DEFLATIONISM ABOUT TRUTH AND THE GENERAL FORM OF SENTENCE

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_____

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

_____

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil Turan
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

_____

Prof. Dr. David Grünberg
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Erdinç Sayan	(METU, PHIL)	_____
Prof. Dr. David Grünberg	(METU, PHIL)	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Erhan Demircioğlu	(METU, PHIL)	_____
Prof. Dr. Harun Tepe	(H.U., PHIL)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aziz F. Zambak	(METU, PHIL)	_____

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Name, Last name : ARMAN BESLER

Signature :

ABSTRACT

DEFLATIONISM ABOUT TRUTH AND THE GENERAL FORM OF SENTENCE

Besler, Arman

Ph.D., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. David Grünberg

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Deflationism about truth is roughly the negative thesis that truth is not a substantial notion, and does not call for a reductive philosophical analysis. Deflationism comes in several main varieties, each focusing on a particular aspect/appearance of this negative fact, hence formulating the deflationary thesis under the guidance of that aspect/appearance. This study attempts to reformulate the deflationary thesis by (1) proposing a simple but illuminative typology of deflationisms, (2) detecting the correct type, and (3) interpreting the specification of the location of that type on the proposed typological map. The proposal is made under the guidance of certain insights concerning the nature of logical analyis, but specifically of the theme of the general/abstract grammatical form of sentence. The study concludes by showing the implications of the emerged neat picture of alethic deflationism with respect to the truth-conditional account of meaning.

Keywords: Truth, deflationism, sentence, logical analysis, meaning.

ÖZ

DOĞRULUKTA İNDİRİMCİLİK VE GENEL CÜMLE BİÇİMİ

Besler, Arman

Doktora, Felsefe Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. David Grünberg

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Doğrulukta indirimcilik, kısaca, doğruluğun içerikli bir mefhum olmadığı ve indirgemeci bir felsefi çözümleme gerektirmediği yönündeki menfi iddiadır. İndirimcilik, birkaç ana tür olarak karşımıza çıkar; bu türlerin her biri bahsedilen menfi hakikatin belirli bir yönüne/tezahürüne odaklanır ve indirimci iddiayı bu yönden/bu tezahüre göre deyimleştirir. Bu çalışma, (1) yalın ama aydınlatıcı bir indirimcilikler tipleştirmesi önererek, (2) buradaki uygun tipi teşhis ederek ve (3) bu tipin önerilen tipleştirme haritasındaki yer belirlenimini yorumlayarak genel indirimci iddiayı yeniden deyimleştirmeye çalışmaktadır. Tipleştirme önerisi ise, mantıki çözümlemenin tabiatına ilişkin belli kavrayışların, ama bilhassa genel/soyut cümle biçimi izleğinin rehberliğinde yapılmaktadır. Çalışma, doğruluk indirimciliğine ilişkin ortaya çıkan yalın resmin, doğruluk koşulu temelli anlam açıklamasına dair içerimlerini göstererek sonlanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Doğruluk, indirimcilik, cümle, mantıki çözümleme, anlam.

to Ataç

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Quantification frameworks and deflationism types

IQ: Individual quantification framework

LR: The truth-predicative form is logically reliable

LU: The truth-predicative form is logically unreliable

LUC: The truth-predicative form is logically unreliable and/but functionally composite

LUM: The truth-predicative form is logically unreliable and functionally monolithic

NPD: Natural prosentential discourse (≈prosentential English)

NTD: Natural truth discourse

PIQ: Propositional individual quantification framework

SQ: Sentential quantification framework

Schemata

(Den): $\bar{p}$ is true if and only if p [Denominalization]

(Infl): $\bar{p}$ is true if and only if $\bar{p}$ is F [Inflationary explanation]

(PCFC): $\bar{p}$ is *F* if and only if p [Predicative canonical form construction]

(Red): It is true that p if and only if p [Redundancy]

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE DEFLATIONARY IDEA

One of Leibniz's mature period works on *logica termini* – his version of the traditional type of logical theory which proceeds from an account of the formation of terms (concepts, notions) to an account of the formation of sentences (propositions, judgments) to exhibit syllogistic validity structures – has the title *General Inquiries about the Analysis of Concepts and of Truths*[1](*Inquisitiones de analysi notionum et veritatum*). The title suggests, at a first glance, that Leibniz's aim was to treat exclusively those validity structures which yield *sound* arguments, since he dealt with the generation only of *true* sentences out of the combination and separation of concept terms. But that is not the case: the substantival plural usage here of alethic terminology – the plural noun "truths"– differs clearly from its adjectival/predicative usage – the adjective "true" or the predicate "...is true" – with respect to the notion of truth being expressed.[2] The latter usage expresses the ordinary, surface conception of truth according to which some things, in the shape of sentences, utterances, propositions, judgments, etc., bear the property of truth, while others (of the same kind) lack it. The former one, on the other hand, expresses a deeper conception, according to which every proposition or (fact-stating) sentence, whether true or not true, is a truth in the sense that it states a (truth) condition or makes a (truth) claim.

[1] See Leibniz, 1966. The paper is dated 1686.

[2] Rauzy, 2001, p. 24. The quote from Leibniz given in footnote 2 on the same page is especially illuminating, where he opposes "idées ou termes" to "propositions ou vérités".

The shift of meaning in Leibniz's title can be represented as an emphasis on the *grammatical form* of truths in the ordinary sense – shared by falsities or untruths – for the point of the substantival plural usage is simply to oppose truth-evaluable items, irrespective of their actual truth values, to items that are grammatically unable in the first place to admit of a truth value (terms or concepts in this case). To see the picture, one might find it useful to draw the following (admittedly imperfect) analogy with properties such as *length*, *weight*, and so on. Now every spatio-temporal thing has length in the sense that it is linearly extended; but "length" can also be taken to mean – if we leave aside matters about idiomaticity – the state of being long, in opposition to short, in which case only some of the spatio-temporal things will have that property (assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that we have some absolute metrics to determine whether a given thing *is* long or *not*). Likewise, every statement or sentence, whether it be true or false (but necessarily one or the other), *has* truth. Truth in this sense is nothing but truth-evaluability, or more properly, sententiality.

The deeper conception is perfectly displayed in alethic schemata, such as the disquotational schema, " 'p' is true if and only if p", and the (minimalist's) equivalence schema, "the proposition that p is true if and only if p", and maybe more vaguely displayed in the grammatical equivalence between alethic prosentences such as "it is true" and "that is true" on the one hand, and salient sentences for which they stand in the relevant communicative context on the other. For such equivalences exhibit an illuminative regularity concerning the truth discourse without yielding a criterion for knowing the true from the false, or clearly stating the difference between the two – without, in other words, signaling the ordinary conception.

However, a certain philosophical approach to truth, *deflationism*, roughly has it that this deeper conception suffices to account for the ordinary one; the logical and grammatical equivalences mentioned above suffice to show us what we mean when we call our statements or sentences *true* and *false*. And they do so in a way that frees us from the need for a substantial, reductive analysis of the *property* of truth, and for the sort of general criterion that both Kant and Frege declared to be principally unachievable.

The problem is that there is no satisfactory *general* statement of the deflationary position other than some introductory formulations, such as the claim that truth, like being, is not a genuine property, or the claim that the truth predicate is not a real predicate, or negative theses such as the claim that truth neither calls for, nor admits of, a substantial, reductive analysis; and each alleged variety of deflationism seems to focus on a particular aspect of the connection between the deeper and ordinary conceptions given above. Thus, for instance, the *disquotational* account holds that the truth predicate is essentially a device for neutralizing the semantic effects of directly quoting a declarative sentence; the *prosentential* account holds that the truth predicate is essentially a device for constructing sentential analogues of pronouns; and *minimalism* holds that the equivalence schema, and the *theory* that stems from it, give us a completely sufficient basis for understanding the overall use – and therefore the meaning – of the truth predicate, and that the predicate is essentially a device for generalizing with respect to the grammatical position of sentence.

This thesis attempts to give a more concrete (i.e. specific) formulation of the position which is still abstract (i.e. generic) enough to account for all the particular phenomena brought under focus by the above mentioned main implementations of the general deflationary idea, the idea that the ordinary

conception of truth can be accounted for by being bridged to the notion of truth-evaluability. Specifically, what is required is the statement of a single general deflationary *thesis* that can span the whole range of main deflationary phenomena. However, the simple abstraction from the main varieties of deflationism of a common mark will not do, for these varieties, taken in their present clothings, differ from each other in certain important respects – such as the attitude taken towards the idea of a *truthbearer* – that make it impossible even to begin to compare them to each other, save only in an argumentative fashion, that is, by defending one of them against others, or by endorsing yet another (possibly *inflationary*) account of truth.

These accounts can nevertheless be brought into line by some method of typification, whereby the individual variation among them turn out to be a *typical* variation. In this way, the explanatory capability/incapability, and the degree of internal consistency, of an individual deflationary account can be attributed to the type it belongs with, or – which comes to the same thing – to the overall structure it embodies according to the proposed typology. But then there arises the possibility that the most *correct* type be found, which would be able to account for *all* the main deflationary phenomena in the most effective and coherent way. The aim of this study is to show that there *is* such a type of deflationism, and its expression in the form of an explicit statement gives us the general deflationary thesis.

Now the phenomena in question can be listed, in a rather telling way, as sentence disquotation, sentential anaphora, and sentential generalization. It is clear that in each case it is the grammatical notion of *sentence* (in opposition to the sub-sentential) that is primarily of concern. In the following chapters, it is shown, in line with this clue, how a simpler yet adequate enough formulation of the deflationary approach emerges from a consecutive analysis of the

disquotational and prosentential accounts of truth, and how a certain problem about the minimalist conception confirms this reformulation. The emerged view is simply that the predication of truth of a nominalization of a declarative sentence "p" of a given natural language is merely a conversion of "p" into a certain canonical sentential form of that language, specifically into the predicative form "x is F"; and that truth predication *in abstracto* is a *composite* and *semi-stipulative* general representation of the sentence position in natural language. The overall picture in which these hold is one according to which truth talk is *the* natural device of sentential generalization. This way of stating the deflationary thesis, it is argued, not only enables us to separate what is central from what is incidental in particular deflationary accounts of the notion of truth, but it simplifies to a high extent the task of applying the deflationary lesson to the closely related sphere of *meaning*, via an effective deflation of the notion of *truth condition*.

The following chapter gives reasons for placing the philosophical discussion about truth around a certain grammatical appearance of the notion, namely, the truth *predicate*. The third chapter executes the above mentioned consecutive analysis of disquotationalism and prosententialism, and distills, as it were, the proposed reformulation of the general deflationary approach. The fourth provides a confirmation basis for the reformulation by *radically* dismantling a certain type of objection to the minimalist conception, the objection that the minimal theory cannot be *stated* adequately. And the concluding chapter deflates the notion of truth condition in line with the novel formulation, and shows very briefly what kind of sense the deflationist could be expected to make of the idea of a truth conditional theory of meaning. Each chapter begins with a very brief *Overview* section, numbered "x.1", which will give a more precise idea of what is being done in that chapter.

CHAPTER 2

TRUTH AND THE TRUTH PREDICATE

2.1 Overview

This chapter

- argues that it is the truth predicate, or more properly, truth predication as a whole, that lies at the center of the philosophical investigation of, and in particular, of the deflationary approach to, truth;

to that effect,

- it gives a first illustration of the significance of the difference between the two basic logical appearances of truth: the so-called liar paradox can be formulated with the truth predicate, but not with the truth operator;
- and shows why the truth predicate is, unlike the truth operator, irredundant: truth predicative form is a much useful tool for sentential generalization.

The chapter ends by setting the scene for the deflationary approach, discussed and reformulated in the next chapter, by underlining the difference between the transparency and the redundancy of truth.

2.2 Appearances of truth

The philosophical investigation of truth is a logical-philosophical analysis of the notion of truth. The notion of truth is the originally vague concept or idea that results from certain regularities, apparent or latent, concerning our overall use of the truth discourse (or truth talk)[3], which appear most naturally in the form

[3] I assume in the following that the truth discourse under question is part of what I characterize (in a universalizing fashion) as *natural language*, and that the particular language that functions as natural language is again vaguely the English language or some extension thereof that

of natural language schemata, and less naturally in the form of quantified (hence general) statements recruiting logical vocabulary.

The truth discourse is that part or mode of natural language which is characterized by the employment of *alethic* expressions. Alethic expressions – i.e. types of expression that can be said, somewhat circularly, to signify the notion of truth – appear in multifarious forms of different kinds: kinds of *grammatical function*, such as *truth as predicate* – or more commonly but quite misleadingly,[4] *the truth predicate* – and *truth as direct object*; various *parts of speech* (or simply, grammatical forms) such as the truth *adjective* and the truth *noun*; logical forms such as the alethic *operators*, namely, the truth operator, the falsity (or more safeguardedly, untruth) operator, along with their modifications with respect to tense and mood, and so on.

It might be expected that a complete philosophical analysis of (natural) truth talk give an exhaustive treatment of *every* such particular kind of appearance of truth, and if the analysis is to have a logical character, such treatment will be expected to result in schematic representations that codify the essentials of the use of the kind of form under question. For a typical philosophical-logical analysis of a given clause structure (representative of a certain kind of discourse) is a *regimentation* of that structure according to a previously specified language of analysis, that is, a logical language. In other words, philosophical-logical analysis is essentially a matter of translating natural language structures that, by the vagueness they are prone to, prompt philosophical discussions about what is really meant by their instances.

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contains certain philosophical/logical tools, unless otherwise stated.

[4] Roughly, the description "the truth predicate", as it appears in the philosophical literature about truth, signifies the predicative *functionings* of the verbal phrase "is true". For the division of linguistic forms as grammatical *functions* and grammatical *forms*, see Aarts, 2001, especially the tree analysis illustrated in section 4.4, p. 108-10.

A most illuminating example is Russell's analysis of definite description structures, where we find *surface* forms that prompt a philosophical discussion on whether ascriptions containing nominal expressions that fail to have any referential value, such as "The present king of France is bald" (uttered in a context where no such king exists) can have a definite truth-value and meaning.[5] Russell's logical analysis is simply a method of translating natural language sentences containing such *apparently* naming or referring descriptions into the language of analysis, namely, an extension of natural English containing first-order quantifiers, variables and connectives. The logical translations exhibit the *deep* form of such structures in a way that makes us able to give a definite answer to the original philosophical question: roughly, definite descriptions are not names but complex existential quantifiers, and ascriptions containing definite descriptions that fail to have instances are meaningful but false (for they are essentially conjunctions at least one conjunct of which is false). The translation rule can be represented by a schema of the following rather simplified form:

(DD) The F is G if and only if there is at least and at most one x such that x is F and x is G.[6]

The point is that this *particular* analysis of natural definite descriptions is meant to answer a *particular* philosophical question, namely, whether ascriptions containing unexemplified definite descriptions have a definite truth-value; so there might be other regularities about the use of definite descriptions that concern other aspects, or maybe parts, of the relevant discourse. In other

[5] See for example Russell, 1963, chapter 10.

[6] The capital letters on the left- and right-hand sides are schematic letters for natural language adjectives, and the *apparently* natural quantifiers and the individual variable "x" that appear on the right-hand side, along with the connective "if and only if", pertain to the language of analysis.

words, it is – ideally – the particular phenomenon that concerns us prior to the philosophical-logical analysis that determines which particular regularity about the relevant discourse should be underlined. Thus the expectation that the philosophical-logical treatment of a given discourse cover every fact about every kind of expression that is able to characterize that discourse is ill-founded. To put it simply, logical analysis is always intention-directed.

Our intention, then, in this study is to give the most adequate formulation of the deflationary thesis about truth, a formulation that both applies well enough to each main variety found in the cluster of approaches, theories or conceptions that are said to be deflationary, and is still concrete enough to be viewed as an independently significant thesis.[7] So we need a first, rough characterization of the deflationary thesis to specify which uses of which types of alethic expressions we should focus on. One such characterization is the claim that a certain fact about truth, namely, that every truthbearer specifies its own condition for being true, is necessary and sufficient for grasping the notion of truth,[8]and for illuminating the further uses of alethic expressions, specifically, the truth predicate. The contrast here is drawn with attempts to explicate the notion of truth in the standard fashion, by reducing it to other notions, notions that are not without explanatory content (or matter) but definitely simpler and more fundamental than truth. These latter, (so-called) *inflationary* accounts have the general form:

(Infl) x is true if and only if x is F

[7] The sense in which such formulation is to *apply* to main varieties of deflationism is a bit complicated and unusual, and will be clarified in the following chapter. See also Appendix A, "Clarifications" , the answer to the first objection.

[8] Horwich, 1990. See especially, for the wording, "the Preface to the First Edition".

where the verbal phrase "is *F*" gives the intended reductive analysis – as in, e.g., "...corresponds to reality", "...is part of a coherent body of knowledge", "...has justification in ideal epistemic conditions", and so on. The deflationary thesis is not simply that there is no such "*F*", or simply that we do not need one; it is rather that we need and actually have a different kind of account of truth ascription, one suggesting that truth has a rather *formal* or *structural*, and not a material, "nature". This is the point of the above characterization of the deflationary thesis, where the meaning of truth seems to vary as the value of the individual variable "x" varies, *yet according to a definite rule*: it is always the particular sentence or proposition of which truth is being ascribed that determines what truth means for that particular ascription. Thus there must be a structural connection between the *analysans* of an ascription of the form "x is true" on the one hand, and "x" itself on the other, if we are to have a *general* explanation of the meaning of truth. This is the first, main condition that should be satisfied by the alethic schemata that are to be the focus of attention in our discussion about the deflationary approach.

Now the grammatical or logical phenomenon that finds expression in the deflationary thesis is quite hard to label, but the idea of *transparency* seems to be adequate for the present.[9] By the transparency of truth, it should be understood that truth is a purely grammatical or logical notion, that it does not have a real or natural – i.e. explanatorily relevant – content to be analyzed in the inflationary fashion. For the sake of simplicity, call those alethic schemata that are able to represent this aspect of truth *transparency schemata*.

[9] A characterization of the deflationary approach in terms of the transparency of truth can be found in Lynch, 2001, p. 421.

As instances of transparency schemata, consider the following schemata for a certain use of the the truth adverb "truly", and a certain use of the truth noun "truth":

(TAdv) One speaks truly in saying that p if and only if both one says that p and p.
(TNn) One tells the truth in saying that p if and only if both one says that p and p.[10]

In each case, the alethic part of speech that occurs in the *analysandum* is not simply eliminable, but is so in favor of an expression that already occurs in the *analysans*, namely, the schematic sentential letter "p". In other words, the intended *structural connection* between the *analysandum* and the *analysans* is provided via the schematic letter. Similar schemata for different but similar uses of these parts of speech, and for other alethic parts of speech – such as the truth adjective – can be found. But what concerns us exclusively at this point is a couple of transparency schemata the comparison between which underlines another, closely related aspect of truth, namely, *irredundancy*. The couple consists of the basic schema for the *identity truth-function*[11]– i.e., truth operation – and the *denominalization schema*[12] for truth predication.

(Red) It is true that p if and only if p
(Den) $\bar{p}$ is true if and only if p

[10] Note that this use of the truth noun differs from the one where some character of the sort of *sincerity* or *honesty* is attributed to the speaker.

[11] The term is due to C. J. F. Williams, see his 1976.

[12] The term is due to Wolfgang Künne, see his 2003.

The first schema is a codification of the simple fact that the truth operator is *redundant*, that the elimination of the identity truth-function – unlike, for instance, its polarity, the negation truth-function – results in a schema that expresses the most simple triviality that every sentence is equivalent to itself, p if and only if p.[13] The first thing to note about the denominalization schema is that the alethic expression cannot be *dropped*, as in the case of truth operation, without loss of grammaticality: "$\bar{p}$ if and only if p" would in that case yield only grammatically ill-formed sequences as instances, since the left-hand side would be occupied by a noun-phrase which is supposed to be some suitable nominalization of the sentence replacing "p". Thus the truth predicate, in this occurrence, neutralizes the grammatical effect of such nominalization – hence the label.

The really crucial point about the denominalization schema is that although it takes the part of (Red), against (Infl), in expressing the transparency of truth, it nevertheless fails to express the redundancy of truth. (Den) does set, unlike (Infl), a grammatical proportion between the *analysandum* and the *analysans*, which is the reason that it *is* a transparency schema. But this connection, unlike the one set in (Red), is one that exhibits the usefulness of the truth predicate, or more properly, the truth-predicative form as a whole. So the task of the rest of the present chapter is to account for this incongruity between transparency and redundancy in terms of the significant connection between a sentence "p" and its nominalization "$\bar{p}$". The former difference will also set the scene for our treatment of the varieties of the deflationary approach in the first section of the next chapter.

[13] Note, however, the redundancy claim does not extend over to the temporal and modal modifications of the truth operator, such as "It was true that.." or "It be true that...", in which cases one needs, to bring out the transparency, to dig into the argument sentence to modify its main verb.

Section 2 gives a first illustration of the above mentioned difference via the formulation of the *liar paradox*. The final section shows why truth predication *in abstracto* is a useful, irredundant device, and gives a first characterization of deflationary truth in terms of transparent irredundancy.

2.3 Formulation of the liar paradox

There are at least two ways to analyze *away* the difference between the truth operator and the truth predicate – and naturally the one between the corresponding basic schemata. The first way is to take the truth operator as a stylistic or idiomatic variant of the truth predicate. Paul Horwich, for instance, takes this attitude in his discussion on truth:

> In light of the locution "It is true that p", it might be thought that a theory of the truth *predicate* would have to be supplemented with a separate theory of the truth *operator*; but this is not so. We can construe "It is true that p", on a par with "It is true *What Oscar said*", as an application of the truth predicate to the thing to which the initial "It" refers, which is supplied by the subsequent noun phrase, "that p".[14]

The second way is to give an *ascriptive* interpretation of the truth operator – i.e., to read the formal rendering of the truth operator, say "Tp", as a function from the declarative sentence "p" to a truth predication of the form "$\bar{p}$ is true". This can be viewed as merely a roundabout version of the first strategy, for the terminus of the analysis in each case is the truth-predicative form, "x is true".

What is right about both strategies, and possible others agreeing with them in the terminus of analysis, is that they underline the centrality of the truth *predication* form to the philosophical discussion about truth. However, the precise way that the non-trivial grammatical connection between the sides of (Den) mentioned in the previous section expresses transparency – namely, by

[14] Horwich, 1990, p. 16, fn. 1.

separating it from redundancy – suggests that we had better treat the locution type "It is true that..." as what it first appears to be, that is, as a connective that takes (declarative) sentences as arguments, in contradistinction to the truth predicate "...is true" which completes suitable noun-phrases into sentences.

The so-called *liar paradox* is one alethic phenomenon where the significance of a separate treatment of those forms can be clearly observed. The liar paradox is simply the result of the instantiation of (Den) with some version of the type of sentence called the *liar sentence*. The liar sentence has various versions, but the common idea is the simple one of predicating untruth of a *name* that denotes that very predication:

(Liar) Liar is not true.

The paradox can be shown to emerge by replacing the sentence letter in the quoting version of (Den)[15], " 'p' is true if and only if p", with Liar. For what results from this substitution is:

"Liar is not true" is true if and only if Liar is not true.

and replacing the name "Liar" with the within-quotes occurrence of Liar in this sentence, we get:

Liar is true if and only if Liar is not true.

[15] This version, it will be argued in the next chapter, is nothing other than what is known as the *disquotational schema*.

which is an obvious contradiction. What gives to such derivations the air of *paradox* is the fact that whichever of the two truth-values, *true* and *not true*, one initially ascribes to Liar, one ends up with the other: if Liar is true, then it is, by its own declaration, not true, and if not true, then it will be erring in declaring itself to be not true, therefore it will be true.

Now the key fact about the emergence of the liar paradox that prompts philosophical discussion is that Liar *can* be replaced for the sentential letter "p" in (Den) – i.e., that Liar is a genuine declarative sentence. From an intuitive point of view, Liar cannot be a genuine sentence, as it is intuitively devoid of cognitive content. There are two structurally similar deflationary explanations[16] of this intuitive fact that highlight the nature of the connection between a sentence "p" and the relevant basic truth predication, "$\bar{p}$ is true": one turns around the idea of *ungroundedness* on any object-level proposition free from alethic terminology[17]; the other around the notion of *grammatical inheritance*, according to which the reason why Liar is not a genuine sentence is, roughly, that there is no independently meaningful sentence from which Liar is to *inherit* its content.[18] Since what concerns us here is not so much the paradox itself as the bearing of its formulation on the centrality of the truth-predicative form, I will give another, simpler exposition of the mentioned intuitive fact, which is along similar lines, but focuses on the difference between the two main appearances of truth.

The idea is that a truth ascription is meaningful only when the (linguistic) subject of the ascription is able, independently, to specify a full *propositional*

[16] See Beall and Armour-Garb's 2005 edition, for a comprehensive treatment of the bearing of Liar on deflationary truth.

[17] See Horwich's discussion of Tarski's account of truth, in his 2010, ch. 5.

[18] See Grover, 1977.

content. The term "propositional content" might be misleading, as it might suggest the ordinary semantic picture in which there are sentence-shaped content- or meaning- entities called *propositions*, and the matter of being meaningful for sentences is reduced to the matter of *expressing* – whatever that is to mean – such entities. There is, however, a less committed possible use of the term, prompted by Ramsey's use of the closely related "propositional reference" in his 1927 monograph on truth[19], which it will be healthier to prefer for reasons that will get clear in the next chapter.

Considering a case where two subjects are reported to believe alike that the earth is flat, the most natural expression of which would be a statement of identity of the *object* of belief, Ramsey makes the following warning: "It is usual in logic to express this resemblance between the two men's beliefs not by saying as I do that they have the same propositional reference, but by calling them beliefs in the same proposition; to say this is not however to deny the existence of such a character as propositional reference, but merely to put forward a certain view as to how this character should be analysed." And in the following paragraph we are told: "Merely thinking of Napoleon cannot be true or false, unless it is thinking *that* he was or did so and so; for if the reference is not propositional, if it is not *the sort of reference which it takes a sentence to express*, there can be neither truth nor falsity."[20]

Thus in saying that a nominal expression specifies a propositional content, we do not have to hold that it denotes (names, refers to, etc.) a sentence-shaped meaning *entity* – we do not have to specify, or mean anything about, the "character" our propositional reference is to take. What we mean is simply that the nominal expression under question somehow re-codifies the original content

[19] "The Nature of Truth", a part of his original material titled *On Truth*, reprinted in Lynch, 2001, as ch. 18, pp. 433-445.

[20] Lynch, 2001, p. 435. The latter italics are mine.

of a fully interpreted declarative sentence *in the nominal position*, or, which comes to the same thing, that the expression can be converted, in principle, into a that-clause where the content is explicitly specified. So, for instance, the nominal expression "Einstein's law" is said to specify a propositional content, since it re-codifies the content of the declarative sentence "$E = mc^2$" in the nominal position, or it can be replaced, in idiomatically suitable contexts, by "that $E = mc^2$".

So the idea that gives us the condition a truth ascription has to satisfy in order to count as a genuine sentence is as follows. If a given truth ascription bears the form of a truth operation, as in "It is true that $E = mc^2$", the "subject" of the ascription is by definition sufficient to specify a propositional content in the above sense, for it must have the explicit form of a declarative sentence – here, the form "$E = mc^2$". If, on the other hand, the ascription has the form of a (singular) truth predication, then its subject should be a nominal expression that specifies a full propositional content – such as " 'Snow is white' ", "that the cat is on the mat", "Pythagoras' theorem", "The sentence you just uttered" and so on. Liar does have the appearance of a normal truth ascription, but only the appearance of it, for the subject term of Liar, the name "Liar", is unable to specify all by itself a full propositional content.

To see this more vividly, we could try to formulate the truth ascription (allegedly) made by Liar using the truth operator instead of the truth predicate. Now Liar in its original form consists of two basic logical moments: the specification of the required propositional content, realized by the name "Liar", and alethic ascription, realized by the untruth predicate "is not true". To render Liar in the truth operational form, the alethic ascription function should be served by the truth operational correlate of the untruth predicate, i.e., the negation operator "It is not true that...". The element, likewise, that is to

provide the propositional content (allegedly) specified by "Liar" in the predicative case must take the form of a proper declarative sentence filling in the sentential gap of the negation operator. What one gets by making such projection is an infinite operator of the following form:

It is not true that it is not true that it is not true that...

The element that is to specify the propositional content of the alethic ascription in the operational case is the whole ascription itself *in the sentence position*, as it was in the predicative case the whole ascription in the nominal position. Thus we must take the step of alethic ascription anew every time we arrive at the moment where the propositional content is specified, since the element realizing that moment directs us every time to the ascription itself. In other words, no propositional content (independently of the alethic ascription element) at all is specified, which means that Liar is devoid of propositional content, that it is not a truth-evaluable item in the first place.

So the intuitive condition that a given singular truth predication of the form "$\bar{p}$ is true" should satisfy in order to count as a genuine sentence, i.e. that "$\bar{p}$" specify a full propositional content independently of "is true", corresponds, to a certain degree, to the formal condition that the whole predication can be converted to a truth operation of the form "It is true that p". However, this does not in any way show that the predicative form *in abstracto* is redundant, that its instances can simply be eliminated in favor of their truth operational projections. For there *are* cases in which a projection of this sort terminates the expressive strength of the truth predicative form, cases, that is, in which the *logical*[21] structure of a (genuine) truth predication – which can be exhibited in the form of a truth operation, and given that the redundancy schema (Red)

[21] See the following chapter for the correct sense of this adjective.

holds, in the form, in turn, of a declarative sentence free from alethic terminology – cannot account for all the aspects of its *grammatical* appearance. These are aspects that concern the grammatical limits of natural language with respect to *quantification*, and will be discussed in the following section.

2.4 Sentential generalization and deflationary truth

The natural way we quantify "over" items has a distinctive aspect that clarifies the difference between transparency and redundancy of truth. Specifically, it displays the possibility of a deflationary picture in which the truth predicate – or the truth-predicative form as a whole – preserves its transparency without being redundant. The point is simply that the truth-predicative form enables us to generalize with respect to the (grammatical) sentence position, *within the boundaries of natural grammar*, where no sentential quantification tools, such as sentential quantifiers and sentential variables, exist.

There are certain regularities we encounter in the world concerning individuals which we are able to state using the ordinary machinery of natural quantification. As an instance, consider the statement that a certain set of individuals, characterized by having a certain common property such as *being* F, all have another common property, *being G*. One natural way to state this is to say that *every F is (also) G* – formally, $\forall x(Fx \rightarrow Gx)$. But there are also regularities concerning the facts themselves we are able to state in this way about individuals; for instance the regularity we encounter in the two statements, that *if* snow is white *then* snow is white, and that *if* grass is green *then* grass is green. The regularity we are set to express in this case concerns neither the individuals – for snow and grass (considered to be mass terms) are two different items – nor the properties of being white and being green. It concerns rather the conditional form of the whole sentence in each case, which can be represented schematically as "$p \rightarrow p$". Natural quantifiers, which are

composed of *quantifier words* and *common nouns*, as in "everything" and "no man", obliges us to bring the *sentential* structure over which we want to quantify, into the noun position – specifically, natural quantifier words open up a nominal position to be filled in with a common noun.

So in order to state the latter kind of regularity, we need to view the schematically represented sentential form "$p \rightarrow p$" as belonging to items of a certain *sort*, labeled by a common noun such as "sentence" , "proposition", "thought", "condition" and so on. Call this process of conversion, for ease of use, *natural nomnalization*. Now we also need some other kind of expression to complete the quantifier yielded by natural nominalization, say "every proposition of the form '$p \rightarrow p$' ", in order to restore the sentential force – the force of stating something – found in the instances which suggested us the regularity in the first place. What we need, in the minimum, is a predicate that can complete the *singular* products of natural nominalization, in this case, "the proposition that if snow is white then snow is white" and "the proposition that if grass is green then grass is green", to sentences materially equivalent to the relevant original sentences that have undergone the process of natural nominalization. In other words, what we need is a predicate that can fill in the predicate place signaled by "*F*" in the following schema:

(PCFC) $\bar{p}$ is *F* if and only if p.

What we mean by the irredundancy of truth, then, is the simple fact that the truth predicate satisfies the schema for *predicative canonical form construction*, at least for certain *sorts* of natural nominalization, such as *sentence*, *proposition*, *belief* and *thought*. It is quite obvious that the same condition does not hold for the truth operator.

Of course, the regularity codified in the above conditional schema is a general fact that holds of logical necessity, that is, one that concerns the *logical form* of a certain set of sentences; but there are also contingent matters of fact that can be stated by generalizing with respect to the sentence position following this natural strategy, irrespective of the logical form of the sentences in question. As a vivid example, consider Wittgenstein's employment of a similar predicative structure "x is the case" in the *Tractatus*. In the very beginning of the text, Wittgenstein gives a distinctive definition of *the world*, as *everything that is the case*, which views it not so much as a list or a mereological composition of denotable items as a "conjunction" of truths. The idea conveyed here is not that the world consists of possible states of affairs – entities having the shape of a sentence nominalization – some of which happen to fall into the extension of the predicate "is the case", but rather that the world does not consist of items – or that the world is not a domain – in the first place, for he remarks, following the definition, that the world consists of facts *in opposition* to things.[22]

Now the surface grammatical form of this statement might suggest, quite misleadingly, a logical regimentation containing as one of its parts an individual quantification of the form:

$$\forall x(...Fx...)$$

where "Fx" is supposed to translate the natural predicate "is the case"; but the correct logical regimentation of the statement, according to the picture

[22] Thus Horwich, discussing the connection of the Tractarian picture to the more recent *truthmaker theory*, says: "In particular, Wittgenstein's remark that the world consists of facts rather than things (paragraph 1.1) should not be construed as the proposal of a new sort of *entity*, but precisely the opposite"; see his 2010, fn. 22 on page 321. We find a similar characterization of the idea of a world of facts in Russell's introduction to the text, in the form of a statement that according to the Tractatus, we could not describe the world by *pointing out* to *items*, but only by stating the facts, i.e., truths, about them; see Wittgenstein, 1961.

suggested by the remark following the definition, should rather contain a sentential quantification of the form:

$$\forall p(...p...)$$

Following the same strategy, a generalization to the effect, for instance, that whatever a certain subject of speech, *Subject*, utters is true – or in a more natural form, that Subject is always right – can be regimented as

$$\forall p(\text{Subject utters that } p \rightarrow p)$$

where the quantifier and the variables are sentential, and the incomplete expression "Subject utters that" functions like a sentential connective. It seems, however, that the same generalization can also be regimented as

$$\forall x(\text{Subject utters } x \rightarrow x \text{ is true})$$

taking now "Subject" as the name of an individual or a definite description, given that the language of regimentation itself will be supposed to contain the truth predicative form, "x is F". In this way, it might be contended that the whole machinery of sentential quantification even for the language of analysis is *redundant*.

Now this simple comparison suggests that there are two possible extreme views of the analysis of the natural truth discourse via a logical language of analysis: at one extreme, one might hold that natural language can be supplemented with stipulatively defined sentential quantification devices, so that the truth predicate in natural language becomes completely redundant; at the other extreme, one might hold that the truth predicate subsists even in the language

of regimentation, so that sentential quantification is what is really redundant. The first extreme gives us the correct form of the so-called *redundancy theory* of truth, correct in the sense that it shows that no reasonable deflationary thesis about truth could be thought to be a redundancy theory.[23] The second extreme, on the other hand, finds *partial* support from certain deflationists, adding, however, an element of vagueness to the sense in which their theories are deflationary.[24]

The main claim of this study is that the adequate formulation of the deflationary thesis hinges on the clarification of its location on the scale that falls between these two extreme points. Thus the following chapter will classify the main varieties of deflationism in light of the above discussion of the structural deviation of natural from formal quantification, and the picture of logical analysis suggested by that discussion. It will elaborate on two main leading versions of the deflationary approach, the disquotational and the prosentential accounts of truth, and propose a more abstract, yet specific enough, formulation of deflationism. The main idea prompted by this elaboration will be that the truth-predicative form resides – as a useful sentential canonical form – only in natural language, for it can be shown to disappear *altogether* in logical analysis. Specifically, it will be argued that we do not need the *transitional form* of logical truth predication, "Tx", recruiting formal individual variables and the *logical* predicate of truth[25], in order to analyze our natural truth discourse. The third leading variety, minimalism,

[23] I admit that this interpretation of the label "redundancy theory" is not completely in line with the common terminology. See the first section of the following chapter for a clarification of this point.

[24] Quine and Horwich are the first two examples to come to our minds, for both strongly oppose the use of sentential quantification tools in the language of analysis. In what sense and to what extent they give this support, and what results concerning their accounts follow from it, will be clarified in the following chapters.

[25] The deflationary truth predicate, it will be shown, is *not* a logical predicate, in the sense that it does not appear in the language of analysis.

will be discussed in the fourth chapter, in the context of a discussion on the idea of a *truthbearer*.

We may conclude by noting that an inflationary theorist could well agree that the truth predicate is irredundant in the above sense, and that the proposed sentential quantification translations are perfectly correct, but still argue that truth admits of the sort of analysis supposed to be suitable for ordinary predicates which we take to express real or natural properties. What they will not agree, thus, is that this particular grammatical-logical fact about truth is *the* explanation of the notion of truth, that its being a device for sentential generalization fully explains its further occurrences in the truth discourse. So the point of deflationism is not only the irredundancy of truth, but what we labeled as its *transparency*, i.e., its essentially being a phenomenon concerning the grammatical structure of our natural/logical discourse. Deflationary truth is transparent but irredundant.

CHAPTER 3

FORMULATING DEFLATIONISM: TRUTH PREDICATION AS CANONICAL FORM

3.1 Overview

This chapter

- proposes a criterion for classifying deflationary accounts, in the form of a two-step question, namely, whether the truth predicative form appears in the language of analysis, and if not, whether it is redundant even for natural language;
- applies the criterion to Horwich's list of deflationary accounts;
- elaborates on the disquotational approach to truth, and show its defects;
- displays the three-step development of the prosentential account, and shows that the limiting case of such development is the correct form of deflationism; and
- concludes with the proposal of the canonical form approach to truth discourse, according to which the truth discourse is a *structural* component of natural language, namely, its very theory of sentential generalization.

3.2 Deflationisms

3.2.1 Redundancy of truth and the general form of sentence

Deflationary truth has been characterized as transparent and irredundant. So it is quite confusing that Ramsey's 1927 account, which forms one of the most

important roots of the modern deflationary approach, is commonly viewed as a *redundancy theory*. A typical redundancy theory about a given expression type is expected to be the simple claim that this type can be analyzed *away* in all its appearances, and hence is redundant for the language in which it originally appears and for which it primarily functions. In this sense, a redundancy theory of truth will correspond to one of the extreme views, defined in the final section of the previous chapter, of the connection of natural truth discourse to its logical regimentation – namely, the view that the logical apparatus of sentential quantification could well replace the truth predicate in *natural language*.

It is clear that Ramsey's account is not a redundancy claim in this sense. The account consists of two main points about the truth predicate, one concerning its function, the other its significance. The significance of the truth predicate is given, according to Ramsey, by analyses of belief ascription paralleling the transparency schemata given in the previous chapter: roughly, if Subject believes that p, then Subject's belief is true if and only if p. The issue here is that there does not seem to be a natural way to mark the sentential place in its full generality, as done by the formal sentential variable "p". Thus the significance or meaning of truth cannot initially be *stated*, but can only be intuited in singular analyses of truth predication.

> ...we must come to the point: what *is* the meaning of "true"? It seems to me that the answer is really perfectly obvious, that anyone can *see* what it is and that difficulty only arise when we try to *say* what it is, because it is something which ordinary language is rather ill-adapted to express.
>
> Suppose a man believes that the earth is round; then his belief is true because the earth *is* round; or generalising this, if he believes that *A* is *B* his belief will be true if *A* is *B* and false otherwise.

> It is, I think, clear that in this last sentence we have the meaning of truth explained, and that the only difficulty is to formulate this explanation strictly as a definition. If we try to do this, the obstacle we encounter is that we cannot describe all beliefs as beliefs that *A* is *B* since the propositional reference of a belief may have any number of different more complicated forms. A man may be believing that all *A* are not *B*, or that if all *A* are *B*, either all *C* are *D* or some *E* are *F*, or something still more complicated. We cannot, in fact, assign any limit to the number of forms which may occur, and must therefore be comprehended in a definition of truth; so that if we try to make a definition to cover them all it will have to go on forever, since we must say that a belief is true, if supposing it to be a belief that *A* is *B*, *A* is *B*, or if supposing it to be a belief that either *A* is *B* or *C* is *D*, either *A* is *B* or *C* is *D*, and so on ad infinitum.[26]

So the fact about the significance of truth is that we need a completely general mark of the sentence position to stand in for any sentence (of the relevant language) of any grammatical or logical form, to achieve a general characterization of truth ascription. In a word, we need a *sentence variable*:

> In order to avoid this infinity we must consider the general form of a propositional reference of which all these forms are species; any belief whatever we may symbolise as a belief that p, where "p" is a variable sentence just as "A" and "B" are variable words or phrases (or terms as they are called in logic). We can then say that a belief is true if it is a belief that p, and p.[27]

Ramsey notes that the part of the *analysans* "and p" might strike one as an ungrammatical sequence, for the variable "p" has the form, in natural language, of an ordinary *term*. The point is that we need to know beforehand that this term stands in for some expression which contains a verb, and hence can be an argument or constituent of the sentential connective "and". In other words, we need to *stipulate* that this terms represents the general form of sentence. But this means that the sentence variable is an unnatural expression

[26] Ramsey, 1991, p. 9.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

type, not available without stipulation. So the general character of truth cannot be stated using only natural expression types after all.

If Ramsey explicitly held that the kind of general representation of the sentence position exercised by the sentence variable could well replace the truth predications in natural language, then he would be holding a simple redundancy claim. But the point he makes about the function of truth suggests that he acknowledges the need in natural language for a transparent predicate like the truth predicate. After warning the reader about the misleading nominal, verb-less *appearance* of the general form of sentence in natural language, he remarks:

> The same point exactly arises if we take, not the symbol "p", but the relative pronoun which replaces it in ordinary language. Take for example "what he believed was true." Here what he believed was, of course, something expressed by a sentence containing a verb. But when we represent it by the pronoun "what" the verb which is really contained in the "what" has, *as a matter of language*, to be supplied again by "was true."[28]

The correlates of formal (individual and sentential) quantifiers and (individual and sentential) bound variables in natural (or "ordinary") language are, roughly, natural quantifiers, consisting of quantifier words and common nouns[29], and relative (hence bound) pronouns. The problem here, if any, is that the sentential character of sentential quantifiers and variables is lost in natural quantification; specifically, a natural pronoun that is to stand in for, or specify the propositional content of, a full-fledged sentence – as "what" in "what he said was true" – has the grammatical shape of a noun-phrase, and hence calls for a verb – nay a transparent one – to take the shape of a sentence.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 10. The italics are mine.

[29] See the third section of the previous chapter.

A clearer way to make the same point is to abstract from the idea of pronoun the generic idea of *proform*, and apply it back, this time, to the grammatical category of sentence; the point then becomes that the pro*sentences* we encounter in natural language cannot make the required kind of contribution to the natural framework for quantification, so that natural language employs instead the *pronoun+transparent predicate* structure to serve the prosentential function:

> As we claim to have defined truth we ought to be able to substitute our definition for the word "true" wherever it occurs. But the difficulty we have mentioned renders this impossible in ordinary language which treats what should really be called *pro-sentences* as if they were *pro-nouns*. The only pro-sentences admitted by the ordinary language are "yes" and "no", which are regarded as by themselves expressing a complete sense, whereas "that" and "what" even when functioning as short for sentences always required to be supplied with a verb: this verb is often "is true" and this peculiarity of language gives rise to artificial problems as to the nature of truth, which disappear at once when they are expressed in logical symbolism, in which we can render "what he believed is true" by "if p was what he believed, p".[30]

Two things must be noted here. First, the above analogy with the pronouns is the real root of the later prosentential theory, according to the orthodox (1975) version of which the idea of a truth predicate is actually a misleading abstraction from essentially indivisible natural prosentences, such as "it is true" and "that is true". Secondly, and more importantly, Ramsey does *not*, however, claim that the relevant natural expressions bearing the pronoun+transparent predicate structure *are* natural prosentences, along with "yes" and "no". He seems to remain true to the picture of prosentence suggested by the formal sentential variable – a monolithic body serving a non-composite function; and in this respect, his account clearly differs from the orthodox version of prosententialism (which point will be the subject of the final section

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

of the present chapter). What Ramsey tries to convey in the above paragraphs is that natural language has its own way of serving a distinctive function the nature and scope of which gets clear only through logical regimentation within the framework of sentential quantification. None of this implies either that the natural truth-predicative form is a mere appearance, or that the truth predicate in natural language is redundant.

Thus the overall status of natural truth according to Ramsey cannot be redundancy in the above mentioned sense. Yet Ramsey's account does contain a restricted redundancy claim, one that concerns the *singular* instances of generalized truth predications. In singular truth predications, the truth-predicative form, such as "that *A* is *B* is true", is replaced – after a recursive application of the rule of analysis – by a non-alethic sentential form, such as "*A* is *B*". Considering the above example about pronominal belief ascription, Ramsey notes: "If however we particularize the form of belief in question all need for the words 'was true' disappears as before and we can say 'the things he believed to be connected by a certain relation were, in fact, connected by that relation'."[31]

So it becomes clear that the real issue here is the absence of a general form of sentence in natural language, i.e. of a non-stipulative form that is abstract enough to mark sentences of all grammatical or logical shapes, but determinate enough to mark sentences *only*. If we had such a natural form, truth would be only transparent but not irredundant, and its (idle) functioning could be exhaustively captured by the redundancy schema (Red).

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

3.2.2 The truth predicate, the sentence variable and the classification of deflationary accounts

However, in order for the question of the presence/absence of a *natural* general form of sentence to arise in the first place, it must be conceded that the natural instances of the truth predicative form are logically regimented as sentential quantification clauses. For the very idea of an abstract general sentential form is initially suggested by the idea of a schematic *sentence* letter, whether it be employed boundedly or freely in sentential quantification, or only freely in some theory of propositional logic. In other words, the first step to be taken is to deny that the truth predicate is a *logical predicate*.

Now a confusion might arise concerning the label "logical predicate", for it could be used to express two crucially different senses. The first sense concerns the kind of notion supposedly expressed by the truth predicate: truth, unlike notions that are expressed by empirically or predictively relevant ordinary predicates, concerns the structure of language, and not directly the facts that could be codified and communicated through language. It is obvious that this sense captures the transparency phenomenon defined in the previous chapter. The second sense, on the other hand, concerns the analytic reliability of the truth predicative form, and conveys the idea that the form survives the process of the logical analysis of the natural truth discourse, reappearing as "Tx" within the logical framework of *individual* quantification.

The intended sense, then, above is the latter one, namely that the truth-predicative form is preserved in the final analysis. To deny this, however, will be to disregard certain accounts counted among the leading varieties of deflationism, such as the disquotational theory and the minimalist conception.

For both accounts (1) take the truth predicate as a reliable tool for logical analysis, specifically, for generalization with respect to the sentence position, and (2) view the framework of sentential quantification as an unreliable – or, given the truth-predicative form, a redundant at best – machinery. However, they still hold that truth is transparent, and that the very kind of transparency it bears is what explains its place in natural language and in the logical language of analysis. Such accounts are obviously in line with our characterization of deflationary truth as irredundantly transparent.

So there *are* deflationary accounts for which the question of redundancy does not arise at all. Thus the question whether the truth predicate appears in the final logical analysis gives us the notion of the first specification or variance of deflationism about truth; put simply:

(LR) The truth-predicative form is logically reliable, i.e. the truth predicate is a logical predicate.

(LU) The truth-predicative form is logically unreliable, i.e. the truth predicate is not a logical predicate.

The significance of this first division comes from the fact that (LR)-accounts, unlike (LU)-accounts, need to hold in some sense/to some extent, that truth is a property, and it has bearers. The simple reason is that any expression that appears as a predicate in the *final* analysis will trivially specify an extension (and a counter-extension) within the domain of the interpretation of the relevant individual quantification framework (assuming that the interpretation is of the domain-and-values type) – independently of whether the property thereby expressed is or is not merely of a logical nature, in the first,

transparency sense given above. Thus we have the interesting option of a deflationary account of the *property* of truth.[32]

(LU)-accounts, on the other hand, will hold that the truth-predicative form is redundant for the language of analysis, which will employ instead a stipulated non-composite representation of the sentence position *in abstracto*. An extreme form of (LU) is the redundancy theory of truth, in the above defined sense according to which Ramsey's account is *not* a redundancy theory. Indeed, it is quite hard to find any actual instances of the redundancy theory defined this way, so it could be treated merely as a distinct, ideal type. But a more significant variation is available within (the irredundancy version of) (LU), which concerns the grammatical architecture, so to speak, of the natural truth predicative form: (LUM), the view that natural truth predications should be modeled after the sentence variable, i.e. as non-composite or monolithic bodies, or (LUC), the view that they should not be.

In the case of (LUM), the various ways in which a propositional content could be specified in a natural truth predication are explained as various contexts in which a non-composite natural sentence form (modeled after the sentence variable) could appear. To state it simply, the logical machinery of sentential quantification, according to (LUM), not only translates the natural truth discourse as a whole, but determines how it is to be carved up into *functional* pieces. In the case of (LUC), on the contrary, the truth-predicative form is treated as an ordinary, composite (or modular) predicative form, so that the functioning of the sentence nominalization is explained independently of the functioning of the truth predicate "is true". The functional division of natural

[32] According to Richard L. Kirkham, however, this is not a real option. See his formulation of the deflationary thesis as the simple claim that "there is no property of truth, hence nothing is a truthbearer"; Kirkham, 1992, p. 311.

truth discourse should be determined, according to (LUM), by natural grammar itself, without altering in any way the fact that the correct logical regimentation of this discourse employs a completely different division of functions. So we have:

(LR) The truth predicative form is logically reliable

(LU) The truth predicative form is logically unreliable

(LUC) The truth predicative form is logically unreliable and functionally composite

(LUM) The truth predicative form is logically unreliable and functionally monolithic

The task of this chapter and the next is to show that (LUC) is the healthiest formulation we could have of the deflationary approach, in that it is both able to yield the core claims and observations of the main varieties of deflationism, and to stand as a specific thesis in its own right about the natural truth discourse, namely, that this discourse is natural language's *own* theory for sentential generalization. Now to ground my choice of the main varieties, I apply the proposed classification to Horwich's list of deflationary accounts, and show what remains of it.

Horwich gathers his list on the basis of a four-level characterization of the deflationary approach. Briefly: as, (1) on the pragmatic or illocutionary level, the idea that the truth predicate is essentially some sort of linguistic or logical device; (2) on the semantic level, the idea that the meaning of the truth predicate is given by transparency schemata instead of instances of (Infl); (3) on

the metaphysical level, the idea that truth is not a substantive property; (4) and on the meta-philosophical level, the idea that truth-based theorizing in philosophy is ill-directed. I quote the list in full:

> 1. The *redundancy* theory, whereby "The proposition *that p* is true" merely rearticulates the meaning of "p".
>
> 2. The *minimalist* theory, whereby we mean what we do by the truth predicate in virtue of the fact that our overall use of it is explained by our propensity to accept instances of the material equivalence schema, "The proposition *that p* is true $\leftrightarrow$ p".
>
> 3. *Tarski's* theory, whereby truth, for the sentences of a given language, is defined in terms of reference within that language, which is in turn defined by a mere list of what its words refer to. (Note that Tarski is quite clear that the meaning of the expression, "true in English", is implicitly fixed by a disquotation schema. The purpose of his further theorizing is to put this idea into the form of a "respectable", explicit definition.)
>
> 4. The *sentence-variable* theory, whereby "x is true" is analysed as
>
> "$\exists p(x = \langle p \rangle \ \& \ p)$".
>
> 5. The *prosentential* theory, whereby "it is true" is a kind of dummy sentence, or sentence variable, whose relation to other sentences is similar to the relationship between pronouns and other singular terms.
>
> 6. The *disquotation* theory, whereby our concept of truth for sentences (at least for the context-*in*sensitive part of our *own* language) is captured by the strong equivalence of "p is true" and "p".[33]

The varieties that will primarily concern us in the following are the disquotational and minimalist accounts as instances of (LR), and the prosentential account in its 1972 origination and 1975 orthodox statement as an instance of (LUM), but in its 1992 revision as an instance of (LUC). (LR) has defects, some of which are explained in this chapter in the context of a

[33] Horwich, 2010, p. 19-20.

discussion on the idea of semantic ascent, and others in the following chapter, in the context of a discussion on truthbearers. The main point about the evolution of the prosentential account from (LUM) to (LUC) will be that (LUC) is but a denial of the whole notion of prosentence.

As for the remaining varieties:

- The redundancy theory, it has been shown, is merely an ideal type in the proposed classification, which signifies the exact opposite of (LR), since (LR) could rightfully be formulated as the converse redundancy claim that the framework of sentential quantification is redundant given the truth-predicative structure, "*Tx*", as a logically reliable tool. So it will not be separately treated in the following.

- The so-called sentence-variable theory is not specific enough to mark a place in the proposed classification, for it does not seem to be anything more than the observation that sentential quantification can paraphrase truth-predicative discourse.

- Tarski's account, although clearly deflationary in several respects, is too unique to be counted as yet another variety of deflationism. First of all, it is essentially a program for defining language-specific truth predicates – i.e. of "*true-in-L*" for certain *formal* sorts of "*L*". And secondly, his way of dealing with the question of the abstract form of sentence is quite distinctive: he incorporates the finitely statable compositional mechanism that produces in the first place the infinitely many sentential forms of the (formal) language in question to the very definition of truth for that language. Tarski's account will be mentioned in the discussion of the implications of deflationism as (LUC), with respect to the idea of a truth-conditional semantics, in the final chapter.

3.3 The disquotational account

One leading instance of (LR)-deflationism is Quine's disquotational account of truth. Before giving a description of this account, however, it will be useful (especially for what is to follow in the next chapter) to note that an account of truth can be disquotational in two different but related senses. In the first sense, the account could take the form of a *theory* of truth consisting of all or some instances, for a certain (set of) language(s), of the disquotational schema, " 'p' is true if and only if p."[34] In the second sense an account of truth might be disquotational because it states that the appearance of the truth predicate in the disquotational schema is explicative of the overall appearance of truth in language. A disquotational account in this sense, therefore, is expected to contain an account of the *raison d'être* of truth in natural and/or logical language, based on the idea of disquotation.

It is clear that Quine's account is disquotational primarily in the latter sense: it is essentially an account of why truth is not redundant in terms of its functioning in some certain instances of the disquotational schema. However, the two senses are not that distant from each other, as also acknowledged by Quine himself, who presents the account in some places in relation to the Tarskian program of defining language-specific definitions of truth. The basic idea at the center of this program is to define truth for a given formal language – the compositional structure of which can be stipulatively manipulated and perfectly exhibited – in a formally correct and materially adequate way. Material adequacy concerns the extent to which the definition agrees with the

[34] "Now in a wider sense of the word, we may call a *disquotationalist* anyone who believes that our best theory of truth consists of some collection of Tarski-biconditionals. In this wider sense, Paul Horwich is surely the most renown present-day disquotationalist"; see Horsten, 2011, p. 50. Still, there is a strong sense in which Horwich's *minimal theory*, which forms a part of his overall minimalist conception, is not disquotational, namely, because it employs sortally marked that-clauses as names of propositions, instead of sentence quotations as quote-names of sentences. See the first section of the following chapter.

intuitive conception of truth possessed by the language user, for a definition of truth can well have the correct form of a definition without defining truth as we know it (if, for instance, it aims to be a completely prescriptive refinement or alteration of the notion).

A simple, extensional way to state such adequacy condition is to oblige the proposed definition to entail in full a certain set of sentences that together codify the regularity of *that* use of the truth predicate which is able to express the possessed intuitive notion. Such regularity of use can be codified by sentences, in this case, of the form " 'p' is true if and only if p", a specific version of the denominalization schema where we see the essentials of the appearance of truth in language. So a materially adequate definition for the given language will be expected to entail an instance of the disquotational schema, for each and every declarative sentence that can appear in that language.

But if among the sentences of the language in question are those like Liar, material adequacy could only be achieved for the price of formal correctness, since the disquotational instances of such sentences will result in paradox, signaling the formal incorrectness of the definition (or possibly the language in question). Now one way to refine the material adequacy condition so as to preserve the formal correctness of the definition is to restrict the *theory* consisting of the initial instances of the disquotational schema[35] by simply excluding such harmful instances. One common property of such instances is that they contain the very truth predicate (or some modal or temporal modification thereof) which is being defined.[36] So the needed restriction rule can be that the theory of truth the definition should entail in order to count as

[35] The *naive* theory of truth; Horsten, 2011, p. 49.

[36] Note that this property does not have to be genuine source of their harmfulness, especially in light of the deflationary approach to the liar phenomenon, discussed in the previous chapter.

materially adequate does not contain the instances of the disquotational schema for sentences which already contain the truth predicate.

What results from such restriction is simply the disquotational theory of truth. It is particularly a *disquotational* theory, for in each of its instances the truth predicate that appears on the left-hand side, along with the quotation marks around the relevant declarative sentence, disappear on the right-hand side, in favor of an independent occurrence of that sentence – in a word, the truth predicate *disquotes* the quoted appearance of the given sentence. Quine, in the context of a discussion on the liar phenomenon, says:

> The truth predicate will be said to *disquote* a sentence *S* if the form
>
> ____ is true if and only if____
>
> comes out true when *S* is named in the first blank and written in the second. Thus what the disquotational account of truth says is that the truth predicate disquotes every eternal sentence. But the lesson of the antinomy is that if a language has at its disposal the innocent notations for treating of quoting and appending, and also the notations of elementary logic, then it cannot contain also a truth predicate that disquotes all its own eternal sentences – on pain of inconsistency. Its truth predicate, or its best approximation to one, must be incompletely disquotational. Specifically, it must not disquote all the sentences that contain it....And of course it must not disquote all the sentences containing terms by which that predicate could be paraphrased. This, apart from its special orientation to quoting and appending, is substantially what has come to be known as Tarski's Theorem.[37]

However, there is more to disquotation, and hence to the disquotational account or conception – in opposition to *theory* – of truth[38], that cannot be captured by the simple idea of the disappearance of quotation marks. Disquotation is not so much an orthographic as a semantic phenomenon, for it is closely related to the

[37] Lynch, 2001, p. 477.

[38] The same holds of the minimalist conception of truth; see the following chapter.

idea of the logical analysis of natural truth discourse. In the following two subsections, I give a brief description of the orthodox version of the disquotational account, and elaborate on it as an instance of (LR)-deflationism.

3.3.1 The definition

Quine's disquotational account of truth is essentially a statement of the *raison d'être* of the truth predicate, primarily as a disconfirmation of *propositionalism* about truth. Propositionalism in general is the meta-philosophical attitude of committing, in the logical-philosophical analysis of a given discourse *D*, to entities that primarily function as the meanings of the characteristic sentences of *D*. A propositionalist, for instance, about the (biasedly labeled) propositional attitudes discourse, consisting of ascriptions of the form "*Subject Vs that* p", expressing notions such as belief, knowledge, thought etc., will hold that the ascription clauses must be regimented in a way that represents propositions as distinctively standing items. So a propositionalist logical analysis of the ascription clause type, for instance, "Subject believes that p", is one that either represents the clause type as "Subject/believes/that p" or as "Subject believes/that p", suggesting the semantic independence of the entity allegedly denoted by the sentence nominalization "that p", but definitely not as "Subject/believes that/p" or "Subject believes that/p", where the propositional reference (in the Ramseian sense) of the sentence is specified clearly in the non-denoting sentence position.

Propositionalism about truth, specifically, is the view that among the basic elements of the semantic analysis of the natural truth discourse are propositions, sentence-shaped meaning entities, and that it is the propositions, in opposition to sentences, that bear or lack the property of truth in the first

place. There are various ways in which the propositionalist could argue for the primacy of propositions in the analysis of the truth discourse – for instance, by pointing to the common forms natural truth predications take in the actual uses of natural language – but an indirect argument for propositions is one that is put forward against sentences or other linguistic or mental items that are also commonly posited as truthbearers. The core intuition is that truth concerns extra-linguistic/extra-mental reality, obviously more than it concerns, and/or quite independently of, the way it is stated in different systems of representation, such as in different natural languages, or the way it is represented in general via different kinds of representational systems, such as speech, writing, thought etc. It is neither the sentence tokens/types, nor particular utterances or thinkings, *about* the reality in question, but reality itself, that produces truth or falsity; and this fact is best captured by the (allegedly) language-independent and act-independent, eternal (non-temporal), vagueness-free thought contents, namely, propositions.

Quine argues that the requirement that truth essentially concern reality and not language, allegedly suggesting the propositionalist picture, is actually satisfied without positing such sentence-shaped meaning entities.

> Philosophers who favor propositions have said that propositions are needed because truth is intelligible only of propositions, not of sentences. An unsympathetic answer is that we can explain truth of sentences to the propositionalist in his own terms: sentences are true whose meanings are true propositions. Any failure of intelligibility here is already his own fault.
>
> But there is a deeper and vaguer reason for his feeling that truth is intelligible primarily for propositions. It is that truth should hinge on reality, not language; sentences are language. His way of producing a reality for truth to hinge on is shabby, certainly: an imaginary projection from sentences. But he is right that truth

> should hinge on reality, and it does. No sentence is true but reality makes it so.[39]

The argument is simply his disquotational explanation of the *raison d'être* of truth in terms of sentential generalization, echoing Ramsey's corresponding irredundancy explanation given above: truth *is* predicated of sentences, more properly, of names of sentences, but only to formulate certain generalities about the extra-linguistic reality which happen to present themselves as constancies of logical form only with respect to the sentence position, such as "$p \rightarrow p$" or "$p \vee \neg p$". The generalization in such cases is formulated, accordingly, with respect to the sentence position, employing, as we have seen in the previous chapter, sortal quantifiers plus transparent predicates, but the topic is still the same extra-linguistic reality, i.e. the topic of the possible (alethically free) values of that position.

> We can generalize on "Tom is mortal", "Dick is mortal", and so on, without talking of truth or of sentences; we can say "All men are mortal". We can generalize similarly on "Tom is Tom", "Dick is Dick", "0 is 0", and so on, saying "Everything is itself". When on the other hand we want to generalize on "Tom is mortal or Tom is not mortal", "Snow is white or snow is not white", and so on, we ascend to talk of truth and of sentences, saying "Every sentence of the form 'p or not p' is true", or "Every alternation of a sentence with its negation is true". What prompts this semantic ascent is not that "Tom is mortal or Tom is not mortal" is somehow about sentences while "Tom is mortal" and "Tom is Tom" are about Tom. All three are about Tom. We ascend only because of the oblique way in which the instances over which we are generalizing are related to one another.[40]

Quine, however, does not present the irredundancy of the truth predicate in terms of the simple grammatical processes of (sortal) sentence nominalization and denominalization (as done in the characterization given in the final section

[39] Quine, 1070, p. 10.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

of the previous chapter), but rather chooses to oppose individual and sentential generalization in terms of the idea of *naming*, which explains the centrality of the notion of *semantic ascent*. The sort of generality witnessed in the simple case of individual predication takes the form of a change solely in the names of the relevant individuals, such as the change from "Tom" to "Dick", suggesting the reading of "All men are mortal" as "x is mortal for all things x of the sort that 'Tom' is a name of."

> But what would be a parallel reading of the generalization of "Tom is mortal or Tom is not mortal"? It would read "p or not p for all things p of the sort that sentences are names of". But sentences are not names, and this reading is simply incoherent; it uses "p" both in positions that call for sentence clauses and in a position that calls for a noun substantive. So, to gain our desired generality, we go up one step and talk about sentences: "Every *sentence* of the *form* 'p or not p' is *true*".[41]

Quine's point here is simply that since a sentence cannot reasonably be supposed to name items, the schematic sentence letter "p" cannot be used as a variable, for the sole paradigm for variation in a framework of quantification, according to Quine, is change of names for a certain set of items. In order to quantify with respect to the sentence position, specifically, to state a certain sentential regularity exemplified by the extra-linguistic reality, then, one needs to ascend to a higher semantic level to take sentences themselves embodying the logical form codifying that regularity as the new topic of discourse; what only remains to be done is to turn this topic into a full-fledged *statement* by conjoining to it the truth predicate (or some modification of it): "This ascent to a linguistic plane of reference is only a momentary retreat from the world, for the utility of the truth predicate is precisely the cancellation of linguistic reference. The truth predicate is a reminder that, despite a technical ascent to talk of sentences, our eye is on the world."[42]

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 11-12.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

3.3.2 Semantic ascent and (LR)-deflationism

Now the way Quine states the equivalence between a quotational truth predication[43], such as " 'Snow is white' is true", and the relevant object-level sentence, namely, "snow is white", suggests a *strong* interpretation of the equivalence relation.[44] According to such interpretation, the relation is an equivalence of meaning that holds between the sides of the singular instances of the disquotational schema, and hence an equivalence of meaning *structure* that holds between the sides of the schema itself. In other words, the schematic expression " 'p' is true" has the same meaning structure as the schematic sentence letter "p" .

Not only that, for the equivalence of meaning structure is established in favor of the monolithic sentence letter on the right-hand side, so that the *real* meaning structure of the instances of the quotational truth predication schema is determined by the structure of the corresponding object-level instances of the sentence letter. For instance, if the sentence letter is replaced with a relational sentence of the form "*aRb*" , the corresponding quotational truth predication of the form " '*aRb'* is true" will have, despite its monadic predicative appearence, a dyadic relational meaning structure; or if the sentence letter is replaced with an existential quantification of the form "$\exists x(\ldots x\ldots x\ldots)$", the corresponding quotational truth predication will have an existential meaning structure. So considering the instance of the disquotational schema for "Snow is white", Quine remarks: "By calling the sentence true, we call snow white."[45] And similarly, he takes the main function of the truth predicate in the context of

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[43] A quotational truth predication is simply a predication of the form " 'p' is true".

[44] See Horwich's list of deflationary accounts given above.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

singular and general disquotations to be the restoration of "the effect of objective reference" – i.e., semantic descent – instead of bare *denominalization*.

In a word, the truth predicative structure borne by a quotational truth predication is unreliable as a meaning structure indicator. But this is clearly in tension with the (LR)-claim that truth-predicative form is logically reliable.[46] The tension is caused by the very reasonable assumption that the genuine meaning structure of a natural expression type is determined by its logical regimentation – reasonable, for what will be the point of logically regimenting a given natural expression type, if it is not the clarification of what is *really* meant by the instances of that type? For instance, what is the point of logically regimenting a natural definite description clause after the Russellian paradigm, if it is not to show that what is really meant is not that the individual *named* by the definite description *is so-and-so*, but that *there are* individuals satisfying some certain condition, *and* those individuals *are so-and-so*?

An easier way to underline the tension is to ask what exactly is meant by "disquotation". The meaning that seems to direct the disquotational account depends not barely on quotation, but specifically on sentence quotation. In quoting a proper name or any other kind of nominal expression, we essentially do one thing: we step on a higher semantic level to *mention* what is normally used to name or describe individuals. This is the bare form of semantic ascent. In quoting, however, a non-nominal expression, specifically, a sentence, we do more than one thing: we not only ascend semantically, but change the grammatical category of the target expression, in this case from the sentential

[46] "The truth predicate in its general use, attachable to a quantifiable variable in the fashion 'x is true', is eliminable by no facile paradigm", *ibid.*, p. 13.

to the nominal. This latter is the simple process of (sentence) nominalization. So sentence quotation consists of two relatively distinct functions of semantic ascent and nominalization. These functions are only relatively distinct, for although it is possible to nominalize a sentence without ascending to a higher semantic level – that is, without naming or denoting it – it is not possible to mention, in the full sense, a sentence without also nominalizing it.[47]

So what exactly is the function of the truth predicate: semantic descent and denominalization, or solely denominalization? Now the dilemma is as follows. Either Quine employs the semantic ascent terminology seriously, or only figuratively. In the first case, the truth predicate will fail to neutralize the effect of linguistic reference, for according to (LR), it is a reliable logical predicate, having a real extension inhabited by the bearers of the (supposedly logical) property it expresses, among which are the sentences the names of which can appear as subject terms in truth predications. The only thing the truth predicate could then provide is material equivalence between the sides of the disquotational schema, so that Quine's dictum would come to mean that in calling “Snow is white” true, we also happen to call snow white, and vice versa, but nothing stronger. Truth, in this option, is merely a device of denominalization, yet a transparent one, as it does not alter the propositional content specified by the sentence nominalization of which it is predicated. If, on the contrary, Quine employs the semantic ascent terminology only metaphorically, so that a quotational truth predication has the mere appearance of a truth predication, then the analytic reliability of the truth

[47] It *might be* possible, however, in a conversational context, to relate in the general sense to a sentence without nominalizing it. For instance, one might employ, aside from expressions such as “yes” and “no”, sentential inheritors such as the alleged prosentences “it is true” and “that is true”, to relate to sentences that are uttered or would be uttered in that context. This possibility is one central feature of (LUM), and is disconfirmed, to some extent, in (LUC). See the final section of the present chapter.

predicate, or the truth predicative form as a whole, is put into question, which contradicts (LR).

Otherwise stated, if any genuine semantic ascent occurs in the first place in quoting a sentence, then there is no reasonable way to neutralize its effect – the effect of linguistic reference – by truth predication. The most reasonable way to manipulate the disquotation phenomenon is to leave (LR) altogether and hold that a *general* quotational truth predication, such as "Every sentence of the form '$p \rightarrow p$' is true", has the mere appearance of a truth predication, that its logical regimentation should have the form of a sentential quantification, in this case, "$\forall p(p \rightarrow p)$".

This opens the way to (LU)-deflationism, the leading instance of which is the prosentential account. The following section will discuss the prosentential account in its evolution from (LUM)- to (LUC)-deflationism, as a confirmation of the claim that the most powerful and contentful statement of the deflationary thesis in general is provided by (LUC).

3.4 The prosentential account

3.4.1 Origination of the position: the natural reading of sentential quantification

The prosentential account originates rather indirectly with Dorothy Grover's 1972 discussion[48]of propositional/sentential quantification. Grover's aim in this discussion is to display the two main alternative ways of stipulating formal sentential quantification, and giving an enriched version of natural English in

[48] "Propositional Quantifiers", reprinted in Grover, 1992, as chapter 2, pp. 46-69. The references will be made to the reprint.

which instances of one of these stipulations can be clearly read or pictured. One of the alternatives is the employment of a formal language containing sentential variables – i.e. variables that occupy the sentence position – and the other is the employment of a formal language containing propositional term variables – i.e. individual variables the possible values of which are sentence nominalizations such as names of propositions, names of sentences, or simple that-clauses – and transparent predicates like the truth predicate. The reason for the enrichment of natural language is simply that it does not contain even only approximate analogues of formal sentential quantification tools, specifically of sentential variables, by which one could grasp the overall picture of sentential quantification.

Grover also sets herself to show that Quine's rejection of viewing the schematic sentence letter as a sentential variable is ill-based. As stated in the previous section, Quine's rejection is based on a strictly pronominalist picture of variables in general, according to which a letter can function as a variable only if it can name or denote items; but since a sentence letter cannot be reasonably taken to name items and to occupy the sentential position at once, we need the *semantic ascent* + *disquotational predicate* framework to quantify with respect to the sentence position. So according to Quine, even the purely stipulative use of sentential variables and quantifiers is suspect. Grover tries to show how Quine's picture misrepresents the essentially *prosentential* character of sentential quantification, by arming natural language with items that are able to mimic the schematic sentence letter *and* to appear in quantificational contexts.

According to Grover, in order to give "faithful and perspicuous"[49]natural readings in natural language of sentential (or propositional) quantification clauses employing sentential variables, such as "$\exists p(p)$" and "$\forall p$(If John knows that p then p)", natural language should be armed with what she calls (after Ramsey) *prosentences*. Grover also employs a bridging metalanguage, *philosophers' English* (as she calls it), which is rich enough to enable the comparison of natural and formal structures: in philosophers' English, "propositional variables that take sentences as substituents can sensibly be used"[50], without, contra Quine and Suppes[51], viewing them as doubling as names of (dubious) propositions or other sentence-shaped items.

Now the crucial point here is that natural language *does* give readings, to certain extents, of formal sentential quantification clauses like the ones mentioned above. But those readings, according to Grover, are not faithful or exact enough in that they do not represent clearly the functional structure of – i.e. the particular way the whole is divided into distinct functional parts within –such clauses.[52] Consider the following clause employing sentential quantification tools:

(1) $\forall r$(John believes that $r \rightarrow$ Bill believes that r)

One most appropriate natural reading of (1) is

[49] Grover, 1992, p. 47.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[51] For Quine's position, see the previous section; for Suppes, see his 1957, the "Postscript on Use and Mention" to Chapter 6, pp. 121-127.

[52] This observation lies at the center of (LUM)-deflationism. See 3.2 above.

Bill believes everything John believes.

This natural reading, although perfectly idiomatic, and quite faithful to (1) *in toto*, misrepresents the functional structure of (1), for it employs, for instance, the predicates "Bill believes" and "John believes" in place of the sentential connectives "John believes that" and "Bill believes that". Again, consider,

(2) $\exists r(r \rightarrow$ snow is white$)$

which might read in natural language

(3) There is something such that if it is true then snow is white.

where the functional structural variation is quite obvious: there is nothing, for instance, in (2) that corresponds to the truth predicate that appears in (3).[53]

However, such structural deviations do not seem to concern sentential quantification exclusively; for they occur in cases even of individual quantification, where no natural idiomatic correlate can be found, for instance, for the unrestricted universal quantifier "$\forall x$", considered in isolation from the quantification structure "$\forall x(\ldots x\ldots)$", or simply for the unrestricted variable "x" itself. The trivial reason is that natural quantification, individual or sentential, employs its own framework for the resolution and composition of quantification functions – so that a type of function that is embodied as non-composite in the

[53] Grover, 1992, p. 50.

language of logical regimentation can appear to have a composite body in natural language, or vice versa; and the parts of the composite body in one language can reasonably fail altogether to have any correlate in the other.

> In suggesting readings in English of quantified formulas, it is essential to find something that does the job in English that the variable does in the formal language. There is no *single* kind of linguistic entity that is adequate for either quantifiers binding individual variables or quantifiers binding propositional variables. In the case of quantifiers binding individual variables, this point is seldom or never mentioned but is nonetheless true: The effect of the variable is obtained in English through the use of a *combination* of *common* nouns that indicate the kind of variable, and anaphoric uses of relative pronouns that do the cross-referencing required.[54]

Grover makes this point to counter possible objections to the stipulative use of sentential quantification tools in the metalanguage; simply stated, the evidence is that the use of individual quantifiers and variables are no less stipulative. Still, it is easier to find faithful *enough* natural readings of individual quantification clauses, for at least the *grammatical position* held by individual variables match with the one held by natural variables – it is the noun position in each case.

But the same does not hold of sentential quantification: we cannot even *picture* in natural language the kind of functions served by formal quantifiers binding sentential variables and by monolithic sentential variables themselves. This is the very reason for extending natural language by adding to it appropriate semi-stipulative types of expression in giving faithful translations of sentential quantification clauses.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

So Grover's solution to enrich natural language with prosentences, specifically with “thatt” mimicking essentially the *binding* occurrence of pronouns, and “the-first” and “the-second”, mimicking their *bound* or relative occurrences. Grover, using the analogy with the connection between nouns and pronouns, and with the way they function in translating individual quantification clauses, specifies three conditions for being a prosentence. First, a prosentence should hold the grammatical position of sentence, just like a pronoun holds the grammatical position of noun. This means that a prosentence should be grammatically appropriate to fill in the argument place or places of a sentential connective, such as “John believes that...”, yielding, for instance

John believes that *thatt*.[55]

where “thatt” stands in for, and so can be replaced with, a full-fledged declarative sentence, such as “Snow is white”.

Secondly, cross-referential uses of prosentences should be available. A cross-referential use of the pronoun “he” is witnessed in the simple dialogue between Bill and Jane:

BILL: Fred is overworked.

JANE: *He* would manage if *he* worked more efficiently.

The pronoun “he” is used by Jane to *refer to* Fred, but only because the name “Fred” itself happens to do so; in other words, in cross-referencing, the essential

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

idea is not reference – as the label suggests – but *standing in*, in the sense of serving the same semantic function. So although "thatt" used by Jane in

BILL: Snow is white.

JANE: If *thatt*, then it reflects the sun's rays.

does not in any sense *refer to* "Snow is white", it cross-refers to it in the sense that what Jane means is simply that if snow is white, then it reflects the sun's rays.

Thirdly and finally, one should be able to employ a prosentence in contexts of anaphora, specifically, those of bound quantification. The main difference between cross-reference and quantificational anaphora is that in the latter case, the semantic value of the antecedent expression from which the proform in question is to gather its own could be indeterminate. A pronominal example is the simple natural quantification

Every man knows his limits.

where there is no definite semantic value to be inherited by "his". In the same fashion, "thatt" is used anaphorically in the following translation of (1) above:

For each proposition, if John believes that *thatt*, then Bill believes that *thatt*.[56]

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

To see how the proposed prosentential expressions are to operate in the translation of sentential quantification more vividly, the following two examples will suffice.

$$\forall r(r)$$

could be translated as

For each proposition, *thatt*.

and

$$\forall r \exists s(r \rightarrow s)$$

as

For each proposition, there is some proposition, such that if *the-first* then *the-second*.[57]

What one sees, according to Grover, in such translations is that sentential variables, once allowed by stipulation in the formal language of regimentation, do convey some sense that cannot be captured in any way by a pronominal

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

treatment of quantification. However, one could alternatively choose to employ the standard individual quantification tools, and merely sortally restrict the relevant variables so that they only take sentence nominalizations as values. In that case, (1), for instance, would have the more "natural" shape

$$\forall u(\text{John believes } u \rightarrow \text{Bill believes } u)$$

However, the bound yet independent occurrences of sentential variables – such as the final occurrence of "p" in "$\forall p(\text{John believes that } p \rightarrow p)$" – would in that case be represented by the truth-predicative form "Tx":

$$\forall u(\text{John believes } u \rightarrow Tu)$$

Crucially, the nominal gap contained in natural truth-predicative forms such as "...is true" and "...is the case"[58], corresponding to the individual term position in "Tx", can be filled in by some completely natural anaphoric device, such as the natural pronouns "it" and "that", yielding a completely natural expression type that satisfies all the three conditions for being a prosentence:[59] "it is true" and "that is true" (1) occupy the sentential position (well, they *are* sentences); (2) they can be used cross-referentially, as in "Snow is white; but if that is true, then it reflects the sun's rays"; and most importantly (3) they can be used anaphorically in quantification, as in "every proposition is such that if Bill believes that it is true, then it is true". However, as the case of anaphora suggests, a prosentential treatment of such truth-predicative forms will have to represent them as monolithic bodies, modeled after the monolithic sentential

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[59] *Ibid.*, pages 17 and 56.

variable of the formal language, and its shadow in the proposed enrichment of natural language, namely “thatt”.

The prosentential account of truth, thus, originates with the inverted reading of this consequence which essentially concerns natural quantification, as a consequence concerning truth itself: the primary, explanatorily fundamental appearance of the truth predicate is its appearance within (natural) prosentences.

3.4.2 The truth-predicative form as prosentence

English + “thatt” is essentially a device for reading, or more properly, for modeling the readability of, the formal sentential quantification framework, *SQ*. The alternative in formal language to sentential quantification is propositional individual quantification (not necessarily employing meaning-entities such as propositions), *PIQ*. Natural truth discourse, *NTD*, employing the composite truth-predicative form and sentence nominalization paradigms, can be rendered either in PIQ or SQ. (LR)-deflationism, in the form of Quine's disquotational theory, argues that the correct translation is some form of PIQ; SQ is not a real option, for it cannot be “read” in any coherent way. Grover's earlier point can thus be seen as a disconfirmation of a certain kind of (LR).

The 1972 account of sentential quantification remains, however, quite indifferent to the question how to render NTD in formal language. But the allegedly prosentential uses of the truth-predicative form in natural language, suggested by the projection of the equivalence between “p” and “Tx” as an equivalence between “thatt” and “it is true” (or “that is true”), prompt the idea that the essential use of the truth-predicative form might be the prosentential

one. The truth-predicative form does the job of, on the formal level, the monolithic sentential variables, and on the natural level, the prosentences added to English by stipulation. Its prosentential functioning might after all be *the* explanation of its overall employment in NTD.

The 1975 statement of the prosentential account is simply the answer to that question in terms of the translatability of ordinary NTD to what we may call *natural prosentential discourse*, *NTD*, which is not an enrichment of English with stipulatively defined prosentences, but rather a certain fragment of it in which the occurrences of the truth predicate within bodies of expression such as "it-is-true" and "it-will-be-true-that", which are the *monolithic* projections of sentential variables and alethic sentential connectives/operators, are its only occurrences. (That fragment of English Grover et al. label as *English**, but I will continue with the label "NPD" in order to mark the variation of that fragment with respect to NTD.)

> English* is not to contain the truth predicate in any interesting sense, but English* *does* have the prosentences "that is true" and "it is true"; however, these are to be *treated as* atomic prosentences like "thatt". That is, the truth predicate will not be isolable: sentences such as "What Barbara said is true" do not belong to English*. And the verb "is" in "that is true" cannot be modified....since English* does not permit us to tinker with the interior of prosentences, it needs some special connectives to get the effect of tensing, modalizing, and so on, in the modification cases – just like the Ramsey language. Since we want English* to be a proper fragment of English, we will not, however, allow ourselves to add some funny connective symbols; instead, we will draw from English itself such connectives as
>
> it was true that, it will be true that, it is possible that, it might be true that, it is necessary that, it is not true that, it is false that
>
> and so forth.[60]

[60] Grover et al., 1975, p. 92-93.

The program is to show that NTD can be rendered exhaustively in terms of NPD, and that the appearances of the truth predicate in NPD are explicative of its overall employment in natural language. The reason why this account is a version of (LU)-deflationism is obvious: it does not allow us to explain natural truth predications in terms of PIQ; so it is not as liberal as the 1972 account. But it is more specifically a (LUM)-deflationism, in that it models those occurrences of the truth predicate in NPD after the monolithic architecture of the sentential variables and connectives of SQ. The forms recruited in NPD, unlike the prosentences of the 1972 account, *are* natural forms, but they are viewed, just like 1972 prosentences, under the shadows of SQ forms.

To see how this program works, we may consider several translation paradigms that parallel the ones encountered in the 1972 account. For instance, the simple NTD clause

Everything John says is true.

appears in NPD as

For each proposition, if John said that it is true, then it is true.

after the 1972 paradigm of

For each proposition, if John said that thatt, then thatt.

which was in the first place projected from an SQ clause of the form

$$\forall p(Jp \rightarrow p)$$

So a correct NPD instance, with respect to, say, “Snow is white”, of this NPD quantification would read

If John said that snow is white, then snow is white.

and not

If John said that that snow is white is true, then that snow is white is true.

for the required anaphoric connection is not established between the pronoun “it” in “it is true” and the sentence nominalization “that snow is white”, but between “it is true” *in toto* and the sentence “Snow is white” itself.[61] This means, however, that the temporal and modal variations of the copula within the truth predicate should be explained as variations *from without*, with the use of monolithic sentential operators of tense and mood. So the NTD simple past tense clause

That was true.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 94-95.

is rendered in NPD as

It-was-true-that that is true.

and the NTD subjunctive

(whether) it be true

as

(whether) it-be-true-that it is true

and so on.

More complicated cases that call for sequences of prosentences, specifically cases of indirect reference/definite descriptions, can be dealt with after the model of “the-first” and “the-second” of 1972, by subscripting the prosentences of NPD, and employing further sentential connectives. A telling instance is the NPD analysis of the NTD clause “Goldbach's conjecture is true”. Grover et al. employs the sentential connective “that...is-the-same-conjecture-as-that...”, which they abbreviate as “⇄” ; so the NPD version reads

There is a proposition$_1$ such that Goldbach conjectured that it is true$_1$, and for every proposition$_2$ if Goldbach conjectured that it is true$_2$, then it is true$_1$ $\rightleftarrows$ it is true$_2$, and it is true$_1$.[62]

So the essentials of the proposed NTD-to-NPD translations are clear. It would be in vain at best to object to the use of alethic expressions within the proposed connectives as prompting circularity, for Grover et al.'s point is not to analyze "true" or "is true" in isolation, into other, more fundamental elements, but rather to show that their occurrences "within" such apparently composite but functionally non-composite natural bodies is able to account for all the on-goings in the natural truth talk at large. However, one could meaningfully ask what exactly the point of the whole prosentential program is, assuming that it does work – that is, assuming that NPD can translate NTD. What do we achieve by showing that a prosentential treatment captures the essentials of NTD?

The answer can be given on two levels. On the pragmatic level, the point of the prosentential program might seem to be to show that the *property ascribing* model of natural truth talk is simply defective.[63] In (seemingly) predicating truth of subject terms of various forms that are able to specify a full-fledged propositional content, the primary thing we do is essentially to establish cross-referential connections with certain parts of discourse in a conversational context in many different ways – such as "granting a point ("that's true, but..."), considering a point ("if that is true,..."), expressing agreement, and so on"[64].

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[63] See Strawson's 1950 classic paper for a pragmatic criticism of inflationary truth accounts suggesting a similar treatment of truth predicative form in its *total* functioning; the paper is reprinted in Strawson, 1971, as chapter 10.

[64] Grover et al., 1975, p. 108.

This point is significant, for the whole program is based on a simple analogy with the cross-referential use of pronominal expressions, drawn by way of an abstraction of the idea of proform from that of pronoun, and its application to the grammatical category of sentence.

However, Grover et al. treats this facet of the prosentence phenomenon merely as one *consequence* of their account.[65] The essential achievement of the account is actually on the semantic level, and it can be stated most properly in relation to the 1972 discussion on sentential quantification. So to see clearly the semantic thesis of the prosentential account, consider the following kinds of projection:

From NTD up to PIQ: projecting the forms of natural truth discourse onto formal language.

From SQ down to NPD: projecting sentential quantification forms onto natural language.

The first kind of projection corresponds to one of the alternative grammars for propositional quantification defined in 1972, namely, propositional individual quantification employing, on the one hand, individual variables that range over sentence nominalizations, and on the other, transparent predicates like the truth predicate. It roughly characterizes the essentials of (LR)-deflationism, as it treats the truth-predicative form as a logically reliable tool. This is one of the extremes of deflationism defined in 2.4 and 3.2.

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[65] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

The second kind of projection corresponds to the prosentential fragment of English defined in 1975, namely NPD. Now NPD is modeled after the 1972 extension, English + "thatt", except that it is freed from the isolated occurrences of the truth predicate. The point of the 1972 extension was to show that SQ was readable in some purely grammatical enrichment of natural language; the point of the 1975 fragmentation is to show, inversely, that NTD can and should be analyzed in terms of SQ. The prosentential account shows this by translating NTD first to a "natural" projection of SQ, that is, NPD. But since the source of the projection is a grammar that employs a monolithic canonical representation of the sentence position (in the form of the sentential variable "*p*", the basic forms of NPD are accordingly monolithic. This gives us (LUM): NTD is, not only *in toto*, but also in its functional partitioning, equivalent to SQ. More properly, the functional partitioning of NTD is to be modeled after NPD, which is itself modeled after SQ.[66]

Thus the prosentential account of truth in its orthodox version is essentially the proposal of a mediate analysis of natural truth discourse in terms of the grammar of formal sentential quantification, the mediation being NPD. There are two respects in which such mediation can be scrutinized. The first concerns the connection between quantification and cross-reference at large; the second concerns the general idea of logically analyzing a given non-logical grammar, such as NTD. I conclude this subsection by commenting briefly on the first respect, and leave the second one, which yields the (LUC) picture, to the final subsection.

[66] Note that (LUM) would be the other extreme of deflationism, if it took the form of a redundancy thesis that NPD could replace NTD in favor of the elimination of the truth predicate/truth-predicative form from natural language. It cannot reasonably take this form, however, for NPD is only a *functional* fragment of English, lexically containing the truth *predicate*, but pretending not to employ it as one.

The prototype of employing anaphoric/cross-referential devices in quantification in general is the case of natural translation of ordinary individual quantification. (Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that we have the grammar of formal individual quantification somehow prior to its natural correlate, which, of course, is actually not the case.) Now in ordinary (formal) individual quantification, the boundedness of a context of relations to a quantifier is provided by the *uniform* occurrence of the variables that are themselves bound to the quantifier within that context; so it is the uniform occurrence of "x" within the relational context "$(\ldots\ldots\ldots)$", as "$(\ldots x\ldots x\ldots)$", that brings that relational context under the scope of, say, "$\forall x$". The quantifier manipulates the context *through* the variable(s) it binds. So although the quantifier in this case is commonly represented by the head expression "$\forall x$" in isolation, its adequate representation is in fact the whole structure "$\forall x(\ldots x\ldots x\ldots)$". The alleged bound variables are not so much *in* as they simply *are* the scope of the quantifier.[67]

In natural (individual) quantification, on the contrary, the quantifier is quite independent of the context it is to bind. For instance, in "Every man knows his limits", the quantifier "every man" has no agents within the relational context "knows his limits" that is to bind that context to it. This is observed more clearly in the case of instantiation: the singular instances are achieved simply by replacing with the quantifier names of suitable individuals, as in "Bill knows his limits", with no change at all in the relational context. This is the reason why the connection of the context to the quantifier is provided, in natural quantification, anaphorically, from with*out* so to speak, by relative pronouns. Relative pronouns are not individual variables, natural quantifiers are not binding quantifiers, and anaphora is not boundedness; nevertheless, correct

[67] Of course the mentioned common representation that separates the quantifier from its variables has its advantages in model-theoretic accounts of quantification, where the leading idea is the satisfaction of *open* sentences by sequences of objects.

and clearer translations can be given of (ordinary) natural quantifications in a formal language employing the latter kinds of form/function.

In formal sentential quantification, the *sentential* variable, when appears in an *operational* context, as in "$(...p...p...)$", similarly binds that context to the *sentential* quantifier to which it is connected in the first place, as when it is employed in "$\forall p(...p...p...)$". So the grammatical transition from individual to sentential quantification is perfectly uniform in formal language: from individual to sentential variables, from individual to sentential quantifiers, and, correspondingly, from relational to operational contexts – thanks to the power of stipulation. However, no such uniform transition is observed in natural language. The transition from ordinary natural quantification to NTD is not a transition from individual/nominal to sentential quantifiers, nor a transition from relational to operational contexts; and moreover, the pronominal expressions employed in ordinary natural quantification do not match, in isolation, with bound individual variables. So there does not seem to be any strong reason to insist on the analogy with relative pronouns in accounting for natural sentential quantification.

In other words, when we represent the monolithic sentence variable, in light of the phenomenon of anaphora, as a *pro*nominal truth predication, what we do is merely to carry the deviation or the highly imperfect correspondence between formal and natural individual quantification structures to the sentential level. The constancy of such deviation through the transition from the individual to the sentential level might prove heuristically useful, e.g., for showing, as in Grover's 1972 account, that SQ is readable in *some* natural (or semi-natural) way; but when proposed as an account of the actual functioning of natural sentential quantification performed by NTD – which is not grammatically

different from ordinary natural quantification in any significant respect – it loses much of its strength.

The transition from individual to sentential quantification in natural language seems to occur primarily within the subject term: it is the transition from terms of various sorts that designate individuals – "Bill", "every man", "the present king of France", etc. – to terms of various sorts that are able to codify whole propositional contents – "that the cat is on the mat", "everything Bill believes", "what Percy said", etc. – that characterizes NTD. This might suggest that PIQ instead of SQ should be the correct analysis of NTD, for the mentioned change within natural subject terms might correspond to the restriction of the possible values of individual variables to sentence nominalizations (i.e. the restriction of the possible values of "x" to those of the form "u"). However, as noted, individual variables do not match in any way with natural subject terms, so the kind of restriction performed by PIQ cannot represent the natural restriction of subject terms to sentence nominalizations.

But what is more important is that PIQ merely employs the logical projection of the truth predicate, i.e. "Tx", and hence cannot explain its real contribution to natural sentential generalization.[68] That contribution can only be explained by matching NTD structures with SQ structures. The point is, such matching does not have to be mediated by a shadow grammar like NPD.

[68] This does not mean that an explanation of that contribution cannot be given *externally*, i.e. without representing it in the logical grammar. This is exactly the (LR) strategy: leaving the truth predicate as it is in logical grammar, and invoking semantic ascent (disquotationalism), or the predictive/explanatory irrelevance of the truth predicate (minimalism) etc.

3.4.3 (LUC) and the canonical sentential form

The doubtful nature of the shadow grammar of prosentential English is more vividly displayed by Grover's 1992 remarks on the development of the prosentential account, specifically on the relevance of the *composite* structure of natural truth predications. The idea conveyed in these remarks is that prosentential cross-reference is only one among many ways of "locating" a sentential "antecedent", i.e. of specifying a propositional content (in the Ramseian sense), so that there is no apparent reason to view pronominal truth predications as *the* paradigm of employing canonical sentential forms in natural discourse. In other words, 1992 remarks acknowledge that in natural language, there is no single canonical form of sentence, but are possibly *many* such forms resulting from the different ways in which, on the one hand, the subject term, and on the other, the verb of the relevant transparent predicate, can be manipulated. However, the parts of a truth predication are manipulated independently of each other, which suggests that there might be no canonical sentence form at all, even in the functional sense, recruited by NTD. Mentioning "the significance of the subject-predicate structure of prosentential constructions in English", Grover says in 1992:

> In developing my account of prosentences, I had my eye on pronouns. But that analogy can take one only so far, because prosentential constructions, as found in English, e.g., "That is true" as distinct from "thatt", have a *structure* that introduces features pronouns do not have: Verbs can be modified and subjects can be manipulated in various ways....We highlighted the utility of modifiable verbs in prosentential constructions....I, for one, had blinders on when it came to the range of options made available by the subject term position in English prosentences...
>
> I think a reason for this blindness was the path by which I arrived at the prosentential account of the truth predicate: from propositional variables and pronouns to "thatt" – all without syntactic structure. While working on various versions of the Liar sentence, however, I began to recognize how we do indeed utilize

> alternative subject terms in making the connections we need to make in discourse. In those situations where "That is true" will not suffice for the anaphoric connections we want, definite descriptions, quotation names, and demonstratives can be used in place of "that".[69]

This is rather a roundabout way of acknowledging that there are no prosentences at all.[70] Nevertheless, natural language can still be seen to be able to serve the prosentential function at large, but only with the condition that it do so in its own way, namely, by modifying the subject and predicate terms separately in truth predications. Grover draws the picture of this nuance in terms of a distinction between the grammatical and logical subjects in prosentences: "I now think 'that' in 'That is true' may sometimes be construed as an independently referring pronoun that picks out the antecedent of the prosentence. In figuring out what is said, we must distinguish between the grammatical subject term 'that' and the logical subject 'That is true'. The grammatical subject term is 'that' and it locates the antecedent; the logical subject derives from the logical subject of the antecedent, and there can be complications."[71]

The possibility introduced here is a type of (LU)-deflationism which leaves the given grammatical division of the (content specifying) functions in an NTD clause as they are, without thereby projecting that division onto the level of logical analysis – namely (LUC)-deflationism. (LUC) removes the mediating element (in this case, NPD) altogether in the logical analysis of NTD via SQ, and holds that even if the truth-predicative form disappears in logical analysis,

[69] Grover, 1992, p. 18, my italics

[70] Another instance of the attempt to save the prosentential "picture" without losing the functional elasticity provided by the composite structure of natural truth predications is Brandom's 1994 amendment, clearly shown to be ineffective by Horwich in his 2010, pp. 29-31.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

truth predications are on a par with non-alethic, object-level, ordinary natural predications with respect to functional structure. To grasp the possibility of such equivalence *in toto* between NTD and SQ clauses without a corresponding equivalence between the relative functional *parts* introduced by the two grammatical frameworks, the following simple consideration on the idea of logical analysis might be useful.

The label "logical analysis" specifically characterizes the kind of translation from the clauses of a certain type of "surface" language, namely of natural language, to those of a certain type of language of analysis, of first- or higher-order logical language. However, as stated in the previous chapter, a scheme of logical translation cannot be determined independently of the specific set of intentions it is to serve. So what essentially makes the languages of first- and higher-order logic *logical* languages in the first place is that they are able to a high extent to expose the inferential meaning structures of natural language clauses, where the relevant intention itself is to study inference. Thus it seems possible to abstract from the idea of the study of inference the more generic idea of the study of meaning structure, and view logical analysis as translation of meaning at large.

Under such a broad conception of logical analysis, even simple translations from one natural language, such as French, to another, such as Korean, might count as logical analysis; however, there are less trivial instances of this broader conception that are able to highlight (LUC), such as the case of higher- and lower-level computer programming languages. Very roughly put, a higher-level programming language is one with a syntactic structure that calls for quite a many mediating languages for the translation of its, say, "discourses" in the form of whole program codes, into the machine "language" whose

discourses are sequences of ones and zeros, representing sequences of executable instructions for the computing machine. The analogy here is that the compilation of a programmer's code written in a higher-level programming language is a logical analysis of that discourse via the machine language. To that extent, the relevant sequence of ones and zeros is "logically" equivalent to the programmer's discourse; however, it would be absurd to look for an exact *sub-discursive* match between the programmer's and machine codes, to look for, for instance, exact correlates of single zeros or ones in the programmer's code, or an exact machine correlate of some particular command that appears in a "while"-statement of the programmer's code. A code written in a lower-level language, such as an assembly language, on the other hand, can have a more exact sub-discursive match with the machine grammar. Then the assembly language, say, is relatively *approximate* to the machine language, while a higher-level language is relatively *distant* from it.

So (LUC) simply holds that the logical analysis of NTD should be given in SQ, but that their relative grammars are quite *distant* from each other. The upshot is that there is no paradigmatic canonical/general form of sentence in natural language – which is quite understandable in light of the fact that even the individual variable "x", supposedly representing on the logical level the paradigmatic canonical form of *term*, has no exact match in natural language. (Pronominal expressions, to state it again, are not individual/nominal variables.) Nevertheless natural language uses NTD (and its extensions[72]) essentially to establish connections *on the sentential level* between pieces of natural discourse (connections that can only be incompletely captured by the notion of sentential *cross-reference*) so that its correct analysis should be given

[72] See the second and third sections of the following chapter.

in the rather distant grammar of SQ, and not the seemingly approximate one of PIQ.

(LUC) can trivially account for the deflationary phenomena of disquotation and prosentential cross-reference, simply by employing instances of (PCFC), such as "$\bar{p}$ is true if and only if p", as transitionary forms between NTD and SQ. The predicative form "$\bar{p}$ is true", according to (LUC), is neither logically nor naturally acceptable: logically not, for it employs the truth predicate, which is simply logically unreliable; naturally not, for it employs "$\bar{p}$", the alleged sentence nominalization variable, which actually necessitates a prior understanding of the sentence variable "p". However, it forcefully signals the absence of a natural canonical sentential form, by representing the general form of sentence nominalizations as a grammatical *lessening* from the sentence variable, only to mark the purely grammatical contribution of the truth predicate to truth predication. The truth predicate, according to (LUC), is essentially a device of (transparent) denominalization, and has nothing to do with either semantic descent or cross-reference/anaphora.

(LUC) can also account for further deflationary phenomena, such as the inexpressibility of the theory of truth proposed by the *minimalist conception*, as the deflationary basis of our notion of truth, the *minimal theory*; and the disappearance of *truthmakers*, sentence-shaped entities posited by the *truthmaker theory* as the ontic grounds of truth, in favor of an alleged identity with true *truthbearers*. To extend the effect of (LUC) over to such phenomena, we need to be able to see its philosophical import independently of the specification of its location within the proposed classification of deflationisms.

In other words, we need to see what (LUC) says other than that the truth predicative form is logically unreliable yet functionally composite in natural language. What it says is simply that NTD is (a part of) the natural theory of sentential generalization; NTD is a "theory" only in the sense that, for instance, propositional calculus is the theory of truth-functions or truth-functional connectives. That is, NTD, as a whole, is (part of) a device of manipulating sentential generalization within the boundaries of natural grammar. This is the reason why it corresponds with SQ, but still cannot be efficiently dissected into functional parts in ways other than the one introduced by natural grammar itself.

CHAPTER 4

TRUTH WITHOUT TRUTHBEARERS

4.1 Overview

(LU)-deflationisms, such as prosententialism and Williams' 1976 account, characteristically ban the employment of the truth predicative form in the logical analysis of NTD. According to (LU), not only the truth predicate in isolation, but the "remaining" item in natural truth predication, the so-called *truthbearer*, is a logically unreliable category. This short chapter is set to show how a case can be made for a deflationary picture of truth that excludes bearers of truth (with the deep sense of "truth" communicated by Leibniz's title) in terms of a certain view of sentence nominalizations. So it

- sheds light on the connection of the category of truthbearers to the (LR) thesis, in terms of the function of propositionalism in Horwich's *minimalist* conception;
- shows the possibility of dismantling the common objection to this conception to the effect that the *theory* of truth it proposes cannot be adequately stated by reading it as a confirmation of the picture of deflationism suggested by (LUC) (not, however, in favor of the minimalist conception itself);
- strengthens the (LU) picture that excludes truthbearers by a brief discussion on sortally marked sentence nominalizations of the general form "*the F that* p", and on the alleged *identity theory* of truth.

4.2 Inexpressibility of the minimal theory

Another leading instance of (LR)-deflationism is Horwich's *minimalist conception*. The minimalist conception roughly consists of (1) the transparency claim that the *minimal theory* provides the sufficient (deflationary) basis of our notion or understanding of truth; and (2) the irredundancy claim that the truth predicate is a *logical* device of sentential generalization.

The minimal theory is roughly a conjunction or list of non-paradoxical instances of the *equivalence schema*, a propositionalist irredundancy schema of the following form: "the proposition that p is true if and only if p". The minimalist transparency claim is essentially a semantic thesis concerning the truth predicate, to the effect that the meaning of the truth predicate is "fixed" by the equivalence schema. The equivalence schema, however, does nothing more than to codify a basic regularity of the *use* of the truth predicate, which suggests that the transparency claim employs a use conception of meaning. Indeed, the "minimalist thesis is the product of two prior claims: first, that our underived endorsement of the equivalence schema is explanatorily fundamental with respect to the overall use of the truth predicate; and second, that the meaning of any word is engendered by the fact about it that explains its overall use."[73] Thus the transparency claim, concerning the meaning of the truth predicate, is linked to the irredundancy claim concerning its *basic* employment in natural and logical discourse, or simply its *raison d'être*.

The minimalist thesis agrees with the disquotational account in holding that the truth predicate is essentially a device of generalization with respect to the sentence position, with two critical reservations: first, the bearers of truth – a

[73] Horwich, 2010, p. 37.

category the positing of which is characteristic of (LR)-deflationism – are meanings of (declarative) sentences in the form of propositions[74], instead of sentences themselves; and secondly, the equivalence between the sides of the proposed irredundancy schema is material, not strong. These two reservations – propositionalism and the weak nature of the minimalist equivalence – are so closely connected to each other that both can be accounted for at once simply in terms of the particular way the minimalist account formulates the transparency phenomenon.

The irredundancy thesis of the minimalist account is (the already familiar one) that the truth predicative form is primarily a logical device of blind ascription, that is, of stating propositional contents which are not specified explicitly but are merely characterized by noun-phrases, as in "what Oscar said" or "Einstein's law". The truth-predicative form "enables the construction of another proposition, intimately related to the one we can't identify, which is perfectly appropriate as the alternative object of our attitude."[75] A blind ascription such as "What Oscar said is true" is in fact a finite reformulation of an infinite conjunction of conditionals of the form "If what Oscar said is *that eels are good* then eels are good, and if he said *that milk is white* then milk is white, ...and so on"[76]. Blind ascriptions of this sort are then essentially generalizations with respect to the sentence position. Indeed the real contribution of the truth predicate, according to the minimalist account, is observed specifically in those blind ascriptions where the subject of predication explicitly specifies a common mark of some (possibly infinitely large) set of

[74] Horwich is not committed to any particular conception of what propositions are; see his 1990, p. 17. However, the presentation here argues that they should be viewed as sentence meanings of some sort in order for the deflationary transparency thesis to hold.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

sentences, such as their common logical form, as in "every proposition of the form '$p \rightarrow p$' is true".[77]

The minimalist transparency thesis is that this generalizing function of the truth-predicative form – the statement of which is common to almost every reasonable version of deflationism – can in turn be sufficiently explained on the grounds of the minimal theory, the collection of the "uncontroversial"[78] instances of the equivalence schema. So the minimal theory, which is a collection of equivalences of the form "The proposition *that quarks really exist* is true if and only if quarks really exist, the proposition *that lying is bad* is true if and only if lying is bad,...and so on"[79], is an extensional characterization of the basic use of the truth predicate, basic in the sense that it is able to account for the overall appearance of truth in natural and logical discourse. Now the minimalist program is to show that everything *exclusively* about truth in its particular appearances in discourse can be explained solely on the grounds of the relevant instances contained in the minimal theory; *and* that if something in those appearances cannot be so explained, then it does not exclusively concern truth in the first place, but can only be accounted for by recourse to everyday, philosophical or scientific knowledge about matters other than truth.

To see this point, consider the following example (of Horwich's): we are to explain the thesis "If all Bill wants is to have a beer, and he thinks that merely by nodding he will get one, then, if his belief is true, he will get what he wants."

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[78] To see the problems concerning the determination of the range of the instances of the minimal theory, see Horwich's 2010, ch. 3. Concerning the paradoxical instances, such as the instance for Liar, see ch. 5 of the same book, especially pp. 90-91.

[79] Horwich, 1990, p. 5.

Horwich's point is that the contribution of the notion of truth to this thesis can be accounted for solely on the grounds of the corresponding instance of the equivalence schema, namely, on the grounds of "$\langle$Bill nods $\rightarrow$ Bill has a beer$\rangle$ is true iff Bill nods $\rightarrow$ Bill has a beer"[80] . The explanation begins with the assumptions

1. Bill wants $\langle$Bill has a beer$\rangle$.

2. Bill believes $\langle$Bill nods $\rightarrow$ Bill has a beer$\rangle$.

and continues with the following one that concerns matters such as belief, desire and action, but definitely not truth

3. (Bill wants $\langle$Bill has a beer$\rangle$ & Bill believes $\langle$Bill nods $\rightarrow$ Bill has a beer$\rangle$) $\rightarrow$ Bill nods.

From these assumptions, it follows simply that

4. Bill nods.

The initial thesis contains the assumption that Bill's belief is true, so

5. Bill's belief is true.

[80] In Horwich's symbolism, "$\langle p \rangle$" stands normally for "the proposition that p", but here it seems to stand for the bare nominalization "that p". I avoided the symbolism as far as I can in my presentation.

6. ⟨Bill nods → Bill has a beer⟩ is true. [From 2, 5]

It is here that the minimal theory makes its contribution

7. ⟨Bill nods → Bill has a beer⟩ is true iff Bill nods → Bill has a beer.

[Minimal Theory]

8. Bill nods → Bill has a beer. [From 6, 7]

9. Bill has a beer. [From 4, 8]

And since

10. ⟨Bill has a beer⟩ is true iff Bill has a beer. [Miminal Theory]

11. ⟨Bill has a beer⟩ is true. [From 9, 10]

we conclude, from (1) and (11), that Bill gets what he wants[81], without invoking anything other than the minimal theory of truth, and assumptions that do not necessarily concern truth. Horwich's program thus is to universalize such explanation paradigms to account primarily for philosophical topics, such as meaning, inference, belief, knowledge, realism/anti-realism, etc.,[82] to which the "notion" of truth is wrongly supposed to make a *substantial* contribution. The only contribution it could ever make to any topic whatsoever is already

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 22-23.

[82] Especially for the bearing of deflationary truth on the realism debate in philosophy of science, see Horwich, 2004.

captured by the equivalence schema, which fully captures its basic use,[83] and the minimal theory it engenders (relative to a range of substituents for "p").

Now the truth-predicative form, "$\langle p \rangle$ is true", can serve the function of generalization with respect to the sentence position only if it is able to restate the same propositional content as "p", albeit in a different clothing, in one that enables to abstract from the given propositional content *in a uniform manner*. Otherwise said, the meaning structure of the sides of each instance of the equivalence schema must be identical. Indeed, "the truth predicate allows any sentence to be reformulated so that its entire content will be expressed by the new subject – a singular term open to normal objectual quantification. In other words, 'p' becomes '$\langle p \rangle$ is true'."[84] But the identity of meaning cannot be provided by the sentential connective "if and only if", expressing simple material equivalence between the sides (unless the meaning value of a declarative sentence is to be equated with its truth-value). The point is that the required meaning equivalence is provided by the ratio between the nominalized sentence and the nominalization: the noun phrase "the proposition that p" *denotes* the meaning *expressed* by the sentence "p". The job that remains for the truth predicate is to complete that name to a full-fledged sentence materially equivalent to the initial sentence – "the truth predicate serves merely to restore the structure of a sentence: it acts simply as a *de-nominalizer*."[85]

[83] Horwich himself prefers a use account of meaning at large, see his 2005; he presents the minimalist account of truth as an application of his account of meaning to the truth predicate in his 1997. The connection of the minimalist account of truth to the use conception of meaning at large is much more complicated; see his 2010, ch. 8.

[84] Horwich, 1990, p. 32.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

In this way, the meaning equivalence is provided without altering in any way the extensional character of the schema, or of the theory resulting from it. The minimal theory is then able to fix the intension of the truth predicate on a basis which is extensional in two different senses: in the sense of stemming from a truth-functional relation, namely, material equivalence; and in the sense of being a collection or conjunction or series of instances of the denominalization schema, instead of a closure of it. The minimal theory characterizes the use property of the truth predicate – which is sufficient for grasping its overall employment – without stating it as a law or analysis, in the form of a quantified sentence (expressing or not a relation stronger than material equivalence).

This is the root of the common objection to the minimalist account, to the effect that the theory of truth it proposes is "so cumbersome that it cannot even be explicitly formulated."[86] For instance, Anil Gupta underlines the difference between *fixing the intension* of an expression – via an infinite list of sentences *correctly* employing the expression, and employing many other concepts not necessarily accessible to every competent user of the expression – and accounting for the *understanding* yielding that intension.

> The biconditionals are particular in character. They explain the notion of truth proposition by proposition, utterance by utterance; and they do so using massive conceptual resources. Our understanding of truth, however, has a general character. We seem to possess some rules that enable us to understand truth attributions, even when truth is attributed to something beyond our conceptual ken. Our understanding of truth does not *derive from* the conditionals. Instead, in the context of certain kinds of information, it *leads to* the biconditionals.[87]

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[87] Gupta, 1992, p. 366-67. The nature of the minimal theory can also be characterized as an inversing of Tarski's framework for defining truth: Horwich's minimal theory *is* a version of the list of sentences the entailment of which is required by a *materially adequate* Tarskian definition of truth.

Gupta remarks that the minimalist account can be a satisfactory explanation of our understanding of truth only if we somehow disregard the difference between our knowledge of the minimal theory on the one hand, and our knowledge of the schematically represented generality about that theory, on the other.[88] Horwich does imply at some places[89] such underestimation of the difference between the general and the singular. In any case, Horwich is committed to a use conception of meaning, purporting to account for meanings via detectable law-like regularities of use. The more important question is whether he himself admits that the minimal theory cannot be explicitly and finitely stated, and if so, why.

Horwich admits that the minimal theory is not expressible in the form of a quantified, finite statement.[90] (He also believes, to note, that the theory *need not* be finitely expressible.) He considers several possible suggestions to formulate the general truth about truth in the fifth article of his 1990[91]. Except one, these suggestions all call for the use of schematic (and specifically, disquotational) tools – such as disquotational reference clauses – which introduce the problem of finitely non-statable infinities anew. The one suggestion that differs from the rest is the employment of SQ forms in stating the minimal theory; that is, the statement of a principle of the following form (which we encountered in the shape of a sentence-variable analysis of truth in our classification of deflationisms):

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 367.

[89] He speaks, for instance, in his 2010, p. 19, of "our propensity to accept instances of the material equivalence schema", instead of our direct knowledge the minimal theory.

[90] Horwich, 1990, p. 25.

[91] p. 25-31.

$$(x)(x \text{ is true iff } \{\exists q\}(x = \langle q \rangle \ \& \ q))$$

Horwich uses the curly brackets to indicate that the interpretation of the quantification should be *substitutional*. The reason why he rejects this suggestion, then, is that the notion of substitutional quantification can be explained only by recourse either to the notion of truth itself, engendering circularity, or to inference schemata which bring back the problem of non-generalizable infinities. I make the following three remarks at this juncture.

1. As shown in Grover's 1972 discussion on sentential quantifiers, the kind of an interpretation is relatively independent of the grammar of quantification for which it is to be proposed: not only individual quantification clauses can be interpreted substitutionally, but clauses employing SQ forms can be given a domain-and-values interpretation. The problem is not so much the kind of the mathematical modeling of a given grammar of quantification as its *reading* in some extension or fragment of natural language. SQ clauses are readable, albeit only via NTD forms.

2. But even if we hold that SQ calls for substitutional interpretation, it is still not the employment of that interpretation per se, but the *natural statement* of its functioning, that employs the "notion" of truth. So the rule of use of the SQ structure "$\{\exists p\}(...p...)$" , which quantifies into an operational context, is stated in an extension of natural language as "Some sentence formed by replacing the 'p' in '$...p...$' with a sentence of (some extension) of English is true"[92]. This is perfectly normal, given that NTD's essential function in natural grammar is to generalize with respect to the sentence position without quantifying into operational

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

contexts. And we could *do* substitutional quantification without stating its rule of use.

3. The real problem with the proposed formulation is the employment of the hybrid expression type "$\langle p \rangle$". Now since minimalism endorses the (LR) thesis, it employs the truth predicative form on the logical level within the general framework of individual quantification. The "subjects" of natural truth predications, in this framework, are normally represented in the individual position, either as individual constants or as individual variables. In either case, however, the fact that they are essentially sentence nominalizations should be marked, in order for the irredundancy fact about NTD, namely, that it is a device of generalizing with respect to the sentence position, to have *logical import*. So they should be linked, in some way, to the sentence position, represented in its full generality by the schematic sentence letter "p". Simply put, the expression type "$\langle p \rangle$" can represent the *truthbearer* position only because it can refer back to the sentence position, represented by the sentence letter. Thus the simple (LR) strategy here is to employ the roundabout structure "$\exists x(x = \langle p \rangle \ \& \ ...x...)$", referring back to the *schematic* sentence letter, in place of the SQ structure "$\exists p(...p...)$", which directly employs the sentential *variable*. In the former case, even though the "truthbearer" expression appears in a relational context that is open to individual quantification, the desired generality cannot be preserved, for the occurrence of the sentence letter is merely schematic; in the latter case, however, the sentence letter preserves the desired generality, with the proviso that the context in which it appears is operational.

Now the operational character of the contexts in SQ quantifications might be a problem only if we decided beforehand to employ the truth-predicative form in logical analysis. So there should be some independent reason to do so, and

indeed a strong one, for the price to be paid is generality and semantical economy. The former is clearly observed in the inexpressibility phenomenon; the latter in the expansion of our domain of discourse with the suspect category of truthbearer – suspect, because its representation in logical analysis refers back to the sentence letter (whether used purely schematically or not). The problem with (LR)-deflationism is that there does not seem to be any such reason: the grammar of individual quantification is as equally suspect as, and as equally reliable as, SQ. On the contrary, there *is* a strong reason in favor of the employment of SQ in an analysis of NTD. It is that the logical discontinuity between ordinary natural predication and NTD can be exhibited perfectly clearly in the form of a grammatical discontinuity between the logical frameworks of IQ and SQ, i.e. between relational and operational structures of quantification. Natural language is not capable to exhibit this discontinuity, for it canonically (and rightfully) treats the truth-predicative form on a par with ordinary predications.

In fact (LR)-deflationism comes close to being capable of exhibiting this discontinuity by employing the sentence letter in the equivalence schemata which communicate the idea that the semantic structure of a truth predication is a function of the substituents of the monolithic sentence position to which it is equivalent. But it stops short there of employing that sentence position as the correct logical translation of a natural singular (affirmative) truth predication, since it finds the SQ grammar unreliable (for no satisfactory reason). The idea of a bearer of *deflationary* truth, represented on the level of logical grammar by hybrid forms such as "$\langle p \rangle$" and "$\bar{p}$", is actually the product of this "timidity" of the (LR)-deflationist.

4.3 Sortal nominalizations and identity without identicals

Actually, Horwich's own view of natural predications recruiting various *sorts* of sentence nominalizations underline the priority of the sentence position, grasped in its full generality, with respect to truthbearer expressions. Horwich presents his view in the context of his critique of the *truthmaker* theory, the highly inflationary program of accounting for the ontic groundedness of truth in terms of the existence/non-existence of sentence-shaped items, called *truthmakers*.[93]

> A truthmaker for $\langle a$ is $F\rangle$ is supposed to be an entity in the real world, a thing distinct from the proposition itself, with which the proposition, as a whole, is correlated. The believer in truthmakers holds that complete truths, and not just their sub-propositional constituents, have worldly relata. But this does not get to the bottom of the idea that something in the world must *make* the truth in question true. The correspondence theorist's intuition is not simply that $\langle a$ is $F\rangle$ must be correlated with an entity in the world, but that there must be "something in the world which *ensures* that *a* is *F*": something which acts as the truth's "ontological ground". The idea here is that a true proposition's truthmaker must be such that its *mere existence guarantees* that the proposition is true.[94]

The main idea is to form correspondences on the grammatical level of the sentence between various suitable types of truthbearer (propositions, thoughts/thinkables, utterances, belief states etc.) and the world; so the world must contain, beyond ordinary individuals and their ordinary relations, certain bits the specifications of which somehow codify full propositional contents, such as states of affairs, events, facts, tropes etc. Very roughly stated, the program focuses on specifying sufficient ontic grounds for molecular truths on the basis of the ontic grounds of atomic truths; so that, say, the actual state of affairs of

[93] One orthodox statement and defense of the theory is Armstrong, 1997; a clear and complete exposition of the various forms the theory does and *could* have, with arguments for and against each, is given in Merricks, 2007; an elaboration of the account from the point of view of certain adherents of the identity theory truth can be found in Beebee and Dodd, 2005.

[94] Dodd, 2000, p. 3. Dodd quotes from Armstrong, D. M., "Classes are States of Affairs" , *Mind*, 100, pp. 189-200, p. 190, with his own italics.

snow's being white might be a truthmaker both for, say, the thought that snow is white, and the thought that either snow is white or grass is green. The truthmaking relation is most commonly formulated in the form of an entailment principle: "For $\langle p \rangle$ to be true, there must exist at least one entity, distinct from $\langle p \rangle$, whose existence entails that $\langle p \rangle$ is true."[95]

Now Horwich makes two important remarks concerning the program: one on its overall character, the other its *basic* machinery of explanation. The first remark shows, in view of the minimal theory, that the truthmaker theory does not concern truth in the first place. The truthmaker theorist is actually set to find suitable kinds of substituents for "x" in

(1) p in virtue of x.

The referents of the possible substituents for the individual schematic letter are entities the existence of which is supposed to account for the "truth" of the possible substituents of the sentence letter, but only in a minimalist sense of "truth"; in other words, it is only via the minimal theory that we get from (1) to

(2) $\langle p \rangle$ is true in virtue of x.

Schema (2) communicates, idiomatically, the idea that

(3) $\langle p \rangle$ is made true by x.

[95] Dodd, 2000, p. 9.

Given the "sorts" of the sentence nominalization and the individual letter, the schematic (3) is read in natural language as the following quantification:

(4) Every proposition is made true by something.

The sole contribution of truth to the statement of the theory is the deflationary one of sentential generalization, as observed in (2)-(4).[96]

As for the basic machinery of explanation, Horwich claims that the truthmaker approach to the bearing of truth on the world simply gets the explanatory direction wrong. The basic truthmaker machinery is the account given for (truth-functionally) atomic sentences of the logical forms such as "k is F". The mechanism is the simple projection of the logical form of atomic sentences onto the ontic sphere, so that a typical atomic truthmaker has the form of a sentence nominalization, considered, however, as a *denotable* entity residing in the realm of reference, canonically "k's-being-F" or "that k is F"; and this consideration is represented, most commonly, by the sortal marking "(the) fact". So the idea is "that a simple contingent proposition of the form $\langle k \text{ is } F \rangle$ is made true by the fact that k is F. This could be extended into a general account, by supposing that *any* true proposition, $\langle p \rangle$, is made true by the fact that p."[97]

The truthmaker theory holds that the existence of the fact that p (or the actuality of the state of affairs that p) is an explanation of the truth (if any) of the corresponding proposition (or thought). Now Horwich states that "$\langle p \rangle$" is

[96] Horwich, 2010, p. 306.

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

normally *explained* on the grounds of certain natural/scientific laws and initial conditions; only *then* can the truth of the proposition be deduced (via the minimal theory). But the same holds of the corresponding fact: there exists the fact that p – or more colloquially, it *is* a fact that p – *because* p, and p because the world is the way the laws and the initial condition statements say it is. "Thus 'the fact that p exists' is always *less* fundamental in our explanatory deductive hierarchy than 'p' is."[98] The (object-level) "proposition" itself is the common ground of both the corresponding truth predication and the corresponding "facthood" predication.

Within the same context, Horwich states, as another radical objection to the truthmaker program, what might be viewed as the core thesis of the so-called *identity theory* of truth. An identity theory of truth is actually a negative thesis concerning the truthmaker, and more broadly, the correspondence program, to the effect that facts are nothing more or less than true thoughts, that being true for a (suitable kind of) truthbearer is being identical with a (or the) corresponding fact.[99] Schematically, the idea is the simple identification of the fact that p with the true proposition that p,[100] as an objection to the truthmaker theorist's employment of the former as the ontic ground of the latter. According to the identity theory, then, the groundedness of truth/falsity of our truthbearers on the world (or more properly, on the way it is) does not require anything more than a sub-sentential correspondence between the mental and

[98] *Ibid.*, p. 311.

[99] The leading modern statement of the position is Dodd's 2000. The historical development, if any, of the theory is irrelevant in the context of our discussion, but see Candlish, 1989. The identity theory in its modern form is essentially a simple deflationary rejection of the truthmaker program, but for a rather distinctive context in which the identity thesis can be stated, see McDowell, 1994, ch. 2.

[100] Note that the identity theorist can be committed only to those kinds of truthbearer that are capable of being identical with facts, such as propositions (considered paradigmatically as possible states of affairs) or thoughts, but not, for instance, sentence tokens or belief acts.

the real: nothing more than snow and the property of whiteness, no entity of the "snow's-being-white type", is required for the truth of the thought that snow is white to have bearing on reality.

Horwich states the identity thesis only to show that the basic machinery of truthmaker theory, i.e. the list of simple ontic projections of atomic truthbearers, can have no real explanatory value. Horwich proposes several reasons, concerning the natural grammar of sentence nominalizations and ontological economy, in favor of the identification. But what is really significant is the way he extends the identity thesis to other sorts of (what might be characterized in general as) transparent predications. Now a possible objection to the identity thesis draws on the distinction between Russellian and Fregean propositions (i.e. objects, roughly, of *de re* and *de dicto* beliefs respectively): "...although facts of type FR may be the same as true propositions (and hence incapable of making those propositions true), the RU-'facts' – better called events or states -- are *concrete* entities (quite distinct from propositions which are *abstract*), and therefore perfectly suitable as truthmakers."[101] Horwich's answer to the objection is simply that each kind of proposition is identical with the corresponding kind of fact; but more importantly, the case is generalized to other types of sentence nominalization, so that a Fregean fact is not only a true Fregean proposition, but an actual Fregean state of affairs, and an occurring Fregean event, and an obtaining Fregean condition; the same holds of Russellian facts mutatis mutandis. Horwich remarks:

> Granted, the various nominal constructions
>
> (i) the proposition that k is F
>
> (ii) the state of k being F

[101] Horwich, 2010, p. 314.

(iii) the fact that k is F

(iv) the condition of k being F

(v) the event of k being F

exhibit certain syntactic differences and certain differences in meaning. In particular, there is variation as to which of the following predicates are appropriately deployed to single out which instances of (i)-(v) entail that k is F: i.e.

(i*) is true

(ii*) is actual, obtains

(iii*) exists, is real

(iv*) is satisfied, holds

(v*) occurs, takes place

However, we need not conclude that the alternate sentence nominals denote different kinds of thing. Such a multiplication of entities would have to be justified in light of explanatory advantages. But it is by no means clear what those would be.[102]

Each sortal nominalization-transparent predicate couple then communicates essentially the simple object-level thesis that k is F in a specific idiomatic clothing. For this reason, the truthmaker theorist's search for an ontic ground of the truth of truthbearers in terms of one or the other of such couples is a vanity affair: "For the real foundation is expressed by sentences rather than nominals."[103] In each case, the understanding of the object-level thesis in its full sentential appearance is required for the understanding of such transparent predications; and accordingly, the schematic understanding of each such predication *in abstracto* calls for the schematic understanding of the

[102] *Ibid.*, p. 315, fn. 17.

[103] *Ibid.*, p. 316.

communicated object-level thesis *in abstracto*, namely, an understanding of the canonical form of sentence, represented by the sentence letter "p".

However, this will also mean that the *sub-sentential* identity between the fact that p and the true proposition that p – put forward by the identity theorist in general and by Horwich in this context – might be misleading, for the real common ground is sentential. A better move then would be to replace the identity thesis with one of *equivalence* between whole transparent predications communicating the same propositional content (originally specified by a full-fledged declarative sentence), without any regard to the sub-sentential. The simple reason why the analysis terminates in individual identity rather than sentential equivalence is the (LR) inclination to preserve the truthbearer category; but that category itself can be grasped only by recourse to some canonical representation of the sentence position, whether it be merely schematic or not. The identity theory is a correct thesis that is simply incorrectly formulated.

So the healthy way to accommodate the priority of the understanding of the sentence position to the understanding of transparent (sentential) predications is to hold to the (LU) strategy of analyzing those predications in terms of sentential variables appearing in operational contexts. And to do this without losing the grammatical elasticity provided by the natural idiomatics of transparent predication – without, for instance, disregarding the expressive strength provided by the noun-phrase types such as "the fact that p" – one should only hold to (LUC). The idea of truthbearers' being true has no priority over other transparent predications – they all logically correspond to operational contexts (given (LU)), albeit in different ways (given (LUC)).

(LU)-deflationism is even able to *show* the logical unreliability of the idea of truthbearer clearly, via a certain kind of SQ analysis of NTD, devised by C. J. F. Williams. Williams aims to expose what he calls the "apparent evaporation of truth" in logical analysis, whereby, however, the whole structure of truth predication becomes logically suspect. The idea behind the exposition is, ironically, that the truth predicate serves an invaluable grammatical function in natural language.[104] And the basis of the exposition is the SQ translation of natural truth predications employing definite descriptions (that, of course, locate a sentential antecedent) as the subject term, in analogy with the Russellian analysis of ordinary definite descriptions. Now an IQ analysis of the natural ordinary predication "What the postman brought is surprising" can be given as:

$$\imath xFxGx$$

where "F" and "G" translate, respectively, "the postman brought" and "is surprising".

The subject term in isolation corresponds to the complex *relational* quantifier (i.e. the open individual quantification clause with a relational gap) "$\imath xFx(\ )x$", translating, more correctly, "What the postman brought (is)...". Accordingly, "What Percy says is believed by Pauline" is analyzed in SQ as

$$\imath pJpDp$$

[104] The air of irony disappears when we view Williams's (LU) account as a species of (LUC)-deflationism. So Kirkham's characterization of Williams's account as redundancy theory is quite misleading. See Kirkham, 1992, p. 321.

where the sentential operators "J" and "D" translate, respectively, "Percy says that" and "Pauline believes that". So the "truthbearer" expression "What Percy says" is to have the form of a sentential complex quantifier:

$$\imath pJp(\ )p$$

This, according to Williams, gives us the general form of truthbearer expressions.[105] Now what would be the correct representation of the truth predication "What Percy says is true"? It will be translated to SQ simply as

$$\imath pJpp$$

where nothing can be found that can correspond to the natural "is true" in isolation – the truth predicate simply evaporates. But the difference we encounter between "What Percy says" and "What Percy says is true" seems likewise to correspond to nothing in SQ, for the operational "gap" found in the general form of truthbearer expressions can be dropped without any loss of grammaticality – simply because it is operational.

The point is that the natural language correlates of both relational and operational definite descriptions are noun-phrases. In the relational case, the incompleteness of the logical rendering is represented by the nominal character of the corresponding noun phrase, i.e. the fact that it calls for a (first-order) predicate to be completed into a full-fledged sentence. In the operational case, however, there is no incompleteness at all: "$\imath pJpp$" is as complete an expression

[105] Williams, 1976, p. 45.

as "$\imath pJpDp$" and "$\imath pJp\neg p$" . So it cannot be represented in natural language by "What Percy says" in isolation. Read conversely, "What Percy says", just like "is true" in isolation, corresponds to nothing at all on the logical level:

> To make a complete sentence of it a verb-phrase has to be added. The verb-phrase ordinary language provides for this purpose is "is true". The verb "true" is needed in ordinary language because the ordinary-language equivalents of definite descriptions demand complementation by something which has the form of a first-order predicate. It would be a mistake to say that definite descriptions have this form in ordinary language because they have the form of proper names or because they have the function of referring to objects like letters or pseudo-objects like Propositions.[106]

The idea of a bearer of deflationary truth, to state it again, is the product of the hesitation on the part of the (LR)-deflationist to analyze NTD relations in terms of SQ operations. (LU) in general holds that the logical functioning of natural expressions of the form "What Percy says" can be grasped in some way by contextual SQ-translations; (LUC) states, in addition, that their *natural* functioning – i.e. the natural predication mechanisms whereby they contribute to the formation of operational contexts – is as natural language presents them to be.

Let me conclude by simply restating the advantages of (LUC)-deflationism (aside from the one that it explains all the main deflationary phenomena flawlessly):

- (LUC) does not fall short of *showing* the *grammatical* discontinuity between natural ordinary predications and natural truth predications, in the form of the grammatical discontinuity between quantification frameworks, such as (P)IQ, recruiting relational contexts on the one hand, and frameworks, such as SQ, recruiting operational contexts of

[106] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

quantification, on the other. This advantage comes from, of course, its genus, not its species. In other words, the point is the employment of SQ, irrespective of whether the functional parts of NTD are specified under the guidance of the grammar of SQ or the grammar of ordinary natural predication.

- (LUC) preserves the *general* character of truth, in the form of the generality provided by sentential quantification. This advantage comes from the trivialization of the notion of a theory of truth, in the sense communicated by the minimal and disquotational theories. Given that NTD itself – considered broadly as covering also (what might be called) the fact-discourse – constitutes the natural theory of sentential generalization, the idea of a finitely expressible or inexpressible theory of the truth predicate becomes useless. The logical functioning of NTD cannot be generally stated, simply because NTD is itself a tool for generalization.

- (LUC) saves us from the sort of semantical extravagance caused by the property and bearers of truth. (LUC) is perfectly deflationary in the sense proposed by Kirkham.[107] A model of the world recruiting individuals and their ordinary, non-alethic relations suffice to account for NTD generalizations, provided that the substituents for the sentence variables employed by SQ are sentences that admit a logical analysis in terms of the ordinary framework of IQ.

[107] Kirkham, 1992, p. 311.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: TRUTH AND SENTENTIAL MEANING

Overview. I conclude by briefly stating the possibility of reconciling the idea of a truth-"based" account of sentential meaning, specifically a truth-conditional semantics, with a deflationary conception of truth. The possibility is drawn from one of Horwich's critical observations on the "orthodox"[108] picture of a philosophical account of meaning, read under the light of (LUC)-deflationism.

The meta-philosophy of deflationary truth. (LR)-deflationism is characteristically forced to explain the essential function of natural truth discourse externally, most commonly in the form of a meta-philosophical statement about the notion of truth, simply because it cannot show that function, since it refrains from employing grammatical frameworks of the SQ type. The meta-philosophical idea is that truth is not a deep, vital, explanatorily/predictively relevant notion, that it has no underlying nature to be analyzed, despite the fact that the truth predicative form is logically reliable. Its logical reliability, leading to its employment within the framework of individual quantification as "x is true", is trivially explained by (LR) via the stronger thesis that it is logically *required*: the very point of the presence of the truth predicate in natural and logical grammar is its enabling us to express whatever we could express using a suspect grammar like that of SQ. Such explicit meta-philosophical statement of the deflationary fact about truth forces us to reconsider those departments or doctrines of philosophical knowledge in

[108] Horwich, 2010, p. 143.

which truth is commonly supposed to play a vital or basic role: simply put, nothing substantial could be reasonably expected to be based on such a "thin" notion.

Deflationary truth in meaning theory. Theory of meaning is the most representative case. So the initial problem with accounts of sentential meaning that employ some truth-theoretic notion as the *explanans* – such as truth-value, truth condition, or truth in possible world[109] – from the deflationary perspective, might be that they attempt to base a substantial notion on the *transparent* phenomenon of truth, "that the theories to which the truth-theoretic approach gives rise lack the necessary explanatory power."[110]

Horwich clarifies this point in application to Davidson's proposal of a truth-conditional semantic program by comparing the two possible opposite readings of a Tarski biconditional such as " 'Tachyons can travel back in time' is true if and only if tachyons can (indeed) travel back in time." In one of the readings, the right-hand side (out-of-quotes) occurrence of the embedded sentence constitutes the truth-conditional meaning analysis of its left-hand side (within-quotes) occurrence. The problem is that

> ...it is not possible to agree with the minimalist claim that this knowledge also helps to constitute our grasp of "is true". For in that case we would be faced with something like a single equation and two unknowns. Rather, if knowledge of the truth condition of "Tachyons can travel back in time" is to constitute our understanding of that sentence then this knowledge would presuppose some pre-existing conception of truth.[111]

[109] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[110] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

[111] Horwich, 1990, p. 68.

So if the truth-conditional meaning analysis of a given sentence is to have the form of the instance of a disquotational schema for that sentence, then it seems impossible to have *both* a deflationary conception of truth (employing that schema or some variation thereof) *and* a truth-conditional account of meaning that employs a deflationary conception of "truth condition".[112]

Employing deflationary truth. However, in light of the (LUC) thesis that natural truth discourse is the theory of sentential generalization of natural language, the characteristic appearance of deflationary truth in discourse should be its *employment* as a device; and this employment need not be accompanied by a deflationary meta-philosophical statement about truth. The fact that a given philosophical theory or doctrine is based on deflationary truth does not have to mean that it contains some such meta-philosophical thesis; it is necessary, but also sufficient, that it makes use of truth in the way stated by the deflationary conception at large, namely, as a device of (sentential) generalization, or in a significantly related way. The question then is in what sense the truth-conditional program can be seen to employ a deflationary kind of *truth condition* in giving an account of sentential meaning.

In order to see this, it suffices to take a glance at Davidson's statement of his own truth-conditional program.[113] Davidson's main aim is to account for the semantic phenomenon that, solely with the knowledge of a finite stock of words and finitely many rules of syntactic combination, language users are able to

[112] Simply stated, "knowledge of the truth condition of a sentence cannot simultaneously constitute *both* our knowledge of its meaning *and* our grasp of truth for the sentence"; *ibid.*, p. 68. The classical statement of this dilemma is found in Etchemendy, 1988.

[113] The statement of the program is given in his classic 1967 paper "Truth and Meaning"; my references will be to its reprint in Davidson, 1984.

understand each other in uttering *new* sentences in communicative contexts. The first bare idea that comes to mind in accounting for this phenomenon is specifying the meaning*s* of the ultimate parts of sentences (i.e. simple words) and applying rules of combination to get to the meaning*s* of the (indefinitely many) wholes. But this simply does not work for most types of construction.

> The point is easily illustrated by belief sentences. Their syntax is relatively unproblematic. Yet, adding a dictionary does not touch the standard semantic problem, which is that we cannot account for even as much as the truth conditions of such sentences on the basis of what we know of the meanings of the words in them. The situation is not radically altered by refining the dictionary to indicate which meaning or meanings an ambiguous expression bears in each of its possible contexts; the problem of belief sentences persists after ambiguities are resolved.[114]

The apparent problem is that there are many different ways "the meaning" of one and the same given constituent can contribute to the meaning of the wholes in which it is to appear. This phenomenon of semantic interdependence forces us to view the kind of holism a comprehensive meaning account for a given language should exemplify in a way that is quite different from the bare one in which it entails a theorem, for each sentence, of the general form "*s* means *m*", where "*s*" stands for a structural description of the sentence, and "*m*" for the name of *its meaning*:

> If sentences depend for their meaning on their structure, and we understand the meaning of each item in the structure only as an abstraction from the totality of sentences in which it features, then we can give the meaning of any sentence (or word) only by giving the meaning of every sentence (and word) in the language. Frege said that only in the context of a sentence does a word have meaning; in the same vein he might have added that only in the context of the language does a sentence (and therefore a word) have meaning.[115]

[114] Davidson, 1984, p. 21.

[115] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

In order to cope with semantic interdependence encountered on both sentential and sub-sentential levels, then, the (first) safest move is to employ the schema "*s* means that p", where the sentence letter "p" is to be replaced by a paraphrase of the sentence structurally described by "*s*". The simplest case is where the metalanguage is able to translate the object language via the object language itself, i.e. where the sentence is its own paraphrase. However, the connective "means that" is defective in two respects: first, the main verb has an intensional import; and secondly, it is gramatically hybrid in that the gap on the left-hand side is nominal whereas the one on the right-hand side is sentential. These two defects are neutralized at once if we employ instead the perfectly extensional and perfectly sentential connective "if and only if", with the condition that "*s*" be completed to a full-fledged sentence with some predicate satisfying (in the simplest case)

s is T if and only if p.

Davidson's point is that the deflationary truth predicate *happens* to be the one we are looking for – deflationary, for the substituent for the schematic sentence letter in the simplest case is the very sentence described by "*s*"; that is, in the simplest case, the schema is an instance of (PCFC). Now the program is to find a suitable machinery that could display the compositional meaning structure of the *whole* language, say *L*, the sentences of which are under question. But that machinery is nothing other than a Tarskian recursive definition of *truth-in-L*:

> Any two predicates satisfying this condition have the same extension, so if the metalanguage is rich enough, nothing stands in the way of putting what I am calling a theory of meaning into the form of an explicit definition of a predicate "is T". But whether explicitly defined or recursively characterized, it is clear that the sentences to which the predicate "is T" applies will be just the true

> sentences of *L*, for the condition we have placed on satisfactory theories of meaning is in essence Tarski's Convention *T* that tests the adequacy of a formal semantical definition of truth.[116]

Partiality. Thus, thanks to the recursive character of Tarskian language-specific truth definitions, truth-conditional meaning theories can be given for languages compositional structures of which can be logically manipulated and/or exhibited. The contribution of truth to this possibility is perfectly deflationary, for it can be captured solely in terms of the point of departure of the meaning analysis, namely, the relevant instance of (Den), which guarantees that the equivalence between the sides is one of meaning. However, one huge mistake would be to see the Davidsonian program as one of calculating the truth-condition*s* of sentence*s*. For the very idea that prompts the Davidsonian strategy is that the theory of meaning does not have to be, and in fact had better not be, an account of meaning*s*.[117] In other words, it would be wrong to suppose that individual equivalences of the form "*s* is true if and only if p", where "p" is to be replaced with a Tarskian statement of the truth-condition of "*s*", as applications of a general truth-conditional meaning formula to *particular* sentences of the language in question.

Simply stated, *partiality* is to be taken in the mereological sense of *parthood*, not in the logical sense of particularity. Given the deflationary character of truth, a truth-conditional meaning account can be fruitful only if it is to be a holistic one – otherwise it is proved useless by the minimalist's point "that while understanding a sentence does indeed usually *coincide* with an explicit knowledge of its truth condition, understanding does not *consist* in such knowledge."[118] Statements of truth condition are semantically useful only as

[116] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[117] For the distinction, see Soames, 2010, Ch. 1.

[118] Horwich, 1990, p. 69.

parts of a compositional whole – this is the Davidsonian sense in which an account of meaning is to be truth-conditional.[119]

Deflationary truth condition. (LUC)-deflationism is completely in line with the sense in which the truth-conditional semantic program is *based* on truth. The reason is simply that (LUC) does not propose any meta-philosophy of truth, but merely attempts to show what transparent function is served by the natural truth discourse, by recourse to (Den): the truth-predicative form is merely a device of (case-specific) sentential canonical form construction that can employ various forms of sentence nominalization, including structural-descriptive "names" of sentences.

Given this reading of the function of the predicative form "$\bar{p}$ is true", the label "truth condition" itself is to be interpreted as nothing other than an eccentric type of sentential generalization. The idea is quite neat: there are as many types or kinds of "condition" formulable in a given language as there are general forms of sentence in that language. The sentence, for instance, "Snow is white", specifies simply the deflationary[120] *whiteness* condition for *snow*; so the form "a is F" represents generally the specification of the condition of F-ness (or F-hood) for a. More complicated general sentential forms represent the specification of conditions of more complicated forms, most of which cannot even be nominalized as in the above simple case. However, these conditions can

[119] Horwich clearly separates Davidson's original statement of the position and (then) current implementations of the program in philosophy and linguistics, and admits that Davidson's version is much more in line with a deflationary reading of *truth*, *being true of*, and *reference*. See his 2010, p. 161, fn. 16.

[120] From an inflationary point of view, the sentence "Snow is white" itself does not *specify*, but merely states the whiteness condition for snow; the specification is provided by the proposed semantic, inflationary *analysis* of the sentence (whatever particular form that analysis takes). This explains my use of the adjective "deflationary": a deflationary whiteness condition for x can be specified by the very predication "x is white".

be characterized canonically as "truth conditions", for given (Den), every sentence, irrespective of its "inner" structure, is a truth predication, and hence specifies a truth condition.[121] [122]

The misleading analogy. There is actually nothing uninteresting about deflationary truth. The structural contribution of the truth discourse to our natural system of discursive representation – at least from a transcendental idealistic point of view – *is* a substantial contribution: the discursive capabilities it introduces us with provide in fact a more complicated (and possibly more exact) picture of the world itself. Simply put, the world, *qua* representation, is richer with truth. It is quite ironical, then, that the common characterization of the only approach that perfectly captures such enrichment is based on an analogy with *deflation*.

[121] By "*a* truth condition", we should understand "truth condition for *a* sentence nominalization". It is the propositional content (as a whole) that varies; truth remains the same through the variation.

[122] This also sheds light on Frege's regress argument against the idea of giving a general definition of truth. Frege's assumptions seem to be that (1) to define a predicate is to state explicitly the condition it specifies, and that (2) every statement specifies a truth condition. The regress in attempts to define truth is prompted by the simple fact that the condition of being true for a sentence cannot be stated without stating a *further* truth condition. See his "Der Gedanke", translated as "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry", by A. M. and Marcelle Quinton, reprinted as chapter 1 in Ludlow, 1997, pp. 9-30.

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APPENDICES

A. CLARIFICATIONS

In the following are my answers (in brief) to several objections made by the members of the committee, added as clarifications of several important points. (The objections might have been amended to a certain extent in the rephrasing.)

Objection 1. (LUC)-deflationism is proposed both as the correct formulation of the *general* deflationary thesis and as the correct *variety* of deflationism (specifically, of (LU)-deflationism). The latter thesis might be reasonable to hold to a certain extent, given the (alleged) defects of actual varieties; but the former is simply ungrounded.

Answer. First of all, the locations on the proposed logical map of deflationisms are not particular deflationary accounts, but particular *types* of deflationism. So for instance (LUM) is not to be equated with the prosentential account, nor (LR) with either disquotationalism or minimalism. The types are considered in their concretizations as varieties; nevertheless, it is the particular *location* on the map corresponding to a given type that is really under focus, and not the incidental drawbacks or advantages of the concrete variety itself.

Now there are two facets of (LUC)-deflationism: (1) the specification of its location on the proposed logical map, as a possible type – namely, the abstract deflationary attitude of treating the natural truth-predicative form as logically unreliable but still functionally composite; (2) the idea (concerning truth, or

language, or logical analysis, etc.) communicated by this location. Not every type has this double appearance; actually, each other type fails to communicate any idea other than the one communicated by the specification of its location on the map.

(LUC) as a type is the simple result of the structure of the map.[123] But a particular fact about it suggests that it conveys more than is conveyed by the statement that specifies it as that type. It is that it bans both of the two basic kinds of grammatical projection, one from the grammar of sentential quantification down to natural grammar (resulting in prosentential English), the other from natural truth predication up to the grammar of individual quantification (resulting in the framework of propositional individual quantification). The point is that it thereby happens to ban *any* projection whatsoever, given that *all* the available options are those two.[124] The idea communicated by this fact is that natural truth discourse *basically corresponds* to the sentential quantification framework, that the functional architecture of neither is to be pictured in terms of that of the other (hence no sub-sentential projection), for both frameworks serve the same function of sentential generalization, in their native grammars (i.e. natural and logical grammars), *in their own ways*.

Thanks to its location in the map, (LUC) accounts for all the main deflationary phenomena. (Briefly, it accounts for truth in semantic "descent", in sentential anaphora, and in sentential generalization. Moreover, it accounts, rather trivially, for the inexpressibility of the minimal theory, and specifically for the

[123] Another, rather weird possible type, not considered in the text, is that kind of (LR)-deflationism which holds that natural truth discourse should be analyzed in terms of the propositional individual quantification framework, but only via the sentential quantification framework. As expected, this type does not have any actual instances.

[124] *Two* differs logically from *one* when *all are two*. When all are more than two, on the other hand, *one* and *two* are both logically *at least one*.

circularity allegedly engendered by the use of substitutional quantification in defining truth.) It preserves the elasticity provided by the functional partitioning of natural truth discourse without losing the semantical economy provided by the sentential quantification framework. Metaphorically, it is the best location in the deflationary field to see with minimal effort *everything* going on. This is the ground for taking the idea suggested by this specific location in the map of deflationisms, namely, the idea that natural discourse is the native theory of sentential generalization of natural language, as *the* general deflationary thesis.

However, this idea is not generic in the simple Porphyrian sense that it is a genus arrived at by some process of abstraction from distinct actual species of deflationism. The three-step process whereby it is arrived at is as follows: (1) projection of the leading varieties on to the proposed logical map as types; (2) detection on the map of a novel[125] location where all the main deflationary phenomena can be effectively explained; (3) interpretation of that location/type in the form of a thesis.

So the proposed formulation of the general deflationary thesis as the idea communicated by the type (LUC) is both general (as it is a type) and critical/corrective (as it is only one of the types).

Objection 2. The final statement of the second chapter is that deflationary truth is transparent and/but irredundant. But no conclusive argument to that effect is available in that chapter. So the only possible option is to read that statement prescriptively, that is, as a statement concerning what is to be

[125] The location is novel to the extent that its specification is realized completely within the conceptual scheme provided by the map, not by some projection from outside the scheme. But this does not necessarily mean that the resulting type must be yet unexemplified.

proposed in the following. But then the wording is incorrect, for it *attributes* transparency and irredundancy to deflationary truth.

Answer. *Prescriptive* and *descriptive* are idealizations. Any particular description of things is at the same time a prescription of seeing things *that* way. This prescriptive element in a description can be relatively strong, as when the way proposed of seeing things is rather disputable/ungrounded, or relatively weak, as when that way is based on firmer grounds. The statement in question is a description of deflationary truth the prescriptive dimension of which is *quite* apparent. This is in line with the fact that the description is introductory.

Objection 3. But the characterization of deflationism as irredundant transparency implies that the redundancy theory is not a deflationary option, which it in fact is according to the main literature. So the characterization cannot have the kind of innocence suitable for an introductory description, for it forces us to disregard in advance certain actual varieties of deflationism.

Answer. (1) It is not stated anywhere that redundancy theory is not a real deflationary variety. It is stated, however, that it does not constitute a reasonable option (see Chapter 2). (2) What the main literature takes to be the redundancy thesis is actually the "evaporation" thesis (the use of the term is due to Williams, 1976): the truth predicative form evaporates in logical analysis. This corresponds on the proposed map to (LU). (3) The idea of the redundancy of truth is employed in the proposed classification as one of the extremes. At one extreme lies (LR), which holds that sentential quantification framework is redundant, given the (logical projection of) the truth predicative form; at the other its contrary, the claim that the truth predicative form is redundant given (the natural correlates of) sentential variables – namely, the

simple redundancy theory. Even the orthodox statement of (LUM) is not a redundancy theory in this sense.[126] Ramsey's and Williams' accounts, on the other hand, are shown to be closer to (LUC).

Objection 4. There is already a clear general statement of deflationism in the form of a negative thesis, namely, the thesis that truth can*not* be reductively analyzed as prescribed by (Infl). Why bother for another one?

Answer. There is a clear case in which such meta-philosophical characterization of the deflationary position is insufficient – the case of *primitivism*. Primitivism holds that truth is a simple, unanalyzable property some sentences or statements (or whatever our truthbearers are) *happen* to bear, while others happen to lack. So according to primitivism, truth has no underlying nature. But primitivism is not a variety of deflationism.

One of the failures of (LR)-deflationism is that it cannot separate itself from primitivism, as it does not represent the discontinuity between ordinary and alethic predication in the final analysis, i.e. as one of *logical* grammar. (LR) fails to get beyond of stating, on the grounds of a deflationary meta-philosophy of truth, an identity of meaning structure between "p" and "$\bar{p}$ is true". The logical structure of the equivalence itself does not *guarantee* it; it is rather the (deflationary) property of truth in virtue of which "p" samesays as "$\bar{p}$ is true". But a primitivist can hold the same about the property of truth, and still claim that it is unanalyzable (in the inflationary fashion) because it is a simple property – the deflationary phenomena in which the "property" is active has no bearing on the question whether it is simple (unanalyzable) or complex (analyzable).

[126]See Grover et al., 1975, p. 122-124, for the restricted and special kind of redundancy claim the prosentential theory makes.

Objection 5. How *exactly* is NTD to be analyzed in SQ according to (LUC)?

Answer. The simple answer is "immediately", i.e., without the mediation of any of the above mentioned projections. The point is that it is not any easier to read NTD in terms of NPD (or something similar) than to read it directly in terms of SQ. But it is simply unhealthier to do so, for reasons given above.

To state it more properly, NTD is not actually *analyzed* in terms of SQ. Neither one can give an analysis of the other, for they are related to each other by *basic* correspondence. The only thing to expect from a scheme of NTD-to-SQ translations is an analysis of the contribution of NTD to natural discourse at large, and that analysis takes the simple form of an exhibition of the grammatical discontinuity between the grammars of IQ and SQ. We cannot state what NTD does, but we can show/see it, by *employing* SQ in translating general truth predications. (By the same token, SQ can rightfully be characterized as *the truth theory of logical language*, since what SQ does in that language is exactly what NTD does in natural language. Neither one of the notions of truth and sentential generalization is prior to the other in analysis.)

B. TURKISH SUMMARY

Doğrulukta indirimcilik (deflationism about truth), kısaca, doğruluğun içerikli bir mefhum olmadığı ve indirgemeci bir felsefi çözümleme gerektirmediği yönündeki menfi iddiadır. İndirimcilik, birkaç ana tür olarak karşımıza çıkar; en öne çıkanları, Ramsey'e atfedilen *fazlalık* kuramı (redundancy theory); Quine'ın *alıntı giderme* yaklaşımı (the disquotational account); Grover, Camp ve Belnap'ın *cümle zamiri* yaklaşımı (the prosentential account); Williams'ın *buharlaşma* (evaporation of truth) tespiti; ve Horwich'in *enazcılığı*dır (minimalism). Bu türlerin her biri bahsedilen menfi hakikatin belirli bir yönüne/görünüşüne odaklanır ve indirimci iddiayı bu yönden/bu görünüşe göre deyimleştirir. Bu çalışma, (1) yalın ama aydınlatıcı bir indirimcilikler tipleştirmesi önererek, (2) buradaki uygun tipi teşhis ederek ve (3) bu tipin önerilen tipleştirme haritasındaki yer belirlenimini bağımsız bir iddia biçiminde yorumlayarak genel indirimci iddiayı yeniden deyimleştirmeye çalışmaktadır.

Tipleştirme önerisi, mantıki çözümlemenin tabiatına ilişkin belli kavrayışların, ama bilhassa genel/soyut cümle biçimi izleğinin rehberliğinde yapılmaktadır. İndirimcilik görüşleri, tabii doğruluk konuşmasının (natural truth discourse) mantıki çözümlemesi verilirken, doğruluk yüklemesi biçiminin (truth-predicative form) ve genel cümle biçiminin (general form of sentence) tabii ve mantıki dillere nasıl dağıtıldığına göre tipleştirilirler. Öyle ki, bazı görüşler doğruluk yüklemini/doğruluk yüklemesi biçimini tabii dile hapsedip bu biçimin mantık diline uzanmasına izin vermezken, ötekiler doğruluk yüklemini mantık diline de taşıyabilirler; doğruluk yüklemesi biçimini tabii dile hapsedenlerin bazıları da genel cümle biçiminin – en azından bir işlev olarak – tabii dilde mevcut olduğunu söylerken ötekiler bunu reddedebilirler. Böylece ortaya çıkan

indirimcilikler haritasında, tek tek indirimcilik çeşitlerinin müspet ve menfi yönleri *yapı özellikleri* olarak incelenebilir.

Çalışmanın temel iddiası, önerilen tipleştirmedeki en uygun, en verimli konumun, doğruluk yükleme biçimini mantıki çözümleme diline taşımayı ve bu biçimin tabii dildeki işleyişini (functioning) – veya işlev bölümlemesini (functional partitioning) – mantıki gramerin (logical grammar) sunduğu genel cümle biçimine göre temsil etmeyi aynı anda reddeden (LUC) olduğudur. Bu konumdan, yalnızca önde gelen indirimcilik çeşitlerinin odaklandığı farklı indirimcilik olgularının tümü en etkin/verimli bir biçimde açıklanmakla kalmaz; bu konum, tipleştirmedeki özel yeri sayesinde de, bu yerin kaplam bakımından belirleniminden bağımsız olarak dile getirilebilen bir iddiaya dönüştürülebilir. Bu iddia – yani, tabii doğruluk konuşmasının, tabii dilin cümle genelleştirmesi kuramı olduğu iddiası – aranan genel indirimci iddiadır. Çalışma, bu konumdan deyimleştirildiği haliyle indirimciliğin, doğruluk koşulu temelli anlam kuramına ilişkin içerimini göstererek sonlanır: Doğruluk koşulu temelli anlam kuramının doğruluğa *dayanma* biçimi, bir genelleştirme *aleti* olarak doğruluğun, indirimciliğe uygun bir biçimde *kullanılması*dır; bu dayanma biçimi, (LUC)'nin sunduğu doğruluk konuşması resmine tam olarak oturur.

Önerilen indirimcilik tipleştirmesindeki konumları açıkça ifade edebilmek için, bu konumları/tipleri belirleyen ana iddiaların, iddialarda sözü geçen niceleme çerçevelerinin/gramerlerinin ve kullanılan denklik taslaklarının kısaltmalarını Türkçe karşılıklarıyla vermemiz icap eder. Kısaltmalar şöyledir:

İndirimcilik tipleri:
LR: Doğruluk yükleme biçimi mantıki olarak güvenilirdir.
LU: Doğruluk yükleme biçimi mantıki olarak güvenilmezdir.

LUC: Doğruluk yükleme biçimi mantıki olarak güvenilmez, (ama) işleyişi bakımından parçalıdır.
LUM: Doğruluk yükleme biçimi mantıki olarak güvenilmez, işleyişi bakımından (da) yekparedir/parçasızdır.

Niceleme çerçeveleri/gramerleri:
IQ: Birey nicelemesi çerçevesi (e.g. " $\forall x(...x...x...)$")
NPD: Tabii cümle zarfı konuşması (e.g. "Ne için diyorsan ki *o-doğru*, *o-doğru*")
NTD: Tabii doğruluk konuşması (e.g. "Ne diyorsan doğru")
PIQ: Önermeli birey nicelemesi çerçevesi (e.g. "$\forall u(...u...u...)$"
SQ: Cümle nicelemesi çerçevesi (e.g. "$\forall p(...p...p...)$")

Temel taslaklar:
(Den): $\bar{p}$ doğru(dur), eğer ve ancak p ise [İsimleştirme giderimi]
(**Infl**): $\bar{p}$ doğru(dur), eğer ve ancak $\bar{p}$, F ise [Artırımcı açıklama]
(**PCFC**): $\bar{p}$, *F*('dir), eğer ve ancak p ise [Yüklemeli kanuni biçim inşası]
(Red): Doğru(dur) ki p, eğer ve ancak p ise [Fazlalık]

Doğruluğun görünüşleri. Doğruluk çözümlenen ve çözümleyen dilde farklı biçimlerde görünüşe gelir. Daha kati bir ifadeyle, doğruluğun görünüşleri, çeşitli gramatik/mantıki biçimler ve gramatik işlevlerdir. Öne çıkan gramatik biçimler doğruluk sıfatı ("doğru"), doğruluk zarfı ("doğru" yahut "doğru olarak"), doğruluk ismidir[127] ("doğruluk"/"hakikat"); gramatik işlevler doğruluk yüklemi/doğruluk yüklemesi ("...doğru(dur)"/"x, doğru(dur)."); mantıki biçimler ise doğruluk ve yanlışlık işlemcileridir (Türkçe'nin tabii anlatım kalıplarının biraz dışına çıkarak, "doğru(dur) ki..."/"yanlış(tır) ki...").

[127] Bu özet metninde "isim" ve "ad" sözcükleri sırasıyla İngilizce "noun" ve "name" sözcükleri yerine kullanılmaktadır.

Mantıki çözümlemenin niyet/yönelim bağımlılığı göz önüne alındığında, doğruluk konuşmasının mantıki-felsefi çözümlemesinin bu konuşmadaki bütün atıf yapılarını ele almak yerine belirlenen niyete hizmet edecek şekilde sınırlandırılması, daha açık olarak, bu niyete uygun görünüşlere ve kullanımlara odaklanması beklenir. Söz konusu niyet, indirimciliğin anlaşılması olduğu içindir ki *cümlelik*le doğruluk arasında kurulan indirimci bağlantıyı iyice teşhir eden görünüşler ve kullanımlar öne çıkarılır. Bunlar, ilk aşamada, saydamlık fenomenleridir (transparency phenomena), yani doğruluk atfının cümle genel biçimleriyle elenebildiği denklikler kuran saydamlık taslaklarının ifade ettiği fenomenler. Mesela,

(DZ) Kişi *doğru* der, eğer ve ancak kişi der ki p ve p ise.
(Dİ) Kişi *doğruyu* söyler, eğer ve ancak kişi söyler/der ki p ve p ise.

Bu gibi saydamlık taslaklarında, karşılıklı koşullunun sol tarafında beliren doğruluk ifadesi, sağ tarafta genel cümle biçiminin – en sıklıkla, taslak cümle harfinin – kullanımı yoluyla buharlaştırılır. Ama saydamlık taslakları arasında bazıları vardır ki saydamlığın yanında doğruluğun kullanışlılığını/fazlalık olmayışını da ifade edebilmektedir. Doğruluk yükleminin ve doğruluk işlemcisinin temel kullanımlarını ifade eden şu iki taslakta bu fark açıkça görülür.

(Den) $\bar{p}$ doğru(dur), eğer ve ancak p ise.
(Red) Doğru(dur) ki p, eğer ve ancak p ise.

Bunlardan ikincisi doğruluğun, fazlalık olduğu bir görünüşünü resimler: doğruluk işlemcisi. Doğruluk işlemcisi, değilleme işlemcisinin ters kutbu olarak düşünülebilir; öyleyse doğruluk işlemcisinin varlığı ve yokluğu, hem gramer hem de içerik açısından, birdir. Ama doğruluk her zaman fazlalık olarak

görünüşe gelmez. İlk taslakta olduğu gibi, doğruluk, yüklem olarak (veya yükleme biçimi içinde) görünüşe geldiğinde, her ne kadar tek tek örneklerde sağ taraftaki cümle taslağının alacağı değer yoluyla buharlaştırılabilse de, taslağın kendisinden basitçe kaldırılamaz. Sebep şudur ki gramer yapısı itibariyle, doğruluk yüklemi cümleye değil, sadece "$\bar{p}$" ile temsil edilen cümle *isimleştirme*sine yüklenebilir, dolayısıyla kaldırıldığı zaman gramer düzeni bozulmuş olur. Ama doğruluk yüklemini fazlalık olmaktan asıl kurtaran, onun cümle genelleştirmesindeki (sentential generalization) ve (bununla bağlantılı olarak) kör atıftaki (blind ascription) kullanımlarıdır. Bu kullanımlar, yukarıda sözü geçen ana indirimcilik yaklaşımları tarafından doğruluğun tabii ve/veya mantıki dildeki varlığının sebebi – hikmet-i vücudu – olarak tespit edilir.

İndirimci doğruluk felsefesinde doğruluğun merkezi görünüşü, doğruluk yüklemesi biçimidir. Belirtildiği gibi bunun asıl sebebi bu biçimin bir genelleştirme aracı olarak kullanılabilmesi, böylece fazlalık olmaktan kurtulmasıdır. Şimdi önce doğruluk yükleme biçimiyle doğruluk işlem biçimi arasındaki farkı, doğruluk yazınında çok önemli bir yer tutan *yalancı* fenomeni üzerinden biraz daha belirginleştirip, sonra da yükleme biçiminin bir genelleştirme aracı olarak dile yaptığı vazgeçilmez katkıdan bahsedelim.

Yalancı açmazının deyimleştirilmesi. Doğruluk işlemcisi ile doğruluk yüklemi arasındaki farkın önem arzettiğinin en açıkça görüldüğü örneklerden biri *yalancı açmazı* olarak adlandırılan tasarımlanmış gramatik fenomendir. Yalancı açmazına yol açan tasarım, *bizatihi kendisine yapılan yanlışlık (doğru olmama) yüklemesini adlandıran* bir addır:

(Yalancı) Yalancı, doğru değil(dir).

“Yalancı” adı, bizatihi “Yalancı doğru değil” yüklemesini adlandırır. Açmaz çok basit olarak şöyledir: Yalancı doğruysa, Yalancı’nın doğru olmadığı doğrudur, yani, Yalancı doğru değildir. Yok eğer Yalancı doğru değilse, Yalancı’nın doğru olmadığı doğru değildir, yani Yalancı doğrudur. Her iki durumda da kendisiyle başlanan doğruluk değerinin değiline varıldığı için açmaza düşülür.

Açmazın ortaya çıkmasındaki kilit varsayım, Yalancı’nın gerçek bir cümle olduğu ve böylece belli bir doğruluk değeri taşıması gerektiğidir. Oysa ki en azından hayalen (intuitively) Yalancı bir cümle değildir, çünkü hiçbir bildirim içeriği yok gözükmektedir. İşte bu hayali hakikati bildirmenin bir yordamı vardır ve bu yordam, doğruluk yüklemiyle doğruluk işlemcisi arasındaki gramatik farkın önem arz edebileceğinin ilk emaresidir. Yordamın dayandığı ana fikir şudur: her doğruluk (yanlışlık) atfında, iki mantıki lahza bulunur. Birincisi, kendisine doğruluk (veya doğru olmama) atfedilecek olan önerme içeriğinin (propositional content) belirlenmesi; ikincisi, doğruluk atfı. Yalancı’daki sorun, birinci lahzadadır. Bunu görmek için doğruluk yüklemesi biçiminde sunulan Yalancı’yı doğruluk işlemine bu iki lahza arasındaki ayrımı gözeterek çevirmeye çalışmak yeter.

Doğruluk yüklemesinde, ilk lahza cümle isimleştirmesince, ikinci lahza da doğruluk (doğru olmama) yüklemince gerçekleştirilir. Doğruluk işleminde ise ilk lahza, işlemcinin açtığı cümle konumunu dolduran cümlece, ikinci lahza da işlemcinin kendisi tarafından gerçekleştirilir. Öyleyse Yalancı’yı doğruluk işlemi olarak deyimleştirmek için ilk yapılması gereken, doğru olmama yüklemesinin işlemcil karşılığını, yani doğru olmama işlemini yazmaktır: “Doğru değil(dir) ki...”. İkinci lahzanın işlemcil karşılığını belirlemek için, “Yalancı” adının gönderim değeri olan cümleyi açıkça yazmamız gerekir. Ama bu ad bizi yeniden yüklemenin bütününe, yani “Yalancı, doğru değil”e gönderdiği için, yeniden Yalancı yüklemesini çevirmeye başlamamız

gerekecektir: “Doğru değil(dir) ki doğru değil(dir) ki...”. Elde ettiğimiz şey, aynı çeviri yöntemiyle doldurulması gerekecek bir cümle boşluğudur. Bu böyle *ad infinitum* ilerler. O halde, Yalancı yüklemesi, aslında, şu şekilde bir sonsuz işlemcidir:

Doğru değil(dir) ki doğru değil(dir) ki doğru değil(dir) ki...

Böylece, işlemci cinsinden yeniden deyimleştirildiğinde görülür ki Yalancı aslında *tam* bir cümle değil, sadece sonsuz bir işlemcidir. Dolayısıyla, yalancı açmazının doğması, Yalancı cümlesinin bir yükleme olarak deyimleştirilmesine bağlıdır, çünkü ancak öyle deyimleştirildiğinde bir doğruluk değeri alması gerekecektir.

Cümle genelleştirmesi. Ne var ki doğruluk yükleminin esas ayırdedici görünüşü, (bilhassa tabii dilin) genelleştirme mekanizmasına yaptığı katkıdır. Tabii dilin genelleştirme kalıbı, kabaca, sınırlandırılmış (i.e. türü işaretlenmiş) niceleyiciler ile birlikte bunlarla bağlantı kurabilen (yine sınırlandırılmış) zamirlerden oluşur. Bu kalıp, yalnızca dünyanın, görece tartışmalı olmayan unsurları – bireyler – hakkındaki genellemeler için değil, dünyanın unsurları oldukları tartışmaya açık olan başka tür “şey”ler, mesela cümleler veya zikretmeler (utterances) üzerine, daha doğrusu, bunların gramatik konumları (grammatical positions) üzerine yapılan genelleştirmelerde de kullanılır. Cümle konumu üzerine yapılan nicelemelerde, niceleme öğesinin isim konumunu tutması sebebiyle cümlenin bildirme yahut bir koşul tanımlama kuvveti kaybedilir; öyleyse, niceleme öğesine eklendiğinde bu kuvveti geri kazandıracak, ama bunu da herhangi bir içerik değişikliğine yol açmadan yapacak, saydam yüklemlere (yahut fiil ifadelerine) ihtiyaç vardır. Doğruluk yükleminin genelleştirmedeki katkısı tam olarak budur ve bu katkı *yüklemeli*

*kanuni biçim inşa taslağı*nda (predicative canonical form construction schema) açıkça ifade edilir.

(PCFC) $\bar{p}$, *F*('dir), eğer ve ancak p ise.

"*F*" yüklem boşluğu uygun bir yüklemle doldurulduğunda bir yüklemeli kanuni cümle biçimi elde edilir; öyle ki, çok farklı gramatik/mantıki biçimler taşıyan cümleler tek bir kanuni cümle biçiminde ifade edilir hale gelir. Bu uygun yüklemlerden en yaygını doğruluk yüklemidir ve ürettiği kanuni biçime yapılacak dönüştürmenin kuralı da isimleştirme giderme taslağında, (Den)'de, ifade edilir.

Basit bir örnek olarak, "Özne" isimli bir konuşma öznesinin bildirdiği şu cümlelere göz atalım.

Kedi paspasın üzerinde.
Köpek mutsuz.
Kar beyazsa, çimen yeşil.

Birincisi iki yerli bağıntı, ikincisi basit (birli) yükleme, üçüncüsü ise koşullu biçiminde olan bu cümleler üzerine, Özne'yle olan ilişkileri bağlamında bir genelleme yapmak istiyoruz – diyelim ki Özne'nin zikrettiği her cümleyi kabul etmeye hazır olduğumuzu dile getirmek istiyoruz. Yapacağımız şey, bu cümleleri doğruluk yüklemeli kanuni biçime, yani "$\bar{p}$, doğru" biçimine dönüştürüp

Kedinin paspasın üzerinde olduğu doğru.
Köpeğin mutsuz olduğu doğru.
Kar beyaz olduğunda çimenin yeşil olduğu doğru.

Özne'yle olan bağıntılarını kurmaktan ibarettir. Yani

Özne ne diyorsa doğru.

dememiz yeterli olacaktır. Bu yolla, Özne'nin söyleyip söyleyebileceği, belki bir çoğunu duymayacağımız, duysak da anlamayacağımız (kör atıf), ilkece sonsuz sayıda olabilecek cümleyi, tek bir sonlu genelleştirme biçiminde kabul edebiliriz. Doğruluk yüklemi, tek tek örnekler düzeyinde buharlaştırılabilse de, yani, mesela,

Kedinin paspasın üzerinde olduğu doğru.

yerine basitçe

Kedi paspasın üzerinde.

diyebiliyor olsak da, Özne'ye atıfla yapılan genelleştirmeden ve benzeri genelleştirmelerden doğruluk yüklemini gramer düzenini bozmadan kaldıramayız. İşte indirimci görüşler, doğruluk yükleminin bu işlevini, veya bu işleviyle yakından bağlantılı olan başka bir gramatik gerçeği, doğruluk "mefhum"unun yeterli açıklaması olarak kabul eden görüşlerdir.

Doğruluk yükleme biçiminin cümle genelleştirmesindeki katkısı bilhassa mantık "doğruluklarını" ifade etmek için kullandığımız cümle taslaklarını, yani açık cümleleri, kapalı cümlelere dönüştürürken açığa çıkar. Mesela,

Kar beyazsa, kar beyazdır.
Kedi paspasın üzerindeyse, kedi paspasın üzerindedir.
Köpek mutsuzsa, köpek mutsuzdur.

cümlelerindeki ortak mantıki biçim "$p \to p$" taslağıyla ifade edilir. Bu taslak, her cümlenin kendi kendisini (maddeten) içerdiği yönündeki mantıki doğruluğu gösterir. Bu doğruluğu kapalı bir cümlede bildirmek için yapılması gereken tek şey, taslağı isimleştirerek (Den) yükleme taslağına oturtmak

"$p \to p$" doğru.

ve isimleştirme tür işaretlerini (nominalization sortal marks) kullanarak onu bir genellemeye dönüştürmektir.

"$p \to p$" biçimindeki bütün cümleler doğru.

Mantık dili düzeyinde, bu genelleştirme, birey nicelemesi çerçevesi içine kabaca şöyle yerleştirilebilir:

$$\forall x(x = \langle p \to p \rangle \to Tx)$$

Şimdi, elimizde cümle nicelemesi aletleri, yani cümle niceleyicileri ve cümle değişkenleri olduğu durumda, aynı bildirim (mantıki) doğruluk yüklemine ve tür işaretli cümle isimleştirmelerine başvurulmadan da ifade edilebilir.

$$\forall p(p \to p)$$

Dolayısıyla doğruluk yükleme biçimiyle cümle nicelemesi biçimleri arasında bir tür ve belli bir derecede mütekabiliyet söz konusudur. İşte bu tezin önerdiği indirimci görüşler tipleştirmesi veya haritası, bu iki farklı çerçeveye alınan tavır temelinde çizilir.

İndirimcilikler. Bu çalışmada incelenen indirimcilik çeşitleri, önerilen indirimcilik haritası temelinde elde edilir. Önerilen harita, basit bir karşılaştırmadan türer ve kendisi de oldukça basittir. Haritanın iki uç noktasında iki fazlalık iddiası yer alır: Bir uçta doğruluk yükleminin mantık dilinde mevcut olduğu, dolayısıyla SQ gibi çerçevelerin kullandığı ifade tiplerine, bilhassa da cümle değişkenine ihtiyacımız olmadığı iddiası, diğer uçta, tam aksine, genel cümle biçimini ifade eden bir aletimiz olduğu sürece, doğruluk yüklemesinin tabii dil için bile fazlalık olduğu iddiası. İkinci iddia, basitçe *fazlalık kuramı* olarak bilinen görüşünün uygun deyimleştirmesidir. Bu haliyle fazlalık iddiası makul bir görüş değildir, çünkü tabii dilde genel cümle biçimini veren veya gramatik cümle konumunu bütün soyutluğunda/genelliğinde gösterebilen bir tür cümle değişkeninin bulunmadığı açıktır. Dolayısıyla, fazlalık kuramı yalnızca bir ideal tiptir ve haritanın yapısını *tamamlamaktan* başka bir işlevi yoktur.

Birinci iddia ise ilk bakışta makul bir seçenektir ve doğruluk yazınında iki parlak örneği bulunur: Quine'ın alıntı giderme yaklaşımı ve Horwich'in enazcılığı. Bu indirimcilik tipine göre doğruluk yüklemi mantıki olarak güvenilir bir alettir; doğruluk yükleme biçimi yalnızca tabii dilde değil, birey nicelemesi çerçevesini kullanan mantıki çözümleme dilinde de yer alır/almalıdır. Asıl güvenilmez ve fazlalık olan biçim, SQ gibi çerçevelerin kullandığı cümle niceleyicileri ve cümle değişkenleridir. Elde "Tx" gibi bir yüklem olduğu sürece, "x" üzerinde belirli anlambilim sınırlamaları yaparak cümle konumu üzerine niceleme yapılabilir. Bu, (LR)-indirimciliğidir (**l**ogical **r**eliability of the truth-predicative form).

(LR)'nin basit değillemesi, (LU)'dur (**l**ogical **u**nreliability of the truth-predicative form): doğruluk yüklemesi biçimi mantıki olarak güvenilmezdir; bu biçimin tabii dilde gördüğü esas işlevin ne olduğu, mantıki çözümleme dilinde,

cümle niceleyicileri ve cümle değişkenleriyle gösterilmelidir. Mantıki çözümleme, *son* çözümleme olduğu için, yani tabii konuşmamızın gerçek anlambilim örgüsünü bu çözümlemede takip edeceğimiz için, doğruluk yüklemi *gerçek* bir yüklem değildir. Doğruluk yüklemi, gerçek bir *kaplam* (ve karşıt-kaplam) tanımlamaz ve dolayısıyla gerçek bir *özelliği* ifade etmez – doğruluk taşınabilir bir özellik değildir. Dolayısıyla (varolmayan) doğruluk özelliğinin *taşıyıcıları* da yoktur.

Şimdi (LU) tipi, yukarıda tanımlandığı haliyle fazlalık kuramına yakınlaşabilir ve aslında doğruluk yüklemesinin tabii dilde de şüpheli bir görünüşü olduğunu, doğruluk yükleme yapısının, işlev bakımından, aslında göründüğü gibi parçalı olmadığını, ama fazlalık kuramında kendisi yerine konan genel cümle biçimi veya cümle değişkeni gibi yekpare olduğunu savunabilir. Öyleyse bu tipe göre, doğruluk yüklemi, gördüğü işlev bakımından olmasa da, *yüklem olarak* fazlalıktır. Bu, (LUM)-indirimciliğidir (**l**ogically **u**nreliability and **m**onolothicity of the truth-predicative form). (LU) tipi diğer uca, yani (LR) tipine de yakınlaşabilir ve doğruluk yükleminin güvenilmezliğini mantık diliyle sınırlayıp, tabii dilde doğruluk yükleme yapısının işleyişinin tam da bu yapının görünüşüne uygun olarak parçalı olduğunu savunabilir – (LUC) (**l**ogical **u**nrelibility and **c**ompositeness of the truth-predicative form). Bu tipe göre, doğruluk yüklemi, gördüğü işlev bakımından da gramatik görünüşü bakımından da fazlalık değildir; ama yine de son çözümlemede doğruluk yükleme yapısı, yerini genel cümle biçimini temsil eden ifadelere bırakacaktır. Yani doğruluk yine gerçek bir yüklem değildir ve gerçek bir özelliği ifade etmez.

(LR)'nin örnekleri bulunduğunu söyledik. (LU)'nun da doğruluk yazınında parlak örnekleri vardır: Ramsey'in 1927 tespitleri, Grover, Camp ve Belnap'ın (bütün gelişim süreciyle) cümle zamiri yaklaşımı, Williams'ın buharlaşma iddiası (hatta, biraz genişletmeyle, Strawson'ın pragmatik çözümlemesi de) bu

tipe dahil olur. Bunlardan en önemlisi elbette cümle zamiri görüşüdür; çünkü bu yaklaşım hem en karmaşık ve doygun (LU) örneğidir, hem de, daha önemli olarak, tarihi-mantıki gelişimi içinde ele alındığında (LUM) ile (LUC) arasındaki ince farkı serimleyebilmektedir. Daha açık olarak söylersek, cümle zamiri yaklaşımı, söz edilen gelişim içinde (LUM)'den (LUC)'ye doğru *gelişir*. Bu tezde özellikle incelenen görüşler, (LR) örnekleri olarak alıntı giderme yaklaşımı ve enazcılık, (LUM)'den (LUC)'ye doğru gelişen cümle zamiri görüşü, ve (kısmen) (LUC) örneği olarak Williams'ın buharlaşma tespitidir. Bu özette yalnızca bunlardan en önemlileri olan alıntı giderme yaklaşımından, cümle zamiri yaklaşımından ve önerilen indirimcilik tipinden (yani (LUC)'den) bahsedilecektir.

Alıntı giderme. Alıntı giderme (disquotation) yaklaşımı, Quine'nın 1970'te sunduğu haliyle, esas olarak önermeciliğin (propositionalism) bir reddiyesidir. *D* gibi bir konuşmaya/istidlale (discourse) dair önermecilik, *D*'nin merkezindeki atıf yapılarının mantıki-felsefi çözümlemesinde, gönderim değerleri olan cümle isimleştirmelerinin kullanılmasını buyuran meta-felsefi görüştür – elbette bu isimleştirmelerin gönderim değerleri, önermelerdir (propositions). Önermecilik lehine sunulan argümanlardan biri, doğruluk ve yanlışlığın (veya doğruluk yokluğunun) dünyada zeminli oluşunu sağlamanın en iyi yolunun doğruluğun/yanlışlığın taşıyıcılarının cümle anlamı işlevi de gören kevni unsurlar (ontic items), yani önermeler olarak alınması olduğudur. Quine'ın alıntı giderme görüşünü sunarkenki amacı, bu zeminliliği açıklamak için cümle anlamı işlevi gören varlıklara/kevni unsurlara ihtiyaç olmadığını göstermektir. Öyle ki, doğruluk ve yanlışlık aslında (son çözümlemede) dünyanın sıradan unsurları, yani bireyler, hakkında bildirimde bulunan cümlelerin özellikleridir; cümlelerin doğru veya yanlış oluşunun dünyada zeminli oluşu da, bu nesne düzeyi bildirimlerin konuları olan bireyler yoluyla

gösterilebilir. Bunun için tek gerekli olan saydamlık taslakları, bilhassa da alıntı giderme taslağıdır.

(AG) "p" doğru, eğer ve ancak p ise.

Alıntı giderme taslağı aslında (Den) taslağının alıntılamalı bir örneğidir – daha açık olarak, (Den)'de temsil edilen cümle isimleştirmesini dolaysız alıntılama yoluyla gerçekleştiren örneği. Alıntılanan cümleye yapılan doğruluk yüklemesi, cümlenin alıntı öncesi haline *denk* bir cümledir, böylece bir anlamda yapılan alıntılama giderilmiş olur. Quine'a göre doğruluğun hem tabii hem de mantıki dildeki varlık sebebi, bir alıntı giderme aleti olarak cümle genelleştirmelerine yaptığı katkıdır. (Bu katkının ana hatları, yukarıda verilen "$p \rightarrow p$" biçimi ile ilgili örnekte verilmiştir.)

Quine, alıntı giderme görüşünü dile getirirken *semantik yükselme* (semantic ascent) kavramını kullanır. Genel doğruluk yüklemeleri yaparken, aslında nesne-düzeyi cümlelerin konusunu teşkil eden sıradan bireyler ve onlar arasındaki bağıntılar hakkında konuşuruz, yani genellememizin konusu yine bireylerin dünyasıdır. Ama bu genellemeler, doğrudan bireylerin ortak biçimleri üzerine değil, onların içinde belirdiği bağıntı bağlamları (relational contexts) üzerine yapılır; bu bağlamlarsa gramatik olarak ancak cümlelerle ifade edilir. Dolayısıyla, dünyada beliren/belirebilecek olan bu tür bağlamlar üzerine niceleme yapmak istediğimizde, dilimizin yapısından kaynaklanan zorunluluklar itibariyle, semantik olarak yükselip cümleler üzerine niceleme yapmak zorunda kalırız. İşte doğruluk bu gramatik sınırlamanın neden olduğu semantik yükselme etkisini gidererek konuşmamızı tekrar dünya – yani bireyler ve aralarındaki bağıntılar – hakkında kılar. Quine'ın bir ifadesini değiştirerek söylersek, " 'Kar, beyaz' doğru" gibi bir doğruluk yüklemesi

yaptığımızda asıl yapıyor olduğumuz şey “Kar beyaz” cümlesine doğruluk atfetmek değil, karın kendisine beyazlık atfetmektir.

Böylece, alıntı giderme taslağında ifade bulan denklik, bir anlam yapısı özdeşliğidir (identity of meaning structure): cümle alıntısına yapılan doğruluk yüklemesi olarak görünen şey, anlam yapısı itibariyle, alıntılanan cümlenin konusunu teşkil eden bireye yapılan bir nesne-düzeyi yüklemedir. Öyleyse, bu denklik, basit bir maddi denklik (material equivalence) olamaz, çünkü maddi denklik, anlam yapısı özdeşliği sağlamaya kadir değildir – maddi denklikle elde edilebilecek tek şey doğruluk değeri özdeşliğidir ve bu tür özdeşlik de, cümlenin anlamı onun doğruluk değeriyle aynı sayılmadığı sürece, anlam yapısı özdeşliği sağlayamaz.

Bir (LR) indirimciliği olarak alıntı giderme yaklaşımındaki sorun da buradadır. Cümle alıntı adına yapılan doğruluk yüklemesi aslında (alıntılama öncesi haliyle) cümlenin kendisine maddi denklikten daha güçlü bir kipte denk olacaksa, bunun mantıki çözümlemenin kendisinde *gösterilmesi* gerekir, çünkü mantıki çözümlemenin bütün amacı verili tabii dil ifadesinin *aslında* ne anlama geldiğini, yani ifadenin ait olduğu tipin *derin anlam yapısı*nı *ortaya çıkarmaktır*. Oysa alıntı giderme kuramında (ve daha genel olarak (LR) indirimciliğinde) söz konusu anlam yapısı özdeşliği yalnızca *bildirilir* ama gösterilemez, çünkü doğruluk yüklemi/doğruluk yükleme biçimi mantık dilinde meşru kabul edilir.

Genel olarak (LR) indirimciliği açısından değil de alıntı giderme kuramının özelinde soruna bakılacak olursa, kilit kavramın semantik yükselme olduğu görülür. “Semantik yükselme”yle kastedilen nedir? Şimdi Quine bu kavramı ya bir tür mecaz olarak veya düz anlamıyla kullanmaktadır. Düz anlamıyla kullanıldığında, doğruluk yükleminin bir alıntı giderici olması, onun hem

isimleştirme giderici hem de semantik *alçalma* aleti olduğu anlamına gelir. Ama doğruluk yükleminin başka tür cümle isimleştirmelerine yüklendiğinde nasıl davrandığına bakılacak olursa görülür ki bu yüklemin semantik *düzeylerle* bir ilgisi yoktur – (Horwich'in de kabul ettiği gibi) doğruluk yüklemi sadece bir *isimleştirme gideric*idir (denominalizer). Öteki durumda, yani semantik yükselme kavramının sadece mecazi olarak kullanıldığı durumda ise, cümle alıntılamasında zaten en baştan bir semantik yükselme gerçekleşmez, dolayısıyla alıntı adı doğruluk yüklemiyle tamamlandığında elde edilen cümlenin anlam yapısı, doğruluk yükleminin/özelliğinin kaplamına düşen bir cümle biçiminde değil, alıntılanan cümlenin bireyler ve nesne-düzeyi bağıntılar dünyasında belirlediği koşul biçimindedir. Yani, " 'Kar beyaz' doğru" yüklemesinin anlam yapısı, 'Kar beyaz'ın, DOĞRULUK kaplamında yer alması biçiminde değil, karın BEYAZ kaplamında yer alması biçimindedir. Zaten Quine'ın 'Kar beyaz'a doğruluk atfetmenin kara beyazlık atfetmek olduğu yönündeki bildirimi de bunu anlatır.

Ne var ki, (LR) indirimciliği, doğruluk yüklemini son çözümlemede koruduğu için, gereken anlam yapısı özdeşliğini ancak dışarıdan – bir nevi buyurma yoluyla – yani *göstermeden* sağlayabilir, çünkü son çözümlemede beliren bir yüklemin gerçek bir kaplam belirlememesi, çözümleme gramerinin kendisine gölge düşürecektir. Söz konusu anlam yapısı özdeşliğini bu şekilde sağlamanın tek yolu, doğruluk yüklemini bir kenara bırakıp, yüklemenin "taşıyıcısı" olan cümle isimleştirmesiyle – Quine'ın yaklaşımı özelinde, cümle alıntısıyla – isimleştirme öncesi cümle arasında bir anlam bağıntısı kurmaktır. (Zaten (LR) indirimciliklerinin yaptıkları tam olarak budur: Quine'ın cümle alıntısı cümleyle *adlandırma* (naming) bağıntısı içindeyken, Horwich'in kullandığı "$\langle p \rangle$" biçimindeki önerme adı, ilgili cümlenin ifade ettiği (express) anlamla adlandırma bağıntısı içindedir.) Ama bu da, kullanılan çözümleme dilinden daha derin bir çözümleme dilinin işlerlikte olduğu anlamına gelecektir.

Öyleyse, bir cümle isimleştirmesine yapılan (yalın) doğruluk yüklemesinin anlam yapısı bakımından ilgili nesne-düzeyi cümleyle özdeş olduğunu bildirmenin sağlıklı yolu, doğruluk yükleme biçimini son çözümlemede tamamıyla ortadan kaldıran bir çözümleme planı uygulamaktır. Bunun da en yaygın/kabul edilir yolu, tabii doğruluk konuşmasını, cümle niceleyicileri ve cümle değişkenlerini kullanan SQ gibi bir niceleme çerçevesi yoluyla tercüme etmektir. İşte (LU), bunu yapan indirimcilik tipidir.

Cümle zamiri. (LU)'nun en parlak örneği, Grover, Camp ve Belnap'ın (kısaca GCB) birlikte geliştirdikleri cümle zamiri yaklaşımıdır (the prosentential account). Çok kabaca, bu yaklaşım, tabii dildeki doğruluk yükleme biçiminin aslında işaret ve nispet zamirlerinin cümle düzeyindeki karşılıkları gibi işlediğini, yani belli bir konuşma bağlamında, önceden zikredilmiş veya zikredilebilecek cümlelerle *bütün olarak* – i.e. cümlenin alt unsurlarına inmeden – ilinti kuran yapılar olduğunu savunur. Doğruluk yüklemi, işleyişi bakımından cümle düzeyinde olan bu yapıdan yapılmış yanıltıcı bir soyutlamadır; aslında işleyiş bakımından bölünemez olan cümle zamirinin (bu yanlış soyutlamayla elde edilmiş) cümle-altı (sub-sentential) parçasıdır. Cümle zamiri olarak doğruluk yüklemesi, yazım bakımından (ortographically) veya ses bakımından (phonetically) parçalıdır: en yalın durumda, bir özne ile bir yüklemden – doğruluk yükleminden – oluşur. Ama işleyiş bakımından, mantıki çözümleme dilinde kullanılan genel cümle biçimleri gibi yekparedir. Tabii dilde doğruluğun anlamı, işte bu yekpare yapıdaki geçişi/görünüşü bakımından tüketici bir biçimde kavranabilir.

Bu tez, cümle zamiri yaklaşımını, (LUM) tipinden (LUC) tipine bir tarihi-mantıki gelişim içinde sunmaktadır. Bu sunum, hem (LU)'nun bu alt türlerini anlamımızı kolaylaştırır hem de – daha önemli olarak – cümle zamiri

yaklaşımının tam olarak ne söylüyor olduğunu ortaya çıkarır. Gelişimin basamakları kabaca şu şekildedir: (1) Grover'ın 1972 tarihli önerme niceleyicileri (propositional quantifiers) incelemesi; (2) GCB'nin 1975'te sundukları haliyle klasik cümle zamiri yaklaşımı; ve (3) Grover'ın 1992'de cümle zamiri yaklaşımıyla ilgili eleştirel tespitleri. Birinci aşamada ortada bir doğruluk yaklaşımı yoktur, ama yine de cümle zamiri görüşünün temellerini atan çok önemli bir gözlem vardır. İkinci aşamada bir (LUM) indirimciliği savunusu, üçüncü aşamada da (LUC) tipine doğru bir yönelme bulunur.

Grover'ın 1972 incelemesinin ana hedefi, cümle konumu üzerine niceleme yapmanın iki farklı yolunu karşılaştırmaktır. Birinci yol, doğrudan Grover'ın *önerme niceleyicileri* (propositional quantifiers) ve *önerme değişkenleri* (propositional variables) olarak adlandırdığı, bizimse buraya kadar *cümle niceleyicileri* ve *cümle değişkenleri* olarak adlandırdığımız ifade tiplerini kullanan SQ çerçevesinin kullanımıdır. İkinci yol, birey nicelemesi çerçevesinin sınırlarında kalıp, semantik olarak cümle isileştirmeleriyle sınırlandırılmış birey değişkenleri ve birey adları ile birlikte doğruluk yüklemi gibi saydam yüklemlere başvuran *önermeli birey nicelemesi* çerçevesinin, yani PIQ'nun (propositional individual quantification) kullanımıdır. Aslında PIQ, (LR) indirimciliğinin, tabii doğruluk konuşmasını, yani NTD'yi çözümlerken kullandığı birey nicelemesi çerçevesinden başka birşey değildir.

Grover'ın göstermek istediği, PIQ gibi doğruluk ve benzeri yüklemlere başvurmadan da cümle konumu üzerine sağlıklı bir şekilde niceleme yapılabileceğidir. Tek yapılması gereken, SQ'nun gerçekten sağlıklı bir gramatik çerçeve oluşturduğunu göstermektir. Grover, bunu göstermek için, bilhassa Quine'ın SQ reddiyesine karşılık olarak, SQ'nun tabii dilin salt gramatik bir genişletiminde (a purely grammatical extension) okunabilir olduğunu teşhir etmeye çalışır. Bunun için yaptığı genişletim, tabii dile –

elbette kendi örneğinde, İngilizce'ye – *cümle zamiri* olarak adlandırılabilecek, aslında SQ'da yer alan cümle değişkenlerinin tabii izdüşümlerinden ibaret olan yapıların eklenmesiyle elde edilir. Grover'ın İngilizce için önerdiği yapı "thatt" şeklinde, sıradan "that" zamirine nazire yapan bir kurgudur. O halde Grover'ın iddiası, SQ ifadelerinin İngilizce + "thatt" yoluyla – doğruluk yüklemine ve cümle isimleştirmelerine başvurmadan – *okunabileceğidir*. "Thatt" yapısı – ki bir dereceye kadar, Türkçe'deki karşılığının, halihazırda "o" işaret zamirine nazire yapan "öyle" olduğu düşünülebilir – SQ'daki "*p*" yapısı gibi yekpare bir yapıdır. Grover, bu yapıyla birlikte sıralı değişken bağımlılığını temsil etmeye memur "the-first" ve "the-second" gibi kurgu yekpare cümle yapılarını da kullanarak, SQ nicelemelerinin sağlıklı bir şekilde okunabildiğini gösterir.

Buradaki kilit nokta, öteki seçeneğin, yani PIQ'nun kullandığı yapılarla da aynı işin – bazı anlambilim sıkıntılarıyla karşılaşılmakla birlikte – yapılabildiğidir; öyle ki, aslında tabii dilin ve PIQ'nun başvurduğu "cümle isimleştirmesi + saydam yüklem" yapısı neredeyse tam olarak işlev bakımından "thatt"e karşılık gelmektedir. İşte burada şu gözlem yapılır: tabii dilde doğruluk yüklemesi yapısı, tam da "thatt" gibi, daha doğrusu, "thatt"in izdüşümü olduğu, mantıki dilin cümle niceleyicisi gibi işliyor olabilir. Kısacası, doğruluk yükleme biçimi, tabii dilin cümle zamiri yapısı olabilir.

İşte bu gözlemle birlikte, Grover'ın cümle nicelemesi yaklaşımı, 1975'te, tersinden bir okumayla, indirimci bir *doğruluk* yaklaşımına, yani cümle zamiri yaklaşımına dönüşür. Dönüşme basitçe şu şekilde gerçekleşir: *tabii dil* + *yapay cümle zamiri* gibi bir genişletim yerine, bu kez tabii dilin *cümle zamiri parçası* (prosentential fragment) alınır. Bu bir *işlev* parçasıdır (functional fragment): doğruluk yükleminin yalnızca yekpare (bölünemez) yapılar içinde geçiyor olarak temsil edildiği parça. Öyle ki, bu parçada, doğruluk yüklemi, bir yüklem olarak iş görmez, ama "bu-doğru", "o-doğru" gibi cümle zamirleri içinde ve

“doğrudur-ki...”, “doğru-olabilir-ki...”, “doğruydu-ki...” gibi işlev bakımından bölünemez olan cümle eklemleri içinde yer alır. (Aslında bunların içlerinde bile geçmez, çünkü bunların “iç”leri yoktur.) Bu işlev parçası, *tabii cümle zamiri konuşması*, yani NPD (natural prosentential discourse) olarak görülebilir. (GCB’nin tercih ettiği isim “prosentential English”, yani “cümle zamiri İngilizcesi”dir.) NPD, SQ’nun (yarı-)tabii izdüşümünden başka birşey değildir.

Cümle zamirinin klasik bildiriminin göstermek istediği şey, tabii doğruluk konuşmasının, yani NTD’nin, NPD *dolayımıyla*, SQ çerçevesinde tam olarak çözümlenebileceğidir. Dolayısıyla cümle zamiri yaklaşımı, aslında, NTD’nin sıradan (parçalı, bölünebilir) yapılarının NTD’ye sorunsuzca ve tüketici bir biçimde tercüme edilebilirliğini gösterme izlencesidir (program). Öyle düşünülmektedir ki bu gösterildiği takdirde, NTD’nin SQ cinsinden tam bir çözümlemesinin verilebileceği fikri pekiştirilmiş olacaktır – çünkü NPD, SQ’nun (yarı-tabii, yarı-suni) bir izdüşümüdür, yani gramatik ulamları bakımından SQ ile tam örtüşmektedir. Bu ise, doğruluk yükleminin, her ne kadar tabii dile yaptığı katkı bakımından faydalı bir yazım/ses aleti olsa da, bir *yüklem olarak* fazlalık olduğunu, yani doğruluk yüklemesi yapısının işlev bakımından yekpare olduğunu göstermiş olacaktır.

Tercüme izlencesinin ayrıntılarına girmeden cümle zamiri yaklaşımındaki sorunu dile getirebiliriz. Şimdi, Grover’ın 1972’deki en önemli tespitlerinden biri, sıradan birey nicelemesi çerçevesiyle, yani IQ (individual quantification) ile, sıradan tabii yüklemelerden müteşekkil konuşma arasındaki uyumsuzlukla igilidir. IQ nicelemeleri, sınırlandırılmamış, mutlak niceleyiciler ve gramatik terim konumunu bütün soyutluğunda temsil edebilen birey değişkenleri kullanırken, tabii dil, tür işaretlemeleriyle sınırlandırılmış, mutlak olmayan niceleyiciler ve çapraz gönderim (cross-reference) yapan nispet zamirlerinden faydalanır. Daha açıkça ifade edecek olursak, IQ çerçevesi, değişken bağlılığını,

değişkenlerin özdeşliğinde – yani, bir ve aynı değişkenin niceleme bağlamında farklı noktalarda belirmesinde – temsil ederken, tabii sıradan niceleme çerçevesi, bağlılığı temsil etmek için çapraz gönderime, dolayısıyla da nispet zamirlerine, muhtaçtır. İşte cümle zamiri yaklaşımı, NPD'yi tesis ederken, bu uyumsuzluğu veya eksik mütekabiliyeti kendisine bir model olarak alır ve SQ'yu tabii dile izdüşürürken IQ ile sıradan tabii niceleme-yükleme çerçevesi arasındaki uyumsuzluğu korumaya çalışır. Bu sebepledir ki IQ'dan SQ'ya geçiş, zamirden cümle zamirine geçiş olarak temsil edilir.

(LUC). Ama cümle zamiri görüşüyle ilgili *asıl* sorun başkadır. Grover, 1992'de, bu zamana kadar (geliştirerek) savunmuş olduğu cümle zamiri kuramına ilişkin çok önemli bir tespit yapar: "bu-doğru" yahut "o-doğru" gibi yekpare cümle zarfları ve "doğru(dur)-ki" yahut "doğruydu-ki" gibi yekpare eklemler, aslında doğruluk konuşmasındaki işlev zenginliğini gölgelemektedir. NTD'nin genel cümle formunu (veya cümle zamirini) üretmesinin çok farklı yolları vardır ve bu yolların çeşitliliği, tam olarak sıradan tabii yüklemenin ve nicelemenin sunduğu gramatik ve semantik imkanlarca belirlenir. Dolayısıyla cümle zamirine varmanın bu farklı yollarını açıklamanın en iyi yolu, tabii dilin kendi gramatik yapısına bağlı kalarak doğruluk yüklemesinde özne konumuyla yüklem konumunun işlenişini birbirinden bağımsız kılmaktır. Ortaya çıkan resimde artık merkezdeki fikir, cümle düzeyinde çapraz gönderim yapan cümle zamiri değil, özne teriminin, doğruluk yükleminden görece bağımsız olarak, bir cümle öncülü saptamasıdır (location of a sentential antecedent by the subject term). Başka türlü söylersek, (Den) taslağında yer alan cümle isimleştirmesi teriminin bir cümle öncülü saptama yollarının çeşitliliği, tabii dilin sıradan terim oluşturma yöntemlerinin çeşitliliği gibi ve o kadardır. Bu resimde doğruluk yüklemi, basit bir isimleştirme giderici haline gelir; cümle öncülü saptama işinin neredeyse bütün yükü özne terimindedir. Öyleyse doğruluk yükleme biçimi, işleyişi bakımından cümle zamiri ve cümle değişkeni gibi

yekpare değildir. Yani doğruluk yükleme biçimi mantıki olarak güvenilmez olmakla birlikte, işleyişi bakımından parçalıdır – (LUC).

Elbette Grover, bu resimde artık cümle zamiri fikrine yer olmadığını kabul etmez. Daha kati olarak ifade edersek, Grover (LUM) ile (LUC) arasındaki farkla ilgilenmez; onun için, özne teriminin cümle öncülünü tespit etmesinin farklı yolları, aynı zamanda, cümle zamirinin inşasının farklı yollarıdır – veya bunlar arasında bir fark varsa da bu fark önemsizdir. Ne var ki bu fark önemsiz değildir, çünkü (LUC)'nin indirimcilikler tipleştirmesindeki konumu sıradan bir konum değildir.

Şimdi, (LR) indirimciliğinin NTD'nin sıradan tabii yükleme/nicelemeden anlam yapısı bakımından nasıl farklılaştığını göstermek için başvurduğu çözümleme çerçevesi, yani PIQ, aslında NTD'nin genel birey nicelemesi çerçevesine eksik izdüşümünden (veya iz"çıkımı"ndan) başka birşey değildir. Yani PIQ'nun ayırdedici özelliği olan, cümle isimleştirmeleriyle sınırlandırılmış özne terimi, NTD yüklemelerindeki özne teriminin tür işaretli oluşundan modellenmiştir; ve zaten doğruluk yüklemi de olduğu gibi bu çerçeveye taşınmıştır. Benzer şekilde, cümle zamiri yaklaşımının, NTD'yi SQ cinsinden çözümlemek için kullandığı dolayım, yani NPD, SQ'nun yarı-tabii izdüşümüdür: cümle zamiri, mantık dilinin cümle değişkeninden esinlenilerek kurgulanmış bir yekpare biçimdir. Bu *iki* izdüşüm, önerilen indirimcilikler haritasının yapısı itibariyle, mümkün olan *bütün* izdüşümlerdir. İşte (LUC) bu iki izdüşümün birden reddedildiği konumdur; öyleyse (LUC), *hiçbir* izdüşüme yer vermeyen konumdur. Bu kaplam hakikatinin (extensional fact) bir içlem hakikati (intensional fact) olarak ifade edilmesiyle, yani, haritadaki söz konusu konumun yorumlanmasıyla elde edilen iddia, NTD ile SQ'nun *temel mütekabiliyet/yanıtlaşım* (basic correspondence) bağıntısı içinde olduklarıdır. Öyle ki, NTD'nin SQ cinsinden çözümlenmesi hiçbir izdüşümün dolayımında

olmamalıdır; SQ, mantık dilinin genelinde hangi işlevi görüyorsa, NTD de tabii dilde o işlevi görür. Kısacası NTD, tabii dilin cümle genelleştirme *kuramıdır*. (LUC)'de, indirimcilik fenomenlerinin tamamını en verimli biçimde açıklamak kabil olduğundan, onun haritadaki konumunun yorumlanmasıyla elde edilen bu iddia, genel indirimci iddiadır (the general deflationary thesis).

Tür işaretli isimleştirmeler ve özdeşlik. Tabii dilin cümle genelleştirme kuramı olarak doğruluk konuşması, doğruluk terimlerinden ve doğruluk atfı yapılarından ibaret değildir. "Olgu konuşması" (fact discourse) olarak adlandırılabilecek, varlıkbilim havası taşıyan tabii dil parçası da temel yapıları itibariyle bu genelleştirme kuramına katkı sağlar. Bu yapıların en yalın örnekleri, olgu yüklemesi ve olgu isimleştirmesidir: "$\bar{p}$ vakidir" ve "$\bar{p}$ olgusu" (yahut Türkçe'nin kendi isimleştirme mekanizmasına daha uygun olarak, "*a*'nın *F* ol*duğ*u"). Olgu konuşmasında daha karmaşık yapılarla da karşılaşılır; bu yapılar, özne konumundaki cümle isimleştirmesinin türünü belirleyip bu türe uygun bir saydam yüklem kullanır: örneğin, "$\bar{p}$ koşulu karşılanmıştır/gerçeklenmiştir" veya "$\bar{p}$ şeydurumu, fiilidir". Bu tür farklı tür-yüklem çiftleriyle aslında yapılan "$\bar{p}$ doğru" ile yapılandan fazlası değildir, yani verili cümleleri yüklemeli kanuni biçimde yeniden deyimleştirmek.

Bu bağlamda öne çıkan bir mesele de olguların doğruluklarla özdeş olduğunu bildiren *özdeşlik kuramı*dır. Özdeşlik kuramına göre doğru bir önerme ile ona "tekabül eden" eşbiçimli olgu bir aynı şeydir; bir önerme (veya düşünce) için doğru olmak, "mütekabil" olguyla özdeş olmaktır. Özdeşlik kuramının esas hedefi, önermelerin/düşüncelerin doğruluk ve yanlışlıklarının gerçek dünyadaki/varlık alanındaki zeminliliğini, bu önermelerin kevni izdüşümleri (ontic projections) olan *doğrukılıcıların* (truthmakers) *varlığı* ve *yokluğu* bakımından açıklamaya çalışan doğrukılma varlıkbiliminin (truthmaker ontology) eleştirisidir. Özdeşlik kuramına göre, $\bar{p}$ olgusunun $\bar{p}$

önermesini/düşüncesini doğrukıldığı fikri, doğruluk çözümlemesine gereksiz bir dolayım getirir – $\bar{p}$ olgusu, doğru $\bar{p}$ önermesinden, veya daha kati olarak, $\bar{p}$ önermesinin doğruluğundan ötesi değildir. Kısacası, doğrukılıcı, doğru doğruluk taşıyıcının (true truthbearer) ta kendisidir.

(LUC) indirimciliğine göre, olgu konuşmasının temel yükleme yapısı, (PCFC)'yi gerçeklediği için, özdeşlik kuramının eleştirisi daha dipten, daha sağlam bir biçimde şöyle ifade edilebilir: ne doğrukılıcı ne de doğruluk taşıyıcı vardır; hem doğrukılıcının varlığı hem de doğruluk taşıyıcının doğruluğu, isimleştirilen cümlenin varlık alanında belirlediği, bireyler ve bağıntılarla ilgili nesne-düzeyi koşul bakımından açıklanır. Özdeşlik değil, farklı kanuni cümle biçimlerinin birbirine *denkliği* söz konusudur. Hem doğruluklar hem de olguların varlık zemini, nesne-düzeyi cümlelerin konusunu oluşturan bireyler ve onların bağıntılarından başka birşey değildir. Özdeşlik kuramı, doğrukılıcıyı buharlaştırmakta haklıdır, ama aynısı doğruluk taşıyıcı için de yapılabilir/yapılmalıdır. Doğruluk taşıyıcı ulamı, daha açık olarak, indirilmiş doğruluğun taşıyıcısı (bearer of deflationary truth) fikri, (LR) indirimciliğinin bir tortusudur.

C. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Besler, Arman
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: July 19, 1982 , Ankara
Marital Status: Single
Phone: +90 312 440 49 56
email: armanbesler@gmail.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU Philosophy	2008
BS	Hacettepe Uni. Sociology	2003
High School	TED Ankara College	1999

WORK EXPERIENCE

Position	Institution	Year
Research Assistant	METU, Department of Philosophy	2008-2014

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Upper Intermediate French

HOBBIES

Music, History, Walking, Wine.

D. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ:

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ☐

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Besler
Adı : Arman
Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Deflationism about Truth and the General Form of Sentence

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☐

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: