NIETZSCHE’S INFLUENCE ON MODERNIST BILDUNGSROMAN:
THE IMMORALIST, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN,
AND DEMIAN

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This thesis carries out a comparative analysis of three modernist *bildungsromans* written by André Gide, James Joyce, and Hermann Hesse in the light of Nietzschean philosophy. *The Immoralist* (1902), *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1916), and *Demian* (1919) are all coming of age novels reflecting the zeitgeist of modern Europe at the beginning of the 20th century. It is argued that their protagonists are typical modernist characters who show a rebellious characteristic and strive for freedom and authenticity. Pointing out the importance of Nietzsche in the modernist context, this thesis tries to show his influence on Gide, Joyce, and Hesse by revealing the Nietzschean elements found in these novels. The protagonists Michel, Stephen Dedalus, and Emil Sinclair are discussed as Nietzschean characters in that they detach themselves from the herd and its values and become the creators of their own values. It is also disclosed that Gide, Joyce, and Hesse interpret this philosophy in different ways. Gide, in *The Immoralist*, intends to make a warning that if misread, Nietzschean ideas may result in an aimless individualism and destruction. Joyce, on the other hand, uses this philosophy quite positively. Although Stephen’s future is not known to the reader, it is shown that in following the Nietzschean path he gains the potential to
become a successful artist. Finally, Hesse employs Nietzschean philosophy in his novel so as to make his character one of the few who can transform the world through a Nietzschean transvaluation of values.

Keywords: Modernist Bildungsroman, transvaluation, contempt for the herd, free spirits
ÖZ

NIETZSCHE’NİN MODERNİST OLUŞUM ROMANI (BILDUNGSROMAN) ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: THE IMMORALIST, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN, VE DEMIAN

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belirtilmemesine rağmen, karakterin Nietzsche’nin yolundan giderek başarılı bir sanatçı olma potansiyeli kazandığı gösterilmektedir. Son olarak, Hesse, Nietzsche felsefesini karakterini değerlerin yeniden değerlendirilmesi yoluya dünyayı değiştirilebilecek az kişiden birine dönüştürmek amacıyla kullanmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Modernist Bildungsroman, değerlerin yeniden değerlendirilmesi, sürüyü hor görme, özgür ruh
To My Family and Emin
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<tr>
<td>BGE</td>
<td>Beyond Good and Evil</td>
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<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td>The Birth of Tragedy</td>
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<td>GM</td>
<td>On the Genealogy of Morals</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>The Gay Science</td>
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<td>HAH</td>
<td>Human, All Too Human</td>
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<td>TSZ</td>
<td>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</td>
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<td>UM</td>
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<td>WP</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to make a comparative analysis of three bildungsromans written by André Gide, James Joyce, and Hermann Hesse in the light of Nietzschan philosophy. The Immoralist (1902), A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916), and Demian (1919), respectively, are all coming of age novels written under the influence of Nietzsche. Published at the very beginning of the 20th century, they are notable for their rebellious protagonists and reflect the zeitgeist of their age. Therefore, how these novels relate to the bildungsroman tradition of their time and why it is necessary to consider Nietzsche as an important influence can be best understood in the historical context of modernism.

1.1. 19th Century Thought and Nietzsche

As Daniel Schwarz argues, “modernism is a response to cultural crisis” (9), a crisis which took Europe under its influence at the end of the 19th century. An immense chain of events and discoveries most of which were born in Victorian England soon spread throughout the continent and changed European life and thought, possibly forever. The Industrial Revolution, to begin with, bred alienating working conditions and eventually economic problems. Life in industrial cities like Manchester led the working class into pessimism and despair as five-year-old children worked in mines sixteen hours a day, and workers and their families “lived like packs of rats in a sewer” (Abrams 1892). It was under such conditions that people worked, and factory owners argued for the benefit of such “unregulated working conditions” for everyone (1892). Yet, the 1840s witnessed a severe crisis and hunger which the statesman Charles Greville described in his diary as following:
There is an immense and continually increasing population, no adequate demand for labor, . . . no confidence, but a universal alarm, disquietude, and discontent. Nobody can sell anything. . . . Certainly I have never seen . . . so serious a state of things as that which now stares us in the face; and this after thirty years of uninterrupted peace, and the most ample scope afforded for the development of all our resources. . . One remarkable feature in the present condition of affairs is that nobody can account for it, and nobody pretends to be able to point out any remedy (n. pag.).

This was the situation in which Karl Marx would see the plight of the working class and the inconsistencies inherent in the capitalist system. In 1867, he published the first volume of his major work *Das Kapital*. He viewed work as a determining factor in an individual’s life, and the prevailing working conditions as a trigger for alienation. In his attacks on the capitalist system, he, in a way, laid the foundations of the modern, alienated man renouncing bourgeois values. The poverty the working class suffered from was imposed by the capitalist system, and the Anglican Church ignored it for a considerable time, which, according to Walter Houghton, paved the way for atheism among those living in misery (qtd. in Gürakar 12).

In a few decades, as science and technology developed, agnosticism and atheism became more and more widespread. The discoveries in the field of geology proved the age of the earth to be millions of years, which shook people’s beliefs in what the Old Testament says about the history of earth. As John Tyndall wrote,

> not for six thousand, nor for sixty thousand, nor for six thousand thousand, but for aeons embracing untold millions of years, this earth has been the theater of life and death. The riddle of the rocks has been read by the geologist and paleontologist, from sub-Cambrian depths to the deposits thickening over the sea bottoms of today. And upon the leaves of that stone book are . . . stamped the characters, plainer and surer than those formed by the ink of history, which carry the mind back into abysses of past time (24).

Another scientific finding that whispered man his nothingness in the universe was in the field of astronomy. Astronomers discovered that the distances between stars are much bigger than previously believed. The extent of the universe, just as the extent of the earth’s history came into conflict with the Bible and man’s previous knowledge of
the cosmos. This showed the 19th century man his smallness and insignificance since the universe was much bigger than he thought, and had existed much longer than the history of mankind.

The control of religion which was shaken by these findings, diminished further with Charles Darwin’s *The Origin of Species*. Published in 1859, this treatise suggested a new mechanism which would replace the idea of a divine being behind the process of creation. Rather than suggesting God’s creation, Darwin’s theory of evolution depended merely on chance. Through the process he called natural selection, individual species try to adapt to the environment. While those who cannot adapt have to die, those well adapted to the environment survive and continue to evolve. Thus originates a variety of species which, according to Darwin, includes man, too, and happens with no divine direction or intention behind:

> no shadow of reason can be assigned for the belief that variations, alike in nature and the result of the same general laws, which have been the groundwork through natural selection of the formation of the most perfectly adapted animals in the world, man included, were intentionally and specially guided (qtd. in Richardson 11).

What Darwin put forth was “the essential chanciness of nature, the randomness of life” (11). Emphasizing the absence of a need for God during evolution, this randomness of life brought about a universe devoid of an ultimate meaning as well. Furthermore, when Darwin published another treatise, *The Descent of Man*, in 1871, man’s identification with the animal species became more apparent. This increased the conflict to another level in that man’s role in the world and values attached to him were destroyed. “If the principle of survival of the fittest was accepted as the key to conduct, there remained the inquiry: fittest for what?” (Abrams 1896-7). Therefore, Darwin’s legacy resulted in the quest to know what it is to be human.

Although evolution theory faced numerous contradictions, soon it spread to such an extent that, as Grant Allen wrote, “everybody nowadays talks about evolution. Like electricity, the cholera germ, . . . it is ‘in the air’” (qtd. in Richardson, “The Life Sciences” 6). Together with its popularity, loss of faith in religion and in humanity’s special role in the universe grew. Thus, many people, among whom several eminent Victorians as John Ruskin, George Eliot and Thomas Hardy can be found, developed
doubts about the truth of the Bible and ended up in agnosticism and even atheism (Lewis 20).

Another well-known agnostic was Viriginia Woolf’s father Leslie Stephen. He encouraged his children to gain a secular worldview, and more importantly, he popularized agnostic thought with his books *An Agnostic’s Apology and Other Essays* (1893), and *Essays on Free Thinking and Plainspeaking* (1907) (Carter, and Freedman 2). The emergence of such books is one of the many manifestations of the ongoing changes in thought and culture.

This new transition, or cultural crisis, gave birth to new voices in psychology and philosophy. That is to say, Sigmund Freud and Friedrich Nietzsche, who, together with Marx, constitute the core of modernist thought, were deeply influenced by Darwin’s theories, and shaped their own ideas based on Darwin’s. In his review of *The Origin of Species*, Thomas Huxley wrote about the intermingling of the science and thought of the time: “we do not believe that . . . any work has appeared calculated to exert so large an influence . . . in extending the dominion of science over regions of thought into which she has, as yet, hardly penetrated” (qtd. in Richardson, “The Life Sciences” 7).

“The blurring between disciplines” is to be seen clearly in Freud’s work, because, he himself, in his autobiography, pointed out his indebtedness to Darwin saying that his theories rendered it possible to better understand the world (Richardson, “The Biological Sciences” 58). As Darwin put it, the human race can be identified with animals. This argument caused a great controversy since it challenged the idea of humanity’s being above the animal species. Yet it came to be accepted that man, like animals, depends on instinct. The German philosopher Eduard von Hartmann, depending on Darwin’s theory, explained the close relation between humans and animals when he wrote that

> the time has gone by when the animals were contrasted with the free man as locomotive machines, as soulless automata. . . . deeper insight into the lives of animals . . . has shown that with respect to mental capacity man differs from the brutes in degree and not in kind, just as the brutes differ among themselves (qtd. in Richardson, “The Biological Sciences” 57).
The conclusion Hartmann draws is that, differing from animals only in degree, man also is driven by instinct, which can be considered a part of the unconscious. This biological fact, first introduced by Freud and then accepted by Hartmann, was taken by Freud as the basis for his psychoanalysis. Freud divided the human psyche into three categories: id, ego, and superego. While id represents the unconscious, the instincts and desires, the superego interferes in these instincts and tries to suppress them to make the ego culturally acceptable. However, believing that it is natural for a man to have the desires of the id, Freud founded his work on the quest for the liberation of the ego from the workings of the superego. As he put it, the aim of psychoanalysis is to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the superego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge its organization, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the id. Where id was, there ego shall be: it is a work of culture – not unlike the draining of the Zuider Zee (qtd. in Frosh 118).

Clearly seen in the quotation above, Freud’s studies focused on the emancipation of the ego, and it was a work of culture. This emphasis on psychoanalysis’ being a field highly related to culture can be understood when the clash between human nature and cultural values is taken into consideration. What Stephen Frosh also points out is this contradiction between culture and modern thought. Like other scientific and technological innovations of the modern age, psychoanalysis also created a kind of confusion, because putting the emphasis on human nature, it opposed individuals to culture on opposing sides. Frosh shows this by explaining the triggering factor behind Freud’s patients’ neurosis:

The parallels here, between the maelstrom of modernity and that of the early psychoanalytic movement, are very compelling. The classic Freudian patients were hysterics and obsessional neurotics – people with relatively clearly differentiated symptoms who might be understood to be suffering from too much repression. These people were not mad; they functioned on the ordinary human level which requires recognition of reality and the ability to form relationships with others. On the whole, they could manage this, but at an exaggerated cost. Like everyone else, their tolerance of the demands of society required renunciation of certain inner demands, pressures for sexual and
aggressive satisfaction which, if acted upon, would lead to the devastation of their social relationships and hence their selves (122).

The id, or in broader terms the human nature, is driven by sexual and aggressive instincts. However, being a culturally and socially acceptable person necessitates the repression of these instincts. According to Freud, neurosis results directly from repression, so what is done through psychotherapy is a kind of reconciliation between these sexual and aggressive instincts and the ego. To put it differently, psychoanalysis tries to treat the symptoms resulting from the clash between the individual and the expectations of the society for the sake of achieving a healthy mind and body.

It is seen that, like Darwin’s theory of evolution, Freud’s studies contradicted the long-accepted knowledge and values attributed to humanity. Deepening the anxiety the modern man felt when faced with such striking notions, Freud transformed what had been known about sexuality and gender. Apart from calling attention to the acceptance of bodily desires, he also totally separated sexuality from gender. As Liesl Olson mentions, Freud, like Havelock Ellis, pointed out that sexuality is not determined by a person’s sex. On the contrary, everyone is born “polymorphously perverse”, which means that both homosexual and heterosexual inclinations are inherent in each individual. Thus, Freud and Ellis rejected the idea that homosexuality is a pathological case, and they even considered it very similar to heterosexuality (145-6). To sum up, Freudian psychoanalysis justified what had been regarded as degeneration in society, and embraced instincts which had been continuously denied and suppressed by civilization.

When it comes to Nietzsche as another important figure whose ideas can be considered partly Darwinian, it may not be wrong to assert that like Freud, Nietzsche established his main ideas considering what Darwin called instinct, or what Freud called psychological drives. According to Nietzsche, the leading drive in humankind is the ‘will to power’, which, together with other main concepts of his philosophy will be discussed in the following chapter. The will to power as the leading instinct in humans to strive for growth is parallel to Darwin’s ‘survival of the fittest’, which emphasizes the instinct to be strong and to survive. Furthermore, from Darwin’s theory it can be concluded that man differs from animals only in degree, and this is also analogous to Nietzsche’s thought. For Nietzsche, animal nature exists within man, too,
and it should be appreciated. However, culture urges man to suppress his animal side. Therefore, all established values of culture and religion fundamentally deny man’s nature. Thus, Western culture is ‘life-denying’ according to Nietzsche, and becomes the focus of his criticism.

By criticizing Western culture and mainly Christian religion, Nietzsche ended up in negating all prevailing values. In this respect, it is arguable that Nietzsche represents the modern man who found it difficult to live by the existing norms of civilization. For him, as for Nietzsche, life became devoid of any meaning. Previously mentioned developments of the 19th century, namely the industrial revolution and urbanization, discoveries in geology and astronomy, the theory of evolution, and Freud’s findings related to the workings of mind took place “too quickly for the adaptive powers of the human psyche” (Abrams 1891). The result was confusion, pessimism, and a feeling of meaninglessness. Therefore, modernity, described by Fredric Jameson as a “catastrophe”, led to nihilism (Weller 2). For Roger Griffin, as well, it was a step from progression towards nihilism as modernity “passed from a revolutionary, progressive phase in the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century, to a decadent and ultimately nihilist phase in the later nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century” (Weller 1).

Considering Griffin’s view, it seems appropriate to assert that nihilism was the common response to life shared by a vast group of people in the second half of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th. Having lost belief in everything, they desperately searched for meaning. What Charles Kingsley wrote pictures this loss of, and quest for meaning: “The young men and women of our day are fast parting from their parents and each other; the more thoughtful are wandering either towards Rome, towards sheer materialism, or towards an unchristian and unphilosophic spiritualism” (4). In the abyss of nihility, some tried to awaken the spirituality lost together with the faith in Christianity with the hope that

spirituality could be found elsewhere – perhaps in the East or in the ancient past. Influential gurus, often from Eastern Europe, . . . captivated artists in search of a spiritual identity outside of organized religion and did so through a heady brew of global and ancient religious practices (Carter, and Friedman 147).
As it may be understood from the situation above, towards the advent of modernism, European people were suffering from a feeling Nietzsche grasped thoroughly and depicted in his works. As Shane Weller in his introduction to *Modernism and Nihilism* argues, Nietzsche is one of the most influential figures in the modernist thought, because “it was he who deployed the concept of nihilism to capture the essence of modernity” (6-7). In his *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche announced its coming:

> What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism. . . . This future speaks even now in a hundred signs, this destiny announces itself everywhere . . . For some time now, our whole European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach the end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to reflect (3).

Within a few pages he asserted again that “Nihilism stands at the door”, and continued “whence comes this uncanniest of all guests?” (7). Apparently, as the origin of this “guest” he saw the Christian religion and morality, which he attacked relentlessly.

One of the several definitions of nihilism he made is a “psychological state” which is reached when we have sought a "meaning" in all events that is not there: so the seeker eventually becomes discouraged. Nihilism, then, is the recognition of the long waste of strength, the agony of the “in vain,” insecurity, the lack of any opportunity to recover and to regain composure (12).

However, this nihilism as “the agony of the ‘in vain’” is something Nietzsche conceived only as a transitory state. He did not see nihilism as an end itself. On the contrary, it is something that should be overcome. To elaborate on this idea of overcoming nihilism is necessary since here lies the importance of Nietzsche in 19th and 20th century thought.

In his deep and systematic analysis of the concept of nihilism, Nietzsche came up with two kinds of nihilism which he explained as “Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism”, and “Nihilism as decline and recession of the
power of the spirit: as passive nihilism” (17). He attributed passive nihilism to Christianity, Buddhism, and to Schopenhauer’s philosophy. It is “a sign of weakness”, and promises nothing but valuelessness, because it encourages stoicism and wastes the power of the spirit (18). Active nihilism, on the other hand, is the one he preferred, since, as a destructive power, it paves the way for overcoming itself. By negating everything that is meaningless, active nihilism prepares the grounds for individuals to assert their own values. Therefore, it can be viewed as a necessary step towards the affirmation of life and towards the übermensch.

As the advocate of active nihilism, Nietzsche provided the grounds for the modern man to overcome the destructive effects of nihilism and assert their own modes of existence. In short, in his philosophy, the rejection of any kind of morality gave man a godly power to create his own values, which became the antidote for the plight of nihilility. In this respect, Nietzsche “became an epochal symbol so that many who saw radical change, and fateful opportunity, in the experience of modernity were inclined to find in him echoes of their own enthusiasms and fears” (Michael Bell 58). This is the reason why great writers of the modernist age such as James Joyce, W. B. Yeats, Thomas Mann, Hermann Hesse and André Gide were deeply influenced by him, and why he is chosen as the main figure of influence on the three novels that constitute the scope of this thesis.

1.2. Modernism and the Bildungsroman Tradition

Radical transformations in science and thought, such as major ones mentioned in the previous part, triggered the advent of a fundamental change in art in the following decades. Therefore it is possible to say that modernism is a response to this cultural transformation. That should be why Jesse Matz defines the modern novel as “fiction that tries for something new, in the face of modernity, to reflect, to fathom, or even to redeem modern life” (7). Modernity promised progression, and at the same time it meant confusion. Accordingly, Marshall Berman viewed being modern as “to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world – and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are” (qtd. in Matz 7-8).
Artists felt this paradox and they became alienated both from society and from the old forms of art. For Virginia Woolf, for example, the “novel of the recent past . . . failed to keep up with real life” (Matz 9). Therefore, so as to make sense of modern life and at the same time to make a critique of it, they experimented with language and form. That is to say, since the existing culture and values failed to answer the new, modern life, artists had to make up new sets of values in their writings.

This change was reflected in different aspects of the novel in both form and content. New knowledge in psychology, to begin with, led the writers to focus on the consciousness of characters. Thus, novels employing the stream of consciousness technique stressed the workings of mind and the loneliness and alienation of individuals, because consciousness is unique to each individual. The plots of novels also showed one of the most important changes in form. Modernists rejected the strong plot to such an extent that in 1934 Gertrude Stein wrote about the contemporary novels that “there is, in none of them a story” (qtd. in Kern 67). As there is no story in modernist fiction, trivial events replaced the important, more striking ones. James Joyce, as an example, used mainly epiphanies to narrate “a sudden insight triggered by a trivial, everyday event” which may seem trivial, but has a great influence on the character’s emotions (49).

Among these and several other innovations in modernist novel, the change in character seems quite important in that it has an impact on other aspects of the novel. As stated by Virginia Woolf, at the beginning of the 20th century, human character was considered to have changed. As a result, the hero of the novel experienced a metamorphosis. With the workings of the subconscious, it gained a fragmented quality as a complex being. Hence, heroism, stereotypes, and social norms were succeeded by uncertainties (Matz 45). The hero of the previous novels was replaced with more complex beings showing both good and evil, or strong and weak characteristics. Simultaneously embodying different personalities, the hero of the modern novel was now “a hybrid entity” (Kern 28).

Better called anti-hero than hero, modernist characters are fragmented beings. For instance, André Gide’s The Immoralist depicts Michel as a split personality oscillating between his homosexuality and his feelings of responsibility as a husband (28). Besides having a fragmented personality, the new anti-hero also has other
characteristics that would have been considered flaws in the hero of a realist novel. The anti-hero is distinguished with his lack of “classical virtues of strength, beauty, courage, and pride” (34). On the contrary, he may be a coward, a murderer, or just immoral, and this does not essentially make the character bad. As Matz argues, they are “heroical in new ways” (47).

The hero’s transformation to the anti-hero stems from the fact that he is in conflict with society, and cannot identify himself with the prevailing social norms.

In a way, all modern characters are anti-heroes, because no modern character can connect perfectly to society as a whole. To be a hero in the old sense, a character not only has to represent his or her culture’s best powers and features. He or she lives in a world . . . in which the individual’s needs can match up with those of society at large. But with the coming of modernity such a relationship became more and more difficult. A sense of connection gave way to a sense of alienation. Social norms seemed out of sync with individual needs, as social wholes grew more vast, impersonal, mechanistic, and oppressive. Individual character, it seemed, could no longer be defined in terms of its affiliation with the group. Instead, alienation became definitive; character came to be something defined in terms of opposition to society (47).

It is understood from Matz’s depiction of the anti-hero that in contrast to previous characters who acted in accordance with social expectations, the new hero is an outsider who is rebellious and who clashes with the society he lives in.

The rebellious character is closely linked to the bildungsroman genre of the modernist age, because bildungsroman went through a similar change alongside the modernist character. As characters became alienated from society, bildungsroman plots changed in such a way that they became the grounds for the characters to assert their individuality outside social norms. A brief summary of the bildungsroman tradition in Europe may be helpful in portraying the modernist bildungsroman and its relationship with the development of the Nietzschean characters in The Immoralist, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, and Demian.

First coined by Karl Morgenstern in 1820s, the term bildungsroman was used to mean, with reference to Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, a novel which “portrays the Bildung of the hero in its beginnings and growth to a certain stage of consciousness” (qtd. in Jeffers 49). Broadly defined as the coming of age novels, bildungsromans came to be written, Thomas Jeffers argues, only after the democratic revolutions in the 18th
century Europe, through which “‘feudally’ prescribed” roles of individuals ceased to be the frame of personal development (51). Previously, the development of the youth was “too socially straightforward to be interesting” (51). Hence, considering Jeffers’ argument, it is possible to infer that the advent of the coming of age novels anticipated a discrepancy between the individual and society. As the youth acknowledged it rightful to define their own roles in life themselves, there appeared a crisis of development from adolescence to adulthood, because individual desires tend to confront the socially prescribed requirements of adulthood.

In this respect, Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1795), the first novel referred to as a bildungsroman, revolves around this conflict between the individual and community. In Reading the Modernist Bildungsroman, Gregory Castle defines this novel as the classical bildungsroman which represents the notion of bildung – character formation – in the 18th century Germany. As Castle observes, at the beginning of these stories the young man in the classical bildungsroman chooses a different path from that of his family and society through for the sake of freedom. However, this rebellion is only a step to be passed before the hero achieves the necessary reconciliation with his or her social authorities. That is to say, after this phase of rebellion, s/he willingly comes to terms with social institutions (9). Wilhelm, for instance, in the end, says “I consign myself entirely to my friends and their direction, for it is useless trying to act according to one’s own will in this world” (qtd. in Castle 11). It can be concluded that the classical bildungsroman puts the emphasis on harmony between the individual and the society.

In the 19th century, the bildungsroman genre moved from the dominance of Germany to France and England, where it served the “ideology of pragmatic individualism” (13). While in the classical bildungsroman the hero endeavors to experience the world and achieve inner harmony, in the 19th century bildungsroman, this “aesthetico-spiritual form” was abandoned, and the hero was motivated merely by fashion and success “at the expense of self-formation” (13-14). In this socially pragmatic version of the notion of bildung, the individual is usually integrated into social institutions, and those “whose desires for self development are identical to the demands of the social system” win at the end (18). Like the heroes in French bildungsroman who “pursue social success for its own sake”, the young men in the
English novels also struggle for social improvement, for example, to become a gentleman (15-19). For instance, Pip in Charles Dickens’ *Great Expectations* views self-development in the context of social classes and tries to ascend to a more respectable level in the social hierarchy.

“But the problems change, and old solutions stop working” says Franco Moretti regarding the *bildungsroman* written in the 20th century (230). In the previous novels, social institutions were successful in integrating individuals into the system. However, in the 20th century *bildungsroman*, which Moretti calls the “late Bildungsroman”, social institutions are regarded differently. Törless in Robert Musil’s *The Confusions of Young Törless*, for instance, complains about school: “but of all we are doing all day long here at school, what does have a meaning? What do we get out of it? For ourselves, I mean. . . . We know we have learned this and that . . . but inside, we are as empty as before.” (qtd. in Moretti 230). It is seen that the shared values imposed by the social institutions do not answer the changing views and needs of the modern man any more in the 20th century, and this makes the integration of individuals into the system impossible. According to Moretti, “the individual will hardly feel at home in this world, and socialization will not be fully accomplished” (231). This is the reason why the modernist, or in Moretti’s terms the late *bildungsroman*, is quite problematic in that it fails to fulfill the harmonizing function of the classical or socially pragmatic *bildungsromans*.

As modernists became critical of social institutions like school, family, and religion, they lost the sense of a shared purpose. Individuals had to define their own values and goals. So as to reflect this, the plot of the *bildungsroman* had to be rearranged with “new narrative strategies” (Kern 41-42). Matz also views the plot of the classical *bildungsroman* as “false and forced” in the modernist context, and as a result, in the modernist *bildungsromans*, characters define themselves outside social institutions, and they “often grow from conformity to rebellion, and end not in happy oneness with society at large but in intense and often destructive rejections of it” (48).

Such a picture of youth illustrated in the modernist *bildungsroman* is clearly seen in all of the three novels this study deals with. *The Immoralist*, for instance, can be seen as a reversal of the classical *bildungsroman*, because Michel runs away from the institution of marriage and his vocation as a scholar, which define his life at the
beginning of the novel. In other words, he starts off as a man who is married and who has a respectable career, however, he sees that his bildung can only be achieved through the rejection of this conventional path. Hence, he decides to follow his own way regardless of the fact that the results may be destructive. In Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist, too, the hero acknowledges that family, nationality, religion, and school prevent his self-cultivation. Thus, he ends up in voluntary exile, in a complete rejection of these institutions. Stephen Dedalus chooses the path towards an authentic artist and individual, which renders it difficult to achieve both his individuality and a simultaneous harmony with society. When it comes to Hesse’s Demian, it is easy to infer that Emil Sinclair fulfills his self-development by looking inwards and rejecting outside factors. Like Stephen Dedalus, he grows critical of his family and religion, and considers this as the only way of being himself. Although Hesse does not necessarily show Emil Sinclair’s bildung as a ‘destructive rejection’ of social institutions, it is obvious that it does not have a ‘socially pragmatic’ function at all. On the contrary, Demian, like the other two novels, puts the emphasis on the intense criticism of shared values in the process of the hero’s self-cultivation.

As it is seen, what is common in these heroes is their insisting on denying integration into society, and on claiming their individuality. This constitutes the core of the modernist bildungsroman as Castle argues:

> In the modernist Bildungsroman, Bildung so often turns out to be a dissent from social order, from bourgeois appropriation of self-cultivation, a dissent as well from the ideas of pedagogy and parenting that sanction restrictive and punitive models of development. Precisely those elements that demanded stability and predictable development in the classical Bildungsroman – harmonious identity-formation, aesthetic education, meaningful and rewarding social relations, a vocation – become problematic in the twentieth century. The modernist Bildungsroman carries on the struggle between desire and “great expectations”, but the struggle no longer resembles the dialectical processes so elegantly narrativized in Wilhelm Meister (24).

As he continues, Castle defines the process of bildung in modernist novels as “a liberatory depersonalization” in contrast to the socialization that is seen in the classical bildungsroman, because this new conception of bildung “respond more effectively and productively to the demands of modern social conditions” that were mentioned in the
previous section (28). Therefore, the modernist *bildungsroman* is different from the previous ones both in plot and in its depiction of the youth.

In short, a new kind of subject is born in this important critique of Bildung. This new subject rediscovering the aesthetic dimension of self-cultivation and becomes conscious of the artifice of the self, which now, in this climate of revolt, constitutes the only available freedom from so-called freedoms of bourgeois subjectivity (66-67).

At this point, when the modernist *bildungsroman* renders it possible for the individual to freely create his own self, Castle finds an analogy to Nietzsche’s views of the self (67). Hence, the importance I attributed to Nietzsche in the previous section is acknowledged by Castle, too, with regard to the notion of *bildung* in the 20th century. This is because Nietzsche also regards one’s identity as “a creative project” rather than as something that can be prescribed by other institutions (39). His arguments in *The Gay Science* make his view of the self obvious:

> To ‘give style’ to one’s character – a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. . . . It will be the strong and domineering natures that enjoy their fine gaiety in such constraint and perfection under a law of their own; the passion of their tremendous will relents in the face of all stylized nature, of all conquered and serving nature (Nietzsche 232).

It is seen that Nietzsche views character as something to be created individually. He sees life as a work of art. To make it a piece of art, one needs to ignore outside factors and to turn to one’s own nature. Only by looking inwards can one create a true self, because social institutions do nothing but turn people into ‘walking encyclopedias’. It is obvious that Nietzsche’s view of the self and the modernist notion of *bildung* are identical in that they both attribute absolute freedom to the individual.

Having drawn this analogy, it seems clear that Nietzsche’s ideas are quite useful for the modern man who wants to have an authentic identity. Considering this, this thesis analyzes the process of *bildung* in the protagonists of *The Immoralist*, *The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, and *Demian* in the light of Nietzsche’s view of the self. It is argued that Nietzsche influenced Gide, Joyce, and Hesse, and this
influence shaped the nature of their \textit{bildungsroman} characters’ developments. Thus, this study aims to reveal the parallels between Nietzsche’s philosophy and the ideas these heroes adopt during their processes of \textit{bildung}.

So as to make a complete picture of Nietzschean philosophy, the next chapter dwells on his ideas in a more detailed way. Throughout the chapter, Nietzschean ideas applicable to the novels in question, namely the will to power, Apollonian and Dionysian forces, and master and slave moralities, will be explained briefly. Hence, the characteristics a typical Nietzschean man should have will be shown so that a general portrait of the Nietzschean free spirit that will be seen in these protagonists will be drawn.

In the chapters 3, 4, and 5, the protagonists in \textit{The Immoralist}, \textit{The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man}, and \textit{Demian}, respectively, are analyzed as Nietzschean characters. Which Nietzschean ideas they adopt and integrate into their lives will be illustrated with examples. Thus, Nietzsche’s influence on Gide, Joyce, and Hesse, and how these writers interpreted his philosophy in their novels will be revealed.

Finally, in chapter 6, the similarities and differences in their interpretations of Nietzschean philosophy and how they reflected their views in these novels will be discussed. A general conclusion showing Nietzsche’s influence on Gide’s, Joyce’s, and Hesse’s \textit{bildungsromans} will be drawn from this comparative study.
CHAPTER 2

NIETZSCHEAN PHILOSOPHY

As stated in the previous chapter, Nietzsche, in the 19th century, foresaw the advent of nihilism in Western Europe. In his analysis of the western civilization, he specified the factors leading to nihilism and endeavored to come up with a new set of ideas that would constitute an alternative to earlier philosophies and a way out for the modern man caught in pessimistic thoughts. In doing so, he became one of the most ardent critics of culture and religion, and at the same time paved the way for the emergence of a new kind of man he alternatively calls a free spirit, higher man, philosopher of the future or the übermensch. Therefore, it can be asserted that Nietzsche’s philosophy revolves around ways of relinquishing nihilism and consequently becoming a free spirit. In short, the essence of Nietzschean philosophy is quite positive because of its life-affirming character. Contrary to the widespread misconception that he is a nihilist, Nietzsche celebrates a new, hopeful kind of man who has enthusiasm for life.

Nietzsche’s views about man, his nature, how the higher spirits differ from the herd and how they achieve a life-affirming stance can be understood better once some key ideas of Nietzschean philosophy are made clear. Hence, in this chapter, the main concepts at the core of Nietzschean thought will be discussed in more detail. In the first section, the concept of will to power will be explained as the driving force in life. In the following sections, the dichotomy of Dionysian and Apollonian approaches to life, and Judeo-Christian values as a slave morality will be discussed, in an attempt to make a complete picture of the forthcoming higher man predicted by Nietzsche.

2.1. Will to Power

A Nietzsche reader comes across his doctrine of will to power in several of his books like WP and BGE. Yet, most of Nietzsche’s ideas on the will to power are found
scattered in his unpublished notes, which makes his critics approach this concept quite suspiciously (Solomon and Higgins 216). Nevertheless, the will to power is still considered the core of his philosophy; it is the concept through which Nietzsche theorizes about the nature of man and life.

To begin with, Nietzsche sets off with the idea that man is still an animal, driven by a set of instincts which he may not be able to understand or choose (217). That is to say, we are constantly and unconsciously driven by different impulses, which is why Nietzsche defines man as a “bundle of forces” (Welshon 162). These forces which govern each behavior of a person are “subsumed under the ‘universal instinct’ for ‘life’”, and Nietzsche calls this universal instinct the will to power (Cooper 832). This instinct governs not only human beings but all that is alive. Thus, Nietzsche generalizes the will to power as ruling the whole world:

this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my "beyond good and evil," without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will toward itself - do you want a name for this world? A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnighly men? - This world is the will to power - and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power - and nothing besides! (WP 550).

According to Rex Welshon, this proposal has two implications: that “all levels of existence are nothing but instances of will” and that they are “nothing but instances of power” (159). In other words, each and every behavior is an expression of this universal will, and each is directed by this will towards the growth and expression of power.

Nietzsche’s interpretation of life as will to power challenges other theories of evolution, because he refutes self-preservation as the ultimate goal in life. In BGE he writes that

Physiologists should think twice before deciding that an organic being’s primary instinct is the instinct for self-preservation. A living being wants above all else to release it strength; life itself is the will to power, and self-preservation is only one of its indirect and most frequent consequences (15).
Apparently, Nietzsche sees the instinct for self-preservation only as a minor pursuit in life. The fundamental motivation, on the other hand, is following appropriate conditions in which the living being exhibits his strength. Hence, as Daniel Conway also points out, from Nietzsche’s point of view, life is a struggle for power, and fundamentally “active, aggressive, and formative” (533).

Considering that “life is a fountain of pleasure”, and that “the inner essence of being is will to power”, Karl Jaspers concludes that instances of a living being’s increasing his power bring about pleasure, and being incapable of mastering other beings leads to pain (295). So, pleasure may be accepted as a criterion for the success of the will to power. So as to make the concept clearer, Lee Spinks provides several situations in which the pleasure of a growing power is manifested. Acts of physical enslavement and philosophical discussions are among the examples he provides (138). From these instances of power struggle, it is easy to infer that will to power dominates all aspects of life from physical to intellectual.

One point that is necessary to clarify is that Nietzsche does not imply political power when he talks about the will to power. Despite the fact that his sister unethically used his writings and caused a misuse of his ideas to become a material for propaganda by anti-Semites, what Nietzsche actually means by will to power, as Solomon and Higgins explain, is personal strength rather than political power. It does not mean ‘power’ in the nasty, jackbooted sense that still sends flutters up the European spine. The term means something like effective self-realization and expression. Nietzsche stresses that when a person is successful in pursuing such ‘power’, aggressive and domineering methods are not necessary (220).

It is seen that, despite the confusion it causes, the term will to power should be understood as something more personal and not as a physical and aggressive force. Indeed, according to Nietzsche “self-mastery is . . . one of the most effective strategies that the will to power employs” (222). That is to say, a more preferable and useful expression of will to power, according to Nietzsche, is turning our power not towards oppressing others, but towards ourselves, which would result in self-overcoming, one of the central themes he is concerned with.
2.2. Apollonian and Dionysian Forces

In his first book *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche proposes his personal analysis of Greek tragedy and makes crucial inferences about modern German culture and its view of life. Through his analysis of the origins of Greek tragedy, he concludes that the ancient Greeks managed a balance between Dionysian and Apollonian impulses. Reflecting this balance in their tragedy, they celebrated a natural kind of life both in their art and in reality. Yet, as their tragedy evolved in time, they lost the balance between Dionysus and Apollo. Consequently tragedy lost its previous character and became repressed. Drawing a parallel between art and life, Nietzsche comes to the conclusion that the history of Greek tragedy is analogous to life in that while becoming more civilized, life actually became unnatural and repressed in the modern culture, just as tragedy lost its balance and became life-denying. This is the frame of Nietzsche’s thoughts in *BT*, and how he eventually comes to criticize modern culture and life.

To begin with, Nietzsche proposes that tragedy is the form of art that makes the fullest representation of a culture and urges a culture to question its values. This significance that he attributes to tragedy as an art form is the starting point of his *BT*. He argues that the development of art depends on the combination of Apollonian and Dionysian forces or drives (*BT* 19). He associates the former with sculpture, whereas the latter is identified with music. As he explains clearly, it is important that the two run together. They are, thus, both contradictory and complementary:

These two very different drives run in parallel with one another, for the most part diverging openly with one another and continually stimulating each other to ever new and more powerful births, in order to perpetuate themselves the struggle of that opposition only apparently bridged by the shared name of ‘art’; until finally, through a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic ‘will’, they appear coupled with one another and through this coupling at last give birth to a work of art which is Dionysian as it is Apollonian – Attic tragedy (19).

When it comes to the so called Apollonian and Dionysian natures, it is seen that Nietzsche describes them in various words, as powers, drives, or forces. Yet, what is clear about them, as Douglad Smith writes in his introduction to *BT*, is that they are “forces larger than individuals, forces capable of compelling individuals in certain ways regardless of their own volition” (xxiii).
As it can be easily guessed, these forces compel individuals in opposite ways. Apollo, the sun god, encourages order and clarity. So, the Apollonian ideal views individuals separate from reality and can “contemplate it dispassionately” (Magnus and Higgins 22). Dionysus, on the other hand, is the god of wine and incites excessive behaviors. The Dionysian principle embraces sexuality and other natural impulses, thus functioning as a drive which tries to “reunite us with the ‘innermost core’ of nature” (Spinks 20).

If not taken under control, each of these drives, as Smith puts it, “would tend to the extreme”, that is, taken separately, the Apollonian creates militaristic cultures defined by order and discipline while the Dionysian leads to pessimism (xix). Hence, Nietzsche gives utmost importance to the balance between these forces. This balance is achieved in Attic tragedy of the fifth century BC. However, after Aeschylus and Sophocles, whose works embrace both the Dionysian and the Apollonian, Euripides caused the fall of tragedy, according to Nietzsche. As Solomon and Higgins interpret, putting the emphasis on consistency and rationality “left little room for Dionysian experience” in the new version of tragedy (67).

According to Nietzsche, the late Greek tragedy which abandons the Dionysian side is analogous to modern German culture, and this is exactly what he attacks. The inclination to turn to only rationality, which rules over modern culture, Nietzsche believes, should be abandoned. Instead, the Dionysian attitude should be embraced.

It is even argued that Nietzsche’s Dionysian ideal is a spiritual alternative to Christianity (98). When it is considered that he views Christianity as a life-denying religion, it is not a surprise that he “finds inspiration in the ancient Athenians” who honored life and our natural inclinations (98).

It can be argued that the dichotomy of Apollonian and Dionysian forces is an explanation Nietzsche provides for the trouble experienced by man oscillating between rationalism and his natural desires. The remedy Nietzsche suggests and wants his readers to take up is, undoubtedly, arousing the long repressed Dionysian energy and, together with Apollonian order, integrating it into our lives so that there can be the ideal balance between these contradictory – and complementary – forces.
2.3. Master and Slave Moralities

Nietzsche starts theorizing about moral value-judgments by first separating theology and morality. He acknowledges that evil and its origin cannot be explained by religion. On the contrary, evil is a worldly concept created by man himself. Nietzsche traces its origin back to history and tries to find an answer to the question “Under what conditions did man invent the value-judgments good and evil?” (GM 5).

The answer he comes up with is that there are two types of moralities. The first is master morality, which was defeated by the second one, slave morality.

Since, for Nietzsche, life is will to power, master and slave moralities are defined by the relationship between two groups of people separated in terms of power. Those who are the owners, the masters, or simply the powerful, are the inventors of master morality. Since they are the ruling group, the make value judgments only on the basis of good and bad. That is, anything in accordance with health and strength is considered good in the master morality. Accordingly, anything which causes weakness and sickness or which is in contrast with the will to power is considered bad. In short, as Smith argues, master morality “is characterized by an ethic of active and ruthless self-affirmation” (xv).

While master morality is based on the will to power, slave morality is the result of the ressentiment of the weak. Since the weaker group of people whom Nietzsche calls slaves do not have the privilege to behave in the manner of their masters, they grow resentful and seek ways to defeat their masters. Yet, as powerless people who cannot take revenge, they find the only relief in the transvaluation of values. Nietzsche calls this “the slave revolt in morals” and writes that it “begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and ordains values: the ressentiment of creatures to whom the real action, that of the deed, is denied and who find compensation in an imaginary revenge” (GM 22).

According to Nietzsche, it is the Jews who felt resentful and in turn invented the slave morality. They declared that the powerless are the good, while the noble and the powerful are the evil ones. Thus, the good man of the master morality became the evil of this new morality (25). It is seen that the slaves try to compensate for their weakness by pretending that they deliberately choose to be so. As Nietzsche puts it,
their “inability to take revenge is called refusal to take revenge” (31). Hence, submission and silence became the virtues of slave morality.

What the man of slave morality fails to understand is that the strong, whom he accuses of being strong and oppressive, actually have no liberty “to express or not to express strength” (29). That is to say, being strong is inherent in their nature. Nietzsche explains this with a metaphor. Birds of prey, he says, quite naturally prey on little lambs, and they are accused of being bad towards these lambs. However, this is a wrong attitude towards the birds of prey, because they are not free to feed or not to feed on lambs, and to be or not to be strong. Strength is simply in their nature, and they cannot behave otherwise. It is the weak, the men of ressentiment who believe that “the strong may freely choose to be weak, and the bird of prey to be lamb – and so they win the right to blame the bird of prey for simply being a bird of prey” (30).

To sum up, master morality is based on what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The weak men of ressentiment, on the other hand, reverse these judgments of good and bad and define the weak as good and the strong as evil. Thus, in contrast with master morality, the value judgments of slave morality become ‘good’ and ‘evil’. As Smith also asserts, these values of ressentiment have been accepted in Western culture as “the absolute foundation of ethics” (xvi). Thus, Nietzschean philosophy takes western morality and religion to be identical with slave morality. When Nietzsche says in BGE that “[m]orality in Europe today is herd animal morality”, he prepares the grounds for his main argument that this morality must be overcome (89, 33).

His contempt for European morality, indeed all herd moralities in general, lies in the fact that any kind of morality of the herd has a tendency to make generalizations and by addressing all people, it tends to “negate all distinctions and all differences between human beings” (Tongeren 395). As well as ignoring individual differences, the herd morality that is in operation in Europe also contradicts the will to power and human nature by encouraging self-sacrifice and silence. Therefore, as argued by Henry Louis Mencken, Nietzsche concludes that our tendency to submit to the codes of morality is “a curse to the human race and the chief cause of its degeneration, inefficiency, and unhappiness” (54).

Considering the characteristics of herd or slave moralities, it becomes clear why Nietzsche so passionately declares that morality should be overcome. He believes
that if, in the future, man can free himself from the herd morality, freedom of will will become possible again (Janaway 61). Thus, he wants his readers to get rid of the chains of slave morality. However, this does not mean that he encourages us to turn to master morality. As Solomon and Higgins state, through slave morality and Christianity we have become too civilized and too spiritual to go back to master morality (117). Thus, it is seen that Nietzsche considers neither moralities as a solution in modern European context, and it is not clear what he suggests as an alternative to these moralities.

Although Nietzsche does not provide a fully drawn alternative for these moralities, at least he provides his followers with a little insight into the picture of the future man he has in mind. Mencken states that Nietzsche calls himself an immoralist, “innocent of ‘virtue’ and ‘sin’ and knowing only ‘good’ and ‘bad’” (65). So, this becomes the model for his followers, since Nietzsche argues in *BGE* that the noble person is an immoralist in that he does not need any morality. He views himself as the creator of his own values, because he is capable of differentiating between what is good and what is bad needless of moral values (*BGE* 154). In short, Nietzsche pictures the ideal man as above morality, as the creator of values, and as “the man beyond good and evil” (106).

### 2.4. Nietzsche’s Free Spirits

The ideas discussed throughout this chapter constitute Nietzschean thought in the general sense and help depict what kind of an individual Nietzsche hopes for in the future. The free spirits, the higher men, the philosophers of the future, the übemensch, or whatever he calls them, embody his ideals and as a result, are able to overcome nihilism and affirm life.

To start with, Nietzsche hopes that the modern man who believes that God is dead and respects only scientific materialism will regain his spirituality one day. Also stressed by Solomon and Higgins, this return to spirituality can be possible by a “renewed appreciation of earthly life and nature” (97). As stated several times before, Nietzsche takes life in this world as the basis of his value judgments. Therefore, he hopes that man will appreciate life and not be deceived by the idea that life’s sufferings will be compensated for after life.
To be able to determine what promotes life and what is noble, man should take his nature as the only guide and listen to his senses. “Our senses are the first origin of all credibility, all good conscience, all apparent truth” (Nietzsche, *BGE* 67). In this respect, we come to the conclusion that Nietzsche wants the future man to be a Dionysian, because it is the Dionysian ideal of ancient Greeks that appreciates nature and encourages individuals to value their natural instincts and desires.

Embracing one’s nature also requires that any morality which denies life and man’s instincts should be renounced. Calling himself an immoralist, Nietzsche believes that free spirits will be able to distance themselves from the herd and their morality. They will, in turn, be the creators of their own values. Thus, a free spirit will be an immoralist, too. He will live beyond herd morality and its values of good and evil. As Nietzsche himself asserts, he will be his own master:

The greatest person should be the one who can be most lonely, most hidden, most deviant, the man beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, abundantly rich in will. This is what greatness should mean: the ability to be both multifarious and whole, both wide and full (*BGE* 106-107).

Another interesting description of free spirits is given in *GM*. This time, Nietzsche calls them ascetics, but Nietzsche’s notion of asceticism here is a different one. It is probably used to imply how serious and devoted they are in their rejection of prevailing values and in being their own masters. All in all, it provides a wider description of the future man Nietzsche dreams of:

These deniers and outsiders of today, these absolutist in a single respect – in their claim to intellectual hygiene – these hard, severe, abstemious, heroic spirits, who constitute the pride of our age, all these pale atheists, anti-Christians, immoralists, nihilists, these spiritual sceptics, . . . these last idealists of knowledge, these man in whom the intellectual conscience is alone embodies and dwells today – they believe themselves to be as free as possible from the ascetic ideal, these ‘free, very free spirits’: . . . they themselves are perhaps its sole representatives today, they themselves are its most spiritualized product . . . (126).
No matter how Nietzsche portrays these higher men, he believes that someday they will appear and that these men, most deviant from today’s ideals, will overcome nihilism and bring back the spirituality he longs for. Hence, considering how hopeful Nietzsche is for the future man, it becomes easier to accept him as a positive philosopher and to appreciate this final statement:

This man of the future, who will redeem us as much from the previous ideal as from what was bound to grow out of it, from the great disgust, from the will to nothingness, from nihilism, this midday stroke of the bell, this toll of great decision, which once again liberates the will, which once again gives earth its goal and man his hope, this Antichristian and Antinihilist, this conqueror of God and of nothingness – he must come one day… (GM 76).
CHAPTER 3

THE IMMORALIST

3.1. André Gide and Nietzsche

In 1890s, when André Gide started his career with his first novel The Notebooks of André Walter, Nietzsche had already become popular among French intellectuals. As G. W. Ireland argues, in the literary circles Gide himself entered, Nietzsche’s name was “a household word”, and Charles Andler’s translations of Nietzsche were greeted with enthusiasm (182). Conversations about Nietzsche among his friends must have appealed to Gide as he is known to have mentioned Nietzsche in several of his letters. Thus, by the end of the century, Ireland asserts, his familiarity with Nietzscheanism had increased to a great extent (183). In his biography of André Gide, Alan Sheridan also points out that in 1898 Gide read a detailed work on Nietzsche and also a translation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (André Gide 163-164). After reading the former, he wrote to Marcel Drouin “Nietzsche is driving me mad. Why did he exist? I would madly have wanted to be him. I am jealously discovering my most secret thoughts, one by one” (qtd. in Sheridan, André Gide 164). Another interesting fact that shows the depth of Nietzsche’s influence on Gide in these years is that Gide read Thus Spoke Zarathustra seven or eight times (Durant and Durant 140).

Having recognized his homosexuality in his youth, Gide oscillated between contradictory impulses, which dragged him to a moral crisis. That is why he found in Nietzsche his most secret thoughts, and why he wrote in one of his letters “Only Nietzsche has done me any good in my crisis” (qtd. in Sheridan, André Gide 164). In a way, as Ireland writes, he viewed Nietzsche as a source of relief and support for his radical thoughts on morality, individualism and sexuality (182). In short, Gide was closely familiar with Nietzsche and deeply influenced by his transvaluation of values, in which he found an answer to his personal crisis.
Considering Gide’s interest in Nietzschean thought, it is possible to find that many of his writings display echoes of Nietzsche. Hence, the influence of Nietzsche on Gide’s works has been much discussed. To give a few examples, his *Paludes* (1895), in which only being different determines the value of a person, is viewed by Patrick Pollard as “an echo of Nietzsche’s praise of individualism” (309). Moreover, *Les Nourritures terrestres* (1897), according to Sheridan, takes *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as its only model (“Introduction” vi). A later work, *Les Caves du Vatican* (1914) is also regarded as a work written under the same influence, as its central character, Lacfadia, is a follower of Nietzsche (Durant and Durant 142). As seen, Gide had been strongly influenced by the German philosopher from the beginning of his literary career.

Although a Nietzschean approach is found in many of Gide’s works including the ones above, *The Immoralist* is by far the most famous of Gide’s Nietzschean novels. Its young protagonist, Michel, for many critics as for Albert Guerard, is a representative of his age, “the age of Nietzschean hopes and destructions” (100). However, most of the criticism in English published on *The Immoralist* deals with Michel’s homosexuality. Hence, there are not many works available in English which make a detailed reading of Michel as a Nietzschean character. Considering this, and also Nietzsche’s strong influence on Gide, the next section aims at analyzing Michel’s *bildung* in the light of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

### 3.2. Michel as a Nietzschean Character

#### 3.2.1. Michel’s Immaturity

Gide’s short novel *The Immoralist* narrates the coming of age of its young protagonist Michel. Although this 25-year-old man seems older than the hero of a traditional *bildungsroman*, the first chapters of the novel immediately reveal the immaturity of our hero. The fact that he knows too little about life, and the events that trigger his awakening are related from Michel’s own point of view, who constantly endeavors to understand himself and what it means to live authentically. The story of his *bildung* is given as a letter written by one of Michel’s friends to whom he tells his story in a single night.
Telling his own story, Michel, throughout the novel, explains and justifies his actions and tries to give a full picture of his motivations. From his point of view, it may be easy to develop empathy and to understand him. Yet, there is another aspect of the novel which should not be ignored: Michel’s story is transmitted by a friend through a letter. This second level of narration, which is the friend’s point of view in the letter, puts a distance between Michel the hero and Michel the narrator. Thus, reading the story from the friend’s letter, from a more distant point of view, makes it less easy to sympathize with Michel. Although neither Gide in the preface, nor the friend in the letter makes any judgment or criticism about the story, it may be argued that by putting a distance between the hero and the narrator, Gide may have wanted to provide different points of view. This way, the story becomes open to different interpretations. While on the one hand readers may find in Michel’s story their own ideas and experiences, on the other hand, he may be read as a flawed hero. As an anti-hero, he lacks the ability to foresee his tragic end, and following the Nietzschean ideal so relentlessly, he ends up in the extremes. Thus, it can be claimed that the letter as the medium of narration provides an outside viewpoint, which makes the protagonist open to criticisms as a failing hero.

As soon as Michel invites his friends and starts telling his own story, it is revealed that the man telling the story is much different from the one at the beginning of his adventures. That is, at the beginning of his story, Michel is quite an immature man who does not know much about life. Within the first few pages it is disclosed that Michel had been exposed to a conventional and stern upbringing by his mother. After his mother’s death, his father provided him with a strong education, which made him a successful historian, surpassing even his father. Yet, he confesses that at the age of 25, his knowledge of life and its possibilities is still limited to his academic learning:

Thus I reached the age of twenty-five, having thought of little else but ruins and books, and knowing nothing about life. I poured all my energy into my work. . . . I had a few friends . . . I knew [them] as little as I knew myself. It never occurred to me that I could lead a different life, that there was a different way to live (16-17).

As can easily be understood from this passage, and as Ireland puts forth, he has had “virtually no experience of life” (187). Thus, he is unaware of any other path he
may possibly follow. In this state of immaturity and ignorance, he marries Marceline, a woman he hardly knows. Getting married merely to please his dying father, he apparently does not know what consequences his act may have:

It was a loveless marriage, largely a sop to my dying father, who was worried about leaving me on my own. . . . So I made a life commitment before I had explored the possibilities of what my life could be. . . . I may not love my fiancée, I told myself, but at least I have never loved another woman. In my view that was enough to ensure our happiness. Still knowing myself so little, I believed I was giving myself to her totally (15-16).

Taken as a whole, Michel’s education, life style, and marriage constitute the picture of an immature man whom Nietzsche would call a “walking encyclopedia” (UM 79). He is stuck between ruins and books, stuffed with knowledge, yet still unaware of his own nature, of the meaning and purpose of life. Hence, in this situation, he sets off for Tunis with his wife for their honeymoon.

3.2.2. Awakening Senses and the Will to Live

On their way from Paris to Marseilles and then to Tunis, Michel realizes that he is getting more and more tired and starts coughing in Tunis. As he starts spitting blood, it is understood that he is in a severe phase of tuberculosis. When the doctor comes, he understands that there is no hope for him, and he simply surrenders to the disease, thinking “After all what is there to live for? I have worked hard to the end, done my duty with passion and dedication. Apart from that . . . oh, what else is there?” (22). He finds it easy to give up life which he knows so little, and for which he does not have any passion. Thus, he does not have any motivation to fight for his life, and when they arrive at Biskra, he is “more dead than alive” (23).

Although he has given up all hope, Marceline’s “passionate care” saves him, and one day “like a lost sailor spotting hand”, he feels “the first glimmer of newly awakening life” (24). This indicates a new hope for Michel, and the beginning of a great change in his life now that he is enthusiastic to discover it. It is interesting that this new thrill of life overlaps another intriguing experience Michel has: the visit of an Arab boy, Bachir. He is excited at noticing that Bachir is “completely naked beneath his thin white gandourah” (25). As Michel watches the boy’s “bare feet” and
“charming ankles”, he feels an urge to touch him (25). Although he cannot grasp that this is an indication of his homosexual inclinations, it still makes a big impact on him, and he falls in love with the boy’s health. Then, at the moment the boy cuts his thumb, Michel is thrilled at the sight of the flowing blood:

I shuddered with horror, but he just laughed it off, showing off the glistening cut and watching the flow of blood with an air of amusement. . . . He licked the cut blithely; his tongue was pink like a cat’s. Ah, how well he looked. That is what I fell in love with – his health. This small boy was in beautiful health (26).

His excitement at this moment causes a fundamental change in Michel’s attitude towards life. In Ireland’s words, his “feeble interest in living revives” (188). So, it is possible to consider this moment as an epiphany in Michel’s life, because from this point on, he starts to love life. In a way, he becomes a Yes-sayer to life:

I thought of Bachir’s beautiful, glistening blood . . . And suddenly I felt a wish, a desire, more pressing and imperious than anything I had ever felt before, to live! I want to live. I want to live. I clenched my teeth, my fists, concentrated my whole being into the wild, desperate drive towards existence (27).

He starts his way to achieving self-awareness, to becoming an individual independent of any person or any rule, by appreciating life. So, with a strong passion to live and to be healthy, he makes up his own principles. He takes his recovery as his main goal for the time being, and keeps his health in mind as the only measure for deciding on the value of things. He decides thus: “I would identify as good only those things that were salutary to me, forget, reject anything that did not contribute to my cure” (27). Therefore, on the path of becoming a Nietzschean, Michel starts making value judgments independently, only on the basis of his health. It is as if he embraced the principles of what Nietzsche calls master morality, because the man of master morality “feels himself as the determining value – he does not need approval, he judges that ‘what is harmful to me is harmful per se’, he knows that he is the one who causes things to be revered in the first place, he creates values” (BGE 154).

Motivated to live and to be strong, like a master, Michel determines what is good and bad on his own. Thus, it can be argued that this is the beginning of his
individuality, his creating his own values as a strong person. Despite the fact that this act is limited only to his cure for the time being, as it will be seen, this is just the first stage of his new attitude towards life, through which he will become more and more Nietzschean.

Another sign of his strength and independence is revealed through his conversation with Marceline about praying. Upon learning that Marceline has gone to mass and prayed for him, Michel abruptly opposes her, saying “There’s no need to pray for me, Marceline” (29). He argues that praying for God’s help “creates obligations”, so he rejects it. This shows that Michel embraces his new, strong self, and if his independence necessitates the rejection of God, he simply rejects him. So, it can be predicted that Michel will choose to be one of the ‘strong’ people in Nietzsche’s philosophy, and he is ready to renounce anything in order to become a strong and authentic person.

In the meantime, he gets better with the help of his wife and especially with the health and energy he absorbs from the Arab boys. Soon he starts to take walks in the gardens of Biskra, where he appreciates nature and the healthy bodies of young boys through his awakening senses. He realizes that up to that time, he has not paid enough attention to the signs of the flesh:

> Until that day, it seemed to me, I had felt so little and thought so much, and I was astonished to find that my sensations were becoming as strong as thoughts. . . . From the depths of my early childhood the glimmer of a myriad lost sensations was re-emerging. With my new-found awareness of my own senses I was able to recognize them, albeit tentatively. Yes, as my senses awoke, they rediscovered a whole history, reconstructed a whole past life. They were alive! Alive! (34).

As a man who is accustomed to thinking and rationality, he is deeply moved at his own sensuality. From then on, he becomes capable of appreciating his senses and utters the statement “My mind was blank – what was the point of thinking? I felt extraordinarily . . .” (36). As seen, he starts to exalt sensuality over rationality. He seems to internalize Nietzsche’s doctrine that “Our senses are the first origin of all credibility, all good conscience, all apparent truth” (*BGE* 67). As he approximates the Nietzschean ideal, he learns to listen to his natural impulses.
3.2.3. Repudiation of Prevailing Norms

While becoming more inclined to primitive, unrestricted feelings, Michel gradually withdraws from the prevailing rules of his culture. This is clearly seen when he rejoices at the sight of an act of theft. Moktir, one of the children who visits him, steals Marceline’s scissors, thinking that Michel is not seeing him. However, Michel actually notices him stealing, and still does not say anything. On the contrary, he likes what Moktir has done: “I could feel my heart pounding for a moment, but for the life of me I couldn’t summon up a squeak of protest. In fact, I would have to say that the feeling that swept over me was nothing other than joy!” (38). This is a clear sign of how much Michel has withdrawn from morality and rules. From that day on, Moktir becomes his favorite, because he is more natural than the other boys and he does not restrict his actions according to the rules of moral conduct. Moktir’s act introduces Michel to “a life more primitive and less constrained” than the life he knew; so, it is a much “more authentic [expression] of life than the social conventions which they violate” (Ireland 192). Therefore, it is revealed that Michel has started to feel more akin to those who are sincere and authentic, and to draw away from moral restrictions.

As Michel and Marceline continue travelling, Michel for the first time grabs the fact that “since [he] had fallen ill [his] life had been free of rules of moral scrutiny; [he] had merely concentrated on living, like an animal or a child” (42). This is the first time he becomes conscious of his ‘immorality’. It triggers him to question and learn more about himself.

I started to despise the learning that I used to pride myself on. . . . I had discovered that I was different and that I existed – what joy! – independently of them. As an academic, I felt foolish; as a man – did I know myself? I had only just been born and couldn’t yet know who I was. This is what I had to find out (43).

Pondering upon the experiences he has gone through, Michel becomes aware of the fact that his life threatening illness has caused a great change in him and a total reversal of the values he had previously revered:

After my brush with the wing of death, the things that seemed important before no longer mattered; other things had taken their place, things which had never seemed important before, which I didn’t even know
existed. The accreted layers of acquired learning flaked away like greasepaint, offering glimpses of bare flesh, the real person hidden underneath (43).

His experience of death and then return to health urge him to question his mode of life and to acknowledge “his former existence as misguided and based on a false set of values” (Walker 25). Thus, he decides on a reversal of his way of living. His transformation triggered by his illness, as Guerard suggests, is analogous to Nietzsche’s personal experience (103). In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche writes

Illness likewise gave me the right to a complete reversal of my mode of life. . . . The essential self, which had been buried, as it were, which had lost its voice under the pressure of being forced to listen to other selves continually . . . awakened slowly, timidly, doubtfully – but at last it spoke again (qtd. in Guerard 104).

In both cases – Michel’s and Nietzsche’s – approaching to death functions as a trigger for the man to find and become himself. Just like Nietzsche who advocates the idea that man should always be in a state of becoming himself, Michel, too, becomes determined to discover his true self, “the authentic being . . . the one that everything in [his] life – books, teachers, parents . . . – had tried to suppress” (43). It is clear in his decision “to shake off these layers” that Michel intends to eliminate all the values imposed on him by his family, society, and education (43). That is why he cries “A new self! A new self!” (44).

Just as Nietzsche supports man’s constant act of becoming himself, Michel sees himself as a “perfectible being” (44). In order to find his new self he has to get rid of any artificial, culturally imposed ideal. Following Nietzsche, he reverses his mode of life. As it is argued by Nietzsche, education and the existing morality – being a slave morality – try to suppress man’s natural side. In this respect, they deny life. They destroy man’s senses and force him to be a rational being and condemn whatever his nature supports and wishes. What Michel decides to do, on the other hand, is uncovering the things that morality suppresses. To be able to do this, he is determined to “revile or repress everything that [he] thought [he] owed to [his] past education and [his] former morality” (44).
With this motivation, he arranges his pattern of thought and life in a way that he will be free of any restriction and use his will to make his body stronger. Therefore, it becomes clear that Michel’s will to power, which has been buried and repressed for a long time, is now liberated and has started to govern his thoughts and actions. It leads Michel towards creating his own morality in the service of his strength and happiness.

3.2.4. The Triumph of the Dionysian over the Apollonian

Considering that Michel has started to respect his senses and to decide on his own ideals, it can be asserted that he has come a long way since his marriage. In other words, he has become another man, and can be called a Dionysian in Nietzsche’s terms. While at the beginning he was depicted as a rational scholar, what he becomes after his illness and the discovery of his homosexuality is a very different man who can appreciate his own nature. That it so say, the Apollonian man of the past becomes more and more Dionysian as time passes.

As a rejection of his Apollonian side, he first despises his academic learning and career, since they do not give insight to real life, the life of the senses. This idea leads him to get rid of his scholarly look and to gain a new appearance suitable to his new self. As he looks in the mirror, he is not content with what he sees: “a dusty old scholar”; therefore, he shaves his full beard out of a “need to find expression for the changes to [his] inner self” (48). This act can be regarded as a sign of his contempt for his old Apollonian self as a scholar.

Having greeted his new appearance which matches the new character he has adopted, Michel continues enjoying his journey “towards a richer, fuller life and a more delicious happiness” (49). His senses have grown so important to him that he describes his contentment with words related to his five senses. He not only goes towards a ‘delicious’ happiness, but also rejoices at the feeling of “sun-warmed rocks” and gets excited by the “smells” along the road (50). When he exclaims “O joy of the body!” and “The great rhythm of my muscles! Good health!” (50), it is more clearly seen that he is motivated by the messages of his body and has become a Dionysian who is united with his nature and who leaves the command of order and rationality aside.
Another manifestation of the strong Dionysian impulse he is driven by is seen in his thoughts about history, his main field of profession. He confesses that his historical projects do not attract him anymore. He is interested in only one historical figure, and the reason for this attraction is that he finds in this figure his own rebellious inclinations:

[T]he figure of the young king Athalaric was the one that attracted me most. I pictured this boy of fifteen, secretly inspired by the Goths, rebelling against his mother Amalasontha, kicking against his Latin education, rejecting his culture like a horse shaking off a troublesome harness and choosing the society of the uncivilized Goths over that of the old and wise Cassiodorus; for a few years . . . he led a life of violence and unbridled pleasure, only to die at the age of eighteen, burned out by debauchery. In his tragic impulse towards a more savage and unsullied state I found elements of what Marceline would call with a smile ‘my crisis’ (53-54).

Michel recognizes the resemblance between Athalaric and himself, and for the first time feels uneasy about the rebellious character he has internalized. As he sees in the case of Athalaric, embracing only the Dionysian drives – uncontrolled passions – may lead to excess and destruction. Since he identifies himself with the tragic Dionysian Athalaric, he concludes that there is a lesson for him to be learned in this tragedy. Yet, no matter how much his destiny will resemble Athalaric’s, Michel seems to have already become the Dionysian man celebrated by the ancient Greeks and by Nietzsche.

Considering the new attitude he has adopted, it can be argued that Michel’s experiences throughout his trip have helped him emancipate his repressed instincts. Thus, as Ralph Freedman also points out, “freedom of sensation”, Michel’s new Dionysian principle, is “identified with North Africa, Arab boys . . . and implied homosexuality” (145). All these have helped the revival of the instincts unknown to Michel up to that time, and made him a Dionysian who can eventually grasp the virtue of the senses.

3.2.5. Contempt for the Herd

Inspired by the tragic case of Athalaric, Michel feels urged to question his mode of life. The question marks he has in mind about his relentless hedonism and sensuality lead him to decide on settling down and taking up his scholarly work again. This shows
the contradictory impulses inherent in Michel. While he feels a need to change, to follow his passions, on the other hand he starts to fear that his end may resemble that of king Athalaric. Moreover, he recognizes that the pace at which they are travelling has started to exhaust Marceline. Besides, she gets pregnant, which makes it compulsory for her to take some rest. As a result, Michel resolves to try settling down and fulfilling his duties. Fearing that he may end up like the ruthless king Athalaric, “he guards against ‘vagabond inclination’” by setting up an expensive apartment and accepting a lectureship in Paris (Guerard 104-105).

After having stayed at Michel’s family estate at La Moriniere for four months, they move back to Paris. Occupied with arranging their new house, they find themselves constantly spending money. Although the cost of this luxurious life exceeds their income, Michel relies on the extra income he hopes to get from the farm in Moriniere and from the lectures he will give throughout the year. Once they set up their home, they get an “endless stream of visitors”, which makes it impossible for Marceline to have the rest she needs (71). Consequently, Marceline’s health declines dramatically.

So as to save Marceline from the exhausting task of receiving visitors every day, Michel decides to have “an ‘open house’ every Thursday evening as a way of avoiding having to receive people the rest of the week” (79). Besides, he decides to visit friends in their places so that Marceline has more time to rest. Nevertheless, Michel soon discovers that he does not like the company of his acquaintances any more. He sees that it is impossible for his friends to understand him, thus he feels “compelled to act out a false part, to be like that person they thought [him] still to be, so as not to appear to be pretending” (72). When he tries the company of the novelists and poets he knows, he is disappointed again, seeing that they do not understand life, and those with an understanding, on the other hand, do not show it. “I got the impression that they didn’t live at all; they were content merely to give the appearance of it; to them life seemed little more than an annoying impediment to their writing” (72). Having also met some philosophers and mathematicians, he comes to the conclusion that they are all like each other, and none of them really, fully lives.

Disappointed at spending a whole day with such people, one day, Michel complains to Marceline that “They are all the same, like exact copies. When I speak
to one I could be speaking to any of them” (73). For Marceline, an ordinary woman not at all like Michel, this is not something to be bothered by. When she tells Michel that not everybody can be expected to be different from other people, Michel explicitly utters his growing contempt for society: “The more they are like each other, the less like me they are” (73). Apparently enough, Michel has become so different a person that his life in Paris has become fake, and he cannot stand it. This is clearly seen one more time, when he says

[n]one of them has been ill. They are alive, they give the appearance of living, yet they don’t seem to know they are alive. Come to that, since I’ve been in their company, I haven’t been alive myself. Today, for example, what have I done? . . . I met your brother at the solicitor’s and then couldn’t get rid of him. . . . I had lunch in that part of town with Philippe, then met Louis in a café. . . . And now that I look back on my day it all seems so pointless and empty that I wish I could have it back again and relive it and it just makes me want to cry (73).

Compared to the young Arab boys who are much more natural and appealing to his senses, the Parisian people around Michel make him realize how artificial and ignorant of life culture makes people. Therefore, he comprehends that all people he has met are the same, and all are unaware of the other possibilities in life experienced by Michel during his trip. Having realized this, Michel develops a growing disgust of society, and starts to pride himself saying “The very things that separated me and distinguished me from other people were what mattered; the very things no one else would or could say, these were the things I had to say” (74). Hence, it is seen that he praises individuality and authenticity. So, one more time, he becomes more like one of Nietzsche’s strong men who are courageous enough to run away from the herd. They have a contempt for the herd, because it is the weak people who constitute the majority, the herd, in which repression of the natural instincts is the governing rule. As Nietzsche writes,

wherever there are herds, it is the instinct of weakness which has willed the herd . . . For the following fact should not be overlooked: the strong are as naturally inclined to disperse as the weak are to congregate; when the former join together, it is only with a view to an aggressive collective action and satisfaction of their will to power . . . the latter, on the other hand, take pleasure in the very act of assembly – in the process,
their instinct is satisfied to the same extent that the instinct of the born 'masters'... is deeply irritated and disturbed by organization (GM 114).

As a born ‘master’, as a free spirit, Michel feels urged to avoid the society of the weak and ordinary people. Correspondingly, he loses interest in everyone in Paris except for one man. As it can be predicted, the reason for his interest in this man, Menalque, is that he is an outsider like Michel. He has been involved in a lawsuit, which is not described clearly. Yet, it is explicit that he is involved in a scandal, and newspapers do not write nice things about him (74). However, Michel seems to like that he has a somehow blackened name. Hinting that he is not one of the herd, Menalque’s case intrigues Michel:

‘[D]ecent society’ was outraged and so-called ‘respectable’ people felt impelled to turn their backs on him and pay him back for his contempt in kind. To me this was another point in his favour. Attracted by some secret affinity between us, I went up to him and embraced him warmly in front of everyone (74-75).

Similarly, Menalque is attracted to Michel and wishes to learn more about him. As they get into a conversation, Menalque explains that the reason why he wants to know Michel better is Michel’s “throw[ing] on the bonfire” “everything [he] once held in such high esteem” (75). Apparently, Michel’s reversal of life and ideas appeals to Menalque, and they involve themselves in a conversation which brings to light the similarities between these two men.

Soon it is understood that Menalque is a devoted Nietzschean in that he has a strong appreciation of life. When asked by Michel about whether he smokes or not, he answers “Not any more... I seek to heighten life, not diminish it, through intoxication” (76). He holds it as a principle that his acts should contribute to life. Furthermore, he turns out to be a Dionysian like Michel, since he embraces the Dionysiac ideal which aims to unite life with nature. “I exist as a single whole. My only claim is to be natural; if something gives me pleasure, I take that as a sign that I should do it” (80). This statement is parallel to the Dionysian idea in that Menalque listens to his natural impulses instead of repressing them like other people. The fact that both men celebrate the unity of life and nature, and that both enjoy fulfilling their bodily desires bring them closer to each other. This friendship becomes interesting for Michel, because
Menalque’s ideas are like echoes of his own feelings (85). This spokesperson of Nietzsche helps him identify the vague thoughts and feelings he owns but cannot name clearly. Thus, Menalque becomes an important figure in Michel’s life in that he helps him to strengthen his own philosophy.

Another common point between them is revealed through Menalque’s criticism of people. He argues that whatever they value is rooted in restraint and imitation:

. . . most of them believe the only good comes from restraint; their pleasure is counterfeit. People don’t want to be like themselves. They all choose a model to imitate, or if they don’t choose a model themselves, they accept one ready-made. . . . The law of imitation – I call it the law of fear. . . . The things one feels are different about oneself are the things that are rare, that give each person his value – and these are the things they try to repress. They imitate, and they make out they love life! (81).

In this criticism Michel finds a more complete expression of his previous ideas about society. Since Menalque says the same thing Michel has tried to express to Marceline before, Michel is deeply influenced by him and feels that he should agree, saying “I loathe as much as you. I hate all people of principle” (81).

Just as they hate society, so do they also have an aversion of the culture it creates. Michel, in his lectures, suggests that “culture, which is born of life, ends up killing it” (74). According to him, culture prevents spirit from uniting with nature, and as a result, “life within” diminishes, and the spirit eventually dies (74). This is an echo of Nietzsche’s argument that modern culture is life-denying. Under the disguise of civilization, it actually kills what is authentic and natural. Menalque, too, shares the same idea. His criticism is based on a comparison between the art and philosophy of the ancient Greeks and of today, the exact method of Nietzsche’s criticism. Just like Nietzsche, Menalque argues that

[t]he Greeks created their ideals directly from life. The life of the artist was itself an act of poetic creation, the life of the philosopher an enactment of his philosophy. Both were bound up with life: instead of ignoring each other, philosophy fed poetry and poetry expressed philosophy, with admirably persuasive results (84–85).
Modern poetry and philosophy, on the other hand, are “so lifeless” according to him, because “they are detached from life” (84). Hence, it seems proper to infer that Michel’s criticism of culture, Menalque’s comparison of modern and Greek art, and Nietzsche’s analysis of ancient Greek tragedy, all three of them, arrive at a similar conclusion: Modern art, philosophy, and culture are disintegrated from life and nature. That is why it kills life and the individuality and authenticity of people. Thus, both Michel and Menalque repudiate culture and society so as to be authentic individuals.

3.2.6. Losing the Balance between Sensuality and Logic

Obsessed with his new self and with constructing his own morality, Michel is not aware of the fact that he is neglecting his wife. Although Marceline is expecting a baby and needs to be cared for, Michel is focused on his own thoughts and fails to take care of her. As a result, Marceline’s condition worsens day by day.

On the last night Michel meets Menalque and they discuss about their attitudes towards life, Michel very well knows that Marceline’s situation has become risky and she should not be left alone. Yet, following his desire to see Menalque for a last time, Michel chooses to meet him. After he comes home, he finds Marceline covered in blood and the doctor waiting besides her. It turns out that she has had a miscarriage. Feeling guilty for neglecting her, Michel decides to take Marceline to La Moriniere with the hope that fresh air will help her get better.

As soon as Michel’s lectures come to an end, they leave Paris. At Moriniere, Michel takes care of the farm. However, in this second visit, Michel is possessed by “a strange urge to destroy the harmony and order he had helped establish” during his previous stay” (Guerard 105). Soon it is seen that Michel spends time with the workers of bad character instead of organizing the farm work. He becomes more interested in the lives of notorious workers than his responsibilities as a land owner and as a husband. Soon, he loses control over the farm and learns that the workers do not respect him anymore. Some even try to cheat him. Consequently, he puts the farm up for sale, from which he will not be able to profit. After the loss of the baby, this is the second failure he experiences. Hence, this can be regarded as another example of the destructive outcomes of Michel’s new form of existence.
When it comes to Marceline, it is seen that Michel continues to ignore her. She is always left alone at home, so her illness becomes more threatening. One night, when she feels bad, she responds to Michel’s dutiful care by asking “Do you really care so much whether I live or not?” (102). It becomes clear that the new life style Michel has taken up has started to harm both him and the people around. Brée and Guiton also claim that his new personality becomes “brutally destructive” (28). While trying to achieve a kind of self-fulfillment, he actually causes disasters in everything he is in contact with. Thus it can be argued that on his way to freedom and self-awareness, he is “in a sense blind; . . . blind to the direction he is taking, blind to the disaster he is preparing” (Brée and Guiton 29).

The destructive effects of Michel’s attitude on the baby, on the farm, and on Marceline’s health, results from the fact that Michel has started to lose the balance between his logic and sensuality. Completely rejecting the importance of rationality and fulfilling responsibilities, he loses order and logic in his life. He is confined within the dictates of his senses. This is clearly seen when he cannot focus on his studies:

I was easily distracted by the sound of someone singing or the slightest noise from the outside world; every voice I heard seemed to be calling me. How often would I drop my book and dash to the window, only to find nothing there! How often would I rush out of the house . . . The only way I could pay attention to anything was through my five senses (97).

It appears that Michel has become too Dionysian, and has been totally suppressing the Apollonian impulses. Although at first appreciating the Dionysian drive provides him with a chance to learn how to cherish life, as soon as he loses the balance between the contradictory impulses and eliminates rationality completely, his life starts to go to the other extreme.

Still not fully aware of the direction his life is taking, Michel takes Marceline south as if they were on a second honeymoon. However, they have to stop at Neuchatel, since Marceline’s health deteriorates critically. There, she is diagnosed with tuberculosis which makes it necessary to stay there for a while. However, Michel finds it difficult to tolerate people in Switzerland. He regards their honesty as banal and artificial:
My own is more than enough for me. I detest these honest folk. I may have nothing to fear from them, but I have nothing to learn from them either. And they have nothing to say. . . . Oh these honest Swiss. Where do their good manners get them? . . . They have no crime, no history, no literature, no art. . . . They are like a sturdy rosebush without thorns or flowers (110).

As he hates anything ordinary and acceptable by society, he feels urged to investigate the wild side of people. He feels more akin to people who are decadent according to the norms of society. He explains the philosophy he has adopted about people as follows: “I began to appreciate other people only when they displayed their wild side; I hated it when they suppressed this out of some sense of restraint” (110). Allegedly, he has interest only in the strong people who dare to be different. For the others who, out of fear, restrict their animal side, he feels contempt. Therefore, the civilized, ordinary people of Switzerland bore him to death, and he wishes to leave and go to south to find the life he previously experienced there. As it is stated before, Michel’s deeply buried Apollonian side cannot interfere in his preoccupation with his own feelings. Despite the fact that his wife is in a crucial condition, he is worried only about himself, and decides to leave Neuchatel to discover new things: “It seemed to me that I had been born to make new sorts of discoveries. I grew strangely excited by my investigation into the darkness, knowing that it entailed a repudiation of all culture, decency and morality” (110).

Consequently, he takes Marceline down to Italy, hoping that the warm weather would help her health. Although his main motivation seems to be to improve Marceline’s condition, deep down inside he cannot find satisfaction for himself wherever they go. They travel from Milan to Florence, to Rome, then to Naples, and then back to Rome (111). However, this does more harm than good to Marceline:

Although she relied on me to take care of everything, these sudden changes of scene tired her out. But what tired her out even more – I can admit it now – was her alarm at what was going on in my head.

‘I understand your doctrine,’ she said to me one day, ‘for that is what it has become – a doctrine. And no doubt it is a very fine one.’ Then she added sadly, lowering her voice, ‘But it leaves out the weak.’ (112).
It is apparent that the strong passions Michel is driven by make him a selfish wanderer who drags his desperate wife from city to city, and who cannot see that she is dying. When Marceline says his way of life eliminates the weak, Michel answers that “[t]hat’s how it should be” (112). As Pollard pinpoints, Marceline’s going in the “opposite direction” while Michel is getting stronger is “an example of the weak sacrificed to the strong” (355). As a result of Michel’s newly adopted attitude, the weak is eliminated for the sake of the strong. In this case, it causes the decline of Marceline’s health.

It is seen that Michel’s uncontrolled Dionysian impulse causes him to adopt contempt for the weak. It first starts with his choosing the company of stronger Arab boys and rejecting the shy and weak ones. Then, he develops a doctrine that people who can rebel against the prevailing norms are stronger, and he likes them more. Now, one of the weak people, Marceline, suffers from Michel’s selfish hedonism. He really thinks that ‘that is how it should be’.

Continuing to ignore the weak in order to become happier and stronger, Michel keeps on taking Marceline to south, this time to Syracuse. There he again leaves his wife at the hotel and frequents the bands of “tramps and drunken sailors” (115). It is seen that he finds pleasure among decadent groups of people:

I found the lowest types the most delectable company. I had no need to understand their language when I could feel it in my whole body. I misread the brutality of their passion as a sign of health and vigor. . . . In their company I felt even more strongly my growing hatred of luxury, of comfort, of that protected blanket which my new state of health had rendered obsolete, of all the precautions one takes to insulate oneself from the hazardous contact with life (115-116).

Ever more provoked by the company of such people, he wants to travel to Tunis. Being there for a second time, he thinks that “this land of pleasure satisfies desire without assuaging it; instead, desire is stimulated once more” (117). Thus, he realizes that wherever he goes, he cannot find satisfaction. This results from the fact that he has lost the balance he should have kept. So it goes on taking him to extremes, and slowly to the destruction of everything he has. After Tunis, they arrive at Biskra, the place where he discovered his awakening senses and homosexual inclinations. Marceline, being too tired, goes to bed, and Michel immediately runs out to find the
children. However, what he finds out disappoints him. They have all grown up and have jobs now. He fears that even the children he loves so dearly have grown up to be like the other people Michel hates. He exclaims “How respectable careers make pigs of us! Am I going to find the same things here I detested so much at home?” (118).

Apparently, at his second visit, Michel finds the same things he has been actually running away from. Only Moktir is as he hoped to find. Only he has not been integrated into the adult world, because, as Michel learns, he does not work and has just got out of prison (119). Michel realizes that he wants to see him again, and haphazardly asks him to accompany him to Touggourt. It is seen that Michel has become “a prowler as he prefers the instinctual to the civilized” (Pollard 362). He travels from one place to another, spontaneously, without thinking. However, he is not sure about what he wants to do and where he wants to go, and suddenly finds himself at a lost: “I am losing my art, I can feel it going – to be replaced by what? Not, as before, a happy harmony . . . I no longer know the dark god I revere. O new God, show me new peoples, unimagined forms of beauty” (120).

Clearly, he is not happy and excited anymore as at the first days of his recovery. Some change has happened, but he cannot name it. On the way to Touggourt, this time he finds the things he sees “paltry and ugly”, and Marceline protests with the exclamation “You are in love with the inhuman” (120). She seems to have the right to protest as Michel does not know what he wants, does not have a purpose. He only brings Marceline closer to death day by day. Indeed, this trip becomes their last one, since the harsh weather exhausts the woman. On the first night they arrive at the hotel, Michel leaves Marceline in order to meet Moktir’s mistress, and then turns back only to find that “[t]he sheets, her hands and night dress are drenched with blood. It is all over her face. Her eyes are hideously enlarged. No cry of pain could have chilled me more than her awful silence” (122). It turns out to be the last night of Marceline’s life and of Michel’s story.

At the end of his story, Michel accepts that although he has liberated himself, he has failed to find a reason to live. Thus, he feels at a loss and does not know whether he has followed the right path or not:

The thing that scares me, I have to admit, is that I am still quite young. I sometimes feel as if my real life has yet to begin. Take me away from
here and give me a reason to live. I no longer have one. Maybe I have
liberated myself. But so what? I find this empty liberty painful to bear.
It is not, I promise you, that I am tired of my crime, if you want to call
it that, but I must prove to myself that I have not gone too far (123).

3.2.7. The “Imperfect Nietzschean”

Following Michel’s journey from the beginning to the end reveals that his story
of bildung can be read at two different levels. First, he grows from immaturity to self-
awareness. Although at the beginning he knows nothing of life, through his illness and
recovery, he slowly gains freedom and a new, more authentic identity. On the second
level, while acquiring a new self, he causes the destruction of several things and lives.
So, to a certain point, he develops from immaturity to awareness; however, after a
while, his bildung takes the form of a “failed apprenticeship” (Day 24). Embracing
Nietzsche’s philosophy as his guide in life, Michel first becomes an authentic being
who appreciates life; however, through the end, he loses the balance and prepares his
decline and destruction.

At the beginning, in James Day’s terms, he is a “bookworm ignorant of real
life” (27). He is an ordinary man conforming to social norms. However, his illness
makes him question life, and he starts to embrace ideas quite similar to Nietzsche’s.
Soon, these ideas shape his new self. He organizes his life and reverses his thoughts
according to these ideas.

During his honeymoon trip, he learns how to appreciate life. When he realizes
his senses, he starts to love life. In Nietzschean terms, he becomes a Yes-sayer. Having
acknowledged the power of his will, he makes decisions in a way that they give him
pleasure and power. Pledging to be natural, he tries to learn his true self by a “ruthless
elimination of everything factitious and acquired” (Guerard 103). Consequently, he
becomes a Dionysian and takes his senses as the only truth.

Especially after meeting Menalque, who teaches him “the relativity of moral
codes” (Durant and Durant 141), he rejects existing moral values, which gives the
novel its title. However, his repudiating Christian ethics, his immoralism, does not
mean that he becomes amoral. He is an immoralist only in the sense that he does not
accept prevailing morality “as a satisfactory basis for evaluating the only
manifestations of life which he regards as authentic” (Ireland 193). Hence, his
immoralism does not mean that he has stopped making moral judgments. It is only that
he determines moral values on his own, not according to Christian ethics. So, he decides that to have an authentic self, he has to become the creator of his own values, just like Nietzsche orders.

Having liberated himself from such constraints, however, he finds it difficult to use his freedom meaningfully. As Guerard claims, he becomes paralyzed by this freedom (101). Therefore, he follows a “harsh and aimless individualism” (102). Still unable to put meaning into his new life style, Michel loses the necessary balance between logic and his sensuality, which I find analogous to the balance between Apollonian and Dionysian impulses in Nietzsche’s philosophy. While embracing his senses, he totally forgets the necessity of reason and order; thus, his new personality becomes destructive. As a result, he finds himself alienated from everyone, and loses his career, estate, child, and wife.

This failure, in one respect, shows that Michel has misread Nietzsche’s philosophy. In the Nietzschean ideal, there is a balance between the contradictory impulses of Apollo and Dionysus. If one surpasses the other, the equilibrium is lost, and the result is disaster. Yet, Michel fails to see this. He misinterprets his freedom and sacrifices the Apollonian for the sake of the Dionysian appreciation of his senses. As Guerard claims, “Michel is an imperfect Nietzschean” exactly due to this failure. Thus, The Immoralist can be read as a critique of Nietzschean philosophy. If this philosophy is interpreted incorrectly, it leads to the destruction of the individual as in the case of Michel, who “was incapable of the solution Gide elsewhere proposed: to become fully conscious of the inner dialogue between order and anarchy, and to suppress by an act of will whichever voice threatens to become too strong” (Guerard 109).

In conclusion, The Immoralist can be viewed as a criticism. Narrating the coming of age of Michel, it at the same time dwells on the integration of Nietzschean philosophy into real life. While doing this, Gide makes a criticism of this philosophy by showing its possible outcomes if it is taken to the extremes. However, it is not Nietzsche’s ideas that Gide criticizes. What he tries to show instead is the possibility of ending up with an aimless individualism if Nietzsche’s ideas are misread, because Michel’s emancipating himself from moral codes and releasing his natural desires prove to be inadequate to save him from disaster in the end. In this respect, it is
arguable that what Gide criticizes in *The Immoralist* is not actually Nietzschean philosophy itself, but the protagonist’s lack of capacity to bear the freedom he gains. As Sheridan, too, observes, “Michel takes Nietzsche simplistically, abandoning Culture for Nature, letting the weak go to the wall, and in the end losing everything” (xi). Still, the philosophy he takes up helps him gain a richer view of life and of himself. All in all, Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values, and especially the opposition between Apollo and Dionysus play the most important role in the self-fulfillment of the hero of *The Immoralist*. 
CHAPTER 4

A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN

4.1. James Joyce and Nietzsche

While André Gide’s affiliation with Nietzsche is widely known and studied, Nietzschean influence on Joyce is not the main concern in most of the discussion on Joyce’s fiction. However, his biographer Richard Ellmann’s suggestions support the few works focusing on a Joyce-Nietzsche relationship. Ellmann writes that by 1903 Joyce had been familiar with Nietzsche, who was rapidly being discovered in Ireland in those years, and also that

it was probably upon Nietzsche that Joyce drew when he expounded to his friends a neo-paganism that glorified selfishness, licentiousness, and pitilessness, and denounced gratitude and other ‘domestic virtues’. At heart Joyce can scarcely have been a Nietzschean any more than he was a socialist; his interest was in the ordinary even more than in the extraordinary; but for the moment, in the year’s doldrums, his expectations everywhere checked, it was emollient to think of himself as a superman, and he meditated a descend from the mountain to bring his gospel of churchless freedom to the unreceptive rabblement (142).

This statement makes it possible to believe that Joyce found Nietzsche’s ideas interesting and identified himself with the idea of übermensch. That is why one of the cards sent by Joyce to a friend is signed “James Overman” (162). Ellmann also points out that in the tower where he stayed in 1904 with Gogarty for a while “Nietzsche was the principal prophet” (172). Considering all these signs that Joyce was familiar with Nietzsche, it is possible that Joyce’s ideas and works may display many correlations to Nietzschean thought.

Thinking that Joyce himself grew critical of the existing society and religion, and rebelled against old moral codes, one can easily suppose that most Nietzschean ideas may have influenced Joyce. Correspondingly, quoting Joyce’s “[m]y mind
rejects the whole present social order and Christianity”, Christopher Butler argues that Nietzsche helped Joyce preserve his opposition to the totalizing sets of values characterizing the bourgeoisie (67-68). Similarly, Joseph Valente who has written one of the most comprehensive discussions of Joyce’s fiction as Nietzschean, claims that in Nietzsche, Joyce found “an empowering myth for his struggle against the mind-forged manacles of Irish society” (87).

Among Joyce’s works, the one most widely associated with Nietzsche seems to be *Ulysses*. Kim Allen Gleed, for instance, views Buck Mulligan as a Nietzschean character who identifies himself with the *üermensch* (182). Nietzsche describes the *üermensch* as the one who lives only for this world and according to his own values. This, Gleed writes, may have been interpreted by Joyce “as carte blanche for immorality” (182). Hence, calling himself the *üermensch*, Buck Mulligan in *Ulysses* seems to embrace this very Nietzschean idea. “A Painful Case”, a story from *Dubliners*, is also worth mentioning as it has found its place in David Thatcher’s survey of Nietzsche’s reception in England. According to Thatcher, the theme of “A Painful Case” is based upon the ideas found in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (135). Another work that is claimed to contain Nietzschean ideas is Joyce’s only play, *Exiles*. One of the characters, Robert, expresses ideas identical to Nietzsche’s sympathy towards human desires and disgust of the laws of slave morality. These ideas are found in Robert’s statement: “I am sure that no law made by man is sacred before the impulse of passion. . . . There is no law before impulse. Laws are for slaves” (qtd. in Mahaffey 215). Mahaffey also directs attention to the same idea when he quotes Robert saying “with Nietzschean fervor, ‘All life is a conquest, the victory of human passion over the commandments of cowardice. . . . The blinding instant of passion alone—passion, free, unashamed, irresistible—that is the only gate by which we can escape from the misery of what slaves call life.’” (215). Therefore, it is seen that although it may be too far-fetched to say that Joyce’s works are completely based on Nietzschean ideas, there is still a clear sign of influence in several of Joyce’s works from *Ulysses* to *Exiles*. At least, both Nietzsche and Joyce dwelled upon more or less the same ideas.

Considering Joyce’s interest in Nietzsche leads one to question the possibility of finding traces of Nietzsche in another of Joyce’s major works, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. A careful reading easily reveals that as a modernist
*bildungsroman*. *Portrait* is the story of a rebellious hero rejecting harmonious oneness with society. Therefore, it is expected that the hero embraces similar ideas to that of *The Immoralist*’s Michel and follows a path which can be called Nietzschean.

Actually, several critics have directed readers’ attention to the Nietzschean characteristics of the *Portrait*. Valente, for instance, considers Stephen’s decision “to forge . . . the uncreated conscience of [his] race” as a “recognizably Zarathustrian project” (87). Paul Jones, too, comes to a similar conclusion by comparing *Portrait* with George Moore’s *The Lake* and argues that both novels are essentially Nietzschean and both apply this philosophy to an Irish context (169). With a different approach, Sam Slote, in his *Joyce’s Nietzschean Ethics*, points out the similarity between Stephen’s aesthetic theory and Nietzsche’s ideas about the self-creation and self-fashioning of the artist (7).

Although critics approach the Nietzschean influence on Joyce from different points of view, there seems to be a tendency to view Stephen as an übermensch, as Thatcher does when he writes that “Stephen’s vision in *A Portrait* of the ‘hawk-like man whose name he bore’ may owe something to Nietzsche’s vision of the superman” (135). Therefore, keeping in mind that Stephen aspires to a Nietzschean way of life, I make a discussion of the *Portrait* as a *bildungsroman* characteristically modernist and Nietzschean in that its protagonist ends up in a total rejection of culture, religion, and nationality.

**4.2. Stephen Dedalus as a Nietzschean Character**

**4.2.1. Guilt and Punishment**

During his school years, Joyce himself adopted doubts about Irish Catholicism, and slowly repudiated it. His rejection of its values and desire for total freedom, therefore, found their place as autobiographical elements in the *Portrait*. Stephen, like the novel’s author, gains his identity as an artist by shaking off the same values. However, before emancipating himself wholly, he lives through a stage when he is controlled and created by Irish culture and Catholicism. Thus, on his way to becoming an artist, he goes through a phase of oscillation between obedience to the voices controlling him and fulfilling his human desires.
His story of development is similar to that of Michel in *The Immoralist* in that Stephen becomes a Nietzschean anti-hero like Michel. Although his story is not a story of failure and destruction which is seen in *The Immoralist*, he shares several characteristics with Michel. Like Michel, he is a typical modernist anti-hero who is alienated from his surroundings and who is absorbed in his own ideas and feelings. As it will be seen, he has intimate relationships neither with his family nor with his friends, which makes him all alone during his journey towards selfhood. Thus, he has to learn his own wisdom on his own, and this results in his total detachment from society. From others’ point of view he seems to be a selfish and rebellious boy, which is a characteristic of both modernist and Nietzschean heroes. Hence, throughout the novel it is easy to view Stephen as a Nietzschean anti-hero who will become more and more independent and socially alienated.

At the beginning, he is depicted as a baby recognizing the world through his senses. Relating his childhood memories from a child’s point of view, Joyce uses a vocabulary of the senses: “When you wet the bed first it is warm then it gets cold”, and Stephen remembers that his mother had a ‘nice smell’ (3). It is seen that, quite naturally, Stephen distinguishes between good and bad things through their warmth and smell. However, he is exposed to restricting rules of his culture and religion right through the beginning, which will force him to be obedient and to mortify the senses that actually help him understand the world.

The religion Stephen is exposed to is portrayed with an emphasis on its restrictive character. Even when he is asked to apologize for something, Dante, a devoted Catholic, tries to make Stephen obey by means of imposing fear: “[I]f not the eagles will come and pull out his eyes” (4). Thus, Stephen remembers the following song:

*Pull out his eyes,*  
*Apologize,*  
*Apologize,*  
*Pull out his eyes.*

*Apologize,*  
*Pull out his eyes,*  
*Pull out his eyes,*  
*Apologize* (4).
Raised by fear and punishment, Stephen learns to obey religious rules so as not to be punished in the other world. He says his prayers every night “so that he might not go to hell when he died” (12). So, it can be argued that it is the feeling of guilt and bad conscience which controls man’s loyalty to social and religious rules. This is analogous to Nietzsche’s views on punishment and guilt. According to him, punishment aims at a sense of guilt, at controlling desires and taming man. This means a separation for man from his animal side. Therefore, he views bad conscience as “the deep sickness to which man was obliged to succumb . . . when he found himself definitely locked in the spell of society”, and for punishment, society’s method of control and repression, he says that it “tames man, but it does not make him ‘better’ (GM 64). As seen, bad conscience and punishment, which Nietzsche sees as the instruments of life-denying values, lie at the heart of Catholic upbringing found in the *Portrait*.

At his Jesuit school, Stephen experiences an unfair act of punishment. Just because he has broken his glasses and cannot study, Father Dolan, the prefect of studies, calls him a “schemer” and beats him in front of the class (37). As Eric Bulson points out, this is a reason for Stephen to identify Church with betrayal (53). Therefore, his trust in priests is shaken. Deeply hurt, he goes to the rector and tells him what happened. Still, he decides to force himself to be quiet and obedient to Father Dolan to show that he is not proud for reporting the case to the rector (44).

This experience results in Stephen’s distrust of priests, because it makes him see the wrong and unjust side of them. He contemplates that

[i]t was wrong; it was unfair and cruel; and, as he sat in the refectory, he suffered time after time in memory the same humiliation until he began to wonder whether it might not really be that there was something in his face which made him look like a schemer and he wished he had a little mirror to see. But there could not be; and it was unjust and cruel and unfair (39).

Hence, this incident deeply influences Stephen, and from then on, he starts to draw away from religion.

As he gains a better awareness, he fully recognizes religion and priesthood as unbalanced and unsatisfactory. For instance, when he observes one of the Jesuit
priests’ clothes and behaviors, he realizes that there is deterioration and insincerity: “he was aware of some desecration of the priest’s office or of the vestry itself whose silence was now routed by loud talk and joking and its air pungent with the smells of the gas-jets and the grease” (64).

Founded upon fear and punishment, and also seen as insincere, the religious life experienced by Stephen is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s own account of religion, because punishment and guilty conscience are Nietzsche’s points of criticism related to religion (Hibbs 120). Having started to develop doubts about Catholicism, Stephen starts to alienate himself from the Jesuits, which will be encouraged more by his awakening senses in the future.

4.2.2. Revolt against the Common Norms

After being punished in a humiliating and unjust way, Stephen feels betrayed, and as William York Tindall argues, this causes a decline in his faith and obedience (56). Therefore, he gradually gives up listening to other people’s commands. Although at first he is described as “a model youth” by a friend saying “He doesn’t smoke and he doesn’t go to bazaars and he doesn’t flirt and he doesn’t damn anything or damn all” (57), he starts to pay attention to the voices of his inner self and awakening senses. One day, thinking of Mercedes from the novel The Count of Monte Cristo and picturing that he is her lover, Mercedes’ image makes him feel that “a strange unrest crept into his blood” (48). Also, at a party he meets a girl, E. C., who attracts him for a long time. He is moved by watching her, and “his heart [dances] upon her movements like a cork upon a tide” (52). Seeing that he has these new strange impulses, his heart becomes restless, because he is under the influence of what his upbringing has always taught him to repress. This can be viewed as a sign that he is led by the Nietzschean will to power, which will result in his becoming more and more Dionysian in future. He will find strength to follow his awakening Dionysian urges.

First, he tries to obey the teachings of his family and priests and feels angry “for being young and the prey of restless foolish impulses” (50). However, soon it is revealed that he is different from other boys, and he will follow his own way rather than being obedient. As the first step of his artistic journey, he acknowledges the difference between him and other boys. As he observes the others at the party, he feels
alone and “the noise of children at play [annoy] him and their silly voices [make] him feel, even more keenly than he . . . felt at Clongowes, that he was different from others” (48). Considering Lee Oser’s suggestion that the other boys Stephen is distinguished from represent Nietzsche’s herd, it is arguable that Stephen chooses not to be one of the herd (71). This is more clearly seen when he starts to “taste the joy of loneliness” (51). As well as being a Nietzschean contempt for the herd, this is also something Stephen shares with Joyce himself, since Joyce, like Nietzsche, talks about isolation and contempt for the mass: “No man, said the Nolan, can be a lover of the true or the good unless he abhors the multitude; and the artist, though he may employ the crowd, is careful to isolate himself” (qtd. in Belanger xxiv).

Now that Stephen ventures to be different, to reject the herd and its values, he can try to be an independent individual. The first sign of his rebelliousness is displayed through the essay he writes. His English master remarks in class “This fellow has heresy in his essay” (59). Mentioning the Creator and the soul, Stephen has written “without the possibility of ever approaching nearer” (60). This is regarded as a sign of heresy, and it makes Stephen a rebel in his fellows’ eyes.

Another important event that shows Stephen’s detachment from mainstream beliefs takes place when he is trapped by his friends and treated cruelly just because he tells them that in his opinion the greatest poet is Byron. It is significant that he likes Byron, because Byron was a Dionysian who relentlessly followed his desires. According to the other boys, it is not acceptable, because they say “Byron was a heretic and immoral too” (61). Stephen, stating “I don’t care what he was”, proves that he has stopped making value judgments on the basis of prevailing morality.

Upon being frequently criticized and threatened for his beliefs, Stephen remembers all the voices telling him what to do and what not to do. Consequently, he detaches himself from these voices and turns to his inner world:

While his mind had been pursuing its intangible phantoms and turning in irresolution from such pursuit he had heard about him the constant voices of his father and of his masters, urging him to be a gentleman above all things and urging him to be a good catholic above all things. These voices had now come to be hollow-sounding in his ears. When the gymnasium had been opened he had heard another voice urging him to be strong and manly and healthy and when the movement towards national revival had begun to be felt in the college yet another voice had
bidden him be true to his country and help to raise up her language and tradition. . . . And it was the din of all these hollow-sounding voices that made him halt irresolutely in the pursuit of phantoms. He gave them ear only for a time but he was happy only when he was far from them, beyond their call, alone or in the company of phantasmal comrades (63).

As Vivian Heller puts forth, the more society demands from him, the more crowded his inner world becomes (64). That is, he rejects the outer world and embraces his inner voices, which are more sincere and true. Soon it will be seen that he is becoming a Dionysian like his favorite poet, because, following Nietzsche, he has stopped listening to other voices and obeying their artificial laws. Instead, he embraces the only true law, that is the law of his own nature. So, driven by his Dionysian instincts, he starts to follow his inner self and his own desires, which will result in his rebellious acts like visiting prostitutes.

Simultaneously, he is alienated from his family. He sees that he is not like his father either. He also feels divided from his mother and siblings as he turns to “the fierce longings of his heart” (75). The impulses he previously endeavored to silence now become stronger, and he feels as if “his blood was in revolt” (75). It becomes evident that now he is driven not by logic and the teachings of his family and the church. Instead, the desires of the body take control of him since he chooses to listen to them. “He wanted to sin with another of his kind, to force another being to sin with him and to exult with her in sin. He felt some dark presence moving irresistibly upon him from the darkness, a presence subtle and murmurous a flood filling him wholly with itself” (76).

Leaving obedience to religion and morality aside, he follows his inner voices and ends up visiting a prostitute, which makes his eyes delighted and filled with tears of joy and relief (76). This is definitely an act of rebellion towards the voices echoing in his mind and telling him to be a good Catholic. However, he has apparently identified religion with betrayal and repression and has seen that embracing his natural impulses instead of religion gives him a better feeling, a feeling of contentment and strength: “In her arms he felt that he had suddenly become strong and fearless and sure of himself” (77). As the Dionysian force unites man with nature, now Stephen seems to have been united with his nature, and, feeling happy and strong, he rejoices at this union.
4.2.3. Religion as a Life-Denying Institution

After a period of fulfilling his earthly desires, Stephen is captured by his guilty conscience, because his religion forbids such earthly life, and the impact of the priests at the Jesuit school is still too much for a young man like him to bear. Despite the fact that he seems to be freed from religious restrictions for a while, soon it is seen that religion puts a strong pressure on these young students by evoking a fear of punishment in them. What is important about this period of regret and guilty conscience in Stephen’s life is that the characteristics of his religious experience resemble the way Nietzsche interprets religion, in that it takes the individual under its control through fear and punishment. It tries to kill life in this world and promises happiness only after death. More importantly, it tries to separate man from his nature, from his animal side by teaching him to kill his senses. This is the exact point of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion, and at the same time it is this life-denying aspect of religion that Jesuit priests mostly try to impose on young boys.

Parallel to Nietzsche’s condemning religion for killing one’s senses, Joyce too makes a criticism of Jesuit schools by emphasizing that they urge people to repress their natural impulses. This is the religious paralysis of Ireland which Stephen experiences and then will try to fly by. Heller also points out the same idea that “the Jesuits corrupt youths by teaching them to equate spiritual purity with sexual repression” (66). Under such influence, therefore, Stephen starts to feel guilty for fulfilling his sexual desires. While at first his acts gave him pleasure and power, thinking about it now fills his conscience with thoughts of guilt and sin:

He had sinned mortally not once but many times and he knew that, while he stood in danger of eternal damnation for the first sin alone, by every succeeding sin he multiplied his guilt and his punishment . . . What did it avail to pray when he knew that his soul lusted after its own destruction? (79).

He also regrets that he has failed to offer prayers to God, which he thinks to be the sin of pride. Thus, it is clear that sexual repression is taught to be the most important thing to pay attention, because if one fails to do it, it means that he consequently commits other sins. As Stephen thinks, “[f]rom the evil seed of lust all other deadly
sins had sprung forth” (81). So, he connects to his sin of lust all other sins, adding up to his feeling guilt:

pride in himself and contempt for others, covetousness in using money for the purchase of unlawful pleasures, . . . murmuring against the pious, gluttonous enjoyment of food, . . . the swamp of spiritual and bodily sloth in which his whole being had sunk (81).

Stephen’s fear and guilt are even more stimulated during a period of retreat. The opening speech of a priest reveals that they are strictly required to do away with all their worldly thoughts and focus only on death and judgment. Obviously, they are urged to sacrifice life for the sake of heaven:

[I]f he has sacrificed much in this earthly life, it will be given to him a hundredfold and at thousandfold more in the life to come, in the kingdom without end – a blessing, my dear boys, which I wish you from my heart, one and all, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. Amen! (85).

Hence, it is emphasized that it is not possible to live this life fully and at the same time to be rewarded after death. For those who prefer earthly life, like Stephen, what is waiting is eternal damnation. This is how religion clashes with earthly life, and why Nietzsche calls religion life-denying.

Religion’s instrument of controlling man, besides punishment and reward, is man’s indebtedness to God. Teaching that we are responsible to God and that God is the entity capable of punishing man helps control man’s adherence to religious teachings. Correspondingly, Stephen has this idea in his mind that now that he has sinned towards God, “[a]gainst his sin, foul and secret, the whole wrath of God was aimed . . . God’s turn had come” (88). Thus, sinning justifies the punishment he is supposed to be given. According to Nietzsche, man’s indebtedness towards God becomes for him an instrument of torture. In ‘God’ he apprehends the ultimate opposing principle to his actual and irredeemable animal instincts, he himself reinterprets these animal instincts as a debt towards God . . . This represents a kind of madness of the will in psychic cruelty which simply knows no equal: the will of man to find himself guilty and
It is seen that in Nietzsche’s philosophy the believer’s indebtedness to God and letting himself be punished contradicts with man’s nature and the will to power, because it means that man, as a believer, gives in and accepts to sacrifice his earthly life. So, Stephen’s fear of God’s punishment, as Nietzsche would expect, leads him to surrender to the religious commandments and to lead a life of sacrifice out of fear.

Besides the emphasis on God’s power to eternally damn man, during the retreat students are given a frightening description of hell. What is interesting is that although the topics the priest’s speech covers are heaven and hell, heaven is not touched upon at all. By choosing to make a dark picture of hell and not mentioning heaven at all Joyce must have intended to make a criticism of Jesuit education which reduces religion to repression and punishment. In making a repressive picture of religion and showing its impact on Stephen, Joyce assumes a critical stance similar to that of Nietzsche in that both view religion as the destroyer of earthly life.

Correspondingly, the retreat and the fear imposed upon the boys lead Stephen to confess his sins and then to try another life, “[a] life grace and virtue” (112). However, as religion, in both Joyce’s and Nietzsche’s views, means the repression of one’s natural impulses, Stephen has to try hard to kill his senses.

Each of his senses was brought under a rigorous discipline. In order to mortify the sense of sight he made it his rule to walk in the street with downcast eyes . . . To mortify his hearing he exerted no control over his voice which was then breaking, neither sang nor whistled, and made no attempt to flee from noises . . . To mortify the taste he practiced strict habits at table . . . But it was to the mortification of touch he brought the most assiduous inventiveness. He never consciously changed his position in bed, sat in the most uncomfortable positions, suffered patiently every itch and pain . . . (115-116).

Considering that his senses have been the best source of understanding the world for Stephen, it would not be wrong to argue that his new endeavor to compensate for his sins by killing his senses means that he cuts himself off from the world and from life. Trying to do this, he actually torments himself as his senses are the only connection for him to life and happiness. Thus, trying to lead a religious life becomes the best way
for Stephen to see the problem with religion, that is it is actually life-denying. The impossibility of leading this lifeless mode of life shows him that his fasting and prayers actually help nothing other than that it causes “a sensation of spiritual dryness together with a growth of doubts and scruples”, so he ends up viewing his sacraments as “dried-up sources” (116). As Jacqueline Belanger pinpoints, he comes to realize that his struggles to be virtuous are superficial and they lack sincerity and feeling; and as a result, he develops doubts about all this act of fasting (xii). He realizes that the requirements of the priestly life are against man’s nature. That is why after a short period of thinking, he rejects priesthood offered to him as a life-long occupation.

His experience with accepting religion and then rejecting it after fully recognizing its nature is analogous to Nietzsche’s argument that “One must have loved religion and art like mother and nurse . . . – otherwise one cannot grow wise. But one must be able to see beyond them, outgrow them; if one remains under their spell, one does not understand them (HAH 135). Emphasized by Deena ElGenaidi too, this is exactly what Stephen does, because he first embraces religion, and having known it fully, he moves beyond it, which is a necessary step in order to become a free spirit (7). Therefore, it can be argued that his resolution to turn down priesthood and to learn his wisdom on his own is a characteristically Nietzschean act.

His destiny was to be elusive of social or religious orders. The wisdom of the priest’s appeal did not touch him to the quick. He was destined to learn his own wisdom apart from others or to learn the wisdom of others himself wandering among the snares of the world (124).

In short, the guilt Stephen feels for his sins proves helpful for him to fully understand religion and to be able to move beyond it. It helps him to see that religion urges man to deny his nature and to sacrifice the whole life of the senses. Hence, at the end he emancipates himself from this life denying institution and moves closer to the Nietzschean ideal of the artist and a free spirit, making the commitment like proud Lucifer that “He would fall” (124).

4.2.4. The Artist as a Free Spirit

When Stephen rejects priesthood and enters the university, he realizes that he has passed through a challenge, that is, remaining among the Jesuits would have meant
being subject to them. Now that he has turned away from this possibility, he feels that a new destiny and a new adventure wait for him (127). He will soon realize that his destiny is to become an artist, and it is hidden in his name as a prophecy. When a friend calls him ‘Stephanos’, the secret meaning of his name is suddenly revealed to him. “Stephanos Dedalos” as he realizes, is a clear allusion to the Greek craftsman Daedalus:

Now, as never before, his strange name seemed to him a prophecy. So timeless seemed the grey warm air, so fluid and impersonal his own mood, that all ages were as one to him. . . . Now, at the name of the fabulous artificer, he seemed to hear the noise of dim waves and to see a winged form flying above the waves and slowly climbing the air. What did it mean? (129-130).

Obviously, what he sees is the image of Daedalus, the great artificer, who, imprisoned in the labyrinth he built for King Minos, fashions wings and makes it possible for his son and himself to fly by the labyrinth. Seeing the bird-like image flying above the sea, Stephen clearly identifies himself with the artist and recognizes his destiny to be the

hawk-like man flying sunward above the sea, a prophecy of the end he had been born to serve and had been following through the mists of childhood and boyhood, a symbol of the artist forging anew in his workshop out of the sluggish matter of the earth a new soaring impalpable imperishable being? (130).

It becomes evident that in his identification with Daedalus Stephen leaves behind religion, family, and culture, and decides his main occupation to be art. As Catherine Akça suggests, this is a Nietzschean resolution, because Nietzsche believes that “the metaphysical activity of mankind should be art rather than morality since the existence of the world could only be justified as an aesthetic phenomenon” (53). Hence, renouncing morality and embracing art, Stephen in a way follows Nietzsche.

His commitment to art is made possible when he is called Stephanos. In other words, his name is Hellenized, and as Thomas Hibbs puts forth, this represents “the progression towards a recovery of pagan art” found in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy (120). Leaving the Catholic Irish context behind and identifying himself with
Daedalus, Stephen comes closer to the pagan world Nietzsche values better than the modern European culture. Nietzsche appreciates the ancient Greek culture which embraces both Apollo and Dionysus and whose Gods “served to justify man” and “did not take upon themselves the execution of punishment” (GM 74). Stephen, too, comes closer to embracing the same ancient world by choosing to be an artist free from religious and moral limitations.

Another Nietzschean aspect of Stephen’s determination to be an artist is seen in his frequent use of the bird image since both Nietzsche and Stephen view flight as closely related to freedom and strength. According to Nietzsche, on the road to a “mature freedom of spirit which is equally self-mastery and discipline”, on the road to become a free spirit, man experiences a condition which “is characterized by a pale, subtle happiness of light and sunshine, a feeling of bird-like freedom, bird-like altitude, bird-like exuberance” (HAI 4). Besides symbolizing freedom, birds in Nietzsche’s writings also mean the individual’s being above the herd as he has a bird-like altitude. Hence, in aspiring to the hawk-like man, in feeling an “ecstasy of flight”, Stephen experiences a strong feeling of freedom, strength and pride:

    His throat ached with a desire to cry aloud, the cry of a hawk or eagle on high, to cry piercingly of his deliverance to the winds. This was the call of life to his soul . . . An instant of wild flight had delivered him and the cry of triumph which his lips withheld cleft his brain (130).

Therefore, recognizing bird-like features in himself, Stephen becomes one of Nietzsche’s free spirits. He decides that his art will be fed by the power and freedom he attributes to himself as a great individual, and that he will be like the great artificer. As this feeling fills him with ecstasy, he utters the Nietzschean great yes-to-life: “Yes! Yes! Yes! He would create proudly out of the freedom and power of his soul, as the great artificer whose name he bore, a living thing, new and soaring and beautiful, impalpable, imperishable” (130).

The bird is also seen in the famous epiphany Stephen experiences when he sees a girl gazing out to the sea. He recognizes the girl as a magical being transformed into the shape of a “strange and beautiful seabird” (131). He also compares the girl to a crane. At this moment, he feels a stronger enthusiasm for the destiny waiting for him
than he felt when he identified himself with the hawk-like man. The image of the bird-like girl arouses in him a strong desire

[to live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life! A wild angel had appeared to him, the angel of mortal youth and beauty, an envoy from the fair courts of life, to throw open before him in an instant of ecstasy the gates of all the ways of error and glory. On and on and on and on! (132).

It is seen that only after wholly emancipating himself through his identification with birds and flight can he look at a girl and be moved by her without feeling guilt or shame (Bulson 57). Hence, it may be argued that the joy of flight he feels helps him both to shape his identity as an artist and to let himself to be moved by a woman. Sex, which is a natural drive, has started to be regarded by Stephen as a normal and natural phenomena, and this is made possible only when he is let free of the command of convention. So, Harry Levin’s suggestion that the ecstasy of flight represents both artistic creation and sexual fulfillment seems to be quite appropriate (96). For it is the thought of flight which makes Stephen a free spirit.

In conclusion, Stephen first frees himself from religious and social restrictions in order to be an individual who will approach women with a free conscience and then turn his experiences into a work of art. The reason why he was first restless and had difficulty in deciding on a vocation is that, as Bulson claims, religion and society threaten his autonomy (48). However, being moved by the prophecy of his name and by the images of flight, he has now got rid of the pressure of religious and social institutions. In Nietzschean terms, he has become a free spirit, and as Nietzsche would suggest, he prefers art to morality. So, he is ready to appreciate the beauty of women, and out of it, to create his own art, “a living thing, new and soaring and beautiful, impalpable, imperishable” (130).

4.2.5. A Voluntary Exile from the Fatherland

Having determined his destiny to be an artist and in Nietzschean terms a free spirit, Stephen starts shaping his life and his identity as an artist according to his own values. It is seen that he gradually removes from his life anything artificial and pertaining to the herd. That is to say, he wants to be as free as possible. As a result of
this new identity, he repudiates his nationality, religion, and finally the whole fatherland, because they interfere in his artistic and spiritual development.

At first, he acknowledges his Irish identity through the unrest he feels towards the English language. Speaking to the English dean, he feels that English is a foreign language to him:

The language we are speaking is his before it is mine. . . . I cannot speak or write these words without unrest of spirit. His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech. I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. My soul frets in the shadow of his language (146).

Although he is raised with the English language and has always spoken it, being an Irish man, he still feels that it is a foreign language that does not belong to his nation. However, when he is asked to contribute to the revival of the Irish language and to join nationalistic acts, he simply rejects it. For instance, when a friend asks him to sign a petition, he says “The affair doesn’t interest me in the least” (152). Upon this rejection, he is strictly criticized by his friend Davin who protests by saying “I can’t understand you . . . One time I hear you talk against English literature. Now you talk against the Irish informers. What with your name and your ideas – Are you Irish at all?” (156). Then he keeps on telling Stephen to learn Irish and to be one of them. Yet, Stephen is determined not to serve the nationalist group. Instead, he argues “My ancestors threw off their language and took another”, “[t]hey allowed a handful of foreigners to subject them. Do you fancy I am going to pay in my own life and person debts they made? What for? ” (156).

Stephen’s rejection of the Irish revival is important for two reasons. First, the reason why he is not interested in it, as Bulson also points out, is that “it asks him to belong to the group” (55). As Stephen has already said, he is happier when he is away from the voices telling him what to do. Therefore, he chooses not to belong to the group of Irish nationalists, for the sake of his autonomy. This shows one more time that Stephen follows Nietzsche in being above and away from the herd, the multitude. Although Davin tells him that “a man’s country comes first”, and he can be an artist after, Stephen puts his personal artistic and spiritual development above the nationalistic case (157). This is parallel to Howe’s suggestion that modernist artist
refuses the mass and directs himself “into the self-sufficiency of art” (qtd. in Akça 52). This is what Stephen exactly does as a modern man. He rejects the commands of the majority and embraces art as the only true occupation.

Another point which shows the importance of Stephen’s rejection of nationalism is that it recalls both Joyce’s and Nietzsche’s views on the subject. Although Joyce was always concerned with politics in Ireland and emphasized the Irish context of his writings, he was objective enough to criticize the flaws in the Irish nationalistic movement and to keep away from it. Correspondingly, Belanger writes that Joyce viewed “both the Irish Literary and Gaelic Revivals as restrictive and in the service of a narrow-gauge nationalism, … his objection to late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Irish cultural nationalism was that it was inward-looking rather than European-oriented” (vi). This inward-looking notion of nationalism prevents both the nation and its individuals from development. Stephen realizes that it wants him to belong to a group and to limit himself according to its norms, which would make his personal development impossible. Thus, in order to be able to follow his destiny, he detaches himself from this restrictive movement.

What is important in both Joyce’s and his protagonist’s attitude towards nationalism is that they share ideas similar to Nietzsche’s. Diane Morgan writes that Nietzsche views nationalism as an artificial construct and its constant flag-waving, marching, and fighting consume individuals’ energy, so there is little energy left that can be used for intellectual, spiritual, and artistic development (457). Hence, nationalistic movements should not remain “locked into the senseless repetition of redundant customs”; instead, Nietzsche suggests “an evolving national identity” so that it may contribute to a “forward moving people” (465). Furthermore, Nietzsche compares it to Catholicism, and argues that it has a totalistic nature “inflicted on the many by the few and requires cunning, force and falsehood to maintain a front of respectability” (HAH 174).

It can be inferred from Nietzsche’s criticism of nationalism that, imposed on an individual, it leaves little room for authenticity, freedom, and artistic and spiritual development. Hence, as a Nietzschean free spirit, Stephen chooses not to be tied by the Irish nationalists when he says “I shall express myself as I am” (156).
A more striking parallel between Joyce’s and Nietzsche’s views on nationalism is that both think that it should not be limited within its borders. Instead, as stated above, Joyce believes that it should be European-oriented. Similarly enough, Nietzsche writes that once one recognizes the flaws of the existing mode of nationalism, “one should not be afraid to proclaim oneself simply a good European” (HAH 175). Thus, both Joyce and Nietzsche view the existing notion of nationalism quite restrictive and narrow, and they believe that it should be European-oriented so that it can be a broader and progressive concept.

Considering these views, it would not be wrong to claim that Stephen mirrors the ideas of both Joyce and Nietzsche when he decides to dissociate himself from the narrow nationalism of his society, because he also views nationality as a net flung at him: “When the soul of a man is born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets” (157).

After finally making such a commitment to fly by the nets of religion, language, and nationality, Stephen is able to construct his own aesthetic philosophy and comes one step nearer to becoming an artist. It is seen that he is now able to create from his experience a work of art, and he writes a villanelle. At that moment, having written his poem, he finds himself gazing at the sky and is suddenly attracted by the birds he sees flying. As he remembers the hawk-like man he previously identified himself with, it is revealed to him that “the creatures of the air have their knowledge and know their times and seasons because they, unlike man, are in the order of their life and have not perverted that order by reason” (italics mine) (173). This may come to mean that he believes that man interferes in the harmony between life and man’s nature by applying to reason alone. Thus, like birds, which remind him of freedom, he makes the final resolution that he will fly from his fatherland. He wonders whether the image he sees is the “[s]ymbol of departure or of loneliness” (174). He will learn that it means both, and he will run the risk of both departure and loneliness in the service of his freedom and self-fulfillment.

After the moment when birds remind him of departure, it is seen that he has made up his mind to follow the voices of his own, and his determination is made explicit in his conversations with his family and friends. To start with, it is seen that
he is serious enough to quarrel with his mother over a religious case. He is asked to make his Easter duty, yet he rejects it regardless of the sadness he causes to his mother. Criticized by his friend Cranly, too, he accepts that he once believed in religion when he was at school. However, he asserts “I was someone else then.,” and “I was not myself as I am now, as I had to become” (185). Here it is obvious that he has changed totally, and he has become a Nietzschean. As Nietzsche wants his followers to always continue ‘becoming’ since one must become who one really is, Stephen listens to this advice and thoroughly alters his character in order to become himself. Now it is understood that he has become a new person who can reject anything which contradicts his own values.

The other point showing the new route he is taking is his decision to leave Ireland. He wants to “discover the mode of life or of art whereby [his] spirit could express itself in unfettered freedom” (190). The only way to achieve this freedom and to keep on becoming the one he has to be is eliminating the pressure of convention by leaving the country. Thus Stephen explains his final project as the following:

I will tell you what I will do and what I will not do. I will not serve that in which I no longer believe, whether it call itself my home, my fatherland, or my church: and I will try to express myself in some mode of life or art as freely as I can and as wholly as I can, using for my defence the only arms I allow myself to use – silence, exile, and cunning (191).

In saying “I will not serve”, Stephen identifies himself with Lucifer whose statement “non serviam” is exactly what Stephen chooses to do (90). Yet, apparently his view of Lucifer has changed, too. In contrast with the evil one taught him at school who falls from the grace of God, the Lucifer Stephen aspires to become has a much higher stance. He identifies himself with Lucifer, because he considers him as a hero. Tindall argues that, a good Latinist, Stephen must know that Lucifer actually means “Light Bringer” (77). He also claims that Stephen associates Lucifer with Shelley’s Prometheus – the “bringer of fire from heaven to mankind” –, and with the heroic rebel of Milton’s Paradise Lost (77). Therefore, it is seen that in his aspiration to become like Lucifer, who must have a positive connotation in his mind, Stephen becomes a rebellious hero who gloriously rejects service to authority.
Consequently, in Belanger’s words, exile becomes, for Stephen, “the only way of eluding these constricting ready-made sources of identity” (xxiv). As a result he takes the risk of making a life-long mistake, and of being alone. Embracing the Nietzschean idea that the herd and its values consumes the individual, he sets off to create his own values, and to individually and freely construct his own identity as an artist. Thus, his escape from the multitude to the wisdom of isolation can be viewed as a Zarathustrian project.

As Stephen’s story comes to a close, the mode of narration shifts from third to first person view. It must have been intended by Joyce that this shift represents a new phase in Stephen’s development. Silencing all other voices in his life, he eventually gains his own voice as his story is now related from Stephen’s point of view in the form of a diary. He reflects his enthusiasm for his journey when he writes “Welcome, O life! I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race” (196).

However, the last sentence he writes in his journal is approached quite problematically, since it may reflect the possibility of failure in Stephen’s future, as many critics have argued so far. “Old father, old artificer, stand me now and ever in good stead” (196). Writing this, he has the Greek artist Daedalus in mind, and wishes him to support him in his odyssey. Yet, Tindall suggests that, addressing Daedalus as the father, Stephen identifies himself not with Daedalus, but with his son, Icarus (75). Levin also puts a similar argument saying that Stephen is more nearly akin to the son” (99). If these arguments are taken into consideration, it will be predicted that Stephen’s journey will end in failure, because Icarus is Daedalus’ failing son who flies too near to the sun and who is destroyed at the end. Thus, associating Stephen with Icarus rather than his father, one may easily view him as an unrealistic boy who will not be able to achieve anything he intends to.

There are also some critics who use Stephen’s failure in Ulysses to support the idea that he will not succeed. ElGenaidi, for instance, suggests that his aspiration is not realistic, because in Ulysses he comes back disappointed (3). Yet, I argue that taken on its own, the Portrait is nothing but a story of success. As within the novel his development is not put on a trial, we have to interpret it only with what we are provided
with within the pages of *Portrait*. Having come a long way, Stephen seems to have achieved freedom and has the potential to do more.

What is more important than whether he will succeed or not is the journey of his becoming. Ever since realizing that he is not destined to be a priest, Stephen has committed himself to a Nietzschean freedom and obviously has attained a higher position and a fuller identity. Following Nietzsche, he has separated himself from the herd and its values. He has made a strong commitment to creating his own values by liberating himself from religion, family, and nationality, in other words, from the nets flung at him. In short, he can be appreciated as a Nietzschean free spirit who has gained a God-like attribute capable of creating things anew.
5.1. Hermann Hesse and Nietzsche

In *Hermann Hesse: Life and Art*, Joseph Mileck directs attention to Hesse’s life-long interest in Nietzsche. He claims that Hesse’s first readings of Nietzsche dates back to 1895, and Nietzsche “never ceased to intrigue him” (26). What first appealed to Hesse in Nietzsche’s writings was the philosopher’s aesthetic approach to life (27). From these years on Hesse’s interest in Nietzsche waxed and waned from time to time, but never ceased totally. Apparently there were times when Hesse was deeply impressed by him as he once wrote “I was too deeply fascinated by Nietzsche” (qtd. in Zeller 45).

The best evidence of a Nietzschean influence on Hesse is to come from his novels, because in many of them there are direct allusions to Nietzsche and his Zarathustra. Mark Boulby, for instance, detects Nietzschean elements in Hesse’s *Rosshalde* and *Siddharta*. He claims that Nietzschean ethics play an important role in *Rosshalde*, and that some passages of *Siddharta* reflect “memories of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra”, as do some common images like birds (76, 155). The hero of *Knulp* is also viewed as a Nietzschean character, an “anti-christ” figure akin to Dionysus (Borbély 15-16).

A more fascinating Nietzschean element taken up by Hesse is the complimentary figures of Apollo and Dionysus. As Ştefan Borbély observes, Hesse uses them to create “the dual typology of the antithetical protagonists of his novels” like *Demian, Narcissus and Goldmund* and *Klingor’s Last Summer* (14). The dichotomy of Apollonian and Dionysian energies is found also in *Gertrude*. Eugene Stielzig views the novel’s artist figures as Dionysian and Apollonian, because “Kuhn’s compositions are based on order, clarity, and restraint, whereas Muoth’s performances and life are marked by a destructive urge to ecstatic self-abandonment and
intoxication” (121). Thus, it is clearly seen that it is possible to come across Nietzschean ideas while reading a work by Hesse. The years following World War I seem to be one of the periods when Hesse’s interest in Nietzsche increased, because it is these years that witnessed the publishing of *Demian*, and also an essay titled “Zarathustra’s Return”. In this essay, in Theodore Ziolkowski’s terms, Hesse “took up Nietzsche’s pen” and addressed Germany’s youth (103). Refashioning Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, Hesse advises the young to stop obeying the herd and to listen to their inner selves. He also preaches Nietzschean ideas about destiny, solitude, and becoming oneself.

Such ideas exist also in *Demian*, published in the same year with “Zarathustra’s Return”. As Hesse underwent psychotherapy in those years, *Demian* is quite rich in its use of Jungian archetypes and individuation. Yet, it would be wrong to view the novel as merely Jungian since Nietzsche is also quite important to determine the novel’s character. *Demian* is a novel of individuation written under the influence of both Jung and Nietzsche. As it will be seen throughout this chapter, Nietzschean philosophy contributes a lot to Emil Sinclair’s individuation process.

### 5.2. Emil Sinclair as a Nietzschean Character

#### 5.2.1. Two Realms: Light and Darkness

In *Demian*, Hesse presents the coming of age of a 10-year-old boy called Emil Sinclair. The name Emil is a clear allusion to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Emile or On Education* (1762), which is Rousseau’s treatise on parenting and raising a child. It presents a system of education that conceptualizes an idealized natural man. Hence, this allusion to *Emile* seems to be important in that Hesse’s version of Emile too goes through an education through which Hesse fashions his own ideal form of the natural man.

In the novel, the world Emil Sinclair lives in is a world defined by dualities. It is a world led by the Christian bourgeoisie which divides life into two opposite poles: light and darkness, good and evil, etc. The novel’s protagonist Emil Sinclair is born into the world of light. However, he soon realizes the dark world and starts to oscillate between these two poles. His story of *bildung* revolves around his struggle to cope with this dichotomy. As it will be seen, this is not so easy, because the prevailing
system makes it impossible to manage a kind of reconciliation between these two opposites. Hence, Emil Sinclair has a long and difficult way to go. Just like Michel and Stephen, he will have difficulties in following his own path. He will constantly need a mentor and from time to time he will lose his courage to go on alone and draw back. These make him an anti-hero and makes it more difficult to like him as a character. However, it will be seen that he will somehow manage to follow the Nietzschean path and to become an independent free spirit. Thus, he will fit into the context of the modernist bildungsroman which is characterized by rebellious heroes fulfilling themselves outside social norms.

At the beginning Emil Sinclair associates his household with cleanliness, good manners, and model behavior (3). He talks about his parents, the order of the house and the conventional life with a feeling of happiness and contentment. In Walter Sokel’s words, Emil goes through “a sheltered bourgeois boyhood” (35). Apparently, this constitutes the realm associated with light. This light world prepares Emil for a mode of life accepted by Christianity and bourgeois society.

This sheltered world tries to prevent Emil from entering the other realm, that is the dark world. This other realm contains prisons, drunkards, suicides, and anything frightful and violent (4). However, as Emil is taught, he can escape from this dark world as long as he is bound to the light world of his household:

It was wonderful that peace and orderliness, quiet and a good conscience, forgiveness and love, ruled in this one realm, and it was wonderful that the rest existed, too, the multitude of harsh noises, of sullenness and violence, from which one could still escape with a leap into one’s mother’s lap (4).

Although his education aims at separating these two worlds from each other, Emil realizes “how both realms [border] on each other, how close together they [are]” (4). He feels secure in the realm of light, but at the same time knows that the dark realm is not so far away. Actually, he gets to know the dark world when he is still a child. He starts to find this world more intriguing and appealing (5). One day, when he is in the company of boys from this other realm from which his parents try to save him, Emil feels urged to get himself accepted into the group. Hence, as the first step of entering the dark world, he invents a story that he once stole apples from a garden.
With this story he hopes to be liked by Franz Kromer, the head of the group, the boy Emil is actually afraid of. However, this turns out to be an unfortunate decision, since it gives Kromer the opportunity to threaten and blackmail Emil. He urges him to steal money and bring it to him. Therefore, it is seen that stealing apples causes Sinclair’s fall from an “Edenic atmosphere” to the dark world (Knapp 29). Thus, darkness becomes a reality for Emil rather than being merely an intellectual concept (30).

With the Kromer episode, Emil learns more about the dark world and gradually enters it. As this is not acceptable by his parents and by the society of the light realm, he realizes that he has to hide it from everyone. He thinks that there is no way out for him, hence he will live with his guilt and lies:

[M]y way, from now on, would lead farther and farther downhill into darkness. I felt acutely that new offenses were bound to grow out of this one offense, that my presence among my sisters, greeting and kissing my parents, were a lie, that I was living a lie concealed deep inside myself (13).

It can be argued that the Christian dichotomy of light and dark, or good and evil constitutes the main problem Emil faces and tries to handle throughout the novel. His conception of the worlds as opposing and his being a part of the dark realm make it clear to him that the existing social values are there to prevent an individual from entering the dark world. If one does, he lives in shame and guilt as in Emil’s case. He remembers: “My condition at that time was a kind of madness. Amid the ordered peace of our house I lived shyly, in agony, like a ghost; I took no part in the life of the others, rarely forgot myself for an hour at a time” (20). Hence, the dichotomy of light and dark prevents him from enjoying life. As this dichotomy is in a general sense the result of Christianity, in order to handle the problem, Emil Sinclair has to struggle to transcend religious bonds and moral certainties.

5.2.2. Transvaluation of Values

Sinclair’s unrest in the face of the dark realm can be overcome by leaving the moral duality behind. In doing this, a friend, Demian, turns out to be quite influential and helpful for Sinclair. He is a mature and strange boy and impresses Sinclair easily. He teaches Sinclair something that will totally change the flow of his life, that is, he
shows Sinclair how to interpret everything from a different and unaccustomed point of view; “[m]ost of the things we’re taught I’m sure are quite right and true, but one can view all of them from quite a different angle than the teachers do – and most of the time they then make better sense” (23).

Demian, who, according to Ziolkowski, is the “mouthpiece of Nietzschean goal”, teaches Sinclair Nietzsche’s perspectivism (139). Both for Nietzsche and for Demian, morality is not absolute. In other words, one can reach different meanings and values if he interprets things differently. Thus, Demian tells Sinclair his own interpretation of the biblical story of Cain and Abel. Apart from what teachers tell, he argues, the mark that protects Cain may as well mean that Cain was more powerful than the others and people were afraid of him. So they interpreted the sign of power differently and said “Those fellows with the sign, they’re a strange lot” (24). It is understood that, according to Demian’s interpretation of the story, people invented a myth about Cain and his children in order to compensate for their fear. As Demian says

[p]eople with courage and character always seem sinister to the rest. It was a scandal that a breed of fearless and sinister people ran about freely, so they attached a nickname and myth to these people to get even with them, to make up for the many times they had felt afraid (24).

In looking at the story from a different point of view and regarding Cain as the actual hero of the story, Demian employs the Nietzschean transvaluation of values, because he celebrates the power and intelligence of a man who is actually a murderer in the eyes of others. In short, “[t]he strong man slew a weaker one” (24). The others, on the other hand, were afraid to fight him, and “if you asked them: ‘Why don’t you turn around and slay him, too?’ they did not reply ‘Because we’re cowards,’ but rather ‘You can’t, he has a sign. God has marked him’” (25). This is also analogous to Nietzsche’s interpretation of slave morality in Beyond Good and Evil. As mentioned before, according to Nietzsche, slave morality originates from the slaves’ being weak and afraid of the masters, so they condemn the powerful group for simply being powerful in order to make up for their own weakness. Correspondingly, in this story, people blame the powerful man simply because they are weak and cannot take revenge on Cain.
“Cain a noble person, Abel a coward! Cain’s mark a mark of distinction!” (25). This strange view of Cain and Abel strikes Sinclair, because it implies the opposite of the accepted values, and justifies the man of the dark world. In a way, it transcends all the religious and social values. Deeply influenced by Demian’s teachings, Sinclair for the first time gets rid of the shame and guilt he had felt, because he now identifies himself with the powerful, with Cain: “I, who was Cain and bore the mark, had imagined that this sign was not a mark of shame and that because of my evil and misfortunate I stood higher than my father and the pious, the righteous” (26).

However, after Demian saves him from Kromer’s blackmailing, Sinclair one more time turns back to the light world of his family. It is seen that although he appreciates Demian’s transvaluation and remains under its spell for some time, he is actually still too immature to stay on his own feet and to bear the results of this strange philosophy. He still needs something to depend on, and he chooses the protective world of his family:

I was unable to walk alone. So, in the blindness of my heart, I chose to be dependent on my father and mother, on the old, cherished “world of light”, though I knew by now that it was not the only one. If I had not followed this course I would have had to bank on Demian and entrust myself to him. That I did not do so at the time seemed to me to be the result of my justifiable suspicion of his strange ideas; in reality it was entirely because of my fear (38).

Hence, Sinclair has not become powerful enough to become a Cain yet. On the contrary, he is still afraid and suspicious of Demian’s ideas, because they require relinquishing all the values he has been living with. As a result, he returns to the light world, but only to leave it again in the future.

Indeed, Sinclair’s harboring in the light world of bourgeois society does not last long, because he starts to realize the awakening of his sexuality. The existence of the sexual drive pushes him again into the dark world as it clashes with his “sheltered childhood” (40). Aware of his natural impulses, but at the same time unable to integrate them into his life, Sinclair leads “the double life of a child who is no longer a child” (40). However, he inevitably acknowledges that the dark world has come to the surface again.
His realization of his natural drives, as in the cases of Michel and Stephen Dedalus, results in a decrease in his interest in religion (44). He finds the new things he has been discovering much more exciting than religious matters. As a result, he follows his Nietzschean mentor Demian in repudiating religion and in questioning everything he has been taught. Demian encourages Sinclair’s attempts to discover new things: “Good that you ask,” says Demian, “[y]ou should always ask, always have doubts” (48). Therefore, it is seen that Sinclair is now ready and open minded enough to grab Demian’s teachings and to follow him along the Nietzschean road awaiting him.

Questioning stories like Cain and Abel, Demian first teaches him “to regard and interpret religious stories and dogma more freely, more individually, even playfully, with more imagination” (50). In other words, Demian teaches him how to move beyond religious values of good and evil and to determine the values of things individually. Hence, they end up appreciating things that are regarded dark and evil in their society, because according to their own interpretation, they find some virtues in these so-called evil doings. The best example of such a transvaluation – after the Cain and Abel story – is their conversation on the Biblical account of Golgotha. From the two thieves in the story, the one who repents and improves himself is appreciated by their teachers. However, Demian makes Sinclair realize that the other thief who did not change his way should be respected more than the convert.

If you had to pick a friend from between the two thieves or decide which of the two you had rather trust, you most certainly wouldn’t select the sniveling convert. No, the other fellow, he’s a man of character . . . He has character, and people with character tend to receive the short end of the stick in Biblical stories. Perhaps he’s even a descendant of Cain (51).

Associating the thief with Cain, Demian implies that they were both strong men, men of character, and they did not sacrifice their true character to the demands of social and religious values. In other words, they are the strong condemned by the weak. Just like Nietzsche who prefers the strong, Demian and Sinclair now appreciate these strong men who obey only themselves. In this, Demian teaches Sinclair to make judgments regardless of existing values and even to love evil if necessary.
In Nietzschean terms, Demian moves Sinclair into a realm beyond good and evil. Sinclair, who has tasted the dark, the evil before, knows that his religion denies this dark side. However, having experienced the inevitable impulses coming out in him, Sinclair also knows that darkness is a part of life, too. In order to be able to embrace his inner, natural self, one has to respect both light and dark worlds. Otherwise, echoing Nietzsche, it would be life-denying. As Nietzsche says, man is a bundle of forces which turn out to be both good and bad. So, the bad or evil is also inherent in man’s nature, and a God denying evil actually denies man’s nature. Hence, they find out that the main problem lies in religion and in the God of Christianity, because it is only light, and denies the natural, darker aspect of life.

The point is that this God of both Old and New Testaments is certainly an extraordinary figure but not what he purports to represent. He is all that is good, noble, fatherly, beautiful, elevated, sentimental – true! But the world consists of something else besides. And what is left over is ascribed to the devil, this entire slice of world, this entire half is suppressed and hushed up. In exactly the same way they praise God as the father of all life but simply refuse to say a word about our sexual life on which it’s all based, describing it whenever possible as sinful, the work of the devil (52).

In this way, they make a criticism of religion in the manner of Nietzsche who says that religion denies life and suppresses whatever that is natural. Indeed, as Bettina Knapp also points out, before Saint Augustine, God was considered a totality, embracing all. However, with Augustine’s views, it started to be believed that “Christ was all light, as was God. Evil was denied substance in a God-created world” (33). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the world consists of both good and evil. As a result, Demian convinces Sinclair to believe that “alongside the divine service we should also have a service for the devil” (52).

From then on Sinclair grows out of the dichotomy of good and evil and seeks some divinity which is more natural and which embraces both good and evil: “you must create for yourself a God that contains the devil too and in front of which you needn’t close your eyes when the most natural things in the world take place” (52). In repudiating the Christian God and searching for a new deity, Demian and Sinclair return to the idealized concept of an ancient religion. This is parallel to Nietzsche’s
appreciation of the pagan world, because the ancient Greek gods were not at all like the Christian God, and because they embraced both light and dark sides of life:

[T]here are nobler ways of making use of the invention of gods . . . this, fortunately, as revealed by the merest glance at the Greek gods, those reflections of noble and self-controlled man, in whom the animal in man felt himself deified and did not tear himself apart, did not rage against himself! . . . the Greeks used their gods for no other purpose than to . . . be allowed to enjoy the freedom of their soul: thus, in a sense diametrically opposed to that in which Christianity has made use of its God . . . Thus the gods at that time served to justify man even to a certain extent in wicked actions, they served as the cause of evil – at that time they did not take upon themselves the execution of punishment, but rather, as is nobler, the guilt . . . (GM 73-74).

In short, with the help of Demian, Sinclair learns that the world consists of both evil and good, both of which should be accepted as natural. The existing morality forbids the evil; however, what is evil is forbidden is “not something eternal, it can change” (54). He acknowledges this through Demian’s interpretations of Cain and Abel and of the two thieves of Golgotha. Hence, he starts to believe in the necessity of the transvaluation of imposed values, which makes him a Nietzschean. This leads him to transcend Christianity and move beyond the dichotomy of good and evil in search of a new God, resembling the ideal image of god in Nietzsche’s philosophy.

5.2.3. A New Spirituality Beyond Good and Evil

Considering that the main obstacle for Sinclair’s development is the dichotomy of good and evil, it can be claimed that he goes one step further by “transcending the Christian outlook” through “a Nietzschean reversal of Biblical values” (Sokel 36, 38). His emancipation from religious values means that now he has to create his own laws and obey his inner self. In other words, he has to be a Cain and take the responsibility of making his own choices. As Renee Horowitz claims, he, like Cain, will be “what he makes of himself” (183). Thus, the mark of Cain Sinclair bears represents the active nihilism of Nietzsche in that he has to destroy readily available values and be his own judge. Demian gives this responsibility to Sinclair by saying
[t]hose who are too lazy and comfortable to think for themselves and be their own judges obey the laws. Others sense their own laws within them; things are forbidden to them that every honorable man will do any day in the year and other things are allowed to them that are generally despised. Each person must stand on his own feet (54).

The path towards one’s inner self and individuality is clearly not an easy one. As well as necessitating being one’s own judge, it also requires that one has to detach himself from the others. In short, individuality requires isolation and Sinclair suffers deeply from it. He finds himself in a self-isolation and “often secretly [succumbs] to consuming fits of melancholy and despair” (59). This is quite like an echo of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, who says that isolation and alienation from others is difficult: “And when you will say, ‘I no longer have a common conscience with you,’ it will be a lament and an agony” (TSZ 62). Nevertheless, isolation is a hard but necessary condition of achieving self-awareness. Hesse makes a similar argument in his “Zarathustra’s Return”:

Blessed be he who has found his solitude, not the solitude pictured in painting or poetry, but his own, unique, predestined solitude. Blessed be he who knows how to suffer! Blessed be he who bears the magic stone in his heart. To him comes destiny, from him comes authentic action (90-91).

Hence, Sinclair seems to be determined to go on this Zarathustrian project and to search for his true self in isolation.

Still not able to define a goal for himself he keeps on searching for some time, lingering and drinking in the bars of the dark world. He seems to be at a loss, yet he still do not yield to the constricting life of the light world. On the contrary, he rebels against it by going to the bars: “In my odd and unattractive fashion, going to bars and bragging was my way of quarreling with the world – this was my way of protesting” (66). After carrying on this life style for some time, he finally recognizes that this is not the right path either. Ziolkowski points out that “this plunge into the abyss of the ‘dark’ world” is as constricting and wrong as his previous surrender to the light world (99).
As Stephen Dedalus sees a bird-like girl and experiences an epiphany, Sinclair, too, sees an inspirational girl he tellingly calls Beatrice\(^1\) and then enters a completely new world of spirituality in which he will learn how to embrace several Nietzschean ideals. He stops drinking and starts enjoying himself reading and going out for walks (68). Although he calls this the “world of light”, he is aware that it is his own creation, pointing out the autonomy he starts to gain over his life. More importantly, he starts to paint. First, he tries to paint Beatrice, but he realizes that his painting resembles Demian and himself rather than Beatrice. After that he comes to the realization that “the heraldic bird was coming to life inside me [Sinclair]” (76).

This bird image, as in *Portrait*, turns out to be quite important for the young man, because identification with birds and flight makes him closer to the Nietzschean ideal of freedom and strength. Hence, just like Dedalus, Stephen is impressed by this image, and starts painting “a bird of prey with a proud aquiline sparrow hawk’s head” (76). He pictures the bird as if half of its body were “stuck in some dark globe out of which it was struggling to free itself as though from a giant egg” (76). Taking Sinclair as the bird image, it can be argued that he paints himself struggling to free himself from the restricting world he is stuck in.

Hesse may have taken the image of bird of prey directly from Nietzsche, since Nietzsche uses the relationship between birds of prey and lambs as the basis for establishing his master and slave morality systems. They represent a natural order. Both in Hesse and in Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morals*, birds of prey symbolize strength. In the *Genealogy of Morals* they are the strong animals whom lambs approach with fear and resentment (29-30). Also, as pointed out in the previous chapter, Nietzsche associates birds with freedom, with a perspective above the limits of the herd. Hence, identifying himself with the bird image, Sinclair seems to have started to become a Nietzschean free spirit. As Mileck states, “he, like the hawk, is now prepared to break through the shell enclosing him: the Christian-bourgeois ethic” (97).

Indeed, the bird painting Sinclair makes and sends to Demian turns out to have a similar meaning to the one birds in Nietzsche’s writings bear. A note from Demian

\(^1\) This is probably a reference to Dante’s *Divine Comedy*. In the “Paradiso” section of the *Comedy*, Beatrice appears as Dante’s inspiration and guide. She has the same symbolic significance in *Portrait*.\[81\]
says “The bird fights its way out of the egg. The egg is the world. Who would be born must first destroy a world. The bird flies to God. That God’s name is Abraxas” (78). So, Sinclair needs to leave the bourgeois world behind if he wants to become himself. Yet, he finds another significant answer in this note: the name Abraxas. Soon he learns that it means “a godhead whose symbolic task is the uniting of godly and devilish elements” (80). Therefore, Demian provides Sinclair with this name as an answer to their need of previously mentioned new deity embracing both light and dark. With this new God, Sinclair gets rid of the duality in morals, because Abraxas solves the problem of dichotomies being both god and devil, angel and satan, light and dark, good and evil… Having learned this, Sinclair now realizes his true path in life: “It seemed that I was destined to live in this fashion, this seemed my preordained fate” (82).

Uniting godly and devilish elements in one deity is Hesse’s way of handling the problem of religion and dual morality. In this way, he follows Nietzsche and carries his protagonist beyond good and evil, because Abraxas frees Sinclair from the burden of religion and its values of good and evil. In a way, he transcends the morality Nietzsche harshly criticizes. From that moment on, he learns to be more and more Nietzschean. Indeed, he mentions reading Novalis, and then he openly expresses his enthusiasm for Nietzsche: “Even later in life I have rarely experienced a book more intensely, except perhaps Nietzsche” (72). Under such a big influence, he gradually learns to listen to his own self, to surrender to nature and to break away with the herd. He makes a resolution to “try to live in accord with the promptings which came from [his] true self” (83).

As a potential Nietzschean, he is impressed by music. He hears an organ music while passing by a church and becomes fascinated by what he hears. Later, he explains this to the Church organist Pistorius as the following:

I like listening to music, but only the kind you play, completely unreserved music, the kind that makes you feel that a man is shaking heaven and hell. I believe I love that kind of music because it is amoral. Everything else is so moral that I’m looking for something that isn’t. Morality has always seemed to me insufferable (86).

His emphasis on the feeling of shaking heaven and hell and on the unreserved and unrestrained feature of music reveals that he now enjoys the Dionysian energy. As well
as being associated with Dionysus, music, as Hibbs writes, “breaks the artificial divisions, characteristics of Apollo, between inner and outer (123). Hence, listening to Pistorius’ unrestricted music, Sinclair feels as if he were one with his inner self. In this respect, he has become a little more Dionysian who can rejoice at the sight of sincere and natural feelings.

Soon, the organ player Pistorius becomes another mentor for Sinclair. He teaches him, first of all, to surrender to one’s nature and inner self. He reminds him that it is a dangerous and difficult path, yet he should not give in. When Sinclair dreams that he is able to fly, Pistorius encourages him to keep flying despite its dangers: “It is the feeling of being linked with the roots of power, but one soon becomes afraid of this feeling. It’s damned dangerous! That is why most people shed their wings and prefer to walk and obey the law. But not you. You go on flying” (93).

So, he teaches that being different and not following others is the right way of reaching one’s inner world. Only then one can obey the natural laws rather than obeying the artificial laws of society. He makes Sinclair learn that it is important to obey nature and his inner voices:

[I]f nature has made you a bat you shouldn’t try to be an ostrich. You consider yourself odd at times, you accuse yourself of taking a road different from most people. You have to unlearn that. Gaze into the fire, into the clouds, and as soon as the inner voices begin to speak, surrender to them, don’t ask first whether it’s permitted or would please your teachers or father, or some god. You will ruin yourself if you do that (94-95).

This way, Sinclair learns that natural impulses within us should not be spoiled with secondary thoughts. This may be regarded as another manifestation of the tendency for the Dionysian, under the spell of which, Nietzsche writes, “nature in its estranged, hostile, or subjugated forms also celebrates its reconciliation with its prodigal son, man” (BT 22). Hence, learning to be harmonious with his nature, Sinclair comes closer to the Dionysian man celebrated by Nietzsche.

Correspondingly, he learns from Pistorius that his desires are a part of nature, and he should be at peace with them.
[Y]ou must have desires. Perhaps you’re made in such a way that you are afraid of them. Don’t be. They are the best things you have. You can believe me. I lost a great deal when I was your age by violating those dreams of love ... you can’t consider prohibited anything that the soul desires (97).

Like the Dionysian protagonist of *The Immoralist*, Sinclair acknowledges the Nietzschean idea that all truth comes from one’s natural desires and senses, so they should be treated with respect. To sum up, Pistorius, in Boulby’s words, “teaches him to pay the soul its due” (114). However, Sinclair soon realizes that there is nothing left he can learn from Pistorius and decides to “transcend and leave even him, the leader, behind” (109). This shows that he has grown much and learned to walk independently when there is nothing left to learn.

However, to reach his Nietzschean goal, he still has things to learn since Nietzsche says that man’s journey of becoming is a never ending process. Thus, Sinclair carries on his struggle for individuation. Meanwhile, he reads Nietzsche and fully absorbs him as a model:

> [O]n my table lay a few volumes of Nietzsche. I lived with him, sensed the loneliness of his soul, perceived the fate that had propelled him on inexorably; I suffered with him, and rejoiced that there had been one man who had followed his destiny so relentlessly (115).

As both of his mentors, Demian and Pistorius, represent Nietzschean ideas, it is not a surprise that Sinclair turns out to be an admirer of Nietzsche. Actually, it is something predictable that he identifies himself with Nietzsche, because throughout the novel his mentors prepare him for it. As a result, he fully adopts his philosophy.

### 5.2.4. Those with the Mark of Cain

Sinclair finds Demian one more time, because he feels that he needs him. Demian recognizes him easily, saying that Sinclair has changed, yet still has the sign (117). He goes on to explaining that he, like Demian and some others, has the mark of Cain and that is why they have been friends. Having learned this, Sinclair finds himself in a small community including Demian, his mother Frau Eva, and a few other people. What is important is that they all bear the mark of Cain. Therefore, they all represent
the Nietzschean higher men. What distinguishes them from other people is that they are superior to common people. More importantly, it is the “Nietzschean relativism” which distinguishes them (Ziolkowski 120). In other words, they do not restrict their judgments within the borders of prevailing value system. According to Boulby, too, they represent Nietzschean übermensch (104).

Demian talks to Sinclair about the importance of an authentic community and the herd instinct existing instead of it. “Genuine communion”, he says, is a beautiful thing. But what we see flourishing everywhere is nothing of the kind. The real spirit will come from the knowledge that separate individuals have of one another and for a time it will transform the world. The community spirit at present is only a manifestation of the herd instinct (118).

Their community which consists of those with the sign, on the other hand, is quite different from the herd. They have a different vision and represent a totally different mode of life. While the herd tries to kill whatever is different and new, they, those with the mark of Cain, strive for individuality and for more original ideals:

We who wore the sign might justly be considered “odd” by the world; yes, even crazy, and dangerous. We were aware or in the process of becoming aware and our striving was directed toward achieving a more and more complete state of awareness while the striving of the others was a quest aimed at binding their opinions, ideals, duties, their lives and fortunes more and more closely to those of the herd . . . But whereas we, who were marked, believed that we represented the will of Nature to something new, to the individualism of the future, the others sought to perpetuate the status quo (126).

He also mentions an approaching conflict, which will turn out to be war. He believes that it will wipe out present-day ideals and the existing Gods. “The world, as it is now, wants to die, wants to perish – and it will” (119). Predicting this crisis, he mentions Nietzsche, saying that the approaching crisis has been mentioned by him, too. Indeed, foreseeing the advent of nihilism, Nietzsche says that a spiritual crisis stands at the door of Europe. Thus, like Nietzsche, Demian notices that their society is rotten, and the approaching crisis will sweep away its ideals.
Despite the conflict they expect, Sinclair and the others come to believe that “a new birth amid the collapse of his present world [is] imminent, already discernible” (127). Hence, they are quite hopeful for what is about to come, and when the day comes, they believe that these Nietzschean men, those with sign will be needed.

Not as leaders, and lawgivers – we won’t be there to see the new laws – but rather as those who are willing, as men who are ready to go forth and stand prepared whatever fate may need them . . . The few who will be ready at that time and who will go forth – will be us. That is why we are marked – as Cain was – to arouse fear and hatred and drive men out of a confining idyl into more dangerous reaches (128)

It is seen that they will function as the harbingers of a new spirituality, of a new world of values beyond good and evil.

When the time comes, Sinclair sees an intriguing image in the sky, which they take as a sign of the approaching war. It is the image of a “gigantic bird that tore itself free of steel blue chaos and flew off into the sky with a great beating of wings” (134). This time it is seen that the bird image symbolizes not an individual, but the whole humanity “striving to break out of the bonds of tradition” (Ziolkowski 117). As Demian and Frau Eva also see similar signs, they conclude that now “the world wants to renew itself” (136). And this impulse for renewal results in a world war.

As soon as the war breaks out, Demian and Sinclair are sent to the front. In the middle of the war, Sinclair sees that things have started to change: “Deep down, underneath, something [is] taking shape. Something akin to a new humanity” (142). The war apparently shakes people’s beliefs in the old ideals; and Sinclair, together with Demian, hopes that this is the beginning of new ideals more akin to the ideals of those with the mark.

At some point, Sinclair has a vision of a figure resembling Frau Eva, and stars spring from her forehead (143). He sees that one of these stars shoots him. He is actually shot in the war. The next thing he remembers is lying on a bed and finding Demian, who is also shot, lying next to him. Just before dying, Demian says to him

I will have to go away. Perhaps you’ll need me again sometime, against Kromer or something. If you call me then I won’t come crudely, on horseback or by train. You’ll have to listen within yourself, then you
will notice that I’m within you. . . . Frau Eva said that if ever you were in a bad way I was to give you a kiss from her that she sends by me . . . Close your eyes, Sinclair! (145).

As Sinclair closes his eyes, Demian gives him a kiss which is actually on behalf of Frau Eva, and then dies, leaving Sinclair alone. His speech before his death implies that Sinclair has become a fully grown man and has gained an awareness so that he does not need Demian anymore. Thus, Demian leaves him. Sinclair’s concluding remarks after the war also point out the same conclusion. Demian is now within him. That is, Sinclair has eventually gained the potential to contribute to the new humanity that will arise as a result of the war. All in all, while he needed Demian when he was Abel, now that he has fully become a Cain, he does not need his master anymore. It is sufficient that he looks into his own self to find out answers whenever he needs:

Dressing the wound hurt. Everything that has happened to me since has hurt. But sometimes when I find the key and climb deep into myself where the images of fate lie aslumber in the dark mirror, I need only bend over that dark mirror to behold my own image, now completely resembling him, my brother, my master (145).

To sum up, it can be argued that in *Demian*, Hesse depicts a small community of Nietzschean übermenschen. Sinclair, the novel’s protagonist becomes one of them under the influence of Demian. Hesse’s main point in the novel revolves around the Christian dichotomy of good and evil. He presents these ideas as incompatible realms, and transcending this dichotomy as the only solution for an authentic individual. In this respect, Demian functions as a great mentor and saves Sinclair from the burden by preaching the “Nietzschean gospel of liberation from guilt feeling” (Sokel 37).

In order to transcend the dichotomy of incompatible forces, Sinclair learns to be a free spirit who escapes morality by applying the Nietzschean transvaluation. Boulby also claims that this transvaluation of values is one of the central points in the novel (82). This displays one more time that his characters in the novel follow the great philosopher. Thus, they embrace many Nietzschean ideas like moving beyond morality, listening to one’s inner voices, escaping from the herd, and following one’s own path in isolation.
However, in the final parts of the novel, when the approaching war becomes the issue, Hesse’s handling of this philosophy “assumes universal proportions” (Ziolkowski 117). While before he focuses only on the individual, through the end he starts to take an interest in the whole society. Hesse’s concern for the multitude can be better understood when Mileck’s following point is taken into consideration:

Hesse had always been an individualist but had never been able or willing to accept the full consequences of his individualism and had not been averse to compromise. He had tended to be more mindful of the expectations and comfort of society than responsive to the self, and had become something of a socialized outsider (92).

He is also probably under the influence of the World War I when he takes the whole of humanity into account. As Horowitz puts forth, Hesse views war as something that will cause “the death of the old civilization” and lead to “a renewal of culture” (181). All in all, he makes it that the small group of higher men in the novel have a function to contribute to the new spirituality Hesse hopes to see after the war. As Mileck points out, Hesse’s motivation must have been that “[a] better world of tomorrow could be ushered in by an enlightened few girded for a Nietzschean transvaluation of values” (93). Therefore, he has concerns not only for the individual, but for a whole society, and believes that those with the mark of Cain, that is to say, the followers of Nietzsche, can be individuals with full self-awareness and they can also help the world renew itself. Correspondingly, Sinclair learns to adopt Nietzschean ideals in the service of both his own individuality and the new spirituality awakening after the collapse of the old ideals. The kiss from Frau Eva at the end, therefore, represents Sinclair’s success as well as being a “confirmation of this unified experience” (Freedman 71).
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study set out with the aim of disclosing Nietzsche’s influence on three modernist *bildungsromans*. The novels were chosen from different European contexts – French, Irish, and German – in order to reveal whether the same phenomenon can be seen in different European cultures.

So as to be able to give a full account of modernist *bildungsroman* features and the importance of Nietzsche in modernist thought, some major 19th century developments leading to modernism were discussed. It is seen that the new findings and thoughts in the fields of science, psychology, and philosophy led to a cultural crisis and the decline of faith in old concepts and values. In this respect, Nietzsche stands as one of the most influential figures of the age, because he saw this crisis in advance and called it the advent of nihilism. His philosophy, therefore, revolves around the doctrine of active nihilism, which seeks to provide individuals with ways of overcoming nihilism and adding meaning and enthusiasm to life.

This *fin de siècle* cultural and moral crisis eventually led to an important literary movement, namely modernism. Modernist writers generally opposed to worn out ideals and their reflections in art and literature. Taking the newly emerging ideas into account, they, in a way, experimented with language and literary techniques. Literary works of this period are distinguished mainly by their use of deep psychology, new narrative techniques like stream of consciousness, new ways of dealing with time and memory, and anti-heroes. This new type of hero generally has a complex psychology, and has problems with himself and also with his society. He is an outsider and displays a rebellious character.

Similarly, the hero of the modernist *bildungsroman*, too, opposes to old ideas prevailing in society. In the discussion of the modernist *bildungsroman* and of the points it is distinguished from the previous novels of development, Gregory Castle’s
comprehensive account of the history of bildungsroman was used as the basis of discussion. It was revealed that while in the classical bildungsroman the hero is finally integrated into the existing social system, in the modernist bildungsroman he rejects being harmonious with his society, because he has different ideals and cannot find their expression in the society he is born into. Hence, in contrast with the previous bildungsroman heroes who achieve harmonious oneness with society, the modernist version of the bildungsroman protagonist exhibits a rebellious character and chooses to recreate himself in accordance with his own ideas.

Drawing upon Castle’s arguments on modernist bildungsroman, it has been suggested that there is a correlation between modernist bildungsroman characters and Nietzsche’s own notion of the self, because several rebellious modern bildungsroman characters reject existing values and create their own moral values, which results in the creation of an independent and authentic individual. Nietzsche, too, believes that man should be always in a state of becoming and he should create himself as if he were creating a work of art.

Having drawn this analogy, I carried out a brief discussion of the major points in Nietzsche’s philosophy. First of all, Nietzsche argues that man is a bundle of forces, and all of these forces are controlled by a universal instinct, which he calls the will to power. It directs each individual towards the growth and expression of power, and also towards self-mastery. Another important issue Nietzsche deals with is the nature of ancient Greek tragedy which includes Apollonian and Dionysian elements. Nietzsche concludes that Apollo leads to order and discipline and Dionysus leads to the unity of life and nature and embraces man’s natural impulses. According to Nietzsche, the decline both in Greek tragedy and in modern European culture results from the excessive superiority of the Apollonian ideals on the Dionysian energy. Thus, he believes that the Dionysian energy, which is totally repressed in modern culture should be aroused so that there can be a balance between Apollo and Dionysus, which would result in a spiritual and cultural development. Another point worth mentioning in the context of this thesis is Nietzsche’s criticism of morality and religion. He argues that Christianity aspires to a herd morality, or in his terms, the slave morality which prevents man from fulfilling his desires for power and happiness. Thus, arguing that the existing religion and morality is life-denying, he announces the death of god and
urges his followers to be the independent creators of their own values, in other words, to become free spirits.

It has been argued that all these Nietzschean ideas which support the autonomy of the individual are found in the three modernist bildungsromans chosen for this study. Gide’s The Immoralist, Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, and Hesse’s Demian are modernist novels dwelling on the coming of age of their protagonists. The rebellious hero as a characteristic of modernist bildungsroman appears in each of these novels, because it is seen that Michel, Stephen Dedalus, and Emil Sinclair renounce the values of the bourgeois society and obey their own laws.

As the main focus of this study, it has been revealed that all three of these protagonists follow the path illuminated by Nietzsche. Considering that Gide, Joyce, and Hesse were familiar with Nietzsche’s philosophy and shared many beliefs with him, it was expected that Nietzsche’s influence would be detected in their novels. Indeed, it has turned out that the protagonists of these three novels apply Nietzschean doctrines to their lives throughout their processes of development. Hence, Nietzsche plays an important role in making their bildungs possible.

The Immoralist’s Michel, as the first one of our Nietzschean bildungsroman characters, goes through a journey of self-awareness and strives to unearth his real self. First of all, he realizes his awakening senses through his homosexual inclinations. As Nietzsche argues, the only truth comes from our senses. Therefore, Michel learns to obey them. Just like a man of Nietzsche’s master morality, he decides on what is good and bad on the basis of his health and power. With the help of his friend and mentor Menalque, who is an embodiment of Nietzschean ideas, Michel makes up his mind that he abhors the herd and its values. Thus, he transcends morality and starts to find appealing only what is strong and amoral. For instance, Moktir, the boy stealing Marceline’s scissors, becomes his favorite, because he does not limit his actions according to the external limits. Furthermore, he adopts the Nietzschean contempt for weakness. Struggling for whatever or whoever is powerful, he ignores the weak individuals of the herd and even his wife Marceline.

More importantly, Michel becomes a Dionysian by learning to obey his nature. He throws away his career as a historian and becomes a wanderer following only his natural desires. This is more clearly seen in his identification with a gothic King
Athalaric. This figure appeals to him a lot, because he is also an example of a Dionysian man. He rejects his culture and education and chooses an uncivilized culture. He leads a life of pleasure and violence. Aspiring to be like Athalaric, Michel makes it clear that he prefers his Dionysian impulses over the Apollonian order.

While Gide makes sexual impulses and homosexuality the basis of his novel, Joyce prefers focusing on religious matters in an Irish context. Just as Nietzsche does in his criticism of religion, Joyce depicts Catholicism as a life-denying and repressive religion. Jesuit schools teach young boys to repress their sexual impulses and confuse sexual purity with goodness. The novel’s protagonist Stephen goes through such a religious education which controls him through punishment and feeling of guilt. After struggling hard to mortify his senses, he experiences a period of realization that his religion actually makes him unhappy by forcing him to deny his natural side.

Having acknowledged the life-denying side of religion, he decides to be an artist independent of anything restrictive. His resolution to be an artist is important, because he identifies himself with the Greek artificer Daedalus. Also, his name is once uttered as Stephanos. This inclination towards the ancient Greek world and its artists is parallel to Nietzsche’s appreciation of ancient Greek culture and art. In his Hellenization of his name, Stephen aspires to a pagan art and culture free from religious and moral constrictions.

Another Nietzschean aspect in Stephen’s coming of age period is the frequent use of the bird image. Both in Nietzsche’s philosophy and in Stephen’s story, birds represent the Nietzschean freedom and power. Hence, it is quite important that Stephen identifies himself with the hawk-like man. He is also impressed by the bird-like girl and decides to leave Ireland after seeing another bird figure in the sky. Therefore, identifying himself so much with birds, Stephen aspires to a Nietzschean freedom, and leaves Ireland in order to be able to create his own values and own mode of life.

Like Gide and Joyce, Hesse depicts a protagonist who reaches his inner self by aspiring to Nietzschean ideals. He transcends morality and learns to obey only the laws coming from his inner self. Under the mastery of Demian – and to some extent Pistorius – he learns that moral values may change according to one’s point of view, so they are not absolute rules. This is analogous to Nietzsche’s principle of perspectivism. Therefore, he learns the Nietzschean transvaluation of values through
Demian’s reinterpretation of the story of Cain and Abel. It turns out that there is another way of viewing the story, and Cain may be a superior and stronger man accused by cowards.

What they employ is the Nietzschean transvaluation which is parallel to his genealogy of morals in which the weak people, out of cowardice and resentment, blame the strong ones and bring about slave morality. Realizing this, Sinclair learns to free himself from the dual morality of his culture. He moves beyond the dichotomy of good and evil. From then on, he adopts several Nietzschean ideas and lives away from the herd and tries to find his true self in isolation.

Quite similar to Joyce, Hesse uses the bird imagery throughout the novel. There is a bird shape above the door of Sinclair’s house. Also in the following years, Sinclair paints a bird of prey with which he identifies himself. Finally, the new God they believe in, Abraxas, is depicted as the God through which a bird flies after destroying its world. Thus, as in the Portrait, the bird symbolizes Nietzschean freedom and trying to break his egg, it represents the individual trying to break free of the borders of traditional values.

Hence, as modernist bildungsromans, each of these novels depicts how its protagonist moves from immaturity to self-awareness, and from society to his own self. As a typical characteristic of bildungsroman genre, the protagonists’ coming of age processes are encouraged by a mentor. Michel is greatly influenced by his Nietzschean mentor Menalque, who teaches him to be natural and to live freely. Like Michel, Emil Sinclair finds inspiration and courage in others. Actually he has more than one mentor. Although he is mainly taught by Demian, he learns much from Pitorius too, and to some extent, from Frau Eva. However, in this respect, Stephen Dedalus does not belong to them. Throughout his journey, he is alone and he has to learn everything individually. Not having a mentor, Stephen is lonelier and more alienated than Michel and Emil Sinclair. However, regardless of whether they have a mentor or not, all three of them somehow manage to follow their own paths and to create their own selves.

It is seen that Gide, Joyce, and Hesse, all of them were influenced by Nietzsche’s ideas and employed them in their novels. Hence, their characters follow this great philosopher in order to make their self-fulfillment possible. However, despite
the many parallels, it can also be stated that these writers interpret and employ Nietzschean philosophy with different points of view. Gide, to start with, aims to make a warning about this philosophy. Although he highly appreciates it, he also wants to alert his readers that if the individual does not have the potential to bear this kind of freedom and responsibility, he may misinterpret what Nietzsche actually tries to say. Hence, such a misreading of this philosophy, as in the case of Michel's failure, may lead to excess and destruction. So, it can be claimed that Gide directs attention to the dangers Nietzsche’s philosophy bears.

In Joyce’s *Portrait*, too, the possibility of a future failure is hinted to some extent. That is to say, if Stephen aspires to the son Icarus instead of the father Daedalus, he may end up in destruction. However, Joyce ends the novel quite optimistically and it is understood that following the Nietzschean path will help Stephen in actualizing his identity as an independent artist. Therefore, it would be rightful to claim that Joyce has a different, more optimistic view of this philosophy than Gide has.

Hesse, on the other hand, makes use of Nietzschean ideas quite differently. In *Demian*, it contributes to the self-fulfillment of the individual, but more than that, it creates a small community of elites which will introduce a new spirituality to the multitude. Hesse believes that after the war old spiritual and moral norms will be extinguished, and these few Nietzschean man will help the birth of a new culture.

In short, while the first two novels are individualistic and their heroes are interested only in their own lives, Hesse’s protagonist represents one of the few who would lead and change the world into a Nietzschean one. *Demian* aspires to a universal change while in *The Immoralist* and *Portrait*, Nietzschean philosophy is influential only on the level of individual.

All in all, despite the differences in the authors’ ways of dealing with these ideas, it has been disclosed that Nietzsche was an influential figure and a powerful source of inspiration for the modernist *bildungsroman* writers discussed in this study.
REFERENCES


Modernist oluşum romanları ve Nietzsche’nin modern düşünce alanındaki yeri ve önemi konusunda detaylı bir tartışma yapılabilmek için, 19. yüzyılda gerçekleşen ve modernizm akımına katkıda bulunan bazı önemli gelişmeler konusunda bilgi verilmesi gereklidir. Sanayi devrimi, Marx’ın fikirleri, Darwin’in evrim teorisi, Freud’un psikanaliz çalışmaları ve bilinçaltılıkla ilgili mật tutması, ve daha pek çok yeni gelişme 19. yüzyıl boyunca insanlığın adı altında olamayacağı kadar hızlı ortaya çıkmış, eski inanç ve düşünce sistemini büyük ölçüde değiştirmiştir. Açıkça görülmektedir ki, bilim, psikoloji ve felsefe alanındaki yeni bulgu ve fikirler insanların eski kavram ve değerlerle olan ilişkisinde ciddi anlamda bir sarsılmaya sebep olmuştur. Bu açıdan, Nietzsche çağının önemli ve etkili figürlerinden biri olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Çünkü inanç alanındaki bu krizi öngören ve bu krizi nihilizm (hiççilik) kavramını kullanarak anlambilir ve açıklamaya çalışan kişi Nietzsche’dir. Umutsuzluk ve karamsarlığa sürüklekten pasif nihilizm ve bu karamsarlığı bir şekilde yıkmaya çalışan aktif nihilizm olmak üzere iki farklı nihilizm şekli tanımlamıştır. Bu bağlamda, Nietzsche felsefesi aktif nihilizm meselesi etrafında gelişmektedir. Yani, Nietzsche’nin düşünce sistemi...
bireynin nihilizmin üstesinden gelmesi ve hayatına kendi bireysel anlamlarını yükleyebilmesi konularına odaklanmaktadır.


bir birey olarak onun karakterini yansıtma, dolayısıyla karakterin roman boyunca kendi kişisel değerleri doğrultusunda hareket ettiği, kimliğini topluma göre değil, kendi düşünce ve inançlarına göre çizdiği görülmektedir. Bu noktada modernist oluşum romanları daha önce yazılan oluşum romanlarından ayrılmaktadır. Kısaca, modernist bildungsroman karakterleri daha ası bireylerdir ve inanmadıkları değerlere göre davranmayı kesinlikle reddederler.

Ayrıca, yine Castle’ın iddialarından yola çıkarak iddia edilebilir ki modernist oluşum romanlarındaki bu genel görüş ve Nietzsche’nin birey konusundaki görüşleri arasında önemli ortak noktalar bulunmaktadır. Modernist oluşum romanlarındaki başkaldıran kahramanlar kendi ahlak sistemlerini kendileri yaratmaya, özgür ve özgün bireyler olarak var olmaktadır. Benzer olarak, Nietzsche de bireylerin tamamen özgür olmalarını, kendilerini toplumdaki değer ve kuralların kısıtlamalarından tamamen kurtarmalarını ve bir sanat eseri yaratmaya neden olan kimliklerini yaratmalarını savunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, Nietzsche felsefesinin modernist oluşum romanlarında önemli bir etkiye sahip olma olasılığı göz ardı edilmemelidir.


Michel’in hoşuna gider. Aynı Nietzsche felsefesinde olduğu gibi, zayıf veahlaklı olan kişilerden uzaklaşır ve yalnızca gücün ve güçlü olan kişilerin peşinden koşmaya başlar. Sürünün zayıf bireylerini, hatta kendi eşli Marceline’i bile görmezden gelir.


Stephen, dinin yaşamla çelişen yönünün farkına vardıktan sonra her hangi bir kısıtlamaya maruz kalmayan, bağımsız bir sanatçı olmaya karar verir. Stephen’in sanatçısı olmaya karar vermesi önemlidir, çünkü bu kararla Nietzsche felsefesinde de takdir edilen antik Yunan idealine bir adım daha yaklaştıktır. Adının bir arkadaşı tarafından Stephanos olarak telaffuz edildiğini duyan Stephen kendini Yunan


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başarılıp bu ahlaki benimseyen sürüden de soyutlanarak kendi gerçek kimliğini bulmaya çalışır.

benzerliklere rağmen, Gide, Joyce ve Hesse’nin Nietzsche felsefesini farklı şekillerde yorumladıkları ve romanlarında bazı farklılıklarla kullanıdıkları iddia edilebilir. İlk olarak, Gide romanında bu felsefe hakkında bir uyarı yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Gide bir yandan Nietzsche felsefesini çokça takdir ederken, bir yandan da okuyucularına bir uyarıda bulunmak ister: Eğer bir birey özgürlük ve sorumluluk taşıyabilecek kapasiteye sahip değilse, Nietzsche’nin ne söylemiş olduğunu yanlış veya eksik yorumlayabilir. Bu yanlış anlama da, Michel örneğinde olduğu gibi, aşırılık ve yıkmaya yol açabilir. Dolayısıyla, Gide The Immoralist romanında Nietzsche felsefesinin muhtemel tehlikelerine dikkat çekmeye çalışır.


Kısaca söylenebilir ki, ilk iki roman Nietzsche felsefesini daha çok tek bir birey seviyesinde ele alırken, Demian’da bu felsefe tüm toplumu etkileyebilecek daha geniş bir konu olarak işlenmektedir. The Immoralist ve Portrait’te karakterler sadece kendi yaşamlarlarıyla ilgilenirken, Demian’da Emil Sinclair daha geniş çapta bir gelişim ve değişim umudu beslemektedir.
APPENDIX B

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ
Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü  X
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü
Enformatik Enstitüsü
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN
Soyadı : BAŞPINAR
Adı : HARİKA
Bölümü : İNGİLİZ EDEBİYATI

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : NIETZSCHE’S INFLUENCE ON MODERNIST BILDUNGSROMAN: THE IMMORALIST, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN, AND DEMIAN

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans  X        Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.  X
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. 
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: