

THE SPECTERS OF COLONIALISM: EPISTEMIC RACIALIZATION OF
EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND ISLAM IN EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

THE SPECTERS OF COLONIALISM: EPISTEMIC RACIALIZATION OF EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND ISLAM IN EUROPE

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Beginning in the 1990s, an increasing tension has developed between Europe and the Muslims who live there. This tension is primarily concerned with the Muslim culture and religion, and their compatibility with the supposed European values. The tension peaked after the bombing attacks of 2001, and eventually resulted in Europe declaring a ‘war on terror’ against European Muslims, with its own ways of addressing, which can be defined as an *apophatic* mode of address, mentioning by not mentioning, declaring by not explicitly declaring it. To properly inquire into the nature of this situation, we require an approach that can detect the various aspects and layers of this tension. This dissertation proposes to use Joan W. Scott’s *symptomatic politics* for this purpose, where visible behaviors are explained as symptoms of a larger hidden conflict and we are forced to ask questions to understand what is hidden. This dissertation asserts that the conflict between Europe and Muslims is symptomatic of the supposedly ‘disappeared’ colonial and racist past of Europe. Actually, colonialism and racialization have not disappeared; rather they are repressed, and now return in disguise to the ‘postcolonial’ and ‘postracist’ European context. As a psychoanalytic conceptualization, this notion of the return of the repressed is closely allied with Jacques Derrida's idea of *hauntology*, where the existence of the visibly inexistent and the presence of explicitly absent are analyzed by going beyond conventional classifications. Following Derrida, this

study finds that the aforementioned tension is a consequence of the *specters* of colonialism haunting the contemporary ‘post-colonial’ context of Europe.

Keywords: Europe, European Muslims and Islam, racism, European colonialism, hauntology

ÖZ

SÖMÜRGEÇİLİĞİN HAYALETLERİ: AVRUPA’DA MÜSLÜMANLARIN VE İSLAM’IN EPİSTEMİK İRKLAŞTIRILMASI

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1990’lardan başlayarak, Avrupa ve uzun yıllardır Avrupa sınırları içinde yaşayan Müslümanlar arasında gerilimli bir ilişki gelişmeye başlamıştır. Bu gerilim temel olarak Müslümanların din ve kültürlerinin Avrupa değerleri ile uyumsuzluğu ile ilgilidir. Bu gerilim 2001’den sonra hat safhaya ulaşmış ve sonunda Avrupa’nın, kendi ifade etme biçimiyle yani ima ederek Avrupalı Müslümanlara karşı terörle savaş ilan etmesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Bu durumu etraflıca soruşturmak için bu gerilimin farklı katmanlarını tespit edebilecek nitelikte bir yaklaşıma ihtiyaç vardır. Bunun için bu tez Joan W. Scott’un ‘semptomatik politika’ (*symptomatic politics*) yaklaşımını kullanmayı önerir. Bu yaklaşım görünen davranışları, daha büyük gizli bir gerilimin semptomları gibi ele alır ve bizi bu gizli gerimi anlamaya yönelik sorular sormaya zorlar. Bu çerçevede bu tezin iddiası, Avrupa ve Müslümanlar arasındaki gerilim, Avrupa’nın ortadan kalktığını varsaydığı sömürgeci ve ırkçı geçmişinin bir semptomudur. Sömürgecilik ve onun ırklaştırıcı pratikleri yok olmamış; bastırılmıştır. Bastırılan bugün sansürlenerek ve kılık değiştirerek, Avrupa’nın sömürgecilik-sonrası ve ırkçılık-karşıtı bağlamına geri dönmektedir. Psikanalitik bir kavramsallaştırma olarak ‘bastırılanın geri dönmesi’ (*return of the repressed*) Jacques Derrida’nın musallat-bilimi (*hauntology*) ile yakından ilişkilidir. Musallat-bilimi, geleneksel sınıflandırmaların ötesine geçerek, görünürde varolmayan varlığını ve orada olmayan oradallığını analiz etmek için

uygulanabilir bir perspektif verir. Bu çalışma Derrida'yı takip ederek, başta bahsedilen gerilimi, sömürgeciliğin hayaletlerinin, Avrupa'nın sömürgecilik-sonrası güncel bağlamına musallat olması biçiminde tanımlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa, Avrupalı Müslümanlar ve İslam, ırkçılık, Avrupa sömürgeciliği, musallat-bilim (hauntology)

To the Memory of Kamil Sağır

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The status of Europe as an idea, an identity, a culture, a political and economic entity, and even as a geographical region, has been debated for a long time. Here, Europe refers to both the European Union and European nation-states, since today Europe can be defined as neither a supranational structure going beyond the nation-state form, nor a geographical region including totally independent nation-states. Europe is both neither of them and both of them at the same time; it reflects in-between situation which may refer to as a Janus-faced figure. Moreover, when it is looked at the historical context and the present conjuncture, we can argue that Europe is not a complete entity; it is an open-ended and process-oriented construction on the one hand, and it reflects a complete being that there is a strong sense of what Europe is on the other. Therefore, it is necessary to take all these factors into account when we critically identify, define and analyze Europe.

It has to be stated that ‘Europe’ does not refer to a homogeneous structure. It is clear that every nation-state has its own situation, culture, history and political culture. Even the European Union does not reflect a homogeneous entity, because it is clear that member states retain many different policies, particularly about border control, visa and immigration procedures, and their interests. In spite of differences between the countries, there are also similarities; the EU policies and the enlargement process of the union are shaped through the assumption of a ‘Europe’ and a particular ‘European identity’. Even if EU has an instrumental (economic, strategic and political) foundation and a formation for securing the human rights and democratic principles, it has been emphasized that Europe is also based on and enlarging through the assumed ‘European value and identity’. It is

assumed that there are culture, language, tradition and values shared by the separated parts of Europe.

Ruth Wodack suggests that there is a common perception of Europe because of the enlargement process. Her examination of the discursive construction of European identity, led her to question the complex issues in constructing the “New Europe”. Wodack says: “Europe consists of different historical traditions, different nation-states with their own histories, different cultures, different languages, different political, national, regional and local interests and traditional ideologies, different interest groups, different economic concepts, different organizations, etc.” On the contrary, it is assumed that it has to be found certain values in order to re-organize, legitimize, and represent this enlarged and diverse Europe. In other words, this enlarged Europe has to find a new narrative, a new perspective, and a vision in which European citizens could identify themselves. On the other hand, a single unified identity for Europe should not be claimed, since there are different constructions, representations and images of Europe in political, historical and cultural contexts. Identities are discursively co-constructed in interactions. In addition to this, new hybrid forms characterize the relationship between discourse, politics, and identities. On the other hand, the present discourses on Europe are created via the interaction of three dimensions. First one is the ideational dimension representing the making meaning, which refers to the idea of Europe, its essence, substance, or meaning. Second one is the organizational dimension representing the organization of how Europe is to be organized that reflects seeking for the institutional forms of decision-making and appropriate political frameworks. Third one is the geographical dimension, which refers to the border-construction concerning the insider and outsider of Europe.¹ In sum, Wodack draws attention to problematic assumption of common European identity, culture, values and history.

¹ Ruth Wodack, “Doing Europe”: The Discursive Construction of European Identities”, in Richard C. M. Mole (ed) *Discursive Construction of Identity in European Politics*, New York: Palgrave, 2007.

In the same manner, Meyda Yeğenoğlu critically revisits the discourse of common European identity and tradition by questioning the imagined unity of them. In this context, she speaks about the ‘Europeaness of Europe’ by drawing attention to ‘tradition’ which is one of the fundamental to European identification like historicity, civilization and scientific achievement. It is attributed to value that is claimed as superior from the other cultures and traditions which are perceived as lack of civility. Therefore, compatibility and incompatibility of different cultures is discussed in the framework of the discourse of common identity and shared values.² Furthermore, Murray Pratt’s argument is striking the similar context. He suggests that constructing European cultural identity is a project in progress by suggesting that this project is an anti-universalist form of Eurocentricism. The idea of shared cultural identity and European unity in a common destiny is a fantasy. This fantasy makes comparison between civilized Europe and barbarians outside its borders. This reflects the Eurocentric ideas, myth of Europe and the founding doctrine of Orientalist thinking on which Europe’s history has been based. From this framework, the EU acknowledges external division from Others rather than internal division.³

Therefore, the EU has been shaped through the imagined unity and commonality of the idea of Europe against different cultures and religions. In other words, through the idea of shared destiny, culture, religion, language and history of European countries, the boundary between Europeans and ‘non-Europeans’ has been shaped during the unification process of Europe. In this framework, it can be suggested that Europe’s relation with not “‘really’ and ‘fully’ Europeans”⁴ has been shaped through re-narrating European contours. In his speech on Turkey’s membership, Valéry Giscard D’Estaing clearly expressed as:

² Meyda Yeğenoğlu, ‘The Return of the Religious: Revisiting Europe and Its Islamic Others’, *Culture and Religion*, 7:3, 2006, pp. 249-250.

³ Murray Pratt, 2005: 7,16, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 250.

⁴ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, pp. 217

almost all of Europe has a Christian inheritance, which means that the great majority of us, whether believers or not, are profoundly shaped by up to two millennia of Christian culture. You can only think this does not matter profoundly if you fail to see how culture overwhelmingly makes us what we are, and does help give us a sense of European identity despite the manifold differences... The creators of the European project were mostly Christian Democrats who had a great historical aim – to reconcile Germany and France, and to end the wars that helped destroy Europe’s power in the world. It was an intelligible ideal based in history and shared experience.⁵

If it is gone back to statement mentioning that Europe has been debated for a long time, it can be suggested that currently, it is much more open to debate than before. The debates center on the colonialist, racist, exclusionary, and discriminatory legacies impacting Europe's current conceptual and material design. The impact of these legacies has not only framed how Europe views what is properly outside or inside its borders, but also works to determine and legitimize the very borders themselves. Starting in the 1990s, this design has been predominantly articulated within the framework of a tension between Europe and European Muslims, living inside the borders of Europe, and their culture and religion. There seems to be a high level of consensus among many European countries about the formal and informal declarations, and legal regulations surrounding issues related to Muslims. These declarations and regulations have been generally shaped through debates on these three issues: the visibility of Muslims and their religious practices in Europe's public sphere (prominent examples are France, Switzerland, Germany and Belgium), the difference between the European and Islamic culture and values (prominent examples are the Netherlands and Denmark), and Muslims' citizenship status and their “problems” with integration (prominent examples are the UK, the Netherlands and Germany).

⁵ John Casey, *Daily Telegraph*, 13 December 2002, cited in Meyda Yeğenoğlu, ‘The Return of the Religious: Revisiting Europe and Its Islamic Others’, pp. 254.

This consensus began to take shape in the early 1980s. On January 27, 1978, Margaret Thatcher's famous public statement, "[p]eople are really rather afraid that this country might be swamped by people with a different culture,"⁶ exemplifies the situation and atmosphere during that time. The declarations and regulations relating to this consensus continued to evolve after the 1980s. Multiculturalism and pluralism declined in significance in the 1990s, and their failure was declared around 2010. The failure of multiculturalism began to be discussed particularly in Germany, France, Spain and the UK in the late 2000s. It is useful to highlight some prominent examples here. In 2002, Jan-Peter Balkenende, Christian Democratic prime minister of the Netherlands, stated that he did not think, "multicultural society is something to strive for".⁷ On 17 October 2010, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, declared that the multicultural society had failed and immigrants needed to make stronger efforts to integrate more.⁸ In the same year, the British prime minister, David Cameron, said that the doctrine of state multiculturalism caused 'disastrous' results by encouraging segregation. He continued this line of reasoning by arguing that British tolerance encouraged segregated communities to behave contrary to British values.⁹ French President Nicolas Sarkozy, again in the same year, opined that the state of France had "been too concerned about the identity of the person who was arriving and knowing not enough about the identity of the country that was receiving him."¹⁰ Similarly, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria commented on the dangers of immigrants

⁶ <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=103485>

⁷ Cited in Maarten P. Vink, 2007, "'Dutch 'Multiculturalism' Beyond the Pillarization Myth," *Political Studies Review*, Vol.5, pp.337-350.

⁸ *BBC News*, 17 October 2010. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451>.

⁹ *Guardian*, 05 February, 2012. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/feb/05/david-cameron-muslim-extremism>. In this declaration, it is striking that she viewed integration to be the sole responsibility of immigrants rather than the German government.

¹⁰ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8317497/Nicolas-Sarkozy-declares-multiculturalism-had-failed.html>

refusing to integrate into the rest of the society.¹¹ In addition to the governmental declarations, some normative academics such as Miller (1998), Paul Cliteur (1999, 2007), Paul Scheffer (2000) and Samuel Huntington (2004) published critical works about immigration and multiculturalism. Their works mainly reflect the idea that multiculturalism, as a political approach, delays the integration of immigrants into the receiving society. This in turn threatens the unity and coherence of the receiving society. In the final assessment, the following conclusion was reached: multiculturalism is an unacceptable ideology.

If this issue is looked at in more detail, it can be seen that the idea of multiculturalism being detrimental to society became more concrete after the attacks in the US in 2001, in London in 2004, and in Madrid in 2005; when the existence of Muslims in ‘non-Muslim’ countries began to be viewed as a threat to the security of both the European population, and the population of the entire world. The link between the rise of “Muslim extremism and violence” and the failure of multicultural policies was addressed in 2010 in a speech by the British Prime Minister David Cameron:

Europe needs to wake up to what is happening in our own countries. We need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of these terrorists attacks lie- and that is the existence of an ideology, Islamist extremism. And it is not just the jihadist that we need to be aware of. Along the spectrum you find people who may reject violence, but who accept various parts of the extremist world-view including real hostility towards western democracy and liberal values. If we are to defeat this threat, it’s time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past. So first, instead of ignoring this extremist ideology, we as governments and societies have got to confront it in all forms.¹²

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² Patrick Wintour, ‘David Cameron Tells Muslim Britain: Stop Tolerating Extremist’, *The Guardian*, 05 February, 2011, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/feb/05/davidcameron-muslim-extremism>

However, this connection was not initially suggested by Cameron. The discussions after the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, the release of the Mohammed cartoons in Denmark by *Jyllands-Posten* and the subsequent controversy in other European countries during 2005-2006, offer the most well-known examples. These cases were accepted as proof of both the disloyalty of Muslims to European notions of multiculturalism and tolerance, and the failure of multiculturalism and integration policies in the Netherlands and Denmark.¹³ In addition to these events, the Paris riots of 2005, and the minaret debate in Switzerland in 2009 provide a “series of iconic events in Western Europe [that] have assumed explanatory power in relation to [the] diverse and often particularized political conflict” between Europe and its unintegrated Muslims.¹⁴

All these events were elaborated in the context of the incompatible difference between European and Muslims' culture and values, rather than a political and economic conflict. On this ground, the entire community of European Muslims has been put under a shadow of suspicion and began to be framed as ‘enemies within’. Moreover, their religion and culture has been viewed as dangerous with the emphasis of its presumed resistance to integration. This view has reached such a point that Muslims are increasingly reflected politically as beings that are needed to be kept under strict control. This image has been further supported by theses on the “culture clash”, which ascribed the idea that “the West and the Rest”¹⁵ are discrete and unrelated entities, and are at different levels of development¹⁶ and civilization.

¹³ Alana Lentin & Gavan Titley, “The crises of ‘Multiculturalism’ in Europe: Mediated Minarets, Intolerable Subjects”. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 15 (2), 2012, pp. 126.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 127.

¹⁵ Kishore Mahbubani, ‘The West and the Rest’, *The National Interest*, Summer 1992, pp.3-13, in Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilizations’, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, p.41. Huntington has used the Kishore Mahbubani's conception and stated that the world politics will be the relations between “the West and the Rest”. Rest refers to the non-Western civilizations.

¹⁶ Shrene Razack, ‘Imperilled Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim Men, and Civilized Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to Forced Marriages’, *Feminist Legal Studies*, 12: 2004, 129.

In these theses the main emphasis is that Western culture was built upon the Greek, Roman, and Renaissance traditions that value democracy, equality, individual rights, and rational thought; without the same history, the “Rest” of cultures cannot make the same claim. Samuel P. Huntington provides a popular example of these theses in which he draws a bright line between Western and non-Western civilizations. He states that:

The West differs from other civilizations not in the way it has developed but in the distinctive character of its values and institutions. These include most notably its Christianity, pluralism, individualism, and the rule of law, which made it possible for the West to invent modernity, expand throughout the world, and become the envy of other societies... Europe as Arthur R. Schlesinger Jr. has said, is ‘the source –the unique source’ of the ‘ideas of individual liberty, human rights, and cultural freedom... these are European ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption.’ They make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is valuable not because it is universal but because it is unique.¹⁷

His popular “clash of civilizations” thesis mainly reflects that the fundamental conflict in the new world order will be cultural, rather than ideological and economic. Global politics will be defined by conflicts between nations and civilizations, rather than between nations and other nations. He clearly states that since the end of the Cold War, international politics has been shaped by the conflicts between “the West and non-Western civilizations” on one hand, and between “non-Western civilizations” “which no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history” on the other. This conflict is unlikely to decline; on the contrary, in the future “the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics”.¹⁸

¹⁷ Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, 1995.

¹⁸ Smauel P. Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilizations’, p.41.

The effects of this narrative and the clash of civilization thesis were clearly seen after 2001; Islam and Muslims began to be perceived as a ‘monolithic enemy’ of Western civilization. Particularly in the US, the political discourse began to reflect the idea of an irreconcilable clash between the West and non-Western civilizations. In 2001, the US began to wage a “war on terror” with Islamic civilization in response to the bombings of the World Trade Center and of the Pentagon. Of course, Huntington's thesis has influenced Europe as well, but in a different form. European governments did not declare a “war on terror”, but it started fighting against terror in an implicit way.

The reaction of European governments against the attacks in the US was featured in the daily news of *The New York Times*. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder described the attacks as “a declaration of war against the civilized world”¹⁹, rather than only a war against the US. Namely, Europe reacted to ‘Islamic terror’ on the ground of clash of civilization thesis, but this thesis has more fundamental and deep ground in European discourse. It is grounded on Eurocentric narrative about Europe and ‘the rest of the world’. European identity, culture and values are still on the center of this narrative and it shapes the decisions, organizations and regulations of the European political context.

At that point, it is crucial to state that the word “European political context” does not simply refer to everyday politics or party politics. It is in the constitutive level being independent from the governmental politics and its ideology. There is no doubt that democratic constitutional systems based on the principle of division of constitutive and constituted power, and the rule of law, and equality of them over defining the political discourse; however, in European politics, it seems that constitutive power defines the political context in the last instance. That, is constitutive power, constituted by identity, culture and values, is the ultimate

¹⁹ Cited in *New York Times*, September 12, 2001, available at:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/reaction-from-around-the-world.html>

determinant of politics of the constitutional systems. Then, if identity is one of the main factor through which European politics is defined, the question that needs to be asked should be: “what kind of identity, then, does Europe represent to Europeans?”²⁰

The Eurocentric narrative about what Europe has been revived after 2001. It has been manifested itself through an effort of self-definition of with an emphasis on what Europe is and how the non-Europeans can place inside the borders of Europe. Revealed during the enlargement process of the EU, this form of self-definition has also emphasized European identity, culture and values, but this time it began to take a dramatic form.

The widespread narrative about Europe defines everything with reference to Europe and emphasize the superiority of European politics, economy, culture, and values. This is addressed by the prominent scholar Anthony Pagden. He stated that there is a particular emphasis on that there is no alternative to the European liberal democratic state structure in the narrative about Europe.²¹ In the same manner, Talal Asad draws attention that Europe has always been described as the pioneer or even essential missionary of civilization of the whole world. It is perceived as always productive and legitimized by law and science. Asad gives some examples of the creator of this narrative. For instance, Huhg Trevor-Roper defined such a civilization that were taking things up from outside and creatively worked on them. Also, John Lock's Enlightenment theory about property made a significant contribution to this narrative. Lock states that

God gave the world to men in common, but since He gave it them for

²⁰ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?” in Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union*. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 209.

²¹ Anthony Pagden, *The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union*. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 11.

their benefit and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed He meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to use of the industrious and rational (and labor was to be his title to it); not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious.²²

For Talal Asad this text reflects the mentality in which property was perceived as European and Europeans lawfully appropriated, cultivated, and passed it to generations of Europeans as their own inheritance. Moreover, it reflects the mentality which sees the European history is the history of improvement and accumulation and puts Europe as the place of all material and moral acts.²³ This kind of narrative puts the difference between Europe and Others by emphasizing the superiority of European history and democratic state structure.

The narratives about Europe emphasized the Europe as a civilization being different from other civilizations. In this narrative while being universal, distinctive, and advanced is attributed to the European civilization, the people who come from non-European civilization, but live in Europe are assumed as 'unstable' and 'ambiguous' and 'completely external' to European civilization. Particularly, European Muslims having been perceived in that way.²⁴ On the other hand, the following should be emphasized that, despite Muslims are in the center of discussions recently, not only Muslims, but also Russians or European Jews are perceived to be not included by this experience. They are not accepted as 'fully' European, because they are assumed to not have this civilization background.

As indicated before several times by prominent scholars, Europe's 'religious' and 'secular' self-definition is one of the main determinants of this understanding of

²² John Locke, *Two Treatises of Civil Government*. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1924, book II, chapter V, paragraph 34 (emphasis added), cited in Talal Asad, "Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?", pp. 216.

²³ Talal Asad, "Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?" pp. 216-7.

²⁴ Talal Asad, "Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?" pp. 215.

civilization. This understanding shape the perception about the Europe's Others. If it is looked at the history about Europe's religious and secular definition, as Jan Ifversen noted that, while Europe was attached to geographical representations of world composed of Europe, Asia, and Africa/Libya before 15th century, in the 15th century, it was formed within the religious discourse and equated with Christianity. On the other hand, while Christianity was referring to a transnational term, the concept of Europe was referring to the limit to a non-European world. The concept of Europe was increasingly used in an international political context in the 16th century, so that state discourse replaced the religious discourse. Thus, the concept of Europe began to be used to define a system of military, economic, diplomatic and legal relations, rather than a religious value. The concept of Europe did not have a religious connotation anymore, but it was accompanied by an idea of Europe as a cultural value which is combined with “civilization”. In the context of civilization, Europeans have placed themselves and their continent in a superior position.²⁵

On the other, I assert that a shadowy transformation is at stake here. Namely, although there is no clear reference to religion/Christianity, Europe defines the difference between the civilizations mostly with reference to religion in an *apophatic* way of mentioning. Therefore, as opposed to general assumptions, civilization has a specific history and religion in an *apophatic* form. This has been gaining visibility through the perception about Muslims and Islamic civilization. As Ghada Hashem Talhmi (2004) states that religion has always been a powerful cohesive force that Islam remains external to Europe. Europe has been distinguishing itself from the Other by secularism which is related with Enlightenment. To examine the historical background of Europe distinguishing itself from non-Europeans, Talhmi focuses on the John Esposito's ideas that the

²⁵ The electronic edition of Jan Ifversen, 'The Meaning of European Civilization – A Historical – Conceptual Approach', Working Paper no: 51-97, Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus, available at:
http://www.hum.au.dk/ckultur/f/publications/ji/european_civilization.htm

period after the European Enlightenment became the yardstick by which all other religions were measured and also it delimited Europe as the West. Therefore, West represents the separation of church and state, while Islam as a faith make no separation between religion and politics.²⁶ Asad mentions that this oppositional role of Islam caused to be coded as a civilization which tries to destroy Europe's civilization. In this narrative, Europe has been narrated as a victim who needs to overcome this struggle. The myths and narratives of both Europe and the Other, who are assumed to live in Europe, rather than from Europe, have attributed unchangeable essences to both of them. In this context, European civilization is assumed to have essential superior character and this authorizes Europe to assimilate Muslim immigrants to European civilization. Insomuch that, due to its superior character, Europe has been represented as an active power to reconstruct the world. More strikingly, in these narratives Europe has been assumed and reflected as a linear history and a homogeneous identity in spite of the huge differences between the inhabitants –Byzantium, Eastern Europeans, North-Western Europeans, Jews- of European continent.²⁷

Of course such a narrative should also be considered in terms of what it does not tell. In order to understand the concept of Europe, the unwritten narrative of Europe should be read. The immediately visible thing is the violent colonization of Africa and in the Middle East, and decolonization process. They fit poorly into this narrative, since some particular memories are easier to accept than those of degrading period of colonization and decolonization. Therefore, it seems that Europe has a selective memory about its past.²⁸ As Tony Judt pointed out post-war Europe was built on “founding myths” which were helpful in building a liberal

²⁶ Ghada Hashem Talhmi, ‘The Oxford Round Table: European, Muslim and Female’, *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 2, (Summer 2004).

²⁷ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, pp. 216-8.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 212.

order, and there was much that needed to be forgotten. The most prominent founding myths of Europe has shaped with the aim tempting to erase from the public record any reference to the legacy of colonialism and slavery, and racism.²⁹ Hence, while some parts of history are ignored and repressed, some other parts are emphasized and even apologized for them. In a particular sense, European political context either does not bring colonialism and racism into discussion, or ignore them as disappeared by leaving out Holocaust and “civilizing mission” of colonialism. This selective approach of Europe is expressed by Alana Lentin in a very sharp way: “The holocaust was Europe's tragedy. Colonialism someone else's”.³⁰ In the same manner, in his book *The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe*³¹, Tony Judt notes that the idea of Europe based on the collective memories about Holocaust; the mass brutalities and civil cruelties during Nazi crimes for which all states were directly or indirectly responsible.³² From this context, he addresses a very striking point that “the myth of Europe” does not simply suppress the collective memories of violence within Europe; the resurrection of some memories strengthens that myth”.³³ And this attempt to resurrect the Holocaust memory reaches such a point that European solidarity is strengthened by it.³⁴ But, right at that point, a very significant fact should be emphasized that in this selective mentality, Holocaust has also been discussed in a very limited perspective; it has been reflected as a Nazi crime. As Goldberg stated

²⁹ Tony Judt, “The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe”, *Daedalus*, Vol.121, No.4, 1992.

³⁰ Alana Lentin, ‘Europe and the Silence about Race’, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 11(4), 2008, pp.495.

³¹ Tony Judt, “The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe”.

³² Cited in Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, pp. 212.

³³ Cited in Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, pp. 212.

³⁴ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, pp. 12.

that racism has been seen as a minoritarian ‘attitude’ rather than an outcome of ‘racial rule’.³⁵ Lentin addresses this way of mentioning racism with this emphasis:

Europe stands for what are upheld as universal values, the values that set Europe apart and above: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Under this trinity, there is no room for race, indeed, race, as we have been told, came to blights Europe for a brief period but was banished as quickly as it settled. Europe is, therefore, the standard against which all else can be judged.³⁶

In the same way, European colonial history was treated as a blind spot of history. Both historians and policy makers talked about the colonial rules as beneficial to natives.³⁷ It is hardly defined as racist; it is perceived as a part of civilizing mission of Europe. Therefore, colonial past is not suppressed completely; the civilizing mission of colonial past has been emphasized to strengthen the myth of Europe.

On the other hand, today, we know from the literature and the situation in European metropolises that colonization and decolonization periods are very violent processes and racial discrimination and torture are intrinsic to them. Although there is a very strong tendency to ignore the colonial history of Europe, as Goldberg (1992), Asad (2002), Mignolo (2002), Grosfoguel (2004) strongly state that colonial histories are intrinsic to not only European history, but also modernity in general (Asad, 2002). Insomuch that, for Asad (2002) and Mignolo (2000), colonialism is the main instrument which makes modern European states. Balibar expands this approach to a wider context by stating that

The emergence of a European public space, whatever detours and conflicts it may have to pass through, will inevitably pose the problem of a transcendence of atavisms inherited from a political history marked as much by exploitation and colonialism as by democratic conquest and

³⁵ David Theo Goldberg, *Racial State*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002.

³⁶ Alana Lentin, ‘Europe and the Silence about Race’, pp. 500.

³⁷ Alana Lentin, ‘Racism in Post-racial Europe’, pp. 3

movement of social emancipation.³⁸

Moreover, as Etienne Balibar (2004) and Barros (2005) state, the contemporary understanding of immigrants and their categorization is still being shaped by the colonial and racist mentality. In the same way, although race is assumed to be not applicable anymore, as Lentin (2008) draws attention that race is “adapting and readapting itself, chameleon-like to the changing political and social landscape. It is for reason that race is central to political culture in a constitutive sense: it plays a formative role in constructing images of societies that are easily transmittable”.³⁹

As Anthony Pagden states that “a double imposition” is at stake in self-definition of Europe: “the need to repudiate their imperial past while clinging resolutely to the belief that there can be no alternative to the essentially European liberal democratic state”.⁴⁰ Almost every step of this narrative, as Goldberg noted, Europeanness has been reflected as a norm and moral hegemony.⁴¹ In this context, I think that all the narrative about Europe brings the position of being the criteria of legitimacy. Here, the notion of legitimacy refers something more than a relationship of consent between the ruler and the ruled; it refers to a position which is constructed as legitimate by the subject who takes such a position. Hence, there is very limited place for the “other” narratives in this self-definition. From this context, it can be concluded that Europe which is narrated by ignoring some part of its history, is a fictive construction. Hayden White and Saskia Sassen are the ones who addressed the fictiveness and constructedness of European identity. I assert that this fictive and constructed character of European identity became visible after 2001.

³⁸ Etienne Balibar, *We the People of Europe?: Reflections of Transnational Citizenship*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. pp. 43.

³⁹ Alana Lentin, ‘Racism in Post-racial Europe’, *Eurozine*, available at: <http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2011-11-24-lentin-en.pdf>

⁴⁰ Anthony Pagden, *The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union*, pp. 11.

⁴¹ David Theo Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.29, No. 2, 2006, pp. 336-339.

If we go back to the Europe's reaction to 'Islamic terror', we can see these prominent events in the first hand. The French newspaper *Le Monde* run a front-page headline with "*Nous sommes tous Américains*", or "We are all Americans". Also, French President Jacques Chirac released a statement:

It is with great emotion that France has learned of these monstrous attacks which have just struck the United States of America. In these horrific circumstances, the French people stand a one, side by side with the American people. They want to expresses their friendship and solidarity in this tragedy. Their thoughts go especially to injure and to the families of the victims. France condemns totally this terrorism against which we must fight with absolute determination.⁴²

Although France did not considerably change its anti-terrorism framework after 2001, the Law on Everyday Security passed November 15th, 2001. This new law enlarges police powers, allows stopping and searching of vehicles in the context of terrorism investigations, and enlarged the extensive monitoring and recording of electronic transactions. Also, new immigration law in 2003 was released which made easier to "deport individuals who 'have committed acts justifying a criminal trial' or whose behavior 'threatens public order'". More selective immigration policies have been regulated in May 2006 and it has been stated that Islam is central to the legal changes Nicolas Sarkozy declared that France should reject the difference and new immigrants must accept the "European values" such as publication of religious cartoons in newspapers and taking identity photographs without headcover for women. Similar rejection came from the left which states that they are not willing to accept differences on core matters such as gender. The prominent example is Malek Boutih who is the ex-president of anti-racist organization SOS-Racisme and prominent member of the Socialist Party. Boutih defended this new policies by mentioning the "*laïcité* and the respect of gender equality as precondition for migration".⁴³ It increased penalties for illegal

⁴² *Le Monde*, <http://wfile.ait.org.tw/wf-archive/2001/010913/epf410.htm>

⁴³ Cited in Jocelyne Cesari, "Introduction: Use of the Term 'Islamophobia' in European Societies" in

immigration and put new limits on family reunification. Germany developed new policies on both September 19th, 2001 and January 1st, 2002. These new policies regarded civil liberties, immigrant rights, the freedom of churches, and law enforcement powers. Police power was expanded that financial records, electronic and postal communications, and transportation records became available to the police. Military intelligence has received more domestic powers. The legal principles were reshaped in the context that foreigners considered a threat to German democracy and security can be deported. The United Kingdom also published a new Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill on November 13th, 2001. This new bill made possible to detain and interrogate the individuals in anticipation of violence rather than in response to the action. This new bill was updated after the bombings on the London subway on July 7th, 2005. This updated bill allows for detention of terrorism suspects for up to ninety days. Italian government also regulated new laws in 2005. These new regulations expanded police detention powers and increase the penalties for illegal immigration. It brought strict limitations to entry and residency of immigrants, and family reunification. The Netherlands focused on the security and prevention of the radicalization of domestic populations, and proposed new anti-terrorism laws which made easier to arrest terrorist suspects and hold them for up to two years prior to court decision. The new immigration policies have been developed. They emphasized the importance of assimilation of immigrants to the common values. New restrictions have been regulated for family reunification.⁴⁴

Moreover, as in France, Muslims and Islam have been the central to these changes. The striking example of these changes is that the Dutch Ministry of Aliens Affairs

Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe, Muslims in Western Europe After 9/11: Why the Term Islamophobia is a More Predicament than Explanation, Submission to the Changing Landscape of Citizenship and Security: 6th PCRD of European Commission., 1 June, 2006, pp. 28, available at: http://www.euro-islam.info/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/securitization_and_religious_divides_in_europe.pdf

⁴⁴ Jocelyne Cesari, "Introduction: Use of the Term 'Islamophobia' in European Societies", pp. 20-3.

and Integration made a film which shows some part of Dutch gender relations and sexuality. The film screens naked bodies, homosexuality in public and assertive female characters. For Jocelyne Cesari, this film sends a “no-so-subtle message against conservative Islam”.⁴⁵ Cesari stated, “the most dramatic change has happened in the political culture of the Netherlands.... Increasingly it is possible to make anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant statements in common politics which would have been entirely inappropriate in previous years”.⁴⁶ The changes were not happened in the level of policy level, but in the level of public debates which has focused on the forbidding Islam, the deportation of second generation Moroccans or the banning of gender segregated mosques.⁴⁷

The connection between September 11, 2001 attacks and European Muslims were emphasized. The prominent example is retrial of Mounir al-Motassadek who was arrested in Hamburg eleven weeks after the attacks in New York and Washington. In this case, the Hamburg-based “cell” connection of the September 11, 2001 attacks were emphasized. German prosecutors mentioned that “the Hamburg cell consisted of eight members: three suicide pilots, three logistical planners and two others whose role remains vague, but who might also have become suicide pilots. The cell was active and embarking on the plot to attack US targets by the summer of 1999.... [Also] Muhammed Atta, a wealthy Egyptian, is believed to have been a key figure in the Hamburg cell, but also the ringleader of all 10 of the 9/11 hijackers”. Particularly, the prosecutor Kay Nehm mentioned that

[a]ll of the members of this cell shared the same religious convictions, an Islamic lifestyle; a feeling of being out of place in unfamiliar cultural surroundings that they were not used to. ... At the center of this stood a hatred of world Jewry and the United States. ... [The group] began talking about a holy war against the United States in which the

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 28

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 32.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

maximum number of people could be killed”.⁴⁸

BBC news headlined this issue as “Hamburg Connection” and emphasized that “Germany's second largest city is home to about 200.000 Muslims, and the radicals blend in easily with the ordinary Muslim population.... Investigators believe that al-Qaeda has operated in the city since at least 1999”.⁴⁹ CNN News headlined this issue as “Hamburg Cell at the Heart of Terrorist Plot Against Europe” and addressed that a 1990s, Mohamed Atta, who went on to become the lead hijacker in the 9/11 attacks, was attended the Taiba mosque in Hamburg and a friend of him, Naamen Meziche, a French citizen of Algerian descent, “worked to persuade a number of young men praying at the Taiba mosque to join in jihad, the officials said”.⁵⁰ A European counter-terrorism official mentioned that Meziche had connections to al-Qaeda dating to the 1990s. Moreover, it was addressed that some members of the group are German of Syrian or Iranian descent and they urged other Germans to join in jihad against American forces in Afghanistan. CNN reported the declaration of the German intelligence officials who told CNN that “Hamburg, like many other European cities, including London, face greater challenges”.⁵¹

In addition to the changes in political culture, another trend has been the use of Muslim spokespeople to criticize Islam and Muslims. They have been represented as the voice of minority. The most famous one is Ayan Hirsi Ali who is Somali-born immigrant and former MP in the Netherlands. She had a campaign about the illiberal aspects about Islam. She is a character who defines herself as ‘ex-Muslim’

⁴⁸ Cited in BBC News, ‘The Hamburg Connection’, Friday 19, 2005, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2349195.stm>

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ Cited in CNN News, ‘Hamburg Cell at the Heart of Terrorist Plot Against Europe’, October 4, 2010, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/10/04/europe.terror.plot/>

⁵¹ *ibid.*

and blaming Islam as the source of backward cultural practices. She was reflected as an expert on Islam and a trustworthy critic of Islam. She stated that the conservative form of Islam fundamentally incompatible with liberal democracy. More than that, she defined the Islamic prophet Muhammad as “a pedophile” and “a preserve tyrant”.⁵² Another figures are from France: Fedela Amara, Loubna Méliane, and Djavann Chahdortt who were emerged during the debates on Islamic headscarves. As Ayan Hirsi Ali, they published their autobiographies that reflect their difficult personal experiences with Islam. They define themselves as both anti-racist activists and co-founders of *Ni Putes Ni Soumises* (Neither Whores nor Doormats). As Hirsi Ali did, they defined themselves as “ex-Muslim” women and criticized the conservative Muslim communities. They emphasized that they embraced the “secular-*qua*-universal” values of liberty, equality and tolerance. In France, they have been perceived as “ideally suited to speak on behalf of their sisters silenced by patriarchal Islamic 'fundamentalists’”.⁵³ They were invited by the Stasi Commission that was created by President Jacques Chirac to investigate threats to French secularism and *laïcité*. Felda Amara wrote an autobiography and won the French National Assembly's Political Book Prize in 2004. In her book she supported the “reaffirmation of secularism” as the solution to the problems of banlieues in which Islamist groups practicing a “basement Islam” which refers to unregulated underground Islam.⁵⁴

A specific image has been created through the media about Muslims. Muslims are reflected as problems or their integration failure was emphasized rather than the success. For example in Germany, honor killings became a large controversial topic. Moreover in 2004, one of the TV channel in Denmark showed an imam's

⁵² Jocelyne Cesari, “Introduction: Use of the Term 'Islamophobia' in European Societies”, pp. 33.

⁵³ Mayanthi Fernando, ‘Exceptional Citizens: Secular Muslim Women and the Politics of Difference in France’, *Social Anthropology*, 17: 4 (2009), pp. 379-380.

⁵⁴ Cited in Mayanthi Fernando, ‘Exceptional Citizens: Secular Muslim Women and the Politics of Difference in France’, pp. 380.

speech which mentions that “Danish women who do not wear the veil ‘were asking for rape’; other clerics recommended that Denmark adopt the tribal concept of blood money”.⁵⁵ Also, as Ammitzboll, who is a journalist with *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten*, and Vidino, who is an analyst for the Investigative Project on Terrorism and author of *Al-Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad*, stated that Danish newspapers began to report crimes committed by immigrants. Politicians detailed the abuse and criminal activities during the cartoon controversy in Denmark. *Jyllands-Posten* focused on very particular figures from the Muslim immigrants. Raed Hlayhel is one of them who is “a Lebanese graduate of the University of Median in Saudi Arabia where he immersed himself in Wahhabism. He moved to Denmark in 1999 after receiving a humanitarian visa to get medical care for his son but refused to learn Danish. Hlayhel established himself at Gellerup's small Grimhoejvej mosque and began to preach his strict and politicized interpretation of Islam, attracting a small following among the neighborhood's Arab population. His sermons repeatedly made *Jyllands-Posten* headlines, as he decreed that Muslim women should cover themselves from head to toe and will disqualify themselves from paradise if they wear perfume or got to the hairdresser”.⁵⁶

In the same manner 28-year-old imam Ahmed Akkari who was born in Lebanon was also presented in the media. First, he was portrayed as a model immigrant. He participate a campaign to prevent his family's deportation to Lebanon for illegal immigration.⁵⁷ After he won his battle with the government, he came to the agenda

⁵⁵ *The Copenhagen Post*, Sept 24, 2004; *Berlingske Tidende* (Copenhagen), June 3, 2005, cited in Pernille Ammitzboll and Lorenzo Vidino, ‘After the Danish Cartoon Controversy’, *Middle East Quarterly*, (Winter 2007), available at: http://www.investigativeproject.org/269/after-the-danish-cartoon-controversy#_ftn6

⁵⁶ *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten*, May 21, 2006, cited in Pernille Ammitzboll and Lorenzo Vidino, ‘After the Danish Cartoon Controversy’.

⁵⁷ *Ekstra Bladet* (Copenhagen), Feb. 14, 2006, cited in Pernille Ammitzboll and Lorenzo Vidino, ‘After the Danish Cartoon Controversy’.

with his assault of person who accidentally removed her sister's veil. Then he again came to the agenda with his advocacy of a case who kicked unveiled Muslim girl.⁵⁸ Ahmed Abu Laban, who is popular imam in Denmark is another striking figure which was brought to the agenda. He defines himself as a moderate Muslim, but his past was known with terrorism because of his membership to Muslim Brothers and his close relationship with the top leader of the Egyptian terrorist group. He also worked for a magazine which “glorified the killing of Western tourists in Egypt and urged the annihilation of Jews in Israel”.⁵⁹

The report of the European Monitoring Center of Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) shows the increase in negative media stereotyping of Muslims asylum seekers as terrorists, in the months following September 11 across all the EU member states. For example, British media were identified as having a particularly disproportionate coverage of Muslims who declared their willingness to join an Islamic war against the West in EUMC (Allen and Nielsen, 2002). Then, the bombing events in 2001 were interpreted as a message to Europe to go into a state of alert and change the multicultural and soft integration policies that served as “obstacles” to the integration of Muslims into European society and culture. As Brubaker (2003) suggests, instead of declaring a “war on terror”, assimilation was achieved and the 'failure of multiculturalism' was declared after 2001. Brubaker states that

[t]he return of assimilation has involves a subtle but significant change in perspective. Analytically this has involved a shift from an overwhelming focus on persisting difference -and on the mechanisms through which such cultural maintenance occurs- to a broader focus that encompasses emerging commonalities as well. Normatively, it has involved a shift from the automatic polarization of cultural difference

⁵⁸*Ekstra Bladet* (Copenhagen), Feb. 15, 2006, cited in Pernille Ammitzboll and Lorenzo Vidino, ‘After the Danish Cartoon Controversy’.

⁵⁹ Pernille Ammitzboll and Lorenzo Vidino, ‘After the Danish Cartoon Controversy’.

to a renewed concern with civic integration.⁶⁰

In this context, European governments started to take steps, which may be seen as an act of subjugation to defuse the “Muslim threat”, violating the principle of equality that underlies the idea of multiculturalism on behalf of integrating Muslims into European society. This notion of subjugation also found expression in the form of violent local protests against Muslim Europeans. The ENAR (European Network Against Racism)⁶¹ published a report in 2003 and emphasized this violence:

Harassment against Muslims and other minority members peaked in late 2001 due to what appeared to be heightened vulnerability created by the September 11 events and an election campaign that was largely dominated by a negative focus on immigration. From September to December 2001, the Central Intelligence Service registered a record number of 52 alleged racially motivated attacks on foreigners, including cases of vandalism, arson, intimidation and physical

⁶⁰ Rogers Brubaker, ‘The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspective on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and United States’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.24 No.4 (July 2001), pp. 542.

⁶¹ ENAR defines itself that “is the only pan-European anti-racist network that combines advocacy for racial equality and facilitating cooperation among civil society anti-racist actors in Europe. The organization was set up in 1998 by grassroots activists on a mission to achieve legal changes at European level and make decisive progress towards racial equality in all EU Member States. Since then, ENAR has grown and achieved a great deal”, cited at <http://enar-eu.org/About-us>. It defines its own mission as: “Our mission is to achieve full equality, solidarity and well-being for all in Europe. We want to allow all members of society, whatever their skin color, ethnicity, sex, gender, religion, disability, age or sexual orientation, to participate and be included in society. Our take on this? We combat racism and discrimination based on color, ethnicity, national origin, nationality, religion, culture, language or legal status. We envision a vibrant and inclusive society and economy that embrace equality and diversity and the benefits of a racism-free Europe. Unequal treatment and discrimination against people because of their skin color, religion, culture, nationality, legal status or ethnicity result in poorer job opportunities and greater obstacles in accessing health, housing, education and services. Not to mention the more serious consequences of various forms of racism: physical and verbal violence against ethnic and religious minorities and migrants, which not only impact individuals but also entire communities. These inequalities have a negative impact on the whole of society. Discriminating and excluding talented individuals result in a huge waste of talents and skills, especially at a time when we need to harness our collective full potential to get out of the present economic downturn. We have decided not to let this go unchallenged: we break down structural barriers and policies that limit migrants’ and ethnic and religious minorities’ opportunities to participate fully in society and have, ultimately, a damaging impact on the well-being of all European residents”, cited at <http://enar-eu.org/Mission-142>

assaults.⁶²

Rather than peaking in 2001 though, violence against Muslims gradually increased even more after 2001. One of the most extreme examples is given by the actions of Anders Breivik in Norway on July 22, 2011. His attack killed over seventy people at a youth camp, and his manifesto emphasized a corresponding antagonism with the multicultural policies of Europe and the Muslims of Europe.

This subtle but significant change, which identified European multicultural tolerance and soft integration policies as factors that impede the integration of Muslims into European culture and values, justified an extended emphasis on the incompatibility of Muslims openly expressing their thoughts and being visible publicly “as they are” with universal values. In this regard, new discriminatory and assimilationist legal decisions and regulations about Muslims and their daily and religious practices have come into the political agenda. These include banning headscarves at schools in France and Germany, preventing the construction of Minarets for mosques in Switzerland, and regulating new citizenship tests in the UK, the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany. The cases in France and Switzerland particularly provide clear examples of these assimilationist policies. Although French multiculturalism emerged from the *le droit à la différence* (right to difference) rhetoric of the 1980s, the recent popular and parliamentary backlash against wearing veils at schools reflects a violent rejection of multicultural ideals. This was rationalized as a defense of the Republican ideal of *laïcité*, a principle that values the neutrality of public space and the separation of public and private, and led to the exclusion of Muslim school girls wearing veils from the public education system. The situation relating the construction of minarets for mosques in Switzerland arose around similar reasons. Both of these bans have been legitimized

⁶² European Network Against Racism (ENAR), Shadow Report 2003: Denmark (Author: Bashy Quraishy), p. 38, cited in the report by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, ‘Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims in EU: Developments since September 11’, p.50. <http://www.enar-eu.org>

through emphasizing the core values of Republicanism and the neutrality of public space.

After all these explanations, it seems that multiculturalism, introduced by the liberal systems of the 1960s, has been losing popularity and acceptability on both formal and informal levels in European political contexts since the 1990s. The current immigration and integration policies of many European countries reflect a shift from pluralism to assimilation.⁶³ On the governmental level, this shift is particularly visible in both a discursive and non-discursive level. This was pointed out in a report by the ECRI⁶⁴ (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance) which proposed that policies promoting a culturally diverse society were influenced and eventually changed in the late 1990s, by the idea that multiculturalism and immigration pose existential threats to cultural and public life within Europe. In this report, it is also pointed out that the events of September 11, 2001 further reinforced this trend and created increased frustration with existing policies. The most obvious example for this is the rapidly growing popularity of some populist politicians, like Pim Fortuyn, after that time.⁶⁵

Therefore, it can be argued that Europe also declared a ‘war on terror’ with its own ways of addressing, which can be defined as ‘an apophatic mode of addressing’, ‘mentioning by not mentioning’, ‘unsaying or speaking-away’. In this way of mentioning ‘every act of unsaying presupposes or demands a previous saying’.

⁶³ Rogers Brubaker, ‘The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspective on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and United States’, pp. 542.

⁶⁴ ECRI is a human rights body of the Council of Europe, composed of independent experts, which monitors problems of racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, intolerance and discrimination on grounds such as ‘race’, national/ethnic origin, color, citizenship, religion and language (racial discrimination); it prepares reports and issues recommendations to member States. At ECRI’s official web site: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/default_en.asp

⁶⁵ LBR, *Racism in the Netherlands – Year in Perspective 2001* (July 2002), at <http://www.lbr.nl>, cited in Helsinki Report, 2005, p. 107. Available at: <http://www.art1.nl/nprd/factsheets/Intolerance%20against%20muslims%20in%20the%20EU%2003-2005.pdf>

From this framework, Europe also declared a war on terror against European Muslims by not explicitly declaring it. In other words, Europe declared a war on terror in an apophatic mode of address; namely, by declaring the failure of multiculturalism and the necessity of integrating Muslims into European society and culture. The discussions after the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, the release of the Mohammed cartoons in Denmark by *Jyllands-Posten* and the subsequent controversy in other European countries in 2005-2006, are clear examples of this mode of address at work. These cases were reflected as proofs of both the disloyalty of Muslims to European notions of multiculturalism and tolerance, and the failure of multiculturalism and integration policies in the Netherlands and Denmark.⁶⁶ Also, banning the visibility of Muslims and Islam in the public space for the sake of integrating them into European culture and values, and protecting the secularity of the public space of France and Switzerland, are other clear examples of this mode of address. What was emphasized through these cases is rooted in David Cameron's speech⁶⁷, which emphasizes protecting Europe from Islamic extremism on the part of not only jihadist Muslims, but all Muslims who are tolerated by multicultural systems and soft integration policies. This speech reflects the sub-text of the need for regulations of integration policies of European countries. In fact, if it is taken back one step further, the sub-text of this sub-text is the issue of whether there is a space for Muslims, who came to Europe as a post-colonial or post-world war 'temporary' labor power, inside the borders of Europe; which has 'distinctive values and institutions' including Christianity, pluralism, individualism, and the rule of law. This subtext makes the 'fantasized' self-perception of Europe visible. Namely, it does not give space for difference by violating the ideas of individual liberty, human rights, and the cultural freedom of Muslims on the one hand, for the sake of protecting universal values, a republican

⁶⁶ Alana Lentin & Gavan Titley, 'The crises of 'multiculturalism' in Europe: Mediated Minarets, Intolerable Subjects'. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 15 (2), pp. 127.

⁶⁷ *Guardian*, 05 February, 2011.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/feb/05/david-cameron-muslim-extremism>

system, secularism, freedom of speech and expression on the other; but at the same time it continues to ironically perceive itself as the unique source of the ideas of individual liberty, human rights, and cultural freedom despite its violation of its spirit. In this manner, not only Muslims, but also other immigrants and their second and third generation descendants who are from Europe have been set apart from Europeans; cultural traits was being main factor which has set them apart.⁶⁸ In these cases, the subtle but significant changes in European politics are based on an older and deeper content.

In this regard, it can also be argued that in spite of the changes in discourse about Muslims in Europe after 2001, this date does not mark a radical shift⁶⁹ in Europe's perception of difference and its understanding of “democracy”, “multiculturalism” and “tolerance”. The discussions on Dutch multiculturalism that took place before 2001 are a clear example of this. They began as early as 1989, when the Scientific Council for Government Policy observed that Dutch integration policies had not been able to prevent the marginalization of immigrants. Following this, Frits Bolkestein, the leader of the liberal party VVD, publicly questioned the compatibility between Islamic and Western values in 1991.⁷⁰

While multiculturalism was the declared governmental policy of the Netherlands in the 1880s, cultural assimilation has been emphasized in immigrants and minority policies since 1990s. Minorities are expected to assimilate the dominant public culture and to limit their cultural and religious practices in the private sphere.

⁶⁸ Alana Lentin, ‘Racism in Post-racial Europe’.

⁶⁹ For instance Nilüfer Göle takes September 11 as a turning point. Nilufer Göle, *İç İçe Girişler: İslam ve Avrupa*, Metis: Istanbul, 2009.

⁷⁰ Cited in Maarten P. Vink, “Dutch 'Multiculturalism' Beyond the Pillarization Myth”, *Political Studies Review*, vol.5, 2007, p. 337-350.

'Good citizenship' and 'civic integration' became new policy goals. Taking an integration course became compulsory for newcomers in 1998.⁷¹

This shows that European political contexts have always already perceived “some” differences as a problem, but now with a twist: this has been addressed through the apophatic way of address following 2001. Given the prior existence of such discussions about the incompatibility between cultures, the significance of 2001 is that the issue has now been brought to the surface of both intellectual and mainstream political discourses. In other words, the events in 2001 and their aftermath allowed this issue to be discussed openly. With reference to the bombing events in the US and Europe, Muslims are increasingly perceived and defined as the most threatening Other; not only in Europe, but also in all of the Western world. In “How Washington's ‘War on Terror’ Became Everyone’s”, Farish Noor states that Washington's declaration of the global “War on Terror” had immediate repercussion on domestic political developments in various parts of the world. He suggested the “War on Terror” discourse become a further extension of American political, military, and ideological hegemony in the world.⁷²

In fact, this situation has “triggered” a “paranoia” and “anxiety” about “threat of Islam”, which had been defined as islamophobia⁷³ long before. The events in and after 2001 have provided a “legitimate” visibility to islamophobia; the discourse is now more of an apology for the adoption of a paranoid politics, rather than the ultimate cause of it. The British Prime Minister David Cameron's self-righteous self-criticism in an interview on al-Jazeera TV to mark the 10th anniversary of the attacks is significant in this sense. Even 10 years after, it can be seen that he

⁷¹ Jocelyne Cesari, “Introduction: Use of the Term 'Islamophobia' in European Societies”, pp. 26.

⁷² Farish A. Noor, ‘How Washington's War on Terror Become Everyone's: Islamophobia and the Impact of September 11 on the Political Terrain of South and Southeast Asia’, *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*: Vol. 5: Iss.1, 2006.

⁷³ According to Oxford English Dictionary, this term was first used in an article in *The Journal of Theological Studies* in 1923 (Oxford University Press).

emphasize the continued anxiety about potential attacks as a tool for defending their past “mistakes”.

Yes of course mistakes were made and of course you know what happened at Guantanamo Bay, there were mistakes made. ... Yes, we can certainly see with hindsight, and in some ways at the time, mistakes were made in that we lost some of our moral authority, which is vital to keep when you are trying to make your case in the world ... [but] remember how many British people, how many French people, how many Germans, how many people of all nationalities were killed on 11 September. All of those governments and the American government were thinking this is going to happen again. This is going to happen very quickly. Maybe it will be a chemical or biological attack. That point was made very forcefully.⁷⁴

From this speech it can be seen that the events of September 11, 2001 intensified Europeans' fears about their own vulnerability to such acts. After that date, islamophobia became the main grounding determinant for the exclusionary regulation of Muslims and Muslim practices which have been defined and coded through the perception of 'Islamic extremism'.⁷⁵ Moreover, they have been declared as not only dangerous, essentially barbaric, and uncivilized, but also indefinable and uncanny beings that need to be kept under strict control. In this context, the information that the undertakers of the attacks, Osama bin Laden and his network, have sympathizers among European Muslims, has put the entire Muslims community under a shadow of suspicion.⁷⁶ Hence, the events in and after 2001 are used to justify and legitimize extreme discourse and regulations about Muslims. All in all, what happened on September 11, 2001 has had significant and negative consequences for the Muslims in the US and Europe. On the other hand, it has also opened a way to question the European political context and fantasized

⁷⁴ *Guardian*, 10 September, 2011, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/sep/10/david-cameron-uk-moral-authority>

⁷⁵ Liz Fekete, “Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State”, *Race & Class*, 46: 3, 2004, pp. 3-29.

⁷⁶ Shireen T. Hunter, *Islam, Europe's Second Religion*, Praeger: USA, 2002, pp. 277

self-definition of Europe. Particularly, the declarations and regulations about European Muslims gives a possibility to challenge Europe's authoritarian position about being the main holder of human rights, democracy, pluralism, multiculturalism and tolerance. For this questioning, we need to ask why and how Europe has been imposing extreme regulations on European Muslims, and how it legitimizes these behaviors.

Following the statements made so far, it can be clearly seen that the paranoia and anxiety about Muslims triggered by these events; they triggered something which has been asleep in the European political context. By looking at the emergence of this paranoid tone and islamophobic discourse very suddenly, we can think that there may be a very strong censorship in the form of exclusion from the public sphere in political context of Europe. With the attacks in 2001, assumed to be organized by “Muslims”, severity of censorship reduced to the ground of a necessity to fight the source of the paranoia and anxiety. From this framework, as Alana Lentin noted, “[m]ulticulturalism has become a battleground in a Europe desperate to (re)discover itself and to (re)assert its hegemony”.⁷⁷ That is, the criticism of multiculturalism and soft integration policies on the ground of the “threat of Islam” reflects this censorship. The otherness of Muslims, and the invasiveness and violence of European democracy and tolerance are not solely the product of 2001. As with many sociological issues, the visible tension between Europe and its Muslims since 2001, is a complex phenomenon; which resists explanation from any single source. In these instances, taking 2001 as a turning point, the tendency of perceiving the existence of Muslims in Europe as a problem makes us blind to see the longer, complicated and multi-layered historical processes working to arrange the relationship between Europe and European Muslims.

⁷⁷ Alana Lentin, “Racism in Post-racial Europe”.

In order to understand these multi-layered and complicated processes, we have to look at the debates shaped after the bombing events in September 11, 2001 as a “reproduction” of an existing image of Muslims. It is a reproduction of this image in a contemporary form; in accordance with the contemporary conditions. This reproduction has been encouraged by the resurrection of a powerful categorization of religion as a main factor for othering, offered in the 19th century, which centered on the idea that

[the] thing called religion still held sway over all those who were unlike [Europeans]; non- Europeans, Europeans of the premodern past, and among their own contemporary neighbors, the uncivilized and uneducated bucolic populace as well as the superstitious urban poor, all whom were something of 'savages within'. [Therefore] the modern discourse on religion and religions was from the very beginning a discourse of secularization; at the same time, it was clearly a discourse of othering”.⁷⁸

Significantly, this categorization of religion provides precedence for the conflation of the religious Other with the uncivilized, uneducated, poor and superstitious “savages within”. The step from the “savages within” to the “enemy within” is a small one, where this term describes a threatening religious enemy, who tries to reappropriate religion for their own political aims in a Europe where religion was expected to be relinquished centuries ago. In this manner, under the guise of the “threat of Islam”, Muslims are coded as “enemies within” until explicitly proven otherwise, and whose religion of Islam supposedly poses a challenge to not only the European political and economic stability but also to European values and culture in the post-Cold War neoliberal mindset. After the war political and economic “systems” are no longer negotiable or open to threat, everyone will become democratic and capitalist according to this mindset. What are at stake then

⁷⁸ Tomoko Masuzawa, *The Invention of the World Religions*, The Chicago University Press: Chicago and London, 2005, p. 19.

are the stability of the neoliberal political and economic order, and the global dominance of European ideology and culture.

This notion of an enemy immediately reminds the conceptualization provided by Carl Schmitt.⁷⁹ In his conceptualization, the "enemy" has to be public, not private or personal: "[a]n enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity".⁸⁰ The 'political' is defined as a political struggle between friend and enemy; an authentic value requires an accompanying struggle. He puts religion as a cultural and political source for the noteworthy levels of hostility that enable the differentiation of friend and enemy. In accordance with this conceptualization, John Esposito draws attention to arguments that were popular in the 1990s; which claimed that transnational Islam was the new global monolithic enemy of the West after the death of communism. These arguments rely on the idea of Islam being essentially external to the West and to the essence of globalization.⁸¹ The idea of conflict between friend and enemy is useful to understand the conflict between Europe and its Muslims, but this conflictual relationship is so complex that it can be rarely reducible to a simple binary conflict between two opposing factions. Instead, to make a proper inquiry into the discourse that began to be visible in the 1990s, which peaked after the bombing attacks of 2001 in the US and in 2004 and 2005 within Europe, we need an approach that would be able to detect the many layers of this conflict.

For this, this dissertation proposes to use the Joan Scott's noteworthy idea of "symptomatic politics"⁸² which is significant to understand the complex situation

⁷⁹ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, p.28.

⁸¹ John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 5.

⁸² Joan Scott, 'Symptomatic Politics: The Banning of Islamic Head Scarves in French Public Schools', *French Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 23 No: 3 (Winter 2005), p. 109.

that has been created in Europe after 2001. It is significant, because it attempts to explain a visible behavior as a symptom of a larger hidden conflict, and forces us to ask questions to understand the hidden conflict. In other words, it encourage us to point out and analyze the deeper layers of this conflict. To apply this to the current issue, the portrayal of Muslims in Europe as a problem or an enemy is the symptom of a large hidden conflict. In order to find the larger hidden conflict, the main questions that need to be answered are “why” and “how” Europe stigmatizes the people who live inside its own borders as enemies, which conditions legitimize the perception of European Muslims as enemies, and what are the underlying dynamics of this justification and legitimation?

This dissertation aims to answer these questions by asserting that the conflict between Europe and its Muslims originates from the legacy of European colonialism; which was manifested through otherization, racialization, and civilization. Since European Muslims are still perceived as “immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies”, they are then caught in the logic that Europe employed in its colonialist past.⁸³ In other terms, as Etienne Balibar (2004) and Barros (2005) state, the contemporary understanding of immigrants and their categorization is still being shaped by a colonial and racist mentality; since as Balibar puts very clearly,

[...] the emergence of a European public space, whatever detours and conflicts it may have to pass through, will inevitably pose the problem of a transcendence of atavisms inherited from a political history marked as much by exploitation and colonialisms by democratic conquest and movement of social emancipation.⁸⁴

Therefore, the discourse on the contemporary crises of multiculturalism and stigmatization of Muslims *via* the denigration of their culture and religion is

⁸³ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order*.

⁸⁴ Etienne Balibar, *We the People of Europe?: Reflections of Transnational Citizenship*

sympiotic with and symptomatic⁸⁵ of the ‘disappeared’ colonial and racist ‘past’ of Europe, since the underlying motive of this discourse is civilizing the people from ‘other’ civilizations; which are assumed to “essentially” contradict Western civilization. In other words, colonialism and racialization have been couched within the criticism of multiculturalism and integration policies in a supposedly postcolonial and anti-racist context of Europe, and persists with stigmatizing European Muslims and Islam as an ‘other’ civilization. These are then contemporary articulations of colonialism and racism. They have contemporary organizational paradigms which on the one hand are affected by the ongoing process of globalization. While on the other hand, they are based on a very old issue of the European context: being the question of, there being space for difference inside the ‘very’ borders of Europe itself. At this point, it should be immediately emphasized that the racism emphasized here is different from the one which is openly manifested by extreme right or neo-Nazi groups. The form of racism which is emphasized here is close to the Enlightenment idea and left-tendency political approach. In a more brief sense, it is a form of racism manifested by the stigmatization of European Muslims, and the restriction of their religion by a continued civilizing and proselytizing “mission” of colonialism focused inside the very borders of Europe. That is, this form of racism is manifested as a contemporary civilizing mission of colonialism.

I am aware of the problems that the use of such a challenging assertion can pose, especially in relation to the condition of Europe having a selective memory⁸⁶ about its past. As it is mentioned earlier, it is such a context that while some parts of history are ignored and repressed, some other parts are emphasized and even apologized for. In a particular sense, the European political context either does not bring colonialism and colonial racism into discussion, or ignores them as having

⁸⁵ Joan Scott, 'Symptomatic Politics: The Banning of Islamic Head Scarves in French Public Schools', p. 109.

⁸⁶ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”

disappeared following the ownership of the Holocaust over the “civilizing mission” of colonialism.

Therefore, Europe’s self-conscious admission of racism limits racism with Jewish anti-Semitism, exile, direct exclusion, genocide, or imprisoning at concentration camps. This reflects the denial of racism after Holocaust and denial of legacy of slavery and colonialism reflecting the initial racist experience of Europe. This denial works through anti-racist institutions and organization. Namely, it is believed that racism was condemned by the international organizations such as UN, UNESCO, ILO which refuted the scientific concept of race. Moreover, racism is claimed as a concept that has been the subject of several declarations which have been created after Holocaust. In this framework, it is claimed that racism has not been the issue in contemporary European context. In this framework, today racism is taken as exceptional in European societies; racist acts are claimed as the expressions of far right, extremist or neo-Nazi groups who are definitely against the foreign presence.⁸⁷

On the contrary, Goldberg claims that this kind of handling racism leads to the denial of and the silence on today’s racism against the Muslims via stereotyping them as hostile, aggressive, engaged for religious purpose in constant jihad against Europe.⁸⁸ Within this framework, this dissertation asserts that neither colonial racism, nor racism in the Holocaust have never been really resolved in Europe; it is at the heart of Europe and manifesting itself in the form of racialization of a religion and of borders of the EU. In the framework of this denial, it can be suggested that Europe did not face up to its racist past, rather repressed it. Hence, racism of Europe should be analyzed as a ‘repressed legacy of the European

⁸⁷ David Theo Goldberg, ‘The Threat of Race: reflections on Racial Neoliberalism’, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 181.

⁸⁸ David Theo Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’, pp. 344.

colonial past and modern racist state formation' that shape today's racism against "non-European Europeans".

This is an issue in European discursive universe. One of the most striking examples for this is the debate between the Black and Jewish communities in France that is symbolized by Dieudonné M'Bala M'Bala who is a comedian and become popular with the gesture –quenelle– invented by him. For Jean-Yves Camus, Dieudonné's anger is a product of historical tension between the black and Jewish communities in France. His movie project about the Code Noir – the compendium of laws enacted in 1685 by King Louis XIV in order to regulate the slave trade – was denied public funding. He makes fun of the idea that Holocaust should be remembered. The major subject of the controversy is the legal status of the Nazi genocide and of the slave trade. "Some black activists strongly resent the exclusive demand of the Jewish community to recognize the Holocaust as the only case of genocide and crime against humanity".⁸⁹

On the other hand, Auschwitz has served to give a bad conscience to Europe and to the French. It is placed as the most significant event of recent history. In France, it has been interpreted as the symbol of nationalism. Insomuch that, over 300 Paris schools bear a plaque commemorating the tragic fate of Jewish children deported to Nazi concentration camps. France has been questioning itself that they did not take an effective role to defeat against the occupation by Nazi Germany. Feeling guilty about the holocaust is "supposed to keep them loyal to the European dream". For some interpretations, Dieudonné has been criticizing the "constant reminders of events that are supposed to make them feel guilty", rather than making fun of Shoah itself.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Alice Robb, "Meet the French Comedian Behind Soccer's Anti-Semitism Controversy", *New Republic*, available at: <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116085/meet-dieudonne-french-comedian-behind-soccers-antisemitism-contr>

⁹⁰ Diana Johnstone, "The Move to Muzzle Dieudonné M'Bala M'Bala: The Bête Noire of the French Establishment", *Global Research*, January 25, 2014. Available at:

However, the significant point here is that there is not a disappearance, only a very strong repression, and what is repressed has never really disappeared; colonialism continues to survive. While unusual in a sociological context, this idea is developed extensively with the concept of the “return of the repressed”⁹¹, by Jacques Lacan. He noted that a repressed signifier reappears under the guise of various formations of the unconscious, such as symptoms, dreams, parapraxes or jokes. From Jacques Lacan's point of view, repression and the return of the repressed are one and the same process. In this conception, the repressed content in the symptom is returning from the future and not from the past. That is, the symptom as a return of the repressed precedes its cause. Working through the symptoms precisely brings about the past, the long-forgotten traumatic events.⁹² According to this conception, colonialism and its racialization have not disappeared; rather they are repressed, and now return in disguise to the postcolonial and postracist context of Europe.

This notion of return of the repressed is closely allied with Jacques Derrida's idea of *hauntology*, through which he identifies specters and ghosts in a philosophical context. Hauntology is an 'irreducible category', introduced by Derrida in his work *Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, and mainly comes from a statement of Karl Marx and Frederic Engels in the Communist Manifesto: “the specter of communism is haunting Europe”. By following this statement, Derrida asserts that the 'specters of Marx is

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-move-to-muzzle-dieudonne-mbala-mbala-the-bete-noire-of-the-french-establishment/5366249>

⁹¹ Jacques Lacan takes up the Sigmund Freud's distinction between *primal* repression and *secondary* repression. Lacan explains the primal repression as the alienation of desire when need is articulated in demand. It is repression of the first *signifier*. For Lacan, the secondary repression is structured like a metaphor, and always involves “the return of the repressed” in which repressed signifier reappears under the guise of the various formations of the unconscious, such as symptoms, dreams, parapraxes or jokes in Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits: A Selection*. trans. by Alan Sheridan, London: Tavistock Publications, 1977, p.286.

⁹² Slavoj Žižek, “The Truth Arises from Misconception”, in Ellie Ragland-Sullivan and Mark Bracher (eds.), *Lacan and the Subject of Language*, Ed. New York and London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 189.

haunting Europe”. Through this assertion, he means that Marx would become more relevant after the fall of Berlin Wall, regardless of the neoliberal claims which asserts that the economic theory of Marx has ended. He offers to reread and discuss Marx through a process of going beyond the usual scholarly readings of him. According to Derrida, this is a political, philosophical and theoretical responsibility; since the world where we live in is marked by the memory and inheritance of Marx.⁹³

Hauntology is also unusual in a sociological context, but this dissertation attempts to show that the idea of hauntology is broadly applicable even outside of its original context. It is meaningful in a sociological work which aims to analyze the existence of the visibly inexistent, and the presence of explicitly absent, by going beyond (or even between) conventional classifications. Moreover, it provides a particularly invaluable stance for this dissertation; which aims to challenge the image of the post-colonial and post-racist Europe through the examination of contemporary manifestations of colonialism and racism. It provides such a formula that can reveal that in the present situation, a colonial mentality still functions under disguise within the boundaries of Europe. It circulates incognito and passes through the borders of post-colonial and anti-racist Europe by censoring itself. In this sense, classifying something clearly as colonialism or racism misleads us, because what is visible is only the shadow cast of their contemporary manifestations. Precisely for this reason, this dissertation intentionally proposes to use the indefinite notion of hauntology, ghosts and specter.

By following Derrida, this dissertation defines this situation in a way that the *specters* of colonialism are haunting the ‘post-colonial’ contemporary context of Europe. Here, “specters of colonialism are haunting the European contemporary context” means that while the act of colonization of the distant ‘Rest’ of the world

⁹³ Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, trans. by Peggy Kamuf, New York: Routledge, 1994. p. 14.

ended long time ago, the accompanying racialization, otherization and civilization of the ‘inferior other’ by the ‘civilized superior’ are still active. It is active and haunting the European political context through the racializing, othering and civilizing of European Muslims; who are either first generation post-colonial and post-Second World War immigrants, or their second and third generation descendants who live inside the borders of Europe.

I have to state that I am aware that colonial thinking is haunting the current political discourse not only in disguise, but also in a visible form. Namely, colonial administrative practices and language is still existent and is contested in Europe. One of the most immediate examples are the memory studies in the 1990s in especially in France which is very much with this question. They reflect the continuation of colonial thinking in contemporary form. One of the very striking examples is the violence against post-colonial migrant population in the center of European countries. It was manifested by the figures who were part of the Vichy regime and helped Nazi's kill Jews, later became colonial officers and after that came to Paris and oppressed the post-colonial migrant population in Paris. Maurice Papon is one of these famous figures who tortured Algerians when it was a colony and killed 200 Algerians protesters in France in 1961. Nabila Ramdani wrote about this issue in 2011 with the headline ‘The Massacre that Paris Denied’. Under the headline Ramdani emphasized that “no one was ever brought to justice for the murder half a century ago of up to 200 French–Algerians. She reported that

Commemorations were planned for the 50th anniversary of the French-Algerian massacre, when up to 200 peaceful protesters were slaughtered in cold blood around iconic national monuments, including Eiffel Tower and Notre Dame Cathedral. The most memorable –and vicious – atrocities saw policeman herding panicking crowds on to Paris’s bridges, where many were tossed into the Seine. Normally, a romantic symbol of the most popular tourist city in the world, the river became a watery morgue for scores of victims, whose lifeless bodies were washing up for weeks afterwards. Others died in police stations, or in nearby woods, where mutilated bodies testified to truncheon and

rifle-butt injuries.⁹⁴

Then she draws attention to the Maurice Papon who was the Paris police chief and instigated the killings. He and some other people who organized these kinds of violent acts had been Nazi collaborators. They learned the method of controlling the crowds from the Gestapo. He was tried for crimes against humanity but only for those he committed during the Second World War. President Charles de Gaulle and the successive governments confirmed that he was never charged for what he did to the French Algerians of Paris.⁹⁵ Many French blames Algerians in-fighting and terrorist attacks for the deaths. Most Algerians forced to live in the blighted housing estates which is out of the city center, because police thinks that they can control ‘insurgents’ better on the estates. These estates are still overflowing with young people from North Africa. So much so that, as Ramdani states, controls are still regularly imposed on the estates with vehicles filled with paramilitaries moving in during disturbances. Recently, in 2005, when heavy riots broke out, Nicolas Sarkozy imposed a state of emergency that was based on Algerians war legislation from 1955.⁹⁶ Namely, in response to 2005 riots the government established a curfew in some suburbs, and this curfew was a colonial practice applied on the migrants in Paris, now re-applied to their grandchildren. On the occasion of this event, in a way appropriate to the language of this dissertation, Robert Aldrich states that “the spectre of colonialism haunts post-colonial France. From revelations about torture in colonial Algeria to dispute about wearing of ‘ostentatious’ religious symbols by Muslim students in present-day France, from

⁹⁴ Nabila Ramdani, “The Massacre that Paris Denied”, *The Guardian*, Sunday, 16 October 2011. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/16/massacre-paris-denied>

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *ibid.*

political movements by the descendants of colonial migrants to urban riots, France is being forced to re-examine its colonial past and the legacy it left".⁹⁷

The events developed as follows. In 2005, Sarkozy government tried to pass a law that required teachers to teach the 'positive role' of colonialism. The passing law in February 2005 provoked a great controversy involving historians, politicians in France and Algeria, and members of the public. Aldrich mentions that the 'Algerian Syndrome' came in unexpected manner on 23 February 2005. The government explicitly paid homage to the people who played a role in *Algérie française*. It was stated that university researches should study the 'the French presence overseas', particularly in North Africa. Moreover, it was addressed that teachers should teach the 'positive role' of the French overseas' particularly in North Africa, and emphasize the 'sacrifices' of the French army. The French historians and researchers immediately gave a negative reaction against the law. They criticized the law in terms of three main reasons. First, by imposing the official version of history, the law was opposed to respect for freedom of thought; second, by imposing the positive effects of colonialism, it hides the crimes, massacres, genocide, slavery and racism which are inherent colonization; and third, by legalizing nationalist communitarianism, this law provokes the other communitarian reactions from the other groups. Jean-Claude Guibal, a conservative *député*, the historians as the only defending their turf and their biased anti-colonial positions. Moreover, the interior minister, Nicholas Sarkozy postponed his visit to France's West Indian outpost because of the fears of violence. On 31 January 2006, the law was cancelled by the Conseil Constitutionnel.⁹⁸

If it is looked at the general perception about the French decolonization, it can be seen that half of the French and nine-tenths of Algerians considered the 1954-1962

⁹⁷ Robert Aldrich, 'Colonial Past, Post-Colonial Present: History wars French Style', *History Australia*, Vol. 3 No.1, 2006, pp. 14.1.

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 14.5.

war one of the most significant events of the twentieth century. On the other hand, only two-thirds of both groups admitted that torture was used. They also differed on whether it was episodic or systematic torture. The Algerian War and colonial history of France has never stimulated public attention that much before. For Aldrich, this shows that “colonial past stubbornly refuses to remain in the past”.⁹⁹

In June 2005, an article was published in a French newsweekly with the title of ‘Suburbs: A Colonial Problem?’. It reported on the activities of a group who called themselves *les indigènes de la République* (Republic’s indigenes). They are the descendants of migrants from France’s former colonies in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Their fathers or grandfathers were recruited from the old colonies of France in the 1960s and 1970s when a growing French economy needed cheap unskilled labor or recently, they came to Europe because of the disastrous economic and political conditions of Africa. They have a manifesto demanding redress of their criticisms of cultural discrimination, economic exploitation and social marginalization.¹⁰⁰ The group declared that “The Republic of equality does not exist... Our parents and grandparents were reduced to slavery... We, the daughters and sons of colonized peoples and immigrants, are engaged in a struggle against oppression and the discrimination produced by the post-colonial Republic”. With reference to Lancelin and Vigoureux (2005), as Aldrich states, this organization attracted little support from intellectuals and public figures, and even from those who supports anti-racist campaigns. Three months after this manifesto, violence was exploded in the suburbs of France. Aldrich defines the events as: “in hundreds of towns and cities, over 10.000 cars were burned, 200 public buildings were torched, and three people were died, and the world was treated to scenes of an inflammatory France not seen since 1968”.¹⁰¹ Then the government declared the

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 14.6.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 14.1

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*

state-of-emergency which was legislated in 1955 against the colonial war being waged in Algeria.

The other prominent example to these ongoing discourses and legacies of colonialism is the Nicolas Sarkozy's speech on 26 July 2007 at the Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, Senegal. The reactions against the speech from both African and French audiences. For the Senegalese audience, was that "the big white chief" come to enlighten his "little African brothers".¹⁰² James McDougall states that "Sarkozy's 'vision' of Africa turned out to be a tissue of fantasy images from a familiar stock of 19th century clichés"¹⁰³:

The tragedy of Africa is that African man [sic] has never sufficiently entered into History. The African peasant, who for millennia has lived with the seasons, whose ideal of life is to be in harmony with nature, knows only the eternal recommencement of time in rhythm with the endless repetition of the same gestures, the same words. In this imaginary where everything always begins anew, there is no place for the adventure of the human spirit, nor for the idea of progress. In this universe where nature commands all, [African] man escapes the anguish of History that grips modern man, but he remains immobile amidst an immutable order in which all seems written in advance. Never does he launched himself towards the future. Never does the idea occur to him that he might break with repetition and invent his own destiny... [colonialism] took but [...] it also gave. The colonizer built bridges, roads, hospitals, dispensaries, schools, made fertile virgin soil, gave his effort, his labor, his knowledge... [Colonizers] believed that they were fulfilling a civilizing mission, believed they were doing good. They were wrong but they were sincere ...Colonization is not responsible for all the difficulties of Africa today.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Thomas Hofnung, *Libération*, 28 July 2007, cited in James McDougall, 'Sarkozy and Africa: Big White Chief's Bad Memory', *Open Democracy*, 7 December 2007, available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/sarkozy_and_africa_big_white_chiefs_bad_memory

¹⁰³ James McDougall, 'Sarkozy and Africa: Big White Chief's Bad Memory', *Open Democracy*, 7 December 2007, available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/sarkozy_and_africa_big_white_chiefs_bad_memory

¹⁰⁴ Cited in Thomas Hofnung, *Libération*, 28 July 2007, cited in James McDougall, 'Sarkozy and Africa: Big White Chief's Bad Memory', *Open Democracy*, 7 December 2007. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/sarkozy_and_africa_big_white_chiefs_bad_memory

In this framework, McDougall states that the ‘recognition’ of the colonial legacy of France turns out to be the celebration of “the epic of Greater France”. Inasmuch that, a 2003 parliamentary report was titled as *Promoting Work of Overseas France* and put it to the national assembly in 2004. In this manner, he carefully draws attention that

This abysmal grasp of African history cannot be seen simply as ignorance[;] the president’s consciousness, ..., is apparently as forgetful of half a century or more of social science in, and about, Africa as it is fogged by imperial fictions. ... [This] suggests a deliberate reiteration of a fantasy that has served, and most likely been deliberately and defiantly revived to serve, a particular and deeply reactionary political agenda.¹⁰⁵

As a reflection of this reiteration of fantasy, the notion of the Sarkozy’s visit to Africa reflects the “revival of an openly imperial theme” that is built on the

Fantasy image of the Franco-African past is what turns out to be an old dream of a ‘Eurafrican’ future. [...] Sarkozy’s vision of the two continents’ co-development is embedded in a 19th century imperial fantasy of African primitivism and European modernity. It appears today as an unabashed recycling of a later, mid-20th-century imperial vision: ‘What France wishes to achieve with Africa is to prepare for the advent of *Eurafrique*, the great destiny that awaits both Europe and Africa’.¹⁰⁶

More serious than the content and mission of this speech in Dakar, as McDougall addressed that the regulations of the ministry of immigration, integration and national identity would create serious trouble in France. Its system includes DNA tests for immigrants who seeks to rejoin family members in France 22. This is the

¹⁰⁵ James McDougall, “Sarkozy and Africa: Big White Chief’s Bad Memory”.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*

part of the project of rebuilding French society, culture and self-conception on recognition of complex history of France.¹⁰⁷

The debates and rhetoric in France is prominent, but France is not only the country in which colonial thinking is haunting the current political discourse not only in a spectral form, but in a visible form. Namely, colonial administrative practices and language is still existent and is contested in many European countries. Another example is from the Netherlands: the Zwarte Piet phenomenon. It is called as 'Sinterklaas Festival' which dates back to the 1600s. In the 1800, the Sinterklaas appeared with Black Pete. In this festival, the man in white is the Dutch St Nicholas, Sinterklaas throwing small round cakes and sweets to children. Sinterklaas walks around with his helper 'Black Pete' who blacken their faces, paint their lips red and don afro wings. The news about it in *BBC* defines the relationship between the two as:

The character [of Black Pete] is always at the butt of joke, misunderstanding Sinterklaas' requests and acting as a jester for the crowds. He wears gold hoop earrings – traditionally a slave token. ... Traditionally the role of Black Pete was to frighten children – if they were bad they would be beaten and carried off in a sack.¹⁰⁸

Art historian Eugenie Boer documented the parallels between the pictures of Sinterklaas and his black servant in a book in 1850 and 17th and 18th century paintings which portrayed a black servant similar with the today's 'Black Pete'.¹⁰⁹

It became a big debate particularly after the grassroots organization, *Zwarte Piet is Racisme* appeared in 2011. The controversy over 'Black Pete' reached a global

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Karren Millington, 'Zwarte Piet: Is 'Black Pete' a racist Dutch custom?', *BBC News*, 6 December 2013. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/0/24744499>

¹⁰⁹ John Helsloot, 'Zwarte Piet and Cultural Aphasia in the Netherlands', *Quotidian*, 2012, pp. 9. Available at: http://depot.knaw.nl/10235/1/Helsloot_Zwarte_Piet_Cultural_Aphasia-pdf.pdf

scale and UN working group became a part of the debate.¹¹⁰ In spite of all criticism against the representation of Black Pete, the Amsterdam's mayor EE Van der Laan stated that "...the tradition id not in the least static. In the past 50 years, Zwarte Piet was no longer depicted as an ogre for educational ends. He evolved from being the stereotypical subservient 'black slave' into a cheerful 'clown'".¹¹¹ Facebook Page titled as "Zwarte Piet is Racisme". Their numbers are thousands now and they get outnumber supportive comments. The reaction against the people who proclaim that Zwarte Piet is racist is strikingly reproduces racism; the supporters are told to "go back where they came from", to "stop destroying a warm and innocent children's holiday", and to "stop introducing racism where it is not".¹¹² Zwarte Piet phenomenon is criticized in the context that the historical figure of Zwarte Piet and the institutions of slavery in the 19th and 'blackface' in the 20th century. Ethan Mark states that by clinging to Zwarte Piet as "a warm and innocent children's holiday" and reacts against the criticism of this event as racism, the Netherlands is "denying the undeniable". For Mark, in this debate it is important to emphasize the legacy of Dutch colonialism. It reflects the colonialism's contribution to Dutch identity and colonial racism which includes the slavery-based-racism based on the division between two biological races of black and white. On the other hand, colonial racism reflects a more complex situation than that; it based on the systematic mix of exclusion and inclusion. The Netherlands are lacking in knowledge of their colonial past as a whole.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Karren Millington, 'Zwarte Piet: Is 'Black Pete' a racist Dutch custom?'

¹¹¹ Cited in *ibid*.

¹¹² Ethan Mark, "Zwarte Piet and the Colonial Inheritance: The Roots of Dutch Racism-Denial", November 15, 2013. Available at: <http://wishfulthinkingleiden.wordpress.com/2013/11/15/zwarte-piet-and-the-colonial-inheritance-the-roots-of-dutch-racism-denial/>

¹¹³ Patrick Simon, French National Identity and Integration: Who Belongs to the National Community?, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012, pp. 1-3. Available at: [file:///C:/Users/%C3%87i%C4%9Fdem/Downloads/FrenchIdentity%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/%C3%87i%C4%9Fdem/Downloads/FrenchIdentity%20(1).pdf)

Philomena Essed thinks that Zwarte Piet is partly because of ignorance, but solution can be found. She stated that

the discussions should not be narrowed down to for or against Zwarte Piet. For Zwarte Piet is more, it symbolizes the racism. People are very reluctant to talk about racism in the Netherlands, both the dominant group –they feel offended– and the dominated groups who feel intimidated more and more. ... Many would not be aware of colonial history, as it is not in the school books... it is not a significant part of teaching in the Netherlands. So you cannot blame people, they have very little clue”.¹¹⁴

In 2004, Zwarte Piet is still on the agenda and people learned a lot during the debate on it, but on the contrary to the Essed’s optimism, many people are not willing to learn about the colonial legacy of the Netherlands.

These are just a few examples which shows that colonialism is haunting European political context in a visible manner, but more striking than that the repressed reality of colonial racism returns to European context in disguise. From this framework, criticizing multiculturalism and integration policies, and the stigmatization of Muslims via the denigration of their religion and culture, conjures up the “return of the repressed”; the return of the repressed reality of European political contexts which are rooted in a repressed colonialist and racializing mentality. The repressed reality of European politics repeatedly takes different shapes when it returns. Namely, colonialism and racism, which are the repressed realities of Europe, return to the contemporary European context in the form of criticism of multiculturalism and stigmatization of Muslims through a legitimated islamophobia.

This haunted colonialism racializes, otherizes and civilizes Muslims under the guise of ‘integrating’ them into European culture, in order to ‘protect’ Europe’s ‘unique’ and ‘universal’ values from the ‘threat of local’ value systems; which are

¹¹⁴ Cited in, Karren Millington, “Zwarte Piet: Is ‘Black Pete’ a racist Dutch custom?”

ironically able to survive inside the borders of Europe under the safe roof of the this unique and universal values. Therefore, unlike the initial form, it is haunting the European political context neither in the form of aggressive policies nor that of enslavement outside the borders of Europe, but it is in the form of non-lethal and even increasingly legitimized regulations inside the borders of Europe. Wandering in spectral form within the European political context can be pointed to and touched through the texts of specific cases banning the visibility of Muslims and Islam in the public space, for the sake of integrating them into European culture and values.

Protecting secularism in France and Switzerland and criticizing multiculturalism for the sake of protecting the universal values of freedom of speech in the Netherlands and Denmark, are the ways in which colonialism is haunting the contemporary context of Europe. Particularly, the emphasis on the necessity to make some prohibitive regulations about Muslims' and Islam's visibility in public life 'as they are' or to make sharp regulations about the ongoing political context to protect the 'universal' values of secularism and freedom of speech, corresponds to 'civilizing mission' of European colonialism, but with a major difference: this mission of Europe has been on the agenda within its own borders. In fact, *via* this emphasis, as it was in colonial time, by assuming itself as the authority of civilization and universal, the contemporary European context forces a project to civilize the 'uncivilized' Muslims inside the borders of Europe.

This shows that the European political context still holds its 'civilizing mission' and continues civilizing the uncivilized Other. In this way, it recognizes Muslims as acceptable inside the borders of Europe, only through the process of rehabilitating them *vis a vis* the assumption that Muslims are in need of being civilized. With this mission, it actually stigmatizes them as Other and sets them apart from the society through the *apophatic* emphasis produced in the gap between civilized and uncivilized. This is precisely a form of racialization occurring by not saying and mentioning 'race'. It is a form of racialization in which

‘race’ is addressed by apophasis: “difference per se that is problematized by the various debates and policies that frame what is no longer known as race in Europe”.¹¹⁵

In this form of racialization, racism and state power has been woven together by the fabric of state racism that is not in the form of direct exclusion, slavery, or exile, but in the form of technologies of inclusive exclusion. In this system, immigrants are not excluded, killed, enslaved or exiled; yet they are placed just after the outside. As such, the main point here is that cultural racism/ racism without race/ differential racism has been a mode of governance in European context from a long time. In this sense, contemporary racism has been shaped by the principle of bio-politics¹¹⁶ that they are obsessed with welfare and security. From this framework, it can be thought that today, this security obsession is shaped alongside the perceived challenge of Islam and Muslim immigrants in contemporary European context. In other words, politics is shaped by techniques of inclusive exclusion which is based on the principles of securing the state and caring for life of national citizens. Giorgio Agamben calls this “ex-crape”.¹¹⁷ As a result, the category of immigration¹¹⁸ have suffered discrimination and violence alongside state racism in which racist stereotyping *via* bio-power and bio-politics has played an essential role.

¹¹⁵ Lentin, Alana ‘Europe and the Silence about Race’, pp. 499.

¹¹⁶ This concept is first used both Michel Foucault in order to explain the mechanisms of modern states and their techniques of controlling their population. Then, Giorgio Agamben used this concept in a different context.

¹¹⁷ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998.

¹¹⁸ Etienne Balibar suggests, “the new racism is a racism of the era of ‘decolonization’, of the reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises, and the division of humanity within a single political space. ...”. Etienne Balibar, “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?” in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel M. Wallerstein (eds.), *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, London & NY: Verso, 1991, p.21.

It is such a way of mentioning that racism has been manifested through a tactic of ‘inclusive exclusion’; which refers to an affirmation through a negation. As a result, specters of colonialism are haunting European political context, by racializing Muslims through mentioning the race in an apophatic way of address; the gap between civilized European and uncivilized Muslim cultures currently problematized by various debates and policies “that frame what is no longer known as race in Europe”. That is, racism still functions independent from the idea of race; it functions in a more complex way, like affirmation through negation or inclusive exclusion.

As can be seen, this form of racism has been racializing Muslims in Europe by stigmatizing their religion and culture as particularly resistant to integration, being inherently violent and nonsecular. That is, religion and culture are the central impetus in this form of racialization. Therefore, it can be argued that this form of racialization is characterized by a shift in emphasis from race and skin color to culture and religion. On the other hand, as David Theo Goldberg draws attention, recent constructions of difference masks themselves behind apophatic discourses; they have sought to avoid being recognized as racism.¹¹⁹ The consideration of the question of this form of racism was first framed by Martin Barker (1981) with the concept of “new racism”. Then, some prominent figures like Pierre-André Taguieff (1989), David Theo Goldberg (1990), Etienne Balibar (1991), and Sunera Thobani (2006), proposed to think about a form of racism based on the insurmountability of cultural difference, rather than biological heredity. In this form of racism, supposed cultural, national and religious traits are naturalized to the group that is characterized. This is what makes the specters of colonialism evident and pointable in a spectral form, and enables us to point out the recolonization of European Muslims through the racialization of their religion and culture inside the borders of Europe. This can be read from mainstream political declarations and regulations

¹¹⁹ David Theo Goldberg, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning*, Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993.

about the existence of Muslims in Europe, or the interpretation of trouble cases related to Muslims. On the other hand, rendering European political discourse as racist or islamophobic is not a new assertion. The complexity and range of racism that European Muslims or, more importantly, people perceived to be Muslim, face in contemporary Europe have begun to be critically explored in recent years. Tariq Modood and Pinina Werbner (1987), Rober A. Williams (1989), Etienne Balibar (1991), Neil MacMaster (2001), Alana Lentin (2004), Jeffrey Cole (2005), and Sherene H. Razack (2008) are some of the prominent figures who brought this issue into question more than two decades ago. Then, by bringing this issue into the agenda, what is new that this dissertation proposes to conduct a research?

As such, intending to provoke the European political context by asserting that specters of colonialism are haunting the European political context through racialization of Muslims and Islam is not a simple attempt. In order to handle this assertion, it is crucial to explain “why” and “how” Muslims have been racialized in European contexts in which identifying racism has been difficult since 1950s. This questioning brings us to the point that the racialization of Muslims, and the consequent Islamophobia, is not uniquely a social and cultural phenomenon; rather, they engage and operate within broader questions about a mentality constituted by particular epistemological and material conditions. These are the conditions through which the specters of colonialism are haunting the “post-colonial” context of Europe through the racializing of Muslims in anti-racist Europe. The mentality shaped by these conditions is based on the idea of an essential hierarchy between European and non-European politics, economy, culture, and values. Therefore, in order to understand why and how Muslims are racialized and recolonized, it is crucial to focus on these conditions.

What is new is that this dissertation would add to the literature an answer to this question: why is colonialism and racism forced to be disguised in Europe? This question helps to open up and then discuss the repressed reality of racism which is a constitutive part of Europe as an identity, civilization and modern state power.

The answer to this question is what makes this dissertation new. The ‘why’ and ‘how’ of specters of colonialism haunting the European political context are strongly claimed as post-colonial, and why and how Muslims can be racialized in this context, which is strongly claimed as anti-racist. It asks how colonialism repeatedly haunts back to the political scene in Europe and racializes culture, religion and ethnicity through stigmatization in a post-colonial and post-racist context. It aims to change the way in which European colonialism and racism have been analyzed and understood. In addition to focus on what has been happening in Europe about European Muslims and Islam, it draws attention to importance of questioning the underlying mechanisms of what has been happening by asking the question of ‘how’ in a symptomatic manner.

In this context, the rest of the chapters of this dissertation will focus on the epistemological and material conditions of the European political context, which is being haunted by the spectral colonialism. In order to discuss all of these in detail, the second chapter will recontextualize Europe. At the risk of hiding the specters, some concepts will be taken as given. While the main concepts of colonialism and racism will be taken as a given, the concept of Europe will be specified by focusing on the politics of Enlargement of the European Union, the myth of Europe, the politics of the immigration issue in Europe, and the politics of the borders of Europe. This chapter will specify the main concepts of this dissertation.

In the context of these concepts, the third chapter will propose the tools which are necessary to analyze the spectral character of colonialism which haunts the European political context by the racialization of Muslims and Islam. It will explain in more detail why hauntology provides an invaluable stance to address the imperceptible or latent that cannot be caught by any other approach even discourse analysis or genealogy. It will show how hauntology may be used to address the spectral existence of the presumably nonexistent colonialism and racism in post-colonial and anti-racist Europe by giving the possibility to go beyond mainstream classifications. The sections of this chapter will explain the deconstructive

standpoint of Derrida's hauntology, and will use this to revisit the concepts of racism, contemporary forms of racism, and current forms of racialization in Europe.

From hauntological standpoint, in order to understand how Muslims are being racialized by spectral colonialism, the fourth chapter focuses on four troubling cases in Europe and suggests that the specters can be made graspable in these cases. It focuses on the current regulations and governmental declarations about Muslims and Islam by analyzing the surrounding political discourse. It reinterprets them as the embodiment/disembodiment of the specters of colonialism that haunt Europe. Recent statements and regulations about Muslims and Islam show the institutionalization of colonial racism within European politics. Through these cases, this chapter does not aim to address the colonialism and racism of any specific country, but rather shows that a specter which belongs to Europe haunts through them. The sections of this chapter discuss the bans on wearing headscarves at schools in France, the construction of minarets in Switzerland, cartoons of Mohammad in Denmark, and the showing of the film *Submission* in the Netherlands.

The fifth chapter will focus on the epistemological conditions through which the specters of colonialism haunt Europe. It aims to understand how the hidden/invisible inferiorization of Muslims became possible through European epistemological conditions that constantly define Europe as democratic, universal, secular, superior and sovereign. These same conditions constantly stigmatize the Other as inferior, non-democratic, non-universal, violent, and as an enemy that is to be kept separate. It asserts that borders inside and outside of Europe are created by these epistemological conditions. Colonial design of religion the contemporary political discourse about Muslims and the stigmatization of them through the “clash of civilization” thesis. Also, by suggesting that secularism is part of epistemological conditions, the last section of this chapter addresses the fantasy of a secular Europe and the inferiorization of European Muslims and Islam through

this fantasy. This chapter includes four sections which open a way to understand the modern/colonial epistemic design and epistemic colonialism, secularism and Islam, inferiorization of Islam through secularism thesis, and “clash of civilization” thesis as a contemporary political framing of Muslim immigrants in Europe.

After all, the sixth chapter will focus on the material conditions through which specters of racism are haunting the European context. It addresses the material conditions of spectral racism that racializing European Muslims. It will address how the repressed real of colonialism and racialization return through the material conditions of European political context and legitimizes the stigmatization and inferiorization of Muslims in Europe. This chapter will show that colonialism and racism can be possible in a post-colonial and post-racist context, through the modern/colonial material design.

In addition to the general assumptions which suggests that racism has been manifested through extermination, discrimination, and exclusion of different physical appearance, culture, and religion, this dissertation draws attention that racism has been manifested through rationalization, legitimization and systematic justification of violence, discrimination, exclusion, and inferiorization of physical appearances, cultures, and religions. Rationalization, legitimization, and systematic justification is possible due to the material and epistemic conditions of racism. Thus, the material and epistemological conditions of European political context perpetuates racism.

CHAPTER II

RECONTEXTUALIZING CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

To begin, I have to state that this chapter is not an attempt to give a final definition of Europe and fix it as a definite concept; it is an attempt to recontextualize the infinite context of Europe from the framework of Derrida's textuality. "There is an indefinite opening of every context, an essential nontotalization".¹²⁰ As Derrida informs us the concept of context is infinite and includes all of the world, reality, and history.

Reality always appears in the experience and in the movement of interpretation, which means that any given text is open to a range of possible interpretations and has no single authoritative reading. This way of reading is called "Deconstruction". Derrida emphasizes the importance of context and deconstruction with this statement:

One of the definitions of what is called deconstruction would be the effort to take the limitless context into account, to pay the sharpest and broadest attention possible to context, and thus to an incessant movement of recontextualization. The phrase [...] of deconstruction means nothing else: there is nothing outside context.¹²¹

Therefore, everything belongs in a context, in as much as the context is the entire "real-history-of-the-world".¹²² Within this framework, this chapter attempts to reinterpret the concept of Europe by recontextualizing it in the medium of

¹²⁰ Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988, pp. 137.

¹²¹ *ibid.*, pp. 136.

¹²² *ibid.*, pp. 136.

deconstruction. That is, it aims to open the text of 'Europe' to possible interpretation.

The concept of Europe is expansive and contentious, and has been discussed over many years from many different perspectives. Despite the difficulty, considerable effort has been gone into finding a precise definition of Europe and where its borders start and end. There is, at the same time, a strong but nebulous sense of what constitutes Europe that comes from Europe's constant self-definition. What we understand from this self-definition is that Europe is not only identified as a geographic region, but also as a culture and value system, and by distinct political and scientific approaches. That is, it is a complex phenomenon. It has been shaped through modernist ideas, policies, and perspectives whose validity has not been subject to much scrutiny or doubt. Europe is much more open to scrutiny now though, due to its immigration policies and to the violence within and at the borders of the EU and its member states. This creates conflict between the outwardly perceived image and a self-image that involves being the bearer of universality, human rights, democracy, and plurality. For this reason, conceptualizing Europe today is more significant than ever.

I am aware of the problems posed by using such an overreaching concept can pose. It is clear that the EU is not a homogeneous entity, and that every single European country has its own historical, political, economic and social conditions. As Balibar stated that

Europe is mobile 'overlapping zones' of contradictory civilizations rather than with juxtapositions of monolithic entities. In all its points, Europe is multiple; it is always home to tension between numerous religious, cultural, linguistic, and political affiliations, numerous readings of history, numerous modes of relations with the rest of the world, whether it is Americanism or Orientalism, the possessive individualism of 'Nordic' legal systems or the 'tribalism' of

Mediterranean familial traditions.¹²³

However, by looking at the different European countries' ways of defining themselves and others, this chapter asserts that in spite of the different histories, economies, policies, and interests, there is a definition of Europe that is nevertheless serviceable. Balibar addresses the situation of Yugoslavia in this regard; he states that this situation “is not atypical but rather constitutes *a local projection* of forms of confrontation and conflict characteristic of all Europe, which I did not hesitate to call European *race relations*, with the implicit understanding that the notion of race has no other content than that of the historical accumulation of religious, linguistic, and genealogical identity references”.¹²⁴ This chapter attempts to make such a generalization, while remembering Europe to a concept risks hiding any specters or ghosts. The risk will be avoided as much as possible by specifically looking for them.

Rather than giving a descriptive historical narrative about what Europe is and how it is constituted, this chapter attempts to re-contextualize contemporary Europe in a provocative way. It takes contemporary Europe as a phenomenon with four prominent elements: the integration of the European Union, the myth of Europe, immigration issues, and the borders of Europe. The sections of this chapter emphasize the conflict between the outwardly perceived image and the self-image of Europe in these four dimensions. The conflict intrinsic to these four elements is based on the question of whether there is space for differences inside Europe's borders. That is, they reflect Europe's perception of ‘difference’ and Europe's positioning of itself relative to this difference.

The first section will focus on how Europe defined itself during the post-Cold War integration process. The enlargement process was one of the defining events in the

¹²³ Etienne Balibar, *We the People of Europe?: Reflections of Transnational Citizenship*, pp. 5.

¹²⁴ *ibid.*

European political context, and this section shows that it was an effort to redefine the EU with the emphasis on identity, culture and values. The EU then decided who could be a member of the union by this definition. This took a dramatic form in the 2000s with the question of how the non-Europeans could live within borders of Europe. In a sense, the “origin story” of Europe was resurrected. The second section will address this by emphasizing the conflict between the perceived and self-image of Europe. The third section will focus on immigrants and immigration. Finally, the fourth section will focus on the borders of Europe.

2.1. Enlargement of the European Union

As a political concept, Europe refers to both the European Union (EU), and the combination of European nation-states. Membership in the EU involves giving up some autonomy, but does not require the complete dissolution of the member nations. Thus the EU is neither a supranational structure going beyond the nation-state form, nor a combination of totally independent nation-states; instead, it is a Janus-faced figure that keeps the members in an intermediate state.

In order to understand this structure, we should examine the change in the significance of Europe when the European Economic Community began to be discussed from the 1950s onwards. The existing structure of the European Union was shaped by political initiatives of Western European governments that aimed to overcome the national rivalries which caused World Wars I and II. As the result of an attempt to integrate West Germany into Western Europe to improve European coal and steel industries, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in the 1951 Treaty of Paris. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands formed the ECSC by conceding some of their sovereignty to a supranational body. The success of ECSC led to a more comprehensive structure: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were created by the Treaties

of Rome in 1957. This led to the European Communities (EC) in 1965, which had fifteen member states including Denmark, the UK, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, and Sweden by the 1990s. Then, the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992. This treaty sought greater unity in politics, legal-judiciary systems, economy, foreign policy, security, and strengthened the role of the European Parliament in Community decisions. Present-day Europe is mostly shaped by the negotiations at the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and eventually becoming a union even in name. Thus, the process of the European integration in the post-war era has increasingly shaped today's Europe.¹²⁵

In the mid-1990s, the member states of the European Union decided to enlarge the Union towards the east. This began a new phase of European integration with the integration of Eastern Europeans into the Western Europe. The continuity of the enlargement of the EU has inevitably raised questions about who Europeans are, what kind of values characterize, the nature and purpose of the European Union. This mostly concerns the integrity of the European identity in a union of nation-states with their own histories, cultures, languages, and distinct political, national, regional and local interests. Since the identities are defined and constructed mainly by their common present and future, this enlarged Europe has to find a new narrative, a new perspective, and a new vision with which nation-states and citizens can identify themselves.

Many different proposals have been made about what constitutes the core characteristics of the EU, and how this should shape the future direction of integration. Some interpretations have claimed that the EU is mainly a market securing the free movement of goods and capital; others have suggested that the EU was built on a common European identity and common European values, and

¹²⁵ Helene Sjursen, 'Introduction: Enlargement and the Nature of the EU Polity', in Helene Sjursen (ed.) *Questioning EU Enlargement*, Oxon: Routledge, 2006, pp. 1.

some have suggested that the EU is a supra-natural polity securing the democratic principles and human rights.¹²⁶

The present discourse on Europe has taken on three dimensions: ideational dimension refers to meaning, essence and substance; the organizational dimension refers to organizing institutional forms of decision-making and appropriate political frameworks: and the geographical dimension refers to border-construction delineating the insiders and outsiders of Europe. Within the context of this transformation, there is a further debate about the future in an EU having twenty-five member states.

Sjursen addresses the three conceptualizations of what kind of order is emerging in the EU in more detail. The first is the instrumental type, in which the EU is understood as merely a problem solving entity. This collective entity takes the interests of member states for granted. In other words, “the core cooperation would, in this conception, be aimed at promoting the material interests of the member states through economic cooperation”.¹²⁷ The second is the contextual type, in which the EU is understood as a value based community. A sense of common identity serves as a basis for integration that the EU as a geographically delimited entity uses to revitalize common European values and affiliations. In this value-based community, collective institutions contribute to shape and define the collective understanding of the community’s identity and purpose. The third conceptualization claims that the EU may be understood as a rights-based union, where policy coerces the democratic constitutional state to conform to European standards. This assumes that there are autonomous institutions whose legitimacy is derived from a European demos, not from the member states; integration rests on

¹²⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 1-2

¹²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 2

universal rights, democratic procedures, and cultural pluralism, rather than on a feeling of cultural cohesion and common traditions.¹²⁸

Sjursen states that these three different conceptions all played roles in the EU enlargement process. This explains why the EU has systematically decided in favor of enlargement in spite of the costs and risks.¹²⁹ She draws attention to the distinction between value or identity-based and right-based norms, arguing that this is clearly shown by the debate to include Turkey. There are different justifications given by the EU to extend into Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey. Since East and West are seen as two part of the same entity, there is a sense of shared destiny and duty to overcome this division since Turkey is not seen as a natural part of the European family. The aim of policies towards Turkey is different; turkey has been described as an important partner to Europe with a strategic position in a sensitive region. Consequently, although the extension to Central and Eastern Europe is presented as a duty by the EU, the integration of Turkey is instead presented as a strategic partnership.¹³⁰

Others have discussed the integration process by analyzing whether feelings of kinship and a common culture have played a role in the membership of Turkey, since Turkey is often assumed to be culturally different from Europe. They often compare the membership process of Turkey with the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries. For instance, Asa Lundgren emphasized that although Romania and Bulgaria were not successful in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria and not considered ready for membership, they started accession negotiations in 2000. From a perspective of utility, concern for human rights and democracy or cultural values, Turkey scored higher than Romania. Despite Turkey being more successful in meeting the criteria, it is still a candidate country. The geographical proximity of

¹²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 2-3

¹²⁹ *ibid.*, p. 3-4

¹³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 11-13.

the EU and the CEE was interpreted to mean that they share a common history, a common culture and common values. By contrast, Turkey was described as a bridge between Europe and Asia, as a bridge between developed and developing neighbors, and as a bridge between the religion of Islam and Western Europe, but not as a part of Europe. Despite instrumental interdependency between Turkey and the EU, and the cultural and historical difference between them have been emphasized encouraging the adoption of democracy and human rights. Therefore, the EU's prioritization cannot be explained by reference to utility calculations or a concern for human rights and democracy; the EU is apparently a culture and value based union, with Romania and the other member states being considered as natural parts of the European culture. The same declared by the European Parliament and the European Commission when they described the aim of the integration process as overcoming the division of Europe and restoring the unity of the people who share a common heritage and culture. This was discussed in Helsinki in 1999 and again in Brussels in 2004, where the importance of having a civil political union rather than a value and culture based union was underlined. Nevertheless, the membership situation of Turkey failed to change substantially.¹³¹

Opposition to Turkey's membership to the EU is readily visible. As recently as 2012, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, a historian and supporter of the Social Democratic Party gave his opinion on Turkey's membership with this statement:

This Muslim country should never join the EU [because] as a Muslim state a deep cultural boundary separates this country from Europe. ...Regarding its geographical location, historical past, religion, culture, and mentality, Turkey is not part of Europe.... The incorporation of 90 million or more Turks would destroy the historical character of the Union. ...Europe is a club of states imbued with Christian principles.¹³²

¹³¹ Asa Lundgreen, "The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More 'European' than Others", in Helene Sjursen (ed.) *Questioning EU Enlargement*, Oxon: Routledge, 2006, pp.122-3, 134-9.

¹³² *Die Zeit*, September 2002, cited in Christoph Ramm, "The Orientalization of Turkey and

Focusing particularly on Germany, Christoph Ramm informs us that the idea in this thesis were supported by the liberal and Social Democrat politicians, journalists, and academics, but not as openly as above. Some argued that belonged to different civilizations Europe and Turkey by emphasizing that Europe and Turkey are different civilizations with different identities. A clear example of this was given by an economic magazine:

Europe, if it has a meaning, is unconceivable without its civilization, its cultural identity, and that is western identity. Turkey, however, is part of a different civilization, that is to say, Islamic civilization. The supporters of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk have been trying to transform the country into a western civilization for decades, but such a transformation has never been accomplished in the history of the human race...Europe's continued existence requires the defense of western civilization. Peace on earth requires civilizations living together with an equal status.¹³³

Therefore, neither a cost-benefit analysis of material interests, nor a concern for democracy and human rights can explain the enlargement process; there is ample evidence that perceptions about cultural affinity have played a role.¹³⁴ The religious and cultural arguments above depend on a specific historical narrative which depicts Turkey and Europe as monolithic civilizations, and emphasize the “essential” and ‘unbridgeable’ gap between them. Evidence for this difference is given by reference to the “progressive forces” of Europe: the classical Greek-Roman antiquity, Judeo-Christian culture, the Protestant reformation, the Renaissance, secularization, the Enlightenment, and the scientific revolution.¹³⁵ The failed integration of Muslim immigrants is interpreted as being caused by the

Turkish Immigrants”, Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.) *Racism Postcolonialism Europe*. Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, pp.107.

¹³³ *Wirtschaftswoche*, 12 December 2002, 'Selbstmord Europas' ("European Suicide), cited in Christoph Ramm, “The Orientalization of Turkey and Turkish Immigrants”, pp.107.

¹³⁴ Asa Lundgreen (2006), “The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More ‘European’ than Others”, pp.122-3, 134-9.

¹³⁵ Christoph Ramm, “The Orientalization of Turkey and Turkish Immigrants”, pp. 108.

absence of corresponding forces and as a proof of this 'insurmountable' difference. Wehler stated that "Overall in Europe, Muslims defy assimilation and retreat to their subcultures; it is well known that the Federal Republic [of Germany] does not have a problem with foreigners, it has a problem with the Turks alone".¹³⁶ While the opposition to Turkey's membership in the EU has also been shaped by other concerns (e.g. geographical, demographic and economic), these have not been discussed as much as the difference in culture, religion and civilization. The Social Democratic version of the essentializing and inferiorizing of Turkey was not explicit. perception was not that implicit. As Ramm noted, the Social Democrats supported the creation and integration of a "modernized" Turkey as a member of the EU. They claimed that this would help to avoid a conflict between Islam and the West. A Social Democrat politician, Gernot Erler gave a clear example of this perspective. He supported Turkey's membership by emphasizing that this membership "is a crucial force for the unique modernization of an Islamic country". He continued with: "If Turkey becomes the case of a successful modernization on the European model and thus sets an example to the other Islamic states, this would contribute to the prevention of the clash of civilizations".¹³⁷

The concept of a European identity that is implicit in this statement is not only instrumental in shaping the current organization of Europe, but is itself shaped by the integration process. That is neither a unified structure, nor the concept of citizenship is sufficient to supplant the idea of European identity that subsumes European culture, value and religion. Etienne Balibar's critical statement about the limitations of European citizenship is a confirmation of this conclusion:

European citizenship, within the limits of the currently existing union,
is not conceived of as recognition of the rights and contributions of all

¹³⁶ Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 'Das Turkenproblem' ['The Turkish Problem'], *Die Zeit*, 2002, cited in Christoph Ramm, "The Orientalization of Turkey and Turkish Immigrants", pp.109.

¹³⁷ *Die Welt*, 13 October 2004, cited in Christoph Ramm, "The Orientalization of Turkey and Turkish Immigrants", p.109.

the communities present upon European soil, but as a postcolonial isolation of 'native' and 'nonnative' populations. This exposes the European community to the reactive development of all sorts of identitarian obsessions, following the model of mutual reinforcement and exclusions and communitarianisms (including 'national', 'secular', and 'republican' communitarianisms) promoted by globalization.¹³⁸

There is an important distinction between Europe and the EU, namely, that the EU as a new organizational mechanism is not able to break the predominant European views on identity, culture, and values. Jacques Derrida criticized the self-definition of the Europe and offered a different perspective that overcomes the limits of this definition, *The Other Headings: Reflections on Today's Europe*.¹³⁹ The main theme of this work is that the European discourse of today must include a discourse about tomorrow; it must be not only critical, but also deconstructive. He especially emphasizes the need to challenge the dominant perceptions of the EU held by conservatives, liberals and left-liberals. Otherwise, the Europe of today will be in danger of losing track of the "other". He suggests that a critical attitude may be developed and the prevailing insights about the EU might be transformed by returning to examine the history.¹⁴⁰ He states that the traditional discourse about Europe is already the discourse of the modern Western world, and proposes that European people must themselves accept responsibility for shaping it.

It is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of a difference of Europe, but of a Europe that consists precisely is not closing itself off in its own identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not, toward the other heading of the other, indeed –and this is perhaps something else altogether- toward the other of the heading, which would be the beyond of this modern

¹³⁸ Etienne Balibar, *We the People of Europe?: Reflections of Transnational Citizenship*, pp. 170.

¹³⁹ Jacques Derrida, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe*, trans. by P. A. Brault and M. Naas, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*, pp xxxv-xxxviii.

tradition, another border structure, another shore.¹⁴¹

The ‘responsibility’ here is to find an alternative approach that transcend the raw political polarities of Eurocentrism or anti-Eurocentrism, and instead seeks to lay the cultural foundation for a new discourse for a new Europe. Derrida further states that people must accept responsibility for appreciating the essential ‘differentness’ that is present in European culture, and develops a discourse that is appropriate to today's pluralist and heterogeneous Europe.¹⁴² This conflicts with the idea of the *spiritual* geography of Europe where

Europe has always recognized itself as a cape or headland, *either* as the advanced extreme of a continent, to the west and south..., the point of departure for discovery, invention and, colonization, *or* as the very center of this tongue in the form of cape, the Europe of the middle, coiled up, indeed compressed along a Greco-Germanic axis, at the very center of the center of the cape.¹⁴³

In place of this limited view, Derrida offers an alternative direction that recognizes with the name of ‘the Other heading’ the ever-presence of the ‘other’:

The expression “The Other Heading” can also suggest that another direction... To change direction can mean to change goals, to decide another heading, or else to change captains, or even-why not?- the age or sex of the captain. Indeed it can mean to recall that there is another heading, the heading being not only ours but the other, not only that which we identify, calculate, and decide upon, but the *heading of the other*, before which we must respond, and which we must *remember*, of which we must *remind ourselves*, the heading of the other being perhaps the first condition of an identity or identification that is not an egocentrism destructive of oneself and the other.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp.27-9.

¹⁴² *ibid.*, pp 10-12.

¹⁴³ *ibid.*, pp.20.

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.*, pp.15.

For Derrida, the alternative direction must include a respect for both universal values and differentness, since “responsibility” involves continually defining and redefining. The traditional definition of “Europe” is in terms of substantive moral universal values. Instead of this, Europe should be defined by a recognition of the ever-presence of general ‘differences’ by an appreciation of the contingency and historicity of particular differences. Europe must be responsible for the other, since its own identity is in fact constituted by the other. This redefinition of the European identity should respect both universal values and accept differences. Instead of either complete unification or total dispersion, Derrida describes the need to work with and from the Enlightenment values of liberal democracy while at the same time recalling that these values are never enough to ensure respect for the other.¹⁴⁵

In the twenty years since Derrida wrote this book and emphasized the responsibility of redefining the European identity and culture on the basis of pluralism in 1992, Europe has only tied his identity more strongly to its culture, values, and tradition. After the events in the US in 2001 and in Europe in 2004 and 2005, the European political context has been increasingly shaped by particular cases related to Muslims. This has brought up an old issue: whether there is a space for difference inside the borders of Europe. Europe perceives itself as a homogeneous entity, and has attempted to protect its homogeneity. That is, contrary Derrida’s proposition, it has preferred to not take responsibility and redefine itself by appreciating the differences. European identity, culture and values are still the central consideration in organizations and regulations of Europe.

At this point, it is crucial to state that the phrase “European political context” does not simply refer to everyday politics or party politics. It is independent of the governmental politics and its ideology at the constitutive level. There is no doubt that democratic constitutional systems based on the principle of division of power and the rule of law define the political discourse; however, in European politics, it

¹⁴⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 22-9.

seems that the constitutive power is the final word in defining political context. That is, the constitutive power, constituted of identity, culture and values, is the ultimate determinant of politics in constitutional systems. This is, the context that needs to be addressed when we recontextualize Europe.

If identity is one of the main factors that define European politics, the question that needs to be asked is: “what kind of identity, then, does Europe represent to Europeans?”¹⁴⁶ The following section attempts to answer this question by focusing on the narratives about the myth of Europe.

2.2. Immigration Issue

As it has been mentioned before, this dissertation takes the Holocaust as the “mirror stage” in European political context. In this context, in order to specify the concept of Europe through analyzing the issue of immigration and immigrants of Europe, this section focuses on the post-World War II period. Also, this date is important, since before the war, most western European countries had been imposing the restrictions on immigration, but after that they changed their immigration rules. It starts by setting a brief historical scene of the migration policies of West European countries after that time. Then, it focuses on the contemporary transformation of the political discourse on immigrants and immigration in Europe.

There are four major pillars of the post-war immigration. The first one is the experience of labor migration that is legal and government sanctioned movement. The second pillar involves the family reunification driven by the both immediate family members and other relatives. The third dimension is the *forced migration* that is constituted by the asylum seekers and refugees, and the fourth dimension is

¹⁴⁶ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, pp. 213.

called as ‘illegal’ or irregular immigration.¹⁴⁷ It is commonly assumed that during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s most foreign workers were embraced by European governments in order to fulfill the demand for cheap and unskilled labor of European nation-states’ economies after the war years. At the end of the Second World War which refers to the reconstruction process of Europe, European big powers like France, Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal and others needed the resources of both their colonies and other poor countries. It is estimated that 5.4 to 6.8 million people migrated to Europe over a forty-year period from many different locations in the decades after the World War II.¹⁴⁸

On the other hand, as Castles notes that labor recruitment goes back to the ancient world that conquests were motivated by taking slaves as a cheap labor (Cohen. 1987).¹⁴⁹ Slave trade was part of the colonial economy in early modernity in Europe. Then, colonial states receive free immigrants when slaves were abolished. Migrant labor also needed during the industrialization period. Migration was organized by employers, rather than states during those dates. In the First World War, European states, particularly France and Britain, recruited labor from their old colonies. Nazi regime was also based on migrant labor.¹⁵⁰

When we talk about the immigrants in and immigration to Europe, the consequences of colonization, decolonization and *recolonization* should be emphasized. Like colonization, decolonization experience was very traumatic both in colonies and Europe. Long and violent process of decolonization was followed

¹⁴⁷ Anthony M. Messina, *West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century*, USA: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ Stephen Castles, ‘The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies in Rethinking Migration: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives’, in Alejandro Portes and Josh DeWind (eds.), *In Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspective*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2007, pp. 32.

¹⁵⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 32.

by a migration from old colonies to Europe; both colonial places, and Europe itself started to be shaped through decolonization. Many people left their own countries because of the brutality, disruption, and conflict which lasts several years after the decolonization wars. For instance, in 17th century France has colonies in North America, the Caribbean, India, the islands in the Indian Ocean. In 19th century, the French empire reformed with the colonies across Africa, Indochina and Pacific and by the end of the war, it included Algeria, Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) Morocco, Tunisia and sub-Saharan Africa. After the war, between 1950s and 1960s, almost 450.000 people arrived from Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia. Moreover, Algeria was the premiere colony of France that France and other Europeans settled in Algeria in 1830s. France -Algeria war persisted for 8 years and was very violent and traumatic that between 100.000 and 200.000 people came from Algeria to France. Also, in early 17th century the Dutch empire had roots in the Caribbean, Dutch Guyana in northeastern America, Ceylon, and Southeast Asia. During the decolonization process of the Netherlands, between 1945 and 1963, approximately 300.000 immigrants from the Old Dutch colonies arrived in the Netherlands.¹⁵¹ The people who arrived in France during 1960s were the 4th or 5th generation in their family born overseas, but the place of colonies in the French political imagination was always ambiguous. In 1946, France abolished the distinction between citizen and subject: all people became citizens.¹⁵²

In 1973-4, many European governments had employed mostly young men from not only the former colonies, but also the northern rim of the Mediterranean basin. They deployed these people on a temporary basis in construction, industry, and low-skilled services in urban areas.¹⁵³ The number of foreign workers in Belgium,

¹⁵¹ Andre Smith, *Europe's Invisible Migrants*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003, pp. 13-17.

¹⁵² Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question, Theory, Knowledge, History*, CA: University of California Press, 2003.

¹⁵³ Stephen Castles and Godula Kozack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.

France, West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland were six million in 1960. In 1970, it became thirteen million and in ten years it became almost sixteen million. Almost 40 percent of the estimated sixteen million immigrants were coming from non-European countries. Temporary existence of the immigrants has been emphasized with the term *gasterbeiter* or ‘guestworkers’ in German speaking countries.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, even if European political discourse has strictly stated that immigration is a temporal process, it can be concluded that the post-war Europe transformed into a country of immigration.

2. 2. 1. A General Overview

The nineteenth century was a period marked by increasing freedom of movement from industrialization and the distinction between citizen and foreigner from the emergence of the welfare state, display a great deal of internal migration within Europe to meet the changes demands that new production focuses placed upon labor.¹⁵⁵ Following this broad historical description, the last half of the twentieth century has been called an age of migration, seeing many external migrants mobilize to Europe in order to meet production demands for labor.¹⁵⁶ On the other hand, as Castles has also drawn attention to, foreign labor recruitment within Europe is not a new thing; it goes back to the ancient world, when conquests found motivation in part by taking slaves as a cheap labor.¹⁵⁷ Slave trade was also part of the colonial economy of early modern Europe. When slavery was abolished, colonial states tended to open themselves to receive free immigrant labor during

¹⁵⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 490-2.

¹⁵⁵ Stephen Castles, ‘The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies in Rethinking Migration: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives’, pp. 32.

¹⁵⁶ *ibid.*,

¹⁵⁷ Cohen, 1987, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 32.

the industrialization period. Migration was organized by employers mostly, rather than states, during this period. Particularly, during the First World War, European states, especially France and Britain, recruited labor forces from their old colonies.¹⁵⁸

If focused more on the 20th century, the general idea is that there are four major pillars of post-World War II immigration to Europe. The first one is the experience of labor migration; which is generally a legal and government sanctioned movement of migrants. This kind of migration was sustained by migrants from the old colonies, other European countries, and beyond. The second one involves family reunification, driven by both immediate family members and other relatives of existing immigrants. The third pillar is *forced migration*; which is constituted by asylum seekers and refugees. Finally, the fourth one is called ‘illegal’ or irregular migration.¹⁵⁹

The long and violent process of decolonization was followed by large migrations from the old colonies to Europe; both colonial places, and Europe itself started to be reshaped through this process. Like colonization, the decolonization experience was so traumatic that many people left their own countries because of the brutality, disruption, and conflict that take place for many years after the upheavals decolonization brought to local regions. Therefore, like colonization, the decolonization process has been equally violent, both within the ex-colonies and within Europe. For instance, in the 17th century, France had colonies in North America, the Caribbean, India, and islands in the Indian Ocean. In 19th century, the French empire expanded with colonies across Africa, Indochina and Pacific and by the end of the war, it included Algeria, Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), Morocco, Tunisia and sub-Saharan Africa. After the Second World War, between

¹⁵⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 32.

¹⁵⁹ Andrew Geddes, *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*, London: SAGE Publication Ltd., 2003, p. 14 and Anthony M. Messina, *West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century*, USA: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002, p. 6.

1950s and 1960s, almost 450.000 people arrived from Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia. Moreover, the war in Algeria, which was the premiere colony that France and other Europeans settled in the 1830s, persisted for over 8 years and was extremely violent and traumatic. During the course of the war, between 100.000 and 200.000 people migrated from Algeria to France. Also, in the early 17th century the Dutch empire had roots in the Caribbean, Dutch Guyana in northeastern America, Ceylon, and Southeast Asia. During its decolonization process, between 1945 and 1963, approximately 300.000 immigrants from the Old Dutch colonies arrived in Netherlands.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, whenever immigration to Europe is discussed, the consequences of colonization, decolonization should be emphasized; even if the place of colonies within the European imagination is always 'ambiguous' and given to a certain sense of denial and ignorance about its 'real' effect.

In addition to this, Northern and Western European countries are experiencing a wave of migration that began in the 1940s. At the end of the Second World War, in particular reference to the reconstruction process of Europe; European big powers like France, Britain, Netherlands, Portugal and others required the resources of both their colonies and other poor countries. During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s most non-European workers were embraced by Western European governments, in order to fulfill the demand for cheap and unskilled labor within the European nation-states' economies after the war years. According to estimates, 5.4 to 6.8 million people migrated to Europe over a forty-year period from many different locations in the decades following World War II.¹⁶¹ The need for reconstruction led many European countries either to recruit foreign workers or to adopt some type of *laissez faire* immigration policy. This early immigration was substantially composed by post-colonial subjects particularly within Britain, France, and the Netherlands 'where agreements with former colonies provided for special rights to

¹⁶⁰ Andre Smith, *Europe's Invisible Migrants*, pp. 13-17.

¹⁶¹ *ibid.*

former subjects'. This movement was mostly motivated by economic interests; not controlled by governments. Then, governments arranged the second phase, which was emerged during the early 1970s, because the previous migration flow created problems; like unemployment during the economic recession of the decade.¹⁶²

When the profiles of migrants in Europe are examined, they are constituted by people not only from the non-European countries, but also from southern European countries. Then the composition of immigration was changed in Europe after 1945. By the 1960's immigrant workers were largely coming from the developing countries of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. On the other hand, after the 1960s all countries in Western Europe began to receive significant numbers of workers mainly from the southern European States.¹⁶³ In addition to this, in 1973-4, many European governments had employed mostly young men from not only their former colonies, but also the northern rim of the Mediterranean basin, although most western European countries had been imposing restrictions on immigration from this region from before the war. They employed these people on a temporary basis; mostly in construction, industry, and low-skilled services within urban areas.¹⁶⁴ Following the Second World War, up until the 1980s, especially around 1960s, large amount of immigrants to larger Northern European states came from other European countries. In 1962, approximately 75 per cent of foreign residents in France were of European origin; by 1982 this rate has changed to less than 50 per cent.¹⁶⁵ The number of foreign workers in Belgium, France, West Germany, Britain, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland were approximately six

¹⁶² Gallya Lahav, *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 29

¹⁶³ Douglas Massey et al 'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal', *Population and Development Review*, Vol.19, No.3 (September 1993), pp.431.

¹⁶⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 431

¹⁶⁵ Jonathan Marcus, *The National Front and French Politics: The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995, pp. 76.

million in 1960. In 1970, it this number jumped to thirteen million, and in ten years it reached almost sixteen million. Almost 40 percent of the estimated sixteen million immigrants were coming from the non-European countries, and 60 percent were from European ones. By the 1990s, migrants and their descendants made up 8.2 percent of the German population, 6.4 percent of the French population, 16.3 percent of the Swiss population, and 5.6 percent of the Swedish population.¹⁶⁶

The 1990s can be defined as a critical decade for the shifting relationship between European countries and immigration flow. European governments started to make very complicated and controversial arrangements for migrants and migration issues, in order to control and manage the flow of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees to Europe; such as bone scans for investigating the age of asylum seekers, speech-recognition technologies, civic integration examinations in the country of origin, biometrics, and data banks for storing the data on illegal migrants. When the controls were strengthened, between 1993 and 2006, more than 7000 people died while they were crossing borders into Europe, and the number of deaths increased significantly after the controls were further strengthened.¹⁶⁷ At that point, Sciortino and Pastore drew attention to the fact that in spite of the overemphasized border control, and the complexities of visa regulations to decrease the irregular immigration flow based on illicit entry, the opposite happened; rather immigration flow increases paradoxically.¹⁶⁸ In the same manner, he draws attention to the mythical assumptions about immigration control in Europe. He mentions that in spite of the ‘restrictive orthodoxy’ or ‘communitarized immigration’, the need for foreign labor was recognized in many European countries with reference to

¹⁶⁶ Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, 490-2.

¹⁶⁷ Spijkerboer, T. P. ‘The Human Costs of Border Control, *European Journal of Migration and Law*, Vol.9, 2007, pp. 151.

¹⁶⁸ Sciortino, G. & Pastore, F., ‘Immigration and European Immigration Policy: Myths and Realities’, paper presented at *Extending the Area of Freedom, Justice and Home Affairs in the EU: Liberty and Security through Enlargement: Challenges for the European Union Conference*. Trier, Germany, 2002, pp. 202-3.

ECOTEC, showing that “all the talk of ‘zero immigration’ notwithstanding, no EU Member State has ever stopped labor migration completely. All Member States have actually increasingly instituted a variety of programs for the entry of foreign labor”.¹⁶⁹

The issue of immigration control is not a recent thing though; almost for 40 years, migration to Europe has mostly been regarded as problematic and needs to be controlled. The European Union states usually control this problematic issue by dividing immigrants into categories as follows: temporary labor migrants, also called guest-workers or overseas contract workers, who migrate for a limited period in order to take up employment; highly skilled and business migrants who are welcomed by the hosting country; refugees who have a right to reside outside their country of nationality because of the fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, according to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; asylum-seekers who moved to another country in search for protection; forced migration who were forced to move by environmental catastrophes or development projects; family reunification migrants who have a right to migrate to the country of their family members; and return migrants who return to their countries of origin after a period of time abroad.¹⁷⁰

What is striking about the political discourse about migrants in Europe is that, as Robert Miles insists, the categories of ‘immigration’ and ‘immigrant’ refer to people who originate from nation-states called the ‘Third World’, even if they are constituted by the people not only from non-European countries, but also from southern European countries.¹⁷¹ For instance, in France, the term ‘immigrant’ is

¹⁶⁹ ECOTEC, 2001, cited in Sciortino, G. & Pastore, F., ‘Immigration and European Immigration Policy: Myths and Realities’, pp. 196.

¹⁷⁰ Stephen Castles, ‘The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies in Rethinking Migration: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives’, p. 33.

¹⁷¹ Robert Miles, *Racism After ‘Race Relations’*, New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 206-7.

commonly used to signify non-Europeans, particularly Africans and those from the Caribbean¹⁷², despite the fact that until the 1980s, especially around the 1960s, large amount of immigrants came from the other European countries to France; since almost all countries in Western Europe began to receive significant numbers of workers mainly from southern Europe after the 1960s.¹⁷³

The other striking point is that migrants are consistently perceived as minorities in this discursive universe. Talal Asad's statements about the term 'minority' may help to understand this conception better. The concept of 'minority' does not refer purely to a quantitative concept. This concept has arisen from a specific Christian history after the Reformation between the church and the early modern state. It is different from the secular Enlightenment concept of the abstract citizen; which is constituted by the abstract collection of equal citizens and refers to the political inclusion of minorities. It is documented under the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizens' in which minorities are defined as historically constituted, but not different from majorities.¹⁷⁴ On the other hand, the nineteenth century's distinction between citizen and foreigner seems still to protect its validity, since the people who immigrated to Europe a long time ago and have since become citizens of Europe, along with their descendants, are still mostly perceived and called migrants or minorities. They live in Europe, yet they are not considered European, because their legal or political relationship to a geographic locality is not enough to be European. In other words, simply living within Europe is not enough to identify oneself as European; instead, one must be able to lay claim to a historical sets of

¹⁷² Maxim Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and Citizenship in Modern France*. London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 3.

¹⁷³ Douglas Massey, et all, 'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal', *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 19, No.3 (Sep., 1993), pp.440-5.

¹⁷⁴ Asad, Talal, "Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?", pp. 222.

procedures and engagements with “European”. This opens migrants to physical and epistemic violation and torture.

The situation about migrants and migration in France is a good summarizing example for having a general overview about the larger migration issues in Europe. It is also a good example for the next chapter, which will focus on the transformation of the political discourse about 'migrants' and 'minorities' in Europe. Hargreaves explains that after the Second World War, the French government needed substantial numbers of immigrants to assist in reconstruction work, and to compensate for the demographic growth of France. After the war, immigration from Italy and other European countries were encouraged by the French government (Weil, 1991).¹⁷⁵ Also, family unification was facilitated for them (Amar and Milza 1990).¹⁷⁶ Moreover, after the war, the most dynamic component of the migratory flow was amongst the non-Europeans; the Maghrebis, Africans, and Asians in that order. Before the war, only very few people from these countries migrated to France and settled there permanently, since most of these countries were still under colonial rule during that time. The most prominent issue about these approaches to immigration was that while family reunification was rapidly facilitated for Portuguese migrants who arrived during the 1960s (Amar and Milza 1990)¹⁷⁷, family unification was discouraged for Algerians; through many indirect ways (Weil, 1991:60).¹⁷⁸ This is because Algerians were expected to stay in France temporarily. In 1974, when policy decisions taken under the center-right presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing being the head of the state from 1974 to 1981 inward immigration to France officially was ended. However, the process of immigration did not come to an end; the number of non-European immigrants, who

¹⁷⁵ Cited in Alec G. Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, Oxon: Routledge, 1995.

¹⁷⁶ Cited in *ibid.*, 263

¹⁷⁷ Cited in *ibid.*, pp. 263

¹⁷⁸ Cited in *ibid.*, pp.63

were mostly from Muslim countries, continued to rise. In the same years, the trends toward family re-settlement causing changes to the social structure in France began to be heavily debated. Also, the new characteristics of the immigrant population became an agenda, on the ground of changes caused to social structure. Namely, the first immigrants, who came during the 1970s, were mainly males, while the newcomers were predominantly women and children, creating new inflows into the housing market and an increase of children starting to go to the French schools.¹⁷⁹ As the perception about migration and migrants was changed in France, “immigres (immigrants) have come to be regarded as synonymous with travailleurs immigrés (immigrant workers), who were in turn equated with unskilled workers rather than professionally qualified personnel”.¹⁸⁰ More than that “immigrants as a whole had come to be seen essentially as people of color whereas European and the other Western residents were commonly referred to as strangers (foreigners)” (Sayyad, 1979: 25).¹⁸¹ In the same manner, Giry draws attention to the fact that until the mid of 1980s, immigrants had been thought of as workers, but after that they were mainly understood as Arabs.¹⁸² In conclusion, the term immigrants being in turn equated with both immigrant skilled and unskilled workers, along with the Muslim population in France; is a good instance of how the transformation of the perception about the issue of immigration and immigrants in Europe has shaped itself. The next sections will focus more on the transformation of the discourse on immigrants and immigration in Europe.

¹⁷⁹ Stephen Castles, ‘The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies in Rethinking Migration: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives’, pp. 22-24

¹⁸⁰ Sayyad, 1979, cited in Alec G. Hargreaves, *Immigration, ‘Race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, Oxon: Routledge, 1995.

¹⁸¹ *ibid.*

¹⁸² Stephanie Giry, ‘France and Its Muslims: The Politics of Assimilation’, *Foreign Affairs*, available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61919/st%C3%83%C2%A9phanie-giry/france-and-its-muslims>

2. 2. 2. Transformation of the Political Discourse about Immigrants

Almost for 15 years, European migration policies are in a state of transformation because of the anxiety over the social, economic, and security impacts of existing immigrants who are mostly from Muslim countries and their second and third generation descendants, and immigration flows from south and east part of the Europe created by refugees, asylum seekers, and ‘illegal’ immigrants in the age of globalization. On the other hand, the anxiety about immigrants and the increasing entry of immigrants in Europe is not a new issue, yet it dates back from the late 1970s. Particularly, since the mid-1970s, immigrants began to be seen as a problem, while they were seen as necessary during the economic expansion in 1950s and 1960s. Even though Europe has been reconstructed in terms of their immigrants, those people have not been perceived as the part of ‘the European’ society, but rather they have been seen as a huge problem for Europe. Also, strikingly, although they have been living in Europe for at least three generations, have citizenship or residency for generations, they have been seen as foreigners or temporary and ambiguous beings in Europe. Their temporary existence has been emphasized with the term *gasterbeiter* or ‘guestworkers’ in German speaking countries.

On the other hand, even though European political discourse has strictly stated that immigration is a temporal process, it seems that the post-war Europe has been transformed into a region of immigration and by the 1980s, immigrant workers became permanent residents.¹⁸³ After that, immigration issue transformed into the social and political realm. Although all European countries did not have the same experience with immigration, they started to discuss this issue with the same rhetoric.¹⁸⁴ In this rhetoric, European immigrants and their descendants have been

¹⁸³ Castles, Booth and Wallace 1984, Rogers 1985, cited in Gallya Lahav, *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders*, pp. 30.

¹⁸⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 30.

conceptualized as 'guest'. By doing this, it has fixed the "host". Therefore, although immigrants have been gaining their full citizenship and becoming more European, they have been still viewed as outsider inside and non-European.¹⁸⁵

If looked at the transformation of the political discourse on immigration in Europe since the 1970s, it can be clearly seen that immigration control has been one of the prominent character of this transformation. The discourse about controlling the migration has been shaped around the political concern about increasing amount of migration to Europe during the 1970s because of not only new migration, but also the migration of dependents and extended family of the immigrant workers. According to the Castles (2007) approximately 30 million people, workers and their descendants, entered the Western Europe through the early 1970s. This led the permanent settlement of temporary immigrants in Europe. It was totally opposed to the expectations of European governments assuming that 'foreign/non-European' immigrants workers would return to their 'home' countries when Europe does not need them anymore. Thereafter, they were started to be called as 'unwanted' immigrant. On the other hand, during that time Western European countries did not dispense with migrants, since migrant workers were concentrated on the jobs which locals were unable or unwilling to do.¹⁸⁶

In the context of this discursive universe, when it comes to the 1980s, immigrants of Europe were started to be marginalized and coded as problematic people for Europe. They have been marginalized economically, socially and politically, and then started to be perceived as a threat to economic and social life of Europe. This discursive universe has been shaped in the framework of debates discusses restricting the immigration and sending back to existing immigrants to their 'country of origin'. Margaret Thatcher's speech gives the very sense of tone of the

¹⁸⁵ Anthony M. Messina, *West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century*, pp. 2.

¹⁸⁶ Stephen Castles, 'The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies in Rethinking Migration: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives', pp. 34-7.

debates about the ‘non-European’ immigrants of Europe. In 1978, Thatcher defined the Caribbean and Asian people as a threat to ‘Britishness’ with these words:

[...]you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the world, that if there is a fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react and be rather hostile to these coming in (3 April 1982).¹⁸⁷

While these happens, during 1980s and 1990s the explosion in the numbers of asylum seekers and refugees that gained entrance to Western Europe. The idea of ‘migration crises’ was developed, and then popularized by academics, media, and other opinion leaders in the same years.

In the framework of growing number of immigrants from the East and the South, politicians started to declare that welfare states have been swamped by these immigrants. In the same manner, extreme right has empowered their anti-immigration campaigns. Those people are stigmatized as threats to prosperity, welfare, culture, and national identity. In France, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front (FN) and the other populist-nationalist parties condemn immigrants as threats to European cultural integrity, economy, and society. Le Pen had electoral success during those years. After that, other mainstream parties in Europe started to adopt anti-immigrant policies. Within this parallel, xenophobic and racist political groups started to grew and gain political success in 1980s: the freedom party in Austria, the national front in Belgium, the national front in Britain, the progress party in Denmark, the national front in France, the center party in the Netherlands, the progress party in Norway, the national socialist front in Sweden, the people's party in Switzerland and some xenophobic groups in Germany are the prominent examples for this.¹⁸⁸ During those years, media, from serious newspapers to weekly

¹⁸⁷ Cited in Robert Miles, “Recent Marxist Theories of Nationalism and the Issue of Racism”, *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 38, No.1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 24-43.

¹⁸⁸ Kitschiest 1995: 3, cited in Anthony M. Messina, *West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century*, pp.2

popular magazines or television shows, have been reporting attacks on and discrimination against immigrants. In December 1988, a German ultra right militant named Josef Seller set fire to the 'Habermeier Haus' building in Schwandorf, Bavaria killing the Turkish couple Fatma and Osman Can, together with their son Mehmet; the arson attack also took the life of German citizen Jürgen Hübner. Also, in November 1992, *New York Times* reported that an arson in Mölln perpetrated by right-wing youth killed three Turks.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, in reunited Germany, many African, Asian and eastern European refugees, Jews, and Turks were attacked and killed in 1992. The Solingen arson attack of 1993 was one of the most severe instances of anti-foreigner violence in modern Germany. On the night of May 28 to May 29, 1993, four young German men (ages 16-23) belonging to the far right skinhead scene, with neo-Nazi ties, set fire to the house of a large Turkish family in Solingen in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. Three girls and two women died; fourteen other family members, including several children, were injured, some of them severely. The attack led to violent protests by Turks in several German cities and to large demonstrations of Germans expressing solidarity with the Turkish victims.¹⁹⁰ In England, it was reported that 6,459 racially motivated incidents occurred in 1990.¹⁹¹ On the other hand, in 1990, the European Parliament stated that refugees, Jews, gypsies, and immigrants were violated and attacked particularly by far right groups. Also, many surveys, which focus on the

¹⁸⁹ '2 Germans Admit Arson Attack that Killed 3 Turkish Nationals', *New York Times*, December 2, 1992, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/02/world/2-germans-admit-arson-attack-that-killed-3-turkish-nationals.html>

¹⁹⁰ 'Thousands of Germans rally for the Slain Turks', *New York Times*, June 4, 1993, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/04/world/thousands-of-germans-rally-for-the-slain-turks.html>

¹⁹¹ *The Runnymede Trust*, 1990, available at: <http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/bulletin/pdfs/313BulletinAug98.pdf>

European attitudes to immigrants from non-European countries, were designed in those years.¹⁹²

In the same years, policy makers and officials reacted to this increasing immigration flow by regulating stricter border control and police regime.¹⁹³ In 1980s, external control became a prominent issue and then migration control became more intense in Europe in 1980s and 1990s. Although it was a local issue until the 1990s, it started to become a supranational issue in 1990s. In this framework, in 1985 Schengen Agreement and in 1997 Amsterdam Treaty was implemented. Both of them have regulated migration and asylum policies of the EU which is a supranational form of Europe.¹⁹⁴ On the other hand, European countries continue to follow national logic even though there is a trend towards transnational behavior and consciousness, since national logic in Europe has not been fully outmoded in every issue by the transnational logic.

2.2.3. Muslim ‘Immigrants’

Perceiving immigration as a threat to the welfare system is very ironic, since the most part of the welfare system in Europe has been constructed by the immigrants’ labor employed by governments during the post-1945 period. Muslims are in Europe, because of two reasons. First one is that they immigrated to Europe during decolonization period as skilled and unskilled labors. Second one is again immigration as a labor power after the Second World War. The other part of them migrated to Europe because of the family unification with the previous movement.

¹⁹² Anthony M. Messina, *West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century*, pp. 2-4.

¹⁹³ Stephen Castles and Sean Loughna, ‘Globalization, Migration and Immigration’, in George Vic and Robert M. Page (eds.) *Global Social Problems*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, pp. 177.

¹⁹⁴ Stephen Castles, ‘The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies in Rethinking Migration: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives’, pp. 34-8.

That is, most of the Muslims in Europe immigrated to Europe as a labor power during the post-colonial and post-war period. On the other hand, Muslims in Spain, they have been there for hundred years.

Even if there are no official statistics detailing religious affiliation in European countries, there are estimated numbers of Muslim immigrants in some European countries. In Denmark, for instance, it is estimated that 160,000-180,000 of the 5.3 million residents of the country are Muslims. As it is stated in the Report published by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 'Intolerance and Discrimination Against Muslims in EU: Developments since September 11 in 2004,

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many Muslims came to the country as labor migrants from countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Morocco and the former Yugoslavia, and in the 1980s-1990s, considerable groups of Muslim refugees arrived in from the Middle East, Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Muslims with refugee background currently constitute about 40% of all Muslims in Denmark. ... As of the late 1990s, there were some 25,000 Muslims who were naturalized Danish citizens, and this number is likely to have grown since. ... Denmark is traditionally characterized by a high degree of ethnic and religious homogeneity and it is only as a result of immigration in the last few decades that a greater variety of cultural and religious traditions have become visible in society.¹⁹⁵

According to the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics,

There were 945,000 Muslims out of a total population of 16.3 million in the Netherlands in January 2004. Two thirds of all Muslims have origins in Turkey or Morocco, while the rest originate from, among other countries, Surinam, Iraq, Somalia, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the 1960s many Muslims arrived as labor migrants from Turkey and Morocco, while in more recent decades most Muslim immigrants have arrived under family reunification schemes or as

¹⁹⁵<http://www.art1.nl/nprd/factsheets/Intolerance%20against%20muslims%20in%20the%20EU%2003-2005.pdf>, Report by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 'Intolerance and Discrimination Against Muslims in EU: Developments since September 11, 2004, p.49.

asylum seekers.¹⁹⁶

In France, it is estimated that 7-8% of the population which is 4-5 million of the 60 million residents are Muslims. Islam is the second largest religious belief after Catholicism. About half of all Muslims are French citizens and mostly live in and around big cities, including Paris, Lille and Marseille.¹⁹⁷

Current political discourse particularly shaped around the categorization of people from Muslim countries as a potential threat to western civilization in both the US and Europe. In his brilliant article, Asad mainly focuses on this problem. He draws attention that “Islam is excluded from the representation of Europe”.¹⁹⁸ In the framework of his argument, this sections draws attention that this exclusion is a racialization and colonization of Islam and Muslims inside the borders of Europe by the neo-colonial and racist mentality.

There seems to be a high level of consensus among many European countries about the formal and informal declarations, and the legal regulations about the issues related to Muslim immigrants of Europe. This consensus, which began to emerge in the early 1980s, is not accidental. That period has witnessed the economic recession of European economy. The aggressive programs of liberalization and structural reforms were initiated in the 1980s under the guise of Reaganism and Thatcherism. This has enhanced the flows of goods, services, labor, and capital on a global scale. This transformation of political economy has caused to devaluing

¹⁹⁶ ‘Almost a Million Muslims in The Netherlands’, *NIS News Bulletin*, September 21, 2004, at <http://www.nisnews.nl>; Statistics Netherlands, “Population: Key figures”, available at <http://www.cbs.nl/en/492>, Nico Landman, *Country Profile: the Netherlands*, at <http://euro-islam.info/>. Cited in Report by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 'Intolerance and Discrimination Against Muslims in EU: Developments since September 11, 2004, p.104

¹⁹⁷ Islamic Institute for Human Rights (IIHR), “Country Profile: The Conditions of Muslims in France,” at <http://www.iifhr.com/Country%20Profiles/France.htm>; Juliane Hamer, “Muslims in France,” *Islam Online*, January 2000, at <http://www.islamonline.net>; “Muslim population in France,” 2003, at http://www.fact-index.com/i/is/islam_in_france.html, cited in *ibid.*, p. 61

¹⁹⁸ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, pp. 220.

the meaning of immigration and immigrants for Europe; so to speak, they have lost their social use. In more specific terms, European immigrants, who came to Europe during decolonization and reconstruction process of Europe after the Second World War, have lost their desirability and they have been seen as the useless leftovers of colonialism and post Second World War reconstruction process.

To give more details, it will be focused on the reports of some organizations trying to report these issues. One of them is ECRI which “is a human rights body of the Council of Europe, composed of independent experts, which monitors problems of racism, discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, citizenship, color, religion and language, as well as xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance, prepares reports and issues recommendations to member States”.¹⁹⁹

Its reports focus on the attitude towards ‘minorities’ in general and Muslims in particular the countries of the EU by giving detailed information about the formal relations between the state and the Muslim community of the countries, the negative sentiments and harassment against Muslims, discrimination against

¹⁹⁹ “One of the pillars of ECRI’s work program is its country-by-country approach, whereby it analysis the situation as regards racism and intolerance in each of the member States of the Council of Europe and makes suggestions and proposals as to how to tackle the problems identified. The country-by-country approach deals with all member States of the Council of Europe on an equal footing. The work is taking place in 4/5 year cycles, covering 9/10 countries per year. The reports of the first round were completed at the end of 1998 and those of the second round at the end of the year 2002. Work on the third round reports started in January 2003. The third round reports focus on “implementation”. They examine if ECRI’s main recommendations from previous reports have been followed and implemented, and if so, with what degree of success and effectiveness. The third round reports deal also with “specific issues”, chosen according to the different situations in the various countries, and examined in more depth in each report. ...The working methods for the preparation of the reports involve documentary analyses, a contact visit in the country concerned, and then a confidential dialogue with the national authorities. ...ECRI’s reports are not the result of inquiries or testimonial evidences. They are analyses based on a great deal of information gathered from a wide variety of sources. Documentary studies are based on an important number of national and international written sources. The in situ visit allows for meeting directly the concerned circles (governmental and non-governmental) with a view to gathering detailed information. The process of confidential dialogue with the national authorities allows the latter to propose, if they consider it necessary, amendments to the draft report, with a view to correcting any possible factual errors which the report might contain. At the end of the dialogue, the national authorities may request, if they so wish, that their viewpoints be appended to the final report of ECRI”. Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/default_en.asp.

Muslims in different areas of society, and media coverage of issues related to Islam and Muslims in some European countries.

The first report that I focus on is about Austria in 2010. In this report it is stated that

Black people and Muslims are especially vulnerable to racism and discrimination and the Roma, who continue to suffer a socioeconomic disadvantage compared with the rest of the population, still face serious difficulties. Antisemitic prejudice remains very much alive in Austria and there are reports of Jewish, and also Muslim, memorials, cemeteries and places of worship being desecrated. Migrants still have to contend with a restrictive family reunification policy based on a system of annual quotas, and the “integration contract” which they are required to fulfill in order to obtain a long-term residence permit has a coercive element that would be better replaced by incentives and measures to promote integration. Asylum seekers, meanwhile, are faced with a negative climate generated, to a large extent, by certain politicians and media, and have access to only limited legal support. More generally, the issue of racism and xenophobia in political discourse and in certain sections of the media is all the more worrying as the authorities do not appear to have taken any meaningful steps to find solutions.²⁰⁰

The second report is about Denmark written in 2012 by ECRI:

Denmark has still not ratified Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights.²⁰¹... Some media have continued to

²⁰⁰ ECRI (European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, 2 March 2010, available at: <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/austria/AUT-CbC-IV-2010-002-ENG.pdf>.

²⁰¹ This Protocol has signed by the Member States of the Council of Europe in Rome in 4 November, 2000. Being resolved to take further steps to promote the equality of all persons through the collective enforcement of a general prohibition of discrimination by means of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4 November 1950. The Member States have agreed on six articles. First article is about the general prohibition of discrimination. It has two articles. First one states that “[t]he enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”. Second one states “[n]o one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1”. Available at: <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/177.htm>

portray minority groups, in particular Muslims and Roma in a negative light. Moreover, some politicians, especially from the Danish People's Party, have continued to make disparaging statements about groups of concern to ECRI in general and Muslims in particular. Few cases have been brought to court under the Criminal Code for this type of speech. The public's attitude towards Roma is negative and they face harassment and discrimination. Asylum seekers are still not permitted to attend upper secondary school or university in Denmark. The negativity of public and political discourse has had a disproportionately adverse effect on groups of concern to ECRI in a number of important areas of policy. [...] ECRI also encourages the Danish authorities to review the language examination and citizenship test required to acquire Danish citizenship in order to ensure that they do not become an obstacle for applicants.... ECRI recommends that the Danish authorities encourage the media to refrain from broadcasting any information likely to fuel discrimination and intolerance towards Roma. ECRI recommends that the authorities encourage debate within the media on the image which they convey of Islam and Muslim communities and on their responsibility in this respect to avoid perpetuating prejudice and biased information.... Denmark has still not ratified the (Revised) European Social Charter. Denmark has informed ECRI that it has not accepted the provisions of Article 19 of the European Social Charter; this article provides for the right of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance. Denmark has informed ECRI that it has no plans to ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families because it finds this instrument likely to be very wide. ... ECRI notes with concern reports according to which some media continue to portray minority groups, especially Muslims and Roma, in a negative light. ECRI has also received reports indicating that some media report the ethnic background of a suspected criminal when this is not necessary for understanding the information, but that criminal offences committed by Danes against groups of concern to ECRI are underplayed. Moreover, ECRI is aware of the view among some members of groups of concern to ECRI that they are being denied opportunities to express themselves in the media while no exception is taken to those, including academics, who express racist

views in the media. The rhetoric carried by the media concerning groups of concern to ECRI thus has affected the majority population's perception of such groups with which they otherwise have little day-to-day interaction. ECRI further notes with concern that those media which incite racial hatred face in practice no legal consequences.... Some politicians, especially from the Danish People's Party, have continued to make disparaging statements about groups of concern to ECRI in general and Muslims in particular, portraying them in a constantly negative light.²⁰²

Increasingly restrictive policies toward 'foreigners' and 'minorities' in Denmark in recent years were also expressed in the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe.²⁰³ According to human rights observers, it is important to note that the tendency to problematize the presence of people of foreign origin in Denmark dates back to the mid- 1980s, and that immigration policies have gradually been tightened since that time. As a result, the most recent developments can be viewed as a culmination of a longer-term development.²⁰⁴ It is clearly stated that

The political debate on foreigners and minorities has become increasingly harsh since the mid-1980s, when a political fringe movement for the first time warned of the alleged "invasion" of Muslims in the country. The tone of the current debate has largely been set by the far-right Danish People's Party, which won 12% of the votes in the 2001 elections and is a key party supporting the government in parliament. Members of this party have repeatedly made highly inflammatory statements, including by accusing Muslims

²⁰² ECRI Report on Denmark, 22 May 2012, available at: <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/denmark/DNK-CBC-IV-2012-025-ENG.pdf>.

²⁰³ Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his visit to Denmark 13th-16th April 2004, p. 4, available at <http://www.coe.int>, cited in Report by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, "Intolerance and Discrimination Against Muslims in EU: Developments since September 11", p. 51.

²⁰⁴ Mandana Zarrehparvar, senior adviser with the Danish Institute for Human Rights, to the IHF, September 6, 2004, cited in *ibid.*, p. 51.

of undermining democratic values and promoting violence.²⁰⁵

The third one is about the Netherlands written in 2008:

Partly as a consequence of a number of national and international events, the tone of Dutch political and public debate around integration and other issues relevant to ethnic minorities has experienced a dramatic deterioration since ECRI's second report, resulting in a worrying polarization between majority and minority communities. ...The Muslim, and notably the Moroccan and Turkish, communities have been particularly affected by these developments, which have resulted in a substantial increase of Islamophobia in both the political arena and other contexts. The climate of opinion around members of other groups, notably Antilleans, has also clearly worsened, as reflected in policies and practices targeted at them in different fields. The situation of Roma and Sinti groups has not yet been given the necessary attention at central government level. Targeting the ethnic minority population only, the integration policies adopted since ECRI's second report have not reflected an idea of integration as a two-way process. In spite of efforts made antisemitic, and notably Holocaust denial, Islamophobic and other racist material on the Internet has continued to increase. While efforts are underway, the criminal justice system, and notably the police, still needs to enhance its role in monitoring and countering racially-motivated offenses. ...Events that have contributed to this change include world-scale events, such as the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. And the ensuing global fights against terrorism, but also circumstances that have a more national dimension. Prominently among these feature two events: firstly, the emergence on the political scene of Pim Fortuyn, a successful political leader who was very outspoken on matters of immigration and integration and vocal about his views on Muslims and who was killed in 2002 by an extreme environmentalist of Dutch origin; secondly, in 2004 the murder, by a Dutch citizen of Moroccan origin, of Theo van Gogh, a film-maker and a columnist, following the publication of a film on the subject of domestic violence against Muslim women.... ECRI is deeply concerned about these developments, not only because they have allowed for racist and xenophobic expression to become, sometimes quite explicitly, a more usual occurrence within public debate itself, but especially because of the impact that the new political and public debate has had on public opinion and on the actions of ordinary citizens. ECRI notes with regret that in this context, cultures have been

²⁰⁵ *ibid.*, p. 53.

strongly stereotyped and values automatically and arbitrarily assigned to one or another group.... The debate around freedom of expression represents only one example of the overall shift towards a debate based on stereotyped cultures and values. In a more general way, ECRI would like to underline that this shift in public debate has resulted in a polarization of positions that it considers as extremely counterproductive in terms of preparing the grounds for a constructive dialogue among the different communities in the Netherlands. For instance, members of Muslim groups have reported to ECRI that they find it insulting and frustrating to have to systematically display, unlike their non-Muslim peers, anti-terrorism positions or a commitment to freedom of expression or other human rights, simply due to their Muslim background. The potentially divisive and stigmatising use currently made of the word “allochtonen”⁵² as a catch-all expression for “the other” in the Netherlands has also been highlighted. ... The tone of public debate on integration in the last few years has made integration more difficult, not easier.... Since ECRI’s last report, Islamophobia is reported to have increased dramatically in the Netherlands.... ECRI stresses that Muslims are the minority group that appears to have been affected the most by these events. As further detailed below, since ECRI’s second report the Muslims of the Netherlands have been the subject of stereotyping, stigmatizing and sometimes outright racist political discourse and of biased media portrayal and have been disproportionately targeted by security and other policies. They have also been the victims of racist violence and other racist crimes and have experienced discrimination.... In the period after the events of 11 September 2001, and especially in the months following the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004, the Netherlands witnessed a sharp rise in racist violence and other racist crimes, essentially targeted at its Muslim population. This comprises violence directed against individuals, but also violence directed against property, including attacks on mosques and Islamic schools and violence against shops owned by Muslim persons.... Sweeping generalizations and associations made in the media between Muslims on the one hand, and terrorism on the other, have unfortunately compounded the situation.... Islamophobic views are increasingly becoming part of mainstream thinking.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁶ Third Report on the Netherlands, 29 June 2007. Available at:http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XML/Ecri/ENGLISH/Cycle_03/03_CbC_eng/NLD-CbC-III-2008-3-ENG.pdf).

In addition to ECRI, some other important reports draw attention to the violent incidents following 2000 in the Netherlands. According to a report published by the Research and Documentation Center of the Dutch Anne Frank Foundation and the University of Leiden,

A total of 174 violent incidents occurred between November 2 and November 30, 2004, including cases of verbal abuse, intimidation, graffiti, physical violence, vandalism, bomb attacks and arson. Out of these incidents, 106 were targeted at Muslims or Muslim institutions or property.²⁰⁷

The fourth country is France. For France, it is emphasized that

Intolerance against Muslims has reportedly been on the rise in France in recent years.... A growing number of attacks on Muslims have been observed, ranging from verbal harassment to physical assaults and vandalism. The French Organization against Islamophobia (CCIF) was established in 2003 to monitor acts of intolerance and discrimination against Muslims. During the period from October 2003 to August 2004, this organization registered 26 cases of verbal and physical assaults on Muslims, 28 cases of vandalism and attempted arson targeting mosques, and 11 cases of desecration of Muslim graves. Four of the attacks on individual Muslims were considered grave, and over 70% were targeted at Muslim women wearing the headscarf.²⁰⁸

The rise in hostility against Muslims has been noted with concern by the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH), a body established by the prime minister that is composed of governmental and non-governmental representatives. The CNCDH highlighted the problem of racism against Muslims in its 2003 annual report, and referred inter alia to cases of anti-Muslim graffiti, violence against public figures linked to Islam and intolerant statements made by

²⁰⁷ Research and Documentation Centre of the Anne Frank Foundation and Department of Public Administration at the University of Leiden, *Developments Following the Murder of Theo Van Gogh* written by Jaap van Donselaar and Peter R. Rodrigues, December 2004, at www.annefrank.org/upload/downloads/ANNEXengels_dec04.doc, cited in Report by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, "Intolerance and Discrimination Against Muslims in EU: Developments since September 11", pp. 106.

²⁰⁸ CCIF, Rapport d'étape du CCIF sur l'Islamophobie en France 2003/2004, p. 17. cited in *ibid.*, p. 62.

elected officials and newspaper columnists.²⁰⁹

In the aftermath of September 11, media have increasingly been criticized for reinforcing negative stereotypes against Muslims in their coverage of issues related to Islam. According to researchers, reports often serve to associate Muslims with criminality, fanaticism and terrorism, and Muslim representatives feel that media exploit terrorist attacks and other events to depict Islam as a threat to French values. Muslim representatives also regret a tendency in the media to give wide attention to Muslims with extremist views, which are not representative of the majority of Muslims.²¹⁰

In its 2003 annual report, the CNCDH denounced media reports that identify Islam as the sole ideological cause of terrorism committed in the name of Islam and that feed “conspiracy theories” through the use of sensationalist images, headlines and comments.²¹¹

In Germany,

According to the results of a German study that were made public in 2002, media coverage of the conflicts in the Near and Middle East largely serve to associate Islam with terrorism, and therefore have a negative impact on public attitudes toward Islam and Muslims. The researcher behind the study noted inter alia that media often give disproportionate attention to extremist opposition groups and identify Islam as a basis for violence, while overlooking economic and social factors that fuel conflicts.²¹²

In Spain,

Following the September 11 events, many media reports reflected a balanced approach toward Islam, and many opinion leaders contributed commentaries that defended Islam as a tolerant religion. However, anti-racist organizations also observed a growing trend in which the media

²⁰⁹ Cited in *ibid.*, p.63.

²¹⁰ Open Society Institute (OSI), *EU Monitoring Accession Program: The Situation of Muslims in France*, p. 85-86, cited in *ibid.*, p. 63.

²¹¹ CNCDH, *Bilan des actions racistes, antisémites et xénophobes en 2003* (April 2004), cited in *ibid.*, p. 63.

²¹² Cited in *ibid.*, p. 77.

used stereotypical language and images toward Muslims, thereby encouraging negative sentiments against this group.²¹³

A year after September 11, Muslim representatives published a declaration expressing concern that Islam is often associated with terrorism in the media, which they feel contributes to enhancing the vulnerability of Muslims in Spanish society.²¹⁴

In the aftermath of September 11, immigration policies increasingly have been linked to security concerns in Spain. While depicting tougher immigration policies as an element of the campaign against terrorism, the authorities have adopted new measures to enhance border control, combat illegal immigration and further restrict immigration legislation.²¹⁵

In Sweden,

Immediately after the September 11 events, there was an upsurge in attacks on Muslims. Most attacks involved verbal abuse, but some cases of physical assaults and vandalism and arson targeting Muslim institutions and property were also reported. ...While representatives of the Swedish government and most major political parties publicly condemned intolerance against Muslims after the September 11 events, some far-right movements exploited the situation to engage in anti-Muslim rhetoric.²¹⁶

Moreover, Muslim and human rights organizations are concerned that some of the counter-terrorism measures taken by the Swedish government since September 11 may have had the effect of

²¹³ EUMC, *Anti-Islamic Reactions in the EU after 11 September 2001: Spain*, p. 7, 5, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 121.

²¹⁴ The chapter on Spain in IHF, *Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Report 2003 (Events of 2002)*, p. 34, cited in *ibid.*, p. 121.

²¹⁵ Human Rights Watch, "In the Name of Counter-terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide: Spain", presented to the 59th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, March 25, 2003, at <http://www.hrw.org>, and the chapter on "Asylum, Immigration and Border Control Policies in IHF" in *Anti-Terrorism Measures, Security and Human Rights* (April 2004), at <http://www.ihf-hr.org>, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 121.

²¹⁶ European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), *Anti-Islamic Reactions in the EU after the Terror Attacks against the USA: Sweden*, p.18, 43-44 (prepared by the EXPO Foundation) (May 2004), at <http://www.eumc.at>, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 128-130.

encouraging negative attitudes toward Muslims.²¹⁷

From this framework, being against the arguments which suggest the abolishment of inner borders of Europe, I assert that the securitization of immigration and re-territorialization of Europe are not limited with regulating the external borders of Europe; internal borders of Europe have been reshaping for a long time in a different manner. It has recently been reconstructed visibly through coding the Muslim immigrants as ‘enemy within’ or ‘outsider inside’. Therefore, in order to recontextualize contemporary Europe, we need to go back to the discussion about the changing character and function of European borders.

We need to draw attention to the reterritorialization of Europe in the context of the EU during those years. Although it is maintained that global market forces act on against strict control of borders²¹⁸ and draw attention to impossibility of strict border control²¹⁹, Europe has putting the obsessively strict control over external borders since 1985 and 1997 when Schengen and Amsterdam Treaty was declared. Andreas offers the term ‘rebordering’ which means that while military and economic function of borders have been declining, borders are becoming more crucial in policing “clandestine transnational actors” helps us to understand this reterritorialization. In this context, “the importance of territoriality is shifting rather than simply diminishing”.²²⁰ In order to clarify this more, it is supportive to look at the William Walters’s analysis on Schengen phenomenon in the framework of biopolitics. Walters puts border as a “site of biopolitical management” which

²¹⁷ Information from SUM to the IHF, November 1, 2004 and information from SHC to the IHF, January 2005, cited in *ibid.*, p. 131.

²¹⁸ Adrian Favell and Randall Hansen, ‘Markets against Politics: Migration, EU Enlargement and the Idea of Europe’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol.28 No.4 (October 2002), pp. 581-602.

²¹⁹ Bigo, D., ‘Frontier and Security in the European Union: The Illusion of Migration Control’, in Anderson, M. and Bort, E., (eds.) *The Frontiers of Europe*, London: Pinter, 1998.

²²⁰ Peter Andreas, 2003: 3, “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the twenty-first Century”, *International Security*, 28(2): 78-111.

regulates population, their movement, security, wealth, and health. Schengen is the prominent example for this kind of ‘rebordering’: it is not directly and visibly connected with a politics of war and peace; it reflects a regional border rather than national border.²²¹

It is commonly believed that although the outer borders of Europe have been strengthened, the internal borders of Europe have removed. And this abolishment of internal borders of the EU has increased the control of the borders of the Schengen area, since the member states have a mutual interest in strengthening the control of the external borders. As Huysmans (2000) states that this reflects the ‘securitization’ of migration which became the most prominent issue in reshaping the politics and borders of the EU.²²² In 26 October 2004, the council of the European Union established FRONTEX (From Frontiers Exterieuriers) which is a new external border agency of the EU.²²³ FRONTEX reflects not only the visible result of the securitization of migration, but also institutionalization of it. Its purpose is defined as “co-ordination of intelligence driven operational co-operation at the EU level to the strengthened security at the external borders”.²²⁴ Andrew W. Neal's work on FRONTEX is a detailed reference for understanding it. Neal points out that FRONTEX does not use over securitizing language and do not follow the classic logic of securitization, yet it explores empirical evidences and theoretical questions about securitization theory, and its appropriateness and applicability to the structure of the EU.²²⁵ In FRONTEX, it is stated that “security is ultimately a

²²¹ William Walters, Border/Control, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9(2), 2006, pp. 187-203.

²²² Jef Huysman, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.38, No.5 (December 2000), pp. 751-77.

²²³ The Council of the European Union, 2004. Available at: frontex.europa.eu/assest/About_Frontex-regulation_en.pdf

²²⁴ FRONTEX “Mission Statement” available at: http://www.FRONTEX.europa.eu/more_about_FRONTEX.

²²⁵ Andrew W. Neal, ‘Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The origins of FRONTEX’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.47, Iss.2 (March 2009), pp. 333-4

matter of shared agreement or attitudes”.²²⁶ In this framework, it can be concluded that the contemporary form of immigrant policies of Europe has been shaped in the context of reterritorialization/rebordering of European outer borders through the ‘securitization of immigration’ not with the classical logic of securitization, but with *apophasis*, mentioning by not mentioning.

In summary, migration policies had been determined predominantly by considerations of labor needs in the west European states, and then from the 1970s onwards, migration issue increasingly became a subject of popular party politics. In this manner, migration and existing migrants started to be coded as a problem which has negative impacts on European societies, culture, economies, welfare, social services, social cohesion, and labor markets. Insomuch that immigrants have been perceived as internal enemies. This framework politicized migration issue more in Europe in 1980s and it was started to use as a proof for political mobilization. This discourse has encouraged more restrictive policies about immigration in Europe. Some scholars –prominently Balibar (1991)²²⁷ and Miles (1993)²²⁸ - have drawn attention to the role and impact of late capitalism for the problematization of immigration and immigrants in Europe starting from mid the 1980s. During those years, it is generally assumed that slow economic growth and recession caused that western European countries started to have troubles with the flow of immigration and existing immigrants.²²⁹ On the other hand, this framework is not enough to understand the problematization of immigrants and immigration in Europe. With reference to SOPEMI Report²³⁰ in 1979, as Sciortino draws attention,

²²⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 336.

²²⁷ Etienne Balibar, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, trans. of Etienne Balibar by Chris Turner, London, New York: Verso, 1991.

²²⁸ Robert Miles, *Racism after ‘Race Relations’*, London: Routledge, 1993.

²²⁹ Anthony M. Messina, *West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century*, pp. 1.

²³⁰ Yearly report on migration, immigrants and policy for the continuous reporting system on migration of the OECD.

immigration was banned in 1970s because of the political rather than economic reasons. In this report, it was clearly stated that the restrictive decision on immigration grounded in the political and social situations and motivated by political reasons.²³¹

Therefore, when we come to 2000s, a paradoxical issue about the European immigration and immigrant politics draws our attention: although globalization is celebrated as internationalization, liberalization, universalization, borderless world, or as a globalized welfare system (Francis Fukuyama), the immigrant and immigration policies of Europe become more exclusive than fifty years ago. It is very ironic that in spite of many organizations which regulate the global migration regime, migration has been violated by the many European states. Geneva Refugee Convention was the first one that was signed by some 146 states in 1951. International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Population Division, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and UNESCO has followed it. In 2004, A Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) was established by Kofi Annan. In spite of these organizations, some border crossings and immigrants have been perceived as danger and violated by European political agenda.

2.3. Borders of Europe

Despite having a reputation for and describing itself as being an open society, contemporary Europe is notable for the proliferation of boundaries. These appear at all levels of the society, from the individual to the international union. The re-territorialization of Europe in the context of the EU has been at stake for a while. This process is not limited with calibrating the external borders of Europe; the

²³¹ Sciortino, G., 'Immigration in a Mediterranean welfare State: the Italian Experience in a Comparative Perspective', *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, Vol.6, No.2, pp. 112.

internal borders of Europe have been rectified as well for a long time. Here, it is worth mentioning that the inner/internal borders of the EU do not refer to the borders which function for separating the European countries, but rather refers to conflict within the European societies lives inside the borders of the EU. These borders are not defined legally and physically, yet they are social boundaries which have 'dispersed everywhere'. The changing character of European borders is indicated by Philomena Essed's following analysis:

Five centuries after Columbus gave effect to the idea that country borders should be extended limitlessly in order to include more and more territories, European countries today close their borders in order to exclude the 'other'. The 'Fortress Europe' ideology, and the bureaucratic machinery operating to create legal, economic and political boundaries to protect Europe against the rest of the world, in particular the south, can be considered part of the phenomenon of Europism. Economic decline and internal discomposure are giving way to identity crises and construction of new enemies: enemies within, first-, second- and third -generation racial and ethnic minorities; and enemies on the doorstep, refugees who are supposedly pouring in by the millions in order to take advantage of western Europe welfare.²³²

Essed emphasize the economic decline and internal discomposure as the factors creating the identity crises of Europe in 1996. Since then, the factors have been expanding with the "anxiety over the threat of Islam". This anxiety represents Islam and Muslims as incompatible with an accepted universal configuration of social, cultural and political norms. Therefore, understanding the borders of Europe is crucial for recontextualization of Europe.

The borders of Europe reflect an in-between situation: they are not only observable as geographical, territorial, and linear, but are also figured as non-geographical, non-territorial, and non-linear; much like Europe itself. In this section, the non-geographical, non-territorial, and non-linear character of European borders will be

²³² Philomena Essed, "Intolerable Humiliations" in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Ed. by, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, p.139.

explicated. By keeping in mind that borders are not only the matter of political negotiation and geographical structure, but also the matter of culture and language²³³, it will show that borders of Europe have been fragmenting the society through culture, values, religion, race, and ethnicity. This refers to re-territorialization of Europe.

Etienne Balibar's conception of *ubiquity of borders*²³⁴ is useful to understand this character of European borders. This concept refers to dissemination of borders which means that borders are no longer reflecting the outer limits of a given territories, but rather have dispersed everywhere. In this condition, the notions of interiority and exteriority, representing fundamental dimensions of borders, are now losing their meanings. Bordered zones now refer to a center instead of margins/periphery, and constitute the melting pot for the formation of people.²³⁵

Balibar provides an analysis of this situation with a very prominent example: the Balkan War of the 1990s. This war shows the ambiguity of both the notions of *interiority and exteriority*, and the *name of Europe* itself. Namely, even though the Balkans are geopolitical parts of Europe, this war showed that they are claimed, by the dominant Western European powers, as exterior parts. As such, the colonization of Kosovo as an “interior colonization” is a clear example of the ambiguity of the notions of interiority and exteriority. In the framework of this ambiguity, the main assertion here is those cultural and religious signifiers become the most important factor creating this ambiguity of the notions of interior and exterior.²³⁶ Recently, the inner borders of Europe have been reconstructed through

²³³ David Theo Goldberg, ‘The Threat of Race: reflections on Racial Neoliberalism’, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 187-8.

²³⁴ Etienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*.

²³⁵ *ibid.*, pp.1

²³⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 4-5

the discursive reconstruction of Muslims and Islam as ‘enemy within’ or ‘outsider inside’ inside the borders of Europe. Insurmountable difference between secular European values and the unreformed and inassimilable character of Islam is the main argument underlying this reconstruction process. The very striking point here is that the enemy is the citizens, who are presumably surrounded by the protection of the rules of law and human rights.

In this context, it seems that both the external and internal borders of Europe have been constituted through, not only laws and policy measures, but also ‘technologies of power’ – as defined by Foucault in 1970s. In this sense, it can be suggested that the borders of Europe have been shaped through ‘dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, techniques’ which are called ‘rituals of exclusion’ and ‘a practice of rejection, of exile-enclosure’.²³⁷ Here, for Foucault, exclusion works through ‘panopticism’ which is ‘a figure of political technology that may and must detach from any specific use’.²³⁸ It is different from the medieval treatment of leprosy through which the subject ‘was left to his doom in a mass among which it was useless to differentiate’.²³⁹ This is related to bio-politics which is shaped through the techniques of protecting populations, instead of nations. Within a bio-political framework, power, in its modern form, exists through differentiating the population as those who deserve living, and who do not. Through this differentiation, life of those deserving living can be produced. Power can only gain its ‘legitimacy’, which is very important criteria in modern political discourse, through eliminating ‘ambiguous beings’ in order to produce acknowledged ones.²⁴⁰

²³⁷ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, New York: Vintage Book, 1979: 198.

²³⁸ Foucault, 1977: 205

²³⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 198

²⁴⁰ Foucault, Michel, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France*, trans. by David Macey, London: Penguin, 2003, pp. 240-250.

It is worth drawing attention that this happens mostly because, as Foucault states, the core of modern states is not the territoriality, but security within the borders of the countries. Insomuch that modern states are obsessed with security which is shaped through producing and protecting the life of its acknowledged citizens against the 'ambiguous' ones. Namely, this kind of discursive universe mainly differentiates insiders and outsiders both politically and culturally; however, nations and geopolitical national borders are not definitive factors in this differentiation. Therefore, the supposed concept of security is gaining a new definition; security is not simply a militaristic national issue anymore, instead it becomes a biopolitical issue. It means that it is defined through differentiating the 'real' citizens as secure insiders from the 'ambiguous' citizens as insecure 'outsider inside' and 'enemies within' the borders of Europe. The most striking point here is that in the condition where human rights, democracy, equality, and anti-racism are the criteria of legitimacy, this division has been manifested through an *inclusive exclusion* of systems/models/techniques; which Giorgio Agamben proposes the concept of *ex-crape* in order to better define these systems/models/techniques.

The concept of *ex-crape* refers to inclusive exclusion which is a way of controlling the population, instead of thinking inclusion and exclusion as a straightforward binary oppositional relationship. Inclusive exclusion refers to a system/model/technique that cannot be reduced to either; it is neither only inclusion nor only exclusion, but both inclusion and exclusion at the same time. The combination of simultaneity, the co-existence of aspects in one image creating a consecution which changes one aspect directed to another yields both a neither/nor and both/and dialogic across various inter-connected discourses on immigrants within Europe. So, this inclusive exclusion system/model/technique forms no grounds for a reasonable synthesis. The unity of this model is always more than a sum of inclusion and exclusion. From this framework, European borders can be defined as a space where contradictory processes of openness and closeness, exclusion and inclusion, and acceptance and rejection are at work at the same time. In this context, European 'citizens' who are perceived and stigmatized as

“ambiguous citizens” inclusively excluded because of their culture and religion. From this content, it is possible to assert that inclusive-exclusion is part of the biopower.

Pheng Cheah's prominent book, *Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights* is a clear example showing this relationship. He emphasizes Foucault's biopower as operating in the “new international division of power”.²⁴¹ Cheah mainly draws attention to how capitalism functions and how industrial capitalism is possible through a new form of power which is neither ideological nor repressive; does not negate its targets, yet actually positively shapes and produces its objects through discourses of truth. He states, “it is infrastructural because it fabricates the economic basis of capitalism... the very capacity of the laboring body as a useful productive force”.²⁴² Biopower regulates the physical and social borders, in addition to the 'new international division of power', and reconstructs its immigrants within the borders of Europe through the discourses of truth. It has been manifested through the discourse of tolerance, multiculturalism, and integration. They functioned as the forms of inclusive exclusion. This is visible in some prominent cases which will be mentioned in the fourth chapter.

Ashwani Sharma's arguments on the borders of Europe clarify the changing structure of the borders of Europe and the role of multiculturalism and tolerance. Sharma states that

Territorial colonialism was sustained by the binary logic of 'west' and 'rest', where racist discourse, especially in the form of orientalism, sustained an imperial governmentality, and where the

²⁴¹ Pheng Cheah, *Inhuman Conditions: Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights in the Current Conjuncture*, USA: Harvard University Press, 2006, pp. 183-185.

²⁴² *ibid.*, pp. 183-185.

boundary between the racialized white Occident and its 'others' was clearly marked and secured.²⁴³

This binary logic is not sustainable in postcolonial Europe which is populated by racial, religious and cultural Others within its borders. Instead of territorial borders, multiculturalism is being used as a strategy to control and manage the increasing presence of racial and cultural Others within the borders of Europe. In this context, Sharma gives reference to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's arguments on territoriality of Empire with the following cote:

Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command.²⁴⁴

As a result, the bio-political borders increasingly replace the older, 'geopolitical' borders; it divides not only lands, but also populations. This reflects the reterritorialization of Europe informed by the internal and external conquest of territories of Europe in 1492 when Islamic Spain was re-conquered and Jews and Arabs were expelled from the Spanish peninsula by the Christian Spanish monarchy. In this year Americas were discovered and indigenous people began to be colonized, and the internal and external imagined boundaries of Europe began to be constituted. Jews and Arabs were perceived as the internal Others and the indigenous people were perceived as the external Others.²⁴⁵ Recent rebordering

²⁴³ Ashwani Sharma, "Postcolonial Racism: White Paranoia and the Terrors of Multiculturalism", in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, p.122.

²⁴⁴ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 2000, p. xiii, cited in Ashwani Sharma, "Postcolonial Racism: White Paranoia and the Terrors of Multiculturalism", in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, p.122.

²⁴⁵ Mignolo, 2002, cited in Ramon Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants, "The Long-Duree Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System,

process of the European Union reminds the old territoriality of Europe, but with a twist: at present, as Balibar states, borders have a “poly-semic nature”. It means that borders are not merely territorial dividers, but they deploy zones of surveillance and instruments of discrimination. In other words, this new form of borders separates the inside from outside not only in the geopolitical sense, but also in political, religious, and cultural senses too; they are ubiquitous.²⁴⁶ This form of borders pervades the European socio-political imaginary, and material and epistemological conditions of European countries, and *vice versa*. In this context, border security and surveillance have been designed against non-European citizens having legal statuses within the borders of Europe. This new function of borders refers to the biopolitization of European borders and informs the further division and segmentation. Through this bio-politization process civil liberties, rights, and access to universal values are eroded, suspended, and hijacked in the name of security, and protecting the finite resources of welfare state, universal values and cultural integrity of Europe. Therefore, it seems that contemporary Europe has been reterritorialized through physical and non-physical borders. Philomena Essed defines this old borders and new boundaries of Europe with the concept of “Europism”. She states “on a cultural level Europism is manifest in the nostalgia for the past, which people tend to think of a culturally homogenous, although in fact that is a myth”.²⁴⁷ Helma Lutz redefinition of Europism explains more the current reterritorialization or rebordering process of Europe. Lutz's notion of Europism is the “defensive discourse of constructing a “pure Europe” as a symbolic continent whose territory is cleansed of foreign and 'uncivilized'

An Introduction”, *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, V.1 (Fall, 2006), pp. 1-12.

²⁴⁶ Etienne Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*. London: Verso, 2002, pp. 83-4.

²⁴⁷ Philomena Essed, 1996, cited in Christoph Ramm, “The Orientalization of Turkey and Turkish Immigrants”, in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, p.138.

elements”.²⁴⁸ As Ramm states that this obsession with European identity reflects nineteenth century “civilizationist reflexes”.²⁴⁹

After all, it can be concluded that European political discourse has been constructing itself by defining Europe as a homogeneous culture and civilization which is in harmony with the plurality and multiculturalism, due to the fundamental European principles of democracy and tolerance. However, simultaneously, it attempts to protect its internal and external borders coming from the 15th century, because it has anxiety about the presence of this plurality and multiplicity of cultures within European borders. In the same manner, it efforts to create a trans-national identity and “cosmopolitan” structure of the EU, but it instead of national identities it emphasizes a “European identity” constituted by European values and culture. Furthermore, it attempts to enlarge its borders and become a more constitutive union, in accordance with the cosmopolitan ideal and the mission of protecting the human rights and democracy, but simultaneously it problematizes the Turkey's membership to the union because of its “civilizational background”, and culture and religion. In this condition, it creates such a multicultural and plural discourse that it constantly puts Europeanness as a norm and moral hegemony. It imagines itself as a norm and, in fact, fixes the “superior” position of Europe. It fixes, as Said mentioned, “the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures”.²⁵⁰ This obsession reflects the in-between character of Europe; in between colonial and post-colonial, racist anti-racist, and combination of nation-states and Union. I assert that European political discourse, unavoidably, stays in in-between position. At that

²⁴⁸ Helma Lutz, 1997, cited in Christoph Ramm, “The Orientalization of Turkey and Turkish Immigrants”, in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Ed. by, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, p.113.

²⁴⁹ Christoph Ramm, “The Orientalization of Turkey and Turkish Immigrants”, in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, p.113.

²⁵⁰ Edward Said, *Orientalism*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978, pp. 7

point, the question that needs to be answered is that why Europe unavoidably reflects an in-between situation.

From this perspective, as Asad states “identity depends on the other's *recognition* of the self” more than before. It is neither in the form of “rediscovery of ethnic loyalties”, nor a matter of legal rights and obligations, but it “concerns exclusions and the desire that those excluded recognize what is included in the name one has chosen for oneself. The discourse of European identity is a symptom of anxieties about non-Europeans”.²⁵¹ He states that this comes from the idea of Europe which is inextricable from the colonial history:

Europe's colonial past is not merely an epoch of overseas power that is now decisively over. It is the beginning of an irreversible global transformation that remains an intrinsic part of 'European experience', and is part of the reason that Europe has become what it is today. It is not possible for Europe to be represented without evoking this history, the way in which ways in which its active power has continually constructed its own exclusive boundary- and transgressed it.²⁵²

This largely explains the exclusive approaches of Europe, but I will explain more why identity depends on the other's recognition of the self more than before and where the anxiety about non-Europeans comes from by offering to look at this issue from the perspective of Jacques Derrida's *hauntology*. For this, by following Joan Scott, the anxiety about “non-Europeans” will be taken as a symptom of a larger pathology or a long “forgotten” traumatic event. Namely, the anxiety about non-Muslims is a symptom which is the “return of the repressed” reality; a forgotten traumatic event; or a pathology. This traumatic event, pathology, or “real” is the colonial past of Europe which is attempted to be excluded like Muslims. However, it keeps returning and has to keep returning, because repressed never disappears, but it always returns in disguise, in the form of specter or ghost.

²⁵¹ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?” , pp. 211.

²⁵² *ibid.*, pp. 218.

It also keeps returning and has to keep returning, since the Europe that we are talking about based on this colonial past; it is the product of colonialism. In order to understand this process, it is crucial to have a critical distance to the master narratives about Europe and its colonial and racist history. Next chapter will propose a way to have this distance.

CHAPTER III

MAKING SENSE OF HAUNTOLOGY

As stated before, following Joan Scott's arguments on “symptomatic politics”, the main assertion of this dissertation is that “racism in Europe” is a “symptom” of a much larger problem. It is a symptom of a political disease that needs to be properly diagnosed and then cured. This political disease is a form of European colonialism; which even though thought eradicated, has recently manifested its presence again through the systemic racialization of Muslims and Islam. It is not that easy to make this assertion for a contemporary Europe, which has identified itself as being in accord with the principles of human rights, and post-colonial and anti-racist regulations. Therefore, for the mentioned assertion, it is necessary to first propose a way of investigation; which is able to identify the current European political context with colonialism and racism, despite its having a widely accepted “post-colonial” and “anti-racist” context. For this investigation, this chapter makes use of Jacques Derrida's *deconstruction* and *hauntology*, in order to analyze colonialism and racism.

From the perspective of hauntology, the assertion claims that the specters of colonialism are haunting the European political context, and racializing European Muslims within the borders of Europe. This means that, at present, colonialism and racism circulate incognito through the borders of a post-colonial and anti-racist Europe; using a discourse that censors itself. In this sense, classifying something clearly as colonialism or racism is misleading, because only the shadows of their contemporary manifestations are visible. In order to challenge this censored image of Europe, it is crucial then to go beyond conventional classifications and examine the contemporary manifestations of colonialism and racism. *Hauntology* provides a useful tool to analyze these unconventional manifestations; from a hauntological

framework, the image of post-colonial and post-racist Europe becomes available for questioning towards this end. It opens the possibility to go one step further from the linear history of racism and colonialism, and allows articulation about the current racialization of Muslims by the lingering specters of colonialism. It opens a displacement between what is present and absent, bypassing the linearity of the history which declares the end of both colonialism and racism within Europe.

Although hauntology is unusual in a sociological context, this chapter attempts to show that it is nevertheless broadly applicable. In other words, it attempts to take Derrida's interrogation of the mechanics of European philosophical texts, and applies his approach to the interrogation of European sociological texts. This is achieved through three subsidiary analyses: why and how hauntology applies to sociological issues, why and how it applies to contemporary Europe, and why and how it applies to hidden forms of colonialism and racism. By hidden forms, I mean to reinterpret 'anti-racist' and 'post-colonial' Europe by showing that this self-definition does not necessarily forbid colonialism and racism from persisting within European discourse centered on those defined categories.

Hauntology does not propose a new method, but rather a new language and a new standpoint. To be clear, by proposing hauntology this chapter does not introduce a technique or method for reading racializing texts. Instead, it proposes a "formula" that must by necessity remain fluid and indistinct; so as to be able to reveal the equally nebulous ghost and specters that haunt the contemporary European context. The chameleon nature of racism and colonialism defies analysis by any technique that involves a rigid series of steps; which are applied in the same way to every situation. Derrida explains:

It is a kind of formula. I am not disavowing the formula, but still, as soon as it becomes technique in the instrumental sense, it can't work. Nevertheless, I believe that what was indicated in this double gesture is necessary. So on the one hand there is what appears to be this technique. But there is no deconstruction without questioning of technique, without returning to the question of technique... without recalling that deconstructions can't be reduced, can't let themselves be

instrumentalized and become a method of literary criticism, for example, or a method for reading philosophical texts. At that point, it is already 'false' or 'wrong' to transform the double gesture into a device, a technical procedure. It's already insufficient.²⁵³

This departure is necessary to be able to go beyond the categorizations and classifications of European sociological texts that constantly produce binary oppositions and hierarchical power structures. This new standpoint opens a way to take responsibility and talk about the hidden reality of European sociological texts, describing them in the form of ghosts which haunt 'our time'.

Claude Lefort's criticism of political and social scientific approaches in 1960s is useful to understand why sociology needs a hauntological stance in order to understand the sociological issues. Lefort states that these approaches were characterized by functionalism and value-neutral behaviorism which mainly focus on behavior and 'objective' facts, and reduces politics and society to a set of empirically observable facts. By doing so, they limit the potential to grasp the meaning of events in the political realm. They perceive the society as completely homogeneous and transparent; as the 'People-as-One'. On the other hand, there are 'forms of societies' referring to differences in societies. In order to analyze the 'forms of society', it is crucial to examine the political realm with all institutional structures and practices. There is a double movement in which the political is revealed:

[The political] appears in the sense that the process whereby society is ordered and unified across divisions becomes visible. It is obscured in the sense that the locus of politics (the locus in which parties compete and in which a general agency of power takes shape and is reproduced) becomes defined as particular, while the principle which generates the overall configuration is concealed.²⁵⁴

²⁵³ Jacques Derrida *Positions*, trans. by Alan Bass, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, p.7.

²⁵⁴ Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, trans. by David Macey, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988, pp. 11.

Thus, in order to understand society, we must take into account the principles guiding local institutions and society. In order to understand these principles, it is necessary to go beyond behavior and objective facts, and focus rather on what is invisible/concealed/hidden.

In a similar context, Jacques Derrida draws attention to the fact that focusing on a given context is not enough to understand the disguised codes of the political dimension. He states that

Political evaluation [...] will always be formulated in a given context, starting from given forces or interests, against another manner of determining the context and of imposing this determination. This context is not only and always a discursive context. This political dimension is not always apparent. It often dissimulates itself, articulates or translates itself through mediation that are numerous, differential, potential, equivocal, difficult to decipher. It often depends upon codes that are still poorly apprehended, allowing therefore for different possible implementations, given the mobility to context that is constantly being reframed.²⁵⁵

He particularly draws attention to the example of the “exclusion of parasites of divergences, contamination, impurities” and insists that this exclusion cannot be justified by purely theoretical-methodological reasons. The practice of exclusion should be necessarily translated into a politics, and thought in the context of politics of language, politics of education, politics of immigration, and politics of all social institutions.²⁵⁶

From this framework, this first section sets off from Jacques Derrida's deconstructive way of thinking. After a brief explanation of deconstruction, it explains why this dissertation takes a deconstructive view, highlighting Derrida's conception of *hauntology* and *specters*. It suggests that the deconstructive notions

²⁵⁵ Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc*, trans. by Samuel Weber, Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988 [1977], pp. 135.

²⁵⁶ *ibid.*, pp.135-6.

of *hauntology* and *spectrality* are appropriate for analysis of the existence of colonialism and racism in Europe; because they provide a framework to address the existence of the inexistent and the presence of the absent. This framework specifically emphasizes the importance of going beyond the linear understanding of history. This resembles Michel Foucault's genealogical framework, but it differentiates from genealogy by focusing on an imperceptible/invisible existence of a history or past operating in the present. In a more brief sense, while genealogy is interested in the interaction of power making up societal norms and institutions which have emerged in a specific historical period, hauntology goes beyond this linear understanding of history in terms of deconstructing strict divisions between existence and inexistence, presence and absence, perceptible and imperceptible.

With the conceptual tools prepared in the first section, the second reinterprets the contemporary European political discourse, by developing the possibilities that Jacques Derrida's deconstruction and hauntology to analyzing contemporary European political discourse. In the framework of hauntology, it initially focuses on the contemporary or symbolic manifestation of European colonialism, and then explicates what the specters of colonialism means. Then, it reinterprets the issue of racism in the framework of this manifestation of colonialism. It touches upon the issue of racism in Europe in the context of a 'new racism', by particularly analyzing the 'newness' of the new in a deconstructive manner. It emphasizes that European racism is not only a problematic representation of the 'Other', a personal prejudice or an ideology; it is also a combination of a set of hypothetical premises and presumptions that are produced by particular material and epistemological conditions. This section also criticizes current anti-racist regulations.

In the context of this understanding of racism, the third and the last section of this chapter focuses on the racialization of Muslims and Islam as an embodiment of a contemporary form of racism. Here, embodiment refers to a form through which spectral/invisible/imperceptible colonialism haunts and can be graspable even in its ungraspability. Here, graspable means becoming something that can be thought; it

flocks to thought and triggers the desire to temper the context. This form of the formation of colonial racism discussed in this section, is an introductory part to the more detailed analysis occurring in the fifth chapter; including four specific cases from Europe. As a result, throughout these three sections, this chapter aims to make sense of hauntology.

3.1. Deconstructive Standpoint and Hauntological Statement

The main assertion of this section is that the possibilities given by Jacques Derrida's *hauntology* is indispensable in sociological work that seeks to understand repressed realities and specters. If we borrow the Alain Badiou's notions of descriptive and prescriptive politics, I think that European sociological text about colonialism and racism is descriptive, which means that it is stable and a closed system: "it is neither a necessary determination nor an absolute contingency".²⁵⁷ This context should be prescriptive which means that it should open to possibilities. I suggest that deconstructive framework of hauntology would give the prescriptive perspective to sociological texts; it will keep sociological text open to possible readings.

In order to situate hauntology in relation to the argument of this dissertation, an understanding of deconstruction is necessary. The following statement of Derrida is a preliminary about deconstruction: "[deconstruction is] neither a philosophical position nor a critique of finite contexts, which it analyzes without claiming any absolute overview".²⁵⁸ He talks about deconstruction in detail in his groundbreaking text, *Of Grammatology* (1976), which he later addressed with this

²⁵⁷ Alain Badiou, *Metapolitics*, trans. by Jason Barker, Verso: London and New York, 2005, p.32

²⁵⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc*, pp. 137.

statement: “[g]rammatology must deconstruct everything ties the concept and norms of scientificity to ontology, logocentrism, phonologism”.²⁵⁹

In this work, he primarily discusses “logocentrism” and “metaphysics of presence” by suggesting that metaphysics of presence is the effect of logocentrism. He critically questions their impacts on the western philosophy and thought system by particularly addressing the Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural linguistics which is based on the idea that language has a natural structure. For Derrida, Saussure's notion of “linguistic sign” is the exemplary of the practice of both logocentrism and metaphysics of presence since it assumes a natural/original order between sound and sense. Although there is an arbitrary relationship between signifier and signified, Saussure's system assumes a natural relationship between signifier and signified.

Moreover, Derrida informs us that in Saussure's system “the linguistic object is not defined by the combination of the written word and the spoken word: the spoken form alone constitutes the object. ... [A]n oral tradition that is independent of writing”.²⁶⁰ By doing this, Saussure excludes the written word by privileging speech over writing and signifier over signified. This relies on the assumption that presence is privileged over absence, the self is privileged over the other, and Being is privileged over being. That is, the initial terms always have a privileged position and suppress the latter terms. Therefore, a violent hierarchy between these terms is inherent to this system.

As Derrida notes “very schematically: an opposition of metaphysical concepts (e.g., speech/writing, presence/absence, etc.) is never the confrontation of two terms, but a hierarchy and the order of a subordination”.²⁶¹ For Derrida, this is

²⁵⁹ Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. by Alan Bass, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, pp. 35

²⁶⁰ Jacques Derrida, *Linguistics and Grammatology*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1976, pp. 30-1.

²⁶¹ Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc*, pp. 21.

exactly what metaphysics of presence means and why it should be criticized. In the context of this criticism, Derrida suggests that there is no pure presence, original meaning, and privileged Being. A word does not have its own original meaning independent from the other words; it has a meaning because of the association with the other words. Therefore, in this philosophical approach, structure does not create meaning, since there is no original and prior structure.

In response to the framework of metaphysics of presence, he proposes *deconstruction* as a way or ‘formula’, with his own words, of questioning the suppressive position of signifier over signified, speech over writing, presence over absence, and Being over being. He proposes deconstruction as a way/formula which is able to uncover the hierarchical relationship hidden by the binary opposition between the concepts. In other words, deconstruction opens a way to think beside the binary oppositions, and by doing so, it challenges the western metaphysical thought and logocentrism. He states,

deconstruction puts into practice a *reversal* of the classical opposition and a general *displacement* of the system. [It] will provide the means of *intervening* in the field of oppositions it criticizes and that is also a field of nondiscursive forces.... [It consists] in reversing and displacing a conceptual order as well as the nonconceptual order within which it is articulated.²⁶²

Then the concept, which has been subordinated and excluded, corresponds to “what has always *resisted* the prior organization of forces”.²⁶³ Thus, deconstruction reverses the hierarchical binaries. Derrida offered the following ideas in the sense of their ability/potential/capacity to disrupt the violent hierarchy of western metaphysical thought and logocentrism: *supplement*, *trace*, *différance*, *hymen*, *pharmakon*, and *dissemination*.

²⁶² *ibid.*, pp. 21

²⁶³ *ibid.*

If explained in a brief sense, the concept of *trace* disrupts the hierarchy between presence and absence by referring both of them. Derrida puts it as: “a text ... is the play of presence and absence, a place of the effaced trace. ... Such is the strange ‘being’ of the sign: half of it always ‘not there’ and the other half always ‘not that’”. The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of the other which is forever absent”.²⁶⁴ As can be understood from this cote, for Derrida, in contrast to the western philosophy’s need to be full presence, the language is undecidable between presence and absence. In order to explain 'undecidable', he offers the term of *différance* which refers to both differ, and defer. The idea of *différance* disrupt the hierarchical binaries between presence and absence (*trace*), poison and cure (*pharmakon*), fertilization and fruitlessness (*dissemination*), inside and outside (*hymen*), and speech and writing (*arche-writing*).

Différance is the term which shows that there is no original and transcendent signified, and frozen meaning. Namely, the difference between difference and *différance* is only marked by '-a' cannot be heard, but it can be seen. Through this term, he shows that speech and signifier cannot be privileged over writing and signified. In general, throughout all these concepts, Derrida challenges the binary thinking and Hegelian dialectic which creates a third term. They show that meaning is not immediately present; it is unable to be fixed or fully grasped. Norris states that *différance* functions as “one set of marks in signifying chain which exceeds and disturbs the classical economy of language and representation”.²⁶⁵

With the idea of *supplement*, Derrida explains the limits of language:

The supplement, which is neither simply the signifier nor the representer, does not take place of a signified represented, as is prescribed by the concepts of signification or representation or by the syntax of the words ‘signifier’ or ‘representer’. The supplement comes

²⁶⁴ *ibid.*

²⁶⁵ Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. by Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, pp. 15.

in the place of a lapse, a non signified or a non represented, a non presence. There is no present before it, it is not preceding by anything but itself, that is to say by another supplement. One wishes to go back from the supplement to the source: one must recognize that there is a supplement of the source.²⁶⁶

As understood from this cote, Derrida criticizes the idea supplementary which forces us to look for the origins and original place outside of language. He states as:

[w]e have no language –no syntax and no lexicon- which is alien to this history [*of metaphysics*]; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulation of precisely what it seeks to contest.²⁶⁷

Also, the working principle of *dissemination* is crucial to understand deconstruction. *Dissemination* is a writing principle which refers that a text always opens to potential readings; it cannot be finalized. It is a “literary way of writing” which is different from the “scientific way of writing”; unlike scientific way of writing, it does not constantly impose truth. It challenges truth, original meaning, or binary oppositional thinking, by not imposing a new truth. This way of writing explains the working principle of deconstruction: “[deconstruction] is a symptom that takes a philosophical form most often. Philosophical and literary”²⁶⁸... deconstruction of philosophy does not renounce truth. ... It is a question of thinking this other relation to truth”.²⁶⁹ It is a form of displacement of a certain system.²⁷⁰ It is a rejection of the definition of truth as the agreement of known

²⁶⁶ Derrida, Jacques, *Linguistics and Grammatology*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976, pp. 303-4.

²⁶⁷ Jacques Derrida, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe*, trans. by P. A. Brault and M. Naas, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, pp. 152.

²⁶⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, pp. 18.

²⁶⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 10.

²⁷⁰ Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. by Alan Bass, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, pp. 3

object/signifier and knowing subject, Cartesian subject, which gives metaphysical priority to man, the subject. It is an attempt to undermine metaphysical structure from the inside, rather than outside the text.

The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they accurately aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work.²⁷¹

As such, Derrida asserted that “there is no outside-text” and focused on textual analysis. With this working principle of deconstruction, he addresses the hierarchical power structures in the Western philosophical texts. He clarifies this statement with this quotation including the themes and concepts which constitute the principle of deconstruction:

The concept of text or of context which guides me embraces and does not exclude the world, reality, history.... [A]s I understand it, the text is not the book, it is not confined in a volume itself confined to the library. It does not suspend reference –to history, to the world, to the reality. To being, and especially not to the other, since the say of history, of the world, of the reality that they always appear in an experience, hence in a movement of interpretation which contextualizes them according to a network of differences and hence of referral to the other, is surely to recall that alterity (*différance*) is irreducible. *Différance* is a reference and vice versa ... [A]s soon as it accommodates reference as difference and inscribes *différance* in presence, the concept of text or of context no longer opposes writing to erasure. The text is not a presence.... This concept of writing or of trace perturbs every logic of opposition, every dialectic. It de-limits what it limits. This is why the finiteness of a context is never secured or simple; there is an indefinite opening of every context, an essential

²⁷¹ Jacques Derrida, *Linguistics and Grammatology*, pp. 24.

nontotalization.²⁷²

In this statement he drew attention that text, including world, reality and history, contains implicit hierarchies. These hierarchies in the text exclude and hide various potential meanings. In order to open a text to various potential meanings, he proposes the term *textuality*. This term characterizes writing, and puts the writing and reading as *originary*. It means that reading is what makes text and writing possible; none of them comes prior or later. In the same manner, he offers another theme: *arche-writing* which refers to a way of reading that includes writing.

This emphasis is the point that Derrida dissociates from the perspective reflected by Michel Foucault. Foucault's way of analysis insists on what happened in history by emphasizing the relationship between power and discourse. This way of analyzing emphasizes the power-knowledge relationship during the colonization period. This analysis unavoidably helps to understand the power mechanisms of colonialism and racism. On the other hand, it does not help to think that European colonialism is still being manifested in a "spectral" form and become visible through racializing a religion. This is exactly the point where Derrida's textuality dissociates from Foucault's discourse analysis. For Derrida, the past/history cannot be completely ended and become a "past"; past remains alive in present. Following Derrida and focusing on text allows reading the current regulations, governmental rapports and media news about Muslims and Islam and reinterpreting them as the embodiment/disembodiment of specters of colonialism which is haunting Europe. In other terms, following Derrida's textuality allows to focus on text and read the recent prominent cases and the debates about Muslims and Islam in Europe which as the current documents of spectral colonialism and racism. Another way of putting this is to say that, through focusing on text, the prominent debates about Muslims can be deconstructed and colonialist racializing hierarchies being dominant to European political discourse would be pointed out. Thereby, by

²⁷² Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, pp. 137.

focusing on text, it can be asserted that colonialism, in a spectral form, is haunting Europe and colonial racism is racializing Muslims and Islam in Europe. Through focusing on text, it can be asserted that, with Derrida's words, the repressed can never be obliterated: "a specter is always a revenant. One cannot control its comings and goings because it begins by coming back".²⁷³ In this formula, past violently remains alive in present and contradicts it. This is not a simple repetition of past in the present but it is "repetition *and* first time, but also repetition *and* last time".²⁷⁴ As such, Derrida's approach forces us to take an "extraordinary" or may be "atypical" standpoint by offering to go beyond the presuppositions and prejudices. He clearly expresses this in this cote:

What you need deconstruction for is to undo a number of presuppositions, prejudices and so on and so forth. But where you do not need to undo such things, you do not need deconstruction... So it depends on the type of relationship that you have between interpretation and knowledge, and of course the more you rely on interpretative languages, on institutional practices and so forth, the more you need deconstruction.²⁷⁵

Up until this point, in order to understand the deconstructive stance of hauntology, this section has explained concisely what deconstruction means, and how it works. After this brief explanation, it will explain more why this dissertation has chosen a deconstructive way/formula by highlighting the Derrida's notion of *hauntology*.

In order to understand Derrida's hauntology, it would be necessary to make some preliminary remarks on *specter and ghosts* which is the central notion of of hauntology. Hauntology is an 'irreducible category', introduced by Derrida in his work *Specters of Marx: The State of Depth, the Work of Mourning and the New*

²⁷³ Jacques Derrida, *Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, New York: Routledge, 1994, pp. 11.

²⁷⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 10.

²⁷⁵ Jacques Derrida, 2001: 110

International. It mainly comes from the following statement of Karl Marx and Frederic Engels in Communist Manifesto: “the specter of communism is haunting Europe”. By following this statement, Derrida asserted that “specters of Marx is haunting Europe”.²⁷⁶ With this assertion, he emphasized that Marx would become more relevant after the fall of Berlin Wall, regardless of the neoliberal claims assuming that economic theory of Marx ended. Being opposed to these assumptions, he offers to reread and discuss Marx by going beyond the usual scholarly readings of him. Rereading Marx means learning to live and talk with ghosts that refers to going beyond existential opposition between being and not-being, and life and death.²⁷⁷ Derrida explains the core of this work as:

A simple attempt to analyze with some consistency such an exordium: ‘I would like to learn to live. Finally.’ Opens this work with a striking exordium which includes the discussion on ‘to learn to live’ and the question of “[w]ill we ever know how to live and first of all what ‘to learn to live’ means?...To live, by definition, is not something one learns. Not from oneself, it is not learned from life, thought by life. Only from the other and by death. In any case from the other at the edge of life. At the internal border or the external border, it is a *heterodidactics* between life and death.

And yet nothing is more necessary than this wisdom. It is ethic itself: to learn to live –alone from oneself, by oneself. ... It has no sense and cannot be just unless it comes to terms with death. Mine as (well as) that of the other. Between life and death, then, this is indeed the place of a sententious injunction that always feigns to speak like the just. ... If it –learning to live- remains to be done, it can happen only between life and death, can only *maintain itself* with some ghosts, can only *talk with or about* some ghosts. ... So it would be necessary to learn spirits. Even and especially if this, which is neither substance, nor essence, nor existence, is *never present as such* ... to learn to live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation.... To live otherwise ... more justly. But with *them*. No *being-with* the other, no *socius* without this with that makes being-with in general more enigmatic than ever for us. And this being-

²⁷⁶ Jacques Derrida, *Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, 1994, 2006.

²⁷⁷ *ibid.*, pp. xvii-xviii.

with specters would also be, not only but also, a *politics* of memory, of inheritance, and of generations.²⁷⁸

For him, learning to live and talk with ghosts is a political, philosophical and theoretical responsibility, since the world where we live in is marked by the memory and inheritance of Marx.²⁷⁹ Also, he mentions that he talks about ghosts, inheritance and generations “in the name of *justice*. Of justice where it is not yet, not yet *there....*”.²⁸⁰ The main theme of this book, hauntology, refers that specter/repressed can never be obliterated: “a specter is always a revenant. One cannot control its comings and goings because it begins by coming back”.²⁸¹ In this formula, past violently remains alive in present and contradicts it. This is not a simple repetition of past in the present but it is “repetition *and* first time, but also repetition *and* last time”.²⁸² Hauntology shows that “time is out of joint” which refers to an unstable definition of past and present, with the present existing in the shadow of the past. He explained this existence as:

One time in the past, how would it be valid for all times? In other words, how can it come back and present itself again, anew, as the new? How can it be there, again, when its time is no longer there? How can it be valid for all the times in which one attempts to say “our time”? In a predicative proposition that refers to time, and more precisely to the present- form of time, the grammatical present of the verb to be, in the third person indicative, seems to offer a predestined hospitality to the return of any and all spirits, a word that one needs merely to write in the plural in order to extend a welcome there to specters.²⁸³

²⁷⁸ *ibid.*, pp. xvi-xviii

²⁷⁹ *ibid.*, (1994), pp. 14.

²⁸⁰ *ibid.*, (2006), pp. xviii.

²⁸¹ *ibid.*, (1994), pp. 11.

²⁸² *ibid.*, (1994), pp. 10.

²⁸³ *ibid.*, (2006), pp. 62.

This conception of time is not particular for this work of Derrida; in his early work *Limited Inc.* (1988), with regard to time, he also mentioned that “the time and place of the *other time* already at work, altering from the start the start itself, the *first time*, the *at once*. ... [T]he other time in(stead of) the first, at once”.²⁸⁴ As he stated here, the existence of past in the presence is a non-identical repetition; it is same as what it repeats, but it is not identical. His concept of *iteration* explains this character of repetition more clearly. Iteration refers to the potential of texts to be repeated in new situations. He states as:

Iteration alters, something new takes place.²⁸⁵ [...] Iterability supposes a minimal remainder (as well as a minimum of idealization) in order that the identity of the *selfsame* be repeatable and identifiable *in, through,* and even *in view of its alteration*. For the structure of iteration -and this another of its decisive traits- implies *both* identity *and* difference. ... [I]terability is differential, within each individual, ...because it splits each element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the remainder [...] is never that of a full or fulfilling presence: it is a differential structure escaping the logic of presence or the opposition of presence and absence. ... Like the trace it is, the mark is neither present nor absent. This what is remarkable about it, even it is not remarked. ... [T]he 'permanence' or the 'survival' of the document imply iterability or remaining in general. But the inverse is not true. Permanence is not necessary effect of remaining. ... [T]he structure of the remainder, implying alteration, renders all absolute permanence impossible. Ultimately, remaining and permanence are incompatible”.²⁸⁶

In addition to this conception of time, hauntological stance and its central notion of specter and ghost gives another framework which has an ability and potential to go beyond the analytically oriented approaches which distinguish sharply the real and unreal, present and past, and being and non-being by privileging the formers over

²⁸⁴ Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, pp. 62.

²⁸⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 40

²⁸⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 53-4.

latter.²⁸⁷ In this philosophical approach, things are neither fully absent nor fully present neither living nor dead; everything stays in the borderland between perceptible and imperceptible. The idea of specter and ghost refers to this form of being which challenges the hierarchical relationships mentioned above:

The specter is paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and carnal form of the spirit. It becomes rather, some some “thing” that remains difficult to name: neither soul nor body and both one and other. [...] There is something disappeared, departed in the aspiration itself as reapparition of the departed. The spirit, the specter is not the same thing. [...] *It is* something that one does not know, precisely,... one does not know not out of ignorance, but because this non-object, this non-present present, this being-there of an absent or departed one no longer belongs to knowledge. At least no longer to that which one thinks one knows by the name of knowledge. One does not know if it is living or if it is dead. Here is or rather there is, over there, an unnamable or almost unnamable thing: something, between something and someone, anyone or anything, some thing, “this thing”, but this thing and not any other, this thing that looks at us, that concern us [...], comes to defy semantics as much as ontology, psychoanalysis as much as philosophy.²⁸⁸

In this context, it can be concluded that the idea of specter and ghost, as a central notion of hauntology, challenges the presumably dichotomous oppositions and offers a form of relationship which disrupts both the linearity of history by interrupting the “presentness” of the present and the borderland between perceptible and imperceptible. In this relationship, past may govern present and sets the possibilities of future and imperceptible may become perceptible from a different perspective. This refers to both existence of multiple perspectives on any given event and possibility to think about the histories of exclusions and invisible. This conception of time and specter gives the possibility to question the existence of hidden narratives under the surface of received history.

²⁸⁷ Jacques Derrida, *Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, 1994, pp. 51.

²⁸⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 6.

From this framework, by taking a responsibility towards history, next section attempts to question the hidden narratives under the received history of Europe by following the possibilities that Derrida's deconstruction and hauntology give. It considers this as a political and ethical responsibility, since the world that we live in is marked by the memory and inheritance of colonialism, enslavement, and racism. By going beyond the existential oppositions, it questions the European political context. For this, it proposes to analyze which understands colonialism as a “civilizing act” and racism as an individual prejudices, Nazi policies or neo-Nazi violence against Jewish Europeans. This attempt refers to tackling the legacy of what transpired during the European colonialism and enslavement which is emphasized by the Steven Small's following statement: “figure out how to unravel the tangled knots of fallacy, fiction and farce, which have so often masqueraded as facts in institutional representations and scholarly analysis.”²⁸⁹

3.2. Reconsidering Colonialism and Racism in Europe from *Hauntological* Standpoint

This section attempts to reinterpret claims about racism and colonialism in Europe by claiming that racism and colonialism are more complex phenomena than they are assumed, so they need to be analyzed from a broader perspective in order to fully understand them. In order to understand this complex situation, it is necessary to offer an accurate and comprehensive analysis of colonialism, racism and racialization for the twenty first century, a period in which colonialism and racism are strongly claimed to be over. In order to have a broader perspective to understand these complex phenomena, following Derrida, this section proposes to reconsider colonialism and racism in Europe through the context of *deconstruction* and *hauntology*. Continental philosophy has largely been preoccupied with

²⁸⁹ Stephen Small, (2011) in *Black Atlantic*, xii.

constructive, reductionist and ultra-objective ways of thinking. Derrida's philosophy has been situated within this philosophical framework, and offers *deconstruction* and *hauntology* in order to displace the presuppositions which are intrinsic to mainstream approaches. In order to talk about racism in the time and place that racism is assumed to be over and will never happen again, we need the Derrida's hauntological stance; which asserts that there are specters still haunting the present and prevent the so-called "end of history". *Spectrality* serves to disjoint time by making the category of present slippery, and reminding the responsibility the presents owes to the past and future.

In this manner, deconstruction offers a way to question the idea of homogeneity. Derrida mentions that "the motif of homogeneity, the theological motif par excellence, is what must be destroyed".²⁹⁰ In particular, by hauntology, he attempts to uncover a way to talk with our *ghosts*. Deconstruction is a way to understand these ghosts, while also maintaining a critical distance to the master narratives about Europe and European self-definition. The deconstructive conception of time is crucial here, because talking about the presence/absence of European colonialism, especially when it is assumed to be over, necessitates the need to overcome the limits of a linear vision of history. By taking Derrida's point of view, talking to the ghosts of European colonialism, and examining them, shows that the past governs the present, and also sets the possibilities of the future. Therefore the idea of specter and ghost gives the possibility of disrupting the linearity of history, by interrupting the 'presentness' of the present. This refers to the existence of a haunting narrative under the surface of a received history. Derrida notes:

The present is what passes, the present comes to pass, it lingers in this transitory passage, in this coming-and-going *between* what *goes* and what *comes*, in the middle of what leaves and what arrives, at the articulation between what absent itself and what present itself.²⁹¹...The

²⁹⁰ Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, pp.86.

²⁹¹ Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of Dept, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, p.25.

specter is the future, it is always to come, it presents itself only as that which could come or come back.²⁹²

This section will propose a way to establish this distance. In this formulation, the notion of a spectral colonialism based on deconstruction²⁹³ of the analytical frameworks supporting it, gives us a way to further deconstruct European racism by pointing out its *iteration* of racisms. For this first part, the metaphysical character of Eurocentric history, which declares the end of racism or no racism in Europe by persistently keeping a blind position against colonial racism, which is most visible and alive in the streets of Paris, London, Copenhagen, and Amsterdam, will be deconstructed.

Initially, this section challenges Europe's perception of its own history and the continual contempt displayed towards its Others. Specifically, it takes the responsibility to revise and rethink postcolonial and anti-racist Europe by using Derrida's *hauntology*, so as to go beyond a prescribed scholarly discussion of European colonial and racist history. It considers this to be a political and ethical responsibility, since we live in a world that is marked by the memory and inheritance of colonialism, enslavement, and racism. It uses the conceptual tools prepared in the previous section to critically revisit 'how' specters of colonialism haunt Europe, and work to racialize the 'different' in 'post-colonial' and 'anti-racist' Europe.

As explained in detail in the previous section, Derrida's hauntological framework makes it possible to go beyond a 'to be or not to be' approach, which is based on a strict distinction between present and absent²⁹⁴; it disrupts the privileged position of presence over absence. This framework concerns the 'virtual space of spectrality'

²⁹² *ibid.*, pp.39.

²⁹³ *ibid.*

²⁹⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 11

as a way to go beyond the sharp distinction between perceptible and imperceptible, real and unreal, and being and non-being. If the European political context is analyzed from this framework, it can be seen that post-colonial and post-racist self-definitions of Europe are open to reinterpretation.

In the context of this reinterpretation, this section attempts to deconstruct the “myth of Europe” by following Talal Asad's statement emphasizing that “Europe’s historical narrative of itself needs to be questioned”.²⁹⁵ This section deconstructs this narrative by investigating the following statement: colonialism and racialization are integral parts of the European political context; they are inextricable from the modernizing and civilizing mission of Europe.²⁹⁶ It understands colonialism in a broader sense; “not just as a specific conquest or event in the past, but as an ongoing exercise of economy, military and political power by stronger states and groups over weaker ones. ... [It] is a way of maintaining asymmetrical relations of economic and political power...”.²⁹⁷ It shows that European colonialism is not over; it is still active in a spectral form. While the act of colonization of the distant “Rest” of the world ended a long time ago, the accompanying racialization, otherization and civilization of the “inferior other” by the “civilized superior” is still active.

Another aspect of this identity has expressed by Talal Asad. The European identity “concerns exclusions and the desire that those excluded recognize what is included in the name one has chosen for oneself. The discourse of European identity is a

²⁹⁵ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, pp. 225.

²⁹⁶ Goldberg, 1999; Asad, 2000; Grosfoguel, 2004.

²⁹⁷ Nihdi Trehan and Angela Kocze, “Racism, (Neo-)colonialism and Social Justice: The Struggle for the Soul of the Romani Movement in Post-Socialist Europe”, in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, ed. by, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, pp.51.

symptom of anxieties about non-Europeans”.²⁹⁸ This comes from the idea of Europe which is inextricable from its colonial history:

Europe's colonial past is not merely an epoch of overseas power that is now decisively over. It is the beginning of an irreversible global transformation that remains an intrinsic part of 'European experience', and is part of the reason that Europe has become what it is today. It is not possible for Europe to be represented without evoking this history, the way in which its active power has continually constructed its own exclusive boundary- and transgressed it.²⁹⁹

In *Racism Postcolonialism Europe*, Huggan (2012) challenges the perception of Europe as the only representative of civility by stating that

racial ideologies have long been central to European social and cultural identities...inextricable from the internally differentiated, often directly competing, modernizing and/or civilizing mission that European countries...have taken it upon themselves to impart to the world.³⁰⁰

With reference to Talal Asad (2002), Walter Mignolo (2000), and Pocock (2002), Huggan states that the European self-image as a civilized place of liberty and cosmopolitanism are actually repressing the colonial history of Europe. In this context, he draws attention to the striking novel *Dead Europe* written by Christos Tsiolkas. The novel depicts Europe as

a place seemingly condemned repeating its own violently self-destructive history. Haunted by specters of its own making, it is deadened – but also deadly – site of corruption pimps and destitute sex workers, caught in a vicious web of race- and class-based exploitation that eventually threatens to engulf them all.³⁰¹

²⁹⁸ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Rperesent Islam?”, pp. 211.

²⁹⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 218.

³⁰⁰ Graham Huggan, ‘Introduction’, in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.) *Racism Postcolonialism Europe*. Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, pp.2.

³⁰¹ Cited in *ibid.*, pp. 1

Huggan thinks that with this image, Europe is far from the “idealistic humanism dreamed up by generations of both pre- and post-Enlightenment politicians and philosophers”.³⁰²

In his book of *Maps of Englishness*, Simon Gikandi (1996) draws attention to this situation by particularly emphasizing how decolonization necessarily carries the processes of colonialism and imperialism into it, in spite of the fact that decolonization is given as a reference to deny colonialism.³⁰³ Gikandi particularly focuses on the English identity and states that where English identity was a product of the colonial culture: “Englishness as a cultural and literary phenomenon produced in the ambivalent space that separated, but also conjoined, metropol and colony”.³⁰⁴

The specters of colonialism are haunting the European political context, when it perceives and defines itself as 'homeland and the main guard' of human rights, anti-racist laws and regulation, democracy, and rule of law. It is in such a context that racism was declared to be over, and this has been pronounced along with the term of “never again”. The term racism is generally associated with Nazism, the segregationist political extremists, and anti-black racism in the US. Particularly, there has been a powerful sensitivity towards the Holocaust that overemphasizes racism as anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism is perceived as ‘extraordinary’ with regard to the extermination of Jews done by the ‘irrational’ and inhuman Nazi government, before and during the Second World War.

Addressing Holocaust narratives helps to understand this point of view. In documentaries, films, and books, the Holocaust has been generally reflected as an unprecedented extreme physical violence against Jews, conducted by Nazi power. Particularly, films about the Holocaust propagandize this image of anti-Semitism,

³⁰² Cited in *ibid.*, pp. 1

³⁰³ Cited in *ibid.*, pp. 3

³⁰⁴ Simon Gikandi, 1996: xii, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 3

by depicting members of the Nazi army as psycho-pathological figures; whose policies and regulations created the Holocaust. All the responsibility for this mass extermination is attributed to the Nazi government and its agents. Nazism and its well-known figures have been blamed and prosecuted as the only conductors of this mass extermination. Therefore, this narrative fixes racism as an inconsistency, which refers to regret, but gives no specific reasons. Inconsistency gives a way to talk about racism as an extraordinary and horrific violence manifested by the Nazi government's racist regulations. In this narrative, there is no reason and decision; this shadows the rational and well-planned character of racism in Europe. This narrative of the Holocaust, institutionalized racialization and then the extermination of Jews, is secured as the standard exemplary of racism in Europe. As David Theo Goldberg draws attention to, this match of racism with anti-Semitism leads to overlooking of the fact that Nazism did not only target the Jewish people but also communists, gypsies, and disabled peoples.³⁰⁵ Insomuch that, it is perceived as the only visible/well-known/accepted/common sensual violent act produced inside the borders of Europe. Thus, while particular histories have been emphasized and highlighted, the other histories are treated as if they do not exist.

In the context of this narrative, today, racism is perceived as a marginal phenomenon and connects with xenophobic and far right extremist party policies. For example, Ginsburg stated that racism is closely connected with far right party politics; which have power or are getting more power in many European countries. Also, MacMaster suggests that mainstream political parties and governments are the most crucial factor in the reproduction of racism in Europe. In the same manner, Helma Lutz addressed that the rise of racism in Europe is related to the

³⁰⁵ David Theo Goldberg, 'Racial Europeanization', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 29 No.2 (March 2006).

current redrawing of boundaries. It is built on the idea “of defending ‘our’ home, space, territory against ‘disturbing’ others”.³⁰⁶

These perceptions reflect racism as a reactionary behavior of extreme nationalistic groups and working class being against immigration and increasing unemployment in Europe. Moreover, they see racism as an individual problem created by anxiety of some group of people. They primarily emphasize that racism cannot be part of European context which is the founder of democracy, human rights and law. Therefore, they both externalize racism to European context, and invoke it in a highly reductive way. In the context of this externalization, Philomena Essed draws attention that “in order to sustain the Western image of non-racism. The definition of racism is often limited, to include only the most obvious and blunt expressions, where racist motives are explicit in the very act. Thus racism becomes an exception, a deviance from ‘normal’ practice”.³⁰⁷ More strikingly, because of the principle of tolerance, they are perceived as a deviance to be tolerated, “tolerance comes to include the tolerance of racism”.³⁰⁸ This reflects the lack of political analysis or depoliticization of racism within the borders of Europe.

From a different point of view, Griselda Pollock critically draws attention to the lack of real political analysis about the Holocaust by focusing on three films about Holocaust: *Night and Fog*, *The Diary of Anne Frank* (1959) and *Shoah*. She addressed that all these films were universalized and depoliticized the racist horror perpetrated against Jewish Europeans in the manner of their representation of the events. They make characters acceptable to the American audience in the 1950s. They did not recognize the extermination of the Roma and Sinti. At that point, she

³⁰⁶ Cited in Christoph Ramm, “The Orientalization of Turkey and Turkish Immigrants”, in *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Ed. by Graham Huggan and Ian Law, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, p.113.

³⁰⁷ Philomena Essed, “Intolerable Humiliations”, in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, p.137.

³⁰⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 133.

highlighted the Hannah Arendt's opinions about “crystallization into totalitarianism”. With this concept, Arendt draws attention to the problematic representation of cultural commemoration and didactic pedagogy of the Holocaust which reflects the final solution, fascism in Germany and a history of anti-Semitism in the logical and chronological context. This indicates that totalitarianism was inevitable and the Holocaust in the natural result of it. Arendt rightfully emphasizes that this framework narrates the event, but it does not discover its formation because of the events itself.³⁰⁹

In this manner, Pollock draws attention to urgency to focus on how “ethnic, religious and cultural specificity was turned into a signifier for the right to live – or rather its suspension”. In this context, Jews and Gypsies were marked by racializing language. With reference to Victor Klemperer, Pollock emphasize that these people were designated for a “final solution” which

presumes a problem to be finally solved. They were imagined as unassimilable 'strangers' during the most comprehensive period of modern nationalism. The mobilizing ideologies of this new racism, Pollock states, address “impersonal and absolute forces, nature and history, in order to retrieve the contingencies of actual historical processes in which Europe, marked by various imperia from Christendom to the Holy Roman Empire to the Austro Hungarian Empire, had been home to a variety of peoples, cultures, ethnicities, religions, languages, and histories. Nature (race) and history (invented traditional based on language, blood and long-term territorial occupation) were now to found indefatigable laws that must be obeyed for the truth and safety of those selectively allowed national identity, as opposed to those who on whom was merely conferred legal citizenship by birth.”³¹⁰

³⁰⁹ Griselda Pollock, “Concentrationary Legacies: Thinking Through the Racism of Minor Differences”, in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism Postcolonialism Europe*, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, pp.26-8.

³¹⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 24.

She emphasized that colonialism born inside this nationalism and turned into imperialism. This nationalism differentiated its citizens and marked for extermination from European civil society.³¹¹ With reference to Arendt, she emphasizes that modern and different form of imperialism was at stake in the Third Reich Germany. Being different from the mid-nineteenth century nationalism and colonial expansionism, the Third Reich brought the colonial process back, focused on building beyond local nationalist ideologies and dominates all Europe. This event cannot be explained as simple ideological corruption of the Germans' nationalist xenophobia.³¹² At that point, she offers to deconstruct the “comforting explanations” of the Nazi genocide by stating that

Whenever an event occurs which is great enough to illuminate its own past, history comes into being. Only then does the chaotic maze of the past happenings emerge as a story which can be told, because it has a beginning and an end.³¹³

To deconstruct the “comforting explanations” of the Holocaust, the unwritten, invisible, hidden, and unspeakable part of the Holocaust should be focused on. With Griselda Pollock's term the “false comfort of pre-known and pre-destined historical narratives”³¹⁴ which show the events as historically unavoidable, has to be disturbed. Namely, the conditions -material and epistemological- that gave rise to this instance should be questioned. In other terms, it is needed to go beyond the moment and the results of the Holocaust and question what made that kind of extreme physical violence possible; which conditions and factors made the Holocaust possible in a Europe which had become committed to a post-

³¹¹ *ibid.*, pp. 25.

³¹² *ibid.*, pp. 34.

³¹³ Hannah Arendt, 1994: 319, cited in Griselda Pollock, “Concentrationary Legacies: Thinking Through the Racism of Minor Differences”, pp. 29.

³¹⁴ Griselda Pollock, “Concentrationary Legacies: Thinking Through the Racism of Minor Differences”, pp. 28.

Enlightenment project of securing universal values. Also to be questioned is how this commitment and potential to exterminate some people because of their religious beliefs, culture, physical conditions, or age could come together and rendered as legitimate. This questioning would bring us to analyze European racism as a complex phenomenon that cannot be limited to a specific set of violence ‘against’ Jews, designed and conducted by Nazi policies. Moreover, this questioning would challenge us to overcome the restricted understanding of racism as a social construct, a violence against European Jews or a violence against immigrants because of the economic and political problems; it would force us to understand the conditions under which European racism in this instance had being produced. Primarily, it gives a way to analyze European racism not only as an instance merely directed ‘against’ some people, races, culture, religion, age or a way of life, but also as a phenomenon constantly formed by certain epistemological and material condition and manifested by naming and accepting. This way of analysis will be able to point out the racism in Europe which racializes the Muslims and Islam within the borders of Europe.

Besides all, to deconstruct the “comforting explanations” of the Holocaust, the problematic character of anti-racist discourse of Europe should be addressed. It is as problematic and complex as racist discourse. In spite of the general claim which suggests that both racism has been condemned by the international organizations (UN, UNESCO, ILO), and a scientific concept of race refuted, racism and racialization still organize social and political order of Europe. The Human Rights Declaration (1948) and anti-racist organizations, which were shaped after the Second World War, were not enough to erase the colonial and racist character of European political discourse; no one could deny that the concerns of these institutions and organizations are useful. However, it is also clear that racism still exists in Europe in spite of these institutions and their efforts for confronting

racism, since they can only be “palliatives”³¹⁵ for the anxieties of Europe. It means that they can only be a treatment which provides comfort and temporary relief to the symptoms of racist trauma; treatment that does not cure the underlying conditions that give rise to racist acts in the first place. Moreover, they can be a remedy that only alleviates the pain of racist occurrence, without curing the underlying conditional causes of racism in Europe. This means they systematically neglect to discuss these challenging questions: what does racism in Europe means and through which conditions racism has been manifested in Europe. Anti- racist does not focus on the question of how racism emerged and shaped the political discourse that it rejects as racist. Rather, it sees racism as a historical problem that can be removed from political discourse; instead of understanding it as a latent operational feature which can erupt at any time from the conditions that allow discourse to function. This point of view de-politicizes the view of racism, by ignoring the political implications of it as a possible systemic component of political discourse itself. In this framework, anti-racist discourses play an important role in the dissociation of racism from the material and epistemological conditions of discourse in Europe.

In summary, the issue of racism is not discussed in the sense of European colonialism, but it perceived as the mass extermination of Jewish people in Europe by “extraordinary” Nazi politics. Recently, it is perceived as the issue of extreme right popular party politics or neo-Nazi groups' violence against immigrants in Europe. When it comes to colonialism, the general assumption is that colonialism was a civilizing act which is manifested to civilize the uncivilized “Rest” of the world and ended long time ago. However, racist character of colonialism has not been emphasized. The issue of racism is perceived as either a radical extermination or extreme violence created and organized by German Nazi mentality or a local and individual reactionary and marginal behavior of extreme nationalists or rightist

³¹⁵ Palliatives, in medicine, minimize the progression of the disease and relieve the undesirable symptoms of it for as long as possible, rather than attempting to cure the (usually incurable) disease.

people rather than as a larger effect of institutionalized exclusionary practices within European political context. "Scientific fallacy" point of view supports this image of racism as a marginal and extraordinary phenomenon by declaring the end of racism when the scientific fallacy of it was proved.³¹⁶ This perception differentiates, distances and even dissociates racism from the colonialism, enslavement and recent stigmatization of culture and religion. However, this mainstream and commonsensical image of racism is not enough to understand and analyze the Holocaust in particular and European racism in general. Hence, the situation described so far only gives information about the limited part of the complex issue of racism.

In the context of deconstructing the “comforting explanations” of racism in Europe, Etienne Balibar (1991) warned about this perception by emphasizing that there is not a determinate racist configuration that has fixed frontiers and the figures of Nazi anti-Semitism cannot be evoked as the only events or periods which mark out the place of racism in history.³¹⁷ Also, he warned about the assumptions that claim a reciprocal relationship between crises situation and racist acts in some European countries. He draws attention that the concept of crises puts the racism as a behavioral reaction against the marginal actions and disguises the actual dimension of racism. In this point of view, racism is perceived as external to Europe; as a reaction to increasing instability created by migration and migrants identified with “crises” and security problems in Europe. He particularly draws attention to the perception about the development of racism through the crises in the context of the

³¹⁶ Dinesh D'Souza, *The End of Racism: Principles for a Multicultural Society*, New York: The Free Press, 1995.

³¹⁷ Etienne Balibar, “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?” in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, eds. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel M. Wallerstein (London & NY: Verso, 1991), p.40.

recent events in France where the concept of crises obscures the debate on racism.³¹⁸

Moreover, in his remarkable work, *Racial Europeanization*, David Theo Goldberg significantly draws attention to this problem by stating that this kind of handling racism leads to silence on today's racism which racializes Muslims as hostile, aggressive, engaged for religious purpose in constant jihad against Europe.³¹⁹ Concerning with "mapping the racial contours of contemporary European self-conception ... [and] tracing the figures in European imaginary of the European, the black, the Jews and the Muslim"³²⁰, Goldberg stated that after Auschwitz we are unable to speak about race; race is 'buried alive' which refuses to remain silent"; it still operates within European political discourse and policy: "[I]t is not just a word. It is a set of *conditions*, shifting over time. Never just one thing, it is a way (or really ways) of thinking, a ways(s) of living, a disposition."³²¹

Although race remains salient, it is inescapably one of the determinants of politics and society.³²² In 1981, Martin Barker brought a new dimension to the idea of race. He asserted that racial categorizations are shaped by the immutable cultural differences.³²³ Then, Gilroy (1987), Wieviorka (1995) and Banton, (1996) followed him. In 1991 Pierre Andre Taguieff (1990) and Balibar (1991) proposed the notion of 'differentialist racism' and 'new racism'.³²⁴ Recent interpretations of racism continue to carry these assertions. For instance, Alana Lentin mentions that race

³¹⁸ *ibid.*

³¹⁹ David Theo Goldberg, "Racial Europeanization", pp. 344.

³²⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 331.

³²¹ *ibid.*, pp. 337, 338.

³²² Etienne Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*

³²³ Barker, 1981 cited in *ibid.*, pp. 21

³²⁴ *ibid.*

structures our imaginative capacity while hiding itself from view. The bodyguards at race's door are indefatigable'.³²⁵

3.3. Iterability of Racism

Talking about the contemporary guidance of colonialism and racism, in a place and time in which racism is assumed to be ended, is a way of talking about the "existence of inexistent"³²⁶ in Ranciere's terminology; "ghosts", "spectrality" and "hauntology" in Derrida's terminology. These arguments address an embodiment with different techniques, strategies and forms intemperance by protecting its main character and structure. It is something coming back in disguise; crossing the borders –borders between colonialism and post-colonialism, and racism and anti-racism- in disguise. As such, this something is "blurring the boundaries" in Ranciere's term or "deconstructing" the boundaries between the binary oppositions in Derrida's term. Using different terminologies does not matter very much, but it does matter that all of these two statements mainly deconstructs the binary oppositions and the borders between things or situations like colonialism and post-colonialism, racism and post-racism, existence and inexistence, or presence and absence. Also, it matters that they give possibility to open a way for "reframing the configuration of a problem"³²⁷ and thus, overcome the mainstream vicious cycle. In this context, this section aims to reframe the configuration of problem by emphasizing the iteration of racism in Europe. Derrida's concept of iteration is the only way to understand the contemporary manifestation of racism. Iteration refers to existence of past in the presence as a non-identical repetition; it is same as what it repeats, but it is not identical. It refers to the potential of texts to be repeated in new situations with a minimal remainder which does not have full presence; it is

³²⁵ Alana Lentin, 'Europe and the Silence about Race', pp. 500.

³²⁶ Jacques Ranciere, 'The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics,' p.13

³²⁷ *ibid.*, p.2

neither present nor absent. This is such a remainder that implies alteration which makes all absolute permanence impossible, since remaining does not necessarily refers to permanence.³²⁸ Thus, contemporary form of racism refers to iteration of racism.

Starting from the early 1980s, there is a growing enthusiasm about the issue of racism in Europe and its new forms, as an attempt to understand Europe's current troubled affair with its immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. The consideration of the question of this form of racism is framed by the arguments of Martin Barker (1981), Pierre-André Taguieff (1989), David Theo Goldberg (1990), Etienne Balibar (1992), and Sunera Thobani (2006), who have suggested the framework of a new racism, referring to a 'racism without race' based on the insurmountability of cultural differences rather than biological heredity. 'New racism' was first used in 1981 by Barker.³²⁹ He introduced the term "new racism" in his well-known book *The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of Tribe*. He used this term as a way of bringing critical focus to the emergence of a 'New Right' within the British Conservative Party. His conceptualization of racism was thus incorporated into an account of the then current ideological and political crises occurring in British capitalism. He explicitly identified this 'new racism' as:

[A] theory of human nature. Human nature is such that it is natural to form a bounded community, a nation, aware of its differences from other nations. They are not better or worse. But feelings of antagonism will be aroused if outsiders are admitted. And there grows up a special form of connection between a nation and the place it lives.³³⁰

³²⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, pp. 53-4.

³²⁹ Etienne Balibar, "Is there a 'Neo Racism'?" in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.) trans.by Etienne Balibar and Chris Turner *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. (London and New York: Verso, 1991).

³³⁰ Barker, 1981: 21.

In this form of racism, those who refuse to adopt the life style of the country in which either they were forced or have chosen to live be characterized as 'moral failures' and are presented as a serious threat to the 'homogeneity of insiders' and their 'carefully nurtured individuality'. When it comes to the late 1980s, Pierre-Andre Taguieff (1989, 1990) followed up Baker by contributing another definition of new racism, which he termed “differentialist racism”. Taguieff brought up the integration of the question of immigration with racism and cultural differences, calling this new form of racism a *differentialist racism*; which refers to “the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions”³³¹. In addition to these remarks, racism also become an issue in the political agenda of Europe at large, and in 1989 the European Community (CCE) published an important survey titled, “Racism and Xenophobia”. And still later, Balibar (1991) brought a new consideration of the topic forward, and proposed the term “neo-racism” in order to define new racism. He underlines this term neo-racism as:

irreductable to earlier models or it is a mere tactical adaptation. [It is] inscribed itself in practices (forms of violence, contempt, intolerance, humiliation and exploitation), in discourses and representations which are so many intellectual elaborations of the phantasm of prophylaxis or segregation (the need to purify the social body, to preserve 'one's own' or 'our' identity from all forms of mixing, interbreeding or invasion) and which are articulated around stigmata of otherness (name, skin color, religious practices).³³²

Goldberg has crucially contributed to this point of view by emphasizing that the “new” concept of race is identified with “language groups, religion, group habits, norms and customs: including typical styles of dress, behavior, cuisine, music and literature, etc.”³³³ But at the same time, this new conceptualization continues to use

³³¹ Etienne Balibar, “Is there a ‘Neo Racism’?”, pp.21.

³³² *ibid.*, pp. 83.

³³³ David Theo Goldberg, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, pp.70.

“racial otherness” as logical grounding feature.³³⁴ Thobani has likewise drawn attention to the construction of racial hierarchies within discourse about cultural and also national difference.³³⁵ All in all, in this form of racism, supposed cultural, national and religious traits are naturalized and essentialized to the group that is characterized.

It can be suggested that there are two different approaches suggesting that racism has had a new form because of its emphasis on incompatibility of different cultures. They mainly underline the opposition between different cultures because of their incompatible character of them. At a time when legitimacy is a very important criteria, incompatibility of different cultures functions as a legitimate ways for racist political and social regulations. At one point they differ: one of them suggests that old and new form of racism, which are called as biological and cultural racism, are set apart by emphasizing that old form was differentiating on the bases of skin color and it was disappeared, while the new form differentiates just on the basis of culture. Also, they note that while the old/biological form of racism has been declining, the new/cultural form has been taking its place. The other set of argument suggest that Stuart Hall states that race is a floating signifier which signifies cultural, religious and biological difference and defines political discourse.³³⁶ In the same manner, Sole emphasizes that racism includes both cultural and physical differences, saying that by

linking the phenomenon of racism to the question of culture, the definition is broadened to the point where discriminatory issues and behaviors which are equally justifiable culturally become comparable [...] Physical characteristics are implicitly related to cultural hallmarks

³³⁴ *ibid.*, pp.70.

³³⁵ Sunera Thobani, *Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007, pp.158.

³³⁶ Stuart Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity”, in David Hall and Anthony McGrew (eds.), *Modernity and Its Futures*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.

of specific groups which are then ethnically defined, i.e., not just in terms of cultural attributes but also in terms of the ethnocentric exclusion of the other.³³⁷

For Balibar, this refers to what is called 'racism without race'; in which the discourse of biological difference and inferiority is replaced with cultural and religious difference and inferiority. All in all, both arguments highlights that in new formulation of racism, supposed cultural, national and religious traits are naturalized and essentialized to the group that is characterized.

In summary racism has been emphasized in a way that presents as a more subtle form of racism, compared to the old crude racism that existed in the past. The subtle means used to express racialized hostility has been figured within the literature on the topic as changing from overt to covert approaches, and racism has become, as Sivanandan states, “less visible but no less virulent”.³³⁸ Also, the cultural connotations of these ‘new’, ‘neo’ or ‘differentialist’ racisms have been drawn attention.

From this framework, contrary to commonsensical and mainstream claims and narratives which claims that racism is ended after the Second World War and now it is a local marginal phenomena in Europe, this dissertation asserts that “racism is embedded in a politico-discursive realm, which is so profoundly obscurantist, that racism has been made unrecognizable as ‘racism’”.³³⁹ It is not an abstraction from rationality towards irrationality; it has a rational base and a logical extension constituted by modern European epistemological and material universe. As Ramon

³³⁷ Sole, 1995: 43.

³³⁸ Hall, 1998; Barker, 1988; Reeves, 1983; Omi and Winant, 1986; Sivanandan, 1988.

³³⁹ David Theo Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’ Goldberg, 2006.

Grosfoguel states, it is not only a social phenomenon, but it is political, economic and epistemic question.³⁴⁰

On the other, separating the new and old forms of racism does not help to understand why racism resurrected in a contemporary form in post-racist Europe. In order to understand and examine contemporary racism, it should be noted that there are 'new routes' of racism, which are produced through the combination of the material and epistemological conditions of European political discourse. We can speak about a form of racism which is not new, but functions within a new language and new institutional design that nevertheless works to racialize people. In this context, the main point is that racism manifested in post-racist and anti-racist Europe is not an abstraction from rationality towards irrationality; it has a rational base and a logical extension constituted by modern European epistemological and material universe. As Ramon Grosfoguel states, it is not only a social phenomenon, but it is political, economic and epistemic question.³⁴¹ Thus, in order to understand contemporary form of racism, these conditions needs to be emphasized.

The argument here is that the specters of colonialism are haunting Europe with the help of these conditions, since the racist text of Europe is created through these conditions. Arguing that human races are not the only phenomenon causing racism, and racism cannot be understood through focusing only on behaviors, attitudes, prejudices, and states' ideologies, this section has addressed racism in the context of Balibar's statement which emphasizes the combination of racism with the other negative approaches like sexism, patriarchy, religious intolerance, nationalism, imperialism, individualism, and market culture.³⁴² In this context, this section

³⁴⁰ Ramon Grosfoguel 'Multiple Faces of Islamophobia', *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, Vol.1, Iss.1 (Fall 2006), pp. 9

³⁴¹ *ibid.*,

³⁴² Etienne Balibar, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, trans. of Etienne Balibar by Chris Turner, London, New York: Verso, 1991, pp. 24.

asserts that racism cannot be understood as a prejudice or myth; it is a negation of indivisibility of human species. It refers to the “separated evolutions, inherited inequalities and hierarchies to justify social discrimination”. In order to understand racism, it is crucial to focus on both the political manipulation of masses and the diseases of mass politics, and ‘the effects of power relations, natural right tradition and a new foundation of humanism’.³⁴³ From this framework, the next next section will show that racism in Europe is still alive and racializing European Muslims through stigmatizing their religion.

3.4. *Hauntology* and Racialization of Religion

This chapter continues the reconsideration of racism, but with a particular emphasis on the recent political discourse about European Muslims and Islam. It proposes to analyze this discourse from the framework of conceptual tools and content prepared in the previous sections. Following Derrida, it suggests that the visible racialization of culture and religion is the result of the *specters* of colonialism which are haunting “post-colonial” Europe. Namely, while the outward colonization of the distant “Rest” of the world ended long ago, the tendency to racialize and civilize that is implicit in the colonialist attitude still exists.

The effect of these specters is experienced by European Muslims who live inside the borders of Europe, and who are either first generation post-colonial and post-Second World War immigrants, or the second and third generation descendants of these immigrants. European Muslims are perceived from Samuel Huntington's perception; they seen as “immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies”³⁴⁴. Therefore, the underlying motive for the

³⁴³ *ibid.*, pp. 23

³⁴⁴ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order*.

racialization of Islam and Muslims is to civilize people from “the other” civilizations that are assumed to “essentially” contradict Western civilization.

At that point, it is crucial to explain how Islam began has been seen as a civilization. With reference to Walter Mignolo, as Ramon Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants draw attention, 1492 is a crucial year for the internal and external conquest of territories of Europe started to be shaped. In that date, Islamic Spain was re-conquered and Jews and Arabs were expelled from the Spanish peninsula by the Christian Spanish monarchy. In the same year Americas were discovered and indigenous people began to be colonized. In this context, the internal and external imagined boundaries of Europe began to be constituted; Jews and Arabs were perceived as the internal Others and the indigenous people were perceived as the external Others.³⁴⁵ In accordance with the “Christian-centric” global religious hierarchy, Arabs and Jews were characterized as the “people with the wrong religion” and the indigenous people were characterized as the “people without religion”.³⁴⁶ Moreover, the religious difference in the premodern/colonial world turned into a racial/ethnic difference in the modern/colonial world starting from the 15th century. He defines this transformation as “discursive mutation”. He states that

[this mutation] was central to the entanglement between the inferiorization of religion and the racism against non-European human beings practicing those religions. The Christian-centric global religious hierarchy and the Eurocentric global racial/ethnic hierarchy were increasingly entangled and the distinction between practicing a non-Christian religion and being racialized as an inferior human became increasingly erased.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁵ Ramon Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants, “The Long-Duree Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System, An Introduction”, *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, Vol.1 (Fall 2006), 1-12.

³⁴⁶ Maldonado-Torres, 2006, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

³⁴⁷ Ramon Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants, “The Long-Duree Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System, An Introduction”, pp. 4

In the context of this mutation, as Dussel (1994) informed us that indigenous people were characterized as “people without God” and inferiorized as sub-human or non-human beings. Thus, they turned into the first racialized subject of the modern/colonial world.³⁴⁸ This racist image of indigenous people was gradually extended to the all non-Europeans. In the 16th century, it is extended to Africans and then to the “people with the wrong religion” starting with the Dutch colonization of Indonesia in the 17th century, the British colonization of India in the 18th century, and the British colonization of the Middle East in the 19th century. In the 19th century, with the secularization of Christian imaginary into a “scientific evolutionary hierarchical civilization”, “people with the wrong religion” turned into the “people without civilization”.³⁴⁹

From hauntological framework, what we understood from here is that the discourse of civilization is the spectral form of Christianity and racism. In this condition, spectral Christianity and racism are haunting European political context and racializes Islam as a civilization, rather than a religion in a secular Europe. It names Muslims as “people without civilization” which contradicts with the Western civilization. Precisely at that point, the “civilizing mission” of Europe comes into play. Particularly, the emphasis on the necessity to make some prohibitive regulations about Muslims' and Islam's visibility in public life “as they are” or to make sharp regulations about the ongoing political context to protect the “universal” values of secularism and freedom of speech, corresponds to “civilizing mission” of European colonialism. In fact, *via* this emphasis, as it was in colonial time, by assuming itself as the authority of civilization and universal, contemporary European context forces to civilize the “uncivilized” Muslims within the borders of Europe, but with a major difference. This mission of Europe has been on the agenda within its own borders. Namely, European political context still holds its

³⁴⁸ Cited in *ibid.*, pp. 3.

³⁴⁹ Cited in *ibid.*, pp. 3

“civilizing mission” and continues civilizing the uncivilized Other within the borders of Europe. With this mission, Europe attempts to civilize Muslims as “being immigrant without civilization” and makes them acceptable within the borders of Europe. However, with this mission, it stigmatizes Muslims as uncivilized and set them apart from the society. This stigmatization constructs a gap between the civilized Europe and uncivilized Muslim cultures through rhetorical trope of apophasis. Therefore, spectral racism discussed here is distinct from the aggressive and visible form manifested by extreme right or neo-Nazi groups, and is instead motivated by the “civilizing mission” of colonialism expressed in Enlightenment and leftist ideas and the “threat of being destroyed by Muslims. In the present condition, civilizing mission and the threat of Islam is manifested by both Eurocentricism and “Europism” which are the distinct parts of European identity, proposed by Philomena Essed. I will explain this by giving a long cote from Essed; she indicates as:

Eurocentricism was a product of the history of conquest and colonization, of the ‘age of Europe’ (Amin 1989; West 1993). Ideologies of European superiority, and in particular the idea that Europe is the cradle and the norm for human civilization, typify an extroverted mode of European assertion. Today, a more introverted process of Eurocentricism emerged from the victory of conquest and the ‘civilizing mission’, Europism is based in the defeat of Europe, first by the United States, now gradually being followed by the Far East. Five centuries after Columbus gave effect to the idea that country borders should be extended limitlessly in order to include more and more territories, European countries today close their borders in order to exclude the ‘other’. The ‘Fortress Europe’ ideology, and the bureaucratic machinery operating to create legal, economic and political boundaries to protect Europe against the rest of the world, in particular the south, can be considered part of the phenomenon of Europism. Economic decline and internal discomposure are giving way to identity crises and construction of new enemies: enemies within, first-, second- and third -generation racial and ethnic minorities; and enemies on the doorstep, refugees who are supposedly pouring in by

the millions in order to take advantage of Western Europe welfare.³⁵⁰

Essed emphasize the economic decline and internal discomposure as the factors creating the identity crises of Europe in 1996. Since then, the factors have been expanding with the anxiety over the “threat of Islam”. This anxiety represents Islam and Muslims as incompatible with an accepted universal configuration of social, cultural and political norms. This representation secures the necessity of manifestation of civilizing mission of Europe. In the condition of this kind of anxiety, the specters of colonialism are haunting European political discourse, denying space for Islam and Muslims in Europe.

While the European immigration policy in the 1980s was based on the idea of control and management of migratory flows, since the 1980s and 1990s, politicians and public opinion have been obsessed with a serious threat to European culture and value coming from the existing immigrants coming predominantly from Islamic countries which are mainly former colonies and the other part of the world which are mainly immigrant sending countries after the Second World War.³⁵¹ Thus, the discourse about Muslims has come to that point since 1980s, and after 2001, Muslim started to be framed as an ‘enemy within’ and Europeans as the victims of disastrous circumstances created by Muslim immigrants because of multiculturalism and the soft integration policies of European countries. In other terms, the notions of insecurity and fear have both changed the perspective on multiculturalism and transformed the discourse on Muslim immigrants and Islam into ‘radical’ Islam and the ‘terror’.³⁵² That is why; September 11 is not a turning point in the perception of Muslims and Islam in Europe. However, the post

³⁵⁰ Philomena Essed, “Intolerable Humiliations” Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, p.139.

³⁵¹ Stephanie Giry, 2003, France and Its Muslims, *Foreign Affairs*, 2006, pp. 1

³⁵² Leeuw, Marc de and Wichelen, Sonja van, “Please, Go Wake Up’ Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the ‘War on Terror’ in the Netherlands”, *Feminist Media Studies*, Vol.5, No:3, 2005.

September 11 period has legitimized to talk about both the threat of Islam and necessity of civilizing Muslims in an indirect way. Namely, particularly after the bombings of the public transport systems in Madrid and London which have been conflated events such as the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the riots in French banlieues, and the recent protests over the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad in Denmark were reflected as evidences of the failure of multiculturalism, tolerance and “soft” integration policies of several European countries. After that date, multiculturalism and tolerance became the contested debates. In this framework, new discriminatory legal decisions and regulations about immigrants and their daily and religious practices –such as banning veiling headscarf at schools in France and constructing minaret for mosques in Switzerland or regulating new citizenship tests in Netherlands and Germany- came into the scene.

This context has emphasized the security problems of the centers of the European states because of the Islamic extremism supported by jihadists, and indeed by any Muslims tolerated by multicultural systems for a long time. Then, the failure of multiculturalism has been explained as an expression of the assumed tension between Western and Islamic values. This is one example of a larger trend towards presenting Islam and Muslims as a problem for the West³⁵³. September 11, 2001 marked the beginning of a new representation of Islam. Since then, Islam has been posed as being politically violent³⁵⁴ and Muslim immigrants have been perceived as a monolithic enemy who cannot be assimilated or integrated easily into Western civilization's values, because of the essential character of their religion, Islam. Consequently, contemporary discourse on Muslims and Islam is shaped as a 'failure of multiculturalism', 'securitization of immigrants', and inferiorization of Muslimism through the ‘enemy within’ discourse.

³⁵³ Jawad, 2003; 7-8.

³⁵⁴ Cesari, 2005: 39.

This anxiety violently represents Islam and Muslims as incompatible with an accepted universal configuration of social, cultural and political norms, and this representation in turn creates more anxiety. It is exactly this anxiety that drives the civilizing mission of colonialism. This representation secures the necessity of manifesting the civilizing mission of Europe. With this kind of anxiety, the specters of colonialism haunt the European political discourse, denying space for Islam and Muslims in Europe.

Particularly, the need to make prohibitive regulations about Muslims' and Islam's visibility “as they are” in public life –or to make sharp regulations about the ongoing political context to protect the “universal” values of secularism and freedom of speech– corresponds to this “civilizing mission” within the borders of Europe. Thus, Europe still clings to its archaic “civilizing mission” and continues to civilize the uncivilized Other within in the context of Europism.

The existence of a civilizing mission implicitly points to the existence of a hierarchy of cultures in the European consciousness, where the European culture is superior to all others. Historically, this not only served to justify European colonialism, but elevated the civilizing mission to a moral imperative. That is, the European powers had a responsibility to share the fruits of European civilization with the undeveloped Other, even when faced with armed resistance from the colonized nations. A change in external conditions means that explicit colonization is no longer possible though; the United Nations provides a setting to make public precisely this kind of aggression, and Europe's decline as the dominant international power means that any unilateral action receives considerable resistance. Nevertheless, the persistence of the hierarchy of cultures in the European consciousness gives rise to contemporary specters of colonialism. That is, a specter of colonialism is any behavior that is motivated by the same factors giving rise to the civilizing mission, but with an outward form that is compatible with modern material conditions.

The Second World War was the single most important event in shaping the modern material conditions experienced by Europe. Outwardly, the destruction wrought throughout the European continent required a focusing of attention and resources inwardly for the purpose of reconstruction, leaving relatively little for the civilization of the undeveloped Other. Psychologically, the experience of this destruction may be likened to the realization of one's own mortality. When merged with the belief of the superiority of European culture, this realization gave rise to two readily identifiable modes of behavior. First, the need to preserve European culture and values in the face of perceived threats may be seen as a moral imperative, since the disappearance of the champion of 'universal' values would impoverish those that remain. Second, a denial of vulnerability and an assertion of strength may be realized by imposing European culture on groups with little additional recourse. The focus inward following the Second World War means that this is usually manifested toward minorities and immigrants living within the borders of Europe. Again, these modern behaviors are spectral form of colonialism in the sense of having the same source, namely, the sense of the superiority of the European culture. The manifestation is different enough though that the continuation of historical colonialism in a contemporary form may elude more conventional sociological analysis.

This form of civilization of Muslims proceeds under the guise of “integrating” them into the European culture. This is done to “protect” the “unique” and “universal” values of the European culture from the “threat of local” value systems that survive within the borders of Europe only under the protection of these same unique and universal values. The result is that the specters of colonialism haunt the European political discourse in the form of non-lethal and even increasingly legitimized regulation, rather than aggressive policies or enslavement outside the borders of Europe.

The “crises of multiculturalism” discourse and “integration” of Muslims by the denigration of their culture and religion is symptomatic³⁵⁵ of the “disappeared” colonial and racist “past” of Europe. The racialization that is implicit in this view has been disguised in the form of criticism of multiculturalism and integration policies. While this criticism is couched in the old issue of whether there is space for differences within the borders of Europe, it is of course a contemporary articulation of the same old forms of colonialism and racism. This may be defined as “symbolic” articulation in the sense of Claude Lefort's statement about the difference between ideological and symbolic.

Symbolic means that racialization is being manifested by *apaophasis*; by not mentioning “race”. That is, racism is still functioning independent from the idea of race. As Alana Lentin notes, “difference per se that is problematized by the various debates and policies that frame what is no longer known as race in Europe”.³⁵⁶ In this present form, racism is being manifested in a more complex way of affirmation through negation and inclusive exclusion. As Ashwani Sharma mentioned, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri addressed this in their well-known work *Empire*. They draw attention that in the condition of new empire, exclusionist racist logic of colonialism has shifted. At present, it is in the form of cultural neo-racism of segregation and works through inclusion. It mainly regulates, orders and controls the difference by integration, rather than absolute exclusion and negation: “Subordination is enacted in regimes of everyday practices that are more mobile and flexible but that create racial hierarchies that are nonetheless stable and brutal”.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁵ Joan Scott, 'Symptomatic Politics: The Banning of Islamic Head Scarves in French Public Schools', *French Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 23, No: 3, Winter 2005.

³⁵⁶ Alana Lentin, 'Europe and the Silence about Race', pp. 499.

³⁵⁷ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, 2000, p. 194, cited in Ashwani Sharma, “Postcolonial Racism: White Paranoia and the Terrors of Multiculturalism”, in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism Postcolonialism Europe*, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, p.122.

Multiculturalism and tolerance are the immediate models of this form of manifestation. Slavoj Žižek draws attention to this relationship between multiculturalism and racism. He states that

Multiculturalism is a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a 'racism with a distance' -it 'respects' the Other's identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed 'authentic' community towards which, he the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible by his privileged universal position.³⁵⁸

Furthermore, Philomena Essed draws attention to the ambiguous relationship between tolerance and racism explains the haunted character of tolerance. She maintains:

On the surface, the ideal of tolerance suggests that racism is absent or that it occurs only as an aberration from normal practice. In order to sustain the western image of non-racism, the definition of racism is often limited, to include only the most obvious and blunt expressions, where racist motives are explicit in the very act. Thus racism becomes an exception, a deviance from 'normal' practice. Because the function of tolerance is to allow for aberration to be tolerated, tolerance comes to include the tolerance of racism.³⁵⁹

Also, with reference to Gijswijt-Hofstra, (1989), Philomena Essed addressed that the following notion of tolerance is significant in understanding this relationship:

The notion and practice of tolerance implied the perception of a range of 'deviances' to be dealt with, including deviant religions (heathens, Catholics, Jews) and beliefs (magic); sexualities (sodomy, same-sex); sense of property (theft, slavery); heritage and looks (ethnic minorities, Roma and Sinti, Jews); and so on.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁸ Slavoj Žižek, 1997: 44, cited in Ashwani Sharma, "Postcolonial Racism: White Paranoia and the Terrors of Multiculturalism", in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism Postcolonialism Europe*, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, pp.122.

³⁵⁹ Philomena Essed, "Intolerable Humiliations", pp. 133.

³⁶⁰ *ibid.*, pp.137.

Essed suggested that this notion of tolerance reflects humiliating tolerance. It is clearly visible in the Dutch immigration debates which is constituted by this perception:

We (dominant group) tolerate you (racial/ethnic groups) among us but we will let you know that you are not really worthy of being here -your culture does not deserve that much respect. You are not worthy of our tolerance, because you, your religion, your culture are not tolerant either”.³⁶¹

There is a long history of religious tolerance in the Netherlands; different beliefs within Christianity, Catholicism and Protestantism, were given the opportunity to emancipate separately; “the principle of ‘we’ versus ‘them’ and the endorsement of *segregated institutionalized spaces* are at the core of Dutch tolerance”.³⁶²

Moreover, addressed by Talal Asad, the liberals' perception about the issue of racism in Europe. The liberals in Europe suggest that there is very little anxiety about immigrants in Europe, but the extreme right is xenophobic and reflects the presence of Muslims and Islam in Europe as a potential cultural disaster. The liberal position is assumed to close to tolerance and open society. However, “the liberal position is more layered than one might suppose”. This can be seen their significant reactions to the “Islamic disregard” of the principle of secular republicanism in headscarf issue in France and “Islamic attack” against the principle of freedom of speech in Rushdie Affair in Britain. Asad suggests that their reaction is no less than the extreme right; they have asked whether Islam can find a legitimate place in a modern Western society.³⁶³

From this framework, unlike the arguments stating that since the end of 2001, European tolerance and democracy has begun to be replaced by both implicit and

³⁶¹ *ibid.*, p.137.

³⁶² *ibid.*, p.139.

³⁶³ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, pp. 210.

explicit cultural racist discourses, this section challenges the word “replace” and changes it with “haunt”, and asserts that since 2001, European democracy and tolerance has been haunted by the specters of colonialism. From hauntological framework, specter/repressed can never be obliterated: “a specter is always a revenant. One cannot control its comings and goings because it begins by coming back”.³⁶⁴ That is, European colonialism is revenant and haunting European democracy and tolerance. This explains why the racism racializing European Muslims and religion discussed here is distinct from the aggressive and visible form manifested by extreme right or neo-Nazi groups, and is instead motivated by the “civilizing mission” of colonialism expressed in Enlightenment and leftist ideas.

As a result, as stated before, colonial mentality is not disappeared, but it is repressed, and now it returns in disguise to postcolonial context of Europe. Criticizing multiculturalism and integration policies, and stigmatization of Muslims via the denigration of their religion and culture conjures up the “return of the repressed”; the return of the repressed reality of European political context which are colonialism and its racializing mentality. The repressed reality of European politics repeatedly takes different shapes when it returns. At present, it returns in the form of criticism of multiculturalism and stigmatization of Muslims. Some prominent discussions on presence of European Muslims in Europe, their integration problems, their way of practicing religion, their culture and religion reflect this form racialization in detail. The issues highlighted in these discussions explain more how the specters of colonialism are haunting European political context and racializes Muslims with the civilizing mission of Europe.

Hauntological approach of this dissertation gives a good maneuverability to suggest that the presence of racism can be thought in the absence of it, in presence

³⁶⁴ Jacques Derrida, *Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, 1994, pp. 11

of it “where” it is claimed as absent, and in presence of it “when” it is claimed as absent, since past asserts itself with the manifestation of secrets and the appearance of ghosts. In this logic, the past and future as the determinants of the present; not just as a past, like something stuck in the past and future like something not yet, as Jacques Derrida strongly recommends. Hauntological framework brings out the problematic elements in sociology, and helps us to understand the necessity of “displacement” between present and absent; “displacement” of the order which implies opening of every existing order with regard to its responsibility to the Other.

As emphasized in the beginning of this chapter, hauntology is unusual in a sociological context, but this section has attempted to show that the idea of hauntology is broadly applicable even outside of its original context. It is meaningful in a sociological work which aims to analyze the existence of inexistent, and presence of absent by going beyond the conventional classifications. It provides an invaluable stance particularly for this dissertation which aims to challenge the image of the post-colonial and post-racist Europe through the examination of the contemporary manifestations of colonialism and racism. It provides such a formula that can be suggested that in present situation, colonial mentality still functions, but it exists under disguise within the boundaries of Europe; it circulates incognito and passes through the borders of post-colonial and anti-racist Europe by censoring itself. In this sense, classifying something clearly as colonialism or racism misleads us because what is visible is only the shadow cast of their contemporary manifestations. Precisely for this reason, this dissertation proposes to use the indefinite notions of hauntology, ghosts and specters.

In the framework of hauntology, after having established some of the key parameters of an analysis of European colonialism and racism in this chapter, the next chapter shows how specters of colonialism racializes Muslims in Europe by focusing on four particular trouble cases about Muslims in Europe. They provide considerable empirical evidences to support the main argument of this dissertation.

They provide examples for the popular and mainstream declarations and interpretations as the reflection of something intrinsic to the political discourse that cannot be seen at the first hand. That is, the cases itself and the political discourse shaped around them show how the specters of colonialism are haunting European political context by racializing Muslims and Islam through apophasis at work in the racialization of Muslims and Islam in Europe.

As a result, as stated before, colonialism and its racialization are not disappeared, but they are repressed, and now they return in disguise to postcolonial and postracist context of Europe. Criticizing multiculturalism and integration policies, and stigmatization of Muslims via the denigration of their religion and culture conjures up the “return of the repressed”; the return of the repressed reality of European political context which are colonialism and its racializing mentality. The repressed reality of European politics repeatedly takes different shapes when it returns. At present, the repressed realities of Europe return to European context in the form of criticism of multiculturalism and stigmatization of Muslims. Some prominent discussions on presence of European Muslims in Europe, their integration problems, their way of practicing religion, their culture and religion reflect this form racialization in detail. The issues highlighted in these discussions explain more how the specters of colonialism are haunting European political context and racializes Muslims with the civilizing mission of Europe.

As a result, hauntological framework brings out problematic elements in European sociological texts, and helps us to understand the necessity of “displacement” between present and absent; “displacement” of the order which implies the opening of every existing order with regard to its responsibility to the Other. In his book, *Specters of Marx: The State of Depth, the Work of Mourning and the New International* (1994), by proposing these terms, Derrida points out what is distinctly characteristic of a mainstream sociological approach is that traditional scholars do not understand and believe the “virtual space of spectrality”; they believe the sharp distinctions between real and unreal, actual and inactual, being

and non-being. Continental understandings and critical inquiry are based on a “to be or not to be” approach, and as such its adherence to “objectivity” is based on the distinction between what is present and not.³⁶⁵

Hauntological approach of this dissertation gives a good maneuverability to suggest that the presence of racism can be thought in the absence of it, in presence of it “where” it is claimed as absent, and in presence of it “when” it is claimed as absent, since past asserts itself with the manifestation of secrets and the appearance of ghosts. In this logic, the past and future as the determinants of the present; not just as a past, like something stuck in the past and future like something not yet, as Jacques Derrida strongly recommends.

As emphasized in the beginning of this chapter, hauntology is unusual in a sociological context, but this section has attempted to show that the idea of hauntology is broadly applicable even outside of its original context. It is meaningful in a sociological work which aims to analyze the existence of inexistent, and presence of absent by going beyond the conventional classifications. It provides an invaluable stance particularly for this dissertation which aims to challenge the image of the post-colonial and post-racist Europe through the examination of the contemporary manifestations of colonialism and racism. It provides such a formula that can be suggested that in present situation, colonial mentality still functions, but it exists under disguise within the boundaries of Europe. It circulates incognito and passes through the borders of post-colonial and anti-racist Europe by censoring itself. In this sense, classifying something clearly as colonialism or racism misleads us because what is visible is only the shadow cast of their contemporary manifestations. Precisely for this reason, this dissertation proposes to use the indefinite notions of hauntology, ghosts and specters.

³⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p.11

After having established some of the key parameters of an analysis of European colonialism and racism in this chapter, the next chapter shows how specters of colonialism racializes Muslims in Europe by focusing on four particular trouble cases about Muslims in Europe. The political discourse shaped through these cases show how the specters of colonialism are haunting European political context by racializing Muslims and apophasis at work in the racialization of Muslims and Islam in Europe. That is, they provide considerable empirical evidences to support the main argument of this dissertation. They provide examples for the popular and mainstream declarations and interpretations as the reflection of something intrinsic to the political discourse that cannot be seen at the first hand.

CHAPTER IV

COLONIAL HAUNTOLOGY AND FOUR CASES ON RACIALIZATION OF MUSLIMS AND ISLAM IN EUROPE

As has been mentioned before, this dissertation does not limit racism to the blunt and obvious reactions of specific groups to political and economic change, or to obvious prejudice or humiliation. Racism includes, but is not limited to these; rather, it is, as Goldberg stated, “embedded in a politico-discursive realm, which is so profoundly obscurantist, that racism has been made unrecognizable as ‘racism’”.³⁶⁶ This notion of embeddedness can be understood in the context of the following statement of Talal Asad:

racial ideologies have long been central to European social and cultural identities... inextricable from the internally differentiated, often directly competing, modernizing and/or civilizing mission that European countries... have taken it upon themselves to impart to the world.³⁶⁷

Inspired by these statements, this dissertation attempts to bring a broader perspective to the issue of racism. From the framework of hauntology, it views racism as a way through which the specter of colonialism haunts the European political context. This form of racism is an iterated form of racism, which racializes religions, cultures, and the people assumed to belong to these religions and cultures. That is to say, racism is not repeated in precisely the same form as it has been in the past, but is able to change its expression depending on the situation. Contexts may be repeated in new situations, and yet have a minimal remainder that

³⁶⁶ David Theo Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’.

³⁶⁷ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, pp. 2

does not have a full explicit presence. Wandering in a spectral form, this form of racialization is informed by Eurocentricism and Europism, and can be made touchable only by focusing on the texts manifested in each iteration. That is, the specters of colonialism can be grasped by analyzing the texts.

For textual analysis, this chapter examines trouble cases from four different European countries, with the conceptual tools prepared in the previous chapters. It focuses specifically on the debates that have risen up around the headscarf ban in France, the construction of minarets in Switzerland in 2009, the production of the film *Submission* in the Netherlands in 2004, and the publication of cartoons of Mohammed in Denmark in 2006. The main assertion here is that these cases are prominent examples of an iteration of a persistent colonial racism, which racializes Muslims by emphasizing their culture and religion instead of biological race. They reflect the (in)visible embodiment of a colonial mentality which haunts Europe. That is, they reflect the contemporary materialization of Eurocentricism and Europism, attitudes which are characterized by a civilizing mission and an anxiety about Muslims and Islam within the borders of Europe. Therefore, the specters of colonialism can be made graspable by a deconstructive reading of these cases. Namely, the specters can be made graspable by challenging the established interpretations of these cases, and reinterpreting them by pointing out the implicit hierarchies and hidden meanings embedded in them. In order to do this, this chapter describes these cases, identifies their prominent themes, and analyzes the discursive universe created by the surrounding debates attached to them.

The prominent themes of these cases are secularism, freedom of speech, the “threat of Islam”, “Islamization of Europe”, and incompatibility of Islamic and European cultures and values. A discussion of the themes is a necessary preliminary to catching the specters of colonialism, and to understanding the racialization of Muslims in the context of Eurocentricism and Europism. With reference to these prominent themes, this chapter addresses the implicit racialization of Muslims and Islam, by deconstructing the present cases under the two headings of “hiding” and

“showing”. First, under the heading of hiding, it considers the two cases from France and Switzerland; where the visibility of Muslims and Islam in public was banned for the sake of protecting secularism, and for directing the integration of Muslims into European culture and values. Second, under the heading of showing, it considers the two cases from the Netherlands and Denmark; where Muslims and Islam are shown in a humiliating manner which is legitimated in the name of freedom of speech.

Finally, despite the specters of colonialism haunting each country in superficially different ways, these cases provide support for the proposition that the four countries all ask the same question, that is: whether there is space for Muslims and Islam within the borders of Europe? Furthermore, the rhetorical structures of the framing devices that both surround these cases and direct media and governmental policy making are similar. The four cases are thus related. Therefore, rather than addressing a country’s specific expression of colonialism, this chapter draws attention to the interrelated mechanisms of “showing” and “hiding” which are at work in the racialization of Muslims and Islam in Europe, circulating around the unifying question of the space they inhabit within the borders of Europe.

The first section analyzes the rhetorical structure of 'showing' by focusing on the broadcasting of the film *Submission* in the Netherlands, and on the publication of the Mohammad Cartoons in Denmark. The second section analyzes the rhetorical structure of 'hiding' by focusing on the banning of wearing headscarves at public schools in France, and the banning of the construction of minarets for mosques in Switzerland.

4.1. Showing the 'Represented' Reality of Muslims and Islam in Europe

This section attempts to show that media interventions about Muslims and Islam, and debates about these interventions, are one of the central components of the racialization of Islam and Muslims. This racialization is manifested in the form of

claims about certain aspects of their religion and culture, securing them as incompatible with the value of freedom of speech. While the media's statements about Muslims are not always hostile and aggressive, they still employ different rhetorical strategies, either intentionally or not, which create a set of images that racializes Muslims. This section analyzes two cases where specific events triggered media intervention about Muslims and Islam; namely, the film *Submission* shown on a public channel in the Netherlands in 2004, and the Mohammed Cartoons published in a weekly magazine in Denmark in 2006. These cases are particularly pertinent to contemporary forms of racism because, following Leeuw and Wiechelen, this section considers media as directly “representing and shaping cultural values of society”. Moreover, it perceives media channels “not so much as definers of 'reality', but as dynamic sites of struggle over representation, and complex spaces in which subjectivities are constructed and identities are contested”.³⁶⁸

The aim of this section is twofold then. First, by focusing on the visual representations of Muslims and Islam, it questions how they are represented by the European media, and what we can understand from these representations. By analyzing the visual strategies available in these cases, it aims to address “the constitutive role of *pictorial* representation in naturalizing self-evident truths about Islam and its alleged obscurantism and fanaticism, intolerance and violence”.³⁶⁹ Second, this section aims to analyze the impact of these representations, by focusing on the discursive universe extending from and surrounding the debates. The images in both the film and cartoons were criticized and protested by Muslims, not only in the Netherlands and Denmark, but also around the world. This triggered

³⁶⁸ Spitulnik, 1993: 296, cited in Marc de Leeuw and Sonja van Wichelen 'Please, Go Wake Up' Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the “War on Terror” in the Netherlands”, *Feminist Media Studies*, Vol.5, No:3, 2005, pp.329.

³⁶⁹ Katarzyna Murawska-Muthesius, “The *Jyllands-Posten* Muhammed Cartoons Controversy: Racism and Cartoon Work in the Age of the World Wide Web” in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, 148-161.

debates on the subjects of freedom of expression, tolerance and multiculturalism – which are counted as national characteristics of these specific countries – and the framing of Muslims' opposition to and disrespect of them.

4.1.1. The Film *Submission* and Assassination of Theo Van Gogh in Netherlands

This section initially gives brief information about the film *Submission*, and the assassination of Theo Van Gogh who is the director of the film; and then proceeds with a critical analysis of the representation of Muslims and Islam, and the discursive universe that represents Muslims and Islam in the aftermath of the assassination of the director.

To begin, it is crucial to emphasize the Philomena Essed's account, which reflects the Netherlands as an interesting case. She states that

In the Netherlands, tolerance counts as a national characteristic, a sign of civilization, of enlightenment, generated by those seen as 'genuinely' Dutch. In this view, immigrants, in particular Muslims are considered intolerant about religion, women's emancipation and homosexuality. Thus, the Netherlands and 'genuinely Dutch' claim cultural superiority and the moral obligation to serve as normative models, symbolically speaking not much different from the historical 'white man's burden.'³⁷⁰

On the other hand, as she informs, the degree of *muslimophobia* is higher in the Netherlands than in other European countries.³⁷¹ Essed establishes this by giving some statistical evidence. According to the European Monitoring Center, the obsession with Islamic immigrants in the Netherlands was 72 per cent in 2004, and even though one year later it dropped to 51 per cent, that was still the highest rate

³⁷⁰ Philomena Essed, "Intolerable Humiliations", pp. 133.

³⁷¹ *ibid.*, pp. 133.

in a European state at that time. Of further interest is the number of anti-Islamic attacks in the Netherlands right after the various terrorist attacks in 2001.³⁷² On these points, Essed draws attention to the Netherlands as presenting a unique case, because it was the only country where responses against the absolute freedom of speech were extremely violent. In fact, two assassinations happened in two years. It is an important trouble case because while it has advanced in civil rights and other freedoms over the last century; racial, ethnic, gender and other forms of discrimination are still statistically prevalent in the Netherlands. In the same manner, she draws attention to the ambiguous relations existing between tolerance and racism. By denying the presence of racism within its borders, and limiting the troubling expression racism to occurring in isolated explicit and obvious events, “tolerance comes to include the tolerance of racism”.³⁷³ In summary, the general depiction that the principle of tolerance holds as a national characteristic of the Netherlands has a problematic character with regards to the actual occurrence of racist acts and attitudes in the country.

Moreover, multiculturalism has been another defining characteristic of the Netherlands, but lately it has become an increasingly debated issue (Vink, 2007; Joppke, 2004; Doornik, 2005). As Maarten P. Vink states, the general position is that multiculturalism and tolerance have become a matter open for debate in and after 2001. Christian Joppke has likewise defined these changes after 2001 with the term “seismic shift”. By pointing out the impact of 2001, he considers that the willingness to tolerate diverse cultural practices has been declining, and repressive regulations about integration have been rising as a result in the Netherlands.³⁷⁴ Joppke notes that

³⁷² Boog, 2006, pp. 36-7, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 133.

³⁷³ *ibid.*

³⁷⁴ Maarten P. Vink, “Dutch 'Multiculturalism' Beyond the Pillarization Myth”, *Political Studies Review*, Vol.5, 2007, pp. 338.

The supposedly difference friendly, multicultural Netherlands is currently urging migrants to accept 'Dutch norms and values' in the context of a policy of civic integration that is only an inch (but still an inch!) away from the cultural assimilation that had once been attributed.³⁷⁵

Vink emphasizes that there are some key figures and declarations that supports these assumptions. For instance the politician Pin Fortuyn is one of the main proponents in these debates. He has openly declared the “Islamification of Dutch identity” and has warned that the Netherlands is under the threat of Islam and Muslims. Another example is Ayan Hirsi Ali, who is Somali-born immigrant and former MP in the Netherlands. She has successfully campaigned for a parliamentary seat in 2003 upon the illiberal aspects of Islam. Rita Verdonk is another figure who was the former immigration minister. During her tenure, she advocated a tough stance on immigration and integration.³⁷⁶

However, Vink draws attention to the fact that although these figures have been at the center of discussions about Dutch integration policies over past five years, the crucial criticism of Dutch multiculturalism actually became an issue long before 2001. The leader of the Dutch liberal party VVD, Fritz Bolkestein, publicly questioned the compatibility between Islamic and Western values as early as 1991. Moreover, the Scientific Council for Government Policy declared that Dutch integration policy had not been able to prevent the marginalization of immigrants.³⁷⁷ Thus, the critical discourse about Dutch multiculturalism and tolerance, and the threat of Islam, had begun to take shape long before 2001; but it was radicalized and made prominent after that date. Still, it is important to note that there was already a challenge to multicultural policies and tolerance to difference before the “seismic shift” after 2001. This shows that, “multiculturalism was never

³⁷⁵ Christian Joppke, 2007: 2, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 343.

³⁷⁶ *ibid.*, 338

³⁷⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 339.

accepted or practiced as fully as suggested in more stereotypical depictions of Dutch integration politics”.³⁷⁸ This can be seen through the use of the Dutch term *allochton*; which is used to define ethnic groups in the Netherlands. It refers to then explicitly being framed as outside and non-native. What we learn from both Essed's and Vink's accounts is that there is a “stereotypical depiction” of Dutch tolerance and multiculturalism, which assumes that it only began to be discussed critically with the impact of 2001. However, in practice they have always already had a debatable character; and they have not been truly practiced as fully as suggested in the stereotypical depiction before 2001.

Another interesting thing about the Netherlands is that while only 60 per cent of the first-, second- or third-generation immigrants are Muslims, immigrants have been wholly defined as Muslims in various accounts. Rudolph Peters defines this situation as the phenomenon of the “Islamization of migrants”, which reflects that in the Netherlands “speaking about Islam became in many ways speaking about migration”.³⁷⁹

In this context, Theo Van Gogh produced the film *Submission* in August 2004. Theo van Gogh was a native of the Netherlands, and was a film and television actor, as well as a film-maker and columnist for a free newspaper. He wrote a book in 2003 called *Allah Weet Beter* (Allah Knows Better) that was mockingly critical of Islam. Also he was a member of the Dutch Republican Society with Pim Fortyn. The script for the film *Submission* was written by Ayan Hirsi Ali; who came from Somalia and has had a Dutch citizenship since 1997. She was a member of the Dutch parliamentary on a list for the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People's Party for Liberty and Democracy, VVD). She defines herself as ‘ex-Muslim’, and actively blames Islam as the source of backward cultural practices. In

³⁷⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 339.

³⁷⁹ Rudolph Peters, “‘Dangerous Book’, Dutch Public Intellectuals and the Koran”, EUI Working Paper RSCAS, No.2006/39.

an article in the *Economist* (2004), titled 'Another Political Murder', Hirsi was presented as a good example of integration with the statement: "Although they (the immigrants) are worse off than the ethnic Dutch, there is no immigrant underclass, and no real ghettos exist. Some immigrants are, like Hirsi Ali, already joining the Dutch middle class, both in incomes and in lifestyle".³⁸⁰ Theo Goldberg defined her as a "Somali refugee and vocally lapsed Muslim, darling of Dutch conservatives and currently a member of the Dutch Parliament".³⁸¹

The film *Submission* set in a fictive country called 'Islamistan' depicted four short scenes, which show four topless women with transparent dresses. These women's bodies are inscribed with Arabic letters. The film is mainly about a condemnation towards Islam, because of its association with the oppression of Muslim women. It shows a woman who is forced into an arranged marriage with a man who physically abuses her. She is raped by her uncle and punished for falling in love with another man. She declares that the Koran justifies violence against women. This film attempts to show that Muslim women are silenced and oppressed by Islamic rules: 'the body and the text are conjoined in communicating a message'.³⁸² The women shown in the film are speaking with God and expressing their sadness because of the oppressive rules of Islam. Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh declared that in this film, they show woman's body in this way because they aim to show "women that are made of flesh and blood and not things that can be thrown away".³⁸³ The makers of the film state that Islam and the oppression of women are identical, and they show Koranic Verses as a proof. They suggest that there is a

³⁸⁰ *Economist*, 11.06.2004, cited in Ron Eyerman, *The Assassination of Theo van Gogh: From Social Drama to Cultural Trauma*, Duke University Press: Duke, 2008, pp.8.

³⁸¹ David Theo Goldberg, "Racial Europeanization", pp. 334.

³⁸² Ron Eyerman, *The Assassination of Theo van Gogh: From Social Drama to Cultural Trauma*, p.9.

³⁸³ In video recordings *Reporter*, December 8, 2004 and *Zomergasten* 2004, cited in Leeuw & Wichelen, "Please, Go Wake Up' Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the 'War on Terror' in the Netherlands".

direct relationship between the wording of these texts and the oppression of women.³⁸⁴

The film was shown on Dutch public television, and caused a big critical reaction in both the Netherlands and other countries within and outside of Europe. In November 2004, after this film was shown, the director of the film, Theo van Gogh “was shot and stabbed to death by a bearded man of dual Dutch and Moroccan citizenship, who pinned a note to the death body. The note articulates an account of the barriers facing Arab immigrants in the Netherlands, and ends with a chilling warning that Hirsi Ali too is a marked woman”.³⁸⁵ The note pinned to Van Gogh's body was considered to be composed as an indictment of Western society.³⁸⁶

This event triggered reactions against and debates upon Muslim immigrants and Islam in the Netherlands in particular, and in Europe in general. Some Muslim schools and mosques were vandalized,³⁸⁷ since this murder was framed in the media by emphasizing the Islamic religion and the ‘original’ nation of the murderer. Mohammed Bouyeri, the murderer, had both Dutch and Moroccan citizenship. However, after this event, he was primarily referred to as a Muslim Moroccan. Bouyeri went on to be convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under the new anti-terrorism law.³⁸⁸

This event happened in a country that was perceived to be one of the most liberal and tolerant countries in the world. There is even a specific term referring to this assumption: 'Dutch tolerance'. As has been mentioned before, this event triggered numerous debates on Muslims, their religion, and their culture; and promoted these

³⁸⁴ Cited in Rudolph Peters, “‘Dangerous Book’, Dutch Public Intellectuals and the Koran”.

³⁸⁵ Theo Goldberg, “Racial Europeanization”, pp. 336.

³⁸⁶ Ron Eyerman, *The Assassination of Theo van Gogh: From Social Drama to Cultural Trauma*, pp.1.

³⁸⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸⁸ *ibid.*

qualities as being closed to tolerance and absolutely opposed to one of the most prominent liberal universal values: the freedom of speech and expression. After this event, the existence of Islam and Muslims in Europe began to be debated more openly, because this event was taken as a proof of Islam's and Muslims' inherent intolerance and violence.³⁸⁹

The media coverage of the event has also been extensive. It was framed as part of clash of civilizations by many commentators. Additionally, Ayan Hirsi Ali became a very famous figure around the world, especially in the US, because of this Ali has become an international celebrity.³⁹⁰

Still, this kind of discursive universe began to take shape long before the murder in 2002; when the declarations of Pim Fortuyn were made, describing Islam as a “retarded culture” that “threatens Dutch values”. In this declaration, he explicitly called for a “new Cold War” against Islam. Fortuyn played a central role in the campaign leading up to the May 2002 parliamentary elections, in which questions of immigration and security were the prominent issues.³⁹¹ Pim Fortuyn was subsequently assassinated in 2002. Immediately following this tragic event, it was widely assumed that the assassin was an Islamic militant; but then it turned out that the assassin was Volkert van der Graaf, who was a white Dutch animal rights activist. Following this, he immediately began to be defined as an activist in the media; and his religious identity was not emphasized. Based on this turn of events, Philomena Essed highlighted that “Fortuyn will most likely enter the Dutch history books for provoking, if not insulting, 'hypocrites of the establishment'....³⁹²

³⁸⁹ Peter Van der Veer, cited in Bengi Bezirgan, *Europe and Muslim Immigrants at the Intersection of Secularism, Religion and Religion*, Thesis (M.S.), Ankara: METU, 2010.

³⁹⁰ Ron Eyerman, *The Assassination of Theo van Gogh: From Social Drama to Cultural Trauma*, pp.2.

³⁹¹ Liz Fekete, “The Dutch General Election and the Assassination of Pim Fortuyn,” *Independent Race and Refugee News Network*, August 1, 2002, at <http://www.irr.org.uk>.

³⁹² Philomena Essed, “Intolerable Humiliations”, pp. 133.

Conversely, Bouyari, the murderer of Theo van Gogh, was depicted with marked emphasis on his religious identity and his social, political, and cultural backgrounds. Bruma (2005) clearly defined him as a 'typical for a second generation Moroccan immigrant'³⁹³, which literally means having a father who was an unskilled laborer, and a mother who, speaking broken Dutch, came to be with the father in the Netherlands through an arranged marriage.³⁹⁴

In summary, unlike the assassination of Fortuyn, the murder of Theo van Gogh has triggered a lasting debate on Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands in particular, and in Europe in general. This is the case because, unlike the murderer of Fortuyn, the murderer of Van Gogh was a Muslim Moroccan Dutch citizen in the Netherlands. Fortuyn's murder was a matter then framed as an act of isolated criminal violence, whereas the abstract concept of 'tolerance' as a principal aspect that the Netherlands applies to its identity construction, is somehow foregrounded in the case of Van Gogh's murder.

Another crucial point which helps one to understand the atmosphere in the Netherlands is that of the populist politician Geert Wilders, a former member of the Liberal Party, who grew rapidly in popularity in the weeks following the murder of van Gogh. As Fortuyn previously did, Wilders has declared that Islam is "retarded" and "incompatible with democracy." He has also warned against allowing Islam to become dominant in the Netherlands, and has advocated tough measures against extremist groups and leaders who act in the name of Islam.³⁹⁵

³⁹³ Cited in Ron Eyerman, *The Assassination of Theo van Gogh: From Social Drama to Cultural Trauma*, pp.7.

³⁹⁴ Ron Eyerman, *The Assassination of Theo van Gogh: From Social Drama to Cultural*, pp.7.

³⁹⁵ Mark Baker, "Dutch Immigration Policies: Holland's New Fortuyn?," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 29, 2004; Garteh Harding, "Interview with Geert Wilders", United Press International, December 2, 2004; Anthony Browne, "Death Threats Force Controversial Dutch MP Underground," *The Times*, November 20, 2004, available at: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk>, cited in Helsinki Report, pp. 110.

All in all, the more prominently ideal tolerant and multicultural system of Netherlands has been opened to discussion about the reality of its tolerant and multicultural attitude. Because it is assumed that this system has granted an immense amount freedom to Muslims to practice their religion, which is seen to be incompatible with the cultural norms of the motherland of tolerance and freedom of speech. In this way, the supposed failure of multiculturalism began to be discussed by stressing the threat of Muslim extremism and inherent intolerance of Islam. In these discussions, the incompatibility between Islamic values carried by Muslim immigrants and competing Dutch values were emphasized. Therefore, Muslims and Islamic values, and Dutch values had suddenly been outstandingly separated in these debates, declaring an inescapable clash between these values. When focused upon the debates, which polarizes Dutch society and Muslim immigrants, we can see that the nature of Islam becomes the focal point of this debate, allowing it start a new discussion on the viable position of Muslim immigrants in a liberal and tolerant society. Islam began to be perceived and coded as a threat to the unity of not only Dutch values, but also universal values. As such, this newly opened discursive universe was shaped through stereotypes about the violent and unreformed character of both Muslims and Islam. As a result, the mentality through which the film *Submission* was created is at the ground of shaping the debates that have occurred after showing this film.

4.1.2. The Mohammad Cartoon Controversy in Denmark

The second case is from Denmark and called the ‘Mohammed Cartoon Controversy’. An extensive debate on cartoons and their publication has taken shape after the publication of the Islamic Prophet Mohammad’s Caricatures by a newspaper in Denmark.³⁹⁶ It was such an extensive debate that, as Deniz Göktürk,

³⁹⁶ The cartoons can be found online in the Mohammad Image Archive:
"http://www.zombietime.com/mohammed_image_archive/"

informs us, a special issue of the academic journal *International Migration* was devoted to the cartoon affair.³⁹⁷ In this case, the Islamic Holy Prophet was depicted in twelve satirical cartoons published in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, in 2005:

one drawings simply depicts Mohammad in the desert; two combine Mohammad with Islamic symbols like the crescent and the star; one is of a boy named Mohammad writing 'the editors of *Jyllands-Posten* are a bunch of reactionary provocateurs' on a blackboard in Arabic letters; and two satirize a Danish author, whose claim not to be able to find an illustrator for a children's book about Mohammad started the whole affair. Others somehow associate the Prophet, Islam or Muslims with terrorism, however; one shows Mohammad with a turban in the shape of an ignited bomb with verses from the Qur'an inscribed on it; another portrays the Prophet in Paradise, saying 'Stop, Stop. We ran out of virgins' to a long line of suicide bombers; two refer to the fear of cartoonists that pictures of Mohammad will trigger revenge from Muslims; and two links the Prophet with suppression of women.³⁹⁸

One of the most famous cartoons depicted the prophet with a black bomb with a burning fuse and with an inscription in Arabic on the front of it, declaring 'Peace'. This was totally different than the idealized representations of him appearing in Persian miniatures.³⁹⁹ These cartoons were published under the title 'Faces of Mohammed'. Soon after publication, these pictures became part of various events at both the national and international level. The situation created due to the cartoons was described as “the most serious crises in Danish foreign policy since the Second World War”.⁴⁰⁰ Insomuch that, the controversy over cartoons was defined by *The*

³⁹⁷ Deniz Gokturk, ‘Jokes and Butts: Can We Imagine Humor in a Global Public Sphere?’, *PMLA*, Vol.123, no.5 (October 2008), pp. 1707.

³⁹⁸ Sune Lægaard, 207: 481, cited in Bengi Bezirgan, *Europe and Muslim Immigrants at the Intersection of Secularism, Religion and Religion*, pp.86.

³⁹⁹ Peter Hervik, ‘The Danish Cultural World of Unbridgeable Differences’, *Ethnos*, 69(2), 2004, pp. 247-267.

⁴⁰⁰ Hervik, 2006: 225, cited in Murawska-Muthesius, Katarzyna, “The *Jyllands-Posten* Muhammed Cartoons Controversy: Racism and Cartoon Work in the Age of the World Wide Web”.

New York Times as the second major divisive political event since the September 11, 2001 attacks, which brought Muslims as a political actors to the scene of international politics.⁴⁰¹ The conflict was also called by different names like the 'Danish cartoon war', 'Mohammad cartoon controversy', the 'cartoon jihad' or the 'cartoon war'.⁴⁰²

The “cartoon controversy” has been shaped around three main issues. First, is that the images in the cartoons reinforce stereotypes about Islamic religious beliefs being inherently violent and signify Muslims as terrorists. This first issue has been critically addressed by some Danish intellectuals, Muslims from around the world, and Islamic Organizations from Denmark along with some other European countries. Critical opinions have been published in newspapers in Norway, Italy, Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands.⁴⁰³ Furthermore, this critical point of view was shared by the UN. As they suggested:

On 24 November 2005, the UN Special Reporter on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance asked the Danish government to answer some questions in regard to the cartoons. Despite the substantial reply dated 23 January 2006, in a report of 13 February⁴⁰⁴ the Special Reporter found the cartoon issue one of the most severe examples of hatred for Islam, adding that the Danish Government in its initial handling of the matter revealed ‘the trivialization of Islamophobia at the political level’.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰¹ Müller and Ozcan, 2007: 287, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 148

⁴⁰² Nederveen Pieterse, 2006, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 148.

⁴⁰³ Muller and Ozcan, 2007: 287, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 149.

⁴⁰⁴ Report E/CN.4/2006/17, available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?m=92

⁴⁰⁵ Cited in Tim Jersen. General Secretary of IAHR-The International Association for The History of Religions- and Head of the department of The Study of Religions, University of Southern Denmark.

In the context of this stereotyping, some journalists began to emphasize the activities of some of Denmark's most radical imams. In 2004, one of the TV channels in Denmark showed an imam's speech; which mentions how 'Danish women who do not wear the veil 'were asking for rape'; other clerics recommended that Denmark adopt the tribal concept of blood money'.⁴⁰⁶ Also, as Ammitzboll, who is a journalist with *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten* and Vidino, an analyst for the Investigative Project on Terrorism and author of *Al-Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad*, began to report crimes committed by immigrants. Politicians also over-stated issues of immigrants committing benefit abuse and criminal activities during the cartoon controversy.⁴⁰⁷ During the period, *Jyllands-Posten* focused on very particular figures from Muslim immigrants; Raed Hlayhel being one of them. *Jyllands-Posten* emphasized his strict and politicized interpretation of Islam.⁴⁰⁸ Moreover, during that time, again, an imam whose past was associated with terrorism due to his membership in the Muslim Brotherhood and his close relationship with the their leader in Egypt, became very famous in Denmark.⁴⁰⁹ More notably, Ammitzboll states, "while Danes sympathize with moderate Muslims, the government must still address the radicalism of a segment of the community".⁴¹⁰ Strikingly, his newspaper still won an award from the EU in 2005, because it was focusing on the positive cases of Muslim immigration.

This second issue was shaped in the context of 'freedom of speech'. Namely, criticism against the cartoons, The Danish tradition of tolerance and openness had

⁴⁰⁶ *The Copenhagen Post*, September 24, 2004; *Berlingske Tidende* (Copenhagen), June 3, 2005, cited in Pernille Ammitzboll and Lorenzo Vidino, 'After the Danish Cartoon Controversy', *Middle East Quarterly*, (Winter 2007), pp. 3-11.

⁴⁰⁷ Cited in *ibid.*

⁴⁰⁸ *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten*, May 21, 2006, cited in *ibid.*

⁴⁰⁹ *ibid.*

⁴¹⁰ *ibid.*

been opened to debate. During the debates, *Jyllands-Posten* put the principle of freedom of expression at the top of the agenda, and the reactions against the cartoons have been perceived as open challenges to the three of the main principles of the Danish culture: freedom of speech, tolerance and openness. Saving the Jews during the World War II, and the social acceptability of living as a man and a woman as an unmarried couple since 1960s, along with the legality of same sex marriage since 1970s; were emphasized as the most immediate proofs of these principles.⁴¹¹ Also, the twelve cartoonists criticized Muslim demands for respect of their religious sensitivities, by emphasizing that this demand is “incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of speech, where you must be ready to put up with insult, mockery and ridicule”.⁴¹² This emphasis was also not limited to criticism within Denmark; for example, a newspaper from France, *France Soir*, republished the cartoons, and explained the reason behind the republication with this statement: “no religious dogma can impose itself on a democratic and secular society.... Yes, we have the right to caricature God”. Then put a cartoon of Buddhist, Jewish, Muslim and Christian gods. In the caricature, the Christian god talks to Mohammad and says “Don't complain, Mohammad, we've all been caricatured here”.⁴¹³

On the other hand, when the cartoon was defended as a sign of freedom of speech, the South African Government did not show the cartoons in terms of the South African Bill of Rights; which includes the right to be respected as a human being as

⁴¹¹ Jorgen Baek Simonsen, ‘Globalization in Reverse and the Challenge of Integration: Muslims in Denmark’, in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (ed.), *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 13.

⁴¹² Rose, 2005, cited in Katarzyana Murawska-Muthesius, “The *Jyllands-Posten* Muhammed Cartoons Controversy: Racism and Cartoon Work in the Age of the World Wide Web”, pp. 148.

⁴¹³ *BBC News*, February 1, 2006, cited in Bengi Bezirgan, *Europe and Muslim Immigrants at the Intersection of Secularism, Religion and Religion*, pp.87.

overruling the right to freedom of expression. In the context of this hierarchy of rights, they made it illegal to show the cartoons.⁴¹⁴

The third issue was shaped in the context of “clash of civilization” thesis. The cartoons were perceived as deeply offensive and criticized by the local Danish Muslim community. Muslim criticism and expectations of respect for their religious sensitivities were perceived as incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of speech. The editor of Jylland-Posten, Flemming Rose emphasized this incompatibility with this statement:

The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand a special position, insisting on special consideration of their own religious feelings. It is incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of speech, where you must be ready to put up with insult, mockery and ridicule.⁴¹⁵

The criticism and protests of Muslims against the manifestation of freedom of speech through their holy prophet's cartoons were perceived in these cases as a clash of Islamic and European civilization. From this holistic perspective, the events that happened after the publication of the cartoons were connected to discussions that had pre-existed before the cartoons. In the context of the first two frameworks, some instances of the political and academic debates have tended to frame this affair as a clash between liberal democratic and illiberal religious values.⁴¹⁶ With reference to reactions and protests of Muslims from around the world, this event was called the “cartoon war”, and some books were written solely about this war. Also, global news media broadcasted angry mobs burning Danish flags and performing attacks on Danish embassies in Damascus, Beirut, Teheran,

⁴¹⁴ Achille Mbembe, cited in Philomena Essed, “Intolerable Humiliations”, pp. 132

⁴¹⁵ Jeppe Fogtmann, 2009, cited in Bengi Bezirgan, *Europe and Muslim Immigrants at the Intersection of Secularism, Religion and Religion*, pp. 96.

⁴¹⁶ Tariq Madood and Geoffrey Brahm Levy, “The Muhammad Cartoons and Multicultural Democracies”, *Ethnicities*, Vol.9, No.3, (September 2009), pp.428.

Jakarta, and Kabul. Saudi Arabia boycotted the Danish products. This affair and its various representations pushed religious fundamentalists and thousands of ordinary Muslims out onto the streets all over the world. Europe was declared an enemy Islam in many of these protests. Moreover, users of Wikipedia spent a lot of effort to constantly update and revise the digital entry about the cartoon issue. At some point, Wikipedia and some other online platforms also became a battleground for this issue.⁴¹⁷ More serious demonstrations happened, requesting an official apology, and punishment of the cartoonists and newspaper to be carried out. In Gaza, an armed gunman attacked the EU office; who demanded an official apology for the cartoons from the EU. Also, Hamas's Leader declared that Denmark should punish the cartoonists and the newspaper. In London, demonstrators had placards which said "Free speech go to hell", "Europe is the cancer and Islam is the cure", "Europe will pay, your 9/11 is on its way". By the end of the events worldwide almost 139 people were killed.⁴¹⁸

As a result, these representations and the debates on them have reinforced the idea that Muslims and Islam are essentially opposite to European culture and values. This has further reinforced popular and ongoing sentiment about the clash of civilization thesis. However, these representations have violated the existence of Muslims and Islam in Europe who are not antagonistic to its culture and values. This violation, ironically, is manifested upon the principles of freedom of speech and tolerance; which are manipulated through a colonial and racist mentality that bases Europe on an *a priori* superior position. They are thus promoting a racializing political agenda in both Denmark and the Netherlands. In this manner, they are abstracted values rather than "idealized" forms of them.

⁴¹⁷ Katarzyana Murawska-Muthesius, "The *Jyllands-Posten* Muhammed Cartoons Controversy: Racism and Cartoon Work in the Age of the World Wide Web", pp. 157.

⁴¹⁸ Randal Hansen, 2006: 10, cited in Bengi Bezirgan, Europe and Muslim Immigrants at the Intersection of Secularism, Religion and Religion, p.89.

In summary, in Denmark, the images of Islam and the Muslim in the drawings were depicted as primitive and aggressive; with bombs and swords. After Muslims were depicted in this way, Muslims' reactions against this depiction have been further confirmed as 'intolerant' and 'aggressive', not only in Denmark, but also in other European countries. Subsequently, with the republication of the same cartoons by other newspapers and magazines throughout Europe, in the name of freedom of expression, the intolerant image of Muslims was reinforced. More importantly, as may be seen from these explanations, this discussion completely excludes the possibility of Muslims being present at all. The act and process of representing Islam and Muslims *via* the Mohammed cartoons or through the film directed by Theo Van Gogh is actually forbidden to Muslims; from both their religious practice and the frame that the film and cartoons draw around them. They therefor cannot present themselves even in the discussion that follows from these representations. The only available political interaction left for Muslims is in a place of response. Because Muslims have no way of presenting themselves within these representative frames; they are forced to apologize for the reactions without having any hand in their creation. In order for European Muslims to become politically present, they must first succumb (either through defense, rejection, or apology) to the representation of being inherently archaic and violent. The voice and the concerns of Muslims go unheeded; they have no political significance or stature apart from the process of representation they are caught within. Namely, we can conclude that such rhetorical gesture portrays Muslims and Islam as speechless objects of Western representation; they are excluded from culture, language, and history.

This is of course politically unacceptable and highly ironic, because the very thing that guarantees the possibility for the activity of representation, primarily "freedom of speech," contains and controls the direction of the political discourse. Freedom of speech, perceived as a universal condition for political discourse, was hijacked through a process of *showing*; which is at work in these representations. Thus, the European exercise of *freedom of speech* in these cases, works in a way that dictates

the *course* of speech, which European Muslims must follow; which is a course that Muslims cannot follow first because of their experience of Islam, and second because they are relegated to apologizing for a caricature that fails to adequately represent them. Therefore, some Europeans who are perceived as “Muslims” instead of Europeans are denied access to the universal condition of freedom of speech in these cases. As a result, the universal principle of freedom of speech is monopolized/colonized, and ironically restricted from allowing a universal application.

As Murawska-Muthesius explain, caricatures and cartoons operate by distortion and substitution, and contain a special category of persuasive visual representations. They appeal to their viewers by proclaiming subjective views of reality “as an ultimate guarantee of reaching the ‘hidden truth’”. The ‘right to offend’ is the defining feature of the cartoons, and the offense can be either emancipatory or discriminating. Cartoons are useful and deceptive because of their “liminal position between rituals and subversion, which allows them to parade as subversive or rebellious even as they cling to, and reinforce, the power/knowledge of status quo”.⁴¹⁹ More importantly, as opposed to general claims that cartoons are not always used as liberating tools, they are effective tools to mock, degrade, exclude and vilify minorities. They reflect the visible articulations of the violent hierarchy between the represented Other and representing self. Namely, degradation of the represented other is unavoidably manifested by the claims of the moral and cultural superiority of the representing self. In this hierarchical representational act, the representing self uses the freedom of speech in order to defend itself; and by doing this, it elevates its “assumed” status to a signifier of freedom and enlightened secularism. On the other hand, the represented other is put in a situation that needs to find a way to get out this chaotic web of representation. Caricatures of Jews, Irish, Blacks, eastern Europeans, Suffragettes or Gays are

⁴¹⁹ Katarzyana Murawska-Muthesius, “The *Jyllands-Posten* Muhammed Cartoons Controversy: Racism and Cartoon Work in the Age of the World Wide Web”, pp. 152.

visceral documents of this violent hierarchy. The articulation of a general visual regime is the significant issue here. Particularly in the case of the Mohammad Cartoons, this regime “sets as a ‘standard’ frame for the representation of a Muslim body, whether that body belongs to a mass murderer or a religious leader or, by implication, as one might expect, to an ordinary citizen wearing a turban”.⁴²⁰

4. 1. 3. Conclusion

As a result, the main assertion of this section is that these cases mainly show how racism is manifested not only through restricting, banning or hiding the visibility of Muslims, but also through showing and representing them from a particular perspective. These are the clear examples of racism that are manifested by the work of inclusive exclusion. While inclusive exclusion is a multi-layered and complex process, Jyllands-Posten's editor, Flemming Rose's following statement directly reflects the subtext of this complex process. He stated as:

We have a tradition of satire [in Denmark] ...The cartoonist treated Islam the same way they treat Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions. And by treating Muslims in Denmark as equals they made a point: We are integrating you into the Danish tradition of satire because you are part of our society, not strangers. The cartoons are including, rather than excluding, Muslims.⁴²¹

This inclusive exclusion system is the result of a “European way of multicultural tolerance”. It means that European multiculturalism is far from the “idealized” and “abstract” form of it. Ghassan Hage's argument on multiculturalism supports this

⁴²⁰ *ibid.*, pp.154, 158.

⁴²¹ Flemming Rose, 2006: 95, cited in Bengi Bezirgan, *Europe and Muslim Immigrants at the Intersection of Secularism, Religion and Religion*, pp.95.

system. He states that contrary to assumptions, multiculturalism is shaped by the fantasy of a White centrality and supremacy.⁴²²

It is already a well-known fact that using images and metaphors enhance the power of the imagination. Also, as Derrida stated, media, academic culture, and political culture cooperates to produce hegemony and imperialism. They are complex, conflictual and overdetermined (Derrida, 52-4). He suggests that the newspapers and media effect do not lie in “the power of direct ideological indoctrination”, but rather in an “ability to frame the discursive context within which political subjectivities are constituted, reinforced and reconstituted.”⁴²³ In this context, by focusing on the visual representations of Muslims and Islam in public media channels, this section shows the manifestation of a colonial mentality and racialization of Muslims, by representing them with the “deceptive instances of stereotyping and of naturalization of 'scopic regimes’”.⁴²⁴ As Paul Gilroy mentions, the “cognition of 'race' has never been an exclusively linguistic process, and has [always] involved ... a distinctive visual and optical imaginary”.⁴²⁵

The main assertion of this section is that humiliation and racial/cultural/religious stigmatization are at work in these representations of Muslims, and in the burgeoned discursive universe created by surrounding debates about them. Humiliation operates in two ways. First, it occurs in the depictions of Muslims within visual images and scripts that are shown in public media channels. Second, it occurs as part of the reaction to Muslims' criticisms and protests of these visual

⁴²² Gassan Hage, *White Nations: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society*, Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press, 1998, p. 17.

⁴²³ Lynn and Lea, 2003: 423.

⁴²⁴ Katarzyna Murawska-Muthesius (2012). “The *Jyllands-Posten* Muhammed Cartoons Controversy: Racism and Cartoon Work in the Age of the World Wide Web”, pp. 151.

⁴²⁵ Gilroy, 2004: 35, cited in Katarzyna Murawska-Muthesius (2012). “The *Jyllands-Posten* Muhammed Cartoons Controversy: Racism and Cartoon Work in the Age of the World Wide Web”, pp. 150.

images. As a response to the criticisms and protests after the publication of these images, it was declared that these images had been produced in the name of freedom of speech. This allowed the criticisms and protests to be perceived as a reflection of a form of intolerance to the universal principle of freedom of speech, and so proved Islam's incompatibility with European values. Paradoxically, Muslims and Islam were once further represented in the debates, exactly as they were in the film and the cartoons.

In *Intolerable Humiliation*, Philomena Essed clearly explains what humiliation means and how it is manifested in various channels. With reference to Fry (2006: 11), she writes that humiliation is more than a feeling or emotion; it determines how conflict is expressed. It is a form of aggression that involves the infliction of harm or pain; which can be verbal, physical or symbolic. Also, with reference to Linder (2001: 51), she says that humiliation is “a central aspect of the interaction between human beings, and their social and natural environment”.⁴²⁶ Essed is mainly interested in humiliation as a punishment or discouragement of resistance to oppression, and she particularly focuses on the Netherlands in which ethnic minorities – lately Muslims – are exposed to public contempt. This concept of humiliation being woven into the fabric of society originated with David Theo Goldberg, who discussed the systemic humiliation of individuals and groups in societies that are structured with unequal racial, gender, culture and class formations.⁴²⁷ Following Essed and Goldberg, the cases in this section are examples of systemic humiliation of Muslims in the name of freedom of speech. It is a reflection of Europe's anxiety about the ones who are humiliated. Particularly, as Essed states, the case from the Netherlands shows that “the norm of tolerance has come to license public humiliation – in particular, the symbolic humiliation of

⁴²⁶ Philomena Essed, “Intolerable Humiliations”.

⁴²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 133.

Muslims and Islam – in the name of freedom of the word”.⁴²⁸ This kind of tolerance is a “humiliating tolerance”. She explains this as:

We (dominate group) tolerate you (racial/ethnic groups) among us but we will let you know that you are not really worthy of being here – your culture does not deserve that much respect. You are not worthy of our tolerance, because you, your religion, your culture are not tolerant either.⁴²⁹

This form of humiliation creates racial stigmatization that unavoidably includes Orientalist connotations. As Marc de Leeuw and Sonja van Wichelen mentioned in their comprehensive analysis of *Submission*:

These narratives define women by their violability where women are always/already subordinated. Simultaneously, the sensual female voice, the explicit use of American English, and her nakedness under transparent veil, evoke an association with quasi soft-porn images. In this respect, *Submission* not only produces the Western ‘Oriental’ image of Muslims and Islam, but also frames this within a Western misogynist image in which women's bodies are depersonalized as objects of desire and lust. As such, one can argue that *Submission* refers both to the depersonalization of Muslim women (as oppressed and helpless object), and to the depersonalization of Western women (as sexual and commodified objects).⁴³⁰

This discourse is used in Western media and Hollywood films; the film *Not Without My Daughter* (1991) is a prominent example. These kinds of films make manifest “the popular 'based-on-a-truth-story' narrative where Western or Muslim women are often depicted as passive and helpless victims of Islamic oppression”.⁴³¹

⁴²⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 135.

⁴²⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 137.

⁴³⁰ Marc de Leeuw and Sonja van Wichelen “ ‘Please, Go Wake Up’ Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the ‘War on Terror’ in the Netherlands”, pp.332.

⁴³¹ *ibid.*

In the same manner, the Mohammad caricatures also draw clearly on orientalist clichés by brutally showing the Muslims' Prophet as violent and a suicidal bomber, with an angry expression supported by dark dense eyebrows and a beard. These images use distortion and substitution to imply the reduction of Islam to terrorism. As with the movie, these images not only perpetuate the Orientalist image of Muslims, but more importantly, depersonalize them. As Murawska-Muthesius clearly and precisely state:

[The cartoons] supplied a visual regime for the dissemination of 'truths' about violence, terrorism, hypocrisy that were associated with Islam but also provided a memorable frame through which millions of viewers might look (down) at any Muslim person with a turban. The cartoon showed, in other words, how, in the 'new racism' era, phenotypical differences have been effectively displaced onto hairstyle and dress, or satirical stage props down from political actuality.... [Thus] the 'Mohammad cartoons controversy' was neither a war nor a 'clash' between secularism and spiritualism, but rather a particularly intense and disastrous episode in the long-running battle for signification itself. Safe and relatively easy to play as long as it was enclosed within the media circuit, it acquired apocalyptic dimensions when it 'tuned real', and when the represented object, which, for centuries, had been locked into derogatory stereotypes, rose bodily against its own imprisoning visual regime.... Muslims entered the battle with their own bodies".⁴³²

Both cases reflect the reproduction of destructive narratives of Muslims in contemporary Europe. The images support a “representation” of Muslims and Islam as characteristically archaic, violent, dangerous and therefore inferior. That is, these representations indicate a symbolic recollection of the image of Muslims and Islam and these images essentialize Muslims' otherness. More importantly, as Murawska-Muthesius mention “these images reproduce established regimes of truth about violence, promiscuity, patriarchalism, evil and backwardness as the defining features of Islam”.⁴³³ Thus, “showing”, as a rhetorical form apophasis,

⁴³² Katarzyna Murawska-Muthesius (2012). “The *Jyllands-Posten* Muhammed Cartoons Controversy: Racism and Cartoon Work in the Age of the World Wide Web”, pp. 157.

⁴³³ *ibid.*, pp. 155.

does not refer to “uncovering” or “unveiling”, but rather to be a constructed representation. Paradoxically, Muslims and Islam are covered up through being shown and locked into pejorative stereotypes, in a manner that has never been shown. This has a profound effect on the political discourse surrounding Muslims. Since the strategy of showing produces a specific representation of Muslims, it denies Muslims' any access to voice their *present* experiences outside the frame of their *shown* image. These experiences are excluded from the represented frames; which inform the political discourse about Islam.

For example, any opportunity to shape the representations in the Mohammed cartoons or the film *Submission* is forbidden to Muslims. Despite being *shown* in their caricatured articulation, they are not actually present within these representations. Furthermore, Muslims could not participate in the discussions that followed from these representations; in fact, the discussions completely exclude the possibility of Islam being present at all. The only political interaction available to them is one of response. They are forced to apologize for the representations without having any hand in their creation. Therefore, in order for European Muslims to be politically present, they must first succumb (either through defense, rejection, or apology) to being represented as archaic and violent.

This is of course highly self-contradictory, because the very “freedom of speech” that guarantees the possibility of representation contains and controls the direction of the political discourse. Freedom of speech, as a universal condition for political discourse, is hijacked by the strategy of showing. Europe's interpretation of *freedom* of speech in these cases *dictates* the course of speech that Muslims must follow; and, because of their experience of Islam, this course of speech cannot be followed. In these cases, Muslims are denied access to the universal condition of freedom of speech. Their freedom of speech is denied in the name of a more general/abstract/absolute freedom of speech. Therefore, the nominally universal right to freedom of speech is monopolized, colonized, and restricted to “European”, and thus is not applied universally. It was appropriated to Europe by Europe, and

hence, it was closed to universal benefit and has lost its universal value. This also certainly seems to correspond with Gayatri Spivak's emphasis on *speaking* and *hearing*. In her view, the subaltern is the one who does not speak; the condition of speaking as a subaltern is impossible.⁴³⁴ More than that, this situation precisely shows that there is no conditions for *hearing* in Europe. This shows that the violent executed by the position of power is hidden by *showing* the radical otherness of Muslims and Islam. That is exactly where ghosts haunt the European political context, stemming from the constitutive force of colonialism.

As a result, these cases reflect the manifestation of implicit forms of racism by showing and excluding 'difference', and then denying their access to universal conditions on the grounds of that difference. This shows that Muslims can be within the borders of Europe while staying 'different'; there is actually no space then for Muslims and Islam in the discursive universe of Europe, even though many Muslims and Islam inhabits Europe. In this way, it appears that some form of earlier pervasive beliefs in Jewish inferiority within European discourse, manages to continue to have repercussions for contemporary European Muslims. In this repercussion, there is no direct exclusion or extermination, but there is an inclusive exclusion; which fits very well with the post-racist, tolerant and multicultural self-image of Europe.

4. 2. Hiding the Present' Condition of Islam and Muslims in Europe

This section analyzes the rhetorical figure of apophasis, a 'hiding', by focusing on the banning of wearing headscarves at public schools in France, and the banning of the construction of minarets for mosques in Switzerland. It would be irresponsible to simply claim that these regulations in France and Switzerland are for integration and therefore, not available for analysis. Rather, the responsible position is to

⁴³⁴ Gayatri C. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.) *Marxism and Interpretation of Culture*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988.

analyze these specific issues, as being systematically linked to a racist agenda present in these countries.

In this context, this section attempts to show that these restrictive regulations about the public visibility of Muslims and Islam are the other central components in the racialization of Islam and Muslims. The main argument here is that ‘hiding’ is at work in repressing the *present* reality of Islam and of Muslim immigrants in Europe. These cases show that the issue of difference has been handled through ‘hiding’ the presence of difference, in the name of protecting the grand themes of republican and universal values. These two cases are qualitatively different from their Danish and the Netherlands counterparts. Instead of manipulating and covering the present reality of Muslims and Islam through representation, *hiding* works by denying and repressing the present reality of Islam outright. As showing, hiding is a form of racism which racializes “non-Europeans” – lately Muslims – through an inclusive exclusion and affirmation through negation. Paradoxically, the work of *hiding* is much more explicit and immediately visible than the work of representation in Denmark and in the Netherlands.

4. 2. 1. The Headscarf Debate in France

The headscarf began to be debated in France first in 1989, and then it became an issue open to debate again in 1994. By 2003, it had become a source for significant controversies in France. The debates in 1989 began due to a specific event: three Muslim students were expelled from school because they kept their headscarves on in the classroom. This decision was made by a school principal, Ernest Cheniere, on account of the fact that public institutes in France are regulated through the principles of *laïcité*; imposing the formal separation of state from religious institutions. This decision triggered debates not only on wearing headscarf at school, but also about the status of Muslims and Islam in France.

The central notion of the debates about Muslims in France is constituted by two main founding elements of the French political model: Republicanism which is a model of civic and political integration, and secularism which is a principle of regulating religion. Therefore, the political discourse about Muslims revolved around their failure of integration, and the so-called “Islamic threat” to French political principles. In this regard, ‘Muslims’ who are predominantly from Islamic countries which were originally French colonies, have been perceived as a threat to the French national identity.

Although numbers are difficult to estimate, because French consensus reports do not include a question on religion, it is estimated that there are approximately four million Muslims living in France. Although Muslims have lived in France for centuries, many of the current Muslims have migrated to France due the postcolonial regulations. They have fought for France in the First World War and because of their service, they were honored with a grand mosque which was built in Paris in the 1920s. Most of them also continue to experience socio-economic difficulties and exclusion. They are also reflected as ‘problems’ by some political parties, who use immigrants in general and Muslims in particular as sources for political propaganda. Particularly, the Front National political party (National Front) argue for anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim laws that restrict the migration, residence and citizenship of immigrants. Their original members either served as soldiers in colonial Algeria or were supporters of colonialism. Jean-Marie Le Pen is one of the most prominent figures of the movement. They regularly accuse migrants of taking jobs, perpetrating crime and drug use, refusing to assimilate, and adopting Islamic standpoints. This reflects a collective discrimination that is based on race and religion. Moreover, other parties have not been opposed to anti-immigrants and anti-Muslim feelings and regulations, and to manipulating the

memories of France's war in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s.⁴³⁵ As Robert Aldrich states, this situation refers precisely that

The colonial spectre did haunt post-colonial France... Recent debates have continued to keep old wounds infected... France is being forced to confront a colonial past that many preferred to forget... And yet: the colonial era would not disappear, and it was not only the disenchanted daughters and sons of the colonies who kept the memories alive.⁴³⁶

In line with this, colonial violence, the Algerian war in particular where between 200.000 and 300.000 Algerians were killed, the deportation of Algerians, the sending of tens of thousands of coerced workers to Hitler's German, and the deportation and extermination of 76.000 Jews from France are all taboo subjects in France. Henry Rousse has called the avoidance to talk about the Vichy system as 'the Vichy syndrome', and with reference to Rousse, Aldrich has called the avoidance to talk about colonial violence as "the Algerian syndrome".⁴³⁷

In this context, the first headscarf issue, called as *l'affaire du foulard* (the affair of the headscarf), came into the national agenda and was generated as a national crisis in France in 1989. Naomi Davidson states that the year 1989 was a turning point in debates about French national identity and sovereignty in the face of immigration, globalization and European integration, as well as fears of "political Islamism".

The incidence took place in Gabriel-Havez College, in Creil, a working-class suburb, in 1989. Freedman indicates that "in 1989 when the *affaire des foulards* began [the school] had almost 90 pupils of 25 different nationalities and 500 of these pupils came from Muslim families."⁴³⁸ In 1989, the school declared that

⁴³⁵ Robert Aldrich, 'Colonial Past, Post-Colonial Present: History wars French Style'. *History Australia*, Vol. 3 No. 1, 2006, pp. 14.1-14.10, pp. 14.2-14.3.

⁴³⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 14.2, 14.3

⁴³⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 14.3

⁴³⁸ Jane Freedman, 'Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? The French Dilemma', *International Migration*, Vol. 42 (3), 2004, pp. 11.

headscarves could only be worn in the school building, but must be taken them off in class.⁴³⁹ In the framework of this new regulation, three young North-African students in the French public secondary school were expelled from the school, since they insisted on wearing their headscarves in the classroom. They were expelled from the school on the grounds that they violated the principles of *laïcité*; which is a core dimension of French national identity.

In 1989, *l'affaire du foulard* (the scarf affair) in France resulted with the court decision that stated that religious insignia could be worn in state schools.⁴⁴⁰ The headscarf was considered as compatible with *laïcité*; which is based on freedom of conscience, separation of church and state, and neutrality of the state in dealing with any religion. After this decision, within five years, the number of headscarves being worn in school increased from 10 to 2000.⁴⁴¹ However, this amount decreased to 1256 in the next five years.⁴⁴² In spite of this decision, the headscarf was also criticized as an identity marker for oppression and inequality of women in Islam. Some feminist groups, such as Ardens, perceived foulard as a symbol of paternalism, of patriarchy, and of the oppression of women. They stated that Muslim men pressure their girls to wear headscarves as in instrument of control.⁴⁴³ Also, Felda Amara, a member of *Ni Putes Ni Soumises* (Neither Whores nor Doormats) described the headscarf as the “symbol of woman’s oppression” in her autobiography. She drew attention to “Islamic obscurantism” as the real problem in banlieues, by emphasizing that the government's “policies of social segregation is

⁴³⁹ Norma Claire Moruzzie, ‘A Problem with Headscarves: Contemporary Complexities of Political and Social Identity’, *Political Theory*, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 653-672.

⁴⁴⁰ Godfrey, 2003, cited in Howard Adelman, “Monoculturalism versus Interculturalism in a Multicultural World”, in Howard Adelman and Pierre Anctil (eds.), *Religion, culture, and the State: Reflections on the Bouchard-Taylor Report*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2011, p. 39.

⁴⁴¹ McGoldrick, 2006: 256, cited in *ibid.*, p. 39.

⁴⁴² Keaton, 2006: 181, cited in *ibid.*, p. 39.

⁴⁴³ Beaud and Pialoux, 2003; Maurani, 2009, cited in *ibid.*, p. 40.

not the main problem”.⁴⁴⁴ Therefore, her emphasis on the banlieues, supported a mainstream political discourse which addressed the 'Islamic threat', instead of positing a failure of social and economic problems as the main problem of banlieues. In the end, all together, the decline of secularism was reflected as the main problem causing social disintegration. In order to overcome this, her book and ideas became a reference point for declaring the need to secure France against Islamic conservatism in the banlieues, and “re-establishing the autonomy of the Republic by banning the headscarf”.⁴⁴⁵ Emmanuel Terray defines this environment in France as a 'political hysteria':

a peculiar defensive ploy [in which community] will substitute a fictional problem, which can be mediated purely through words and symbols, for the real one that it finds insurmountable. In grappling with the former, the community can conceive itself that it has successfully confronted the latter.⁴⁴⁶

In this manner, he emphasized 'national anxieties' which stem from the insurmountable problems of racial and sexual equality, as suddenly displaced upon the problems of Islam. For Fernando, this anxiety upholds debates about the headscarf and about Islam in the banlieues. With reference to Holmes (2000), Fernando addressed how the Republic's sovereignty is challenged by “globalization, European integration, regional decentralization and consumerism, all of which disrupt the national values of equality and social solidarity on which the French welfare state has long been based”.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁴ Cited in Mayanthi Fernando, 'Exceptional Citizens: Secular Muslim Women and the Politics of Difference in France', *Social Anthropology*, 17: 4, 2009, pp. 382-3.

⁴⁴⁵ Cited in *ibid.*, pp. 383.

⁴⁴⁶ Emmanuel Terray, 2004:118, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 383.

⁴⁴⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 384.

Likewise, in 1994, the headscarf issue became a prominent debate in France again. This time, Francois Bayrou, the Minister of Education, published a proposal which included banning all ‘ostentatious’ religious symbols in French schools. As we learn from Jane Freedman, the most prominent aspect of this debate is that in 1989 Bayrou supported the rights of women wearing headscarves, but now he declared that today, he fully understood the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism. This time not only Bayrou, but also S.O.S. Racisme, the anti-racist organization, supported the government’s decision. They said “they believed that the growth of Islamic fundamentalism was a real danger in some of the suburbs with large immigrant populations”.⁴⁴⁸ Therefore, in the 1994 debate, the issue of Islamic fundamentalism came onto the scene and was emphasized even by anti-racist organizations.

The headscarf was debated again in France in 2003, when President Jacques Chirac called on Bernard Stasi, the French ombudsman (*médiateur de la République*) and expert on immigration to head up a commission that included intellectuals, academic experts, religious leaders, politicians, a school principal, a rights mediator, and a representative from *Ni Putes Ni Soumises* (Neither Whores nor Doormats).⁴⁴⁹ Islamic presence was regarded as a threat to the cultural integrity of France; and to the secular values of freedom, gender equality and tolerance held by the secular majority in France. In this regard, the Islamic headscarf was designated as a “conspicuous religious signs” in French public schools. A commission came together to investigate the possible threats posed by headscarves to French secularism or *laïcité*.⁴⁵⁰ The commission discussed whether the headscarf is a possible threat to French secularism or *laïcité*, received interviews, and created a report around the issue. The report recommended a ban on the wearing of

⁴⁴⁸ Jane Freedman, ‘Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? The French Dilemma’, pp. 14-5

⁴⁴⁹ Howard Adelman, “Monoculturalism versus Interculturalism in a Multicultural World”, pp. 40.

⁴⁵⁰ Mayanthi Fernando, ‘Exceptional Citizens: Secular Muslim Women and the Politics of Difference in France’, *Social Anthropology*, 17: 4, 2009, pp. 379-80.

“conspicuous religious symbols” in schools, and imposed new regulations about holidays for religious feasts days.⁴⁵¹ The ban has also been supported by some feminist groups and intellectuals; such as the association *femmes publiques* who supported the ban by defining the headscarf as a “visible symbol of the submission of women in public”.

Secularism or *laïcité* in France has an ideological significance in Europe. As Olivier Roy states “Many inhabitants of France see *laïcité* as far more than [the separation between state and church]. For them, it expands into an ideology that 'claims to provide a value system common to all citizens'”

This time, the socialist deputy, Jack Lang, offered a bill to the National Assembly that would ban signs of any religious affiliation in public school.⁴⁵² A commission headed by Bernard Stasi was appointed to investigate the realization of *laïcité* principles in the French Republic. This commission was filled with school principals, teachers, civil servants, academics, business people, and parliament members- from diverse origins, religious beliefs, and political opinions. They were appointed to examine religious symbols at schools. In the framework of this commission’s recommendations, the wearing of not all the religious symbols, but just the headscarf was prohibited in public schools.

Therefore, the headscarf has been debated a few times in France since 1989. There were also two big debates, in 1994 and 2003,. In the first debate, the headscarf was perceived as a threat against French culture and the abandonment of the French revolutionary heritage of secular Republican education. In the second one, the emphasis on wearing the headscarf was associated with Islamic fundamentalism. In the third one, the headscarf was understood as the only religious symbol to be

⁴⁵¹ Howard Adelman, “Monoculturalism versus Interculturalism in a Multicultural World”, pp. 40-1.

⁴⁵² Joan Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007, pp. 30.

prohibited in public schools, in order to realize the *laïcité* principle of the French Republic. Therefore, protecting the French Republican tradition, in which the main priority is preserving the homogeneous national identity, from Islamic fundamentalism, was represented as the main reason for putting the headscarf away from the public sphere in France. From this framework, at first glance, it can be concluded that the Republican tradition of France seems to control decisions about specific cultural and religious conventions when they are perceived as a contradiction to this tradition. However, it is clearly seen that in all these cases only the headscarf was perceived as both a religious sign and a threat to French culture and the French revolutionary heritage of a secular Republican education. Hiding the present reality of Muslims and Islam for the sake of protecting the grand themes of republican values and universal nature of French nationhood is what is at stake here. As Davidson stated this demonstrates the “‘incompability’ of ‘Islam’ with French Republicanism, of ‘Muslims’ with ‘Frenchness’ for many French people across the political spectrum”.⁴⁵³ This also demonstrates that “the French state continued blurring of the boundaries between racialized essence and religious practices when it comes to ‘Muslims’ and its refusal to allow for the possibility of being both French and a practicing Muslim”.⁴⁵⁴ More importantly, this religious sign is prohibited on account of the fact that it is perceived as a sign of Islamic fundamentalism.

Adrian Favell suggests that the political and cultural heritage of France is the most important determining factor of the present-day immigration policy of France.⁴⁵⁵ The project of the French Republic is the disappearance of difference through the assimilation of all to one legitimate culture. Therefore, this ideology not only seeks

⁴⁵³ Naomi Davidson, *Only Muslims: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France*, pp. 208.

⁴⁵⁴ *ibid.*, p. 209.

⁴⁵⁵ Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France And Britain*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001, pp. 4-44.

to overcome all types of specific identities and belongings, but also seeks to create equality through sameness.⁴⁵⁶ In this context, particularly, I would like to examine the debate over multiculturalism in France in the framework of the discussion of the Stasi Report from 11 December 2001, and the following legislation on the banning of religious symbols in French public schools. In this framework, I will focus on the two main counter arguments, which suggests that these laws not only reflect the anti-multicultural and assimilationist model of integration, but also reflect the divergence from real problems of racism, unemployment, and gender inequality.⁴⁵⁷ The other arguments suggest that while the law on religious symbols was exclusionary, these new institutional regulations were inclusionary.⁴⁵⁸

When we look at France, in the first sense, it is claimed that the political and cultural heritage of France are the most important determining factors for the present immigration policy of France.⁴⁵⁹ French Republicanism and secularism are the most prominent aspects of this determination. French republicanism seeks to overcome all types of specific identities and belongings, since it aims to create equality through sameness. Therefore, it reflects the disappearance of difference through the assimilation of all to one legitimate culture.⁴⁶⁰ The discussion on Stasi

⁴⁵⁶ Jane Freedman, 'Secularism as a Barrier to Integration?', pp. 10.

⁴⁵⁷ John Scot, 2005; Etienne Balibar, 2004.

⁴⁵⁸ In the same manner, when we look at Britain, we can see that the Rushdie Affair in 1989 and the Gulf War in 1990 were the visible events through which Muslim immigrants became a focal point. On 5th October 2006, a different kind of discussion started in Britain following Jack Straw's, who is the Leader of House and Cabinet Member, MP, encounter with a veiled woman. MP Jack Straw declared that the woman who came to his constituency advice bureau with hijab, full veils signified a separation and difference. The main point here is that such a kind of visibility was not a new state in Europe, yet it has been assumed as signal out exteriority, and strangeness to Britishness recently. The government's five-year plan on asylum and immigration, published in February 2005, reflects that the issues of immigration and race relations have become tied to concerns about terrorism and security.

⁴⁵⁹ Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*, pp. 4-44.

⁴⁶⁰ Jane Freedman, 'Secularism as a Barrier to Integration?', pp. 10.

Report in 11 December 2001 and the following legislation on the banning of religious symbols in French public schools show this clearly. There are two main counter arguments to these laws. One of them suggests that these laws not only reflect the anti-multicultural and assimilationist model of integration, but also reflect the divergence from the real problems of racism, unemployment, and gender inequality.⁴⁶¹ The other argument suggests that while the law on religious symbols was exclusionary; these new institutional regulations were inclusive. Norma Claire Moruzzi defines this situation as “near-hysterical references to a vulnerable national heritage, Moslem fanaticism and fundamentalism [...] to prohibit young women wearing headscarves from attending public school classes”.⁴⁶²

Joeylne Cesari argues that as Muslims become more settled, the Muslim immigrants have started to build mosques, opening halal butchers, and claiming Muslim sections in cemeteries. This brought about an increasing visibility for Muslims in French society, which has increasingly been claimed as a problem for France. Headscarves in schools triggered this anxiety about the visibility of Islamic practices in French public sphere. As Giry states in France, political issues are shaped by the French Republican tradition in which *laïcité*, plays an important role especially in education, and was enshrined as law in 1905. This system is not antireligious, yet it mandates the privatization of religion. Therefore, it is different from secularism. May be all the religions are problematic in this system, but Islam is still seen as more problematic than the others.⁴⁶³ In this manner, Giry draws attention the fact that

Islam has been distrusted in Europe since the Middle Ages, and modern

⁴⁶¹ John Scot, 2005; Etienne Balibar, 2004.

⁴⁶² Norma Claire Moruzzi, ‘A Problem with Headscarves: Contemporary Complexities of Political and Social Identity’, *Political Theory*, Vol.22, No.4, (November 1994), pp. 660.

⁴⁶³ Stephanie Giry, ‘France and Its Muslims: The Politics of Assimilation’, *Foreign Affairs*, available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61919/st%C3%83%C2%A9phanie-giry/france-and-its-muslims>

French colonial authorities took care to institutionalize their suspicion in France's overseas territories. As early as the 1970, they set up a two-tier system in Algeria under which local Catholics and Jews could become French but Muslims could not. Islam was seen as a barrier to Frenchness- and in one way or another it still is today.⁴⁶⁴

In line with this argumentation, I suggest that practicing Islam is still considered a barrier to Frenchness. Therefore, Islam can survive in France only if it is hidden. In other words, it can be there only through not being there.

However, I suggest that we have to focus on the background of these 'near-hysterical references' about the headscarf. In other words, I support that we have to deconstruct the discourse on the headscarf by pointing out the underlying mentality constructing this discourse. According to Meyda Yeğenoğlu, it is important to point out the Orientalist motives behind both the discourse about the headscarf and the visibility of Islam in Europe.⁴⁶⁵ As we understood from the debate in France, headscarves are perceived in three interrelated arguments. First it is related to the consideration of the veil as an emblem of the subordination of women in a patriarchal religion. The second is about the assumed 'hidden meanings of headscarf'. And the third is about the condemnation of the veil as a challenge to the integration of Muslims into French society.

As a consequence, republican universalism violates the citizenship and human rights of Muslims living in France by hiding them. In other terms, the 'freedom of expression', as a universal condition for political discourse, is hijacked and colonized through the colonization of Islamic practice for the sake of 'neutrality', and *laïcité*, using the strategy of *hiding*. More importantly, France embraces the open practice of Islam within the country, but only by denying its visibility in

⁴⁶⁴ Stephanie Giry, 'France and Its Muslims: The Politics of Assimilation'

⁴⁶⁵ Meyda Yeğenoğlu, 'The Return of the Religious', *Culture and Religion*, Vol.7, No.3, (November 2006).

public space. So, Islam is paradoxically unacceptable through its acceptability and vice versa. This reflects an erasure of Islam from European political discourse. There is no place for the diversity of experience in terms of race, religion, gender and sexuality. This refers to an internalist narrative of European identity, which refers in turn to the “imagined homogeneity of Europe”.⁴⁶⁶

Strikingly, Asad draws attention to the liberal and the left position in European politics, showing that a growing skepticism about Islam and Muslims is in these positions as well. When it comes the Islamic disregard of both the principle of secular republicanism as in the *affaire du foulard*, the principle of freedom of speech as in the Rushdie Affair, the attack against the director of *Submission*, and the caricature debate in Denmark; liberals and the left claim to stand for tolerance and open society, while also attacking Islam in Europe. Although liberals and the left criticize the extreme right because of their xenophobic behavior, they have also started to become skeptical about whether there is a legitimate place for Islam in a modern Western society.⁴⁶⁷

Attention needs to be drawn to the fact that European political discourse manipulates and includes/excludes Islamic religion and Muslims by manipulating European identity. Noticeably, the discursive universe that develops around these issues has ascribed a combination of naturalized cultural attributes to Muslims that have little to do with religious beliefs or with being a believer. I contend that the argument that these debates move forward to establish Europe’s cultural and value systems as synonymous with ‘universal’ culture and values, is indicative of a latent racist thinking still at work within European political discourse. That is to say, they reflect the discursive construction of a racialization of Muslim immigrants in the

⁴⁶⁶ Stuart Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity”, in David Hall and Anthony McGrew (eds.), *Modernity and Its Futures*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.

⁴⁶⁷ Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?”, pp. 210.

European context. This latent racist thought directly links back to eugenic and social-Darwinist conceptions of European superiority.

We can conclude that the policing of Muslim communities is organized under the logic that there is an irreconcilable culture clash between the West and Islam. This culturalist approach, which does not possess a commitment to human rights, woman rights or democracy, enables the stigmatization of old colonial technologies, renewed at a time when the culture clash or clash of civilization has become a hegemonic framing of political discourse. There is a close connection then between assertions of cultural difference and racism.

The headscarf debates and ban show that the French state blurs the boundaries between “racialized essence and religious practices when it comes to ‘Muslims’”. It refuses the “possibility of being both French and a practicing Muslim”.⁴⁶⁸ Mayanthi Fernando's emphasis on “the dual imperatives of French Republicanism: universalizes and particularizes simultaneously”, with reference to Gary Wilders (2005, 2007), explains this refusal. These dual imperatives are contradictory imperatives of French Republicanism, and shape republican citizenship. The position of the three figures, mentioned before, match this contradiction of republican citizenship. Their ex-Muslim and secular character gives them universal citizenship, but their racial and cultural character dose not allow them to be full citizens.⁴⁶⁹

In this context, when we look at the discursive construction of the veil/headscarf in the context of Germany, we uncover arguments that suggest the problem of the headscarf also poses an integration problem, because the headscarf is used as a symbol of religious identity. Germany, by specifically examining the headscarf

⁴⁶⁸ Naomi Davidson, *Only Muslims: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France*, pp. 209.

⁴⁶⁹ Mayanthi Fernando, “Exceptional Citizens: Secular Muslim Women and the Politics of Difference in France”, pp. 381.

ban, reflects certain legal changes affecting Muslim women in Germany due to their use of a veil Furthermore, the debate over this ban has aroused considerable attention in the media, in the political arena, in the court and in the legal journals.

4. 2. 2. Minarets Debate in Switzerland

The minaret debate in Switzerland echoed some other prominent debates in various European countries where other Islamic articles (the headscarf and burqa in France and Belgium, and mosques in Germany) were targeted.⁴⁷⁰ The ‘Minaret ban’ in Switzerland has two main dimensions: first, Switzerland’s decision to vote for a referendum, and second, the result of this referendum. In order to understand both of these dimensions, it is crucial to understand the ‘constitutive’ elements or values of Switzerland: ‘Swiss Confederation’, ‘Swiss harmony’, and ‘multicultural Switzerland’. Switzerland is based on the idea of a confederation, which is a model of a state founded on linguistic and religious pluralism. This model seems to support diversity by constructing a common identity. This system is formulated along the axes of three Christian religions rooted in the territory. Pluralism is the identifying feature of Switzerland. There is a term that defines this situation: ‘Swiss Harmony’; which is composed by a complex of interconnected principles of freedom of religion, secularism, and religious pluralism. ‘Multicultural Switzerland’ is shaped in the context of *Willensnation* – ‘a nation created by its own will’. It is based on the respect of the autonomy of each political body.⁴⁷¹ The freedom of

⁴⁷⁰ Myriam Cherti, ‘The Politics of Muslim Visibility in Europe: The Case of the Swiss Minaret Ban’, *Public Policy Research*, 17 (3), pp.157.

⁴⁷¹ Vincenzo Pacillo, “‘Stopp Minaret’? The Controversy over the Building of Minarets in Switzerland: Religious Freedom versus Collective Identity” in Sabrina Pastorelli and Silvio Ferrari (eds.), *Religion in Public Spaces: A European Perspective*, Ashgate Publishing Limited: England, 2012, p. 339, 340, 348.

religious expression is guaranteed by the Swiss constitution and Human Rights declaration.⁴⁷²

Switzerland is a combination of small areas that differ in climate, territory, language and culture. The citizens' will to form one sole nation keeps these differences together. Recently, since 1980s, this panorama has been changing with the immigration of *gasterbeiters* from ex-Yugoslavia, Africa and the Middle East. These new comers are not Christians and they do not speak any of the four national languages. They have, however, increased the cultural and religious diversity of the nation. This is a third multicultural change for the nation. The first one came on the addendum to the 1948 Constitution, which brought the freedom of residence. This freedom ended the religious boundaries stemming from the Kappel wars. It marked the end of a hostile denominationalism, which had characterized the beginning of an ecumenical opening between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The second one came to agenda with the migratory flows from Southern Europe into Switzerland between 1945 and 1970. Since they were Christians, they were not very different from the social fabric of the receiving Swiss society. That is, they did not create a big 'trauma' in the receiving society, and they integrated into Swiss culture progressively.⁴⁷³ It is commonly believed that this harmonious situation of Switzerland has been changing since the 1980s, when the immigration rate had increased. This flow of migration brought in European people from different cultures and religions, which were not historically present in this territory. For Sartoni, these migrants created "a kind of multiculturalism which opposes

⁴⁷² Martin Baumann, 'Anxieties, Banning Minarets and Populist Politics in Switzerland–Preliminary Analysis', available at: http://pluralism.org/files/spotlight/Baumann_Swiss-ban-on-minarets_Nov09.pdf

⁴⁷³ Vincenzo Pacillo, "'Stopp Minaret'? The Controversy over the Building of Minarets in Switzerland: Religious Freedom versus Collective Identity", pp. 348-9

pluralism, since it demands cultural secession and [...] ends up with a tribalization of culture”.⁴⁷⁴

In such an environment, the minaret debate came to the foreground when the Olten Türk Kültür Ocağı association submitted a request to build a six-meter-high minaret on the roof of the building housing their headquarters in 2005. When the minaret ban was debated, it was in the context of building this architectural structure and how it would not comply with the town-planning standards of the area. The local commission of *Baukommission* and *Justizdepartement* of Canton of Solothurn decided that building this structure would not match with the overall town-planning, and the minaret, if built, could also only be symbolic and could not be used to broadcast the call to prayer. This decision was confirmed by the administration. This reflects the extremely technical nature of the decision. The judges did not discuss the issues that were emphasized by the association. Judges gave decisions with reference to the Federal Constitution of 1999, which guarantees “the freedom of conscience and belief”. This article is the same with the first paragraph of article 49 of the 1874 Constitution, which ensures the “full externalization of the religious and philosophical convictions of the individual against any interference from state power”.⁴⁷⁵ On the other hand, the association emphasized the need to protect the traditional *Heimat*, in spite of the freedom of worship of their religion. They also addressed that “the right to build minarets in Switzerland could open the way to the progressive 'Islamization' of the Swiss Confederation”.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷⁴ Sartoni, 2000: 48, cited in *ibid.*, p. 339.

⁴⁷⁵ Vincenzo Pacillo, “‘Stopp Minaret’? The Controversy over the Building of Minarets in Switzerland: Religious Freedom versus Collective Identity”, pp. 341.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 342

Then the politicians participated in this debate. First, Helena Morgenthaler, who is the city councilwoman and a member of SVP, defined the minaret as an 'aggressive missile-shaped symbol'.⁴⁷⁷ Then a petition was titled "Stop the Minarets".⁴⁷⁸ Also, a member of SVP emphasized the issue of preserving *Heimat*. Afterward, the Canton of Ticino proposed regulation forbidding the building of minarets, but this was rejected by the Commission for Legislation in 2008.⁴⁷⁹ In 2007, various local initiatives introduced a ban on building minarets on Swiss territory. They tried to change the Swiss Federal Constitution by adding an amendment stating that, "the building of minarets is prohibited".⁴⁸⁰ However, the government rejected the initiative, since it was incompatible with the fundamental principles that protect the rights and freedom of religion and conscience.⁴⁸¹ Nevertheless, the Federal Council claimed that banning minarets "would not prevent Muslims from freely developing and living a religious belief nor from practicing and spreading their religion. The ban on minarets would not therefore compromise the real essence of their fundamental rights" (27 August, 2008).⁴⁸² The Federal Constitution stated that they had to include the ban for the following reasons:

Islam does not separate religion from State. Islam incorporates all of the legal system. Minarets as symbols of Islamic power therefore express a totally anti-democratic claim to hegemony. [Because of this lack of separation] minarets represent a symbol of the religious and political power of Islam; [it] is a demonstration of how Muslims are no longer content just to practice their own religion, but *will make more*

⁴⁷⁷ *Langenthaler Tagblatt*, 17 August 2006, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 343.

⁴⁷⁸ *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, 6 November, 2006, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 343.

⁴⁷⁹ Vincenzo Pacillo, "Stopp Minaret'? The Controversy over the Building of Minarets in Switzerland: Religious Freedom versus Collective Identity", pp. 343.

⁴⁸⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 344.

⁴⁸¹ *ibid.*, pp. 344-5.

⁴⁸² Cited in *ibid.*, pp. 345.

*and more demands on society. ... In Europe, we are undoubtedly witnessing a tendency towards Islamization.*⁴⁸³

From this framework, by analyzing the political and social context shaped around the referendum about the construction of minarets for mosques, this section will analyze the discourses surrounding the imaginaries and representations of Islam and the existence of Muslim immigrants in Switzerland. When looking at the referendum process, the referendum was the result of a national initiative. It had been launched on 1 May 2007 to modify article 72 of the Swiss Federal Constitution on Church-State relations, by adding the sentence “The construction of minarets is prohibited”. The main concern about this referendum was that it contradicts the European convention on Human Rights.⁴⁸⁴ SVP was the main actor who represented the political struggle against the building of minarets. They became popular in last 20 years, because of their party policy which is against Switzerland’s joining the European Union. They argued that the EU is a threat to the ‘national identity’, independence, neutrality and democracy of Switzerland. Also, they proposed to reduce immigration and apply a very strict asylum policy. Lastly, they strongly defended Christian tradition, and rejected the demands of non-Christian minorities.⁴⁸⁵

The poster that they used in 2007 for the federal elections reflects their policy clearly. They created a negative image of Islam with reference to September 11, 2001 and further terrorist attacks. This poster also addresses the suppression of women, genital mutilation, forced marriages and wearing headscarves.⁴⁸⁶ In these

⁴⁸³ Freudiger, 2009:1, cited in *ibid.*, p. 345.

⁴⁸⁴ Myriam Cherti, “The politics of Muslim Visibility in Europe: the case of Swiss Minaret Ban”, pp. 157, 158.

⁴⁸⁵ Vincenzo Pacillo, “‘Stopp Minaret’? The Controversy over the Building of Minarets in Switzerland: Religious Freedom versus Collective Identity”, pp. 343.

⁴⁸⁶ Martin Baumann, ‘Anxieties, Banning Minarets and Populist Politics in Switzerland—Preliminary Analysis’, 2009.

posters, Muslims were compared to dangerous “black sheep”, and they are considered to be 'strangers' and expelled from the Switzerland.⁴⁸⁷ Most strikingly, the posters portrayed minarets as rockets piercing the Swiss national flag.⁴⁸⁸ Therefore, this poster created an image of Islam as oppressive, aggressive and intolerant. However, as Bauman has written, this image does not match the existing presence of the current Muslims in Switzerland who are from Balkans and Turkey. More importantly, it defined minarets not as religious symbol, but as a “political sign of gaining power in a territory”.⁴⁸⁹

Before the referendum, it was expected that only the right wing voters who constituted 35 percent would vote against minarets. On the contrary, 57.5 percent voted in favor of the initiative. While the results look like a surprise, it has a past constituted by the debates about ‘foreigners’ (*Auslanders*) in general and Muslim immigrants in particular, both in Switzerland in particular and Europe in general. Also, the rise of nationalist party is agenda problem in Switzerland, as in other European countries.⁴⁹⁰ These nationalist parties have very strong ‘Islamization of Europe’ rhetoric, as well. The chairman of the Netherlands' right-wing Party for Freedom, Geert Wilders statement clearly shows this rhetoric. He said as:

I come to America with a mission. All is not well in the Old World. There is a tremendous danger looming, and it's very difficult to be optimistic. We might be in the final stages of the Islamization of Europe. This is not only a clear and present danger to the future of Europe itself; it is a threat to America and the sheer survival of the West. The United States as the last bastion of Western civilization will

⁴⁸⁷ Nilüfer Göle, “The Public Visibility of Islam and European Politics of Resentment: The Minarets-Mosques Debate”, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 37(4), pp. 388.

⁴⁸⁸ Myriam Cherti, “The politics of Muslim Visibility in Europe: the case of Swiss Minaret Ban”, pp. 157.

⁴⁸⁹ Martin Baumann, ‘Anxieties, Banning Minarets and Populist Politics in Switzerland—Preliminary Analysis’, 2009.

⁴⁹⁰ *ibid.*,

be facing an Islamic Europe. The Europe you know is changing.⁴⁹¹

The Swiss People's Party (SVP) has the 29 percent of the votes in the country. Its votes have been increasing since the 1990s. They declared that this referendum is not related to the freedom of religion and not directed against Muslims and Islam, but it is related to the political signs of the minaret.⁴⁹² Party leader Ulrich Schluer said that "we do not forbid Islam; we forbid the political symbol of Islamization, and this is the minaret ... [which] is a symbol of political victory".⁴⁹³ Therefore, they defined and fixed the minaret as a political symbol. Moreover, SVP addressed that the minaret represents the 'schleichende Unterwanderung durch den Islam' (creeping infiltration by Islam); it is not 'Schweizerisches' (Swiss). As Bauman states, this proposition reflects the borders between 'us' and 'them'.⁴⁹⁴ More than that, this proposition reflects the ambivalence in the self-image of Switzerland that defines itself with 'Swiss Harmony' and cosmopolitanism.

Nilüfer Göle draws attention to another ambivalence in the self-perception of Switzerland. She addresses that a pre-established definition of the national community and a public space creates the fear, tensions and exclusions which are visible in the posters published during the referendum. The presence of Muslims has a quality for disruption of the essentialist conception of the nation, and the fixed conception of the public space. In the framework of these conceptions, the

⁴⁹¹ Cited in Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Switzerland Ban Minarets", *The Washington Times*, December 01, 2009.

⁴⁹² Martin Baumann, 'Anxieties, Banning Minarets and Populist Politics in Switzerland—Preliminary Analysis', 2009.

⁴⁹³ Cited in Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Switzerland Ban Minarets", *The Washington Times*, December 01, 2009.

⁴⁹⁴ Martin Baumann, 'Anxieties, Banning Minarets and Populist Politics in Switzerland—Preliminary Analysis', 2009.

public space and the nation are not open to plurality of citizens, cultures, religions, speeches, and expressions.⁴⁹⁵

This ambivalence is not only the case for Switzerland; it is the case for some other European countries. This referendum about constructing minaret for mosques in Switzerland has been discussed in other national contexts and has a transnational character. Throughout this debate, the fear of Islam has become a transnational debate and “instrumentalized by different populist parties and ‘anti-Islamization politics’”.⁴⁹⁶ Göle draws attention to some political figures who have contributed to the transformation of national political agendas across Europe. She argues that these figures as new figures of politics of ‘anti-Islamization’ who gain their popularity through their engagement with Islam. With reference to Vincent Geisser (2003), she draws attention to changing the agenda of the extreme right from xenophobia and anti-immigration politics to Islamophobia: “current political populism gains ground in Europe. ...The public sphere is at risk of losing its role as the ideal expression of democracy and becoming a place of common sense, of the satisfaction of public opinion, and of the contagion of the sensational and scandalous”.⁴⁹⁷ Islamophobia is the widely expressed theme of these debates. In this context, the visibility of Muslims and Islam were perceived as conquering European public space and territory.⁴⁹⁸ Swiss People's Party member Ulrich Schuler's speech reflects this perception openly. He addressed the necessity of this prohibition to prevent the future catastrophes that might be created by Muslims in Europe:

The fear is great that the minarets will be followed by the calls to prayer of the muezzin...Sharia is gaining in importance in Switzerland

⁴⁹⁵ Nilüfer Göle, “The Public Visibility of Islam and European Politics of Resentment: The Minarets-Mosques Debate”, pp. 388.

⁴⁹⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 389.

⁴⁹⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 389-390.

⁴⁹⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 391.

and in Europe. That means honor killings, forced marriages, circumcision, wearing the burqa, ignoring school rules and even stoning.⁴⁹⁹

Marine Le Pen is one the most prominent examples of this popular approach. She has shifted the political discourse of her father's extreme right party. Her statement about Muslims visible religious practices in European public space is very striking: “Muslims praying on the streets in some neighborhoods were like Nazi occupiers”.⁵⁰⁰ This discourse about Islam became the legitimacy criteria for the violent regulations about Muslims and Islam in Europe.

However, in addition to this direct and rude language, there is also an indirect rhetoric, which emphasizes the legitimate criteria for regulations about Muslims. Thwaw things violate human rights and the main values which characterizes Switzerland. The most visible one is addressing the limits of tolerance. Nicolas Sarkozy's statement which presents the 'people of Europe' as culturally and naturally welcoming and tolerant, while simultaneously concerned about “their lifestyle, their way of thinking, and their social relations to be distorted” (2009)⁵⁰¹ reflects this rhetoric. Moreover, a commentator in Switzerland addressed that it is a fact that although there is very little evidence that 'politically extreme Islam' is growing in Switzerland, the newspapers and televisions create a perception that Switzerland is face to face with the threat of Islamization with reference to extreme forms of terror in the name of Islam, which have emerged in main European cities: the transportation bombings in London and Madrid, and the murder of Dutch filmmaker in Amsterdam in particular. She continues about how “the Swiss voted

⁴⁹⁹ Traynor, 2009, cited in Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley, “The Crises of 'Multiculturalism' in Europe: Mediated Minarets, Intolerable Subjects”, pp. 129.

⁵⁰⁰ *Telegraph*, 12 December 2010, cited in Nilüfer Göle, “The Public Visibility of Islam and European Politics of Resentment: The Minarets-Mosques Debate”, pp. 389.

⁵⁰¹ Cited in Myriam Cherti, “The politics of Muslim Visibility in Europe: the case of Swiss Minaret Ban”, pp. 160.

in favor primarily because they did not have much Islamic extremism – and they do not want any either”.⁵⁰²

On the other hand, it is crucial to state that left-wing parties, churches and liberals rejected the campaign against minarets and criticized the decision, because they felt that this decision violates religious freedom, tolerance and the neutrality of the Swiss state.⁵⁰³ Also, some other European countries criticized the ban. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner interpreted the ban as a “show of intolerance” and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt defined the ban as “a display of prejudice and perhaps even of fear”.⁵⁰⁴ Also, the former UK Justice Secretary Jack Straw stated that “this is preposterous, a form of religious persecution we should be worried about. We have seen this kind of thing before in Europe, with the banning of the Star of David”.⁵⁰⁵

On the other hand, some other European countries leaders and politicians supported the referendum and the results of it. French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated, “instead of vilifying the Swiss because we do not like their answers, we should rather ask ourselves what it reveals”.⁵⁰⁶ Furthermore, the leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) Geert Wilders has called for a similar referendum in the

⁵⁰² Applebaum, 2010, cited in Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley, “The Crises of 'Multiculturalism' in Europe: Mediated Minarets, Intolerable Subjects”, pp. 130.

⁵⁰³ Martin Baumann, ‘Anxieties, Banning Minarets and Populist Politics in Switzerland–Preliminary Analysis’, 2009.

⁵⁰⁴ Dacey, 2009, cited in Myriam Cherti, “The politics of Muslim Visibility in Europe: the case of Swiss Minaret Ban”, pp. 158.

⁵⁰⁵ Cowley, 2009, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 158.

⁵⁰⁶ Sarkozy, 2009, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 158.

Netherlands.⁵⁰⁷ Mostly conservatives and elder less educated people living in rural areas supported the ban, since they feel threatened by foreigners.⁵⁰⁸

However, as Bauman emphasized, it also is the fact that the ban had strong support; because liberals, the left-wing and Muslim groups stayed passive during the campaign against minarets.⁵⁰⁹ The comment of the Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain on this ban explained what this decision means: “the extent to which far right racist groups [are] winning the battle of ideas on the future of Europe”.⁵¹⁰ At this point, it is crucial to ask how and why these populist political approaches gain ground in “democratic” Europe, and how a democratic public sphere can be transformed so easily by populist politics.

This is the case because colonial racist rhetoric continues into the political language of Europe. That is, colonial racism is still haunting European political language. It iterates in the form of a fear of Islam within the borders of Europe. This fear is the 'legitimate' motivation behind this racist rhetoric, which is haunting European political discourse in a spectral form. The spectral form of racism is manifested through the removal of the visibility of all religious things from the public sphere. By doing this, it is believed that equality and a sense of national citizenship is guaranteed. Particularly, recently, many European countries, which define themselves with religious and cultural heterogeneity and multiculturalism, declare that these approaches have been reinforcing differences and social

⁵⁰⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 158.

⁵⁰⁸ Martin Baumann, ‘Anxieties, Banning Minarets and Populist Politics in Switzerland–Preliminary Analysis’, 2009.

⁵⁰⁹ *ibid.*,

⁵¹⁰ *Gulf Times*, 2009, cited in Myriam Cherti, “The politics of Muslim Visibility in Europe: the case of Swiss Minaret Ban”, pp. 158.

stratification. In this framework, they perceive and define the visibility of religion Islam as threatening to secularism and the idea of unity, and national identity.⁵¹¹

However, as Tariq Ramadan argues, banning the visibility of Islam reflects the failure to recognize Islam as both a European religion and a Swiss religion.⁵¹² It is the rejection of Muslims' quest for recognition as citizens in the public spaces of Europe, and of the transition of the status of Muslims from an invisible migrant to visible citizen.⁵¹³

4. 2. 3. Conclusion

These cases show that as a *present* reality, Islam and Muslims are unacceptable, and must be transformed into an acceptable form for the European context. In the Danish and Netherlands cases, a constructed representation of Islam is manufactured, however it is left up to Muslims to eventually transform to it. As a present reality, European Muslims are thus seen as unacceptable. On the other hand, while the work of 'showing' shows that once Muslims adopt the represented reality proposed, they are then viewed as acceptable. However, this strategy works again to perpetuate a vision of Islam that persists as unacceptable, for both the European and Muslim contexts. Muslims must forfeit articles (headscarves/minarets), which represent their faith in order to practice it.

⁵¹¹ Myriam Cherti, "The politics of Muslim Visibility in Europe: the case of Swiss Minaret Ban", pp. 160.

⁵¹² Ramadan, 2009, cited in Myriam Cherti, "The politics of Muslim Visibility in Europe: the case of Swiss Minaret Ban", pp. 160.

⁵¹³ Nilüfer Göle, "The Public Visibility of Islam and European Politics of Resentment: The Minarets-Mosques Debate", pp. 392.

While, Europeans embrace the open practice of Islam within their countries, they still require its denial and its visibility in the public space. So, Islam is paradoxically unacceptable through its acceptability and vice versa. These cases show that the public space is necessarily colonized and monopolized, and how public space is always already constituted by exclusions. Namely, it reflects the current repercussion of the modern rigid boundaries between public and private. Secularism manifests itself in a concrete mode of governance in modern societies and sustains the power relations between state authorities and religious groups.⁵¹⁴ Public-private distinctions are the constitutive element for modern liberal social orders. Religion has been attempted to be removed from the modern secular state and the modern capitalist economy. State neutrality toward the privatization of religion was a key principle of the liberal state. However, in these cases the privatization of religion has become valued. In this context, it was declared that tolerance would be a main principle as long as religion is privatized.⁵¹⁵

4.3. General Conclusion

In these four cases, these two interrelated concerns first attract our attention: Muslims have a problem to integrate into European values and societies, and for this reason, they should be brought under control. Particularly in Denmark and the Netherlands, with reference to the protests against the Mohammed cartoons and the assassination of the director Theo Van Gogh, integration problems of Muslims and the failure of multiculturalism have been emphasized through this statement: since Muslims have been given too much freedom and tolerance, they have eventually

⁵¹⁴ Armando Salvatore, "Authority in Question: Secularity, Republicanism and 'Communitarism' in the Emerging Euro-Islamic Public Sphere", *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol.24, No.2, 2007, pp. 153.

⁵¹⁵ Casanova, José, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 19.

showed their intolerance and opposition against European cultures, values and traditions. I suggest that the main claim creating this presumption is that Islam and Muslims are essentially against the European values, culture, and life styles and this cannot be changed simply and easily through integration; because unlike Christianity, Islam is against reformation and secularization, and is essentially irrational, rejecting the rationality that Christianity perfectly matches with. In other words, what highlighted especially in these two cases is that, the European values of freedom of speech, tolerance, human rights, democracy and democratic rights are under the threat of Islamic irrational and violent opposition; they are taking advantage of them and use them against European values and culture.

In summary, this chapter focused on the transformation of the political discourse about migrants and the racialization of Muslim migrants in Europe. It gives the general framework of several cases and their debates in four countries, emphasizing a primary dimensions for them. More importantly, the discussion in this chapter shows that the colonialist and Orientalist mentality are still the main parameters of European identity construction. Therefore, when these cases are analyzed, colonialism and its missionary mentality should be taken into consideration, since these debates reflect a repetition of it. On the other hand, these motives are not enough to explain how and why racism and racialization shape discourse in these cases. Therefore, it is necessary to surpass the orientalist and colonialist notion of a European mentality; and instead focus on the material and epistemological conditions of European racism. The main dimensions of material conditions are the racist character of the modern nation state, the paranoid mode of politics, and constitutional democratic systems. These material conditions are shaped by two main elements of epistemological conditions, namely, the idea of Europe as having unique Eurocentric epistemology. In this framework, the next chapter focuses on the material and epistemological conditions of racism in detail.

Showing Muslims as a represented reality, and hiding their present reality with reference to universal values of freedom of speech and secularism are clear

examples of the iteration of colonialism, which is dominated by an Enlightenment past. In other words, all these cases and the strategies of showing and hiding operationalize the racialization of Muslims and Islam, which is manifested by the specters of colonialism. They reflect the manifestation of a civilizing mission in the context of Europe itself. In the most visible sense, these cases reflect the racialization of Muslims and Islam through degradation.

The restrictive regulations about Muslims and Islam are hidden through the visual images shown in the Netherlands and Denmark. While the regulations that restrict the visibility of Muslims and Islam in European public space shows that Muslims and Islam can be included and affirmed in Europe only through exclusion and negation. Namely, the visual images of Muslims and Islam in film and cartoon, reproduce established regimes of truth, which are not open to interpretations and criticisms from Muslims and Islam, on the contrary it strictly closes their access. They function to naturalize the “‘self-evident truth' about Islam as its alleged obscurantism and fanaticism, intolerance and violence”. They are so closed to the interpretation of Muslims and Islam, that Muslims even do not have access to criticize these images by using their freedom of speech, because these representations are secured by a universal principle of freedom of speech that denies Muslims from speaking. More striking than those, the protests of Muslims against these 'true' examples of freedom of expression are interpreted as further proof of the same 'self-evident truth'. Therefore, in every step of this act of representation, Muslims and Islam are excluded. They are affirmed through these images, which are, in fact, the reasons of their negation. As a result these cases shows how racism in Europe iterates in the form of a cultural racism, but more importantly, it iterates in the form of inclusive exclusion and affirmation through negation.

Gabrielle Marranci's statement explains this dilemma:

On the one hand, Europe asks them to become part of it, in other words to become, if not 'fully' European, at least Muslims of Europe and; in

other words, Muslims that re-elaborate their cultural and religious identity to become citizens of a new Europe, which include also Islam. But, at the same time, Europe acts in a way that Muslims can only remain Muslims in Europe; in other words, aliens in a Christocentric European environment to whom tolerance might be only granted.⁵¹⁶

As Talal Asad states in his prominent text 'Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?' that:

Muslims are present in Europe, yet absent from it. ... Europe (and the nation-states of which it is constituted) is ideologically constructed in such a way that Muslim immigrants cannot be satisfactorily represented in it. ... They are included within and excluded from Europe at one and the same time in a special way. ... In Europe today Muslims are often (mis)represented in the media and discriminated against by non-Muslims.⁵¹⁷

As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, these four cases are prominent examples of the iteration of a colonial racism that racializes by emphasizing culture and religion, instead of race. They reflect the manifestation of racism through an inclusive exclusion, and an affirmation through negation.

The question that needs to be answered here is, why do the specters of racism constantly haunt back the political scene of Europe? At this point, this dissertation mainly asserts that an understanding of the issue of European racism and Muslims should be grounded in a reassessment of the psychoanalytical, epistemological, and material conditions of European political discourse. As such, it attempts to analyze the underlying dynamics of spectral racism in the political discourse of Europe. The next chapters will give voice to this silent part of racism in the European political context, exposing the conditions actively nourishing the hierarchical

⁵¹⁶ Gabrielle Marranci, 'Multiculturalism, Islam and the Clash of Civilizations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia', *Culture and Religion*, Vol.5, No.1, 2004, pp. 112.

⁵¹⁷ Talal Asad "Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?", pp. 209

relations between Europeans and non-Europeans, acceptable and unacceptable citizens, outsiders and insiders, and us and them in violent ways.

This dissertation understands these debates as implicit scenarios, or a black cat in a dark room. The themes in these debates will enlighten the scenario. It particularly focuses on the points in which anxiety is intensified, and it draws attention to these. In these cases and debates, the formation of reactions, manipulations, and fictions can be seen.

This chapter offers to open a way to gain another understanding of conditions of European racism. It brings forward the following question: why are the specters of colonialism constantly haunting the political scene of Europe. What will become viewable is how this racialization maintains the epistemic and material conditions, which are created through a colonial mentality.

After I analyze all these issues, I will suggest that the discourse under view seems to revolve around this simple fact: only accepting the increasing visibility of Islam and Muslims in the European public sphere, through showing their non-rational and violent inferiority and hiding their visibility. Put differently, they show one more time that the permanent residency of Muslims and Islam in Europe can only be possible through representing and fixing them as irrational, violent, patriarchal and different from Europe; and integrating these ‘different’ beings to an essentially universal European culture by hiding their present reality. Therefore, what is ultimately being sustained is showing the *represented* and hiding the *present* reality of Islam. It is this encoding and fixing of an incommensurable difference between the religion of Islam and normative European culture and values which refers spontaneously to the idea of a “universal culture and values.” From this framework, the permanent existence of Islam and Muslims in Europe can only be possible in the framework of differentiation between Muslims as non-being, and Europeans as being. Therefore, through these issues, Europe shows us that Muslims and Islam can still exist in Europe, but only as non-beings in the context of ‘legitimate’ arrangements; which are manifested through what I exactly mean by the inclusive

exclusion, and affirmation through negation, a humanizing through dehumanization. In other terms, these strategies not only maintain the difference, but also affirm the difference through emphasizing the necessity of its negation in the framework of legitimate arrangements. As we see in these issues, through hiding and showing, Muslims in Europe have been systematically excluded from the “benefits” of the universal ideals of freedom of speech and expression, equality, and democracy. I suggest that this refers to the construction of a European self as a being and a Muslim Other as a non-being. This is the precisely racist construction of self and the Other.

CHAPTER V

HAUNTOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC CONDITIONS OF SPECTRAL RACISM IN EUROPE

As has been mentioned in the introduction, racism is a complex phenomenon and not limited to the descriptive representations of “Others”. Moreover, “[it] is not only a social phenomenon but it is also an epistemic question”⁵¹⁸; it consists of a set of hypothetical premises and presumptions which are produced by a specific epistemological frame. Racism is therefore a mode of knowledge production. From this understanding, this chapter aims to explore the epistemological conditions through which colonial racism produces a racialization of Muslims and Islam in a spectral form. Namely, it examines the epistemic conditions that justify and constantly reproduce a racializing discourse. In this context, the chapter draws attention to the hegemonic character of the modern epistemological universe that has kept a European colonial mentality alive. The chapter argues that due to this epistemology, the colonial mentality has never actually disappeared from Europe; and that the specters of colonialism constantly come back and haunt the contemporary European context by enacting a racializing of an Other to the European ideal vision of itself.

In order to deconstruct the formation of the colonial mentality, this chapter initially addresses Martin Heidegger’s ideas on the relationship between Western knowledge production and imperial power. In this sense Heidegger’s insights give a general framework about the formation and persistence of a colonial attitude within Europe. Heidegger finds the essence of a relationship between Western

⁵¹⁸ Ramon Grosfoguel, ‘Multiple Faces of Islamophobia’, *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, Vol.1, Iss.1 (Fall 2006), pp. 9.

knowledge and imperial power by showing how the Roman understanding of truth demonized the radical Greek understanding of truth; and thus justified its mistranslation and erasure from canonical history. He defines Western knowledge production, stemming from the canonical Roman understanding of truth, as imperial in nature, stressing that it hierarchized the earlier Greek understanding of truth into a true and false dichotomy. In the following quote from Heidegger the statement on the difference between the Roman and Greek “essence” of truth is made more prominent:

The essence of negativity is nothing negative, but neither is it something ‘positive’. The distinction between the positive and negative [un-concealment and concealment] does not suffice to grasp what is essential [in the Greek understanding of the truth] as *a-letheia*, to which the non-essence belongs. The essence of the false [for the Greeks] is not something ‘false’.⁵¹⁹

In this quote, Heidegger also displays how the Roman understanding of truth reflects an imperial character, while Greek does not. Heidegger’s standpoint on the Roman concept of “false”, which functions as a fundamental dimension of commanding, is worth mentioning; because the Roman conception of false is related to overseeing, supervising, and dominating the ‘Other’, which is foreign to Greek thought. This ground for knowledge production then not only pacifies the Other, but also reflects what Heidegger has described as the ‘fixed situation of the fallen’.⁵²⁰

After this basic understanding of the imperial impetus in the Roman understanding of truth, which works to shape the history of Western knowledge production, it is useful to draw attention to Michel Foucault’s perspectives on relations between society, knowledge, truth, discourse, and power, emphasizing Foucault’s criticism

⁵¹⁹ Heidegger, 1992: 44, cited in William V. Spanos, "Heidegger's Parmenides: Greek Modernity and the Classical Legacy" in *Modern Greek Studies*, 1992, pp. 97.

⁵²⁰ Heidegger, 1992: 41, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 99-100).

of absolutist suppositions about the truth. This statement is also worth mentioning, since it addresses another fundamental problem about the problematic aspects of Eurocentric rationality and objectivity. Primarily, that Eurocentric rationality is fixated on permanently producing visible and invisible hierarchies within society, and necessitates a production the Other in order to maintain its assumed sense of “truth”. Foucault mainly presents that the “truth” discourses of post-Enlightenment modernity are not external to the function of power; but rather they are internal to it. In this context, he draws attention to a new regime of power. ‘New regime’ here refers to an emphasis on the institutionalization of much more efficient and less wasteful technique. He explains:

We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: ‘it’ excludes, it ‘represses’, it censors, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.⁵²¹

Thus, knowledge production is ‘indissociable’ from the regimes of power that enact and function with it.

In his prominent work, *Power and Knowledge*, Foucault mentions that truth is indispensable from the structures of society. The effects of truth are thus produced historically within socially structured discourses. In this sense, he proposes a concept of the political economy of truth, which shows truth as centered on a historically specific form of scientific discourse, and its institutions. Truth circulates through institutional apparatuses of education and information; it is produced under the control of military, university and media complexes. And lastly it is the core issue of all political debate and social confrontation. In essence, power is attached to the political economy of truth.⁵²²

⁵²¹ Michel Foucault, 1977: 194, 1978: 17-49.

⁵²² Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980, pp. 120, 131-2.

The image of the Other is created by this political economy of truth. Social sciences and anthropology, being some of the biggest inventions of the nineteenth century, have been informing us about Other societies, religions, culture, and people. From this framework, this following chapter is composed into four sections. The first section draws on truth claims and knowledge productions about “Others”, analyzing the modern/colonial epistemic designs of colonialism. The second section analyzes knowledge productions about “religions” from the framework of the modern/colonial epistemic design. The third section focuses on the categories of secular Europe, and analyzes the contemporary political *framing* of Muslim immigrants within the Europe context of the modern/colonial epistemic design. This section further shows that these categories constitute an unassimilatable barrier to the possibility of Muslims being accepted into and accommodated by the nation of Europe.⁵²³ In the context of this barrier, the last section draws attention to the “clash of civilization” thesis, and the stigmatization of Muslims in contemporary European political discourse.

5.1. Modern/Colonial⁵²⁴ Epistemic Design and Epistemic Colonialism

The main assertion of this section is that any criticism of European political discourse, which has been shaped by colonial expansion starting from the fifteenth century, needs to be premised upon the criticism of a modern epistemic design. This design is mainly based on the dichotomy between “civilized Europeans” and

⁵²³ David Scott and Charles Hirschkind, “Introduction: The anthropological Skepticism of Talal Asad”, in *Powers of the Secular Modern*, ed. by David Scott and Charles Hirschkind, Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2006, pp. 10

⁵²⁴ Walter Mignolo (2002) uses the concept of modern, which is equivalent to colonial is not equivalent to “modernity”. The modern world-system analysis locates its beginning in the fifteenth century and links it to capitalism, and made visible the need to look at modernity and coloniality together. This analysis put colonialism not as a one of the components of modernity, but as a derivative (Mignolo, 2002: 60).

“uncivilized non-Europeans”. The hierarchical categories of this dichotomy has been shaped through a colonial mentality, which is based on the assumed centrality and hegemonic position of European “civilized” discourse over the world. While the image of the Other has existed even before established timelines of the colonial period in Europe; the concepts, institutions, and inventions of colonialism have systematically shaped the image of Other ever since the emergence of colonial power in Europe. It is a constructive mentality of Europe that has never disappeared since its initial appearance. Even though the traditional historical embodiment of this mentality, primarily in the colonization of Africa and Asia, has ended long ago, the mentality itself continues to manifest itself in a spectral form. This means that the mentality has transformed through time and has adopted itself to the new situations directing European discourse. Currently, the specters of this mentality haunt the European political discourse and racialization of Muslims and Islam. In order to understand this racialization, this section aims to examine epistemic colonialism, and its continued shaping of modern/colonial epistemic design.

Today it is a well-known issue that the discourses of anthropology, ethnographic studies and travel literature are the main elements which shaped the modern/colonial epistemology. The assumed hierarchy between European and non-European cultures, religions and civilizations has been fixed by these discourses. These discourses created the image of Self and Other, which legitimized colonialism and made it possible. At present the specters of colonialism haunts Europe, by racializing Muslims through the continued work of these discourses. Critical stances about the knowledge production of colonial epistemic design, shows how these categories, European “civilized” non-European “uncivilized”, have shaped through the above mentioned discourses. This criticism has been primarily based on the criticism of the relationship between power and knowledge initiated by C. Wright Mills in 1963. Mills addressed this relationship by first

mentioning that “the problem of knowledge and power is, and always has been, the problem of the relations of men of knowledge with men of power,”⁵²⁵ but he did not explain what this power is, or specifically holds it. In order to understand this relationship, it should be emphasized that this power is a form of colonial power, and was created by a colonial mentality, in order to exploit some part of the world in the name of a “civilizing mission”. I should be noted that when considered as a product of the “exploitative” nature of European industrialization/capitalism, this mission is ironic, not being about the genuine interest of “improving” the “uncivilized” but rather cynically pacifying them into more efficient forms of political manipulation, in order to make their exploitation more efficient by European power. In order to better understand the relationship between power and knowledge then, how power and the position of “power” is constructed by the “civilizing mission” manifested by the institutions of knowledge production should be further elaborated upon. In this chapter’s context, in order to better understand the epistemological conditions of racism, this section must go beyond Mills’s and Foucault’s criticisms then, and addresses the “decolonized” criticisms which have attempted to “decolonize” the recognized relationship between power and knowledge.

In the late 1960’s, anthropology began to self-criticize itself, recognizing how it was a product of colonial expansion, and functioned as a legitimate data supplier for the design of colonizers. This period was characterized by themes of colonial critique, the crises of representation and ethnographic authority, and the primacy of politics in anthropology. This movement began in the 1960s and 1970s and gained dominance in the 1980s. Talal Asad (1973), Edward Said (1978), Dell H. Hymes (1974), Pierre Bourdieu (1977), James Clifford (1983), Paul Rabinow (1977) and Michael Hezfeld are some of the prominent figures of the era, producing

⁵²⁵ Cited in Richard Brown, “Anthropology and Colonial Rule: The Case of Godfrey Wilson and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Northern Rhodesia” in Talal Asad (ed.), *Anthropology and Colonial Encounters*, London: Ithaca Press, 1973, pp. 173.

foundational work for this movement. They mainly emphasized the lack of attention to the political and ethical issues assumed in the scientific anthropological stance. They addressed the relationship between the discipline of anthropology and the colonial European powers, exposing how colonial powers used anthropological knowledge in the management of colonized societies. In other words, they criticized the discipline as being a tool of colonial administration.⁵²⁶

This knowledge production –the relationship between colonial powers and anthropological knowledge– started to be problematized in 1969 when Goddard and Banaji wrote a very critical article published in the *New Left Review*, emphasizing the relationship. Later, other writers also criticized colonial era anthropologists.⁵²⁷ Perry Anderson's pointed out this relationship in his 1969 statement: “colonial administration had an inherent need of cogent, objective information on the peoples over which it ruled”.⁵²⁸

Kwame Nkrumah, another well-known figure, asserted that anthropological knowledge production was begun after the abolition of the slave trade. He argued:

[w]ith the abolition of the slave trade, African Studies could no longer be inspired by the economic motive. The experts in African Studies therefore changed the content and direction of their writings; they began to give accounts of African society which were used to justify colonialism as a duty of civilization. Even the most flattering of these writings fell short of objectivity and truth. This explains, I believe, the popularity and success of anthropology as the main segment of

⁵²⁶ Lawrence A. Kuznar. *Reclaiming Scientific Anthropology*, UK: Alta Mira Press, 2008, pp. 89.

⁵²⁷ Richard Brown, “Anthropology and Colonial Rule: The Case of Godfrey Wilson and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Northern Rhodesia” in Talal Asad (ed.), *Anthropology and Colonial Encounters*, Ithaca Press: London, 1973, pp. 174.

⁵²⁸ Cited in Richard Brown, “Anthropology and Colonial Rule: The Case of Godfrey Wilson and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Northern Rhodesia”, pp. 174.

This quote points out that with the help of knowledge produced by anthropology, Europe undertook – and still undertakes – a “civilizing mission” after the establishment of a slave trade in Africa. After the abolition of the slave trade, in order to exploit Africa more, the duty of civilization to establish law and order among the 'savages' was declared. “In this process the ways of life and the systems of thought of the 'natives' had to be studied so that alternative ways of introducing civilization to them, or introducing them to civilization with the least possible cost, could be found”.⁵³⁰

In 1973, Talal Asad addressed this relationship by editing a book named *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind defined this effort as: “[he] was beginning to develop a skeptical mode of anthropological inquiry attuned to the ideological character of objectification and therefore, the historical and political conditions of formation of the apparatuses of scholarly investigation”.⁵³¹ In this book, he asserted that capitalist powers used anthropological descriptions to dehumanize the colonized people and to justify the exploitation of them. Then, he concluded that

anthropology is a holistic discipline nurtured within bourgeois society, having as its object of study a variety of non-European societies which have come under its economic, political and intellectual domination – and therefore as merely one such discipline among several (orientalism, indology, sinology, etc.).⁵³²

⁵²⁹ Cited in Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, “Some Remarks from the Third World on Anthropology and Colonialism: The Sudan” in Talal Asad (ed.), *Anthropology and Colonial Encounters*, Ithaka Press: London, 1973, p. 208.

⁵³¹ David Scott and Charles Hirschkind, “Introduction: The Anthropological Skepticism of Talal Asad”, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 1-11.

⁵³² Talal Asad, *Colonial Encounters*, London: Ithaka Press, 1973, pp. 109.

In the same work, Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed draws attention to how this knowledge was mainly produced by anthropology, in terms of the relation between anthropology and colonial rule. Anthropology was an aid to colonial administration and exploitation. The colonial administrators use the knowledge produced by anthropologists and developed their policy over time.⁵³³ He explained this relationship as: “European attitudes to the outside world in the imperial age had – and still have – a great influence on the thinking of many European scholars in various fields of knowledge”.⁵³⁴ This knowledge was developed and varied between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. The assumption followed that since Europe is the home civilization it then has a duty to civilize the “barbarians” and “savages” who always fight each other. As such, under these aspirations it was an organized attempt to “set a course for the European exploitation of areas that come under his power”.⁵³⁵

Another important figure was Dell H. Hymes. He offered his criticism with the statement: “anthropology is unavoidably a political and ethical discipline, not merely an empirical specialty”.⁵³⁶ He stated that anthropologists have been guilty of “scientific colonialism” and exploitation of indigenous communities, since they reproduce these societies as a profit.⁵³⁷ Another critical scholar Clifford Geertz mainly criticized the materialist tradition of scientific anthropology. He proposed interpretive anthropology as a corrective alternative; which focuses on culture, and

⁵³³ Helene Lackner, “Social Anthropology and Indirect Rule. The Colonial Administration and Anthropology in Eastern Nigeria: 1920-1940” in Talal Asad (ed.), *Anthropology and Colonial Encounters*, Ithaca Press: London, 1973, pp.123; Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, “Some Remarks from the Third World on Anthropology and Colonialism: The Sudan” in *ibid.*, pp. 261-4.

⁵³⁴ Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, “Some remarks from the Third World on Anthropology and Colonialism: The Sudan” pp. 261.

⁵³⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 261.

⁵³⁶ Dell H. Hymes, 1974: 48, cited in Lawrence A. Kuznar. *Reclaiming Scientific Anthropology*, p.89.

⁵³⁷ Dell H. Hymes, 1974: 49, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 89.

tries to understand the complex meanings of human actions, words and ideas. Also, he proposed to look at culture as a text, and introduced this as a methodological tool. This tool shows the constructedness of culture and human experiences, and the fictive character of anthropological writings about culture.⁵³⁸

In 1978, Edward Said published *Orientalism* and questioned the West and power/knowledge relations. This work created an intellectual space for a revival of the colonial question. In this work, he criticized anthropological knowledge by asserting that this knowledge is systematically biased; it does not accurately represent the Oriental world. His analysis mainly addressed that how Orientalism “justified colonialism in advance as well as subsequently facilitating its successful operation”.⁵³⁹ Clifford continued as: “[Orientalism] functions in a complex but systematic way as an element of colonial domination.”⁵⁴⁰ In 1986, James Clifford and George Marcus published *Writing Culture* with the same motives. Asad contributed to their book with an article titled “The Concept of Cultural Translation”, and critically addressed “translation” and “reading the implicit”, showing that

it is only that the process of cultural translation is enmeshed in conditions of power –professional, national, international. And among these conditions is the authority of ethnographers to uncover the implicit meanings of subordinate societies. Given that this is so, the interesting question for inquiry is not whether, and if so to what extent, anthropologists should be relativists or rationalists, critical to charitable, toward other cultures, but how power enters into the process of 'cultural translation' seen both as a discursive and non-

⁵³⁸ Clifford Geertz, 1973: 10, 17, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 90, 91.

⁵³⁹ Edward Said, 1978, cited in Meyda Yeğenoğlu, *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism*, Cambridge University Press: UK, 1998, pp. 15.

⁵⁴⁰ James Clifford, 1988: 268, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 15.

discursive practice.⁵⁴¹

Furthermore, Paul Rabinow and James Clifford stressed the fictional and constructed character of facts, knowledge and ethnography.⁵⁴²

Ann Laure Stoler also drew attention to the tie between the production of anthropological knowledge and colonial authority. Stoler suggests that “the discursive management of the sexual practices of colonizer and colonized was fundamental to the colonial order of things”.⁵⁴³ In this context, she critically analyzes Foucault's work on the sexual order of things, by drawing attention to how Foucault's works excludes colonialism. Although his work includes western imperial expansion, culture and the production of disciplinary knowledge, it does not focus on key sites in the production of discourse that is colonialist. Some others, Jean Comaroff, Nicholas B. Dirk, Aihwa Ong, Vincente Rafael, focused on this same issue by describing how discourses on hygiene, education, confession, architecture and urbanism have also shaped the social geography of colonialism.⁵⁴⁴

In the same manner, critical archeologists draw attention to similar disciplinary problems by criticizing the modern archeological approach. Shanks, Tilley, and Hodder are prominent figures of a postmodern approach that criticizes traditional archeology. This approach mainly draws attention to the dehumanizing, colonizing and alienating character found in traditional archeology. Hodder (1991) states, “that archeology does not appear to have been successful in encouraging alternative perceptions and experiences of the past, may be linked to the role of archeology

⁵⁴¹ Cited in David Scott and Charles Hirschkind, “Introduction: The anthropological Skepticism of Talal Asad”, in David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (eds.), *Powers of the Secular Modern*, Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2006, p.5

⁵⁴² Lawrence A. Kuznar. *Reclaiming Scientific Anthropology*, pp. 94.

⁵⁴³ Ann Laure Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995, pp. 4.

⁵⁴⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 1, 6.

and archeologies in power strategies in Western society”.⁵⁴⁵ In the same context, Shanks and Tilley (1987) mentions, “the truth in scientific archeology's denial of subjectivity is its reflection of the fetishized position of people in contemporary capitalism”.⁵⁴⁶ They all mainly criticize the interpretive nature of archeology and the reduction of human activity to scientific analysis, offering instead to look at the construction of past as an extension of contemporary power strategies. They state that archeologists are part of these power strategies. In order to develop a critical archeological perspective, they argue that it should go beyond the historical and social constructedness of classical archeology, and further politicize it.⁵⁴⁷

Chris Gosden criticized the creation of a “self” by the theories produced in the disciplines of anthropology and archeology since the 1850s. For Gosden, these disciplines constructed the mentality of a colonialism that “gave Europeans a sense of themselves through an understanding of all the peoples that they were not”. The European past was shaped by this gap between self and other, particularly beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁵⁴⁸ Nineteenth century thinkers used this view of colonialism to emphasize differences between Westerners and others.⁵⁴⁹ Even the European so-called “post-colonial” present has been shaping while still under this colonial influence:

[I]t is no simple matter to become postcolonial. The end of formal colonial and imperial structures does not immediately bring about a total shift in forms of thought and feeling. In order to explore what it might mean to be postcolonial, we need to look at the range and depth

⁵⁴⁵ Cited in Lawrence A. Kuznar, *Reclaiming Scientific Anthropology*, AltaMira Press, 2008, pp. 114.

⁵⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁵⁴⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 114-6.

⁵⁴⁸ Chris Gosden, “The Past and Foreign Countries: Colonial and Post-Colonial Archaeology and Anthropology”, in Lynn Meskell and Robert W. Preucel (eds.), *Companion to Social Archeology*, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, pp. 161.

⁵⁴⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 174.

of colonial influences, their continuing influence, and how we might unlearn these influences.⁵⁵⁰

In a summarizing manner, Nicholas B. Dirks states that colonialism was not only based on the power of superior arms, military organization, political and economic power, but also based on cultural power. In fact, it is a cultural project of control. In the framework of colonial knowledge production, cultural forms were reconstructed and transformed, and new categories were defined to emphasize the opposition between colonizers and colonized, European and Asian, modern and traditional, West and East, and male and female. Cultures were ordered by colonialism. Even what is known about culture was a bi-product of the colonial encounter. Colonialism and cultural formation reciprocally defined each other; culture is both the means and ends of colonialism. Culture became the fundamental of the formation of a class society, the naturalization of gender divisions, race and nationality. In this context, colonialism re-created Europe and its Others. This re-creation process was so important, that colonial powers did not colonize the nations just for economic profit, but for further protecting the nation-state form itself; which meant developing new technologies of state rule, class society and patriarchal society, by strengthening Western control over the development of world capitalism and gaining international cultural hegemony. Thus, colonialism should be thought in terms of a cultural project of control. This refers to its complex interplay of coercion and hegemony and its expanded domains of violence.⁵⁵¹

In the same manner, Walter Mignolo drew attention to the fact that Western expansion was not only economic and political but also educational and intellectual. The world became unthinkable beyond European epistemology.

⁵⁵⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 162.

⁵⁵¹ Nicholas B. Dirks, *Colonialism and Culture*, ed. by Nicholas B. Dirks, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992, pp. 1-4.

Modern epistemology which is constituted by philosophy, social science and natural sciences, was exported from Europe (North Atlantic) to the non-European world; which was degraded as being overrun with folklore, magic and the like.⁵⁵² He draws attention to the conceptualization of knowledge to a geopolitical space: Western Europe. By going one step further from Immanuel Wallerstein's "world-system theory", Mignolo pointed out the "modern/colonial world-system", emphasizing that the concept of the "modern" which is also equivalent to "colonial", is not equivalent to "modernity".⁵⁵³ Ramon Grosfoguel also criticized the economic reductionist understanding of the world-system. He suggests that power hierarchies of the world-system are broader and more complex than what is theorized in world-system analysis. Capitalist accumulation is only one of the multiple components of a present world-system. World-system should refer to the "modern/colonial European/Euro-American Christian-centric capitalist/patriarchal system". This long phrase is able to reflect the present multiple hierarchies which are all entangled with one another.⁵⁵⁴

In the 1990s, David Theo Goldberg contributed more criticism by introducing thought on "Eurocentric epistemic strategy". He addresses rationality, argumentation and reasoning, and their crucial role played in shaping the discursive universe. He states that rationality, argumentation and reasoning have material power for the exclusion of difference, and so, as such, they represent power relations. They are the crucial elements of racist discourse and (re)produce racist expressions. They shape racist discourses through making classifications, over generalizations, factual conclusions, and impose hierarchical orders which structure the concepts of inferiority and superiority that are implicit in racial hierarchy. He

⁵⁵² Walter Mignolo, 'The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference', *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 101.1 (Winter 2002), pp. 63, 90.

⁵⁵³ *ibid.*, pp. 59, 60

⁵⁵⁴ Ramon Grosfoguel, 'Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge and Global colonialist in the Modern/Colonial capitalist World-System', *Review* 25(3), 2002, pp. 203-224.

also draws attention to the role of language by emphasizing that race is coded in language. That is to say, semantics of race are produced by complex inter-discursive processes and the language of culture and nation which invokes a hidden racial narrative. Goldberg indicates that there are many aspects of racist expressions and racialization. If we look at the racist discourses more deeply, we can see that racist discourses and practices are used either directly or indirectly. In direct way, writing or speaking about Other negatively or positively is at stake. In an indirect way, there is no direct reference to discriminatory connotations; discriminatory opinions, stereotypes, prejudices, and beliefs are produced through both de-legitimizing the Other while legitimizing itself.⁵⁵⁵

Gayatri Spivak's critique about Western texts⁵⁵⁶ also makes valuable contributions to criticism of this Eurocentric racializing epistemology. She describes "epistemic violence"⁵⁵⁷, referring to the role of narration in creating a particular view or category, suggesting that different narratives can produce different realities. These attribute certain qualities to non-Western populations by assigning them into certain categories based on the assumption of natural differences. They also allocate populations or cultures within certain categories, by emphasizing the fundamental characteristics of them. This can lead to categorization of cultures and populations into stagnant and fixed groups.

In the 2000s, following Dussel's (1977) concept of "geopolitics of knowledge", Ramon Grosfoguel also draws attention to this strategy by proposing the term "body-politics of knowledge". By specifically underlying Western Philosophy, he

⁵⁵⁵ David Theo Goldberg, *Racist culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning*, Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993, pp. 46-57.

⁵⁵⁶ Gayatri Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp.113-4.

⁵⁵⁷ *ibid.*

states that philosophy has always privileged the myth of a non-situated “ego”. This disembodied and unlocated neutrality and objectivity of the ego is a Western myth. Namely, universal knowledge conceals and erases the power and epistemic location of the subject who speaks from a particular ethnic, racial, gender and sexual location. Speaking from the ego-politics of knowledge has allowed Western philosophy and science to produce a myth of about “a truthful universal knowledge that covers up, that is, conceals who is speaking as well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks”.⁵⁵⁸ Western philosophy and science have been able to produce this myth by delinking ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location and the subjects that speaks. This exactly reflects the epistemic strategy of Western global design which articulates the (re)production of a global racial/ ethnic hierarchy between Europeans/ non-Europeans; which is the inseparable part of the epistemic strategy of Western global design.⁵⁵⁹ This statement recalls Foucault's ideas; which emphasizes that the discourse of objectivity, impartiality, and universality are part of the regime of power.⁵⁶⁰ In this manner, Western epistemology conceals itself as being beyond a particular point of view. It constructs itself as superior with reference to the universal, while it codes non-Western knowledge as inferior, by emphasizing its particularistic character. This point of view fixes the hierarchical positions of knowledge, and justifies oppression and hegemony by the Western cultural tradition of other non-Western ones.

At this point it is useful to give specific examples about how colonial knowledge is produced in literature. Jan Ifversen addressed that from the end of the 17th century, ethnography and travel literature became popular in Europe. They shaped the

⁵⁵⁸ Ramon Grosfoguel, ‘Decolonizing Post-Colonial studies and Paradigms of Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking and Global Coloniality’, *Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World*, 2011, pp. 7.

⁵⁵⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁶⁰ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980.

relations between Europeans and non-Europeans as an encounter between civilization and non-civilization. Moreover, they shaped the narrative of the poles of home and outside. Throughout these narratives, the image of the Other and Self were defined. While the East has been imagined without any border, the Atlantic Ocean was like the mythological frontier between the known and unknown. Ifversen points out one of the most famous narratives, Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), proposing that it shows the embodiment of this differentiation between Europe/England, the home of Robinson, as the center of civilization, and the island/savage/Friday's home as the point zero of civilization. At the end of the story, the island, being the anti-thesis of civilization, wild and threatening, was transformed and civilized by Robinson, being from the center of civilization. Furthermore, with the emphasis on work and possession being the fundamental values of European civilization, civilization is defined as not only an inherent quality of Europeans, but also a process within which the island and non-European Friday are transformed into. Ifversen addresses a more striking point at the very end of the story, when Friday is civilized and he speaks Robinson's language they still never become equal; because civilization is essentially located in Robinson. Thus, in such a relationship, Friday can only copy civilization and be the subject of a narrative of civilization.⁵⁶¹ In this narrative, the image of European and non-Europeans reflects the ideological location of knowledge; which has been constructed by colonial epistemology.

What is understood from these critical stances is that there is a very well established modern/colonial epistemic design; which shaped and still shapes the discursive universe that surrounds societies and people. In this epistemological universe, as Balibar stated, human history has been reflected as an antagonism between civilizations; which are assumed to be founded upon cultural heredity and

⁵⁶¹ Jan Ifversen, 'The Meaning of European Civilization – A Historical – Conceptual Approach', Working Paper no: 51-97, Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus, available at: http://www.hum.au.dk/ckultur/f/pages/publications/ji/european_civilization.htm#notes

memory. This framework has been supported by anthropological categories through which different cultures and civilizations have been pictured as unequal, incompatible and heterogeneous. Therefore, racialization through cultural and religious differences has been central in human history, through which different cultures and civilizations have been pictured as unequal and incompatible.⁵⁶²

As Balibar states, the categorization created by modern/colonial epistemic design, created the idea of race and racism. As such, it is crucial to point out that although the concepts of race and racism are the product of modern epistemological design, the idea of race and racism are very old phenomena. Nicholson draws attention to the premodern formations of authority and cultural identity and he states that although there was no racial or physical descriptive code in that time, slavery had little or nothing to do with race, the most prominent statements about slavery are racist. He points out the Aristotle's statement about the growing criticism of slavery as the prominent example for this. More briefly, Aristotle criticizes people who

affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust (bk.1, ch. 2, 1253b, p.1130), ... some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule (bk. 1, ch. 4, 1254a, p.1132)".⁵⁶³

For Aristotle, the non-Greek primitive people were naturally suited for it. Nicholson states that although there is nothing in Aristotle's statement that is explicitly race or racism; it reflects a racist approach, since it fixed reality of the slave and freeman as the product of natural forces beyond control or reason. Racism, as a modern concept, has been using the same arguments to defend slavery

⁵⁶² Etienne Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?", pp. 26

⁵⁶³ Philip Yale Nicholson, *Who Do We Think We are?: Race and Nation in Modern World*, New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 2001, pp. 20.

and colonialism, genocide, and anti-Semitism. It is this context that Jews were perceived as a distinct group and identified in a particular way, even if there were no ethnic hostility against Jews.⁵⁶⁴ In addition to this, Nicholson draws attention to the arguments which points out the beginnings of modern racism in the monotheism and dichotomous structure of Christianity in the middle Ages. These arguments suggest that Christianity was responsible for bringing dichotomies into the Western consciousness. They draw attention that the definition of the Other in the medieval time is the collection of the imagined savage: hairy, nude, sexually aggressive male, darkly hued, and not a good Christian.⁵⁶⁵

In the same manner, while he is examining racism in Europe, Miles also draws attention to the Other in the representation of medieval European writers as a plurality of monstrous forms.⁵⁶⁶ As a result, it can be concluded that the roots of the idea of difference, inferiorization of the difference, and natural hierarchy between the differences based on very old and powerful foundations. On the other hand, the ideas about the difference have had a particular form and then they have been defined by the term race and its embodiments as racism and racialization by modernity. The perception and realization which is defined as racism today, have been manifested in different mediums and targeted different Others, but the term race and racism are the modern phenomena first manifested with colonialism. Benjamin Isaac explains this issue as

[there are] close links between the prejudices and ancient ideas about slavery. ... [P]rototypes of racism were common in the Greco-Roman world.... [However], obviously, in classical antiquity, racism did not exist in the modern form of a biological determinism. Clearly too there was no systematic persecution of any ethnic or presumed racist

⁵⁶⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 21

⁵⁶⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 22-4.

⁵⁶⁶ Robert Miles, *Racism After 'Race Relations'*, New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 16-7.

group.⁵⁶⁷

Balibar's statement clarifies this relationship more by mentioning that “there is no racism without theory” which means that a racist mentality always invents comprehensible theories and knowledge which are able to legitimize its racist acts. On the basis of this reflection, he notes that contemporary forms of racism, which are also called cultural racism, “racism without race”, “neo racism” or “differential racism”, rely on a theory of anthropological culturalism.⁵⁶⁸ In this context, racism “at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or people in relation to others, but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions.”⁵⁶⁹

In addition to Balibar, David Theo Goldberg, Paul Gilroy, Howard Winant, Ivan Hannaford, Barnor Hesse, and Michael Foucault draws attention that race and racism are intrinsic to European modernity. They suggested that racial categorization of human beings is an invention of modern Europe; it is the outcome of the Enlightenment rationality. In the same manner, Hannoford (1996) states that race is created by the Enlightenment methodological framework.⁵⁷⁰ Moreover, Balibar mentions that race the necessary to define non-man after Enlightenment that helps demarcate the boundaries of what constitutes “man”.⁵⁷¹ Drawing attention to Enlightenment characteristic of the concept of race and racism makes them political. On the contrary, arguing that racism is inherent into the European

⁵⁶⁷ Benjamin Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 1

⁵⁶⁸ Etienne Balibar, “Is there a 'Neo-Racism'/?” in *Race, Nation and Class*, ed. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), p.19.

⁵⁶⁹ *ibid.*, pp.21.

⁵⁷⁰ Ivan Hannaford, *Race*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996.

⁵⁷¹ Etienne Balibar, ‘Subjection and Subjectivation’ in *Supposing the Subject*, Copjec, J. (ed.), *Supposing the Subject*, London: Verso, 1994, pp. 198.

subject form is an absolutist argument and depoliticizes both the concept of race and the act of racism.

By following the above line of reasoning, it can be concluded that knowledge in this mode is always partial and hierarchical. It is produced from a particular power position, which has been constructed over years. Contrary to positivist claims, there is no objective, impartial and universal position, but there is an oppression and violation through the assumption of objectivity, impartiality and universality. European political discourse speaks from this particular position and produces knowledge about the Other within this hierarchical order by not mentioning this. In this context, the next section particularly addresses the knowledge production about “religions” from the framework of this modern/colonial epistemic design.

5.2. Secularism and Religion

After having explored the modern/epistemic design and the epistemic conditions of colonialism, this section will focus on religious knowledge production in the context of this epistemic design. For this, it initially examines the detailed genealogical work of Tomoko Masuzawa, who has also focused on this design in her work, *The Invention of World Religions*. In this work, Masuzawa presents a genealogy of the emergence of the concepts of “world religion” and “national religion”, within the formation of the “science of religion”. This genealogical work clearly addresses how the emergence of the “world religion” conceptual frame reconstructed the classical understanding of religions. It is also of crucial interest to this current work, to point out this reconstruction of understanding of religions by the term “world religion”, because with this reconstruction religion came to also function in relation to modern racial categorizations. Additionally, this reconstruction has shaped academic discourses about secularization, modernization and the othering of the “non-European” parts of the world. The main argument of this section is then, that modern self-definition of Europe as secular, is still haunted

by earlier modern/colonial epistemic definitions of religion. Namely, the specters of colonialism continue to haunt European political discourse, especially through the racialization of Islam and Muslims, from the context of the scientific design and definition of religions. Masuzawa's genealogical work helps us to grasp these specters of colonialism, by examining the epistemological conditions that work to produce the contemporary racialization of Muslims and Islam in Europe.

From its inception, the science of religion has proposed some key ideas through which to objectively classify the major religions. In the context of this classification, Oriental religions were identified first, at the end of the nineteenth century. These newly categorized religions offered European scholars a powerful typological framework for the emergent fields of Anthropology and Orientalism, and impacted a lasting effect upon the aims of religious studies in the contemporary European academy. These two emerging fields, Anthropology and Orientalism, identified and classified non-European societies as essentially different from European ones, and categorized Oriental religions in order to explain the characteristic features of non-European societies. These new fields went on to further promote popular presumptions about 'religion'. Categorizing religions also provided a powerful mode of explanation for the assumed foundational characteristic features of those being different from Europeans, and likewise allowed those "others" living within Europe to be perceived as "savages within". With Masuzawa's words:

This quickly became an effective means of differentiating, variegating, consolidating, and totalizing a large portion of the social, cultural, and political practices observable among the inhabitants of regions elsewhere in the world. This pluralist discourse is made all the more powerful [] by a corollary presumptions that any broadly value-orienting, ethically inflected viewpoint must derive from a religious heritage.⁵⁷²

⁵⁷² Tomoko Masuzawa, *The Invention of the World Religions*, The Chicago University Press: Chicago and London, 2005, pp. 20

This categorization and typological framework of religions, as belonging to a broad concept of “world religions”, continued to be shaped through the fields of anthropology and Orientalism, and has been functioning as an epistemological tool for othering since the 19th century.⁵⁷³

From this general set of starting points, this section initially brings attention to Tomoko Masuzawa's argument; which focuses on the genealogy of this design by emphasizing what she terms “Eurohegemonic principles”.⁵⁷⁴ These principles, she argues, have been effective from the late fifteenth century up until today, and are based on the presumed centrality and hegemonic position of continental Europe.

Starting from the late fifteenth century, Masuzawa contends, a new world order began to be shaped in favor of Europe with the help of colonial expansion and the progress of modernity. Despite the transfers of the ruling power over colonial trade between the regions in the eighteen-century, the presumed central position of Europe has not been challenged in time; on the contrary, it has become an inseparable part of modernity. European modernity had then also begun a transformation of Europe's relation to the rest of the world. In particular, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, a geopolitical shift happened, because colonial expansion changed the longstanding power relations between the “Islamic domain” and “European Christendom”. Because of this, the nineteenth century can be characterized as a “dramatic transformation” of Europe's relation to Islamic world.

The image of Islam was likewise transformed under the scrutiny of nineteenth century European scholarship. Islam was reconfigured as a prototypical Arab and Semitic religion. It was primarily defined by the assumed national, racial, and ethnic character of Arabs, and was perceived as rigid, narrow and inferior to

⁵⁷³ *ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

⁵⁷⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 186.

Enlightenment understandings of these categories within Europe.⁵⁷⁵ Masuzawa draws attention to a very clear example of this approach from Otto Pflleiderer, a German theologian of the era, calling it a “quick-stroke caricature”. He stated as

Islam, the religion of Mohammed, is the latest among the historical religions, a late after-impulse of the religion-forming power of the Semitic race. Founded by the prophet Mohammed under Jewish and Christian influences among the half -barbaric Arabic people in the seventeenth century, Islamism shares the monotheistic, rigidly theocratic and legalistic character of Judaism, without its national limitation; with Christianity, it shares the claim and propagating impulse of world religion, but without the wealth of religious thought and motivates and without the mobility and the capacity for development which beings to a world religion. It might be maintained, probably, that Islamism is the Jewish idea of theocracy carried out on a larger scale by the youthful national vigor of the Arabians, well calculated to discipline raw barbaric peoples, but a brake on the progress of free human civilization.⁵⁷⁶

Additionally, the Semitic character of Islam was emphasized very roughly in these caricatures. During that time, Islam was coded predominately as the most peculiar, irrational, and anomalous of the old religions. Masuzawa points to one of the overt manifestations of this claim; which posits:

Islam, the religion of submission, as it sprung up among a people who have preserved most faithfully their Semitic characteristics, has also remained faithful to Semitic religious conceptions. In nearly every case the gods of the Semites were lofty and terrible deities, before whom man crouched in fear, unlike those of the Aryan race. And Islam in its conception to Allah has made this the foundation-stone of their faith. It is a religion of fear, not of love; it is ultra-Calvinistic in its idea of destiny and its denial of free-will; while every one of its dogma is marked out with the utmost precision and the frankest literalism. Probably for these very reasons it succeeded from the first among barbaric races, on whom fear, fact, and precision always make a deep impression. Thus the religious experience of an enthusiast, preached with authority, commended itself to millions, mostly of an inferior

⁵⁷⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 179-180

⁵⁷⁶ Otto Pflleiderer, 1907: 274, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 199.

civilization, and become one of the so-called universal religions. ...More than any other religion Islam has shown itself unable to develop from within and to adapt itself to the varying needs of successive ages. The absolute authority of the Quran is the cause why... Islam is lifeless, and, because lifeless, cannot grow, cannot advance, cannot change, and was never intended to do so.⁵⁷⁷

What this passage accomplishes, clearly, is that because of its Semitic, national, and ethnic character, Islam did not belong to the class of “world religions” by the nineteenth century European scholars. Strikingly, Sufism was perceived as totally different doctrine than Islam. Particularly, in Pfeleiderer and MacCulloch's statement, Sufism was defined as totally foreign to Islam. Pfeleiderer openly states, “Sufism was not a genuine product of Arabian Islamism, even though ...”.⁵⁷⁸

Also, MacCulloch further defined Sufism as Aryan Islam, and suggested that Sufism has some pantheistic influence carried over from Buddhism. On the other hand, Buddhism was presented as an alternative to the (mono)theistic foundation of universalism. It was also construed as an Aryan and universal religion by the new science of language. This epistemological framework allowed theorists to try to describe a similarity then between the historical origins of Christianity and Buddhism, rather than Christianity closest monotheistic shared historical origins with national/ethnic Judaism and Islam. This framework attributed a universal character to Christianity instead, and drew an analogy between universal Buddhism in relation to a national/ethnic conception of Brahmanism. Masuzawa defines this situation as “the conquest of Islam” and the embodiment of Christianity as a true form of universalism, by virtue of the new sciences of religion and language. This placed Christianity in a privileged position, and secured it as a universal religion; a view which was subsequently expressed by prominent thinkers like David Hume and Hegel. Pfeleiderer himself described the genuine universality of Christianity by

⁵⁷⁷ Joan Arnott MacCulloch, 1904: 167, 172, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 196.

⁵⁷⁸ Cited in *ibid.*, pp. 202.

stating that: “...Christianity became the religion of religions, conquered the old world and let up to the new”.⁵⁷⁹

Christianity was represented in a way that recognized how it “emerged from the Semitic religion [of Judaism], but directly out of the ancient prophetic tradition, and therefore it was from the beginning transnational and transethnic in nature. A similar capacity is attributed to the nations of Greece, Persian or India, who are also perceived as Aryan, and also display the capacity to transcend their national particularities, by virtue of their propensity to universality. Near the end of the nineteenth century, this idea came to such a point that the intrinsic universality of Aryans and inescapable national, ethnic and racial limitation of the Semites was accepted. In this manner European hegemony in the military, economy, and politics has been perceived as absolutely trustable.”⁵⁸⁰

Moreover, the idea of a fundamental difference between Islam and Christianity had been established under these investigations of 19th century European scholarship into religion. Transformations of the image of Islam as a national, ethnic and Semitic religion, and Europe’s religious/spiritual self-identification as Indo-Christian and universal, were the main perceptions that set up the ground for these differences. This reconstruction and transformation occurred by virtue of the new language of the science of religion. Although, there were “negative”, “racially anxious”, and “self-serving” opinions, towards the end of the 19th century with regards to religions, “world religions” were still defined by the normative relations between three central religions: Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. Particularly, Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber gave this list of the world religions; while Weber expanded this list by adding Hinduism and Confucianism to it.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷⁹ Otto Pflieger, 1907: 273, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 202.

⁵⁸⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 205-206.

⁵⁸¹ *ibid.*, pp. 204.

Another transformation that came with the 19th century was how religion came to be explicitly associated with race. It was postulated that religion was not only an individual conviction, but also something intrinsic to a particular race. The prominent figure who put forward these kinds of claims was Ernst Troeltsch; who wrote an influential essay titled “Christianity and the History of Religion” in 1897. He suggested that culture and religion were historically determined, and in the case of Christianity it had a close connection to the development of civilization through Greece, Rome and Northern Europe. He writes:

All our thoughts and feelings are impregnated with Christian motives and Christian presuppositions; and, conversely, our whole Christianity is indissolubly bound up with elements of the ancient and modern civilizations of Europe. From being a Jewish sect Christianity has become the religion of all Europe. It stands or falls with European civilization; whilst, on its own part, it has entirely lost its Oriental character and has become Hellenized and westernized.⁵⁸²

This statement clearly reflects the attempts of a general trend in the 19th century to deorientalize Christianity, and make it fully appropriate and exclusively for the West; by drawing a definite line between European Christianity and its Semitic-Oriental origin.⁵⁸³ With this emphasis, the essentially superior character of both the West and Christianity is secured. Namely, as Troeltsch opines: “Christianity could not be the religion of such a highly developed racial group if it did not possess a mighty spiritual power and truth; in short”.⁵⁸⁴ In this epistemological frame, Christianity was necessarily defined as different from all other religions. It was thus posited as transnational, transhistorical and “uniquely universal”. That is, it was presumed as absolute and incomparable with other religions, which are regarded as particular and finite. In this context, the universal character of Europe

⁵⁸² Ernst Troeltsch, 1923: 24-25, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 320-1.

⁵⁸³ *ibid.*, pp. 321.

⁵⁸⁴ Ernst Troeltsch, 1923: 24-25, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 321.

has mostly manifested in connection to the universal character of Christianity; which was a product of modern epistemological projects.⁵⁸⁵

Moreover, as Talal Asad addresses, there is a general assumption about Christianity that fixes European civilization's democracy, freedom of speech and political equality as stemming directly from the Christian doctrine of “an universal dignity of man”. Recently, Francis Fukuyama has also suggested this idea. In the context of this idea, Islamic civilization was defined as having an absence of democratic traditions, and an essential inability to grasp the importance of political freedom. Asad has criticized this assumption by deconstructing the Medieval Latin concept of *dignitas*. He shows that this concept paradoxically “was used to refer to privileged and distinction of high office. Not the equality of all human beings”.⁵⁸⁶ Furthermore, with reference to 19th century scholars, he also asserts that the concept of modern democracy is perceived as coming from classical Greece, not from Christianity. Because of these conceptions, colonization of the “Rest” of the world has been an integral part of the European project of civilization.⁵⁸⁷

Similar contradictions were shaped by the categorization of religions as Aryan, Semitic and Turanic. Friedrich Max Muller proposed these categories in his work, “Introduction to the Science of Religion” from 1873. Particularly, the gap between Aryan and Semitic religions were emphasized in his writing. While Islam was defined as Semitic, Christianity was defined as Aryan. Aryan was additionally defined as having the “capacity for indefinite growth and never-ending development” along with a “natural gentleness”, whereas the Semitic was defined

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 323

⁵⁸⁶ Talal Asad, “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism” in Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood (eds.), *Is Critique Secular?, Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech*, The Townsend Papers in Humanities: University of California, Berkeley, 2009, pp. 22.

⁵⁸⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 22-4.

with reference to political and military history, and a violent impulsive energy inherent to it.⁵⁸⁸

Therefore, in all of these acts of categorization of religion, Christianity and Islam are constructed in exclusionary manners. The most crucial point that needs to be emphasized in these constructions is that they “create not only knowledge, but also the very reality they appear to describe”.⁵⁸⁹ By following the above line of reasoning, the second part of this section seeks to combine the above-summarized genealogy of religion with modern secularization arguments. As such, the presumed transformation from religious to secular is critical to understand how modern/epistemological designs continue to reconstruct Europe and Islam in a contradictory manner’ especially through the metaphysical binary between understandings of the religious and secular. Insomuch that, the theory of the modern secular is itself constitutive of “absolute differences”; which enable European political discourse to code Muslims as its opposite image.

This section addresses this particular issue by suggesting that the events at the end of the nineteenth century triggered the formative discourse of secularism. As Masuzawa argues, history was reconstituted as a scientific discipline; it was no longer an antiquarian interest. That is, history emerged as a science, and with it came positive political and social aims and effects. Also, along with this transformation, “comparative religion” and the “history of religion” emerged as well. With this emergence, the discourse of religion was not understood as pertaining to “dogmatic”, “apologetic” and “evangelical interests” anymore; it was taken up rather as an object of philological, archeological and anthropological research. In 1897, Ernst Troeltsch’s article, “Christianity and the History of

⁵⁸⁸ Cited in Tomoko Masuzawa, *The Invention of the World Religions*, pp. 212, 253.

⁵⁸⁹ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978, pp. 94.

Religion” was published. With this publication, at the beginning of the twentieth century, an increasing interest in Oriental societies and their spiritual cultures burgeoned.⁵⁹⁰ Although there were still a prevalence of negative images of Islam and Oriental societies, this new interest had sought to be more educated and objective. New conceptions of historicity were discovered and the image of historical Christianity was changed yet again. This new approach

destroyed the Catholic fiction of that the church simply represented the continuation of original Christianity; as well as the Protestant fiction that the Reformation represented its restoration... [Then] Christianity lost its exclusive-supernatural foundation. It was now perceived as only one of the great world religions, along with Islam and Buddhism, and like these, as constituting the culmination of complicated historical developments.⁵⁹¹

This was followed by, as Wendy Brown addresses, the emergence of the belief that critique displaces religious authority and prejudice with reason; it replaces faith with truth and science. However, critique was also comported with secularism. For Brown, this belief developed in the context of Enlightenment presumptions that “the true, the objective, the real, the rational, and even the scientific emerge only with the shedding of religious authority or 'prejudice'”. In Kant's view, everything must refer to critique; in Hegel's, the rational kernel of Christianity should be revealed; in the Young Hegelians' account religion should be criticized as an illusory consciousness; and in Marx's, religion is the condition of unfreedom and an expression of suffering. This approach to identify critique with secularism has also continued into the present, shaping aspects of German critical theory through Habermas. In the context of posing the question, “is critique secular?”, after informing briefly how critique comported with secularism, Brown concluded that

[c]ritique in this tradition had prided itself on explaining both mystification and human consort with these mystification from a place

⁵⁹⁰ Tomoko Masuzawa, *The Invention of the World Religions*, pp. 310-1.

⁵⁹¹ Ernst Troeltsch, 1897: 77-8, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 312.

imagined to be their opposite in every respect. Thus does the rational, material, real, scientific, and human aim both to explain and supplant the religious, the ideal, the unreal, the speculative, and the divine”.⁵⁹²

As a result, it can be concluded that this apprehension of critique, religion, and secularism creates a violent gap between the religious and the secular. In this discursive binary Christianity, secularism, reason, tolerance, free thought and speech are on one side, while Islam, fundamentalism, submission, intolerance, restricted thought and speech are on the other. From this framework then, the main assertion of this section is that this is another epistemological condition that allows the specters of colonialism to continue to haunt European political discourse; since this binary oppositional relationship is, as such, a hierarchical relationship between secular and non-secular identifications. There is no doubt that in this hierarchical relationship, the secular reflects the superior position. The constitutive force of the lingering colonial mentality constructs its other Other as also being non-secular; while constructing itself as secular. Therefore, the colonial mentality continues to haunt Europe by racializing the Other in terms of its modern conception of secularism.

In order to understand the racialization of Muslims in Europe, we need to point out clearly how the modern conception of secularism haunts European political discourse. Namely, as Talal Asad has addressed, we need to examine critically the “formation of the secular”, by deconstructing the theory of secularism; since the world is divided along religious and secular boundaries by hegemonic modern and secular epistemologies.⁵⁹³

Jose Casanova also examines this formation by focusing on the “triumph of knowledge regime”. He understands secularism as an ideology, as a generalized

⁵⁹² Wendy Brown, “Introduction”, pp. 11-13.

⁵⁹³ Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, pp. 166.

worldview, and as a social movement. He critically revisits the theory of secularization by emphasizing that this theory was developed more systematically in 1960s. This theoretical development of secularism continued to suggest that the religious and the secular are definitely two dualistically structured spheres. This division of the world into two spheres is a form of reproducing the myth, which assumes a socially progressive evolution of humanity from superstition to reason, from belief to unbelief, and from religion to science.⁵⁹⁴ He examines this theory by disaggregating it into three separate propositions and proceeds to analyze them separately. The three propositions are presented as follows; First “secularization as a differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms”, second “secularization as a decline of religious beliefs”, and third “secularization as a marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere”. For this theory, there is a “core component” in the theory secularization.

[It] was the conceptualization of societal modernization as a process of functional differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres – primarily the modern state, the capitalist market economy, and modern science – from the religious sphere, and the concomitant differentiation and specialization of religion within its newly found religious sphere”.⁵⁹⁵

Therefore, the general assumption of this theory is that “religion tends to decline with progressive modernization”. In the context of this theory, “public religions necessarily endanger the differentiated structures of modernity”. According to

⁵⁹⁴ José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 13, 17.

⁵⁹⁵ José Casanova, “Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad”, in David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (eds.), *Powers of the Secular Modern*, Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2006, pp. 12-3

Casanova, this understanding is “traced back to the Enlightenment critique of religion”.⁵⁹⁶

Moreover, he pointed out the connotation of secularization in the European context. He suggests that “secularization is overloaded with multiple historically sedimented meanings that simply point to the ubiquitous and undeniable long-term historical shrinkage of the size, power, and function of ecclesiastical institutions vis-à-vis other secular institutions”.⁵⁹⁷ Insomuch that, secularization became a “self-fulfilling prophecy”, that is “a theological process of modern social change: that more modern a society the more secular it becomes; that is, “secularity” is “a *sign of the times*”. The religious decline was proposed as the “telos of history”.⁵⁹⁸

In this modern normative perspective, every religion is expected to be committed to the criteria of modern secular, which are tolerance and privacy. In this epistemic universe, as John Esposito says, religion in politics and public sphere is potentially perceived as dangerous and fundamentalist.⁵⁹⁹ In this context, public visibility of Islam is perceived as a challenge to the differentiated structures of modernity. The current repercussion of this perspective is seen in the headscarves and minarets debate in France and Switzerland. More than that, it is claimed as a revolt against modernity and universal values of Enlightenment. Thus, Islam is represented in its alterity to Europe in the discourse of secularization. Religious communities are claimed as incompatible with the modern principles of citizenship. This framework furnishes the discursive and the conceptual construction of European and Islamic identity. It perceives the Islamic states as anti-modern, since they reject the

⁵⁹⁶ José Casanova, 1994:7, cited in José Casanova, “Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad”, in David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (eds.), *Powers of the Secular Modern*, Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2006, pp. 13.

⁵⁹⁷ José Casanova, 1994:7, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 16.

⁵⁹⁸ José Casanova, 1994:7, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 18.

⁵⁹⁹ Esposito, John, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 202.

Enlightenment value of secularism in the name of tradition. As a result, religion becomes the part of politics in these societies.⁶⁰⁰

The problem of this perspective is twofold. First, secularism is perceived as a particular historical process of the transformation of Western Christendom, and might not be applicable to other world religions, apart from other “universal” religions like Confucianism and Taoism; which have connection with an enlightened world-view.⁶⁰¹ Moreover, it emphasizes how the Roman Empire, the Enlightenment, and industrialization are key influences on European experience, and how Muslim societies do not have direct or intrinsic historical access to these experiences. Because of this, a discourse about civilization is foregrounded, and the people who do not have a “civilizational essence” are defined as not European; even if they are actual inhabitants of the European continent. This “civilizational essence” becomes particularly important in the formation of the contemporary Muslim identity within Europe; because Muslims are perceived as having a quasi-civilizational identity. Moreover, an antagonism is created through this discourse with Islamic civilization, and cause Islam to be represented as an existential threat to Europe’s civilization.⁶⁰² This theory of secularization shows, as Talal Asad has pointed out, that secularism is more than a political doctrine about the separation of religious and secular institutions; it is a phenomenon in which religion, ethics, the nation and politics all relate to each other.⁶⁰³

Second, this expectation imposes the “power of modern secular” and the “Enlightenment critique of religion” based on the violent power/knowledge

⁶⁰⁰ Satish Kolluri & Ali Mir, “Redefining Secularism in Postcolonial Context”, *Cultural Dynamics*, (14:1, 2002), pp.10

⁶⁰¹ José Casanova, 1994:7, cited in José Casanova, “Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad”, pp. 19.

⁶⁰² Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, pp. 166-9.

⁶⁰³ *ibid.*

relations created by a colonial mentality. This expectation ignores the fact that Islam as being simply a religion that follows different norms, and imposes a strict differentiation of public and private with regard to its acceptable practice in secular contexts. Moreover, this expectation ignores that secularization might affect different socio-political and religious structures in different ways. Namely, since Islam follow different norms compared to Christianity, Islamic societies are seen to have different patterns of secularization.

In the West, secularization is seen as a prerequisite for democratization, but in the Middle East it is mostly associated with dictatorship from the former Shah of Iran to President Ben Ali in Tunisia. The contradiction of secularists in many Muslim countries is that they favor state control of religion and often ignore or even suppress traditional and popular expressions of it; such a policy maintains a link between state and religion. More generally, in most Muslim countries secularization has run counter to democratization.⁶⁰⁴

Still, not only Islamic society, but also Muslims who live in European countries are perceived by secularism in the same way. Jose Casanova explains this by stating, “the formation of secular is linked with the internal transformation of European Christianity, particularly through the Protestant Reformation”.⁶⁰⁵ Therefore, the discourse revolving around secularism reflects a big split between Europe's definition of secularism, and consequent expectations about the secularization of Muslims and Islam. Namely, while the essential anti-secular character of Islam and Muslims are emphasized, they are expected to secularize and integrate to European values and culture.

More important than that, this discourse constitutes an absolute barrier to the possibility of Muslims being accepted into and accommodated by the nations of

⁶⁰⁴ Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, pp. 3

⁶⁰⁵ José Casanova, “Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad”, in *Powers of the Secular Modern*, ed. by David Scott and Charles Hirschkind, Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2006, pp. 21.

Europe.⁶⁰⁶ Casanova states that in a liberal secular Europe, Islam is differentiated uniquely from other religions. Although religious tolerance is one of the main issues in Europe, when it comes to Islam, the limits of modern secularist toleration with regard to Muslims are under question.⁶⁰⁷ Casanova continues:

Anti-immigrant xenophobic nativism, secularist anti-religious prejudices, liberal-feminist critiques of Muslim patriarchal fundamentalism, and the fear of Islamist terrorist networks, are being fused indiscriminately throughout Europe into a uniform anti-Muslim discourse.... The parallels with Protestant-republican anti-Catholic nativism in mid-nineteenth century America are indeed striking. Today's totalizing discourse on Islam as an essentially anti-modern, fundamentalist, liberal and undemocratic religion and culture echoes the nineteenth-century discourse on Catholicism" (Casanova, 2006: 80).

As a result, Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (1997) and Patricia Hills Collins (1991) have pointed out that a Eurocentric epistemology dominates the social sciences, and has a specific color and gender. Grosfoguel called this discourse a "Eurocentric fundamentalist discourse"; which assumes that democracy, universalism, rationality, and objectivity are inherently Western. Furthermore, this Eurocentric fundamentalist discourse constitutes itself through crude binary, essentialist, and racial hierarchies.⁶⁰⁸ In this context, Eze suggests that:

This epistemic privilege of the 'West' was normalized through the Spanish Catholic monarchy's destruction of Al-Andalusia and the European colonial expansion since the late 15th century. From re-naming the world with Christian cosmology and characterizing all non-Christian knowledge as a product of pagan and devil forces, to assuming in their own Eurocentric provincialism that it is only within

⁶⁰⁶ David Scott and Charles Hirschkind, "Introduction: The anthropological Scepticism of Talal Asad", pp. 10

⁶⁰⁷ José Casanova, "Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration" in Timothy A. Aynnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 78.

⁶⁰⁸ Ramon Grosfoguel, 'Epistemic Islamophobia and Colonial Social Sciences', *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, Vol.8, Iss,2, 2010, pp. 29-31

the Greco-Roman tradition, passing through the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and Western sciences that “truth” and “universality” is achieved, the epistemic privilege of Western, Eurocentric, male ‘identity politics’ was normalized to the point of invisibility as a hegemonic “identity politics”.⁶⁰⁹

In this manner, he challenges Eurocentric epistemology, by proposing an “epistemic racism” as the connective constitutive part of the knowledge produced by the social science disciplines of the 19th century. This concept of epistemic racism encapsulates the modern/colonial epistemic design that has been discussed in his current work up until now. He suggests that although epistemic racism is a foundational and older form of racism, it is still active; but social, political, and economic racism and sexism are much more visible and recognized in contemporary discourse than this epistemic racism. Epistemic racism, however, still grounds that we continue to inhabit a Westernized/Christianized modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system; which produces a hegemonic and essentialist thought system, wherein which the West is considered to be uniquely rational and the only legitimate tradition of thought. Against this conception, non-Western people are perceived as irrational and illegitimate bearers of thought. An inherent part of epistemic racism is thus constructed by a hidden dichotomy, which casts knowledge and discourse as being directed from superior Western males, and the inferior rest of the world. It hides the identity and power position of this Western speaker by proposing knowledge as a “common sense”, with reference to the myth of the western academy; where “neutrality” and “objectivity” are said to reside. In other words, it hides the “epistemic body-politics of knowledge and geopolitics of knowledge”.⁶¹⁰

In summation, this section has pointed out the reconstitution of religion in the framework of a modern/colonial epistemic design. From this framework, the next

⁶⁰⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 30

⁶¹⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 31.

section addresses the “clash of civilization” thesis, as a very direct and concrete manifestation of epistemic racism. It will show how epistemic racism is shaped around Islam, and works to colonize its legitimacy as a form of reasonable discourse. As such, Grosfoguel suggests, that “[e]pistemic racism in the form of epistemic Islamophobia is a foundational and constitutive logic of the modern/colonial world and of its legitimate forms of knowledge production”.⁶¹¹

5.3. Inferiorization of Islam through Secularism Thesis

This section draws attention to the secularization thesis, by arguing that by reemphasizing a superior position for Europe this, thesis functions to code Islam and Muslims as inferior. Secularist discourse institutes a hegemonic position for Europe, by claiming an essential conflict between the West and Islamic religion, securing secularism as belonging to Europe and fundamentally external to the Muslim world. Because of the fact that the secular presents itself as the ground from which theological discourses can be understood as a form of false consciousness⁶¹², reasonable and rational discourses within Western civilization are seen to be under a severe threat from the practice of religion and tradition; especially from Muslims. The political space has then, under secularism, been divided into two antagonistic poles. That is, it has created a contradiction between the West and Islam via a theoretical binary opposition between tradition and civilization. The main separating point being that culture and tradition are perceived as the only constitutive elements of Islamic societies.

Post-Enlightenment secular discourse defines religion as a system of personal belief, rather than a way of life. Because of this, it understands religion and

⁶¹¹ *ibid.*, pp. 32.

⁶¹² Talal Asad, cited in Satish Kolluri & Ali Mir, “Redefining Secularism in Postcolonial Context”, pp. 14

traditional beliefs as obstacles to modern political, economic and social development. This discourse works to equate secularization with progress, while equating religion with backwardness and conservatism.⁶¹³ Moreover, a declining of religion is figured as ‘normal’ and ‘progressive’ and secularism is seen as the ‘quasi-normative consequences of being a “modern” and “enlightened”’. It is expected that modernization will inevitably lead to secularization: “the more a society modernizes, the more secular it becomes”.⁶¹⁴ In this context, religion in politics carries either potentially to be extreme or moderate.

Additionally, secularism is perceived as belonging specifically to Europe. In this discourse views “the West as exemplary in attaining modernity which meant that all its spheres of social life could progressively distance themselves from religion, hence relegating Christianity to private sphere of individually held beliefs”.⁶¹⁵ John Esposito’s ideas state that the period after the European Enlightenment became the yardstick by which all other religions were measured, and it also delimited Europe as the West. After that time, the West has been founded upon the separation of church and state, whereas the Islamic world has made no separation between religion and politics.⁶¹⁶ Muslims are perceived to be submitted to the will of God in both individual and community life⁶¹⁷, since Islam has not encountered modernity in the manner of Europe through the Renaissance and Reformation.⁶¹⁸ In this context, the Western world perceives itself as being responsible for bringing

⁶¹³ Esposito, John, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, pp. 200-1

⁶¹⁴ Jose Casanova, 2004. ‘Religion, European secular identities, and European integration’: available at: <http://www.erozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html>).

⁶¹⁵ Meyda Yeğenoğlu, ‘The Return of the Religious’, pp. 246.

⁶¹⁶ Ghada Hashem Talhmi, ‘The Oxford Round Table: European, Muslim and Female’.

⁶¹⁷ John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, pp. 29

⁶¹⁸ Iftikhar Malik, *Islam and Modernity: Muslims in Europe and The United States*, London: Pluto Press, 2004, pp. 8

Muslims into modernity.⁶¹⁹ Evidenced by, as Malik states, current discourses emphasize that Muslims can only acquire peace and stability, by developing a secular position divorced from their Islamic heritage.⁶²⁰

This reflects a continued colonial “civilizing mission” by Europe. By imposing the necessity of secularism and modernization, it tends to regard Muslims as minors; in the sense of Chakrabarty’s definition of the term, which points out the semantic relation between ‘minorities’ and ‘minors’ as such:

Minority and majority are, as we know, not natural entities; they are constructions. The popular meanings of the words ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ are statistical. But the semantic fields of the words contain another idea: of being a ‘minor’ or a ‘major’ figure in a given context. ... The others were still the ‘minors’ for whom they, the ‘adults’ of the world, had to take charge, and so on.⁶²¹

This reflects the dominant discourse in European politics that is shaped through a modern/colonial epistemology, which shapes the general European perception about Muslims.

As a result, Muslims have been posed as a ‘challenge’ and ‘threat’ to universal values. Secularization is one of the main conspicuous topics in contemporary debates on Islam and Muslims. It functions for coding Islamic values as different from and incompatible with universal values and culture; which are perceived as essentially European in nature. Through this incompatibility with the universal, Islam and Muslims have been further coded as inferior. As Meyda Yeğenoğlu mentions, signifying the particularity of difference is a product of a power and

⁶¹⁹ Shrene Razack, ‘Imperilled Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim Men, and Civilised Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to Forced Marriages’.

⁶²⁰ Iftikhar Malik, *Islam and Modernity: Muslims in Europe and The United States*, pp. 1-5.

⁶²¹ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 100.

discrimination that establishes both superiority and universality. This process excludes the different by defining them as particular, and so inferior or other.⁶²²

This contradiction between superior and inferior reflects older colonial power relations. Moreover, in the context of the discourse of secularism, conclusions about Islamic and Muslim societies have been manufactured that frame them as essentially backwards and in need of modernization.⁶²³ These conclusions underline the difference between European and Muslim societies, highlighting the difference between European democracy and progress on the one hand, and a religious and backward character of Islam on the other. In more specific terms, Islam is not modern and if it is not modernized, as Casanova states, it cannot catch up with the European levels of political, economic, social, and cultural development. This framework further reinforces a clash between Muslims and Europe and Islam and the West. The next section addresses this “clash” as a reiteration of an earlier colonial racialization of Muslims and Islam.

5.4. “Clash of Civilization” Thesis and Epistemic Islamophobia: Contemporary Political Framing of Muslim Immigrants in Europe

There are some key spheres which shape the discursive reality about Muslims in Europe. The crucial one is that the religion of Islam is perceived as a heritage or a culture, which is claimed as being anti-Western in nature. This understanding has been supported by the thesis of a culture clash; based on the assumptions that Muslim societies are inherently and historically anti-Western. This domain furnishes a discursive and conceptual construction of Muslim identity from the framework of a culture clash.

⁶²² Meyda Yeğenoğlu, *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism*, pp. 103.

⁶²³ John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, pp. 202-3.

The historic confrontation of this framework was basically reinforced by the work of Bernard Lewis. In his well-known book, *Roots of Muslim Rage*, Islam and Muslims are portrayed as protagonists against Western values since the 14th century. Moreover, Muslims are described as aggressive, responsible for attacks and jihads, while the West is described as defensive, crusaders and conquerors. These essentialist and reductionist arguments reflect Muslims as a uniformly emotional and illogical race, that moves as one body and speaks with one voice. The attitudes and actions of Muslims are interpreted and understood through these basic stereotypes.

In 1989, Samuel Huntington has mentioned that the greatest division among Western and Islamic peoples will be cultural in the next decade; since Islam has been challenging the 'perfect' and progressive Greek-Judeo-Christian heritage. In 1995, he produced the 'clash of civilization' thesis in the framework of this opinion. As Sherene Razack (2000) states, this thesis has been primarily constructed through the idea that the West and the rest are seen as discrete and unrelated entities, because of their being at different levels of development. They have emphasized that Western culture has been steadily built upon its Greek, Roman, and Renaissance traditions; which value democracy, equality, individual rights, and rational thought, while the "rest" has not. This can be clearly seen in Samuel Huntington's thesis, which is the base of the 'clash of civilization thesis'. It draws on:

The West differs from other civilizations not in the way it has developed but in the distinctive character of its values and institutions. These include most notably its Christian, pluralism, individualism, and the rule of law, which made it possible for the West to invent modernity, expand throughout the world, and become the envy of other societies... Europe as Arthur R. Schlesinger Jr. has said, is 'the source –the unique source' of the 'ideas of individual liberty, human rights, and cultural freedom... these are European ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption.' They make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is valuable not

because it is universal but because it is unique.⁶²⁴

In the framework of these theses, Western civilization has been seen to be under a severe threat from non-Westerners. Hamid Dabashi states, with his famous thesis, that Huntington, “had practical advice for his Washington policy makers and other readers... [He] outlined the intellectual contour of a new imperialist agenda for the United States.”⁶²⁵ The most well-known figure who draws attention to the threat created by Islam in Western states is Ernest Gellner (1981,1996). He mainly draws attention to opposition and distrust between Muslim society and Western states. He suggests that Islam has produced an alternative order to the Western secular model, by aggressively expanding its culture.⁶²⁶ Gellner, openly mentions that Islam poses a fundamentalist challenge to the existing secular order, and juxtaposes itself against the secular state. (1993, 196).

This thesis reflects the reformulation of the transformation of the image of Islam, mentioned by Masuzawa, under the scrutiny of 19th century European scholarship. The Semitic image of Islam established by the end of the 19th century is still available and present in these representations. The stereotypical views of religions are also pushed by popular media. This image is not limited to a Semitic religion; but it has been recast as a prototypical Arab religion, as well. It has been perceived as rigid, narrow and inferior. That is, it has been defined by the national, racial, and ethnic character of the Arabs.⁶²⁷ On the other hand, the religion of Christianity has always held a privileged position as a universal religion. This can be clearly seen from David Hume's writings in 1756, Ernest Renan's writings in 1850s, and in

⁶²⁴ Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, 1995.

⁶²⁵ Hamid Dabashi, “For the Last Time: Civilizations”, available at: http://www.alati.com.br/pdf/2004/Separatas_do_Livro_de_New_York/pdf97.pdf

⁶²⁶ Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 22.

⁶²⁷ Tomoko Masuzawa, *The Invention of the World Religions*, pp. 179.

Dermesterer' in 1895. This privileged position of Christianity has been attributed it, because of the assumption that Christianity is a true monotheism, a unity, a singularity and a universality of the Deity. Buddhism, within this early typology, was presented as the only true alternative to the Christian monotheistic foundation of universalism.⁶²⁸ Masuzawa draws attention to the deep ambivalence in attitudes of Europe towards the East. For her, this ambivalence is less “psychostructural” than a direct reflection of a particular historical circumstance that aligns “Buddhism” with Christian appeals to the universal.

Ramon Grosfoguel argues that “[e]pistemic racism in the form of epistemic Islamophobia is a foundational and constitutive logic of the modern/colonial world and of its legitimate forms of knowledge production”.⁶²⁹ In this context, he points to the debate about Moriscos in 16th century Spain, as an example which was full of epistemic Islamophobic conceptions. Also, he draws attention to 19th century thinkers' arguments about Islam, which reproduces the same epistemic Islamophobia. A modern example of this is Carl W. Ernst (2003), who emphasizes the incompatible character of Islam with science and philosophy. Grosfoguel continues to point out epistemic Islamophobia in the social sciences, particularly emphasizing the influential ideas of Max Weber and Karl Marx. Weber mainly suggested an irrational, communitarian, and unscientific character for Islam and Muslims. In the same manner, Grosfoguel draws attention to the Karl Marx and Frederic Engels in terms of their racist stereotypes about Muslims and the religion of Islam and Muslims. For Grosfoguel they reflect the typical epistemic racism of an Orientalist vision. They emphasized the superiority of Western civilization and a need to civilize non-Western societies, particularly Muslims. Their opinions reflect the simplified, essentialist and reductionist views of Islam from a Western-centric

⁶²⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 187.

⁶²⁹ Ramon Grosfoguel, *Epistemic Islamophobia and Colonial Social Studies*, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, VIII, 2, Fall 2010, pp. 32.

perspective.⁶³⁰ When it comes to contemporary discussions about epistemic Islamophobia, it can be seen that the incompatibility between Islam and democracy is at stake. This image of Islam is portrayed in association with “terrorism”. This discussion emphasizes the inferiority of Muslims and Islam by using existing knowledge and well circulated stereotypes about Islam. Grosfoguel strikingly mentions that: “...the stereotypes and lies repeated over and over again in the Western press and magazines ends up, like in Gobbels' Nazi theory of propaganda, being believed as truth”.⁶³¹ In the same context, he draws attention to Edward Said's statement, which reflects the prominent example of this trivialization:

A corps of experts on the Islamic world has grown to prominence, and during crises they are brought out to pontificate on formulaic ideas about Islam on news programs or talk shows. There also seems to have been a strange revival of canonical, though previously discredited, Orientalist ideas about Muslim, generally non-white, people -ideas which have achieved a startling prominence at the time when racial and religious misrepresentation of every other cultural group are no longer circulated with such impunity. Malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form denigration of foreign culture in the West; what is said about Muslim mind, or character, or religion, or culture as a whole cannot now be said in mainstream discussion about Africans, Jews, other Orientals, or Asians.... [M]ost of this is unacceptable generalization of the most irresponsible sort, and could never be used for any other religious, cultural, or demographic group on earth. What we expect from the serious study of Western societies, with its complex theories, enormously variegated analysis of social structures, histories, cultural formations, and sophisticated languages of investigation, we should also expect from the study and discussion of Islamic societies in the West.⁶³²

The main assertion of this section is then that this discursive universe has been created through a colonialist, Orientalist and racist framework; mainly tending to regard Muslims as inferior beings. In other terms, regarding Muslims and Islam in

⁶³⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 31-3.

⁶³¹ *ibid.*, pp. 37.

⁶³² Edward Said, 1978: xi-xvi, cited in *ibid.*, 37.

this way demonstrates a colonial and Orientalist regime of images/stereotypes about Muslims; which functions by emphasizing the secular and universal character of Europe against a non-secular, violent and local essence of Islam. Some specific debates have been created with indirect references to the supposed inferior position of Islam. Therefore, a new form of violence and exclusion is at stake in Europe, rather than a war against terrorism. It does not simply reflect an exclusion of Muslims from politics and society, on the account of security or their inferiority, but, as I mentioned in the previous section, it is in the form of an inclusive exclusion and affirmation through negation.

The discursive frame about Muslims is currently openly shaped by the clash of civilization thesis. Particularly, after 2001, Muslims and Islam have been increasingly defined with reference to this thesis by many mainstream and right politicians and intellectuals. Muslim communities have been perceived as requiring the force of law to bring them into European modernity. Assisting Muslims into modernity is also perceived as an obligation of the Western world⁶³³ since Islam is viewed as not having encountered modernity in the form of the Renaissance and Reformation. This reflects a Eurocentric mindset which totally ignores the socio-economic realities of the Islam.⁶³⁴ Islam is seen as totally incompatible with modernity, pluralism, democracy and human rights. Left thinking politics has also described Islam as an anti-modern, anti-intellectual and anti-feminist ideology. Therefore, Muslims can only acquire peace and stability by developing a secular position, totally divorced from their Islamic heritage.⁶³⁵ Furthermore, according to the neo-colonialist and neo-Orientalist image of Islam, secularism is seen as something external to and even incompatible with Islam. As a result, the discourse

⁶³³ Shrene Razack, 'Imperilled Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim Men, and Civilised Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to Forced Marriages'.

⁶³⁴ Iftikhar Malik, *Islam and Modernity: Muslims in Europe and The United States*, pp. 8

⁶³⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 1-5.

has come to the point where Muslims are too different to be integrated in European values. However, this point of view has been reproduced via the binary categories of earlier Oriental discourse.⁶³⁶

In the framework of the idea of a 'clash of civilization', Western civilization is seen to be under a severe threat, mainly from Muslims.⁶³⁷ Therefore, the policing of Muslim communities is organized under the logic that there is an irreconcilable culture clash between the West and Islam. As Razack states that this culturalist approach, which does not possess a commitment to human rights and woman rights or democracy, enables the stigmatizing of Muslim communities as tribal in nature and stuck in pre-modernity. Therefore, the notion of Europeanness produces a dichotomy of the civilized citizen and the barbarian other. Old colonial technologies are renewed and the configuration of Islam versus the West over the hegemonic framing of the New World Order. There are also close connections between assertions of cultural difference and racism. Today, the culture clash in the West is organized around the Muslim other, expressing European superiority.⁶³⁸ There is an attempt then to assimilate American and European cultures into a single model, that posits them as a Christian monolithic entity. As a result of this, Europe constantly reminds Muslims that they can only be Muslims in Europe by emphasizing Europe's Judeo-Christian heritage; which reinforces the impression of an ongoing clash of civilizations. In following this, Europe tries to order the temporal implications of different pasts and possible futures. The Judeo-Christian interpretation of Europe's essential past, leads to a simultaneity of different cultures, namely Islam; and refers to these other cultures as belonging to a civilizational of backwardness and fundamentalism. As a result, the civilizational

⁶³⁶ Ruba Salih, 'The Backward and the New: National, Transnational and Post-National Islam in Europe', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30:5, 995-1011, 2004.

⁶³⁷ Iftikhar Malik, *Islam and Modernity: Muslims in Europe and The United States*, pp. 1-5.

⁶³⁸ Shrene Razack, 'Imperilled Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim Men, and Civilized Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to Forced Marriages'.

dimension of Islamic culture has become prominent.⁶³⁹ Moreover, the language of the cold war has been adapted to the language of Islam by the West. This frame allows explanations about Islam which helps Europeans and Americans understand the rise of terrorist attacks at the turn of the millennium. This frame also transfers irrational fears about the future to a more acceptable ‘Islamophobia’, which is connected to the fear of real multicultural society in which Islam may become a recognized and meaningful part of European society and history. Marranci discusses ‘islamophobia’ after September 11th, 2001, claiming that it stems from a defense for resistance against Islam and multiculturalism, driven by a wholesale fear of Islam. This fear continues to transform what Europe is today.⁶⁴⁰

Schiffauer explains that after September 11, 2001, =immigrants were considered as different and unequal, and had to be taken care of rather than integrated into the political system.⁶⁴¹ It marks differences between Islam and the West, and the imagined boundaries between Islamic culture and Western civilization. Cultural and religious signifiers are the most important factors for developing islamophobia; which spreads through the misrepresentation of the Muslim world and the representation of their life-style as alien from Western society. Hence, European media and politicians try to show how Islam is incompatible with Western culture, and dangerous for Western civilization; by assuming this Islamic “barbaric” culture is founded on anti-Western values. As a result, it has reinforced the myth of a Europe founded on Judeo-Christian values.⁶⁴² Furthermore, Sherene Razack shows

⁶³⁹ Monika Wohlarb-Sahr, ‘Integrating Different Pasts, Avoiding Different Futures?: Recent conflicts about Islamic religious practice and their juridical solutions’, *Time & Society*, 13:1, 51-70, 2004.

⁶⁴⁰ Marranci, Gabrielle, ‘Multiculturalism, Islam and the Clash of Civilizations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia’.

⁶⁴¹ Werner Schiffauer, ‘Enemies within the Gates. The debate about the Citizenship of Muslims In Germany’, ed. Tariq Mood, Anna Triandafyllidou and Richard Zapata-Barrero, in *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006.

⁶⁴² Marranci, Gabrielle, ‘Multiculturalism, Islam and the Clash of Civilizations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia’.

how media interventions identify the pre-modern Muslim other as a threat to European Jews, as well as to other Europeans. Therefore, the West is figured as facing a considerable challenge from the Islamic world, since large numbers of Muslims still live in Europe now.⁶⁴³

Especially after various acts of terrorism, there has been an underlying tension between Western and Islamic values. Therefore, the notions of insecurity and fear have radically changed the perspective on multiculturalism within Europe, and transformed the debate into a debate on 'radical' Islam and the 'war' on terror.⁶⁴⁴

As a result, Muslims in Europe are seen as a potential Islamic danger, since Islam has been designated as a potential internal enemy. Internal and external securities are embedded in the figure of the 'enemy within' or of the 'outsider inside'; which is characterized by immigrants who are the foreigners while also national citizens. Since as Ruba Salih states that Muslims are the subject of increasing xenophobia and racism, the visibility of Muslims in public sphere has provoked increased official discourse on Muslims in Europe, predominately with reference to a theme of losing control of civilization. Essentialist and self-defensive dispositions towards Islam in the West may lead to a kind of hands-off approach, favored by an extreme cultural relativism which discounts universal values as not valid for the Middle East and for Muslim communities in the West. Secular voices run the risk then of overlooking the very complex reality, and the diverse and conflictual, political and cultural projects that characterize European Islam.⁶⁴⁵

In summation, there a domain which shapes the discursive universe that distinguishes European values and Islam. First, Islam is a unifying factor in

⁶⁴³ Shrene Razack, 'Imperilled Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim Men, and Civilized Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to Forced Marriages'.

⁶⁴⁴ Marc de Leeuw, and Sonja van Wichelen, "Please, Go Wake Up' Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the 'War on Terror' in the Netherlands".

⁶⁴⁵ Ruba Salih, 'The Backward and the New: National, Transnational and Post-National Islam in Europe'.

Europe against Muslims, since Islamic principles are claimed as essentially anti-Western. Secular tradition as a result of the Enlightenment is the other key point. And a third point is the clash of culture thesis, which refers to the civilized Western against a barbaric Islamic culture. This framework can furnish discursive and conceptual constructions of both European and Islamic identity, and allows one to understand how Muslims are conceived of as extremely 'different', 'anti-modern', 'anti-Enlightenment', 'alien', and 'dangerous' to European identity.

CHAPTER VI

COLONIAL HAUNTOLOGY AND MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF SPECTRAL RACISM IN EUROPE

The political and social situation described so far reflects the Janus-faced character of modern civilizations, shaped by modern forms of power, which is to say: creation and destruction are inseparable parts of it. We can see this by looking at the prominent events of the colonization of Asia and Africa, the Holocaust, and Apartheid in South Africa and now in Europe ⁶⁴⁶; which have come through the modern forms of power and civilization. As has been mentioned before, mainstream discourse tends to distance itself from these past events. Only the Holocaust is allowed to be perceived as an extreme violence produced by Europeans inside borders of Europe. Likewise, it is coded as a form of extreme physical violence against Jewish people manifested by an “extraordinary” Nazi governmentality. This viewpoint can be easily seen from the majority of Holocaust narratives. In documentaries, films, and books; the Holocaust is generally reflected as a form of unprecedented extreme physical violence against Jews, conducted specifically by Nazi power. Films about the Holocaust particularly propagandize this image of anti-Semitism; by showing members of the Nazi army as psychopathological figures, whose policies and regulations created the Holocaust. All responsibility for this mass extermination is attributed to the Nazi government. In this way, Nazism and its well-known figures have been blamed and prosecuted as the only conductors of this mass extermination. What this works to do, is fix the narrative of racism conducted as instrument of power as an inconsistency; which

⁶⁴⁶ Etienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, trans. by. James Swenson, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

refers to a regretful use of power, but with no reason as to why or how power has used it as such. Inconsistency allows for an apologetic way of talking about racism, describing it as an extraordinary and horrific violence manifested by the particular use of it in the context of the Nazi government's racist regulations. In this narrative, there is no locatable reason and decision of racism beyond its inappropriate or misuse by an organized power. However, this shadows the rational and well-planned character of racism that exists in Europe; in which it is always considered to be an 'extraordinary' product of a faulty organization, rather than a possible condition existent in the very configuration of ideal European organized power itself. The narrative of the Holocaust, as institutionalized racialization followed by the extermination of Jews, is secured then as the standard exemplary of racism in Europe. In the context of this narrative, today, racism is perceived then as a marginal phenomenon, and connects with xenophobic and far right extremist party policies.

This framework is not enough though to understand and analyze the Holocaust, neither in its particular Nazi context, nor as a symptom of European racism in general. In order to adequately understand the analysis of the Holocaust then, the unwritten/invisible/hidden/unspeakable part of European racism should be focused on. Once this focus comes into view, it becomes possible to deconstruct the "comforting explanations" of the Holocaust. To effectively do this, Griselda Pollock's term for the "false comfort of pre-known and pre-destined historical narratives"⁶⁴⁷; which show events as historically unavoidable, has to be disturbed. Namely, the conditions -material and epistemological- that gave rise to this instance should be interrogated. In other terms, the moment and the results of the Holocaust needs to be radically opened, and questions about what made that kind of extreme physical violence possible should be allowed to come forward.

⁶⁴⁷ Griselda Pollock, "Concentrationary Legacies: Thinking Through the Racism of Minor Differences", in *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Ed. by Graham Huggan and Ian Law, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, pp.28.

Particularly, which conditions and factors made the Holocaust possible in a Europe that had become committed to a post-Enlightenment project of securing universal values? Also a follow up question about how this commitment provided not only a potential to exterminate some people because of their religious beliefs, culture, physical conditions, or age; but also how in the Nazi context they could come together and be rendered as legitimate. To simply regard this Nazi context is 'exemplary' with regard to anti-Semitism, is to carry a gross injustice to anti-Semitism in the Pan-European context. Anti-Semitism was not, and still is not, merely and isolated phenomenon particular to the Nazi context. Anti-Semitic thinking and structure were contemporary to the Nazi Project, not only during, but also before and after the Holocaust. This fact points anti-Semitism, as a form of racism, as not only a product of organized power, but also pre-figured as symptom of something deeper in the frame establishing the rights of power itself. The frameworks that understand racism in Europe as 'a particular Nazi problem' are basically committing to the "post hoc ergo propter hoc" fallacy: "because of this so this".... Racism in Europe (anti-Semitism in this case) is placed as a direct causal product of Nazism, this is logically fallacious, because there are clearly correlative elements that work alongside it. Likewise, racism cannot simply be regarded as a product of a different form of correlated organization either, like with anti-Semitic sympathizers before, during and after the Holocaust, because then we commit similar fallacy. What is needed is anti-Semitism must be viewed as part of the very fabric of the possibility for both direct and correlative organizations, which lead to the historical events of its production. It is radically then, before production itself, at the very ground of the ideal liberal frame which allows production to take place.

This questioning would lead us to analyze European racism as a complex phenomenon, which cannot be limited to a specific set of violence 'against' Jews, designed and conducted merely by Nazi policies. Moreover, this questioning would challenge us to overcome the restricted understanding of racism as a social construct, a violence against European Jews or a violence against immigrants

because of economic and political problems; it would force us to understand the conditions under which European racism in this instance has been produced. Primarily, it gives a way to analyze European racism, not only as an instance directed ‘against’ some people, races, culture, religion, age or a way of life, but also as a phenomenon constantly formed by certain epistemological and material condition at the ground of the possible production itself. This way of analysis will then be able to point out how racism in Europe continues to racialize; especially in the contemporary context of Muslims and Islam within the borders of Europe. Without deconstructing the “comforting explanations” of colonialism and the Holocaust, anti-racist discourse of Europe would not be efficient and effective.

For this, the first step should be the acceptance that the Holocaust is not only an event that happened at a certain time and place, which has also ended. This becomes clear when we recognize that it is rather a phenomenon that has the potential to re-iterate. It is then not an event created only by the Nazi organization; but rather it is a ‘mentality’ which was organized by Nazi government upon the base of Eurocentric epistemological conditions, detailed in the previous chapter. ‘Mentality’ is a term that needs to be better defined here; mentality is what turns racism into the instrument ‘anti-Semitism’, but that instrument, as a matter of the mathematical ‘fractal’ metaphor ‘iteration’ is ‘an applied function’ in the Nazi case. This ‘function’ (which can re-iterate in diverse situations/events that are tied to a Eurocentric domain, including the Nazi case) is part of the Eurocentric epistemological conditions which allow its application for use/development. In this sense, to carry the metaphor fully through, any iteration of the Eurocentric epistemological conditions will have racism built into the very ‘dimension’ of its functional production. Therefore, this mentality could be said to be an applied ‘function’ stemming from the set of Eurocentric epistemological conditions.

It is an *iteration* of colonial thinking and structure that have been created by a modern/colonial epistemic design. It is not a simple repetition; because it is a repetition of the past in the present, but not in an identical way as would occur in a

completely ideal space. This is because this repetition alters the function, which means that after this repetition something new takes place. However, “[it] supposes a minimal remainder (as well as a minimum of idealization) in order that the identity of the *selfsame* be repeatable and identifiable *in, through, and even in view of its alteration*.”⁶⁴⁸ At present, colonialism iterates in the context of “Europism”⁶⁴⁹ that is based on the defeat of Europe. As mentioned before, this concept is offered by Philomena Essed to emphasize the changing structure of Eurocentricism. While the borders of Europe were extending during the colonization of Africa and Asia, today it is declining its borders in order to exclude the 'other' on the base of the 'Fortress Europe' ideology, protecting Europe against the rest of the world and constructing new enemies. In most xenophobic accounts, for example, these enemies are predominantly figured as first, second and third generation racial and ethnic minorities, and other refugees who are presumably coming to Europe to take advantage of Western Europe welfare.⁶⁵⁰ However, this does not mean that colonial Eurocentricism has disappeared; instead it has been repressed and integrated into the “Fortress Europe” ideology, by virtue of its re-iteration upon previous colonial iterations.

In the context of *iteration*, today the colonialist mentality re-iterates, since the conditions of colonialism and racism are still valid. As Goldberg mentions, “race refuses to remain silent” and it still operates: “it is not just a word. It is a set of *conditions*, shifting over time. Never just one thing, it is a way (or really ways) of thinking, a ways(s) of living, a disposition”.⁶⁵¹ Particular cases, addressed in the fourth chapter, show that the recent political discourse of Europe has been attributing certain qualities to Muslim immigrants and Islam in general, and

⁶⁴⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, pp. 53.

⁶⁴⁹ Philomena Essed, “Intolerable Humiliations” in Graham Huggan and Ian Law (eds.), *Racism, Postcolonialism, Europe*, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 2012, p.139.

⁶⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁶⁵¹ David Theo Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’, pp. 337.

allocates them within certain categories; by either showing or hiding their presence in European public space. That is, “race refuses to remain silent”. Although the precise contours of the patterns of colonialism and racism may vary from country to country, and the individual countries may have divergent discourses on the inclusion and exclusion of Muslims, the issue of racism in Europe has a persisting characteristic because it is intrinsic to the very epistemic and material conditions of European politics. Namely, colonialism and racism re-iterate, because Europe has an epistemic and material design in which colonialism and racism are the constitutive elements. In this context, this chapter will mainly focus on the material conditions of European colonialism and racism. That is to say, this chapter attempts to analyze the non-epistemic condition –materiality– through which we can understand why the specters of colonialism constantly haunts European politics.

Material conditions mean observable sets of discursive practices (scientific, economic, political, etc.), which can be observed as symptomatic of an underlying presence of epistemic conditions that ‘haunt’ from earlier European colonial projects. The term hauntology refers then to exposing the epistemic conditions that are covered up by the claims of discourse, showing that the ‘ghost’ of earlier forms of discourse still ‘haunt’ contemporary ones. The ghost of colonialism then is not a matter of speculation, but rather an observable spectral presence in the material site of contemporary discourse.

Zigmund Bauman addresses these conditions and factors by stating that the “ingredient of the Holocaust was within the realm of what is considered normal in western societies- these ingredients were just mixed together in a unique combination”.⁶⁵² So, the holocaust was a “test of the hidden possibilities of modern society”.⁶⁵³ He emphasizes that it was developed in a bureaucratic, rational manner

⁶⁵² Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 12.

⁶⁵³ *ibid.*, pp. 12.

-using such procedures like a means-ends calculus, budget balancing, universal-rule application; it was truly modern. He writes as:

[...] the rules of instrumental rationality are singularly incapable of preventing such phenomena [like the holocaust]; that there is nothing in those rules which disqualifies the Holocaust-style methods of 'social-engineering' as improper or, indeed, the actions they served as irrational. I suggest, further, that the bureaucratic culture which prompts us to view society as an object of administration, as a collection of so many 'problems' to be solved, as 'nature' to be 'controlled', 'mastered' and 'improved' or 'remade', as a legitimate target for 'social engineering', and in general a garden to be designed and kept in the planned shape by force (the gardening posture divides vegetation into 'cultured plants' to be taken care of, and weeds to be exterminated), was the very atmosphere in which the idea of the Holocaust could be conceived, slowly yet consistently developed, and brought to its conclusion. And I also suggest that it was the spirit of instrumental rationality, and its modern, bureaucratic form of institutionalization, which had made the holocaust-style solutions not only possible, but eminently 'reasonable' - and increased the probability of their choice.⁶⁵⁴

Bauman addresses that the following three conditions made the Holocaust possible: the violence is *authorized* by official orders; actions are *routinized* by rule governed practices and exact specification of roles; and lastly, victims are *dehumanized* by ideological definitions and indoctrinations.⁶⁵⁵ This statement is true but still is not enough to explain how the violence was authorized, actions were routinized and victims were dehumanized; through which exact conditions do these conditions become possible?

To explain these conditions, this chapter asserts that these conditions were possible and is still possible because of a paranoid style of politics, the mechanisms of a "racial state", and the globalization process. The paranoid mode in European politics has been created through a rhetorical framework which suggest that threats

⁶⁵⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 18.

⁶⁵⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 21

against constitutive European values, secularism and freedom of expression are no longer external, but have infiltrated and dispersed throughout the system. The paranoia of a possible attack to universal and humanistic European values from the presence of “Other” cultures, which have been tolerated for many years, has recently been taken up and extended through the paranoid mode of European politics. This mode has been working to strengthen “the borders” between Europe and Muslims. However, these borders are not physical and territorial borders; which is to say they do not exclude the Other to an exteriority, but rather they include the Other through an interiorized exclusion. This chapter asserts that this current mode of the paranoia has been secured through a modern/colonial material design of Europe, which has constituted itself through discourses on multiculturalism and tolerance, “racial states”, and the recent globalization process. This design works a seeming paradoxical inclusive exclusion of Muslims from politics, public presence, and the benefits of universal values.

In this framework, by referring to Richard Hofstadter's *paranoid style of politics*⁶⁵⁶, the first section explains the rhetoric and mechanics of a paranoid style of European politics, situating it as a material condition for the spectral racism which currently racialize European Muslims and Islam. The second section addresses the always divisive character of multiculturalism and tolerance, as a practical extension of the materiality of the paranoid style. The third section focuses the modern state structure with reference to Michel Foucault's concept of a “racial state”, showcasing it as another material condition for spectral racism. And finally, the last section of not only this chapter but also this dissertation focuses on the globalization process as a material condition of spectral racism in Europe. As a result, this chapter directly addresses the conditions through which the specters of

⁶⁵⁶ Richard Hofstadter, ‘The Paranoid Style in American Politics’, *Harper's Magazine*, November, 1964.

colonialism haunt the political scene of Europe and racialize European Muslims and Islam.

6.1. Paranoid Style of European Politics

This section offers a close reading of Hofstadter's *paranoid style*. It also aims to develop an understanding of how European political discourse has been and is being shaped through this paranoid style. In order to do this, this section will initially give more information about the "paranoid style of politics" in Hofstadter's article, which is elaborated through an American context. Then it will address the specific paranoid style of European politics. In all, the main argument is that European political discourse, which is haunted by the specters of colonialism, is determined through a "paranoid style" of politics, as defined by Richard Hofstadter in his article "The Paranoid Style in American Politics" (1964).⁶⁵⁷ It should be noted as well that even though there are many styles articulating paranoia in European politics, recent regulations and political discourse on Muslims and Islam shows us the institutionalization of a paranoid style as paranoid mode.

In his prominent article, Hofstadter states that paranoia is a mode of rational political thinking, and that conspiratorial thinking gives legitimacy to various paranoid styles of politics. He defines this style by historically tracing its appearance within American political history. Furthermore, this term, 'paranoid', does not refer to its use in a normal clinical psychological sense. He explains the reason why he uses this term in an unconventional manner, stating that: "[s]imply because no other word adequately evokes the qualities of heated exaggeration,

⁶⁵⁷ *ibid.*

suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy that I have in mind”.⁶⁵⁸ He mentions that he uses the term “much as a historian of art might speak of the baroque or mannerist style. ... It is a way of seeing the world and of expressing oneself. ...In [the] paranoid style, the feeling of persecution is central and it is indeed systematized in grandiose theories of conspiracy”.⁶⁵⁹ He articulates the difference between a paranoid spokesman and a clinical paranoiac:

[a]lthough they both tend to be overheated, oversuspicious, overaggressive, grandiose, and apocalyptic in expression, the clinical paranoid sees the hostile and conspiratorial world in which he feels himself to be living as directed specifically *against him* whereas the spokesman of the paranoid style finds it directed against a nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not himself alone but millions of others. In so far as he does not usually see himself singled out as the individual victim of a personal conspiracy, he is somewhat more rational and much more disinterested. His sense that his political passions are unselfish and patriotic...⁶⁶⁰

Moreover, he notably states the paranoid style is pervasive across all the various ideological alignments appearing on the political spectrum, explaining that: “[t]here is a [paranoid] style of mind, not always right-wing in its affiliation that has a long and varied history”.

Hofstadter analyzes all these dimensions of the paranoid style in the context of historical political paranoia against Illuminists, Freemasons, Jesuits and McCarthyism in American politics. He also talks about how the paranoid style in American politics has been influenced by the, at the time of the article's writing, more recent American engagement with Soviet communism. Conspiracy about outside threats or Others inside a national context are an inherent character of paranoid politics.

⁶⁵⁸ *ibid.*, pp.3.

⁶⁵⁹ *ibid.*, pp.4.

⁶⁶⁰ *ibid.*, pp.4.

Particularly, his examination of paranoia in the 19th century anti-Masonic movement is very relevant to contemporary European anti-Muslim regulations, since it mobilizes a "secretive conspiracy" against actors who are outwardly aligned with civic life and law, while being projected as inwardly aligned with foreign antagonistic political and spiritual interests. He says:

“A further aspect of anti-Masonry that is at once arresting and puzzling to the modern mind is its obsession with the character of Masonic oaths. Oaths were considered to be blasphemous, since they were profanations of a transaction with God, and contrary to civil order, since they set up a secret pattern of loyalties inconsistent with normal civil obligations”.⁶⁶¹

He specifically gives an example from a book which describes the new danger to the American way of life in 1835. He quotes from this book: “A conspiracy exists and its plans are already in operation... We are attacked in a vulnerable quarter which cannot be defended by our ships, our forts, or our armies”.⁶⁶² He continues then with his own words: “In the greater war going on in the western world between political reaction and ultra-modernism on one side and political and religious liberties on the other. America was a bastion of freedom and hence an inevitable target for popes and despots”.⁶⁶³

This following section asserts that what Hofstadter says about the paranoid style is not exclusive to American politics; that it instead can appear in diverse places. As a kind of mode it has also been operating within the history of Europe. A similar paranoid style is observably working/operating within contemporary European policies that stigmatize Arabs, Africans, Muslim immigrants and Islam within Europe. In another context, Nicholas Lebourg has drawn attention to the paranoid

⁶⁶¹ *ibid.*, pp.18.

⁶⁶² *ibid.*, pp. 19.

⁶⁶³ *ibid.*, pp.19.

style of politics particularly in France. He emphasizes the fact that in the 1980s, public intellectuals who specialized in the critique of communism began shifting the focus of their criticisms to Arabs and Muslims, applying the same schemes they used to denounce Communist dangers to Islam, Iran and migrants. More importantly, Lebourg has drawn attention to

[t]his transposition from Communism to Islam is not limited to the French radical right. In speeches circa 2005 and 2006, President George W. Bush claimed that 'Islamofascism' was the new global enemy facing the western world after it had defeated those previous 'totalitarianism', fascism and Stalinism. He echoed Ronald Reagan's concept [...] that the whole of global terrorism was secretly centralized and led by the Kremlin, and simply replaced the latter with the 'single movement' of 'Islamic fascism' composed of Hamas and Al Qaida. ... Metaphors of disease are typical- Marine Le Pen spoke of a 'cancer' and of 'gangrene' in her speech.⁶⁶⁴

If more focus is brought upon Marine Le Pen's stance, it can be easily seen that the existence of Muslims and Islam in Europe are perceived as presenting a larger potential conspiratorial risk of the Islamization of Europe. Le Pen clearly states, "French identity is under the threat of extinction. If we continue to fill our country with mosques and if our children become like those monotonous Arabs and Africans who lack cultural richness, how can we believe that France will remain the same tomorrow".⁶⁶⁵ In addition to risk of Islamization, in 2012, Le Pen mentioned that France is also under the attack of Islamist killers.⁶⁶⁶ These examples echo the way Hofstadter reads paranoia in similar American political rhetoric.

⁶⁶⁴ Nicolas Lebourg, "Marine Le Pen, The Radical Right and French Islamophobia- Part II, 1 May 2012, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/nicolas-lebourg/marine-le-pen-radical-right-and-french-islamophobia-part-ii>

⁶⁶⁵ www.front-national.com

⁶⁶⁶ Nicolas Lebourg, 'Marine Le Pen, the radical right and French Islamophobia- Part II', 1 May 2012, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/nicolas-lebourg/marine-le-pen-radical-right-and-french-islamophobia-part-ii>

Therefore, the argument on the paranoid style in American politics fits very well with this dissertation's arguments on the racializing character of European politics.

Moreover, Hofstadter's statement that this style is not limited to right wing politics, but is apparent in left-wing political discourse as well fits perfectly with Europe's current condition. As has been mentioned before, the problematic regulations and policies in Europe about Muslims are not situated solely within right wing discourse, but rather are endemic to the overall political discourse and policies of both the European left and right.

Here, Žižek's understanding of racism can help better encapsulate the relationship between spectral racism and paranoia. Žižek understands racism, particularly racism against Jews, with reference to the return of the repressed, the Lacanian Real, which is excluded from the Symbolic, as a paranoid construction of Jews. He writes:

Society does not exist,' and the Jews is its symptom. The stake of social-ideological fantasy is to construct a vision of society which does exist, a society which is not split by an antagonistic division, a society in which the relation between its parts is organic, complementary. The clearest case is, of course, the corporatist vision of Society as an organic whole....The 'Jews' is the means, for Fascism, of taking into account, of representing its own impossibility.... [However], far from being the positive cause of social antagonism, the 'Jew' is just the embodiment of certain blockage—of the impossibility which prevents the society from achieving its full identity as a closed, homogeneous totality. Far from being the positive cause of social negativity, the 'Jew' is a point at which social negativity as such assumes positive existence.... Society is not prevented from achieving its full identity because of Jews: it is prevented by its antagonistic nature, by its own immanent blockage, and it 'projects' this internal negativity into the figure of the 'Jew'. In other words, what is excluded from the Symbolic (from the frame of the corporatist socio-symbolic order) returns in the Real as a paranoid construction of the 'Jew'.⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶⁷ Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, London, New York: Verso, 1989, pp. 125-7.

This paranoid construction has been institutionalized as paranoid mode, and this mode has been further shaped through an ultra-objective posture. In the context of this mode, recently, what is excluded from the Symbolic returns to the Real as a paranoid construction of the Muslim immigrants and Islam. The term ultra-objective, which guides paranoid ideology and politics, is related to the accounts of Žižek (1991) and Stavrakakis (1999), and their Lacanian analysis of the ideological fantasies of wholeness and exclusion that make up European politics and society. When viewed through Žižek's remarks on the lack of identity, he mentions "the subject attempts to fill out its constitutive lack [...] by identifying with some master signifier that guarantees its place in the symbolic network".⁶⁶⁸ This master signifier is figured as an omnipotent, post-colonial and post-racist Europe which was reborn after the Second World War. However, with Žižek's abstraction, which can never totally succeed; there will always be the remainder of a defeated, colonial and racist Europe: either 'pathological' or 'leftover' in its politics.⁶⁶⁹

From this framework, this section suggests that the paranoid style of European politics has two layers. In the first layer, conspiracies about Muslims and Islam are not at work; rather at this level the paranoid mode of European politics is shaped through Europe's self-perception. From this paranoid mode, Europe is in the position of confirming Others; while it is not open to be confirmed by the Others. This position works to confirm Europe as unique, isolated and exceptional. From this vantage Europe reflects itself as developing from an outstanding position. There is a very subtle nuance however here; because, chiefly, outstanding in this context refers to Europe as eminent and distinguished, while at the same time organizes itself as an unfinished and incomplete project. There is also an active cultural and political ambition to protect this position. From a psychoanalytical

⁶⁶⁸ Slavoj Žižek, *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture*, pp. 163.

⁶⁶⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 165

perspective, this ambition refers to an extreme fragility, imperfection and faultiness; which must be hidden from the Other. A fictive figuring of omnipotence, informs the usual rhetorical posturing used in ambition to hide away the deeper conditions of fragility, imperfection and faultiness. The self, who has the fear of being harmed by Others, secures its omnipotence or fictive completeness, by projecting itself as somehow outside of its fragility. However, this fragility, as such, is precisely itself and within itself. Therefore, it actually hides itself from the within of itself, and by doing so it places itself outside of itself. This is how the reference to paranoia is formulated from a psychoanalytical framework. Paranoia means being outside of one's mind; it does not mean being merely suspicion. In the context of this brief psychoanalytical explanation, it can be seen then that the outstanding and omnipotent self-image Europe reflects a hidden dimension of inward incompleteness and fragility. In this framework, the fear of being harmed by the Others' culture, religion, and race, reflects another complicated hidden tendency to wish harm upon the Other. This wish for harm is a kind of residue of the anxiety of the recognition of the hidden faults and weaknesses that ambition attempts to cover. Because this anxiety points to an insecurity, the Other as the referent figure fixing the discourse that ambition attempts to develop, is seen as posing an existential threat, a "lynchpin" that can expose the inner workings hidden through the projection of ambition. From this psychoanalytical context, it can be suggested then that the paranoia of European politics, is shaped and guided through its wish to harm its Other.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁷⁰ It should be emphasized right here that this paranoia is not 'uniquely' European. This paranoid mode is actually a common feature of most liberal modern nation states (European or otherwise) that then finds a unique expression in the European context. Perhaps one way to say this is that in the European context, ambition attempts to 'transcend' its local designations (within the borders of a given state, France, Netherlands, etc.) and secure an institutionalized 'ambition' across the continent! For example, France is ambitious in ways other than Germany, but as part of a European sense of ambition they can further their local ambitions in concert under the banner of some mythos about the history, legacy and future of a pan-European project. Which allows them to keep certain citizens under suspicion of belonging, not only at the national level, but also at the European level as well.

In the second layer, actual conspiracies about the Other shapes the paranoid mode. At present, several conspiracies about Muslims and Islam work to shape a contemporary paranoid mode of politics within European states. More precisely, a conspiratorial fantasy is at work. In this fantasy, Islam and Muslims are perceived as something other than what they are. Orientalist depictions of them are earlier, pre-contemporary examples of this style. When extended out of the past, the paranoid style proceeded into a new stage; one that is given shape by the more recent explosion of paranoid political thinking. Historically this shift can be understood as a symptom of a form of divisive politics, which intermittently have arisen across European history. Gabriel Marranci describes this situation in the framework of the term Islamophobia; which is shown to spread through the representation of Islam as alien to and incompatible with Western culture. Islam is said to be founded on anti-Western values, and is thus dangerous to Western civilization. In this context, as Marranci states, multiculturalism is being criticized, since it opens the way of tolerating ‘enemies within’ which is embodied with the Muslim immigrants. This criticism is expressed clearly and indifferently in the words of Samuel Huntington.⁶⁷¹ He mentions as

Western culture is challenged by groups within western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home. This phenomenon is most notable among Muslims in Europe. ... In Europe, western civilization could also be undermined by the weakening of its central component, Christianity .⁶⁷²

In name however, though novel in its emphasis, what is being called Islamophobia, is still not a distinctive form of European discourse about the Other; rather it is only

⁶⁷¹ Cited in Gabriele Marranci, ‘Multiculturalism, Islam and the clash of Civilizations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia’, *Culture and Religion*, Vol.5 No.1, 2004, pp. 114.

⁶⁷² Huntington 1996: 304-305, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 114.

the latest form of a paranoid politics to iterate in Europe. The bomb attacks in the US in 2001, and Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005, are the particular historical triggers allowing for the shifting of Europe's paranoid mode of politics to "Islamophobic" paranoia about a so-called "threat of Islam". The significant point here is that the very popular agenda of the 'war on terror' has provided a 'legitimate' visibility for Islamophobia. Furthermore, this paranoia has visibly emerged as one of the main elements in contemporary European political discourse. In the framework of this paranoia, Muslim Europeans are presented in debates as a potential danger to Europe; and the visibility of their religion and culture in European public space has been increasingly stigmatized as a challenge to European values and culture; even though these values are assumed to be universal, *per se*. Contrary to civil order, it is assumed then that Muslims set up a secret pattern of loyalties inconsistent with normal civil obligations; which amounts to a institutionalization of conspiratorial projections about Muslims within European political discourse and policy making.

Current Islamophobic paranoia, which represents Islam and Muslims as incompatible with an accepted universal configuration of social, cultural and political norms; not only offers new grounds to express a paranoid style of European politics, but also works to shape and secure a concrete paranoid mode of European politics. In the condition of this mode of politics, spectral forms of racism continue to haunt European political discourse, denying space for Islam and Muslims in Europe. The trouble cases of banning wearing headscarves at schools in France and the construction of minarets in Switzerland, alongside the depictions of Islam and Muslims as violent, irrational, and suspicious in the caricatures of Muslims' prophets in Denmark and in the film, *Submission*, in the Netherlands; reflect the most visible forms of European racism manifested through Islamophobic paranoia. These cases of policy bans can be read as reflecting the paranoia of an "Islamization of Europe", and the latter cases of depiction can be read as reflecting the paranoia of "threat of Islam".

A paranoid mode of politics has been shaping by the anxieties over the Islamisation of Europe, positing a conspiratorial colonization of Europe by Islam and Muslims, and they are used to confirm the “threat of Islamic violence” against European sovereignty. Particularly, the banning of headscarves and minarets on the grounds of their being the symbols of a transformation of the modern secular society into a traditional Islamic one, clearly reflect the most visible forms of this anxiety. As Schirin Amir-Moazami (2005) notes, the headscarf has caused trouble in France' since it has been seen as a ‘political’ and ‘missionary’ symbol.⁶⁷³ This paranoid mode however, is strongly haunted by a residual Christian missionary mentality; which is based on the lingering history of a European mission to Christianization the world. These countries try to overcome their anxieties then by hiding the visibility of Islam within their borders. The second anxiety is reflected by prominent discourse about Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands and Denmark, especially after Theo van Gogh's murder and the protests against cartoons depicting Mohammad. These countries have tried to overcome their anxieties over the ‘threat of Islamic violence’, by representing them with reference to their protests, and showing Islam to be both irrational and vicious. In both cases, two forms of paranoia can be seen as taking effect: a projected conspiratorial fantasy about Muslims is presented, in order to enact policy or ‘speech’ which protect Europe's omnipotence. This paranoia is based on a much older modern/colonial epistemology; which works to construct a superior position for Europe, by always constructing the Other as inferior. Therefore, in both cases, observing the paranoid mode at work allows one to see that the specters of colonialism are still haunting the European political context.

⁶⁷³ Schirin Amir-Moazami, ‘Muslim Challenges to the Secular Consensus. A German Case Study’, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 13 (3), 2005, pp. 271.

6.2. Racial State⁶⁷⁴

This section addresses arguments pointing out the racist character of modern state formation. It examines racism as a constitutive part of modern nation-states; as a mode of governance alongside the concepts of bio-politics. Foucault's concept of bio-power, whose central task is a bio-politics, will be used for this examination.

Foucault used the concept of bio-power in order to emphasize a power whose central mission is the administration of human life as a resource. This form of power defines the human body as a source of labor power, and optimizes the capacities of bodies by integrating them into the machinery of production. In this way, bio-power maximizes the state's resources, by organizing the population into a system of means and ends. In this form of technology, immigrants tend to be seen as "temporary" foreign workers. In Dutch and German speaking countries, they are even called 'guest workers'. The temporary existence of migrants is emphasized through this dual perception of being wholly foreign and/or guest. In this framework, they have not been integrated into the social fabric of the state, despite many of these immigrants having lived in these countries for at least three generations. Even second and third generation descendants, who have been born in the country, are still seen as temporary. More importantly, because of the events in and after 2001, they have increasingly been seen as religious and cultural enemies as well. Since security cannot be legally or economically guaranteed by destroying or eliminating immigrants; techniques of inclusive exclusion have become the norm of modern states when enacting policy reforms about their immigrant populations. In this state form, racist regulations have been legitimated and shaped by these inclusive exclusion techniques. This is how normative conditions, in the form of these policies, also work to show that spectral racism continues to haunt European politics.

⁶⁷⁴ David Theo Goldberg, *Racial State*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002.

Eric Voegelin (1933, 1940)⁶⁷⁵ and Michel Foucault (1997)⁶⁷⁶ pointed out that a conception of race is central to state and governmentality. They state that race is fundamental to the construction of modern nation-states, manifesting processes of exclusion and inclusion. Michel Foucault draws attention to the effort of protecting an imagined homogeneity of modern nation-states by denying its internal heterogeneity. He suggests that the modern nation-state is a “racist state”⁶⁷⁷, in which race and nation are defined in terms of each other, protecting an imagined homogeneity for the state. This explains how racism functions in connection with the concept of bio-politics; which is a central theme in Foucault’s later works: *Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality* (1990 [1976]) and *Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France* (2003 [1975-76]). In these works he proposes the concepts of bio-power and bio-politics, which fix the meaning of the emergence of populations. This understanding contrasts with the previous forms of technological control over people; which Foucault terms “sovereign power”. In order to understand the concepts bio-politics and bio-power more deeply, we should look deeper into Foucault's differentiation between the sovereign power of the old territorial states and novel modern forms of power. In *The History of Sexuality* (1990), Foucault argues that when natural life becomes included in the mechanisms of state power, politics turns into a ‘bio-politics’. Thus, the territorial state becomes a ‘state of population’, and the nation’s biological life becomes a discursive problem of state. In the end, the population becomes both a *subject* and an *object* of government. The concept of bio-politics posits the state as controlling while also caring for the population. Within the same perspective, in *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France* (2003), Foucault uses the concept of ‘bio-power’ in order to address how the modern state aims to the care of

⁶⁷⁵ Eric Voegelin, *Race and State*, trans. Ruth Hein, ed. Klaus Vondung, Baton Rouge, 1933.

⁶⁷⁶ Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France*, ed. by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana; general eds. Francois Ewald and Alessandro Fontana, trans. by David Macey, London: Penguin, 2003.

⁶⁷⁷ *ibid.*

population through the use of bio-political governmental technologies, including gathering information about the lifestyle of the population through demography and statistics. In summary, for Foucault the concept of population is itself constituted by bio-politics: there is no population in the modern sense before bio-politics: population only appears as such in the eighteenth century; before that, population just referred to people being present in a given area, and not a “political personage”. Bio-power is then specifically the technology that enables the control of populations. As Foucault underlines, they are technologies of power.⁶⁷⁸ In this framework, Foucault also addresses how the modern state is involved with racism. Chiefly, racism shifts its focus from casting distinction between biological races to a bio-political management of life, and this is internal to the development of bio-political state racism. Sovereign power was a technology of spectacular and extraordinary physical violence. In contrast to the ‘bio-politics’ of ‘bio-power’, sovereign power is ‘thanatopolitics’. The former form of power controls people through the use of life, through caring for people’s organic wellbeing, while the latter used death, or exposure to the risk of death, to keep people in line.⁶⁷⁹

He illustrates the modern nation-state as a state of population, monitored and controlled through bio-political technologies. Rather than focusing on individuals, the concept of bio-politics focuses on supporting and promoting the life of the population through interventions.⁶⁸⁰ Likewise, bio-power is not concerned with the practice of power over the individual body, but acts at the level of massification instead of individualization.⁶⁸¹ It is important to state that this is not a discipline

⁶⁷⁸ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78*, Michel Senellart, Francois Ewald and Alessandro Fontana (eds.), trans. by Graham Burchell, New York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillian, 2009, p.94.

⁶⁷⁹ Michel Foucault, ‘The Political Technology of Individuals’ in Michel Foucault (ed.), *Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984*, New York: The New Press, 2000, pp.416.

⁶⁸⁰ Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France*, pp. 251.

⁶⁸¹ *ibid.*, pp, 243.

oriented power, but it still focuses on preserving population life even at the cost of biological life; which becomes the prominent concern of politics. Thus, bio-politics is the process by which bio-power is exerted to manage life, with the aim of achieving ‘equilibration’ and ‘regularity’ for a state’s population.⁶⁸² For Foucault, Nazi Germany is the supreme example of bio-political tendencies: it exterminated portions of its own population in the name of a pure and healthy population. The Nazi state went on to wage a war as well, killing millions more people and devastating vast areas in order to secure more Lebensraum for its own population. These programs culminated in a terrible destruction being visited back upon that selfsame population, but other biopolitical biopowers; which was a risk that the regime embraced.⁶⁸³

In a similar manner, David Theo Goldberg defines Western nation-states as ‘racial states’. He states that law is the central point of state formation in the West, and this shapes the conception of race through legal terms. In this way, law functions to legitimize various forms of physical violence. In this kind of state formation, which includes a racially defined population, law does not guarantee equal treatment for all segments of the population within the state’s borders; rather it promotes racial categorizations and shapes national identities through legislating unequal citizenship rights and immigration controls.⁶⁸⁴ Therefore, ‘equal’ is guaranteed in most Western States, but not for the entire population. For instance, this is clearly the case for ‘illegal’ immigrants and even for ‘legal’ immigrants in Europe. In the case of ‘illegal’ immigrants, since they have no defined citizenship status, the state can treat them anyway they like, regardless of what the universal human rights law says. They are denied In the case of ‘legal’ immigrants, although they have defined citizenship status and rights, the state can make the changes in their citizenship

⁶⁸² *ibid.*, pp. 246.

⁶⁸³ *ibid.*, pp. 260.

⁶⁸⁴ David Theo Goldberg, *Racial State*, pp. 149.

status and rights. It is clearly the case for the citizenship tests created by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Denmark in late 2007.

Moreover, as Goldberg states, racial state formation excludes heterogeneities in order to construct homogeneity. However, state formations still find ways to appropriate apart racial difference through claims of multiculturalism. But, being far from its ideal definition, multiculturalism helps to further construct homogeneity, rather than deconstructing homogeneity of nation-states. This 'racial state' then seeks to continually redefine the boundaries of belonging within it, by declaring itself to be grounded upon a racelessness. Moreover, it asserts its control not by excluding others and destroying constitutional regulations, but rather by enacting hierarchical categorizations defined by invented histories and cultural imaginings.⁶⁸⁵ Thus, in this version of multicultural society becomes simply have plurality rather than a society which is made up of people with different cultural identities or religions. To have a multicultural society, political leadership needs to show recognition of different cultures and religions.⁶⁸⁶ On the other hand, in 'racial state' structure, there is a strong fear of the effects of multiculturalism which is assumed to bring full recognition and freedom of expression to the 'minority' cultures and religions.

Goldberg goes on to draw attention to two characteristics of racial states: naturalism and historicism. Naturalism fixes racially conceived natives as premodern and naturally incapable of progress. On the other hand, historicism, defines Europe on the whole as a figure of progress and development, while either conversely explicitly defining or through an ellipse implying that others outside Europe are primitive and underdeveloped. This motivates the view there is a needed historical shift from naturalist racial regimes to historicism regimes based

⁶⁸⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 149.

⁶⁸⁶ Gabriele Marranci, 'Multiculturalism, Islam and the Clash of Civilizations Theory: rethinking Islamophobia', pp. 115.

on racelessness. Through historicism, racially immature neutrality states can be inserted into a process of historical development. In this manner Europeans are elevated over primitive or underdeveloped others. The work of modern nation-state progressivism then aims to assist its underdeveloped and uncivilized racialized others; through assimilation and control into economic and ideological forms of governance in order to improve their conditions. At that point then, it becomes possible to discuss how there is a palpable shift between naturalist to historicist regimes moving away from physical repression and violence to the formation of legally fashioned racial (or raceless) orders.⁶⁸⁷ Therefore, despite the fact that racism has been dismissed as a pre-modern concept; it is still central to modern governmental ideology. Goldberg defines this condition as ‘the culturalist turn’ of last twenty years; which denies that racism somehow goes hand in hand with state control over incoming and existing populations.⁶⁸⁸

Following Foucault and then Goldberg, this section suggests then that the racial state is another reflection of how spectral forms of racism haunt European states. That is, the racial state is yet another material conditions for the continued re-iteration of racism even well into the post-racist era.

6.4. Globalization Process

This section asserts that globalization process is yet another material condition of spectral racism haunting European politics. However, the argument of this chapter is different from the approaches which support that globalization is a turning point in a negative manner in European politics. By addressing the globalization process,

⁶⁸⁷ David Theo Goldberg, *Racial State*, pp. 80, 92-6, 200-238.

⁶⁸⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 238.

the aim of this section is to revisit the very material conditions of colonialism underlying the process of globalization.

For instance, the argument of this section is different from Wieworka's statement; which draws on the changing form of European politics after the 1980s. According to him, until the 1960s and 1970s, being an industrial and egalitarian society were the basic political-economic components of most European countries. For him, most European countries have long been industrial societies and social relations have been rooted in concerns over industrial labor and organization. Many of them have been based on social welfare and security, because they aimed at ensuring egalitarian treatment to all citizens and individuals within the state as an industrial society. This egalitarian approach of states inserts a distance then between religion and politics, and makes national identity a central and primary component for the state's constitutive power. However, through this frame, European governments in the 1970s, when the governments started to manifest liberal policies, began to develop populist discourses and attitudes which worked against immigrants or ethnic minorities, ignoring the egalitarian principles at the ground of the state's constitutive power. These populist discourses and attitudes caused the exclusion and marginalization of immigrants and minorities. Moreover, the structure of nationalism has continued changing because of this transformation. While previous forms of nationalism used to be progressive and had a strong tie with universal values then, in this new form, it is increasingly loaded with xenophobia and racism.

This section follows arguments which state that the hierarchical structure of colonialism still exists as the grounding logic for these transformative processes; not in the form of sharp expression of a dichotomy between the West and the "Rest", but in the form of transnational corporations being the main components of globalization. Walter Mignolo, who is a well-known researcher of these types of arguments, draws attention to the fact that dependency theory is still valid, meaning that colonial power is still a factor in organizing the world hierarchically. This hierarchical organization is not structured under the imperialist idea of an economic

center and periphery dichotomy anymore, but instead is restructured through the effect of transnational corporations extending their reach from a decentered conception of their business operations.⁶⁸⁹

The debates on globalization have been gathered into two prominent camps. The first one perceives globalization from an optimistic perspective, since in a more general sense they believe that globalization can be a solution or antithesis for state sponsored violence, inequalities, racism, and injustice. Also, they suggest that the globalization process can help to open new/alternative spaces for old problems. They strongly believe that globalization can help to create a transnational, borderless, and more democratic world order. One of the scholars from this group, Scholte⁶⁹⁰ defines globalization as the processing of increasing global flows of good, information, people, services, culture, and establishing a deterritorialized and supranational order. Also, Lipschutz states that in the globalizing world, we see the emergence of a global civil society which effects a liberalizing of the individual. This civil society is composed of “heteronomous transnational political networks being established by and among actors within civil society ... for particular political and social purposes ... such as human rights”.⁶⁹¹ In the same manner, Held and McGrew claim that globalization brings a more liberating system of governance: “a system of multilayered global and regional governance which ... [is] marked by internationalization and transnationalization of politics, the development of regional and global organizations and institutions, and the emergence of regional and global law”.⁶⁹² Furthermore, Homi Bhabha celebrates the hybrid subject that is

⁶⁸⁹ Walter Mignolo, ‘The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference’, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 1001:1, (Winter 2002), pp. 62

⁶⁹⁰ Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, London: McMillian, 2000, pp. 3.

⁶⁹¹ R. D. Lipschutz, *Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society*, *Millennium*, 21(3), pp. 391-393.

⁶⁹² David Held and Anthony McGrew, ‘The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the Prospects for World Order’, *Review of International Studies*, 24, 1998, pp. 233.

created through the effects of transnational/global mobilization.⁶⁹³ This understanding of globalization is closely connected with the progressive and privileged notions of modernity and the Enlightenment.

Contrasted to this, the second debate on globalization is skeptical about the globalization process and draws attention to its discontents. This perspective challenges the normative claims about globalization, by highlighting the uneven development and the negative consequences of the globalization process for people who live in the ‘rest’ of the world; people who do fail to have an access to any of the perceived advantages of this process. Moreover, it challenges the assumption that states are losing their power because of it.⁶⁹⁴ This point of view is unoptimistic about the globalization process, since it does not see how globalization can bring about a successful transnationalism, post-nationalism or cosmopolitanism. One of the main figures of this perception, Pheng Cheah points out that contemporary globalization or cosmopolitanism does not mean the end of nationalism. For him, both nationalism and cosmopolitanism emerge and exist at the same time. He explains this situation with the term of “cosmopolitical”. He also states that new cosmopolitanisms are not necessarily progressive by emphasizing the relationship between the institutionalization of inhuman condition and globalization. Here, economic globalization means the liberalization of capital movement and free trade for the advance of Western transnational cooperation across the globe. It also means increasing income inequalities within and between nations.⁶⁹⁵ Rupert thinks that globalization discourse only serves to make an ideologically aligned capitalist hegemonic project of liberalization globally possible. For him, world politics “will depend upon the outcomes of current social struggles in which the meanings

⁶⁹³ Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge, 1994.

⁶⁹⁴ Linda Weiss, ‘Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State’, *New Left Review*, 225, September-October 1997), pp. 3-27.

⁶⁹⁵ Pheng Cheah, *Inhuman Conditions: Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights in the Current Conjecture*, USA: Harvard University Press, 2006.

assigned to ‘globalization’ are central”.⁶⁹⁶ In addition to these authors, Sivanandan (2001) draws attention to the idea that globalization brings more divisions as well. He defines economic globalization as a neocolonial project; which opens a way to ethnic and communal divisions. The nation states in the Third World and in the eastern bloc are the primary targets of this.⁶⁹⁷

In the framework of this very brief reference to the debate on globalization, I will focus further on debates on the relationship between globalization and racism. According to Norman Ginsburg there are also two main arguments over globalization and racism. One of them suggests that globalization and racism are antithetical. They believe that globalization is the condition for universal human rights and global governance which can break down the barriers of nationalism and ethnic intolerance. They link globalization with the Enlightenment values of Western political liberalism. Therefore, for them globalization can weaken racism which carries particularism, exclusionary and discriminative practices, along with differences in human values. It has already done this by strengthening the anti-racism. In this sense, these two effects are contrary to each other, running parallel to one another. Other arguments state that contemporary economic globalization and racism support each other. They suggest that economic globalization increases racialized inequalities and injustice. In 2000, Mary Robinson for example, who is the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated, “globalization is leading to a rise in racism”.⁶⁹⁸ These arguments see globalization as a Westernized act shaped by anti-Muslim sentiment and a revitalization of White supremacist discourse. They note that the increasing flow of immigration due to globalization has enabled xenophobia and the racialized exclusionary immigration

⁶⁹⁶ Mark Rupert, *Ideologies of Globalization: contending Visions of a New World Order*, London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 42.

⁶⁹⁷ Ambalavaner Sivanandan, ‘UK: Refugees from Globalism’, *Race and Class*, 42(3), pp. 88.

⁶⁹⁸ Norman Ginsburg, ‘Globalization and Racism’ in Vic George and Robert M. Page (eds.), *Global Social Problems*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, pp. 166.

asylum policies in the West. In other words, they emphasize an obvious link between the global immigration flow and the growth of a global inequality and ethnic absolutist.⁶⁹⁹ In summary, these arguments suggest that economic globalization and liberalization increases not only postcolonial and post-communist domination of the world's economy and polity, but also racial inequalities; and this increases a global structural racism or global apartheid.⁷⁰⁰ In the same manner, Zygmunt Bauman notes that economic globalization creates a “world-wide *restratification*, a new socio-cultural hierarchy on a world-wide scale”.⁷⁰¹ Moreover, Alana Lentin understands the language of hybridity and transnationalism as a means of the changing nature of postcolonial racialized existence. This language not only obscures the roots of racism, but also underestimates the durability of these roots.⁷⁰²

Ginsburg himself thinks that structural racism increases at the supranational and regional level in the framework of economic globalization. In this context, he talks particularly about the Fortress Europe and a new Europeanized racism. He explains European integration as a cultural and political reaction against the process of globalization. In this case, the European Union has been constructed as a structure in which Europeans can insulate themselves from the aspects of globalization. The EU's current agricultural regime is a clear product of this effort. He thinks that this new Europeanized racism is often directed towards Central and Eastern Europeans, and he criticizes calling this racism xenophobia; because its targets are “other” Europeans. On the contrary, for him this is the result of white supremacy projected

⁶⁹⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 160-1.

⁷⁰⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 166.

⁷⁰¹ Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, Cambridge: Polity, 1998, pp. 70.

⁷⁰² Alana Lentin, *Racism and Anti-Racism*, London: Pluto Press, 2004, pp. 314.

at non-white European ethnicities. As an example, he presents the experiences of Irish people in Europe as form of the white supremacist reaction.⁷⁰³

On the other hand, his other statements about the relationship between racism and globalization have another different point. He contends that globalization is contributing to working an undermining of racisms. Because of globalization, racialized groups are migrating to the richer countries, and this migration flow challenges the rich states to confront the racism within their borders. In other words, he believes there is still a positive contribution of globalization to anti-racism. In this manner, he finds that arguments which emphasize the link between racism and immigration as pessimistic.⁷⁰⁴

In addition, Castles also points to the globalization of racism. Economic globalization has not only political, but also cultural consequences; which strengthen existent racism in poorer countries. He thus sees racism as fundamental to the contemporary period of late modernity and economic globalization. He defines globalization as a colonization of the rest of the world in the form of not only a political and economic hegemony, but also as a diffusion of one culture. In this context, new racism has been evolving from recent conditions created by the cultural and economic globalization process.⁷⁰⁵

⁷⁰³ Norman Ginsburg, 'Globalization and Racism', pp. 167.

⁷⁰⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 168.

⁷⁰⁵ Stephen Castles, 2000: 164, cited in Vic George and Robert M. Page (eds.), *Global Social Problems*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, pp. 168.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This dissertation asserts that there is visible conflict between Europe and Muslims in Europe, and that this conflict originates from a legacy of European colonialism which is manifested through otherization, racialization, and civilization. The argument is given in four parts. First, the concept of Europe is adequately defined in a sociological context. Second, the concepts of deconstruction and hauntology help to establish the connection between the contemporary forms of racism and the persistent colonialist mentality of Europe. Third, evidence for this connection is given in the form of four cases from four different European countries, two that show the radical otherness of Muslims and Islam, and two that hide the visibility of Muslims and Islam in a “secular” public space. Fourth, the epistemological and material conditions of Europe are shown to support and even encourage the colonialist mentality in modern European thought, and thereby to maintain the connection between contemporary racism and colonialism.

The concept of Europe is defined in four parts. First, the integration/enlargement process in the post-Cold War era is one of the main events in the European political context. This enlargement process was an effort to redefine the EU with an emphasis on identity, culture and values. With this emphasis, the EU decided who could be the member of the union. Revealed during the enlargement process of the EU, this form of self-definition began to take a dramatic form in the 2000s with the emphasis on what Europe is and how the non-Europeans can take place inside the borders of Europe. In a sense “origin story” of Europe has been resurrected. Second, this definition emphasizes the conflict between the perceived and the self-image of Europe. Europe perceives itself as universal, distinctive and advanced, and thereby different from other civilizations. By extension, people who come from

non-European civilizations are assumed to be unstable, ambiguous and completely external. The conflict arises when outsiders live within the borders of Europe and receive treatment that is incompatible with the supposed universal culture of Europe. Third, the definition involves the consequences of this conflict on Europe's policy towards immigrants and immigration. Immigration policies have been determined predominantly by considerations of labor needs in the west European states, and have recently become a subject of popular party politics. The paradox is that although globalization is celebrated as liberalization and universalization, the immigrants and immigration policies of Europe have become more exclusive than fifty years ago. Fourth, contemporary Europe is partly defined by a proliferation of boundaries. Of particular interest are borders that are not defined legally and physically, but are social boundaries that are dispersed everywhere. These invisible boundaries are a reaction to anxiety about the dilution of the universal European culture by outsiders.

That there is contemporary racism in the Europe defined above is clear from existing literature on racism, new forms of racism, cultural racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and the racialization of religion and culture. Curiously, there is also a proliferation of literature emphasizing the effective function of human rights, civil society, multiculturalism, and liberal and modern democratic political systems regulating Europe's relationship with its Others. This literature argues that social rights have been guaranteed in modern democratic states since these states follow the logic of inclusion based on an Enlightenment tradition of cosmopolitan ethics and values. The role of international legal norms are pointed out as a showcase for the improvement of immigrant rights.⁷⁰⁶ However, all these ideal “inclusive” systems and regulations are *de facto* exclusive, since the optimistic ideals, anti-

⁷⁰⁶ Masakazu, 2001: 59; Thalhammer et al. 2000, cited in Sciortino, G., ‘Immigration in a Mediterranean welfare State: the Italian Experience in a Comparative Perspective’ Sciortino, pp. 205; Baubock, 1996; Catles and Davidson, 2000, cited in Stephen Castles, “The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies in Rethinking Migration: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives”, pp. 46.

racist regulations, human rights, and multicultural society are shaped by the epistemological and material conditions of European politics through which colonialism and racism constantly return.

However, it is not easy to make this assertion for a Europe that is identified with the principles of human rights, and post-colonial and anti-racist regulations. Classifying something clearly as colonialism or racism is misleading because only the shadows of their contemporary manifestations are visible. This requires a means of investigation that is able to identify the strands of hidden colonialism and racism that circulate incognito through the borders of post-colonial and anti-racist Europe. This is offered by Jacques Derrida's concepts of *deconstruction* and *hauntology* that overturn the conventional classifications that characterize the "social scientific" approach. With these concepts, Derrida proposes a "formula" that must by necessity remain fluid and indistinct to be able to reveal the equally nebulous ghosts and specters that haunt contemporary Europe. The chameleonic nature of racism and colonialism defies analysis by any technique that involves a rigid series of steps that is applied in the same way to every situation. Hauntology gives a good maneuverability to go one step beyond the linear history of racism and colonialism, and talk about the racialization of Muslims by the specters of colonialism. It opens the displacement between present and absent and bypasses the linearity of the history which declares the end of colonialism and racism in Europe.

The hauntological perspective shows us that the specters of colonialism haunt the European political context and racialize European Muslims. Modern European thought views racism as a set of violent behaviors directed against minority parties, and therefore as a historical problem that has been removed from the political discourse. This point of view ignores the possibility of racism being a systematic component of the political discourse, with the accompanying political, material and epistemological implications. Specifically, those who refuse to adopt the life style in which they live are characterized as 'uncivilized' and as a 'serious threat' to the

homogeneity of the society. Hauntology shows that this is an *iterated* form of colonial racism, where an iterated form is a repetition that shares the same source with but is not outwardly identical with the previous form.^t Modern racism and Europe's colonial past both stem from an imagined “civilizing mission”, where the benefits of European civilization are imparted to the Others. Modern racism is an iterated form by virtue of being combined with a recent anxiety over the European identity and a focus on maintaining the integrity of Europe and its borders. This anxiety violently represents Islam and Muslims as incompatible with an accepted universal configuration of social, cultural and political norms.

The connection between modern racism and Europe's colonial past suggested by hauntology is made more explicit by four recent cases involving the perception and regulation of Muslims in the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Switzerland. The cases in the Netherlands and Denmark show that there exists a representation in Europe of Muslims and Islam as characteristically archaic and violent. The film *Submission* in the Netherlands depicted fictive violence towards Muslim women, and provocatively suggested that Islam and the oppression of women are identical. The resulting outcry and the assassination of the director, Theo Van Gogh, served only to reinforce this image. A series of twelve satirical cartoons in Denmark depicted Mohammad, and by extension Islam, as associated with violence and terrorism. This prompted worldwide protests in which almost 139 people died. The cases in France and Switzerland show that present reality of Muslims and Islam within Europe is repressed, or hidden from view. In France, the wearing of headscarves was perceived as a threat to French culture, and a challenge to secular Republican values. The banning of headscarves not only veiled the presence of Muslims in France, but was considered to be a defense of universal secular values. A national referendum in Switzerland banned the construction of minarets for mosques as an overt reaction to an unspoken fear of being occupied by a foreign culture.

These four cases show that the present reality of racism in Europe shares three fundamental features with the colonialist mentality. First, the European civilization and the civilization of the Other are perceived as being fundamentally different. Second, Europe claims itself to be the progenitor and protector of the universal values and human rights contained within the concept of western civilization. Third, the superiority of the European civilization justifies the subjugation of the Other and the supplanting of the Other's civilization. The film *Submission* and the cartoons of Mohammad were said to be protected under freedom of speech, and the subsequent indignation of the worldwide Muslim community was claimed to indicate an incompatibility of Islam with this universal human right. The perceived intolerance of Muslims for freedom of speech justified Europe's view of itself as a superior civilization, and reinforced the urgency of the 'civilizing mission'. This took the form of open discussions about the need to more fully integrate European Muslims by supplanting the aggression and intolerance supposedly inherent in Islam with the corresponding superior European values. The wearing of headscarves and the construction of minarets were said to be unacceptable public declarations of religious belief, and incompatible with an ideally secular modern society. The banning of these practices constitutes a nationally sanctioned encouragement to abandon certain articles (headscarves and minarets) of Islam as the price for admission to European society. Indeed, in the case of France, students wearing headscarves were banned from receiving public education, another one of the universal human rights claimed by Europe.

Viewed from an overall perspective, in theory, modern political systems gain their legitimacy through implementation of democratic constitutional systems, human rights, and anti-racist policies, yet when what has been happening is looked at in practice, it can be easily seen that these 'legitimate' systems, paradoxically, destroy their legitimacy by presenting an impossible criteria for legitimacy. The best examples for this are the policies that declare the need for strong assimilationist regulations, violating the freedom of speech of the Other in the name of protecting

the freedom of speech as an ideal; and likewise violating the basic human rights of the Other in the name of protecting the ideal of secularism.

The troubling cases from Europe are the symptoms of the repressed reality of European colonialism that seems irresolvable within the context of the absolute universal position of Europe, since this position precludes other particular living conditions that cannot be recognized as legitimate within the adopted universal frame. Universalism in this form acts as a racializing unity, in which Islam is cast as a defective religion, because of its perceived “incompatibility.” In the condition of this kind of exclusive universality and paranoid style of politics, the specters of colonialism will continue to haunt European political discourse and there will be no space for the Other in Europe.

The hegemonic character of the modern epistemological design plays an important role in keeping the colonial mentality alive. Modern epistemology is constituted by philosophy, social science and natural sciences that were exported from Europe to non-European world. This itself constitutes an iterated form of colonialism where other knowledge systems are conquered by epistemic violence, rather than other nations by physical violence. Furthermore, the hegemonic character of European epistemology shaped European and non-European thought to accept the myth of a non-situated ego, with neutral and objective knowledge produced from the western worldview. The superiority of European culture came to be assumed, as did the concepts of race and racism. This justifies a second form of iterated colonialism where the civilization of the Other is replaced with that of Europe.

The consequences of this epistemological design are particularly visible in contemporary thinking about religion, where the European branch of Christianity occupies a privileged position. Specifically, Christianity is defined as having the “capacity for indefinite growth and never-ending development” and a “natural

gentleness".⁷⁰⁷ The capacity for growth allows an unbroken continuity from the historical Christian states to the modern democratic and secular nations of Europe. By the exclusionary nature of European epistemology, Islam is denied these same attributes; it is mired in a violent and military history, and is believed to be incapable of development. From this view, the integration of European Muslims into a modern secular society must involve not only the abandonment the violent aspects of their religion, but the religion itself owing to a fundamental incompatibility with secularism.

Hence, modern epistemological design leads to a situation where European Muslims are forced to participate in the 'civilizing mission' of Europe under the guise of secularism and modernization. This system of thought is further formalized by the clash of civilization thesis, where the West and the rest are seen as discreet and unrelated entities by virtue of being at different levels of development. The clash of civilization thesis is not objective in any sense of the word though, but only acquires meaning specifically within the knowledge framework described above. This suggests that much of the apparent conflict surrounding European Muslims may be most easily resolved by critically examining epistemological design, rather than by explicit governmental policy.

Epistemology is influential because it is both pervasive and hidden, covertly shaping 'objective' knowledge and resisting conventional forms of analysis. The specters of colonialism may also be seen in the material conditions of Europe though, where 'material' implies that there is a practical political expression visibly affecting the lives of European Muslims. Systemic material expressions of iterated colonialism include a paranoid style of politics, policies relating to multiculturalism and tolerance, the mechanisms of 'racial state', and the process of globalization. A paranoid style of politics is characterized by a suspicious and apocalyptic view in

⁷⁰⁷ Max Muller, 1873, cited in Tomoko Masuzawa, *The Invention of the World Religions*, pp. 212, 252.

which the spokesman imagines a conspiracy directed against his nation, culture, and way of life. That is, the paranoid style is born from a fear of declining strength and influence, where the colonized returns to supplant the culture of the colonizer. This is a persistent pattern in European politics, playing a part in the Holocaust in the Second World War, and more recently shaping policies to resist the threat of Islam and Islamic violence.

The paranoid style reveals a sharp distinction between European culture and the Other that shapes the practical implementation of multiculturalism; rather than structuring society to allow different cultures to contribute equally, multiculturalism has come to mean that the dominant culture merely permits the Other to exist within its borders. The permission to exist is usually given the name of 'tolerance', though this does not disguise the moral superiority claimed by Europe as the tolerant party. Therefore, multiculturalism and tolerance perpetuate the cultural incompatibility and cultural superiority that characterize the European colonialist mentality.

The iterated form of colonialism visible in multiculturalism and the paranoid political style is distinguished by a separation of 'Self' and 'Other', and by the fear of being colonized by the Other. The same occurs at the international level through the structure of *racial* state and an existential fear from the process of globalization. Specifically, the *racial* state codifies the distinction between races and between citizens and immigrants in legal terms. The fear of European culture and values being diluted during the process of globalization encourages the strengthening of these legal distinctions, and further integration of the European Union as a means to insulate the member nations from change; this idea is often referred to as 'Fortress Europe'.

This analysis has shown that *deconstruction* and *hauntology* are useful tools to relate the visible conflict between Europe and European Muslims with the legacy of European colonialism. The notions of hauntology and spectrality provide a deconstructive framework which displaces the position of the privileged superior

and what is 'present' with the idea of a spectral existence and what is 'absent'. This stance points out that something unfinished, incomplete or unresolved from the past haunts and continues in the present. As a concrete example, Europe is in the privileged position of a sovereign power and is haunted by its colonial past, which continues in the present as the many subtle forms of racism discussed above. The emphasis here is not on the many manifestations of racism *per se*, but instead on the elements of European thought and structures in European politics that give rise to racism even in today's anti-racist society. The chapters on the epistemological and the material conditions of spectral racism in Europe establish that the source of this racism is the same mentality that motivates traditional colonialism; that is, modern racism is a consequence of the specters of colonialism that are haunting Europe. The particular advantage of hauntology is that identifying the source not only allows a more complete analysis of the symptoms, but raises the possibility of future substantive changes that will address the issue at its source. That is, this dissertation serves as a preface for a future detailed study of the epistemological and material conditions of spectral racism in Europe, for the purpose of further raising awareness of what is hidden and stimulating further discussion on the legacy colonialism.

Moreover, deconstruction and hauntology are useful to analyze any kind of political discourse which defines itself by repressing and excluding. The self-representation of Europe is marked by a collection of fantasies; the fantasy of 'liberty' is denied by restricting the response of Muslims to criticism of their religion, the fantasy of 'equality' is denied to Muslims wearing headscarves who are not admitted to school, and the fantasy of 'fraternity' is denied to Muslims whose religion is mocked in film and cartoons. The preoccupation with these fantasies makes seeing the repressed reality of Europe all the more difficult. Europe must not only acknowledge the specters of its own past, but learn to live and talk with them. As Derrida stated, we must "learn to live *with* ghosts... To live otherwise, and

better. No, not better, but more justly... If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts... it is in the name of justice”.⁷⁰⁸

To meaningfully conclude this dissertation, it is necessary to ask what has been accomplished to engender a more complete understanding of what is a much spoken-about phenomenon. While Derrida offers for us to think about “Other Heading” as a responsibility of Europe, this dissertation shows that Europe is not yet at a point where it can consider this. Europe still defines itself by excluding the Others. It redefines its borders and enacts strict regulations to control them. Europe, must first take responsibility to learn how to talk with its ghosts, and to learn how to talk with its own repressed realities. This is important since ghosts and specters haunt the contemporary political discourse and make the legitimacy of European inventions (e.g., human rights and anti-racist regulations) questionable. More generally, this is not only Europe's responsibility; the 'rest' of the world must also learn to talk with the ghosts that haunt their political discourses. The present focus on Europe is necessary because this discussion is enabled by precisely the possibilities that are given by the European epistemology, and by values like freedom of speech.

This is a crucial point that this dissertation is not written outside of the European context; it must be written inside the text because “there is no outside of the text”. That is, European epistemology is what makes it possible to question European epistemology. There is a very small nuance here. The freedom to question Europe and the knowledge framework in which to do so is, in some sense, the 'essence of Europeanness'. This is an important disclosure, since this dissertation is at risk of being perceived as adopting an Occidental or opposing position. This dissertation does not aim to create new oppositions and tensions, but instead aims to release the existing tension.

⁷⁰⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, pp. xviii.

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APPENDIX 1

CURRICULUM VITAE

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EDUCATION

2011-2012 University of California, Berkeley, USA

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2001-2005 Istanbul Technical University, Turkey

MA (2005), Department of Art History

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Günkut Akın

Thesis Title: Art of Gulsun Karamustafa in the Transformation of Art in Turkey after 1980

1994-2000 Middle East Technical University, Turkey

BA (2000), Department of Psychology

LANGUAGES

Turkish (Native)

English (Fluent)

RESEARCH GRANTS RECEIVED

- 2011** TUBITAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey)
“New Forms of Racism and Racialization of Muslims in Europe”
Long Term Research Fellowship (12 months, \$20,000)
- 2010** NINSEE (The National Institute for the study of Dutch Slavery and its Legacy) “European Racism Reconsidered”
Short Term Research Fellowship (1 month, \$2000)
- 2009** TUBITAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey)
“State, Society, and Religion: The European Model”
Short Term Research Fellowship (1 month)

PAPERS PRESENTED IN CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS

- 2012** Middle East Technical University (METU), Turkey
“Revisiting the European Racism and Racialization of Immigrants in Europe from a Psychoanalytical Perspective”
- 2011** University of California, Berkeley, USA
“Spectrality of Racism at Work in the Racialization of Immigrants in Europe”
- 2009** Karl Franzens University, Austria
Workshop on “State, Society and Religion: European Model”
“Digging into the Social Constructivist Analysis of European Union Enlargement Process and Revisiting the EU through Jacques Derrida’s ‘Other Heading’”
- 2008** Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey
6th Graduate Conference of Siyasi İlimler Türk Derneği (National Political Science Organization)
“Revisiting the Debate on Islam and Secularism in the Age of Globalization”

INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOPS

- 2010** Vrije Universiteit and NINSEE (The National Institute for the Study of Dutch Slavery and its Legacy), Netherlands
‘Black Europe: Exploring Dimensions of Citizenship, Race and Ethnic Relations’
- 2009** Karl Franzens University, Austria
‘State, Society and Religion: European Model’

APPENDIX 2

TURKISH SUMMARY

Bir fikir, kimlik, kültür, politik ve ekonomik varlık ve hatta coğrafi bir bölge olarak Avrupa uzun zamandan beri tartışılan bir mesele. Burada Avrupa'dan kasıt hem Avrupa Birliği hem de aynı zamanda Avrupa ulus devletleridir çünkü bugün Avrupa ne ulus devlet formunun ötesine geçmiş ulus-ötesi bir yapı, ne de birbirinden tamamen farklı ulus-devletlerden oluşmuş bir kıta olarak tanımlanabilir. Avrupa hem bu ikisi, hem de bunlardan hiçbiridir; İki Başlı Kapılar Tanrısı gibi arada bir duruma işaret eder. Dahası, tarihsel sürece ve bugünün konjonktürüne bakıldığında Avrupa'nın tamamlanmamış bir yapı olduğunu söyleyebiliriz; Avrupa bir yandan açık uçlu, süreç odaklı bir yapı, bir yandan da hakkında güçlü bir fikre sahip olduğumuz tamamlanmış bir yapıdır. Avrupa'nın bugünkü söyleminin oluşmasında üç faktör etkili olmaktadır. İlki, düşünsel boyuttur; bir 'Avrupa' düşüncesine işaret eder. İkincisi, organizasyon boyutudur; karar alma ve en uygun politik çerçeveyi belirlemeyi hedefler. Üçüncüsü, coğrafi boyuttur; Avrupa'nın içerisi ve dışarısını belirleyen bir sınır oluşturma sürecine işaret eder.⁷⁰⁹ Dolayısıyla Avrupa hakkında eleştirel bir tanım ya da analiz yapılırken tüm bu faktörler dikkate alınmalıdır.

Önemle vurgulanması gereken diğer bir konu ise Avrupa'nın homojen bir yapı olmadığıdır. Her ulus-devletin kendine ait koşulları, kültürü, tarihi ve politik yaklaşımı vardır. Hatta Avrupa Birliği bile homojen bir yapıyı yansıtmaz; üye ülkeler bazı politik kararlarını kendi inisiyatifleri doğrultusunda alırlar. Özellikle

⁷⁰⁹ Ruth Wodack, “‘Doing Europe’: The Discursive Construction of European Identities”, in Richard C. M. Mole (ed) *Discursive Construction of Identity in European Politics*, New York: Palgrave, 2007.

sınır kontrolü, vize meselesi ve göçmen politikaları konusunda, kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda kararlar alır ve düzenlemeler yaparlar.

Ülkelerin uygulamalarındaki farklılıklara rağmen bazı benzerlikler de vardır. Avrupa Birliği politikaları ve birliğin genişleme süreci belli bir ‘Avrupa’ ve ‘Avrupa kimliği’ fikri üzerinden şekillenmektedir. Avrupa Birliği araçsal diyebileceğimiz ekonomik, stratejik ve politik bir yapı ve insan haklarını ve demokratik prensipleri güvence altına almayı amaçlayan bir yapı olsa da, Avrupa ve Birliğin genişleme süreci belli bir ‘Avrupa değerleri ve kimliği’ varsayımına göre şekillenmektedir. Avrupanın farklı bölgelerinde paylaşılan bir Avrupa kültürü, dili, geleneği ve değerleri olduğu varsayılır.

Oysa ki, Avrupa farklı tarihsel gelenekleri, kültürleri, dilleri ve farklı politik, ulusal, bölgesel ve yerel çıkarları ve yaklaşımları içermektedir. Buna karşıt olarak, bu çok farklı ve genişleyen Avrupa’yı temsil ve organize edecek bir ortak değer tanımlama çabası vardır. Diğer bir deyişle, Avrupa vatandaşlarının kendilerini tanımlayabilecekleri ve ait hissedecekleri bir vizyon, perspektif ve anlatı bulma zorunluluğu olduğu varsayılır; ancak böyle bir ortak ve tek kimlikten bahsedilemez.

Ortak bir ‘gelenek’ fikri Avrupa’nın politik söylemini oluşturan temel faktörlerden biridir. Tıpkı tarihsellik, medeniyet ve bilimsel buluşlar gibi gelenek fikri de ‘Avrupa’nın Avrupalılığı’nı tanımlar. Bu geleneğin, diğer gelenek ve kültürlerden üstün niteliklerde olduğu kabul edilir.⁷¹⁰ Murray Pratt Avrupa’nın kültürel kimliğini kurma meselesinin sürekli geliştirilen bir proje olduğunu ve bunun evrensellik karşıtı bir Avrupamerkezcilik formu olduğunu belirtir. Bu ortak kültür, kimlik ve kader fikri bir fantazidir ve bu fantazi ‘medenî Avrupa’ ve ‘barbar dışarı’ arasında sürekli bir karşılaştırma ve ayırım yapar. Bu fantazi, Avrupa tarihinin dayandığı Avrupamerkezci fikri, Avrupa mitini ve Oryantalist düşüncenin

⁷¹⁰ Meyda Yeğenoğlu, ‘The Return of the Religious: Revisiting Europe and Its Islamic Others’, *Culture and Religion*, 7:3, 2006, pp. 249-250.

kurucu doktrinini yansıtmaktadır. Bu çerçeveden bakıldığında denilebilir ki, Avrupa Birliği de ‘Diğeri’nden farklılığını vurgulamayı önemsemektedir.⁷¹¹

Bu bağlamda, Avrupa’nın göçmenleriyle gerilimli ve çelişkili bir ilişkisi vardır. Bu çelişkilerin iki boyutu vardır. İlki, Avrupa her ne kadar kendini göçmen bir ülke olarak tanımlamasa ve göçmenlerini kalıcı olarak algılamasa da, uzun bir zamandan beri sürekli olarak göçmenleri barındıran bir yapı olagelmıştır. Bugün AB’nin göçmen nüfusu, kayıtlara göre 31 milyon civarındadır. Yasadışı yollarla gelenler hesaplandığında bu sayı aslında daha fazladır. Bu, yaklaşık 500 milyon olan AB’nin genel nüfusunun neredeyse % 5’inin oluşturmaktadır. Bu sayı her geçen yıl, doğumlarla ve aile birleşimleri ile daha da artmaktadır. Göçmenlerin büyük bir bölümü aslında üçüncü nesil Avrupa vatandaşlarıdır ama buna rağmen ya geçici olarak ya da başka ülkelerin vatandaşları oldukları halde Avrupa’da bulunan azınlıklar olarak algılanırlar. Bu çerçevede onlarla ilgili meseleler, ‘Diğeri’nin başa çıkılması gereken problemleri olarak görülür.

Avrupa uzun zamandan beri göçmenleri içinde barındıran ama aynı zamanda onları Avrupa’ya ait unsurlar olarak görmeyen bir yapıdır. Avrupa’nın göçmenleri dört farklı bağlamda Avrupa’ya gelmişlerdir İlki, sömürgecilik sonrası (post-colonial) dönemde Avrupa’nın eski sömürgelerinden, metropollerine olan göçlerdir. İkincisi, 60’lardaki işgücü göçüdür ki bunun büyük bir kısmı Türkiye’den olmuştur. Üçüncüsü ise, 90’larda komünist sistemin sona ermesinin ardından AB’nin genişleme süreci çerçevesinde Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinden batı Avrupa ülkelerine olan göçlerdir. Dördüncüsü gene 90’lardan itibaren üçüncü dünya ülkelerinden işsizlik, siyasi çatışmalar, savaşlar ve baskıcı rejimlerden kaçış, demokrasi ve insan hakları güvencesi altında yaşama umudu çerçevesinde olan, çoğunlukla yasadışı olarak adlandırılan göçlerdir. Bu son grup aslında sığınma talep edenler ve mültecilerden oluşur, ancak AB’nin gittikçe sertleşen göçmen politikaları nedeniyle bunlar yasadışı yollardan Avrupa’ya girmek zorunda kalırlar. Sonuçta

⁷¹¹ Murray Pratt, 2005: 7,16, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 250.

Avrupa’da tek bir göçmenlik tanımı yoktur. Göçmenler farklılık arzederler, ancak bu farklılıklara rağmen AB’nin, göçmenleri ile ilişkilerinin benzer çelişkileri barındırdığı görülür.

Dolayısıyla, Avrupa Birliği’nin farklı kültürleri dışlayan, ortak bir kültür ve gelenek altında biraraya geldiğini varsayan, hayali bir birlik ve ortaklık düşüncesini yansıttığı söylenebilir. Avrupa’nın birlik olma sürecinde Avrupalı ve Avrupalı olmayan arasındaki fark belirleyici olmaktadır. Dolayısıyla Avrupalı olan ve gerçekten ve tam anlamıyla Avrupalı olmayan arasındaki ilişki, Avrupa’nın içerideki ve dışarıdaki sınırlarını şekillendirmektedir.

Bu noktada en başta belirtilen Avrupa’nın uzun zamandan beri tartışılan bir yapı olduğu meselesine geri dönecek olursa görülür ki, bugün Avrupa, öncesinde olduğundan daha fazla tartışmaya açık bir hale gelmiştir. Tartışmalar Avrupa’nın sömürgeci, ırkçı, dışayıcı ve ayırımçı mirasının Avrupa’nın güncel kavramsal ve materyal tasarımını etkilediği yönündedir. Bu miras Avrupa’nın yalnızca sınırları içinde ve dışındakileri nasıl gördüğünü belirlemez; sınırların takendisini de nasıl tanımladığını ve meşrulaştırdığını gösterir.

1990’lardan başlayarak, bu tasarım belirgin olarak Avrupa ve Avrupa sınırları içinde yaşayan Müslümanlar ve onların din ve kültürleri arasındaki bir gerilim çerçevesinde gündeme gelmektedir. Bir çok Avrupa ülkesinde, bu konuda bir konsensus var gibi gözükmemektedir. Özellikle Müslümanlarla ilgili yasal düzenlemeler ve formal ve informal düzeydeki açıklamalara bakıldığında bu görülebilir. Bu açıklamalar ve düzenlemeler genellikle şu üç konu çerçevesinde şekillenir: Müslümanların ve onların dini pratiklerinin, Avrupa’nın kamusal alanındaki görünürlüğü (özellikle Fransa, İsviçre, Almanya ve Belçika bu konuda öne çıkan örneklerle sahip), Avrupa ve İslam kültürü ve değerleri arasındaki fark (özellikle bu konuda öne çıkan örnekler Hollanda ve Danimarka) ve son olarak Müslümanların vatandaşlık statüleri ve entegrasyon problemleri (özellikle Birleşik Krallık ve Hollanda ve Almanya göze çapan örneklerle sahip).

Bu konsensusun 1980'lerde şekillenmeye başladığı söylenebilir. 1978'de Margaret Thatcher'ın ünlü demeci, 80'lerdeki genel atmosfer hakkında bilgi verir niteliktedir. Konuşmasında İngiltere'nin farklı kültürlerden insanlar tarafından dibe çekilmekte olduğunu belirtmiş ve bunun insanları çok korkuttuğunu dile getirmiştir. Bu konsensusu yansıtan açıklamalar 1980'lerden sonar artarak devam etmiştir. 1990'larda çokkültürcülük ve çoğulculuk önemlerini kaybetmeye başlamışlar ve bunun devamında, 2010'da bu sistemlerin başarısız oldukları ilan edilmiştir. Bu başarısızlık, özellikle Almanya, Fransa, İspanya ve İngiltere'de 2000'lerin sonunda tartışılmaya başlamıştır. Bu tartışmaların ana teması çokkültürcü toplumun artık savunulamayacağı, çokkültürcülüğün ve çoğuculuğun, göçmenlerin enetgrasyonunu sekteye uğrattığı, entegrasyon probleminin toplumsal birlik ve uyuma zarar verdiği, hatta tam bir felakete yol açtığı çerçevesinde şekillenmiştir. Politika ve hükümet düzeyinde gerçekleşen bu tartışmalar, entellektüel ve bilimsel düzeyde de benzer bir tema etrafında yer almıştır. Sonuçta çokkültürcülüğün kabul edilemez bir ideoloji olduğu vurgunmıştır ve vurgulanmaya devam etmektedir.

Daha detaylı bakıldığında, görülebilir ki, çokkültürlü toplum ve çokkültürcü sistemlere yönelik bu eleştiriler, özellikle 2001'de Amerika'da ve sonrasında 2004'te Londra ve 2006'da Madrid'de gerçekleşen bomba eylemlerinden sonra sertleşmeye başlamıştır. Bu olaylardan sonra Müslümanların, Müslüman olmayan ülkelerdeki varlıkları hem Avrupa toplumlarına, hem de tüm dünya toplumlarına bir tehdit olarak algılanmaya başlamıştır. Daha sonra Hollanda'da çektiği film *Submission* nedeniyle yönetmen Theo Van Gogh'un öldürülmesi ve 2005'te Danimarka'da İslam peygamberinin karikatürlerinin yayınlanmasının ardından büyük tartışmaların ve şiddet eylemlerinin gerçekleşmesi üzerine çokkültürcülük çok yaygın bir şekilde tartışılmış ve eleştirilmiştir; tartışma ve eleştiriler bugün de devam etmektedir. Bu örnekler, çokkültürcü ve toleransa dayalı sistemlerin çöktüğünün kanıtı olarak gösterilmektedir. Bunlara ek olarak, 2005'te Paris ayaklanması, Fransa'da orta dereceli okullarda başörtüsü ve İsviçre'de cami minaresi inşa etme yasağı çerçevesinde gerçekleşen tartışmalar da bu sistemlerin

entegrasyona engel teşkil ettiği ve bunun devamında Avrupa ve Müslümanlar arasında güç odaklı bir politik çekişmeye neden olduğu gerekçesiyle eleştirilmiştir.

Tüm bu olanlar Avrupa ve Müslüman kültürü ve değerleri arasında kapanmaz bir fark olduğu çerçevesinde değerlendirilmekte; ekonomik ve politik problemler tartışmaya açılmamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, tüm Avrupalı Müslümanlar zan altında bırakılmakta ve ‘içerideki düşmanlar’ olarak görülmektedir. Entegrasyon problemi vurgulanarak, Avrupalı Müslümanların din ve kültürleri tehlikeli olarak kodlanmaktadır. Bu yaklaşım ve algı öyle bir noktaya ulaşmıştır ki, Müslümanlar sıkı bir control altında tutulması gereken varlıklar olarak görülmektedirler. Bu imaj daha da ileriye giderek, ‘Batı ve Geriye Kalan Diğerleri’⁷¹² arasındaki medenileşme ve gelişmişlik farkını vurgulayan ‘kültürler çatışması’ tezleri ile desteklenmektedir.

Bu tezlerde, Batı kültürünün Yunan, Roma ve Rönesans gelenekleri üzerinde temellendiği ve bu geleneklerin demokrasi, eşitlik haklar ve akılcı düşüncüyü değer olarak kabul ettiği ve aynı tarihe sahip olmayan Diğerleri’nin aynı değerlere sahip olmadığı ve olamayacağı vurgulanmaktadır. Bu tezlerin en popüler örneği Bernard Lewis ve Samuel Huntington tarafından dile getirilmiştir. Bu tezlerde Batılı ve Batılı olmayan arasında çok kesin ve açık bir sınır çizmiş ve bu ikisi arasındaki kapanmaz farka vurgu yapılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Huntington, gelecekteki politik çekişme ve savaşların, Batılı ve Batılı olmayan toplumlar arasında ve ‘kültürlerin çatışması’ çerçevesinde gerçekleşeceği öngörüsünde bulunmuştur. Bu bakımdan, bu tez özellikle 2001’den itibaren haklı ve önemli bir referans kaynak olarak görülmektedir.

Bu tezler özellikle Amerika’nın politikalarında belirleyici olmaktadır. Müslümanlar Batı medeniyetlerinin ortak düşmanı olarak görülmekte ve deklare

⁷¹² Kishore Mahbubani, ‘The West and the Rest’, *The National Interest*, Summer 1992, pp.3-13, in Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilizations’, *Foreign Affair*, Summer 1993, p.41. Huntington has used the Kishore Mahbubani’s conception and stated that the world politics will be the relations between “the West and the Rest”. Rest refers to the non-Western civilizations.

edilmektedirler. 2001 sonrasında ilan edilen ‘teröre karşı savaş’ politikasının temel referans noktası bu düşüncedir: İslam medeniyeti terörüne karşı bir savaş ilan edilmiştir. Tabi ki bu tez sadece Amerika’da değil, Avrupa’da da referans olarak alınmıştır. Avrupa’da bu teze farklı bir dille referans verilmiştir; avrupa’da açıktan bir biçimde İslam medeniyetinin terörüne karşı savaş açıkça declare edilmemiştir. Avrupa’da bu mücadele farklı bir başlık ve tema altında devam etmektedir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, Avrupa’da terörle üstü kapalı bir şekilde mücadele edilmektedir. Şöyle ki, çokkültürcülüğün başarısızlığı, Müslümanların Avrupa toplumuna ve kültürüne entegre olamadıkları ve bu konuda bazı düzenlemelerin yapılması ve entegrasyonun sağlanmasının önemi vurgulanmış ve bu yönde yeni düzenlemeler yapılmıştır.

Bunun en açık ve çarpıcı örnekleri, 2001’de Amerika’da bombalama eylemlerini gerçekleştirenlerin Avrupa’da öne çıkan bazı Müslümanlarla ilişkileri olduğunun uzun bir süre gazete manşetlerinde yer bulması ve tartışmalara konu olmasıdır. Bunun paralelinde, Avrupa’da öne çıkan bazı cami imamlarının, Avrupa kültür ve değerlerini eleştiren ve bunların İslami değerlerle örtüşmediğinin altını çizen röpotajlarının yayınlanmasıdır. Bu araçlarla her fırsatta Avrupa’nın değerleri ile İslam’ın değerlerinin biraraya gelemeyen bir biçimde farklı oldukları ve keskin uyuşmazlığın söz konusu olduğu dile getirilmiştir. Daha da fazlası, İslam’ın Avrupa’daki varlığının ciddi bir tehlike arzettiği vurgulanmıştır.

Hollanda’da Theo Van Gogh’un katledilmesi ve Danimarka’da İslam peygamberinin karikatürlerinin yayınlanması ve bunun üzerine gelişen olaylara referansla başlayan tartışmalar üstü kapalı mücadeleden ne kastedildiğini açıklayan örneklerdir. Bu olaylar Müslümanların entegrasyon problemi ve sadakatsizliği olarak yorumlanmıştır. Uzun bir zamandan beri Avrupa’nın tolerans ve çoğulcuğunun çatısı altında yaşayan Müslümanların, tüm bu olumlu sistemleri olumsuz yönde kullandıkları ve Avrupa değerlerinin korunması ve sürdürülmesi

konusunda bir tehlike yarattıkları belirtilmiştir.⁷¹³ Özellikle kendini tolerans kültürü ile tanımlayan Hollanda’da bu kaygılar çarpıcı bir biçimde ifade edilmiştir. Van Gogh’un öldürülmesi ‘Müslümanlık’ ile ilişkilendirilmiş ve Müslümanların dinleri İslam’ın buyruğu gereği tolerans kültürünü benimsemelerinin ne derece zor olduğu vurgulanmıştır.

Karikatür tartışmalarında da benzer bir söylem, Danimarka’nın sınırlarını aşarak daha geniş bir bağlamda tartışılmıştır. Müslümanların karikatürlere verdikleri tepki ‘ifade özgürlüğü’ çerçevesinde de değerlendirilmemiş; tepkiler her koşulda ‘ifade özgürlüğü’ne karşı İslam referanslı tepkiler olarak tanımlanmış ve kodlanmıştır. Hatta çok büyük bir kitleselliğe ulaşmış eylemler karşısında bazı Avrupa ülkelerinin tavırları daha da sertleşmiş ve karikatürlerin sürekli olarak farklı şekillerde ve farklı ülkelerdeki medya kanallarında yayınlanmasına kadar gitmiştir. Danimarka’nın karşı karşıya olduğu bu durum diğer bir çok Avrupa ülkesi tarafından da sahiplenilmiş ve bunun Avrupa değerlerine yönelik bir müdahale olduğu savunulmuştur.

Bunun yanında Fransa ve İsviçre’de Müslümanların Avrupa kültür ve değerlerine entegrasyonunu sağlamak ve kamusal alanın sekülerliğini korumak adına Müslümanların ve İslam’ın görünürlüğünün yasaklanması da, üstü kapalı bir şekilde ve ima ile ‘İslami terör’le mücadeleye bir örnektir. Kamusal alanın sekülerliğini korumak adına, insan hakları ve ifade özgürlüğü prensipleri ile uyumsuz kararlar alınmıştır. Burada Fransa’nın yaklaşımının çok önemli bir boyutu daha vardır; Fransa’da orta öğretim okullarında başörtüsünün yasaklanması, kadınları feodal düzenin baskısından korunması için gerekli bir düzenleme olarak da tartışmalara konu olmuştur. Diğer taraftan bu yaklaşımlar Oryantalist bir bakış açısını yansıttığı gerekçesiyle eleştirilmiştir.

⁷¹³ Alana Lentin & Gavan Titley, ‘The crises of 'multiculturalism' in Europe: Mediated Minarets, Intolerable Subjects’. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 15 (2), pp. 127.

Bu olaylar gerçekleşirken ortaya çıkan diğer bir ilgi çekici durum ise, özellikle Hollanda ve Fransa’da öne çıkan/çıkarılan figürlerdir. Bu figürler kendilerini eski Müslümanlar (ex-Muslims) olarak tanımlamışlar ve İslam dininin kendilerine büyük zararlarının dokunduğunu dile getiren açıklamalar yapmış ve kitaplar yayınlamışlardır. Burada en ilgi çekici şey bu figürlerin ulusal figürlere dönüşmesi ve kamusal medya kanallarında sık sık yer bulmalarıdır. Bunların açıklamaları, İslami değerler ve Müslümanlar hakkında güvenilir ve geçerli bilgiler olarak algılanmıştır. Bu figürlerin kendi kişisel deneyimlerinden oluşan kitapları ulusal ödüller almış ve referans kaynağı olarak dahi kullanılmıştır.

Bu örneklerdeki, ‘mülahim’ ancak önemli meseleler Avrupa’nın daha derin ve eski bir bağlamından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, 2001’de ve sonrasında politik söylemde gerçekleşen çarpıcı değişime rağmen bu tarih, Avrupa’nın ‘farklı’ olana bakışında ve demokrasi, çokkültürcülük ve tolerans anlayışında radikal bir dönüm noktası olarak tarif edilemez. 2001’in eğer farklı bir özelliğinden bahsedilecekse bu, farklı kültürlerin uyumsuzluğu meselesini, entelektüel ve ana-akım politik söylemde görünür kılmasıdır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, 2001 ve sonrasında gerçekleşen olaylar, zaten varolan bir ‘İslam tehdidi’ kaygısını ve paranoyasını tetiklemiş ve bunların açıkça tartışılmasını meşrulaştıran bir bağlam yaratmıştır. Öyle ki, bu olaylar İslamofobi’ye meşru bir görünürlük kazandırmış ve onu paranoid politikaların bir sebebi değil, sonucu olarak yansıtmıştır.

Paranoid bir tonun ve islamofobik bir dilin hemen oluşmasına bakılırsa görülür ki aslında Avrupa politik söyleminde çok güçlü bir saklama ve sansür söz konusudur. 2001 ile beraber bu gizlilik ve saklılık, paranoya ve kaygının kaynaklarıyla savaşmak için gerekli olan görünürlüğe kazanmıştır, diğer bir ifadeyle su yüzüne çıkarılmıştır.

1990’larda görünürlük kazanmaya başlayan ve 2001, 2004 ve 2006’da gerçekleşen bombalama eylemleri ile ayyuka çıkan bu söylemsel yapıyı hakkıyla analiz edebilmek için, Avrupa ve Müslümanlar arasındaki çatışmanın çok farklı katmanlarını analiz edebilecek bir yaklaşıma ihtiyaç vardır. Bu bağlamda bu tez,

Joan Scott'un çok anlamlı bir fikri olan 'septomatik politika' (*symptomatic politics*) yaklaşımını kullanmayı önerir. Bu yaklaşım bu tezin argümanı açısından çok önemlidir çünkü bu tez görünen örneklerden yola çıkarak ve onları analiz ederek görünmeyene işaret etmeyi ve onu açık etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Diğer ifadeyle görünmeyenle ya da saklı olanla konuşmayı ve yüzleşmeyi önerir. Bu bakımdan görünen davranışı bir semptom olarak alır. Buna göre görünür olan, daha derinde ve gizli ve büyük bir çatışmanın semptomudur. Dolayısıyla bu fikir bizi, saklı olanı görmeye, sorgulamaya ve anlamaya zorlar.

Bu tez Avrupa ve Müslümanlar arasındaki yaşanan çatışmanın ve yukarıda bahsedilen yaklaşımın, Avrupa koloniciliğinin mirasından kaynakladığını iddia ediyor. Bu miras ötekileştirme, ırklaştırma ve medenileştirme ile gündeme gelir. Dolayısıyla, çokkültürcülüğün ve tolerans yaklaşımının güncel krizi üzerine yapılan tartışmalar ve Müslümanların kültür ve dinlerini değersizleştirerek onları damgalamaya varan yaklaşımlar, ortadan kalktığı varsayılan sömürgeci ve ırkçı düşünceden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu söylem ve uygulamalar, Avrupa'nın sömürgeci ve ırkçı geçmişinin bir semptomudur. Diğer bir ifadeyle, Müslümanlar hakkındaki söylem ve uygulamaların motivasyonu, 'özel olarak' Batı medeniyetine karşı olduğu varsayılan 'diğer' medeniyetlerden olan insanları 'Diğeri' olarak kodlamak, ırklaştırmak ve medenileştirmektir.

Dolayısıyla aslında 'kültürler çatışması' (*clash of civilizations*) tezleri Avrupa'nın dile gelmeyen İslami terörle mücadelesinde etkili olmuştur. Bu tezlerin Avrupa söyleminde çok daha derin ve güçlü temelleri vardır; bu temel Avrupa ve Diğerleri hakkındaki Avrupamerkezci anlatıdır. Avrupa kimliği, kültürü ve değerleri bu anlatının merkezindedir ve Avrupa politikasının kararlarını ve düzenlemelerini belirler. Burada hemen belirtilmelidir ki, 'Avrupa politik söylemi' basitçe hükümetler düzeyinde bir politika, yani yürütme gücünün politika etme biçimi olarak anlaşılmamalıdır; burada politik bağlamdan kasıt, hükümetlerden, onların ideolojilerinden ve günlük parti politikasından daha farklı bir düzeyde, kurucu güç düzeyinde bir politik çerçevedir. Şüphesi ki, demokratik anayasal düzenlerde

kurucu güç, kuran güç, yasa ayırımı ve bunların bağımsız birer güç olmaları esastır ancak görünen o ki, Avrupa politik bağlamında kurucu güç nihai belirleyici olmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, hükümetlerin gündelik politika yapma ve yasa yapma süreçlerinde, Avrupa kültürü, kimliği, değerleri ve gelenekleri gibi daha kurucu düzeyde bir söylemsel yapı hakimdir. O halde burada sorulması gereken soru, nasıl bir kimliğin, politik söylemin belirlenmesinde belirleyici olduğudur. Talal Asad bu soruyu şöyle sorar: Avrupa Avrupalılara nasıl bir kimlik temsil eder?⁷¹⁴

2001 sonrasında Avrupamerkezci anlatının restore edilerek yeniden gündeme gelmesi söz konusudur. Bu, özellikle Avrupa'nın, Avrupa'nın ne olduğu ve Avrupalı olmayanların Avrupa sınırları içinde nasıl yer alacaklarına vurgu yaparak kendi tanımını yaparken görünür olmaktadır. Belirgin olarak AB'nin genişleme sürecinde de restore edilerek gündeme gelen bu Avrupamerkezci çerçeveden kültür, kimlik ve değerler temelli kendini tanımlama meselesi, 2001 sonrasında daha da dramatik bir biçim almaktadır. Bu anlatıya daha detaylı bakılacak olursa, görülecektir ki, yaygın anlatı her şeyi Avrupa referanslı olarak anlatmakta ve Avrupa kültür, değer, ekonomi ve politikasının Diğerlerinden üstün olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Öyle ki, Anthony Pagden'in belirttiği gibi Avrupa liberal demokratik devlet yapısına bir alternatif olmadığı vurgulanmaktadır.⁷¹⁵ Aynı bağlamda, Talal Asad ise Avrupa'nın her koşulda öncü ve hatta tüm dünyanın medenileştirilmesinde temel misyoner gibi tanımlandığına dikkat çeker. Bu tanım hukuk ve bilim tarafından meşrulaştırılır ve her daim yürürlükte bulundurulur. Bu bağlamda Asad, John Lock'u örnek olarak verir. Lock'a göre, mülkün asıl sahibi Avrupa'dır. Avrupa mülke hukuka uygun bir şekilde sahip olmuş ve sonraki nesillere miras olarak aktarmıştır. Bu bakış açısı aynı zamanda Avrupa tarihini bir

⁷¹⁴ Talal Asad, "Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?" in Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union*. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 209.

⁷¹⁵ Anthony Pagden, *The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union*. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 11.

ilerlemeler ve birikimler tarihi olarak gören ve Avrupa'yı bütün maddi ve manevi olayların yeri gibi algılayan yaklaşıma da iyi bir örnektir. Burada da Avrupa tarihinin ve devlet yapısının üstünlüğü vurgulanmıştır. Avrupa hakkındaki bu anlatı, Avrupa medeniyetinin diğer bütün medeniyetlerden farkını vurgular. Şöyle ki, Avrupa medeniyeti evrensel, farklı, kendine has ve ileri bir seviyede tanımlanırken, diğer medeniyetler Avrupa sınırları içinde yaşasa dahi değişken, karmaşık ve Avrupa medeniyetine tamamen dışsal olarak tanımlanır. Özellikle Avrupa sınırları içinde bulunan Ruslar, Yahudiler ve Müslümanlar Avrupa deneyimine dışsal ve ondan farklı olarak görülürler; bu deneyime sahip olmadıklarından 'tamamıyla' Avrupalı olarak da algılanmazlar.

Altında yatan motivasyon eski bir temele dayansa da, burada bahsedilen koloniciliğin ve ırkçılığın semptomları günceldir. Diğer bir değişle, Avrupa'nın sömürgeci ve ırkçı düşüncesi güncel formlarda gündeme gelirler. Bu türden bir sömürgeci düşünce Avrupa sınırları içinde kendini gösterir. Onun bir uzantısı olan ırkçılık ise, Avrupalı Müslümanlarının damgalanması, haklarının ve dini pratiklerinin görünürlüğüne, evrensellik atfedilen Avrupa değerlerinin korunması ve Avrupa'nın medenileştirme misyonunun çerçevesinde sınırlandırılması biçiminde tezahür ederler.

Diğer taraftan, her şeyi Avrupa'ya referansla açıklayan ve Avrupa politikası, ekonomisi, kültürü ve değerlerinin üstünlüğünü vurgulayan Avrupamerkezci anlatıda, çok güçlü ve kararlı bir biçimde sömürgeci ırkçılığın reddi söz konusudur. Bir anlatıyı iyi ve doğru analiz edebilmek için, onun bize anlattıkları kadar anlatmadıkları da dikkatle ele alınmalıdır. Burada atılmayan olarak hemen Avrupa'nın Afrika ve Orta Doğu'da gerçekleştirdiği sömürgecilik, sömürgeci ırkçılık ve sömürgecilik sonrası döneme geçişte ve sonrasında gerçekleşen aşırı şiddet dikkatimizi çeker. Bu kısım, özenle kurgulanmış Avrupa anlatısına pek uygun düşmez, çünkü bugünkü Avrupa imajı açısından bazı anıları hatırlamak pek kolay değildir. Sömürgecilik geçmişi bu anlatıda ancak ekonomik ve sosyal 'medenileştirme misyonu'nun gerçekleşmesi olarak yer alabilir. Dolayısıyla aslında

sömürgeci geçmiş tamamen yok sayılmaz; kabul edilebilir bir biçimde tanımlanarak Avrupa anlatısına dahil olur. Hatta bu anlatıda yaratılan Avrupa mitini güçlendiren bir etki de yaratır.

Bu seçicilik için verilebilecek en ilgi çekici örnek ise Holokost'tur. Holokost'un tüm dehşet vericiliği ile kabul edilmesi ya da üstlenilmesi, üzerine dikkatle düşünülmesi gereken bir meseledir. Sömürgeci ırkçılığı yok sayarak ve hatta hiç olmamış gibi davranarak Holokost'u kabullenmek, sahiplenmek ve hatta onu anlatının merkezine koymak ise bu anlatının tekrar tekrar sorgulanması gerekliliğini açıkça ortaya koyar. Ancak tam bu noktada hemen belirtilmelidir ki, Holokost da Avrupa anlatısına dahil edilirken dizayn edilmiştir. Holokost'da farklı gruplara yönelik bir soykırım söz konusuysa, Holokost Yahudi soykırımı olarak anlatılmış ve kodlanmıştır. Bundan daha fa vahimi, Holokost Avrupa'nın dinamikleri çerçevesinde gerçekleşen bir olay olmak yerine, sıradışı ve akıl dışı davranışlarıyla gündeme gelen Nazi politikalarının bir sonucu olarak anlatılmaktadır. Avrupa sınırları içinde gerçekleşen bu vahşetin Avrupa'nın sömürgeci düşüncesiyle ve sömürgeci ırkçılık ile ilişkisi kurulmamaktadır. Holokost'un, sadece Nazi ideolojisinden kaynaklanan bir vahşet olduğu imajını güçlendiren çok sayıda kaynak mevcuttur. Bunlardan en iyi bilinenleri ise Holokost'un sinemada ele alınma biçimidir. Bütün bu problemli noktalar, aslında Holokost'un da tam anlamıyla sahiplenildiğinin göstergesidir.

Bu yok ve var sayma çerçevesinde denilebilir ki, Avrupa kendi ırkçı tarihiyle tam anlamıyla yüzleşememiştir; bu tarihi bastırarak yok saymaktadır. Sosyolojik bağlamda çok yaygın olarak yer almasa da, psikanalitik çerçeveden bakıldığında bastırılan asla yok olmaz ve her zaman sansürlenerek ve kılık değiştirerek gündeme gelme eğiliminde olur. Bu perspektiften bakıldığında, sömürgecilik ve ona eşlik eden ırkçılık ortadan kalkmamış ve yok olmamıştır, ancak bastırılmıştır ve bugün sansürlenerek ve kılık değiştirerek post-sömürgeci ve post-ırkçı Avrupa bağlamına geri dönmektedir.

‘Bastırılanın geri dönmesi’ kavramsallaştırması Jacques Derrida’nın musallat-bilimi (*hauntology*) ile ilişkilidir. Psikanaliz gibi bu bilim de sosyolojik bağlamda nadiren yer bulur, ancak bu çalışma, bu bilimin kendi orjinal bağlamı dışında da uygulanabilir olduğunu gösterme iddiasındadır. Özellikle geleneksel sınıflandırmaların ötesine geçerek, görünürde varolmayan varlığını ve orada olmayanın oradalığını analiz eden sosyolojik bir çalışma için çok anlamlı bir yaklaşım olduğunu savunur. Bize öyle bir formül verir ki, bu formülasyon çerçevesinde sömürgeci mentalitenin Avrupa sınırları içinde kılık değiştirerek etkili olduğunu söyleyebiliriz.

Bu çerçevede, bu tez sömürgeciliğin hayaletlerinin post-sömürgeci ve post-ırkçı Avrupa’nın sınırlarından geçtiğini düşünebiliriz. Tam da bu nedenle bu çalışma musallat bilim ve hayaletler (*specters*) kavramlarını bilinçli olarak kullanıyor. Avrupalı Müslümanların ve İslam’ın ırklaştırılması meselesini Derrida’ya referansla, sömürgeciliğin hayaletlerinin Avrupa’nın güncel post-sömürgeci bağlamına musallat olması biçiminde tanımlıyor. Diğer bir deyişle, Müslümanların ırklaştırılmasında sömürgeci ırkçılığın iş başında olduğunu belirtiyor. Bu şu anlama gelir: Uzaktaki Diğer dünyanın sömürgeleştirilmesi uzun zaman önce sona ermiş olsa da, ona eşlik eden üstün olanın, kendinden farklı olan ve dolayısıyla aşağı olan Diğerini, diğerleştirme, ırklaştırma ve medenileştirmesi hala aktif olarak iş başındadır. Sömürgecilik sonrası dönemde ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Avrupa’yı yeniden inşa etmek için Avrupa’ya göçmen ya da ‘misafir işçi’ (*guestworkers*) olarak gelmiş birinci nesil ya da onların ikinci ve üçüncü nesil ailelerinden müteşekkil Avrupalı Müslümanları diğerleştirerek, ırklaştırarak ve medenileştirerek Avrupa politik söylemine musallat olmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, Avrupa’da ırkçılık analiz edilirken, ‘Avrupalı sayılmayan Avrupalı’ya karşı ırkçılığın, Avrupa’nın sömürgeci geçmişinin ve modern devlet formasyonunun bastırılmış bir mirası olduğunun belirtilmesi gerektiğini savunmaktadır.

Bu bakımdan uluslararası ırkçılık karşıtı organizasyonlar ve örgütlerin içerdiği çelişkilerden de bahsedilmelidir. Bunların ırkçılıkla mücadelede önemli bir

misyonu yerine getirdikleri inkar edilemez, ancak diğer taraftan, ırkçılığı sürekli yeniden üreten bazı temel faktörlere değinmedikleri de bir gerçektir. Öncelikle bunlar ırkçılığın, sömürgeciliğin ve milliyetçiliğin amaçları çerçevesinde ortaya çıktığına değinmezler. Böylece, ırkçılığın politik sonuçlarını görmezden gelerek onu de-politize ettikleri söylenebilir. Buradaki çelişkinin ikinci boyutu, ırkçılık konusunda Holocaust'un bir dönüm noktası, belirleyici bir olay olarak ele alınmasıdır. Avrupa'nın ırkçı geçmişi söz konusu olduğunda, Holocaust bir referans noktası olarak alınır; ancak Avrupa'nın sömürgeci geçmişi ve kölelik mirası ırkçılık çerçevesinde ele alınmaz. Sömürgecilik, Avrupa'nın ilkel ve barbar toplumları medenileştirme misyonunu ile ilişkilendirilir. Oysaki, Avrupa'daki siyah karşıtı ırkçılık, Avrupa'nın sömürgeci geçmişinin bir mirasıdır. Dolayısıyla, bu, Avrupa'nın ırkçılığını antisemitizme indirgeyen ve sömürgeciliğin Avrupa'nın ve Avrupa ulus-devletlerinin oluşumunda çok az ya da hiç etkisi olmadığını söyleyen problemli bir yaklaşımdır.⁷¹⁶ Çelişkinin üçüncü boyutu ise UNESCO'nun, ırkçılığı 'ırksızlık' üzerinden ele almasından kaynaklanır. Buna göre, ırk farklılıkları empirik bir bilgi değildir, bilimsel dayanakları yoktur; sosyal inşa süreçlerinin bir sonucudur. Dolayısıyla, ırk kavramının bilimsel olduğu savlarının yanlışlığının gösterildiğine ve böylece ırkçılığın sona erdiğine inanılır. Oysa ki, Avrupa'da ırkçı ve etnik ayrımcılık ve dışlama formları, sadece Avrupa'nın bilimsel geleneği çerçevesinde oluşmamıştır; kültürel fark söylemi ve etnik ve dinsel sınıflandırmalar sonucunda oluşmuştur. Bu sınıflandırma, Avrupa'nın kültürel üstünlüğü fikrine dayanır. Dolayısıyla denilebilir ki, ırkçılık biyolojik ve bilimsel ırkçılıkla, Nazi antisemitizmi ile, deri rengine dayalı siyah-beyaz ırkçılığı ile ya da bir ırkın açıkça dışlanması ve yok edilmesi biçimleri ile sınırlandırılarak anlaşılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede ırkçılık karşıtı yaklaşımların, ırkçılığın farklı biçimlerde varolabileceği ihtimalini yoksaydığı için sorunlu olduğunu söylenebilir.

⁷¹⁶ David Theo Goldberg, 2009.

Tüm bu açıklamaların ardından ortaya çıkan sonuç üç boyutludur: ilki, AB'nin basitçe ekonomik bir ortaklık ve kapsayıcı bir yapı olarak tanımlanamayacağı; ikincisi, Avrupa'daki göçmen karşıtlığının basitçe ekonomik nedenlerle, sağ parti politikalarıyla ve marjinal (neo-Nazi) grupların davranışlarıyla kestirmeden ve kolayca açıklanabilecek bir mesele olmadığı; üçüncüsü, Avrupa'nın ırkçılıkla kurduğu ilişkinin indirgemeci olduğu, hem Avrupa'nın ilk ırkçı deneyimi olan sömürgecilik ve kölelik mirasını, hem de Holocaust sonrası ırkçılığı yok saydığı. Sonuçta, buraya kadar bahsedilenler gösteriyor ki, AB'nin kendini kurma süreci ve bu bağlamda göçmenleriyle ilişkileri ve ırkçı geçmişi ile kurduğu ilişki biçimi eleştirel bir yaklaşımla yeniden gözden geçirilmelidir.

AB'nin kendini kurma ve ırkçılığı algılama biçiminin en temel probleminin, AB'nin homojen bir “Avrupa” fikri çerçevesinde şekillenmesi olduğu savunulabilir. Bu çerçevede yabancı yani Avrupalı olmayan kültürlerin varlığı, homojen Avrupa kimliğine ve kültürüne bir tehdit olarak algılanır. Dolayısıyla AB ve onun göçmen karşıtı söylem ve politikaları, Avrupalı-Avrupalı olmayan ve ait-ait olmayan ayrımları bağlamında şekillenir. Bunu avro-ırkçılık (Euro-racism) bağlamında açıklayabiliriz, yani ırksal olarak Avrupalı olmayanların asla ya da yeterince Avrupalı olamayacağı düşüncesi.⁷¹⁷ Burada bahsedilen Avrupalılık ise kültürel olarak Hristiyan, ırksal olarak beyaz ve sivil bir yapıdan menkuldür. Bu durumu en iyi “racial europeanization”⁷¹⁸ (ırksal avrupalaştırma) özetler. Bu çerçevede, Avrupalıların Müslüman, kahverengi ya da siyah deri renkli olabilecekleri hiçbir zaman düşünülemez. Hatta, bunlar Avrupalı olmayan (non-European) ve dolayısıyla ait olmayan (not belonging) kimlikler olarak kodlanır. Bu kodlamada kültürel hiyerarşiler söz konusudur.⁷¹⁹ Bu bağlamda, özetle

⁷¹⁷ David Theo Goldberg, 2009: 187-8.

⁷¹⁸ David Theo Goldberg, 2006. *Racial Europeanization*

⁷¹⁹ Philomena Essed, 2008: 7

Avrupalıların kendilerini diğer kıtalardan ve “Diğer”inden “ırk” kavramı ile ayırdettikleri/ farklılaştırdıkları söylenebilir.

Buraya kadar bahsedilenler, ırkçılığın Avrupa kimliğini oluşturma sürecinin bir parçası olduğunu vurguluyor. Bu, Avrupa ırkçılığının bir boyutudur. Ancak burada sorgulanması gereken diğer bir konu diğer bir konu ise, bunun nasıl mümkün olabildiğidir. Bu konuda bu tezin argümanı, ırkçılığın epistemic ve materyal temellerinin olduğu ve bunların hala belirleyici olduğudur. Epistemic temeller, ırkçı düşünceyi yaratan ve onun varolmasını sağlayan bilgi üretimine dikkat çeker. Materyal temeller ise, ırkçılık ve devleti idare etme yöntemlerinin içiçe geçtiğini vurgular. Bugün ırkçılık, güvenlik saplantılı modern politika ve yönetim biçimleri olan bio-politika⁷²⁰ ve yönetimsellik⁷²¹ prensipleri tarafından şekillenmektedir. Modern devlet, heterojen unsurları yönetebilmek için ırkçı düzenlemeler yapar. Bu, modern devlet ırkçılığıdır ve direk dışlama, soykırım, işkence, kölelik, özel yetkili kamplara kapatma, sömürgeleştirme biçiminde değil; içleyerek dışlama yöntemleri, modern güvenlik teknolojileri ve neo-liberal politikalar çerçevesinde gerçekleşir. Giorgio Agamben bunu “ex-crape” (dışarıda tutma) olarak tanımlar.⁷²²

Özetle, Avrupa’da ırkçılık, Avrupa’nın kendini tanımlama biçiminin ve devlet yönetiminin kurucu bir unsurudur. Diğer bir deyişle, Avrupa’nın kendi kimliğini ve politik söylemini oluşturma süreci bir ‘ırksal avrupalılaştırma’ (racial europanization) sürecidir. Dolayısıyla ırkçılık ortadan kalkmamıştır; daha da karmaşıklaşmıştır ve Avrupa’nın politik evreni ve kimliği böyle kurulduğu sürece varılmaya devam edecektir. Bu nedenle, onu sürekli yeniden üreten unsurlara dair bir sorgulama yapılmadan, ırkçılığın ortadan kalktığından bahsedilemez.

⁷²⁰ This concept is first used both Michel Foucault in order to explain the mechanisms of modern states and their techniques of controlling their population. And then Giorgio Agamben uses this concept.

⁷²¹ Michel Faucault, 1, 1990. *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley, New York: Penguin Books.

⁷²² Giorgio Agamben, 1998. *Hommo Sacer and Bare Life*,

Bu tezin amacı bu sorgulamayı yapmaktır. Avrupa'yı, Avrupa kimliğinin kurucu bir unsuru olan “Diğeri”ni, güncel ‘teknolojilerle’ ırklaştırma sürecini, Müslüman göçmenlerin ve İslam’ın ırklaştırılması çerçevesinde sorunsallaştırmaktır.

Bu bağlamda, İslam dininin özüne, Müslüman göçmenlerin görünüş ve davranışlarına odaklı söylem ve uygulamalara odaklanarak özellikle 2001 sonrasında oluşan İslam ve Müslüman göçmen karşıtı baskın söylemi, Avrupa ırkçılığı bağlamında analiz eder. Bu formda bir ırkçılık, bir dinin ve kültürün özüne vurgu yaparak ve onu epistemolojik olarak kodlayarak gündeme gelir. Bu tez, İslam’ın Avrupa değerleri ve medeniyetiyle uyumsuz, ona entegre olamaz, onun gibi sekülerleşemez ve bu nedenlerle onun için bir tehdit oluşturduğunu vurgulayan uygulama ve yasaklamalara dikkat çekerek, bugünkü Avrupa konjonktüründe ırklaştırmanın basitçe biyolojik bir ırkın, diğer ırkı tehdit ettiği gerekçesiyle değil; bir dinin ve kültürün özsel niteliklerinin tehdit oluşturduğu gerekçesiyle gündeme geldiğine dikkat çekiyor.

Diğer bir deyişle Avrupa’da ırkçılık hayaletinin İslam’ı ve Müslümanları ırklaştırarak ‘hortladığı’ ve Avrupa politik söylemine ‘musallat olduğu’⁷²³ argümanını öne sürüyor. Burada kapsayan bir dışlama söz konusudur, yani kapsama ve dışlamanın basitçe karşıtlığı değil, aynı anda birarada bulunmaları söz konusudur. Bu bağlamda Müslümanlar, kültürlerinin ve dinlerinin eksikliği üzerinden kodlanır, ırklaştırılır ve jeopolitik olmayan sınırlarla dışarıda tutulurlar. Bu çerçevede ırkçılığın hayalet formundan bahsetmek, ırkçılıkla mücadele prensibi temelinde oluşturulan UNESCO, UN, İnsan Hakları Evrensel Beyannamesi’nin kurucusu olan Avrupa’da ırkçılığı, var mı ya da yok mu sorularının ötesine geçerek tartışmayı mümkün kılar. Diğer bir ifadeyle konuşulmayı ve bastırılanı dile getirerek, onu tartışmaya açık bir konuma taşır.

⁷²³ Jacques Derrida, *Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, New York: Routledge, 1994.

Bu çalışmanın ana konusu olan ‘yeni ırkçılık’ literatürde farklı biçimlerde ele alınmaktadır. Marxist perspektiften bakanlar ekonomik ırkçılıktan bahsederler. Diğer bir ifadeyle ırkçılığı ekonomik faktörlere odaklanarak açıklarlar. Sivanandan (1992) bu yaklaşımın en önemli temsilcilerindendir. Immanuel Wallerstein (1992) da bu ilişkiye dikkat çeken önemli teorisyenlerden biridir. İkinci grup yeni biyolojik ırkçılıktan bahseder ve burada en öne çıkan isim Barker (1981)’dır; yeni ırkçılık kavramını Pierre Andre Taguieff’den referansla kullanmıştır.

Etienne Balibar (1991) yeni ırkçılığı ‘kültürel ırkçılık’ olarak tanımlar. Bu aynı zamanda ‘farklılaştırıcı ırkçılık’, ‘neo-ırkçılık’ ya da ‘kültürel farkın ırkçılığı’ anlamına gelir. Bu ırkçılık formu sömürge sonrası dönemde Avrupa’nın eski sömürgelerinden, metropollerine doğru gerçekleşen tersine nüfus hareketleri bağlamında söz konusu olan ırkçılığın bir parçasıdır. Kültürel olarak ilkel ve geri kalmış olanların modern medeniyete asimile edilmesi mantığına dayanır. Bu yeni ırkçılık, biyolojik kalıtım yerine kültürel kalıtım ilkesine dayanır. Ayrıca Poul Gilroy da benzer şekilde Avrupa’da kültürel ırkçılığa vurgu yapar. Bunlar etnosentrik ırkçılık yerine Eurosentrik ırkçılıktan bahsederler. David Theo Goldberg (2006) bunu şöyle açıklar: ABD’nin ırkçılığı daha çok deri rengi üzerinden siyah-beyaz ikiliğine dayanır. Ancak, Avrupa’nın ırkçılığı sadece deri rengi üzerinden anlaşılamaz; Avrupa ırkçılığı deri renginden bağımsız olarak büyük oranda Batılı olmayan Avrupalıların ırklaştırılması çerçevesinde anlaşılabilir. Diğer bir deyişle, bu ırkçılık formunda, kültürel kimlikler direk ya da dolaylı yollardan ırklaştırılır.

Yeni ırkçılık formunda öne çıkan diğer bir faktör “devlet”tir. Poul Gilroy devletin racism’in nedeni olduğunu belirtir. Burada devlet hükümete (government) işaret etmez. Michael Foucault da benzer biçimde devlet ırkçılığından bahseder. Ona göre modern devlet ırkçı düzenlemeler yapar. Bunu biopolitika kavramı ile açıklar. Modern ulus-devletin ırkçı yaklaşımına dikkat çeken diğer önemli teorisyenler David Theo Goldberg, Zygmund Bauman ve Etienne Balibar’dır. Bu paralelde

Nora Ratzel (2002), ırkçılığın Batı Avrupa ulus-devletlerinin politik söyleminin bir parçası olduğunu belirtir.

İrkçılığın Avrupa kimliğine ve modern devlet yönetim sistemine içselliğinden bahsetmek, Avrupa'nın ırkçı mirasından bahsetmeyi beraberinde getirir. Jacques Derrida bunu, olduğumuz şeyin varlığı herşeyden önce bir mirastır diyerek açıklar. Miras almak geçmiş için yanıp tutuşmak anlamına gelmez. Ayrıca devralma ile ilgili de değildir. Bu bağlamda 'hayalet' metaforunu kullanır. Bu 'hortlak' felsefesinin merkezi nosyonudur: bastırılmış olanın asla yok olmayacağını, her zaman geri döneceğini ve bu dönüşün kontrol edilemeyeceğini belirtir. Bir devralma yoktur burada. Dolayısıyla Avrupa'da Müslüman göçmen karşıtı ırkçılık Avrupa ve İslam arasında, haclı seferlerinden beri süregelen bir çatışma ile açıklanamaz. Bu bağlamda Gerard Delanty'nin *Avrupa'nın İcadı* (1992) isimli kitabında bahsettiği türden, süreklilik arzeden bir düşmanlıktan bahsedilemez. Ayrıca, Müslüman göçmen karşıtı ırkçılık, İslam ve Batı'nın ezeli karşıtlığından bahseden Bernard Lewis'in tezleri, gene benzer şekilde Samuel Huntington'un 'medeniyetler çatışması' tezi ile de açıklanamaz. Gene Avrupa'nın ırkçı mirası çerçevesinde, ırkçılığın marjinal bir olgu olmadığını savunan görüşler vardır. David Theo Goldberg (2006) ırksal Avrupalılaştırmadan (*racial Europeanization*) bahseder. Benzer çerçevede, Avrupa ırkçılığını bir söylemin üretilmesi bağlamında ele alan ve söylem analizine odaklanan en belirgin eleştirel yaklaşımı Teun Van Dyck'in ve Ruth Wodack'ın çalışmalarında bulabiliriz. Bunun yanında, "anti-ırkçı söylem" eleştirisi belirgin olarak John Solomos ve Alana Lentin tarafından yapılır. Alana Lentin UNESCO'nun söylemine ve kapsayıcılığına eleştirel bir yaklaşımla dikkat çeker.

Burada hemen dikkatle vurgulanmalıdır ki bu çalışma, sömürgeciliğin hayaletlerinin Avrupa politik söylemine musallat olduğunu iddia etmekle, Avrupa'nın sömürgeci ve ırkçı yönetim şeklinin, düşünce ve davranışlarının çok fazla sansürlenmeden de, Avrupa'nın sınırları içinde gerçekleşmesi biçiminde tezhür ettiğini yok saymaz. Şu anda Avrupa'nın bazı ülkelerinde açıkça işaret

edebilecek yaklaşımların söz konusu olduğunu görür. Ancak bu tezin yapmaya çalıştığı, giderek görünmez ve yakalanamaz olan hayaletleri, yakalanamazlığının farkında olarak yakalama girişiminde bulunmaktır.