

NATIONALISM AND TERRITORIALITY:  
THE CONCEPTION OF HOMELAND IN THE COMMUNITIES OF TURKISH  
ORIGIN IN BULGARIA AND THE NETHERLANDS

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---

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zana Çitak  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Prof. Dr. Nuri Yurdusev	(METU, IR)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zana Çitak	(METU, IR)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aslı Çırakman Deveci	(METU, POLS)	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. İlker Aytürk	(BILKENT, POLS)	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç	(METU, IR)	_____

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Name, Last Name: Ahu Şenses

Signature :

## **ABSTRACT**

### **NATIONALISM AND TERRITORIALITY: THE CONCEPTION OF HOMELAND IN THE COMMUNITIES OF TURKISH ORIGIN IN BULGARIA AND THE NETHERLANDS**

Şenses, Ahu

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zana Çitak

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Territoriality has been a long neglected issue in international relations and nationalism studies. This thesis aims to draw attention to the significance of territorial relations in defining modes of human political organization and identity formation and to help establish linkages between international studies and the disciplines of geography and anthropology that problematize territoriality. It questions how territoriality can be conceptualized within the framework of particularly migrant and minority groups with hyphenated ethno-cultural identities and multiple territorial/homeland ties. In order to address this question, this thesis devises a three-layered model of territoriality. This model differentiates between the cultural, instrumental and normative aspects of territorial identification which denote the local, national and transnational levels of analysis respectively. The thesis applies this model to the communities of Turkish origin in Bulgaria and the Netherlands and attempts to reveal their peculiarities and commonalities with regard to their members' territorial experiences and homeland attachments, basing its analysis on a field research that involves open-ended and in-depth interviews with selected community members. It argues that, despite certain differences between their

territorial practices and perceptions, the members of these two communities cannot yet be claimed to have transcended their usually parochial ethno-cultural loyalties or to be moving towards a state in which their embeddedness in their original societies and national territories are being undermined by the allegedly deterritorializing and emancipatory effects of transnationalism. Ethno-cultural and national ties as embodied in homeland identification are still relevant for understanding the political allegiances and practices of individuals and collectivities.

Keywords: Territoriality, Homeland, Turks, Bulgaria, Netherlands

## ÖZ

### MİLLİYETÇİLİK VE TERİTORYALİTE: BULGARİSTAN VE HOLLANDA'DAKİ TÜRKİYE KÖKENLİ TOPLULUKLARIN VATAN ALGISI

Şenses, Ahu

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Teritoryalite, uluslararası ilişkiler ve milliyetçilik çalışmalarında ihmal edilmiş bir meseledir. Bu çalışma, teritoryal ilişkilerin, insanların siyasi örgütlenmeleri ve kimlik oluşum süreçleri açısından önemini altını çizmek ve bu anlamda uluslararası çalışmalar ile teritoryalite meselesini konu edinen coğrafya ve antropoloji disiplinleri arasındaki bağları geliştirmek amacını taşımaktadır. Bu çalışma çerçevesinde, birden çok etnik-kültürel kimliğe ve teritoryal bağlara sahip göçmen ve azınlık toplulukları bağlamında teritoryalite kavramının nasıl incelenebileceği sorusu üzerinden üç katmanlı bir teorik model tanımlanmıştır. Sırasıyla yerel, ulusal ve ulus-ötesi analiz düzeylerini temsil eden kültürel, araçsal ve normatif katmanlardan oluşan bu model, Bulgaristan ve Hollanda'da yaşayan Türkiye kökenli toplulukların teritoryal ilişkilerini nasıl düzenlediklerini ve vatan kavramını nasıl algıladıklarını inceleyebilmek amacıyla kullanılmıştır. Bu iki ülkede yapılan alan araştırmasında, her iki topluluktan seçilmiş üyelerle ucu açık ve derinlemesine görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiş ve bu görüşmeler ışığında iki Türkiye kökenli topluluğun teritoryal ilişkiler ve vatan algısı bakımından farklılıkları ve benzerlikleri tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu incelemelere dayanarak, bu iki topluluğun görüşülen üyelerinin,

teritoryal iliřki biimleri ve algılarındaki bazı farklara raėmen, kendi dar etnik-kültürel kimliklerini ve köken toplumlarıyla olan milli-teritoryal baėlarını aşarak ulus-ötesi faaliyetlerin ve araçların özgürleştirici ve mekansallıktan baėımsızlaştırıcı etkilerini henüz içselleştiremedikleri sonucuna varılmıştır. Vatan kavramında somutlaşan etnik-kültürel ve milli baėlar, insanların ve toplulukların siyasi mensubiyetlerinin ve eylemlerinin anlamlandırılabilmesi için hâlâ önem teşkil etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Teritoryalite, Vatan, Türkler, Bulgaristan, Hollanda

*To Semra and Tuncer Şenses*

*Aileme...*

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

BAP	: Bilimsel Araştırma Projesi (Scientific Research Project)
BSP	: Bulgarian Socialist Party
CDA	: Christian Democratic Appeal (Netherlands)
CEDIME-SE	: Center for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe-Southeast Europe
D66	: Democrats 66 (Netherlands)
DIDF	: Federation of Democratic Workers' Associations (Netherlands)
EU	: European Union
FORUM	: Institute for Multicultural Affairs (Instituut voor Multiculturele Vraakstukken- Netherlands)
GL	: GreenLeft Party (Netherlands)
HAK-DER	: Federation of Alevi Associations in the Netherlands
HDV	: Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands
HTIB	: Turkish Workers' Union in the Netherlands
HTIKB	: Union of Turkish Islamic Organizations in the Netherlands
HTKB	: Turkish Women's Association in the Netherlands
HTSKF	: Federation of Turkish Sports and Culture in the Netherlands
IOT	: Consultative Council of Turks in the Netherlands
IR	: International Relations
MRF	: Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Bulgaria)
NDSV	: National Movement for Stability and Progress (Bulgaria)
NIF	: Netherlands Islamic Federation
OECD	: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OETC	: Education in Own Language and Culture (Netherlands)
PKK	: Kurdistan Workers' Party
PvdA	: Labour Party (Netherlands)
PVV	: Party for Freedom (Netherlands)
SICN	: Islamic Foundation Center (Netherlands)
SOPEMI	: Continuous Reporting System on Migration (OECD)

SP : Socialist Party (Netherlands)  
TICF : Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (Netherlands)  
TRT : Turkish Radio and Television Corporation  
UDF : Union of Democratic Forces (Bulgaria)  
UK : United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
USA (U.S.) : United States of America  
USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
VVD : People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Netherlands)

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

As a student of international relations, I have always been puzzled throughout my studies by how underestimated the role of territorial relations was in studies that explore individuals' or human groups' actions, interactions and patterns of organization. Issues of territoriality have been mostly referred to the disciplines of geography and anthropology. This is striking because time and place are the two basic dimensions of all forms of existence and action including those of human beings. While temporal variations are almost always accounted for in social studies, territorial embeddedness of human actions and interactions has generally been neglected as if individuals, collectivities or organizations act in a physical vacuum.

One reason for this neglect may be the prevalence of the assumption that places are "empty containers" (Kaiser 1994: 5). As such, the container does not have social scientifically relevant implications for, or a constitutive effect on its inhabitants. However, the idea that places are not neutral elements and have an impact on the organization of human relations has become more and more pronounced in the recent studies on human territoriality. Places and territorial relations they embody affect and are affected both symbolically and materially by the content and mode of human activity they come to contain. Therefore, they deserve special attention in any effort to understand various forms of human activity and identification.

Another reason for the virtual invisibility of territoriality may be the difficulty of grasping the nature and functioning of human territorial relations. The temporal dimension is relatively easier to discern as we have tools such as histories, chronicles, narratives, written or audio-visual documents, newspaper reports and plain observation that help us concretize in our mind the changes in the course of

human history in its individual and collective forms. Even though we may not capture all aspects of temporality in a detailed and truthful manner, we are reminded of the passage of time through calendars, clocks, newspapers, history books, etc. Indeed, we have maps, atlases, pictures of landscapes that visualize the geographical boundedness of human experience. But these tools cannot demonstrate on their own how this boundedness operates in relation to the everyday progression of political, economic, cultural and social phenomena. As ordinary human beings, we are sometimes blind to the influences of our physical environment on our actions, ideas and life-style. It might be easy to discern the territorial implications of more immediate localities such as a neighbourhood or a village, but we may be unable to grasp the complexity of wider territorial units such as cities, regions, countries, continents and political-legal formations that span these territorial units.

As students of social science, we are also helpless in weaving the territorial dimension into our chronologically or thematically organized research schemes. Because, in general, territoriality is only recalled when there is mobility. Mobility is more visible and easier to track. Therefore, we have myriads of studies on migration and migrant groups, but the situatedness of individuals or groups in territorial settings attracts less scholarly attention. While time is usually associated with change, concepts such as place and territory, which imply situatedness, are taken to denote immobility or constancy. However, lack of mobility or movement does not always mean stagnation or inaction. Territorial relations are produced and reproduced in a dynamic fashion every day. Boundaries of both physical and symbolic geographies are defined in new ways and people constantly engage in these territorial relations even when they do not change their physical location. Therefore, people do not have *settled* territorial relations even when they are *settled* in a geographical place.

As I will discuss in detail in the following chapter, classical definitions of territoriality stress the notion of domination. They define territoriality as the human effort to control actions and relationships of people through partitioning geographical areas and dominating territories. However, this definition seems to be a reductionist

one. It implies that territoriality is merely a political act. Moreover, it objectifies territory/geography disregarding the reciprocal nature of territorial relations. Territoriality is not always directly political; it has more natural and immediate cultural (or even biological-instinctive) forms that are not always ideologically or politically defined or imposed. Human action not only constitutes but also is constituted by territorial relations. The cultural, social, economic and political relations embodied in a certain geographical area or place condition the ideas, values, beliefs, actions and ways of life of those who are born into or spend a reasonable amount of time in this place. Ideas, beliefs and customs of human individuals and collectivities diverge mainly because both the non-uniformity of physical geography and symbolic boundaries of territorial relations potentially obstruct their dissemination. This divergence also stems from the fact that people tend to establish a strong association between their ideas, beliefs and customs, and the places and lands they inhabit and do not usually question this association unless they move to another place. Thus, understanding this territorial association is very important for our efforts to explore processes of identity formation which are generally defined in terms of group (not territorial) attributes such as ethnicity, religion, ancestry and language.

In sum, the fundamentality of territoriality for human relations has been largely neglected probably because territorial relations are seen too fundamental and too obvious to be explored at a separate level. And even when the territorial dimension included in the scope of a research endeavour, its nature and functions are generally taken for granted. For we do not have handy research tools to spot and comprehend different manifestations of territorial relations or to measure the degree and type of territorial attachment among human beings. On the other hand, group attributes are the more discernible and easily classifiable benchmarks of human association.

As a result, there is a paucity of comprehensive analyses of the territorial implications of political and non-political relations in domestic and international settings. This lack of interest in territoriality is particularly remarkable in the discipline of international relations because many studies in the discipline still

implicitly or explicitly take the relations between nation-states as its primary subject matter. Most of the time, the nation-state is defined first and foremost by reference to the notion of sovereignty over a territory with clearly demarcated and strictly patrolled borders. Moreover, those who set out to theorize nationalism, which is regarded as the founding ideology of nation-states, identify the homeland attachment as one of the basic tenets of the nationalist ideology and an important marker of national identity. The most cited definition of nationalism, put forward by Gellner, suggests that nationalism rests on the congruence between the political and the national unit and urges all nations to have their own states (Gellner 1983: 1). In this account, the state in turn derives its legitimacy as the ultimate authority to enforce laws on its sovereign territory from this congruence between the ethnic and the political unit. Therefore, the most widely shared assumptions about the organization of the political world rely on the inextricable link between the nation, the state and territory. A great majority of works produced in international relations focus on how the state conducts its domestic and international affairs and how it interacts with other actors, forces and structures both inside and outside its borders. We also come across numerous studies on how to define nationalism and account for its historical evolution as well as on what constitutes ethnic and national identity. In discussing these topics, many scholars of nationalism underline the importance of the image of a common ancestral homeland or a sacred territory for the consolidation of ethno-national identity in many cases of nation-building. Most of the time, however, they do not examine closely how territorial ties operate in the formation of nationalistic feelings or ideas. Thus, despite the popularity of the first two subject matters (namely the nation and the state) in the literature, we surprisingly find very few scholarly undertakings that aim at explaining the nature of the relationship of territoriality with these two defining categories of politics. In fact, the disciplines of international relations and political science have failed to a great extent to benefit from the arguments and findings of geographical and anthropological works regarding the territorial origins of human identity formation and group association. Consequently, we witness the prevalence of the depiction of relations of human groupings as functioning independently from territorial dynamics. The near disappearance of

territoriality from the scholarly sight resulted in its underestimation as one of the main foci of human attachment.

In fact, with the increasing mobility of people, capital, goods and information due to the technological advances in communication and transportation, a new literature on transnationalism and globalization emerged. The literature on transnationalism suggests the proliferation of linkages and processes that transgress national boundaries and presumably pave the way for the construction of multi-layered identities and multi-sited patterns of existence and organization eroding the monopoly of nation-states over the processes of the formation of collective identities and allegiances. Many accounts of transnationalism build their assumptions on the deterritorialization of human actions and interactions and claim that we are now witnessing a new phase of cross-border mobility and connectedness distinctive both in intensity and quality from previous instances of increased cross-border activity such as periods of massive migration waves, extensive trade activities and overseas travel. Interestingly, however, these accounts usually tend to avoid directly addressing the questions of how exactly territorial relations have transformed with this new age of transnationalism, and more importantly, whether there is a substantive change in the way people, as subjects of transnational activities, perceive and define their territorial ties including homeland attachment.

Despite the centrality of the notion of territoriality in the current setup of our political world as well as in the construction of collective identities, territoriality emerges as one of the most overlooked factors in international studies. One aspect of territoriality that may be claimed to be directly influenced by the repositioning of the nation-state and redefinition of national identity as a result of transnational and global processes is homeland attachment. A focus on the allegedly new manifestations of homeland identification may be instrumental in two ways. First, it may contribute to the assessments about the fate of nationalism and nation-states by addressing the question of whether we are heading towards a transnational, or postnational, or cosmopolitan world where national identification with a specific piece of territory will have been replaced by multi-dimensional, flexible and less

territorially defined identities. In other words, it may help us respond in an informed way to the question of whether the taken-for-granted national order of the world is giving way to a new kind of political organization in which national borders will matter less and less. Second, it may enable us to explore whether the social organization of human beings is in the process of being decoupled from its more immediate and concretized (i.e., cultural-biological) territorial entanglements and whether the notion of the “sanctity” of original territory or homeland that had prevailed even before the advent of nationalism will be undermined in this process to the benefit of deterritorialized, non-symbolic or interest-based group identities. If so, an analysis of changing conceptions of homeland may give us clues about what kind of new symbolic and material anchors or organizing principles may be utilized to bind people together to form meaningful and stable communities that will go beyond short-term, issue-based forms of association.

In the light of these observations, this study problematizes the concept of homeland among the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands with a view to establishing the missing link between (trans)nationalism and territoriality. While doing this, it sets out to serve four basic aims. Firstly, it seeks to draw attention to the virtual invisibility of issues of territoriality in the discipline of international relations and in studies of nationalism. It intends to demonstrate the scarcity of territorially informed accounts of political and social organization and to revive interest in matters of territoriality. To this aim, it will revisit some basic concepts and principles defining human territoriality such as place, space, homeland, mobility and diaspora. These concepts will form the basis of the theoretical assumptions of this research endeavour.

Secondly, this study aims to draw attention to the weak inter-disciplinary ties between the fields of international relations, nationalism, diaspora studies, geography and anthropology. The disconnectedness of the literature on nationalism from the works of geographers on human territoriality confines us to the sociological and political explanations of nationalism, nation and national identity, which has no reference to territory (Penrose 2002: 289-290). In this respect, benefiting from other

fields that research similar topics, but with different methods and tools, may provide us with a multi-perspective approach that will help cover the blind spots of the existing literature.

Thirdly, this work intends to question how the increasing intensity and changing patterns of mobility and migration impact on communities with hyphenated identities and sustained ties to more than one territorial unit. To this aim, it will incorporate two case studies to test the theoretical assumptions that will be outlined at the beginning of the study. The Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands are two separate types of ethnic communities with different historical trajectories, group characteristics, and political, legal and social positions. While the former falls in the category of ethno-religious minority, the latter is mostly a labour migrant community with certain diasporic qualities. Though these two groups may seem incomparable at first sight, the selection of these two diverse cases is deliberate. Such a selection will give me the opportunity to juxtapose two groups with different experiences of mobility, migration, settlement and integration so as to compare and contrast their peculiarities and similarities regarding different conceptions of territorial attachment and homeland identification. This way this research will be able to break the pattern of analyzing similar groups (for instance, comparing a diaspora group to other diasporas, a labour migrant community to similar migrant groups, a territorially based minority to other such minorities) from the viewpoint of a certain paradigm or disciplinary approach, a pattern which mostly reproduces unquestioningly accepted assumptions and previously found results.

Fourthly, this research undertaking aims to contribute, through its findings, to the discussions on whether there is a fundamental change in the territorial conceptions of particularly people with multiple territorial and ethno-national allegiances and whether we can identify a linear evolution towards a common destination of transnational or cosmopolitan modes of human organization and identification. In order to meet this last aim, I will define a three-layered model for conceptualizing territoriality (namely the cultural, the instrumental and the normative layers), each layer referring to a different but intertwined aspect of territorial identification.

Through this model inspired by the definitions and theories of territoriality put forward by various disciplines, I will try to locate the findings from the case studies within the general framework of the existing scientific research on territoriality in general and the idea of homeland in particular.

I believe this model will be the original contribution of this study to the existing literature. Anthropologists basically study the cultural aspects of territorial relations as they focus on how the immediate locality of human beings enable or constrain the cultural reproduction of certain norms, values, habits and customs. Political geographers mostly deal with the partitioning and domination of territory with special emphasis on the importance of power relations in shaping the territorial existence and experiences of individuals and groups. Scholars of nationalism and transnationalism recently question whether nationalist ideologies and patterns of organization are in retreat in the face of transnational challenges and whether new (postnational or cosmopolitan) norms, practices and forms of loyalty are underway. However, studies that combine these layers in a structured way are rare. Even though the model can be further developed with new ideas and findings, it provides a starting point for future research efforts in this issue area.

Basing my research on this model of territoriality, I will ask the following questions: How can we theorize different aspects of territoriality with a specific reference to the idea of homeland? How can we link these different conceptualizations to the territorial experiences of diasporic, migrant or minority communities with multiple territorial and group identities? How can we define the patterns of territoriality and conceptions of the idea of homeland among the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands? What are the similarities and differences between the territorial and homeland understandings of these two communities? And finally, what do the findings pertaining to these two cases tell us about the territorial assumptions of studies of (trans)nationalism?

As mentioned, the subject matter of this research stands at the intersection point of several disciplines or areas of study. Therefore, in the theoretical chapters, I will draw on the works of scholars from basically the fields of geography, anthropology,

political science, international relations, diaspora studies and the study of nationalism. The literature I will rely on consists of secondary written and online academic sources which will help me formulate my research questions in a more theoretically informed way, given the elusiveness of the basic concepts and the ambiguity of the terminology used in this issue area.

In the chapters dedicated to the two cases, I will build my case studies mainly on the narrative analysis of the open-ended and in-depth interviews conducted with and the life histories collected from selected members of the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands as well as on my field observations. The groups of interviewees in both countries include people representing differences mainly of age, education, profession, political affiliation and place of residence. The groups mainly encompass politicians, former and current representatives of community organizations, (retired) public and private sector employees and labourers, university students, writers with journalistic and academic backgrounds and religious officials. The interviews in Bulgaria were conducted in June 2011 with twelve people living in the cities of Varna, Shumen, Omurtag and Provadia. The interviews in the Netherlands were conducted in December 2011 with seventeen people in the cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht. The travel and accommodation costs of the field research were funded by the Middle East Technical University within the framework of a scientific research project (BAP) submitted to the university in 2010.

All interviews were conducted in the Turkish language and will be translated into English by the author when necessary. Before conducting the interviews, I devised three separate sets of questions, each surveying one of the cultural, instrumental and normative conceptualizations of territoriality in line with my three-layered model. The analyses of the interviews will be based mainly on the responses to these question sets, even though the interviews were open-ended and the questions sometimes required revisions in advance or on the spot due to differences in interviewee profiles.

This research is based on a selective sample of interviewees. While choosing the interviewees, I sought to incorporate people with different generational, sectoral,

political, educational and geographical backgrounds in order to reflect as much as possible the diversity of territorial and migratory experiences of each community. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the interviewee groups do not represent the whole population of the examined communities, either in scale or in scope. Therefore, the findings of this study are in no way generalizable for the totality of the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands.

In the analyses of cases, I will also benefit from secondary written and online sources including academic books, articles, quantitative research papers, newspapers, academic websites, official and government websites of Bulgaria and the Netherlands, websites of domestic and international organizations. These sources will help me acquire a better understanding of the historical evolution and current situation of these communities in their countries of settlement by providing background information particularly on issues of migration, diaspora territoriality, minority rights, integration and homeland identification.

The theoretical part of this thesis will be composed of two chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 will analyze in detail the under-theorization of the concept of territoriality in the literature on nationalism and look into the reasons for this neglect. Combining the existing theories on nationalism, nation and nation-state with those of political geography, this chapter will discuss the meaning and the pre-modern and modern foundations of human territoriality and will attempt to link the discussion on territoriality to two conceptually relevant representations of territorial existence, namely *space* and *place*. Building on these discussions, I will define in detail the three-layered model of territoriality that I will employ in analyzing the research outcomes of the two case studies.

In Chapter 3, I will firstly assess the relevance and significance of the notions of territoriality and homeland for understanding the material and symbolic existence of human collectivities as well as the formation and perpetuation of group identities. In the second part of this chapter, I will focus on definitions of diaspora, diaspora territoriality and transnationalism. A discussion on diaspora and transnationalism is particularly important because it offers the necessary concepts and analytical tools to

examine the changing nature of territorial and homeland attachment in a world increasingly marked by cross-border mobility, migration, diasporization and transnationalization of ideas, goods and practices. Finally, I will question whether and how the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands fit into the theoretical picture drawn in the previous part with regard to diaspora territoriality and transnationalism. Being aware of the fact that these communities fail in crucial respects to qualify as classical diaspora cases, I will nevertheless explore how the insights provided by diaspora and transnationalism studies into the examination of multiple territorial ties and of homeland consciousness could be incorporated in the case analyses.

The following two chapters will present the case studies. Chapter 4 will focus on the territorial relations and homeland conceptualization of the Turkish community in Bulgaria. After sketching the historical evolution and current status and conditions of the community in its country of settlement, I will proceed to the narrative analysis of the interviews with selected members of the community within the framework of my three-layered model of territorial attachment. Drawing also on my field observations and secondary sources, I will try to uncover certain patterns or commonalities among the interviewees regarding the ways they conduct their territorial relations and perceive the idea of homeland. I will examine the findings pertaining to each layer of territorial conceptualization (cultural, instrumental and normative) in a separate section. In each section, I will define certain parameters that qualify each layer of territoriality and analyze the interviews in accordance with these parameters.

I will deal with the territorial and homeland perceptions of the Turkish community in the Netherlands in Chapter 5. I will follow the same outline as in the first case study. First, a historical background to the labour (and other) migration from Turkey to the Netherlands will be offered. In this part, I will also look into the evolution of the legal, political, economic and social position of the Turkish migrant community and give brief information about the changes in migration and integration policies of the Dutch state. In the following part, I will examine under separate headings the cultural, instrumental and normative aspects of the territorial and homeland

understanding of the Turkish community in the Netherlands on the basis of the interviewee accounts, field observations and relevant academic sources. The same or similar parameters as in the first case study will be used to elaborate the analysis of interviews and other sources under each heading.

In Chapter 6, I will undertake a comparative analysis of the main findings of the two case studies. I will attempt to reveal similar and divergent patterns in the territorial experiences and perceptions of the Turkish groups in Bulgaria and the Netherlands. At the end of this chapter, some concluding remarks will be presented.

After having outlined the general scheme of this study, I will finally touch upon the constraints and difficulties I experienced when conducting the field research and analyzing its findings. One difficulty was that this research had to be carried out on a rather limited number of interviews. This was mainly due to constraints of time and financial resources. But linguistic and organizational difficulties also impeded research particularly in the Bulgarian case. These difficulties were attempted to be remedied by an elaborately prepared research plan and a comprehensive set of interview questions, which allowed me to have very detailed interviewee accounts for each of the three layers of my territorial model.

Another difficulty with interviews concerned the diverse backgrounds of the interviewees. The differences in age, profession, education, intellectual level, cultural practices, personal experiences and interests of the interviewees made both the conduct and the analysis of the interviews difficult since a comparative narrative analysis requires at least an average level of comprehension of or interest in basic concepts of the subject matter, which may sometimes be too abstract or irrelevant for certain participants. This difficulty was partly overcome by revising interview questions before and during the interviews so as to accommodate such differences.

Finally, I could get hold of a limited number of secondary sources that problematize my exact research questions. There exists a multitude of theoretical work dealing with the concepts of territoriality and homeland particularly in the fields of political geography, diaspora and transnationalism studies. There is also a plenty of

qualitative and quantitative research on the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands with a focus on issues of migration, integration, minority rights and homeland ties. However, there are very few scholarly endeavours that link the theoretical discussions on territoriality to specific cases with a view to demonstrate the unfolding of territorial relations at different levels of analysis. I hope this study will help fill this gap and constitute a step towards more theoretically informed discussions especially on transnationally active groups with multiple collective identities and complex territorial experiences.

## CHAPTER 2

### DEFINITIONS: SPACE, PLACE, TERRITORIALITY AND NATIONALISM

#### 2.1 “Lost” Territory: *Where Does the Story Take Place?*

Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives... You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets to us where they lie side by side now here in this country of ours... You, the mothers, who sent their sons from faraway countries wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well.

The above-mentioned quotation, which is inscribed on a memorial at Anzac Cove, is from a letter sent by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to Anzac mothers in 1934 in order to relieve their grief for their fallen sons who had participated in the Gallipoli Campaign and to foster friendship after the war. These words are also significant in another aspect as they denote the close association of man with the soil which he not only lives on, but also loses his life for and/or is buried in. The soil/land being the bosom of human life is a recurrent theme both in cultural works and in political discourses. Nationalist accounts in particular derive much of their legitimacy from the allegedly primordial attachment of man to the land of his ancestors. Despite this common theme, theories on nationalism seem to neglect the conceptual and practical implications of the notion of territorial attachment for both human life and scholarly endeavour.

We may find in the literature a considerable number of studies that focus on different components of nationalist ideology in general, or of a specific nationalism, which include language, culture, descent and shared history; on its various forms (official,

extreme, violent, popular, pan-, banal etc); on its carriers (ideologues and other actors such as nationalist parties, institutions, etc.); and on its impact on domestic and international politics. However, the territorial aspect of nationalism has mostly been ignored. Yet, territoriality and borders are among the most distinctive constitutive elements of the modern nation-state, and thus of the international system which is still defined, to a great extent, by the presence and predominance of the nation-state.

In a closer examination, we see that much of the literature on nationalism and nationalist movements has so far relied predominantly on the dichotomy of civic nationalism versus ethnic nationalism. Those who set out to offer a remedy for malicious and exclusionary manifestations of ethnic nationalism propose the concept of civic nationalism based on equal citizenship. However, an attempt to reduce national identity or allegiance to a mere legal bond underestimates the power of nationalism as a popular sentiment that ensures social unity and solidarity within the boundaries of the ethnic or political entity in question.

On the other hand, studies on transnationalism, particularly those that suggest a radically transforming world in which transnational activities and connectivities have resulted in multiple identities and multi-sited subjectivities, also give undue theoretical credence, often in an indirect way, to identity markers such as ethnicity, race, religion etc. by utilizing them as exclusive explanatory tools.

This study aims to go beyond the above-mentioned simplistic dichotomy that presumes an oscillation between ethnic and civic elements in explaining nationalist discourses (or a particular form of nationalism), and attempts to introduce an element of territoriality to the debates on nationalism, and correspondingly on transnationalism. This will help us transcend the parochial and unproductive formulations pervading the current scholarly work that dwell almost exclusively on group attributes in explaining both national and transnational forms of human association as if territoriality no longer matters and human groupings are now being formed in a physical vacuum. Adding territoriality to these formulations will in turn serve to avoid yet another mind-narrowing dichotomy of whether we still live in a

nationalist paradigm or whether we have been proceeding towards a transnational or postnational world.

It will be argued, in other words, that we should in the first place undertake to see nationalism, which is defined as both a theoretical stance and a political practice, in a new light by taking into account the constituting effect of territoriality. Then, we need to emancipate our perceptions of international political behavior of human groups from parochial discussions on ethnicity and national identity defined in a fixed, deterritorialized and dehistoricized manner.

## **2.2 The (Missing) Link between Territoriality and Nationalism**

Dr. Chi Park: Patriotism is natural. We've always relied on our tribes to keep us safe. It's helpful for society if its members have positive feelings about that society.

Dr. Gregory House: Iranian women. Drag Queens in Uganda. Patriotism is nothing but loyalty to real estate, real estate that's been conquered 800 times by 800 different regimes with 800 different cultures. But each time, it's just the best.<sup>1</sup>

As I have mentioned above, there is a disconnection between geography literature dealing with concepts such as territory, borders, homeland, space and place, and the literature on nationalism. Indeed, there exists a range of valuable works that attempt to establish a link between the disciplines of geography and international relations; scholars including Jean Gottmann (1951, 1952), John H. Herz (1957), James Anderson (1986), John Gerard Ruggie (1993) and John Agnew (1994) have problematized the geographical and spatial assumptions of the discipline of IR, questioning the nature and evolution (and the modernity) of the notions of territoriality, borders, territorial state and state sovereignty. However, when we put aside a handful of studies, we see that the inextricable link between territoriality and nationalism has either been ignored or under-theorized. As put by Robert J. Kaiser,

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<sup>1</sup> This is a dialogue taken from episode 8.04 of *House M.D.*, a TV show aired in the United States between 2004 and 2012. For a transcript of the episode, see <http://clinic-duty.livejournal.com/45726.html> (accessed 01.11.2011).

*place*, if not ignored altogether, has been seen as an “empty container –meaningless in and of itself- within which individuals and groups live out their lives” (Kaiser 1994: 5).

The lack of scholarly interest in and the under-theorization of the territorial aspect of human association in general, and of international relations in particular, mainly stems from the paucity of research into the relationship between human territoriality and (national) identity. Nationalist discourses frequently appeal to concepts such as “sacred soil”, “homeland”, “fatherland”, “place of origin”, “ancestral land”, and “love of country”. Despite these references common to almost all forms and manifestations of nationalism, the territorial aspect of the nationalist ideology has been an often neglected dimension in the literature. This neglect is even more striking when we take into consideration the existence of accounts that go beyond treating territory and homeland as mere components or tools of nationalist ideologies, and identify attachment to a particular territory as the distinctive sign or defining feature of national identity.<sup>2</sup>

Highlighting this disconnectedness in the literature, Jan Penrose holds that the territorial dimension of nationalism has gradually been displaced in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. According to Penrose, the field has largely been left to sociologists and political scientists with limited contribution from geographers. As a result, theories of nationalism have rather focused on the sociological and political dimensions of nationalism and of the concept of nation, with no reference to territory. Instead of concentrating on territory and territoriality, the arguments put forward have centered on how a population is defined as they have commonly made a distinction between civic and ethnic nations (Penrose 2002: 289-290).

In order to fill this theoretical void, Penrose proposes a twofold argument: 1. “the ideology of nationalism is, itself, a product of the attempts to merge two very

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<sup>2</sup> Rupert Emerson, for instance, claims that the nation is characterized by its association with a particular territory, a feature that distinguishes it from other communities that also have a sense of common destiny such as family, caste or religious body. (*From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962, p.105)

different views about the value of territory and consequently, two different practices of territoriality.” 2. “the main lines of division in *explanations* of nationalism reflect the differential privileging of one aspect of territory and one practice of territoriality over the other... [D]ifferent understandings of territory and territoriality are intimately bound up with the different conceptions of nations, states and homelands that are so central to nationalist thought” (Penrose 2002: 277-278).

With regard to the second argument Penrose states, “[w]here the nation is viewed as ethnic, the homeland tends to be seen as an emotive, cultural entity –a geographical extension of ‘the people’. Where the nation is viewed as civic, the homeland is viewed as a material resource defined by the boundaries of the state.” (Penrose 2002: 291). Either way, issues of territoriality are central to an attempt to understand the phenomena of nations and nationalism.

Based on these assumptions, Penrose further argues that the nation-state as a political form and nationalism as a political ideology attempt to combine two different forms of territoriality. The first one is *pre-modern territoriality* in which identity is culturally defined and the emotional power of attachment to land has primary influence in its formation and preservation. In this form, territory signifies the “geographical expression of cultural identity”. The second one is *modern territoriality* in which identity is territorially defined and the material resources of a territory have primary significance. In this modern form, territory has become the main factor in defining the person’s identity. In Penrose’s view, it is this combination of pre-modern and modern forms of territoriality that partly explains the success of both the nation-state and nationalism (Penrose 2002: 283-284). Kaiser proposes a complementary argument when he discusses the oft-cited description of the nation as a goal-oriented community of interest; a community that is most capable of satisfying the needs of its members. Although this definition is presented as an alternative to the primordialist explanations of the nation, Kaiser holds that the nation is a different sort of interest group and that there is a perceptual linkage between the primordial and instrumental aspects of national self-consciousness: “Even if national elites are unsuccessful in attaining benefits for their members, the masses are

unlikely to abandon the nation. Indeed, the very idea of voluntary ‘denationalization’ probably would not occur to most members, who perceive their membership as being conferred by birth. This is a distinct advantage that the nation enjoys over other communities of interest (e.g. class)” (Kaiser 1994: 20).

In a similar vein, Steven Grosby questions the reason behind the fact that millions of human beings have given their lives for a land or a country that they believed to be theirs in an age defined by secularization and individualism. In order to offer an explanation, Grosby refers to the “primordial attachment to one’s own country, one’s own land and one’s own way of life”, in which the term “primordial” does not mean “racial” or “genetic”; but rather it denotes the “significance of vitality which man attributes to and is constitutive of both nativity and structures of nativity” (Grosby 1995: 144). These structures of nativity, be it the relation of lineage (e.g. the family) or the relation of area (e.g. the locality in which one is born and sustained), are considered by man to be “life-giving” and “life-determining” (Grosby 1995: 144). In other words, territoriality implies not only the physical characteristics of the land or the patterns of relationships pertaining to a bounded territory in which life is carried on, but also the consciousness of, or the shared significance attributed to, these bounded patterns of relationships. According to Grosby, even though this consciousness is a product of the human imagination, it is not imaginary as it has acquired reality (Grosby 1995: 149).

Defined as such, territoriality is not a distinctively modern phenomenon. Although modern means of communication and transportation as well as the demands of the markets have resulted in the formation and stabilization of territories larger than those of the pre-modern times, territoriality is a “fundamental feature of all human societies” (Grosby 1995: 152-155). Because “[t]erritory is life-sustaining. It sustains biologically the life of the individual and the life of that individual’s collectivity by providing the necessary physical nutrients. It also sustains life by providing the locus for those memories and psychic patterns necessary for the ordering of life” (Grosby 1995: 158).

Anthony D. Smith also discusses the pre-modern foundations of the modern world. He holds that attachment to a homeland, a sentiment with a long history, has acquired a new meaning in the modern world as it has become “another sacred foundation” of national identities. Nevertheless, he believes that the emphasis put by modernists including Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson on modern means, such as mass public education, as a way of embedding collective sentiments and nationalist ideals in the society does not help us explain why a particular territory is chosen as the target of these sentiments or why in the first place such strong feelings for the homeland are to be possessed by people (Smith 2003: 131-132).

In order to understand the formation of sacred territorial attachments, Smith examines the continuity of layers of memory and tradition and defines a process that he calls the “territorialization of memory”. This is a process by which “particular places evoke a series of memories, handed down through the generations”, signifying “a tendency to root memories of persons and events in particular places and through them create a field or zone of powerful and peculiar attachments” (Smith 2003: 134). In this way, he suggests a different interpretation of territory and homeland from those offered by modernists. His interpretation “emphasizes the importance of long-term popular values, symbols, and traditions of sacred land, which are then taken up by nationalists in the modern epoch and given new, political dimensions” (Smith 2003: 165).

In other words, Smith proposes a modification of the modernist positions deriving from the idea of invention or imagination<sup>3</sup> since the latter cannot fully explain the fervor of nationalism. Smith’s perspective emphasizes the modern and peculiar characteristics of nations and nationalism, and yet attempts to delineate the historical content of the idea of nation. It reveals the limitations of the theories that single out the processes of total and downright political construction as the origin of the idea of

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<sup>3</sup> For modernist views on the invented or imagined nature of nations and nationalist ideas, see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983; and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (rev. ed.), London and New York: Verso, 1983. Please also note that Anderson differs from other modernist writers in that he defines the imagined nature of the nation in terms of creation rather than fabrication and falsity, arguing that all communities larger than primordial villages are imagined (p.6).

sacred territory and homeland as well as of the phenomenon of nationalism. It underlines the fact that no ideology or movement can condition so effectively the way people think of themselves and their identity, and mobilize them in such unconditional and radical ways unless it has a sound historical background, a source of legitimacy that is rooted in ordinary people's memories and every-day experience.

This perspective leads us to the question of how territoriality is to be conceptualized within the context of this particular study. In order to answer this question I should first focus on what human territoriality involves.

### **2.3 Space, Place and Territoriality**

Jean Gottmann, one of the first scholars who have attempted to establish a link between geography and international relations, claims that any space penetrated by men becomes partitioned in some way and the differentiation of the space accessible to men is the very foundation of any study not only in geography, but also in international relations (Gottmann 1951: 162-165). Here, accessibility is the key factor; areas which are not accessible by men do not have any political standing (Gottmann 1952: 513). Accessibility leads to partitioning, and the emerging political units or territories acquire a "position in space" (Gottmann 1952: 513). This position is more than a mere mathematical placing of it on a map; it encompasses the relations resulting not only from physical features, but also from the perceptions, actions and interactions of the inhabitants within the particular territory and those outside of it (Gottmann 1952: 513-514). Therefore, the uniqueness of a geographical position is essentially a "political product"; it is the people, not the territory, that organize these relations and choose the courses of action that they intend to follow from among many others offered by physical conditions (Gottmann 1952: 514).

As we have established the defining significance of geography and territoriality for any study of politics and international relations, we should look into what territoriality signifies in human life. The word *territory* is derived from the Latin

noun *terra* (earth, land) and verb *terrere* (to warn or frighten off), implying a bounded and defended space, with connotations of attachment and exclusiveness. Basing his definition on the above-mentioned etymological connotations of the notion of territory, John R. Gold defines the term *territoriality* as “the processes and mechanisms by which people establish, maintain and defend territories” (Gold 1982: 44).

There has been a great deal of scholarly attempts to understand what human territoriality consists in. Among them, instinct theories that draw parallels between human and animal territoriality and argue for the biological predispositions of human beings towards territoriality have been largely discredited. Human spatial behaviour is generally accepted as culturally derived, learned behaviour. In Gold’s words, “[w]hereas animal territoriality is rooted in physiological needs connected with survival, human territoriality may also embrace ‘higher’ needs for, say, identity, status, recognition by others, and achievement of self-image... [T]erritoriality does not emanate from mere whim, nor is it subject to rapid change. Its rules, mechanisms, and symbols are developed gradually over time and are passed from one generation to the next by the essentially conservative process of socialization” (Gold 1982: 48).

Robert D. Sack defines human territoriality as “the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions and interactions (of people, things and relationships) by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a geographic area” (Sack 1983: 55). According to Sack, “[t]erritoriality is not simply the circumscription of things in space... It is circumscription with the intent to influence, affect, or control... Territoriality is not an object, but a relationship” (Sack 1983: 56). Similarly, Grosby states, “[a] territory is not simply an area within which certain physical actions are performed; rather it refers to a structural, symbolic condition which has significance for those who act within it and towards it... [T]erritoriality is a spatial structure of temporal depth... [T]he individual participates in the image of this temporally deep, that is historically produced and tradition-bearing structure... The spatial structure of a territory and the

objective image of that structure must not be viewed as being exclusively external to the individual who participates in that structure” (Grosby 1995: 150-151).

As can be seen from these formulations, the concept of territoriality goes beyond physical location and encompasses all human relations, interpretations, discourses, meanings, ideas, memories, experiences, traditions that derive from and are ingrained into individuals’ and communities’ interaction with specific places, and spaces. At this point, it is important to briefly touch upon the relationship between “place” and “space” in order to clarify the difference between the two notions and to pave the way for the upcoming discussions in subsequent chapters as to how spaces are turned into places with concrete, every-day effects on the lives of people.

In order to establish the relevance of this space-place conversion to my research topic, I should refer to Peter J. Taylor’s argumentation on space-place relationship. Taylor cites the generally accepted argument that space is more abstract than place, and that states are space-producers that impose, through top-down political processes, spaces on places where the latter are seen as sites for bottom-up opposition. Taylor criticizes this argument as being too simplistic. Instead, he suggests, “[a]lthough initially imposed, boundaries can themselves become familiar, become embedded in society and have their own effects on the reproduction of material life. In this way what were spaces are converted into places” (Taylor 1999: 14). For Taylor, the nation-state is the most important incidence of this conversion which he defines as a cumulative process of “filling the container”. He states:

By combining state and nation in nation-state, sovereign territory has been merged with sacred homeland to convert a space into the place. Notice that, given the scale, this is an ‘imagined place’ but is nevertheless reproduced in routine, everyday behaviour which Michael Billig (1995) has famously called banal nationalism. Modern states are so powerful because they have become constructed as places out of spaces (Taylor 1999: 14).

James Anderson claims that all social organizations occupy geographical space. However, modern states, nations and nationalism are all *territorial* in a distinct way; they are based on particular geographical territories which are suggested to be

enclosed within clearly demarcated and defended boundaries, and thus impenetrable. The fact that the sovereignty of the modern state is based on territory *per se* differentiates it from medieval forms of sovereignty that were shared between different secular and religious authorities whose territories were discontinuous and ill-defined (Anderson 1986: 117). Similarly, nationalism, in Anderson's view, is a territorial ideology as it is internally unifying and externally divisive, and reinforces territorial impenetrability. Nationalist ideology, as being both unifying and divisive over space, has the ability to unite people with different class and factional interests. This ability is in part "geographically-based in that people who share the same territory frequently share a common identity and, simply by virtue of geographic proximity, also have at least some interests in common" (Anderson 1986: 118).

John H. Herz is another scholar who inquires into the foundations of the modern nation-state and asks what accounts for its peculiar unity, compactness and coherence. In line with Anderson, Herz also points to the territoriality and impenetrability of the modern state as the underlying factors. He asserts that, throughout history, the unit that provides human beings with security and protection has tended to become the basic political unit; and the modern nation-state as "an expanse of territory encircled for its identification and its defence by a 'hard-shell' of fortifications" has proved to be relatively secure from foreign penetration and has emerged as an ultimate unit of protection for those within its boundaries (Herz 1957: 474). Gottmann shares this idea as he suggests that territory effectively controlled by a government provides both security and opportunity for its inhabitants (cited in Knight 1982: 517). Although territory does not have a political or social existence by itself and it acquires its meaning through human action and imagination, we may still assert that the function of territory is not limited to its symbolic significance. Territoriality involves material functions and resources as well.

We may infer from these discussions that the potency and endurance of the modern nation-state, and its distinctiveness from previous forms of political organization may in part be explained by its territoriality. Territorial identification is distinct from other forms of belonging in that it creates different sorts of commonalities and interests

emanating from physical and relational proximity that cannot easily be overshadowed by other more symbolic, and less tangible, forms of affinity or affiliation. Walker Connor asks how we can differentiate the nation from other human collectivities. He believes that “a sense of homogeneity”, “a feeling of sameness, of oneness, of belonging, or of consciousness of kind”, expressions often utilized in defining the term nation, fail to distinguish the latter from other types of groups as we can see these elements among certain religious groups or inhabitants of a specific place (Connor 1978: 380). According to Connor, the notion of shared blood, of a separate origin and evolution is an important ingredient of national psychology as it incorporates the sense of an extended family (Connor 1978: 380-381).

However, common descent is not typical of the nation, either. Tribes, clans, ethnic groups, feudal formations, castes, large aristocratic families, even some religious groups, like Jews, may all share this trait. We need more than “a sense of belonging” or “common descent” to account for the resilience of the idea of nation. We need to look into the subordination, extension and remoulding of the traditional notions of territory and territoriality by the modern state. We need to see how people’s orientation shifted from “group” to “territory”. David B. Knight notes that in pre-modern times, and still in many areas of the Third World, clan or tribe was the main locus of loyalty. Individuals were defined by the social group into which they were born, and their territory could acquire its meaning only by virtue of these social relations, identities, and organization according to which land ownership and division were realized. By contrast, in modern Western, and Westernized, societies, land has become a commodity to be bought and sold, generally independently from social relations (Knight 1982: 516). On the other hand, as the nation has become the dominant form of social grouping, loyalties have also changed focus:

Whereas a socially cohesive group once defined its territory, in time the politically bounded territory came to define the people; there was a transference in emphasis from group to territory. Historian Maine put it for Englishmen as follows: ‘England was once the country in which Englishmen lived: Englishmen are now the people who inhabit England’ (cited

in Jones 1966: 56). In that case, people from different parts of the country came to develop a sense of belonging to a territorial unit larger than just their more immediate regional societies and, in turn, the territorial extent of that larger unit, England, came to define who they were. This new territorial definition of group gave rise to another concept, that of nation-state (Knight 1982: 516-517).

The above-mentioned process indicates the transition from a cultural notion of territoriality in which territory is seen as an extension of social relations and cultural meanings in a compact social group to an instrumental conceptualization basically effectuated by modern nation-states and endorsed by their citizenry, a transition which I will discuss in detail in the next part.

Borrowing the concepts and definitions put forward above, this study will look into the relationship between history and territory within the framework of the Turkish migrant communities in Bulgaria and in the Netherlands with an aim to analyze how these communities link themselves not only to the territories they live in, but also to the ones that they imagine as homeland. Within this specific context, I will attempt to address a more general question of how primordial human attachment to his immediate locality has been transformed in the age of nationalism into a self-sacrificing loyalty to a more extensive unit (i.e., one's homeland or the sovereign territory of one's country), and then in the age of trans-nationalism into multi-sited identities, long-distance attachments and imagined territories.

The conceptual tools that I will employ in this study will rest on the arguments outlined above. In order to be able to organize the above-mentioned arguments and insights into more concrete categories, I will define a three-layered model which differentiates between various dimensions of territorial relations. By applying this model to the two cases I have chosen, I will attempt to analyze in a systematical manner the territorial implications of my field research and capture the commonalities and particularities of the two cases to be examined.

## **2.4 Different Conceptions of Territoriality**

In this study, three different, though intertwined, conceptions of territoriality will be employed. Before defining them, it should be noted that these categories are not mutually exclusive; different combinations of them may be (and usually are) present in any one case at any one point in time. Nor does any one of them have primacy over the others, though specific forms of each may be predominant in a selected context.

As discussed above, territoriality is a multifaceted concept and its characteristics and conceptualization have changed throughout history along with the transformations of social, economic and political structures that generate and shape different modes of human organization and identification. It affects directly or indirectly the way we think, act and interact in a physically bounded and geographically partitioned world. Therefore, we can identify theoretically as many dimensions of territoriality as there are diverse manifestations of human condition across time and space. In addition to the definitions and theoretical perspectives cited here, territorial relations have psychological, sociological, biological, ecological, economic, legal, etc. aspects as well. This list may be further extended depending on the preferred unit or level of analysis.

The model of territoriality I will employ here will be confined to the cultural, instrumental and normative dimensions because this study problematizes the neglect of territorial matters in the fields of IR and nationalism and focuses on those aspects of territoriality (and mobility) which have direct impact on human political identification and organization. Local, national and transnational linkages, identities and loyalties of the selected communities will be singled out with the aim of questioning whether changing conceptions of territoriality and mobility have come to challenge in a recognizable and irreversible fashion the hegemony of the nationalist paradigm as the organizing principle of human political life with regard particularly to these two cases examined here.

### **2.4.1 Cultural Conception of Territoriality**

Following Penrose's categorization, culture-based territoriality entails a close association with one's immediate locality. Here, the territory we are talking about is rather small-scale, such as a neighborhood, a village, a town, a landscape or tribal territory. As Penrose aptly argues, in this form, landscape is seen as "the cultural extension of people" (Penrose 2002: 289-290). In other words, attachment to land stems from tradition; it is part and parcel of every-day experience and way of life. People build their houses on that particular territory, hunt in its forests, graze their animals on its pasture, cultivate the soil, bury their dead in that very soil; and are inspired by its monumental features.

As we can see, this type of territorial conception is more concrete and natural; and by extension less ideological, meaning that there is little room for intermediaries and their ideological tools in the production and perpetuation of this type of attachment. It is simply transferred from generation to generation through daily practices and oral tradition. It derives its resilience from its close association with the fulfillment of basic, day-to-day needs.

In this regard, culturally defined territoriality is congruent with the original meaning of "patria" or homeland, which in antiquity was "native town or village"; the home of a man. (Kantorowicz 1951: 476). The Latin word "patria" and the Greek word "patris" actually derive from words meaning "father", denoting "paternal and ancestral home" (Lewis 1992: 169). This connotation is also in line with Grosby's previously discussed conceptualization of both family and native land as "life-giving" and "life-determining" (Grosby 1995:144). This semantic tie as well as the often used analogy between parentage-family-ancestry and territory-soil-(home)land highlights the life-generating and life-sustaining essence of territorial attachment. Defined as such, one's homeland is the embodiment of one's family, and by extension their tribe, community, or people. It is the concretization of a man's past and the spring of its future.

Although we may safely assume that this type of territoriality basically pertains to traditional societies, we cannot simply confine it to pre-modern practices. Even today, we may see examples of such culturally defined modes of territoriality in modern nation-states. The prevalence of such examples denotes the still persisting relevance and significance of a direct tie between man and the land he inhabits.

Interestingly, we may find instances of culturally defined territoriality not only in pastoral life, but also in big urbanized places where identities and loyalties are multiple, social life is much more complex and man's relationship to land is significantly different as urban communities are claimed to have become increasingly detached from land. Even though one's actual memories of their birthplace may be too far away, too few or too blurred, these memories provide a powerful constitutive frame of reference for the rest of their lives. It might even be the case that one has never been in their hometown or homeland in their entire life, but still has a nostalgic familiarity with or even a longing for it as they listen to stories of their elder family members and ancestors who had inhabited these places and had become amalgamated with them both physically and spiritually. As a result, therefore, a person who dwells in a modern (and possibly far away) city with no experience of a traditional rural life in their native land (and this person might even have transnational habitation or ties) may establish a sentimental bond with such an "imagined" territory.

However, not all forms of territoriality have manifested themselves as directly and concretely as outlined above. Just as the term "patria" has acquired new meanings in time, people's territorial attachment has assumed new dimensions.

#### **2.4.2 Instrumental Conception of Territoriality**

In Greek and Roman antiquity, "patria" mainly referred to the city; the unit of political identity and loyalty (Kantorowicz 1951: 474). Therefore, being a Greek or Roman entailed not only dwelling in a city, but also being a *citizen* with the pertinent

political rights and duties (i.e. the right to govern and the duty to defend the city) similar to their modern sense (Lewis 1992: 169). In the Roman Empire, a whole province, or the country, as we understand it today, became the unit of identity. Thus, attachment to territory has been projected onto a larger scale, a situation which continued into medieval and early modern times in Europe. Although contended by the allegiance claims of the churches, and feudal lords and kings, the sense of country grew stronger (Lewis 1992: 169).

With the advent of the nation-state and its ideology of nationalism, both “country” and “patria” acquired new connotations. As Liah Greenfeld argues, in the sixteenth century England, the word “country”, once meaning “county”, a locality and an administrative unit, acquired the sense of “patria” and came to be used as equivalents of “nation” and “people” (Greenfeld 1992: 338-339). Connor illustrates how the word “nation”, once connoting common blood ties, gradually evolved to mean the sector of a country from which a university student comes, and then to describe the inhabitants (the people or the citizenry) of a country regardless of their ethnonational composition. By the late seventeenth century, he notes, the term nation came to be used as a substitute for the territorial juridical unit, the state. Connor offers two possible explanations for this development. The first one is the rapid spread of the doctrine of popular sovereignty in which the *people*, already being equated with the idea of nation, was seen as the font of all political power, and thus becoming synonymous with the state. The second explanation is the interchangeable use of *nation* and *state* as abbreviations for the expression *nation-state*. Despite the fact that nation-state defines the congruence between the borders of the territorial unit and the territorial distribution of the national group, and that this definition applies only to a very limited number of states, all states came to be referred to as nation-states (Connor 1978: 381-382). As a consequence of this confusion, nationalism also came to mean loyalty to the state rather than to the nation, a development which was also reinforced by the rise of militant German and Japanese nationalisms (Connor 1978: 383-384).

On the other hand, Benedict Anderson, tracing the origins of national consciousness, explains in a perceptive way how changes in the conception of *time* led to an implicit assumption among the people of a country, who are in fact unknown to each other, that they live and act *anonymously* and *simultaneously* within a limited territory towards a common national goal (Anderson 1983: 22-24). Hence, the genesis of the “nation” as an imagined community. This genesis was particularly induced by the developments in communications. Print-capitalism paved the way for two forms of imagining, namely the newspaper and the novel, which in turn fed into the ideas of simultaneity and homogeneity (Anderson 1983: 25-36). Anderson’s account is useful to understand the cultural conditions that contributed to the formation of national consciousness, and thus facilitated nation-building. However, it is devoid of political action and agency: *who* exactly imagined the nation and why were nations imagined *this way*? Nor does it address the question of territoriality: how were the boundaries of nation-states drawn and maintained?

This is where the state comes into play. Although the issue of whether nationalism predated and paved the way for the nation-state, or whether states invented nations by using nationalism as an ideological tool to establish and maintain their authority is still debated, we may at least say that the formation of modern states played a very significant role in the demarcation and consolidation of sovereign territories. As people within these clearly demarcated borders tended to identify more and more with an entity called “nation”, their conceptualization of territoriality also shifted to a level that is ideological rather than natural, and to a scale much larger. As the nation-state became the dominant political unit, it increasingly called for the loyalty of people above all other (particular and local) allegiances.

Jonathan Boyarin underlines how states manipulate “the dimensionalities of space and time, invoking rhetorically fixed national identities to legitimate their monopoly on administrative control” (Boyarin 1994: 15-16). He further argues that states may be said to map history onto territory with an effort to assert temporal origins and spacial boundaries so that state identities may be created (Boyarin 1994: 16). From a similar perspective, Williams and Smith claim that nationalists and their followers

have focused on the subjective, malleable aspects of the land rather than on the objective ones such as size, location, terrain, and climate, and have redefined their environment as a political territory. In this process of the reconstruction of space, Williams and Smith discern three main trends that have prevailed since the eighteenth century, and have been pursued by the nationalist elites, movements and parties to further their interests as they have attempted to reshape their territorial environment. The first is the “activation” (symbolic as well as physical) of the environment and its use as a resource for collective goals of cultural communities. This has included appropriation of the land and its resources for communal ends, population transfers, radical demographic changes as well as transformation of popular conceptions of the environment and idealization of the land as the natural home of the people. The second trend is the “hardening of space” which means the filling-out of power vacuums and the utilization of all areas of social benefit and communal power. National elites have undertaken to eliminate all sorts of political-territorial uncertainty by trying to control even uninhabited parts of the territory, and to convey to the world the image of a united and mobilized community on a secure, compact territory which cannot be challenged externally or internally. Finally, there has been a growing “abstraction of land”. This trend has involved conferring new meanings upon territory and environment, and redefining objective data through rewriting textbooks, reinterpreting society’s relationship with nature, searching for origins and endowing historical events, heroes, monuments and geographical features with nationalistic content (Williams and Smith 1983: 512-514).

Although these accounts offer useful insights regarding the efforts of nation-states and nationalist elites to reconstruct or redefine the notions of space and territory in popular imagination, we cannot fully grasp the role of the state in “carving out” the nation and national territory merely by looking at how it controls cognitive processes and remoulds collective identities in a supposedly top-down manner. We also need to take into account both political and materialist explanations in order to understand the function of the state in the creation and perpetuation of this new type of territoriality. Ernest Gellner is one of the scholars who point to the fallacy of assuming that nation-states, nationalism or nationalists imagined a particular type of

community called the nation and delineated the territory of this nation in a particular way simply out of an arbitrary, fully conscious choice, or as part of a social engineering design. Gellner is indeed a modernist who thinks, contrary to the depictions of nationalists, that nationalism is “not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force”; it is “the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state” (Gellner 1983: 48). In other words, nationalism engenders nations, not the other way round. It uses pre-existing cultures in a selective way, revives dead languages and invents traditions. However, these facts should not lead one to conclude that nationalism is a contingent, artificial, ideological invention that would not have emerged, if it were not for the European thinkers who had injected it into the bloodstream of communities (Gellner 1983: 55-56). Gellner clarifies this point when he asserts:

It is not the case that nationalism imposes homogeneity out of a wilful cultural Machtbedürfniss<sup>4</sup>; it is the objective need for homogeneity which is reflected in nationalism. If it is the case that a modern industrial state can only function with a mobile, literate, culturally standardized, interchangeable population, as we have argued, then the illiterate, half-starved populations sucked from their erstwhile rural cultural ghettos into the melting pots of shanty towns yearn for incorporation into some one of those cultural pools which already has, or looks as if it might acquire, a state of its own, with the subsequent promise of full cultural citizenship, access to primary schools, employment, and all (Gellner 1983: 46).

As we can see, Gellner’s account is basically a political-instrumentalist one that brings to the forefront the decisiveness of political and economic exigencies including the modern state’s need for survival in an era of industrial social organization. Eric Hobsbawm, on the other hand, refines Gellner’s theory by not only relating the birth of nations to a certain kind of modern territorial state, but also legitimately situating this birth in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development. As he adds technology and liberal economy to the

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<sup>4</sup> Machtbedürfniss: craving for power

functioning of the modern territorial state as factors that engendered nations, he nevertheless admits to the fact that there is always an element of invention and social engineering in how nationalisms and states make nations (Hobsbawm 1990: 10). Consequently, in Hobsbawm's account, it was not until 1884 that "tierra" (in the sense of homeland or "patria" ), which had previously meant "the place, township or land where one is born", or "any region, province or district of any lordship or state", came to be attached to a state. Similarly, "not until 1925 do we hear the emotional note of modern patriotism, which defines *patria* as 'our own nation, with the sum total of material and immaterial things, past, present and future that enjoy the loving loyalty of patriots' " (Hobsbawm 1990: 15).

In sum, culture-centric and voluntaristic accounts that simply focus on anonymous persons' will or imagination without any reference to the role of specific political and economic agents and of wider structures in which these agents operate limit us in the sense that they are unable to explain the material foundations of the emergence and the evolution of the nation and the nation-state. They also fail to expose how the agents of the latter entities came to lay claim to people's territorial identifications and condition these identifications at their will in such a way that the terms "nation", "state", and "patria/homeland" have come to be perceived as coterminous in scale, scope and meaning.

As a result, the inclusion of materialist and modernist insights into our account leads us to a second type of territoriality where territory (or homeland) is not only a cultural entity but also a material resource. In other words, with the advent of the modern territorial nation-state and the resulting primacy of the national identification, territory of the country in which one lives is no longer only culturally identified but also politically and materially defined. People extend their loyalty to the nation-state and risk their lives for the defence of its territory not simply out of an abstract and subjective notion of an imagined (and/or imposed) belonging to a totality. They are also tied to this totality by actual relations of representation, voting and political participation (the political bond); citizenship rights and duties conferred by law (the legal bond); physical protection and recruitment (the military bond);

production and market relations (the economic bond); mass education and mass media (the ideological bond), bureaucratic dealings (the organizational bond) and so on.

Therefore, we may assert that the notion of territoriality ensuing from being a member of a nation and nation-state can be interpreted as conjunctural in the sense that it is the end product of many different material and immaterial circumstances that stem from a particular state of affairs at a particular point in time. It is not a fixed, nor an absolute category. Moreover, this territorial conceptualization can also be deemed contextual since people tend to give their allegiance to the political organization (namely the state) that claims to represent the territory in question in return primarily for material resources.

As a consequence, a change in material as well as in immaterial circumstances may lead to the questioning of this allegiance, and presumably to a corresponding change in the nature of the territorial attachment itself. It may be the case that if one or more of the above-mentioned material bonds between a person (or a community) and the political organization (usually the state) governing and representing the territory he lives in are considerably compromised either by the unfavourable policies of the state or by the emergence of contending identifications, then this person may develop similar ties with other groups, states or organizations across the border. This assessment brings us to the third conceptualization of territorial attachment.

### **2.4.3 Normative Conception of Territoriality**

Advancements in transportation and communication technologies as well as increasing mobilization of people have marked the beginning of a new set of transnational relations where the territorial nation-state is no longer the primary contender for people's identification.

Throughout history, people have left their countries (or territories) of origin and have moved to other places for many different reasons including wars, deportation, fear of

persecution, political repression, economic deprivation, education, marriage, family reunification, career opportunities, missionary activities, colonization, natural disasters, adventure seeking, etc.

What differs today's patterns of mobility from previous instances might be that they come in an age of the territorial nation-state with clearly demarcated and strictly patrolled borders within which it is supposed to have nearly absolute authority. Though the nation-state as a political entity is a fairly new phenomenon in human history, it is still difficult for a person born as a citizen of a nation-state to imagine a world in which the first question they are asked in both official and personal dealings beyond their country's borders is not "where do you come from?", meaning "what is your nationality?".

Despite the fact that we still live in a world divided into nation-states, the sway of the latter on people is mitigated by the presence of millions of migrants in these "*nation-states*" and by multiple and complicated ties that they maintain with their ancestral homelands. To put it differently, as people move away from the places where they or their ancestors were born and/or raised in order to settle in new territories, the association between "territoriality" and "homeland" is becoming more and more blurred.

People who settle in new countries become attached to their new territories in some of the ways outlined in cultural and instrumental types of territoriality: they try and adapt to a new natural habitat and social environment; cultivate the new soil; practice their original profession or acquire new skills; go to local schools, and thus socialize into a new way of life; enjoy the physical protection afforded by the state they now live in; enter into a different set of economic, legal, and social relations; and some of them will probably be buried in their new territory. These people may also naturalize and become citizens of their new states in due time. Consequently, their every-day life, habits, traditions, attitudes, and even values start to change. Even their memories of the homeland wear off over time.

Nevertheless, some members of these migrant populations still remain attached to their homeland not only mentally and emotionally, but also by way of actual political, economic, social and cultural interactions. In fact, a new scholarly literature has recently emerged to define and study such allegedly new patterns of transnational activities and identifications.

Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc challenge the conventional characterization of immigrants as “uprooted” people, and suggest a new term, *transmigrant*, for defining contemporary immigrants who maintain multiple linkages to their homeland while they try to establish roots in their new country, thus becoming simultaneously embedded in more than one society. In their own formulation, “[t]ransmigrants are immigrants whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state”; and by extension “transnational migration is the process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Glick Schiller *et al.* 1995: 48).

In another study entitled “*Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home*”, Glick Schiller, together with Georges Eugene Furon, whose migration experience from Haiti to the United States is the main theme of the book, states that the nationalism of many transmigrants like Furon is not an exclusive, competitive ideology (Glick Schiller and Furon 2001: 8). Nationalism, in its traditional sense, is basically about a nation’s right to control the territory that it deems its homeland by having its own state. As a result of the political movements organized around this principle, we live in a world divided into territorially based nation-states; a world in which every individual is supposed to belong to only one nation and can be a citizen of only one state. However, as the authors rightly put, in a new age of migration and intensified globalization, long-distance nationalism compels us to reassess our assumptions about the relationship between people and states that claim to represent them. According to them, we can now talk about “*transnational nation-state*”; a new form of state that reaches beyond its territorial

borders and sees its emigrants as continuing to be an integral part of their ancestral homeland, even though these emigrants have permanently settled abroad and have even become citizens of their country of settlement (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001: 18-19).

Long-distance nationalism, as a new type of nationalism, does not pertain only to emotions or passive identification with a homeland; it may also entail specific actions which may even include fighting and dying for it (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001: 20). In this model, the existence of territorially based nation-states are not challenged; it is only that the relationship of transborder communities to their nation-states is redefined in a much more flexible and inclusive manner. This is what differentiates “diasporas” from long-distance nationalism: diaspora populations might share transborder identifications based on religion, common descent, or a history of oppression and dispersal; but if they do not identify with a particular, existing state (or aspire to establish a new one) and participate in nation-state building, then they are not considered to be long-distance nationalists (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001: 23).

Long-distance nationalism shares a common point with the conventional ideology of localized nationalism: the link between people and territory. The notion of a territorial homeland is still central. However, membership in the nation is not confined within national borders. People might be living in different geographic locations under the authority of different states, but they do not necessarily cut their emotional and actual ties to their ancestral territory and state. In other words, in this formulation of nationalist identification and mobilization, we still cannot talk about a process of “deterritorialization” of nation-states as argued by various writers including Glick Schiller herself and her colleagues Basch and Szanton Blanc in their 1994 work entitled *“Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States”*.

On the other hand, long-distance nationalism is not always viewed in such a positive light as a factor that fosters transnational connectivities and opens up new opportunities for migrants as well as for their states of origin and settlement.

According to Benedict Anderson, for instance, long-distance nationalism creates a serious problem of accountability. The long-distance nationalist might be participating in the politics of their country of origin, let's say, by sending money and guns, distributing propaganda material, organizing political action via computer networks, etc. without contributing to its political and economic system through votes, taxes, and without being accountable to its judicial organs (Anderson 1998: 74).

For this reason, we should question the empowering capacity of transnational connectivities including long-distance nationalism. In addition to the above-mentioned problem of accountability in instances of long-distance nationalism, there is also another predicament: some other manifestations of transnationalism may not be as "transnational" as they might seem to be. Although the means of doing politics can be said to have transnationalized due to the developments in communications and transportation technology and the availability of informal channels and transborder fora to larger segments of societies, the ends pursued may still remain quite particularistic. People all over the world are utilizing transnational processes, tools, media and milieux not only for global causes such as solving transnational problems, exchanging ideas and sharing experiences, coming across new and challenging viewpoints, and contributing to the emergence of a much inclusive global politics and culture; they also make use of the opportunities provided by transnational networks to enhance interests pertaining to a specific identity or locality, or to a parochial political cause.

Lyons and Mandaville point out this fact as they make a distinction between transnational politics that revolve around cosmopolitan values and universal rights; and partisan, chauvinistic, territorially and ethno-nationally specific versions of transnational mobilization (Lyons and Mandaville 2010: 129). We may see the examples of the latter among migrant organizations and diaspora networks<sup>5</sup> whose "agendas and goals are still defined in territorial and normatively particularist terms,

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<sup>5</sup> The authors' definition of "diaspora" is political. Kinship ties or multiple social, economic and cultural linkages of a transnational nature are not sufficient for the creation of a diaspora: "a diaspora should represent itself as a coherent transnational community with a clear political agenda" (p.132).

but the modes of organization and activism increasingly defy state sovereignty and physical borders” (Lyons and Mandaville 2010: 132). Lyons and Mandaville claim that this is because diaspora mobilization has become an important strategy utilized by diaspora leaders, home and host countries and various non-state political movements, parties, or insurgent groups for a wide range of reasons including fund-raising, lobbying, campaigning. (Lyons and Mandaville 2010: 132-133). Hence, we see territorial identities reinforced among diaspora communities:

[S]ome of the earlier literature on transnational politics expected globalization to encourage a liberal, cosmopolitan type of politics. The most effective way to mobilize a diaspora, however, is often around identities that are specific, parochial and territorially based. Rather than transcending old territorial attachments, diaspora websites and publications often emphasize the symbols of the nation state – maps, flags, symbolic geographic features, or local plants. Often the language of exile emphasizes the links to homeland as a very much earthly place by speaking of the ‘original soil’ and the need to maintain ‘roots’ in times of dispersal and forced displacement. (Lyons and Mandaville 2010: 134).

Though we are far from a world marked by a cosmopolitan ethos, we may still argue for a reconstruction of place and a redefinition of territoriality. There is a plethora of studies that highlight the deterritorializing effects of ever increasing human mobility. Most of these studies reformulate notions such as “place”, “home”, “homeland” as well as “identity” and “belonging” in accordance with their belief in the socially constituted nature of cultural phenomena. As such, these notions started to be perceived as fluid, relational, and constantly reproduced in new ways, in contrast to the conventional understanding of them as static and bounded givens. As Ward puts, “[t]he flexible nature of recent formulations of place and home allows for cultural identities to be understood as negotiated and constructed between cultural worlds rather than being ‘rooted’ to a singular, stable ethnic locale” (Ward 2003: 81). Hence, movement as the new norm in today’s world entails “contextual identities and multiple sites of belonging” (Ward 2003: 81).

In a similar vein, Kearney recounts how globalization marked by migration, commerce, communication technology, finance, tourism, etc. has challenged the

“bipolar imagery of space and time” of modernism that stipulates a spatial order divided between metropolitan centers and peripheral sites connected in a hierarchical way. Globalization with its universal, impersonal, less institutionalized and less intentional character came in sharp contrast with the hegemonic cultural and political projects of nation-states and nationalism (Kearney 1995: 548-549). This way, it entailed “a shift from two-dimensional Euclidian space with its centers and peripheries and sharp boundaries, to a multidimensional global space with unbounded, often discontinuous and interpenetrating sub-spaces.” (Kearney 1995: 549). In parallel with this development, the concept of culture as distinctive characteristics of peoples rooted in national territories has also been shaken, calling for a reconsideration of the conventional understanding of the world as being composed of separate and bounded cultures. Thus, we see an increasing interest in *identity* in place of *culture* in scholarly circles (Kearney 1995: 556-557).

As another scholar who problematizes the impact of the circulation of people on the production of locality, Appadurai calls attention to how diasporic flows in its contemporary forms and the ensuing “translocalities” threaten the regulating, stabilizing and standardizing tendencies of the nation-state, and thus undermine the “isomorphism of people, territory and legitimate sovereignty” that characterizes the latter (Appadurai 1996: 191-192). According to him, electronic media have further contributed to the creation of “virtual neighbourhoods” that are no longer bounded by territory, but are still able to mobilize ideas, money, social linkages, political projects, delocalized political communications as well as local nationalisms, suggesting an ability far beyond the scope of long-distance nationalism as defined by Anderson (Appadurai 1996: 195-196).

Appadurai claims that we are heading towards a global order in which the nation-state is losing its grip on people, and that alternative, “postnational” formations are emerging. Mass migrations, combined with electronic mediation, imprint rapidly circulating images on the imagination of deterritorialized (but not necessarily physically mobile) viewers, creating “diasporic public spheres” outside the

boundaries, and certainties, of local, national, or regional spaces (Appadurai 1996: 3-6).

In this new postnational order marked by the plurality of imagined worlds, we may still see nationalist movements as well as instances of ethnic violence. However, these movements themselves are “diasporic” and are less and less inspired by ideas of spatial boundary and territorial sovereignty (Appadurai 1996: 161). Indeed they contain transnational, subnational, and nonnational identities and aspirations in the context of a general search for “nonterritorial principles of solidarity” (Appadurai 1996: 165). According to Appadurai, territorial nationalism is not necessarily the basic motive or final goal of these movements. Even in cases such as Palestine where territorial sovereignty seems to be the main point of contention, aspirations are in fact about power, justice and self-determination (Appadurai 1996: 21). Frequent recourse of antistate movements to images of homeland, soil and place does not stem from the hegemony of territorial nationalism, but is rather a sign of the poverty of the political languages available (Appadurai 1996: 166).

Although Appadurai calls into question the legitimacy of territorial nation-states and predicts their demise, he points to the global spread of originally local national identities as evidence of the transnational thriving of the idea of the nation. The mobility of populations as migrants, refugees, tourists, or students leads to a variety of diasporic identities and collectivities, which Appadurai terms delocalized, nonterritorial “transnations” (Appadurai 1996: 172). In this new order, diaspora is not an exception, and settled ways of life are increasingly challenged as diasporic communities feel primarily attached to their nonterritorial transnations rather than territorial states of origin or settlement (Appadurai 1996: 172-173).

Appadurai offers a sophisticated account of how mass mobility and electronic media have been transforming people’s imagination making postnational formations and spaces possible. However, his depiction of the newly emerging world order seems to downplay the involvement of nation-states in this transformation. Nation-states are still relevant, if not the only, arbiters of space production. Although they may naturally be expected to be resisting the so-called deterritorialization and

transnationalization of political and cultural actions and identifications, they also seek in some contexts, or even simultaneously as they resist, to adapt to the new conditions and to take advantage of the new opportunities offered by the very same processes.

In order to maintain and strengthen their authority and legitimacy, many states now frequently utilize transnational networks and fora to advance their national and international causes, mobilize diaspora communities both to raise funds and to assist lobbying efforts, and enjoy the communications and surveillance facilities enabled by the proliferation of the new technology including electronic media. More importantly, they still monopolize the right to patrol their borders even more efficiently now with the help of the new technology as well as through stricter visa regimes so as to determine who enters and exits the territory they occupy. As such, states, though not going unchallenged any more, seem to retain some sort of a prerogative on mechanisms of control including the shaping and reshaping of political, cultural and ideological spaces.

Moreover, accounts that put too much emphasis on the undisciplined, spontaneous and stimulating nature of the new transnational connectivities run the risk of concealing the relations of hierarchy, control and domination that are generated by the underlying political and economic structures and processes. As mentioned above, such transnational linkages or postnational formations may not necessarily and inevitably be liberating in all conditions; nor may they always strengthen the position of individuals and collectivities vis-à-vis oppressive or delimiting institutions and practices. They may well be used to obscure changing patterns of power distribution and domination by giving a false image of emancipation and empowerment. In order to argue for a new world order characterized by interconnecting and overlapping spaces, cross-cutting allegiances, more flexible postnational identities and multiplying opportunities for political action, it does not suffice to point out *how* interlinkages are proliferating and new subjectivities are being formed within the general context of a constant reshaping of our imagination. We also need to ask *who* the new agents and carriers of these changes are, and *why* these changes manifest

themselves differently (and usually unevenly) in different *places*, particularly given the suggestion that we are heading towards delocalization and deterritorialization.

David Harvey offers an alternative approach regarding the spatial experiences and practices associated with a so-called postmodern condition starting from the 1970s onwards as well as with previous phases of history (Harvey 1989). He attempts to situate the changing conceptions of space and time within the overall political-economic transformation of late twentieth century capitalism. He claims that the transition from Fordism to flexible accumulation has facilitated the acceleration of the turnover time in production, exchange and consumption, which has in turn led to an intense phase of “time-space compression”. Although we had witnessed a similar phase of time-space compression with the rise of modernism and Fordism, postmodernity marked by flexible accumulation has brought about a much more intense and disrupting process of fragmentation and reorganization of the spatial order of production and capital flow. The speeding up and the increasing versatility of production, exchange and consumption processes enabled by new organizational forms and new technologies have had significant repercussions not only for political and economic relations, but also for cultural and social life (Harvey 1989: 284-285).

According to Harvey, one of the major consequences of this transition has been “to accentuate volatility and ephemerality of fashions, products, production techniques, labour processes, ideas and ideologies, values and established practices. The sense that ‘all that is solid melts into air’ has rarely been more pervasive...” (Harvey 1989: 285-286). As a result, “individuals were forced to cope with disposability, novelty, and the prospects for instant obsolescence” (Harvey 1989: 286). Harvey suggests that one response to such large-scale disruption and disorientation caused by the “annihilation of space through time” has been the urge for discovering or constructing an “eternal truth” in a general quest for a more secure ground and longer-lasting values. This urge has manifested itself in the form of a revived interest in religion and/or other basic institutions such as family and community, while also leading to a search for authenticity and authority in politics as well as for historical roots. Hence the rise of nationalism and localism (Harvey 1989: 292).

Harvey further claims that these sentiments and responses are coupled with a sensitivity towards the new spatial adjustments and that the collapse of the spatial barriers has amounted neither to a disappearance of space nor to a decreasing significance of spatial arrangements. On the contrary, under conditions of accelerating capitalist competition, a better control over space and an enhanced ability to exploit spatial differentiations and geographical circumstances achieved as a result of diminishing spatial barriers have become much more decisive in the struggle between classes, localities, cities, regions, and nations (Harvey 1989: 293-295). This has in turn laid the ground for the active production of places with special qualities so as to render these places more attractive to capital, a process which engenders an ever increasing inter-place competition and an ensuing geographical hierarchy as well as fragmentation, uneven development, and insecurity within a highly unified global space (Harvey 1989: 295-296).

Although the disruptive nature of the new spatial organization outlined above may be taken by some as an opening providing new opportunities and possibilities for survival, Harvey states that it has also induced an opposite reaction. In their search for personal and collective identity and security in a shifting world, individuals and social movements have started to put more emphasis on place-bound identities, organizations and resistances, thus establishing a link between place and social identity. In particular, oppositional groups such as minorities, colonized people, and women have a better control of and organize better in *place*, whereas they are disempowered in organizing over *space* which is under capitalist hegemony. This situation results in further fragmentation that plays into the hands of an increasingly mobile and flexible capitalism (Harvey 1989: 302-303).

Harvey's narrative underlines the tension that is generated by the processes of constant deterritorialization and reterritorialization that lies at the heart of the capitalist system. He situates the very questions of place and space within the framework of the evolution of capitalism and historicizes the arguments for the increasing, or alternatively decreasing, importance of territoriality with its implications for individuals, groups, and political-economic entities and systems. In a

way, he puts *in place* the concepts of space, place and territoriality that have long been “uprooted” and abstracted from their political and economic context.

Akhil Gupta’s discussion of the Nonaligned Movement in comparison to the European Community in a transnational world (1992) parallels Harvey’s account in that he also draws attention to the *reterritorialization* and reinscription of space, alongside the processes of deterritorialization and displacement, in late capitalism. Gupta also adds “postcoloniality” as the political factor to the general picture of late capitalist transformation. In his view, the Nonaligned Movement is a good example of a transnational imagined community with its diffuse and decentered profile and its control on the distribution of news and cultural products (Gupta 1992: 66). The Movement has had as one of its basic motives the opposition to colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and racism (Gupta 1992: 66). But, at the same time, it has been based on a nationalist desire to preserve and consolidate the independence and sovereignty of its third-world members in a postcolonial order and has used nationalist elements such as an anthem-like song in order to create a third world identity analogous to national identities (Gupta 1992: 67). In line with Appadurai’s account of the idea of the nation flourishing transnationally, Gupta points to the paradoxical situation that nationalism needs transnationalism to protect itself (Gupta 1992: 67).

These discussions show us the difficulty of establishing direct causal links and reaching definitive or categorical judgments about the relationship between territoriality, nationalism, and transnationalism. Perhaps the only sure thing that we can safely discern from the plethora of studies that scrutinize this elusive and multidimensional web of relations of space, place, and territory is that territoriality still matters regardless of the fact that it has lately been redefined in a more sophisticated and complex fashion than ever before. Even if the concepts such as place, territory and homeland have lost their original meaning of a bounded physical location independent of human action, intervention and interpretation, as Gupta and Ferguson argues, they nevertheless maintain their function as “moral locations” and

“symbolic anchors” in a world in which aspects of our lives are still localized and the global capitalist economy is highly spatialized (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 10-11).

## **2.5 Conclusions**

The arguments outlined above indicate that identities are not essential categories and they are in constant flux. Based on this, we may say that forms of territorial belonging are not purely natural or absolute. As Malkki convincingly argues, common assumptions about the primary and inevitable need of human beings for (territorial) rootedness and the naturalized identity between people and place as well as between culture and soil harbour an essentialism that we should remain wary of (Malkki 1992: 26-29).

On the other hand, however, even if we acknowledge the emergence of transnational or postnational identities that are detached from traditional conceptions of territoriality and are multi-sited (i.e., constituted in different physical and symbolic places), this acknowledgement does not necessarily amount to coming to terms with an understanding of free-floating cultural categories and of extremely fluid, malleable identities. Identities might derive from different territorial and cultural contexts, but the cultural bearing of each context on the individual or community in question might not be of the same extent or nature. Some relations of territoriality are norm-generating, hence deep-rooted, whereas others may be of a more pragmatic, or transient, nature.

This might specifically be the case with migrant communities. People, particularly those who have been dislocated or dispersed, may have a sense of an ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, historical, cultural, or civilizational belonging (or a combination of several of these) that might be associated with a range of different territories, or geographies. It is needless to mention that an individual cannot be readily assumed to be belonging to a particular group or community just because they descended from an ethnic, racial or religious group, or they speak a certain language, or live in a

specific location. Nor does a person automatically acquire the characteristics of a particular group or a geographic area just because they happened to have been born into it. Moreover, a symbolic or strategic endorsement of a particular identity for the sole purpose of provisionally aligning oneself with or differentiating oneself from certain groups in physical or categorical proximity is not a safe ground for permanently attributing that identity to the person in question. Identities can be discerned and theorized in a social scientifically relevant way insofar as they function as a relatively stable and long-term basis of values, beliefs, mores, codes of conduct, emotional and ideational categories that can be clearly identified by the observer.

Norm-generating territoriality differs from the first and the second types in that it is not directly or necessarily linked to specific immediate localities such as one's place of birth, homeland or place of settlement, or to nation-states (or other forms of political organization) that claim to represent these localities at a wider scale. This seems to be a contradiction at first sight, since one may ask how territoriality can be defined without reference to a specific territory. The concept of normative territoriality does not defy "territory"; it rather defies a necessary and inevitable link between certain (types of) territories and certain (types of) identities. A person might have been born and have grown up in a geographic location, a country, or a state; but this does not necessarily call for an automatic association between this territory and the person's cultural world, meaning their customs, beliefs, values, attitudes, habits, way of life, and ideology.

Conversely, let us imagine that a person left their hometown, homeland, or country of origin presumably at a very early age, and have lived in a different place for a very long time; or that this person has never seen their ancestral land. This fact should not lead us to jump to the conclusion that this person or his posterity will eventually abandon the cultural codes of their ancestral land and adopt those of the new land. Which cultural world(s) may dominate the lives of dislocated people or people with transnational ties and how distinct cultural worlds with their focus on different value systems and identity markers will interact with each other so as to win the loyalty of

these individuals and groups are too complex questions to be addressed without giving due attention to how territoriality is defined and perceived in each case in a specific period of time. In other words, identities are anchored in territorial relations, but the nature of the link between them and how this link evolves in time is a matter that calls for indepth analysis.

In the light of the above-mentioned arguments, therefore, we should not take for granted the idea that transnational linkages always produce truly transnational agendas or postnational identities. Neither should we reckon on the deterritorializing effect of transnationalism. New patterns of transnationalism might be argued to have ruled out the necessity of physical proximity for political and social mobilization, as people may now come together in cyberspace, or travel long distances in fairly short periods of time. However, the tasks of creating alternative global allegiances utterly detached from territorially based identities and developing agendas that transcend nation-state oriented politics have proved to be harder than expected.

In conclusion, we may still talk about the emergence of transnational politics, linkages and identities, but we should keep in mind that these concepts are almost never delinked from territorial relations, no matter whether these relations are implicit or explicit, abstract or concrete, symbolic or instrumental, naturally acquired or imposed from above. Both human mind and activity are spacially situated and territorially implicated.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **TERRITORIALITY, TRANSNATIONALISM AND DIASPORA**

In the first chapter, I have argued that most studies on group identities, particularly those in the literature on nationalism, have neglected the aspect of territorial situatedness of individuals and collectivities in their analyses of the conditions and principles of group formation and collective identification. In order to remedy the resulting disconnectedness between the disciplines of geography, international relations and nationalism studies, I have explored and defined some basic concepts such as place, space and territoriality and attempted to establish their fundamentality for an informed analysis of nationalism and of the evolution of the idea of homeland. Building on the previous works of scholars who set off to define and theorize human territorial relations, I have proposed a three-layered model of territoriality based on three different but interconnected conceptualizations of human territorial attachment, namely the cultural, the instrumental and the normative territoriality. My analyses of the territorial identification and homeland attachment of the ethnic Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands will be based on these three conceptualizations.

Before proceeding to the case analyses, however, I shall provide here some basic insights into how the territorial concepts and ideas I have put forward in the previous chapter have been explored by different scholars from various disciplines. In the first part, I will further assess the relevance and significance of the notions of territoriality and homeland for any attempt to understand human existence as well as the process of identity construction of human groupings. In this part I will also look briefly into the historical evolution of and the interconnections between these two concepts by examining the works of influential geographers.

In the second part, I will delve into two interrelated research fields, namely transnationalism and diaspora studies, to benefit from their discussions on changing conceptions and forms of territorial relations in a world increasingly marked by mobility, migration and diasporization. I will dwell particularly on new and expanding definitions of diaspora, the proliferation of diasporic groups, relations and experiences, the link between diaspora territoriality and the idea of homeland, and the transforming territorial relations of diaspora communities in the face of the transnationalization of different aspects of life which include territorial ideas, norms, habits, ways of connecting and organizing.

In the third and final part, I will connect these discussions on diaspora territoriality and transnationalism to my research cases. With the insights provided by the previous surveying of the existing theoretical approaches towards territoriality in the literatures of geography, diaspora politics and (trans)nationalism, I will try to assess the status of the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands with regard to the new definitions, concepts and arguments developed to grasp the impact of the recent global changes on the territorial identities of ethnic communities with multiple attachments.

### **3.1 The Significance of Territoriality and Homeland**

It has previously been mentioned that human existence is spatially situated and territorially implicated. This statement implies a situatedness that refers to more than merely being present in a geographical or physical place that can be identified by mathematical coordinates. The phenomenon of being territorially situated encompasses not only a sense of physical existence that can be attested by way of having a visible position within the empirical world, but also a relational condition that determines one's access to communal membership, resources and social-political-economic power. The latter aspect brings to the fore the issue of boundary setting and maintenance. Once territoriality goes beyond the condition of occupying a physical point in the universe and becomes a matter of encircling a certain area and

controlling who or what will –and will not- be allowed within, then it acquires a political dimension. And politics is a purely human endeavour.

Moreover, based on the definition of territoriality as a method of boundary setting and maintenance, an analysis of territoriality requires a discussion not only of fixation, but also of movement. Such an analysis inevitably leads us, in turn, to an examination of not only fixed primordial ties to, or instinctive uses of, territory, but also wilful political acts of inclusion, exclusion, boundary-crossing, and trespassing. Robert D. Sack examines territoriality as a strategy to establish different degrees of access to people, things, and relationships (i.e. a strategy that is directed to human motivations and goals, and that can be turned on and off) instead of linking it to a biologically driven instinct to obtain food, mates, and to control population size by using territoriality (Sack 1986: 20, 24). As he puts:

Territoriality points to the fact that human spatial relationships are not neutral. People do not just interact in space and move through space like billiard balls. Rather, human interaction, movement, and contact are also matters of transmitting energy and information in order to affect, influence, and control the ideas and actions of others and their access to resources. Human spatial relations are the results of influence and power. Territoriality is the primary spatial form power takes (Sack 1986: 26).

In Sack's view, territorial strategies have the advantage of making relationships impersonal and shaping future activities within a hierarchy, an advantage that we cannot enjoy with other methods of classification that determine access or membership according to kind or type rather than geographical area (Sack 1986: 22-23). In other words, categorizing people, things and relationships by type is neither practical nor possible in many cases as one has to evaluate every single instance to determine access and make a list of who or what is to be included in the category at hand. Moreover, one cannot establish rules and laws to apply to future cases in a consistent way unless they specify and delimit a territory, and take control of it so as to communicate these rules and laws to those liable and enforce them effectively. George W. White claims that governance requires possession of territory since the enactment and execution of laws are not possible or meaningful without a certain

degree of control over territory. This is the reason why human beings are very protective of places and territories that are both embodiments of their identity and repositories of natural resources (White 2000: 30-31).

These arguments that take territoriality as a tool for classification, rule enforcement and control seem to presuppose large and complex societies. At this point, we have to ask whether or not territoriality has always been employed as a strategy of control by human beings, and if so, how its nature and manifestations have changed throughout history. Sack compares the conceptions of territoriality of the Chippewa Indians of North America with those of the modern Western society, and concludes that the imposition by the white men in North America of political territories (national, state, county, and township) with clear-cut boundaries served the needs of a hierarchical society based on market relations and private property. In the case of the Chippewa, being born into this community was enough for being accepted as a member, whereas in modern Western societies living within a territory often defines membership of a community (Sack 1986: 12-13). Consequently, he argues, territoriality in the modern world is an essential means of defining membership in a group and shaping the ensuing social relationships. This use of territoriality hardly occurs in primitive societies, occurs in a limited degree in pre-modern societies, while it is employed to the full extent with all possible effects in modern societies (Sack 1986: 27).

Although the use of territoriality as a strategy of control has developed as a predominantly modern phenomenon, human attachment to land and place seems to have a longer history. Tuan explains this type of territoriality with reference to a religious concept of “geopieté”, a term which covers a broad range of emotional bonds (including reverence, propitiation, pity, compassion, and affection) between man and his terrestrial home (Tuan 1976: 11-12). As Tuan recounts, in the ancient world, landscape was believed to have local powers and this belief was reified in shrines, sacred enclosures, images, sacred stones and trees (Tuan 1976: 18). These powers were personified in gods, goddesses, spirits, etc. that were believed to dwell in mountains, caves, groves, streams, or soil. Just like these religious figures, human

beings were also thought to emanate power after death; that is why ancestors and heroes were raised to a semidivine status and burial grounds were sanctified (Tuan 1976: 21). Even though nature has been stripped of its holy features, and has thus been secularized in the modern era, and reverence or awe towards a superior power in the ancient sense has disappeared; geopious feelings have remained in the form of attachment to place, love of country, and patriotism (Tuan 1976: 12-13).

As also pointed out by Fustel de Coulanges, patriotism of the ancient Greeks and Romans, upon which modern patriotism was built, was a religious sentiment. The word “country” signified *terra patria* (land of the fathers), and the fatherland was a sacred soil inhabited by gods and ancestors and sanctified by worship. A person had two fatherlands: the small fatherland was the family enclosure with its tomb and its hearth; the great fatherland was the city with its *prytaneum*<sup>6</sup> and its heroes, with its sacred enclosure and its territory marked out by religion (de Coulanges cited in Viroli 1995: 18).

The secularization of the concept of homeland has been ironically accelerated by the spread of Christianity. Hastings argues that early Christianity stipulated both a theological and a geographical discontinuity with the concept of “holy land” as well as with the holy lands, in the eyes of the Jews, of Jerusalem and Palestine (Hastings 2003: 34). Christians were not supposed to have a holy or special land, nor a particular nationality; they were expected to embrace catholicity, in other words, universality (Hastings 2003: 34). According to Hastings, it was only in the fourth century that the idea of holy places recurred particularly in the Christian Roman Empire in the West because the authority of the papacy and the bishops became increasingly attached to the possession of certain holy places, particularly of martyrs (Hastings 2003: 34-35). Just as the political power became intermingled with ecclesiastical authority, the latter was organized around localized holiness (Hastings 2003: 35).

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<sup>6</sup> public hall

However, although the religious conception of attachment to land began to fade as man strengthened his control over nature and as Christianity came to dominate the Western world, the rhetoric of the classical antiquity continued to be used by modern patriotism. As Tuan points out, people still talk about dying for the sacred soil. National heroes and their glorious battles, enshrined in monuments and history books, replaced gods and saints of the previous period (Tuan 1976: 26-27). So, how did the concepts of sacred territory and holy lands become translated into the presumably secular language of the nationalistic paradigm in the modern era?

According to Anthony D. Smith, modernist accounts of nationalism that attribute the nationalist demarcation of territory to the centralizing activities of the state (such as census taking, map making and mass public education) fail to explain why people have such strong feelings about national homeland and why these sentiments are directed towards a particular territory, not any territory, in each case (Smith: 2003: 131-132). Though not underestimating the role of the modern state in shaping national territories, Smith underlines the continuity between pre-modern and modern sources of the sanctity of the homeland. He notes:

Investing 'our' homeland with special qualities, and regarding it with reverence and awe, as the birthplace of the nation or the resting-place of its heroes and ancestors, is to continue in secular form the pre-modern practice of hallowing historic places and marking off sacred ancestral territories.

Indeed, as secularization becomes more common, ancestral homelands acquire greater sanctity. This is partly the result of displacement of affect: the transfer of awe and reverence from the deity and his or her 'church' to the location of the shrine and its worshippers... Thus 'religion', or in this case religious sentiments, permeates the secular forms and hence penetrates the realm of worldly politics (Smith 2000: 806-807).

Smith thinks that the processes of territorialization of memory, which I have briefly touched upon in the previous chapter, rests upon religion in the wider, social, Durkheimian sense, if not on a specific religious tradition. In his view, long-term popular values, symbols, and traditions of sacred land, including myths of creation,

longevity, and chosenness and the veneration of ancestors and their shrines, have been taken up by the nationalists in the modern era, given new meanings, and put to political use (Smith 2003: 165).

However, not all sources of patriotism can be deemed religious. Maurizio Viroli argues that in addition to and strictly intertwined with religious patriotism in which a man is attached to his country by a sacred tie and he must give himself to it entirely, a political patriotism also descended from classical antiquity to modernity (Viroli 1995: 19). Political patriotism of ancient Rome was based on the identification of *patria* with *respublica*, common liberty, common good, and laws and institutions of the city. This type of love for *patria* involved respect and compassion, service and care; it was a love similar to the affection felt for parents and relatives (Viroli 1995: 19-20).

According to Tuan, attachment to homeland, even though its strength varies across time and place, is a common emotion and is not limited to a particular culture or economy, or a period of time; it exists among literate and non-literate peoples, hunter-gatherers, and sedentary farmers as well as city-dwellers (Tuan 1977: 154). The emotional bond is stronger when ties that bind them to a specific place or territory are numerous (Tuan 1977: 158). Tuan identifies the reason for the ubiquity of man's attachment to homeland as follows: "[t]he city or land is viewed as mother, and it nourishes; place is an archive of fond memories and splendid achievements that inspire the present; place is permanent and hence reassuring to man, who sees frailty in himself and chance and flux everywhere" (Tuan 1977: 154).

Particularly relevant for my study is the situation in which these feelings of nourishing and permanence are shaken and/or redefined by moving away from one's territory or homeland as a result of migration, deportation, war, or any other reason. Lord Acton claims that "exile is the nursery of nationality" (Acton cited in Benedict Anderson 1998: 59). Even before the nationalist epoch, we see that exile is an important theme in the self-identifications of both individuals and communities. As Tuan notes, land and religion were so closely associated in antiquity that exile was

the worst punishment; it deprived one not only of his physical means of support, but also of religion and the protection afforded by local gods (Tuan 1977:154).

When we say homeland, we tend to assume “ancestral homeland”, the land of origin. However, besides ancestral homeland, Smith defines another kind of sacred homeland: promised land, the land of destination. Although these two types may historically overlap, the former is the land of history whereas the latter is the land of destiny (Smith 2003: 137). As mentioned before, Smith modifies the modernist and instrumentalist accounts by calling attention, in his attempt to explain the roots of modern nations, to the durability of pre-modern collective cultural units and sentiments, which he terms “*ethnie*”, and by claiming that modern national units and sentiments have largely been fashioned out of these ethnic units and sentiments, though with important changes of form and content (Smith 1986: 13-16). He further argues that what makes *ethnie* durable is not so much their ecological locations, class configurations, or military and political relationships as the nature of their myths and symbols, their historical memories and central values, i.e., the “myth-symbol complex”, and the mechanisms of their diffusion and transmission to future generations (Smith 1986: 15). It is these complexes that have been exceptionally durable and have been sought to be revived and/or combined with later complexes by modern nationalisms (Smith 1986: 16). Smith defines the relationship of *ethnie* to territory as follows:

An *ethnie* need not be in physical possession of ‘its’ territory; what matters is that it has a symbolic geographical centre, a sacred habitat, a ‘homeland’, to which it may symbolically return, even when its members are scattered across the globe and have lost their homeland centuries ago. *Ethnie* do not cease to be *ethnie* when there are dispersed and have lost their homeland; for ethnicity is a matter of myths, memories, values and symbols, and not of material possessions or political power, both of which require a habitat for their realization.

...

Territory is relevant to ethnicity, therefore, not because it is actually possessed, nor even for its ‘objective’ characteristics of climate, terrain and location, though they influence ethnic conceptions, but because of an alleged and felt symbiosis

between a certain piece of earth and 'its' community. Again, poetic and symbolic qualities possess greater potency than everyday attributes; a land of dreams is far more significant than any actual terrain (Smith 1986: 28).

This assertion brings us to the issue of diaspora nationalism and diasporic formulations of homeland. A discussion of diaspora nationalism is particularly relevant to my case studies since Turkish communities in different parts of the world are being placed under the rubric of diaspora communities by an increasing number of analysts.

### **3.2 Definitions of Diaspora and Diaspora Territoriality**

What makes a migrant community a "diaspora" is a widely debated question. There have been many scholarly attempts to define the term diaspora and to determine the criteria that can be applied to groups of migrants in order to identify them as diaspora communities. Some of these definitions are based on the motivation and method ("pattern") of migration or dispersal, others on the existence of an intention of returning to homeland, while others on the group's self-identification with country of origin and/or its active participation in homeland matters. Whatever the determining factors are, the general inclination in the discipline of diaspora studies in recent years is to widen the scope of the term diaspora so as to include groups that had previously been left out of the classical diaspora definitions.

Conventionally, diasporas have been defined as communities that have been dispersed (or forcefully deported) from their original homeland and are scattered across multiple countries or geographic areas. Accordingly, the Jewish, Greek and Armenian diasporas have frequently been cited as the quintessential examples of classical diasporas. William Safran holds that the concept of diaspora that, for a very long time, exclusively signified the exile of the Jews from their historic homeland and their dispersion and oppression in the aftermath has been extended to refer to several distinct groups of people: expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien

residents, immigrants, and ethnic and racial minorities (Safran 1999: 364). Granting that such an over-stretching of definition might result in a loss of meaning, Safran offers a definition of diaspora that covers expatriate minority communities whose members share several of the following six features: 1) to have been dispersed from a specific original center to at least two peripheral, or foreign regions; 2) to have a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland; 3) to believe that they are alienated and insulated from and cannot be fully accepted by their host societies; 4) to see their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home to which they or their descendants will eventually return; 5) to be collectively committed to the maintenance and restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; 6) to continue to relate to their homeland in one way or another, this relationship being the defining factor of their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity (Safran 1999: 364-365).

In the light of this definition, Safran claims that we may legitimately speak of a Turkish diaspora (inter alia), although, in his view, none of the diaspora groups fitting into this definition fully conforms to the “ideal type” of the Jewish diaspora (Safran 1999: 365). According to him, the Turkish (*Gastarbeiter*) community in Germany may qualify as a diaspora if his definition is slightly modified since its members, though not having been forcibly expelled from their countries, have nevertheless developed a high diaspora consciousness and have internalized the “myth of return” (Safran 1999: 366-367). We may draw a parallel between the labour migrants in Germany and those in the Netherlands in the sense that both communities have shared a similar migration pattern, and to some extent, a myth of return, as well as having maintained a fairly close relationship with their homeland over the years. However, this assertion should not overshadow the fact that these communities have experienced diverse political, social, and cultural trajectories in their respective host countries as Germany and the Netherlands differ considerably with respect to their political systems, migration and minority policies, and social texture.

Safran further refines his definition by noting that not all dispersed communities can be considered diasporas. Groups that were politically detached from the motherland,

such as the Magyars of Transylvania, cannot be regarded as diasporas since they were not expelled or expatriated (Safran 1999: 367). In these terms, the Turkish community in Bulgaria cannot be deemed a diaspora since they constitute a left-out minority community on a territory that had been separated from a dissolving empire.

The criterion of forcible dispersion is one of the most debated aspects of the issue of defining a diaspora. The centrality of the idea of dispersion in definitions of diaspora can also be seen by a closer look at the etymological background of the term. Khachig Tölölyan traces the origin of the term diaspora which, until the late sixties, had been used by the Western scholars to denote the Jewish experience as the paradigmatic case and the Armenian and Greek dispersions as two other noteworthy examples. He states that the term diaspora derives from the Greek verb “diaspeirein” (i.e., to scatter) which had the proto-Indoeuropean root *spr*, as in “spore, sperm, spread, disperse,” and originally signified “an abrupt but natural process, the fruitful scattering away of seeds from the parent body that both dispersed and reproduced the organism” (Tölölyan 1996: 9-10). Robin Cohen also notes that the term diaspora is found in the Greek translation of the Bible and originally meant “to sow widely”; in fact, the Greeks used the term to describe the colonization of Asia Minor and the Mediterranean around 800-600 BC, and thus “diaspora” essentially had a positive connotation (Cohen 1996: 507). However, in later stages, the concept of diaspora has been so closely associated with the Jewish experience, an association particularly reinforced by references to Jewish religious texts, that it has lost its original meaning and has come to imply a “victim diaspora” (Cohen 1996: 507-508). With regard to the common features of a diaspora, Cohen agrees with Safran in that a diaspora should be dispersed to more than one land and that stranded minorities living in ethnic enclaves inside a country or in nearby countries would not normally count as diasporas (Cohen 1996: 514). Yet, he qualifies Safran’s first criterion by listing “the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions” as another cause besides traumatic dispersal from an original homeland (Cohen 1996: 515).

Rogers Brubaker diagnoses a trend since the late 1980s to extend the category of diaspora so as to include many diverse groups including trading diasporas, labour migrants, emigrant groups with continued involvement in homeland politics, or long-distance nationalists as defined by Anderson (1998), linguistic categories (such as Anglophone, Francophone communities) and religious groups with little or no reference to a homeland, assimilated emigrant groups, ethnonational groups that result from the migration of borders over people rather than vice versa (Brubaker 2005: 2-3). The term diaspora has even been stretched to define various other categories of people the only common feature of whom is that they are dispersed in space: the yankee diaspora, the white diaspora, the liberal diaspora, the gay diaspora, the digital diaspora, and so forth (Brubaker 2005: 3). Brubaker warns us against this dispersion of meaning of diaspora in various directions which results in what he calls a “diaspora” diaspora. To place every discernible category of people under the label of diaspora makes the term useless as it loses its discriminating power. “If everyone is diasporic, then no one is distinctively so.” (Brubaker 2005: 3).

The inclusion of such diverse flocks of people into the category of diaspora may risk eroding the latter’s explanatory power. This possibility should force us to work on certain parameters to establish the boundaries of the concept so that it will allow us to make it flexible enough to accommodate new patterns of mobilization and grouping, but at the same time enabling us to differentiate it from other circumstantial and transient, or nonterritorial, human groups. Moreover, these parameters will help us ascertain whether the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands can be labelled diaspora communities and whether their ties with Turkey as ancestral homeland, if so defined by their members, is of diasporic nature. These parameters might be listed, though non-exhaustively, as follows:

### **3.2.1 Causes and conditions of dispersion**

Dispersion is generally taken to be the most evident criterion for diaspora formation. However, it should not be taken for granted since, as mentioned before, modes of

dispersion have impacted on the very definition and scope of diaspora. In classical accounts of diaspora, forceful dispersion and victimization were dominant themes, whereas recent formulations tend to encompass voluntary migration and border movements as well. Gabriel Sheffer believes that ethnic diasporas are created either by voluntary migration (e.g., Turks in the then West Germany), or as a result of expulsion (e.g., the Jews and the Palestinians) (Sheffer 1999: 9). Walker Connor defines diaspora as “that segment of a people living outside the homeland”, a definition that may include even compactly settled minority populations living outside their homelands (Connor cited in Brubaker 2005: 5).

A discussion on the mode of dispersal as such may not bear fruit since it obscures the real motives behind mass movements. In other words, economic migrations including trading and labour migrants, or mass movements as a result of wars, border changes, geopolitical repartitioning, regime changes, coups d'état and so forth may not, in a straightforward way, be classified as strictly voluntary or involuntary. In many cases, it is difficult to establish whether the population in question moved because they were explicitly forced by state authorities, or dominant groups, to do so, or whether they thought it was to their best interest to migrate under conditions of imminent or foreseeable danger, (explicit or implicit) social pressure, conflict, chaos, bad living and working conditions. This ambivalence regarding the genuine motivations of migrating populations and the degree of forcefulness therein renders it difficult to decide which cases of dispersal should be regarded as diaspora-generating. We should be wary of the fact that people might feel forced to move to different places even in the absence of a clear-cut case of expulsion by identifiable agents.

The only way to overcome this difficulty is to focus on other factors that might manifest themselves more evidently than motivations and drives of the migrating group in a given case do. The feeling of displacement and diffusion may be reinforced, and thus we may legitimately speak of diaspora formation if:

- 1) the group was dispersed in masses.
- 2) the group was dispersed to more than one land or country.

- 3) the group, though dispersed to different lands, shares similar patterns, experiences, myths and memories of dispersion or migration.
- 4) the mode of dispersion imbues the group with a feeling of exile and an idea, if not the physical presence, of a left-behind, far-away, or nostalgic homeland as a territorial point of reference. (These feelings of displacement and detachment may not only and necessarily be instigated by movement of peoples, but also by movement of borders).
- 5) the group's migration and resettlement experience is traumatic, if not forceful.

Now I should elaborate on the above-mentioned elements of dispersion. Exile is usually thought to be an individual and provisional experience whereas expulsion and deportation have connotations of collectivity and long duration. However, a feeling of exile and an idea of return to, or an orientation towards, a real or imagined homeland is an important hallmark of diaspora consciousness. This is also the reason why dispersed communities living in different countries under different conditions are usually classified as *a diaspora* (singular), even when they do not have widespread organic inter-community ties, or enjoy necessary means to foster close, face-to-face relationships among members. This feeling of exile, combined with a fixation with a physically or symbolically distant homeland, is generally intensified if the group is dispersed in masses and over diverse areas since such an experience is conducive to producing myths and memories of suffering, hardship, wretchedness, scattering, disorientation, and victimization. This state of traumatic dislocation is what makes diaspora communities distinct from individual cases of exile; from the moving of trading, missionary, adventurous, conquering, or imperial/colonizing groups; or from willful migration for professional, educational or other personal purposes.

Although trauma is a central element in many discussions of diaspora, traumatic experiences are not always the result of forceful imposition of expulsion by authorities or coercive bodies. People may choose to emigrate from their original homeland by their own volition; however, the compelling reasons for and the

conditions of migration and resettlement may equally be dislocating and traumatic. People might want to flee from poverty, diseases, disasters, unhealthy (even deadly) living conditions, political turmoil or war, authoritarian regimes, imminent danger of persecution, etc., and they might see migration as their only option to survive, even if nobody is obliging them, by law or by force of arms, to do so. Examining the constitutive elements of the Jewish-centered, paradigmatic definition of diaspora that had prevailed from the second century CE until the late sixties, Tölölyan brings up the issue of “structural coercion.” He cites, as an example, the economically motivated emigration of a million Indian labourers that caused them to scatter across the globe and asks whether this form of coercion fulfills the definitional requirements of the Jewish paradigm (Tölölyan 1996: 12-13). In addition, the conditions of migrants’ settlement in their new countries and their reception by the host society might be as traumatic as the compelling reasons. Newcomers might face a loss or deterioration of status, jobs, legal rights, and of political, economic and social opportunities in addition to suffering from disorientation, social exclusion, and even discrimination. The situation is worsened when there is a considerable discrepancy between the economic levels, political systems and cultural worlds of the host and home countries. Problems of adaptation and integration may strengthen diasporic feelings of exile and victimization.

On this basis, we may say that the relationship of diaspora communities with their homelands and their engagement with their host societies are two important parameters in defining and understanding diasporas. Therefore, we should focus on them as separate factors in explaining diasporic relations.

### **3.2.2 Relationship with homeland**

The causes and conditions of dispersal outlined above impacts on diaspora community’s ties with both the homeland and the hostland. The nature of the relationships between the diaspora, homeland and hostland, in turn, marks the diaspora’s identity and cohesiveness. Sheffer claims that diasporas may mobilize to

defend their interests or the interests of their homelands within their host countries and this may lead to either conflictual or cooperative triadic networks among the three parties (Sheffer 1999: 10).

Safran also speaks of a triangular relationship between the diaspora, the homeland and the hostland. According to him, this relationship is quite complicated and never one-way. The “myth of return”, as he calls the diaspora aspiration to go back home, serves to consolidate the ethnic consciousness and solidarity of the group when religion, the family and the cohesiveness of the local community fail to do so (Safran 1999: 372). This is so even when there is no actual homeland to return to, or when the homeland is not a welcoming place, or when returning is not a practical or convenient choice. Nevertheless, the homeland myth is exploited by the diaspora, the homeland and the host society for a variety of political and social purposes (Safran 1999: 372-373). Sometimes the domestic and diplomatic interests of the host country dictate that diaspora groups remain so, or even diaspora sentiments be strengthened, whereas at other times, the interest of internal unity calls for a disruption of the relationship of the diaspora with its homeland (Safran 1999: 373). Safran cites, as an example of the former situation, the German authorities’ initial emphasis on the temporary character of the Turkish workers’ residence in Germany with the aim to induce them to return to their homeland (Safran 1999: 374). On the other hand, homeland authorities may manipulate diaspora sentiments and activities for their own purposes (Safran 1999: 374). It might even be the case that homelands may not be as welcoming as expected in the face of returning diasporas since returnees may be disruptive of the homeland’s political, economic and social structure (Safran 1999: 375). Safran notes that the homeland myth also plays a role in the political behaviour of diasporas including voting tendencies and interdiaspora relations in any given host country (Safran 1999: 375). However, Safran adds:

In sum, both diaspora consciousness and the exploitation of the homeland myth by the homeland itself are reflected not so much in instrumental as in expressive behaviour. It is a defence mechanism against slights committed by the host country against the minority, but it does not –and is not intended to– lead its members to prepare for the actual

departure for the homeland. The 'return' of most diasporas (much like the Second Coming or the next world) can thus be seen as a largely eschatological concept: it is used to make life more tolerable by holding out a utopia –or *eutopia*- that stands in contrast to the perceived *dystopia* in which actual life is lived (Safran 1999: 375).

As we can see from Safran's above-mentioned statements and his six criteria for defining ideal type diaspora that were previously mentioned, the myth of return has a central place in his account of diaspora characteristics. Although physical return may never materialize in most cases, a desire to return and the homeland myth play a crucial role in the formation of diaspora consciousness. However, some other scholars criticize this central role attributed to the concept of return in diaspora studies. Being cautious about approaches that rest on definitions of an "ideal type" and that set definitive criteria for that purpose, James Clifford suggests that a real or symbolic homeland is not required for the formation of transnational diaspora linkages. As he remarks, "[d]ecentered, lateral connections may be as important as those formed around a teleology of origin/return. And a shared, ongoing history of displacement, suffering, adaptation, or resistance may be as important as the projection of a specific origin" (Clifford 1994: 306).

This insight brings us back to the idea that feelings of exile and victimization are defining features of diasporic identity. These feelings may not necessarily lead to a physical return, or to a plan, intention or desire to return. What is more, they do not automatically entail a direct, organic, active relationship with homeland, or with elements, segments or regions of homeland that diasporas associate themselves with. It might be the case that the homeland no longer exists, or that the internal dynamics of the homeland have changed over time and become less familiar, or even that homeland policies have become hostile or indifferent towards the emigrating groups. Also, diasporas themselves may find it to their interest to de-emphasize their diasporic identity and downplay the centrality of homeland ties either as a survival strategy in their hostlands, or because homeland ties may in time wear off as an unintended result of nativization and localization. Nevertheless, the idea of homeland is not confined to the actual presence of, or a tangible attachment to, a piece of

territory. It has symbolic, normative and ideational aspects that may directly or indirectly translate into patterns of thinking, behaving and organizing.

We can link this discussion to the three conceptions of territoriality I have identified in the previous chapter. Diaspora members may continue to have dual territorial identities as well as concrete, long-term physical presence in the homeland. They may own real estate in the homeland in which they stay seasonally round the year; they may have divided families across the hostland and the homeland and may pay frequent visits to family members and relatives; they may spend their holidays or retirement days in their homelands, thus maintaining active physical ties and obtaining first-hand experience of the homeland. All these activities amount to a state of familiarity and socialization that is in line with the cultural conception of territoriality. Secondly, diaspora communities can have instrumental ties to their homelands through diaspora organizations, lobbying activities, dual citizenship and voting, remittances, cultural and artistic ties as well as through supporting and sponsoring political causes and activities relating to the homeland. In other words, diasporic experiences with the homeland may encompass a vast variety of actual connections and cross-cutting networks of every kind. Besides these more concrete and visible forms of interaction, or intersection, we observe that homeland provides a symbolic anchor, an ethos, and necessary ideological and practical tools that can be utilized by diasporas to deal with their every-day feelings of victimization, displacement and alienation. The norm-generating and custom-setting function of diaspora homelands may endure even in the absence, or in a process of erosion, of tangible linkages or direct interactions. The normative aspect of homelands perceived by diasporas may not necessarily be in conformity with the actual conditions within the confines of the homelands. Diasporas may have long lost grip of the realities of their territories of origin. Still, they may attribute certain meanings, myths and memories to their ancestral homelands and regard the latter as the source of their ideas, behaviour and beliefs, and thus establishing a triangular link between territory, norms and identity.

The significance of territoriality is particularly evident in diaspora cases. The idea of homeland, as a territorial point of reference, serves as a remedy for the decoupling of these communities from their original territories. It may be regarded as a compensation mechanism for the trauma of displacement and diffusion deeply felt by diasporas. Unlike most ethnic minorities, diaspora communities are not usually associated with a particular territory or region in their host countries. Their nonterritorial, or aterritorial, position makes the idea of homeland even more indispensable for them in solidarity building and identity construction. Kim D. Butler is one of the scholars who challenge the mainstream view that actual return, or a desire to return to the homeland is a defining feature of diaspora. This is mainly because both the homeland and the diaspora are transformed irrevocably by the process of diasporization (Butler 2001: 204). Yet, at the same time, Butler draws attention to the seemingly ironic situation that the existence of the *issue* of return and the accompanying sense of connection to the homeland constitute a fundamental part of the diasporan experience (Butler 2001: 205). As she puts it:

Because diasporization often arises from extremely traumatic conditions, it is common for the homeland to no longer exist, or for it to change dramatically. Yet the *construct* of the homeland is essential; it functions as the constituting basis of collective diasporan identity. Identity based in a shared connection to homeland thus distinguishes diasporas from such groups as nomads. Although diasporas may also share complementary sources of common identity (e.g., language, religion, phenotype) that are typical markers of ethnicity, it is the homeland that anchors diasporan identity. This connection to place is a hallmark of diasporan identity that differs from constructions of *ethnic* identity, which can be constituted on virtually any basis (Butler 2001: 204).

The question of whether there are cases of diasporization which do not bear reference to a specific homeland is worth asking. Anne K. Knowles's account (1999) of the Welsh attempt to set up a colony in Patagonia in the middle of the nineteenth century is a revealing example of an emigrant community that does not necessarily define itself by a left-behind homeland. Knowles juxtaposes Welsh and Irish experiences of emigration and concludes that the Welsh emigration did not contribute to Welsh nationalism, nor did it help develop a strong attachment to Wales as homeland since

it was voluntary and was motivated by goals of a better livelihood and individual liberty. Irish emigrants, on the other hand, were driven by hunger and oppression; they considered their experience as one of exile and saw Mother Ireland as their true homeland. However, Knowles does not agree with early Welsh emigrant leaders' view that Welsh identity was an aspatial one in which culture constituted homeland even if divorced from its native soil (Knowles 1999: 310). Territory mattered for Welsh nationalists too, but "[t]he difference is that for Welsh nationalists, the territory that matters has always been the land inhabited by native Welsh speakers, not Wales as a whole, or Wales as an independent political entity" (Knowles 1999: 311).

The case of Welsh emigrants provides crucial insights into the link between territoriality and diaspora psychology. The nature of the colonial attempts to set up a new homeland elsewhere shape and condition the emigrant community's relationship with and its conceptualization of the original homeland. The diasporic quality of colonial endeavours in general, and of the Welsh example in particular, is certainly open to debate. Even if we do not include them within the scope of diaspora, these cases have implications for diaspora studies as they offer new openings for understanding territorial experiences of displaced or territorially detached persons. As the Welsh case also shows, territoriality continues to matter not only for stable communities settled on certain territories for a long time, but also for emigrants of all sorts, no matter what the drives or goals of their emigration are and how their perception of their ancestral homelands change in accordance with their differing emigration experiences. In short, territorial orientation of individuals and communities, though manifested in many different forms and degrees, remains constant in their efforts to consolidate their communal identity and solidarity, and to ground their normative claims concerning their disrupted lives in new territories and contexts.

### 3.2.3 Boundary-maintenance and relationship with hostland

In the previous section, I have discussed the function of territoriality and homeland as cultural, instrumental and normative anchors in diasporas' search for a secure ground to build a new life on. John A. Armstrong defines diaspora as “any ethnic collectivity which lacks a territorial base within a given polity, i.e., is a relatively small minority throughout all portions of the polity” (Armstrong 1999: 393). He clarifies this definition as he says, “[c]learly, a diaspora is something more than, say, a collection of persons distinguished by some secondary characteristic such as, for example, all persons with Scottish names in Wisconsin. For the mobilized diaspora, which has often constituted for centuries a separate society or quasi-society in a larger polity, the factors making for stable identification require especially close examination” (Armstrong 1999: 393-394). If one facet of diaspora consciousness is an attachment to an original homeland, the other complementary aspect is their territorial rootlessness in their host countries. The latter aspect prompts diasporas to build and maintain communal boundaries vis-à-vis their host societies. In other words, territorial detachment in their hostlands is compensated for by closer intra-diaspora ties.

Referring to Connor's previously mentioned loose definition of diaspora as “that segment of a people that lives outside the homeland”, Tölölyan questions how this association with the homeland is possible for the subsequent generations of diasporas. He answers as follows:

[I]n order to be recognizable as a segment, it is necessary to exist as a collectivity rather than a scattering of individuals. To participate in a community, diasporic individuals must not only have identities that differ from those prescribed by the dominant hostland culture, but also diaspora-specific social identities that are constructed through interaction with the norms, values, discourses and practices of that diaspora's communal institutions, honouring some and transgressing others. This relation between individual diasporic identity and diasporic community repeats that which exists between the community and a larger entity. For the diasporic segment, in turn, labours to remain in interaction with the larger

transnation which includes the homeland and other diasporic segments (Tölölyan 1996: 29).

As we can see from Tölölyan's statement, what determines diasporic boundaries within a hostland is not merely the differences of collective identities, norms, values, or practices between the homeland and the hostland, or the distinctiveness of the identities, discourses and social behaviours attributed to the diaspora by the hostland based on the latter's perception of the diaspora's origins. In addition to these factors, diasporic boundary-maintenance also requires a diasporic culture with peculiar norms, values and institutions which may in time lose its connection to, and thus may not necessarily be in line with, those of the homeland.

On the other hand, Brubaker points to the ambivalence in the literature regarding boundary-maintenance and the preservation of diasporic identity. According to him, while the latter qualities are ordinarily emphasized, there are alternative accounts that stress "hybridity, fluidity, creolization and syncretism", hence a tension in the literature between boundary-maintenance and boundary erosion (Brubaker 2005: 6). In fact, diasporas are generally conceptualized as a challenge to the traditional state system since they raise questions about citizenship and loyalty. Many have referred to diasporas as loci of dual loyalty and dual identity. They have been depicted as torn between interests, identities, social norms and cultural ways originating from their homelands and those that they encounter in their hostlands. However, we should also add to this duality diaspora-specific interests, identities, values, modes of being, doing and organizing. These diaspora-specific qualities are, in turn, diversified across diaspora segments living in different host countries as well as within a single diaspora community in a particular hostland. Hence we may speak of multiple, rather than dual, loyalties, identities and connectivities.

Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth define diasporas as geographically outside the state, but identity-wise perceived (by themselves, the homeland, or others) as 'inside the people'. This unique status renders kinship identity extremely important for diasporas and that diasporas link international and domestic spheres of politics as domestic politics no longer merely denotes politics inside the state; it also

encompasses politics inside the people (Shain and Barth 2003: 451). Although diaspora links with and influences on the homeland are never one way and unidimensional, and are often complicated by the existence of diverse motivations,<sup>7</sup> diasporas “often attach more importance to national identity than those inside the state. While the insiders experience their national identity in their day-to-day lives, diasporic distinctiveness tends to be fluid and more tenuous. Diasporas thus engage in efforts to shape national identity not so much to gain through it leverage over (material) interests, but mainly because it is their interest to insure and sustain an identity that perpetuates and nourishes their self-image” (Shain and Barth 2003: 459).

National, or nationalist, susceptibilities of diasporas is a main theme in diaspora studies. I have already discussed, in the previous section, the meanings diasporas attach to their original land, with special emphasis on the myth of return, and various forms the relationship between diasporas and their homelands may take. Now I shall dwell on the ways diasporas tackle the disorienting influences of homeland and hostland politics as well as of inter- and intra-diasporan dynamics. How do diasporas construct their peculiar hybrid identities in the face of potential or actual contenders for loyalty? How do they maintain their relative autonomy vis-à-vis their homelands, hostlands and possible rival diasporan groups that might be competing for similar resources and/or challenging them in their specific political causes?

Given their position at the intersection of sometimes conflicting currents of mobility, transnationalization and creolization on the one hand; and nativization, localization and particularization on the other hand, it is a difficult task for diasporas to strike a balance between the need for a certain degree of integration into their new countries and the urge to preserve their diasporan distinctiveness as a secure ground for the

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<sup>7</sup> Shain and Barth identify four possible motivations of diasporas to exert influence on the homeland and its foreign policies: 1) protecting the interests of “the people” (the entire kin community inside and outside the homeland); 2) protecting the homeland’s future (as separate from the people), including its existence, well-being, international alliances and security; 3) protecting the interests of a specific community, including the viability, security, image and standing, and self-perception as well as the material well-being of the diaspora in the hostland; 4) protecting the narrow bureaucratic interests of their diasporic organizations. For a detailed discussion of these diasporic interests, see pp. 454-457.

continuity and persistence of their authentic identities, customs, norms, memories and myths. David D. Kaplan underlines the erosion of territorial loyalties and the emergence of bifocal identities as a result of rapid changes in global economy, culture and technology. According to him, spatial identities of diaspora communities are manifested at two geographic scales: diasporas are transnational in the sense that they are dispersed across several countries, and at the same time many diasporas are extremely national insofar as they share a political and cultural loyalty to their homelands. Therefore, divided loyalties become a key issue both for diaspora communities and for those in the host country who perceive diasporas as a threat (Kaplan 1999: 38). Tölölyan also points to the paradoxical nature of divided loyalties, but he also sees in them a window of opportunity for constructing regimes of multiplicity in which diasporas may also be better-off:

[D]iasporas exist neither in necessary opposition to their homelands' nationalism nor in a servile relationship to them. Diasporas may criticize their homelands but not chastise them, especially when the diasporans live in EuroAmerica and the homeland is underdeveloped. Diasporas need not apologize for their alleged lack of authenticity, for the hybridity of diasporan identity, as if it represented mere decline from some purer homeland form... [A]t its best the diaspora is an example, for both the homeland's and hostland's nation-states, of the possibility of living, even thriving in the regimes of multiplicity which are increasingly the global condition, and a proper version of which diasporas may help to construct, given half a chance. The stateless power of diasporas lies in their heightened awareness of both the perils and rewards of multiple belonging, and in their sometimes exemplary grappling with the paradoxes of such belonging, which is increasingly the condition that non-diasporan nationals also face in the transnational era (Tölölyan 1996: 7-8).

In the literature on diasporas and transnationalism, we observe many different manifestations of the idea that the diasporic condition that involves multi-sited forms of existence and multifaceted articulations of cultural and political identities may pave the way for a world order in which traditional territorial nation-states with their physically and ideologically rigid boundaries will be uprooted, or reformulated in a more pluralistic manner. In a similar vein, Clifford claims that diasporic cultural

forms can never be exclusively nationalist. Although diaspora populations may sometimes cling on to (violent) assertions of purity and to racial exclusivism as a weapon against the stronger, they have rarely founded nation-states (Israel is the prime example of such nation-states). Therefore, he suggests, nationalist aspirations of diasporas, which are usually in the form of nostalgic visions, should not be paralleled to actual nation-building with the help of armies, schools, police, and mass media (Clifford 1994: 307). Clifford further argues that assimilationist ideologies and policies of nation-states are designed rather for “immigrants” than diaspora groups; the latter cannot be assimilated since they have collective memories of displacement and violent loss that cannot be “cured” by integrating into a new community, and they maintain their practical connections to a homeland or other dispersed kin groups. Therefore, diaspora populations have the potential to subvert the nation-state defined in terms of common territory and time (Clifford 1994: 307). Moreover, according to Clifford, cosmopolitan features of diaspora discourses also challenge indigenous, autochthonous claims of tribal peoples. Diaspora cultures, marked by displacement, are in tension with nativist identity formations and with tribal assertions of “first nationhood”, continuity of habitation, and a natural connection to the land (Clifford 1994: 308).

At this point, a legitimate question seems to be how we can interpret the apparent paradox between the depiction of diaspora as an atomic collectivity preserved in a relatively hard shell that inevitably differentiates and dissociates it from the rest of the host community, and the cosmopolitan outlook that is usually attributed to diaspora communities because of their multiple belongings, transnational ties and activities. In other words, are diasporic communities and ties always cosmopolitan and progressive in terms of transcending the defects of the territorial nation-state? Here, I should refer back to Lyons and Mandaville’s evaluation of territorially defined and particularistic agendas and goals of diaspora networks, and should highlight the distinction these two writers make between transnational politics that revolve around cosmopolitan values and universal rights; and partisan, chauvinistic, territorially and ethno-nationally specific versions of transnational mobilization (Lyons and Mandaville, 2010).

Persistence as a community is cited by many as an important criterion for defining diasporas, and persistence entails a certain degree of coherence and solidarity that may at times verge on self-enclosedness, isolation, and ghettoization. Territoriality does not always amount to an exclusive and fixed attachment to a politically or administratively defined region, or to a country (a national territory) with clearly identifiable and internationally recognized borders. Territoriality may be reproduced on local scales in urban ghettos or in ethnic enclaves with shifting, less visible, and more porous boundaries. Or territorial affiliations can be maintained, though seemingly transnationally, on a local-to-local basis, say, between an ancestral village or town in the homeland and a confined diasporic locality in the hostland, thus complicating the simplistic, binary “homeland vs. hostland” nexus that is most commonly employed as the level of analysis in diaspora and migration studies, and making the arguments for cosmopolitan transnationalism questionable in this regard. Members of the first generation Turkish immigrants in Europe are known to have long maintained such local-to-local ties. Predominantly coming from relatively small towns and villages in Turkey, a considerable number of these immigrants’ relationship to their country of origin was basically limited to occasional visits to their hometowns or villages as they have led mostly isolated lives with other co-nationals in their reserved neighbourhoods due mainly to lack of proper political, legal, linguistic and cultural knowledge and skills required to mingle with the general society in their new countries. Kreuzberg neighbourhood in Berlin, which is known as having the largest Turkish population outside Turkey, and therefore also nicknamed “Little Istanbul”, is a case in point with its own peculiar mix of subcultures.

Another example is put forward by Anthony D. Smith as he discusses how diasporas deal with the double loss of both their homeland and their autonomy, and with the resulting self-perception as “people-to-be-restored”. As restoration is ever-postponed, Smith claims, religion, or a salvationist faith in particular, serves as a substitute for this double loss (Smith 1986: 114). Smith looks into the Jewish case as not only a concentrated example of ethnic fragmentation, but also of intense solidarity over centuries, and points out that the severance of Judaism from its

territorial roots at an early stage contributed to the emergence of an ethos of wandering and an idealization of a restored homeland. This, in turn, led to the construction of successive centers of Jewry (Babylonia, the Rhineland, Spain and Poland, and latterly America) as “replica homelands” with varying degrees of autonomy and acting as magnets for smaller, distant Jewish enclaves (Smith 1986: 117). As seen, Smith emphasizes the central role of religious priesthoods, rites and traditions, rather than homelands, politics and location in preserving ethnic identity and achieving ethnic survival (Smith 1986: 119). This raises the question of how diasporas maintain their communal boundaries and secure solidarity if they are not territorial entities in the conventional sense. Put differently, if we assume that diasporas cannot be defined by specific bounded and fixed territories and that they have multiple belongings, transnational ties, hybrid and fluid identities, how can we talk about “diasporas” as identifiable groups with distinctive qualities and peculiar attributes? How do we determine whether an individual or a certain group of people belongs in a diaspora or not? How do we discern a diaspora and what are the hallmarks of diaspora membership?

While analysing how diasporas evolved from being victims to challengers to the nation-state, Cohen focuses on globalization and the challenge posed to national identities by deterritorialized social entities. He asserts:

In the age of globalization, the world is being organized vertically by nation-states and regions, but horizontally by an overlapping, permeable, multiple systems of interaction. This system creates communities not of place but of interest, based on shared opinions and beliefs, tastes, ethnicities (where these are trans-state), religions (again, where there are trans-state), cuisine, the consumption of medicines (Western and complementary), life-styles, fashion, music, etc. (Cohen 1996: 517).

Regarding these communities of interest, Cohen goes on to argue, “[b]onds of language, religion, culture and a sense of a common history and perhaps a common fate impregnate a transnational relationship and give to it an affective, intimate quality that formal citizenship or even long settlement frequently lacks” (Cohen 1996: 518). Even though it is not clear how (and where exactly) Cohen situates

diasporas, a distinct subcategory of deterritorialized social entities, along this wide array of interactions based on all sorts of commonalities, the idea of “communities of interest” replacing territorial communities resonates among those writing on transnationalism and diasporas. Zdravko Mlinar identifies the simultaneous and interdependent operation of globalization and individuation<sup>8</sup> as factors undermining the traditional territorial organization of society (Mlinar 1992). Whereas in traditional, static society, territoriality was marked by exclusiveness of locations and “communities” in space, we now witness a transition from the space of places to the space of flows where certain ideas can be present everywhere, accessibility increases, and the importance of location is relativized and diminished (Mlinar 1992: 25). As a result, we see territorial communities (local, regional, national) being replaced by *networks* of transnational linkages which are based on specific functions and interests, and are selective, flexible and independent from a specific territorial base (Mlinar 1992: 28).

These observations definitely correspond to real life situations and processes the evidence of which we can see all around us, one bit here one bit there. Certainly, we experience the comprehensive effects and consequences of a globalizing world facilitated by critical advancements in communication and information technology, no matter how globalization is defined or whether it is seen in a predominantly positive or negative light. And clearly, these processes and the corresponding proliferation of actors, linkages and models of organizing, which are usually elusive as they may produce contradictory results across time and place, have had a considerable impact on how we perceive, define and redefine traditional concepts such as territoriality, boundary and identity among others. However, we should still resist any propensity for reductionism and over-simplification. Just as we differentiated between (roughly three) conceptualizations of territoriality (namely, cultural, instrumental and normative), no definition of a concept, idea, or category regarding the changing forms of human relationship, organization or grouping can be made by precluding any of these aspects. Therefore, purely instrumental, or interest-

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<sup>8</sup> Mlinar defines individuation as “the processes of increasing the autonomy and distinctiveness of the actors at both the collective and the individual levels” (p. 15).

based definitions of community or territoriality will be deficient and misleading. Moreover, lumping all sorts of transnational (interest) groups, commonalities and linkages into the same basket leaves us with a conceptual mess in which all analytical categories are stripped of their distinguishing capacity. Here, we should keep in mind that there are crucial differences of type between various human groupings and linkages, be it transnational or not. Some human relationships and identities are perceived as essential and more durable, surviving through centuries, whereas others are ephemeral and contextual. Interests may bring diverse groups of people together and these unions may fight for common causes and help remedy problems affecting populations across state borders, and may thus generate substantial outcomes for a great deal of subject matters that might have profound consequences for the entire globe. However, the mere existence of a bond of interest does not suffice to turn a human group into a “community”. Interests are malleable, and membership in interest groups may be protean. This statement is by no means to suggest that identities are fixed and perpetual. Neither does it imply that every member of a community feels or acts the same way as other members do, or is dedicated to the group identity to a similar extent, or actively promotes it in a similar fashion. Individual identities in themselves may be as diverse and composite as individual backgrounds, preferences, interests and priorities; as such they are more prone to change in the face of new experiences and ever-changing circumstances. Collective identities, on the other hand, are relatively discernible and generalizable as they generate certain patterns, builds on shared points of reference and induce collective ways of behaving. They amount to collectively shared, produced and imposed norms, organizing principles, and structures that are wider in effect than and qualitatively different from the totality of individual subjectivities.

Therefore, we cannot fully grasp the nature of diasporas by simply juxtaposing it with such other groups as pop star fan clubs, international political activists or ad hoc protest groups in an effort to prove the extensiveness of transnational ties. The interests that bring together the members of the latter groups are often specific, issue-based and short-term since these groups may dissolve when their specific goals are achieved, or when members drop out as they redefine their interests and revise their

positions accordingly. Relatively durable communities such as diasporas, ethnic and cultural groups, religious communities, social and economic classes are all-encompassing in the sense that their sphere of influence and operation field are not limited to an issue area; they set general rules and common goals, preach a certain life-style, shape collective meanings, memories, myths and norms, and condition the ideas, values, habits, attitudes and choices of their individual members. Plus, just as membership in such groups is usually involuntary, opting out of these groups is not easy as strayers may incur some costs including isolation, accusations of betrayal and deprivation of group advantages.

How should we, then, read into the distinctiveness and persistence of diasporas as a category of collective identity in international politics? To be able to answer this question, we should not limit our analysis to a single diaspora community within a specific host country. Instead, we should broaden our perspective to incorporate into our analysis other equally important parameters: interrelationships between diaspora segments in different host countries, the issue of permanence of diasporas, and the currency of the “diasporic model” which is proposed as an alternative to the traditional territorial nation-states in an ever transnational world.

### **3.2.4 Interrelationships between dispersed diaspora segments and the “diasporic model”**

One implication of conventional analyses of diasporas has been that diasporas are transitory because they will either return to their homeland, or alternatively assimilate in time into the host culture. This is probably because diasporas are almost always viewed in connection with their (actual or aspired) homelands. However, the recent state of diaspora politics and transnationalism seems to point to the opposite direction. Sheffer claims that the prediction that diasporas will disappear as a result either of the emergence of classless societies (Marxist assumption) or of cultural, social and political tolerance (liberal assumption) has proven invalid. On the contrary, such groups in the US as the Polish Catholic community, the Irish

community, the Greeks and the American Blacks, which were losing their ethnic identity and organized existence, have revived their trans-state activities (Sheffer 1999: 384). Zlatko Skrbiš states that deprivation of homeland is not the mere condition of the existence of a diaspora population. As exemplified by the Jewish case, although a diaspora population may result from the disappearance of a homeland, it may retain its diaspora status *despite* the existence, or establishment, of the latter (Skrbiš 1999: 4). Therefore, the existence and persistence of a diaspora cannot simply be explained by a direct causal link to the disappearance (and eventual re-establishment) of the homeland, or a betterment of the homeland situation that had resulted in the original dispersal. As previously discussed, the idea of homeland and return that functions as a binding force among diasporas does not necessarily amount to an immediate concern for or an actual attempt at return. Notwithstanding this fact, diasporas have historically had, as we have seen, a particular disposition towards boundary maintenance vis-à-vis their host societies unlike many other ethnic groups and individual immigrants. In other words, it may be argued that diaspora attachment to homeland is primarily a matter of internal solidarity rather than an aspiration directed towards a particular original land. This observation may constitute the basic rationale behind the permanence of diasporas.

For the purpose of examining the issue of permanence I shall specify two main dimensions: temporal and spatial-horizontal. The former refers to how diaspora consciousness is transmitted to subsequent generations and how many generations need to pass before we can safely call a certain migrant group a “diaspora”. An analysis of generational differences is important to understand any community, let alone diasporas as collectivities that are considered to be particularly marked by a distinctive form of cohesion. Let us briefly look at how the temporal dimension (i.e., the generational evolution of diaspora identity and cohesion) can be relevant to intra-diaspora relations.

In his analysis of the Croatian and Slovenian communities in Australia, Skrbiš focuses on the question of generations as an indicator of the internal diasporic dynamics and tensions and shows that inter- and intra-diaspora relations may have

considerable impact on diaspora organizations, indirectly determining their future. According to his research carried out among the members of both communities, there are crucial differences between first and second generations in terms not only of their perception of social reality, but also of levels of participation and differentiation of functions in diaspora organizations. Generally speaking, to the members of the second generation, the host society is not the direct result of a voluntary or involuntary migration. The second generation individual is deprived of the experience of the cause of displacement, and therefore believes that he/she lacks the experience of choice as well as the opportunity to challenge the patronizing position of the first generation and to change things (Skrbiš 1999: 74-77).

Regarding the importance of generational differences, Mlinar makes the general observation that differences among generations are becoming greater as international channels of communication and influence from expanding areas increase. The restraining force of local cultural heritage is diminished by the spread of new cultural patterns derived from elsewhere; younger generations are paying less attention to the territorial and national origins of these new cultural products and flows. As a result, territorial culture and identities are weakened by discontinuities between generations (Mlinar 1992: 31). Given the supposed widening gap between generations in a rapidly globalizing and closely interlocked world, Butler's inclusion of the temporal-historical dimension into her list of the distinguishing features of diaspora is plausible. In her view, a diaspora should exist over at least two generations. If a migrant group is able to return to its homeland within a single generation, it may be described as being in temporary exile. Diasporas are defined as multi-generational communities that "combine the individual migration experience with the collective history of group dispersal and regensis of communities abroad" (Butler 2001: 192). Butler also differentiates between the chronological stages of a diaspora's history, claiming that newer diasporas (up to two or three generations) are substantially different in character. Their identity is likely to be built on a common bond to the homeland, and such issues as migration, adaptation and political strategies dominate their agenda. The subsequent generations, on the other hand, may need to actively reinforce identity in order to resist assimilation, shifting the focus from the homeland

to the diaspora itself. In this way, a new phase begins as diverse communities of the diaspora develop interrelationships and forge a diasporan common identity distinct from an exclusive homeland identification. Butler furthers her argument and speculates about whether another phase begins when secondary diasporas emerge and whether there is a point at which a diaspora is no longer discernible as a meaningful category of analysis as newer diasporas disperse and intermingle (Butler 2001: 210).

These questions are not easy to tackle, mainly because they call for a deeper assessment of who belongs in a diaspora and how we can delineate common definitional and relational boundaries so as to mark out, in a realistic and analytically workable way, a diaspora community with its segments dispersed over different countries. Even though diasporas are not static and are composed of many distinct groups and individuals with differing backgrounds, interests and priorities, we need to problematize diaspora-specific forms of (cross-border) community-building in order to be able to call a certain collectivity a “diaspora”, and study it as a meaningful analytical category without getting trapped in fallacies of over-generalization or under-theorization. This brings us to the second dimension of the permanence of diasporas, namely the spatial-horizontal dimension.

The spatial-horizontal dimension is inevitably intermingled with the temporal dimension. The ways in which diasporic relations and identities change over time impact our attempts to identify diasporas, define diaspora membership, and expose the specificities of intra-diasporic relations. Tölölyan points to the fact that the first generation of any group of immigrants bear the homeland’s and nation’s marks in body, speech and soul, and asks in what sense the fourth or tenth diaspora generations remain a segment of the people in the homeland:

[T]he diasporic segment, in turn, labors to remain in interaction with the larger transnation which includes the homeland and other diasporic segments. There is a heterogeneous, ever-changing set of norms and knowledges, of behaviors and cultural practices (for example, linguistic and economic, musical and literary, social and political, historical and contemporary) which are embedded in the

properly transnational formation that includes homeland and diasporas alike. The diasporist project, as C.L.R. James understood, is to enhance the articulations between the past and present, homeland and hostland segments of the transnation. Without such connections –however sporadic and discontinuous they may be in arduous practice– to claim that the individual diasporan is a member of the diaspora and that the diasporic segment is a part of the homeland people (which can consist of the descendants of shared ancestors from three or ten generations ago) risks mere biologism. This pitfall can be juxtaposed with the mere psychologism that regards diaspora to be the figure of boundary-crossing multiplicity and links a specific individual to that diaspora by virtue of the multiplicity they share and –again- of birth. A diaspora is never merely an accident of birth, a clump of individuals living outside their ancestral homeland, each with a hybrid subjectivity, lacking collective practices that underscore (not just) their difference from others, but also their similarity to each other, and their links to the people on the homeland. Without some such minimum stringency of definition, most of America –or Argentina, or New Zealand, or any modern immigrant-nation– would just as easily be a diaspora (Tölölyan 1996: 29-30).

As it is implied in this statement, to qualify as a diaspora, there should be a certain degree of interaction in terms of the formation of communal identities, institutions, norms, values, discourses and practices between the four components of the diaspora: the diasporan individual, the diaspora community the individual belongs in, other segments of the diaspora in other hostlands, and the homeland. Tölölyan rightly puts that a diaspora can be identified neither by biologism that sets genealogy as the only criterion for diaspora membership, nor by psychologism that regards the mere presence of multiple identities and hybridities as sufficient reason for diaspora identification. Diasporan identity rests not only on the cultural and social discrepancies between the diaspora community and the hostland, but also on internal convergences, and collective involvement into diasporic affairs. A diaspora community should not be simply defined and portrayed only in terms of the diaspora's (sometimes tense and antithetical) relationship to the host community and state; such a definition should also be based on active community-building and interaction among diaspora members both locally and across other segments.

Therefore, we, as researchers, should also shift our focus from “diaspora as opposed to the hostland” to “diaspora in itself”.

However, I should also note that the specific content of intra-diaspora interaction is not clear here. When we say communal interaction, are we suggesting strictly organized collective actions among diaspora components and segments, or are we implying actions, though not concerted, but particularly directed towards common diasporic goals such as enhancing the status of diaspora groups and solving diaspora-specific problems? Or are we talking about less organized, or even unintended, impersonal, loose interactions as in flows of ideas, images, cultural products, or the spread of discourses and practices? Moreover, do we expect a certain level of diasporic consciousness from the diasporan individuals and groups while they carry out their internal relations? In other words, are the similarities we are looking for in a diaspora naturally formed or are they generated as a result of conscious, wilful action, or of what some call “a diasporic project”? For instance, can we equate sending remittances to family members back in the homeland, or visiting relatives in another host country to the activities of large trans-state diasporic organizations that seek to build and enhance diasporic links and consciousness, and promote diasporic causes and interests? Can we put all such diverse activities with different degrees of volition and intensity under the label of diaspora transnationalism?

If diaspora membership is a matter of *doing* rather than *being*, there seems to be a need to differentiate between various forms of diaspora membership. Sheffer proposes a classification based on four types of diaspora membership: 1) “Core members” are those born into the ethnic nation. They openly identify as members of their diasporic entity and are ready to act on behalf of their community and homeland; 2) “Members by choice” are descendents of mixed families, converts, etc. who fully participate in the life of the diaspora 3) “Marginal members” maintain their ethnic identity, but they do not identify as such or they purposely distance themselves from the community; 4) “Dormant members” have assimilated or fully integrated, but know or feel that their roots are in the diaspora group. Dormant members can be mobilized under certain circumstances (Sheffer 2003: 100).

This distinction is problematic in various ways. First, it is not clear from the perspective of whom these distinctions will be made. Numbers may considerably differ if diaspora membership is quantified by the homeland, the hostland, the diaspora itself or the detached observer. Second, even if we can identify the first two categories in a relatively unequivocal manner based on historical data and declarations of individuals, the latter two seems to be somewhat arbitrary. These categories may stir up discussions, similar to those taking place in nationalism studies, on how we can recognize identities; whether ethnic, national or other identities are essential or self-declaratory, or whether they are action-based; which elements of identity are subjective and which are objective. Finally, these categories can rarely be rigid since changing circumstances may induce individuals to feel and act differently. For instance, a situation of war in the homeland may incite nationalistic feelings among diasporans and force them to mobilize their resources to assist (certain groups in) their homeland community, thus making dormant or marginal members more active.

In order to avoid such problems of groupism, Brubaker suggests that we abandon substantialist understanding of diaspora as a bounded entity, and rather think of it as an idiom, a stance, a claim, a category of practice (Brubaker 2005: 12). As such, not all claimed members of diasporas adopt a diasporic stance. In this reformulation, diaspora is an agent of strong normative change as it is “used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilize energies, to appeal to loyalties... It does not so much *describe* the world as seek to *remake* it” (Brubaker 2005: 12).

The transformative potential of diasporism is a promising topic in diaspora analyses. There seems to be an increasing number of people who regard diasporas and diasporic transnationalism as a possible alternative to the rigid and exclusivist national-territorial state system of today. Rather than seeing diasporas as a transitory stage before return or assimilation/acculturation, as an anomaly for national states, they believe diasporism may pose a political and social model for future communities. Daniel and Jonathan Boyarin think that diaspora can replace national

self-determination as a theoretical and historical model (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993: 711). This is because it can offer an alternative to the two traditional ways of constructing group identities, namely common genealogical origin (race) and common geographical origin (space) (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993: 693). Through diaspora, we may be able to “articulate a theory and practice of identity that would simultaneously respect the irreducibility and the positive value of cultural differences, address the harmfulness, not of abolishing frontiers but of dissolution of uniqueness, and encourage the mutual fructification of different life-styles and traditions” (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993: 711).

On the other hand, however, there are also critical perspectives that question the practical relevance and analytical usefulness of the concept of diaspora. Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal claims that the understanding of diasporas as natural and inevitable is a consequence of the global and hegemonic discourse of identity which authorizes cultural particularisms and claims to group rights. Here, Nuhoglu Soysal spots a paradox: while the source and legitimacy of rights are transferred to the transnational level and are defined in a more inclusive fashion, identities remain particularistic, exclusionary and locally defined and organized (Nuhoglu Soysal 2000: 6). Hence, we observe a decoupling of rights and identities, the two main components of citizenship. This leads to yet another paradox: groups tend increasingly to legitimate and further their collective identities and particularistic (ethno-national, religious, linguistic, cultural, etc.) claims by utilizing the universalistic discourses and strategies of human rights, the universal right to “one’s own culture” being the most notable among these human, or personhood, rights (Nuhoglu Soysal 2000: 7, also 6). According to Nuhoglu Soysal, the focus of diaspora theories on the ethnic axis of homelands and abroad obscures the transgressions of national boundaries and collectivities as well as the new ways by which immigrants experience and enact their membership (Nuhoglu Soysal 2000: 10-11). New patterns of membership are no longer based on “the horizontal connectedness” among members of an ethnic community, but rather on “vertical connection” to common, universalistic discourses and on diverse, multi-referential citizenship practices that cannot be captured by bi-directional ethnic transactions and arrangements (Nuhoglu Soysal 2000: 11).

In the light of the detailed discussion of the concept of diaspora and the overview of the recent state of diaspora theorizing that I offered above, Nuhoglu Soysal's criticism might be taken as limited to classical diaspora studies. Even though conventional accounts of diaspora may have emphasized ethnic solidarity and homeland tie as the defining characteristics of diasporas and have downplayed the role of multi-faceted relationships between various contexts, factors and actors affecting diaspora formation; with the proliferation of both global migratory movements and new studies on diaspora transnationalism, the concept of diaspora has been revisited and provided with definitional width and analytical depth to accommodate new developments and challenges.

Diaspora as an alternative model for identity construction and political organization at large is a very interesting, but complex issue. It requires a deeper theoretical scrutiny and a more comprehensive empirical and comparative research. As obvious, the latter task is beyond the limits of this study. However, existing diaspora studies might provide useful insights into my upcoming evaluation of the two cases with regard to their diaspora status. With the critical view provided by all previous discussions about diasporas, homeland, territoriality and identity, and the interlinkages between these concepts, I can now turn to an assessment of Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands in the context of diaspora nationalism and transnationalism.

### **3.3 Diaspora, Transnationalism and Turkish Communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands**

Our previous inquiries into the nature of diaspora leave us with basically two alternative ways of looking at diasporas: normative and non-normative. Many diaspora scholars tend to view diaspora as a value-laden, normative category. Some consider diasporism to be a promising model for future cosmopolitanism. As we have seen, though, there are also others who view diasporism in a negative light and associate it with cultural particularism. Either way, we are faced with reductionism

of some sort with a normative content: diasporism defined either as a stage in an evolutionary path towards a cosmopolitan end-design where boundaries of all kinds will have been discarded, or as a disruptive, even a regressive force which will take us back to a world order where ethno-nationally specific identities and the bounded forms of territoriality are reinforced.

The belief in a teleology of diasporism, in a unilinear progression of diasporic identities and relations towards a utopian or dystopian state of affairs, is the basic hallmark of this normative understanding. As scholars, we are sometimes tempted to interpret mostly sporadic events, formations, movements that we see around us as novel, unprecedented and intercorrelated, which in turn leads us to consider them to be the building blocks of a general path that will incrementally take us to a much-hoped-for world of unboundedness. A considerable proportion of diaspora research seems to be particularly inflicted by this utopian idealism. However, such a teleological stance that strictly attributes certain over-arching goals, patterns, characteristics and meanings to diaspora, or to a specific diaspora community, may impede our ability to understand both diaspora as a general category and the individual diaspora cases in and for itself. Attempts to seek common characteristics in order to reach viable definitions are understandable and necessary to the extent that we are able to distinguish diaspora from other related categories of analysis. But an insistence on a selective reading of diasporas with a wider aim to justify and uphold the supposedly emancipating potential of diaspora transnationalism (or to anathemize diasporism altogether for its perceived disruptive effects) seems to obscure instances that deviate from the presumed pattern.

In an alternative non-normative approach, we may see diaspora as a loose, circumstantial form of transnationalism that is in constant flux, and is not necessarily politically and morally implicated. Here, the term *loose* is not used as a qualifier for the intensity of diasporic links and diaspora consciousness, or for the organizational rigidity of diasporic endeavours in a given case. It rather points to the unpredictability of the turn to be taken by diasporic forms of existence (if we can identify such a single, unidirectional turn) and to the the plurality, variability and

inconsistency of diasporic trends worldwide (and across time), trends which inevitably deviate from a supposedly goal-oriented diaspora model evolving towards an end design.

This study suggests that the teleological readings of diasporas celebrated by critics of traditional territorial systems and identities (or shunned by others, depending on how one interprets the input of diasporas into the efforts for a more cosmopolitan world) risks the danger of homogenizing diverse diaspora experiences and multiple forms of diasporic relations across time and place. If we claim that diasporas are inherently prone to cosmopolitanism (or conversely, particularism), then we may have difficulties delineating different trajectories followed by a myriad of diaspora communities, historical and contemporary. Diasporas may have transformative effects on interpretations and practices of nationalism, transnationalism, territoriality and citizenship. However, the argument that all diasporic communities, organizations, representations and relations are invariably oriented towards a certain world image seems to be unrealistic, or at least immature.

Therefore, we should refrain from limiting our analysis to conclusions derived from specific well-examined diaspora communities and their peculiar experiences, and treating them as generalizable examples that alone can set the boundaries of both defining and studying diaspora. Rather than grounding our arguments on certain diaspora communities with the assumption that they are stable, monolithic, timeless models that can lend themselves to rigid definitions and serve as generally valid benchmarks for other cases, we should rather assess diasporic relations within its own terms in a given time period and remember that the circumstances that produce particular diasporic forms and relations are subject to change. In other words, with such an elusive category as diaspora, our conclusions can in no way be authoritative.

My research on the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands proves this point for the most part, since each of these cases combines elements from the opposing putative models regarding diaspora identity, namely cultural particularism and cosmopolitan universalism. In addition to presenting mixed results, the comparative analysis of the two communities in question also reveals a general

outlook that runs quite contrary to commonsense assumptions. Although these findings will be refined in the following chapters, let me briefly clarify this point here.

One would expect that the Turkish community in the Netherlands would be more open to new forms of transnationalism and universalist discourses since it is a predominantly economic diaspora with a relatively brief history in a more developed host country, and it has had quite limited experience of being oppressed or discriminated against in this hostland known for its multicultural policies. On the other hand, the Turkish community has a much longer history in Bulgaria. It was initially formed as a result of imperial conquest which had been followed by the resettlement of mainland groups in the region and assimilation of segments of the indigenous population. It was later detached from the homeland by successive wars and the ensuing reconfiguration of boundaries of a dissolving empire. Remaining within the boundaries of Bulgaria, this group experienced periods of assimilation, discrimination and deportation. Given these facts, the Turkish community in Bulgaria would reasonably be expected to be more sensitive about preserving an ethnic-territorial identity that could tie them more strongly to their neighbouring ancestral homeland, which was then perceived by many as their protector in times of severe hardship. However, the interviews conducted with members of this community revealed ideas and experiences (particularly among the younger generation, but not confined to them) that are relatively more compatible, though not in total harmony, with the general premises of transnationalist accounts which emphasize multiple identifications and subjectivities that transcend traditional territorial relations and attachments, whereas the respondents from the Turkish community in the Netherlands conveyed an image of a more inward-looking, culturally conservative community. The latter group made exposing statements that can be considered to be examples of cultural particularism and parochial defining of identities and interests. In short, my cases do not neatly conform to clear-cut categories regarding diaspora communities and identities, and the dividing lines between these categories are not as discernible as expected. Yet, the interviews I conducted for this research raise interesting questions with regard to the common

presuppositions about the nature of diaspora transnationalism. Before discussing my findings in detail, I should first establish how legitimate it is to place the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands under the rubric of diaspora.

With regard to the first parameter, namely the causes and conditions of dispersion, neither of the communities experienced a forced deportation. However, as discussed earlier, the use of direct sheer force is not a necessary condition for defining a diasporization experience as traumatic. In the Netherlands, the immigrant community from Turkey is not a homogeneous group; it encompasses economic migrants and political refugees, Turks and Kurds, groups with different religious affiliations, etc. However, the majority of the immigrants are economically motivated Turkish-speaking people and were not involuntarily displaced. The Turkish community in Bulgaria became diasporized when they voluntarily or involuntarily remained on their present territories, unlike other emigrating Turkish groups, when the Ottoman Empire had to retreat from the Balkan lands as a result of wars waged in the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. As we can see here, the criterion of volition does not lead us to a meaningful analysis. In both cases, the conditions impacting diasporization of these communities were beyond their control and it would be fair to assume that these conditions created a state of disorientation and dislocation. Needless to say, the dislocation experienced by the Turks remaining in Bulgaria was rather political, social and psychological than physical (except for internal migration) as the order of their living space was disturbed by endless wars, political turmoil, changing borders and an uncertain future. They did not move, but the political, social and economic space that they acted upon moved, and in the end left them in a completely different set-up. We do not have first-hand knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of these people in the face of such drastic changes, but we can safely assume that this situation must have caused feelings of insecurity, hardship, victimization as well as loss of status and legal rights.

The cause and conditions of diasporization of the Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands fit into Tölölyan's definition of "structural coercion" I mentioned before. The economic situation in Turkey forced thousands of labourers to seek a

better life in various European countries including the Netherlands. Just like the authorities of the sending and receiving countries that warranted this labour exchange, most immigrants thought that this would be a temporary venture; that is why many of them did not take their families with them. However, as their stay evolved into a permanent one, problems of integration became more apparent. For the Turkish immigrant community in the Netherlands, therefore, the source of trauma has been the challenge of adaptation to a significantly different culture and political system in their new country, especially given the fact that these people were coming from the much lower socio-economic strata, hence a more conservative sector of Turkish society. The trauma of dislocation, the idea of return to the homeland as a last resort in case of deterioration of status, and the feeling, if not the reality, of “temporariness” are still observable even among the younger immigrant generations.

I argued earlier that the degree of volition is not a sound and reliable criterion for defining diaspora since it cannot be easily identified or measured. In today’s world, there are fewer cases of forced deportation than instances of structural coercion caused by conflicts, failed states, economic plight, discrimination, oppression, natural disasters, etc. In latter cases, we cannot conclusively determine the genuine motives behind decisions to migrate (or stay), or identify the weight of various interfering factors that make each individual migration decision and experience unique and personal. Moreover, although we may seek patterns and commonalities in migratory flows, the perceptions of individuals regarding their own reasons and conditions of migration may differ considerably since there are subjective processes involved in decision-making, and initial self-perceptions may also be distorted in the course of events. For this reason, we are inevitably propelled to shift the focus of analysis from compelling reasons and the degree of coercion exerted to the consequences of migration and diasporization experiences and their effects on scattered communities. I claim that a community has gone through a diasporization process if its scattering can be said to have generated feelings of victimization, dislocation (in physical, political, economic, social or moral terms) and suffering that are manifested in a recognizable and collective fashion. The construction of diaspora

identity around a mutually shared history of victimization and suffering that is continually reproduced distinguishes diasporas from other migrating collectivities.

The two communities in which I take an interest here were not diasporized in the classical sense and their historical backgrounds are not quite comparable. Even though they have gone through various phases of dislocation and victimization in a collective fashion, these took different forms under different circumstances. Both communities have been voluntarily or involuntarily detached from their ancestral homeland and have faced difficulties in their process of adaptation to a new order. However, this detachment occurred more than a century ago for ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and even before this event they had been an autochthonous population for centuries on more or less the same geography that they inhabit now. Therefore, they cannot be treated as an extension of the Turkish nation. Defined as such, the Turkish community in Bulgaria does not fit well into Connor's description of diaspora as a segment of a people living outside the homeland or into Shain and Barth's formulation of diaspora as "outside the state, but inside the people". Unlike the Turkish community in the Netherlands, the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria qualify neither as a diaspora nor as an immigrant community. This distinction brings us to the second parameter: the homeland tie. Even though association with an ancestral homeland is a central theme in the construction of diaspora identity, the nature of this link and self-perception of different segments of dispersed communities are not identical. I may say that this difference is quite striking between the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands.

The interviewees from the Turkish immigrant community in the Netherlands had mixed feelings about the policies of the Turkish authorities towards Turkish immigrants in Europe: some demand more protection and support from Turkey, while others disapprove of any attempts at manipulation and interference since they do not wish to be seen as an extension of the Turkish state. Almost all of them expressed concerns about being used as leverage in foreign policy matters, or being seen solely as vote and remittance suppliers. The majority of the interviewees refrained from commenting on internal affairs of the Turkish state. This may be

interpreted as a lack of interest, but an element of anxiety regarding a potential misuse of interviews and a desire to avoid being labelled as an extension of the Turkish state might have played a part. For the Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, the significance of Turkey goes beyond such material ties as voting, sending remittances, visiting family members, and owning real estate in Turkey; many of them tend to see Turkey as the basis of their community ethos. Their link to Turkey, which they see as the source of their ethno-religious identity and the basis of their values, customs and way of life, functions as their normative anchor in a foreign cultural world.

This conception of homeland is in stark contrast with the way the Bulgarian-Turks associate themselves with their ancestral land. Even though politically motivated interviewees emphasized Turkishness as the foundation of their identity and Turkey as a *de facto* protector state that steps in when their identity and rights are in jeopardy, a discourse of universal and European values was evident in the responses of most interviewees. Obviously, this attitude stems partly from the “Europeanization” of the political environment generated by Bulgaria’s EU membership preparations and its eventual accession to the Union. But it can also be attributed to the fact that many members of the Turkish community in Bulgaria do not assume an irreconcilable contradiction between their own values and the European norms and principles that Bulgarian society *as a whole* claims to take part in.<sup>9</sup> This is not to imply that the Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands are sceptical about, or in defiance of, universal values including human rights and freedoms; my findings suggest merely that they are more inspired in their daily dealings and personal relations by their ethno-religious identity and their ties to the homeland. They have a hierarchy of values according to which Islam and Turkishness usually trump other overarching norms or encompassing identity markers in case of conflict.

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<sup>9</sup> The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a centrist political party set up mainly for protection of the rights and freedoms of the minority groups in Bulgaria on the basis of the international human and minority rights documents, adopts as one of their foreign policy goals the integration of Bulgaria into the European and Euro-Atlantic organizations. See “Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi Tüzüğü” (MRF Party Statute) at <http://www.dps.bg/tr/onemlibelgeler.aspx> (accessed 26.07.2013).

These two communities' differing conceptualizations of homeland are also reflected in their respective attitudes towards their countries of settlement, which is my third parameter. Clearly, after their centuries old presence in the region, the Turkish Bulgarian community has become an indigenous population, hence their deeper integration into the wider Bulgarian society. Some of the interviewees stated that they had two homelands: Turkey as their ancestral homeland and Bulgaria as their current (lived) homeland. Despite their past experiences of oppression and recent problems regarding their status as a minority group, they see themselves as an integral part of Bulgaria. For them, the presence of Turkey as a neighbouring kin state to look to for help when it is needed is reassuring, particularly given the fact that Turkey opened its borders for those who fled the pressures of the Zhivkov regime in the 1980s. However, they do not see their ties to Turkey as a substitute for their loyalty to the Bulgarian state. I also observed that the emotional attachment felt by previous generations was wearing off among younger generations due to the fact that the political environment in Bulgaria has drastically changed since the 1980s and younger people are now more inspired by transnational ideas and channels, and are therefore distancing themselves from traditional ethno-religious affiliations.

The members of the Turkish community in the Netherlands whom I interviewed have displayed less emotional and normative identification with their host society; their ties to the Netherlands seemed more of an instrumentalist nature. It was interesting to observe that a number of interviewees seemed to have internalized the alienating discourse towards the newcomers that has been prevalent in some sectors of Dutch society; they consciously or unconsciously used the terms "*göçmen*" (immigrant), and "*yabancı*" (foreigner, outsider) when referring to themselves. I may conclude on the grounds of these observations that at least a segment of the Turkish community in the Netherlands does not (yet) regard the latter as a proper homeland, though this situation may change in the future.

If there is one thing in common regarding these two communities' attitudes towards homeland-hostland nexus, it is their perception of Turkey as a sort of "emergency exit" that can be used in case of an imminent security threat, or of socio-economic

exigencies. The Turkish community in Bulgaria has seen many waves of mass emigration to Turkey throughout their history, most of them being due to political reasons including wars, border changes, oppression and expulsion. Recently, however, the bitter memories of past adversities are fading away among Bulgarian-Turks mainly because the democratization steps taken by the Bulgarian state and the latter's EU membership have resulted in a relatively more convenient political environment for minorities. Younger generations are now more concerned about their economic fate in Bulgaria. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the ousting of Zhivkov, Bulgaria entered a period of transition plagued by economic difficulties. This has had a severe impact on the Turkish minority, which constitutes the poorer segments of the population, urging a number of them to emigrate and look for better job opportunities in Turkey and elsewhere. There are now many divided families whose members go back and forth between Bulgaria and Turkey in order to improve their lots. They enter Turkey mostly on tourist visas without officially applying for immigrant or refugee status. The labour migration from Bulgaria to Turkey in the post-1990s period has been categorized by Turkish authorities as ethnic return migration, making the immigrants invisible both in irregular migration statistics and migration literature despite the fact that they view their residence in Turkey as temporary and have more in common with other irregular migrants from Eastern Europe than they do with the 1989 Turkish migrants from Bulgaria who were automatically granted citizenship upon arrival (Parla 2007: 158-159).

As for the first generation of the immigrant community in the Netherlands, their residence was intended by the homeland, the hostland and the immigrants themselves to be temporary. While a number of immigrants have returned to Turkey in the course of time, many others have stayed on. Despite the lack of reliable data as to the number of returnees, Ahmet İcduygu points out that a sharp increase in the number of return migrants from Europe to Turkey occurred in the early 1980s mainly due to measures taken by host governments to encourage return. Some 10,000 of these returnees were from the Netherlands in 1985-86. The figures started to decline in the late 1980s down to the level of around 2,000 returnees annually from the Netherlands in the first half of the 1990s, and again maintained a steady level in the 2000s

(İçduygu 2008: 7-8). However, İçduygu makes a distinction between the return migration of the last two decades and that of the previous period:

The return migration of 1990s and 2000s is quite different from the return migration of 1970s and 1980s. In fact, it is mostly a movement of floating population of emigrant between the host countries and their home country. Many Turkish emigrants who previously settled in various European countries are returning to Turkey, but not all of them permanently. Many of the first generation migrants who migrated in the 1960s and 1970s and later got retired have started living six months in Turkey and six months in Europe. They prefer to keep in contact with, for example the health services and pension systems, and they often do not wish to give up their houses, and try to keep in contact with their relatives, who live both in Turkey and abroad. Meanwhile, children of migrants who were born in Europe or grown up there also sometimes return to Turkey because they wish to return to their roots (İçduygu 2008: 8).

In line with İçduygu's statements, Böcker and Balkır argue that circular migration patterns enable the migrants to use resources in both countries and to keep all options open. Surveys conducted in the Netherlands found that many elderly Turkish immigrants divide their time between Turkey and the host country. One survey conducted in 2000 showed that the Dutch health care system and the presence of children and other relatives in the Netherlands are important reasons for elderly Turkish migrants to stay in the Netherlands (Van den Tillaart *et al.* cited in Böcker and Balkır 2012: 13). As for younger generations, a recent study on the return intention among second-generation Turks in Europe revealed that low levels of socio-cultural integration and maintaining transnational ties with their parents' country of origin substantially increase the likelihood of expressing a return intention (Fokkema 2011). The results also conveyed that second generation Turks in countries with predominantly multicultural policies are more inclined to return than those in countries with a more exclusionist or assimilationist approach. Compared to the average Turkish second-generation migrant, those in the Netherlands, Belgium and France were more likely to intend to return and those living in Sweden, Germany and Switzerland were less so (Fokkema 2011: 13).

Today, younger generations of immigrants who maintain connections with their country of origin see their transnational ties as an opportunity window that allows them to have multiple bases for their business transactions, educational, cultural and artistic endeavours, and personal networks. In other words, the initial presence of compelling circumstances, or *force majeure*, such as wars, ethnic cleansing, deportation, deprivation of homeland is not a precondition for diaspora groups to maintain a “myth of homeland”; labour migrants also uphold an image of homeland both instrumentally as a resource option that functions as a remedy for possible economic and social deprivation and loss of status in host country; and symbolically as a normative and cultural reference point occasionally employed to ensure internal cohesion. The transnationalization of many aspects of life places individuals and groups with multiple identities and territorial bases in a more advantageous position vis-à-vis others practicing more localized forms of connecting and organizing.

However, it should also be noted that transnational ties may sometimes unfold in an ad hoc and individualized fashion. Such transnational activities as business partnerships, artistic, cultural and educational projects, and personal networking may not always amount to cross-border community building. I have previously examined the interrelationships between diaspora segments as my fourth parameter and mentioned that community building engagements between various diaspora groups reinforce diaspora consciousness, and therefore constitute an important aspect of diaspora formation. Through community building processes, diaspora segments forge diaspora-specific identities and agendas that will in time turn them into a collectivity with common norms, values, practices and institutions. As expected, the links between the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands are loose; the divergence of the historical conditions and chronology of their detachment from the ancestral homeland, their status in their respective countries (the former being an autochthonous minority population, the latter being a immigrant group) and the differences marking the nature of problems they currently face in their respective societies set them apart and seem to detract from their diaspora status, particularly when compared to other close intra-diasporic networks such as those formed by Jewish and Armenian migrant groups around the world. Nevertheless, these two

Turkish groups have at least one point of connection; in the Netherlands, around 80% of all the irregular migrants from Bulgaria<sup>10</sup> is stated to be ethnic Turks. This is mainly because emigration to different countries depends on previously formed informal migrant networks. Once they are in their host societies, immigrants live in isolation with little connection with their Western colleagues, employers or Western ways of life, remaining rather within networks of ethnic Turks and Kurds, and usually losing contact with acquaintances they make abroad upon returning to Bulgaria (Guentcheva *et al.* 2003: 43-44, 50).

Despite the paucity of active connections between the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands, each of these communities can be said to be more organized within their own community setting in their separate countries. They have established foundations and associations on a wide range of issues including culture, education, labour, business and religion as well as friendship and student organizations. However, the institutional scenery of the immigrant Turkish community in the Netherlands has been particularly fragmented since many of these organizations reflect the ethnic, ideological, and religious cleavages imported from their country of origin. This can be considered to be a partial impediment to boundary maintenance vis-à-vis the host society. On the other hand, however, a great deal of these organizations in both countries are community-specific in the sense that they promote the rather narrow goals and interests of particular groups within the respective Turkish communities, practically denying membership to native or other minority/immigrant populations. Laying the ground for collective action and contributing to the construction of a common identity, these organizations reinforce communal ties in less familiar and challenging environments. They also enable their members to retain a sense of rootedness by helping preserve their attachment, sometimes in a merely symbolic way, to their territory of origin and to the values, norms and customs this territory is believed to represent, even though this attachment

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<sup>10</sup> Statistics Netherlands, the central bureau responsible for collecting and processing official national statistics, declares the number of individuals with Bulgarian origin to be around 20,000 in the Netherlands as of 2013. See <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLLEN&PA=37325ENG&D1=0&D2=a&D3=0&D4=0&D5=39&D6=11-17&LA=EN&VW=T> (accessed 23.07.2013).

may be perceived and expressed in considerably differentiated ways across the ideological, ethnic and religious scala.

### **3.4 Conclusions**

Defining diaspora and identifying a dispersed group as diaspora are problematic endeavours, almost always raising controversies as to the criteria employed and the congruence between these criteria and the case at hand. No matter which criteria are chosen, diaspora, like any other social unit, is not an absolute category. It is not immune to temporal and spatial variations. Moreover, each case of diaspora formation has its own particularities, making futile the attempts to find ideal examples. Therefore, it is not reasonable to expect any given case to comply unequivocally with all the generally accepted standards of diaspora; a group of people may qualify as diaspora in some respects, while failing to meet other requirements.

The Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands are surely not diasporas in the traditional sense of the term. It is not only that the historical settings of their detachment from homeland are utterly, and in some respects incomparably, different from each other, but also that each of them fails to meet one or more criteria that were specified here. In the first place, the causes and conditions of their detachment are dissimilar. The divergences in their initial conditions and their consequent territorial experiences not only serve to expose their peculiar characteristics, but also reflect the main points of contention in scholarly efforts to define and analyze diasporas. As a matter of fact, I should note that these two cases were chosen not despite their differences, but because of them. Notwithstanding the incompatibility of certain aspects of each case with the presumptions of conventional diaspora studies, the diaspora literature is still relevant for this research since it offers valuable insights into the relations of territoriality and the operation of the “homeland idea” among dispersed populations.

The assessments I have put forward above regarding the diaspora status of the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands are inevitably based, in addition to the narrative analyses of interviews and my own field observations, on a very limited number of empirical studies that are available. Despite this drawback, they are intended to contribute to the existing efforts to redefine diasporas and diaspora territoriality in a new transnational era, and to forge stronger scholarly connections between research fields of diaspora studies, geography, and international relations. It is not the task incumbent upon this study to determine in a conclusive way whether these two cases conform to the prevailing diaspora definitions; my research rather aims at taking a step towards a more informed analysis of the changing patterns of territorial conceptions and practices of uprooted individuals and communities. To this aim, I will deal, in the following chapters, with the specific findings of my fieldwork pertaining to each case at hand.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **TURKISH COMMUNITY IN BULGARIA: ONE PEOPLE, TWO HOMELANDS?**

This chapter will proceed in two parts. The first part will offer a historical background of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria with a focus on its origins, past status and present condition. The second part will be dedicated to the analysis of the interviews conducted with various members of this minority community within the framework of the three conceptions of territorial attachment I defined in the first chapter. For each territorial conception, I will identify certain parameters that will help me unveil, if possible, certain patterns or commonalities regarding the idea of homeland among the interviewees. At the end of every section dealing with a different conception of territoriality, I will list the conclusions I have drawn from the analyses of the interviews based on these selected parameters.

#### **4.1 Historical Background**

The origins of the Turkish community in Bulgaria are usually traced back to the conquest of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth century. İnalçık argues that Turks, since the time of the Huns, have settled and established states in the northern regions of the Black Sea and the Balkans. After the Huns, other Turkic groups including Ogurs, Bulgars (who founded the first Bulgarian state in 680-681, but were later Slavicized and Christianized), Avars, Pecenegs, Uz, and Cumans (or Kipczaks) also played major and minor roles in the history of Bulgarian lands (İnalçık 1943: Önsöz V-VII). However, most of these groups disappeared leaving little enduring impact on the cultural and religious composition of the region; the

main population movements from Anatolia occurred following the Ottoman conquests (Eminov 1997: 24-27).

As the Ottomans advanced into the Balkans, Turkish groups from Anatolia, mostly nomadic Turcomans, followed suit. These nomadic tribes were later sedentarized and were incorporated into the Ottoman military and social order that was gradually consolidated in the Balkans. The populations that were brought to the Balkan lands did consist not only of nomadic tribes, but also of soldiers, administrators, farmers, artisans, merchants, dervishes and preachers (Eminov 1997: 27). Therefore, in addition to the gradual sedentarization of nomadic groups, Yaşar Yücel identifies a second method of Ottoman colonization in the Balkans: reorganization of towns through the establishment of Muslim quarters around *tekkes* and *zaviyes* (dervish lodges) as centers to attract population (Yücel 1992: 73-75). Ömer Barkan also acknowledges that Turcoman tribes, who voluntarily immigrated into the newly conquered Balkan territories with the hope of finding wider and more fertile lands for themselves, formed the bulk of the Turkish speaking Muslim rural population in the region. However, he argues that the transfer of Turkish groups into the region had more to do with the Ottoman administrative, economic and military organization which dictated the (forceful) migration and resettlement of its subjects in order to achieve the goals of ensuring a more rational and efficient utilization of agricultural and other labour, and thus increasing state revenues; revitalizing ravaged lands; securing the transfer of military provisions and personnel by establishing towns and villages along transfer routes; and finally consolidating its political and military power by placing Turkish and Muslim elements into a foreign land. Consequently, the nomadic groups that were seen by the state as disobedient and were suspected to possibly take part in rebellions in other parts of the country were transferred forcefully into newly conquered lands so as to punish them through exile as well as to secure the above-mentioned military-political goals (Barkan 1952: 57-59).

The Ottomans had conquered the territories that now form present-day Bulgaria by the end of the fourteenth century (İnalçık 2009: 67-68). From their conquest up until 1878, the Bulgarian territories remained under the Ottoman rule and were subjected

to colonization and demographic restructuring. Besides voluntary migrations and deportations, conversions to Islam (either by force or voluntarily for political, legal, economic, and social benefits) and the ensuing Turkification of converts also contributed to the gradual increase in the number of Muslim-Turkish population. Consequently, while the rural areas remained predominantly Christian, urban centers became Muslim for the most part. However, unlike Anatolia, conversion and assimilation of the indigenous populations into the Muslim-Turkish community as state policy remained limited to certain areas (Vryonis cited in Eminov 1997: 44-45). The *millet* system, which was instituted to regulate the inter-community relations within the empire, also ensured the autonomy of groups of different religious persuasions vis-à-vis each other, relegating race, ethnicity and nationality to a secondary position. However, despite the administrative classification of communities along the lines of faith, the *millet* system ironically helped local groups preserve their ethnic identity as well. Karpát claims that the ethnic aspect of the *millet* system has largely been ignored by scholars; it is true that the *millet* system created a class of high level religious functionaries that administered the affairs of their relative communities and were politically associated with the Ottoman state, the system depended heavily on ethnic structures beyond the Ottoman capital. The clergymen in villages and towns were selected from among the ethnic group that they were supposed to serve (Karpát 2006: 260-261). In addition to the *millet* system, Karpát states that the local autonomy accorded to regions, provinces, cities, quarters, towns and villages, which were separate administrative units run by locally selected community leaders, also functioned as a crucial element in the preservation of ethnic identities under the Ottoman Empire (Karpát 2006: 263). Sugar goes even further to argue that the *millet* system, and the legal status it provided for the non-Muslims enhanced the latter's group solidarity, and created the framework for the development of modern nationalism among these groups, a process culminating in their independence from the Ottoman rule (Sugar 1969: 28).

Despite the fact that non-Muslims enjoyed a degree of local autonomy in religious and administrative matters, the Muslim-Turkish population constituted the majority of the Bulgarian population from the sixteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth

century as a result of demographic restructuring. Before the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War, the population of the Muslim-Turkish community in the Ottoman provinces (*vilayet*) of Danube and Eastern Roumelia, which would later combine to form the Principality of Bulgaria, was more than 1,600,000 of the estimated total population of 3,500,000 (Turan cited in Dayioğlu 2005: 34). The Russo-Turkish War ended with a Russian victory, and the Treaty of San Stefano, signed in 1878, envisaged a large Bulgarian state stretching from the Black Sea to the Aegean and encompassing almost all ethnic Bulgarians. However, the treaty did not come into effect. Instead, the Treaty of Berlin was signed in the same year, establishing a much smaller Bulgarian principality on the territories of the province of Danube. Even though the principality was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, it enjoyed *de facto* independence. In 1885, the Principality of Bulgaria annexed the province of Eastern Roumelia. Later, in 1908, it declared its independence and became the Kingdom of Bulgaria.

The Russo-Turkish War and the ensuing loss of the Bulgarian lands by the Ottomans triggered mass migrations of Muslim and Turkish groups to Anatolia, reducing the remaining population by half. In fact, the Treaty of Berlin stipulated the protection of the rights and freedoms of minorities in Bulgaria; these rights were granted, long before the League of Nations system, to the Turkish-Muslim minority in Bulgaria as a concession in return for the Ottoman retreat from these lands (Eroğlu 1992: 45). However, despite the protection accorded, a steady decrease in the Muslim-Turkish population ensued until 1910. Even though there occurred a short period of relative increase in the 1910s and 1920s due to natural birth rates and enlargement of Bulgarian territories particularly through the Balkan Wars in 1912-13, the general trend has since been one of decline as a result of mass and individual emigrations generated by incessant wars and unfavourable political, economic, and social conditions. Şimşir estimates the number of emigrants from Bulgaria to Turkey between 1923 and 1980 to be slightly more than half a million (Şimşir 1992: 65). Eminov claims the total number of people that have emigrated from Bulgaria to Turkey between 1878 and mid-1990s to be 1.5 million (Eminov 1997: 79). According to the Bulgarian official statistics based on census results, the percentage

of Muslim population (which also includes such non-Turkish speaking groups as Pomaks and Muslim Gypsies) in Bulgaria diminished from 21.44% in 1887 to 12.2% in 2001:

**Table 4.1: Population of Bulgaria by religion based on census results**

Source: National Statistical Institute, Bulgaria, available at <http://www.nsi.bg/Census/StrReligion.htm> (accessed 29.08.2013).

Creed	Census Years									
	1887	1893	1900	1910	1920	1926	1934	1946	1992	2001
(Eastern) Orthodox	2,424,371 (76.86%)	2,606,786 (78.74%)	3,019,999 (80.66%)	3,643,918 (84.0%)	4,062,097 (83.8%)	4,569,074 (83.4%)	5,128,890 (84.4%)	5,967,992 (84.9%)	7,274,592 (85.7%)	6,552,751 (82.6%)
Muslim	676,215 (21.44%)	643,258 (19.43%)	643,300 (17.18%)	602,078 (13.9%)	690,734 (14.3%)	789,296 (14.4%)	821,298 (13.5%)	938,418 (13.3%)	1,110,295 (13.1%)	966,978 (12.2%)
Jewish	24,352 (0.77%)	28,307 (0.86%)	33,663 (0.90%)	40,067 (0.9%)	43,232 (0.9%)	46,431 (0.8%)	48,398 (0.8%)	43,335 (0.6%)	2,580 (0.0%)	653 (0.0%)
Catholic	18,505 (0.59%)	22,617 (0.68%)	28,569 (0.76%)	32,150 (0.7%)	34,072 (0.7%)	40,347 (0.7%)	45,704 (0.8%)	-	53,074 (0.6%)	43,811 (0.6%)
Protestant	1,358 (0.04%)	2,384 (0.07%)	4,524 (0.12%)	6,335 (0.1%)	5,617 (0.1%)	6,735 (0.1%)	8,371 (0.1%)	-	21,878 (0.3%)	42,308 (0.5%)
Armenian/Gregorian	5,839 (0.19%)	6,643 (0.20%)	13,809 (0.37%)	12,259 (0.3%)	10,848 (0.2%)	25,402 (0.5%)	23,476 (0.4%)	-	9,672 (0.1%)	6,500 (0.1%)
Other	1,461 (0.04%)	-	326 (0.01%)	706 (0.0%)	371 (0.0%)	1,456 (0.0%)	1,802 (0.0%)	79,604 (1.1%)	15,226 (0.2%)	7,784 (0.1%)
Not self-identified	2,274 (0.07%)	718 (0.02%)	93 (0.0%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	308,116 (3.9%)
<b>Total-Principality</b>	<b>3,154,375</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>3,310,713</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>3,744,283</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>4,337,513</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>4,846,971</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>5,478,741</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>6,077,939</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>7,029,349</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>8,487,317</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>7,928,901</b> <b>(100%)</b>

Demographic data on ethnicity is more difficult to obtain and less reliable since a portion of particularly the Muslim groups (Pomaks, Tatars, the Roma) tended to register themselves as Turks mainly because they would be able to emigrate to Turkey if they did so. Moreover, there has been a dispute between Turkish and Bulgarian sources over the ethnic origins of the Pomak and Roma groups, each party attempting to place these groups under their own ethnic category. The censuses in 1880, 1887 and 1892 did not have a question on ethnic affiliation. These censuses measured ethnicity by mother tongue. Accordingly, the percentage of Turks among the general population in these years was found to be 24.86%, 19.25% and 17.21% respectively (Crampton 2007: 24-25). For the Bulgarian official statistics on population by ethnicity from 1900 up to 2011, see **Table 4.2** on the next page.

The last census held in 2011<sup>11</sup> found the total population of Bulgaria to be 7,364,570 persons. Among them, 588,318 persons declared themselves as ethnic Turks. This corresponds to a percentage of 8.8% making Turks the second largest ethnic group in Bulgaria. Ethnic Bulgarians are more urbanized compared to other groups: 77.5% of ethnic Bulgarians live in urban areas, whereas this rate is 37.7% among ethnic Turks. Ethnic Bulgarians prevail in all districts excluding Kardzhali and Razgrad, where they represent 30.2% and 43.0% respectively. Ethnic Turks are concentrated in Kardzhali, Razgrad, Targovishte, Shumen, Silistra, Dobrich, Ruse and Burgas. Among those with Turkish ethnicity, 96.6% or 564,858 persons have declared Turkish as mother tongue while 18,975 persons (3.2%) declared the Bulgarian language. According to the census results, 4,282 persons have both Bulgarian and Turkish citizenship. As for religious affiliation, 87.6% of those with Turkish ethnicity are Muslim (444,434 persons). Of them 420,816 persons are sunni and 21,610 are shiite<sup>12</sup>; 2,008 declared themselves Muslim only; 14,698 persons answered “no religion”; 39,529 did not state their religion; 5,279 are Eastern Orthodox, 1,182 Catholic and 2,400 Protestant. Among the Bulgarian ethnic group the share of illiteracy is 0.5% while among the Turkish it is 4.7%. Among the

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<sup>11</sup> See [http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final\\_en.pdf](http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf) (accessed 29.08.2013).

<sup>12</sup> In Bulgaria, the term "Alevi" or "Kızılbaş" is generally used for the Shiites.

Turkish ethnic group, the share of children who do not attend school is 11.9%, whereas it is 5.6% among ethnic Bulgarians.

**Table 4.2: Population of Bulgaria by ethnicity based on census results**

Source: National Statistical Institute, Bulgaria, available at

<http://censusresults.nsi.bg/Census/Reports/1/2/R7.aspx> (accessed 29.08.2013).

Census Years	Ethnicity					
	Bulgarian	Turkish	Roma	Other	Not self-identified	Total
1900	2,888,219 (77.1%)	531,240 (14.2%)	89,549 (2.4%)	235,275 (6.3%)	- -	<b>3,744,283</b> (100%)
1905	3,203,810 (79.4%)	488,010 (12.1%)	99,004 (2.5%)	244,751 (6.1%)	- -	<b>4,035,575</b> (100%)
1910	3,518,756 (81.1%)	465,641 (10.7%)	122,296 (2.8%)	230,820 (5.3%)	- -	<b>4,337,513</b> (100%)
1920	4,036,056 (83.3%)	520,339 (10.7%)	98,451 (2.0%)	192,125 (4.0%)	- -	<b>4,846,971</b> (100%)
1926	4,557,706 (83.2%)	577,552 (10.5%)	134,844 (2.5%)	208,639 (3.8%)	- -	<b>5,478,741</b> (100%)
1934	5,204,217 (85.6%)	591,193 (9.7%)	149,385 (2.5%)	133,144 (2.2%)	- -	<b>6,077,939</b> (100%)
1946	5,903,580 (84.0%)	675,500 (9.6%)	170,011 (2.4%)	280,258 (4.0%)	- -	<b>7,029,349</b> (100%)
1956	6,506,541 (85.5%)	656,025 (8.6%)	197,865 (2.6%)	253,278 (3.3%)	- -	<b>7,613,709</b> (100%)
1965	7,231,243 (87.9%)	780,928 (9.5%)	148,874 (1.8%)	66,921 (0.8%)	- -	<b>8,227,966</b> (100%)
1975	7,930,024 (90.9%)	730,728 (8.4%)	18,323 (0.2%)	48,696 (0.6%)	- -	<b>8,727,771</b> (100%)
1992	7,271,185 (85.7%)	800,052 (9.4%)	313,396 (3.7%)	94,203 (1.1%)	8,481 (0.1%)	<b>8,487,317</b> (100%)
2001	6,655,210 (83.9%)	746,664 (9.4%)	370,908 (4.7%)	69,204 (0.9%)	62,108 (0.8%)	<b>7,928,901</b> (100%)
2011	5,664,624 (84.8%)	588,318 (8.8%)	325,343 (4.9%)	53,391 (0.8%)	49,304 (0.7%)	<b>7,364,570</b> (100%)

Having established the basic facts about the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, I can now turn to the historical evolution of the minority's legal, political and social status. After the establishment of the Principality of Bulgaria by the Treaty of Berlin, Bulgaria adopted its first constitution, the Tarnovo Constitution, in 1879. The constitution, which remained in effect until 1947, guaranteed all Bulgarian citizens equality before law. Even though it prioritized the Orthodox Church as the dominant faith, it granted religious freedoms to other groups as well. Up until 1934, the Muslim community enjoyed spiritual, administrative and judicial autonomy; their affairs were governed by the Supreme Spiritual Council, local mufti deputies and Muslim courts. Moreover, their schools were privately run by mosque administrations. These rights were protected by the international treaties signed by Bulgaria starting from the Treaty of Berlin (1878) and including the Treaty of Istanbul (1909), the Peace Treaty of 1913, Neuilly Peace Treaty (1919), and the Treaty of Ankara (1925). However, the administrative and religious autonomy granted to the Turkish minority, together with the culture-centered education system, served as an impediment to the integration of the Turkish minority into wider Bulgarian society (Zhelyazkova 1998: 5).

As far as the Turkish minority is concerned, the Bulgarian education system was plagued by various problems. Turkish schools were poorly funded; they received limited state support and lacked trained teachers. Students were almost exclusively male and the drop-out rate was high. As a result of limited educational facilities, illiteracy rate among the ethnic Turks was considerably high, especially when compared to other minority groups (Eminov 2000: 139). There were no secondary schools until 1918. Almost all of the Turkish and Muslim students attended their own private schools which taught in Turkish and not Bulgarian state schools. The education provided in Turkish schools was mainly religious except for a few urban secular "*rusdiye*"s.

Until the 1930s and 1940s, the Turkish population defined itself mainly by religion. They lacked a secular national elite. Despite the fact that they were represented in parliament as members of Bulgarian parties, this representation was very limited in

number and did not have an ethnic outlook. In other words, they were not in a position to exercise political power at the national level. In economic and social terms, the Turkish minority constituted a closed, agrarian and under-developed segment of the society in general (Höpken 1997: 56-57). Their economic and social plight was intensified with the social changes in Bulgaria that were triggered by the establishment of the national state. The Bulgarian state pursued a policy of Westernization and modernization that also aimed at eliminating elements from the country's Ottoman past, particularly the Islamic religion. This added to the alienation of the Turkish-Muslim community, which in turn led to further emigrations and reinforced the community's self-enclosedness (Höpken 1997: 59). Nevertheless, as Höpken goes on to argue, the compromise between the minority's religious elite and the Bulgarian state was maintained from 1878 up to the 1920s. While the religious elite formulated their demands on the basis of a religious identity and refrained from secular ethnic mobilization, the government reciprocated this self-restraint with non-interference. In this period, the rights of the Turkish minority were legally protected, and their religious and cultural autonomy largely remained unchallenged (Höpken 1997: 60-61).

The Treaty of Berlin and the Tarnovo Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of conscience and worship to all citizens of Bulgaria, provided the legal basis of the religious autonomy granted to the minorities. After the declaration of independence in 1908, a new accord was called for in order to accommodate the new situation. Therefore, in 1909, an agreement was signed in Istanbul between Bulgaria and the Ottomans, and it remained the basic legal instrument which regulated the rights and freedoms of the Turkish minority until after World War II. According to this accord, *muftis* were entitled to administer mosques, schools and endowed properties (*vakifs*), and together with local Muslim judges (*kadis*), retained the right to settle disputes among Muslims on issues such as family matters and inheritance. Muslim communities had the right to establish Muslim councils that could own property such as schools and mosques. The 1919 law on Muslim communities particularly aimed at enhancing minority education and raising the literacy rate among the ethnic Turks. Muslim communities had around 2,300 mosques and 4,000 hodjas to lead prayers

and teach at schools. By the year of 1926, there were 1,329 Turkish schools with a total of 58,000 pupils. The Grand Medrese was opened in Shumen in 1922 for higher religious training. Turkish students could also attend Sofia University, where a lectureship in Turkish had been established in 1907 (Crampton 2007: 431, also 426-427).

When we come to the 1930s, we see the emergence of a movement among the Turkish intellectuals for establishing modern secular Turkish schools, a development influenced by the Kemalist reforms undertaken in Turkey. In these new schools, Bulgarian teachers taught new subjects such as Bulgarian language, history and geography. Alongside these schools, the Turkish community published a number of newspapers in Turkish and established cultural, educational, and sports societies, the most prominent of which were Turan, Altın Ordu, and Alparslan (Zhelyazkova 1998: 5). In fact, the extent of the Kemalist influence on Turkish-Muslim communities in Bulgaria is not very clear. Höpken claims that the impact of Kemalism has been exaggerated by both Bulgarian and Turkish historiography. While the former emphasizes the influence of Kemalism as evidence of Ankara's Panturkist policies aiming at transforming the Turks of Bulgaria into a Turkish national minority, the latter attempts to underscore the close ties of the Bulgarian-Turks as an ethnically conscious minority to the new secular Turkey. Höpken holds, however, that even though Kemalist ideas held sway among the small group of urban Turkish teachers and intellectuals particularly in north-eastern towns of Varna and Shumen, it had a limited impact among agrarian Turks of the south-east. This was mainly due to the small size of the secular elite, the high rate of illiteracy, the continuing importance of religious leaders within the community, and the lack of the support of the Bulgarian government for Kemalist secularism (Höpken 1997: 61). For the emergence of a more thorough movement of secularization, one had to wait until the ascendance of communism to power.

In the meantime, an authoritarian *coup d'état* in 1934, carried out by the Zveno military organization with the help of certain army sections, restricted political freedoms dissolving the parliament, banning political organizations, parties, unions,

and temporarily abolishing the Tarnovo Constitution. The new regime also abolished Turkish organizations and newspapers, reduced the number of Turkish schools, and ousted parliamentarians and mayors of Turkish origin. The deterioration in their conditions led many members of the Turkish-Muslim community to emigrate in the 1930s. These developments marked the beginning of a period in which the above-mentioned compromise between the Bulgarian state and the Turkish community which had been based on religious autonomy and non-interference was shaken by the emergence of a secular ethnic consciousness among the Turks and an increased nationalism among the Bulgarians (Höpken 1997: 64).

This shift in the inter-community relations was furthered by the policies of the communist regime which took power in 1944. During the first years of their rule, the communists took measures to strengthen the Turkish ethnic identity among the Turks as they followed the Soviet model which envisaged the protection of ethnic and minority rights. In 1947, Bulgaria adopted the Dimitrov Constitution which stipulated secular, democratic and progressive education for all citizens. Education would be provided only in public schools or in permitted private schools under state supervision. The constitution recognized the existence of national minorities by stating "national minorities have the right to learn their modern tongue and to develop their national culture while learning the Bulgarian language is required" (Article 79). As a result, Turkish schools were integrated into the Bulgarian public school system and the study of the Bulgarian language became compulsory. Although the language of instruction remained Turkish with certain subjects taught in Bulgarian, the curriculum became centrally determined and reflected the communist ideology and its atheistic outlook. Eminov identifies the motives behind these steps towards the nationalization and secularization of Turkish educational institutions as follows:

First, the government wanted to improve the dismal state of education among Turkish speakers. Second, by making the study of Bulgarian compulsory in the nationalized Turkish language schools, the authorities sought to increase fluency in Bulgarian among a largely monolingual population in order to ease their integration into Bulgarian society. Third, the

government sought to create a secular Turkish-speaking intelligentsia and to use it to effect a shift from primary Muslim identity among Turkish speakers to ethnic Turkish identity. Finally, this secular Turkish-speaking intelligentsia was expected to take the lead in facilitating a final shift of identity from parochial ethnic Turkish identity to an identity with the socialist Bulgarian nation (Eminov 2000: 140).

The efforts of the Bulgarian government towards nationalization and secularization of the institutions of the Turkish community yielded results in a short time. Some religious schools were transformed into secular ones; new ones including secondary schools and teachers' colleges were set up; the number of students attending these schools as well as that of trained teachers increased; illiteracy rates dropped considerably while bilingualism expanded. Moreover, a process of cultural revival unfolded with the proliferation of Turkish-language publications and broadcasts, theaters, libraries and cultural organizations. On the other hand, theological education was gradually undermined as the number of religious schools and of *hodzas* was reduced and teaching of the Quran was banned. The nationalization of the *vakif* properties dealt a financial blow to the religious establishment. These policies aimed at eroding the firm hold of the Islamic religion on the Turkish community and were in line with the anti-religious stance of the communist regimes that was directed towards all religious communities in an effort to create a secular and socialist society. The regime's anti-religious undertakings were combined with the collectivization efforts that hit hard the rural Turkish community; these efforts resulted in the loss of the minority's lands to the state and threatened their traditional way of life as a closed agrarian society. These developments led, with the encouragement of the Bulgarian state, to one of the largest waves of Turkish emigration in 1950-51, the numbers reaching as high as 155,000 persons (Höpken 1997: 65-67).

From the late 1950s onwards, the Bulgarian government's restrictive attitude towards religious affiliations began to take a new form and be directed towards the ethnic manifestations of the minority identities since the state authorities saw parochial ethnic identities as an impediment to the realization of the homogeneous, unified Bulgarian socialist nation. In this period which continued until the late 1980s, the

government's policies towards minorities became more and more oppressive. Turkish schools were merged with the Bulgarian ones; Turkish-language education practically ended; Turkish publications and broadcasts gradually disappeared; religious and ethnic customs and rituals such as funerals, circumcision and clothing were targeted. However, these efforts proved futile as the Turkish community preserved its ethnic and religious particularities to a great extent. Also in the legal realm, the status of the minorities deteriorated. Unlike its predecessor, the Zhivkov Constitution, which remained in effect between 1971 and 1991, did not refer to national minorities.

The Bulgarian Communist Party's alarm at their failure to assimilate different ethnic and religious elements was accompanied by their perception of the Turkish community as the "fifth column" of Turkey in Bulgaria (Zhelyazkova 1998: 7). Indeed, until the mid-1980s Turkey's official policy towards the ethnic Turks outside its borders had been one of non-interference and mutual respect for minorities, a policy preference which was in line with the general status quoist foreign policy attitude of the republican Turkey. For the most part, Turkish governments refrained from any moves that could be interpreted as irredentist or interventionist (with the exception of Cyprus), and did not resort to ethnic mobilization as foreign policy leverage. As Poulton states, even though Turkey opened its borders to ethnic Turks in times of hardship, it preferred them to remain as citizens of their states. In the mid-1980s when the assimilation campaign against the Turks reached its peak, Turkey had to respond to the destitution of the Turkish community in Bulgaria, especially under the pressure of the public opinion. With the collapse of the communist regimes, Poulton goes on to argue, actors other than the state have utilized the opportunities offered by the end of the Cold War and have also come to be influential in Turkey's relations with the ethnic Turks abroad, Islamists being the most visible of these actors (Poulton 1997: 200-201).

Before I focus on the mid-1980s campaign of assimilation, I should remind that the number of emigrants from Bulgaria to Turkey between the years 1923 and 1980 exceeded half a million. According to Şimşir, only the number of emigrants between

1969 (the year after a migration agreement was signed between Turkey and Bulgaria allowing the close relatives of previous emigrants to leave Bulgaria for Turkey) and 1980 reached 130,000 persons (Şimşir 1992: 65). However, the biggest “exodus” occurred in 1989 when almost 350,000 ethnic Turks migrated to Turkey as a response to the forced assimilation campaign taken up by the Bulgarian state during the years 1984 and 1985. Although eventually half of the 1989 emigrants returned to Bulgaria, the “rebirth” or “revival” campaign, as termed by the Bulgarian authorities, and the mass emigration wave that followed constituted a defining moment in the Bulgarian history as well as in the majority-minority relations. The campaign involved forced changing of ethnic Turkish names with the claim that Turks in Bulgaria were the descendants of Islamicized Bulgarians rather than of Turkish groups who had settled on the Balkan lands conquered by the Ottoman state.

Even though there is now a broad consensus in the literature on the nature of this campaign as forced assimilation, accounts regarding the reasons behind and the conditions of such a drastic move are still varied. Some authors argue that this campaign was the epitome of Bulgarian nationalism long disguised behind socialist principles of internationalism and fight against bourgeois nationalism. Zhelyazkova states,

The system of peaceful co-existence of Christians and Muslims, Turks and Bulgarians, functioned smoothly over the centuries, being based on a mutual respect of traditions, of the specific characteristics of daily life, and the ‘komsuluk’. In moral and psychological terms, however, these relations, ever since the Revival until the present day, have been harassed by mistrust, prejudice and some sort of cultural and social revenge-seeking, which sometimes bordered on a stance of national domineering. For over a century, a serious national complex has been operating, which can be seen in a most synthesized and comprehensible form in a cliché of decade-old usage, referring to the ‘five centuries of dark Turkish yoke’ (Zhelyazkova 1998: 4-5).

Neuburger defies the argument of "ancient hatreds" generally employed in explaining the Bulgarian authorities' repressive attitude towards the ethnic Turks. Rather, she attributes the problems in the Bulgaro-Turkish relationship to the tools and themes of

modernity including the European constructed dichotomy of national self and other (Neuburger 1997: 2). Although the Bulgarian nation-building process "did result in a violent ethnic-untangling of Turk from Bulgarian its impetus was not the *a priori* existence of local hatred between Bulgarian and Turk. Ironically, these purportedly *ancient* Balkan enmities were constructed within the Bulgarian national elite's appropriation of inherently ambiguous Western Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment concepts of nationhood" (Neuburger 1997: 1). In a later study of hers entitled "*The Orient Within*", Neuburger defines the modern era as one in which the world was remapped into imagined geographical places along categories of civilization and barbarity generating such dichotomies as "East vs. West" and "Europe vs. Asia". By the nineteenth century, Bulgarian intellectuals, feeling insecure in the Balkans which was perceived as a place on the margins of maps where boundaries between cultures and ethnicities were blurred and shifting, sought to assert their Europeanness, hence cultural superiority, vis-à-vis their backward Asiatic Ottoman overlords. With this vision in mind, as national territories were reclaimed, there emerged a tendency among Bulgarians to expel or destroy markers of difference, both material and human. This sometimes took the form of coerced migration via land reforms. At other times, it was carried out through transformations of everyday culture; after Bulgarian culture had been cleansed of Ottoman imprints, Muslims too were gradually "liberated" from Ottoman occupation. Based on the claim that Pomaks and Turks had forcibly been Islamicized and Turkified and thus were racially Bulgarian, their bodies had to be stripped of markers of Muslimness (read backwardness and foreignness) such as clothes and names (Neuburger 2004: 197-198). In particular, the name as an audible and knowable marker of identity served in the twentieth century as a tool for ethnic groups to define themselves and demarcate their ethnonational boundaries. For many Bulgarians, both their own hybrid names and the names of Muslims functioned as a hindrance to modernization, progress, national amalgamation, and integration into an imagined cultural concept of Europe (Neuburger 2004: 167).

This was the historical and psychological backdrop against which the name-changing campaign of 1984-85 took place. Other political, economic and social factors also

played their part in Zhivkov regime's initiation of the Bulgarization process, which ironically foreshadowed the regime's doom. One such factor was the political and economic changes in the USSR. Even though the campaign of 1984-85 may be seen as an intensified episode of assimilationist aspirations of the Bulgarian communist regime since the early 1960s, the adoption by the Soviet regime of policies of political and economic restructuring (*perestroika*) increased the feeling of insecurity among the Bulgarian Communist Party. This insecurity was further fuelled by the demographic statistics which revealed that the population of Turkish and other Muslim minorities was growing at a faster rate than that of the majority (Warhola and Boteva 2003: 263). Forced migration of ethnic Turks to Turkey in masses had been a policy instrument frequently applied by both bourgeois and communist regimes of Bulgaria since 1878 as a means to keep the minority population in check. However, this instrument was considered to have proved insufficient at the beginning of the 1980s when Bulgaria had the lowest birth rates and the smallest population amongst its socialist neighbours. Hence, a new policy of "national revival process" was designed to turn the Turks into an integral part of the "developed socialist society" through interference with their language, religious traditions, customs, and finally names (Vasileva 1992: 346).

Another factor that contributed to the insecurities of the Zhivkov regime was the perceived change in Turkey's position regarding kin communities abroad. Even though the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria were stricken with the tensions of the Cold War, they never involved territorial disputes or instances of direct intervention. Turkey's motives regarding the Turkish-Muslim community in Bulgaria remained mainly cultural. However, Turkish intervention in Cyprus and the resulting occupation of the northern half in 1974 raised questions as to whether Turkey was changing course on its policy towards ethnic Turks abroad. Furthermore, the wave of terrorist attacks in a number of Bulgarian cities in 1983-84 also led to a suspicion that Turkey was behind these attacks. The increasing concerns about a potential Turkish threat were coupled by a sense of opportunity generated by the military coup of 1980 and the war against Kurdish insurgents during the 1980s in Turkey. As Turkey's energy was being drained by its internal problems and the international

community turning against it due to gross human rights abuses, the sudden launching of the Zhivkov's so-called rebirth process did not at first elicit any strong reaction from the Turkish authorities, though an effective international campaign was initiated later on (Dimitrov 2000: 11-13).

The assimilation process and the resulting wave of mass emigration of the Turks in 1989 dealt a blow to the already feeble position of the Zhivkov regime. Weakened by the growing economic problems and its inability to adapt to Gorbachev's new policies, the Zhivkov regime's legitimacy was further eroded by its assimilationist policies. Bulgaria's treatment of its minorities not only led to its international isolation, but also undermined its economic system as the emigration of such massive numbers of the minority population meant a serious decline in the agricultural workforce. Under these circumstances, Zhivkov had to resign in 1989. Free elections were held in 1990 and a new constitution was adopted a year later. These developments marked the beginning of a process of transition towards a liberal democracy with a free market economy. Even though this process has not been a smooth one and political instability prevailed particularly in the period between 1989 and 2001, positive developments have taken place with regard to the protection of human and minority rights and the establishment of a pluralistic society.

Prepared with a view to the achievement of integration with the EU, the 1991 Constitution was a significant step in the way of enhancing fundamental rights and freedoms. It reiterates the principle of equality of all citizens before the law and defies any privileges or restriction of rights on the grounds of race, national or social origin, ethnic self-identity, sex, religion, education, opinion, political affiliation, personal or social status or property status (Article 6/Paragraph 2)<sup>13</sup>. The Constitution does not use the term "national minority" and does not confer any collective rights to ethnic, religious or other groups. While it guarantees the unrestricted practicing of any religion and the separation of religious institutions from the state, the Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the traditional religion in Bulgaria and forbids the use of religious institutions,

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<sup>13</sup> See the Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 at <http://www.parliament.bg/en/const> (accessed 20.09.2013).

communities or beliefs to political ends (Article 13). According to Article 36 of the Constitution, the study and use of the Bulgarian language shall be a right and obligation of every Bulgarian citizen and the citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian shall have the right to study and use their own language alongside the compulsory study of the Bulgarian language. In the following article, freedom of conscience, freedom of thought and choice of religion and of religious or atheistic views are deemed inviolable; the state is obliged to assist the maintenance of tolerance and respect among believers from different denominations and between believers and non-believers. However, this right shall not be practiced to the detriment of national security, public order, public health and morals, and of the rights and freedoms of others. Article 54 entitles every citizen to the right to develop his own culture in accordance with his ethnic self-identification, a right which shall be recognized and guaranteed by law.

The above-mentioned constitutional rights are safeguarded by international agreements to which Bulgaria has become a signatory in the post-1989 period. Bulgaria became a member of the Council of Europe in 1992. The same year, it became a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and two years later it recognized the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. In 1999, Bulgaria ratified the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities.

Even though the human and minority rights stipulated in the Bulgarian Constitution and the multilateral agreements and institutions that Bulgaria has become a party to have paved the way for a new, more liberal era regarding the status of the minorities in the country, it was the establishment of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) that has contributed to a large extent to the actual enforcement of these legal safeguards. The MRF was officially founded as a political party in 1990, though it had previously functioned undercover. Its basic goal was declared to be the promotion of the rights and freedoms of minority groups in Bulgaria. It participated in the first free elections held in 1990 and secured 23 seats in the Bulgarian Parliament out of a total of 98 seats, becoming the third biggest party in the

Bulgarian political scene after the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP-formerly the Bulgarian Communist Party) and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF-the anti-communist coalition). The foundation of the MRF incited strong reaction from the Bulgarian nationalists and faced several legal attempts to disband the party on the grounds that the Constitution bans the establishment of political parties on ethnic, racial and religious lines (Article 11/Paragraph 4). However, the party survived such political and legal challenges, and established itself as a key actor in maintaining the precarious balance between the formerly communist and anti-communist forces in the parliament, a role which was more prominent in the turbulent years of consecutive coalition governments in the 1990s. This role has at times been compromised by such factors as intra-party struggles, allegations of corruption and of dubious political past levelled against party leaders, the protracted economic hardship faced by the minorities, and finally the party's diminishing constituency due particularly to economic emigration. Nevertheless, the MRF has acted as a broker in multi-party politics as well as a legitimate ground for advocating human and minority rights and pressing for more democratic legislation, thus contributing to the normalization of inter-ethnic relations and increasing the political representation of minority groups.

Many observers regard the integration of the movement into established parliamentary politics as one crucial reason why the ethnic tensions in Bulgaria have not turned into violent conflict, or dissolution, as happened in several other post-communist states. Vassilev traces the evolution of the MRF from 1990 onwards and observes that the peaceful resolution of the minority problem in Bulgaria and the central government's ability to resist nationalistic tendencies were made possible only with the drifting of the MRF away from its earlier ambiguities, semi-loyalty and sectarianism towards greater participation and democratic accommodation. While demanding group rights for minorities, the party has refrained from asserting aspirations for political or territorial autonomy, separatism or religious extremism (Vassilev 2002: 113-115). The pragmatic approach of the MRF and its adoption of a rather low-profile position regarding the political aspirations of the Turkish and other minorities have often led to criticisms from more radical sections in the party,

leading up to the elimination of the latter elements from the party. The MRF's preference for democratic and equal citizenship over ethnic nationalism as its main political principle has facilitated the relatively swift recovery of the basic rights and the freedoms of the minority peoples in Bulgaria.

First of all, the name-changing campaign was reversed and those who were affected by this assimilationist policy could apply to recover their birth names. Secondly, the teaching and manifestations of minority cultures have been allowed more room. Elective courses on Turkish language and Islamic religion were reinstated in public schools. Previously closed religious schools and Turkish language departments in universities as well as teachers' colleges were reopened. Turkish publications and limited radio and television broadcasts in the Turkish language were allowed. Thirdly, the MRF spearheaded the efforts to pass a law on the property rights of the minorities; the Turks could now claim their properties that were nationalized during the communist rule and were also seized from them during and after the forced migration of 1989. Finally, the MRF has played a significant role in the achievement of the internal peace, and national unity of Bulgaria, and through its support for integration of the country into the European institutions, it contributed to its overall democratization (Dayioğlu 2005: 453-455). The MRF has had the opportunity to take part in the government as a coalition partner first with the NDSV (the National Movement for Stability and Progress of the former king Simeon II) between 2001 and 2005, with the BSP between 2005 and 2009, and again with the BSP from May 2013 to the present. The MRF is represented by three ministers in the government formed after the parliamentary elections in May 2013, while gaining 36 seats in the 240-seat parliament. The Turkish minority may be said to be well represented at the local level as well. The MRF currently has mayors in 35 municipalities.

In addition to regaining their cultural and property rights, the Turkish minority were also restored their citizenship rights. After the events of 1989, many Turks settled in Turkey and acquired Turkish citizenship. This raised a question about the status of these people with double citizenship since both the regulations of 1940 and those of the communist regime had prohibited dual citizenship. The 1991 Constitution does

not specifically provide for dual citizenship. However, it tacitly recognizes the possibility of having another citizenship when stipulating in Articles 65(1) and 93(2) respectively that the candidates for the National Assembly and the presidency shall not hold another citizenship (Smilov and Jileva 2013: 10). The Citizenship Law adopted in 1998 gave the 1989 migrants holding Turkish citizenship an opportunity to renew their Bulgarian citizenship while keeping the former. Due to the fact that migrants are registered with different names in each country (with their Bulgarian names in Bulgaria and with their native Turkish names in Turkey), the total number of dual citizens cannot be reliably estimated, though the unofficial numbers in Turkey range from 50,000 to 250,000 (Özgür-Baklacioglu 2006: 324).

Despite the above-mentioned improvements on the rights of the minorities, we cannot assert that the issue of discrimination has been fully addressed. There are restrictions on the voting rights of expatriates that include Bulgarian-Turks who reside in Turkey. According to Articles 3(4) and 4(5) of the Bulgarian Electoral Code of 2011, in order to enjoy the right to elect and to be elected municipal councillors and mayors, Bulgarian citizens shall have resided in the respective nucleated settlement at least during the last twelve months. Eligibility for presidency and vice presidency requires a five-year residence prior to the elections (Article 4/ Paragraph 2).<sup>14</sup> These provisions may be regarded as a response to the debates on the introduction of residence requirements for expatriates that had preoccupied the political scene since the 1990s. These debates culminated in a campaign against voting abroad particularly after the official data revealed that more than 95 percent of the Bulgarian citizens living in Turkey had voted for the MRF in the parliamentary elections of 2009 (Smilov and Jileva 2013: 19-20).

Concerning the status of the minorities in Bulgaria, there are further entanglements. It has been claimed by the minority politicians that the ethnic and religious minorities are underrepresented in appointed positions in the state, in police agencies and in the military (Petkova 2002: 51). On the other hand, the deterioration of the economic

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<sup>14</sup> See the Election Code of Bulgaria at <http://www.legislationline.org/topics/topic/6/country/39> (accessed 31.10.2013).

situation in Bulgaria from the 1990s onwards has put the minorities in a more disadvantaged position regarding employment opportunities, particularly given the fact that minority groups generally have lower levels of education. The Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2012, prepared on Bulgaria by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour of the U.S. Department of State, highlighted the fact that school drop-out rates were disproportionately high among ethnic minorities while only 29.7% of the Turkish population had completed secondary school in comparison to 52.3% for the ethnic Bulgarians as revealed by Bulgarian official statistics for the year 2011<sup>15</sup>. Moreover, the ethnic Turks I met during my research expressed dissatisfaction about the Turkish language education offered on a voluntary basis in public schools, claiming that the hours were insufficient, resources limited and physical arrangements inefficient.

In addition to economic and cultural-educational drawbacks, there have been incidents of violent attacks targeting Muslim places of worship. The independent expert report on minority issues in Bulgaria, which was prepared after a mission dated July 2011 and submitted to the Human Rights Council of the United Nations General Assembly, drew attention to the activities of nationalist political parties that aim to stir up tensions among the communities and to the reluctance of the authorities to persecute the perpetrators of incidents of violence and damage. The report cited as a case in point the rally organized in 2011 by the supporters of the far right Ataka party outside the Banya Bashi Mosque in Sofia during which members of the Muslim community as well as some of the protestors were injured.<sup>16</sup>

I have so far examined the origins of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and briefly sketched the milestones in the evolution of its status and rights throughout different time periods and political regimes. I have also touched upon the current situation in

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<sup>15</sup> See

<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dld=204270#wrapper> (accessed 24.09.2013).

<sup>16</sup> See pp. 15-16 at

[http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-19-56-Add2\\_en.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-19-56-Add2_en.pdf) (accessed 24.09.2013).

Bulgaria with regard to the overall context of minority rights and fundamental freedoms and to the state of the Turkish minority in particular. Now I may probe into the homeland conceptualization among ethnic Turks in Bulgaria by way of analyzing the interviews conducted with selected members of the community.

#### **4.2 Turkish Community in Bulgaria and the Idea of Homeland**

This part will be based mainly on the narrative analysis of the open-ended and in-depth interviews with and the life histories of twelve members of the Turkish community in Bulgaria representing differences mainly of age, profession, level of education and place of habitation. The interviews were conducted in the cities of Varna, Shumen, Omurtag and Provadia. The group of interviewees included representatives of community organizations, (retired) public and private sector employees, university students, one housewife, one peasant, one academician and one imam. Most of the interviewees were city-dwellers some of whom had been born in villages. Even though revised prior to the interviews and on the spot, when a revision was called for in order to accommodate differences in interviewee profiles and context, the interview questions can broadly be grouped under three categories in accordance with the three-layered model of territoriality.<sup>17</sup>

The set of questions pertaining to the cultural aspect of the idea of homeland inquires into one's traditional and natural attachment to their immediate locality. The idea here is to delineate the conditions of the natural and day-to-day perpetuation of a person's embeddedness in their environment with a further aim to understand the differences between the territorial relations implicated in this familiar environment and those subsumed in wider and more distant forms of geopolitical organization and linkages. This set includes questions on birth place, personal history of migration (domestic or international), intention to migrate, attachment to land (emotional, professional, or instrumental), association with hometown and current place of

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<sup>17</sup> The Turkish version of the interview questions can be found in Appendix A.

residence, homeland ties of ancestors and descendants, preferred place for burial, meanings attached to the concept of hometown/homeland.

The second set of questions focuses on the national scale. It aims to probe into the respondents' ties with their country of residence and with wider society. Here, the questions are designed to reveal the instrumental aspects of territorial attachment, and to establish the link between the local manifestations of territoriality addressed by the first set of questions and the political-ideological projection of the idea of homeland on a larger (national) scale. The emphasis is on the relationship between the state and the individual in its organizational, political, and ideological dimensions and on the nature of the exchange between the state and the individual of the latter's loyalty for the former's material resources. This part includes questions on citizenship, political representation and voting behaviour, access to public services, civic participation and community relations, education and employment opportunities, (physical) security, extended family ties and international migratory experience/behaviour of family members, issues of alienation and discrimination.

The third set of questions revolves around the normative implications of territorial identification. The questions in this part problematize the transnational and so-called "deterritorialized" forms of territoriality which transcend the immediate cultural and material manifestations. At the center of the analysis are political, social, cultural and economic linkages of the interviewees to Turkey and other countries, and to transnational formations and networks. The themes include issues of dual citizenship, distant voting, cross-border family ties, cross-border visits and dwelling, membership in transnational organizations and participation in transnational activities, the use of deterritorialized means of communication such as satellite TVs and the Internet, the changing practices of territoriality and their impact on the sense of the interviewees' normative belonging, territorial identification and homeland conceptualization, and finally transnational norm transfer and agenda building.

The interviews were conducted in the Turkish language in June 2011. All the interview excerpts used in this chapter are translated into English by the author. The names of all the interviewees are replaced by pseudonyms in order to protect their

confidentiality. Now I will discuss my findings from the interviews on the basis of each set of questions that corresponds to a different conception of territoriality and homeland.

#### **4.2.1 Cultural Conception of the Idea of Homeland and the Case of Bulgarian-Turks**

The idea of homeland is a particularly elusive concept. Accordingly, defining and problematizing it are profoundly context-bound acts. This may hold true for many abstract categories and analytical concepts in social sciences. However, the idea of homeland may be highlighted for its wide-range of connotations as well as manifestations at many levels of human existence and activity including the psychological, the sociological, the political, and the international. Therefore, in interpreting interview data, the researcher should be alert to the difficulties associated with differentiating the levels of analysis in any particular articulation of the idea of homeland. While taking these restraints into account, it is nevertheless possible to discuss in a theoretically informed fashion the possible interconnections between these various levels.

The starting point of such a scholarly exercise should not be any presumption about the validity of a certain argument on territoriality, nor should the ultimate goal be to prove the general applicability to these cases of one specific theoretical approach towards territorial identification. Rather, this study seeks to capture the diversity of human condition, experiences and perceptions regarding the phenomena of territoriality and homeland in different contexts. In this way, we may be able to question, in an unconditioned manner, whether there are certain patterns and commonalities the exposition of which could add to our existing knowledge on these phenomena.

In an effort to discern the peculiarities of the cultural conception of territoriality vis-à-vis the two other conceptions, I will base my analysis on four parameters:

- 1) existence of habitual, individualized, day-to-day activities and relationships pertaining to one's native land or immediate locality that perpetuate personal attachment to the latter;
- 2) lack of (or minimal interference by) an ideological intermediary, such as a leadership, a political movement or party, the state or the international system, predominating the process of the construction of the idea of homeland;
- 3) perception of homeland as a life-sustaining bond between one's past and future, bearer of meaning and coherence, and provider of genealogical continuity and integrity;
- 4) functioning of territorial identification as an organizing principle of one's moral and material life.

The above-mentioned criteria are neither definitive nor easily quantifiable. However, they may provide me with a framework within which I can organize distinctive aspects of the cultural conception of territorial identification. The overlapping of these parameters with the parameters that will be employed to analyze the other two conceptualizations seems natural in some respects. Because we, as human beings, experience territoriality at all these three layers simultaneously, though in varying degrees and forms depending on multiple factors including age, level of education, profession, life-style, social status, personal history, and political ideology. As such, we do not always question or fully comprehend particular forms of our own territorially implicated ideas, actions and interactions.

In other words, this analysis is inevitably bound by the limitations of not only the researcher's but also the interviewees' educational and intellectual backgrounds and by their language abilities in formulating complex ideas and real-life situations, and differentiating between nuanced cognitive processes and notions. The cultural and linguistic barriers between the researcher and the participants as well as among the participants and the degree of their awareness of these barriers also come into play,

compromising at times the eligibility of conceptual tools chosen and parameters defined, and impairing the precision of the researcher's assessments.

One major difficulty stemming from these complexities manifests itself in the formulation of the idea of homeland in the Turkish language. In Turkish, there are two words to denote homeland: "*vatan*" and "*ana vatan*". Even though the latter derives from the former and both are used interchangeably most of the time, the distinction between them has become of some relevance within the context of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria since a few of the interviewees referred to Turkey as their *ana vatan* while endorsing Bulgaria as their *vatan*. *Güncel Türkçe Sözlük* (Dictionary of Contemporary Turkish), which is the official dictionary of the Turkish language published by the Turkish Language Association, defines *vatan* by its synonym "*yurt*", which in turn means primarily "a piece of land on which a people lives and forms its culture."<sup>18</sup> *Ana vatan*, or *ana yurt*, on the other hand signifies "the place that was initially adopted as *yurt*."<sup>19</sup> Therefore, we may say that *vatan* corresponds primarily to (lived) homeland and *ana vatan* to the land of origin, ancestral land or mother country. In addition to these concepts, there is another term that also denotes homeland in various contexts: "*memleket*". In its first meaning, the term denotes "country" or the "totality of lands under the sovereignty of a state". Its second meaning is "the place, town or *yurt* where a person was born and raised."<sup>20</sup> However, I should note that, in daily language, *memleket* is also used to refer to the place where a person's family originates from, not necessarily one's own birthplace.

In its second meaning, the term *memleket* is closer in scope to the cultural conception of the idea of homeland as it has the potential to encapsulate the four parameters enlisted above. It expresses a less ideologically loaded and more directly effectuated

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<sup>18</sup> translated by the author from  
[http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com\\_gts&arama=gts&guid=TDK.GTS.5270d04db40681.53085392](http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_gts&arama=gts&guid=TDK.GTS.5270d04db40681.53085392) (accessed 30.10.2013).

<sup>19</sup> translated by the author from  
[http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com\\_gts&arama=gts&guid=TDK.GTS.5270d3e380b3c5.41749516](http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_gts&arama=gts&guid=TDK.GTS.5270d3e380b3c5.41749516) (accessed 30.10.2013).

<sup>20</sup> translated by the author from  
[http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com\\_gts&arama=gts&guid=TDK.GTS.5270d3f28d4b04.64815152](http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_gts&arama=gts&guid=TDK.GTS.5270d3f28d4b04.64815152) (accessed 30.10.2013).

form of territoriality and homeland. In this regard, almost all of the middle-aged and elderly interviewees mentioned the term *memleket* in the sense of both the country they lived in and the specific place/town where they were born and/or where their extended family came from. The other four interviewees were students (three of them were interviewed in Varna, one in Shumen) who were in their early 20s at the time of the interviews. They never referred to the country they lived in or their birthplace as *memleket*. This may partly be explained by the fact that *memleket* is rather an old-fashioned word that may not find a place in the younger generation's daily vocabulary, especially given that the proficiency of three of the interviewed students in Turkish was meager.

However, neither of the students mentioned any emotional or organic tie to their birthplaces or hometowns just because they or their family members were born there. Despite their occasional visits to these places in order to see their parents and/or close relatives, the territorial ties of the younger generation to the specific places where they had actually lived or preferred to live and study seemed to be based rather on the notion of familiarity. They did not express any attachment to specific places on the grounds of their family history, ancestral ties, pastoral life-style, or active involvement in land-based activities. Rather, they found it more secure and preferable to live in the locality the ways, life-styles, habits, and inhabitants of which they deem familiar. In one example, this may be the place where they spent most of their lives, in another, this may be the one where they studied and made friends. Nevertheless, this feeling of familiarity is not fixed once and for all. Even though all of them stated that after graduation they might prefer to stay on in the places where they had familiarized themselves most, they also added that their culturally defined territorial allegiance might be directed towards another place if they had the chance to spend ample time to get used to the cultural and social ways of the new locality as well. In the case of the younger generation respondents, nativity seems to be produced and reproduced by the exigencies of their educational and professional lives as well as the social and economic complexities presented by an urban life-style, which is in stark contrast to traditional nativity-producing structures such as the repetitive daily and seasonal rituals of a land-bound pastoral life. However, this does

not invalidate by itself the cultural elements in younger generation's definition of and association with their localities.

In order to exemplify the above-mentioned points, I may refer to the replies of Meryem, a university student in Varna who was then 21 years old. She stated that she chose to seek her bachelor's degree in Varna because it was close to her hometown, Provadia, which she and her family had left after Meryem finished seventh grade. She also mentioned that Varna was a big and nice city and she thought she could improve her foreign languages, Spanish and English, in the university she attended in Varna. In these very reasons we can detect the traces of a culturally defined territoriality that rests on a combination of familiarity, personal linkages, and social and educational advantages offered by a cosmopolitan urban life.

Leyla, another university student in Varna, aged 23 at the time, regarded Turkey as her homeland since she and her family had left Bulgaria when she was one year old and she had lived in İstanbul until she returned to Bulgaria for her university education. When asked why she had preferred Varna for studying, she mentioned that she was from the region. She used to visit Varna when she was a child and was therefore familiar with the city. Moreover, she liked the academic program in her department. Here we also see a conjunction of familiarity and opportunity. However, the cultural aspects of Leyla's territorial attachment to Varna as both her birthplace and her current place of residence did not suffice for her to call Varna her *hometown*, nor did Bulgaria qualify as her *homeland*. The reason for this was what she formulated as "life-style", meaning the cultural codes and social habits that characterize a given place. She said that she failed most of the time to socialize with the ethnic Bulgarians because of her poor Bulgarian and that the majority of her friends were from among the returnees from Turkey as they shared common problems. On the other hand, she claimed that she could not relate to the ethnic Turks born and raised in Bulgaria because of their different life-styles and cultural codes; she particularly mentioned more liberal gender relations in Bulgaria as one of the main reasons for her feelings of cultural alienation. In Leyla's view, the distinguishing feature of her homeland was the feeling of affinity stemming naturally

from the fact that she grew up in Turkey and socialized into its peculiar cultural and habitual patterns.

I should also note that Leyla put special emphasis on İstanbul as her self-identified native city. However, this feeling of nativity did not stem simply from the familiarity factor regarding the conditions of her upbringing and socialization; it was also reinforced by the perceived opportunity structures offered by such a metropolitan city as İstanbul. As she put it in her own words, “Turkey is a completely different country, very different, from its food industry to transportation. It is much more developed. It offers better opportunities, particularly İstanbul. I am glad I live in İstanbul. It is a metropolitan city; it has everything inside. The economy is also good. When you compare it to the salaries here, Turkey [’s economy] is at a completely different level.” When asked whether cultural affinity or material opportunities attracted her more to Turkey, Leyla answered “both”.

Therefore, in Leyla’s example the idea of homeland is not solely about connecting with one’s past and securing one’s present existence, but also about building one’s future. This makes homeland attachment not only a matter of historically conditioned continuity, but also a matter of comparison and preference. The idea of “choosing” between possible homelands may seem to be unusual for older generations since many may perceive the idea of homeland as a “natural condition” of human existence, and their tie to a specific homeland as given and fixed. Of course, this is not to claim that people have come to a point in history where they pick and choose specific places over others just by looking at their “pros and cons” on paper. People make preferences, but not in a social, political or historical vacuum. Nevertheless, we may safely assume that the scale and scope of human mobility and the accompanying shift from a belief in fixed allegiances to a single territory to at least the possibility of multiple and complex territorial identifications might have well brought the *individual* with his wilful deeds into the picture, challenging the traditional assumptions about the automaticity and authenticity of territoriality in general and the idea of homeland in particular. At this point, it is legitimate to ask whether homeland attachment is becoming more of an individually constructed notion than a

collectively defined identification. Before I dwell on this question, I should first juxtapose my observations regarding the responses of the elderly interviewees with my findings above.

I have mentioned that the statements of the younger respondents converged on two key factors: familiarity and opportunity. When I evaluated the responses of the rest of the group, two notions came to the fore: the ideas of continuity and mooring. In the case of the elderly respondents, I saw that notions denoting permanence were recurrent themes; their homeland and hometowns ensured genealogical continuity and served as moral anchors even if they were physically separated from these places. They tended to attach special meaning to these places not simply because they had been born, raised and spent their life there becoming familiarized with the customs and practices specific to these places. Even though they very much cherished their personal memories and their daily habits and rituals inherited from past years, the idea of homeland represented a higher value than being a mere locus of daily activity and personal affinity; it transcended the temporality of the quotidian and the personal, and embodied their collective history and identity. Therefore, even when they had to leave their homeland or hometown, the idea of the native land helped them preserve the feeling of permanence and integrity. In this regard, it functioned as the organizing principle of their moral life, if not always the material one.

While doing my field research, I could best observe these feelings of continuity and permanence concretized in the idea of homeland in Mehmet's responses. Mehmet, who was born in Bulgaria in 1944, spent many years in Moscow, Germany, France and Turkey. He now served as the founding secretary of a Turkish cultural association and the chair of a Turkish reading house in Varna. Mehmet stated the reason why he decided to return to Bulgaria with his family to be his fear that his children would eventually lose connection with their *memleket*, their roots and their extended family in Bulgaria. That is why he had taught them Turkish, Bulgarian and the history of Bulgaria while abroad. "Regarding the issue of homeland, family ties are crucial. Should there be nobody left from your extended family in your

homeland, then this feeling [of homeland] wears off,” he said. “When I was a kid, my father would not let us speak any other language than our mother tongue in our home. He would not mind whatever language we spoke outside... Since the use of Turkish was banned back then, we would secretly listen to Turkish radios [from Turkey and Greece]... My mother would pray five times a day and my father would take us to our relatives in the village... Our feudal ties were strong. That is why we feel ourselves morally among our extended family wherever we are... I am working within the society. The idea that I am doing something useful and that I have a mission is a source of great happiness... I do not know if my father did this on purpose or out of obstinacy, but he laid the foundations [of my life afterwards]; he taught me the Turkish language and literature, Turkish radios and our religion. The other developments have rested on this foundation,” he added.

In a similar vein, Hatice, the manager of two cultural associations in Shumen, defined her homeland as the place where she was born, grew up and itinerated: “Many of our friends and family members who migrated to Turkey tell us that they like Turkey, but that their hearts remained in Bulgaria. You love the place where you opened your eyes to the world... Our people lived up until their 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s under certain conditions and laws, [they have been involved in a certain set of] human relations and ways of thinking. All of a sudden you change the state and the system. Despite the fact that we are also Turks, our mentality and philosophy of life are different. The immigrants to Turkey have experienced these differences more or less... Human relations are different. Our habits in the communist period were different. Work routines were different. Everything was so different to them. Ideally, people should not migrate, they should stay in their birthplaces... If we opened our eyes to this world here, if our ancestors shed their blood here, if our grandparents, our mother and father were buried here, I think we should stay here... I cannot call *memleket* the places where I have not been to.” But she also alluded to her life as an exception as she said, “[w]ell, do not ask me about this issue. I travel a lot. The whole world is my *memleket*. I visit a lot of places; the Turks are all over the world.” While interviewing Hatice, I also observed that she placed great emphasis on Turkishness as a higher value than other transient personal-political principles,

allegiances, events or contextual transformations. According to her, politics and partizanship were transient whereas Turkishness was persistent. When asked about Bulgarian nationalism and the rise of Ataka, the Bulgarian far right party, she asserted that she was not afraid of the attacks of Ataka because “the most they could possibly do is to kill people and one cannot kill an ideology, a culture by killing people. Turkishness has endured through time and will do so in the future.”

The collective and moral understanding of territoriality exemplified above seems to be in contradiction with the more individualized and opportunistic definitions of the younger interviewees. However, we should take into account two things here, one being a general condition and the other being specific to the Bulgarian case. Firstly, younger people may naturally tend to place more emphasis on material conditions because they still have ahead of them the tough task to organize their lives in the midst of future ambiguities, particularly in a country undergoing severe economic difficulties. As they grow older and thrive in life in later years they may develop a deeper interest in past linkages and collective memories, and may wish to make sense of the world and their own life through the lenses of immaterial values. At that point, collective identities and the living image of specific places as well as the values these places represent might serve as the moral moorings for a later stage of life. As a result, younger people may end up in their older ages having deviated from a pragmatic stance towards a more morally grounded perspective. In other words, they may go through what Anthony Smith calls the process of the “territorialization of memory” by which they will associate their early life memories with specific places they have lived in and thus build strong attachments to these places by way of the values, symbols and traditions that the latter represent (Smith 2003: 165).

Secondly, within the framework of this research, the difference between the attitudes of the younger and those of the older generation respondents might also be attributed to the fact that the elder interviewees had to go through the repressive and assimilationist policies implemented in the later stages of the communist rule as well as through the turmoil of the early 1990s. It may legitimately be expected that they

have become more politicized in the process as being a generation that witnessed one of the biggest transitions in the country's history.

Due to these two intervening factors, we should not make precipitous assessments overestimating the impact of the increasingly mobilized and globalized social spaces on the territorial perceptions of the new generation in this particular case. We are bombarded every day with trite discourses and images that reiterate consciously or unconsciously the commonsense conviction that territoriality is losing its meaning and relevance. Consequently, younger generations are becoming more and more ideologically conditioned to think that collective spaces are becoming more fluid and unbounded as is the individual realm of each human being. However, Leyla's account as a person who has been an immigrant twice in her short life shows us that adaptation to a new place entails dealing with linguistic, cultural and psychological barriers that condition a person's social relations and status, and are not always easy to surmount. Therefore, the prevalence of immediate cultural ties to territories have become neither unsubstantiated nor obsolete, though they are now increasingly mitigated or remoulded by the interventions of ideological intermediaries that sometimes take globalism and its effects for granted as well as by the complexities of urban life.

I have discussed in the first chapter Steven Grosby's notion of territory defined as life-sustaining, both biologically by providing the necessary physical nutrients, and symbolically by providing the locus for the memories and psychic patterns that help us order our lives (Grosby 1995: 158). I built the cultural conception of territoriality basically on this definition. As such, it may be argued that the biological aspect of territory as life-giving and life-determining becomes irrelevant as people are increasingly estranged from agricultural, pastoral life. Among the interviewees the only example that could be highlighted to be the epitome of the culturally defined territoriality in both its biological and symbolic forms was the case of Ayşe. Ayşe was a 55 year-old villager who had never left her village except for short periods of time. She sustained her living on agriculture. Despite the fact that all her children and grandchildren and many of her relatives had moved to towns and cities and her

husband died ten years earlier, she insisted on staying in her birthplace. When asked why she did not move to the city with her children, she remarked, “Old age is different than being young. The young should mingle among themselves and live their youth. I had an operation once and had to stay in the city [Omurtag]. I did not want to stay on after one week. I thought I would get better in my home. I felt comfortable again when I came back home. I was born here. I grew up here. This is my homeland. I am not used to staying idle. When I go elsewhere, I miss it here; the animals, fields. I always wish to be around and work. [When asked about life in big cities] I have been to Sofia. I cannot live there. The best place is the one you have got used to.”

There was an interesting discrepancy between Ayşe’s account of her territorial linkages and that of Mustafa’s who belonged to a much older generation. Mustafa was 90 years old at the time of the interview and had spent his life in different places throughout Bulgaria because of his educational and professional careers as well as his official duties while he was a member of the then Bulgarian Communist Party. When asked whether he had a longing for or any intentions to return to his hometown, he replied, “To grow onions? [Laughing]... We had a house in Novi Pazar, my hometown. My brother died and the house was sold. We have nothing there. I do not even know whether there are still relatives living there. Most of my family members are in Turkey. I visited them... I did not live among them [the relatives] for a long time. I have worked here and there. I have always been an immigrant. I was seeking a job. I was looking for a means of living. [That is why] I do not know them [the relatives].”

This contradiction between the accounts of the two elderly people may suggest that the assumed link between the increasing human mobility of the present era and the erosion of the cultural ties to native territories may also be affected, alongside generational differences, by such factors as upbringing, conditions of working life, ideological inclinations and the life-style that ensues from these factors. Mustafa was ideologically motivated to think that he had a mission, as a party member, to reach out to less developed areas and contribute to their advancement within the

framework of the party principles. This brought about a mobile life-style which was rare among his generation. Such a trajectory of life inevitably changed his conception of territoriality and rootedness. Consequently, his understanding of homeland attachment became quite personal: "People say that our ancestral homeland (*ana vatan*) is Turkey. If I had moved to Turkey, it would have taken some time before I could call Turkey my homeland. First I should have learned and endorsed its conditions and ways of life. Only then a place becomes your homeland. The issue of homeland is a personal matter. It falls upon the individual to decide where their homeland is."

These remarks may prompt us to think that the internalization of collective identities including territorial identification and the ways we act upon these identities are more likely to be determined on an individualized basis particularly when the person in question has been socialized into a mobile life and multicultural social settings for a sufficient period of time in conformity with such factors as their level of education, degree of urbanization, of political consciousness and ideological motivation or imperatives of working life. We may not have enough evidence to assume a direct causal link between the individualization of once collectively defined, culturally reproduced and locally standardized relations of territoriality on the one hand, and the increasing complexity of social relations and the multiplicity and availability of alternative cultural orders facilitated by such processes as urbanization, transnationalization and globalization on the other hand. Nevertheless, it may be claimed that even the mere idea of the possibility of uplifting one's territorial restraints when desired so and the increasing recognition of situations of multiculturalism, hybridity, translocality and multi-sitedness as the natural order of things seem to increase the actorness potential of individual human beings with regard to their decisions about how they experience and define specific places and territorial units that they physically and symbolically relate to.

On the basis of these interviewee accounts including those not quoted here, I may claim the following points regarding the four parameters put forward earlier:

1. Habitual, day-to-day, locally defined and standardized activities and relationships that perpetuate personal attachment to one's birthplace or self-identified native land are still observable in present-day urban life. However, culturally produced ties to a specific territory stemming from traditional land-based economic and social activities seem to produce more organic and static territorial relations when compared to those ties in urbanized areas where economic, professional and educational considerations and activities become primary constituents of cultural habits, identities and interactions, generating more versatile and contextual forms of territorial engagement.
2. The influence of an ideological intermediary in the construction of the idea of homeland was more prominent among younger, urbanized and educated interviewees. They were attracted to a greater extent to the idea of a globalized world without barriers where people should pursue their individual well-being and economic interests as opposed to a world where people are tied down to specific places because of the traditional system of land-based subsistence and feudal allegiances to family and community.
3. Generational differences seem to play a bigger part when it comes to the perception of homeland as a locus of meaning and coherence and a link between past and future that guarantees genealogical continuity and collective integrity. The conception of homeland as an abstract higher value that helps satisfy basic human needs for permanence and stability was more common among elderly respondents whereas younger ones emphasized familiarity and opportunity when defining their ties to specific places. However, these findings may not overall testify to a paradigm shift or the emergence of a new form of territoriality without immediate cultural connotations. Because what may seem in the first analysis to be a consistent, lasting and all-encompassing perceptual evolution through generations may in fact signify coincidental discrepancies associated with diversified personal histories of members of the sample group, or may actually arise from the changes in later stages of life in human psychology which incline people towards a more stable, past-oriented, and morally and physically moored life-style. Alternatively, generational

differences may also stem from certain traumas or large-scale transformations that may strongly affect one generation while not even being evident to another. Therefore, in order to argue for a constant and coherent perceptual transformation away from culturally and collectively defined territorial engagements towards individualistically and instrumentally conditioned forms of territoriality, further research needs to be done on forthcoming generations.

4. Territorial attachment or the idea of homeland in particular, may serve as the organizing principle of moral and material life most notably for people who regard territorial identification as an exposition of their collective identity. The presence of sentiments of responsibility towards a collectivity (be it an extended family, the indigenous population of a locality, an ethnic group, or a nation) and of a perceived mission to assure the latter's continuity and integrity may be concretized in the idea of a home country or native land. This may strengthen the understanding of territoriality as a life-ordering ideal which shapes a person's choices in moral and material realms. This situation manifested itself particularly among the interviewees who had seen the times when their collective identities had been suppressed and who therefore chose to be active in community life through local and cultural organizations that aim to consolidate their collective identities. However, for those interviewees not old or ideologically motivated enough to attach a particular significance to collective identities and mores, the three-way link between territorial identification, collective identities and individual preferences in moral and material dilemmas are rather weak.

#### **4.2.2 Instrumental Conception of the Idea of Homeland and the Case of Bulgarian-Turks**

In this section my basic goal is to probe into the ties of the interviewees with a larger territorial unit (i.e., national state or country of residence) which is instrumental through its laws, institutions and other tools of governance in providing the basic

functions and services for the maintenance of a population's (and hence an individual's) political, economic and social existence and well-being. In other words, I will attempt to detect the instances of instrumental conceptualization of territorial attachment among the interviewee group, and to establish the link between the cultural-local manifestations of territoriality addressed by the previous section and the political-ideological projection of the idea of homeland on a larger (national) scale. My analysis under this heading will be based on four parameters:

- 1) presence of active citizenship ties with the homeland: political ties (political participation and voting, lobbying), legal ties (formal citizenship, civic rights and duties), economic ties (relations of production, distribution and consumption, money transfers and remittances), bureaucratic and military dealings (provision of public services, opportunity- and security-generating structures), and ideological bonds (national education, mass media, cultural exchanges, nationalistic mobilization, religious ties and activities);
- 2) interference of ideological intermediaries, such as the state, or any other political organization or leadership, in the process of the construction and perception of the idea of homeland;
- 3) an emphasis on a political-materialist perspective on homeland identification;
- 4) presence of the idea of a collective existence (mutually shared past memories and future goals) embodied in the image of a secure and concrete homeland.

Active citizenship ties are an important indicator of the instrumentalist conception of homeland. The state engenders popular loyalty and legitimacy through its mechanisms devised to deliver its basic promises of security and welfare and to integrate its citizens into its structures of governance. Homeland as one's country of nationality and/or settlement signifies a territory larger in scale than a hometown or birthplace. Therefore, the cultural, organic and immediate quality of locally defined territorial relationships may not be as visible or strong in large-scale territorial units as in smaller-scale places. However, I have stated in the first chapter while

discussing space-place relationship that large-scale abstract spatial units may also turn into familiar *places* with a profound bearing on people's everyday lives. As previously cited from Peter J. Taylor, the modern nation-state is the product of a process of conversion of spaces into places. Though it is imagined, sovereign territory of the state has been merged with the sacred homeland, making its initially imposed boundaries familiar and embedded in society. Along this cumulative process of filling the container, sovereign territory of the state is continually perpetuated in routine, everyday behaviour of its inhabitants and itself generates concrete effects on the reproduction of material life (Taylor 1999: 14).

When I evaluated the interviews in terms of the respondents' active citizenship ties, I came across mainly three problematic issues that seemed to have undermined in the recent period the loyalties of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria to the Bulgarian state:

- Assimilationist campaign of the communist regime in the 1980s that culminated in the forced mass emigration of ethnic Turks to Turkey in 1989;
- Economic problems that have been poorly addressed by the post-communist Bulgarian state and have led to increased irregular economic migration to Turkey and various European states;
- Instances of overt and covert discrimination that Turkish minority is subjected to in their professional, civil and personal dealings.

These three intertwined developments that have marked the political and economic transition of Bulgaria in the last three decades seem to have shaped the attitudes of the members of the Turkish minority towards the Bulgarian state and the idea of homeland it represents. For the interviewees who had witnessed the unfortunate events of the 1980s and even before, the Bulgarian homeland became a rather insecure place both physically and in terms of rights and freedoms. This insecurity has obviously eroded their civic attachment to the Bulgarian state and placed Turkey in the position of a "reserve homeland" that can be looked to in times of hardship. However, this feeling of insecurity does not seem to translate into a severance of emotional ties with their Bulgarian homeland. The interviewees distinguished between the policies of the government that targeted their basic rights and freedoms

at the time and the Bulgarian society that, according to them, never approved those policies. Therefore, despite the fact that they were deprived of their civic rights and basic freedoms for a period of time and that most of them had family members, friends and relatives who had to be physically separated (deported) from their native country, the resentment of the interviewees was directed neither towards their home country nor towards their fellow citizens of different ethnic backgrounds.

While the political turmoil of the 1980s unsettled both the material and the cultural status of the Turkish minority, the economic distress of the transition period has particularly hit the ethnic Turks who have lower levels of education and are concentrated as a work force mainly in the field of agriculture. While the memories of political and cultural suppression and forced migration occupied a significant place in the minds of the elderly interviewees, economic concerns and the problem of unemployment seemed to strike the old and the young alike. The inability of the Bulgarian state to provide the expected welfare standards for its citizens seems to be the biggest obstacle on the part of the disadvantaged groups to recovering their active citizenship bonds that have already been worn out by the preceding political dislocation. None of the respondents expressed any negative opinion about economic emigration or about people who intended to leave, or had already left their homeland for economic reasons. No matter how much they valued Bulgaria as their homeland and how difficult, as they acknowledged, it was to leave the homeland for an unfamiliar place, almost all of the respondents mentioned that the issue of economic survival was a game changer.

In the previous section, one of the respondents, Hatice, was quoted to say that people should not be put in a position to leave their native land. Yet, she also mentioned that her children moved to Germany to find better jobs. She said that she did not interfere with their decision since being unemployed was a real ordeal for them. According to her, young people are more concerned about finding a job and paying their bills than about nationalistic feelings or the preservation of their ethnic ties (“their Turkishness”). In line with Hatice’s observation, all of the younger interviewees also declared that they would not hesitate to move to another country (preferably a

Western European country) in order to find a better job or better educational opportunities.

Another respondent, Havva, who taught at the Department of Turkish Studies and Literature at the Konstantin Preslavsky University of Shumen, underlined an important shift in particularly the younger population's perception of the state. She states, "Previously, students used to have expectations from the state. Over time the state has stopped being an umbrella. They now say, 'I have to find a job.' They hear from their parents that it was better back then [during the communist rule]. At least, people did not have health, education, or unemployment problems. When you left your job, the state had to find another one for you. Students now wish to have these [advantages]. But they prefer the current system in terms of freedoms. They cannot even imagine the times when the state did not let people go abroad." This shift might be an anticipated development given that the liberal democratic transition has brought about a change of mindset regarding the role and duties of the state vis-à-vis its citizens, resulting in an expectation of a more limited state intervention in economic and social matters. However, the responses of the interviewees as well as my informal observations lead me to state that the public mistrust of the state's ability to meet the needs and demands of its citizens was not confined to the economic sphere.

All of the interviewees, young and elderly, expressed their diminishing faith in the problem-solving capacity of politics in general and of the current political parties and leaders in particular. None of the interviewees projected any major political or economic improvements in the near future. Even the two respondents who were actively involved in party politics shared the general skepticism about the transforming power of high politics. Mehmet, taking part in the administration of two cultural organizations, stated that notwithstanding his official capacity in a political party he paid utmost attention to limiting the activities of these two organizations to the field of culture, keeping political issues off their agenda. I asked him whether the participation of members of the Turkish minority in community-specific organizations had made them more conscious and/or active about general and

community-specific problems. His comments were striking in this respect: “Politics should not enter our associations. Politics divide people. It is our culture and language that unite us.” Another interviewee, Hatice, also shared Mehmet’s diligence about not mixing up politics and community work as she asserted her determination to bar political activities and partisanship under the roof of the two associations she was involved in. As may be recalled, I have previously referred to her statement that she valued the notion of Turkishness well above politics and political parties.

The comments quoted above depict a cultural, and not a political, portrayal of collective identity and tend to reduce the notion of community organization to a locally bound realm of activity utilized mainly for cultural reproduction. Such a narrow understanding of community action falls short of an interest-based instrumentalist formulation of group mobilization argued by the modern civil society discourse that rests on active member participation, collective problem-solving, political and civil networking, lobbying and agenda-setting. Even though it may be argued that it is neither necessary nor desirable to allow partisan politics to mingle with the functioning of cultural organizations, it is still noteworthy that none of the respondents, actively mobilized or not, referred to the Turkish community in Bulgaria as a political collectivity.

This observation is even more striking when we take into account the presence of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a minority-based popular party, on the political scene and the weight it carries for the ethnic Turks. Based on the accounts of the interviewees including the ones that declared their active support for the MRF, I may claim that the party was not perceived to be the sole and persistent representative of the minority. Neither were the party chiefs seen as organic community leaders. This situation may pose a remarkable contrast to minority-based political parties in many other countries. In Bulgaria, the MRF appeared to stand as merely another option among several others in parliamentary politics. Apparently, it could not manage to function, though it may be aspiring to do so, as an intervening political layer between the Bulgarian state and the ethnic Turkish society. Rather, the ethnic Turks interviewed seemed to be individually and directly tied to the Bulgarian political

system without the categorical interference or mediation of alternative communal or sub-national structures of representation. And the Turkish community did not seem to have constructed itself as an autonomous political entity with strictly drawn communal boundaries and organic leaders existing in parallel to the state's official representatives and governing structures.

However, this is not to deny the crucial part played by the MRF in recovering the equal citizenship status of minorities, winning back their political and cultural rights and improving the democratic rule in their country. As such, the MRF has certainly provided a legitimate platform for the struggle for basic rights and freedoms and helped remedy the strained relationship of the minorities to the Bulgarian state by building confidence in the possibility of settling domestic conflicts within the existing political system. In this regard, it may be argued that the MRF has functioned as an intermediary, as described in my second parameter, in the process of re-establishing or repairing the political, legal and emotional links between the individual citizens in the minority communities and the Bulgarian state mechanisms. This has in turn reinforced the shaken homeland attachment of both the remaining minority members and the returnees after the mass exodus of 1989. Although there has been instances when party policies have caused disappointment on the part of its voters as well as the general public, the ability of the MRF to channel the demands of the minorities into the legitimate political sphere and its role in the normalization of state-citizen relations have proved to be a safeguard for a distrustful minority population with a still precarious political status.

On the other hand, particularly the elder interviewees stressed that overt and covert instances of discrimination still plagued the relationship between the state and the citizens of non-Bulgarian origin. Interestingly, none of the interviewees expressed any serious concerns about the discriminatory discourse and actions of Ataka. Most of them stated that Ataka did not have a popular footing since many citizens of Bulgarian origin also shunned the party and its extremist policies. Rather than considering nationalist extremism as an imminent danger, the interviewees cited instances of covert discrimination as a more widespread and formidable problem.

According to them, this kind of “structural” discrimination became evident in the bureaucratic inertia regarding the acknowledgement and the resolution of the problems of minority populations, in the reluctance of state authorities to support and participate in the activities of cultural and other minority organizations, in the biased practices of employers in their employment decisions, in the history textbooks that degrade the country’s Ottoman past and disregard certain ethnic groups, and in the prejudices of the general public against the visibility and active participation of minorities in society. Yet, none of the respondents sounded hopeless about the possibility of the elimination of such prejudices in the future. They stressed that it would take some time to overcome the centuries-old image of “the uncivilized, backward and ruthless Turk” nurtured in the minds of the Bulgarians by official Bulgarian history-writing as well as by politicians exploiting such misconceptions for political gain.

I have evaluated the three problematic issue areas that may have constituted a hindrance in the way to the consolidation of the legitimacy and authority of the Bulgarian state in the eyes of its citizens, both Bulgarian and non-Bulgarian. These problems have impinged upon the physical security, the political and cultural status, and the socio-economic development of the minority populations in Bulgaria. They have also adversely affected the domestic peace and the economic well-being of the entire population since both the political and economic migration of such high numbers of people from different professions have drained the country of a significant part of its human capital functioning both as a work force in manual jobs and as an intellectual asset. This has in turn stirred up reaction among the general population causing the eventual downfall of the old regime. Therefore, despite the current economic difficulties facing the Bulgarian state and society, the establishment of a multi-party regime aspiring to reinstate the minority rights including the gradual abolishment of restrictions on cross-border movements and exchanges and the granting of dual citizenship rights to emigrants and returnees has enabled the reconstruction in the minds of the victimized groups of the idea of Bulgaria as a genuine homeland that is now much more pluralistic and inclusive.

The inclusion, though with some difficulty, of the MRF into this burgeoning multi-party democracy and the amelioration of bilateral relations between Turkey and Bulgaria have saved the Turkish community from making a forced choice between these two countries as their ultimate homeland. The relatively constructive approach adopted by both countries to common problems has not only relieved the suspicions of the Turkish community regarding their reintegration into the Bulgarian state and society, but also moderated the effects of the economic hardships undergone by the ethnic Turks as they could go back and forth across the border in order to survive economically. While the latter situation has helped ease the economic burden on the shoulders of the Bulgarian government regarding its duty to secure the economic well-being of its population, the confidence that has been built between the two countries has abated the perception of the Turkish minority as the fifth column of Turkey.

However, I should also note that the substantial removal of political, legal and bureaucratic obstacles to active participation in the social and political life of Bulgaria while preserving ethnic differences and the increase in the cultural and social exchanges particularly among the younger members of different ethnic groups in bigger cosmopolitan cities did not seem to have translated into a strong ideological bond to the Bulgarian nation as a whole. The differences of language, religion and culture and the rather exclusivist manifestations of Bulgarian nationalism that reached its peak in the 1980s have obstructed the emergence of a civic form of national attachment that would unify every section of the society including minorities around the idea of a mutually shared nationhood based on common interests and goals. Unlike Pomaks who speak the Bulgarian language and the Roma who are divided along the lines of language, ethnicity and religion, the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria are relatively homogeneous. Despite the existence of sectarian and regional differences, the Turkish community forms a relatively compact collectivity, having a strong sense of Turkish ethnic identity. This situation also hampers the amalgamation of the Turkish community with the rest of the society.

However, it cannot be argued that the existence of such a clear-cut ethnic identification within the Turkish community naturally implies a strong form of Turkish nationalism in the sense of an inextricable association with the Turkish state, or of an irredentist or pan-Turkist agenda that encompasses and appeals to all ethnic Turks in the neighbouring countries and elsewhere. The ethnic Turks in neighbouring areas (and in Turkey) have moved along diverse historical and political paths. Therefore, even though cross-border cultural exchanges are observable at an increasing level, the ethnic Turkish communities abroad cannot qualify as potential political allies in the Bulgarian-Turks' quest for equal opportunities and more liberty and visibility in their home country. On the other hand, as also affirmed by the interviewee accounts, the orientation of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria towards Turkey is not identical for every member of the community. While one part of the community views Turkey as their mother-state, others consider Bulgaria to be their mother-state and Turkey as only a kin state, which could provide them refuge from violence, economic and other crises in Bulgaria (Zhelyazkova cited in CEDIME-SE report entitled *Turks of Bulgaria* 1999: 21).

In sum, neither Bulgarian nationalism or nationhood nor Turkish nationalism in its systematic versions constitutes a cohesion ideology for the majority of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. I have also examined the Turkish community's political mobilization for civic rights and freedoms which has been led mainly by the MRF and concluded that the MRF does not equal an organic and unifying national leadership. Both the community and the party have ruled out local nationalism or any claims for self-rule, autonomy, secession or irredentism. What remains as a possible cohesion ideology is religion.

Baskın Oran, writing about his observations from a study trip taken to Bulgaria in 1992, predicted that religion would come into prominence in the following decade since the fall of communism would leave an ideological vacuum and the advent of capitalism would bring about income disparity and high inflation rates, which would in turn create an inclination towards religion. According to him, the masses had never abandoned religion, and the growing religious interest among the Bulgarians

together with the global rise of religion would add to the factors cited above. Moreover, Oran envisaged that the religious communities both from Turkey and other Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, would attempt to increase their sway over the Muslims in Bulgaria. Nevertheless, Oran also foresaw a wave of secularization in the longer run due mainly to the individualistic character of capitalism and the already limited sphere of influence of the religious establishment in Bulgaria unlike its counterpart in Western Thrace of Greece that enjoyed broader authority in temporal affairs as well (Oran 1992: 124-125).

We may say that Oran's predictions have proved right over the years. It is a fact that the Muslim community in Bulgaria has secured to a large extent its religious autonomy and Islam has become more visible with the opening of new mosques and freely observed religious rituals. Unlike their parents who had grown up under the communist rule that had shunned religion for decades, younger generations are now in a more convenient position to relate to religion as an integral component of their collective identity. Despite alleged efforts of various domestic and international actors to the opposite effect, religion has never become a political cause for the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. Neither could the religious establishment present itself as a superior authority that has the power to shape the aspirations and preferences of the members of the minority in their personal or political life. Religion has largely remained for the majority of the Turkish minority within the limits of the cultural sphere.

The remarks of Bayram, the imam of the only functioning mosque in Provadia, testify to this observation: "Religion is lost here in Provadia. Few people come for the Friday prayer. The number sometimes decreases to 5-6... There were seven mosques in Provadia. Now this is the only one standing. Even if the other ones are opened, they have no community." Even though Bayram stated that the situation was not as disappointing in other areas, I could observe that official religion did not seem to dominate the social life of the interviewees. It is true that most interviewees cited religion as one important pillar of their collective identity. However, with the

exception of Bayram, neither of them defined themselves as devout believers, nor did they declare themselves to be religious activists.

In the light of the above-mentioned points, the following conclusions may be drawn within the framework of the four parameters that define the instrumental conception of territoriality:

1. The Bulgarian state with its democratically evolving bureaucratic machinery and the multi-party system which opened room for the minorities' political representation in the parliament and for the occasional power sharing in government through legitimizing the operation of the MRF and normalizing the relations with the neighbouring kin-state Turkey have made possible the mending of the damaged citizenship ties of the minorities to Bulgaria.
2. While acknowledging the role of the changing political climate and the contributing internal and external actors (such as the liberal governments in Bulgaria, and friendly partners in Turkey and the EU) in the reinvigoration of the homeland attachment of the Turkish minority to Bulgaria, neither any domestic or international organization, any state or state institution nor any political party, movement or leadership can be regarded as monopolizing the individual or collective will of the minority populations to define their own relationship or allegiance to a certain territorial unit or political entity. As the minority members have exercised their citizenship rights as autonomous individuals, not as dysfunctional parts of a homogeneous conglomerate under the guidance of communal or religious leaders or mentors, these intermediaries have often been compelled to function as enablers rather than arbiters. The occasional attempts of the MRF to assert itself as the sole representative of the minority as a block and to sway the formulation of its needs and demands seem to have proven futile for the most part. Likewise, the efforts of the internal and external religious actors to widen the sphere of influence of official religion and to dominate the social and political functioning of the minority community have produced limited results.

3. The failure of the Bulgarian state to cater to its citizens' economic and social needs and the lingering cases of structural discrimination continue to erode the minority population's emotional and ideological bonding with the state, paving the way for a materialist approach to homeland identification based on political and economic strategies of survival. Disappointment about employment opportunities and the low level of wages have compelled particularly the diasadvantaged groups to resort to internal or external migration, sometimes more than once as in irregular migration, as a means to alleviate their economic plight. This has in turn made their territorial identity and relations volatile and unstable.
4. The fourth parameter is the weakest of all in terms particularly of the Turkish community's perception of a common destiny with fellow citizens. In the absence of a cohesion ideology, or any other structured form of a social cement that could tie the community *en masse* to their home state and native territory, the ethnic Turks seem to lack a widely shared definition of the idea of homeland or a discernible collective formulation of territoriality. They have a common sense of their ethnic identity and are conscious about minority-related issues of rights and freedoms. However, the idea of a common past with unhappy episodes of hardship and forced migration do not seem to have translated into commonly held and clear-cut future goals shared with the rest of the nation or into a feeling of national unity engraved in the image of a secure and inclusive homeland. Their territorial ties seem to be built on an individual-familial and contextual basis and their choices regarding settlement, migration and loyalty to be determined on the grounds of circumstantial factors rather than formed around a resilient and deep-rooted idea of Bulgaria being the sole focus of homeland attachment.

### **4.2.3 Normative Conception of the Idea of Homeland and the Case of Bulgarian-Turks**

My analysis under this heading will proceed through distinguishing between four levels of transnational engagement, each depicting a qualitatively different, if not stronger, form of transnationalism. Here the purpose is to identify norm-generating associations that are not anchored in one specific bounded territory, but go beyond traditional, more immediate forms of nativity:

- 1) blurring of the traditionally assumed territorial association of one's place of birth and/or residence with the notion of homeland (or ancestral land) due to increased and more complex patterns of mobility and migration;
- 2) emergence of new transnational interconnections that cannot be confined to a particular territory or state; individuals becoming simultaneously embedded in more than one society;
- 3) increasing manifestations of diasporism and long-distance nationalism as alternate forms of homeland attachment that denote active mobilization of resources across the borders;
- 4) proliferation of liberal cosmopolitan agendas, goals, and norms at the expense of local, parochial, ethno-nationally defined but presumably transnationally perpetuated identities, interests, and values; an assessment on whether or not the latter (i.e., the normatively particularist and formally transnational) framework has the potential to give way to the former (i.e., the normatively and formally transnational) framework.

Before assessing the interviews on the basis of the above-mentioned parameters, I should underline the fact that the majority of the Turkish community in Bulgaria still live in rural areas and work in agriculture, therefore their levels of education and urbanization are relatively low and their access to modern means of communication and transportation are rather limited. The interviewees I selected were the persons whom I could contact through some international networks or via communication

technologies that may not be available to most members of the rural population. In other words, the interviewees were indeed from such segments of the society that could transcend the restrictive local conditions and could one way or another come into contact with multiple and mixed environments. Still, the transnationalization patterns of the educated and urbanized segments may give us a clue about the rest of the community that has lesser means for translocal and transnational interactions and networking. Unless we are faced with forms of transnational mobility resulting from abrupt and forced deportation of masses, what we call transnationalization pertains mainly, but not exclusively, to the urban and educated strata possessing appropriate economic and technological means to take advantage of the globalized patterns of networking and transborder activity.

The degree of transnationalization of an individual or a community is difficult to measure. It raises questions as to whether we should focus on discourses, on deeds or on deeper identities and interests of individuals or collectivities in our assessment of transnationalization. Is the presence of sporadic connections to more than one territorial unit (or nation-state) sufficient for talking about a process of transnationalization? Or do we need to look for more specific features that should qualify the process such as more durable and substantive connections that have the capacity to transform not only the daily personal and professional habits but also the identities, norms and perceptions of its bearers? Does the mere situatedness of the “transnational subjects” in multiple places amount to a genuinely transnational reconstitution of identities and relations? Or does transnationalism call for a more active involvement in transnational practices and mobilization, and for a profound reorientation towards transnationalism as a consciously held ideological stance?

Each of the four parameters I have identified corresponds to a different dimension in the trajectory of a presumably deepening process of transnationalism. As we are moving away from the nationalist assumption that a person’s, and by extension, a people’s existence is inextricably embedded in a national homeland or an ancestral

territory,<sup>21</sup> we are increasingly becoming aware of the notion that territorial relationships are much more complex and do not lend themselves to such one-dimensional and simplistic definitions. Ruptures in human territorial experience are quite common, invalidating the idea of a natural and organic link between people and a specific place.

In this regard, the experiences of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria in the last decades are a case in point. The mobility of this community across the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey has figured in the form of the mass exodus of 1989 for political reasons, the return migration that followed and the irregular (labour) movements of the later years. This has created a rather unusual situation that challenges the conventional paradigm based on a world order characterized by territorially bound nation-states and their neatly defined boundaries encapsulating a monolithic population with an irrevocable allegiance to their national homeland. In the presence of such high mobility marked by multiple boundary crossings of the community members over a long period of time and in a fashion that is difficult to trace, locating the homeland has become a matter of individual experience rendering any attempt at generalizations faulty.

In her work based on a research carried out among the Bulgarian-Turks living on the two sides of the Turco-Bulgarian border, Ayşe Parla aptly demonstrates the difficulty of classifying the various experiences of individual migrants into sharply defined categories (Parla 2006). She focuses on the life histories and homeland perceptions

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<sup>21</sup> The sweep of nationalist assumptions concerning the inextricable tie between a person/people and the national homeland is not confined to nationalist theories or to discourses of nationalists. Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) argue that scholarly studies in many fields suffer from methodological nationalism, which is the naturalization of the nation-state by social sciences (p. 576). In core disciplines of social theory there has been a tendency to ignore the power and prevalence of the nation state model, to take for granted nationally bounded societies as the natural unit of analysis and to confine the study of social processes to the political and geographic boundaries of a particular nation-state analytically cutting off everything that extends beyond its borders (pp. 577-578). According to Wimmer and Glick Schiller, scholars in migration studies have also been trapped in methodological nationalism despite the fact that the concepts of the modern state and of a national population have historically developed within transborder rather than territorially limited spaces (p. 581). These scholars have portrayed the immigrant as a threat to the orderly functioning of state and society, a foreigner to the community of shared loyalty and shared rights, a challenge to the nation-building project, and a burden on the welfare systems of states. In other words, the immigrant has been viewed as an anomaly that destroys the isomorphism assumed by modern nationalism between people, sovereign, citizenry, nation and group of solidarity (pp. 582-585).

of three migrants from Bulgaria to Turkey, two of whom were forced migrants deported by state authorities in 1989. One of them welcomed his deportation deeming it a reunion with the motherland since he had been an active opponent of the communist regime with a firm loyalty to his Turkish ethnic identity, and had thus been under pressure for most of his life. Despite the hardships and disappointing experiences he went through in Turkey, he never wished to go back endorsing Turkey as his homeland. The second account belongs to a former member of the Bulgarian Communist Party who was similarly compelled to leave Bulgaria in 1989. However, he never regarded his expulsion as a betrayal of his comrades. He nurtured a deep longing for Bulgaria during his stay in Turkey, eventually returning within a short time to his much beloved homeland. The third account is about an immigrant who had voluntarily left Bulgaria in 1989 and eventually moved back upon her husband's retirement after spending twelve years in Turkey. Just like she had found the first migration experience unsettling and painful, and could not overcome the memories of her life in Bulgaria, the second experience also left her divided between the two lands as she left behind her children, neighbours and friends. As we understand from her account, even though she and her husband seemed to have resettled in Bulgaria for good, the fear of another expulsion in the future as well as the unfamiliarity of the current circumstances in Bulgaria inconvenienced her in her new life.

According to Parla, these accounts reveal clearly the tensions and discordant aspects between and within each migration experience which are usually ignored or downplayed both by conventional migration studies that envisages a gradual assimilation of migrants into their new country and society and by nationalist discourses that assume a harmony between the people and the homeland prioritizing the original homeland over the temporary one. The depiction by the Turkish nationalists of the arrival of the immigrants from Bulgaria as a long awaited homecoming, a depiction accompanied by the images of migrants kissing the ground upon arrival, obscures the fact that a territory may be home to one man and exile to another.

The accounts of the ethnic Turks I interviewed revealed a similar diversity in the patterns of territorial experiences and identifications. Some of the interviewees defined Bulgaria as their one and only homeland no matter where they go while others identified Bulgaria as their lived homeland and Turkey as the motherland. As discussed before, the younger interviewees who were born and raised in Bulgaria saw Turkey not so much as the motherland with the associated emotional weight or as a *de facto* protector kin-state with the capacity to mobilize its cultural, political and economic resources to back them when necessary. They rather viewed it as a window of opportunity, as just another option among other economically promising countries, the only difference being a higher level of cultural affinity and familiarity.

However, even for the interviewees who viewed Turkey as a protector motherland, their actual interactions with Turkey were rather limited to occasional visits to family members and relatives living in Turkey; and for the representatives of cultural organizations, these interactions consisted of cross-border cultural and educational activities organized together with their civil society and university counterparts in Turkey. The contacts with the Turkish communities in other Balkan states were even more limited. The existing contacts with the ethnically associated groups abroad were for the most part based on a culturally and narrowly defined conception of transnationalism. In this conception, transnational platforms and tools are utilized for the cultural reproduction of a mutually shared ethnic identity and the strengthening of the groups' domestic status via cross-border alliance-building. At this stage of transnationalism, we cannot yet talk about a simultaneous embeddedness of the Turkish community in multiple societies or the emergence of mutually shared and transnationally effective values, ideas and norms among ethnically related groups that go beyond mere manifestations of ethnic solidarity and cultural exchange.

It is needless to say that the Turkish community in Bulgaria is not free from the effects of global political and cultural trends and transformations. These effects may be marginal in rural or isolated areas where communication technologies might be beyond every-day access or traditional ways of life do not easily allow novelties to take root. Nevertheless, increased mobility and technological facilities such as the

Internet, satellite TVs and smart phones enable the speedy circulation of information and ideas, and local groups are engulfed in this global cobweb one way or another. However, in order for us to talk about the transnationalization of identities and ways of thinking, and not just of daily bits of information and of the media that transmit these bits, we should be observing a deeper and a more widespread transformation of human (community-to-community) and territorial (community-to-territory) relations.

Despite the fact that the interviewees had access to at least one of the above-mentioned means of global connection, only one of them displayed a normatively informed attitude transcending the parochial approach that rests on practicality-oriented and opportunity-seeking interpretations of transnationalism. Being a researcher and writer in geography and folk culture and an Esperanto activist in Omurtag, Ahmet seemed to be well-integrated into translocal and transnational networks. He stated that he exchanged information, ideas, and written materials via the Internet and maintained face-to-face interactions in conferences and seminars with people who worked on similar subjects in Bulgaria and abroad. These interconnections certainly transformed his mindset and his cultural identity now that he had come into contact with many different people and cultures from around the world. He had left Omurtag a few times for educational and employment purposes, but he returned since he had to take care of his ailing parents and his family's financial situation did not allow them to live in bigger cities. But he said he would encourage his son to go wherever he wished so that he could build a better life and learn how to survive by himself. Ahmet repeatedly expressed his belief in a mobile life claiming that mobility brought about openness and progress. In his account, the domestic and international networks built by long- or short-term emigrants to bigger cities and foreign countries helped subsequent migrants find better employment opportunities in these places and provided them with the necessary settings for socialization while away from home. Furthermore, these migrants, when they returned home, contributed to the opening up of the previously self-enclosed society in Omurtag. As a result, younger generations are more self-confident and venturesome in endorsing a mobile life unlike previous generations who were

predominantly agrarian and were tied to the land and bound by family responsibilities.

Ahmet's life story is a good example of the normative transformation that a deeper transnationalization may achieve. Transnational notions and values including mobility, openness, networking, international solidarity, tolerance for differences, co-existence and interdependence found their expression in Ahmet's way of thinking, behaving and working. Other interviewees, on the other hand, basically used communication and transportation technologies to keep in touch with far-away family members and friends, to carry out professional correspondence and to enjoy cultural products of familiar social circles. As such, they are neither interested nor actively involved in the politics or culture of not-so-familiar groups, countries or networks. The respondents who identified themselves with Turkey and claimed to pay frequent visits to the country for personal and cultural exchanges did not express any concern about broader issues concerning the general state of life there. Most respondents declared that they did not regularly follow the political debates or take interest in social matters in Turkey. Nor were they engaged in any form of an institutional and organic relationship with political, economic or social actors in Turkey. In my view, this is mainly because there are hardly any commonly experienced and mutually recognized political, economic, social, or regional issues or causes between the two communities. In the minds of even those who saw Turkey as their original homeland, Turkey seemed to figure as an abstract *idea*, or an "*imagined* homeland" that was devoid of any actual and evolving existence to be deliberately explored and that assumed reality insofar as it in some way became interfused with their lives in their current localities.

The representatives of Turkish cultural associations mentioned their ties with their counterparts in Turkey as well as in other third countries, but their vision and activities did not go beyond the narrow cultural sphere and their aim was mainly confined to the preservation of Turkish language and culture and to awareness-raising about "Turkishness" in their own country and abroad. The emphasis in their cross-border connections and activities was on specific cultural topics such as the

proliferation of Turkish publications, the organization of literature seminars and folkloric shows, and the preservation of religious and cultural customs rather than on broader transnational issue areas that might have common appeal to Turkish communities in other countries with similar causes and problems. These issue areas might include local governance, minority rights, environment, urban development, regional and European integration and the like. In short, when the majority of the interviewees are concerned, we cannot yet talk about a cosmopolitan type of transnationalism taking root in issue areas, norms, agendas or networks.

This paucity of interest in and lack of active mobilization of resources for common agendas and problems across borders show us that the physical and/or emotional decoupling of a population from a single fixed territory does not always amount to a shift from a framework shaped by territorially and normatively particularistic agendas and ethno-nationally defined priorities towards an emphasis on multi-sited and multicultural experiences and cosmopolitan values. Here, we can refer back to Lyons and Mandaville's remarks about the partisan, territorially and ethno-nationally specific versions of transnationalism the examples of which are particularly visible in diaspora and migrant networks (Lyons and Mandaville 2010: 132-133). The interviewee accounts of the members of the Turkish community were in line with the authors' observation that ethnic and diaspora politics to say the least may still be way behind the much upheld ideal of an inclusive, liberal global politics and culture based on a universalist cosmopolitan outlook. Also, the interviewees seemed to be far from realizing "diasporic public spheres" or "virtual neighbourhoods", argued by Appadurai (1996), where ideas, social, linkages, political projects and money are mobilized without the constraining effects of bounded territories.

However, as previously argued, we should refrain from a teleological approach to transnational politics which foresees an evolution towards either ethno-cultural particularism or universalist cosmopolitanism. When we set the bar so high in our effort to define the nature and direction of the transnationalization of ethnic and diaspora communities, we tend to miss a myriad of details that may give us important clues about rather overlooked aspects of transnationalism. In this case, the emphasis

on Turkish culture and Turkishness evident in interviewee accounts does not by itself imply that they suffer from local nationalism or cultural parochialism. The lack in the minds of the interviewees of the concept of a “transnation” encompassing their own ethnic community together with other nationally associated groups worldwide and the scarcity of community-building engagements with other Turkish communities abroad may at first sight appear to be signs of self-enclosedness and localism, hence a deficit in the degree of their transnationalization.

It should be kept in mind that the Turkish community in Bulgaria cannot be classified as a classical diaspora community despite the high level of mobility across the Turco-Bulgarian border in the form of temporary and permanent migration as well as of personal and cultural interconnections. Because it lacks a diasporic identification with a "Turkish transnation" and therefore does not define common problems or envision a common fate with its ethnic kindred beyond the borders, nor does it seek to mobilize its resources for shared political causes in a way to indicate the existence of long-distance nationalism. However, the lack of a diaspora mentality and of the elements of long-distance nationalism may not be regarded as a missing link between the various stages of a deepening process of transnationalism identified at the beginning of this section. From a different angle, it may rather be interpreted as a progressive element as it opens room for values, ideas, norms and methods that are not ethnically defined or culture-specific.

The position of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria which is dissociated both from an official Bulgarian nationalism and from an actively pursued long-distance Turkish nationalism seems to have led to an approach to transnationalism that is basically instrumentally motivated, yet not devoid of a normative content. While assessing the interview responses, I saw examples, though not articulated in a fully fledged manner, of a firm orientation towards modern Western norms and values such as respect for human and minority rights, rule of law, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, gender equality, scientific and social progress, a disciplined public culture and professional ethics. These norms were seen by the interviewees to have an overarching value and to be irreversible. In their view, the material opportunities

offered by a place or a country cannot be fully enjoyed without the provision of such fundamental rights. For instance, some interviewees, when asked about their past experiences in or future intentions to move to Turkey, expressed their concern about the cultural gap between Turkey and Bulgaria, and by extension, between Turkey and Europe. They were particularly worried about the gender inequality and differences in work culture in Turkey. To them Turkey represented a familiar and economically promising option for possible migration decisions, though a less developed one in terms of universal norms and values. European countries on the other hand exhibited a better combination of economic opportunities and normative progress. Even though the EU membership proved to be a disappointment in economic terms, most of the interviewees reiterated their belief in Europe's pioneering position in norm-generation and norm-diffusion.

In the first part of this chapter, I have briefly touched upon the historical backdrop of the Bulgarian nation-building process and its impact on the characteristics of Bulgarian nationalism. Quoting Neuburger (1997, 2004) I have argued that Enlightenment ideas about progress and modernity influenced the Bulgarian national elite to a great extent, resulting in a Bulgarian historiography that rested on a dichotomy of backward Ottoman past and modern European civilization in which the Bulgarian nation's future lay. Peter Sugar's account on how nationalism as a Western European model was transferred to Central and Eastern Europe has been particularly instrumental in reinforcing the perception that Eastern nations, especially the Balkans, have adopted an exclusivist, ethnically defined version of nationalism and could not overcome the so-called historical hatreds among themselves. Sugar bases his argument on the opposition of Western versus non-Western nationalism and attributes this difference to the late arrival of nationalism to Central and Eastern Europe where local conditions transformed the basic notions of nationalism (such as constitution, freedom and republic) and paved the way for more aggressive and chauvenistic forms of the latter. Since the Orthodox world had lived under the Muslim rule for centuries, they were left unaffected by the major political, cultural and religious movements in the West, such as the scientific revolution, Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, and by the political and economic changes

accompanying these movements. Therefore, “the farther the area was from the lands in which nationalism developed, the less its nationalism resembled the original model” (Sugar 1995: 8, also 20).

According to Todorova, the model of the “arrival of nationalism” has been influential in the scholarly efforts to understand the non-Western manifestations of nationalism and the notion of a temporal lag has become central to Eastern European historiographies. This has in turn led to a sense of “backwardness”, a chronic feeling that latecoming nationalisms are less mature and degenerative, and the non-Western world will always lag behind the West. Todorova rejects this “trap of backwardness” based on the general perception of an “organic” Western nationalism exported to and transformed in an alien soil. Instead, she argues that nationalism is a product of modernity and within a *longue durée* framework of modernity Eastern and Western nationalisms can be deemed relatively synchronized (Todorova 2005: 145-150).

However, the feeling of backwardness and resentment about a constant lagging behind an ever advancing European civilization appeared to be quite well-entrenched in the consciousness of the people of Bulgaria as these themes recurred in the responses of the interviewees as well. I have previously introduced Mehmet who had lived in various European countries as well as in Turkey before returning to Bulgaria. In his opinion, the Bulgarian people had the notion of belonging to Europe and this was reinforced by the EU membership of Bulgaria. However, as he put, “A place’s culture is not simply comprised of its folklore or literature; culture rather rests on human relations. Europe has an advanced culture because of good human relations there. People respect each other’s rights... Bulgaria will one day reach the current level of the European states. But then, they will be much ahead of us and we will still be lagging behind.”

The interviewees who had been to other (Western) European countries and those who intended to seek their fortunes there not only underlined the economic welfare of these countries but also emphasized their human rights credentials. “*Ubi bene ibi*

*patria*<sup>22</sup> was the motto used by Ahmet while explaining his understanding of homeland. According to him, the idea of homeland was expanding because there was now freedom of movement. Provided that there was good life in other countries and that there were no restrictions on the international movement of people, then people should feel at home everywhere and no country be foreign. Prospects for a good life apparently involved a good job, a prosperous and comfortable life and respect for everybody's individual liberties and their cultural, religious, ethnic and other differences. To Ahmet, the notions of prosperity, freedom and mobility went hand in hand. It has been frequently argued that we are increasingly observing an association of mobility and progress in the minds of a considerable number of people all around the world, and as we can see from these accounts, at least a portion of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria seemed to be no exception to this transformation. Finally, the remarks of Ramize, Ahmet's wife, on emigration were emblematic of this association: "Some of our relatives emigrated. We could not because the borders were closed. Those who migrated are in a better position now. They did something, they took action. We are all the same here. We have made no progress."

I have so far analyzed the interviews within the framework of the four parameters corresponding to four different aspects of transnationalization of territorial identities. Based on this analysis, the following conclusions may be drawn with regard to the normative conceptualization of territoriality and homeland among the Turkish community in Bulgaria:

1. The Turkish community in Bulgaria has experienced complex and irregular patterns of permanent and temporary migration both domestically and internationally in the last decades. This has resulted in an inevitable minimization of their territorial association with a single piece of territory. Though this has not meant a total severance of cultural and other ties with their places of birth and of long-term residence, interviewed community members were now more positive towards mobility. Once perceived as a tool in the hands of the governments for homogenizing the population and

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<sup>22</sup> "Home is where it (the life) is good" (Latin expression)

therefore deeply associated with assimilation campaigns and forceful expulsions, mobility and migration now seemed to be regarded as opportunity-generating phenomena that can be utilized for personal and professional needs such as remedying economic deprivation by finding better paid jobs elsewhere, building personal and communal alliances with cross-border partners and taking advantage of better public services in places of destination.

2. As a result of increased mobility, new forms of translocal and transnational connections are proliferating among the Turkish community in Bulgaria. These might take the form of personal connections as in the form of family and kin visits abroad, or professional-organizational ties with translocal and transnational counterparts particularly in the field of preservation of culture and ethnic identity, or contacts with co-nationals abroad in search for better job opportunities in economically dynamic places. In this regard, Turkey, in addition to several European countries like Germany and Austria, presented itself as one of the most popular destinations for labour migrants due to its geographical proximity, cultural familiarity and the presence of high numbers of earlier immigrants from Bulgaria. However, despite the prevalence of common migration experiences and the multitude of divided families on both sides of the borders, it cannot be argued that the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria are becoming simultaneously embedded in both societies. Not even the ethnic Turkish interviewees who had first-hand experience of Turkey through close family or other ties, or those who viewed Turkey as their true motherland expressed any genuine interest or any instance of active involvement in political, economic, social, or ideological matters in Turkey. Their ties remained on a local-to-local basis. Societal ties of ethnic Turks with other Turkish communities in third countries proved even more limited, when assessed within the framework of the sample group of this study.
3. Diasporism and long-distance nationalism requires the existence of a triadic relationship between the homeland, the hostland and the ethnic community in question. Diaspora identification entails diaspora communities that are

instrumentally and ideologically tied to their homelands through diaspora organizations, lobbying activities, dual citizenship, voting, sending of remittances, and cultural and artistic networks. Long-distance nationalism on the other hand signifies a continuous and more active involvement of dispersed communities in the symbolic and actual nation-building or national development efforts in their homeland basically through mobilizing financial, political and human resources for perceived common national causes. With regard to the position of the Turkish community in Bulgaria, I observed neither of these transnational formations or activities. Beyond instances of cultural exchange and solidarity for ethnic preservation, the interviewed members of the Turkish community endorsed neither a nationalist ideology that ties their fate with that of Turkey, nor a nationalist agenda that unifies the goals and interests of the two kin communities and their official and unofficial organizations on both sides of the Turco-Bulgarian border.

4. The transnational connections of the Turkish community in Bulgaria seemed to remain confined basically to the cultural sphere. Based on the interviewee accounts, I may argue that these cultural exchanges with ethnically related groups in Turkey or elsewhere did not seem to create, at least for the interviewees, a common normative ground on which new values, ideas, preferences, and methods of organizing and problem-solving could develop. Instead, these cultural interconnections were carried out on a loosely defined and culturally perpetuated notion of “Turkishness” which seemed to be devoid of any structured ideological content. Therefore, though these cross-border transactions were transnational in form, they lacked a normative attitude to transnationalization. However, the absence of a communal ethos mutually shaped by ethnic Turkish communities beyond the borders of Bulgaria does not suggest that the Turkish community in Bulgaria has been unaffected by universal, or European, norms and values. The interviewees declared, or implied in some of their responses, that they saw themselves as part of the European civilization, though admitting that Bulgaria in general lagged behind most of the other European countries. Based on my research

experience in Bulgaria, I may claim that many members of the Turkish community in Bulgaria did not assume an irreconcilable contradiction between their own culture-specific values and the European norms and principles that Bulgarian society as a whole claims to take part in. The European (or Western) values they cherished included democratic rule, protection of human and minority rights, basic liberties including freedom of expression and movement, gender equality, respect for diversity, scientific and social progress, and an advanced public and professional culture. Nevertheless, a cosmopolitan consciousness or a belief in world citizenship was yet far from materialization among the members of the Turkish community in Bulgaria in spite of their general acknowledgement of the overwhelming effects of an ever more interdependent world order brought about by globalization.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **TURKISH COMMUNITY IN THE NETHERLANDS: A DIASPORA WITH REPLICATED HOMELANDS?**

This chapter will proceed in two parts. The first part will offer a historical background of the labour migration from Turkey to the Netherlands. This part will also focus on the changes in migrant integration policies of the Dutch state and the evolution of the legal, political, economic and social status of the Turkish migrant community. In the second part I will analyze the interviews conducted with various members of this community in relation to the three conceptions of territorial attachment that I defined in the first chapter. For each territorial conception, I will use the same, or similar, parameters employed in the previous chapter with the aim to capture the specificities of the idea of homeland among the interviewees. At the end of each section dealing with a different conception of territoriality, I will list the conclusions I have drawn from the assessment of the interviews within the framework of these parameters.

#### **5.1 Historical Background**

Labour migration from Turkey to the Netherlands was formalized with a bilateral recruitment agreement signed between the two countries in 1964. The Netherlands was not the only country that signed labour agreements with Turkey; others included Germany (1961), Austria and Belgium (1964), France (1965) and Sweden (1967). Through these agreements, the European states aimed to improve their war-stricken economies and remedy their problem of labour shortage which, combined with rapid urbanization, created social tensions. Turkey, on the other hand, expected that

emigrants would supply the necessary foreign exchange to finance its balance of payments deficit (Abadan-Unat 2007: 1).

Labour migration was intended to be temporary and migrants were initially not allowed to bring their family members with them. The main motivation of immigrants was to save sufficient amounts of money and enhance the economic situation of their families back in Turkey. Though emigration started initially in urban centers of Turkey, gradually migrants from less urbanized and less developed parts formed the majority of the total migrating population to the Netherlands. Many migrants had low education levels (three quarters had only attended primary school) and came from families of small farmers (Böcker 2000: 156).

Labour recruitment was terminated in 1973 as a result of the oil crisis. However, migrants' temporary stay turned into permanent settlement in many cases and the Turkish immigrant communities in European countries continued to enlarge due to family reunifications, marriage immigration and natural population growth. According to the official Dutch statistics, the number of Turkish immigrants increased from 23,600<sup>23</sup> in 1970 to 395,302<sup>24</sup> out of a total population of 16,828,996<sup>25</sup> in 2013. Being one of the largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands, the Turkish population is generally concentrated in big cities such as Rotterdam, Amsterdam, the Hague and Utrecht.

The migrant population originating from Turkey is not homogeneous. It encompasses different religious (Sunni, Alevi, Christian) and ethnic groups (Turks, Kurds, Armenians). It is composed not only of labour migrants but also of political asylum

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<sup>23</sup> See <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLEN&PA=37556eng&D1=0-44&D2=1,11,21,31,41,51,61,71,81,91,101,1&HD=140113-1452&LA=EN&HDR=G1&STB=T> (accessed 21.12.2013).

<sup>24</sup> See <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLEN&PA=37325eng&D1=0&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0&D5=231&D6=a&LA=EN&HDR=G2,G3,G4,T&STB=G1,G5&VW=T> (accessed 21.12.2013).

<sup>25</sup> See <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLEN&PA=37943eng&D1=0-3,6-9&D2=186,203-206,208-210,212-214,216-218,220-223,225-227,229-231,233-235,1&HD=090218-0913&LA=EN&HDR=T&STB=G1> (accessed 21.12.2013).

seekers and illegal migrants. The share of “chain migrants” (those who came to the Netherlands to be reunited with or start families) has been much larger than that of asylum seekers. The latter category includes a few thousand Turkish Christians (the Syrian Orthodox and Armenians) that requested asylum in the second half of the 1970s and political dissidents including many Kurds who fled the violent conflicts before and after the military coup in 1980 (Böcker 2000: 155).

Until the end of the 1970s, the Netherlands had no explicit policy regarding the legal status and integration of immigrants because the state assumed that the repatriates coming from former Dutch colonies would have no difficulties with integration and that labour migrants would eventually return to their countries of origin (Vink 2007: 340). By then the Netherlands had refused to be regarded as an immigration country. However, as the immigrant population grew and it became apparent that many immigrants settled permanently, Dutch authorities felt the need to devise policies to integrate them into the mainstream society. In 1980, the Dutch state announced a general policy on minorities. In 1983, the Minorities Memorandum (*Minderhedennota*) was accepted. This act explicitly identified those groups with disadvantages in the processes of integration and officially defined them as minorities, Turkish migrants being one of these groups. The aims were to ensure a tolerant, multicultural society in which cultural and ethnic differences would be preserved, and to eliminate social disadvantages and institutional discrimination with a view to guarantee equal opportunities (Lucassen and Penninx 1997: 150-151).

On the basis of this memorandum, the Dutch state took several steps to realize its aims. The revised constitution of 1983 put further emphasis on equality, non-discrimination and the promotion of social and cultural development of all residents, even though it did not specifically address minority peoples (Brinkel 2002: 3). Also, the constitutional amendments granted the right to participate in local elections (at the municipal level) to non-national residents who have been legally residing in the Netherlands for at least five years. These electoral rights were incorporated into the Election Law in 1985. Foreign residents still do not have electoral rights at the provincial or national levels (Schrauwen 2013: 1, also 6).

Another measure aiming at deeper integration of immigrants concerned the enhancement of the legal status of immigrants. A new nationality act was adopted in 1985 to facilitate more generous naturalization policies. Dual citizenship was tolerated between 1992 and 1997, which considerably increased the rate of naturalizations. In 1994, the Equal Treatment Act was introduced. This act created a commission which examines cases of direct and indirect discrimination. Other legal and administrative initiatives were taken in order to promote more effective immigrant participation in Dutch society and to eliminate social disadvantages in such areas as education, labour market participation, and housing.

As mentioned, the government's minorities policy rested on a classification along collective categories; the state specified the ethnic and immigrant groups that it would directly address in formulating and implementing its integration policies and grant certain group advantages in this process. This group approach was interpreted by many as the legacy of the structure of "pillarization" that traditionally characterized Dutch society. In this structure, different groups (the "pillars") were given a semi-autonomous status within society, which included the right to establish their separate, state-sponsored institutions in various fields such as politics, education, welfare, syndication, broadcasting, health, sports and recreation. The pillar system aimed at the "emancipation" of separate groups that comprised Dutch society through safeguarding and enhancing their cultural distinctiveness and group interests. This system, initially designed for the religious denominations (Catholic and Protestant), was later extended to other (secular) groups such as the socialists/social democrats. With the processes of secularization and individualization, the system of pillarization started to lose much of its weight in the second half of the twentieth century. But its impact lingered in the legal and administrative setup of the Netherlands as it inspired the policies and processes initiated by the Dutch government to incorporate newcomers into the mainstream Dutch society.

The creation of a multicultural, pluralist Dutch society in which migrants were treated as corporate groups rather than individuals was the motivation behind the

earlier integration paradigm. Similar to the pillar structure, migrant groups were given the right to have separate schools, run their own radios and TVs, and establish migrant organizations while benefiting from state funds and consultation mechanisms in so doing (Nuhoglu Soysal 1994: 48-50). In this ideal society of multiculturalism, corporate migrant groups were to be encouraged to preserve their collective institutional existence and the government should not interfere with the expression of group identities and interests.

Based on these collective rights, many schools, broadcasting agencies, minority organizations and places of worship have been set up by Islamic, Hindu and other groups since the 1980s by making use of state subsidies. Mother-tongue lessons were made available in schools within the framework of the "Education in Own Language and Culture" (OETC) programme. This programme had been originally designed to facilitate immigrant students' reintegration in their country of origin after their presumed return, but was later modified so as to prevent cultural alienation and ensure better school performance among immigrant descendents. National networks started to broadcast programmes for minorities within specified hours. Moreover, consultative bodies were established by the Dutch state in order to create direct channels of communication between the government and the representatives of migrant organizations with diverse interests and orientations. These consultative bodies were designed basically along ethno-national lines. The consultative council of Turkish immigrants (IOT) was established in 1985 and brought together influential organizations with different political tendencies both left-wing and right-wing. However, its operation has been hampered at times by the antagonisms between the member federations and associations that reflect the political conflicts in Turkey (for further information, see Mügge 2012: 29-31).

However, when we come to the early 1990s, the efficiency and appropriateness of a multiculturalist and group-based integration strategy in overcoming social segregation started to be called into question. Following a public debate on the failure of the collectivist approach in achieving desired goals, a new integration policy was introduced in 1994, signalling a shift from a multiculturalist perspective

to a model based on the principle of equal participation of individuals in society. In 1997, the right to dual nationality was annulled and the obligation to renounce prior citizenship for naturalization was reinstated, causing a sharp decline in naturalization requests. In 1998, the Newcomer Integration Act took effect. This act obliged newcomers to participate in integration programmes which consisted of courses on Dutch language and culture and on professional orientation. The act also stipulated fines if the requirements were not met.

The shift from a multiculturalist paradigm to a civic integration model continued well into the 2000s. Several developments stirred up once again the debates about the ongoing social segregation in Dutch society. The 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the murder of Pim Fortuyn, a Dutch politician known for his anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim views, by an environmental activist during his electoral campaign brought into question the compatibility of Islamic and Western values. As a result, the growing concerns about the social and cultural gap between the native Dutch population and immigrant communities radicalized the political discourse and led to further hardening of integration policies.

In 2003, stricter requirements for naturalization were introduced; applicants were required to pass an examination that tested proficiency in Dutch language, culture and institutions. In 2004, native language courses were abandoned with the claim that their contribution to integration was doubtful. The Civic Integration Act, which entered into force in 2007 replacing the 1998 Newcomer Integration Act, extended some of the integration requirements stipulated by the previous act to settled immigrants. Rather than achieving integration through strengthening collective identities and intra-community cohesion, the new act prioritized the integration of individuals in society as free and equal citizens, placing the responsibility of integration on the shoulders of the immigrant. Civic integration is rendered compulsory for all migrants (including clerics such as imams and pastors) from outside the EU with only a few exemptions. Moreover, the integration process is expected to begin abroad; newcomers have to pass a civic integration exam in their country of origin in order to obtain an authorization for temporary stay in the

Netherlands. The act was amended in 2012, making the rules on integration stricter. Under the new regime as of 1 January 2013, newcomers are responsible for their own integration and must pay for it themselves.<sup>26</sup> Again in 2012, family reunification with partners and extended family was abolished.<sup>27</sup>

The coalition government formed in 2012 between People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and Labour Party (PvdA) intends to introduce other measures to tighten the policy of civic integration. They declared that the integration of aliens will be consistently monitored from the outset and those who do not make a sufficient effort will lose their residence permit. In addition, the time period required of aliens to be able to vote in municipal elections, to qualify for naturalization and to retain their residence rights when applying for social assistance benefit will be extended from five to seven years and those individuals who cannot speak Dutch will not be able to receive social assistance benefit. Another measure that particularly concerns Muslim immigrants is that clothing that covers the face will be banned in education, the care sector, public transport and in public-authority buildings.<sup>28</sup>

I have highlighted the turning points in the history of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and the evolution of Dutch integration strategies and policies since the signing of the bilateral recruitment agreement with Turkey. I shall now turn to how and why both the official policies and public opinion have been steered away from the ideals of multiculturalism and cultural diversity towards a civic integration approach marked by arguably anti-immigration and anti-immigrant measures for achieving the acculturation of immigrants into the mainstream Dutch society and values. There were several developments that induced a change of direction in immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands. As mentioned before, there had already been a growing concern in the Netherlands and elsewhere about how

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<sup>26</sup> For further information, see <http://www.government.nl/issues/integration/integration-in-the-netherlands> (accessed 02.01.2013).

<sup>27</sup> See the OECD's "International Migration Outlook 2013" at [http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2013\\_migr\\_outlook-2013-en#page280](http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2013_migr_outlook-2013-en#page280) (accessed 02.01.2013).

<sup>28</sup> See the Coalition Agreement at <http://www.government.nl/government/coalition-agreement/immigration-integration-and-asylum> (accessed 02.01.2013).

cultural diversity should be handled when norms and practices of groups with different cultural backgrounds both within and across borders clashed. Starting from the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the argument of “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1993, 1996) became a much cited one in public debates as well as in academic circles.

Several incidents of violence that took place after the attacks were interpreted as manifestations of the increasing friction between the Western and Islamic worldviews. As mentioned, the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn was killed in 2002. This murder was followed by that of Theo van Gogh, a Dutch film-maker and author who was also known for his criticisms of Islam. Van Gogh was shot and stabbed in 2004 by a Dutch citizen of Moroccan origin, his death causing an international outcry. The Somalian immigrant and former MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who collaborated with van Gogh in a film on domestic violence among Muslims, received death threats and had to eventually leave the country in 2006.

As a result of these events, more and more people in the Netherlands began to voice the view that newcomers and settled immigrants should share at least the fundamental values and principles of the Dutch culture. Rita Verdonk, who served as the Dutch Minister for Integration and Immigration between 2003 and 2007, was one of them. Verdonk advocated a more rigid approach towards immigration and integration and was the architect of many controversial policy decisions. Another figure who came forth with a vigorous belief in the need to adopt an assimilationist stance on immigrant integration was Geert Wilders. Wilders founded the Party for Freedom (PVV) in 2005 with an anti-immigrant and anti-Islam agenda. The party achieved quite a success in the national elections of 2006, gaining nine seats in the parliament. In the last elections held in 2012, the PVV came third and secured 10% of the national vote, causing anxiety about the further radicalization of Dutch politics.

Therefore, the calls for a tougher immigration and integration regime were accompanied by a growing concern about the rise of racism on the Dutch domestic scene. Racism in its classical sense has not commonly been associated with the multiculturalist image of the Netherlands. The term discrimination is generally

preferred when referring to exclusionary and prejudicial treatment of immigrants and minorities. Ellie Vasta criticizes this preference because it obscures the specific types and forms of discrimination; despite having unequal power relations as their basis, different forms of discrimination have different roots (Vasta: 2007: 727). Vasta borrows Balibar's notion of "new racism" where racism rests no longer on superiority of one race over the others, but rather on the argument of immutable differences between cultural groups that diminish their chances of co-existence (Balibar cited in Vasta 2007: 728). Vasta claims that both old and new racism exist in the Netherlands. Problematizing the prevalence of institutional racism (i.e. the perpetuation of social exclusion of immigrants and ethnic minorities by the state and its institutions), she holds that there are routine, unnoticed practices of racism that systematically disadvantage immigrants and minorities, but are nevertheless not perceived as racist. According to her, the persistent failure of integration policies and programmes and the systematic negative outcomes in the labour market and education prove this point. Despite these indicators, however, the Dutch maintain the myth of the "tolerant nation" putting the blame of social segregation on immigrants and seeing instances of racism as individual flaws (Vasta 2007: 729-732).

As I will discuss in detail in the following part, the interviewee accounts collected within the framework of this study also revealed a deep sense of resentment among members of the Turkish community regarding the extensiveness of institutional and other forms of discrimination which sometimes border on racism. Most interviewees complained about the formulation of integration policies as a one-way process in which both the financial and non-financial burden of fulfilling the integration requirements falls on the individual immigrant as if Dutch society's acceptance of and willingness to familiarize with different cultural groups did not matter at all. No matter what terminology is used to define the current situation of inter-community relations, there seems to be a deepening disappointment on both sides regarding the perceived failure of the previous integration efforts. On the one hand, an increasing number of people in the Dutch state and society tend to think that certain migrant groups failed to adapt their way of life and norms to those of wider society despite the existence in the Netherlands of one of the most liberal immigrant and integration

regimes. On the other hand, segments of immigrant communities hold the state and the native Dutch community principally responsible for the obstacles in the process of incorporating different groups and their demands into the social, economic and political structures. They often disclaim the new integration policies and programmes as they are seen to be too biased, demanding and disregarding of the progress achieved since the arrival of the first immigrants.

What factors underlie the widening gap between the perceptions and prescriptions of both sides regarding how integration should be tackled, and how social segregation and discrimination should be overcome? I have talked about the growing tendency especially since the 9/11 attacks to associate political cleavages and violent confrontations in the international and domestic realms with the image of a cultural war between two (or more) different belief systems and worldviews. In this new condition, many issues and problems that have their roots in diverse social, economic and political transformations are framed within a discourse of identity, culture and the (in)compatibility of cultural worlds. Identity politics sometimes function as a cover for the operation of more complex economic, social and political dynamics that may sometimes produce unwanted or not easily identifiable outcomes. This may be because defining a problem or a conflict of interest in essentialist, binary terms is usually more convenient and less costly than searching for and eliminating the root causes. Political parties also make use of the discourse of cultural incompatibility since playing on the economic and social insecurities of the dominant population is more easily translated into popularity and votes. This holds true not only for extremist or racist movements and parties but also for moderate ones, because the radicalization of the general language of politics compels them to take part in the same game in order to be competitive in electoral politics. Within the specific context of the Netherlands, the recent economic recession and rising unemployment rates have also created an environment of insecurity conducive to anti-immigrant discourses and actions.

In fact, one of the reasons why the inter-community tension has aggravated in recent years may be the shifting status of labour migrants from being “guests” to permanent

settlers. This might have caused anxiety among the native Dutch about not only the redistribution of economic wealth but also the reorganization of the social and the public realm. With the decline of the pillarization system in which rights and duties of and the boundaries between communities were more clearly defined, the previously semi-autonomous spheres of native and migrant communities are now more likely to overlap. This increases the possibility of tensions and confrontations between and among communities.

On the other hand, I should also note that the depiction of problems of economic redistribution and social segregation in terms of essential, immutable and incompatible cultures and loyalties gives a free hand to decision-makers and representatives of both the state and separate communities in shaping public discussions and decision-making processes in such a way as to secure their own parochial, short-term goals and interests. The discourse of cultural enmity allows them to obscure actual causes of integration problems, to implement controversial policy decisions or to orientate their followers towards desired directions by way of manipulating inter-community frictions and misperceptions. Thus, leaders of political parties, communities or community organizations manage to keep their followers firmly united around narrowly and subjectively defined agendas and to preserve their position in the community and in wider society. As for ordinary community members, the idea of belonging in a close-knit group with a fixed, distinctive identity, unquestionable loyalties and lofty causes offers a shield of protection against supposedly hostile groups or behaviour and nourishes the sense of self-worth especially when they feel that their values are under attack. As a result, particularly the disadvantaged segments of each community, both native and immigrant, are made to believe that they will be more comfortable and secure within the cultural and physical boundaries of their own community and that maintaining the inter- and intra-community status quo will avoid further confrontations.

I have pointed out that the recognition of the permanent status of immigrants led to an anxiety about the need to initiate a process of mutual adaptation as a result of which certain prerogatives of dominant groups might be lost, and also to a confusion

as to the appropriate methods of adaptation. Like other immigrant communities, the Turkish community became more visible both in number and in presence in the last decades. When labour migrants first came to the Netherlands, they had special agencies for job assistance, had to work hard and lived in confined boarding houses. Their contact with wider society was limited. However, as they have secured a more stable legal and social position in society and their numbers increased due mainly to family reunifications and marriage migration, they had to come into more contact with Dutch institutions for housing, education, health care, employment, social security, etc. Moreover, in order to fulfill their own social and infrastructural needs they started to establish their own shops, agencies, schools, mosques and cultural organizations, much to the dismay of the local Dutch population (Böcker 2000: 158).

In the Netherlands, the Turkish community stands out among other immigrant communities with its high level of organization. According to estimates by a Dutch research institute, there were 1,125 Turkish organizations in the Netherlands more than a decade ago (van der Wal and Tax cited in Østergaard-Nielsen 2001: 270). Turks are considered to have the highest ratio of organizations per inhabitant in comparison to other immigrant groups (Avcı 2006: 79). Starting from the early 1980s Dutch authorities began to attach more importance to Turkish organizations; the new policies of the eighties emphasized the preservation of cultural diversity and representation of community interest, creating a much more favourable climate for Turkish organizations in terms of both funding and legitimacy (Vermeulen cited in Odmalm 2009: 159). No matter whether they were established by political groups active in Turkey, or on the initiative of the receiving state, or as a result of the evolution of labour movements in Turkey and in Europe, almost all Turkish organizations came to embrace since the 1980s a discourse that emphasized notions of identity and culture, be it national, ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional, or political (Kastoryano 2007: 69). The most influential organizations set up by the Dutch-Turks have been those reflecting the main tensions of the homeland, left-right and religious-secular in particular. Among these are labour federations such as HTIB (Turkish Workers' Union in the Netherlands) and DIDF (Federation of Democratic Workers' Associations); Islamic organizations including HDV (Islamic Foundation

of the Netherlands/*Hollanda Diyanet Vakfı*), TICF (Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation/affiliated with HDV), NIF (Netherlands Islamic Federation/*Milli Görüş*) and SICN (Islamic Foundation Center/*Süleymanlılar*); Islamic-nationalist HTIKB (Union of Turkish Islamic Organizations in the Netherlands); Alevi organizations (HAK-DER/Federation of Alevi Associations in the Netherlands); HTKB (Turkish Women's Association in the Netherlands); HTSKF (Federation of Turkish Sports and Culture in the Netherlands); Kurdish organizations and business associations.

In the Netherlands, most mosques are a member of a national or regional federation or an umbrella organization, and are often accompanied by women and youth organizations such as the Women's Federation of Milli Görüş (Davelaar *et al.* 2011: 21). The Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands (HDV/*Diyanet*) was established in 1982 as a branch of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (*T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) in Turkey, which funds and sends imams to the mosques owned by the HDV. The HDV collaborates with the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (TICF) which is a local organization. The TICF was founded in 1979 and transferred the religious activities it had carried out to the HDV upon the latter's establishment in 1982. Now, 143 mosque associations function under the HDV as the overarching body, but are also members of the TICF.<sup>29</sup> As of 2007, there were 242 Turkish mosques in the Netherlands; in addition to 143 *Diyanet* mosques, 48 mosques belonged to the Süleymanlı group, 25 to Milli Görüş and 26 to others.<sup>30</sup>

There are about 45 Islamic schools in the Netherlands, most of them being elementary schools. Schools based on a particular religion or denomination are allowed under Article 23 of the Dutch constitution.<sup>31</sup> They resemble private schools in the sense that they have a school board and are allowed to appoint teachers, but

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<sup>29</sup> See the federation's webpage at <http://www.ticf.nl/tr/home> (accessed 08.01.2014).

<sup>30</sup> For the figures concerning the Muslim community in the Netherlands, see the FORUM (Institute for Multicultural Affairs) Survey entitled "Muslims in the Netherlands 2012" at <http://www.forum.nl/Portals/International/english-pdf/Muslims-in-the-Netherlands-2012-FORUM-Survey.pdf> (accessed 08.01.2014).

<sup>31</sup> See the Dutch constitution at <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/regulations/2012/10/18/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008.html> (accessed 08.01.2014).

they are state-funded similar to public-authority schools and their standards are supervised by the government. Islamic schools sometimes come under criticism for exacerbating social segregation. There have been heated discussions about the annulment of Article 23 of the constitution. Leftist parties in particular argue for annulment whereas the Christian Democrats are against it.

Other areas in which there are vibrant debates on immigrant participation and social segregation include education and labour market participation. The level of education of non-Western immigrant groups, especially of Turks and Moroccans, is still significantly lower than that of the native Dutch population. In 2010, one fourth of Turkish immigrants from 15 to 64 years old comprised those who had finished only primary school whereas the number is 7% for native Dutch adults. Nevertheless, there were significant improvements in comparison to the previous decade. The share of Turkish adults with only primary education was 55% in 1996 while the percentage of high educated Turkish adults rose from 4% in 1996 to 7% in 2010.<sup>32</sup> When we look at the drop-out rates among ethnic minorities, we see that they are significantly higher than those of the native Dutch population. However, there is a sharp downward trend among most non-Western minority groups. The drop-out rate among the Turkish community declined from 6% in 2005/2006 to 4.5% in 2011/2012.<sup>33</sup>

The level of education of immigrant groups is a significant determinant of their economic performance and labour market participation. Due to the deterioration of the economic situation in the Netherlands, unemployment has become a serious concern for natives and immigrants alike. The total unemployment rate in the Netherlands was over 6% in 2012 and over 8% in 2013.<sup>34</sup> Unemployment rate among

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<sup>32</sup> For the figures, see Dutch SOPEMI-Report of 2010 written by de Boom *et al.* and entitled "Migration and Migration Policies in the Netherlands 2010" at <http://www.godfriedengbersen.com/research/sopemi/> (pp. 116-117), (accessed 08.01.2014).

<sup>33</sup> For the figures, see "Key Figures 2008-2012: Education, Culture and Science", a statistical publication of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science at <http://www.government.nl/issues/education/documents-and-publications/reports/2013/07/31/key-figures-2008-2012.html> (pp 36-37), (accessed 08.01.2014).

<sup>34</sup> See <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLEN&PA=80479ENG&D1=4-5,10-13&D2=0&D3=0&D4=%281-25%29-1&HD=100712-1629&LA=EN&HDR=T&STB=G1,G2,G3> (accessed 08.01.2014).

Turkish immigrants for the first quarter of 2012 was 15% with the highest rates among young immigrants between 15 and 25 years old. When the unemployment rates of the native Dutch and the Turkish immigrant populations with the same education level were compared, the unemployment rate among Turkish immigrants was more than twice as high as the rate among Dutch natives in terms of poorly qualified labour and was almost four times as high in terms of highly qualified labour.<sup>35</sup> Another indicator of labour market integration of immigrants is occupational level. The percentage of Turkish immigrants having elementary/lower occupations dropped from 74% in 1996 to 52% in 2010 while the figures for the native Dutch population were 32% and 28% respectively. The percentage of Turks having higher/scientific occupations increased from 5% to 13% while the increase among Dutch natives was from 27% to 33% in the same period.<sup>36</sup>

Finally, political participation is an important aspect of both immigrant integration and representation of group interests at the local and national levels. The level of active participation in Dutch politics is improving among members of the Turkish community. There are now six MPs of Turkish origin in the Dutch House of Representatives, which is the 150-seated lower house of the Dutch parliament.<sup>37</sup> In line with the general upward trend in the numbers of locally elected immigrants since 1978 when first ethnic minority council members were elected, Turkish immigrants have also become well-represented in local politics. In the local elections of 2010, the Turkish community is best represented among other immigrant groups with 163

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<sup>35</sup> See the FORUM (Institute for Multicultural Affairs) Monitor entitled “Ethnic Minorities in the Dutch Labour Market Q1 2012, 10<sup>th</sup> Monitor: Effects of the Economic Crisis” at <http://www.forum.nl/Portals/International/english-pdf/Ethnic-minorities-in-the-Dutch-labour-market-Q1-2012.pdf> (accessed 08.01.2014).

<sup>36</sup> For the figures, see Dutch SOPEMI-Report of 2010 written by de Boom *et al.* and entitled “Migration and Migration Policies in the Netherlands 2010” at <http://www.godfriedengersen.com/research/sopemi/> (p. 135), (accessed 08.01.2014).

<sup>37</sup> See the news report by Basri Doğan entitled “Hollanda’da Türk Kökenli Yeni Milletvekili Göreve Başladı” at [http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya\\_hollandada-turk-kokenli-yeni-milletvekili-goreve-basladi\\_2101934.html](http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_hollandada-turk-kokenli-yeni-milletvekili-goreve-basladi_2101934.html) (accessed 08.01.2014).

members elected for municipality councils, followed by Moroccans (66), Surinamese (32) and Antilleans (7).<sup>38</sup>

I have briefly sketched the past and present conditions of the presence of the Turkish community in the Netherlands. Now I can turn to this community's conception of the idea of homeland and territoriality.

## **5.2 Turkish Community in the Netherlands and the Idea of Homeland**

This part will be based mainly on the narrative analysis of the open-ended and in-depth interviews with and the life histories of seventeen members of the Turkish community in the Netherlands representing differences mainly of age, profession, level of education and political affiliation. Only one of the interviewees declared that his immigration to the Netherlands was politically motivated; he decided to emigrate from Turkey due to the political pressures exerted on leftist groups during and after the military coup of 1980. One interviewee stated that he had come to the Netherlands for pursuing a university degree, another had come by way of marriage, and yet another had come to visit the country and decided to stay. One of the interviewees was appointed by the Turkish state as the imam of one of the *Diyanet* mosques in Amsterdam. The rest were descendants of the first-generation labour migrants, five of whom had been born in the Netherlands representing the third generation of the Turkish community in the Netherlands. The group of interviewees included (retired) labourers, politicians, former and current representatives of community organizations, university students, one academician, one journalist, one mosque administrator, one imam and private business owners.

The interview questions directed to the respondents can be broadly grouped under three categories in accordance with the three conceptualizations of territoriality I

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<sup>38</sup> See the FORUM (Institute for Multicultural Affairs) Factsheet entitled "Political Participation of Members of Ethnic Minorities" at <http://www.forum.nl/Portals/International/english-pdf/Factsheet-Political-Participation-2010.pdf> (accessed 08.01.2014).

defined: cultural, instrumental and normative.<sup>39</sup> The set of questions pertaining to the cultural aspect of the idea of homeland inquires into one's traditional and natural attachment to their immediate locality. The idea here is to delineate the conditions of the natural and day-to-day perpetuation of a person's embeddedness in their environment with a further aim to understand the differences between the territorial relations implicated in this familiar environment and those subsumed in wider and more distant forms of geopolitical organization and linkages. This set includes questions on birthplace, personal history of migration (domestic or international), intention to re-migrate, attachment to land (emotional, professional, or instrumental), association with hometown and current place of residence, homeland ties of ancestors and descendants, preferred place for burial, meanings attached to the concept of hometown/homeland.

The second set of questions focuses on the national scale. It aims to probe into the respondents' ties with their country of residence and with wider society. Here, the questions are designed to reveal the instrumental aspects of territorial attachment, and to establish the link between the local manifestations of territoriality addressed by the first set of questions and the political-ideological projection of the idea of homeland on a larger (national) scale. The emphasis is on the relationship between the state and the individual in its organizational, political and ideological dimensions, and on the nature of the exchange between the state and the individual in which latter's loyalty is traded for the former's material resources. This part includes questions on citizenship, political representation and voting behaviour, access to public services, civic participation and community relations, education and employment opportunities, (physical) security, extended family ties, international migratory experience/behaviour of family members, and issues of alienation and discrimination.

The third set of questions revolves around the normative implications of territorial identification. The questions in this part problematize the transnational and so-called "deterritorialized" forms of territoriality which transcend the immediate cultural and

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<sup>39</sup> The Turkish version of the interview questions can be found in Appendix A.

material manifestations. At the center of the analysis are political, social, cultural and economic linkages of the interviewees to Turkey and other countries, and to transnational formations and networks. The themes include issues of dual citizenship, distant voting, cross-border family ties, visits to and residence in other countries, membership in transnational organizations and participation in transnational activities, the use of deterritorialized means of communication such as satellite TVs and the Internet, the changing practices of territoriality and their impact on the sense of the interviewees' normative belonging, territorial identification and homeland conceptualization, and finally transnational norm transfer and agenda building.

The interviews were conducted in the Turkish language in the cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht in December 2011. All the interview excerpts used in this chapter are translated into English by the author. The names of all the interviewees are replaced by pseudonyms in order to protect their confidentiality. Now I will discuss my findings from the interviews on the basis of each set of questions that corresponds to a different conception of territoriality and homeland.

### **5.2.1 Cultural Conception of the Idea of Homeland and the Case of Dutch-Turks**

As I did in the previous chapter dealing with the Turkish community in Bulgaria, I will base my analysis on the same four parameters which will help me unveil the cultural aspects of the territorial experiences and homeland identification of the Dutch-Turkish interviewees:

- 1) existence of habitual, individualized, day-to-day activities and relationships pertaining to one's native land or immediate locality that perpetuate personal attachment to the latter;
- 2) lack of (or minimal interference by) an ideological intermediary, such as a leadership, a political movement or party, the state or the international

system, predominating the process of the construction of the idea of homeland;

- 3) perception of homeland as a life-sustaining bond between one's past and future, bearer of meaning and coherence, and provider of genealogical continuity and integrity;
- 4) functioning of territorial identification as an organizing principle of one's moral and material life.

I have previously asserted that bonds forged with the inhabited land through territorial activities such as cultivation and farming, and the traditional feudal relations generated thereof, figured prominently in the original conception of the cultural interpretation of human territoriality. However, these traditional land-oriented patterns of cultural territoriality have in time been replaced in the case of most urban dwellers by urbanized and culturally more fluid, but still place-bound, forms of territorial identification. As for the interviewees selected from among the Turkish community in the Netherlands, traditional feudal forms of territorial attachment are almost non-existent since they are all city-dwellers and none of them practice land-based activities in the Netherlands. In fact, most members of the Turkish community moved to the Netherlands either within the framework of the labour migration agreement between the two countries or by way of family reunification arrangements designed for family members of labour immigrants in later years, though a small portion of the community was yet constituted by relatively well-educated and urbanized political refugees who fled Turkey particularly after the military coup of 1980.

Instead of perpetuating culturally defined territorial ties through land-bound forms of social and economic existence, many members of the Turkish community seemed to establish their ties to their immediate localities and to their country of settlement through close inner community and family ties which were usually embedded in the neighbourhoods that they resided in and the mosque communities that they took part in. A communal life revolving around a religious/mosque community was a common pattern among the observed Turkish individuals. 143 of the mosques frequented by

Turks function under the authority of *Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi* (Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands),<sup>40</sup> a foundation directly affiliated with the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey which provides these mosques with necessary funding and appoints their imams. There are also mosques which are administered by other (non-state) religious foundations and communities. During my visit I observed that mosques were not only used for religious services and worship but also for social services, education and cultural activities. The reproduction of cultural, religious and communal values through generations seemed to be coupled by the construction of relatively homogeneous localities inhabited mostly by members of the very community. I was told stories of people who rarely left their locality, or of those who almost never visited the city center. Despite the fact that the number of people with such a locality-bound life decreased considerably among the immigrant Turkish community by the emergence of new generations with better language abilities and more urbanized ways of life, it may be argued that most instances of socialization still occurred within immigrant-dominated neighbourhoods and through cultural and religious activities usually confined to the members of the local community.

Based on the interviews I conducted and my observations, I could identify Islam and Turkishness as the two most prominent organizing principles of the moral and material lives of the community members. The ties of the Turkish-born interviewees to their hometowns had been substantially severed when they emigrated while the Dutch-born interviewees made no mention of habitual place-bound or land-based activities that would culturally tie them to their places of residence except for their frequent visits to the local mosques for religious and social purposes. The relationship of the majority of the interviewees to their localities seemed to have failed to a great extent to generate distinctive cultural values, habits and identities specific to those localities, causing them to cling onto the cultural and religious baggage that they, or their parents, had imported from their country of origin. For the most part, the lack of a territorially anchored cultural existence seemed to be substituted for by closed circuit community life organized physically around local

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<sup>40</sup> See <http://www.diyonet.nl/hdv-cami-hizmetleri/sube-cami-adresleri/> (accessed 03.12.2013).

mosques or centers of cultural and/or religious organizations and morally around principles of Islam and feelings of national belonging.

Not only the interviewees with lower levels of education and socio-economic opportunities, but also the university students and those with high social status including the politicians, representatives of community organizations and professionals (with the exception of a couple of leftist or liberal interviewees) underlined the constitutive quality of these two markers of identity, namely Islam and Turkishness. One interesting point was that many interviewees referred to these identity markers as elements that were “present in their blood” and as such were part of their national character. Such an emphasis on genealogically transferred qualities fits well into primordialist understandings of human identity and essentialist-deterministic definitions of community attachment. When I looked at how the interviewees who took Islam and Turkishness as the grounds of their individual identity and communal bonds concretized such vaguely defined categories of group identification, I saw some common values and themes recurring in most interviews.

One such theme was patriotism, or the love of country. Despite some interviewees’ endorsement of two countries as being equally important in shaping their lives, Turkey still seemed to occupy a central place in their hearts and minds. This was more than evident in their repeated, conscious or unconscious use of expressions such as “our country”, “our nation”, “our prime minister”, “our government”, “our culture”, “our values” etc., all denoting Turkey and persons, institutions, and concepts pertaining to Turkey. On the other hand, in the accounts of the interviewees the love of country went beyond their lingering attachment to and longing for their mother country; it presented itself as a virtue in and for itself. Some of the interviewees criticized the native Dutch community and other immigrant groups in the Netherlands for lacking patriotic feelings and having weak homeland ties. For instance, Kemal, a second-generation immigrant who came to the Netherlands at the age of 16 through family reunification, remarked that he would see Turkey as his homeland even if he lived 100 years in the Netherlands and that this was a privilege

since the Dutch people had no proper sense of homeland attachment and paid no respect to the national flag.

Another crucial component of being a Turk and Muslim according to the majority of the respondents was strong familial and communal bonds and the ability to exert social control over community members by the help of these bonds. From a religious perspective, respect for parents and for the elderly was stated to be a very important norm for the maintenance of social and cultural ties and for the generational transfer of a pious morality. It was also instrumental in the prevention of crime and immoral behaviour among younger community members who were seen to be torn between two cultures and were therefore more exposed to social evils and dangers of living in a big modern city with an intimidatingly multicultural and complex environment. From a nationalist perspective, inculcating patriotic feelings and cultural values into younger generations would stave off the imminent danger of assimilation into an alien culture. Some of the interviewees even referred to Turkey's Ottoman past as a source of distinctiveness, claiming that the Turkish people had never surrendered to the yoke of other countries or cultures and this spirit of independence "naturally" marked the character of the Turkish nation, which included the Turkish communities living abroad.

This conception of a compact organic community with strong internal ties was paralleled by most interviewees' perception of other native and immigrant communities in the Netherlands as having weak communal bonds and inferior values, a situation that rendered these groups lesser or faulty communities in the eyes of the interviewees. The native and immigrant communities were seen not only from the perspective of cultural conflict but also from that of a moral hierarchy. Despite their appraisal of the well-functioning Dutch political system and social order, many of the interviewees implicitly or explicitly expressed their contempt for the cultural and moral values of the Dutch society. Some of the interviewees even asserted that they did not view the native Dutch population as a genuine nation with a distinctive collective identity or a community ethos. The perception of the Dutch as a degenerate community, or even a "non-community" manifested itself in some

interviewee remarks that drew a clear line of separation between the moral spheres of both communities. It was interesting to note that almost all interviewees referred to the Dutch community as “they” and almost never used such self-inclusive expressions as “our society”, “our community”, “our country”, “our culture”, “our identity”, “our values” etc. when referring to the Netherlands, its population and concepts related to these two. The frequent use of the Turkish pronoun “*bunlar*” (these) for the Dutch community by some interviewees in a pejorative sense was also a case in point.

The line of separation between the moral and cultural spheres of the two communities basically reflected the religious contours of the Turkish community’s social organization. Observance of religious rites and customs, preservation of the traditional patriarchal social order, revulsion against extramarital relationships and disapproval of intercultural marriages, religious bans on the consumption of alcohol, drugs, pork and pork products, emphasis on close family ties and parental guidance, scepticism about individualistic life-styles as opposed to strong intra-community social control seemed to constitute the basic pillars of the community ethos shared by many members of the Turkish population. These issues could also be seen as the main grounds for potential friction between the moral codes of the Turkish and native Dutch communities. In this respect, the *home*, the *mosque* and the *neighbourhood* figured as the “sacred sanctuaries” where community members relatively freely practiced their religious and cultural rituals and thus reinforced their ethno-religious identity.

The importance of the *home* as the stronghold of a “decent moral life” was particularly evident in Ömer’s statements. Being a graduate of legal studies, Ömer ran a snack bar in Utrecht. He mentioned that he had good relations with the Dutch people from the time when he had come to the Netherlands at the age of 10 and did his best to perform his job well and to blend into wider society as an accomplished person. However, when it came to establishing more intimate relations with the Dutch people such as paying home visits, he said, “I am good at my job, I attend the Dutch well. But I have not lost my Turkish and Muslim identity... It [paying home

visits] is something else. That is the crux... They cannot enter there [my house]. I cannot tell them not to drink or do indecent things; it is their culture. But I should keep away from evil... I mingle with the Dutch like I am a brother. But when it comes to the crux... A lion should defend his den.”

However, I cannot argue that all cultural divisions between the Turkish community and wider Dutch society stem from the endorsement of Islam by a considerable number of Turkish immigrants as the basic source of their mores. There were other themes raised in the interviewee accounts that cannot be directly linked to the Islamic culture. The monotonous nature of urban professional life, the rarity of intimate human relations and the lack of a culture of solidarity were also mentioned by some interviewees as features defining the Dutch culture. Two of the interviewees particularly brought up the issue of distant and dull human relations in the Netherlands claiming that the native people led “robotic” lives between their homes and workplaces and they did not know how to enjoy themselves. Obviously, these features are not peculiar to Dutch society; they characterize many other industrialized and urbanized communities all over the world. The alienation felt by members of the Turkish community might purport itself, as implied by the interviewees, to be a result of the “national character” of the Dutch community; but it should rather be viewed as a consequence of the gap between the preindustrial and the postindustrial forms of economic and social organization experienced particularly by the first wave of immigrants.

The first-generation Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands were mostly from rural and preindustrialized areas of Turkey where traditional values, norms and patterns of behaviour associated with feudal and semi-feudal modes of production and social organization still prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s. With the help of the social control exerted on younger members of the community, the descendents of the first generation have sustained to some extent the traditional social relations they inherited from their parents in a postmodern urban environment where the industrial phase of capitalism was giving way to a later phase of “time-space compression” as termed by David Harvey. As discussed in the first chapter, the speeding up and

increasing versatility of the processes of production, exchange and consumption have led to the disruption and reorganization of previous cultural and social structures while rendering practices, products, ideas, values and spaces extremely volatile and reviving interest in such traditional institutions as religion, family and community (Harvey 1989).

The importance attached to such institutions as religion, family and community was also apparent in the statements of most interviewees regarding other immigrant communities in the Netherlands. Most interviewees pointed out that the Turkish community had been a close-knit entity with a firmly preserved national identity, religious faith and collective values. But at the same time, in their view, the Turkish community had been well-integrated into wider society since they had always been law-abiding citizens with lower crime rates than those of other immigrant groups. Some of the interviewees singled out Moroccans as an example of an immigrant community with an inferior position in society due to their lack of strong national, community and family ties. These interviewees associated Moroccans with crime, drugs, loose morality and decadence, and claimed that they were one of the least successful groups at integration due to their lack of good citizen qualities. The mention of Moroccans, another large Muslim group in the Netherlands, as a benchmark for the level of their own community cohesion and at the same time for the success rate of their integration is remarkable given the fact that all interviewees complained about the government's adoption of regressive immigrant policies and about the increasing instances of discrimination and degradation levelled against immigrants in general and Muslim immigrants in particular. It is ironic to criticize on the one hand the association of immigrants (and Muslims) with anarchy and crime, and to establish on the other hand an implicit social and moral hierarchy among different sectors of society in order to segregate other immigrant (Muslim) groups with a similar position. This irony was exacerbated by the view expressed by various interviewees that Islamic rules were not properly observed by Moroccans while the interviewees reacted at the same time against the occasional intrusions of Dutch authorities into the ways their own community preferred to practice their creed.

Other immigrant groups in the Netherlands were considered to be belonging to yet another category along the social and moral hierarchy. Particularly, the immigrants from former colonial lands, mainly Indonesia and Suriname, and from the Dutch Caribbean Islands were seen by the interviewees as better-integrated and favoured groups since they had the advantage of having cultural affinity with the native Dutch population and made use of the guilt complex suffered by the Dutch because of their colonial past.

The perception of such a socially and morally segregated society can be attributed to the desire of the Turkish community to maintain and strengthen the distinctiveness of its collective identity vis-à-vis other immigrant (and native) groups. Thinking by way of homogeneous categories with neat and clearly defined labels helps organize social life according to a communitarian understanding as opposed to individualism. My analysis of the interview responses revealed that individualism was not seen as a positive trait among the interviewed community members with only a few exceptions. The sense of living in an alien culture was quite strong among the community members. Free riders in the community were discredited and were insulted by using derogatory expressions like “*gavurlaşmak*” (becoming infidel, and hence foreign) or “*Hollandallaşmak*” (becoming Dutch). As seen, nativization was not considered to be a desirable goal by these interviewees; on the contrary it signified the disruption of the cohesion and integrity of the collectivity and the erosion of its fundamental values.

One reason for such a strong resistance to creolization might be the common understanding prevailing particularly in traditional societies that collective identities and values are absolute, primordial categories that are transmitted by birth and should be preserved at all costs. However, this phenomenon may also be attributed to another factor specific to the case at hand. That is, the originally intended temporariness of labour migrants in the Netherlands might have impacted on the collective psychology of community members, eroding their sense of permanence and rootedness in their new country. Even though many interviewees conceded that the likelihood of permanent return to Turkey was now slim as they and their children

had built their lives in the Netherlands, their position seemed to be one of maintaining the existing state of affairs within the already set social and cultural boundaries rather than pushing for an amalgamation with or a more active and organic involvement into wider society.

This sense of transience seems to hold the individual members of the community back from leaving a permanent imprint in society, for instance, through art, literature, architecture and other forms of cultural expression. This point was well explained by Yusuf, a former high-rank representative of an Islamic organization in the Netherlands, as he criticized the limited and inward-looking cultural practices of the Turkish community: “The best thing Turks in Europe can do is business. Nothing else. But it is not enough. A Turkish kid being educated in the Netherlands would probably like to read a book on Amsterdam written by a Turk living here. There are books written by Moroccans. This provides them with a feeling of nativity and self-confidence. But Turks here say that they have nothing [to root them] here. They still have the idea of return. According to them, this country is not theirs.”

The general tendency among members of the Turkish community to differentiate themselves from the rest of the population, native or immigrant, may be interpreted as an attempt at boundary maintenance. I have previously argued that boundary maintenance is an indispensable component in the construction of diaspora consciousness. In the second chapter of this study, I cited Armstrong’s definition of diaspora as a relatively small minority scattered throughout the host country without a specific territorial base (Armstrong 1999: 393-394). In the absence of a territorial base or an ethnic enclave, group cohesion can only be assured by rigorously patrolling the constructed boundaries of the collectivity. The majority of the people I interviewed expressed serious concerns about the future possibility of losing their peculiar identity as time passed and new generations became more and more embedded in Dutch society and culture. The lack of a specific and compact territorial base in the country of settlement unlike indigenous ethnic and minority communities seemed to flare up fears not only about the possibilities of degeneration and moral decline among individual members of the community, but also about an overall

deterioration of the social status of the whole community especially in the face of the recent economic crisis and rising racist tendencies within society.

There is another factor that reinforces this sense of rootlessness among the Turkish community: the paradoxical nature of their relationship with their country of origin. This relationship for many seemed to be characterized by a strong sense of national belonging and longing for a far-away, yet idealized, homeland on the one hand, and a commonly shared perception of being neglected by the Turkish state on the other. While they derived the fundamental components of their collective identity from their roots in the original homeland, they also had to come to terms with either the indifference of Turkish authorities to a great deal of their problems in the Netherlands, or the "self-interested" official policies of Turkey which were perceived to be remittance- and vote-oriented. The situation was further complicated by the processes of disorientation and alienation these people experienced during their visits to Turkey when they were stigmatized as being too "different" or too "European" by the native population there.

When I looked at the responses of the interviewees about the general conduct of social relations among the Turkish community in the Netherlands and about their own social experiences, I saw that the lack of a strong and immediate territorial identification, and the resulting sense of rootlessness and of social precariousness, were compensated for by the establishment of community-specific organizations and groups which would tie them simultaneously to their "roots" in the mother country and to their stock in the Netherlands. In other words, the lack of collectively venerated places of national and religious importance in their country of settlement and the physical (and sometimes psychological) distance from the country of origin or from hometowns associated with family lineage seemed to have compelled them to construct communal *spaces* whose form, content, boundaries and degree of flexibility could be set by their members or *inhabitants*. When sketching the historical background and current status of the Turkish community in the Netherlands in the previous part, I have touched upon the abundance of the foundations and associations established by Turkish immigrants and stated that the

Turkish community is one of the best organized among immigrant groups. However, I should also note that a great deal of these organizations is community-specific and their membership is confined to Turkish immigrants with a similar background. The main reason for this is that many of these organizations were initially founded with the aim to address the issues, problems and agendas that had been imported from Turkey through migration, and thus reflect for the most part the political, ethnic, religious, and geographical divisions in Turkey. Among these organizations, mosque foundations established and governed by various politico-religious communities and hometown associations appealing to fellow townsmen are in the forefront.

The organization of the social sphere basically along cultural and religious lines and definition of the individual existence of community members through such sectarian structures have produced mixed results. On the one hand such a high level of community mobilization has empowered members of the community the majority of whom suffered from the disadvantages of having low levels of education and income, limited Dutch language skills and problems of cultural adaptation. Community organizations have not only offered a platform for members to socialize with fellow people speaking the same language and having a similar cultural background, but also provided them with the necessary information, skills and tools to survive in an unfamiliar environment. The interviewees told me that they could ask for assistance and advice from knowledgeable persons working for or contacted by these organizations in case they needed it for their official and legal dealings. Moreover, they could discuss their common problems and organize activities to strengthen their communal ties within the framework of these organizations. Their children could benefit from the courses offered on various subjects including Quran and Islam, the Turkish and Dutch languages, and other curricular subjects. As a result of the social, educational and legal support provided by these organizations, the community members have become more resourceful and self-confident in tackling the problems of intergration into an otherwise overwhelmingly complex social life of the host country which has incomparably different political, legal and cultural dynamics than those of Turkey.

On the other hand, however, the existence of such a vast number of organizations with diversified (and often antagonistic) goals and agendas have led to further isolation of small clusters of members from other groups in the Turkish community and from wider Dutch society. The orientation of a considerable number of the existing popular community organizations towards Turkey reflecting the political and social cleavages in this country may also distract the attention of community members from the issues and problems that are related to their relatively lower socio-economic position in the Netherlands and may diminish the possibilities of allying with other immigrant communities and disadvantaged groups in the struggle to enhance not only their own well-being but also the general status of immigrants in society. The direct and indirect control and funding of some of these organizations by various institutions, political parties and groups based in Turkey may also be regarded as a factor that challenges the autonomy of the community as a whole vis-à-vis both the home and host countries and impedes the indigenization of newcomers and settled immigrants by feeding into the widespread perception of the migration experience as one of permanent exile.

Furthermore, a community structure in which many of its members are deeply involved in community organizations and networks, or at least are encouraged to organize their social life through these intermediaries runs the risk of locking its members up in their narrow cultural spheres leaving them with limited chances of interaction with other segments of society. This in turn adds to the feelings of alienation and transience I have discussed above. Even though the support mechanisms and social services provided by these organizations may be effective in dealing with community-specific problems in some cases, the excessive clout held by these organizations may at other times turn into a barrier that obstructs the direct linkages between community members and the existing problem-solving mechanisms and institutions of the Dutch state and society. This situation may reinforce a false image of collective self-sufficiency in a fashion that would compromise the ability of individual members of the community to establish, as they desire, healthier and more organic relations with the state and society they live in.

In addition, the means of social control facilitated by the close-knit functioning of particularly cultural and religious organizations may be used by community leaders to exert pressure on individual members who wish to pursue alternative life-styles, or take different courses of action in their public or private life, or lead a more integrated life with wider society. Community members may face accusations of “*gavurlaşmak*” and be ostracized from the community when they act contrary to community codes and expectations. Or they may develop mechanisms of self-control and refrain from personalized and novel forms of cultural expression. Hence the complaints about the paucity not only of elements of individuality, creativity and autonomy in the field of artistic production, but also of new and more effective hostland-oriented mechanisms of problem-solving and social cohesion among the Turkish community in the Netherlands. Finally, we sometimes observe that the unquestioned relations of devotion between community members and organizations (and their leaders) claiming to represent collectively praised values, beliefs and ideas may lead to the manipulation and even exploitation of the material and immaterial resources of members for wrongful or illegal purposes through abusing their vulnerabilities and their dependency on services provided.

I will deal with the issue of community organizations in further detail in the following section within the framework of the discussions on migrant integration and inter-community relations. Before proceeding to the analysis of the instrumental conception of homeland territoriality among the Turkish community in the Netherlands, I should also address the question of why these intermediary organizations, groups and structures have come to dominate the cultural and social aspects of the community life among Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands.

Based on the interviews, I may argue that migration experience proved quite traumatic for Turkish immigrants in the sense that it caused a rupture both in their accustomed life-style and cultural codes and in the ways they had previously related to places they deem important, including their birthplaces (or *memleket*), places of residence, holy places, and the wider home country. It is not surprising that this rupture eroded for some the bond that connected their past and future together. The

sense of disorientation among immigrants caused by the uplifting of the cultural and territorial anchors that had nestled them in their immediate localities in Turkey as a result of migrating to a previously unknown country with an alien culture had to be remedied by the establishment of parallel social structures that would accommodate their imported norms, practices and ways of life and thus substitute for the territorially contained forms of social cohesion utilized back in the home country.

No matter what the causes and conditions of migration were and even if economic migrants left their country of origin on a voluntary basis, the initial perception was one of exile as a response to the process of being detached from familiar places, people and culture. When immigrants began their struggle to build a new life in the host country, the feeling of exile was combined with the initial idea of temporariness and the lack of a territorial base or an ethnic enclave that would function as an interlocking container of group identity and integrity. As time passed and the idea of temporariness lost its validity in the eyes of both immigrants and the native community, nationalist and racist tendencies also started to take root both in politics and in society, which in turn reinforced the feelings of alienation and exclusion experienced by Turkish immigrants. Exacerbated by the image of a never-reconciling cultural clash with the native community as well as by the gradual deterioration of the socio-economic status of immigrants due to economic hardships and the rise of anti-immigrant discourses, the initial feelings of dislocation and victimization, a natural reaction of the first generation, have turned into a perception of a permanent condition of exile.

In the light of the above-mentioned findings, let me now list the conclusions I have reached with regard to the four parameters identified at the beginning of this section:

1. The absence of historically important national and religious places in the Netherlands and the physical distance from original hometowns that represent family lineage seem to compel many members of the Turkish community to establish cultural ties to their immediate locality or place of residence through self-enclosed Turkish or immigrant-dominated neighbourhoods that are organized around mosques and cultural centers. The home, the mosque and

the neighbourhood serve as the well-preserved and morally revered places of community-building, social interaction and cultural reproduction. The limits of these confined places at the same time mark the boundaries of the moral space occupied by its inhabitants. This moral space has been attempted to be defined, maintained and patrolled by the intervention of various community organizations that wish to put their stamp on the nature of this space in line with their specific goals, norms and values. The arrangement of social gatherings, political discussions, religious rites and cultural activities, and the addressing of community-specific needs and problems by means of these organizations constitute the necessary ground for community-locality association which is very crucial for the continued material and immaterial existence of both individual members and the community as a whole. In the absence of these day-to-day, habitual social, cultural, religious and political activities at the community level, the territorial rupture with the original homeland and with specific places of family descent would have been hard to tolerate for many community members. Collective activities organized and identities represented and consolidated by the culturally and religiously motivated community organizations in particular establish the cultural-territorial links between the home (as the personal sanctuary of the individual and their family), the mosque (as the concrete embodiment of the values and norms of the enlarged -religious- community) and the neighbourhood (as the territorial anchor of the local community in the hostland).

2. In addition to establishing the three-way link between the home, the mosque and the neighbourhood in a local-cultural sense, politico-religious and homeland-based organizations also help the Turkish community forge the triadic relationship between the well-preserved localities (i.e., homes, mosques and neighbourhoods) of community members in the Netherlands, the host state and society, and the original homeland. Cultural practices of community members for the most part take shape within the framework of these two-layered triadic relations (i.e., locally at the home-mosque-neighbourhood nexus, and translocally at the community-homeland-hostland

nexus). The unfolding of these two-layered triadic relations is mediated by community organizations or political or other groups in the original homeland that reach out to the community via some of these organizations. These intermediaries tend to hold sway over the social routine of community members and interfere in the construction of cultural identity and behaviour of their followers and in the structuring of the communal life, sometimes to the degree of eliminating other (indigenous, non-community) actors and forces within the host country. In this way, these cultural and political intermediaries become influential arbiters in the processes of community-building, of cultural reproduction and of entrenching community practices, values, and norms in the country of settlement.

3. The migration experience undermined the territorial embeddedness of immigrants' notion of genealogical continuity and their world of meaning. Detached from their previous land-based, rural activities and deprived of any immediate means for territorially anchoring their collective identity in the host country, they have constituted their cultural and normative world within self-contained community spaces, the most important of which are the home, the mosque and the neighbourhood. The religious and cultural values, beliefs, ideas and patterns of behaviour imported from the homeland and community organizations representing and promoting (some of) these elements have served as the cement of social cohesion much needed in a potentially hostile environment. The genealogical continuity and communal integrity of immigrants have been sustained not only through the construction of replicas of their specific homeland setting in their new places of residence, but also by paying habitual visits to the home country and to places of special significance, such as hometowns, family houses and cemeteries. This way the perpetuation of familial, communal and national allegiances that are supposed to contribute to the distinctiveness of group identity and to function as a barrier against the perceived danger of cultural assimilation has been made possible.

4. In the case of the Turkish community in the Netherlands, the role of territorial identification in the social organization of community life seems weak. The territorial relevance of the above-mentioned foci of community activity (namely the home, the mosque and the neighbourhood) is inevitably provisional since territoriality presupposes a degree of continuity and fixity. These places, as tangible structures, do not possess in their own right the sanctity of the values and meanings they symbolize. A community member may move to some other house, neighbourhood or city, may change their personal habits, or their relations with their immediate environment and neighbours may be disrupted for some reason. Despite this personal kind of rupture, however, the reconstituted spatial relationship with the new neighbourhood or with the new foci of community activity will most probably be equally appreciated from the perspective of the preservation of collective identity, provided that the new neighbourhood is a “Muslim-Turkish” one as well. Therefore, we may speak of the development particularly among the core members of the Turkish community of a deterritorialized, even transportable, community ethos that does not require the existence of a firm territorial anchor for its preservation and its transfer to younger generations. Though the definition and content of this community ethos may differ according to individual members or groups, conservative patriarchal cultural values, religion and homeland attachment stood out as the most referenced determinants of this ethos among the interviewees. The inevitable retreat of territorial identification into the background seems to have led to an overemphasis on these equally strong and supposedly “primordial” agents of social cohesion. As a result, many members of the community have retained the basic components of the community ethos defined in terms of “Muslimhood” and “Turkishness” and upheld them as the organizing principles of their moral and material life against a backdrop of the perceived state of permanent exile in a not-so-much internalized cultural environment.

### **5.2.2 Instrumental Conception of the Idea of Homeland and the Case of Dutch-Turks**

In this section I will analyze the relationship of the interviewees with their country of settlement, or lived homeland, which is a much larger territorial unit than one's immediate locality, neighbourhood or city and is instrumental through its laws, institutions and other tools of governance in providing the basic functions and services for the maintenance of a population's (and hence an individual's) political, economic, social existence and well-being. In other words, I will attempt to detect the instances of instrumental conceptualization of territorial attachment among the Dutch-Turkish interviewee group, and to establish the link between the cultural-local manifestations of territoriality addressed in the previous section and the political-ideological projection of the idea of homeland on a larger (nation-state) scale. My analysis under this heading will be based on four parameters:

- 1) presence of active citizenship ties with the lived homeland or country of settlement: political ties (political participation and voting, lobbying), legal ties (formal citizenship, civic rights and duties), economic ties (relations of production, distribution and consumption, money transfers and remittances), bureaucratic and military dealings (provision of public services, opportunity- and security-generating structures), and ideological bonds (national education, mass media, cultural exchanges, nationalistic mobilization, religious ties and activities);
- 2) interference of ideological intermediaries, such as the state, or any other political organization or leadership, in the process of the construction of the idea of homeland regarding the country of settlement;
- 3) an emphasis on a political-materialist perspective on territorial identification with the country of settlement;
- 4) presence of the idea of a collective existence (mutually shared past memories and future goals) embodied in the image of a secure and concrete land of settlement.

There are two dimensions to the instrumentally defined territorial ties of the Turkish community to the Netherlands as their lived homeland or country of settlement, whichever term individual members prefer to use. One is the community-to-state relationship which denotes active citizenship ties with the Dutch state. The other is the community-to-community dimension which signifies the relationship of the Turkish community to the native Dutch and other immigrant communities. These two dimensions may imply both the adoption of a political-materialist perspective and the existence of a sentimental attachment to the country and society. I will try to take into account the implications of both dimensions for the instrumental conception of the homeland idea while proceeding with my analysis of the interviewee accounts in this section.

The integration of immigrant communities into the political, economic, social and cultural structures of their country of settlement has always been a controversial issue on the part of immigrants, decision-makers and society in general. Integration is a vague concept which is sometimes perceived by immigrant communities as a euphemism for assimilation. Some of the interviewees claimed that the Turkish community had already become integrated into Dutch society as the new generations solved the language problem and raised their educational and socio-economic level by taking part in a wide range of sectors in society. According to them, the demands of Dutch authorities and society for further integration were in fact a call for total assimilation. The interviewee accounts revealed that the scope of integration in the view of the majority of the Turkish population in the Netherlands should be limited to three basic conditions: speaking the Dutch language, being good, law-abiding citizens and finally participating in the economic life of the country by seeking employment in preferably more prestigious sectors (i.e., entrepreneurialism).<sup>41</sup>

Most interviewees conceded that Turkish immigrants had been slow or reluctant in their efforts to adapt to the political-administrative system and social order of the Netherlands. According to the interviewees, although Turkish immigrants had come

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<sup>41</sup> I would like to thank Ali Aslan Yıldız, an academician and researcher in Utrecht working on issues of migration and ethnic relations, for providing me with his valuable insights into the Turkish community's general conception of integration.

to demonstrate rather sufficient levels of respect for and conformity with the general legal framework and mostly complied with the host-country system of laws and regulations, they had some difficulties in comprehending and adapting to social conventions and cultural codes of wider society. With respect to sharing a common community ethos with the rest of the population, for instance, the interviewees had mixed feelings. Some argued that a minimum degree of harmonization of cultural values and social behaviour was needed for more integrated inter-community relations, while others thought that reconciliation of the two cultures was neither necessary nor desired. As an indicator of their willingness for cultural integration, I asked a number of interviewees about the cartoons controversy in Denmark which involved the depiction of the Islamic prophet in an unfavourable way as well as about other incidents that had been interpreted as insults to the Muslim community in recent years. The responses of the interviewees prioritized the sanctity of religious beliefs and figures over the liberal democratic notions such as freedom of expression, tolerance and multiculturalism. When asked about the possible ways to overcome similar crises, the interviewees pointed out that they had no idea about how to resolve such value conflicts, but they believed that criticism of Islamic norms and values should not be tolerated in the name of freedom of speech.

There was a unanimously shared perception among the interviewees that discrimination against immigrant groups including the Turkish community was widespread. They emphasized that racist and discriminatory discourses and actions were observable not only among representatives of right-wing political parties or among extremist groups in society but also at the level of judicial and administrative bodies, public institutions, and private companies. The extensiveness of discriminatory practices at the institutional level particularly in employment decisions taken in both public and private establishments seemed to be perceived as more alarming when compared to individual incidents of discrimination at the community level. This appears to be in contradiction with the image of the Dutch state and society as a more liberal and tolerant model among other immigrant receiving countries. Regarding this contradiction, one of the interviewees, Kemal, a teacher and the current director of an education center in Amsterdam, remarked that

discrimination in the Netherlands was a sugar-coated and covert type; "discrimination with a smiling face" in his own words. Kemal went on to say, "The Netherlands is a country where there is a high level of racism and discrimination, but with a smiling face. They do everything through laws. There is an anti-discrimination bureau here. They say that if someone approaches you and spits, or shouts, 'Filthy Turk!', or pushes you aside while getting on a bus, then this is racism and discrimination. They want to focus on this. In my eyes, this is the act of a lunatic or a sociopath, and that exists in every society. This is not racism. Racism is when I stand in the court and the judge issues biased rulings. To me, racism occurs on the basis of institutions... There are 30-40 interns here [at the center]. They could not find internship opportunities somewhere else because they wear headscarves or because they are Turkish and have Turkish names... These things happen particularly during periods of economic crisis, but they are veiled."

The above-mentioned ideas and sentiments were more or less shared by all interviewees regardless of age, profession, creed or political orientation. This could be one of the reasons why many Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands tend to vote for left-wing or liberal parties which are perceived as immigrant-friendly. Despite the fact that the majority of the Turkish community in the Netherlands are predisposed towards conservative ideologies and parties with religious and nationalist agendas, they shift their voting preferences in the Dutch political context towards socialist or social democratic parties. A factsheet prepared by FORUM reflects this situation. An exit poll carried out to find out about the party preferences of ethnic minorities in the municipal (Amsterdam) and national elections in 2010 indicates that 59% of the Turkish community voted for the Labour Party (PvdA), 15% for the GreenLeft (GL), 14% for Democrats 66 (D66; a social-liberal and progressive party) and 10% for the Socialist Party (SP) while the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD; a conservative-liberal party) could each secure only one percent of the Turkish votes.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> See FORUM (Instituut voor Multiculturele Vraagstukken-Institute for Multicultural Affairs) Factsheet entitled "Political Participation of Members of Ethnic Minorities" at

The Party for Freedom (PVV), a right-wing party supporting a more stringent immigration policy and demanding a stop to immigration from Muslim countries, has considerably increased its public support in the last three rounds of elections and became the third party in the general elections of 2012. The overtly racist and discriminatory declarations and actions of the PVV targeting the Muslims in particular have stirred up reactions from immigrant communities. The interviewees also expressed their worries about the upsurge of racist tendencies in Dutch politics. In this regard, the implicit or explicit hardening of immigration policies of moderate and leftist parties as a result of the radicalization of the political scene seemed to be causing more concern than the rise of the openly extremist PVV. Most interviewees attributed the strengthening of the anti-immigration stance both in politics and in society to the recent economic recession and the contraction of the job market. However, they also pointed out that the attacks of September 11 had put the Muslims in the spotlight as the scapegoats of many irrelevant negative developments and created a political atmosphere conducive to the spread of Islamophobic sentiments and policies. In this process, some of the interviewees claimed, Muslimhood started to overshadow ethnic identities as a marker of difference and lumping of all Muslims into the same basket became a common practice.

The interviewees' perception of alienation and discrimination of immigrants at the level of institutions and party politics was coupled by the general understanding that discriminatory policies were not merely the reserve of certain governments or political parties, but had always been systematically promoted and implemented by the Dutch state all along. Contrary to the images of the Netherlands as a successful model of multiculturalism and peaceful co-existence of different "pillars", some of the interviewees argued that the Dutch state never intended to integrate immigrant communities in a dignified and proper manner; it rather envisaged their containment within general society during their stay and their eventual return to countries of origin. Kenan, a free-lance journalist who had come to the Netherlands at the age of 25 as a tourist and decided to settle because of its liberal social structure, admitted

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*<http://www.forum.nl/Portals/International/english-pdf/Factsheet-Political-Participation-2010.pdf>*  
(accessed 08.01.2014).

that the country was not so liberal when it came to issues of immigration and treatment of foreigners. He claimed that immigrants were brought to the Netherlands not because of their intellectual faculties but because of their muscles. Therefore, immigrants were neither expected nor intended to be integrated; they were pushed to the margins on purpose and their socio-economic deprivation and neediness were used as a leverage to reduce the wages of native Dutch workers. According to Kenan, this was why the economic and social plight of immigrants was reinforced by state policies that initially encouraged Turkish immigrants to retain the Turkish language instead of learning Dutch and to set up community-specific organizations that would prevent them from blending into wider society.

The above-mentioned ideas may at first seem a bit far-fetched since the initial reluctance of the Dutch state to develop necessary policy tools to facilitate the smooth integration of newcomers can also be explained, among others factors, by the intended temporariness of the presence of immigrants and the initial lack of know-how on integration. This in turn might have ruled out robust responses to the piling immigration-oriented problems. Even if we accept the relevance of these factors, however, the Dutch state has been hardly neutral in immigration-related matters. One of the most common themes brought up by the interviewees was the official labelling of immigrants as “*allochtoon*” even if they acquired Dutch citizenship. This labelling seemed to have added to their feelings of estrangement and collective frustration regarding the readiness of Dutch society and polity to accept them as an integral part.

The dichotomy of *allochtoon* (those who were born outside the Netherlands or who descend from a foreign-born person) and *autochtoon* (those of Netherlands birth and ancestry) has long been in use in administrative and public discourse. Official statistics too rely on these two concepts when differentiating between population groups. Population statistics by origin classifies the total population first into the categories of *allochtoon* and *autochtoon*, and then divides the category of *allochtoon* groups into those with Western background (defined as originating from a country in Europe -excluding Turkey-, North America, Oceania, or from Indonesia or Japan) and those with non-Western background (defined as originating from a country in

Africa, South America, Asia -excluding Indonesia and Japan-, or from Turkey). The non-Western category primarily denotes immigrants from Morocco, Turkey, Suriname, Dutch Antilles and Aruba. These categories are further split into first-generation and second-generation allochtones, and the latter into those with one foreign-born parent and those with two foreign-born parents.<sup>43</sup> The inclusion, for instance, of people with Japanese or Indonesian origin into the Western allochtone category and the singling out of Turkish and Moroccan labour immigrants from among other labour immigrant groups with diverse origins (both Western and non-Western) and the labeling of only them as non-Western apparently induced the idea among the interviewees as well as among other immigrants that these categories had been formulated in an arbitrary or biased fashion. Because, instead of indicators that are more easily discernible and less controversial such as birthplace, nationality and type of migration (labour, political, etc.), the interviewees believed that the Dutch state relied on such factors as historical-cultural affinity, level of socio-economic development and religion as the selected criteria for determining who belongs to which statistical category.

Despite the appearance that the demographic categories of the Dutch state are based on geographical *places* (countries, continents, the West, etc.), the above-mentioned and other inconsistencies of taxonomy call into question the motives and assumptions underlying the official categorization scheme. Yanow and van den Haar focus on the place-based hierarchy of the official categorization of population groups and ask whether geography serves as a proxy for identity in socio-economic and cultural terms. Even though the Netherlands has no explicit race discourse, the authors claim that the adoption of a geographical hierarchy as a conceptual tool for

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<sup>43</sup> See

[http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=37325&D1=a&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0&D5=0-4,137,152,220,237&D6=0,4,9,\(1-1\),l&HD=130605-0936&HDR=G2,G1,G3,T&STB=G4,G5](http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=37325&D1=a&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0&D5=0-4,137,152,220,237&D6=0,4,9,(1-1),l&HD=130605-0936&HDR=G2,G1,G3,T&STB=G4,G5) (accessed 10.12.2013),

[http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLEN&PA=37325eng&D1=0-2&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0&D5=0-1,3-4,139,145,210,225&D6=4,9,\(1-1\)-l&HD=090611-0858&LA=EN&HDR=G3,T&STB=G5,G1,G2,G4](http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLEN&PA=37325eng&D1=0-2&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0&D5=0-1,3-4,139,145,210,225&D6=4,9,(1-1)-l&HD=090611-0858&LA=EN&HDR=G3,T&STB=G5,G1,G2,G4) (accessed 10.12.2013),

and <http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/bevolking/methoden/begrippen/default.htm?ConceptID=315> (accessed 10.12.2013).

an essentialist gradation of similarity to and difference from “Dutchness” in particular, and “Europeanness” more broadly, alludes to the association in the race discourse between place and behaviour/character. In their view, the linking of birthplace to identity and character may not in the Dutch case amount to a racial differentiation in the genetic sense, but it definitely rests on stereotypes of collective behaviour and reinforces certain prejudices about the *allochtoon*, especially in its non-Western form (Yanow and van den Haar 2013: 29-30).

Notwithstanding the testimonies of the interviewees to the effect that there is a rising tide of racist populism in politics and that they or their circle of friends and family had sometimes been frustrated by examples of discriminatory or prejudicial practices in their daily life, none of them declared that they had been exposed to a racial or ethnically essentialist type of discrimination inflicted in an all-pervading and oppressive manner by state authorities. Many interviewees also stated that there existed official and unofficial channels to remedy the adverse consequences of unjust treatment. What disturbed the interviewees more than overt and glaring instances of discrimination was the structural and less visible forms of prejudicial behaviour.

Structural discrimination unfolds at the level of both the state and society. At the state level, the implementation of tougher integration policies and the restrictions placed on family reunification and naturalization were perceived by some of the interviewees as manifestations of a hidden logic of "either assimilate or exclude" on the part of the Dutch decision-makers. Even for those who did not go that far, the imposition of compulsory requirements by the Civic Integration Act that entered into force on 1 January 2007 replacing the Newcomer Integration Law of 1998 certainly constituted a discouraging move. Because, by this law, some of the obligations set for newcomers by the previous law (such as the requirement to pass a standardized integration test within a specified period of time) were extended to settled immigrants as well.<sup>44</sup> The interviewees expressed their disappointment about

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<sup>44</sup> For a detailed evaluation of the Civic Integration Act, see the report entitled “Summary: Evaluation of Civic Integration in the Netherlands” at [http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/resources/detail.cfm?ID\\_ITEMS=21763](http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/resources/detail.cfm?ID_ITEMS=21763) (accessed 11.12.2013). This

compulsory integration measures because they believed these measures reflected the ongoing official perception of established immigrant communities as "aliens" to be principally tackled. They also mentioned their resentment regarding the curriculum of the integration courses stipulated by the new legislation; the courses contained lectures on appropriate (read *civilized*) social conduct expected of newcomers from (*less civilized*) parts of the world and the interviewees found this particularly humiliating.<sup>45</sup>

The concerns of the interviewees about a gradual deterioration of their immigrant status due to stiffening integration policies are not unfounded. Especially with the rise of Islamic terrorism, there has been a growing understanding in immigrant-receiving countries in Europe that previous legal and social frameworks for integration have proved to be a failure in many respects and that new concepts and policy tools should be designed in order to enhance immigrant integration. As a result, there occurred a shift both in discourse and in actual laws and policies from a model based on the principles of multiculturalism, group autonomy and voluntary integration towards the concept of civic integration that rests on individualization of migrant integration and imposition of obligatory mechanisms. Parallel to this shift, the Netherlands, a country previously seen by many as the closest example of ideal-type multiculturalism, has also revised its conception of integration adopting a civic model.

Christian Joppke regards civic integration as the extension of the logic of economic neoliberalism into the domain of migration and defines it as a model that rests on the treatment of migrants as individuals who are held responsible for their own integration. He goes on to argue that the civic integration model reinforces the idea that the migrant's initial position in the new polity is not secure and that he/she must

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report was prepared by the Dutch Ministry for Housing, Communities and Integration and was submitted to the States-General of the Netherlands in 2010.

<sup>45</sup> In 2010, Dutch judges ruled in three different cases that imposing integration courses on Turkish immigrants is against the agreements between the European Union and Turkey. These rulings were upheld by the appeals court in 2011. See the news report entitled "Turks Exempt from Dutch Integration Courses" at <http://www.rnw.nl/africa/bulletin/turks-exempt-dutch-integration-courses> (accessed 11.12.2013).

gradually "earn" the rights of full and permanent membership (Joppke 2007: 247-248). This stands in contrast to the previous model that underscored cultural diversity and group autonomy by treating individual migrants as members of their own cultural-ethnic group and framing policies to prevent their possible victimization as a group. Joppke thinks that civic integration was a response to the obvious failure of the multiculturalist approach to deepen the integration of immigrants and their descendants; the latter model led to the containment of migrant groups within their separate worlds whereas civic integration aims at migrant participation in mainstream institutions (namely, the concept of "shared citizenship") through learning the Dutch language, civic education and preparation for the labour market. Hence, the stipulation of taking integration courses and passing an integration exam as preconditions for the granting and renewal of residence permits (Joppke 2007: 249).

According to Joppke, one reason for this policy shift is the right-wing populism that emerged in Dutch politics after the murder of the far-right populist leader Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and pervaded not only his followers but also mainstream politicians propelling them towards more restrictive migration and integration policies. But Joppke identifies another reason that closely concerns the Turkish immigrant community in the Netherlands, and that is the demographic profile of the new migrant groups. In the absence of big waves of labour immigration, the majority of the newcomers are asylum-seekers and migrants coming through family reunification who are predominantly low-skilled or unskilled. This is particularly problematic in the eyes of Dutch authorities because the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant communities in the Netherlands have a high rate of in-group marriages, and most second- and third-generation Turks and Moroccans tend to look for marriage partners from their countries of origin. As a result, the offspring of such in-group marriages also grow up in ethnically closed families, and this in turn perpetuates the ethnic segregation that marks these groups (Joppke 2007: 250-251).

The solution found by the Dutch state to the problems of isolation and segregation of immigrant communities was the concept of integration from abroad. The Civic

Integration (Preparation Abroad) Act, dated 2006, obliges immigrants to gain the necessary knowledge and skills regarding their prospective life in the Netherlands *before* coming to the country. Immigrants should gain a basic knowledge of the Dutch language and society in their country of origin or long-term residence and should succeed in the civic integration examination that can be taken at Dutch missions abroad. In other words, prospective immigrants seeking to form or reunite with a family, or demanding authorisation for temporary stay cannot come to the Netherlands until they have passed the examination.<sup>46</sup> Joppke claims that this new framework for newcomers makes the integration test a perfect tool for preventing unwanted family immigration since there is hardly any access to Dutch education programs abroad. In short, the policy of integration from abroad discourages integration, and when accompanied by the introduction of the above-mentioned obligations for settled immigrants it indeed amounts to a policy of "no-immigration" (Joppke 2007: 250).

Not surprisingly, the new integration measures designed as a remedy for the perceived gap between the migrant and native communities have not been well-received by many members of immigrant groups including Turks. The situation was aggravated by the introduction of stricter requirements for naturalization and of restrictions on dual citizenship. Before 2003, Dutch-born children of immigrants had an unconditional option right to Dutch nationality when they came of age and integration requirements for naturalization were quite low. For the first-generation immigrants having had five years of legal residence in the Netherlands, a reasonable knowledge of the Dutch language and being accepted in Dutch society were required for acquiring Dutch citizenship (van Oers *et al.* cited in Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010: 778), but in practice only a simple language assessment would suffice. Since 2003 the option right can be refused based on the outcome of a public order investigation and applicants are required to sit for a naturalization exam that includes

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<sup>46</sup> For a detailed evaluation of the Civic Integration (Preparation Abroad) Act, see the report entitled "Evaluation of the Civic Integration Act Abroad (WI)" at [http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/resources/detail.cfm?ID\\_ITEMS=9949](http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/resources/detail.cfm?ID_ITEMS=9949) (accessed 11.12.2013). This report was drawn up by the Supervisory Committee of the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Integration and was submitted to the Dutch House of Representatives in 2009.

oral and written language tests at a much higher level as well as questions on Dutch politics and society. (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010: 778).

As for the right to dual citizenship, the Netherlands had a *de facto* acceptance of dual nationality before 1992. In this year, the right to dual nationality was legalized, but after heated debates the obligation to renounce prior citizenship was introduced in 1997. Nevertheless, there are many exemptions to this obligation and the law is not very strictly applied (van Oers *et al.* cited in Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010: 778). As of 1 January 2011, the number of Turkish immigrants with dual (Dutch and Turkish) nationality was roughly around 290,000.<sup>47</sup> According to a statistical evaluation, in 2009, around 60% of the first-generation Turks and Moroccans living in the Netherlands had the Dutch nationality in addition to their original citizenship while this rate was over 80% among second-generation Turks and Moroccans. Very few Turks and Moroccans have only the Dutch nationality.<sup>48</sup>

Noting the radical shift from the "citizenship stimulates integration" approach to the view that citizenship is a crown on successful integration, Ersanilli and Koopmans ask whether easily accessible citizenship indeed promotes higher levels of socio-cultural integration of immigrants. After collecting data from sample groups of Turks living in Germany, France and the Netherlands and processing the data with regard to four dependent variables (host-country identification, frequency of speaking host-country language, host-country language proficiency and social contacts with host country ethnics), they concluded that host-country identification is enhanced by easily accessible naturalization whereas linguistic and social integration is not. Naturalization has a positive impact on linguistic integration only in those countries where new citizens have been traditionally required a certain degree of cultural assimilation (i.e., France and Germany) (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010: 775). In the Netherlands, where naturalization requirements were relatively lower until 2003 and dual nationality was mostly condoned, the data showed no significant differences

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<sup>47</sup> See <http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2012/2012-3578-wm.htm> (accessed 12.12.2013).

<sup>48</sup> See <http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2009/2009-2997-wm.htm?Languageswitch=on> (accessed 12.12.2013).

between the naturalized and non-naturalized Turkish immigrants on any of the indicators of socio-cultural integration. According to the authors, this result reflects the absence in the Netherlands until very recently of significant linguistic and cultural assimilation preconditions for naturalization. Even though Dutch-Turks performed better than German-Turks and similarly to French-Turks in terms of the level of host-country identification, authors observed lower levels of host-country language usage and proficiency due to the fact that linguistic assimilation had not been promoted in the Netherlands for a long time (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010: 787-788).

In the light of all the above-mentioned developments regarding the rights of immigrants, it may be argued that most immigrants in the Netherlands have come to feel less secure in their host country because of the shift in the Dutch integration paradigm towards a civic model that aims at further cultural and linguistic assimilation by holding the individual migrant responsible for their own integration and restricting their rights in case of unsuccessful integration. This was more than evident in the interviews I conducted. I observed that those interviewees who adopted a defensive stance regarding the preservation of their original group identity were the ones with greater anxiety about the future prospects of their social status and cultural autonomy as a collectivity in the Netherlands. In fact, there seemed to be a paradox in their approach. On the one hand, they bemoaned the assimilationist challenges posed by the Dutch state and other actors in society and expressed their determination to preserve their unity, identity and cultural autonomy as a close-knit, compact collectivity. On the other hand, however, they rejected the homogenizing approach adopted by the Dutch state and society based on stereotypes about Muslims and certain ethnicities including Turks. The questions of whether immigrant communities have become less inclined to integrate because of discriminatory and exclusionist attitudes of the host country or whether the immigrants' preservation and perpetuation of segregated cultural spheres and practices have paved the way for the host country's endorsement of more assertive (and sometimes assimilationist) integration policies seem to signify a vicious circle, and how you identify its starting point usually depends on which side you belong to.

As mentioned before, there was a consensus among the interviewees regarding linguistic integration; proficiency in the Dutch language was seen to be a must for successful integration. Economic participation and law-abidance were the other preconditions identified by the interviewees. However, for many, cultural integration meant the total dissolution of the community and was therefore renounced. I also observed that most interviewees, when asked about their most pressing problems, formulated their claims and demands on cultural-religious grounds. Even though all interviewees touched upon the multiplied negative effects on immigrants of the recent economic recession and the rising rates of unemployment, very few of them brought up, or identified as immediate concerns, such welfare state issues as social benefits, income distribution gap, deteriorating labour rights, women's rights, child care, etc. These issues actually pertain to the population as a whole and cross-cut various segments of Dutch society, hitting the disadvantaged groups (particularly the unqualified and female immigrants) more strongly than the others. The lack of interest in these matters may be explained by the development of parallel social structures and kin networks that aim to solve or at least mitigate the effects of these problems *within* the confines of the immigrant community by using tools that do not contravene the perceived traditional set-up and cultural composition of the community.

Of course, producing collective and culturally convenient short-term solutions to urgent problems is one thing, achieving a smooth and successful integration in the long-run is another. Many interviewees claimed that their self-enclosedness and segregation from the rest of society were triggered by the increasingly assimilationist discourses and policies at the official-political level as well as by exclusionary and discriminatory attitudes at the societal level. Classical arguments of multiculturalism also suggest that integration of immigrants is better achieved if immigrants obtain equal civic rights as quickly and widely as possible and are granted special group rights allowing them to retain their peculiar cultural identity and practices as a collectivity. Koopmans, in another study (2010), challenges this core assumption of the multiculturalist perspective and argues that easy access to equal rights, including unrestricted access to welfare state arrangements, combined with a high degree of

facilitation of cultural differences have had negative effects on socio-economic integration of immigrants. Within the framework of this study, Koopmans conducted a comparative analysis of the data measuring the integration levels of non-EU immigrants in eight European countries including the Netherlands with respect to three selected components of socio-economic integration, namely labour market participation, residential segregation and crime levels.

The Netherlands, as a generous welfare state and one of the top three countries that have granted immigrants the broadest range of cultural rights, was found to be one of the least successful countries in achieving the integration of immigrants in terms of the selected areas of integration. Together with Sweden and Belgian Flanders, the countries that also have generous welfare arrangements with easy access to equal citizenship rights and limited assimilation pressures, the Netherlands showed the poorest labour market integration of immigrants (Koopmans 2010: 14-15). In terms of residential segregation of immigrants, the study revealed that segregation is related to the degree of cultural difference; the more culturally distinct Muslim groups live more strongly physically segregated from the rest of the population than European or postcolonial immigrants from the Caribbean, who usually speak fluent Dutch or English and mostly have a Christian background. As for the Turkish immigrants, the data indicates the highest rates of segregation in the three Dutch cities (the Hague, Rotterdam and Amsterdam) as well as in Stockholm when compared to the other cities and countries examined. This leads to the conclusion that countries that put more emphasis on assimilation show more moderate levels of residential segregation (Koopmans 2010: 17). Concerning the crime levels, the study looked into cross-national differences in the rate of overrepresentation of immigrants among the prison population and reached similar results as above. Overrepresentation of inmates from an immigrant background is by far the strongest in the Netherlands, where their share in the prison population is six to eight times as high as in the general population (Koopmans 2010: 18).

As seen, the multiculturalist record of the Dutch state combined with generous welfare arrangements seems to have contributed to the already sharp cultural divides

between the immigrants and the natives as well as between the immigrant communities with different cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds. This conclusion was also confirmed by the weakness of the organic tie between the community members I interviewed and the Dutch state. Most interviewees stated that they were permanent settlers in the Netherlands with admittedly slim prospects for migrating back. As such, they enjoyed the benefits of having the Dutch citizenship and passport, and became accustomed to the favourable aspects of the Dutch political-administrative system and public life. They particularly mentioned that they appreciated the well-organized and strictly controlled state machinery, stability of the political system, orderliness of public life and the popular endorsement of rule of law and business ethics in the Netherlands. Some of them even complained about how some members of the Turkish community attempted to exploit the welfare state arrangements to extort financial and other benefits contrary to laws and regulations. They also condemned those immigrants who vandalize public property by claiming that the Dutch state does not represent them or that it is allowed by religion to inflict damage on the property of infidels.

Notwithstanding their sensitivities regarding the obligation to respect law and order in their host country and their appreciation of the well-functioning Dutch state machinery and of the conveniences attached to Dutch citizenship, the interviewees seemed to lack a strong emotional attachment to the Netherlands since very few of them identified the latter as (a) homeland. The perception that the cultural ways and the fundamental values and ideas defining the Dutch state and society were irreconcilably different from theirs seemed to be a very influential factor in their feeble host-country identification. The emotional distance from their country of settlement was also evident in the anti-state attitude adopted by some of the interviewees. Rejection of cultural adaptation and disapproval of state intervention to impose any sort of cultural integration was accompanied by a claim for self-sufficiency in the accounts of these interviewees. The entrepreneurialism of the Turkish community and the predisposition of community members towards setting up their own private businesses instead of working in the public sector were regarded as positive elements that ensured communal self-sufficiency and group autonomy

vis-à-vis a not-so-friendly state. In this view, the state should only be instrumental in generating the conditions that are conducive to the economic and cultural self-realization of separate communities, and any move on the part of the state beyond that of a facilitator should be resisted.

Here we see the conception of the state-community relations as a zero-sum game in which socio-cultural adaptation is seen as being equal to capitulating to unjustifiable demands of the Dutch state and surrendering to assimilation by relinquishing community rights regarding group autonomy and cultural differences. The understanding of mutual empowerment between the state and society as a whole that typically characterizes homeland attachment in the classical sense hardly exists in this context. The interviewees emphasized that the thriving of Turkey as a stronger and better-off country in the international arena empowered Turkish communities all over the world, consolidating their socio-political status and boosting their collective self-esteem in their host countries. However, apart from their recognition of the interdependence of their economic fate with that of the host country, the interviewees did not express any marked sign of national attachment to their host state or population, nor did they convey any clear impression of possessing national pride (or resentment) regarding how the Dutch state and people fared domestically and internationally. Only a few interviewees mentioned that the centrality of the concepts of freedom and human rights in the Dutch political and social order constituted a reason for their decision to settle in the Netherlands, and that the general atmosphere of freedom continued to be a significant component of their allegiance to the country despite the severity of problems of migrant populations.

This overriding feeling of emotional detachment from the host country may also be the reason why we witness many instances of naturalization among Turkish immigrants without actually renouncing their original Turkish citizenship, an act in defiance of the Dutch nationality law. Many interviewees stressed the benefits of obtaining the Dutch passport particularly in international travels and the need to protect the interests of the Turkish community in politics as the primary reasons to naturalize. Yet, almost none referred to any conception of a “national duty” towards

their fellow Dutch people or towards the country they had lived in for so long. Only one interviewee declared that he chose the Dutch nationality over the Turkish one because he thought that having dual nationality was ethically problematic and that a person should be subject to only one legal-political system.

This materialist-instrumentalist conception of host-country allegiance also manifests itself in the investment decisions of Turkish immigrants. Most immigrants prefer to acquire property or real estate in Turkey. Even if they do not have a short-term plan for return, the mere “idea of return” seems to be still appealing as it provides many immigrants with a utopia to look to or an anchor in a socially and culturally threatening place. Moreover, there are also immigrants who split their time in both countries throughout the year especially after retirement. In this way, they take advantage of the material benefits of the Netherlands while reinvigorating their ties with the “ideal homeland”. I will analyze this aspect of homeland attachment in further detail in the upcoming section. But for now, I may argue that the still-maintained material and moral ties with the original homeland seem to compensate for the fragility of emotional-cultural association with the host country and nation.

National pride also seems to play a part in this picture. National pride can be said to have a paradoxical dimension in the context of Turkish immigrants. On the one hand, they are always reminded of their (Muslim-Turkish) origins and thus never allowed by the natives to indigenize or feel “at home” in the Netherlands, a situation also mentioned by the interviewees. This feeling of victimization activates sentiments of national pride. On the other hand, many immigrants believe that acculturation of any sort or degree is off the table because national characteristics (Turkishness and Islam) are “what make us who we are”. In their view, cultural adaptation is redundant because they already have their community-specific mechanisms for the services not properly provided by the state and they mostly run their own businesses without being dependent on public resources and employment opportunities. Furthermore, cultural adaptation is not favoured also because many Turkish immigrants feel that they have a moral superiority over Dutch society since their own values, beliefs and customs are thought to be not only more authentic as they derive

from the true religion and from an exquisite national lineage, but also more conducive to a morally anchored community and family life as well as to collective solidarity and self-preservation.

The detachment of the Turkish migrant community from the Dutch state and society and their association with the latter on the grounds of pragmatism and interest-oriented forms of allegiance were interpreted by some interviewees as a sign of reluctance, or even resistance, to integrate. But is it really the case that the Turkish immigrant community in the Netherlands is resisting integration? I will refer to two studies regarding the adaptation strategies of Turks in the Netherlands and the majority opinion on these strategies.

The first one, an earlier study published in 1998, investigated the cultural adaptation strategies preferred by Turks and Moroccans living in the Netherlands and the Dutch majority's evaluation of the possible strategies chosen by these minority groups (van Oudenhoven *et al.* 1998). The study revealed that among the four adaptation strategies (namely integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization)<sup>49</sup>, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants showed most appreciation for integration; they felt the need to contact with the Dutch majority while wanting to maintain their original culture (van Oudenhoven *et al.* 1998: 1002). As to the reaction of the Dutch respondents to the adaptation strategies that Turks and Moroccans may choose, the authors observed the most positive evaluation towards the forms in which Turks and Moroccans desire to have contact with the majority (assimilation and integration). Assimilation, a form in which the original culture is downplayed, was the most preferred form whereas the forms that imply little contact with the Dutch (separation and marginalization) evoked more negative responses. However, when the Dutch respondents were asked which strategies were *actually* preferred by the specified immigrants groups, the Dutch respondents assumed that separation and

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<sup>49</sup> In this study, integration is defined as the situation in which immigrants simultaneously wish to have contact with the dominant group and maintain their original culture. In the case of assimilation, immigrants wish to have contact with the dominant group, but the original culture is less important to them. Separation refers to the case in which immigrants do not aspire to contact with the dominant group and value maintaining their original culture while in marginalization immigrants feel the need neither to contact with the dominant group nor to maintain their original culture (p. 997).

marginalization occurred more often among Turks and Moroccans than the other two strategies. In other words, the most appreciated strategy (assimilation) was perceived by the majority members to occur the least whereas the least appreciated one (separation) was estimated to occur the most (van Oudenhoven *et al.* 1998: 1007). This study also confirms the huge perceptual gap I have identified between the native and the immigrant communities. Many Turkish immigrants hold that they are open to integration (but not to assimilation) in the sense of adapting to the conditions necessitated by the need to participate in the Dutch public life. They claim that they have indeed mostly achieved it particularly among the second- and third-generation members, though they acknowledge some short-comings. However, they believe that the Dutch community fails to appreciate it and pushes for further assimilation disregarding the importance for them of their original culture.

The second study confirms for the most part the findings of the first one for the Turkish community which it exclusively focuses on (Arends-Tóth and van de Vijver 2003). This study examines the attitudes of both Dutch and Turkish-Dutch participants towards multiculturalism and acculturation. It evaluates the results according to the same four acculturation strategies of integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization. However, as distinct from the first study, it distinguishes between the private and public domains of life, questioning which strategies are preferred by the two groups in separate domains. The results show that the Dutch natives preferred assimilation of the immigrant group in both public and private domains and were less in favour of cultural maintenance than the Turkish-Dutch group. The Turkish-Dutch participants on the other hand made a clear distinction between public and private domains; integration was the most preferred strategy in the former domain while separation was by far the most preferred in the latter. In other words, the Dutch natives valued cultural adaptation of Turkish immigrants in all domains of life whereas the Turkish-Dutch respondents preferred cultural adaptation only in public domains of life (Arends-Tóth and van de Vijver 2003: 259-260).

The distinction made by Turkish immigrants between the public and private domains of life is noteworthy. This study corroborates my assessment based on the interviews that Turkish immigrants value the home, the mosque and the neighbourhood as inviolable spaces of cultural maintenance. While they deem host-country language proficiency and inter-cultural contact necessary for securing a position in society, they view the private domain as one to be defended against the possible infiltration of alien cultural ways. Being compatible with the legal and public order of the host country is important for avoiding stigmatization and marginalization within wider society. However, in their view, espousal of the strategy of integration in the public domain does not preclude efforts for cultural preservation in the private sphere. In other words, cultural preservation in the private sphere and integration in the public sphere are not mutually exclusive or inherently incompatible strategies for Turkish immigrants. While migrant groups see the private domain as part of another social and cultural subsystem, majority people tend to adopt a homogeneous, domain-independent view on culture according to which the culture of the private domain and the public domain are identical (Arends-Tóth and van de Vijver 2003: 263).

Such a clear-cut differentiation by immigrant communities of private and public domains of life may also be one of the factors that account for the homeland-oriented and culture-specific nature of the goals, scope and activities of many Turkish organizations in the Netherlands. Being motivated primarily by the overarching goals of sustaining homeland ties and ensuring cultural preservation in the host state, these organizations mostly cater to ingroup needs and their membership remains practically limited to Turkish immigrants. Obviously, Turkish immigrants generally regard these cultural organizations as part of the private domain of their community life. These organizations constitute the medium through which cultural boundaries are fortified and the private sphere becomes impenetrable by outsiders and extrinsic cultural effects.

It should also be noted that the studies cited above are not up-to-date; the shift in integration policies of the Dutch state from multiculturalism to a rather assimilationist perspective as well as the turning of the political tide against

immigrants might have impacted on the strategy preferences of both the immigrant and majority groups. At this stage, we lack the necessary means to evaluate the medium- and long-term effects of the changing integration paradigm in the Netherlands. Before moving on, however, the issue of migrant integration begs another question. Are there any generational differences in immigrant conceptions of cultural maintenance and adaptation?

Opinions of the interviewees diverged on the matter of generational differences. Some interviewees claimed that the second- and third-generation Turkish immigrants were more integrated into the larger society as they were well-educated, better-equipped with linguistic and social skills and better-informed about the legal, administrative and economic dynamics of the host country. On the other hand, some others stated that they had been observing symptoms of increasing cultural conservatism among younger generations. The interviewees attributed the growing tendency of cultural radicalization among younger immigrants to basically two conditions. Firstly, economic survival was the primary concern for first-generation immigrants whereas the relief facilitated by relative improvement of the well-being of subsequent generations induced a renewed interest in cultural roots. Members of the first generation were neither as politically motivated due to their intended temporariness nor as politically conscious mainly because of their low education levels as members of the subsequent generations. Secondly, the perceived proliferation of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes and discourses in the Netherlands, in conformity with the polarization of the international political atmosphere along arguably religious-civilizational lines particularly since the beginning of the 2000s, inclined younger immigrants towards a more ardent embracement of their cultural- religious identity.

A study conducted among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands inquires into the generational differences in ethnic and religious identity and practices, and their interrelation (Maliepaard *et al.* 2010). The study revealed that second-generation Turks and Moroccans, though still referring themselves as Muslim, identify less strongly with their religious and ethnic group and engage less

in ethno-cultural and religious practices when compared to the first-generation respondents. The decline of religious and ethnic identity was found to be interrelated in the sense that those who felt more Dutch regarded religion less important than those who felt more strongly Turkish or Moroccan. According to the authors, growing up in a secular receiving context affects both religious and ethnic attachment negatively. Surprisingly, however, the religious and the ethnic identity are more strongly intertwined for the second generation; being Muslim is more strongly related to feeling Turkish or Moroccan for this group. These results confirm the central assumption of the assimilation theory which predicts the gradual decline of ethno-religious identification among migrants over generations, and contravene the much-repeated argument that there is an increase in religiousness among young Muslims and this hampers their socio-cultural integration into the mainstream society (Maliepaard *et al.* 2010: 466-468).

Integration is an elusive concept and is hard to measure. Socio-economic, or structural, integration may not always imply cultural integration. Likewise, cultural maintenance may not always preclude structural integration. Perceptions regarding the level of integration may differ between migrant and native communities and between migrant generations. There may also be conjunctural shifts both in actual and perceptual processes. Ties of migrants with their original homeland are sometimes taken as evidence of poor integration performance on the part of immigrants. However, whether close homeland ties and a sustained interest in homeland-related issues result in a lesser identification with the hostland and thus in poorer integration is a question to be addressed. Before delving into the transnational and diasporic implications of the homeland-hostland nexus within the context of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, let me summarize my conclusions for this section with reference to the four parameters I defined:

1. The majority of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands have both the Turkish and Dutch nationality. Having dual nationality or dual attachment to both the original and lived homeland did not seem to cause a bifurcation of national identity among the interviewees; naturalization was indeed a

decision of convenience for many while their primary national allegiance remained with Turkey. Identification with the Dutch nation was very weak. Though many conceded that they had built their life in the Netherlands, and thus had a vested interest in the country's economic and political stability and in the maintenance of its ethos of freedom and multiculturalism, this state of "voluntary dependence" did not seem to be translated into discernible patriotic feelings about the Netherlands. They preferred the role of the Dutch state to be limited to that of a facilitator of the people's economic well-being and of the smooth and fair functioning of the legal-political system. They did not take issue with further integration into the Dutch legal, political and economic structures while all of them expressed their continuing emotional and/or cultural attachment to Turkey. Many of them stated that the majority of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands made their political choices in the Netherlands on the grounds of the political parties' stances on issues of migration and immigrant rights rather than on the basis of their own ideological orientation, a situation also confirmed by surveys. The state of being an immigrant figured as the main constitutive element of many interviewees' self-perception and their relations with the Dutch state and society.

2. The existence of any strong ideological intermediaries shaping or manipulating the relationship of the Turkish immigrant community to the Netherlands or the Dutch nation could not be identified. This may be explained by the fact that the Dutch political system and social structure are based on less hierarchical and more individualized forms of participation. The legacy of the pillarized political and social structure and the adoption of multiculturalism as the main instrument for incorporating migrant populations may be argued to have impeded the flourishing of the idea of the Netherlands as the "lived homeland" among Turkish immigrants. Another reason for the weakness of the idea of a Dutch homeland may be the still influential presence of immigrant cultural and political organizations that are either oriented towards Turkey and Turkish culture or are directly controlled

by political parties, movements and organizations in Turkey. This mutually reinforcing set of conditions results in the prominence of Turkey as the true homeland and the consequent relegation of the country of settlement to the position of a place of “voluntary exile”.

3. The allegiance of the interviewed Turkish immigrants towards their country of settlement appeared to be based on pragmatism and convenience as they emphasized the practical benefits of Dutch residence and citizenship more strongly than an emotionally or nationalistically driven conception of homeland attachment. At the beginning, the Netherlands had emerged as a wiser option for securing an economically better-off life for labour immigrants and as a more liberal and stable country for politically motivated immigrants. After years of struggling to build a new and prosperous life and to enhance their status in Dutch society, their country of settlement now came to represent familiar and established ways and habits in daily life as well as not-so-easily dispensable socio-economic advantages.
4. Despite increasing concerns about the recent economic crisis and the concomitant anti-immigration and anti-Muslim discourses and policies, most interviewees did not express any intention to return permanently to Turkey. The idea of return was still fresh and thrilling for some, but they admitted that it was a tough choice to unsettle their established life in the Netherlands and leave for good. According to them, a solution would be dividing their time between the two countries upon their retirement. The relative political stability and the well-functioning state machinery of the Netherlands, combined with the benefits of the welfare state, seemed to be still appealing to most immigrants. This feeling of security experienced in the Netherlands and the image of volatility associated with their country of origin made Turkey a lesser option for permanent settlement, even though the latter country still served as the source of their ethno-religious identity and practices. Moreover, the fact that their children and grandchildren grew up in the Netherlands and became part of the socio-economic life of the country also tied them down. Nevertheless, I should also note that the idea of sharing

of a common history and future goals with the Dutch nation was shaky among the interviewees. Because their past memories were limited to their time in the Netherlands, and the emotional weight associated with a myth of common ancestry and an idea of sacred soil conquered and defended by national heroes was naturally not present in their relationship with the Dutch people and land.

### **5.2.3 Normative Conception of the Idea of Homeland and the Case of Dutch-Turks**

In the previous section, I have stated that the majority of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands still define themselves primarily as Turks and Muslims and maintain strong cultural, political, economic and family ties with Turkey. In this section, I will focus on the questions of whether these ties are translated into an explicit normative homeland attachment and whether they signify a diasporic existence and consciousness on the part of the Turkish community in the Netherlands. I will also examine whether these cross-border ties and activities amount to the emergence of a true transnational outlook. My inquiry will be informed by the distinction I employed in my analysis of the Bulgarian case between four levels of transnational engagement, each depicting a qualitatively different, if not stronger, form of transnationalism:

- 1) blurring of the traditionally assumed territorial association of one's place of birth and/or residence with the notion of homeland (or ancestral land) due to increased and more complex patterns of mobility and migration;
- 2) emergence of new transnational interconnections that cannot be confined to a particular territory or state; individuals becoming simultaneously embedded in more than one society;

- 3) increasing manifestations of diasporism and long-distance nationalism as alternate forms of homeland attachment that denote active mobilization of resources across the borders;
- 4) proliferation of liberal cosmopolitan agendas, goals, and norms at the expense of local, parochial, ethno-nationally defined but presumably transnationally perpetuated identities, interests, and values; an assessment on whether or not the latter (i.e., the normatively particularist and formally transnational) framework has the potential to give way to the former (i.e., the normatively and formally transnational) framework.

The relationship of Turkish immigrants with their country of origin may be examined at two levels. One is the presence of actual cross-border interactions, and the other is the imagining of the original homeland as the embodiment of collective memories, symbols, myths, customs, beliefs, values and norms. Of course, these two implications of the idea of homeland are interrelated, even mutually constitutive in some respects.

As previously mentioned, some of the interviewees expressed their intention of return to Turkey. However, these interviewees also stated that a permanent return, even after retirement, would once again mean divided families, an unsettled life and the loss of their socio-economic position secured after years-long struggle in the Netherlands. Despite mixed feelings about permanent return, the image of Turkey as the ultimate territorial representation of their cultural and religious identity, values and practices seemed to hold for most interviewees. However, Turkey not only figures as the symbolic spring of cultural and group identities and norms, but it also serves four important functions for individual members of the Turkish community.

First, it provides a viable territorial alternative for worst case scenarios in which the Netherlands may lose its socio-economic appeal due to the aggravation of recent economic hardships and a further increase in racist discourses and discriminatory practices. The erosion of the image of a multicultural and pluralist Dutch society combined with a perceived narrowing of job opportunities particularly in middle- and

top-tear sectors may compel the well-educated young immigrants to seek their fortunes in Turkey as well as in other economically promising countries. Some interviewees testified to a reverse brain drain towards Turkey, which has been marked as a growing economy during the recent economic crisis in Europe. Despite the widely held idea that Turkey now has greater economic and social potential than five decades ago when its first labour emigrants left for the Netherlands, Turkey is still an uncertain option for return because of doubts about its long-term political stability and the strength of its democratic institutions and practices. Therefore, the chances of a wide-scale return migration from the Netherlands to Turkey on the grounds of a materialist cost-benefit analysis seem rather slim for now.

More importantly than Turkey's function as a beneficial alternative for permanent settlement, the original homeland and the maintenance of strong ties with it serve as a balancing mechanism for the perceived deficiencies of the country of settlement. The conditions that were specified by the interviewees as points of dissatisfaction in the Netherlands included the individualistic and formal nature of social relations, perceived social segregation that nurtured feelings of cultural alienation and exclusion, a strictly applied system of laws and rules, an excessively regulated and controlled public order, and unfavourable/unfamiliar geographic and climatic conditions. Freedom was a key concept in the comparisons made between the two life-styles represented by two countries. While the interviewees appreciated the extensiveness of political liberties guaranteed by the Dutch constitutional system, some of them implied that they were sometimes overwhelmed by the Dutch public order which was perceived to be too disciplined and strictly regulated. A couple of them asserted that even the parking restrictions applied in big cities annoyed most Turks as they felt besieged by the state apparatus with no way to escape public surveillance. In their self-enclosed community life, on the other hand, they themselves attempted to regulate communal relations and assure the smooth functioning of the social realm through a rigorously maintained and informally implemented set of cultural values and norms. In short, at least some community members seemed to have preferred the loosening of public controls, and the resulting vacuum of authority would have been compensated for by applying the community's

own culturally generated rules and norms that would prevent wrong-doing within the community. In other words, the relative latitude allowed in the public sphere would be counterbalanced by stricter community and family supervision in the private sphere.

The accounts of the interviewees revealed that these points of dissatisfaction and the resulting feelings of engulfment were attempted to be remedied by spending summer holidays almost exclusively in Turkey with family members and relatives in their hometowns, by going back and forth between the two countries throughout the year and by spending longer times in Turkey especially when retired. A study showed that 74% of Turkish immigrants surveyed had had face-to-face contact with their close relatives in Turkey at least once in the past twelve months. Those who had contacted their relatives in Turkey by other means (phone, mail and e-mail) amounted to 97% of the respondents, 60% of whom had the contact frequency of once a month and 37% once a week (Schans 2009: 1174). In my research, most interviewees declared that they had houses in Turkey, some having one in their hometown and one in a holiday resort. The more dynamic and intimate human and family relations in Turkey were juxtaposed in some of the accounts with the individualistic and “robotic” functioning of Dutch society, the former being idealized.

However, not all interviewees shared this idealization of human relations and social dynamics in Turkey as some disapproved of such a splitting-up of social life between the two countries. This compartmentalization of social relations along two territorial identifications was argued to be preventing community members from focusing on their present life and future goals in the Netherlands. "The majority of Turks here invest in Turkey and it detracts from their life in the Netherlands. They lead diminished lives here", one interviewee said. He added that the general tendency to bring spouses from Turkey meant that the first generation never ended and the same integration problems associated with the original first generation repeated themselves over and over again and continued to plague the Turkish community as a whole. Another interviewee suggested that instead of purchasing real estate in Turkey, the Turkish community should have invested their financial resources more on the

education of their children, which had been a neglected issue especially among the firstcomers. According to her, the socialization of young generations into their original culture should be through education, not by inflicting pressure on them.

The third function of the image of Turkey as the ideal homeland is the positive correlation assumed by community members between their position in the Netherlands and the domestic and international preponderance of Turkey. A powerful Turkish state seemed to mean a lot especially to the interviewees having a strong identification with their Turkish-Muslim origins. The more assertive foreign policy pursued by Turkey in the recent years has apparently flattered their national pride and rendered them more self-confident as a migrant community. This state-centered approach based on the idea that a powerful state equals a powerful nation and self-confident individuals in a sense contradicts their perception of the Dutch state as a neutral container that should merely function as a technical regulator of state affairs and the facilitator of self-realization of diverse communities. While the former conception seems to be inspired by the primordialist understanding of nationalism that defines the state as the consummation of national will and the cradle of the nation's culture and dignity, the latter relegates the state to a mechanical device devoid of any emotional or normative appeal. Here, we do not see a principled approach towards the desired nature and role of the state in general; this is rather an attitude that prioritizes the immediate contextual needs of the community defined in relation to its subjective parochial self-perception as a victimized, disadvantaged group in a potentially hostile environment. My impression was that the reason why community members saw the Turkish state as a power resource for their own well-being in the Netherlands was their discontent with the community's minority status in this country. Even if their collective rights were secured in the Netherlands, they seemed to find it difficult to forge an organic relationship with a state/country that does not represent their national and cultural identity. The perceived friction and irreconcilability between their own cultural world and that of the dominant population generated a feeling of inferiority no matter how much their socio-economic status had been enhanced. Therefore, their primary orientation was not towards the state in which they live but towards the one in which they are part of the

majority. Some interviewees even referred to the history of the Turkish nation which arguably saw no subordination to foreign rule as one of the reasons why many Turkish immigrants felt as outsiders and resisted cultural integration in the Netherlands.

Fourthly and finally, there exist instrumental-material ties between Turkish immigrants and their original homeland. Migrants and political actors in Turkey including the state depend on one another in many respects. During my visit to the Netherlands, one of the most-debated issues among Turkish immigrants was the new law on paid military service which would also be applied to those Turkish citizens living abroad who were liable for military service. The law was designed to create a source of revenue for the Turkish state, but the high payment requirement was criticized by many in Turkey and abroad. Another form of economic connection is the preference of many Turkish immigrants not only in the Netherlands but also in other European countries to keep their savings in Turkish banks and to invest in real estate in Turkey, which constitutes an important source of foreign exchange inflow. Moreover, sending remittances to family members and relatives living in Turkey is still a common practice among Turkish immigrants. According to a study, 41% of Turks in the Netherlands sent money to family members (only parents, siblings and children included) in Turkey in the last year prior to the study (Schans 2009: 1171). In terms of economic exchanges, I should also mention donations made by immigrants to political and/or charity organizations that are connected to their counterparts in Turkey. Many organizations opened branches in immigrant-receiving countries in order to generate income by attempting to appeal to religious, cultural and political proclivities of immigrants. However, some of these organizations have come under suspicion due to allegations of corruption and fraud, legal action being brought against their administration in some cases.

In addition to economic ties, Turkish migrants abroad are also important for Turkish political parties in terms of enlarging their vote base. Popular Turkish parties have representations, youth organizations and informal sister organizations in the Netherlands. In Turkey, political parties are prohibited to receive donations from

international organizations and from real persons and legal entities not possessing Turkish nationality.<sup>50</sup> However, through these immigrant organizations abroad, political parties raise money, disseminate political messages, campaign for gaining votes and even provide transportation for potential voters to Turkish customs where they can cast their ballots since, according to Turkish law, voting is not possible at the Turkish consulates in foreign countries (Østergaard-Nielsen 2000: 29). Moreover, the fact that Turkish immigrants constitute one of the largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands as well as in various other European countries has occasionally provided Turkish governments with a useful foreign policy leverage in their relations with both individual countries and the European Union. In the first half of the 2000s, when Turkey's EU membership was a hotly debated issue both in Turkey and in member countries, the presence particularly of well-educated and well-integrated young Turkish immigrants in European countries was used by the Turkish government as evidence for the argument that Turkish culture and European values are not incompatible as implied. By using this argument the Turkish government wished to persuade opposing and lukewarm European governments to adopt a favourable position on Turkey's membership.

However, it should also be noted that Turkish immigrants and their organizations are too fragmented to form a monolithic and strong lobbying block in comparison especially to such other migrant-community lobbies as the Armenian and Jewish diasporic groups with transnational ties as well. The fact that many of Turkish migrant organizations mirror the political, ethnic and religious fault lines in Turkey has made their cooperation problematic in most cases. In addition to internal factionalism, host country attitude towards homeland-oriented lobbying is also decisive. In the Netherlands, immigrants have formalized channels to communicate their demands and needs to the political institutions (such as political parties, trade unions or consultative platforms) of their host country, but these institutions do not welcome lobbying on homeland political issues since such dialogue is thought to impair integration (Østergaard-Nielsen 2000: 33). Ögelman argues that there are two

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<sup>50</sup> See the Turkish Law on Political Parties at <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2820.pdf> (accessed 25.12.2013).

factors that determine the participatory patterns of immigrant organizations within their communities: host society's ability to absorb various ethnocultural minorities and sending state's tendency to generate ideologically contentious political migrants. According to Ögelman, if the host society fails to absorb a particular ethnocultural community and the sending state generates considerable numbers of ideologically diverse political migrants, then diverse transplanted factions are likely to emerge, contributing to resilient and intense fragmentation of the immigrant community (Ögelman 2003: 171-172). The Turkish community organizations in the Netherlands seem to fit to a large extent into this depiction of community cohesion and participation. Since I have already examined the host country integration policies and inter-community relations in the previous section, I will here focus on the sending country factor.

Turkey has a long history of reaching out to its (former) nationals abroad and tying them to their country of origin, even though the goals and tools of this policy have been modified over time due to certain developments and changes in both host and home country and in the perceptions and behaviour of immigrant populations (Mügge 2012). It has employed various tools ranging from instituting branches of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) in receiving countries and appointing imams centrally from Ankara to the mosques functioning under these branches, using the state broadcasting agency TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation) to promote Turkish interests and nationalism, reaching out to immigrant communities through ministries and consulates to political instruments such as allowing dual nationality, granting certain citizenship rights to former nationals and legalizing voting from abroad (Mügge 2012: 22, 24-25).

Through these instruments, Turkey has always kept a firm hand on migrant communities abroad, but the goals and the tone of Turkey's policy towards emigrants transformed in years. As also put by Mügge, while this policy focused on the return of migrants and the sending of remittances up until the 1980s, it later became obvious to both home and host countries as well as to migrant communities that at least some migrants would become permanent settlers. Moreover, the military coup

of 1980 and the escalating armed conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish insurgents particularly in the 1990s caused waves of political migration to European countries in particular. Therefore, from the beginning of 1980s, the Turkish state, in addition to its previous efforts to contribute to the well-being of immigrants abroad and to ensure the continuity of their ties to the Turkish state, struggled to hold in check opposition groups (particularly the leftists, radical Islamists and Kurdish dissidents) now mobilizing more freely in the liberal political climate of Western European states. However, Mügge goes on to argue, with the liberalization of the political scene in Turkey due to the loosening of the Turkish military's grip on politics and the increasing prospects for Turkey's EU membership, Turkey oriented its policies more towards the integration of migrants in their countries of residence than towards cross-border implications of homeland politics (Mügge 2012: 23-24, also 27).

A good indicator of this shift was the speech delivered by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan in Düsseldorf, Germany on 27 February 2011 just a few months before the Turkish parliamentary elections in June 2011. In his speech, Erdoğan advised Turkish immigrants in Germany to integrate into German society through learning the Dutch language, seeking higher education and becoming doctors, professors and politicians in Germany. However, he also warned them against assimilation as he claimed that no one had the right to deprive them of their culture and identity.<sup>51</sup> These remarks may be said to reflect the general guidelines of the current official Turkish policy towards Turkish migrants living abroad. Erdoğan's statement drew a line of distinction between integration and assimilation, endorsing the former and rejecting the latter. Interestingly, an approach that confines the content of integration merely to language proficiency and educational and occupational achievement parallels the opinions of the interviewees regarding integration that I discussed in length in the previous section. This might be the reason why Erdoğan's emphasis on the preservation of original culture and identity while encouraging immigrants to

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<sup>51</sup> For a news report by Özlem Gezer and Anna Reimann on this speech, see <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/erdogan-urges-turks-not-to-assimilate-you-are-part-of-germany-but-also-part-of-our-great-turkey-a-748070.html> (accessed 25.12.2013).

pursue a better position in society seemed to resonate well with many Turkish immigrants in Europe including those in the Netherlands.

When I looked at how Turkey's current policy stance as encapsulated in Erdoğan's speech was received by Turkish immigrants I interviewed in the Netherlands, I saw mixed feelings. Most interviewees resented that Turkey had failed to formulate efficient and robust policies and strategies designed to address hostland-specific problems experienced by Turkish immigrant communities abroad. For years, they claimed, Turkey had seen immigrants as a source of income and votes without engaging in an institutionalized and continuous effort to contribute to their well-being and to make them feel that they were not alone. Nevertheless, the interviewees expressed their appreciation of the more assertive foreign and emigrant policies adopted by Turkey in the last decade. However, some other interviewees, though taking pride in the image of Turkey as an increasingly potent and vigorous country, shunned a symbiotic relationship with their country of origin. The interviewed politicians particularly expressed their discontent with being treated by native Dutch colleagues as the natural extension of the Turkish state; they complained about how their opinions were insistently asked each time an important (usually negative) development took place in Turkey, as if they were the spokesperson of the Turkish government.

The automatic association of the Turkish community with their original homeland seemed to be a reciprocal process. I have previously shown how most interviewees repeatedly referred to the Turkish government, prime minister, and other actors and institutions pertaining to Turkey as their own while they hardly called the Dutch state, government or prime minister "our state", "our government" or "our prime minister". This self-association was frowned upon by some interviewees as they stated that many Turkish immigrants especially among the first generation followed the developments in Turkey more closely than those in the Netherlands and some of these immigrants did not even know who the Dutch prime minister was. One interviewee, Kenan, also criticized the Turkish prime minister for disseminating his election propaganda in Germany (referring to his Düsseldorf speech) as such moves

would hinder immigrant integration. According to Kenan, Turkish officials' advice for Turkish immigrants to integrate had never been sincere since the resistance of Turkish immigrants to integration and their dependence on Turkey would mean the continuous inflow of euros from abroad and the Turkish state would never want to see this flow stop.

Despite scepticism about the intentions of the Turkish state, the prospects for a strong Turkey nevertheless figured in most interviewee accounts as an important input in the Turkish community's struggle to secure an equal but culturally distinct place in their host society. The image of Turkey as a safeguard of equal treatment and cultural preservation in the Netherlands also explains why some community members, particularly the young educated ones, tend to envisage Turkey as virtually a "backup homeland" to be resorted to in case of further social or economic distress. Younger generations' orientation towards Turkey, frequently suggested by the interviewees, seemed to stem from two basic needs: the need to construct a stable and recognized collective and individual self-image and to accomplish economic and social well-being in an inclusive and resourceful society. The more the younger community members feel that the society in which they live falls short of providing the necessary conditions for the fulfillment of these two needs, the more they steer towards their original homeland which they picture in an idealized manner. However, this "ideal construct" may not always correspond to reality.

Gülşen, an expert in security and crisis management and a local politician, claimed that the reason why the Turkish youth in the Netherlands were branded as radical and Turkey-oriented was the identity crisis undergone by particularly those who were born in the Netherlands. Unlike their parents who came to the Netherlands at a later age with consolidated identities and a stable self-image, the Dutch-born Turkish youth could not figure out how they could reconcile with their hyphenated identities. They would frequently ask "Who am I? Am I not one hundred percent Turk?" According to Gülşen, this identity crisis was exacerbated by ostracization in society and youngsters attempted to find a way out of this crisis by idealizing Turkey. "They see Turkey only during holidays. They have an idealized image of the country. They

think there is real freedom there. They believe it is a bed of roses. Because they only see the life in Bodrum, Alanya, etc. They can enjoy their time in Turkey because they have enough money in their pockets. But reality is different. Life is difficult everywhere”, she remarked. Songül thought that Turkey might present a plausible alternative for those with high qualifications because they were not usually allowed to climb the career ladder in the Netherlands and could find better-paid jobs and promotion opportunities especially in the private sector in Turkey. Even then, differences in social norms and work culture between the two countries would pose challenges to Dutch-born returnees. On the other hand, an average Turkish returnee would probably suffer also from lower standards of living in Turkey in addition to difficulties of cultural adaptation.

In short, imagining Turkey as an ideal homeland has the function of not so much generating a real option for permanent settlement as providing the model for constructing a “replica homeland”, to use Smith’s expression, in the Netherlands. As stated before, Smith uses this expression to define how Jews constructed successive centers of Jewry in various lands after being detached from their original homeland and how their religious beliefs, rites and traditions served as a substitute for their territorial loss ensuring their ethnic survival and autonomy (Smith 1986:114-119). Even though there are huge differences between the historical evolution of the two cases of territorial uprooting, the concept of replica homeland can also be employed in the Turkish case to denote the pattern of social and spatial organization adopted by Turkish immigrants in order to preserve their cultural autonomy and ethno-religious distinctiveness.

I have stated in the section dealing with the cultural implications of the idea of homeland that Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands attribute great value to Islam and Turkishness. I have also argued that their ties to the Netherlands do not generally translate into a strong national identification with their country of settlement. In other words, community members mostly derive their cultural norms and practices from their ethno-religious background and interpret the outside world from a peculiar community-specific lens. It may be asked whether a strictly defined

and strongly preserved ethno-religious identity can co-exist with Dutch identification so as to facilitate a meaningful level of cohesion with wider society or whether these two allegiances are mutually exclusive. In a series of studies conducted among Turkish-Dutch (Sunni) Muslims, Turkish and Muslim identities were found to be closely related and very important for most participants. About half of the participants had the highest possible score on the ethno-religious identification measures, indicating total ingroup identification. On the other hand, between 54% and 63% of the participants indicated low or neutral Dutch national identification while 63.3% indicated neutral and high Dutch disidentification (i.e., reactive or oppositional identity) suggesting clear conflicts between the individual and society. Moreover, it was shown that Turkish and Muslim identities were negatively related to Dutch identification and that Muslim identity was positively related to Dutch disidentification, though the associations found were not very strong (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007: 1459-1460).

If one aspect of social segregation is the existence of an explicit and pervasive tension between collective norms, values and identities of the immigrant community and those of the native population, the other is the spatial organization of communities. I have touched upon the issue of residential segregation in the previous section, referring to a study that revealed high levels of residential segregation among Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands (Koopmans 2010). There are other studies that support this finding (Bolt and van Kempen 2003, Zorlu and Mulder 2008). However, there is another factor that conditions in a more essential way the construction of a replica homeland in the host country than the physical segregation of neighbourhoods. That is the segregation of life spaces.

Some interviewees told me about how Turkish immigrants chose to draw boundaries between their social-cultural and physical spheres and those of the native and other immigrant populations. They also mentioned that they listened to the stories of their parents who claimed that the level of segregation had not been as high in the past as it is now. Yusuf, a second-generation immigrant who had initially worked voluntarily for and later professionally directed the Dutch branch of a very influential Islamic

organization for years, was one of the interviewees expressing their concerns about the increasing levels of social segregation in Dutch society. Though, he argued that this segregation was not only created by minority populations but also fuelled by the increasing fascist tendencies in Dutch society, he nevertheless stated that the closer and more harmonious inter-community relations of the past had yielded to distancing and even hostility: "Ghettos are enlarging. Previously, Turkish kids used to play with Dutch kids in the streets. They had the chance to learn some Dutch this way. They would visit each other in their homes. None of these exist now. Turkish kids play with Turkish, or Moroccan kids at the most. The street is Turkish, the market is Turkish, the school is Turkish... For instance, there is a kid born in the Netherlands to Turkish parents from Sivas. You would think he himself comes from Sivas, not his parents, in the sense of language, mentality and world view. My kid was born here and he is more Turkish than I am." These words are striking because they come from a person with a very strong religious identity and a history of Islamic activism as well as a nationalist background, though he claimed to have distanced himself from Turkish nationalism after coming to the Netherlands.

The proliferation of ethnic ghettos and formal and informal separation of schools based on ethnic and religious divisions have been accompanied by another form of segregation: self-contained, factional, homeland-imported patterns that have marked Turkish civil society organization. I have previously overviewed the general outlook of the organizational spectrum of the Turkish immigrant community in the Netherlands and referred to the continuing weight of homeland or homeland-oriented organizations. Østergaard-Nielsen recounts that Dutch authorities initially encouraged self-organization within the migrant communities in accordance with their principles of multiculturalism and pluralism. This led to the excessive proliferation of Turkish organizations, which exceeded the number of those in Germany where Turkish immigrant community is much larger. Østergaard-Nielsen reports that most of these organizations are referred to by some as "paper organizations" established to attract funding or personal prestige by individuals. However, in the 1990s, she adds, the Dutch state decided to tighten their policies and to provide funding for activities rather than organizations and mainly for immigrant

(not homeland) political activities. The aim was to stimulate cooperation between different organizations on common immigrant issues. These initiatives have produced positive results for organizations of somewhat similar political, ethnic or religious orientation compelling them to co-operate and sit on the same committees, but failed to bring together the more irreconcilable ethnic or religious organizations (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001: 270). Yet, she continues:

There *are* many immigrant politically-oriented, state-funded organizations in Holland compared with Germany, and more systematic co-operation on a host of issues. Nevertheless, the pattern of co-operation –or rather lack thereof- between organizations in both Germany and the Netherlands indicate ‘the spatial diffusion of domestic politics’ between Turkey and the host countries brought about by transnational identification and affiliation within the communities living abroad. That is, the political and institutional context of the receiving country is not as important for differences in social homeland political organization as is the case with immigrant political organizations. Instead, the landscape of organizations in Germany and the Netherlands is largely parallel, as branches of the same homeland political organizations and movements can be found in both countries. Furthermore, most local organizations are members of umbrella organizations at federal (Germany), national (the Netherlands) or European levels. These organizations serve as the bridgeheads between counterparts in different countries and between these countries and Turkey itself (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001: 271).

What Østergaard-Nielsen depicts in this paragraph seems to hold true for some political parties/movements and politico-religious organizations originating from Turkey, such as Milli Görüş, Süleymancılar, Alevi organizations and Kurdish organizations mostly affiliated with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). Having branches in receiving countries, these organizations forge networks and organize activities transnationally. This way they aim to further their usually parochial, factional interests. This seems to fit into the diasporic model of a triadic relationship between the homeland, the hostland and diaspora segments in receiving countries, which was outlined in the second chapter of this study. However, the link between the diasporic community and the homeland is rather complicated in this case since

political and ethno-religious movements organized among immigrants do not always represent the officially defined national interests of the homeland. On the contrary, their goals and activities might even contradict homeland national interests, as the reason why some of these organizations took root in migrant-receiving countries in the first place was to escape the control of the Turkish state. As such, most of them cannot be readily deemed national lobbies or diaspora networks such as those of the Jewish or Armenian immigrant communities that can be unified around concrete foreign policy goals of their homelands.

The literature on “transnationalism from below” celebrates decentered, localized forms of grassroots mobilization that would challenge top-down global processes thwarting cultural and local differences and resist domination by the nation-state and the global capital from above. However, as argued by Guarnizo and Smith, transnationalism from below may not always lead to emancipatory practices, or culturally hybrid identities, nor is it inherently resistant to hegemonic forces (Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 5). Even in the event that new immigrants are settled permanently and their sense of connectedness with the homeland fades away or that they deliberately sever their ties with their country of origin, continuous flow of information, ideas, cultural values and commodities as well as monetary and non-monetary exchanges, cultural tourism, religious or non-religious rituals may reproduce a transnational social field. As a result, we see the revitalization of ethnic pride and nationalism among second- and third-generation immigrants in various countries (Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 19). Therefore, we may find many cases that “suggest the reinscription of group identities by transnational actors ‘from below’ as efforts to recapture a lost sense of belonging by recreating imagined communities. These identities forged from below are no less essentialized than the hegemonic projects of nation states. Identities forged ‘from below’ are not inherently subversive or counter-hegemonic” (Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 22-23).

When we look at the widespread, transnationally organized movements among Turkish immigrants in Europe, it is doubtful whether such organizations and networks are appealing to the majority of immigrants or are representative of

interests and agendas stemming from immigrants' socio-economic position and entanglements in their new local and national contexts. The personal experiences and observations of the interviewees also testified to the fact that cross-border organizations of narrowly defined political or politico-religious movements usually have specific, homeland-oriented agendas and are based on a limited core membership that usually acts militantly. Their agenda-setting and decision-making processes are top-down and centralized, and their internal functioning is far from being democratic. They have weak practices of cooperation on mutually shared issues with other migrant organizations having a similar ethno-national origin or not. Even though they mobilize their resources and members transnationally, it cannot be argued in most cases that they pursue substantively transnational ideas, values or practices, or pave the way for the construction of transnational, or postnational, hybrid, multi-sited identities or of universally applicable norms and ideals.

At this point, we may ask how transnational or homeland-oriented claims are made by immigrants and their host-country organizations in the Dutch context. In a comparative study on migrant claims-making in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands, Koopmans and Statham distinguish between three types of transnational claims-making. The first one is called transplanted homeland politics in which claims are made by migrants in the country of settlement, but they refer in all other respects to the country of origin. The second type consists of claims which mobilize organizational networks and political opportunities in the country of settlement, but the ultimate political aim is oriented towards the homeland; organizations may ask the government of the country of settlement to intervene with the homeland government on behalf of the group's interests. The third type involves the situations when homeland-based groups mobilize homeland-based organizational resources and opportunities to intervene on behalf of the group's interests in the country of settlement. The last two types are more substantively transnational and hybrid in the sense that they bring together both homeland and country of settlement orientations (Koopmans and Statham 2001: 89). The results of the study revealed that purely national claims are the largest category in all three countries. In the Netherlands, 71% of all claims were purely national, which means that claims-making by migrants

and minorities stays entirely within the political context and the public sphere of the country of settlement. In other words, organizations originating in the country of settlement advance claims on authorities in the country of settlement in order to further the interests of a constituency in the country of settlement. 10.1% of all claims reflected country of residence-directed transnationalism while 9.9% indicated transplanted homeland politics and 8.1% homeland-oriented transnationalism. In the Netherlands, the percentage of homeland-oriented claims made by Turkish immigrants was 26.9% and Turks were identified as one of the ethno-national groups with a strong homeland orientation. (Koopmans and Statham 2001: 90-92).

Based on their findings, the authors claim that we should not overestimate the role of homeland influences, intrinsic characteristics of migrant groups or inter-ethnic differences because inclusive citizenship regimes such as those of Britain and the Netherlands not only affect the degree to which certain groups make homeland-oriented claims but also shape the very identities of these groups (Koopmans and Statham 2001: 93). The multiplicity of Turkish immigrant organizations, combined with the relative openness of the Dutch citizenship and integration model, seems to have created a political environment conducive to homeland-oriented, transnational claims-making of immigrants. The increased levels of transnational activity and claims-making particularly among Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands as well as in other receiving countries seem to be related basically to the vehemence of enduring political conflicts in the homeland and the importation of these conflicts into the hostland through migrant groups. Moreover, the strengthening of migrant ties with the homeland or with homeland-based political groups has been largely facilitated by the proliferation of deterritorialized means of communication and of easier and cheaper forms of transportation which catalyzed transnational practices and activities of organizations.

However, it should also be noted that active participation in transnational networks or organizations is not a widespread practice among most migrants. Active membership requires time, effort and financial resources which socio-economically constrained immigrants cannot easily afford. Moreover, as I have mentioned, many

transnationally active migrant organizations represent parochial group interests and are not usually inclusive in their membership and agendas. Therefore, the role of homeland-oriented migrant organizations should not be overestimated. The vast majority of homeland-directed transnational activity takes place at the level of individuals in the form of ongoing relations with homeland-settled family members, homeland-based holiday trips, business/professional networks and real estate ownership.

Beyond these concrete ties, the idea of homeland also prevails in the cultural-normative sphere as a kind of social cement and a source of collective identity. Most members of the Turkish community retain the homeland myth even in the absence of tangible or physical homeland bonds because it serves as “a defence mechanism against slights committed by the host country against the minority”, as put by Safran (Safran 1999: 375). It provides a symbolic normative-cultural anchor to be utilized by dislocated migrants and diaspora members in order to deal with their every-day feelings of victimization and alienation. The symbolic and normative qualities associated with the homeland may not correspond to the actual condition of the homeland. But imagining the homeland as they desire and attributing their own values, beliefs and customs to it eases migrants' anxiety of perceived rootlessness caused by territorial detachment and feeds into their sense of embeddedness and connectedness. The *construct* of homeland in the hostland, or the image of a replica homeland, in both its physical-material and symbolic meanings was best described by Emre, a university student in Utrecht. After identifying his homeland as Turkey, Emre uttered the following words: “I was born here and have always lived here. But it is in no way comparable to Turkey. Turks here have never lost their culture and traditions. The Dutch state is not happy with this; they are not happy with the fact that we love our country. The person who loves his country lives it, lives Turkey everywhere.” Notwithstanding the verbal intensity of these utterances, strong patriotic feelings do not always transform into a highly developed and well-organized association with the homeland or with homeland groups, and this situation detracts from the diaspora status of the Turkish community in the Netherlands. This is also evident in the fragmented outlook of the organizational spectrum of the

Turkish community and in the paucity of overarching organizational structures or of inter-connected diasporic lobbying groups highly and sustainably mobilized around transnationally defined goals and agendas.

Moreover, homeland identification of immigrants is not free from difficulties. Similar processes of alienation and exclusion as endured in the hostland may sometimes be experienced in homeland contexts as well. Some interviewees expressed their resentment about incidents when Turkish people in Turkey acted in ways suggestive of migrants' "foreignness" to the "native" people and affairs. This dismissive attitude also manifested itself in public discourse in which all immigrants living abroad are called "Almanci", a pejorative word originally used in Turkey for Turkish *gastarbeiter* in Germany. Being lumped into the same basket with all labour immigrants all over Europe without differentiation of country of settlement or of generation seemed to aggravate feelings of dislocation and rootlessness among the interviewees.

This confusion regarding multi-layered and multi-sited identities was indeed apparent among the interviewees at almost all levels of cultural-normative identification. When discussing the basic markers of cultural identity and collective association among community members, I argued that values, beliefs and rituals identified with Turkishness and Muslimhood set the contours of the cultural sphere. However, I also stated that the interviewees thought that the responsibility for less-than desired levels of integration fell not only on the Dutch state and society but also on members of the Turkish community some of whom insisted on clinging onto the same way of life they had had back in Turkey. The interviewees believed that integration called for some cultural adjustments in the public domain, though the degree and type of these adjustments varied. For instance, some stated that appearance mattered in public life and an insistence on wearing Islamic clothes such as hijab caused stigmatization of Muslim immigrants, while some others considered the observance of Islamic rules strictly among cultural red lines that should not be crossed in the name of integration. Differentiating between what constitutes an acceptable integration step and what remains within the ambit of religious-cultural

private sphere proved to be a highly controversial issue not only in public debates but also for individual community members as they waver between conflicting positions in their every-day choices and cannot sometimes decide which cultural elements may be compromised in case of a conflict of values.

Based on the responses, I may say that universal values such as democracy, the rule of law, protection of human rights, freedom of speech, respect for differences and pluralism had credence among the interviewees. None of the interviewees directly challenged the basic principles of the Dutch political system or the common values of native Dutch society. They seemed to recognize the need to behave within the limits set by the founding principles and the modus operandi of the political order and public life in their host country. In their view, problems and short-comings pertaining to their immigrant status and to the exercise of their collective and individual rights could be remedied within the existing political and legal system. Most interviewees expressed their confidence in the resolution of the current problems of social segregation and discrimination with the efforts of the both sides, claiming that they would live in the future in a much more harmonious and tolerant society. Even though a number of interviewees sounded pessimistic about the future economic prospects and the rising anti-immigrant rhetoric, none of them perceived a rampant or imminent threat to their physical or cultural existence in the Netherlands.

The acknowledgement by the Turkish community of the normative authority of the Dutch state and society at least in the public domain may be a factor reducing the likelihood of inter-community friction. As underlined before, there exists dissatisfaction in some matters such as the excessive state supervision over public matters and the increasing intolerance about immigrant issues. Nevertheless, Turkish immigrants show reluctance to initiate a political movement or party in order to promote their causes and pursue their interests in party politics. Despite the existence of local parties that primarily appeal to immigrants, these political movements have not become popular among the Turkish community. The interviewed politicians assessed such moves as uncalled-for at least for the moment. In their view, it was wiser to struggle for immigrant causes within existing political parties and to prove

that they were able to find a legitimate room for themselves in the established system.

Therefore, the interviewees' confusion about collective identities stems not so much from an assessment of a deficiency in the ability of the Dutch legal, political and institutional mechanisms to channel collective demands or from the perceived obstacles to the effective utilization of these channels, but rather from conceiving certain collective identities as essential, fixed and authentic categories while deeming others secondary and inferior. This conception was evident in a number of interviews in which the terms identity, culture and religion were so frequently used with the verbs “protect” and “lose”. Original/ancestral identities were seen by some as if they were solid, tangible things to be jealously defended in the face of assimilationist attempts and of cultural penetration, or otherwise they might be “lost” all at once. One interviewee, for instance, stated that she was a Dutch-Turk as different from a Turk in Turkey or in any other country. She was content with her hyphenated identity since it denoted a richness of perspectives. She claimed that the world was leading towards a state where nationalities and the idea of a fixed single homeland mattered less and less. Nevertheless, she stressed that no one would ever forget their original identity, not even in their 80s. But maybe after fifteen generations their collective identity might become endangered and if Turkish immigrants wanted to prevent this, she continued, they should do something about it starting from today.

Here we see an implicit hierarchy among different types of collective identities; some are legal-political (the identity before the hyphen, the *Dutch* identity) while others are more authentic and innate (the identity after the hyphen, the *Turkish* identity). In this hierarchy, the former identity tends to be contextually and territorially bound, and thus may be negated, if so desired, just as in acquiring or renouncing a formal citizenship tie. The latter, however, is inherent and stable, and thus cannot be disclaimed. Placing one identity over the other by claiming it to be more authentic and privileged calls into question the assumed liberating influences of transnationalism on the construction of less exclusive and more fluid and transitive identities. Despite the fact that Turkish immigrants have concrete ties with both their

original homeland and their country of settlement, internalization of truly hybrid identities and of transnationally generated common values and norms has not yet fully materialized in the Turkish-Dutch context. Universal values and transnationally defined identities and practices seemed to be endorsed by the interviewees insofar as these served as a legitimate ground for mobilizing for their collective rights and peculiar causes, or functioned as practical tools for organizing their multi-sited life. Yet, the overarching norm-generating structures and globalized practices were not usually welcome in the event that they were perceived to be encroaching on the collectively patrolled private sphere of cultural identification and reproduction.

This instrumentalist conception of transnationalism manifested itself most clearly within the context of two issues during the interviews. One was the interviewees' suspicion about the widely circulated rhetoric that we had been witnessing the emergence of a more integrated world with tremendously increased intercultural connections and a burgeoning ethos of cosmopolitanism as a result of processes of globalization. Most interviewees regarded globalization as a process taking effect only in economic and technological realms without bringing about a substantive change in how people construct their primary identities and interconnect at the cultural and social levels. The interviewees declared that they could now utilize transnational channels for their individual and community-specific causes, enjoy the speed and practicality of new communication and transportation technologies to keep in touch with their families and friends in other places, and obtain information about almost anything on the Internet. However, they doubted whether these transnational practices actually paved the way for the approximation of cultures, hybridization of identities or universalization of certain norms and values. Approximation of cultures and creolization of identities imply at least a certain degree of fusion. However, what I observed in the Turkish-Dutch case, with the exception of socially mobile politicians and civil society representatives, was a state of living side by side (not together) with other communities, most members being confined to their physical and cultural ghetto and having only limited experience of inter-community connection. The possibility of fused identities seemed to be disturbing for many. Moreover, rigid formulations of group identities as innate and superior also

downplayed the importance of individual identity forms such as profession, educational status, city-dwelling, club membership, civil society participation, personal preoccupations and preferences. One of the interviewees expressed this situation in a nutshell: "If you ask any one of them [Turkish immigrants] who he/she is, the first thing he/she will say is 'I am a Turk.' They will not say that they are a journalist, a civil servant, or a politician or that they are Dutch."

The other manifestation of the instrumentalist approach to transnationalism and cross-border integration was the interviewees' attitudes towards the EU and towards a common European identity. The EU was discredited by most interviewees because they identified the economic interdependence and monetary union brought about by the EU as the main cause of the economic hardships and impoverishment they had been going through. Though acknowledging that the EU had brought along certain benefits including free movement of people and human rights standards, the interviewees believed that it had failed to overcome national differences and create a sense of Europeanness shared by many across the continent. But at the same time these interviewees supported Turkey's EU membership claiming that Turkey belonged in Europe and should enjoy membership advantages. A few interviewees had a more categorical attitude towards the EU. A leftist interviewee took a negative stance arguing that the EU did not represent the interests of the working class, and conservative interviewees believed that the EU personified a completely different culture, religion and history and that Turkey's EU membership would compromise its national characteristics.

The attitudes towards transnational allegiances and hyphenated identities such as the Dutch-Turkish or Dutch-Turkish-European (we can also add to the list identities associated with more local contexts such as hometowns or cities or with wider contexts such as civilizations or all humankind) imply that even people with migration experience, multi-sited lives and opportunities to make use of advanced forms of communication and organization may still remain ambivalent and confused about how they could accommodate multiple (and sometimes conflicting) loyalties and identities. Because transnationalism not only generates opportunities, but also

poses challenges. Notions such as mobility, speed, connectivity, hybridity, unboundedness and multi-sitedness, which nowadays bear positive connotations, may sometimes contradict human inclinations towards stability, certainty, rootedness and clear-cut categories of meaning. As put by Al-Ali and Koser, "[d]espite the unsettling of previously rooted and fixed notions of home, people engaged in transnational practices might express uneasiness, a sense of fragmentation, tension and even pain. Everyday contestations of negotiating the gravity of one's home is particularly distressing for those who are vulnerable, for example the poor, women, illegal immigrants and refugees" (Al-Ali and Koser 2002: 7).

The association of transnationalism exclusively with mobility, deterritorialization and unboundedness while assigning qualities such as fixity, territorial boundedness and monolithic identities to national or local contexts is problematic. The perpetuation of such neat and impervious dichotomies and the depiction of culture and identity as becoming progressively deterritorialized and free from place and locality have increasingly come into question. Even when we think about transnationalization of the exchange of cultural products, we see that, despite cultural goods may appear to be deterritorialized as a result of increasingly porous borders and boundaries, their meanings are reterritorialized through distinctive local contexts of consumption. This vindicates Escobar's argument that, for most people, most of the time, culture still "sits in places" (Escobar cited in Jackson *et al.* 2004: 6).

We may place this debate on the positive and negative repercussions of transnationalization for immigrant communities within the nexus of globalization, integration and individualization. The question of whether better-integrated immigrant communities or individuals are less willing to forge transnational and homeland ties has been frequently debated. One central assumption of classical migration literature has been that the more integrated an immigrant becomes into his host society and culture, the less he/she will feel the need to develop transnational ties with the original homeland or with other co-ethnics elsewhere. However, another strand holds that integration and transnationalization are not mutually exclusive and better-integrated migrants might even be more successful in maintaining

transnational identities and practices, and vice versa. According to Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, the binational field created by back-and-forth movements and regular exchanges of tangible and intangible goods between places of origin and destination may offer an alternative adaptation path for immigrants in the advanced world. As these authors put, "[w]hereas, previously, economic success and social status depended exclusively on rapid acculturation and entrance into mainstream circles of the host society, at present they depend (at least for some) on cultivating strong social networks across national borders" (Portes *et al.* 1999: 228-229). In this approach, involvement in socio-cultural transnational activities facilitates successful integration into the host society by reinforcing self-images and collective solidarities, and by offering cultural anchors and a purposeful group life with which especially young generations deal with difficult external challenges. In other words, transnational activities provide immigrant youths with a point of reference to establish their distinct identities and sense of self-worth as well as with opportunities for economic mobility (Portes 1999: 472).

However, the correlation between integration and transnationalization may not be so straightforward. A number of interviewees asserted that easier, faster and cheaper transportation and communication technologies had not produced the intended results at least for some segments of the Turkish community. According to them, rather than an expected opening up of a previously self-contained and conservative community, transnational relations might have reinforced communal isolation and rendered Turkey as the primary source of cultural nourishment for some. One of them, an academician who was also active in the fields of business and civil society, underlined the inward-looking character of the Turkish people and claimed that transnationalism should not merely involve back-and-forth movement between the two countries or watching Turkish satellite TVs. In his view, in order to become global, one has to understand the local first, but Turkish immigrants had not made much effort to learn about the Dutch culture. They always expected others to understand and take care of them because they had a feeling of cultural superiority and self-righteousness. On the other hand, there were interviewees who thought that globalization had some negative consequences for approximation of cultures. For

instance Gülşen, whom I quoted before, argued that transnationalism had a polarizing effect; once people started to encounter other cultures and ways of life as a result of globalization, religious and cultural differences became more visible, creating an environment conducive to political manipulation of issues regarding culturally different migrant groups. A couple of other interviewees pointed out the adverse effects of globalization claiming that it caused degeneration of cultural and moral values.

As we can see, the nature of transnational activities, ingroup dynamics and self-images may also play a part in how immigrant groups interpret and internalize new cultures, ideas and practices they interact with during processes of transnationalization and globalization. Cultural interaction, just like cultural integration, calls for a certain degree of the loosening of ingroup social control and a flexible approach towards group loyalties. Only this way can cultural boundaries be transgressed. As mentioned, rigidly defined, exclusivist forms of group identification are an impediment to the construction of hybrid identities and to the emergence of sustainable and substantive experiences of transnationalization. In other words, a smooth process of integration and hence of substantive transnationalization (i.e., transnationalization not only of technologies and short-term practices but also of long-term associations and allegiances) requires the individualization of members of migrant communities.

In the Turkish immigrant community, however, we still see the predominance of group identities and loyalties. Rigidly defined group identities restrain the range of options or of courses of action an individual can choose between; group loyalties condition individual members' preferences as to where and how to live, whom to contact and in what ways. A certain degree of individualization on the other hand enriches alternatives and allows individuals to make more informed choices. This means an increased likelihood of forging sustained and multifaceted relations with other individuals and groups both within and beyond the borders of the country of settlement. The positive correlation between individualism and transnationalism (with a view to cosmopolitanism) was well explained by Hakan, a local politician

and the director of a theater in Amsterdam. Hakan argued that urbanized and well-educated people with a good command of languages could live wherever they liked, and if people were allowed to make their own informed choices regarding where and how to live, they would embrace the places they chose to live and the people they contacted more readily than those imposed on them.

I have discussed in detail the transnational and homeland-oriented aspects of migrant territoriality within the context of the Turkish community in the Netherlands while also focusing on the normative implications of these linkages. Now I shall list the main points put forward in this section in relation to the four parameters of normative territoriality:

1. Many members of the Turkish immigrant community in the Netherlands have access to the necessary means to maintain and diversify their contacts with their original homeland and culture. The increased instances of exchange of both tangible and intangible cultural products between the countries of origin and settlement as well as the facilitation of both face-to-face and long-distance contacts by new technologies have enabled migrants to lead multi-sited lives without having to choose conclusively between the two countries. This flexibility might have been an important element in the decisions of many migrants to settle permanently in the Netherlands as they could now travel easily to their country of origin, manage their assets and pay frequent visits to their family members and relatives there. Moreover, they are now more exposed to political, economic, cultural and other influences coming from their country of origin and have better chances to follow the developments in other parts of the world including Turkey. As a result, not only the borders between states but also the conceptual boundaries between various forms of territoriality are becoming blurred. The Turkish migrants I interviewed seemed confused about their territorial attachments. Even though a considerable number of them regarded Turkey as their primary or "ideal" homeland and admitted stronger emotional ties to it, they had also become undeniably bounded by their settled life routines in the Netherlands. This

multisitedness is even more evident among those who reside in both countries for longer periods of time over the year.

2. Increasing transnational ties and the state of multi-sitedness may be expected to transform immigrant lives in such radical ways that they become simultaneously embedded in two societies. However, this does not seem to be the case for many Turkish migrants in the Netherlands because their inward-looking patterns of social organization and rigidly defined communal attachments block in some respects their integration into the wider Dutch society. For those immigrants who are primarily involved in issues, causes and identities pertaining to Turkey, constructing replica homelands in their country of settlement offered a practical solution for dealing with the trauma of being detached from their original territory and from the culture this territory was perceived to embody. These replica homelands are constructed in usually secluded neighbourhoods and derive their socio-cultural input and normative basis from the land of origin, serving as a substitute for the latter. This situation testifies to the continuing symbolic and normative importance of the original culture and land within the imagery of Turkish immigrants. However, when we take into consideration the instrumentalist aspects of territorial identification, we see that members of the Turkish community are deeply embedded in both societies. In addition to regular migrant ties such as sending remittances, purchasing real estate and investing in their country of origin, many immigrants also possess dual nationality. This way, they seek to enjoy the relative advantages of the legal, political and economic systems of each country and use these advantages as a balancing mechanism for the deficiencies of one another in an effort to enhance their political, social and economic well-being. While many interviewees appreciated this situation, some others believed that it prevented Turkish immigrants from concentrating on their current life and future prospects in the Netherlands.
3. The Turkish community in the Netherlands has strong actual and emotional ties with Turkey, which has both symbolic and instrumental implications for community members. The community has constituted itself as a collectivity

with a widely shared community ethos, clearly delineated cultural boundaries and a certain degree of social cohesion and group autonomy vis-à-vis the host state. However, we cannot yet see the emergence of effective ethnic lobbies that can mobilize a large number of people and resources for both domestic and foreign policy goals and causes originating from the country of origin, nor can we talk about a well-organized diasporic network that extends to similar diasporic groups in other countries. However, there emerged organizations and movements that represent the interests and agendas of various political, ethnic and religious groups or parties that are either linked to or based in the homeland. On the one hand, bonding of community members in culturally cohesive bodies may be argued to provide some sort of an ideological and social anchor for those who have difficulties in adapting to an unfamiliar cultural environment and are concerned about their precarious socio-economic position in a country with a deteriorating economic situation and problems of discrimination and rising anti-immigrant discourses. On the other hand, however, organizations which have self-enclosed and sectarian decision-making and operating structures and exclusivist membership regimes contribute to the fragmentation rather than cohesion of the wider Turkish community in the Netherlands. They also impede the development of more substantive and comprehensive transnational relations based on a cosmopolitan spirit with individuals and groups having similar concerns across the border.

4. Based on my research among the Turkish community in the Netherlands, I may claim that transnationalization has so far unfolded either at the personal level in the form of family contacts and cross-border economic, professional and cultural transactions, or at the level of sectarian organizations that uphold narrowly defined ethnic, religious or ideological goals and agendas. Despite the fact that most interviewees declared that they appreciated universal values and fundamental freedoms which were also incorporated into the Dutch political and cultural system, they were highly sensitive about the preservation of their original culture and morals and believed in the primacy

of their "innate" ethno-religious identity. In the event that the norms of two cultural worlds clashed, they thought that the original culture (formulated basically as Turkishness and Muslimhood) would take precedence at least in the private domain. Individualization, cultural openness and ideas of cosmopolitanism seemed to be secondary to these concerns. Scepticism about processes of globalization and the possible effects of these processes on their ethno-religious identity marked the accounts of many interviewees.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

In the previous two chapters I have analyzed the interviews I conducted with selected members of the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands and attempted to address the question of how they make sense of the idea of homeland and construct their territorial relations at the cultural, instrumental and normative levels. In this final chapter, I will try to make a comparative analysis between the conceptions of homeland and territoriality of each group of interviewees based on my findings discussed in the preceding two chapters. I will follow the outline of the previous chapters and focus on firstly the cultural, then the instrumental and finally the normative implications of different manifestations of territoriality pertaining to the two communities.

#### **6.1 Cultural Conception of Territoriality in Turkish Communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands**

The most striking difference between the culturally defined manifestations of territoriality among the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and the Turkish immigrant community in the Netherlands is the presence, or absence, of a territorial base in their country of settlement. The Turkish minority in Bulgaria has been based in certain geographical areas for many generations and has generally been preoccupied with land-based activities for their living. Even today, many ethnic Turks in Bulgaria are employed in agriculture in their own ethnically-dominated villages, hometowns and regions.

Members of the Turkish community in the Netherlands, on the other hand, have primarily populated the Dutch cities and thus were detached from rural, land-based activities they had carried out back in Turkey. This difference may be claimed to have compelled the Dutch-Turkish community to put special emphasis on boundary maintenance vis-à-vis the host state and society as not only a means of building social cohesion and of ensuring socio-economic survival, but also an antidote for migration-induced feelings of territorial disorientation and rootlessness experienced particularly by first-generation migrants as well as by marriage and family unification migrants that followed. As a result, there emerged an inward-looking, close knit society concentrated in Turkish dominated neighbourhoods and organized mostly within mosque communities or Turkey-oriented, community-confined religious, political or cultural organizations. This situation impeded the ability of Dutch-Turks to construct more organic ties with their immediate locality or develop a place-oriented basis of identity. Instead of developing cultural values and practices that are peculiar to a place, town, or region they inhabit, the majority of the Turkish community in the Netherlands have tended to cling onto the cultural-religious values, beliefs and rituals that they or their parents imported from their land of origin. As a result, their community ethos has been shaped around principles that, according to the interviewees, have generated from two main identity markers: Islam and Turkishness. The principles such as patriotism, religious observance, strong family ties and respect for the elderly, social cohesion and control, and communitarian lifestyle are viewed as authentic, fixed cultural elements that mark the national character of the Turkish community as a whole and are attempted to be preserved through the patrolling of the physical and symbolic boundaries of communal spaces constructed at the local level around the home, the mosque and the neighbourhood as the places of cultural reproduction.

When I examined the culturally defined territorial relations of the ethnic Turks I interviewed in Bulgaria, I saw that they had more organic ties with their localities, be it a rural or an urban setting. Due to their long-lasting presence in their country of settlement, which was defined as their primary homeland by most interviewees, their structures of nativity were inspired more by territorial concepts that denote

permanence and continuity. The significance of territorial mooring for cultural and genealogical continuity was underlined particularly by the elder interviewees; hometown or native land was defined not only as the repository of personal memories and historical (heroic) events, but also as a life-sustaining bond between the past and the future of both the individual and the collectivity. Even though these more symbolic functions of territorial attachment are becoming obscured to younger generations and concerns of familiarity and opportunity are taking precedence over those of continuity and mooring, the collective identity of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria seems to be more territorially implicated than that of Dutch-Turks. As mentioned, the trauma of mass deportations in the past might have reinforced the centrality of territorial identification for many Bulgarian-Turks whereas the intended temporariness of Turkish immigrants' stay in the Netherlands might have deferred the "territorial question" until the realization that the settlement indeed became permanent for many. Therefore, for many immigrants in the Netherlands, territorial mooring in their country of residence was not deemed essential at the beginning, causing confusion in their minds about their territorial identity when the rupture they experienced turned out to be irreversible. One response has been to take a defensive position against the perceived danger of assimilation. The resistance to nativization was legitimized by using such terms as *Hollandalılařmak* and *gavurlařmak* for referring to cultural adaptation.

There was also a certain degree of fear of losing cultural distinctiveness especially among the elderly Turks interviewed in Bulgaria who witnessed the assimilationist period of the communist rule. Nevertheless, they seemed more self-confident about their Turkish identity and more optimistic about the construction of a common future with the dominant Bulgarian population, a future based on the preservation of democratic rights, mutual respect, harmony and a better understanding of each other's concerns. When compared to their counterparts in the Netherlands, the Turkish community in Bulgaria seems to experience less friction with the value system of the dominant Bulgarian culture; they believe in the Western democratic system based on fundamental human rights and freedoms and do not see an incompatibility between this system and their own cultural norms and practices. This

cultural affinity results in a stronger “we” sense and a shared belief in the formation of a more harmonious society in the future.

A longer history in the country of settlement and a higher level of cultural integration have provided ethnic Turks in Bulgaria with a form of group autonomy that denies cultural or other forms of patronage. Some of the interviewees declared that Turkey occasionally acted as a *de facto* protector kin-state particularly in times of oppression and deportation in the past and its presence still comforted them as a minority group suffering from ongoing social segregation and discrimination in their own country. However, this did not justify in the eyes of community members any direct intervention from the Turkish state or institutions into the internal affairs of the community. This sensitivity about the rejection of guardianship from extra-community actors or forces is also evident in the nature of community organizations established by ethnic Turks. A great majority of these organizations are based in Bulgaria and are oriented towards issues and agendas pertaining to the interests and problems of the Turkish community there. These are local organizations for the most part aiming at cultural preservation and inter-community dialogue. Therefore, it may be claimed that the organizational landscape in Bulgaria poses a contrast to the general operation of Turkish migrant organizations in the Netherlands. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the Netherlands, Turkish migrant organizations with a popular base are the ones that either reflect the political, religious or ethnic divisions in Turkey or function as extensions of political parties or groups based in Turkey.

Another difference between the two communities relates to their conceptions of a moral hierarchy between communities that make up the wider society in which they live. In the Dutch case, most interviewees regarded the native and other immigrant populations as morally inferior because they arguably failed to demonstrate proper community characteristics and lacked moral virtues such as religiosity, patriotic feelings, strong family ties and communal cohesion. The construction of such a moral hierarchy justified the self-enclosedness and voluntary isolation of the Turkish community from the rest of society. The interviewees in Bulgaria did not seem to have a clearly defined and morally implicated differentiation between different

communities or groups. Despite some negative remarks about the noncompliance of certain gypsy groups with the norms and rules of the public order, none of the interviewees openly expressed or implied any serious doubts about the authenticity or genuineness of the “community” status of any group in Bulgarian society. In other words, psychological distance from other groups seemed to be much more evident among the Turkish community in the Netherlands than in the case of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria.

One reason for the implicit or explicit antagonism that manifested itself in the relations of the Dutch-Turkish community with the native and other immigrant populations might be the stricter, uncompromising, essentialist interpretations of religious and national identities prevalent among community members. Turkishness and Muslimhood figured in most interviews as immutable, impervious, absolute categories that should be jealously protected particularly in the private domain against cultural penetration. Even though the immigrants recognized the inevitability of a certain degree of contact with other segments of society in the public domain while participating in social, political and institutional structures of the host country with the aim to secure a firm socio-economic status, the private domain should remain in the eyes of many community members as the territory of cultural reproduction where the national and the religious identity should be honoured. This schizophrenic split between the private and public domains appears to reinforce the feeling of permanent exile which is attempted to be remedied by the construction of “replica homelands” in the hostland. Replica homelands, which are embodied physically in Turkish-dominated neighbourhoods and mosque communities and symbolically in the discourse and practice of cultural-religious rites, activities and organizations, provide the space in which the “idealized” homeland, Turkey, can be reconstructed in ways imagined from afar.

In the case of the Bulgarian-Turks, though Turkishness and Islam constituted essential identity markers, I observed that these two components of collective identity were not perceived or acted upon by the interviewees in an ideologically stringent fashion. They were rather part of the daily routine of community members

and were not monopolistically represented or framed by politically-motivated popular organizations or movements. In the eyes of the interviewees, Turkishness was important in the sense that ethnic Turks should be allowed to express their identity without official or unofficial restraints; they should be able to speak their language freely, practice their customs, preserve their folklore and organize cultural activities in public. For the observant Muslims, people must be free to fulfil religious duties as a natural part of their daily routine. It may be argued for the interviewees at least that their emphasis on Turkishness did not evolve into Turkish nationalism in a political-ideological sense and valorization of religious values and beliefs did not lead to the construction of collective identity exclusively on an essentialist and unchanging interpretation of religion. Furthermore, many interviewees stated that their conceptualization of Turkishness and Islam was different from that of the Turkish people in Turkey or elsewhere because it had been shaped by the temporal and spatial specificities of Bulgarian lands. In other words, religious and ethnic positioning of Bulgarian-Turks is deeply embedded in the history and territoriality of their country.

The members of the Turkish community I interviewed in the Netherlands did not emphasize the distinctiveness of their ethno-religious identity from that of Turkish communities in Turkey or elsewhere. The withering away of their notion of territorial rootedness (as a result of both their migration experience and their lack of a territorial base in the country of settlement) and the accompanying process of defining identity markers as static, timeless and uniform categories have come to undermine the territorial embeddedness of the cultural ethos of the Turkish community. As a result, we see the prevalence of a dehistoricized, deterritorialized, transportable community ethos that does not need a territorial anchor for its existence or its transfer to younger generations.

In short, in the case of the Dutch-Turkish community, cultural identity is formed and perpetuated in a deterritorialized manner; it is not necessarily anchored in a specific territory or a historically significant or sacred place in the country of settlement. It is rather rooted in the community's private domain and moves with the community

(members). The content and limits of the cultural sphere are collectively defined within the confines of the communal space and strictly patrolled by individual members and organizational structures of the community. In the Bulgarian-Turkish case, in contrast, the cultural ethos of the community is more flexible and more accommodating to the values and norms of the dominant culture and of Europe. Moreover, it is explicitly territorialized as the collective identification of members rests on the notions of familiarity, historical continuity and territorial mooring. In other words, the community culture is deeply rooted in specific places (such as birthplaces, hometowns, places of worship and cemeteries), cities (such as Shumen and Razgrad) or regions (such as Dobrich and Kardzhali) which bear importance for community members both individually and collectively.

## **6.2 Instrumental Conception of Territoriality in Turkish Communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands**

Territorial relations are not constructed solely on localized, culturally transmitted, ethno-religiously defined forms of identification. They also have opportunity-generating aspects which are instrumental in the materialization of the political, social and economic well-being of community members. Put differently, apart from cultural notions and practices that derive directly from everyday manifestations of religion and ethno-national belonging, there are other (less immediate, more institutionalized) factors that shape each community's conceptualization of how community life should be organized and collective existence be maintained. Relationship with political authority is one of them.

The Turkish community in the Netherlands seems to adopt a more passive understanding of citizenship. Despite the fact that individual representatives of the community are increasing in number in the national and local parliaments and in city councils, the majority of ordinary citizens equate the notion of citizenship with being law-abiding members of society, placing more emphasis on duties than rights. Most interviewees condemned other immigrant groups, Moroccans in particular, for

raising their voices in the streets for their rights and resorting to protest activities that sometimes border on vandalism. Stretching the limits of the legal and political order for facilitating further participation of community members in the Dutch system and for widening the scope of freedoms was obviously not considered to be a legitimate motivation for minority mobilization. This is understandable given the fact that Turkish immigrants encountered a more democratically oriented state and society when they came to their host country and have never endured mass human rights violations or oppression as in the case of Bulgarian-Turks. Resistance to political and social pressures and struggling for rights and freedoms have apparently characterized the collective history of Bulgarian-Turks together with other oppressed groups in Bulgaria and have become crucial constituents of their collective identity. This may also be one of the reasons behind their support for the MRF. Consequently, while Bulgarian-Turks enjoy the advantage of having an influential political party that represents the rights and interests of minority groups at the national level, Dutch-Turks are confined to their own community-specific organizations or to limited and indirect institutional frameworks such as the IOT, the consultative council for the Turkish community, for channelling their political and other demands.

Another factor that explains this discrepancy in notions of citizenship might be the legacy of the pillar structure in the Netherlands that defined rights and freedoms on a collective ground, further isolating communities and their organizational structures from others. Another explanation might be related to the conditions and time of settlement; Bulgarian-Turks are the descendants mostly of political settlers who had a continued presence in the region for centuries whereas Dutch-Turks are labour migrants or their descendants who migrated to their current country of residence in the last half century. Therefore, while in the former case political motivation to survive various periods of war, mass deportation and oppression prevailed, in the latter case labour immigrants have come to develop a political consciousness only after they recognized that their stay in the Netherlands turned into a permanent one.

This in turn is linked to how the two communities have conceptualized their minority status. While the Bulgarian-Turkish interviewees declared that they saw themselves

first and foremost as an integral part of Bulgarian society, a considerable number of the Dutch-Turkish interviewees seemed to resent their minority status in the Netherlands as they thought they had an independence-oriented history as a nation and superior cultural values. This way of thinking impedes integration of the Turkish community in the Netherlands and reinforces their collective isolation and sense of entrapment in an alien society. On the other hand, even when members of the Turkish community in Bulgaria seek alternative places for settlement, this is not usually because they have been segregated or alienated to the degree that they no longer feel an integral part of Bulgarian society. Their choices of migration and settlement may be affected by economic hardships and rising unemployment that hit disadvantaged groups more strongly, but not by an urge stemming from a perceived existential disunity with the rest of the population. Therefore, despite the fact that in both communities there is a strong perception of ongoing discrimination and economic disadvantage connected with their minority status, ethnic Turks in Bulgaria are more emotionally and territorially anchored in their country while Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands are beset by deeper problems of cultural integration as they feel torn between their homeland-imported cultural world and the cultural ethos of their country of settlement.

The Turkish-Dutch interviewees stressed the advantages of having the Dutch nationality. Many of them obviously did not consider themselves to be part of the Dutch nation. Neither did they assess the successes and failures of the Dutch state from the perspective of "national pride". They had an instrumentalist-materialist stance on issues of nationality; they appreciated the advantages of having the Dutch passport in the international realm and reaped the benefits of the welfare state through Dutch citizenship. However, these material ties did not transform for many into an emotional-cultural identification with the Netherlands. Most interviewees did not establish any direct link between the domestic and international achievements of the Dutch state and their own contentment and self-esteem. Even though they appreciated the democratic standards achieved so far and benefited from the smooth functioning of the state machinery, not many interviewees exhibited any explicit sign of a strong national attachment to their host state, or used terms signifying patriotic

feelings or notions such as national pride, national duty or national unity when referring to their country of settlement. Naturalization seemed to be indeed a decision of convenience on the part of many immigrants taken to better enjoy civic rights and better pursue community interests at the political and institutional level. As their primary national allegiance remained with Turkey, most of those who naturalized did not renounce their Turkish nationality in defiance of the Dutch law prohibiting dual nationality. The main reason for this might be that the Netherlands fails to bear the symbolic meaning that emanates from myths of common ancestry and nationally defended sacred soil; most community members had not previously possessed any sort of a territorial or ancestral tie to the Dutch land and people, at least not until their immigration into the country.

As for the Bulgarian-Turkish interviewees, it cannot either be claimed that they were tied to the Bulgarian state and people through an ideologically defined Bulgarian nationalism. The differences of language, culture and religion, and the exclusivist interpretations of Bulgarian nationalism have undermined the sense of national belonging to the Bulgarian nation-state on the part of ethnic Turks. Even though many of the interviewees expressed their concerns about the current situation of the Bulgarian economy, democracy and demographic decline as a sign of the idea of sharing a common fate with the Bulgarian population, it may be said that the absence of a cohesion ideology to bind ethnic Turks to other groups in society impedes for now the development of the notion of a solidified nationhood based on mutual interests and future ideals.

Nevertheless, when compared to their counterparts in the Netherlands, the ties of the Bulgarian-Turkish interviewees to the Bulgarian country were much more organic and deep-seated in the sense that they saw the Bulgarian state as "their state", Bulgarian land as "their soil", and Bulgarian society as "their society". I have stated previously that the Dutch-Turkish interviewees almost never referred to the Dutch state, statesmen, territory or society as theirs. Unfortunate events of the past such as the assimilation campaign of the communist regime and mass deportations, though inducing a feeling of physical and socio-economic insecurity, have never caused a

total breakaway of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria. None of the interviewees thought that the responsibility for past hardships could be extended to include the entire Bulgarian governments and society. They believed that past atrocities were a result of the policies of specific governments and individuals and that Bulgarian society never approved these policies.

Another point of dissimilarity between the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands concerns their patterns of political engagement. Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria directly engage in the Bulgarian political system on the basis of the principle of the autonomy of the free and equal citizen vis-à-vis the state, without allowing the direct intervention of other actors, organizations or influential figures that stand out within the community. It is true that the MRF has come to be perceived to be dominated by ethnic Turks and has enjoyed power sharing in government in a couple of occasions. Despite the popular support accorded to the MRF, however, the latter could not come to a position to monopolize the political choices or the collective will of ethnic Turks. Nor could it manage to constitute itself as the sole representative of the community or function as an intervening political layer between community members and parliamentary politics. In contrast, the political choices of many Dutch-Turks seemed to be often mediated by their membership in the Turkish community and/or by the guidance of Turkish migrant organizations and community leaders. Most Turkish associations in Bulgaria aim at the preservation of the Turkish culture (primarily of language and folklore) while many of those in the Netherlands have political agendas alongside their stated objectives. Despite the fact that the Dutch political system is based on less hierarchical forms of governance and that the individualization of citizen participation is encouraged at both national and local levels, the political demands and actions of many Turkish immigrants are formulated within the framework of religious, cultural, ethnic or kin groups and are influenced by organizational representatives of these groups many of which are directly controlled by political parties, movements and organizations in Turkey. Religious groups are particularly strong; religious organizations/movements surface as the primary contenders for group loyalty with their transnational networks and Turkey-based material and human resources. This is in sharp contrast with the position of

institutionalized/official religion in Bulgaria where religious organizations and leaders are not powerful enough to dominate the social life of ethnic Turks.

Despite this difference between the two communities' patterns of political participation, it may still be claimed that the preservation of group rights constitutes an important factor shaping political decisions in both communities. The vote base secured by the MRF among ethnic Turks as well as among other minority groups has largely been due to its critical role in the country's transition to liberal democracy and the reinstatement of minority rights and basic freedoms. Considerations of group rights and interests also explain why the majority of the Turkish community in the Netherlands vote for left-wing parties which endorse a more favourable attitude towards immigrants and immigrant-related issues. This situation testifies to the Dutch-Turks' continuing self-perception first and foremost as "immigrants". Nevertheless, there exist people in both communities who make their political choices on the grounds of ideology and political principles rather than on the narrowly defined criterion of community interests.

I identified three commonly shared issues that render the integration of both communities into their respective societies problematic: cultural divergence, discrimination and economic decline. In both cases, the Turkish communities are relatively homogeneous in terms of language, religion and cultural practices. Even though there are certain cultural, denominational and regional variations between different groups in each community, the majority of members of each community share similar cultural traits and these are fairly different from those of the dominant group. Even though ethnic Turks in Bulgaria have been settled on Bulgarian lands for so long that they have become indigenized, they cannot be deemed fully amalgamated into the mainstream culture just like Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. Moreover, both communities are characterized by lower educational and socio-economic levels in comparison to the dominant populations in their respective countries. These discrepancies fuel social segregation especially when combined with other two factors, namely discrimination and economic decline.

Discrimination was a frequently mentioned problem during the interviews in Bulgaria and the Netherlands. The rise of Ataka in Bulgaria and of the PVV in the Netherlands as political parties openly endorsing racist discourses was a source of concern among ethnic Turks in both countries. However, what worried them more than overt instances of racism and discrimination was structural and institutional forms of discrimination that manifested themselves in the operation of state bureaucracy, in judiciary, in employment and resource allocation decisions of public and private institutions and in the policies of moderate parties which tend to harden their stance on minorities and immigrants in order to be able to compete with extremist parties for votes in a radicalizing political atmosphere.

However, it should also be noted that while the Turkish interviewees in Bulgaria put more emphasis on economic deterioration that resulted in a sharp decline in wages and a considerable increase in unemployment rates, growing tensions in inter-community relations and a paradigmatic shift in integration and immigration regimes seemed to bother Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands more than the recent economic decline in the country. In spite of shortcomings, the Netherlands may be regarded as a still well-functioning welfare state when compared particularly to Eastern European countries still plagued by problems of democratic transition. However, the shift from a multiculturalist paradigm towards a model of civic integration which dismisses the principles of cultural diversity, group autonomy and voluntary integration and places the financial and non-financial burden of integration on the shoulders of *individual* immigrants seems to have reinforced the already existing feelings of alienation and detachment among immigrant communities in the Netherlands. The imposition of compulsory integration programmes and the introduction of more stringent policies in the fields of immigration, family reunification, citizenship and naturalization caused resentment among most Turkish immigrants who maintain strong ties with Turkey to the degree of bringing spouses from this country. The restrictions imposed on both settled immigrants and newcomers and the adoption of the view that citizenship and certain welfare benefits are the prize of successful integration were perceived by the interviewees as having a hidden logic of "either assimilate or exclude".

The ethnic Turks in Bulgaria were also worried about the discriminatory discourses and practices that prevailed in their country. However, there nevertheless seemed to exist a consensus in Bulgarian society on the enhancement of fundamental human rights and freedoms and espousal of universal norms and values. This consensus on the shared community ethos of democratic standards resulted in optimism among the ethnic Turks I interviewed about the resolution of problems relating to rights and freedoms of minorities; they saw it as only a matter of time for wider society to overcome the image of the uncivilized and backward Turk propagated by Bulgarian nationalists for a long time and to consolidate the democratic peace established with the transition to liberal democratic multi-party system. On the other hand, the interviewees seemed to be more preoccupied with the deepening economic problems aggravated by their minority status as their lower levels of education and prevailing prejudices in society rendered them more vulnerable to economic fluctuations. The solution many Turks found was irregular or seasonal migration to economically better-off countries including Turkey, a situation that made their territorial ties to Bulgaria more precarious.

About overcoming inter-community prejudices and discriminatory practices, the Dutch-Turkish respondents seemed less optimistic than their Bulgarian-Turkish counterparts. They stated that discriminatory policies were not confined to certain governments or political parties but were systematically implemented by the Dutch state all along. Even though they declared their determination to fight racism and discrimination, they implied that the prejudices of the Dutch people, just like those of other European nations, against immigrants (and Muslim immigrants in particular) have been so deep-rooted that inter-community tensions emanating from prejudices and stereotyping cannot be easily resolved. That is why, the interviewees continued, Turkish immigrants are discouraged from further integration efforts. Moreover, while some interviewees advocated further harmonization of cultural codes and social behaviour with wider society, others claimed that proficiency in Dutch language, respect for Dutch laws and regulations and economic participation would suffice for successful integration. For them, cultural integration was neither necessary nor

appropriate since what Dutch authorities demanded of immigrants in the new system of civic integration amounted indeed to assimilation.

Most interviewees formulated their more immediate problems and demands on religious-cultural grounds while very few of them brought up welfare issues. This meant a divergence from the approach of the Bulgarian interviewees for whom economic and social matters seemed to have higher priority than identity politics. Dutch-Turks relied on their community-specific organizations, parallel social structures and kin networks for many social services whereas Bulgarian-Turks looked to the state for welfare issues, though without much hope for short-term improvement. This may be the legacy of communism, but it should also be noted that the role of the state was changing in the eyes of younger generations as they increasingly adopted the neo-liberal assumption that everyone should be primarily responsible for their own well-being. Bulgarian-Turks' diminishing faith in the state's ability to provide the welfare of its citizens and their growing mistrust in the problem-solving and transformative capacity of politics were also shared to a certain extent by some of the interviewees in the Netherlands. The Dutch-Turkish interviewees had a claim for self-sufficiency, a claim supported by the entrepreneurial and organizational abilities of Turkish immigrants as well as by arguments for cultural-moral superiority as discussed earlier. In their view, the state should not intervene into the internal affairs of the community and not push for further cultural integration. It should leave the issue of integration to the natural course of time and should only facilitate the necessary conditions for the economic and cultural self-realization of each community. This view seems to be an expression of a zero-sum perception of state-society relations in which an understanding of mutual empowerment between the state and society that typically characterizes "homeland attachment" hardly exists. The Bulgarian-Turks, on the other hand, did not adhere to such an assertive dissociation from their state; they were more inclined to think that their fate was intrinsically tied to that of the rest of society and that their survival always called for a harmonious relationship with the Bulgarian state and society. Problems of adaptation and of inter-community dialogue are naturally not as severe in the Bulgarian case because the Turkish community there have a much

longer history of nativization, resulting in a certain degree of cultural fusion with different groups.

Even though Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands are not happy with pressures for further integration and believe that these measures deepen inter-community divides and have a negative impact on integration efforts of immigrants, studies reveal that multiculturalist policies and easy access to equal civic rights and welfare arrangements discourage integration. Asking whether integration is slow because of discriminatory-exclusionist attitudes and practices of the Dutch state and society or whether the Dutch state had to change its integration regime because multiculturalist policies failed to integrate immigrants constitutes a vicious circle. While most immigrants believe that new policies erected new barriers between the native population and immigrant communities, Dutch authorities tend recently to think that more liberal and pluralist policies of the past had led to the containment of immigrants within their own communities, increased levels of social segregation and rendered immigrants reluctant to integrate. The perceptual gap between Turkish migrants and Dutch natives was also evidenced by scientific studies. In a couple of surveys conducted among native and immigrant respondents, Dutch natives were shown to believe that separation and marginalization were the two most commonly adopted strategies among Muslim immigrants while Turkish immigrants preferred integration as the most appropriate adaptation strategy and favoured contact with the majority population, though they mostly rejected cultural adaptation particularly in the private domain. Indeed, the perceptual gap between communities seems to be more effective in fuelling prejudices than actual policies and practices do.

### **6.3 Normative Conception of Territoriality in Turkish Communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands**

In addition to instrumental forms of territoriality and their perceptual implications for individual-state and individual-society relations, there may be other foci of individual and group loyalty that may challenge or reinforce locally or nationally

defined forms of territorial embeddedness. In other words, territorial relations are not confined to the physical and symbolic situatedness of individuals and groups in culturally relevant localities or in nation-states. Even though these two settings tend to produce more immediate and concrete forms of territoriality that can be easily tracked on the basis of their inhabitants' daily habits and practices as well as their institutionalized ties, other (non-local, cross-border, transnational) types of engagement may also take part in the construction of territorial identification. Since physical situatedness may be experienced in this type of territoriality only in a loose or limited fashion in comparison to the first two conceptualizations, symbolic-normative aspects take precedence over physical-material ones.

The presence of strong transnational ties, both actual and symbolic, with an ancestral homeland or country of origin is one of the factors that determine one's relations with their country of settlement. The question of whether such transnational ties undermine the loyalty of individuals or groups to their lived homeland or country of settlement or whether they reinforce integration through empowering disadvantaged groups is a debated issue. Either way, transnational interactions are definitely becoming more and more influential in defining territorial identification of human subjects.

When I compared the interviewee accounts regarding their ties to and their association with Turkey, I saw both similarities and differences. One remarkable difference pertained to the homeland identification of the interviewees. Most of the Dutch-Turkish interviewees still regarded Turkey as their original homeland, defining the Netherlands as their second homeland or merely their country of settlement. Even those who have limited physical-material ties with Turkey expressed their continuing emotional ties with the country. Homeland identification among the Bulgarian-Turkish interviewees on the other hand displayed the effect of generational differences. The interviewees who experienced the assimilationist campaign of the Bulgarian state and the mass exodus of 1989 had a more emotional type of attachment to Turkey; they defined Turkey as their motherland, or ancestral homeland and Bulgaria as their lived homeland. Among younger interviewees, the

perception of Turkey as the motherland or a protector kin-state was weak. They rather viewed Turkey as a window of opportunity, or an alternative place for settlement that offers better economic opportunities and has the advantage of cultural and linguistic familiarity. Even for those who saw Turkey as their motherland, actual interactions with Turkey were limited to occasional family visits. Apart from family visits, cultural organizations were reported to have cultural and educational activities organized together with their Turkish civil society and university counterparts. Their contacts with other Turkish communities in third countries were also limited to the cultural sphere. Therefore, we cannot talk about the simultaneous embeddedness of members of the Turkish community in Bulgaria in multiple societies or territorial settings. Nor can we detect the emergence of transnationally generated and mutually shared values, ideas or practices between Bulgarian-Turks and other ethnically related groups across the borders. Even those interviewees who had close personal or other ties with Turkey stated that they did not take much interest in the political debates or social matters or have any sustained institutionalized relationship with political and social actors in Turkey.

This situation contrasts the accounts of the interviewees in the Netherlands. Many interviewees stated that they, their families and their Turkish acquaintances closely followed the developments in Turkey and took pride in its achievements. Moreover, a host of Turkish immigrant organizations in the Netherlands have close institutional and/or ideological ties with political parties and movements in Turkey. Most Turkish organizations in the Netherlands are politically motivated and in this respect diverge from Turkish organizations in Bulgaria which have generally confined their scope to cultural preservation and community representation. Despite being deprived of the advantage of geographical proximity with the ancestral land unlike Bulgarian-Turks, the Turkish community in the Netherlands is closer to having a diaspora status. Even though permanent return to Turkey did not appear to be a realistic option especially for those who had built their lives in the Netherlands with their families and had acquired socio-economic advantages after so many years of working, the idea of homeland in its symbolic and materialistic manifestations still seemed to serve as an important anchor for cultural maintenance and communal cohesion.

A number of the Dutch-Turkish interviewees clearly depicted an image of Turkey as the idealized territorial representation of their national, religious and cultural identity, the original source of their cultural norms and habits and a stimulator of communal self-esteem particularly when Turkey's domestic achievements and international prestige increase. Apart from these symbolic functions, Turkey also provides Dutch-Turks with a viable option for alternative permanent or temporary settlement in the event that things go wrong in the Netherlands. If, for instance, the economic situation continues to decline and the job market further contracts, or if racist discourses and practices come to a point of threatening the socio-cultural existence of the Turkish community, then, the interviewees stated, there might be a wave of return migration to Turkey. But for now, the odds looked slim. Despite a relative deterioration in their status as immigrants, the fears associated with unsettling their established lives and fragmenting their families as well as the continuing volatility of the political situation in Turkey seemed to hold them in check. This conception of the country of origin as the "reserve homeland" has also been observable throughout the history of Bulgarian-Turks. Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria looked to Turkey for support and for a safe shelter in times of war, persecution and political pressure for mass migration. Of course, Turkey's function as a refuge for those involuntarily escaping atrocities across the border is not comparable to being a second best option for rationally calculating Dutch-Turks who are not satisfied with their life standards in the Netherlands. Yet, the perceived advantage of having a substitute country seems to prevail in both cases.

Even in the absence of an intention of return, Turkey is being used by many Dutch-Turks as a balancing mechanism for the perceived deficiencies of the country of settlement such as less intimate and less dynamic social and family relations, an excessively regulated public order with strictly applied rules and unfavourable climatic conditions. In order to remedy the disturbance these unfamiliar conditions cause, many members of the Turkish community tend to spend their holidays with their families in Turkey or go back and forth between the two countries for professional and/or recreational purposes. Moreover, there are many Dutch-Turks who make their investments in and bring spouses from Turkey. A considerable

number also maintain homes in the two countries with a view to benefiting from the social, economic and geographical advantages of each country.

In fact, Turkey and Turkish migrants abroad are mutually dependent in many respects. In addition to such economic ties as remittances, savings accounts in Turkish banks and real estate investments in the homeland, immigrants also constitute an important part of the vote basis of Turkish political parties and a source of human and financial resources for many political and/or cultural organizations having transnational ties. Moreover, the presence of immigrants particularly in influential host countries may serve as a foreign policy leverage utilized for putting pressure on governments in order to secure desired decisions as we saw in the debates on Turkey's EU membership. However, it should also be noted that the Turkish community and their organizations are so fragmented and localized in scope and vision that we do not yet witness the emergence of a national diaspora network or a well-coordinated lobby among Turkish immigrants both in the Netherlands and in other European host countries. As previously mentioned, many of the organizations established by Turkish immigrants either mirror the ethnic, religious and political cleavages in the homeland or are hometown associations with limited membership.

The unwelcoming attitude of the Netherlands towards lobbying in homeland issues and the inadequacy of the efforts of Turkey to harmonize immigrant interests and activities within the framework of a common agenda are two other decisive factors in this matter. Even though Turkey has always struggled to tie its nationals abroad to their country of origin, the prominence of dissident groups and organizations among immigrants in politically liberal European states reduced the efficacy of these efforts for a long time up until the relative liberalization of Turkish politics in recent years. Now, Turkey stresses in its official declarations the importance of immigrants' socio-economic integration into their countries of settlement encouraging them to acquire host country citizenship, but expects them to resist cultural assimilation. Even though a few interviewees frowned on a symbiotic relationship with the homeland arguing that this would hinder integration, Turkey's more assertive emigrant policies were

welcome by most of them as they complained about the passive and self-interested policies of the past which were usually based on the goal of extracting votes and money without engaging in institutionalized efforts to contribute to the well-being of migrants abroad through the fulfilment of their material and non-material needs.

In sum, members of the Turkish community in the Netherlands have a certain degree of a diaspora consciousness. Most of them regard Turkey as their ideally imagined homeland that forms the origin of their collective identity, solidarity and self-image and a "backup country" that can be resorted to in case of further economic and social distress. They have actual personal and organizational ties with their country of origin at the social, economic, political and cultural levels. However, in the final analysis, these partly sporadic linkages fall short of a concerted and sustained manifestation of diaspora activism or of long-distance nationalism with long-term and far-reaching effects on the transnationalization of homeland issues.

At this point, it should also be asserted that the Turkish community in Bulgaria cannot either be classified as a diaspora community in the classical sense since it has followed a different historical path after Bulgaria's separation from the Turkish lands and has now hardly any commonly shared issues or problems with the population in Turkey. Most members of the community seem to distance themselves from a systematically defined nationalist ideology or agenda that rests on the rhetoric of common origins, goals and interests of the Turkish populations on the two sides of the border. In short, the community as a whole neither displays a diasporic identification with a Turkish "transnation" nor seeks to mobilize resources around a common political cause. Diasporic identification entails a triadic relationship between the homeland, the hostland, and the ethnic community, in which the latter is instrumentally and ideologically tied to the homeland through diaspora organizations, lobbying activities, citizenship ties, economic exchanges and cultural-artistic networks. However, the Turkish community in Bulgaria does not have sustained, coordinated and consistent linkages with Turkey to justify the existence of such a clear-cut diasporic relationship. If we define long-term nationalism as the continuous and active involvement of dispersed ethnic communities in the actual and

symbolic efforts for nation-building or national development in the homeland, we cannot either claim that the Turkish community in Bulgaria engages in long-distance Turkish nationalism notwithstanding the high levels of social mobility across the Bulgarian-Turkish border.

In fact, the Turkish community in Bulgaria have gone through various phases of cross-border migration in the last decades. First, almost 350,000 ethnic Turks were forced to migrate to Turkey in the late 1980s. After the fall of the communist regime, nearly half of these emigrants returned to Bulgaria. However, with the deterioration of the economic situation in Bulgaria in the 1990s, many ethnic Turks resorted to economic migration to Turkey and to other European countries. Such high levels of mobility created many divided families across borders as well as irregular or circular migrants with unstable territorial ties. However, as mentioned, transnationalism is not only about multiple border-crossings, family visits or remittance-sending. It also denotes transformation of norms, values and practices which will in turn lead to the emergence of multi-dimensional identities and multi-sited subjectivities.

In the case of the Turkish community in Bulgaria, I observed that particularly those community members living in cities had easy access to communication technologies such as the Internet and satellite TVs that facilitate transnational interactions. In this sense, they were not isolated from the effects of global political and cultural trends. But transnationalization of information technologies and the media does not automatically lead to substantive and long-term transformations in how people think and act in ways that go beyond the already existing, settled categories of human identification and organization. In this regard, we cannot yet see a discernible formation of substantively transnational or cosmopolitan identities, norms and practices that transcend narrowly defined local interests and instrumentalist interpretations of transnationalism. Nor can we claim the existence of sustained and pervasive processes of norm transfer at the transnational level.

Nevertheless, the ethnic Turks interviewed in Bulgaria seemed to embrace modern Western norms and values including respect for human and minority rights, rule of law, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, gender equality, scientific and

social progress, a disciplined and norm-based public life and professional ethics. As the Bulgarian national elite were highly influenced by Enlightenment ideas and Bulgarian historiography had long rested on the dichotomy between the backward Ottoman past and modern European civilization, the mentality of minority groups has also been shaped by these ideals of modernity and progress. With the increasingly mobile patterns of human activity brought about by transnationalism, mobility and movement also came to be associated with modernity and progress. I observed this strong cognitive link between and the positive value attributed to the notions of mobility, openness, freedom and progress in interviewee accounts as well. Most interviewees thought that Bulgaria was part of Europe, though it was lagging behind in some respects, and that free movement of people now offered new opportunities for a better life elsewhere and wider horizons for cross-border alliance-building with similar or distinct cultural groups.

The most noticeable difference between normative orientations of the interviewees in Bulgaria and the Netherlands involves the flexibility and adaptability of normative-cultural categories adopted by each community. The Turkish interviewees in Bulgaria did not assume an inherent contradiction between their own cultural norms and those of the rest of the Bulgarian population or of the wider European civilization. They seemed to share most of the principles and ideas of the European culture and never questioned their place within this cultural ring.

Most of the Dutch-Turkish respondents on the other hand explicitly or implicitly suggested an incompatibility between their ethno-religious identity and cultural norms and those of their hostland or the West in general. Indeed, none of them expressed outright rejection of universal values such as democracy, the rule of law, protection of human rights, freedom of speech, respect for differences and pluralism. They acknowledged the necessity to conform to the rules and principles of the Dutch political system and public order. On the other hand, however, they were highly sensitive about the preservation of their original culture and morals and believed in the primacy of their "innate" ethno-religious identity. In the event of a clash of cultural values, most interviewees thought that the original culture (formulated

basically as Turkishness and Muslimhood) should prevail at least in the private domain relegating concepts such as individualism, cultural openness and ideas of cosmopolitanism to a secondary position. This seemed to stem from conceiving certain collective identities (original-ancestral identities) as essential, fixed and authentic categories while deeming others (political-legal identities) secondary and inferior. The belief in an irreconcilable cultural divergence seemed to impact negatively not only on their Dutch national identification but also on their territorial embeddedness in the host country. Residential segregation and ghetto-like forms of settlement, separation of schools, clearly demarcated socio-cultural boundaries fortified against the infiltration of alien cultural influences and civil society organization patterns that suffer from parochialism, factionalism, exclusionary and undemocratic decision-making procedures confirm (and at the same time reinforce) this situation.

Indeed, active participation in transnational networks and organizations is not a widespread practice among most migrants because it requires time, effort and financial resources which socio-economically constrained migrants cannot easily afford. As previously mentioned, many transnationally active migrant organizations promote parochial or homeland-oriented interests and are not usually inclusive in their membership and agendas. As such they may not be appealing to the majority of migrants who are entangled in problems specific to their new local and national contexts. Therefore, the vast majority of homeland-directed transnational activity takes place at the level of individuals in the form of family visits, remittance-sending, holiday trips, business connections and short-term residence. Beyond these concrete ties, the idea of homeland also prevails in the cultural-normative sphere as the basis of communal cohesion and the territorial embodiment of collective identity. Most members of the Turkish community retain the homeland myth even in the absence of tangible or physical homeland bonds because it provides a symbolic anchor to be utilized in their efforts to overcome every-day feelings of victimization and alienation. The symbolic and normative qualities associated with the homeland may not correspond to the actual condition of the homeland. But imagining the homeland

as they desire and attributing their own values, beliefs and customs to it reinforce migrants' sense of embeddedness and connectedness.

However, migrants may sometimes experience similar processes of alienation and exclusion in their original homeland as well since they have been away from the internal dynamics of the homeland for a long time and might have acquired in the meantime new characteristics and habits that might appear foreign to the native inhabitants in the homeland. This may aggravate feelings of dislocation and rootlessness and may lead to a confusion regarding hyphenated, multi-sited identities. Also in the hostland context, deciding which elements of the original culture can be compromised in the name of successful integration constitutes a challenge to migrants as they face many instances of a cultural clash in their everyday life. Despite the fact that Turkish immigrants have concrete ties with both their original homeland and their country of settlement, internalization of truly hybrid identities and of transnationally generated common values has not yet fully materialized in the Turkish-Dutch context. Universal values and transnationally defined identities and practices seemed to be endorsed by the interviewees insofar as these did not encroach on the principle elements of the community culture. Categorically favouring certain types of identity over others by claiming that they are more authentic and legitimate calls into question the arguments for the increasing emancipatory influences of transnationalism on the construction of less exclusive and more fluid and transitive identities.

The Dutch-Turkish interviewees' expressed their suspicions about the emergence of a more integrated world gravitating towards cosmopolitanism and about the capacity of processes of transnationalization and globalization to bring about a substantive change in how people construct their primary identities and interconnect at the cultural and social levels. The interviewees declared that they used transnational channels for the purposes of personal communication, community mobilization and easy access to information, but they doubted whether these transnational practices actually paved the way for the approximation of cultures, hybridization of identities or universalization of certain norms and values. Approximation of cultures and

creolization of identities imply at least a certain degree of cultural fusion. However, this fusion may be disturbing for many. Even people with migration experiences, multi-sited lives and sufficient opportunities to make use of advanced forms of communication and organization may still remain ambivalent and confused about how they could accommodate multiple (and sometimes conflicting) loyalties and identities. Because transnationalism, though generating many opportunities for individuals and collectivities with diverse agendas, may at the same time challenge human inclinations towards stability, certainty, rootedness and clear-cut categories of meaning. Therefore, notions such as mobility, speed, connectivity, hybridity, unboundedness and multi-sitedness, which are valued positively by many today, may be double-edged swords with unsettling effects on human territoriality.

Associating transnationalism exclusively with mobility, deterritorialization and unboundedness and assigning qualities such as fixity, territorial boundedness and monolithic identities to national or local contexts is problematic. We may see elements of both sets of qualities at every level in each context. The idea that culture and identity are becoming increasingly deterritorialized and that they are constructed independently from place and locality is no longer unquestioningly accepted. Indeed, we see that cultural connectivities and exchanges go through simultaneous processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization in ways specific to distinct localities or territorial contexts, vindicating Escobar's argument that culture still "sits in places" (Escobar cited in Jackson *et al.* 2004: 6).

Contrary to classical migration literature, a new line of thought suggests that integration and transnationalization are not mutually exclusive and better-integrated migrants might even be more successful in maintaining transnational identities and practices, and vice versa. But some of the Dutch-Turkish interviewees asserted that easier, faster and cheaper transportation and communication technologies had not produced the intended results at least for some segments of the Turkish community. According to them, rather than an expected opening up of a previously self-contained and conservative community, transnational relations might have reinforced communal isolation and rendered Turkey as the primary source of cultural

nourishment for some. Moreover, as a result of globalization, religious and cultural differences have become more visible, creating an environment conducive to political manipulation of issues regarding cultural differences.

How culturally distinct groups interpret and internalize new cultures, ideas and practices that they encounter during their transnational exchanges do not usually follow a single path. Not only the instruments of transnational interactions but also the goals and nature of transnational activities, ingroup dynamics and self-images play a part in this process. Rigidly defined, exclusivist forms of group identification are an impediment to the construction of multi-layered, hybrid identities and to the proliferation of truly liberating experiences of transnationalism. A certain degree of the loosening of in-group social control and a flexible approach towards group loyalties are needed for the emergence of transnationalization patterns that go beyond diffusion of new technologies and of short-term trends and create longer-lasting transcultural associations and allegiances. Transcultural interactions of this sort can only be achieved through individualization of members of culturally isolated communities. Only this way can cultural boundaries be transgressed.

A comparative analysis between the Turkish communities in Bulgaria and the Netherlands reveals that in communities with strong in-group identification and a conception of cultural superiority and self-sufficiency, we see the predominance of rigidly-defined group identities and loyalties which restrain the range of options regarding courses of action an individual can choose between. In these communities, group loyalties condition individual members' preferences as to where and how to live, whom to contact and in what ways. A certain degree of individualization on the other hand enriches alternatives and allows individuals to make more informed choices. This means an increased likelihood of forging sustained and multi-faceted relations with other individuals and groups both within and beyond the borders of the country of settlement.

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## APPENDIX A

### INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

#### Question Set for the Cultural Conception of Territoriality

- Kendinizi kısaca anlatır mısınız? (Biyografik bilgi: Doğum yeri, yaşı, eğitim düzeyi, mesleği, çalıştığı kurumlar ve görevleri, yaşadığı yer(ler), göç tecrübeleri, aile üyeleri hakkında bilgi vb.)
- Ne kadar zamandır Bulgaristan/Hollanda'da yaşıyorsunuz? Aileniz kaç kuşaktır burada? Onlar ne zaman ve nereden gelmişler, nereye yerleşmişler?
- Sizin (ya da ailenizin) toprakla bağınız var mı? Toprağı ekip biçiyor musunuz? Toprak sizin için ne ifade ediyor? (Aidiyet bağı, geçim kaynağı, yaşam tarzı vb.)
- Sizin için mesleğiniz ne ifade ediyor? Neden bu mesleği/işi seçtiniz? Başka bir işte çalışmak ister miydiniz? Neden?
- Yaşadığınız yer (köy, kasaba, şehir, mahalle) sizin için ne ifade ediyor? Türklerin yoğun olduğu bir yerde/mahallede mi yaşıyorsunuz? Yaşadığınız yerle bağlarınız, komşuluk ilişkileriniz nasıl?
- Yaşadığınız yeri seviyor musunuz? Neden? Sizi buraya bağlayan en önemli etken nedir? Sizce insanları yaşadıkları yerlere bağlayan şey nedir?
- Daha önce Türkiye'de veya başka bir ülkede bulundunuz/yaşadınız mı? Ne kadar süreyle yaşadınız? Ne vesileyle gittiniz?

- Başka bir yerde, şehirde, ülkede (Türkiye) yaşamak ister miydiniz? Hiç başka bir yere göç etmeyi düşündünüz mü? Neden?
- Aile büyükleriniz başka bir ülkede (Türkiye) veya şehirde yaşamak ister miydi? Neden?
- Çocuklarınızın burada yaşamaya devam etmesini ister misiniz? Türkiye'ye veya başka bir yere göç etmelerini ister misiniz? Çocuklarınız göç etmeyi düşünüyorlar mı? Neden? Başka bir yere göç etmek isteseler (örneğin Türkiye'ye dönmek isteseler) siz ne tepki verirsiniz? Başka bir yere göç etmelerine karşı çıkar mısınız?
- Kendinizi ve ailenizi kimlik, köken, milli bağ, kültürel yapı ve değerler vb. bakımından nasıl tanımlarsınız?
- Kendinizi ve ailenizi göçmen/azınlık mensubu olarak tanımlar mısınız? Böyle tanımlanmaktan rahatsızlık duyuyor musunuz?
- Aile büyüklerinizden Türkiye'ye dönenler oldu mu? Aile büyüklerinizin mezarları nerede? Siz kendi mezarınızın nerede olmasını istersiniz?
- Vatan/ana vatan deyince ne anlıyorsunuz? Vatan/ana vatan ayrımı sizin için ne ifade ediyor? Sizin için vatan/ana vatan neresidir? Neden? Kendinizi nerede evinizde veya memleketinizde hissediyorsunuz?
- Aile üyeleriniz ve çocuklarınız nereyi vatan olarak görüyorlar? Neden?

### **Question Set for the Instrumental Conception of Territoriality**

- Bulgaristan/Hollanda devletinin temel ihtiyaçlarınızı (iş, barınma, eğitim, sağlık vb.) karşıladığını düşünüyor musunuz?

- Siz ve aileniz Bulgarlar/Hollandalılar'la gündelik hayat içerisinde ne sıklıkla temas kuruyorsunuz? (Resmi işler, komşuluk, iş ilişkisi, arkadaşlık, evlilik vb.) Türklerin toplumun diğer kesimleriyle ilişkilerini ve kaynaşma düzeyini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
- Gündelik hayatınızı sürdürürken veya resmi işlerinizi yaparken zorluk çekiyor musunuz? Yabancılık veya kültürel farklılık hissediyor musunuz?
- Çifte vatandaşlığınız var mı? Varsa ikinci vatandaşlığınızı ne zaman ve neden aldınız?
- Bulgaristan/Hollanda seçimlerinde oy kullanıyor musunuz? Hangi kriterlere göre oy kullanıyorsunuz? (ideolojik eğilim, partinin Bulgaristan/Hollanda'nın genelindeki hizmetleri ve politikaları, partinin Türk veya göçmen/azınlık toplumlarının taleplerini karşılaması ve çıkarlarını koruması, partinin Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği ile ilişkiler de dahil dış politika konularındaki tutumu, aile üyelerinin veya akrabaların tercihleri, kanaatine güvenilen kişilerin, toplum önderlerinin tercihleri vb.)
- Oy verdiğiniz partinin sizi ve Türk toplumunu yeterince temsil ettiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
- Bir siyasi partiye üye misiniz? Üyeyseniz ne sıklıkta faaliyetlerine katılıyorsunuz? Aktif misiniz? Neden bu partiye üye oldunuz? Partinizin amacı, misyonu, politikaları, faaliyetleri ve üye profilinden kısaca bahsedebilir misiniz? Bu partinin Türk toplumu içindeki yeri ve azınlık/göçmen konularıyla ilgili politikaları nelerdir?

- Devlet kurumları ve siyasi partiler nezdinde toplum ve birey olarak dertlerinizin dinlendiğini, siyasi taleplerinizin karşılandığını, sorunlarınızın giderildiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
- Toplumsal ve bireysel olarak en önemli sorunlarınız nelerdir ve nasıl çözülebilir? Sizde bu sorunlar açısından bölgeler ve gruplar arası farklar var mı? Zaman içerisinde bu sorunların veya algılanış biçimlerinin değiştiğini gözlemliyor musunuz? Türk toplumunun ekonomik durumunu ve eğitim seviyesini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
- Türk toplumunu temsil eden, onun çıkarlarını savunan bir parti kurulması gerektiğini düşünüyor musunuz? Sizde göçmen/azınlık toplulukları etnik kökenleri veya geldikleri ülkeler temelinde siyasi partiler kurmalı mı?
- Bulgaristan/Hollanda eğitim sisteminden memnun musunuz? Yeterli eğitim aldığınızı düşünüyor musunuz? Sizin veya genel olarak Türk toplumunun ihtiyaçlarınızı karşılayacak, gündelik hayatınızı devam ettirmenizi, iş bulmanızı, resmi işlerinizi yürütmenizi kolaylaştıracak bir eğitim aldığınızı düşünüyor musunuz?
- Sizin veya genel olarak Türk toplumunun Bulgaristan/Hollanda'da iş olanakları konusunda dezavantajlı olduğunuzu düşünüyor musunuz? Neden? (Etnik veya dini kimliğe yönelik önyargılar, dil sorunu, eğitim seviyesinin yetersizliği, kurumsal-yapısal ayrımcılık vb.)
- Yaşadığınız yerde kendinizi fiziki olarak güvende hissediyor musunuz?
- Camiye gidiyor musunuz? Dini ibadetlerinizi serbestçe yapabiliyor musunuz? Camilerle ilgili tartışmaları nasıl karşılıyorsunuz?

- Çoğunluğu Hıristiyan olan bir toplumda Müslüman olmak ne ifade ediyor? Bir Müslüman olarak burada yaşamakla ilgili sıkıntılarınız var mı? Dini kimliğinizden dolayı ayrımcılığa uğradığınızı düşünüyor musunuz?
- Kendinizi genel Bulgar/Hollanda toplumunun bir parçası gibi hissediyor musunuz? Bu toplumla bağlarınız nasıl? Kendinizi dışlanmış, dezavantajlı veya ayrımcılığa uğramış hissediyor musunuz? Kendinizi yaşadığınız toplumda öncelikle bir birey olarak mı, yoksa buradaki Türk toplumunun bir üyesi olarak mı tanımlarsınız?
- Türk toplumunun diğer göçmen veya azınlık toplumlarıyla ilişkileri nasıl? Farklı toplumlar arasında resmi veya gayriresmi temaslar, işbirlikleri, toplumsal ve kültürel kaynaşma var mı? Varsa bu temaslar ne yoğunlukta ve hangi kanallar üzerinden sağlanmaktadır?
- Bulgaristan/Hollanda'daki azınlık hakları ve entegrasyon tartışmaları hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce Bulgaristan/Hollanda farklı kültürlerin yaşamasına olanak sağlayan bir ülke mi? Bu konularda şimdiye kadar uygulanan politikalar hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? Eğer bir sorun varsa sizce sorunun çözümü nedir?
- Kendinizi hangi millete ait hissediyorsunuz? Milliyetçilik hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? Kendinizi milliyetçi olarak tanımlar mısınız?
- Kendinizi içinde yaşadığınız ülkeye/topluma milli aidiyet ve/ya gönül bağıyla bağlı hissediyor musunuz?

### **Question Set for the Normative Conception of Territoriality**

- Türkiye'yi ziyaret ediyor musunuz? Hangi sıklıkta ziyaret ediyorsunuz?

- (Ziyaret ediyorsa) Türkiye’de eviniz var mı, varsa nerede? Burada ne kadar süreyle kalıyorsunuz? (Evi yoksa) Türkiye’de eviniz olsun ister miydiniz, almayı düşünür müsünüz? Ekonomik kazancınızı nerede değerlendiriyorsunuz? Emekli olunca nerede yaşamayı düşünüyorsunuz?
- Türkiye’de akrabalarınız, aile üyeleriniz var mı? Varsa ilişkileriniz nasıl? Onların yanına yerleşmeyi düşündünüz mü? Daha genç olsaydınız düşünür müydünüz?
- Türkiye’deyken yabancılik veya kültürel anlamda farklılık hissediyor musunuz? Türkiye’de günlük hayatınızı sürdürürken veya resmi işlerinizi yaparken zorluk çekiyor musunuz?
- T.C. vatandaşlığınız var mı? Varsa Türkiye’deki seçimlerde oy kullanıyor musunuz? Oy kullanıyorsanız tercihinizi hangi kriterlere göre yapıyorsunuz?
- Genel olarak Türkiye’deki gelişmeleri ve siyaseti takip ediyor musunuz? Oy vermeseniz bile desteklediğiniz bir siyasi parti var mı? Neden o partiyi destekliyorsunuz? (“Türkiye için daha iyi”, “Yurtdışı Türkler veya Bulgaristan/Hollanda Türkleri için daha iyi”, “İdeolojik olarak daha yakın hissediyorum”, vb.)
- Nerede eğitim aldınız? Türklerin/göçmenlerin yoğun olduğu bir okulda mı yoksa karma bir okulda mı eğitim aldınız? Bulgaristan/Hollanda’da aldığınız eğitimin sizin kimliğinizi yansıttığını, ihtiyaçlarınızı karşıladığını düşünüyor musunuz? Türkçe dersleriniz var mıydı? Türkçe dersler (daha fazla) olsun ister misiniz?
- Kendinizi Bulgarca/Hollandaca mı, Türkçe mi daha rahat ifade ediyorsunuz? Sadece Türkçe eğitim almak ister miydiniz? Genel olarak buradaki Türk toplumu anadilde eğitim konusuna nasıl bakıyor?

- Daha çok Türk televizyonlarını/Türkçe yayınları mı, yoksa yaşadığınız ülkenin televizyonlarını/yayınlarını mı takip ediyorsunuz?
- Daha çok Bulgarca/Hollandaca gazeteleri mi, Türkçe gazeteleri mi okuyorsunuz? Türkiye kaynaklı gazetelere erişiminiz var mı? Varsa takip ediyor musunuz?
- İnternet kullanıyor musunuz? Daha çok Bulgarca/Hollandaca sitelere mi, Türkçe sitelere mi giriyorsunuz? Türkiye'yle ilgili sitelere giriyor musunuz? Giriyorsanız hangi içerikteki siteleri takip ediyorsunuz?
- Uluslararası yayınları, internet sitelerini, TV kanallarını vb. takip ediyor musunuz?
- Türk derneklerine üye misiniz? Üyeyseniz ne sıklıkta çalışmalarına katılıyorsunuz? Aktif üye misiniz, idari bir göreviniz var mı, yoksa sadece faaliyetlerine mi katılıyorsunuz? Neden bu derneği/dernekleri tercih ettiniz?
- Derneğinizi kuruluşu ve tarihçesinden kısaca bahseder misiniz? (Amacı, misyonu ve özellikle azınlıklar/göçmenler konusundaki politikaları, faaliyet alanları, üye sayısı ve profili, örgütlü olduğu yerler, Türk toplumu düzeyinde katılım, diğer toplumların katılımı, resmi makamların tutumu ve desteği, devletle bağı/resmi statüsü, ekonomik destek/para kaynağı, Bulgaristan/Hollanda'daki diğer dernek, siyasi parti veya kuruluşlarla ilişkileri, Türkiye'deki siyasi parti, dernek veya kuruluşlarla bağı, uluslararası/Avrupa Birliği/diğer Türk topluluklarıyla bağlantıları ve ortak faaliyetleri, karşılaştıkları sorunlar vb.)
- Buradaki Türk toplumu sizce yeterince örgütlü mü? Özellikle azınlık/göçmenlik meseleleri hakkında ne düşünüyorlar, nasıl faaliyetler içerisindedir?
- Başka ülkelere sıklıkla seyahat ediyor musunuz? Hangi nedenlerle seyahat ediyorsunuz? Başka ülkelerdeki Türk topluluklarıyla temas halinde misiniz? Bu

topluluklarla bir bağ, bir aidiyet duygusu kurabiliyor musunuz, onlarla aynı toplumun veya milletin parçası olduğunuzu hissediyor musunuz? Onlarla ortaklaşa çalışmalar yapmak, faaliyetler yürütmek gerektiğini düşünüyor musunuz?

- Türkiye sizin için ne ifade ediyor? Kendinizi Bulgaristan/Hollanda'da mı Türkiye'de mi daha rahat (evinizde, vatanınızda) hissediyorsunuz? Arada kalmış hissettiğiniz oluyor mu?
- Buradaki Türk toplumunun Türkiye'yi algılayış biçimi ve bu ülkeyle bağları nasıl?
- Türkiye'nin yurtdışı Türkler ile ilgili politikalarını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Türkiye bu konuda daha aktif olmalı mı?
- Başka bir coğrafyada/ülkede yaşamak ister miydiniz? Neden? Çocuklarınızın başka bir ülkede yaşamasını ister misiniz?
- Aile üyelerinden veya yakınlarınızdan Türkiye'ye veya başka bir yere göç etmiş olanlar var mı? Varsa ne zaman ve neden göç ettiler? Eğer hâlâ orada yaşıyorlarsa iyi bir karar verdiklerini, daha iyi imkanlara ve daha rahat bir hayata sahip olduklarını düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer Bulgaristan/Hollanda'ya döndüler ise ne zaman ve neden geri döndüler?
- Sizce Bulgaristan/Hollanda'da yaşayan Türk toplumu için vatan/ana vatan kavramı ne anlam ifade eder? Onlar için vatan/ana vatan neresidir? Neden?
- Vatan/ana vatan kavramının algılanışı sizce yaş, kuşak, doğum yeri, etnik-dini köken, eğitim düzeyi, ekonomik düzey, sınıf, meslek, köy/kent/bölge farkları, göç/geri göç tecrübesi vb. değişkenlere göre farklılık gösteriyor mu?

- Avrupa Birliđi hakkında ne düşünöyorsunuz? AB'ye veya Avrupa'ya bir aidiyet hissediyör musunuz? “Ben Avrupalıyım”, diyor musunuz?
- Gelişen ulaşım ve iletişim teknolojilerinden ne kadar faydalanıyorsunuz? Çevrenizdeki insanlar/Türk toplumu ne kadar faydalanıyor? Sizce bu gelişmeler insanların sorunları algılayış biçimlerinde, bu sorunlara ürettikleri çözümlerde ve örgütlenme biçimlerinde bir fark yarattı mı? İnsanlar yerelden evrensele geçebildiler mi? Bu olanaklar insanların, kültürlerin yakınlaşmasını, evrensel değerlerin, kimliklerin ve etkileşim biçimlerinin ortaya çıkmasını sağladı mı? İleride daha kozmopolit değerlere sahip bir dünyada yaşayacağımızı düşünöyor musunuz?
- Sizce ulus-ötesi oluşum ve faaliyetler, küreselleşme süreçleri, Avrupa Birliđi gibi ulus-üstü yapılar, ulaşım ve iletişim teknolojilerindeki gelişmeler insanların vatan/millet algılarında ve milli devletlere olan bađlılıklarında bir deđişiklik yarattı mı?
- Türk toplumunun yaşadıkları ülkedeki, Türkiye'deki ve dünyadaki siyasi-toplumsal meselelere bakışları nasıl? Bu meselelere karşı yeterince ilgililer mi? İlgililerse bu meselelere yerel bir ölçekten mi yoksa daha geniş, global bir bakış açısıyla mı bakıyorlar?

## APPENDIX B

### CURRICULUM VITAE

#### PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name : Şenses, Ahu  
Nationality : Turkish (TC)  
Date and Place of Birth : March 16, 1979, Ankara  
Work Address : Çukurova University,  
Department of International Relations,  
01330, Balcalı, Sarıçam, Adana, Turkey  
Phone : +90 322 338 72 54 (ext. 116)  
Fax : +90 322 338 72 83  
E-mail : asenses@cu.edu.tr

#### EDUCATION AND DEGREES EARNED

- 2006- present : *PhD in International Relations*  
Middle East Technical University, Ankara  
Department of International Relations
- 2001-2002 : *MA in International Relations and European Studies*  
University of Kent at Canterbury, UK  
Department of Politics and International Relations
- 1997-2001 : *BS in International Relations*  
Middle East Technical University, Ankara  
Department of International Relations
- 1990-1997 : Karşıyaka Anatolian High School, İzmir

#### WORK EXPERIENCE

- 2012-present : *Research Assistant*  
Çukurova University, Adana.  
Department of International Relations
- 2007- 2011 : *Research Assistant*  
Middle East Technical University, Ankara  
Department of International Relations
- 2003- 2005 : *Attaché*  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara  
Directorate General for Bilateral Political Affairs,  
Department for Europe

## **HONORS AND AWARDS**

- Jean Monnet Award, Commission of the European Union, MA student, 2001-2002
- Merit-based scholarship, Middle East Technical University, BS student, 1997-2001
- Eight High Honor degrees, Middle East Technical University, BS student, 1997-2001

## **FOREIGN LANGUAGES**

- Advanced English
- Basic Spanish

## **RESEARCH INTERESTS**

- Nationalism
- Diaspora studies
- Turkish politics
- Gender studies

## APPENDIX C

### TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışma Bulgaristan ve Hollanda'daki Türk kökenli toplulukların teritoryal ilişkilerini ve vatan kavramına dair algılarını incelemektedir. Teritoryalite, uluslararası ilişkiler ve milliyetçilik çalışmaları da dahil olmak üzere sosyal bilimlerin birçok alanında üzerinde fazla durulmayan bir kavramdır. Teritoryal meseleler daha ziyade coğrafya ve antropoloji bilimlerinin ilgi alanında kalmış, insan ve insan topluluklarının ilişkilerini ve örgütlenme biçimlerini inceleyen diğer disiplinler insan ilişkilerinin teritoryal-mekansal boyutuna fazla önem vermemişlerdir. Oysaki mekansallık, zaman kavramıyla birlikte, insanın varoluşunun ve eylemlerinin en temel iki boyutundan biridir. Kişiler, insan toplulukları ve örgütler fiziki bir boşluk içerisinde hareket etmezler. İçinde buldukları mekanlarla etkileşim içine girer ve karşılıklı olarak birbirlerini dönüştürürler. Dolayısıyla insanın veya insan topluluklarının mekanla ve toprakla kurdukları ilişki tek taraflı değildir; insanlar yaşadıkları mekanları ve buldukları toprak parçasını değiştirirken kendileri de yaşadıkları yerler tarafından dönüştürülürler. İçinde bulunulan mekanlar ve üzerinde yaşanan toprak hem insanların fiziki ve maddi olarak belli kaynaklara, örgütsel araçlara, siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal altyapılara ulaşımını etkiler, hem de sembolik-kültürel düzeyde bireylerin ve toplulukların değer yargılarının, kurallar ve normlarının, gelenek ve göreneklerinin, hayat tarzlarının oluşumunu belirler.

İnsanların mekanlarla ve coğrafyayla olan ilişkisi genellikle fiziki yer değiştirme yani göç söz konusu olduğunda uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin ilgi alanına girmiştir. Ancak insanların mekanla ve toprakla ilişkisi, yerleşik olma durumunda da insanların hayatını etkiler. İnsanlar belli bir coğrafyada, belli bir mekanda dünyaya gelirler ve içine doğdukları hayatın koşullarını, kültürünü ve gerekliliklerini bu coğrafya ve mekanlar belirler. İnsanlar hayatları boyunca da içinde yaşadıkları coğrafya ve mekanlarla etkileşim halindedirler; onlarla fiziki, biyolojik, maddi-ekonomik ve

manevi-sembolik bağlar kurarlar. Ayrıca, insan ilişkilerini ve eylemlerini kontrol etme amacıyla belli toprak parçalarının ve mekanların bölüşümü ve kontrolü, devletler ve diğer siyasi güç sahipleri açısından önemli tahakküm mekanizmalarından biri olagelmıştır. İnsanların doğdukları ve/ya atalarının yaşadığına inandıkları toprak parçalarıyla, yani “vatan”larıyla kurdukları ilişkinin milliyetçi ideolojilerin temel dayanaklarından biri olduğu milliyetçilik çalışmaları tarafından sıkça dile getirilen bir unsurdur. Milliyetçi ideolojileri benimseyenler arasında da “vatan”ın bir milletin ve o milletin mensuplarının yaşam kaynağı ve onların varlıklarının en somut ifadesi olduğu, bu yüzden de belli bir kutsiyet taşıdığı düşüncesi yaygındır.

Ancak bireylerin ve toplulukların teritoryal bağlarını, gündelik hayat içerisinde hem göçmenlik hem de yerleşiklik halleri çerçevesinde ayrıntılı bir biçimde inceleyen, insan-mekan, insan-toprak, insan-vatan ilişkilerini farklı boyutlarıyla konu edinen bilimsel çalışmalar sayıca çok azdır. Öte yandan (ana)vatan, milliyetçilik, göç, diaspora vb. konular üzerine yapılan çalışmaların önemli bir kısmı teritoryalite kavramıyla ilgili coğrafya ve antropoloji gibi diğer disiplinlerin ortaya koyduğu kuramsal bilgilerden çok az yararlanmışlar, disiplinlerarası bağ kurma konusunda yetersiz kalmışlardır. Bu durum; mekan, yer, toprak, vatan gibi insanların ve insan eylemlerinin varoluşunu belirleyen olguların, sadece içinde olayların geçtiği, bünyesinde barındırdığı insanlar ve onların eylemleri üzerinde herhangi bir dönüştürücü etkisi olmayan adeta “boş bir kap” gibi algılanmasına ve bu olguların yeterince sorgulanmamış birtakım varsayımlar üzerinden tanımlanmasına ve incelenmesine neden olmuştur.

Bu bilgiler ışığında, bu çalışmanın dört temel amacı olduğu söylenebilir. Birincisi, özellikle uluslararası ilişkiler ve milliyetçilik alanlarında teritoryal meselelerin neredeyse görünmez olan konumuna dikkat çekmek ve bu konuyu bu disiplinler çerçevesinde yeniden gündeme getirmektir. İkinci olarak, bu araştırma uluslararası ilişkiler ve milliyetçilik alanları ile coğrafya, antropoloji ve diaspora çalışmaları arasındaki halihazırda zayıf olan bağları tekrar tesis etmeye bir adım atmaya hedeflemektedir. Üçüncü olarak, günümüz dünyasında giderek artan bir yoğunlukla

ve deęişen biçimlerde ortaya çıkan (uluslararası) hareketlilik ve göç olgularının, özellikle birden fazla kolektif kimlik sahibi olan ve birden fazla ülkeyle/toprak parçasıyla bağlar geliştirmiş insanların hayatlarını nasıl etkilediğini sorgulamak amaçlanmaktadır. Bu nedenle bu çalışmanın vaka incelemesi kısmı için hem yaşadıkları ülkelerle, hem geldikleri ülkeler/ana vatanları ile hem de diğer ülkelerdeki akraba gruplarla ilişkilerini çeşitli düzeylerde devam ettiren iki topluluk (Bulgaristan ve Hollanda'daki Türk kökenli topluluklar) seçilmiştir. Dördüncü ve son olarak da, bu vakalar çerçevesinde birden fazla coğrafya veya ülkeyle teritoryal ve etnik-millî bağlara sahip insanların vatan algılarında köklü deęişimler olup olmadığını irdelemek ve bu sayede ulus-ötesi ya da kozmopolit kimlik, ilişki ve örgütlenme biçimlerine doğru genel bir yönelimin olup olmadığına dair tartışmalara katkı sağlamak amaçlanmaktadır.

Bu amaçlar çerçevesinde yürütölen bu çalışma Őu sorulara cevap aramaktadır: Teritoryalite kavramının farklı veçhelerini ve vatan kavramını kuramsal bir çerçeveye nasıl oturtabiliriz? Bu konudaki farklı kuramsal yaklaşımları diaspora, göçmen ya da azınlık topluluklarının teritoryal tecrübeleriyle nasıl bağdaştırabiliriz? Bulgaristan ve Hollanda'daki Türk kökenli toplulukların teritoryal davranış biçimlerini ve vatan algılarını nasıl tanımlayabiliriz? Bu iki topluluğun vatan ve mekan algıları arasında ne gibi benzerlikler ve farklılıklar var? Bu vaka çalışmaları çerçevesinde ulaşılan sonuçlar milliyetçilik ve ulus-ötesicilik üzerine yapılan çalışmaların varsayımlarıyla ne kadar örtüşüyor?

Bu çalışmanın Giriş bölümünü takip eden iki bölümünde teritoryalite kavramıyla ilgili genel bilgiler ve kuramsal tartışmalar verilmiştir. Bu bölümlerde; coğrafya, antropoloji, siyaset bilimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, diaspora ve milliyetçilik çalışmaları alanlarında ortaya koyulmuş bilimsel araştırmalardan faydalanılarak, yer, mekan, vatan, ana vatan, göç, hareketlilik, diaspora gibi temel kavramların tanımları ve günümüz dünyasında deęişen nitelikleri ile algılanış biçimleri incelenmiştir. Giriş bölümünü takip eden bölümde (Bölüm 2) modern ve modernite-öncesi temelleriyle birlikte teritoryalite olgusunun anlamı ve önemi anlatılmış, bu önemle ters orantılı bir şekilde günümüzde yapılan bilimsel çalışmalar kapsamında neden geri plana itildięi

sorgulanmıştır. Yine bu bölümde, vaka incelemeleri sırasında kullanılmak üzere teritoryal ilişkileri kültürel, araçsal ve normatif yönleriyle tanımlayan üç katmanlı bir teritoryalite modeli tanımlanmıştır.

Bölüm 3'te teritoryalite ve vatan kavramlarının önemi üzerinde tekrar durularak, bu kavramların tarihten günümüze kadar olan dönüşümü ile insan topluluklarının varlığını sürdürmesi ve grup kimliklerinin oluşumu üzerindeki etkileri tartışılmıştır. Bu bölümde, ayrıca, diaspora toplulukları ve ulus-ötesi ilişkiler bağlamında teritoryalite olgusunun rolü ve bu çalışmanın vaka incelemesine konu olan toplulukların, ulus-ötesi ilişkiler, diasporalaşma ve vatan algısı açısından nasıl değerlendirilebileceği ele alınmıştır.

Bölüm 4 ve Bölüm 5 vaka incelemelerine ayrılmıştır. Bölüm 4'te öncelikle Bulgaristan'daki Türk kökenli topluluğun gelişimi, özellikleri ve konumu tarihsel bir çerçevede anlatılmıştır. Bu tarihsel değerlendirmenin akabinde, bu topluluğun teritoryal ilişkileri ve vatan algıları, seçilmiş on iki kişiyle yapılan derinlemesine ve açık uçlu görüşmeler temel alınarak incelenmiştir. Bu görüşmelerin yanı sıra, alan gözlemleri ve bu konudaki diğer bilimsel araştırmalara da dayanılarak ulaşılan sonuçlar, Bölüm 2'de tanımlanan üçlü teritoryal model çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiştir. Bölüm 5'te ise Hollanda'da yaşayan Türk kökenli göçmen topluluğun yaşadığı tarihsel süreçlere ve şimdiki konumlarına değinildikten sonra, topluluğun on yedi üyesiyle yapılan derinlemesine ve açık uçlu görüşmeler yine aynı kuramsal model çerçevesinde irdelenmiş, diğer bilimsel kaynaklardan da yararlanılarak vaka incelemesi tamamlanmıştır.

Çalışmanın sonuç bölümünde (Bölüm 6) ise iki vaka incelemesinin bulguları karşılaştırmalı bir şekilde ortaya koyulmuş ve bu çalışmanın temel soruları çerçevesinde yeniden değerlendirilmiştir. Vaka incelemelerinde elde edilen bulgulara ve bunların karşılaştırmalı çözümlenmesine geçmeden önce, bu incelemelerde kullanılan, bu tez çalışmasına özgü kuramsal modeli daha ayrıntılı anlatmak gerekir.

Kültürel, araçsal ve normatif olmak üzere üç katmandan oluşan bu model, coğrafya ve antropoloji bilimlerindeki teritoryalite incelemelerinden yararlanarak

tanımladığım kuramsal bir modeldir. Bu modelde kültürel, araçsal ve normatif katmanlar, zaman zaman birbiriyle iç içe geçen, ancak ölçek ve nitelik bakımından birbirinden farklı teritoryal birimlerle olan ilişkileri tanımlar. Herhangi bir insanı veya insan topluluğunu ele aldığımızda, farklı ağırlıklarda ve tezahürlerde olsalar bile, bu ilişki biçimlerinin üçünü de gözlemlemek mümkündür. Dolayısıyla bunlar birbirini dışlayan kategoriler değildirler.

Teritoryalitenin kültürel katmanında, insanın yaşadığı yerle, toprakla ve coğrafyayla kurduğu doğrudan, aracısız bağ bulunmaktadır. Bu bağ, insanın ve beraber bulunduğu insan topluluğunun kendi arasındaki yaşayış biçimini, değer yargılarını, kültürel kodlarını, norm ve kurallarını, doğayla kurduğu ilişkiyi, biyolojik, maddi ve manevi gereksinimlerini doğrudan etkiler. Burada kastedilen teritoryal birim ölçek olarak küçüktür. Örneğin bir mahalle, bir köy, bir kasaba, bir tabiat parçası (dağ, nehir, vadi, ova, vb.) veya bir kabilenin toprağı olabilir. İnsanlar bu birimle doğrudan kültürel bağlar kurarlar ve söz konusu toprak parçasını veya yerleşim birimini kendi biyolojik ve manevi varlıklarının bir parçası veya devamı gibi görürler. Toprakla veya yaşadıkları yerle kurdukları ilişki gündelik hayatlarının, gelenek ve göreneklerinin bir parçasıdır; burada evlerini kurarlar, hayvanlarını otlatırlar, ürünlerini yetiştirirler, ölülerini gömerler, tabiatından esinlenerek sanat eserleri oluştururlar.

Bu anlamıyla belli bir toprak parçasıyla kültürel düzeyde kurulan ilişki daha doğal, daha somut ve ideolojik araçların etkisinden daha bağımsızdır. Burada toprak veya fiziki mekan, kültürün üretilmesini, gelecek kuşaklara aktarılmasını, insanın maddi (beslenme, para kazanma, vb.) ve manevi (bir yere ait olma, kök salma, diğer insanlarla bütünlük oluşturma, vb.) ihtiyaçlarının karşılanmasını sağlayan gündelik eylemsel ve sözlü pratiklerin vücut bulduğu yerdir. Böyle tanımlandığı zaman kültürel katman, geleneksel, kırsal hayata dair bir olguymuş gibi görünebilir. Ancak kültürel anlamıyla teritoryal/mekansal bağların modern, şehirleşmiş hayat biçimlerinde, insanların toprakla olan doğrudan bağlarının koptuğu durumlarda da geçerli olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Örneğin, doğduğu topraklardan çok erken yaşta ayrılmış ya da atalarının topraklarına veya aile memleketine hiç gitmemiş, sadece

buralarla ilgili aile büyüklerinin hikayelerini, anılarını dinlemiş insanların hayatlarında bile ana vatan veya doğduğu toprakla kurulan sembolik bağın çok önemli olabildiğini gözlemleyebiliyoruz. İnsanların, uzun süreler görmeseler bile bu yerlere özlem duyduklarına, bu yerleri gerçekten oradaymışçasına zihinlerinde canlandırdıklarına şahit olabiliyoruz.

Ancak, her teritoryal ilişki biçimi insanların davranış, duygu, düşünce ve kültür dünyalarını bu denli doğrudan ve doğal bir şekilde etkileyebilir. İnsanlar daha büyük ölçeklerdeki teritoryal birimlerle daha araçsal ilişkiler geliştirebilirler. Bu birimler, insanın gündelik hayatında gözle görüp algılayabileceği boyutların ötesinde olduğu için bu birimlerle kurulacak ilişkiler, onları zapteden, düzenleyen ve yöneten siyasi güçler, örgütler ve kurumlar üzerinden kurulur. Örneğin, ülke veya bölge dediğimiz coğrafi olarak daha büyük teritoryal birimlerle kurulan ilişkiler, ister istemez o birimin egemen gücü ve bu gücün kurumsal temsilcileri üzerinden, yani genellikle devlet ve devletin kurumları üzerinden tesis edilir. Günümüzde uluslararası siyasi düzenin en önemli egemen unsurları ulus-devletler olduğu için de milliyetçilik, milliyete dayalı kimlikler ve devletle kurulan vatandaşlık bağları bu teritoryal ilişki biçiminin en önemli bileşenleri olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Modern devlet bir yandan milliyetçilik ideolojisi üzerinden milli kimliklere dayalı bir toplum düzeni yaratmış, bir yandan da kurduğu siyasi, idari, askeri, sosyal ve ekonomik mekanizmalarla vatandaşlarının maddi ve sosyal ihtiyaçlarını karşılama konusundaki en yetkili organ olarak kendini tesis etmiştir. Başka bir deyişle, hem ideolojik anlamda vatandaşlarını şekillendirip onların kimliklerinin ve sadakatinin temel odağı olarak milli devleti benimsemelerini sağlamış, hem de vatandaşlarının güvenlik, iş bulma, beslenme, eğitim, sağlık, vb. ihtiyaçlarının doğrudan ya da dolaylı olarak karşılanmasını sağlayacak merkezi siyasi bir sistem kurmuştur. Böylece, modern ulus-devletin hüküm sürdüğü topraklarla, bu topraklarda yaşayan vatandaşların ilişkisi de devletle kurdukları hem ideolojik hem araçsal ilişki üzerinden tanımlanmaya başlanmıştır. Vatandaşlar devletlerine siyasi bağlar (siyasi temsil ve katılım, oy verme), yasal bağlar (vatandaşlık hak ve ödevleri), ekonomik bağlar (üretim, tüketim ve bölüşüm ilişkileri), askeri bağlar (fiziki güvenliğin

sağlanması ve zorunlu askerlik), ideolojik bağlar (milli ve kitlesel eğitim, medya, din) ve kurumsal bağlar (bürokrasi) ile bağlıdırlar.

İnsanların teritoryal ilişkileri sadece içinde yaşadıkları devlet ve o devletin hüküm sürdüğü toprak parçası ile de sınırlı değildir. Milli devletin sınırlarını aşan, daha karmaşık ve çok yönlü ilişkiler, insanları daha büyük ve daha uzak coğrafyalarla da etkileşim içine sokabilir. Böylece insanlar birden çok teritoryal birime aidiyet hissedip, asıl vatandaşlık bağlarının ötesinde farklı kimlik modellerini de benimseyebilirler. Özellikle son dönemde ulaşım ve iletişim teknolojilerindeki ilerlemelerle birlikte insanlar hem daha fazla yer değiştirmeye başlamışlar, hem de yaşadıkları kısıtlı coğrafyayla kurdukları ilişkinin ötesinde duygusal ya da tarihten gelen bağlarla bağlı oldukları başka coğrafyalarla da temaslarını daha kolay, hızlı ve ucuz bir şekilde sürdürebilir hale gelmişlerdir. Ulus-ötesi bağların, kimliklerin, faaliyetlerin ve ilişki biçimlerinin yaygınlaştığını; hâlâ ulus-devletlerin sınırlarıyla bölünmüş bir dünyada yaşamamıza rağmen milli kimliklerin ve içinde yaşadığımız toprak parçasının tek belirleyici olduğu bir dünyadan, çoklu kimliklerin ve çoklu teritoryal bağların söz konusu olduğu bir dünyaya doğru yol aldığımızı öne süren bilimsel çalışmalar da artmıştır.

Özellikle göç eden, yaşadığı topraktan koparılan, diasporalaşan toplulukların; yerinden yurdundan edilmiş, kimlik bunalımı yaşayan, köklerini kaybetmiş, buldukları topluma da entegre olamayan gruplar haline geldiği varsayımına dayalı klasik göç ve diaspora çalışmalarının aksine, yeni ortaya çıkan çalışmalar birden fazla toplum, devlet ve yerle bağ kurmanın veya bu bağları devam ettirmenin her zaman köksüzlük, kopukluk, entegrasyon problemleri ya da sadakat karmaşası yaratmayacağını, bu durumun birtakım avantajlar da barındırabileceğini, dolayısıyla devlet-vatandaş, birey-toplum, vatan-köksüzlük ilişkilerine daha farklı açılardan bakmamız gerektiğini savunmaktadırlar.

Bu bakış açısına göre göçmenler ya da atalarının yaşadıkları topraklardan bir nedenle uzak düşmüş insanlar, hem halihazırda yaşadıkları ülkeyle ve toprak parçasıyla olan ilişkilerini bir aidiyet bağı çerçevesine oturtabilir ve vatandaşlık da alarak yeni ülkelerine entegre olabilirler, hem de ana vatanlarında veya dünyanın değişik

yerlerinde yaşayan ve kendileriyle benzer kimliklere ve çıkarlara sahip olduğunu düşündükleri gruplarla olan bağlarını sürdürüp ortak amaçlar çerçevesinde faaliyet gösterebilirler. Hatta artık milliyet ya da vatandaşlık kavramlarının sınır-aşan bir boyuta taşındığı, farklı ülkelerde yaşayan insanların geldikleri ülkelerdeki (ana vatanlarındaki) millet olma ve milli kalkınma süreçlerine, maddi ve manevi kaynaklarını seferber ederek uzaktan katkı sağlayıp bir "uzak mesafe milliyetçiliği" sergileyebilecekleri belirtilmektedir.

Bu düşünce biçimi, her bir bireyin bir milletin organik parçası olduğunu ve dolayısıyla tek bir milliyete sahip olup tek bir ulus-devlete bağlı kalması ve bu bağlılığın (yaşanılan veya elde edilmek istenen) vatana olan sevgi ve sadakat kavramlarıyla perçinlenmesi gerektiğini varsayan klasik ulus-devlet ve milliyetçilik mantığından farklıdır. Bu yeni yaklaşım çerçevesinde, insanların birden fazla topluma, devlete ve coğrafyaya aidiyet hissedebileceği ve bunun bizi ileride sınırların öneminin daha da azaldığı ve insanların, ayrımcılık yaratan unsurları geride bırakmış bir şekilde, evrensel değerler etrafında toplanarak daha hareketli ve kozmopolit yaşamlar sürdükları bir dünyaya doğru götürebileceği inancı dile getirilmektedir. Böyle bir dünyada, sınırları keskin ve dışlayıcı bir vatan kavramının da giderek yerini daha esnek, daha değişken ve daha kapsayıcı teritoryal ilişkilere bırakacağı; eski teritoryal ilişkilerden kalma ayrıştırıcı değer yargılarının aşılıp daha bütünleştirici, yerel çıkarlardan ve dar gündemlerden sıyrılmış, diğer kimlik ve kültürlerle saygılı ve hatta onlarla iç içe geçmiş aidiyet kurma biçimlerinin yaygınlaşacağı düşünülmektedir. Kısacası, değişen teritoryal ilişkiler ve esnekleşen millet ve vatan aidiyetlerinin bir normatif dönüşüme yol açacağı, bunun da insanların var olma, kimliklerini oluşturma, kendilerini ifade etme, birbirleriyle etkileşme ve örgütlenme biçimlerini de kökten değiştireceği (veya şimdiden değiştirmeye başladığı) varsayılmaktadır.

Bu çalışmanın kuramsal çerçevesini oluşturan üçlü teritoryal modeli ana hatlarıyla ortaya koymuş olduk. Vaka araştırmaları çerçevesinde, teritoryal aidiyet ve ilişkilerin bu üç farklı biçiminin görüşmecilerin kendilerinin ve yakın çevrelerindeki insanların hayatlarında nasıl tezahür ettiğini öğrenebilmek için üç farklı soru seti hazırladım.

Görüşmecilerin bu sorulara verdikleri cevapları, ikincil kaynaklardan da edindiğim bilgiler ışığında değerlendirdim. Bu değerlendirmeler sonucunda, aşağıda karşılaştırmalı olarak vereceğim bulgulara ulaştım.

Kültürel düzlemde, Bulgaristan'daki ve Hollanda'daki Türk kökenli topluluklar arasındaki en önemli fark, yaşadıkları ülkeler içerisinde kendilerine ait veya kendilerinin çoğunlukta olduğu bir toprak parçasının veya teritoryal bir tabanlarının olup olmaması meselesidir. Bulgaristan'daki Türk azınlık kuşaklar boyu belli coğrafi bölgelerde, genellikle toprağa bağlı ekonomik faaliyetlerle yaşamlarını sürdürmüşlerdir. Bugün bile Bulgaristan'daki Türkler'in önemli bir kesimi belli bölgelerde, Türkler'in yoğun olarak yaşadığı köy ve kasabalarda, daha ziyade tarımla uğraşarak geçimlerini sürdürmektedirler.

Buna karşılık, Hollanda'daki Türk göçmen topluluk daha ziyade büyük şehirlerde ve toprağa dayalı tarımsal faaliyetlerden kopuk bir şekilde yaşamaktadır. Bu da onları, kendi içlerindeki bütünlüğü sağlayabilmek ve yeni ortamlarında sosyal ve ekonomik olarak tutunabilmek, Hollanda toplumu ve devleti karşısında kolektif sınırlarını ve kültürel değerlerini koruyabilmek için daha fazla çaba sarf etmeye sevk etmiştir. Bunun sonucunda, göç tecrübesinden kaynaklanan teritoryal kopuş ve köksüzlük duygularıyla baş edebilmek amacıyla kültürel sınırları katı bir biçimde çizilmiş, genellikle Türkler'in yoğun olarak yaşadığı mahallelerde oturan ve kültürel hayatlarını bu mahalle, mahallelerde örgütlü cami cemaatleri ve kendi evleri çerçevesinde yaşayan, içe kapalı bir topluluk görüntüsü ortaya çıkmıştır.

Alan çalışması sırasında, Hollanda'daki Türk topluluğunun önemli bir kısmının kendi yakın fiziki çevresiyle organik bağlar kuramadığı ve yaşadıkları yerlerde teritoryal temelli kimlikler oluşturamadığı saptanmıştır. Yapılan görüşmelerin de teyit ettiği gibi, Hollanda'daki Türkler'in çoğunun belli bir yer, şehir ya da coğrafi bölgeye özgü kültürel değerler ve davranışlar geliştirmek yerine ana vatanlarından getirdikleri kültürel ve dini değerlere ve pratiklere tutundukları, bu değerleri de Türklük ve Müslümanlık olarak iki temel unsura dayandırdıkları görülmüştür. Bu iki temel kimlik belirleyicisi çerçevesinde de vatanseverlik, dini ibadet ve değerler, kuvvetli aile bağları ve büyüklere saygı, sosyal dayanışma, grup-içi denetim ve bireyselliğe

karşı cemaatçi yaşam biçimleri en önem verilen değerler olarak ön plana çıkmakta, topluluk üyelerinin bakış açısıyla bu değerler Türkler'in milli karakterini belirleyen otantik, sabit kültürel unsurlar olarak kabul edilmektedirler. Bu değerlerin korunması, mesken, cami (dini cemaatler) ve mahalle bünyesinde gerçekleşen kültürel yeniden üretim süreçlerinin devamı açısından bu kolektif mekanların hem fiziki hem sembolik sınırlarının korunmasıyla eşdeğer tutulmaktadır.

Bulgaristan'da yaşayan Türk azınlığın ise kendi yakın çevreleriyle (bu bir şehir veya kırsal alan olabilir) daha organik teritoryal bağlar kurduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Bulgaristan'daki uzun geçmişi, bu topluluğun Bulgaristan'ı birincil vatanları olarak kabul etmesine, bu vatandaki yerleşme süreçlerinin ise kalıcılık ve devamlılık olguları etrafında şekillenen teritoryal ilişkiler üzerine kurulmasına yol açmıştır. Özellikle orta yaşlı ve yaşlı görüşmeciler, teritoryal bağların kültürel ve soya ait devamlılığın önemli bir unsuru olduğunu; memleketin/vatanın sadece kişisel ve kolektif tarihlerinin önemli mekanlarını barındıran, anılarını sembolize eden bir toprak parçası olmadığını, aynı zamanda topluluğun ve bu topluluğun üyelerinin geçmişini geleceğe taşıyan yaşamsal bir bağ olarak işlev gördüğünü belirtmişlerdir. Her ne kadar teritoryal bağların bu sembolik ve duygusal anlamları genç kuşaklarda bu kadar baskın olmasa ve genç kuşaklar kurdukları teritoryal ilişkilere dair anlatımlarında aşinalık ve elverişlilik/fırsat kavramlarını ön plana çıkarsalar da Bulgaristan'da yaşayan Türkler'in kolektif kimliklerinin Hollanda'da yaşayan Türkler'e nazaran daha fazla teritoryaliteyle tanımlandığı gözlenmiştir. Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin daha önce yaşadıkları zorunlu ve gönüllü göç tecrübeleri teritoryal olarak bir yere bağlı olmanın önemini daha çok ön plana çıkartırken, önemli bir bölümü işçi göçüyle Hollanda'ya gelen Türkler'in buradaki varlığının başlangıçta geçici olacağı düşüncesi, bu topluluğun yeni ülkeleriyle daha sıkı teritoryal bağlar kurmalarını en azından belli bir süre engellemiştir. Aradan geçen zamanda bu topluluğun önemli bir bölümünün Hollanda'da kalıcı olması topluluk üyelerinin kendi teritoryal kimlikleri ve vatanlarının neresi olduğu konusunda kafa karışıklıkları yaşamalarına sebep olmuştur. Bu kafa karışıklığı, özellikle kültürel konularda topluluğun daha savunmacı bir tavır takınmasına, kültürel anlamda yerleşen

topluluk üyelerini "Hollandalılařmak" ve "gavurlařmak"la suçlamalarına zemin hazırlamıřtır.

Bulgaristan'da grřlen Trkler'e baktığımızda ise Bulgar devletinin zellikle 1980'lerde zirveye ıkan asimilasyon politikaları nedeniyle kltrel farklılıklarını kaybetmek konusunda belli korkuları olsa da, Trk kimlikleri konusunda zgvenlerinin ve Bulgar toplumuyla beraber, demokratik hakların korunması ve karřılıklı saygıya dayalı ortak bir geleceğın kurulabileceğine dair inançlarının yksek olduėu gzlenmiřtir. Hollanda'daki Trkler'le kıyaslandığında Bulgaristan Trkleri'nin iinde yařadıkları toplumun yaygın deėerleriyle daha az eliřki yařadıkları, kendi deėer sistemleriyle Bulgaristan'ın da dahil olduėuna inandıkları Batı medeniyetinin insan hakları ve demokrasiye dayalı deėerleri arasında temel bir uyumsuzluk grmedikleri mřahede edilmiřtir. Bu kltrel yakınlık, Trk azınlık arasında, iinde yařadıkları toplumun geneli iin hissedilen daha gl bir "biz" duygusuna ve daha uyumlu bir toplum olma yolundaki inancın pekiřmesine yol amıřtır.

Yařadıkları lkedeki mevcudiyetlerinin uzun zaman ncesine dayanması ve iinde buldukları topluma kltrel olarak daha iyi entegre olmuř olmaları Bulgaristan Trkleri'nin bir azınlık olarak zerkliklerini daha iyi korumalarını ve kendi gruplarının i iřleyiři zerinde vesayet kabul etmemelerini kolaylařtırmıřtır. rneğın, grřmeciler Trkiye'nin siyasi baskı dnemlerinde Bulgaristan Trkleri'nin yanında olan, zorunlu ve gnll g durumlarında onlara kapılarını aan bir devlet olmasından memnuniyet duysalar da Trkiye'nin kendilerine olası bir doėrudan mdahalesine olumlu bakmamaktadırlar. Vesayet konusundaki bu duyarlılık, Bulgaristan Trkleri tarafından kurulan rgtlerin yapısında da kendisini gstermektedir. Hollanda Trkleri'nin kurduėu Trkiye baėlantılı ya da yz Trkiye'ye dnk, Trkiye'deki siyasi, etnik ya da dini-mezhepsel ayrımları yansıtan gmen rgtlerinin aksine, Bulgaristan Trkleri Bulgaristan merkezli ve buradaki Trkler'in yerel gndemlerine ve sorunlarına odaklı, genellikle de kltr temelli rgtler kurmayı tercih etmiřlerdir.

Yerel çevreyle kültürel düzlemde kurulan bağlara dair iki topluluk arasındaki bir diğer önemli farklılık ise bu iki azınlık topluluğunun çoğunlukla veya diğer azınlık gruplarıyla kurdukları ilişkilerde kendini göstermektedir. Görüşülen Hollanda Türkleri arasında Hollanda toplumunu oluşturan çoğunluk ve azınlık grupları arasında bir değerler hiyerarşisi algısı çok yaygınken Bulgaristan Türkleri arasında böyle bir algı ön plana çıkmamıştır. Hollandalı Türkler'in önemli bir kısmı, yerli Hollandalıları ve diğer göçmen grupları değerler açısından kendilerinden aşağı gördüklerini, bu grupların dindarlık, vatanseverlik, güçlü aile bağları ve dayanışma gibi toplumsal ve ahlaki değerler açısından belli standartlara sahip olmadıkları için toplum/cemiyet (*community*) ya da millet özelliği gösteremediklerini açıkça veya ima yoluyla belirtmişlerdir. Bu değer yargısı, Hollanda'daki Türk göçmen topluluğunun kendi içine kapalı bir hayat sürmesi ve toplumun diğer kesimleriyle olan ilişkilerinin bilinçli bir şekilde sınırlı tutulmasını kendi gözlerinde meşrulaştıran en önemli etkenlerden biri olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Hollandalı Türkler'le toplumdaki diğer kesimler arasındaki toplumsal ve duygusal uzaklığın en önemli sebeplerinden birisinin Türkler arasında dini ve milli kimliklerin çok daha katı, özcü ve tavizsiz bir şekilde tanımlanması olduğu değerlendirilmektedir. Yapılan görüşmelerde Türklük ve Müslümanlık kimliklerinin değişmez, dış etkilere kapalı, mutlak kategoriler olarak algılandığı ve bu kimliklerin yabancı kültürel etkilere karşı her ne pahasına olursa olsun korunması gereken unsurlar olarak benimsendiği gözlenmiştir. Her ne kadar toplumun diğer kesimleriyle kamusal alanda temas kurmak göçmen toplumunun kendi sosyo-ekonomik statüsünü koruması için mecburi görülse de, özel alan birçok topluluk üyesinin gözünde kültürel devamlılığın sağlanacağı ve dini-milli kimliklerin özgürce yaşanabileceği mekan olarak önem arz etmektedir. Kamusal ve özel alanlar arasında çizilen bu keskin sınır Hollanda'daki Türkler arasında gönüllü ve kalıcı bir sürgünlük duygusunu pekiştirmektedir. Bu duyguyla başa çıkabilmek için de topluluk üyeleri geldikleri ana vatanın veya memleketlerinin bir kopyasını yaşadıkları ülkede yeniden üretmek yoluna gitmişlerdir. Türk mahalleleri ile bu mahallelerdeki dini-kültürel merkezler ve camiler bu "kopya vatan"ların (*replica homelands*) fiziksel mekanlarını oluştururken, kolektif ya da bireysel bir şekilde icra edilen kültürel ve dini ritüeller,

örgütlenme biçimleri, faaliyetler ve söylemler de topluluk üyelerinin idealize ettikleri ve kendi istedikleri biçimlerde tahayyül ettikleri vatanın (Türkiye'nin veya Türkiye içinde memleket kabul edilen yerlerin) yeniden üretildiği sembolik mekanlar olarak ortaya çıkmaktadırlar.

Bulgaristan Türkleri ile yapılan görüşmelerde de Türklük ve Müslümanlık önemli kimlik unsurları olarak ön plana çıkmasına rağmen, bu unsurlar katı bir ideolojik çerçeve içerisinde algılanmamaktadır. Bu kimlikler gündelik hayatın doğal rutini içerisinde yaşanmakta ve siyasi örgütlenmelerin temsil tekelinde bulunmamaktadır. Görüşülen Bulgaristan Türkleri milli ve dini kimliklerini özgürce yaşamak, ibadetlerini, milli kültüre dayanan geleneklerini ve folklorlarını resmi ya da gayri-resmi herhangi bir engellemeyle karşılaşmadan devam ettirmek istediklerini belirtmişlerdir. Ancak Türklük kavramına yapılan bu vurgu görüşmeciler arasında katı bir milliyetçilik ideolojisine dönüşmediği gibi, dini değerlere verilen önem de bu değerlerin sabit ve özcü bir yaklaşımla benimsendiği anlamına gelmemektedir. Zaten görüşmeciler kendi dini ve etnik kimliklerinin Türkiye'dekinden farklılık gösterdiğini, bu kimliklerin Bulgaristan'ın tarihi ve teritoryal koşulları çerçevesinde geliştiğini ifade etmişlerdir. Hollandalı Türk görüşmeciler ise böyle bir ayırmda bulunmamışlardır.

Hollandalı Türkler'in söz konusu kimlikleri mutlak ve bütüncül bir şekilde algılamaları, onların gözünde kendi toplumsal değerler sistemlerini (*community ethos*) tarihten ve mekandan bağımsız, değişmez ve hatta "taşınabilir" bir niteliğe büründürmüştür. Böylece bu değerler sistemi ve bunun etrafında oluşan kültürel pratiklerin gelecek nesillere aktarılabilmesi ve yeniden üretilebilmeleri için belli bir teritoryal çığaya ihtiyaç duymadığı düşünülmektedir. Bu değerlerle Hollanda'daki herhangi bir mekan, yer ya da bölge arasında bir bağ kurulmadan ve bu yerlere tarihi bir önem ya da milli-dini bir kutsiyet atfedilmeden bu değerlerin oradan oraya taşınabileceği varsayılmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, toplumu bir arada tuttuğuna ve onların varlığını tanımladığına inanılan bu değerler, Türk cemiyet hayatının özel alanlarında, kamusal alandaki ilişkilerden bağımsız olarak yeniden üretilmekte ve topluluk üyeleri yer değiştirdiğinde onlarla birlikte gittikleri yerlere taşınmaktadırlar.

Bu deęerler sisteminin devamı, topluluęun bireyleri ve örgütlerinin grup-içi denetimi sayesinde saęlanmakta ve özel alanların sınırları yabancı etkilere karşı sıkı bir şekilde korunmaktadır. Bulgaristan Türkleri örneğinde ise toplumun deęerler sistemi daha esnek ve buldukları toplumun ve Avrupa'nın deęerler sistemine daha açık bir şekilde tanımlanmıştır. Ayrıca bu deęerler ve kültürel pratikler, içinde bulunulan toplumun ve ülkenin tarihi ve mekansal dönüşümleriyle iç içe ve topluluęun gözünde belli tarihsel ve dini-milli öneme sahip şehirler, bölgeler, ibadet yerleri ve bireylerin kendi yerel memleketlerinde kökleşmiş bir şekilde algılanmaktadır.

Bulgaristan ve Hollanda Türkleri'nin kültürel düzlemde geliştirdikleri teritoryal bağları inceledikten sonra şimdi de araçsal olarak içinde yaşadıkları devlet ve toplumla kurdukları ilişkilere deęinelim. Bu araçsal bağların belki de en önemlilerinden biri vatandaşlık baęıdır. Hollandalı Türkler'in siyasette, yerel yönetimlerde ve bürokraside temsil oranı giderek artsa da yapılan görüşmeler ışığında siyasette veya sivil toplumda aktif olmayan topluluk üyelerinin genelde pasif bir vatandaşlık pratiklerinin olduęu sonucuna varılmıştır. Bu topluluk arasında vatandaşlık kavramı haklardan ziyade devlete karşı ödevler çerçevesinde algılanmakta; kanunlara saygılı vatandaş olmanın, yaşanan ülkeyle baę kurmak açısından yeterli olacaęı düşünölmektedir. Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin aksine, Hollandalı Türk görüşmeciler açısından vatandaşlık ve göçmen/azınlık hakları için aktif olarak mücadele etmek, bu uğurda seslerini yükseltmek ve daha fazla hak talebiyle Hollanda siyasi ve idari sisteminin sınırlarını genişletmeye çalışmak çoęu zaman meşru yöntemler olarak görölmemektedir. Tabii bunda Türkiyeli göçmenlerin halihazırda belli demokratik standartlarla yönetilen ve en azından başlarda vatandaşlık ve göçmen politikalarını çokkültürlölük ve çoęulculuk ilkelerine göre belirleyen bir ülkeye yerleşmiş olmaları ve bu ülkede yaygın insan hakları ihlallerine ve siyasi baskıya maruz kalmamış olmalarının büyük payı vardır. Hollanda'da uzun zaman uygulanan *pillarizasyon* sisteminin de grup haklarının elde edilmesi ve korunması anlamında, sistem ortadan kalkmaya başladıktan sonra bile önemli etkilerinin olduęu kabul edilmektedir. Öte yandan, Hollanda Türkleri'nin büyük oranda son yarım yüzyılda Hollanda'ya göçmüş işçilerden oluşması ve başlangıçta

kalıcı olacaklarının düşünülmemesi de siyasi mobilizasyon seviyesindeki düşüklüğün sebeplerinden birisi olabilir.

Bulgaristanlı Türkler ise bugün sahip oldukları haklar için uzun süre mücadele etmek zorunda kalmışlar ve bu süreçte yaşadıkları hak ihlalleri, zorunlu kitlesel göçler ve siyasi baskılar onların toplumsal tarihinin önemli bir belirleyicisi olmuştur. Çoğunlukla, yüzyıllarca aynı topraklarda yaşamış siyasi yerleşimcilerin devamı olmaları da siyasi bilinçlerinin daha yüksek olmasında önemli bir faktördür. Bu çerçevede, diğer azınlıklarla birlikte Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin haklarını savunacak bir siyasi partinin (Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi-HÖH) varlığı da siyasi bilinç ve faaliyetlerin yaygınlaşması açısından büyük bir rol oynamıştır.

İki topluluk arasındaki bu fark, bu toplulukların, yaşadıkları ülkelerde kendi konumlarını algılayış biçimlerini de önemli ölçüde etkilemiştir. Bulgaristan Türkleri kendilerini Bulgar toplumunun ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak görürlerken ve son dönemde Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin göç ve yerleşim kararlarını etkileyen faktörler daha ziyade ekonomik zorluklar ve iş bulma kaygısı iken, Hollandalı Türkler'in yaşadıkları ülkede azınlık olma durumundan duydukları rahatsızlık görüşmelerde öne çıkan bir tema olmuştur. Bu rahatsızlığın arkasında, Türk milletinin tarihi boyunca hiçbir yabancı gücün tahakkümü altına girmemiş olmasına dair yaygın inanış ile kendi milli değerlerini üstün görme anlayışının yattığını söyleyebiliriz. İki topluluktan görüşmeciler de buldukları ülkede ırkçı ve ayrımcı söylemlere ve uygulamalara zaman zaman maruz kaldıklarını söyleseler de Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin diğerlerine nazaran kendi ülkelerine hem duygusal hem de teritoryal anlamda daha bağlı oldukları görülmüştür. Buna karşılık Hollanda Türkleri'nin kültürel entegrasyon sorunlarının devam ettiğini ve hâlâ kendilerini ana vatanlarından getirdikleri kültürel yaşantı ve değerler ile yaşadıkları ülkenin değerler sistemi arasında sıkışmış hissettiklerini söylemek mümkündür.

Hollanda Türkleri'nin buldukları ülkenin vatandaşlığını almak konusunda, Hollanda vatandaşlığının uluslararası alanda rahat seyahat edebilmek, Hollanda içinde ise sosyal devletin imkanlarından daha fazla yararlanabilmek ve belli siyasi haklara sahip olmak gibi maddi avantajlarını öne çıkaran, araçsal bir tavır

takındıkları belirlenmiştir. Ancak vatandaşlık üzerinden kurulan bu maddi ve yasal bağların duygusal-kültürel bir aidiyet duygusuna evrilmediği; Hollandalı Türkler'in, Hollanda milletinin bir parçası olma, Hollanda devletinin başarılarıyla gurur duyma, Hollanda ülkesine ve milletine karşı bir milli görev bilincine sahip olma gibi milli kimliği oluşturacak ve vatanperverlik çerçevesinde değerlendirilebilecek duygu ve düşüncelerden uzak oldukları saptanmıştır. Hollanda Türkleri'nin Hollanda devleti ve toplumundan ziyade Türkiye'ye karşı milli duygular beslediği, Hollanda vatandaşlığına geçenlerin de Hollanda yasaları izin vermemesine rağmen Türk vatandaşlıklarını devam ettirdikleri gözlenmiştir. Bu durumun en önemli sebeplerinden biri olarak Türk göçmenlerinin Hollanda ülkesi ve halkıyla tarihe dayalı ortak kökler ve beraberce savunulmuş ortak bir vatan mitine sahip olmamaları gösterilebilir.

Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin de Bulgar devleti ve halkına olan bağlarını ideolojik olarak tanımlanmış bir Bulgar milliyetçiliği üzerinden kurmadıkları, bunda dil, din ve kültür farklılıklarının yanı sıra Bulgar milliyetçiliğinin dışlayıcı bir ideoloji şeklinde gelişmiş olmasının etkisinin olduğu söylenebilir. Bulgar toplumuyla ortak bir millet olma ve ortak ülkeleri paylaşma konusunda hâlâ birtakım çekinceleri olmasına rağmen görüştüğümüz Bulgaristan Türkleri, Bulgaristan'dan ve Bulgar halkından kendi ülkeleri, kendi devletleri, kendi toprakları ve kendi toplumu olarak bahsetmişlerdir. Dolayısıyla daha önce Bulgar devletiyle yaşadıkları sorunların buradaki Türkler üzerinde Bulgar devletinden ve milletinden tam anlamıyla bir duygusal kopuş yarattığı söylenemez. Görüştüğümüz Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin neredeyse tamamı, geçmişte yaşadıkları kötü olayların bütünüyle Bulgar devletine veya halkına mal edilemeyeceğini, hatta halkın büyük çoğunluğunun o zaman da kendilerine uygulanan ayrımcı ve asimilasyoncu politikalara karşı olduğunu ifade etmişlerdir.

İki topluluk arasındaki bir diğer önemli fark, siyasi hayata katılım biçimlerinde kendini göstermektedir. Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin Bulgar siyasi hayatına katılımı daha ziyade eşit ve özgür birey olma prensibi temelinde gerçekleşirken, Hollandalı Türkler'in siyasi tercihlerini ve katılımlarını belirleyen birtakım ideolojik araçlar

mevcuttur. Bulgaristan Türkleri arasında geniş bir oy tabanı bulunan HÖH bile Türkler'in siyasi temsilini kendi tekeline almayı başaramamışken, Hollanda'da Türkler siyasi tercihlerini yaparken, genellikle, üye oldukları ve daha ziyade Türkiye kökenli veya Türkiye'deki siyasi parti ve hareketlerin doğrudan temsilcisi olan örgütlerin ve/ya dini cemaatlerin etkisinde kalmaktadırlar. Bulgaristan'daki çoğu hareket veya örgüt daha ziyade Türk kültürünün ve dilinin korunması yönünde faaliyet gösterirken, Hollandalı Türkler'in dahil oldukları örgüt ve gruplar doğrudan ya da dolaylı olarak siyasi (özellikle de Türkiye iç siyasetiyle ilgili) saiklerle hareket etmekte ve Türkler'in kendi bireysel tercihleri ve Hollanda'nın siyasi gündemi temelinde siyasete katılımının önünde engel teşkil etmektedirler.

Ancak siyasi katılım süreçlerindeki bu farklılara rağmen iki toplumun siyasi tercihlerinde grup haklarının ve azınlık/göçmen statüsünün önemli bir belirleyici olduğu söylenebilir. Bulgaristan'da Türkler'in HÖH'e olan desteği ve Hollandalı Türkler'in çoğunluğunun kendi muhafazakar ideolojileriyle örtüşmese bile göçmen konularında daha ılımlı politikalar izleyen sol partilere oy vermeleri bunu kanıtı olarak gösterilebilir.

İki Türk topluluğunun, içinde yaşadıkları ülkelere ve toplumlara uyumunu engelleyen faktörler konusunda birtakım benzerlikler gösterdikleri söylenebilir. Bu faktörlerden en önemlileri şunlardır: kültürel farklılıklar, ayrımcılık ve ekonomik sorunlar. İki Türk toplumunun da kendi içlerinde dil, din ve kültürel özellikler bakımından bazı bölgesel ve mezhepsel farklılıklar göstermelerine rağmen görece homojen bir yapıda olduğu ve bu yapının iki örnekte de yaşadıkları ülkedeki baskın kültürden farklı olduğu söylenebilir. Bu duruma bir de bu Türk topluluklarının çoğunluğa nazaran eğitim ve sosyo-ekonomik düzeylerinin daha düşük olması eklenince, toplumun diğer kesimleriyle yaşanan sosyal ayrışma daha da pekişmektedir. Bunların yanında, her iki ülkede de hem ırkçı partilerin ve söylemlerin yükselişi, hem de özellikle kurumlar düzeyinde ve iş hayatında yaşanan yapısal ayrımcılığın yaygınlaştığına dair algı iki topluluğu da endişelendirmektedir.

Ekonomik sorunlara gelince, Bulgaristan Türkleri azınlık olmaları ve eğitim durumlarının daha düşük olmasından dolayı daha çok etkilendikleri ekonomik krizler

ve işsizlik sorunlarına Hollandalı Türkler'e nazaran daha çok vurgu yapmışlardır. Hollanda'da son dönemdeki ekonomik daralma ve artan işsizlik sorunları göçmen Türkler'i de olumsuz etkilese de, Hollandalı Türkler, özellikle 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrası Batı dünyasında ve dolayısıyla Hollanda'da artan İslam ve göçmen karşıtı söylemlerden, buna bağlı olarak toplumun farklı kesimleri arasında artan gerilimden ve Hollanda devletinin son yıllarda daha da sıkılaştıran göçmen ve vatandaşlık politikalarından, kendilerinin topluma uyumunu zorlaştıran etkenler olarak daha çok söz etmişlerdir. Uyum programlarının zorunlu hale getirilmesi, vatandaşlığa geçme ve aile birleşiminin daha da zorlaştırılması ile çokkültürlülüğü esas alan ve birey haklarından ziyade grup haklarına ağırlık veren eski sistemden vazgeçilip, bireysel entegrasyona dayalı ve entegrasyonun maddi-manevi yükünü ve sorumluluğunu göçmen bireylere yükleyen yeni bir sisteme geçilmesi diğer göçmen topluluklarda olduğu gibi Türkler arasında da rahatsızlık yaratmıştır. Bu politikalar, görüşmeciler tarafından "göçmen" ve "Müslüman-Türk" kimliklerinin ve dolayısıyla genel toplumdan farklılıklarının daha da altını çizerek göçmen gruplar arasındaki ayrışma ve yabancılaşma duygularını artıran ve uyum sağlamayı isteyen göçmenleri de dışlayan faktörler olarak belirtilmişler ve asimilasyon politikaları olarak algılanmışlardır.

Bulgaristan Türkleri ise ayrımcı politika ve söylemlerden şikayetçi olmakla birlikte, demokratik hak ve özgürlüklerin korunması ve yaygınlaştırılması konusunda Bulgar toplumun genelinde bir mutabakat olduğunu; bu mutabakat çerçevesinde azınlıkların hakları noktasında yaşanan sorunların gelecekte çözüleceğine ve Bulgar milliyetçileri tarafından uzun yıllar Bulgar toplumunun dimağına işlenen "barbar ve geri kalmış Türk" imajının zaman içerisinde silineceğine dair iyimser olduklarını belirtmişlerdir. Bu durumda, Bulgaristan Türkleri'ni Türkiye'ye veya üçüncü ülkelere temelli veya dönemsel olarak göç etmeye zorlayan temel neden, kendi toplumlarına olan milli veya teritoryal aidiyet duygularının zayıflığı veya görmüş oldukları ayrımcılıktan ziyade, ağırlığı artan ekonomik sıkıntılar olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Hollandalı Türkler ise ayrımcılığın ve toplumun farklı kesimleri arasındaki gerilimlerin geleceğine dair daha kötümser bir tablo çizmişler, ırkçılık ve ayrımcılığın Hollanda'da ve genel olarak Avrupa'da belli siyasi partiler ve hükümetlerle sınırlı

kalmadığını, Türkler'e ve Müslümanlar'a karşı olan önyargıların çok daha derin kökleri olduğunu, yerel toplum tarafından bu şekilde ayrımcılığa ve dışlamaya tabi tutulmanın da uyum sorunlarını derinleştirdiğini dile getirmişlerdir.

Kültürel entegrasyon konusunda Hollanda'daki görüşmecilerin tavrı birbirinden farklılık göstermiştir. Bazıları, Türkler'in kültürel entegrasyon konusunda geri kaldığını ve belli konularda kültürel alışkanlıklardan taviz verilebileceğini söylerken, diğerleri bu görüşe karşı çıkmış ve entegrasyonun sadece Hollandaca'yı iyi öğrenmek, kanunlara uymak ve ekonomik hayata katılımı sınırlı kalması gerektiğini, kültürel entegrasyonun asimilasyon demek olduğunu belirtmişlerdir. Hollandalı Türkler'in önemli bir kısmı buldukları ülkede yaşadıkları sorunları ve taleplerini daha ziyade kültürlerinin korunması ve kimliklerine saygı gösterilmesi çerçevesinde tanımlarken, Bulgaristan Türkleri temel sorunlarını kimlik siyasetinden ziyade ekonomik ve sosyal problemler olarak ortaya koymuşlardır. Temel sosyal ve ekonomik sorunlarının çözümü çerçevesinde Hollandalı Türkler, sosyal devletin sağlayamadığı hizmetleri kendi kurdukları örgütlerden ve cemaatlerden alma yoluna gitmişlerdir. Yapılan görüşmelerde, Hollandalı Türkler arasında "biz kendi kendimize yeteriz" düşüncesi ve toplumsal değerler konusunda kültürel-ahlaki üstünlük algısının baskın olduğu ve bundan dolayı devletin kendi iç ilişkilerine karışmasını doğru bulmadıkları tespiti ön plana çıkmıştır. Hollandalı Türkler'in çoğunluğu, devletin, ekonomik ve sosyal alanda farklı toplum kesimlerinin kendi amaçlarını gerçekleştirebilmeleri için sadece kolaylaştırıcı bir rol oynamasını ve kültürel entegrasyon talebinden vazgeçmesini beklemektedirler. Bulgaristan'da konuştuğumuz gençler arasında, "her şeyden sorumlu devlet" imajının aşınmaya başlamasına ve siyasetin sorun çözme kapasitesine olan inancın giderek azalmasına rağmen Bulgaristan Türkleri yine de sosyal ve ekonomik sorunların çözülmesi konusunda öncelikli olarak devlete yüzlerini dönmektedirler. Sonuç olarak, geleneksel vatan ve millet bağının temeli olan, güçlü toplum ve bireylerin ancak güçlü bir devletle mümkün olabileceği düşüncesi Hollandalı Türkler arasında Hollanda bakımından zayıfken, Bulgaristan Türkleri Bulgar devleti ve toplumundan kendilerini ayırmadan ortak gelecekte ortak bir kaderi paylaştıklarına, dolayısıyla

ayakta kalabilmelerinin ancak toplumun geneliyle uyumlu ilişkiler kurmaları sayesinde olabileceğine inanmaktadırlar.

Daha önce bahsettiğimiz gibi, yerel ya da ulus-devlet çapında kurulan aidiyet ilişkilerinin dışında ulus-ötesi, sınır-aşan faaliyetler de teritoryal bağlar yaratabilir. Ancak diğer iki tür ilişkilene biçiminden farklı olarak, fiziki uzaklık nedeniyle ilişki kurulan coğrafyalarla birebir temas imkanı kısıtlı olduğundan, bu tür teritoryal ilişki biçimleri fiziki-maddi bağlardan ziyade sembolik-normatif bağlar üretir. Ana vatan kabul edilen veya aile köklerinin dayandığı ülkeyle kurulan bağlar buna örnektir.

Hollandalı ve Bulgaristanlı Türkler'in Türkiye ile bağlarına baktığımızda benzerlikler kadar farklılıklar da görüyoruz. Görüşülen Hollandalı Türkler'in çoğunluğu hâlâ Türkiye'yi ana vatanları olarak görürken, Hollanda'yı ise ikinci vatanları veya sadece yaşadıkları/ikamet ettikleri ülke olarak kabul etmektedirler. Türkiye'yle maddi ya da fiziki bağları zayıflamış olanlar bile Türkiye'ye karşı gönül bağlarının devam ettiğini belirtmişlerdir. Hollandalı Türkler bireysel düzeyde, aile üyelerini ziyaret etmeye ve onlara döviz göndermeye, Türkiye'den ev almaya ve Türkiye'ye yatırım yapmaya devam ederken, üye oldukları örgütler ya da gruplar üzerinden de Türkiye'yle ideolojik, siyasi ve maddi anlamda bağ kurmaktadırlar. Bunun yanında, Türkiye'deki gelişmeleri yakından takip etmekte ve ülkenin başarılarıyla gururlanmaktadırlar. Bu tabloyu değerlendirdiğimizde, Türkiye ile fiziki uzaklığa ve birçok göçmen Türk için Türkiye'ye dönme olasılığının düşüklüğüne rağmen, Türkiye hem sembolik hem de araçsal anlamda önemini korumakta, göçmen Türkler arasındaki toplumsal bağların ve kültürün korunmasına katkıda bulunan bir çimento görevi görmektedir. Bu anlamda, Hollanda Türkleri'ni en azından bazı özellikleri bakımından diaspora tanımının içine sokabiliriz.

Hollanda'daki bazı görüşmeciler, Türkiye'yi kendi milli, dini ve kültürel kimliklerinin teritoryal anlamdaki temsilcisi, kültürel değerlerinin ve toplumsal özgüvenlerinin kaynağı olarak tanımlamışlardır. Bu sembolik anlamın ötesinde Türkiye, her halükarda Hollanda'daki sosyo-ekonomik veya kültürel mevcudiyetleri ve hayat standartları tehlikeye girerse temelli veya dönemsel olarak geri

dönebebilecekleri bir "yedek vatan" görevi de görmektedir. Her ne kadar bu olasılık düşük olsa da Hollandalı Türkler göçmen olarak hem ekonomik hem de sosyal statülerindeki kötüleşme karşısında Türkiye'ye dönme ihtimaliyle rahatlamaktadırlar. Ancak Türkiye'nin kalıcı bir yerleşme alternatifinden ziyade Hollanda'da yaşanan olumsuzluklar için geçici bir telafi mekanizması olma işlevi daha önemlidir. Hollanda'daki görüşmecilerin önemli bir kısmı, yaşadıkları ülkedeki toplum ve aile ilişkilerinin mesafeliliği ve dinamizmden uzak oluşu, kamusal alanın sıkı bir devlet kontrolü altında olması ve kural ve kanunların çok katı bir şekilde uygulanması, iklimsel koşulların uygun olmaması gibi konulardaki memnuniyetsizliklerini Türkiye'deki aile, akraba ve tanıdıklarıyla devam ettirdikleri yakın bağlar ve Türkiye'ye yaptıkları kısa ve uzun süreli ziyaretler sayesinde telafi ettiklerini doğrudan ya da dolaylı olarak ifade etmişlerdir. Hatta bu görüşmelerde Hollandalı Türkler arasında Türkiye'den evlenmek için eş getirme ve iki ülkede edinilen evler sayesinde özellikle emeklilik döneminde yılın yarısını Türkiye'de geçirme tercihinin yaygın olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır.

Öte yandan, Türkiye de yurtdışındaki göçmenlere hem maddi hem de manevi anlamda bağımlıdır. Yurtdışından gönderilen dövizler ve Türkiye'de yapılan yatırımlar Türkiye ekonomisine önemli bir destek sağlarken, Türkiye'deki birçok siyasi parti, örgüt ya da grup hem maddi olarak hem insan kaynağı ve oy tabanı olarak yurtdışındaki göçmenlerden yararlanmaktadır. Bunun dışında dış politika konularında da önemli ülkelerdeki Türk göçmen varlığı bir koz olarak Türk devleti tarafından zaman zaman kullanılmaktadır. Ancak şunu da belirtmeliyiz ki her ne kadar Türkiye son zamanlarda yurtdışı Türkler konusunda daha aktif bir politika izlese de yurtdışındaki Türkler kendi aralarında dağınık bir örgütsel yapı sergilediklerinden eşgüdümlü bir milli lobiden ya da güçlü ve kurumsallaşmış diaspora ağlarından henüz söz edilemez. Türkiye'nin, yurtdışı Türkler'in buldukları ülkelere sosyal ve ekonomik entegrasyonunu teşvik eden, ancak kültürel asimilasyona direnmelerini salık veren politikası görüşmecilerimizin çoğu tarafından olumlu karşılanırsa da, Türkiye'nin göçmen Türkler'in ilişkilerine bu kadar müdahil olmasının entegrasyonu engelleyen bir faktöre dönüşebileceğini söyleyen görüşmeciler de olmuştur.

Bulgaristan Türkleri ile yaptığımız görüşmelerde ise ana vatan bağı konusunda kuşaklar arası farklar daha ön plana çıkmıştır. Bulgaristan'daki asimilasyon politikalarını ve zorunlu göç dönemini yaşamış olan orta yaş ve üstü kuşak Türkiye'yi ana vatan ya da koruyucu bir akraba ülke, Bulgaristan'ı da yaşanılan vatan olarak kabul edip Türkiye ile duygusal bağlarını devam ettirirken, genç görüşmeciler için ise Türkiye daha ziyade ekonomik zorlukları aşmak, daha iyi imkanlara kavuşmak için bir fırsat kapısı olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu anlamda Bulgaristan'da ekonomik ya da siyasi anlamda zor koşullar tekrar baş gösterirse Türkiye'nin bir "yedek vatan" olarak görülmesi Bulgaristan Türkleri açısından da söz konusudur. Ancak şu aşamada Türkiye'yi ana vatan olarak gören görüşmecilerin bile Türkiye'yle bağlarının, eğer Türkiye'de akrabaları varsa, akraba ziyaretleri ile; Türk dernekleri ve kuruluşlarının Türkiye'yle ilişkisinin ise Türkiye'deki veya Türkler'in bulunduğu diğer ülkelerdeki muadilleriyle kültürel faaliyetler ve programlar düzenlemekle sınırlı kaldığı gözlenmiştir. Bu anlamda, Bulgaristan Türkleri örneğinde sınır-aşan, ulus-ötesi bağların ortak değerler ve normlar üretmek, ortak davalar etrafında birleşmek doğrultusunda bir dönüşüm yaratmadığı söylenebilir. Türkiye'nin iç ilişkileriyle fazlaca ilgilenmeyen ve Türkiye'deki siyasi, ekonomik veya sosyal aktörlerle organik bağları olmayan Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin, ulus-ötesicilik akımlarının ulus-ötesi grupların bir özelliği olarak öne sürdükleri gibi, Bulgaristan dışındaki ülke veya toplumlarla organik bağlar kurarak birden fazla teritoryal-siyasi birimde varlık gösterdiğini söylemek şu aşamada güçtür.

Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin bir diaspora bilincine sahip olduğunu veya diaspora tanımının içini dolduracak iyi örgütlenmiş, ortak çıkarlar ve amaçlar etrafında birleşmiş bir diaspora ağına dahil olduğunu da söyleyemeyiz. Görüşme yapılan Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin çoğunun, sistematik olarak ortaya konulmuş bir milliyetçilik ideolojisiyle veya sınır-aşan bir Türk milleti fikriyle kendi aralarına mesafe koydukları müşahede edilmiştir. Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin farklı ülkelere düzensiz/mevsimlik göç ve seyahatlerinin yoğun olmasına ve bu fiziksel hareketliliğin parçalanmış aileler ve düzensiz, çoklu teritoryal ilişkiler yaratmasına rağmen, bu topluluğun Türkiye'deki ve diğer ülkelerdeki Türkler'le ortak gündem ve çıkarlarının ya da kurumsal, eşgüdümlü ve uzun vadeli ortak faaliyetlerinin çok

sınırlı olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Başka bir deyişle, Hollandalı Türk görüşmecilerde olduğu gibi, Bulgaristan Türkleri arasında da artan fiziki hareketliliğin ve giderek yaygın bir biçimde kullanılan kitle iletişim ve ulaşım araçlarının; kimlikleri, temel kültürel değer ve normları, iletişim ve organizasyon pratiklerini köklü bir şekilde dönüştürerek evrensel normların veya daha kozmopolit değerlerin ve kimliklerin oluşmasına en azından bu aşamada yol açmadığı söylenebilir.

Ancak şunu da belirtmeliyiz ki görüşülen Bulgaristan Türkleri'nin evrensel insan ve azınlık hakları, hukukun üstünlüğü, ifade ve seyahat özgürlüğü, cinsiyet eşitliği, bilimsel ve sosyal ilerleme, kurullarla denetlenen bir kamusal alan ve iş ahlakı konularında modern Batılı değerleri benimsedikleri ve Bulgar toplumunu da bu değerlerin temsilcisi Avrupa'nın bir parçası olarak kabul ettikleri görülmüştür. Daha önce belirttiğimiz gibi Bulgaristan Türkleri kendi temel değerleri ile genel Bulgar toplumunun ve Batı medeniyetinin değerleri arasında uzlaşmaz farklılıklar görmemekte, kendi değerlerini de daha esnek ve farklı kültürlere açık bir şekilde tanımlamaktadırlar. Hollanda Türkleri ile aralarındaki belki de en büyük fark, kültür ve kimlik kategorilerinin tanımlanmasındaki bu esnek tutumdur. Hollanda Türkleri Batılı değerleri baştan reddetmeseler ve bu değerlere belli bir düzeyde saygı göstermenin buldukları ülkeye uyum gösterebilmenin bir koşulu olduğunun bilincinde olsalar bile, bu topluluk arasında birincil kimliklerin, yani Türklük ve Müslümanlık kaynaklı norm ve değerlerin en azından özel alanlarda korunmasının önemi ve bu değerlerin üstünlüğüne, değişmezliğine ve asli niteliğine olan inanç açıkça görülmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Hollanda Türkleri arasında evrensel değerlerin ve ulus-ötesi ilişkiler yoluyla tanımlanmış kimlikler ve uygulamaların ancak kendi "asli" kimlik ve değerleriyle çelişmediği sürece benimsendiğini söyleyebiliriz. Bu da ulus-ötesi bağların, daha geçişken ve kapsayıcı kimlikler üretmek anlamında dönüştürücü ve özgürleştirici etkilerinin en azından bu örnek bağlamında sorgulanabileceğini göstermektedir. Görüşmecilerin önemli bir kısmı da zaten ulus-ötesiciliğin ve (ekonomik-teknolojik biçimleri dışında) küreselleşme süreçlerinin öze yönelik değişimler yaratma kapasitesine dair kuşkularını dile getirmişlerdir.

Sonuç olarak, ulus-ötesiciliğin sadece hareketlilik, mekansal ve siyasi sınırlardan kurtulma ve özgürleşme gibi pozitif değer atfedilen kavramlar ile; yerel ya da ulus-devlet düzlemindeki teritoryal ilişkilerin ise durağanlık, mekansal kısıtlılık ve mutlak kimlik kategorileriyle özdeşleştirilmesi problemli bir yaklaşımdır. Kültür ve kimliğin teritoryal bağlardan ve mekanların belirleyiciliğinden tamamen bağımsız bir biçimde şekillendiği yolundaki argümanlar giderek daha fazla sorgulanmaktadır. Fiziki mekanların ve sınırlı toprak parçalarının kısıtlılığını ulus-ötesi araçlar ve hareketler sayesinde aşan bilgi, fikir, değer, norm ve pratikler farklı yerel ve teritoryal bağlamlarda yeni anlamlar kazanmakta ve tekrar bu bağlamların özel koşullarıyla kısıtlanmaktadır.

Farklı insanların ve insan topluluklarının ulus-ötesi ve küresel bağlar sayesinde karşılaştıkları yeni kültürleri, değer yargılarını, fikirleri ve pratikleri nasıl içselleştirdikleri ise tek tip bir şablon izlememektedir. Ulus-ötesi pratiklerin araçları kadar, bu yolla yapılan faaliyetlerin niteliği ile bu pratiklere katılan grupların özellikleri, iç koşulları ve kendilerine dair algıları da bu süreçte önemli rol oynamaktadır. Katı bir şekilde tanımlanmış ve dışlayıcı grup kimlikleri; çok katmanlı, melez kimliklerin ve gerçek anlamda özgürleştirici ulus-ötesi pratiklerin deneyimlenmesinin önünde engel teşkil etmektedir. Sadece yeni teknolojilerin kullanımına bağlı ve kısa vadeli temasların ötesinde, uzun vadeli ve kültürlerarası ortaklıkların kurulabilmesinin, ancak farklı kültürel topluluklar içerisindeki grup-içi denetimin gevşetilmesi, hem fiziki hem sembolik anlamda izole edilmiş ve sınırlanmış yaşam alanlarının dışına çıkılması ve gruba bağlılık kavramından ziyade bireyselleşmenin ön plana çıkarılmasıyla mümkün olabileceği görülmektedir. Vaka incelemelerimizin de ortaya koyduğu üzere, aşırı sıkı grup-içi bağlar ve toplumsal denetim; kültürel üstünlük algısı ve kendi kendine yetme anlayışıyla birleştiği zaman, grup üyelerinin kişisel seçimlerini özgür bir şekilde yapamadıklarını; grup yönelimlerinin bireylerin seçeneklerini kısıtladığı bir ortamda ise yerelliği aşan, çok boyutlu ve çok mekanlı ilişki ve örgütlenme biçimlerinin, aidiyetlerin ve kimliklerin oluşumunun sekteye uğradığını ifade edebiliriz.

## APPENDIX D

### TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

#### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

#### YAZARIN

Soyadı: Şenses  
Adı : Ahu  
Bölümü: Uluslararası İlişkiler

**TEZİN ADI** (İngilizce): “Nationalism and Territoriality: The Conception of Homeland in the Communities of Turkish Origin in Bulgaria and the Netherlands”

**TEZİN TÜRÜ**: Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ**: Mart 2014