

DEMOCRACY IN THE DISCOURSE OF
JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY

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ABSTRACT

DEMOCRACY IN THE DISCOURSE OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY

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The aim of this thesis is to understand the democracy in the discourse of Justice and Development Party (JDP). This is done by examining the discourse of democracy within the frame of JDP's conservative democratic identity. JDP makes a separation as old and the new Turkey and claims that JDP government represents the new Turkey. Therefore, this thesis tries to explain which elements the discourse of democracy includes and excludes on the basis of the separation between old and the new Turkey.

Keywords: Democracy, old Turkey, new Turkey, nation, national will

ÖZ

ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ’NİN DEMOKRASİ SÖYLEMİ

Güneş, Aysun

Yüksek Lisans, Sosyoloji Bölümü

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Bu tezin amacı Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin (AKP) demokrasi söylemini anlamaktır. Demokrasi söylemi AKP’nin muhafazakar kimliği çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. AKP, Türkiye tarihini eski ve yeni Türkiye olarak ikiye ayırmaktadır ve AKP hükümeti olarak kendilerini yeni Türkiye’nin temsilcisi olarak sunmaktadır. Yeni Türkiye ise AKP hükümeti tarafından ileri demokrasi ile tanımlanmaktadır. Bu nedenle bu çalışma AKP hükümetinin eski ve yeni Türkiye ayrımı temelinde demokrasi söyleminin içerdiği ve dışladığı öğeleri tanımlama ve anlamaya yöneliktir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasi, eski Türkiye, yeni Türkiye, millet, milli irade

To my beloved aunt,

Nebahat Güneş

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

JDP	: Justice and Development Party
NOM	: National Outlook Movement
NO	: National Outlook
NOP	: National Order Party
TOBB	: Union Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
JP	: Justice Party
NSP	: National Salvation Party
RPP	: Republican People's Party
NMP	: Nationalist Movement Party
WP	: Welfare Party
TPP	: True Path Party
VP	: Virtue Party
TUSIAD	: Turkish Industry and Business Association
EU	: European Union
UN	: United Nations
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
TAF	: Turkish Armed Forces
USA	: United States of America
GUP	: Grand Unity Party
MP	: Motherland Party
DP	: Democrat Party
FP	: Felicity Party

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim of the Study

The aim of this thesis is to understand the democracy in the political discourse of Justice and Development Party (JDP) in its use of group division as a way to mobilize popular support. The formation of the discourse of democracy within the conservative democrat identity of JDP includes and excludes some components which are at the end lead to a group division in society. Therefore, the main goal of this thesis is to understand to which parts of the society JDP refers and of which parts of the society it excludes through the discourse of democracy.

After November 3, 2002 elections, with 34.6 % voting rate, JDP became the new ruling party of Turkey. Since then, by winning through third general elections, it is still the ruling party of Turkey. It seems that the most important aspect of JDP's achievement is its political discourse. Assessing how JDP reveals its political identity and through which values it defines this identity are of such major significance to understand its political discourse and its use of group division as a way to mobilize popular support.

JDP defines its political identity as conservative democracy. In order to figure out the voter base of JDP as well as its place in Turkish political history as a political party, how conservative democratic identity is formed or from which political perspectives it comprised of should be examined closely.

Singly conservatism or democratic models are not foreign concepts for Turkish political history. They had been in use diversely Turkish-Center Right tradition in history. However; JDP defines itself as Conservative Democratic by using conjunctively conservatism and democracy and opens this identity to discussions different from the preceding parties. In this sense JDP; as claimed by Yalçın Akdoğan who is one of the ideologists of it, "opens a new course" by breaking from

the former Turkish-Center Right parties in Turkey. By keeping its distance from political Islam and claiming that “religion cannot be used in favor of political benefits”, JDP has risen as a new political actor in Turkish political field.

The most important component of conservative democrat identity of JDP government is its statements on democracy. JDP government legitimizes its political authority through its statements of democracy and the ‘New Turkey’ which is claimed to be the representation of advanced democracy. On the other hand, it also gains the consent of the nation / national will. JDP government regards nation / national will as the constitutive subject of democracy and the New Turkey. As having votes of the nation, JDP government perceives itself as the body of national will and the guarantor of the democracy and the New Turkey as well. Therefore, there emerges the necessity to understand what kind of a nation / national will JDP calls out if one wishes to clarify the statement of democracy in the New Turkey.

In its group division by political discourse, JDP defines nation, which is the voter base of party, as the constitutive subject of democracy. On the other hand, there is an ‘other’ which has a quiet inclusive meaning. JDP constructs its own definition of nation as opposed to ‘other’. Since nation is the constructive subject of democracy in the New Turkey, ‘other’ is constructed as the enemy of democracy and the continuation of Old Turkey.

This ‘other’ is quiet inclusive in the sense that it changes with respect to necessities of time and the era; however, still responding to the same discursive formation of democracy as understood from the electoral and parliament speeches of Erdoğan who is the prime minister and the leader of JDP, speeches of JDP cadres and some selected articles about democracy of JDP. With the necessity of time and era, ‘other’ conveys itself into an expanding coalition adding itself diversity of ‘others’. These others are not defined separately; however, as an integration which always considered as a threat to democracy and the New Turkey.

In order to recognize ‘other’ which is the enemy of democracy and the New Turkey, one should carefully examine the separation between Old and the New Turkey. This separation is crucial to understand JDP’s political discourse in its use of group division. New Turkey is the place in which advanced democracy flourished as a

victory of national will. On the other hand, Old Turkey is the place in which democracy is restricted as well as national will.

1.2. Research Procedure and Methodology

This thesis is based on the speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who is the former President of JDP government and the new President of Turkish Republic. These speeches are composed of Erdoğan's speeches on weekly group meetings in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) from May 2013 to July 2014. This time period is preferred intentionally since May 2013 is the month Gezi Protests. On the other hand, it is preferred to maintain July 2014 to able to see the reflection of December 17 and 25 operations to the discourse of democracy. These two examples are crucial in order to see how JDP government articulates other oppositions and movements against itself to its statements of Old Turkey that it put against the discourse of democracy; the representation of New Turkey. Secondly, Erdoğan's Presidential election speeches were examined carefully. Thank to these readings, it became possible to see to through which statements JDP's discourse of democracy is constituted. In addition to these readings, several news and articles helped this thesis to find other examples that are not included in the TBMM and Presidential election speeches.

The chief point of this study is that its perception of the discourse of democracy is formed by the Foucauldian discourse analysis. It might be said that through the eyes of Foucault, this thesis becomes possible since his idea of discourse is promising in order to enlighten Erdoğan's speeches.

A Foucauldian notion of discourse is useful in order to enlighten several aspects of the discourse of democracy since it helps to see the link between knowledge and power, the construction of the concept of democracy, the role of Old Turkey and its components in regards to practices of pointing out 'the other'. The components of Old Turkey can be ordered as one party period of Republican People's Party (RPP) and today's RPP which is perceived as the continuation of one party period of RPP. In this sense one party period of RPP is described as a period in which coup d'états, tutelage, or elites ignored nation / national.

First of all it is important to see the link between power and knowledge for its effect on discourse. Foucault argues that it is important to catch the power where it is capillary.

In the very first place, it seemed important to accept that the analysis in question should not concern itself with the regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central locations, with the general mechanisms through which they operate, and the continual effects of these. On the contrary, it should be concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions.¹

Power has role in the production of knowledge and discourse. Therefore, through which perspective power will be dealt with is determinant in explaining JDP's discourse of democracy. In this sense, rather than approaching power as centered in single institution or place, it should be discussed through its operational dimensions. By this means power will show up as the production of social and historical processes rather than the production of one center of power and will illustrate through which social and historical components JDP built its discourse on democracy.

Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application.²

As the carrier of power, individuals are constructed as nation and they are known by others and know others by their identities. Similar with what Althusser called interpellation, nation; the constitutive aspect of discourse of democracy, becomes aware of its features and ready to be called out. On the other hand, as the ruling party

¹ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p.96

² Ibid., p.98

of Turkey JDP government defines RPP as the continuation of one party period of RPP. In this sense it is clear that JDP government producing knowledge since it reveals today's RPP as the carrier of coup d'état, tutelage mentality as the reflection of Old Turkey in the discourse of democracy.

We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.³

Foucault uses Bentham's panopticon model frequently which is an observation mechanism. It can be argued that JDP government controls nation / national will within the defined boundaries of its laws are determined by JDP government. Foucault argues that:

It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disindividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerned distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up. The ceremonies, the rituals, the marks by which the sovereign's surplus power manifested are useless. There is machinery that assures dissymmetry, disequilibrium, difference. Consequently, it does not matter who exercises power.⁴

By creating new public meeting squares like Kazlıçeşme or Maltepe, a new definition of how a proper demonstration should be is recognized. In this public meeting zones, nation is defined as using their demonstration rights properly by participating meetings in these squares, declaring their demands fairly without being detrimental to environment.⁵ Defining how a proper demonstration and a fair demonstrator should be by creating a public square for it, it becomes sudden for subject to be caught up by power. Defining and controlling nation is held

³ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, (London: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 27.

⁴ Ibid., p. 202.

⁵ Erdoğan defines Gezi Protests as detrimental to environment. It is not a fair demonstration according to him.

simultaneously and points out to a group division by defining the ideal nation. A docile⁶ nation is created by this way.

Controlling nation through such mechanisms reminds what Foucault calls 'bio-politics'. In this sense nation or national will is regarded as a body in which politics of JDP government are realized and implemented. Different from disciplinary mechanism of public or meeting squares, JDP government's conservative identity perceives society as an organic being. Therefore it is more likely to emerge oppositions since differences are hard to be tolerated by such a perspective. Foucault's bio-politics is valid when the issue is conservative character of JDP government rather than its claim on democratic New Turkey. Foucault argues that:

Unlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the new non-disciplinary power is applied not to man's-body but to the living man, to man -as-having-being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species. To be more specific, I would say that discipline tries to rule a multiplicity of men to the extent that their multiplicity can and must be dissolved into individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance, trained, used, and, if need be, punished. And that the new technology that is being established is addressed to a multiplicity of men, not to the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form; on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on.⁷

Together with disciplinary power, bio-politics perceives population as one body that needs to be regulated and controlled. In this sense, JDP's statements on reproduction find its meaning. Erdoğan and cadres of JDP always stress on the importance of having three children. On the other hand, attitude towards abortion in JDP cadres has such an evidential value. Nation for JDP government is a population that needs to maintain reproducing itself for the future of the New Turkey. In this sense others who do not accord with JDP's politics are perceived as out of nation. This perspective will be clearer when the Gezi Protests are revealed as acts of violence. Therefore, performance of police whether or not it is violent will be expressed by Erdoğan as proper. It might be claimed that these protesters or people who do not accord with politics of JDP becomes out of the protection of laws.

⁶ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 169.

⁷ Michel Foucault, *Society Must be Defended, Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976*, (New York: Picador, 2003), p. 242-253.

The central binary relationship of the political is not that between friend and enemy but rather the separation of bare life (zoé) and political existence (bíos)—that is, the distinction between natural being and the legal existence of a person. According to Agamben, we find at the beginning of all politics the establishment of a borderline and the inauguration of a space that is deprived of the protection of the law: “The original juridico-political relationship is the ban.”⁸

There is a strong relationship between the power, knowledge and discourse in Foucauldian perspective. Foucault argues that:

The conditions to which the elements of this division (objects, mode of statement, concepts, and thematic choices) are subjected we shall call the rules of formation. The rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive division.⁹

In discourse of democracy, there are certain rules of formation for it to become possible. In addition to regularities of these rules, there are also rules for what is sayable or not. In JDP’s discourse of democracy, democracy is the representation of New Turkey in which nation could reach its democratic rights. In this sense Old Turkey is put against the New Turkey including one party period of RPP, coup d’etats and tutelage. Therefore; in each case, it is witnessed that JDP government explains events within this framework.

1.3. Organization of the Thesis

In the second chapter of this thesis, JDP’s political identity; which is conservative democracy will be examined. For this purpose, there will be an overview of how JDP reveals and defines its identity. Especially Yalçın Akdoğan’s book about the identity of JDP; ‘Ak Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi’ will be used since it also includes main points of party program. It is important to look how JDP defines its identity since as different from the previous parties; it opened its identity to discussion. One

⁸ Thomas Lemke, *Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction*, (New York and London: New York University Press, 2011), p. 54

⁹ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 42.

of the most important features of this identity is JDP's emphasis on their separation and difference from National Outlook Movement (NOM) and National Outlook (NO) parties. In this sense to understand why JDP needed to make a separation with NOM, there will be an overview of NOM and NO parties in Turkey.

In the third chapter the main emphasis will be the discourse of democracy of JDP government. In this sense, it might be claimed that it is the history of the New Turkey. This notion is derived from Foucault's idea of history of present and it is about Foucault's genealogical method. "It is a form of historical analysis which describes events in the past but without explicitly making causal connections."¹⁰

JDP government defines New Turkey as against Old Turkey in which there was the mentality of one party period leading coup d'états, and tutelage. Therefore Erdoğan, in his description of democracy, puts forward the notion of New Turkey. New Turkey is represented by democracy so understanding the components of democracy, through which notions it becomes possible will be examined. These notions are nation / national will, invention of tradition and mythologization. In the first part there will be an examination on how nation / national will are represented. Its relation with Old Turkey and how it is explained through dualities like center / periphery, secularism / conservatism, and elites / people discussed based on the speeches of Erdoğan. Secondly, there will be an analysis on how JDP invents traditions most of which are prevented days or dates in the one party period of Turkey. Lastly, some examples will be given on how JDP government mythologizes some figures for their struggle for democracy.

In the last chapter; on the basis of speeches of Erdoğan, there will be an evaluation of how actors who are out of discourse of democracy are articulated to the discourse of Old Turkey. This examination will be made through the Gezi Protests and December 17 and 25 operations.

¹⁰ Sara Mills, *Michel Foucault*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 25

CHAPTER II

CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRATIC IDENTITY OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY

Before JDP won the 2002 elections; Yalçın Akdoğan who is one of the ideologists of JDP and advisors of the former president of JDP and Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, wrote a book titled '*Ak Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi*'. In this book Akdoğan explained the essentials of JDP's political ideology and what it means for JDP to be both conservative and democrat. When approached separately, conservatism and democracy are not foreign concepts to Turkish political history primarily to Turkish center-right. However, it is the JDP that makes effort to clarify its political identity and opens it to discussion in both political and academic environment. As a political strategy, background of these concepts' combination can be read through why JDP separated itself from NOM. Therefore, in the first part of this chapter there will be an overview of the history of NOM from the establishment of Turkish Republic to the foundation of NOM and to NOM parties. In the second part of this chapter, ideological framework of NOM will be analyzed. In the third part there will be an evaluation of why JDP broke up with NOM though most of its cadres came from within it. Lastly, JDP's conservative democratic identity will be examined. In this part there will not be a detailed examination on the concept of democracy since its evaluation will be made in Chapter III.

2.1 An Overview of National Outlook Movement History

Young military officers and bureaucrats of late Ottoman period were educated at western style schools which were founded to save the collapsing Ottoman Empire, and where they met with western thoughts. Since they were equipped well with French, they were mainly impressed by French stream of thought. The constituent philosophy of Turkish Republic which was established by these officers was shaped by French thought considerably. Positivist thinking defined as 'bourgeoisie

ideology'¹¹ accompanied to this nation-state building. In this sense, the founders of Turkish Republic who believed in science bracketed religion and aimed to prevent the visibility of religion in public scene. According to Sungur Savran, compared with the other Islamist regions, the newly established state intervened to religion more than other Muslim majority countries.¹²

To that end, after one year of the establishment of the republic, Caliphate was abolished in 1924. Moreover, in the same year, the law of *Tevhid-i Tedrisat* (the law on unification of education) was certified. The aim of *Tevhid-i Tedrisat* was to conduct away religion from the education. Within this scope, religious education institutions like *madrassas* were closed and all education institutions were linked to Ministry of Education. Again in 1924, the institution of Shaykh Al-Islam was removed and instead of it, Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) was established to regulate religious affairs like the appointment of *imams*, or assigning *Friday khutbas*. *Tekkes, zawiyas and shrines* which were protecting vitality of religion in society and also the places of social organization were closed in 1925. To weaken the social strength of the religion some other reforms had been undertaken in 1926 such as adopting the Swiss Civil Code, Italian Penal Code and Commercial Code which was to replace the Islamic Law sharia and was based on German law. In that way, religious intervention into family, society and economy were replaced with Western style understanding.¹³

In 1928, the article stating the religion of state as Islam was removed from the Constitution. From that time any statement regarding the religion of state has not been given place in the Constitution. On the other hand, a provision stating that 'the state is secular' was adopted in 1937.¹⁴ Along with the abolishment of control of

¹¹ Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *AKP ve Türk Sağ* (İstanbul : Agora Kitaplığı, 2009), p. 23

¹² Sungur Savran, "İslamcılık, AKP, Burjuvazinin İç Savaşı," in *Neoliberalizm, İslamcı Sermayenin Yükselişi ve AKP*, eds. Neşecan Balkan, Erol Balkan, Ahmet Öncü, (İstanbul: Yordam Yayınları, 2013), p. 59

¹³ Marrying with more than one woman was prohibited. Equality of women and men in heritage and divorce was adopted.

¹⁴ For early Republican period reforms see: Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 72-101, Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London and New York : I. B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 166-205, Umut Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey*, (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010), Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (London :Hurst&Company, 1998), pp. 461-478

religion on educational institutions with the enforcement of *Tevhid-i Tedrisat*, Imam Hatip Schools, which were founded to educate religious officials, were also closed because of the lack of demand.¹⁵

As understood from the reforms, the main purpose was to withdraw religion from political, social and economic areas and to prevent its organizational ability. The local point of this purpose was to take the religion under the state control. It is not secularism in the sense of separation of state and religion; it is in the meaning of control of religion by the state. The ultimate purpose of the Republic was to keep the religion away from making organizations outside of its control. Sungur Savran argues that although the model of secularism for the founders of the Republic was French style, they went beyond it. Because even though in France, domination of church on education and public life was precluded church protected its economic and administrative autonomy with a hierarchical relationship with Roman Catholic Church against French state.

However; in Turkey, organization of religion was completely controlled by the state through Directorate of Religious Affairs. State separated itself from religion; moreover, tried to safeguard itself against religion with strict rules. However, religion could not separate itself from state. Therefore, state was in on religious affairs to the full extent.¹⁶ That means the classical definition of secularism as ‘separation of religion and state’ was realized in France.

From the establishment of the Republic to the 1946, to the multi-party period, religious organizations functioned out of public sphere under the state control. Even though *Tekkes, zawiya and shrines* were closed, it is not possible to argue that religious organization was totally restrained. Existence of religious organizations was maintained through informal ways at underground.¹⁷ Underground organization of

¹⁵ Ruşen Çakır, *İmam Hatip Liseleri: Efsaneler ve Gerçekler*, (İstanbul :TESEV Yayınları, 2004), p. 220

¹⁶ Ibid., p.63

¹⁷ For example; Mehmet Zahit Kotku was a Nakşibendi and turned to his home after tekkes were closed. Later on he returned as a sheikh of İskender Paşa sect and supported Necmettin Erbakan when he established NOP. Even though he was the imam of İskender Paşa mosques, he maintained his classes after Friday and Sunday prayers and organized meetings in mosque’s yard and in his home. İsmail Ağa sect and İskenderpaşan sect; as understood from their names, were organizing in mosques informally after *tekkes* and *zawiyahs* were closed. Especially, Quran courses were critical in this organizations. For detailed information about Süleymancılar’s organizations via Quran courses

religion started to gain visibility together with the multi-party period. “Competition of parties to win the elections made religious discourse, education and reforms of religious practice a significant part of the Turkish politics.”¹⁸ “The quarter century between the years of 1945 and 1970 might be seen as the periods in which Islamist movements could able to emerge from the cracks of new political stance. It might be seen as the period spreading seeds of the vitalization of Islamism in Turkey.”¹⁹ Islamist movement benefited from the competition between the parties. However, all attempts to establish an Islamist political party resulted in disappointment till Necmettin Erbakan established National Order Party in 1970.

National Order Party (NOP) can be considered as the predecessor of JDP since JDP and the general run of its cadres comes from within it. The motive behind the establishment of NOP is economic conflicts as well as ideological ones. Necmettin Erbakan was elected for the leadership of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) as the voice of ‘small and medium sized enterprises of Anatolian capitalists’²⁰ in 1968. According to Hasan Bülent Kahraman, center-right was identified with the status quo and represented metropolitan bourgeoisie. Necmettin Erbakan who was represented as the ‘agent’ of periphery was identified with periphery, traditional values of Anatolia and petit bourgeoisie.²¹ Afterwards, Justice Party (JP) dismissed Erbakan from his duty as a consequence of the pressure of İzmir and İstanbul’s bourgeoisie.²² He applied to JP to be a member of the parliament in 1969 general elections and his application was rejected. However, Erbakan was elected as independent Konya deputy and established National Order Party one year later.

see: Mustafa Aydın, “Süleymancılık”, in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Cilt, 6, eds. Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekinil, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), pp. 310-311

¹⁸ Burak Gürel, “İslamcılık: Uluslararası Bir Ufuk Taraması”, in *Neoliberalizm, İslamcı Sermayenin Yükselişi ve AKP*, eds. Neşecan Balkan, Erol Balkan, Ahmet Öncü, (İstanbul: Yordam Yayınları, 2013), p. 42

¹⁹ Savran, *İslamcılık, AKP, Burjuvazinin İç Savaşı*, p. 70

²⁰ Gürel, *İslamcılık: Uluslararası Bir Ufuk Taraması*, p. 43

²¹ Kahraman, *AKP ve Türk Sağı*, p. 30

²² Gürel, *İslamcılık: Uluslararası Bir Ufuk Taraması*, p. 43

The establishment of party was depended on two groups. In the sense of economy, it was supported by small and medium sized enterprises of Anatolian capitalists who were effective in Erbakan's election for the leadership of TOBB. On the other hand, it was supported by İskenderpaşa sect whose *sheikh* was Mehmet Zahit Kotku. These two economic and political groups later on constituted party's basic ideology known as NO. Even though the ideology of NOM has survived until today, parties representing it were closed frequently on the ground that they were considered as engaged in activities against 'secularism'. First intervention came after one year of the establishment of NOP in 1971. Party was closed by the military coup d'état in February 12 on account of the fact that it was engaged in activities against secularism. Afterwards, in 1973, Erbakan established National Salvation Party (NSP) which existed till 1980 military coup d'état.

NSP, in 1973 general elections, with 11, 3 percent voting rate took part in the parliament. In large part of 70s, it took part in coalition governments.²³ The first coalition of NSP was with Republican People's Party (RPP) in 1974 and the other was with JP and Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) known as 'nationalist front' in 1977.

After military coup d'état of 1980 Erbakan experienced a long lasting preclusion from politics. In conjunction with the unbanning of politicians' preclusion from politics, with referendum in 1983, Erbakan established Welfare Party (WP).

The period from 1991 elections up to today is the period of rising Islamist movement.²⁴ WP made electoral alliance with NMP and Reformist Democracy Party (İslahatçı Demokrasi Partisi) in 1991 elections and took part in parliament exceeding 10 % election threshold brought with 1980 coup d'état. In 1994 local elections, it achieved to take the municipality of Turkey's two big cities namely Ankara and Istanbul. In 1995 it won the elections as the first party. In 1996, it made a coalition with True Path Party (TPP) led by Tansu Çiller and Erbakan became Prime Minister of Turkey. Erbakan's Prime Ministry was the greatest success of Islamist movement till that time; however, it lasted only eleven months and it came to an end with a military coup d'état. On February 28, 1997, the date of the so called 'Postmodern

²³ Savran, *İslamcılık, AKP, Burjuvazinin İç Savaşı*, p. 72

²⁴ Ibid., 72-73

coup d'état', army published a memorandum and Erbakan resigned from Prime Ministry. Then WP was closed due to its activities against secularism and Erbakan was banned politically. It might be said that JDP which has shown election successes from 2002 till this time was fed by this movement intellectually.

Even though its leader banned politically, NOM established Virtue Party (VP) under the leadership of Recai Kutan. Later on VP was divided into two groups as 'reformists' and 'traditionalists'. In the first congress of VP in 2000, 'reformists' presented Abdullah Gül as the candidate for leadership against Recai Kutan, who was candidate of the 'traditionalists'. The reformist wing, which will later constitute cadres of JDP, lost this election. However, they established a new party named Justice and Development Party in 2001 and participated in the 2002 elections.

2.1.1 Ideological Framework of National Outlook Movement

It might be said that ideological framework of NOM and its parties are shaped around the Islamist values. NOM and its religious fundamentals are constituted by an Islamic heritage that mainly refers to heroic past of Ottoman version of Islam. Ahmet Yıldız claims that "WP's discourse of religion established itself through an articulation of this heritage within the context of modernism. This modernism; nevertheless, was limited to scientific and technological progress and definitely did not include cultural/religious transformations. Relying on a Muslim version of the Weberian analysis of Protestantism, WP cadres held the idea that religion is the leitmotif of "development and progress". One of the mottos of the party was "spiritual development".²⁵

There were two main groups that supported the establishment of NOP in 1970. These two groups also determined the ideological framework of the party. One of these groups was Islamist movement that fed NOM ideologically. The other group was small and medium sized enterprises of Anatolian capitalists that supported NOM in elections economically. Islamist movement and small and medium sized enterprises of Anatolian capitalists were effective in both the establishment of NOP in 1970 and

²⁵ Ahmet Yıldız, "Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook" *The Muslim World*, Volume 93, Issue 2, April 2003: p.189, doi: 10.1111/1478-1913.00020

NO movement's rise to the years ahead. It might be argued that values that NO parties and NO ideology defend are abstract forms of these two groups. NOM has defended these two groups' benefits from its establishment to today.

The ideological framework of NO tradition that was created by Erbakan has come until today without changing apart from some slight differences. As stated by H. Bahadır Türk, Erbakan stayed loyal to same themes, arguments and rhetoric from the beginning to the end of his political life. Moreover, in most of his speeches the only thing that changed was his parties' names.²⁶ As pointed out with this situation, NOM has principals in his ideology contrary to other center-right parties' pragmatic motives in which JDP also takes part. Ideological strictness of NOM parties resulted in their incompatibility with change as well as their closure. Contrary to center-right parties', it did not avoid to declare its ideology strictly. Therefore, in 1996 its success (Prime Ministry of Erbakan and the most successful period of NOM) lasted only eleven months since its politics in these eleven months frightened secular sections of Turkey. These secular sections were primarily represented by Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) and the army. Erbakan resigned from Prime Ministry in February 28, 1997 with the fear of a coup d'état since army published a memorandum. It will not be wrong to define February 28, 1997 as a peak point for NO. Following years might be regarded as the falling periods of NO.

The ideology of NO can be considered as a three-sided structure which is one within the other: An Islamist economy politics which is against capitalism, an opposition discourse to Westernization and supportive discourse to Islamism.

In the statements of the leader of NOM, Erbakan, there is a clear opposition to capitalism. Underlying fact of this opposition is that Islam does not allow interest and banking as a matter of course. In other words, instead of being against capitalism, he opposes to 'interest, tax, mint, banking system and exchange' and regards them as 'the microbes of capitalism'.

Erbakan argues that capitalism is an exploitative system. However, solutions he presented show that he does not refuse capitalism completely. He offers a capitalism in which there is no 'interest, tax, mint, banking system and exchange' defined as

²⁶ H. Bahadır Türk, *Muktedir: Türk Sağ Geleneği ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), p. 164.

‘the microbes of capitalism’. He plans to establish a purified economic structure by ‘movement of heavy industry’. Erbakan’s idea of ‘movement of heavy industry’ was impressed by Germany’s rapid progress after the World War II.²⁷ The ultimate purpose of this idea was to ‘establish factories that will produce factories and machine industry that will produce machines’.²⁸ In this sense, the movement of heavy industry is a model of progress that will remove the dependency of Turkey to the West. However, it is not enough to establish factories. He also gives importance to raising labor force that ‘will able to establish factories, has the knowledge of advance technology and able to follow and develop it’.²⁹

He perceives industrialization as a matter of ‘to be or not to be’ for Turkish economy. With the nostalgia to the golden age of Ottoman Empire, he defends that an industrialized Turkey is prerequisite for ‘to be a powerful country again on earth’.³⁰ He criticizes the gathering of factories in only big cities of Turkey and emphasized that it is necessary to establish factories in each city of Anatolia.³¹ According to Erbakan, movement of heavy industry was going to rescue Turkey from the yoke of Western economy. It was also going to protect local industry and small and medium sized enterprises of Anatolian capitalists against Western economy. It was an economy model in which state intervention to economy was recognized by opposing free market. Erbakan was referring to the order that would come out of this economic model as ‘fair order’. The basic idea of ‘fair order’ is to rescue capitalism from its microbes. In this order there would be no interest, unfair taxes and minting credit money. At the same time credits would be given to anyone who makes fair and useful works. In other words, banking system that constitutes the basis of capitalism is not acceptable in fair order. State intervention to economy is recognized in fair order. Moreover, there is no permission for monopolization. It might be said that opposition to monopolization is in favor of protecting small and medium sized enterprises of capitalists. Although free market is seen unkind, it is permissible on condition that there will be a fair treatment for everyone.

²⁷ Fehmi Çalmuk, “Necmettin Erbakan” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt, 6*, , p. 555.

²⁸ http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/Erbakan_ve_Agir_Sanayi/189822#.VAOxR_1_s38

²⁹ http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/Erbakan_ve_Agir_Sanayi/189822#.VAOxR_1_s38

³⁰ Türk, *Muktedir*, p. 177.

³¹ http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/Erbakan_ve_Agir_Sanayi/189822#.VAOxR_1_s38

At the same time ‘fair order’ is a system that will bring justice to sharing in investment incentive projects. Freedom of expression, learning, organization and worship is guaranteed. In other words, it is thought to bring a fair living condition which is compatible with human dignity.³²

In addition to his statements on economy, Erbakan’s statements on politics were also anti-Western. He opposes to Western style modernization and thoughts originated from Western thinking although he does not oppose to commercial and technological relations with West to a certain extent. Therefore, he accuses other parties of Turkey for they imitate the West. In this sense he opposes to European Union (EU) membership with reference to religion. According to Erbakan, EU is a ‘Christian club’ and desires to make Turkey a province of Europe and exploit it.³³ He refers to old name of EU as ‘The Common Market’³⁴ and claims that ‘they are commons but we are market’. With this statement he mentions that EU is an economic structure aiming to exploit Turkey and reduce it to market. Erbakan perceives United Nations (UN) as a foundation under the control of Zionism and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a foundation which is against Islam. Erbakan claims that Muslim world has to establish alternative organizations against the economic, political and military organizations of West. According to Erbakan this idea will come true in five steps: The first organization that needs to be established is Islamic United Nations because UN is under the control of Zionism. The second step is to establish another NATO which would represent the military cooperation of Muslim countries to prevent all unfair intrusions. The third step is to establish Common Market organization of Muslim countries. Fourth step is to have monetary unity of Muslim countries and the fifth step is to establish their cultural cooperation organization.³⁵

When he became Prime Minister of Turkey in 1996, Erbakan took the first step to establish alternative organizations with Islamic countries against West. He established D-8 which includes economically most developed Islamic countries

³² Türk, *Muktedir*, p. 204-205

³³ Ibid., p.188.

³⁴ Savran, *İslamcılık, AKP, Burjuvazinin İç Savaşı*, p. 83.

³⁵ Türk, *Muktedir*, p. 173

namely; Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Turkey against G-7 which includes the most developed countries of Western world. In this sense the first step in NO program which is the common Islamic market was undertaken.³⁶ Erbakan, in the period of his Prime Ministry, represents his ideas about foreign politics in his foreign trips. As the Prime Minister, he started to his trips with two countries which have problems with West: Libya and Iran. His approach to foreign politics was in contradiction with Turkey's traditional western-oriented policy. According to Sungur Savran, TÜSİAD, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and United States of America, which were the trilateral coalition behind February 28, were uncomfortable with foreign politics of Erbakan.³⁷

Erbakan was never retreated from his statements on Islamism which founded the ideological framework of NOM. Emphasis on Islam was the main theme of his speeches. He perceived East and West as in contradiction religiously. West and its economic, political and military organizations were identified as 'Christian' organizations or organizations under the control of Zionism.

2.1.2 Reasons of Justice and Development Party's Breaking Up with National Outlook Movement

February 28 process became a turning point for NOM. Prime minister Necmettin Erbakan's resignation and closure of Welfare Party in January 16, 1998 by Constitution Court, started a process that will end up with separation of NOM into two cliques. After the closure of WP, NOM established VP as a new party under the leadership of Recai Kutan. A young group member of NOM, called "reformists", emerged against the traditional policies of NOM and its representative leader Recai Kutan and of course Necmettin Erbakan. In the first party congress in 2000 "reformists" presented Abdullah Gül as a candidate to party leadership against the candidate of the traditionalists' Recai Kutan. This was the first leadership race in NOM which had been proceeding almost thirty years under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. Although "reformist" candidate Abdullah Gül lost the election, in a very short period of time "reformists" founded a new party that was Justice and

³⁶ Ibid., p. 173

³⁷ Savran, *İslamcılık, AKP, Burjuvazinin İç Savaşı*, p. 87

Development Party. In order to understand JDP it is very important to analyze the reasons that separated JDP from VP. It is claimed that it is not sure whether or not JDP is a reformist party or just an actor of an internal struggle for controlling several religious groups.³⁸ Therefore, it is important to look at reasons of separation from NOM and its parties.

February 28 process was a very instructive process for the some young members of NOM. February 28 showed that with the traditional policy of NOM, they could head the government however they would not be permanent there. These young cadres, wanted to be permanent in governance. Because of this reason, this “reformist” wing, with the intention of changing traditional policy of NOM, tried to took control of the Virtue Party’s congress in 2000 with the nomination of Abdullah Gül. However failure in election paved the way to found a new party which would not sustain the traditional policy of NOM. In this way, they founded JDP which was not contented with heading the government, but aimed to be permanent in state governance with its party program and discourse. They comprehended that state had some “redlines” and without being in harmony with those redlines, they could lose all achievement in a while. They always kept in mind that Prime Ministry of Necmettin Erbakan in 1996 was the outcome of almost thirty year political struggle of NOM and this achievement could not last more than one year. VP and the other parties of NOM that founded before VP, persisted on the Islamic discourses that were perceived anti-secular, uncompromising and against West and its political, economic and military foundations like United Nations, European Union, NATO etc. Also, NOM parties could not understand the changes and progresses of Islamic capitalists and their changing demands.

As many researchers state, small and medium sized entrepreneurs of Anatolian capitalists that played crucial role in the foundation and development of NOM and its parties, supported NOM parties’ economic policy to a certain extent. As stated before, economic policy of NOM was shaped in an understanding of protectionist economy and above all with this economic policy small and medium sized entrepreneurs gained an advantage over monopoly capitalists and Western capitalism. However, especially adaptation of Turkey into the neoliberalism after

³⁸ Birol A. Yeşilada, “The Virtue Party,” *Turkish Studies*, 3:1, p.78, doi: 10.1080/714005697

1980 also effected and converted Islamic small and medium sized entrepreneurs of Anatolia. This economic development paved the way for conglomerate of those Islamic capitalists. They started to grow up in conjunction with international money circulation and trade. This trade activity was not containing only the Middle Asian and Middle Eastern countries, but was also containing EU countries. For this reason, NOM's traditional hostility to West and EU was not compatible with the interests of Islamic capitalists.

In a similar vein, Islamic capitalists realized that contradictions with the state's redlines could be destructive of their economic interests. Especially during February 28 process, sanctions that Islamic capitalists faced with put their economic interests in trouble. In these circumstances they embarked on a quest to an alternative party that was not endangering their economic interests, but to support their economic development in accordance with neoliberalism. In some sort, JDP was the one of the important results of the point arrived by the Islamic capitalists.

As mentioned before, two main groups were very influential during formation and development of NOM: Small and medium sized enterprises of Anatolia and sects, especially *İskenderpaşa Sect*. While growing Islamist capitalists were trying to find an alternative party to WF of NO was also in search of alternatives to NO among the sects that had considerable effect on the grounds of the movement. The first conflict between sects and WF emerged between the leader of *İskenderpaşa Sect*³⁹; Esad Coşan, and Necmettin Erbakan⁴⁰. Erbakan, in response to the criticisms of Esad

³⁹ *İskenderpaşa Sect* took a direct role in establishment period of NOM. See Ruşen Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye'de İslami Oluşumlar*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990), p. 22, M. Emin Yaşar, "Dergah'tan Parti'ye, "Vakıf'tan Şirkete Bir Kimliğin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümü: İskenderpaşa Cemaati", in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt, 6*, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinçil, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), p. 339. *İskenderpaşa sect* stayed as one of the most effective sects in Turkey until its relations with WF worsened. However, some members of the sects preferred to support WF after they had struggled with it. Moreover, following that struggle *İskenderpaşa Sect* lost its popularity which had between the years Of 1980-1990. See the television programme of Ruşen Çakır on NTV, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/61717.asp>

⁴⁰ The main reason for the conflict between Erbakan and Coşan was Erbakan's desire to have authority over Coşan. Erbakan demanded not only political authority but also moral one. As repeated before, NO staff and its electorate and followers of *İskenderpaşa Sect* were generally the same. In other words, most of the followers of *İskenderpaşa Sect* could be seen in NO parties. For the conflict of Erbakan-Coşan see Ruşen Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye'de İslami Oluşumlar*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990), pp. 38-40. For the speech of Coşan about his problems with Erbakan see Ruşen Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye'de İslami Oluşumlar*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990), pp. 48-54. Coşan began to support Motherland Party (MP) after 1990. "Siyaset Dünyasına Hiç Yabancı Değil", *Milliyet*, 05.02.2001., p. 17. Nureddin Coşan, successor of Esad Coşan declared that they would support JDP before the 2002 elections: "JDP by forming a synthesis which focuses on expectations of

Coşan, said that well-known statement: “those who don’t vote for us (WP) belong to the potato religion.”⁴¹

Another separation occurred with *Süleymanists* (*Süleymancılar*) after 1991 elections. As a matter of fact, *Süleymanists* supported centre right parties rather than Milli Görüş Movement parties until 1991 elections. Especially, Özal period was very profitable for *Süleymanities*. Although, during the 1991 elections, they supported WP, after the elections, they again turned to centre-right parties.⁴² Another strong sect, *İsmail Ağa*, substantially seemed to remain loyal to NO parties.⁴³ Fethullah Gülen Movement, which is a part of the *Nur* sect, generally was very careful not to be in conflict with the state. Also they discredited to NO and always intended to stand by the strongest party of period.⁴⁴ Mehmet Kutlular, the leader of another section of the *Nur* sect, *Yeni Asyacilar* (“neo-Asians”), declared that they would support Right Path Party (RPP) in 2002 elections.⁴⁵ Journalist Ömer Erbil just before the 2002 elections claimed that the *Menzil* sect or *Menzilciler* in Adıyaman would support Grand Unity Party (GUP) in some electoral districts and JDP in the others.⁴⁶

different electorates becomes more advantageous than the other parties. Therefore we support JDP just for these elections. see. “İskenderpaşacılar AK Parti’ye”, 13.07.2007 <http://www.internethaber.com/iskenderpasacilar-ak-partiye-94115h.htm>

⁴¹ Although Erbakan claimed that he had not said those words people generally believed that he said. Those words were used in the accusation prepared during the period of closing of WF and Esad Coşan thought that Erbakan said them. See Ruşen Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye’de İslami Oluşumlar*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990), p. 53

⁴² Grandchild of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, who is the founder of Süleyman sect, Arif Ahmet Denizolgun was the candidate of ANAP and he declared that he was not going to support JDP. However his brother, Mehmet Bayezit Denizolgun became the candidate of JDP although he was not as influential as Arif Ahmet Denizolgun in the sect. see. Ömer Erbil, “Süleymancıların Özal’ı Nerede?”, *Milliyet*, 06.09.2002., p. 21

⁴³ It was claimed that before 2002 elections NOM was going to vote for Felicity Party (FP) Saadet Party which was founded after VP was closed 2002. Ömer Erbil, *Milliyet*, 07.09.2002, s. 22.

⁴⁴ For example, according to Ömer Erbil who prepared an article series regarding the manner of the sects before the 2002 elections, Fethullah Gülen movement would vote for RPP or RPP (Right Path Party). However Fethullah Gülen movement supported DLP for the previous elections. Ömer Erbil, “Nurcuların Oyu CHP ve DYP’ye”, *Milliyet*, 05.09.2002., p. 21.

⁴⁵ Mehmet Kutlular stated that the sects worried about that in case JDP came into power another period of 28th of February could be experienced. Ömer Erbil, *Nurcuların Oyu CHP ve DYP’ye*”, *Milliyet*, 05.09.2002., p. 21.

⁴⁶ The reason for this was that Felicity Party (FP) allied with HADEP and this disturbed the Menzilciler. Ömer Erbil, *Milliyet*, 07. 09. 2002, p. 22.

Nonetheless, it can be argued that, in 2002 elections, most of the sects were impressed by the new, moderate discourse of JDP and they supported it as an alternative to NO and centre-right parties which had already been in crisis⁴⁷ during 1990s. Surely, we do not claim that all the members of a sect voted for the same party. We even do not have such statistics or data. However, we cannot ignore that the statements of sect leaders had influence on their members.

When we look at the probable reasons for why Islamic communities tried to keep distance from WP we see that they had similar worries with Islamist capitalists. Firstly, for the sects continuing their existence and organization under informal and hard conditions following closing of *tekkes* (dervish lodges) and *zawiyahs* (central dervish lodges) they would possibly endanger their existence if they took a stand against the state. Therefore, the sects refrain from annoying the state extremely. They had had critical difficulties during the periods of coup d'états and hesitated to support any party which could lead to a coup d'état again.⁴⁸

The sects would not only lose their religious organization if they took a stand against the state. Since, they had institutional and economic interests. Especially after 1980, the period of Motherland Party (MP) and economic transition to neoliberal policies influenced the sects. While they were establishing foundations for institutionalization, they also accelerated the economic activities and preferred to establish incorporations.⁴⁹ Notably, they were organized among Turkish workers abroad and obtained most of the fund they needed for incorporations through them.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Especially, after Turgut Özal became president and then passed away, MP and after Demirel became president RPP entered into an economic crisis. Şaban İba, "AKP Nasıl İktidar Olmuştu?", *AKP "İlmli İslam", Neoliberalizm*, (ed.) Fikret Başkaya, (Ankara: Ütopya Yayınları, 2013), pp. 85-88; Mete K. Kaynar, "Merkez Sağ ve AKP", *AKP "İlmli İslam", Neoliberalizm*, (ed.) Fikret Başkaya, Ütopya Yayınları, Ankara, 2013, pp. 64-74.

⁴⁸ Ruşen Çakır in 1995 wrote about the doubts of the sects regarding WP that: "another reason for the antipathy of WP is that NO movement has an 'off-system appearance. Many sect leaders who rely the statements as 'if WP comes into power coup d'état will be inevitable.' worry that a military regime will oppress not only WP but also sects." Ruşen Çakır, "Erbakan'dan Şeyhlere Taviz Yok", *Milliyet*, 26.11.1995, p. 31; For the unrest of Yeni Asyacılar and Fethullah Gülen movement see Ömer Erbil, *Nurcuların Oyu CHP ve DYP'ye*, *Milliyet*, 05.09.2002., p. 21.

⁴⁹ "Cemaatler Holdingleşiyor", *Milliyet*, 26.11.1995, s. 31; M. Emin Yaşar, "Dergah'tan Parti'ye, "Vakıf'tan Şirkete Bir Kimliğin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümü: İskenderpaşa Cemaati", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt 6* eds. Tanıl Bora; Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), p. 339.

⁵⁰ For the organization of some sects in Europe see M. Emin Yaşar, "Esad Coşan", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt, 6*, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), p. 334; Mustafa Aydın, "Süleymancılık", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt, 6* eds. Tanıl Bora;

Followers/members of the sects were both the shareholders of the holdings belonging to them and the consumers of the workers and the products in those holdings.⁵¹ If that economic cycle which provided economic support to the sects had been broken, the sects would have suffered from irreparable damages. Similarly, not only the holdings but also the foundations established by the sects were crucial for their existence. Sects were being institutionalized via the foundations they had established and therefore they could have a legal organization network against the state.⁵² Sects could carry on their existence by abstaining from illegal activities against the state. They were going to see at short notice that the party which would realize that was not among NO parties which did not give up political Islam discourse.

Sects noticed that they began to fear the state after the 1997 Military Memorandum which took place on 28th of February. After they saw that one of the parties of NO caused this fear, they decided to find an alternative to it. Here, JDP has occurred as that alternative. As it is seen in 2002 elections every sect took the decision to support JDP. However, they approached JDP cautiously and tried not to make the same mistakes. Therefore they preferred to support a party which had adopted a moderate discourse. On the other hand, it can be claimed that they believe the holdings they have established develop through the neoliberal policies that JDP has adopted.

Founders of JDP realized that with the strong Islamic discourse that could be perceived anti-secular, uncompromising and against West and without taking into consideration changing conditions of economy and Islamic capitalists, they could not govern the state for a long time. It might be claimed that the tension between secularism and political Islam in Turkish political history led JDP to keep in mind that there should be a balance between secularism and Islamist discourse. Binnaz Toprak argues that the tension between secularism and Islam which was originated

and Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), p. 314; M. Hakan Yavuz, “Neo-Nurcular: Gülen Hareketi”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt, 6*, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), p. 304-305. For the role of European workers on incorporation of the sects see Evren Hoşgör, “İslami Sermaye”, in *Neoliberalizm, İslamcı Sermayenin Yükselişi ve AKP*, eds. Neşecan Balkan, Erol Balkan and Ahmet Öncü, (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2013, pp. 222-226

⁵¹ Ruşen Çakır, “Devlet Tarikatları Seviyor, <http://rusencakir.com/Devlet-tarikatlari-seviyor/70>, 01.03.2001.

⁵² See the programme with Ruşen Çakır on NTV, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/61717.asp>

from the early years of Republic represented itself in the democratization politics.⁵³ For this reason, after the foundation of JDP the founders started to make statements on changing their political view and disowning their NOM history. They got down showing how they learn NOM's lesson and they located themselves in "center right" rather than in political Islam. With the newly founded party; JDP, its members tried to emphasize the importance of secularism for them and refused the policy of NOM's anti-Western policy. Furthermore, they indicated their awareness of the complications of Islamic capitalists which was a driving force behind the discontent of NOM. Refusing their NOM history and political Islam; JDP members presented a new ideology that was "conservative democracy" of which the discourse of democracy is at the forefront.

2.2 Conservative Democratic Identity of Justice and Development Party

Conservatism is not a newfound concept for Turkish political history. Although there are several perspectives on the issue, it seems possible to maintain its roots far into Ottoman period. It emerges in direct relation with modernization process in late Ottoman and early Turkey. Therefore; preferring tradition instead of new, some movements can be considered as against to Westernization movement in the Ottoman period. Conservatism may be taken as maintenance of old, settled, traditional or sacred one under the conditions of modernism. It stakes out a claim on existing conditions against Enlightenment rationalization that tries to shape world by reason. Similarly, it might be said that Turkish conservatism developed on the track of traditionalism against modernization and Westernization process.

Fatih Yaşlı claims that conservatism in Turkey has always been existed as a mood and style and it has been given a place over the politics. Afterwards he puts this question forward: Although it has not sophisticated ideologists, how conservatism in Turkey lived so far acutely? He then tries to answer this question by examining JDP's conservative democracy concept reading it as approximately the most influential version of conservatism. Therefore, it is significant to understand how JDP conceptualizes conservative democratic identity.

⁵³ Binnaz Toprak, "Secularism and Islam: The Building of Modern Turkey," *Macalester International*: Vol. 15, Article 9. p.28, <http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol15/iss1/9/>

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan writes a preface to Akdoğan's book on conservative democracy as: "With reference to our tradition of thought, the purpose of JDP is to reproduce our native and rooted value system in line with the universal standards of conservative politics."⁵⁴ Based on this introduction of conservatism, Akdoğan lists some basic parameters that explain why it is important to produce a new concept as conservative democracy. These parameters can be listed as "normalizing politics, seating politics to a realistic ground, producing an autonomous conservative party, and producing a surrounding political style."⁵⁵

In normalizing politics, Akdoğan explains what JDP understands from modernism, universalism and change. It is an understanding of modernism which does not exclude tradition, a universalism that accepts the local, an emphasis on change which is not radical. Thereupon conservatism defends evolutionary and progressive change instead of revolutionary transformation, grounds on moderation rather than radicalism, believes that tradition, family and social gains of past should be protected.⁵⁶ Güler argues that especially after the last quarter of 20th century, neoliberalism and conservatism that the new right defended in economic and social fields caused separate ideologies to come together. Neo-conservatism defended motives like religion and family to be prominent in social field. By this means, the space which was left from disciplinary and authoritarian power of state would be filled.⁵⁷ Conservatism as a philosophical thought and political attitude values existing political, social and economic order and believes that it should be protected as far as possible.⁵⁸ In this sense, as mentioned by Akdoğan, JDP is reformist rather than being revolutionist.

Akdoğan in his book tries to clarify some obstacles that JDP has to overcome. One of them is misrepresentation of conservatism in Turkey. He states that conservatism generally is evaluated as a resistance to change and a political attitude in the sense of

⁵⁴ Yalçın Akdoğan, *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi*, (İstanbul: ALFA, 2004), p.12

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.18-20

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.12

⁵⁷ E. Zeynep Güler, "Muhafazakarlık: Kadim Geleneğin Savunusundan Faydacılığa" in 19 Yüzyıldan 20. Yüzyıla Modern Siyasal İdeolojiler, ed. H. Birsen Örs, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), p. 146

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 117

the status quo. This attitude that might be assumed by a socialist or a liberal ideology identifies conservatism with a negative attribution. One of the obstacles that JDP should overcome today is this negative attitude.⁵⁹ However, interpretation of conservatism that JDP makes to overcome this obstacle seems conflicting. JDP claims that it perceives change in line with evolution but publishes a book titled as “Silent Revolution”⁶⁰ in which they explain democratic change and transformation in Turkey under the rule of JDP government.

Seating politics to a realistic ground is another dimension of conservative democratic identity of JDP. With this statement, it is explained that why JDP tries to identify itself in a certain format and coordination and makes an effort to enhance its political identity even though it is the ruling party. This effort is the result of avoiding the fate of previous parties.⁶¹ This explanation might be revealed through JDP’s approach to political Islam. The fate of political Islam in Turkey necessitated taking precaution to be able to survive politically. The most obvious defeat of political Islam might be interpreted as defeat of February 28. It is stated that on the debate over the conservative democratic identity of JDP, approaching to issue through the JDP’s tension with Islamism instead of its relation with conservatism allows for a healthier JDP analysis. The triangulation point of JDP’s conservative democracy discourse is its relation with Islamism.⁶²

September 12 was a turning point for political Islam in Turkey. Along with the legitimacy of criticizing Kemalizm with liberal discourse, we witness the visibility of Islamism at every level and its leaping forward both in terms of quality and quantity.⁶³ It might be said that political Islam could openly declare its goals or enemies and take part in every sphere of life.

⁵⁹ Akdoğan, *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi*, p. 20

⁶⁰ See: ‘Silent Revolution’ <http://m.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/10-yilda-sessiz-devrim/61956#1>

⁶¹ Akdoğan, *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi*, p. 19

⁶² Nuh Yılmaz, “İslamcılık, AKP, Siyaset” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Cilt 5, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), p. 613

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.615

The turning point for the future of political Islam in Turkey was the overthrow of Erbakan's government and the WF's prohibition by the Constitutional Court. After this event, politicians of political Islam concluded that secularism in Turkey cannot be challenged and contrariwise attitudes can cause severe results for the fate of their politics.⁶⁴ It is revealed that Islamist groups that perceive the defeat of February 28 as a loss, tried to be organized under different institutions, to establish WF or to continue NOM. Evaluating problems as the result of ideological defeat of Islamism in addition to perception of 'Whenever they come to power, they will be precluded', JDP was established by the ones who prefer to be organized under a different and a popular roof and by the 'old' Islamist cadres. JDP can be interpreted as a response to defeat of February 28.⁶⁵

Realization of the defeat of political Islam in Turkey might be said to direct JDP to develop a new political identity as conservative democracy. With this attack, it would be able to escape from the fate of former political Islamist movements and construct a reassuring relation with secularism. It is stated that JDP's support to secularism is more than former Islamist parties. Party program reveals that while religion is a vital component of life, secularism is prerequisite for democracy.⁶⁶ In this sense democracy emerges as the protector of religion and freedom depending on the existence of secularism. In JDP's conservative democratic identity, it is stated that religion cannot be used for the benefits of politics and political gain. Its sacredness should be guaranteed by the secularism which has mutual relationship with democracy.

Erdoğan states that JDP considers the importance of religion as a social value of humanity. However, making religion as a tool for politics; in the first place, trivializes religion. Religion based politics that are using certain religious symbols and statements create an environment in which an exclusionary process for other religious beliefs and values rises. This is harmful for the political pluralism and religion. Erdoğan illustrates that a party which attaches importance to religion is

⁶⁴ William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık, Demokrasi ve Liberalizm: AKP Olayı*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2010), p. 69

⁶⁵ Yılmaz, *İslamcılık, AKP, Siyaset*, p. 615

⁶⁶ Hale and Özbudun, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık*, p. 21

different than a party which exists by the religious symbols and ideology.⁶⁷ In this sense it might be claimed that JDP makes an emphasis on their difference from NOM. Since Islamism is the focal point of NOM parties, Erdoğan claims that JDP attaches importance to religion; therefore, tries to make use of it as not a tool for politics. The guarantor of the value of religion is the existence of secularism in addition to democracy.

It is stated that JDP's relation with secularism does not necessitate withdrawal of religion from the political arena totally. However, it serves religious themes and symbols as a part of basic human rights. Its perception on banning of headscarves at universities may be taken as an example.⁶⁸

Another explanation for the necessity of creating a new political identity as conservative democracy is to produce an autonomous conservative party. In this sense it is claimed that as distinct from the other center-right parties, conservatism of JDP points out to a new situation since it converts conservatism into the main body and locomotive of its politics.⁶⁹

It is said that JDP established hegemony. The reason for the achievement of this hegemony is not what JDP has done so far but it is how it connected different discourses ambiguously and eclectically. It could enjoy organizational support of different groups in Turkey. Its approach to Cyprus, EU etc. could take the support of groups approving foreign intervention for the benefit of internal conditions. With its economy politics, it could take the support of right/liberal/conservative/social democrats and with its discourse on human rights and freedom it could take the support of Islamist or leftist groups.⁷⁰ It might be considered that the reason of its hegemony is not conservative politics but how they conceptualize conservative democratic identity. As in the example of JDP's reaction against banning of headscarves at universities, it could respond to social and economic demands by composing different discourses. The focal point of conservative democratic identity is its ability to respond to different circumstances with different statements.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 22

⁶⁸ Hale and Özbudun, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık*, p. 22

⁶⁹ Akdoğan, *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi*, p.19

⁷⁰ Yılmaz, *İslamcılık, AKP, Siyaset*, p. 614

History of conservatism shows that it has been constituted divergently as a response to different contexts. It is claimed that old conservatism was a combination of monarchy, the church, the family. In old conservatism the reliance was more on tradition rather than reason or the change. In British or American style, there is a combination of conservative and liberal values. In the sense of center-right parties or the multi-party period of Turkey, combination of conservatism and liberalism might be argued as existed together. Therefore, it seems that there is no a strict difference between the center-right parties ideology and JDP. For the case of JDP's conservatism, a similar argument can be made along with a further emphasis on religion.⁷¹ Religion as the local point of humanity's value system exists in the discourse of JDP; however, it is represented generally under the discourse of human rights or freedom as the basic need of humanity.

In the sense of continuity between center-right parties from Democrat Party (DP) to JDP, it might be claimed that they were characterized with similar arguments that marked their conservatism as cultural rather than a political ideology. Elements of conservatism in these parties were Turkish nationalism, an emphasis on tradition and Islamic values, modernization in the sense of technological development and their opposition to RPP.⁷² JDP's emphasis on religion and its opposition to RPP is considered as a continuation of these parties.

Baker claims that conservatism in Turkish Republic includes Islamist discourse; and, it points out to an anti-Kemalizm implicitly.⁷³ In this sense; as mentioned above, JDP might be considered as the continuation of center-right parties in Turkey. However it differs from these parties on its statements about RPP. Although JDP makes and emphasis on the importance of secularism as the guarantor of democracy, how it interprets current RPP in conjunction with its history proves Baker's argument. It interprets RPP as a party which is the continuation of one party period in Turkey. In

⁷¹Hale and Özbudun, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık*, p. 65

⁷² Ibid., p. 66

⁷³ Ulus Baker, "Muhafazakâr Kisve" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, Cilt 5, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), p. 103-104

this sense, JDP's Islamism; as different from NOM, is an implicit expression of it. Conservatism seems a functional way of legitimizing Islamist discourse.⁷⁴

The other statement of JDP in its definition of conservative democratic identity is its claim on producing a surrounding political style. According to this statement JDP differs from parties which conduct identity politics by claiming that these parties are blocking Turkish politics. It emphasizes that a distinguishing political style that makes a division between 'we and others' by centralizing a single religious belief, sect or ethnicity in its movement causes polarization in Turkey.⁷⁵ Especially the political styles of NOM parties and HADEP made them radical and marginal. Therefore, it is emphasized that demands of identity need to be evaluated under the perspective of a general democratization and liberation. Erdoğan points out to this issue by claiming that "our party clearly refuses to impose ideology on its nation and to make use of sacred religious values and ethnicities as a tool for politics".⁷⁶

The sense of politics of conservative democracy is stated by describing the politics as an area for consensus. According to this interpretation, politics is an area of consensus in which there is the recognition of differences in society.⁷⁷ Yaşlı claims that may be the most influential concept of JDP's conservative democratic identity is its claim on 'consensus'.⁷⁸ It is influential in the sense that it makes possible to understand whether or not there is completely a break from NOM especially in the sense of Islamist view.

Erdoğan claims that "We have taken off our National Outlook shirts"⁷⁹ to point out break from NOM and represents themselves as the continuation of center-right parties (DP, MP). On the other hand JDP claims that religion cannot be used as a tool

⁷⁴ Yasin Aktay, "İslâmcılıktaki Muhafazakâr Bakiye" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, Cilt 5, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), p. 350

⁷⁵ Akdoğan, *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi*, p.19

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 19-20

⁷⁷ Ibid. p.13

⁷⁸ Fatih Yaşlı, *AKP ve Yeni Rejim* (Ankara: Tan Kitabevi, 2012), p. 75

⁷⁹ <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/05/22/siyaset/asiy.html>

for political gain.⁸⁰ These two examples might be considered as the discursive shift from the NOM. However Erdoğan introduces their reference point as Islam and Islamist values constantly. For example Erdoğan; when he was nominated for the Presidency, began and finished his speech by praying.⁸¹ JDP uses its conservative identity to legitimize its acts and that may be considered as Islamist or Islamist interference in private life.

Conservatism has a love bond with existing order, customs and institutions. Conservatives perceive society as an organism in which there is a natural growth process. Social beings that compose this whole are in relation with each other in this environment that bestows their social nature and tissues.⁸² However, there are others that are not related to this defined whole. Therefore, this nature of conservatism that perceives society as an organism makes it open to resistance and opposition.

Conservative identity of JDP is revealed in Erdoğan's speeches or in the statements of JDP cadres in a way to support their approaches to issues like private life. It might be said that conservatism of JDP is more of a cultural conservatism. Considering debates on mixed-sex student houses or debates on abortion, the reference point is the cultural structure of its own voters. However, this culture does not involve the whole Turkish society. This might be derived from the resistances or oppositions to JDP on their claims on such issues. Erdoğan claims that 'each abortion is an Uludere and it is a sneaky plan to erase this nation'⁸³. For example, women who defend the right of abortion are excluded from the JDP's inclusive politics. A member of JDP argued with a woman on a social media platform and said her: 'I guess you had so many abortions; maybe that is why you are screaming'.⁸⁴ On the other hand, Erdoğan, about mixed-sex student houses, claims that 'As a responsible conservative

⁸⁰ Akdoğan, *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi*, p.19

⁸¹ See: (<http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/video-galeri/basbakanin-cumhurbaskanligi-adayligi-konusmasi-tamami/18362>)

⁸² Güler, *Muhafazakarlık: Kadim*, p. 147

⁸³ http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/basbakan_her_kurtaj_bir_uluderedir-1089235

⁸⁴ <http://t24.com.tr/haber/melih-gokcek-sen-cok-mu-kurtaj-yaptirdin-bagirmanin-nedeni-bu-mu,204928>

democrat party, we do not let girls and boys stay together in a state house'⁸⁵. He regards these houses as threats to cultural structure of conservative family structure. JDP realizes that Turkish society is composed of different cultures; however, it chooses to be on the side of the conservative segment of Turkish society. In this sense; although it is claimed that their political ideology is pluralistic⁸⁶, it makes a group division in society discursively.

Another issue that is connected to the conservative democrat identity of JDP is about law of alcohol. In this sense, Erdoğan claims that alcohol damages the youth and the family life. About youth he claims that "At the same time we are obliged to introduce our history, our own culture, traditions and values to people whom we see as 'eşref-i mahlukat'⁸⁷ and to orientate youth freely in this direction. On our road to 2053, we want in this country the growth of not one, not ten, not 100 but thousands of Fatih Mehmet, thousands of Ulubatlı Hasan, hundreds of thousands of Akşemsettin, Molla Gürani. In addition to legitimizing alcohol law through youth he also defines the 'ideal youth' by giving reference to historical individuals that might be interpreted as having relation with Islamist world view. JDP was criticized about its discourse on abortion, mixed-sex student houses or alcohol since they were referring to an Islamist perception of the world. Therefore, JDP was seen as a threat to secularism. Erdoğan also replied to these criticisms in May 28, 2013 TBMM by replying that: 'No matter which religion it is; however, if a religion orders the right rather than wrong, will you still take a stand against it for it is the order of a religion?'

It is obvious that JDP makes emphasis on the value of secularism. However, its statements in most of the time might be claimed as close to Islamist interpretation of life. In this sense, it generally refers to its conservative identity rather than a stress on democracy. Therefore, it is obvious that there is also a definition of an ideal society. This ideal society, in the discourse of JDP, is crystallized in the notion of 'nation' and 'national will'. Moreover, the notion of democratic identity of JDP and 'national will' are in mutual affinity in the discourse of JDP. Therefore, it is crucial to

⁸⁵ http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_erdogan-kiz-ve-erkeklerin-devlet-yurtlarinda-karisik-kalmasina-musaade-etmeyiz_2162451.html

⁸⁶ Akdoğan, AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi., p

⁸⁷ The most honoured of all creatures.

understand discursive formation of democracy in JDP in order to comprehend its use of group division as a way to mobilize popular support.

CHAPTER III

DISCURSIVE FORMATION OF THE DEMOCRACY:

HISTORY OF THE “NEW TURKEY”

Why JDP built a new identity as conservative democracy and how it revealed this identity in party program or texts were tried to be explained in previous chapter. In party program or texts, democracy discourse of conservative democratic identity is stated as the guarantor of secularism, human rights and religious freedom. As distinguished from conservatism, JDP puts emphasis on the concept of democracy at the most. It is possible to argue that the concept of democracy; particularly advanced democracy, constitutes the essential point of JDP's political discourse. The discourse on democracy; particularly advanced democracy, comes to the forefront when JDP makes a separation between ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Turkey. JDP claims that, as the ruling party of Turkey, it is the founder and the representative of the new Turkey. This statement was emphasized more clearly in presidential elections speeches and was claimed that presidential elections will be the peak point of new Turkey since election process was changed by JDP. Erdoğan in his speeches argues that:

Do not forget! You will make preference between old and the new Turkey in August 10. I believe that those who support new Turkey will also support Erdoğan; and those who support old Turkey will support others. What is in old Turkey? There is economic crisis. What is in old Turkey? There are corruptions, poverty and prohibitions. What is in old Turkey? There is coalition. There are those who only pay attention to their own benefits. There is ban on headscarf in old Turkey. There are prohibitions to identities and cultures. My sisters, could you go to universities with headscarves?⁸⁸ Construction process of new Turkey that has started with JDP government's twelve years power will reach to its peak point with presidency elections.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ July 16, 2014 Sakarya Presidency Elections Speech

⁸⁹ July 11, 2014 Vision Meeting Speech

The discourse on democracy is an inseparable part of this assertion because the new Turkey exists in consequence of the gains of democracy according to JDP. In this sense, it might be claimed that there is a break up from the old Turkey. As is also understood from JDP's statements, this break up is not realized by a regime shift; however, it is a break up that is realized via democracy which is revealed as Turkey lacks for. In this sense democracy; as a tool for breaking up with old Turkey, is the guarantor of the new Turkey. Therefore, to understand how discourse on democracy is constructed involves the codes of breaking up with old Turkey.

What is meant by the 'History of New Turkey' is a try to understand discursive formation of democracy, rules of its formation, what it includes and excludes in the political discourse of JDP. What is written is not the past but the history of today. The discourse on democracy is the pencil of the new Turkey in its being written. Therefore, discourse on democracy needs to be examined carefully rather than conservatism since conservative identity of JDP functions as a tool for breaking up from its past and secures its relation with political Islam. It will be easy to understand how the history of new Turkey is being written if we understand the conditions out of discourse of democracy emerged.

To write the history of new Turkey might be interpreted as an attempt to change the constitutive paradigm and components of the Turkish Republic rather than a change in the regime overtly. In this sense a questioning on what are these components, how they are redefined, which of them are excluded from the discourse on democracy will be helpful to understand how new Turkey is conceptualized. JDP defines new Turkey or spheres that it relates with new Turkey as indicatives of democracy. Therefore, to understand the rules of formation and the conditions that make the discourse on democracy possible will make us familiar with JDP's political ideology.

JDP, as we mentioned before, defines its conservative democratic identity in its party program or in books or texts; however, on the discourse of democracy it is witnessed a different conceptualization of the concept especially in electoral and parliament speeches. Within this discourse, old Turkey and its representatives are introduced as against new Turkey. These representatives, which might be called as 'others', constitute a sphere in which democracy does not function. What makes this subject interesting is that what are introduced as representatives of old Turkey are not

historical figures; however, they are these days' actors. They are attached to the discourse of old Turkey and revealed as representations of the mentality of old Turkey. As the indicative of new Turkey, the discourse on democracy includes and excludes certain groups, features or components of old and new Turkey. Hence, even though it defines its political identity as inclusive or participative in its party program or in books and texts, it certainly makes a group division when calling out to its voter base. Group division in its use as a way to mobilize popular support is inevitable because of the structure of discourse on democracy.

Rather than gazing upon party program, books or texts that define conservative democracy, one of the benefits of understanding this identity in its use as a discursive fact is useful in making group division visible in political arena. Therefore, it is required to examine rules of formation of the discourse on democracy, what makes this discourse possible, what is sayable or not in the framework of this discursive formation. By analyzing constructive elements of the discourse on democracy via speeches of Erdoğan, it will be tried to understand how the history of new Turkey is being written through the medium of democracy. It seems possible to gather constructive elements of discourse on democracy in three main topics namely; nation / national will, invention of tradition and mythologization.

3.1 Construction of Nation / National Will in the Period of Justice and Development Party

The notion of nation or national will was used in Turkish politics for many years as the representation of political legitimization. One of the components of JDP's discourse on democracy is the notion of nation /national will. JDP legitimizes its political authority and operations through the notion of nation / national will. As Erdoğan argues that:

Our understanding of governing is based on respect and trust to our nation. I am always saying that, we came to power to serve or nation not to be master of them. Our understanding of governing is based on nation and culture. Our understanding of governing is opposed to old or new, all

tutelage. Our understanding of governing is a visionary understanding which thinks big.⁹⁰

In the discourse of JDP, nation is conceptualized as a subject that needed democracy for many years since its history is full of pains and restrictions as a consequence of the lack of democracy. In this sense, it is the unique carrier and owner of the meaning of democracy for its history was written via existence or lack of democracy. Nation is portrayed by JDP as a subject that all the governments of it chose were overthrown via coup d'états and could not live its freedoms; especially religious freedoms, under the restrictions of one party period, coup d'état, tutelage and status quo mentality. Under these circumstances, nation struggled to survive according to JDP.

Nation is also represented as in restriction for many years under the conditions of one party period's mentality that involved elite bureaucrats. Statements like coup d'état, tutelage, status quo, Jacobean, or elites are introduced as the components of one party period's mentality and this mentality is what JDP puts against the notion of nation/ national will. In other words this mentality is actually what JDP means by old Turkey. Through the definition of old Turkey, JDP finds its components to construct its notion of nation / national will by introducing what is nation /national will and what is not.

In this sense, it is clear that as the main component of democracy, nation is introduced via dualities in the discourse of JDP. What are put against the nation are the components of old Turkey. JDP connects these components of old Turkey to their today's reflections. It needs to be questioned whether or not these connections are valid or not; however, JDP's discourse of democracy is constructed through these connections. It needs to be questioned whether or not today's RPP is the continuation of one party period; however, it is the JDP that introduces RPP as the continuation of one party period and this is one of the examples of how JDP forms its discourse of democracy.

There is certainly opposition in parliament to JDP government; however, what is important is how JDP conceptualizes this opposition as part of its discourse of democracy. In this sense, as one of the major oppositions, RPP comes to forefront

⁹⁰ July 11, 2014 Vision Meeting Speech

which is represented as the continuation of one party mentality. On the other hand, NMP is defined with its failure and instability in previous governments. Moreover, it is defined as a dysfunctional party since it has become the tool of RPP and lost its ability to serve its voter base. Therefore, JDP also calls out to NMP's voter base by putting forward a nationalist discourse.

It is evident that there is a strong relationship between democracy and national will in the discourse of JDP. Since national will is represented as the major component of political authority and its legitimization, JDP refers to democracy as a form of body in which consent of national will reflects itself. On the other hand, although it is sometimes confusing that whether JDP calls out to nation or ballot box, the notion of nation / national will constructs the very idea of democracy in JDP's political discourse. As the legitimization feature of its political authority, notion of nation in JDP is represented as a subject that speaks on ballot box and calls enemies of democracy to account. Erdoğan claims that ballot box is the only way for coming power:

Brothers, there is one way in democratic parliamentary law system to come to power and it is the ballot box. Those who want to do politics in this country establish their parties and come into the presence of nation through ballot box. If ballot box lets them go, they become successful and if it does not, they wait for it to come.⁹¹

In this sense, nation with its power on ballot box is constructed in the discourse of JDP as against to enemies of democracy; in other words, the Old Turkey. Moreover, these enemies of democracy are not comfortable with the power of nation:

Now you are determining power in this country. You do not take order for this you; children of this country determine. Now you are making decisions in this country; nation makes decision. They are uncomfortable with that. What you say in ballot box come true. Now nation is governing this country; not one party and they are uncomfortable with that.⁹²

Nation is represented as the decision maker of Turkish politics via ballot box. Hence it is called to protect ballot box for the future of new Turkey. In presidential election

⁹¹ July 2, 2013 TBMM

⁹² February 11, 2014 TBMM

speeches, Erdoğan always calls out to nation to protect ballot box and support the rising of new Turkey:

I request you to go ballot box on August 10 definitely and protect your will and ballot box. Call those who are in vacation. If they can vote there, they should definitely vote. Vote in your ballot box definitely and check your electoral roll. Warn your young friends. Sisters; do not forget, protect this work. I believe you will. Brothers! Protect. History will be written in Turkey on August 10. You will write this new history. You will seal and construct new Turkey on a powerful ground.⁹³

Therefore, it is necessary to examine these dualities that JDP illustrates as in opposition to nation and also the components of old Turkey. These are represented as the problems of old Turkey that lived up until today. One of the most important of these problems is the problem of opposition parties in Turkish political history. Erdoğan in most of his speeches argues that there is no a proper opposition in Turkey. The problem of opposition in JDP's discourse is more visible in its criticism on some dualities. These dualities might be revealed as between secularism / conservatism, elites / people and center / periphery relations. These dualities are actually between the agents of old Turkey and nation; therefore, needs to be solved in favor of democracy. Although all opposition parties are criticized by JDP, its focus is more on between these dualities; in other words, between what it classified as the components of old Turkey and nation. According to JDP what is against nation is also against democracy; therefore, is a threat to new Turkey. In the following section, these dualities are tried to be examined based on the speeches of Erdoğan.

3.1.1 Dualities

3.1.1.1 Secularism / Conservatism

The relationship between secularism and conservative mass of people and its role in the formation of discourse on democracy is prominent. It is told in the previous chapter that JDP criticizes political use of religion. In this sense it forms a different frame from NOM and NOM parties. According to JDP, religion is one of the

⁹³ July 5, 2014 Samsun, Presidency Elections Speech

valuable merits of human being; therefore, secularism that separates religion from the course of politics should be protected. By this means, protecting secularism also means protecting the democracy. However, it might be interpreted that how JDP illustrates the relation between secularism and conservative mass of people makes it closer to the discourse of political Islam.

JDP avoids an explicit criticism of secularism; however, it always mentions that conservative mass of people could not live their religious freedoms for many years under the pressure and oppression of one party period. This approach of JDP makes it open to criticism. It becomes questionable whether or not it really broke up with NOM' ideological perspective.

At this point nation / national will come forth as a conservative mass of people that could not live their religious freedoms under pressure and oppression for their preferences. The chief architect of this pressure and oppression period is represented as the mentality of one party period that governed old Turkey for many years. The mentality of one party period is introduced with concepts like coup d'états, tutelage, status quo and Jacobinism.

Within this regard, JDP's discourse of democracy takes Adnan Menderes's government as its reference point. It might be argued that after Adnan Menderes's government, JDP comes to power to take the revenge of those years based on the speeches of Erdoğan. Erdoğan interprets 1950s; the multiparty period, as a democratic era of Turkish politics in which Turkey had great achievements in each sphere of life. The period that started with Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar was an important turning point in our history. However, this successful period was interrupted with the 1960 coup d'état. Therefore, we lived 1960s and 70s as lost years. Moreover, even though Özal tried to fix these interruptions to democracy, we lived 1980s, under the shadow of 1980 coup d'état as lost years. Afterwards, we witness periods of coalition governments of 1990s and terror in which democracy, human life and freedoms were ignored. That's how we have reached 2000s.⁹⁴

Erdoğan's interpretation of those years seems to have helped his elaboration of the concept of democracy. He does not refer to NOM or NOM parties directly for their perspective of democracy; however, perceives themselves as the continuation of

⁹⁴ July 11, 2014 Vision Meeting Speech

Menderes and Özal governments. In this sense he sees nation as restricted in these years with the lost of democracy. He claims that even though Turkish politics had gained the ability to provide democracy to its citizens, put ballot boxes to the forefront and gave nation the right of choice, it did not become enough for nation to be heard. There were politicians like Menderes who came from the inside of nation and gave importance to national will. However, the winner was gallows, hangmen, RPP, capital and elites. They did not matter how ballot boxes resulted, this country was always directed by media, capital, anti-democratic institutions, gangs and mafia. Erdoğan continues his argumentation by claiming that it was only the JDP government in the history of Turkish Republic in which national will has been reflected to decision-making processes.⁹⁵

In this sense Erdoğan perceives JDP's fate as similar with Menderes and Özal's periods. How Menderes and Özal were tried to be restricted by the actors of old Turkey, Erdoğan perceives actors of old Turkey as a threat to its government. Erdoğan claims that if state had changed since 1940s, we could able to live in a different Turkey. We could able to be in a different level, if coup d'états, gangs, conspiracies had not prevented the change request of nation. It was a country in which there were coup d'états decennially and we paid its price. "Menderes came to power by rebelling to this mentality and became the love of nation. Özal came to power and resisted to this mentality which affronted nation and became the love of nation. Whatever this nation chose, this RPP, this pro-coup mindset disapproved it. Whatever this nation loved and liked, this RPP, this pro-coup mindset disapproved it."⁹⁶

He maintains his argument as "Can you imagine? It was a country in which there were elections once every sixteen months. Do you think such a country has stability? Can you trust this country? Again I want to declare sincerely that if we had not been interrupted in twelve years with threats and if actors of old Turkey had not resisted,

⁹⁵ February 11, 2014 TBMM

⁹⁶ July 6, 2014 Erzurum Presidency Elections Speech

we could able to be in a different level. However, we did not collapsed and did not lost out hopes”⁹⁷

Erdoğan always says ‘we’ when he criticizes coup d’état years. In this sense, he refers to nation / national will. He perceives himself and cadres of JDP as equal to nation / national will. Although JDP criticizes NOM and NOM parties and emphasizes its breaking up with its ideological perspective, it makes a connection with NOM when the issue is the mentality of one party period. Erdoğan does not make a separation between NOM in this regard and comprehends restrictions as a response to Islamic values. He argues that:

We experienced a lot of pain in those years. We had friends whose children could not go to university. There were families whose children were beat in front of the schools. We were people whose moral values were always refused; we were people who were always negated and oppressed. Yes, we were a movement in which our political views were always refused and our parties were always closed. However, we gave importance to problems of each individual of this nation when establishing JDP.⁹⁸

Erdoğan’s political background is also an important part of these statements since he was judged for he read a poem. He always makes an emphasis to this example and represent it such a similar case with those conservative mass of people’s experiences in one party period in Turkey.

Ours was a cadre that had enormous heartbreaks, was restricted, oppressed and judged for reading a poem. However; when we came to power, we protected seventy seven millions of people’s rights, not just ours, our movement or friends.⁹⁹

Therefore; classified as the problems of old Turkey, it seems that JDP’s main purpose is to deal with these problems. In this sense, JDP legitimizes its acts and purposes by always referring to problems of old Turkey. According to this view; traces of old Turkey, traces of one party period of RPP, coup d’etats of May 27 and

⁹⁷ July 11, 2014 Vision Meeting Speech

⁹⁸ July 11, 2014 Vision Meeting Speech

⁹⁹ July 11, 2014 Vision Meeting Speech

September 12 are still alive. One of the problems that have come today is the problem of constitution. JDP perceives constitution as the result of coup d'états. It is claimed that JDP for a long time struggled with this constitution that it calls as 'the product of coup d'états. Although JDP changed many articles of this constitution, it could not prepare a new constitution. JDP always blames opposition parties for this and puts that it will struggle with the constitution of old Turkey and prepare a new constitution that suits new Turkey, a democratic country and the one of the most advanced economy of the world.¹⁰⁰ Within this regard, Erdoğan claims that "If pro-coup mindset can make a constitution, civilians can make even better. Civilians can make a civil, democratic, and a participant constitution. Therefore, we can act in good faith and become hopeful."¹⁰¹

According to JDP the other problem of old Turkey; and may be the most referred one, is the problem of opposition parties. Erdoğan in his speeches refers opposition parties as the parties of status quo. He criticizes RPP mostly and explains that reasons of why opposition parties do not support JDP as because it perceives these parties as the continuation of old Turkey. Erdoğan claims that:

Brothers, there is another problem that comes from old Turkey. Do you know what it is? It is the opposition problem. Opposition could not change and transform, could not adapt to new and developing Turkey with its economy, democracy and foreign policies. It could not become an opposition that thinks big, has vision and perspective. RPP is still that old RPP. It misses the old Turkey and lives with the dream of old Turkey. RPP dreams a Turkey in which there is coup d'états, bans, poverty, corruption. It dreams a Turkey that is wasted and cannot stand on its own legs.¹⁰²

According to JDP, opposition is afraid of new Turkey and thinks that new Turkey will not survive. Therefore, it resists changing.¹⁰³ What JDP means by change is its policies to which it claims RPP and other opposition parties resist. It might be claimed that since JDP perceives itself as the founder and representative of new

¹⁰⁰ July 8, 2014 Denizli, Presidency Elections Speech

¹⁰¹ November 26, 2013 TBMM

¹⁰² July 8, 2014 Denizli Presidency Elections Speech

¹⁰³ July 11, 2014 Vision Meeting Speech

Turkey in which democracy and nation finds its meaning, opposition parties are actually opposed to new Turkey, democracy and nation, when they resist to JDP' policies. Within this scope, Erdoğan gives examples of opposition parties in Western countries to criticize opposition parties in Turkey:

“In Western societies, ¹⁰⁴opposition supports ruling party for the benefit of country. However, our opposition parties; even though the benefits of country at issue claim that ruling party will gain strength; therefore, we should prevent it. It stands against these policies. We will not be deceived since our assurance is nation. We came to power with assurance of nation and will go tomorrows by this way.” On the other hand, JDP's criticism on opposition parties is focused more on the RPP since JDP represents RPP as the continuation of one party period and old Turkey. Erdoğan in his presidential elections speech claims that:

What is this RPP? My Eastern, Southeastern brothers know this RPP very well. RPP means dictatorial regime, denial, assimilation, banning, poverty, corruption. RPP means reading the azan in Turkish, banning the Quran, oppressing veiled women, running over all national and moral values. Brothers, RPP means ignoring the rights of Turk, Kurd, Alevi and Sünni and ignoring all differences.¹⁰⁵

In this sense RPP is introduced as the continuation of old Turkey that is against nation / national will and future of new Turkey in which democracy will flourish. Erdoğan represents RPP as a party which is against national will, ballot box and democracy from the beginning of Turkish political history. According to Erdoğan RPP is a party which ignores demands and choices of nation. RPP chose always the state instead of governments that were chosen by nation. It was on state's and status quo's side. Pro-coup mindsets were always supported and protected by RPP. Moreover Erdoğan claims that, in 2007, RPP prevented JDP's attempt to choose president. According to Erdoğan; with the support of some retired judges, high courts and some officers, RPP prevented JDP to choose president in parliament.¹⁰⁶ In the presidential elections speeches Erdoğan claims that:

¹⁰⁴ November 19, 2013 TBMM

¹⁰⁵ July 13, 2014 Urfa Presidency Elections Speech

¹⁰⁶ July 5, 2014 Samsun Presidency Elections Speech

Who prevented our attempt to choose president in 2007? RPP and its proponents. Who objected to our decision when we said president should be chosen by nation? RPP and its proponents. Who defends coup d'états and tutelage now? RPP and its proponents. RPP prevented parliament to choose president and said no to nation when we claimed that nation should choose president. Now, it demands votes of nation without shame. With whom? With NMP, with whom, with HDP.¹⁰⁷

It might be argued that RPP is one of the biggest problems of new Turkey since; according to JDP, it is the continuation of one party period and old Turkey. Approximately in all speeches, Erdoğan attaches opponent statements or movements towards JDP government to RPP in a way. Other opposition parties are criticized as well; however, it is evident that they are somehow attached to RPP since according to JDP the main reference point of old Turkey today is RPP. Erdoğan argues that “The mentality of RPP is drought; the mentality of RPP is dirtiness; the mentality of RPP is thirstiness”.¹⁰⁸

Other opposition parties are criticized by JDP by similar arguments in most of the speeches. For example, Erdoğan makes comment on NMP by arguing that its politics are useless since it lost its ability to serve its voter base. NMP; according to JDP, has become the tool of RPP. NMP, in most of the speeches, is criticized with its unsuccessful history under the rule of Devlet Bahçeli. Within this regard Erdoğan argues that:

The president of NMP, Devlet Bahçeli, took over NMP in 1999-2002 and made it the tool of Motherland Party (MP) and Democratic Left Party (DLP) in that period. He was elected for five years; however, he could not stand and run away after three and a half years. Do you know this? He remained under the Sakarya earthquake; he remained under the Kocaeli earthquake. Brothers! They could not achieve.¹⁰⁹

One of the main points of criticizing NMP is nationalism. Erdoğan equates nationalism with his understanding of service policy. According to him one of the

¹⁰⁷ July 6, 2014 Erzurum Presidency Elections Speech

¹⁰⁸ July 20, 2014 Hatay Presidency Elections Speech

¹⁰⁹ July 6, 2014 Erzurum Presidency Elections Speech

important indicators of new Turkey is service policy. In this sense it might be argued that service policy is an inevitable part of democracy and nationalism according to JDP. He calls out to the NMP voter base as claiming that NMP's nationalism is racist and in the sense of service policy, Bahçeli has fallen behind. Therefore, it is the JDP under which those who love their nation should gather.¹¹⁰

Erdoğan makes a comment on their understanding of nationalism:

Brothers! Our works represent our nationalism and love of nation. I am asking you: What represent their nationalism? Who accuse us starkly? What is their vision and imagination? What is their work in the name of nationalism, unity, and brotherhood or powerful Turkey? Look I am repeating here; we are opening Marmaray when RPP and NMP are reading national oath all the time. We help Indian tribes in west and our martyrdoms in east. After its opening; in fifteen days, 300 people have used Marmaray in one day on an average. This is something different. You will be remembered with this.¹¹¹

On the other hand, JDP's criticism of People's Democracy Party (PDP) focuses on terror. According to JDP, PDP is a party which takes its power from guns and violence. In this sense JDP again calls out to the nationalist voter base by using Turkish flag example:

On the other side, you see and know PDP' status. It is a mentality which cannot display the Turkish flag in their congresses since they are the enemies of this nation's flag. Brothers! PDP prefers to make politics under the tutelage of guns instead of its own will. It cannot take its own decisions and try to manage its work by orders.¹¹²

According to Erdoğan these three parties; RPP, NMP, PDP, are the problems of old Turkey since they are against the new and the developing Turkey:

Brothers! Be careful to these parties, which arranged in an order like beads. These are all parties of old Turkey and parties of status quo. These parties do not want change; these

¹¹⁰ July 16, 2014 Sakarya Presidency Elections Speech

¹¹¹ November 19, 2013 TBMM

¹¹² July 8, 2014 Denizli Presidency Elections Speech

parties do not want Turkey to grow, develop and be active and a pioneer country.¹¹³

Within this regard, JDP uses this perspective; the oppressed and pressured will of nation, in presidential election speeches frequently since it perceives presidency as one of the major problems of old Turkey in addition to the problem of opposition.

3.1.1.2 Center / Periphery

The success of JDP having been gained after the elections of 2002 was interpreted as historical victory of “periphery” against “centre” by numerous academicians and policy makers.¹¹⁴ On the 4th of November, 2002 shortly after the elections *Sabah* stated the JDP’s victory as “Anatolian Revolution”.¹¹⁵ So what is the source of that view which was defined as the conflict of centre-periphery or what did cause to the claim that Anatolia made a revolution? Anatolia made that revolution under the leadership of JDP against whom?

This centre-periphery paradigm which was utilized in Turkey firstly by Şerif Mardin¹¹⁶ is a theory which was first contributed to the literature of politics by Edward Shils, an American social scientist. According to this theory, every society has a centre and therefore a periphery. Shils claims that the centre is an area/field where values, beliefs and symbols which direct the society are determined. These moral features attribute sanctity to the centre and the actors maintaining the power of the centre. This sanctity is the official religion of the government namely the centre. It can also be called as secular religion. This system of values which the center has constituted is tried to be adopted by the actors of the center from the center to the periphery.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, the periphery is the area where the loyalty and

¹¹³ July 20, 2014 Hatay Presidency Elections Speech

¹¹⁴ Mustafa Şen, “Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of The Justice and Development Party” in *Islamization of Turkey Under the AKP Rule*, eds. Birol Yesilada and Barry Rubin (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 58.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 57.

¹¹⁶ Şerif Mardin, “Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics”, *Daedalus*, Vol. 102, No. 1, 1973, pp. 169-190.

¹¹⁷ Gökhan Tuncel and Bekir Gündoğmuş, “Türkiye Siyasetinde Merkez-Çevrenin Dönüşümü ve Geleneksel Merkezin Konumlanma Sorunu”, *Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2012, pp. 137-158

support to the center decrease as it moves away from the center. Moreover the center becomes a place for the alternative systems and institutional designs.¹¹⁸

Şerif Mardin the first person to use the Sihls's concept of center-periphery in Turkey interpreted the political struggle in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey as conflict of centre-periphery. The initiative of analyzing the politics in Turkey and the success of JDP within the concept of the struggle of centre-periphery that was commenced by Şerif Mardin has been widely accepted and has become a theory which is frequently consulted by many political and social scientists.

Although analysis of centre-periphery includes some economic analysis, key argument is the political and cultural struggle between the center and the periphery and the hegemony that the center has over the periphery and his effort to change it. In other words under the basis of this analysis does not include the class relationships and struggles but the cultural and political ones. While defining the struggle of center-periphery the fact that class conflicts are not allowed is related with that while the republic was being founded a strong bourgeois and working class did not exist. On the other hand the fact that the staff that founded the republic and presided it took an action to modernize Turkey in economic, social, political and legal fields in Western style has become one of the basic arguments of center-periphery dichotomy. In other words although demand for modernization of the society did not come from the majority of the public, administrative staff leaded this change and took strict measures to preserve the reforms having been made. Thus the people who transform and the people who are in charge of preserving the transformation were described as "centre" and the people who change and the people who are obliged to adopt this change as "periphery". As Mustafa Şen stated "In this context, the periphery is the cultural and political territory of the oppressed and marginalized majority, simply the site of (civil) society, while the center is the place of the state, the power of which is at the hand of a secular military-civil bureaucracy (sometimes shared with the state-created bourgeoisie). (...) This state-versus-society approach also sees internal contradictions and struggles within the state as a result of conflicts among elites and counter-elites, not as a reflection of real antagonism within the state and society. It

¹¹⁸ <http://arsiv010101.wordpress.com/2012/08/21/merkez-ve-cevre-kavramlari-kapsaminda-turk-siyasi-tarihi-okumasi/>

portrays as fierce struggle among diverse sociopolitical forces over the state form as a struggle between the state and society.”¹¹⁹

Following the single-party government of RPP having lasted for 23 years the multi-party system began in 1946. This period which began with the victory of Democratic Party in 1950 is defined as the period when the centre started to rise against the periphery. In other words DP became a party which was supported by the periphery namely the ordinary people. The slogan of DP, “Enough! The say is the Nation’s” was regarded as a proof of its occurrence as the representative of the periphery against the center. The 1960 coup d’état following the government of the center having lasted for ten years was interpreted as the move of the center against the periphery. The period until JDP came into power in 2002 was defined as the period when the periphery came into power with the elections and then the center took back the political power from the periphery via military officers. It was interpreted as the struggle of an anti-democratic center which ignored its victories via coup d’état.¹²⁰

As above-mentioned analysis of center-periphery is an insufficient theory due to the fact that it doesn’t emphasize on economic processes and class relationships. Center and periphery were thought as culturally and politically homogeneous structures which do not include the class conflicts. Analysis of center-periphery accepts each of the actors of both the center and the periphery as prototypes. In other words, each person involved in center political institutions, bureaucracy, army or any structure described as center is an actor who is prestigious, secular, Kemalist, willing to work for defending the principles of Kemalizm. In response to this, each actor taking place in a structure called periphery is a homogeneous unity/integrity that is generally a religious, poor or petit provincial bourgeoisie, thus being despised by the centre.

¹¹⁹ Şen, *Transformation of Turkish Islamism*, p. 58.

¹²⁰ Aziz Babuşçu working as JDP’s İstanbul branch head mentioned in his course, “Perception of Center-Periphery in Turkish Politics” which he gives at school of politics at Bahçeşehir University that “the center which is defined within the sense of the single-party period sees itself as the real owner of the state and the guardian of the nation, determines the ideology of the state accordingly and uses the sovereignty on behalf of the state”. He also talked about the conflict of center-periphery as “mass groups that stay out of this definition of the center constitute the periphery. The sense of center that i have mentioned above produced concepts as center-right, center-left, center media and center capital. Thus the center has a quadruplet structure consisting of military bureaucracy, media, and capital. The country was not governed in real terms, in other words the demands of the majority which we called as the periphery have been ignored. In all fields of the life from politics to belief, art to family life, the center imposed its views to the nation and decided on behalf of it. That situation did not change significantly after the multi-party period began. The leaders having aimed to carry the demands of the periphery to the center paid for their mistakes. Media, capital and bureaucracy made all their efforts to be able to resume their habits to shape the society top to down.”

Besides, in terms of politics, actors in the periphery are people who are repressed, oppressed, humiliated and ignored by the centre due to their democratic, cultural, political and conservative identities at the same time. Also, people belonging to centre suppress and overpower those people due to their cultural and political identity and neglect their demands. Surely, we will not discuss how good it is to use a method of analysis to describe such big social structures as homogeneous in terms of politics, social class and culture.

Since being in power, JDP has built centre-periphery antagonism on the ground of its discourse and it has been used as the base argument by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, especially during the presidential election process. Although he often emphasizes that he is the representative and presidential candidate of the periphery -- people suppressed by the centre and that he even comes from that periphery¹²¹, it does not seem possible to say that JDP is still the representative of it at the current situation. Likewise, JDP is unopposed for a long time (we are talking about a political party that has come to power alone for 12 years) and has an authoritative voice in many fields such as culture and economics. Namely, JDP has reached to a position not to be compelled to embrace the values that are imposed by the centre but a position to make the society embrace the values of the party instead. Economically, the party explicitly showed the class position by implementing neo-liberal policies. In other words, it has become an oppressive center rather than being a politically and culturally oppressed periphery.

Still, JDP continues to benefit from the advantages of its center-periphery discourse. While describing periphery, the party uses descriptions like oppressed, ignored and despised and at the same time it describes it as a vast majority of people who struggle for the democracy. Meanwhile it positions the center as the biggest obstacle for the democracy against the periphery. In other words, whereas it positions an elite little group of the state which is the supporter of status quo to the center as anti-democratic, it positions the ordinary people who defend the democracy to the

¹²¹ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emphasized this matter frequently in advertisements that he gave to some newspapers during the presidential elections. For example on 23th of July in an advertisement given to Star it was stressed that: "He was once among the people who were suffered, despised and oppressed. He struggled for securing their freedom and justice. He was banned from office and imprisoned. But he never gave up. He did not allow the tutelage and the coup d'états. He struggled for the national will. He struggled for sustaining the advanced democracy. He removed the bans, paved the way for the freedoms. He was on the side of the people who are not powerful but right. He wished justice, freedom and democracy for not only for Turkey but also for all the oppressed and suffered ones. He criticized the international system, shook the status quo and broke the routine."

periphery.

Developing a discourse within the frame of center-periphery paradigm provided JDP a beneficial discourse material to use it for the critics against the party. Accordingly, in the dichotomy of center-periphery, the periphery which is the element that would enable democracy to develop in Turkey, also described as "people" by JDP, chose JDP as their representative for the development of democracy. Therefore, JDP pulls out all the stops for this aim and carries out the duty of serving for its people and meeting their demands. Additionally, JDP claims to be a periphery party that is under threat of the centre. Along with the discourse of a oppressed party under a ceaseless threat, this discourse is accompanied by a powerful party image that can defeat all the threat and even risk death to meet the demands of the periphery.¹²² Similarly, as a result of identifying periphery with democracy and centre with coup d'état, despotism and oppression, every criticism and social movement in the face of JDP's policies is labeled as an attack against democracy and even an attempted coup d'état.¹²³

The discourse of JDP, built over the center-periphery antagonism, also fulfils an important function of concealing the neo-liberal economic policy implemented by the party. With the implementation of neo-liberal policies around the world¹²⁴ and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the transition from a class-oriented policy to an identity-oriented one took place in the same period of time.¹²⁵ In other words, instead of class, identity and civil society gained importance within the sense of neo-

¹²² In the advertisement put on Sabah on the 7th August it was emphasized that: The GNAT would elect its president in 2007. But they did not allow. Firstly they made up 367-decision. Then they tried e-memorandum. All the opposition parties acquiesced. But we did not. We said that national will cannot be suppressed. We said that from now on the nation shall elect its president. We held a referendum. We struggled against the front which is the supporter of status quo and says "No, the nation cannot elect ..." The nation said "yes" to its new president with the rate of 68%.

¹²³ See the chapter 4

¹²⁴ The victory of Margret Thatcher in England in 1979 and of Ronald Reagan in the USA in 1980 can be regarded as the beginning of the period when neo-liberal economic policy became dominant formally. see Thomas I. Palley, "Keynesçilikten Neoliberalizme: İktisat Biliminde Paradigma Kayması", *Neoliberalizm: Muhalif Bir Seçki*, (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2014), p. 51; for the development of neoliberalism in USA see: Al Campbell, "ABD'de Neoliberalizmin Doğuşu: Kapitalizmin Yeniden Örgütlenmesi", *Neoliberalizm: Muhalif Bir Seçki*, (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2014), pp. 305-324; for the rebirth of neoliberalism in England see Philip Arestis; Malcolm Sawyer, "İngiltere'de Neoliberal Deneyimi", *Neoliberalizm: Muhalif Bir Seçki*, (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2014), pp. 325-338.

¹²⁵ Galip Yalman, "AKP İktidarında Söylem ve Siyaset: Neyin Krizi?" *İktidarın Şiddeti: AKP'li Yıllar, Neoliberalizm ve İslamcı Politikalar*, ed. Simten Coşar; Gamze Yücesan Özdemir, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2014), p.26.

liberal policy. It is undoubted that this progress in politics has provided an opportunity to facilitate somewhat the economic policies implemented for neo-liberal governments. After the 1980 coup d'état that was put into practice with January 24 decisions and that made it possible to remove all the obstacles refraining the implementation of these policies, neo-liberalism has reached the lead position in economics in Turkey. Policies implemented to hinder the struggle of proletariat that could harden the process of neo-liberal policies impeded the organization and struggle capacity of proletariat.¹²⁶ The easy process of putting neo-liberal policies into practice through benefiting from the advantages of the coup d'état period and the transition from class-oriented politics to the identity-oriented one might be living its golden age in JDP government. Concealment of neo-liberal implementations by blending into identity discourse is one of the political achievements of JDP. JDP, in harmony with the claim of downsizing the state, which is one of the fundamental aims of neo-liberalism, and stopping any kind of state intervention on economics, blends this into identity politics with the center-periphery discourse. According to this, the state, its actors and their collaborators play a significant role in every kind of oppression, badness and negativity that the periphery is exposed to. In other words, seeking any kind of badness in the nature of centre and identity policies contribute to hindering/concealing the social and economical reasons.

In brief, JDP has put the widely accepted centre-periphery antagonism, brought to Turkey by Şerif Mardin, on the ground of its political discourse. For his aim, while presenting itself as the representative of periphery, in other words the democracy claimers; JDP describes bureaucracy and RPP of the single-party period, which JDP considers as the biggest obstacle for Turkey's democratic and economic developments and identifies with the center (or state) over the concept of antagonism. According to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the presidency elections by public indicate a turning point that would eliminate the separation of center-periphery or "state-nation". The separation of state-nation will be eliminated and station and nation will integrate with each other with presidency elections by public.¹²⁷ At the

¹²⁶ For coup d'état of 1980 and application of neo-liberalism policies in Turkey see. Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *AKP ve Türk Sağı*, (İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2009), pp.104-117; Mustafa Şen, "Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of The Justice and Development Party", *Islamization of Turkey Under the AKP Rule*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 66-74

¹²⁷ We encounter at the advertisement put on Star on 8th of August these statements: the nation has two options on 10th of August. On one side old Turkey, on the other the new one... on one tutelage,

same time, according to JDP's expectations, it might be claimed that this will be the end of the center-periphery theory.

3.1.1.3 Elites/People

The separation between the old and the new Turkey in the discourse of democracy as in relation with nation / national will is at issue and more visible in the speeches of presidency elections. Since conservative mass of people conceptualized as nation / national will was under pressure and oppression by one party period of RPP through coup d'états and tutelage of soldiers and elite bureaucrats, nation / national will has come to power with the rise of JDP. In the presidential election speeches, the status of nation / national will in accordance with the mentality of one party period might be considered as given under the title of elites and people. Through years, nation / national will was despised by elites. Their preferences, choices were ignored. Therefore, presidential elections will be a turning point to break this fate of nation. Most of the speeches are based on this perspective and shaped through a distinction between the government and state.

Erdoğan claims that it is the resistance of system to change that resulted in negations in the history of Republic in its ninety one years. He then arranges these negations in order to emphasize their approach to change. According to him closure of mosques, inhibited Quran education and ignorance of national and moral values of nation resulted in distrust in the relation between nation and state in 1940s as a result of resistance to change. Imprisoned writers, exiled writers and artists, unidentified murders are the results of resistance of status quo to change. In addition to this headscarf and terror are problems created by resistance to change. Erdoğan claims that:

State was afraid of freedoms; status quo was afraid of change. The regime comprehended change as a threat in addition to demands of change, claims on rights. A happy minority who organized around the state, regime and status quo lived in a

on the other national will... on one side status quo, on the other change... on one side those who defends the rights of the upper class, on the other those who defends of the highness of the law... on one side chaos and crisis, on the other trust and stability... on one side those who disdain the nation, on the other those who serve for the nation... on one side defenders of tutelage and status quo, on the other man of the nation. It is your choice; it is your decision.

way while mass of people paid big prices and lived in pains. Yes! The desire for change has never disappeared even though status quo oppressed, banned and pressured society.¹²⁸

The desire for change of the nation; according to JDP, is associated with one party regime of RPP. There emerges again the same issue. It is not questioned whether or not today's RPP maintains the same policies with 1940s. Moreover, it is interesting that as the ruling party of JDP, it acts like Turkey is still governed by RPP. Erdoğan argues that:

What made RPP for years? It looked down on people. It did this. They (cadres of RPP) are proud, they are arrogant, and oh my god they stand with these. And please be careful. It is the party of 'kaymak takımı' not innocents, victims or oppressed. They affront people whom do not give them vote. Do you remember what they say? They said 'bidon kafalı', 'göbeğini kaşıyan adam', 'koyun sürüsü', 'makarnacı', 'kömürcü'.¹²⁹

Within this regard JDP tries to underlie its perspective towards presidency elections. Its arguments are based on the continuation of one party period with RPP; considered as the continuation of 1940s, which ignores nation / national will. Erdoğan claims that for 200 years, this nation has been directed by imposing certain policies to them without having an alternative. Nation has not been asked for its opinion and its values have been ignored. He continues his criticism with state's intervention to people's lives. State; especially in one party period, imposed a life-style to people. It restricted their lives by imposing rules including their dressing, beards and moustaches, eating, reading and writing.¹³⁰ Erdoğan perceives old Turkey as dark Turkey for people other than in which elitist, gangs. For him, old Turkey is now behind; the desire for change of the nation has found its way of revival. Inevitable change has begun and it is the JDP that fired this movement.¹³¹

¹²⁸ July 11, 2014 Vision Meeting Speech

¹²⁹ July 17, 2014 Tekirdağ Presidency Elections Speech

¹³⁰ November 12, 2013 TBMM

¹³¹ July 11, 2014 Vision Meeting Speech

According to JDP one of the problems that come today from the old Turkey is presidential elections. Erdoğan's view is that the presidency was put against national will in conjunction with May 27, 1960 coup d'état.¹³² He claims that:

Whenever this nation chose its governments, those governments were suspended by coup d'états, conspiracies, traps, gangs and headlines. They said nation does not understand anything; nation cannot make good choices. They said nation cannot choose its own ruler; we know better; what will happen is what we say; they did not give nation right to speak and made Turkey had no progress. And now we say: Who gave you this authority of looking down nation?¹³³

In this sense Erdoğan makes a separation with government and state. On the basis of this perspective, governments are representatives of nation while state is opposed to nation since state represents the mentality of one party period of RPP and is still so. Therefore, the change in the way of presidency elections is a turning point for the new Turkey. Its legitimization is made with again referring to one party period. Moreover, Erdoğan illustrates the condition of old Turkey by comparing it with western countries' situation after the World War II:

Democracy gained strength, freedoms became widespread, state's intervention to society decreased in the world. Our nation wanted to see the same thing in its own country, own soils. What was dominant before us is that: Before state, and after nation. We have come and reversed it: Before nation, and after the state.¹³⁴

For the presidential elections, Erdoğan makes an emphasis on the way of choosing president. It is claimed that for the first time in the history of Republic, public will choose president and the most important aspect of this is that there will be no intermediaries in this election. Not deputies but essentials will choose the president.¹³⁵ It might be argued that Erdoğan ignores the fact that deputies are representatives of the nation and chosen by them since he regards governments and state are opposed to each other and governments are equal to nation:

¹³² July 8, 2014 Denizli Presidency Elections Speech

¹³³ July 12, 2014 Antalya Presidency Elections Speech

¹³⁴ July 11, 2014 Vision Meeting Speech

¹³⁵ July 6, 2014 Erzurum Presidency Elections Speech

What were you doing? You were going to ballot box, determining deputies and government. However, presidency was restricting your choices and will. Government was representing the nation and president was representing the state. Here in 2007 we put an end to this duality and said that government and state will not be separate. We said that state and nation will cuddle. We said that from now on president will be chosen by nation in Turkey.¹³⁶

By this means Erdoğan claims that there will be no separation between government and state. However, he; during presidency elections speeches, emphasizes that there will be a separation in the sense that if he will be chosen, he will not be objective and take stand of nation. This stand might be explained by the service policy of JDP. Erdoğan frequently argues that if he will be chosen, he will continue to participate in government's acts and works. Within this regard he again gives the example of old Turkey by JDP's definition of it:

I am asking you: Was İsmet İnönü objective? Was Cemal Gürsel objective? Were Cevdet Sunay, Fahri Korutürk, Süleyman Demirel and Ahmet Necdet Sezer objective? Were they over the politics? They all had sides and politics. Remember, in the case of headscarf issue nation took stand of freedom and state took stand of prohibition. Nation wanted freedom for their national and moral values and wanted respect; state came by pressure, prohibition, oppression. Citizens wanted freedom for their beliefs, cultures and languages; state always denied, refused, and tried to assimilate. They looked like taking no stand; they took stand of status quo and tutelage.¹³⁷

Erdoğan frequently mentions about the foundation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to make his arguments consistent. In other words, he picks some sections of that history and reveals them as the essentials of Republic. To make an emphasis on the role of parliament and government Erdoğan gives example of Mustafa Kemal. In a letter, Mustafa Kemal mentions that as from April 23, 1920 all civil and military offices will apply to Grand National Assembly.¹³⁸ According to Erdoğan presidency elections after Mustafa Kemal was always problematic. He argues that:

¹³⁶ July 8, 2014 Denizli Presidency Elections Speech

¹³⁷ July 10, 2014 Yozgat Presidency Elections Speech

¹³⁸ December 3, 2013 TBMM

Ghazi Mustafa Kemal died in November 10, 1938 and immediately the day after; in November 11, soldiers surrounded parliament forcibly and chose İsmet İnönü as president. Till 1950; during twelve years, İsmet İnönü was president with the title of National Chief; this is RPP, this is RPP.¹³⁹

Erdoğan deals with RPP approaching it as a party which does not have relation with Mustafa Kemal and the essential meaning of parliament. RPP is revealed as having no relation with the founding paradigm of the Republic. According to him all opposition parties; primarily RPP, took stand of the state not the nation.¹⁴⁰ By restricting opposition parties and their policies to the mentality of one party period of RPP, Erdoğan might be argued as breaking history from the establishing of Turkish National Assembly and connects it to the JDP government. In this sense JDP government will be considered as the continuation of the ‘real’ perspective of the Republic. This can be interpreted in as having two meanings.

First of all, JDP government will escape from the fate of NOM parties in the sense of political Islam by referring to the history of the Republic and Mustafa Kemal. Secondly, he refers to nation that was under the pressure of one party period of RPP. This nation which was under the pressure was exemplified through headscarf issue, religious education or an imposed life-style. Therefore, the nation that JDP government calls out can be portrayed as mass of conservative people. As opposed to NOM parties that directly attack to secularism and the policies of Turkish Republic, JDP prefers to direct this attack to RPP and its policies.

3.1.1.4 Operations

This perspective might be illustrated with some of JDP government’s operations that deal with one party period of RPP. These operations are revealed as a fight with Old Turkey and ‘threats to democracy’ and its reference point is one party period of RPP and today’s RPP which is regarded as the continuation of one party period by JDP government. Rather than attacking directly to secularism or the components of Turkish Republic, Erdoğan canalizes his critics to the mentality of one party period

¹³⁹ July 18, 2014 Bursa Presidency Elections Speech

¹⁴⁰ July 5, 2014 Samsun Presidency Elections Speech

of old Turkey. By changing certain laws and codes in the constitution, JDP prevents the danger of meeting the fate of NOM parties. One of these operations is about Turkish Armed Forces. By changing an article ¹⁴¹of Turkish Armed Forces Internal Administration law, it is aimed to distract members of Turkish Armed Forces from political activity. Within this regard Erdoğan claims that:

Yes, we are changing the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Administration law's article 35 which for decades was represented as the justification for intervention to democracy, used as a justification, offered a cover for interventions. Turkish Armed Forces Internal Administration law's article 35 was always asserted as a justification for May 27, 1960 intervention, September 12, 1980 intervention and February 28 intervention and other interventions arranged later...We are redefining the duty of Turkish Armed Forces and the concept of military service through a change in the article. We are preventing this article to be interpreted differently.¹⁴²

The article change of Turkish Armed Forces Internal Administration law is represented through the examples of coup d'états. By this way Erdoğan challenges with old Turkey and its major component which is the one party period of RPP according to him. Erdoğan exemplifies JDP's operation by referring to the essential constituent philosophy of the Turkish Republic. In other words he legitimizes JDP's operations by claiming that these operations' purpose is to make Turkish Republic to regain its constituent philosophy. Another example can be given about the change in the oath implementation in schools. According to Erdoğan oath that is read by students in every morning in schools is an implantation that was started in 1933. Even though it was invalidated many times, it was revived by March 12 and September 12 coup d'états. Erdoğan finds it ignorance to make equal this oath to our Republic.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ TBMM Genel Kurulu'nda, TSK İç Hizmet Kanunu'nun 35. maddesini değiştiren düzenleme kabul edildi. "Silahlı Kuvvetlerin vazifesi; Türk yurdunu ve anayasa ile tayin edilmiş olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni kollamak ve korumaktır" ifadesi, "Silahlı Kuvvetlerin vazifesi; yurtdışından gelecek tehdit ve tehlikelere karşı Türk vatanını savunmak, caydırıcılık sağlayacak şekilde askeri gücün muhafazasını ve güçlendirilmesini sağlamak, TBMM kararıyla yurtdışında verilen görevleri yapmak ve uluslararası barışın sağlanmasına yardımcı olmaktır" şeklinde değiştirildi (<http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/07/13/tsk.ic.hizmet.kanununun.35.maddesi.degisti/715269.0/>)

¹⁴² July 2, 2013 TBMM

¹⁴³ October 8, 2013 TBMM

What is emphasized with the oath is about the writer of this text, Dr. Reşat Galip. Erdoğan claims that:

The writer of the text known as oath is Dr. Reşat Galip who is a very problematic name. I want our nation to know this also: Reşat Galip who is the writer of the oath was one of the architects of Turkish azan cruelty, writers of Turkish azan text.¹⁴⁴

In this sense Erdoğan calls out to conservative mass of JDP's voter base to explain the necessity of this operation. Since the discourse of democracy is built upon the separation between old and new Turkey, acts and operations should be connected to this discourse to maintain stability in the discourse. JDP's conservative mass of people called as nation; although it is argued that JDP is the party of all citizens in Turkey, emerges as the unique receiver of these practices, acts and operations. It is not questioned in this thesis whether or not these operations are necessary, democratic, and useless or not, the aim is to understand how JDP represents these operations. How it legitimizes or articulates these statements in its political discourse.

Another example can be given by the operation on dressing. In this sense the main reference point is headscarf issue. JDP lifted the ban of working in public works with headscarf and in schools. According to Erdoğan making equal headscarf prohibition to the constituent philosophy of The Turkish Republic is also other ignorance. Erdoğan gives also examples from his personal life when the issue is headscarf:

There were pressures and oppressions in old Turkey that you can never imagine. Do you know your sisters could not go to schools with headscarves? ...Their names were Ayşe, their names were Fatma, their names were Hatice, these were children of this country...I was also father of two girls and my daughters also had troubles, I had to send them abroad."¹⁴⁵We are removing all the pressures, oppressions, cruelties that were implemented starts from 1940s.¹⁴⁶The

¹⁴⁴ October 8, 2013 TBMM

¹⁴⁵ July 9, 2014 Tokat Presidency Elections Speech

¹⁴⁶ October 8, 2013 TBMM

history of this nation is not written by pro-coup mindset of May 27, September 12.¹⁴⁷

Within this regard, it is clear that one of the basic components of the discourse on democracy of JDP is nation / national will. JDP government; as understood from the speeches of Erdoğan makes a separation between old and new Turkey. On the basis of this view, the new Turkey is constructed by JDP government. Democracy is the indicator of this Turkey and it is represented as the need and desire for change of nation / national will. Although there is no clear attack on secularism as opposed to NOM parties, JDP conceptualizes nation / national will as a conservative mass of people who suffered under the pressure and oppression of one party period of RPP.

In this sense JDP's refers status quo, coup d'états, tutelage or Jacobinism as the components of one party period of RPP. Therefore, it tries to reshape the constituent philosophy of Turkish Republic and claims that the essentials of this philosophy are revived by JDP government. Rather than directly criticizing secularism, JDP canalizes its critics to today's RPP. According to JDP government today's RPP is the continuation of one party period's RPP; therefore, it is the party of status quo, elites and pro-coup mindset. In sum it might be argued that the one of the main components of discursive formation of democracy is nation / national will. Nation / national are constructed through dualities like secularism/conservatism, elites/people and center/periphery.

In addition to nation/national will and telling the constituent philosophy of Turkish Republic differently, other components of discourse on democracy are the invention of tradition and mythologization. Actually; it will be seen that, it is another way of dealing with what JDP calls as old Turkey by inventing new days to celebrate and referring certain historical figures. The next chapter will try to understand how JDP government achieves this purpose.

3.2 Invention of Tradition

It might be argued that JDP; by Eric Hobsbawm's perspective, invents traditions to construct its discourse of democracy in addition to its nation/national will statements.

¹⁴⁷ November 19, 2013 TBMM

These are some historical days and dates some of which were celebrated in the Turkish Republic before and removed later on. Prominent ones of these days are 1071 Malazgirt Victory celebrations, Holy Birth Week, İstanbul's Conquest celebrations. In this sense JDP government tries to make these days to be celebrated and become part of the tradition of Turkish Republic. Even though it seems that the period under JDP government is not enough to invent traditions and make them internalized by society, it cannot be denied that JDP tries to put this practice into operation. Within this regard, it is not an accident to prefer Hobsbawm's perspective. Hobsbawm argues that the term 'tradition which is invented' is used in a broader sense but not ambiguously. This term includes traditions which are invented, constructed and institutionalized formally as well as traditions which emerge in a short and determinable time and settled at a great pace.¹⁴⁸ It is interesting that here; in Hobsbawm's argument, old materials or historical events are used in the invention of new traditions for the new purposes. Some of these traditions are constructed as an articulated version of old ones and some of them are organized by collecting official rituals or symbols.¹⁴⁹ This view is compatible with how JDP government has risen the importance of these days namely; 1071 Malazgirt Victory celebrations, Holy Birth Week, İstanbul's Conquest celebrations.

Firstly, 1071 Malazgirt Victory celebration has become one of these invented days. The Ministry of Youth and Sports organized a celebration August 26, 2013. In this celebration the same historical moment in which Alp Arslan had been made preparation for the war was performed in Malazgirt plain. In this celebration 1071 young people whose names were Alp Arslan were called to gather in Malazgirt plain. Seventy one hair tents were brought from Kyrgyzstan and these 1071 young people camped in these hair tents. Celebration began with dawn prayer dedicated to 1071 victory. The Minister of Youth and Sports; Suat Kılıç, was given the keys of the city symbolically.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Eric Hobsbawm, "Giriş," in Geleneğin İcadı eds Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, trans. By Mehmet Murat Şahin (İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2006), p.2

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p.7

¹⁵⁰ http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_malazgirt-zaferi-1071-alparslanla-kutlandi_2124908.html



Figure 1. 1071 Malazgirt Victory Celebrations

Source: http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_malazgirt-zaferi-1071-alparslanla-kutlandi_2124908.html

According to Suat Kılıç under the flag of Sultan Alparslan, there is the unity of all Islamic elements.¹⁵¹ In his speech during the celebration Kılıç argued that:

Even we cannot, our children will see; and if they cannot, our grandchildren will see. I hope that people who will speak in this lectern with this microphone to the grandchildren of Alparslan in 2071 will remember our unity, peace and speeches done here.¹⁵²

Within this regard, Kılıç refers to JDP government's 2071 vision. JDP government sets the year 2071 as a goal to be reached for the future of its political life. Erdoğan in his speech claims that "I believe wholeheartedly that as a city of Seljuk, Ottoman and the Republic, Kayseri will be pioneer in 2071 goals as they are in 2023 goals. We are making investment to Kayseri with this soul and understanding."¹⁵³

What does it mean to pay attention to this historical moment? It is claimed that conquest of Anatolia in 1071 is a central and critical moment in the conservative

¹⁵¹ http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_malazgirt-zaferi-1071-alparslanla-kutlandi_2124908.html

¹⁵² <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/malazgirt-zaferinin-942.-yil-donumu-kutlandi/51149#1>

¹⁵³ <http://t24.com.tr/haber/yeni-hedef-2071,223462>

envisagement. Since Anatolia opened the doors for Seljuks and Ottomans, in the 1071 envisagement there is place for Islam as well as Muslim people who are not Turks.¹⁵⁴ According to the Minister of Development, it is the 1071 that made us capable of being a nation.¹⁵⁵ One of the reflections of 1071 envisagement is the name of boulevard made in ODTÜ. Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayor; Melih Gökçek, decided to give “1071 Malazgirt Bulvarı” name to this boulevard.¹⁵⁶ There were resistances towards the construction to this boulevard¹⁵⁷ and one of them was in ODTÜ. In the ODTÜ protest which was against the construction of boulevard, there was a student who wore Byzantine costume.¹⁵⁸ Since Malazgirt victory was between Seljuks and Byzantine Empire, all the students in protests were represented as grandchildren of Byzantine.¹⁵⁹

Even though there were resistances, its construction could not be prevented and this issue was reflected again in the framework of old and new Turkey since resistance was related to the mentality of RPP as a representation of one party period. On the basis of this issue Erdoğan claims that:

What is this mentality? RPP. We said bridge; they said we do not want. Whether you want it or not we made and will make (...) these young people are deceived, cheated. These young people see the world from a different perspective (...) their minds belong to 1940s. Our nation stopped this by saying enough it is the word of nation from now on (...) There is no place to ‘we do not want’ in new Turkey.¹⁶⁰

In the case of envisagement of 1071, JDP government’s separation between the old and the new Turkey is clear. Therefore, it becomes possible to argue that there is certainly a tradition that is tried to be implemented as a tradition. Hobsbawm argues

¹⁵⁴ <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/158581-dava-restorasyon-ve-paradoks>

¹⁵⁵ <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/malazgirt-zaferinin-942.-yil-donumu-kutlandi/51149#1>

¹⁵⁶ <http://www.sendika.org/2014/02/gokcek-dusmanligini-yollara-yazdi-odtu-yoluna-1071-malazgirt-bulvari-adi-verildi/>

¹⁵⁷ <http://www.sendika.org/2014/02/gokcek-dusmanligini-yollara-yazdi-odtu-yoluna-1071-malazgirt-bulvari-adi-verildi/>

¹⁵⁸ This claim is not certain. There are some debates about that this student might be a police officer. See <http://www.ulkehaber.com/guncel/bizans-kilikli-odtu-eylemcisi-desifre-oldu-34117.html>

¹⁵⁹ <http://m.yeniakit.com.tr/foto-galeri/odtudeki-bizans-torunlari-malazgirt-1071i-hazmedemedi-156>

¹⁶⁰ http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/odtude_1071_gerilimi-1178447

that traditions are invented since old methods cannot be reached or implemented.¹⁶¹ JDP's discourse of democracy which is the reflection of new Turkey is based on this separation; therefore, old Turkey and its components should be defeated. It can be interpreted that the head of the old Turkey is RPP which is represented as the continuation of one party period of RPP.

Secondly, Istanbul's Conquest celebration is one of these days. It is one of the envisagement that JDP perceives as the political goal of its future; the goal of 2053. It might be argued that the emphasis on Istanbul's Conquest day and importance given to it is related challenging with old Turkey. On the importance of Istanbul's Conquest day, Erdoğan makes an explanation in the parliament. He claims that:

One of the first operations of the Deceased Menderes was to celebrate the anniversaries of İstanbul's Conquest when he obtained the authorization from nation. Unfortunately, the first celebration prohibition of May 27, 1960 intervention was May 29 Conquest celebrations. In the fifty three years period; as each work of May 27, nation also reacted against this prohibition. Even though state and governments remained distant to this issue, we comprehended May 29 enthusiastically and excitedly throughout our political life. Tomorrow; if god lets, we will celebrate May 29 İstanbul Conquest day in İstanbul with two activities.¹⁶²

The most important mission of celebrating May 29 is to response and change old Turkey and its practices. Celebrating Conquest day might be argued as equal to dealing with coup d'états of old Turkey. Placing these celebrations in to the very agenda of Turkey's important days can be interpreted as a signature of dealing with old Turkey.

Lastly, Holy Birth Week; even though it was a day celebrated before, gained importance in the period under the JDP government. In the Holy Birth Week, meetings are organized in which '*mevlid*' is read.¹⁶³ Erdoğan and also cadres of JDP gives importance to celebrate and give messages about this day. For example Erdoğan in Holy Birth Week gives a message and states that:

¹⁶¹ Hobsbawm, *Geleneğin İcadı*, p. 10

¹⁶² May 28, 2013 TBMM

¹⁶³ <http://m.akparti.org.tr/tbmm/haberler/kutlu-dogum-haftasinda-mevlut/62368>

I believe that Holy Birth Week of which our nation in each year embraces in an increasing excitement will deepen our culture of brotherhood. We should protect the memory and the deposit of our beloved Prophet who enlightens our ways, fills out hearts with love and mercy.¹⁶⁴

Meeting organizations for the Holy Birth week are announced on billboards to increase the participation in cities.



Figure 2. A billboard inviting people to the Holy Birth Week activities

Source: <http://www.tarsusmedya.com/mersini-kutlu-dogum-coskusu-sardi/>

As it is seen from the message of Erdoğan and billboards, emphasis is the unity and brotherhood message of the Prophet. Islamic interpretation of unity and brotherhood through Holy Birth Week is an act that JDP government supports. However, the unity message becomes questionable; for whether or not it includes each individual living in Turkey who has different religions or ethnic identities, since Erdoğan in a TV program said that “They called me Georgian, excuse me they called me Armenian uncouthly.”¹⁶⁵ In this sense it might be claimed that the discursive interpretation of other religious or ethnic groups are not included to the culture of brotherhood that Erdoğan perceives as the message of the Prophet.

¹⁶⁴ <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/620689-erdogandan-kutlu-dogum-haftasi-mesaji>

¹⁶⁵ <http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/basbakan-erdogan-bana-da-affedersiniz-ermeni-diyen-oldu-haberi-95529>

3.3 Mythologization

In addition to an emphasis on the democracy heritage of Menderes, JDP government frequently uses some other historical or today's figures as the legitimization dynamic of its politics. It refers to these people or events to attribute a divine meaning to its political vision. In this sense one of them is the Rabia symbol. Rabia symbol came to the forefront in the Rabiātül Adeviyye Square in which there were protests against coup d'état in Egypt. Proponents of Mursi; whose government was overthrown, adopted this symbol to refer Rabiātül Adeviyye Square and Mursi since he was the fourth president. The Rabia symbol then has expanded to protests out of Egypt and come to the fore of Turkey.¹⁶⁶ Afterwards Erdoğan has adopted this symbol to refer to new Turkey and JDP government's democracy struggle. In his presidential election speeches he ends his words to remind the importance of Rabia symbol.

Brothers, what was the fourth one of Rabia? One state. There is no another state. In this case it is one nation, one flag, one motherland, one state. Do you remember Esma¹⁶⁷? Do not forget. We are struggling for democracy similarly; and we will continue to do in this manner.¹⁶⁸

Rabia symbol; as it can be seen below, has become one of the prominent symbols of JDP government and adopted also by the supporters of JDP government to refer the struggle for democracy in favor on new Turkey.



Figure 3. A symbol representing the demonstration in Rabiātül Adevviyye against the Egyptian Coup d'état in 2013

¹⁶⁶ <http://t24.com.tr/haber/rabia-isaretinin-anlami-ne.237256>

¹⁶⁷ She was a girl who was murdered during the protests in Rabiātül Adeviye Square.

¹⁶⁸ July 6, 2014 Erzurum Presidency Elections Speech

Another example can be given in accordance with the service policy of JDP government. In presidential election speeches, Erdoğan legitimizes JDP's service policy mostly by referring to Ottoman Empire. It will be appropriate to exemplify this issue through the Marmaray project. In the official web page of Marmaray, it is argued that this project was first expressed by Sultan Abdülmecit in 1860. However, there was no step taken for the actualization of this project. Later on; in 1987, the Prime Minister Turgut Özal tried to actualize it; however, it was postponed by the coalition governments after Özal.¹⁶⁹ At the end it has been actualized by JDP government, and they stated that "A dream that is at the age of 153 is realized."¹⁷⁰

In the presidential election speeches, Erdoğan mentions about the construction of Marmaray project by referring to Ottoman Empire and Fatih Sultan Mehmet mostly.

Brothers, this issue is about feelings, about persistence, about faith. We are walking with the soul that made Fatih Sultan Mehmet to carry out ships on land. Our ancestor Fatih carried out on land, and we carried and are carrying out under the sea. They were our source of inspiration.¹⁷¹

For the legitimization of foreign policy of JDP government, the reference point is again Ottoman Empire. JDP government criticizes old Turkey by claiming that it was not active and pioneer in the foreign policy and it was following other foreign countries to make a decision in the international problems. However; as the constructor and representative of new Turkey and democracy, JDP government asserts that it conveyed Turkey into a country which is pioneer at the international level. In this sense Erdoğan argues that:

There was a Turkey which was afraid of its own shadow and its own nation. It was following sovereigns in the international problems. It was the old Turkey. I believe now that those who walk with the trademark of old Turkey cannot be the candidate of our nation because this does not suit our nation. My ancestor was different; it was sending navies to Açe since there was oppression. Once upon a time we were a nation. We came to world; teach people what means nation and nationality. We are such a kind o nation. Can we put it

¹⁶⁹ <http://www.marmaray.gov.tr/icerik/marmaray/Tarih%C3%A7esi/1>

¹⁷⁰ <http://www.marmaray.gov.tr/icerik/marmaray/153-Y%C4%B1ll%C4%B1k-Hayal-Ger%C3%A7ek-Oldu/48>

¹⁷¹ July 6, 2014 Erzurum Presidency Elections Speech

aside? We cannot. This is how we earn dignity for the Turkey's foreign policy.¹⁷²

In this sense Erdoğan also criticizes the behavior of RPP and NMP for their opposition to JDP government's foreign policy by referring again historical figures.

My grandfathers, my ancestors went to into Europe from Malazgirt including Yemen, Tunisia on horseback; however, I cannot see and hear Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Gaza which are at my elbow. Is it possible? Hey! RPP and NMP. Go and sit near the Esad with your joint candidate. Brothers, we cannot collaborate with cruel.¹⁷³

Lastly, another person who was referred approximately in all speeches for the presidential elections was Ali Fuat Başgil. Erdoğan began his presidential election speeches from Samsun by stating that before ninety five years ago Mustafa Kemal reached to Samsun to start War of Independence and; therefore, he started his election speeches from here.¹⁷⁴ In this sense he equates presidential elections to War of Independence as the new Turkey's turning point. Erdoğan argues that "As before ninety five years ago, today we say 'bismillah' in Samsun and start from Samsun which is a holy travel for our nation and Turkey (...) I hope that that this travel will be good for our country, nation and democracy."¹⁷⁵

By stating that presidential election is equal to War of Independence for both of them is a new start for Turkey; Erdoğan clarifies why it is important to start from Samsun his presidential speeches in addition to the importance of War of Independence. He gives the example of Ali Fuat Başgil. Erdoğan claims that:

Brothers, do you know that Samsun gave vote over eighty percent to the candidate who was over against the RPP in the multiparty period of 1930? He was an independent candidate. Samsun raised a courteous person like Ali Fuat Başgil. Samsun always supported democracy, freedoms and national will. In August 10, Samsun *inşallah* will justify a holy travel and call what was done to Ali Fuat Başgil to account at the ballot box.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷² July 9, 2014 Tokat Presidency Elections Speech

¹⁷³ July 9, 2014 Tokat Presidency Elections Speech

¹⁷⁴ July 5, 2014 Samsun Presidency Elections Speech

¹⁷⁵ July 5, 2014 Samsun Presidency Elections Speech

¹⁷⁶ July, 5 2014 Samsun Presidency Elections Speech

In this sense Erdoğan brings the issue to the mentality of RPP. Ali Fuat Başgil and his nomination from Samsun for the presidential elections over against RPP can be considered as the reason of why JDP chose Samsun as a starting point for election speeches and equates it to the War of Independence.

These historical figures and moments in JDP government's discourse of democracy can be said as functional in two senses. Firstly, it functions as a legitimization for its politics in the sense of service and foreign policies. Secondly, these historical figures or moments are attached to the critics of RPP in a sense. Therefore, their symbolic meanings bring the issue to the rectification of old Turkey which is actually perceived as the mentality of RPP.

CHAPTER IV

EXPANSION OF THE DISCOURSE OF OLD TURKEY

The aim of this chapter is to understand the relation between the components of JDP's discourse of democracy and what JDP illustrates as the opposites and threats towards its democracy perspective. The structure of the oppositions and threats to democracy offered by JDP represents that JDP's discourse of democracy cannot go out of them. In this sense it can be argued that oppositions and threats to JDP's democracy are also constitutive in the discursive formation of JDP's discourse of democracy. This perspective makes it possible to understand the structure of opposition and threats to democracy according to JDP.

Within this regard, it is possible to say that oppositions and threats to democracy in JDP's discourse of democracy have a flexible structure since each opposition or movement against JDP government are revealed by JDP as a threat to the components of democracy. The discourse of democracy of JDP is constituted through one party period of RPP, coup d'états, and RPP as opposed to nation / nation will, invention of tradition and mythologization. Each opposition and movement against JDP government; therefore, are articulated to the one party period of RPP, coup d'états and RPP statements as the mentality of old Turkey. Hence all the units or components which are out of JDP's discourse of democracy are explained by articulating them to each other.

There are two examples that will make it easy for us to understand these relations. Firstly, it is the Gezi Protests that Turkey witnessed in May, 2013. The second example is December 17 and 25 operations that confronted JDP government with corruption accusations. What was JDP government's attitude towards these events was to articulate them with each other. The main referent point that these events were articulated to was the mentality of old Turkey and its representatives.

4.1 Gezi Protests

Turkey; even the world, witnessed an unexpected social movement which began at the end of May, 2013. A small park which is called as Gezi Park and is located in Taksim was tried to be replaced with a shopping mall. The images of a small number of activists that attempted to save the trees in the park and the police's violent intervention against them spread on the social media and one of the biggest demonstrations of the Turkish history began.¹⁷⁷

Gezi protests although called as Gezi resistance or Gezi upheaval did not remain limited to Gezi Park or Istanbul and quickly spread throughout Turkey. One striking aspect of the protests was its not being limited to centrums. Besides centrums, demonstrations with great participation were also held in districts and quarters. According to the report of Ministry of Internal Affairs by the date of 23th of July, 2013 in 79 provinces 2, 5 million people participated in the protests and approximately 4 thousand people were injured.¹⁷⁸ These are official figures including the number of people who actively participated in the protests by the date of 23th of July. Moreover, if it is bore in the mind that those protests continued until September and there were people who passively supported them¹⁷⁹, it can be thought that the number was over 2, 5 million.

The most remarkable feature of the Gezi demonstrations was political, cultural and class diversity of the participants. It was possible to see people from different sections of the society: “young women and men, wage-laborers and proletarians, small retailers, unemployed people, housewives, women wearing a headscarf or not; people from all generations, LGBT individuals, students from both high schools and universities, sections from different philosophical, political views and beliefs as neo-

¹⁷⁷ For the first days of the demonstration see <http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/bastan-sona-gezi-parkinda-neler-oluyor-haberi-73811>

¹⁷⁸ http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/gezi_eylemlerinin_bilancosu_aciklandi-1138770

¹⁷⁹ Those were the people who supported the protests by making noise through kitchenware and gave refuge to protestors escaping from police. There was also a great support to the protests via social media.

nationalists, liberals, socialists, social democrats, Kemalists, anarchists, atheists, Muslims, Alewis etc.”¹⁸⁰

Several articles, books and columns were written regarding the reasons for this social movement having gathered different groups in the same demonstration. Surely we will not discuss the comments regarding the reasons for Gezi demonstrations.¹⁸¹ Moreover, society felt discomfort and uneasiness toward neo-liberal economic policies and policies intended to conservatize the society that JDP implemented. Therefore, that crowd from different identities and classes gathered.¹⁸²

Previously in the chapter “Centre-Periphery, we claimed that JDP reached a power where it could impose its neo-liberal and conservative policies to the society, which proved that it was no longer “periphery”, but became “center”. Gezi protests are the irrefutable outbreak of JDP’s becoming center. The police intervention against the protestors was really violent. That rigid intervention was criticized by many countries notably UN¹⁸³, EU¹⁸⁴ and USA¹⁸⁵. According to the statement of Turkish Medical Association dating 27th of June in the protests 5 protestors and a police passed away and 8041 people were injured.¹⁸⁶ When it is considered that the number that Turkish Medical Association gave includes only those who went to the hospitals and were registered, the number of wounded was more than estimated.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁰ Selma Gürkan, “Bu Daha Başlangıç, Mücadeleye Devam”, Gezi, İsyan, Özgürlük: Sokağın Şenlikli Muhalefeti, ed. Kemal İnal, (İstanbul: AyrıntıYayınları, 2013), p. 125.

¹⁸¹ For a detailed analysis see Kemal İnal, “Gezi: Tanım, Failler ve Roller”, Gezi, İsyan, Özgürlük: Sokağın Şenlikli Muhalefeti, ed. Kemal İnal, (İstanbul: AyrıntıYayınları, 2013), pp. 13-40

¹⁸² Certainly, some stated that JDP was innocent and those protests were manipulated by international conspiracy. For a detailed study about issues of Yeni Şafak during Gezi Parkı protests see İsmail Saymaz, “Yeni Şafak’ın Gezi Parkı Karnesi: Entelektüel Gazeteden Parti Broşürüne...” Medya ve İktidar: Hegemonya, Statüko, Direniş, eds Esra Ersan and Savaş Çoban, (İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın, 2014), pp. 188-198

¹⁸³ <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bm-den-gezi-parki-aciklamasi/dunya/detay/1721728/default.htm>

¹⁸⁴ <http://everywheretaksim.net/tr/birgun-abden-akpye-gezi-elestirisi/>

¹⁸⁵ <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25447147/>; <http://www.gazetevatan.com/ab-ve-abd-den-gezi-parki-tepkisi--542751-gundem/>.

¹⁸⁶ <http://t24.com.tr/haber/insan-haklari-vakfindan-gezi-parki-bilancosu.234224>

¹⁸⁷ For the estimated figures see <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/gezi-den-kalanlar-ve-farkli-bir-gundem/ydetay/1797280/default.htm>

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who could not foresee that to what extent these protests could grow called the protestors as “çapulcu” (looters) with a powerful manner on the first days of the protests.¹⁸⁸ However, as protests grew and got out of control, the discourse of Erdoğan changed. Despite the violent intervention of police, during and after the protests the discourse that Prime Minister embraced was the discourse of periphery. JDP was a suffered party of periphery and Gezi protests were a conspiracy or an attempt of coup d’état. In this sense it is possible to discuss the JDP government’s attitude towards Gezi protests can be discussed in terms of three perspectives.

Firstly, it can be discussed through how JDP government made an explanation for these protests. It is crucial to emphasis on these explanations in which JDP government tried to explain the real motivation and the intention of the protests. It is crucial since JDP government brings the issue to the threats to new Turkey as a developing country and democracy. According to Erdoğan these protests are an organized attempts of coup d’état to the new Turkey’s democracy. Erdoğan claims that:

Look my precious brothers. This May is a month in which Turkey has achieved enormous achievements. Why do you think that these events happened in this period? You saw them all. Was it about a tree? Now everybody sees that it was not. The problem is something different.¹⁸⁹

After stating that the problem is not tree but something else, Erdoğan explains the real motives and reasons behind Gezi protests.

They said the problem is not the Gezi Park. Yes the problem is not Gezi Park. That is the issue. Their problem is to stop democracy; the problem is to stop Turkey; the problem is to stop economy; the problem is to make Turkey lose by hitting tourism. They have done this several times in ten years period. Make JDP government lose even though Turkey is damaged. This was their mentality. We cannot tolerate such a vandal, and a barbarian mentality.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ <http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-birkac-cabulcunun-tahrikine-seyirci-kalmayiz-taksime-cami-de-yapacagiz,231154>

¹⁸⁹ July 2, 2013 TBMM

¹⁹⁰ July 2, 2013 TBMM

According to Erdoğan, Turkey has developed and become successful. Therefore, the aim is the impairment of this new developed Turkey.

There is a country that achieved enormous achievements in ten years. There are achievements in social policies. There are achievements in education system. There are achievements in both substructure and superstructure. It is possible to add other examples.¹⁹¹

In this sense the real motive and intention behind these protests was to stop democratic new Turkey. The national will which is regarded by JDP as the carrier of democratic new Turkey was targeted. As it is mentioned before, presidential elections were regarded as a turning point for the new Turkey. The focal point of the presidential elections speeches was its emphasis on the separation between state and the governments. On the basis of this argument, Erdoğan claimed that governments; which were elected by national will, were always prevented and overthrown by coup d'états since there was a separation between state and governments. In this sense presidency was representing state and governments were representing nation / national will.

Within the framework of JDP's discourse of democracy and its relation with new Turkey and nation / national will, it becomes comprehensible that national will become the target of protesters since the discursive formation of democracy relies on these relationalities. In this sense Erdoğan claims that:

There are those who participate in these demonstrations with innocent reasons, fair demands and want to use their democratic rights as well as those who participate in with different aims and different accounts. Those who want to settle account with Turkey, our government and national will. They used these demonstrations as a tool and brought into a different state rather than the beginnings of these demonstrations.¹⁹²

Secondly, it is important to look issue through how JDP government pointed out some figures who motivated Gezi protestors as a reason lying behind the Gezi protests in general. In the first hand, it explained the real motivations and intentions of the Gezi protestors. Then it pointed out some figures as the real motivators of Gezi

¹⁹¹ July 2, 2013 TBMM

¹⁹² June 25 ,2013 TBMM

protests. One of them is interest rate lobby and media. The other one is RPP. According to JDP interest rate lobby was uncomfortable with the growing Turkey in JDP period. Therefore; with the support of some proponent media, interest rate lobby tried to threaten Turkey. Erdoğan argues that:

Brother, we just know to produce and we have come to these days by doing, producing, constructing and growing Turkey. Now I am highlighting; we have come to these days in despite of interest rate lobby. This interest rate lobby supposes that it will threaten us by speculating in the market. They need to know this better; we will not victimize the great effort of this nation.¹⁹³

It can be understood from the explanations of Erdoğan; in addition to interest rate lobby, media supported these events made organizations.

Organized operations were made in social media. Some media organizations in Turkey participated in these operations as head arranger and head provocateur. We know these media organizations. We know and my nation knows which organizations had active roles as written and visual. International media had role in these operations; you know their names; I explained.¹⁹⁴

According to JDP government the other actor who supported the organization of Gezi protests is RPP. It is revealed that since RPP could not be successful in political arena, it chose to organize its voter base in these protests against JDP government. Erdoğan expresses that:

I also expressed in our last group meeting. The insufficient, ineffective and poor opposition of the Republican People's Party, the awkwardness of RPP's administration, double wrongs, goofs, disappointments of elections; unfortunately, made RPP's voter base desperate. Since it cannot oppose in parliament, RPP made war calls on streets and provoked its voter base. Therefore, it paved the way for this disappointed mass of people to go out.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25447579/>

¹⁹⁴ June 25, 2013 TBMM

¹⁹⁵ June 25, 2013 TBMM

Later on; Erdoğan, turns back to his perspective about old Turkey since its one of the representations is RPP as the continuation of one party period of RPP. Then he continues by criticizing the General President of RPP.

Believe me, 1940s and 1950s's RPP is innocent when it is compared with today's RPP in the sense of oppression and ugliness. Today the General President of RPP tries to appear good to its hangman. To appear good to his hangman and to transfer from black person to white, he legitimizes all kinds of ugliness. A General President; who ignores an inhuman assault to a young woman with her six months baby¹⁹⁶ regardless of her dress, belief, political preferences, is the dishonor of both RPP and politics.¹⁹⁷

In this sense the nation / national will statements as a subject speaking through ballot box appears again. The third issue through which Gezi protests is evaluated by JDP government is nation / national will and its relation with ballot box. Since intentions of Gezi protesters is to deal with nation / national will, nation / national will defend itself on ballot box. It might be argued that nation / national will is illustrated as having right to speak on through ballot box according to JDP government and this means that nation of JDP is restricted to one area where its boundaries are defined by JDP government. In this sense it is questionable to accept that JDP represents nation since its definition and right to speak are defined by this government. After Gezi protests Erdoğan argues that:

We will settle an account on ballot box with those who have problem with national will. We will settle an account with those who have problems with Turkey's economy by growing a stable and safe economy. We will settle an account with those who have problem with our democracy by strengthening democracy's standards.¹⁹⁸

As it is mentioned before, JDP government defines the boundaries of nation / national will by suggesting that nation / national will speaks through ballot box and only settle an account with those who have problem with nation / national and democracy. The other definition of JDP is about the demonstration rights of nation /

¹⁹⁶ For detailed information about 'Kabataş attack', see: <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/153536-kabatas-saldirisi-ve-gezi-nin-unutulan-duyarliliklari>

¹⁹⁷ July 2, 2013 TBMM

¹⁹⁸ June 25, 2013 TBMM

national will. With respect to JDP government's idea of ideal demonstration, nation / national will; this time, is restricted to ideal demonstration places. After Gezi protests, JDP government organized public meetings of its name was 'Milli İradeye Saygı Mitingleri' in several cities of Turkey. The purpose of these public meetings was to spoil the game of those who organized Gezi protests to attack nation / national will and the democratic new Turkey.¹⁹⁹In this sense JDP government compared nation with those who participated in Gezi protests. According to this comparison, nation knows what the aim of Gezi protests was. Erdoğan claims that:

We saw clearly in the 'Milli İrade Mitingleri' that how people perceive recent demonstrations and acts of violence. Nation watched demonstrations with patience and temperance. However, our nation also perceived and perceives what was targeted with those demonstrations with its extensive foresight.²⁰⁰

Afterwards, Erdoğan emphasizes on how a fair demonstration should be by pointing out the 'Milli İrade Mitingleri':

Please be careful 100 thousands and millions of people; who support JDP or not, represented moderation in this squares. They did not burn, they did not destroy, and they did not be on side of conflict and noise. On the contrary, they reflected their democratic rights in those squares which are provided them with laws. That is what we are talking about. If you want to say something, come and say it in these squares. Violence is never the precursor of victory. Violence creates otherness. Therefore, those who apply violence always lose every time. And if you are on the side of honesty and democracy, you may come and tell this legally since the conditions and rules of democracy are clear. At the end you may the result from ballot box in the election period. That is what JDP does and we invite others to this way.²⁰¹

In this sense, Erdoğan makes a separation between how a fair demonstration is and not. Therefore, others who do not participate in demonstration squares which are organized and defined by JDP government are considered as not behaving legally. This perspective might be claimed as justifying violence to them. Erdoğan's

¹⁹⁹ <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/video/46042/milli-iradeye-saygi-mitingi-istanbul>

²⁰⁰ June 25 ,2013 TBMM

²⁰¹ June 25 ,2013 TBMM

explanations about platforms²⁰² which are organized after Gezi protests illustrates that he does not take these people who constitute platforms and try to have dialogue with government seriously. He says that “You will first know your place! It is not important whether or not you are this or that’s platform. ‘Ayaklar ne zamandan beri baş olmaya başladı?’”²⁰³

On the basis of these arguments Erdoğan also perceives police violence to Gezi protesters as a fair reaction: “They will burn, destroy and we will not see. They will insult, we will not see. They will ruin public order and disturb people, we will not see. They will use violence against our police, we will not see. There is no such a world brothers.”²⁰⁴

Erdoğan most of the speeches claims that police’ behavior towards protesters was legitimate and right since Gezi protests is not compatible with what JDP government defines as a fair demonstration and a fair nation that uses its right of demonstration within the defined boundaries. For example, he speaks highly of police for its performance in the Gezi protests: “Our police stayed in within the boundaries of law and did its duty successfully. It passed from the test of democracy successful. Merely it made a heroic history.”²⁰⁵

Therefore, it might be claimed that police’s performance cannot be considered as violence since it used its democratic rights against protesters who were not democratic in the way of their demonstrations.

It can be understood from explanations of Erdoğan about Gezi protests that these protests were organized by some actors that were uncomfortable with Turkey’s growth and democracy which is the unique representation of new Turkey according to JDP government. These actors were primarily interest rate lobby, media and RPP. As we mentioned before, JDP government perceives today’s RPP as the continuation of one party period of RPP and as the carrier of one party period’s mentality that is defined through coup d’etats, tutelage.

²⁰² Taksim Solidarity Platform

²⁰³ June 25 ,2013 TBMM

²⁰⁴ June 25 ,2013 TBMM

²⁰⁵ <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25450862/>

Therefore, as one of the main threats to JDP, other oppositions and movements towards JDP government are articulated to the JDP's statements on RPP. JDP government's perspective on this issue is also represented by the supporters of JDP by referring to the Menderes and Özal's fate on their way for democracy since they were the men of nation. Supporters of JDP government; after Gezi protests, claimed that they will not let Erdoğan to have the same fate with Menderes and Özal. It can be seen from the billboards prepared for this vision.



Figure 4. A billboard showing the popular support during Gezi Protests in May 2013

Source: <http://ulkucununsesi.com/06/11/kim-kime-ne-dedi-arsivler-de-acilsin/astiniz-zehirlediniz-yedirmeyiz/>

4.2 Events of December 17-25: Cemaat – Justice and Development Party Conflict

The second considerable political event of 2013 that Turkey experienced was the events of December 17-25. Undoubtedly it will take place among the biggest events marking Turkish political life.²⁰⁶ In the operation undertaken on 17th of December and called also as “corruption operation” many high-ranking bureaucrats and

²⁰⁶ Ruşen Çakır ve Semih Sakallı analysed the operation of December 17 and the fight of JDP-Cemaat after it. See Ruşen Çakır; Semih Sakallı, *100 Soruda Erdoğan X Gülen Savaşı*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2014)

businessmen including the sons of some ministers were detained and then twenty four of them were arrested.²⁰⁷ Besides, three ministers whose sons were detained had to resign on 25th of December.²⁰⁸ A second operation was expected on 25th of December but security forces could not carry out the detention decisions of prosecutors. Then the prosecutor conducting the operation declared with a written statement that he suffered oppression and the investigation was hampered.²⁰⁹ Police officers²¹⁰ and prosecutors²¹¹ having involved in the operations were relocated after 18th of December, which was one of the basic reasons for the fail of operation of 25th December. JDP-Cemaat conflict increasingly went on; firstly it was claimed that the Cemaat is an illegal organization, and then the alleged tape recordings of Prime Minister, Ministers and some businessmen regarding the corruption and the pressure on the media²¹² were serviced on the internet.²¹³ Later on that struggle, some police officers that were allegedly connected with Cemaat were arrested on suspicion of coup d'état and spying.²¹⁴ However, those who had been arrested within the operations of corruption were released.²¹⁵

During the JDP-Cemaat conflict which proceed over the period of presidential elections of 2014, the discourse utilized by both prime minister and the other

²⁰⁷ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/25378685.asp>

²⁰⁸ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/25438044.asp>. Egemen Bağış, Minister of European Union did not resign but was not involved in the new cabinet.

²⁰⁹ http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/savci_muammer_akkas_sorusturma_nedeniyle_baski_gordum-1168152

²¹⁰ <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/29-polis-muduru-gorevden-alindi-/gundem/detay/1809403/default.htm>.
<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/25515006.asp>

²¹¹ <http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/turkiye/zekeriya-oz-boluya-atandi>

²¹² <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/medya/155391-uc-ayin-bilancosu-ses-kayitlari-nda-medyaya-kac-mudahale-oldu>

²¹³ There is no proof that these recordings were serviced by the Cemaat. We do not claim it, either. However we had to touch this matter because the tape recordings were associated with JDP-Cemaat conflict.

²¹⁴ <http://sozcu.com.tr/2014/gundem/8-polis-tutuklankdi-564206/>;
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/paralel_yapi_operasyonunda_11_polis_tutuklandi-1204362;
<http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2014/08/07/o-polisler-tutuklandi>;
<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/27139497.asp>;

²¹⁵ http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/45983/Sifirladilar_Yolsuzluk_skandalinda_tutuklu_k_almadi_.html.

members of JDP was the discourse of periphery which was on the edge of coup d'état.²¹⁶ In other words JDP positioned the Gülen Cemaat within center which threatens the periphery.

In this sense; similar with Gezi protests' evaluation, JDP government perceives the real motivation and intention of these operations as an attempted coup. What were targeted were nation / national will and democracy of the growing new Turkey. Erdoğan describes December 17-25 operations as the biggest and most immoral attempt to coup towards democracy.²¹⁷ According to Erdoğan, the main goal was to harm democracy and nation / national will:

I want to express this firstly: December 17 will be remembered as a black spot for Turkey's democracy and law. The conspiracy of December 17 with its preparation period, implementation style and to what extent it was supported and instructed by inside and outside overtook all other attempts for coup d'états. It was recorded as a betrayal to nation, state and democracy.²¹⁸

Erdoğan frequently uses the term 'betrayal' for December 17 operations. In this sense it might be claimed that Erdoğan accepts their relation with Cemaat before these operations since he compares JDP government and Cemaat relation in December 17 with the story of Yousef who is one of the prophets in Islam: "Prophet Yousef was leaved out to the well by his brothers. God took him out of well and made him vizier to the Egypt."²¹⁹

Erdoğan turns back to his statements on nation / national will as in Gezi protests. According to him nation / national will was targeted.

This operation attempted government; therefore, it attempted to national will. It attempted to Halkbank; therefore, it attempted to our national bank. This operation attempted to

²¹⁶ On the day when operation of December 17 was conducted Prime Minister making a speech in Konya mentioned about the operation as "a trap set against the nation". See <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-dan-onemli-aciklamalar/siyaset/detay/1808756/default.htm>.

²¹⁷ January 14 ,2014 TBMM

²¹⁸ January 14 ,2014 TBMM

²¹⁹ February 18 , 2014 TBMM

our national foreign policy and our national benefits. Yes this operation attempted to our National Security Organization.²²⁰

This operation's aim is represented as an attempt to nation / national will, democracy and to stop Turkey which raised its voice in the world and became the name of justice and conscience with its growing reputation. In addition to this perspective of JDP government, it also proposes that it is meaningful why December 17 operation was performed in this period since the time for local elections was coming. This operation was implemented by some actors who foresee JDP government will win again. Therefore, they wanted to prevent the success of JDP. Erdoğan claims that:

I always declared that those who foresee JDP will be the first party in March 30 local elections, those who understand that they cannot compete with JDP government on ballot box, and those who understand that they will never gain the mercy of nation will apply to inconvenient ways. December 17 was the representation of this inconvenient attempt and inconvenient setting. Those who organized this attempt and those who want to implement this scenario made mistakes and revealed themselves. Firstly they could not foresee the perception of nation and its mercy towards democracy and elected government. From the beginning there was a pressure of its goal was to penetrate public perception; however, our nation saw what was done, saw the game and took up its position against this operation.²²¹

Similar with his argumentations on Gezi protests, Erdoğan claims that this was an organized operation of its aim was to prevent democracy to live and Turkey to grow. Even though actors of this operation are from Gülen Cemaat, Erdoğan adds other actors to Cemaat. Erdoğan again mentions the role of lobbies and media in this operation and also claims that Turkey witnessed an example of this operation in Gezi protests. According to him, in Gezi protests, the aim and actors were the same and they desired Turkey's economy to stop over social media and other channels.²²² On the other hand, these actors tried to prevent JDP government's success in the coming March 30 local elections. According to Erdoğan:

They are now in a rush to cover their national will thief those who are calumniating us with corruption and bribery

²²⁰ January 14 ,2014 TBMM

²²¹ January 14, 2014 TBMM

²²² January 28 ,2014 TBMM

accusations. They administrate certain lobbies and certain closed door meetings. Why? Their problem is that: There should be government that will not disturb us. This is local election; you cannot expect this result. And again in March 30, JDP government will come by with a loud noise guaranteed through ballot boxes.²²³

On the basis of this view, Erdoğan's assumption is that these are actors of old Turkey and their aim is to return Turkey back to these unsuccessful years:

They say that JDP government should leave political arena. They suggest chaos, uncertainty, instability, poverty and restrictions as in old Turkey instead of JDP government. They desire old Turkey in which nation was disabled, one party governed country and certain groups always won. Therefore, they come over us with all kinds of immoral attacks.²²⁴

The aim is to return Turkey to back to one party period mentality; therefore, Erdoğan puts forth his example of coup d'états that he perceives as one of the representations of one party mentality and old Turkey. On the other hand; according to Erdoğan, the leader of the Gülen Cemaat collaborated with those who prepared the February 28 coup d'état and the roots of Cemaat should be looked for in September 12 coup d'état.

Brothers, this problem did not start with us. The roots of this problem is in September 12, 1980 coup d'état. Its preparations began before coup d'état; however, continued with coup d'état. The root of this problem is also in March 28 coup d'état. With the December 17 coup d'état attempt, we address with this issue alone. Yes, we are left alone in this problem; however, we say that God helps us and we will maintain. Nation is with us.²²⁵

As different from Gezi protests, another actor is included to the statements of December 17 coup d'état attempt. This actor is judicial institution in Turkey. According JDP government, judicial institution lost its objectivity and took decisions that target directly JDP government. It might be argued that even though JDP was claiming that they are the representatives of new Turkey and nation had the right of democracy through the association of state and government, it serves judicial

²²³ January 28, 2014 TBMM

²²⁴ February 11 ,2014 TBMM

²²⁵ February 11 ,2014 TBMM

institution as a problem. It becomes questionable whether or not JDP government opposes to institutions when they become a threat for itself. In this case Erdoğan argues that:

We should first to talk about the objectivity of judicial institution as a problem since it lost its objectivity, it is busy in legitimizing political operations, it became on side of political struggle, it put away its conscience, it put aside nation, and it functioned in behalf of an organization.²²⁶

Afterwards, Erdoğan again turns back to his statements on coup d'état periods of Turkey by referencing 1960s. According to him, since 1960 judicial institution became one of the tools of restricting and orienting politics in favor of tutelage. Decisions about *Yassıada*²²⁷ were given by a court; there was a court there. Then he maintains with September 12 coup d'état and claims that September 12 had courts that hanged young boys.²²⁸ On the basis of these arguments, Erdoğan points out, as he does in most of the speeches, to RPP. He perceives today's RPP as the continuation of one party period of RPP; therefore, he connects each opposition or movement against JDP government as the organized movement of the mentality of Turkey. Hence it might be claimed that RPP will never be put out the discourse of threat to democracy and the new Turkey. On December 17 and 25 operations and its relation with RPP and NMP; which is perceived as the tool of RPP, Erdoğan claims that these are 'the trinity of evil'. He argues that:

RPP and NMP can be the tool of this parallel²²⁹ structure; this secret structure. However, we did not and will not be the tool of this structure. We did not submit our will to sneaky structures; we do not and will not. We will not victim national will that we carry as a holy deposit to this parallel structure which is governed by international environments. I dare! Do what you can do; use what you have. We are sure our pray as well as our ablution.²³⁰

Afterwards Erdoğan emphasizes on the role of RPP in corruption operations:

²²⁶ January 14, 2014 TBMM

²²⁷ The place of the court in which Adnan Menders was sentenced to death.

²²⁸ January 14, 2013 TBMM

²²⁹ Erdoğan calls Gülen Cemaat as "Parallel Structure"

²³⁰ February 11, 2014 TBMM

RPP supported the grab of national will in May, 27. Since then it became the address of stealing, corruption and thieves. Right now, those who are the losers of old Turkey come together and sing the song of corruption. Again I will tell to this losers lobby who calumniate us with corruption: If you want to see corruption, please go and look to mirror.²³¹

RPP did not support the JDP's suggestion about change in The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK); therefore, it is a proof that RPP collaborates with parallel structure according to JDP "Now I am asking: I am calling out those who prevented HSYK to pass into law in parliament. You prevented this. What does it mean? You collaborate with parallel structure, you RPP and NMP."²³²

After March 30 local elections, Erdoğan intensified his view on the relation between Cemaat, RPP and NMP relation. These attacks to democracy of the new Turkey were suppressed with the support of nation / national will on the ballot boxes. As speaking through ballot box as an example of fair citizenship according to JDP government, nation / national was not deceived.

Brothers I want to emphasize this: Our precious nation saw the real motivations and intentions of Gezi Events, saw the December 17 and 25 coup d'état attempts. However, our nation was patient, was patient towards Gezi Events and did not reply to them. Our nation was patient towards December 17 and 25 coup d'état attempts. Thank God, our nation did not go out to streets even though there were so many provocations, did not reply to attacks, did not be part of the game, and waited March of 30 with patience. Our nation showed their strength in the meeting squares then spoke through ballot boxes. We understood the message of our nation; however, RPP, NMP could not get the message.²³³

In this sense it is obvious that JDP government's discourse of democracy is composed of the separation between old Turkey and new Turkey in which democracy is flourished. Therefore, components of discourse of democracy are used when there is an opposition to JDP government. It is an articulation of 'others' to each other in front of the nation / national will and democracy statements. Hence JDP's perception on oppositions or unities that it puts against the discourse of democracy has a flexible structure that enlarges with the new attacks.

²³¹ February 11, 2014 TBMM

²³² February 11, 2014 TBMM

²³³ April 8, 2014 TBMM

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to understand the democracy in the political discourse of Justice and Development Party in its use of group division as a way to mobilize popular support. Within this perspective, I tried to understand how JDP government formed its discourse of democracy. I tried to do this by examining Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speeches; who was the previous Prime Minister and the new President of Turkish Republic in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) and his Presidential election speeches. In order to understand the discursive formation of democracy of JDP, I first reviewed how JDP defines its conservative democratic identity since JDP government frequently emphasizes its difference from previous parties; especially National Outlook (NO) parties.

For this reason I tried to understand why JDP needed to emphasize its difference from NO parties and opens its identity to criticism and discussion. Therefore, I reviewed NO parties and their ideologies briefly. It was understood that JDP wants to separate itself from NO parties since it does not want to live the same fate with them. Most of the NO parties were closed since they were regarded as attacking secularism. Hence JDP always explains that they are against the use of religion for the political purposes. However in most of the speeches, Erdoğan uses examples of February 28; which was the date of coup d'état against Erbakan's party.

In the third chapter, I explained how JDP forms its discourse of democracy. It was understood that this discourse has three dimensions. First one was nation / national will statements of JDP. JDP government uses nation / national will statements as the legitimating notion of their political authority. However, the focal point of this notion comes from how it was constituted. JDP claims that it is the party that opens a new course in the history of Turkey and calls this as the New Turkey. The main representative of this New Turkey is democracy. Democracy is the unique need of

nation since in the Old Turkey nation was deprived of its right to democracy through coup d'états, and tutelage.

This happened since Old Turkey was governed by one party period of Republican People's Party (RPP). In this sense JDP perceives today's RPP as the continuation of old party period of RPP. Therefore, JDP's critic of each event is explained through one party period mentality. Nation / national will were explained through some dualities namely; center / periphery, secularism / conservatism and elites / people. JDP always uses the discourse of periphery and claims that it is a party that represents periphery against center. In Presidential election speeches, Erdoğan refers state as the representative of one party period and governments as the representatives of nation. Nation was always ignored by one party period mentality and its preferences denied according to Erdoğan. Turkey; for several years, was governed by elite bureaucrats who looked down on nation's preferences. Therefore, Erdoğan explains that JDP is a party that has risen as a reply to nation's demand of change. Nation whose religious beliefs or preferences were ignored for several years and JDP brought them the change that they needed. It was understood that JDP perceives nation as a one body who can only speak through ballot box.

The third aspect of discursive formation of democracy was invention of tradition. In this sense I tried to understand why JDP made certain days to be celebrated. In this case what I saw was that these days were prevented in previous years. They were especially days which were celebrated in the period of Justice Party (JP) of Adnan Menderes whom JDP perceives itself as the continuation of it. Therefore, to make these days to be celebrated again was defeat the mentality of Old Turkey. These days were 1071 Malazgirt celebrations, Istanbul's Conquest day and Holy Birth Week.

The fourth aspect was mythologization. In this sense JDP pointed out some historical actors of symbols that it equaled to its struggle for democracy. These myths were Rabia symbol, Ottoman sultans and Ali Fuat Başgil. Rabia symbol was representing protests against coup d'états in Egypt. Since Mursi; who was the President of Egypt, was the fourth President of Egypt, protestors used Rabia symbol which also represented 'four' in Arabic. On the other hand, Erdoğan frequently refers to Ottoman sultans for explaining JDP's service policy and foreign policy. According to Erdoğan they give services similar with Ottoman sultans in explaining the difficulty

of the projects that they achieved. Erdoğan also claims that JDP made Turkey a pioneer country in international level. He always gives examples of Ottoman Empire in its try to help other countries. Therefore, he perceives that it is legitimate to intervening with other countries' fates and having words to say over other countries' politics.

The other example was Ali Fuat Başgil. Ali Fuat Başgil example was given during the Presidential election speeches. Ali Fuat Başgil was a candidate for Presidency from Samsun against RPP in multi party period in Turkey. However; even though his vote rate was higher than other parties, his Presidency was prevented by the one party period's mentality. Therefore, in its struggle for democracy against Old Turkey, Ali Fuat Başgil was honored in Presidential election speeches.

In the last chapter I examined how Old Turkey discourse expands with other actors. It was understood that Old Turkey discourse had a flexible structure since each opposition and movement against JDP was considered as the mentality of Old Turkey. The first one was the Gezi Protests. Erdoğan explained that Gezi Protests was organized by some interest rate lobby, media and these actors were articulated to the mentality of RPP. Since RPP could not be achieved in the parliament, it tried to call out its voter base to streets. Then December 17 and 25 corruption operations against JDP government were articulated to the discourse of Old Turkey. In addition to interest rate lobby and media judicial court was added to the threats to democracy and the growth of New Turkey. Therefore Erdoğan again articulated these operations to the discourse of Old Turkey by claiming that RPP supported these operations.

In conclusion it is possible to see that JDP government separates itself from political Islam represented by NO parties in Turkey with several years. To do this, it defines and opens to discussion to its political identity. However, what was targeted not secularism but bring into Islamic perspective to the forefront by attacking Old Turkey and its components. Therefore, nation and national will as the idealized citizens are separated from those who oppose to JDP's politics.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. Tezin Türkçe Özeti

Bu tezin amacı Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin (AKP) demokrasi üzerine olan siyasi söylemini anlamaya çalışmaktır. AKP'nin muhafazakar demokrat kimliğinin, partinin siyasi söylemlerinde en çok vurgu yapılan ögesi olarak demokrasi kavramı içerdiği ve dışladığı ögeler çerçevesinde incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Çalışmanın içeriği Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin eski Başbakanı ve yeni Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim konuşmaları ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde (TBMM) yapılan haftalık parti grup toplantılarında Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın yaptığı konuşmaların son bir yıllık konuşma metinleri incelenerek yapılmıştır. TBMM parti grup toplantı konuşmalarının özellikle son bir yılının çalışmaya dahil edilmesinin amacı, AKP'nin demokrasi söylemine ülkemizde Gezi protestoları olarak bilinen toplumsal hareketten ve 17-25 Aralık operasyonlarından sonra hangi ögelerin eklemelendiğini görebilmektir. Demokrasi söyleminin içerdiği ve dışladığı alanların ve aktörlerin birbirlerine nasıl eklemelendiğini görmek anlamında araştırmanın bu yönü çalışmaya özellikle büyük katkı sağlamıştır.

AKP'nin siyasi söylemi dahilinde özellikle demokasiye yapılan vurguyu anlamak ve demokrasi söyleminin nasıl kurgulandığını anlayabilmek için ilk önce Türkiye'nin siyasi tarihinde Milli Görüş Hareketi olarak bilinen siyasi oluşuma bakmak gerekmektedir. AKP kadrolarının büyük bir bölümü Milli Görüş Hareketi olarak bilinen siyasi oluşumun içinden çıkmıştır ve Milli Görüş partilerinin eski üyeleridir; dolayısıyla bu hareketi incelemek ve AKP kadrolarının Milli Görüş ideolojisiyle bağlarını neden kopardığı ve muhafazakar demokrasi olarak yeni bir kimliği neden kurguladığını anlamak demokrasi söylemini anlamak için önemli bir başlangıçtır. Bu nedenle tezin ilk bölümü Milli Görüş Hareketi'nin ideolojisini ve AKP kadrolarının neden bu hareketle arasına bir mesafe koyup muhafazakar demokrasi olarak yeni bir kimlik ortaya koyduğunu anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Daha sonra AKP'nin muhafazakar demokrat kimliğini, parti programı ve özellikle Yalçın Akoğan'ın bu kimliği teorik bir çerçeve içinde incelemeye çalıştığı “Ak Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi” kitabı referans alınarak nasıl ortaya koyduğu incelenmeye çalışılmıştır.

Milli Görüş Hareketi, Milli Görüş partileri ve Necmettin Erbakan'ın bu hareketteki önderliği siyasal İslam'ın Türkiye politikasında yükseldiği dönemi ve sekülerizme olan açık karşıtlığı nedeniyle kapatılma davalarıyla karşılaştığı dönemleri işaret etmektedir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşundan sonra devletin dini siyasal alandan uzaklaştırması ve buna yönelik reform ve hareketleriyle, İslamcı grupların hareketini kısıtlamış ve onları yeraltı örgütlenmelerine itmiştir. Bu anlamda Milli Görüş Hareketi'nin ortaya çıkması ve güçlenmesinde bu örgütlenmelerin, Anadolu'nun küçük ve orta ölçekli kapitalistlerine ek olarak büyük etkisi vardır. Erbakan'ın özellikle 'adil düzen' ve 'ağır sanayi hamlesi' söylemleriyle hedeflediği milli ekonomi, İslamcı değerlerin çerçevesinde Batı müdahalesini ve Batı'nın teknoloji dışındaki değerlerinin İslam kültürüne olan etkisini ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlamaktır. Bu anlamda 28 Şubat 1998 Milli Görüş Hareketi için bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Erbakan'a getirilen siyasi yasak ve Refah Partisi'nin kapatılması süreci, Milli Görüş'ün iki kampa ayrılmasına sebep olmuştur. Bu kamplardan biri gelenekçiler olarak adlandırılan ve Recai Kutan önderliğinde kurulan Fazilet Partisi ve diğeri de reformistler olarak anılan ve bugünkü AKP'nin temelini atacak olan gruptur.

AKP'nin Milli Görüş Hareketi'nden ayrılmasının en büyük sebebi AKP'nin dini siyaset aracı olarak kullanmanın yanlış olduğunu düşünmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Parti programı ve AKP'nin muhafazakar demokrat kimliğini açıkladığı kitaplarda özellikle bu konu vurgulanmaktadır. AKP dini siyaset aracı olarak kullanmanın yanlış olduğunu beyan eder; zira din insani değerlerin en yücelerindendir ve bu anlamda siyaset aracı olarak kullanılması dine katkı yapmaktan çok onu zedeleyecektir. Bu anlamda AKP sekülerizmi, dini değerlerin koruyucusu olarak görür ve demokrasi ise bu yaklaşımın garantörüdür. AKP parti programında katılımcı ve uzlaşmacı siyasete, kimlik politikası yapan partilerden farklı olduğuna ve muhafazakar siyasetlerine uygun olarak devrimci olmaktan ziyade reformist bir ideolojileri olduğunu ifade eder. Milli Görüş Hareketi'nden farklı bir ideolojisi olduğunu sık sık dile getirme sebebi ise önceki partilerin kaderinden ders çıkarmış olmakla ifade edilir. Bu anlamda 28 Şubat süreci AKP'nin artık sekülerizmi ve dini değerleri dengeleyecek bir politika izlemeleri gerektiği konusunda örnek teşkil etmektedir.

Bir sonraki başlık AKP'nin demokrasi söylemini nasıl kurguladığı ile ilgilidir. Milli Görüş Hareketi ile aralarına mesafe koyup koymadıkları, ya da AKP'nin din olan ilişkisini anlama, sekülerizme yönelik düşüncelerini nasıl bir başlık içinde ifade ettiklerini görmek yönünden demokrasi söyleminin dahil ettikleri ve dışladıklarını anlamak gerekmektedir. Tezin bu kısmında dolayısıyla AKP'nin demokrasiyi nasıl bir çerçeve içinde sunduğu anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu kısmın başlığı olan 'Yeni Türkiye'nin Tarihi' bu konunun ipuçlarını sunmaktadır. Zira AKP demokasi kavramıyla yeni Türkiye'yi birbirine eş tutmaktadır. Yeni Türkiye olarak adlandırdıkları Türkiye, AKP'nin 12 yıllık iktidarıyla başlayan ve özellikle Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim konuşmalarında sıkça dile getirildiği gibi, bu seçimlerle en yüksek noktasına ulaşacak Türkiye'dir. Yeni ve eski Türkiye ayrımı, AKP'nin demokrasiyi nasıl çizdiğinin kodlarını taşımaktadır. AKP' ye göre eski Türkiye darbeler, vesayet ve statükonun olduğu, milletin seçtiği hükümetlerin darbelerle kapatıldığı ve tek parti rejiminin zihniyeti etrafında şekillenmiş ve demokrasinin olmadığı, ortaya çıktığı zamanlarda ise yok edildiği bir Türkiye'dir. Yeni Türkiye ise milletin yükselişe geçtiği ve ileri demokrasinin hüküm sürdüğü Türkiye'dir.

Bu anlamda öne çıkan kavram millet ve milli irade olmaktadır. AKP'nin siyasi söyleminin ana öğelerinden biri olarak millet ve milli irade, siyasi otoritenin meşruluğunu sağlayan en önemli özne olarak çizilmektedir. Yeni Türkiye'nin öznesi olarak millet ve milli irade kavramları ise belli ikilikler üzerinden anlatılmaktadır. Millet ve milli irade, merkez / çevre, sekülerizm / muhafazakarlık, elitler / halk kitleleri, gibi ikilikler üzerinden anlatılır. Bu anlamda AKP; Milli Görüş partilerinin de kendini ifade ettiği gibi, merkeze karşı çevrenin temsilcisidir. Merkez toplumu şekillendirecek olan değerler, inançlar ve sembollerin belirlendiği yerdir ve çevreyi tahakküm altına alır. Bu anlamda eski Türkiye'nin temsilcileri, özellikle tek parti rejimi zihniyeti olarak tasvir edilen zihniyet tarafından yıllarca demokrasi ve değişim talepleri reddedilen ve yok sayılan halk kitleleri olan tasvir edilen milli irade, AKP hükümetinin siyasi otoritesini dayandığı ve demokrasi söylemini meşrulaştırdığı en önemli söylemdir. Bu anlamda AKP'nin 2002'de seçimleri kazanması Anadolu'nun zaferi dolayısıyla çevrenin zaferi olarak yorumlanmıştır. Millet ve milli irade kavramlarıyla ilişkili olarak eski ve yeni Türkiye ayrımında demokrasi söylemi özellikle Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim konuşmalarında ön plandadır. Muhafazakar halk kitleleri yıllarca tek parti zihniyeti tarafından darbeler, vesayet ve statükoyla

tahakküm altına alınmış; değerleri, inançları ve tercihleri yok sayılmıştır. Bu anlamda halkın Cumhurbaşkanı seçmesiyle birlikte, AKP'nin zaferi milli iradenin zaferi ile eş tutulacaktır. AKP demokrasinin önündeki en büyük engelleri tek parti zihniyeti, darbeler, vesayet ve Türkiye'de olmadığını iddia ettiği muhalefet sorunu olarak sıralar. AKP siyasi söylemlerinin çoğunda günümüz Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'ni (CHP), tek parti döneminin devamı olarak sunar ve muhalefetin niteliğini AKP hükümetinin politikalarına tepkileri kapsamında yorumlar. Zira AKP millet ve milli iradenin dolayısıyla da demokrasi ve yeni Türkiye'nin temsilcisidir. Bu anlamda AKP hükümetinin politikalarına karşı çıkmak milli iradeye ve demokrasiye karşı çıkmak ve engel olmakla eş tutulur. CHP'ye ek olarak Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) ve Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP) de AKP tarafından muhalefet yapamadıkları konusunda eleştirilir. AKP'ye göre MHP, CHP'nin lokomotifi olmuş bir partidir ve kendi parti tabanına seslenme yeteneğini kaybetmiştir. Bu anlamda Erdoğan miting ve Meclis konuşmalarında milliyetçi tabana seslenmekte ve MHP'nin kendilerini temsil edebilecek niteliğini kaybettiğini ve asıl milliyetçi partinin AKP olduğunu iddia eder. Bu iddasını da hizmet politikasıyla meşrulaştırır. AKP'ye göre gerçek milliyetçi siyaset doğu ve batı ayrımı yapmadan ülkenin her yerine hizmet götüren siyasi anlayıştır. HDP ise AKP döneminde başlatılan çözüm sürecine engel olmakla sunulur ve bazı konuşmalarda güneydoğunun CHP'si olarak tasvir edilir. AKP'nin demokrasi karşıtı olarak konumlandığı ve dolayısıyla katılımcı ve uzlaşmacı siyaset anlayışlarının dışında gördüğü her hareket eski Türkiye'nin unsurlarına dolayısıyla CHP eleştirisine eklemlenir. Millet ve milli irade kavramlarına ek olarak AKP'nin yeni Türkiye'nin demokratikleşmesinin unsurları olarak gördüğü diğer iki konu ise tez içerisinde geleneğin icadı ve mitleştirme olarak iki ayrı başlıkta incelenen hususlardır.

Ünlü tarihçi Eric Hobsbawm'ın tabiriyle geleneğin icadı olarak yorumlanan bu alan bazı önemli gün ve tarihlerin yeni Türkiye olarak adlandırılan AKP hükümeti döneminde ön plana çıkarılmasıdır. Bu önemli günler 1071 Malazgirt Zaferi kutlamaları, Kutlu Doğum Haftası ve İstanbul'un Fethi kutlamaları olarak sıralanabilir. 1071 Malazgirt Zaferi bu kutlama günlerinden biri haline gelmiştir ve geleneksel olarak kutlanması hedeflenmektedir. Bunun için 26 Ağustos 2013 tarihinde adı Alparslan olan 1071 genç Malazgirt Ovası'nda bir araya getirilmiş ve Malazgirt Savaşı öncesi yapılan hazırlıkların bir örneği sergilemiştir. Gençlik ve

Spor bakanı Suat Kılıç'a ise sembolik olarak şehrin anahtarı verilmiştir. Bu zaferin önemi ise Anadolu'nun kapılarının tüm etnik gurplara açıldığı tarihi bir gün olarak yorumlanıp özellikle çözüm sürecine yönelik açıklamalar yapılmasıdır. Bu anlamda AKP tüm etnik unsurların bir arada yaşamasına vesile olan bu günü çözüm süreciyle eş tutarak bir anlamda, bu konudaki insiyatifin sadece kendilerinde olduğunu belirtmektedir. Dolayısıyla diğer muhalafet partileri bu konuda işlevsiz olarak nitelendirilir. Bu zaferin önemlerinden biri de tüm etnik grupların tek bir çatı; İslam çatısı, altında birleşmesi olarak sunulur. Dolayısıyla AKP, Türkiye tarihinde zaten önemli bir gün olarak kabul edilen Malazgirt Zaferi'ni farklı bir kurgu altında yeniden üretmektedir ve parti hedeflerinden birini ise bu güne atıfta olarak bulunarak 2071 olarak belirlemiştir.

Diğer bir önemli gün ise; daha önce de önemli bir gün olarak kabul edilen fakat AKP hükümeti döneminde önemi daha da artan Kutlu Doğum Haftası ve bu güne yönelik kutlamalar olmuştur. Kutlu Doğum Haftası'nda AKP kadroları; başta Erdoğan olmak üzere, birlik ve kardeşlik mesajlarını İslami değerler çerçevesinde sunmaktadır. AKP kadroları çeşitli illerde mevlitler yapmakta ve partinin resmi internet sayfasında mesajlar vermektedirler.

Eski Türkiye'nin aktörleri ile mücadelede önemi ön plana çıkarılan bir diğer gün ise İstanbul'un Fethi'dir. Erdoğan bir konuşmasında İstanbul'un Fethi kutlamalarının Adnan Menderes döneminde 27 Mayıs darbesiyle engellediğini ifade eder ve Menderes milli iradeyi arkasına aldığı halde demokratik girişimlerinde tek parti zihniyeti tarafından engellenmiştir der. Bu anlamda İstanbul'un Fethi kutlamaları yeni Türkiye'nin demokratik zemininin işaretlerinden biri olma anlamında önem kazanmıştır. Hatta AKP parti programında hedeflerinden birini de bu güne referansla 2053 olarak belirlemiştir. Mitleştirme AKP'nin siyasi söyleminin merkezinde yer alan diğer husulardan biridir. Bu konuda AKP bazı tarihi ve günümüz kişilerine referanslar vererek politikalarını meşrulaştırmaktadır. Genel olarak kendilerini demokrasi mirasçıları olarak gördükleri Menderes ve Osmanlı ve Selçuklu yüceleştirmeleri dışında başka kişiler de bu anlamda büyük önem kazanmaktadır. Bu mitlerden biri Rabia sembolüdür. Rabia sembolü Mısır'daki darbe karşıtı gösterilere sahiplik yapan Rabitaül Adeviyye Meyda'nında ön plana çıkmıştır. Mursi destekçileri, Mursi'nin dördüncü Cumhurbaşkanı olmasından ve Rabia'nın anlamının

dört olmasından dolayı bu sembolü içselleştirmişlerdir. Daha sonra ülke dışında da etkileri görülen bu sembol AKP'nin sembollerinden biri haline gelmiştir. Özellikle kendi demokrasi mücadelelerini Rabi'atü'l Adeviyye'de olan gösterilerle özdeşleştiren AKP, bu sembolü demokrasi söylemlerine eklemiştir. Özellikle Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim konuşmalarının sonunda Erdoğan, konuşmasını Rabia işareti yaparak bitirmektedir.

Osmanlı ve Selçuklu ile ilgili olan mitleştirmeler genellikle AKP'nin hizmet politikaları ve dış politikasını meşrulaştırmada kullandığı görülmektedir. Özellikle Marmaray projesinden bahsederken Erdoğan sık sık “ejdadımız Fatih” demek ve onun gemileri karadan yürütmesiyle Marmaray projesini eş tutmaktadır. AKP hükümetinin dış politikasını meşrulaştırmak için ise yine Osmanlı İmparatorluğuna referans verdiği görülmektedir. Uluslararası meselelerde, diğer ülkelerin politikalarına müdahale etme politikasını Osmanlı İmparatorluğu zamanında yapılan müdahalelere benzetmekte ve kendi politikalarını bu zemin üzerinde tasvir etmektedir. AKP eski Türkiye adını verdiği Türkiye siyasi tarihini uluslararası politikalarda pasif olmakla ve karar alma süreçlerinde diğer ülkeleri takip etmekle eleştiriyor. Bu anlamda AKP hükümeti döneminin yeni Türkiye ve demokrasinin öncüsü olarak, Türkiye siyasetini uluslararası politikada öncü bir ülke konumunu getirdiğini iddia ediyor. Bu eleştirinin hedef noktasında ise daha önceki eleştirilere benzer olarak muhalefet geliyor. AKP hükümetinin uluslararası politikalarını eleştiren; başta CHP olmak üzere, diğer muhalefet partilerini eski Türkiye özlemi içinde olan partiler olarak sunuyor. Bu anlamda muhalefetin hangi zemin üzerinde bu politikalara karşı çıktığının değerlendirilmesi önemini kaybederek, AKP hükümetini eleştirdiği için eski Türkiye söylemine ekleniyor. Zira AKP hükümeti kendini yeni Türkiye ve demokrasi ile özdeşleştirdiğinden, hükümete yönelik eleştiriler demokrasie yönelik eleştiriler olarak değerlendiriliyor. Son olarak mitleştirme adını verdiğimiz başlık dahilinde; özellikle Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim konuşmalarında, sıkça vurgu yapılan bir diğer isim Ali Fuat Başgil'dir. Erdoğan Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim konuşmalarına Samsun'dan başlamıştır ve İstiklal Savaşı'na atıfta bulunarak bu seçimin kendileri için bu mahiyette olduğunu belirtmiştir. Ali Fuat Başgil'in Cumhurbaşkanlığı adaylığının eski Türkiye aktörleri tarafından engellendiği örneğini vererek, eski ve yeni Türkiye ayrımı üzerine olan söylemlerini tekrar ederler. Eski Türkiye'de demokratik girişimlerin engellendiği üzerine olan söylem,

Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim konuşmalarında bu örnekle tekrar edilir. Tek parti döneminin günümüz uzantısı olarak ele alınan CHP eleştirisi bu örnek üzerinden de kendine yol bulur. Zira Ali Fuat Başgil'in demokratik başarısını engelleyen bu zihniyetin devamı CHP'dir ve bugün yine aynı zihniyetle Cumhurbaşkanını halkın seçmesini engelleyecek girişimlerde bulunmuştur. Dolayısıyla bugünkü CHP'nin hükümete yönelik eleştirilerinin temelleri incelenmeden eski Türkiye ve tek parti zihniyetine bağlanması, hükümete yönelik eleştirilerin de sorgulanmadan eski Türkiye söylemine eklenmesine sebep olmaktadır.

Tezin son bölümünün amacı AKP'nin demokrasi söylemine dahil ettiği ve dışladığı öğeler; yani eski Türkiye ve yeni Türkiye söylemlerinin esnekliğini gösterme amacı taşımaktadır. Bu anlamda AKP'nin demokrasi karşıtı olarak nitelendirdiği söylemin, AKP hükümetine karşı olan hareketlerde kendini dayattığı gözlemlenmektedir. Aslında demokrasi karşıtı olarak sunulan öğelerin de, AKP'nin demokrasi söyleminin yapı taşlarından olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Daha önceli bölümlerde gösterildiği gibi AKP hükümeti demokrasi karşıtı olarak nitelendirdiği hareketleri eski Türkiye olarak adlandırdığı yapının devamları olarak görmektedir. Eski Türkiye'nin problemleri olarak nitelendirilen öğeler daha çok tek parti dönemi zihniyeti olarak adlandırılan vesayet, statüko ve darbeler söylemi etrafında şekillenen bir yapıdır ve günümüz CHP'si ve genel olarak muhalefet bu zihniyetin devamı olarak görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla AKP'nin demokrasi söyleminin ayrılmaz bir parçası olan eski Türkiye söylemi, hükümete yönelik hareket ve eleştirilerde kendini tekrar etmekte ve yeni öğeleri bünyesine alarak genişleyen esnek bir yapı teşkil etmektedir. Bu bölüme kaynak oluşturan olaylar ise Gezi protestoları ve 17-25 Aralık operasyonlarıdır. Gezi protestolarından sonra AKP hükümeti bu protestoları medya ve faiz lobisi gibi, yeni Türkiye'nin ilerlemesini durdurmaya çalışan aktörlerin sebep olduğu protestolar olarak tasvir eder. Eski Türkiye tasvirinin parçası olarak da CHP bu olaylarda da söyleme dahil edilir. AKP hükümetine göre CHP siyasi olarak seçmenini tatmin edemediği için onları protestolara ve eylemlere teşvik etmektedir. Genel anlamda Gezi protestoları eski Türkiye aktörlerinin yeni Türkiye'nin demokrasisine engel olmaya çalışan zihniyeti tarafından tetiklenmiştir. Benzeri söylemler 17-25 Aralık operasyonlarından sonra da gözlemlenmektedir. Bu konuda AKP hükümeti, bu operasyonları düzenleyenleri yeni Türkiye'nin demokrasisine engel olmaya çalışan aktörler olarak gösterir ve önceki söylemlerine benzer bir

şekilde bu yeni aktörleri de eski Türkiye aktörlerine eklemler. Görüldüğü gibi AKP'nin demokrasi söyleminin öteki olarak resmettiği aktörlerin bir kısmı sabit olmak üzere, hükümete yönelik eleştiri ve operasyonlarla yeni öğeler bu öğelere eklenmekte ve demokrasi söyleminin esnekliğini göstermektedir. Görüldüğü üzere, AKP yeni Türkiye ve eski Türkiye arasındaki ayrımı demokrasi üzerinden kurmaktadır. Bu anlamda demokrasi söyleminin temelini, bu söylemin kapsadıkları ve dışladıkları kurmaktadır. AKP'nin demokrasi söyleminin kendini dayatan bir söylem olduğunu söylemek mümkündür; zira kendini olası yeni müdahale, söylem ve hareketlerle beraber yeniden üretir ve bünyesine yeni aktörleri katarak genişler. Kendini var ettiği söylemsel yapının kendini dayatması, öteki olarak resmedilen eski Türkiye aktörlerinin yeni aktörlerle beraber sabit kalması ve diğer öğelerle ilişkisinin kurulmasını gerektirir. Bu anlamda demokrasi söylemi, AKP'nin siyasi söyleminin en önemli kurucu öğelerinden biri olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

APPENDIX B. Tez Fotokopisi İzin Formu

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Güneş
Adı : Aysun
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : DEMOCRACY IN THE DISCOURSE OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☒ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☒

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: