

LOCAL CLASS RELATIONS WITHIN THE DIALECTICS OF VALUE AND
SOCIALISATION: THE CASE OF KAYSERİ

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ABSTRACT

LOCAL CLASS RELATIONS WITHIN THE DIALECTICS OF VALUE AND SOCIALISATION: THE CASE OF KAYSERİ

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This dissertation analyses the recent industrialisation process in Kayseri from a particular theoretical perspective that focusses on the relations between capital and labour, labour regime in particular. However, it is neither a theoretical study on industrial accumulation nor an empirical investigation for a local industrial growth; but rather a theoretically-informed analysis of the development of class contradictions between capital and labour within the city of Kayseri where a remarkable level of (private) industrial investments has taken place in some locally specific ways over the last two decades. In line with a particular conceptualisation based on historical-geographical materialist understanding of capital accumulation process, this study reveals the historical, social, economic, cultural, institutional and legal aspects of such development in the local industry of Kayseri at different spatial scales ranging from the international and national to the local and workplace levels.

Keywords: Turkey, capital-labour relations, labour regime, local industrial development, Kayseri.

ÖZ

DEĞER VE SOSYALİZASYON DİYALEKTİĞİ İÇERİSİNDE YEREL SINIF İLİŞKİLERİ: KAYSERİ İLİŞKİLERİ

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Bu tez Kayseri’de yakın zamandaki sanayileşme sürecini, sermaye ile emek ilişkilerinin gelişimine, özellikle emek rejimine, odaklanan belirli bir kuramsal yaklaşımdan incelemektedir. Bununla birlikte, ne sanayi birikim süreçleri üzerine kuramsal bir çalışma, ne de bir yerel sanayi büyüme öyküsüne yönelik ampirik incelemedir; daha çok, son iki onyıllık içerisinde yerel olarak özgün yollarla dikkate değer bir (özel) sanayi yatırımının gerçekleştiği Kayseri kentinde sermaye ile emek arasındaki sınıf çelişkilerinin gelişimine yönelik kuramsal olarak temellendirilmiş bir araştırmadır. Bu çalışma sermaye birikimi sürecine ilişkin tarihsel-coğrafi materyalist kavrayışa dayalı bir kavramsallaştırma içerisinde, Kayseri’de yerel sanayide sözkonusu sınıf ilişkilerinin -uluslararası ve ulusal ölçekten yerel ve işyeri ölçeğine uzanan çeşitlikte- farklı mekansal ölçeklerde gelişiminin tarihsel, toplumsal, ekonomik, kültürel, kurumsal ve yasal yönlerini açığa çıkarmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, sermaye-emek ilişkileri, emek rejimi, yerel sanayi gelişimi, Kayseri.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DİSK	The Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions
İş-Kur	Labour Agency of Turkey
JDP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP)
LLCRs	Local Labour Control Regimes
MADA	Middle Anatolian Development Agency
MHA	Mass Housing Administration
MİSK	The Confederation of Nationalist Trade Unions
OID	Organised Industrial District
SSK	The Institute of Social Security
TEKSİF	The Textile, Knitting and Garment Industry Workers
TEKSİF	The Textile, Knitting and Garment Industry Workers' Union
Türk-İş	Confederation of the Turkish Trade Unions
UMEM	Specialised Vocational Training Project
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
RPP	Republican People's Party

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Aim of the Thesis

This PhD thesis is about the local industrial development within a capitalist economy. Local economic development is generally analysed by two main theoretical approaches in mainstream theory. Liberal-individualistic approach focuses on individual exchanges, i.e., relations between firms without any conception of the economy and society as a whole. Keynesian-institutionalist approach gives priority to some macro-forms of these exchanges such as flows of demand between different parts of economy, the relation between production and finance or economic growth periods. Either at the individual-firm level or at the macro-economic level; however, both approaches are premised upon the given assumption of the primacy of capitalist market exchanges in social relations and thus disregard the social constitution of different forms of such relations such as capital and labour.

In contrast, this thesis argues for a particular theoretical approach that considers class relations as the essence of capitalist development or, more accurately, accumulation process. At a more concrete level, these relations refer to labour control since capital accumulation is basically depended on the subordination of labour to capital at the workplace level. However, capital-labour relation has also a set of fundamental contradictions such as abstract vs. concrete labour, discipline vs. cooperation and use value vs. exchange value, operating within and between the workplace and the wider-levels of class relations. Therefore, capital accumulation within a particular place primarily involves certain coherence, if not permanent, for these contradictions operating at various levels ranging from workplace and industrial district to the local and global scales.

This coherence actually embraces a particular labour control relation largely at the local scale.

From this theoretical perspective, this PhD thesis aims to analyse the recent industrial development within the city of Kayseri by focussing on its class relations and local labour control regime in particular.

1.2 The Motivation of the Thesis

This study has been motivated by two main concerns. First, this study seeks to develop an alternative conceptualisation of local economic development in critical theory, focussing on the contradictions of capital-labour relation that operate both workplace-level relations and the wider processes. In particular, it seeks to raise the question of labour in local economic development. Second, this study sets out to introduce these substantial arguments into the analysis of the recent industrial development in Kayseri as one of the pillars of the fundamental changes in the economic and political structures of Turkey throughout the 2000s. Thus, it intends to reveal the contradictions of such changes in reference to the case of Kayseri.

The analyses of local economic development in Turkey including the critical ones have been mainly developed from two different frames of reference based on the seemingly opposite poles of the accumulation process. The first looks at local economic development through the lens of global market exchange relations. In this line, a number of scholars have produced optimistic analyses, referring to the rise of some local economies in Turkey through integrating with the globalising world economy. Such localities are also celebrated as the hub of dynamic and competitive social forces towards challenging existing state-society relations in Turkey (Keyder, 1993; 2003; Buğra, 1998). From the similar frame of reference; on the contrary, some scholars have provided important critical analyses for the recently rising local industries in Turkey. They have revealed highly unequal exchange relations within so-called global commodity chains to the detriment of local industries consisting of supplier firms in the less developed

regions. It is then underlined that workers mainly pay the price of such unequal relations, being employed as cheap labour (Dikmen, 2000; Köse and Öncü, 1998; 2000; Öngel, 2012).

In addition, the second frame of reference considers local economic development in the view of the organisation of production within a particular place. Focussing on some ‘success’ stories particularly in inner Anatolian cities of Turkey, many scholars have produced empirical analyses referring to distinct aspects of such stories in workplace-, industrial district- or locality-wide networks. The main assumption of these analyses is that these local ‘success’ stories potentially involve certain development-models in which social relations become organised in cooperative as well as competitive manners without serious tensions (Pınarcıoğlu, 2000; Eraydın, 2002; 2006; Keyman and Koyuncu-Lorosdağı, 2010). From the similar frame of reference; on the contrary, it has been possible to provide critical analyses revealing both instabilities and inequalities within these ‘success’ stories (Türkün-Erendil, 2000).

Considered in this framework, it appears that there have been some important problems in these accounts, heavily in the non-critical ones. First, both the globally- and locally-driven analyses do not consider local development in global-local continuum which is indeed rooted in the nature of accumulation process consisting of both the production of surplus value within a particular place and its realisation in the exchange relations at wider scales. Rather, these analyses tend to produce one-sided explanations referring to either the global exchange relations or the local production complexes and networks, failing to involve the mutual processes among them that may disrupt or sustain local development. Second, more importantly, non-critical analyses of local development within both frames of reference disregard the fundamental dynamics of capitalist social relations i.e. class tensions and conflicts. Rather, such analyses tend to give emphasise on the agency of bourgeoisie, be it directly them or through the localities they are rooted. Thus, when explaining the recent changes in the economic and political structures of Turkey, these analyses turn into what

Wood (1991: chapter 1) calls the “bourgeois paradigm” which considers social changes as the interplays among the bourgeoisie regardless of their relations with other classes, labour in particular.

On the other hand, thirdly, critical analyses of local development have also been inadequate in the consideration of labour. The globally driven ones tend to consider labour as the victimised subject by local supplier firms. The specific dynamics and complexities of capital-labour relation based on the cooperation vs. conflict are then reduced to the employment of cheap labour. The locally driven critical analyses tend to reveal such dynamics and complexities within capital-labour relation. However, they are not considered as the permanent aspects of class relations but rather temporal consequences of instable periods within local economy. Thus, tensions and conflicts between capital and labour become visible only at the times of crisis of local coherence.

There is then an urgent need for an alternative frame of reference in the analysis of local development, embracing both the global market exchange relations and local organisation of production in continuum. Furthermore, such an alternative should involve capital-labour relation within its specific dynamics and complexities beyond the employment of cheap labour as well as the times of crisis of local coherence. This involvement is quite important as the existing critical analyses of local development have some theoretical limits in the consideration of labour and thus remain inadequate to address the challenge against the bourgeois paradigm in the non-critical analyses.

This theoretical concern seems to be much more evident in the case of Kayseri than other local development stories in Turkey. First, the city of Kayseri has witnessed remarkable (private) industrial investments along with the increasing integration of Turkish economy with global market exchange relations since the 1980s. These investments have accelerated specifically throughout the 2000s, turning the city into an industrial centre of manufacturing in middle Anatolia linked to the global economy. Second, such a spectacular industrial development in Kayseri is also attributed to some specific relations among

businessmen, public institutions and workers constituting cooperative as well as competitive local organisations of production. Third, the city is often referred to be the homeland of so-called Anatolian bourgeoisie as well as political Islamist movement both of which have appeared as the two important agents in the recent changes in state-economy and state-society relations in Turkey. Fourth, the city of Kayseri is then presented as a model for local development not just in an economic sense but also political sense.

Thus, the analysis of industrial accumulation in Kayseri from an alternative frame of reference mentioned above would provide us with new insights into local economic development in the recent years of Turkey. Furthermore, these insights would be helpful to reconsider recent changes in state-economy and state-society relations in Turkey. Since focussing on the contradictions and conflicts between capital and labour, such an analysis would also reveal the hints of the prospective development of class relations at both the local and national levels.

This PhD thesis then attempts to investigate local industrial development in Kayseri within a particular conceptualisation focussing on capital-labour relation and labour control regime in particular. In this line, this thesis follows some important empirical investigations that revealed various aspects of class relations in the similar industrialising inner Anatolian cities of Turkey (see Köse and Öncü, 2000; Türkün-Erendil, 2000; Özügurlu, 2005; Bedirhanoglu and Yalman, 2009a). However, the thesis seeks to distinctively underline class contradictions and conflicts within (local) labour control regime as the fundamental core of capitalist development.

1.3. Research Questions and the Methods

The strategies and design process of the research flow from an alternative conceptualisation for the development of class relations and labour regime in particular. This conceptualisation is framed at the most abstract level of analysis, involving fundamental contradictions of capitalist social relations. The research

then requires exploring the development of these contradictions between capital and labour in a particular time and place. Thus, it becomes neither a theoretical study nor a pure empirical investigation but rather a theoretically informed analysis.

Following the premises discussed above, the formulated research questions are as follows:

- 1- How does the development of capital accumulation process in Turkey relate to class relations and labour regime in particular? What are the socio-spatial forms of current capital-labour relation and labour regime in Turkey?
- 2- What kind of social and spatial structures has local industrial development in Kayseri involved within its wider relations? Specifically, what is the capital-labour relation and labour regime in particular that made possible the rise of Kayseri as an industrial centre in the middle of Anatolia?
- 3- What are the current dynamics, forms and tensions of local class relations in Kayseri? How does the class relations and labour regime develop within these dynamics, forms and tensions?
- 4- What are the reflections of local class relations at the workplace level? How do class relations develop in direct and actual confrontations among employer, employees and the state?

These research questions are investigated by using qualitative research methods, including semi-structured interviews, documentary collection as well as participant observations techniques. The research is designed in three phases each of which directed to certain target groups between September 2011 and September 2012, including several visits short to long stays in Kayseri. The first phase includes semi-structured interviews with industrial managers employed in forty different local firms representing more or less the variations in local industry by size as well as by sectors (for details see Chapter 4). This group of interviewees is targeted to reveal the pattern of labour process in local industry. The second phase of the research involves fifty-five semi-structured interviews

with workers employed in local industry (for details see Chapter 5). The interviews were made deliberately outside the workplaces where workers meet and live, i.e. public teahouse in the city centre, firm shuttle stops and working class neighbourhoods. This phase also involves participant observation of unionisation movement in a metal factory coincidentally happened at the time of the fieldwork. This experience enabled the research to have a deeper understanding of the development of capital-labour relation at the workplace level. During the participant observation I attended workers' meetings, resistance in front of the factory and demonstrations. At these times, I also interviewed eleven workers involved in the unionisation movement. The third phase of the research includes seven semi-structured interviews with representatives of local business associations and labour unions.

All the interviews were tape recorded unless the interviewee refused to be recorded. The unrecorded ones generally include firm managers and representatives of local business associations and labour unions. Nearly all of the workers allowed me to tape record or take notes during the interview. The semi-structured interviews used pre-designed questions including the concepts to be covered for the each interviewee group; however, the flexibility in the method itself let me develop new questions during the interviews according to the responses of the interviewees. This also allowed me to turn some of the interviews into a conversation-like chat.

1.4. The Structure of the Thesis

Following the introduction, Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework of the research. It first introduces the methodological basis for thinking through a set of scalar relations of capital-labour relation within capitalist development in continuum. Chapter 2, then, examines critical theories on capital-labour relation mainly dealing with labour regime. The chapter concludes with an alternative conceptualisation of class relations from a geographical materialist perspective, referring to the fundamental contradictions of capitalist economy as the dialectics of socialisation and value.

Chapter 3 relates the development of capital accumulation process with capital-labour relations and labour regime in particular from a historical perspective at the national level. It aims to reveal the development of capital-labour relation within subsequent labour regimes through the dialectics of socialisation of production and reproduction with value processes among the state, capital and labour in Turkey. The chapter argues that the post-2001 period remarks a historical break in the development of class relations in Turkey as the social reproduction of labour is largely subordinated to the rule of global market exchange relations.

Chapter 4 approaches to local industrial development in Kayseri in a historical view, providing certain periods of class relations. The chapter reveals that the city of Kayseri experienced a spectacular industrial revival along with the wider neoliberal policies by mobilising its local specificities as a particular labour regime within the value production. Chapter 4 concludes with the argument that such revival has enormously accelerated since the 2001 crisis, with the increasing contradictions and conflicts between capital and labour.

Chapter 5 focuses on the current dynamics, forms and tensions of class relations in local industry mainly by drawing on semi-structured interviews with workers as well as with others. The chapter shows that class relations and labour regime behind the spectacular industrial development in Kayseri have been disintegrating as the dialectics of socialisation and value in accumulation process have produced remarkable disruptions, failures and instabilities within capital-labour relation at both production and reproduction levels. Moreover, Chapter 5 specifically argues that such dialectics have paved the way for the making of working class in Kayseri, leading to increasing tensions and conflicts within local class relations.

Chapter 6 aims to track the ways in which these tensions and conflicts within local class relations develop at the most concrete level of capital-labour relation, namely, the workplace level. In this line, the chapter analyses a radical unionisation movement in a big-sized metal factory in local industry, revealing

the historical, structural and actual relations among the employer, employee and the state within particular workplace-level relations. Chapter 6 underlines that workers' collective movement for an independent unionisation, though being not successful due to various economic and political barriers against them, has increased tensions and conflicts within local industrial relations.

This PhD thesis ends with Chapter 7. The chapter is written as a conclusion of the thesis, which, however, reconsiders as a whole various aspects of local class relations and labour regime in Kayseri that have been revealed at different spatial and temporal scales throughout the previous chapters. In this line, it also aims to provide empirical and theoretical insights for the future direction.

CHAPTER 2

CLASS RELATIONS AND LABOUR CONTROL REGIME

2.1. Introduction

The capital-labour relation has a special importance within capitalist development, since the minimum necessary cooperation among them is always at risk due to a set of technical, social and behavioural reasons. The capitalist employer primarily needs to ensure that labourers *both* smoothly move from their living places to production process *and* become ready to work under its management. For a sustained economic development, the basic essential is thus a relatively stable labour control relation, namely, labour regime that provides capitalist employers with a certain level of confidence about their involvement into production process. Yet, studies on economic development have paid little attention to capital-labour relation, especially in parallel with the removal of labour as a unified subject within social and political arena since the last quarter of 20th century.

Instead, much recent work on capitalist development has revolved around so-called globalisation process that is said to bring fundamental changes in economies by opening up competitive commodity markets across the world space. Capital-labour relation, when investigated in critical approaches, is generally considered as a subsequent outcome of the relationship between the lead and supplier firms within the structural conditions of interactions in global consumer markets (Fröbel, et.al., 1980; Gereffi and Korzeniewichz, 1994). In this line, while the analytical scale of reference fully shifts to global exchange relations, specific dynamics and complexities of capital-labour relation are reduced to firms' generalising strategies on commodity chains (Selwyn, 2012).

On the other hand, parallel with changes in production models, management techniques and business culture, considerable amount of studies have directed towards workplace-level processes, constituting a body of work in industrial relations literature, namely, “new regionalism” (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Storper and Walker 1989, Scott 1998). Based on particular organisations of assembly lines, forms of employment, division of labour as well as linkages between firms, this work underlines ‘successful’ examples of economic development within certain places by arguing for the importance of flexible relations between capital and labour as well as between firms. In its most sophisticated explanations, these workplace-level relations are seen as embedded within a wider set of economic and political relations that regulates them in efficient ways (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989; Tickell and Peck, 1992). However, to the extent that explanation is based on idealising particular cases for a coherent economic model, there is no systematic conflicts assumed between workplace-level relations and wider consequences of capitalist development such as overaccumulation, capital flows, uneven development and so on (Gough, 1996). In this line, while the continuum within capitalist development is ontologically separated between workplace relations and the wider economic and political context, capital-labour relation is seen rather in a technical-organisation manner as an issue of either task flexibility or appropriate social regulation for a sustained economic growth.

In contrast with these two opposing lines, this work attempts to consider capital-labour relation as the essential part of capitalist development involving both workplace-level relations and the wider processes. This attempt stems from an fundamental argument that capitalist development is based on a competitive system of accumulation process in which individual capitals seek to extract from labourers at workplace more surplus value that is to be realised through market exchanges at wider scale (Mandel, 1977 (1962); Harvey, 1982; Wood, 1995). In other words, while capital’s need for a systematic control on labourers arises from the essential class nature of capitalist production, both workplace- and market exchange-level dynamics are simultaneously involved in shaping the relation

between capital and labour. However, these dynamics become differentiated not just in terms of spatial levels but also with regard to forms of social relation. While the former is about the concrete materiality of production with different qualities, the latter implies the homogenising processes of commensuration, flows and quantity. In this respect, thinking through such differences and commonalities as the reflections of simultaneous movement of capital-labour relation at different spatial scales requires what Harvey (1999:83) considers as a methodological necessity against capitalist social reality “a serious discussion on the relations between commonality/difference, the particularity of the one and the universalism of the other”.

To develop an adequate conceptualisation of capital-labour relation in general, and of labour control regime in particular, there is then an initial need for a particular methodological approach that would enable us to consider such relation within different scales of its movement as involving simultaneously both difference and commonality. The following section deals with this methodological approach. In the light of its methodological premises, the second section then initiates a theoretical attempt for the unit of analysis for investigating capital-labour relation. In this section, labour process is considered as the key starting point. The third section seeks out fundamental relations between capital and labour within labour process. A number of contradictions are then underlined. The fourth section looks at the reproduction process in an attempt to reveal fundamental tensions within capitalist development. Having outlined a particular understanding of capital-labour relation at the most abstract level, I turn to theoretical arguments on the more concrete forms of class relations. The fifth section, thus, investigates some conceptualisations of capital-labour relation within critical approaches. This section also paves the way for an alternative conceptualisation that is to be developed in the sixth section. The last section summarizes main arguments, concluding with a research agenda for setting the light to the empirical analyses.

2.2. The Relations of Difference and Commonality within Capitalist Development

The methodological problem between the difference and commonality within capitalist development has to deal with two main theoretical issues: causality and specificity. The former is about how internal or external processes shape the development of social forms in certain ways. The latter is concerned with the understanding of concrete differences through abstract categories in a non-reductionist way. Both problems also refer to key political questions in that the answers to them cause to change the content as well as the place of class conflicts within capital-labour relation. For example, depending on the answer to the problem of causality, workplace-level can be seen as an essential space for shaping class relations; or the answer on specificity may enable us to envisage the idea of universal subject from a vast of particular situations in ways representing different individuals or groups of workers to change collectively their conditions (Gough, 2003:25-6).

Mainstream approaches have some answers, though deceptive, to these questions about the relations of difference and commonality within capital-labour relation. Neoclassical approach, built on the basic assumption of liberal-individualistic political economy that society is comprised of individuals with self-seeking interests, gives no account of historical and social constitution of capital and labour. They are understood as distinct entities prior to the society and economy as a whole. In this sense, the totality can only appear as an aggregation of spontaneous interactions among these entities. Thus, there is no theoretical space to discuss the relations of the part with the whole as they are initially excluded from the analysis. In contrast, Keynesian approach associated with institutionalist theory, emphasizing on historical and cultural dimensions within economic interactions, privileges rather macro-forms of those interactions over the individual exchanges. In this line, it gives remarkable insights to the impacts of broader economic and political forms such as long-term investments, agglomeration economies and state incentives on the development of capital-labour relation. However, to the extent that such macro forms are connected on

the basis of market exchange relations, they are considered both secondary to market relations and externally related. In this sense, neoclassical approach still lies behind Keynesian-institutionalist critiques. The consequence is then to miss the question of social constitution of those forms, thereby failing to consider dialectics of the particular and universal (Gough, 2003:27).

On the other hand, critical social theory basically points to unobservable relations at deeper levels behind the appearances by arguing that social reality can only be understood via certain abstractions providing proper concepts that are able to make sense of diverse social forms. Hence a non-atomistic ontology that posits a relationally constituted world of complex realities is provided by a specific epistemology with knowledge of reality beyond the appearances – a clear methodological achievement over mainstream theories. However there are still on the part of critical theory controversial issues of (i) how the actual development of social forms is shaped by their relations at deeper levels, and (ii) how a variety of differences can be explained in a non-reductionist manner. Indeed, these issues create methodological discussion between critical realist methodology and Marxist abstraction within critical social theory (Brown et. al., 2003). According to the former, social reality involves examples of both internal and external relations, and it is an open question of concrete analysis if any relation in historical time is an internal or external one. Furthermore, the causal powers and liabilities of social object coming out of its deeper relations may or may not be realised depending on its external relations at more concrete levels. Therefore analysis should be propelled by a specific method of abstraction called retroduction that would separately identify these causal powers and external relations in moving from simple abstract to complex concrete models (Sayer, 1995).

However, Marxist abstraction is fundamentally concerned with essential relations among social objects that make them internally-related (Bonefeld, 1991b; McNally, 2015). It is because of this fundamental concern that Marxist theory initially applies for a systematic abstraction of capitalist society towards its

mode of production and then starts an analysis of object from within that abstraction (Olmann, 2003). The measure against any functionalist and/or reductionist explanation (a sort of epistemological and/or ontological fallacy) is the nature of contradiction(s) inherent in social objects whereby changes and interactions within them proceed in various ways and forms (Gunn, 1989). Marxist abstraction then proposes to move along the way(s) of such contradiction(s) unfolding dialectically in its development towards more concrete forms rather than what critical realist methodology assumes linear progression in thinking from simple to complex models (Roberts, 2003:16). In this way, distinct particularities appear as neither independent things nor, to use the critical realist terminology, “separate totalities” but rather a moment of wider processes in which the whole is constituted. For example, individuals or firms are formed by the social relations into which they involve. The point is here that the whole is not something that has to be completely known prior to the analysis but a logical construct implying the process of its constitution through internal relations in each of their parts. This indeed refers to a dialectical and materialist understanding of totality that considers the whole not as a formal entity over its constituents but as a *structural interdependence* among its parts (Olmann, 2003:140). Thus, although having a common methodological ground against positivism and empiricism, Marxist abstraction differentiates itself from critical realism in the sense of claiming to involve simultaneously both the (abstract) structural commonalities and (concrete) empirical differences among social objects¹.

¹However, it should be added that this methodological claim led to two opposing traditions within Marxism, namely, structuralism and historicism, each of which privileges one aspect over the other (see Gramsci (1971) vs. Althusser and Balibar (1970); Miliband (1968) vs. Poulantzas (1969)). To overcome such duality, there have also been remarkable attempts within Marxist theory, developing some reformulations for a medium-range theory based on specific concepts that are “regime of accumulation” and “mode of regulation” referring to certain activities taking place in between those structural and empirical ontologies (see Aglietta 1979, Jessop 1990). Yet, to the extent that they have just focused on such activities functioning within society by downplaying fundamental contradictions rooted within capitalist mode of production, such reformulations fail to overcome the problem they inherited as is revealed in the coupling the “regime of accumulation” and “mode of regulation” that cannot avoid structuralist-functional consequences (Bonefeld, 1991a). Jessop’s addition of the concept of

However, one can argue that there is still an important sense in which Marxist methodology is unnecessarily restrictive in its remarks about systematic abstraction as to taking seriously enough the concrete empirical differences. For example, systematic abstraction tends to cast light on how a distinct object reflect the structural contradictions of capitalist relations operating at more abstract levels of analysis but not on how it refracts them (Roberts, 2002). As a response this problem, Gough (1991; 2003) suggests considering a dialectical and mediated relation between concrete empirical data and systematic abstraction in which the former is understood by mutual modifications of abstract structures through both melding into complex combinations and developing their contradictions in time and space. Moreover, as concrete differences are constructed out of such abstractions, these abstractions are also improved through multiple ‘cuts’ at which a distinct social object is considered at different levels of abstraction and spatial scales (Harvey, 1982) as well as from different vantage points (Ollman, 2003). Thus conceived, the abstract structures do not appear static, hierarchical and/or engulfing over concrete differences, but always dynamic, relational and integral to them.

To illustrate this methodological framework, it is safe to argue that the most fundamental structure within capitalist development is capital-labour relation, because it spans every scale of capitalist society by operating both as ubiquitous processes of exploitation and general formation of capital at global

strategy and hegemonic project has only provided a kind of oscillation between economic necessity and political contingency, with still no dialectical and materialist account of how the diversity of social objects come together and get unified in capitalist societies (Roberts, 2001). Furthermore, these medium-range reformulations, while seeking to move the domain of Marxist theory supposedly at the level of analysis of CMP towards its historical and concrete forms in certain contexts, cannot resist falling into trap of matching each aspect of social object with only one epistemological level of abstraction. However, any social object such as certain labour management techniques or a spatial form of capital-labour relation can be associated both with contemporary concrete forms of capitalism and with its abstract function in capitalism as such, while even belonging to class society in a wider sense. In this regard, Ollman argues that Marx’s own mode of abstraction suggests operating like a microscope that can be set at different degrees of magnification in order to capture distinct relations of the same object with multiple social realities at the same time (2003:chapter 5).

level, and as particular use by the firms of its labour force at workplace-level (Gough, 2003). There are also two other key structures that immediately exist along the development of capital-labour relation, namely the relations of reproduction of labour power and the (over)accumulation of capital (Gough, 1991; Ollman, 1971:22-25). These three structures are therefore essentially related at the highest level of abstraction, constituting mutually each other. In their development, while they meld with each other in spatially and temporarily specific settings by taking concrete forms, the contradictory nature of those structures also produce some tension and dilemmas at different spatial levels that lead to various development paths for social agents to follow. For example, as capital being in actual cooperation with labourers at production has to impose certain level of discipline over them in order to extract surplus value (Marx, 1990: chapter 13), the development of capital-labour relation constitutes many tensions for both the employer and labourers about the forms of articulation of discipline and cooperation in different contexts. Moreover, since the reproduction of labour mainly operates outside the workplace within wider social relations, there is always a possibility of disproportionality between the reproduction of labour power and the demands of capital which in practice lead various social actors to intervene the process in certain ways. Furthermore, to the extent that each firm has capitalist impulse to expand its capital force in competition with others, the inevitable overproduction of capacity pushes actually each firm to develop various strategies to avoid its disruptive consequences. In these ways, thus, contradictory dynamics of abstract structures within capitalist economic development lead to both different structural forms in different context and the variety of strategies and choices on the part of agents. Hence, as Gough (2003:30) puts, “difference can be developed out of abstract structures, providing these are understood as materially-based, relational and contradictory”.

2.3. Labour Process: A Key Starting Point

In the light of these methodological premises, it is clear that neither the individual firm in neoclassical explanation nor the economy and/or political-cultural systems in Keynesian-institutionalist formulation provides an essential

starting point for the analysis of capital-labour relation. Moreover, it cannot be comfortably found in the so-called medium-range reformulations as regulationist theory, because its suggested coupling and co-evolution of the “regime of accumulation” and “mode of regulation” is not able to give a non-reductionist account of the difference-commonality dialectics within capitalist development. In line with systematic abstraction, however, we can argue that a key starting point is the labour process in that it is the immediate site and material medium of capital-labour relation (Gough, 2003).

The specificity of labour process within capitalist social relations, in fact, lies in the distinct nature of capitalism from previous class societies. In capitalism, surplus is not guaranteed by political arrangements prior to the production due to the separation of economics from politics (Wood, 1995:chapter 1); instead, it is extracted invisibly and simultaneously from wage-labourers working within production process belonging to capital. In this process, as Burawoy (1985:31) puts, “there is no separation either in time or in space between necessary and surplus labour time” Therefore it is only through its control of the labour process that capital can ensure that labourers produce more value than it is paid in wage. However, labour process control proceeds between capital and labour within their historically specific social forms. It is in the first place that labourer is compelled to work not so much because of political repressions, but because it is dispossessed in its survival and thus has to sell its only property that is labour power in return for wage (Mandel, 1977 (1962): 118-20). Therefore, labourer is initially subordinated at labour market to capital, fundamentally through its basic social need for employers as being profitable enough to supply jobs to work. Within the development of these social forms as employee and employer, then, labourer is also subordinated to the labour process itself both because of its need to save the job and because the employer supports the jobs only through extracting enough surplus value from the labourer. In short, labour process (and labour market) within capitalism involves specific social forms in which the labourer is structurally disempowered (thus controlled) by its relation with capital (Gough, 2003:34).

This means that the power of capital is intrinsically inscribed into the organisation of labour process itself. In capitalist relation such an obscuration of class power within labour process is possible as long as the surplus production provides the employer with enough profit to reproduce class relation. However, since surplus labour time is only realised through market exchanges beyond the workplace-level process, capitalist employer is never sure if it is extracted enough, thereby continuously attempting to increase its power on labour process. Its direct implication is to undermine the obscuration of class power inscribed within the organisation of labour process. Hence, labour process appears also as the immediate site of fundamental contradiction within capitalist class power between securing surplus value production from labourers and obscuring it (Burawoy, 1985:32-33).

Classical Marxist terminology considers this contradiction mainly through two basic concepts that are “forces of production” and “relations of production”. While the former refers to the particular and concrete use value aspects such as material, technical and organisational components of production, the latter is based on surplus value production that refers to universal aspects of capital-labour relation like the processes of commensuration, flows and quantity. It is then argued that capitalist labour process is inherently embedded within a tension between concrete material forms of production and abstract value relations on them. To consider them more explicitly, following Friedman (1986), labour process can be seen in five basic aspects: (i) the technical nature of production: the material forms of production technology, raw materials, process of production, and the final product, (ii) the tasks necessary to carry out production process, including human capacities (iii) the labour management and control, (iv) employment relations and (v) the relations between workers within the work. These different aspects of labour process are constructed in mutual relations with each other (Gough, 2003:31). For example, while forms of labour management are selected as the most compatible ones with the given material nature of technology and tasks within production process, the latter may also be shaped to improve the former. This, however, does not mean that such mutual relation

smoothly operates without dilemma. A clear example is that when employment relations are considered along value relations particularly to discourage any possibility of workers' collective entity by fostering divisions among them, the given material form of technical nature of production with use value aspects can require more interaction and coordination among workers. Thus, labour process is filled with the range of possibilities from more compatible employment relations and management strategies to new technologies and organisations in response to this tension, producing variety of forms in capital-labour relation - again that differences come through the development of contradictions (see 2.1).

2.4. Contradictions of Capital-Labour Relation within Labour Process

In capitalist economy, the essential relation that makes different products from different labour processes exchange with each other is not their prices assumed by neoclassical economics as operating in the balance of demand and supply, but indeed the (socially necessary) labour time into which labourers entered while producing commodities (Marx, 1990 (1971): 166; Harvey, 1982: chapter 1). In this regard, commodities involve not just concrete labour directly expended in production but also abstract labour representing the former in pure quantity within market exchange. However, abstract labour as the measure of value becomes possible only when human labour is transformed into a measurable thing, namely, a commodity that can be sold in (labour) market (Mandel, 1977 (1962): 118-120). This commodity is the capacity for labour or labour-power that labourer carries with him/her to sell at labour market (Marx, 1990: 270)². It is through this specific market relation that the labourer meets with capitalist employer who is seeking for labour power to consume within the labour process

² This is indeed an important point where Marxist approach offers a fundamental distinction from non-Marxist political economy and mainstream economics. In searching for the source of surplus value at the end of the exchanges of equivalent commodities as it is assumed in classical political economy, Marx concludes, "the money owner must be lucky enough to find within the sphere of circulation, on the market, a commodity whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value" (1990:270). To put differently, in line with the laws of exchange, there is a specific commodity on the market that has the capacity to produce more value than it itself has. This special commodity, Marx puts, is "the capacity for labour, in other words labour-power" (1990:270).

of commodity production. For capital, there is then no difference between labour market and commodity market, since both of them operate via the exchange of their values, namely, the labour-time necessary for their (re) production.

However, labour market is fundamentally differentiated from others in the sense that it contains a unique commodity, namely, labour power that has the potential to create more value than it commands in exchange. Moreover, labour power is inextricably associated with the labourer. In other words, what is sold as commodity (labour power) is inseparable, if not identical, with the seller (labourer) (Fine, 1999: chapter 10). This unique aspect gives labourer a contradictory social form in which s/he involves concrete individual characteristics as well as the abstract and anonymous labour power created by the market. Within labour process, then, capital has to both use the particular capacities of labourer and continue to consider it as abstract and replaceable. In practice, this situation means a dilemma for capital between using the initiative of labourers and persisting market discipline over them (Friedman, 1977; 1986).

In addition, capitalist labour process necessarily involves a certain degree of cooperation between capital and labour, which potentially empowers the latter against the former (Marx, 1990: Chapter 13). This cooperative nature is often strengthened by forms of coordination other than market (we shall call them later “socialisation of production”) such as mutual organisations within large firms or collaborative relations between capital and labour for more efficient organisation of production. In these ways, labourers receive certain levers (against capital) within labour process, for example, qualification, technical knowledge of production and collective organisations, which may be used for a certain degree of challenge to the employer’s value impositions on them (Gough, 1996)³.

³ This also proves what Burawoy argues (against Braverman) that labour process cannot be fully monopolized, though being controlled, within certain management techniques such as keeping workers away the conception of production (1985: 41).

Nevertheless, such value pressures via market exchanges for advancing technologies and organisation of production to increase labour productivity circumvent labourers in many ways (Marx, 1990: chapter 15). With the increasing mechanisation of production, while there are radical changes in tasks towards simplification along which specialised labourers are replaced with a relatively undifferentiated workforce by producing redundancy, more skilled labour is also needed not just to conceive this mechanization but also to use it (Tinel, 2011:192). This also refers to a process called by Marx as *the transition from formal subsumption of labour to real subsumption*⁴ in which labourers are continuously forced to (re)produce themselves with certain skills and capabilities in accordance with technological changes within labour process. In terms of capital-labour relation, the implication is again contradictory; it both increases labourer's dependency on capital, and requires more social coordination of production to produce, inter alia, compatible work force.

The increasing mechanisation of labour process is also interpreted in Marxist terminology as shifting from the method of absolute surplus value extraction to that of relative surplus value one. The former seeks to multiply the actual hours of labouring through lengthening working day as well as intensifying work in speeding-up and eliminating slacking time. In contrast, the latter is based on increasing the value per worker-hour by improving technological conditions of production (Marx, 1990: chapter 16). However, as Gough (2003: 49-54) emphasizes, the mechanisation process cannot be taken as a unilinear process towards the relative surplus value extraction, fundamentally because effective

⁴ Capitalist production develops from a labour process in which the labourer is disposed of the control on the product (considered as formal subsumption of labour) into the one where capital completely takes full possession of technical and material aspects: "With the real subsumption of labour under capital a complete (and constantly repeated) revolution takes place in the mode of production, in the productivity of the workers and in the relations between workers and capitalists...On the one hand capitalist production now establishes itself as a mode of production sui generis and brings into being a new mode of material production. On the other hand, the latter itself forms the basis for the development of capitalist relations whose adequate form, therefore, presuppose a definite stage in the evolution of productive forces of labour" (Marx, 1990:1035).

labour control, even in the case of the most technological production process, is indispensable part of capitalist class power within labour process. Furthermore, labour market conditions such as increasing redundancy, involvements of excessive workforce and/or available cheap labour power can always make the absolute surplus value extraction a viable alternative from the perspective of capital. In this regard, capital-labour relation in value extraction is formed not just within the process of technological changes but also wider economic and political processes in workplace, sector and locality as well as in national and global context.

2.5. Contradictions of Capital-Labour Relation within the Reproduction Process

The payment of wage by capital after its consumption of labour power within labour-process principally means that there is no responsibility on its part for the reproduction of labourer. Within this specific exchange relation, the value of labour power like that of other commodities is determined by the labour time necessary for its (re)production. However, it is not labour power itself but labourer that has to be (re)produced since the former is activated only through the latter. In this respect, contrary to other commodities, as Marx (1990:275) puts, “the determination of the value of labour power contains a historical and moral element”. Yet, there is an objective separation between labour power and labourer from the direct perspective of the capitalist paying out value for a certain of time in exchange for using labour power (Fine, 1999: 187). Hence, a dual situation immanently emerges within the process of reproduction of labour power: whereas capital tends to consider the reproduction of workforce just in terms of the quantity of labour time needed to produce equivalent consumer goods for its maintenance, even the composition of those goods has been formed within a broader social and historical process. More importantly, the consumption process takes places primarily in household and wider social relations outside the direct control of the capitalist. In other words, ‘non-value’ aspects of social relations that operate beyond the market exchange relation essentially involves into the reproduction of labour power and hence to capital-labour relation.

There is then a diverging path between the reproduction of labour power and capitalist production as value relation. Its direct implication is the possibility of disproportionalities within labour process such as lack of enough qualification, inadequate workforce or noncompliant labour profile that create problems to ensure a sustained accumulation (Gough, 1996). In response to them, both capital and labour tend to develop various non-market complementary forms for managing the reproduction process in accordance with their different concerns (Gough, 2002). They are mainly bound up with, though not reducible to, the state as the most institutionalised form of capitalist social relation outside the workplace. Within its political form separated from the economy, as the state primarily needs to have sustainable economic environment, the main task of the state with regard to labour-power is to assume responsibility for the parts of its reproduction that individual capitalists do not directly provide (de Brunhoff, 1978: chapter 1). Despite having an external form, the state is thus immanent in capital-labour relation by embodying necessary cohesive aspects of capitalist development (Meszaros, 1994: 49-65)⁵. In this context, state institutions for certain complementary functions appear as the sites of class confrontation, which shapes not only the mode of their establishment but also their extension (de Brunhoff, 1978:19). There are then different forms of the state management of labour power that involve into capital-labour relation.

However, state involvements do not solve contradictions of capital-labour relation but only develop them in certain ways. Although the state is principally welcome by capital seeking to control the risks in reproduction on the basis of contradictory nature of accumulation process, its actual involvement creates tensions among capitalists and between capital and labour on the basic ground

⁵ In Meszaros's terms, because there is no totalizing unity within the capital system on the basis of its individual and internally fractured nature, "the formation of the modern state is an absolute requirement both for securing and for safeguarding on a permanent basis the productive accomplishments of the system". Therefore, "the modern state is brought into being its specific historical modality above all in order to be able to exercise comprehensive control over the unruly centrifugal forces emanating from the separate productive units of capital as an antagonistically structured social reproductive system" (1994:49-50).

that it comes to offend as a universal subject the essential rule of market exchanges between private individuals (Meszaros, 1994: 65-71; Eisenschitz and Gough, 1998:761). In this context, for example, the containment by the state of the inadequacies of the reproduction process may be turned into a universal recognition for the guaranteeing of maintenance; thereby undermining the essence of class relations within capitalism namely labourers' initial subordination to capital (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1996). A corollary is the danger of securing surplus production within labour process (cf. Burawoy, 1985: 32-33; see also 2.2). On the other hand, as the state operates through the involvement of particular sections of capital and/or workers (Gramsci 1971; Poulantzas, 1978), its actions are primarily constructed to favour them over the others. This then constitutes politicization of class relations that are assumed to work in 'nature' (Offe, 1984: chapter 2). This time, the implication is the risk of uncovering class power relations within capitalist economy as well as wider social and political sphere. In short, the form, content and limits of state involvements into the reproduction of labour are shaped within highly sensitive paths of class relations, producing new tensions and conflicts between capital and labour engulfing even the state institutions themselves.

2.6 Theories of Labour Control within Capitalist Development: From the Management of Labour Process to the Labour Regimes

Until the mid-1980s, the literature on capital-labour relation had been centred on the changing practices of capitalist control within the workplace, developing certain periodisation corresponding broadly with the historical stages of technical-organisational aspects of labour process. Edward (1979), for example, suggests a particular periodisation of capitalist control: from the simple-direct control in the early stages of capitalist development, to the technical one with the use of machines in labour process, and to the bureaucratic-hierarchical control in the context of growing of large-scale industrial firms. In this managerial problematic, Braverman (1974) develops a highly influential, though controversial, argument that the relation of capital and labour is basically driven by an essential capitalist motive of the former to separate conception of

production from the latter who is sought to be only in executing, so that the skill and knowledge is left to the hands of management. Thus, he suggests the separation of mental and manual labour as the foundation of capitalist social structure. In addition, at a more concrete level, Friedman (1977; 1986) distinguishes two different forms of managerial control within labour process: direct control and responsible autonomy. While the labourer in the direct control is dictated by a strict division of labour with close supervision over the detailed production process, in the responsible autonomy the labourer is expected to work in a self-motivating way via status endowments, co-opting trade unions or fancy facilities.

However, such understandings of capital-labour relation as the matter of managerial control have been widely criticized for both over rationalising managerial behaviours and neglecting the workers' subjectivities within labour process⁶ (Zeitlin, 1978; Wood, 1982; Rose and Jones, 1985). In addition, Burawoy (1985: chapter 1) goes further to argue that they also miss the wider specific nature of capitalist class relations within labour process. He argues that capital-labour relation within labour process is also deeply involved in employment relations, the reproduction of labour power, workers' organisations and their political regulations that are to a large extent shaped outside the workplace. Therefore, labour process should be set within a wider set of social and political relations, which can be understood via "the notion of politics of production which aims to undo the compartmentalisation of production and politics by linking the organisation of work to the state" (Burawoy, 1985:122)

In this celebrated framework, Burawoy (1985: chapter 3) suggests that production process cannot be confined to labour process itself composed of technical-material relations at work. It has also political apparatuses entrusted

⁶ It should be noted that having received some critiques, Friedman gave more emphasis on contradictions within each managerial strategies: "Both types of managerial strategies have serious contradictions. These limitations stem from their common aim, to maintain and extend managerial authority over people who are essentially free and independent, but who have alienated (sold) their labour capacity" (1986:99).

with the reproduction of these relations in labour process that are shaped within political struggles between capital and labour. For Burawoy, as labour process within capitalism can only start with, and is determined by, workers' dependency on the sale of their labour power, the generic character of production process is centred around the political apparatuses of production regarding with the reproduction of the labourer and labour power (1985:126). He argues that they are concerned with production process in two main ways: The first is through social insurance policy such as the practice of unemployment wage or provision of public health services by which reproduction of labour is guaranteed at a certain level beyond the individual exchange relations at labour market with capital. The second refers to labour legislation concerning with, for example, trade union recognition, grievance machinery or collective bargaining that directly frames how the management by capital of labour power at workplace is carried out. While the first type of state intervention shapes the degree of labourers' dependence on the employer, the second type regulates the content of their subordination to capital at workplace. Hence, the form and content of state involvement into the reproduction of labour power give essential features to the production process.

In this line, Burawoy suggests two distinct (ideal) types of what he calls factory regimes based on different forms of relations between capitalist production process and political regulations concerning the reproduction of labour: despotic regimes and hegemonic regimes. While the former is shaped by the sole economic power of market relations engulfing both production and labour reproduction processes, the latter is built on certain political regulations to guarantee the reproduction of labour beyond market relations. On the basis of these ideal types, then, the actual development of capitalist production throughout the 20th century appeared to have seen a broad shift from market despotism exercised by paternalistic and patriarchal employers to the consensual hegemonic regimes with certain state provisions for labour reproduction. However, Burawoy also suggests that a third type of factory regime called hegemonic despotism has been emerged out of the recent processes of increasing mobility of capital flows

which left labourers defenceless against the closure of their workplaces while forcing state interventions to comply with the employers' perspective if only to secure accumulation (1985:151-2).

As a result, Burawoy's seminal work quite convincingly underlines fundamental implications of political processes in the development of capital-labour relation within certain factory regimes towards wider hegemonic social structures. However, as it considers production process to be separated between the technical and task aspects (termed as "relations in production") and the class control and political aspects (termed as "relations of exploitation and of production), the capital-labour relation is understood in such a way that the employer has no particular technical-material dependencies within labour process, having just its universal aim to get surplus from labourers. Nevertheless, we have seen that these universal and particular sides of labour process are not independent each other but constructed in mutual relations, affecting their development in certain ways (see 2.2). The implication of this problematic understanding reveals itself when a new despotic regime (hegemonic despotism) on labour is claimed enough to arise from increasing flows of capital that force competitive market conditions without any consideration of the labour process and social relations that sustain it in particular places. However, capitalist competition is not only about the presence of many agents in competing in markets as it is in the neoclassical account, but also concerned with the organisation of production and the social relations it involves (see Bryan, 1985). Therefore, Burawoy's work needs to involve material dependencies of capital in particular places as much as it includes the flows of capital across geographies.

In addition, his fundamental concept of "factory regime" tends to assume a homogenous social space in which a particular regime is uniformly exposed to all workers, ignoring the possibility of its differentiation according to the concrete features of workers even on the same shop floor. This possibility has been increasingly the case in point in contemporary capitalism with enhanced capacity

to use all differences among workers on behalf of capital⁷. Furthermore, when it is used to arrive at certain generalisations such as some typologies of regime and historical periodization, his analysis falls into the methodological trap (of “the extended case analysis”) that fails to capture the embedded nature of workplaces within interlocking social relations at different spaces and their consequent effects as uneven development on each factory regimes. In short, Burawoy’s seminal work involves remarkable theoretical and practical shortcomings in analysing capital-labour relation.

To overcome both the problem of generalisation and lack of interest in local particularities within Burawoy’s approach, Jonas (1996) calls for a contextual analysis of capital-labour relation with a geographical perspective. He starts from an essential contradiction within capitalism between capital’s abstract interest in the global exchange of labour and the concrete interest of particular capitals in local context of that exchange. It is argued that there is a fundamental need for particular capitals to have relatively stable form of labour reproduction, as they are dependent on the concrete process of that exchange relation in each locality⁸. According to him, employers are in pursuit of establishing particular reciprocities around the autonomous sites of production, labour market, consumption and reproduction within a particular locality, so that adequate number of labourers with certain qualifications gets smoothly transition from labour markets to the labour process. These reciprocities to engender conditions of stability and predictability within local labour markets, amount to the local labour control regimes (LLCRs) that encapsulate a variety of place- and time-

⁷ Knutsen and Hansson (2010), for example, indicates that migrant workers from rural areas are subjected to harsher working conditions than local workers in the same factory in China as well as in Vietnam. Kelly (2002) also convincingly shows that a variety of differences belonging to workers that ranges from social and spatial ties to customs, norms and habits is taken seriously into labour recruitment and management strategies by capital, leading to different configurations of capital-labour relation across geographies that runs contrary to the assumption of a homogeneously set of factory regimes.

⁸ For Jonas (1996:336), it is this point that is missed in Burawoy’s work because he examines capital-labour relation only from the perspective of capital-in-general rather than those of particular capitals.

specific coordinating mechanisms of production and labour reproduction as well as the whole range of practice, norms, behaviours and habits around them. Jonas argues that “these mechanisms are not generated by the workings of the market nor do they result from the tendential global processes of capitalism. Rather they evolve historically from struggles around the local labour control needs of firms and industries” (1996:325).

To the extent that these LLCRs are constructed in a social and spatial context well beyond the workplace, then, the analytical frame of reference in the analysis of capital-labour relation can no longer be confined to the boundaries of the factory nor should it be directed primarily towards global scale. Instead, Jonas suggests thinking through the relations between production, consumption and reproduction within local scale. However, this does not mean disregarding non-local interventions of capital-labour relations: the territorial extent of the LLCRs is indeed demarcated by the non-bounded spatialized relations in which the local and wider scales of these relations continuously interact. Depending on these interactions, there are different degrees of the LLCRs ranging from the fully developed to the partially developed one that is largely dependent on non-local interventions within each localised setting. Therefore, “a local labour control regime is not static and fixed object but rather a fluid and dynamic set of social relations and power structures which are continuously reproduced and/or transformed by forces of domination, control, repression and resistance operating at a variety of scales” (Jonas, 1996:328-9). In comparison with Burawoy’s generalisation of the idea of factory regimes, then, the concept of LLCRs promises to provide much more dynamic and nuanced analysis of capital-labour relation across localities, emphasizing rather on historical and geographical contingencies leading to local variations in this relation even within the so-called hegemonic periods.

With this geographical perspective, Jonas further argues that the LLCRs are basically involved in urban space that is more or less delimited by local labour markets, on the grounds that the organisation of urban space creates territorial

divisions along the lines of income, ethnicity or gender by which labourers are considerably constrained in certain enclaves where to meet particular employers (1996: 329-331). In other words, urban spatial organisations are considered to provide different contexts for those reciprocities, enabling local companies having interest in particular labourers to exploit certain labour enclaves. For example, while industrial districts, techno-poles or free trade zones provide companies with clusters of particular labour power that would be otherwise impossible to come together, residential patterns and changes in them also reinforce or undermine those sorts of clusters within local labour markets. Therefore, urban space embodying different places of reciprocities can appear as a strategic component of capital-labour relation in local context. However, to the extent that urban space turns into the places of local labour needs of particular capitals, it also contradicts with the global nature of capitalist labour market as a free and unlimited exchange of labour power. Thus, urban space becomes geographies of various manifestations of this contradiction, which may also provide a variety of opportunities for capital in situ before the decision to flow into another place.

In this framework, Jonas (1996:332-5) also puts forward that both companies and workers within urban agglomerations tend to develop various countervailing strategies to contain the consequences that undermine their interests in the LLCRs. According to him, there is no constant site of such strategies, as they change with the dominant social relations and power geometries within each LLCRs. For example, depending on social economic and political conditions within localities, workers' resistance may be centred on the sites of consumption rather than that of production. Similarly, companies can advance particular involvements into different aspects of urban agglomeration, according to their social and material stakes in local labour market. While they may undermine or reinforce each other, those involvements also lead to particular ideologies within local communities that would then become an important part of the development of the LLCRs towards a hegemonic social structure.

In sum, Jonas (1996) brings via the concept of the LLCRs important contributions to the analysis of capital-labour relation, especially emphasizing on its actual extensions to local space. He mainly thinks capital-labour relation as constructing relatively stable control regimes on the latter within urban spatial agglomerations because of high sensitiveness of particular capitals to the concrete context of labour exchange relation as opposed to capital-in-general which is only interested in the abstract process of that exchange. In this line, contrary to Burawoy's current hegemonic despotism on the labourer, it is quite rightly argued that capital-labour relation cannot be understood either as the pure result of the flows of capital disarticulated from concrete time and space considerations or as by-product of state policies designed to appeal to their abstract interests; rather, Jonas suggests, this relation is shaped within instable, conflictual and varied ways of the development of reciprocal interconnections within urban-local labour markets between production and reproduction in the context of wider scale of power relations. Thus, the analysis becomes directed to include the concrete, particular and contingent dynamics of capital-labour relation within a local context, aiming to compensate for the structural-functionalist generalisations of Burawoy's analysis as factory regimes.

However, the way in which this aim is pursued is flawed in many points by regulationist theory though being refined on the basis of his initial emphasis on contradiction within capitalist relation. The regulationist theory with a specific understanding of capitalist development as embodying regulatory mechanisms on economic dynamics and social structures leads Jonas to consider capital-labour relation basically on three concepts: production, reproduction/consumption and reciprocities: While production and reproduction are seen to be autonomously operated spheres with their own dynamics (which then come into interaction), reciprocities are considered as externally constructed mechanisms to coordinate those two spheres. This indeed admits that reciprocities are not on an equal conceptual level with production and reproduction. Yet, they are asserted at the same analytical level as embodying processes of harmonization between production and reproduction. In other words, it is suggested that the production-

reproduction nexus are only provided by reciprocities that are ontologically constructed outside them. A corollary is that there is no role given to contradictions of capital-labour relation in the development of such nexus although they are initially emphasized. It then seems that contradictions are rather understood as structurally given necessary forms such as those autonomous spheres of production and reproduction or opposite modes of capital-in-general and particular capitals that just provide external conditions to the contingent constructions of reciprocities for a sustained capitalist development. Methodologically, this understanding means a set of problematic counterpositions i.e. the abstract to the concrete, the structural to the contingent or the global to the local, rather than to move between them (see 2.1). Within these counterpositions, because it is not possible to consider the development of inner relations, the initial emphasis on contradiction between capital-in-general and particular capitals in relation with labour turns into some incompatible needs within certain spatial contexts between individual capitals and capital-in-general about the reproduction of labour power, leaving behind the basic antagonisms between capital and labour⁹. The analysis of capital-labour relation is thus transmuted into that of local labour market reciprocities between production and reproduction, shifting away from the starting point to the needs of particular capitals for the reproducible patterns of accumulation in the form of the LLCRs against the impositions of market exchange relations. Since such needs are not defined as part of contradictions, the structural-functionalist logic is inevitably involved into the analysis.

To avoid structural-functionalist explanation in the shaping of the LLCRs, Jonas seeks to give more emphasises on time- and space-contingencies like “the day-to-day and locally-situated struggles and agreements among and between firms, industries, workers, public agencies, community organisations and so forth”

⁹ Therefore, the source of instability within capitalist development appears to be disharmonious influences of labour market segments. Nevertheless, although these are important, they cannot be understood outside the basic antagonism between capital and labour (see Fine, 1999: 132-150; chapter 7).

(1996:335). In as much as refraining from structural-functional logic, then, the analysis develops into voluntaristic explanation to the labour control regimes. Yet, such an explanation doesn't acknowledge above all why the particular capitals actually resist involving the reproduction of the labourer into their full responsibility if reciprocities are beneficial to them. This indeed reveals that there must be some structural necessities that are continuously at work even within the concrete process of labour power management. In a voluntaristic account, on the other hand, it becomes also blurring that why labour regimes needs to be specifically attached to the local scale as opposed to the national scale of labour market¹⁰. Yet, again, there are indeed certain urban-local aspects such as daily-commuting distances, labour's degree of dependence of local capital and local reproduction, local forms of family and gender relations that are inherently involved into the development of capital-labour relation starting from labour market and labour process. In other words, urban-local scale is integral to capital-labour relation not just because it provides an immediate space for labour markets, but because it has fundamental effects in the processes of production and reproduction.

Consequently, although bringing important theoretical insights to the analysis of capital-labour relation by starting with contradiction within labour exchange process between capital-in-general and the particular capitals of local context, Jonas's analysis eventually fails to move it into more concrete levels due to his regulationist premises based on a taken-for-granted separation of production and reproduction. The analysis then becomes searching for the ways of how they are interconnected by reciprocal practices within labour markets corresponding to the urban-local space. In this line, while fundamental class contradictions within capitalist labour process such as abstract labour versus concrete labour or

¹⁰ Indeed, Jonas raises the question of spatiality of labour regime by arguing that there are differential effects of urban spatial organisations on labour control regimes. However, since his approach is mainly shaped by Lefebvre's general formula as the space-place contradiction regarding with the freedom of labour, urban-local scale is rather seen as an arena of certain size of labour agglomeration where to construct reciprocal relations between production and reproduction.

discipline versus cooperation are confined to the issue of social regulations of labour markets, the analytical frame of reference is based on urban-local scale as the space of those regulations. The result is eventually at best to reveal the importance of urban local agglomerations in the construction of labour regimes¹¹, and at worst to disregard the uncontrollable nature of class contradictions that have been shaped within labour process. All of these means that we still need to have a theoretical framework in which the systematic abstraction of capital-labour relation can be taken to the more concrete levels of analysis in a dialectical and mediated manner.

2.7. An Alternative Approach: Considering Capital-Labour Relation within the Dialectics of Socialisation and Value

In the light of the previous section, we can continue to think through what is called as particular capital in certain places that refers to a basic unit of capital-labour relation. It is actually composed of three main social processes: the involvement of labourers into labour market, development of labour process and the reproduction sphere. While each of these processes has its own distinct dynamics, they are also internally related in numerous ways: The reproduction

¹¹ As a notable example, Kelly (2002) convincingly develops this geographical perspective into the argument that space is also deployed as an important dimension for the control and containment of labour by drawing on an empirical analysis of three rapidly industrialized localities of Southeast Asia. He reveals five distinct types of spatial strategies of labour control that are operating in those workplaces being examined: atomizing workers' bodies as an autonomous unit of recognition, designing the workplace as a container for dispute resolution, establishing industrial enclaves as de-nationalised and de-socialised space, constructing bureaucratic and imagined national space over any labour collectivity, and distancing home place from workplace through recruiting migrant workers. He argues that while labour control strategies become differentiated through different employers' practices using the spatial relationships between workers, their household and communities, workplaces and the state, these strategies are configured in quite distinct ways across local geographies within a particular scalar containment. It is in this framework, Kelly (2002:409) argues, a detailed analysis of the LLCRs needs to cover "the nature and evolution of the state in each context, the historical development of export oriented development in local and national settings, the ways in which political power is exercised at the local scale, discourse of political legitimacy and labour market practices, the relationship between local power and national state power, cultural constructions of household relationships and gender roles, and the agency of certain individuals"

sphere affects labour process in ways that the labourers' employment capacities are broadly shaped within the social contexts of households, neighbourhoods, consumption and public services. On the other hand, income from wages, forms of local employments, the skills and so on that have been shaped within labour process directly affects various aspects of reproduction process ranging from consumption, gender and ethnic division of labour to personal identities and ways of life. In addition, both processes can only develop through the involvement of labourers into labour market that is also led by wider consequences of capitalist production. There is then a single yet differentiated social structure composed of labour markets, labour process and the reproduction sphere that lies behind the formation of particular capitals. Furthermore, such social structure is also embedded in, and develops through, certain geographies: labourers move into labour markets at a certain spatial extent, daily-commuting distances limits workers' links between workplace and residential area, spatial organisations of workplace are the intrinsic part of the material aspects of labour process, land prices set by the level of spatially associated surplus profits affects both reproduction sphere and wages, and public services are organised on the spatial basis of daily personal contacts and use of services. In other words, some geographical dimensions such as place, distance and built environment are inherently involved into capital-labour relation as to both in the extent of labour markets, and within labour process, and the reproduction sphere.

Departing from this substantial involvement between social relations and space within capitalist development, Gough (1991) suggests considering capital-labour relation at the most abstract levels of analysis as both spatially specific and spatially effective structure. It is spatially specific because it differentiates across geographies, for example, in terms of qualities of labour power, material aspects of labour process and social and cultural circumstances. It has also spatially effective structures in that its development proceeds necessarily through the use of space such as connections between spaces of production and that of reproduction, spatial concentration/decentralisation in the extents of production and market, or

establishment of infrastructures for certain types of investments.¹² Within such a subtle socio-spatial dialectic, capital-labour relation can then be considered as locally effective structure, fundamentally because it is primarily within local space that labour market, labour process and important parts of reproduction spheres are constructed (Gough, 2003:38):

Local labour process, and the forms of competition playing on them, strongly shape industrial relations. Attitudes to work, capitalist discipline and workers' solidarity are also reproduced in social life, differentiated by locality. Local gender relations (themselves arising from the production-reproduction nexus), as well as constraining women's access to jobs, can produce distinctive attitudes to work and trade unionism among men and women respectively. Local divisions between ethnic groups profoundly affect industrial relations for both dominant and oppressed ethnicities. Local particular conditions of reproduction such as high housing prices can affect workers' attitudes to wage bargaining.

In short, capital-labour relation proceeds as a set of locally effective structures within which locality plays a constitutive role.¹³ Nevertheless, those locally effective structures are also embedded in wider scales of production and reproduction processes. Therefore the development of capital-labour is also affected by the ways in which local scale is articulated with other geographies. However, the question still remains unanswered: how to come to grips with the development of those locally effective structures towards certain socio-spatial forms of capital-labour relations? In particular, what are the dynamics and mechanisms of the construction of labour regimes?

To answer these questions in line with the method of systematic abstraction, we need to first go back to fundamental contradictions of capital

¹² In other words, while capital-labour relation takes specific forms in different geographies, they are also pushed into more concrete figures by both ubiquitous class contradiction and their spatial structures. This also proves that difference and variety are not unique to contingent combinations of concrete distinct entities, but also come from the necessary development of abstract class contradictions and their spatial structures.

¹³ Despite these interrelations, localities are differentiated in much radical studies only by their labour power and reproduction spheres (see Castell, 1977; Urry, 1985; Cooke, 1990; Swyngedouw, 1992; Peck, 1996).

relation as a mode of production. As seen in previous sections, capital-labour relation is basically depended on capital valorisation process in which profit rates on capital are commensurated through competition by private individuals in markets, resulting with capital flows into and out of the sectors, firms and workplaces (Marx, 1990). It is then within this process that private firms with their locally effective structures are constantly imposed to the value discipline constituted at wider scales that abstracts from their particular labour process, labour power and local ties. A corollary of this competitive condition is initially to develop particular attempts by individual capitals for changing their internal processes and class relations at the workplace level. For example, a local sector capital may increase labour control, introduce new products, change organisation of production, restructure firm ownership or invest in training and built environment in an essential aim to make labour process more competitive and profitable. In these ways, external relations of competition in market exchange relations are transformed into a set of conflictual issues internal to the capital-labour relation at workplace (Bryan, 1985). To the extent that such workplace level relation is involved into local labour markets and reproduction sphere, this process also means attempting to change its locally effective structures in certain ways that would make a local sector capital competitive against others. In other words, as Gough (2003:41) puts, “the dynamics of a product-industry and its spatial form can thus be understood as a dialectic of external competition and commensuration within the industry with the locally specific and locally effective structures that make it up”

It is within such dialectics that a sustainable capitalist development has to involve a kind of coherence within a certain place between labour markets, labour process and reproduction sphere, providing relatively reliable and predictable socio-spatial context against value impositions of market exchange relations. Harvey has defined it as “structured coherence” which in practice (1985:140):

embraces the standard of living, the qualities and style of life, work satisfactions, social hierarchies (authority structures in the workplace, status systems of consumption), and a whole set of sociological and

psychological attitudes toward working, living, enjoying, entertaining and the like.

From the perspective of Marxist abstraction, this “structured coherence” embracing various aspects of social relations ranging from working to the living and entertaining can only be understood through a specific concept which both embodies fundamental contradictions of capital accumulation within labour process and enables us to pursue the ways in which they dialectically grow into wider aspects of social relations by producing complex varieties in time and space. Following Eisenschitz and Gough (1996), Gough and Eisenschitz (1996), Gough (1991; 2002; 2003) and Roberts (2004), I argue that the concept of socialisation of production that is already placed in Marxist economics, once developed towards reproduction processes, can be employed to understand the movement of contradictions of capital-labour relation within a particular place in a dialectical manner.

The concept, originally used as the term of cooperation in *Capital*, refers to direct concrete forms of material and technical organisation of labour process as opposed to its abstract value aspects operating at wider spaces through exchange relations (Marx, 1990: chapter 13).¹⁴ It also denotes the major contradiction with the private nature of capitalist production within the historical development of capitalism (Marx, 1990: chapter 32).¹⁵ In other words, *the*

¹⁴ In this chapter (of *Capital* volume I) called Cooperation, Marx puts, “If capitalist direction is thus twofold in content, owing to the twofold nature of the process of production which has to be directed –on the one hand a social labour process for the creation of a product, and on the other hand capital’s process of valorization- in form it is purely despotic” (1990:450). At the next page, he explains specific nature of capital-labour relation within labour process more clearly : “Being independent of each other, the workers are isolated. They enter into relations with the capitalist, but not with each other. Their co-operation only begins with the labour process, but by then they have ceased to belong to themselves. On entering the labour process they are incorporated into capital. As co-operators, as members of a working organism, they merely form a particular mode of existence of capital. Hence the productive power of capital developed by the worker socially is the productive power of capital” (1990:451).

¹⁵ While depicting historical tendency of capitalist accumulation process, Marx refers to the socialisation as follows: “... as soon as the labourers are turned into proletarians, their means of labour into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its

cooperative form of the labour process including technical, material and organisational aspects (or, to use Marxian economics, “use value” aspects) bring with it socialisation of production that potentially contradicts with the private logic of capitalist class relation that is reflected in value production based on the separation of economics from politics. In terms of capital-labour relation, this means confronting private-individual capitalist employer with *socialised labourers*. Within this confrontation, while having to involve a co-operative and reciprocal relationship with labourers so as to continue the extraction of surplus value, the employer seeks to develop new (control) mechanisms, machines and technologies for isolating those socialisation dynamics within labour process in ways as to protect such private logic of class relation. Hence, “isolated reciprocity” between capital and labour appears as a substantial contradictory form rooted in the determining core of capitalist development (Roberts, 2004:477).

As a matter of fact, as capitalist development proceeds over time, socialisation of production tend to increase on the grounds that private logic of capital does not produce enough materials (use values) not just to labourers but also to individual capitalists who become increasingly depended on long-turnover time, complex division of labour and social nature of knowledge (Mandel, 1980).¹⁶ Moreover, multiple contradictions that are inherent in capitalist

own feet, then the further *socialisation of labour* and further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers...This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralization of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, *the cooperative form of the labour process*, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economizing of all means of production by their use as means of production of combined, *socialised labour*, *the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market*, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic regime.” (Marx, 1990:928-9) (*italics* are mine)

¹⁶ “The socialization of labour is taken to its most extreme extent as the total accumulated result of the scientific and technical development of the whole of society and humanity

production such as difficulties in the reproduction of suitable labour power; overproduction of capacity or competitive pressures to short-term decisions by private firms deepens the need for organising some social relations in ways that go beyond the market exchange relations (Gough, 1996). It is then within this process that the tendency for socialisation within capitalist labour process is further developed towards wider areas, with various forms of coordination among capitalists, between capitalists and groups of workers and between workers. These forms tend to be associated both in civil society and within the state as the political form of capitalist social relation. This “socialisation” then relates to both production and reproduction (Gough, 2002:408). Nevertheless, as socialisation of production and reproduction proceeds through non-market direct forms of organisation in contradiction with private logic of capital, it is prone to politicization of class relations. Therefore, there are also continuous attempts by capital and the state for isolating those social forms from the potentials of politicization (Gough, 2002; Roberts, 2004).

On the other hand, labourers are not passive recipients of these processes. Instead, there are various forms by labourers of resistance, demands and collective strategies as opposed to capitalist socialisation (or “isolated reciprocity”) whose logic is to constrain them, in and through a set of formal and/or informal social organisations including the state, into the carrier of labour power to be consumed within labour process in return for a wage payment referring to an equivalent of its value in market exchange relations namely the labour-time necessary for its (re)production like other commodities. In this respect, labourers inevitably seek to find better ways of their reproduction beyond the market-exchange relations, for example, through pressuring the employer for better payments and working conditions and demanding public institutions for investing on social welfare provisions such as housing and hospitalisation and in education for getting more skill and being more powerful in relation to capital (Herod, 1997). These quests

increasingly becomes the immediate precondition for each particular process of production in each particular sphere of production” (Mandel, 1980:267-8).

by labourers for a better reproduction can in turn give rise to the constitution of collective organisations against those constraining organisations over them, as they experience similar impositions and conditions in their survival. In these ways of class struggle, either individually or collectively, labourers eventually affect capital's investment and employment strategies as well as public policies in particular lines (Selwyn, 2012:219).

As a result, the dialectics of socialisation of production and reproduction (involving quality, cooperation and reciprocity) with the value nature of capitalist relation (embodying quantity, discipline and isolation) shape the development of capital-labour relation within a particular local place. Within this dialectics, to the extent that local socialisation as locally effective structures between labour process, labour power, the reproduction sphere and built environment sustains long-term capital accumulation within the locality, the existing form of capital-labour relation is to be reproduced. However, local socialisation may generate weak accumulation or involve barriers against it, mainly because (i) the relation between local socialisation and the wider socio-economic structures may be interrupted or change, and (ii) contradictions internal to particular structures of the local economy may be erupted (Gough, 2003:44-5). To illustrate, changes in national or international processes of capital accumulation can undermine local socialisations, and/or different requirements of local sectors for labour power, infrastructure, business culture or urban social life may create disruptions to local class relations. Under these conditions, class tensions accelerate by paving the way for increasing conflicts between capital and labour about the contradictory forms in which they can reproduce themselves. While the former seeks to innovate more efficient forms of capitalist socialisation (or “isolated reciprocity”) within labour process for its growth, the latter inevitably attempt to defend them against value impositions and workplace isolations in ways developing either individual strategies or alternative socialisations for a better reproduction. Through the involvement of certain sections of capital and/or labour into its decision-making at different spatial scales, the state is mainly to produce a set of responses to those socialisation dynamics in ways as to sustain capital

accumulation. However, state's responses give rise to politicisation among capitals and between capital and labour as its direct and universal political form inevitably come to offend the private rule of capitalist class relations based on market exchanges. In this respect, they do not bring stable and consistent complements to the contradictions of capital-labour relations; rather, state responses develop those contradictions into various political forms depending on the class struggle between capital and labour at different spatial scales.

2.8. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter we have seen that capital-labour relation is intrinsically embedded within a set of contradictions that are required to be given a certain degree of coherence within a particular place specifically in the (re)production of labour power for a sustained accumulation. These contradictions are (i) between abstract labour (labour time expended for exchange) and concrete labour (a useful labour activity of production) (ii) between quantitative aspects of work discipline stemming from market exchange relations and qualitative nature of cooperative labour process and, (iii) in the diverging path between the determination of wages in value relations and the reproduction of labour within wider social relations. They are not soluble nor can be displaceable but constitute chronic aspects of capitalist class relation. Thus, capital-labour relation develop in and through these contradictions to the extent that they are involved into a relatively stable coherence in the (re) production of labour power enough to produce surplus value. At this point, this chapter argues that it is primarily local scale where such coherence can be achieved, fundamentally because three basic structures of capital-labour relation as labour market, labour process and reproduction process are constructed to a large extent within local space.

From this geographical perspective, capital-labour relation is then reconsidered as a locally effective structure composed of local labour market, labour process and local reproduction processes that stands for competition and commensuration in wider market exchange relations. Thus, capital-labour relation within a particular industry appears to develop as the dialectics of the locally

effective structure that makes such relation up with the competitive and commensurate exchanges at wider scales. In line with Marxist abstraction, this chapter further argues that such a dialectical development can be best understood through the concept of “socialisation of production (and reproduction)” that refers to the direct, concrete and material aspects of social relations as opposed to indirect, abstract and non-material value relations. The concept involves not only the inherent cooperative forms of labour process but also wider dynamics within capitalist development, as the private logic of capital does not produce enough materials (use values) to the reproduction of social relations. In this respect, there also appear various socialisation attempts beyond labour process in order to complement the inadequacies brought along with the development of capital-labour relation. Yet, they produce neither consistent nor stable forms within capital-labour relation. In contrast, both their forms and aims are essentially differentiated according to capital, labour and the state, and their logic contradicts with the value nature of capitalist relations. Thus, they are prone to create politicisation of class relations. It is because of this danger that capital and the state also seek to control the potential of politicisation from socialisation attempts. However, labourers are not passive recipient of these control strategies. Instead, they can resist such control strategies, demand better ways of reproduction and, even develop their own socialisation forms against value relations, for example, labour unions. It is then through these class struggles as socialisations attempts at different spatial levels that class relations take different social forms.

Based upon this substantive understanding of capital-labour relation as a dialectical interplay between value and socialisation at different spatial levels, this chapter then brings a particular research agenda for analysing capital-labour relation and labour regime in particular within a certain place. It includes in temporal and spatial terms, (i) labour market formation, (ii) the requirements of material and technical aspects of labour process (iii) labour control strategies by individual capitals for capital accumulation (iv) forms of political regulations on both manufacturing and the reproduction of labour, (v) labourers’ experiences of these processes and their responses at production as well as reproduction levels. In

the next chapters, I will take into consideration this research agenda for the analysis of the contradictory development of capitalist class relations and labour regime in Kayseri.

CHAPTER 3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR REGIME IN TURKEY

3.1. Introduction

Industrial development in Ottoman-Turkish geography proceeded along a particular way mostly through the attempts by the Ottoman ruling elites to modernise the state in competition with the European rivals since the 19th century. It was then the state that directly embarked on organising industrial production as modern factories in order to meet the needs of the army. In this line while capitalist industrial relations took a specific form dominated by the state, working class formation became historically imprinted with this state-dominated form. In contradistinction with the development in the West, this historical fact led to the image of “father state” as a protective and caring authority, creating a considerable deformation in class-consciousness as well (Akkaya, 2002).

Despite the weak nature of industrial development, there had been such a remarkable number of workers’ resistance, strikes and organisations that Ottoman state needed to take some legal measures against labour movement. In this line, the Law on Work Stoppages (Tatili Eşgal Kanunu) was introduced in 1909 to put strict conditions on strikes and unionisation. This Law explicitly prohibited unionisation in foreign and public enterprises and workers movement had to continue rather in ways to form associations and craft societies under the Law of Associations of 1909 so as to carry on unionisation in disguise (Akkaya, 2002; Karakışla, 1998). As a result, the state confined the development of labour movement to these associational forms, bringing serious impediments to the unionisation attempts conducive to collective class practice and culture.

Such a dominant and authoritarian formation of the state in relation with social classes, particularly with labourers, as it continued to exist with the foundation of modern Turkish Republic, became the essential question in the

social science literature of Turkey. In this context, much of the explanation is based on a particular consideration of Ottoman-Turkish state as having patrimonial state tradition that assumes state bureaucracy locating at the centre of decision making in a confiscatory relation with the social classes displaced towards the periphery (cf. Mardin, 1969; İnel, 1996). Yet, this consideration both (i) tends to think the relations of state and society as the two different things opposing to each other, and (ii) disregards the class aspects of state policies imposed by such state bureaucracy (Yalman, 2002). Some scholars explain this authoritarian state formation with the concept of corporatism as a dominant ideological form of Ottoman-Turkish society (Parla, 2005). However, although the perception of a “unified people without conflicting interest” has always been a basic ideological motto lying behind the attempts in Ottoman-Turkish modernisation process, this commitment is never taken to form any corporational social organisation among classes on the basis of their occupational positions. This is strongly clear when labourers are considered. As Makal (1999) underlines, those state practices introduced in the early Republican period that were seemingly close to corporatist organisations did not allow workers to form collective organisations based on their occupational positions. Thus, the term of corporation would also become inadequate to explain state-society/class relations in Ottoman-Turkish context.

In a critical approach to these considerations, there are also some important analyses attempting to reveal the class aspects of such an authoritarian state formation. The concept of paternalism comes to the fore in explaining why Turkish state was so powerfully involved in class relations. For example, Boratav and Özuğurlu (2006) argue that the perception of “a unified people without conflicting interest”, which became the constitutive ideology of Republican Turkey in the aftermath of the collapse of Ottoman Empire, gave rise to the development of particular state-society relations which rejects class-based demands but considers the state as being responsible for the well-being of vulnerable people in society. Therefore, to the extent that it set a certain context for the preservation of workers and peasants against the consequences of capitalist

development, such a paternalist formation of the state also achieved benevolent characteristics (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006:158).

Similarly, Çelik (2010) uses the concept of paternalism in explaining the dominant and authoritarian state formation during the early Republican era. While broadly considering paternalism as referring to a protective relationship between the dominant subject and the subordinated ones, he underlines that its distinct aspect is to put social inequalities and power relations among these subjects into a moral case that conceals them. Therefore, paternalist relationship serves in society to men rather than women, to the subordinating classes rather than subordinated people, and to capitalists rather than workers (Çelik, 2010: 66). In this line, he argues that the notion of paternalism has shaped class relations of modern Turkish Republic until the 1960s within hegemonic struggles among social classes. The state thus appeared as a dominant subject in relation with social classes via the notion of populism (*halkçılık*) based on the ideology of “organic society with no classes and no privileges” (Çelik, 2010:553):

Keeping labour movement and unions under the control of the state and away from class conflict, politics, and other social movements is one of the most important features of traditional social policy in Turkey. Turkish social policy has incessantly aimed to delay the collective actions of workers, to keep them under control, and to isolate the workers’ movement from other organizations. When this is impossible; however, it chose to add labour movement and union to its historical block.

The above two arguments on the historical formation of class relations as state-dominated paternalist form in Ottoman-Turkish context provide an important starting point for this chapter that aims to investigate current forms of class relations, labour regime in particular, in Turkey from a historical perspective. However, the former argument, in an instrumentalist approach to the state-society/class relations, considers this paternalist state formation as shaped by the ruling elite’s ideological orientations. The latter argument, though having a wider approach to state-society/class relations as a process of hegemonic struggles, tends to conceive these struggles in general sense as if they have not involved specific social forms in capitalist relations i.e. labour, capital and the capitalist

state. In contrast, class relations and the role of the state are not solely shaped by the ideological orientations of the ruling elites in state power; nor can they be simply considered without such contradictory social forms. Rather, class relations and the state formation appear as the consequent reflections of the actual struggles within the economic and political forms of contradictions of capital accumulation at a particular time and context (cf. Clarke, 1991; Bonefeld, 1991b). Drawing on theoretical arguments regarding with the fundamental contradictions of capital-labour relation in Chapter 2, I argue that a more robust explanation for the development of state-society/class relations in Turkey is initially required to involve such economic and political forms that have been continuously (re)shaped within the dialectics of socialisation and value relations in the course of capital accumulation process.

In this framework, this chapter is divided into four main sections each of which deals with the analysis of different phases of capital accumulation process in Turkey in an attempt to reveal fundamental class contradictions complemented within a particular labour regime. The first section focuses on the earlier phase of capital accumulation process in which the state directly initiated itself to the development of basic capitalist social forms such as labour and capital. The notion of paternalism is then applied to reveal the role of the state in class relations. The second section analyses the post-war period referring to a new phase of capitalist accumulation process in Turkey based on import-substituted industrialisation within domestic market relations. In this section, the rise and demise of a conciliatory class relation is underlined by emphasizing on the increasing socialisation dynamics in the state on the basis of its central role in the accumulation process. The third section looks at the ways in which the emergent socialisation forms in the previous decades in favour of wider sections of society underwent repressive state policies as domestic accumulation patterns were shifted to export-led growth strategies along with a neoliberal market therapy. While pointing out the constitution of a legal framework for a repressive labour regime, this section also indicates that the development of socialisation attempts against the destructive consequences of market relations gave rise to a new phase

in the capital accumulation process since 1980 as those attempts were satisfied with the inflows of money capital. The fourth section brings the attention to the 2001 economic crisis, giving a special emphasize on the new economic programme (“Transition to a Strong Economy”) that seeks to eliminate long decades of socialisation forms while at the same time attempting to shift the accumulation base to productive investments. In this respect, the post-2001 period is regarded as a historical departure in class relations towards direct market-ruling process. Considering this departure within the context of the rise of productive investments, this section is then specifically aimed to reveal the emerging labour regime in its contradictory class nature. The last section attempts to draw some concluding remarks by taking into account successive labour regimes throughout the development of capital accumulation process in Turkey.

3.2. The State’s Building of Labour Regime Between Protectionism and Authoritarianism

Due to the late development of capitalism in Ottoman-Turkish geography, the process of capital accumulation developed in certain ways that are simultaneously both the formation and the internationalization of the circuits of productive, commercial and money capital (Ercan, 2002). In the 19th century, Ottoman economy was inserted into the commercial circuit of European capital, and at the beginning of 20th century a remarkable degree of capital accumulated in the hands of the businessmen mainly from non-Muslim communities. Following the collapse of Ottoman Empire, modern Turkish Republic was founded as a new state premised upon the ideas of nation-state, political independence and populism (halkçılık). Indeed, the Republic developed from a specific type of revolution separating from classical bourgeois revolutions in the sense that it precluded active participation of the masses. Thus, it was brought along with certain ‘incomplete’ capitalist forms, mainly reflected in three important realms of class relations: political democracy, urban-rural relations and land question (Savran, 2010: 83).

There was a particular social and spatial matrix in the earlier period of Turkish Republic, involving a high degree of inequality between a limited number of newly industrialising urban centres and large rural areas where much of its population lived on subsistence farming with a small-scale land ownership. In these circumstances, the transformation of state-society relations towards capitalist forms could become possible only through a concentration of power in certain institutional structures at the political level conducive to dominant and centrist state formation. As a part of such transformation process, class relations of modern Turkish Republic were formed within the paternalist rule of the state. The world economic crisis of 1929 led to some changes in this paternalist formation. One of them was to increase the authoritarian aspect of state involvement into class relations at the expense of paternalist protections as the favourable economic conditions of the 1920s disappeared. Given the lack of adequate industrial investment, the state also had to directly launch an industrialisation programme, labelled as etatism, based on domestic market. In this line, while the first state investments were made in different cities of Anatolia to produce basic consumer goods such as wheat, sugar and textile that were previously imported from the West, the following ones were directed for the production of strategic intermediate goods like iron, steel and cement in accordance with a 5-year industrial plan of 1934 (Boratav, 1988). As a result, Turkish state became a direct investor in the capital accumulation process of the transition from commercial into productive capital (Ercan, 2002).

To the extent that industrialisation became a major economic policy, some basic issues regarding with the labourers to work regularly at modern factories such as a stable labour market, work discipline and reproduction of labour power came to be seen important things that needed organising. This was clearly reflected in the words of the then Ministry of Economy: “workers come, move into factory, work there perfectly for two-three months, and one morning you see their workplaces empty. They have moved en masse back to their villages” (quoted in Boratav and Ozuğurlu, 2006: 167). The search for creating a stable environment for industrial labour force then led to the introduction of the Labour

Law of 1936. In this period, while state enterprises developed certain protective measures for the employees at individual level such as the provisions of shelter, occupational education and health services, the Labour Law brought a set of authoritarian policies aimed at both imposing work discipline over labourers and preventing their collective existence. It was within this context that not just the Labour Law of 1936 but also the Law on Associations dated in 1938 strictly prohibited strikes, collective bargaining and class-based associations.

In this framework, labour regime under a state-led industrialisation process consisted of a combination of the limited number of individually protective policies with the wide range of authoritarian control against any collective potential of workers. Moreover, the burden of such an authoritarian labour regime on labourers was partially ameliorated with a free education policy at all levels of state schools. Nevertheless, the eruption of Second World War cancelled not only the state industrial investments but also all the protective policies of labour regime. With the introduction of National Protection Law against the possible war conditions, even some extra ordinary state policies, namely, compulsory work could be imposed on labourers, thereby shifting the labour regime into despotism to a significant extent (Boratav and Özüğurlu, 2006:169).

Following the end of Second World War and the emergence of a new economic and political context relatively in favour of labour at the international level, it became no longer possible to sustain such authoritarian labour regime moving towards despotism. As a part of the political strategy of Turkish state to engage in western capitalist countries, some authoritarian aspects of class relations were eliminated. In this scope, the Law on Associations was amended to allow for the constitution of associations on class basis. Yet, as this amendment gave rise to in a short period proliferation of many independent unions as well as the constitution of socialist parties with a close involvement in these unions, the state developed a reactionary attack in the support of the rising Turkish bourgeoisie that had accumulated considerable amount of capital during the war

conditions. First, the Martial Law dated in the December of 1946 declared both the unions and the socialist parties as illegal associations. Thus, a possible meeting between the growing working class mostly employed in state enterprises and socialist parties supporting their interest could be prevented in advance. Second, two important laws regarding with employer-employee relations, the Law on Employers' and Labour Unions and the Law on Labour Union Associations, were passed in 1947. The main aim of these Laws was to keep particularly labour unions "outside all kinds of currents and influences" and to turn them into organisations "consonant with national character" of the regime and "acting together with the state" (Akkaya, 2002:130). In addition, even though giving the unions legal status on certain conditions, these Laws did bring to them neither the right to strike nor the right of collective bargaining. Thus, unionisation attempts were taken into powerless institutional forms in their relations with the state and capital (Çelik, 2010:143).

In this context, labour unions developed mainly in large-scale state enterprises although there appeared remarkable amount of private industrial investments in the west part of the country as the migration flows from rural areas fuelled the big cities' labour markets. Given their political, ideological and institutional formation, labour unions played a limited role i.e. solving only workers' particular problems within the development of class relations at that time. The real blow came along with the worsening of overall economic conditions in the last quarter of the 1950s. When the situation turned into a wider economic and political crisis in capital accumulation process, a fundamental intervention came along with the sword of the armed forces in 1960 in the political support of an amalgam of urban classes (Gülalp, 1993).

3.3. The Rise and Demise of Conciliatory Labour Regime within Domestic Capital Accumulation Process

Following the military intervention, a new Constitution was made in 1961. It initially redefined the state on a set of principles that are democratic, laic, social and the rule of law. Among them, the principle of social state particularly

appealed to the labourers. Furthermore, the 1961 Constitution recognizes social state in detail as the rights of all citizens to education, health and work, thereby guaranteeing them at the Constitutional level. In addition, it accepts the rights of the workers to collective bargaining, unionisation and strike while giving employers the right to lockout as well. In this line, a sort of conciliatory relation between capital and labour was aimed to develop within the active role of the state (Akkaya, 2002).

This relation was compatible with the emerging industrial accumulation pattern in which Turkish bourgeoisie sought to produce durable consumer goods through import-substitution on the condition that a stable domestic market would be guaranteed. The state was then assumed to provide them with a guaranteed domestic market in ways regulating import-quotas and allocating foreign currency as well as delivering basic industrial materials according to their needs. One of the important components of such a politically determined national enclave of industrial accumulation was the labour considered both as a work force and the demand of production. In this framework, there emerged a unique context to form conciliation between capital and labour as long as state interventions sustained the domestic pattern of industrial accumulation.

The following years after the 1961 constitution then witnessed a distinct period with respect to capital-labour relation that would be later called as a golden age. Thanks to the introduction of new regulations providing more suitable conditions for labour unions to organise, unionisation exploded particularly at public sector investments. Türk-İş, the then single trade union confederation founded in 1952, reached in a short period to a membership around 550,000 three fourths of which were employed in the public sector (Akkaya, 2002:133). In order to prevent its potential threat to capitalist class relations, the confederation got reorganised as a pragmatic economic actor focussing on wage increases in what is called as “policy above parties” (Çelik, 2010:450-69). In this context, the state

and capital did not approach so reactionary to unionisation attempts to the extent that their demands were compatible with the pattern of domestic accumulation¹⁷.

Throughout the 1960s, Turkish economy has achieved enormous growth particularly in industrial production on the basis of some specific aspects of the country such as the existence of both a large domestic market and massive labour force migrating from rural geographies without breaking off their material links. This economic growth also brought benefits to the dissident commercial capitalists and big landowners, while at the same time providing labourers with the hope of increasing their welfare in industrial cities. However, the primary winner was the emergent industrial capitals that became big capitalists in a decade. Instead of making further investment vertically in a particular sector, they preferred using their accumulation to expand horizontally across many sectors in a way making certain deals with their counterparts so as to share non-competitive domestic market like duopolies. Thus, they grew enormously with increasing control over commercial and money-capital through the ownership of banks that would then turn them into conglomerates known as “holding companies” (Öztürk, 2010, 2014).

Nevertheless, this economic growth pattern proceeded with the development of capitalist tensions. They were concentrated into the state as it operated like a buffer against the competitive operation of value relations. Since the conditions of both import substitution and stable domestic market were provided directly through decisive state interventions within the political decision making process, class relations became substantially politicised to the degree that the main way of accumulation appeared as political rather than economic competition among capitalist classes. Thus the state came to be an immediate arena of capitalist classes with conflictual demands. Moreover, as the capitalist

¹⁷ Yet, after a split from the ranks of Türk-İş founded DİSK in 1967 (the Revolutionary Confederation of Labour Union), mainly organised in private enterprises, with a policy of class and mass-based unionism, the labour movement would be seen as a threat to the development of domestic accumulation.

classes sought to reap the politically protected market and politically delivered subsidies, peasants and workers too raised their voices to get state support particularly thanks to their electoral majority. In this line, the state was pushed to provide them with not just subsidies or services but also employment¹⁸. All of them eventually resulted with the increasing conflictual demands in the state that would gradually undermine its fundamental role in managing class relations within a conciliatory labour regime.

However, the emergent crisis dynamics of domestic industrial accumulation at the end of 1960s could be mitigated through some distinct aspects of Turkish capitalism at this period. The major one was the availability of cheap external finance for the Turkish state in sustaining domestic accumulation as it used its geostrategic position in favour of western capitalist countries in the international context of Cold War. In this line, a unique contribution to the state came through the increasing Turkish migrant workers in Europe sending back their remittance in various ways¹⁹ (Boratav, 1988). In addition to these sorts of external funding, Turkish state and capital became relieved by the specific aspect of Turkish urbanisation in which labourers built *gecekond* houses on the wide areas of public land without paying extra money to urban rents. As revealed in the five-year development plans at that time, this urbanisation of labour remarkably contributed to the transferring of state resources to the industrialisation process while at the same time helping capitalist employers keep the wage at lower levels (Şengül, 2003). In other words, prevalence of state-owned lands in Turkish cities derived from Ottoman land regime played a complementary role in the

¹⁸ The state came to be the employer of one-third of the working population and 36 % of the manufacturing labour force throughout the 1960s and 1970s (quoted in Düzgün, 2012:133).

¹⁹ Among these ways are not only the formal transferring of remittances as savings to the Central Bank of Turkey but also informal money-collection by some initiators from migrant workers for the setting up of multi-partner industrial enterprises in their homelands in Anatolian towns which was also supported by the then Turkish coalition government composed of center-left Republican People's Party and Islamist National Salvation Party in mid-1970s.

development of capitalist accumulation throughout the post-war years. Furthermore, internal migrant workers in cities continued to have economic links with their villages mainly due to the fact that there had been yet to emerge a “great transformation” (a la Polanyi, 2001) in rural social relations since the state could be kept still subsidising agricultural production against market pressure (Keyder, 1987). A corollary of the workers’ links with their rural background was the relieving of the burden of the cost of reproduction of labour power on capitalist employers because these links brought remarkable non-market contributions to the survival of workers.

Nevertheless, the above distinct aspects of Turkish capitalism could not end but only delay contradictions of domestic industrial accumulation for some time. As a matter of fact, the 1970s have witnessed subsequent development of fragmentation, conflict and collapse within the economic, political and ideological realms of class relations. As the limits and contradictions of domestic accumulation come up initially through balance of payment crisis, the peaceful coexistence between the emergent big industrial conglomerates and small-scale capitalists within the pattern of domestic accumulation began to disappear on the one hand; on the other hand, both capitalists imposed increasing pressure on labour union movement, DISK in particular. This situation also paved the way for the radicalisation of workers including even in the Türk-İş Union as their demands were severely repressed.

All of these class contradictions were eventually concentrated in the state because it also grew enormously like a buffer at production and reproduction processes against value relations within domestic accumulation process. In addition to big public enterprises and subsidies at the production process, the state had been directed to provide a remarkable degree of social policies ranging from education and health services to social security systems. Given the majority of

population living still in rural areas and the high levels of informal employment²⁰ in cities, the burden of such social policies was largely carried by the state because the social security system based on the employers and employees' contributions came to be inadequate and tax increases were considerably limited by the electoral pressure of worker and peasants. A corollary of this situation became a series of "financial crisis of the state" revealed in the form of substantial need for foreign currency. As labour militancy increased and Turkish industrial bourgeoisie responded simply by decreasing capacity utilization and investment, such condition turned into an "organic crisis" in class relations. The Gordian knot of class relations was again cut by the armed forces, yet this time supported only by Turkish big bourgeoisie and international capital (Ozan, 2013).

3.4. The State's Repressive Labour Regime under Neoliberal Agenda

When the top commander of military junta explicitly declared on the first day of the coup that the primary reason behind the economic and political instability of the country was the labour unions raising irredeemable demands, it appeared that 12th September of 1980 would become a turning point in the development of class relations. Before the military coup, there was actually a new economic program issued by the state on 24th January of 1980 proposing shifting economy from domestic accumulation to the one based on export orientation. The main aim of such programme was to provide Turkish big bourgeoisie, who had been stuck in the contradictions of domestic accumulation, with certain channels to receive foreign currency for improving technological organisation of industrial production in compatible with the competitive nature of international markets (Ercan, 2002). Since giving a privilege to the value-determined nature of international market relations over relatively politically-directed domestic economic structures, this economic program was also in line with wider neoliberal strategies developed by international capital in response to its devaluation

²⁰ By 1965, the people with pension and health coverage consisted of only 20.2 percent of Turkish population. This then increased to 48.9 percent and 39.4 percent in 1980, respectively (Boratav ve Özüğurlu, 2006:175)

tendency as well as to the over politicised class relations across the world economy. In this respect, the implementation of such market-based economic program would indeed refer to attacking both existing socialisation forms and the militancy of labour movement. With the elimination of democratic political regime in a target against labour unions, the military coup of 1980 thus initiated itself into a political guardianship of the attempt by Turkish bourgeoisie and international capital for changing class relations along with neoliberal agenda (Akkaya, 2002:136).

Having experienced a three-year of military junta rule, in which -besides a series of important laws- a new Constitution of 1982 was introduced, class relations and the state underwent a fundamental restructuring process. In contrast with the previous one, the 1982 Constitution was based on the general idea that civil and economic rights of the people can be misused in such ways as to damage the economic and political order (Özdemir, 2012). In this line, while the state was considered as a unique authority preserving the order, basic civil rights were recognised only with the restrictions to them. This approach became more severe when it came to collective rights, particularly the right to unionise. In the 1982 Constitution, the right to collective agreement and strike was recognised with strict conditions and restrictions; labour unions were not allowed to involve in politics (article 51, 53 and 54). In addition to the constitution, the Collective Agreement, Strike and Lockout Law no. 2822 and the Trade Union Law brought a set of detailed restrictions on the right to unionise: unions were entitled on the condition of overcoming certain high levels of thresholds namely ten per cent at the sectoral level and fifty per cent at the workplace level, and union membership application were only made at notary offices. Thus, the post-military period came with a new framework of labour regime that would not conform to conciliatory class relations but rather to the general thrust of state's repressive supervision over the collective agency of workers (Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir, 2006:314).

During the 1980s, capital accumulation was depended on export promotion strategies. Given the limited portfolio of competitive domestic

industries at international markets, major industrial activities became the production of labour-intensive goods like textile and garment. It could make the recovery of economic contraction of the late 1970s in the mid-1980s. However, this economic growth was heavily based on the suppression of wages as well as the starting of using unutilised capacity left at the previous years (Boratav, 1988). As a matter of fact, between 1977 and 1988 wages decreased by 25 per cent and the share of wages in the manufacturing value-added declined from 37 to 15 per cent (Boratav and Özügürlü, 2006:179). It was also within this period that financial system became reorganised in favour of business groups by shifting tax burden significantly to wage earners and consumers. Furthermore, agricultural subsidies underwent serious erosion at this period, giving rise to a process of elimination of small farmers from agricultural production.

However, it was again through urban policy that social consequences of such market-based policies became remarkably ameliorated. At the beginning of the post-military period, the government, while implementing neoliberal policies, introduced a set of laws regarding with the amnesty of illegal housing, urban planning procedures and administrative levels of urban management (Şengül, 2003). With these laws, both the gecekondu dwellers were given land titles and their settlements were then made possible to be transformed into legal apartment housing in agreements among dwellers and small-scale constructors according to the new construction planning that would be developed by municipal governments for the first time. Through the insertion of urban rents into gecekondu settlements, on the one hand the increasing need for low-income housing was considerably provided without public expenditures; on the other hand, highly politicised and collective nature of these settlements that had achieved in struggle to access public services during the previous decades has been subordinated to the development of capitalist relations on urban lands (Buğra; 1998; Bayırbağ, 2010). Nevertheless, given the high rates of wage decreases, increasing costs for social reproduction and the relatively proletarianised nature of new comers, such a complementary policy remained both inadequate in general and limited to the early dwellers before the enactment

of the amnesty law, and to the owner-occupied in particular. As a result, the big cities of Turkey came to be much more the places of informal economic activities and unemployment, giving rise to a new form of urban poverty with a permanent feature (Işık ve Pınarcıoğlu, 2003). The rise of poverty in cities was partially responded by the state through setting up a Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund with a particular aim to “help poor and needy citizens.... in order to consolidate social justice and provide a fairer income distribution”

By the end of 1980s, however, as the export oriented strategies did not bring an investment boom but rather wage suppression and privatization, a new wave of labour militancy from below as well as radical political movements developed into a wider economic and political oppositional ground against neoliberal policies. With the new styles and form of organisations, such oppositional attempts could not just stop privatization policies but also reverse the long years of decreasing wages in real terms. Another important outcome of these attempts was the increasing number of unionised workers reaching to its highest point that has never arrived at according to official registers (Boratav and Özüğurlu, 2006:160). Hence, neoliberal aspects of accumulation process became remarkably undermined at the end of 1980s.

In response, the state and Turkish big bourgeoisie developed external financial liberalisation as a way of overcoming the burden of such developments on accumulation process. Throughout the 1990s, financial liberalisation became a major mechanism of resource transfer to big bourgeoisie as their holding banks were functioned to sell money capital from international market to the state in return for higher rate of interest. It was then through the state debts that both capital accumulation continued and the increasing social demands could be responded to some extent²¹. Thus, while the state came to be again a major area of

²¹ The increase in the public expenditures of education and health between 1988 and 1992 is remarkable. The share of these expenditures in the total public expenditures rose from 15.3 percent to 24.3 percent. This also referred to the rise from 2.5 percent to 5 percent in the GDP (Boratav and Özüğurlu, 2006:181).

the socialisation demands of the wider sections of society, they were inserted into particular capitalist forms in which state and Turkish economy became more directly subordinated to the circulation of money capital at wider scales. This also meant imposing the latter over the former when a financial instability emerged not just at national scale but also across the world level.

In addition, the emergent pattern of capital accumulation throughout the 1990s based on the inflow of money capital gave rise to significant changes in industrial development. As being repressed with the immediate imposition of value relations operating at wider scales, employers tended to direct themselves more towards limiting wage increases, attacking workers' collective organisations and developing subcontracting relations in order to reduce production costs as well as to make workers less disobedient (Ercan, 2006). As a result, wages decreased in real terms by 29 percent in comparison with their highest level in 1993. Furthermore, there appeared considerable fall in unionisation rates particularly as a consequence of the increasing political attempts for the privatisation of public enterprises (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006:182). A more striking development came along with the subcontracting relations, changing the geography of industrial investments in a remarkable manner. Industrial investments that had been so far limited to the big cities in the west except for a few large-scale state enterprises, became ravelled out towards some inner Anatolian cities having with certain infrastructural investments like the Organised Industrial Districts (OIDs) for the development of industry (Köse and Öncü, 2000). A new industrial geography then appeared within a mutual development of *both* big industrial companies located in the big cities that attempted to reduce their fixed capital investments in response to the increasing pressure of wider market relations *and* the emergent capitalists in some inner Anatolian cities, who had gradually developed during the post-war period, seeking to accumulate capital in aggressive strategies. The latter, to the extent that developing links directly with international companies or product-markets, appeared as a distinct section of Turkish capital that would be later named as Islamic bourgeoisie.

To sum up, the pattern of capital accumulation throughout the 1990s increasingly led industrial capital to develop into a particular class relation shaped with the short term subcontracting relations and aggressive accumulation strategies on labour. Thus, labour became much more targeted for capital accumulation at that time (absolute surplus value production). Given the limited capacity of such value production, however, productive investments became less competitive within international market, paving the way for shifting capital to unproductive investments. This resulted with the increasing dependency of Turkish economy on the inflow of money capital, which made it more fragile to the financial instabilities across the world economy. As a matter of fact, a series of subsequent economic crisis in 1994, in 1998 and 1999 took place in Turkish economy either as a direct consequence of inevitably increasing state debts or through the financial fluctuations at wider scales. Each economic crisis, while hitting more severely Turkish economy, was responded with the neoliberal policies of wage pressures, privatization, public service cuts and reduction in agricultural subsidies²². In this context, the decreasing of unionisation rates and the supplementation of labour pool in big cities with the new comers, and specifically with the fully proletarianised Kurdish labourers due to the forced migration, helped Turkish capital keep the wages at lower levels.

Nevertheless, this process came to be severely detrimental to the capital accumulation in a longer term. While the limits of such accumulation pattern based on financial liberalisation and state debts appeared as growing crisis dynamics, Turkish big bourgeoisie had to find new ways of accumulation in the pursuit of new investment opportunities. In these ways, such bourgeoisie have been enthusiastically in favour of certain internationalisation processes such as the involvement into Custom Union (1995) and the EU membership candidate (1999) as well as IMF and WB agreements that were expected to recompose Turkish economy and state along with more competitive lines (Aydın, 2012: 99). In this

²² As of 2002, real wages decreased by 31 per cent in comparison with their peak point in 1993 (Boratav and Özügür, 2006:182).

line, when a new standby agreement with IMF in 1999 declared the aim of directing banking sector via a comprehensive banking reform towards giving loans to the fixed capital investments rather than selling money capital to the state, this hinted at shifting to a new capital accumulation pattern based on productive capital (Karakaş, 2009; Oğuz, 2012). However, such a fundamental departure from existing pattern of capital accumulation with various socialisations embedded in the state on behalf of not just capital but also wider sections of society required much more comprehensive changes beyond a banking sector reform. A subsequent economic crisis in the February of 2001, which hit Turkish economy so severely that dynamics of capital accumulation almost stopped, would bring an opportunity to restructure class relations in a comprehensive manner.

3.5. Labour Regime in the post-2001 Period: From State Repression to Direct Market Ruling?

The February of 2001 crisis appeared first in the domestic banking sector and then involved rapidly all economic activities²³, with an extra-ordinary situation not just in Turkish economy but also in politics. In response, a particular economic programme called the “Transition to a Strong Economy” was subsequently made within a great effort of different sections of Turkish bourgeoisie in a direct collaboration with international capital. As an essential part of this programme, a set of laws regarding with the operation and management of various economic activities ranging from agriculture and industry to finance, was enacted in National Assembly under the pressures by capitalist actors with a motto called “15 laws in 15 days”. In this line, the Central Bank received an autonomous institutional structure; privatization of state enterprises became facilitated; public procurement law changed in ways to ease the involvement of international capital into domestic market; state agricultural subsidies were shifted from the support for guaranteed buying at -politically constituted- floor prices to

²³ As a consequence of the crisis, the GDP decreased by 9.5 percent and the domestic currency received devaluation by 21.2 per cent.

the temporarily designed direct income support programme; specific type of institutions were set up within the state in a full entitlement to direct and manage some important economic activities such as the production of sugar, tobacco and alcohol. The main logic of these laws was to restructure the relations of the state and economy into depoliticised institutional forms in compatible with the dynamics of global capitalist economy (Ercan, 2003; Bayramoğlu, 2005; Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman, 2009b). Through this restructuring of the state, it is claimed, there would be no place for the using of political rents over market relations that has been the disease of state-economy relations since the foundation of Turkish Republic. To leave aside the liberal illusion of this claim about market relations as being formed and operated in isolated ways without political interventions (see Yalman, 2007), such restructuring has led to a fundamental change in class relations. They were increasingly subjected to abstract value relations operating at wider scales while at the same time having been lack of existing socialisation forms within the state. In this respect, the years following the 2001 crisis has brought not just a new phase based on productive capital in the capital accumulation process but also a historical break in the ordering of the processes of production and reproduction towards direct market-ruling.²⁴

Such a break has been much reflected in the capital-labour relation within different legal and institutional forms. One of the first legal regulations made by the Justice and Development Party²⁵ in power was the individual labour law. Although the re-regulation of the collective labour law in the military junta period had brought considerable advantages to employers, they have also sought to

²⁴ For a similar emphasize from the perspective of political Marxism, see (Düzgün, 2012).

²⁵ The Justice and Development Party (JDP), which was founded in 2001 as the transformed successor to the political Islamist movement, gained 35 percent of the votes in the early general election of 2002, and thus formed a single party government after the long years of coalition governments throughout the 1990s (Savran, 2014:86-93). In a close association with the emerging capitalists called Islamic bourgeoisie, the JDP fully adopted liberal economy and presented itself as the conservative-democrat party in an appeal to the influential international actors as well as to the liberal intellectuals (Hoşgör, 2014:238-243).

change individual labour law since the 1990s since it was not seen as flexible enough to make them competitive in market from their perspective. The Labour Law no. 1425 came into force in 1970 with the imprints of the conciliatory labour regime at that time, which in practice meant that workers could individually receive some legal protections in their relations with employers. For example, since there was no capitalist definition of work in the Law, the judiciary would rather give its verdict on behalf of employee by considering him/her as the weaker party in the dispute within the scope of the Obligations Act (Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir, 2006:316). Although the Constitutional Court's decisions brought some restrictions against employees in line with the rising discourse of the "protection of workplace" throughout the 1990s, the Labour Law remained within its relatively social democratic origins that came to be no longer tolerated by employers. Given the fact that, in comparison with the collective labour law, the individual labour law has a wider area of application including informal sector if the worker could bring the dispute before the court, employers have increasingly demanded a new Labour Law that would provide them with so-called flexible conditions against employees.

The new Labour Act of Turkey no. 4857 was enacted in 2003, with essential changes in various aspects of employee-employer relations ranging from the obligations to the conditions of work in favour of the latter (Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir, 2006)²⁶. First of all, in spite of the previous one, the new Labour Act particularly defines the concept of individual employment contract in an explicit capitalist form by referring to the subordination of employees at workplace, thereby no longer allowing the judiciary to consider any employment dispute within the scope of Obligations Act in a way to protect the weaker party (Article 8).²⁷ Such a capitalist definition of individual employment contract -based

²⁶ The following considerations regarding with the new Law Act of Turkey are mainly based on this article.

²⁷ The first sentence of article 8 defines the labour contract as a type of contract whereby a party (employee) undertakes to perform, under subordination, a service in return for which the other party (employer) undertakes to pay him/her a certain wage (Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir, 2006:318)

on the notion of subordination- gives its tone to other important regulations in the new Labour Act. For example, whereas the previous one gave the worker the right to both terminate employment contract and claim severance pay without a prior notice when the employer altered the conditions of employment, the new Labour Act empowers the employer to force the worker under new conditions by just stating in writing that the change is compulsory (Article 12). The notion of subordination to the employer in the definition of employment contract is also influential in the re-regulation of working hours. Under the previous system, the number of working hours was legally distributed evenly over the working week and the working week was officially 45 hours. In contrast, the new Labour Act leaves to the employer's discretion the distribution of weekly working hours until a maximum of 11 hours a day. Furthermore, it does not consider the duration of overtime work on the basis of the number of weekly working hours as it was under the previous Labour Act; instead, the new Labour Act calculates the overtime work from the number of working hours in a two-month period. It also gives the employer the right to extend this period to four-month on the condition that it was added to the collective contract. This means in practice both the increasing degree of so-called flexibility in the working hours at the employer's discretion and two or even four months deferral of overtime work payment. The former is further strengthened by providing the employer with the increasing power to determine the start, break and finish times of the working day in the 24-hour period (Article 67).

In addition, the new Labour Act considers the subordination of the employee to the employer at the workplace as continuously operating employment relation without interruption due to any reason. According to the classical labour law, it was enough for worker to carry out his/her obligation at the workplace by serving him/her labour power, irrespective of being used, to the command of the employer. However, the new Labour Act, via the invention of a new concept called compensatory work, gives the employer the right to demand in two months that workers work without any corresponding payment to compensate the suspension of work for any reason (Article 63). In this line, another

extraordinary regulation in the new Labour Act that relieves the employer of his/her obligation to the worker is provided as a direct state support in recession times. According to this, when the weekly working hours are reduced due to economic crisis or unforeseeable circumstances, the employer can direct the workers to the state to receive the payment of such reduced hours in a four-week period (Article, 65).

In sum, the Labour Act of 2003 (no.4857) fundamentally shifted the form of individual labour law from the one imprinted with a logic of mutual obligations between employee and employer to the one based on the capitalist nature of work as the subordination of the former to the latter. This has created a qualitative change in the power of individual capitalists over workers within labour process, because workers became subordinated to the capitalists not just generally through labour market relations but also particularly within the workplace level relations. This new form of subordination is associated with a new legal subject of the employer who is capable of determining the conditions of work in many instances (Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir, 2006:327). Given the fact that the new Labour Act is much more concerned with the increasing of working time, it may be also argued that such employer has developed on the basis of absolute surplus value production strategies which seem to correspond to the formal subordination of labourers to capital irrespective of their skills and capacities as opposed to the real subordination in a Marxian sense. Nevertheless, as it was claimed in Chapter 1, there is no unilinear process from absolute to relative surplus value production strategies in the development of capitalist production; rather, the former have always been in the employers' agenda either as viable alternative to relative surplus value production within the context of instable labour market conditions or as the more effective ways of implementing it within labour process. Therefore, departing from the fact that the main concern of the new Labour Act is the increasing of working time, it is not safe to argue that absolute surplus value production strategies have been the single form of the relations between capital and labour in the post-2001 crisis period. In contrast, some other policies that aim to restructure labour market conditions along with the dynamics of investments

also signalled to the development of relative surplus value strategies in capital-labour relations at the same period.

In this line the most prominent example is the “active labour market policies” that have been increasingly implemented since 2001 to create a flexible labour force in adapting to the rapidly changing dynamics of capital accumulation through so-called “life-long training programmes”. In coordination with the employers seeking for the qualified labour force, the state has initiated various training programmes through which to make labourers qualified enough to be employed. Furthermore, the labourers themselves have increasingly assumed the burden of these programmes after the completion of temporal subsidies. An important consequence of these policies has been, *inter alia*, to decrease the importance of formal education while giving privilege to the short-term training towards the employment (Ercan and Oğuz, 2014). In this direction, the JDP government also made a radical step by introducing a new law dubbed as “4+4+4 education model” in 2012. Leaving aside its wider political implication as the Islamisation of education system, this education model, which divided the eight-year primary education period into two stages and allowed for the vocational training starting from the second stage, has paved the way for a direct connection between education and employment, shifting completely the aim of the former to create labour force in compatible with the requirement of employment. All in all, this reflects a strong tendency in Turkish capitalism towards relative surplus value production strategies.

Indeed, certain sections of Turkish bourgeoisie have much expressed this tendency in their demand for a “new industrial policy” after a certain stage in the spectacular growth of the post-2001 crisis period. This policy is meant for a shift in the composition of industry from labour intensive to capital intensive and higher skilled production as they have seen the former no longer competitive (TEPAV 2007; TUSİAD, 2008). Furthermore, a new incentive package for promoting investment, which was introduced in 2012 as a result of increasing pressure for a new industrial policy, revealed that such a shift in the composition

of Turkish industry has geographical differentiation across the country. Defining six regions on the basis of their development levels, the incentive package encourages high- and medium-technology based investments in the western provinces while supporting labour intensive investments in the less developed regions (Resmi Gazete, 2012). In this line, the most labour intensive sectors are encouraged to move to the poorest regions in the east and south-eastern part of the country. Considered with respect to the surplus production strategies, this geographical pattern generally implies that policies towards relative surplus value extraction come into the prominence in the most developed provinces while absolute surplus value methods are predominantly used in poorer regions.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the change in the direction of Turkish capitalism towards productive investments did not refer to the decreasing of non-productive activities, i.e., financialisation in economy; rather, it has developed along with the increasing financial investments throughout since the 2001 crisis (BSB, 2012). As it is seen in the Table 3.1 below, industrial growth has been accompanied with the high growth rates in service sector where financial activities are concentrated. The increasing development of non-productive investments can also be found in the employment numbers of this period which shows that there has been more growth in non-productive sectors (commerce, finance, bureaucracy) in comparison with productive sectors such as agriculture, industry and mining (BSB, 2012:86-7). This spectacular economic growth on behalf of non-productive sectors has been closely linked with a certain monetary policy facilitating the inflows of international capital to be used in profitable investments including industrial production while at the same time leading to the overvalued exchange rates. As the latter makes the imports cheaper, industrial production has then been towards importing much of the intermediate inputs. A corollary was the extraordinary increase in imports along with the industrial growth, which in turn gave rise to not only the increasing of balance of payment deficits in general but also relatively lower rate of increase in employment in particular. For example, although the average annual growth rate in industrial production has spectacularly increased to 7.3 per cent between 2004 and 2007, the

annual growth in employment rates were, in a revised calculation according to the new population projections, respectively 1.8 per cent, 1.6 per cent and 0.5 per cent for each year in the same period (BSB, 2012: 45).

Table 3.1. Economic Growth Rates in Turkey Between 1999 and 2010 (%)

Year	Agriculture	Industry	Service	GDP
1999	-5.7	-4.6	-1.3	-3.0
2000	7.1	6.3	6.6	6.5
2001	-7.9	-9.1	-0.9	-4.5
2002	8.8	4.6	4.8	5.2
2003	-2.0	7.8	4.1	4.5
2004	2.8	11.8	9.7	9.6
2005	7.2	8.7	8.6	8.5
2006	1.4	10.2	7.1	4.8
2007	-6.7	5.8	6.4	4.8
2008	4.3	-1.3	2.3	1.3
2009	3.6	-8.6	-1.8	-3.6
2010	1.6	13.6	7.7	8.9

Source: BSB (2012: 43)

Therefore, the direction of Turkish capitalism towards productive investments in the post-2001 period has developed in a manner extremely depending on financial and product markets operating at wider scales, thereby making it highly fragile against the instable nature of global capital accumulation process. Moreover, to the extent that this has given rise to the increasing value pressure over productive investments, domestic capitals came to face with the crisis dynamics not just in their valorisation process but also in the revalorisation process of the accumulated capital. As a response, the JDP government introduced an aggressive spatial policy aimed to turn the natural resources and urban areas into a new field of capital accumulation mainly through the construction of hydroelectric power plants on rivers and initiating urban regeneration projects in the big cities (Ercan, 2013). Leaving aside the environmentally destructive and socially exclusive consequences of this state policy, it paved the way for the development of a particular accumulation pattern within Turkish capitalism depending directly on state authorities and their discrete decisions. As the state came to play a direct role in the capital accumulation process, the result has then

been the increasing politicisation of class relations, with the tensions and conflicts among capitals and between capital and labour (cf. Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014).

In this process it was the 2008 world economic crisis that made these tensions and conflicts within Turkish capitalism manifested in a clear manner. The immediate effects of the 2008 crisis as a sharp contraction in demand at the western countries hit the industrial production severely in Turkish economy. In 2009, industrial production decreased by 8.6 per cent and the unemployment rate increased from around 10 per cent to 14 per cent (BSB, 2012:46). The impact of the 2008 world economic crisis on class relations in Turkey became so staggeringly that it had considerable repercussions at the political level. A striking sign of them came out in the local elections in March of 2009, as a result of which the ruling party, JDP, had first, if not a defeat, a remarkable loss after its foundation in 2001.

The response to the consequences of the 2008 world economic crisis in Turkish economy became mainly in two different forms. Initially, the state developed certain ways of making direct contributions to the operation of financial capital while at the same time attempting to boost domestic consumption via making remarkable discounts in some selected consumption goods so as to compensate for the losses of industrial capital in export markets. In addition to these direct state supports as short-term cautions, a relatively comprehensive policy called “employment package” was also introduced to decrease the increasing unemployment rate. This package includes both some ‘hiring subsidies’ to the employers (meaning the reduction of employers’ non-wage costs) and different types of flexible work contracts as well as so-called active labour market policies such as vocational training programmes (Bozkurt and Yalman, 2012; Aydın, 2012: 104). In this way, a remarkable part of the employers’ responsibilities to the employees became socialised through the state supports. The amount of them is reported to have reached to the equivalence of 3.42 per cent of the GDP in 2009 (BSB, 2012:58).

With respect to the employment conditions, the employment package did not bring any improvements but the acceleration of ongoing trends towards precarious and flexible forms of employment. In practice, these employment forms have been mainly relied upon the subcontracting firms undertaking collateral parts of labour process in the name of main employers (Çerkezoğlu and Göztepe, 2010). While being previously seen only in few sectors dominated by informal relations like construction, employment via subcontracting firms came to be the main axis of class relations in Turkey. The number of registered “subcontracted worker” triplicated between 2002 and 2007 and also increased by 50 per cent between 2007 and 2011 (Öngel, 2014:40). Furthermore, as the state came to act like capital at the production level because of the consequences of neoliberal financial constraints, subcontracting work contracts have also developed rapidly in the public sector, health and education in particular²⁸. Worse still, the National Employment Strategy, launched by the state in 2011 for a comprehensive change in capital-labour relation, promises to increase and consolidate subcontracting relations in employment (Bozkurt and Yalman, 2012).

Table 3.2. The Number of (Registered) Subcontracted Worker in Private and Public Sector

Year	Number of Worker Employed by Subcontracting Firms
2002	387,118
2003	449,011
2004	581,490
2005	657,677
2006	907,153
2007	1,163,917
2008	1,261,630
2009	1,049,960
2010	1,293,898
2011	1,611,204

Source: Öngel (2014: 40)

²⁸ The subcontracted workers employed in the state services are specifically in the health sector. In 2009 it was reported that while there were 174,857 workers employed by the subcontracting firms in the state services, 108,000 of these workers worked in the health sector (Öngel, 2014:41).

The basic capitalist motive behind the development of subcontracting relations is to fragment the collective potentiality of workers based on the socialisation dynamics within labour process. In this respect, the rise of subcontracting relations in employment throughout the 2000s undermined the unionisation attempts that have been already repressed under the legal framework of the 1982 Constitution. What's more, the acceleration of both privatization and clearance of public enterprises after the 2001 crisis became detrimental to the union organisations at these enterprises. Thus, the rate of unionisation in Turkey appears to have the lowest level among the OECD countries: while it was 20 per cent in 1980 and 10 per cent in 2000, unionisation rate declined to 5 per cent in 2010 (OECD, 2011). According to the recent statistics on unionisation by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the number of registered workers (excluding public officers) in Turkey is 12,287,288 of which 1,189,481 workers are unionised. Then, the unionisation rate is officially 9.45 per cent (Resmi Gazete, 2014). However, even though reflecting more reliable data about the number of employment and unionised workers in comparison with the previous statistics, this official calculation remains inadequate with respect to international standards because it does not take into consideration the number of unregistered workers that have indeed constituted remarkable part of the employment in Turkey²⁹. Furthermore, according to international standards, unionisation rates should be based on the actual implication of unionisation that is the number of workers that are capable of making collective contract. In this perspective, the total number of workers (excluding public officers) reveals nearly as 14 million while there are approximately 750,000 unionised workers employed within the scope of collective contract. As a result, the actual unionisation rate appears to be around 5 per cent that is indeed compatible with what OECD puts forward. Worse still, when private sector is considered, it appears that only 400,000 workers are

²⁹ One of the prominent aspects of labour market in Turkey has always been about the high rates of unregistered employment. However, there has been a slight decrease from 50.1 per cent to 43.5 per cent in the rate of unregistered employment between 2004 and 2008. Yet, this has been still high. More importantly, as of 2008, the rate of unregistered employment among wage and salary earners in the non-agricultural sectors was 24 per cent. This rate rises to 30 per cent in private sector (BSB: 2012:53).

unionised within the scope of collective contract in spite of the fact that the total number of private sector workers are nearly 13 million workers. In other words, the unionisation rate in Turkey comes to be around 3 per cent (Çelik, 2014).

Table 3.3. Unionisation Rates in Turkey (per cent)

	Wage and Salary Earners* (person)	Unionisation	Public Sector	Private Sector
1980	-	47.6	89.2	24.2
1990	3,563,527	42.5	93.3	22.7
1995	3,905,118	24.5	79.3	10.3
2000	4,521,081	16.0	55.4	6.4
2005	5,022,584	14.9	50.2	6.0
2008	5,414,423	8.19	50.1	6.0
2014**	12,287,238	9.68	-	-

Source: Social Insurance Institution quoted in Yücesan-Özdemir (2012:140) and Ministry of Labour and Social Security

* Wages and salary earners include only the number of registered workers.

** The statistics of 2014 are taken from the updated data prepared by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security in July.

It is possible to think that the declining rate of unionisation in Turkish capitalism provides a parallel tendency along with the process of restructuring world capitalism since the 1980s on the basis of what is called “de-constitutionalisation of labour”. However, such a low level of unionisation also stems from the persistence of an extra-ordinary hostility to the workers’ collective organisations in the legal framework of Turkey over decades. Despite various amendments made by different governments to the 1982 Constitution, there has been no change in the articles 51, 53 and 54 bringing strict restrictions to labour organisations (Özdemir, 2013:51). Thus, the main aim of the 12th September of 1980 coup to displace workers’ collective organisations from economic and political decision-making processes has remained unchanged over the decades (Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman: 2009b:119). Although the JDP government has recently introduced a new Labour Union Law no. 6356 by both reducing the ten per cent of national sectoral threshold for the official recognition of the unions and removing the notary condition for membership application, it did not brought considerable advantageous to labour organisations and unionisation in practice. First of all, the new one per cent sectoral threshold remains high for labour unions

within the context that the actual unionisation rate declined to the level less than five per cent. Second, the shift from the notary condition to the using of electronic password given by the state for the union membership application does not provide workers with a more suitable condition in the unionisation process. In contrast, employers can more easily control and direct unionisation attempts by collecting workers' electronic passwords on the basis of the unequal power relations at workplace³⁰. What's more, the new Labour Union Law still keeps the Ministry of Labour and Social Security having the right to define the branch of industrial production on which labour unions are officially organised, thereby continuing to use, when necessary, political controlling over unionisation. In a similar manner, as it was before, the Law also gives the Cabinet the right to directly delay the strike for two months in the name of public order and health. As a consequence, it appears that the legal framework brought along with the military coup in 12th September of 1980 to restrict workers' collective organisation did not change but remains in a more consolidated form within a new phase of capital accumulation process.

On the other hand, along with all these worsening conditions for workers in the post-2001 period came a new wave of labour migration flows having with a fully proletarianised characteristic as opposed to the previous ones (Özüğurlu, 2011). Although there has been a gradual decline of the employment in agriculture since the 1980s, it was still around 39 per cent at the beginning of 2000, making the country one of the few peasant strongholds among the OECD countries. However, it has fallen sharply in the post-2001 period as the state abandoned the support purchases of agricultural products to a great extent and initiated temporarily direct income support as a rather compensatory policy³¹. As

³⁰ There have been many cases in which employers collected workers' electronic passwords in order to control the unionisation attempts. For further information: <http://direnemek.org/2014/12/29/isveren-e-devlet-sifresiyle-iscinin-sendika-uyeligini-sorguluyor-isten-atiyor/>

³¹ The amount of agricultural support decreased from the 3.2 per cent of GDP in 1999 to the 0.45 per cent of GDP in 2009 (Günaydın, 2009).

a result, employment in agriculture came to be around 24 per cent, with the dissolution of nearly 2.6 million small farmers into urban proletariats in a full sense between 2000 and 2010 (BSB, 2012:163). They have migrated not only to the big metropolitan cities of Turkey like İstanbul and Ankara but also to the medium-range newly-industrialising cities of inner Anatolia such as Denizli, Manisa, Antep and Kayseri. All in all, as Table 3.5 reveals, this process resulted with a great transformation in the class composition in Turkey by giving rise to a rapid growth of urban worker households from 49.6 per cent in 2002 to 61 per cent in 2010.

Table 3.4. Sectoral Distribution of Employment in Turkey (per cent)

	Agriculture	Industry	Service
1980	55.0	14.1	30.9
1985	50.9	15.3	33.8
1995	48.1	15.0	36.9
2000	34.5	17.2	48.3
2006	27.3	19.7	53.0
2008	23.7	20.6	55.7

Source: TÜİK Household Labour Force Survey, quoted in Yücesan-Özdemir (2012:136)

Table 3.5: Status in Employment in Turkey (per cent)

	Wage and Salary Earners	Employers	Self-Employed	Unpaid Family Workers	Total
2000	49.6	5.3	24.5	24.5	100
2006	56.5	5.4	23.5	14.7	100
2008	61.0	5.6	24.6	11.2	100

Source: TÜİK Household Labour Force Survey, quoted in Yücesan-Özdemir (2012:134)

Given the decreasing real wages, entire privatization of state enterprises, commercialisation of public services, full commodification of urban land and increasing housing prices as well as high unemployment rates, such a massive growth of urban proletariat, while remarkably sustaining productive capital either as an active labour force or as a reserve labour army, would inevitably lead to the rise of social and economic inequalities that are detrimental to the reproduction of class relations in both economic and political manners. It is presumably because

of the perception of these detrimental consequences on class relations that Turkish state and capital have been increasingly interested in social policy yet within a particular reformulation. According to this reformulation, which indeed represents a part of wider strategy called post-Washington consensus developed by international capital in an attempt to overcome the destructive consequence of neoliberal market-therapy policies, social policy is meant to develop certain complementary measures to the operation of market relations. Thus, social policy is no longer considered as a redistributive state intervention but rather as a set of poverty reduction programme to be carried out without creating conflicts among social classes. In this respect, such a reformulation brings with it not only market-oriented social policy schemes but also a substantial shift in the state's role within the process of reproduction of class relations that is from the redistribution to the so-called risk management (Yalman, 2011).

Thanks to the years of experience of Islamist political parties in the organisation of direct aids to the urban poor particularly during the period when they have been in the municipal power of various big cities including Istanbul and Ankara since 1994, the JDP government strongly committed itself to the implementation of this social policy since it came to power at the national level in 2002. More importantly, the government developed this implementation into a distinct social policy regime conducive to strong political control over the growing urban poor. Such social policy regime is relied upon a set of pragmatic articulations among neoliberal, conservative and Islamic aspects at different spatial scales. It has been articulated in such a way that even a purely neoliberal policy of social security reform could be introduced without receiving considerable reactions from the poor (Yücesan-Özdemir, 2012). In this case, the individualised participation model that would operate basically on market norms irrespective of different employment status is presented as an egalitarian aspect in the neoliberal social security system. This “market-egalitarianism” appeals to the poor that are generally employed in informal sectors or low-income private sectors with some underprivileged employment status in comparison with the state officers or relatively high income, unionised sections of the working class.

However, the support of the former is depended on the degree to which social assistance policies compensate for the consequences of such market egalitarianism. Thus, market-oriented policy reforms have been accompanied by the growth in social assistance particularly at the local scale. The importance of local scale lies in the fact that social assistance has long been organised through particular network relations among Islamic NGOs, municipal authorities and local capitalists as a kind of charity organisation without providing the poor with any right-based benefit that would bring financial pressure to the state.

Nevertheless, to the extent that these social assistance practices have grown enormously in a rather informal way, there appears a danger that the recipients may tend to use them as an enclave against market processes, thereby being detrimental to the capital accumulation process since such an enclave makes lower the dependency of labour on labour market. It is most likely because of the recognition of this possible danger that the JDP government needed to develop a more systematic framework for social assistance practices by transforming the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund into a General Directorate entitled to organise them via its local charities under the rule of the governorships of 81 provinces across the country. Hence appear central state-controlled social assistance mechanisms while still carrying out the charity-like practices. According to Kapusuz (2014), as of 2008 more than 10 million people/households received social assistance through the activities of the Social Assistance and Solidarity Charities in Turkey. Furthermore, throughout the years of the JDP rule the amount of social assistance has risen up from 0.2 per cent to 1.43 per cent in proportion to the GDP³². This shows that labourers came to be increasingly dependent on non-market relations of social assistance as capitalist market relations have dominated production and reproduction processes during the post-2001 crisis period of Turkey. Given the fact that social assistance has been organised as charity-like practices in top-down relations rather than state benefits

³² It should be added that these numbers are behind the reality because social assistance has been still carried out informally and in a fragmented manner despite the apparent central state policy to develop a more systematic framework.

on a formally universal base, this social policy also brings to the JDP government a distinct direct control power over labourers in non-democratic and authoritarian manners.

To sum up, the post-2001 period brought a new context to the development of class relations in which labourers have been severely surrounded by market exchange relations that considers them simply as a commodity (labour power) like other products being sold in market. In this context, labourers have been completely losing control on their own life to the rule of capital at different levels of social relations. First, as social reproduction came to be fully depended on market exchange relations, labourers have been increasingly subordinated to capital both in a formal sense that is the need for selling their labour power to the employer for their survival and in a real sense that involves their skills and capacities. Thus, while there has been enormous growth in the number of labourers seeking to be employed by capitalists into labour process, they are also expected to have compatible labour power in qualitative terms with the labour process being continuously shaped under the impositions of value relations. To this end, social existence of labourers are largely adjusted via education policies or training programmes according to the requirements of investments made within the dynamics of capital accumulation. Secondly, thanks to the new Labour Law of 2003 labourer has been no longer recognised as a concrete labour employed into a certain labour process within a mutual relation with the employer, but rather as an abstract capacity to work subordinated to the employer's service in highly flexible manners as to the duration and place. A corollary has been a huge loss of individual autonomy on the part of labourers in their relations with the employer at workplace. Thus, labourers become exposed in a much stronger way to the class nature of capitalist labour process that means in practice ordering workplace level relations at the full discretion of the employer. Thirdly, the wider social conditions of labourers have been also circumscribed by the rule of capital as the state was withdrawn from the redistributive socialisations. In this line, public policies fundamental to social reproduction of labourers such as education, health and housing have been carried out much more according to the market principles

and prices. Hence, there has been almost no enclave in which labourers can reproduce themselves in a way other than market exchange relations.

Nevertheless, as underlined in Chapter 2, capital-labour relation is essentially embedded in a set of contradictions fundamentally because the latter cannot be fully reduced to a commodity form that indeed constitutes the basis of the former. In this respect, such a wide range of domination by capital on the social existence of labourers would inevitably give rise to serious conflicts, shortage and failures in the development of class relations. As a matter of this tendency, during the post-2001 period there has been enormous increase in social and spatial inequalities within Turkish society to the effect that labourers came to the point where they have run into danger in providing even the basic needs for reproducing themselves. A clear evidence of this danger is the massive growth in the use of consumer credits among workers in the same period³³. According to a recent case study by Karaçimen (2014) on the metal workers in Istanbul, while indebtedness is overwhelmingly widespread among them (nearly 73 per cent of the workers were found in arrears), the most common types of debt are bank loan and credit card debt (56 per cent and 31 per cent of indebted participants respectively). Given the fact that, in comparison with the wage relation, credit is the rending of surplus value before the participation of labourers by the capitalist employer into labour process, the considerable rise in workers' indebtedness in the post-2001 period means the intensification of their dependency on the capital-labour relation itself, thereby worsening the social existence of labour in a vicious cycle. In addition, both the proliferation of social assistance networks and the remarkable rise in the state's expenditures of social policy along with its reformulation as risk-management at the same period also reveals that such vicious cycle has eventually arrived at a modern version of the poor laws of the

³³ The Banks Association of Turkey reported that in 2009 and 2010 while 42 per cent of the borrowers of consumer loans were people who earned less than 1000 TL, 28 per cent of the borrowers were those whose average monthly income was between 1000 TL. Considered with respect to the composition of borrowers by occupation, this situation shows that wage earners constituted more than half of the consumer loan borrower in 2009 and 2010 (quoted in Karaçimen, 2014:2).

earlier phases of industrial revolution. In other words, social existence of labour has been put into an oscillation between market-exchange relations and charity-like state assistances. Worse still, the latter have been also constrained to the degree that the labourers would not use them as an enclave in the face of market exchange relations. Thus, the situation increasingly appears on the part of the labourers to fight for their survival against the impositions of both market exchange relations and the state's restrictions as both consider them either simply as commodity, namely abstract labour, or only as submissive recipients without having a social and political existence.

3.6. Concluding Remarks

This chapter shows that labourers have always been imposed by certain control practices conducive to different labour regimes within the contradictory development of class relations in the course of capital accumulation process within Ottoman-Turkish geography. Since this process was largely formed through the constitution of modern Turkish state within a specific type of bourgeoisie revolution excluding active participation of the masses, labour regimes and class relations have been effectively imprinted with the state itself taking different forms according to the different phases of capital accumulation process. This historical formation of the state-society relations gave rise to the paternalist role of the state within class relations in the initial phase of accumulation process in which the circuit of commercial capital were gradually extended towards that of productive capital. The balance between protective measures and authoritarian power within the state's paternalist role changed over time at the expense of the former as the state had to directly involve into industrial investments due to the disappearance of favourable conditions of accumulation in the wake of the Great Depression of 1929. However, although the latter could move towards despotic characteristics within the extraordinary economic conditions of the Second World War, the state continued to provide certain protections against capitalist development on the basic condition that they were limited to the individual level without referring to any collective rights on a class base. This protection transformed into a fundamentally different form in the post-

war period particularly since the 1960s when an extensive industrialisation process developed along with the massive growth of labourers in cities. In this period, class relations took a conciliatory form based on the collective organisations of capital and labour as long as the state sustained domestic accumulation process through both direct industrial investments and financial supports. Yet, as the state appeared as the primary base for socialisation dynamics against the competitive impositions of value relations at wider scales, such conciliation ended up in a short period politicising class relations, thereby making difficult for the state to manage the increasing tensions and conflicts among social classes. Hence came out the limits of domestic accumulation process along with the fundamental crisis of capital-labour relation.

Therefore, when the pattern of capital accumulation was needed to involve into world market through export promotion in labour intensive production in the beginning of 1980s, it initially required repressing the collective organisations of labourers in order to suppress the wages and labour militancy. Such a repressive regime was brought by the military intervention in 1980 and then legally built upon the 1982 Constitution basically aimed to depoliticise class relations through the state's authoritarian supervision over workers' collective organisations. Thus, labourers were kept under the state's repressive control while neoliberal market-based policies were imposed in a severe manner. The consequences of this process on labourers such as massive lay-offs, decreasing wages and increasing poverty were partly ameliorated through the use of urban land in a relatively inclusive spatial policy. Yet, to the extent such neoliberal policies failed to bring an investment boom absorbing the increasing tensions within class relations, a new wave of labour militancy arisen out of public sector workers' struggles in response to the privatization attacks paved the way for the development of wider socialisation demands on the part of labourers and peasants squeezed by neoliberal market-based policies. In response, external financial liberalisation was adopted by the state as a strategy of overcoming the emergent difficulties within the capital accumulation process. Thus, the state played again as the prominent socialisation area for social classes against the contradictions of capital

accumulation. However, as the accumulation process became directly subordinated to the circulation of money capital at wider scales due to the financial liberalisation, the state and economy came to be exposed much more to the abstract value impositions of world market relations, experienced in the subsequent crises of 1994, 1998 and 2001. This crisis-ridden development of accumulation process came eventually to the point that existing forms of socialisation concentrated into the state could not survive any longer under the increasing pressures of value impositions.

In this line, the post-2001 period has given rise to a fundamentally different class relation in which world market-exchange relations have developed into the immediate and the sole means to the social reproduction of labourers. It has been particularly enabled by the restructuring of the state towards guaranteeing and promoting capital accumulation through being stripped away from its enduring socialisation forms such as direct state investments, agricultural subsidies and other public supports over market-exchange relations. Since then there has been an unsettling wave of proleterianisation together with the dissolution of vast small farmers into urban proletariat on the one hand; on the other hand a breakneck economic growth embracing inflows of international money capital, overseas trade and immense productive investments. Thus, growing number of labourers came to be fully dependent on capitalist investments considering them simply as abstract individuals (labour power to produce surplus value) under the direct impositions of world-market exchange relations. In practice, this has meant prevailing insecure and uncertain employment forms within capital-labour relation, being continuously threatened with the lay-offs and unemployment due to the instable nature of world-market exchange relations. However, such abstraction and precariousness within the emergent labour regime pose a fundamental threat to the social reproduction of labourers. Thus, it becomes inevitable for labourers to find the ways to save themselves, be it individually or collectively, against this threat.

CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN KAYSERI

4.1. Introduction

Kayseri is a city located in the centre of Anatolia in Turkey, with almost equidistant (900 km.) between Aegean shores in the west and the Iranian border in the east. The city has historically involved in trading and crafting activities mainly because it lies on a high plateau in the north of Erciyes mountain which provides poor quality for agricultural activities. It thus became one of the trade centers on historical Silk Road. From the 11th century to 13th century, Kayseri became also the second capital of Seljuk state as the hub of Ahkism (Ahilik)—an organised brotherhood among craftsmen. However, it was not until the late Ottoman era that any kind of industrial plant has been set up in Kayseri. During 18th and 19th century, there has been a nitre production plant where saltpetre was collected from the land around Kayseri and then sent to the gunpowder factory in Istanbul. In 1900, the population of Kayseri town was 56,200 nearly half of which was composed of non-Muslims who are mostly Armenians (18,900) and Greek Orthodox (2,800). These non-Muslim communities mainly held local trading activities until the Empire's last decade. It is reported that some Muslim traders first gathered in 1911 to set up a business firm called Islam Facility Company (Nazif, 1987; Dayıoğlu, 2005; Karatepe, 2001).

Nevertheless, it would still need to wait the foundation of Turkish Republic to see modern industrial investments in Kayseri. As a part of *etatist* economic policies in the first decades of the Republic, Kayseri was destined to have certain state enterprises and infrastructural investments. Among them are the Kayseri Aircraft Factory (1926), Kayseri-Ankara Railway (1927), Bünyan Hydroelectric Power Station (1930), Kayseri-Adana Railway (1933) and Kayseri Sümerbank Textile Factory (1933). The two state enterprises, Aircraft Factory and

Sümerbank, played fundamental roles in the development of manufacturing production in Kayseri, not just because they employed many workers and produced cheap materials for industrial activities, but mainly in that they provided local people with qualification in their own apprenticeship schools. Another public investment, the Boy's Arts School (Erkek Sanat Okulu), which was opened in 1942, also served to produce qualified labour that would later become a remarkable force in the development of local industry (Bilgili, 2001).

Therefore, it is clear that the beginnings of industrialisation in Kayseri were state supported. In addition, such large-scale state enterprises built during the *etatist* era became the only industrial firms in Kayseri over the years. In the wake of the end of World War II, when the *etatist* era ended and private manufacturing began to develop in Turkey, there were then two different types of industrial developments in Kayseri: on the one hand some big-sized private enterprises each of which had more than 200 employees were initiated for the first time, on the other hand many small-traditional craft workshops in the city-centre with 3 to 4 employees producing mainly copper ware, iron stuff and stove to directly sell them consumers tried to survive (Ayata, 1991: 71). However, there would be remarkable changes within this local industrial structure in the decades to come.

In this chapter, these changes are investigated analytically in two main periods: before and with the 1980s. Before the 1980s, the development of local industrial production had been strongly shaped by social and spatial forms of inward-oriented capital accumulation process associated with the nation-state's central policies. In this period while technical changes towards manufacturing and capitalist relations emerged in local industry, a certain level of accumulation achieved at the same time in both metal and textile sectors. Considering class relations and organisational aspects within labour process, I dissect the 'before the 1980s' into two sub-periods each of which is discussed with a reference to its own essential feature. With the 1980s, however, local industrial development was cast into a fundamentally distinct mold as neoliberal shift in economic policies gave

more international characteristics to the pattern of industrial accumulation. Thus, whereas the big-sized state enterprises in Kayseri were left into the disinvestment process, there has been an investment boom in local industry in which local class relations have been recomposed in new ways. The second section is then dedicated to the analysis of this recomposition. I analyse this process in two subsections referring to its essentially different moments while I also argue that the latter namely the post-2001 crisis period has meant a distinct phase in the whole history of local industrial development. This chapter ends with the concluding remarks in which current tensions and conflicts in local industrial development are underlined.

4.2. Local Industrial Production within Inward-Oriented Capital Accumulation Process

The post-war decades of Turkey as a so-called developing country were shaped by inward-oriented capital accumulation process that mainly refers to the transformation of domestic merchants into industrial bourgeoisie while including at the same time internal labour migration into big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and so on (Ercan, 2002). It was based on industrial investments within these cities for durable consumption goods as well as some intermediate goods through the import-substituted strategy with high tariff policies. This process meant, inter alia, the deepening of uneven development across the country, albeit including partially redistributive policies along with the five-year national development plans after 1961 (cf. Tekeli, 1982). For local industrial development in inner Anatolian cities like Kayseri, the implication was relatively the lack of capital as well as labour power since both moved into these big cities. Therefore, whereas giving rise to increasingly capital-intensive industries in the western parts of the country, inward-oriented capital accumulation was experienced in such Anatolian cities as an initial period of capitalist relations with dissolution of some pre-capitalist associations. In the sections below, I explore this period in reference to two episodes.

4.2.1. First Episode: Crafts Quarter (Sanayi Çarşısı) and The Cooperation of Craftsmen and Traders

In the early 1950s, the Crafts Quarter was built on just beyond the city limits to contain in the clearly organised small plots many craft workshops that had been concentrated hazardously in city-centre. While purchasing conditions were made favorable for craftsmen to settle in the Crafts Quarter, they were forbidden to continue crafting any longer in city centre. According to a Dutch economist called Leo Van Velzen, who carried out a research on industrial activities in Kayseri in the mid-1970s as part of a wider project by Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation in pursuit of developing so-called “return projects” for migrant workers in Europe, the consequence was the flourishing production supported by fine infrastructure of the Crafts Quarter (1977:37). However, as they moved to the then outskirts of city, this also meant a geographical separation of the craftsmen from selling their products directly to the consumers. For example, the coppersmiths were reported to have suffered much from the removal of crafting from the city-centre as they had lost their direct contacts (Ayata, 1991:93-94). The result was then increasing involvement of tradesmen as an influential force into craft production. In a closer investigation on crafting at that time in Kayseri, Ayata (1991) reveals that whilst the coppersmiths were rapidly subjected to the demands of tradesmen, the blacksmiths continued to have their autonomous production in the Crafts Quarter, since they had no deal with the wholesalers. On the other hand, the stove-crafts begun to feel increasingly depended on local tradesmen because they were financially unable to stock raw materials for a more series production. Thus, both through spatial segregation and due to financial limits, craft production in Kayseri begun in 1950s to be subordinated to the logic of capital accumulation via tradesmen.

In order for craft production to survive, there were nevertheless neither financial capacity to renew the means of production nor the facility to employ more qualified labour that was already scarce at local labour market. The only way appeared to develop, by the means of spatial closeness within the Crafts Quarter, a particular industrial organisation among craft workshops in which one

of them functioned for a more serial production as a central workshop in coordinating others (Ayata, 1991: 136-7). Depending on the technical aspects of each crafting, these workshops then began to transform into different forms of small-scale capitalist enterprises albeit being still operated under the control of a craft master. In this process, as qualified and experienced workers in large-scale state enterprises were increasingly needed for local industrial production, there emerged many forms of cooperation between local tradesmen and such skilled workers as well as among the latter to set up workshops and small manufacturing of metal products in the Crafts Quarter (Ayata, 1991: 138-144; Velzen, 1977: 103-11)³⁴.

In addition to spatial convenience, the Crafts Quarter meant a pool of cheap labour force for small-scale enterprises that were still being operated in a traditional employment system of apprenticeship. This was such an essential aspect of Crafts Quarter that even in the mid-70s Velzen noted that not only small workshops struggling to survive but also others to expand into considerable size of manufacturing preferred to stay in Crafts Quarter so as to benefit from the cheap labour force (1977:125):

I have in mind an enterprise which I actually consider middle-scale already and which I expect to move away from the crafts quarter in the near future to more spacious accommodations. At present this enterprise has organised production within the craft quarter in a number of smaller workshops. They selected this production set-up with conscious intent fully aware that in so doing they could make use of inexpensive apprentice labourers and could evade run-ins with unions or government inspectors. In this manner the crafts quarter has become a shelter or breeding ground for nascent industrial enterprises accumulating capital in preparation to making a leap into the world beyond.

This cheap labour force generally meant to these children who were sent to industry from near villages where there were few economic activities to survive for their joint families. A recent PhD study focusing on the extraordinary

³⁴ It should be noted that the closing of Aircraft Factory in 1950 facilitated the shifting of qualified labourers employed in state enterprises into local industry within associate firms.

industrial performance in the last four decades of a small town called Hacilar, which was at that time a village having with only 14 km. distance from the city, reveals the miserable conditions of these children some of whom would become today's major industrialists in Kayseri (Cengiz, 2012: 123):

They were on the road in the blind of the morning everyday, working in the dirty and unhealthy workshops, eating bad food on the newspapers in a corner of the workplaces and taking almost nothing. They were facing with insults and dressing-downs as ordinary attitudes everyday and they did not have regular working hours. Expectedly, they deprived of any kind of social rights and did not have any organizational protection mechanism. Most of the time they were working until late night and some time sleeping in the workplaces or same single rooms in the squatters of Kayseri

To sum up, despite the poor conditions for industrial development such as financial inadequacy (and thus high dependency on commercial capital), limited number of skilled labour and geographical distance to the production places of basic raw materials, the Crafts Quarter of Kayseri provided local enterprises with a pool of cheap labour force within a spatial facility to develop a specific industrial organisation based on workshops and small manufacturing units. With the using of limited cheap labour for accumulation, these manufacturing units had a gradual development in local (private) industry by concentrating in the production of metal stuff such as stove, cooker or simple separators. Ayata (1991), who studied in the late 1970s on the relations of capital accumulation and social change in the case of metal sector in Kayseri, underlines that it was not until a certain level of accumulation and experience was achieved in the 1960s that serial production took place in local industry. In terms of the emergence of mass production, such gradual development from small workplaces to relatively big manufacturing provides a different case from the large-scale investments that have occurred to local industry especially since the late-60s (1991: 134-5). Because the latter was based on different social and spatial dynamics, I below consider them within a second episode in the initial period of industrial accumulation in Kayseri.

4.2.2. Second Episode: The Shift to Mass Production via Worker Remittances

In his research, Velzen noted that whereas craft and small-scale industrial enterprises chose to locate in Crafts Quarter as well as in the new one built in 1972, medium and big scale manufacturing as factory halls jumped towards wider locations along motorways in and around the city of Kayseri (1977:50). According to figures in Table 4.1, besides four state industrial enterprises, there were thirty-two private ones with more than 10 employees in Kayseri in the beginnings of the 1960s. However, it was only these four public enterprises that constitute the two-thirds in terms of employment in local industry at that time, dominating over private enterprises in every respect until the mid-1970s.

Table 4.1: Industrial Enterprises (with more than 10 employees) in Kayseri between 1968 and 1974

	1964		1966		1968		1974	
	Total	State	Total	State	Total	State	Total	State
Number of Enterprises	36	4	26	5	31	5	67	6
Number of employment	6389	4202	6058	3916	6225	3740	10996	4260

Source: Velzen (1977:67).

The development of private enterprises in local industry relied on the complex combination of a number of dynamics such as a certain level of money, technology-transfer capacity, forward and backward linkages, labour market possibilities and so on. For example, furniture firms that were to lead local industry after the 1980s had been only at the level of the craft production of doors, windows and frames three decades ago. The original corps of carpenters began to make upholstered furniture in 1959. According to Velzen (1977:74), the turning point in furniture production came out with the introduction of a new material called formica into local industry in 1962. After that, furniture workshops developed in Kayseri by producing upholstered furniture as well as formica cabinets and tables. In addition, when a factory was first opened in Turkey for

manufacturing rounded and square hollow pipes that are useful for table and chair legs, some furniture workshops in Kayseri began to turn into large enterprises for developing mass-production of tables and chairs. These enterprises were also seen to have constituted some trade corporations among themselves on the basis of their owners' social networks, i.e., village backgrounds or relative ties in order to overcome the monopolistic power of local merchants on trading raw materials. Yet, such initiatives had not arrived at the setting up a furniture factory despite that some attempts were revealed. For Velzen, this failure stems from the fundamental fact in furniture sector that it was difficult to compete in terms of both price and quality with those enterprises in Bursa-İnegöl, a town in Marmara region in the western parts of the country where wood industry was mainly centered. Thus, the influential power of commercial activities on local industry continued to exist.

Nevertheless, there was a remarkable stepping up at that time among local private enterprises in metal and textile products. Velzen (1977) and Ayata (1991) reported considerable amount of growth cases in the production of metal goods in which once a small workshop or manufacturing in the Crafts Quarter turned into large scale manufacturing halls or small factories located on a wider land. However, further private initiatives in these sectors were only launched at that time in the form of multi-partnership investments whose holders were mostly migrant workers employed in European countries (Velzen, 1977: 76). In this line, workers remittances were mainly used for the introduction of new technologies into local industry, with the constitution of big scale multi-partner private enterprises in Kayseri such as Erbosan and Hes Kablo in metal products or Orta Anadolu, Lüks Kadife, Birlik Mensucat and Karsu Tekstil in textile products (DPT, 2002; Bilgili, 2001; Cengiz, 2012)³⁵.

³⁵ The state played an influential role in the development of these multi-partner industrial enterprises. Beyond the state economic policy in 1970s to use Turkish migrant workers' savings for compensating increasing deficit accounts due to import-substituted industrialization, both parts of the CHP and MSP coalition government at that time converged on the support of multi-partner ownership in economic enterprises as part of

The impacts of such developments towards mass-production in local industry were felt much in the metal sector heavily composed of craft and small manufacturing firms along with labour-intensive production. These developments brought together modern technologies and products that meant unfavorable conditions for the firms in metal sector to compete. In this scope, while the introduction of aluminum that was to replace copper as a raw material was the first step, the involvement of hydraulic presses into cast work instead of foundries constituted the second one in paving the way for the development of changes in local metal sector. The direct tangible implication of them was the shifting to a more serial production on assembled lines of aluminum pots, pans, electric ovens and metal stoves (Velzen, 1977: 79-83). The concentration of large private investments into metal products as well as textile sector throughout the late 60s and 1970s is clearly evident in the Table 4.2:

Table 4.2: Local Enterprises (with more than 5 employees) registered by Kayseri Chamber of Industry in 1976

Activities	Number of Workplace More than 100 employees	Number of employees	Number of Workplace Between 25 and 100 employees	Number of employees	Number of Workplace Between 5 and 25 employees	Number of employees	Total	
							Enterprises	Employees
Food Processing	4	1,383	2	124	13	150	19	1,657
Textiles	8	7,035	3	124	9	105	21	7,264

their wider political strategies. In this context, public institutions backed many multi-partner industrial investments in various forms.

Table 4.2 (continued)

Stoves, pressure, cookers, separators, ovens	6	1,186	8	411	12	167	35	1,764
Major Castwork	1	100	3	108	13	130	24	338
Steel furniture	-	-	7	237	12	119	26	356
Lathes	-	-	-	-	12	191	17	191
Copper and Aluminium sheets	1	110	-	-	4	37	7	147
Mines	1	150	4	258	2	27	8	435
Printing	-	-	-	-	7	78	7	78
Auto Batteries	-	-	-	-	3	28	6	28
Rubber	-	-	1	35	4	34	5	69
Plastic eater bottles	-	-	-	-	2	25	2	25
Steel wire	-	-	-	-	2	35	8	35
Heating installations	-	-	1	30	3	44	7	74
Door Knobs	-	-	2	109	1	8	3	117
Constructio n	1	127	1	33	3	38	8	198
Miscellane ous	3	2,260	2	95	9	91	21	2,446
TOTAL	25	12,351	34	1,564	111	1,307	224	15,222

Source: Velzen (1977:64).

However, such concentration resulted with changes not only in technical and organisational aspects of local industrial production but also in class relations. Ayata (1991) underlines that, when it comes to the late 1970s, there was no longer a strong tendency among qualified labourers or craft masters for stepping up to the owner of an industrial enterprise. This did not directly refer to the dissolution of small-scale manufacturing activities under the control of these masters since they could still survive on the basis of some specificities of their labour processes and even make a certain level of accumulation especially through the use of cheap labour force (1991: 173-4). Yet, there were clear signs of proleterianisation as the conventional apprenticeship system within small manufacturing provided no guarantee for having a self-employment as master craftsman. Velzen states that journeymen (*kalfa*) who had seen no future in small manufacturing sought to entry in medium and large scale enterprises, thereby undergoing a certain proleterianisation process (1977:120). They were preferred by large-scale enterprises to the new comers of local labour market. In this way, there emerged a particular relation on recruitment between small manufacturing and large-scale industries corresponding to a kind of segmentation within local labour market. Thus, while qualified workers tended to move into large industries, the newly coming labourers from the rural sides of Kayseri were recruited into small manufacturing (Ayata, 1991:187). The rising population of the city from 65,488 in 1950 to 281,320 in 1980 reveals the degree of the growth of local labour market within this mobility.

Table 4.3: The Population of Kayseri between 1927 and 1980

	1927	1950	1960	1970	1980
Kayseri (city)	39,544	65,488	102,596	160,985	207,039
Kayseri(province)	250,490	403,861	480,387	596,372	778,383

Source: Velzen (1977:29)

The proleterianisation process had been experienced more sharply in medium and large scale manufacturing to such a degree that workers in private sector developed unionisation at that time as a way of defending them against the

disruptive consequences of this process. Apart from the ones in state enterprises such as TEKSIF (The Textile, Knitting and Garment Industry Workers' Union) originally since 1947 in Sumerbank, local employers encountered for the first time labour unions in the beginning of 1970s when a group of metal workers joined İç Anadolu Metal-İş Union (Middle Anatolia Metal Workers' Union), affiliated with the nationally organised union confederation called Türk-İş (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions). It was at that time that TEKSIF also started to organise workers of textile industry in the multi-partnership private companies like Orta Anadolu and Birlik Mensucat.³⁶ This vibrant economic and political atmosphere among workers, in association with the national-level developments, had created 31 different trade unions in Kayseri (Velzen, 1977: 127)³⁷. In this line, class tensions within local industrial development has exploded during the 1970s, with the increasing conflicts between employers and employees provoking clashes among trade unions, especially in metal sector (Velzen, 1977:130):

Management, it can be seen, has a vested interest in disputes among the ranks of labour. They will applaud the principle 'divide and conquer', but at the same time they will abet the union with which they think they can work together most advantageously...Turk-Is had lost all influence in the metal sector in bygone years and had only re-entered the scene in October 1976. Entrepreneurs in small middle-scale enterprises were, in fact, a

³⁶ In a book of the Kayseri Branch of Turkish Red Crescent composed of interviews with charitable people (mostly businessmen), Tahir Horoz, who is presented as one of these people and has been the chairman of TEKSIF Kayseri Branch for 40 years without interruption, tells that his trade union even went on a strike for 59 days in 1973 in Orta Anadolu Company (Biol, 2011: 696)

³⁷ In terms of membership as a branch to the nationally organised bonds, there were in the 1970s three different affiliations among local trade unions that were organised in textile and metal sectors: Türk-İş, DISK (the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions) and MİSK (the Confederation of Nationalist Trade Unions). Türk-İş, which was established after the Second World War in a manner following the blueprint of American trade unions, had been the sole affiliation in Kayseri until 1974. DISK was involved in local industry when the metal workers' union separated from Türk-İş affiliation and decided in 1976 to join the Maden İş Union. On the other hand, MİSK, which had been established in 1970 as a national confederation in a reactionary manner against the workers' political uprising in affiliation with DISK, began to entry in local industry as the DISK-affiliated Maden-İs Union increased its influence on labour movement.

driving force behind the resuscitation of Metal-Is. In this way, they hoped to take some wind out of the sail of the more radical Maden-Is, affiliate of DISK. It would be far simpler to conclude a labour contract of their liking with Metal-Is which would be under their influence, indebted to them for revival.³⁸

Despite a considerable degree of proleterianisation, large scale investments and increasing class conflicts within local industry, for Velzen, the overall picture at the end of 1970s did not refer to what he considers (in a rather Weberian division) as “industrial capitalism” based on productive investments. Rather, it was dominated by “trade capitalism” in which accumulation is achieved mainly through trading, property ownership and rents, fundamentally because local industry was led by the demands for simple consumption goods which doesn’t entail capital-intensive investments especially in its peripheral conditions to the western parts of the country. Thus, the outcome was a labour-intensive industry having lack of prospective development without being supported by external factors such as workers’ remittances or increasing consumer demands

³⁸ An example of how this strategy was carried out would make clearer both the level of politicisation within class relations and the direct brutality by employers against workers at the end of 1970s in Kayseri: “For a union to prove that in a certain enterprise the union has a specific number of members, membership must be confirmed officially by a notary and signed. Evenings, however, notaries’ offices are closed, which posed the unions the problem of securing valid proofs of membership in a short time. Maden-Is organised a small action in response to the problem: during work hours, a hundred or so workers left the factory premises to have their membership in Maden-Is officially confirmed. The entrepreneur seized upon this action as sufficient provocation to discharge 7 ringleaders of this “walkout” on the spot, without compensation, and 20 others according to prescribed procedures. In this matter, the leadership of DISK’s representation was excluded. The additional 70-80 participants in the dynamite visit to the notary were allowed to remain. This prompted escalation of the clash. A spontaneous strike broke out which continued the next day. The next day police were present everywhere about factory grounds. The entrepreneur, moreover, now conveyed a notary to the factory itself. In the notary’s presence workers were put under pressure to register themselves as members of Metal-Is! Those who had participated in the previous day’s action were no longer in the factory; all were fired. A number of workers refused to sign on as Metal-Is members and declared their solidarity with the strikers so that they, too, lost their jobs... All in all, 200 workers were dismissed in the process. Metal-Is has won the right to be the official representative of the factory workers during the negotiations with management concerning the next collective labour agreement! (Velzen,1977:131).

(Velzen: 1977: 173-194)³⁹. On the other hand, Ayata draws a different conclusion that the additional involvement of medium and large-scale industrial enterprises into certain trading activities did not refer to the dominance of trade capitalism in local industry; rather, the profits from trade were made, when necessary, to support industrial investments (1991:201-3)⁴⁰. For him, accumulation process in Kayseri since the 1950s created strong tendencies of both embourgeoisification and proleterianisation, giving rise to remarkable local industrial bourgeoisie along with the development of particular local labour market formation. In this sense, there appeared fundamental changes in local social relations in the course of such industrialisation (Ayata, 1991:216).

Leaving aside the descriptive accounts either as trade capitalism or not, it is safe to conclude that both analyses point to that local industry, while being underway in a relatively gradual development towards small and medium manufacturing, rapidly stepped up via workers' remittances to a relatively large scale factory production within a new organisational form of multi-partnership companies especially in textile and metal sectors. In comparison with large-scale state enterprises; however, such multi-partnership companies were established to produce with the low-level technologies basic consumption goods for domestic markets. Accompanied with this development was the emergence of proleterisation within local industry along with an internal labour migration to the city leading to the rapidly growing local labour market. There have been two

³⁹ It should be noted that this labour-intensive characteristic of investment in Kayseri had a direct implication on class relations. Velzen, whilst explaining the power of employers against workers, underlined that although workers' strikes negatively effected the employers' profit, this did not reach at an alarming level leading the entrepreneurs into a survival crisis. Indeed, there were cases in which strikes could provide employers with certain advantageous to reduce the stocked products during the temporary stopping of production (1977:132). Workers' strike could then loose its real power within workplace politics against the employer.

⁴⁰ A recent PhD study on local industrial development, from an inter-generational perspective within a neo-institutionalist approach, also argues for the compensative using of trading activities in this period by specifically underlining local traditional families as the basic economic actor/unit in Kayseri to involve simultaneously via different family members both industrial investment and trading (Hovardaoglu, 2009: 126-8).

fundamental consequences of this process. First, to the extent that wage increases were pressured to comply with the declining of consumption demands within domestic market, this paved the way for the proliferation of conflicts between local employers and workers in which class relations became politicized to such a degree that even in medium sized enterprises workers could join the DISK-affiliated unions to raise their demands⁴¹. Second, this politicisation was also echoed in the wider local context. With the social democratic populist policies appealing to the growing urban proletariat in the city, the centre-left party of CHP came to the municipal power for the first time in the post-war period (Doğan, 2007:150-7).

It was then within such a politicized local context of the late-1970s that whereas technological limits, competitive domestic market, declining consumption demands and so on compelled local employers to take a stronger offense to labour, neither workplace politics nor local urban politics could enable them to move remarkably into this direction. In a prospective statement, Ayata concluded his study at that time by arguing that local industrial accumulation could only be continued through a particular system that would keep labour under an intense “economic-social pressure” (1991: 218). Such a kind of system would indeed bring along with the 1980s as the relatively conciliatory class relations of the domestic accumulation pattern ended in a shift to the neoliberal policies at national scale.

⁴¹ In a coincidental meeting with a local industrial man who went bankruptcy in the 2000s while managing a small scale workplace in the metal sector after the long years of experience as a worker stretching back to late 1970s, for example, I was told by him as follows: “In 1977, when I was 18 years old, I was working at Silver stove heater factory. We were 80 people there. MİSK was the union. We were not happy with it we got organized. When we were the majority with 55 people we went to DİSK and registered at Maden-İş union. When the boss found out about it though we gathered us all and put a lot of pressure. 15 of us resisted but not our other friends. We had to go to the court but the court decided to give MİSK the authorization”

4.3. Development of Local Industry in Kayseri within Neoliberal Context

The response to the nation-wide crisis of domestic capital accumulation was the new economic measures of January 24, 1980, supported by large-scale Turkish capital in association with the international agents of world-capital namely IMF, WB and so on. The main aim of these economic measures was to increase export-promotion through wage suppression within market-based policies (Ercan, 2002). Against the backdrop of the high level of politicisation within Turkish capitalism, this neoliberal agenda was backed by the military coup of September 12, 1980, which initially closed down the labour unions except for Türk-İş in order to depoliticize workers' collective organisation. In this process, as Turkish large-scale industrial companies became directly integrated with the competitive dynamics of global markets, there has been considerable tendency among these companies to shift some parts of their investment in the form of sub-contracting relations towards inner Anatolian cities where cheaper labour is available. These sub-contracting industrial relations were also extended in different forms with international companies (Köse and Öncü, 2000), leading to considerable changes in the geography of industry in Turkey in such a way that some inner Anatolian cities begun to be called the new industrial foci based on small- and medium-sized firms (Eraydın, 1992; 2004). In this framework, although there are important objections among scholars against both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of this industrialisation (Köse and Öncü, 1998; Erendil, 2000; Şengül, 2001; Bedirhanoglu and Yalman 2009a), it is generally agreed that local industrial development have entered into a new period with the 1980s in parallel with the development of neoliberal policies in Turkey. This new period also manifested itself particularly in Kayseri as local industry has been fundamentally restructured in relation with national and supra-national dynamics.

4.3.1. The Revival of Local Industrial Production

Neoliberal policies primarily affected local industry in two main ways. On the one hand, as neoliberal policies allowed for the operation of international-circuit of value across national market by removing high tariffs on imported

goods, local industrial firms were increasingly threatened with scrapping capacity or closures due to the failure in competition with imports. In a number of statistics on industrial production of Kayseri, there are clear signs showing that local firms could not resist such value pressures. For example, while the provincial share by Kayseri of the amount of value-added in the manufacturing of Turkey was 1.45 per cent in 1980, it has continuously decreased nearly by 40 per cent to 0.8 percent in 1992 (Bilgili, 2001). Besides, it is reported that the local industry's share within the provincial income distribution fell from 25 per cent in 1978 to 16,9 percent in 1992 (Özaslan and Şeftalici, 2002). Such a remarkable shrinking within local industrial production seems to have continued until the beginning of the 1990s:

Table 4.4: The Share of Local Industrial Production within National Manufacturing

Kayseri	1980	1988	1992	1997
Firms (%)	1.17	1.10	1.36	1.62
Employment (%)	-	1.78	1.84	2.18
Value-Added (%)	1.45	0.87	0.81	1.52

Source: Bilgili (2001:68-71)

On the other hand, there also appeared some alternative development ways in local industrial production for which the success-stories of two different industrial companies at that time have given the signs. Orta Anadolu, a local multi-partnership company in textile sector, when left to an economic bottleneck, was purchased in 1980 by the two originally Kayserian families living in Istanbul. The first measure by the new management against financial difficulties was to fire half of the workforce. As a short-term measure, the management also shifted to produce cheap yarn and cloth for export market in order to achieve foreign currency required for the renewing of production technologies. While having a remarkable development in a few years, the company also begun to make business contacts with the American clothing giant, Levi Strauss, which was seeking out local suppliers for its European factories. With the using of cheap credit opportunities by Turkey's Industrial Development Bank in association with a

World Bank programme, the local company has invested over five year 70 million US dollar for denim-cloth production, making itself one of there local suppliers for Levi Strauss at the end of 1980s. In the mid-1990s, the Orta Anadolu Company came to supply denim-cloth for the worldwide known brands (ESI, 2005: 14-15). Other multi-partnership companies in Kayseri in textile sector have considerably been lined up along the route that Orta Anadolu Company took, primarily being appropriated by their wealthier shareholders at the devalued prices in the 1980s (Özdemir, 1999).

However, a more popular way within local industrial development took place in furniture sector particularly in the development of Boydak Company: Established as a small carpenter workshop in 1957, Boydak Company was still a small-scale factory producing table, chair and office equipment within a limited level of mass production techniques in the beginning of the 1980s. These low-qualified products were met with consumers thanks to local dealers especially in the eastern parts of the country. In a business trick to the increasing urban-growth based on domestic migration as a consequence of neoliberal austerity policies, the company decided to completely shift production for the çek-yat (pull-sleep) sofa that has emerged as basic home furniture to the low-income people. By 1991, Boydak Company became a large factory producing 1,500 çek-yat each day, seeking to produce more especially for the western parts of the country. This local success-story starting from a small workshop would turn into a national phenomenon throughout the 1990s by inspiring many other firms to follow suit (ESI, 2005:11; Birol, 2011:353).

However, either through taking over the existing multi-partner companies or in a so-called entrepreneurial way on the basis of a particular domestic demand boom, such industrial developments in labour-intensive sectors are heavily based on the using of cheap labour in unregistered or else non-unionised manners. A comprehensive analysis on the development of manufacturing production in Turkey between 1980 and 1996 clearly underlines that labour intensive sectors (consisted of textile and garment, wood products and furniture, metal stuff, and

the food and beverage), while shifting remarkably to the inner Anatolian cities, have got low-paid and unregistered workforce in comparison with other sectors (Köse and Öncü, 2000). This situation has been especially valid in Kayseri, because it was only the cheap labour that could be used by local firms as a comparative advantage for industrial accumulation (Erdem, 2003; Bilgili, 2001).

In this line, local industry rapidly developed in the production of textile, metal stuff and furniture throughout the 1990s. The opening up of Kayseri Organised Industrial District (hereafter, OID) on a wide area of 12 million square meters in the western outskirts of the city and the official definition of Kayseri as a second degree in the priority areas for development assistance became two crucial state interventions in local industrial development⁴². After that, industrial investment increased in Kayseri, as reflected in the statistics of the share of local industry in total value-added of the manufacturing production of Turkey: while it was 0.81 percent in 1992, it became 1.28 percent in 1994, and 1.41 percent in 1996 (Ataay, 2001). An important aspect of this acceleration was exportation. According to the registration of Kayseri Chamber of Industry, there were more than hundred per cent increases in the amount of money from export production in 1994. It has also increased nearly six folds between 1993 and 2000, arriving at 374,446,787 US dollar (Bilgili, 2001:77).

Table 4.5: Ten Biggest Local Industrial Firms by the Amount of Export in 2000

Firms	Export Products	The Amount of Money (US \$)
Orta Anadolu	Denim cloth	56,897,666
Hesfibel	Fibre Optic Cable	35,035,980
Çetinkaya	Home-Textile and Cotton-yard	33,779,139

⁴² It is reported that Kayseri has been the leading province in the 1990s where the proportion of the establishment of workplaces and industrial districts on the basis of using state incentives was the highest (Özdemir, 1999:95).

Table 4.5 (Continued)

Birlik Mensucat	Towel	27,060,327
Erbosan	Galvanised Pipe	23,016,364
Atlas Hali	Carpet	17,819,274
HES Hacilar	Telephone Cable	17,444,389
Merkez Celik	Furniture (seat and home-textile)	14,029,819
Kumtel	Telephone and Electric Heater	14,000,000
Ulutas	Furniture (seat and home textile)	12,316,723

Source: Kayseri Chamber of Industry, quoted in Bilgili (2001:81)

The big companies in local industry have also been ranked upwards in the list prepared by Istanbul Chamber of Industry of the biggest 500 industrial enterprises of Turkey. In 2001 there were 16 local firms involved in this list—it was 7 in 1991 (Erdem, 2003: 127). In addition to these big local firms, such industrial boom was specifically characterized by the proliferation of small- and medium-sized enterprises. The number of firms employing less than ten workers was 6,235 in 1997, which was equal to 89 percent of the total number of local industrial firms. Moreover, it rose to 8,307 in 2001 whilst there were only 179 firms employing more than 50 workers out of which the ones employing more than 250 workers were just 26 firms (Erdem, 2003:117). Thus, according to the latest official classification⁴³, the number of small- and medium-sized firms in Kayseri amounted to 99.7 percent of total industrial firms in 2001.

This overwhelming dominance of small- and medium-sized firms within local industry has stemmed from, inter alia, the increasing development of furniture sector in Kayseri. Its main products such as couch, bed and seat have a very simple production process in which metal or wooden frames are basically added with sponge to be upholstered with different cloths or other sorts of coats. They are also complemented in a few uncomplicated ancillary activities like

⁴³ The latest official by-law on the definition of small and medium-sized enterprises considers big-seized firms as employing more than 250 workers. In this line, small firms are defined as those firms employing less than 50 workers.

giving some accessories. In other words, there was no sophisticated component in furniture production partly except for sponge. Therefore, it was possible to enter with small savings into the furniture sector promising to bring gain only on the condition that a sufficient amount of labour could be afforded to compete at product-markets. Thus, industrial entrepreneurs having the capacity to mobilise enough labour within family ties, religious fellowships and other social networks for production gave a massive interest in local furniture sector especially in the second part of the 1990s⁴⁴. This reached rapidly at a point that furniture production came to surpass by employment other local industrial activities in few years. This is clearly understood from local industrial statistics based on the 2000 General Census of population in comparison with the ones in 1994 yet considering only workers at firms employing more than 10 employees.

Table 4.6 Major Local Industrial Sectors by Employment in 1994 and 2000

Sectors	1994	2000
Food	2,124	5,017
Textile	9,025	15,390
Furniture	1,536	16,943
Primary Metal	1,166	1.542
Metal Fabricated Stuff	4,803	13,393
Local Industry (total)	19,707	57,482

Source: State Institute of Statistics, DIE (1998; 2000)

At the end of the 1990s, local industry thus became concentrated by furniture production as much as by the production of textile and metal-fabricated

⁴⁴ The aforementioned PhD study on the proliferation of entrepreneurs from Hacilar town in Kayseri's industrial development argues that, despite its currently decreasing importance, patriarchal order has been very critical factor in both start up and development of firms: "This patriarch could be a grandfather, father, big brother or the educated brother of the family. Here the critical point is the existence of this founding and legitimate patriarchal authority even if he makes a mistake" (Cengiz, 2012: 210). In one of my managerial interviews, a respondent from a medium sized workplace producing metal panel radiators similarly mentioned such patriarchal order in his critical statement, using a conventional phrase to define the simplicity of local companies: "a table, a safe and a Hajji Uncle. That's it!" (Bi masa, Bi kasa, bi de Hacı Dayı. Hepsi bu!)

stuff. The development of local furniture sector arrived at a point that Kayseri rapidly rose in 1996 to the second province in terms of the share of the value-added produced within wood and furniture sector at national scale in spite of its comparative disadvantage as having lack of forest in its surroundings (Ataay, 2001: 91). However, local furniture production was largely for domestic market. In terms of exportation, it fell far behind textile and metal-fabricated stuff production whose exports amount to respectively around 65 per cent and 20 per cent of the total amount of local industrial export⁴⁵ (Erdem, 2003:137).

Nevertheless, a simple comparison between the data by the 2000 Census of Population on local employment and the number of officially registered workforce by the Institute of Social Security (SSK, in Turkish) shows that the rise of local industry in those sectors proceeded along the recruitment of unregistered workforce and casual employees. In the scope of the SSK registration that contains industrial employment as well, there were 96,214 employees informed in Kayseri in the Census of 2000 (DIE, 2000). Yet, it is only 81,530 workers that were confirmed by SSK as registered workforce in 2000⁴⁶. Thus, there were at first glance 14,864 unregistered employees working within local economy, which amounts to 15 percent of workforce in the scope of SSK. Furthermore, Doğan (2007:108) argues that that the level of unregistered workforce can also be calculated at least as 37.6 percent when the male employment is taken into account⁴⁷. Either way, it is clear that unregistered and casual employment has

⁴⁵ It should be noted that the provincial amount of export production in Kayseri constituted at that time only 0,71 percent of the total national amount of export production. Yet, the amount of furniture exports was striking: while constituting only 7.3 percent of total provincial export, it was equal to 5.95 percent of total furniture exports at the national level. This seems to imply for two things: First, furniture sector has remarkably concentrated in Kayseri as opposed to relatively industrialized cities; second, it was highly oriented to domestic markets in comparison with other sectors.

⁴⁶ The data was taken from Kayseri Memory Center (KAYHAM), which is a joint-center in Kayseri University set up in collaboration with Kayseri Chamber of Industry.

⁴⁷ In the Census of 2000, there seems to be an inconsistent data on the number of female workforce in local economy. Although the SSK registration argues that there were 12,456 women at work, the Census declares it as 3,369. Normally, the opposite would be expected because of the registered workforce avoidance. In this context, when the SSK

been remarkably evident within local industry as it had been before 1980. In the interviews with workers, which will be referred much in the next chapter, even some local firms listed in the biggest 500 industrial enterprises at the national scale are reported to have long used unregistered and casual employment until the mid-2000s⁴⁸.

Accompanying with this industrial development in Kayseri has been, on the other hand, the rising of urban population mainly due to labour migration not just from the rural areas at the provincial scale but also wider poor geographies including the surrounding cities such as Sivas, Yozgat, Maraş and Nevşehir. Thus, local labour market was composed of migrant labourers with a rural, poor and unqualified background. The population of Kayseri (city) increased nearly twofold in two decades, arriving at 524,819 in 2000. Moreover, the city enormously grew with broad land uses for specialised industrial activities⁴⁹ as well as for housing and other facilities. In this process, while emerging as a medium growth-centre in middle-Anatolia, the city begun to reflect social differentiations in space. For example, whereas the city's south-eastern corridor, especially southern parts of Sivas Street, appeared to be the high land-valued areas of middle class housing and facilities, the western sides towards the OID

registration is considered, the number of male workers appears as 69,074. This then adds more to the level of unregistered male workers

⁴⁸ For example, a metal worker from a local industrial company that has been listed in the biggest 500 firms at the national level since 2005 said to me that when he had started to work six years ago, there had been no insurance and any official registration offered to him: "Right now I'm working in the cable room. I started at the assembly line, and worked there for a very long time. When I was there I didn't have insurance, we would work under the foreman...we would work for him, meaning we didn't have ties to the factory. We worked for 2-3 years like that with no insurance. Things got bigger, and the factory made a deal with the Italians in 2008. They were going to export to them. When that happened, they insured some of us. I got insured too. Until then, and I'm not exaggerating, 80% of us were not insured" (W15).

⁴⁹ Besides Kayseri OIDs, local industrial activities have been carried out within the Free Industrial Zone adjacent to it and two other OIDs called Mimar Sinan and Incesu on the southern and eastern outskirts of the city respectively. Moreover, there have been six industrial districts in the city where relatively small-scale enterprises have been in operation (Kayseri Valiliği, 2011).

and the northern parts of the city developed as working class housing areas with multi-storey apartments as well as squatter buildings (Doğan, 2007; Hovardaoğlu, 2009). Thus, land value speculations and building sector appeared to be the important part of local economy and politics so much so that many investors in industrial areas were reported to seek only to benefit from the rising land values, thereby hindering the actual industrial investments (Hovardaoğlu, 2009:185; Özcan, 2006:130). However, this situation did not lead to an essential cleavage within local bourgeoisie, mainly because they generally hold trading and industrial investments at the same time thanks to the enduring dominance of family firms within local economy (Hovardaoğlu; 2009)⁵⁰. In short, the rising urban population expanded not only urban labour market but also urban land market both of which were used by local bourgeoisie in a complementary way for the sake of capital accumulation.

To sum up, throughout the two decades following neoliberal shift at the national level, local industry in Kayseri had been fundamentally restructured along certain labour-intensive sectors namely textile, metal fabricated stuff and furniture in a manner that small and medium-sized enterprises proliferated on the basis of using cheap labour with low-level technologies. Some of these enterprises also became large-scale industrial enterprises with integrated production plants and dominated local industry in many ways ranging from employment to product

⁵⁰ Yet, it should be noted that local bourgeoisie have been fragmented with urban-political alliances between centrist and Islamist projects in the 1990s. Within the process of proliferation of small- and medium-sized firms in local industry, a section of local commercial capital mainly involved in a town-centred religious community called Cami-i Kebir turned into a broader, influential social and economic force that could be no longer subjected to the centrist project conventionally supported by the local big capital. Parallel with the rise of Islamic movement at wider scales, such social and economic force took over local municipal power of Kayseri in 1994 (Dogan, 2007: 190-200). It is within this changing local political alliances that municipal power has been actively involved in local economy on behalf of these nascent small- and medium-sized capital, which created apparent tension with the conventional local capital especially in the decision-making and implementation processes of big scale local developmental projects such as the establishment of Free Zone Industrial District and the Yamula Dam Project (see Özcan, 2006).

capacity and productivity⁵¹. In this process while urban labour market grew with the low-skilled labourers mostly having rural-links, local employers tended to consider this labour market formation as comparative local advantage for competitive production. Within a patriarchal order, they also employed broader social relations such as local fellowships, religious sects or other communitarian ties in order to sustain such advantage. At this point, the rapid increasing of furniture firms with relatively simple labour process suitable to be organised even in small workshops, facilitated the widespread development of such paternalistic capital-labour relation based on non-organised, unregistered or casual employment within local industry. A considerable level of capital accumulation was then achieved mainly through the ways of increasing direct work pressure on labourers, albeit softened within an active involvement of wider local social relations into workplace-level relations. In other words, it is possible to argue that local industrial production proceeded within a particular form of socialisation in which a massive influx of low-skilled labour became aligned into labour intensive production process within many small and medium-sized workplaces as well as in a few large-scale enterprises. Nevertheless, this form of socialisation was so fragile against value relations that local industry could be easily shocked by short-term national economic fluctuations in both 1994 and 1999, with remarkable lay-offs and closures. However, it was at the same time so flexible that local industry could be rapidly restructured in the same manner as before without apparent serious class dispute. Yet, the 2001 crisis would be different for local industry not

⁵¹ For example, interviewee from a major local cable factory told me that: “Generally speaking, as the companies grew, separate factories have been built gradually to produce such things constituting the main inputs. 90% of their production is for our companies, but they also produce for the market. In HES Kablo the aluminum and copper sections were also built as a separate factory. We buy the cable sheath and plastic/sleeve from our conglomerate’s factories” (M1). Similarly, when asked for the organization of production, another managerial respondent from the leading bed factory portrayed a very integrated organization within the wider inside linkages of company: “Let’s take our bedding company as an example. What we do in Kayseri is mostly assembly. That is to say, the metal accents of the bed come from our group’s company Boyçelik; the sponge comes from our Form Sünger; and the fabric, likewise, comes from one of our group companies called BoyTekstil. We assemble them here accordingly, stitch the sides and give them their final form” (M5).

just because of its deeper destruction but also due to the prospective development path it requires.

4.3.2. Changes in Local Industry since 2001

The rise of local industrial production within short-run fluctuations was sharply interrupted in the period of the 2001 national economic crisis. The crisis led to a dramatic decrease in the total number of firms within local economy, most of which took place nearly by 45 per cent on the side of small firms employing less than 10 workers. Moreover, the number of registered local employment in the scope of SSK fallen from 81,530 to 69,955 in a year (Erdem, 2003). In Kayseri OID, where local industrial production concentrated, while there had been 459 firms at work in 2000, it declined to 424 in 2001 and to 383 in 2002⁵².

Interviewing with industrial managers⁵³ also revealed that the local industrial firms were mostly influenced negatively in the crisis period: among those 36 firms established before the 2001, there are 16 firms seriously- and 9 firms remarkably-damaged within the context of crisis. The primary measure of

⁵² The data was taken from Kayseri Memory Center (KAYHAM), which is a joint-center in Kayseri University set up in collaboration with Kayseri Chamber of Industry.

⁵³ As the first stage of empirical research in this PhD study, I made semi-structured interviews with 40 managerial people from local industrial enterprises among which only one called Orta Anadolu Textile Company is located outside Kayseri OID. Since the aim is to unravel local industrial pattern including some technical and organisational aspects of production, interviewees were preferred to be the person with a top-level managerial position such as factory or production manager. They were expected to answer the questions about the strategies by their firms in and after the 2001 crisis period with regard to the labour process, labour market and product market as well as wider social processes related with industrial production. In this line, 40 local industrial enterprises were detected, of which 15 firms are in furniture sector, 12 firms in metal-stuff production, 5 firms in textile sector, 5 firms producing small machine, 2 firms in food sector and 1 firm producing plastic pipe. In terms of scale, 19 firms can be classified as big-sized (employing more than 250 workers), 14 firms as medium-sized and 7 firms as small-sized (employing less than 50 workers). With regard to ownership structure, 27 firms are depicted as family-firm in the form of either incorporated company (15) or limited company (12). Furthermore, 5 firms are defined as incorporated company subjected to a holding company. The remaining ones are told to be as limited or incorporated companies without family links.

these firms against the consequences of the crisis was to reduce the workforce at around 20 to 25 per cent.

Table 4.7 The Number of Local Firms by Employment before and after the 2001 Crisis

Number of Employee	1997	2001	2002
1-9	6,235	8,307	4,513
10-24	477	577	596
25-49	149	173	200
50-99	58	96	84
100-249	35	57	67
250-499	14	12	17
500-999	7	13	10
1000-4999	2	1	3
Total	6,977	9,236	5,490
Provincial share (%)	1,40	1,52	1,51

Source: Erdem (2003:117).

For the representative of Kayseri Chamber of Industry; however, to the extent that imposing the changing conditions of economic realities, the 2001 crisis meant rather a contribution to the renewal of local industry along a more competitive line, despite that it created short-term consequences⁵⁴. The key for

⁵⁴ “After the 1980s, the industrialization process (which had been started by big public investments in the past) accelerated with Özal and his economic policy, export incentives, and with the incentives given to OSB regions. Periodic crisis naturally disrupted this progress from time to time. The crisis of 2001, the devaluation in 1995, and various previous crises all affected industrial progress. However, I view this positively. Of course nobody wants crises, but these crises in Turkey were an eye-opener for industrialists. They now realize that they have to change according to the changing conditions. 2001 was an example of this. There were obviously some companies that had a hard time, and some of them had to stop the production. But the case remains that every cloud has a silver lining, this was the case. Our industrialists decided to act much more smart after the experience of 2001” (C6). This evaluation is also shared by a manager from the leading furniture company in local industry: “Our firm benefitted from the 2001 crises. All the factories let their workers go at the time of the crises, and so their capacity declined. Most of these were qualified, experienced workers. We may have had difficulty paying the wages for some time, but never had to let workers go. Once the effects of the crises faded

such a renewal was seen in exportation since local companies increasing their profits in spite of the crisis conditions appeared to be the ones that have already produced for export markets. In interviews, 23 firms out of those 25 firms damaged in the crisis period are reported to have restructured themselves along the export-oriented production as a way of overcoming the consequences of crisis. This tendency is also reflected in a number of statistics on local export. For example, although there had been 146 exporting firms in Kayseri, the number of them became 272 in 2001 and then rapidly increased to 677 in 2007. The increase in the amount of export production is more striking: while being equal to 207 million US dollar in 1996 and 319 million dollar in 2001, it sharply increased in 2008 to 1,129 million dollar. However, the local (provincial) share of the amount of export within the national GDP has not changed remarkably, which implies that this widespread shift in local industry towards export production has still been based on low value-added products⁵⁵.

Table 4.8: Local Export Production between 1996 and 2009

Year	Number of Exporting Firms	Provincial share within Turkey (%)	Amount of Export (1,000 USD)	Provincial Share within Turkey (%)
1996	146	0.62	207,498	0.89
1997	168	0.72	228,498	0.87
1998	199	0.82	248,702	0.92
1999	217	0.87	221,137	0.83
2000	272	1.09	253,355	0.91

away and the jobs bloomed again, our factories got most of the work because the others simply fell short of the demand. It was the same in the crisis of 2008” (M5).

⁵⁵ In one of the managerial interviews, a respondent from a medium-sized furniture company depicted this situation as follows: “what we actually have done in export production is nothing more than drudgery, menial work because our great effort to fill tens of transporters with sofa, bed and so on, is indeed equal to only one transporter exporting machine products” (M8).

Table 4.8 (Continued)

2001	338	1.17	319,191	1.02
2002	387	1.22	351,569	0.97
2003	458	1.29	465,104	0.98
2004	533	1.35	639,617	1.01
2005	579	1.37	702, 969	0.96
2006	612	1.39	751,660	0.88
2007	677	1.40	973,209	0.91
2008	618	1.28	1,129,770	0.86
2009	645	1.33	963,223	0.94

Source: KAYHAM

In the process of the restructuring of industrial production towards exportation, renewing equipment pool within labour process has been widely embraced. Interviews revealed that local enterprises have mostly tended to invest in production equipment with a particular aim to increase production capacity. Some firms especially in producing furniture and electrical metal kitchen-stuff are reported to have achieved 300 per cent increase in production capacity mainly thanks to the investment in production equipment during that period. Moreover, a remarkable number of firm are reported to have expanded after the 2001 crisis their production sites in ways either moving their workplaces outside to OID or going to considerable spatial enlargement for workplaces within the OID. This growth process since 2003 can be apparently found in the increasing number of industrial firms within Kayseri OID. While decreasing from 459 to 383 between 2000 and 2003, since then the number of industrial firms in OID has increased, reaching to 816 in 2010.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ The data was taken from Kayseri Memory Center (KAYHAM), which is a joint-center in Kayseri University set up in collaboration with Kayseri Chamber of Industry.

Table 4.9: The Number of Industrial Firms (by sector) in Kayseri OID between 2000 and 2010

Sector	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Food	16	15	16	16	16	?	24	29	26	31	38
Chemistry	9	9	19	19	16	?	15	15	14	?	23
Machine	24	24	12	2	2	?	25	24	5	?	34
Metal stuff	51	48	52	135	135	?	169	124	114	134	135
Plastic and Packaging	24	23	17	24	24	?	40	63	?	?	73
Textile	57	55	55	64	64	?	87	84	90	79	86
Furniture	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	249	?	228	258
Other	22 6	212	174	178	178	?	41	132	460	?	?

Source: KAYHAM

To understand the dynamics of investment flows across local industrial sectors, a survey report prepared in 2006 by Kayseri Chamber of Industry on its 400 members about their annual evaluations and future expectations would be helpful. According to the report, while the highest investment increase took place in the sectors of textile, construction and main metal industry (electrical kitchen-stuff), the least investment occurred in the machine and equipment, wood and wooden products and the mining sectors. In terms of profit, the highest increase appeared on the side of those firms in mining and construction sectors. However, it was those firms in the production of furniture, food and electrical metal stuff that have seen the highest decrease in profits (KAYSO, 2006:34, 37). The noticeable point within this survey report is that furniture sector that has emerged as the powerhouse of local industry since the mid-1990s was not reflected in positive manners. Departing from this point, it is possible to consider that local furniture sector has arrived at a certain point that its capital formation no longer allows for an easy entrance into the sector as well as for high levels of profit. This argument is also supported by a managerial interviewee from a medium sized

furniture firm who underlined increasing difficulties to compete with the large-scale firms at market. This respondent, whose firm fully left behind separate production and run as a subcontractor for İstikbal, the leading local furniture company, also stated that subcontracting for the leading local firms came to be increasingly acceptable for small- and medium-sized independent firms as it became difficult to compete with them. He summarizes the new situation for small and medium sized firms as follows: “even if it does’t rain, at least it drips in this way”⁵⁷.

The other side of the same coin has been the development of subcontracting relations with international companies. In the interviews, it is revealed that international subcontracting relations have been proceeded primarily through those local leading firms which have also their branded products at both national and even international market. Out of 19 big-seized firms, there are only 9 firms that were mentioned to have no current subcontracting relation with international companies. Looked in detail, these firms belong to either the ones producing some specific semi-finished goods like steel cable, yarn and so on, or the ones producing specifically for domestic market. However, such big-seized local firms involved in international subcontracting relations are mostly concerned with the basic consumption goods such as electrical heater, oven, couch and other furniture products. On the other hand, there is no example in which a small and medium sized firm directly develops international subcontracting relations. The main way for exporting is then via the leading firms of local industry. The exception, however, belongs to few local firms specifically involved in the

⁵⁷ Similar espousals of subcontracting to major firms in local furniture sector are also reported by Cengiz’s study on Hacilar industry in depth-interviews with the owners of small firms: “There have been really established a supplier industry around furniture. However, none of them actually desire to produce for İstikbal. I don’t like. Why? They have incredible purchasing agents. They don’t let you earn 5 kurus profit. They know the production cost very well and proposes that exact prices: “do if you want brother”. Someone accept if you don’t; because, most of them are in trouble. So, actually it is not a good thing. Both they have an immense volume of transportation and it is a continuous business when there is no job at all. At the end of the day, it is a business better than not” (quoted in Cengiz, 2012: 180).

production of some distinct production machinery. In a nutshell, the development of export production within local industry has increasingly led to the emergence of a hierarchical production chain of basic consumption goods that is controlled by major local firms operating under the determination of international purchasing firms.

Since basically depending on high levels of international demand, this production chain within local industry is also subjected to sectoral or general dynamics of product- and consumer-market at wider scale. For example, all interviewees from textile sector told that local textile firms have suffered from competing with China-based companies especially after the removing by the western states of quotas against China. In response, local textile firms tend to develop so-called “low-road” strategies including the moving of certain plants to different countries where cheaper labour is available. This is clearly seen in the case of Orta Anadolu Company, which is one of the leading firms in denim production beyond local and national scale, as its managerial respondent admitted that the company has recently bought its former subcontracting textile company in Bahreyn in order to get price competition within certain product-markets. Another leading local firm in textile sector, Birlik Mensucat, which had expanded to employ 3000 workers in previous decades, stopped factory production in 2007 and decided to work only in subcontracting relations with those firms in India or China. Furthermore, other interviews make it apparent that at least 17 local firms most of which were in textile sector have moved all of their production plants to Ethiopia and other Arab or African states over the last few years. However, it is the recent global economic crisis in 2008 that accelerated more widely such price pressure on local industry. In this period, such exporting industrial firms became paralyzed with the contraction of consumer demand in the western countries. Although it did not create as dramatic consequences as the 2001 national crisis⁵⁸,

⁵⁸At this point, central state’s incentive packages seem to have played crucial role in ameliorating the consequences of crisis on industrial enterprises. For example, interviews revealed that local industrial workers were forced at that time to use provisional work grant in which local employer becomes responsible to pay workers only 4 day week-wage to be complemented by the state on condition that no redundancy takes place. It should

a remarkable number of workforces in local industry were made redundant. According to the SSK registration, while there had been 155,862 registered workforces in May 2008 when the contraction was initially felt, it decreased rapidly to 127,990 in less than one year. The number of firms within local economy at that time has only reduced from 18,136 to 17,686⁵⁹. It is then safe to argue that the destructive effects of recent global economic crisis could be avoided to a certain extent primarily through shifting its burden onto workers. It seems that contraction in local industry was recovered in 2010. Interviews with the managerial people make it clear that local industrial recovery was made in a relatively short time thanks to the increasing export production into new consumer markets such as those in Middle-East, Middle-Asia and North Africa⁶⁰.

To sum up, as local industrial production becomes involved directly into global production, local development has been subjected to the competitive and instable nature of capitalist relations operating at wider scale. In this context, local industrial relations among firms have also gained more hierarchical characteristics

also be noted that such a seemingly Keynesian state intervention was financially supported not by the general budget but a specific fund designated for unemployed people. The irony continues, as I witnessed in my interviews with workers, when a worker who previously used such work grant then becomes redundant. In this case, it is not allowed to apply for unemployment benefits for a limited period as the worker is already considered to have used his/her share in the fund. Besides this support, employers were given remarkable temporal tax concessions to such a significant degree that local employers demanded them to be continued: “Right now in the sector everyone’s been anxiously waiting. What are we going to do once this tax reduction is over? We’re saying this should go on until December instead of September” (Boydak, 2009: 30).

⁵⁹ The data was taken from Kayseri Memory Center (KAYHAM), which is a joint-center in Kayseri University set up in collaboration with Kayseri Chamber of Industry.

⁶⁰ In addition to respondents from industrial enterprises, Prof. Nisfet Uzey from Erciyes University Department of Economics, who is also advisor of Kayseri Chamber of Industry, told me that there has been a remarkable shift in local industrial export to the Arab and African countries over the last few years. This is also confirmed by the words of the chairman of the Assembly of Kayseri Chamber of Industry as follows: “More than 52% of the Kayseri Chamber of Industry’s members’ exports are for EU countries. Due to the financial crisis, the market for EU countries has shrunk. For the past five months we have been recommending that our members enter the middle eastern, African, CIS, Iranian, and Iraqi markets instead” (Okadan, 2009: 26).

within which large-scale enterprises remarkably control the main dynamics of local industry thanks to their relatively high technological capacity and integrated organisation of production. Yet, such hierarchy takes different forms according to sectoral differentiations in labour process. For example, to the extent that labour-intensiveness remains the considerable aspect of production in furniture sector, small- and medium-sized furniture firms have been able to survive within partial or full subcontracting production assembling around the leading local firms. As for the metal production; however, there has been rather a kind of partition on the basis of product types between large-scale firms and small and medium-sized firms, fundamentally because its labour process, especially cutting and pressing stages, relatively involves more technology-intensive means of production when it comes to the production of electrical stuff. In addition, it seems to be less suitable to divide labour process into different pieces to be carried out at different workplaces. On the other hand, local textile sector has developed in a more concentrated manner partially except for cotton selection or coloring stages. Yet, there has been remarkable differentiation among textile firms between the ones only producing yarn and others that have been able to extend production to weaving cloth. However, when extra capacity is needed, the former can also be involved in subcontracting relation with the latter.

Nevertheless, local industrial development has been primarily depended on the use of cheap labour, as price competition in global production chains requires. At this point, it is clear that the continuing influx of labour migration from provincial geographies has provided employers with a vast amount of cheap labour⁶¹. On the basis of this labour market opportunity, the registered local employment in the scope of SSK has reached nearly by 150 per cent increase to 172,267 for a decade.⁶² According to the same data, such a considerable increase

⁶¹ According to TUIK Census based on the address register, the population of Kayseri (town) has become 977,340 by 2010. It was 732,410 in 2000.

⁶² The data was taken from Kayseri Memory Center (KAYHAM), which is a joint-center in Kayseri University set up in collaboration with Kayseri Chamber of Industry.

in local employment has taken place by far in private sector with a 91 percent share. Another aspect of local employment is concerned with the extreme gender differentiation to the detriment of female workers: only 27,993 women are registeredly employed in the face of 144,274 male workers⁶³. In terms of industrial employment, the latest official report puts that there has been at least 51,500 workers most of which are employed in Kayseri OİD. It is also reported that industrial employment is led by furniture sector with 10,695 workers, followed by textile and metal sectors (Kayseri Valiliđi, 2011).

Last but not least, unionization is strongly inhibited within local industry until it appears unavoidably as a result of strong demands from workers. The evidence is the low level of unionization among the 19 big-seized industrial enterprises whose managerial people were interviewed: only 6 firms, of them, have unionized workers. However, the number of unionised labour in private sector is statistically seen as rising from 10,254 in 2000 to 21,755 in 2006. However, even once leaving aside the inflated nature of the unionization statistics in Turkey, such a remarkable increasing still remains low in comparison with the fact that the number of registered workers has grown nearly by 150 percent at the same period. More importantly, local unionization practice has developed along a particular route under employers' direct control. This is so apparent that, when asked about unionization, a managerial interviewee from a large-scale company ironically admitted "employer decided to bring trade union into factory in response to increasing voices among workers" (M15). In this sense, the seemingly quantitative increase in unionism does not seem to be taken as the rise of relatively independent labour organization but rather an increasing level of dissidence among labourers.

⁶³ A recent comparative study on female employment in different Turkish cities argues that the rate of women work participation in Kayseri (9%) is by far lower than Istanbul (21.5%) and Denizli (28,3%). However, it is above Gaziantep with 6% (Buđra, 2010).

4.4. Concluding Remarks: Contradictions within Local Industry

Over the fifty years, local (private) industry in Kayseri has transformed from small craft production with two to three employees into well-designed agglomerations of remarkable amount of investments mainly in furniture, metal and textile sectors in which more than 800 firms employ at least 50,000 registered workers to produce not just for domestic market but also considerably for wider markets in ways mainly through taking part directly or indirectly in subcontracting relations with international companies.

In this process, some local social and spatial forms played essential roles by accelerating industrial development in particular directions. The establishment of Crafts Square, where exclusive craft activities had an opportunity to develop cooperative relations for serial production, appeared to be the prime mover of local industrial development. Then, worker remittances that were channeled into local industry in the form of multi-partner companies, while providing money capital for the introduction of mass production techniques, led to the converting of qualified workforce in crafting into jobseekers in labour market as small workshops became outweighed by competitiveness. With 1980s, however, neoliberal strategies with the guardianship of military regime in Turkey brought a new context in which local industry could appeal to the increasing attempts by capital for restructuring labour-intensive sectors towards less developed regions. In this context, after a period of regression resulting with some takeovers in multi-partner companies, local industrial firms became regenerated particularly in ways to develop subcontracting relations with larger companies by using the main comparative advantage of Kayseri as having vast amount of cheap labour. Yet, the prospective development of local industry was distinctively shaped by the unprecedented boom in local furniture production on the basis of the contingent combination of a number of local and national dynamics. Since being depended on a relatively simple labour process with low-level technological equipment, furniture production within local industry appeared to proliferate in a few years with a particular class relation based on casual and unregistered employment that has been also complemented with wider local social relations, i.e., family links,

ethnic-community ties and religious discourse and practice. The formation of such religious kind of paternalist class relation has also been facilitated by central state's continuing anti-trade union policies after transition to parliamentary democracy in 1983. Hence appeared two remarkable results in local industry. In as much as requiring relatively less money to start production, local furniture sector revitalized to a certain degree the process of primitive accumulation within local industry in which the bourgeois 'success' story from a hard-working employee to an employer could find some concrete expressions, with their ideological repercussions. Furthermore, as furniture production became the prominent sector for capital accumulation, its religious-paternalist class relation came to be a hegemonic position within local industrial relations and business culture.

Nevertheless, the more capital accumulation proceeds, the more local industry involves its contradictory dynamics namely concentration and centralization of capital, overproduction and increasing capitalist class power over labour. The moments of economic crises at wider scales in 1994, 1999, 2001 and 2008 have been both the reflection and the acceleration, of those dynamics in local industry. However, the 2001 national economic (and political) crisis opened up a new period for local industrial development, fundamentally because (i) the post-2001 period, while leading to the elimination of remarkable amount of small firms, has seen local industrial firms shifting considerably to export production through a number of restructuring strategies that mainly involves improving production technology as well as increasing production capacity; (ii) it has also seen those large scale state enterprises, which had long been active beyond economic concerns, being fully removed from local industry and culture either through closure (Sumerbank Textile Company) or privatization (Kayseri Sugar Factory Inc.); (iii) the post-2001 period has brought with it a new Labour Law which substantially increased the power of employer over the labourers. Yet, these fundamental changes have also made local industry more conflictual and staggering despite having at the same time considerable developments in production capacity and export linkages. This vulnerable industrial development

has made itself felt widely especially in the wake of global economic crisis of 2008 that accelerated competition as a result of big contractions in consumer market.

Therefore, the post-2001 period has also compelled local industrial firms to transform their labour processes into more competitive lines, forms or sectors. I think Mustafa Boydak, the chairman of Kayseri Chamber of Industry, hints at this pressure in his following words (2008: 126):

We, as Kayseri industry, have been in a process of transformation. Kayseri is now giving up those works with low value added and difficult to compete with, especially the ones that have been carried out with cheap labour in countries like India and China. If we don't leave them today, we will have been left by force tomorrow. We always make recommendations for our members in this way so that our industry shall produce high value added goods

During my field study trips, I was told, and directly observed, that there have been remarkable hints of such a transformation within local industry. For example, a managerial respondent from a long-year big-sized metal company that had produced iron-casting stoves until shifting to the production of electrical heater, oven and so on in the beginning of the 2000s, said that the company has just agreed with a Chinese firm to produce together washing machine, refrigerator and television in its recently built workplaces at Kayseri Free Industrial Zone. I have also seen some local machine firms producing with high-technological equipment in various attempts to invest more. Even local furniture sector whose labour process has been characterized more with labour-intensiveness is considered to involve a similar transformation: "It is certainly to be seen also in furniture sector to have fundamental transformation concerning with workforce profiles after the (global) crisis. It is necessary to qualify labourers, attract them into workplaces, have a business tradition led by creative and innovative companies, improve workforce profile, strengthen the resources and support a sense of belonging" (Bozkır, 2008:79).

Thus, what has been inherently compelled, and also actively pursued, within local industrial development is eventually centred on the employment of a qualified labour force that would be compatible with changing dynamics of labour process. Given that local industry has so far developed through a particular class relation based on the employment of a relatively unqualified workforce in a low-wage regime, such a fundamental tendency for qualified labour indeed refers to an opposite movement against the dominant forms of socialisation of production and reproduction in local industry. Put it differently, competitive dynamics of industrial accumulation push for a larger transformation of local industrial relations involving the moments of labour market, workplace relations and urban social structures. In each moment, however, there have been various ongoing forms of socialisation in contradiction with this transformation: continuing influx of unqualified workforce into local labour market, employer's insistence on low-wage regime and disciplinary labour management, informally-operating business practice, conservative social life and community culture, formal and informal widespread income supports and so on. Thus conceived, the so-called transformation process primarily requires getting an influential social actor to coordinate different moments of local industrial relations at different spatial scales in a compatible direction. As the dominant institutional nodes of local power relations, the Greater Municipality of Kayseri, Kayseri Chamber of Industry and Middle-Anatolia Development Agency comes to the fore to play such a role in local politics.

In this process; nevertheless, the other side of the same coin has been composed of growing number of labourers employed within similar experiences of labour process and urban social relations that have been increasingly shaped by capitalist dynamics. It is clear that this situation leads to systematic social differences in both workplace and urban contexts of Kayseri. These differences indeed conflict with this religious kind of paternalist class relation between employer and employees in local industry. Thus, the ways in which this conflict has developed within local class relations are worthy to ask a question. The next chapter will try to answer this question.

CHAPTER 5

ACTUAL DYNAMICS, FORMS AND TENSIONS OF LOCAL CLASS RELATIONS

5.1. Introduction

Chapter 2 underlined labour process as the key moment of class relations within capitalist development by diverging itself from other critical approaches whose theoretical scope only extends to labour market segments and their regulations. However, the adopted approach did not disregard the impacts of labour market structures on the development of capital-labour relation. Rather, drawing on a more dialectical and mediated understanding of Marxist methodology, it was argued that capital-labour relation basically involves some direct relations within a certain place of labour market, labour process and social life that can be largely conceptualised as a set of locally effective structures. Thus conceived, (local) class relations emerge as the development of such local structures within a wider commensuration process of a particular industrial production, or, to use an alternative conceptualization, as the dialectics of local socialisations and value production (see 2.6). Therefore, analyzing local class relations (and thus labour regime) primarily requires revealing these socialisations as a set of locally effective structures that involve the processes of (i) labour market formation, (ii) production and workplace relations, and (iii) social reproduction.

Following this theoretical approach, Chapter 4 brought a historical perspective to the development of local industrial production that has been associated with various forms of such socialisations. Chapter 4 concluded that the rise of local industry in recent decades has been essentially linked up to a particular composition of some “locally-effective structures”: a massive influx of unqualified labour force into labour market, labour-intensive production of

medium- and small-sized workplaces, and a set of complementary social reproduction policies within a medium-scaled city of Kayseri. In this context, the (ideology of) Islamic brotherhood has also been employed in capital-labour relation in distinct ways serving to cover class tensions embedded in this relation. It was then a religious kind of paternalist relation between capital and labour that produced unprecedented industrial accumulation in Kayseri. Nevertheless, Chapter 4 also pointed out that as competitive dynamics of industrial production have accelerated especially in a wider context of post-2001 economic crisis, this paternalist relation came to be incompatible with the dynamics of industrial development.

This chapter attempts to deal with this period. Since capital-labour relation is analytically considered as involving the three fundamental social processes above mentioned, this period will be analysed in three main sections dedicated to each process. Before these sections, the following section initially provides a general outline and some observations about the method of research for the field research in Kayseri. The next section then looks at the social and spatial dynamics of local labour market formation. The main aim of the section is to understand the ways and forms in which labourers are involved into industrial relations. In the third section, the attention is shifted to the production process and workplace-level relations in order to reveal the tensions and conflicts in the capital-labour relation within labour process. The section is divided into three parts: technical division of labour and inter-firm relations; working conditions and wage regime; and labour control strategies and workers' responses. The fourth section focuses on (urban) social reproduction process. It aims to analyse three important aspects of class relations within this process: local business culture; urban-workplace nexus; and working class culture and class-consciousness. The fifth section summarizes main findings of the previous sections in a set of concluding remarks.

5.2 The Field Research Method

As it was underlined in the Introduction (section 1.3), the strategies and the design process of the research flow from a particular conceptualisation for the

capital-labour relation developed here as a set of class contradictions at the highest level of abstraction. The research is then aimed to track the ways in which such abstract contradictions meld into complex combinations as the capital-labour relation develop in time and space. In this regard, the research is considered neither as a theoretical study on local class relations nor a pure empirical investigation their concrete expressions but rather a theoretically informed analysis that seeks to reveal the development of such abstract class contradictions in Kayseri over time.

Following these methodological premises, the field research in Kayseri was carried out by using qualitative research methods that is mainly based on semi-structured interviews with the workers as well as with industrial firm managers and the representations of business associations and labour union. In the scope of field research, I made 40 semi-structured interviews with firm managers, 55 interviews with workers and 7 interviews with the business and union representatives. In addition, I could also make 11 interviews with the workers involved in the unionisation movement at a big-seized metal factory, specifically aiming to investigate the development of class relations at the most concrete levels of such relations. The main reason of using qualitative research techniques, semi-structured interviews in particular, in the field study stems from the research questions aimed to reveal the development of abstract class contradictions between capital and labour within the complex combinations of wider social relations. Such development could only be revealed through semi-structured interviews mainly because they enable the researcher to develop dialogistical relation with each interviewee and thus involve new questions that are not considered before the field study. On the other hand, the survey questionnaire, particularly for workers, could have been carried out in order to achieve more quantitative results regarding with some statistical issues. However, the fact that (private) industrial development in Kayseri does not have a long history and thus involve relatively less differentiation in itself in many respects makes the survey questionnaire for workers unnecessary in the field research. Instead, the number

of semi-structured interviews with the workers was kept high to the extent that they can enable the researcher to arrive at some quantitative results.

As a researcher having with no social and cultural link with Kayseri, I faced with fewer difficulties in making the field research than I had expected before. If the field research had been based on the interviews with local employers or the high profile local politicians, I would have had some troubles particularly in developing dialogistical relation with them. Such troubles appeared within the interviews with industrial managers to a certain extent as they considered me as an outsider. In these cases, I tried to warm up the conversations by asking questions their hometowns or their education background towards some commonalities with me so as to gain their trust. In general, these questions worked, particularly the one related with the hometown, as I had a family origin in Sivas, which is one of the neighbourhood city of Kayseri. The easier parts of the interviews were the ones with workers because they were highly open to tell their worsening survival conditions with someone whom they trust on. I tried to give such a feeling of trust to the interviewee workers as much as I could do. In this line, I deliberately preferred carrying out the interviews with workers outside the workplaces where they can feel more confident and trust on me while talking about. Thus, the municipal teahouse in the city center, firms' shuttle bus stops and working class neighbourhoods appeared to be the places for making interviews with the workers.

However, the only difficulty with which I faced, as a male researcher, during the field study work in Kayseri was about interviewing with female workers in local industry. Among 55 interviewees I could have only 3 female workers who were convinced by some mediators of talking with me. This makes me avoid making assessment on the gender aspects of local class relation. In this regard, I accept that the analysis involves certain deficiency although it is nearly inevitable for a male researcher making a field study in such a conservative place like Kayseri. Nevertheless, I also argue that this deficiency does not lead to undermine the main arguments of the analysis fundamentally because the female

workers constitute still less than 10 percent of the whole employment in local industry. Yet, it should be underlined that local employers have tended to increase female workers in recent years as much as technical aspects of labour process in local industry make it possible. Thus, it would be necessary for the future analysis to involve the gender aspects of local class relations in Kayseri.

5.3 Local Labour Market and The Recruitment Process

As it was argued in the previous chapter, a certain degree of local labour market relations converged around industrial investments when mass production techniques were involved in local industry along with not only remarkable level of proletarianisation among the craft but also an influx of labourers from surrounding towns and villages. It was during the years of the late-1960s and the 1970s that the population of Kayseri (city) has grown nearly twofold especially as an outcome of the inward migration at local and provincial scale. Those years remark a locally distinct period in which the net migration became positive despite a backdrop of massive labour flows towards metropolitan cities that were made appealing by both state policies and private industrial investments at that time. This period ended in the 1980s, with increasing negative net migration along with the decreasing local industrial investments. It was not until the beginning of the 2000s that net migration became again positive although this negative tendency had already started to decrease after the revival of local industry in the mid-1990s (TÜİK, 2006). As for the geographical scale of this increasing migration movement into the city of Kayseri, the latest TÜİK Census on register provides important findings: over the years a considerable number of people born in the surrounding cities have become Kayseri dwellers, nearly constituting 20 percent of the current provincial population.⁶⁴ It is therefore safe to argue, the city of Kayseri has recently appeared to be a remarkable destination for migration

⁶⁴ Despite 911,064 city dwellers registered in Kayseri (province), there is a large number of people living in Kayseri yet having other provincial registration: the major non-Kayserian registers are respectively 71,803 (Sivas), 55,287 (Yozgat), 31,408 (Nevşehir) and 22,295 (K.Maraş), 18, 584 (Ağrı) and 15,402 (Adana) (TÜİK, 2010, ADKNS database).

movements not only from local and provincial places but also from its wider regional hinterland that is even reached to Ağrı province, which is located on the eastern border of the country.⁶⁵

This spatial and temporal pattern of migration flows brought considerable effects on the profile of both employers and specifically workforce in local industry. First of all, commercial activity has dominated local political economy for long years. Thus, industrial development largely took place along with this migration flows in such a way that remarkable number of industrialists emerged from earlier immigrants to work in Kayseri (see Cengiz, 2012; 2013). In this context, local economy became involved in a certain degree of distinction of commercial activities over industrial production. This specific distinction is also translated into local popular culture as correspondingly “the native” urbanite (“yerli”) over “the peasant” (“köylü”) coming from its town and villages to work in Kayseri. It was evident in various interviews that such distinction within local culture had some repercussions even on the prominent industrialists, affecting their public behaviors in distinct ways.⁶⁶ However, it has more profound effects on the demographic profile of local industrial workforce. For example, a managerial interviewee from a major local cable factory, which has been long run by some of those ‘peasants’ from the town of Hacılar, described its workforce as follows:

⁶⁵ Although it is not surprising to encounter in any growing cities with migrants from the Kurdish-dominated places in eastern parts of the country, the fact that Kurdish migrant people constituting remarkable part of Kayseri dwellers almost came from Ağrı can be found interesting. There is very limited information on why people from Ağrı particularly moved to Kayseri. Yet, there is one possible explanation: Shafi (Şafi) religious sect of the people from Ağrı which has strong conservative values enables them to be adopted by the dominant local culture in Kayseri.

⁶⁶ To illustrate, when the city’s major football team (Kayserispor) was defeated and left behind by a recently-founded football team from a small town, Hacılar, which was sponsored by a leading industrial company whose owners were coming from the same town, this became a wider event for the relations between the native urbanite and the peasants. Faced with increasing reactions within local politics, the owners of such industrial company urgently decided to withdraw its sponsorship relation (see Boydak, 2011:355).

Kayseri receives labor migration from neighboring cities and towns. Because there is no industry in those places, workers come here to work. Unless we are looking for someone specific, these fulfill our needs.

Which regions do your employees come from, for example?

Now 547 of our nearly 800 employees are from Kayseri; meaning they're from Hacilar and other towns and villages. Locals aren't generally industrial workers. Of the rest, 68% are from Yozgat, 53% are from Sivas, 52% are from Nevşehir and 24% are from Maraş (M1).

While similarly pointing out this distinction, another manager from a local thread mill that flourished after 2001 crisis also revealed that industrial labour market has increasingly got regional characteristics as a result of subsequent migration flows:

People from Kayseri, especially locals, do not like working very much. Our people come from the villages and towns. Most of our workers are from Maraş, Yozgat and Sivas. (M2).

This is clearly evident in Table 4.1 on local industrial workforce that I derived from my semi-structured interviews with workers in Kayseri. According to the table, more than one-third of the interviewees have non-Kayseri registers (meaning homeland) mainly belonging to those surrounding provinces within the regional hinterland of the city. Moreover, most of them are reported to have birthplaces outside Kayseri province. Thus, it seems that local industrial workers that have non-Kayseri registers are currently the first generation of this regional labour migration flows. As a matter of fact, they are mostly reported to have settled in the city after the revival of local industry in the mid-1990s. On the other hand, this table also shows that local inward labour migration flows have increasingly continued since the mid-1970s. In this line, the mid-1990s remarks a new wave of migration flows at local provincial scale.

Table 5.1 The Profile of Industrial Workforce in Kayseri

W	Age/ G	Birth of Place	Father's Occupation	Date of Migration	Educati on	Number of previous jobs	Current Job (sector)
1	23/M	Kayseri (city)	worker	1977	S	3	metal
2	39/M	Sivas	farmer	1990	P	4	textile- thread
3	36/M	Aksaray	farmer	1998	H	5	textile- thread
4	32/M	Kayseri	farmer	2002	S	5	metal
5	25/M	Kayseri	street- vendor	2012	S	3	furniture
6	34/M	Kayseri	officer	1988	H	2	furniture
7	35/M	Kayseri	farmer	2002	S	3	metal
8	24/M	Kayseri (city)	shopkeeper	1976	VH	2	furniture
9	27/M	Kayseri	farmer	1988	S	2	textile- thread
10	30/M	Kayseri (city)	construc. worker	2006	P	5	furniture
11	21/M	Kayseri	construct. worker	1992	S	1	metal
12	26/M	Kayseri	worker	1994	H	3	metal
13	44/M	Kayseri (city)	construct. worker	1977	H	4	furniture
14	23/M	Kayseri	Worker	1998	S	3	metal
15	34/M	Kayseri (city)	farmer	1988	P	1	metal
16	32/M	Austuria	shopkeeper	1993	L	3	metal
17	33/M	Kayseri	shopkeeper	1979	P	3	furniture
18	28/M	Kayseri	construc.w orker	1990	P	2	furniture
19	24/M	Kayseri	officer	2005	P	2	metal
20	32/M	Yozgat	farmer	2011	H	5	metal
21	29/M	Yozgat	farmer	1995	P	1	furniture
22	33/M	Yozgat	worker	1985	P	2	food
23	26/M	Nevsehr	farmer	2002	S	2	furniture
24	39/M	Kayseri	farmer	1990	VH	5	metal
25	32/M	Kayseri	farmer	1994	VH	4	metal
26	24/M	Kayseri	farmer	1994	S	1	metal
27	36/M	Kayseri	worker	1986	H	3	textile- thread
28	39/M	Kayseri	farmer	1986	P	3	food
29	30/M	Adana	worker	1982	VH	3	furniture
30	35/M	Nigde	farmer	1999	P	4	metal
31	50/M	Nevsehr	farmer	1974	P	3	furniture
32	30/M	Sivas	worker	1977	S	1	metal
33	47/M	Maras	farmer	1993	P	2	metal

Table 5.1 (Continued)

34	32/M	Kayseri	farmer	2004	H	1	furniture
35	35/M	Sivas	farmer	2004	H	1	furniture
36	37/M	Kayseri	worker	1976	S	5	furniture
37	21/M	Kayseri	state-officer	1988	H	1	metal
38	23/W	Sivas	farmer	2008	S	2	metal
39	28/W	Kayseri	farmer	2003	S	2	metal
40	29/M	Kayseri (city)	construc. worker	1978	H	3	metal
41	33/M	Sivas	farmer	2005	VH	3	metal
42	27/M	Kayseri (city)	state officer	2008	H	3	metal
43	22/M	Kayseri	farmer	-	VH	3	plastic-chemical
44	21/M	Kayseri	construct. worker	1978	H	3	metal
45	31/M	Kayseri	farmer	2003	H	3	metal
46	33/M	Kayseri	farmer	1993	H	2	metal
47	37/M	Kayseri-Hacılar	shop-keeper	-	H	3-4	furniture
48	31/M	Kayseri	farmer	2003	P	4	metal
49	34/M	Maras	state-officer	1996	VH	4-5	metal
50	30/M	Kayseri (city)	street vendor	1970	H	3-4	metal
51	25/M	Kayseri (city)	construct. worker	1983	S	3	textile
52	23/M	Kayseri	construc. worker	2012	H	3-4	textile
53	43/M	Nevsehr	farmer	1982	VH	6-7	metal
54	41/W	Maras	farmer	1993	P	3-4	metal
55	35/M	Kayseri	farmer	1975	P	1	furniture

W: Worker, G: Gender, M: Male, F: Female, P: Primary school, S: Secondary School, H: High School, VH: Vocational High School

The importance of labour migration flows in analysing class relations lay in the fact that such flows also contain some fundamental aspects of proletarianisation process like its origin, velocity, scope, temporality and the direction, each of which have considerable effects on the development of capital-labour relation within a particular place (Özüğurlu, 2006:68-74). Some scholars argue that social (craft or peasant) and spatial (town or rural) origins of labour migration shape class relations in different forms and directions, giving rise to full- or semi-proleterianised type of wage labour (Wallerstein, 1993; Fröbel et.al,

1980), high or low level of labour militancy (Burawoy, 1985), and open or conservative cultural values among workers (Mann, 1973). The velocity, scope and temporality of labour migration are also associated with the development of class relations by pointing out the effects of migration on political radicalism and social change. To illustrate, Mann (1973) argued for certain relations between migrant workers and their political directions, exemplifying workers in France and Germany as two opposing cases. It is also argued that the direction of migration that involves its impulse, mechanisms and destination brings important results to the formation of class relations as it reshuffles proletarian workforce in space and, in turn, affects social division of labour in particular ways (Özügürü, 2006:73).

Although generally agreeing with those emphasizes in the literature above, I do not follow their typological results, mainly because there are many distinct dynamics of the migration process that have been contingently shaping the formation of class relations in various manners depending on wider social relations. Rather than giving priority to such typologies, it seems more convenient to initially involve empirical cases to reveal their distinct dynamics about the migration process, and then to follow their interactions with the wider social relations. In this line, I take a closer look to the industrial workers in Kayseri in terms of their migration dynamics and proleterisation process.

The profile of industrial workforce above (Table 5.1) provides parallel results with the general demographic statistics on Kayseri that points to two different waves of inward migration flows in the 1970s and in the 2000s, respectively. It is clearly seen that current industrial workforce in Kayseri is mainly supplied by those migration waves: out of 53 reportedly-migrated workers among 55 interviewees⁶⁷, there are 11 workers whose family had migrated to the city in the 1970s, 9 workers in the 1990s, 16 workers in the 1990s and 17 workers

⁶⁷ In other words, there are only two workers who have Kayseri (city) register. This result is indeed parallel with a popular belief among workers in Kayseri that “the native urbanites do not become industrial worker”.

in the 2000s. The number of migrant workers is more striking in the period of local industrial revival along neoliberal policies: there are reportedly 25 workers who (or whose family) migrated to the city of Kayseri after 1993, revealing that nearly half of the workers has homeland-ties outside the city. Seen from the variations on homeland-ties, the non-Kayseri registers are nearly in the ratio of 2:3 to the Kayseri (province) registers. The former are respectively from Sivas (6), Yozgat (3), Nevsehir (3), Maraş (3), Nigde (1), Adana (1), Aksaray (1), Ağrı (1), Kırıkkale (1) and Erzurum (1), denoting the spatial extent of local industrial labour market at regional scale. Coming to the birthplaces; however, while the number of workers born in the city of Kayseri rises from 2 to 10, that of non-Kayseri registers has a slight decrease to 18. This raises the idea that a remarkable number of urban-based industrial workers in Kayseri have developed over the years despite the fact that the city has increasingly been the main destination in recent years for labour migration from rural geographies within its regional hinterland.

However, such urban-based labourers do not have industrial working-class background. Most of them stated that their fathers had worked in construction sector and informal urban services like street trading rather than local industry or formal services. Those industrial workers who were born outside and then migrated to the city have a rural background; they largely stated their father occupations as farmer. Thus, it seems possible to argue that current local industrial workforce in Kayseri has been constituted mainly through two different proletarianisation routes of social and spatial backgrounds that are based on (in)formal urban sectors and rural agricultural activities. However, there are also few cases in which industrial worker occupation was devolved from a previous generation or emerged as a consequence of the dissolution of some self-employment opportunities such as being a shopkeeper.

My father was in the construction business. He worked at construction sites for 30-35 years, but does not work anymore. They used to come to Kayseri to work for 6-7 months and then go back to Ağrı. Once he got married, they moved here for good so as not to go back and forth all the time (W10).

My father was a construction worker. We were in a Talas village. When I was 7 years old, my father moved us all to the city. I also worked in construction, then moved to the factory (W13).

My father is a farmer, and we used to plant and grow sugar beets. When the beet business wasn't doing so well, my father said 'It's no good here; if you're going to go to the dogs, go to the dogs in the city so that at least your kids will be better off. So I migrated in 2004. I had an older relative who helped me find a job, so I came here and started to work at İstikbal (W34).

I started to work at Erbosan in 2004. After 3 years, I quit because of medical conditions...My father worked at Erbosan for 30 years, my uncle for 27 years. I worked together with my uncle in the final years before he retired (W29).

It's been 32-33 years since my father immigrated. He worked at Sümerbank. That's why he came to Kayseri. He worked for about 10 years, and they took him as a retiree after he died (W32).

We have a family business, a small-scale retail establishment. We have a small convenience store here. But the money wasn't enough once I got married and moved in to another place. We didn't shut down the store, but it wasn't enough for two households. So I started to work in the industry. That place is barely enough for my father and the family (W47).

It is clearly seen that the main part of current local industrial workforce have intensely stemmed from the demise of agricultural activities in the surrounding provincial areas in that there are reportedly 18 rural background workers among those 25 workers who have migrated to work in the city with the revival of local industry since 1994. Following this fact and considering the rapid increase in urban population at that time, it is safe to argue that behind the rise of industrial activities in Kayseri have considerably been the precipitate labour flows mostly from rural and poor geographies at the regional hinterland of the city. It should be added that such flows have taken place during a particular time in which neoliberal policies have been expansively imposed on economic activities across wider scales. Thus, a vast amount of rural people in middle Anatolia were thrown into local industrial labour market in Kayseri in a very short time as labourers to sell their labour power.

To understand the recruitment of industrial workforce in Kayseri, I interviewed people at managerial positions during the first stage of my field research. In general, their answers pointed to developing formal relations within

local labour market in recent years. For local employers, central state's local job centre and newspaper advertisements have been the rising ways of accessing to so-called blue-collar labourers. It also appeared that industrial employment has taken more registered forms in the last few years, confirmed by the conversations with workers. Furthermore, I encountered by a large extent strong emphases on the priority of technical qualifications over social or cultural features in the recruitment of labourers. Interviewees from leading local firms underlined some extra recruitment criteria, i.e., having primarily a vocational high school degree so that they could employ more compatible workforce with the improving manufacturing technology. Yet, they also admitted that those criteria could be disregarded at a time when overflow of work is needed.

What do you take into consideration when hiring workers?

Firstly, we look for professional skills. Second comes age. And the third is social situation.

What matters to you as the social situation?

It's not entirely about coming from the same hometown. I cannot say we're mostly hiring these and those. But because it's our friends who recommend them mostly, their hometown and familiarity become the preferred reasons (M3).

We seek qualified people. Now, the new heavy-duty regulations require that the people doing this type of work be graduates from relevant schools or be trained in this area. This is a legal obligation; otherwise there's a fine. So, of course, we look for qualified people. But in Kayseri there is a scarcity in this respect. When things get very busy, we have to bend this rule and the requirement for a high school or vocational school diploma (M4).

Nevertheless, when it comes to small- and medium-sized firms, there are some examples in which certain conservative moral values such as responsibility, honesty or sedateness are privileged over technical qualifications irrespective of sectoral differences. Similar conservative and paternalist considerations are widely seen especially in responses on gender aspects of recruitment. However, this seems to be rather due to the dominance of gender-biased nature of labour process within local industry although conversely local culture is dominated by conservative values. Except for few small-sized enterprises, I was generally told that the male preference in recruitment were a necessary outcome of the labour

process rather than a conservative contest. This argument is also reinforced by the fact that there has been increasing number of female workforce employed in specific stages of labour process which require either elaborateness like sewing in furniture and textile sector, or simplified labour such as working at assemblage in the production of metal goods. Yet, marital status was explicitly stated as an important touchstone of the firms' recruitment policies.

We would accept unqualified workers, because qualified workers have the audacity to lecture us. I mean it's not necessary, what is to be done is clear. We also prefer the married workers because they tend to be more responsible (M2).

We primarily prefer the married ones or the ones who are about to get married. Why? They tend to be responsible individuals who would try to protect their jobs. We even see this during the interviews. They tend to be ambitious and motivated, and try to provide their families with good living conditions (M4).

We have a recruitment policy that applies to all of our companies: one must have graduated from at least a high school/vocational high school, have completed the military service, and be younger than 28. Beside that, being married is a plus. And, of course, it has its benefits such as being responsible, laying claim to their jobs and the company, adaptability etc. (M5).

In this context, female employment has been comparatively limited as a result of both the specificities of labour process and some gender discriminations (at least to single women) in Kayseri. However, it should be noted that the latter has been sustained not just by local cultural aspects but also by real material concerns as single women have a legal right to terminate employment contract without sacrificing compensation fees to the employers when they get married. That single women has also been employed in recent years to satisfy the increasing need for labourers is a proof of this fact. In other words, recruitment policies are eventually shaped by actual material conditions rather than some conservative aspects of local culture.

To sum up, local industrial workforce has been mainly composed of the labourers migrated from rural places in the middle Anatolia mainly as a consequence of the dissolution of their agricultural economies. They largely represent unskilled labour with limited education degree of primary or secondary school. There is also a remarkable number of urban-based industrial workforce

mostly as a second generation of the earlier migration flows to the city in the 1970s, representing relatively more skilled labour with vocational education degree. In addition, some industrial workforce comes from the dissolution of self-employed artisans or shopkeepers. Out of this proleterianisation process, there have been two important outcomes impacting on local class relations. The first one is the lack of enough skilled labour force to be compatible with technological improvements within local industrial production. Local industrialists often complain about the number of qualified workforce within local labour market.⁶⁸ However, only 5 firms among 19 large-scale enterprises are mentioned in the interviews to give systematic work instruction programme to their workforce within a working period. This implies that local industrial employers are reluctant to invest in workforce. This would lead to a vicious circle of low-productivity, low-wage and high workforce turnover rate. As a matter of fact, all managerial interviewees also complained about high level of workforce turnover rate that could be arrived at serious defectiveness in labour process.

The second outcome is the level of proleterisation or so-called semi-proleterisation as industrial labourers in Kayseri have been in some complementary relations with agricultural production in their homelands. The role of semi-proleterisation in industrial class relations is theoretically stated as non-capitalist contribution to labour reproduction through which capitalist employers can partly avoid their own essential burden (Wallerstein, 1993; Fröbel et.al, 1980). In one of the interviews, a worker quite explicitly indicated the role of semi-proleterisation in the reproduction of labourers in Kayseri while revealing that there has been increasing rate of so-called full-proleterianisation among them:

⁶⁸ As a representative person of local industrialists, the chairman of Kayseri Chamber of Industry touched upon this issue with a particular policy suggestion: “There is a shortage in qualified labour. Education is a serious thing. There has been serious waste of resource. There is a scattered structure in vocational education system ranging from municipalities, chambers, Ministry of Education to Higher Education Council, which has been spending billions of Turkish liras. Yet, indeed, we have employed the workers. Instead of transferring resources to those institutions, the state should support firms like us for giving vocational education to their employess. This would be much more efficient” (Boydak, 2009:31).

We also have some perks; if we didn't have those we'd be doomed with this wage. My father sent me away from the village because there was no money in growing sugar plants. But we keep farming the cropland. My father and uncles continue the work, and sometimes I go join them to help. They also employ farm workers when necessary. We have some sort of an income from the village after all. My father sends me fruits and vegetables, potatoes for winter etc. We'd really be doomed otherwise. But there are many who do not have anything coming in from the village. I have no idea how they do it (W34).

Local employers' interest in semi-proleterian labour can even go as far as employing peasants who live in nearer villages and continue to be engaged in farming. Even in some big-sized factories, it is reported, there are some cases in which local employers deliver shuttle bus directly to those villages in order to get workforce into labour process. Yet, such peasant-based workers has led to a contradictory consequence as it sustains the dominance of unqualified workforce within local labour market which has been no longer seen as compatible with (some parts of) industrial production. In other words, the formation of local labour market mainly through the unqualified rural labour migration flows has brought with it a growing dilemma for local employers between the use of cheap labour and the need for qualified workforce. The remaining sections are devoted to the analysis of this and other class dilemmas within local industrial development, starting from production and workplace-level relations.

5.4. Production and Workplace-Level Relations

5.4.1. Technical Division of Labour and Inter-Firm Relations

In the previous chapter, it was underlined that local industry in Kayseri has been composed of three main sectors: textile, metal and furniture. Despite a set of diverse and unreliable data on the number of employment, local industrial employment is apparently concentrated in the sectors of furniture, metal and textile, respectively. In this context, it is possible to define local industry as labour-intensive according to official classification by the Ministry of Industry (for the classification see Köse and Öncü, 2000). However, those labour intensive industries become differentiated among them in terms of the level of technologies and the degree of labour intensiveness. To illustrate, whereas labour process of metal sector includes some stages of production such as press, casting and enamel

coating that involve the use of relatively technological means, that of furniture sector having with the stages of molding, framing and upholstering requires lesser technologies in production. On the other hand, leaving aside its further stage of weaving, textile-yarn production is heavily depended on uncomplicated working of machines that turns labour into rather an observer of the process.

It is on the basis of those differentiations in production process that different types of labour are employed in local industry. This can be seen not only among different sectors but also within the same sector whose production process involves considerable variations in itself. For example, the production of metal goods requires a relatively qualified labour at the stages of pressing, cutting and enamel coating although conversely fitting with unqualified labour at the assemblage stage. In comparison, although demanding for a relatively qualified labour at the stages of molding, framing and upholstering especially in big-sized factories, the production of furniture includes less differentiation in its labour process with regard to the type of labour. However, as it is depended on a relatively unsophisticated technical division of labour, there is no remarkable differentiation in the types of labour within local textile industry unless the production is extended to weaving cloth that requires relatively qualified labour.

Another important aspect of technical division of labour is about the spatial organisation of production. As mentioned in the previous section, unprecedented degree of development in industrial production of Kayseri in the last two decades has been built on both supra-local economic processes (internationalisation of capital, neoliberal policies and the spatial ravelling of productive capital etc.) and local specificities. As for the latter, the building of Kayseri Organised Industrial District (OID) which brought close together various middle- and medium-sized industrial firms scattered in different parts of the city has provided essential spatial context in which to develop particular relations among those firms that would support each other in many ways. This spatial context may seem to be associated with a set of arguments as new industrial districts referring to some regions that has rapidly developed on the basis of some

mutual relations and flexible specialisations between small- and medium-sized firms in the wake of world economic crisis in the 1970s (cf. Piore ve Sabel, 1984). In this line, some Turkish scholars tend to consider recent local industrialisation developments like in Kayseri as having similar, if not the same, relations that would produce similar achievements. Theoretically, in Chapter 2, these approaches were already criticized for both failing to comprehend wider destructive consequences of capitalist relations of production such as over accumulation, uneven development and flows of capital, and ignoring class tensions under the command of those consequences (cf. Eraydın, 2002)⁶⁹. In addition, even approached from this perspective, it is highly difficult to consider the spatial concentration of local industrial production in Kayseri OID to have the same industrial relations with so-called new industrial districts. First, although there were similarly many independent small- and medim-sized firms mostly operating within the direct involvement of their owners in production, the rapid development of certain big-sized firms in each sector subsequently surpassed them and became the most powerful actors in local industrial relations. In this regard, local industrial development in Kayseri has proceeded not through a set of relatively balanced relations among firms specialising in certain components of products, but within the attempts by some individual firms to constitute their own integrated production process.⁷⁰ Managerial interviewees from big-sized firms also confirmed this aspect as follows:

⁶⁹ For example, one of the prominent Turkish scholars arguing for this approach, while taking into the research agenda class relations only as labour costs as neoclassical economics suggests, confines the research entirely to the question of whether or not a kind of ‘flexible specialisation’ can happen in so-called new industrial regions in Turkey: “Once the penetration of foreign markets was successful; imaging, design and trend products started to be improved. Today, the industrial centers of Anatolia are trying to improve the acceleration that they achieved in the first phase and reach the international market. After that; if they can move to special products, product diversification and to the phase of innovation and design; they would be able to become a part of the new production system that flexible specialization requires as part of the global network of production. Whether such a transformation will happen or not will be determined by local entrepreneurs, the local workforce and local people” (Eraydın, 2002:178).

⁷⁰ A recent comprehensive study on industrial employers in Kayseri arrives at similar conclusions regarding with the patterns of local industry (see Cengiz, 2013:258-261).

Generally speaking, as the companies grew, separate factories have been built gradually to produce such things constituting the main inputs. 90% of their production is for our companies, but they also produce for the market. In HES Kablo the aluminum and copper sections were also built as a separate factory. We buy the cable sheath and plastic/sleeve from our conglomerate's factories (M1).

Let's take our bedding company as an example. What we do in Kayseri is mostly assembly. That is to say, the metal accents of the bed come from our group's company Boyçelik; the sponge comes from our Form Sünger; and the fabric, likewise, comes from one of our group companies called BoyTekstil. We assemble them here accordingly, stitch the sides and give them their final form (M5).

What then emerged out of these attempts has not been a set of mutual relations among firms that involves, as it is argued in the literature of new industrial districts, specialisation and product diversity, but rather an agglomeration of those firms producing similar consumer goods such as furniture, metal stuff or textile products within a relatively simplified labour process. However, within its locally specific structures such agglomeration led to the creation of an effective social and spatial context that facilitated particular development in local industrial production. In one of managerial interviews, this context was portrayed in a striking manner as follows:

They keep talking about this so-called Kayseri model. What the hell is it? It's not an organization or some technological stuff. There's a tradition of trade in Kayseri but it's not enough to support an industry. And besides, there's real-estate income because of municipalism. What is gained with this income becomes a weapon in the hands of entrepreneurs. Plus, there are no hurt feelings because everybody knows each other. You make a phone call, and then go to Ankara if necessary. Or the AKP provincial head is a friend of yours. This is the Kayseri model. There's no pricing policy, R&D work, shared documents, nor any investment policy. People just know each other. Let's say you know Mustafa Elitaş from when you were neighbors in the industry, or you know the Minister of Energy from when he was the the directorate of the electrical power administration. This small town culture existing in a big city is what makes us different. Other than that, there is no motivation to come together and collaborate financially. Let's dig and find out how many aggregate corporations are out there. What's happened to them? There was Taksan, Birlik Mensucat, and Çimkur. Where are they now? They were all aggregate corporations; some of them were founded with the immigrant remittances. Now they've either gone bankrupt or are in the hands of a few families. Where is the partnership culture now? (M6).

Within these informally operating industrial relations, small- and medium-sized firms continued to proliferate in a number of entrepreneurial strategies ranging from developing some cooperative relations among employers mainly as business organisation to attend exhibitions *to* copying product types from each other. Nevertheless, as competitive dynamics of market relations accelerated after the economic crises in 2001 and in 2008, such industrial relations have been gradually transformed into a set of contract manufacturing hierarchies. In this process, while leading local industrial firms in each sector have developed subcontracting relations with international companies, small- and medium-sized firms have been increasingly compelled to incorporate themselves into those relations. This tendency has been especially evident in local furniture production as it is more open to spatial fragmentation in a relatively labour intensive labour process:

İstikbal has really given us all a vision. It was a family corporation too, but it took serious steps towards institutionalization. It put aside its family corporation identity, and has become professional. Now Kayseri follows its lead. Other family businesses copy it. We've also copied it in terms of institutionalization. Now the conditions require everything to be this way. Just the other day we attended a seminar held by İstikbal; and of course it is difficult, this is a much smaller business but we will try to implement a similar change here too (M7).

Before the 2008 crisis we would manufacture furniture with our own brand to the domestic markets, such as the Karadeniz region. But when the demand became imbalanced with the crises, and the payments were late, we had to turn completely to contract manufacturing. Now we make furniture for İstikbal. The profit is lower but at least the demand is regular. It doesn't pour but still trickles down. Now we've learned how to do smooth business using invoices, even if it's out of obligation. To be honest, in the past, we would show the amount in the invoices lower than they were, or didn't care about the quality control etc. As you see, it brings some institutionalization with it (M8).

In this framework, it is safe to argue that such informally-operating industrial relations in local industry have been transforming into so-called formal and institutional relations within contract manufacturing hierarchies going through the emergent big-sized enterprises down to the small- and medium-sized firms. On the part of leading local firms, this transformation can go as far as introducing certain capitalist rationalisation into labour process and management strategies that remains no longer loyal to some local socialisations:

A year or two ago, we started to have some of our cheaper products made in Bahrain. We were only able to compete with the cheap products of far-eastern countries in this way. Now we've bought this factory in Bahrain and we're manufacturing all our cheapest products there (M4).

In 2010 we moved to a whole new organizational model, and became a fully professional company; we moved the head office to Istanbul, did research for efficiency, and finally decided that it is better to buy some of the product inputs, such as felt and fiber, from outside. Therefore, we've stopped manufacturing them and decreased the overmanned sections (M9).

This transformation within local industrial relations involves important repercussions for class relations. Within those informally operating industrial relations, labourers could find some channels through which to find jobs and survive other than pure market-based relations. Most of the workers who have long worked in local industry said that they could at times come across the employer at production line, have an easier access to the employer and demand financial support to be paid in instalments when necessary. For example, a local industrial worker, who is named here as Çetin and has long worked at a big-sized metal factory, depicted the employer-employee relations of the previous years as follows:

In the past, the boss would come and tour the factory. We were about 300 employees back then. Most of us were his fellow townsmen. He would come and stand by the worker. I personally experienced this. He came and showed me how to do the job, how to use the point machine.

Would you be able to see him if there was a problem?

Let me give you an example from our section again. When I was working the night shift, the payments were overdue by several days. Apparently, our section got together and decided to go and talk to the boss. Of course the boss got mad for this seemingly threatening move, as if they were going to beat him up or something. But they also got their money that day. And of course some of those who had gone to him were let go a few days later, but that's another story (W12).

This case reveals that one aspect of such informally operating industrial relations was the direct concrete relation between employer and employees blurring the class lines within the paternalist power of the former over the latter at the workplace. Nevertheless, parallel with the rise of so-called formal and institutionalised industrial relations in recent years, it seems that such direct

relations between employer and employees have disappeared into the quantitative and performative ones. This is clearly evident in workers' responses to the question on their current relations with the employer.

The man's always concerned with the numbers. Back when the factory was smaller it wasn't like this. We were a bit freer, there was a warmer environment. As it grew, they started doing studies, and measured our work by the minute (W55).

They time you without telling. Let's say I make my product in 8 minutes. The next month I make 200 products. Then they say 'we know your performance, you can do better'. They've increased it more and more, pushing for more all the time (W20).

They've built such a system that assumes that the worker is like a machine. Even with a machine, you need to cool it when it's overheated. The worker does not even get that or any form of motivation. You would even approach your child with affection, buy a toy, make them happy etc...The factory is like the military. Everybody has to do their job within a hierarchy. There are the study groups; they analyse everything, they measure, they make arrangements. Foremen give us directions accordingly. The guys are conditioned for numbers (W34).

I'm telling you what I see between the boss and the worker. He's acting like a rival company, or seeing us as the firm he's buying the materials from. He says 'the cheaper I buy this material, the bigger my profit will be'. And he sees the worker the same way. 'The less I pay the worker, the more profit I'll make' (W47).

It then seems that the recent transformation in local industry into relatively formal and institutional relations among firms has proceeded along with, to use Edward's (1979) terms, the development of technical-scientific control within labour process imposing systematically competitive market pressures on workers. In this line, it is apparent that there has been a considerable degree of crystallisation of class relations in the employer-employee relationships. A clear reflection of this tendency is the last quotation (W47) revealing that there has been much more competitive market relation rather than paternalist cooperation in the employer's approach to the workforce in recent years. This has also been associated with the increasing performative discipline over the workers within labour process. In this framework, it is safe to argue that capital-labour relation has undergone some essential changes along with the recent development of local industrial relations towards some formal and institutional lines. The details of these changes are investigated in the next sections.

5.4.2. Working Conditions and Wage-Regime

In general, the notion of working conditions embodies the activity and organisation of work, skilling levels, training, working time and other employment conditions. To use the concepts provided in Chapter 2, while the technical division of labour provides the material basis of socialisation of production, working conditions can be regarded largely as value-determined content of this socialisation at the workplace level. In addition, as wage is both a direct extension, and an integral part, of the capital-labour relation, it can be associated with the notion of working conditions. Thus, this section attempts to investigate these two important components of capital-labour relation in order to reveal the tensions and conflicts attached to them.

To begin with, I introduce a part of semi-structured interview with a local industrial worker who is here named as Ali. Having migrated from his village in the mid-1990s and then worked at a poultry farm, Ali started to work in a big-sized metal factory producing electrical metal goods. As he has worked for more than eight years at the same factory, interviewing with him provided many details and changes about working conditions within local industry.

What do you do in the factory?

Right now I'm working in the cable room. I started at the assembly line, and worked there very long time. When I was there I didn't have insurance, we would work under the foreman.

Are you bound to the company? Were you insured?

No. The one responsible for the line was the foreman, we would work for him, meaning we didn't have ties to the factory. We worked for 2-3 years like that with no insurance. Things got bigger, and the factory made a deal with the Italians in 2008. They were going to export to them. When that happened, they insured some of us. I got insured too. Until then, and I'm not exaggerating, 80% of us were not insured. But still we're registered to another company called Kumteks under the factory.

How's that?

When they got us insurance the factory owners founded a few companies. For example Kumteks workers are low in number; about 200, and they're all unionized. Most of them were insured in the first place. And then most of us were made employees of Kumteks. These are high in number. There are about 200 at Kumteks.

The unionized ones you mentioned, in which parts do they work?

The ones in the enamelling, dyehouse and press sections are mostly unionized and are Kumteks employees. Almost all of the ones in the cable room or on the assembly line like me are Kumteks employees, which means no union.

What's your work hours and pace like?

I work 12 hours a day. It starts at 7:30, I leave my place at 6 and get on the shuttle bus around 6:30. Then I work from 7:30 until 11 am. There is no tea break or anything. There's a 45-minute lunch break. Then I work until 5:30 pm. The ones at the assembly usually get off at 5:30 but because our cable room needs to rush goods to them, there's regular overtime work after 6 until 7:30 or 8. We work from morning until 3 or 3:30 again on Saturdays.

What is your work pace like? For example, if you had to compare, is there an increase in the pace of the line you work at, or in the work that you're doing?

Yes, surely. They take weekly, monthly and yearly readings, and measure which line did how much work. They always want more to be done. The foremen especially push hard on this because the more they make the more bonus they get. They keep pressuring us, saying 'come on, hurry up', 'we've done very little', 'keep up, otherwise you'll be fired', it's always threatening. Excuse my French, but they make people race like horses.

And there are also some risks in your work in terms of safety. When you're doing your job, is the necessary equipment such as gloves, protective masks or goggles provided?

That's terrible too. If your glove's ripped, they tell you to come bring it so they'll see if it's ripped or not first. You can only get it after asking time after time; you get weary of going in and asking. They don't care much about the masks anyway, and if you ask for it and finally get it, you have to use the same mask all the time. So you give up.

May I ask how much you're getting paid under these conditions?

The pay is the minimum wage: 700-something lira. The overtime would be 100-200 lira that you get under the table. It's not in your payroll. Together with the overtime, subsistence allowance and everything, it's about 850 in total.

How many overtime hours do you do?

We have about 10-12 hours of overtime per week, over 45 hours. Overtime is mandatory, you cannot say no. If you say you cannot stay the foreman tells you to do. If you push it too hard you have to pay it in other ways. When you need some time off, he makes it difficult. Or he treats you badly, threatens to fire you. On the other hand, you compensate the low pay with the overtime pay to some extent. But it's still not worth it. Everybody's complaining. You want to rest at some point (W33).

What Ali told about working conditions and wages within local industry were echoed in nearly all of other semi-structured interviews with workers. For example, many workers told me that they had been employed unregisteredly until the recent years.⁷¹ As for the working conditions, health and work safety became the most emphasized issue raised by workers. This is especially crucial for metal workers as they work in highly risky and severe working conditions. In this regard, they seem to be much concerned with safety in labour process.

We work in the metal shop. We put the plate onto the counter by hand. If it slips, you get your hand cut. One of our friends had to have his hand cut off. There are laser-twisting machines here. To make the machine work faster they've removed the lasers. The machine turns itself off now. When our friend was working the machine went bam! The man's fingers got cut off from here. One of our close friends lost his fingers with the shear. There is no work safety. Sometimes we work by very risky machines. For example people who do pressing are made to work at the shear or twisters are sent to the shear. You work with the machines you're not familiar with, so of course there are accidents (W16).

On the basis of workers' statements, it is possible to say that local industrial employers do not provide even some minimum legal requirements regarding with the health and work safety in production process. In the above-mentioned case, for example, the worker should have received adequate work instruction before being given the task of using specific machinery according to official by-law on severe work. Nevertheless, employers generally meet with those requirements on

⁷¹ "I did pressing work at Femaş for 2 years, and I had insurance. They did not insure the ones at the assembly line. Because pressing is dangerous, they would do it right away. But I had many friends at pressing who did not have insurance. While working at night shift, one of them lost his four fingers. I mean pressing is tough. They did not let him go, though; he became a night guard instead (W 51). I never worked without insurance at Kumtel but I witnessed others doing it. A couple of lines were reserved for contract manufacturing. When we were at Kumtel, these were insured. But, when it was work for contract manufacturing, there were kids working at lines; kids who were too young to even do their military service. Contract manufacturers tell them to make, let's say, 1000 products, and do whatever they have to do in order to finish it. Then of course they find people from all over and meet the demand (W49). They started my insurance in 2004; I had to work without insurance for 9 years. (Is it less common to work without insurance now?) It is, compared to the past. There is almost no one without insurance in many firms. But they still suggest not insuring them and offering to pay 100 liras more instead. And people accept it because they need the money. This wasn't uncommon" (W21).

paper. This is apparently revealed in what a managerial interviewee said is compared with a worker interviewee in the same factory:

Of course we train the workers. The heavy-duty regulations require us to do so (M10).

Sometimes the foreman brings some papers and just tells us to sign them. He says it'll take long to read so just sign it. If you ask what it is or whatnot, he says 'don't you trust us?' One time I was curious so insisted on asking. They said it's a document showing you got training. But they didn't give us any training (W39).

As for the wages, all the workers in different sectors basically complain about the employers' official minimum wage policy. This policy has been so prevalent within local industry that even the leading local industrial firms pay the same wages to the workers.

We register them first with the minimum wage. There's a probation period of 3 months. They become union members after 3 months. And, after a year, they receive the right to get a bonus. In the successive years, the pay is increased according to the raise stated in the association agreement (M1).

Our payment system works like this: Workers get minimum wage for starters. After the work period it is raised according to the association agreement (M4).

We pay minimum wage. Of course, the operators and the foreman are different. (M11)

In Kayseri, minimum wage is the principle. This applies to us as well (M6).

Such a wide-range existence of minimum wage policy within local industry has led industrial workers to experience similar economic conditions in their reproduction process. Furthermore, minimum wage policy has paved the way for the development of a set of tensions in capital-labour relation within local industry. Workers' survival is mainly based on working over time for long hours. On the basis of this fact, local employers have primarily introduced working over time as a way of increasing production to such a degree that it can be arrived at the biological limits of workers. In this line, employers use all legal and class power to force workers into working overtime. Although workers generally consider working overtime as a remarkable, if not adequate, financial contribution to their low wages, its biologically unbearable duration has given rise to various

kinds of individual reactions among workers. Interviewing with workers revealed that an initial reaction appears as a deliberate attempt to reduce individual work performance to the minimum levels. A seemingly obedient worker, as conversation turned into a warm and friendly talk, depicted workers' general reaction against employer as "working depending on the amount of money" in a quite striking manner:

He should give 3-5 or 10 or whatever, man, just to keep the worker motivated. He should pay wages regularly. I don't know, maybe he should give 10 more lira on top of the minimum wage the state gives so the guy would come in more motivated to work. If he gives a little more, the workers really wouldn't mind the small stuff. They'd say he cares for the workers. But what he thinks is that if you go away there's someone else ready to work. Ahmet goes, Mehmet comes in. The boss says the same thing. Why? Because, there are too many men. Then what do you do? You work according to the wage given to you... The man does not give you that much money. Then why would the worker be into it? Why would I think about this job day and night then? (W4)

In response, it has then been inevitable for employers to increase disciplinary control over workers in order to receive maximum labour in the production process. Nevertheless, this provokes another kind of reaction on the part of workers. They leave their jobs whenever an alternative appears. This reaction is so prevalent among workers that it can lead a cumulative consequence as a high rate of labour turnover within local industry. As a matter of this fact, the most complaining issue by managers about workers is their reluctance to work and to leave their jobs easily. This complaint is evident even in big-sized industrial firms.

There's a high turnover... Workers switch jobs for petty reasons. There's also this side of the story, honestly. The wages are set in Kayseri. It's minimum wage. The worker also knows it, if he has any kind of trouble at work he can go to these places; he knows that when he quits his job in the morning he gets another one in the afternoon. Especially during summer months when there's much demand, the workers become demanding. Even if they don't have social rights like they do in our factory, they go to another place. They get cross with the foreman or with a friend and they're gone. He says he cannot smoke in the factory so he leaves. They cannot take the discipline at the big factories (M12).

We have a problem of high turnover. We try to compensate for the loss through overtime. The turnover affects the quality. I can say that this is our biggest problem (M13).

Furthermore, it seems that a more radical reaction to the working conditions and wage regime in local industry appears as a resistance to be an industrial worker. Having witnessed many job advertisements on the walls of factories during the first stage of field work in Kayseri OID, I sarcastically asked industrial managers that “it seems there is no unemployment problem in Kayseri, does it?” They all replied that it is not an unemployment problem but being overcritical by workers about the jobs in local industry. A manager from the leading local metal-cable factory was complaining about labourers as follows:

We’re having a difficult time procuring employees. You see, there is a UMEM Project that the government is supporting, it pays the wages for about 3 months, provides their insurance. But they cannot get employees. For example, we wanted to hire about 200 people within this UMEM Project. We announced the project, and asked for 100 people. It turns out 50 people applied. We want them to be a bit qualified for the carpet factory, but we cannot find them. We cannot find them by asking for different conditions. For example, we want them to be high school graduates, younger than 28. But then, there are no applicants. We bend these conditions but there are still very few applicants (M1).

In a warm and friendly conversation; however, another manager from a medium-sized food factory explained why and how labourers have resisted to being industrial worker in Kayseri in a very striking manner:

The fact is that the workers are made to work for very little pay. That’s why the worker does not want to work. The factory is looking for a worker, but the worker does not work for that much in Kayseri. It may be more appealing to work in the construction sector. He can work for 60-70 lira per day for about 7-8 months and then he is able to go back to his village for the winter. And the village kids are tough enough for construction. Right now we cannot find workers, and the workers do not like the job.

How come? Isn’t there unemployment in Kayseri? Aren’t the workers looking for work?

Exactly. There’s no unemployment in Kayseri, the workers just turn up their noses at jobs. They do not want to work for minimum wage. There are some employers here who make people work for low wages, for even lower than the minimum wage. The construction sector is very well developed in Kayseri; it goes on for 7-8 months. The worker works there for about 7-8 months for 60-70 lira per day. And then maybe he goes and works at OSB for 3-4 months. Or he goes back to his village, and comes back to construction once the winter’s over (M14).

Thus, it is apparent that poor working conditions and minimum wage policy in local industry of Kayseri have led labourers to involve various kinds of reactions ranging from the minimum performance in production process and non-loyal attitudes towards workplaces to the distinct survival strategies other than being employed in local industry. More importantly, although those reactions have been at the individual level, their cumulative consequences came to the point where industrial employers have strongly felt labour problem within its different moments i.e. labour market, workplace and reproduction spheres. In the interview with the general director of Kayseri OID, this problem was also pointed out with a highly controversial solution:

In Kayseri I've seen many job ads for qualified and unqualified workers. What's the unemployment situation?

There's no unemployment in Kayseri. Rather, there's being stuck up.. I arrange a place for all the guys who are sent to me for work but they quit not even waiting for one day. Why? Because they don't want to work. The people who come to work through some connections think they can just come in and out as they please. When it's work time they don't want to work.

Why do you think this is the case? Don't these people need to work?

Of course they do, they have a family to feed. You know, it's the same all over Turkey, but especially in Kayseri the concept of a family is very important. It's common that one member of the family works and the others are fed. It's not like in Europe where you have to work once you're eighteen. Here, if there's someone without a job, someone in the family will give them money. It's the family way here. That's why they're not in a bad position if they're out of work. They get support from the family somehow. So there's this aversion to work. They manage one way or another.

Does this cause a problem for the industry?

Of course it does. To be honest, what some of the employers say is this: "We wish they would build workers' shelters like the ones in Mannheim back in the day so that we could bring workers here from other cities." They say that they wish they [the workers] would stay in those bachelor's pads so they could meet their needs (C1).

Leaving aside the practicability of this extra-ordinary solution within local industry, it is safe to argue, the fact that industrial employers consider workers' dormitory as a policy suggestion reveals that they have some serious difficulties regarding with the management of labour. The next section is devoted to the

analysis of these difficulties in detail by focussing on both the employers' strategies to cope with them and the workers' responses at the production and workplace level.

5.4.3. Labour Control Strategies and Workers' Responses

As mentioned in Chapter 2, labour control strategies generally involve a series of attempts operating at various scales ranging from local labour market to (urban) reproduction process, seeking to supply an adequate number of labourers with certain qualifications to work. However, because (i) capital basically approaches to labour as the source of abstract surplus value, and (ii) individual capitals tend to have no responsibility for the reproduction of labourers after paying wages, contradictions between capital and labour becomes an integral part of labour control strategies. A corollary is that a relatively coherent form of these contradictions for a sustained capital-labour relation, referring to a particular local labour regime, also involves some inadequacies, shortages and failures, which inevitably leads to the development of conflicts between capital, labour and the state at different scales. In this perspective, I initially look at such labour control strategies within workplace-level relations. Their wider-scale consequences will be analysed in the next section.

In order to understand, if not directly, some aspects of employers' labour control strategies, firstly, I asked managers "how do they include workers in the decision making process". The answers point to that a sort of grievance procedure through which workers are taken part in the decision process has been established in many industrial firms including all the big-sized and some medium-sized ones. Drawing on this fact, it is possible to argue that so-called modern management procedures developed along with the rise of industrial production in Kayseri. Yet, a detailed investigation signs the fact that such procedures remain on paper, and are generally accompanied within so-called traditional control mechanisms. In other words, there are rather some hybrid forms of controlling procedures even within big-sized workplaces. A manager from one of the two leading local

furniture-bed companies hinted at this fact when he was comparing his workplace with its counterpart in local industry in terms of the management procedures.

The shift to professionalism in Kayseri has been slow. The traditional relationship models are still effective although İstikbal turned this into a positive thing. They are a semi-professional/semi-family corporation combining the tradition with innovation. But we're different than İstikbal; we're more modern. We strongly disagree on certain matters. Let me put it this way. I work like Google; I trust my employees and get the feedback accordingly. But they [İstikbal] work like the state; they abide by all the laws. If you don't give your workers that kind of trust you cannot keep the unity of family as a corporation. If you make more, you need to know how to share and motivate. When the boss wins, the others win as well... We're different than İstikbal. They've combined tradition with innovation, but Yataş is more modern in every sense of the word. We're an exception here (M9).

It is indeed that the above factory has some differentiated aspects in the management procedures within the local industry. For example, unionisation in this factory dates back to the early years of the 1990s when there was no trade union organised in furniture sector within the local industry. In comparison, it seems to be less concerned with the religious values and practices that are widely mentioned to be included into industrial relations in order to cover class tensions. Despite such remarkable differences, the company involves no shift in the wage-regime that is dominant in the local industry.

So is this different approach of yours still different than other establishments when it comes to payments?

It's higher here, I mean our white-collar employees get paid better in Kayseri. For the blue-collar ones it's minimum wage because they're registered of course. We cannot go below that because it's our legal obligation (M9).

Therefore, so-called modern management including participatory and collaborative mechanisms for workers to effect some policies at workplace seem to be limited to the white-collar workers in a few big-sized firms. Moreover, such firms cannot be taken to genuinely represent the class nature of the revival of industrial development in the last decades mainly because they were generally established before the 1990s.

However, this does not mean that those companies established or rapidly grown after the 1990s have not involved in the so-called modern management techniques. Interviewing with a manager from the leading local industrial company, which is proudly mentioned as having the melding of traditional family relations and universal business culture, shows that so-called modern management policies became incorporated into those companies at a certain level of development.

We have a complaint-and-suggestion system at our factory. We don't get much participation but we'd actually like to use it more. We give away awards depending on how much their suggestions contribute to production. We have the suggestion holder of the month, or suggestion holder of the year etc. Plus, we have practices of team leadership and coaching. We build team leaderships, team responsibility, team coaching, and total quality circles. That's why we primarily want at least high school graduates. We're trying to switch from foremanship to team leadership. Someone smart is actually enough for us because machines do all the work. We're preparing the workers with training programs (M5).

However, it would be wrong to deduce that such modern management techniques are the natural outcome of the growth of those companies, namely being classified as big-sized firm. Neither all big-sized industrial firms are reported to have such management techniques, nor it was only the big-sized firms that have implemented them. As an example for the latter, a medium-sized firm producing some machine equipments are said to carry out certain methods such as total quality management, team working and quality circles. Indeed, there is also a considerable amount of critical works which reveals that management methods are basically shaped to control workers in a more efficient way (see Wood, 1993; Graham, 1993; Danford, 1999, Nichols and Sugur, 2004). As a matter of this fact, a manager from a rapidly growing metal factory hinted that its management policies on workers have actually changed depending on the workers' attitudes to work in production process.

We aim to build a sense of belonging in workers. We value this, really concern ourselves with it, and study it. We also receive consultancy on professional management techniques. We're now aware that the firm is expanding, and that we need to have a different way of communicating with employees. For example, five years ago we would pay the standard minimum wage, and the social benefits were limited. But the scale's expanded now. We need to motivate the workers

because unrest grows easily when the factory grows. For instance, we developed compensation policies that would motivate workers and make them more competitive. We've built scales of payment: A, B, and C. After a two-month probation period we decide whether the worker will become A, B or C. We reassess everyone's position in the payment scale after every year. A is minimum wage; B is A + 100 TL; and C is A + 200 TL (M13).

The last case indeed reveals that management procedures and techniques on workers are selectively developed on the nature of technical division of labour, primarily taking into consideration workers' efficiency and their potential reactions. It would then be misleading to consider those procedures and techniques as modern vs. traditional; rather, they should be analysed in their actual complex forms that are selectively constituted by employers in the pursuit of increasing efficiency and class power within workplace-level relations. Given the actual limits to receive these forms from the managers, I will try to find out them from the semi-structured interviews with workers in the next section.

5.4.3.1 Direct Disciplinary Labour Control via Journeyman

When asked about the management policies at labour process, all of the workers initially spoke of not employers or managers but journeymen (ustabaşı). This is indeed not surprising when what worker Ali above told about the journeymen as “informal contractor” that had unregisteredly employed workers in collaboration with industrial employer, is kept in mind. Although they have no longer such an autonomous position at the workplaces, it is understood that journeymen are still given some distinct roles in the management of labour at so-called modern factories. A worker who has long worked at some major local industrial firms summarized his experiences with journeymen as follows: “I have been working since 2001 but have never seen a journeyman protecting workers”. He subsequently added that “There was a special thing when I was working in the factory. The journeymen were getting bonus. For example, the quota determined by employer is 700 at the assemblage. If the workers at this assemblage produce more than 700, the employer gives a bonus yet only to the journeymen. Thus, no bonus given to workers” (W49). Similarly, another worker employed at a big-sized textile-yarning factory point to increasing work pressure and disciplinary

attitudes by journeymen on workers in order to receive bonus from employers: “journeymen gets the bonus, that’s why they don’t give any breaks and they are pushing us all the time. They impose the workload of 30 workers to 10 to 15 workers” (W2). It can then be argued that whereas workplaces have increasingly become modernised in many respects, journeymen are still considered to carry out not just a controlling role within labour process but also direct disciplinary function on workers. This argument finds many evidence in workers’ statements about journeymen at work.

The factory is like the military. Everyone has to do their job within a hierarchy. We have a foreman who pretends he’s doing all the good work and blames the workers for the bad work. So arguing with each other separates us. But the superiors are always better off. One of my friends became the foreman’s assistant, and we got cross with each other. I couldn’t deal with it and quit. You’re at a loss as to whom to support (W34). Because I’m a former foreman my pay is good. I would get paid 1400 lira four years ago. Now they’ve moved me from that position, but my salary is still the same. I started to speak about the workers problems a bit, and got cross with the boss. On top of that, the supervisor that he brought put a lot of pressure on the workers, and we got into an argument. So the boss removed me from the foremanship position but did not decrease my salary although I didn’t get a raise for four years (W55).

However, journeymen’ disciplinary impositions seem to change according to both the scale of workplaces and the specificities of labour process. Most of the complaints about journeymen’ practices at work come from the workers employed at big-sized factories. In this context, the scale of workplace appeared to be more conspicuous for furniture sector since furniture workers at small- and medium-sized factories reflected less concern about journeymen’s disciplinary practices within the labour process. For textile sector, the scale of workplace seems to play a less role in shaping journeymen’ attitudes, primarily because the nature of its labour process such as uncomplicated aspects of production, the use of unqualified labour and one-sided dominance of machinery production do already determine workplace-level relations on behalf of disciplinary practices. In this regard, rather than the scale of workplace, product-type seems to be more influential for local textile production in shaping the relations between journeymen and workers: as textile-yarn production is extended to weaving by involving relatively complicated labour process, those disciplinary practices on

workers become partially weakened. When it comes to metal sector, journeymen's attitudes seem to have remarkable changes according to different stages of labour process. While workers employed at simple, repetitive and uncomplicated parts of the labour process like assemblage are exposed to intensified disciplinary practices by journeymen, others working at the stages of press, casting or enamel coating which involve qualified and experienced workforce encounter less disciplinary attitudes by journeymen, according to semi-structured interviews with metal workers.

Despite all these remarkable variations; however, it is apparent that the management of labour at labour process is heavily based on the disciplinary function of journeymen over workers as workplace-level relations get organised in line with so-called modern factory-type production.

5.4.3.2 Paternalist Labour Control within a Religious-Communitarian Utopia

Workplace-level relations between employer and employees cannot be fully constrained to the technical procedures of management of labour process. These relations are also organised in and around various material and symbolic practices aiming to sustain some essential features such as cooperation, obedience and motivation that are basically needed to exist on the part of workers within labour process. Such practices seem to be effectively prevalent especially at small- and medium-sized workplaces within local industry. In semi-structured interviews, workers employed in those workplaces are remarkably differentiated in the sense that they specifically underlined some material and symbolic practices making them relatively content at work while talking about the management and journeymen's attitudes.

We have a good relationship with the foremen, and we get enough breaks...There's sort of a family culture. Whoever needs help i taken care of. It's like family. More or less everybody knows each other very well here... There's social aid, you get extra money if you're married. There are more benefits during Ramadan and stuff. When you're in need, you get help. Let's say you're having a wedding; they'll lend you money. We have ways to motivate the workers. For example, we organize soccer tournaments. The boss takes us to the cinema

sometimes. If he gets something, he wants his employees to get something too; that's the kind of person he is (W1).

We don't have any problems with the foreman, or with the bosses for that matter. We can just show up at their office if we need to. We have many bosses but we can see them easily. They help during Ramadan, give away food etc. They help with things at weddings. If a couch costs 2 thousand TL, for example, they're willing to pay the half (W13).

The foreman comes and asks if we should stay to do work overtime because the work is kind of urgent. If he comes in and tells us that we have to overstay, we won't do it. But he's just asking. Maybe I'm tired or have things to do, but when he asks nicely like that, we stay... I've never thought of working in another sector. Why haven't I? Because I didn't know anyone anywhere else, but I have my uncle here, I feel secure... I was at Istikbal but didn't stay there because their hours are very difficult. My brother-in-law works there. They say it's a nice place but they time everything. You don't overwork yourself here; whatever you can make is fine. And that's why you want to give them more; but they require a specific amount there, it's mass production (W14).

The workers' statements above refer to a particular form of workplace-level relations that involves socially and spatially a set of proximities between employers and employees. Within this form, workers are generally employed via acquaintances mostly at small- and medium-sized workplaces; they can access to employer to demand their needs when necessary; their expectations are then matched with paternalistic considerations of the employer. In explaining such form, the concept of "cultural hegemony" (Thompson 2004; 2002) is widely considered among critical scholars to be particularly appropriate as cultural elements play an essential role in the development of those workplace-level relations (Coşkun, 2013; Erdoğan, 2012). In Kayseri, where local culture has been historically dominated by strong conservative elements, cultural hegemony within the employer-employee relationship became organised mainly through Islamic-religious discourse and practices that make such relationship recognizable in mystified ways having with divine references. In these ways, while class relations are considerably reduced to some religious-communitarian imaginations, the religious practice called "faith" ("tevekkül") rather than struggle appears as an acceptable norm among workers (see Durak, 2011). For local industrialists, religion (Islam) has thus been a distinct part of the management strategies to

provide the essential values of cooperation, obedience and motivation for workers at work.

The most obvious expression of the involvement of religious elements into local industrial relations is the Central Mosque at Kayseri OID, which was built by the leading local company to host nearly 8,000 Muslim people for pray. On Friday noon, workers from different factories are taken by free shuttle buses to attend Friday pray, so much so that there is no vacant place left even at the courtyard of the Mosque. Therefore, thousands of workers pray together with local employers in a way giving a sort of feeling that they are equal people before God. This religious-communitarian rhetoric is also addressed in prayer's speeches especially at the time of economic crisis and industrial conflicts. As an unintended consequence, the central Mosque also becomes a unique meeting point at Kayseri OID where such a number of workers from many separate workplaces can communicate and socialise among themselves. Probably because this potential began to be seen as a threat, employers of the big-sized factories do not tend to allow employees to visit Central Mosque collectively for Friday pray; instead, employers recommend them to use relatively small mosques at each factory plot.

The above religious-communitarian rhetoric is also rooted in the management of labour inside the workplaces. Local employers are widely reported to distribute religious handbooks that advise workers to keep them away from conflict at workplace, and to invite the prayer (imam) to give workers religious speech about the harmony and peace at work. Interviews with workers revealed similar stories in line with these reports. At this point, what a pious metal worker have experienced at his workplace, when he attempted to get unionised together with his workfellows, is a striking example of the prevalent use of religious rhetoric in the management of labour within the local industry:

The employers from Kayseri make themselves look like excellent Muslims. They abuse it though. I'm not saying all of them do but I haven't seen anyone who doesn't. For example, there's a type of lawsuit called "treason against the workplace". They instill it in you when you're little: you shall not betray your bread and butter. I'm not betraying, man. But this has really happened before. The foremen came in, the men of the boss, and the managers came in and said

this is betrayal; this is not in our religion. But does the religion really say this? (W16).

To the extent that religious communitarian discourse became incorporated into workplace as a legitimising reference to the employer-employee relationship, some religious practices then achieved an inviolable feature within workplace-level relations. In this context, “time-out for praying” became such a legitimate demand by workers that none of the industrial employers could ban it at the workplace. This actually has led to many cases in which workers demand to use three time-outs for praying per day within working hours. In addition, each “time out-for praying” can be lasted for 20 to 30 minutes in a deliberate preference to re-perform ablution before each pray. Thus, the use by local employers of religious rhetoric in the management of labour has also provided workers with an opportunity to act at workplace in particular ways that may conflict with the work discipline of capitalist labour process. Interviews unveiled the fact that such conflict has recently come to the fore within local industry to such an extent that “time-out for praying” is considerably restricted, put under strict control and even banned by the management.

They scream and yell at the guys who go to pray. They tell them to do their five-time-prayers at home. Even performing religious duties is forbidden. I mean they don't say it to their faces but still... (W2)

The boss wants them to do the prayer later. There are some very conservative ones; we cover up for them. I mean I understand the employer's position too. If we have to finish the production by 4 o'clock for the delivery, let's say, the boss gets the penalty when people go off to pray. The employer is right (W31).

The foremen used to pressure the workers to go and comeback. They would tell them to make up later for the times they missed praying. However, upon some complaints, on one Friday Hacı Boydak came up and said that from now on no one shall be refrained from performing the prayer. After that, the pressure was less severe. There are, of course, some others who go to pray and don't show up for half an hour or 45 minutes. When this happens, I start to be suspicious and jokingly ask if they're doing any make-up prayer too. Such things happen as well. For example, the worker does not perform ablution when he's got free time, and does it when he goes to pray. That takes about half an hour. The Friday prayer always takes 10 minutes longer, and they calculate even that time difference. That's the sole reason why they've reduced the lunch break from one hour to 45 minutes (W34).

People perform the prayer, of course. There are places where they put pressure on the workers but our firm isn't one of them. If you go and do it quickly, and there's no delay in your work, that's no problem. There's a guy working beside me who always performs his ablution during lunch break and then goes off to prayer (W4).

It's difficult to do it five times a day. We go to the Friday prayer collectively. They used to drive us on a shuttle bus to go to the central mosque, but about a year ago they built a prayer room (mescid) inside the factory because it would take too long to get together with the commute and everything. Now they're saving 20 minutes compared to the past (W12).

The thing about the regular and Friday prayers is... It's a problem for whoever is on shift. For instance, a person who is on the 7-3 (7:00 a.m. – 3:00 p.m.) shift cannot leave for the Friday prayer. It's because the lunch break is around 11, and you get about half an hour. The call to prayer starts at 12:50. If you leave for the prayer you'll come back at 1:30 p.m. Then it becomes a problem. There is no other person to substitute for you. The work cannot stop. You cannot stop an operating machine (W50).

Thus, it is clearly shown in the interviews that “time-out for praying”, which developed as highly legitimate demand at workplace where employer exerted certain religious discourse on employees in order to get their consent, is no longer seen as acceptable and tolerable as it was. Furthermore, this is not limited to big-sized workplaces at which labour process is organised within a serial production and intensified work discipline; workers at small and medium sized workplaces are also facing difficulties in breaking work for praying as those workplaces became a part of wider hierarchies of production and work discipline. Such an apparent refusal to workers' demand for “time-out for praying” at workplace is likely to undermine the cultural hegemony within the employer-employee relationship that was mainly built in reference with religious discourses. It is because of this danger that local employer avoids a formally-declared prohibition on religious practices during working hours, deliberately leaving workers in ambiguity to whom to blame for the restrictions they face. The question of whether or not this ambiguity serves to help employer continue such cultural hegemony over workers is worth investigating further in the next sections. However, it is here safe to conclude that the disciplinary aspects of labour process have increasingly dominated workplace-level relations within the local industry.

In the scope of so-called cultural hegemony within the employer-employee relationship, there is also another form of social relation, that is being from the same village/town or ethnic community, which is effectively used in the management of labour. This is particularly referred in a number of critical studies on rapid industrialisation process that has taken place in Anatolian towns (see Bedirhanoglu-Yalman, 2009a; Özugurlu, 2005). In this respect, local industry in Kayseri provides no exception. As the revival of local industry coincided with the emergence of industrialists from a local town called Hacilar, so the industrial workforce was initially supplied via acquaintanceship from the same town, especially given the context that local people of Kayseri were reluctant to work in industry (Cengiz, 2012). This form of recruitment was subsequently found functional in that it provided employer with a set of social ties with workers that can be manipulated in many ways to execute interclass consensus at workplace. Although such recruitment has lost its predominance as local industry spectacularly expanded along with massive flows of migration at a wider scale, there are still some cases in which the employer recruited its workforce particularly from the town and/or ethnic-cultural community to which s/he belongs. One of them is exemplary of the employer's labour control strategies in and through such recruitment policy. In that case, which took place at a big-sized metal factory (employing 800 worker), employer particularly preferred to employ labourers from his ethnic community (the people of Circussian) to such a degree that he has direct ethnic-community ties with nearly half of his workforce. Despite the worsening working conditions, the management has controlled the emergent class tensions in distinct ways using such ties as a means of social pressure over them at various scales ranging from individual to ethnic-community level. This management strategy was seen more explicitly when workers attempted to get unionised in a collective class response to everlasting workplace-level relations: "As we got unionised, our boss made a complaint to the Circussian Association and also reported us to the local newspapers. He claimed that we put the factory in danger and betrayed the Circussian community" (W, 12). Nevertheless, it can be argued that as workers experience such labour control strategy within the context of increasing class tension, they become less open to its manipulative power over

themselves. Workers can even turn into ones developing counter arguments regarding with the manipulation by the management of those ethnic-community ties, as the worker above continues to tell: “We heard this kind of words several times: protect the workplace that feeds you; when a Circussion employer wins, you all going to win. Well, he doesn’t remember I am also from the Circussion community when I have worked in poor conditions with low payment; but he thinks that I betrayed the community when I got unionised. I think, it is indeed him who betrayed the community” (W 12).

5.4.3.3. Confining Labour Struggles into Multiple Company Bodies

In this labour control strategy, employers generally launch more than one company at the same workplace and break workforce into fragments that are employed in each company in more managable manners. This labour management policy is closely related with what a worker Ali in the beginning of previous section told about his workplace. His employer set up three companies with which labourers were to be contracted under different employment forms such as subcontracted worker, parent-company worker and unionised worker. The aim of the setting up of these companies within the same workplace is to adapt existing labour control policies for a new context of workplace-level relations. In this context, informal employment becomes undesirable as local industrial firms are required to show international companies their eligibility for subcontracting production. In another case, which was revealed by a worker-interviewee employed at a big-sized metal factory, the introduction of new companies at the same workplace was directly motivated to stop worker’s challenging attempt for unionisation.

When the factory reopened after the crisis, we got back in touch with the union Özçelik-İş. They heard about this in the factory, so the managers formed a strategy as putting their workplace power against our power. They would stop at nothing to stop the union from returning to the factory. We worked like this until November 2003. Right when the union was about to start [to work], we were told to resign so they would put us all in different companies...then they started 3-4 different companies under the same firm. The workers were spread to different companies. This was done in order to stop the union, and it’s still going on. And there’s also a cleaning company (W15).

This type of extra-ordinary labour control via the setting up of multiple company bodies is specifically found in the rapidly growing firms of metal industry. There is no similar labour control policy reported in the interviews made with workers from other industrial sectors. Such differentiation in metal sector seems to be rooted in its specificities of labour process that involve relatively considerable degree of duality regarding with the qualification of labour between different stages of production while also requiring to have spatial unity among them at the same workplace. Therefore, a better labour control for rapidly-growing big-sized firms in metal industry appear to divide workforce within a multiple company structure, thereby confining workers into different legal-institutional forms in which to treat them with different management strategies. At the same workplace, it is then possible to see that workers' demand for unionisation became tolerated within certain sections of production while being strictly opposed at other sections like assemblage where labourers are also employed within a different company contract and/or status.

5.4.3.4. Top-Down Unionisation

The development of unionisation at some (parts of) workplaces actually appears within local industry as a further labour control policy by employers rather than a progressive change in class relations in favour of labourers. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there had been a vibrant labour union movement in the 1970s in Kayseri to such a degree that the DİSK-affiliated Maden-İş Union, a leftist radical labour union in metal sector, developed as a challenging force within local class relations by appealing to local workers even from small- and medium- sized factories. Yet, this process was violently interrupted by the military coup of 12 September 1980, which subsequently banned all trade unions except for the ones affiliated with Türk-İş, a relatively state-centred and nationalist trade union confederation following the blueprint of American trade unions. Thus, unionisation within local industry mainly became confined into the state-run companies (Sümerbank Textile Company, Kayseri Sugar Factory, Çinkur Zinc Company) and a few big-sized (private) workplaces where Türk-İş-affiliated trade unions organised workers in a promise to achieve

regular wage increase. It is indeed the existence of such a high degree of non-unionised workers that allowed local employers to keep the wages low without encountering workers' collective contest in the increasing competitive context of neoliberal era, thereby giving rise to industrial capital accumulation at a level that made the way for rapid local industrial development in the 1990s. This spectacular industrial development, though still being characterized with a low degree of unionisation, has witnessed since the late 1990s the rise of a set of labour unions in some rapidly grown big-sized workplaces. In this context, the unions of Öz-İplik İş and Çelik-İş belonging to the national confederation of Hak-İş, which is in line with the movement of political Islam, emerged as two major labour organisations respectively in the sectors of textile and metal production. These labour unions got ahead of the long-year labour unions, Teksif and Türk-Metal, within local industry in a short time. Furthermore, local branch of the union of Öz-Ağaç İş from the confederation of Hak-İş was launched in this period to be the single labour organisation for thousands of workers employed in furniture production. Thus, a remarkable number of workers have been unionised despite a local industrial context where low-paid, casual and non-unionised work constitutes the dominant employment form.

Nevertheless, interviews with workers revealed that this unionisation was formed through top-down relations under the surveillance of local employers rather than from the bottom-up organisations of the rank-and-file movement. It has increasingly grown after a period of events within local industry that reflected the eruption of labour struggles against workplace closures and decreasing real wages⁷². In this regard, such unionisation seems to become considerably shaped

⁷² To illustrate, in 1993 a large section of workers employed at the two big textile companies of local industry, Atlas Halı and Orta Anadolu, collectively attempted to change their registered union as a reaction to its cooperative relations with employers; in 1996, a group of workers from a textile company, Saygın Tekstil, initiated a rebel against their union leaders by blaming them for selling out workers in association with the employer; in 1997, thousands of workers from the biggest local textile company, Birlik Mensucat, went to strike for three months; and in 2000, workers employed at a big sized furniture factory, Poli, attempted to get unionised in an independent way from their employer.

with the employers' concern to contain labour struggles in particular ways that keep them under control. As a matter of fact, the workers interviewed who also experienced unionisation processes at that time pointed to the entry of labour unions into the workplace as a collaborative attempt with the employer to disperse some radical initiatives developed among workers from below.

The situation with the union went like this: In 1999 the ones who wanted the union collected signatures. In response to that, the boss gathered the union, but first they let the union vanguards go. Then the union was like the boss. Whatever the boss would say, the union complied (W36).

We were union members first, members of Öziplik-İş. When the company grew and the factories got separated though, there appeared various lines of work. Thus we were off the thread work. We had a movement to bring the union we wanted by collecting signatures. Then everything got super tense. Nobody would dare to move. If you said something, they'd fire you. Then, at that time, the other union, ÖzAğaç-İş was brought in. The notary was also brought to the factory and they made people give their signatures after lunch. You need to have the balls not to sign it; of course we signed it (W34).

Let me put it this way: There used to be workers who would stand up to them, the workers who had support from their family and so didn't need the money. Those ones pushed the union. However, all of them were eliminated by being sent out to other factories or fired. The ones that remained were silenced, and intimidated (W47).

In one of the interviews, a managerial union representative from one of those labour union branches called their union practice "moderate unionism" in a bid to defend workplaces against the threat of closures. Upon the workers' statements above, it can then be argued that so-called moderateness in union practice actually refers to a promise to have collaborative relations with employers. Despite that promise, it should be noted that such unionisation is not welcome to local employers at ease since it also means recognizing workers as a collective entity which has to be negotiated to reach a consensus on class tensions. An industrial employer of a medium-sized factory in metal sector, when asked for his approach to unionisation at workplace, replied, in a reactionary manner, that "labour union create duality in the management of the factory; we, as the management, have already given the workers what they need; that's why, we do not need a separate body in the factory, we are not sympathised with the idea of unionisation" (M11). Therefore, even though having a highly collaborative

promise called moderate unionism, labour unions are still unwelcome in local industry until they are imposed on local employers as a technical and social requirement to manage the relations with labourers. Such unionisation has emerged in particular ways that can be defined as “relational necessity” within the employer-employee relationship rather than an automatic outcome of a certain level of industrial development. This is clearly seen in a unionisation experience at the second largest furniture company in local industry, which a managerial union representative interviewed from Öz-Ağaç İş told me in detail.

I heard that workers in this company had a long history of becoming unionized.

In the past workers in this company first became members of Öz-İplik İş that was here in place of us by proxy. Apparently when the boss found out that the workers were going to the union, he was offended, and said ‘are you not happy with me that you’re going to the union?’ When the union was only there by proxy they didn’t get organized, so everything calmed down in a way. When we started working here we wanted to become reorganized in 2005. Of course we needed a spark to get the workers going again. And that happened when the employer gave out food in little packages as if it was some sort of charity. The workers took this as an insult and started to become union members. This happened in 2008, and after that we were organized at İpek.

Did the employers accept the union?

We got the authorization, but in the meantime the employer made workers resign by intimidating them. When we were doing the work for collective labor agreements we were left only about 60 people out of the hundreds of people working there. The boss did not want to negotiate with us and appealed the arbitration. Meanwhile, a voting for strike took place, but we did not want to go on strike, and they appealed to the arbiter. Then the boss of İpek had to acknowledge the union somehow.

How are you getting along with the employees now?

We held various meetings to break the ice with the employer. We said that we’re not enemies; we do not wish to go out of business. We want the employer to win but workers to be given their due as well. We told them that that was our goal. So they said okay, and we made an agreement. We did not have any bonus before that, but we got our bonus. Nevertheless, this agreement is far behind the ones we made with other factories (C2).

Therefore, it would be misleading to consider those unions as the simple instruments of local employers in labour control although conversely they tend to operate at workplaces in line with them just as what is known in critical labour

literature as yellow-unions do. As workers' representative body in a negotiation with employers on workplace-level relations, labour unions need to produce a minimum degree of legitimacy on the part of the former even if they actually seek to carry out so-called moderate unionism in cooperation with the latter. The Hak-İş-affiliated labour union branches claimed to have such legitimacy through a limited degree of progress in wages and working conditions articulated with a discourse of religious brotherhood covering up class differences between employer and employees.

However, parallel with an argument by Buğra (2002) on the relations between the national union confederation of Hak-İş and Islamist employers organised at MÜSİAD (the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen), class conflicts begun to be reflected in the relations of such unions and local employers as industrial production developed along with the dynamics of capitalist relations. These tensions, albeit being considered in reference to generational changes among local employers, are hinted at the words of the chairman of the local branch of Çelik İş Union:

The situation in Kayseri goes like this: The previous generation of employers came from being workers as well, so they knew what it meant to be broke. Even if they forgot about it, sometimes they would remember. We got along better with them; we could negotiate more easily. Now we're having a difficult time with the second and the third generation because they do not know the meaning of poverty. No matter how much I try to explain to them how difficult it is to live on minimum wage, they just pretend to listen but do not understand. They haven't got a clue in the world about what kind of difficulties the workers have to go through, but their fathers were not like this (C3).

Nevertheless, those unions have reacted to class tensions at workplace not in the way that transmits workers' resentments to the employers but particularly in a manner seeking to suppress them. In doing so, these unions have turned into the ones imposing over workers directly labour control practices in accordance with the management. This is clearly seen in their decision-making process about two critical issues of workplace-level relations between employer and employee: the election of union representatives at workplace and the signing of collective contracts. For the former, those trade unions are strictly agree (along with the

Türk-İş affiliated unions) to get union representatives at workplace directly through assignment rather than using ballot box, although the legal procedure brought along with the military coup of 1980 can not totally ban the election option. As for the latter, they have a process carried out by a limited number of union representatives in closed-door meetings with the management without informing workers about the situation. On these two critical issues, they do not provide any remarkable difference with the Türk-İş affiliated unions that are associated with authoritarian and centralist union practices. What makes difference seem to be the role that they assign themselves of convincing employees to work without dispute in a respect for employers.

It's not like we're absolutely advocating for election because we do not believe that representatives who would be helpful to the workers will come with elections. The workers do not heavily demand it either; I believe that the workers are content with 90-95% of the representatives we pick. There could well be an election as well but these things cannot just happen with a flash of excitement. The representatives can also do more harm to the workers than help sometimes. There is no schooling for this, after all. I don't mean to offend anyone but there are some workers who cannot even write their names...besides, an election creates tension and conflict between workers. Sometimes we are not quite able to fully explain the collective labor agreements to them, and then we get criticism. For instance, during the crisis nobody got a raise because the employers could not see what was ahead. When that period was over though there was growth. It's because the small businesses naturally shut down during the crisis so their work has been left to the bigger businesses allowing them to expand. After the crisis was over the businesses were again able to see what was ahead of them so they grew by about 10-15%. But you cannot make the worker understand this. For instance, they hear that some company bought an airplane and start complaining that they didn't get a raise even though the company was able to buy the plane. But, you know, the guy has trouble thinking on a wider scale. Maybe he'll need to go to Europe in a rush, he'll need the plane. I know them from our one-on-one meetings, they're not greedy people. They've gotten over the whole 'becoming rich' thing. What they care about now is their name, being a Turkish brand; they think about how they employ 15000 people and it means responsibility. Not a lot of people see it now; sometimes they lose sleep over the possibility of having to let people go. Once, I witnessed an employer becoming overemotional and saying, almost crying: I've been a businessman for 40 years. If I shut down the factory today, I'll make profit out of it but I've put in so much effort for these people. These people count on me. I have a responsibility even to provide milk for their kids; I'm losing my sleep over this. You see, some employers take this responsibility; they have a greater sense of responsibility than money. This goes unseen but it needs to be addressed. As a union we need to better explain this to the workers, this is our responsibility (C4).

The main way of this role has been through the use of religious brotherhood relations within labour unions and their practices. It is widely said that employers directly involve union elections by making some collaboration with religious communities. Correspondingly, these religious communities become influential actors not just in the recruitment but also in the management of labour by mobilizing their community ties in favour of employers. Thus, class tensions within workplace level relations can be absorbed into wider religious communities organised in hierarchical forms with sacred references over their members. In the case of a metal worker, who declared himself, at the end of a warm and friendly talk, as a member of a religious community called Nakşibendi, such intertwined relations between employer, labour union and religious community seem to work in a harmonious way:

How did you get the job?

My brother-in-law helped because he was a union representative there. He told me there was work.

Then there's a union at the workplace?

Yes, there is.

Are you happy with it? With the collective labor agreements that the union makes, and the other things?

I am happy. I mean they do solve the problems eventually even with some delay.

How do they make the collective agreements? Do they ask you about it? Are you happy with the results?

The union does it by itself but we have representatives in it. They discuss, and the union leaders see the bosses. When there's a result they let us know.

Do you think they fulfill your demands, or get what you deserve?

There are shortcomings but we talk about them in other places without any brawling and it gets done eventually. Even if it's a bit slow, it does get done (W, 50).

However, as industrial production has grown in size and become complicated in many respects, these religious community relations come to be insufficient for labour unions to drive the recruitment process under their

influence. Relatedly, unions' manipulative power embedded in such religious community relations becomes unsatisfactory in the eyes of many workers as class contradictions shape workplace-level relations by worsening workers' material conditions. The evidence of this second point is the prevailing critique among workers (both unionised and non-unionised) against the notion of "charitable employer" referring in religious terms to his altruistic practices outside workplace such as building mosque or school and aiding to poor. For workers, the real material conditions become more important in their relations with the employer than his charity activities outside the workplace. They have been so reactive against so-called charitable employers that a union representative admitted that unions had to give up such religiously inspired propagation.

The workers get worked up most about this charity thing. We no longer respect such things either. Charity has become the politics, the demagoguery of this business. The workers do not care about the schools or mosques; they think they're not getting what they're entitled to. We think this way because we're not employers. If we were employers too, God forbid, would we become that way too? Such things happen in Kayseri, we hear them from Konya as well. I mean, there is a sense of advertisement/promotion (C3).

It is within the context of increasing workers' resentments at real material conditions that local trade unions have recently sought to play some complementary roles for workers' survival without involving workplace-level relations. In this scope, besides a kind of mediating role as warrenter for workers in getting advance payments, labour unions are also searching for the ways to decrease workers' consumption expenditures so that low-wage contracts can be tolerated. These ways mainly includes special contracts with shopping centres, private hospitals and some course-centres like the cram or driving schools. In one of the interviews, a union representative was proudly calculating how much they contributed to the wages in such ways:

As a union, we have made agreements with private hospitals, driving schools, and grocery stores. For example, for the workers who cannot go to Istanbul or Antalya for vacation, we've made a deal with the hotels here at Kozaklı thermal springs, and reduced the price from 80TL to 43 TL. Maybe they don't get to see Antalya, but they see the hot springs. We couldn't get enough of a raise for the salary but we're at least trying to decrease his vacation expenses. We make deals with shopping spots, so that helps them. We also made a deal with the driving school so

they could benefit from it. In the end, we got a raise of 100 liras but we also help them save 100-150 liras like this, so that makes 250-300 liras. Whatever the worker does not have to spend, we see as a raise. We've made deals with private hospitals so they do not charge the workers the bed fee. We've also made deals with the stationary shops (a kind of school supplies store in Turkey), they give them discounts so the school expenses are less now. We get to contribute in these ways too (C4).

Leaving aside the real impacts of those special contracts by trade unions on workers' material conditions, it is safe to argue that the search for complementing low-wages through such ways without disturbing existing workplace-level relations shows not only the collaborative nature of those unions with employers but also the rising importance of material satisfaction within the relations between unions and workers. To the extent that those unions are not able to provide workers with the material satisfaction, the latter increasingly see the former as standing for authoritarian and centralist impositions in line with the management. For workers, this situation has actually meant a clear disenchantment with those unions that rapidly developed within the local industry. To put it differently, such yellow unions that have indeed played within local industrial relations as the most effective labour control no longer appeal to workers in the ways they have done so far.

Does this cleavage between workers and those unions involve the development of class tensions within local industrial relations in more explicit ways? The answer to this question cannot be given properly by limiting analysis to the workplace-level relations, not just because workers' survival and their material satisfaction are determined within social and spatial relations operating at wider contexts but also due to the fact that industrial relations tend to become over time depended on social division of labour that is taking place at wider scales beyond workplace-level relations. Therefore, there is a need to move the analysis towards social reproduction process particularly at urban scale where the above dynamics develop to a large extent. In the remainder of this chapter, I will investigate the crucial dynamics of social reproduction process within the city of Kayseri in terms of class relations.

5.5. (Urban) Social Reproduction Process

5.5.1. Local Business Culture: “Trading Mentality” and Kayseri Model

For a long time the city of Kayseri has been associated with trading activities as well as the abundance of people with so-called trading mentality. As mentioned in the previous section, trading between different regions and cities have historically become the main source of income in Kayseri mainly due to the lack of fertile land for agriculture in the areas surrounding the city. Within such a context, some local people sought to pursue the trading opportunities brought along with the development of domestic market particularly in the post-war period to such a degree that they overflowed into big cities as Kayserian traders. They achieved such a widespread reputation that certain features related with trade such as entrepreneurship, timeserving and practicality has been matched with being Kayserian. Correspondingly, it is widely argued that the rise of local industry in recent decades has been an outcome of the using by local individuals of such trading mentality in a specific way for industrial production. This way is generally dubbed as “Kayseri model” according to which cooperation rather than conflict is the key for local industrial relations not just among those individuals but also between them and local institutions. Such discourse for industrial development is so prevailing that a researcher is to be given many examples of those cooperative relations in interviews with local industrialists or representatives of major local institutions. Yet, theoretical and empirical considerations, so far, reveal much more the determining role of contradictory class relations operating at different levels than so-called cooperative trading mentality or “Kayseri model” in local industrial development. However, to the extent that having a remarkable impact on urban social reproduction process, such mentality or model, which can be summed up as local business culture, may be taken to represent certain aspects of class relations. In this sense it involves class contradictions, thereby having an explanatory power in the development of industrial relations. Thus, I below approach to local business culture as a part of class relations and use it in order to reveal class tensions within the industrial development.

In the section (5.3.1) where I discussed interfirm relations, a managerial interviewee's genuine and critical assessment on local industry was quoted extensively. In a nutshell, he considers local industrial development as arisen uniquely from some undesigned relations among individuals who have already known each other and have particular abilities stemming from the tradition of trading to combine emergent economic possibilities at the national level with distinct advantageous of the city. However, he added, what has been achieved so far in this way is most likely to disappear unless a particular industrial organisation based on planning and creativity is developed (see section 5.3.1). These two points indeed provide crucial hints of both the background and the current situation of local industry. The first point refers to the prevalence of some informal coordination mechanisms among local employers having with strong pragmatic and practical tendencies. Indeed, there were many 'success' stories in which employers' pragmatism and practicality played important roles especially in the beginning years of the rise of local industry. Within a distinct local culture of "sitting" ("oturma") bringing men together to talk about their daily practices along with a religious content, local employers have got also a comprehensive network through which to develop mutual relations in business. Although it is difficult to state the degree to which such informal coordination has shaped the local industrial development, much work on local economy and politics give a specific emphasize on the culture of "sitting" within this process (Doğan, 2006; Çakıroğlu, 2008; Daniş, 2012; Cengiz, 2012). I also encountered similar emphasizes by many interviewees except for workers. To illustrate, a deputy general secretary of the Middle Anatolian Development Agency, a newly established state institution centred in Kayseri and entitled to coordinate developmental policies at sub-national regional scale covering also the cities of Sivas and Yozgat, classified this distinct culture as the strengths opposed to the weaknesses of the local industry.

In Kayseri's industry, such things as professionalism, institutionalism and technological advancements are relatively limited and not very strong. Many things are improving, however, and there's a fast circulation of information and capacity to make decisions among employers. People from different sections of society; conservatives, leftists, various institutions, managers and employers can come

together and make joint resolutions for Kayseri. The peculiar tradition of house gatherings has a great impact on this matter. The level of coming together for Kayseri's interests is higher than other cities. Thus it has a positive impact on Kayseri's development (C5).

These local informal networks are included into the relations not only among employers but also between them and the state institutions, dubbed as "Kayseri model". This model is proudly claimed as a distinct way of problem solving in the city of Kayseri. At the heart of this model has been the Greater Municipality of Kayseri, the mayor in particular. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Greater Municipality of Kayseri has been ruled by political parties from political Islamist tradition since 1994. During this process, there have been two important developments with regard to local politics and economy. Initially, the Islamist party's local power, built on the coalition between a town-centred religious community called Camii Kebir and the rising new industrial capital, led to a tension within local politics with the traditional centrist local bourgeoisie. This tension exploded itself as an objection by the former to the big scale local developmental projects such as the establishment of Free Zone Industrial District and Yamula Damn Project that were enthusiastically supported by the centrist local bourgeoisie. However, it did not last long and eventually disappeared as some projects were completely abandoned and others were left to the rule of the Islamist municipal power. Both the rise of Islamist party as a coalition partner of the national political power (1995-97) and the transformation of political Islamist tradition along neoliberal lines after the so-called post-modern military intervention (28th of February in 1997) paved the ways for solving this tension within local politics. As a second important development in the process of Islamist party's local power, Mehmet Özhaseki, coming from local commercial bourgeoisie with a more pragmatic discourse, was elected as the new mayor in place of Şükrü Karatepe, who had been unseated by the central government due to his conflictual Islamic arguments leading him eventually to be under arrest in this turbulent political context. Indeed, the new mayor has played a distinct role in

consolidating local coalition among different sections of bourgeoisie in the Greater Municipality of Kayseri.⁷³

As the political and economic importance of local government has grown unprecedently along with recent legal changes for decentralisation at the national level, the municipality as the institutional locus of such coalition in the city became more influential in local decision-making processes. In this line many interviewees from local employers' organisations refer to the Greater Municipality of Kayseri, the mayor in particular, as the key actor behind the spectacular development of local industry and economy in the last decades.

In Kayseri there's the structure of one-in-five: the Mayor, the Governor, Chamber of Commerce President, Chamber of Industry President, and Head of Exchange. They'll all bound together. If it's about Kayseri, nothing else matters. The metropolitan municipal mayor of Kayseri, Mr Özhaseki, is a very important figure. He's part of the local gentry. He knows Kayseri very well, and has been in the municipality administration for years. He was the district's president in 1994, and not long after he became the metropolitan municipal mayor. He's been the mayor for the past four terms. Now people get together under the leadership of Mr Özhaseki, and make decisions about what the Chamber of Commerce or Chamber of Industry shall do, and everyone agrees to them. It is an invisible organization, so to speak. There are no objections or arguments really. When it's about Kayseri no one wants to pose an obstacle. We have different views of the world, but we work together when it comes to Kayseri (C6).

To the extent that the Greater Municipality of Kayseri, and particularly the mayor, has appeared as the most influential authority along with a restricted number of actors in local decision-making process, it is likely to emerge an increasing degree of dissatisfaction among wider circles including employers out of this process. As a matter of fact, in an interview made with him, Özhaseki

⁷³ In an interview, Mehmet Özhaseki, the mayor of Greater Municipality of Kayseri introduced himself and his municipal policy as follows: "... I've received the culture of Camii Kebir artisans, after all. We must see the propriety and moral side of the matter. We grew up learning that you should not deceive the customer, you should give trust, act right, and should never lie when it comes to money; we grew up with this Ahi culture. We also got to learn how to treat the customer, how to sell products, how to profit when selling, how to get products cheap, and all of that by practicing and getting hands-on experience in the market. Thank God I'm coming from the private sector too. I tried to put the logic of private sector into practice as soon as I started to work at the municipality... I've always gotten the big projects done by utilizing my practicality from Kayseri. (2011:446-7).

admitted that he encountered some critiques about non-inclusive aspects of local decisions.⁷⁴ I also heard similar comments by some employers, representatives of civil society and residents. Nevertheless, those critiques remain being expressed at the individual level without taking any collective form challenging to the existing local coalition. Besides their weak organisational capacity, this indeed reveals the strong dominance over urban social relations of the above local coalition with the leadership of the mayor.

The second point by the managerial interviewee mentioned above is about the increasing need for the long-term strategies of planning and creativity in local industrial production. For, it is no longer possible to survive in increasing competitive market conditions for local industrial firms having with low-level technology and short-term targets. As shown in the previous chapter, the general tendency in local industry has been in line with the improvement in production technology in the post-2001 period, with massive increase in production capacity. However, to the extent that being limited to individual firm-level and short-term expectations, investment in production technologies remain inadequate to constitute a comprehensive change in the patterns of local industrial production i.e. product type, level of specialisation and labour profile. According to this managerial interviewee, such change cannot be satisfied with the long-lasting crony relations in local industry, thereby requiring a new organizational form entitled to develop long-term strategies. In line with this critique, Middle Anatolia Development Agency (MADA) as a newly established state institution seems to be a candidate for this organization. The MADA was recently formed by central state in Kayseri as a distinct state institution entitled to coordinate developmental policies at sub-national regional scale. With a governance-type institutional form, its executive committee is composed of state bureaucrats (the governors), elected politicians (the mayors), employers' direct agents (local branches of the Chambers

⁷⁴ “Sometimes people say, just so they can criticize him, that Özhaseki makes all the decisions with his friends and rules the city with them. Of course, I listen to my friends at the sittings. I also go to the sittings in Kayseri and attend forty or fifty of them. I value the ideas that come out of them, that’s something else” (Biol, 2011:447).

of Commerce and Industry) and representatives of voluntary institutions. Its main policies are both to define medium- and long-term targets for economic development and to provide firms with financial support in accordance with those targets. In this frame, the MADA has developed a regional development plan employing industrial targets according to which financial supports are to be given to the firms (ORAN, 2011). The general secretary of the MADA, whom I interviewed, added that it also developed some joint projects in collaboration with local industrialists to satisfy their needs. Among them is the building of the Industrial Design Center on an adjacent area of Kayseri OID so that more qualified workforce can be supplied into local industry. The Center, which is to be run in a partnership between Kayseri Erciyes University and the General Directorate of Kayseri OID, is also expected to bring innovation to local industry. In sum, although currently having limited financial resources and legal power, the MADA is basically designed to provide a more formal political-institutional space in and through which local employers are directed towards more competitive lines with long-term strategies.

However, there are remarkable evidences casting doubt upon that the MADA would carry out such formal coordination among local employers in a way that is supposed to do. First, the MADA seems to provide a narrowly framed local decision-making process even though having some mechanisms like the committee of development open to wider participation. The proof can be hinted at the words of the General Secretary of Kayseri Chamber of the Commerce when I asked for the Chamber's approach to the MADA: "The head of the MADA is a close friend and he is working well. He lets us know when there is a project open to bid for financial support. Then we propose the project and get the funding" (C6). In other words, such informal networks among a limited number of local actors continue to operate within the decision making process of the MADA. This is indeed a consequence of the MADA's distinct institutional form based on direct involvement of local capital and private actors in its executive committee. Second, as the MADA's investments and financial support come to be seen significant in industrial production, it is more likely to emerge some resentment among local

employers at having been treated unfairly in its decision making process. As a matter of fact, an industrial employer of a medium-sized metal company complains about the unfair decisions on distributing incentives:

We apply for projects from the development agency or KOSGEB. It's a good thing; we apply for software support, advertisement support, project support. We applied for a new technology called enamel follow-up palette but it didn't pass the committee. The incentives are important, but they're distributed unfairly. Only the ones who have connections get the incentives (M11).

The more the MADA intervenes into local industrial relations, the more there appear similar complaints among employers. Thirdly, local capitals stand against the wider participation of other social actors even in the lower parts of the MADA's decision-making process. This is clearly expressed by the General Secretary of Kayseri Chamber of Industry as follows:

The agencies give some incentives that seriously help the firms get it together and become professional. We see that the employers in Kayseri are motivated to make changes in order to use these incentives. We see the development agency positively in this respect. However, the agencies need to be in closer contact with the chambers. If you go to the development agency now there are just so many people gathered together. Don't get me wrong, we're not uncomfortable with people from different sections of society coming in, but the relations with the chambers should be stronger. If an investment is to be made in Kayseri it should be decided with Kayseri Chamber of Industry. That's what we're saying (C7).

In other words, local capitals tend to consider the MADA as a state-level institution providing financial support and some investments for local development only in a direct collaboration with them. This approach actually not only narrows the MADA's political-institutional space completely to the local capital's particularist vision but also undermines its *raison d'être*, namely, directing them towards more competitive lines beyond short term expectations. All of these evidences then point to that the MADA is less likely to play such a transformative role within the local industry than to operate like a financial incentive center for local employers.

At this point, it should be also added that a more influential state intervention in local industry has developed directly through the central state's policies especially after the 2008 world-economic crisis that had an adverse effect

on industrial production across the country. To ameliorate this effect, especially increasing unemployment, central state put into practice a set of incentives, inter alia, giving employers certain exemptions on employee's insurance premium on the condition that new jobs are given to the unemployed. In this context, a particular policy called Specialised Vocational Training Project (UMEM, in Turkish), formed in a collaboration among the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey was also introduced to improve skills in accordance with technological investments. According to the project, provincial units of those ministries, taking into consideration industrial employers' demands, set up three-month training courses at Vocational High Schools to which at least six-month unemployed labourers can freely attend only in a promise to three-month work at a company involved in the project in order to get practice. During this six-month period, central state also pays so-called trainees a two-third of the official minimum wage. The only thing that is expected of industrial employers is to employ trainees for a longer period after a three-month practice. The interviews show that both policies have considerably appealed to local industrialists in Kayseri. Nearly all big-sized industrial firms are reported to have benefited those state incentives. Even the companies' employment strategies became revised according to the conditions of such incentives⁷⁵. As for the UMEM project covering the years of 2010-2015, there are 1324 trainees who have taken various courses at three different Vocational High Schools in Kayseri, according to the numbers provided by the local department of central state Labour Agency (İş-Kur) by July of 2012.

⁷⁵ This has been directly reflected in job advertisements within local industry that particularly refers to a six-month unemployment as a condition among others to apply for. When I asked the reason of that condition, a managerial interviewee from a local textile company replied as follows: "It's actually because of an exceptional or temporary situation: according to the regulations of the bag law, when businesses hired someone who was unemployed before, the state would pay the insurance premiums from 36 to 48 months. In order to benefit from it we prefer to hire people who've been in the unemployed status for 6 months. The state is applying this rule so as to prevent the firms from abusing this by hiring and firing people all the time. So that's why we prioritize the unemployed people"

In a nutshell, the competitive pressures on industrial production as well as its development level have required a fundamental restructuring in local industrial patterns towards formally operating industrial networks that would produce a number of specialisations in product types within a vertical division of labour among industrial firms having with long-term strategies. However, there have been no remarkable endogenous initiatives appeared on the part of local employers to lead such a structural change in local industry. In this line, the continuation of local industrial accumulation becomes depended more on the central state interventions. It is within this structural context, and particularly in the wake of 2008 world economic crisis, that the direct state interventions have been much involved in local industrial relations either through the regional development agency's (the MADA) attempts ranging from preparing industrial planning to some supplementary investments or in the forms of increasing industrial incentives in various titles. However, the more the state is involved into local industrial relations, the more it undermines their fetishistic nature as operating seemingly on individual and private base since the state involvements make these relations politicized. Both the MADA's activities and the central state's industrial incentives, while complementing industrial accumulation in certain ways, have also led to the emergence of grievances among local industrial actors. These grievances not only belong to the employers resenting being treated unfairly in the decision making process of such interventions but also, more importantly, appear on the part of the employees to be an essential critique to the relations between the state and capital as they have experienced them.

Okay, I'm going to be frank with you now. You know UMEM, right? UMEM and İş-Kur have a joint project. I applied to İş-Kur as a worker. I attended the vocational courses. They put me to Boyçelik to work from 7 in the morning until 6 in the evening for 30 liras per day. I worked 22 days a month. If they hire a worker they'll pay them 720 liras as the minimum wage, plus 230 liras for the insurance; it'll cost the employer 1000TL. But this UMEM is such a trick that Boyçelik hired workers under UMEM so they don't pay for them because they've generated employment. A worker costs 330 liras to the boss. Therefore the boss makes a profit of 750 liras off-the-cuff. Plus, just because the boss extended your contract, the state pays for your insurance. In fact, the employer needs standard personnel but he gets the workers for cheap by hiring with UMEM. The state gives an incredible amount of support (W42).

Given the apparent direct relations between the state and local employers, workers then find a legitimate base to raise certain demands, if not immediately from their employers, from the state: “We see the state giving various incentives to the employers. If the employers are going to fall in bankruptcy when they pay more than minimum wages; then, the state should give incentives to the workers as well” (W4). In short, on the one hand state interventions are increasingly required for the continuing of industrial accumulation; on the other hand, they provoke conflictual perceptions among individual actors. What is the impact of these individual perceptions on class relations? Do they provide workers with a common perception against existing class relations? It is clear that these important questions cannot be responded entirely at this level as workers’ perceptions are shaped within a wider scale of class relations. In this regard, the next section investigates the ways in which workplace level relations have been variably interlinked with urban social relations, thereby analysing class relations and workers’ conditions within a wider socio-spatial context.

5.5.2. The Urban-Workplace Nexus

The city itself would certainly appeal to a researcher doing a field study in Kayseri in any topic. This mainly stems from a series of urban spatial structures that stand out apparently even in a short journey from the bus terminal to the city center: on the one hand high-rise apartments, new office buildings and big-sized urban investments i.e. the new stadium, tramway etc. that are settled within a highly planned spatial organisation lead one to think of a rapid modernisation process in the middle of the poor central Anatolia; on the other hand, concentration of city center in a single zone, its less differentiated nature and dominance of small-sized shops that are associated with conservative climate of urban social life provide opposite thoughts. It is actually these contrasting images of the city between modern and traditional to which many analyses refer as the enigma of local industrial development in Kayseri. It is further argued that while local entrepreneurs seek out profitable investment to bring economic development to the city, urban management compensate for their unsettling consequences via the distinct urban relations based on traditional values. Hence, a unique urban

combination between entrepreneurship and conservatism emerges as a model for local economic development (Keyman and Lorosdağı-Koyuncu, 2010; İ. Öztürk, 2010)

However, a number of critical works on Kayseri in recent years reveal some ignored aspects of this combination in conspicuous manners. Doğan (2007), for example, in his study on the development of municipal government under the rule of political Islamist tradition, convincingly shows that while the city of Kayseri has been increasingly shaped with automobile-centred planning and high-rise buildings under the dominance of exchange value on urban land, a set of urban policies built on charities and conservative-communitarian values have enormously grown in order to ameliorate the unequal outcomes of this development. For him, even though bringing with it a certain degree of modern public notion, these policies remain precarious in the sense that they are considerably based on top-down and traditional relations. Daniş (2012) also considers this precariousness, in comparison with modern notion of public administration, as a deliberate way by the municipality of Kayseri for managing tensions within urban spatial development. According to her, it is through a sort of precarious way of urban management that the municipality has long been able to develop bargaining with local actors and thus to organize the city in a relatively harmonious way that can be called “urban rent brotherhood”. In addition, Korat (1997), from a critical view of modernism, underlines the demise of multi-cultural aspects of the city that were particularly embedded in streets and traditional districts as its spatial planning has been based on wide roads since the 1950s. What eventually emerged from this spatial planning is for him a ‘city’ mainly composed of high-rise so-called modern apartments where its residents are all assumed to be Turk and Muslum, and everyday life is awfully conservative. He further argues that despite the increasing degree of social division of labour along with local industrial development in the city, such conservative perceptions have formed dominant local culture, leaving no space for diverse practices:

The daily life is organized according to the understanding of the small retailers and tradesmen while the general course of life is shaped according to the investments of

financial capital. The daily life is coded by the big bourgeoisie pressuring the politics, and by the small retailers pressuring the ideology, so to speak (Korat, 1997:26).

On the other hand, a recent comprehensive work on the debate of the rise of conservatism in Turkey provides a less pessimistic picture about the city of Kayseri (Akşit et. al., 2012: 111-130). According to the authors, a spectacular local economic development in Kayseri has been accompanied with a paradoxical process at political, cultural and ideological levels. There has been within local social relations an increasing degree of religious conservatism and communitarian practices on the one hand, an unprecedented degree of communication and connection with the world outside, on the other hand. It is due to this paradoxical process that local social relations have proceeded not along a uni-lateral conservatism but within a set of conflicts between modern and traditional forms. In this context, the authors argue that the most apparent conflict in the city of Kayseri has been the one between being individual and belonging to the community, concluding with that (Akşit, et.al. 2012:130):

This community-based life does not provide the people in the city with a proper ground and environment for individualism to develop, excludes any lifestyle, inclination, or political view that is not in line with the traditional community's rules on the widest context, and does not tolerate such differences. Therefore, although a kind of modernity has been evolving here, the kind of democratic consciousness that respects differences and individual rights and freedom is lacking.

During my several visits to Kayseri, I observed many concrete expressions of these arguments above. In this sense, I agree with them albeit with a conceptual reservation, fundamentally because these important works tend to consider some descriptive terms such as modern or traditional as if they were conceptual abstractions of social relations at the most essential level. In this line, they do not move the analysis beyond some remarkable descriptions about urban social relations in Kayseri. I here consider urban dimension neither as a separate descriptive research nor in reference to normative arguments like the modern city (cf. Doğan, 2007). Rather, urban dimension is taken as an integral part of class relations in urban-workplace nexus.

In Chapter 2, it was underlined that although capitalist social relations are based on a fundamental separation between production and reproduction processes, they indeed belong to a single unity that is considerably constituted within a certain social and spatial context as “locally-effective structures” (see 2.6). In this line, it is through the interactions between family patterns, housing, living spaces, local market, working conditions, wage-regime, everyday life and so on that both labour and the place of these interactions (urban space) become differentiated (Harvey, 1989; Gough, 2001). As the dynamic of such interactions is based on capitalist production, their coherence as a single unity is continuously exposed to deterioration due to its internal contradictions. To ameliorate the situation, then, various actors ranging from employers and (local and central) state to the workers and residents with different concerns and means attempt to shape, *inter alia*, urban space from their perspectives. In as much as having an effect on such interactions within locally effective structures, these interventions change class relations in particular ways.

Considered in this framework, it appears that social and spatial development in the city of Kayseri has always been associated with the development of class relations in local industry. The setting up of Sümerbank Textile Company in Kayseri as a part of etatist economic policies in the 1930s, for example, was accompanied by a set of wider investments in urban space such as housing, school, cinema and stadium (Asliiskender, 2002). The following central state’s industrial investments in the period of state-led development were also made along with other investments that had remarkable effects on urban development and social life (Asliiskender, 2008). The Boy’s Art School, which was opened in 1942, is widely accepted as a key factor in the development of local private industry (Ayata, 1991; Bilgili, 2001). With the multi-party period after 1950, local actors came to be more influential in urban spatial development. At that time, under the rule of the mayor Osman Kavuncu, the municipality’s two main urban policies, the building of Crafts Quarter and the planning of the city based on wide-roads, had great impacts on the successive development of local industry. In the 1970s, parallel with economic and political developments at the

national scale, urban politics was shaped by the discourse of social and spatial justice bringing a social-democratic coalition to the local power. In this period, municipal public investments in collective consumption services such as housing, transportation and bread production supported the labourers' survival, and thereby putting a particular impact on local class relations (Doğan, 2007:150-58). After the military coup of 1980, the new municipal power, in accordance with central state policies, introduced private property land regime into *gecekond* areas, where poor labourers mostly lived, by distributing title allocation certificates and preparing spatial planning for those areas. It also supported mass housing construction by developing a vast urban land for housing cooperatives, so that there would be no problem in the housing of employees as local industry has developed.⁷⁶ Although social democratic coalition came again to the municipal power in the local election of 1989, it was not until the ruling of the Greater Municipality of Kayseri by political Islamist coalition that urban politics have seen remarkable change in its neoliberal framework shaped since 1980.

The rise of Welfare Party to the municipal power did take place within a particular local coalition between traditional trading capital and newly emerging industrial capital in an appeal to the urban poor suffering from inadequate collective consumption services as well as wider neoliberal policies. With the financial support of local capital, political Islamist party could organize a large charity network for urban poor that was then used effectively as an electoral base. Indeed, such charity politics corresponded particularly to the interest of rapidly growing industrial capital in Kayseri OİD that began to face some class tensions at workplaces and sought to displace them. In as much as this charity network became organised in reference to religious values, urban politics came to be reformulated not only within such top-down direct material supports to the labourers but also through religious-communitarian considerations of urban social relations. This is clearly reflected in the image of “white city of Kayseri” (Beyaz

⁷⁶ Although the project had initially aimed to build 15,000 houses, the Belsin housing cooperative could produce 9,000 of them when it was completed in 1989 (Doğan, 2007:167).

Şehir) given as a name to the new mass housing project developed by Islamist ruling party in local power. As Doğan (2007:235) argues, the image of “white city” has a meaning beyond its name, representing a sort of homogeneous and coherent urban space in a clear differentiation from the outside. Within such a religiously-communitarian perspective, while avoiding big-sized urban projects that could only be held by wider-scale actors, political Islamist coalition increased charity activities and continued to invest in some mass housing projects and collective services. Thus, the survival of urban poor labourers became considerably socialised via a religious-communitarian urban politics. Accompanied to this socialisation; however, has been the development of de-unionisation and subcontracting in the production of municipal services. In other words, municipal workers were burdened with the cost of such socialisation.

Nevertheless, as aforementioned, political Islamist tradition underwent an important transformation towards business-friendly politics after so-called post-modern coup of 28 February in 1997, so did local political coalition in municipal power. In this process, there has been not only a (compulsory) replacement of the mayor with a business-originated person, but also a remarkable shift in its policies (Doğan, 2007:239-263). The municipal government then no longer avoided big-scale urban projects such as Yamula damn, natural gas distribution and tramway. Moreover, it withdrew itself from supplying directly collective consumption services. However, its charity activities for urban poor enormously increased to such a degree that a separate municipal unit was launched to carry out them in a more systematic manner.⁷⁷ In sum, local municipal power under the rule of political Islamist tradition completely abandoned its religiously-communitarian urban politics and restructured itself much on the basis of market rationalities although conversely continuing to charity activities. Thereby, as Doğan

⁷⁷ “While reaching to 1500 people in 1994, these charity activities increased rapidly after 1998 and spread out towards 16.000 local people in 2002. Thus, the poor people benefiting these charity activities went beyond the ones considered as non-active workforce such as old, disabled or orphan” (Doğan, 2007: 248).

(2007:261) depicted, there appeared a transformation from so-called “white city” to “the city of charitable people”.

In parallel with this shift, some recently published works on the city of Kayseri, even the ones with a neo-institutionalist approach, point to an unequal and heterogenous urban development:

Kayseri has mostly been seen and considered in terms of economic success and wealth. However, nearly the half of the town has recently been experiencing poverty that gradually becomes deeper. Especially in the outskirts of both the southern and northern parts of the town, the poverty rates are rapidly increasing...The town no more is able to represent an immigrant friendly feature especially in terms of livable dwelling areas. ... On the one hand the rapid population growth and on the other the rapidly increasing land value and the annuity expectations of the land owners restrained the local opportunities of finding livable dwelling areas. The other face of the town of Kayseri has gradually been apparent especially since 2000s (Hovardaoğlu, 2009:183-4).

With these practices coming as the result of a strategy to create an urban look, the city of Kayseri which has the conservative social organization that is typical of Anatolian cities has built a new system of values by associating its conservativeness, which it has submitted to the fluctuations in commercial and industrial capital, with national and international processes of accumulation. It has been configuring the characteristics of life in favor of the decisions made by capital owners in a way that would make their urban lives comfortable while keeping the ones with the knowledge and experience to enhance this power in the city (Zengin and Urkmez, 2013: 105-6).

Interviews with the workers provide a parallel picture with this recently increasing urban spatial differentiation in Kayseri. They revealed that there has been a remarkable differentiation in urban space, of the north and west of the city from the south and east. In general, labourers live in the north and west part of the city within different types of housing. Among them are the high-rise cooperative apartments in the district of Belsin Kürsü next to Kayseri OID, the two or three-storey semi-detached houses in the district of Eskişehir Bağları as a formerly gecekondu prevention zone, and relatively less apartments and the gecekondu buildings in Battalaltı, Gaziosmanpaşa, Hürriyet and Yeşil districts. Out of these districts in the north and west of the city, I also met a few workers living in the far south (Talas) and north-east (Argıncık) of the city where relatively middle-income people live. It is reported that workers also choose to stay in the east edge of the

city where the Mass Housing Administration (MHA) initiated new housing units for lower income people. Nevertheless, it could not be possible to come across any industrial worker as a dweller of the eastern part of the city center, Alpaslan district, where shopping centres, office buildings and luxury apartments have recently concentrated.

Considering this spatial differentiation in urban space, I carried out much of the interviews with workers at these working class districts. These districts can easily be recognizable as the living places of labourers with the intensely constructed buildings and low-level urban services as well as factory shuttle busses that are lined along the street according to the working hours. Interviews with workers, carried out both in the city centre and in the districts, point to the fact that labourers experience urban space not just in its remarkable spatial differentiation but also through its contradictions, i.e., increasing rents. Out of 55 interviewees, 25 workers are reported to be occupying property as tenant. By taking into consideration some single workers living in their family houses, this refers to that the rate of home-ownership among workers is less than fifty per cent. The price of house renting in these districts ranges from 250 TL to 350TL which amount to nearly one-third of a worker's wage when added with overtime work payment. A significant point regarding with the tenants is about the fact that they are mostly composed of the workers who migrated to the city in the last 10 years.

On the other hand, there has been a clear shift in the way labourers achieve to be an owner-occupier. It is understood from the interviews that the main way to be a homeowner among workers was previously *either/both* through selling of gecekondü house or land as the city developed to its outskirts *or/and* via the participation into housing cooperatives subsidized by the municipal government. The districts of Eskişehir Bağları and Belsin Kürsü where labourers mainly live in the city include many examples of these ways of homeownership:

This place has been arranged as an illegal housing prevention zone by the municipality. It used to be a vineyard; like its name, Eskişehir vineyards. City-dwellers used to have vineyards on this hill. The municipality bought it to build an illegal housing prevention zone with the money coming in from the treasury. Then

they sold it to the public for them to build houses. They built two- or three-storey houses according to the projects determined by the municipality. We bought this place from a person though. The guy was a manager at the municipality so he bought it somehow when it was up for sale. Then he sold it to us through the notary because an annotation was put on to the title deed. We had a house in Hürriyet district but we sold it. With that money and more we bought this land and built the house eventually. We paid 14-15 thousand liras for the land in 2004. Now we live on the ground floor, my mom above us, and my siblings one above her (W, 49).

It is my house; I live here in Belsin. This is a 90% workers' neighbourhood; most of these blocks were built by the cooperatives. It's close to the Organized Industry, which is just 15-20 minutes away. I was a tenant for 18 years, and then became a homeowner with the cooperative. Because I'm from Kayseri I had some land around İncesu and I sold it when it increased in value. Then, I added some more to that money, rendered the payments, and bought this house. It's difficult to buy a house now. If I hadn't sold the land in İncesu I would not have been able to (W 28).

Even though frequently being associated with the abuse and corruption cases, the above ways to be a homeowner involved relatively larger social processes beyond market exchange relation between (local) state, urban poor and small-scale contractors. Nevertheless, they have recently disappeared to a great extent as the Greater Municipality of Kayseri withdrew itself from subsidizing low-income housing. It has been no longer involved in mass housing projects not just in direct ways as the main contractor like being in Beyaz Şehir mass housing project but also in non-direct ways, i.e., providing cheaper urban land for housing cooperatives. Thus, housing cooperatives that have long been influential actors in urban spatial development lost their appeals to low-income people in the last years. It is within this context that labourers in Kayseri can be owner-occupier mostly through getting bank loan in the completely individualised processes of market exchange relations.

Most of our worker friends have taken out either home or personal loans. We get by with credit cards. I talked to the accounting office the other day and they said that there are 27 enforceable workers because of their debt to the banks. I took out loans for mortgage too. What should I do? I bought a house for 62000 liras. It's impossible to buy one around here, of course. It's in Esenyurt, a far away place after the Eastern Terminal. You can only afford to buy one there. My father took out the loan because we thought maybe they wouldn't give it to me. I thought to myself: if I get a raise of 50 liras every year my salary will be 1000 liras in five years. But I'm getting 850 TL now. I'm paying 400TL of the debt, and my father 600. I get my salary but give it to the bank right away (W41).

In our section there are many who are indebted to the banks. I know 3 people who have just taken out loans (W42).

I took out a home loan of 45.000 TL, and we bought a place from the MHA (TOKİ) homes. It's close to the Eastern Terminal and takes about an hour from downtown. We paid a downpayment but are still paying the installments. The mortgage will be paid off when I retire (W46).

We were tenants for years. My husband's been working for years and I've been working for 7 years now but we've just been able to buy a home. We bought one in Talas 15 days ago. We took out a loan of 50 thousand liras but it will be 85 thousand with the interest. We're just going to have to pay it by cutting down our food costs (W 54).

With regard to the industrial class relations, there are some important outcomes of this low-income housing through individual borrowing from banks. First, since the indebtedness means for labourers receiving money in advance before selling their labour power, borrowing from the banks leads labourers to be depended more on capitalist class relations. In practice, such increasing level of dependency plays the role of undermining labourers' resistance against the employer at workplace. This is clearly seen in the words of an interviewee who told about his hesitation to unionisation due to his debts for housing credit: "When my work-fellows invited me to be involved in the union membership, to be frankly, I had doubts. It is not possible to live on the wages, but I also have 45,000 TL mortgage credit to pay. I first thought that how I am going to pay if I get fired. I asked to my wife: 'I want to get unionised but the employer might fire us'. She replied: 'I support you to the end. Having taken my wife's support, I felt relieved and took part in the unionisation' (W46). In a similar vein, having critically talked about increasing work-discipline, compulsory overtime work, low wages and silent trade unions at workplace, another interviewee answered my question on labourers' response to these conditions as follows:

75% of my fellows are in debt because of the loans; it's either consumer loan or home loan. If they let me go now, how am I supposed to pay the loan back for 3 or 5 months? If you're in good shape and do not have any debt, you'll break at some point. But in situations like ours you just put up with it somehow (W34).

Therefore, it is possible to argue that high level of individual debts among labourers for housing due to the lack of adequate public subsidies by the

municipality for low-income housing produces a disciplinary impact on workers within industrial class relations at workplace. Secondly, in as much as leading to the appropriation by bank capital of a large part of wages, high level of individual debts exacerbates also the reproduction of labourers within industrial class relations. To cope with this situation, labourers develop different survival strategies at different levels. Primarily, labourers' family ties are mobilised in various ways in order to compensate them for their debts. In this scope, the initial strategy is to get food support from their rural ties. Moreover, labourers' household keep open to the participation of single-male brother(s) from rural homeland so that the number of breadwinner can increase, thereby contributing to household budget. A further survival strategy at household level, if needed, can be the involvement of women into local labour market. To illustrate, one of few women interviewees said that the reason why she became an industrial worker despite having a little child who still needs caring was the need for compensation for the housing credit debt. However, this strategy has some limits stemming from not just local social division of labour that mainly sets women in the reproduction of household at home but also the technical nature of industrial production giving relatively limited space for the employment of women (see chapter 4). In this regard, to the extent that these family- and household-level strategies do not provide enough support for the reproduction of labourers, survival strategies are inevitably extended to workplace-level relations. As mentioned in section 4.3.2, working overtime and having a second job have already been the major labour survival strategy in response to strict imposition of minimum wage policy in Kayseri OID. Therefore, extra strategies are needed for labourers to cope with the situation of being in debt. In this context, severance pay, which is indeed given by the employers to employee upon the dismissal or discharge from employment, is demanded in advance to pay for debts. I met with many workers saying that they had used severance pay in order to pay their debts. However, the use of severance pay has its limits in the sense that it is initially depended on the employer's decision and can only be used once over the years. As for the employers, there are also both financial and legal limits in paying workers severance pay in advance. Given these conditions, the demand for wage increase becomes inevitable for

labourers to reproduce themselves (with their households). As a matter of fact, class tensions within the local industry increasingly appear to pass through the demand for increasing wages in recent years to such an extent that it has rapidly led to the development of labour organisations from below in a challenge to the employer's labour control strategies. For the two different unionisation attempts in the local industry that I came across during my visits to Kayseri, to illustrate, the main motivation of the labourers were to increase their wages.

In this framework, it seems worth paying attention to the mass housing projects by the central state's Mass Housing Administration (MHA) for low-income people in Kayseri. The MHA has built 3128 apartment flats in the city of Kayseri out of which 1036 flats are devoted to the low-income people. These projects also initiated further mass housing projects by private contractors or housing cooperatives around the land where the MHA projects were built. Most of the workers interviewed told me that the rising housing rents had stopped to a large extent thanks to the MHA's mass housing projects yet being built on the outskirts of the city. After a selection by the lottery of the MHA, some of these workers owned their houses in the MHA's low-income housing projects. There were also some workers among them who had moved to these flats as tenants primarily because housing rents are comparably low in this area. In this regard, the MHA's low-income housing projects appear as a remarkable public intervention in urban housing development in a particular way to reduce the cost of the reproduction of labour. Nevertheless, given the inadequate numbers of these flats, it is not possible to think that this intervention is fully aimed to satisfy the needs of labourers for housing. It has been rather to alleviate the consequences of the increasing urban contradictions on local industrial employers as municipal power withdrew itself from low-income housing.

On the other hand, such interventions in urban spatial development have also produced some results on local class relations in a reverse way. As the general framework of the MHA's housing policy is based on a distinct model called "sharing revenue" with private companies, its low-income housing projects

can only be built on the far outskirts of the city where land prices are relatively low. In this line, such low-income housing projects in Kayseri have developed on an urban land nearly with 20 km. distance from the city center. Moreover, it is on the opposite edge of the city in comparison with Kayseri OİD. Workers living in this area said that getting their workplaces in the OİD takes more than one hour even by the factory bus-services. For example, a worker living in a flat of the MHA's mass housing apartments talks about his urban condition in a way that seems to have no difference from the one in a big metropolitan city:

Between when I leave the house and get back at night it takes about 13-14 hours. The commute takes an hour by the shuttle bus. If you miss it, you're screwed; so I get up at 6 a.m. When I come home at night I'm totally off. My wife asks why I don't talk but I'm exhausted by the time I get home. If you saw me last night, I swear I wouldn't have talked this much. But since it is my off day I was able to sleep 2 more hours. I walked downtown a bit so my mind's working again; I'm able to speak properly (W34).

Departing from the statement above, it is possible to argue that Kayseri can no longer be considered as a medium city involving relatively slower temporal rhythms and closer spatial distance. Furthermore, the city has been host to more dynamic and heterogeneous urban experience in recent years. An important point in recent local investments appears to improve urban services in accordance with industrial development. For example, there has been increasing investment in education, making the city having four universities two of which are private. In addition, with the setting up of private hospital chains the city becomes a regional center in health services. Moreover, the ongoing large-scale project on Erciyes Mountain, called Erciyes Winter Tourism Center, by the Greater Municipality of Kayseri is going to provide the city with hotels with 5000 bed capacity and various entertainment and sport centers. Each of these investments, while improving urban services in certain lines, has brought with it more dynamic and heterogeneous social relations in Kayseri. The rise of middle- and high-income people along with local industrial development has also paved the way for the production of some distinct spaces such as gated apartments, cafes and shopping malls that make remarkable difference within the so-far development of the city. In a nutshell, what was portrayed above by Korat (1997) as a small city of

homogenous spaces within which everyday life became organized according to the shopkeepers and merchants' temporal rhythms has considerably changed in a manner that a set of heterogeneous spaces developed along with the growth of the city, leading to the emergence of a more unequal urban experience among its residents.

The most intensified place of such experience appears as shopping malls. There are three large-scale shopping malls that have been built in Kayseri in recent years, the latest of which is on the former stadium area, 10 to 15 minutes away by walk from the city center. Nearly all of the workers interviewed said that they had visited these shopping malls at least once. There are, however, only a few workers among them who have done shopping in these shopping malls. They generally describe these shopping malls as "the places not for us". For most of the workers, the shopping areas are the traditional Grand Bazaar, the underground bazaar and other small stores in the city center. However, young workers tend to use the shopping malls for spending time and meeting friends. Yet, this does not change workers' general perception about shopping malls, as it is seen in the experience of a group of young industrial workers:

We went to this newly opened Kayseri Forum thinking maybe I'd buy a few things. A pair of shoes is 200 liras and a shirt is 40-50 liras. I can buy shoes for 30-40 liras at the underground market. Anyway, we thought at least we'd eat something. You know they have cafes upstairs. A hamburger is 10 liras. I looked at the people eating, and had another look at the hamburger and couldn't believe they would pay that much money for it. A couple of friends and I wanted to sit down and have some tea at least. Then the bill came: 15 liras. It cut me to the bone, hurt me so bad in my heart. Here at the municipality's teahouse, the tea is 50 kuruş (half a lira)! (W4).

Thus, these shopping malls, cafes and office buildings that have been developing along the east part of the city center, while constituting an alternative urban center in the city of Kayseri, come to be exclusionary places for labourers. Together with other developments, the city of Kayseri no longer seems to represent a homogenizing space in which social differences could be absorbed into a particular urban experience that makes them unified in each other. In other words, the urban-workplace nexus that has been made through a religious-

communitarian urban management since the mid-1990s significantly disappeared: on the one hand class tensions have increased in workplace level relations, on the other hand spaces of housing, consumption and leisure come to be differentiated more apparently according to the class lines. As a result, the nexus between urban space and workplace-level relations appear to be more conflictual rather than complementary as to the local industrial development.

Does this situation make labourers develop class attitudes? According to E.P.Thompson, an English labour-historian, class-consciousness is eventually composed of cultural forms of a set of experience embodied in tradition, value systems, thoughts and institutions. In this regard, “if the experience appears as determined, class consciousness does not”, argues Thompson (2004:40). Therefore, it is only through the analysis of such cultural forms that the extent to which labourers have class attitudes can be understood. The remainder of this chapter is thus devoted to this analysis.

5.5.3. Class Culture and Class Consciousness

The issues of culture and consciousness constitute a contentious subject in Marxist class analyses. Although Marx himself emphasized on some points regarding with these issues such as the distinction as class in itself and class for itself, ideology and praxis, subsequent studies tended to consider them as secondary issues to the class relations rather than their distinct aspects. In this line, the role of culture and consciousness in class relations were largely ignored in Marxist analyses within a strong adherence to the so-called base-superstructure formulation of the relations between economy and politics. In spite of the increasing attention paid by Lenin, Gramsci and Lukacs as early-20th century Marxists to the political processes, the issue of culture and consciousness was yet to be theoretically placed within class relations in an integral manner. It was not until the post-war period that such a consideration could be initiated due to the continuing influence of such base-superstructure metaphor within Marxist theory. As it completely disappeared along with the post-war capitalist settlement in developed countries, Marxist theory begun to be reconsidered in a specific way

that incorporates more political and ideological aspects into the analysis of class relations. In a response to the structuralist formulation of this reconsideration, E. P. Thompson suggested an alternative formulation in which class is considered as neither a structure nor a conceptual category but something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in social relations (2004:39). For him, while production relations determine classes in a general sense, their making takes place within a set of cultural processes such as certain norms, rituals and behaviours. In this line, he invited Marxist studies to deal with class experiences in cultural contexts rather than to derive class differentiations from economic relations. This formulation has then provided Marxist theory with a wider perspective incorporating the issues of culture and consciousness into the analysis of class relations (McNally, 2015:141). However, it should be also noted, to the extent that searching out the making of class completely in cultural contexts rather than in mutual interactions with production relations, Thompson's contribution, while avoiding the structuralist formulation, tends to fall into the trap of so-called subjectivist-culturalist position in Marxist class analyses.

In this respect, a more balanced consideration on the role of cultural aspects in class relations comes from Raymond Williams in what he calls a cultural materialist approach. According Williams, culture is not purely consisted of a set of things in private or separate fields but involves a whole way of life, thereby can only be comprehended within an integrated understanding of the relations between cultural aspects and material processes. In this line, he argues that there is a fundamental distinction between bourgeois culture and working class culture with regard to both the ways of life and the alternative ideas to the nature of social relations: whereas bourgeoisie has individualised ways of life and ideas of social relations, working class people are obliged to develop collective social ideas, habits of thought, practices and institutions in response to similar living conditions and forms of subordination. Therefore, working class culture is primarily social rather than individual. Based on its social and collectivist nature, this culture has also two essential aspects that are universal: the quest for justice and solidarity (Williams, 1968:313-4). However, it should be noted that these

aspects do not directly constitute a class culture as opposed to bourgeoisie; rather, they take different forms in time and space depending on various dynamics. As Özüğurlu (2005:82) argued, it is only through the involvement of the mature tones of class-consciousness into these universal cultural aspects among working class people that a genuine class culture can appear. In this regard, class culture appears not only within a distinct mode of thought among labourers but also through their wider relations with other social structures as class consciousness is variably formed at different levels of social relations such as family, community and the state (Harvey, 1985).

To investigate the cultural forms of the labourers in Kayseri, I adopt Williams' arguments above as cultural materialism which gives the concept of culture an explanatory power in the analysis of class relations. In this line, I search out the correspondence of such universal cultural aspects on the part of industrial workers in Kayseri by drawing on the semi-structured interviews with them as well as on my personal observations. An investigation into the levels of class-consciousness is specifically avoided mainly because it would be pointless to seek out its mature tones in such a new industrial region. Instead, as Geniş (2006) carried out for the workers of Ostim Organised Industrial District (Ankara), I make a topological journey on workers' consciousness. To this end, I first tried to find out their perceptions and reactions regarding with the separation and distance that they have encountered at both production and reproduction processes. In this scope, I also asked if they could agree with a set of statements about inequality and class differentiation in order to derive more concrete inferences about their class perceptions. Then, I investigated both their understandings of being employee and being employer, and their fundamental expectations from employers. In addition, instead of directly asking questions about their political orientations, I preferred approaching to workers by demanding them to evaluate the current government's policies. In order to apprehend the ideal social relationship in their mind, I finally asked the question of "if you had a power to do, what would you initially change?"

One aspect of class-consciousness among workers may be drawn from their considerations of, as well as their approaches to, certain hierarchical positions at both the production and reproduction levels. In order to reveal them, I first asked labourers for the one(s) to whom they tend to talk about the problems at workplace and feel closer in this regard. In general the answers pointed to master and foremen that supervise them rather than their work-fellows in similar positions. This may be taken as a sign for that individualistic and pragmatic attitudes are more prevalent among labourers in comparison with collectivist and solidaristic approaches. The former can be found in the explanations when those workers were subsequently asked if they could approach to their work-fellows, as a worker replied obviously: “My work-fellows in similar positions with me can not help me solve the problem” (W10). Individualistic and pragmatic attitudes were mostly seen among the workers employed in small- and medium-sized workplaces by the number of employment or in furniture production by industrial sector. This situation can be considered to reflect, besides the general profile of local industrial workforce as having less experience in collective struggles, the dominance of paternalist expectations among workers at these workplaces, and particularly in furniture sector. However, it should be added that when it comes to big seized enterprises, such individualistic and pragmatic attitudes particularly among furniture sector workers apparently weaken in favour of collectivist and solidaristic approaches. This seems to be relevant to the undermining of the paternalist considerations as formal and disciplinary impositions develop along with the growing of workplaces in size. To illustrate, a worker from the leading local furniture factory explains the reason why he came to feel closer to his work-fellows as follows:

We have separate cafeterias for the managers and the superintendents; and now they've separated the foremen too. They've separated their shuttle buses as well. They don't take the buses anymore; they take a special minibus with air conditioning that is more comfortable. When you're in a position like this you have no friends but the workers around you (W34).

In other words, as workers become disappointed with some exclusionary policies in workplace-level relations, they tend to have less individualistic and

pragmatic attitudes by turning themselves more to their work-fellows. Nevertheless, a sort of collective feeling among workers seems to be limited in the extent of their relations with master and foremen directly imposing such policies. It is understood that there are still some paternalist expectations towards employers on the part of workers employed at those big-seized workplaces. The above worker, while being highly critical against his master, foremen and managers due their disciplinary impositions, also tends to place his employer on a different side in a distinct expectation in favour of workers:

I tell my coworkers that the boss probably does not even know most of what we go through here. They've built such a system that the work would go on even if the boss did not show up for ten years. For instance, if I tell Hacı Boydak to mount the air conditioner he'll do it right away, and huff at the ones below him. But then the foremen would get mad at me for telling the boss (W34).

On the other hand, there is a clear differentiation among workers in metal sector in the sense that they mention to a large extent their work-fellows as the people to whom they have initially talked about the problems at workplace. To exemplify, even a metal worker employed in a medium sized workplace who do not reflect any sort of class-based attitudes throughout the interview (for example he thinks that having a Muslim employer is beneficial to workers) replied to the question by giving a strong reference to his work-fellows:

The one who is in the most similar situation as mine is the worker. The guy who has to pinch pennies is the closest to me. Then comes the foreman, and I cannot go any higher than him (W4).

The fact that workers in metal sector tend to give priority to work-fellows in workplace-level relations is quite relevant to the labour process which involves relatively more collective practices in highly heavy and dangerous work conditions. These practices and conditions make metal workers develop a sort of solidaristic ties among each other. As for the textile workers, they manifested similar reactions against master and foremen mainly by giving references to their disciplinary impositions over them. In comparison with the furniture sector workers, there is no one among local textile workers interviewed who approached to their employers in a paternalist expectation. Yet, this fact cannot be taken

solely to consider the existence of a sort of coherent collective feelings among them. Rather, it seems to reflect comparably a less degree of paternalist involvement of employer in workplace-level relations in textile sector due to its specific aspects in terms of the size and nature of labour process. Working mostly at big-seized workplaces, textile workers, particularly in yarn production, are generally employed in highly unqualified jobs reduced to the simple control processes of working machines, thus representing less skilled as well as more mobile and fragmented part of local workforce. In this respect, textile employers are less interested in paternalist protections than disciplinary practices in production process.

In an attempt to reveal the degree to which workers carry a class perspective on a wider scale beyond workplace, I asked them a question regarding with the hierarchies or inequalities they have felt and encountered in society: “where do you see the source of social inequalities?” Their answers overwhelmingly pointed to the distinction between rich(ness) and poor(ness). The tendency to consider social inequalities on the basis of the richness-poorness distinction instead of wider consequences of class separation between employers and employees is generally interpreted by sociologists as a distinct understanding of inequality among Turkish workers in their extension of traditional rural culture towards urban areas (see Akşit, 1985). These answers can be considered in line with this interpretation. However, a remarkable number of workers interviewed, while talking about social inequalities, particularly associated the richness with having money. Such a clear emphasise on money for the rich-poor distinction actually implies a more urbanised understanding of inequality shaped by capitalist relations that indeed goes beyond the rural culture. Thus, it should be added that such sociological interpretation falls short of explaining fully this general tendency on the part of workers to consider social inequalities as referring to the rich-poor distinction.

As another way for revealing the class feelings among workers’ imagination, I also asked the workers intervieweed to define the identities of both the boss and

worker: “who is the boss?” “who is the worker?” A larger part of workers’ answers converged on the neutral definitions of these social forms i.e., “boss gives job” and “worker is employed to work”. However, it is quite recognizable that workers at big-sized workplaces tend to consider such definitions in some ambiguous class separations: “the boss is the person who makes me work; the worker is the one who works for the wage” (W 31), “the boss is the owner of the factory; the worker is the person who have to work” (W17). In this line, a clear differentiation in workers’ imagination is seen on the part of metal sector workers. Their imaginations on the relations between employer and employee are apparently arisen from tensions and conflicts.

The boss is the king. If the king of the jungle is the lion, the bosses are the kings of the Industry. The worker is the slave (W40).

The boss is the one who leeches off of the worker whereas the worker is the one who lifts up the company by his work but loses himself (W15).

The boss is the one who has his way. The worker is the slave because you come in early in the morning and work until the evening; you work to death (W4).

The bosses are a group of unjust people. The workers are the people who demand their fair share (W25).

The boss exploits the worker. The worker is the one surviving with his labor (W53).

The boss uses the worker like a slave, who does not have a sense of justice. The worker means the slave. (W49).

Taking a further step, I also demanded the workers interviewed to portray the ideal profile of an employer in their eyes. As mentioned in previous section, local industrial employers have deliberately introduced to labourers a religious identity about themselves as a particular strategy of labour control. Such identity is actually taken a basic reference point in workers’ portrayals of the ideal employer. There are mainly two different types of consideration among workers about this identity. First, a group of workers, particularly employed at small and medium sized workplaces mostly in furniture production, approach to this religious identity in a rather pragmatic way to bring with it inclusive workplace relations. For them, a religious employer would be more helpful in as much as his

beliefs do not allow him to be unfair. Yet, it is immediately added, he should be a real religious person instead of having pretentious practices.

The boss should be a believer, first of all. Really. It's important that he listens to us when we have a problem (W13).

The boss should be religious. It would be better for me if he is pious, then he would look out for his workers (W17).

It's good for a boss to be religious. Then he will at least give people their fair share, I mean to a certain extent. And I'm talking about the ones who really have faith. Some of them are just showing off. The believer fears God (W4).

It's important that the boss is devout. How can harm come from a Muslim? But he must be a real Muslim, not like the fake ones here at the Industry (W36).

Secondly, a larger part of the workers consider the identity of religious employer in a highly critical way. Behind workers' critiques of this identity lie their previous experiences and current working conditions in local industry that are considered quite unfair to them. Thus the employer's religiosity has been widely discredited in the eyes of workers. What becomes essential for the workers about the employer seems to be whether or not s/he gives them an adequate wage for their reproduction.

I've seen both the religious and compassionate ones who were unfair. Does he pay my salary on time, or does he give me my share? That's what matters (W29).

The boss must know what it means to be human. He should be able consider whether this much money is enough to survive. He should give the worker a bit more. It's not about religion or being from the same town. One of the former muftis has a factory here but the workers are suffering (W12).

Whether he is religious or not, he must give the workers their fair share. I've worked in many places, and, how should I put it? These people are religious too but they go to mosques to help the poor and then do not give the workers their money. He prays to show off to the community, does charity work but does not look out for his own workers (W7).

In either pragmatic or critical views, both considerations indeed reveal a common point that employer's religiosity makes sense for workers as long as it becomes a part of their material survival. The latter view further shows that religion has increasingly lost its ground in shaping employer-employee

relationship as class tensions dominate workplace relations in more severe forms. Workers' experiences of these tensions have created such a challenging force in their mind that they come to a point where not only the employer's religiosity but also the religion may become out of the question. Nearly all of the workers who are critical of the identity of religious employer, when asked if they work at a workplace owned by a foreign i.e., Christian employer, replied positively. The most striking response among them belongs to a metal worker who also identifies himself as a strongly religious person i.e., the follower of sharia.

I like a boss who gives the workers their share. If he does that, then he is already devout. If it's not holding up my religious duties it's not a problem for me. Because I'm just a worker, it wouldn't be a problem even if he was a Jew, I mean it (W16).

In a nutshell, there are clear evidences that the identification of employer with religious personality seems to have lost its credit in the eyes of a large part of local industrial workers although conversely it has been still seen important among some workers mostly employed in small and medium sized enterprises that are particular in furniture production. In shaping workers' approaches to the profile of so-called religious employer, their experiences of class tensions within the material context of workplace-level relations have played a fundamental role. To the extent that these tensions are controlled within relatively less severe forms that are generally compensated for by employer's paternalist attitudes, workers tend to give special importance to the employer's religiosity in a rather pragmatic expectation that his/her beliefs would provide the basis for a relatively just relationship between employer and employees. Moreover, even having been subjected to the exclusionary nature of class relations, workers can remain loyal to this utopia in a highly distinct way separating the employer's religiosity as the fake and the real.

Nevertheless, as the material context of production changes towards big-sized workplace having with a factory system of intense disciplinary impositions, workers become less interested in employer's personal profile and raise an apparent secular view of the employer-employee relationships. Then, if there is a general tendency along with the development of industrial production that

religious brotherhood ceases to provide a common worldview in the employer-employee relationship that have actually played a consensual role for the workplace-level tensions, what has emerged in workers' mind instead of it?

At this point, it may be illuminating to track the way in which workers approach to the notion of justice that is indeed part and parcel of working class culture in a distinct way as mentioned before. To this end, I asked the workers interviewed to depict the workplace-level relation based on justice in their eyes. Their answers as workplace justice converge on the achievement of a minimum level of living standards to satisfy their basic material needs in exchange for working at least eight hours a day. In this line, an experienced metal worker further argued that workplace justice necessarily requires unionisation of workers to raise their demands collectively:

What the worker understands of justice is obvious: A good and regular salary, support for the kids etc. not a whole lot. When you want it yourself you don't get it. Then it necessitates unionization. And if there is no such union it's all up to whatever the boss says; and that's a system of kingship. Whatever he says gets done (W15).

However, there were few examples among workers' responses in which unions are initially considered as the necessary part of workplace justice. This may be associated with the weakness of a unionisation culture among the relatively newly-proleterianised industrial workers with a rural background. As a matter of fact, I encountered many workers, particularly from small- and medium-sized workplaces, who really have no idea about labour union. However, it seems that the weak interest in labour union as the means of constituting workplace justice is much more related with the dominant form of unionisation in local industry as yellow unions than workers' rural background. In the eyes of most of the workers including the non-unionised, local unions do not bring to them remarkable changes in workplace level relations.

The truth of the matter is that the union is no help. They cut off our money so it's harm done to us again. I did not register at the union at the Erbosan factory, then they sent me off themselves. The employer did. When I was not at the union before

that, I would get my subsistence and coal. There is no difference now. They send you off just so they can cut off money from there (W29).

I would normally want a union but the unions are dodgy. That's why I don't want it. Otherwise it's a good thing but it needs to be side by side with the workers. They take my day's wage by default. They sit down to have an agreement with me but give me more or less the same amount of money that the state would give otherwise (W28).

However, such a widespread reaction among workers to the labour unions does not preclude them from having an interest in combative unionism. For example, a furniture worker who has long worked at the major local furniture company considers a radical labour union affiliated with the DĪSK, a leftist labour union confederation, as the basic requirement for workplace justice in local industry although he keeps himself away from left politics.

In a just workplace there must really be a union but not like these. DĪSK should come but they won't let it. They'd interfere. DĪSK belongs to a leftist party.

Are you a leftist?

Oh dear, no. God forbid (W36).

Therefore, it is not possible to argue that workers' perceptions about workplace justice do not involve unionisation as a collective organisation among them for solidarity and struggle. Given the lack of any independent unionisation in the local industry; however, workplace justice is rarely envisaged among workers in reference to labour unions. It is actually considered in ways that are less associated with their collective organisation and struggle. For the workers who are particularly from small- and medium-sized enterprises, workplace justice is regarded as an outcome of employer's justice:

In a fair workplace the boss should listen to the workers' problems and do justice. Our boss does it at least. He helps any way he can. But you cannot talk directly to the boss where there are a thousand or five thousand people working. That is the reality (W13).

In the case of big-sized workplaces with a factory system, workplace justice is widely understood in a rather procedural sense that generally refers to the equal treatment of foremen and master to each worker in production process. In general,

workers employed at these workplaces underlined the need for the removal of nepotism, unequal workload and mobbing in order to achieve workplace justice. On the contrary; however, some workers associated workplace justice with the radical economic demands in a rather political sense:

Let's say he made 100 million; the employer should take 50 million and give away the other 50. That is justice. These people want it all (W26).

It should be noted that such political understanding is also supported with some religious narratives and themes that preach the importance of justice in society. The calling of religion for justice indeed reminds of Marx's famous phrase about the religion as "the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions"⁷⁸. It may be also considered as a kind of reversal by workers against employers of the religious utopia made by the latter over the former in a deliberate attempt to cover up class tensions at workplace. As there has appeared an unavoidable gap between workers' material conditions and the discursive socialisation within such religious-communitarian utopia, the latter can provide the initial steps for workers in developing critiques against employers in search for workplace justice.

If one's not just, he'll think of only his profit. He won't care about the workers or their profit. He should feel that if he is earning, the worker should earn too. That is how you establish justice. If a guy does not act this way then he is not devout. Look, the question is more of being a just person who does not care only about himself than being religious (W39).

In a fair place, you seek your rights. In this system it's possible with a union. There should be both the struggle and religion. Besides, for the boss to be religious is his problem. It is not about me. Even the prophet forbade putting so much weight on the camel. We're humans and should be treated as such. These people totally abuse religion; I'm excluding the ones that don't (W16).

⁷⁸ This phrase is quoted from a passage in Karl Marx's book called "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Rights". The full passage is as follows: "Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest Against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless World, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people" <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm> the date of download: 15th October 2014.

In a just work place, you need to give the worker the money he needs in order to live comfortably. You even need to write down all the revenue and expenses, such as electricity etc., and show them to the workers in order to be able to show your own profit too. If the worker gets a 100, the employer should get 200 at most. It'll be better if I explain it with a hadith. The prophet Ebu Bekir, for example, gave all of his fortune to the poor except for one piece of clothing (W49).

At this point, there appears an important question which needs responding: to what extent do these religious critiques by workers against employers constitute a fundamental reference, i.e., an ethical principle among the former to raise the idea of workplace justice in a radical sense. In the recent years of Turkey, as Islamist politics came to be hegemonic in many aspects of social life, similar questions have been dealt in critical writings. Some scholars develop positive answers by positing them towards a wider political stance called as left-divinity (sol-ilahiyat) (Özdoğan and Akkoç, 2013). In contrast, I generally approach to this political stance in a bit sceptical manner on the grounds that the issue cannot be considered only at discursive level. In this respect, I here propose taking a closer look three different religious workers interviewed in order to understand the ways in which religious values are incorporated into workers' considerations about workplace-level relations.

The first worker (W48), who is to be named as Sadullah, was a poor peasant without land until his migration to Kayseri and is currently working at the biggest metal-cable factory of local industry. Having worked as a subcontracted worker for six years, he has been employed for two years as a registered worker in the same metal-cable factory. He has a union membership and earns 900 TL a month with which to maintain his family including five-person. In spite of the harsh conditions of his (and his household) survival, Sadullah seems to be satisfied in comparison with his rural background:

I grew up in a village. I wouldn't even buy shoes; would go to Adana to work wearing a shintyan. I had to endure such hardship; I grew up under harsh conditions. Thank God I've come this far from those days (W48).

In addition, he welcomes some religious brotherhood organisations in his living area. He has benefited particularly from their free religious education

services for his kids in the hope of making them at least religious officers. In a talk about the wages, Sadullah provides a highly compliant profile.

They call the employers in Kayseri religious and charitable, I saw the mosque down that way. Apparently your employer had it made. And he also had a community health center in another neighborhood. It's being said that he gives out many food supplies as well. Is your boss so charitable towards the workers too?

I'm doing well, man. I'm asking you how much you'd give me if you were the employer?

I don't know. For example, if I want the worker to be well I would want to talk to the workers and find out how much they need, and give that much. I would conscientiously not want to give any less than what he can survive on.

Okay now, you're right, fine. But you cannot just go on and give everyone this much money. You'll give it to the ones who've been working for 10-15 years but not to everyone.

Would the employer go bankrupt if he did?

No, he wouldn't. But the employer has made all the rules this way.

The workers in Kayseri say that it is impossible to live on anything less than 1500 liras.

No one can give that much money. How could they?

I believe that the factory you work for is among the 500 biggest companies in Turkey. Don't you think he can increase your salaries a bit?

Look, okay, I know he makes money. But there is the electricity, water and all sorts of other expenses, right?

You think you're getting your fair share as I see?

This is my fair share. I'm getting what I deserve to get. God should help the poor. You know the story goes: there used to be a sultan who told his vizier to bring whoever he can get. So he does. Then one day the vizier finds a guy's skull. The sultan puts the skull on one pan of the scale and soil on the other. The more soil he puts in the heavier the skull gets. Then the sultan turns to the guy beside him and says: you see, humans are greedy. Whatever you give them they still want more.

So you're saying the moral of the story is...

The worker never gets satisfied; he's always hungry.

Nevertheless, as the conversation continued, it revealed that the reason why Sadullah seems to be so compliant despite the severe conditions in his survival is

closely related with both his high level of dependency on wage labour and the low level of collective attitudes among his work fellows.

I'm going to ask you this because you spoke so frankly. Isn't there anything you would like to change?

If someone were to do something, no one would follow him. There are some things that no one can change. Let's say you work somewhere. They say 'come on, let's do this. Let's do it together.' Then you go ahead but you cannot find anyone behind following you. There's no one. You're alone. Then you back away too. Why? It's your bread and butter, after all. The employer thinks: this guy depends on me. He'll accept whatever I give him. He's dependent on me no matter what I give him be it 10 or 20 liras. What do you do? Then the employee thinks maybe he'll be able to do something later when he's retired because he's got insurance and all.

You cannot even ask them to be just?

I told you that the rich oppresses the workers. Can you go up to the rich and tell them how much they make, then ask for more? What would happen even if you ask it as alms? They'd kick you out, then you'll lose your job. Now can you say it or not? I cannot. Then you'll be grateful to God and accept it (W48).

In the case of Sadullah, where there is a religious worker yet having with a high level dependency on wage labour for survival, religious-communitarian values are not allowed to play a critical role in considering workplace level relations. Rather, these values are selected in such ways making the workplace-level relations perceived as unjust something that needs bearing within a belief giving thanks in all circumstances to God.

The situation becomes differentiated in the case of the second worker (W50) who is to be named here as Recep. Having worked in construction sector, Recep has been employed for three years in a big-seized metal factory thanks to his brother-in-law who is a union representative at the same factory. He is in his late-20s, single and staying with his family in a working class neighbourhood. He is also committed to a religious brotherhood organisation called Naqshi, one of the largest religious community in Turkey which is well known for its emphasise on order and discipline. Interviewing with him reveals that as there appears an unavoidable gap between his religious-communitarian values and the actual material conditions at workplace, he tends to reformulate the former in compatible with the later rather than thinking the later through the lense of the former.

Is this “sitting” (“oturma”) tradition very common here? I know local employers do it, but is it common among the workers as well?

I don't do it since I'm not married. If I get married, I'll go to my married friends' places with my wife too.

Do you need to be married for it?

There are other things. We have religious talks, religious orders. I sometimes go to the Nakşibendi order. There's *hatme* we go to. They have religious talks there.

Do you also talk about the problems at work and the injustices you experience too? Injustice is one thing, justice is another. Injustice is inappropriate; and the just part is done with the possibilities at hand. These questions have certainly been asked and the responses have been given.

How?

How should I put it? For example it says you shall give someone's share before his sweat dries out. It says you shall not do business by using interest. But there is also tenancy. Let's say I borrowed 10 liras from you. Would it be okay if I gave you 10 liras? I've used the money, and then I need to give you the same amount to have the right to use it.

Is this right determined by interest or something else?

It's about intentions. It's done according to the purchasing power. For example if you could buy 10 loaves of bread before, you should be able to do the same.

So interest is fine?

No, it's forbidden.

But this purchasing power is increasingly determined by the markets, financial relations and so by interest. When you ask these to yourself how do you answer?

We leave the rest to Allah.

It must be difficult

Now Allah (swt) tells you not to eat pork. But he also says you can eat a little bit if you have to, in order to survive.

So you're saying these devout employers here do business with interest and act unjustly because they're at the point of dying of hunger?

(Laughing) of course they just want to get bigger.

So what do you have to say about private property? According to the Kuran, all property belongs to God. But the employer practically says: this factory is mine. You will either work for this amount of money or you're out. Do you think this is

conflicting? Can you, example, ask how he can say that to you because all property belongs to God?

I can, and it would be based on this: Our lord Ali came upon a mosque while traveling with some people. He wants to go in, and there is a guy in front of the mosque. He asks if he can look after his horse. The guy says he would. Ali goes into the mosque, and thinks to himself that he should give this guy 2 pieces of gold. But when he comes out he finds that the guy's gone along with the horse's saddle. Ali gives those 2 pieces of gold to the guys who came with him so they could go and buy a new saddle from the market. Off they go to find a saddle. They do not recognize the guy who stole the saddle and buy it from him. When Ali sees this guy later he turns to his fellows and says: if God gives you your livelihood ("rizk") it is your right. You'll have it either lawfully or unlawfully. You cannot escape this. This guy was going to have it lawfully but he is having it unlawfully now. If the boss lets me go now...Allah (swt) gives a certain livelihood to me, it is stated in the Fatiha prayer "who can deny the rizk?" If he is to let me go, he'll do it. Then our rizk ends there.

Thus, in the case of Recep, where there is a religious worker committed to a particular Islamist brotherhood community that has a widespread network both among employers as well as trade unions and employees in local industry, religious-communitarian values are re-interpreted in highly distinct ways that seeks to make them comply with existing workplace-level relations. From these interpretations, it is not difficult to excavate both the fundamental premises of such religious community to which Recep is committed and his individual survival conditions ranging from the access to employment and the state of being employable to the wider social relations outside workplace that are largely provided within the network of that community. In this context, religious-communitarian values come to appear as shaped actively within top-down religious community relations as well as through each worker's survival conditions embedded within these relations. Thus, religious-communitarian values are weeded out of their radical extensions that would conflict with the existing workplace-level relations.

Nevertheless, another worker named here as Abuzer who is also involved into a different religious brotherhood community provides a completely distinct case in which religious-communitarian values are brought into a radical consideration of workplace justice. Having graduated from the vocational high school, Abuzer, 35-year old, has worked mostly at big-sized metal companies of

local industry without a long-term break. Since his high school years, he has been committed to a unique and small religious brotherhood community in Kayseri called Rufai, which represents a relatively dissident, if not oppositional, tradition in the history of Islam. In a way reflecting the dissident nature of such religious community, Abuzer told that he had been fired from his previous jobs because he, to use his own words, “draws the sword, if necessary, for his rights”. Interviewing with him reveals not only his radical consideration of workplace justice based on his religious-communitarian values but also the power of actual material conditions on workers’ considerations:

I’ve been told that the workers in Kayseri do not object the employers and are compliant because they’re religious. Is that true?

Now God gives you a rızk, right? This is a place of examination. There’s no such thing in our religion. Let me give you an example from our prophet: during the Battle of the Trench our prophet was starving because he hadn’t eaten for three days. Then he tied a piece of stone to his belly so the warmth of the stone would assuage his hunger. Someone said, “My dear prophet, I’ve been hungry for three days. The prophet replied by saying he’d been hungry for six days. So, he ties two stones to his belly. This means he can not be full while his people are hungry. I’m saying all this because we were talking about religion. The life of our prophet was special like this. You know the fairness of the prophet Ömer. Ebuzer Guffari has also been quoted a lot. Ebuzer Guffari grabs the Muaviye by the collar and kicks him off the throne because he was feasting lavishly. Prophet Ömer, for example, wears a gown that was a bit too long. It was made of his son’s share. A sahabe (the religious companion) asks why his gown is too long, and then the son tells him that he gave away his share. Ömer thanks God because there are still people who would fix him with a sword. This means that our religion can even fix a caliph.

Do you talk to your other fellow workers at the factory about these, especially with the ones saying this is their rızk?

I mean, if it comes to claiming your rights you’d go with the sword in your hand. They say that was the way in the past, but no more. But if that’s the case we should all be sitting at home not working. It’s the rızk coming from God, after all. No. You must work and be productive. There is a verse on working, man. It says you must give the worker his fair share before his sweat dries out. According to religion you need to be paid daily. I’m saying all of this to the so-called Muslim employers. They’re not Muslim if you ask me ... though there are also the ones who understand what we’re saying and accept it. I’ve seen employers calling people in for a meeting with my own eyes. During the crisis in 2008 they did not give us a raise and we stopped doing overtime work, but his son got himself a jeep that was worth 500,000 euros.

What do the workers of another communion say when you talk about these?

Well, they tell me not to think that way because they [the employers] are with God, so there must be a reason.

Do you think they say it despite all the trouble because they're real believers?

The truth is that there is no trust. They have faith all right; some really feel that way. However most of them do not believe that it will change. They don't hold any power, or there is no union. The guy's just being smart thinking he's dependent on this because there is no law.

To sum up, the three cases above involve different ways of the involvement of religious-communitarian values into workplace-level relations, with completely different roles in workers' consideration of workplace justice. While Sadullah keeps himself away from taking his religious-communitarian values as a reference to consider workplace-level relations in a critical way making him submissive to all conditions and rules, Recep tends to adopt his religious-communitarian values to the existing workplace-level relations within the top-down relations of a religious-brotherhood community to which he is committed. On the other hand, Abuzer raises a highly radical view of workplace justice in line with his commitment to a dissident religious-brotherhood community among others that sticks to the premise as the equality of Muslims before the God. All of them then show that although workers' religious-communitarian values apparently conflict with the existing workplace-level relations albeit with varied degrees, this does not necessarily provide them with a critical consideration to the latter through the lense of the former. Rather, there appear different approaches on the part of these religious workers ranging from the cynical and the adaptor to the radical about workplace-level relations in terms of the values they believe in. Such wide-ranging considerations among so-called religious workers about the workplace-level relations indeed reveals not only that that workers' religious-communitarian values are not the single variable that shapes their mind regarding with workplace justice but also the fact that there is no constant equivalent of these values among workers but various interpretations and understandings. In this respect, workers' consideration of justice seems to be better sought out within their actual material contexts rather than in a bookish assumption of their religious-communitarian values.

In this line, let me continue tracking the ways in which workers in Kayseri consider the notion of justice at a wider scale beyond workplace level. At this point, I think, workers' answers to the question of "what would you change if you held authority at your hands" may hint at these ways. Leaving aside some ultra-nationalist resolutions regarding with Turkey's long-year political-cultural problems like Kurdish question or some heated political issues at the time of field study, i.e., increasing tension between Turkey and Syria, much of the workers' answers point to a particular consideration of equality in society.

I'd try to balance the injustices. I mean, let me put it this way. For example, I work for ten hours and get 1000 liras. He works ten hours too but gets 700 liras. The work he does is perhaps heavier than mine. There must be fairness in income (W8).

I'd raise the minimum wage to the poverty line. If you're announcing this, then at least raise it to that level (W35).

I'd want equal pay for equal work (W34).

However, such egalitarian perspective among workers is also filled with a particular reaction to the state officers/employees whose wages are considered to cause unfair income distribution in society. Workers' statements wishing for an equal society are subsequently added with a critique to the wages of state officers/employees.

If I had the authority to do it, I'd have a one-way system. The public workers are too many, for example - that number needs to be reduced. We work for minimum wage in the private sector whereas they get 1.5-2 thousand liras from the state (W25).

That workers in private sector tend to compare their situation initially with those in state-owned enterprises, and particularly with the state officers, is also found in many studies on working class people in Turkey (see Geniş, 2006, Coşkun, 2012). The reason why workers initially weigh them against the state officers rather than their employers seems to be associated with the fact that workers and state officers are relatively in close proximity to each other in both social and spatial senses. This leads the former to develop much intra-class comparisons with the latter. However, some workers can move such

comparisons towards a more class-based axis that primarily puts employers (and the rich) on target.

I'd make regulations to relieve the lower classes. I'd help the suffering workers, and also investigate the assets of the rich (W18).

I'd triple the minimum wage and change the working conditions. I'd do more inspections and deport the abusers of religion (W12).

In this framework, it is then possible to argue that industrial workers in Kayseri have an egalitarian component within their class culture in ways that confirm what Raymond Williams underlines in general regarding with working class culture. Moreover, workers' egalitarian concerns are rooted much more in their actual material relations, their survival conditions in particular, than in their religious-communitarian beliefs. Nevertheless, to the extent that these egalitarian concerns are brought into the considerations in tension with public sector workers including state officers, it seems that such egalitarian component within workers' class culture lacks collectivist and solidaristic features.

As a way of taking a closer picture of this class culture, I also asked workers to respond to a set of statements regarding with certain tensions and inequalities in society. In this scope, all workers approach positively to the statement that "workers have interests in common that are completely different from employers' interests", which explicitly suggests a contradictory relation between workers and employers. Although this situation points to that workers carry some class feelings against employers, their subsequent responses reveals that they are partial, fragmented and contradictory in themselves. To illustrate, when asked whether they agree with the statement that "one's richness in a society rises on the poverty of many others", which proposes thinking inequalities rather in a dialectical manner; workers provided a scattered picture in their approaches. A third of the workers interviewed expressed their disagreements with this statement partially or completely. Similarly, workers' responses to the statement that "as employer profits, employees win too" constitute similar picture in a reverse way. Although all of the workers interviewed made a clear commitment to the first statement

proposing a contradictory relation between employers and employees, a third of them also argues for the statement above suggesting a sort of cooperative relation at workplace. For example, having declared his agreement with the statement filled with a clear class contradiction, a metal worker employed at big-sized metal factory can subsequently commit himself to another statement yet with a cooperatist perspective in an argument that “an employer making profits might employ more workers” (W46). Nevertheless, such fragmented and contradictory perceptions in workers’ approaches disappear and transform into the strong class feelings when the statements are directly about them rather than their relations with employers. For example, the statement that “the reason of the poverty is simply due to that the poor does not have intelligence and talent enough to make them competitive” was strongly criticised by most of the workers interviewed. In this regard, the weakest critique pointed to at least the equality of opportunity in an argument that “workers would do everything if the opportunity was given”. On the other hand, there were also a few numbers of workers replying this statement in a way putting the blame (being poor) on them individually. These workers are mostly long-year workers who were directly involved in the spectacular growth of local industry in which many local employers have emerged mostly within small-business individual ‘success’ stories. Such perception of poverty as an individual failure seems to stem from a particular comparison of their conditions with those local employers. As a matter of fact, when asked for the failure they considered causing their current situation, such workers generally referred to a small-business ‘success’ story regarded as missed at a particular moment in the previous years. However, as proleterianisation became consolidated, it seems that such individualised perception disappeared. None of the workers involved in local industry in recent years, during which so-called small-business individual ‘success stories’ have considerably become extinct, blamed their poverty on them.

On the other hand, as the statements asked are concerned with their direct situations, workers’ responses come to a point where collective perceptions are reflected most. To illustrate, the statement that “the reason of poverty is due to the

workers' laziness and unwilling to work hard" is responded in such a way that all workers expressed their clear objections by referring to the long-hour and severe working conditions in local industry. However, in a step moving forward, when subsequently asked about its radical explanation that "the reason of poverty is because of the existing economic system based on private property and profitability", workers tend to respond in such ways reflecting that their perceptions of inequality do not involve some systematic-ideological explanations. Yet, these perceptions were not totally exempt from certain radical considerations. Some workers felt to reformulate the statement above as the "employers' excessive ambition of making profit" in order to explain the reason of poverty in their own terms:

I think it's about being over-ambitious to make more money. It's about being selfish and not sharing (W16).

I'd agree partially. It is better if we do not call it profit-oriented but opportunity-oriented (W47).

I'd agree but it's more accurate if we call it over-ambition to make profit rather than property (W53).

The disintegration of workers' relatively collective perceptions in the face of some systematic-ideological explanations recurred in other responses. For example, all of the workers expressed their agreement with the statement that "most people in Turkey earn less money than what they really deserve to receive", revealing implicitly high degree of the perception of injustice among workers with regard to the wages and income. Nevertheless, such perception disperses when it subsequently comes to responding to a related statement that carries the previous one to a particular conclusion that "the emergence of the rich and the poor as the consequence of income inequality is unjust": "everyone cannot be rich" and "if everyone is rich, who wants to work?", a remarkable number of worker replied. Similarly, nearly all of the workers reflected a clear disagreement to the statement that "economic policies are beneficial to all citizens in the country" and even added that "it is only the rich, a segment, that benefits". Yet, such strong class feelings among workers faded to a dusty gray when they subsequently

encountered the statement involving an abstraction regarding with the existing economic and political system: a remarkable number of workers considered that “our political and economic system, to leave aside the abuse of it, is beneficial to the whole society”. On the other hand, workers’ responses to the statements about the relation between work and richness reveal that their perceptions of the inequality in society are not fragmented and scattered but also contradictory on occasion. To the statement that “a person acting cleverly and working hard eventually achieves a good living standards”, nearly half of the workers interviewed gave responses that are partially or completely in agreement. However, there also appeared a full of disagreement among all workers to the subsequent statement that “the rich comes to that position by working hard”. In other words, it seems that a considerable part of the workers, while assuming that people become rich through some illegal ways other than working hard, have a sort of individualistic idea that they can be rich on the condition of working hard and acting cleverly.

In this framework, it is then safe to argue that although industrial workers in Kayseri have remarkably egalitarian aspects in their perceptions about social relations, these perceptions do not refer to a systematic-ideological class-consciousness and a genuine class culture but rather a set of fragmented, scattered and non-consistent class feelings. Based on the notions of justice and fairness, such consciousness has a remarkable potential conflicting with capitalist relations. Nevertheless, this potential is also covered with workers’ individualistic and pragmatic concerns that make certain class feelings shaped in their concrete practices at workplace fading away in the face of systematic-ideological abstractions for society-level relations. In this regard, there appears a wide difference in the degree of workers’ class-consciousness at two different levels namely the living-concrete-individual and the conceived-abstract-social. Between these two levels lie ideological-political orientations. In this regard, last but not least, workers’ ideological-political orientations need evaluating in terms of class culture and class-consciousness. I attempt to give a particular outline of them in a

way that draws upon workers' considerations about the current government's policies.

The aforementioned conservative-nationalist social climate in Kayseri, which indeed stems from a reactionary relic associated with the exile of Armeanian dwellers in the beginning of previous century, has long been reflected in the political behaviour. As a city of center-right stronghold in Turkish politics, Kayseri has been one of the host localities of the development of Islamist politics, with the voting rates above its national average. The ruling Islamist party, AKP, received a landslide victory with the voting rate of 50 percent in Kayseri in the general election of 2002. It was followed by the centre-left Republican People's Party (CHP) and the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) with the same voting rates of 11 percent. During the years of the 2000s, the Islamist-conservative party has increased its votes to the rate of 65 per cent that is above its national average by at least 15 points. The oppositional political movement in the city has been much represented within a nationalist channel, making MHP a second biggest party with the voting rates reaching to 20 per cent. The centre-left RPP has not been appeal to the people in Kayseri, keeping the same voting rate at around 12 percent. The uninterrupted rise of AKP votes in the city has stopped for once in the local election of 2009, having a decline in its voting rate to 52 per cent. It is also in this local election that MHP saw a sharp increase in its votes reaching to the rate of 25 percent. The notable point about this election is that it was held at a time when local industry was hit by the 2008 world economic crisis, with massive lay-offs and increasing unemployment rates.

The workers interviewed were not asked about the political parties for which they have voted. Instead of their voting behaviour, talking about their considerations of the current government's policies was preferred to make the interviews more genuine. As the interviews turned into warm talks, many workers did not hesitate to mention the political parties they voted in the elections. Drawing on workers' statements, it is safe to argue that a great part of the working class people in Kayseri have voted for AKP in the elections during the years of

the 2000s. However, it was not rare to encounter with workers who stated that they supported MHP especially in the local election of 2009 in a reaction to the ruling party, AKP. On the other hand, workers' responses to the question that "is there any policy of the ruling government that you have supported in particular?" show that their support to AKP is based on some functional appeals rather than pure ideological issues. Despite the dominance of a conservative social and political climate over the city, there are not many among the workers interviewed who completely confirm or defend the ruling government's policies. It was quite recognizable that workers employed at big-sized factories irrespective of their sectors had more critical eyes on the ruling government in comparison with other workers. In general, the majority of workers tended to appreciate that the ruling government provided Turkish economy with consecutive growth-years after the economic crisis of 2001 while at the same time adding that this has brought less benefit to them. In particular, it is the ruling government's transportation and health policies that workers generally considered positive and found successful.

I swear I haven't seen anything done by the government that I actually found right (W3).

The government makes only the roads right. The rest is wrong. The hospitals have gotten better too but the rest is useless to us (W16).

The government has more faults than it has done well. Nobody can deny that they've enhanced the health service, made some major changes, double highways, etc. However the matter with the severance pay is different. The worker only has a few things to hold on to, and they're trying to kill them, too. The lower class is just regressing (W34).

What I can say the government has done right is transportation, health, and education a little. Whatever they do is for the bosses. They're over-pressuring the lower class. The minimum wage is just too low (W35).

On the other hand, when asked reversely "is there any policy of the government that you have particularly found wrong?" many workers were seen to raise deep-seated critical responses in comparison with what the government has provided for employers in the form of investment incentives.

The state and the government must be fairer. It should not favor the boss all the time but support the employees a bit more. The minimum wage speaks for itself (W12).

What the government does wrong is this: it tolerates the private sector too much. Perhaps it's good and they're thinking of the workers' interests, but there's nothing helping the workers. For instance, the government says it'll pay the premium if they employ workers. That's good. However, the employer is going to employ those workers whether you pay the premium or not. Employers abuse this a lot. Even the operating factories received support from them and made a depot (hangar?) out of it. We have many witnesses. They've totally abused it, and the government does not inspect them (W15).

I heard something in the news the other day that felt so wrong. It said that the government would not tax the investors if they invested in the southeast. They don't tax the employers if they build factories. The prime minister says they just need to make investments. So they don't tax them. But why do they tax the worker so much who barely survives with three to five kids (W38).

In other words, the fact that the government, while carrying out a strictly limited minimum wage policy towards workers, has provided employers with a wide range of financial and bureaucratic supports leads the workers to consider a strong degree of injustice in state interventions. Moreover, it seems that this consideration not only undermines the neutrality of the state in the eyes of workers, but also puts it at the target of their demands for economic justice so much so that they tend to direct the wage increase claims to the state rather than to the employers.

You need at least a 1,000 liras to survive in Kayseri. The minimum wage is now 700 liras. I think that the state should give 200-250 liras to the workers instead of the employers. It should, my friend. Whether you call it social benefit or support, whatever. The state must give money to the worker before putting the money in the employer's bank account. Then the employer wouldn't feel so much pressure either. The guy thinks he'll have trouble if he raises the minimum wage.

Do you think it would be bad for you if your employer paid 1000 liras as the salary?

He may have to let some workers go. Let's just call a spade a spade. For instance, there are many rival couch factories. There are so many factories that some workers might have to be let go if they're in a crisis. That's why the state should pay it from the budget without going so heavy on the employer just like the incentives it gives to the employer (W4).

Nevertheless, as it can be seen above, workers' demand for economic justice on the state is not shaped by a relatively high degree of class-consciousness including a sense of common interest among all working people against capital. It is rather based on some initial feelings to the conditions that they consider as operating unfairly for them. In this respect, they are open to some reactionary considerations as much as to the radical demands on the development of class relations. For example, having reflected a relatively progressive approach to the state-economy relations, the above worker continued to criticise the state policies in a rather class-divisive manner:

The government shouldn't look out for the public officers; it should look out for the worker instead. And they did certain things better compared to the past. This hospital arrangement has been very good. We weren't able to go in the past; the doctors would huff at you. Now they greet you at the door. However, the payments are still far behind (W4).

These sorts of class-divisive considerations are much prevalent among workers. It seems that such considerations are deeply rooted in the ways in which workers experience social inequalities in different aspects of social relations ranging from the production to reproduction processes. To illustrate, even a worker having apparently with a higher level of class-consciousness among others, while portraying the conditions of industrial workers in Kayseri, needs to separate workers in private sector from public sector employees (including officers) by exemplifying that the latter receives a different treatment in their social and economic relations:

Because I work in the private sector, when I go to the bank they don't treat me like a human, but like a third class citizen. The classification of people is based on money. If you work for the state there's at least an open door for you. If you're in the private sector that door is closed too. You're entirely in the background. I'm in the lowest class. Public officers are one above us, and so on. The private sector employees are not held in esteem (W15).

It is indeed this perception among workers that seems to play important role in their strong support to the ruling government's certain policies like the neoliberal health reform. Although paving the way for the marketization of health services, the government's health reform is widely welcomed among workers on

the grounds that it provides them with a direct access to the state and university hospitals by abolishing a privileged treatment to the state officers. However, as the neoliberal content of health reform became more apparent within its subsequent stages, i.e., the raising of the share of medicine costs on patients, workers' perceptions based on formal equality are likely to change. This can be found in the words of a worker who previously supported such health reform in an expectation to receive equal treatment in health services.

I thought at least the hospital situation was made better and that we could go into any hospital we wanted. Now that's messed up too. The deductibles are too high now; they used to be lower (W16).

To sum up, although it is clear that workers in Kayseri have tended to support conservative, Islamist or nationalist political parties in elections, the essential motivation lying behind their political behaviour seems much to be their perceptions regarding with the inequalities in social relations they are involved rather than strong ideological commitments. To the extent that such perceptions are dominated by a depressing feeling of the differentiation of private sector workers particularly from the state officers, workers come closer to those political parties which promise to ameliorate such differentiation in certain ways. In this line, since its foundation the ruling conservative-Islamist party, AKP, has appealed to workers in Kayseri in as much as presenting it to ameliorate social inequalities in the eyes of them. However, there are quite remarkable signs showing that it has weakened in recent years, as the ruling government, while strictly keeping the official minimum wage low, has been generous to the employers in providing financial and bureaucratic supports. The apparent preference by the ruling government in favour of employers set in motion a sort of critical considerations in workers' mind even though they are ideologically close to AKP:

The government services are one thing but the minimum wage is too low. When Mustafa Elitaş came to the neighborhood before the last elections my dad went and asked: my son's been working for minimum wage for years. Why don't you increase it? Elitaş responded: We want to raise it but your son can at least find a job now. If we make such a law they'll make one person do the same job that two people do. Then your son will be out of work. Is it really like this? If that happens the boss will hire two people below me and make them work. That's it.

Are you saying that the government wants to increase the minimum wage, but cannot do it?

I mean, they are saying, we want to, but we wish there was such a climate. The government provided a lot of support to the bosses during this crisis period. They said, you pay the 15 days worth of the wages, and I'll pay the remaining 15 days, just so that you don't fire workers. They supported those who opened new factories. All the bosses took advantage of this. Many of them didn't need it. They counted construction as investment. Isn't it a waste of this state's money? They spent the people's money. May Allah humble the employers from Kayseri, they always abuse. Employers are powerful; they say they'll fire people. The government always helps out the employers in this situation, but we suffer (W43).

5.6. Conclusion: The Making of Working Class in Kayseri?

As re-emphasized in the introduction of this chapter, the relation between capital and labour which basically involves some direct relations within a certain place of labour market, labour process and social reproduction has proceeded in particular ways taking different social and spatial forms that can be conceptualised as a set of locally effective structures. The basic motive of the development of capital-labour relation is the contradictory relation embedded in capitalist production between abstract market pressures of value production and concrete socialisation forms of such locally effective structures. In this process, while capitalist employers seek to manage this contradiction in a way as to continue surplus production, labourers inevitably attempt to develop certain demands and resistance as a way of surviving their social existence. Furthermore, as capitalist labour process becomes sophisticated along with the development of industrial accumulation and mechanisation that requires increasing use of qualified labour, the relation of capital and labour tend to involve more socialisation forms at wider scales beyond workplace level. This then leads to the development of its contradictory nature towards (urban) social reproduction processes. It is at this moment that the management of capital-labour relation is no longer confined to the controlling of workplace-level relations; rather, it goes as far as to involve organising the relations among local labour market formation, social reproduction process and urban-daily life in compatible with value production. Nevertheless, because the contradictory dynamics of class relations operating at various scales continuously undermine in various ways any kind of

so-called compatible organisations of the wider processes of social relations of production and reproduction, there always appears a need for some complements to the capital-labour relation. These complements may or may not produce a sustainable labour regime in which contradictions of capital-labour relation can be managed in favour of surplus value production.

Considered in the light of this theoretical approach, it is seen that local industry in Kayseri has become more dynamic and contradictory characteristics in terms of the development of class relations especially since 2001 national economic crisis. Local industrial development, which has been particularly fed with a pool of cheap labour force coming out of the process of rural migration from the regional hinterland of the city of Kayseri since the beginning of the 1990s, is mainly based on the furniture, metal and textile production. In this period of spectacular industrial growth, there appeared both a number of big-sized industrial workplaces having with factory-type production methods and numerous small- and medium-sized enterprises aggregating around the former particularly in the furniture sector thanks to its distinct aspects of labour process. As workplace-level relations became dominated by capitalist value production along with the development of big-sized factories, the capital-labour relation formed as a kind of paternalism with the religious-communitarian utopia began to be shelled from the cooperative practices at workplace level. Rather, workplace-level relations have been shaped more with the intensified disciplinary practices that impose class distinctions over workers in various senses. However, the disruptive consequences of this shift in workplace-level relations were also compensated for by a particular collaboration between employers and Islamist municipal power for charity activities in the urban reproduction level. The poor conditions of labourers could then be ameliorated to a certain extent. Thus, the cooperative nature of religious-communitarian utopia was largely displaced from workplaces although its symbolic parts had to keep remaining. Nevertheless, this period also witnessed a series of independent collective attempts by workers to develop resistance and demands in response to increasing work pressure, low wages and lay-offs. These attempts could succeed in taking certain forms like strike, direct action and

unionisation initiative at some big-sized workplaces of metal, textile and furniture production. In response, local employers rapidly developed a number of so-called yellow unions, and thus controlled labour movement to a large extent.

Following the 2001 national economic crisis, which indeed imposed a sharp value therapy on Turkish economy; however, local industrial production in Kayseri has entered into a new period of spectacular growth in association with the comprehensive technological investments and increased capacities in each workplace. During this period, the number of big-seized workplaces has dramatically increased particularly in the furniture and metal production. They have been integrated into wider market relations in terms of both raw material supply and final product sales albeit mostly through the ways of subcontracting to international firms. On the other hand, it is also during this period that a plenty of small- and medium-sized firms in furniture production have directed their relatively separate production activities towards sub-contracting relations with big-seized industrial firms. Thus, local industry involved a sort of value chain down to the small and medium sized workplaces.

The impacts of these considerable changes in the pattern of local industry on class relations have been profound. Firstly, it should be noted that the flows of labour migration from rural geographies have increased to the extent that local labour market become inflated with unqualified workforce. This actually led to contradictory results as to the development of capital-labour relation in local industry. On the one hand, such flows have provided local industry with a vast amount of cheap labour to be used as a comparative advantage in market competition. On the other hand, they become incompatible with the changes in production lines as local industrial firms necessarily invest more in technological aspects of labour process. This contradictory development has affected the industrial firms that are particularly in metal sector and partly in furniture sector where labour processes are associated more with technological investments, i.e., mechanisation than others. As a result of this contradiction, local industrial development has produced a segmented labour market formation that can be then

reflected even in the same workplaces as a set of differentiation among workers like the unionised-nonunionised, the registered-unregistered or the employee-subcontractor worker.

Secondly, as local industrial firms become incorporated via subcontracting into international contexts of market exchange relations where certain degree of formal relations is required to involve due to some social and technical reasons, there have been particular improvements in working conditions within local industry, i.e., the prevalence of registered employment at least in big seized workplaces. However, this process has also proceeded with the accelerated rhythms of work, intensified work discipline and increasing overtime work in order to produce more surplus value. In this context, the abstract nature of value production have dominated over concrete socialisation forms of workplace-level relations to such a degree that breaking work by workers for pray, which actually gained untouchable practice within workplace-level relations on behalf of workers thanks to the religious-communitarian utopia once strongly imposed by employers on them, came to be no longer tolerated on the account that it would cause interruption in work rhythm. To put it differently, dynamics of capitalist value production have led to the displacement of such religious-communitarian utopia including even its symbolic parts from workplace-level relations. This situation has created unsettling impacts on the workers' perceptions in such ways that disintegrate existing paternalist impositions on them. Furthermore, as small- and medium-sized workplaces are incorporated into the dynamics of value production at wider scales via subcontracting to big-seized workplaces in local industry, such disintegration also extends to the workers employed in the former.

Thirdly, the spectacular industrial accumulation process in Kayseri has taken place together with considerable changes in the social reproduction processes and urban space. In the period of post-2001 economic crisis, Kayseri has grown rapidly, leaving behind the socio-spatial characteristics of a medium city. In this context, urban space and social life in Kayseri considerably lost some locally distinct aspects making class tensions ameliorate in economic and spatial

ways. With the demise of public interventions in land and housing policy in favour of low-income people, the urban survival conditions for labourers got worse. Housing prices increased and low-income housing became possible mostly on bank loans, causing to the appropriation of the large proportion in the wages. However, this urban development has raised a collective demand among workers for wage increase in a way that brings a serious threat to local class relations based on the strict imposition by employers of official minimum wage within local industry. Interestingly enough, it is not the local state but central state via the Mass Housing Administration (MHA) that has been much involved into low-income housing so as to ameliorate urban survival conditions for labourers. Yet, to the extent that such intervention is entirely based on the using of urban rents in association with private investments in housing, the result has not been to improve the urban survival conditions for labourers in both quantitative and qualitative senses; rather, it has paved the way for the development of urban space in Kayseri in ways that make class differentiations more apparent.

Another important change in the social reproduction process is the setting up of a distinctly formed state institution, the Middle Anatolia Development Agency (MADA), which is entitled to constitute long-term development plan for local industry and to coordinate industrial firms in this line. Even though having power not enough to carry out its policy decisions in full sense, the MADA has made important state interventions in local labour market and industrial relations. The general political-economic motive behind the setting up of the MADA reveals the two interlinked facts with regard to the development of local industry. The first is that local industrial development based on the use of cheap workforce by individual entrepreneurships arrived at its limits to a significant degree. The second is that there has been emerging need within local industry for coordinating the development of workplace-level relations with the wider processes of social division of labour embodying local labour market formation and urban social reproduction.

Nevertheless, the MADA has been in practice inadequate to develop such coordination not just because of having still less competence as to the implementation of its policy suggestions but also due to its forms of state intervention based on governance model hesitating to offend the private rule of capitalist relations. Thus, the MADA develops rather as a formal political-institutional space where certain financial incentives are distributed to the employers according to its decisions. However, the MADA's decisions also provokes growing number of industrial employers to consider unfairness in the distribution of financial incentives, undermining its project as providing formally operating impartial coordination mechanism among industrial firms. Furthermore, as state interventions are incorporated into local industrial relations in more direct and apparent ways, i.e., financial incentives and bureaucratic supports, they give rise to the development of politicisation not only among local employers but also on the part of employees. The apparent difference in state policies between the generous industrial incentives and strict minimum wage policy leads the workers to feel much the exclusionary class nature of state-society relations to such a degree that a common economic demand that is wage increase prevails them entirely albeit that it is yet to be directed strongly against employer but rather to the state.

To sum up, it is safe to argue that the accelerated dynamics of industrial accumulation in the wake of 2001 national economic crisis, while undermining to a significant degree existing labour control regime of religious-paternalism, has given rise to the development of a set of class tensions within both production and reproduction levels. Although these accumulation dynamics require local industry to have long-term plan in investment decisions as well as relatively more qualified workforce in accordance with the increasing mechanisation of labour process, individual employers fail to organise such a kind of restructuring within local industry, and thus state, both at the central level and newly defined regional level, has to involve more directly into local industrial relations so as to direct industrial firms towards more productive lines. It is within this context that central state's growing industrial incentives, its increasing investments in education, vocational

education in particular, and the MADA's initiatives to constitute a formal network among industrial firms appear as the significant interventions within local industry.

Nevertheless, to the extent that industrial class relations are shaped with non-market interventions, the potentials of socialisation that are inherently involved into the latter produce various contradictions with the individual and private nature of capitalist relations. Not only at the basis of these contradictions but also at the most fragile point of them lies the capital-labour relation. In this context, industrial labourers in Kayseri have experienced a particular transformation in the workplace-level relations in which the religious paternalist labour regime disappeared into a set of disciplinary labour control practices. Moreover, it has been more difficult for industrial labourers to reproduce themselves within the changing context of urban social and spatial development in Kayseri. As a result, being a worker in Kayseri has widely meant working within the intensified disciplinary factory regimes in exchange for what is determined as official minimum wage and then developing survival struggles in the harshening conditions of urban reproduction process. An important outcome of this process has been the development of class ties among local individual workers in Kayseri.

However, it should be noted that this development apparently varies among workers on the basis of the differentiation of labour processes across industrial sectors and the workplace sizes. To illustrate, the local metal sector is considerably differentiated from the furniture sector in a number of ways such as its spatial organisation of production in a single workplace, the need for relatively qualified workforce at least for some parts of production and its heavy working conditions that indeed cause to crucial distinction in workplace-level relations. Moreover, as the size of workplace grows, local furniture sector is equipped with more technological means of production and thus demands relatively more qualified workforce in accordance with them while at the same time achieving extra ordinary increases in work rhythms accompanied with a high degree of

disciplinary factory regime. In addition, since the textile-yarn sector is extremely based on the operation of machines, its workforce becomes considerably confined to a sort of unqualified labour simply assigned to observe it. When the labour process is extended to weaving; however, this situation changes towards employing more qualified labourers.

All of these differentiations in labour processes within local industry bring different impacts to the development of such class ties among local industrial workers. However, workers have also been involved in common experiences as local industry is largely determined by a high degree of disciplinary impositions, unhealthy working conditions and the prevalence of official minimum wage. Furthermore, urban social reproduction process has increasingly pushed the workers to live within similar survival conditions. Thus, in a similar manner that Marxist labour historian E.P. Thompson mentioned 19th century English working classes as achieving a feeling of unity based on similar class experiences despite the huge variations in labour processes, there seems to be emerging a sense of commonality among local industrial labourers in Kayseri with regard to their survival conditions. At the unprecedented moments of workplace-level relations, particularly when a workplace accident or an exclusionary class practice take place together with the perception of injustice, these class feelings among labourers can rapidly transform itself into direct collective reactions against employers in a way surpassing all labour control mechanisms. Workers' reactions have taken different forms ranging from calling factory managers to negotiate and introducing certain demands to the employers to the slowdown strikes and even walkouts. In response, local employers develop a set of disciplinary measures starting from firing so-called the leading workers in order to control their reactions. Local employers have been so far successful in controlling workers' reactions at workplace although conversely leading to the increasing of class tensions at various levels. In this process, it is possible to say that industrial accumulation in Kayseri has proceeded within a particular form of the capital-labour relation in which the old (religious-paternalism) is dying and the new is yet to be born.

However, as workers' reactions go beyond existing labour control strategies particularly to the level that an independent unionisation can be achieved within local industry, capital-labour relation in Kayseri would take on a new form relatively in favour of the latter. Drawing on their relatively strong socialisation potentials within labour process, it can be argued that local metal sector workers are the major candidate to lead such a change in local class relations. As a matter of fact, a group of workers employed in a big-seized metal factory have recently attempted for the first time to unionise in a DİSK-affiliated labour union, Metal-İş Union, after the coup of 12 September of 1980. In the next chapter, this case will be touched upon as a reflection of the various forms of class tensions that have been taking place in certain hierarchies at different scales of economic and political relations.

CHAPTER 6

LOCAL CLASS RELATIONS AT WORK: AN ANALYSIS OF A UNIONISATION MOVEMENT WITHIN A METAL FACTORY

6.1. Introduction

The development of local class relations (and labour regime) investigated in the previous sections has eventually taken place within some direct and concrete confrontation between the employer (management) and employees at the workplace level. At this level, while the former tends to increase his/her control on labour process and labourers in order to achieve more surplus production, the latter come to have no option other than resisting to the employer's increasing impositions in individual or collective ways so as to protect their (social) reproduction. There are then complex interplays of control and resistance between employer and employees within labour process, paving the way for changes in employer-employee relationship in certain ways. In this respect, although being embedded in economic and political processes operating at wider scales, local class relations (and labour regime in particular) primarily develop in and through the specific aspects of workplace level relations between employer and employees. Thus, an investigation on the development of class relations should also involve analyzing this development as the interplays of control and resistance between employer and employees within a particular workplace. Moreover, this scalar approach is in line with what Ollman (2003: chapter 5) mentions Marxist abstraction as operating like a microscope that can be set at different degrees of magnification in order to capture distinct relations of the same object with multiple social realities (see Chapter 2).

In this framework, this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of a unionization movement that came out in a big-sized metal factory during my field study in Kayseri. It was previously underlined that local industrial development has witnessed various forms of workers' resistance ranging from the individual

responses like quitting job against increasing work discipline to some collective attempts such as slowdown and short-time stoppage in response to the deteriorations in wage payments or working conditions. However, they generally appear as defensive initiatives in the face of a certain problem at the workplace, develop on the basis of limited demands and then disappear in a short time when these demands are partially solved in ways without leading to considerable changes in workplace-level relations. In contrast, unionization represents an offensive movement on the part of employees within workplace level relations fundamentally because it aims to give the employee collective organisation based on the socialized nature of production process, thereby taking them into a relatively better form wherein to bargain with the employer. This offensive nature of unionization movement within workplace level relations in favour of workers becomes more important in the below case where the labour union in question, Birleşik Metal-İş Union in affiliation with DİSK, is distinctively known to represent combative and independent unionism among others in local industry. Given the fact that existing labour unions in local industry have predominantly served to control labourers in favour of employers, workers' attempt to join in such DİSK-affiliated union further means a considerable challenge not just to the workplace-level relations at a metal factory but also against existing class relations in local industry in a wider sense.

In recent years, there has been increasing interest among critical social scientists in collective labour movements within certain local contexts, with a remarkable literature consisting of ethnographic investigations (Fantasia, 1989; Hodson, 2001; Nichols and Suğur, 2005; Birelma, 2014). These ethnographic investigations generally claim that conventional studies searching for class-consciousness and class culture among working class people are inadequate in the sense that they produce general and static explanations imprinted with methodological individualism. Rather, it is argued that the analysis should focus on the collective movement itself in order to explain the dynamic, unstable and contingent aspects of working class culture. In doing so, such ethnographic analyses have developed new conceptualisations for examining labour movements

such as “solidarity cultures”, “dignity at work” and “collective mobilization process”.

I here draw on these ethnographic analyses in investigating the unionization movement above mentioned. However, I also argue that labour unionization for changing the employer-employee relationship involves wider economic and political processes that cannot be confined to the ethnographic analysis of the collective mobilization moment. In other words, unionisation process within a particular workplace, while developing through building certain degree of collective interest among workers, is embedded in a set of class tensions operating at wider scales; it is actually workers’ collective mobilization that appears to develop in and against these tensions. Therefore, to use the conceptualization raised in the previous chapters, labour unionisation refers to direct class confrontations between employer and employees within the dialectics of socialisation dynamics and value production in and through a particular labour process. In this sense, it reflects local class relations at work in its historical, structural and actual aspects at a particular workplace.

6.2. The Context of Unionisation: Labour Process, Forms of Socialisation, and Class Relations

The unionisation movement in question has recently taken place in a big-sized metal company producing office furniture. The company, which was established in 1998 in Kayseri OİD, is here named as Çer-Sa. It is a family-run company although it has also a foreign shareholder with the 20 per cent shares since its inception. It is probably through this shareholder that the company has been fully engaged in export production both with its own trademark products and within subcontracting relations. The company did not meet a loss in the context of the 2001 economic crisis; on the contrary, it reaped more profits thanks to the huge increases in the prices of foreign currencies at that time. In the post-2001 period, the company has thus experienced an extraordinary growth: its production equipment was both technologically improved and numerically increased, and the production space was enlarged. This growth has also been associated with the

increasing numbers of employees during this period. While there were around 300 employees working in the company before the 2001 economic crisis, the following years have witnessed a considerable boom in the employment: the number of employees was 361 in 2002, 564 in 2003, 677 in 2004, 836 in 2005, 913 in 2006, 994 in 2007, 1075 in 2008. After that; however, it has decreased remarkably to 935 in 2009, 829 in 2010 and 769 in 2011. It is possible to consider that such a remarkable decrease in employment is mainly due to the 2008 economic crisis that led to a considerable contraction in consumer markets in the western countries. Despite the adverse impacts of the 2008 economic crisis, the company has remained one of the leading big-sized metal factories in Kayseri OİD.

The increasing need for labour recruitment in the company's rapid growth period was satisfied primarily with the labourers from a certain ethnic community (Circassian) that constitutes a remarkable part of the population in Kayseri. The owner of the company comes from the same community as well. Thus, it is possible to think that this employment relation was based on, and sustained, some paternalist expectations between the employer and the employees. For the employer, the Circassian employees were meant to have maximum degree of loyalty to him on the grounds that they both have been involved largely in the same social ties. For the Circassian labourers, working at a Circassian-owned factory was assumed to provide them with minimum protections against the social and economic threats under which they lived. In this line, to the extent that these expectations were mutually satisfied in social, economic and symbolic ways, the inherent class tensions within the employer-employee relationship could be subsumed into a discursive utopia imprinted with ethnic as well as religious communitarian aspects.

However, as labour process has developed and grown enormously towards producing more surplus value, labourers have also been involved into different socialisations other than ethnic and religious ties within workplace level relations. Çer-Sa came to be in a short time a social space in which more than 300

employees work together in three shifts along with the technical division of labour process. They have been divided into the cutting, pressing, bending, punching, welding, painting and fitting stages in production process. While the first two stages are heavily depended on the cutting and pressing machines that require certain degree of qualification from the labourers, the subsequent ones fit with the relatively less qualified labourers. However, workers in the stages of bending and punching have to work in much more cooperative ways than the ones in those of welding, painting and fitting. Despite these variations, all stages in labour process include high degree of difficulty, risk and physical effort that give rise to relatively stronger feelings of solidarity among workers in metal sector in comparison with the ones employed in other sectors of local industry.

Now, working in the metal sector is not like working in furniture or textiles. It's high-risk; we do heavy work after all. You have to be careful in the cutting workshop, at the press. There are machines that press so many tons. If you don't know the job, if you're not careful; there goes your hand. Bending and tack welding are also difficult. Sheets go through cutting and pressing and come to tack welding. Here, two or three workers work together, standing on their feet for hours. Many folks get herniated discs after a while. After tack welding, it's time for welding, and the welding job is also difficult. Your eyes are ruined. After welding, metal cabinets are puttied and carried to the painting workshop. You have to work in heavy paint fumes. Lastly, they're assembled and it's time for loading. It's less risky work, but you carry heavy cabinets all the time (Çer-Sa W1).

Within these distinct aspects of labour process, workers begun to experience a different form of socialisation among themselves that appeared in conflict with the employer. As a result of this socialisation based on class relations within labour process, workers could bring up occasionally against their employers. The two different events that took place in the early years of the rapid growth period hint at the development of class tensions as well as socialisation dynamics among workers within workplace level relations.

I'll give you an example. Again, it's our tack-welding department. When I was on the night shift, our pay was late for 2 days. Our department got together and said, let's go to the boss and talk to him. They got together and went to see the boss. Of course the boss was angry, he said, "Why are you coming to me, are you raiding the place, will you beat me up?" But he saw that the salaries were paid that day, too. But the next day he fired three or four people that went there. He cut five minutes off the thirty-minute breaks (Çer-Sa W1).

2004 was the best time for Çer-Sa; it wasn't as bad as this. Salaries were better, though of course working conditions were always heavy. Some people tried to unionize. They were trying to do it by themselves. Nobody really had faith either. It wasn't something that could happen with the efforts of a few people, so I didn't join in (Çer-Sa W1).

Both two events reveal that the rapid growth of company has been accompanied by the development of class conflicts within the employer-employee relationship. However, it is also clear that workers had a poor degree of independent class attitudes and mobilization. It seems that at that time workplace level relations were strongly shaped by the paternalist rule of the employer though it was apparently being undermined. This situation can be readily understood in the first event. It shows that although workers had a particular degree of mobilisation based on the collective interest among them, its ultimate point was limited to the direct transmitting of their complaints to the employer in an expectation to be solved at his discretion. In the end, as a matter of the fact, the employer moved towards solving the workers' complaint on wage payment. Nevertheless, the employer's protection came along with his authoritarian rule that ended up giving sack some of those workers who dared to challenge his authority by bringing up against him.

However, following years witnessed this paternalist class relation came to be eroded as its essential aspects such as direct contacts between employer and employees, certain degree of protection by the former over the latter and inclusive workplace relations in general disappeared into disciplinary class relation. In the conversations, workers that have long worked in Çer-Sa told me that foremen and journeymen had exposed them to the increasing disciplinary impositions as the workplace had grown rapidly throughout the 2000s. Moreover, they underlined that they had no longer seen the employer coming down to the workplace and talking with them about their conditions.

In addition, despite the apparent growth of the company, workers also faced with the worsening of their economic conditions to the effect that they could not live on their current wages. In this respect, many workers have also sought an additional job for the remaining time after working 8 hours in Çer-Sa as long as

there is no option for overtime work. Yet, these irregular additional jobs are not only physically exhaustive but also economically inadequate for the workers. Under these conditions, workers have generally tried to manage their survival through borrowing bank loans.

We got along well with the foremen. I mean we were like brothers back then. We'd talk when we ran into trouble. We talked directly even with the boss. He walked around the workplace, and asked us about how we were doing. But then the workplace environment got gradually worse. We worked hard back then too, but we didn't push ourselves like this. How should I put it, we would work, frankly with enthusiasm, with a few foremen working us up, a bit of working each other up. Then, in time, the situation turned into pushing. The foremen told us continuously: you'll do this much work today, increasing the numbers. They didn't leave us any time to breathe (Çer-Sa W2).

Most of my work-fellows have taken out loans for a house or for needs. We get by with credit cards. The other day I talked to the payroll manager; he says there are 27 workers in foreclosure because of bank loans. Now I have bought a house too. What can I do? I bought a house for 62 billion. It's not possible in the vicinity of course. It's in Esenyurt, far away, after you pass the Eastern Terminal. Only there is it affordable. My father took out the loan; maybe they won't give it to us. I thought, if I get a 50 TL increase every year, my salary will be 1000 liras in 5 years. But my salary is 850 liras now. I pay 400 of the debt; my father pays 600. I take my salary, and give it to the bank (Çer-Sa W3)

These developments have also taken place along with the prevalence of formal relations in the employer-employee relationship. For example, unregistered employment has been no longer allowed at all and the wages started to be rendered through each worker's bank account. In this line, the employer-employee relationship came to be fully revolved on the market exchange relations between wage and labour power to the extent that much of non-market paternalist protections became displaced from workplace level relations. However, some of them that have also achieved symbolic importance over the years within local class relations did not cease to exist. They are mainly consisted of the religiously formed protections such as delivering food boxes in Ramadan month, paying premium before religious festivals and tolerating pray at the working time. However, they have been restricted to a remarkable extent. In the conversations, many Çer-Sa workers underlined that Ramadan food boxes became poorer in the recent years in terms of both the quality and the quantity of foods. A remarkable number of workers added that when they received these Ramadan boxes each year,

they felt humiliated by the employer rather than supported by his goodness as a Muslim employer. In addition, it was also underlined that the management has been no longer so indulgent to the demand for praying at work in case it would hinder production process and work discipline. However, it seems that religious practices at work cannot be banned totally and or explicitly as they have so far achieved considerable degree of legitimacy within the development of workplace level relations. In this context, workers can even use this legitimacy against the management, which then give rise to a set of implicit class conflicts around the religious practices at the workplace level.

If someone stops me from praying five times a day, I'd quit that day. I haven't witnessed this myself, but another friend told me. While changing before prayer, I heard the foremen say, "you are idling around, I'll have it cut from your salaries" (Çer-Sa W4).

I don't pray five times; but when there are friends who want to pray, we cover up. The foreman says, go and come back quickly. He says, don't ruin your ablution every time; it'll take too much time. I can't say those who pray don't take it slowly and deliberately either. We joke amongst ourselves; we tell those who pray that they got a good rest (Çer-Sa W1).

However, when it comes to Friday prayer, such implicit conflicts between the management and workers totally disappear into a common religious practice at a high rate of participation. This is mainly due to the fact that Friday prayer is seen as a religious duty required of all Muslims. Nevertheless, even in the case of Friday prayer, it seems that there are some class distinctions at work. Until the recent years, the management provided workers with free shuttle buses in order to enable them to perform Friday prayer at the center mosque of Kayseri OSB where nearly 8,000 people from different factories come together at that time. As it had taken more time to get workers back to workplace, the management built a small mosque inside the workplace area and cancelled free shuttle buses on Friday to the Center Mosque. In the eyes of workers, the building of a small mosque represents the employer's aim to save time for production rather than a favour granted to them for facilitating performing prayer. Furthermore, the employer has cancelled a breaking time on Friday afternoon as the Friday prayer last nearly 15 minutes longer than the duration of lunchtime breaks. For workers, the employer's

concern about 15 minutes work time after the Friday prayer reflects his desire to profit more money which indeed casts a suspicion on his religious practice.

We used to go to Friday prayer together up until two years ago. They took us in service vehicles. Then they built a prayer room in the factory. They built it because it was taking time. Now they have a 20-minute gain. They made a retired preacher the imam, that's how we do the Friday prayer. On top of it all now they cancelled the Friday afternoon breaks, since there was a 15-minute delay after lunch and prayer. They calculate even that. Then they tell us they're religious (Çer-Sa W1).

In the development of such a divisive workplace level relations along class lines, being Circassian seems to have lost its privilege among workers except for those who are well known as informers to the management. Although workers complained much about injustice within workplace level relations, they did not show an apparent tendency to link it with being Circassian or not. For example, when asked if being Circassian provided any advantageous in workplace level relations, a worker, who might be expected to put some blame on it as he is not of Circassian descent, replied as follows:

The boss has relatives who he trusts and who obey him, down to the foreman. The foreman also sees it like that, he seeks men who'll do whatever he says. He favors them. The boss gives the foreman two billion, and tells him to distribute it to the workers as bonuses. Then and there, you're at the mercy of the foreman. There is extreme favoritism when he distributes it. You ask the foreman why he is distributing it like that. He says, that's how I evaluated your work. There are many Circassian workers here, many of the leadmen and foremen are the boss's fellow villagers. But there are also many wronged Circassian workers, even from the same village as the boss (Çer-Sa W5).

To sum up, workplace level relations in Çer-Sa have been apparently shaped much more according to class lines rather than to ethnic or religious communitarian aspects in the recent years. Furthermore, the management has developed considerable restrictions on such communitarian practices within workplace level relations. Thus, class relations in Çer-Sa metal factory have been largely stripped away from the employer's paternalist protections based on these communitarian practices. Rather, there have been increasing disciplinary impositions at the hands of journeymen and foremen over the workers. This has then given rise to certain degree of common feelings and perceptions among workers based on their individual experiences of these impositions within the

technical division of labour process. As workers have had similar survival conditions outside the workplace such as having a physically exhaustive additional job or financially being in debt, their common feelings and perceptions begun to transform into the quest for collective attempts independent from the employer.

In this process, the breaking point between employer and employees came out in 2008 when Çer-Sa and other local factories were hit by the world economic crisis erupted in the western countries. Since then there has been steady decrease in the employment of the company, laying off more than 100 workers in each successive year. In this process, the employer also decided to use the central state's "short-term work grant" aimed to support industrial companies decreasing their production as a result of the contractions in world market. In line with the conditions of this grant, both the production capacity in Çer-Sa temporarily reduced to its fifty percent and workers worked only for four days in exchange for the half of their wages. The remaining part of the wages was supplied by the state during a two-month period. It has been during this period, in which nearly 15 percent of the registered workforce in local industry was also laid-off, that Çer-Sa workers experienced a further step in the feeling of fundamentally different living conditions from the employer. As a matter of fact, while talking about the reasons why they attempted to join unionisation, workers specifically pointed to this period:

The 2008 crisis was a trigger for the decision to unionize. We saw this in that period. The factory got bigger, and another factory was opened in Russia. The boss's kids got new cars. But they didn't even give us a raise on the minimum wage. They said there was a crisis. There were layoffs (Çer-Sa W1).

The Prime Minister said the crisis passed at tangent, but we were made to work 4 days a week in the last period of 2008. We were put on an unpaid 3-day off. We weren't even certain whether we were going to return to work. It was a very stressful period, workers were laid off in every factory in the Industry, the salaries weren't paid. But the boss's situation is not like ours; we saw that plainly. While he was telling us "I can't give you a raise", he opened a new factory in Russia. I believed more in unionization after that period. The more you give into injustice, the more the boss walks over you. We also should have something to defend ourselves, at least for the future of our children (Çer-Sa W6).

As a result, when they came back to the full time working, workers began to talk about the need for a labour union that can really raise their demands collectively against the employer. Moreover, the number of the workers seeking to involve unionisation was pretty high in comparison with the previous attempts.

6.3. The Development of Unionisation Movement: Workers' Organisation, Collective Action and Resistance

Unionisation movement in Çer-Sa was decidedly initiated by a group of worker in 2010 after months of conversations with a local activist and union campaigner who has a great sympathy among many industrial workers thanks to his long-year activities in local politics at the grassroots level. The previous attempts for unionisation in Çer-Sa had a highly weak organisation among workers and thereby turned into a fiasco in a short time. According to the workers, those workers leading the unionisation attempt at that time were directly informed by the labour union itself to the employer and they were subsequently fired. The consequence was then huge loss of morale and trust among workers that made it easier for the employer to develop disciplinary impositions within workplace level relations in the following years. This experience has sustained a particular belief among workers that they cannot get unionized unless they target at a combative labour union to defend their rights against the employer. In this respect, when workers decided to initiate a new attempt for unionisation, it is only the Birleşik-Metal İş Union in affiliation with DİSK (Confederation of Revolutionary Labour Unions) that appeared to fit with their expectations.

However, the choice of a DİSK-affiliated labour union also included some extra difficulties for the workers in unionisation. First, since the military coup of 1980, which initially banned DİSK, there has been no DİSK-affiliated labour union organised in local industry even after the re-opening of DİSK in 1992. In contrast, unionisation attempts by workers in local industry throughout the 2000s have been pervaded by those labour unions affiliated with Islamic-minded Hak-İş Confederation in collaboration with local employers. Therefore, Çer-Sa workers' decision to join the Birleşik-Metal İş Union meant to an attempt for introducing

not just a new labour union but also a challenge from below to the local industrial relations. In this sense, it also involved wider issues than a simple unionisation attempt in a workplace, thereby giving alarm to the whole employers in local industry. Second, the decision to join in the DİSK-affiliated labour union had a particular difficulty in the mobilisation of workers as they might raise some ideological reservations on the basis of its popular image as a leftist organisation. Furthermore, the management would manipulate such reservations among workers against unionisation. Despite these extra difficulties, increasing class tensions within workplace level relations and the previous experiences of unionisation made it easier to convince the workers in participating into the attempt for unionizing in the DİSK-affiliated union.

We have our Cevher abi here. He asked, “we're going to the union with friends, will you come?” I already thought that having a union to defend us was a must. But when he said DISK, the first thing I said I won't go to DISK. When we hear revolutionary, we think these people are monsters. Anyways, I said we should go to Türk Metal. They'd had an experience with Türk Metal one time. Türk Metal tricked the guys and so there were layoffs. So they said they wouldn't go there. I said let's go to Hak-İş. They had tried them too. They were sold out there too. Nothing to do then, I said, let's go. That's how I joined these friends (Çer-Sa W4).

Unionisation process in Çer-Sa was designed to develop through setting up narrow workers' committees in different stages of production that would grow towards incorporating other workers into the process over time. In this line, leading workers, in association with the union campaigner, mapped the labour process within its different stages showing the number of workers employed at each stage. The next step was to develop contacts with the reliable workers of each stages of labour process in anticipation that they would convince other workers in participating into the unionisation process. It took nearly two years to organize the majority of Çer-Sa workers for joining the Birleşik Metal İş Union, mainly because it required to have gradual steps in ways as to develop reliable relations among workers so that the management would not attack unionisation movement in advance, for example, by giving the sack of leading workers or threatening workers with lay-offs and unemployment. Workers' committees for unionisation developed faster in the stages of cutting, pressing and punching

where relatively qualified labour is employed or labour process is depended much on collective practices. As they have grown on reliable relations, it became easier to receive the support of other workers in other stages of labour process. In this process, conversations among workers for joining the union were carried out not just as chats in workplace area at breaking times but also through several teahouse meetings in the city center or many home visits to the workers in their living areas. When it was considered that the majority of the workers employed in Çer-Sa, which is the minimum legal requirement for the labour union to raise an official claim to have an authority for signing collective agreements with the employer, became convinced in joining the Birleşik Metal İş Union, a further step in the unionisation process were taken to organise the individual applications for union membership at notary office. This was another critical moment in the unionisation process that needs organizing conveniently in a short time before the management had heard of it. At this point, it would be more telling to quote this moment from a worker involved in this organisation in order to reveal the actual difficulties of the unionisation process in Turkey:

Now registration began first on a Friday. Those who left work on Thursday night went and signed-in Friday morning. When all shifts left work, there were registrations. After that, when collective registrations were over, we started going to people's homes one by one. That is, we went to their homes, we talked to them and their families and we tried to convince them. We convinced them and brought them in. The boss learned about it within the first day. But we were quick and completed the signatures within two days. Then the signatures were over, and we made an application for authorization. When we started work on Monday, the relatives of the boss, the foremen, the leadmen, and his workers were killing us in the factory. They swore at some, they pressured some; they said "we'll fire you." Within that one-week about 100 people were taken to the notary and were made to resign. There were severe resignations from two or three departments. After the resignations our morale was down too, and people started coming to us. They'd say, "there are so many resignations, what will we do?" They'd say, "we'll resign too." After that we tried harder to organize. We mobilized our friends at the factory; we brought back 120 people out of the 150 that resigned. We took them to the notary and made them members. Of course you'll pay separate notary fees for each membership. You can't take it from the workers. They are already broke. The union has to pay (Çer-Sa W1).

Having completed workers' individual applications for union membership at notary office, the unionisation process has developed in a series of apparent conflicts between unionised workers and the employer/the management. The

latter's strategy was to force the former to resign from union membership by threatening them with his power not just at the workplace but also beyond it. In this line, while being exposed to increasing mobbing at work, these workers also faced with social pressures in their everyday life through the employer's deliberate attempt to provoke their ethnic and cultural ties against them. As for the social pressures, it was particularly Circassian workers who had to face up much to them since the employer presented himself to Circassian community as being stabbed in the back directly by his employees from the same ethnic community. In order to make the unionised workers give up union membership, a particular religious discourse that recommends keeping away from any rift and conflict within workplace level relations were also sent towards workers through the Friday prayers as well as via daily chats by journeymen at work. In addition to such impositions, the employer developed certain improvements in some issues about which workers have long complained such as the quality and the quantity of food services, in the anticipation of defusing increased tension at the workplace.

Such impositions and improvements resulted with certain degree of achievement on the employer's behalf, leading some workers to resign from union membership. However, they also helped workers consolidate themselves towards unionisation. For example, the unionised Circassian workers reacted to social pressures from their ethnic community relations by developing a counter argument that "why the employer did not recognized us as his fellows while he was forcing us to work under such worse working conditions with low wages". Furthermore, certain improvements by the management in working conditions after the emergence of unionisation attempt sustained a popular belief among workers that "if a word of unionisation have led the employer to do them, there would be definitely more improvements in working conditions when the unionisation process ends with the official authorization of making collective agreements with the employer".

I'm Circassian, and there is extra intense pressure on us. When you mention being Circassian, they say I imagine this is happening to you.. They say, "you went and

became members of leftists, of PKK.” But now I say, “when I couldn't bring home bread, did you think about my being Circassian?” (Çer-Sa W7)

They tried to use being Circassian to make us resign from the union. They said, “does this become a Circassian?” I said, “We've been Circassian for 9 years! Now it occurs to you that I'm Circassian (Çer-Sa W1)?

When there was talk of a union, the meals that we'd been complaining about were straightened. But we'd been complaining about the meals for years; telling the foremen and the manager that the meals were inadequate, that they were very bad. They weren't doing anything. Now they increased it to 4 meals and made meals with meat. Do you have to revolt to have what you want? Well, it turns out you do (Çer-Sa W3).

However, such consolidation towards unionisation also required the development of collective feelings, attitudes and resistance among workers against the employer's impositions. To this end, the leading workers and union campaigner organised a Sunday meeting with the participation of the chairman of Birleşik-Metal İş Union in the city center to which all workers with their families were invited. In this meeting, which I had a chance to attend as well, more than 200 unionised workers with their families came together to talk about their motivations for unionisation, contributing to the development of collective feelings among workers. It was the highest moment in the unionisation movement in terms of morale power. Yet, there was still a long way for workers to arrive at a point where their union membership would mean to the right to make a collective agreement with the employer.

Firstly, their union membership needed to be checked by the Ministry of Labour in terms of the legal criteria of workplace threshold that requires the majority of workers employed in the same sectoral branch of the company to have been a member of the Birleşik Metal İş Union so that the union would receive an official authorization to represent them against the employer. Although the ministry's decision on the application by labour unions for authorization takes a few months, employers can object to the authorization by increasing workplace threshold via so-called collusive (muvazaalı) employment, thereby leading to some protraction in the process. Thus, they would achieve more time to force workers to resign from union membership. In this case, the employer gave his

objection to the Ministry about the Birleşik Metal İş Union's application for receiving authorization to represent Çer-Sa workers. For workers, this has meant struggling with employer's increasing pressure on them for a longer duration. Worse still, secondly, it was surprisingly at these days that the JDP government decided to suspend all applications for authorization at the Ministry of Labour until a new Trade Union Law, aimed to make considerable changes in unionisation procedure, would be enacted. Thus, the application by Birleşik Metal-İş union for an official authorization to represent workers against the employer in Çer-Sa has been left to an uncertain future. In other words, a two-year organisation for unionisation among more than 400 Çer-Sa workers became suddenly suspended due to the government's political decision, throwing them to directly confront with the employer's attacks seeking to undermine their organisation.

In this uncertain context, the only way to proceed for the unionisation movement was to raise the workers' voices against the employer's attacks and thus to persuade him to make a collective agreement with the union. In this line, the coming May Day was seen as an important platform where Çer-Sa workers would make their unionisation movement revealed in wider scale in the anticipation of constituting public pressure on the employer. The May Day demonstration of 2012 in Kayseri, which I attended as well, hosted for the first time to a large group of local industrial workers organised in a DİSK-affiliated union since the military coup of 12th September 1980. In this respect, Çer-Sa workers gave rise to a historical event in local politics as well. Although being seen highly excited and determined on the unionisation process, they also reflected some anxiety about the prospective development unless the union has received official authorization to represent them against the employer. The main concern among workers was to face with being fired. However, they added that it was difficult for the employer to fire a lot of workers at a time when the company had just received new orders from international companies. In other words, workers were aware of the dependency of employer on them at that time and this situation has made them brave and partially aggressive in the unionisation process.

Thus, the leading workers decided to take a further step in creating pressure on the employer.

May Day was quite good...For the first time we showed ourselves as the Industry workers. Everybody was excited. After May Day we went aside to make an action plan. We all met up to talk about what we should do. They said, "this time let's have a march at the Industry!" We said, "OK let's do it. Let's do it right away on May 2nd after work. Nobody knows, after work we'll walk to the service vehicles and then we won't get on them and we'll march!" We agreed. When we started work, we got people together. We talked with them and we organized the others. It was around 3 o'clock at the end of the workday. They called the police, saying we'd occupy the factory. Supposedly we were going to set the factory on fire. We gathered, we didn't get on the service vehicles, and we started off at the factory. We walked in the Industry, passed along the mosque and marched to the exit. We were about 200 people from our factory, On the way, other workers supported us by clapping and whistling. This boosted our morale. With that, we marched to Belsin Kürsü, about 5 km. The next day when I got to work, I was sure they'd lay me off. It was two o'clock, and someone said, "They're calling you downstairs." I went and they said, "you'll sign this for your layoff." I refused to sign. I'll claim all of my rights. He said, "As you say." That day six of us were laid off (Çer-Sa W1).

With the sack of leading workers, unionisation movement in Çer-Sa shifted to a new line. The fired six workers decided to set up resistance tent outside the workplace in order to both get back their job and prevent a possible demoralization among workers. The resistance tent remained outside the workplace for three weeks during which workers received solidarity visits from the local branch of the leftist public sector union confederation called KESK and some leftist local NGOs and political organisations. Even though attracting only a limited degree of attention in local politics, the resistance outside the factory became an unsettling event that has not been seen before in Kayseri OID. Thus, it also discomfited other employers in local industry to such a degree that they developed certain attempts so as to prevent any connection among workers in Kayseri OID. One of these attempts was changing the route of the service buses that had used the road in front of the Çer-Sa factory. They began using a different route that bypasses Çer-Sa workers' meeting point where the resistance tent was located. More importantly, according to the leading workers in unionisation process, there was a full agreement at all cost among local industrial employers about blocking the introduction of the DİSK-affiliated union into Kayseri OID. As

a sign of such alliance, the employer offered sympathetically workers to join the Hak-İş affiliated union instead of Birleşik Metal İş Union.

However, this did not mean that the employer gave up authoritarian impositions on workers after the giving sack of leading workers. In contrast, he continued to lay off unionised workers in order to deter other workers from joining the Birleşik Metal İş Union. Thus, 30 to 35 unionised workers were laid off with their severance pay in a month following the May Day demonstration. Yet, there were few workers among them who sought to attend the resistance tent outside the factory. Most of them immediately started to work in other factories within local industry by pointing to their survival conditions that they could not compensate for even a month of unemployment. Worse still, such lay-offs gave rise to a rapid demoralization among unionised workers being still employed in Çer-Sa, leading to further resignations from union membership. As workers have not been able to organize a direct collective action painting the employer into a corner, unionisation movement in Çer-Sa fell into a sharp decline. In this context, it became increasingly difficult for a limited number of leading workers to maintain the resistance outside factory. In these days, those workers in resistance took a quick decision to evaluate the President Abdullah Gül's visit to his hometown for the opening of a new factory in Kayseri OID as a chance to draw public attention to unionisation movement in Çer-Sa, thereby at least stopping employer's attacks on unionised workers. To this end, they prepared a simple action for making their voices heard in the opening ceremony. Yet, police took them into custody in advance even before the President came to Kayseri OID. In addition to employer's class power at workplace, workers thus experienced direct state power against the unionisation. Consequently, given the lack of workers' initiative to develop collective action, unionisation movement came to a point where the leading workers could no longer maintain the resistance outside the factory. After the removal of the resistance tent, unionisation movement in Çer-Sa disappeared into a silent waiting for the Ministry of Labor's official announcement regarding with Birleşik Metal İş Union's application for authorization. Furthermore, it turned into individual struggles at the juridical level

as each of those sacked workers individually filed reemployment lawsuit against the company.

6.4. The Fading of Unionisation Movement and The Restructuring of Labour Process

With the ending of active resistance period, the prospective development of unionisation movement totally got out of workers' control, depended on the two important decisions that would be taken by the Ministry of Labour on the authorization issue as well as by the Court of Labour on the reemployment lawsuits. The first decision was subordinated to the enactment of the new Trade Union Law bringing a remarkable reduction in the sectoral threshold for the authorization of labour unions along with the requirement of the introduction of more accurate statistics on union memberships (see 3.5). The Assembly passed it in October of 2012, after which the Ministry announced that the decisions about the authorization of labour unions would not be taken until the preparation of new statistics on union membership. In the process of waiting for the enactment of new Trade Union Law, Çer-Sa workers lost their hope that the union would receive the authorization document. As of the end of this summer, nearly half of unionised workers resigned from union membership. Thus, unionisation movement in Çer-Sa became faded away in a short time. It was after this level of union membership that employer gave up imposing pressure on the remaining unionised workers since the unionisation movement was no longer seen as a threat to existing class relations.

The fading of unionisation movement in a short time could have been avoided if the reemployment lawsuits filed in the Court of Labour had been urgently concluded on behalf of the fired workers. Although such lawsuits are considered in principle as the specific cases that should be concluded in an urgent way so as to protect the injured party in dispute, the juridical process takes more than a year in practice. As a matter of this fact, when those sacked workers in Çer-Sa won the reemployment lawsuits, it had taken one and half year since they brought their cases to trial. Furthermore the winning of reemployment lawsuits

did not provide such workers with a smooth start to work. They were legally required to pay back either in advance or in installments the severance pay given to them when they had been fired. Yet, as they had largely lived on the severance pay during the unemployed period, this meant that these workers had to bear the cost of being fired although the court concluded that employer had no legal base to fire them. Furthermore, even if they accepted giving back the severance pay, this did not guarantee that they would continue to work again in Çer-Sa. In fact, the workers who accepted giving back the severance pay were dismissed again in a day on the basis of some fabricated reasons so that they could not lead to a revival in unionisation process. Hence, they became left with no option other than filing another lawsuit against employer, this time with a claim to receive compensation for bad faith damages.

In addition, a long-term development that would effect unionisation movement in Çer-Sa has been through the restructuring of labour process. Having defeated workers' collective attempt for unionisation, the employer developed a particular strategy of increasing mechanization within labour process towards diminishing its high level of labour intensiveness. While aiming to increase the productivity of labour process, this strategy has also targeted at undermining workers' independent organizational capacity on the basis of socialisation of production. With this strategy, Çer-Sa workers have been exposed to not only increasing control practices within labour process but also certain lay-offs. Unsurprisingly, it was the remaining unionised workers who were primarily made redundant.

In my punch department everybody was unionized. After May Day two years ago, we were forced to resign from the union. I didn't resign but nearly everybody in the department left the union. When they made a certain number of people resign, they didn't mind the remaining 150-200 workers. I worked like this for 1.5 years. Now, at the beginning of this year (2014), they started layoffs again, four months ago. As justification, they pointed to the renewal of the machinery and technological development. There will be layoffs at the factory for a while like this, said the manager. Apparently they have a right to decrease the number of workers with new machinery. They gave me my severance pay. What can I do? I left (Çer-Sa W8).

To sum up, unionisation movement in Çer- Sa developed in response to increasing class tensions between employer and employee has accelerated dynamics of class relations in particular ways. In the waiting process of the Ministry of Labour's decision to (or not to) authorize Birleşik Metal-İş Union, the movement faded away as workers could not resist collectively to the employer's attacks. Thus, it largely turned into a group of leading workers' attempts that would then be confined into unending legal struggles between these workers and the employer at individual level. However, even though failing to constitute fundamental changes in workplace level relations through joining the DİSK affiliated labour union, Çer-Sa workers' collective struggle also led the employer to initiate certain changes in class relations. Among them has recently been the stimulation of an alternative unionisation from above in an aim to control workers' collective potential in line with the employer. In one of the conversations, workers still being employed in Çer-Sa told me that the employer has collected their electronic passwords⁷⁹ for union membership application by promising to let them unionise without conflict in a short term. Therefore, Çer-Sa workers are likely to achieve a labour union, if not an independent and combative one, through which they would make collective bargaining with the employer. Thus, Çer-Sa workers would have a particular collective form within workplace level relations, providing them with a new socialisation base along class lines.

6.5. Class Consciousness and Class Culture

The unionisation movement in Çer-Sa has also developed along with the rise of class attitudes among workers. It was particularly at the time of direct collective actions that these class attitudes revealed themselves at the highest levels. From the coming out of unionisation movement to the May Day demonstrations and the first lay-offs, the main themes among workers have been

⁷⁹ With the introduction of new Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements Law no.6356 dated November 7, 2012, the so-called "notary condition" for union membership application was lifted and the application is made possible on the internet. To this end, the state gave the workers individual electronic passwords to be used for the union membership applications (for the details, see 3.5)

revolved around common problems such as low wages, poor working conditions and indebtedness, reflecting a particular degree of class perception about themselves. However, it could not transform itself into a remarkable collective resistance against the employer when the leading workers were dismissed. What's worse, there were few participation among the subsequently fired workers to the resistance tent set up by the leading workers outside the factory. In addition, when faced with the employer's pressures, nearly half of the unionised workers resigned from union membership in a short time. Given the fact that unionisation movement in Çer-Sa became easily disintegrated into individual survival strategies, it seems possible to consider that workers are deprived of class consciousness and class culture which can lead them to move towards changing class relations in their collective interests.

Nevertheless, although inevitably being grounded on certain class perceptions about themselves, workers' collective movement actually developed within the material context of the production and reproduction processes. For example, I was surprised to learn that a worker who had been decidedly in favour of unionisation resigned from union membership in the aftermath of the first layoffs and his fellow workers explained his excuse as having a new baby that made him more fragile to the unemployment threat. Indeed, it was "the course of unemployment" to which workers in the interviews referred strongly as the basic reason behind the prevalent hesitation among them to continue collective resistance against the employer.

Now, if you are out of a job for three weeks, you can only make up for it if you work for three months if you don't have other support. It's not hard to find a job in Kayseri; you can find one fast if there is no crisis or anything like that. But still, even just ten days is a great loss for a worker. If you live in a rental on top of that, or if you're in debt, you cannot bear the endless struggle. Even if you do, it's difficult to follow up on it, as happened with us. The employer tried all kinds of pressure, the union waited for months for authorization. In such uncertainty the workers could not be patient or find the strength to resist anywhere. Still, we could have acted harder against layoffs, but we surrendered easily. Inexperience, idleness, a little cowardice dispersed us fast (Çer-Sa W1).

Therefore, it seems rather the high degree of dependency among workers on labour market exchange relations in their social reproduction process that undermine the potential of developing collective resistance regardless of the class culture and class-consciousness. In this line, some aspects of workers such as being married, old or indebted lead to extra deficiencies against the employer as they additionally increased the degree of their dependency on labour market exchange relations. However, it is also clear that the main motivation behind the workers' involvement in unionisation movement was to bring into a new protector, i.e., labour union, from outside in response to the demise of the employer's paternalist protections rather than to organize them as a collective power within workplace level relations. Thus, to the extent that the coming of labour union as a protector to the workplace was delayed to an uncertain future, individual survival strategies prevailed over the leading workers' attempts for developing collective action. This relation with the unionisation movement was also reflected in the Çer-Sa workers' participation to the next May Day demonstration of 2013 in Kayseri, which I also attended to make interviews with them about their experiences. Although Birleşik Metal İş Union had still some hope, if not high, for receiving the official authorization in Çer-Sa, workers seemed to have generally lost their interest in the unionisation movement, with a sharp decrease in the attendance at the union' march in the demonstration. There were around 30 to 35 workers behind the union banner nearly all of which started to work at other local companies after they had been fired from Çer-Sa. When asked for the reason of their attendance, most of them declared that they came to the union march in order to see their former workfellows rather than to take part in the May Day demonstration.

Nevertheless, such distance among workers to certain collective struggles such as direct workplace action or May Day demonstration cannot be taken to represent the lack of class-consciousness and class culture. Firstly, it reflects to a large extent the failure of unionisation movement. Secondly, there are few cases among workers in which one regrets being involved into the unionisation movement even though having been dismissed from his employment in Çer-Sa. In

the conversations, workers generally mentioned those days, when the unionisation movement was being organised and brought into appearance, as the most distinctive period of their working life in Kayseri OID. It was the time when they first felt hopeful for the future. For example, as asked if they had any regret to join the unionisation movement that eventually resulted with their dismissal, the two different workers who have not been among the leading figures behind the movement responded as follows:

I don't have regrets. On the contrary, I'm glad I got into it. Sure we saw hardship and I was laid off. We also got some support from the union for a period, then I found a job too before too long...For one, even if we didn't win, we fought. Let me say this; for the first time I felt that something could change in this industry. It could have really happened too, if this authorization business wasn't delayed so much. Then dispersion wouldn't happen so easily (Çer-Sa W9).

If there were unionization again, frankly, I'd join again. I wouldn't hesitate. I didn't resign from the union. I held my ground. Yes they laid me off later with another excuse. But that's OK, I found a job in ten days, and I took my severance pay. Others found them too. Yes we were dispersed; we had a circle. I had friends that I trusted. I've been working in the Industry for more than ten years, for the first time we formed a group among ourselves and everybody was excited. This would be a first in the Industry. When we marched in the Industry, it was beautiful when everybody looked at us with admiration, when they supported us. But there wasn't enough resistance afterwards, because of fear, of bigotry, and there was stalling, friends gave up fast, they regretted it later too, but the train was missed (Çer-Sa W8).

Thirdly, workers' experience of collective movement also brought to them some unobservable results that can only reveal themselves in specific contexts, as E.P. Thompson argued that "if the experience appears as determined, class-consciousness does not" (2004:40). In parallel, a worker who had refrained from collective resistance by starting to work at another factory and then have lost completely his interest in the unionisation movement, while talking about working conditions at his current workplace, could be caught in having a remarkable degree of class consciousness.

My new workplace is small compared to Çer-Sa. The wages are a bit better. Worker friends ask me why I quit the job. When I say it happened because of the unionization process, most of them don't understand. I tell them, "A union is something that enables workers to claim their rights all together." When I say that, they are interested, but it's a bit early for a union here. Perhaps if the number of workers increases to 150-200, a movement can be developed (Çer-Sa W10).

Departing from the failure of unionisation in Çer-Sa, it is then not possible to arrive at a conclusion that workers are deprived of class-consciousness. In contrast, the movement itself revealed the existence of a remarkable level of class-consciousness among workers. Although unionisation movement in Çer-Sa became easily disintegrated into the workers' individual survival strategies, the failure seems to be much more related with workers' material conditions as having high degree of dependency on labour market exchange relations which makes them quiet fragile to the unemployment threat. Actually, the most needed thing for the unionisation movement was the solidarity practices among workers that would strengthen them in the face of both employer' attacks and the state's restrictions. As a matter of fact, one of the leading workers behind the unionisation movement explained the reason why they became disintegrated so rapidly as follows:

The union should have been tighter. It was limited to the march and the protest. The case was brought to the court to return to work. We waited. We won, but we spent the severance pay too. Waiting won't do. Even if it's difficult, the union should financially support the workers to some degree so they can survive. Besides, there should have been moral support. The worker should at least know they're not alone.. At least the union will go to the workers' homes, visit them, drink tea, talk, and support them. Otherwise it's difficult, the workers fall back. Frankly this is one reason for the dispersion. We should have increased the unity among us (Çer-Sa W11).

6.6. Concluding Remarks

The analysis of unionisation movement that have recently taken place in a big-sized metal factory (Çer-Sa) in Kayseri OID provided us with a distinct perspective through which to look at the development of class relations (and labour regime) within the specific aspects of workplace level relations between employer and employees. Thus, class tensions and conflicts operating in the dialectics of value production and socialisation at various scales could be pursued at the most concrete level where there have been complex processes of control and resistance between capital and labour ranging from state's regulations and employer's tactics to the workers' individual and collective responses. As a collective attempt by workers against existing class relations, unionisation

movement in Çer-Sa in its rise and fall also enables us to reflect upon the class-consciousness and class culture among workers.

In this framework, firstly, workers' independent unionisation movement in Çer-Sa reaffirms that the rapid development of local industrial accumulation in the post-2001 period has completely undermined the paternalist nature of the employer-employee relationship by removing the protective role of the former over the latter rooted in ethnic and religious communitarian relations used to cover up class tensions and conflicts. In this process, while workplace level relations have been increasingly shaped by the employer's disciplinary labour control impositions, workers have recognized each other much more according to class relations on the basis of their individual experiences both in the production and reproduction processes. A corollary has been the prevalence of class perceptions among workers against the employer, accelerated within the worsening local economic context of the 2008 economic crisis.

Secondly, unionisation movement in Çer-Sa reveals that these class perceptions among workers could be mobilized into a collective organisation, i.e., labour union, to provide the minimum conditions for their survival, attempting to change workplace level relations in their interests. However, the movement also shows that such an attempt through unionisation has to overcome not just the employer's attacks but also state's restrictions on labour as a collective entity. To the extent that unionisation of workers means a remarkable loss in the employer's power on labour within workplace level relations, s/he imposes different strategies of consent and coercion on workers to keep them away from unionisation. These strategies range from developing provisional improvements in working conditions and using their ethnic and religious communitarian relations as a social pressure over them in their everyday life to threatening them with dismissal. In this line, when needed, a further step in the employer's strategies would be giving the sack of the leading workers behind the unionisation movement.

In addition, state's restrictions on labour as a collective entity bring to workers serious legal difficulties in the unionisation process for the benefit of

employers. Besides the well-known high threshold levels putting serious barriers against labour unions, there are many detailed procedures in unionisation process that benefit employer to the detriment of workers. Initially, the authorization of labour unions under the tutelage of the Ministry of Labour makes the unionisation process subordinated to the state's political decisions out of workers' control, which might lead them into a highly handicapped position against the employer as it was experienced in Çer-Sa. As a part of such tutelage, employers can also apply to the Ministry of Labour for a redefinition of the branch(es) of industry at workplace for unionisation on the accounts that certain changes have taken place in the labour process. The Ministry's redefinition at the political level may then be detrimental to the unionisation movement. Furthermore, employers have also the right to collusive employment that can be turned against the workers if it increases workplace threshold required for unionisation. Even if the unionisation movement has overcome all of these procedures against employees and received the state's official authorization, employers can have a right to bring the authorization to the trial, leading to procrastination in the labour union's involvement into workplace level relations. Thus, while unionisation is delayed for an uncertain future in legal struggles, employers use this period as an opportunity to impose further attacks particularly on the unionised workers so that there would be a less disobedient labour union when the unionisation becomes inevitable.

Thirdly, unionisation movement in Çer-Sa also sheds some light on the reason why workers have been less invisible as a collective actor in local industrial relations despite the development of relatively suitable conditions for their unionisation as the employers' paternalist hegemony disappeared to a large extent. Against its widespread acknowledgement referring to low level of class-consciousness among workers, it is revealed that this invisibility seems to be much more concerned with the fact that workers have high level of market dependency in their survival which then makes them less resistant to the risks of collective struggles against the employers. In this context, the crucial thing for labour movement to change local industrial relations appears to build a culture of solidarity among workers so that they can maintain the movement to the end.

Last but not least, unionisation movement in Çer-Sa unfolds the ways in which contradictions of class relations in local industry have developed into new tensions and conflicts. In response to the workers' collective attempt for providing the minimum conditions for their survival via unionisation, the employer developed various counter strategies to undermine their unionised power to the extent that labour process has been put into a particular restructuring towards increasing mechanization so as to, inter alia, diminish the labour intensiveness in production. Such restructuring, while relieving the employer of his high level of dependency on labour, increases the need for qualified labour in production process in a conflictual way with the nature of local labour market formation. This situation would contribute to two important tendencies within the development of local industrial relations. The first is the emergence of redundancy in employment as the labour intensiveness in production decreases. There is then a risk of increasing rate of unemployment within local labour market in its social and economic repercussions. As a counterbalance to this tendency, the second is to invest more in enhancing the skills and capacity of labourers so that they can match with the requirements of industrial production. In this line, as state interventions are much more involved in local industry, there is then a risk of politicisation of class relations that may produce various conflicts with the private nature of capitalist accumulation. Thus, it is possible to argue that the prospective development of local industry along with each tendency mentioned above is embedded in increasing class tensions and conflicts between capital and labour. This inevitably compels the latter to involve further experiences of collective struggle against the former in order to maintain their social existence.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

7.1. Introduction

This PhD thesis attempted to analyse the development of class relations, labour regime in particular, within the city of Kayseri, one of so-called rising inner-Anatolian cities of Turkey, where a remarkable level of (private) industrial investments has taken place over the last two decades in such ways that present the city as a model for economic development within contemporary capitalism. This research adopted a particular theoretical approach referring to class relations between capital and labour as the foundational core of capitalist development in contrast with the liberal-individualistic and Keynesian-institutionalist approaches. It was argued that these class relations involve a set of fundamental contradictions, i.e., abstract labour vs. concrete labour, discipline vs. cooperation, and value-determined wage labour vs. wider nature of the reproduction of labour. The essential aim of capitalist class relations is to extract surplus production from the labourers at the workplace under the rule of capital so as to realize it through market-exchange relations at wider scales. This process then spans and relates the economy and political in each moment of the whole relation. In addition, its analytical frame of reference is neither the space of exchange relations nor that of workplace level relations; it rather involves both levels at the same time. Based on a Marxist methodology of determinate abstraction focusing on the development of internal relations/contradictions among social objects, this PhD thesis pointed to dialectical interplays within capital-labour relation between its direct, concrete and material aspects within a particular territory *and* the indirect, abstract and non-material processes across territories.

In this framework, along with a particular geographical perspective that considers spatial aspects at the most abstract level of analysis, Chapter 2

conceptualized this dialectical interplays as between local socialisation of production (and reproduction) *and* value relations operating at wider scales that lead to a particular labour regime. While underlining labour process as the key site of capital-labour relation, this chapter argued that local socialisations involve the interlinked relations among labour market, labour process and reproduction process within a particular spatial extent. For a sustained accumulation, local socialisations have to involve certain degree of coherence to the contradictions of capital-labour relation, providing adequate labour for producing surplus value at labour process.

Nevertheless, such coherence is neither stable and consistent nor exempt from tensions and conflicts, mainly because it is (i) based on the fundamental contradictions that are not soluble but constitute chronic aspects of capitalist class relations, (ii) shaped through the struggles at different levels between capital, labour and the state each of which has conflictual aims in the reproduction of class relations. Therefore, local socialisations may also generate weak accumulation and involve barriers against its development since (i) its internal contradictions may be erupted and/or (ii) its relations with the wider economic and political structures may be interrupted or change. The consequence is then increasing conflicts between capital and labour on the local socialisations, thereby invoking interventions of the state. Chapter 2 distinctively underlined that state interventions do not bring stable and consistent complements to the contradictions of capital-labour relation even though ameliorating them in particular ways. Rather, since involving political forms having with a universal claim that inevitably offends the private rule of capitalist class relations, state interventions increase politicisation among capitals and between capital and labour. Thus, they do not resolve class contradictions but exacerbates them, giving rise to further struggles between capital and labour on the socialisation forms at different spatial levels ranging from workplace and industrial district to the local and supra-local scales.

Following this theoretical framework, this research aimed to track the ways in which these contradictions and conflicts have developed within the city of Kayseri by producing various local socialisations against value relations in the process of industrial accumulation. Since these local socialisations are mainly consisted of three different levels of labour market, labour process and social reproduction each of which has been shaped within the wider economic and political structures at supra-local scales, the development of class relations (and labour regime) in Kayseri was approached analytically at different spatial and temporal scales. In this line, while Chapter 3 examined the development of labour regime at the national level in a historical view, the succeeding chapters were dedicated to the investigation of local industrial development both in time and at different spatial levels. Thus, Chapter 4 provided a historical and structural analysis for local industrial development; Chapter 5 focused on the recent dynamics, forms and tensions of local class relations; and Chapter 6 carried the analysis to the workplace level, examining a radical unionisation movement in a big-seized metal factory. Therefore, the development of local class relations (and labour regime) in Kayseri was dissected into its economic and political components at different spatial and temporal scales. In this conclusion chapter, such components will be reconsidered as a whole in such ways providing empirical and theoretical insights for the future directions.

7.2 Local Class Relations within the Dialectics of Value and Socialisation: The Case of Kayseri

Industrial development in Kayseri appears to have proceeded as large-scale state enterprises during the so-called etatist era when modern Turkish state had to directly carry out a particular industrialisation programme that was initially aimed at producing basic consumer goods such as wheat, sugar and textile within domestic market. As a part of this industrialisation programme, the city of Kayseri was selected as the place of two state enterprises, namely, Aircraft Factory and Sumerbank Textile Factory which were set up with their wider facilities such as housing, school, cinema and stadium providing certain degree of support for the

reproduction of labour. The state also took initiative in the production of qualified labour for these industrial investments.

At that time, private industrial investments were limited to the traditional craft workshops with two or three workers under the direct rule of an owner-masterman in iron stuff, copper ware and stove production. However, following the emergent economic and political conditions at the end of the Second World War, the pattern of local industrial production changed significantly. In these years, a remarkable intervention in local industrial development was the municipal investment that is the building of a well-organised Crafts Square on the then outskirts of the city. It created a specific spatial context for the development of cooperative relations among small workshops and between their owners and local tradesmen towards serial production for wider markets. Thus, the Craft Square appeared as the prime mover of (private) industrial development in Kayseri. The Craft Square also provided a pool of cheap labour force for small-scale enterprises as they could organise their serial production among small workshops that were operated in a traditional system of apprenticeship. In this context, workers in Craft Square had unregistered employment without basic labour rights. On the contrary, workers of large-scale state enterprises achieved labour unions such as TEKSİF in Sumerbank following the introduction of new state regulations for the employer-employee relations as a way of adopting the country to the post-war international conditions.

Nevertheless, it was not until the achievement of a certain level of accumulation in the late 1950s that manufacturing production in local (private) industry could start to take place. Local manufacturing took a further step at a time when industrialisation appeared as a national economic strategy throughout the 1960s and 1970s, even though much of the investments were directed to the western part of the country. The distinct way of local industrial development was the channeling of workers' remittance by some local entrepreneurs into the setting up of multi-partner industrial companies with state support at that time. The impacts of these companies on the local industrial development became profound.

Firstly, since introducing mass production technologies and new products in local industry, they surpassed small workshops at market competitiveness. Secondly, most of the qualified labourers in crafting turned into workforce of these multi partner companies. This then proceeded certain proleterianisation process within local industry. Thirdly, these companies also attracted rural-to-urban migrants as unqualified labour into local industrial labour market. This then gave rise to the development of a certain degree of segmentation among workforce. In the context of a conciliatory labour regime between capital and labour at the national level, these proleterianisation contributed to the proliferation of labour unions in local industry including Maden İş Union, which was affiliated to DİSK, a left-radical union confederation. As domestic accumulation process reached its social and spatial limits in the 1970s and local industrial firms that were capable to produce only within the safeguarded domestic market relations faced with the declining consumption demands, class contradictions and conflicts prevailed local industrial relations to such an extent that local industrial accumulation was largely blocked.

This blockage was overcome through a series of developments at different spatial levels to the detriment of labour. At the national level, neoliberal shift in economic policies gave rise to the export-oriented accumulation strategies along with market therapies over industrial investments. Moreover, the military coup of 12th September of 1980 brought along with it a disciplinary labour regime mainly targeting at the collective potential of labour by imposing strict rules on unionisation process. These developments at the national level not just removed the infantile labour organisations but also scrapped certain productive capacities in local industry. The latter heavily hit such multi-partner companies: some of them were closed and some were sold to family companies. However, such developments also brought to local capital a new accumulation opportunity on the basis of using cheap labour in unregistered or non-unionised manners as there appeared a particular spatial tendency on the part of international capital to shift labour-intensive industries towards less-developed regions. It was in this context that two important state interventions that are the building of Kayseri Organised Industrial Districts and the definition of Kayseri as a second degree in the priority

areas for development assistance, provided local employers with remarkable advantageous in making use of this accumulation opportunity. Furthermore, some local entrepreneurs distinctively met with an unprecedented boom in furniture sector along with the rise of urbanization and mass housing investments at the national level after 1980, gathering an extra momentum in the revival of industrial production. In this line, the 1990s have witnessed a conspicuous local industrial development in Kayseri concentrated in metal, textile and furniture production.

Such industrial development was based on a particular local socialisation among unqualified labour force, labour intensive production of small- and medium-sized workplaces and a set of complementary social reproduction policies within a relatively medium-sized urban space (see Chapter 4 and 5). In this context, the ideology of Islamic brotherhood was widely employed in the capital-labour relation, serving to cover class tensions embedded in this relation. Thus, local industrial development throughout the 1990s mainly proceeded within a particular form in which contradictions of class relations were given a certain degree of coherence in and through a set of religious and paternalist local socialisations. Nevertheless, such coherence of local industrial development was not stable, involving tensions and conflicts at various levels. At first, the wider economic and political structures shaped by different manifestations of crisis of neoliberalism ranging from global financial fluctuations in the world economy to the lower rates of productive investment at a national level provided a highly fragile context for the development of local industrial production. In relation with these wider structures, internal contradictions of capital-labour relation emerged. For example, while there appeared for the first time unionisation attempts in the rapidly grown companies, a series of workers' resistance erupted as a response to workplace closures and relocations in local textile sector. However, these contradictions could be managed particularly thanks to the alleviation in a wider local context through a set of complements by Islamic municipal power into the social reproduction process.

Nevertheless, as Chapter 3 demonstrated, the 2001 national economic (and political) crisis gave rise to fundamental changes in the production and reproduction processes towards direct market ruling. Thanks to the findings of semi-structured interviews with managerial people from local industrial companies, Chapter 4 argued that these nation-wide changes paved the way for a new period within local industrial development in a number of senses. First, the 2001 crisis eliminated a remarkable amount of small-sized firms from local industry. Second, it also compelled other firms to improve production technology and increase production capacity for international markets to such a degree that there has been more than three times increase in the amount of local export production in the following years. Third, the 2001 crisis that imposed market therapies on productive investments became a deathblow to the already doomed state industrial enterprises in local industry, with both the closure of Sumerbank Textile Company and the fully privatization of Kayseri Sugar Factory. The demise of state industries meant having much more than privatization or workplace closure to the local industrial relations, involving disappearance of a particular industrial culture and class experience accumulated over the years. Fourth, the crisis enforced making a new Labour Law that increased the power of employer over labourers to the degree at which the latter can be legally managed as abstract labour at the workplace under the rule of the employer. This has accelerated the undermining of paternalist class relations in local industry that were based on some concrete and direct intercourses between the employer and employees.

In this framework, Chapter 5 aims to scrutinize the dynamics, forms and tensions of local class relations in the post-2001 period. This chapter revealed that there has been increasing class contradictions along with the spectacular growth of local industrial production, leading to various forms of control vs. resistance dialectics between capital and labour within workplace-level relations. As industrial production became sophisticated along with the increasing mechanization that requires more capital and qualified labour, there appeared a major contradiction between existing local socialisations and value impositions.

This contradiction was clearly reflected, albeit in a bourgeois paradigm perspective, in the words of a high rank managerial person from a local industrial company as saying that industrial production in Kayseri can no longer proceed simply as a set of informal networks of each local entrepreneur. According to the interviewee, it must be immediately replaced with a more comprehensive organisation of technology, investment and specialization in production among firms and between firms and the state (see 5.2.1). What this managerial person was indeed concerned about the contradictions of existing local socialisations against value relations was investigated in a wider theoretical perspective focusing on three fundamental processes of class relations that are labour market formation, production and workplace level relations and social reproduction. The investigation was mainly based on semi-structured interviews with industrial workers as well as with the representatives of business associations and labour unions in Kayseri.

First, it clearly demonstrated that local labour market has been overwhelmingly composed of region-wide labour migration flows mostly from rural geographies where agricultural production was hit severely by both the demise of state subsidies and the further restrictions on some agricultural crops such as sugar after the 2001 economic crisis. Those newcomers are less-educated and unqualified workforce in local industry. They are fully propertyless in the city although conversely some have family properties such as small farmlands in their villages that facilitate the reproduction of labour. In the case of Kayseri, the market-ruling agricultural policy at national level enforced a considerable part of agricultural population in the city's regional hinterland into urban proletariats, shaping local labour market into a growing pool of unqualified labour. Although providing a comparative advantage for industrial development in labour-intensive sectors such as textile and furniture having with relatively simplified labour process in particular, this labour market formation brought with it certain limits to the prospective development of industrial production. These limits have appeared in local industry as value impositions compelled local employers to improve production technologies in order to cope with competitive market exchange

relations. In recent years, local industrialists have increasingly complained about the shortage of qualified workforce in Kayseri. Given the inadequacy of qualified labour in local labour market, they have primarily sought out so-called low road strategies for market competition mainly based on cheaper labour, thereby leading to a vicious circle in the local industrial development. The tendency to improve mechanization of industrial production, which has been seen in recent years in (some parts of) the labour process of certain sectors such as metal and furniture, has nevertheless increased the need for qualified labour in local labour market. This then requires wider organisation and investment for training labour. Yet, the crucial question is who would take the initiative towards such organisation beyond individual-firm level by carrying its burden?

Second, at the workplace-level relations, the investigation reveals that contradictions of local socialisations have appeared in direct and severe as well as conflictual manners. Along with the spectacular industrial growth in a more integrated way with global exchange relations in the post 2001 period, both workplace level relations and inter-firm relations within local industry have changed dramatically depending on the specific aspects of each labour process. There has been a sharp increase in the number of big-sized industrial firms mainly through developing subcontracted relations with international companies. These firms have also led to the development of value chains in local industry particularly in furniture sector down to the small and medium sized firms by incorporating them into the wider-scale capitalist relations. The impacts of these changes on local industrial class relations have been profound. On the one hand, the involvement of local firms into subcontracting relations brought with it a certain degree of improvement in working conditions such as the rise of registered employment due to some social and technical requirements to fulfill the wider scale socialisations. On the other hand, this improvement has proceeded with the increasing dominance of abstract value relations over labour process such as accelerated work rhythms, intensified work discipline and increasing overtime work.

The consequence has been undermining the long-year paternalist socialisations that were based on direct, concrete and close relations between employer and employees. In this process, non-market material protections provided by the employer over the employees became largely absorbed into pure capitalist exchange relation between wage and labour. Moreover, workplace level relations were increasingly organised within a set of disciplinary labour control in order to produce more surplus value in a given technological level. One of the important outcomes of these material and behavioral changes in employer-employee relationship has been the development of independent socialisations among workers that go so far as to involve unionisation attempts. A corollary has then been the increasing interplay of control and resistance between employer and employees within workplace level relations.

Third, when it comes to the social reproduction process in the city of Kayseri, such disintegration in paternalist class relations has also developed in many points. Firstly, a specific form of state intervention aimed to re(shape) class relations in particular ways was introduced into local industrial relations through a regional governance institution called Middle Anatolian Development Agency (MADA). It is entitled to coordinate investments via consulting and financing in line with regional development plans. Although it became apparent that the MADA actually fall short of a transformative agent in local industry not just because of its currently limited budget but also its specific form of intervention hesitating to offend the private rule of capitalist relations, it brought a remarkable political-institutional space over local industrial relations. The implication has been the politicisation of industrial relations particularly with regard to the MADA's financial supports. This has been immediately seen among local employers as increasing resentments at the MADA's decisions that are considered to produce unfair results in favour of other companies.

Secondly, a more striking politicisation has taken place among workers particularly since the 2008 world economic crisis to which the state responded by introducing a set of new subsidies for employers such as short term work grants,

hiring incentives and vocational training courses. These generous state subsidies widely used by local employers have meant dramatic perceptions to the workers facing with lay-offs and worsening survival conditions at that time. They have felt themselves excluded from the state level subsidies to such an extent that a widespread political reaction appeared among them particularly against the state's low minimum wage policy that has been strictly imposed by industrial employers. Thus, while complementing to industrial accumulation process in certain ways, these state subsidies have inevitably led to the development of many disputes and separate perceptions both among employers and between employers and employees.

Thirdly, some urban socio-spatial dynamics in the reproduction process have also produced remarkable changes in local socialisations. Along with the spectacular industrial growth in the post-2001 period, the city of Kayseri has developed in such ways that urban space became involved into both further distance and more exchange value relations. While the former remarkably removed the easily accessible spatialities of a medium city, the latter has resulted with the rise of uneven (urban) spatial development in Kayseri. Both have worsened workers' urban survival conditions in different ways while at the same time leading to a new urban experience that is much based on class differentiations along with the shopping malls, gated communities and business centers. The most striking reflection of this urban process appears in the provision of low-income housing. In the post-2001 period the Greater Municipality of Kayseri has completely withdrawn its direct and indirect interventions for low-income housing, with the adverse effects on housing cooperatives that had been the major way for labourers to meet their housing needs. The implication of this urban policy has been the rise in housing prices and rents to the levels that produced incompatibility with the prevalence of minimum wages in local industry.

Furthermore, it has enormously increased the use of bank loans by labourers for meeting housing and other needs, supported by wider scale economic policies. In this context, a central state institution called Mass Housing

Administration played a partial role in the decrease of housing prices in Kayseri by producing housing for low-income household yet on the far outskirts of the city where land prices are low. However, it also paved the way for a new urban experience above mentioned. Contradictions appear more severely in the use of bank loans by labourers on their needs, housing in particular. Due to the indebtedness, workers have been more dependent on labour market relations, thereby avoiding conflicts with their employers on the one hand. On the other hand, as the wages are remarkably drained by bank loans, there has appeared common demand among workers against employers to change the minimum wage policy in local industry. As a result, urban socio-spatial development, in particular low income housing, has been producing conflicts rather than complements with regard to the development of local class relations.

Considered in this framework, it is safe to argue that class relations in Kayseri appear to have less coherence for industrial accumulation in the three fundamental processes of labour market formation, production and workplace relations and social reproduction. A corollary is the weak accumulation pattern in which tensions and conflicts between capital and labour tend to accelerate particularly within labour process as the immediate site and material medium of the capital-labour relation. As a matter of fact, employers have increasingly attempted to change labour process and impose various labour control strategies in disciplinary ways seeking to achieve more surplus value. This has meant sharp class experiences to labourers. Section 5.3.3 revealed that these experiences have also led to the proliferation of class feelings, ties and consciousness among industrial labourers in Kayseri. The implication is that employers' religious-communitarian ideology for covering up class tensions no longer appeals to them. However, this implication is not associated with the prevalence of working class culture/ideology that motivates labourers to change class relations in favour of their collective interest. For example, some aspects of such religious-communitarian ideology like fairness and solidarity can be an important part of class culture among labourers in Kayseri. Furthermore, labourers can sometimes take these religious communitarian aspects as a legitimate base on which to

develop individual or collective resistance against employers' impositions. Yet, this section also showed that there are varied interpretations of religious-communitarian aspects at workplace level even among so-called religious labourers, reflecting their different material relations in production and reproduction processes. Contrary to some arguments based on culturalist explanations, workers' motivations for collective class attitudes against employers are embedded within the material forms of socialisation of production and reproduction. As a matter of this fact, the two essential aspects of working class culture (the quest for justice and solidarity) as argued by Raymond Williams appear relatively significant among labourers employed in the big-sized workplaces, particularly in the metal sector, where labour process includes more potential for socialisations to offend the employer's private rule within workplace level relations.

Thus, it is primarily at these big-sized workplaces that tensions and conflicts within local industrial development are likely to erupt in such ways that workers initiate some collective attempts against employers to pursue their interest. Chapter 6 provided a closer look for the development of local class relations in and through these collective attempts by analyzing a radical unionisation movement among workers (for a DISK-affiliated labour union) that has recently taken place in a big-sized metal factory. It revealed that there are various barriers to the development of workers' collective organisation, to their unionisation in particular. Firstly, employers use numerous control practices to prevent unionisation among labourers. These practices include both disciplinary impositions such as isolating workplace socialisations, employing informant workers or applying mobbing, and some religious-communitarian advices on so-called peace and harmony between employer and employees. Moreover, such control practices can be extended beyond workplace level as employers mobilize their wider community relations as a social pressure over workers at the urban reproduction level. Yet, to the extent that these community relations have lost their complementary roles in alleviating class tensions, particularly in the reproduction of labour, workers appear to consider themselves along with their

class experiences as much as with their community networks. The implication is that such communitarian ideologies that disregard class experiences have been no longer affective on workers. Instead, workers come to accentuate much more their mutual relations on the basis of socialisation of production thanks to their class experiences both at workplace and in (urban) reproduction levels. After a sharp class experience such as serious work accident, worsening working conditions or severe economic crisis, this tendency among workers can even turn into the development of unionisation attempts for defending them collectively within workplace level relations against the employer.

Secondly, workers also deal with the state's legal barriers involving high threshold levels and strict political control over unionisation. These barriers cause serious disadvantages to unionisation attempts in the phases of both organizing workers and receiving the state's official authorization. For example, as the high threshold levels for labour unions require majoritarian organisations at workplace, employers can be easily informed about the workers' attempt and then attack by imposing various strategies, i.e., laying off the leading workers. In the event of lay offs, there also appear many detailed juridical procedures to the detriment of workers involved in the unionisation attempt. Thus, workers have to overcome all these barriers and difficulties in order to achieve collective representation against the employer. Indeed, contradictions in local industrial development in Kayseri have brought to workers strong motivations for attempting to act towards changing class relations despite all these barriers and difficulties. Nevertheless, Chapter 6 reveals that high levels of dependency on market exchange relations among workers on the basis of the indebtedness in their urban reproduction process play an undermining role in maintaining collective attempts like unionisation against employer and the state. It is then possible to argue the power of market exchange relations gives more labour control within local class relations than employers' disciplinary impositions and state's legal barriers.

7.3. The Main Findings of the Thesis and Future Directions

The motivation of the thesis was to reveal class relations, labour control regime in particular, from a particular theoretical perspective referring to their contradictions and conflicts in local industrial development in Kayseri during the last decades. The case of Kayseri has appeared as one of the important inner-Anatolian cities that witnessed a spectacular industrial accumulation along with the rise of a new bourgeoisie in locally specific ways. These cities are considered as the pillar of the fundamental changes in the economic and political structures of Turkey throughout the 2000s.

The literature of (local) economic development has been shaped by two dominant theories, namely, global value chains and new regionalism. The former sees local economic development as the relationship between the lead and supplier firms within the structural conditions of interactions in global markets. The analysis then focuses on the market exchange relations by disregarding workplace level relations. Thus, the specific dynamics of complexities of capital-labour relation are reduced to firms' generalizing strategies on commodity chains. The theory of "new regionalism" rather sees local economic development as the coherent combination among production models, management techniques and business culture within a particular place. Its analysis then focuses on workplace level relations embedded within a particular locality by seeking out success stories in order to put an economic model for other geographies. Thus, the capital-labour relation is seen as a technical organization without tensions and conflicts in capitalist development. In contrast to these two theories, this thesis argues that (local) economic development is based on contradictory class relations for capital accumulation in which the individual capitals seek to extract from the labourers in production surplus value to be realized through market exchange relations at wider scale. This thesis then considers the capital-labour relation as the vantage point of capitalist development as it includes both the particularities of production process at workplace level and the ubiquitous nature of market exchange relations at wider scales. Following this theoretical argument, this research provided a specific research agenda for local economic development by focusing on the

relations between capital and labour within their contradictions at different spatial levels. At a more concrete level, such relations refer to the development of labour regime in which employers seek to control adequate number of labourers with certain qualities at the workplace level in the anticipation of reproducing itself within a particular place in line with the accumulation dynamics. Thus, capitalist development has a set of social processes and relations, including (i) the involvement of suitable workforce into labour market, (ii) direct labour control within the material context of production relations and (iii) the reproduction of labour power beyond the workplace level. However, capitalist development is not stable and secure due to both its internal contradictions and conflicts within a particular place *and* its changing relations with the wider economic and political structures.

This research revealed that the spectacular industrial development in Kayseri over the last decades have proceeded within a particular labour regime, called here religious-paternalism, on the basis of a remarkable degree of coherence among the dynamics of local industrial market, labour process and urban reproduction level. However, this labour regime has recently been in disintegration as local industrial production became more integrated into global market exchange relations and urban social reproduction processes were involved into much more capitalist relations. A corollary of these changes in production and reproduction levels has been the proliferation of class differences that undermines existing religious-paternalist socialisations constituting local labour regime in Kayseri.

This research also found that such changes paved the way for development of collective attempts among workers towards changing workplace level relations in their interest. In response, employers develop new control mechanisms, i.e., top-down unionisation for isolating workers' attempts. The dialectics of workers' collective attempts and employer's responses within workplace level relations accelerate the intrinsic capitalist tendency for changing labour process towards increasing mechanization. This tendency is more likely to produce two possible

future directions in local industrial development. As increasing mechanization diminishes the labour intensiveness in production process, there might be mass redundancy in local industrial employment. This indeed signs for the limits of existing accumulation pattern within local industry. The second future direction may appear in the increasing need for qualified labour in compatible with the development of mechanization in industrial production. Both directions would invoke state interventions to overcome their consequences. These interventions will be shaped through the struggle between capital and labour.

Thus, further researches can be made on the possible forms of cooperation and conflicts among individual capitals and between capital and labour as well as among labourers. In this line, several questions appear for future investigations. The most important ones can be formulated as follows: Would the individual capitals develop a hegemonic strategy towards restructuring local class relations along technologically-improved and competitive lines? What kind of strategies i.e. collective and/or individual would labourers in Kayseri advance for their survival? What would the interventions of the state to respond different pressures coming from capital and labour? And how would these interventions prove reactions among classes? To the extent that the case of Kayseri represents recent industrialization processes in the other inner Anatolian cities such as Denizli, Antep and Manisa, these questions achieve much more importance to the development of class relations at wider scale in Turkey. In this regard, it is possible to argue that while the Kayseri case shows us that such Anatolian cities will be likely to appear the new places of class tensions between capital and labour in Turkey, the ways in which such tensions develop seems to be shaped with the forms of responses to the questions above. Therefore, industrial development within these cities needs to be analysed much more from the perspective of class relations, labour regime in particular, than they have been so far considered.

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Çer-Sa W2, 01.05.2013

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APPENDICES

A: TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışmada Türkiye’de yakın dönemde yaşanan toplumsal dönüşüm sürecinin önemli bir kaynağı olarak gösterilen Anadolu içlerindeki sanayileşme ve yeni burjuva faillerin etkinliğinin belirli bir kapitalist toplumsal ilişkinin gelişiminden bağımsız ele alınamayacağını savundum. Bu doğrultuda, sermaye birikim süreci ve sınıf ilişkilerine içkin çelişkilerin/gerilimlerin söz konusu sürecin gelişiminde ve toplumsal faillerin etkinliğinde başat bir rol oynadığını ileri sürdüm. Bu çelişkilerin temelinde ise emek-sermaye ilişkisi; aralarındaki yapısal eşitsizlik ve tahakküm ilişkisi dikkate alınarak söylenirse, bir emek (kontrol) rejimi bulunmaktadır. Bu çerçevede çalışma, yukarıda sözünü ettiğimiz toplumsal dönüşüm sürecinde hem ekonomik hem de politik dinamikleriyle öne çıkan bir yerel birimde, Kayseri’de, sanayi gelişimini “(yerel) emek rejimi” kavramıyla ele aldı. Bu çalışma Anadolu içlerinde gelişen sanayileşme sürecini sınıfsal dinamikleri açısından inceleyen bir dizi önemli çalışmayı takip etmiştir. (bkz. Köse ve Öncü, 2000; Türkün-Erendil, 2000; Özügürlü, 2005; Bedirhanoğlu ve Yalman, 2009a). Bununla birlikte özgün olarak, daha çok sınıf ilişkilerinin çelişkilerine ve “(yerel) emek rejimi” kavramına vurgu yapmıştır. Bu nedenle, öncelikle söz konusu kavram etrafında bir kuramsal tartışma yürütülmüştür. İzleyen bölümlerde, öncelikle Kayseri’de sanayileşme sürecine ilişkin tarihsel bir yaklaşım geliştirilmiştir. Daha sonra, geliştirilen “yerel emek rejimi” kavramsallaştırması doğrultusunda Kayseri’de sanayi üretimi etrafında şekillenen çelişkili sınıf ilişkilerinin anatomisi çıkarılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda ayrıca bölgede bir metal fabrikasında ortaya çıkan sendikalaşma mücadelesi de işçilerin kolektif mücadele örneği olarak incelenmiştir. Sonuç bölümünde, Kayseri’de sınıf ilişkilerinin ve emek rejiminin gelişimini farklı zaman ve ölçeklerde inceleyen önceki bölümlerdeki sonuçlar birlikte yeniden ele alınmış ve gelecek çalışmalar için dikkate alınması gereken sorular geliştirilmiştir.

Kapitalist üretim içerisinde sermaye ile emek arasında ücretle biçimlenen toplumsal değişim ilişkisinin nihai amacı artı-değer elde etmektedir. Ancak i) “ücretli emek” biçiminde üretim, emek gücünün belirli bir zaman süresince işverene fiziki zora dayanmayan biçimde çalışma karşılığında satışına dayandığı ve ii) artı-değer, üretilen metanın ancak piyasada eş-değerler arası değiş-tokuş süreci sonunda ifade bulduğu için, sermaye ancak emek sürecini sürekli olarak kontrol ederek verdiği ücretten daha fazla değer ürettiğinden emin olabilir. Bu çerçevede kapitalist üretim ilişkisinde artı-değerin kaynağı emek gücü sahibi, temel iktidar/denetim alanı ise emek sürecidir. Ancak kapitalistin emek süreci ve emek gücü sahibi üzerindeki bu denetimi, tarihsel-toplumsal biçimler içerisinde işleyen bir ilişkidir. Bir başka ifadeyle, söz konusu denetim emek gücü sahiplerinin (yeniden) üretim araçlarından yoksun kaldığı ve elinde kalan tek varlık olan emek gücünü “ücretli emek” biçiminde emek pazarına katılarak ve üretim araçlarına sahip kapitaliste satarak ayakta kalabildiği bir tarihsel-toplumsal ilişkiyi içerir.

Emek-sermaye ilişkilerine dair ilgili yazın, uzunca bir süre işyeri ölçeğinde kapitalist denetim pratiklerindeki değişikliklere odaklanmış ve emek sürecinin teknik-organizasyonel özelliklerindeki değişikliklere bağlı olarak çeşitli dönemler tanımlamıştır: basit-doğrudan denetim, teknik denetim ve bürokratik-hiyerarşik denetim. Braverman (1974)’ın vasıfsızlaş(tır)mayı kapitalist üretimde sermayenin temel emek denetim stratejisi olarak tanımladığı önemli çalışması dahil, emek süreci yazını işverenin yönetim teknikleriyle sınırlı kalmıştır. Buna karşılık, ilk kez Burawoy (1985) kapitalizmde üretim sürecinin kapitalist toplumsal ilişkinin yapısal özelliklerinden bağımsız ele alınamayacağı savunmuştur. Bu süreçte emek gücü sahibinin sermayeye bağımlılığın belirleyici olduğunu ileri sürmüştür. Bu çerçevede “üretim politikası” kavramını geliştirmiştir. Buna göre, kapitalist üretim süreci ile emeğin yeniden üretimini sağlayan politik süreçler arasındaki ilişkileri birlikte düşünülebilir. Böylelikle üretim sürecinin kapitalist sınıf ilişkilerin inşasındaki özel konumu esas alınırken, aynı zamanda işyerinin ötesinde işleyen toplumsal-politik süreçler de analize dahil olmuştur. Bu bağlamda Burawoy’ın kilit kavramı, “fabrika rejimi”dir. Ona göre, işyerlerinde

emek ile sermaye arasında ilkinin ikincisine maddi bağımlılık biçimine ve düzeyine bağlı olarak oluşan fabrika rejimleri, tüm toplumsal düzene yön verir. Örneğin 20. yüzyılın başına kadar emeğin yeniden üretimini bütünüyle emek piyasasındaki değiş-tokuş ilişkisine bağlı olarak sürdürdüğü despotik karakterde bir fabrika rejimi sözkonusu iken, sonraki yıllar daha çok devletin emeğin yeniden üretimini belirli ölçüde güvenceye aldığı hegemonik fabrika rejimleri gelişmiştir. Burawoy, 1980’li yıllardan itibaren sermayenin uluslararasılaşmasının eşlik ettiği yeni bir piyasa despotizmine tanıklık edildiğini ileri sürer. Bu, işyerini korumak adına emeği sermaye ile işbirliğine yönlendirdiği ölçüde, hegemonik bir despotizmdir.

Burawoy’ın “fabrika rejimi” kavramsallaştırması emek süreci yazınına oldukça önemli bir teorik müdahaledir. Bununla birlikte Althusserci yapısalcılığından kaynaklı olarak bir dizi sorun içerir. Bütüncül bir yaklaşım arayışına rağmen, üretim sürecindeki teknik özellikler ve görevler ile sınıf denetimi ve politik nitelikli ilişkiler arasında kesin bir ayırım öngörür. Bu ayırımın sorunlu tarafı, hegemonik despotizm kavramsallaştırmasında belirgindir. Burawoy, artan uluslararasılaşma eğilimiyle sermayenin emek ve üretim mekanı ile ilişkisinde bağımsızlaştığı sonucuna kolaylıkla varır. Fakat, üretimin teknik özellikleri sermayeyi –tüm alternatif çabalarına ve tehditlerine rağmen- hem emeğe hem de üretim coğrafyasına her zaman bir ölçüde bağlar. Bir başka deyişle, sermaye-emek ilişkisi ilkinin ikincisinden artı-değer çekip çıkarması biçiminde bir taraftan evrensel amaca sahipken, diğer taraftan bunu belirli maddi-teknik ilişkiler/bağımlılıklar içerisinde gerçekleştirir. Dolayısıyla sermaye-emek ilişkisinin evrensel özelliği ile belirli/kısmi gerçekliği birbirinden bağımsız değildir. Aksine birbirini besleyen bağlar oluşturur. Ayrıca “fabrika rejimi” kavramı, hem fabrika ölçeğinde hem de daha geniş ölçekte aşırı genelleştirmeden muzdariptir. Özellikle artık aynı fabrika içerisinde bile değişik koşullarda istihdam, ücret ve denetim örneklerinin yaşandığı günümüz fabrikasını homojen bir toplumsal uzam olarak ele almak güçleşmektedir. Öte yandan Burawoy’ın metodoloji olarak benimsediği “genişletilmiş vaka analizi”, fabrika rejiminden kapitalist sınıf ilişkilerin inşasına doğru sonuçlar çıkarmasına karşın farklı

ölçeklerde işleyen süreçler arasındaki ilişkileri dikkate alacak kavramsal araçlara sahip değildir. Dolayısıyla sınırlı ölçekteki ilişkilerden daha geniş ölçekte sonuçlar türetirken, vaka-bağımlı ampirisizm tehlikesi taşır.

Bu çerçevede Burawoy'ın emek süreci yazınına teorik müdahalesini, onun hem Althusserci yapısalcılığından hem de coğrafi ölçekler arasındaki ilişkilere kapalı metodolojisinden kurtaracak bir çerçevede geliştirmek gereklidir. Bu çalışmada böyle bir çerçevenin kapitalist sınıf ilişkilerinin değişik ölçeklerde işleyen çelişkili yapısını emek sürecinin özgül önemiyle birlikte alan tarihsel-coğrafi materyalist bir kavramsallaştırma ile mümkün olduğunu ileri sürülmüştür. Kapitalizmde sermaye ile emek arasındaki ilişki artı-değer üretimine yöneliktir ve işyerindeki üretim araçlarına sahip olan ilki, sadece emek gücü sahibi olan ikincisini belirli bir zaman süresince çalıştırarak elde ettiği meta formundaki artı-değeri piyasada aynı sektördeki rakipleriyle rekabet ederek elde eder. Bu süreçte ortaya çıkan kar oranları aynı zamanda sermayenin sektörler, firmalar ve işyerleri arasındaki yatırım eğilimlerine de yön verir. Dolayısıyla dünya tarihinde eş görülmemiş bir toplumsal ve mekansal dinamizm yaratan kapitalist üretim ilişkisinin temelinde, sermayenin belirli bir emek süreci organizasyonu içerisinde emek gücü sahibinden çekip çıkardığı artı-değerin daha geniş ölçekte işleyen piyasada varoluş mücadelesi yatar. Artı-değerin bu yolculuğu, açıkçası bir dizi çelişkiye/gerilime gömülüdür. Bunların başında, artı değer belirlenir bir ölçekte işleyen doğrudan ve somut ilişkiler içerisinde üretimine rağmen onun ancak ve ancak daha geniş ölçekte soyut ve dolaylı ilişkiler sonucunda karşılık kazanması bulunur. Başka bir ifadeyle, doğrudan ve somut ilişkilerle örülü emek sürecinin niteliksel varlığı, bu ilişkilerden arındırılmış soyutlukta işleyen piyasadaki niceliksel karşılık tarafından sürekli olarak tehdit altında tutulur. Dolayısıyla birikim, sermaye-emek ilişkisinin doğrudan emek süreci içerisinde -piyasada oluşan soyut değere göre- daha üretken biçimlerde örgütlenebilmesiyle mümkün olur. Artı-değerin kaynağı emek gücünün kullanımında saklı olduğuna göre, daha üretken bir emek süreci organizasyonu neticede işyerinde çalışma süresini artıracak ücretleri azaltacak veyahut daha yoğun çalıştıracak yeni emek kontrol stratejileriyle gerçekleşir. Bunlara karşı, emek gücü sahiplerinin emek süreci

içerisinde direniş ve mücadele arayışlarına yönelmesi kaçınılmaz olur. Sonuçta sermaye ile emek arasındaki gerilim arttıkça, işyerinde emek gücünün ücretli emek biçiminde kullanımında saklı kapitalist üretim ilişkisinin sınıfsal gizeminin de altı oyulur.

Diğer taraftan, teknik işbölümü biçiminde işyerinde örgütlenmekle birlikte, emek sürecini toplumsal olarak daha geniş ölçeklerde işleyen emek pazarı ve yeniden üretim dinamiklerinden ayrı ele alınamaz. Ayrıca kapitalist üretim yaygınlaştıkça ve daha karmaşık hale geldikçe, emek sürecinin teknik işbölümü ile toplumsal karakteri arasındaki ilişki derinlik kazanır. Bu karşılıklı ilişki daha çok, emek süreci ile emek pazarı ve yeniden üretim dinamiklerinin en yoğun olarak iç içe geçtiği yerel ölçekte bulunur. Bir başka deyişle emek süreci, daha geniş anlamda, aslında emek pazarı ve yeniden üretim dinamiklerini içeren bir yerel toplumsal yapılanmaya karşılık gelir. Bu çerçevede kapitalist üretim, içinde bulunduğu piyasadaki rekabet ve (soyut) değer değişimi ilişkisi *ile* emek pazarı ve yeniden üretim dinamikleriyle birlikte oluşturduğu yerel (somut) toplumsallaşma biçimleri arasındaki diyalektik gerilim içerisinde var olur/gelişir. Dolayısıyla herhangi bir yerde kapitalist gelişme, öncelikle yerel ölçekte, emek pazarı, emek süreci ve yeniden üretim süreçleri arasında söz konusu gerilimle baş edebilecek nitelikte bir tür “yapılaşmış uyum” gerektirir. Bu uyumun temel hedefi uygun nicelikte ve nitelikte emeğin, emek pazarından emek sürecine ve yaşam alanlarına uzanan toplumsal döngü içerisinde sermayenin kullanımına sunumudur. Daha açık bir ifadeyle, yerel emek rejimi inşasıdır.

Yukarıdaki kuramsal öncüllerden hareket ederek bu çalışmada Kayseri’de yakın dönemde ortaya çıkan sanayi gelişimini, bir yerel emek rejimi inşası olarak ele aldım. Daha somut düzeyde Kayseri’de emek rejimi inşasını birbirlerini etkileyerek şekillenen üç düzeyde inceledim: emek pazarı, emek süreci ve yeniden üretim süreci. Bununla birlikte yerel emek rejimi inşasını daha geniş ölçeklerde işleyen ekonomik ve politik süreçlerinin etkilerinden ayrı düşünmek mümkün değildir. Bu nedenle söz konusu yerel toplumsallaşma biçimlerinin yakın

dönemde nasıl şekillendiğini incelemeyen önce, Kayseri’de sanayinin gelişimini hem zamansal hem de mekansal olarak daha geniş bir pencereden ele aldım.

Kayseri, çevresinde elverişli tarım topraklarının olmamasının da etkisiyle, geçmişten itibaren ticaret ve zanaat faaliyetlerinin öne çıktığı bir yer olmuştur. Modern Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin kuruluş yıllarında önem verdiği ulusal sanayi yatırımlarının bazıları için Kayseri kenti seçilmiştir. Bu kapsamda yapılan Tayyare Fabrikası (1926) ve Sümerbank Bez Fabrikası (1935) yerel sanayinin gelişiminde etkili olmuştur. Bu fabrikalara nitelikli işçi yetiştirmek için açılan çıraklık okulları ve 1942’de açılan Erkek Sanat Okulu, sonraki yıllarda ortaya çıkacak küçük ve orta ölçekli imalatçılara yataklık etmiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası yıllarda Kayseri’de Şeker Fabrikası (1955) gibi büyük kamu yatırımları devam ederken, küçük ölçekli zanaatkar üreticiler şehrin yakın çevresinde 1950 yılında kurulan Sanayi Çarşısında bir araya gelmiştir. Daha sonra, yurtdışı göçmen işçi dövizlerinin çeşitli mekanizmalarla yerel ekonomiye girişinin etkisiyle, tekstil, metal eşya ve gıda sektörlerinde çok-ortaklı büyük özel sanayi işletmeleri kurulmuştur (Velzen, 1978; Ayata, 1991). Bu doğrultuda Kayseri 1980 öncesinde ulusal düzeyde sanayi sıralamasında dokuzuncu büyük sanayi merkezi olarak değerlendirilebilecek bir düzeye gelmiştir.

Ancak daha geniş ölçekte yaşanan gelişmelere paralel olarak, Kayseri sanayisi 1980’li yıllardan itibaren köklü bir değişim geçirmiştir. Kriz ve ardından gelen neoliberal politikaların desteklediği piyasa terapisi altında bir yandan kamu yatırımları önemli ölçüde kesintiye uğramış diğer yandan özel sektörde düşük verimlilikteki fabrikalar kapanmıştır. Fakat aynı zamanda, emek yoğun ve düşük katma değerli endüstrilerde yaşanan sanayileşmiş bölgelerden kaçış eğilimiyle buluşmuş ve 1990’lı yıllardan itibaren yeni bir sanayileşme dinamiği yaşamıştır. Böylelikle Kayseri’de ulusal ve uluslararası firmalarla alt-sözleşme ilişkileri içerisinde emek-yoğun nitelikte tüketim malları üretimi yapan ve özel sektörün hâkim olduğu bir sanayi yapısı oluşmaya başlamıştır (Erdem, 2003). Bu süreçte Kayseri Organize Sanayi Bölgesi’nin açılması (1989) ve kente ikinci derecede

kalkınmada öncelikli yöre teşvikinin verilmesi gibi devlet müdahaleleri etkili olmuştur.

Sonraki yıllar, sözü edilen sanayileşme dinamiği çerçevesinde, ağırlıklı mobilya, metal eşya ve tekstil-iplik sektörlerinde yoğunlaşan bir sanayi ve sermayedar sınıfının gelişimine tanıklık etmiştir. Bu süreçte hakim yerel ticaret burjuvazisi ile büyümekte olan sanayi sermayesi arasında siyasal İslam projesi içerisinde kurulan siyasi ittifakın yerel sanayinin gelişimine özel bir ivme kazandırmıştır. Belediye yönetimi bir taraftan kaynaklarını mümkün olduğu ölçüde yerel sanayinin gelişimi lehine kullanırken, aynı zamanda kentsel toplumsal yaşamı emek gücünün yeniden üretimine destek olacak biçimlerde düzenlemiştir. Bu bağlamda, kalifiye düzeyi düşük emekçilerin oluşturduğu yerel emek pazarı ile basit teknik işbölümü ve ucuz emek gücü kullanımının hakim olduğu emek sürecinin, kentsel kolektif hizmetlerin görece kamusal nitelikte sunumuyla tamamlandığı bir “yapılaşmış uyum” oluşmuştur. Bu uyum, önemli ölçüde küçük ve orta ölçekli işletmelerine özgü doğrudan temas ve yakınlıklara dayalı sınıf ilişkileri pratiklerinden beslenen bir tür paternalizm ile biçimlenmiştir. Paternalizm egemen olanın itaat karşılığında astlarıyla gözetici bir ilişki kurmasına dayandığı ölçüde, sermaye ile emek arasındaki ücretli emek ilişkisinin paternalist kalıplara dökülmesi söz konusu itaat-gözetim bağını içeren başka bir toplumsallaşma tahayyülüne ihtiyaç duyar. Bu tahayyül Kayseri’de din ve dindarlık etrafında oluşturulmuştur. Üstelik bu tahayyül sadece işyeri ölçeğinde değil, hatta giderek daha fazla, İslami belediye yönetimi öncülüğünde kentsel ölçekte geliştirilmiştir.

2001 ekonomik krizi ulusal ölçekte olduğu gibi Kayseri yerelinde de mevcut gelişme dokusu üzerinde yıkıcı sonuçlara yol açmıştır. Bu dönemde yerel ekonominin büyük bir bölümünü oluşturan (10 ve daha az işçi çalıştıran) küçük işletmelerin %45’i kapanmış; kayıtlı yerel istihdam sadece bir yıl içerisinde 81.530’dan 69.955’e düşmüştür. Yerel sanayi faaliyetlerinin yoğunlaştığı Kayseri OSB’de firma sayısı ekonomik kriz öncesinde 459 iken 2002 yılında 383’e gerilemiştir. Bununla birlikte sonraki yıllar, firma sayısından üretim değerlerine

ve istihdam rakamlarına yansıyan hızlı bir büyüme sürecine şahitlik etmiştir. Bu süreçte sadece Kayseri OSB 50.000'i aşan işçinin istihdam edildiği büyük bir üretim yeri haline gelmiştir. Ayrıca bölgede uzun yıllardır önemli işlevler üstlenen kamu işletmelerinin kapatılmasına rağmen, yerel sanayi ve ekonomi ulusal düzeyde önemini artırmıştır. Yaptığım saha çalışması, 2001 krizi sonrasında yerel sanayinin gelişiminde dikkate değer düzeyde teknolojik yatırım ve ona dayalı kapasite artışının önemli bir rol oynadığını göstermiştir.

Saha araştırması Kayseri OSB'de yer alan firmaların yöneticileri ve işçilerin yanısıra işçi ve işveren örgütleriyle Eylül 2011-Ekim 2012 arasında görüşmeler biçiminde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Görüşmeler, yarı yapılandırılmış mülakat tekniğiyle yürütülmüştür. Bu kapsamda 40 firma yöneticisi ve 55 işçi ile görüşme yapılmıştır. İşçilerle yapılan görüşmeler için işyeri mekanı özel olarak tercih edilmemiş; aksine, işçilerin işyeri mekanı dışında yoğun olarak kullandıkları servis durakları, belediye çay bahçesi ve yaşam alanları görüşme yerleri olarak belirlenmiştir. Saha çalışmasına da dayanarak, Kayseri'de sanayi birikimine dayalı kapitalist gelişmenin ne tür bir emek rejimi inşa süreci içerdiğini birbiriyle iç içe gelişen üç ayrı düzeyde inceledim.

Yerel emek pazarının önemli ölçüde kentsel ölçekteki nüfus dinamikleriyle örtüştüğünü ileri sürmek mümkündür. Bu anlamda Kayseri kenti, yerel sanayinin geliştiği 1960'lı ve 1970'li boyunca yakın çevresindeki emek göçü hareketlerinin çekim yerlerinden birisi olarak nüfusunu ikiye katlanmıştır. Bu dönemde kentteki net göç hareketini pozitif gösteren istatistikler, ancak 2000'li yıllarda yeniden benzer bir eğilime işaret etmiştir. Bu dönemin başında 700.000 civarında olan kent nüfusu, yeni bir göç dalgası eşliğinde on yıl içerisinde bir milyonu aşmıştır. Söz konusu göç dalgası yakın çevredeki illeri kapsayan bölgesel bir ölçeğe sahiptir. Son nüfus istatistikleri, kentte yaşayanların dikkate değer bir bölümünün Sivas, Yozgat, Nevşehir ve Maraş gibi çevre illerde doğduğunu göstermektedir. Kayseri OSB'de çalışan işçilerle yapılan görüşmeler de nüfus istatistiklerinde izlenebilen bölgesel ölçekteki yeni göç dalgasının sınıfsal yüzünü ortaya koymaktadır. Örneğin görüşme yapılan toplam 55 işçiden sadece 9'u Kayseri

kentinde doğmuştu. Ayrıca görüşülen işçilerin yarısından fazlası, 1990'ların ikinci yarısından sonra, özellikle 2000'li yıllarda Kayseri kentine göç etmişlerdi. Kente göçün temel nedeni, tarımsal desteklerin kaldırılması sonucunda küçük köylülüğün ekonomik olarak varlığını sürdüremez hale gelmesidir. Bu çerçevede bölgesel ölçekli kırsal göç hareketliliğinin taşıdığı vasıfsız emek gücü, yerel emek pazarının ağırlıklı bir bölümünü oluşturmuştur.

Yerel emek pazarının bu özelliği, sınıf ilişkilerinin gelişimi üzerinde önemli etkiler yaratmıştır. Bölgesel ölçekte işleyen kırsal göç yerel emek pazarını bir büyük ucuz emek gücü havuzuna dönüştürmüştür ve bu havuzu saldırgan biçimlerde kullanan yerel sermaye emek yoğun ve vasıfsız emek gücüne dayalı sektörlerde hızlı bir birikim elde etmiştir. Birikimin ilk aşamaları geride kaldıkça görece vasıflı emek de önemli hale gelmiştir. Ne var ki yerel emek pazarının ağırlıkla vasıfsız emek gücü göçü ile biçimlenmesi, yerel sanayinin gelişim patikasını önemli ölçüde sınırlandırmıştır. Vasıfsız ve ucuz emek gücünün kullanımına dayalı emek süreci örgütlenmesi yerel sanayinin gelişiminde aynı zamanda aşılması gereken bir eşik haline gelmiştir. Öyle ki, bu eşik aşılamadığı ölçüde yerel sermayedarın ucuz emek gücüne bağımlılığı emek kullanımlarında sıra dışı arayışlara bile yol açmaktadır. Hakim bir eğilim oluşturmasa da, ucuz emek gücü arayışı kimi örneklerde yakın köylerden servislerle vasıfsız emek gücü taşınması biçiminde işleyen köylü-temelli işçiliği de sınıf ilişkilerinin bir parçası yapmaktadır. Ancak bu, sadece vasıfsız emek gücüne dayalı bir emek süreci örgütlenmesini beslediği ölçüde, yerel sanayinin daha üretken biçimlerde yapılanmasını sınırlandırmaktadır. Nitekim bölgede sanayici işveren ve yöneticilerle yapılan görüşmelerde en çok ifade edilen sıkıntı, emek pazarında vasıflı emek gücünün yetersiz olması ve bu nedenle emek yoğun sektörlerle sınırlı gelişen yerel sanayinin artık başka coğrafyalardaki daha ucuz emek gücü kullanımlarıyla rekabet edememesi yönünde olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, son on yıl içerisinde yerel sanayide hem özellikle metal ve mobilya sektöründe teknolojik yatırım düzeyi artırılmış hem de yeni ürün tipi (örneğin beyaz eşya) ve sektör arayışları ortaya çıkmıştır.

Kayseri’de sanayi üretimi metal, mobilya ve tekstil sektörlerinde yoğunlaşmakta ve dolayısıyla emek-yoğun karakterdedir. Bununla birlikte, her bir sektörün emek sürecinin teknik yapısı ve kullanılan emek tipi bakımından hem diğer sektörlerle hem de kendi içerisinde dikkate değer farklılıklar taşımaktadır. Örneğin metal ev eşyaları üretimi pres, döküm ve emaye kaplama gibi görece daha karmaşık ve teknolojik araçlarla işleyen emek süreci aşamalarını içermekte;, mobilya üretimi kalıp, iskelet çıkarma ve döşeme gibi temel aşamalarında daha az karmaşık araçlara dayanmaktadır. Tekstil sektörü sadece iplik üretimi ile sınırlı kaldığı ve dokuma aşamasını içermediği ölçüde, çok daha az basit ve tekdüze bir makine üretimine sahiptir. Bu çerçevede teknik işbölümünün niteliklerine göre kullanılan veyahut talep edilen emek tipi söz konusu sektörlerde belirli ölçüde farklılaşmaktadır. Ancak, söz konusu farklılaşma aynı sektörde ve aynı üretim mekanında da gündeme gelebilmektedir. Örneğin, metal eşya üretiminde yukarıda anılan aşamalarında görece vasıflı emek gündeme gelirken, aynı üretim sürecinin montaj ve nakliye aşamaları için vasıfsız ve deneyimsiz emek tipi yeterli olmaktadır. Bu farklılaşma, mobilya üretiminde de gözlemlenmektedir. Tekstil sektöründe ise daha tekdüze bir emek tipinin baskın olduğu söylenebilir.

Emek sürecinin yapısından kaynaklı bu farklılaşmalara rağmen, yerel sanayinin her sektöründe son yıllarda artan teknolojik yatırımlara paralel bir biçimde en azından makineleşme ile uyumlu düzeyde görece vasıflı/deneyimli emek talebi artmaktadır. Yerel sanayi özellikle 2001 krizinden sonra kapsamlı bir yeniden yapılanma süreci yaşamıştır. Ekonomik kriz özellikle küçük ölçekli işletmelerin önemli bir bölümünü tasfiye ederken aynı zamanda sadece kayıtlı işgücünde yaklaşık % 15 düşüşe yol açmıştır. Yerel sanayici ve firma yöneticileriyle yürütülen görüşmeler, üretim parkına teknolojik yatırım, üretim mekanında genişleme ve nihayetinde kapasite artışı yoluyla firmaların kriz sürecini geride bıraktıklarını ortaya koymuştur. Bu süreçte büyük ölçekli işletme sayısı artmış; küçük ve orta ölçekli işletmeler ise doğrudan ürün piyasalarına yönelik üretimden daha çok yerel sanayi içerisinde alt-sözleşme ilişkilerine yönelmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, emek süreci yapısı daha uygun olduğu için özellikle mobilya sektöründe büyük ölçekli firmaların uluslararası firmalarla kurdukları

ilişkilere benzer olarak yerel sanayinin kendi içerisinde de üretim hiyerarşileri gelişmiştir.

Bu yeniden yapılanma sürecin sınıf ilişkilerinde yarattığı değişiklikler bu süreci yaşamış işçilerin ifadelerinde çarpıcı biçimde görülmüştür. İşçi görüşmeleri, işyerinden sınıf ilişkilerinin artan iş disiplini ve daha yoğun çalışma ile karakterize olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Bu sınıf ilişkisi aynı zamanda, iş güvenliği ve sağlığından büyük ölçüde yoksun çalışma koşulları ve baskın bir asgari ücret rejimi üzerinde yükselmektedir. Yerel sanayi üretim hiyerarşileri içerisinde uluslararası ölçekte işleyen kapitalist ilişkilere dahil oldukça, daha geniş ölçekteki standartlar/kurallara (ya da bu çalışmada savunduğum kavramsallaştırmayla toplumsallaşma biçimlerine) uyum zorunluluğu önceki yıllarda yaygın olan kullandıkları kayıt-dışı çalışma biçimini önemli ölçüde azaltmıştır. Bu doğrultuda sınıf ilişkilerinde genel olarak işçiler lehine bir gelişme olmakla birlikte, ücretli emek biçimini tahkim ettiği ölçüde, işverenlerle aralarındaki enformel biçimlerde işleyen himayeci ilişkileri de ortadan kaldırmıştır. Böylelikle kayıtlı çalışma işçilerin ayakta kalma mücadelelerini daha çok işverenden bağımsız olarak kendi başlarına yürütmesi anlamına da gelmiştir. Asgari ücret rejimi altında, bu mücadele sınıf gerilimlerinin daha sert biçimlerde yaşanmasına yol açmaktadır. İşçilerin fiziki kapasitelerinin sınırlarına varacak ölçüde fazla mesai yapması ya da ek işlerde çalışması Kayseri’de sınıf ilişkilerinin bir parçası olmuştur.

Emek sürecinin denetimi için işverenlerin başvurdukları yol otoriter uygulamaların artırılması olmaktadır. Sınıf ilişkileri giderek daha fazla disiplinci biçimler etrafında şekillenmektedir. Ayrıca bu doğrultudaki uygulamalar büyük ölçekli işletmelerle sınırlı kalmamaktadır. Yerel sanayi içerisinde üretim hiyerarşilerine paralel biçimde, büyük ölçekli işletmelerde hakim olan kapitalist iş ritmi ve disiplinci denetim uygulamaları küçük ve orta ölçekli işletmelerin emek süreçlerine de nüfuz etmektedir. Sektör ve işletme ölçeğinden kaynaklı farklılaşmalarla birlikte, sınıf gerilimi ve otoritesi yerel sanayide emek süreçlerinde doğrudan biçimlerde ifade bulmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda süregelen

paternalist pratikler de emek sürecinde sınıfsal işlevini ve anlamını önemli ölçüde yitirmektedir.

Bu gelişmeler, en çarpıcı biçimde, işçilerin söz konusu paternalist pratikleri daha geniş bir toplumsal tahayyül içerisinde anlamlandırılmasını sağlayan din ve dindarlık algılarında izlenmiştir. Din ve dindarlık etrafında kurulan belirli bir toplum tahayyülü Kayseri’de sınıf ilişkilerinin itaat-himaye biçiminde örgütlenmesinde oldukça etkili olmuştur. Dinsel cemaat söylemi, hem kendi aralarında belirli ölçüde ihtiyaç duydukları yardımlaşmalarına hem de işçilerle aralarında ortaya çıkan sınıf gerilimini örtmelerine mümkün kılmıştır. Bu çerçevede özellikle işçilere yönelik olarak çatışmadan uzak durmayı telkin eden dinsel anlatılar doğrudan veyahut dolaylı biçimlerde sürekli olarak gündeme getirilmiştir. Neticede herhangi bir söylem somut pratiklerden bağımsız gelişmeyeceği için, fabrikada dinsel cemaat söylemi işverenin koruyucu uygulamaları ve dinsel pratikleri eşliğinde güç bulmuştur. Özetle emek sürecine içkin ayrıştırıcı sınıf gerilimleri dini referanslı toplumsallaşma biçimleri yoluyla hafifletilmiştir. Ne var ki birikim sürecinin genel işleyişi ve artan kapitalist iş ritmi ve disiplinci denetim uygulamaları, son yıllarda söz konusu dinsel toplumsallaşma biçimleriyle açık bir biçimde çelişir hale gelmiştir. Bu durumda fabrika içerisinde dinsel pratiklerin alanı daraltmakta veyahut emek sürecinin bütünüyle dışına çıkarılmaktadır. Bununla birlikte işçilerle yapılan görüşmeler bu tasfiye sürecinin bir taraftan bazı toplumsal-kültürel engeller içerdiğini diğer taraftan fabrika içerisinde işçi ve işveren arasında karşılıklı oyunlar içerisinde geliştiğini göstermiştir.

Bu doğrultuda dinsel toplumsallaşma biçimleri, Ramazan ayında yiyecek yardımı, dini bayramlar öncesi dağıtılan yarı maaşa yakın ikramiye ödemeleri ve Cuma namazı ritüelleriyle sınırlı kalmak üzere, büyük ölçüde işyeri mekanından dışlanmıştır. Üstelik işyeri ölçeğine hitap eden dindar işveren kimliğinden vazgeçilmiş ve kentsel ölçekte işleyen hayırsever işadamı profilini öne çıkarılmıştır. Saha çalışmasında işçilerle yapılan görüşmeler söz konusu değişimin işverene yönelik hem paternalist beklentileri hem de dinsel-toplulukçu algıları

önemli ölçüde zayıflattığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Hayırsever işadamı kimliğine üzerine yapılan konuşmalarda işçiler “dinimiz çalışanın alın teri kurumadan hakkını vereceksin diyor; ama bunlar işçisine hakkını vermeyip dışarda hayırsever görünüyorlar” biçiminde tepki göstermişlerdir. İşverenlerin dindarlığı üzerine konuşulduğunda, “onlar hakiki Müslüman değil” yanıtlarıyla karşılaşmıştır. Buradan hareketle, işçiler arasında işverene karşı süregelen dinsel-toplulukçu tahayyülün kapatamayacağı bir mesafenin geliştiği ileri sürülebilir. Bu mesafe belirginleştikçe, işçiler işverenden bağımsız yeni toplumsallaşma biçimlerini de gündeme geldiği anlaşılmaktadır. Örneğin 1990’lı yılların sonundan başlayarak yerel sanayi işçilerin sendikalaşma çabalarına tanıklık etmiştir. İşverenlerin yanıtı, işçilerin sendikalaşma taleplerinin önüne geçmenin mümkün olmadığı noktada, sendikaları kontrolleri altına almak olmuştur. Bu bağlamda 2000’li yıllar bölgede tüm sektörlerde siyasal İslam geleneğine yakın bir sendika bizzat işverenler tarafından desteklenmiştir. Dolayısıyla, işçilerin sınıf bağı temelinde geliştirdikleri sendika örgütlenmesi, işverenlerin işçilere yönelik bir denetim aracı halini almıştır. İşçilerle yapılan görüşmelerde “işveren ne ise sendika da o” sözüyle sıklıkla karşılaşmıştır.

Yukarıda emek rejimi kavramı üzerine kuramsal bir tartışma yürütürken, kapitalist üretim yaygınlaştıkça ve daha karmaşık hale geldikçe kaçınılmaz olarak emek sürecinin teknik işbölümü ile toplumsal karakteri arasındaki ilişkinin derinleşeceğini ileri sürmüş ve sınıf ilişkisinin giderek daha fazla (kentsel) yeniden üretim alanında yeni toplumsallaşma biçimlerine bağlı gelişeceği savunulmuştu. Saha çalışmasında görüşülen bir firma yöneticisi, bu savı doğrular biçimde yerel sanayinin gelişimine ilişkin çarpıcı bir tespitte bulunmuştur. Bu firma yöneticisine göre, yerel özgünlüklerin bireysel girişimcilik hikayelerine dönüştürülmesi üzerine kurulu birikim süreci ömrünü tamamlamıştır. Aslında 2001 krizi, ucuz ve vasıfsız emek, basit teknoloji ve kısa-vadeli üretim stratejilerinden oluşan emek süreci organizasyonun piyasa koşulları altında ayakta kalamayacağını ortaya koymuştu. Bu dönemde firmaların krizden çıkışı, teknolojik yatırım, kapasite artışı ve ihracata yönelik üretim yoluyla olmuştur. Ancak, teknoloji yatırımlarıyla ivmelenen sanayi birikim süreci vasıfsız emek ve

firma ölçeğiyle sınırlı süregelen emek süreci yapısının ötesinde görece uzun vadeli ve kapsamlı bir toplumsal örgütlenme gerektirmektedir. Yerel ölçekte bu tür bir toplumsal üretim örgütlenmesi için öngörülebilir yapılanmaların oluşturulması gerekmektedir.

Yakın dönemde (merkezi ve yerel) devlet ile yerel sermaye arasındaki doğrudan işbirliği içeren kurumsal biçimiyle bölgesel kalkınma ajanslarının kuruluşu, yerel ölçekte gelişen sanayi birikiminin ihtiyaçlarına yanıt niteliğindedir. Kayseri’yi merkez almak üzere çevre illeri kapsayacak biçimde oluşturulan Orta Anadolu Kalkınma Ajansı, hem bölgesel kaynakların belirlenmesi ve yatırım envanteri oluşturulması yönündeki faaliyetleri hem de uluslararası ve ulusal fonların yerel işverenlere aktarılmasındaki seçici kararlarıyla yerel sanayinin gelişiminde yeni bir kurumsal yapı oluşturmaktadır. Ajans, yerel sanayinin gelişimine kamu kaynaklarıyla müdahale ettikçe, bu müdahaleleri kendileri açısından yararsız, yetersiz veyahut olumsuz görenler arasında tepkiye de yol açmaktadır. Saha çalışmasında görüşülen işveren ve firma yöneticilerinin önemli şikayet konuları arasında, Ajansın desteklerinde firmalar arasında ‘adaletsiz’ davrandığı dikkat çekmiştir. Dolayısıyla yerel işverenler arasında çekişmeleri derinleştirdiği ölçüde, Ajans faaliyetleri bizatihi hedeflediği işbirliğine dayalı yerel ve bölgesel ekonomik ilişki setiyle çelişkili sonuçlar üretmeye adaydır.

Bu tür çelişkili sonuçlar, işçiler arasında daha belirgin biçimde gelişmektedir. İşçilerle yapılan görüşmeler, özellikle 2008 yılında patlak veren ekonomik krizi sonrasında daralan sanayi üretimini desteklemek amacıyla merkezi ve yerel devlet tarafından işverenlere verilen teşviklerin işçiler tarafından yakından takip edildiğini ortaya koymuştur. Devletin işverenlere yönelik cömert teşvikleri ile kendilerine yönelik düşük asgari ücret politikası arasındaki çelişki işçiler tarafında değişik biçimlerde ifade edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda işçiler arasında “asgari ücrete de teşvik verilsin” biçiminde bir talebin yaygınlaşmaktadır. Sözkonusu çelişkinin işverene yönelik taleplere dönüşmesi, ancak daha özel uğraklarda gündeme gelmektedir. Bir örnek vermek gerekirse, 2008-9 kriz döneminde tüm teşvikleri kullanmasına rağmen işçilerine kötüleşen piyasa koşulları gerekçe göstererek sıfır

zam önerisinde bulunan bölgenin önde gelen firması, yılsonunda yüksek oranda kar elde ettiğini açıkladığında aşağıdan gelişen güçlü bir işçi tepkisiyle karşılaşmıştır.

Sınıf gerilimlerini artıran bir diğer gelişme, kentsel mekan ve gündelik hayat düzeyinde açığa çıkmaktadır. 2001 krizi sonrası dönemde yerel sanayi birikimi hızlanmış ve Kayseri kenti hızlı bir mekânsal büyüme sürecine girmiştir. Bu süreç Kayseri'yi orta ölçekli kenten bir büyükşehire dönüştürmüştür. Daha geniş ölçekteki gelişmelere de paralel olarak Kayseri kenti, sınıf gerilimlerini hafifleten özgünlüklerini yitirmektedir. Kentsel hayat giderek pahalılaşmakta, işyeri-konut mesafesi artmakta ve alışveriş merkezleri, kapalı siteler ve büyük ölçekli projeler yoluyla kentsel mekan daha fazla sınıfsal ayrımları gösteren biçimlerde yapılanmaktadır. Bu süreçte işçiler en yoğun olarak, konut sorunu ve artan borçlanma ile karşılaşmaktadır. Ucuz arsa üretimi ve kooperatiflerin desteklenmesine dayalı belediye politikası son yıllarda bütünüyle gündemden düşmüş ve işçilerin konut edinme biçimi giderek banka kredilerine bağlı hale getirilmiştir.

Bu durumda ücret artışı işçiler arasında en yaygın ve acil bir talep haline gelmektedir. Dolayısıyla kentsel gelişim, önceki yıllardan farklı olarak, sıkı ölçüde asgari ücret rejimine yaslanan yerel sanayideki sınıf ilişkileri ile gerilimli sonuçlar üretmektedir. Bu gerilim yerel yönetimden daha çok merkezi hükümet tarafından Toplu Konut İdaresi (TOKİ) eliyle bir ölçüde hafifletilmiştir. TOKİ'nin Kayseri kentinde yaptığı, 1036 tanesi doğrudan düşük gelirli ailelere olmak üzere yaptığı toplam 3128 dairelik konut yatırımı işçilerin konut ihtiyacını bir ölçüde karşılamış ve son yıllarda şehirde artan konut fiyatları üzerinde düzenleyici bir etkiye bulunmuştur. Ancak, neticede kentsel rantları esas alan TOKİ uygulamaları kentsel gelişmenin ortaya çıkardığı sınıf gerilimlerini hem niceliksel hem de niteliksel olarak ortadan kaldıramamıştır. Aksine, kentin doğu ucunda yaptığı düşük gelirli konut alanları örneğinde olduğu gibi, TOKİ uygulamaları kentsel gelişmeyi sınıfsal farklılaşmayı artıracak biçimlerde yönlendirmektedir.

Toparlanacak olursa, Kayseri sanayisi 2001 ekonomik krizi sonrasında teknolojik yatırım, kapasite artışı ve ihracata yönelik üretim doğrultusunda yeni bir büyüme sürecine girmiştir. Bu süreçte mobilya, metal ve tekstil sektörlerinde uluslararası firmalarla alt-sözleşme ilişkileri içerisinde gelişen büyük ölçekli işletmeler/işverenler yerel sanayiye hakim olmuş ve oluşturdukları üretim hiyerarşileriyle küçük ve orta ölçekli işletmeleri daha geniş ilişkilerin bir parçası haline getirmişlerdir. Bu işverenler aynı zamanda hem yerel hem de ulusal düzeyde karar alma süreçlerine müdahil olmaktadır. Bu çerçevede üzerinde yükseldiği birikim kalıplarını daha avantajlı hale getirecek düzenlemeler vaat eden aktörlerle ekonomik ve politik işbirlikleri geliştirmektedirler.

Bununla birlikte Kayseri’de yükselen sanayi burjuvazisi belirli bir sınıf ilişkisine, buradaki kavramsallaştırmayla söylenirse, emek rejimine dayanmaktadır. Yukarıda yapılan inceleme, Kayseri’de yakın dönemde yaşanan sanayi birikim sürecinin dinsel-paternalizm biçimini almış süregelen emek rejiminde köklü değişikliklere yol açtığını göstermektedir. Emek sürecinde paternalist ilişkiyi ayakta tutan işçi-işveren arasındaki sosyal ve mekânsal yakınlıklar ortadan kalkmış ve dinsel anlatılar etrafında kurulan toplulukçu söylem fabrika ölçeğinin dışına atılmıştır. Bu süreçte aynı zamanda emek sürecine sıkı disiplinci bir denetim pratiği hakim olmuştur. Fabrika ölçeğindeki otoriter uygulamalar ise kentsel ölçekte yürütülen “hayırsever işadamı” profiliyle telafi etmeye çalışmaktadır. Ancak asgari ücret karşılığında sıkı disiplinci bir emek denetiminde çalışmak durumunda olan işçiler için hayırsever işadamı profili büyük tepki yaratmaktadır. Öte yandan gerek yerel emek pazarının vasıfsız emeğe dayalı yapısı gerekse bireysel girişimcilik şeklinde işleyen yatırım pratikleri sanayi üretiminin gelişimine belirli sınırlar getirmektedir. Bu durum kriz koşullarında belirginleştikçe gündeme gelen devlet müdahaleleri, yerel sanayi ilişkilerini belirli ölçüde düzenlemekle birlikte aynı zamanda politikleştirilmektedir.

Sınıf ilişkilerinde artan politikleşme kapitalist kente özgü sosyo-mekansal eşitsizlikler içerisinde ayakta kalma mücadelesi yürüten işçiler arasında daha çarpıcı olarak yaşanmaktadır. İşçiler devletin işverenlere yönelik sanayi

teşviklerine bilfiil deneyimledikçe yerel sanayide baskın asgari ücret rejimine karşısında benzer ekonomik destek taleplerini dile getirmektedir. Bu çerçevede işçiler arasında ortak sınıf deneyimi ve ekonomik talepler gelişmektedir. Hatta belirli bir sınıfsal ortaklık bağı oluşmaktadır. Bu tür ortaklık hissiyatları, önceden tahmin edilmesi güç uğraklarda, tüm kontrol ve disiplin uygulamalarını aşarak işverenlere karşı somut tepkilere de dönüşebilmektedir. Bunlar genellikle iş kazası, ağır bir adaletsizlik duygusu ya da dışlayıcı bir uygulamanın ardından hızla gelişebilmekte; üretimi yavaşlatmaktan işverenden taleplerde bulunmaya varan biçimlerde ifade edilmektedir. Buna yanıt olarak işverenler, sarı sendikalar dahil işçilerin kolektif hareketlerini kontrol edecek yeni denetim araçları geliştirmektedir.

Bu çerçeve çalışma, Kayseri’de sanayi emek süreci ile emek pazarı ve yeniden üretim süreçleri arasında birikim dinamiklerini besleyen bir “yapılaşmış uyum” veyahut emek rejiminin gelişmediğini ileri sürmektedir. Aksine artan sınıf gerilimleri, fabrika ölçeğinde otoriter ve disiplinci denetim mekanizmaları, kentsel ölçekte “hayırsever işadamı” yardımları yoluyla idare edilmektedir. Ne ki, hem bu idare biçiminin yerel sanayi üretiminin temel sorunlarına görece uzun-vadeli bir yanıt sunmaması hem de oluşmakta olan sınıf bağları etrafında işçilerin işverenden bağımsız kolektif hareket etme çabası sınıf gerilimlerinin daha çetin yaşanacağı bir döneme işare etmektedir. Bu durumda Kayseri’de yerel sınıf ilişkilerinin daha sert doğrudan güç mücadeleleri içerisinde şekilleneceği ileri sürmek mümkündür. Aralarındaki farklılıklara, yetersiz deneyime ve artan disiplinci denetim mekanizmalarına rağmen, Kayseri OSB’deki sanayi işçileri için varoluş mücadelelerini daha kolektif biçimlerde sürdürmek giderek bir ‘zorunluluk’ halini almaktadır.

Ayrıca Kayseri örneği, yerel düzeyde sanayi birikim biçiminin çelişkilerini açığa vuran 2008-9 krizi sonrasında, devletin, sanayi teşvikleri, yatırım envanterinin oluşturulması, mesleki eğitim programları ve TOKİ uygulamaları gibi bir dizi politikayla giderek daha fazla sınıf ilişkilerine dahil olduğunu göstermiştir. Ancak devlet müdahalesi kamusal ve politik bir biçime sahip olduğu

ölçüde, sınıf ilişkilerini politikleştirme ‘tehlikesi’ taşımaktadır. Bu nedenle, yerel sınıf ilişkilerinin gelişiminde sözkonusu politikleşme potansiyelinin nasıl kontrol altına alınacağı giderek daha önemli soru haline gelmektedir. Dolayısıyla gelecek çalışmaların sermaye ile emek arasında fabrika mekanında sınıf gerilimlerinin yanısıra daha geniş ölçekte devletin de dahil olduğu politikleşme süreçlerini daha yakından incelemesi gerekmektedir. Bu noktada tez, gelecek çalışmalar için bir dizi soru önerisi de geliştirmiştir. Bunlardan en önemlileri şunlardır: Bireysel işverenler yerel sanayiye teknolojik olarak daha gelişkin ve daha rekabetçi biçimlerde yeniden yapılandırmaya yönelik hegemonik bir strateji geliştirebilecek durumda mıdır? Bu süreçte işçiler ayakta kalma mücadelelerinde bireysel veyahut kolektif olarak ne tür stratejiler geliştirebilirler? Devlet, merkezi ve yerel düzeyde, hem işverenlerden hem de çalışanlardan gelen taleplere ne tür yanıtlar verebilir? Ve bu yanıtlar içerisinde toplumsal sınıflar nasıl şekillenebilir?

Sonuç olarak sözkonusu sürecin ve soruların, Kayseri yakın dönemde Anadolu kaplanları olarak adlandırılan Denizli, Antep, Manisa vb. yeni sanayi merkezleriyle benzerlik taşıdığı ölçüde, daha geniş bir coğrafyada ifade bulacağını ileri sürmek yanlış olmayacaktır. Bu açıdan, sanayileşme dinamiklerine bağlı olarak yerel ölçekte emek, sermaye ve devlet arasındaki ilişkilerin gelişiminin incelenmesi yakın dönemde daha da önem kazanacaktır.

B: CURRICULUM VITAE

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EDUCATION

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2003- Present	METU ADM	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

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PUBLICATIONS

1. Gündoğdu, İ. (2015) Kayseri’de Yerel Emek Rejimi ve Sınıf Çelişkileri, In: G.Yücesan-Özdemir (Eds.) *Rüzgara Karşı: Emek Süreçleri ve Karşı Hegemonya Arayışları*, İstanbul: Notabene, 195-224.
2. Gündoğdu, İ. (2014) Anadolu Kaplanları veyahut İslami Burjuvazi Tartışmalarına Bir Katkı: Kayseri’den İşçi Hikayeleri, In: M. Yaman et.al. (Eds.) *Emeğin Kitabı*, İstanbul: SAV.
3. Gündoğdu, İ. (2009). Sermayenin Bölgesel Kalkınma Eğilimleri: Bölge Kalkınma Ajansları Yasası Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme, *Praksis*, 19, 267-302.
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HOBBIES

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C: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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YAZARIN

Soyadı : Gündoğdu
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Bölümü : ADM

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : LOCAL CLASS RELATIONS WITHIN THE
DIALECTICS OF VALUE AND SOCIALISATION: THE CASE OF KAYSERİ

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

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