

EXPLAINING CHANGE IN EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY TOWARDS SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA IN THE 2000s: THE PERSPECTIVES OF SYSTEM, PROCESS AND POWER

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ABSTRACT

EXPLAINING CHANGE IN EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY TOWARDS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN THE 2000s: THE PERSPECTIVES OF SYSTEM, PROCESS AND POWER

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The purpose of the thesis is to explain EU development policy change towards sub-Saharan African countries in the 2000s. It explores EU development policy change in three dimensions; change in the EU's multilateral development policy change, change in the EU's bilateral donor role, and change in institutional architecture of EU development policy by asking the questions of why and how these changes have occurred. This thesis investigates the causes of EU development policy change by employing perspectives of system, process and power and argues that EU development policy change can be explained by taking into account the interaction of both intra-EU and extra-EU factors. On this basis, changes in the multilateral EU development policy such as the adoption of European Consensus, EU's Code of Conduct on Division of Labour role are mainly explained by system perspective. Changes in EU's bilateral donor role are investigated with reference to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and its 2005 and 2010 reviews, and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and explained by process perspective. Changes in institutional architecture of EU development policy are discussed with reference to the institutional innovations of Lisbon Treaty, especially the EEAS, and explained by power perspective.

Keywords: European Union Development Policy, Sub-Saharan Africa, Cotonou Agreement, Lisbon Treaty and the European External Action Service.

ÖZ

2000'Lİ YILLARDA AB'NİN SAHRAALTI AFRİKA'YA YÖNELİK KALKINMA POLİTİKASINI AÇIKLAMAK: SİSTEM, SÜREÇ VE GÜÇ PERSPEKTİFLERİ

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Bu tezin amacı, 2000'li yıllarda AB'nin Sahraaltı Afrika'ya yönelik Kalkınma Politikası'ndaki değişimi açıklamaktır. Bu çalışmada, Birliğin Kalkınma Politikası'ndaki değişim üç açıdan ele alınmıştır: AB'nin çok taraflı yardım politikasındaki değişim, AB'nin ikili donör rolündeki değişim ve AB'nin Kalkınma Politikası'nın kurumsal değişimi. Bu değişimlerin nedenleri sistem, süreç ve güç perspektifleri kullanılarak açıklanmıştır. Böylelikle, AB'nin Sahraaltı Kalkınma Politikası'ndaki değişimin AB-içi ve AB-dışı faktörlerin etkileşiminin birlikte ele alınarak açıklanabileceğini savunulmuştur. AB'nin çok taraflı Kalkınma Politikasındaki değişimler AB Kalkınma Konsensu ve AB Kalkınma İş Bölümü temel alınarak incelenmiş ve sistem perspektifi ile açıklanmıştır. AB'nin ikili donör rolündeki değişim Cotonou Anlaşması, bu anlaşmanın 2005 ve 2010 tarihli revizyonları ve AB-Afrika Ortak Stratejisi çerçevesinde tartışılmış ve süreç perspektifi ile açıklanmıştır. Birliğin Kalkınma Politikası'ndaki kurumsal değişim Lizbon Antlaşması'nın beraberinde getirdiği yenilikler, özellikle AB Dış İlişkiler Servisi, ele alınarak güç perspektifi ile açıklanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliđi'nin Kalkınma Politikası, Sahraaltı Afrika,Cotonou Antlaşması,Lizbon Antlaşması ve Dış İlişkiler Servisi

To my mother – Fatma Sarıkamış

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
AUHIP	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan
BMZ	Germany Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CARIFORM	Caribbean Forum
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO	DG Development and Cooperation-Europe-Aid
DEVE	European Parliament Committee on Development
DG Agriculture	Directorate-General Agriculture
DG Development	Directorate-General Development
DG Relex	Directorate-General External Relations
DG Trade	Directorate-General Trade
EBAs	Everything But Arms
EC	European Community
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EEC	European Economic Community
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
G20	Group of 20
G77	Group of 77
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSP	Generalised System of Preferences
GNI	Gross National Income
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation

HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MICOPAX	Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
STABEX	Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation
SYSMIN	System of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
US	United States
WTO	World Trade Organization
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Development aid is part of international politics since successful implementation of the Marshall Programme in West Europe after the end of Second World War. In addition to helping the reconstruction of post-war Europe, development aid was also used to support decolonisation process in the 1950s. Initially, it was delivered as a means for supporting economic and social growth. However, the role and actors of development aid has evolved over time. In addition to supporting economic growth, it has been employed by nation states for a variety of purposes such as protection of commercial interests, tackling with international terrorism or realisation of foreign policy objectives. While states have tendency for using development aid for interest-based reasons, multilateral institutions at the global level support development aid for building economic and political stability and raising global welfare.

As a sui generis organisation, the European Union (EU) provides development aid since the start of European integration process with the Rome Treaty. EU Development Policy is one of the oldest policies of the Union's external relations whose origin goes back to the late 1950s. It started as an "association" relationship with 18 former colonies of founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and expanded gradually over time. In the 1970s, the EU started to deliver aid to almost all of the decolonized states in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the EU development policy became an advanced "model" of North-South relations through its non-reciprocal trade preferences and generous financial aid packages. In the 1980s, the geographical scope of EU development policy reached to countries in Latin America and the Mediterranean. During the post-Cold war period, the EU development policy focused on the liberalisation and democratisation of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). In the 2000s, the EU has become one of most

generous development aid donor in global politics. Today, the EU and its member states together provide more than half of global official development aid.

Compared to other multilateral aid institutions such as the World Bank or United Nations(UN) aid Agencies, the EU has a distinctive role in development policy. In addition to delivering development aid directly, the EU also coordinates bilateral development aid programmes of its member states as a multilateral agency. The EU has its own aid budget and aid bureaucracy that enable the EU to provide development aid to different parts of world. In addition to its donor role, the EU takes an active role in global development politics and promotes cooperation among its member states on development issues.

In the year 2000, the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 189 Member States of the UN became a turning point for development aid at the global level. UN Member States agreed on concrete commitments for poverty reduction, the achievement of primary education, reduction for child mortality, promotion of gender equality and maternal health by 2015. The MDGs brought aid efforts to the global level and put poverty reduction at the centre of global development politics.

Besides the MDGs, the shift of economic and political power from West to global South became another factor that influenced global development politics in the 2000s. The rise of new donors from global South started to challenge development aid policies and practices of the Western/Northern Donors. Moreover, civil society organisations, private foundations, transnational aid advocacy groups increased diversity of donors. The proliferation of both public and private donors makes development aid a complex issue.

In this context, EU development policy is also experiencing a critical period of transformation over the past ten years, in which purposes, the role,

practices and institutional setting of development policy have been changing. Having been a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EU is seeking to maintain its position in changing global aid politics and to strengthen the impact and effectiveness of its development policy.

Against this background, this thesis is engaged with explaining the reasons and causes of EU development policy change in the post-millennium period. It provides a detailed analysis of EU development policy starting from the adoption of the MDGs in 2000 to the establishment of the EEAS by the Lisbon Treaty in 2011 by addressing the following questions:

What has changed in EU development policy in the first decade of the millennium?

Why have these changes occurred in EU development policy?

How has EU development policy changed?

Therefore, it examines EU development policy change in three dimensions: change in the EU's bilateral donor role, change in multilateral development policy and change in institutional architecture of EU development policy. The EU's development policy towards sub-Saharan Africa is selected as a case study since the EU has been delivering aid to this region since the 1960s through successive agreements. In other words, development aid is at the centre of the EU's relationship with the sub-Saharan African countries. The Union provides more than half of overall global aid provided to the sub-Saharan African countries and becomes one of the main donors of sub-Saharan African countries. Furthermore, this region is dependent on European countries in terms of not only aid but also trade and market access.

The dependent variable explained in this study is the change of the EU's development policy. The independent variables are intra-EU coordination, EU's participation to multilateral development policy process and the EU's search for power. In his regard, this study offers the following hypotheses:

The first hypothesis suggests that EU development policy change is predominantly driven by the EU's search for a more integrated and coordinated policy at the EU level.

The second hypothesis posits that EU development policy change is mainly stemmed from the EU's adaptation and cooperation with multilateral development policy process at the global level.

The power hypothesis proposes that EU development policy change is result of the EU's aspiration for being a global power in world politics.

This study attempts to fill a gap in the literature on EU development policy by systematically explaining EU development policy change over the last ten years. It put forward an analytical framework for EU development policy change. Therefore, the main contribution of this thesis is to apply Christopher Hill and Michael Smith's general framework, which they applied in explaining "International Relations of the EU" in their edited volume "International Relations and the European Union" to specific field of EU development policy by adding "change dimension" to this analytical framework. Consequently, this thesis is an attempt to a make a modest contribution to the growing body of literature on the EU's external relations and development policy. The structure of the thesis is organised as follows:

The chapter on analytical framework provides an analytically grounded discussion of change. It examines the existing research on development policy and put forward an analytical framework for development policy change. It starts with the review of existing literature on EU external relations and touches on actorness approaches, powerness approaches and critical studies on EU development policy. It offers an analytical framework for change on the basis of three main perspectives: system, process and power.

The contextual framework provides a background for empirical observations of thesis. It discusses the evolution of global and EU development policy from its origins to the contemporary era. It deals with main events and

actors shaping the EU development policy and put EU development policy into historical and global context.

The chapter on the EU's multilateral development role engages with the interaction of member states bilateral development policies with EU development policy and examines changes in EU's development policy practices, rules and aid delivery. Hence, it focuses on development policy change *within* the EU. It starts with EU development policymaking process and indicates main differences in Member states' aid policies. Afterwards, the EU's commitment to the MDGs and efforts for increased coordination and harmonisation are examined. Besides, the European Consensus on Development, the EU's Code of Conduct on Division of Labour and Agenda for Change are analyzed as main building blocks of change in multilateral development policy.

The EU's changing bilateral development aid policy towards sub-Saharan Africa lays out change in development policy conducted by the EU towards partner countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Change in the EU's bilateral development policy is examined through significant changes brought by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Cotonou is the most comprehensive and sophisticated development partnership of North-South relations. In addition to changes in political and economic aspects of Cotonou, the JAES is examined as well.

The chapter on institutional architecture deals with institutional changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty and its implications on the EU's global role. Since the Maastricht Treaty, development is part of the EU's global role. The Lisbon Treaty brought a new legal framework and institutional structure for the EU. The institutional changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty are examined with a view to the establishment of new posts in EU external relations and the EEAS. This chapter also examines the implications of the EEAS on EU development policy.

Methodologically, this study is based on quantitative research analysis. In addition to use of academic studies as secondary sources, official documentation from the EU institutions and Member States, material from aid NGOs and think tanks, policy papers, working papers are also used as primary sources of the study. Additionally, semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions were made with officials at EU institutions and diplomats from EU Member states in Brussels in 2009 and 2010.

CHAPTER 2

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXPLAINING EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY CHANGE

The chapter provides conceptual tools of this study by defining main elements of analytical framework for the analysis of EU Development Policy change. It starts with discussion of the EU's distinctive characteristics in global politics and proceeds with the review of literature on EU development policy. The second part of the chapter elaborates analytical framework of this study to explain EU development policy change in the 2000s.

2.1. The Conceptual Starting Points on EU Development Policy and Literature Review

The EU as a collective entity has an elusive nature that makes it difficult to analyse. In comparison with international organizations, the EU has more autonomy and competence in various issue areas. However, the EU does not have many features of a nation state. Hence, the Union is located in a space between nation states and international organizations in world politics. It is recognized that the EU is a distinctive agency of global politics in both horizontal and vertical terms. Horizontally, the EU's policy portfolio is more comprehensive than any other regional organization. The Union challenges the Westphalian state system in Europe and establishes a new level of politics and policymaking.¹ Vertically, Member States delegates part of their authority to the EU in certain domains. Although they are reluctant to give away their power to the EU level in external relations, Member States and the Union are mutually interdependent with each other in the age of globalisation.²

¹ Henri Vogt, "Introduction", Hartmut Mayer and Henri Vogt (eds.), *A Responsible Europe: Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 6.

² Ibid., p.7.

Looking at complex nature of the EU, scholars define the EU as an agency of global politics from their own perspective. Scholars of European foreign policy such as Bretherton and Vogler view the EU as an “unorthodox actor in international affairs”³; Rosamond describes the EU as “a polycentric polity”⁴; Michael E. Smith defines the Union as “highly institutionalised regional multilateral system”⁵; Brian White conceives the EU as “non-state collective identity”.⁶

The EU’s distinctive characteristics pose challenges for EU researchers and IR theorists. Conventional IR Theories are based on the analysis of relations between states and assume states as main unit of analysis. From the view point of IR theory, the EU is a deviant case for state-centric IR theory since the EU is neither a state nor has discernible interests.⁷ Thus, the EU is “a heterodox unit of analysis” for IR theory. While IR theory looks for generalizations, EU represents a unique example of cooperation at regional level. IR studies prefer to study EU’s internal policies such as trade, agriculture, money where more integration taken place as an example of regional integration not the EU’s foreign and external relations.⁸ Conventional IR approaches are limited in terms of grasping peculiar attributes of the EU’s relations with the world and analyzing the multilevel features of EU policy making.⁹

State-centric IR theory conceptualizes the EU as an intergovernmental organisation through which Member States pursue their own interests. The EU

³ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p. 13.

⁴ Ben Rosamond, “Globalisation and the Social Construction of European Identities”, *Journal of European Public Policy* (vol. 6, no. 4, 1999).

⁵ Michael E. Smith, “Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals”, *Politics* (Vol. 28, No. 3, 2008).

⁶ Brian White, “Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen and Brian White (eds.), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy* (London: Sage, 2004), p. 45.

⁷ Ben Rosamond, “Conceptualizing the EU Model of Governance in World Politics”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vo. 10, No. 4, 2005), p. 465.

⁸ Filippo Andreatta, “The European Union’s International Relations: A Theoretical View”, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 22.

⁹ Rosamond, “Conceptualizing the EU Model of Governance in World Politics”, op.cit., p. 468.

is not conceived as a full-fledged player by IR scholars since the Union does not have clearly- defined interests.¹⁰ On the other side, European studies scholars focus on internal characteristics of the Union and define it as a sui generis global actor starting from the 1970s. This view conceptualizes the EU as a separate category that entails different perspectives for the analysis of its unique international potential. Yet, the emphasis on the uniqueness of the EU may lead to the analysis of EU in isolation from wider IR themes and other actors.¹¹

Inspired from IR theories, EU studies scholars developed European integration theories for understanding integration in different issue areas. Liberal intergovernmentalism was offered by Stanley Hoffman in 1960s and further developed by Andrew Moravcsik in the 1990s. It reflected state-centric Realist or Neorealist approaches in European studies and argued key role of member states in EU integration process. Member states decisions' on integration process is mainly determined by their domestic politics and economic interests, rather than military or strategic considerations.¹² In contrast to intergovernmentalist approach, supranational view put forward neo-functionalism that explains integration in low politics areas by supranational consensus politics. Linked to this, deeper integration in one economic area may lead to further integration in other economic areas. This "spill-over" process is main engine of European integration.¹³

In addition to European integration theories that were developed to explain the advance of integration in low politics domain, new conceptual perspectives were offered by scholars to analyse the growing international activism of European Community in the 1970s. For instance, EU studies make use of actorhood for examining the EU's "in between" position between

¹⁰ Arne Niemann and Charlotte Bretherton, "EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorhood and Effectiveness", *International Relations*,(Vol.27,No,2013.), p.262.

¹¹ Ibid, p.263.

¹² Michel Cini, "Intergovernmentalism", in Michel Cini (eds), *European Union Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),p.101.

¹³ Ben Rosamand, *Theories of European Integration* (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 2000),p.51-52.

Westphalian intergovernmentalism and post-Westphalian supranationalism.¹⁴ Although state-centric conceptualization of actorhood in terms of legal personality has been used since the early 1970s, EU scholars started to employ actorhood to capture the attributes of the EU as an independent and autonomous entity in international politics. Hence, the EU is conceived as a purposeful unit capable of making and implementing its own policies on the international scene.

As a challenge to mainstream state-centric IR approaches, actorhood was used by Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitcett in the early 1970s to examine the EEC and the United Nations as new actors of international politics. The scholars defined actorhood as “capacity of act” and pointed out three interdependent criteria for actorhood of international organization; autonomous decision-making power, ability to have an influence and other actors’ perception. They compared the EEC’s actorhood with the UN. Since the UN has a global purposes and outlook, UN’s actorhood derived from its global influence whereas the EEC had more impact in Europe.¹⁵ By considering the UN and EEC as new actors, Cosgrove and Twitcett offered an analysis of the actorhood of these organizations with reference to notions of “autonomy” in the sense of separateness, “impact” and “perception by other actors” significance given to its foreign policies by other states, especially its members.¹⁶

After Cosgrove and Twitcett, Sjöstedt criticized their ad hoc definition of actorhood by finding out their definition non-specific and proposed two main criteria for the definition of the EC’s “actor capability”; autonomy defined as the “degree of separateness” and cohesion referred to the “degree of internal integration”.¹⁷ Sjöstedt’s actor capability denoted the EU’s autonomous capacity to act actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the

¹⁴ Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and David J. Bailey, “Introduction”, in Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and David J. Bailey (eds.), *The European Union and Global Governance: A Handbook* (UK: Routledge, 2011), p. 5.

¹⁵ Joachim Alexander Koops, *The European Union as an Integrative Power: Assessing the EU's 'effective Multilateralism' with NATO and the United Nations* (Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2011), pp. 96-98.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.101.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

international system. By referring to the EC's influence in the GATT Kennedy Round, Sjöstedt drew attention to "governmental diplomatic interaction" of the EC in a multilateral context which was directly related to "transformation of the structures of the international system" and "international rule making". However, the EC's this transformative impact was dependent on some sort of action emerging from the Community system that reflected the identity of European Community as a whole not one of its constituent parts.¹⁸

Having considered conceptual difficulties of actorhood, David Allen and Michael Smith introduced the notion of "presence" in 1990 and revised it in 1998. In search of going beyond the ambiguities of EU's actorhood as "less than full-fledged nation state" and "more than dependent phenomenon", Allen and Smith underlined "variable and multi-dimensional" presence of the EU. Their early conceptualisation of "presence" was based on "passive presence" that denoted the EU's influence and impact owing to the EU's being, sheer existence without necessity of taking action. Afterwards, Allen and Smith shifted from "passive" to "active" conceptualization and identified presence with "making one's presence felt" and "taking responsibility".¹⁹

In the 1990s, actorhood maintained its dominant position for the analysis of EU's international activities. Jupille and Caporaso advocated their own conceptualization of actorhood by expanding Sjöstedt's definition with adding new analytical criteria, namely, recognition, authority defined as legal competence to act, autonomy in terms of institutional distinctiveness and cohesion.²⁰

In addition to Jupille and Caporaso's actorhood conceptualization, Bretherton and Vogler provided a comprehensive definition of actorhood by incorporating Allen and Smith's "presence" with Sjöstedt's actor capability. From their perspective, actorhood is defined as "interacting processes, based on the notions of opportunity, presence and capability that combine in varying

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 102.

¹⁹ Ibid.p. 108.

²⁰ Joseph Jupille, and James A. Caporaso, "States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics", in Carolyn Rhodes (ed.), *The European Union in the World Community* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), pp. 214-217.

ways to shape the Union's external activities." Accordingly, presence component of actorness is concerned to the EU's peculiar characteristics and consequence of being, while capability refers to internal context of the EU in which coherence has central importance. Opportunity component of actorness links EU internal attributes with international context and refers to the factors in external environment, including ideas, events and expectations of third parties that constrain and enable actorness.²¹ Applied to the EU's development cooperation policy, actorness denotes the impact of the EU in global development. Since presence refers to result of "being" and indicates the EU's ability to shape the perceptions, it sheds light on the EU's ability to have an influence in developing world. Yet, it does not denote a purposive external action. Hence, presence stems from the internal characteristics of the EU. Opportunity stands for the material factors, ideas, and events of external environment that constrain or enable actorness. It draws attention to the colonial histories of member states, expectations of associated the ACP countries and conducive international environment for the evolution of EU's development policy. Capabilities component of actorness is related to EU's capabilities and resources and available instruments for the achievement of its goals in development cooperation policy. Bretherton and Vogler also explained the evolution of EU development policy by using actorness. They explained the evolution of EU development policy. European imperialism is the most significant internal factor influencing the Union's development policy. However, the evolution of the Union's development policy is the outcome of EU's unique characteristics and its economic presence in agriculture and trade²².

Although the analysis of EU actorness reveals the EU's strengths and weakness regarding to making decisions and purposive behaviour and capabilities regarding to EU institutions and member states, it concentrates on the analysis of EU's impact and outcome and misses policy analysis approach.

²¹ Charlotte Bretherton, and John Vogler, "The European Union as a Sustainable Development Actor: The Case of External Fisheries Policy", *Journal of European Integration* (Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008), pp. 404-405.

²² Bretherton and Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, op.cit., pp. 112.

Yet, it adopts a unitary approach and considers the EU as a monolithic single actor.²³

In relation to the agency centric actorness approach, another strand of literature revolves around the issue of what kind of actorness the EU has. Having recognized the EU's actorness, scholars discuss EU's ability to lead and act in international politics with reference to powerness approach. Conventionally, the EU's development cooperation policy is analysed as an instrument of EU's civilian power. In the Cold War milieu of 1970s, the EU's relation with world was defined by civilian power Europe by François Duchene owing to the EU reliance on non-military instruments such as trade and civilian means that excluded coercive attitude. Hence, the development cooperation policy as a non-military instrument of the EU reflects the EU's civilian power characteristics.

In addition to civilian power, normative power is discussed in relation to the development cooperation policy. Having been conceptualised by Ian Manners, Normative Power derived from the debates on ideals, values and principles of the Union and drew attention to the "ideations and power of norms as the substantive basics of EU studies."²⁴ The more recent debate on Normative Power Europe is related to the conceptualisation of the EU's external actions which are neither material nor normative but concerned with ideas, opinions and conscience. The Normative Power argument of Ian Manners indicates not only a particular kind of entity, but also the EU's specific aim of setting standards for others by the dissemination of ideas, conscience and exertion of norms rather than military means or economic incentives. It examines the power of norms for influencing actor's identity and behaviour.²⁵

Normative Power is concerned with diffusion of normative goals such as respect for human rights, the rule of law, democratic principles, rather than

²³ Brian White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 29.

²⁴ Richard G. Whitman, "Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and International Relations", in Richard G. Whitman (ed.), *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 2.

²⁵ Thomas Diez and Ian Manners, "Reflecting on Normative Power Europe" in Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams (eds), *Power in World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 175.

actual policy practice. By norm diffusion, the EU illustrates the forms of appropriate behaviour and highlights its identity as a “force for good”.²⁶ It also reflects the EU’s value-based international approach that endeavours to “persuade or condition others to incorporate EU norms.”²⁷

While civilian power writings underline the EU’s employment of the use of economic resources and thus material assets for the benefit of owner, normative power highlights the importance of non-material factors, norms. Applied to the EU’s development cooperation policy, development policy emphasizes values of solidarity and the humanitarian and civilian features of the EU’s external relations. The EU’s delivery of aid serves to the promotion of the fundamental freedoms, consolidation of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law. Hence, development policy has enabled the Union to project its norms and values in developing world starting from the 1990s.²⁸

In addition to the normative principles of democracy, human, rights, the rule of law, which are holistic principles of the EU’s external policy, Manners argues that the EU’s commitment to social solidarity including workers’ right, family and children rights are also equally important. Yet, the specific normative principle of solidarity is overlooked in the EU’s development policy. In this regard, Manners made reference to Andy Storey’s study that indicated that the EU prefers to promote norms of freedom and good governance at the expense of social solidarity.²⁹ The Union promotes more holistic principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law by means of conditional aid. Consequently, the EU is seen as “a committed but troubled normative power” in the field of development policy.³⁰

²⁶ Isabel Ferreira Nunes , “Civilian, Normative, and Ethical Power Europe: Role Claims and EU Discourses”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 16, No. 1, 2011), p. 6.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁸ Vicki L. Birchfield, “The EU’s Development Policy: Empirical Evidence of ‘Normative Power Europe?’”, in Richard G. Whitman (ed.), *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 144.

²⁹ Ian Manners, “The normative power of the European Union in a globalised world”, in Zaki Laïdi (ed.), *EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 25.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

In addition to normative power, the concept of ethical power is used to understand the EU's development policy. The ethical power Europe is conceived as an outcome of normative globalisation after the end of Cold War which led to the EU to assume responsibility beyond its borders. Ethical power denotes the EU's exercise of power through transforming international environment by diffusion of its norms such as effective multilateralism³¹. However, the ethical power is not defined on the basis of "altruism or moral absolutism in terms of self-sacrifice". The EU is an example of ethical power since it deploys its resources and capacity for the good of others by promoting peace, prosperity and rights in the world. The EU tries to combine ethical motives with strategic and instrumental interests. Therefore, the EU uses its power indirectly to influence the environment by extending norms such as democracy, good governance and the rule of law. However, the EU does not pursue its interests at the expense of others. The EU pursues its interests by "certain rules of action" including persuasion, negotiation, dialogue, rather than coercion, with a view to "concern for well-being of others".³² Consequently, ethical power illustrates that the norms and values promoted by the EU have global moral validity and are "oriented towards the protection of the rights of individuals, rather than those of states."³³ According to Vogt, development policy reflects the EU's historical responsibility towards its former colonies and moral responsibility to tackle with global poverty. Hence, the EU's development policy has an ethical component that makes the EU a responsible global actor.³⁴

According to Nunes, powerness approach of EU such as civilian, normative, ethical power explain the specific qualities of EU that make it different from traditional actors. However, these concepts do not offer a comprehensive vision for various international roles played by the EU. They fall

³¹ Lisbeth Aggestam, "Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?", *International Affairs* (Vol.84, No.1, 2008), p. 4.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

³³ Nunes, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

³⁴ Henri Vogt, "Coping with Historical Responsibility: Trends and Images of the EU's Development Policy", in Hartmut Mayer and Henri Vogt (eds.), *A Responsible Europe: Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

short of providing a consistent picture of the EU as an international actor and provide limited insights into the EU's strengths and weaknesses.³⁵

In relation to the EU's development policy practice, Jan Orbie underlined that the EU's adherence to its normative or civilian power role is declining. The EU seems to pursue more realistic superpower discourse that may overshadow development objectives in the 2000s. The EU's assertion of itself as a global power is defined as "enlightened superpower" role. The EU seeks to accommodate its pursuit of more powerful role with its strong normative background. The EU's ambitions for development policy are stemmed from the EU's search for promoting its identity, rather than meeting development needs of people. Compared to other development actors such as the US, China, the EU presents itself as a benevolent development actor, but the EU's development objectives may be eclipsed "European superpower temptations."³⁶

Similar to Jan Orbie's perspective, Patrick Holden argues that the EU's development policy is neither altruistic nor commercial. It indicates the EU's quest for structural power by promoting its economic security and ensuring access to key commodities, changing domestic rules and structures in line with EU rules and developing international legal and institutional framework appropriate for its interests and values. Hence, the development cooperation policy gives the EU the power to shape institutions and structures in recipient countries.³⁷

Finally, there are scholars examining the EU's relations with developing world from the perspective of EU integration theories. Especially, Martin Holland noted the distinctive EU's approach to development policy and underlined the central role of the development policy for the European integration and the EU's global role. According to Holland, development aid

³⁵ Nunes, op.cit., p. 10.

³⁶ Jan Orbie, "The EU as an actor in development: Just another donor, European norm maker, or eclipsed by superpower temptations?", in Sven Grimm, Davina Makhan and Stefan Gänzle (eds), *The European Union and Global Development – An Enlightened Superpower in the Making?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 34-35.

³⁷ Patrick Holden, *In Search of Structural Power: EU Aid Policy as a Global Political Instrument* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), p. 19.

policy has a key role in the process of European integration and is part of the EU's global ambitions. As a policy, it incorporates both altruistic goals such as rising standards of poor people, prevention of poverty, promotion of values and self-interested motivations like the prevention of migration flows and refugee crisis, access to resources and markets, promotion of global free trade.³⁸ Holland underlined the linkage of the EU's internal and external policies and argued that the EU's internal problems affecting the EU's relations with the Third World.³⁹

Although most of the studies on the EU's developing policy are examined this issue from perspective of development studies, Holland put forward the importance of dynamics of European integration for understanding the EU's relations with wider world.⁴⁰ In other words, he stated that European integration theories can be used to analyze the EU's external relations⁴¹ and argues that "the EU's external actions are more the consequences of its own internal integration dynamics than of external realities"⁴²

Holland examined four main approaches to European integration, namely liberal intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, multilevel governance, new institutionalism. Although many events of development policy are explained by liberal intergovernmentalism, other theories of integration can also be used. But no single macro theory is capable of explaining EU development policy. Thus, various approaches can be used by taking into account the level of analysis and the nature of empirical case.⁴³

For instance, Liberal Intergovernmentalism underlined the role of interstate bargaining of rational governments in the process of European

³⁸ Martin Holland, *The European Union and the Third World* (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002), pp. 14-15.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

⁴² Martin Holland and Matthew Doidge, *Development Policy of the European Union* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), p. 27.

⁴³ Holland, *The European Union and the Third World*, op.cit., p. 20.

integration. Accordingly, EU policies are mainly determined by domestic policies of EU member states and reflect lowest common denominator among member states. Hence, main parameters of EU policies are determined by member states whereas micro policy choices are made by others.⁴⁴ Additionally, liberal intergovernmentalism notes that importance of all members is not equal, big three, France, Britain and Germany, are dominant actors of EU development policy making process. The influence of France and Britain was seen in Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. After the accession of Spain and Portugal, the EU's development policy was expanded to assist Latin American countries.⁴⁵ The primary role of member states was also observed in lack of agricultural concessions in the Cotonou Agreement owing to member state opposition. Likewise, the involvement of migration and security clauses to the Cotonou revealed the explicit member state involvement.⁴⁶ Hence, liberal intergovernmentalism highlights the role of member states in changing the EU's development policy and thus marginalizes the role of EU institutions, especially downplays the Commission role as a policy initiator and co-legislative power of the European Parliament.⁴⁷

On the other side, neo-functionalism points out the significance of supranational actors such as the Commission and the Parliament without denying the role of member states. Particularly, the concept of "spill over" introduced by Neofunctionalism is employed to indicate the linkages of different policy sectors. Spill-over has three elements; the functional, the political and the geographical. Hence the decisions for promotion of deepening in a particular sector have repercussions and consequences for other sectors. In this regard, the EU's changing development policy cannot be examined in isolation from other sectors. The changes of the EU's development policy are connected to the EU's foreign policy, enlargement and trade policy.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Holland, *The European Union and the Third World*, op.cit., pp. 236-237.

⁴⁵ Holland and Doidge, op.cit., p. 29.

⁴⁶ Holland and Doidge, op.cit., p. 30.

⁴⁷ Holland and Doidge, op.cit., p. 30.

In addition to literature on EU Studies, IR scholars from Critical perspectives examine EU's relations with developing world from a different angle. EU's colonial and then, postcolonial relations with developing world are examined by a wide range of critical theories such as neo-Marxism, Gramscianism, Habermasian, post-structural feminist theories. Although they are less prevalent in literature, these theories seek to reveal unequal power relationship and the means for emancipation. They classified this relationship as a particular type of inequality. For instance, Marxism focuses on capitalism, feminism focuses on patriarchy and women, post-colonialism examines relations between the Northern core and South periphery and post-structuralism emphasizes the existence of excluded other.⁴⁹

In the field of EU's external relations, Marxist critical theories examine class relations and domination. There are also studies with neo-Gramscian analysis. For instance, Hurt applied neo-Gramscian perspective and argued that the EU imposed neoliberal norms and market liberalisation internationally by development policy vis-a-vis the ACP countries. On the other side, Cafruny and Ryner underlined the role of the EU as a subordinate actor in a global historic bloc dominated by the US and global capitalism.⁵⁰ In a similar way, Karagiannis study named as "Avoiding responsibility adopted post-structuralist perspective"⁵¹ explained change of development by transition of EU's development policy from a colonialism to post-colonialism. Post-colonialism deals with how the inequalities stemming from Europe's history of colonial relations are reproduced in today's world and "how the dominant narrative of European integration acts to exclude and conceal the colonial and postcolonial relations within which EU member states are embedded." In this sense, the EU-ACP relations were initially characterized by exceptionality, common past,

⁴⁸ Holland and Doidge, op.cit., p. 31.

⁴⁹ David J. Bailey, "The European Union in the World: Critical Theories", in Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and David J. Bailey (eds.), *The European Union and Global Governance: A Handbook* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 39.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 43.

⁵¹ Nathalie Karagiannis, *Avoiding Responsibility: The Politics and Discourse of European Development Policy* (London: Pluto Press, 2004).

efficiency and mutual engagement and obligations between the ACP and the EU; later it turned to be a disengaged relationship marked by global responsibility, global relations and irrelevance of colonial past.⁵²

In sum, the review of literature provides messy picture of studies on EU development policy. No single theory can adequately explain EU development policy. Actorness and powerness approaches of European foreign policy are used to explain the EU development policy. Besides, European integration theories are offered to understand the peculiar characteristics of the EU development policy. On the other hand, critical approaches of IR theory are put forward to indicate asymmetrical and unequal characteristics of EU development policy.

2.2. Analytical Framework for EU Development Policy Change

Despite large range of studies on the EU's development cooperation policy, main problem with the existing research is that little effort has been made for a theoretical analysis of question of change. Much of the literature on the EU's development aid policy is descriptive and centred around factual policy analysis. Majority of the studies were made without employing any theoretical perspectives from IR theory or EU studies. The scarce literature on EU development policy change prefers to explain change in a historical and descriptive manner, which prevents a rigorous analysis of EU development policy change.

For instance, Andrew Mold's edited study entitled as "EU Development Policy in a Changing World" examined the evolution of the EU's development policy with regard to internal and external factors. The study focused on the implications of globalisation, 9/11 events and the EU's enlargement waves on the EU's development cooperation policy without offering any theoretical or analytical framework.⁵³ Similar to this study, K. Arts and A. K. Dickson's edited

⁵² Ibid., p. 45.

⁵³ Andrew Mold, (ed.), *EU Development Policy in a Changing World: Challenges for the 21st Century* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007).

book entitled as “EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol” underlines external and internal factors shaping the direction and scope of changes in development policy in the post-Cold war era. While they emphasized the end of Cold War, the liberalisation of CEECs, globalisation and rise of civil ethnic conflicts and failed states as external factors; enlargement, advance of European integration and the interests of member states and bureaucratic interests of the Commission were stated as internal factors of policy change.⁵⁴ Yet, Arts and Dickson approach was mainly “historical, regional and policy-making” and lacked a theory-informed research in the analysis of the parameters of the evolution of EU aid policy

Adrian Flint’s study on ‘Trade, Poverty and the Environment: The EU, Cotonou and the African-Caribbean-Pacific Bloc’ examined the EU’s promotion of sustainable development in its relations with the ACP countries. This study is based on the analysis of the nexus of development policy with environment from a neoliberal perspective.⁵⁵

Maurizio Carbone’s book on “EU and International Development: The Politics of Foreign Aid” focused on the European Commission’s role in the Union’s changing development policy. Although the book touched upon integration theory in the beginning, it mainly examined process of preference formation and the role of the Commission in this process with a specific emphasis on “institutional entrepreneur” role of the Commission Directorate Generals’ (DGs). Carbone substantiated this entrepreneurship role in three cases: the EU’s decision to increase aid volume by setting collective targets of 0.39 per cent of GNI by 2006 and then 0.56 per cent by 2010, the EU’s commitment to the global public goods and the decision to untied aid. Hence, Carbone’s book explained the major changes of EU’s development policy since the mid-2000s from leadership position of Commission. Commission succeeded in influencing the EU’s decision making process by overcoming its internal

⁵⁴ Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson, “EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol?”, in Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson (eds.), *EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).

⁵⁵ Adrian Flint, *Trade, Poverty and the Environment: The EU, Cotonou and the African-Caribbean-Pacific Bloc* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

differences and acting as a unitary actor and taking advantage of the opportunities provided by international context.⁵⁶

Against this background, this thesis aims to examine EU development policy change by offering an explanatory framework. Policy change is one of complex issues of international politics. There is no consensus on what constitutes policy change. In this sense, Charles Hermann made a classification of foreign policy change that can be adapted to development policy change. According to Hermann, there are four kinds of change: adjustment change, program change, problem/goal change and international orientation change. Adjustment changes are quantitative changes in the “level of efforts” and/ or “scope of recipients”, program changes refer to change qualitative change in methods or means. In other words, “what is done and how it is done changes”. Problem/goal changes are changes in problem or purpose of foreign policy. The final category of change is international orientation changes that indicate change in total redirection of countries’ orientation in world politics.⁵⁷ Hermann’s classification of policy change is utilized for understanding the nature of EU development policy change in the proceedings chapters.

Previously, the studies of Roy Ginsberg and Brian White attempted to develop analytical frameworks for understanding the Union’s global role by incorporating intra-EU and global factors. Ginsberg’s innovative study explained European foreign policy by an analytical model inspired from David Easton’s classic work. His framework consisted of the contexts, inputs, European foreign policy system that converts inputs into outputs, and feedback loops. Ginsberg applied his model to three case studies, namely the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the Middle East Peace Process and the impact of the US.⁵⁸ Ginsberg stressed on external outcome of the EU’s foreign policy activities and differentiated output, action, outcome, impact and effect. EU foreign system

⁵⁶ Maurizio Carbone, *The European Union and International Development: The Politics of Foreign Aid* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

⁵⁷ Charles F. Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy, *International Studies Quarterly*, (Volume 34.No.1, 1990), p. 5.

⁵⁸ Roy Ginsberg, *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire* (USA: Rowmand and Little Field, 2001).

produced outputs, if these outputs have external political impact, they become outcomes. Thus, Ginsberg linked the EU's international role with having political impact on others. Hence Ginsberg operationalized the EU's actorness through "external political impact".⁵⁹

Similar to Ginsberg's approach, Brian White examined European Foreign Policy with an assumption of "interacting system of action". White's study examined European Foreign Policy in terms of three subsystems: Community foreign policy covering trade and development, Union foreign policy referring to the CFSP, Member States' foreign policy. White investigated these three subsystems of European Foreign Policy in terms of "the context within which policy is made, the actors involved and the process that characterizes policy making, the instruments used to achieve policy objectives and the outputs that emerge from the policy process"⁶⁰

In addition to Ginsberg's and White's application of policy system model, Karen Smith defined system as a "object of inquiry that is not a tightly integrated entity like a state but rather a set of institutions and norms created to generate common policies." While the EU member states are most important actors of this system, EU institutions are also influential in policymaking and implementation. She also underlined that the EU's relations with wider world involves multiple levels of inquiry and multiple actors at those levels. In this regard, Smith's definition of EU foreign policy system consists of institutions and norms guiding the making and implementation of policy.⁶¹

Recently, Hill and Smith's study on International Relations of the EU examined the EU's global role by taking into account coexistence of three perspectives: system, process and power. Their approach is based on the assumption that the analysis of EU's global role cannot be made in isolation

⁵⁹ Koops, op.cit., p. 118.

⁶⁰ Brian White, "Understanding European Foreign Policy System", op.cit., pp. 23-25.

⁶¹ Karen Smith, "Understanding the European Foreign Policy System", *Contemporary European History*, (Vol.12, Issue 1, 2003), p.330.

from the EU's relations with wide world.⁶² Both global and EU factors are taken into account in the study since the EU's policies are "neither fully domestic nor authentically international". Hill and Smith also underline the inadequacy of "one-size-fits-all" approach for the analysis of the EU's global role.⁶³ Owing to "heterodox" nature of the EU as a unit of analysis, "tailor-made" approaches are needed for the examination of the EU's relationship with outside world. The advantage of this study is that it helps us to think the "wood" and "trees" together and to examine the actors and processes within and beyond the EU in a comprehensive way.

This thesis adapts and modifies the Hill and Smith's general framework for the analysis of EU's global role to the specific nature of EU development policy to explain why and how the Union's development policy has changed since the 2000s. The EU development policy change is explained on the basis of three main analytical dimensions: (sub)system, process and power, which enable us to unravel factors that contribute to change of EU development policy. As stated by Hill and Smith, EU's external activities, including development policy, is not a "self-contained" policy. The development policy does not involve only donor-recipient relationship. It is related to both EU's internal policy making and multilateral aid politics at the global level.

The departure point for application of this study for EU development policy change is the definition of global aid system, which can be made by using analytical conceptualizations of system in IR theory. For instance, Kaplan's study entitled as "System and Process" stressed on "interaction" and defined system as "agglomeration of interrelated elements whose regularised or normalised behaviours may take structural forms, but structure being not a defining characteristic apart from the elements". Hence, "interactions or interrelations of the parts that makes the entity in question a system". Kaplan's

⁶² Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, "International Relations and the European Union: Themes and Issues", in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), *International Relations and the European Union* (2nd ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 6-7.

⁶³ Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, "Acting for Europe: Reassessing the European Union's Place in International Relations", in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), *International Relations and the European Union* (2. ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 469-470.

definition of system centred on “interrelation/interaction” and reflected functionalist understanding of system⁶⁴. After Kaplan, Waltz defined international system as a status of an entity itself and a structure. There were three defining components of structure; first one is the ordering principle of the system; the principle according to which the parts are organised, secondly the specification of the functions of differentiated parts and thirdly the distribution of capabilities among the units.⁶⁵ Waltz’s proposed that system was independent of observed actors. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, world system perspective of Wallerstein challenged previous system approaches by advancing a hierarchic and vertical conceptualisation of international system. In a similar way to Wallerstein, Modelski developed “long cycles” that had structural systemic characteristics.⁶⁶ Despite the common elements of interaction and interrelation; IR scholars offered different understanding of system. While Kaplan made “interaction” based definition, Waltz underlined structural interrelations. Yet, fundamental idea is the “relations occur and in time get institutionalised and thus constitute a systemic factor.”⁶⁷

In the light of insights from IR theory, international aid system can be conceived as recurrent and persistent aid interactions between affluent and wealthy donors of global North and underdeveloped countries of global South. Hence, asymmetrical North-South relations constitutes main pattern of global aid system. According to Paul Opoku Mensah, international development system was established in the post-war period to facilitate economic growth of the developing countries of Global south. It is a new kind of system “reflecting global power relations and continuously developing and framing regional, national and local subsystems”.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Nuri Yurdusev, *System Theory and International Relations: Three Major Conceptualisations*, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, (Ankara: METU, 1991), p. 119.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.154.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.50.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

⁶⁸ Paul Opoku-Mensah, “China and the International Aid System: Challenges and Opportunities”, *DIR Research Series Working Paper No. 141* (Denmark: DIR & Department of History, International and Social Studies Aalborg University, 2009),p.1

Over time, key actors, processes and interaction of global aid system have changed. During the Cold War era, both international aid system consisted of Northern donors such as the US, Canada, the Soviet Union and conceived as “system of states”. With the end of Cold War, international aid system started to expand and diversify. The relations between global and regional levels intensified. In addition to intergovernmental relations, transgovernmental and transnational relations gained importance. In the new millennium era, the expansion and diversification of the actors in gave rise to a multicentric and multilayered global aid system consisting of both states and non-states.

The change of global aid system over time can be explained by Gilpin’s classification of international change, namely systems change, systemic change and interaction change. System change refers to change in fundamental nature of system such as fall of empires or rise of nation states, systemic change means change within system such as governance of system, interaction change is concerned with changes in entities relations with each other such as alliance formation and diplomacy.⁶⁹ The last decade witnessed change within global aid system by means of rise of new donors, the diversification of types of donors such as non-state actors, advocacy groups alongside nation states, which coincided with the third type of change, interaction change within global aid system.

In the case of EU development policy, the EU as (*sub*)*system* perspective sheds light on the EU’s coordination of preferences and interests of member states for common approaches and thus more integrated EU development policy.⁷⁰ The subsystem perspective essentially points out the connected and associated relationship between the EU and Member States, the nexus of whole and parts. Seen as such, EU’s development subsystem can be conceived as “patterns of relations” between the developing world, particularly the ACP states in global South, and EU institutions and member states. It is a kind of

⁶⁹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981), p.42.

⁷⁰ Hill and Smith, “International Relations and the European Union: Themes and Issues”, op.cit., pp. 9-11.

“mixed actor” system encompassing supranational EU institutions and EU member states. The subsystem perspective focuses on the coordination of divergent interests and preferences of member states and the formation of common perspective on development policy. It thus draws attention to uneasy relationship between the EU and Member States. Owing the divergence of member states attitudes towards development policy and division within the different Directorate Generals of Commission, the EU’s subsystem is a fragmented aid system in which components of systems are linked each other in a loose way.

However, EU’s development policy is more than the sum of member states’ aid policies. In addition to 28 member states, the EU has its own peculiar characteristics that are independent from its parts. Union’s development policy is a donor in its own rights and has its own institutions and budget. EU member states politically prefer to act within the Union’s framework when benefits of collective action are more than unilateral action. Additionally, the EU’s development policy enables member states to reach developing countries by using the EU’s wide network of delegations all around the world. Despite the fact that the EU’s development policy is as old as European integration process, member states continue to conduct their own national development policy. There is no delegation of authority from member states level to Union level. The EU has to share its competences with member states. Member states are reluctant to construct a common EU policy on the basis of Community method, which may give rise to tension between the EU institutions and member states in terms of the degree of cooperation. The Union’s development policy as a subsystem works on the basis of logic of integration. The EU institutions, especially the Commission promotes joined-up approaches and the convergence of member states aid policies in terms of rules, norms and implementation.

This perspective explains change by the needs of integration process. The EU subsystem deals with the issue of whether the EU is more or less than the sum of aid policies of member states. Initially, EU’s development policy as a subsystem consisted of homogenous units since donor countries were at the similar levels of economic and social development with similar geopolitical

interests. Yet, EU aid system expanded and diversified in terms of membership as result of enlargement waves, which makes cooperation and coordination of EU member states difficult. To improve coordination, the Commission plays a “facilitator” role in the convergence of different interests and formulation of non-binding common rules and norms. Hence, the EU serves as an avenue for building concerted policies of EU member states.

Secondly, the EU as a process perspective denotes the interplay between the global aid system and the EU subsystem. From the view point of Hill and Smith, the EU as a process explains the EU’s involvement to the general process of international relations, which is defined as “the common mechanisms, formal and informal, through which international problems are confronted”. Hence, it points out the EU’s key participant role by means of “exchange, cooperation and conflict”.⁷¹ In the case of development policy, the EU’s process role explains the EU’s participation and contribution to legal, institutional and political mechanisms through which poverty reduction is addressed⁷². The Union’s participation to general process of international relations draws attention to the EU’s wide range of involvement to multilateral aid process at the global level and underlines the EU’s cooperation with multilateral agencies and actors. The process perspective is explained by Stephen Woolcock as follows:

EU development policy is however, embedded in a multilateral process that includes member state, as well as the policies and initiatives taken by other multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, UNIDO, the WTO and so on. Member state governments have pursued development policies and initiatives both bilaterally and through these multilateral organizations as well as through the EU, so that EU development policy could be said to be more part of a wider multilateral approach than in the case of trade or environmental policy.⁷³

⁷¹ Hill and Smith, “International Relations and the European Union: Themes and Issues”, op.cit., pp. 11-12.

⁷² Hill and Smith, “International Relations and the European Union: Themes and Issues”, op.cit., p. 8.

⁷³ Stephen Woolcock, *European Union Economic Diplomacy: The Role of the EU in External Economic Relations*, (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), p. 149.

During the 2000s, the EU has established more intimate relationship with other development actors and institutions at the global level and deeply embedded to global aid policy making process. In response to global demands and pressures on poverty reduction, the EU has intensified its negotiation and communication with other actors. In addition to influencing global aid policy process, the EU has internalized global norms and practices and by “organising” and “mobilising” member states’ policies in accordance with global agenda. Hence, the EU holds “lead by example” role by advancing aid harmonisation, joint programming and division of labour at the EU level.

In the last decade, global development politics moved from post-colonial aid delivery to pro-poor oriented economic growth and effective aid. The main global multilateral development agencies, namely, the UN, the World Bank and the OECD play role in shaping the dynamics of global development politics. For instance, the UN put emphasis on social and humanitarian aspect of development and promoted the MDGs as main framework of global development. The World Bank determines global development agenda by means of its extensive resources for research and capacity for financing development aid.⁷⁴ OECD deals with efficient aid delivery norms such as ownership, result-management, alignment and harmonization. Hence, these agencies maintain issue leadership role in global development politics. In comparison these multilateral agencies, the EU’s role in terms of norm-making and rule-generation is limited. The EU is neither international rule setter at the global level nor compliance enforcer at regional level. However, the Union cooperates with these organizations in line with its commitment to effective multilateralism principle in external relations.

Thirdly, power perspective refers to the EU’s aspiration for “being a global power” in world politics. The EU’s development policy started with 18 African countries, most of which were the former colonies of France and Belgium and reached to more than 130 developing countries which are eligible

⁷⁴ Olav Stokke “The Changing International and Conceptual Environments of Development Cooperation”, in Paul Hoebink and Olav Stokke (eds.), *Perspectives on European Development Cooperation: Policy and Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), p. 71.

for ODA. The EU has a global presence in development policy. The Commission manages a variety of geographical and thematic aid instruments including the ENPI, DCI and the EDF. ENPI finances the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy that covers Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, Northern Africa and the near Middle East. DCI is used for supporting countries and regional programmes in Asia, Central Asia and South America and South Africa. It also covers five thematic budget lines such as investment in human capital, environment, non-governmental actors, food security and migration and asylum. Both ENPI and DCI are funded directly from the EU budget. In addition to these programs, the Commission manages Pre-Accession Instrument for EU candidates and potential candidates in the Western Balkan countries. The Commission's aid program towards sub-Saharan Africa except for South Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific region is financed by the European Development Fund. Unlike other geographical instruments the EDF is separate from the EU budget and supported by voluntary contributions of EU member states. The EU has ambition of turning its economic weight and presence in global aid politics into a political power.

The EU's development policy is not oriented directly toward the EU citizens. It is one of components of EU's global role in the world. The dominance of Northern donors in global aid was started to be challenged by rising donors of global South, especially the BRICs. The new alignment of countries of global South as an alternative to Northern donors shifted global aid system from cooperation to competition among donors. Hence, the EU seeks to maintain its position against the diffusion of power from North to South in global development politics and thus aspires to play a prominent role as a donor. As a result, development policy has become a crucial component of the EU's global role. It is a significant instrument of the EU for the prevention of instability, the promotion of free trade and a means for global actorness. Besides, it makes contribution to the achievement of foreign, security and

commercial policy objectives. The EU's employment of aid instrument with non-aid policies multiply the power of the EU.⁷⁵

In this regard, the Union's development policy is one of power resources of the EU. It involves both material and ideational component of the EU power. The EU not only provides development aid but also disseminates its norms and values towards developing world. Hence, the EU exercises various types of power in its development policy. It contains the EU's economic power through trade preferences, the ethical power through the promotion of human rights, the rule of law and democracy and military power by supporting peacekeeping and crisis management operations. The EU co-mingles and pursues all these different forms of power. The power perspective explains sources of change in the EU development policy by the EU's search for "doing more" at the global level in line with its economic weight and interests. Advance of the EU's international standing.⁷⁶

To sum up, the changing the EU's development cooperation policy can be accounted by three main perspectives: system, process and power. The EU as a subsystem of global aid system is concerned with development policy conducted within and by the EU. The EU's subsystem role denotes the coordination of preferences of member states for the purposes of a common approach in development policy. This role is driven by logic of integration and explains change by the demands placed on the EU to accommodate divergent interests of member states for a collective action at the EU level. The EU as a process denotes the EU's role in the management of global challenges and contribution to global governance of aid. The EU as a power indicates the EU's aspiration to exert influence by means of development policy and become a prominent development actor. This role draws attention to instrumental function of Union's development policy in enhancement of the EU's power and influence towards developing world.

⁷⁵ Martin Holland, "When is Foreign Policy Not Foreign Policy? Cotonou, CFSP and External Relations with the Developing World" in Martin Holland (ed.) *Common Foreign and Security Policy: the first decade*, 2nd edition, (Continuum, London, 2005), p. 116.

⁷⁶ Michael E. Smith, "A Liberal Grand Strategy in a Realist World? Power, Purpose and the EU's Changing Global Role", *Journal of European Public Policy* (Vol. 18, No. 2, 2011).p.148.

2.3. Conclusion

The evaluation of existing literature on EU development policy reveals that neither IR theories nor literature on the EU's global role provides analytical tools for the examination of EU development policy change. Sui generis nature of EU as a collective entity poses challenges for IR theory. On the other side, European integration theories provides incomplete picture of EU development policy since they emphasize on domestic dynamics of development policy and overlook the role external factors. Besides, the literature on EU global policy put forward concepts of "actorness and powerness" to capture the EU's multidimensional global role. However, these concepts mainly focus on the analysis of EU's impact and outcome of its policies and overlooks EU's role in policy process at the global level. Against this background, this study has offered the modification and application of Christopher Hill and Michael Smith's analytical framework for explaining EU development policy change. It has provided three main perspectives, namely system, process and power, to explain the EU development policy change towards sub-Saharan African countries in the 2000s.

CHAPTER 3

SETTING THE CONTEXT: CHANGING INTERNATIONAL AID ARCHITECTURE FROM NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS TO SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

This chapter provides a conceptual and historical analysis of both global and EU development aid with a view to give background for the proceeding chapters. It makes a retrospective appraisal of the development aid since its inception and lays out its implications for the EU development aid policy in four different periods from 1950s to 2000s.

3.1 The Emergence of Development Aid

Development aid refers to the transfers of loans or grants from donor country or multilateral development agency to recipient countries for the purposes of economic growth and prosperity. According to the DAC of OECD, foreign aid can be accepted as ODA if the grants to aid recipients are provided by the official aid agency with the aim of promotion of economic development and if the loans involve grant element of at least 25 per cent. The OECD's definition of ODA involves the transfer of concessional resources from one institution or government to recipient country, yet export credits or trade financing are not accepted as ODA. Similarly, funding for cultural exchanges, loans and credits, any kind of military aid such as the supply of military equipment and services, support for anti-terrorism or intelligence activities or loans given for military purposes are not eligible for ODA definition⁷⁷. Furthermore, public resource transfers to countries that are not classified as "poor" by the DAC, or "the least development countries (LDCs)", "low-income,

⁷⁷ OECD, "Is it ODA?", Factsheet, November 2008. Available on <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf>

lower-middle-income, or upper-middle income” country recipients of the World Bank, are not counted as ODA.⁷⁸

In global politics, development aid implies more than the promotion of economic and social growth. As it is rightly argued by Hans Morgenthau, it is one of the contentious issues of international politics and “real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy; none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid.”⁷⁹ Having been one of the controversial issues of international relations, development aid is explained differently by scholars. Realist scholars point out interest-based motives of aid and conceive development aid as an instrument of power politics. The delivery of development aid can be a tool of foreign policy and contributes to the containment of communism or the prevention of terrorism. Marxist scholars draw attention to dark side of development aid by which capitalist donor countries make use of development aid as a tool for domination and expansion of world capitalism. Despite this pejorative accounts of development aid, liberal and constructivist scholars draw attention to cooperative and altruistic motives of development aid. For liberal internationalists, development aid is a means for tackling global challenges such as poverty collectively. Constructivist scholars underline the normative dimension of development aid and conceptualise it as a means for expansion of ethical and moral values such as equality, solidarity and justice.⁸⁰ As well as motives of aid, scholars offer different perspectives on benefits of development aid. Realist scholars are divided on the potential impact of aid. For some Realist scholars, development aid is a waste of domestic resources that do not get enough back in return. It is ineffective and illegitimate foreign policy expenditure. For other Realists, development aid helps to pursue national goals and could be utilised as foreign policy instruments for like supporting allies,

⁷⁸ Carol Lancaster, “Foreign Aid in the Twenty-First Century: What Purposes?”, in Louis Picard, Robert Groelsema and Terry F. Buss (eds.), *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Lessons for the Next Half-Century* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), p. 39.

⁷⁹ Hans Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid”, *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 56, No. 2, 1962), p. 301.

⁸⁰ Lancaster, op.cit., “Foreign Aid in the Twenty-First Century”, pp. 3-4.

promotion of trade, stabilisation of potential threats and projection of power. Liberal internationalists argue that state benefit from cooperation on common challenges and development aid could contribute to reduction of poverty and acceleration of economic growth. They views aid as a catalyst for liberal trade and greater economic integration.⁸¹ Despite the variety of views on foreign aid, IR theory accepts that foreign aid is “inherently” political. It is one of instruments of foreign policy that is subject to both strategic calculations and altruistic motives.⁸²

Donors usually have a complex mix of motives such as expression of solidarity, the projection of moral values or the necessity of power politics and the pursuit of national interests.⁸³ For Carol Lancaster, donor countries may provide aid for many different reasons. Donors could be driven by diplomatic reasons such as protection of international security, management of political relations, commercial reasons such as expansion of markets and securing access to raw materials, or humanitarian reasons like food aid in case of emergency, or cultural reasons for the promotion of language and values. In other words, development aid can be granted for diplomatic, commercial, humanitarian and sometimes cultural purposes. For instance, the US utilized development aid in the Middle East Peace Process for diplomatic purposes. On the other side, Japan and recently China have employed aid for commercial purposes for guaranteeing access to raw materials or broadening markets. Aid for humanitarian purposes is the least controversial form of aid and used in natural or manmade crises. Compared to other motives, aid for cultural purposes such as funding educational activities and opening language courses is rarely employed.⁸⁴

While these conceptual and theoretical approaches on development aid shed light on its motives and purposes, the emergence and the evolution of

⁸¹ Emma Mawdsley, *From Recipients to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape*, (London: Zed Books, 2012), pp. 24-25.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁸³ Lindsay Whitfield (ed.), *The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 28.

⁸⁴ Lancaster, *op.cit.*, “Foreign Aid in the Twenty-First Century”, p. 15.

development aid reflects hierarchical and asymmetrical relationship between “the haves and have nots” in the world. Geographically, rich and industrialised countries are mainly located in the north of globe, the poor and socially backward countries, which are in need of financial assistance for meeting their basic needs, are situated in the south of globe. In the Cold war era, North-South relations became part of power politics. Industrialised Northern countries governed by market economy and democracy constituted the First World. The members of communist bloc that were governed by centrally planned economies were named as the Second World⁸⁵. The countries which existed in the grey area between these two blocs and associated with non-alignment towards these power blocs were called as the Third World countries. Economically, the countries of the Third World looked like neither planned economies of Eastern bloc nor free marked system of Western bloc. They were outside advanced capitalist economies or communist countries and were relatively poor and depended on agriculture. Although the original meaning of Third World refers to non-alignment, it has been used to define economic or social underdevelopment with poor quality of life.⁸⁶ However, the pejorative meaning of this term ended with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of Second World. With the globalisation of the 1990s, the term “developing world” started to be used instead of “Third World” since it is a more inclusive term and free of economic and political connotations regarding countries orientations.⁸⁷

3.2 The Formative years of Development Aid Policy (1960-1980s)

The establishment of the Bretton Woods Institutions in 1944 and the US President Harry Truman’s Point Four Programme marked the start of international aid programmes. The emergence of development aid policy

⁸⁵ Dan Harris, Mick Moore and Hubert Schmitz, “Country Classifications for A Changing World”, *Institute of Development Studies Working Paper 326* (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2009), p.11.

⁸⁶ Marcin Wojciech Solarz, “‘Third World’: the 60th anniversary of a concept that changed history”, *Third World Quarterly* (Vol. 33, No.9, 2012), p. 1563.

⁸⁷ Brian C. Smith, *Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 16-17.

coincided with the reconstruction of Europe in post-war era. The role of the US in the emergence of development aid was stated Truman's inaugural address as follows:

We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people⁸⁸

Truman's speech was translated into action by the Marshall Plan to help recovery of Western Europe after the end of World War II. In addition to being one the most generous US aid programme, this plan had a political purpose of the prevention of the spread of communism in Western Europe. In the early years of foreign aid, the primary rationale for US aid was to fight against expansion of communism.⁸⁹ When the US President John F. Kennedy came to power in the early 1960s, he used development aid as a tool for anti-communist strategy. In the late 1970s, the Carter administration gave priority to human rights in delivering development aid; however, this did not change the US strategy of giving aid for strategic reasons. The US aid to Egypt and Israel in the 1970s illustrated the utilisation of the development aid for foreign policy tool.⁹⁰

On the Soviet Russian side, Nikita Khrushchev, who came to power in 1953, utilized foreign aid as a valuable foreign policy instrument. Soviet aid aimed to encourage decolonizing states to prefer socialist path. By this way, Moscow expected to increase Soviet sphere of influence and disrupt trade and resource interests of capitalist countries. Therefore, two camps of the Cold War

⁸⁸ President Harry S. Truman, "The Four Point Speech", 20 January 1949.

⁸⁹ Lawrence Korb, "Foreign Aid and Security: A Renewed Debate?", in Louis Picard, Robert Groelsema and Terry F. Buss (eds.), *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Lessons for the Next Half-Century* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), p. 28.

⁹⁰ Rhonda L. Callaway and Elizabeth G. Matthews, *Strategic US Foreign Assistance: The Battle Between Human Rights and National Security* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2008), p.23.

rivalry used foreign aid to reward their allies and support to their political ideologies.⁹¹

The Cold War bipolar political environment shaped the bilateral aid policies of the US and Soviet Russia. While East-West rivalry became main pattern of bilateral aid policies, the UN opened a new window of opportunity by introducing multilateral aid. While bilateral aid is directly related to national interests of donors, multilateral aid provided by international agencies are relatively free from commercial and political interests.

The colonial era came to an end in early 1960s and newly-independent states became member of the UN. Decolonisation process was consequence of the demands of independence and ideas of freedom, democracy, equity and justice. Colonial powers adopted different strategies in this process. While Britain pursued policy of adaptation and allowed to various degrees of self-rule, France resorted to military force. Likewise, liberalisation struggle of colonies involved conflicts and tensions for other European colonial powers such as Belgium and the Netherlands. In this context, the UN played a crucial role in decolonisation process and became major platform for solving conflicts between colonial powers and newly-independent states.⁹²

Decolonisation represented an early stage of development aid with little conditionality due to post-colonial guilt.⁹³ Despite the sovereignty and equality of post-colonial states in the nation state system, these countries were in need of aid to maintain their administrative existence.⁹⁴ After the independence of colonies, aid became major instrument of old colonial power to maintain their influence. As a result, newly independent states became major

⁹¹ Mawdsley, op.cit., pp. 49-50.

⁹² Stokke, "The Changing International and Conceptual Environments of Development Cooperation". op.cit.

⁹³ Caroline Robb, "Changing Power Relations in the History of Aid", in Leslie Groves and Rachel Hinton (eds.), *Inclusive Aid: Changing Power and Relationships in International Development* (UK: Earthscan, 2004), p. 22.

⁹⁴ Whitfield, op.cit, p. 47.

recipients of bilateral aid programmes of colonial power.⁹⁵ Newly independent countries of decolonisation movement such as India, Ghana, and Indonesia gave priority to the national development, rapid economic growth and social progress, industrialization and mass consumption and experienced golden age of development⁹⁶

The UN General Assembly declared the 1960s as the “UN Development Decade” in 1961. Furthermore, many bilateral aid agencies of Northern countries like Australia, France, Sweden and Britain was established in the early 1960s.⁹⁷ In this context, the launch of EU, then European Economic Community (EEC), development policy took its roots from Europe’s colonial past. Initially, development policy of the EEC was shaped by member states’ former colonial relations. Former colonial members of the EEC such as France and Belgium sought to keep their relations with their former colonies to meet their need for the supply of raw materials and goods for their markets and the expansion of former colonies’ markets to European firms.⁹⁸ In the early years of European integration, development cooperation policy was driven by the priorities of member states. In the 1950s and the 1960s, France was a key actor shaping main features of the EU development policy between the EEC and a few francophone countries in West Africa.

On the other side, the Soviet Union presented itself as a “natural anti-imperialist ally” for the newly independent states. In order to expand its spheres of influence, Soviet Union gave extensive support for infrastructure facilities in return for naval bases and airports.⁹⁹ Moscow built large scale public industrial

⁹⁵ Stokke, “The Changing International and Conceptual Environments of Development Cooperation”. *op.cit.*, p. 36.

⁹⁶ David Hulme, *Global Poverty: How Global Governance is Failing the Poor* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), p. 18.

⁹⁷ Olav Stokke, *The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2009), p. 8.

⁹⁸ Maurizio Carbone, “The EU and the Developing World: Partnership, Poverty, Politicization”, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 326.

⁹⁹ Whitfield, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

infrastructure in countries with Socialist tendencies like Egypt, Ghana, Guinea and Mali in 1960s. Yet, the impact of these large scale projects became quite limited. Despite the economic support of Soviet Russia, a number of countries like Ghana and Guinea turned decisively to the capitalist world. Furthermore, decolonising countries remained tied to the economies of former colonizing country. Therefore, Moscow started to pursue more cautious approach starting from Brezhnev era in the mid-1960s. Soviet development aid turned to be economically pragmatic and less ideological in the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁰⁰

Until the end of the 1960s, institutions and policies of international aid system were mainly shaped by Northern governments' agenda and their national politics, rather than reduction of poverty. The rise of de-colonialism and nation state did not influence aid allocations.¹⁰¹ In addition to bilateral aid policies of Northern donors, multilateral aid agencies were established in the 1960s. OECD DAC was established in 1961 with the participation of major Western donors of development assistance. Furthermore, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), became main sources of multilateral aid for former colonies, though they were established to finance post-war European reconstruction. In addition to bilateral aid programmes, the UN as a multilateral agency provided development aid to support the reconstruction of war-torn countries, rather than economic growth and prosperity. The main aid modality of this period was the projects and programs aid such as the building of infrastructure facilities such as dams and roads, agricultural extension programs and training and technical assistance programs.¹⁰²

In the 1960s, modernisation paradigm became main paradigm of development. Modernisation approach emphasized state intervention for the promotion of economic growth. Hence, it conceived development as a national process that was based on capital formation by means of saving, investment and

¹⁰⁰ Mawdsley, op.cit., pp.51-52.

¹⁰¹ Robb, op.cit, p. 23.

¹⁰² Whitfield, op.cit, p. 51.

especially industrialisation.¹⁰³ During this era, Yaoundé Convention was signed in 1963 between the EEC and 18 newly independent states of West Africa and formed the basis of relations between the EEC and sub-Saharan Africa. Yaoundé II was signed in 1969 with the inclusion of other African states.¹⁰⁴ Again, France became a main bridge between the EEC and developing countries of Africa owing to its strong economic, historical and strategic links with Africa. Other member states such as the Netherlands and Germany accepted the idea of association and economic costs due to the *Eurafrica*, which implied responsibility of colonial powers in economic and social development of Africa and thus building an equitable relationship between Europe and Africa.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the EDF was established with the Rome Treaty to support former colonies of EEC member states. The EDF was outside the Community budget and financed by voluntary contributions of member states.

The call of Third World countries for adjustment of the excessive dominance of industrialized nations in world trade gave rise to the New International Economic Order in the 1970s. The countries that did not want to accept polarising pressures of the West and the Soviet Union sought to influence international trade regime in line with their interests.¹⁰⁶ In response to these demands, the 1970s was declared as the second UN development decade and a separate target of allocation of 0.7 per cent of ODA / GNI ratio was accepted. Decolonization and the rise of nation state in many southern countries influenced the relations between the developing South and industrialized and developed North. Southern governments challenged the deterioration of their international trade and established the non-aligned movement and the G77 for making their collective voice heard. The G77, the largest developing forum in the UN, provides the means for Southern governments to foster their collective

¹⁰³ Whitfield, op.cit, pp. 54-55.

¹⁰⁴ Woolcock, "European Union Economic Diplomacy", op.cit.

¹⁰⁵ Anne-Sophie Claeys, "'Sense and Sensibility': The Role of France and French Interests in European Development Policy Since 1957", in Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson (eds.), *EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 119-120.

¹⁰⁶ Mawdsley, pp.19-20.

interests and increase their joint negotiating power. By means of these forums, Southern governments demanded fairer trade and more liberal conditions for financing development.¹⁰⁷ Hence, the developing countries of Global South presented more determined and self-confident attitude and demanded equal distribution of power between the Global North and South¹⁰⁸

However, in the mid-1970s Western donor countries faced with economic crisis, which also affected the developing world. The two major oil crises of 1973 and 1978 increased the price of crude oil and gave rise to high inflation. Oil crises affected both the donors and recipients of international aid. Due to sharp increase of oil prices, oil producing countries in the Middle East accumulated huge amounts of monetary reserves and became significant donors in this period. On the other side, strong inflationary pressures and high interest rates negatively affected the poor governments of South.¹⁰⁹ As a result, international aid system of the 1970s witnessed a shift of power towards the Middle East due to the political importance of oil. Oil producing countries became donors of international aid. Nevertheless, Northern donors continued to dominate international aid system despite southern governments' demand for greater equality.¹¹⁰

Oil Crisis led to the adoption of global perspective by the EU during the 1970s. Before oil crisis, regional Euro-African perspective on development was observed, yet, distinction between global and regional perspective was blurred after oil crisis.¹¹¹ In this context, membership of Britain, Ireland and Denmark with the first enlargement of the EC in 1973 became important step towards "globalised aid approach" at the EU level.¹¹² In addition to associated countries,

¹⁰⁷ Robb, op.cit, p. 22.

¹⁰⁸ Stokke, "The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation", op.cit., p. 10.

¹⁰⁹ Robb, op.cit, p. 24.

¹¹⁰ Robb, op.cit, p. 26.

¹¹¹ Robb, op.cit., p. 43.

¹¹² Mirjam Van Reisen, "The Enlarged EU and the Developing World", in Andrew Mold (ed.), *EU Development Policy in a Changing World* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), p. 39.

the non-associated countries were included in the scope of development policy. The EU moved from a regional Euro-African approach to a global perspective and built new relationships with developing world on the basis of solidarity.¹¹³

Following the Britain's EU accession, the first Lomé Convention was signed in 1975 as a successor of Yaoundé Conventions for a five-year period. The geographic scope of Lomé included almost all of the independent sub-Saharan African states and ex-colonies of Britain and France in the Caribbean and the Pacific. However, Lomé partner countries did not involve all ex-colonies of member states or the poorest countries of the South. Lomé I covered part of ACP countries which had access to rich resources and raw materials such as lead, copper, zinc and uranium. Another criteria for the selection of countries was the prevention of expansion of communism in Africa, South Africa treated differently.¹¹⁴

Lomé Convention was negotiated within the context of New International Economic Order. The demands of global south regarding preferential access for developing countries, debt relief, equal participation to international economic institutions were partly met by the Lomé I. Unlike Yaoundé Agreements that gave reciprocal trade privileges for small number of former colonies and associated states, Lomé provided preferential duty-free access to 95 per cent of all goods of sub-Saharan African countries without any tariff and quota restrictions.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, it established a scheme for the stabilisation of agricultural export revenue called as STABEX. Besides, it attached the Sugar Protocol for the import of specified quantities of cane sugar at guaranteed prices from the ACP producers. Lomé II was signed in 1979 with 55 ACP Countries for five years. It expanded the scope of commodities that were eligible for STABEX and established the SYSMIN. Hence, Lomé Convention coincided with to the demands of South in 1970s, in which the South looked for non-interference and non-conditionality of aid and national development

¹¹³ Ibid., p.43.

¹¹⁴ Holden, "In Search of Structural Power", op.cit., p.126.

¹¹⁵ Woolcock, "European Union Economic Diplomacy", op.cit., p. 151.

strategies vis-a-vis the North.¹¹⁷ While Yaoundé Convention provided reciprocal trade privileges for small number of former colonies and associated states and reflected a regional approach in development policy, Lomé Convention granted non-reciprocal trade preferences to almost all goods and thus recognized as the most advanced example of North-South relations.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, Lomé represented a historical transition from colonialism to mutual cooperation and equality on the basis of a contractual and negotiated arrangement.¹¹⁹

The supporters of Lomé Convention viewed it as a model for North-South Relations since it introduced a non-reciprocal trade regime, contractual foreign aid without any interference to political affairs of the recipients and provision of compensatory schemes for fluctuations in prices of agricultural and mineral exports. On the other hand, critical observers like Galtung and Ravenhill argued that Lomé Convention was a new kind of colonialism since it provided access for raw materials and a huge market for multinational investment.¹²⁰ Ravenhill defined it as “collective clientelism”, which means “a relationship in which a group of weak states combine in an effort to exploit the special ties that link them to a more powerful state or group of states”.¹²¹

3.3 Neoliberal Turn in Development Aid and Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1980s

The 1980s witnessed major change in the role and conception of aid. The rise of neo-liberalism challenged inward oriented industrialisation and protectionism of dependency school. According to Neoliberal approach, underdevelopment of Third World stemmed from incorrect government

¹¹⁷ William Brown, “From Uniqueness to Uniformity? An Assessment of EU Development Aid Policies”, in Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson (eds.), *EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 19.

¹¹⁸ Carbone, “The European Union and International Development”, op.cit., p. 32.

¹¹⁹ Carbone, op.cit, “The EU and the Developing World”, pp. 326-327.

¹²⁰ Carbone, op.cit, “The EU and the Developing World”, p. 328.

¹²¹ Carbone, op.cit, “The EU and the Developing World”, p. 328.

policies, rather than a hostile international system. Neo-liberalism manifested itself by structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and IMF policies.¹²² In this sense, policies of these institutions were named as Washington Consensus, which put forward a market economy, openness to world and macroeconomic discipline as a path to development.¹²³

The emergence of debt crisis influenced international aid system during the 1980s. The deepening of debt crisis in Latin America and macroeconomic instability led to increase in balance-of payment support and transfer of funds instead of projects. Large increases in the IMF's and the World Bank's structural adjustment lending were observed.¹²⁴ Consequently, the debt crisis of developing world gave rise to adjustment policies with an emphasis on conditionality. In this period, development aid confronted with the problems of 'aid fatigue' owing to the dependency of developing countries to donors. Instead of solving economic problems, it was seen that foreign aid led to aid dependency relationship in poor countries. The issue of the effectiveness of aid conditionality was also critically debated¹²⁵

During this era, the IMF and the World Bank advocated deregulation and privatization. Poverty reduction was not a main goal for them, the idea was that once the "prices are right", poverty would decline automatically.¹²⁶ Hence, the 1980s was regarded as the "lost decade" of development. The rise of neoliberal ideologies and new structural adjustment policies overshadowed the "basic needs" approach of the 1970s.¹²⁷

¹²² Anna K. Dickson, "The Unimportance of Trade Preferences", in Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson (eds.), *EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 45.

¹²³ Narcis Serra, Shari Spiegel and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Introduction: From the Washington Consensus Towards a New Global Governance", in Narcis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 3.

¹²⁴ Hulme, op.cit, pp. 26-27.

¹²⁵ Erick Thorbecke, "The Evolution of the Development Doctrine and the Role of Foreign Aid, 1950-2000," in Tarp, Finn (ed.), *Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 26.

¹²⁶ Hulme, op.cit, p. 28.

At the EU level, the accession of Greece, Portugal, and Spain expanded geographical scope of development policy towards Mediterranean and Latin America in the late 1980s. Southern member states asked to remove the trade privileges guaranteed to the ACP countries. The financial resource available for Latin America and Mediterranean countries increased substantially.¹²⁸

Throughout the Cold War period, there was neither internal nor external incentives were sufficient for the reform of the EU's relations with developing world. The bipolar and stable context of the Cold War did not induce any change for the EC's development policy. Internal influencing factors were not strong enough to cause in nature of EU development policy. However, the end of the Cold War changed the context completely. Both external and internal factors became mutually reinforcing with each other in support of change.¹²⁹

3.4 Development Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Economic Liberalisation & Democratisation

In the 1990s, economic liberalisation and democratisation were main themes of global development politics. The underdevelopment of Africa was linked to "poor governance" of African states and good governance and democratisation were offered as "remedies" for underdevelopment.¹³⁰ In the 1990s, three major political events namely the end of Cold War, debt relief and the rise of political instability such as regional and local conflicts in developing world, refugee problems influenced the global development policy. The end of the Cold War removed the Cold War allegiances in aid giving and resulted in a sharp decline in aid given to some developing countries, donors focused on different countries. Aid levels declined but emergence of global civil society, the

¹²⁷ Hulme, op.cit, p. 30.

¹²⁸ Carbone, "The European Union and International Development", op.cit., p. 37.

¹²⁹ Carbone, "The European Union and International Development", op.cit., p. 2.

¹³⁰ Jens Stilhoff Sørensen "Introduction: Reinventing Development for the Twenty-First Century?" in Jens Stilhoff Sørensen (Ed) *Challenging the Aid Paradigm: Western Currents and Asian Alternatives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 1.

“NGO boom”, led to an increase the emphasis on democracy and good governance.¹³¹

In the 1990s, the World Bank transformed into an international institution and poverty reduction became its main objective.¹³² The 1990s became a turning point for the dissemination of poverty reduction as a norm. In the post-Cold War era, the World Bank’s World Development Report and the UNDP’s first report on Human Development brought poverty to global agenda and process towards the adoption of the MDGs started. Several UN Conferences were organized in the early years of the 1990s.¹³³ Although these conferences and summits increased public awareness on poverty, the level of ODA from rich to poor countries as a percentage of the GDP declined in the 1990s. The end of Cold War and the elimination of Soviet threat changed Western donors’ aid motivations. Except for Japan, OECD countries preferred to assist economic and political liberalisation in the middle income countries of the Central and Eastern European Countries.¹³⁴ For instance, major donors allocated their aid resources for supporting political and economic transition period in Eastern Europe, addressing global problems and post-conflict rehabilitation. Coincident with these new purposes, the volume and amount of aid changed dramatically. As a result, the aid given to the sub-Saharan Africa declined by one-third between 1994 and 2000.¹³⁵

In the 1980s and early 1990s, development aid policies were shaped by neo-liberalism or Washington Consensus that underlined the importance of markets, trade liberalization and macro-economic stability for growth and prosperity. However, the market-oriented paradigm of Washington Consensus was gradually being questioned especially after East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Consequently, development policies shifted away from market-oriented Washington Consensus towards institution-based post-Washington

¹³¹ Robb, op.cit, pp. 30-31.

¹³² Robb, op.cit, pp. 33-35.

¹³³ Hulme, op.cit, p. 29.

¹³⁴ Hulme, op.cit, p. 30.

¹³⁵ Lancaster, op.cit,, “Foreign Aid in the Twenty-First Century”, p. 44.

consensus.¹³⁶In addition to reappraisal of government institutions with post-Washington Consensus, the centre of development aid was shifted toward poverty reduction since neoliberal policies of the 1980s increased worldwide inequalities.¹³⁷

In the mid-1990s, principles and modalities of development assistance were revised and the OECD-DAC's report on Shaping the 21st Century in 1996 led to the reassessment of development cooperation policies of donor countries. The report introduced a set of new concepts such as ownership, alignment, coherence and coordination or harmonization to aid issue. Ownership was introduced to tackle with problems of aid conditionality. It had been apparent that aid does not work without the support of aid recipients. For this reason, ownership principle envisaged alignment of aid programs with national strategies, institutions and procedures.¹³⁸

Economic conditionalities of development aid were strengthened by political conditionalities for the receipt of aid. After the end of the Cold War, the political conditionality meant the good governance in state administration, respect for human rights and multiparty elections, and the link between domestic political situations and allocation of aid and this was adopted by all major donors, including the US, Britain, France, Germany and Japan.¹³⁹

Being one of the major multilateral providers of development aid, the EU development cooperation policy focused on the group of former colonies of member states in Africa. This relationship was regulated by the successive conventions and agreements.¹⁴⁰ In the Cold War period, the ACP countries became the main beneficiaries of EU development policy. The relationship

¹³⁶ Wil Hout , "Development Cooperation, Poverty Reduction and the European Union", in Wil Hout (ed.), *EU Development Policy and Poverty Reduction: Enhancing Effectiveness* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 2-3.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 6.

¹³⁹ Brown, "From Uniqueness to Uniformity?", op.cit., p. 24.

¹⁴⁰ Brown, "From Uniqueness to Uniformity?", op.cit.

between the Community and the ACP was based on trade preferences, aid and institutionalized dialogue. Yet, the pyramid of privileges altered substantially with the end of the Cold War. The relations of the EU with the outside world were redesigned by geographical proximity. The regions that are more close to the Union gained importance during the post-cold war period.¹⁴¹ With emergence of a new group of states in Central and Eastern Europe, priorities of the EU changed dramatically and aid funds were shifted from the ACP countries to the Eastern Europe.¹⁴²

The post-Cold War period induced the EU to prioritise its relations with the neighbours and provided opportunity for a stronger global role.¹⁴³ Member states supported the EU's growing global role and its engagement with different parts of the world. They regarded the EU level more suitable for pursuing their economic and security interests and dealing with third countries owing to "politics of scale" factor, preference for collective action against unilateral action.¹⁴⁴

Despite the dynamism and ever expanding relations with the world, the EU's development cooperation policy has never become an issue of the EU's top priorities. The EU usually reacted events rather than producing its own plan. Furthermore, member states have different approaches to development issues and do not constitute coherent group in the EU.¹⁴⁵ In the post-Cold War era, the deteriorating development situation in Africa and increasing ambition of the EU as a global actor lead to downgrading of the sub-Saharan Africa. Poor countries with large debts and fewer prospects for development were located at the bottom of the EU's development agenda and countries of the sub-Saharan

¹⁴¹ Karen E. Smith, "The ACP in the European Union's Network of Regional Relationships: Still Unique or Just One in the Crowd?", in Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson (eds.), *EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 60.

¹⁴² Arts and Dickson, "EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol?" op.cit., p. 8.

¹⁴³ Smith, "The ACP in the European Union's Network of Regional Relationships", op.cit, p. 63.

¹⁴⁴ Smith, "The ACP in the European Union's Network of Regional Relationships", op.cit, p 64.

¹⁴⁵ Marjorie Lister, "Europe's New Development Policy", in Marjorie Lister (ed.), *European Union Development Policy* (Great Britain: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 18.

African countries lost their privileged position. EU's aid policy shifted to more economically promising regions.¹⁴⁶

Furthermore, the 1990s witnessed extension of conditionality principle in development policy. The politicisation of the EU's relations with the developing world started during this period. It reflected the idea that sustainable development takes place in a context of security, democracy and freedom.¹⁴⁷ The delivery of development aid was conditioned by economic and political actions of recipient states. In addition to neoliberal economic policies, donors implemented political conditionalities by emphasizing the rule of law, respect for human rights.¹⁴⁸

In the early 1990s, the European Commission revised its aid policies in parallel to wider global trends towards political conditionality. In addition to the Commission, Council of Ministers declared unilaterally that the EU's aid was made conditional on government type, transparency and financial accountability as well as respect for human rights and rule of law. Although Lomé Conventions had been an interstate treaty based on principle of equal partnership, the unilateral decision of EU indicated the EU's alignment with the World Bank-IMF led structural adjustment programmes, rather than being as an alternative pole for developing countries to pursue their own objectives. In the early 1990s, the EU operationalized conditionality of aid and suspended the EU aid in eight countries due to security problems, lack of democracy or the violation of human rights.¹⁴⁹ Although Lomé did not involve political conditionality statements, article IV of Lomé made reference to respect for human rights. Furthermore, midterm review of Lomé IV specified the respect for human rights and democratisation as essential elements of EU-ACP cooperation.¹⁵⁰ Starting from Lomé IV, the EU's development policies were closely aligned with the global trends. Late 1990s witnessed the recognition of

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁴⁷ Smith, "The ACP in the European Union's Network of Regional Relationships", op.cit, p. 61.

¹⁴⁸ Brown, "From Uniqueness to Uniformity?", op.cit., p. 26.

¹⁴⁹ Whitfield, op.cit, pp. 69-70.

¹⁵⁰ Brown, "From Uniqueness to Uniformity?", op.cit., pp. 26-27.

poverty reduction as the main objective of development cooperation alongside with macroeconomic and governance goals.¹⁵¹

Towards the end of 1990s, Lomé system came to an end. Despite 25 years of trade preferences and aid, Lomé did not achieve its principal objectives such as export diversification and economic growth. Furthermore, the Nordic enlargement, the accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria, affected the direction of policy. Nordic countries supported global orientation of EU development policy and prioritization of poverty, rather than provision of aid to countries with historical colonial links. Maastricht and Amsterdam made reference to integration of developing countries to world economy, especially the most disadvantaged ones.¹⁵²

Historical overview of evolution of global aid system revealed that various factors influenced conceptualisation of development aid including global economic and political environment such as colonialism, the Cold War, oil crisis, debt crisis, political instability, financial crises and globalization; dominant political ideologies such as the rise of neoliberal ideologies, domestic politics, the rise of civil society and NGOs. However, the nature of international aid system remains unaltered. The asymmetric and hierarchical power relations between North and South preserved its existence. In this context, the EU-ACP relations constituted the most visible and institutionalised dimension of the EU's relations with the developing world.¹⁵³ The EU built its own development policy on the basis of its internal dynamics. Initially, the EU put emphasis on continuation of post-colonial relations. In the 1970s, the EU put forward its alternative approach of development policy and became benevolent donor towards the ACP countries. However, the EU failed to maintain the peculiar characteristics of its development policy against far-reaching changes of

¹⁵¹ Brown, "From Uniqueness to Uniformity?", op.cit., p. 33.

¹⁵² Matthew Louis Bishop, Tony Heron and Anthony Payne, "Caribbean development alternatives and the CARIFORUM", *Journal of International Relations and Development* (Vol.16, 2013), p.90.

¹⁵³ Brown, op.cit, p. 17.

international environment in the 1990s and shifted from “originality to uniformity” in its development policy.¹⁵⁴

Table 1 EU-ACP Conventions

CONVENTION	Signatory Parties	EU MEMBER STATES
Yaoundé I (1963)	Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Ivory Coast, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo	France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands
Yaoundé II (1969)	Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda	France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands
Lomé I (1975)	The Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Zambia	France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, Ireland
Lomé II (1979)	Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tuvalu	France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, Ireland
Lomé III (1984)	Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominican Republic, Mozambique, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,	France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Greece

¹⁵⁴ Brown, op.cit, pp. 17-18.

	Vanuatu, Zimbabwe	
Lomé IV (1990)	Equatorial Guinea, Haiti	France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal
Lomé IV revised (1995)	Eritrea, Namibia, South Africa	France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal
Cotonou (2000)	Cook Islands - Marshall Islands - Federated States of Micronesia - Nauru - Niue - Palau	France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden

3.5 New Age of Global Development in the 2000s

Unlike the 1980s and 1990s, global aid landscape of 2000s has seen significant transformations with regard to nature, modalities and actors of development aid. Above all, global development discourse shifted to a comprehensive understanding of development that focused on human development at the global level. Instead of focusing on economic growth and development of one country and one region, global aid efforts are directed towards improvement of human conditions and meeting of basic needs at a global scale.

In regard to aid paradigm, the MDGs have become key framework of global development in the 2000s. The UN as a global institution tried to increase awareness about global poverty and encouraged its members to devote more resources and attention to poverty through several UN conferences and summits, yet, the UN was not successful in persuading its member states to tackle with poverty until the end of 1990s.¹⁵⁵ Notwithstanding almost half of the world's population living in the Global South suffered from poverty, the issue of global poverty did not come to global agenda except for acute crisis. In

¹⁵⁵ Hulme, "Global Poverty: How Global Governance is Failing the Poor", op.cit., p. 83.

the new millennium era, the domestic politics of donor countries and multilateral aid agencies and development-oriented NGOs put pressure for recognition of poverty reduction as a global norm.¹⁵⁶ The adoption of the MDGs by 189 Member States of the UN 2000 became a turning point for development aid. Concrete commitments for poverty reduction, the achievement of primary education, reduction for child mortality, promotion of gender equality and maternal health by 2015 revived efforts for raising aid volumes, impact and effectiveness of development aid at the global level. In addition to bilateral aid organisation of states and multilateral aid agencies, private foundations, transnational non-governmental organisations became new players of global development politics.

UN Members agreed to recognize poverty as a global problem for three reasons: Above all, the developed countries of North acknowledged that combating with poverty is a global responsibility for the promotion of social justice and solidarity at the global level. Secondly, it became apparent that the extreme poverty threatens social and economic stability in the world and gives rise to global problems of state fragility, illegal migration and security problems. Poverty reduction efforts at the global level would provide better opportunities to poor people and help to solve these problems in the field. Thirdly, UN members reached consensus on the issue that underdevelopment is a global issue, which could be solved at the global level by dealing with unfairness of world trade regime, multinational companies, developed countries' control over finance and technology.¹⁵⁷

The MDGs were accepted by 147 states at a summit meeting held at the UN in 2000 and supported by the Bretton Woods Institutions and the OECD.¹⁵⁸ They set specific targets for the attainment of global goals in income, poverty, nutrition, universal primary education, gender parity in education, child and maternal mortality, environment-clean water and sanitation- and global

¹⁵⁶ Lancaster, op.cit., "Foreign Aid in the Twenty-First Century", p. 5.

¹⁵⁷ Hulme, op.cit., pp. 3-4.

¹⁵⁸ Hulme, op.cit., p. 2.

partnerships and put poverty reduction on global agenda. Before the agreement on the MDGs, poverty reduction was not a top priority. Although the World Bank and the UN engaged with issues of hunger, education and child survival, they had not been at the centre of international development agenda. Economic growth and industrialisation were main concerns of the UN Development Decades between the 1960s and the 1980s. The MDGs reflected a “normative shift” by endorsement of poverty reduction as a central objective of development and institutionalised it as “global responsibility”.¹⁵⁹

With the MDGs, the UN’s Millennium Moment reached its peak and heads of governments of all countries reached on a global consensus on the attainment of the MDGs in the fields of poverty, health, education and gender equality by 2015. The MDGs also illustrate common political will at the global level for halving poverty and hunger, reduction of infant mortality by two-thirds by 2015. They are not exhaustive targets, they are illustrative and suggestive. Despite these focus- and result-oriented and measurable targets, the means for achievement of these goals are not specified.¹⁶⁰ The MDGs were formulated as a consequence of top-down and donor-led process. For this reason, many of developing countries lack ownership with regard to the MDGs.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, they are criticized for being limited in scope and stressing on quantification and overlooking main objectives such as human rights, peace and security, democracy and good governance and universal values like freedom, tolerance, equality.¹⁶²

Despite its weakness and imperfections, the MDGs have provided a global momentum on human development and mobilise public support over the past ten years. They have shaped national budgets, domestic policies and

¹⁵⁹ Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and David Hulme, “International Norm Dynamics and the “End of Poverty”: Understanding the Millennium Development Goals” *BWPI Working Paper 96* (June 2009), p. 3.

¹⁶⁰ Jan Vandemoortele, “If not the Millennium Development Goals, Then What?”, *Third World Quarterly* (Vol. 32, No. 1, 2011), pp. 14-15.

¹⁶¹ Hulme, op.cit, p. 5.

¹⁶² Hulme, op.cit, p. 9.

foreign aid issues both in the North and South.¹⁶³ In addition to setting up seven MDGs for developing countries by 2015, they provide action plan for multilateral and bilateral agencies engaging with low-income countries. They have a motivational function for global community for increasing development efforts for poor countries.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, the MDGs put forward a multidimensional conceptualisation of poverty, rather than income poverty and reflected a compromise between Bretton Woods Institutions paradigm of economic liberalism and UN paradigm of human development.

Africa has become major focus for the achievement of the MDGs. Especially the sub-Saharan Africa countries are main geographical areas for tackling with extreme poverty. However, the failure of the sub-Saharan Africa concerning the MDGs may be misleading since it started from a lower level of human development. It is unlikely for the sub-Saharan African countries to meet global targets by 2015. Africa cannot meet global targets due to its low starting points.¹⁶⁵ To meet poverty goals, Africa need rapid growth rate.¹⁶⁶ However, the implied negative picture of Africa on the MDGs has a demoralizing impact on African leaders and activities and strengthens the stereotype that “Africa always fails”. Since the MDGs are determined for global level, not country or regional level, the goals need to be assessed at global level. Labelling Africa as a failure downplays Africa’s progress.¹⁶⁷ Today, the MDGs in the fields of poverty, gender and water are mainly “on the track” whereas the goals in terms of nutrition, primary education and child mortality are “off track”, particularly the achievement of goal of maternal mortality is unlikely. According to the World Bank, the ratio of income poverty, people living under \$ 1.25 has decreased from 43 per cent to 22 per cent in 2008 and is expected to decrease to 16

¹⁶³ Hulme, op.cit, p. 10.

¹⁶⁴ William Easterly, “How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa”, *World Development* (Vol. 37, No. 1, 2009), p. 26.

¹⁶⁵ Hulme, op.cit, p. 12.

¹⁶⁶ Hulme, op.cit, p. 32.

¹⁶⁷ Easterly, op.cit, p. 33.

percent in 2015.¹⁶⁸ Compared to figures of the 1990s, which is the base year for the measurement of progress for attainment of the MDGs, extreme poverty has fallen, while it is falling slowly in the sub-Saharan African countries. Extreme poverty has fallen from 43.1% in 1990 to 22.4% in 2008. In terms of primary education enrolment, many regions have achieved the rate between 90% and 95%. In the sub-Saharan Africa, this ratio is 76%, still below world average, but this ratio increased more than 22% between 1999 and 2010.¹⁶⁹ There has been some progress in reduction of under-five mortality rate between the 1990 and 2010. Over the last 20 years, mortality rate decreased dramatically, while this rate was around 30% in the sub-Saharan Africa. Compared to developing countries, the LDCs have made slow progress in the attainment of the 2015 targets.¹⁷⁰

In addition to recognition of the MDGs, development objectives are expanded to include global public goods. Global public goods are defined as non-excludable and non-rivalry goods that are available worldwide. They are non-excludable since nobody can be prevented from consuming it. They are categorized as non-rival in consumption because the consumption by one person does not reduce the quantity available to others. All countries and people could enjoy its benefits. Global public goods are aggregated in five main fields: environment, health, knowledge, peace and security. Hence, freedoms from poverty, financial stability, environmental sustainability, climate stability are examples of global public goods.¹⁷¹ In the 2000s, the provisions of global public goods have been supported by main multilateral aid organizations. Especially the UNDP played role in popularization of the concept of global public goods. UNDP promoted global public goods to reduce negative consequences of globalisation and provide a new rationale for international cooperation. The

¹⁶⁸ Andy Sumner and Thomas Lawo, "The Post-2015 Development Agenda: A Review of the Debate And Potential Elements of A Joint EU Strategy", *EADI Policy Paper*, 2013, p. 2.

¹⁶⁹ European Union, *European Report on Development 2013, Post-2015: Global action for an Inclusive and Sustainable Future* (Belgium: European Union, 2013), p. 13.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁷¹ Mikaela Gavvas, "The European Union and global public goods: challenges and opportunities", *DIIS Report No. 5* (March 2013), p. 8.

adequate provision of global public goods is likely to increase aid effectiveness and mitigate negative consequences of globalization. Owing to non-excludability of these goods, they are beneficial for both developing and developed countries.¹⁷² The finance of global public goods entails collective action at the global level. The EU focuses on the fields of climate change and food security in provision of global public goods.¹⁷³

¹⁷² Carbone, "The European Union and International Development", op.cit., p. 81-82.

¹⁷³ Gavass, op.cit., "The European Union and global public goods", p. 12.

Table 2. Evolution of Global and EU Development Policy

Time Frame	Changes in Global Context	Changes in Development Paradigm	Changes in EU Context	Changes in EU Development Policy
1950s	End of World War II, Start of De-colonization	Infrastructure Projects – Financial Aid to Colonies	Rome Treaty	Establishment of the EDF
1960s	UN Development Decade (%0.7 target) Establishment of Bilateral Aid Agencies	Modernization Theory – Focus on Growth		Yaoundé Convention
1970s	Oil Crisis – Expansion of Multilateral Aid & Rise of Arab Donors	New International Economic Order (NIEO) – Basic Needs	First Enlargement (UK, Ireland, Denmark)	Lomé Convention
1980s	Debt Crisis End of Cold war	Washington Consensus World Bank & IMF – Structural Adjustment Programs	Southern Enlargement (Greece, Spain, Portugal) Single European Act	Lomé III
1990s	Globalisation of World Economy Liberalisation of International Trade Democratisation	Post-Washington Consensus Aid Conditionality Good Governance	Maastricht & Amsterdam Treaties Nordic Enlargement (Accession of Sweden, Austria and Finland)	Lomé IV
2000s	9/11 terrorist attacks Power shift to global South Emergence of BRICs	Millennium Development Goals Aid Effectiveness Agenda	Eastern Enlargement (accession of CEECs) Lisbon Treaty	Cotonou Agreement

3.6 South-South Cooperation and New Aid Architecture

As well as change of dominant aid paradigm, the international aid landscape which was shaped by bilateral aid agencies and multilateral agencies has been changing. Until the 2000s, mainstream development aid policy was promoted by Western donors that are members of OECD-DAC and multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. As a neutral and principal committee of development, the DAC of OECD is located at the centre of mainstream development policy. Rather than delivering aid, the DAC defines and monitors standards of development aid and become a main platform for sharing views and exchanging lessons. The members of OECD-DAC¹⁷⁴ delivered around 95 percent of total ODA in the world in the 1990s. Starting from 2000s, the dominance of OECD DAC over global South has been challenged by new donors of global South.¹⁷⁵ In the words of Ngaire Woods, “a silent revolution” took place with the rise of new donors that entered international development landscape quietly without overturning or replacing the rules of established donors. Unlike the less generous and less attractive aid of established donors, new donors deliver aid more generously with favourable conditions.¹⁷⁶

As a matter of fact, Southern countries attempted to shape global politics in line with their interests in the past. For instance, a number of countries from Africa and Asia came together in the 1950s and formed Non-Alignment Movement to refuse the polarizing pressures of the West and the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold war. Developing countries of global South tried to protect their interests with New International Economic Order in the 1970s. However, big countries of global South did not have political and economic power to shape international politics in the 1950s and 1970s. They

¹⁷⁴ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States and the EU.

¹⁷⁵ Peter Kragelund, “The Return of Non-DAC Donors to Africa: New Prospects for African Development?”, *Development Policy Review* (Vol. 26, No. 5, 2008), p. 555-556.

¹⁷⁶ Ngaire Woods, “Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance”, *International Affairs* (Vol. 84, No. 6, 2008), pp. 1220-1221.

started to shape international politics with their economic weight in the 2000s.¹⁷⁷

In the 2000s, the South-South cooperation denotes the exchange of resources, personnel, technology and knowledge between developing countries. It involves foreign direct investments, diplomatic meetings and agreements among Southern countries.¹⁷⁸ According to OECD Paris Declaration, “South-South cooperation on development aims to observe the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, equality among developing partners and respect for their independence, national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity and local content. It plays an important role in international development cooperation and is a valuable complement to North South cooperation”¹⁷⁹ Development policy is one aspect of South-South cooperation. The implications of South-South cooperation as a new power constellation have been seen in debates on the reform of the UN Security Council, balance of voting rights in the World Bank and the IMF and global trade issues¹⁸⁰. In the field of development, it refers to donor countries of global South that do not have colonial past. Different terms are used such as emerging donors, rising donors to define the South-South cooperation in development realm. In fact, the term of emerging donor is misleading because most of these Southern donors have had a long history of development partnership. The term non-DAC, which is used to classify countries that are not members of OECD-DAC, is more appropriate. OECD has 34 members, yet 23 of which are members of the OECD DAC, including the EU. Except for Japan and South Korea, all DAC members are Western donors. Japan became the member of the DAC in 1960, shortly after the establishment of the DAC. South Korea became a member of DAC in 2010.¹⁸¹ The definition of non-DAC donors refers to “residual category” since it defines this

¹⁷⁷ Mawdsley, op.cit., pp. 19-20.

¹⁷⁸ Mawdsley, op.cit., p. 63.


¹⁷⁹ OECD, The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the ACCRA Agenda for Action”, 2005, Article 19/e. <http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/34428351.pdf>

¹⁸⁰ Mawdsley, op.cit., p. 12.

¹⁸¹ Mawdsley, op.cit., p. 5.

countries by “what they are not” The non-DAC donors refrain from labelling themselves as donor since the term donor is usually associated with paternalism, post-colonial hierarchies and superiority of Western norms and ideas and neo-colonial interference and call themselves as partners.¹⁸²

Map 1. OECD-DAC Donors



Map 2. Non-OECD-DAC Donors



¹⁸² Mawdsley, op.cit., p. 6.

Development aid landscape is designed for past power structures, not present. The development aid paradigm evolved in the context of colonial and post-colonial Western hegemony. In the 2000s, Southern countries have gained political and economic influence to shape global norms and standards.¹⁸³ There are at least 23 non-DAC countries including the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs), the Gulf and other oil-rich countries as well as middle income countries such as Turkey.¹⁸⁴ Turkey status has changed its status from an aid recipient country to a net donor in the last decade. Turkey not only increased its aid allocations but also expanded geographical scope its development policy towards Balkans, Middle East and African countries. Turkish development policy gives importance to technical cooperation in health and education and building social and economic infrastructure in recipient countries, rather than using development aid for accessing natural resources or pursuing political or commercial interests.¹⁸⁵

Despite the rise of the BRICs as new donors, these countries are not seen among the most affluent countries in terms of per capita income. They are confronted with serious income inequality and poverty challenges. Nevertheless, they are capable of influencing global economy on the basis of their strong economic performance and territorial and demographic aspects.¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, the BRICs look for place and status in determining the global agenda with their economic success and population weight. They actively

¹⁸³ Mawdsley, op.cit., p. 173.

¹⁸⁴ Homi Kharas, "South-South Cooperation in Changed Development Assistance Landscape", in Korea Development Institute (eds.), *Emerging Asian Approaches to Development Cooperation* (Korea: The Asia Foundation, 2011), p. 13.

¹⁸⁵ Birol Akgun, Mehmet Özkan, "Turkey's opening to Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, (Vol.48, No:4, 2010), p.525.

¹⁸⁶ Pedro Morazán, et.al., *The Role Of BRICS In The Developing World* (Belgium: European Union, 2012), p. 7.

participate in the global debate on development for democratising international relations.¹⁸⁷

The rise of the BRICs as aid providers challenges the coherence of conventional aid system.¹⁸⁸ For instance, the BRICs are reluctant to follow aid norms and standards established by the World Bank or the OECD on the ground that they do not participate sufficiently in making of these norms and standards.¹⁸⁹ Instead of being member of the DAC, they prefer to influence development policies through loose multilateral coalitions and international fora, such as the G20. Hence, the BRICs have become an important alternative for Western-dominated aid system and thus need to be taken seriously as increasingly important actors capable of influencing EU development policies.¹⁹⁰

The rise of the non-DAC donors has made new millennium as an “age of choice” in which developing countries have more options in terms of sources of development aid. Therefore, direct aid conditionality is likely to be less effective, though traditional donors have to find other ways of engaging with issues of governance and democracy.¹⁹¹ To illustrate, the non-DAC donors’ interest to Africa has increased development aid flows to Africa. More African countries are able to receive development aid. However, this situation does not necessarily bring economic and social development in Africa. In many cases, non-DAC donors provide aid for expanding trade opportunities, make use of natural resources and exercising political influence.¹⁹²

Among the BRICs, the position of China is examined intensively in literature. Despite globalisation, the rise of China was neglected until 2000s. In

¹⁸⁷ Maxi Schoeman, “Of BRICS and Mortar: The Growing Relations Between Africa and the Global South”, *The International Spectator* (Vol. 46, No. 1, 2011), pp. 33-34.

¹⁸⁸ Gregory Chin and Fahimul Quadir, “Introduction: rising states, rising donors and the global aid regime”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (Vol. 25, No. 4, 2012), p. 496.

¹⁸⁹ Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou, “The United States and rising powers in a post-hegemonic global order”, *International Affairs* (Vol. 89, No. 3, 2013), p. 649.

¹⁹⁰ Morazán, op.cit, p. 4.

¹⁹¹ Romilly Greenhill, Annalisa Prizzon and Andrew Rogerson, “The age of choice: developing countries in the new aid landscape”, *ODI Working Papers No. 364*, 2013, p. 55.

¹⁹² Kragelund, op.cit, p. 580.

the 2000s, political spill-over effects of economic rise of China became apparent. Alongside to its economic power, China started to engage with global issues actively and develop capacities to obtain the international outcomes in line with its interests. China was no longer an internationally isolated country. China has become a part of 266 international treaties and a member of more than 130 intergovernmental and international organizations¹⁹³

China's modernization and growth has become a model for developing world. However, China prefers to position itself with Southern donors, rather than the OECD DAC members. Hence, China maintains its image of "developing country", and acts outside of the OECD DAC framework. China gives importance to bilateral aid, rather than multilateral channels. China differentiates itself from DAC donors by emphasizing "solidarity" with developing world and post-colonial world as a normative framework, "South-South Cooperation" and "development partnership" objectives of its aid policy.¹⁹⁴ China's development aid policy has been driven by its rise as a world economic power. This economic power enables China to establish new strategic partnerships with countries of Global South. Consequently, China delivered aid from Asia to Africa, Latin America to Caribbean. The geographical scope, volume and instruments of China's aid is wide, including grants, interest-free loans, assistance related concessional loans. It is estimated that China is the world's second or third largest provider of aid. Despite its global economic power, China still identifies itself with the South and seeks to allocate part of its wealth and experience to developing countries.¹⁹⁵ China's foreign aid is delivered to most of developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. According to 2009 data, China delivered aid in 161 countries and cooperated with over 30 international and regional organisations. China has the widest scope of aid among non-DAC donors. China also provides unreported aid to countries that

¹⁹³ Jing Gu, John Humphrey and Dirk Messner, "Global Governance and Developing Countries: The Implications and the Rise of China", *World Development* (Vol. 36, No. 2, 2008), pp. 276-277.

¹⁹⁴ Gregory T. Chin, "China as a 'net donor': tracking dollars and sense", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (Vol. 25, No. 4, 2012), p. 580.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 599.

are sanctioned by Western donors, such as Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela unconditionally.¹⁹⁶

Since China offers concessional loans and preferential credit to countries, it is seen as an alternative to existing systems dominated by the International Financial Institutions. China's development aid principles are based on non-intervention in domestic politics, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.¹⁹⁷ China challenges development strategies of Western countries such as Washington consensus or economic liberalisation by offering alternative way of growth. Also, China strives to improve its soft power features by combination of its economic strength with cultural exchanges, expansion of Chinese language schools and scholarships to Chinese universities and training programmes, thus increasing visibility and presence of China in Africa¹⁹⁸.

China's stance on development policy involves tensions and rivalries between China and the West. Although the global interdependencies and the network of global governance institutions facilitate global power transitions, there is still competition over resources. Especially, China's pragmatic attitude for accessing economic resources and diplomatic support of African countries and China's reluctance to play by OECD rules raised concern in the OECD DAC. China challenged OECD DAC rules and norms such as trade liberalisation, financial reform, conditionality on human rights and good governance and displays itself as a defender of Africa against these conditionalities.¹⁹⁹

In addition to China, Brazil is another donor that is part of Southern donors. Brazil's rising donor status is the result of Lula da Silva's foreign policy that gives special importance to "South-South Cooperation". Under Lula da Silva's administration, Brazil increased its technical cooperation with

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 582.

¹⁹⁷ Fahimul Quadir, "Rising Donors and the New Narrative of South-South Cooperation: What Prospects for Changing the Landscape of Development Assistance Programmes?", *Third World Quarterly* (Vol. 34, No. 2, 2013), p. 325.

¹⁹⁸ Gu, Humphrey and Messner, op.cit., p. 286.

¹⁹⁹ Gu, Humphrey and Messner, op.cit., p. 285.

developing countries dramatically in terms of volume, projects and partners. The evolution of Brazil's aid policy is the extension of its foreign policy. Brazil refrains from labelling itself as a donor since it carries an implication of hierarchical or vertical relationship between aid giver and recipient. Hence, Brazil characterizes itself as a 'Southern development partner' and a member of "South-South cooperation" that refers to a horizontal relationship and a new form of development assistance that is qualitatively different from North-South aid relationship.²⁰⁰ Brazil also gives importance to 'triangular cooperation' which means cooperation with another country or an international organization as a 'co-donor'. Despite being a Southern donor and a developing country, Brazilian development aid involves both altruism and national interest and not far away from hierarchical form of aid relationship.²⁰¹

Geographically, Brazil gives priority to South America and prefers technical cooperation as a means of development cooperation. With the Lula government, Brazil started to give more importance to Africa, especially Portuguese-speaking countries. Brazil opened 16 new embassies in Africa and multiplied trade relations five times between 2002 and 2008. Brazil made reference to "common cultural background" and "African people's contribution to Brazilian national identity". Aid to Africa is seen as an effort for the consolidation of Brazil as a global player.²⁰²

India is another donor that represents the global South donor group. India's political weight has been increasing owing to its geostrategic importance and its nuclear ambitions. India looks for a stronger linkage to multilateral organizations and portrays itself as a spokesperson of developing countries. Similar to other members of the BRICs, India aspires to be a prominent

²⁰⁰ Cristina Inouea, Aoki Yumie and Alcides Costa Vaza, , "Brazil as 'Southern donor': beyond hierarchy and national interests in development cooperation?", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (Vol. 25, No. 4, 2012), p. 508.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p.509.

²⁰² Ibid., p.518.

economic and political force in the world. In this regard, its relations with African countries are part of its strategy to be a global power.²⁰³

Similar to China, India's aid policy is based on non-interference principle and does not engage with normative values of democracy promotion or good governance. India conceives foreign aid policy as a means for the attainment of great power status and thus concentrates on trade and economic cooperation. While China and India has strong presence in Africa, Brazil's development cooperation policy has a regional orientation with an emphasis on Latin America and the Caribbean.²⁰⁴

In addition to BRIC countries, the Arab donors constitute the second category of non-DAC donors. They entered development aid scene after the first oil boom in the 1970s. Especially, oil exporting Gulf Arab states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have the experience of development aid for more than forty years.²⁰⁵ In the 1980s and 1990s, the development aid delivered by the Gulf Arab donors declined owing to decrease in oil revenues. However, it is estimated that Arab donors is providing around 1.5 percent of their national income as an aid and has transcended UN aid target of 0.7 percent. ²⁰⁶ The great amount of Arab aid is provided by three countries: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Their aid is delivered by the Kuwait Fund, the Saudi Fund and the Abu Dhabi Fund respectively. The Kuwait Fund is the most well-organized and generous bilateral aid agency and inspired by the World Bank.²⁰⁷ The Saudi Fund has two branches including economy-oriented aid and politically motivated aid. The Saudi Fund is influenced by the Saudi strategic interests. Because of this, Yemen

²⁰³ Dorothy McCormick, "China and India as Africa's New Donors: The Impact of Aid on Development", *Review of African Political Economy* (Vol. 35, No. 115, 2008), p. 82-83.

²⁰⁴ Marry Farrell, "The EU and UN Development Cooperation: Effective Multilateralism for Global Development", *op.cit.*, p. 240.

²⁰⁵ Bessma Momani, and Crystal A. Ennis, "Between caution and controversy: Lessons from the Gulf Arab states as (re-)emerging donors", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (Vol. 25, No. 4, 2012), p. 605.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 608.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.618.

is one of the main beneficiaries of the Saudi Aid. The Abu Dhabi Fund has the largest source of donation with the aim of making Dubai an international hub of global humanitarian aid. Compared to Saudi or Kuwait Fund, Abu Dhabi Fund is driven by more humanitarian motives.²⁰⁸

In addition to these bilateral donors, there are a number of Arab multilateral donor organizations, such as the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Islamic Development Bank, the OPEC Fund for International Development. However, these aid organisations delivers grants and technical loans as soft loans to comply with Sharia rules of lending.²⁰⁹

Except for modest aid commitments to the sub-Saharan Africa, majority of Arab aid is given to Arab countries. Until recently, Morocco, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia and Sudan have been main recipients of Arab aid. In addition to big donors, multilateral organisations such as The Islamic Development Bank, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, OPEC Fund for International Development make important contributions to Arab aid. However, Arab donors have historically been absent from global debates. Recently, they start to engage with global debates. For instance, the United Arab Emirates reported its ODA to the OECD for the first time in 2010.²¹²

In addition to these non-DAC donors, proliferation of non-state donor is another aspect of new age of development. Evolving global development landscape is characterised by diversification of aid donors. In addition to rising donors of global south, the non-state development donors increased in recent years. Proliferation of new donors and their aid modalities add *complexity* to aid system and aid system changes in response the rapid changes in context. There are many aid organizations operating at different levels - global, regional and national.. There are mainly three types of non-state development actors;

²⁰⁸ Ibid.p.619.

²⁰⁹ Mawdsley, op.cit., p. 66.

²¹² Lisa Denney, and Leni Wild, "Arab Donors: Implications for Future Development Cooperation", *EDC 2020 Policy Brief No. 13* (March 2011).

private foundations, corporate philanthropists, and global vertical programmes.²¹³ In this sense non state actors involve a big and heterogeneous group of actors which can be grouped into three: private foundations, corporate philanthropists and global vertical programmes. These organisations involve public or private partnerships and philanthropists. Among them, international NGOs such as Oxfam International, Doctors without Borders, Save the Children are high-profile actors of international aid. They play a significant role in delivering aid effectively and draw attention to neglected issues.²¹⁴ Global philanthropic foundations have common properties. Above all, they are non-governmental agencies. Secondly, they are based on non-profit; their financial resources come from a private endowment. They give special importance to health and education. Leading examples of international aid foundations are; the Wellcome trust (UK) focusing on health and medical research, Deutsche Bank corporate social responsibility-microfinance education, the Big Lottery Fund (UK) poverty reduction; Shell Foundation (UK) Urban Pollution, Energy; Bernard van Leer Foundation (the Netherlands) Children; Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; health agriculture, financial services; Kellogg Foundation, The Rockefeller foundation, the Ford foundation²¹⁵. On the other side, global vertical programs mobilize additional sources from public and private actors to provide a focal point for tackling with a narrow set of objectives. Major global vertical funds are the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; Global Environmental Facility, Education for All-Fast Track.²¹⁶

Summing up, the new aid architecture is quite different from the old one established by a few bilateral and multilateral donors. Non-DAC donors consisting of countries of Global South, Arab donors and other regional emerging powers deliver substantial amounts of aid. Consequently, new age of

²¹³ Erik Lundsgaarde, "Emerging Non-state Actors in Global Development: Challenges for Europe", *EDC 2020 Working Paper No. 7*, (April 2010), p. 5.

²¹⁴ Paul J. Nelson, "NGOs in the Aid System", in Louis A. Picard, Robert Groelsema and Terry F. Buss (eds.), *Foreign Aid Policy: Issues and Debates* (M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 315.

²¹⁵ Erik Lundsgaarde, "Global Philanthropists and European Development Cooperation", *EDC 2020 Policy Brief No. 8*, (February 2011), p. 8.

²¹⁶ Lundsgaarde, "Emerging Non-state Actors in Global Development", *op.cit.*, p. 20.

development is made of a network of national and international aid agencies and rules and arrangements for the management of aid flows to developing countries.

3.7 Conclusion

The early years of aid was characterized by pattern of asymmetrical relationship between North and South. The EU development policy was established to protect post-colonial relations of EU member states. However, the EU built its own unique model of development over time. Lomé Conventions between the EU and the ACP countries became a genuine example of North-South partnership in the 1970s. Yet, the end of Cold War and subsequently globalisation process altered the EU's development policy significantly. The EU's priorities shifted from the ACP countries to its immediate neighbourhood. The EU gradually removed unique elements of its development policy. The EU preferred to follow policies of other multilateral agencies by introducing aid conditionality and promotion of free trade. In the last ten years, the EU's development policy has confronted with the shift of power from West to East and South and proliferation of aid donors. The emergence of new donors such as China, India, Brazil and rise of South-South Cooperation have increased competition among "aid providers" and narrowed down the EU's policy space in developing world.

Old Depiction of the Aid Architecture




Table 3. Old Depiction of Aid Architecture

Based on Wolfgang Fengler and Homi Kharas (eds.), *Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons From the Field*, (Washington: Brookings Press, 2010), p. 8.

New Depiction of the Aid Architecture




Table 4. New Depiction of Aid Architecture
 Based on Wolfgang Fengler and Homi Kharas (eds.), *Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons From the Field*, (Washington: Brookings Press, 2010), p. 9.

CHAPTER 4

CHANGE IN THE EU'S MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY: THE QUEST FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE AND COORDINATED POLICY?

The Maastricht Treaty assigned a double role in development policy. As well being a donor on its own right, the Union coordinates Member States' bilateral development aid policies. The EU's multilateral development policy engages in internal management of the EU development policy regarding to building common vision of development, establishing shared norms and practices and thus harmonisation of different aid policies under the EU. This chapter examines change in multilateral development policy of the EU with a view to the EU's initiatives for increasing effectiveness and quality of EU development aid. With the adoption of the MDGs and the aid effectiveness agenda of the 2000s, the issue of "more aid, better aid and faster aid" has gained importance. The EU has made several reforms in the multilateral aspect of its development policy by adopting landmark documents such as the European Consensus, the Code of Conduct on Division of labour and the Agenda for Change. These reforms are examined in detail to explain change in the EU's multilateral development policy.

4.1 Development Policy-Making in the EU and Member States Development Policies

Although the EU's development policy has its origins in the late 1950s, it did not have a legal base until the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. The Treaty of Rome had a special section on emphasizing solidarity between Europe and Associated and Overseas Territories, but did not make an explicit reference to development policy. The Treaty set out the parallel existence of the Community's development policy and Member States' policies, but there was neither cooperation among EU member states nor coherence among different

EU policies in the early years of development cooperation policy. The development policy evolved in an ad hoc manner responding to changes at the EU and global level.²¹⁸

The EU's efforts for better coordination and coherence of development policy came to the EU's agenda during the Single European Act negotiations in the mid-1980s. Despite the Netherlands and Denmark's calls for comprehensive Community mandate on development policy and the European Parliament's support for aid coordination, the Single European Act did not touch on the aid coordination issue.²¹⁹ In the 1990s, the European Commission offered the idea of coordination of member states' development aid policies by the European Commission, yet it was opposed by Member States on different grounds. For instance, Britain objected to the Commission's coordination role on the basis of its traditional reluctance to transfer of authority from national level to the EU level. France wanted to protect existing role of the Commission since these changes could jeopardize the EU's approach to the ACP group. Germany put pressure for efficiency of the Commission aid, rather than coordination issue. Denmark and the Netherlands gave priority to coherence of development policy with other policies, especially trade and agricultural policy.²²⁰ From the early days of European integration, member states are reluctant to give more competence to the EU in the field of development policy since development policy is considered as part of their foreign policy. Any delegation of authority to the EU level is identified with the erosion of national sovereignty. Hence, member states oppose the delegation of authority and financial resources to the EU level.²²¹

The Maastricht Treaty became a milestone for the Union's development policy. In the 1990s, the Union revised its relations with developing world and

²¹⁸ Iciar de Chávarri Ureta "The European Commission's Institutional Framework for Development Policy", in Carol Cosgrove-Sacks (ed), *Europe, Diplomacy and Development* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 56.

²¹⁹ Carbone, "The European Union and International Development", op.cit., p. 52.

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 53.

²²¹ Woolcock, "European Union Economic Diplomacy", op.cit., pp.149-150.

produced a new policy paradigm in which geography and history were no longer sufficient for the definition of development needs.²²² The Maastricht Treaty came into force in November 1993 and established the legal base of the development policy for the Community's development policy. The main objectives of EU's development policy were stated in Article 130 as follows:

Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them; the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy; the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.

The Maastricht Treaty conferred competence in development policy which has to be shared between Member states and the EU. The Treaty divided the competences between the EU and Member states according to pillar structure. EU's policies are generally divided into two as "Commission-led" policies that are mainly shaped by Commission and "Member state-led policies" made by EU member states in the Council. In general, Pillar I policies includes exclusive and shared competence policies such as development policy, agriculture, environment that are led by the Commission. Development policy is a shared competence and the scope of the Commission mandate is limited to the extent provided and allowed by Member States.²²³

The European Commission is the main institution for the formulation and management of EU's development cooperation policy. It has both administrative power and monopoly of policy initiatives in development policy-making. The Commission advances development policy legislation to the Council and issues numerous Communications in order to shape development policy agenda. Furthermore, the Commission supervises the implementation of EU's aid policies and deals with harmonization of member states' development policies. In addition to policy-manager role, the

²²² Holland, and Doidge, op.cit., p. 5.

²²³ Louise Van Schaik, et.al., *Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council: Strategies for the Way Forward* (Brussels: Centre For European Policy Studies, 2006), pp. 10-12.

Commission acts as agenda-setter in the Union.²²⁴ For this purpose, the Commission has a crucial role of producing and sharing knowledge, building national aid capacities and adoption of global aid initiatives on the EU level.²²⁵

The European Commission as a donor provides development aid to different regions of the world from its own resources that amounts to 20 per cent of the EU's total aid budget. In addition to direct aid delivery, the Commission makes contribution to global aid initiatives at the global level. Hence, the Commission is more than an additional 29th EU donor. It acts a kind of "conveyor" between the EU and global aid community, which makes its influence on Member States' development policies greater than its quantitative share in total EU aid.²²⁶

Over the years, the Commission has obtained a privileged position in the EU's development policy process. It has increased its competences and autonomy vis-à-vis national governments and become the engine of integrated policies. In addition to its formal role of facilitator of member states divergent approaches, the Commission may act as autonomously and play a leadership role under certain circumstances.²²⁷

Nevertheless, the Commission is not a unitary institution. Bureaucratic quarrels may take place among various DGs related to development policy. In the pre-Lisbon structure, DG Development deals with the ACP group and general development issues whereas DG Relex engages with development policy of non-ACP countries from a broader perspective of EU's foreign policy. On the other side, DG Trade engages with economic aspects of development policy. These three DGs of Commission may have

²²⁴ Lisbeth Aggestam et.al., "Institutional Competences in the EU External Action: Actors and Boundaries in CFSP and ESDP" *SIEPS Report No. 6-7*, (Stockholm, May 2008), p. 112.

²²⁵ Owen Barder, et.al., "Governance of the Aid System and the Role of the EU", Paper presented at the Spanish EU Presidency Conference on Development Cooperation in times of crisis and on achieving the MDGs, held on the 9th and 10th of June 2010 in Madrid, p. 17.

²²⁶ Paweł Bagiński, *The European Union's Development Cooperation Policy in the context of the Polish Presidency of the EU Council in 2011: Guidelines for Member States of Parliament and Senators* (Warsaw: Polska Akcja Humanitarna, 2010), p. 48.

²²⁷ Carbone, "The European Union and International Development", op.cit. p. 11.

clashing views on the direction of development cooperation policy. Poverty-oriented and pro-poor policies of DG Development could contradict with market-liberalisation approach of DG trade or foreign policy ambitions of DG Relex.²²⁸

Furthermore, the European Commission's leadership role in policy formulation and agenda setting is constrained by Member States. The European Commission is responsible for initiating general development policy and promotion of coordination with member states; yet, Member states are key actors in Council decisions. Their approaches to development policy are shaped by their commitment to European integration and understanding of development aid. The Council is unable to take binding decisions on development cooperation policy. All statements, resolutions and conclusions of Council on development policy are "soft law" instruments with moral force effect. European Parliament has co-decision power with the Council. It has also a role in the approval of the budget and responsible for its final adoption.²²⁹ Thus, the Council has a dual role of giving general political direction and approving the Commission's policy initiatives²³⁰.

In terms of policy making, the Commission is a sole institution that can propose new legislation on the EU's development cooperation policy. Development Policy legislation may contain the legal basis for financial instruments or regulations for external assistance. The Council and Parliament involve in legislation process after proposal for development cooperation is accepted and published as Communication. The European Parliament acts as co-legislator as a result of "Co-decision Procedure" and reacts to the Commission proposal by accepting, suggesting amendments or rejecting it. The Council gives its opinion after the Parliament and if Council approves Commission's proposal is accepted. With this co- decision procedure, the European Parliament and the

²²⁸ Carbone, "The EU and the Developing World", op.cit., pp. 342-343.


²²⁹ Carbone, "The European Union and International Development", op.cit. p. 50.

²³⁰ Aggestam et.al., "Institutional Competences in the EU External Action", op.cit., p.109.

Council decide on equal footing and the Council reaches an agreement by qualified majority.²³¹

The European Parliament has a separate committee on development issues, which is called DEVE. It is composed of 30 members and meets once or twice every month in Brussels. Development Committee is mainly responsible for handling Commission Communications and proposals of the European Commission. The Committee also supervises the Commission’s Aid Budget and the Cotonou Agreement. ²³² European Parliament is seen a “voice of conscience” in the EU’s relations with developing world, supporter of democracy and human rights into the EU’s external relations and inserts moral imperatives and human rights into economic and trade negotiations.²³³

Table 5. Decision Making in EU Development Policy



The policy making process constitutes main Achill’s Hill of EU’s development policy. The process of compromise between the Commission and

²³¹ Austrian EU Platform of Development NGOs, *Understanding EU Development Cooperation: Development Cooperation of the European Community Institutions – Structures – Procedures* (Vienna, May 2007), p. 16.

²³² *Ibid.*, p.15.

²³³ Holland and Doidge, *op.cit.*, p. 100.

conflicting political priorities of its member states is a difficult task. In this regard, EU member states as components of EU subsystem have divergent views on development cooperation policy. Various groups can be identified according to the member states' attitudes in terms of geographical scope, aid motives and aid management structure.²³⁴

The first group consists of like-minded states that allocated higher percentage of foreign aid to poor and democratic states; Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK. As a group, their preferences converge and represent themselves as a collective group. The second group consists of France, Belgium, Italy that provides a lower percentage of aid and make allocations of aid for strategic reasons. While the like minded group supports poverty-oriented global approach to development, the second group supports European approach to international development. Finally, the third group consisting of CEECs does not have much experience and capacity in aid.²³⁵

In general, Northern member states are significant players of global development, and deliver high volumes of aid and support poor and democratic governments by means of program aid or sector wide approaches. Southern and eastern member states are committed to European integration but deliver low volumes of aid. Between Northern and Southern donors, there are big three countries with different development policy attitudes. French development policy is usually oriented toward former colonies whereas Germany is not always interested in low income countries; Britain is concerned with quality and impact of aid. Unlike France and Germany that have positive attitude towards enhancement of EU's role, Britain is sceptical about the empowerment of EU institutions in development policy.²³⁶

In addition to aid attitude, the management of development policy at member state level changes from one country to another dramatically. Differences in terms of development policy management stemmed from several

²³⁴ Bagiński, op.cit., p. 32.

²³⁵ Carbone, "The EU and the Developing World", op.cit., p. 342.

²³⁶ Maurizio Carbone, "Development policy: the EU as a bilateral and multilateral donor", in Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and David J. Bailey (eds.), *The European Union and Global Governance: A Handbook* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 163.

factors such as the type of relations between donor and recipient country such as post-colonial relations; the size of donor economy, the management culture. In terms of organizational structure, the EU respects diversity of management models and does not impose any institutional model. Germany, Britain, France and Denmark have large development aid system consisting of over 2000 people.²³⁷ In Denmark, development policy is integrated to foreign ministry and territorial departments of Ministry are responsible for the entire policy towards recipient countries including development policy. This system provides coherence in all spheres of international relations. In Denmark, development policy is central part of the country's foreign and security policy. DANIDA is part of Danish Foreign Ministry and responsible for Denmark's development program.²³⁸ After the adoption of MDGs, Danish development cooperation has been revised to reflect the priorities of MDGs and new global challenges such as climate change and economic crisis. Danish development policy gives special importance to gender equality, promotion of democracy and the rule of law, stability and conflict prevention in fragile states, thus Afghanistan, Zimbabwe and Somalia are new priority countries for Denmark.²³⁹

The second model is adopted by Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands and locates development policy as a department or agency within the structure of ministries of foreign affairs. This model does not guarantee coherence but allows for the inclusion of concerns of development policy into foreign policy.²⁴⁰ For example, development cooperation is one of the main pillars of the Dutch foreign policy. Hence, there is not a separate ministry or agency for development policy, Foreign Ministry's Directorate General for International Cooperation is responsible for the formulation, coordination and implementation and funding of Dutch Development programme. Dutch embassies with staff specialized in development issues play active role in the

²³⁷ Bagiński, op.cit., p. 70.

²³⁸ Bagiński, op.cit., p. 71.

²³⁹ German Foundation for World Population, "Guide to European Population Assistance Funding, 7th Edition", 2010, p. 34.

²⁴⁰ Bagiński, op.cit., p. 71.

implementation of aid. The Netherlands is committed to the allocation of 0.8 percent of GNI for development cooperation. Within the EU, the Netherlands has been active supporter of the EU's policy coherence programs and improvement of effectiveness of EU aid.²⁴¹ The Netherlands provides a third of its development aid through multilateral agencies; thus the Netherlands is one of the largest donors of the UN agencies.²⁴²

The third model is based on existence of independent executive agencies for development cooperation subordinated to ministries of foreign affairs. This model is seen in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. This model allows for engagement of separate institution entirely with development issues, including technical ones. This model functions with the employment of development experts outside diplomacy. Thus, it is costly and could lead to problems of incoherency between foreign policy and development.²⁴³ For instance, strategic planning and policy priorities of Austria's bilateral aid is made by the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs and implemented by the Austrian Development Agency. Austria's development policy focuses on long-term thematic priorities such as water, rural development, energy, private sector development, education, promotion of democracy and good governance. In the allocation of aid, Austria gives priority to the South-eastern Europe as a result of its geographical proximity and traditional historical relations.²⁴⁴ The BMZ is responsible for German development cooperation. Projects are implemented by the GTZ. In 2010, German government allocated €6.07 billion to development aid, which meant an increase of 4.4 percent compared to 2009. German development policy is committed to achievement of the MDGs; hence it focuses on education, health, rural development, sustainable economic development. In addition to the MDGs, Germany recognises the protection of human rights and

²⁴¹ Bagiński, *op.cit.*, p. 68.

²⁴² Bagiński, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

²⁴³ Bagiński, *op.cit.*, p. 71.

²⁴⁴ German Foundation for World Population, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

strengthening of good governance as core principles of development.²⁴⁵ In recent years, Germany favours bilateral aid programs to multilateral aid and allocates more resources to its bilateral aid programs to improve effectiveness and visibility of German aid. Furthermore, Germany reduced the number of recipient countries to 58. While Africa remains the major regional focus of German development cooperation, Germany selects recipient countries on the basis of factors such as development needs, governance performance, the relevance of German aid compared to other donors.²⁴⁶

The final model is seen in Britain where development cooperation is a separate ministry of government administration. This model is managed by a minister charged exclusively with development issues.²⁴⁷

Among EU member states, eight of them, namely, Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Ireland and Britain, are recognized as the most generous donors owing to their high allocation of aid with regard to percentage of GNI for ODA. All of these member states allocate 0.5 percent of their GNI for development aid, whereas Sweden and Luxembourg contributes over 1 percent.²⁴⁸

On the other side, new EU members from CEE have different preferences compared to the old members (EU-15). New members of the EU, EU-12, consist of ten former communist states, five CEECs, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland, three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, two Southeast European states, Bulgaria and Romania and two Mediterranean states, Cyprus and Malta. These new member states' aid volumes are about the two percent of old member states.²⁴⁹ After the accession, new

²⁴⁵ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), *German Development Policy at a Glance*, (Düren, August 2010).

²⁴⁶ German Foundation for World Population, op.cit., p. 32.

²⁴⁷ Bagiński, op.cit., p. 71.

²⁴⁸ Bagiński, op.cit., p. 17.

²⁴⁹ Ondřej Horký, "The Impact of the Shallow Europeanization of the 'New' Member States on the EU's Actorness: What Coherence between Foreign and Development Policy?", in Stefan Gänzle, Sven Grimm and Davina Makhan (eds.), *The European Union and Global Development: An 'Enlightened Superpower' in the Making?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 57.

member states declared to increase quantity of their aid formally and informally. However, they failed to meet their commitments. Most of new members find development policy “too costly” for themselves.²⁵⁰ Furthermore, the soft law characteristics of development policy and weakness of DG Development is unable to force them to meet their commitments. New members cut their aid budget dramatically when their political priorities change as a consequence of economic situation.²⁵¹ Before the EU accession, some of CEECs had the experience of development aid under communism, but this was mainly political aid for supporting communist world. New member states built their programs under the influence of the EU as the largest donor and the OECD DAC as the main principal forum for donor countries.²⁵²

New member states have a pragmatic approach to development policy. Despite their EU membership and the bid for OECD DAC membership, their development cooperation is related to the pursuit of national interests, unlike old member states, CEECs do not have former colonies in poorest regions of the world, so they could not justify their aid policies by altruistic values. CEECs consider development aid as an instrument for achievement of broader foreign and security policy objectives, rather than reduction of poverty itself. The EU-12 questions the EU-ACP relations since they have little historical connections with developing countries of Africa and prefer to give aid to neighbouring states, especially Eastern Partnership. The majority of EU aid is allocated to the Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.²⁵³

For old member states, Africa is the traditional geographic focus; new members were less concerned about Africa. Newest members of the EU that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 pose a special challenge for the future direction of European Development Policy. While some of these new members have had

²⁵⁰ Interview with a diplomat from an EU Member State.

²⁵¹ Simon Lightfoot, “The Europeanization of International Development Policies: The Case of Central and Eastern European States”, *Europe-Asia Studies* (Vol. 62, No. 2, 2010), p. 339.

²⁵² Ondřej Horký and Simon Lightfoot, “From Aid Recipients to Aid Donors? Development Policies of Central and Eastern European States”, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* (Vol. 13, No. 1, 2012), p. 2.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

experience of development cooperation, the EU membership process changed the scale and the quality of their development policy. They formulated new bilateral development policy under the guidance of the OECD and the EU.²⁵⁴

Nevertheless, except for Hungary, Estonia and Poland new members did not list poverty reduction as one of their objectives of development aid. Most of new member states gave priority to issues of democracy promotion, the rule of law, regional security and sustainable development rather than overall objective of poverty eradication. Despite the Consensus statement on poverty reduction, this document does not put them under obligation of giving aid to Africa. The document provided impetus for new member states to expand their development cooperation policies from neighbourhood to Africa, similar to foreign policy, no formal obligation.²⁵⁵

CEECs prefer to allocate their bilateral aid to their regional neighbourhood, such as the Balkans and former Soviet Republics. In addition to geographical allocation of aid, new members follow different path from large donors of the EU by delivering aid that ensures direct return to them. Hence, they provide tied aid, funding student costs or project aid that could be contradictory to the norms promoted by DAC donors within the EU. Hence, the EU's role as a "norm setter" regarding to development policies of new member states is limited. The subordination of development policy to foreign policy in new member states may lead to resistance to development policy norms promoted by the EU.²⁵⁶

New member states give priority to countries in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia and argue that countries in these regions are also in need of development aid similar to non-LDCs of ACP states. While coherence and complementarity entails concentration on priority countries, geographical focus on Africa, CEECs are not familiar with neighbours and no experience with Africa. The Code of Conduct entails focus on sectors in which

²⁵⁴ Erik Lundsgaarde, "The Challenge from Within: New EU Donors and European Development Cooperation", *EDC 2020 Policy Brief No. 10*, (March 2011), p. 1.

²⁵⁵ Lightfoot, "The Europeanization of International Development Policies", *op.cit.*, p. 339.

²⁵⁶ Lundsgaarde, "The Challenge from Within", *op.cit.*, pp. 2-3.

they have a comparative advantage. For CEECs, these sectors mean democratisation, market liberalisation and managing transition, but little evidence of practice reflected in aid flows.²⁵⁷

New member states are confronted with the challenge of increasing public awareness and mobilizing resources for development policy. Especially, financial crisis of Europe makes it difficult to sustain support for global development. After MDGs, the EU adopts globally active development policy and determines Africa as the main focal region for its aid policies. While most of the Western and Northern EU member states support the EU's engagement with Africa because of their colonial ties or strong poverty reduction orientation, new EU member states do not regard Africa as their priority and thus this leads to a tension between new and old member states due to "competing geographical priorities".²⁵⁸ Consequently, the EU member states are far from being a homogeneous group in development policy. While like-minded group of countries represent "lead states" in development policy, Southern countries of the EU can be seen as "laggard states" those are reluctant to take action in development policy. New member states are "passive" members of the EU that are in the process of learning. EU member states take into account this diversity in their aid allocations and seek to the EU's multilateral development policy with their bilateral development policies. Member states give priority to their own bilateral aid policy since bilateral development policy is directly related to national interest. EU's multilateral development aid is secondary to member states bilateral aid.²⁵⁹ Furthermore, the EU development policy is seen as one of channels for multilateral aid by big member states. Big member states give weight to their bilateral development aid programs and try to "multilateralise" their bilateral development policy through EU development policy.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁷ Lightfoot, "The Europeanization of International Development Policies", op.cit., p. 340.

²⁵⁸ Lundsgaarde, "The Europeanization of International Development Policies, op.cit., p. 3.

²⁵⁹ Interview with a Diplomat from an EU Member State

²⁶⁰ Interview with a diplomat from an EU Member state.

4.2 Three “C”s and European Consensus on Development

The Maastricht Treaty introduced new principles of coordination, complementarity and coherence, known as three “C”s for short. The principle of consistency was added to these principles with the Amsterdam Treaty.²⁶¹ Coordination principle is the C with the longest history in the evolution of development cooperation. The first call for the coordination of Member States’ development policy goes back to Pearson Report of 1969. Coordination in development cooperation policy denotes organization of donor activities harmoniously so as not to hinder one another. It prevents building of wells side by side or vaccination of the same child twice. Coordination at the EU context is important for provision of aid activities in harmony.²⁶² Hence, coordination is the basis of common action at the EU level that allows for harmonisation of policy programmes, procedures and practices and mobilisation of resources for maximisation of effectiveness of aid resources. Coordination efforts at the EU level include sharing of information, a joint examination of strategy documents, standardised procedures and common sectoral approaches.²⁶³ In this regard, coordination refers to consultation of Member states and the Commission on aid programmes and positions in international organizations and international conferences for speaking with a single voice. The Commission takes initiatives for coordination of member states aid policies.²⁶⁴

The second principle of complementarity is the result of coordination and points out that Commission’s development policy complete and not to replace the Member States’ development aid policies. Hence, the Commission is given explicit competence to formulate and implement policies to complete

²⁶¹ Holland and Doidge, *op.cit.* p.188.

²⁶² Ngaire Woods, “Rethinking Aid Coordination”, in Homi Kharas, Koji Makino and Woojin Jung (eds.), *Catalyzing Development: A New Vision for Aid* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), p. 118.

²⁶³ Paul Hoebink, “Evaluating Maastricht’s Triple C: An Introduction to the Development Paragraphs of the Treaty on the European Union and Suggestions for Its Evaluation”, in Paul Hoebink (ed.), *The Treaty of Maastricht and Europe’s Development Co-operation* (Brussels: European Union, 2004), p.5.

²⁶⁴ Carbone, “The EU and the Developing World”, *op.cit.*, p. 330.

those of Member states.²⁶⁵ Complementarity principle aims to prevent duplication of programmes and thus waste of resources. It is also crucial aspect of the improvement of aid effectiveness through concentration of aid activities where donors have competitive advantage with regard to resources, specialisation and experience²⁶⁶ Coordination and harmonisation of the EU and Member states aid policies are the building blocks for complementarity of the EU's aid with member states bilateral policies.²⁶⁷ By means of these principles, the EU seeks to improve its aid effectiveness by rationalising allocation of resources, preventing duplication and reduction of transaction costs and expenses.²⁶⁸

The third principle of coherence is adapted from global institutions to the EU level. In the global development context, policy coherence for development came to the global development agenda in the mid-1990s as a result of globalisation and broadening of development agenda by inclusion of other objectives such as satisfaction of basic social needs, governance, promotion of democracy and human rights, environmental sustainability and gender equality. Especially, the OECD provided impetus for the achievement of coherence by inclusion of a detailed section on coherence in DAC guidelines on poverty reduction²⁶⁹. The OECD definition of coherence defines coherence as “objectives and results of a government’s development policies are not undermined by other policies of that same government which impact on the development countries, and that these other policies support

²⁶⁵ Lisa Dacosta, Yannick Jadot, Alice Sindzingre, “Complementarity of European Union Policies on Development Cooperation: First Elements of Analysis and Recommendations for An Evaluation”, in Paul Hoebink (ed.), *The Treaty of Maastricht and Europe’s Development Cooperation* (Brussels: European Union, 2004), pp. 102-103.

²⁶⁶ Genevra Forwood, “Complementarity in the European Union’s Development Policy: Fifteen plus One?”, in Carol Cosgrove-Sacks (ed.), *Europe, Diplomacy and Development: New Issues in EU Relations with Developing Countries*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 216.

²⁶⁷ Dacosta, Jadot and Sindzingre, op.cit., p.104.

²⁶⁸ Dacosta, Jadot and Sindzingre, op.cit., p.104.

²⁶⁹ van Schaik et.al., op.cit., p. 3.

development objectives where feasible".²⁷⁰ Hence, coherence entails the conduct of different policies towards the same direction and is related to both the process and outcome of policy making.²⁷¹ The significance of policy coherence for development rose from the expansion of development cooperation. In today's world development cooperation is not limited to the transfer of money from the North to the South for economic and social development. It is no longer government-to government activity. In addition to governments, a wide range of actors involve in development policy. Moreover, the scope of development policy has widened to address political, economic and security issues. The conduct of effective development cooperation policy largely rests on the compatibility of other policies such as agriculture, trade and security with development purposes. The clashes between development and agricultural or trade protectionism undermine the achievement of the policy coherence for development. The ongoing economic and financial crises have adverse effect on policy coherence for development. As well as reducing aid volumes, donor countries reduce development-friendly trade or migration measures.²⁷² In the EU context, the achievement of PCD is more difficult, since EU's external policies are subject to different decision making. While trade policy is an exclusive Union competence, development policy is a shared competence. The coexistence of supranational and intergovernmental decision-making poses challenges for policy coherence for development.²⁷³

In the EU context, coherence can be addressed at several levels. While institutional coherence denotes a shared vision and responsibility between Commission and Council, vertical coherence is related to the division of responsibilities and competencies between Community and the

²⁷⁰ Guido Ashoff, *Enhancing Policy Coherence for Development: Justification, Recognition and Application to Achievement*, (Bonn: German Development Institute Studies, 2005), p.15.

²⁷¹ Maurizio Carbone, "Beyond Aid: Policy Coherence and Europe's Development Policy", in Gilles Barbonnier (eds.), *International Development Policy: Aid, Emerging Economies and Global Policies* (Geneva: The Graduate Institute Geneva, 2012), p. 162.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p.163.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.163.

member states and measures the alignment of policies between member states and the EU level. Horizontal coherence means the compatibility of EU's development aid policy with other policies such as trade, agriculture and development. Multilateral Coherence is concerned with the alignment of EU's external policies with multilateral organization at global level.²⁷⁴

Although three principles of coordination, complementarity and coherence seems to be technical notions that aim to improve the effectiveness and quality of the EU's development aid and Member States approach these principles as a political issue. The implementation of these principles is an uphill battle task. In the 1990s, the EU did achieve little in implementation of coordination and complementarity of aid policies. Most of the member states kept their development cooperation policy as a part of their national sovereignty. Big member states wanted to maintain their historical and strategic relations with third countries. Besides, small member states did not favour common or single development policy. National bureaucracies opposed to a supranational development policy or any attempt for coordination or complementarity to preserve their power and jobs.²⁷⁵ Despite member states commitment to a common vision of development, member states bilateral development policies are mainly driven by strategic and economic considerations. The parallel existence of Commission-managed EU development policy and member states bilateral development policy may give rise to frictions, duplications, tensions and even competition, which prevent the fulfilment of principles of coherence, coordination and complementarity.²⁷⁶ Hence, Commission's relationship with Member States suffers from the problem of "joined-up" approach. Multilateral aid policies of the EU do not necessarily followed by bilateral aid policies of Member States. Despite the EU's global reach, the shortcomings at both the multilateral and

²⁷⁴ Ashoff, op.cit., p. 19.

²⁷⁵ Carbone, "The EU and the Developing World", op.cit., p. 330.

²⁷⁶ Carlos Santiso, "Reforming European Foreign Aid: Development Cooperation as an Element of Foreign Policy, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2002, p.404.

bilateral levels prevent translation of this global reach into global influence. Thus, the EU fails to punch its true weight and capitalise its strength.²⁷⁷

Nonetheless, the Commission has given importance to its convening or coordinating role and developed a set of common strategic frameworks and action plans that are approved by the European Council in the last ten years. In this regard, the “European Consensus on Development of 2005” provided common objectives and principles of development policy for the first time in the European integration process. Initially named as “EC Development Policy Statement”, “European Consensus on Development” outlines the common vision of values, objectives, principles that are shared by the EU and all member states. The European Consensus on Development is a joint statement by the Council and representatives of the governments of the member states meeting with the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on EU Development Policy. It provides a “common vision” of development policy for the EU and its member states for the first time in EU history. “European Consensus on Development” is a political document establishing a common framework and principles of development cooperation policy of the Union and Member States in the spirit of complementarity. Since it was approved by both the EU institutions and all Member States, it is a main reference document for both the EU and Member States of the Union.²⁷⁸ Former Development Commissioner, Louis Michel strongly supported the adoption the European Consensus by EU institutions and all EU member states. Before European Consensus, there was no common document stating main guidelines of EU development policy.²⁷⁹ Louis Michel was a political figure coming from one of the former colonial powers of Europe, Belgium. A High profile of Louis Michel as Development Policy Commissioner made reform of development policy one of most urgent issues of EU agenda.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Richard Whitman, “The EU: Standing Aside From the Changing Global Balance of Power?”, *Politics* (Vol. 30, No. 1, 2010), p. 31.

²⁷⁸ Bagiński, op.cit., p. 21.

²⁷⁹ Interview with an EU Official from the European Commission.

²⁸⁰ Interview with a Diplomat from an EU member state.

The first part of the Consensus articulates the common objectives and principles for development. The second part clarifies the mission, added value of the Union development aid and put forward the operationalisation of objectives, principles, values and policy coherence for development at the EU level. Consensus recognized the MDGs as an overarching goal of EU development cooperation policy. As a largest provider of development aid, the EU underlined its commitment for the fulfilment of the eight MDGs: eradication of poverty, achievement of universal primary education, promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women, reduction of mortality of rate of children, improvement of maternal health, combating HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and building a global partnership for development. In addition to commitment to the MDGs, the Consensus underlined value-loaded aspect of EU development cooperation policy by stating its common values. In thi sense, Union’s development policy is based on the promotion of common values such as respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity, justice and effective multilateralism.

Regarding poverty reduction, the Consensus put forward “multi-dimensional” aspects of poverty including human capabilities, health, education, human security. Hence, the Consensus made broad definition of poverty, rather than measuring it with income level. While the World Bank defines \$1.25-a-day for poverty line for the least developing countries, \$2-a-day for developing countries, the UN Human Poverty Index is based on several measures including income, education, health and life expectancy measures. The Consensus’s definition of poverty is similar to the UN approach to global poverty.²⁸¹ The Consensus recognizes poverty reduction as the main objective of development policy and thus underlines the priority of Low Income Countries in aid allocations. Administratively, it refers to shift from project aid to general budget support and performance-based assessment. Furthermore, the Consensus

²⁸¹ Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, “International Norm Dynamics and the “End of Poverty” op.cit., pp. 40-41.

emphasizes the role of “national ownership” of aid programs in aid effectiveness.²⁸²

The Consensus also made clear the common principles of development policy. The EU and its member states are committed to ownership, partnership, political dialogue, participation of civil society, gender equality, and combating state fragility as common principles of development cooperation policy. Similar to previous treaties, the Consensus underlined the importance of coherence, complementarity, and coordination in EU’s development cooperation policy. Therefore, European Consensus supported the EU’s “value-based identity” and self-image of “force for good”. However, the initial attempts for differentiating the EU’s development approach from other global actors such as Bretton Woods Institutions or the US were not successful. The Consensus did not reflect an alternative European way of development to global development; for some observers, its principles coincided with post-Washington Consensus emphasis on poverty reduction, democracy, good governance and alignment with the MDGs.²⁸³

The second part of the Consensus also elaborated the operationalisation of common objectives, values and principles at the EU level. According to the Consensus, the EU’s global presence all around the world makes it global partner for developing countries. The EU can reach different parts of the world, including fragile states with its extensive network of delegations. The comprehensive policy portfolio of the Union covering trade, agriculture, fisheries and migration provides the EU with comparative advantages over other donors. Furthermore, the EU takes active role in stimulating European debate on development best practice such as budget support, sectoral aid and untying of aid.²⁸⁴

²⁸² Simon Maxwell, et.al., “Global governance of the aid system and the role of the European Union (EU)”, *ODI Briefing* (May 2010).

²⁸³ Carbone, “The EU and the Developing World”, op.cit., p.337.

²⁸⁴ Maurizio Carbone, “The European Union, Good Governance and Aid Co-ordination”, *Third World Quarterly* (Vol. 31, No. 1, 2010), p. 16.

By declaring common principles, values, objectives of development policy of the EU and its member states, the Consensus sought to narrow down the differences between EU institutions and its member states concerning making and implementation of development policy. Four years after its implementation, there has been calls for the review of European Consensus due to the need for adjusting it to the post-Lisbon context of the EU and new global challenges.

4.3 The EU and the MDGs

The MDGs were adopted by 189 members of the UN for the achievement of concrete global goals in the fields of poverty, primary education, gender equality and reduction of child mortality, improvement of maternal health and environmental sustainability by 2015. Nonetheless, the impact of the MDGs changes from country to country, region to region. However, the greatest impact of the MDGs on wealthy countries is seen at the EU level. With the enthusiasm of like-minded EU countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands and strong support from the UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, the EU committed itself to achieve MDGs and increase its aid allocations.²⁸⁵ Hence, the EU has become the only group of countries (along with Norway) to have set deadlines for achieving the UN's 0.7 percent ODA/GNI target.

As the largest provider of development aid, the EU pledged to increase its aid volumes in Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development. The EU announced to provide 0.39 percent of its GNI to development aid by 2006. Nevertheless, Monterrey aid commitments gave rise to intense discussions in Barcelona European Council of 2002. Despite the Northern Members' strong support for an increase in aid volumes on the basis of the EU's moral obligation to help poor people, the Southern Member States underlined their economic problems and insisted on quality of aid, rather than quantity of aid.²⁸⁶ Member states were divided among themselves on the EU's commitments to increase of

²⁸⁵ Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, *op.cit.*, p. 30.

²⁸⁶ Carbone, "The European Union and International Development", *op.cit.*, pp. 66-68.

aid volumes and set up individual time frames. Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Finland, Ireland, the UK wanted to increase volume of aid with ambitious time frame. On the other side, Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain argued for the improvement of quality of aid, rather than quantity of aid. With the intense efforts of the European Commission, EU Member States agreed on the collective aid target of 0.39 percent of their combined GNI and country targets of at least 0.33 percent by 2006.²⁸⁷ Hence, the European Commission acted as a unitary actor and succeeded in influencing the aid volumes for the first time in EU history. On the basis of this achievement, the Commission went one step further and proposed more ambitious target: the achievement of a collective EU target of 0.56 percent and a country target of at least 0.51 percent for the old member states (EU-15) and 0.17 percent for the new member states (EU-12) by 2010. The Commission's proposal was accepted by the European Council in 2005 with the aim of reaching 0.7 per cent of aid target by 2015.²⁸⁸

The initial implications of MDGs were seen in the legal and financial aspects of the EU's development cooperation. The EU aligned its development policy legal basis with the achievement of the MDGs. The Commission's legal and financial alignment with the MDGs reached 85 percent. It was not full alignment because of the lack of any specific hunger focus in policy framework.²⁸⁹ In addition to the Lisbon Treaty that makes specific reference to the poverty eradication, the European Consensus on Development confirms poverty eradication and the achievement of the MDGs as the overarching objectives of EU development cooperation.²⁹⁰

Therefore, the MDGs are located at the centre of EU's development cooperation policy. The Commission issues a Communication on "The EU - A global partner for development: Speeding up progress towards the MDGs" ²⁹¹

²⁸⁷ Carbone, "The European Union and International Development", op.cit., pp. 72-74.

²⁸⁸ Carbone, "The European Union and International Development", op.cit., p. 80.

²⁸⁹ Mirjam Van Reisen (ed.), "The EU's contribution to the Millennium Development Goals: Poverty Eradication: From Rhetoric to Results?", 2015 Watch Report 5, 2008, p. 10.

²⁹⁰ Millennium Development Goals Alliance Report 2008, p. 11. Available at <www.alliance2015.org>

and encouraged member states to increase the volume and effectiveness of aid in April 2008. Another communication on “Supporting Developing Countries in Coping with the Crisis” and offered 20 concrete proposals for covering aid volume and finance etc.²⁹² The Commission’s development programs provided €51 billion for the period 2007–2013 for global efforts for the achievement of MDGs. The alignment between the Commission’s development programs and MDGs reached to 53 percent in 2006. Since the EU’s development policy documents do not make specific reference to eradication of hunger and thus any specific target on hunger, the alignment score is not high.²⁹³ The EU’s achievements are stated by Development Commissioner Piebalgs as follows:

Over the last ten years, the EU and its Member States have committed around 45 billion euro per year to development aid – more than half of all global assistance. Our support has paid off: since 2004, the EU has contributed to the enrolment of more than 13 million boys and girls at school, to the vaccination of around 18 million children and to providing more than 70 million people with access to water around the world. ²⁹⁴

However, the most obvious impact of the MDGs is seen in the EU’s encouragement of Member States to increase their aid volumes in order to reach 0.7 percent of ODA/GNI target by 2015. The Commission proposed 0.7 percent of ODA/GNI by 2015 and an intermediary goal of 0.56 percent of ODA/GNI by 2010 collectively at the EU level. For the EU-12, the Commission proposed the ambitious level of 0.51 percent of ODA/GNI in 2010 and 0.7 percent of ODA/GNI by 2015. EU member states agreed to allocate an interim target of 0.56 percent by 2010 and 0.7 percent of GNI as ODA by 2015.

²⁹¹ European Commission, “The EU - a global partner for development Speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals”, (COM 2008, 177 final, 9 April 2008).

²⁹² European Commission, “Supporting Developing Countries In Coping With The Crisis”, (COM 2009 160/4 8 April 2009).

²⁹³ Mirjam Van Reisen, “The EU’s contribution to the Millennium Development Goals”, op.cit., p. 7.

²⁹⁴ Andris Piebalgs, “Making the MDGs a reality for all”, Speech at UN MDG Acceleration Event, New York, 24 September 2013.

Alongside the encouragement of EU institutions for the MDGs, European public support the EU's efforts for the attainment of these goals. The Euro-barometer survey on 'Europeans, development aid and the MDGs' that was conducted in June 2010 indicated that 89 per cent of respondents found development aid is important or very important. Two in three Europeans supported the EU's pledge to increase development aid to 0.7% of GNI by 2015, despite the economic crisis in Europe. Besides, recent European survey entitled as "*Making a difference in the world: Europeans and the development aid*" that was carried out in the 27 EU member states in September 2011 illustrated that 62 per cent of European citizens support the increase of aid volume at least 0.7 % of EU Gross National Income by 2015. 70 per cent of citizens think of sub-Saharan Africa as the most deprived region that is in need of aid. Furthermore, 84 per cent respondents of survey are in favour of the EU's development policy. More than half of young European citizens at the age of 15-24 are ready to pay more for products that would be beneficial for poor people of developing countries. This public support did not declined substantially despite the financial crisis.


Table 6. EU Official Development Assistance 2004-2012, Source: European Commission

Member State	2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI
Austria	545	0.23	1,266	0.52	1,194	0.47	1,321	0.50	1,188	0.43	820	0.30	912	0.32	799	0.27	865	0.28
Belgium	1,178	0.41	1,580	0.53	1,575	0.50	1,425	0.43	1,654	0.48	1,874	0.55	2,268	0.64	2,019	0.54	1,792	0.47
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	1	0.00	17	0.06	13	0.04	12	0.04	31	0.09	35	0.09	30	0.08
Cyprus	4	0.03	4	0.09	21	0.15	18	0.17	26	0.17	33	0.20	39	0.23	28	0.16	20	0.12
Czech Republic	87	0.11	109	0.11	128	0.12	131	0.11	173	0.12	154	0.12	172	0.13	180	0.12	171	0.12
Denmark	1,640	0.85	1,697	0.81	1,782	0.80	1,872	0.81	1,944	0.82	2,018	0.88	2,168	0.91	2,108	0.85	2,115	0.84
Estonia	4	0.05	5	0.08	11	0.09	12	0.08	16	0.10	13	0.10	14	0.10	18	0.11	18	0.11
Finland	547	0.37	726	0.46	665	0.40	717	0.39	808	0.44	926	0.54	1,006	0.55	1,011	0.53	1,027	0.53
France	6,820	0.41	8,067	0.47	8,445	0.47	7,220	0.38	7,562	0.39	9,048	0.47	9,751	0.50	9,348	0.46	9,336	0.45
Germany	6,064	0.28	8,112	0.36	8,313	0.36	8,978	0.37	9,693	0.38	8,674	0.35	9,804	0.39	10,136	0.39	10,198	0.38
Greece	258	0.16	309	0.17	338	0.17	366	0.16	488	0.21	436	0.19	383	0.17	305	0.15	252	0.13
Hungary	56	0.07	81	0.11	119	0.13	76	0.08	74	0.08	84	0.10	86	0.09	100	0.11	93	0.10
Ireland	489	0.39	578	0.42	814	0.54	871	0.55	921	0.59	722	0.54	676	0.52	657	0.51	629	0.48
Italy	1,981	0.15	4,096	0.29	2,901	0.20	2,901	0.19	3,370	0.22	2,368	0.16	2,262	0.15	3,111	0.20	2,053	0.13
Latvia	7	0.06	8	0.07	9	0.06	12	0.06	15	0.07	15	0.08	12	0.06	14	0.07	16	0.08
Lithuania	8	0.04	12	0.06	20	0.08	35	0.11	35	0.11	30	0.11	28	0.10	38	0.13	40	0.13
Luxembourg	190	0.79	206	0.79	232	0.89	274	0.92	288	0.97	298	1.04	304	1.05	294	0.97	336	1.00
Malta	8	0.18	7	0.17	7	0.15	8	0.15	11	0.20	10	0.18	10	0.18	14	0.25	14	0.23
The Netherlands	3,384	0.73	4,115	0.82	4,343	0.81	4,547	0.81	4,848	0.80	4,615	0.82	4,800	0.81	4,563	0.75	4,298	0.71
Poland	95	0.05	165	0.07	236	0.09	265	0.10	258	0.08	269	0.09	285	0.08	300	0.08	341	0.09
Portugal	830	0.63	303	0.21	316	0.21	344	0.22	430	0.27	368	0.23	490	0.29	509	0.31	441	0.27
Romania	-	-	-	-	3	0.00	84	0.07	94	0.09	99	0.08	86	0.07	118	0.09	113	0.08
Slovak Republic	23	0.07	45	0.12	44	0.10	49	0.09	64	0.10	54	0.09	56	0.09	62	0.09	61	0.09
Slovenia	25	0.10	28	0.11	35	0.12	40	0.12	47	0.13	57	0.15	44	0.13	45	0.13	45	0.13
Spain	1,962	0.24	2,429	0.27	3,038	0.32	3,755	0.37	4,761	0.45	4,728	0.46	4,492	0.43	3,001	0.29	1,516	0.15
Sweden	2,191	0.78	2,705	0.94	3,151	1.02	3,170	0.93	3,281	0.98	3,266	1.12	3,423	0.97	4,030	1.02	4,078	0.99
UK	6,362	0.36	8,667	0.47	9,926	0.51	7,194	0.36	7,973	0.43	8,251	0.51	9,855	0.57	9,948	0.56	10,627	0.56
EU15 Total	34,440.61	0.35	44,856.34	0.44	47,032.75	0.43	44,953.66	0.39	49,206.53	0.43	48,412.69	0.45	52,594.16	0.46	51,839.96	0.44	49,563.90	0.41
EU12 Total	316.83	0.07	463.36	0.09	635.46	0.09	745.05	0.09	825.21	0.09	829.88	0.10	862.80	0.09	951.47	0.10	961.10	0.10
EU27 Total	34,757.44	0.34	45,319.69	0.42	47,668.21	0.41	45,698.71	0.37	50,031.74	0.40	49,242.56	0.42	53,456.96	0.44	52,791.43	0.42	50,525.00	0.39

Table 7. EU ODA 2011-2015, Source: European Commission

Member State	2011		2012		2013		2014		2015		2015 commitment		2015 financial gap	
	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI	EUR Million	% of GNI
Austria	799	0.27	865	0.28	1,362	0.43	1,359	0.42	1,347	0.40	2,361	0.70	1,014	0.30
Belgium	2,019	0.54	1,792	0.47	1,998	0.51	2,065	0.51	2,920	0.70	2,920	0.70	-	-
Bulgaria	35	0.09	30	0.08	45	0.11	50	0.12	56	0.13	146	0.33	90	0.20
Cyprus	28	0.16	20	0.12	28	0.17	29	0.18	29	0.17	55	0.33	26	0.16
Czech Republic	180	0.12	171	0.12	178	0.13	189	0.13	188	0.12	501	0.33	313	0.21
Denmark	2,108	0.85	2,115	0.84	2,151	0.85	2,204	0.84	2,258	0.84	2,685	1.00	427	0.16
Estonia	18	0.11	18	0.11	19	0.11	23	0.12	25	0.13	63	0.33	38	0.20
Finland	1,011	0.53	1,027	0.53	1,118	0.56	1,123	0.55	1,119	0.53	1,485	0.70	366	0.17
France	9,348	0.46	9,336	0.45	9,826	0.47	10,531	0.49	10,916	0.49	15,587	0.70	4,671	0.21
Germany	10,136	0.39	10,198	0.38	10,461	0.38	10,731	0.38	11,008	0.38	20,418	0.70	9,409	0.32
Greece	305	0.15	252	0.13	234	0.13	217	0.12	202	0.11	1,308	0.70	1,106	0.59
Hungary	100	0.11	93	0.10	96	0.10	100	0.10	104	0.10	335	0.33	231	0.23
Ireland	657	0.51	629	0.48	623	0.48	623	0.46	623	0.44	982	0.70	359	0.26
Italy	3,111	0.20	2,053	0.13	2,476	0.16	2,288	0.14	2,822	0.17	11,521	0.70	8,699	0.53
Latvia	14	0.07	16	0.08	16	0.07	17	0.07	19	0.07	84	0.33	66	0.26
Lithuania	38	0.13	40	0.13	41	0.13	43	0.12	44	0.12	119	0.33	76	0.21
Luxembourg	294	0.57	336	1.00	323	0.98	323	0.95	337	0.96	352	1.00	15	0.04
Malta	14	0.25	14	0.23	15	0.22	19	0.28	23	0.33	23	0.33	-	-
The Netherlands	4,563	0.75	4,298	0.71	4,340	0.71	3,951	0.63	4,161	0.64	4,581	0.70	420	0.06
Poland	300	0.08	341	0.09	554	0.15	583	0.15	613	0.15	1,347	0.33	734	0.18
Portugal	509	0.31	441	0.27	464	0.30	488	0.31	513	0.31	1,153	0.70	640	0.39
Romania	118	0.09	113	0.08	110	0.08	126	0.08	134	0.09	515	0.33	381	0.24
Slovak Republic	62	0.09	61	0.09	63	0.09	66	0.09	69	0.09	265	0.33	196	0.24
Slovenia	45	0.13	45	0.13	46	0.13	48	0.14	49	0.13	122	0.33	73	0.20
Spain	3,001	0.29	1,516	0.15	1,955	0.19	1,630	0.15	1,360	0.12	7,630	0.70	6,270	0.58
Sweden	4,030	1.02	4,078	0.99	4,411	1.01	4,599	1.00	4,748	1.00	4,748	1.00	-	-
UK	9,948	0.56	10,627	0.56	13,067	0.70	13,612	0.70	14,117	0.70	14,117	0.70	-	-
EU15 Total	51,800	0.44	49,564	0.41	54,809	0.46	55,744	0.45	58,450	0.46	91,847	0.72	33,397	0.26
EU12 Total	951	0.10	961	0.10	1,212	0.12	1,293	0.12	1,353	0.12	3,576	0.33	2,223	0.21
EU27 Total	52,791	0.42	50,525	0.39	56,021	0.43	57,037	0.42	59,803	0.43	95,423	0.69	35,620	0.26
EU Institutions ODA	12,507		13,669											
<i>of which:</i>														
<i>Imputed to Member States</i>	9,054		9,125											
<i>Not imputed to Member States</i>	3,453	0.03	4,544	0.04										
Collective EU ODA ⁽¹⁾	56,244	0.45	55,069	0.43										
<i>(1) Including EU Institutions ODA not imputed to Member States</i>														
												Gap to collective 2015 target 0.7%		
												Target in EUR Million		
												97,097		
												Gap in EUR Million		
												46,572		

Table 8. State of individual progress towards the 2015 EU targets, Source: European Commission



After the adoption of MDGs, the EU member states committed to achieve at least an individual average of 0.33 percent of their GNI. European Commission was tasked with the progress of each individual member states.²⁹⁵ As a result of this commitment, the EU reached a collective ODA/GNI ratio of 0.44 percent in 2010, which is above the DAC average of 0.32 percent, but below the EU's intermediate target of 0.56 percent.²⁹⁶ While some of member states such as Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark and the Netherlands currently exceed this level of 0.7 percent of ODA/GNI; current economic crisis put EU member states under great pressure to cut expenditure, including ODA. Despite the shrinking aid budgets, some Member States such as Britain considered ODA as top priority and increased ODA allocations.²⁹⁷

However, the EU failed to increase its collective performance owing to Italy. Italian development aid declined considerably in the 2000s. In 2005, the EU established new collective target of 0.56 percent of the EU's collective GNI. However, Italian governments did not take these targets seriously.²⁹⁸ While France, the UK, Germany increased their volume of aid in the 2000s, Italy lagged behind these European countries and performed poorly in terms of quality and quantity of aid.²⁹⁹

From 2004 to 2011, the EU increased its ODA/GNI by a tenth of a percentage point, from 0.3 percent to 0.4 percent, equivalent to €17.1 billion. The EU's 2011 ODA/GNI of 0.4 percent in 2011 was much higher than the DAC average (0.3 percent) and that of the US (0.2 percent), Japan (0.17 percent) and Canada (0.31 percent).³⁰⁰

²⁹⁵ Maurizio Carbone, "Italy as a Development Actor: A Tale of Bipartisan Failure", in Maurizio Carbone (ed.), *Italy in the Post-Cold War Order: Adaptation, Bipartisanship, Visibility* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011), p. 109.

²⁹⁶ OECD, "European Union's Development Assistance Committee (DAC)", *OECD Peer Review*, 2012, p. 54. Available on: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/50155818.pdf>.

²⁹⁷ Bagiński, op.cit., p. 38.

²⁹⁸ Carbone, "Italy as a Development Actor" op.cit., p. 109.

²⁹⁹ Carbone, "Italy as a Development Actor" op.cit., p. 110.

³⁰⁰ 2012 DATA Aid Report: Europe's African Promise, p.18, available at <http://one-org.s3.amazonaws.com>

Despite the fact that EU member states delivered \$69.7 billion of ODA in 2010, they failed to achieve 2010 target. They have to allocate more resources to reach a collective ODA/GNI ratio of 0.7 percent by 2015. The Commission conceives this target as a challenge since the majority of member states are planning to cut down their aid budget as a result of financial crisis.³⁰¹

According to the OECD DAC statistics, 16 of the 27 Member States decreased their aid. Member States will have to double their aid levels to meet their 0,7 per cent GNI/ODA level. According to preliminary DAC data on 2012, Denmark, France, Greece, Spain and the Netherlands provided less development assistance to sub-Saharan African in 2012 compared to 2004. In fact, fourteen of the EU-15 cut their aid to sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, Finland, Ireland and Britain declined their aid up to 10 per cent, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden cut their aid between 10 to 20 percent compared to 2011. Belgium, France, Greece, Portugal reduced their aid by more than 20 per cent. Spain reduced its aid to the highest per cent at 60 per cent. Only Luxembourg increased its aid level among the EU 15 from 2011 to 2012.

It is apparent that ODA targets for the attainment of the MDGs will not be reached. Except for few EU member states, the EU overall is unlikely to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA by 2015. The EU's role is crucial in terms of translating global goals into EU-level targets and promoting collective action at the EU level. The EU's commitment to the MDGs continues with the post-2015 agenda on the MDGs. The EU is playing a leading role in formation of a new global framework for development that updates the MDGs with an emphasis on issues of inclusiveness, sustainability, employment and inequality.³⁰²

The MDGs enabled delivery of development aid with a measurable targets and indicators. The MDGs have been largely met in terms of access of basic health, education and water. The most progress has been seen in the target of reduction of extreme poverty, gender equality in primary school and

³⁰¹ OECD, "European Union' Development Assistance Committee (DAC)", op.cit., p. 18.

³⁰² European Union, European Report on Development, Development in a Changing World: Elements for a Post-2015 Global Agenda Report, (Brussels: 2013), p.197. Available at www.erd-report.eu.

access to water.³⁰³ However, the MDGs overlooked the root causes of poverty and engaged with the symptoms of poverty. They do not pay sufficient attention to non-income aspects of development such as inequality, human rights, transparency, and vulnerability.³⁰⁴ As the deadline for the MDGs is approaching, the review of the MDGs is on the agenda for post-2015 period. The UN Development Group guided by the High Level Panel is working on a new global agreement which would be more inclusive, equitable and sustainable.³⁰⁵

4.4 The EU's Search for Integrated Development Policy: Aid Effectiveness Agenda and Division of Labour

Aid effectiveness issue draws attention to the quality of aid and is concerned with the improvement of the collective outcomes of aid. Aid efficiency is concerned with avoiding unnecessary costs for donors or recipients. The proliferation of aid donors and fragmentation of development aid weaken the impact of development aid.³⁰⁶ The Global initiatives for aid effectiveness have been promoted by the OECD/DAC, the World Bank and the IMF since the 1990s. Aid effectiveness is different from development effectiveness. Aid effectiveness refers to “arrangement for the planning, management and deployment of aid that is efficient reduces transaction costs and is targeted towards development outcomes including poverty reduction.”³⁰⁷ On the other side, development effectiveness refers to development outcomes and defined as “the achievement of sustainable development results related to

³⁰³ Jack Mangala, “Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: Significance and Implications”, in Jack Mangala (ed.), *Africa and the European Union: A Strategic Partnership* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 10.

³⁰⁴ Alexei Jones, “Report on the Consultation Process on “Towards a Post-2015 Development Framework”, Final Report, (November 2012). p. 6.

³⁰⁵ Mangala, op.cit., p. 6.

³⁰⁶ Maxwell, et.al., op.cit., p. 5.

³⁰⁷ Elliott D. Stern et.al., Thematic Study on the Paris Declaration, Aid Effectiveness and Development Effectiveness (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, November 2008). Available at http://www.managingforimpact.org/sites/default/files/resource/stern_2008.pdf.

the MDGs that have country level impacts that have discernible effects on the lives of the poor”.³⁰⁸

The UN Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development in 2002 was attended by 50 states and provided the widespread consensus on “more and effective aid” among bilateral and multilateral donors for the achievement of the MDGs. In addition to increase of aid volumes, the improvement of aid effectiveness and exploration of new sources of development finance were accepted as main steps for new aid agenda.³⁰⁹


Donors decided to take initiatives for the reduction of huge costs of proliferation of aid donors and detrimental effect of fragmentation at the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey 2002. In the 2000s, the proliferation of donors with their own priorities and practices has given rise to the problem of aid coordination and aid effectiveness. Uncoordinated aid is seen as one of the reasons for the slow progress in African development. Fragmentation of aid agencies increases administrative and financial costs of delivering aid. The new international aid agenda focused on aid efficiency with a central role of coordination. The OECD arranged four High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness to set up international principles of aid coordination. The Paris Declaration of 2005 became a turning point for aid harmonisation, alignment and management of aid. It was accepted by over 100 donors and developing countries in 2005. Paris declaration outlined 50 specific commitments which can be classified under five principles for improvement of quality of aid: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, management for results and mutual accountability. The Paris Declaration set an action-orientated roadmap for the quality of aid and its impact on development aid. In December 2011, the Fourth High Level Forum took place in Busan, which assessed the progress and outlined new framework for meeting the MDGs.³¹⁰

³⁰⁸ Ibid.,p 21.

³⁰⁹ George Mavrotas and Espen Villanger, “Multilateral Aid Agencies and Strategic Donor Behaviour”, *UNU-Wider Discussion Paper No. 2*, 2006, pp. 1-2.

³¹⁰ Sarah Delputte, and Fredrik Söderbaum, “European Aid Coordination in Africa: Is the Commission Calling the Tune”, in Stefan Gänzle, Sven Grimm and Davina Makhan (eds.), *The*

Table 9 Development Results (Source: OECD DAC The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness)



Harmonisation principle of the Paris Declaration aimed at cooperation among donors for the improvement of aid delivery. It is mainly concerned with harmonisation of rules and procedures and the use of new instruments for pooling resources such as budget support. It also points out the importance of division of labour in which donors concentrated their aid in sectors and countries where they have comparative advantage.³¹¹

The global context of donor coordination and aid effectiveness influence the EU's development cooperation policy. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU aspired to improve coordination in development policy area. The debate on donor coordination at global level provided the EU with opportunity to strengthen its coordination role and presented itself as a responsible global actor for leading new aid agenda. The EU wants to coordinate member states' aid and takes a leading role in the implementation of the Paris Agenda.³¹² Notwithstanding the EU's involvement of aid delivery since the early days of integration, the EU is a late-comer to aid effectiveness debate. The EU overlooked issues of aid quality and effectiveness until the mid-1990s. The EU member states did not engage with aid issues effectively except for making

European Union and Global Development: An 'Enlightened Superpower' in the Making? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 39.

³¹¹ Ibid., p. 39.

³¹² Ibid., p. 40.

contributions to the EDF. Thus, the EU punched below its weight in development cooperation policy.³¹³ According to Council Conclusions, the EU's performance in the implementation of Paris Aid Commitments is above global average. Despite the EU's progress in aid effectiveness principles, the EU advances unevenly with regard to five main aid principles. The EU is successful in the implementation of ownership principle. The EU's progress in alignment and harmonisation is uneven. The least progress is seen in result-management principle.³¹⁴

Although the Commission regards itself as a donor-committed to the implementation of global commitments on aid effectiveness, the Commission's role as a coordinator is not strong. The European Commission is not seen as a feasible aid coordination platform. The European Commission is largely seen as a donor, rather than aid coordination platform in the non-EU world by member states. Furthermore, EU delegations in the field are far from functioning as a driver of coordination in the field.³¹⁵

In spite of the limitations of Commissions in aid effectiveness issue, the Commission follows global initiatives on aid effectiveness and applies them at the EU level for delivering "more aid, better aid and faster aid." The increased attention to aid effectiveness and aid coordination at the global level provided an opportunity and a conducive environment for deepening and strengthening of the EU's coordination role and promoting itself as a responsible actor for taking active role in the new aid agenda.³¹⁶ In this regard, The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour in Development Policy was adopted in 2007 to improve coordination and harmonisation of Member States' aid policies. Together with the European Consensus, the Division of

³¹³ Carbone, "The European Union, Good Governance and Aid Co-ordination", *op.cit.*, p. 18.

³¹⁴ Council of the European Union, "EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November – 1 December 2011)", Council conclusions, (3124th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Development Council meeting, Brussels, 14 November 2011), pp. 3-6.

³¹⁵ Delputte, and Söderbaum, *op.cit.*, p. 41.

³¹⁶ Delputte, and Söderbaum, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

Labour aims at the reduction of aid fragmentation and improvement of the impact of development policy.³¹⁷

The division of labour between donors implies the coordination of donors in the same country and in the same sectors. Concentration of too many donors in the same country or same sectors give rise to problems of aid ineffectiveness. As a result, while some countries receive high amount of development aid compared to their national income, others cannot sustain live of its citizens. Division of Labour in development policy implies the reduction of the number of donors involved in the same activities. Hence, each donor should deliver aid in countries or sectors in which it has particular strengths rather than delivering aid in new areas. While the EU as a donor is capable of providing different kinds of aid in many different places of the world, the EU encourages its member states to specialise in a coordinated way on specific countries, themes and sectors.³¹⁸ However, division of labour does not mean less aid. It means maximum coordination of development efforts for prevention of duplication and fragmentation of aid. It is much more than aid harmonisation and alignment. It limits the number of donors per country, per sector. It recommends the concentration of aid activities in sectors or countries where donors have comparative advantage in comparison with other sectors.³¹⁹

The EU's Code of Conduct is underpinned by the reduction of aid fragmentation and duplication of aid between EU member states and outlines operational but voluntary principles of complementarity among EU donors. It operationalizes principles and objectives of the European Consensus and puts forward the concentration of EU member states aid delivery in a limited number of countries in coordination with other member states. Hence, the Code of Conduct seeks to allocate enough aid funding to aid orphans and fragile states. While some countries of developing world receive lots of aid from international donors, the other parts cannot take aid flow to meet their needs. While the

³¹⁷ Delputte, and Söderbaum, op.cit., p. 37.

³¹⁸ Holger Mürle, *Towards a Division of Labour in European Development Cooperation: Operational Option*, (Bonn: German Development Institute), p. 1.

³¹⁹ 2008 OECD DAC Multilateral Aid, OECD, September 2008, p. 74.

former countries are called as aid darlings such as Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal and Vietnam, the latter is named as aid orphans and made up of fragile states such as Guinea, Uzbekistan and Yemen.³²⁰ The division of labour in aid delivery would prevent the waste of aid funds and enable balanced distribution of aid among developing countries regardless of colonial past or strategic importance.³²¹

Although it is a political agreement among member states, it is a voluntary and dynamic document open to all other donors. The Code of Conduct explains main guidelines for the “in-country complementarity”, “cross-country complementarity” and “cross-sector complementarity”. For the improvement of effectiveness of the EU development policy, the Code of Conduct emphasized the “in-country complementarity” and “cross-country complementarity” of member states. Thus, the EU seeks to play a coordination role by proposing a division of labour among member states such as the reduction of number of partner countries with coordination of the EU.³²²

“Cross-country complementarity” refers to agreement of EU member states on selection of their geographical focus and reduction of priority countries. Hence, it is expected that member states allocate their resources to correct the imbalance between “aid darlings” and “aid orphans”. The EU assumes active role in strategic planning of member states’ aid with regard to geographic concentration and country priorities. While the EU respects member states’ decisions on allocation of their aid, the EU seeks to play a facilitator role in cross-country complementarity. “In-country complementarity” is concerned with concentration of member states’ activities on no more than three sectors per country except for budget support and resources to civil society. In case of member states’ involvement in more than three sectors, member states must shift their resources to budget support. Hence, the number of active donors per

³²⁰ Nils-Sjard Schulz, *International Division of Labour: A Test Case for the Partnership Paradigm*, (Spain: FRIDE Working Paper, No. 79, 2009), p. 7.

³²¹ Carbone, “The European Union, Good Governance and Aid Co-ordination”, op.cit., p. 20.

³²² OECD, “European Union’ Development Assistance Committee (DAC)”, op.cit., p. 77.

sectors should be between three and five. Furthermore, “a lead donor” would be in charge of coordination for each priority sector.³²³

The Code of Conduct demanded member states to focus on maximum three sectors per country; and a maximum of five EU donors per sector. Subsequent to the Code of Conduct, the EU implements the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour and Complementarity.³²⁴ While division of Labour is related to the EU’s coordination; the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour is concerned with the best Code of Conduct envisaging thematic and sectoral division of labour in which each sector is steered by one or more “lead donor”.³²⁵

Being “leading donor” has the advantage of more visibility and opportunity for agenda setting, and disadvantage of a severe administrative burden. Thus, leading donorship requires technical and human capacities. In this sense, bigger donors are able to take the leading role in more strategic sectors, it is not easy for small donors to hold leading donor role in strategic sectors. The disadvantage of leading donor role is that it constrains agency’s space for promoting its own policies since it has to moderate other donor’s approaches and find a common denominator.³²⁶ Another advantage is that the leading donor role constrains agency’s space for promoting its own policies since a leading donor has to moderate other donors’ approaches and find a common denominator.³²⁷

As a donor, the European Commission is sometimes given a leading role, yet it is not seen as an effective leading donor. Compared to the World Bank as a leading agency, the Commission’s financial, intellectual and human resources are quite limited. It still suffers from administrative delays and

³²³ Maurizio Carbone, “Desperately Seeking Coherence: Aid and Security in the Development Policy of the EU” *European Report on Development Report*, 2009, pp. 12-13.

³²⁴ Delputte, and Söderbaum, op.cit., p. 40.

³²⁵ Delputte, and Söderbaum, op.cit., p. 41.

³²⁶ Maxwell, et.al., op.cit., p. 42.

³²⁷ Delputte, and Söderbaum, op.cit., p. 42.

hierarchy. It is not flexible enough to implement new ideas and policies.³²⁸ The Commission has also certain limitations regarding the leadership role.³²⁹ Unlike the Nordic Plus donors, the Commission suffers from problems of bureaucracy and inflexibility; problems in joint programming and joint analysis. The Commission promotes new ideas, but cannot play an “engine role”.³³⁰ The division of labour has not been supported by all EU member states, Like minded countries represented by Nordic Plus group , consisting of Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), as well as the Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands, cooperate with each other and started to concentrate aid in fewer countries. As a group they are strong supportive of aid division of labour and have a Joint Action Plan on Harmonisation and Alignment.³³¹ For instance, Sweden reduced its partner countries and concentrated on certain regions and with specific issues. Recently, Sweden decided to deliver aid to 33 countries with a focus on concentration on Africa and Eastern Europe and sectors of peace and security in conflict and post-conflict situations and promotion of democracy and human rights.³³²

On the other side, there are some good examples of division of labour among EU Member States and the Commission. Division of labour is made through delegated cooperation or co-financing. For example, the Commission delegated to €5,8 million to German Organisation for Technical Cooperation to reform justice sector in Zambia.³³³ Likewise, EU Delegations cooperate with member states aid agencies such as the French Development Agency and the Portuguese Institute for Development Agency. The Commission also hold a facilitator role for Fast Track Initiative on the Division of Labour in Mali,

³²⁸ Delputte, and Söderbaum, op.cit., p. 42.

³²⁹ Delputte, and Söderbaum, op.cit., p. 42.

³³⁰ Delputte, and Söderbaum, op.cit., p. 43.

³³¹ Nils-Sjard Schulz,op.cit. p. 1.

³³² Nils-Sjard Schulz, op.cit, p.11.

³³³ European Commission, “Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Annual Report 2010 on the European Union’s Development and External Assistance Policies and their Implementation in 2009”, (COM (2010) 335 final), p. 25.

Tanzania, Ethiopia and Mozambique. Mali is accepted as a pilot country under the Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour. The Union plays a central role in improving the division of labour among donors in Tanzania.³³⁴

The main obstacle for the advance of a division of labour is the issue of a national interest. Most of the time, countries allocate aid for the pursuit of commercial and geostrategic interests which are disadvantage of other countries. Competitive interests of donors prevent the pursuit of shared goals. A system of coordination can be possible with the recognition of member states' collective interests in poverty reduction; otherwise, the pursuit of individual national interests undermines collective aid efforts.³³⁵ Hence, The EU's role as a coordinating mechanism does not function well in Africa. Donors prefer to pursue individual programs in isolation from other donors, which results in a multitude of overlapping and competing region building programs.³³⁶

Despite the EU's efforts for increased donor coordination in Africa, competing donor identities prevent coordination at the EU level. The European Commission makes the use of development policy as an instrument of EU's global actorness and the Commission as a collective and global actor seeks to represent both the EU as an institution and the member states. However, most of the EU member states consider development cooperation as part of their sovereignty. Consequently, member states are unwilling to build a common development policy since it would challenge their identity as a donor. Additionally, the Commission's heavy bureaucracy and technocratic role is another factor hampering donor coordination at the EU level.³³⁷ In the field, EU delegations are not effective in promoting EU coordination, member state do not provide much support for the Commission in terms of facilitating more coordination. With the establishment of the EEAS, it is expected that EU

³³⁴ Ibid, p.57

³³⁵ Maxwell, et.al., op.cit., p. 18.

³³⁶ Fredrik Söderbaum, and Patrik Stalgren, "The EU and the Global South", in Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stalgren (eds.), *The European Union and the Global South* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 10.

³³⁷ Delputte, and Söderbaum, op.cit., pp. 53-54.

delegations will play more strategic and political role in donor coordination in the field.³³⁸

As a result, the progress on the division of labour is slow due to the fact that “everybody wants to coordinate but no one wants to be coordinated” and the desire to ‘plant a flag’ sometimes prevents progress. For this reason, the gap between ‘aid darlings’ and ‘aid orphans’ cannot be reduced.³³⁹ Despite the EU’s efforts for coordination and effectiveness, member states give priority to their bilateral relationships and the autonomy of their programmes. They attach great importance to ensuring the visibility of their support both for recipients and for their domestic audiences.³⁴⁰ EU institutions’ ability to play a leading role in aid coordination and effectiveness is constrained by the attitudes of EU member states. Member states prefer to follow their own policy objectives in development cooperation policy with different objectives. Significant differences exist between Northern and Southern members of the Union and the EU Delegations are not capable of providing coordination in the field. Hence, little progress is made in implementation of the division labour on the ground. There is still a gap between the EU’s commitments on paper and implementation in the field.³⁴¹

According to “European Commission’s Study on Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach”, it is estimated that the annual cost of aid ineffectiveness is around €5 to €7 billion. The progress in aid effectiveness is slow at the EU level since member states prefer to remain in politically attractive sectors and coordination is regarded as time-consuming effort undermining the international visibility of donor country.³⁴² Consequently, the EU is able to coordinate only 33 percent of EU donors and EC missions while the EU target is 66 percent.³⁴³

³³⁸ Delputte, and Söderbaum, op.cit., p. 55.

³³⁹ Delputte, and Söderbaum, op.cit,p.41.

³⁴⁰ Delputte, and Söderbaum, op.cit,p.43.

³⁴¹ Delputte, and Söderbaum,op.cit.,p.45.

³⁴² Maxwell, et.al., op.cit., p. 31.

In this context, the EU has put joint programming of development aid as an important stepping stone for the enhancement of division of labour among EU donors in recent years. Joint programming enables the EU and member states to engage partner countries coherently on the basis of a shared set of priorities. The coordination of development cooperation policies of the EU and member states is a challenging task since development cooperation is an area of shared parallel competence.³⁴⁴

The EU's recent effort for joint programming of development aid is an ambitious aid modality. It is based on the idea that better coordination between the EU institutions and member states would reduce duplication and fragmentation of aid. Joint programming aims at increasing effectiveness. As well as its practical benefits, joint programming contributes a more coherent and coordinated EU external action in the post-Lisbon process. A Joint programming process takes place with the participation of the European Commission, the EEAS and EU member states. These actors come together and determine a development strategy for a particular partner country and draft a joint country strategy document to replace bilateral country strategies. The division of labour of sectors among donors is taken into account in this process.³⁴⁵

Joint programming in development was tried in Haiti and South Sudan in recent years. In early 2012, joint programming was initiated in five countries, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Laos and Rwanda. The selection of countries for joint programming is made on the basis of the reports of EU Heads of Missions and a joint feasibility assessment by EU delegations and member states.³⁴⁶

³⁴³ Maxwell, et.al., op.cit., p. 32.

³⁴⁴ Greta Galeazzi, Damien Helly and Florian Kratke, *"All for One or Free-for-All? Early Experiences in EU Joint Programming"*, ECDPM Briefing Note No.50, May 2013, p. 2.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

4.5 The Modernisation of EU's Development Policy: Agenda for Change

The Communication on “Increasing the Impact of EU Development Cooperation- An Agenda for Change” was presented by the Commission in October 2011 and accepted by the Foreign Affairs Council in May 2012. Agenda for Change aimed to increase the impact and effectiveness of EU development policy. It put forward a “two-pillared” approach. The first pillar emphasizes the promotion of the EU's values such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. The second pillar gives weight sustainable and inclusive growth to reduce poverty reduction by supporting social inclusion and human development, a decent work, sustainable agriculture, energy supply and access to energy. Hence, EU development policy is moving toward economic growth, job creation and the promotion of good governance. The focus on inclusive and sustainable growth underlines the importance of catalysing jobs and growth as a means for poverty reduction.³⁴⁷

In addition to these priorities, Agenda for Change introduced a differentiated approach in aid allocations. The Union decided to deliver aid to countries that are most in need and where the EU can have greatest impact. As a consequence of the need for differentiation of partner countries, the European Commission is planning to withdraw its bilateral development aid programs from 19 developing countries that have reached upper-middle income status or produces 1 per cent of global GNI including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Thailand, Venezuela, Uruguay.³⁴⁸ Hence, advanced developing countries which also deliver aid will receive less or no aid. Yet, the EU will increase its support for the poorest and most vulnerable countries. Hence, aid will be allocated on the basis of needs including situations of fragility. According to 2010 OECD figures, the EU institutions delivered \$4,9 billion aid to middle income countries and \$4,6 billion aid to the LDCs. The middle income

³⁴⁷ European Commission, Annual Report on the European Union's Development and External Assistance Policies and their Implementation in 2012 (Belgium, December 2013), p. 26.

³⁴⁸ Svea Koch, *From Poverty Reduction to Mutual Interests? The Debate on Differentiation in EU Development Policy*, (Bonn: DIE Papers, 2012), p. 2.

countries were given slightly more grants than the LDCs. The differentiated aid approach envisages tailor-made strategies in aid delivery by taking account of specific needs, capacities and commitments and performance of countries. Therefore, the EU will withdraw its bilateral cooperation programme from some of middle income countries and shift these resources to the countries that are most in need of aid.³⁴⁹

Complementary to the Agenda for Change, the Commission issued a communication on “The Future Approach to EU budget support to Third Countries” which strengthens the use of budget support for the EU’s development policy. Budget support is an aid funding to governments that is not allocated for specific projects or expenditure items, thereby diverging from imposed conditionality of the structural adjustment era. It is distributed through the government’s own financial management system and is specifically intended to support countries’ poverty reduction strategies.³⁵⁰ The aim of provision of budget support is to increase aid effectiveness by fostering country ownership and domestic accountability with the ultimate goal of poverty reduction.³⁵¹ The Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness (2005), the European Consensus on Development (2006) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) have clearly driven the shift towards budget support by directing donors to channel aid through recipient country systems. The main reason behind donor’s turn to budget support is that it enables donors to increase aid delivery, thereby meeting disbursement rates, without a need for an enlargement of their own administrative operations, thus keeping their costs down. This motivation is related with donors’ institutional dynamics rather than poverty reduction.

Budget support, which is granted for a three year period, is preferred by the Commission as aid modality where conditions allow. Member states’ have different views about budget support. While proponents of budget support conceives it as a means for ownership, effectiveness and efficiency; opponents

³⁴⁹ OECD, “European Union’ Development Assistance Committee (DAC)”, op.cit., p. 19.

³⁵⁰ Raquel C. Alvarez, “The Rise of Budget Support in European Development Cooperation: A False Panacea”, *FRIDE Policy Brief* (No. 31, January 2010).

³⁵¹ Ibid.

are sceptic owing to its potential for misuse and misappropriation of development funds, concentration of power in finance ministers and thus marginalisation of them from policy debates.³⁵²

The Commission gives priority to budget support for the achievement of the MDGs. Budget support is useful for improvement of aid effectiveness since it promotes country ownership and alignment of development aid with national priorities. The employment of budget support depends on the existence of appropriate environment. Budget support means allocation of aid directly to the budget of partner countries.³⁵³ Since the 2000, the European Commission has been using general budget support for sub-Saharan African states. It was envisaged that 44 percent of €13.5 billion allocated to the region under the tenth EDF (2008–2013) would be given as a budget support in 2008. The European Commission endorsed budget support as an aid modality since budget support is an effective instrument for the promotion of Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness such as ownership, alignment, harmonisation, mutual accountability and managing for results.³⁵⁴ Commission delivers budget support either a direct support for general budget or sector specific budget support to assist recipient country to advance in a given sector. The EU provides budget support to some fragile states in post-crisis or post-conflict situations to facilitate stabilisation and prevent economic and political deterioration.³⁵⁵

Budget support provides resources to raise funding for national strategies and addressing poverty reduction, or economic and social reform, which partners themselves identify. General Budget Support, in which funds are transferred without being allocated to pre-identified expenses, supports overall strategy of partner countries and is intended to translate into concrete results at

³⁵² Maxwell, et.al., op.cit., p. 32.

³⁵³ Interview with an EU Member State Diplomat.

³⁵⁴ Mirjam Van Reisen, “The EU’s contribution to the Millennium Development Goals”, op.cit., p. 19.

³⁵⁵ European Commission, “Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Annual Report 2010 on the European Union’s Development and External Assistance Policies and their Implementation in 2009”, op.cit., p. 7.

the macroeconomic level.³⁵⁶ It is given to countries where the EU's support plays a significant role such as poorest African countries, or where the European Commission has an opportunity to discuss with the government on the multiple faces of its development and economic reform policies.³⁵⁷

However, it is so early to ascertain the success of the budget support. Nevertheless, recent evaluations indicate that budget support's potential to alleviate the poverty may be amplified. In many least developed African countries it may do more harm than good through subsidizing and reinforcing bad governance,³⁵⁸ Member states have different opinions regarding to budget support and the relevance of conditionality. While the Commission favours budget support as a preferred aid modality on the basis of boosting ownership, effectiveness and efficiency, all member states do not agree with Commission view. For some member states, budget support has potential to misuse and misappropriation of development funds and provides concentration of power in finance ministries. Similarly, most of member states are sceptical towards conditionality since recipients accept conditionalities just for receiving aid.³⁵⁹

4.6 Conclusion

The change in EU's multilateral EU development policy is concerned with the Union's efforts for common vision of development, shared goals, harmonization of aid policies at the level. It is centred on the interaction between the EU institutions and Member States on development policy. The Commission tries to coordinate divergent policies of EU member states to strengthen aid effectiveness at the EU level. European Consensus on

³⁵⁶ European Commission, "Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Annual Report 2010 on the European Union's Development and External Assistance Policies and their Implementation in 2009", op.cit., p. 5

³⁵⁷ European Commission, "Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Annual Report 2010 on the European Union's Development and External Assistance Policies and their Implementation in 2009", op.cit., p. 5.

³⁵⁸ Alvarez, op.cit.

³⁵⁹ Maxwell, et.al., op.cit., p. 32.

Development of 2005 and Code of Conduct on Division of Labour are main instruments of the EU for more coordinated and effective aid. Alongside these landmark EU documents, the MDGs and Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness provided the Commission with the opportunity to increase the effectiveness and impact of EU development policy. Although division of labour and joint programming in development policy are in their early stages, they are significant stepping stones for a more integrated and coordinated EU development policy.

CHAPTER 5

CHANGE IN THE EU'S BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: CHANGE FROM ORIGINALITY TO UNIFORMITY?


This chapter examines EU's bilateral development policy change towards sub-Saharan Africa by looking at changes in political, trade and aid aspects of relationship. In the first part of the chapter, the evolution of European-sub-Saharan African relations is briefly described. In the second part, changes in political aspects of development policy are analyzed on the basis of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and its reviews. Changes in trade aspects of relations cover the EU's shift to reciprocal trade preferences under EPAs. Changes in aid management are discussed with a focus on the EDF. The final part of chapter is devoted to the securitisation of development policy and Joint EU-Africa Strategy.

5.1 The Evolution of EU's Donor Role towards sub-Saharan Africa

European engagement with sub-Saharan Africa goes back to colonial occupation of Africa by major European powers during the late 19th century. King Leopold of Belgium started the European race for colonisation of Africa called as "scramble for Africa". European powers dominated and colonized different parts of Africa and established their own colonial rule. Britain colonized Africa from Ghana to South Africa until the 1914. British colonialism reached to Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe. British colonialism was based on indirect rule by which local rulers acted as representatives of British Empire. France occupied Western Coast of Africa including Senegal, Mali, and Ivory Coast and pursued assimilationist colonial rule by the enforcement of direct rule. France's colonial rule imposed French culture, language and education through "mission civilisatrice". Portugal preferred to exploitation of resources in Angola and Mozambique under its colonial rule. Belgium focused on privatisation of extracted raw materials under its colonial rule in Rwanda and

Burundi. The diversity of colonial patterns gave rise to different patterns of decolonisation process. Consequently, diverse forms of statehood emerged in Africa such as African-socialists or pro-Western regimes from 1960s to 1980s. Nevertheless, most of newly independent African states turned to be undemocratic, single party or military regimes over time.³⁶⁰

Map 3. Colonisation in Africa



However, decolonization process did not alter the peripheral position of African countries in political and economic terms. Sub-Saharan African countries³⁶¹ are still conceived at the periphery or margins of international

³⁶⁰ Stefan Meyer, “The Future of International Political Transformation in African States” in Erik Lundsgaarde (eds.), *Africa Toward 2030: Challenges for Development Policy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). p. 168.

³⁶¹ 48 countries that make up Sub-Saharan Africa are as follows: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, North Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Africa is not included with the countries

politics.³⁶² It has been one of the poorest and least developed regions of the world owing to political and economic problems inherited from colonialism. European dominance, occupation and exploitation colonialism left negative repercussions on the continent.³⁶³ The majority of Sub-Saharan African countries do not have an efficient and cohesive state structure. Unlike Western nation states which are based on positive sovereignty that provides external and internal security for the population of a given country and delivers public goods at least a minimum degree, sub-Saharan African states are mainly characterized by negative sovereignty and suffer from external and internal security problems and the lack of basic public services. Thus, they are conceived as “quasi-states” that lack the empirical statehood. Consequently, sub-Saharan Africa as a region hosts the largest number of fragile states that are divided by ethnic conflicts or inefficient governments.³⁶⁴

Economically, 34 of 48 sub-Saharan African states are categorised as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).³⁶⁵ Despite rich natural resources, three out of every four Africans live in poverty. In terms of economic structure, there are mainly three different kinds of economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Natural-resource-rich economies such as Angola, Nigeria, and Cameroon are faced with transforming the rents from exploitation of mineral resources into sustainable forms of income. Hence, governments have to allocate resource income to investment in different kinds of infrastructure, rather than consumption. Coastal economies are countries that are well positioned to export manufactures to other continents but lack natural resources of its own. Gambia,

of sub-Saharan Africa due to its economic and political differences from sub-Saharan African countries

³⁶² Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen, “Global Politics and Africa – and Africa in International Relations Theory” in Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen (eds.), *Africa and the North: Between Globalization and Marginalization* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), p. 4.


³⁶³ Gerrit Olivier, “From Colonialism to Partnership in Africa-Europe Relations?” *The International Spectator* (Vol. 46, No. 1, 2011), p. 53.

³⁶⁴ Engel and Olsen, op.cit, p. 8.

³⁶⁵ Categorisation of the LDCs is made by the UN on the basis of three criteria: income per capita less than US\$ 900, insufficient human resources and vulnerable economy and a population limit less than 75 million.

Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo comprises main coastal economies of sub-Saharan Africa. Landlocked economies without natural resources are the most vulnerable SSA countries that are in a difficult situation. Overseas trade is difficult owing to high transport costs and trade costs. These countries include Burkina Faso, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Malawi, Sudan, and Uganda. They have neither high rent natural resources nor coastal economies; their growth opportunities are dependent on the growth of their neighbours.³⁶⁶ Apart from economic and security problems, the sub-Saharan African countries are confronted with demographic challenges and environmental problem of climate change. As a consequence of declining fertility and mortality rates, population grows rapidly and it is estimated that one fifth of the world's population- around 2 billion people- would be living in Africa by 2050. This rapid population growth slows down economic and social development in Africa.³⁶⁷

Map 4. Sub-Saharan African Countries (Sudan was divided into North and South Sudan in 2011)



³⁶⁶ United Nations Industrial Development Organization, “Industrialisation, Environment and Millennium Development Goals in Sub-Saharan Africa: The New Frontier in the Fight Against Poverty”, *Industrial Development Report*, Vienna, 2004, pp. 7-14.

³⁶⁷ Erik Lundsgaarde, “The Future of Africa-EU Strategy”, in Jack Mangala (ed.), *Africa and the European Union: A Strategic Partnership* (December 2012), pp. 226-227. Available at: <http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doi/10.1057/9781137269478.0017>

Despite the negative aspect of the Europe-Africa relations in terms of colonialism and dominance, the EU has been benevolent towards the economic and political problems of sub-Saharan African countries. From the view point of the European Commission, "Europe's relationship with Africa is not new. It is deeply rooted in history and has gradually evolved from often painful colonial arrangements into a strong and equal partnership based on common interests, mutual recognition and accountability".³⁶⁸

Sub-Saharan African countries are considered together with a number of island countries in the Caribbean and the Pacific and named as the ACP group in EU geography. These countries are grouped together owing to their colonial relations and common peripheral position in global system. After the establishment of the EEC, they were granted the highest level of preferential access to European common market under the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. In addition to granting privileged market access, Lomé Convention envisaged an inter-regional dialogue with institutions just as a joint parliamentary assembly, regular political dialogue. Lomé was an initial example of European inter-regionalism contained both political and economic elements of cooperation.³⁶⁹ Europe is still the main trading partner of the most of the sub-Saharan African countries. Around 85% of Africa's agricultural exports and 75% of trade of the sub-Saharan African countries are made with European countries. The EU is still Africa's main trading partner whereas Africa accounts for 9 % of EU-27 trade. In addition to intense economic relations, Europe remains main source of development aid to African countries.³⁷⁰

In the new millennium era, development cooperation is located at the centre of the EU's relations with the sub-Saharan African countries. The 60% of the EU's official aid accounts is sent to Africa. The Commission committed to deliver around €12 billion for African countries under the 10th EDF between

³⁶⁸ European Commission, "Communication to the Council and the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, EU-Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development", (COM (2005) 489 final, 2005), p. 2.

³⁶⁹ Olivier, op.cit., p. 54.

³⁷⁰ Ian Taylor, *The International Relations of sub-Saharan Africa* (New York: Continuum Publishing, 2010), p. 98.

2008 and 2013. In addition to the Commission, EU member states delivered € 25.3 billion ODA to African countries in 2011. Hence, the EU provided more than half of the total amount of ODA given to Africa and became one of top donors of Africa alongside the US and the World Bank.³⁷¹ However, The Union has a fragmented approach to Africa on the basis of the division of Africa into two sub-regions: North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. While the EU's relations with North African countries are managed by the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU's relationship with the sub-Saharan African countries is managed by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.³⁷² For the purposes of this thesis, this study will focus on the EU's development aid policy towards the sub-Saharan African countries that is financed by the EDF and managed by the European Commission.

5.2 Change in Political Aspects of the EU's Bilateral Development Policy

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which was signed between 15 members of the EU and 77 ACP countries, constituted main framework of the EU's development policy towards 48 sub-Saharan African countries. As a successor of the Lomé Conventions lasting 25 years, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement signed in 2000 after 18-month negotiations. It was a departure from the EU's past relations with the sub-Saharan African countries. Cotonou brought an institutionalized and hierarchical cooperation on the basis of bilateral economic relations and development assistance. With Cotonou, the EU adopted a global stance and the influence of global aid system was seen explicitly.³⁷³

The Cotonou Agreement brought radical changes to the most of the distinctive features of EU's development cooperation policy towards the sub-

³⁷¹ European Commission, Key facts on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 23 April 2013, MEMO/13/367.

³⁷² Olivier, op.cit., p. 57.

³⁷³ Mary Farrell, "The European Union and Africa: Partnership, Governance and (Re-)evolving Relations", in Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and David J. Bailey (eds.), *The European Union and Global Governance: A Handbook* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 246.

Saharan African countries. Hence, the transition from Lomé to Cotonou was more than change of names. The Cotonou stipulated a new partnership framework in both political and economic aspects of the development cooperation policy in order to overhaul the EU's development policy towards the sub-Saharan Africa.³⁷⁴

With its 100 articles on objectives, principles and instruments of cooperation, the Cotonou establishes a contractual relationship between the EU and sub-Saharan African countries. Article 1 of the Cotonou defined the objectives of agreement broadly such as the promotion of economic, social and cultural development of the ACP states and contribution to peace and security. Besides, the poverty reduction, sustainable development and gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy are stated as the main pillars of partnership. The linkage between poverty reduction and sustainable development was underlined in many articles. In addition to reduction of poverty and sustainable development of the ACP countries, the Cotonou sought to facilitate the integration of ACP group to global economy. Article 2 put forward the equality of partnership, local ownership, mutual dialogue and the fulfilment of obligations and differentiation of ACP countries and regions as fundamental principles of ACP-EU relations. Unlike Lomé Convention's uniformity approach, differentiation principle paved the way for the division of ACP countries into sub-groups and different regions and thus building of different policies on the basis of national characteristics.³⁷⁵

³⁷⁴ Geert Laporte, "The Cotonou Partnership Agreement: What role in a changing world? Reflections on the future of ACP-EU relations", *ECDPM Policy Management Report 13* (November 2007), p. 19.

³⁷⁵ Holland, "When is Foreign Policy not Foreign Policy?", *op.cit.*, p. 118.

Map 5. The ACP Countries



In stark contrast to Lomé Conventions which concentrated mainly on economic cooperation, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement was structured around a strong political foundation. It stated core values of the EU such as respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law as “essential elements” of partnership, whose violation may lead to the suspension of the partnership. Thus, the rule of law was added as essential elements whereas good governance. Additionally, good governance defined as “the transparent and responsible management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development” in article 9.3 and good governance, transparent and accountable institutions are accepted as a new legal category of “fundamental” elements of partnership. Hence, the Cotonou envisaged a stronger political conditionality in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law and good governance.

The Cotonou’s extension of political conditionality in spite of opposition of ACP states and the suspension of cooperation against serious breach of principles indicated the EU’s close alignment with the international development paradigm.³⁷⁶ The EU’s adaptation to mainstream development paradigm by means of political conditionalities gave rise to the politicisation of EU’s relations with developing world and weakened the post-colonial relations.³⁷⁷ Besides, the performance criterion and the conditionality of good governance led to dissatisfaction among ACP countries since these provisions

³⁷⁶ Brown, “From Uniqueness to Uniformity?” op.cit., p.35.

³⁷⁷ Smith, “The ACP in the European Union’s Network of Regional Relationships”, op.cit., p. 61.

brought uncertainty and hampered the ownership and joint management of aid principle.³⁷⁸

In addition to incorporation of these clauses, the Cotonou Agreement has a separate whole section (Part 1 Title II) devoted to the political aspect of the relationship. The Cotonou broadened the principles of cooperation between the EU and the sub-Saharan African countries. Before the Cotonou, the principles of state-to state relations such as equality and sovereignty were main principles of cooperation. The Cotonou expanded these principles from state-to-state to state-to-civil society and private sector organisations by adding other principles such as participation of civil society, political dialogue, differentiation and regionalisation.³⁷⁹

Furthermore, the Cotonou provided a qualitative change in political aspects of relations. It extended and consolidated the arrangements for political dialogue as a crucial aspect of ACP-EU Relations. Political aspect of development cooperation grew in the 1990s. Unlike previous agreements, the Cotonou made explicit reference to political dialogue as one of the pillars of ACP-EU partnership along with development aid and trade relations. Involvement of civil society actors to development process were another innovation of ACP-EU political dialogue.³⁸⁰ The end of the Cold War and improvements in human rights and democratization influenced political dialogue.³⁸¹

The importance of non-state actors in development process was underlined by Article 4 as such: “...the Parties recognise the complementary role of and potential for contributions by non-state actors to the development processes”. This is another major innovation of the Cotonou Agreement. For the first time, the essential roles of non-state actors were fully recognised and this cooperation was expanded to include civil society, local actors and private

³⁷⁸ Laporte “The Cotonou Partnership Agreement”, op.cit., p. 29.

³⁷⁹ Olufemi Babarinde, and Gerrit Faber, “From Lomé to Cotonou: Business as Usual?”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 9, No. 1, 2004), pp. 36-37.

³⁸⁰ Karin Arts “ Political Dialogue in a ‘New’ Framework”, in Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber (eds), *The European Union and Developing Countries*, (Netherlands: Brill NV, 2005), p. 156.

³⁸¹ Ibid., p. 158.

sector. With the involvement into non-state actors, the EU aspired to construct participatory approach to development.³⁸² The Cotonou reflects a new aid paradigm that attributes new roles to non-state actors and envisages “complex, politicised and multi-actor” development process.³⁸³

With the Cotonou, the EU’s development cooperation policy moved from state-to-state relationship to multi-actor relationship. Non-state actors and local governments are incorporated as complementary to development process. Non-state actors such as private sector, civil society, local and central governments are given opportunities to take part in development process. The involvement of non-state actors in the stages of programming, evaluation and implementation is encouraged as a consequence of participatory democracy. Hence, the Cotonou envisages a comprehensive framework for the development process of sub-Saharan African countries. However, the outcome of political participation of civil society actors is not satisfying.³⁸⁴ However, the adoption of participatory development approach widened the range of the EU’s partners beyond the signatory parties. The weakness of non-state actors in ACP states was compensated by the African Union in the second half of the 2000s. The African Union started to involve in the political dialogue between the EU and sub-Saharan African countries as a regional non-state actor. The EU intensified its relations with the African Union and viewed it as interlocutor. Therefore, the African Union has become main locus of the region-to-region dialogue between Africa and the EU.³⁸⁵

The African Union was set up in 2002 for building peace and development in Africa through integration. As an institution, it has similar

³⁸² Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, “A Global Actor Past its Peak?”, *International Relations* (Vol. 27, No. 3, 2013), p. 122.

³⁸³ Laporte “The Cotonou Partnership Agreement”, op.cit., p. 21.

³⁸⁴ Maurizio, Carbone, “Mainstreaming Non-state Actors: Assessing Participation in EU-Pacific Relations”, in Paul Hoebink (ed.), *European Development Cooperation: In Between the Local and the Global* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), p. 73.

³⁸⁵ Jan Vanheukelom, James Mackie and Jean Bossuyt, “Political Dimensions: Introductory Note”, *ECDPM seminar: The Cotonou Partnership Agreement: What role in a changing world?* (Maastricht, 18-19 December 2006), p. 54.

objectives to the EU. The institutional structure of the African Union also looks like the EU and includes the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Permanent Representatives' Committee, the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice and the African Central Bank. The whole institutionalisation process of the African Union is supported by the ownership of the EU.³⁸⁶ Despite these similarities, the African Union is limited in terms of human resources. Compared to officials of the EU, they are ill-equipped and lack of expertise and experience in many fields. In regard to membership, the African Union shows great variety in terms of needs and priorities. The Members of the African Union have also membership to other sub-regional bodies such as African free trade areas and regional security organisations that compete with the African Union. Hence, the African Union is quite a weak organisation for tackling with problems of the sub-Saharan Africa.³⁸⁷

Another aspect of politicisation of the EU's development policy towards the sub-Saharan Africa is the establishment of a mechanism for consultation mechanisms that can lead to the suspension of aid or implementation of sanctions in cases of serious breaches of the essential or fundamental elements of the agreement with Article 96 and Article 97.³⁸⁸ The suspension of development aid started with the 1990s in an informal way. The decision to freeze aid to Equatorial Guinea was taken by the Commission with the mandate of the Council in 1992. Afterwards, the suspension of cooperation with Nigeria in 1995 was made by means of a CFSP Common Position. The Cotonou Agreement provided mechanisms for the suspension of development aid if partner countries fail to fulfil their obligations arising from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. Hence, the EU seeks to use development aid for promotion of democratic and accountable governments. The lack of democratic norms and values are seen as obstacle for economic and social development. In 2003, the EU partially suspended development aid given to Central African Republic owing to a coup d'état and economic corruption.

³⁸⁶ Daniela Sicurelli, *EU's Africa Policies: Norms, Interests and Impact* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), p. 31.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³⁸⁸ Vanheukelom, Mackie and Bossuyt, *op.cit.*, p. 47.

Togo is another country that has been faced with Article 96 suspension several times as a consequence of a succession of interruptions in the democratic process. Similarly, development aid given to Ivory Coast and Fiji was partially suspended due to the military coups. As seen, the Article 96 was invoked mainly in the cases of the interruption of democratic processes and human rights violations. Nevertheless, the violation of human rights or democratic principles is not sole reason for the suspension of development aid. The suspension of development aid is mainly driven by military coup d'états. Furthermore, the EU's sanctions towards developing countries are criticized for being inconsistent. The former colonial powers France and Britain have tendency to protect their former colonies from aid cut-offs. Hence, the EU does not invoke Article 96 in every case of the violation of human rights and democracy.³⁸⁹

On the contrary, the EU interprets Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement in the sub-Saharan Africa narrowly and applied the Article 96 procedure in cases of dramatic regression from the status quo such as flawed elections as seen Ivory Coast in 2001, Togo and Guinea in 2003 or a coup d'état such as Mauritania in 2005, 2008; Guinea in 2008, Madagascar in 2009. The EU prefers to use Article 96 as a last resort.³⁹⁰In addition to political conditionality, good governance which is inspired from the World Bank development agenda became another aspect of the EU's changing development cooperation policy. The EU's financial aid for good governance is concerned with better implementation of programs rather than democratization of government.³⁹¹

Changes in political aspect of the EU's development policy led to the redefinition of political principles, expansion of actors of cooperation relationship and extension of political conditionality of the EU. Although these changes reflect the normative and value-driven dimension of the Union's

³⁸⁹ Clara Portela, *European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do They Work?* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010).

³⁹⁰ Karen Del Biondo, "Democracy Promotion Meets Development Cooperation: The EU as a Promoter of Democratic Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa", *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 16, No. 5, 2011), p. 669.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 671.

development cooperation policy, they put the Union's development cooperation policy in closer conformity multilateral aid agencies at the global level.

5.3 Change in Economic Aspects of Relations

Economic aspects of the EU's aid relationship with sub-Saharan Africa are centred on non-reciprocal trade concessions. The EU has been using trade as a means for economic growth since the mid-1970s. The Union granted sub-Saharan African countries non-reciprocal preferential access for many goods except for some agricultural products until 2000s. The Cotonou altered trade aspect of development policy significantly.

Globalisation changed the EU's position in world economy in the 1990s. The Union's relations with the rest of the world increased at a higher rate than trade within the EU. The EU's comfortable position in global trade was challenged by growing economic competition in Asia. Hence, the EU needed access to fast-growing markets of Asia to maintain its economic power. The non-reciprocal trade preference given to the sub-Saharan countries did not make any contribution to the EU's global trade. Furthermore, these concessions were seen as burden of post-colonial relations on the EU.³⁹² Therefore, the globalisation and the intensification of interdependencies led the EU to support regional and multilateral approaches for its trade interests and used the WTO as a means for accessing to third world countries' markets.³⁹³ . As a result, the EU gave importance to regional and multilateral approaches by making reciprocal trade agreements at regional level and strengthening its relations with the WTO at global level.³⁹⁴

However, the non-reciprocal preferences given under the Lomé Conventions weakened the EU's negotiating position at the WTO. Furthermore, the EU had to pay large amounts of concessions in other areas for obtaining these preferences. Yet, these non-reciprocal preferences no longer produced the

³⁹² Babarinde and Faber, *op.cit.*, p. 29.

³⁹³ Babarinde and Faber, *op.cit.*, p. 30.

³⁹⁴ Babarinde and Faber, *op.cit.*, p. 31.

expected outcomes and prompted the EU to reconsider most of its trade privileges in the 1990s.³⁹⁵ The failure of Lomé arrangements in terms of growth figures and development indicators and contextual developments led to debates on relevance of non-reciprocal trade concessions. The EU moved to trade liberalisation as a predominant international norm. Furthermore, the DG Trade of European Commission became main supporter of multilateral trade regime and WTO.³⁹⁶

The key event shaping the EU's relations with the WTO was the 'Banana Dispute'. The WTO and the EU confronted with each other owing to dispute of banana exporting from Latin American Countries. In 1999, the WTO ruled against the EU's banana trade regime and stated that European preferential trade regime with the ACP for the export of banana was a violation of non-discrimination rule.³⁹⁷ After the 'Banana Dispute', the EU revised all trade relations with the ACP countries to prevent any further sanctions. The EU decided to shift from preferential to reciprocal trade agreements and the WTO granted Lomé trade regime a waiver until 2007.

Despite the binding nature of WTO law, the wording of WTO provisions allows the EU with broad room for interpretation. In adopting WTO norms, the EU attached importance to regional free trade areas and development cooperation in support of liberalization. WTO's 'Most Favoured Nation' principle is not an obstacle for regional trade agreements between members as long as liberalization includes "substantially all trade" in goods between its members; members of these agreements do not apply trade barriers towards other WTO members. The term "substantially all trade" is open to negotiation.³⁹⁸ However, influence of the WTO on the Cotonou agreement is apparently seen in the Article 34.4 of the Cotonou "economic and trade cooperation shall be implemented in

³⁹⁵ Babarinde and Faber, *op.cit.* p. 33.

³⁹⁶ Ole Elgström, "Partnership in Peril? Images and Strategies in EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations", in Sonia Lucarelli and L. Fioramonti (eds.), *External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 139.

³⁹⁷ Dickson, "The Unimportance of Trade Preferences", *op.cit.*, p. 55.

³⁹⁸ Sicurelli, *op.cit.*, p.74.

full conformity with WTO provisions”.³⁹⁹ Despite the economic rationale of opening up new markets, the EPAs involve much more than trade liberalisation. These agreements impose much conditionality and force for regional integration in conformity with WTO rules.⁴⁰⁰ The EPAs reflect the impact of global trade regime on the EU’s development aid policy. Non-reciprocal duty free entry of ACP products into EU market was criticized for the violation of non-discrimination principle of the WTO. The EU paid a waiver for the non-reciprocal trade preferences for ACP to promote economic growth of ACP countries.

In addition to compliance with world trade regime, the EPAs are also related to the enlargement of the EU and redefinition of relationship with the CEECs. Since the 1990s, the EU gave priority to its immediate neighbourhood and provided financial and non-financial aid for eventual EU membership. Flow of economic assistance from the EU to the CEECs put the ACP countries in a disadvantageous position.

EPAs are new trade arrangements that changed the economic aspects of relations between the EU and sub-Saharan African countries, most of which are categorized as the least developed or low income countries. The EPAs were offered as substitute for the replacement of non-reciprocal preferences. They regulate the opening up of sub-Saharan African countries’ markets to EU products and exporters over a period of up to 12 years. While Lomé Conventions did not differentiate sub-Saharan African countries in terms of economic level, Cotonou envisaged differentiation of countries and emphasized on the LDCs at the apex of the EU’s ‘pyramid of preferences’.⁴⁰²

The EU argued that the EPAs are instruments for development and decided to remove non-reciprocal trade preferences and pushed the ACP states for a series of free trade agreements known as EPAs on the basis of Article Article 36: ‘...the Parties agree to conclude new WTO compatible trading

³⁹⁹ Ole Elgström and Jess Pilegaard, “Imposed Coherence: Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements”, *Journal of European Integration* (Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008), p. 370.

⁴⁰⁰ Farrell, “A Triumph of Realism over Idealism?”, *op.cit.*, p. 266.

⁴⁰² Elgström and Pilegaard, *op.cit.*, p. 369.

arrangements, removing progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade'. Unlike the Lomé, the Cotonou underlined the importance of economic integration of African countries to global economy, and opened the way for the marginalisation of Africa in the global economy.⁴⁰³

From the EU's point of view, EPAs are "trade-induced" development instrument that facilitate the trade between the EU and the ACP regions in export and imports of goods and services. Hence, trade liberalisation, opening up of the ACP markets would lead to transfer of technology and reduction of costs of inputs and thus make them more efficient and competitive in global trade. Hence, the liberalisation would be beneficial for them. Furthermore, EPAs would end marginalization of ACP countries and facilitate their integration to world economy. By liberalizing their markets, the ACP countries will attract more investments and move out of poverty.⁴⁰⁴

Unlike the previous negotiations with the ACP countries that were conducted by DG Development, EPA negotiations were conducted by DG Trade, whose role was expanded to contain all trade related issues at the expense of weakening position of DG Development.⁴⁰⁵ EPA negotiations were regarded as "traditional free trade negotiations" with little interest in development aspects. The behaviour of DG Trade was criticized as being confrontational, mercantilist negotiator that forced ACP countries to open their markets while protecting the EU market.⁴⁰⁶ The EPAs also led to turf wars between DG Trade and DG Agriculture within the Commission owing to the implications of the EPAs for CAP reform.⁴⁰⁷ In spite of divergences within the Commission, the Union endorsed EPAs as development instrument, whose main purpose is the

⁴⁰³ Farrell, "A Triumph of Realism over Idealism?", op.cit., p. 270.

⁴⁰⁴ Sicurelli, op.cit., p. 84.

⁴⁰⁵ Elgström and Pilegaard, op.cit., p. 48.

⁴⁰⁶ Ole Elgström, "From Cotonou to EPA Light: A Troubled Negotiation Process", Gerrit Faber and Jan Orbie (eds.), *Beyond Market Access for Economic Development: EU-Africa Relations in Transition* (London: Routledge, 2009), p.25.

⁴⁰⁷ Gerrit Faber, and Jan Orbie, "Everything but Arms' in the European Union's international trade and aid agenda", *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 47, No. 4, 2009), p. 773.

reduction and then eventually eradication of poverty in line with Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement. Hence, EU discourse makes direct causality between trade liberalization and poverty reduction. Although development and economic growth are interrelated with each other, they are not in a causal relationship as stated by the EU discourse.⁴⁰⁸ In this regard, EPAs are outcome of the Union's adjustment of its development policy to global trade, rather than any real commitment to sustainable development and poverty alleviation. The EU's non-reciprocal trade preferences continued until 2008 with a waiver. Afterwards, the EU offered EPAs to replace non-reciprocal trade concessions to comply with the rules of WTO. The EPA negotiations were scheduled to coincide with the end of WTO waiver regarding to continue Lomé preferences.⁴⁰⁹

Cotonou Agreement removed particular circumstances of the EU-ACP relations and normalised the EU's approach. The EPAs is driven by a desire for greater economic integration and promotion of regional trade liberalisation. Despite the argument for conformity with WTO rules, the EU is not outside of the WTO framework, the EU has a role in shaping WTO rules.⁴¹⁰

In spite of the fact that the EU inserted its values such as free trade, development, regional integration and democracy to EPA negotiations, the EU understands of these values is specific and exclusive. Development is identified with and associated with economic growth that is driven by trade liberalization and regional integration.⁴¹¹ Besides, the liberalisation of ACP economies has not been backed sufficiently by development assistance projects. The EU overlooked development demands of African counterparts and constrained EU market access for African products, thus leaving African economies in a disadvantaged position.⁴¹²

⁴⁰⁸ Linda Sheahan, et.al., "Benign Partner or Benign Master? Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations between the European Union and the Pacific Islands", *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 15, No. 3, 2010), p. 360.

⁴⁰⁹ Flint, "Trade, Poverty and the Environment", op.cit., p. 145.

⁴¹⁰ Stephen R. Hurt, "Understanding EU Development Policy: history, global context and self-interest?", *Third World Quarterly* (Vol. 31, No. 1, 2010), p. 164.

⁴¹¹ Sheahan, et.al., op.cit., p. 365.

According to Cotonou Agreement, it was expected that EPAs negotiations would start in September 2002 and end December 2007. African countries' dependence on European market pushed them to trade liberalisation and start EPA negotiations. With its long-standing trade-negotiation capacity, the EU is able to impose its conditions to weaken African states.⁴¹³ Lomé was criticized for being exploitative and asymmetrical relationship that strengthened old dependencies. In fact, EPAs have heavier conditions and reflect the EU's asymmetrical use of power for building regional economic integration to pursue trade interests.⁴¹⁴

EPA negotiations divided member states into two main camps that are proponents of either "free trade" or "like-minded countries". The different priorities of member states resulted in an internal debate that was at least partly transparent to outsiders.⁴¹⁵ While France, Belgium, Italy and many NGOs as representatives of regional development policy defended the status quo and the integrity of the ACP groupings, Germany put pressure for the compatibility of development policy for the WTO. Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK advocated poverty-centred development policy and stressed upon the social development.⁴¹⁶ Despite the Community's exclusive competence in the EPA negotiations, the UK and Denmark together with like-minded countries tried to influence the Commission and recommended to take non-mercantilist approach.⁴¹⁷ Due to the enormous pressures on both the EU and ACP side, "EPAs light" or "interim EPAs" were made instead of full EPAs. These EPAs light agreements covered goods and market access and leave sensitive issues

⁴¹² Daniela Sicurelli, "Regional Partners? Perceptions and Criticism at the African Union", in Daniela Sicurelli and Lorenzo Fioramonti (eds), *External Perceptions of the EU as a Global Actor*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), p.182.

⁴¹³ Mary Farrell, "From Lomé to Economic Partnership Agreements in Africa", in Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stalgren (eds.), *The European Union and Global South* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 85.

⁴¹⁴ Farrell, "The European Union and Africa", op.cit., p. 248.

⁴¹⁵ Elgström and Pilegaard, op.cit., p. 376.

⁴¹⁶ Elgström and Pilegaard, op.cit., p. 369.

⁴¹⁷ Ole Elgstrom, "From Cotonou to EPA Light", op.cit., p. 27.

aside.⁴¹⁸ Interim EPAs were criticized for lacking sustainable development issues and overlooking fundamental norms and values that underpin the Cotonou Agreement. These agreements forced ACP states to open their markets to European imports at a rapid pace. On the other side, the costs of ACP exports will rise owing to European sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. These standards are likely function as trade barriers that reduce impact of European market opening under the EPAs. With free trade agreements, the tariffs will be eliminated and import tax revenues will decline.⁴¹⁹

Instead of articulating the European development agenda at a global level and promoting EU's norms and values, the EU put much of its time and energy for coordination of different and competing national positions. The member states do not provide the EU tools and mechanisms for influencing the EU development policy. Thus, the EU cannot offer alternative views of development.⁴²⁰ As a result, inter-institutional dynamics such as the division between DG Development and DG Trade and divisions among member states play a role in policy process of the EPAs as well as external conditions such as compliance with WTO rules.⁴²¹

5.4 Change in Development Aid Management and the EDF

Another change in the economic aspect of the EU's bilateral aid policy towards sub-Saharan Africa is seen in aid management. As a financial instrument of the EU's development policy towards sub-Saharan African Countries, EDF was established by the Treaty of Rome and first started in 1959. It is been funded by voluntary contributions of EU member states and managed by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank. As a non-EU

⁴¹⁸ Ole Elgstrom, "From Cotonou to EPA Light", op.cit., p. 33.

⁴¹⁹ Karin Arts, "A Human Rights-based Approach to the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements: Issues and Implications", Gerrit Faber and Jan Orbie (eds.), *Beyond Market Access for Economic Development: EU-Africa Relations in Transition* (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 281.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., 235.

⁴²¹ Sicurelli, "EU's Africa Policies", op.cit., p. 92.

budget instrument, the EDF is the outcome of intergovernmental agreement of the member states and reflects the comparative interests of member states. The EDF accounts for around 30% of EU's total external aid and is subject to its own financial rules and procedures. Each EDF is concluded for a multi-annual period. In every five years, member states come together and agree on their voluntary contributions to this fund.

The EDF as the EU's main financial instrument for development cooperation between the EU and sub-Saharan African countries is used to finance development projects and programmes of successive Yaoundé Agreements, the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement. It is managed by the Commission and the European Investment Bank for more than fifty years. Unlike the ENPI or DCI, the EDF is not part of the EU budget. The EDF resources come from five-yearly "ad hoc contributions" from the 28 Member States. The representatives of EU Member States meet at intergovernmental level to make their own financial contribution and to oversee its implementation. Hence, the EDF is financed directly by the Member States and operates according to its own financial regulations. The EDF resources have been increasing steadily in line with enlargement of the Union.⁴²²

As a non-EU budget instrument, Member States make their own decision on the level of their EDF contributions. Hence, the EDF reflects voluntary contributions of EU member states, which are often based on historical relations. The Cotonou Agreement brought significant changes in the financial management of the EDF. First of all, it put emphasis on the needs of each beneficiary country in terms of poverty reduction. Secondly, specific measures are designed to prevent serious cases of corruption and to ensure good governance. Thirdly, Annex IV, Article 5 of the Cotonou Agreement stated "... the [European] Community may revise the resource allocation in the light of the current needs and performance of the ACP state concerned" and brought performance system in addition to need-based allocation. Hence, country allocations are started to make on the basis of performance in implementation of reforms, transparency and accountability in the management of resources

⁴²² European Commission DG Development, *European Development Fund in a Few Words*, February 2002, pp. 8-9.

alongside the needs criteria such as per capita income, population size, economic and social development indicators. Fourthly, export earnings and instruments of STABEX and SYSMIN were abolished. In addition to these new rules, EU has adapted to aid selectivity in aid allocation and rolling programming. Aid allocation is made in line with the progress in the implementation of national indication plans. This new principle allows the EU great flexibility in aid allocation. It enables the EU to deliver more aid on the basis of needs and performance, rather than entitlement. In other words, The EU may cut aid in case of unsatisfactory performance.⁴²³ Until Cotonou, financial support for developing countries was made according to commitments. The ACP countries were given specified amount of aid irrespective of their performance. The Cotonou Agreement brought performance system and introduced result-oriented programming.

In aid allocation process, the EU adopted selectivity in aid allocation, which implies supporting sub-Saharan African countries that are committed to the newly defined priorities and penalising countries that do not do that. Similar to World Bank partnership and selectivity principle, the EU imposed stricter conditionality by rewarding policy performance not policy promises.⁴²⁴ The EU's aid selectivity was introduced by rolling programming that allows for greater flexibility by delivering aid on the basis of needs and performance, not entitlement.⁴²⁵ Furthermore, "Rolling" programming provides the delivery of aid according to the progress in the implementation of national indication plans that are reviewed regularly. The aid allocations could be reduced in case of unsatisfactory performance. More aid could be given to better performing countries. National indicative plans put forward more strategic approach with a

⁴²³ Vibeke Rasmussen and Jason Scott, "EDF Management: A view from the field", in Geert Laporte (eds.), *The Cotonou Partnership Agreement: What role in a changing world? Reflections on the future of ACP-EU relations*, *ECDPM Policy Management Report 13*, (November 2007), p. 99.

⁴²⁴ Brown, "From Uniqueness to Uniformity?", *op.cit.*, p. 36.

⁴²⁵ Vibeke and Scott, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

focus on a limited number of sectors. The main aim is to better and effective use of aid.⁴²⁶

Table 10. EU Member States' Contribution to the 11th EDF (2014-2020)
(Source: European Commission Communication on Preparations on Multi-annual framework regarding the EU's Partnership with the ACP countries for the period of 2014-2020, COM(2011), 837 Final, Brussels, 7.12.2011)

EU Member States	11th EDF (2014-2020) Contribution key	11th EDF Contributions in EUR million (2014-2020)
Belgium	3.23 %	1 108.55
Bulgaria	0.22 %	75.38
Czech Republic	0.83 %	284.58
Denmark	1.97 %	674.70
Germany	20.54 %	7 041.44
Estonia	0.08 %	28.82
Ireland	0.95 %	324.16
Greece	1.57 %	539.79
Spain	8.06 %	2 762.43
France	17.83 %	6 110.88
Italy	12.62 %	4 324.33
Cyprus	0.12 %	39.74
Latvia	0.11 %	37.52
Lithuania	0.18 %	61.42
Luxembourg	0.26 %	90.00
Hungary	0.69 %	237.42
Malta	0.04 %	13.44
The Netherlands	4.85 %	1 662.01
Austria	2.36 %	810.04
Poland	2.17 %	743.24
Portugal	1.20 %	410.17
Romania	0.72 %	247.40

⁴²⁶ Laporte "The Cotonou Partnership Agreement", op.cit., p. 27.

Slovenia	0.23 %	80.05
Slovak republic	0.38 %	131.85
Finland	1.51 %	516.47
Sweden	2.94 %	1 006.82
United Kingdom	14.33 %	4 912.95
TOTAL	100.00 %	34 275.6

5.5 2005 Review of the Cotonou and the Move towards Securitization of EU Development Policy

Development aid and trade were major policy instruments of the EU towards Africa until the 1990s. EU member states wanted to keep sub-Saharan Africa under their power with development aid and trade concessions of the Union.⁴²⁷ During the post-Cold war era, international aid community adopted a holistic understanding of development by linking development with security and good governance. Weak state structures were seen as primary factor behind conflicts and economic problems. The EU applied this holistic understanding of development to its relations with the sub-Saharan African countries and started to engage crisis management and conflict resolution issues in Africa in the 1990s. The establishment of the CFSP with the Maastricht Treaty revived the EU's old ambition to be a global actor in world politics. The Union utilized its emerging CFSP and ESDP instruments to supplement its development policy towards the sub-Saharan African countries.⁴²⁸ The EU intervened conflicts in Africa in order to complement its role as a donor of Africa.⁴²⁹ In spite of its limited military capacity, the EU involved in peacekeeping and crisis management operations

⁴²⁷ Gorm Rye Olsen, "The European Union: 'European interests', bureaucratic interests and international options", in Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen, *Africa and the North: between globalization and marginalization* (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 94-96.

⁴²⁸ Niagalé Bagoyoko and Marie V. Gibert, "The Linkage Between Security, Governance and Development: the European Union in Africa", *Journal of Development Studies* (Vol. 45, No. 5, 2009), pp. 789-790.

⁴²⁹ Olsen, "The European Union: 'European interests', bureaucratic interests and international options", op.cit., p. 102.

in Africa. EU's military operations Operation Artemis in Congo in 2003 and EU's Chad missions were mainly reactions to conflict situations and management of post-conflict conditions.⁴³⁰

Nevertheless, the 9/11 terrorist events externalised Africa's problems and problems of development and security were seen as threats to world's stability and prosperity. The EU's "enlightened self-interest" led EU institutions to support development and good governance for the prevention of spill over effects of local conflicts and insecurity.⁴³¹ The first sign of securitization of development aid was seen in the European Security Strategy. In European Security Strategy, the EU made reference to employment of multiple instruments such as trade relations, development and humanitarian aid to deal with new security threats. Furthermore the strategy explicitly made mono-directional links between security and development by establishing "security as a precondition for development". However, the EU rectified this subordination of development for security policy with policy coherence for Development Agenda 2005. The EU recognized the complementarity of development and security by European consensus on development. In this document, insecurity and violent conflicts are seen as the main obstacle for the attainment of Millennium Development Goals. Security and development are identified as complimentary aspect of EU's relation with developing world.⁴³²

The security concerns of the post-9/11 era were reflected to 2005 Cotonou Review. The article 11 on "Peace Building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution" stating "an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace building and conflict prevention and resolution within the framework of partnership" was expanded with the addition of the following articles:

"The Parties reiterate their firm condemnation of all acts of terrorism and undertake to combat terrorism through international cooperation, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, relevant conventions and instruments and in particular full implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1456 (2003) and other relevant UN resolutions. To

⁴³⁰ Farrell, "The European Union and Africa", op.cit., p. 269.

⁴³¹ Gibert, op.cit., p. 130.

⁴³² Carbone, "Desperately Seeking Policy Coherence", op.cit., pp. 13-14.

this send, the Parties agree to exchange: -information on terrorist groups and their support networks; and- views on means and methods to counterterrorist acts, including in technical fields and training, and experiences in relation to the prevention of terrorism.”

“The Parties consider that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, both to State and non-State actors, represents one of the most serious threats to international stability and security. The Parties therefore agree to cooperate and to contribute to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery through full compliance with and national implementation of their existing obligations under international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements and other relevant international obligations. The Parties agree that this provision constitutes an essential element of this Agreement.”

The 2005 amendments of the Cotonou pushed sub-Saharan African states to cooperate on the issues of terrorism and non-proliferation and joining the International Criminal Court. Thus, the securitized objectives of the 2005 Cotonou review overshadowed principal objective of poverty reduction. The EU gave priority to security problems and overlooked economic and social problems of poverty, which are root causes of insecurity and instability.⁴³³ Amendments of Article 11 on fight against terrorism also reveal that sub-Saharan African states are seen as cradle for terrorists.⁴³⁴ Furthermore, the cooperation on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is stated as the essential element of Cotonou together with other fundamental elements such as human rights, rule of law and good governance.⁴³⁵ The inclusion of anti-terrorist and non-proliferation provisions enhanced development-security nexus in EU’s development cooperation policy and opened the way for the employment of development policy for foreign policy interests of member states.⁴³⁶

⁴³³ Amelia Hadfield, “Janus Advances? An Analysis of EC Development Policy and the 2005 Amended Cotonou Partnership”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2007), p. 50.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

With the 2005 review of the Cotonou, Union's development policy characterized by non-reciprocal financial aid in a non-interventionist manner moved towards a tool for EU's transmission for its political values and norms. Furthermore, the amendments of article 11 reflected the EU's securitized approach to developing world.⁴³⁷ On this basis 2005 amendments was an example of "Janus-like" face of EU development policy divided between the main objective of poverty reduction and the need to combine security threats with scope of development policy.⁴³⁸ Western donors preferred to subordinate development concerns to their security interests. Consequently, securitization of the development aid defined as the incorporation of the security concepts related to instability and conflict stemming from underdevelopment and backwardness.⁴³⁹

In addition to donor role, the EU actively engages with crisis management and post-conflict situations in Africa. Article 11 of the 2005 Review allowed the EU to help regional organizations in Africa. The African Union was recognised as an actor of the EU's relations with the sub-Saharan African countries. Furthermore, this article enabled the EU to use the EDF funds for African Peace Facility operations. African Peace Facility was established in May 2004 in response to the call from African leaders as a development and peacekeeping instrument.⁴⁴⁰ African Peace Facility is the outcome of uneasy relationship between development and security. It is supported by the EU to establish conducive environment for socio-economic development in Africa. Although it was considered as temporary arrangement, its capacity is expanding to cover new missions. Considerable resources allocated to African Peace Facility as the EU's crisis management instrument. In 2004 the EU allocated €250 million to support the African peace-keeping operations. Although allocations of the funds for peace-keeping operations are not counted as ODA by

⁴³⁷ Ibid., p. 39.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., p. 57.

⁴³⁹ Ibid. 58.

⁴⁴⁰ Daniela Sicurelli, "Framing Security and Development in the EU Pillar Structure: How the Views of the European Commission Affect EU Africa Policy", *European Integration* (Vol. 30, No. 2, 2008), p. 225.

OECD, African Peace Facility was presented as a development instrument. Thus, development funds of EDF were transferred to the CFSP, which opened the way for the securitization of the development cooperation policy.⁴⁴²

African Peace Facility was supported by EU member states for the reinforcement of the Europe's image as a preferential partner for Africa. The EU's financial contribution to the APF let the EU to intervene African security without European troops and makes the EU a crucial player in Africa. By this way, the EU moved to "local ownership" of peacekeeping operations and shifted its military personnel to other operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. Since EU member states are reluctant about sending their troops to the sub-Saharan Africa due to high risk of casualties, African Peace Facility was welcomed by EU members who did not want to undertake national military operations in Africa.⁴⁴³

Hence, the African Peace Facility brought a new dimension to the EU's development policy. Until the establishment of the African Peace Facility, the EU's involvement in peace and security issues in Africa was quite limited and mainly focused on post-conflict reconstruction. It opened space and paved the way for the involvement of the Commission in the areas of peacekeeping and crisis management by allocating development funding for APF operations.⁴⁴⁴ Furthermore, it was employed in the Darfur crisis despite the lack of UN Security Council resolutions and active opposition of the Sudanese government to the UN operations. The employment of African Peace Facility did not solve the crisis but prevent its further escalation. ⁴⁴⁵

As a result, the African Peace Facility has become an operational instrument of Africa-EU partnership on peace and security. The EU has delivered more than € 1 billion since 2004. The missions financed by the facility are lead and staffed by Africans. Currently, the African Peace Facility is

⁴⁴² Richard Youngs, "Fusing Security and Development", op.cit., pp. 225-227.

⁴⁴³ Sicurelli, "EU's Africa Policies", op.cit., p. 60.

⁴⁴⁴ Aggestam et.al., "Institutional Competences in the EU External Action", op.cit., p. 134.

⁴⁴⁵ Aggestam et.al., "Institutional Competences in the EU External Action", op.cit., p. 150.

conducting peace support operations of AMISOM (AU Mission in Somalia), MICOPAX (the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic) and AFISMA (the African-led International Support Mission to Mali).⁴⁴⁶

Furthermore, *the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel*, which was adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 21 March 2011 strengthened security-development linkage. The Strategy stated that the achievement of security is an integral part of poverty reduction and economic growth in the Sahel region. As a regional strategy, it focuses on three countries: Mauritania, Mali and Niger. It is one of the poorest regions of the world and confronted with challenges of extreme poverty, climate change, food crisis, rapid economic growth, state fragility, corruption and unresolved internal tension. Since this region is situated in the EU's southern neighbourhood, it is strategically important in terms of European energy supplies, management of migration flows and containment of illicit trafficking and terrorism. The EU's comprehensive strategy for Sahel is based on the synthesis of security and development instruments in four lines of action: development, internal conflict resolution and good governance, security and the rule of law, political and diplomatic action and the fight against violent extremism and radicalisation. The majority of financial resources are provided by the EDF. Accordingly, €450 million is given to 3 Sahel countries and West African regional level from the 10th EDF.⁴⁴⁷ Following the same path, the EU promoted another strategic framework for the Horn of Africa that covers the following countries: Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda. In the field of peace and security in the Horn of Africa, the EU currently provides over €15 million per month in financial support for AMISOM.⁴⁴⁸ It supported the deployment of AMIS

⁴⁴⁶ European Commission, "Key facts about the strategic partnership between EU and Africa/ 2. Key facts about our cooperation with Africa", *Memo 13/35*, Brussels, 25 January 2013. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-13-35_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-35_en.htm).

⁴⁴⁷ European Parliament, *The EU Strategic Framework for Horn of Africa: A Critical Assessment of Impact and Opportunities*, DG for External Policies Policy Report, (Brussels: 2012), p.47

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

in Sudan/Darfur and continues to provide financial assistance to the AUHIP in mediation efforts between North Sudan and South Sudan.⁴⁴⁹

According to Hadfield, the combination of peace-building policies and the non-proliferation activities into the development cooperation activity weakened the donor characteristics of the EU and strengthened the international actorness of the EU. The employment of development for security purposes allows the EU to intervene security problems emerging from underdeveloped nations.⁴⁵⁰

5.6 Joint EU-Africa Strategy: Weakening of Donor Dynamics?

Africa entered into an economic recovery period and achieved impressive economic growth rates in the early 2000s. Optimistic long term economic prospects and high economic growth rates of many African states attracted global investors and emerging economies to expand markets for their products.⁴⁵¹ High growth rates, increasing engagement of non-Western countries in Africa and the emergence of new African self-esteem led to the recognition of Africa as a new frontier and rising continent of global politics.⁴⁵² Africa is no longer seen as a “hopeless” and a “dark” continent. “Afro-pessimism” of the 1980s and 1990s was replaced by an image of “rising continent” with its vibrant economy, more open political system and an entrepreneurial private sector. The average annual growth rate in Africa has been around 5.7 per cent in the 2000s. Furthermore, six sub-Saharan African countries, namely Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda, were located among the fastest growing economies of the world.⁴⁵³

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 27.

⁴⁵⁰ Hadfield, op.cit., p. 44.

⁴⁵¹ Lundsgaarde, “The Future of Africa-EU Strategy”, op.cit., p. 225.

⁴⁵² Damien Helly, “The EU and Africa since the Lisbon summit of 2007: Continental drift or widening cracks?”, *South African Journal of International Affairs* (Vol. 20, No. 1, 2013), p. 138.

⁴⁵³ Timothy M. Shaw et.al., “Conclusion: What Futures for African International Relations?” in Scarlett Cornelissen, Fantu Cheru and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), *Africa and International Relations in the Twenty First Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 195.

Southern donors, especially China and India, played significant role in Africa's recent growth and development. Increasing demand for Africa's energy and natural resources necessitates investments in strategic infrastructure of Africa for raising productivity and growth. The rise of Southern powers opened up new opportunities for African countries and tried to counterbalance the dominance of West in Africa.⁴⁵⁴ The non-DAC aid providers such as China, Brazil, India started to challenge the European presence in Africa. These countries have become competitors with the EU member states in terms of market access, influence and the provision of development aid.⁴⁵⁵ For instance, Africa has become the second most important region for China after Asia. As well as investing billions of dollars in mineral projects and building massive infrastructure projects, China provides impressive development assistance to African countries.⁴⁵⁶

The main rationale for China's growing engagement with Africa is similar to that of Europeans who came Africa several centuries earlier. China seeks to make use African energy resources and mineral wealth for its booming economy.⁴⁵⁷ Africa is seen an indispensable continent in the new geopolitics of energy. In addition to having 10 per cent of the world's oil reserves, Africa possesses 90 per cent of world reserves for platinum, cobalt and chromium, 60 per cent of world's reserves of manganese and more than 40 per cent of gold reserves.⁴⁵⁸ Hence, Africa has become "a new 'chessboard' on which powers which shape world geopolitics move."⁴⁵⁹ In this context, China's development aid is largely linked to the securing supplies of oil, copper, timber, natural gas, zinc, cobalt and iron. For instance, China granted loan to Zimbabwe in return for

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 196.

⁴⁵⁵ Lundsgaarde, "The Future of Africa-EU Strategy", op.cit., p.228

⁴⁵⁶ Suisheng Zhao, "China's African Relations: The Balance with Western Powers", in Jing Men and Benjamin Barton (eds.), *China and the European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), p. 61.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 62.

⁴⁵⁸ Louis Michel, *Africa-Europe: The Indispensable Alliance* (Brussels: European Commission, 2008), p.13.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 16.

a deal over its extensive platinum reserves, to Mozambique to access wood and to Zambia to get raw copper.⁴⁶⁰ From the view point of the Europeans, China is “investing in Africa by building roads, dams and bridges, not delivering aid”. China’s unconditional aid policy is not compatible with the EU’s norms and values.⁴⁶¹

Unlike the political and economic conditions of Western donors and multilateral aid agencies, China’s economic cooperation and development policy towards African states does not involve any conditions regarding to human rights and economic liberalisation as a result of its adherence to “non-interference” principle. Furthermore, China offers “Beijing Consensus” by providing new source of economic assistance and development approach in response to the Washington Consensus that provides loans and grants on the condition of democracy, good governance, decentralisation, anti-corruption and transparency.⁴⁶² In line with China’s non-interference policy, China has made its largest investment to Sudan in Africa. Despite the International Criminal Court’s request for the indictment of Omar al-Bashir, China opposed the decision and continued its economic activities in Sudan on the basis of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Similarly, China gave billions of dollars to Angola and played significant role in post-war reconstruction of Angola while the IMF attached conditions of transparency and good governance to its loans. China vetoed sanctions against the Mugabe regime of Zimbabwe and continued its arms sales to the regime.⁴⁶³

Consequently, China’s activities in the domains of trade, investment, development aid and diplomacy have been increasing tremendously since the 2000s. Although Chinese government does not publish statistics regarding to its

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 67.

⁴⁶¹ Interview with an EU Official in the European Commission.

⁴⁶² Jing Men and Benjamin Barton, “Introduction: China and the EU in Africa: Changing Concepts and Changing Policies”, in Jing Men and Benjamin Barton (eds.), *China and the European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), p. 11.

⁴⁶³ Ibid., p. 12.

external aid to African countries, China is seen as the biggest developed country working together with developing countries without any conditionalities.⁴⁶⁴

While the impact of Southern donors in Africa is growing in recent years, the EU has concentrated on its own internal problems. The reform process of Lisbon Treaty turned to the EU its domestic politics⁴⁶⁵ Furthermore, the economic crisis of Eurozone changed the political priorities of the Union. EU member states gave priority to their domestic economic problems, rather than development issues of Africa. China has been building its diplomatic and trade relations with Africa by making investments and diplomatic visits, yet, the EU officials or leaders rarely visit Africa.⁴⁶⁶ It is apparent that the EU's economic and political role in Africa is diminishing. EurAfrique, the era in which European powers dominated African economy and politics, came to an end. The EU needs to move to an equal partnership with Africa and develop Afro-Europa to prevent the prospect of Chinafrique⁴⁶⁷ The growing engagement of rising donors accelerated the EU's efforts for making an Africa strategy on the basis of partnership. In other words, the rise of Southern donors, especially China, became a "wake-up call" for the EU. Consequently, Joint EU- Africa Partnership was made in 2007 following the inaugural China-Africa Summit in November 2006⁴⁶⁸ Joint Africa-EU Strategy is a successor of EU-Africa Strategy that was declared unilaterally by the EU in December 2005.

Joint Africa-EU Strategy represents the European agenda of Africa.⁴⁶⁹ It envisaged a common strategy of interregional relations and upgrade of

⁴⁶⁴ Sven Grimm and Christine Hackenesch, "European Engagement with Emerging Actors in Development: Forging New Partnerships?", in Stefan Gänzle, Sven Grimm and Davina Makhan (eds.), *The European Union and Global Development: An 'Enlightened Superpower' in the Making?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 218-219.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 224.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 225.

⁴⁶⁷ Xinghui Zhang, "China's Aid to Africa: A Challenge to the EU?", in Jing Men and Benjamin Barton (eds.), *China and the European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011).

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., p.3.

historical relations to “a new strategic level”. It is an overarching long term framework of political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels.⁴⁷⁰ The Joint Africa-EU Strategy upgraded the EU-Africa relationship from donor-recipient relationship into a level of strategic partnership with strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation in the areas of peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, trade, regional integration and infrastructure, MDGs, energy, climate change and environment, migration, mobility and employment. This Joint EU-Africa strategy emphasized the importance of Euro-African consensus on values, common interests and objectives.⁴⁷¹ One of the innovations of this partnership is the treatment of Africa as one and upgrading EU-Africa relations as a continent to continent partnership. Therefore, the EU abandoned the fragmentation of the Africa as ACP and non-ACP region and that reflects traditional donor-recipient relationship. Furthermore, this framework fully supports regional and continental integration of Africa and African Union as a representative of African unity.⁴⁷² Hence, the Joint Africa-EU Partnership aimed to overcome the EU’s fragmented approach to the Africa by proposing de facto integration of North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa under the motto of “One Europe, One Africa”.⁴⁷³ The EU has bilateral, regional and continental relationship with Africa. In addition to bilateral relations with African countries, the EU has regional policy frameworks such as European Neighbourhood Policy and Cotonou Agreement. The EU’s relation with Northern Africa is managed by the EU’s neighbourhood policy that of sub-Saharan Africa is conducted by the Cotonou Agreement. Thus, the EU has a fragmented policy approach to Africa.

⁴⁶⁹ Men and Barton, “Conclusion: China and the EU in Africa: Partners or Competitors?”, op.cit., p.196

⁴⁷⁰ Lundsgaarde, “The Future of Africa-EU Strategy”, op.cit.

⁴⁷¹ Maurizio Carbone, “The EU in Africa: increasing coherence, decreasing partnership”, in Federiga Bindi (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2010), p. 249.

⁴⁷² Veronika Thywuschik and Andrew Sheriff, “Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy”, *ECDPM Discussion Paper No:87*, 2009, p.3.

⁴⁷³ Christina Barrios, *EU Cooperation with African Union: Problems and Cooperation with African Union*, FRIDE, July 2010, p. 2.

However, Joint Africa Strategy envisages a continental relationship that covers sub-Saharan African countries, Neighbourhood Policy Countries and South Africa under one framework. The Joint Africa EU Strategy not only provides a “comprehensive, integrated and long term framework” for the EU-Africa relations but also recognised Africa as “one entity” for the first time.⁴⁷⁴

The establishment of African Union in 2002 facilitated the formation of EU’s Africa strategy. The African Union was recognized as institutional partner of the EU that can assume African ownership in dealing with key problems of Africa.⁴⁷⁵ The transition of Organisation for African Unity into the African Union in 2002 signified a break from post-independence and new principles for regional cooperation and integration. With its 54 African members, the AU declares itself as a central platform for representation of Africa in global politics. In this regard, the African Union transcended its predecessor Organisation of African Unity. The Joint Africa EU Strategy gave the African Union a central role and accepted the AU as an institutional partner which is capable of strengthening African ownership in tackling with Africa’s main challenges.⁴⁷⁶ The African Union has been active in coordinating African forces in ceasefire and peacekeeping missions, including Burundi, Somalia and Sudan with the support of Western donors and UN support.⁴⁷⁷ Legally speaking, both the EU and the AU have legal personalities. They can interact with each other as equal partners. However, the EU seems to be dominant partner that drives the relationship and provides majority of resources for continuation of this relationship.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁴ European Commission, “Communication to the Council and the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, EU-Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development”, op.cit., p. 2.

⁴⁷⁵ Thywuschik and Sheriff, op.cit., p. 3.

⁴⁷⁶ Thywuschik and Sheriff, op.cit., p. 4.

⁴⁷⁷ William Brown, “A Question of Agency: Africa in international politics”, *Third World Quarterly* (Vol. 33, No. 10, 2012), p. 1891.

⁴⁷⁸ Gerrit, op.cit, p. 62.

Building strategic partnership with international actors has been one of component of the EU's effective multilateralism. The EU has strategic partnership with the US, Brazil, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Canada and South Africa; only regional partner is Africa. The African Union is the sole multilateral organization that the EU has strategic partnership.⁴⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the term strategic partnerships are not based on well-formulated strategies for the achievement of well-defined objectives. For example, these partnership agreements involve environmental policy but this does not lead to any meaningful common action in international conferences or organisations. It remains on a rhetorical level.⁴⁸⁰

With Joint EU-Africa Strategy, the EU tried to move from post-colonial donor-recipient relationship to a new forward looking foreign policy and development partnership. EU tried to bring a partnership perspective to EU-Africa relations to replace long standing donor-recipient relationship. The EU recognized the AU as its main interlocutor and put forward new political and financial incentives for good governance. The EU prefers to encourage the AU for building democratic states and putting democratic benchmarks, rather than interfering domestic politics. Thus the EU underlines the importance of equality, solidarity, common objectives and ownership.⁴⁸¹

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy that started in 2007 has not produced desired results so far. It failed to transform development cooperation between two continents. The growing influence of emerging powers in Africa and financial economic crisis and its adverse effects on development aid budgets of European donors made the EU Africa Partnership rhetoric, not a reality.⁴⁸² The equal partnership principle between two continents and the EU's 'One Africa'

⁴⁷⁹ Gerrit, op.cit, p. 62.

⁴⁸⁰ Stephan Keukeleire and Hans Bruyninckx, "The European Union, the BRICs, and the Emerging New World Order", in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 389.

⁴⁸¹ Zhang, op.cit., p. 257.

⁴⁸² Oladiran Bello, "The EU Africa Partnership: At a Strategic Crossroads", *FRIDE Policy Brief*, No.47, May 2010, p. 1.

approach did not go beyond reality.⁴⁸³ The Strategy has ambitious in terms of purposes and geographic scope, but lacks financial resources for achievement of these aims. The pan-African focus of strategy does not coincide with EU's fragmented financial aid instruments for Africa. The financial aspect of Joint Africa EU Strategy was envisaged to be provided by co-financing of both the EU and African Union. However, African Union was unable to deliver financial resources for the functioning of Joint Strategy. On the other hand, the EU did not allocate a new specific financial envelope for the fulfilment of strategy. The Union preferred to shift some of existing financial resources to the Joint Strategy.⁴⁸⁴ The lack of specific financial resources and the failure of AU to build a pan-African approach made the implementation of the Joint Africa EU Strategy a challenging issue.⁴⁸⁵

Africa's strategy is based on "One Africa" for establishment of a comprehensive, integrated and long term framework between the EU and Africa. However, neither strong African states such as South Africa or Nigeria nor big EU member states like France feel attached to this "One Africa" strategy. These countries prefer to pursue their own particular agenda which might be divergent from this strategy.⁴⁸⁶

Joint Africa EU Strategy established an intercontinental relationship and stressed on African institutions and the AU. It overlooked financial and institutional limitations of the AU and its member states. The growing relation between the EU and the AU has not changed the fragmented approach of the EU toward Africa. There has not been a sufficient level of cooperation between two institutions. Hence, the Joint Africa EU Strategy is seen as "an opaque bureaucratic construct" without "any tangible impact" on lives of African people.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸³ Ibid., p. 2.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

⁴⁸⁵ Interview with a diplomat from an EU Member State.

⁴⁸⁶ Gerrit, op.cit, p. 63.

⁴⁸⁷ Helly, op.cit., 145.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined changes in EU bilateral development policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in the 2000s on the basis of Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Cotonou changed political, economic and aid dimensions of EU development policy. Politically, it strengthened political conditionalities and emphasis the role of civil society in development policy. Economically, it shifted from reciprocal trade preferences to non-reciprocal trade preferences. It introduced performance-based aid allocations in aid management. 2005 Review of Cotonou opened the way for use of development funds for security purposes. The Joint-Africa EU strategy offered a pan-European perspective and moved EU-Africa relations from donor partnership to strategic level.

CHAPTER 6

CHANGE IN THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY: THE SUBORDINATION OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY TO EXTERNAL ACTION?

The Lisbon Treaty in itself and its institutional innovations have significant implications on the EU development policy. This chapter examines changing institutional structure of the EU development policy in the post-Lisbon era. It starts main institutional changes in EU External Relations. The reorganisation of development policy is discussed with respect to newly established European External Action Service (EEAS). In the final part, the future status and position of the development policy within the EU's external action is assessed in the post-Lisbon period.

6.1 The Lost Decade of Reform: From Laeken European Council to the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty emerged as an outcome of a complex negotiation process that lasted almost 10 years. The need for a more effective, coherent and visible EU in world affairs launched a reform process in 2001. The European Convention process worked from February 2002 to July 2003 under the leadership of former French President Giscard D'Estaing. The proposals of European Convention were debated at the Intergovernmental Conference from October 2003 to June 2004. Consequently, the document was renamed as European Constitution and signed by EU leaders in October 2004 in Rome. Although the majority of EU member states ratified the treaty, it was rejected by two founding members of the Union, France and the Netherlands, in 2005.⁴⁸⁸ Consequently, the EU leaders decided to negotiate another treaty called as a Reform Treaty. As a result of long negotiations, the treaty known as the Lisbon Treaty was signed in Lisbon in 2007 and entered into force after the complex

⁴⁸⁸ Gian Luigi Tosato, "The Shape of Post-Lisbon Europe" in Stefano Micossi and Gian Luigi Tosato (eds.), *The European Union in the 21st Century: Perspectives from the Lisbon Treaty*, (Brussels: CEPS, 2009), p. 275.

ratification processes in 27 Member States that were finalized in December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty is made up of two treaties: Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Treaty on Functioning of EU (TFEU). These treaties have same legal value but they differ with regard to content and formal legal regime. TEU states main principles, goals, values of the Union. TFEU lays down rules for functioning of institutions and provisions for implementation of common policies⁴⁸⁹.

The Lisbon Treaty amended and made additions to the Rome and Maastricht Treaty. Former three pillars and a roof organization were replaced by a single legal personality of the European Union. The decision-making in first pillar and second pillar policies did not change. Community policy and intergovernmental policy characteristics are maintained. However, the most of third pillar policies in Justice and Home Affairs such as asylum, immigration, border checks moved to the first pillar. In terms of institutional structure, the Treaty increased the role of the European Parliament in main treaty revisions and selection of senior EU leaders. Also, Parliament's oversight role on the Commission was increased. The number of Commissioners and members of Parliaments was increased in line with the accession of new members in 2004 and 2007.⁴⁹⁰

In the domain of external relations, the Lisbon Treaty aimed to build a more coherent, efficient and visible Union in global politics. During the negotiation process of the Treaty, the need for the improvement of coherence and effectiveness of the EU's external policies was stated in different EU documents. For instance, the European Security Strategy pointed out new security challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and organised crime and underlined the need for a more coherent and active Union.⁴⁹¹ In addition to new security threats, global

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 277.

⁴⁹⁰ Finn Laursen, "The Lisbon Treaty: How Significant?", in Finn Laursen (ed.), *The EU's Lisbon Treaty: Institutional Choices and Implementation* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012).

⁴⁹¹ European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003, Brussels, p.11.

challenges such as poverty, inequality, climate change put pressure on the EU to act together in global politics.⁴⁹² Moreover, rising economic powers such as China, India, Russia and Brazil started to challenge economic and political power of European countries in the world. In this, the Lisbon Treaty took effect in December 2009 for making the EU more effective, coherent on the world stage.⁴⁹³

6.2 The Main Institutional Changes in External Relations in the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty provided the EU with the opportunity to redesign its institutions and speak with one voice in global politics. The Lisbon Treaty abandoned the EU's former pillar structure that was established by the Maastricht Treaty in order to unify the different strands of EU external relations. In the pre-Lisbon era, EU's external policy portfolio consists of two kinds of policy making: community policies and intergovernmental policies. Community policies such as trade, development aid, neighbourhood and enlargement were managed by the Commission. Intergovernmental policies such as the CFSP and ESDP were governed by the Council. The Lisbon Treaty brought these pillars together and led to "rapprochement" within Community and intergovernmental pillars.⁴⁹⁴ However, the Treaty did not end the first-second pillar dichotomy. Owing to their 'specific' character, foreign and security policy of the Union remained in the TEU, under general provisions of the Union's external action (Title V TEU). Hence, security and defence aspects of Union's external action are separated from other policies of EU external relations.

⁴⁹² CONCORD, *EEAS Review 2013*, (March 2013), p. 3.

⁴⁹³ Jeske Van Seters, and Henrike Klavert, "EU development cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty: People, institutions and global trends", *ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 123*, 2011. Available at: http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/0/BFF9BE34264694F9C1257959003E7166?OpenDocument#sthash.zc3lm9l3.dpuf, p. vii.

⁴⁹⁴ Maxime Lefebvre and Christophe Hillion, "The European External Action Service: Towards a Common Diplomacy?", *European Policy Analysis Issue 6* (SIEPS, 2010).

Practically, the Treaty did not change the division of external competences between the EU and member states. The need for coordination and coherence took precedence over centralisation and thus the Treaty focused on the establishment of policies located in the TFEU such as trade, development, cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, and relations with international organizations.⁴⁹⁵ The Treaty stipulated the catalogue of competences of articles 3-6 of TFEU. Accordingly, there are three kinds of competences; exclusive competences in the fields of customs union, competition, monetary policy (euro-zone), fisheries and marine biological policies, trade policy; shared competences in development aid, internal market, agriculture, coordination competence in the areas of economic policies, employment and social policies and finally supplementary role of the EU in human health, culture, tourism and education. (See Table 11)

Table 11. Catalogue of the EU External Competence in the Lisbon Treaty

EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCES	SHARED COMPETENCES	SUPPORT ACTIONS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Customs Union • Competition • Monetary • Marine Resources • Commercial Policy • International Agreements (AETR) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal Market • Social • Agriculture and Fisheries (Except where exclusive) • Environment • Consumer Protection • Transport • Trans-European Networks • Energy • Freedom, security and justice • Public health • Research and Technological Development • Space • Development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human Health • Industry • Culture • Tourism • Educational, vocational training, youth and sport • Civil Protection • Administrative Cooperation

⁴⁹⁵ Steven Blockmans and Marja-Liisa Laatsit, "The European External Action Service: Enhancing Coherence in the EU External Action?", in Paul James Cardwell (ed.), *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era* (Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2012), p. 139.

	Cooperation • Humanitarian Aid	
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According to Lisbon Treaty categorization of competence, member states and the EU have shared competence in development policy. Hence, both the EU and member states can conduct their development policies side by side as stated in Article 4 (4) of TFEU as follows: “In the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member states being prevented from exercising theirs.”⁴⁹⁶ While the Maastricht Treaty provided that development policy of the EC and member states are complementary to each other, Article 208(1) of Lisbon Treaty stated that EU’s development cooperation policy and that of the Member States “complement and reinforce” each other. Hence, Union’s and member states’ development cooperation policies are mutually complementary and neither takes precedence over the other.⁴⁹⁷

As well as delimitation of competences, the Lisbon Treaty introduced new institutions and posts in order to enhance consistency in the EU’s external relations. The Treaty established the post of The President of the European Council. This full time President post was designed to improve the EU’s visibility in global politics. The President of the European Council is assigned with chairing EU Council meetings, preparations and continuation of Council work.⁴⁹⁸ Also, the European Council has become a new institution without any change in its competence. The European Council has no legislative function in external relations.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also acts as Vice-President of the Commission, (HR/VP) is another significant post brought by the Lisbon Treaty in the EU’s external relations.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹⁶ Morten Broberg, “What Is the Direction for the EU’s Development Cooperation after Lisbon?: A Legal Examination”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 16, No. 4, 2011), p. 545.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 554.

⁴⁹⁸ Article 15 of TEU.

The new post of HR/VP was established as a result of the merge of former External Relations Commissioner with High Representative for the CFSP. The main rationale was to connect the Union's foreign policy with other policies of External Relations and to better execute external policies. Hence, HR/VP has the mandate to coordinate all areas of external action including poverty reduction, democracy promotion, human rights, and conflict prevention.⁵⁰⁰ In order to assist this "double-hatted" position, the EEAS was established as a sui generis institution. The service mainly functions as a diplomatic service responsible for ensuring coherence of the EU's external policies such as environment, development, security and trade with general line of EU foreign policy in a given region or country.⁵⁰¹ In addition, Foreign Affairs Council was established to oversee the EU's external action including development cooperation, the CFSP, the CSDP and external trade. It comprises foreign ministers of EU Member States, HR/VP and Commissioners of external policies. HR/VP is given the coordination of all external relations and chairing the meetings of Foreign Affairs Council. Development ministers of Member States take part in these Council meetings at least twice a year. The role of Development Commissioner in Foreign Affairs enhanced after the Lisbon Treaty.⁵⁰²

Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty granted the Union a legal personality which ended the distinction between the EC and the EU. Although the scope of legal personality is limited by the Treaty, it enables the EU to enter into legal relations with third parties and become a member of an international organisation. Hence, the EU is given the opportunity to have a strong voice at the international stage to influence global policy decisions. In fact, the UN General Assembly granted the EU an observer status in the UN General Assembly in 1974. Therefore, European Commission participated to the proceedings of UN General Assembly in the areas of exclusive Community

⁴⁹⁹ Simon Duke, "Consistency, Coherence and European Union external action: the path to Lisbon and beyond", in Panos Koutrakos (ed.), *European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspective*, (UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), p. 30.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

⁵⁰¹ Van Seters, and Klavert, *op.cit.*, p.1.

⁵⁰² Interview with an EU Official in the European Commission.

Competence. In the 1990s, European Commission took part in major UN Global Conferences. In the 2000s, EU-UN cooperation entered into new phase with a number of strategic partnerships in the development and humanitarian aid. Following the Commission's Communication on "Building an Effective Partnership with the UN in the field of Development and Humanitarian Affairs" strengthened the partnerships between EU and UN Development agencies⁵⁰³ As a result of the institutional amendments of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was granted with the right to speak and make interventions in the assembly, to participate in the general debates and exercise the right of reply regarding to the position of the EU. Hence, the EU's legal personality provided the Union with speaking rights, not voting rights.⁵⁰⁴

In this regard, the EU obtained enhanced observer status at the UN General Assembly, which allows the EU to speak at the General Assembly without voting rights, however the EU's representation at other UN bodies and international organisations changes. The EU is a full member at limited number of international organisations such as the WTO, G20 and the FAO. The EU is a participant in the OECD and has observer status at the UNDP.⁵⁰⁵

However, the Lisbon Treaty does not clarify the EU's external representation. The EU can be represented by the European Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the European Council. The Commission's external representation contains all external issues including trade, development, environment, climate, energy, transport, immigration, financial cooperation. The corresponding Commissioner is responsible for a given issue.⁵⁰⁶ On CFSP matters, representation is provided by the High Representative and the EEAS under her leadership at ministerial level. The External Representation of the Union is provided by the permanent President of the European Council at the level of

⁵⁰³ Farrell, "The EU and UN Development Cooperation", *op.cit.*, p. 232.

⁵⁰⁴ Farrell, "The EU and UN Development Cooperation", *op.cit.*, p. 235.

⁵⁰⁵ Van Seters, and Klavert, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

⁵⁰⁶ Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, "Swimming In Murky Waters: Challenges In Developing the EU's External Representation", *Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper 88* (September 2011), p. 4.

head of states or government.⁵⁰⁷ Instead of rotating Council presidency, the permanent President of the European Council provides representation of the EU. Yet, the President of the European Council does not have exclusive representative power; the President shares its representational powers with the High Representative on CFSP issues and horizontally with the President of the European Commission on all non-CFSP issues.⁵⁰⁸

With the Lisbon Treaty, former Commission delegations in third countries became EU delegations and linked to the EEAS. They are given the official representation of the EU for coordination political dialogue with third countries. Additionally, they are involved in programming and implementation of development aid in the field. However, the delegations' coordination role is limited in the field since majority of the Member states are not in favour of "being coordinated" and prefer other alternative platforms such as Nordic Plus or donor wide.⁵⁰⁹

The introduction of new posts of permanent President of the European Council, HR/VP and establishment of EEAS aimed at improvement of consistency of Union's external relations. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty adopted a holistic approach and brought various realms of external action –foreign policy, security, trade, aid- together.⁵¹⁰ However, new posts are likely to strengthen intergovernmental aspect of the Union. The European Commission could be seen as a "looser" in redesign of EU external relations in Lisbon Treaty. In addition to losing ground to the EEAS, the number of College of Commissioners has not been decreased, so that it continues to resemble a sort of intergovernmental 'COREPER', and its right of initiative has been diluted further.⁵¹¹ Development policy-making and implementation is assigned to Development Commissioner. The European Neighbourhood Policy, which was

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., p.4.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid., p.5.

⁵⁰⁹ Van Seters and Klavert, op.cit., p. 6.

⁵¹⁰ Van Seters and Klavert, op.cit.

⁵¹¹ Adriaan Schout and Sarah Wolff, "The 'Paradox of Lisbon': Supranationalism-Intergovernmentalism as an Administrative Concept", in Finn Laursen (ed.), *The EU's Lisbon Treaty: Institutional Choices and Implementation* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), p. 21.

managed by DG Relex before the Lisbon Treaty, was merged together with Enlargement and linked to the Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood.

However, these institutional innovations do not change the essence of decision making system of the EU external relations. Majority of these institutional innovations are administrative in nature, which raise the question of whether these changes are sufficient for strengthening coherence and effectiveness of EU external relations.⁵¹²

6.3 The EU Development Policy in the Lisbon Treaty

The development policy was not at the centre of negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty aimed at the strengthening of EU's global role and improvement of impact of its external action. The development policy of the Union was squeezed into discussion on the EU's global role.⁵¹³ The changes in development policy were considered within the redesign of EU external action.

The Lisbon Treaty combined all objectives of the EU's external policies, from security over development to trade and environment, in a single Article 21 of TEU to improve policy coherence in EU external relations. Besides, the institutional architecture and administrative framework for EU external action changed significantly. Yet, these changes slightly modified the distribution of competences in decision-making. Owing to their 'specific' character, EU foreign and security policy remained in the TEU, under the general provisions of the Union's external action (Title V TEU). Hence, security and defence aspect of Union's external action is separated from other aspect of external relations policies located in the Treaty on Functioning of the EU such as trade, development, cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, relations with international organizations.⁵¹⁴

⁵¹² Lefebvre and Hillion, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

⁵¹³ Holland, "The EU and Third World", *op.cit.*, p. 95.

⁵¹⁴ Blockmans and Laatsit, *op.cit.*, p. 139.

The Lisbon Treaty put the most of the existing provisions concerning development policy in a separate section (Title III of Part V of the TFEU, Articles 208-211). The references to the three principles of development, coherence, cooperation and consistency, did not change.⁵¹⁵ In relation to Union's development policy with Member States national policies, the Article 210 of Treaty stated that *"In order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the Member states shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes, including in international organizations and during international conferences. They make undertake joint action. Member states shall contribute if necessary to the implementation of Union aid programmes."* Thus, the Lisbon Treaty assigned more weight to development cooperation on the European level.⁵¹⁶ Besides, the Lisbon Treaty speaks of former EC development policy as the EU development policy. In fact, the Treaty did not change the parallel existence of the two tracks of the EU and national development policies. Concerning the legislation procedure, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary procedure, are authorized to take decisions in development policy.

Moreover, in accordance with the reform agenda of the 2000s, Article 208(2) of TFEU states that "Union development policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that implements which are likely to affect developing countries." Hence, poverty eradication became not only goal of Union's development cooperation, but also overarching goal of EU external action legally. In other words, the Lisbon Treaty strengthened the legal basis of development policy and underlined poverty reduction as its main purpose. In addition to poverty reduction, policy coherence of development became a legal obligation. The

⁵¹⁵ Maurizio Carbone, "Preserving Policy Autonomy: EU Development Cooperation from Maastricht to Lisbon", in Finn Laursen (ed.), *The EU's Lisbon Treaty: Institutional Choices and Implementation* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), p 237.

⁵¹⁶ Marikki Stocchetti, *Between Consensus And Confusion: Institutional Changes And Policy Challenges In The EU's Development Policy Post-Lisbon*", *Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper 93* (November 2011), p. 5.

external policies of the Union have to be coherent with poverty reduction purpose.⁵¹⁷

Unlike previous Treaties that made reference to the EU's relationship with the ACP countries, the Lisbon Treaty removed provisions that safeguard the intergovernmental nature of EU-ACP relationship and the non-budgetary status of EDF that allowed for the finance of development aid given to the ACP countries.⁵¹⁸ The deletion of this article opened the way for the inclusion of the EDF to EU general budget and the loss of financial privileges of the ACP countries. Although the EDF will be maintained until the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020, the status of the EDF is uncertain for the long term future.⁵¹⁹ Thus the Lisbon Treaty abolished the exclusive status of the ACP countries and adopted a holistic perspective on development without prioritizing any region in developing world. It seems that the EU-ACP countries partnership will be dissolved after the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020.⁵²⁰

The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and their operationalization influenced the Commission's role in Union's development policy. Both the HR/VP and the Commissioner for Development were given the leadership role in the management of development policy. In the post-Lisbon era, neither the High Representative Ashton nor Development Commissioner Piebalgs has demonstrated strong leadership in effective and coherent formulation and implementation of EU development policy. Commissioner Piebalgs raised some doubts about exerting political influence over the EEAS and College of Commissioners owing to his low political profile. On the other side, Baroness Ashton has not been committed to development objectives within the full spectrum of EU external action.⁵²¹ Despite the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty, Development Commissioner indicated little leadership for the improvement of

⁵¹⁷ CONCORD, *op.cit.*, p.10.

⁵¹⁸ Sandra Bartelt, "ACP-EU Development Cooperation at a Crossroads? One Year after the Second Revision of the Cotonou Agreement", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, (Vol. 17, No. 1, 2012), p. 21.

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 22.

⁵²⁰ Interview with an EU Official in the European Council.

⁵²¹ Van Seters, and Klavert, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

Policy Coherence for Development. Thus, organisational measures have not been sufficient for engaging with coherence issues.⁵²² Both Ashton and Piebalgs have failed to demonstrate full commitment to development objectives within EU's external action. Rearrangement of institutional setting of development cooperation policy has not provided a more effective policy so far.⁵²³

Although development practitioners welcomed positively these provisions, they remarked the risks of a potential sidelining of development in the organization of the EEAS and the diminished role of the Development Commissioner vis-a-vis the High Representative. Some observers argued that it would be meaningless to separate foreign and security policy while seeking to enhance the Union's external coherence.⁵²⁴ Despite the EU's aspiration for a strong and unified EU voice in development policy, the opportunities and potential provided with the Lisbon Treaty have not been fully used in development policy.⁵²⁵

To sum up, the substance of the EU's development cooperation policy remain unchanged with Lisbon Treaty. EU development policy was recognised an independent policy of its own and associated the EU's external action in Articles 208-211. Poverty reduction is maintained as main objective of development policy and also postulated among general provisions of external action (Article 21 TEU). However, EU's competences in the field of external aid and development aid are pooled and redistributed in order to strengthen the consistency of the EU's external action.⁵²⁶

⁵²² Van Seters, and Klavert, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

⁵²³ Van Seters, and Klavert, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

⁵²⁴ Carbone, "Preserving Policy Autonomy", *op.cit.*, p. 237.

⁵²⁵ Van Seters, and Klavert, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

⁵²⁶ Isabella Tannous, "The Programming of EU's External Assistance and Development Aid and the Fragile Balance of Power between EEAS and DG DEVCO", *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 18, No. 3, 2013), p. 332.

6.4 The Nexus between External Policy and Development Policy: the EEAS

The establishment of the EEAS by the Council Decision on 26 July 2010 altered policy-making and implementation of development policy within the European Commission. Article 27.3 of TEU articulated the mandate of the EEAS in general terms without clarifying the functioning and operationalisation of the EEAS. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty did not specify functions and competences of the EEAS and leave it to the institutional bargaining between the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament.⁵²⁷ The EEAS started formally on 1 January 2011 to work under the leadership of the HR/VP. It supports the High Representative without interfering Commission functions in certain areas of EU external action. As an autonomous service, the EEAS cooperates with the European Commission. The establishment of the EEAS was presented as a big opportunity for a stronger and more unified EU voice on international setting in the words of HR/VP Catherine Ashton as follows:

the creation of the EEAS is a huge chance for Europe. ... A once-in a generation opportunity to build something that finally brings together all the instruments of our engagement - economic and political instruments, development and crisis management tools - in support of a single political strategy. The watchwords ought to be: maximizing synergies, avoiding heavy procedures and strengthening our collective impact on the ground. The basic rationale for a strong EEAS is that we in Europe need to adapt to a world of growing complexity and fundamental power shifts."⁵²⁸

The organization and functioning of the EEAS was arranged by a Council Decision as a consequence of long deliberations among member states. Turf wars took place among Member States on who would get the best jobs in the new bureaucracy and the retainment of policy making prerogatives. The foreign policy and development nexus was not discussed in the context of the EU's global engagements. Hence, the institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty were not based on global strategy of the

⁵²⁷ Holland, *The European Union and the Third World*, op.cit., p. 124.

⁵²⁸ Speech by Catherine Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the European Parliament's foreign affairs committee, 23 March 2010, Brussels.

EU.⁵²⁹ The allocation of top positions such as secretary general, deputy secretaries general, chief operating officer, directorate-generals, special representatives and heads of delegations caused sharp debates among member states.⁵³⁰ During the negotiations, Member states, particularly big ones, were concerned to counter the Commission's initiatives for taking control of the EEAS. They emphasized on representation of Member States at the EEAS.⁵³¹ Therefore, most of the heads of EU delegations were appointed on the basis of member states' historical linkages with developing countries. For instance, France looked for strong representation in the Maghreb and West Africa whereas Spain pressured for representation in Latin America.⁵³² Instead of effectiveness of the EEAS, big member states spent their time and energy for occupation of key posts with their officials. New member states were underrepresented in the allocation of the delegations of the EEAS.⁵³³ Despite the EU's aspiration for a strong and unified European voice in development policy, the opportunities and potential provided with the Lisbon Treaty were not put into practice. The realisation of the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty for collective action and EU-wide approaches in development policy is left to the hands of Member states.⁵³⁴

Although the EEAS is a new service in the field of diplomacy, it is not purely intergovernmental organization. It has elements from functionalist method of Jean Monnet since it is based on the institutionalized cooperation between member states.⁵³⁵ New service is different from both the Commission

⁵²⁹ Mark Furness, "The Lisbon Treaty, the European External Action Service and the Reshaping of EU Development Policy", in Stefan Gänzle, Sven Grimm and Davina Makhan (eds.), *The European Union and Global Development: An 'Enlightened Superpower' in the Making?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 75-76.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁵³¹ Lefebvre and Hillion, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

⁵³² Furness, *op.cit.*, p. 89.

⁵³³ Anand Menon, "Foreign and Security Policy after the Lisbon Treaty", *EUSA Review Forum: Life after Lisbon* (Vol. 23, No. 1, Winter 2010), p. 2.

⁵³⁴ Van Seters, and Klavert, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

⁵³⁵ Lefebvre and Hillion, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

and the Council Secretariat. Some of the communitarian features of the Commission such as programming of aid instruments, geographical desks of Commission including enlargement were integrated into the EEAS. The crisis management structures within the Council were transferred to the EEAS by keeping their intergovernmental nature.⁵³⁶ The former DG Relex of Commission, the Council part of the CFSP and a number of units from DG Development, DG Enlargement and Neighbourhood constituted organisational structure of the EEAS. Given sui generis nature of the EU, EEAS emerged as a functionally autonomous body and “indeterminate entity”, whose functions look similar to Commission Directorate-General, rather than the Council General Secretariat.⁵³⁷

The establishment of the EEAS influenced the Commissioners’ composition on external relations. The number of external relations Commissioners increased from four to six. Catherine Ashton as the HR/VP is responsible for the CFSP and the CSDP chairs Foreign Affairs Council and ensures consistency of EU external action. She is assisted by the EEAS that includes the EU delegations. Development policy-making and implementation is placed under one Commissioner, Andrius Piebalgs, who also represents the Commission on the Foreign Affairs Council. The Development Commissioner is responsible for EU’s relations with all developing countries regardless of geography. DG Development and DG EuropeAid is linked to the Development Commissioner. The European Neighbourhood Policy formerly conducted by DG RELEX and enlargement are combined together and Stefan Fule was appointed as Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Commissioner. DG ECHO is assigned to Kristalina Georgieva, the Commissioner for International Cooperation Crisis Response and Humanitarian Aid.⁵³⁸

Since the Lisbon Treaty stated the main framework of the EEAS and left its operationalisation to the inter-institutional bargaining at the EU level, EU

⁵³⁶ Lefebvre and Hillion, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

⁵³⁷ European Parliament, *Organization and Functioning of the European External Action Service: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities*, (Brussels: EU Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, February 2013), p. 83.

⁵³⁸ Mikaela Gavvas and Eleonora Koeb, “Setting up the European External Action Service: Building a comprehensive approach”, *ODI Background Note*, April 2010, p. 2.

political actors such as the European Commission and its President, the Council Secretariat and some Member states made use of this vagueness as a chance to push for greater influence over external policy. Member states preferred to establish new service for the EU's external action, and pushed for the transfer of Commission's external policy directorates to the EEAS.⁵³⁹

Both the EEAS and the Commission seem to have parallel organisation structures in several strands of the EU's external policy, which may hinder the coherence and effectiveness of the EU action. As a general principle of the EEAS Decision, Commission is responsible for the management of external cooperation programmes unless the EEAS Decision envisages other roles for the Commission.⁵⁴⁰ The Commission is mainly responsible for the conduct of common trade policy including planning, negotiation and implementation of trade agreements. Programming and implementation of enlargement process, including the negotiation of accession agreements, joint programming of external aid instruments with the EEAS and the implementation of the EDF, the DCI, the ENPI and other tailor made instruments such as IfS and Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.⁵⁴¹

The EEAS organized the EU's relations with world is under five geographic directorates: 1)Asia, 2)Africa 3) Europe& Central Asia 4)North Africa, Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq, and 5)Americas. The relations with the ACP were subsumed into Africa directorates. As well as geographic directorates, a sixth directorate is responsible for global and multilateral issues like human rights and conflict prevention and a seventh directorate is tasked with crisis response and operational coordination. The coordination of development cooperation is incorporated into the global and multilateral issues directorate. Hence, the EEAS does not have a unit for dealing with EU-ACP relations; it seems that the EU is likely to conduct its relations with

⁵³⁹ Furness, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

⁵⁴⁰ European Parliament, *Organization and Functioning of the European External Action Service*, *op.cit.*, p. 46.

⁵⁴¹ European Parliament, *Organization and Functioning of the European External Action Service*, *op.cit.*, p. 47.

the ACP like any other partner in the world. After the expiration of Cotonou Agreement in 2020, a similar agreement seems to be unlikely. In addition to dilution of ACP countries as a special group, the EU adopted a regionalist perspective to its relationship with ACP. Hence, the EU prepared different strategies for Caribbean, Africa and Pacific regions. The geographical desks of the EEAS revealed the historical and political dissembling of ACP group and division of four-decades of institutionalised ACP-EU Cooperation between the Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia, Central Asian and Pacific States. In addition to managing directorate for sub-Saharan Africa, the relations with the Caribbean were assigned to the Managing Directorate for Latin America; those of Pacific were attached to Managing Directorate for Asia. In the post-Lisbon period, the Commission preferred a global and regional approach to development policy and put less emphasis on ACP countries as a political group.⁵⁴⁵

As far as the European development policy is concerned, policy-making seems to be particularly complex as the struggle over development policy leadership and shared competence has not yet been permanently resolved among the EU institutions and between the EU and national levels.⁵⁴⁶ In the pre-Lisbon period, the EU development policy was managed on the basis of the division of developing world into the ACP and Non-ACP countries. Development relations with the ACP countries were given to DG Development while relations with non-ACP countries were conducted by DG Relex of the Commission. Furthermore, Europe-aid was established for the implementation of all development programs of the EU.⁵⁴⁷ Europe-aid became responsible for the implementation of all external aid programmes in all third countries.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁵ Stocchetti, op.cit., pp. 8-9.

⁵⁴⁶ Stocchetti, op.cit., p. 8.

⁵⁴⁷ Jan Orbie and Helen Verluys, "The European Union's International Development Policy: Leading and Benevolent?", in Jan Orbie (ed.), *Europe's Global Role: External Policies of the European Union* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 70.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 72.

The EEAS is located at the centre of the institutional design of development policy making. However, the EEAS is, in essence, an administrative structure at the service of policy-makers. After the establishment of the EEAS, Commission merged DG Development as a policy making and Europe-Aid as a policy implementation unit and created new DG named as DEVCO in January 2011.⁵⁴⁹ DG DEVCO is in charge of defining and implementing development policy and promoting policy coherence for development. It also deals with conducting policy dialogue at sector level.⁵⁵⁰ The establishment of the EEAS and the reorganisation of the Commission and the Council affected both Union's External Relations in general, development policy in particular. Geographical desks of the Commission, which were divided between DG Development and DG Relex, are brought together under the EEAS. With the transfer of its country desks, DG Development turned into a policy institution, "an organisation of leftovers" that lost some of its weight.⁵⁵¹ Furthermore, development aid and humanitarian aid was separated completely.⁵⁵²

On the other side, new organisational structure of new DG DEVCO comprises three political and thematic directorates (EU Development Policy, Human and Society Development and Sustainable Growth and Development), five geographic directorates (East and Southern Africa and ACP Coordination, West and Central Africa, Neighbourhood, Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf and Pacific) and an administrative directorate. The division between ACP and non-ACP countries was abandoned. Within DG DEVCO the Directorate A 'EU Development Policy' is responsible for formulating the general framework and issues of budget support and policy coherence for development up to the effectiveness of aid and international development dialogue. DG DEVCO has over 4,200 staff members, of whom about 1,300–1,500

⁵⁴⁹ Van Seters, and Klavert, *op.cit*, p. 1.

⁵⁵⁰ Van Seters, and Klavert, *op.cit*, p. 2.


⁵⁵¹ Holland and Doidge, *op.cit*, p. 125.

⁵⁵² Holland and Doidge, *op.cit*, p. 126.

employees work at DEVCO's HQ in Brussels, plus the staff of approximately 3,000 employees in the EU Delegations.⁵⁵³

⁵⁵³ Tannous, op.cit., p. 341.

Table 13. Post-Lisbon Treaty External Relations Structure



The crux of new institutional structure for development policy is the programming of development aid. Development programming is the determination of long-term objectives for a country alongside with financial envelopes and a set of identified projects. The EU's development programming consists of five stages. Country/regional strategy papers are the five to seven-year strategic evaluation of the political and economic situation of country/region. Country/regional allocation indicates the seven-year (six-year for the EDF) allocation of resources for each region and country on the basis of population, needs/poverty assessment, absorption capacity and commitment to political reform. Indicative programs are derived from strategy papers and identify priority sectors and themes. Annual action programmes are related to implementation of aid.⁵⁵⁴

In the pre-Lisbon era, five-staged programming cycle of development aid was conducted by the Commission, DG Development and implemented by Europe-Aid. In the post-Lisbon era, the EEAS is responsible for the preparation of strategic, multiannual steps within the programming cycle and the country allocations.⁵⁵⁵ The EEAS is tasked with the allocation and programming of development aid through its desks under the responsibility of the Development Commissioner. Thus, the allocation of large sums of financial resources gave rise to disputes about who has the final say on programming decision proposals: the Development Commissioner or the High Representative?⁵⁵⁶ Involvement of the EEAS in programming of the development policy was seen as "a shift towards intergovernmentalism and a member state power grab over the EU's development budget."⁵⁵⁷ The establishment of the EEAS gave rise to the turf wars over the control of multi-billion EU development funds. The changes

⁵⁵⁴ Gavas and Koeb, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

⁵⁵⁵ Tannous, *op.cit.*, p. 345.

⁵⁵⁶ Van Seters, and Klavert, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

⁵⁵⁷ Furness, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

brought by the Lisbon Treaty were seen as the achievement of bringing together different EU's external action policies in a "unity of command".⁵⁵⁸

Programming is related to the final allocation of development funds per country and between focal sectors. Owing to multifaceted aspect of development, development aid can be used for a variety of purposes including economic growth, prevention of illegal immigration or fighting terrorism. The Lisbon Treaty assigned the EEAS a role in programming of country and regional allocations. In the pre-Lisbon period, the Commission was responsible for aid programming. DG Development and DG RELEX made the EDF and the DCI programming respectively. While DG Development gave more weight in allocation of funds for development issues, DG RELEX prioritized security and conflict issues over development.⁵⁵⁹


The role of EEAS in aid programming through the control of budget lines influenced the balance between the EEAS and DG Development. During negotiations on the EEAS, all external budget instruments had been formally put under the control of the EEAS and the High Representative. However, the European Parliament put pressure for the involvement of DG Development in the formulation of annual spending programs of the DCI and the EDF. However, the submission of programming of the DCI and the EDF to the College of Commission can be done with the mutual agreement of DG Development and the EEAS.⁵⁶⁰ The division of tasks between the EEAS and DG DEVCO in terms of political programming and implementation has led to tensions. In some cases, the EEAS may be seen as competing with the Commission, rather providing strategic guidance to overall EU external action. Furthermore, the Commission deals with "operational money" of external aid instruments whereas the EEAS cannot deliver money. Hence, the relationship between the EEAS and DG DEVCO has become open to fighting and disagreements.⁵⁶¹

⁵⁵⁸ Mario Giuseppe Varrenti, "EU Development Cooperation After Lisbon: The Role of the European External Action Service", *College of Europe's EU Diplomacy Papers* 10, 2010, p. 6.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

⁵⁶⁰ Holland and Doidge, op.cit, p. 126.

Table 14. EU Development Policy Planning and Programming between EEAS and DG DEVCO (Source: Isabella Tannous, “The Programming of EU’s External Assistance and Development Aid and the Fragile Balance of Power between EEAS and DG DEVCO”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 18, No. 3, 2013))



Furthermore, the involvement of the EEAS in aid programming is undermining the image of the EU as “a benevolent actor” since the EEAS could facilitate that the use of development funds for short-term foreign policy interests.⁵⁶²

The EEAS’s role in aid programming has led to concerns about the use of development funds for non-development purposes such foreign policy objectives. For example, the EU shifted its development funds from Africa to East Europe in the 1990s as a consequence of its declining interests to this continent. Recently, the EU decided to support crisis management and

⁵⁶¹ EU Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, op.cit., p.48

⁵⁶² Bartelt, op.cit.,p.23.

peacekeeping missions of the African Union from the EDF budget. Furthermore, the EU preferred to allocate more funds for high profile humanitarian crises to increase its visibility in international scene.⁵⁶³

Despite these concerns, the EEAS was presented as an institutional innovation for the enhancement of synergy between foreign and development policies. As a matter of fact, the EEAS provides both challenges and opportunities for EU development policy. Despite its potential gains for development policy, the lack of safeguards for the protection of development policy against the dominance of foreign policy under the EEAS leads to doubts about the use of development funds for short-term foreign policy interests. The EU's security concerns such as building regional stability in the neighbourhood, the fight against terrorism or illegal migration could influence the EU's policies towards developing world.⁵⁶⁴ Besides, big member states, namely 'Big Three' consisting of Germany, France and the UK, could dominate the EU's external policy making and put pressure for the utilisation of EU's policies and instruments as means for advancing their national interests.⁵⁶⁵

6.5 The Future of EU Development Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era

Until the mid-1980s, development policy was directed towards the former colonies of EU member states in Africa. The successive Lomé Conventions provided generous aid and trade packages that stimulated economic growth in these countries. With the end of the Cold War, the scope of development policy was expanded geographically and aligned with the EU's wider external relations agenda.⁵⁶⁶ In the 1990s, the Union development policy was influenced by foreign policy priorities of the EU. The EU development policy focused on the CEECS and overlooked development needs of African

⁵⁶³ Varrenti, op.cit., p. 10.

⁵⁶⁴ Furness, op.cit., pp. 81-82.

⁵⁶⁵ Furness, op.cit., p. 77.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 12.

Countries. In the 2000s, the Lisbon Treaty affirmed this trend of “a more coherent yet more ‘politically’ driven EU external action”.⁵⁶⁷

The Lisbon Treaty maintains the autonomy of development policy and recognizes sustainable development and poverty reduction among the general principles of the EU’s external action. However, the policy making and implementation process of the Union’s development policy give rise to concerns about the subordination of long-term development policy objectives to short-term foreign policy interests.⁵⁶⁸ The redesign the EU’s external relations with the operationalization of the Lisbon Treaty raised questions the about instrumentalization of development aid foreign policy objectives such as the pursuit of economic and security interests rather than needs of poor.⁵⁶⁹ The EEAS’s involvement into programming procedure may open the way for aid delivery on the basis of geo-economic and commercial interests. Hence, the autonomy of development policy is not protected vis-a-vis other spheres of EU external policy.

Moreover, the Euro crisis is threatening the future of EU development policy. Majority of EU member states cut their aid allocations for budgetary constraints. Member states are now less committed to development goals. The poverty focus of development policy may shift to other foreign policy priorities of the member states in the coming years.

6.6 Conclusion

The Lisbon Treaty entered into force for making the EU more effective and coherent in the global politics. It established new posts in EU external relations and reorganized administrative structure of EU external relations. Additionally, the new Treaty abolished the division within the Commission in terms of management of development policy. In the pre-Lisbon era, the EU-ACP

⁵⁶⁷ Maurizio Carbone, “Development Policy, the Treaty of Lisbon and the EU’s Role in the International Arena”, *EUSA Review* (Vol. 23, No. 1, 2010), p. 11.

⁵⁶⁸ Maurizio Carbone, “The EU and the Developing World” op.cit., p. 325.

⁵⁶⁹ Varrenti, op.cit., pp.9-10.

relations were conducted by the DG Development, the EU's relations with Asia, Latin America and the Middle East were managed by the DG RELEX. The Lisbon Treaty unified all geographic desks under the EEAS and assigned the task of implementation of all development policy instruments to Development Commissioner. The EEAS was given a role in aid planning process alongside with DG Development. The involvement of the EEAS in aid planning gives rise of concerns about the autonomy of development policy with respect to short-term political interests of the EU.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis has investigated significant changes that have occurred in EU development policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in the 2000s. It has covered changes in the substance, means and institutional structure of EU development policy from the adoption of the MDGs to the establishment of the EEAS. It consists of analytical, contextual and empirical parts on EU development policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to in-depth study of the EU's development policy towards sub-Saharan Africa, this thesis has attempted to provide a theory-informed examination of EU development policy change towards this region.

In the literature, the evolution of EU development policy was explained with regard to the peculiar characteristics of EU policymaking process and the role of member states. This study has examined the EU development policy change by taking into account both intra-EU and extra-EU factors and offered an alternative approach to inward-looking analysis of EU development policy change. This study has underlined the importance of the interconnectedness of the EU with the global development politics. Hence, one of the findings of this study is that the Union development policy can not be fully understood by looking solely on EU-internal factors such as EU policy making process or EU institutions.

Despite the growing literature on EU development policy, it is a weakly-theorized issue. The review of literature reveals that neither the existing body of IR theories nor theoretically-informed EU foreign policy approaches have proven to be relevant for the analysis of EU development policy change. IR

theories usually examine bilateral development policies of member states or intergovernmental development agencies at the global. The EU is neither state nor international organisation in a conventional sense. Hence, the EU poses challenges to IR theory as a unit of analysis. On the other side, the literature on the EU's global role, actorness and powerness approaches seem to be relevant for EU development policy change. For instance, numerous conceptualisations of power such as civilian power, normative or ethical power are used to examine the EU development policy. Despite the fact that these concepts are useful for the differentiation of the EU from other donors and indicating the distinctive features of EU development policy, they are not relevant for analysis of change. On the other side, the actorness approach is primarily concerned with the impact of EU development policy, not change analysis. Consequently, this dissertation adopted Hill and Smith's analytical framework and has demonstrated its applicability and relevance for explaining EU development policy change. It has examined the EU development policy change towards sub-Saharan Africa in the 2000s in three perspectives: system, process and power.

The EU as a subsystem perspective focuses on the relationship between the EU institutions and member states. It explains change through relationship between whole and parts, i.e. EU and member states. Therefore, sub-system perspective underlines the importance of factors related to the internal management of the policy such as *intra-EU coordination and internal distribution of competences* among EU member states. The second perspective, the EU as a participant to wider process of global development politics, explains change with the EU's participation to multilateral global development process. The Union takes an active role in "process of exchange and cooperation" with other global development institutions and engages in the formation of global development policy at the global level. On this account, the Union's development policy change is primarily driven by the EU's commitment with multilateral development policy process at the global level. The EU final power perspective indicates the EU's material and non-material

capabilities in EU development policy and points out the use of development policy for the EU's aspiration to be a global power in world politics.

The contextual framework has traced the evolution of both global and EU development policy from 1950s to current era. This chapter demonstrated that EU development policy is not isolated from outer influences. It has been an evolving policy under the influence of changes in global development politics and dominant aid paradigms. Despite the existence of "multitude of contexts" in global development politics, this thesis has narrowed down contexts into two: international and EU contexts. In the early years of EU development policy, maintenance of post-colonial relations was a major motivating factor for the EU development policy towards sub-Saharan African countries. The EU development policy was mainly shaped by former colonial powers, especially France. Hence, EU development policy had a regional orientation towards francophone countries in West Africa. The first enlargement of the EU and accession of Britain, Ireland and Denmark changed geographical orientation of EU development policy. Most of decolonised countries of Africa were included in the development policy. Lomé Convention became a hallmark in the evolution of EU development policy. Influenced by New International Economic Order of 1970s, Lomé Convention offered a unique development policy model on the basis of equality and partnership. The successive Lomé Conventions between the EC and the ACP countries became a model of North-South relations. Yet, the end of Cold War and subsequently globalisation process altered the EU development policy significantly. The leverage of history-based or geopolitical factors started to decline during this period. Furthermore, the EU development policy was increasingly affected by liberalism and democratisation waves of 1990s. The EU's policy priorities shifted from the ACP countries to its newly independent CEECs. The post-millennium period was marked by the urgency of responding global challenges such as poverty, human suffering, fragile states, climate change at the global level. The MDGs were adopted as a main normative framework of global development and poverty

reduction became overarching objective of global aid efforts. In addition to adoption of the MDGs, international aid landscape was recasted by the rise of non-DAC donors from global South. The shift of wealth and power from West to global East and South influenced development aid patterns. North-South relations have been challenged by the rise of non-DAC donors like BRICs and intensification of South-South cooperation. In addition to rise of Southern donors, non-governmental organisations, private foundations and faith-based charities have become new actors of global development politics. Consequently, multiplication and proliferation of donors have made development policy more complex. In response to rise of non-DAC donors, the EU continues to act together with OECD-DAC members. Besides, the EU has assumed new global responsibilities and recognised poverty reduction as an overarching goal of its development policy.

Changes in multilateral aspect of EU development policy have been discussed from adoption of European Consensus in 2005 to the Agenda for Change in 2012. Before investigating changing aspects of EU development policy, this chapter explained the decision-making process in EU development policy and member states' bilateral development policies. The change in multilateral aspect of EU development policy could be seen as a "qualitative change" in EU development policy in terms of effectiveness, coherence and impact. European Consensus on Development, the EU's commitment to the MDGs, EU's Code of Conduct on Division of Labour and Agenda for Change became main stepping stones for this change. These changes aimed at greater coherence and effectiveness of the EU development policy and shared commitments of member states. In this regard, the European Consensus on Development was a significant development for advance of intra-EU cohesion. It established a common vision, principles and norms of EU development policy for the first time in the EU history. It was accepted by all EU members and EU institutions. Afterwards, the EU's Code of Conduct on Division of Labour was adopted for the prevention of fragmentation of EU development aid and duplication of aid efforts. It provided the EU with opportunity to deepen coordination of Member states aid policies in third countries. It envisaged

division of labour in aid allocation by means of “ in-country complementarity”, “cross-country complementarity” and “cross-sector complementarity”. In addition to division of labour, the EU has put forward country “ joint-programming” in aid allocation recently. Furthermore, Agenda for Change stimulated a debate on the upgrade of EU development policy with respect to shifts in global poverty. It offered a differentiation of aid allocation on the basis of income and encouraged aid delivery in countries and sectors where EU aid could have maximum impact. Besides, it emphasized importance of sustainable and inclusive growth, good governance and human rights and underlined value-based understanding of EU development policy. Also, it promoted budget support for more efficient way of aid delivery.

These changes are the outcome of bargaining and negotiations between the EU institutions and member states. Hence, changes in multilateral aspect of the EU’s development policy are usually associated with considered preferences and interests of the EU member states. Member states can leverage control over the EU’s behavior through their financial contributions and representation in the Council. Big members states could play a decisive role through their “power of purse”. However, EU as subsystem perspective reminds that the EU is not the sum of its member states. It has its own institutions, norms and rules that enable the Union to pursue its own policy that could be quite different from bilateral development policies of member states.

In this regard, changes in multilateral EU development policy could be explained by sub-system perspective since they have been made to reverse general perception of the EU development policy as “less than sum of its parts”. The coordination of member states development policies is a difficult task owing to the diversity of EU member states. Yet, the European Commission has played an “activator” role in these changes in order to improve coordination and harmonisation of member states’ development policies at the EU level. Commission put pressure for the advance of integration and coordination at the EU level. The Commission tried to integrate member states development policy at the EU level on the basis of the UN’s MDGs and OECD’s

Aid Effectiveness Agenda. In advancing more coordinated and integrated EU development policy, the Commission made use of conducive environment of multilateral global development politics and transposed international aid effectiveness principles to the EU level. For instance, the Union has facilitated the dissemination of Paris Aid Effectiveness principles among member states. Hence, the EU has become major platform for the implementation of global development norms and practices in the second half of the 2000s. Since the EU development policy is a shared competence between the EU institutions and member states, reconciliation of divergent interests and coordination of member states development policy have taken place to a limited extent. The Commission's attempts for more coordinated European aid have not led to the communitarisation of the EU development policy.

Changes in bilateral aspect of EU development policy change illustrated the role of global development process on the EU. The dissatisfaction with the results of successive Lomé Conventions gave rise to overhaul the EU's development policy towards sub-Saharan African countries. Cotonou Partnership Agreement changed the EU's development policy towards sub-Saharan African countries substantially. Poverty reduction was declared as a main objective of EU development policy. Besides, political objectives of promotion of rule of law, democracy, good governance and human rights were added to the content of EU development policy. Unlike successive Lomé Conventions that had political neutrality towards sub-Saharan African countries until the 1990s, Cotonou brought political conditionality in aid delivery. In this sense, the promotion of EU's values and norms became one of the objectives of the EU development policy. In line with democracy promotion, the EU encouraged participatory model of development in sub-Saharan African countries and emphasized the role of civil society in economic and social development of Africa. Furthermore, the EU put emphasis on trade liberalisation and integration of sub-Saharan African countries to world economy. Hence, the EU abolished non-reciprocal trade preferences given to the

ACP countries and ended trade privileges. The Union offered EPAs to replace former trade concessions. Consequently, the unique features of EU's relationship with sub-Saharan African countries such as non-reciprocal trade relations, unconditional aid, need-based aid allocation changed with the Cotonou Agreement.

Changes in the EU's bilateral donor role were mainly driven by EU's adaptation to political and economic liberalisation of global development institutions. The changes in political aspect of development policy were mainly associated with policies of the World Bank. Starting from the 1990s, World Bank drew attention to non-income aspect of poverty and underlined the importance of good governance, transparency, effective public management and building of civil society for economic and social growth. On the other hand, removal of barriers for free trade is the main objective of the WTO. Although the WTO is not a development agency, its policies have significant impact on EU development policy. As a member of the WTO, the EU followed trade liberalisation approach of the WTO and ended trade privileges given to sub-Saharan African countries. Similar to WTO approach, the EU endorsed free trade as an instrument for economic growth. Aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks, security concerns became one of motivations for development aid. The EU regarded fragile states in Africa as one of the main challenges for development policy and shifted part of its funds for tackling with security challenges emanating from these states. Hence, sub-Saharan countries are no longer seen as a privileged group of countries in EU development policy. The EU abandoned its distinctive development policy towards sub-Saharan African countries and adjusted its development policy to multilateral development process at the global level. The donor dynamics of EU development policy has weakened. Political and economic liberalisation and dealing with security challenges gained importance.

The chapter on change in institutional structure of development policy has investigated the reorganisation of EU development policy in post-Lisbon era. The Lisbon Treaty brought significant changes in the institutional structure of EU development policy. Lisbon Treaty aimed at more coherent and effective Union in global politics and brought different aspects of external relations together. The establishment of High Representative/Vice President and the EEAS as a diplomatic service altered policy making in EU external relations. Besides, the Union was provided with single legal personality and the role of EU delegations in EU development policy was increased. Poverty reduction was legally endorsed as an objective of EU external action. The part of Commission role in the EU's external relations was transferred to the EEAS. The Lisbon Treaty ended geographically divided management of EU development aid and established single DG and single Commissioner for EU development policy. Development policy is located under the EU external action to strengthen the EU's coherence and effectiveness in global politics. The Lisbon Treaty omitted special clauses that safeguard special status of the EDF. Despite the existence of separate development Commissioner and global coverage of development policy, the involvement of the EEAS to programming of development policy has weakened the role of the Commission in development policy and paved the way for the diversion of development allocations for the attainment of foreign policy objectives. Consequently, changes in institutional structure of the EU development policy have illustrated that development policy has been increasingly considered as one of the instruments of EU toolbox for exerting influence in developing world in the post-Lisbon era. Power perspective accounts for changes in institutional structure of EU development policy. The involvement of the EEAS in planning and programming of development aid undermined the autonomy of EU development policy vis-a-vis EU external policies. The EU development policy has become open to the influence of the Union's diplomatic services. Besides, neither institutional nor financial safeguards have been envisaged to protect altruistic aspect of EU development policy.

Summing up, the EU development policy towards sub-Saharan Africa changed dramatically in the 2000s. This dissertation attempted to unravel causes of these changes on the basis of Hill and Smih's analytical model. It offered three perspectives for explaining EU development policy change. Hence, it has provided one step forward in theory-oriented analysis of EU development policy change. It has revealed activator role of Commission for more integrated and coordinated development policy in line with global aid effectiveness agenda. It has indicated that that EU development policy change has been predominantly driven by the EU's adaptation to multilateral global development process and thus EU's search for consolidation of its position in the OECD-DAC led global aid system. Furthermore, it has illustrated the weakening of the autonomy of the EU development policy in the post-Lisbon era, which may lead to drift away of development policy from the needs of sub-Saharan African countries. Further research stemming from this dissertation could analyse the EU's relations with sub-Saharan African countries after the revision and upgrade of MDGs in 2015. Another avenue of further research would deepen the analysis of change in the EU's development policy by taking one of sub-Saharan African country as a case study and examine the role of inter-institutional relations between the Commission and the EEAS in Union's development policy towards this country.

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APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

2000'Lİ YILLARDA AB'İN SAHRAALTI AFRIKA'YA YÖNELİK KALKINMA POLİTİKASINDAKİ DEĞİŞİMİ AÇIKLAMAK: SİSTEM, SÜREÇ VE GÜÇ PERSPEKTİFLERİ

II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde, Marshall Programının Batı Avrupa'daki başarılı uygulanmasıyla birlikte kalkınma yardımları uluslararası siyasetin önemli unsurlarından biri olmuştur. Batı Avrupa'nın savaş sonrası yeniden inşasının yanısıra, 1950li yıllarda Afrika'da ve Asya'daki sömürsüzleşme sürecindeki ülkelerin ekonomik ve sosyal refahına destek olmak için kalkınma yardımları verilmiştir. Ancak zaman içinde kalkınma yardımlarının rolü ve kalkınma yardımlarını sağlayan aktörler değişmiştir. Kalkınma yardımları ulus-devletler tarafından ulusal ticari çıkarları korumak veya uluslar arası terörizm ile mücadele etmek gibi farklı amaçları gerçekleştirmek için kullanılmaya başlamıştır. Devletler kalkınma yardımlarını çıkar temelli amaçlı için kullanıyor olsalar da küresel anlamda faaliyet gösteren çoktarafli örgütler kalkınma yardımlarını ekonomik ve siyasi istikrarı inşa etmek ve küresel refahı yükseltmek gibi amaçlar için kullanmışlardır.

Kendine özgü bir örgüt olarak Avrupa Birliği (AB) kalkınma yardımlarını Avrupa Bütünleşme Sürecinin başlangıcından bu yana sağlamaktadır. Dünya Bankası ve Birleşmiş Milletler'in Kalkınma Programı ile karşılaştırıldığında AB'nin Kalkınma Politikasında kendine has bir rolü vardır. Doğrudan kalkınma yardımı sağlamanın yanında AB, 28 üye devletin ikili kalkınma politikalarının koordinasyonunu yürütmektedir. AB'nin kendi yardım bütçesi ve bürokrasisi, Birlik in kalkınma yardımlarını dünyanın farklı bölgelerine ulaşmasına olanak sağlamaktadır. Donör rolünün yanısıra, AB

küresel kalkınma politikasında aktif bir oynamakta ve üye devletlerin kalkınma meselelerindeki işbirliğini güçlendirmektedir.

AB Kalkınma Politikası Birliğin en eski politikalarından biridir. İlk olarak Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğunun (AET) kurucu üyelerinin 18 eski sömürgesiyle bir ortaklık ilişkisi olarak başlayan kalkınma yardımlarının zamanla coğrafi kapsamı genişlemiştir. 1970'lere gelindiğinde AB neredeyse sömürgesizleşme sürecindeki bütün Sahraaltı Afrika ülkelerine kalkınma yardımı sağlamaya başlamıştır. Karşılıklı olmayan ticari tercihler ve cömert mali yardım paketleri sayesinde AB Kalkınma Politikası "Kuzey-Güney" ilişkileri için örnek bir model teşkil etmiştir. 1980'lere gelindiğinde AB Kalkınma Politikasının coğrafi kapsamı genişleyerek Latin Amerika ve Akdeniz ülkelerine uzanmıştır. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında AB'nin Kalkınma Politikası Orta ve Doğu Avrupa Ülkelerinin liberalleşmesi ve demokratikleşmesi amacıyla kullanılmıştır. 2000'li yıllarda ise AB dünyadaki en önemli kalkınma yardımı donörlerinden biri durumunda gelmiştir. Günümüzde, üye devletleri ile birlikte AB dünyadaki resmi kalkınma yardımlarının yarısından fazlasını sağlamaktadır.

2000'li yıllarda Binyıl Kalkınma Hedeflerinin Birleşmiş Milletler üyesi devletler tarafından kabulü küresel seviyede kalkınma yardımları için bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Birleşmiş Milletler Üyesi devletler, 2015 yılı sonuna kadar gerçekleştirilmesi hedeflenen yoksulluğun azaltılması, temel eğitimin yaygınlaştırılması, çocuk ölüm oranlarının azaltılması, cinsiyet eşitliğinin sağlanması, anne sağlığının geliştirilmesi gibi somut hedefler üzerinde anlaşmışlardır. Binyıl Kalkınma Hedefleri, kalkınma yardımı çabalarını küresel seviyeye taşıırken yoksulluğun azaltılmasını küresel kalkınma politikasının merkezine yerleştirmiştir.

Binyıl Kalkınma Hedeflerinin yanında ekonomik ve siyasi gücün küresel düzeyde Batıdan Güneye kayması 2000'li yıllarda küresel Kalkınma Politikasını önemli ölçüde değiştirmiş, Küresel Güney'de yükselişe geçen BRICS ülkeleri OECD-DAC temelinde yürüten Batı merkezli Kalkınma Politikalarına ve uygulamalarına meydan okumaya başlamıştır. Bunun yanında sivil toplum örgütleri, özel vakıflar, sınır ötesi yardım grupları da donör olarak uluslararası kalkınma politikasının bir parçası olmuştur. Kamu ve özel donörlerin artması ve çoğalması Kalkınma Yardımlarını daha da karmaşık hale getirmiştir.

Bu ortamda AB kalkınma politikası da 2000'li yıllar boyunca kritik bir dönüşüm sürecine girmiş ve bu kapsamda AB'nin Sahraaltı Afrika'ya yönelik Kalkınma politikasının amaçları, rolü, pratikleri ve kurumsal yapısı değişime uğramıştır. Bu çerçevede bu tez çalışması bu değişimlerin nedenleri açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu kapsamda Binyıl Kalkınma Hedeflerinin 2000 yılında kabulünden 2011 yılında Avrupa Dış Faaliyetler Servisi'nin Lizbon Antlaşması ile kuruluşuna kadar geçen dönemdeki AB kalkınma politikasını ayrıntılı bir şekilde incelemektedir. Bu tez birbiriyle bağlantılı 3 araştırma sorusuna cevap aramaktadır:

- 2000'li yıllarda AB'nin Sahraaltı Afrika'ya yönelik Kalkınma politikasında neler değişmiştir?
- Neden bu değişimler gerçekleşmiştir?
- Bu değişimler nasıl gerçekleşmiştir?

Bu çalışmadaki bağımlı değişken AB Kalkınma Politikasındaki değişim iken bağımsız değişken AB-içi koordinasyon, AB'nin çoktarafli kalkınma politikası sürecine katılımı ve AB'nin güç arayışıdır. Bu çerçevede bu çalışmanın 3 hipotezi vardır:

İlk hipotez AB Kalkınma Politikasındaki değişimin AB'nin, AB seviyesinde daha bütünleşik ve eşgüdümlü bir politika arayışının sonucu olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. İkinci hipotez AB Kalkınma Politikasındaki

değişimin AB'nin küresel seviyedeki çoktarafli kalkınma politika sürecine uyum ve işbirliği çabalarında kaynaklandığını ileri sürmektedir. Üçüncü hipotez ise AB kalkınma politikasındaki değişimin AB'nin dünya politikasında küresel bir güç olma isteğinden kaynaklandığını ileri sürmektedir.

Bu doğrultuda, AB Kalkınma Politikası'ndaki değişimler üç açıdan ele alınmıştır. AB'nin ikili donör rolündeki değişim, çoktarafli Kalkınma politikasındaki değişim ve AB Kalkınma Politikasının Kurumsal yapısındaki değişim. Bu tez çerçevesinde AB'nin Sahraaltı Afrika'ya yönelik kalkınma politikası örnek olay olarak seçilmiştir. AB'nin bu bölgeye Kalkınma Politikası'nın ilk kuruluş yıllardan itibaren destek sağlamaktadır. Ayrıca, sosyal ve ekonomik kalkınma açısından bu bölge dünyanın yardıma en muhtaç ve bağımlı bölgelerinden biridir. Birlik, Sahraaltı Afrika'ya sağlanan küresel yardımın yarısından fazlasını sağlamaktadır.

AB'nin kalkınmakta olan ülkelerle ilişkisini analiz eden oldukça geniş bir literatür bulunmaktadır. Ancak, AB'nin Kalkınma Yardımlarını inceleyen çalışmaların önemli bir bölümü AB'nin Kalkınma Politikaları'ndaki değişim ve devamlılığı tüm yönleriyle bütünsel olarak anlatmakta yetersiz kalmışlardır. Örneğin Martin Holland AB'nin Afrika, Karayip ve Pasifik'teki ülkeler ile Latin Amerika ve Asya'ya yönelik Kalkınma Yardımlarının AB'nin bütünleşme sürecine etkisini incelemiştir. Başlangıçta AB'nin merkezinde yer almayan Kalkınma Yardımlarının AB'nin genişleme ve derinleşme süreçlerine paralel olarak AB'nin ekonomik ve siyasi bütünleşmesinin önemli bir parçası haline geldiğini ortaya koymuştur. Ayrıca, Holland AB'nin ortak değer ve prensiplerine dayalı olarak yaptığı Kalkınma yardımlarıyla farklı bir yaklaşımı benimsediği ve bu yaklaşımın AB'nin dış ilişkilerini diğer aktörlerden farklılaştırdığını belirtmiştir. Öte yanda, AB Kalkınma Politikalarının gelişimi kolonyalizm ve post-kolonyalizm çerçevesinde incelenmiş ve Kalkınma Politikalarının AB'nin eski sömürgeleriyle ilişkisini devam ettirmek için kullandığı bir araç olarak

değerlendirilmiştir. Literatürdeki bir değer akım, AB'yi devletten farklı ama devlet-benzeri aktör olarak tanımlama çabalarından yola çıkmış ve aktörlük kavramı ile Kalkınma Yardımlarını analiz etmeye çalışmıştır. Bu çerçevede Charlotte Bretherton ve John Vogler AB Kalkınma Politikası'nın gelişimini aktörlük kavramının unsurlarıyla açıklamıştır. Ayrıca, AB Dış Politikası'nda kullanılan sivil güç, normatif güç ya da etik güç bir kavramlarla da AB Kalkınma Politikası analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Bu tez de ise AB Kalkınma Politikası'daki değişimler sistem, süreç ve güçten oluşan üç ana perspektif çerçevesinde açıklanmıştır. Bu çalışma literatürdeki boşluğu AB Kalkınma Politikasında son 10 yılda yaşanan değişimi sistematik bir şekilde açıklayarak doldurmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışma, AB kalkınma politikası değişimini açıklamak için bir analiz çerçevesi sunmaktadır. Bu açıdan, bu tezin literatüre temel katkısı Christopher ve Michael Smith'in "International Relations and the European Union" başlıklı kitaplarında geliştirdikleri genel çerçeveyi AB kalkınma politikası alanına bu analiz çerçevesine "değişim boyutunu" ekleyerek uygulamasıdır.

Bu tezin teorik kısmında, AB Kalkınma Politikası'ndaki değişim, alt-sistem perspektifi açısından AB ve üye devletler arasındaki ilişkiye ve üye devletler ve AB kurumları arasındaki karşılıklı bağımlılık üzerine odaklanarak incelenmektedir. Bu perspektif, değişimi bütün ve parçalar yani AB ve üye devletler arasındaki ilişki aracılığıyla açıklamaktadır. Bu perspektif AB kalkınma politikasındaki değişimi açıklarken AB içi koordinasyonu ve AB içi yetkilerin dağılımı derecesinin rolünün altını çizmektedir. İkinci perspektifte AB daha geniş uluslararası ilişkiler sürecinin bir katılımcısı olarak ele alınmış ve değişim AB'nin çoktarafli küresel sürece uyum sağlama ile açıklamaktadır. Bu çerçevede, AB, küresel düzeyde "değişim, işbirliği ve çatışma süreci"nde aktif olarak yer almış ve küresel seviyedeki kalkınma politikasının oluşumu ve uygulamasına katkıda bulunmuştur. Son perspektif olan güç perspektifi ise AB'nin maddi ve maddi olmayan kabiliyetleri üzerinde durmuştur. Bu

perspektif, AB kalkınma politikasındaki değişimi AB'nin küresel bir güç olma isteği ile açıklamaktadır.

Tezin ikinci bölümü bağlamsal çerçevede küresel Kalkınma Politikasının 1950'lerden bugüne kadar gelen gelişim süreci ve AB'ye Kalkınma Politikası üzerine etkileri tartışılmıştır. Bu bölüm AB Kalkınma Politikasının dış etkilerden izole olmadığını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Buna göre AB'nin kalkınma politikası küresel ortam ve küresel yardım paradigmasındaki değişimler temelinde sürekli gelişen ve evrilen bir politikadır. Küresel kalkınma politikasında birçok bağlam olmasına rağmen bu çalışma bağlamı uluslar arası bağlam ve AB bağlamı olmak üzere iki ana başlık ile sınırlamıştır. AB Kalkınma Politikası Birliğin 1960'lı yıllarda üye ülkelerin Sahraaltı Afrika'daki eski sömürgeleriyle olan ilişkilerini sürdürme amacıyla başlatılmıştır. Bu dönemde AB Kalkınma politikası özellikle Fransa gibi eski sömürgeci güçler tarafından şekillendirilmiştir. Bu nedenle AB Kalkınma Politikasının Batı Afrika'daki Frankofon ülkelere yönelik bölgesel bir yönelimi vardı. AB'nin ilk genişlemesi ile Birliğe İngiltere, Danimarka ve İrlanda'nın katılımı sonrası Birlik kalkınma politikasının coğrafi yönelimi de değişikliğe uğramıştır. Afrika'daki eski sömürgelerin çoğu Birlik kalkınma politikasının kapsamına alınmıştır. Ancak Lomé Konvansiyonu Birlik kalkınma politikası için gerçek bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. 1970'li yıllarda ortaya çıkan Yeni Uluslar arası Ekonomik Düzen'den etkilenerek Lomé Konvansiyonu eşitlik ve ortaklık temelinde kendine özgü bir kalkınma politikası modeli ortaya çıkarmıştır. Birlik ve Asya, Karayip, Pasifik (AKP) Ülkeleri arasında birbiri ardına imzalanan Lomé Konvansiyonları Kuzey-Güney ilişkileri için bir model oluşturmuştur. Ancak Soğuk Savaşın bitişi ve onu izleyen küreselleşme süreci AB kalkınma politikasında önemli değişikliklere neden olmuştur. Bu dönemde tarihsel ve jeopolitik faktörler önemlerini yitirmeye başlamışlardır. 1990'lı yıllardan itibaren AB kalkınma politikası ekonomik liberalizm ve demokratikleşme süreçlerinden etkilenmeye başlamıştır. AB'nin politika öncelikleri AKP Ülkelerinden yeni bağımsızlığını kazanmış olan Orta ve Doğu Avrupa Ülkelerine kaymıştır. 2000'li yıllar

yoksulluk, kırılgan devletler, iklim deęişim gibi küresel seviyedeki tehditlere karşı acil önlem alınması ihtiyacının farkına varıldığı bir dönem olmuştur. Bu amaçla Birleşmiş Milletler üyesi devletler 2000 yılında Binyıl Kalkınma Hedeflerini benimsemişlerdir. Bu hedefler küresel kalkınmanın temel normatif çerçevesi olmuş ve yoksulluğun azaltılması küresel yardım çabalarının temel hedefi haline gelmiştir. Bunun yanında küresel Güney’de Çin gibi OECD-Kalkınma İşbirliği Direktörlüğü üyesi olmayan yeni donörlerin uluslararası sahneye çıkmaya başlaması ile uluslararası yardım ortamı yeniden şekillenmeye başlamıştır. Daha önceki dönemdeki yardım paradigmasını şekillendiren “Kuzey-Güney” işbirliği küresel kalkınma politikasında yeni ortaya çıkmakta olan “Güney-Güney” kalkınma işbirliği tarafından ciddi anlamda tehdit edilmeye başlanmıştır. Bu dönemde uluslar arasındaki ilişkilerin yanında resmi-gayri-resmi ilişkiler ve kamu ve özel ilişkiler de önem kazanmıştır. Sonuç olarak kalkınma politikası birçok aktörü bir araya getiren çok paydaşlı bir süreç haline gelmiştir.

Tezin üçüncü bölümümde 2005 yılında kabul edilen AB Kalkınma Konsensus’undan 2012’de kabul edilen Deęişim Gündemi’ne kadar geçen dönemde AB Kalkınma Politikasının çoktarafli boyutunda yaşanan deęişim incelenmiştir. Bu bölümde AB Kalkınma politikasının deęişen noktalarının yanında AB Kalkınma politikası kapsamındaki karar alma süreci ve üye devletlerin iki tarafli Kalkınma politikalarının genel özellikleri üzerinde de durulmuştur. AB Kalkınma Politikasının çoktarafli boyutundaki deęişim etkililik, bütünlük ve etki açılarından bir “niteliksel bir deęişimi” ifade etmektedir. AB Kalkınma Konsensusü,, AB’nin Binyıl Kalkınma Hedeflerine yönelik taahhütü, AB’nin Kalkınma İşbölümü ve Deęişim Gündemi AB’nin çoktarafli kalkınma politikasının temel enstrümanları olmuşlardır. Bunlar “daha fazla, daha iyi ve daha hızlı Avrupa yardımı” fikrini gerçekleştirmeyi amaçlayan önemli belgelerdir. AB’nin çok tarafli yardım politikasındaki deęişim sistem perspektifiyle açıklanmıştır. Özellikle Birliğe üye devletlerin çeşitlilięi üye devletlerin kalkınma politikalarının koordinasyonunu ve etkinliğini artırmayı

zorlu bir görev haline getirmiştir. Bu bağlamda AB Kalkınma Konsensüsü AB- içi bütünlüğün sağlanması yolunda önemli bir gelişme olmuştur. Bu belge Birlik tarihinde ilk kez AB Kalkınma Politikası için ortak vizyon, ilkeler ve normlar oluşturmuştur. Bu ilke ve normlar bütün üye devletler ve Birlik kurumları tarafından benimsenmiştir. AB Kalkınma İşbölümü ise AB Kalkınma Yardımlarında görülen dağılımı ve kaynak israfını önlemek amacıyla hazırlanmış ve kabul edilmiştir. Böylelikle, AB'ye üye devletler arasında Kalkınma Politikaları'nın koordinasyonunun gelişmesi hedeflenmiştir. Bu belge yardım tahsisinde işbölümünü "ülke içi bütünlük", ülkeler arası bütünlük" ve "sektörler arası bütünlük" aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilmesini öngörmüştür. Değişim Gündemi ise Birlik Kalkınma Politikası'nın küresel yoksulluktaki değişime uygun olarak farklılaşması ve etkililiğinin artırılması amaçlanmıştır. Kalkınma yardımlarının gelir temelinde farklılaştırılması önerilmiş ve sürdürülebilir ve kapsayıcı kalkınmanın önemi belirtilmiştir. Bunun yanında doğrudan bütçe desteği et etkili Kalkınma Yardımı türü olarak teşvik edilmiştir.

AB'nin Sahraaltı ülkelere yönelik ikili Kalkınma Politikası'ndaki değişim Cotonou Anlaşması ve onun 2005 ve 2010 revizyonları çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Her şeyden önce Cotonou Anlaşması AB'nin ikili Kalkınma Politikasının temel hedeflerini değiştirmiştir. Yoksulluğun azaltılması temel amacının yanında hukukun üstünlüğü, demokrasi, iyi yönetim ve insan haklarının yaygınlaştırılıp güçlendirilmesi gibi siyasi amaçlar AB kalkınma politikasının kapsamına alınmıştır. Sahraaltı Afrika ülkelerine yönelik siyasi tarafsızlığa dayanan Lomé Konvansiyonlarından farklı olarak AB'nin değer ve normlarının yaygınlaştırılıp, güçlendirilmesi AB Kalkınma politikasının temel hedeflerinden biri haline gelmiştir. Demokrasinin yaygınlaştırılıp güçlendirilmesine paralel olarak Birlik Sahraaltı Afrika ülkelerinde katılımcı kalkınma modelini desteklemiş ve Afrika'nın ekonomik ve sosyal kalkınmasında sivil toplumun rolüne vurgu yapmıştır. Bunun yanında AB Kalkınma Politikasını Sahraaltı Afrika ülkelerinin dünya ekonomisi ile bütünleşmesini sağlamak ve sözkonusu ülkelerinde ekonomilerinin liberalleşmesi amacıyla kullanmıştır.

Buna baęlı olarak da AB, AKP Ülkelerine tanınan karşılıklı olmayan ticari imtiyazları kaldırmıştır. Birlik bu ticari imtiyazların yerini alacak bölgesel Ekonomik Ortaklık Anlaşmaları önermiştir. Kalkınma Politikasındaki bu deęişimler AB'nin küresel düzeyde çoktarafli Kalkınma Politikası sürecine uyum sağlama çabasıyla açıklanmıştır. Özellikle Kalkınma politikasının siyasi boyutunda yaşanan deęişim Dünya Bankası'nının politikalarıyla yakından ilgilidir. 1990'lı yıllardan itibaren Dünya Bankası yoksulluğun gelir harici öğelerine dikkat çekmiş ve iyi yönetim, şeffaflık, etkin kamu yönetimi ve ekonomik ve sosyal kalkınma için sivil toplum inşasının önemi üzerinde durmuştur. Dięer taraftan serbest ticaretin önündeki engellerin kaldırılması Dünya Ticaret Örgütü'nün (DTÖ) temel amacıdır. Her ne kadar DTÖ bir kalkınma kuruluşu olmasa da izledięi politikaların AB'nin Kalkınma politikası üzerinde önemli etkileri olmuştur. Bir DTÖ üyesi olarak AB Örgütü'nün ticari liberalizasyon yaklaşımını izlemiş ve Sahraaltı ülkelere tanınan ticari ayrıcalıkları kaldırmıştır. AB, DTÖ'ye benzer şekilde serbest ticareti ekonomik kalkınmanın bir enstrümanı olarak kabul etmiştir. Böylece, Sahraaltı Afrika ülkeleri AB Kalkınma Politikasındaki ayrıcalıklı yerlerini kaybetmişlerdir. AB, Kalkınma Politikası'dan kendine özgü uygulamalardan vazgeçmiş ve "küresellięe" geçiş yapmıştır. Birlik, küresel seviyede çoktarafli Kalkınma politikası sürecindeki deęişimlere uyum sağlamayı hedeflemiştir.

11 Eylül sonrası dönemde ise güvenlik endişeleri AB Kalkınma politikalarını önemli ölçüde şekillendirmiştir. AB, Afrika'daki kırılğan devletlerdeki güvenlik sorunları ciddi risk olarak deęerlendirmiş ve Cotonou Anlaşması'nın 2005 ve 2010 Revizyonlarıyla AB Kalkınma Fonu'nun güvenlik amacıyla kullanılmasına imkan verilmiştir.

Birlik Kalkınma Politikasındaki kurumsal deęişimler Lizbon Anlaşması'nın çerçevesinde ele alınmıştır. Lizbon Anlaşması ile AB'nin "sütun"lara dayalı yetki ve politika dağılımı sona ermiştir. AB'nin Dış İlişkileri yeni oluşturulan kurumlarla desteklenmiştir. Lizbon Anlaşması, küresel

politikada daha bütünleşik ve etkin bir Birlik yaratmayı amaçlamış ve bu amaçla Birlik Dış İlişkilerinin farklı öğelerini bir araya getirmiştir. Dış İlişkiler ve Güvenlik Politikası Yüksek Temsilci/Komisyon Başkan Yardımcısı makamının oluşturulması ve Avrupa Dış İlişkiler Servisi'nin kurulması AB Dış ilişkilerindeki politika yapım sürecini değiştirmiştir. Bunun yanında Lizbon Anlaşması ile Birlik tüzel kişiliğe kavuşmuş ve Birlik delegasyonlarının AB kalkınma politikasındaki rolleri artmıştır. Yoksulluğun azaltılması AB dış ilişkilerinin temel amaçlarında biri olarak resmi anlamda kabul edilmiştir. Komisyonun Birliğin dış ilişkilerindeki rolü Avrupa Dış İlişkiler Servisine devredilmiştir. Avrupa Kalkınma Fonunun özel statüsünü koruyan anlaşma hükümleri Lizbon Anlaşması'nda yer almamıştır. Lizbon Anlaşması kalkınma konularından sorumlu Kalkınma Komiserinin ve Kalkınma Genel Müdürlüğünün varlığı ile kalkınma politikasının özerliğini sağlamaya çalışmış olsa da Avrupa Dış İlişkiler Servisinin Kalkınma yardımlarının planlanması ve programlanması sürecine aktif katılımı kalkınma alanında Komisyonun rolünü zayıflatmıştır. Böylece, AB Kalkınma politikasının Birliğin dış politika amaçlarının gerçekleştirilmesi için kullanılmasının önü açılmıştır. AB Kalkınma Politikası'nın kurumsal yapısındaki değişim, Birlik Kalkınma politikasının giderek artan bir şekilde Birliğin küresel alanda güç sahibi olmak ve kalkınma olan ülkelerde olan ilişkisini artırmak için kullandığı araçlardan biri olmaya başladığını göstermektedir. Özellikle Avrupa Dış İlişkiler Servisinin Birlik Kalkınma Politikası'nın planlama ve programlama sürecine dahil olması, Birlik Kalkınma Politikalarının üye ülkelerin müdahalesine açık hale geleceği ve Kalkınma Politikasının fakirlikte mücadeleden daha çok Birliğin dış politika çıkarları doğrultusunda kullanılabilmesi endişelerini güçlendirmiştir.

APPENDIX B
CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Sarıkamış KAYA, Aslıgül
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU International Relations	2004
BS	METU Political Science and Public Administration	2002
High School	Ankara Gazi High School	1997

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2002- Present	METU Department of International Relations	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

English

APPENDIX C

TEZ FOTOKOPİ İZİN FORMU / THESES PHOTOCOPY PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Sarıkamış KAYA

Adı / Name : Aslıgül

Bölümü / Department: Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English) : Explaining Change in EU Development Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa in the 2000s: The Perspectives of System, Process and Power

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master

Doktora / PhD

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