KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL FREEDOM

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BURCU BAŞARAN

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Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

_____

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil Turan
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

_____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman (METU, PHIL) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan (METU, PHIL) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ertuğrul R. Turan (A.U., PHIL) _____

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Name, Last name: Burcu BAŞARAN

Signature :

ABSTRACT

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Başaran, Burcu
M.A., Department of Philosophy
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan

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The aim of this study is to initiate a discussion on the reconciliation of freedom and natural causality in Immanuel Kant's major work *Critique of Pure Reason.* In the Third Antinomy, Kant problematizes transcendental freedom as the reason of the conflict between causality of freedom and of nature. While the thesis of the Third Antinomy claims that transcendental freedom does not contradict natural causality, the antithesis of the Third Antinomy claims that it contradicts natural causality in the field of appearances.

Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy is transcendental idealism, which makes a division between appearances as the settlement of natural causality, and things in themselves as the settlement of freedom. However, transcendental idealism cannot solve the conflict in the cosmological context of the Third Antinomy. It merely shows that though transcendental freedom is not causally possible in the field of appearances, it is logically possible to think transcendental freedom as a regulative idea of reason outside the field of appearances.

Transcendental freedom as a regulative idea makes it possible to conceive practical freedom. Therefore, Kant makes a further division between empirical and intelligible characters in order to solve the problem in the practical context through a theory of rational agency. This study constitutes an attempt to consider the role of transcendental freedom in uniting empirical and intelligible characters in one and the same self to show whether freedom and natural causality are compatible or not.

Keywords: Transcendental Freedom, Natural Causality, Third Antinomy, Empirical Character/Intelligible Character, Transcendental Idealism

ÖZ

KANT'IN AŞKINSAL ÖZGÜRLÜĞÜ

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Bu çalışma, Immanuel Kant'ın başlıca eseri olan *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nde ortaya koyduğu özgürlük ve doğa yasası arasındaki bağdaşabilirlik problemini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Üçüncü Antinomi'de Kant, aşkınsal özgürlüğü, doğa nedenselliği ve özgür nedensellik arasındaki çatışmanın sebebi olarak sorunsallaştırır. Bu antinominin tezi, aşkınsal özgürlüğün doğa yasası ile çelişkili olmadığını iddia ederken, antitezi aşkınsal özgürlüğün görüngüler alanında doğa yasası ile çelişkili olduğunu iddia eder.

Kant, Üçüncü Antinomi'yi, doğa yasasını içinde bulunduran görüngüler alanı ile özgürlüğü içinde bulunduran kendinde şeyler arasında ayrım yapan aşkınsal idealizm ile çözer. Ancak aşkınsal idealizm, aşkınsal özgürlük ve doğa yasası tartışmasına Üçüncü Antinomi'nin teorik bağlamında çözüm sunamaz. Bu teorik bağlamda aşkınsal idealizm sadece aşkınsal özgürlüğün görüngüler alanında bir nedensellik olarak mümkün olmadığını, ancak yine de onu görüngüler alanının dışında, aklın düzenleyici bir idesi olarak düşünmenin mantıksal olarak mümkün olduğunu gösterir.

Düzenleyici bir ide olarak aşkınsal özgürlük, pratik özgürlüğün düşünülebilmesini mümkün kılar. Bu nedenle Kant, özgürlük ve doğa yasası tartışmasını pratik bağlamda rasyonel faillik teorisiyle çözebilmek amacıyla ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakter arasında bir ayrım yapar. Bu çalışma, özgürlük ve doğa yasasının uzlaşabilir olup olmadığını göstermek adına ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakterin bir ve aynı kendilikte birleştirilmesinde aşkınsal özgürlüğün rolünü değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Aşkınsal Özgürlük, Doğa Nedenselliği, Üçüncü Antinomi, Ampirik Karakter/Düşünülür Karakter, Aşkınsal İdealizm

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about the debate on freedom and causal determinism in Immanuel Kant's major work *Critique of Pure Reason,* where what is meant by causal determinism is the coercion by antecedent conditions of time series, and freedom is understood as independence from such coercion.

In contemporary philosophy, the problem of freedom and determinism is discussed in the context of compatibilism and incompatibilism. Compatibilism propounds that freedom can be reconciled with determinism. That is to say, human actions are both free and causally determined. On the other hand, incompatibilism proposes that freedom cannot be reconciled with determinism. They are exclusive of each other; where human actions are determined, there is no room for free and morally responsible actions.

However, Kant's debate on the problem of freedom and determinism is more specific and clearly different from the contemporary disputes between compatibilism and incompatibilism. The contemporary debate originates from the empiricist tradition, whereas the debate on the reconcilability of freedom and natural necessity in Kant's philosophy finds its ground in his transcendental idealism, which involves a critique of both the dogmatic rationalism and the dogmatic empiricism of his time for the sake of clarifying the 'limits of reason'. This is addressed, among other places, in Kant's Third Antinomy, in which the thesis presents a dogmatic rationalist view and demands an unconditioned condition for the completeness of conditions, and the antithesis presents a dogmatic empiricist view and rejects such unconditioned condition for the universality of conditions.

In other words, the thesis of the Third Antinomy pertains to the claim that there is free causality, i.e., transcendental freedom, in the field of appearances in accordance with natural causality. On the other hand, the antithesis of the Third Antinomy rejects such free causality in the field of appearances and makes it possible to think transcendental freedom as a mere idea of reason outside the appearances, that is, things in themselves. In the Kantian context the debate is not between freedom and natural causality as in the contemporary context but between freedom as causality, i.e., transcendental freedom and natural causality. Then the solution of the debate addresses itself to the solution of the Third Antinomy, which is provided through transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealism is the method that we can know and experience objects only as they appear to us, not as they are in themselves. Transcendental idealism thus makes a distinction between appearances (phenomena) and things in themselves (noumena). What makes Kant distinctive is that in Kant's philosophy, compatibility or incompatibility of transcendental freedom and natural causality rests on the distinction between appearances and things in themselves.

The distinction between appearances and things in themselves leads to two different interpretations of transcendental idealism, namely two-world and two-aspect interpretations. The two-world interpretation claims that appearances and things in themselves are two distinct worlds where the distinction is ontological. This interpretation is at the same time termed as the causality interpretation concerning the relation between appearances and things in themselves. The causality interpretation claims there is a cause and effect relation between appearances and things in themselves, in which things in themselves is the ground of appearances. This interpretation of transcendental idealism leads to a subjectivism akin to the Berkeleyan type. On the other hand, the two-aspect interpretation claims that there is only one world and things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves are two aspects of the same world. This interpretation is at the same time termed as the identity interpretation as it rejects a cause and effect relation between things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves but conceives both aspects to be attributed to the transcendental object=x at the "metalevel of philosophical

reflection" (Allison, 1996, p. 3). The epistemological two-aspect reading presents a critical interpretation of transcendental idealism.

With respect to the transcendental freedom and natural causality debate, Kant commentators define compatibilism and incompatibilism in different manners.

According to compatibilists (such as Hud Hudson and Allen W. Wood), there is no contradiction between transcendental freedom/free will and natural causality. Hud Hudson (2002) states that "human actions are causally determined, and yet arise from a will with freedom of independence from pathological necessitation" (p. 247). Compatibilists like Allen W. Wood take seriously Kant's avowed purpose to exhibit that "causality through freedom is at least *not incompatible with* nature" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 558/B 586), that is, "our actions may be simultaneously free and causally determined" (Wood, 1998, p. 240).

While compatibilists assert that there is no discord between freedom and determinism, most of Kant commentators (such as Henry E. Allison, Lewis White Beck, Ben Vilhauer, and Derk Pereboom) defend incompatibilism. They claim that freedom ineluctably clashes with determinism, and hence Kant is unsuccessful in his above-mentioned avowed purpose. According to incompatibilists, "the problematic conception of transcendental freedom . . . is an explicitly indeterminist or incompatibilist conception (requiring an independence of determination by all antecedent causes in the phenomenal world)" (Allison, 1990, p. 1).

Their reasons are as follows:

Firstly, as even a compatibilist like Wood (1998) points out, Kant's causal determinism and morality chart strictly distinct realms in their respective fields, leading to the abolition of a compatibilist approach (p. 241). That is to say, what makes Kant's free will problem distinctive is that he both secures "scientific determinism" at the phenomenal level and establishes "a view of freedom akin to agent-causal libertarianism" (Pereboom, 2006, pp. 538). Thus, as Pereboom states, Kant's characteristic incompatibilism involves the reconciliation of "an essentially

libertarian view of freedom and moral responsibility with a deterministic conception of nature" (p. 537). Commentators also point out that Kant constitutes his project in an incompatibilistic manner against the compatibilism of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and David Hume (Wood, 1998, p. 240; Allison, 1990, p. 28). Moreover, Wood claims that "[Kant] wants to show not only the compatibility of freedom and determinism, but also the compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism" (p. 239). Regarding "a sympathetic understanding of transcendental idealism", Allison, unlike Wood, asserts that transcendental freedom is not compatible with causal determinism. In Allison's (1998) words, "the Kantian project requires not merely the reconciliation of free agency with causal determinism . . . but rather the reconciliation of such determinism with an incompatibilist conception of freedom" (p. 28).

In my thesis, I will try to read anew Kant's writings on the question of transcendental freedom and natural causality in light of this contemporary debate. For this purpose, I will go back to the Third Antinomy in the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

Before doing so, in chapter II, I will present an overview of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to clarify from the beginning the key concepts and conceptual framework in terms of which I will be addressing the problem of freedom in Kant's philosophy. This chapter will briefly expose how objectively valid knowledge is obtained and how the limits of possible experience is drawn. At the end of the chapter, I will delve deeply into the Second Analogy where Kant establishes the principle of causality, upon which both sides of the Third Antinomy rests. Natural or phenomenal causality, which is introduced in the Second Analogy, and free or noumenal causality, which is introduced in the Third Antinomy, will be our focus in the solution of compatibilism and incompatibilism debate in the Kantian context.

In chapter III, I will then concentrate on the Third Antinomy. At the beginning of the chapter, I will explain the faculty of reason and the general characteristics of the antinomies. An extended investigation of the Third Antinomy will involve the proofs

of the thesis and antithesis, the observations and criticisms. Finally, I will address the resolutions of the antinomies in general.

The target of the chapter IV will be the resolution of the Third Antinomy through transcendental idealism. Firstly, I will briefly explain transcendental idealism in contradistinction to transcendental realism. Secondly, I will delve into the phenomena and noumena in relation to the empirical character and intelligible character distinction, which supplies the "conceptual framework" for the resolution of the transcendental freedom and natural causality debate (Allison, 1998, p. 11). Concerning these distinctions, I will describe the two-world and the two-aspect interpretations of transcendental idealism. I will thereafter try to compare Allison's two-aspect interpretation and Wood's two-world interpretation. Eventually, I will explain the disadvantages of the two-world interpretation and the advantages of the two-aspect interpretation.

Last but not least, in chapter V, I will first give a brief description of practical freedom in its relation to transcendental freedom. I will then move on to Allison's 'Incorporation Thesis', which unites the empirical character and the intelligible character with an incompatibilist account of freedom.

CHAPTER II

OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST *CRITIQUE*

Kant's transcendental philosophy is simply a criticism of traditional metaphysics, which was supposed to be the "Queen of all sciences" until his critical project (Kant, 1781/2007, A viii). Kant was aware that traditional metaphysics was not based on a secure ground and it remained dogmatic because of the possibility of clear and distinct knowledge about existence of things in the external world and its treatment of the relation between things and our ideas about them. A critique of traditional metaphysics was therefore necessary.

Kant's critique pertains to a critique of human reason. Human reason has desire to reach "completeness of the system" (A xxi) for the systematic unity of knowledge; however, this desire leads to the overextension of "human knowledge beyond all limits of possible experience" (A xiv). Kant's goal is then to "determine [the] sources, [the] extent, and [the] limits" of human reason (A xii).

To attain his goal Kant takes a critical turn by introducing his alleged 'Copernican Revolution'. Kant's Copernican Revolution suggests replacing the teaching of traditional metaphysics, which propounds that "our knowledge must conform to objects" with the initial condition that "objects must conform to our knowledge" (B xvi).

According to Kant's new vision, our knowledge will not depend on the existence of things anymore; contrarily, objects which have independent existences, will be "dependent upon [our] subjective conditions of knowledge" (Green, 1997, p. 4). That is to say, what appears to us from within the realm of independent existences, viz. the

representations of these existences, must adjust to certain rules which the subject constitutes independently of any object of experience. Reason therefore must be capable of determining its object in possible experience in an *a priori* fashion. "It [would] be possible to have knowledge of objects *a priori*, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given" (Kant, 1781/2007, B xvi).

Having asserted that there being two roots of knowledge, *a priori* one distinguishes itself from *a posteriori* in not being obtained "immediately from experience, but from a universal rule". Being "independent of all experience" (B 2), *a priori* knowledge is pure. On the other hand, '*a posteriori*' knowledge is only possible through experience; being dependent on experience, this knowledge is empirical. As *a priori* knowledge has as its source certain rules of the mind, it is the touchstone of "[n]ecessity and strict universality" (B 4). As for *a posteriori* knowledge it is bound only to particular experience it remains contingent in character.

In addition to the *a priori*/*a posteriori* distinction, Kant also makes another distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Analytic judgments are "merely *explicative*, adding nothing to the content of knowledge" (Kant, 1783/1997a, p. 14) which means that they do not extend our knowledge. Synthetic judgments are "*expansive*, increasing the given knowledge" (p. 14), which means that they "extend our *a priori* knowledge" (Kant, 1781/2007, B 18).

Kant thus introduces synthetic *a priori* judgments to his philosophy; for our aim is to extend our knowledge by determining legitimate use of reason and setting forth certain *a priori* rules independent of all experience. Throughout his critique, Kant questions the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments by asking "How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible" (B 19)? The justification of synthetic *a priori* judgments depends on showing the possibility of metaphysics as a science. In other words, *a priori* principles must be shown as forming the conditions of possible experience.

Such conditions by no means transcend the limits of possible experience, but they provide a ground for it. Hence, they are not transcendent, but transcendental in terms of being independent of and prior to experience. In this respect they are necessary as precluding contingent nature of experience. Kant's critique aims to set *a priori* principles which are capable of serving as universal and necessary conditions of objective knowledge for metaphysics to enter upon the secure path of a science" (B xiv). Throughout his critical project Kant keeps on track of establishing universal and necessary "conditions of the possibility of objects of experience" (A 111). All in all, Kant's transcendental philosophy constitutes an exposition of the justification of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge.

Against traditional metaphysics Kant argues that we know objects not as they are in themselves, but as what appears to us. This indicates in Kant's philosophy a division into two realms: things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves or famously known as phenomena (appearances) and noumena (things in themselves). Here what is important is that all our knowledge is limited to the realm of phenomena. Corollary of this limitation is that we cannot know noumena since they are beyond the limits of experience.

This transcendental division between phenomena and noumena lies at the heart of Kant's transcendental idealism through which he prevents any conflict of reason from treating appearances as things in themselves; it would otherwise lead to transcendental realism.

> By *transcendental idealism* I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves. (A 369)

A more detailed analysis of the faculties of human cognition is needed to understand this passage quoted above, whereby transcendental idealism is formulated in a nutshell. Kant divides cognition into three faculties, namely sensibility,

understanding, and reason. The first two faculties run within the limits of experience, whereas the third one lies beyond experience.

As this thesis focuses on the problem of freedom as it arises in the Third Antinomy, it mainly concerns itself with the faculty of reason whose errors are the source of the antinomies. Thus the arguments in chapters III, IV, and V will deal with the faculty of reason more extensively. In this chapter, however, I will also explain Kant's exposition of the faculties of sensibility and understanding to provide the conceptual background for the discussions in the following chapters. After presenting the first division "Transcendental Analytic" in order to show how objectively valid knowledge is possible in section 2.2, in section 2.5 I will delve deeper into the Second Analogy in which the principle of causality is discussed. The principle of causality is one of the main synthetic principles of pure understanding in Kant's philosophy and is of particular importance for my thesis in its relation to the Third Antinomy.

2.1. Transcendental Aesthetic: The Faculty of Sensibility

What Kant proposed by his Copernican Revolution was that knowledge must be a constitution of our subjective conditions. This process is made clear in Transcendental Aesthetic in that Kant introduces the concept of 'pure intuitions'. We intuit objects "in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way" (A 19/B 33). The objects that are given to our intuition have their source in things in themselves. Things in themselves are unknown to us as they are beyond the limits of experience.

Space and time are necessary conditions for the possible experience of object. For any object of experience to be an object of knowledge, it must be intuited through pure intuition. Space and time are both empirically real and transcendentally ideal; they are empirically real since sensible objects of experience are given to us from outside through space and time, and transcendentally ideal since we cannot conceive

them independently of our minds and they are necessary conditions that make it possible for us to receive objects of sensible intuition. (A 44/B 28)

All manifold of empirical intuition fall in pure intuitions. What we passively receive by empirical intuition is the matter of experience, viz. the formless manifold of representations. We know this manifold in an *a posteriori* fashion. However, it is *a priori* intuitions which underlie all empirical intuition. This is exactly what Kant means when he famously begins in the very outset of *Critique of Pure Reason* by stating that "[t]here can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. . . . But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience" (B 1).

Receptivity is a characteristic of the faculty of sensibility; it is capacity of sensibility for receiving representations. It is thus representations of objects that we know; in other words, object of knowledge are not existence, but the representations of sensibility. That's why our knowledge of objects is possible and limited to phenomena. The faculty of sensibility relates itself immediately to given object in experience via pure intuition. When we sense manifold of any appearance, space and time immediately give form to this content. However, space and time alone do not suffice to constitute knowledge as they are *a priori* conditions that merely underlie the content of experience.

For there to be knowledge, we need another faculty which will spontaneously give form to this content and unify the manifold under certain rules, viz. pure concepts. This faculty is of understanding.

Sensibility and understanding then are two main sources of our knowledge; thanks to the faculty of sensibility, we are given an object and thanks to that of understanding, we think object as it is given as representation (A50/B74). From this point on intuitions and concepts are two constituents of knowledge. Without intuitions, concepts remain formal: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (B 75/A 51).

2.2. Transcendental Analytic: The Faculty of Understanding

As has been mentioned above, Kant claims that objects must conform to the subjective conditions of knowledge. However, for knowledge to be objective (which Kant seeks to attain), its subjective conditions must be related to the objects of experience in an *a priori* fashion.

The faculty of understanding is required for this process. It yields certain pure rules, namely categories, which precede any subjective condition and provide the objective conditions (transcendental conditions) for all possible experience of objects. The pure *a priori* concepts of understanding are "the pure *a priori* conditions of a possible experience" (A 96). Hence, Transcendental Analytic makes room for how is it possible that the pure concepts of understanding gives rise to pure *a priori* knowledge.

Understanding is "a spontaneity of knowledge" (A 126) which can produce its own concepts in a discursive fashion. Concepts are by no means intuitions; conversely, they give form to the manifold of intuitions in experience. The knowledge produced by the faculty of understanding must be through the medium of concepts; they bear active function as "the act of bringing various representations under one common representation" (B 93). In other words, categories provide diversity of representations with a unity by means of this function.

However, the pure concepts of understanding never suffice to produce their own content. This simply means that their objective reality cannot be obtained by means of their act of giving form to any specific content. Categories alone do not yield knowledge, but remain as merely "forms of thought" (B 288). This explains why intuition is necessary for the unity of representations.

Any synthetic *a priori* proposition needs the content provided by the intuition. Concepts are necessary for synthesis as the "act of the understanding" (B 130). Only by means of that synthesis of intuitions and concepts can we think an object.

2.2.1. Transcendental Deduction

Having laid out these two fundamental faculties, Kant returns to the basic question of *Critique of Pure Reason*: How are synthetic *a priori* knowledge possible? As already mentioned above, knowledge calls for a synthetic unity. For this unity it must first be investigated how pure concepts of understanding are possible. Given the possibility of experience being entirely dependent on *a priori* conditions it is obvious that those conditions govern experience without relying on experience. For this reason, Kant makes a transcendental deduction of categories.

There are only two ways that we can relate ourselves to objects of experience; the first one happens in an empirical manner. The second one runs completely in an *a priori* manner. For there to be *a priori* relation to objects, there must be *a priori* concepts preceding and governing all experience. Transcendental Deduction is therefore to justify categories as certain rules and accordingly to establish the objective validity of categories.

However, there arises a problem when it comes to the question of in what manner *a priori* concept of understanding is related to objects of experience in an *a priori* fashion if experience is never give us a sufficient explanation of this relation between concepts and objects. At this point, one can see what Transcendental Deduction has to do with. If categories are the subjective constitutions of our mind, how could it be possible for them to be objectively valid in their relation to the manifold of representations?

As already stated, the manifold of representations is required to be united through the pure synthesis of categories. By pure synthesis Kant means "the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge" (B 103). It is the 'I' who brings the representations under pure synthesis "in one self-consciousness" (B 134).

Kant states that the mind has its three original roots for synthetic unity in *sense, imagination, and apperception* all of which include the conditions of the possibility

of all experience. When the manifold of representations is given to our sensibility, sense is a summarizing the act of our mind upon the manifold. As for imagination, it is accountable for synthesizing the same manifold of representations. Finally, apperception serves for unifying this synthesis through its original apperceptive activity; in other words, apperception is an act of bringing the synthesis of manifold under a category. Consciousness of this unity always accompanies the operation of apperception.

After elaborating on three original roots for the synthetic unity, Kant exposes the process of building knowledge through a 'threefold synthesis'. It is the mind's subjective constituent activity. First of all, understanding functions as synthesizing of 'apprehension' operating within intuition. We are receptive to objects as a manifold of representations which are not of objects itself, but of our inner sense. Time is "the form of [our] inner sense" (B 152); whatever we intuit is necessarily intuited under the subjective condition of time. As all our representations come to happen along with the inner sense, "[a]ll our knowledge is . . . subject to time" (A 99).

Whenever we receive the manifold of representations we immediately unite it "*in a single moment"* under the condition of time. By uniting it in time, we immediately apprehend the manifold of representations "*in a single representation*" (A 99).

So far it has been examined the synthesizing activity of 'apprehension' within intuition. Now secondly, we move to the synthesizing activity of "*reproduction in imagination*" (A 100). This synthesis provides the mind with a transition from one representation to another in succession, connecting one synthesis of representations to another in a time series. Imagination thus operates empirically according to an unchangeable rule, which makes imagination function, viz. reproduce.

Thirdly, the synthesizing activity of "*recognition in a concept*" (A 103) should be exhibited. It is the last synthesis in which the mind unavoidably demands the unity in experience. The activity of recognition pertains to bringing the synthesized single

representation by the imagination under a concept. This activity must always be accompanied by the consciousness of the synthetic unity.

The synthetic unity requires the unity of consciousness. The unity in consciousness is a transcendental act of the mind by means of which the synthetic unity is produced. In fact, the production of the pure concept of an object would not take place if there were no synthetic unity. The transcendental unity of consciousness requires the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, namely the transcendental unity of apperception. It is this consciousness of the synthesis which unites the synthesis of the manifold of intuitions according to universal rules in "one single experience" (A 110). 'I' is also conscious of the unity of the synthesis. Kant calls this state of cognition the transcendental unity of apperception which is brought into "one knowledge" (A 108) in "one single self-consciousness" (A 117a). Thence, being the highest representation under which all manifold of representations are unified, transcendental unity of apperception is the "necessary consciousness of the identity of the self" (A 108):

> It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. (B 131-32)

Without the identity of the self, then, nothing can possibly be thought; in order to be able to say the representations are my representations, the identity of the self must have been established. Only under this condition "do I call them one and all *mine*" (B 134). The unity of self needs the unity of objects of all possible experience. In other words, the self for its unity demands the unity of nature in order to provide objectively valid knowledge.

As stated above, the synthesizing activity of reproduction as the second element of Kant's threefold synthesis operates with imagination. The faculty of imagination functions in an experience in two ways: it produces synthesis in an *a priori* (transcendental) manner and it reproduces synthesis in an empirical manner. What the imagination reproduces is "the association of representations" (A 121). Both

(re)production of the imagination are necessarily related to the transcendental unity of apperception.

The manifold of experience which constitutes the matter of imagination is dependent on pure understanding. Nevertheless, the question haunts us: how will pure understanding be related to appearances that are given to us in experience if it is independent of any empirical data?

After explaining that pure intuitions give form to the manifold, Kant examines how we combine the manifold within imagination. Imagination spontaneously and immediately grasps the synthesis of the manifold and as a result brings the manifold of intuition into an image.

The empirically reproduced representations by imagination are destined to remain subjective and accidental as we can only be conscious of the manifold of representations in an empirical manner. However, all empirical consciousness (subjective consciousness) must necessarily be subject to transcendental consciousness. Therefore, the association of representations must be objectively grounded.

It is indeed transcendental consciousness that gives *a priori* ground for any manifold of empirical consciousness to be synthesized "in one single self-consciousness" (A 117a). This synthetic unity is provided by the productive imagination. The pure productive imagination produces necessary unity of synthesized manifold in appearances. In addition, the pure apperception 'I' must participate in the imagination in order to make its productive activity intellectual.

The pure transcendental imagination thus brings the manifold of intuition into connection with the synthetic unity of apperception. That is to say, it relates the concepts of pure understanding with the empirical data of sensibility. Consequently,

it is the transcendental operation of imagination where lies the answer to the question of how the pure understanding is related to appearances.[1]

In actual operation of perception, we first apprehend the manifold of appearances; secondly we associate them with each other; and thirdly we recognize the association by binding the manifold of representations under the unity of apperception with the categories; and lastly we relate the categories to the objects of experience by the transcendental operation of imagination. By means of this operation of the imagination we know the object. Justifying the pure concepts of understanding (categories) in their *a priori* relation to the objects of experience is thus to constitute the objective validity of these pure concepts.

2.3. The Principles of Pure Understanding

In the chapter The System of the Principles of Pure Understanding, Kant produces the Table of Principles, which are "simply rules for the objective employment" (A 161) of the Table of Categories.

Of the four categories of the Table of Categories, Kant distinguishes the first two from the last two, terming the former mathematical concepts and the latter dynamical concepts; he terms the first two principles as mathematical principles and the last two principles as dynamical principles. Mathematical principles are associated with the "mere intuition of an appearance" as quantifiable magnitudes. In mathematical principles, the synthesis of individual intuitions can be apprehended immediately and thus can be determined in an *a priori* fashion. Mathematical principles thus have intuitive certainty. Dynamical principles on the other hand are associated with the "existence" of appearances. They also have certainty, but only indirectly, in Kant's

[1] The process mentioned here is quoted from the first edition of the Transcendental Deduction. In the first edition, Kant gives the employment of relating understanding to sensibility to the "transcendental function of imagination" (A 124). However, in the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction, he gives this employment to the categories, that is, "the logical functions of judgment" (B 143).

words, “only under the condition of empirical thought in some experience” (A 160/B 200). Dynamical principles thus have discursive certainty (B201/A162).

By virtue of their capability of determining *a priori* the synthesis of individual intuitions as magnitudes or aggregates, mathematical principles are coined as “constitutive” principles. Dynamical principles, however, cannot determine the synthesis of the existence of appearances *a priori*; “since existence cannot be constructed, [dynamical] principles can apply only to the relations of existence, and can yield only *regulative* principles” (A 179/B 222). Whereas in mathematical principles the synthesis among elements is of a homogeneous character, in dynamical principles the synthesis among elements is of a heterogeneous character.

Regarding the distinction between mathematical and dynamical antinomies in the solution of the Third Antinomy in the Transcendental Dialectic, it is important to realize how the distinction between mathematical and dynamical principles is portrayed in accordance with the Second Analogy, which is a dynamical principle. Thus the Third Antinomy is a dynamical antinomy. The Analogies of Experience, specifically the Second Analogy, in which the principle of causality is proved, will be explained in section 2.5. Before explaining the Second Analogy, however, in the next section I will explain the importance of the analogies in relation to the problem of the objective validity of knowledge in Kant’s transcendental idealism.

2.4. The Objective Validity of Knowledge

Paul Guyer (1998) states that Analogies of Experience are Kant’s “ultimate argument for the objective validity of the categories of the understanding in the form of his Refutation of Idealism” (p. 117). In other words, analogies are the heart of the Transcendental Analytic as Kant here proves his transcendental idealism.

The argument for the objective validity of the knowledge of experience is handled in three parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: Transcendental Deduction,

Transcendental Schematism, and Analogies of Experience respectively and progressively. What the Transcendental Deduction teaches us is briefly as follows: for there to be objectively real knowledge, the object must first be given to our faculty of sensibility as a manifold of representations to be apprehended in intuition. The faculty of imagination synthesizes this manifold of representations as single independent images. Finally, the faculty of understanding yields the unity of the synthesis of this manifold through transcendental unity of apperception.

Here the enquiry is about how the subjective unity of self-consciousness will correspond to the objective unity of the world for there to be objectively valid knowledge. Transcendental Deduction fails in this endeavor, however, as it cannot give an account of how these single independent images are connected to one another in experience. Such images remain merely as subjective constitutions of our minds and cannot be subsumed under a category. For instance, Kant derives the concept of causality but he cannot explain how two single perceptions, given to our senses, relate to one another in experience, i.e., he cannot explain alteration. Thus the category of causality cannot be applicable to an object of experience.

Transcendental Schemata advances the argument of Transcendental Deduction and tries to overcome the gap between sensible intuitions and pure concepts by a by the medium of "inner sense and its *a priori* form, time" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 155). Through the intermediary of time, sensible intuitions can be subsumed under categories whereby categories can apply to an object of experience. For instance, the schema of the category of cause can explain how two perceptions connect to one another through alteration. Transcendental Schemata, however, cannot exhibit the mode in which two perceptions relate to one another. That is to say, the relation of perceptions in time cannot be subjected to a necessary rule. This is the problem that Kant aims to address in the Analogies of Experience.

The principle of analogies is formulated as follows: "Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions" (B 218). To explain this principle, Kant begins with the conditions of empirical knowledge.

Empirical knowledge is a "synthesis of perceptions, not contained in perception but itself containing in one consciousness the synthetic unity of the manifold of perceptions [which] constitutes the essential in any knowledge of *objects* of the senses, that is, in experience"(B 218). In the synthesis of apprehension in empirical intuition, perceptions conjoin in a contingent manner; we thus cannot find any necessary connection between perceptions in space and time.

For there to be experience, however, this manifold of perceptions should not be represented in an accidental time order; otherwise they would be merely constructions of our minds and remain empirical. They must be represented as determinate objects of experience in a necessary and objective time order. That is to say, "experience is only possible through a representation of necessary connection of perceptions", that is, in a transcendental manner. (B219)

In order to yield the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience through "necessary conditions of determining objective *time*-relations" of appearances in the Analogies, Kant draws a distinction between subjective temporal relations of perceptions (or representations) *and* objective temporal relations of objects (or appearances), viz. a distinction between empirical time-determinations and universal time-determinations. If Kant did not make such a distinction, then "no meaning would attach to the distinction between objects and perception of objects" (Strawson, 1968, p. 76). All perceptions of appearances are determined in an *a priori* fashion by the transcendental unity of apperception in relation to empirical (subjective) temporal order. For there to be objectivity, these subjective temporal order must be subject to the rules of objective temporal order of the objects of experience.

In the Analogies, distinguishing between two kinds of time-determinations is an advance in reply to the teaching of the Transcendental Deduction, which lacking the unity of time, fails to relate the unity of consciousness (subjective unity of apperception) to the unity of the world (objective unity of apperception). Through the schematized categories of relation, objects can be determined both as my representations in one consciousness and as appearances in one world at one and the

same time. In this way, the subjective unity of apperception corresponds to the objective unity of apperception through the mediation of the unity of time. Correspondingly, inner sense, which is the temporal determining condition of the subjective unity of apperception, also becomes the determining condition of objective unity of apperception as outer sense. The Analogies are thus not related directly to the categories of relation; rather, they are related to the schema of the categories of relation. (Kant, 1781/2007, A 181)

Hence, as the necessary conditions of time-determinations, Kant cites three modes of time, namely permanence or duration (the schematized category of substance); succession (the schematized category of causality); and coexistence or simultaneity (the schematized category of community). The first analogy gives the principle of "objective time-determinations of duration" or permanence; the second analogy gives the principle of "the objective relations of succession"; and the third analogy gives the principle of "the objective relations of simultaneity or coexistence" (Guyer, 1998, p.119).

2.5. The Second Analogy

In the Second Analogy Kant tries to prove the principle of causality. Kant gives different descriptions of the principle of causality in the first and second editions of CPR. The definition of the principle of causality in the first edition is that "[e]verything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule" (A189), and the definition in the second is that "[a]ll alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect" (Kant, 1781/2007, B 232).

The Second Analogy thus constitutes a response to dogmatism (to the rationalist, as well as the empirical idealist, who regards appearances as things in themselves) by proving the transcendental idealistic approach on the one hand and to Hume's skepticism, which criticizes the derivation of the principle of causality from synthetic

a posteriori judgments, by proving that the principle of causality is derived from synthetic *a priori* judgments on the other.

What Hume (1748/1907) claimed in his discussion of causality was that there is no empirical basis for inferring the idea of causality: "All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we can never observe any tie between them. They seem *conjoined*, but never *connected*" (p. 76). Trying to derive causality from experience (and hence from synthetic *a posteriori* judgments), Hume understood that there is no 'necessary succession' between two events, but that we experience two individual events only from our habit of conjoining them. As all our knowledge comes from experience, we cannot know causality because we cannot experience the 'necessary succession' between two events.

For Kant, however, although all our knowledge comes from experience, there are *a priori* rules that constitute the ground of our experiential knowledge. There is a necessary temporal order between two events in accordance with a universal law, and we can know causality by means of these *a priori* rules. Introducing necessary time-determinations under *a priori* rules thus provides a firm basis against the skepticism of Hume.

Kant's refutation of idealism against rationalists will be exposed below in two examples for the principle of causality.

In the proof of the Second Analogy, Kant clarifies the distinction between subjective time-determinations and objective time-determinations in order to employ the principle of cause and effect. He begins with the conditions of the empirical knowledge of appearances, i.e., conditions of experience as he does in the proof of the general principles of the Analogies. In experience, "I am really connecting two perceptions in time" by the synthesis of imagination. However, as the faculty of imagination synthesizes two perceptions at one time as two single states of affairs, what I am conscious of is merely that there is only "one state before" and "one state after". I cannot then determine the objective relation of two states, in which one

comes before or comes after, in an empirical manner through the faculty of imagination, viz. through "mere perception". (Kant, 1781/2007, B 233-34)

For there to be a determinate relation between two states of affairs, it is not sufficient for this relation to be arbitrarily perceived, but it must necessarily be thought. That is to say, we can know the necessary relation between two events not from the indeterminate succession, i.e., subjective succession that occurs in the faculty of imagination in an empirical manner, but from the determinate succession, i.e., objective succession that occurs in the faculty of understanding in a transcendental manner.

> Were it not so, were I to posit the antecedent and the event were not to follow necessarily thereupon, I should have to regard the succession as a merely subjective play of my fancy; and if I still represented it to myself as something objective, I should have to call it a mere dream. (B 247/A 202)

Therefore only the concept of understanding can determine the relation between two states, as one necessarily antecedes or goes after the other in time in accordance with a rule. In the case of Second Analogy, the concepts of cause and effect determine the relation between appearances as follows: the cause precedes the effect, the effect follows the cause, and for this necessary succession the reverse order is impossible (B234).

Consequently, the objective validity of empirical knowledge is "possible only in so far as we subject the succession of appearances, and therefore all alteration, to the law of causality" (B 234). Through the relation of cause and effect, all my "succession of perceptions", i.e., subjective time-determinations can be applicable to the "perception of a succession of states in the object", i.e., objective time-determinations (Allison, 1983, p. 224).

After investigating the case with respect to the objects of experience, Kant questions whether the law of causality is possible regarding events. In other words, Kant's first attempt was to prove that 'every effect has a cause', and now it is to prove that 'every event has a cause'. By 'object' Kant means the sum-total of representations in

one consciousness, whereas by 'event' he means "the change of state of an object" (Allison, 1983, p. 229). He formulates the problem with the following words:

> The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. The representations of the parts follow upon one another. Whether they also follow one another in the object is a point which calls for further reflection, and which is not decided by the above statement. (Kant, 1781/2007, A 189/B 234)

Kant explains this problem in two examples by clarifying the distinction between subjective temporal order and objective temporal order. The first example, the apprehension of an unchanging house, exposes the succession in the objects of experience through subjective temporal order while the second example, the apprehension of a ship moving downstream, exposes the succession in events through objective temporal order.[2]

In the first example, my perception of the manifold of representations of a house is successive in my mind, each part following one another; however, the house, as an actual object of experience, is permanent. Therefore "I apprehend the parts of a house successively, yet I judge them to be co-existing [simultaneous] parts of an enduring object" (Allison, 1983, p. 218). I can perceive the house from top to below or from below to top. My connecting the parts of the house is thus reversible and accidental. Given two perceptions a and b to my subjective time-relation, I can apprehend in my mind that both a precedes b and b precedes a simultaneously. In such a case, my subjective time-determination of the perception of a house is not sufficient to correspond to the objective time-determination of the house itself. There is no necessary determination in my subjective order to derive the order of the world. Such an indeterminate order remains empirical as a psychological constitution of my imagination as it is devoid of the objective temporal order. (Kant, 1781/2007, A 190-2/B 235-7)

[2] This problem brings to mind the argument of the first analogy: as a permanent substance, "time itself cannot be perceived" but can we only perceive the alteration of appearances through their relations in time either successively or simultaneously (B 219; A 182).

Consequently, in the case of the house, it would be problematic to take the subjective order to be identical with the objective order. This would be treating appearances as things in themselves. “If appearances were things in themselves, then since we have to deal solely with our representations, we could never determine from the succession of the representations how their manifold may be connected in the object.” (A 190/B 235)

If we take empirical objects as things in themselves rather than appearances, then all we have is an indeterminate temporal order of these objects as subjective productions of our minds which gives us no knowledge of a determinate order of objects and instead leaves us with a fantasy in the field of appearances. We would then be imprisoned in our minds with an unordered manifold of representations and could never know if they have any determinate temporal order in reality. What is more, we could not even know if they have a reality outside us.

Since, in the example of a house, no objective temporal order of things in themselves can be derived on the basis of the subjective order of our representations of things, empirical idealism cannot explain the principle of causality. This is why Kant makes a critical turn in contradistinction to the rationalist’s dogmatic idealism and tries to explain the principle of causality through his transcendental idealism. With his critical turn, which defends the idea that “‘object’ must be explicated in terms of the conditions of the representation of objects” (Allison, 1983, p. 221), Kant solves the problem by subjecting the subjective temporal order to a necessary rule and this way objectifying it in the field of appearances. In other words, he makes possible the legitimate application of our representations to our judgments in thought so as to yield the conditions of the possibility of the objective temporal order.

Kant explains his critical turn in the second example with the following words: My apprehension of a ship moving downstream changes successively while the succession of the ship changes as well. I perceive the ship moving in the stream from the upper point to the lower point, and in such a case it is impossible that I perceive the ship in the reverse order, as the necessary succession of the parts of the ship

actually occurs in the world, in the order that the upper point precedes the lower, but not that the lower point precedes the upper. (To formulize that the succession is in an irreversible order, given two events A and B, if A is preceding B, then it is impossible for B to precede A. Regarding the relation of cause and effect, it is that cause precedes effect and effect cannot precede cause.) In this case, my subjective temporal order is necessarily determined by the objective temporal order of the ship itself. Therefore, I can "derive the *subjective succession* of apprehension from the *objective succession* of appearances" (Kant, 1781/2007, B 238/A 193). Unlike the example of a house, in which it is merely the subjective temporal order that occurs while lacking objectivity, in the example of a ship the subjective temporal order is rendered objective under the coercion of the necessary rule, so that the subjective order can necessarily and sufficiently be applicable to the objective order.

In other words, "I organize my experience according to a rule which makes the order in which I experience things necessary and irreversible" (Gardner, 1999, p. 176). Such necessary and irreversible determination of the order of objects, in which one event follows upon another in accordance with a rule, gives us the principle of causality through the relation of schematized categories of cause and effect.

Then, the principle of causality can be explained as follows: If "something happens" or "comes to be", there must be something else that precedes it as its cause in accordance with a law of necessity (Kant, 1781/2007, B 237). That is to say, as the necessary condition of causal relation, an event cannot come to be if there is no preceding cause. When an event comes to be, it is necessarily conditioned by its preceding condition, namely the cause; and then the condition (the cause) is conditioned by its preceding cause and itself becomes conditioned (effect) and so on. The cause's relation to the effect continues in an infinite manner in the field of appearances. Through this way, the law of causality leads to the unity of nature to which my unity of consciousness will be subject in a universal time-determination. Thus, the principle of causality yields objective validity of experience and empirical knowledge.

Rendering experience possible through the natural law of causality, the Second Analogy is the heart of the Transcendental Analytic. Natural law of causality is at the same time the subject of the Third Antinomy, which is the heart of the Transcendental Dialectic. In his thesis regarding the Third Antinomy, Kant discusses the possibility of a second kind of causality, that is, transcendental freedom, in addition to the natural law of causality. Contrarily, the antithesis, defending empiricism, rejects transcendental freedom as causality since such causality ruins the "lawfulness or uniformity of nature" (Allison, 1983, p. 228). As it ensures the continuation of the order of nature, the Second Analogy thus will be of great importance especially for the antithesis of the Third Antinomy.

The answer to the question of whether transcendental freedom and natural causality are compatible or not will depend, to a large extent, on how we interpret the Second Analogy and Kant's empirical realism and transcendental idealism. The significance of the Second Analogy is that it exhibits the term 'causality' as a 'necessary succession' in time in the field of appearances. Thus, the Second Analogy takes the term causality to be merely a phenomenal causality in which the faculty of understanding is in use. However, in the context of the Third Antinomy, the term causality can be thought to have two different meanings. Its first meaning is necessary succession between appearances (mechanistic causality or phenomenal causality). This conception of causality, "while recognizing that the principle possesses necessity, so that, if A is the cause of B, B must always occur if A occurs, does not recognize any intrinsic connection between A and B" (Ewing, 1969, p. 174). Kant uses the term in this sense for the mathematical synthesis of the intuition of appearances, i.e., it belongs to the employment of understanding.

In its second use, causality denotes an 'intrinsic connection' between the relations of existences. Kant uses this term for the dynamical synthesis of the existence of appearances. In his book *Kant's Treatment of Causality*, A.C. Ewing questions whether it is possible to think of such an intrinsic connection in the phenomenal series. Observing that Kant insists that such an "intrinsic connection cannot be found

by analysis of causally connected phenomena", Ewing concludes that "the real ground of this [intrinsic] connection is [to] lie in the noumenal sphere" (p. 180), suggesting that there may be an intrinsic relation between appearances and things in themselves.

These two different kinds of causality can be thought to relate to a distinction Kant makes between the World (namely the mathematical sum-total of appearances) and nature (namely the dynamical sum-total of appearances) in relation to the distinction between mathematical antinomies and dynamical antinomies. (As has already been mentioned, the distinction between mathematical antinomies and dynamical antinomies is derived from the distinction between mathematical principles and dynamical principles.) As in mathematical synthesis every member of the series is of a homogeneous character, we can only think a necessary succession between them. However, as dynamical synthesis allows heterogeneous members in the series, it makes it possible to think of an intrinsic connection between phenomenal causes and intelligible or noumenal causes in which noumenal causes will be the logical ground of phenomenal causes or effects. (As there is homogeneity between members in the phenomenal world, phenomenal causes and phenomenal effects are of the same character.)

In brief, due to two different uses of the term causality, we can think necessary succession (phenomenal causality) as the cause attributed to appearances, and intrinsic connection (noumenal causality) as the logical ground attributed to things in themselves.

The distinction between these two senses of causality can also be clarified by naming the phenomenal causality 'cause' and the noumenal causality '(logical) ground' (p. 181). This distinction between cause and ground will shed light on our investigation of the solution of the Third Antinomy at two points: firstly, concerning the distinction between phenomena and noumena, we will try to answer whether there is an intrinsic connection between phenomena and noumena to see whether noumena is the ground of phenomena. This question gives rise to two different interpretations of

transcendental idealism, namely the two-world view (the subjectivist interpretation of transcendental idealism which accepts the intrinsic connection) and the two-aspect view (the critical view of transcendental idealism which rejects the intrinsic connection). These two interpretations will be discussed in chapter IV. Secondly, with regard to the conflict between the thesis (which postulates transcendental freedom as the logical ground) and the antithesis (which accepts only natural causality as the sole kind of causality) of the Third Antinomy, the intention will be to question whether making use of these two different meanings of causality can aid in answering the question whether transcendental freedom and natural causality are compatible or not.

CHAPTER III

THE THIRD ANTINOMY

3.1. Transcendental Dialectic

The Transcendental Analytic has taught us how objectively valid empirical knowledge is possible by means of pure concepts of understanding. Throughout the Analytic, argues Kemp Smith (2003), what Kant tries to show is that it is impossible to treat reality in metaphysical terms since knowledge is restricted to sensory experience (p. 426). For the faculty of understanding, it is forbidden to question what lies beyond the limits of experience; which would otherwise unavoidably result in falling into illusions. It is yet obvious for Kant that the human mind is captured by a demand to construct metaphysics due to its propensity to attain completeness of the system. Therefore, a faculty independent of the understanding is required and this faculty is of reason.

The requirement for faculty of reason led Kant to divide the section Transcendental Logic into two divisions, namely Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic. While the Analytic is based on *"logic of truth",* the Dialectic is based on *"logic of illusion"* (Kant, 1781/2007, B 170).

Just as the Transcendental Analytic relies on the derivation of the categories of the understanding by means of Transcendental Deduction, Transcendental Dialectic is grounded on the three ideas of reason on which transcendental illusion rests. Kant develops 'the doctrine of transcendental illusion' to explain the contradictions (antinomies) and fallacies (paralogisms) that are inevitably caused by the faculty of reason. Unlike the Analytic which safeguards the limits of experience from deceptive

illusions of reason, the Dialectic prevents us from the deceptive character of illusion itself by introducing some safety measures. Kant then begins the chapter Transcendental Dialectic with the doctrine of transcendental illusion.

3.2. Transcendental Illusion

An illusion is simply an error of our mind. Kant points out that the error does not occur in the representation and knowledge of an object in the field of appearances where the faculty of understanding employs in harmony with the faculty of sensibility, but it occurs in judgment on this object.

Kant defines three kinds of illusion, namely empirical, logical, and transcendental illusions. In the Transcendental Dialectic his concern is transcendental illusion. Empirical illusion due to deceptions in the senses, and logical illusion due to careless appeal of inference rules, ceases when we notice the deception and care about the inference rules. However, transcendental illusion does not disappear even if we notice or care about it since it occurs in the transcendental employment of the principles of reason. Therefore, it is "a *natural* and inevitable *illusion*" (A 298) which cannot be averted.

When does transcendental illusion come to happen? Kant answers this question with the following words:

> [T]here are fundamental rules and maxims for the employment of our reason (subjectively regarded as a faculty of human knowledge), and that these have all the appearance of being objective principles. We therefore take the subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts, which is to the advantage of the understanding, for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves. (A 297)

Wike (1982) briefly states that illusion occurs due to the conflict between subjective and objective principles (p.5). We are deceived when we regard subjective principles, on which the transcendental illusion is grounded, as if they are objective

principles. This confusion of principles leads to contradiction because we treat appearances as absolute realities and think of them as "ideally completed" (Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 428). However, appearances are limited to space and time series; they cannot have reality independently of our representations; and such reality remains restricted within our forms of sensibility.

When we regard appearances as things in themselves, we go beyond the empirical employment of the categories. As the empirical employment of the categories is restricted to the field of appearances, going beyond this employment means to trespass the limits of experience. Kant calls the principles transcendent which overstep the limits of experience and those immanent which is employed within the boundaries of possible experience. Therefore, we cannot use the terms transcendental and transcendent as synonymous. However, the term transcendental is identified with the term immanent.

Despite the admonitions of transcendental philosophy that we should not employ transcendent principles (otherwise we fall into contradictions), it is unavoidable for reason, by its very nature, to employ categories beyond the limits of possible experience. Therefore, the aim of transcendental criticism is to "succeed in disclosing the illusion" (Kant, 1781/2007, B 353). In order to achieve this, Transcendental Dialectic first needs to exhibit the mistake in transcendent judgments and then make the mind sure for not to be deluded by illusion. For this reason, a closer analysis of the faculty of reason and its employment are needed.

3.2.1. The Faculty of Reason

As has been mentioned before, there are three faculties for the knowledge of the objects of possible experience: sensibility, understanding, and reason. Among them reason is with the highest rank in that it provides the "highest unity of thought" (B 355/A 299). Since understanding and reason operate differently, Kant draws a distinction between them in the Transcendental Dialectic.

Understanding yields pure *a priori* concepts, that are, categories, while reason pure *a priori* concepts, that are, 'transcendental ideas'. Categories and transcendental ideas have differing functions. Unlike the understanding which operates in appearances, ideas of reason do not relate themselves to appearances or to any object of experience "but only to the understanding" (Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 443). The principles of reason provide the rules of understanding with a unity by ordering it. Ideas of reason unify the unity of understanding under its principles. Kant calls reason's unifying act upon the understanding "the unity of reason" (Kant, 1781/2007, B 359). This unifying act of reason is superior to the unity of understanding. This is the most important difference between understanding and reason, from which the other differences follow.

While in the Analytic the understanding is denoted as 'the faculty of rules', in the Dialectic Kant names the reason as 'the faculty of principles' (B 356). Then the problem poses itself in the form of how a rule differs from a principle if both a rule and a principle have seat in a synthetic a priori knowledge. They have distinct functions; the rules provide us with knowledge from the particular to the universal, whereas the principles from universal to particular. Knowledge provided by principles is "knowledge alone in which I apprehend the particular in the universal through concepts" (B 357). The principles of reason are employed in inferring a particular concept from a universal rule in a syllogism each of which pertains to "deducing knowledge from a principle" (B 357).

Knowledge from understanding, on the one hand, gives us the knowledge of the laws of nature, which are dependent on the realm of appearances; knowledge from reason, on the other, gives us the general principles behind the laws of nature. Thus, with regard to its employment, knowledge from reason is prior to the knowledge from understanding. While the rules of understanding provide the conditions of knowledge, the ideas of reason seek for the totality of conditions which constitutes the cause (ground) of these conditions and is related not to their experience, but to the existence or the origin of things. That is exactly what makes the unity of reason

ideal, and the unity of understanding empirical. (Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 443) This also explains that reason as the highest unity of thought seeks to attain a complete unity and accordingly runs for refining experience (p. 444).

The rules of understanding as they relate to the objects of experience by means of intuition, are subject to determinations of space and time, and therefore to appearances. Knowledge obtained from rules is conditioned by possible experience through the faculties of sensibility and understanding. Such kind of knowledge is not legitimate unless it relates itself to sensory perception. However, the principles of reason, unlike the rules of understanding, do not accommodate any material of intuition. Ideas of reason are independent of spatio-temporal determinations as they do not apply to any object of experience.

All types of illusions have a subjective character by nature because they are motivated by the demands of the mind. As they do not have an objective character, they have no legitimacy. Even though the Analytic shows us that no knowledge is valid unless it relates to any object of experience, reason obtains synthetic *a priori* knowledge without relating to experience, viz. it obtains knowledge independently of empirical content. As a result, the principles of reason cannot produce objective knowledge. Whereas understanding is an objective faculty, reason is a subjective one whose principles are "subjective laws" (p. 445).

Reason also differentiates itself from understanding in that while the faculty of understanding can never free itself from sense-experience, the faculty of reason does not have such kind of dependence and thus has its own self-determination. It is this very independence which opens a realm for the possibility of freedom. In the Dialectic, by freedom Kant understands being independent of laws of nature in spite of the fact that he regards the laws of nature "limitations imposed upon our freedom" (Kant, 1781/2007, B 358).

As Kant sees an independent domain in which general principles will be the cause of the laws of nature entirely of itself, he names this independent domain things in

themselves. He divides the world into two, namely appearances and things in themselves. The rules of understanding are employed in appearances, whereas the principles of reason concern themselves with things in themselves. While the rules of understanding has to do with 'what is' within the theoretical domain, the principles of reason with 'what ought to be' which makes room for a thinkable practical domain.

Reason has twofold employment: logical and real. Logical use of reason is formal since it excludes all content from knowledge. Reason's aim in its logical use is "to discover the universal condition of its judgment" (B 364). As Kant puts it, in discovering those conditions reason seeks to bring the knowledge of understanding down to few principles as the universal condition in order to fulfill the highest unity (A 305). In short, reason's logical employment is to infer principles from the rules of understanding in syllogisms. It is in fact organizing or regulating rules according to principles. That is to say, when taken as a logical faculty, reason has only a regulative employment in which transcendental ideas direct concepts of the understanding.

Unlike the logical one, real employment pertains to the transcendental use of reason. The real use of reason is to be the fountain of principles for higher unity. Concepts and principles are generated from the real use of reason in an *a priori* fashion. This's how the real use of reason leads the unity of reason by reducing variety of rules to the universal condition.

3.2.2. The Antinomy of Pure Reason

When the transcendental employment of reason is connected with the logical one, there arise three kinds of dialectical inferences: paralogisms, antinomies, and the ideal of pure reason. Such "pseudo-rational inference[s]" are derived from three kinds of syllogism respectively, i.e., categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive; in the end, they lead up to the postulation of three transcendental ideas respectively:

immortality of the soul, freedom, and God (A 406/B 433). Hence, in this section, I will briefly present the general characteristics of the antinomies of pure reason before discussing the Third Antinomy in more detail in section 3.3.

Antinomies arisen from the transcendental illusion are simply the contradictions into which reason unavoidably falls because of its natural disposition to trespass the limits of possible experience when endeavoring to attain the unconditioned unity of the series in the field of appearances.

Kant defines the antinomy of pure reason in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason as follows:

> From the fact that my concept of the unconditioned synthetic unity of the series, as thought in a certain way, is always self-contradictory, I conclude that there is really a unity of the opposite kind, although of it also I have no concept. The position of reason in these dialectical inferences I shall entitle the *antinomy* of pure reason. (B 398)

In his book *A Commentary on Kant's Critick* [sic] *of Pure Reason*, Kuno Fischer (1866) explains the antinomy of pure reason with the following words:

> An antinomy consists of two judgments, which predicate the same thing of a concept, and so are similar in content but related as affirmative and negative contradictories. The affirmation is the thesis, the contradictory negation the antithesis, of the antinomy. And in order that these two propositions should constitute a real antinomy, they must not only be asserted, but *proved*, and indeed with equal clearness and upon equally strong grounds. If the proofs are either omitted, or not perfectly equivalent, we have no antinomy in the strict sense. (p. 206)

The reason why the unconditioned synthetic unity of the series is always self-contradictory is that it rests on the character and structure of the antinomies. Unlike paralogisms, antinomies are two-sided illusions. Antinomies consist of an affirmative thesis and a negative antithesis, which equally stand as opposed to one another. That is to say, an antinomy is characterized by two conflicting yet equally demonstrable

assertions. Kant expresses this characteristic of the antinomies upon the following description in The Antithetic of Pure Reason:

> [A]ntithetic may be taken as meaning, not dogmatic assertions of the opposite, but the conflict of the doctrines of seemingly dogmatic knowledge (*thesis cum antithesi*) in which no assertion can establish superiority over another. The antithetic does not, therefore, deal with one-sided assertions. It treats only of the conflict of the doctrines of reason with one another and the causes of this conflict. The transcendental antithetic is an enquiry into the antinomy of pure reason, its causes and outcome (Kant, 1781/2007, B 448/A 421).

It is clear from the Antithetic of Pure Reason that in the conflicting dogmatic assertions of thesis and antithesis, neither thesis nor antithesis is dominant over one another. Therefore, the meaning of antithetic is the possibility of thinking of the harmony between a thesis and an antithesis. Simply put it, we can think of them without contradiction.

Having given the definition of antithetic, Kant proceeds to explicate the characteristics of the antinomies. First, antinomies are not related to categories, but only to transcendental ideas, thereby to the transcendental use of reason regardless of experience. Though reason is employed independently of experience, it still necessarily relates itself to the categories of understanding, as the unity of reason implies an empirical synthesis of conditions in the field of appearances. Therefore, the conditions for the unity of reason have to correspond to the understanding. However, this situation is problematic, when the unity is competent with reason, "it is too great for understanding; and when suited to understanding, too small for reason" (B 450). Hence, there occurs an unavoidable conflict between the empirical use of understanding and the transcendental use of reason with regard to the demand of the unity of reason.

Among two conflicting sides, the theses refer that reason demands for complete unity, that is, to reach the unconditioned unity of the synthesis. The antitheses signify the employment of the understanding, which provides the unity of the synthesis of the series in the field of the appearances. In the conflict the theses take its part on the

intelligible, while the antitheses on the sensible. In other words, the theses point out "dogmatism" in the Leibnizian or Platonian sense and the antitheses "empiricism" in the Newtonian or Epicurean sense (A 466/B 494).

Second, "all antinomies are grounded in dialectical [that is, transcendental] illusion" (Wike, 1982, p.5); Antinomies arise from the failure to distinguish between appearances and things in themselves. Regarding this characteristic of the transcendental illusion, Kant makes a separation between experience and outside experience in order to distinguish between subjective and objective principles (Wike, 1982, p.7). The same distinction applies to the antinomies concerning their relation to transcendental illusion: the series of the theses includes intelligible conditions for outside experience while the series of the antitheses are limited to sensible conditions for experience.

Third, antinomies of pure reason are not arbitrary but necessary: "[B]oth it and its opposite must involve no mere artificial illusion such as at once vanishes upon detection, but a natural and unavoidable illusion" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 422/B 450); they can neither simply be dissolved nor removed. The illusion will endure even if what deceives us is revealed.

Fourth, in the case of antinomies the contradiction is merely between two sides of the assertions to neither of which superiority over the other can be attributed. Yet, there is no self-contradiction in either side of the assertions themselves. That is to say, one side of the assertion is as persistent and obligatory as the other side.

Fifth, "all the antinomies have as their transcendental subject matter the unconditioned or totality" (Wike, 1982, p. 34). Their demand is to reach the unconditioned totality of the synthesis of the series of appearances. This feature of the antinomies will be discussed in detail in the next section since a proper understanding of it is crucial for the resolution of the antinomies. Thus this point will be elaborated on after the problem of freedom in the Third Antinomy is introduced.

3.2.2.1. The Idea of the Unconditioned

Kant defines the transcendental concept of reason as "the concept of the *totality* of the *conditions* for any given conditioned" (Kant, 1781/2007, B 379). As the pure concepts of reason are the totality of conditions, the pure concept of reason is identical with the concept of the unconditioned. Since the transcendental concepts of reason do not relate to any object of experience, they are an independent whole, whereby every experience as a part of the whole is a dependent part of it. In other words, transcendental ideas "organise experience in its totality" through the concept of the unconditioned. (Kemp Smith, p. 446)

Reason aims to extend the conditions of understanding to the unconditioned, thereby bringing the rules of understanding towards the principles of reason. However, for such an extension to take place, it has to be presupposed that "if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another – a series which is therefore itself unconditioned – is likewise given, that is, is contained in the object and its connection"(Kant, 1781/2007, B 364/A 308). Kant claims that such a principle of reason is synthetic. The concept of the conditioned is connected to the concept of the conditions in an analytical manner, but there is no such connection to the concept of the unconditioned due to its synthetic character. The conditioned does not go beyond the series, yet it is in the series.

While the concept of the conditioned is submitted in the concept of the series of conditions, the concept of the unconditioned is not contained in the concept of the series of conditions. In other words, there is no analytical relation between the concept of the conditioned and the unconditioned. Thus there arises a problem in the extension of the concept of the conditioned (concept of understanding) to the concept of the unconditioned (concept of reason). Even though reason somehow co-operates with the faculty of understanding, empirical use of reason is not as sufficient as the concepts of reason for its transcendent employment.

Therefore, what reason is doing when it extends the concept of the conditioned to the unconditioned is to exclude what belongs to experience. Being independent of sensibility, it can broaden the concept of understanding beyond the limits of possible experience. Still it is unable to completely rule out experience because experience is governed by the faculty of the understanding, and reason has to accord with the understanding. Through this function, reason "converts the category into a transcendental idea" (B 436) in order to reach the absolute completeness of the series of appearances, that is, the unconditioned.

According to Kant, absolute totality is possible by bringing the synthesis of the series of the conditions to the unconditioned which stands merely as an idea in abstraction from these empirical series. In other words, the conditioned in the empirical series needs to be lifted up to the unconditioned in the idea: "the principle that if *the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and consequently the absolutely unconditioned* (through which alone the conditioned has been possible) *is also given*" (A 409/B 436).

Here Kant takes the conditioned as given, and then presupposes the conditions to be given as a totality for conditioning the conditioned. In the end, he identifies the totality of conditions, which requires a synthesis of the very conditions themselves, with the absolutely unconditioned. The totality of conditions is nothing but an idea. Therefore, Kant states that the transcendental ideas are nothing but "simply categories extended to the unconditioned" (B 436).

What seems problematic here is how it will be possible for understanding to operate with the totality of conditions, which is a mere idea, beyond its employment. To explain this, Kant makes a distinction between what he calls an ascending series of conditions and a descending series of conditions in the extension of understanding to the unconditioned; the ascending series of conditions is taken as '*regressive* series' whose synthesis is also regressive, and the descending series of conditions as '*progressive* series' whose synthesis is also progressive.

Whenever the conditioned is given in any progressive series, the series proceeds from the first instance to the more remote one. In the series of scale of blue, for example, let's suppose the first is light blue, and the second the middle one and the third is the dark one; the middle blue is given as conditioned by the light blue and at the same time being condition of the dark blue. The series of color blue passes from the condition middle blue to the conditioned the dark blue. Regressive series, on the other hand, is a series in which the conditions are given. It passes from the closest condition of appearance to the farthest one. In the same series of shades of blue when the middle blue is given, the series passes from the conditioned middle blue to the light one. The progressive synthesis of series gives us "the consequences", whereas the regressive synthesis of series gives us "the grounds" (B 438).

Progressive synthesis cannot provide a complete apprehension of the unconditioned since it does not let the series be completed. These series never "make their conditions possible, but rather presuppose them" (B 437). Contrarily, regressive synthesis makes it possible to conceive the series as completed. Thus the concern of cosmological ideas, through which the idea of the absolute totality can be grasped, will be the regressive synthesis rather than the progressive. As transcendental philosophy inquires into the conditions of the possibility of experience, it must involve the conditions, which provide us with the grounds. That is to say, absolute totality is demanded in the regressive series of conditions, not in the progressive series of the conditioned.

Reason can conceive the unconditioned only in the synthesis of the regressively advancing series of conditions. Such a series is projected in imagination which means that it is totally isolated from the conditions of sensibility and therefore remains merely as an idea.

However, when we regard the totality of conditions as absolute, there appears an ambiguity regarding whether 'absolute totality' and 'the unconditioned' are synonymous. Kemp Smith (2003) points out that Kant is not clear about the safe replacement of the unconditioned with absolute totality. For example, he states that

"it is the *unconditioned* alone which makes possible the totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned" (Kant, 1781/2007, B 379). Kemp Smith presents that in other passages such as A416-17/B443-45 the unconditioned is taken to be the outcome of the absolute totality of synthesis (Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 480). In Kant's words:

> For a given conditioned, reason demands on the side of the conditions . . . absolute totality, and in so doing converts the category into a transcendental idea. For only by carrying the empirical synthesis as far as the unconditioned is it enabled to render it absolutely complete; and the unconditioned is never to be met with in experience, but only in the idea. (Kant, 1781/2007, A 409/B 436)

This ambiguity is important because totality is a category, whereas the unconditioned is an idea. When reason aims to extend towards absolute totality, viz. a category, in the empirical synthesis of appearances in accordance with the rules of understanding, it finds itself transformed into the unconditioned, viz. a transcendental idea, without the forms of sensibility. So, when reason seeks to find its completeness in the appearances, what it realizes is that the completeness of the series is nowhere but in the idea. As Wike expresses, "reason desires to find in the world absolute totality, but it can discover only the idea of the unconditioned" (Wike, 1982, p. 48).

The ambiguity of the terms absolute totality and the unconditioned finds its origin in the twofold meaning of the latter; whether the unconditioned refers to whole series or only a part of the whole. The ambiguous description of the unconditioned lies its being both the ground and object of reason at the same time. Antinomies arise due to the two-fold meaning of the unconditioned as being unable to attain the distinction between appearances and things in themselves.

Kant was aware of the difficulty and proposed that the concept of the unconditioned can be thought in two ways; through infinite regress and finite one.

> This unconditioned may be conceived in either of two ways. It may be viewed as consisting of the entire series in which all members without exception are conditioned and only the totality of them is absolutely

> unconditioned. This regress is to be entitled infinite. Or alternatively, [in finite regress] the absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series – a part to which the other members are subordinated, and which does not itself stand under any other condition. (Kant, 1781/2007, B 445)

In infinite regress, since the unconditioned is equal to totality of conditions there is no starting point of the series. This series can never attain completeness and always gives rise to infinitude. In finite regress, on the other hand, the unconditioned is a part of the series to which other parts are subject. Thereby makes us conceive of "a first member of the series" (A 418/B 446). That is to say, the unconditioned gives rise to a highest condition which makes the series begin and thus come to an end in the regress.

As has been expressed above, antinomies find their ground and two-sided structure in two different definitions of the unconditioned. In the thesis of the antinomies, the unconditioned is thought in terms of a finite regress:

> [T]here is a first member of the series which in respect of past time is entitled, *the beginning of the world*, in respect of space, *the limit of the world*, in respect of the parts of a given limited whole, the *simple*, in respect of causes, absolute *self-activity* (freedom), in respect of the existence of alterable things, absolute *natural necessity* (A418/B446).

In the antitheses of the antinomies, the unconditioned is thought in terms of an infinite regress, in which there is no first beginning of the world, no limit of the world, no simple parts, no absolute self-activity, and no absolute natural necessity. That is, the contradiction between the theses and antitheses originates from two conceptions of the unconditioned.

In conclusion, there arises an illusion when we erroneously treat the concept of the unconditioned as if it is a member of the totality of conditions. This transcendental illusion can also be articulated in terms of the distinction that Kant makes between the regulative ideas of reason and its constitutive principles. While constitutive principles are used to construct rules for the possibility of experience, regulative ideas are used to order the concepts and to regulate the relations between them.

Therefore, constitutive principles are determinate, whereas regulative ideas are indeterminate.

In its logical employment, reason has only a regulative function. In its real employment, however, reason as a transcendental faculty, has a constitutive capability to generate concepts. However, Kant claims in the first *Critique* that transcendental ideas do not allow reason to constitute any concepts of the understanding. In other words, an antinomy arises when the regulative ideas of reason are treated as the constitutive principles of reason.

3.2.2.2. Mathematical/Dynamical Antinomies

Kant derives four cosmological ideas from fourfold structure of categories; from the category of quantity, he derives the idea of world; from the category of quality, substance; from the category of relation, freedom; and lastly, from the category of modality, God (B 443).

Kant divides these four antinomies into two groups as 'mathematical antinomies' and 'dynamical antinomies' depending on the relation between the totality of the series of conditions (the unconditioned) and any given conditioned.

Kant in fact draws the distinction between mathematical antinomies and dynamical antinomies, viz. the distinction between mathematical and dynamical transcendental ideas, in accordance with the distinction between mathematical principles and dynamical principles which are derived from the table of categories in the Transcendental Analytic. Through the mathematical principles of understanding, the mathematical synthesis of appearances is rendered possible, and through the dynamical principles, the dynamical synthesis.

Mathematical principles (first and second principles; axioms and anticipations derived from the categories of quantity and of quality) are related with the intuition of appearances as quantifiable magnitudes, while dynamical principles (the third and

the fourth principles; analogies and postulates derived from the categories of relation and of modality) are related with the existence of appearances. Mathematical principles are constitutive principles as they are capable of supplying rules for the constitution of experience by determining *a priori* the synthesis of intuition of appearances as magnitudes. Dynamical principles, however, cannot supply rules for the constitution of experience by determining the synthesis of the existence of appearances *a priori* since existence "cannot be constructed"; dynamical principles thus "can apply only to the relations of existence" in a discursive manner (A 179/ B 222). In this sense, dynamical principles are regulative principles as they "regulate the existence of appearances under rules for the possibility of experience" (Wike, 1982, p. 97).

In the mathematical synthesis of appearances (mathematical regress), every member of the series is an empirical condition in the field of appearances; the conditions are always homogeneous with the conditioned. Such homogeneous series does not allow an intelligible member in the series; every member is an appearance, a part of the same series. Conversely, in the dynamical synthesis of appearances, the conditions do not have to be of the same character (homogeneous) with the conditioned. Dynamical synthesis renders possible a heterogeneous condition in addition to the homogeneous conditions by allowing an intelligible member which does not belong to the series as a part of it but lies outside the field of appearances. In this way, dynamical synthesis makes it possible to think of an intelligible world. In the mathematical regress, each member is determined by the conditions of time; the series proceeds in infinitum and no completion of the series takes place. However, in the dynamical regress, by virtue of a first member, which is intelligible, the series proceeds in infinitum and there is completion of the series. (Kant, 1781/2007, A 528/B 556-A 531/B 559)

In correspondence to mathematical principles, Kant calls the first two antinomies (world and substance) mathematical antinomies and the last two antinomies (freedom and God) dynamical antinomies in correspondence to dynamical principles. The

distinct functions of mathematical and dynamical principles thus shed light on the distinction between mathematical and dynamical antinomies.

Mathematical antinomies are related to sensible objects in space and time; they thus concern magnitude. Contrarily, dynamical antinomies are not related to sensible objects but the relations of their existences. As mathematical synthesis determines sensible objects in accordance with the *a priori* conditions of experience, it is employed in the constitution of experience and therefore has a constitutive function. In accordance with mathematical synthesis, mathematical antinomies have a constitutive function. Dynamical synthesis on the other hand has no constitutive function but only a regulative one in organizing the relations of sensible objects in an experience. Thus, in accordance with dynamical synthesis, dynamical antinomies have a regulative function.

Concerning the mathematical synthesis, mathematical antinomies contain only homogeneous conditions in the field of appearances in their relations to the conditioned. Concerning the dynamical synthesis, on the other hand, dynamical antinomies allow for a heterogeneous element which stands outside the series of appearances as well as homogeneous conditions. Therefore, mathematical and dynamical antinomies differ in that "[t]he mathematical antinomies treat the unconditioned as itself in space and time whereas the dynamical antinomies locate the unconditioned in the intelligible world" (Wike, 1982, p. 100).

As a preliminary to the next section, it is important to note that in mathematical antinomies both the thesis and the antithesis are false; contrarily, in dynamical antinomies both sides may be true. This point will be explained after exposing the Third Antinomy in the resolution of the antinomies.

3.3. The Third Antinomy

3.3.1. The Proofs of the Thesis and the Antithesis of the Third Antinomy

The third of the antinomies which Kant discusses concerns the longstanding debate on the possibility of human freedom. Kant presents this debate, within which he also introduces his idea of transcendental freedom as a cosmological idea, as follows:

Thesis: "Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 444/B 472).

Antithesis: "There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature" (A 445/B 473).

In short, while one view (thesis) posits the existence of a second kind of causality that is different from the kind of causality involved in the laws of nature to make room for human freedom, the opposing view (antithesis) insists that everything in the world has to obey the laws of nature, which are deterministic, and hence there can be no freedom.

To give the proofs of the thesis and antithesis, Kant makes use of an indirect proof, i.e., a proof by contradiction. To put it more clearly, in order to prove the given claim, Kant begins with an opposed claim and shows that the opposite claim is self-contradictory. In the proof of the thesis (that there is a second kind of causality), he begins with the claim of the antithesis (that everything has to obey the causality found in laws of nature), showing that the claim of the antithesis is self-contradictory. However, in the proof of the antithesis (that the only kind of causality is that of nature), he begins with the claim of the thesis (that there is a second kind of causality); and he proves the antithesis by showing that the claim of the thesis contradicts the law of nature. Thus, in the Third Antinomy Kant discusses two modes of causality, namely the causality of freedom and the causality of nature. The

question will be whether the causality of freedom can be reconciled with the causality of nature or not.

To begin with the proof of the thesis, Kant presupposes that the only causality in the field of appearances is the laws of nature. Then, each and every event that takes place in nature is determined by a preceding cause in accordance with a rule. However, the preceding cause, in a way, must come into existence in time; otherwise we would have to accept that the cause has always existed and that its succeeding state, viz. its effect has always existed. The cause, which determines an event, is itself also determined by its preceding cause; it thus becomes an event, and the series goes on in infinitum (in an infinite regress). (A 444/B 472)

If everything comes into being in accordance with the laws of nature, however, then there will be no first beginning and the empirical time series on the side of the causes will never be completed. Nevertheless, the principle of the law of nature commands that "nothing takes place without a cause *sufficiently* determined *a priori*" (A 446/B 474). However, if we are to follow up on the assumption that "everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature" in "unlimited universality", then we are to see that the assumption is self-contradictory (A 445-46/B 473-74). This is because if there is an infinite regress in time, we cannot ascertain that an event sufficiently determines an event that comes after it and is considered its effect since we cannot establish the totality of the causal relations between events. Therefore, from this perspective, "there would be no unity of experience" (Ewing, 1969, p.190) and no cause could be considered a sufficient cause.

The law of nature insists, however, that there must be a sufficient cause determined *a priori* for everything that exists. Therefore, natural law cannot be the only kind of causality. We must then presuppose a second kind of causality, "an absolute spontaneity of the cause" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 446/B 474), which begins of itself in the series of appearances independently of the determination of the law of nature. (Yet this absolute spontaneity is in accordance with the law of nature and thus can

begin of itself in the series of appearances while the series continues according to the law of nature.) This absolute spontaneity is transcendental freedom, which renders possible the series of appearances to arrive at completeness on the side of the causes.

In brief, Kant asserts that unless we postulate a spontaneous beginning, the principle of natural causality contradicts itself. In order to "make an origin of the world conceivable" for the sake of the completeness of the series on the side of the conditions, we must accept "a power of *spontaneously* beginning a series of successive things or states" in the field of appearances, that is, a first beginning or transcendental freedom (A 448/B 476). While Kant's notion of transcendental freedom lies beneath his practical philosophy as well and therefore invites many considerations and discussions involving human agency, its basic meaning is independence from the rules of nature, and thus it is what enables the beginning of a causal series of events in the empirical world.

In order to avoid a misunderstanding as regards how the origin of the world is made conceivable by transcendental freedom, Kant crystallizes the meaning of the term 'first beginning'. In the empirical series of causes, in which the empirical regress from the conditioned to the conditions is involved in homogeneous elements, proceeding in accordance with laws of nature, there is merely "a relatively first beginning", which is merely a "beginning in time", i.e., a mathematical beginning (A 450/B 478). Contrarily, the absolutely first beginning, i.e., transcendental freedom, which begins of itself independently of the laws of nature and which is a heterogeneous cause outside the empirical series, "is not a beginning in time, but in causality", i.e., a "dynamical beginning" (A 450/B 478; A 445/B 473).

This distinction can be explained with an example formulated by Kant with the following words: When I am sitting on a chair under the empirical causal series of laws of nature, in a flash I can stand up with my free choice independently of natural causes, and I begin a new causal chain spontaneously and absolutely. The moment I stand up, while my free act is a beginning in causality in the empirical causal chain, with respect to beginning in time, it is a preservation of the succeeding series in

infinitum for the causal chain of events including and surrounding my act. However, as a beginning in causality, the moment I stand up is outside the empirical series of time-relations, which are determined in accordance with the laws of nature. Although the series after the moment I stand up continues in accordance with the laws of nature as regards time, I once have the power of beginning a new series of empirical causal chain by itself with absolute spontaneity, which is independent of the determination of the laws of nature. That is to say, I can make an origination in the field of appearances.

A first beginning in causality, that is, a free act of mine, is not of an empirical character (as it is with respect to beginning in time) but of a transcendental character; it is outside the series of laws of nature. The beginning in causality, which can be referred to as first cause, or transcendental freedom, is an uncaused cause. (A 450/B 478)

The uncaused cause has a crucial role in the Third Antinomy, for it meets the demand of the principle of reason for the absolute totality of the series on the side of the conditions (viz. the unconditioned) for a given conditioned. Still, it remains a question whether transcendental freedom is to be accepted as a second kind of causality in the field of appearances as the thesis offers.

In the proof of the antithesis, Kant again uses the indirect proof. He presupposes that there is transcendental freedom in the field of appearances, as a second kind causality, in addition to the laws of nature. Transcendental freedom as beginning a state of itself in an absolute manner makes an origination in the series, excluding a preceding cause which is determined in accordance with the laws of nature. However, for there to be causality of nature, every event must be determined by an antecedent cause. Thus, transcendental freedom, which is a first beginning in causality, ruins the uniformity of experience and nature and renders meaningless the conception of nature as an ordered system. In Kant's words, "[n]ature and transcendental freedom differ as do conformity to law and lawlessness" (A 447/B 475). In such a case, there would be no time-determination of events through the

faculty of understanding in accordance with the laws of nature. There would thus be no order and uniformity of nature, i.e., the world would be lawless. As causality necessitates lawfulness, there can be no transcendental freedom as a second kind of causality in the field of appearances (A 445/B 473-A 447/B 475). Transcendental freedom as a second kind of causality contradicts natural causality.

As transcendental freedom is outside the successive time-determinations of experience, it cannot be known by us and remains as an "empty thought entity" (A 447/B 475). What is more, transcendental freedom cannot take the place of natural laws. If it were to take the place of natural laws, then every free act we experience in the field of appearances would be intelligible to us through the faculty of reason alone. Accordingly, transcendental freedom would be conditioned by an antecedent condition and would not constitute a first beginning any more.

The antithesis of the Third Antinomy therefore defends the 'omnipotent nature', in which the series succeeds one another in infinitum according to a universal law, against the pseudo-rational doctrine of transcendental freedom. According to the claim of the antithesis, it is illegitimate for a dynamical first beginning to destroy the limitless empirical series of nature. If we accepted such a dynamical first beginning, then we could not even speak of an alteration in the world in accordance with fixed laws; all we experience would merely be a dream in a lawless world. In other words, the antithesis of the Third Antinomy defends the teaching of the Second Analogy. It briefly concludes that if transcendental freedom is postulated as a second kind of causality, then transcendental freedom contradicts natural causality. Rejecting transcendental freedom in the field of appearances, the antithesis proposes that "even if a transcendental power of freedom be allowed, as supplying a beginning of happenings in the world, this power would in any case have to be outside the world" (A 449/B 477- A 451/B 479).

3.3.2. Criticisms to the Proofs of the Thesis and the Antithesis of the Third Antinomy

As has already been mentioned, reason demands the unconditioned in the empirical series due to the principle that "[i]f the conditioned is given, the entire series of its conditions is given; the conditioned is given, therefore the unconditioned is given" (Beck, 1966, p. 186). The error due to reason's principle occurs when the term 'conditioned' is taken differently in the major premise (if the conditioned is given, the entire series of its conditions is given) and in the minor premise (the conditioned is given, therefore the unconditioned is given). Both Beck and Ewing claim that in the major premise the term conditioned is taken as a "pure category", whereas in the minor as an "empirical concept" of possible experience (Ewing, 1969, p.187; Beck, 1966, p. 186). In other words, while the major premise takes the entire series of conditions as things in themselves, in which the entire series of conditions are independent of time-determination, the minor premise takes the entire series of conditions, viz. the unconditioned, as appearances, in which the unconditioned is subject to time-determination. Hence, the contradiction between the thesis and the antithesis occurs concerning this error of taking the concept of the conditioned and the idea of the unconditioned in two different senses in the major and minor premises.

That is to say, the theses treat the unconditioned (in the sense of major premise) as things in themselves, and there is no temporal succession between the conditioned and its condition: "all members of the series are given in themselves" (Ewing, 1969, p. 188). Contrarily, the antitheses treat the unconditioned (in the sense of minor premise) as appearances, and there is temporal succession between the conditioned and its condition, in which the condition determines the conditioned in an infinite regress.

Now the proofs of the thesis and the antithesis of the Third Antinomy can be investigated under the light of the twofold use of the terms 'conditioned' and 'the unconditioned'.

Both sides of the Third Antinomy are supposed to be based on the principle of causality given in the Second Analogy. However, the dispute between the thesis and the antithesis occurs when transcendental freedom is postulated as a first cause. The thesis maintains that a first cause must be postulated for the completeness or totality of the series on the side of the conditions for any given conditioned. So the series, through finite regress, can reach to the unconditioned (first cause), which is also a part of the series that is independent of any time-determination. Contrarily, the antithesis rejects such a first cause for the sake of the universality of the world. Therefore, in the antithesis, while the conditioned and its conditions continue in an infinite regress in the empirical series, the unconditioned is outside the series. In Ewing's words, while both thesis and the antithesis demand the unconditioned, "the thesis only considers the series of conditions from the aspect of totality, the antithesis only from the aspect of the contingency [their dependence on each other] of its members" (p. 187).

According to Allison (1990), the proof of the thesis rests on a "dual requirement" of the causality of nature, namely "completeness requirement" and "universalizability requirement", in a "single principle" as opposing one another, the causality of nature being self-contradictory (pp. 17-19). Firstly, Kant claims that the law of nature requires that every effect have an antecedent cause which conditions its effect in time in an infinite regress. Thus, the principle of sufficient reason, on which the principle of causality is based, requires for universality that every cause and every effect must come into being in time since they are not beings in themselves which have always existed but occurrences in the world that follow one another in a necessary succession. In other words, in such series, a "partial cause" (condition; sufficient cause) determines a partial effect (conditioned) in infinitum; there is no completion or totality of the series on the side of the conditions (p. 16).

However, Kant also claims that "the law of nature is just this, that nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently determined *a priori*" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 446/B 474). Hence, the problem arises when Kant takes the sufficient cause in an *a priori*

sense that is independent of time-determination for the requirement of completeness. That is to say, such sufficient cause in the Leibnizian sense requires the totality of partial causes (totality of conditions) to reach a "complete effect" (the unconditioned), regarding "infinite series as completed" (Allison, 1990, p. 16-17; Ewing, 1969, p. 189). In accordance with principle of causality in the sense of the Second Analogy, however, we cannot conceive the infinite series as completed; we can only conceive finite series as completed instead. Therefore, to think the infinite series as completed, we cannot assume a necessary succession (a phenomenal causality) between cause and effect as in the first requirement; and yet, we have to think an intrinsic connection (a noumenal causality) in which "'cause' is identified with 'logical ground', and causality is regarded as a principle of explanation" (Ewing, p.189). This is only possible by postulating an intelligible cause or an unconditioned cause that is independent of the temporal determinations of antecedent causes but exists in itself; it can then be the logical ground of the totality of conditions. However, we cannot claim that "no causality is possible save in accordance with laws of nature" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 446/B 474) as there is an intelligible causality in addition to the causality of nature. Thus, Kant's aim in applying a sufficient cause in the *a priori* sense is to make room for an intelligible cause that is transcendental freedom.

When sufficient cause is taken in the transcendental sense, that is, natural causality is taken in absolute universality for the sake of reaching the unconditioned in which "the explanatory series is grounded" (completeness requirement), it brings about a contradiction with the incompleteness of the series required by the sufficient cause in the sense of the Second Analogy (universalizability requirement) (Allison, 1990, p.18). The contradiction between two senses of the principle of sufficient reason united in single principle, namely the causality of nature, renders the causality of nature self-contradictory.

In brief, the proof of the thesis rests on two different senses of the principle of sufficient reason. On the one hand, taking sufficient cause in the transcendental

sense, viz. in the Leibnizian sense is a dogmatic demand of reason and leads to transcendental realism. Taking sufficient cause in the sense of Second Analogy, on the other hand is an empiricist demand of understanding, which is required by transcendental idealism. Thus the self-contradiction of natural causality stems from two senses of sufficient reason and points at "the issue between transcendental realism and transcendental idealism . . . [that] arise[s] at the empirical level" (Allison, 1990, p. 21).

The proof of the antithesis shows, however, that natural causality is not self-contradictory, but that transcendental freedom contradicts natural causality. The antithesis rejects transcendental freedom in the field of appearances as it ruins the universality of nature and claims that the only possible causality is that of nature. As a result, transcendental freedom is incompatible with natural causality.

As has been stated above, the thesis of the Third Antinomy is based on two types of the principle of sufficient reason: Leibnizian and Second Analogy type. However, the antithesis rejects the Leibnizian type of sufficient cause which requires intrinsic connection between totality of causes and the unconditioned as their ground. Contrarily, in the antithesis, the unconditioned is based only on the principle of sufficient reason in the sense of the Second Analogy. Thus, the argument of the antithesis is mostly coherent with the outcome of the Second Analogy. As the antithesis rejects transcendental freedom in the world, both the antithesis of the Third Antinomy and that of the Second Analogy accept only necessary succession between conditions and the conditioned, in which the series succeeds in an infinite regress. In that sense, the antithesis can be committed to transcendental idealism as well as the Second Analogy since the series succeeds within the limits of possible experience as understanding demands. Therefore, the antithesis partially involves a critical standpoint as Schopenhauer claims. (p. 21)

Nevertheless, the antithesis of the Third Antinomy differs from the Second Analogy in that although both imply an infinite regress in the field of appearances, while the Second Analogy never seeks for an unconditioned for the totality of conditions, the

antithesis demands an unconditioned which is outside the series. In other words, while the Second Analogy never takes transcendental freedom as its object, the antithesis campaigns for the possibility of transcendental freedom outside the series. In this sense, though the antithesis represents empiricism in the field of appearances, which is allegedly critical, understanding extends beyond the limits of possible experience in its search for the unconditioned outside the series. Then, reason treats appearances as things in themselves, which leads to transcendental realism, and the antithesis becomes dogmatic. Thus, according to Allison (1990), "the issue between transcendental realism and transcendental idealism . . . arise[s] at the [transcendental level]" since understanding transgresses the limits of possible experience (p. 21). In brief, Allison criticizes Schopenhauer in that the antithesis represents a dogmatic empiricism rather than a critical empiricism.

To sum up, the thesis of the Third Antinomy represents dogmatic rationalism in attaining reason's demand for completeness, whereas the antithesis of the Third Antinomy represents dogmatic empiricism in attaining the demand of understanding for the universality of the conditions of experience. "The antinomy arises because both demands seem to be equally legitimate and each side takes its claim to be incompatible with its opposite" (p. 22).

3.4. The Resolution of the Antinomies

As has already been expressed, the thesis of the Third Antinomy arrives at the conclusion that if transcendental freedom is not postulated as a second kind of causality in the field of appearances, then natural causality contradicts itself. On the other hand, the antithesis of the Third Antinomy arrives at the conclusion that if transcendental freedom is postulated in the field of appearances, then natural causality contradicts with transcendental freedom. Therefore, there is an unfamiliar relationship between the proofs of the thesis and the antithesis (Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 494). According to Ewing (1969), "one principle [principle of causality] cannot, in

one and the same sense, both demand and exclude a free first cause" (p.187). This contradiction between transcendental freedom and natural causality, which originates from the error of reason, should be solved.

The solution to such contradiction between transcendental freedom and natural causality in the Third Antinomy, as well as in the other antinomies, is provided through transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealism offers three kinds of solutions to the antinomies: the first one is the critical solution which yields an indirect proof of transcendental idealism with respect to reason's general mistake regarding the idea of the unconditioned. The second one is the solution with respect to reason's relation to understanding in the empirical regress. The third one is the solution based on the distinction between mathematical and dynamical antinomies. Among the three, only the third one is sufficient to provide a proper solution to the antinomies.

The first solution, viz. the critical solution is related to the structure of the antinomies and revises the type of contradiction between the thesis and the antithesis of the antinomies. An antinomy does not pertain to the basic claim that logical oppositions (analytical oppositions) negate one another; rather, it is a dialectical opposition in which "the conflicting claims are genuine contradictories" (Allison, 1990, p. 13). If an antinomy were merely a logical contradiction, we would have to accept that when the thesis is true, the antithesis is false and when the antithesis is true, the thesis is false. Such an argument, however, would be 'null and void' and cannot provide any progress.

For there to be a real opposition, however, we have to realize that even if the thesis and the antithesis contradict one another in the logical sense (as analytical opposites), the grounds on which they demonstrate themselves must not contradict one another (i.e., on such grounds the thesis and the antithesis are dialectical opposites.) When the thesis and the antithesis are taken as dialectical opposites, both of them happen to be false. That is to say, "as contradictory opposites, thesis and antithesis assume that the series of appearances is either infinite or finite. As dialectical opposites, thesis

and antithesis recognize that the series of appearances may be neither infinite nor finite" (Wike, 1982, pp. 82-83). Michelle Grier (2001) indicates that in the critical solution only "mathematical antinomies provide an indirect proof of transcendental idealism" (p. 181). Thus, the above-mentioned dialectical opposites, in which both sides are supposed to be false, are valid for mathematical antinomies, viz. the first two antinomies.

Thesis and antithesis are dialectical opposites due to reason's mistakenly treating the totality of the series of appearances, viz. the unconditioned, as a thing-in-itself in a transcendentally realistic manner (Kant, 1781/2007, A 506/B 534). What the critical solution proposes is that antinomies can be resolved only if reason avoids treating appearances as things in themselves. In this light, reason's correct task must be "not the determining of its object [unconditioned] as a thing-in-itself but the continuing extension of the regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned" (Wike, 1982, p. 85). This is possible only if reason functions in its regress from the conditioned to the totality of the series of conditions and therefore to the unconditioned as a 'regulative rule' rather than a 'constitutive principle'.

> In short, reason's advance to the unconditioned is only a regulative rule [regulative idea] for the extension of experience [without presuming to reach to the unconditioned], and it is not a constitutive principle for the extension of concepts beyond the world of possible experience. (p. 85)

Beck (1966) also remarks that the idea of unconditioned is not a constitutive idea but "a regulative idea or a rule prescribing a regress in the series of given appearances, and forbidding [reason] to bring the regress to a close by treating anything it may arrive at [in experience] as absolutely unconditioned" (Kant, 1781/2007, A509/B537 as cited in Beck, 1966, p. 187). When a regulative idea is treated as a constitutive principle, the antinomy of reason cannot be solved. Correspondingly, Wood (2010) comments that when reason is employed regulatively but not constitutively, there is "no reason to think that the antinomies would be anymore irresolvable if we take the world-whole to exist in itself than if we take it to consist of appearances" (p. 261). In spite of these, the critical solution is insufficient in that it only explains how the

antinomy occurs due to reason's general mistake, but does not show clearly how both sides of the mathematical antinomies happen to be false.

The second solution is based on the idea of reason's failure to conform to the concept of understanding. Reason's proper task in the empirical regress is not to determine or constitute any empirical object, which is to be determined by understanding, but only to guide or regulate the employment of understanding itself in its (understanding's) constitution of a possible experience and in providing its continuation in an infinite regress. In Kant's words, reason "cannot determine any object, they may yet, in a fundamental and unobserved fashion, be of service to the understanding as a canon for its extended and consistent employment" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 329). The antinomy arises when reason exceeds its task to function in its regulative employment and to be employed constitutively. In such a case, the object of reason, viz. the unconditioned ruins the relation between understanding and reason. That is to say, the idea of the unconditioned cannot correspond to the concept of understanding. Then, the unconditioned is "either *too large* [in the antitheses of the antinomies in which the unconditioned includes infinite regress] or *too small* [in the theses of the antinomies in which the unconditioned includes finite regress] for any *concept of the understanding*" (A 486-7/B 514-15). (This is valid for the first three antinomies, whereas the fourth antinomy points to the opposite direction in the sense that the thesis is too large and the antithesis is too small.)

The second solution to antinomies, as in the case of the first solution, shows that both sides of the mathematical antinomies are false despite the fact that "the object of reason's idea cannot be an object of possible experience" (Wike, 1982, p. 89). The second solution, however, is insufficient in that, not unlike the first solution, it does not explain why both sides of the mathematical antinomies are false.

Finally, as a third solution, Kant makes a distinction between mathematical and dynamical antinomies, in which the regress from the conditioned to the totality of conditions and therefore to the unconditioned is performed in different ways due to two-fold definition of the unconditioned: infinite and finite regress.

Mathematical/dynamical distinction, unlike the previous two solutions, gives sufficient explanation for the solution of the antinomies as they make room for intelligible conditions (intelligible causality), which makes it possible to think of a realm outside the appearances.

What makes the third solution distinctive is that while in the first and the second (mathematical) antinomies both sides are false, in the third and the fourth (dynamical) antinomies, both sides may be true.

In mathematical antinomies, every member of the series as conditions and the conditioned is of the same character, i.e., homogeneous. That is to say, every homogeneous member of the series belongs to space- and time-determination in the field of appearances; every member is inside the world as a part of it. Therefore, in mathematical antinomies, "the regress from the conditioned to its conditions, proceeds *in infinitum*" (Kant, A 523/B 551). It is not possible to reach the unconditioned since what we reach in the mathematical regress is only a further condition. In that case, mathematical synthesis treats the unconditioned like the conditioned as it is restricted to appearances. Thus, reason does not conform to the understanding, as reason's idea is too large (in the thesis) or too small (in the antithesis) for the concept of understanding. Therefore, in mathematical antinomies, "[r]eason by restricting its idea of the unconditioned to the world of appearances satisfies neither itself nor the understanding" (Wike, 1982, p. 98) so that both sides of the antinomies remain false.

In brief, as mathematical antinomies do not allow any heterogeneous element wherein its effects can be seen in the appearances, the series can never be completed. That is to say, in mathematical antinomies the problem arises due to infinity.

However, in addition to homogeneous conditions which exist inside the world, dynamical antinomies allow also for heterogeneous conditions (causes) which exist in themselves outside the world (yet their effects can be involved as a part of appearances). In other words, while the antithesis of dynamical antinomies involves

only homogeneous conditions, the thesis of dynamical antinomies involves both homogeneous and heterogeneous conditions. Hence, through the postulation of intelligible cause, the unconditioned is not restricted only to the field of appearances as in mathematical antinomies, in which the completion of the infinite regress is impossible for both sides. Contrarily, intelligible elements make it possible to conceive the unconditioned in two distinct realms, i.e., appearances and things in themselves. Whereas on the side of the antithesis the series can never be completed and infinity is the case due to the demand of understanding, on the side of the thesis the series can be completed through the postulation of an intelligible element due to the demand of reason.

Concerning the solution to the dynamical antinomies, reason's task is thus two-fold: While reason must accord its ideas with the concepts of understanding in the field of appearances for the continuation of series, in things in themselves it can postulate an intelligible causality for the completion of the series (p. 99). This way both sides may be true.

In the case of dynamical antinomies, asserts Kemp Smith (2003), a dialectical opposition therefore finds its source in the fact that although thesis and antithesis contradict one another they "can both be established by arguments in which such contradiction does not occur" (p. 494). In that case, one might argue that the opposing "claims are contradictory when they are really compatible (given the transcendental distinction between appearances and things as they are in themselves)" (Allison, 1990, p. 14). Allison (1990) claims that in dynamical antinomies "the competing claims are . . . treated as subalternates, rather than contraries, although the conflict between them is still regarded as merely dialectical" (p. 14).

Kant also defines the difference between mathematical and dynamical antinomies with respect to their relation to the world and nature. Kant means by world "mathematical sum-total of all appearances and totality of their synthesis" and by

nature "the same sum-total conceived as a 'dynamical whole'" (p. 24).[3] The mathematical whole involves a phenomenal series in which there is a necessary succession between conditions and the conditioned. That is to say, only phenomenal causality rules in the world where the series advances from caused to cause.

Allowing for intelligible conditions that are not found in the field of appearances, but exist in themselves, the dynamical whole on the other hand enables us to think of an intrinsic connection, that is, "an inner principle of causality" (Kant, 1781/2007, B 446ff) between the grounded and the ground in "which the existence of everything conditioned is to be explained" (Allison, 1990, p. 24). In other words, in nature we may conceive a noumenal causality, in which the totality of the series of conditions as explanatory grounds stands as interconnected as a "self-subsisting whole" (Kant, 1781/2007, B 446ff).

Thus, in nature we do not intuit appearances as a magnitude but conceive the interconnection within the totality of the existence of appearances. In the case of the Third Antinomy, this noumenal causality or unconditioned causality is transcendental freedom, which is the logical ground of the totality of the series of appearances, whereas phenomenal causality or conditioned causality is natural causality under the name of 'mechanistic necessity'.

According to Allison (1990), however, in the Third Antinomy in which the regress proceeds from effect to cause, it is questionable whether there is a logical ground

[3] As we have mentioned at the end of the section on the Second Analogy, concerning the distinction between the world and nature, Ewing makes a distinction between two kinds of causality: a phenomenal causality in which the condition necessarily precedes the conditioned and a noumenal causality in which the totality of conditions is intrinsically connected. He names the former causality "cause" and the latter "logical ground" (Ewing, 1969, p. 181). In the case of the Third Antinomy, natural causality is cause and freedom is logical ground. However, unlike Ewing, Beck claims that "we cannot apply the category of causation to things in themselves so as to have knowledge of them; but we can apply the category by analogy (B431-32) to the relation of noumena and think of the former as a free cause of the latter without infringing on the principle of mechanical causation so far as our possible knowledge is concerned" (Beck, 1966, p. 187). Therefore, the distinction between cause and ground will have a significant role in our investigation in the last chapter regarding whether freedom and natural causality are compatible or not. At the same time, as such a distinction makes it possible to think of a distinction between appearances and things in themselves, it will also illuminate the question of whether things in themselves are the logical ground of appearances or not.

since, while the thesis claims the possibility of such a ground, the antithesis rejects it (p. 23).

The significance of this distinction between two kinds of whole is that the mathematical whole is self-contradictory, whereas the dynamical is not (Kant, 1781/2007, A 527/B 555). The former is self-contradictory because the totality of sensible elements, "whether it be conceived as containing a finite or an infinite number of members" (Allison, 1990, p. 24), is alleged to proceed in an infinite regress in the empirical series, demanding the attainment of completeness. However, this demand discords with the conditions of possible experience as it treats totality as a part of appearance. This point also shows why in mathematical antinomies the idea of reason errs and why both sides are false concerning the idea of reason's being too large or too small for the concept of understanding. As has already been noted, the solution to reason's conflict with the conditions of possible experience is to employ regulative ideas so that the "dogmatic finistic claim of the thesis" which demands completeness can be replaced with the "dogmatic infinistic claim of the antithesis" which pursues further conditions. (p. 24)

Nevertheless, dynamical or "explanatory whole . . . conflicts with the conditions of possibility of experience but it is not self-contradictory" (p. 24) because dynamical whole contains intelligible elements in it so that the unconditioned is not restricted to the field of appearances, but may be thought to be reached in things in themselves. Though the antithesis of dynamical antinomies rejects intelligible elements, i.e., unconditioned cause or the unconditioned in the field of appearances, it still does not claim that such unconditioned cause is self-contradictory since there is possibility of an intelligible element outside the world. Therefore, both the thesis and the antithesis of the dynamical antinomies may be true, the former as it demands the completeness of the dynamical synthesis and the latter as it demands the universality of nature. Their underlying concept being the explanatory whole, the thesis and the antithesis of dynamical antinomies thus may be compatible even though the intelligible element is incompatible with the conditions of the possibility of experience.

In the case of the Third Antinomy, the answer to the question of whether transcendental "freedom is possible at all, and if it be possible, whether it can exist along with the universality of the natural law of causality" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 536/B 564) can be given concerning the resolution of dynamical antinomies. Reflecting the compatibilist side, the thesis of the Third Antinomy claims that transcendental freedom and natural causality can exist in the field of appearances without contradiction. Reflecting the incompatibilist side, the antithesis on the other hand claims that there is only natural causality in the field of appearances; transcendental freedom is contradictory with natural causality. Still, it is not self-contradictory to think transcendental freedom outside the field of appearances. Therefore, the thesis and the antithesis of the Third Antinomy may be compatible although transcendental freedom is incompatible with natural causality (Allison, 1990, p. 24). That is to say, although transcendental freedom cannot exist in the field of appearances, it is logically possible in the noumenal world. Though we cannot know whether we are free in the phenomenal world, we can conceive that we are free from the effects of transcendental freedom; "the representation of it is at least not self-contradictory" (B xxviii).

To sum up, by distinguishing dynamical antinomies from mathematical antinomies, Kant makes it possible to postulate an intelligible cause outside the world. In the case of the Third Antinomy, by virtue of such a postulation, Kant makes room for freedom, which finds its position in the Third Antinomy as transcendental freedom and in the second *Critique* as practical freedom. It also makes room for a noumenal realm where freedom can be located. In brief, in the case of the Third Antinomy, dynamical antinomies show firstly that there are two kinds of causalities, namely natural causality (phenomenal causality) and transcendental freedom (noumenal causality), and secondly that there are two kinds of realms, namely appearances and things in themselves. Then the questions arise whether transcendental freedom and natural causality are compatible or not and whether noumena are the ground of phenomena or not. The latter question will be investigated in the fourth chapter, and the former in the fifth.

CHAPTER IV

TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AS KANT'S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM IN THE THIRD ANTINOMY

The Third Antinomy, by nature, has set forth two opposing claims from which there arises the problem of freedom and nature. The thesis claims that it is possible for transcendental freedom to exist as a second kind of causality in the field of appearances in addition to the causality of nature. The antithesis rejects such transcendental freedom and adopts the principle of the Second Analogy, which claims that the only causality in the field of appearances must be the causality of nature.

The Third Antinomy has left the problem unresolved by merely introducing the idea of transcendental freedom. Therefore, at the end of the chapter The Antinomy of Pure Reason, Kant attempts to resolve the problem concerning freedom and nature by once again raising the question of the Third Antinomy regarding "whether freedom is possible at all, and if it be possible, whether it can exist along with the universality of the natural law of causality" (A 536/B 564). Here, Kant holds that he can show the reconciliation of transcendental freedom and natural necessity only if these two types of causation can be said to manifest themselves in one and the same effect in the field of appearances. According to Kant, the attempted reconcilability of transcendental freedom and natural causality for the resolution of the Third Antinomy can only be achieved through transcendental idealism, which renders necessary a distinction between appearances and things in themselves.

4.1. Transcendental Idealism/Transcendental Realism

As has been mentioned in the third chapter in the section on the general character of the antinomies, Kant identifies the shortcomings of dogmatic metaphysics as the reason of the antinomies. In other words, an antinomy arises due to reason's overextending itself by demanding the unconditioned or absolute totality in the empirical series of appearances. Such demand of reason results in treating appearances as things in themselves. That is to say, it pertains to taking appearances "for more than they actually are" (A 537/B 565), viz. not merely taking them as representations but treating objects of the inner sense as absolutely real things. One who believes that one can meet this demand falls into transcendental realism. The Third Antinomy, and accordingly the transcendental freedom and natural causality debate, arises from this transcendental realistic approach. In Kant's words, "were we to yield to the illusion of transcendental realism, neither nature nor freedom would remain" (A 543/B 571). Therefore, Kant's refutation of transcendental realism is an important part of his attempt to solve the Third Antinomy.

Hence, Kant's Third Antinomy, which gives rise to the transcendental freedom and natural causality debate, finds its solution in his "transcendental idealism; the adoption of the distinction between things as they are in themselves, and as they appear to the human subject" (Priest, 2007, p. 19). That is to say, unlike transcendental realism, transcendental idealism takes objects of experience as appearances, not as things in themselves, insofar as we intuit representations both in space as "extended beings" through our outer sense and in time as "series of alterations" through our inner sense. Thus, the extended objects are not absolutely real but empirically real in the field of appearances; they "have no independent existence outside our thoughts" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 490-91/B 518-19), being transcendentally ideal outside the field of appearances at the same time.

By making such a necessary distinction between appearances and things in themselves, Kant aims to locate natural causality in the field of appearances and transcendental freedom and free will in things in themselves. In the Preface to the

Second Edition, Kant emphasizes that if we did not make a distinction between appearances and things in themselves, then we "could not, therefore, without palpable contradiction, say of one and the same being, for instance the human soul, that its will is free and yet subject to natural necessity, that is, is not free" (B xxvii). Therefore, it is transcendental idealism which saves freedom from being a contradictory idea and renders possible the attempted reconciliation of freedom and nature in one and the same effect.

4.2. Empirical Character/Intelligible Character

For the solution of the Third Antinomy, Kant draws the necessary division of the subject (self) into empirical character (phenomenal self) and intelligible character (noumenal self) upon introducing transcendental idealism, which renders necessary the division of the object into appearances (phenomena) and things in themselves (noumena). The empirical character and intelligible character distinction supplies the "conceptual framework" not only in providing a resolution to the problem of transcendental freedom introduced in the thesis of the Third Antinomy with an attempt for reconciliation with the causality of nature, but also in making room for practical freedom and morality through a theory of rational agency (Allison, 1990, p. 11).

Kant deals with this distinction in two contexts, namely cosmological and practical. First, he sets forth the distinction between these two characters in the cosmological context of the Third Antinomy, that is, with respect to their dependence on or independence from the causality of nature. Second, in the practical context, Kant claims that in addition to the causality of nature, there must be a causality of reason (causality of freedom) to which these two characters must be related as rational agents. This way, rational agents can act through their free will (whether autonomous or heteronomous) in the sensible world in addition to the fact that they are empirically determined by the causality of nature. In brief, it can be said that the

empirical-intelligible character distinction is "the agency version of the phenomenal-noumenal distinction" (Allison, 1990, p. 30).

Kant's aim in making a distinction between phenomena and noumena through transcendental idealism is to make room for an intelligible realm in which freedom is to be located. Similarly, in making empirical character and intelligible character distinction, Kant aims to postulate an intelligible causality by means of which rational agents would be practically free and morally responsible. In Sebastian Gardner's words, "if we are to conceive ourselves as rational agents" intelligible causality is required (Gardner, 1999, p. 257).

By 'intelligible' Kant means "[w]hatever in an object of the senses is not itself appearance" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 538/B 566). The Second Analogy has taught us that every effect in the sensible world as an appearance is determined by its antecedent cause, which is also an appearance, in accordance with the principle of causality. Thus, the causality of nature does not allow any cause that can begin spontaneously as the causality of cause must always be empirical. However, the Third Antinomy, by virtue of transcendental idealism, allows us to think of another kind of causality that is intelligible; it can spontaneously begin an empirical series in accordance with natural causality in the field of appearances.

Thence, in the resolution of the Third Antinomy, it is possible to attribute to a transcendental object[4] two kinds of causalities, which are empirical causality, i.e., the causality of appearances, and intelligible causality, i.e., the causality of things in themselves. That is to say, it is not illegitimate to think another kind of causality, that is, intelligible; and this intelligible causality does not contravene the causality of nature. It is therefore not contradictory to think that the same effect may be caused

[4] The transcendental object is "the purely intelligible cause of appearances in general", i.e., it is an unknown something=x which "is given in itself prior to all experience" to appear for there to be appearances (Kant, 1781/2007, A 494). That is to say, appearances "must themselves have grounds which are not appearances" (A 537/B 565). Here, Kant emphasizes that it is the transcendental object, not things in themselves, which is postulated as the ground of appearances. According to Perry, things in themselves can only be thought as "the contingent ground" of appearances; however, their "absolute ground is the transcendental object" (Perry, 1990, p. 636).

by both an empirical cause, which belongs to nature, and an intelligible cause, which belongs to freedom. Although an intelligible cause is outside the field of appearances and thus free from empirical time-determinations, it applies, as its effects, to appearances. In Kant's words:

> The effects of such an intelligible cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through other appearances, but its causality is not so determined. While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together with its causality, is outside the series. Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature. (A 537/B 565)

In other words, an empirically unconditioned free origin may be the cause of the same effect of the empirically conditioned series of nature without violating the order of the empirically conditioned series. Hence, only by virtue of this reconciliation of two causes in one and the same effect can we think the supposed reconciliation of freedom and natural necessity.

For this purpose, Kant lays down the condition that "the *action* of these [intelligible] causes *in the [field of] appearance* is in conformity with all the laws of empirical causality" (A 545/B 573). He claims that only if we accept this condition may the intelligible causality of an action be attached to the laws of nature to be met in one and the same effect in the field of appearances. That is, even if we conceive of the cause of an agent's acts as intelligible, the acts themselves will have to be dependent on the causal chain of the phenomenal realm.

Now, if we examine these acts from the side of the antithesis, that is, when the totality of appearances is considered in an infinite regress, the causal explanation of these acts, given in terms of other appearances in accordance with natural laws, must be complete. In other words, the causal explanation must be sufficient onto itself. Kant says that, from this perspective, "we have to take their strictly empirical character as the supreme ground of explanation" (A 546/B 574). In this case, because the series of empirical causes progresses infinitely and there is a necessary succession, we do not need to think of a first cause that grounds them. In other

words, from this perspective, we need not think of an intelligible cause as the ground of an agent's (empirical character's) acts. So here, all that can be said about the intelligible is that it is completely unknown. We can at most say that it is signaled by the empirical.

On the other hand, if we examine the act from the side of the thesis, that is, when the totality of appearances is considered in a finite regress, for the series to reach completeness, we will need a first cause which grounds the empirical. For our purposes in this chapter, this first cause is the intelligible cause. In this view, the intelligible cause is a part of the series (of conditions). However, it is (an) unconditioned (condition) and is itself not conditioned, i.e., while being a member of the series, it is not subordinate to any member of the series. From this perspective, we think of the intelligible cause as the ground of an agent's (empirical character's) acts and "find that this subject, together with all its causality in the [field of] appearance, has in its *noumenon* certain conditions which must be regarded as purely intelligible" (A 545/B 573).

After exhibiting the double causality of an object, that of nature and freedom, which may be attributed to one and the same effect, Kant continues by introducing the concept of "character" as the agency version of these causalities. He states that "[e]very efficient cause must have a *character*, that is, a law of its causality, without which it would not be a cause" (A 539/B 567). According to Pereboom (2006), "a thing's character is the way it behaves causally" (p. 545) or in Gardner's (1999) words, 'character' refers to "causal powers" (p. 260). Thence, Kant attributes to the subject (self) an empirical character and an intelligible character corresponding to the empirical causality, i.e., causality of appearances, and intelligible causality, i.e., causality of things in themselves respectively. Two causalities are attributed to the same object that is transcendental. That is to say, Kant means by 'empirical character' "the empirical cause of action" and by 'intelligible character' "the intelligible cause of action" (Hudson, 2002, p. 251).

On the one hand, an agent due to its empirical character is a subject of appearances, acting in accordance with the laws of nature. Since an agent in its empirical character is a subject as appearance, its effects as well as its actions are appearances in that they are immediately known by the faculty of sensibility. On the other hand, an agent due to its intelligible character is a subject of things in themselves, not being subject to the laws of nature but being subject to the laws of reason. Such a non-empirical character is independent of any time-determination of appearances and conditions of sensibility. Thus, for subject as thing-in-itself, as there is no time-determination, there is no alteration; no empirical series begins or ceases in the intelligible character whereas this "active being" spontaneously begins the empirical series (A 541/B 569). That is to say, while the effects of an action of the intelligible character is observed as one and the same effect with the those of appearances, both of which are subject to the conditions of natural causality, the intelligible character's spontaneous uncaused cause is not an appearance, lying outside the field of appearances. In this respect, the intelligible character, as merely an idea of reason, is not "immediately known" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 540/B 568) and experienced by us; still, we can think of it through pure understanding, i.e., through understanding when sensibility is abstracted.

Consequently, when applied to experience, a rational agent involves a double character in one subject. An agent has an empirical character on the one hand and an intelligible character on the other, whose actions are united in one and the same effect. Through her empirical character, the agent is embodied as an appearance of the sensible world where she is under the determination of the necessity of nature. With respect to her being subject to the laws of nature, the agent is not free in her empirical character. As an element of nature, the agent, being an appearance, perceives herself and other appearances of the sensible world through inner sense, i.e., sensibility. That is to say, by virtue of her faculty of sensibility, her actions and their effects in the sensible world become a content of experience.

Thus, the agent knows herself in her empirical character through the faculty of understanding. In this respect, regarding her empirical character, she is a

'phenomenon' to herself. On the other hand, in her intelligible character, being independent of the determinations of the conditions of nature, the agent is not an appearance but lies outside the field of appearances. In this respect, she is free in her intelligible character; she cannot know herself in her actions but can only think herself through pure apperception in which the whole content of experience is abstracted. That is to say, she can only think herself as an idea through the faculty of reason the effects of which are to be met with the empirical concept of understanding. (A 546-47/B 574-75)

Hence, as we cannot know the intelligible character immediately, i.e., we cannot know what it is in itself, Kant presupposes that we have to think it "in accordance with the empirical character – just as we are constrained to think a transcendental object as underlying appearances, though we know nothing of what it is in itself" (A 540/B 568). Here, Kant means that we can infer the intelligible character as an idea that grounds the empirical character, just as we postulate the transcendental object as an idea that grounds appearances. In this respect, Kant in the further passages presupposes that "[t]his empirical character is itself determined in the intelligible character" (A 551/B 579). That is to say, while he claims that a rational agent has a twofold causality and a twofold character in one self, the relation between these two characters is hierarchical; the intelligible character is ontologically prior to the empirical character as the latter's ground. Shortly after, concerning this relation between two characters, Kant states that the empirical character is the "sensible schema" (A 553/B 581) or the "appearance" (A 541/B 569) of the intelligible character. These questions concerning the relation between the empirical and intelligible characters (whether the latter is the ground of the former and whether the former is the sensible schema of the latter) will be discussed according to Wood's and Allison's views at the end of the chapter.

Nevertheless, there arises an ambiguity in Kant's text when he assumes that the intelligible character grounds the empirical character and the empirical character is the 'sensible schema' or 'appearance' of the intelligible character -in which the

intelligible character is dependent on the empirical character in attributing its effects to appearances- for the aim of reconciling nature and freedom.

What does this ambiguity pertain to, exactly? As has been clarified so far, Kant's transcendental idealism renders necessary the division of the object into phenomena and noumena and the division of the subject into empirical and intelligible characters for the sake of attaining his aim in reconciling nature and freedom, which are located in phenomena and noumena respectively. That is to say, by means of transcendental idealism, Kant can attribute both an empirical causality and an intelligible causality to one and the same object or world. At the same time, transcendental idealism makes it possible to attribute an empirical character and an intelligible character to one and the same subject.

However, the kind of relation between appearances and things in themselves as well as between the empirical and intelligible characters is not very clear in Kant's texts. Although Kant claims that there is a twofold causality in one object and a rational agent has a twofold character in one self, he also assumes that there is a hierarchical relation between these two causalities and two characters, which make us think as if there are two distinct objects and two distinct selves. Such an assumption makes it hard to think that these twofold causalities and twofold characters can be united in one and the same effect, thereby making it hard to unite nature and freedom in one and the same effect. It makes us question whether a reading, which mostly follows the hierarchical relationship between appearances and things in themselves and between the empirical and intelligible characters, is the only way to unite nature and freedom.

This ambiguity in Kant's text has led to two different interpretations of transcendental idealism among contemporary commentators. Questions have arisen due to the twofold reading of transcendental idealism. With respect to object or world, are there two distinct worlds as appearances (phenomena) and things in themselves (noumena) or are appearances and things in themselves two aspects of one and the same world? With respect to the subject, are there two distinct selves as

phenomenal self (empirical character) and noumenal self (intelligible character) or are phenomenal self and noumenal self the two aspects of the one and the same self?

This debate is argued among contemporary commentators under the name of the 'two-world' and the 'two-aspect' interpretations of transcendental idealism. Wood (2005) prefers to name these interpretations as 'the causality interpretation' and 'the identity interpretation', as he wants to draw attention to the kind of relation between appearances and things in themselves and between the empirical and intelligible characters (pp. 64-65). Thus, the same question can be asked: is there an ontological distinction between phenomena, to which the empirical character belongs, and noumena, to which the intelligible character belongs, or an epistemological distinction, which rejects any kind of hierarchy? Kant also formulizes this question with respect to the freedom and nature debate as follows: "Is it a truly disjunctive proposition to say that every effect in the world must arise *either* from nature *or* from freedom; or must we not rather say that in one and the same event, in different relations, both can be found" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 536/B 564)?

4.3. One World or Two Worlds?

4.3.1. The Two-World or the Causality Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism

The causality interpretation of transcendental idealism, namely the two-world or two-object interpretation, takes appearances and things in themselves as two separate worlds or as two distinct entities. Concerning the subject, the causality interpretation can be named as the two-selves interpretation. The two-selves interpretation takes the empirical and intelligible characters as two distinct selves belonging to two different worlds.

According to the causality interpretation, as its name implies, there is a causal relationship between appearances and things in themselves, in which things in

themselves are the cause or ground of appearances and appearances are the effect of things in themselves. (Also, with respect to the subject, there is a causal relationship between the empirical character and the intelligible character, in which the intelligible character is the ground of the empirical character and the empirical character is the effect of the intelligible character.) The causality interpretation treats appearances as "subjective states in us, that are *caused* by things in themselves outside us". That is to say, "[a]ppearances have no existence in themselves, being only representations in us", viz. they have no objective reality in the field of appearances but are grounded by transcendentally "real things" that are unknowable things in themselves that lie outside the field of appearances (Wood, 2005, p. 64). For instance, we intuit a tree by our inner sense only as it appears to us in the empirical world, yet its ground as it is in itself, viz. its existence, lies outside the field of the empirical world. Therefore, the tree as it appears to us as an effect and the tree as it is in itself as a ground are two different objects. That is to say, the object as it appears to us and the object as it is in itself are not identical with one another.

The causality interpretation presupposes an ontological distinction between appearances and things in themselves as well as between the empirical and intelligible characters since there is a hierarchy in the relation of 'ground' and 'effect'. That is to say, in the distinct realms of things in themselves, i.e., the ground of appearances, and appearances, i.e., the effect of its ground, things in themselves are ontologically prior to appearances. (Correspondingly, the empirical character is grounded in the intelligible character; therefore, the intelligible character is ontologically prior to the empirical character.) Concerning the problem of the reconcilability of freedom and natural causality, in which freedom is consigned to the noumenal world and natural causality to the phenomenal world, the causality interpretation claims that freedom is ontologically prior to natural causality. In other words, according to this interpretation, our being determined by nature is grounded in our being free. According to Allison (1983), this model of transcendental idealism designates a "dualistic picture" (p. 8).

4.3.2. The Two-Aspect or the Identity Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism

The identity interpretation of transcendental idealism, also called the one-world or two-aspect interpretation, does not take appearances and things in themselves as two distinct worlds or entities. On the contrary, it conceives them as two different descriptions or aspects of one and the same world or entity 'as it appears to us' and 'as it is in itself'. With respect to the self, the identity interpretation, i.e., one-self interpretation, considers the empirical and intelligible characters as two different ways of describing one and the same self.

The identity interpretation rejects the existence of a hierarchical causal relation between appearances and things in themselves, thereby establishing "two levels of reality" (Hudson, 2002, p. 239) and, as befits its name, adopting the identity of objects as they appear to us and as they are in themselves. However, such identity does not mean that appearances and things in themselves or the empirical character and the intelligible character are really identical; otherwise the action that is causally determined would be equal to the action that is independent of such determination. That is, we would render equal two conflicting terms.

Such an identity, however, shows that they are logically identical. In other words, when we claim that there are two aspects, namely an empirical and an intelligible aspect of one and the same world and one and the same self, the distinction of these aspects, as if they belong to two separated fields is considered "only metaphorically" (p. 239). That is to say, according to the identity interpretation, empirical objects are "'considered' at the metalevel of philosophical reflection (transcendental reflection)", in which we can think objects as they appear to us on the same level as objects as they are in themselves (Allison, 1996, p. 3).

The identity interpretation presumes that "appearances are not merely subjective entities or states of our minds; they do have an existence in themselves" (Wood, 2005, p. 65). Thus, unlike the causality interpretation, which takes appearances as empirically ideal entities of our mental states, i.e., which treats appearances of the

inner sense as if they are absolutely real things, the identity interpretation shows that appearances have objective reality in the empirical world by confining empirically real objects of appearances to our cognitive faculties, that are, sensibility and understanding. That is to say, while the causality interpretation takes the distinction "at the empirical level" (akin to empirical idealism), the identity interpretation takes the distinction "at the transcendental level" (akin to transcendental idealism) by acknowledging the limitation to and dependence on *a priori* conditions of human knowledge (Allison, 1983, pp. 8). Only through these universal and necessary conditions, i.e., space and time and pure categories, can we know an object as it appears to us and not as it is in itself.

If we are to give the example of the tree with regard to the identity interpretation, we can say that we intuit a tree by means of our sensibility as it appears to us in the empirical world. The tree as it is in itself exists in the same world too, albeit considered independently of time relations and our cognitive faculties; it does not belong to the faculties of sensibility and understanding but to the faculty of reason. Thus, concerning their phenomenal aspect, objects belonging to the faculty of understanding are empirically real; and concerning the noumenal aspect, the same objects belonging to the faculty of reason are transcendentally ideal. In other words, the object's empirical reality and transcendental ideality, which are conceivable under two different descriptions, coincide in one and the same object.

Rejecting the hierarchical or causal relation between appearances and things in themselves as well as between the empirical and intelligible characters, the identity interpretation also rejects the ontological distinction between phenomena and noumena and between the empirical and intelligible characters. The identity interpretation rather presupposes that the distinction between appearances and things in themselves is epistemological or methodological. In the case of freedom and natural causality, the identity interpretation claims that our being determined by nature is not grounded on our being free. On the contrary, they are at the same

transcendental level, being identical from two different aspects whereby human actions are both causally determined and at the same time free in the same action.

Contemporary commentators are divided into two poles concerning two different interpretations of transcendental idealism. Whereas most of the commentators like Wood, Guyer, Strawson, Vilhauer, and Xie are the defenders of the 'two-world' theory, commentators like Allison, Beck, Hudson, Pereboom, and Grenberg are among the ones who defend the two-aspect theory.

I will try to present the 'two-world' and 'two-aspect' interpretations of transcendental idealism and to question which one is a better explanation in achieving the reconciliation of freedom and nature by mostly comparing Wood's and Allison's interpretations on the debate. Wood and Allison interpret the relation between phenomena and noumena differently especially with respect to the ontological and epistemological readings of Kant's assumption that the "empirical character is itself determined in the intelligible character" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 551/B 579) and that the empirical character is the "sensible schema" (A 553/B 581) or the "appearance" (A541/B569) of the intelligible character.

4.4. Wood's Two-world Interpretation

In his article "Kant's Compatibilism" on Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves, Wood adopts an ontological two-world interpretation. In Wood's (1998) words,

> Kant's compatibilism . . . is based on the aggressively metaphysical distinction between phenomena and noumena; far from unifying our view of ourselves, it says that freedom and determinism are compatible only because the self as free moral agent belongs to a different world from that of the self as natural object. (pp. 240-241)

According to Wood, Kant can achieve his aim of reconciling freedom and nature only if he locates the intelligible character and the empirical character in two distinct worlds, namely noumena and phenomena, in which noumena is ontologically prior to

phenomena, viz. noumena is the ground of phenomena. Correspondingly, through such a model, Wood proposes that there are two ontologically distinct selves, the intelligible character being the ground of the empirical character, and Kant can unite freedom and nature without uniting these two distinct selves in one and the same self.

Kant insisted, however, that an agent has a twofold character in one self, the effects of which can be reconciled in one and the same effect; nature and freedom be can conceived as united through the unity of self and unity of the effects of the actions of the empirical and intelligible characters. Thus, although Wood's claim that the intelligible character is ontologically prior to the empirical character follows Kant's statement that the intelligible character grounds the empirical character, he misses the point that these two characters are united in one self.

In this respect, although Wood adopts an ontological distinction between appearances and things in themselves and between the empirical and intelligible characters, which follows Kant's passages closely, at certain points he interprets these passages very differently from what Kant meant them to be.

It is also one of these passages where Kant proposes transcendental idealism for the possibility of reconciling nature and freedom. In order to refuse transcendental realism, Kant states that "if appearances are things in themselves, freedom cannot be upheld. Nature will then be the complete and sufficient determining cause of every event" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 536/B 564). What Kant means here, as has been expressed in the section on transcendental realism and transcendental idealism, is that we should not treat appearances as absolutely real existences but as mere representations, which are dependent on the *a priori* conditions of experience. That is to say, these representations are taken to be the effects of their antecedent causes in an empirical series in infinitum in accordance with natural causality, i.e., empirical causality. If we took appearances as absolutely real existences, then causality of freedom, viz. intelligible causality, would be the determining cause of all existences, and the order of nature would be violated. In this sense, Kant adopts the teaching of the Second Analogy. However, at this point, Wood reverses Kant's claim in the way

that empirical causes are not "merely apparent causes, but the real causes of our actions" (Wood, 1998, p. 251). As appearances are not things in themselves, empirical causes are "*not* the complete and self-sufficient cause[s] of events . . .. Rather, the complete and self-sufficient cause of actions is our free will, located in the intelligible world" (p. 251).

The reason Wood claims the reverse standpoint that Kant adopts is that, according to Wood, only the intelligible cause is causally efficient, that is, only the intelligible cause has the power to produce its effect. The empirical cause is insufficient to produce its effect as it lacks spontaneity. Therefore, empirical effects would not occur in the field of appearances without a spontaneous cause which determines them outside the field of appearances. In this respect, Wood appeals to the ontological reading of transcendental idealism and claims that "phenomenal causality is grounded in noumenal causality" (p. 250) or phenomenal (empirical) causality is the effect of noumenal (intelligible) causality in his attempt to unite transcendental freedom and natural causality. In other words, Wood claims that transcendental freedom (intelligible causality) is ontologically prior to natural causality. This is probably why he appeals to the theory of causal efficacy, which overlooks Kant's teaching of the Second Analogy and instead underlines the teaching of the Third Antinomy by putting forward the ontological priority of transcendental freedom. However, Wood's theory of causal efficacy annihilates the teaching of the Second Analogy.

In addition to these, Hudson finds Wood's statement ambiguous when the latter claims that empirical causality is 'the effect' of intelligible causality. According to Hudson, being in a relation of cause and effect is a connection that occurs among individual empirical series of nature. Such a relation cannot be justified when applied to two different kinds of causalities (Hudson, 2002, p. 238).

Moreover, Kant never claims intelligible causality is the real ground of empirical causality. According to Ralph Barton Perry (1990), it can only be "the contingent ground" of empirical causality (p. 636). Besides this, Kant emphasizes that the real

ground of empirical causality is the transcendental object in A 538/B 566. Nevertheless, by taking intelligible causality as the real ground of empirical causality, Wood makes a forceful claim than Kant does (Hudson, 2002, p. 236). If intelligible causality were the real ground of empirical causality, then there would be no natural causality because every event in the field of appearances would be determined by the causality of things in themselves. Thence, Kant's supposed reconciliation of freedom and nature would fail according to Wood's model since the former seeks for a 'logical' possibility of reconciliation. Wood's model, however, "commits Kant to a necessity claim" (p. 238). In conclusion, Wood's ontological two-world interpretation of transcendental idealism does not suggest a proper picture for Kant's purpose.

4.5. Allison's Two-aspect Interpretation

Criticizing Wood and other ontological two-world theorists for providing a 'non-critical' view of transcendental idealism, Allison claims that Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves and between empirical and intelligible characters should be provided with an epistemological interpretation which views them as two aspects of the same thing.

Recalling briefly the explanation of the two-aspect theory, one is to see that Allison's theory distinguishes itself from the 'standard picture' of the ontological two-world theory in some respects. Firstly, concerning the world, Allison (1996) draws the distinction "at the metalevel of philosophical reflection (transcendental reflection)" in which we can conceive of two distinct descriptions of empirical objects, namely 'as they appear to us' and 'as they are in themselves', rather than think of two kinds of objects as appearances and things in themselves (p. 3).

Such transcendental thinking requires an epistemological stance in which human knowledge is limited to the field of appearances through the universal and necessary conditions of experience, viz. space and time and pure categories. This way we can

only know that things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves must be conceived as lying outside our limits of knowledge. Allison (1990) calls these conditions required for his view of transcendental idealism 'epistemic conditions', i.e., "conditions of the possibility of the representations of objects", differentiating them from the two-world view's 'ontological conditions', i.e., "conditions of the possibility of the being of things" (p. 4). Due to this epistemological stance, Allison rejects the view that noumena are the ground of phenomena. That is to say, Allison rejects this ground-effect relationship, claiming that phenomena and noumena are identical at the meta-level of philosophy.

Secondly, concerning the self, Allison again differentiates his interpretation from Wood's standard picture. Wood thinks that there are two distinct selves located in two distinct worlds, namely the empirical character and the intelligible character. The relation between these two selves is expressed in causal terms as follows: the intelligible character is the ground of the empirical character, and the empirical character is the effect of the intelligible character. Wood attributes causal efficacy only to the intelligible character as a power spontaneously producing its effect and treats the empirical character as insufficient to produce its effect. In Wood's model, the empirical character remains only as "a product" of the intelligible character (Allison, 1990, p. 32). Therefore, when Kant claims that the empirical character is the "sensible schema" of the intelligible character (Kant, 1781/2007, A 533/B 581), Wood understands that the empirical character is "transcendentally caused" (Grenberg, 2010, p. 116) by the intelligible character, remaining only as an expression of the latter. In conclusion, Wood considers the relation between the empirical and intelligible characters only in the cosmological context of the Third Antinomy. This is because Wood's model attributes the intelligible character to transcendental freedom that spontaneously produces both its and the empirical character's effects independently from the causality of nature. Thus, according to Wood's model, the determination of the causality of nature is insufficient to determine the effects of the empirical character.

Allison rejects such a cause and effect relation between the intelligible character and the empirical character, which are located in two distinct worlds as two distinct kinds of selves. Instead, he claims that the empirical and intelligible characters are conceived as two different aspects of one and the same self. Then the question arises whether there is no causal relation between the empirical character and the intelligible character; if somehow we are to conceive of the intelligible character "in accordance with the empirical character" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 540/B 568), then how would the empirical character and the intelligible character be united in one and the same self?

Here, as has been expressed above, Allison points out the importance of conceiving the distinction between the empirical and intelligible characters at the metalevel of philosophical reflection so that the empirical character can be considered as identical with the intelligible character. In this respect, in order to exhibit his interpretation of transcendental idealism, Allison turns away from an explanation of the distinction in cosmological terms and rather focuses on Kant's further passages where Kant formulates the distinction in moral terms. That is to say, for Allison, transcendental freedom and natural causality are not adequate to satisfy Kant's supposed intention to reconcile freedom and nature.

Allison therefore appeals to practical freedom[5], which makes it possible to conceive the causality of reason through imperatives in the form of an 'ought'. According to Kant, "[t]hat our reason has causality, or that we at least represent it to ourselves as having causality, is evident from the *imperatives* which in all matters of conduct we impose rules upon our active powers" (A 547/B 575). 'Ought' represents itself in the first *Critique* as a theory of human agency (empirical and intelligible characters) which is attributed to the causality of reason.

Allison constructs his theory of uniting the empirical and intelligible characters in one and the same self, following Kant's claim that it is "at least possible for reason to

[5] This is only a preliminary for chapter V. Practical freedom and Allison's theory will be discussed at chapter V.

have causality with respect to appearances" (A 548/B 576). That is to say, though reason is intelligible, it is possible to think that there is "a 'naturalized' version of the causality of reason" or a naturalized version of freedom which finds its expression in the empirical character (Allison, 1990, p. 34). In Kant's words, "[r]eason though it be, it must none the less exhibit an empirical character" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 549/B 577).

Attributing the empirical character to the causality of reason, Allison rejects the view that the empirical character is merely an effect of the intelligible character like in Wood's model. The empirical character has its own cause and determines its effects; it is causally efficient. Therefore, when Kant claims that the empirical character is the sensible schema of the intelligible character, Allison interprets it in the sense that the empirical character is the "empirical or phenomenal expression of reason": "It is on this basis that Allison introduces the possibility of a genuine causality of reason on the empirical level, grounding a compatibilist conception of freedom" (Grenberg, 2010, p. 116).

To sum up, in Wood's two-world interpretation, it is possible to attribute only the intelligible character to the causality of reason, as Wood takes the empirical and intelligible characters in two ontologically distinct worlds. There is a cause and effect relationship between the empirical and intelligible characters in which the former is the effect of the latter. However, in Allison's two-aspect interpretation, it is possible to attribute both characters to the causality of reason (causality of freedom), as Allison takes empirical character and intelligible character in one and the same world, as two different aspects of this world. Thus, while the intelligible character is the noumenal expression of reason or freedom, which is incompatible with the causality of nature, the empirical character is the phenomenal expression of reason or freedom, which is compatible with the causality of nature. There is no cause and effect relation between two characters, but they are identical at the same metaphysical level. However, the above-mentioned explanation (or Allison's two-aspect theory) does not give an account of how the empirical and intelligible

characters are united in one and the same self. In order to clarify this point, Allison provides a theory of rational agency in his "Incorporation Thesis" which will be delved into in chapter V.

4.6. An Overview on the Two-World and the Two-Aspect Interpretations of Transcendental Idealism

In this section, I will try to expose the criticism to the two-world theory and the defense of the two-aspect theory, including the views of Allison and Wood. Before beginning the section, it is crucial to note that while Wood in his article "Kant's Compatibilism" – where I discuss his two-world interpretation in contradistinction to Allison's two-aspect interpretation – defends the two-world or causality interpretation, in his later work *Kant* he criticizes it. His stance is rather closer to the two-aspect interpretation of transcendental idealism in his book *Kant*. Hence, the criticism to the two-world theory will mostly involve Wood's later views.

In interpreting transcendental idealism, there seems to arise problems regarding the causality interpretation (the two-world interpretation). Firstly, both Allison and Wood (in his book *Kant*) claim that although Kant's idealism differs from Berkeley's in attributing the reality of existences not to God but to things in themselves, the causality interpretation seems to come close to the Berkeleyan subjective or empirical idealism in that both treat appearances as nothing more than our mental states (Wood, 2005, p. 71; Allison, 1983, p. 5). Regarding the causality interpretation of transcendental idealism, it is hard to say that objects have objective or empirical reality as they lack their existence in themselves in the field of appearances; they seem to be empirically ideal instead.

Concerning this issue, in his book *Kant* Wood (2005) criticizes the two-world view and holds that "[o]n the causality interpretation, this might look like a form of phenomenalism (akin to Berkeleyan idealism), that attempts to reduce real things (material objects) to patterns of sensation" (p. 72). Similarly, Allison (1983)

criticizes the two-world reading in that by confining knowledge to the mental states of the mind, Kant "undermines the possibility of genuine knowledge at all" (p. 5). Like Wood, Allison (1996) points out that "it combines a phenomenalism regarding the objects of human cognition with the postulation of a set of extra-mental entities, which, in terms of that very theory, are unknowable" (p. 3).

Furthermore, according to Allison (1996), the two-world view represents a view of noumenalism by presupposing an ontological distinction between appearances and things in themselves or by giving ontological priority to things in themselves (p. 11). Accordingly, such noumenalism removes the possibility of uniting freedom and natural causality in one and the same effect since it presupposes that freedom, which is located in things in themselves, is ontologically prior to natural causality, which is located in appearances.

Secondly, though there seems to be no serious problem when the causality interpretation is applied to the object distinguished as phenomena and noumena, it clearly fails when applied to the subject distinguished as empirical character and intelligible character (Wood, 2005, p. 74). Consigning a free intelligible character to a world distinct from that of the naturally determined empirical character and positing it in a relation in which intelligible causality is the unknown cause of empirical causality ruins Kant's aim in reconciling the intelligible character and the empirical character in one and the same self through their effects. In the resolution of the Third Antinomy, Kant clearly states that his transcendental idealism should render possible such reconciliation: "We should therefore have to form both an empirical and an intellectual concept of the causality of the faculty of such a subject, and to regard both as referring to one and the same effect" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 538/B 566).

Although Wood (1998), in his article "Kant's Compatibilism", asserts that freedom and natural causality can be reconciled without uniting the empirical and intelligible characters in one and the same self, he abandons this idea in his book *Kant* (2005) and claims that the causality interpretation does not work well with respect to the self

(in reconciling freedom and nature). Besides this, he criticizes the defenders of the causality interpretation, who claim that there are two selves belonging to two distinct worlds, for "piling metaphysical monstrosity upon metaphysical monstrosity" (Wood, 2005, p. 74).

It can briefly be concluded that the causality interpretation or the so-called two-world interpretation is not successful in exhibiting a critical standpoint of Kant's transcendental idealism.

The identity interpretation, on the other hand, seems more successful in justifying Kant's transcendental idealism. It exhibits a critical standpoint of transcendental idealism. According to the identity interpretation, things as they appear to us are not treated solely as our mental states but have an existence as they are in themselves; their existence is intelligible to us, though. Hence, appearances are empirically real concerning our cognitive faculties, namely sensibility and understanding, from the phenomenal aspect. Since they exist in themselves, the same appearances are at the same time transcendentally ideal concerning our faculty of reason. In other words, the identity interpretation exhibits its significance in restricting our knowledge of representations to our cognitive faculties as they appear in space and time. What we know is merely representations through the forms of sensibility. Nevertheless, the faculty of reason presses the idea that these same representations "have no independent existence outside our thoughts" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 491/B 519). At this point, the identity interpretation of transcendental idealism differs from Berkeleyan empirical idealism by limiting the empirical reality of appearances to our forms of sensibility and the existence of appearances to our thoughts, in which our representations are rescued from being merely subjective states of our minds for the sake of objectivity. Otherwise there would be "appearance without anything that appears" (B xxvi-B xxvii).

In Allison's (1996) words, the two-aspect interpretation "is not phenomenalistic; and since things considered as they are in themselves are not ontologically distinct from the objects of human experience, there is no postulation of a separate realm of

unknowable entities" (pp. 3-4). What makes Allison distinctive is that he bases his theory on the distinction between the transcendental object=x and things as they are in themselves. Hence, things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves can be identical in that both can be attributed to the transcendental object=x as two different aspects of it (Allison, 1996, p. 16).

However, Allison also confesses that the two-aspect interpretation has its weak points. This model is not adequate as regards the explanation of uniting the empirical character and the intelligible character in one and the same self since these characters contradict one another due to former's servitude to the causality of nature and the latter's independence of such causality. Allison thus solves this problem with his theory of rational agency (Allison, 1990, p. 5).

CHAPTER V

DOES KANT'S SOLUTION WORK?

5.1. Transcendental Freedom and Practical Freedom

The conception of freedom formulated in the first *Critique,* namely transcendental freedom, i.e., a mere 'idea of reason', is established in the "cosmological context of the Third Antinomy" (Allison, 1983, p. 310). In the first *Critique* (in the Third Antinomy), the problem of freedom is introduced as a pure transcendental idea, postulated for its supposed reconcilability with the causality of nature regardless of its actuality or even its possibility.

Because of its inability to establish the reality of freedom theoretically, transcendental freedom, as a regulative idea of speculative reason, signifies the negative concept of freedom. In the context of practical reason, as the subject of the second *Critique* Kant introduces a second, and this time positive, conception of freedom. This conception of freedom elaborated on in the second *Critique*, namely practical freedom, is established in the "moral context" (p. 310). Practical freedom is the freedom of human agency who acts in accordance with rules (moral law) given to oneself as imperatives in the form of 'ought', i.e., who acts according to 'what ought to be'. Thus, in the second *Critique* the reality of freedom is provided through practical freedom in accordance with the moral law. Due to its power to establish the reality of freedom in accordance with the moral law, practical freedom, as a constitutive idea of practical reason, signifies the positive concept of freedom.

Kant introduces the concept of practical freedom in order to propose a solution to the problem of freedom concerning the relation between these two kinds of freedom. On

the other hand, my focus is limited to practical freedom within the context of the first *Critique*, where it is formulated in a non-moral context, denoting a "theory of human agency" (p. 310). I will further elaborate on this point when exposing the relationship between transcendental freedom and practical freedom in the following passages.

5.1.1. Transcendental Freedom

As has been discussed in chapter III, Kant defines two kinds of causalities in the Third Antinomy and its resolution. The first kind of causality is the causality of nature, namely the causality of the Second Analogy (and also the causality discussed in both the thesis and the antithesis of the Third Antinomy), which settles the principle that every event has a cause that determines its preceding state or cause in infinitum in accordance with the law of nature. Such causality belongs to the faculty of understanding as it cannot be thought independently of the conditions of experience.

The second kind of causality is the causality of freedom or transcendental freedom, i.e., the causality peculiar to the thesis of the Third Antinomy, which has "the power of beginning a state spontaneously [of itself]" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 533/B 561) in the time series, yet independently of the preceding states or causes which determines it in time. Thence, transcendental freedom is the 'uncaused cause', 'intelligible cause' or 'first cause' in the causal chain of time, which is not determined by an antecedent cause but only determines itself, and yet is in accordance with natural causality. Such causality belongs to the faculty of reason due to its being independent from the conditions of experience.

My being transcendentally free manifests itself in my possession of the power to originate a new series in time without being subjected to the antecedent causes; this way I can be the uncaused beginner of a causal chain in the empirical world. However, transcendental freedom, which is to be thought of as a spontaneous beginner of an empirical series in time in accordance with natural causality, is a mere

postulation of reason, 'a pure transcendental idea'. Hence, transcendental freedom, as an intelligible causality, does not give any evidence – it cannot be derived from experience – concerning whether "I am free" in the transcendental sense. There is no real possibility of transcendental freedom in the sensible world, but only a logical possibility of it, in that my being transcendentally free brings about no discrepancy in conceiving it (Pereboom, 2006, p. 545). That is to say, it is not contradictory to conceive that I am transcendentally free in my acts in the sensible world, even if I 'really' am not. Thus, transcendental freedom remains merely as 'spontaneity' or 'causality' insofar as it is only "required to make an origin of the world conceivable" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 449/B 476). In conclusion, transcendental freedom is a negative concept of freedom as it merely signifies an independence from the law of nature but is not conceived as being determined by its self-legislative reason. Thus, transcendental freedom is "inadequate to the needs of ethics" as it lacks the action of human agency in the determination of the will. (Beck, 1966, p. 179).

5.1.2. Practical Freedom

Practical freedom (in the second *Critique* and *Groundwork*), in contradistinction to transcendental freedom, involves the actions of human agency as a capacity and power in determining the will in order to meet the needs of ethics through the moral law. Hence, there is a necessary connection between practical freedom and morality. Grounded on practical freedom itself, the moral law determines it at the same time. That is to say, the moral law emerges as the "*ratio cognoscendi*" of practical freedom "since it is through the consciousness of this law that one becomes aware of one's freedom, while freedom functions as the *ratio essendi* of the moral law" (Allison, 1983, p. 310).

In other words, positive freedom is derived from morality, and morality renders its actualization possible. My being practically free manifests itself in that I am free insofar as I am morally responsible for my actions in accordance with the moral law,

which we have the power to constitute through the self-legislation of the will and which we give to ourselves in an *a priori* fashion. Thus, practical reason, or the will, is a lawgiving faculty. Freedom of the will, which Kant later discusses at length under the conception of 'autonomy', denotes the positive conception of freedom. Thus, my being practically free, due to its being actualized by the moral law, leads to the real possibility of freedom, in which I can conceive myself as 'I am free' and feel its effects in the sensible world although I cannot *know* that 'I am free'.

Therefore, I cannot encounter practical freedom or free will itself through the conditions of experience as it belongs to the intelligible causality of reason. I can only experience its effects in the field of appearances. As I have mentioned above, practical freedom is not constituted in moral lexicon in the first *Critique*; it rather manifests the capacity of a human agency to act on the basis of "what ought to be" through the faculty of reason. As has been quoted before, in Kant's words, "[t]hat our reason has causality, or that we at least represent it to ourselves as having causality, is evident from the *imperatives* which in all matters of conduct we impose rules upon our active powers" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 547/B 575). Imperatives are applied to an action in the form of 'ought' judgments, i.e., judgments of moral responsibility. Acting on the basis of an 'ought', i.e., acting morally, indicates on the one hand a necessity of obeying the moral law, that is, an obligation to act according to the categorical imperative and, on the other hand, choosing or deciding independently of sensuous impulses imposed by the faculty of understanding as 'what is'. The latter obliges us to act according to the hypothetical imperative.

This capacity of acting independently of the sensuous motives and instead in accordance with the moral law represents itself as two different aspects of practical freedom in the first *Critique*, which are the negative aspect and the positive aspect respectively. It is important to note, however, that the distinction between these two aspects of (practical) freedom is not the same as the distinction between the positive and negative conceptions of freedom; it is a further distinction within the positive conception of freedom.

Practical freedom in its negative aspect is "the will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses" (A 534/B 562). In other words, it is the independence of our sensibility from the necessitation of sensuous motives and determination by inclinations. A will is enslaved when it does not have the rationality to withstand its sensuous desires and capability to act against its commands (Wood, 1998, p. 242). Kant names such an irrational will as "*arbitrium brutum"*, i.e., animal will, as it is both "*pathologically affected*" and "pathologically *necessitated*" by sensuous desires (Kant, 1781/2007, A 534/B 562). However, human will differentiates itself from animal will in the sense that although it is "*arbitrium sensitivum",* that is, a pathologically affected will similar to that of the animals, it is not "*brutum*" but "*liberum*" (A 534/B 562). That is to say, human will is related not only to the sensibility which affects it like animal will is, but also to reason through which it acts independently of the necessitation of sensible desires. Therefore, human will, in contradistinction to animal will, is free in the negative aspect of practical freedom insofar as it has the rational capacity to liberate itself from inclinations.

Practical freedom in its positive aspect, on the other hand, rests on the power of human agents' free choice of acting on the basis of *a priori* principles, i.e., the moral law. Agents construct such *a priori* principles themselves through their active self-determination or self-legislation of the will. As 'autonomy' means "the will's property of being a law to itself" (Kant, 1785/1997b, p.52), the positive sense of practical freedom is basically autonomy. Our actions are autonomous insofar as we act in accordance with the moral law, which is given by an imperative that is categorical. That is to say, practical freedom in the positive sense is "the capacity [of rational agents] to will *a priori*" (Kant, 1817/1996, p. 401).

In the negative sense of practical freedom, our actions are heteronomous as our will is affected by sensibility (even though it is not necessitated by sensibility). 'Heteronomy' means being governed by rules or factors outside oneself. When we are heteronomous, we act in accordance with a hypothetical imperative. Hypothetical imperatives are conditional; that is, they have the form 'if you want x, do y'. Since

the act commanded by a hypothetical imperative is conditioned by a desire or a consequence that one wants to attain, hypothetical imperatives are heteronomous. Thus, in its negative sense, practical freedom is the freedom from empirical causes such as desires, impulses, coercion, consideration of consequences, physical needs, and so on.

Wood (1998) states that while practical freedom in its negative aspect explains "free will in terms of the way it does *not* operate", practical freedom in its positive aspect explains it "in terms of what it *can* do" (p. 242). That is to say, while the former (practical freedom in its negative aspect) remains only as an independence of the will from the necessitation of sensibility, the latter (practical freedom in its positive aspect) is productive in constituting the moral law spontaneously. Therefore, it is the positive aspect of practical freedom, which is required for morality and through which we can be practically free (in the positive sense) in our actions insofar as we are morally responsible for them.

5.1.3. The Relation between Transcendental Freedom and Practical Freedom

After describing transcendental freedom and practical freedom, Kant draws attention to the relation between the two, which gives rise to the 'problem of freedom'.

The problem of freedom can be explained with the following words: if natural causality were the only causality in the phenomenal world, then everything would be sensible in the way that every effect is determined by its antecedent cause in infinitum. Then, there would be no place for an intelligible cause, i.e., transcendental freedom, which can spontaneously begin an empirical series independently from the antecedent causes. Moreover, if there were no transcendental freedom but only natural causality in the phenomenal world, then all our actions would be determined by sensuous motives. As, in this case, we could not resist determination by inclination, there would be no room for practical freedom in the negative sense. If there could be no practical freedom even in the negative sense, there would be no

practical freedom in the positive sense either; and the absence of practical freedom in the positive sense would lead to the abolition of morality. In connection with our not being practically free, we, as rational agencies, would not be able to determine our own actions through our self-legislative will, and we could not be morally responsible for our actions. For this reason, Kant emphasizes that "[t]he denial of transcendental freedom must, . . . involve the elimination of all practical freedom" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 534/B 562).

Thus, there seems to be a close relationship between transcendental freedom and practical freedom, in which practical freedom requires transcendental freedom. In Kant's words, "the practical concept of freedom is based on this *transcendental* idea" (A 533/B 561).

However, Kant's position in the solution of the Third Antinomy is not that we are 'actually' or 'really' free in the transcendental sense; only the logical possibility of such freedom is demonstrated. Further, Kant is nowhere able to prove that we are free in the practical sense; he merely states that, in the practical field, we cannot help but act under the presupposition that we are free.

As has been stated before, Kant's aim is not to prove the actuality or even the possibility of transcendental freedom in the solution of the Third Antinomy, but only to exhibit that "causality through freedom is at least *not incompatible with* nature" (A558/B 586). That is to say, Kant's aim is nothing more than to question whether it is possible to take freedom as a second kind of causality to exist in the phenomenal world in accordance with natural causality. The problem of freedom thus arises due to the stance that 'real' practical freedom is based on a transcendental idea, the reality or even the possibility of which has not been established; it has only been put forth as a causality which is supposed to be met with another kind of causality, that of nature, without contradiction.

Wood (1998) claims that "[t]he free will problem arises for Kant because he believes that practical freedom requires transcendental freedom and that there is no room in

the causal mechanism of nature for a transcendentally free being" (p. 242). According to Beck (1966), on the other hand, the problem of freedom arises when Kant tries to maintain "freedom in his concept does not infringe on the laws of nature, and yet it is a basis for moral imputation" (pp. 190-191).

Consequently, it is the transcendental idea, i.e., transcendental freedom, which leads to the problem of freedom in Kant's theory of freedom. In other words, for Kant transcendental freedom is the "great stumbling-block" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 409) of human freedom. In short, the problem of free will due to the transcendental idea rests on two points. Involving the relation between transcendental freedom and practical freedom, which is our concern in this section, the first point is that transcendental freedom cannot provide a firm ground for practical freedom due to the reality or actuality of freedom (transcendental freedom). Involving the relation between transcendental freedom and natural causality, the second point is that transcendental freedom, as a second kind of causality, becomes part of an antinomy, namely the Third Antinomy, in which its reconciliation with natural causality is to become problematic.

Concerning only the first point, it can be said that there seems to be a complex relationship between transcendental freedom and practical freedom when one claims that practical freedom is based on transcendental freedom. Commentators who approach the problem of freedom in the light of the second *Critique* (see Pereboom, 2006, p. 559) accept Kant's claim that we can be practically free if and only if we are transcendentally free. That is to say, practical freedom can be real if and only if transcendental freedom is real. This reading seems conclusive. However, according to Allison, this cannot be the only possible reading when the problem is considered in the light of the first *Critique*. Allison (1983) accepts that there is a necessary relation between practical freedom and the transcendental idea; nevertheless, this does not indicate that the connection is "between the reality of the two types of freedom" (p. 319).

Besides these, although practical freedom requires transcendental freedom, two conceptions of freedom are clearly distinct from one another with respect to their spontaneity. As we have mentioned above, transcendental freedom is spontaneity, as it is the capacity to begin an empirical time series of itself independently of the determination of an antecedent cause. Likewise, practical freedom is spontaneity, as it is the power to produce its own law, i.e., moral law, independently of sensuous impulses, viz. by depending on *a priori* grounds. On this point, Wood (1998) claims that "[p]ractical freedom is always spontaneity because it requires transcendental freedom" (p. 245), Chad Wellmon (2010) disagrees with Wood, arguing that "[t]he spontaneity of the mind [of transcendental freedom] cannot be transposed onto a spontaneity of the will [of practical freedom]" (p. 64). That is to say, "[t]he possibility that the human being might be able to conceive of an epistemic spontaneity does not require or even imply a spontaneity of the will" (p. 65). Consequently, with respect to two explanations, viz. of reality and of spontaneity, transcendental freedom cannot provide a firm ground in its relation with practical freedom.

Nevertheless, the fact that we are able to conceive of an epistemic spontaneity, combined with the demonstration of the logical possibility of transcendental freedom in the Third Antinomy, constitutes the only way through which we can show the unity of the empirical and the intelligible characters. In that case, Allison insists that we have to render intelligible transcendental freedom's necessary relation to practical freedom. Regarding the solution of the complex relationship between transcendental freedom and practical freedom, Allison (1983) proposes that transcendental freedom has a "regulative function" concerning practical freedom: "This is in accord with the modeling function assigned to the Idea in the observation of the thesis of the Third Antinomy" (p. 319).

As has been established in the third chapter, intelligible cause, i.e., transcendental freedom functions only as a regulative idea, which orders or models the employment of understanding, not a constitutive principle, which employs "concepts to *constitute*

objects" (Gardner, 1999, p. 221). The issue is, when transcendental freedom is taken as a regulative idea, it has nothing to do with experience; rather, it functions "as a model that, though not establishing the actuality of practical freedom [otherwise it would be a constitutive idea], allows one to conceive of its possibility" (Wellmon, 2010, p. 65). Therefore, when transcendental freedom is taken in its regulative function, it is not necessary to prove its reality in order to prove the reality of practical freedom. Rather, the necessity of taking transcendental freedom as a postulation of reason, i.e., as a 'pure transcendental idea' in its relation to practical freedom, will make it possible to conceive human will as practically free. In brief, we can be practically free only by conceiving transcendental freedom in its regulative function.

It can be said with respect to the second *Critique* that the conception of freedom of the Third Antinomy, which regards freedom as a second kind of causality in addition to natural causality, is inadequate to prove the reality of itself and, consequently, the reality of practical freedom. However, it renders possible a "freedom of a turnspit" (Kant, 1788/2002, p. 123) which makes room for morality.

5.2. Compatibilism and Incompatibilism Debate with regard to Allison's 'Incorporation Thesis'

What constitutes the basis of Allison's 'Incorporation Thesis' is that transcendental freedom, as a postulation of reason, in its relation to practical freedom makes it possible to conceive human will as practically free. Allison proposes the unification of the empirical and intelligible characters in the practical context as a solution to the question of the compatibility of practical freedom and natural causality.

As has been mentioned in chapter IV, Allison's project of uniting the two aspects of the self, i.e., empirical character and intelligible character, in one and the same self in order to reconcile freedom and nature finds its solution by shifting from cosmological freedom (transcendental freedom) to practical freedom. A practically

free will which is actualized through acting on the basis of an 'ought' becomes the key concept for Allison's solution to the question of how two selves can be unified. Allison (1990) believes that Kant exhibits a "'naturalized' version of causality of reason" (or causality of freedom) to which the empirical character is attributed (p. 34). The causality of freedom thereby involves both an empirical and an intelligible character.

To facilitate this account, Allison makes use of the fact that 'ought' statements "[include] hypothetical as well as categorical imperatives" (Allison, 1983, p. 316). In the context of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, "*both* moral *and* pragmatic or prudential imperatives indicate a causality of reason" (Allison, 1990, p. 35).

As empirical character is connected with sensibility, its will is determined by hypothetical (pragmatic or prudential) imperatives, its actions thus being heteronomous. On the other hand, as intelligible character is connected with reason, its will is determined by categorical (moral) imperative, its actions being autonomous. In other words, hypothetical imperatives are the practical principles or maxims that are adopted by an empirical character; on the contrary, the categorical imperative is the moral law that is adopted by an intelligible character.

Therefore, intelligible character, due to its spontaneity and independence from the causality of nature, is capable of constituting its own *a priori* rules and of acting on the basis of these *a priori* principles. So, a rational agent, in its intelligible character, is practically free in the positive sense. However, empirical character is subject to the laws of nature on the one hand and is able to resist determination by sensuous impulses such as beliefs, desires, inclinations etc. imposed by nature on the other. By virtue of its being subject to the laws of nature, the rational agent in its empirical character is not free in the positive sense, but still has "limited spontaneity" (Engstrom, 1993, p. 405) to form rules as being attributed to a causality of reason. It has a disposition to act according to its 'subjective' principles by "subsuming the inclination or desire under a practical rule or principle" (Allison, 1990, p.39). Allison sees this empirical rational agent as bearing negative freedom. Therefore, empirical

character represents a compatibilist account of freedom as it reconciles the causality of nature with the negative sense of practical freedom.

Allison (1990) further states that "even desire-based or, . . . 'heteronomous' action involves the self-determination of the subject and, therefore, a 'moment' of spontaneity" (p. 39). Insofar as the rational agency involves deliberation, even in heteronomous actions when an acting subject formulates its course of action to itself in the form of a hypothetical imperative, it is acting under the assumption that it is free (which is rendered possible by the logical possibility of transcendental freedom).

This means that "even in the case of desire based actions" there is an element of spontaneity as long as such actions are the result of deliberation and thus expressions of agency. Allison's 'Incorporation Thesis' suggests that "an inclination or desire does not *of itself* constitute a reason for acting. It can become one only with reference to rule or principle of action, which dictates that we ought to pursue the satisfaction of that inclination or desire" (Allison, 1990, p. 40). That is to say, sensuous impulses, inclinations, and desires cannot determine an empirical character as they are insufficient to begin an action on their own; they must be 'incorporated' under a rule or maxim provided by the spontaneity of an intelligible character.

However, according to Allison (1990), Kant is not content with such a compatibilist conception of freedom that is attributed to the empirical character since "nonmoral motivation" (p. 35) with its limited spontaneity, due to its being subject to the laws of nature, is "insufficient to determine the will" (p. 39). This is why Kant appeals to an incompatibilist account of freedom (as it is contradictory with natural causality's force and influence) attributed to the intelligible character, which involves genuine and absolute spontaneity in its actions due to its being independent from the laws of nature.

> For practical freedom presupposes that although something has not happened, it ought to have happened, and that its cause, [as found] in the [field of] appearance [the action of empirical character], is not, . . . so determining that it excludes as causality of our will—a causality which, independently of those natural causes [intelligible causality], even contrary to their force and

> influence, can produce something that is determined in the time-order in accordance with empirical laws, and which can therefore begin a series of events *entirely of itself*. (Kant, 1781/2007, A 534/ B562)

Therefore, we can conceive the intelligible character, with its spontaneous act of incorporation, to have a "regulative function" in ordering the empirical character's actions in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions to be "subsumed under a rule of action" (Allison, 1990, p. 40). It is the regulative idea of reason (transcendental freedom) which makes it possible to relate the intelligible character's freedom with a naturalized version of freedom attributed to the empirical character. The empirical character thus may be compatible with an incompatibilist intelligible character, which can initiate a series of events spontaneously in nature.

By virtue of Incorporation Thesis, Allison unites empirical character and intelligible character in one and the same self and in one and the same effect, so that, transcendental freedom and natural causality can be united. However, transcendental freedom i.e. intelligible causality is incompatible with the laws of nature.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis investigated the problem of reconciliation of freedom and natural causality in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* As has been seen, the debate on freedom and natural causality arises from the conflict between the thesis and the antithesis of the Third Antinomy.

In order to exhibit this debate, in chapter II, I tried to give the conceptual framework which underlies the problem of freedom in Kantian philosophy. I focused especially on the Second Analogy, which shows the objective validity of experience through exhibiting the principle of causality: 'Every effect has a cause'. Asserting that there is a necessary connection between causes and effects, the principle of causality is a criticism of Hume's skepticism. By limiting possible experience to the field of appearances, it is also a criticism of dogmatism (especially of Berkeley's) as clarified in Kant's refutation of idealism. The Second Analogy is significant for Kant's theory of freedom as both sides of the Third Antinomy are based upon the principle of causality articulated therein.

In chapter III, I first presented the general character and structure of the antinomies in order to elucidate the Third Antinomy. Then, I focused on the proofs of the thesis and the antithesis of the Third Antinomy, including Kant's critique of them. I lay out that the solution of the Third Antinomy is possible through the distinction between mathematical and dynamical antinomies, which is one of the solutions offered by transcendental idealism.

Accordingly, in the beginning of the chapter, I pointed out that the human mind seeks for systematic unity of knowledge. Thus, the faculty of reason independent of the understanding is required. The distinction between the faculty of understanding and reason is crucial in grasping the structure of the antinomies. While the faculty of understanding is employed in the field of appearances, the faculty of reason relates to things in themselves. Being limited to the field of appearances, it is forbidden for the faculty of understanding to question what lies beyond the limits of possible experience. Unlike understanding, reason naturally and unavoidably overextends the limits of possible experience, thereupon falls into illusion. The illusion arises from the misemployment of reason; when it treats (the order of connection of) appearances as (the determination of) things in themselves.

As has been shown, the characteristic and the structure of the antinomies are based on transcendental illusion. In respect to their structure, antinomies are bilateral illusions involving thesis and antithesis, which stand as opposed to one another. While the theses search for the completion of the empirical series, allowing a first beginning, i.e., unconditioned condition for the demand of reason, the antitheses search for the uniformity and continuation of the empirical series, rejecting such an unconditioned condition in the field of appearances for the demand of understanding. Still, in the antitheses it is possible to think the idea of the unconditioned outside the field of appearances. In other words, the theses present the dogmatic rationalist side, whereas the antitheses the dogmatic empiricist side.

Hence, the conflict arises due to conceiving the unconditioned in two different ways; the series are involved either in finite or in infinite regress. In the theses, the unconditioned is conceived as a member of the series. Yet the unconditioned is not subordinated to any members of the series (finite regress), while all members of the series are. In the antitheses, the unconditioned is conceived as the totality of the series, in which all members are conditioned (infinite regress).

In light of this conceptual framework, I tried to explain the proofs of the thesis and the antithesis of the Third Antinomy.

The thesis of the Third Antinomy claims that there is both transcendental freedom and natural causality in the field of appearances. The argument for the need to speak of a second kind of causality (transcendental freedom) is as follows: If there were an infinite regress in time, we could not ascertain that an event sufficiently determines an event that comes after it and is considered its effect because we could not establish the totality of causal relations between events. From this perspective, no cause could be considered a sufficient cause. But still the law of nature insists that there must be a sufficient cause determined a priori for everything that exists. Therefore, natural law cannot be the only kind of causality, so that, transcendental freedom is not contradictory with natural causality. In other words, transcendental freedom and natural causality are compatible.

As has been concluded from the proof of the thesis, if we do not postulate transcendental freedom, then natural causality is self-contradictory. The self-contradiction occurs due to two opposing uses of sufficient cause (in the sense of the Second Analogy and in the Leibnizian or a priori sense) in one principle, that is, principle of causality. When taken in the sense of the Second Analogy, sufficient cause presupposes a necessary succession, i.e., a phenomenal causality between the conditions and the conditioned, in which a partial cause determines a partial effect in an infinite regress. In such regress, there is no completion of the series; instead, sufficient cause yields the extension and the continuation of the series for the demand of understanding to secure the universality of nature. On the other hand, when taken in the Leibnizian sense, sufficient cause presupposes an intrinsic connection, i.e., a noumenal causality between totality of conditions and the unconditioned, in which totality of partial causes are sought to attain a total effect for the completeness of the series due to the demand of reason. The reason why Kant appeals to a sufficient cause ‘determined a priori’ (or in the Leibnizian sense) is to make room for an intelligible cause, that is, transcendental freedom.

On the other hand, the antithesis of the Third Antinomy claims that there is only natural causality in the field of appearances. The proof of the antithesis concludes

that if we postulate transcendental freedom, then it contradicts natural causality since transcendental freedom ruins the uniformity of experience and nature, and renders the conception of nature as an ordered system meaningless. In other words, transcendental freedom (as causality) is incompatible with natural causality in the field of appearances. Nevertheless, it is not self-contradictory to think transcendental freedom (as an idea) outside the field of appearances.

Unlike the thesis, the antithesis of the Third Antinomy takes sufficient cause only in the sense of the Second Analogy and presupposes merely a necessary succession between the conditions and the conditioned.

In brief, the Third Antinomy takes the term causality in two different senses: a phenomenal causality, i.e., causality of nature, which belongs to appearances under the employment of understanding and a noumenal causality, i.e., causality of freedom, which belongs to things in themselves under the employment of reason. The former causality is entitled as cause and the latter as (logical) ground. The distinction between cause and ground is of great importance in the solution of the Third Antinomy at two points: Firstly, it makes it possible to question whether things in themselves are the ground of appearances or not. Secondly, the distinction between cause and ground aids to illuminate the debate on natural causality and freedom, whether they are compatible or not, concerning the distinction between empirical and intelligible characters. I tried to expose these points in the fourth and fifth chapters respectively.

Before passing to the fourth chapter, I tried to express the three methods offered by transcendental idealism for the solution of the antinomies in general. Among them, the first two solutions show that both sides of the mathematical antinomies are false through an indirect proof. These methods exhibit that the antinomy arises from the misemployment of reason; when reason is employed constitutively rather than regulatively, appearances are taken as things in themselves. Therefore, the antinomies can be resolved through a correct employment of reason where its task is not a constitutive principle, which extends the conditions beyond the limits of

possible experience, i.e., to things in themselves. Instead, reason's task must conduct a regulative rule, which provides the continuation of the conditions within the limits of possible experience, without seeking to reach to the unconditioned. The first two solutions are inadequate for the resolution of the antinomies as they cannot explain how both sides of the mathematical antinomies are false.

The third solution rests on the distinction between mathematical and dynamical antinomies. This solution asserts that while in the mathematical antinomies (the first and the second antinomies) both sides are false, in the dynamical antinomies (the third and the fourth antinomies) both sides may be true. Unlike the first two solutions, the third solution gives sufficient explanation of why both sides may be true or why both sides are false in relation to the two-fold use of the idea of the unconditioned.

As has been seen in the solution of the mathematical antinomies, since every member of the series is homogeneous inside the world, there is an infinite regress from the conditioned to its conditions. In other words, such homogeneous series of conditions always seek for a further condition due to the demand of the understanding. When reason demands the totality of the series, the unconditioned is restricted to appearances and it conflicts with the concepts of understanding as being too large and too small for them. This results in both sides being false.

On the other hand, in the solution of the dynamical antinomies a realm outside the world, i.e., things in themselves is rendered possible by allowing an intelligible causality as a heterogeneous element. By means of the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, the unconditioned is not restricted to the field of appearances, but it can be applicable both to appearances (on the side of the antithesis) and to things in themselves (on the side of the thesis). Hence, while on the side of the antithesis, the series can never be completed and is infinite due to the demand of understanding; on the side of the thesis, the series can be completed through the postulation of an intelligible element due to the demand of reason. Therefore, both sides may be true.

I can now reconsider the question whether transcendental freedom and natural causality are compatible or not, concerning the resolution of the dynamical antinomies.

Wood (1998), who claims Kant to be a compatibilist, states that "[Kant] wants to show not only the compatibility of freedom and determinism, but also the compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism" (p. 239). By 'the compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism', Wood calls attention to the nature of the dynamical antinomies, in which both sides are true without contradiction. Hence, according to Wood, Kant wants to make compatible the thesis of the Third Antinomy, which is the compatibilist side, and the antithesis of the Third Antinomy, which is the incompatibilist side.

However, claiming that the thesis and the antithesis are compatible does not necessitate claiming that transcendental freedom and natural causality are compatible.

Accordingly, Allison, who is an incompatibilist, claims that the thesis and the antithesis of the Third Antinomy may be "compatible with one another" though transcendental freedom is incompatible with natural causality (Allison, 1990, p.24)[6]. That is to say, although transcendental freedom cannot exist in the field of appearances, it is logically possible in the noumenal world. Though we cannot know that we are free in the phenomenal world, we can conceive that we are free from the effects of transcendental freedom: "[T]he representation of it is at least not self-contradictory" (Kant, 1781/2007, B xxviii).

[6] In his article "Kant's Compatibilism", rightly after claiming that freedom and natural causality are compatible or Kant is a compatibilist, Wood (1998) gives up his idea and maintains: "Kant does not believe, then, that freedom is incompatible with natural causation generally [here Wood designates contemporary compatibilism and incompatibilism debate], but only that it is incompatible with natural causation" (p. 247). Here, we can conclude that Wood's view on the debate on natural causality and transcendental freedom is in fact not different from Allison's incompatibilism. However, Wood errs when he insists on the claim that Kant is a compatibilist (or natural causality and transcendental freedom are compatible) and at the same time freedom is incompatible with natural causality. At this point, Simon S. Xie (2009) criticizes Wood for insisting on compatibilism as follows: "Wood has already regarded Kant as an incompatibilist, but somehow takes him as a compatibilist" (p. 55).

Then, according to me, Kant's true position is given by Allison who claims, "the Kantian project requires not merely the reconciliation of free agency with causal determinism . . . but rather the reconciliation of such determinism with an incompatibilist conception of freedom." (Allison, 1990, p. 28).

I have seen that the solution of the Third Antinomy through transcendental idealism (or the mathematical and dynamical distinction) could not show how transcendental freedom and natural causality can be reconciled. It only showed that the thesis and the antithesis of the Third Antinomy may be compatible with an incompatibilist conception of transcendental freedom by making a necessary distinction between appearances and things in themselves. For this reason, in chapter IV, I tried to show why Kant appeals to a distinction between the empirical character and the intelligible character in order to solve the debate on freedom and natural causality.

The empirical character and the intelligible character distinction provides a solution to the freedom and natural causality debate both in the cosmological context of the Third Antinomy and in the practical context through a theory of rational agency.

Kant holds that he can show the supposed reconciliation of freedom (intelligible causality) and natural causality (empirical causality) only if these two kinds of causalities can be united in one and the same effect and these two kinds of characters (empirical and intelligible characters) can be united in one and the same self.

As has been expressed, an agent has two characters. An agent in his/her empirical character is a subject of appearances and knows himself/herself immediately through the faculty of understanding. On the other hand, an agent in his/her intelligible character is a subject of things in themselves and cannot know himself/herself immediately, but can conceive of himself/herself only through the faculty of reason. So, just as intelligible causality must be thought in relation to empirical causality, intelligible character must be thought in relation to empirical character in order to attach the effects of intelligible character's actions to the field of appearances to be met with the same effects of the actions of empirical character. In this respect, Kant

claims that “empirical character is itself determined in the intelligible character” (Kant, 1781/2007, A 551/B 579).

However, the kind of relation between appearances/things in themselves and empirical character/intelligible character is ambiguous in Kant’s text. In order to unite freedom and natural causality, Kant, on the one hand, claims that there are two causalities which are attributed to transcendental object and a rational agency has two characters which are attributed to transcendental subject. Such attribution of phenomena and noumena to one object or world and empirical character and intelligible character to one subject reject any hierarchical relation between phenomena/noumena and between empirical character/intelligible character. On the other hand, Kant claims that there is a hierarchical relation between phenomena/ noumena, in which noumena is the ground of phenomena, and empirical character/ intelligible character, in which intelligible character is the ground of empirical character, so that, this makes us think as if there are two distinct objects and two distinct selves.

This ambiguity in Kant’s texts leads to two different interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism: two-aspect and two-world interpretations. While the former formulation of the above paragraph refers to the two-aspect interpretation, the latter refers to the two-world interpretation. I tried to discuss this issue by contrasting the two-world view of Wood and the two-aspect view of Allison.

Wood claims that freedom and natural causality can be reconciled only if the empirical character and the intelligible character are taken as two ontologically distinct selves as located in two ontologically distinct worlds, that are, appearances and things in themselves. By means of this ontological distinction, Wood assumes that things in themselves is the ground of appearances and intelligible character is the ground of empirical character. Assuming such causal relationship between empirical and intelligible characters, however, Wood’s two-world view is inadequate since it omits Kant’s intention to unite the empirical and intelligible characters in one and the same self in order to reconcile freedom and determinism.

Unlike Wood, Allison claims that the distinction between appearances and things in themselves and between empirical character and intelligible character must be an epistemological distinction. Thus, he constructs his two-aspect view by pointing out the distinction between transcendental object and things in themselves. Allison claims that we can conceive of things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves as two different aspects of one and the same world or object and empirical character and intelligible character as two different aspects of one and the same self. Attributed to a transcendental object "at the metalevel of philosophical reflection", things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves are logically identical (Allison, 1996, p.3). Correspondingly, attributed to a transcendental subject, empirical character and intelligible character are logically identical. That is to say, there is no hierarchical relation between them.

Such transcendental thinking requires epistemic conditions, in which human knowledge is limited to the field of appearances through the universal and necessary conditions of experience. Hence, Allison's two-aspect theory assures that we can know things only as they appear to us in the field of appearances. We cannot know things as they are in themselves, because they are outside our limits of knowledge, but we can only conceive of them.

Contrarily, Wood's two-world reading treats appearances as absolutely real things (or as things in themselves) and so makes empirical knowledge impossible as it reduces knowledge to our mental states. In this case, Wood's model represents a form of phenomenalism or subjectivism akin to Berkeleyan idealism.

As has been concluded, while Wood's two-world reading reflects a non-critical view of transcendental idealism, Allison's two-aspect reading reflects a critical view of transcendental idealism. Thus, Allison's reading seems more successful in explaining Kant's supposed purpose to reconcile freedom and natural causality.

In order to solve the debate on freedom and natural causality, Wood takes the distinction between the empirical character and the intelligible character in the

cosmological context of the Third Antinomy by appealing to a theory of causal efficacy. Wood argues that only spontaneous intelligible character is causally efficient to produce and determine its effect. However, empirical character is insufficient to do that due to the lack of spontaneity. That is to say, Wood's model attributes merely the intelligible character to the causality of reason (causality of freedom). The empirical character, lacking causal efficacy, is dependent to intelligible character, so that, empirical character remains merely as a product or an effect of the intelligible character. In short, in Wood's two-world view, freedom and natural causality can be reconciled when empirical character is taken merely as an expression of intelligible character in order to make intelligible character connect to the field of appearances.

Unlike Wood, Allison takes the distinction between the empirical character and the intelligible character in the practical context, which is limited to a theory of rational agency in the first *Critique*. Therefore, Allison appeals to practical freedom which makes it possible to conceive a causality of reason through imperatives in the form of an 'ought'. Allison attributes empirical character to the causality of reason for a 'naturalized' version of freedom. Hence, empirical character is not merely an effect or a product of intelligible character like in Wood's model. Empirical character also has causal efficacy to determine its effect. Therefore, in Allison's two-aspect view, while intelligible character is the noumenal expression of reason or freedom, which is incompatible with the causality of nature, empirical character is the phenomenal expression of reason, which is compatible with the causality of nature. However, Allison's two-aspect view is insufficient to explain how empirical and intelligible characters are united in one and the same self in order to reconcile freedom and nature. For this reason, Allison constructs his "Incorporation Thesis".

In chapter V, I tried to exhibit the relation between transcendental and practical freedom since their relation is significant in showing the unity of empirical and intelligible characters in one self. Then, I passed to Allison's 'Incorporation Thesis',

which shows the reconciliation of freedom and nature (with an incompatibilist conception of freedom) through uniting empirical and intelligible characters.

Transcendental freedom, a mere idea of reason in the cosmological context of the Third Antinomy, represents a negative conception of freedom since it cannot establish the reality of freedom. Conversely, practical freedom is the positive concept of freedom as it establishes the reality of freedom in the moral context of the second *Critique.* However, first *Critique*'s practical freedom is not taken in the moral context, but is introduced only as a theory of rational agency.

As has been pointed out, Kant emphasized that there is a close relation between transcendental freedom and practical freedom, in which practical freedom requires transcendental freedom. However, the free will problem arises due to transcendental freedom since practical freedom, which is conceived to be real, is based on the idea of transcendental freedom, which has no reality but only a logical possibility. Therefore, transcendental freedom cannot provide a firm ground in its relation to practical freedom and the debate on freedom and nature remains problematic.

Although in the context of the second *Critique,* practical freedom can be real if and only if transcendental freedom is real, in the first *Critique,* Kant's aim is neither to prove the reality of practical freedom, nor transcendental freedom, but their conceivability. In this case, both Allison and Beck claim that in the first *Critique* transcendental freedom must be conceived as a regulative idea in its relation to practical freedom (Allison, 1983, p. 319; Beck, 1966, p. 187).

When transcendental freedom is taken as a regulative idea, it has nothing to do with experience, so that, it is not necessary to prove its reality in order to prove the reality of practical freedom. Rather, transcendental freedom makes it possible to conceive of the human will as practically free. This possibility provides a seat for Allison's Incorporation Thesis.

As has been mentioned in chapter IV, Allison tries to solve the problem of freedom and natural causality, by uniting empirical and intelligible characters in the practical

context of the first *Critique*. The first *Critique* exposes practical freedom as the freedom of human agency who acts in accordance with a priori rules imposed upon oneself through imperatives in the form of an 'ought'. 'Ought' statements include hypothetical imperatives as well as categorical imperatives. We know that we have causality of reason (causality of freedom) from these imperatives. Thus, Allison attributes to causality of freedom an empirical character (for a naturalized version of freedom) as well as an intelligible character. Hypothetical imperatives are practical principles or maxims imposed upon the empirical character and categorical imperative is the moral law imposed upon the intelligible character.

In this case, practical freedom can be defined in two different senses: positive and negative.

When an agent is practically free in the positive sense, his/her actions are autonomous as he/she acts in accordance with the categorical imperative. Practical freedom in the positive sense is then the self-legislative capacity of a rational agent in its intelligible character to constitute the moral law and to act in accordance with it. Intelligible character owes this self-legislative capacity to its spontaneity.

On the other hand, practical freedom in the negative sense is the capacity of a rational agent in its empirical character to act independently of sensuous motives or impulses. When an agent is practically free in the negative sense, his/her actions are heteronomous as he/she acts in accordance with the hypothetical imperative. Allison claims that even in heteronomous actions there is an element of spontaneity for rational deliberation (Allison, 1990, p. 39). Although the empirical character is capable of resisting determination by sensuous impulses and of forming its principles or maxims, the spontaneity peculiar to it is limited due to its being subject to the laws of nature.

Concerning spontaneity, the intelligible character is incompatible with the causality of nature since it is the noumenal expression of freedom having genuine/absolute spontaneity. On the other hand, the empirical character is compatible with the

causality of nature since it is the phenomenal expression of freedom having limited spontaneity.

Allison claims that Kant does not confine his theory with a compatibilist account of freedom as it is "insufficient to determine the will" being subject to the laws of nature (p. 39). Kant rather endorses an incompatibilist account of freedom, which can spontaneously begin a series of events.

At this point, Allison puts forward his Incorporation Thesis in order to unite empirical and intelligible characters in one and the same self for the solution of the debate on freedom and natural causality. Incorporation Thesis propounds that sensuous impulses, inclinations or desires are not sufficient to begin an action on their own, so that, they cannot determine an empirical character. Thus, those stimulators must be 'incorporated' under a rule or maxim through the spontaneity of an intelligible character.

By virtue of this spontaneous act of incorporation, intelligible character can be conceived of as having a 'regulative function' in ordering or subsuming the actions of empirical character under a rule. Thus, through this regulative idea of reason, that is, transcendental freedom, the effects of the actions of intelligible character can be united with the effects of the actions of empirical character in the field of appearances.

In conclusion, Allison's Incorporation Thesis manifests that transcendental freedom and natural causality can be reconciled with an incompatibilist conception of freedom. I thus agree with Allison's defense and those Kant scholars such as Pereboom and Vilhauer who argue that Kant is an incompatibilist about freedom and natural causality.

Kant's characteristic incompatibilism involves the reconciliation of "an essentially libertarian view of freedom and moral responsibility with a deterministic conception of nature" (Pereboom, 2006, p. 537). Therefore, Kant's incompatibilism suggests that we can both be free through our will and determined by natural causality. As can be

seen, the debate regarding Kant's compatibilism and incompatibilism differs from the contemporary one, where compatibilism amounts to say that freedom can be reconciled with natural causality and where incompatibilism the other way around. Kant is not a compatibilist since he never thinks that there is no contradiction between free will and natural causality. Indeed quite the opposite; Kant is an incompatibilist since free will contradicts natural causality (Vilhauer, 2008, p.22).

Therefore, Kant's supposed purpose to show that "causality through freedom is *at least not* incompatible with nature" (Kant, 1781/2007, A 558/B 586) fails since transcendental freedom, as a second kind of causality, is incompatible with natural causality.

It can also be understood from the solution of the dynamical antinomies that transcendental freedom is not causally possible (really possible) in the field of appearances, but it is only logically possible to postulate transcendental freedom as a regulative idea of reason in the noumenal realm. Therefore, in the case of the Third Antinomy, it can be concluded that the antithesis has superiority over the thesis since freedom is an indeterminist and an incompatibilist concept. That is to say, Kant is a "strict [determinist] at the empirical level" (Allison, 1990, p. 31). As Ewing (1969) comments "The antithesis is right in asserting that there is no uncaused first cause and no absolutely necessary being to be found in the phenomenal world" (p. 193). In his book *Kant's Dialectic,* Jonathan Bennett (1990) also points out that the argument of the antithesis is predominant in that Kant "[puts] all his trust" on the principle of causality, which is exhibited in the Second Analogy, and then the argument of the thesis is "desultory and obscure" (p. 188).

When taken as a regulative idea (but not a constitutive principle), transcendental freedom has nothing to do with experience in the field of appearances, but it only provides the conceivability of practical freedom in things in themselves (or in the noumena) and so makes room for morality.

In this case, Bennett states that Kant is sympathetic for the argument of the thesis not for the cosmological demand of reason to reach to the completeness or the totality of conditions, but rather for the practical interest of reason to make room for "human freedom" and morality (p. 188).

Accordingly, "[Kant's] central claim is that it is only because the resolution of [the third] antinomy leaves a conceptual space for an incompatibilist conception of freedom that it is possible to give the claims of practical reason a hearing" (Allison, 1990, p. 11).

Thus, in Kant's theory of freedom, the realm of nature and the realm of morality are strictly separated from one another. The gulf between appearances, in which natural causality is located, and things in themselves, in which freedom and morality are located, can never be bridged but it still remains as an ideal striven to be bridged one day. All in all, the possibility of conceiving the reconcilability of freedom (morality) and nature lies in keeping them as separate realms.

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TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tezde Immanuel Kant'ın başlıca eseri olan Saf Aklın Eleştirisi'ndeki özgürlük ve doğa yasası arasındaki uzlaşabilirlik problemi ele alınacaktır. Burada doğa yasası ile kastedilen, zamansal dizilerdeki önceleyen koşullara bağımlı olmak iken; özgürlük ile kastedilen ise bu koşullardan bağımsız olmaktır.

Çağdaş felsefede özgürlük ve belirlenimcilik problemi bağdaşırcılık ve bağdaşmazcılık kavramları bağlamında tartışılır. Bağdaşırcılık problemi özgürlük ve belirlenimciliğin uzlaşabilir olduğu görüşüdür; yani insan davranışları hem doğa yasası tarafından belirlenmiştir hem de özgürdür. Diğer taraftan bağdaşmazcılık problemi ise özgürlük ve belirlenimciliğin uzlaşamaz veya çelişkili olduğu görüşüdür. Eğer belirlenimcilik doğru ise özgürlük bir yanılsamadır veya özgürlük doğru ise belirlenimcilik doğru olamaz.

Ancak Kant'ın özgürlük ve doğa yasası problemi tartışması çağdaş felsefedeki tartışmalardan farklıdır. Çağdaş felsefe tartışmaları kaynağını deneyci gelenekte bulurken, Kant'ın amacı aklın ve deneyimin sınırlarını belirlemek adına dogmatik metafiziği eleştirmektir. Bu eleştiri aslında aklın kendini eleştirmesinden öte bir şey değildir. Bu nedenle Kant, özgürlük ve doğa yasası problemini Aşkınsal Diyalektik'te ele aldığı Üçüncü Antinomi'nin dogmatik akılcı görüşü yansıtan tezi ve dogmatik deneyci görüşü yansıtan antitezi arasında meydana gelen çelişkiyi kaynak göstererek tartışır.

Probleminin kaynağını ve çözümünü göstermeye çalışmak amacıyla ikinci bölümde öncelikle özgürlük problemine işaret eden temel kavramlardan bahsedilecek ve Kant felsefesinin kavramsal çerçevesi çizilecektir. Bu kavramsal çerçeve kısaca Aşkınsal Estetik'te ele alınan duyusallık ve Aşkınsal Analitik'te ele alınan anlak yetileri aracılığı ile nesnel bilginin nasıl elde edildiğini ve deneyimin sınırlarının nasıl çizildiğini gösterir. Bu bölümde özellikle nedensellik ilkesinin ortaya konulduğu İkinci Analoji üzerinde odaklanılacaktır. İkinci Analoji'nin özgürlük problemi

açısından önemi, özgürlük probleminin kaynaklandığı Üçüncü Antinomi'nin hem tez hem de antitez taraflarının nedensellik ilkesi üzerine kurulu olmasıdır.

Üçüncü bölümde Aşkınsal Diyalektik'te ele alınan Üçüncü Antinomi'yi anlamak amacıyla öncelikle antinomilerin genel karakteri ve yapısı açıklanacaktır. Daha sonra Üçüncü Antinomi'nin tez ve antitez kısımlarının ispatları, bu ispatların değerlendirilmesi ve bu ispatlara gelen eleştiriler ayrıntılı bir şekilde incelenecektir. Bölümün sonunda antinomilerin çözümü verilecektir.

Aşkınsal Diyalektik'te Kant öncelikle sistematik birliğe ulaşmak amacıyla duyusallık ve anlak yetilerinden farklı olarak üçüncü bir yetiye olan ihtiyaçtan bahseder. Bu yeti akıl yetisidir. Bu noktada Kant, akıl ve anlak arasındaki farkı ortaya koyar. Anlak yetisi duyusal deneyime bağlıdır, deneyimin sınırları içinde görev alır ve bu nedenle görüngüler dünyasına aittir. Anlağın deneyimin sınırlarını aşması yasaklanmıştır. Ancak akıl kendini duyusal deneyim ile ilişkilendirmez, o kendini sadece anlak ile ilişkilendirir. Bu bakımdan akıl kendinde şeylere bağlıdır ve deneyimden bağımsız olduğu için doğal ve kaçınılmaz bir şekilde deneyimin sınırlarını aşma eğilimindedir. Akıl deneyimin sınırlarını aştığında çelişkiye düşer ve Aşkınsal Yanılsama meydana gelir. Aşkınsal Yanılsama aklın görüngülere sanki kendinde şeylermiş gibi davranmak suretiyle yanlış kullanımından kaynaklanır.

Yapıları gereği antinomiler Aşkınsal Yanılsama üzerine kurulmuştur. Antinomiler birbirine eşit şekilde karşı durmakta olan tez ve antitezi içeren iki taraflı yanılsamalardır. Antinomilerde tezler, aklın talebi üzerine, görüngüler alanında bir ilk başlangıç yani bir koşulsuz koşula izin vererek ampirik dizilerin bütünlüğünü ararken, antitezler, anlağın talebi üzerine, görüngüler alanında böyle bir koşulsuz koşulu reddederek ampirik dizilerin tekdüzeliğini ve devamlılığını arar. Buna rağmen, antitezlerde, koşulsuz idesini görüngüler alanının dışında düşünmek mümkündür. Bu bağlamda antinomilerin tez kısmı dogmatik akılcılığı yansıtırken, antitez kısımları dogmatik ampirizmi yansıtır.

Dolayısıyla antinomi, koşulsuz idesini ya dizilerin sonlu gerilemede olduğu ya da sonsuz gerilemede olduğu iki farklı şekliyle düşünmeye bağlı olarak meydana gelir. Tezler tarafında koşulsuz olan dizilerin bir elemanıdır, ancak dizilerin tüm elemanları birbirine tabiyken, koşulsuz olan dizilerin herhangi bir elemanına tabi değildir. (sonlu gerileme). Antitezler tarafında ise, koşulsuz olan tüm elemanlarının koşullu olduğu dizilerin toplamı olarak düşünülür. (sonsuz gerileme).

Bu kavramsal çerçeve ışığında Üçüncü Antinomi'nin tez ve antitez ispatları aktarılmaya çalışılacaktır. Kant burada dolaylı ispat yöntemini kullanır. Yani tezin ispatı için antitezin argümanıyla başlar ve buradan bir kendi çelişki yakalamaya çalışır. Antitez için de tezin argümanıyla başlayarak bir çelişki yakalamaya çalışır.

Üçüncü Antinomi'nin tezi görüngüler alanında doğa nedenselliğine ek olarak ikinci türden bir nedensellik olan aşkınsal özgürlüğün olduğunu iddia eder. Kant tezin ispatına görüngüler dünyasındaki tek nedenselliğin doğa yasası olduğu iddiasıyla başlar. Bu durumda doğadaki tüm olaylar kendisini önceleyen bir neden tarafından doğa yasasına uygun biçimde sonsuz bir gerileme ile belirlenir. Ancak eğer görüngüler alanındaki her şey doğa yasasına göre meydana gelirse, o halde bir ilk başlangıç hiçbir zaman olmayacak ve nedenler tarafındaki ampirik zaman dizileri hiçbir zaman tamamlanamayacaktır. Buna rağmen nedensellik ilkesi şunu buyurur: "yeterli olarak a priori belirlenmiş bir neden olmadan hiçbir şey olamaz". Bu ilke sınırsız evrensellikte düşünüldüğünde kendisi ile çelişir ve tam da bu nedenle doğa yasası görüngüler alanındaki tek nedensellik olamaz. O halde zamanda kendiliğinden mutlak bir şekilde başlayan ve doğa yasasıyla da çelişmeyecek olan ikinci türden bir nedensellik varsayılmalıdır. Bu mutlak kendiliğindenlik zamansal dizilerin nedenler tarafında tamamlanmışlığını sağlayacak olan aşkınsal özgürlüktür. Burada aşkınsal özgürlük doğa yasasıyla çelişmez; aksine onunla bağdaşır.

Tezin ispatından şöyle bir sonuç çıkar: eğer aşkınsal özgürlüğü koyutlamazsak (postüle etmezsek) doğa yasası kendisiyle çelişir. Bu kendiyle çelişme durumu birbiriyle çelişen iki yeter nedenin (İkinci Analoji'de serimlenen yeter neden ve Leibnizci anlamdaki yeter neden) tek bir nedensellik ilkesine atfedilmesinden

kaynaklanır. Yeter neden İkinci Analoji'de serimlendiği biçimiyle alındığında koşullar ile koşullu arasında zorunlu bir ardıllık yani fenomenal bir nedensellik varsayar, şöyle ki kısmi bir neden (koşul) kısmi bir sonucu (koşullu) sonsuz bir gerileme ile belirler. Böyle bir gerilemede serilerin tamamlanmasından bahsedilemez, aksine yeter neden burada anlağın talebi üzerine doğanın tekdüzeliğini sağlamak için zamansal dizilerin genişletilmesini ve devamlılığını sağlar. Diğer bir taraftan, yeter neden Leibnizci anlamda ele alındığında ise koşullar ve koşulsuz olan arasında içsel bir ilişki yani numenal bir nedensellik varsayar, şöyle ki kısmi nedenlerin toplamı aklın talebi üzerine zamansal dizileri tamamlamak için bütünsel bir sonuca vardırılmaya çalışılır. Kısaca, kendiyle çelişme hali anlağın ve aklın farklı talepleri doğrultusunda meydana gelir. Kant'ın burada Leibnizci anlamda bir yeter nedene başvurma amacı bir ilk nedene yani aşkınsal özgürlüğe alan açmaktır.

Üçüncü Antinomi'nin antitezi ise görüngüler alanındaki tek nedenselliğin doğa nedenselliği olduğunu iddia eder. Antitezin ispatından ise aşkınsal özgürlüğü koyutladığımız takdirde doğanın tekdüzeliğini bozması ya da doğanın düzenli sistemini anlamsız kılması nedeniyle aşkınsal özgürlüğün doğa yasası ile çelişkili olduğu sonucu çıkar. Başka bir deyişle, bir nedensellik olarak aşkınsal özgürlük görüngüler alanında doğa yasası ile bağdaşmaz. Ancak aşkınsal özgürlüğü bir ide olarak görüngüler alanın dışında düşünmek çelişkili değildir.

Üçüncü Antinomi'nin tezinin aksine, antitez yeter nedeni sadece İkinci Analoji'deki anlamında ele alır ve koşullu ve koşulsuz arasında sadece zorunlu bir ardıllık yani fenomenal bir nedensellik olduğunu varsayar.

Özetle söyleyebiliriz ki; Üçüncü Antinomi'nin iki tarafı da İkinci Analoji'de ortaya konulan nedensellik ilkesine dayanır; ancak tez ve antitez arasındaki çelişki aşkınsal özgürlük bir nedensellik olarak koyutlandığında ortaya çıkar.

Ayrıca şunu hatırlatmak gerekir ki; İkinci Analoji nedensellik kavramını sadece anlağın görev aldığı fenomenal bir nedensellik olarak tanımlarken, Üçüncü Antinomi hem anlağın görev aldığı fenomenal bir nedensellik hem de aklın görev aldığı

numenal bir nedensellik olmak üzere iki çeşit nedensellik kavramı tanımlar. Bu bağlamda fenomenal nedensellik (bir sonucun) neden(i) (cause) olarak adlandırılırken, numenal nedensellik (bir sonucun) mantıksal zemin(i) olarak adlandırılabilir. Neden ve zemin arasındaki ayrım Üçüncü Antinomi'nin çözümü için iki noktada önem kazanır. İlk olarak görüngüler ve kendinde şeyler ayrımı açısından ele alındığında kendinde şeylerin görüngülerin zemini olup olmadığı sorusunu cevaplandırmakta, ikinci olarak ise ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakter ayrımı açısından ele alındığında özgürlük ve doğa yasasının uzlaşabilir olup olmadığı sorusunu cevaplandırmakta rol oynar. Bu noktalar sırasıyla dördüncü ve beşinci bölümlerde ele alınacaktır.

Bu bölümlere geçmeden önce genel olarak antinomilerin Kant'ın aşkınsal idealizm yöntemi ile nasıl çözüldüğüne değinilecektir. Aşkınsal idealizm antinomilerin çözümü için üç farklı yöntem önerir. Bunlardan ilk iki çözüm matematik antinomilerin hem tez hem de antitez taraflarının yanlış olduğunu dolaylı ispat yöntemi ile gösterir. Bu çözümlerde antinomi aklın yanlış görevlendirilmesi sonucu yani aklın, anlağın görevlendirilmesini düzenleyici bir ide olmak yerine, sanki onun kavramlarını kurucu bir ilkeymiş gibi davranması sonucu çıkar. Antinomi aklın doğru görevlendirilmesiyle diğer bir deyişle koşullar dizisini mümkün deneyimin sınırları ötesine, yani kendinde şeylere taşıyan kurucu bir ilke olarak değil de, koşullar dizisinin deneyimin sınırları içinde devamlılığını sağlayan ve bu devamlılıkta koşulsuz olana hiçbir şekilde ulaşmaya çalışmayan bir düzenleyici ide olarak işlev görmesiyle çözülür. İlk iki çözüm, sadece hem tezin hem de antitezin yanlış olduğu matematik antinomiler için geçerlidir. Ancak bu çözümler iki tarafın da nasıl yanlış olduğuna açıklama getiremediğinden antinomiler için yeterli bir çözüm sunamaz.

Üçüncü çözüm ise matematik dinamik antinomi ayrımına dayanır. Bu çözüm matematik antinomilerde (birinci ve ikinci antinomiler) hem tezin hem de antitezin yanlış olduğunu varsayarken, dinamik antinomilerde (üçüncü ve dördüncü antinomiler) hem tezin hem de antitezin doğru olabileceğini varsayar. Üçüncü

çözüm, bu varsayımların gerileyen dizilerde aklın koşulsuz idesinin iki farklı kullanımından kaynaklı olduğunun açıklamasını yaptığı için yeterli bir çözüm sunar.

Matematik antinomilerde görüngüler alanındaki bir dizinin tüm elemanları aynı karakterde olduğu için, yani koşullar ile koşullu olan deneyim dizilerinde birbiriyle homojen olduğu için, koşulludan koşulların toplamına dolayısıyla da koşulsuza doğru sonsuz bir gerileme vardır. Yani bu aynı karakterdeki koşullar dizisi anlağın talebine göre hep daha ötedeki bir koşulu ararlar. Akıl bu dizilerin toplamını talep ettiğinde, koşulsuz olan görüngüler alanına sınırlanmış olur. Bu durumda aklın idesi (koşulsuz olan), anlağın kavramlarıyla (koşullu olan) onlara çok büyük veya çok küçük geldiği için çelişir. Bu da hem tezin hem de antitezin yanlış olmasıyla sonuçlanır.

Dinamik antinomiler ise deneyim dizileriyle görüngüler alanında aynı karaktere sahip olmayan, aksine bu zamansal dizilerin dışında yani kendinde şeylere ait olan, koşullar ile koşulsuz olanın birbiriyle heterojen olduğu, düşünülür bir nedene veya düşünülür bir elemente izin verir—ki bu element Üçüncü Antinomi için aşkınsal özgürlüktür. Dolayısıyla düşünülür bir dünyaya alan açılmış olur. Başka bir deyişle, dinamik antinomilerin çözümü ile deneyim dünyası (fenomenal dünya) ve düşünülür dünya (numenal dünya) arasındaki ayrım ortaya konulmuş olur. Bu ayrım sayesinde koşulsuz olan hem görüngüler alanına (antitez tarafında) hem de kendinde şeyler alanına (tez tarafında) uygulanabilir. Dolayısıyla antitez tarafında diziler hiçbir zaman tamamlanamazken, tezler tarafında düşünülür bir elementin koyutlanması sayesinde diziler tamamlanabilir. Böylece hem tez hem de antitez doğru olabilir.

Özgürlük ve doğa yasasının bağdaşabilip bağdaşamayacağı sorusunu Üçüncü Antinomi'nin dinamik antinomilerle çözümüne göre tekrardan değerlendirecek olursak, iki taraf da doğru olabileceği için tez ve antitezin birbiriyle bağdaşabilir olduğu sonucuna varabiliriz. Ancak tez ve antitezin bağdaşabilir olması özgürlük ve doğa yasasının bağdaşabilir olduğu anlamına gelmez. Aksine dinamik antinomiler düşünülür nedenin, yani Üçüncü Antinomi açısından aşkınsal özgürlüğün, deneyim

dizileri dışında olduğunu ortaya koyduğu için, aşkınsal özgürlük görüngüler alanında doğa yasasıyla çelişir. Yani aşkınsal özgürlüğün kendisi bağdaşmazcı bir kavramdır.

Üçüncü Antinomi'de aşkınsal özgürlüğün koyutlanması sayesinde numenal dünyaya alan açılmış olur. Başka bir deyişle Üçüncü Antinomi'nin aşkınsal idealizmin bir çözümü olan dinamik antinomilerle çözümü sayesinde fenomenal dünya (görüngüler alanı) ve numenal dünya (kendinde şeyler) birbirinden ayrılır. Kant böylece doğa yasasını fenomenal dünyaya, aşkınsal özgürlüğü ise numenal dünyaya yerleştirir.

Dördüncü bölümde Kant'ın görüngüler alanı ve kendinde şeyler alanı arasındaki ayrımını zorunlu kılan aşkınsal idealizm metodunun özgürlük ve doğa yasası sorunsalına nasıl çözüm getirdiği incelenecektir. Üçüncü Antinomi bu sorunsalın nasıl çözüldüğünü göstermediği için Kant Üçüncü Antinomi'nin yeniden çözümünde problemi rasyonel faillik teorisiyle çözmek amacıyla ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakter ayrımına gider. Ampirik karakter/düşünülür karakter ayrımı özgürlük ve doğa yasası tartışmasına hem Üçüncü Antinomi'nin kozmolojik bağlamında hem de rasyonel faillik teorisi aracılığıyla ahlak bağlamında bir çözüm sunar.

Kant, ampirik nedensellik yani doğa yasası ile düşünülür nedenselliği yani aşkınsal özgürlüğü bir ve aynı sonuçta ve ampirik karakter ile düşünülür karakteri bir ve aynı kendilikte birleştirebilirse özgürlük ve doğa yasasının uzlaşabileceğini varsayar.

Burada bir failin bir ve aynı kendilikte iki ayrı karaktere sahip olduğu görünmektedir. Ampirik karakterinde bir fail, görüngüler alanının bir öznesidir ve kendini anlak yetisi aracılığıyla dolaysız olarak bilir. Diğer bir taraftan ise düşünülür karakterinde bir fail kendini dolaysız olarak bilemez; ancak kendini akıl yetisi aracılığıyla kavrayabilir. Dolayısıyla nasıl düşünülür nedensellik onun görüngüler alanıyla ilişkisini kurmak için ampirik nedensellikle ilişkili düşünülmeliyse, düşünülür karakter de ampirik karakterle ilişkili düşünülmelidir ki bir failin düşünülür karakterinin eylemlerinin sonuçları ampirik karakterinin eylemlerinin aynı sonuçlarıyla buluşacak şekilde görüngüler alanına bağlanabilsin. Bu bağlamda Kant ampirik karakterin düşünülür karakterde belirlendiğini iddia eder.

Oysa ki Kant'ın metninde görüngüler alanı /kendinde şeyler ve ampirik karakter/ düşünülür karakter arasındaki ilişkinin türü muğlaktır. Özgürlük ve doğa yasasını birleştirmek adına Kant bir taraftan tek bir nesneye (aşkınsal nesne) atfedilmiş iki ayrı nedensellik (ampirik nedensellik ve düşünülür nedensellik) ve tek bir özneye (aşkınsal özne) atfedilmiş iki ayrı karakter (ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakter) olduğunu iddia eder. Ampirik nedenselliğin yasalarının geçerli olduğu fenomenlerin ve düşünülür nedenselliğin yasalarının geçerli olduğu numenlerin tek bir nesneye ya da dünyaya onun iki-veçhesi (iki-yönü) olarak atfedilmesi ve ampirik karakter/düşünülür karakterin de tek bir özneye onun iki ayrı veçhesi olarak atfedilmesi bu iki nedensellik ve iki karakter arasında hiyerarşik bir ilişkilenme şeklini reddeder.

Kant diğer taraftan bu iki nedensellik ve iki karakter arasında numenlerin fenomenlerin zemini olduğu ve düşünülür karakterin ampirik karakterin zemini olduğu hiyerarşik bir ilişkiyi savunur ki bu da bizi sanki iki ayrı nesne ve iki ayrı özne varmış gibi düşünmeye sevk eder.

Kant'ın metinlerindeki muğlaklık, iki-veçhe ve iki-dünya yorumları olmak üzere aşkınsal idealizmin iki farklı yorumuna yol açar. İki nedensellik ve iki karakter arasındaki hiyerarşik ilişkiyi reddeden yorum, iki-veçhe yorumuna işaret ederken; iki nedensellik ve iki karakter arasındaki hiyerarşik ilişki olduğunu savunan yorum, iki-dünya yorumuna işaret eder. Bu mesele Allen W. Wood'un iki-dünya görüşü ve Henry E. Allison'un iki-veçhe görüşü karşılaştırılarak tartışılacaktır.

Wood, özgürlük ve doğa yasasının, ancak ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakterin birbirinden ontolojik olarak ayrılmış iki ayrı dünyada (görüngüler ve kendinde şeyler) yine birbirinden ontolojik olarak ayrılmış iki ayrı karakter olarak alındığında bağdaşabileceğini iddia eder. Bu ontolojik ayrımda Wood kendinde şeylerin görüngülerin zemini, düşünülür karakterin ise ampirik karakterin zemini olduğunu varsayar. Ancak ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakter arasında böyle bir nedensel ilişki varsaydığımızda Wood'un iki-dünya görüşü, Kant'ın özgürlük ve doğa yasasını

birleştirmek için ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakterin bir ve aynı kendilikte birleştirilmesi gerekliliğini göz ardı eder.

Wood'un aksine Allison, görüngüler/kendinde şeyler ve ampirik karekter/düşünülür karakter ayrımının epistemolojik bir ayrım olduğunu iddia eder. Dolayısıyla Allison iki-veçhe görüşünü aşkınsal nesne ve kendinde şeyler arasındaki farka işaret ederek kurar. Allison şeylerin (görüngüler ve kendinde şeyler olarak değil de) bize göründükleri ve kendilerinde oldukları gibi bir ve aynı nesnenin veya dünyanın iki ayrı veçhesi olarak; ve ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakterin de bir ve aynı öznenin iki ayrı veçhesi olarak düşünülebileceğini iddia eder. Tek bir aşkınsal nesneye "felsefi düşünmenin meta düzeyinde" atfedilmeleri nedeniyle, şeylerin bize göründüğü şekli ile kendinde oldukları şekli mantıksal olarak özdeştir. Benzer şekilde tek bir aşkınsal özneye atfedilmeleri nedeniyle, ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakter de mantıksal olarak özdeştir. Başka bir deyişle onların aralarında hiyerarşik bir ilişki yoktur.

Böyle aşkınsal bir düşünme biçimi insan bilgisini, deneyimin evrensel ve zorunlu koşulları aracılığıyla görüngüler dünyasına sınırlayan epistemik koşulları gerektirir. Bu durumda Allison'un iki-veçhe görüşü, şeyleri ancak görüngüler alanında bize göründüğü şekliyle bilebildiğimizi ispatlar. Şeyleri kendilerinde oldukları gibi bilemeyiz çünkü onlar bilgimizin sınırları dışındadır ve bu nedenle biz onları sadece düşünebiliriz.

Buna karşın Wood'un iki-dünya görüşü görüngülere mutlak gerçek şeylermiş gibi davranır (ya da kendinde şeylermiş gibi) ve bu durumda bu görüş bilgiyi zihinsel durumlara indirgediği için empirik bilgiyi imkansız kılar. Bu durumda Wood'un iki-dünya görüşü Berkeleyci idealizme yaklaşan bir görüngücülük ya da öznelciliği tasvir eder.

O halde şu sonuca varılabilir, Wood'un iki-dünya görüşü kritik olmayan bir aşkınsal idealizm yorumu sergilerken, Allison'un iki-veçhe görüşü kritik bir aşkınsal idealizm

yorumu sergiler. Böylece Allison'un Kant okuması Kant'ın özgürlük ve doğa nedenselliğini uzlaştıran sözde niyetini açıklamada daha başarılı görünür.

Özgürlük ve doğa yasası problemini çözmek için Wood, ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakter arasındaki ayrımı nedensel etkililik teorisine başvurarak Üçüncü Antinomi'nin teorik bağlamında ele alır. Bu durumda Wood sadece kendiliğinden olan düşünülür karakterin sonucunu üretmek ve belirlemekte nedensel olarak etkili olduğunu ancak ampirik karakterin kendiliğindenliktan mahrum olması nedeniyle sonucunu üretmek ve belirlemekte yetersiz olduğunu savunur. Başka bir deyişle, Wood'un iki-dünya görüşü sadece düşünülür karakteri aklın nedenselliğine yani özgür nedenselliğe atfeder. Ampirik karakter nedensel etkililikten mahrum olduğu için düşünülür karaktere bağımlıdır, dolayısıyla ampirik karakter Wood'un modelinde düşünülür karakterin bir ürünü ya da bir sonucu olarak kalır.

Wood'un aksine Allison, ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakter ayrımını birinci *Kritik*'te rasyonel faillik teorisiyle sınırlanmış olan pratik bağlamda ele alır. Böylece Allison, 'yapmalısın' biçimindeki buyruklar aracılığıyla aklımızın da bir nedenselliği olduğunu düşünebilmemizi mümkün kılan pratik özgürlüğe başvurur.

Allison ampirik karakteri özgürlüğün doğallaştırılmış (bedenselleştirilmiş) tasvirini aklın nedenselliğine atfeder. Böylece Allison'un iki-veçhe görüşünde ampirik karakter Wood'un iki-dünya görüşündeki gibi düşünülür karakterin sadece bir ürünü veya sonucu olmaktan kurtulur. Yani ampirik karakterin de kendi sonucunu belirleyebilecek bir nedensel etkililiği olmuş olur. Böylece, Allison'un iki-veçhe yorumunda düşünülür karakter aklın ya da özgürlüğün doğa yasasıyla uzlaşmayan numenal ifadesiyken, ampirik karakter aklın ya da özgürlüğün doğa yasasıyla uzlaşan fenomenal ifadesidir. Ancak Allison'un iki-veçhe görüşü de özgürlük ve doğa yasasını bağdaştırmak için ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakterin bir ve aynı kendilikte nasıl birleştirildiğini açıklamakta yetersiz kalır. Bu nedenle Allison 'Geçişim teorisini' ortaya koyar.

Beşinci bölümde ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakterin bir ve aynı kendilikte birleştirilmesinde önemli olması nedeniyle aşkınsal özgürlük ve pratik özgürlük arasındaki ilişki ortaya konacaktır. Daha sonra Allison'un özgürlük ve doğa yasasını ampirik karakterle düşünülür karakteri birleştirmek suretiyle bağdaştıran (ancak bunu bağdaşmazcı bir özgürlük kavramıyla yapan) 'Geçişim Teorisine' geçilecektir.

Üçüncü Antinomi'nin teorik bağlamında sadece bir ide olan aşkınsal özgürlük, özgürlüğün gerçekliğini kuramaması nedeniyle olumsuz anlamda bir özgürlük kavramını temsil eder. Diğer bir taraftan, pratik özgürlük, ikinci *Kritik*'in ahlaki bağlamında özgürlüğün gerçekliğini kurması nedeniyle olumlu anlamda bir özgürlük kavramıdır. Oysa birinci *Kritik*'te bahsi geçen pratik özgürlük ahlaki bağlamda ele alınmamış, sadece bir rasyonel faillik teorisi olarak tanıştırılmıştır.

Kant, aşkınsal özgürlük ve pratik özgürlük arasında, pratik özgürlüğün aşkınsal özgürlüğü gerektirdiği yakın bir ilişki olduğunu vurgular. Ancak, Kant felsefesinde özgürlük problemi aşkınsal özgürlükten kaynaklanır çünkü gerçek olduğu düşünülen pratik özgürlük, gerçekliği olmayan fakat sadece mantıksal bir imkanlılığı olan aşkınsal özgürlük üzerinde temellenmiştir. Bu nedenle aşkınsal özgürlük pratik özgürlüğe sağlam bir zemin oluşturamaz ve dolayısıyla özgürlük ve doğa yasası tartışması problematik kalır.

İkinci *Kritik* bağlamında pratik özgürlüğün gerçek olması ancak ve ancak aşkınsal özgürlüğün gerçek olması koşuluna bağlı olsa da, birinci *Kritik*'te Kant'ın amacı aşkınsal özgürlüğün ve pratik özgürlüğün gerçekliğini kanıtlamak değil, yalnızca kavranabilir olduklarını göstermektir. Bu durumda hem Beck hem de Allison birinci *Kritik*'te aşkınsal özgürlüğün, pratik özgürlük ile olan ilişkisinde sadece düzenleyici bir ide olarak düşünülmesi gerektiğini iddia ederler.

Aşkınsal özgürlük düzenleyici bir ide olarak düşünüldüğünde, onun deneyim ile hiçbir bağı olmayacağı için, pratik özgürlüğün gerçekliğini kanıtlamak için aşkınsal özgürlüğün gerçekliğini kanıtlamak gerekli değildir. Daha ziyade aşkınsal özgürlük

insan iradesinin pratik olarak özgür olduğunu kavramamızı imkanlı kılar. Bu imkanlılık Allison'un 'Geçişim Teorisi' için bir zemin sağlar.

Yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi, Allison özgürlük ve doğa yasası problemini, ampirik ve düşünülür karakteri birinci *Kritik*'in pratik bağlamında birleştirerek çözmeye çalışır. Birinci *Kritik* pratik özgürlüğü, 'yapmalısın' biçimindeki buyruklar aracılığıyla kendisine a priori kurallar yükleyen ve buna göre eylemde bulunan insan özgürlüğü/etkinliği olarak ortaya koyar. 'Yapmalısın' ifadeleri kesin buyrukları içerdiği gibi koşullu buyrukları da içerir. Koşullu buyruklar ampirik karaktere yüklenmiş olan pratik ilkeler ya da maksimlerdir. Kesin buyruklar ise düşünülür karaktere yüklenmiş olan ahlak yasasıdır.

Bu durumda, pratik özgürlük olumlu ve olumsuz anlamda olmak üzere iki farklı şekilde tanımlanabilir. Bir fail, olumlu anlamda pratik olarak özgür olduğunda, kesin buyruğa göre davrandığı için eylemleri otonomdur. O halde olumlu anlamdaki pratik özgürlük, bir akıllı failin kendi düşünülür karakterinde ahlak yasasını kurması ve ona uygun davranması yönünde kendi yasasını kurma yetisidir. Düşünülür karakter bu kendi yasasını kurma yetisini kendiliğindenliğine borçludur.

Diğer taraftan olumsuz anlamdaki pratik özgürlük ise bir akıllı failin kendi ampirik karakterinde duyusal güdü ve dürtülerden bağımsız eyleyebilme yetisidir. Bir fail olumsuz anlamda pratik olarak özgür olduğunda, koşullu buyruğa göre eylediği için eylemleri heteronomdur. Allison, heteronom eylemlerimizde bile akıllıca düşünüp taşınma yönünden bir kendiliğindenlik unsuru bulunduğunu iddia eder. Ancak ampirik karakter her ne kadar duyusal dürtüler tarafından belirlenmeye direnerek kendi ilkelerini ya da maksimlerini oluşturma yetisine sahip olsa da, aynı zamanda onun kendiliğindenliği doğa yasası tarafından belirlendiği için sınırlı bir kendiliğindenliktir.

Kendiliğindenlik açısından ele alındığında, mutlak kendiliğindenliğe sahip olan düşünülür karakter, özgürlüğün doğa yasasıyla bağdaşmayan numenal bir

dışavurumuyken, sınırlı kendiliğindenliğe sahip olan ampirik karakter onun doğa yasasıyla bağdaşan fenomenal bir dışavurumudur.

Allison, Kant'ın kendi teorisini doğa yasasına bağımlılığından ötürü iradeyi belirlemekte yetersiz olan bağdaşırcı bir özgürlük açıklamasıyla sınırlandırmadığını iddia eder. Kant daha ziyade kendiliğinden zamansal dizileri başlatabilen bağdaşmazcı bir özgürlük açıklamasını kabul eder.

Tam da bu nedenle Allison özgürlük ve doğa yasası arasındaki problemin çözümü için, ampirik karakter ve düşünülür karakteri bir ve aynı kendilikte birleştirebilmek üzere 'Geçişim Teorisini' ileri sürer. 'Geçişim Teorisi' duyusal dürtülerin, eğilimlerin ve arzuların kendi başlarına bir eylem başlatmakta yetersiz olduğunu bu nedenle de onların ampirik karakteri belirleyemeyeceğini öne sürer. Bu yüzden bu duyusal dürtüler, eğilimler ve arzular düşünülür karakterin kendiliğindenliği aracılığıyla bir kuralın veya maksimin altında 'geçiştirilmeli' veya birleştirilmelidir.

Bu kendiliğinden olan 'geçişim eylemi' vesilesiyle düşünülür karakterin ampirik karakterin eylemlerini bir kuralın altında sınıflandırmakta ve düzenlemekte düzenleyici bir işleve sahip olduğu ifade edilebilir. Böylece aklın bu düzenleyici idesi yani aşkınsal özgürlük aracılığıyla, düşünülür karakterin eylemlerinin sonuçları, görüngüler alanında ampirik karakterin eylemlerinin (aynı) sonuçlarıyla birleştirilebilir.

Sonuç olarak; Allison'un 'Geçişim Teorisi' aşkınsal özgürlük ve doğa yasasının bağdaşmazcı bir özgürlük kavramıyla uzlaşabileceğini ortaya koyar. Başka bir deyişle, Kant özgürlük ve doğa yasası meselesinde bağdaşmazcıdır ve onun kendine özgü bağdaşmazcılığı aslında özgürlük ve doğa yasasının uzlaşabilirliğini içerir. Bu nedenle Kant'ın bağdaşmazcılığında aynı zamanda hem özgür olabiliriz hem de doğa yasası tarafından belirleniriz. Görüldüğü üzere Kant'ın özgürlük ve belirlenimcilik problemini ele alışı çağdaş tartışmalardan farklılaşır. Çağdaş felsefede bağdaşırcılık özgürlüğün doğa yasasıyla uzlaşabilmesi, bağdaşmazcılık ise özgürlüğün doğa yasasıyla uzlaşamaması anlamına gelmekteyken, özgürlük ve doğa yasasının

uzlaşabilir olduğunu iddia eden Kant tam da özgürlük ve doğa yasasının birbiriyle çelişkili olduğunu ileri sürmesi nedeniyle bir bağdaşırcı değildir. Aksine özgürlüğün doğa yasasıyla çeliştiğini göstermesi nedeniyle bir bağdaşmazcıdır.

O halde Kant bir nedensellik olarak özgürlüğün en azından bağdaşamaz olmadığını göstermekteki sözde varsayımında başarısızlığa uğrar. (A558/B686)

Dinamik antinomilerin çözümünden de anlaşılabileceği üzere aşkınsal özgürlük görüngüler alanında bir nedensellik olarak mümkün değildir; Yalnızca aşkınsal özgürlüğü numenal alanda aklın düzenleyici bir idesi olarak koyutlamak mantıksal olarak mümkündür. Dolayısıyla burada özgürlüğün bağdaşmazcı ve belirlenimsiz bir kavram olması nedeniyle Üçüncü Antinomi'nin antitez iddiasının tez iddiasına üstün olduğu sonucuna varılabilir. Başka bir deyişle Kant ampirik düzeyde katı bir belirlenimcidir ve ampirik dünyada bir nedensellik olarak özgürlüğe yer yoktur. Aklın düzenleyici bir idesi olarak koyutlandığında ise aşkınsal özgürlük, pratik özgürlüğün numenal alandaki düşünülebilirliğini sağlar ve böylece de ahlak alanına yer açmış olur. Dolayısıyla Kant'ın Üçüncü Antinomi!nin tez kısmında bağdaşmazcı bir kavram olan aşkınsal özgürlüğü öne sürmesinin nedeni aslında serilerin tamamlanmışlığına ulaşmaktan ziyade insan özgürlüğüne ve ahlaka alan açmaktır.

Kant'ın bağdaşmazcı özgürlük anlayışında doğa alanı ve ahlak alanı birbirinden keskin bir şekilde ayrılmıştır. Doğa yasasının geçerli olduğu fenomenler dünyası ile ahlak yasası ve özgürlüğün geçerli olduğu numenler dünyası arasındaki uçurum hiçbir zaman kapatılamaz; bu uçurumu kapatma çabası sadece bir ideal olarak kalır. Neticede özgürlük (ahlak) ve doğa yasasının uzlaşabilirliğini tahayyül etmek ancak onları ayrı alanlarda tutmakla mümkündür.

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