SECESSION AND FRAGMENTATION
IN TEVHIDI ISLAMIST COMMUNITIES
BELIEVING SUBJECT VS BELIEVING COMMUNITY

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ABSTRACT

SECESSION AND FRAGMENTATION IN TEVHIDI ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES:
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This thesis aims to descriptively analyze islamist communities/NGO's in Ankara with respect to how they construct their religious identity and we-and-others dichotomy and to understand the theoretical and practical reasons of secession and fragmentation among islamist groups and NGO's which have been widespread since the blossoming of Islamism in Turkey. On the background I will be questioning whether Islamism intrinsically carries an exclusionist and dichotomist discourse. The study also aims to shed light on anticipating the trajectory of the Islamist movements on the creation of a pluralistic, dialogic and deliberative society.

Research findings show that although Islamism historically and currently hindered/hinders dialogue and deliberation; an important ideational change with respect to the ideal of Islamic society, democracy, and communication with "others" could be seen among contemporary islamists. It is observed that If Islam will be the case, contrary to, traditional or tariqa based groups, Islamist thought possesses a promising potential for a future pluralistic society and politics. The emergence of a significant theoretical literature on new forms of community in the late modern societies, the increasing critical approaches and theoretical expansions mostly called as third wave Islamism or post Islamism, and the increasing emphasis on primary relations grounded on morality/ethics, friendship and brotherhood contributed to rethink on new ways of coexistence, and opened new horizons for the discussions on Islamic politics.

Key Words: Tevhidi islamists, islamic unity, ethics/morality, marginality, the other

ÖZ

TEVHİDİ İSLAMCI CEMAATLERDE AYRILMA VE PARÇALANMA:
İNANAN ÖZNE – İNANAN CEMAAT İLİŞKİSİ

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Bu çalışma Ankara'daki tevhidi İslamcı cemaat ve Stk'ların dini kimliklerini ve biz-öteki ikiliğini nasıl inşa ettiklerini anlamaya ve Türkiye'de islamcılığın ortaya çıkışından bu yana süren ayrılma ve parçalanma ilişkilerinin ardında yatan teorik ve pratik unsurları ortaya çıkarmaya yöneliktir. Arka planda, İslamcı düşüncenin içkin olarak dışlayıcı ve ayrıştırıcı olup olmadığı sorusuna da yanıt aranacaktır. Ayrıca çalışmadan elde edilen sonuçlar İslamcı hareketin diyalog zeminine sahip, çoğulcu ve müzakereci bir toplumsal geleceğe dair potansiyeline de ışık tutacaktır.

Çalışmanın sonuçlarına göre İslamcı düşünce her ne kadar tarihsel süreç boyunca ve son dönemlerde de hakim olan düşünce açısından diyalog ve müzakere ilişkilerine kapalı göründüyse de, islamcılar arasında demokrasi, islam toplumu ideali ve 'öteki' ile ilişkiler konularında dikkat çekici bir düşünsel dönüşümün yaşanmakta olduğu söyleyebilir. Ayrıca çoğulcu bir toplum ve siyasetin geleceği açısından, islam söz konusu olduğunda tarikatlar yada geleneksel cemaat yapılarından ziyade, islamcıların ciddi bir potansiyel taşıdıklarını söylemek mümkündür. Geç modern dönemde yeni cemaatleşme biçimlerine dair ortaya çıkan teorik açılımlar, üçüncü dalga islamcılığı ya da post-İslamcılık olarak tanımlanan süreçte ortaya çıkan eleştirel yaklaşımlar ve cemaatleşme süreçlerinde ahlak/etik, kardeşlik, dostluk gibi kavramlara artan şekilde yapılan vurgular, birlikte yaşamanın yolları üzerine yeni düşünsel açılımlar sağlamış ve islami siyaset tartışmalarına da yeni ufuklar kazandırmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Tevhidi islamcılar, islami birlik, etik/ahlak, marjinallik, öteki

To My Little Baby

Rüya

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INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Story of an Islamist:

From "Truth Belongs to Me" to "I Belong to the Truth"

I am coming from a family which is religiously a very traditional one, keeping only some inherited practices such as Friday-Eid prayers, fasting, sacrificing animal and going on pilgrimage. Apart from these practices, there were no consciousness of Quran, Sunnah and Islam in general. They didn't read the Turkish meaning of the Quran and they had no familiarity with hadith[1] literature. In 1990's we were living in a shantytown in the outskirts of Ankara. During the time I was going to secondary school. We used to visit a man named Necmi Abi who was living in our neighbourhood. This benign, cheerful man used to talk to us about Islam, tawhed[2], polytheism, and tağut[3]. In the course of time, I realized that what I heard as Islam from my family was quite different than that of what Necmi Abi used to tell us. We started to believe that particularly tawhed (oneness of Allah) and polytheism were among the most important problems of the time. When I used the term "Tağut", the first reaction of my family and ignorant friends was "tabut?" which showed that they had not heard of it before, though it was one of the central concepts in the Quran. Years passed and we were in the position of the caller (davetçi) to the real truth of Islam. There was a widespread ignorance about Islam and tawhed in

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[1] Hadith: Deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad

[2] Tawhed: Oneness of Allah

[3] Tağut: Any authority, ideology or person against the authority of Allah

our society. People were still claiming to be muslims despite their polytheist beliefs and practices. Willingly or unwillingly we disdained our families and neighbours due to their ignorance. The truth used to belong to us only. The islamist movement in our neighbourhood was the center of the struggle of the truth. The government -needless to say- was in a total polytheism by accepting and applying human made laws contrary and hostile to the political, social and judicial laws of Allah ordained in the Quran. Learned from Sayyid Qutb, we had no goal of acquiring any governmental positions simply in order to be consistent with the idea of rejecting the pagan system by its entire means. Struggling within the system and using the means of it were both delusion and contained danger of becoming infidel simply because it meant to approve the mechanisms of a polytheist system. Accordingly we used to reject "milli görüş"[4] movement due to their integration of Kemalist system, and we were rejecting to vote for any party. Islamic ideals should have only been disseminated from bottom-to-top by educational means and finally would lead to a social revolution just as happened in Iran. We were naming ourselves as "tevhidi müslümanlar" (Unitarian muslims) and the mosques constructed by our own economic efforts were tawhed mosques contrary to governmental mosques and we used to pray only behind our own appointed imams rather than the imams (civil servants) of the polytheist system. On these years my friends in high school also were ignorant of the true Islam, yet I was unable to establish dialog with them on these issues. On the one hand I disdained them, but on the other hand I realized that my simple truth and argumentation were quite shallow compared to the intellectual level of my classmates, most of whom were the children of educated parents. Consequently I became introverted together with the effects of puberty.

I found myself in a very different environment in the university life. I met many different muslims who were intellectually more sophisticated than me. Their different interpretations of Islam were not in fact contrary to tawhed, besides were quite capable of generating wider perspectives to religion, politics, and society. The university life brought many changes to my way of thinking. As time passed by, I felt that I had lost my privilege of

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[4] Milli görüş: A political and religious idea emerged in 1969 by Necmettin Erbakan main tenets of which are religious nationalism, industrialization, development, and economic independence.(Rubin and Çarkoğlu, 2009: 64)

holding the truth. I understood that Islam didn't consist of my own neighbourhood and what I had believed as Islam had been contaminated with arrogance and dogma. I started to struggle both with myself and the brothers in the neighbourhood. I was criticising my muslim community with the same arguments that I had always faced. My muslim brothers were dogmatic in their belief and they were close to any deliberation or dialog. What they had learned a couple years ago used to turn them into dedicated but strict and stubborn muslims being closed to any different interpretations. It was then my turn to be excluded in the name of maintaining uniformity.

Now I remember many of my early muslim brothers who were subjected to the same treatment. If they couldn't be indoctrinated, then exclusion -based on similar reasons- would follow.

Throughout the last ten years muslims substantially changed particularly with respect to their approach to politics. The opposition of muslims against the polytheist system superseded to efforts to find room in political spheres. Some Islamists participated to bureaucratic mechanisms of the system, others continued to refrain from it and the rest were/and still are confused in thought. When the first Islamic NGO's were established, the majority of islamists were abstaining from any institutional or legal affiliations with the government. Nevertheless, almost all islamist communities today have their own NGO's which used to be seen as indisputable means of the polytheist government. I can say that AK Parti had turned the myth of "jahili system" upside down in muslim mindset. Islamists of the 1990's who were excluding and accusing each other of infidelity are now separated and fragmented under different NGO's. Unfortunately each day you can hear of a new islamist NGO with the efforts of ten-twenty muslims. I wish this were the sign of the spread of Islam in society, but it is nothing but the separation of the brothers in the past.

Although I have many good relationship with islamist communities and NGO's, and I am participating their educational programs and other activities; I am not organically affiliated with any of them as a dedicated member. Nevertheless contrary to individualism, I still believe in the necessity of a muslim community, but I also still believe that another form of group action is possible, though I don't know how. Muslims have to find new forms of solidarity and synergy without strict

hierarchy and uniformity. We have to believe that diversity is essential and we have to comply with this principle in all aspects of our lives. I wish there was a muslim community standing for justice only. It is a claim on the one hand that comprises the struggle in the name of Islam, and helps us think beyond the artificial and historical prejudices hitherto which constructed today's very categories of "muslims" and "seculars". Such a starting point I believe, will sweep away all existing dichotomies and hostilities towards both muslim and non-muslim "others".

In the absence of such a community, what do you suggest me to do? Should I be a submissive object to a charismatic mystical leader by joining a tariqa based community? Or should I choose to be with an ethno-religious group whose ethnic ideals and claims are more dominant than the religious claims. Or should I turn back to my one dimensional group in my neighbourhood. Is not it possible to believe rationally, and is not it possible to live together with "others" under the principle of justice?

Of course I still believe in truth. I still believe in the truth of the Quran and the authentic hadith literature. But first of all, Quran does not tell us completely new things, rather reminds us once again what is all about justice and goodness, all of which are thousands year messages. And these are the messages of responsibility which connects us to afterlife. Second I cannot claim to be perfectly comprehending and implementing the Quranic message. I stand in total humility in the face of the scriptural message. The truth doesn't belong to me only anymore. Rather I belong to the truth. This intellectual openness provides me a wide range of possibility to learn from anyone whether believer or not, and also gives me courage to discuss anything linguistically and logically possible. (Cihan, 28)

This is the story of Cihan, who had been organically affiliated with islamist communities for years, but now he has no affiliation with any groups. The general framework of this story and the details related to his experiences shed light on the main points discussed in this thesis. I interviewed with Cihan in Mekan Café, a famous place for islamist youth in Ankara. His story shares the perturbation of many muslims who severed their connection with islamist communities. It can be said that this story could generate the main skeleton of our thesis.

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1.2 Research Problem

This thesis aims to descriptively analyze islamist communities and NGO's in Ankara with respect to how they construct their religious identity and we-and-others dichotomy, and to understand the theoretical and practical reasons of secession and fragmentation among islamist groups and NGO's which have been widespread since the blossoming of islamism in Turkey.

Sectarian diversity is an indisputable reality of the Turkish society. When deeply analyzed (Kara 1986; Sarıkaya 1998) however, it will be observed that this diversity cannot go beyond differing personalities (leaders, sheikhs etc.), rituals or the historical traditions of reference. In other words, there is no significant difference with respect to the way they understand religion, or religiosity. Religion according to this view refers to some charismatic leaders who have supernatural attributes, an inner spiritual devotion and rituals most of which differ according to each sect. It is in short is an otherworldly motivation. These dimensions construct a picture of religion which corresponds to the dominant perception in Turkish society. This study however will focus on the muslim communities which mostly define themselves as "Tevhidi Cemaats" (Unitarians), and which are mostly called by the others as radicals, "irancı", vahhabis, salafis or islamists. The most peculiar characteristic (many of which will be elaborated in detail throughout the thesis) of these communities is their distinctively observed segregation. Tevhidi communities in other words are highly partial, fragmented and separate. My aim in this study is to understand the aspects of the Islamic discourse and practices within which carry intrinsic potentials of creating secession and fragmentation.

By the term "islamist" I refer to Türköne's (2012,) definition as the oppositional movement emerged in 1970's in Turkey with the influence of the translations from Pakistan and Egypt (Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb), what Bulaç (2005) and Eliaçık (2011) named as the second wave islamism. I will try to comprehend the distinctive characteristics of islamist ideology, how they position themselves in the social context, their relationships with the general population, to what extend their efforts contribute to

the embracement / dissemination of Islam in society, how they react to the political shift in the last ten years, and how their religious identity construct their "others".

On the background I will be questioning whether islamism intrinsically carries an exclusionist and dichotomist discourse. The study also aims to shed light on anticipating the trajectory of the islamist movements on the creation of a pluralistic, dialogic and deliberative society in Habermasian sense (communicative action). I will follow the line in between possessive truth claims and relativistic denials of truth.

This thesis first of all aims to think beyond the socially constructed dichotomies prevalent in Turkey such as religious-secular, rightist-leftist, sharia-democracy, and tries to demonstrate that dogmatic view is not related to a particular or holistic truth claim, it is rather related to the way the subject deals with it. (Ramadan, 2010)

Secondly, my study aims to be an intellectual contribution of self-criticism for muslims and islamic communities. This objective is a fortiori motivated by the shared expectations of my interviewees and respondents. Although islamists always claim that personal, organizational or social difference and fragmentation are the unavoidable realities of life, they always at the same time complain about the lack of unity and togetherness among muslims at least under common concerns. Islamists worry about the intensifying decline in the motivation for unity and neglect of intersubjectivity due to the influence of western rationalism and individualism. Another dimension of my objective in this sense will cover islamists' approach to truth claims and anticipation of the future prospects of the so called islamic state and society.

1.3 Field and Method

Based on my assumption that the communities of the second wave Islamism should have a considerable homogeneity both in discourse and practice in Turkey, I included 4 in-depth interviews with islamist community members and a youth group member who were from Gebze, Istanbul, Malatya and Muş. In a general framework these interviews supported my assumption. Hence I included them in my thesis.

The majority of my interviewees were chosen from my own personal relationships that I have been acquainted with for 6-7 years in Ankara. I shared my main objectives for this study. Since I was their brothers, they were certain that this thesis would not be distorted, written with a malicious intent, or biased. Not only my friends but all other islamists whom I interviewed had confidence on my personal position as an insider. This provided me a substantial opportunity to listen to sincere feelings and self-critiques. Nevertheless, while most of the interviewees supported my efforts as a contribution to provide new insights for the problems of muslims and an opportunity of self-criticism; some of them had reservations with regard to the question of secrecy. They were cautious of the negative consequences of revealing the secrets of muslims to non-muslims or seculars. Two of my respondents advocated the necessity of demonstrating an image of powerful, unified and competent islamic consciousness in all aspects, against the cultural and political enemies of Islam. Their contention was pursuant to one of the popular sayings of Prophet Muhammad: "War is deception". Islamists' weak points, theoretical or practical mistakes in this sense should be kept inside and there could at most be an inner discussion and self-criticism if there needs to be. The concept of secrecy therefore will be one of the theoretical discussion topics. In the third chapter I will discuss secrecy and secret communities particularly in the light of the contributions of Georg Simmel and Clark Chilson. Chilson's (2007) distinction of esoteric secrecy and social secrecy will be one of the main theoretical tools for analyzing Islamist communities.

The people I met throughout the study were from the lower-middle-class and middle class families. Based on my 10 years of personal observation and experience it can easily be said that economic power as a class distinction does not have a significant importance with respect to the way islamists organize and continue their activities.

The methods of data gathering used in this study are in-depth interviews, focus groups and participant observation. Over 30 in-depth interviews have been conducted with islamist community members and islamist youth seceded from communities and mini youth community members. Activities of islamists such as reading and discussion

sessions, intellectual debates and political protest activities were followed and participated.

The average length of the interviews was 1 hour (ranging from 40 mins to 2 hours). The places of interviews varied with regard to the interviewees choices. (NGO branches, café's in Kızılay, home meetings, conferences etc.)

1.3.1. Questions to the Communities[5]

Throughout the in-depth interviews I asked several questions in order to understand the past, present and possible future aspects of islamist thought. The framework of the thesis was constructed in the light of the following points:

I tried to understand how islamists position themselves in society and how they construct their identities and truth claims. What they think about other islamist or traditional muslim communities and how they carry on relationships with them.

I asked about their experiences of inter-community relationships with other islamist groups and how they elaborate on the current situation of secession and fragmentation among them.

I wanted to know their views about islamist youth potential and what they think about seceding young members from the communities.

I tried to provoke them by emphasizing on the criticism of marginalization of islamism in Turkey, and asked about the reasons of the lack of embracement of islamist discourse by the common population.

I tried to uncover their approach to the hypothetical ideal of islamic state and society, their views on the concept of democracy and the possibilities and boundaries of living together in a multi-cultural and multi-religious society.

The political process in the last 20 years and the performance of muslim political fronts were other points of curiosity. With my respondents I discussed the relationship

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[5] Original questions are in the appendices

between islam and politics, how islamists react to party politics as an intra-system means of islamic struggle.

1.3.2. Questions to Seceded Islamist Youth

As a second dimension of the study I focused on young muslim activists of 20-30 age groups. My respondents were of two categories: The first group consists of seceded young muslims who perform their religiosity individually or with at most 3-4 brothers. The second group muslims were those who seceded from their former community and organized independent community groups. During my interviews with young islamists:

First of all I wanted to know their personal life experiences of becoming dedicated islamists, and from when they consider themselves as muslims. This second part was crucial for it helps us understand how they differentiate between being a traditional muslim and an islamist.

I wanted to learn which islamic groups or communities hitherto had they been affiliated with. By this question I tried to understand the trajectory and the historical background of their current mindset.

I asked what they think about the necessity of being together with a muslim community and the reasons of their secession.

As for the reorganized youth groups, I chose Hürbeyan as my sample community. I interviewed with the members of this youth community about the reasons of secession, their relationship and dialog with their former communities and their experiences related to the process of autonomous reorganization.

1.4 Researcher's Position in the Field

Life in Turkey is divided into different social, political, economic spheres alienated to each other. The widespread conflicts and tensions between the rightist, leftist, nationalist or islamist ideologies as closed spheres and habitus' (Bourdieu) show the critical level of alienation within the very same shared public sphere. The uniform

social spaces where there is no "other", became the source and meaning of peace for each individual. Despite the intellectual corpus on the destructive authority of the "same" (Marcuse, Derrida, Levinas) and a time period when it is popular and ordinary to talk about diversity, pluralism, and the "other" (postmodernism, multiculturalism), the social and political life still seek for the same and abstain from facing the other (Levinas).

The individuals who have multiple relations with those disparate groups experience the conflicts most intensely, yet at the same time they are the ones who have the highest awareness and knowledge on the commonalities behind the constructed peculiarities. In other words, although living in between those conflicting ideologies frazzles the most, it can also turn out to be an advantage in terms of understanding the "other" very closely. Understanding the other carries with it a self-reflexive perspective and an opportunity to penetrate into the life view of the other, as Weber named it, to empathize with the other (verstehen). In both cases, those are much closer to reality.

In terms of beliefs and assumptions in life, Gellner (1992) points out three distinctive worldviews and remarks his own position.

> On questions of faith, however, our contemporary scene seems to have ceased to be binary. There are not two, but three basic contestants. There are three fundamental and irreducible positions. Three primary colours are required for mapping our condition.
>
> 1. Religious fundamentalism.
>
> 2. Relativism, exemplified for instance by the recent fashion of 'postmodernism'.
>
> 3. Enlightenment rationalism, or rationalist fundamentalism. (Gellner, 1992: 2)

Declaring himself as a rationalist fundamentalist, Gellner infact only adds a third option of relativism -which for Roderick (1991) has no followers- to the hitherto dichotomy of faith and knowledge. According to us however, the first and the the third categories shares the same ground of fundamentalism. In other words it is not related to any truth claims, it rather refers to the way one deals with that truth claim. As Gellner

also added, enlightenment rationalism can also be dogmatic and fundamentalist just as religiousity can be. Hence I reformulated the classification with respect to how we deal with truth.

- Truth belongs to me
- There is no absolute truth
- I belong to the truth

> Today one usually speaks of science as 'free from presuppositions.' Is there such a thing? It depends upon what one understands thereby. All scientific work presupposes that the rules of logic and method are valid; these are the general foundations of our orientation in the world; and, at least for our special question, these presuppositions are the least problematic aspect of science. Science further presupposes that what is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense that it is 'worth being known.' In this, obviously, are contained all our problems. For this presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means. It can only be interpreted with reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must reject or accept according to our ultimate position towards life. (Weber, 1946:143)

> ...I am a convinced believer in scientific progress. (Kuhn, [1962] 2012: 206)

> Reality exists independently of people's consciousness of it, but the connections between what is real, what is thought and what is experienced cannot easily be disentangled. (Ramazanoğlu & Holland, 2002: 72)

This study is based on the assumption of an inextricable conjunction of belief and reason rather than categorical distinction and opposition. Hence what directly interest me are not the multiple aspects of belief and knowledge which I encountered throughout the thesis, rather my concern is how to relate to these categories and to their "others". The ground of my critique to Gellner together with the basis of my classification is that of Weber's, Kuhn's and Standpoint theory's emphasis on subjectivity, pre-acceptances, assumptions and beliefs.

The first position refers to the claim that there is a truth and one can hold that truth. This comprises Gellner's religious and secular fundamentalisms. Fundamentalism in this sense means monopolizing on holding a truth claim and categorically neglecting or invalidating any other possible truth claims whether religious or secular. While fundamentalism in the first category bases religious or a mystical reference as the measure of all things, the second form on the contrary abolishes any such claim and replaces it with science, progress and objectivity. History however always witnessed the predominance of power (subjective, biased, religious) -whether implicit or explicit- over progress, emancipation, freedom, maturity, homogeneity and universality (Foucault, Marx, Badiou, Frankfurt school, postmodern literature). This perpetually nourished a sphere of conflict, and the priority of the "other" always remained in the discursive level.

The second position proclaiming that "there is no absolute truth" is a half-finished claim which abnegates the following political reality. Although it admits the possibility of divergent truth claims, it turns out to be a justification of indifference and recklessness for a relationship of responsibility towards any of those claims.

> People live in real bodies, in real social relationships, in a real world. These realities cannot be reduced to the language in which they are expressed, or discourses through which they are constituted. (Alcoff, 2000: 857-8)

Alcoff's emphasis contains this sort of question which should follow the claims of relativity. Thus in order to incorporate power within the analysis, a standpoint between modernism and postmodernism seems to be necessary. It is also the threshold where the tension between agency and structure could be balanced and minimized (Ramazanoğlu & Holland, 2002). Thereby this position takes us to the point where "I belong to the truth". The subject on the one hand admits the possibility of different truth claims, on the other hand s/he will be in pursuit of making his/her position/truth claim believable. (Ramazanoğlu & Holland, 2002: 56)

What separates my third position from fundamentalism? The concept which will generate us a measure of distinction is morality, which itself is difficult to define with

rational categories (Bauman, 2011) and which gains its contextual meaning i.e. socially constructed as ethical life, (Yıldırım, 2001) yet continues to exist as a hypothetical an universal ideal. The defense of truth starts with a moral responsibility. It is to embark on a non-totalitarian, non-exploitative relationship towards the truer argument (Habermas) with an intellectual humility (Ramadan, 2009, 2010). It refers to staying away from pseudo claims of universality, homogeneity and monopolizing truth. Nevertheless such a starting point does not necessarily take us to naïve relativity; rather on the contrary, it will provide us opportunities for reaching the "similar" behind the constructed walls of difference, i.e. a ground of social conditions of coexistence. This position which will construct my theoretical basis of questioning the relationship of islamists with what they call truth will be discussed further in the chapter of "Ethics and the Other".

Based on Gellner's classification, my attempts of reformulation refer to the assumption that Islamism is evolved by the changing ways of dealing with truth. This classification in other words is believed to provide a projection on how muslims in Turkey understand, interpret and defend their truth claims.

I have been in contact with islamists for almost 10 years. During this time period I have experienced and witnessed many instances of secession, fragmentation and reorganization. The preliminary assumptions are mostly shaped by my personal experiences. Furthermore there have been influence and encouragement of some of my friends in choosing my research topic. Hence based on my personal experience and relationships I can say that this thesis was created with an insider position and a self-critical motivation.

1.5. Classical Literature on Community and Society

There are three main objectives for this chapter. First of all I aimed to emphasize that community as a sociological concept always continued to exist albeit in different forms and characteristics. Secondly I will show that a considerable literature emerged on community formations in the late modern era particularly after 60's, which provided us new insights on thinking beyond the classical conceptualizations of the era of

dichotomies. And finally I aim to contribute to the discussions and inquiries on the necessity of communities in existing forms and possible contributions of the new theoretical perspectives on the re-formation of Islamic communities.

Whether emerged as an intrinsic tendency of sociability (Aristotle 1983, İbn Haldun 2005), or considered as a constructed social solution for the intrinsic tendencies of conflict (Hobbes 1996), sociability / community carries on existing as one of the basic forms of human existence. While Nisbet (1966: 47) states that community is one of the most difficult concepts to define in social sciences, Hillery in his study (1968: 3) shows that community in the literature has 94 different definitions under 16 different concepts. When the changing characteristic of sociability on this literature is taken into consideration, it can be seen that community as a social structure where each individual is born into and owe his/her life to always existed (MacIver, 1928: 209). It is easy to argue however that what we understand as community witnessed radically new cleavages in the late modern period. This study is based on the idea of concurrency of community and society penetrated into each other (Yelken 1999) rather than progressive dichotomy of former traditional community and later modern society.

In the era of meta-narratives (the ends of 19th century and the beginnings of the 20th century) Tönnies developed his theory of the dichotomy of community and society and influenced many of his contemporaries such as Durkheim, Weber and Simmel. As a Hegelian invention (state-civil society) the prevailing idea of this dichotomy was revolving around a gloomy farewell to the traditional and hopeful welcome to the modern (Yelken, 1999: 53). It was the period when the heart lost against the intellect, religious is superseded by secular and belief was defeated by reason. The idea of a new era based on the assumption of progress is shared by almost all thinkers of the time.[6]

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[6] Yelken (1999: 54-55) by referring to McKinney's (1998: 12-29) detailed study, lists similar dichotomies and discusses them on the basis of Tönnies' framework: Spencer's military and industrial forms, Radzanhafer's state of conquest-state of culture, Wundt's natural-cultural polarization, Durkheim's mechanical-organic solidarities, Cooley's primary-secondary groups, MacIver's communal and associational relations, Zimmerman's local and cosmopolitan communities. Odum's duality of folk-state, Redfield's processes of Folk and city, Sorokin's domestic and contractual relations, Becker's sacred and secular societies, and many other dichotomies of primitive-modern, oral-written, and rural-urban.

Yelken argues that "in the course of time, social scientists focused solely on the modern, and the interest in the community waned" (Yelken, 1999: 56). The arguments regarding the ends of community in fact were based on that new era of industrialization and modernization.

Simmel whose renowned article of Metropolis and Mental Life (1950) depicting exactly Tönnies' society, points out that urban individual who responds with his/her mind rather than his/her heart (Simmel, 1950: 410), who undermines the incorporeal and intangible value, instead measuring everything with the price (how much?) (Simmel, 1950: 411) created emotional loneliness which was nothing but compensation of freedom (Simmel, 1950: 413)

> Societies are mere aggregate gatherings of independent individuals despite all unifying factors, and communities in contrast are emotional and goal oriented strong collectivities despite all factors of separation and decomposition. (Tönnies, 1957: 65)

In the course of time however, community was considered to be a continuing characteristic of modern industrial societies, albeit this time emerged as new sense of belonging in the form of nation state (Yelken, 1999: 87). Nation was built as a product of the need for loyalty and solidarity of modern man (Gellner, 1992: 28). Yelken (1999: 135) claims that Gellner indirectly refers to nation as the new religion of society; and symbols and rituals of worshiping were transformed into songs, dances, ceremonies and anthems which keep the nationalist enthusiasm alive and vibrant. Hobsbawn (1995: 65) by referring to nation as an alternative to bygone traditional community believes that nation -or in Anderson's terms the "imagined community"- could stand in the breach as a substitute to "the real communities" which were dissolved and dispersed. Arslan (2000) also discusses modern nation as a new type of religious sociability aiming to encompass all spheres of individual and social life.

> It can be said that modern man is confronted with nation state more than facing with God. Who gives you birth or which family and community you belong to, are not important; only after your registration to the governmental office–secular

baptism-, your existence gains reality. When you wish to marry, again you have to inform i.e. register to any of its institutions - civil marriage-. Let your relatives lament and cry as they want, but your death would become a reality only after the state officially confirms that you died. Your religion may recommend burying the dead "fore with", yet this would not have a meaning out of working hours. Besides, the state will decide where you will be buried. -If your financial situation is sufficient- in accordance with the principle of the sanctity of the private property, you will be among the "proprietor deads" owning the land register deed, hence your grave will be inviolable. (Arslan, 2000: 290)

Nation identity which Bauman (2011: 59) defined as the attempt of retaking root of the self which once lost its roots, gave way to modern tribes in Maffesoli's term (Bauman, 2011: 174). Bauman explains this process on the ground of a dual tension between socialization and sociability (Bauman, 2011: 176).

> Since it is based on a sovereign power devoid of universality, socialization can always extend infinitely in principal if not in practical; on the contrary sociability as a course of its nature seems divisible. Socialization can create more enduring structures than temporary and protean products of sociability. Socialization at the same time stands out by a tendency of soothing, suppressing and extinguishing the emotions specific to moral imperatives; sociability completely frees them and brings them to the boiling point. (Bauman, 2011: 176)

Although Bauman claims that both (socialization and sociability) limit and channel morality (Bauman, 2011: 176) when it comes to the islamic movement, since morality/ethics comprises both subjective motive/impulse and determination (ordained moral principles), sociability can be a starting point for an Islamic ethics. Late modern community formations in this sense will shed light on new possibilities of Islamic communities and as I will discuss later in "ethics and the other" chapter, my starting point will again be morality/ethics.

In the late modern period says Yelken (1999), community witnessed changes of the emergence of small community units displacing total structures, temporal allegiances of daily concerns subrogating the universal ideals and changing importance of intimacy

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instead of aloofness (Yelken, 1999: 168); and reacted to these developments by transforming itself with the following characteristics:

1.   Increasing local, ethnic and religious groups in contrast to totalitarian influence of the nation states.

2.   Parallel to changing scope and meaning of civil society, the emergence of community oriented organizations gaining influence and prevalence.

3.   The structural transformation of the public sphere and the increasing influence of communities in the public sphere

4.   New social movements and their relationship in the form of community

5.   Drawing attention to the increasing communal relations in voluntary organizations, local initiatives, and citizens organizations in line with the discussions and search for new democratic projections.

6.   Parallel to changing patterns of daily interpersonal relations, increasing emphasis on community by referring to the concepts such as friendship, brotherhood and solidarity.

7.   Increasing references to religious discourse in the perceptions of identity and lifestyles, and growing influence of religious communities.

8.   Redefinition of moral subjectivity for the individual attitudes and references to community in discussions on ethics. (Yelken, 1999: 169-170)

While discussing each changing patterns (Yelken, 1999: 170-200), Yelken draws an ideal typical (Weber) framework for the late modern communities:

1. A decisive break from geographical territory and manifesting itself on abstract spaces;

2. Ambiguity of the boundaries which had been decisive elements of communities and transformation to changing variables depending upon the discretion of the individual;

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3. Being constituted by an interactive process of creation, rather than being born into as family, clan, tribe or village;

4. Being associated with civil society more strongly;

5. Contrary to classical multifunctional and holistic communities, increasing focus on group of symbols and single type issues and actions;

6. Conveying the relations of love, friendship and solidarity to public space. (Yelken, 1999: 228-230)

How are the islamist communities being affected by these new processes of change and transformation? In what respect do the characteristics of the community formation of islamists correspond to this process of change?

Tevhidi islamist discourse refers to the endeavors of realizing of a revolutionary religiosity particularly against the traditional Anatolian islam which is believed to be consisting of cultural remnants and superstitions. (Erkilet, 2010: 92-93). The radicalism and opposition within its discourse inevitably shaped the way they form communities. Nevertheless as I will show in the chapter of "islamic unity and disunity"; based on my discussions on existing communal forms, organizational models and possible alternative opportunities of change and expansion, I come to the conclusion that islamists are experiencing parallel processes of change and transformation and these fragile periods will provide new insights for islamists with respect to establishing new community forms in the light of new ways of thinking of Islamic ideals and relations with the "other"

1.6. Islamist Ideology and Reflections in Turkey

Fundamentalism and Three Phases of Islamism

The academic corpus on fundamentalism and radicalism can be understood as the attempts to re-elaborate and rename the return of the religiosity (which was expected to disappear) to the social and political fields by reorganizing as communities against the crude secularization from top to bottom i.e. based on coercive power of the ruling elites

of the new republic. While the central point is the pollicisation of religion as a new phenomenon, the whole world history until the beginning of the 20th century witnessed the opposite. Religion and politics had always intertwined with each other. Nevertheless it was a tradition bygone and at least a threat to be hindered. Muslim intellectuals of the time such as Sayyed Ahmad Khan, Sayyid Amir Ali, Jamal al-din Afghani, Namık Kemal and Muhammad Abduh –while having differing approaches- became the advocates of an authentic islam which was to be perfectly competent for the crises of the modern world and the so called real islam purified from detrimental cultural attachments would be a remedy against the western imperialism and hope for the just and peaceful future of the world (Rahman 1984).

Literature on Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism is vast. It can be mainly framed as the emergence of political claims in the name of Islam, establishment of an Islamic society by reopening the gates of ijtihad[7], application of the shallow and literal interpretation of the commands and prohibitions of the Quran on societies whether by consent or by force, a strict opposition to the antecedent tradition and a gripping embrace of rationalism (Esposito, 2013; Roy, 2007). Bernard Lewis (1988) claims that although fundamentalism was originally used for Christian Protestantism, it is practically possible to use the term for muslims as well. J. Barr (1981) theoretically elaborates on the concept of fundamentalism by two main characteristics: "Exclusion" in the sense of staking their claim on truth, and passing over any possibility of the truth claims of the others except theirs, and "opposition" referring to establishing we-others dichotomies on behalf of creating and maintaining the unchangeable muslim identity. While discussing Barr's approach, Richard and Nancy Tapper (1987: 130) argue that the term can be adapted to any political or religious thought as a common outlook to life in general. Ramadan (2009, 2010) contributes to this argument by stressing that dogmatism does not directly refer to a particular or a holistic truth claim, it rather refers to the way

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[7] Ijtihad: an Islamic legal term that means "independent reasoning" or "the utmost effort an individual can put forth in an activity. (Esposito, John, *In the Islamic World: Past and Present*. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Retrieved April 28, 2013

we deal with it. Regardless of the source of it, an idea can be dogmatic if it is considered to be absolute and closed to the other views.

This conceptualization undermines the dichotomy based on the contradistinction of belief and knowledge. Belief is not directly related to the religious as well as knowledge is not to the secular. Atay (2009) while defining belief on the basis of "the unknown", points out that belief and knowledge have always been in conjunction with each other.

> Although humans strive to cope with problems with science and technology, and show an advanced measure of success on this issue, they cannot succeed to have a complete and absolute control over the surrounding nature and universe. A dimension of uncertainty and therefore a threshold of fear and anxiety regarding the unknown future will continue to exist. At the same time, what science hitherto achieved paradoxically manifests the infinity and endlessness of the knowable. In other words, as much as we know, the sphere of the unknown exponentially expands. Religion at his point offers a way out to the majority of the people facing such a dilemma (Atay, 2009:19)

Islam as an ideology indubitably left its mark on the second half of the 20th century. As the last massive social and political transformations in the Arab world prove, it will continue to be a central dynamic in the near future. Yet at the same time, throughout the last 150 years, Islam appeared in different forms and practices. Discussions on Islamism as the political jargon of Islam (Aktay, 2013) will be grounded on the future social and political visions of differing schools, all of which centralized the ideal of sovereignty and dominion of Islam on the entire social and political spheres of life (Türköne, 1988). Thus how muslims interpret state and society will be my ground theme of discussion. Eliaçık (2011) categorizes the political transformational process of contemporary muslims under three phases. Saving the Islamic state (by saving the Ottoman Empire from vanishing) refers to the first stage which started at the end of the 19th century lasted till the abolition of caliphate. Establishing an Islamic state as an urgent need lasting till 1990's, and questioning what it means to have an Islamic state as the third stage. This last stage for Eliaçık still continues with intense debates on

questioning the theoretical and practical reflections of the ideas of so called islamic state and society. It is the period when radicalism turned to realism (Eliaçık, 2011: 311). Bulaç (2005: 50) also makes a similar classification in terms of the interpretations of Islam. He evaluates on the period between Edict of Reforms (1856) and abolition of caliphate (1924) as the first period of Islamism when the overwhelming motivation was to return to Islam and saving it from the colonialists. The period between 1924 and 1950's however is defined as the period of drowsy sleep when almost 80 percent of the Islamic geography was colonized (Bulaç, 2005: 52). The second period for Bulaç starts after 50's up until 2000, central characteristic of which was a founding mission, projections of a new state and society and a comprehensive islamization of life. While Bulaç (Bulaç, 2005: 66) names the first period as Islamism, he refers to the second period as Islamic movement. The third period starting from 2000 is characterized by the concepts of gradual transformative mission, emphasis on individual, pluralist society, and civil initiatives (Bulaç, 2005: 49)

The first period of Islamic struggle failed after the end of the Ottomans and the foundation of the secular Turkish Republic subsequent with the blossoming nation states in the vast geography of erstwhile caliphate. In the second phase, muslims who had never been derogated by the "kuffar" (infidels) at that level since the beginning of Islam, embarked on an urgent need to re-establish Islamic states if not the caliphate. However those muslims became unfamiliar with the practical spheres of politics and managerial mechanisms partly by being excluded and partly due to their own failure to emerge as a negotiating group or party and therefore became unaware of the new emerged mechanisms of global system of nation states. (Aktay, 2013). This period also witnessed and important change for Islamism which was the emergence of tevhidi Islam in 70's. It was the period when Erbakan movement gained influence and revolution in Iran motivated the islamists of Turkey. Beginning with translations particularly from Egypt and Pakistan, the concepts such as ummah, caliphate, Islamic state and Islamic politics turned out to be popular terms of discussion among islamists, and the political ideals of Islam which had been eliminated by the republican revolution re-emerged this time more assertively and this process culminated with a considerable level of intellectual

accumulation until the harsh confrontation with the Kemalist ideology eventually leading to the February 28th memorandum (Çiğdem, 2005:29). Yet Islamism of this period continued to be dichotomist until the end of 90's. Islam for long had been defined on the base of "not"s. Islam was *not* capitalism, nor was it socialism or liberalism. Any contextual explanation or practical solution developed by muslims has always been rejected in the name of protecting the real but hypothetical essence of Islam.

But despite all intellectual refusals which were based on a doctrinal authenticity, there were at the same time divergent living forms of Islam all over the world. These plural, divergent practical forms were studied by many social scientists, sociologist and anthropologists both by muslim and non-muslim circles (Geertz 1968, Gellner 1983, Gilsenan 2000, Mardin 1989). All these studies were declaring one common argument. There was no one single form of Islam, rather there were "Islams" as it was formulated by Al-Zein (1977). Despite the explicit practical diversity, standing on a one sided truth defined by negation is the major characteristics of fundamentalism which is derived by exclusion and strict opposition. (Barr, 1981)

What is that so called original Islam? What are the contemporary practical means and mechanisms of Islamic state, Islamic society, Islamic economy etc.? Is there any room for the other? How can pluralism be reconciled with the Islamic struggle of the truth? How can Islam resolve the tension between civil society and political society? These kinds of questions as Bulaç and Eliaçık discussed, constituted the main points of debates of the third wave Islamism. Similarly Asef Bayat refers to late 90's and the beginnings of 2000's as the period of post-Islamism in the sense that muslims' approach to social and political processes have significantly changed in the last two decades. The third wave Islamist thought or post-Islamism corresponds to the increasing dynamics of fragility in the last ten years of islamist thinking.

> Post Islamism denotes a departure, however varied in degree, from an islamist ideological package characterized by universalism, monopoly of religious truth, exclusivism and obligation. Post islamist movements acknowledge, in other words, ambiguity, multiplicity, inclusion, and compromise in principles and practice.

Whereas Islamism is defined by the fusion of religion and responsibility, post Islamism emphasizes religiosity and rights. (Bayat, 1996: 43-52)

Muslims of the second phase did not seriously deal with these questions. Instead they created a counter alternative discourse against the western modernity albeit equipped with the same mentality of uniformity and universality. This is the reason behind entitling this phase of Islamism as fundamentalism, a term adaptable to any worldview or ideology (Tapper, 1994). The scope and content of the second phase islamist approach to politics and society shares the same intellectual ground with that of the western thought. Although the history of Islamic civilizations bears many schools of thought and sects of uniformity and exclusivity (khawaric, Shia, salafism, wahhabism etc.), western influence of the twentieth century thereto contributed to the emergence of radical Islamism both in theoretical aspects with its philosophical corpus and practical dimensions of political and economic hegemony. It is in other words a bilateral process of internal and external dynamics. According to Gellner (1984: 30) "Islamic fundamentalism as a modern movement carries the characteristics of a strict unitarianism, circumspection, orderliness, scripturalism, and egalitarianism all of which are compatible with the ideological and organizational necessities of an industrialising world". There is also an influential and widespread approach among muslim intellectuals who considers Islamism or contemporary islamist movements as the products of the influence of the western modernism and unavoidably very weak fronts of the Islamic struggle against the enemies of Islam (Gencer, 2009; Kara, 1986).

1.7 Reflections on the Term "Islamist"

Is being islamist different than being muslim? Do communities which are called islamists adopt that term? What kind of meanings do the term Islamism evokes in muslims mind?

What we mean by Islam here is not Islam as a religion, rather it refers to the sum of theoretical and political ideas of a segment of muslims (these are mostly intellectual literati, political bodies or social leaders) who define their identity and reference of

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belonging on the basis of the general parameters of this religion. We can call this a reinterpretation of the social, economic and political conditions of the modern world. Shortly it is possible to give them the name "islamists". (Bulaç, 2005: 50)

Although it is a common acceptance that the term Islamism is used for the first period Islamic revival (Akçura, 2011), Bulaç -as it is mentioned- prefers to use islamic movement instead of Islamism and lists the reasons of it[8]. Muslims of that period in fact had never defined themselves as islamists. One of the questions I asked in my interviews was islamists' reaction to the term, i.e. whether they adopt it or reject it.

Once, they used to call anyone who has Islamic sensitivity as Nurcu.[9] This stemmed from the popularity and influence of Said Nursi and Nurcu movement in those days. Later on they gave muslims different names such as irticacı (retrogressive), dinci (religious fanatic), İrancı (sympathiser of Iranian revolution), Wahhabi (sympathiser of Saudi government). Now they call us "islamists". (Veli, 60)

Veli had worked for government as a civil servant and trade unionist; he then embraced tevhidi thought of Islam[10] and resigned from his public service. In his own terms, those periods of public service were the periods of jahiliya[11]. He has been active in islamic associations and foundations since the beginning periods of the blossoming of Tevhidi Islam. According to him, anyone believing in the social and political claims of Islam was given different and exclusionary names otherwise than muslims. These were actually strategies of the enemies of Islam in order to distort what it meant to be muslim.

We are muslims. Allah himself gave this name to us in the Quran. We don't need any other names under any form of "-ists". But some people insist on giving us different names.

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[8] See Bulaç (2005: 66-67)

[9] Nurculuk:A religious movement beginning in 60s led by Said Nursi

[10] Converted from traditional Islam to real islam (in his own words)

[11] Jahiliyya: an Islamic concept referring to "ignorance of divine guidance" or "the state of ignorance of the guidance from God.

However we insist on calling us muslims and we are determinant to re-establish the real conceptual content of what it means to be muslim. (Veli, 60)

Veli's answer was in fact similar to the common answers of my interviewees. None of my interviewees -except two- embraced this name. As for two interviewees, they only embraced the term due to its function of differentiating their position from the traditional Anatolian Islam.

The meaning of muslim became so ambiguous and distorted that most of the time we are obliged to embrace the term islamist simply because it at least refers to something beyond the obscured term of the muslim. Nevertheless among us we never use the term islamist. We are muslims and our community activities have no purpose other than in some sort to revitalize the theoretical and practical content of being muslims. (Hamza, 40)

Those who call us political islamists are actually the ones who want to reduce islam only to a matter of consciousness between God and the believer devoid of a political agenda/sharia (like Christianity). Isn't Allah saying in the Quran that "...Then do you believe in a part of the Scripture and reject the rest?" Besides, isn't He who says "…And whosoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed, such are the *Kafirun* (disbelievers)[12] (Yücel, 32)

According to Aktay (2013) who defines Islamism as the political jargon of Islam (parallel to Kara 1986, Türköne 2013), many islamists did not need to use the term because of such a connotation. (Aktay, 2013: 125). This in other words stemmed from the conjunctive reasons of the ideas that Islam which incorporates all spheres of life including the political did not need any further definitive terms, and secondly that Islamism which mostly evokes a political ideology inevitably reduces Islam to an ideological project devoid of the hearth, morality, belief and afterlife.

The term islamist resembles a political ideology like Marxism or communism. Though islam is at the same time morality,

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[12] Quran 2:85; 5: 44

decency, worship, servitude to Allah, i.e. islam encompasses all
aspects of our lives. (Ibrahim, 45)

Although this term is highly popular in intellectual spheres, it has always been an
unprepossessing word within community relations. Those who adopted this term were
eventually saying: "We are from those muslims who are called islamists." (Çetin, 45)

CHAPTER II

TEVHIDI (Unitarian) ISLAM

Although it is -to a certain extent- possible to define the communities that I focused on for the scope of my thesis as fundamentalists or radicals, I cannot gloss over the fact that the second wave Islamism diverged in it. My focus has been rather on those who call themselves tevhidi revivalist movements. Throughout the study I frequently heard of the following characteristics comprising the definition. My question of "how do you define your community?" was usually answered on the basis of oneness of Allah in all aspects i.e. "tawhed". They were tevhidi communities -critical to traditional religiosity, - repudiating nationalism or ethnic centered identities, - having a political vision and believing in realizing the idea of Tawhed in all aspects of life whether theological, political or social.

2.1. Opposition to Traditional Religiosity

Opposition to tradition in islamist thinking in fact originates from an old motivation dating back to the very beginning period of islam i.e. the prophet Muhammad's struggle against the traditional beliefs of the Arabs. As Şeriati (2013) puts it, Prophet Muhammad's was a struggle of religion against another religion. The cult of ancestry as a common motivation of societies against the new messages of the prophets was being condemned in the Quran.[13] According to islamists, the Prophets sent by Allah had never struggled with atheism. Atheism in history had always been minority. The people of Mecca were also religious; they had ancient rituals; and they also used to believe in Allah as the supreme deity above all other gods (Şeriati, 2013; Mevdudi,

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[13] Baqarah 170, Lokman 21

2004). Islamists were frequently referring to the Quran (some popular verses such as Luqman 25, Ankabut 61 [14] etc.) in order to vindicate that for a muslim, it was not a matter of preferring to believe in one religion or another, rather it was a matter of tawhed and shirk (polytheism) together with the corresponding repercussions of social, political and economic life. In this sense, the preliminary reading books among islamists are usually the aqaid books (books related to the principles of belief) which reflects the interesting relationship Islamists have with the Turkish society 99 percent of which is considered to be Muslims.

During my visit to repair my car in the workshop of my friend Adnan (27) we were chatting with him and his brother-in-law Mehmet (26). Mehmet was a traditional muslim contrary to tevhidi islamist Adnan. When it came to the subject matter of praying, Mehmet was telling us that he actually had intentions about praying but he was unable to begin and perform regularly. Adnan answered to him in a quite self-assured and calm manner: "Don't begin praying yet. If you begin, you will give up soon again. Before praying, there are some issues of faith to sort out."

Adnan's answer was based on a very common acceptance among islamists. According to Adnan, Mehmet's faith in Islam was probably mixed with some polytheistic beliefs. He was unaware of the principles of faith. Hence there would be no meaning for such a believer to pray.

İsmail Kara (2004) while discussing on the ostensibly paradoxical dimension of Islamist reaction to tradition, he was at the same time shedding light on how islamism positioned itself against modernity.

> Islamism is both discursively and periodically (its weakening relations with the historical past and tradition) modernized/modernist, ideological (generalized, deterministic,

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[14] Luqman /31:25 And if you (O Muhammad) ask them: "Who has created the heavens and the earth," they will certainly say: "Allah." Say: "All the praises and thanks be to Allah!" But most of them know not.

Ankabut/29: 61 If you were to ask them: "Who has created the heavens and the earth and subjected the sun and the moon?" They will surely reply: "Allah." How then are they deviating?

shallow, political) and substantially a secular discourse. With all its derivatives, Islamism itself is the product and a result of modernization" (Kara, 2004: 41)

The relations of islamist idea with tradition is filled with paradoxes. It should be unquestionable that religion above all is a tradition. It is an expanding and deepening tradition dating back to the prophet Muhammad (even to the prophet Adam). After all, no religion, culture or civilization can take shape and survive without tradition. Nevertheless tradition is also a repository of the residues of history, old and desolate cultural forms, constructed customary behaviors, human weaknesses, failures and miseries accumulated. (Kara, 2004: 43-44)

Kara (2004: 44) adds that islamist opposition to tradition is shaped by this second connotation. Regarding the historical tradition of muslim cultures and civilizations, Islamism is more critical than possessive. I will discuss more on this in the chapter of marginality.

2.2.Anti-Nationalism

Opposition to nationalism in fact is one the distinctive characteristics of tevhidi Islamism compared to general Islamic movements in Turkey. There is a common acceptance that Islamic movements in Turkey represented nationalistic dispositions under the influence of nation state identity, and the repercussion of it was the idea of Turkish-islam. (Türkmen, 2013: 145) Bulaç in addition (1995: 63) refers to the ideal of "leadership to the Islamic world" as a manifestation of the influence of nationalist ideas among Islamic groups including islamists. Nationalism being presented as an alternative to the religious identity (Akçura, 2011), became the cement of the new republic and eventually and inevitably been internalized by islamists as well, albeit in a more religious tone (Mert, 2001; Özdalga, 2006). The reason of this re-inclusion of religiosity for Mert (2001) was the failure of the secular version of nationalism to permeate in the society. Islamists' interest in Turkish Islamism rather than Arabian, Persian or Kurdish Islamism stemmed both from the Ottoman heritage (Turkey as the center of the caliphate) (Şengül, 2004: 530), and the lost Arabian lands after the First World War (Çetinsaya, 2004: 420). Islamism and nationalism were always side by side particularly

in the ideas of the influential figures such as Necip Fazıl, Erol Güngör, Nurettin Topçu, İsmet Özel (büyük doğu, mücadele birliği, MTTB etc.).

The foremost influence of Seyyid Qutb and Mevdudi's books was their role in leading the muslims in Turkey to question their nationalist tendencies (Bulaç, 2004: 65) The Qutubian version of Muslim Brotherhood which raised in a highly nationalist country (Egypt) (Verdani, 2011) substantially influenced the muslims in Turkey and directed them to a more universalist (ummah based) jargon. Tevhidi islamists likewise the mainstream islamists believed that any political claim on the base of ethnicity (Kurdish movement in Turkey for instance) contradicted with the universal vision of islam; therefore it was wrong to struggle against the turkism of the republican secularism by using kurdism. Islam was the solution. Although tevhidi islamists were more universalistic than the mainstream Islamism, they were thinking similar on the Kurdish problem. While they were keeping the ummah based motivation vibrant among themselves, except some minor attempts (Mazlumder, Med-zehra Group, Mehmet Metiner, Girişim journal), islamists alike failed to generate daily-political solutions to the Kurdish problem (Pamak, 2005). This attitude for us is the result of the attitude of abstaining from the means of intra-system struggle. Many of my interviewees of 40-50 years age group defined their islamist identity with the ideational change in 70's from Turkish islam to ummah based islam.

> In Mücadele Birliği (Union of Struggle) we were predominantly nationalist conservatives. After we read Seyyid Qutb's *Milestones* we began to re-think on our views of islam. We had realized that islam in this book was different than what we used to believe. May Allah be pleased with him, he had an enormous influence on our awareness of islam. (Fikret, 59)

Hamza (59) coetaneous to Fikret points out a similar ideational transformation: "Seyyid Qutb and Mevdudi's -may Allah be pleased with them- books showed us that we muslims of Turkey were in fact nationalist, sufistic, and statist."

2.3.Islam and Islamism as a Way of Life

In order to differentiate their position almost all islamists utter the phrase "islam is a way of life"[15]. Being muslim means living in accordance with Allah's rules which comprise all aspects of life from social, political and economic. Hence the popular terms in academic literature such as "political islam" or "politization of islam" comes to islamist highly naïve, since politics is considered to be an inseparable part of Islam.

While he was answering to my question of what makes him different than traditional muslims, the textile worker Yücel (33) was mentioning about a similar comprehensiveness:

> People say that they are muslims and claim to be living in accordance with islam. One eats his food with the right hand, goes to the toilet with the left step, starts any activity with reciting bismillah, in short he assumes that he is carrying out his daily routines in accordance with islam. Yet at the same time he does not care about whether his trade, his economic activities, or the inheritance he bequeathed is acceptable by islam. Or he has no idea of what islam says about the governance, the role of state etc. However according to us, the Quran and Sunnah specify all aspects of life including politics, economics, law and family life.

The preliminary parts of the books of aqaid (principles of Islamic belief) begin with the distinction of Tawhed of Rububiyya and Tawhed of Uluhiyya.[16] This is to emphasize that believing in the existence of Allah as a creator also comprises believing and espousing his worldly authority, scope of which is ordained in the scripture.

This study aims at the same time to draw a framework of the scope and prevalence of tevhidi islamists' activities, i.e. in which social spheres they have influence. In this sense, the distinctive characteristics of Islamism compared to tariqa based or traditional communities will in fact reveal the reason behind islamists objection to the very term Islamism.

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[15] "Islam bir hayat tarzıdır"

[16] Imam Tahavi's "Tahavi Akaidi" or Qaradavi's "Tevhidin Hakikati" are two mostly read aqaid books.

The idea that religion ought to extensively penetrate in all aspects of life is not in fact a new idea (Özdalga, 2006: 63). Particularly in islamic history there have been many instances of calling for a return to the Quran and Sunnah due to the deteriorating cultural and contextual influences. As I mentioned above, this aspect of history produced the oppositional stance among islamists against the tradition. It was in a sense a strategy of preserving the scriptural, rational and urban orthodoxy against the cultural, rural and irrational heterodoxy (Özdalga, 2006: 65).

The belief that islam calls for a disparate life indispensably caused a cynical/neglective attitude -if not a repudiation- against the established political, administrative and social institutions. This kind of cynicism of islamists can easily be seen particularly in grassroots communities. Although most of the adherents of those communities are from lower class segments (petty craftsmen, and workers) they also ideationally abstain from working for government (bureaucratic cadres, being civil servant etc.). Assignment in governmental positions, for them, unavoidably causes wrong attitudes in islam (approving the democratic mechanisms, performing anti-religious ceremonies mostly related with Atatürk). This mode of thinking for Aktay (Aktay, 2010: 54-60) vibrantly motivated islamists to keep off from intra-system means of struggle. Together with the reluctance of the republican regimes on leaving room for Islamic opposition, this bilateral process nurtured isolation and radicalization of Islamism in Turkey (Özdalga, 1999).

According to Tocqueville the bloody, violent and bitter character of the French Revolution stemmed from to the lack of free associations, experienced organized political parties, political classes and communities. (Tocqueville, 1995: 257)

> In such an atmosphere, it was philosophies who directed the public opinion. They opted for comprehensive abstractions which caused neglecting of the social realities. Eventually all institutions were collapsed regardless of the need for distinguishing the ones to be opposed from the ones not to be. Besides, they didn't actively lead the revolution and they left the leadership of the masses to the most ignorant and rigid ones. (Tocqueville, 1995: 261)

Bulaç (1995: 60) in a similar way claims that "since islamists much rather engaged in intellectual and abstract endeavors, they couldn't generate policies and practices corresponding to the realities of life." These abstract endeavors were signifying islamists' cynicism of the social and political practicalities. In other words, just as the "teacher" -compared to the "imam"- failed to penetrate into the social,[17] the islamists also did fail.

2.4.Main Postulates of Tevhidi Islam

Despite the internal ideational differences and variants (Verdani, 2011; Ahmad, 2009), movements such as Muslim brotherhood in Egypt and Jamaat el Islami in Pakistan were understood by the Turkish muslims in a homogenous framework, particularly with the personal influence of Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi. What I call Tevhidi islam was the product of these two influential figures. By scanning the main popular books they read, I have generated a framework regarding the main aspects of tevhidi islamist thought:

- Allah is not only an "ilah" (deity, creator) but also a Rabb (arbiter, lord). Rabb means that He has the utmost authority over how His slaves should live.

I had mentioned above that islamists' preliminary books are aqaid books. Together with them, they read theoretical books which contribute to construct the Islamic identity and consciousness particularly in terms of appropriately interrelating Islamic paradigm with the modern concepts, ideologies and institutions. Hence the peculiar emphasis on the distinction between tawhed of uluhiyya and tawhed of rububiyya stems from the critical reaction towards the traditional religiosity of the mass majority of the people in Turkey who believe in Allah as a creator, but live in accordance with the internalized traditions, customs and established secular law.

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[17] Şerif Mardin, Ne demek İstedim: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bemTW-_CrOI

• A life which is not shaped by Allah's commandments is a jahili (ignorant)[18] life. Such a society is a jahili society. State and governance are again jahili systems. Jahiliya in other words is not a historical period referring to pre-islamic Mecca, it is rather a conceptual apparatus referring to a societal typology. Jahiliya (ignorance) for an islamists does not denote to being illiterate or uneducated. Seyyid Qutb defines the jahiliya society as follows:

> A society which does not depend on being slaves to Allah without any partnership, -whether in terms of belief and mode of thought, social and individual practices, or in legislatory dimensions-, it is a jahili society. (Qutb, 1980: 59-60)

Distinctive from the western capitalism and socialism Islam has a unique and genuine model for social and political system, Allah is not only a creator but also an arbiter on human life. Humanity should follow Allah's orders and laws instead of human made secular laws.

• Ideologies of communism, socialism, democracy and liberalism are all human made ideologies and rejecting them is a necessity of faith whereas approving them is an attitude of polytheism.

• Quran not only mentions about the daily rituals and purification of the soul, but also about the politics, inheritance, war, international relations, economics etc. His social and political orders and prohibitions are to be obeyed without any exceptions regarding time and context. Due to approving another authority against Allah's will, denying his sovereignty on politics and law would mean polytheism.

• In order to create an Islamic state and society, muslims should ideologically reject all living systems of polytheism and practically disintegrate from them and create an oppositional power via educational programs to the people of the ignorance which would eventually lead to a social revolution from

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[18] The concept of jahiliyya is a contribution of Sayyid Kutub to the modern Islamic jargon.

bottom to top. These educational programs consist of reading certain books, discussion of them in sohbet sessions and thence constructing the real Islamic identity. This conscious muslim will believe in Allah both as a creator and as a source of worldly authority; and will be an activist of Islamic struggle.

The most appealing aspects of such an Islamic view to Turkish muslims were its original and authentic jargon instead of semi nationalist semi classical traditionalist Islamic jargon of the time and its power in defending islam via a highly intellectual level of discourse compared to Turkish islam. Furthermore the Islamic revival in 60's and 70's mostly having a political tone pioneered by influential literati such as Necip Fazıl, Sezai Karakoç, Nureddin Topçu and attempts of some muslim scholars such as İsmail Hatip Erzen in Malatya whose aim were to purify religion from cultural and traditional additions were two important factors paved the way for Egyptian and Pakistani influence (Yıldız 2010). Islam was spreading in Turkey through the translations mainly from these two regions and nationalist islam was transforming into a more ummah based[19] form and Islamic discourse gained an oppositional political pretention.

Muslims who organized and participated to the symposium of "Hassan El Benna and The Muslim Brotherhood" held in 5th and 6th days of May in 2012 can be viewed as the main focus group of my thesis. Unusually (contrary to their other organizations), there had been very large scale participation of many communities and NGO's. That unusual crowd of people coming from many parts of Turkey stemmed from the sensitivity towards the founder of the community of Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Banna. It can easily be said that if there is a name whose umbrella would embrace all islamists not only in Turkey but also worldwide, that would unquestionably be Hasan al-Banna. Islamists of Turkey had demonstrated a large scale interest to the symposium despite their separatist and fragmentary mood against each other. Nevertheless that gathering wouldn't itself be a remedy for the communicational problems among islamists. Despite that huge crowd, it was easy to feel in the ambience the disunity

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[19] Brotherhood of all muslims in the world

between the hearts of muslims, let alone the conflict and tension with the secular or non-muslim "others". Self-confidence and subjectivity were creating small conflicting parties among each group. This psychological mood was in fact springing from the feeling of disdain towards the jahili (ignorant) masses. The panorama of those muslims was more like formal, impersonal, goal and interest oriented secondary group relations of a society, rather than face-to-face, emotional and sincere personal relationships of a community. Islamic communities in other words were unconsciously modernized, rationalized and disenchanted.

One of my interviewee Çetin (45) who has a 30 years experience in Islamic movements told me that only in Ankara there were over fifty islamist groups and NGO's which can be considered as tevhidi groups. The striking point is the discrepancy between the simplicity of the discourse and the multiplicity of the fragmented communities disseminating their message through the same books, on the light of the arguments of the same scholars, while conducting the same programs and activities. I aimed to understand in this study, how such a simplex and plain thought could create such sectarianism. I will be questioning whether this fragmentation is the outcome of a practical necessity of the diversity of locations or an exclusionary disjunction hindering fraternal communication.

2.5.Sheikh is dead

The distinctive characteristics, even sine qua non conditions of traditional or tariqa based communities are mysticism and charismatic leadership (Eraydın 2008: 89) Charisma and myth are two inextricable dynamics for the continuation of traditional communities. These two factors created strong and prevalent communities and cults many of which are hundreds of years old. The followers of several tariqas and particularly Nakşi community[20] under many different denominations have widespread influence in Turkish society. (Çakır, 2002)

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[20] Nakşilik: A major spiritual order of Sunni Islam Sufism. It is the only Sufi way that traces its spiritual lineage to the Islamic prophet Muhammad, through Abu Bakr, the first Caliph and Muhammad's companion. Some Naqshbandi orders trace their lineage through Ali, Muhammad's cousin, son-in-law and the fourth Caliph, in keeping with most other Sufi path.

I participated to a conference in Istanbul given by a former sheikh now a rationalist islamist Ferid Aydın whose talk was about the real faces of so called tariqas widespread in Anatolia. He was telling at the conference that he himself had been abandoned by his own disciples by attributing esoteric explanations on his refusal of the unislamic beliefs and practices in the tariqa. For an ideal typical islamist, tariqa based groups or traditional communities ascribe fabricated attributes to their leaders and adorn a religion of islam with mystical or esoteric additions by which masses of ignorant people are embraced.

Blind obedience is commonly seen as a predominant characteristic of religiosity. Such obedience is mostly acquired with the means of "wisdom" and extraordinary attributions mostly to the leaders of communities. Tevhidi Islam however strictly opposes this idea. Islamist youth are taught not to obey blindly what the leaders or others say on religious matters without grounding on the Quran and Sunnah. This ethics of criticism centralized the rationally of the believing subject. There is even a funnies told among islamists regarding the excessive questioning of the elders:

> A young tevhidi muslim goes to Afghanistan for jihad. His commander in the combat zone tells them that there will soon be an assault from the Russians, so he commands them to pack up and hide. Our tevhidi's answer while sitting still is as such: what is your evidence? (Hüseyin 50)

The believing subject's being rational and critical i.e. the coexistence of faith and reason does not correspond to the classical dichotomist approach. Yet in the case of tevhidi islamists, it is necessary to think beyond the constructed dichotomies. The ground in which unites belief and reason is constructed by the islamists relationship with the Quran- sunnah and other sources of truth. Accordingly, first of all, based on the Quranic order (Ahzab 36th verse) islamists believe in the submission only to Allah and his messenger.

> It is not for a believing man or a believing woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, that they should [thereafter] have any choice about their affair. And whoever

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disobeys Allah and His Messenger has certainly strayed into clear error. (Quran, 33:36)

Secondly, with respect to the authority of what prophet said out of the Quran, islamists believe that his authority is conditional rather than absolute. According to a widely known narration, when prophet delivered an opinion, the companions of the prophet used to ask him whether it was the will of Allah (revelation) or his own personal opinion. If it was from Allah, then there would be no question, but if it was prophet's personal idea, then they would express their opinions and critics. (Hamidullah, 2009; Vatandaş, 2010)

There is no other absolute, unquestionable authority for an islamist except Allah and his messenger (partly conditional). As a natural consequence of such an ethics of criticism they don't have any charismatic leaders mostly seen in other communities, or they do not have any esoteric references.

Hegel in his philosophy of history interprets the trajectory of the consciousness of freedom under three phases: one is free in Orientals, some are free in Greeks and all men are free in Prussian Germany (1953). Although being critical and rational are amongst the main characteristics of tevhidi Islamism, reflection of this attitude as customary community behaviour seems to have stayed at the second level of what Hegel pointed out (some); and the critical dynamism of the 70's is reduced to some peculiar muslims (mostly the leaders). We will further discuss the problems among islamists in the following chapters. For the moment we will touch upon an interesting power mechanism functioning among islamists.

> When it is not preferred to answer a critique, a commentary or an objection, and rather preferred to slur over; silence is the solution. Silence and then keeping up, just as if nothing was said. (ömer 30)

Sometimes, a saying of Prophet Muhammad is used against those critical figures:

> What I have forbidden you, stay away from. What I have ordered you [to do], do as much of it as you can. Verily, the people before you were destroyed only because of their

excessive questioning and their disagreeing with their Prophets."
(Bukharî, İ'tisâm 2; Muslim, Hac 412, Fezâil 130-131)

Nevertheless this silence doesn't stem from secrecy, sanctity or a religious dogmatism. It rather originates from the lack of the critical approach, i.e. assuming to being at the center of the truth. In other words, issues which are not within the scope of a community's agenda are simply slurred over.

> On the one hand, we claim to be in the process of tevhidi awakening, i.e. continuing to learn islam, to comprehend the essence of the religion, and widen our perspectives; we claim that we do not recognize any authority (sheikhs, gurus, mentors etc.) over the essence of religion except Allah; yet on the other hand the leaders of the communities try to behave like unquestionable autocratic sheiks, and expect the members of the communities –most of whom are university students- to behave like mürids (disciples). (Hamza, 59)

As far as I can see, the practical repercussions of the tension between believing and reasoning are sometimes conflicting. Nevertheless the results of the thesis - particularly with respect to the focus on different generational categories- showed that islamist thought still possesses a fairly vibrant motivation of critique and deliberation. At the same time, religiosity in which doubt undermines faith, and critique fosters doubt, continues to be the dilemma of islamists which is difficult to get through yet.

> Formerly I was ignorant and I used to believe that sheiks and hodjas perfectly know the religion. I even used to respect anyone walking on the streets dressed in gown and turban (cübbe and sarık). I was abstaining from talking about novel ideas in order to preserve what I got accustomed to. Religion was a matter of faith rather than reason (smiling). (Abdülkadir, 40)

By sharing his religious background with me, Abdulkadir was trying to show his present thought as the opposite. When I asked him his ideas about the muslim intellectuals such as İhsan Eliaçık and Fazlurrahman[21], he said that they were modernist, and apologetic against the west and socialist left. He added that they became heretics due to their unusual ideas. When I responded that his approach was exclusionary in the

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[21] These figures are mostly considered as controversial

sense that he was rejecting anyone who is out of the scope of his view of islam; his answer was a bit furious:

> Ok then let's be open to different ideas and interpretations; but there are some unquestionable principles of the religion aren't they? If we take anyone seriously whose only motivation is to strive to say novel things contrary to what our past ulema (scholars) unitedly said; believe me that nothing will be left as authentic religion. (Abdulkadir, 40)

While I was trying to respond to him, he cut in and added:

> The most inclusive religion is Hinduism. I don't know how many thousands of gods and complex rituals they have. The only reason of this is their inclusive behaviour throughout the history. They incorporated almost all gods and rituals of the world cultures into Hindu religion. If we take all claims seriously without taking the principles into consideration, we will turn into Hinduism.

When I asked him his ideas about the theoretical limits of discussions about islam, his answer was quite the same as the majority of muslims utter:

> The source of truth for us is neither sheiks nor hodjas (hazretler, şeyhler, hocaefendiler). The only criteria for us are Quran and Sunnah. Hence, anything can be discussed, but on the condition of being in accord with the Quran and Sunnah.

By referring to Quran and Sunnah, Abdulkadir actually had said nothing to me. Since all communities -including the traditional ones- repeat the same argument, they determine the practical scope of these sources in accordance with their own specific perspectives. The responsibility of the researcher at this point consists of following the discourse and practice in order to understand what kind of Quran and Sunnah are referred.

In 2011, together with our brothers at the university, we used to weekly gather at an association and we were discussing on our readings about islam. We had decided on a list of readings and we were following the books and articles in the list. One day a friend of one of our brothers participated to our session. At the end of the session we had noticed that that new brother's daze and exemplary eyes gazed at us. Later on we asked

our brother about the guest's opinion. We learned that our guest was a member of a tariqah and he had considered our discussions as meaningless and futile. We were big talking and making religion more complicated. He also had an advice for us "The sheikh of those who don't recognize a sheikh is satan."[22]

2.6. Islamists against Dialog?

The critical importance of this tevhidi view of islam is its envisioning of Islamic governance which would apply Quranic rules and laws whether by consent or enforcement; and in order to attain that goal, Islamic movements would create an oppositional front by disintegrating from the ignorant (jahili) society by all means and having no relationship or dialog with it. Any dialog or negotiation would firstly mean to legitimize it and secondly opens room for making concessions. This ideology of strict opposition influenced islamists' attitude not only towards the political system in Turkey, but also to the secular segments of society and even towards the muslim majority people and other islamist groups. Oppositional islam on the one hand caused social disintegration and polarization by creating introversive communities; on the other hand it turned into an ideological apparatus of exclusion within the communities themselves.

There are many Quranic references emphasizing on unity[23]. Throughout the interviews I tried to question the principles of islam and contradictory reality of muslims and their justifications on that.

While the implementation of the rules and the principles of islam in all spheres of social, political and economic life are essential for an islamist[24], the question here is how? Under what circumstances, and to whom Islamic law will be accountable. What is the role of the state i.e. the coercive authority? Does coercive power has the authority to

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[22] "Şeyhi olmayanın şeyhi şeytandır"

[23] Surahs in the Quran: 3: 104-105, 8: 46

[24] According to Bulaç, Erkilet and Aktay it is essential for a muslim, i.e. every muslim is indispensably an islamist

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implement whatever ordained in the Quran or Hadith literature and coercively forbid whatever is forbidden in them? Then what will be the meaning of self-trial of a believer? Is the responsibility of the government to create a hypocrite society[25] (Hakan: 28) in the name of public good? Or is there a boundary between governmental and personal responsibilities? In many verses of the Quran praying and obligatory alms are mentioned together[26] which have usually been interpreted as the two inseparable principles of islam. Is it possible then to argue that both obligations have to be under the governmental regulation and control?

There are differing schools of thought regarding the role of state power in implementing the Islamic law (sharia) (Eliaçık, 2010). In the classical age of islam the major idea was in parallel with a totalitarian government which interfered all spheres of life. There have been scholars such as ibni teymiye, ibn Cemaa and Ghazali and following this line of thought contemporary scholars such as Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, Khomeini and Mutahhari have been the representatives of an omnipresent government involving all spheres of life. According to that model of state, commands and prohibitions of Islam appealing to both private and public were under the coercive responsibility of the government. Praying for instance was under the governmental control and a muslim who did not pray was to be punished. On the other side, the school of Mutazilah and our contemporaries such as Turabi, Gannushi and Hasan Hanefi leave little room for governmental intervention limited only to the general crimes and responsibilities -such as stealing, murder, corruption etc.- accepted by all civilizations. Although still they all believe in the universality and incumbency of Quranic orders and prohibitions, they differentiate public and private responsibilities and do not attribute all what is good or bad to governmental sanctions. As expected, islamism in Turkey is the supporter of a plenipotentiary government which unquestionably creates and sustains the fears of secular segments of society.

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[25] Forcing to perform worship without will and faithfulness

[26] Quranic verses: 2/:43, 83, 110, 277, 4/ : 77, 162, 5/: 12,55 etc

Nevertheless the more this holistic view of islam create opportunities for itself in practical spheres, the less it holds its previous claims. In other words, living together with the other inevitably melts the icy principles and a more moderate worldview outweighs in both sides whether secular or religious. When muslims who had intellectually internalized the ideal model of Islamic life realize that they are living in a vast diverse society, then they review and revise their previous ideals and expectations. Hence we are frequently hearing of complains as such: "the islamist of yesterday turned into a devoted supporter and member of the polytheist political system." This transformation can be seen on the one hand as a result of the failure of the personal responsibility, on the other hand a result of the neglection of the social and historical reality, manifestation of which is a very shallow view of islam expected to triumph overnight with a hundred percent devoted muslim population.

It should be admitted that islamists do not seem to be contended with the terms of pluralism and pluralistic society. The overwhelming orientalist literature on islam however revolves around the lack of the creation of distinct opposing classes and a common unifying culture. According to Aktay (2013) it is not a weakness but on the contrary a strong point for muslim societies.

> It is well known that Muslims never tried to homogenize the communities they built in the Middle East and the Balkans. Furthermore, in Orientalist literature this Muslim characteristic has been described as a "weakness" of Islam in creating a common culture. However, "the common culture" that the West was quite successful in creating required intense social violence and religious and ethnic cleansing. It is a positive aspect of muslim society that it attached considerable importance to standing against impositions to the extent that it chose not to interfere with individual cultural communities – a practice that maintained Islamic civilization as a "mosaic society". (Aktay, 2013: 121)

Aktay's claim is a commonly shared idea among islamists. Yet discussing on the validity of this claim is out of the scope of this thesis. In order to carry out a competent elaboration, it is preliminarily necessary first to appeal to those influenced cultures and religions, rather than the influencers. The reason I touched upon Aktay's idea is to

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question how islamists who believe to be perfectly tolerant and respectful to other world-views, cultures and religions, can construct their current religious identities on the basis of uniformity and exclusion by leaving no room for the other.

While we were in Hasan El-benna symposium, Ekrem (38) and I were discussing at the hall about sharia, Islamic state and historicism. Ekrem was an admirer of Iranian scholar Ali Şeriati and İranian revolution and he was highly critical about contemporary muslims' relationship with political and economic power. In an accustomed jargon among muslims, he was an uncompromising follower of sharia (şeriatçı) and pretty much reactive to the modernist or historicist interpretations of islam. While we were discussing on the relationship of the Islamic ideal of state and society with coercive power, he defended that after all it was a matter of conflict in which the powerful reigns. And he supported his idea of conflict with a popular phrase believed to be a saying of the prophet: "Allah disciplines those with the sultan who do not discipline themselves with the Quran."[27]

Why muslims hate pluralism in modern times? There is a widespread argument which relates contemporary islamism with western modernism and claims that islamist movements are highly modern in theoretical discourse and practical content. (Gencer 2009, Kara 1986) Leaving aside the detailed discussions, it can shortly be said that if islamism is a modern phenomenon, it is modern not only for its emphasis on rationality but also on uniformity. A one dimensional worldview was transformed into the domination of one school of thought (ahlal sunnah) among many different interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah. Moreover, the idea of Tawhed (oneness of Allah) is related to one uniform model of state and society in which pluralism is considered to be polytheism. In other words islamists still consider pluralistic societies as polytheist societies where any belief, any form of behaviour, any moral, religious view is acceptable, i.e. where anything goes. In pre-Islamic Mecca, it used to be allowed to worship any deity and commit any sins. Revelation preaches only what is moral and

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[27] "Allah, Kuran'la düzelmeyeni Sultanla düzeltir!"

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true before God and to annihilate the others. Islamic law for these muslims should be implemented in all spheres of life except some minor freedom given to other faiths.

2.7. What Happens in an Islamist Community

Throughout the study, the relations of secession and fragmentation among islamist communities are addressed. I discussed these issues mostly on the basis of the experiences obtained through events, programs, sohbet sessions, i.e. from the general activities of islamists. Yet the content and scope of these activities are not explicated in detail. This part consists of drawing a general framework of tevhidi islamic activism for those who are unfamiliar with these social spaces.

Seyyid Qutb in Milestones (2006: 116) says:

> When the number of Believers reaches three, then this faith tells them; "Now you are a community, a distinct Islamic community, distinct from that Jahili society which does not live according to this belief or accept its basic premise." Now the Islamic society has come into existence (actually).

> These three individuals increase to ten, the ten to a hundred, the hundred to a thousand, and the thousand increases to twelve thousand - and the Islamic society grows and becomes established.

> Let there arise out of you a group of people inviting to all that is good (Islam), enjoining *Al-Ma'ruf* (i.e. Islamic Monotheism and all that Islam orders one to do) and forbidding *Al-Munkar* (polytheism and disbelief and all that Islam has forbidden). And it is they who are the successful (Quran 3:104)

To be a muslim for an islamist, is to take action. The action begins with at least three believers devoted to the same ideology. When I listened to the beginning stories of the emergence of large or small communities, I came across similar experiences. In this way, islamists carry out activities in organizational hierarchy and distribution of duties in their neighborhood.

The goals are clear: Above all, striving to live and die as muslims. Conveying the islamic message to others in the family, neighborhood and hypothetically anyone possible in the world and establishing a state and society based on Sharia (islamic law).

Places: Periodical meetings at homes, student houses, dormitories, and apartments of NGO's are the most common used places for islamic activities.

Activities: Since the primary objective is to construct the muslim identity and then to reflect that theory to practice first withing the self consciousness, and then in all aspects of life; the most peculiar activity of islamists is reading, and discussion sessions on the readings. The primary reading is certainly the Quran, whether by learning to read the arabic text, memorizing the verses or contemplating on the translation and hermeneutic interpretation (tefsir) of it. Secondly they read the hadith books and hence try to internalize the essence of the revelation in the heart and consciousness.

Apart from these these two primary sources, they create reading groups based on multiple disciplines commonly from history (islamic history, history of civilizations, turkish republican history and the history of the western thought), literature (reading novels and discussion sessions on them), and political science. The more knowledgeables are assigned as moderators. Additionally supplementary courses which are given to middle and high school students are among the educational activities of islamists..

Since they don't have any peculiar rituals or worship ceremonies which are mostly common in tariqa based groups; they only perform prayer as a congregational ritual.

The daily routines of the islamists are expected to be shaped by the principles of islam. For instance, paying attention to perform daily prayers regularly, not being involved in unislamic attitudes in commercial or business life particularly abstaining from interest, striving to call friends from school and colleagues to the activities of the community, hence providing them in this way to be acquainted with islamic concerns.

Islamist activism therefore is fairly similar to the activities of an ordinary educational or cultural association. Picnics, trip organizations, kermesses, sport activities (mostly of football and ping-pong), public conferences or specific private sohbet programs are among those. What makes them peculiar is the prevailing jargon and content. One of the salient characteristic related to jargon is their avoidance of slang words and attaching importance to particular attitudes of kindness and courtesy corresponding to the requirements of muslim morality (dissemination of selam (greeting), visiting each other, using the word "inşallah" when making a promise[28], watching out the separation of men and women in the activities etc.

In political aspects, islamists strive to be sensitive on the issues appertaining to muslims. Organizing meetings and protest activities and constructing political sensitivity through books and journals. Islamists' most frequent political protest activities comprise their concern for Palestine, Iraq and lately Syria. All meetings and protests without exception have been non-violent by keeping the legal demonstration laws. As an outcome of the nature of discourse, islamist literature filling the books and journals is predominantly political. Military coups, crude secularization and elimination of islam from social and political spheres and oppressive policies of the government are among the main topics of discussion in the journals.

In economic aspects, islamists support the humanitarian relief organizations such as IHH and Deniz Feneri[29]. It is difficult to vindicate that islamists' approach to economic relations are geniunelly different than the ordinary perceptions in Turkish society. Apart from particular exceptions [30] islamists live in accordance with the settled

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[28] This word "inşallah" refers to a distinguishing nuance of jargon. It is commonly understood among people as an indicator of omittance or negligence. If someone isnot really intended to do something, in order to brush off he uses the word "insallah" as a pseudo promise. Among islamists however it refers to a strong commitment albeit only referring to the will of Allah over the wills of humans.

[29] Due to the late judicial operations on Deniz Feneri, islamists' support to the organization relatively diminished.

[30] There are many examples of decent lives of rich Islamists many of whom are not still known not because of their secret accumulation of wealth, but on the contrary because of their humility and generosity.

social and economic standards they belong to. There is however, an increasing internal discussion on muslims' relationship with wealth and material possessions. Late discussions on islamists' changing approach to political and economic processes will be discussed in more detail in the chapters of marginality, democracy and system of jahiliya.

The relations of secession and fragmentation mostly stem from the scope, content and the emphasizing message on the activities in question and issues on whom to be responsible in which area. While in some communities for instance, readings on the Quran, hadith or Quranic interpretation are predominant, others may much rather focus on the readings on social sciences such as western thought, history, philosophy. The scope, content and the qualities of the activities carried out vary parallel to the intellectual and commitment level of each community.

2.8. Community and NGO

Opposition to/of the Regime

Islamic communities that reorganized underground throughout the republican history would finally be integrated into political sphere after 1950s. A significant change was their transformation into NGOs, especially after 1980s. Until that period of time, their activities were under strict governmental control in the name of protecting laicism. According to Özdalga (1999), such a policy itself hindered to create a democratic pluralistic society in Turkey, and this obstacle was created by Turkish government itself. Nevertheless, the Islamic communities became much stronger and well-organized than before, especially after the political victory of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). Consequently, the governmental opposition towards organized religiosity had its peak in February 28 Memorandum. Today, especially with the support of the AKP party, a much stronger and widespread process of Islamisation in all spheres of society from political to economic sphere and cultural life can be observed. Opposition of Tevhidi Muslims towards the Milli Görüş or AKP Party, and more generally in Political arena, will be discussed in the following chapters.

The legitimate existence of Tevhidi Islamic communities in public sphere as NGOs goes back to late '80s and early '90s. During my interviews with the former members of these communities they stressed out the same period of time for NGO'ization process.

> Previously, we had usually gathered and done our activities in our bookstores. In the late '80s and early '90s, brothers thinking like us respectively began to found associations, foundations and think-tanks (Veli, 60)

In fact, the meaning ascribed to the State and the relationship with the Regime as sum of state mechanisms, had primarily great impact on the Tevhidi Islamists' embrace of the public sphere in '90s after 20 years delay.

According to Roy (1996, 2007, 2012) Islamists radicalize more by being kept out of the regime, and thence the clash between secularism and fundamentalism constantly reproduces.Therefore as a solution, Roy thinks that Islamism which does not provide a distinctive political and economic model, can be absorbed into the system by being integrated into the Regime (allowing them to participate to the democratic representation mechanisms) rather than being excluded (1996: 87, 120, 2007: 44, 64). With his work conducted in Sultanbeyli, Tuğal (2010) also carries the assertion that Islamic opposition, by integrating with political and economic apparatus, is gradually absorbed in liberal economy and secular regime. Considering the Tevhidi Islamist communities, it can asserted that the established opposition to the state and regime continues to a certain degree in spite of noticeable fractions and transitions. The crucial point concerning us here is to discuss how Islamists perceive the distinction between communities and NGOs. This is much rather related with the discussions on intra- or off-system struggle and will be discussed in the following chapters.

In a family visit, I was arguing with Ersin (30), a member of a local community in İstanbul, over the matter of voting. According to him, if one wants to carry a political party campaign, s/he would primarily have to approve the current democratic/secular system and its political mechanisms. Yet this was certainly unacceptable in Islam. The second crucial obstacle was the pledge of allegiance to the fundamental principles of the

republic -such as laicism, Atatürk's principles and revolutions- in the National Assembly (TBMM) after being elected to the Parliament which clearly meant concession from the Islamic principles and forgoing the dawah (Islamic struggle). Furthermore, far beyond the compromise this was frequently considered as the line between belief and blasphemy. Accordingly, it was not permissible to carry on an Islamic dawah through the means of political parties.

> As you know, if this revelation is Divine (a message coming from Allah), the methods of struggle for the sake of this revelation is Divine as well. You cannot fight for Islam through illicit methods. By the tribal rulers of his time, the Prophet Muhammad was offered all kinds of political and economic power on condition that he would give up his dawah, yet he said: "By Allah, if even you put the sun in my right hand and the moon in my left, I will not renounce Allah's message." Besides, the Prophet Muhammad did not conceal the message of dawah even though he was very aware of difficulties that he would have gone through.

Ersin, then, referred to Sayyid Qutb's interpretation -which is often repeated among Islamist- in order to explain the divine nature of the method of the Islamic movement:

> It can therefore be said that Prophet Muhammad was capable of kindling among his compatriots the fire of Arab nationalism and would thus have united them. They would have responded gladly to this call for they were weary of continual tribal warfare and blood feuds. He would then have been able to free the Arab lands from the domination of Roman and Persian imperialism and would have been able to establish a united Arab state.

> It can be said that if the Prophet Muhammad had called people in this way, instead of bearing tortures for thirteen years due to the opposition of the people in authority in the peninsula, the whole of Arabia would have accepted it.

> It can be said that if Arabia had thus been united under his leadership and the authority had once devolved into his hands, he could have used all this to make them accept the belief in the Unity of Allah, for which purpose he was sent, and to bring people to submit to their Lord after they had submitted to his own human authority.

> But the All-Knowing and All-Wise Allah did not lead His Prophet on this course. He led him to declare openly that 'There is no deity worthy of worship but Allah' and to bear patiently, with his few companions, whatever trials came to them. (Qutb, 2006: 39-40)

According to Arslantaş (2012), Ercüment Özkan, a well-known Islamist in Turkey, had an aim to establish a party but then changed his mind. The obstacles were the principles in the Constitution and the oath ceremony in the National Assembly that makes Islamic struggle impossible.

> If they said the 141, 142, and 163rd articles from the constitution as well as the text of oath would be removed, there would have been no barrier to be a PM for Ercüment Özkan. (Arslantaş, 2012: 289)

Arslantaş explicates the Islamists' sensitivity about the method of Islamic movement as follows:

> The common tradition of the prophets is to be principled not to be successful. And among prophets sent so far, there are few who are successful. However, there is none who is unprincipled. (Arslantaş, 2012: 289)

In this sense, Gülen Movement[31] under the leadership of Fethullah Gülen is the most criticized community for it is blamed on making concessions even on the main pillars of Islam (not-performing prayers, drinking alcohol, letting women take their headscarves off or marrying with secular women and etc.) in order to gain power in key positions of the state such as military, economics, politics and education. In other words, Gülen Movement finds itself in the lime of fire in terms of the issues of concession or Divine method.

> By the ceaseless utterance of the word precaution (tedbir), they did not leave anything peculiar to islam. Although Allah the Almighty says, "You just do whatever your duty is; the result belongs to Allah", these guys justify every method to gain their goals as if they do not have true trust in Allah. (Ersin 30)

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[31] Gülen Movement is one of the groups (albeit the most powerful one) of Nurcu movement in Turkey.

Party politics, according to Ersin, both practically and discursively undermines faith. That time, I asked about the situation of Ahmed Davutoğlu, former chief adviser who became the minister of foreign affairs vowing in TBMM. Davutoğlu was a credited and respected person among Islamists; but when he began to engage in political issues actively, his credibility became a matter of debate. Referring to another influential figure Ahmet Ağırakça, Ersin mentioned that Davutoglu was different and could therefore be trusted. However; when I recalled him the vow he made in the National Assembly, we realized that we were at the point of a critical predicament lately being confronted frequently (participations of the former islamists to the AKP or Has Party).

Among the Islamists in the course of time, significant moderation in thought emerged, bringing new approaches to polytheist government, intra-system struggle and legitimate-illegitimate means of struggle to the agenda. The extent of this intellectual transformation will be further discussed in the following parts of the study.

Islamists' approach towards the nation state as a holistic and omnipotent structure and its mechanisms comprised the ideological justifications on why Islamists' presence took so long to show up in the public sphere. Fear of state control and surveillance in that period of time was also another significant factor lied behind this delay. Burhan (30), who used to be a young and active member of an Islamist community in '90s, exemplifies the importance of secrecy and security with his own experiences:

> Hizbullah Movement, infiltrated by the shadow government, in eastern Anatolia had been used against PKK (Kurdistan Labour Party): it had merely become a useful apparatus to kill leftist-Kurds by the Islamist-kurds. At that time, our leader was warning us to come carefully -one by one- to the house we used to gather for sohbet, and not to walk arrestingly together in the streets. They also wanted us to cover our books under our jumper or trousers. We were hearing of Hizbullah operations in mass media, and the state was condemning any religious activity –even reading the Quran as a group- as retrogressive activity (irticai eylem). Moreover, we were instructed to say "we are just reciting Quran for our newly dead brother or for the deceased in general" in the face of police raid.

In those times, Islamists continued their sohbets, reading groups and educational activities in the strictest confidence, and associated this with the secret phase of Dawah[32]. Contemporary political and social circumstances made impossible to conduct their activities in public. Therefore, it was always dangerous to appear transparently in the public sphere. However, Islamists had gradually tempted to come out from bookstores to associations, foundations and think-tanks. Both opposition to the regime and opposition of the regime were two rationales behind the fluctuations of that period.

As a member of an institution which was one of the early examples having the experience of NGO'ization among Islamist communities, Fikret (59) explains the Islamists' approach on establishing NGOs, transparency, publicity, and institutionalization in those and subsequent years:

> We had already founded our association, and we aimed to organize common activities, which would be interested to the other Muslims as well. Some (brothers) reacted as: "We cannot call people to islam under the roof of an institution of the Tağuti (non-Islamic) state." We still continued our activities; then these brothers who had labelled us as an institution of the regime, one by one established associations and foundations in time.

However, the appearance of Islamism in public sphere and their legitimacy claims had already begun much earlier with the specific demands such as of sending their daughters to school with headscarves, demanding islamic education that would meet their cultural and religious necessities (schools of Quran), and represent Islamic ideology in political arena and etc. (Kepel, 1997). Yet, on the other hand, I can say that Islamist communities already had these demands as an indispensable result of their struggles. Throughout the study I didn't focus too much on the distinction between community and NGO for this dichotomy is mostly attributed to the Church-and-state, reflecting NGOs as part of the state and public sphere, whereas communities as out of the regime and politics. This western distinction is not valid for Islamic communities

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[32] Corresponds approximately to the first three years of the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca where he revealed the revelation of Allah to only his close relatives and friends not to general public. (Hamidullah, 2009; Vatandaş, 2010)

(Bulaç, 2008). It is hard to say that establishing NGOs has different agendas than gaining legitimacy and being visible in public sphere. I usually received similar replies about the institutionalization experiences from the representatives of Islamist communities: "To conduct Islamic activities in a more comfortable atmosphere." The NGO'ization of Islamist communities on the one hand meant that their integration into the system would provide easier control and surveillance by the government; on the other hand, islamists would gain legitimacy for their religious activities. However, due to the continuing fears of the state oppression, they preferred not to reveal all their activities, even under the roof of the NGOs. Although their activities did not constitute a legal threat, they still had in mind the republican history enriched with military coups, memorandums, laicism and opposition to the religion.

> In our foundation, we were organizing many cultural, educational activities and programs. Our only aim was to work for rising moral and virtuous generations. It is still same. We were also not doing anything contrary to contemporary judicial legislations. However, we could never trust in the state. They could blacken your foundation without reasonable justification, announced it as the centre for retrogressive militancy (laughs) and therefore your efforts to go down the drain. (Hüseyin 52).

These hidden programs were innocuous activities such as reciting Quran and reading Hadiths as mentioned before. Some NGOs continued with the traditional ways of unwritten hierarchy and distribution of power but official regulations remained on paper. One reason for this is the unlawful operations of the state. The other and more significant reason is that Islamists never consider the NGOs as equivalent to the traditional communities. Institutionalization of the communities were being criticized in terms of the abolishment of sentimental bounds, the sense of togetherness and non-formal relationships superseded to prevalence of formality and eventually turning community into an ideological group (society). Threat of the NGOization of the communities has been intensely debated by Islamists.

When I asked what they were thinking about the joint-declaration by 97 NGOs in order to support government on the private courses (Dershane) debate, Musa (35), a

member of Community/NGO that did not sign for it firstly reacted to my description of them as NGO instead of community:[33]

> It is not my business whether they call themselves as NGO, but we are not an NGO. The community is more different than an NGO which is a western originated and modern organizational form. Institutions and concepts carry the culture they belong to. Consequently, western-base NGOs contain incompatible constituents with Islamic perspective in terms of the organizational structure.

While asking him on what kind of peculiarities the community has, distinctly from NGO, Ertuğrul (35) interrupted and added:

> As Musa said, this is not only a matter of institutionalization. There is no concrete model in the Quran. We acquire models from the history. Yet if we need to use a formal model, we ought to take into consideration its effects on the basis of the paradigm of islam. We are, of course, carrying out activities under the roof an NGO. Both the community and NGO obviously share common features such as the unity of a common understanding, certain social visions etc. However, it is hard to create an Islamic/revelational jargon with a western organizational model which is the product of modernism. It is difficult to act with the principles of Islam. On the contrary, we are obliged to use a modern jargon. In NGOs, for example, there is president and board of management and the like. However, there is imam[34] and board of consultation (istişare heyeti) in Islam. Beyond name differences, these are pretty dissimilar in terms of moral grounds. For instance, our gathering place is Mosque. We take our shoes off. There is moral consciousness there. For example, we sit down in circle position, and so everyone sees each other's face; this is a small but an important part of the spirit of brotherhood. Yet NGO is not like that. Today, many Islamist NGOs are wasting time with showing off. They use even their aid campaigns as advertisement because they need ads. Yet,

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[33] The reason of not-signing the declaration was the style evoking a crude partisanship to the ruling government. According to them a community/NGO before anything else ought to employ a critical stance against political power. Hence while there were many issues of criticism, 97 NGOs didn't attempt to write about them..

[34] Imam is a concept which has a wide range of references from the president of a government to a prayer leader.

according to our morality, favors and material aids should be kept in secret. If there are only three persons in an activity/program/conference, this might be a great problem for an NGO, but might not be as such for a community. In other words, the community does not evaluate on the basis of quantity. After we do what ever needs to be done, only Allah decides on the result. We need to trust in his judgment.

In short, we are using modern models on the one hand, and try to revive the Islamic spirit on the other. Therefore, community cannot be reduced to NGO without reservations.

As mentioned before, Ertugrul's and Musa's approach was reminding us one of the popular issues of the recent discussions among islamists. Islamists were having discussions and debates on the Islamic vision of civilization in their reading sessions and sohbets. They were scrutinizing why Muslims cannot use their own concepts, and why they cannot establish their own institutions based on the theoretical paradigm of islam. In those debates I noticed a critical attention on how NGOs, as a modern type of organization, can shape, direct and even distort islamic content.

By internalizing NGOs' publicity, formality, transparency and accountability; some of the communities abandoned being stealthy, introverted and informal, all of which were elements of the community. This kind of abandonment however did not stem from a deficiency of the old community formations, it rather stemmed from a process of publicity due to decreasing political oppression. Causes, dynamics and results of this transformation are going to be discussed in the chapter of Secrecy and Enemies.

Communities have different use and design of space. For instance while the furnishing of a community center resembles a traditional madrasah equipped by divans, reading desks (rahle) and carpets with green tones laid on the whole apartment, and it may not be allowed to enter on shoes. This is probably because of giving a particular attention to islamization of space. Another community center however may have a modern office design with the exception of having a little space for praying. All NGOs have little spaces for praying.

Recently most of the communities have inclined to the area where Hacı Bayram Veli Mosque is located. The buildings they have disposed have mostly traditional Ottoman architecture with two or three floors. The gathering of different communities around this mosque will certainly create new insights and theoretical dimensions which will shed light on the central problematic of our thesis.

Çetin (44), another interviewee, referred to similar complaints of Ertugrul particularly on the inability of muslims to protect the Islamic vocabulary and content:

> In the old days, meetings at our homes and bookstores had a vital importance. Later on we frequently used our NGO. But we saw that we lost the intimacy and sincerity we had at those home meetings. The ambient in NGOs, did not have the same warm feeling as in our home meetings where our families had the chance to cohere.

Cetin's comparison on how they conducted their meeting before and after coincides with the discussion of the dilemma of community and society. Was the community which was bid farewell with discontent by most of the thinkers of the time (Weber, Durkheim, Simmel) a historical fact which would reductively be replaced by the society? When the institutionalized religious communities which have integrated into the public sphere are the case, coexistence of the traditional communal life (sentimental communication, introversion, stealthy and oral communication) and a modern societal life (accountability, sheerness and norms) is possible in which the boundary between community and society is lost.

University student Halil İbrahim (24), who does not have any organic relationship with communities albeit maintaining contacts with them, while interpreting on how NGOization have effects on fraternity, intimacy and sympathy on community formation, he affirmed the current fragmentation of muslims on the condition of a reservation:

> Being institutionalized is a necessity for it provides transparency and accountability. However Islamic NGOs must remain small to protect the sentimental dynamics of communities. By doing so, intimacy and fraternity by which all muslims are responsible

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for each other and which constitutes the consciousness of brotherhood will remain vibrant. Yet this should be only on the condition that, all these fractions should liaise in the matters that concern all Muslims.

The most salient distinction between community and civil society is made by Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (1995) while criticizing Islamists. Sarıbay emphasizes that what democratizes civil society is the attitude of non-totalizing of any social identities. He believes that a pluralist/civil society can only be achieved by an ethics of democracy which is grounded on the sense of responsibility within diverse groups. (Sarıbay, 1995: 143). He claims that with its monolithic envision of social and political life, the idea of tawhed in islam undermines and reverses that ideal of pluralism (Sarıbay, 1995: 23). In short, islamist ideals were undermining civil society. It was a one type homogenous society which is considered to be the enemy of the open democratic society. The answers for the questions of how an Islamic revolution will be realized and what will be the core of this revolution show that Islamists still struggles with the idea of pluralism and diversity. But the answers were also fruitful to demonstrate their rupture and potential transformation on this issue.

2.9. The Unprepossessing Word "Democracy"

One of the easy ways to understand islamists' approach to pluralism and their vision of Islamic state is to ask how they interpret the concept of democracy. This question is also closely related to the institutionalization and transparency of communities in the public sphere. As expected, the concept of democracy is certainly among the popular political concepts such as caliphate, Islamic state, sharia law etc.

As it has been touched upon, one of the distinctive characteristics of islamist thought is their claim that islam is a way of life comprising all aspects of life. Therefore it is indispensable for each islamist to believe that what is ordained in the Quran and Sunnah[35] ought to be implemented in all spheres of life.[36] This is the case both for those

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[35] Although it is mostly referred both to Quran and Sunnah; the centrality and authenticity of the Sunnah is one the controversial issues among the islamist.

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who reject democracy or approve it. The point here as I will show, is the way how Islamic faith is believed to be implemented.

The question of "what do you think about the concept of democracy?" was answered jointly in a repulsive manner. I did not come across any islamist who embraced democracy or democratic system without having reservations. The prevalent meaning of the term in other words was unprepossessing to them. If one reason was its western origin, the other was indubitably its connotation to exalting human volition against the absolute will of Allah.

There generally emerged three different approaches to the question of democracy:

1. The ones who repudiated democracy and considered approval or rejection as the boundaries of belief and disbelief.

2. The ones who repudiated the concept only as a governmental regime without relating to the issues of faith

3. The ones who approve the term as an implementable method of governance

2.9.1. Democracy as the Line between Belief and Disbelief

It should be emphasized that those who considered the issue as a matter of faith significantly decreased particularly in the last ten years. This idea had been prevalent among islamists at the beginning periods of tevhidi revival in '70s and culminated in '80s (Aktaş 2010). Most of my interviewees were saying that, they used to believe in repudiating democracy as a matter of faith. Although there are still the ones who believe in this way, today they prefer at least not to blame people who approve the term of infidelity.

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[36] It is difficult to claim the same strictness and determination for other communities in Turkey. The majority of the religious communities in Turkey have no significant emphasis on religion as a comprehensive way of life particularly with strong political accent.

The islamists in this group explained their view by fairly similar arguments which can shortly be framed as such: "Sovereignty belongs to Allah only. In democracies however, it belongs to the nation." Democracy was considered as the exaltation of human will –so to speak a godly claim". It gives authority crudely to 51 percent of the masses over determining what is justice, truth or good. Whereas for a muslim, the criteria of truth, justice, good or evil are dependent only to Allah, even when nobody approves it. Hence the issues on which Allah revealed orders or prohibitions cannot ever be a matter of choice or deliberation.

The commonly referred verses from the Quran were as follows:

> Verily, His are the Creation and the Command. Blessed be Allah, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the Worlds! (Quran 7:54)

> Further he said: "O my sons! enter not all by one gate: enter ye by different gates. Not that I can profit you aught against Allah (with my advice): None can command except Allah. On Him do I put my trust: and let all that trust put their trust on Him (12: 67)

> Do they then seek after a judgment of (the days of) ignorance? But who, for a people whose faith is assured, can give better judgment than Allah.? (5: 50)

> It is not fitting for a Believer, man or woman, when a matter has been decided by Allah and His Messenger to have any option about their decision: if any one disobeys Allah and His Messenger, he is indeed on a clearly wrong Path (33: 36)

> If any do fail to judge by (the light of) what Allah hath revealed, they are unbelievers (5: 44)

They were frequently referring to a narration over a verse:

> They take their priests and their anchorites to be their lords beside Allah, and (they take as their Lord) Christ the son of Mary; yet they were commanded to worship but One God. There is no god but He. Praise and glory to Him: (Far is He) from having the partners they associate (with Him). (9: 31)

> According to a Tradition, when Hadrat Adi bin Hatim, who was formerly a Christian, came to the Holy Prophet with the intention of understanding Islam, he asked several questions in

order to remove his doubts. One of these was: "This verse accuses us of taking our scholars and monks as our lords. What is its real meaning, sir? For we do not take them as our lords."

As a reply to this, the Holy Prophet put him a counter-question: "Is it not a fact that you accept as unlawful what they declare to be unlawful, and lawful what they declare to be lawful?" 'Adi confessed, "Yes, sir, it is so." The Holy Prophet replied, "This amounts to making them your lords."[37]

Democracy therefore referred to giving right to the majority of human will designate what is "halal" and what is "haram" (commandments and prohibitions) which directly meant polytheism against the worldly authority of Allah.

Those who have intellectual backgrounds discuss the issue by referring to the history of the concept dating back to the Greeks and its connotations in western thought, albeit eventually reach the same conclusion. They also point to the concept of shura as an alternative to democracy. Likewise participating to democratic processes either to be elected or to vote for is against the idea of tawhed.

2.9.2. Repudiation Only as a Political Regime

I never voted for any parties. Although my opinion regarding democracy changed, I still didn't vote. But if anyone comes and say that it is a matter of faith, I will certainly say no to him. First of all, an issue needs to be explicitly written in the Quran for it to be a matter of faith. If there is dispute over an issue among muslim scholars, then it ceases to be a matter of faith. (Hakan, 28)

Hüsnü Aktaş is one of the most respected scholars among islamists. In a conference[38] on the future of Syria and the Middle East, he was asked about whether free Syrians would embrace democracy or Sharia[39], Aktaş began his answer with his

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[37] Tirmizi 3095 ; Taberani, Mu'cemu'l Kebir 17/92

[38] 28.07.2013, Tahrir'den Taksim'e "Küresel Kuşatma

[39] It is possible to say that the majority of the participants were on the side of the first group I mentioned (the ones who approach on the basis of faith.

approach to democracy and surprisingly he warned the participants that they shouldn't have considered it as a matter of belief and disbelief. He added that muslims should have judged it on the basis of accuracy or inaccuracy of a political method. Finally he pointed out that since democratic strategies hitherto did not contribute to any development of muslims and Islamic movements, his own personal judgment was on rejecting it based on the inefficiency as a method.

This ideational shift points out to a significant change on behalf of the islamists, particularly hearing these words from Hüsnü Aktaş was quite important. The democratic elections in Palestine in 2006 which lead to the political victory of Hamas, the experiences of Erbakan movement, Erdoğan, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt were all contributory factors behind this ideational change. Yet at the same time, these served as justifications (especially Egyptian experience) of repudiation as a feasible method.

We were watching the coup d'état in Egypt on TV together with Veli (60), the leader of an Islamist NGO. When I asked him his opinion about the results, his answer was as follows:

> It was obvious from the very beginning. Democracy is a regime which best shows the hypocrisy of the west. By absorbing muslims into the democratic processes they first moderate, and domesticate the Islamic ideals, and when muslims succeed even with the rules of their own game, they spoil the game and resort to coup.

On the other hand, these islamists mostly become glad when a conservative party wins (Erbakan, AKP party). They were so to speak protecting themselves from the fire (fire of the hell), albeit lightening themselves by it.

> We believe that this method of Islamic struggle is illegitimate. Some of our brothers however preferred to participate to these processes. But it is on their own account and they will give that account to Allah. Though, we prefer AKP party to succeed instead of a leftist or a nationalist party. Thence at least we can carry out our activities more comfortably. Besides corruption become less by the hands of muslims. (Ayhan, 42)

These antagonists surely believe in the verses quoted above in the first group. Yet they believe that it is wrong to literally relate a modern concept or an institution to the Quranic references without interpretation.

We were chatting with Adil (48) a renowned islamist for 30 years who runs a bookstore in Kızılay. I wanted to direct our conversation to my thesis and asked him several questions. With regard to democracy, he uttered the same argument of the illegitimacy of authorization of the 51 percent. I asked him whether his alternative meant that if one percent of muslims had the coercive power, they would forcibly implement Islamic sharia law to those 99 percent opponents. After hesitating a while, he said "Actually yes! You are right. If muslims have power, people will certainly and even forcibly submit to islam." This was a rare answer among all other antagonists of democracy. Most of the others hesitated on the question of whether Islamic law can be forcibly implemented to a society who oppose to it. They usually said that they were not expert in Islamic jurisprudence hence were not able to give a complete answer.

For both antagonists, instead of using intra-system means such as participating to democratic mechanisms; the ideal of Islamic state and society can only be realized through education and other activities of calling for islam, thence to reach a significant population demanding for Islamic revolution from bottom to top[40].

2.9.3. Democratic Method as an Implementable Regime of Governance

The distinction between "Democracy" and "democratic method" stems from the critiques and reservations that the concept in essence cannot fully be adaptable to the Islamic paradigm. According to all islamists, the question of whether islam can be reconciled with democracy is itself inadequate and biased.

> It depends here on what you mean both by islam and democracy.
> I don't consider democracy as an inherent western concept inseparable from the culture and values of the west. It is true that

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[40] Two important events which significantly affected islamists of Turkey were the Iranian Revolution and Jihad in Afghanistan (Gündoğan, 2011).

> when the west impose us democracy, they will at the same time try to impose capitalism, laicite and their own culture. For me however, democracy is only an electoral system prioritizing the will of the people, and in this sense I approve it. (Recep 45)

It should be noted that the proponents of this third idea also are in minority. Nevertheless throughout the last ten years, the political victories and achievements of AKP party resounding worldwide had significantly moderated islamists' former strictness particularly with respect to the political, bureaucratic mechanisms and theoretical elaborations of democracy. In spite of the theoretical moderation, there are still considerable reasons of abnegation. Democracy is still believed to be a method of the western colonialism i.e. a means to impose western culture and values. The reservation stemmed from this hypocrisy and incompatibility with the Islamic paradigm.

> The west on the one hand occupies the lands of muslims by claiming to bring democracy, kills millions of people, exploit the natural reserves; on the other hand kills those who fight for saving their lands and civilizations by blaming them of being the enemies of democracy. (Abdullah, 28)

According to this third group muslims, believing in the verses referred in the first group should be elaborated differently than the way of struggling for implementing them. The question in other words is "the ways how muslims are to convey their truth to others".

We had discussed this issue with five islamist brothers in Mekan café. All of them had seceded from their former communities albeit maintaining their relationships with Islamic communities in general.

> The underlying reason of muslims' opposition to democracy is the idea that democratic societies are devoid of values, beliefs and ideologies and living only in accordance with their selfish desires and passions. Even in the Ancient Greeks, Socrates was condemned to death via a democratic method, albeit pursuant to religious and ideological matters. He was insulting the Greek gods and swaying the youth. (Uğur, 29)

"In other words, are you saying that it is possible to establish a state based on religious law via democracy?" I asked. He warned me that my question was reductionist:

> If we don't explicate what you mean by "a state based on religious law", then my answer will be understood as if I mean to use democracy only as a temporary means to achieve a totalitarian regime. Because the connotation of "the state based on religion or sharia law" is unfortunately highly negative. (Uğur 29)

Ömer interfered and referred to the prophet as to how islamic ideals should be conveyed to the others.

> Saying that democracy is the exaltation of the 51 percent of the human volition against the absolute will of Allah is indeed a half-finished sentence. First of all, Allah doesn't speak to us today and the prophet doesn't live among us. Therefore our claims of islam are in fact what we could understand from the content of the literature of Quran and Sunnah. And when we observe around that there are dozens of different interpretations of islam, we may probably be wrong at least in some matters. Secondly Allah sent us a prophet who showed the ways on how truth claims should be defended and conveyed to the others. So coming to political methods, if we will not elect our governor by the power of the majority, then how? (Ömer Musa, 27)

"Is there a viable political alternative which is produced based on our own concepts and historical experience?" Uğur added.

Ömer came to the point which I had asked Aydın in bookstore. He believed that how/in what ways muslims should establish an Islamic order was as important as knowing what is Islamic and unislamic. Ümit (28) added by intervening:

> If transparent democratic elections are carried out in the Middle East, who do you think will head the poll? Of course muslim parties. And the biggest losers will be US, Israil and the Arab dictators. Hence what I understand from democracy is to work for reaching to 51 percent who will claim for Islam. Muslims after all cannot impose sharia law to the others. People should want it and demand it.

> At that time won't we come to a situation where the law of the 51 percent will be imposed on the 49 percent? I mean, power will always be a determining dynamic (Muharrem 35)

Brother I believe that all citizens can agree at least on fundamental law. What we understand from the government is the total sum of these commonalities. Apart from the minimal central authority, there should be a multi legal system beneath. For me this is possible and even necessary. (Eren, 30)

What you said is something hypothetical, a utopia. Every religion or ideology wills to capture the central power. (Muharrem, 35)

Maybe you are right by stressing on the inevitability of conflict. History itself consists of conflict. But isn't Allah saying that muslims should struggle with the others in the most beautiful way[41]? We will struggle in the way which befits us the most. The best environment for us is an environment of peace and dialog where we will freely and openly convey our message and defend our truth. Why did the prophet resort to arms? Because they didn't let him freely tell his truth and he was oppressed, and muslims were tormented. In short, all his life is important in this sense to show us how to struggle today. (Eren 30)

So you say, let them attack us then we will show them. (Muharrem 35 'laughing')

During my interview with Hamza Türkmen, he complained about the lack of academic studies based on the Islamic conceptual framework. He stated that muslims cannot think by their own concepts and cannot produce alternatives. Instead they simply reject whatever they hear due to the idea that they are western.

Muslims do nothing but repeating that there is no democracy in islam but shura. Yet we couldn't even write an article -let alone a book- on the scope and practical content of shura responsive to the contemporary times. (Türkmen, 59)

Although Islamists in this group had reservations on the western concept of democracy which is mostly imposed inextricably with secularism in social life, liberalism in political and capitalism in economic; they still approve it as a political means to overthrow the despotism and dictatorship in the Middle East.

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[41] Invite to the Way of your Lord with wisdom and fair preaching, and argue with them in a way that is better. Truly, your Lord knows best who has gone astray from His Path, and He is the Best Aware of those who are guided. Quran16:125.

Ümit reminded us the latest discussions on Prime Minister Erdogan's statement on inspecting the student houses.[42] He added that this example explicated his understanding of Islamic struggle.

> According to islam, it is prohibited for unmarried couples to live together. It is simply haram. No muslim can defend the reverse. But it is equally prohibited in islam for a governmental authority to behave like the guardian of the morals. I mean, the problem of adultery or indecency is first of all the problem of themselves, then their families, friends and Islamic communities. The government can only carry out incentives. (Ümit, 28)

I asked him to relate these to our topic.

> The central principle in an Islamic state or society is voluntarism. Our goal is only to convey Islamic message to others and to show them in practice. There is no compulsion in religious matters. (Ümit, 28)

Above discussion, particularly Eren and Ümit's approaches manifest that islamists are tended to think more on the basis of civil society rather than state. Islamists in general admit the indispensability of conflict as the dynamic of history i.e. that eventually one paradigm dominates over the other. In this sense, the sphere of civil society as the arena of beautiful struggle determines the winner.

> Life consists of power relations. We muslims struggle in this arena for the sovereignty of Allah's words. (Veli, 60)

> The source of validity is epistemic community. Therefore power determines what is valid. (Ramazanoğlu & Holland, 2002: 138)

When we appeal to Hegel at this point i.e. referring that "dialectic process throughout the history progresses with syntheses in each context", then the question arises whether there would remain any universal authentic truth in a religious paradigm centralizing the principle of conflict. The concept of "asr-ı saadet" (authentic period of happiness) in this sense would be illustrative. The first period of islam when prophet

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[42] Detailed information on the debate:
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=330716

Muhammad and his companions lived, is the central ideal society for almost all muslims. The moral dynamism and social relations in that period turned into a frame of ideal society for the entire Islamic movements in Islamic history formulated as "returning to the asr-ı saadet"[43]. Hence, the conflict and returning to asrı saadet[44] are shaped by the multi-dimensional relationship comprising both change and preserving the authenticity. Hasan Hanefi's evaluation of the relationship between fact and value not on the basis of separation but on unification (Hanafi 2006: 231-241) and Ramadan's association of culture and religion supports this dynamic process: "There is no religion without culture, there is no culture without religion, but religion is not culture". (Ramadan 2008: 95)

Ramadan puts forward that muslims couldn't generate the relationship between believing in a truth and the ways to convey that truth to the "others" which stemmed from the problematic understanding of Tawhed. Ramadan (2010) argues that Tawhed i.e. the oneness of Allah should go hand in hand with the multiplicity of everything except Allah. Believing in one god in other words necessitates believing in multiplicity in the social. Yet still it insists on universal common truths regardless of diversity. The beautiful struggle corresponding to what Habermas called "ideal speech situation" is the means of reflexive deliberation which has also been a part of the trial of the believer.

> If God had willed, he would make you one society. (Quran, 5: 48, 42: 8)

> O mankind! We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most honourable of you with Allah is that (believer) who has *At-Taqwa* [i.e. one of the *Muttaqun* (pious). Verily, Allah is All-Knowing, All-Aware (Quran, 49: 13)

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[43] The most famous sources on "Asrı saadet"(century of happiness) in order to comprehend the ways the prophet and his companions lived, and to reflect theory to practical life, are the books such as Yusuf Kandehlevi's Hayatüs- Sahabe, and Süleyman en-Nedvi's Asr-ı Saadet

[44] This doesn't refer to going back to the historical conditions and cultural perceptions of those periods. It rather refers to realizing the morality, consciousness and commitment of the sahabe (companions).

And among His Signs is the creation of the heavens and the
earth, and the difference of your languages and colours. Verily,
in that are indeed signs for men of sound knowledge. (Quran, 30:
22)

By referring to Levinas' "other", Badiou's "same" and Habermas's
"deliberation", we are at a hypothetical point of communicative action, where
"different" and "similar" are intertwined. The question of whether there is a necessity in
this process to settle on truth is answered by Habermas himself who always uses truth
and legitimacy together. Participation of a religious discourse into this process for us
seems to be possible when islamist thought is in question particularly if both truth and
legitimacy can be put into action.

In the light of the above discussions, it is anticipated that as islamist thought
increase its visibility and transparency in the public sphere, i.e. increase the
opportunities of encountering with the "other", the constructed dichotomy of we-and-
others is moderated and islamist approach to pluralism and governmental mechanisms
ceases to be in former strictness. Nevertheless such a transformation does not necessarily
entail being integrated or absorbed into the secular system as Tuğal (2011) contends, or
the end of the Islamist oppositional discourse as Türköne (2013) defends; it can much
rather be interpreted as the emergence of new theoretical and practical horizons with
regard to Islamic opposition and Islamic politics of governance (Aktay 2005, 2013).

2.10. The System of Jahiliya and Its Means

While Islamic movement in Turkey was increasing its influence after 70's, it was
at the same time encountering new emerging problems particularly due to the increasing
visibility of Islamic jargon and ideals in turkish political life, most exemplary the
Erbakan movement. On the one hand, islam or islamism was becoming more of a threat
to the ideological foundations of Turkish republic, on the other hand inner questions and
conflicts about the authenticity of an Islamic struggle within a non-Islamic system or
using the very means of that system in order to overthrow it turned to be critical issues
among islamists. Many islamists preferred to keep away from the politics and political

processes, while some others sided with Erbakan. Both sides however could not create a model of pluralism, and rather political and social processes witnessed harsh oppositions between two artificial camps: seculars and islamists. Erbakan movement which preferred to struggle within and with the means of the system recasted its way with gradual transformation and the necessity based on reality.[45] They were trying to justify it with the Quranic principles and the practical strategies of the prophets. Nevertheless, participating in electoral or governmental representation after all requires conformity with the political, economic and subjective ideological mechanisms of the system (Badiou, 2002: 99). Struggle within the system for muslims amounted to the same meaning. They confronted with internalizing some unislamic issues such as permission of alcohol, gambling, brothels, usury, and loyalty to the principles of Ataturk which were blurring islamists' minds. On the other side there was ostensibly no problem for those who claimed to have kept away from the system.

Though participating to active political processes was not the only case of discussion anymore. Islamists had started to open legitimate rooms for their cause by charity foundations and solidarity associations, the NGO's. This time the disputation was about the legitimacy of Islamic struggle by using another means of the "polytheist system". But for some islamists, activities under the umbrella of legitimate and transparent institutions would be an opportunity to perform religious and educational activities without the governmental suppression. They knew that Islamic movements working for years in secrecy due to governmental surveillance and control would not need to hide themselves after gaining legal legitimacy and besides they would be visible and open to all people in the public sphere (Fikret, 59). Eventually after a long period of secrecy and closeness, islamist communities who had organized and gathered around bookstores or secret neighbourhood activities until the end of '80s, started to carry out almost the same activities openly and transparently through NGO's. Transparency and legitimacy however couldn't be an overnight solution to the exclusionary manners of

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[45] Islamists explanation for participating to party politics is generally legitimized by the acceptance that there is no other way out in order to come to power.

islamists. On the contrary this time they seem to be perpetuating the discourse of secession and fragmentation through NGOs. Publicity and encounter with plurality couldn't be a remedy per se, rather the public space itself turned into the sphere of diverse and detached fragments. The trial of muslims on "the other" continued.

The idea behind Tevhidi islamists' approach to the existing political system on the basis of polytheism and disbelief has a legitimate ground dating back to early periods of islam. The early scholars' conceptualization of Darul Harp (the lands of war) and Darul Islam (lands under the authority of Islamic law) [46] and the abolishment of implementing Islamic law by the contemporary political regimes (Turkey for instance) were constituting a political oppositional consciousness in Islamists mindset. Such a political centered religious motivation had in fact gave birth to an ideology of islam devoid of appealing to the heart, to emotions, and to the spiritual affection. This transformation is being criticized by islamists themselves. Assuming the existing political system as total infidelity creates on the one hand an ideal of total revolution and a strict opposition to keep off the practical mechanisms of state and bureaucracy. The reason of the inability of tevhidi Islamists to penetrate into the social domains seems to be that oppositional consciousness.

Particularly after 1990's, muslims increased their influence in political as well as social processes of both national and international spheres. The third wave islamism at this period emerged, motto of which was "What is islam?" rather than "What isn't islam?" This question inevitably brings new issues to the agenda such as the discussions on the possible alternatives of Islam to social, economic and political relations; the role, rights and responsibilities of a so called Islamic state particularly with respect to a highly heterogeneous society of different religions, ethnicities and cultures.

The latest intellectual discussions on "the end of Islamism" (Türköne, 2012, 2013; Bulaç, 1992, 2012; Aktay, 2012, 2013) can show us the distinctive relationship

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[46] Dar al-Harb (Domain of War) refers to the territory under the hegemony of unbelievers, which is on terms of active or potential belligerency with the Domain of Islam, and presumably hostile to the Muslims living in its domain (Zahid 2002). Dar Al-Islam: The abode of Islam, the Muslim nation.(Qaradavi, 2001)

between 2nd and 3rd wave islamism. The hitherto black and white issue became the subject of a multi dimensional decomposition. Discussions on Medina constitution (Bulaç 1992, 1998) were attempts to stimulate debates on Islam democracy and pluralism. Aktay's works in general can be considered as efforts to show how Islam has dynamism by generating multiple strategies against various conditions. Instead of declaring ends in islamism, he stands for a new phase for muslims of encountering the other, and he prefers to advocate how "fiqh"[47] and "ijtihad" offer new approaches and by opting for a good solution which is always preferred to an original solution. For Aktay (2013), islamism would not fall into the errors of obstinate idealism or cynical withdrawal.

> Islamism has always had a claim regarding what is "better" for a given situation or for a community. But the Islamists' perception of "goodness" is not a fundamentalist recommendation only made for each given situation once and predetermines all future cases. Conversely, with an emphasis on a dynamic judicial opinion it operates with the assumption that there can be a "good" option among all the possible solutions for a situation. (Aktay, 2013: 120)

Scholars such as Fazlurrahman (1984), Ghannushi (2010), Hassan Hanafi (2000), Jabiri (2001), Ramadan (2009, 2010) search for a new islamic worldview which will transcend the classical dichotomies of religious-secular or traditional-modern. They also try to think beyond another dichotomy of crude imitation of the west by apology or radical opposition by all means.

The question here is to what extent did Islamists of Turkey welcomed this new literature? On the side of the communities it can be said that they are generally closed to these new figures or ideas. These contributions were often neglected pursuant to the condemnation of being modernist and secular arguments. On many occasions of the discussions on islam and reading sessions I have encountered the same argument: It is impossible to understand islam with modern terms and concepts. Hence there has to be a

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[47] Islamic jurisprudence

large scale review of our traditional corpus and muslims have to learn to think in accordance with the Quranic terms and concepts.[48]

Although referring to the Quranic terminology in the name of authenticity and originality seems to be a strong argument, an ideational contradiction appears with respect to the way islamists ground their justification.

At the weekends, we used to meet our islamist brothers in Kızılay. Our frequent topic of discussion was islamic thought. Some of our brothers used to condemn new theoretical contributions of scholars such as Fazlurrahman, Gannnushi, or the scholars of Ankara Divinity school, by claiming that they were generating modernist or secular arguments. Obviously however they were judging muslims scholars on the basis of the very definitions and concepts of the western thought such as of modernism or secularism. Muslims in other words were learning what is modern or secular from the west and internalizing their meaning from the western perspective, then they were at the same time rejecting an inner argument by referring to those conceptual tools in the name of preserving the original discourse of islam.

On the side of islamists who have no organic membership with any communities however, it can be said that they are mostly open to any intellectual horizons eastern or western. During my interviews I witnessed many good readers who have sophisticated knowledge both from Islamic and western sources. Intellectual capacity was remarkably more sophisticated among those who were having no organic or institutional affiliations. During my visit, the academic in Ankara divinity school, Gürbüz Deniz, had an interesting evaluation: "Unfortunately, the intellectual level of religious communities in Turkey is high-school level."

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[48] The most common expressions among islamists to criticize this literature are "modernist zihinle düşünmek (thinking with a modernist mind)", "batıcı söylemler (western rhetoric)" ve "modernist kafa (western mind)"

Agency-structure as one of the main discussion points in sociological theory sheds light on the tension between believing subject and believing community. The hegemony of structure once again colonizes the agency, lifeworld, i.e. the freedom of the subject (Habermas).

CHAPTER III

SECRECY AND ENEMIES

When I shared my thoughts about this thesis with my islamist friends and circles of muslim communities, I have generally faced with two kinds of reactions:

The first reaction was highly motivating and encouraging.

> Academic studies on Islamic movements in Turkey are generally written by outsiders. These studies are most of the time intentionally distorted simply due to the fact that most of those studies are conducted with hostile and malevolent motivations or unintentionally (because they don't understand us) result with wrong outcomes. Hence critical studies with insider perspectives like yours will certainly be very contributory for muslims. (Adil 50)

> If this study is going to help muslims see their situation well, you would have done a pretty good job. (Hamza 59)

> Those who are hostile to islam and muslims know us much better than we know ourselves. Thus we can/have to openly discuss on our current situation. Mistakes and wrong attitudes after all, belong to us, not to islam. And islam does not only belong to us, it rather belongs to anyone who has possibility to say "la ilahe illallah"[49] (Uğur, 47)

The second reaction however required us to add to my thesis the discussion of the concept of secrecy.

> With this study, are you going to reveal our secrets to leftists, seculars and adversaries of islam? (Ömer 55, Hakan 28)

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[49] La ilahe illallah is the phrase of declaration to convert to islam/being muslim.

> People like Ruşen Çakır[50] leaked into muslim communities and they disclosed their private secrets to be used for attacking islam and muslims in Turkey, thus they were promoted in media and in all other aspects. As a muslim, are you aware of what you are trying to do? (Yasin, 40)

> War is deception" says the prophet (pbuh)[51]. Hence it is not correct to reveal the weak points of muslims to those with whom we are in a cultural and political conflict. In this sense we as muslims have to depict a powerful image against them. (Ibrahim 45)

According to this type of reaction I would be in the position of a confessor by presenting materials that would be used against islam. Upon receiving these responses, I started to increase my attention particularly on the reflections of the concepts such as secrecy, enemy and image in muslims minds. What I tried to understand as a parallel inquiry for the central discussion of the thesis was the role of secrecy on the construction of closed and isolated social spaces. Besides I tried to uncover how secrecy affects the motivation and sense of belonging in a community organization.

Secrecy

One of the most famous and most cited books on the concept of secrecy is certainly Georg Simmel's sociology of secrecy and secret societies (1906). He elaborated secrecy as a central motivation both in personal and social life and shed light on the subsequent studies.

According the Simmel (1950), secrecy as a universal social reality begins with a departure from childhood when everything is explicitly uttered and every action happens in front of the others (Simmel, 1950: 330). Contrary to that period says Simmel, secrecy begins with concealment as a result of the senses of pride, bragging and possession (Simmel, 1950: 332). In social structures, this process creates seclusion against the

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[50] A Turkish journalist who is believed to have penetrated into islamic communities by pretending to be insider and then revealing the secrets of muslims.

[51] Pbuh: peace be upon him. It is used as a phrase of respect to the prophet Muhammad.

outside (Simmel, 1950: 369) centralization i.e. monopolizing the truth (Simmel, 1950: 370) de-individualisation i.e. the centrality of the structure rather than the individual (Simmel, 1950: 372), and charismatic community of equal members (Simmel, 1950: 372). Moreover he states that secrecy is developed as a defence mechanism against political or social oppression.

> In general, the secret society emerges everywhere as the counterpart of despotism and police restriction, as the protection of both the defensive and the offensive in their struggle against the overwhelming pressure of central powers –by no means of political powers only, but also of the church, as well as of school classes and families. (Simmel, 1950: 347)

It is a common idea that secrecy is one of the strongest motivations of Islamic communities and tariqa based groups. Many secret orders and denominations throughout the history survived by this mechanism of concealment. Nevertheless I will refer to later theoretical contributions which classify different forms of secrecy and evaluate islamist communities in the light of those classifications.

Johnson (2002) refers to following different aspects of secrecy: Concealing the very existence of a social group, concealing the religious affiliations, concealing some forms of rituals or concealment for the sake of concealment i.e. the groups where secrecy is the core dynamic of dissemination. Chilson's (2010) classification however is more functional for the scope of the thesis. By his distinction of esoteric secrecy and social secrecy, he provides us a theoretical ground for understanding the difference between traditional or tariqa based communities and islamist communities.

> To understand how "esoteric" religions are different from underground ones, we need to distinguish between esoteric secrecy and social secrecy. To make a simple distinction, esoteric secrecy relates to divine concealment of ultimate truths, while social secrecy refers to intentional concealment by people of things less than ultimate. (Chilson, 2010: 203)

As de Jong stated (2006), the word esoteric as a general term according to Chilson refers to system of interpretation focusing on finding extraordinary realities behind ordinary texts, persons, or objects.

The leading social structures corresponding to secrecy and esoteric mysticism are Islamic orders/tariqas (Eraydın 2008). They created highly different life styles than the prophet Muhammad and his companions lived and they explained this discrepancy with hidden esoteric interpretations of the scripture by emphasizing on ostensible and immanent dimensions of it. In these groups, as Simmel pointed out (1906: 333), there are attempts to transform the unknown into an alluring and tempting motivation which creates loyalty and obedience. The lack of knowledge or the capacity to understand is compensated with the lack of faithfulness and devotion. These structures are full of esoteric secrets which can be acquired by a believer only after passing some ritual stages and only by a significant level of conviction. This form of mysticism and secrecy passed on to many traditional communities. Many examples of those stories can be found in traditional communities such as Nurcu community.[52]

The distinctive characteristic of islamist thinking however is the emphasis on reason, particularly referring only to what Quran says rather than blindly believing in the subsequent literature on islam. The primordial examples of the emphasis on rationality can be found in the very first centuries of islam, which goes back to the school of mutazilah (Uludağ 2013). Yet this rationality does not neglect the metaphysical sphere beyond experimentation as 19th century positivism did.[53] The rationality of the islamists for us corresponds to what Kant called g*laube* (belief) which is in between meinen *(mere opinion)* and wissen (*knowledge*) ([1781] 2010)[54] Although such a belief does not deny subjective experience, inner emotional journeys or a metaphysical relationships with God/divinity, death or life, it also emphasizes that the social and political reflections of

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[52] Many esoteric references and extraordinary stories are told for the Gülen movement and Fethullah Gülen in person. And most of those stories were verified by my Nurcu friends. The most famous of them is the claim that Fethullah Gülen periodically meets and consults with the prophet Muhammad.

[53] "Rationality which adopts metaphysical spheres refers to grounding the ideas on the historical reality of the Quran which was revealed in Makkah and Medina periods in 23 years, and the biography of the prophet Muhammad both of which can be subject to communicative deliberation.

[54] Glaube, according to Oneil means to trust, to depend on and to show allegiance. These meanings correspond to the meaning of faith in Islamic literature.

these dimensions should be lawlike i.e. objective (O'neill 1996). Hence they don't have any forms of esoteric secrets or mysticism with regard to their idea of islam or the political repercussions of it. Islamist community in other words is configured from top to bottom with simple, understandable religious arguments. Nevertheless generally Islamic movement in Turkey always chose to work in secrecy due to opposition and suppression of central governments. This was what Chilson argued as social secrecy and the aim of this concealment was keeping of political suppression.

Nevertheless, today it is quite exemplary to see how political ideological camps were hitherto fostered by artificial and constructed ethnic or religious fears of the past, many of which are now considered as bygone. Islamists unexceptionally were influenced by these constructions and the scope of Islamic call in the course of time were narrowed, its arguments and goals confined only to a minority of the population which eventually turned it into a strict and closed group ideology.

One of my first queries regarding the criticism of revealing the secrets of muslims to the others was about what type of secrets were meant to be hidden: "What are those secrets that need to be kept inside? Are they our mistakes or wrong attitudes?"

One of my interviewees (Fikret 59) stated that on the contrary muslims' mistakes and wrong attitudes should have been openly discussed. Secrecy instead according to him comprised only some distribution of duties and responsibilities which were not necessary to be known by third parties. They were not secrets that must not be known, but rather they didn't have to be known. When I criticised him by stating that, these kinds of secrets –if they were called secret- were related only to some procedural responsibilities of any community organizations or NGO's, he partly agreed with me, and we actually had a very detailed and sincere conversation without dwelling too much on the concept of secrecy.

According to another interviewee (Ömer 55) our secrets were those that could not be understood by a non-muslim. He exemplified self-abnegation and altruism of muslims for each others that was impossible for a non-believer to understand. They would probably consider it on the basis of some personal or communal benefits and

would eventually malign muslims. Non-muslims in other words were not capable of understanding the religious motivations on the background. This answer was not actually an appropriate answer to my question and I could feel his hesitation on my second question of asking him to clarify about the type of secrets he means. He had also drawn an exaggerated picture regarding the level of altruism among muslims. Secrecy seemed to have been a communal reflex of protection among muslims due to perpetual suppression of the governments throughout the republican history.

Yasin (40) affirmatively reacted to my question by adducing Ruşen Çakır "what do you mean by our secrets? Are they our mistakes?". "Of course they are included" he said. He believed that muslims should have a powerful image against the adversaries[55]. He in other words preferred to behave politically. Yakup (28) sitting with us interfered in. He contravened that muslims' image politics affected them mostly negatively, that this was causing disappointments for those new participants due to seeing the gap between what is said and what is done, and that it was also not acceptable by the Quran some verses of which publicly criticised prophet Muhammad himself and few of his companions. Hence for Yakup we had to openly and publicly discuss our mistakes and wrong attitudes of misunderstanding or misbehaving of the authentic Islam. Yasin told us that the issue was not that simple and he reminded us Can Dündar's[56] article targeting the Prime Minister Erdoğan and added that those people who were pretending to be criticizing the ruling party were in fact against islam and muslim identity.

A general conclusion regarding islaimsts' view of secrecy is that it is developed as a self-protection reflex mechanism against the government. Islamists had experienced the troublesome periods when it was not allowed to gather even for reading the Quran.[57] This social reflex could not still be got over even in the last ten years when social and

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[55] Adversaries are mostly considered as anyone who is hostile to islam and muslims. Also those who reject the social or political aims of islam –even if they claim to be muslims- are the "others" of islamist.

[56] A turkish journalist believed to be an adversary of islam and islamic revival in Turkey.

[57] "7 Nurcu's were caught red-handed while praying." (Cumhuriyet 20 June 1960)

political conditions changed in the advantage of muslims in general, and it is being held as a measure due to these fragile periods direction of which cannot still be anticipated.

Whether stemming from political surveillance and suppression or being considered as a strategy of image politics, the most important aspect of the secrecy as Simmel pointed out, is its power to channel a community or a social structure towards closeness, isolation, self-reliance and egoism of the community which is constituted by the altruism of the individual (Bauman, 2011). Thence secrecy gives the group a position of exception (Simmel, 1950: 332), and the separation and the formation of the group is connected through the aristocratizing motive. (Simmel, 1950: 365)

My critics in the light of above evaluations of Simmel were generally considered as quite naïve by my muslim brothers who were community members. Since according to them no matter how muslims become open and transparent, the opponents of islam and muslims would continue to harm them. Hence, that optimist and hopeful expectation was quite far from reality. Islamists who seceded from communities however were much more interested in my opinions and they shared parallel ideas with me.

Secondly -as I will discuss further- the motivation of secrecy can also be related to the intentional silence of some islamists' vague, ambiguous and even dangerous envisions regarding the ideal of Islamic state and society.[58] Nevertheless as a general observation it can be said that with the influence of the establishment of Islamic NGO's and following processes of transparency changed the way islamists think on secrecy. Also certainly with the influence of the political shift in the last ten years, they are not as strict as before.

> The issues because of which I was being prosecuted by the law
> in 80's and 90's can now be freely proclaimed by anyone on
> Televisions. (Ramazan, 58)

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[58] Islamic state according to some islamists is understood as a highly totalitarian government which would impose islamic law (sharia) regardless of the peoples consent.

What we are talking about in this program should be as transparent as we are talking in front of the people outside. We have no clandestine agenda. Our goal is loud and clear. (Çetin, 45)

It can be said that by increasing visibility of islamists in the public sphere and institutionalization –as I discussed in the chapter of community and NGO- the democratic principle associated with publicity (Simmel, 1950: 365) gains importance and prevalence; and reflexes regarding secrecy become moderated.

CHAPTER IV

ISLAMIC UNITY

4.1. Unity and Disunity

> *We all have to learn to bring about a real Copernican revolution*
> *within ourselves. (Ramadan, 2010: 25)*

It would be a naive approach to seek an Islamic unity without taking into consideration the Islamic history of 1400 years, numerous schools of thought, hundreds of cultural projections. The deduction that the Islamic unity means a monolithic framework of theory does not reflect the researcher's standpoint. Consequently, there is a book with its all historical facticity and a prophet who lived abiding by that book, that is, Islamic doctrine as well as the historical truth of the prophet is singular; the patterns of understanding Islam and the hermeneutical processes dependent on culture and history generates "Islams" (Al Zein). In other words, understanding and living Islam is contingent upon the interpretational practices of the person and cultural element addressing to that revelation. This contingency emerges from the close relationship between religion and culture. "Islamism," says Aktay "is not a constant metaphysical discourse exempt from human interpretation (Aktay, 2013: 112). In spite of the fact that Islamists, with a similar attitude, generally approach to this intellectual dynamism through opening the door of *Ijtihad*[59] it is possible to say that those kinds of intellectual discussions do not much reverberate on the tevhidi Islamist communities when one thinks along with the point Aktay tries to make. The question for which I seek the

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[59]Ijtihad: independent reasoning" or "the utmost effort an individual can put forth in an activity (Esposito, 2013)

answer is about understanding how Islamists interpret the question of the unity of Islam as well as how they reconcile such principles they stress almost in every meeting and programme as to be united, to be brothers, not to separate and not to break apart with their realities. The answer obtained from the informants inevitably procreated the results in parallel with what they understand from the unity. Principal orders as regards the unity of Muslims and *ummah* (global Islamic community) consciousness in Quran and the literature on Prophet's Mohammed's sayings and deeds are mentioned in studies and programmes on Islam.

> The Believers are but a single Brotherhood: So make peace and reconciliation between your brothers; and fear Allah, that ye may receive Mercy (Quran, 49: 10)

> And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves; and remember with gratitude Allah´s favour on you; for ye were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye were on the brink of the pit of Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus doth Allah make His Signs clear to you: That ye may be guided, (Quran, 3: 103).

> And obey Allah and His Messenger; and fall into no disputes, lest ye lose heart and your power depart; and be patient and persevering: For Allah is with those who patiently persevere. (Quran, 8: 46)

> Be not like those who are divided amongst themselves and fall into disputations after receiving Clear Signs: For them is a dreadful penalty. (Quran, 3: 105)

> You see the believers as regards their being merciful among themselves and showing love among themselves and being kind, resembling one body, so that, if any part of the body is not well then the whole body shares the sleeplessness (insomnia) and fever with it. (Bukhari, Al-Adab, Volume 8, Book 73:40; Muslim, Book 32: 6260)

> Do not turn your back to each other. Do not hold grudge against each other. Do not get jealous of one another. Do not end your friendship. O, servants of Allah, be brothers," (Bukhari and Muslim, Ihya al-Ulum al Din, Vol. 2. 315)

Another determining element of the subject of this thesis is a sentence uttered by the cousin of the writer of this thesis, Mustafa (24), during a conversation about Islam taking place in a family gathering:

> Well... To whom we are supposed to believe? Tens of different hodjas (preachers) keep telling different things and blaming one another at TV programmes. To which one we should believe? Each religious community sees itself holding the truth. How can we know which one is taking the right path?

This schism, valid for every body of thought and ideology, either reproduces one of the existing divisions or keep those, like Mustafa, who have not given thought much to the issue at complete distance.

Montgomery Watt (1961) investigates how Islam was able to gather the fragmented tribal life of that period under a singular religious and intellectual roof. Moreover, in a general framework, he asserts that Prophet Muhammad claimed prophethood in such period that was at the time pregnant to political and economic transformation in Meccan and Medinan societies. For Watt, Prophet Muhammad transformed the economic change from reliance on nomadic pastoralism to reliance on commerce into a new religion by means of Quran deeply penetrated by mercantile terms (Watt, 1961: 6). In a period when blood-feud as a method of providing a measure of security for life was breaking down (Watt, 1961: 15), the Prophet Muhammad transformed the brotherhood based on tribe to the brotherhood based on religion (Watt, 1961: 11). Following this process, the Prophet Muhammad, with his charismatic leadership, constructed a charismatic community (ummah), which gave birth to an idea of unity between all tribal identities. This unity, afterwards, will be expressed as "ummah consciousness" to designate the brotherhood among all Muslims on earth. "Islam's degree of unity appears to be due first and foremost to a dynamic image, the image or idea of what has here been called the charismatic community" says Watt. (Watt, 1961: 142)

Nevertheless, by connecting a specific historical revolution directly to the contextual conditions of the period as well as to the necessities of transitional relations,

Watt ignores the discourse that may have been the fundamental dynamic of the change. The conclusion Watt makes, reminds one of the discussions taking place between Carlyle and Tolstoy: "Do Great Men make the history of nations or the very spirit of nations make their own history?" Do the great men instigate and move the people lying on the ground motionless and decaying like a piece of straw (Carlyle) or a nation having acquired the strength to move mobilizes itself on its own and chooses a leader representing the nations style and sentimentality (Tolstoy) (Petrov 2002). Watt certainly sides with Tolstoy for he associates the movement of Prophet Muhammad only to the spontaneous dynamics of change in the Arabian society.

Although Watt's work is a source that contributes to perceiving the processes of early formation of ummah consciousness, it is quite insufficient to clarify the relations of schism and division, which comprises the ground of this study.

When one screens the literature on the Islamic unity and disunity, one encounters two different and evident approaches: the theological approach and anthropological approach. These two approaches become more evident when the early periods of the history of Islam are at stake, because theology has constructed certain moulds of thought on the approach to Prophet Muhammad and to the generation of the Companions. There are common religious references amongst Muslims with regard to the superiority of the generation of the Companions and next two generations.[60] The political and religious schisms and wars that took place following the death of the Prophet are reserved because of those references; and not many comments with regard to those schisms and wars have been made. According to mainstream Sunni Islam -the most powerful school of Islamic intellectual history-, the events that happened at the time emerged as a result of a

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[60] To give a couple of examples of hadiths on the issue:
- My companions are like stars; whoever amongst them you follow, you will have prosperity. (Beyhakî, el-Medhal, p.164, Kenzu'l-ummal, no: 1002)
- The best people are those living in my generation, my companions. Then come those who follow them, then come those who follow the followers of my companions. Then there will come some communities whose act of witnessing will come before oaths, and the oaths by some of them will come before their witnessing. (Buhâri, Fedâilu'l-ashâb 1, Şehâdât 9)

difference in ijtihads[61], for there are two different ijtihads, one being wrong the other being accurate (in the conflicts between Aisha, Muawiya and Ali). This approach favoured in the thought of Sunni Islam is one of the typical examples where a social and historical fact (anthropology) is explained through doctrine (theology). The Islamist thought in Turkey – although some groups have been thought to side with Mutazila and Khawarij (The Outsiders) – generally has the thought of Sunni Islam, thus Islamists make similar interpretations relating to the abovementioned example. This silence on the period following the death of the Prophet when the first bloody conflict of the history of Islam occurred, has constructed the framework for the fundamental approaches in the following periods and on the constructing periods of basic disciplines such as fiqh (Islamic law), kalam (science of discourse) tafsir (exegesis of Quran), hadith (sayings and deeds of the Prophet) of the Islamic thought. Essentializing Islam, over-respecting particular figures and attributing heavenly features to them, thus causing the social reality to fail to reach our present day with a necessary transparency are the most evident feature of the theological approach (Al-Zein, 1977). Such approach inevitably prevents Muslims from developing Islamic perspectives on the periods in which they are living.

Approaching the religion as well as its socialized and institutionalized forms from the perspectives of economy and power, negating the possibility of a revelational experience beforehand, handling the religious experience with its social, economic and political dimensions are the explicit particularities of the anthropological approach coming to the fore by means of the studies on Islam conducted mostly by the non-Muslim theoreticians especially in 19th and 20th centuries. Watt, C. Geertz, Talal Asad, El-Zein, Gellner, Gilsenan are among these scholars. Despite the fact that those studies make arguments that are incompatible with the perceptions of Muslims on certain issues (explaining the experience of revelation within the psychological and pathological

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[61]The expression used to designate the difference in jurisprudence teaches Muslims that the issue only results from the divergence in opinion between two Companions, therefore indoctrinates the decency not to speak ill of the difference of opinion of two Companions to whom Muslims show respect.

frameworks and analyzing the concept of religion from a positivist and Marxist perspective), it is possible to state that they contribute to the understanding of Islam as much as the theological studies do.

Apart from these two forms of analysis, the studies dealing with both theological means (revelation) and social, economic and political meanings of the religion together, reading the historical adventure of Islam and Muslims based on anthropological realities and, as expected, carried out by Muslim philosophers such as Ali Shariati, Fazlur Rahman, Cabiri, Hassan Hanafi are closer to the theoretical standing on which this study has been grounded.

Cabiri (2001) formulates the most important reason for the recession of the civilization of Islam to be the dominance of theology over anthropology. Moreover, Hanafi (1979) asserts that theological Islam ignores the social, political and economic relations and that Islam's claim on this world can only be possible through an anthropological vision.

Since the matter in this study is the relations of conflict, division and schism among Muslims, an anthropological analysis presents more enlightening results for the purposes of this study and the readings through theological references have usually been unable to go beyond praising the attributes of particular historical subjects, thus the prosperous century and next two generations following that period that have been referred by each Muslim are ripped off from the realities of today's Muslims. One of the examples most open to theological interpretation is the study titled "The Method of Dispute in Islam" (1991) by Taha Cabir el Alvani. While criticizing the current schisms among Muslims through vital statements on the matter, the study idealizing the first period of the life of Companions by means of religious references as a way to exit inclines towards proving how much muslims are far away from that period. This method is also widely adopted in sohbet *halaqas* (religious gatherings or meetings) within Islamist communities. Islamoğlu (2013) however strictly opposes such idealizations:

> We are estranged from the truth... We made up the myth of the
> Companion generation. Due to this myth, we cannot see the evil

and the enemies of Islam cannot see the good. (Islamoğlu, 2013 conference: İslam'da Devlet ve Siyaset Tasavvuru)

A Muslim researcher who aspires to understand the subject is mostly accused of insulting the Companions, disregarding the sayings and deeds of the Prophet (Mawdudi, 2013) or of consecrating the whole Islamic history (Yüksel, 2008). To exemplify, a Muslim who enunciates his or her suspicion regarding certain hadiths can easily be declared to be an enemy of hadith, on the on hand; a Muslim who thinks that it is necessary to respect the tradition, namely, the theoretical and practical corpus produced by the Islamic history and that it is not possible to build a future without tradition can also easily be accused of consecrating the past, on the other hand. In other words, the dichotomy of traditionalism-modernism among Muslims creates a vivid environment of dispute and opposition.

Is it possible to identify a discursive foundation for communication beyond and above all those differences of the Islamic thought that can be diversified as many as the different cultures and humane perceptions in the world? What are the principles for a ground of dialogue with differences? Those principles will bring us to the issue of ethics which will be discussed in the following chapter of this study. In this chapter, Islamists will be listened to on the topic of Islamic unity.

One night Çetin and Fikret with their family visited me to see my newly born daughter. Those brothers are the executives of a Foundation in Ankara and they have been active in the Islamists community for thirty-forty years. Seizing the opportunity, I wanted to talk to them about the study I have been conducting for this thesis.

When the topic came to the issue of Islamic unity, Çetin said that only in Ankara there are almost fifty tevhidi Islamists NGOs, communities, grassroots organizations and etc. Among them are there big massive groups as well as small local groups.

When I asked what he thinks about the Islamic unity, he replied by smiling:

> In Turkey there are five million presidents, presidents of chambers, foundations, executive of buildings etc. This is the case for us Muslims, as well. However, the joke aside, diversity is a reality of life, which was the situation in the Companions'

society. Every Muslim did not think alike. Moreover, after the Prophet died, this diversity transformed into wars and thousands of people died.

At that point I reminded him that the diversities in the society of Companions did not conflict with the charismatic authority of the Prophet and asked, "Are charismatic leaders necessary for Muslims after the Prophet to put up with each other and to live under the same intellectual roof?" Is there no other possibility for such unity? "Secondly, today's disputes among Muslims are sufficient to make them ignore one another and tolerate each other through basic courtesy manners[62]. Nevertheless will those differences not lead to bigger political conflicts or perhaps to the divisions that include violence when they meet power, state and its apparatuses?"

Çetin did not answer the first question but he agreed with me on the second question. Fikret, on the one hand, complained about how fragmented we were and on the other hand tried to tell in fact how this situation was a normal process.

General attitude of the people from the communities with whom I conducted interviews towards Islamic unity incorporate the idea that this situation stems from the human factor, from the concept of *nafs* to which Muslims frequently refer. The comments on the *nafs* as I will emphasize further pave the way for an Islamic ethics by which humility is considered to be the preliminary condition. (Ramadan, 2009; 2010)

> People have *nafs*. Even if you have been in Islamic struggle, the *nafs* will not leave you until you die. I suppose that the believers should re-learn this religion again and should start with learning how to be humble (Uğur, 47).

> The most frequent word in Quran is Allah. Allah is omnipotent and omniscient, Allah is the richest, which does not signify the megalomania of Allah. On the contrary, this idea constructs the relations between Allah and servants and relations among servants. Allah knows, you the servant do not. Allah is powerful, you the servant are weak. Allah is rich, you the servant are poor. This idea teaches that being Muslims first of all is related to knowing your limits and your place and to have humility. In the

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[62]To put it another way, silence again works as a mechanism that blurs the reality.

relationship between servants, both subjects should be aware of the power above them, thus they should be humble, and then the world will be filled with justice and mercy. (İhsan, 50)

During my interviews with Islamists, the most common complain I heard was about egocentrism. In other words, Islamists think that they are not good servants of Allah (iyi kul). The tevhidi Islamist thought that stresses the questioning and criticizing attitude in understanding Islam is the source of the assessments demonstrating the influence of modernism and stating that this attitude is a modern movement, which I have stated in the part on anti-traditionalism. While the ground of the truth is the secular mind for the Western man who destroyed the metaphysical and theological powers; this ground for the Islamists being motivated by the same idea, is the picture in the Islamist mind drawn by what Quran says. The Islamists who frequently criticize the anti-metaphysical approach by the West in effect monopolize the truth in an opposite direction. As Çetin (45) complains, "Everyone says Quran and Sunnah. But almost everyone speaks of a different Quran and Sunnah."

There the difference is about what is most insisted upon, which makes the ways of dealing with truth more prominent, rather than the content of the claims on truth. Since this issue has been dealt in the previous chapter, how Islamists build the relationship between being a servant and being a subject will be discussed through presentation of discursive order and acts that constructs the Islamists identity by means of a couple of examples encountered during the course of the study.

A Foundation organized a programme titled "Our Unforgettable Values." The aim of the programme was to introduce the prominent names in Islamists struggle in Turkey to the youth, to narrate their exemplary lives, thus to present role-models to the youth.[63] The participation was really high to the meeting held on February 9. The topic

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[63] The tradition of presenting role-models through exemplary lives has become a common part of the literature for a very long time. The most important texts of this literature are the studes carried out on the lives of the Prophet and his Companions.

for that day was the life of Rasim Özdenören[64]. Some of the authors from the literary world and the writers from the community who know Rasim Özdenören -who was himself present at the meeting- introduced him. They gave a break during the course of speeches and treats were served. At that moment, one of our friends Erdi (22), approaching from a different angle, said that the format of the programme was wrong. He thought that from an Islamic point of view, praising a believer in his presence was the worst behaviour towards him or her. A Muslim can be praised and remembered with benediction only in his absence, because the Prophet Muhammad used to silence those who praise him against his face; however they were praising Rasim Özdenören with such expressions as the great man, the man of the cause, the man of the struggle. Although Özdenören deserved many of these attributes, the worst part of this was the fact that he was present at the moment of praising. Some of the friends said that Rasim Özdenören was not an ordinary man; hence there was nothing wrong in the format of the program. Eventually, Erdi was not taken seriously and getting angry, he left the programme with the awareness that no one considered his argument seriously.

The self-confidence and pretentious style of certain Islamists I encountered in the places I visited during my study was quite attention-grabbing. While very qualified discussions on such issues as Western thought, enlightenment and modernism sometimes took place; occasionally the interviews were so disorderly that it became hard to compile and to frame them properly. Those Islamists whose jargon was more based on Quran and who employs sentences from Quran, hadiths and a plain style that the public can understand charge the Islamists of whom we speak with intellectualism, arrogance and pride.[65] Whereas some of those who are exposed to this accusation claim that the accusers have shallow thoughts, others with a self-criticizing attitude complain about how they become estranged from the Quranic jargon and about the decrease in their sensitiveness to their religious services. During the course of our study, it has been

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[64] A famous muslim thinker in Turkey

[65] Even a song called "Entel Abiler" was composed by the music group "Kardeşlik Çağrısı".

observed that particular religious communities mostly have such distinctive jargons. To put it another way, these differences in the approaches to religious texts and religious life, as I see them, emerge as an important problem that divides the Muslims community and determines the toleration limits instead of being simple psychological states or character analysis.

The common understanding in religious communities and cults that certain religious services fall after a certain stage, and certain weaknesses are overcome as well as the attitude of glorifying subjects,[66] are still valid among Islamists in spite of the criticisms drawn towards such understanding and attitudes.

> I am from a family that believes in cults and that sort of things. We used to overrate the leaders of the communities. We did not ascribe to them our weaknesses of *nafs* as they are the leaders of this struggle. I never thought that a leader of ours could be proud, could be infected by the illness of egoism or our Muslim brothers could stay away from each other because of such trivial reasons. But Islam as we learnt it says the opposite of that and our way of education did not allow for such thoughts. Now, I strongly believe in that *nafs* leaves no one until their death (Tarık, 27).

Remembering what Uğur (47) said above and combining his critics with the judgements of other Islamists, a fundamental question arises: What dissociates a Muslim

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[66] One of the anecdotes that is frequently narrated in cults and favoured by traditional communities: Once upon a time there was the only son of an aged and anxious woman, being instructed by *Ghawth al-A'zam*, Shaykh Geylani (May his mystery be sanctified) This esteemed lady had gone to her son's cell and seen that he had nothing to eat but a piece of dry, black bread. Her maternal compassion was aroused by his emaciated condition resulting from his asceticism. She felt sorry for him. Later she went to *Ghawth al-A'zam* in order to complain, and saw the Shaykh was tucking into roast chicken. Out of her concern, she said: "O Master! My son is dying of hunger while you are eating chicken!" Whereupon *Ghawth al-A'zam* said to the chicken: "Rise up, with God's permission!" At this, the cooked chicken bones assembled and were thrown out of the dish as an entire live chicken. This has been related unanimously through many reliable and documented channels as a marvel of someone whose extraordinary wonder-working is world-famous. *Ghawth al-A'zam* said to her: "When your son reaches this level, then he too can eat chicken." Thus, the meaning of *Ghawth al-A'zam*'s words is this: whenever your son's spirit rules his body, and his heart rules the desires of his soul, and his reason rules his stomach, and he wants pleasure for the sake of offering thanks, then he may eat delicious things (Risale-i Nur, The Flasshes, 19th Flash).

from a secular in terms of morality? What is the "ideal human" sketched out in the community and NGO activities of Muslims?

> We are so engaged in the matter of creed and in our intellectual discussions that it seems to me that we have forgotten the morality, decency[67] and being a good person. A short while ago, a friend of mine called me to get some information about the man who wants to get married to his daughter. It is interesting that he asked me how the man's creed was in terms of Tawhed. In reply to this I said, "Why don't you ask me about the boy's morality or whether he is honest, humble or reliable? Why don't you ask me whether he gossips or whether he is passionate and you ask me about the principles of belief that he can learn by reading a book? In fact, our problem as Muslims is the fact that personal differences are disguised as intellectual differences. Unfortunately, we do not have the morals of collaboration. (ibrahim, 46).

Being unable to cooperate for common points was the complaint uttered by almost all interviewees. The idea that here is no need for a central organisation represents the dimension of Islamists' perception on community that diverts from cult or traditional communities. However, I hesitated whether the dividedness of the Islamists is most of the time the normalized frame of an inevitable and ungovernable situation after a while or it is the result of a real intellectual standpoint.

> Islamic unity both in global terms and under the roof of a nation-state is practically impossible. In order to realize such a unity, a highly centred organisation is necessary. Nevertheless, establishing small organisation in provinces or districts where every community of believers dwell is more applicable. Our problem, however, is not our inability to gather under one roof, but inability to cooperate for the common issues (Ayhan, 46).

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[67] The concept of decency for Islamists is used to designate the education or schooling to ensure the unity of theory and practice so that Islamic thought can be adopted and reflected in manners. İbrahim emphasizes on the complain about how theory cannot be reflected in practice.

Nonetheless, there are the members –though they are few – of Islamist communities who regards the dividedness of Islamists as normal and as a necessity of the practice of developing communities.

Veli (56) is an experienced community leader who has preserved his attitude of Tawhed until today, to put in the expressions of Islamists, who has persisted in his cause and way.

> Although Muslims occasionally debate with one another on the matters of learning and politics, the picture is not as pessimistic as we assume. A serious matter of division today is only about the debates on what is happening in Syria. There is no necessity or possibility of amalgamation under one roof. We, as foundations, associations and communities sharing the same Islamic thought, perform activities in our own regions and above all, we have a unity of hearts. For example, in 2004 we conducted good activities and benevolent actions with ten Islamic NGOs under the title of Platform for Solidarity with Palestine. We made the basketball game between Turkey and Israel cancelled, which drew very much attention at the time. This time, we will convene under the Platform for Solidarity with Muslims and carry out common actions.

The Platform for Solidarity with Palestine and the Platform for Solidarity with Muslims which was established at a later stage, are two platforms established by the common initiative of Islamists communities and NGOs which are the point of focus of this study. Those platforms were highly important in so far as acting together on the axis of common sensitivities has been yearned by most Muslims, however, the conclusion I reach through the interviews I conducted about these two experiences of collaboration and my involvement with them points out the fact that Muslim's trial with the "other" still continues.

On January 3, 2009, we were marching from Mithatpaşa Street to Abdi İpekçi Park in order to protest Israel's attacks against Palestine after we performed the noon prayer at Kocatepe Mosque. It was the first time I encountered such a huge crowd organised by Islamists. Although the matter was supposed to be a common sensitivity such as Palestine, we were chanting slogans about our own world and excluding the

"other" from our territory among the foreign glances by the public. As I will discuss in the next chapter, the language and the style of Islamists sounded utterly unfamiliar to the society.

I learned that this demonstration was organised by ten Islamist groups called Platform for Solidarity with Palestine. We have arranged various demonstrations to protest about Palestine and Iraq before but they could become popularized only when they were organized under the name of a political party (Saadet, Fazilet). After a couple of demonstrations and events similar to that kind, the Platform for Solidarity with Palestine became inert and de facto dispersed, the reasons for which I heard from Fikret:

> Platform failed because of simple and unrelated reasons and disengagement occurred. For example, during a meeting there was a debate on whether music is *haram* (forbidden by religion) or not between two NGOs. Although our elder brother Hüsnü Aktaş, who thinks that this issue is unrelated to our cause; the debate harmed the ground for dialogue between those two organisations.

Again in another meeting, there occurred a discussion on hadiths between two groups that were members of the platform. According to one group, the hadith sources that have reached us need revising. The other group thought that these sources had already been revised and reached us in an unquestionable way. One of the parts was regarded as denialist of hadiths and the other seemed to have adopted a tradition through consecrating without questioning the rights or wrongs. Even for a common sensitivity, we should have set out with those who think alike us.

The Platform for Solidarity with Muslims was a trial of re-convention by five or six groups apart from those who left the previous platform. The first programme was a conference on the uprising in Egypt and Syria and Arabian uprising held in conference room of teacher's lodge. The participation was very high in order to ensure the motivation to come together after a long time of break. After the conference, however, in the conversation with Ahmet (21), one of the organisers, we complained that we constantly uttered same sentences with same people and were unable to convey our messages to the society and playing our own game by ourselves.

When one takes the mosaic of Islamic thought in Turkey, another salient feature of two experiences of platform organising is that ten groups who were fairly homogeneous found points of rupture in time and turned into a more homogeneous union this time. It seems that the contraction and division will continue and claims on truth will be sharper as well as the place of the other in self will fade.

Fikret narrates an offer they brought to the platform as foundation and the reply they got:

> We thought that the issue of Palestine was not only a matter for Muslims but also for a matter of humanity within the framework of principles of rights and justice. With this thought in mind, we offered to contact with other NGOs so as to open our demonstrations to public participations, to make them popular, to meet on the axis of common concerns and to build common grounds. The reason for the refusal surprised us: We do not cooperate with those who do not think alike us!

Another comment on the division made by theologian Gürbüz Deniz (45) during a conversation I had with him:

> Communities eliminate the possibility of discussion. They should be organisation tolerating the difference. Unfortunately, if you enter a community today, you will have to rent your mind to the leaders.

After this harsh criticism, Gürbüz touches upon another dimension of current de facto situation.

> Although people are pessimistic about the current picture, I believe oppositional ideas keep the language of critique lively, which makes the religious thought rich. After all, what we understand as Islam is the interpretation to which we reach through our intellectual capacity. We should be aware of the fact that we cannot completely surround Islam, thereby difference is normal, it is even necessary.

Gürbüz's comment, as I see it, was referring to the conceptualization of ethics about human and reality of society that comes from Aristotle and Hegel (Erdoğan,

2001), which also be discussed further in the following chapters. Özel (1998: 115) citing from Ghazali relays a similar interpretation:

> For the prosperity of this world and for wisdom, negligence should be widespread. If all the people strive for eating halal (permissible by religion) for forty days, the world will be devastated because of their asceticism, the bazaars and ways of earning livelihood will be vacant.

Another striking point in Gürbüz's comment is his emphasis on the idea that religion is a matter of reason. This point comprises the importance attributed to reason and criticism in Islamic thought on the one hand, and the complaints about the negation of reason in the favour of unquestionable faith in communities on the other.

Two schools in Islamic history come to the fore with regard to the origin of charisma: Shia that is known to be centred around charismatic leaders, and the religious doctrine of which is even constructed in relation to those personalities and khawarij (The Outsiders) the acts of which are centred around the discourse of charisma and communities and that puts the doctrine rather than personalities in the centre (Watt, 1961). The Shia thought having a theology and mythology that incorporates the Imams and their successors, waits for a leader (Messiah) for the construction of a future world of justice and peace. The Khawarij is a world of discourse exceeding personalities but in fact the leader himself is confined to that discourse (Mustafa, 2001; Vatandaş, 2011).

We were at the symposium for Hassan al-Banna. One of the leaders of Islamic communities was walking towards the chair to deliver his speech. While our eyes were laid on the speaker, one of my friends sitting next to me, Ömer (30), made a statement that briefly describes the charismatic society. Leaning towards me, Ömer said:

> Mehmet abi has taught the young people within his community such a discourse and religious perception that one day even if he sees a wrongdoing by himself and wants to change his mind, the first opponents will be those young people he educated but none and they will again bring him to the 'right path'(!).

The Iranian society has been tied to Shia doctrine for many centuries. They had been waiting for the lost Imam Messiah that will bring a social revolution establishing

right and justice for many centuries. However, only one man like Khomeini introduced the idea of *Velayete faqih* (Islamic Government) and changed a huge intellectual past. Erkilet (2010) analyzes in detail to what extent the role of the cult of charismatic leader was effective in building the religious thought within the context of Iranian revolution.

Aktay (2011) thinks that the charismatic authority the loss of which Weber grieves for has in effect not died and it is the characteristics of the modern societies as well. Even though Weber's thesis that the charisma is a quality peculiar to traditional societies remains as a deduction on the period of dichotomies, it is still important in so far it provides theoretical tools. It can be said that both charismatic leader and discourse of charisma are intertwined with the social, their weights and effects change in different periods, though. This situation can also be observable in the history of Islam.

The most obvious fronts one can see looking at the inability of Muslims to act together are the traditionalists who are conservative elders closed to change (older than the age of thirty) and the young generation that is more aware of the other and favours the change and dynamism (between the ages twenty and thirty). At origin of this division lies the maturity coming with age and life experience as well as difference of generations in terms of dominant intellectual paradigms in 1980's and 2000s.

> There are three political parties: radical, liberals and conservatives. The youth is generally radical because they have no history to lose but futures to win. Middle aged people are liberals because they have both history to lose and future to win. Since the elderly have history not to lose but any future to win, they are conservatives (Cündioğlu, in Ersin & Özkan 1996: 63)

The different voices in closed strict organisation first of all, in general, are heard from young people, then from middle-aged groups, lastly and most weakly, from the elderly. For example, Muslims who are at their 50s and see the particular mistakes of the Islamist movement usually carry out a silent opposition; however, in order not to break the operation of the movement or to cause other problems, they can continue working with the same logic as the movement. During the interviews, it was possible to see the restlessness of the older brothers who are themselves responsible for the current

situation of the movement as regards the way the movement functions in their answers and psychological states. With a gesture of reproach on his face but with caution at the same time not to lose control, İbrahim (45) says:

> If the work that is to be done is in the benefit of Muslims in the long run, let us do it, otherwise, we should not take a step towards that. After all, there is a great labour and effort. It is necessary to respect this effort and sacrifice; it shouldn't be wasted.

The young generation has been more courageous on enunciating their favouring change, seeking for new ways and criticizing on what has been done. Middle aged people stand in between but the effect of their position cause more reactions.

Yalçın (26) who is a friend of mine from the department said that a friend of him from Gebze, Ertuğrul (35) would come and my meeting him would be useful in terms of contributions to my study. On the evening of the day he called, we met at Mekan Café.

Ertuğrul runs an Educational Course (Dershane) in Gebze; he is also engaged in community works. One could tell that he read West literature as well as the Islamic literature from the references he gave. He followed up the actual and used the technology efficiently. He knew very well the Islamic community and had a self-critical standpoint. We carried out a fairly sincere interview because of the friend who introduced us to each other.

First of all I asked him about the reflections of the Islamic Tawhed thought that Muslims in Turkey knew with the translated works in 1970s and the intellectual and actual changes during this process.

> The Islamic thought in Turkey has been built on a renovation and a criticism, meaning that at the heart of all thoughts laid a critical attitude. Especially there had been a criticism of the tradition. The tradition emphasised the absolute loyalty; it did not question it. The tradition incorporated the order they got from their elder brothers or sheiks into their lives without questioning it because they believe in the rightfulness of anything the elders or the sheiks said. The new Islamic thought was utterly opposite of this attitude. But while questioning the relationship between sheikh and disciple, we began to realize

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that what was expected from us before our elders was highly similar to that kind of relationship. Moreover, the ones who question and criticizes began to be deemed to be problematic people within the structures. In effect, the islamist thought were training people who are open to criticism; but when that trained person began to criticize the elders, this critical attitude was seen as a problem. I think this is what produced the schisms.

What Ertuğrul said is important in that it reminds the fact that social memory and cultural habits cannot easily internalize the external discourses. With a similar critical attitude, Hamza Türkmen (2013) says that Turkish society is not used to the concepts of criticism, change and transformation and that nationalism, Sufism and Sunnnism has placed them in its social memory, which is also widespread among Islamists (Türkmen, 2013: 145). Furthermore Bulaç (2005: 65) claims that a powerful nation-state is the most important tool for Islamic change in the minds of Muslims as the nation-state was vital as the actor of development and economic as well as technologic progress in the West.

Although the Islamic discourse was critical, this critical attitude beginning to develop in 1970s did not last very long. This critical attitude, as Türkmen points out, turned into a mechanism of schism and division, which was in fact a dilemma into which twentieth century Western thought fell and one of the people who searched a way to exit from this dilemma was Habermas. The biggest problem of the twentieth century Western world where the science transformed into a sphere of research and development and stopped being a liberating activity, where the industrial revolution brought capitalism rather than prosperity and political revolution yielded nation-states was the fact that it constructed the lifeworld and indoctrinated a uniform life (Habermas, 1987; 1996). According to Habermas, the solution is not to pass towards postmodernity but to realize a communicative action with those could adopt the truer or valid argument which is the sole authority that does not dominate (1970: 369-74) to overcome the barriers shielding the truth and validity through reflexivity and self-reflexivity and to try to reach that validity (1973: 17-18).

Preferring the communicative reason instead of Kant's subject-centred reason (1990: 55-56), Habermas thinks that it is possible to reach truth or validity through

rational consensus free from domination (1971: 284). Habermas maintains that in this process, the only operative motive is the cooperative search for truth or legitimacy (1973: 17-18.). However, he says, with a view to adopting the motivation, it is necessary to grasp the context which he calls the ideal speech situation. Therefore, communication in this context can be realized on the grounds of forceless force of the better argument (1970: 369-74; 1975: 95-110). At the same time Habermas requires us to question our traditional interpretations of needs and interests to look at them as a part of our socially constructed reality which has the possibility of being otherwise than it is, on the one hand; against the danger of falling into totalitarianism of his own situation, he clearly remarks that his theory postulates "neither the unilinearity, nor the necessity, nor the continuity, nor the irreversibility of history" on the other hand (1979: 139-140). Nevertheless he does not clearly explain how to establish relationships with those who do not have such intellectual transparency. He affirms that this situation does not necessitate power to operate but it is necessary to enter into process of enlightening. Since tolerance intervenes in the moment between a subject's truth claim and the intersubjective consensus on the validity of that claim (Thomassen, 2006: 457), Habermas postulates that in the communication carried out with a view to finding truth or legitimacy, the primary criterion is a motivation of tolerance, called discursive ethics (Thomassen, 2006: 439-462). He states that the power that does not create domination is valid in all the processes of communication, which manifests itself in the concept of tolerance.

> There is no tolerance without intolerance; indeed in some cases, intolerance is what makes tolerance possible. For instance, if tolerated, "the Nazi regime" and "the political ideologists who combats the liberal state" would undermine the tolerant society. (Habermas, in White 1980: 440)

During all these processes, Habermas asserts, communicative ethics requires abandoning self-deception of thinking that we as "isolated individuals," are always the sufficient judges of the justifiability of our own interests. (White, 1980: 1007-1017)

The ideal speech situation which Habermas tries to establish through rationality and free of domination is actually resonates with the efforts of Islamists to abandon their *nafs* and to catch a ground for dialogue where the truth (Allah's words) dominates. The difference certainly stems from the fact that Muslims regard Quran as a given foundation for truth. At first glance, one might claim that no deliberation relationship can be built on a rational basis with those who absolutely believe in truth. Boon (2010) thinks that Habermas' reflexive model is not capable when Islamic fundamentalism, particularly Sayyid Qutb's ideas is at issue (Boon, 2010: 153). Thinking that Sayyid Qutb according to whom the values in which he believes are truth in themselves, refutes communication (Boon, 2010: 160), Boon adds that for Habermas the only solution is to refer to law (Boon, 2010: 155). According to Habermas, such typical dogmatism is fundamentalism (non-self-reflective "rigid forms of life" aiming at the ultra-stability" of their identities) (Habermas, 1998: 223). And the fundamentalist thought:

> Leaves no room for reflection on their relationship with other worldviews with which they share the same universe of discourse and against those competing validity claims they can advance their positions only on the basis of reasons. They leave no room for reasonable disagreement. (Habermas, 1998: 224)

Although it is commonly believed that the experience of struggle Sayyid Qutb had is reflected in the harshness of his language and style; the actual problem is whether any deliberation takes place under the conditions of Habermas's ideal speech situation, not whether Sayyid Qutb enters rational deliberative processes. Secondly, this motivation towards intolerance of a Muslim between the pre-Islamic period of ignorance and Islam is actually similar to the methods of constructing the consciousness of a proletarian subject and of keeping alive the praxis. This non-reconciliating jargon deployed in order to compose a powerful mass and actuality does not directly prove that his idea is non-deliberative. Beyond Sayyid Qutb, if one thinks in the context of Tawhed thought in Islam, the critical process before coming to this point, it is possible to claim that the grounds explaining why Islamists have faith in Quran as an absolute source of knowledge can be discussed in the ideal speech situation as Habermas would desire. To put it another way, the rational reasons which create the very ground of faith in a text are

reflexively open to deliberation. It is necessary to emphasize that the value and importance of Quran for Muslims is not at the level of a scripture which Kant regards as no more than a book fallen into men's hands" (Kant, [1793] 1996: 98) or "something that chance tossed into our hands" (Kant, [1793] 1996: 100) which has to be interpreted in the interest of morality. The historical value and authenticity of Quran is centrally important for every Muslim who goes beyond traditional piety, and reason is the determining factor at this stage. Additionally, since Habermas states that the needs and desires behind certain rationalities should be able to question again and stresses that his own position is not exempt from such questionability, one might maintain that the faith that incorporates desires and needs has a ground on which it can be discussed with communicative action. As Habermas himself states he has to place the piety of a believing subject on rational grounds. However, if one takes the danger of falling into socially constructed categories into account, such rationality does not require directly refuting metaphysics. Consequently, the acceptance of afterlife is not directly related to power or domination and Islamists' claim on the afterlife can be regarded as a part of communicative action. According to the general judgement reached in this study, I would argue that such possibility exists for Islamic thought whereby faith has been constructed throughout a rational process.

The fact that Islamists negate the flow of thought, its change and transformation and the reality of thought and their illusion of universalizing a certain context was the second point in Ertuğrul's criticism.

> The community which is regarded by Turkish Islamists as a model, is certainly the Egyptian community Muslim Brotherhood. However, when we look at the Brotherhood, we can see that it accommodates different forms of organising and becoming communities in different countries. For example, the Brotherhood displays different forms of organising in Yemen, Syria and Tunisia. But we neglected the different intellectual branches within the Brotherhood and its flexibility applicable to cultural contexts. When someone speaks of the Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb's book *Milestones* came to our mind. Accordingly, we tried to apply his interpretation word-for-word to our land. Therefore, we failed to make it compatible with our specific

social structure as well as cultural and political history, which inevitably shaped our perceptions on state and society.

I had learned that Ertuğrul and two of his friends thinking alike him left the community of which they were once members. I wanted to listen to them about their experience.

> We were members of the community until 2010. Because of three reasons, we could not continue with the older brothers of that community. Those three reasons are about the issues of voting, mechanism of obedience in community and issues on women. The brothers thought that voting was the borderline of blasphemy but it was only a strategic and methodological issue for us. While they attributed importance to the centrality of obedience in the relations of responsibility within the community, we thought that critical language must be dominant rather than obedience. For them, the actual duty of woman was to be mother and her place was home, however, we believed that women must be on the foreground in the Islamic struggle as men are. [68]

> We discussed this matter with fifteen or twenty friends who think alike for eight months. We would either continue with working with the older brothers and have the same problems or compose a new organisation or join in another organisation whose structure of thought was close to ours. After all, Allah commands to be community, to be together with a community and there was no fourth option for us. Most of the time those who leave, establish their own entity or they disperse around. We chose the third option and looked around for organisation which thinks like us. In the end, we decided on İnsan ve Medeniyet Hareketi (The Movement of Human and Civilisation) and joined them."

The decision by Ertuğrul and his friends is not a frequently seen case in Islamic communities. It was even the first example of its kind I encountered during the interviews for the thesis. As I recall, after a small group of young Islamists worked

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[68] Ertuğrul told that women also participated in their consultation meetings. He thought that by participating in those meetings women also got involved in decision making and action processes, shared their opinions and directly knew about what was happening.

together and organised courses and conversations, they joined an Islamist Community. But after a while, accusing the community of blasphemy, they left and established their own autonomous association, which was the common scenario. Small groups leave big communities and then form their own organisations; this division keep this cycle continuing. Islamists cannot still recognize the elephant wandering out. The domination of the "same" continues. (Mayama 2010: 18).

When I asked Ertuğrul about the factors that alienate two generations from one another, he focused on reading:

> The fact that the young generation reads and the leading generation reiterates itself and cannot innovate itself disappoints the young generation. The idea that 'Our elder brother does not have an opinion more qualified and socphisticated than ours' is the expression of disappointment.
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> ...We should accept and cannot question the fact that they took pains with us. But our brothers were busy with action and struggle. They both engaged in business and fulfil their responsibilities as leaders. However, they did not read much. The youth read more, innovate themselves in intellectual terms. After a while, the intellectual difference between two generations caused intellectual disputes which resulted in schism.

I asked him about his experiences as a person who was once present in the conflict between traditionalists and reformists:

> For example, when we saw one of our friends with a young woman on the street, we immediately carry out a consultation, discharge him of the duties granted to him and cut out our relationship with him. There is a verse in Quran: "It is by of grace from Allah that you were gentle with them. Had you been harsh, hardhearted, they would have dispersed from around you" To whom was this sentence sent? It was sent for the bowmen who abandoned their places in the Battle of Uhud, thus leading seventy people to martyrdom.

Ertuğrul fundamentally criticized the communities for negating the ebbs and flows of humans' heart in the realities of life. The influence of modern life on the youth is ignored and the expectations are really harsh. [69]

How was the past of the relationships of Muslims whereby they otherize each other? When asked them to compare the '70s and '80s with today, they said that the atmosphere today was more positive and softer than it was in the past. Muslims used to directly declare one another unbeliever, event have quarrels sometimes. Although they have not found a way to act together yet today, they oppose each other in a softer way than they did in the past and most importantly they are more cautious in declaring each other unbeliever. Eventually they utter these words: "I will not say that you are in blasphemy but I have to say that what you say is blasphemy in my opinion."

Despite that this phrase may be regarded as a soft and an indirect way to declare the other person as unbeliever, still this political language is a development for the Islamists as the subjects necessitating this expression have diminished and the borders for blasphemy are defined not according to enmity and conflict but on a ground that makes dialogue continuous.

4.2. Seceding Youth

Ersan (28) was a young person who left his community five years ago. As the friends who witnessed that time told me, he was a studious, hardworking and disciplined person. He revived the organisation of which he was a member with his friends and developed new programs and activities. For example, he proposed the breakfast meetings on Saturdays which the community still continues and at least thirty or forty university students participate. From time to time, he criticised the organisation and accused it of not being open to novelties and entering into world of the youth. After a while, such independent behaviours drew attention and he got warning from the

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[69] The difficulties in living up to the moral principles of Islam in the relationships with opposite sex, the laziness created the technology and entertainment culture are among the effects of modern life. Briefly, it is possible to speak of the overall modern Western culture which Baudrillard calls "tempting." Music, cinema, consumption, pleasure, speed and carpe diem.

organisation on the grounds that he act independently and he was left between complying or not complying with the existing structure. Consequently, he left the organisation and started working for establishing his own community. He still periodically organises meetings with university students and carries out reading and discussion sessions on topics such as history of Islam and history of Western thought.

One day after a discussion session where we discussed *Araba Sevdası* by Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem in Kızılay, we were walking on the street and talking. The point came to his activities and he told me that it would be better to work under a different institutional roof such as an association and he was working for establishing such an organisation. When I asked him why he needed a separate organisation while there were many places of associations and foundations, he stated that he had difficulties in freely carrying out what he wanted. Starting by opening a student house he believed to have conducted his own activities with his own agenda.

4.2.1. What is happening in Neighbourhoods?

Most of the young Islamists I interviewed in Ankara were the former members of neighbourhood communities who came to Ankara for university life. Islamic discourse and consciousness as well as social and political insight change from one Muslim to another and according to level of education and cultural environment. The relations of division and schism continue more obviously in neighbourhood organisation with more rough examples. We will listen to Cihan telling his intellectual adventure at the beginning of this thesis.

> İhsan Süreyya Sırma, who is a respectable historian and researcher known in Islamic community one day, visited the new association we opened in our neighbourhood. Following a fruitful speech lasting almost two hours and boring no one, our elder brothers in the community were having a private conversation with him in a separate room. At one moment during conversation, "What do you advise us for our local activities?" asked one of the brothers. Professor Sırma drew attention to a situation in which we were probably deeply embedded: "In the small-scale local activities, the gossip culture

is very common. Muslims usually cannot find time to work in accordance with their true aims, for they keep getting on each other's back."

Now I remember that rumors and hearsay were among the most exciting activities in our little neighbourhood. We already had no significant reputation in the eyes of the common people in the neighbourhood. We were just radical proponents of Iran or Saudi Wahhabis who do not even perform the Friday prayer. [70] We were living the religiosity we produced on our own with our own writers, books and professors in our little world. The most popular subject in our community was those who acted in ways that didn't comply with our community, who were dissenters and opponents and who behaved independently. As the Prophet Muhammad resented three people for they did not participated in the Battle of Tabuk for fifty days and did not talk to them, we did not use to talk to such Muslims, stopped saluting them and isolating them; we used to keep that attitude until they repented and complied with the procedures and methods of the community. This attitude was not random but dictated by our community leader. The leader determined to whom and for how long we would behave with such attitude. When I observed a cold attitude by my friends, I used to get afraid due to the idea that I may have been subjected to exclusion.

Lately I learned that I have become a subject of gossip just as I was doing it against others in the past. For yonks, people have been talking about me –either positively or negatively.

One day, I introduced Cihan to Enes (29), who had the same experience as him. Enes was one of the young people in a foundation in İstanbul. He also became pointed within the community and had opposition of discourse and actions. When he came to Ankara to study at university, the already problematic relations ruptured. Nevertheless, as the conversation progressed, I realized that their end turned out to be different.

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[70] The proponents of Iran: The Iranian revolution was reflected in Turkish media as Islamic radicalism and there is a acknowledgement that Islamists were influenced by that revolution very much at the time. Those who do not perform Friday prayers: In fact, a considerable part of muslims who perform their prayers five times a day do not perform the Friday prayer, the reason for which stems from the idea of Dar-al Harb in Hanafi school. Since the Islamic rules were not operative in government, the Friday Prayer couldn't be performed in such a country. Islamists, in this way were trying to display a political consciousness and standing. Wahabbisim is again another designation in order to point out the influence of Saudi Salafism and Ibn Taymiyyah on Islamic thought. All those concepts feed the negative attitudes of towards Islamists.

Actually the problems were experienced by either party. As a young person, I also made mistakes and the community had some mistakes as well. Nonetheless, when I met the elder and younger brothers from the community in my neighbourhood, I encountered with a very mature attitude. Their maturity and intellectual wisdom affected me very much and now we have much better relationships. (Enes, 29)

From what they told, it seemed that the communities of which Cihan and Enes were once members were similar in intellectual terms. But there was an evident difference for Cihan. He wanted to express this difference with the short reaction he gave after hearing Enes' experience: "We went through same things but our brothers have the mind of peasants. Therefore we were exposed to different treatments."

It is already expected that there can be serious differences in the activities of a community in a suburb and the activities of a community in the city centre. In particular, the elements such as the city culture, lifestyle, and pluralism peculiar to city life inevitably reflect the formation of religious communities. As I see it, the most important variant for such difference is the level of education and culture, which determines the intellectual content. In this respect, Enes' community known as radical Islamist is obviously different from other radical Islamist movements. Enes' community is an organisation in Fatih, İstanbul, that is, in the city centre, and its members mostly consists of university graduates, scholars and businessman, namely, upper middle-class Muslims. Cihan's community is an organisation which functions in a shantytown of Ankara and whose members have middle level of education and consist of workers as well as shopkeepers. The ways of reading literature on Tawhed Islam and the relationships established with the other, different and human reality in those two communities are different. This example has importance in demonstrating the differentiations between the communities adopting Tawhed Islam.

We were in the picnic organised by a community for the university students. In a conversation with ten or fifteen people in which one of the prominent brothers of the community, Mehmet abi, also participated, the subject came to the potentiality for youth in communities. Mehmet abi complained that some of the young people wandered

around communities but they did not become stabilized within none of them, thus not being involved in an active schedule. Therefore, he criticized the young people for not being obedient and consistent. Yusuf (28) began talking and said that the responsibility for such attitude did not belong to the young people but to the organisation, namely to the communities. Consequently, the Muslim individual always has more tendencies to make mistakes than a community and the responsibility to take the step to solve the problem lies with the community.

Sharp arguments like those of Yusuf's that contain self-criticism are not welcomed by communities. Actually, the loneliness and isolation of the different and dissident is always present for different forms of togetherness. To speak and act in an unfamiliar way, therefore, always requires courage. What Foucault means in his in his interpretation of Socrates's difference is in effect the matter of dealing with this tension (Foucault, 2005): to speak up for the truth without hesitations, to live the truth as one knows it. The danger in parrhesia originates from the fact that the truth can hurt or frustrate the audience (Foucault, 2005: 15).

Moreover, Parrhesia is not a conversation between the equals; the speaker must occupy a position below that of the audience. That is why, a student (against a teacher), a philosopher (against a tyrant) and a citizen (against the majority or parliament) can behave parrhesiastic not a father, a teacher or a tyrant (Foucault, 2005: 15).

Parrhesia by Foucault has been reiterated in Islamic literature through many brief expressions:

> O you who believe! if any from among you turn back from his Faith, soon will Allah produce a people whom He will love as they will love Him,- lowly with the believers, mighty against the rejecters, fighting in the way of Allah, <u>and never afraid of the reproaches of such as find fault</u>. That is the grace of Allah, which He will bestow on whom He pleaseth. And Allah encompasseth all, and He knoweth all things. (Quran 5: 54)

> Abraham was indeed a model, devoutly obedient to Allah, (and) true in Faith, and he joined not gods with Allah. (16:120)

> The most virtuous jihad is to speak up for the truth in face of a cruel ruler. (Abu Dawoof, Malahim, 17; Nesâî, Bey'at 37; İbni Mâce, Fiten 20.)

But as parrhesia is not guaranteed by the "nomos", namely the freedom to tell the flagged truth remains defenceless vis-à-vis the cold face of the reality; those references are crushed under the realities of Muslims.

> While telling the brutal governor the truth is the most superior jihad, unfortunately a tradition of obedience to the brutal governor on these lands is predominant. (Türkmen 58)

Nevertheless, in order to say that the relationship with the reality lasts through criticism, it is necessary to look at the relation between criticism and praise. Praising someone at their face and criticize someone in their absence are the acts, as Erdi reminded in the previous sections, that are deemed to be shameful, which was an acknowledgement that probably no sect nor school can object to. On the contrary, praising people in their absence and criticizing them in their presence are favourable acts. In other words, parressiastic behaviour is essential in Islam.

> So as not to break people's heart we do not tell people their mistakes, thus depriving them of the possibility of understanding their mistakes and of stopping making them. But we forget that we offend Allah for the sake of our brother. Allah's sake is bigger than that of our brother (Mengüşoğlu, "Sayyid Qutb Symposium", 9-10 September 2006).

While there are such principles, the fact that the reality works in an opposite direction is important in so far as it points out the incompatibility of theory and practice. However, this example is a rather important point that sheds light on the problem of this study since it creates an area of conflict between modesty and subjectivity, hence between subjects.

Fikret states that a reason for the absence of certain NGOs of the Platform for Solidarity with Palestine in the second platform is their lack of potentiality for the youth. Two of the associations declared their apology and left the platform on the grounds that they lack young people for active agency participation.

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The source of the criticism Mehmet abi did in the picnic was actually the reality Fikret mentioned. The Islamist associations and NGOs were short of young people. Since the number of young people who carry out Islamic activities is very limited, sometimes the communities can compete with each other to catch young people.

> There are over two hundred and fifty thousand students in Ankara. This number expressed the mass we have to reach as Muslims. While we need to care about those young people and to strive for introducing them with Islam, we deal with young people who already have Islamic consciousness. (Çetin, 45)

In Ankara, a research institute for university students and scholars was opened. In order to be aware of the activities of the institution, Yalçın (26) shared with me detail that drew his attention.

> When I wanted to do a pre-registration to participate in their programs, the person in charge blurt this sentence out: "Come here and let the place revive." In effect, there was no one in the association and they became glad that we went there.

Muslims had difficulty in finding participants and members for there are many different NGOs with many different names.

Old Ankara houses in the neighbourhood of Hacıbayram Mosque were restored and those places were allocated to Islamists communities, foundations and associations. Some of the institutions bought those houses and other became tenants. The construction of the places have not finished yet but people highly hope that the spatial warmness that will emerge as a result of spatial closeness of Muslims coming together around a common place will pave the way for intellectual closeness and dialogue.

While sitting with the members of a community renting a place in this neighbourhood, one of the managers of the foundation, Çetin abi, uttered their plan to establish an academy of social sciences. We talked together about what can be done on this issue.

After a while, again we were sitting together with the members of a community renting another building in the same place. One of the people from the community

mentioned that they had an idea to establish an academy where social sciences such as history, sociology, philosophy and political science can be learnt.

The most reasonable and rightest thing to do in the first place was to establish a dialogue between two organisations having the same thought and to start an efficient work through creating a synergy. However, Ekrem (38) who knew both of the organisations better than me told me that I should not do this and the people of those two organisations would not want to act together, which was not true but the reality. In the end, I ended up being unable to satisfy my desire to bring them together.

4.3. Reorganizing Youth

The young Islamists whom I interviewed take three different actions. The organic active members of any community, those who perform activities on Islamic studies periodically with four or five friends having abandoned the community and those who establish bigger and massive autonomous youth movements.

Most of the young people who leave the community periodically meet four or five people like themselves and organize various activities to preserve and develop the Islamic faith in line with friendly relationships. They most of the time act cautiously so as not to repeat the points to which they bring criticisms in the communities they leave. Although the format for their programs are usually similar to that of their previous communities, they act more flexibly and more freely, and they decide on the curriculum and syllabi for reading and programs by themselves since they are not depended on any authority or a control mechanism. However, those small groups have no tendency to become new communities and continue existing as small scale friendship groups. As the young islamist Serdar stated: "Being a community does not mean to be subject to big established communities. To be with Muslims is already to be a community."

I know four friend groups where every Muslim person performs activities with the Muslims who have similar thoughts with them. Some of those are friendship groups where people are university students or scholars or carry out master or doctorate studies and others are friendship groups where people are married and employees and see each

other on a familial basis. In effect, the number can be increased because those kinds of groups increase as much as schisms in Islamic communities. The young Muslim who decides to live their religion individually gets lonely due to their personal resentment and reactions. Among the people I interviewed, I encountered only one person, Fatih (32), who objects to the concept of community categorically, however he inevitably keeps relations within the habitus of Muslims. Even though others have ruptured their ties with the big communities, they claim that they act in accordance with the verse, "Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong," thus being a community in one way or another.

One of the consequences of abandonment and division is to establish autonomous youth groups and try for alternative communities. *The Hürbeyan Movement* which was established three years ago and which mostly consists of the members who were previously members of Islamist communities is an organisation thought which it is possible to get signals for change and transformation in communities. Sine Hürbeyan can be considered to a prototype for the abovementioned friendship groups which try to transform into an organisation like Hürbeyan in the future, our examples will be related to Hürbeyan. We were organising meetings for reading and deliberation in 2010. Three of the friends began to participate less in time and after a while when we met them in our tea meetings, they were talking about a youth movement called Hürbeyan. When I met the friends from this movement throughout this year because of my thesis, the movement turned into a striking one as a different channel to which Tawhed youth reached and at least it created particular awareness within Islamic community.

The book *Fasıla* published in October 2013 provided the solid information about Hürbeyan movement. This book released under the subtitle "The discussion of Islamic youth" summarizes the three-year past of Hürbeyan and incorporates almost all of the problems this thesis touches upon.

> In an environment whereby Muslims get more and more apolitic and integrate into the power applying the neoliberal politics, taking the perspective of revelation into account, we tried to

> draw a vision on the actual matters and perform good deeds
> relying on this vision. (Kutan, 2013: 9)

Setting off with purposes beyond capital accumulation and being in opposition to political power and capital, Hürbeyan movement moved two important topics that Muslims started to discuss to the centre. The last ten years whereby Muslims have been dealing with political and economic power revealed those two issues which make them re-question and criticize their positions and standpoints. Did Muslims who used to be *mujahids* (combatants for Islam) turn out to be contractors? Or they used to behave as contractors in suburbs with their little amount of capital? I remember a dispute that took place between two Islamist brothers ten years ago. Erhan was looking for a job for his brother Hasan. Hasan started working in Haydar's -an Islamist brother's- workplace. But Haydar used to pay Hasan the minimum wage. When Erhan told Haydar that it was not right, Haydar had replied: "This is the necessity of the conditions of the market." It is possible to say that the critique of market relations and capitalism among Islamists have not been embodied yet in the religious discourse and it cannot go beyond abstract claims on Islamic justice. Since the relationship that Islamists establish with capital and property is out of the scope of this thesis, this subject will be left for another study.

According to Hürbeyan, Muslims have gained ground in improving the religious information as well as in academic and intellectual discussions and readings, yet the main problem was that those efforts remain as a cultural saving and cannot turn into a political position. The group ground their aims of politization on this basis. This ground reminds of the problem I have been discussing with friends recently and represents one aspect of the problem. The new Islamic consciousness of Muslims does not reflect enough on their actual realities except particular rituals.

> There happens no change in relations of a Muslim who weeps
> while listening to Fajr Sura[71] with his wealth, his property and
> with the poor sections of the society. And no one dares to speak
> about these issues (Ümit, 28).

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[71]The sura in a general framework mentions the love for property and how this love will expose people to punishment.

Ümit's reproach gives clues about how to trace capitalist relationships among Islamists. It is about the adoption of the fact how the Quran that is binding for each Muslim (the respect shown by the traditionalist Muslim can be expressed individually) is reflected in individual's practical life and how it speaks directly of individual and social realities. Time will show whether Muslims will enter into a serious payoff with capitalism.

Another important quality of Hürbeyan was that they arrange their meetings with the participation of both men and women, which was sometimes criticized by Muslims. The applications of sitting separately by men and woman[72] were the most common feature of Turkish Islamic communities. It is one of the subjects to which much attention paid because of its openness to exploitation or abuse (slander, accusation and discrediting) in terms of established moral rules in society (in the context of relationships with the opposite sex).

Believing that the togetherness of Islamic groups is a necessity in order to create a pressure mechanism on the power generating oppression (Fasıla: 28), while introducing themselves, on the one hand Hürbeyan declares that they initially aimed at struggling with capital (brutal capitalism), the political power (referring to the communities acting in accordance with the power) and the traditional piety narcotised with opium; on the other hand they seek for ways to overcome such problems as hierarchy, culture of obedience, closeness, externalizing that produce division and schism.

Ammar Kılıç from Hürbeyan thinks that the organisation Hilf al Fudul which was famous in the Meccan period among Arabs and praised by Prophet Muhammad is a model for Muslims in the modern world. Without observing any religious or ideological division, this organisation adopts the principle of being against the oppressor and siding with the oppressed. Referring to the Verse 18 of sura Zumar, Ammar believes that it is the responsibility of the Muslim to listen to the every voice heard under the heavens and

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[72] To be careful on not leaving a man and a woman whose marriage has no obstacle in the same environment and to act cautiously and with distance.

to pay attention to their parts including the truth (Kutan, 2013: 38). A position centred on oppressor and oppressed and openness to comply with the beautiful word – no matter where it comes from – as it is seen, expresses the near future of the intellectual adventures of Islamist movements. As Ammar stated: "There are grounds on which we can come together with different groups against injustice. Yet It is necessary to bear in mind the principles of our own existence while raising a common word." (Kutan, 2013: 39).

> This should be learned by two parties. This is an exchange. To turn the look onto yourself. To keep the critical consciousness about yourself vivid. It is not mixing with each other. It is not to blur or rub away the borders of truth. It is not to make your religion compatible with extremities of Marxism, liberal expansionism and feminism. (Kutan, 2013: 39)

This intellectual leap will necessitate rebuilding the Muslim identity, to redefine the other and to revise visions for ideal society. Such necessity to re-think has never been felt by Islamists who have recently recognized the differences (both Muslims who think differently and secular/leftist differences with which Muslim become more and more intimate).

Emre Berber who looks for an answer to the question whether it is possible to establish an organisation with no hierarchy states that in their experience with Hürbeyan they initially thought that an organisation where no power is defined would be more functional; but they saw that the undefined power inevitably and spontaneously emerged in time, albeit that time as more dangerous (Kutan, 2013: 62).

> Omnipresence of power: not at all because it regroups everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced at every instant, at every point, or moreover in every relation between one point and another. Power is everywhere: not that it engulfs everything, but that it comes from everywhere. (Foucault, 1978: 93)

> What is right in this respect is not to reject this concept from which we cannot escape and to illegalize it but to rehabilitate it through framing, limiting, controlling and arranging it. (Kutan, 2013: 63)

For Merve, Özlem and Gülnur, students of Ankara University, who talk about the possibility of dialogue among groups of youth in established communities, the number of people and institutions that can provide opinions for students when they ask, that can guide and support them is limited (Kutan, 2013: 90). This statement is important in so far as it reveals the dimension of the relationship that the communities establish with any youth group not tied to them. In their relationships with those independent and uncontrolled youth groups act hesitatively and in a way that externalize those groups and they are expected to integrate into the community and to become an organic element of the community. When I told Veli Abi, who was one of the leaders of a community, that I was reading Fazlur Rahman, I felt that he approached me with suspicion and reaction. He did not say it explicitly but with his acts he was saying, 'Could you not find anything else to read?' Some Islamists did not like the idea that young people can have an interest in sources different from certain Muslim thinkers, which was essentially the result of the insecurity with regard to different thought felt by certain Islamists. Different readings can diminish one's faith and can blur the relationship he or she has established with the truth and can lead one to intellectual crisis. Behind the cautious approach towards social sciences (especially philosophy) that Muslims still hold on to there lies the fear to lose faith.

> When I told my friends from the community that I was going to do my master in the department of philosophy, they first criticized me for this choice and then warned me not to lose my faith. (Enes, 28)

The reflex of not losing control, of monitoring and of inspection lies behind the disinterest and insecurity in the community activities towards the autonomous youth groups. If a youth group declare its dependency on a community, things will certainly change and that community in question will take interest in that youth group. The reason why Islamists pay this much attention to control and monitoring is the fact that Islamic

movement in Turkey faces serious risks[73] as well as the perception of all-encompassing power of modernity and nation-state as effective factors. (Foucault 1977: 195-228)

Another face of the efforts of communities to keep the young under control is their tendency to direct individual's whole potentiality by themselves. After all, it is expected that a person devoted to a community act in accordance with the necessities and aims of that organisation. However, this situation is subject to complaints by some of the young Islamist friends. But the reason for complaint does not rise from taking responsibility within an organisation and acting in accordance with its expectations, but from their negation of the individual's reality of life, which will be discussed in the section of marginality.

With complaint, the Islamist Turgay (35) told the İbrahim's (25) situation who was one of the members of an association. It was probably impossible to listen that from İbrahim himself because as a sensitivity of decency, the decisions taken on behalf of a Muslim individual wouldn't generally be subject to complaint. However, it was possible to understand in the manners the displeasure and restlessness:

> When he finished the school, he wants to go back to his hometown, find a job and get married. But brothers insist on that he will certainly stay in Ankara and maintain the responsibility for the youth group he currently has. That is okay but once the man has graduated, he will need a job, money and he must support his family. No one has a word or a suggestion on these matters. With a grant of three or five hundred liras for a month, will you live by yourself or support your family?

Continuing with *Fasıla*, Arif Emre claims that the language the Islamists of 1980s and 90s had with the public originates from the radical attitude towards tradition in his article titled "The transformation of the political language: From revolutionism to reformism," (Kutan, 2013: 133). He says that the young people who felt the duty to bring the true religion to the ignorant people on their shoulders were almost fighting with the people (Kutan, 2013: 133). Nonetheless, he agrees with the argument that

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[73] In addition to the pressure of official ideology I mentioned in the previous chapters, the fragility in local or globan relations with regard to social and political role of Islam can be mentioned.

Islamism today has developed a relatively softer language and style than they had in the past and states his hopes as regards the future (Kutan, 2013: 135).

While Bedri Soylu (30) likens the encounter of Islamism setting off with a big claim and sincerity with the power and its crumbling to the soldiers who cannot pass the river in the parable of David mentioned in Quran[74] (Kutan, 2013: 175). Yusuf Şanlı claims that young people's need to act independently stems from the fact that the elders integrated into the power relations (Kutan, 2013: 182).

It seems that what Vedat (55) told me in the interview I conducted with him overlaps with the worries and oppositions of Hürbeyan:

> Unfortunately, there are groups who like buttering up and being more royalist than the king in our circle. The government organised a meeting with Islamist NGOs in Istanbul Provincial Presidency and asked us to present our criticism on and requests from the government. Believe me, most of the NGOs in that meeting buttered up the community. The provincial chairman began to speak and warned, "Dear friends, you are dissenters; you do not have to approve of everything the government party has done!" However we presented our criticism on a number of topics such as culture, education, urban planning.

Vedat's community did not support the declaration by 97 NGOs and those who prepared this declaration even though they asked for the support of Vedat's community. He told me that reason was the fact that the text supported the government in a shallow and superficial way.

The points Hürbeyan emphasize includes the important tools for Muslims to develop an ethics of togetherness among themselves and with others. The point of departure for Yusuf Şanlı (32) is exactly the beginning of a relationship of ethics: to come face to face and the responsibility laid by that face-to-face encounter (Levinas). About the Islamist coffeehouse he opened in 2007 in Kızılay, Yusuf said:

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[74] The believers army under the command of General Talut drank water from a river on the way to war against a cruel administrator Goliath, so they stand behind in this struggle. This points out that when Muslims encounter wealth and power on the way of a huge struggle, they drank from that source thirstily. (For detail: Quran: 2: 243-252).

The initial reason for opening Mekan Coffeehouse of which I am a watchman is to provide an environment where young people who think differently or who think that they think differently come together, start to know each other in the first place, and are able to drink a glass of tea together (Kutan, 2013: 187).

CHAPTER V

MARGINALITY OF THE ISLAMIST DISCOURSE

5.1. Alienation to Folk Beliefs

The discourse in traditionalism or tariqas per se has the potential to proliferate. Islamism on the contrary calls for thinking and rationality which could appeal only to the minority. While religiosity in Turkey is still predominantly traditional and mystic, and people are mostly inclined to be devoted disciples, islamists' call for believing rationally and maintaining subjectivity would not have a strong impact. Nevertheless the tendency of the mass population is not the only dynamic behind the lack of embracement. Secondly and more importantly for the scope of our thesis, islamists' attitudes towards the so called jahili people have been highly problematic. Neglection, disdain and strict opposition as it is seen in the personal story of Cihan always lead to the marginalization of islamists. By calling for a return to the authentic golden age of the prophet Muhammad, they expectedly passed over the whole historical tradition with critical and denunciatory eyes. Eventually Anatolian islam was considered as a syncretic cultural bulk of rituals, superstition, polytheism and detrimental innovation (bidat). Mardin (1989: 105) calls this kind of islam as "folk islam" which used to be against the official orthodox islam. With such a repudiative demeanour together with the massive influence of the other worldly asceticism of the Anatolian people, islamist view always remained marginal in Turkey.

While the term "community" in Turkey much rather refers to Gülen, Iskenderpaşa or Suleyman Efendi communities, why did we particularly focus on the so called radical islamists? It is a fact that radicals have never been influential in terms of quantity (Çakır, 2002). We can understand in Çakır's "Ayet ve Slogan" the scope and

social influence of islamist thought compared to other communities. Türköne also touches on the same argument when comparing the traditions of Erbakan and Said Nursi (Türköne 2013). Yet the reason why islamist view couldn't be disseminated to the majority of Turkish population requires a bilateral analysis in terms of the general attention and interest of the masses to religion and religiosity in Turkey and islamists' problematic relationship with society. Both reasons in fact are related to the very jargon and mindset.

Cihan tells about the community in his neighborhood:

> 1990's the number of the members of our community was about a hundred. Twenty years passed and our number didn't actually exceeded two hundreds. And most of the new comers are the old members and their growing children.

> The dwellers of the neighbourhood used to know us only from our assistance of food packets in the month of Ramadan albeit having no idea of who we were except hearsay.

My questions on the marginalization of Islamism were regarding the lack of embracement of islamist thought in society, their failure of appealing to the jargon of the people, and inability of creating strong bonds with a significant cultural group, hence eventually being marginalized. Most of my interviewees responded to these questions self-critically. Cihan's experience was also parallel to these assumptions. Islamists couldn't generate a discourse and jargon corresponding to the ideational and practical realities of the people of Turkey. They couldn't understand the mentality of the people and they couldn't be understood.

> My grandmother was in a bad way. We knew that she would soon pass away. According to me my grandmother's faith in islam was mixed with polytheistic beliefs and superstitions. She used to believe in the extraordinary attributes of Sheikhs etc. I was trying to find a way, an understandable jargon, to tell her about tawhed and the necessity of testifying Allah's unity both as a creator and a law giver. I was unable to talk in her ways of understanding. I was kind of trying to make her an islamist in one hour (smiling).

Islamists dialog with their neighbors, with the people in the district or colleagues were highly limited. As summoners/callers (davetçi) to the true path, they had to develop a well-established relationship with the people in order to convey the Islamic message. Though they were usually unsuccessful mostly due to the bitterness and abstractness of islamist thought entailing idealism far from the social reality. According to Weber ([1958] 2009: 327), the extent of the rationalism and abstraction in a religion of salvation determines the level of idealization along with estrangement and alienation from the necessities of the realities of life. Hence gradually an interpretation on the basis of abnegation of the world holds sway.

According to the constructed idea of tawhed the majority of the people in Turkey were in state of polytheists. The parents of islamists were included to this. Especially in '80s and '90s, Islamists were blaming their parents and entourage with polytheism; and this perception shaped the nature and the limits of dialog with ordinary people.

Recently, during a bus travel, my friend Yusuf (24) was telling me about the problems he lived through with his family. His parents were coming out against his Islamic activities. After all, due to what they were hearing from the mass media, they were worried about the future of their child and they did not have trust in religious communities. I was surprised to see the mode of Yusuf against his family. He had adjudged that his parents were polytheists. Although I had warned him not to be that strict, he was decisive in his opinion. He was trying to find ways and phrases to use in order to convert them to islam.

Although Yusuf is a minor figure among islamists of today, such a viewpoint was highly common among tevhidi islamists of '80s and '90s. In the course of time however, islamists were considerably moderated particularly with respect to the theoretical lines of belief and disbelief.

The relationship established with the ordinary citizens was much rather of ideational superiority. Islamists were assuming themselves as conscious muslims and the rest of the people as unconscious crowds. They constantly disdained the beliefs of the ordinary citizens. They were so confident in their own truths that even in subjects they

were not acquainted with, they used to pass over the opinions of the people. They not only disdained their beliefs, but also their lives in general. The majority of the people after all strive only for livelihood. Whereas Allah had created humans for a goal and this goal was fairly beyond the anxieties of livelihood.

> Just as the prophet Muhammad and his relatives and neighbors fell out and he distanced himself from them, similarly we were interpreting the conflict with our parents and relatives as signs of the truth of our path and hence we were actually content with it. (Mevlüt, 28)

> While the ordinary muslims were reciting "subhanaka" in their prayers, I used to recite "veccehtü". While they were positioning their feet about shoulder width, I was positioning much widely. They were folding their hands on belly, I was doing it over chest.[75]. it may be funny to you but these strategies were making me feel privileged and knowledgeable. This feel of distinction had surrounded my ego. (Mevlüt)

Islamists attitude against the ordinary people was displaying an interesting discrepancy. They on the one hand disdained those people who were being exploited under the oppressing social, political and economic conditions; on the other hand they claimed to bring the Islamic justice ideal of which was a world without exploitation. In other words, though they were complaining about how people are enslaved before wealth, position and political power, they were treating those "victims of the system" scornfully.

The social-psychological situation of islamists was elitism in the strict sense. This was not an economic elitism as commonly understood; rather an intellectual elitism arising from the feeling of being knowledgeable and conscious of the essence of religion. The islamist thought which prioritized the believing subject, and undermined the traditional culture of obedience, expectedly created a social environment of intersubjective conflict. There remained no room for "the others" in this environment,

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[75] Veccehtü, or subhaneke are among the varying prays recited during prayer. Both prays in other words can be acceptable just as the changeable physical positions. Mevlüt here refers to the elitist attitude of islamists by observing distinctive attitudes compared to common practice of the people.

where all subjects count themselves or their particular communities at the very centre of the truth.

"Islamic call" (conducing to conversion to islam) is among the disciplines of Islamic literature. The books on "the methods of Islamic call" exist almost all islamists' personal libraries. All islamists are considered to be summoner/caller (davetçi). The ethical dimension of this motivation however indicates a problematic point of departure fostering elitism.

> We were told to be the callers/summoners of islam. This motivation was in fact creating a distance between we conscious muslims and unconscious ignorant people. We used to assume ourselves as a hodjas. Although this motivation used to help us control our deeds more carefully, it created a unilateral dialog with the people. They were ignorant and we were knowledgeable. I don't think in the same way anymore. What I understand from Islamic call is just to live truly and virtuously. Your struggle with yourself already serves as a model of a good life for the people. Besides, without a hierarchy you make a horizontal friendship and you are being open to their truths as well. I am not calling anyone to the faith (imana çağırmak) anymore. Rather I am asking them to believe together and help each other for practicing our faith. Because I need that help too. Mumin (believer) is a mirror to the other mumin. (Hakan 28)

Hakan's phrase of "their truths" was a topic of discussion in a sohbet. The topic was the relationship between Islam and the western civilization in the foreground question of whether there were values of justice, truth and good in the west. Most of the participant believed that other cultures and civilizations in the world also had a share from what is good, just or true. Since it was highly possible that Allah might have sent them prophets and moreover Allah had already created the faculties of true-false, justice-tyranny, good-evil within the creation of humans.[76] We simplified the question to

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[76] One brother had referred to the Quran: Shams/91: 8,9,10: Then He showed him what is wrong for him and what is right for him. Indeed he succeeds who purifies his ownself. And indeed he fails who corrupts his ownself

whether a non-muslim, or an atheist has right to tell a muslim about what is good, bad or just. The preponderant idea after the program was parallel to the idea that it was possible for a muslim to behave contrary to what s/he believes. Also it was possible for a muslim not to be able to comprehend a Quranic principle. Musab (27) who was frequently complaining about the current situation of muslims, manifested his opinion by giving examples from daily life:

> I am claiming to be muslim, but at the same time I am disturbing my neighbour. I am claiming to be a conscious islamist but spreading terror with my car on the roads or I can easily tell lies, I am immoral, I am rigging bids and many others. If someone – whether muslim or not- comes to me and say "what you do is wrong" am I going to object to him? When it comes to the issue of civilization, just look at the Egypt. Its constitution openly declares that there cannot be any legislation contradicting to Quran and Sunnah. It is in other words based on the sharia. Yet if we take a look at what is going on in Egypt –socially, economically, politically etc.- is that what we mean by the Islamic state and society? (Musab 27)

Almost all programs, conferences and activities I participated were addressing only again to islamists themselves. Attendance from other segments of society has always been too rare. This is indubitably an undesirable situation for islamists, since they aim to disseminate their message to the public.

My questions regarding the reasons of alienation of islamists to the general public and lack of embracement were answered under three different aspects. Some interviewees considered this as an inevitable result of the islamist discourse itself, some others directed the problem to the people who are mostly prone to superstitions, and finally others self-critically blamed themselves. Below there will be discussions elaborating on these three approaches together with anticipation on the possibilities of colligating islamist thought and public interest.

As it has been discussed previously, Islamist thought is grounded mainly on reason as the central dynamic of faith and opposition to tradition. These two coalesce on the opposition to the traditional religiosity in the light of reason. Yet both characteristics

are highly novel and therefore dangerous for a traditional believer. Islamists in this sense were aware that they were referring to a different view of islam. As a concomitant dimension, the political surveillance and oppression of the time together with their relations with the rest of the society contributed to the emergence and perpetuation of elitism and marginalization.

Islamists claim that the Arabian polytheists against whom the prophet Muhammad fought used to believe in Allah as a creator (Vatandaş, 2010; Hamidullah, 2009; Watt 1953). The Quranic references also supports this idea.[77] However, they were not approving His authority over their lives i.e. His right of intervening their social, political, economic lives. They wanted to live how they want rather than the rules of Allah. According to islamists, today's situation is no different than those periods of ignorance. People believe in Allah, and they perform daily rituals -of praying, fasting, pilgrimage etc.-. Nevertheless as an underlying indicator of their antipathy toward the term sharia, they do not approve to live in accordance with the Quran.

Islamism of '80s and '90s is based on this oppositional stance against the vast majority of the people. As I have touched upon above, by time they moderated their views regarding the limits of belief and disbelief. Now they were assuming those former polytheists only as ignorants. The reason behind this change was partly the intellectual evolution of islamists who read more on Islamic literature, and partly their awareness that old strictness created negative consequences. Notwithstanding, there are still the ones who judge this change as an indicator of renouncing the Islamic struggle and appeasing for the sake of being promoted by the political power. No matter how it is interpreted, it is a fact that the moderation of islamist thought continues. Yet it has not turned into a significantly representative character.

After a Friday prayer, we had gathered as "the platform of solidarity with muslims" in the square of Kocatepe Mosque in order to protest the Syrian regime's massacre with chemical weapons and also the coup d'état in Egypt. While the people

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[77] Quran 31: 25; 29: 61; 39: 38; 43: 9

were leaving the mosque one of the activist brothers were announcing that we would perform funeral prayer on behalf of those killed civilians. Thereat there were three coffins on the musallam moves and their fellows and relatives waiting at the courtyard for their funeral prayer. The normally expected procedure was as such: all the people in the courtyard would firstly pray for those three deceased; and then together with the ones who wish to stay we would pray for the Syrians and after the press release we would leave the courtyard. As a religous community aiming to establish dialogs with the public in order to disseminate the "true islam", it was an opportunity for us to share these people's sorrows and create bridges of dialog. Moreover they would be sensitive to our concerns regarding the suffering civilians throughout the world. But interestingly our Islamists did not attend to the prayer for the three deceased. They just waited at the back until people prayed for the deceased. While I was among the praying people, I was hearing the grumblings of the anger against our islamists: "these guys assume to be muslims (!), they don't have any respect for the dead" "aren't these three people muslims?" After these prayers, the islamists joined the praying group and after a couple of slogans and press release by our own, we left the courtyard.

Funeral prayer in islam is not compulsory for all muslims. i.e., when some Muslims take the responsibility, the obligation is fulfilled. Nevertheless Islamists by not praying for the three had indeed drawn reaction from the other people in the courtyard. This kind of attitude was certainly proving that Islamists hadn't significantly changed their approach towards the "ignorant people". After all three ordinary citizens had died and most probably they had superstitious beliefs and it was not allowed to perform funeral prayer for the nonmuslims. This explanation however -though seems to be the most probable one- cannot be claimed to be the real reason behind their attitude since I couldn't find opportunity to ask them. But even if there had been no such justification, it was definitely obvious that Islamists couldn't still merge with the society.

Marginality for some islamists was an indispensable result of the nature of the islamic discourse. The real islamic struggle had to oppose the fabrications and superstitions believed to be part of islam. It was a responsbility pursuant to what Allah

asked muslims to do in the Quran. People however are not generally eager to hear novel things especially in religious matters. Thus islamist thought couldn't be embraced by the generel public. This is believed to be the fate of all prophets in history. Allah was stating this reality in the Quran: And if you obey most of those on earth, they will mislead you far away from Allah's Path. They follow nothing but conjectures, and they do nothing but lie. (Quran 6: 116)

Standing alone and isolation in other words were not considered as problem by islamists, rather a sign of being in the right path.

> People just don't want to abandon their traditional beliefs. Holding onto a past and opposing the novel are typical reactons of the masses. When we try to generate dialog with the people, we also have to pay attention not to be like them. (Uğur, 29)

The artisan Kaner (29) was telling us his experience of discussion on islam with a sufi:

> I was giving examples to him only from the Quran, presenting him dozens of verses; yet he was still talking about "Konyevi Hazretleri"[78]. Although I was telling him pursuant to the Quran that what he believed was apparently against islam, he was not giving a damn, and instead telling me that my faith was weak.

After his complaint, Kaner turned to his own belief and told us the positive aspects of the sufi groups compared to his:

> I am surprised to see the level of sincerity and the sense of loyalty among those submissive, obedient and mystic guys. I can see it from their candid tears while listening to their sheikhs. But although I believe that theoretically I am in the right path, I could never cry and could never feel that level of an emotional devotion to my "true islam".

Kaner's complaint corresponds to the price of rationality over the enchanted world of religiousity. Though emotion could never be compensated with reason. He was uttering a common issue of self-criticism among islamists. The emotional motivation,

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[78] Konyevilik: A Sectarian tariqa based group lead by Muhammad Konyevi

commitment to the belief and serenity among those people believing in a religion full with superstitions were always much higher than the islamists'. İslamists were complaining about the lack of heart (gönül yoksunluğu). They couldn't be as sincere as those sufis.

> We assume that we know islam correctly and condemn the sufis of being into errors. But their fond of worship, sincerity and avidity exist in none of us. When did we last performed a night prayer, or when did we fast aside from the Ramadan month?, How many of us perform morning prayer regularly/without delay? (Ömer, 30)

The prevalence of Sufism in Turkey originates from the long history of Anatolian heterodoxy. Tariqa based communities in other words have no difficulty in conveying their message to the masses. This affinity, does not stem from the calculation of the communities, rather spontaneously sharing the same beliefs accelerates it. Islamism as a modern and contemporary discourse in this sense is bound to lack embracement.

> When the ideology and the contents of the methods of a movement correspond to the ideas behind the religious legitimacy of a society, and when the movement tries to direct their political potentials to activism without making judgements on their traditional religiousity; they acquire more participation and success. (Erkilet, 2010: 24)

There were some Islamists who opposed to my question of marginality. According to Musa (35) Islamists never had difficulty in conveying their message to the masses.

> Today we can easily organize programs with hundreds of people just as we used to do before. We never had difficulty in establishing dialog with the people. But the issue is to keep them, not to reach them. It is quite easy for traditional communities to collect members for the community. They already repeat their superstitious beliefs. The solution is easy for them. But we are aware of how shallow they are. As for us, there are points on which we still continue to discuss, read and contemplate on; for instance the nature of Islamic change and

transformation in society, how a community should act properly etc.

Does that mean that Islamism requires a certain level of intellectualism and scripturalism? And are you trying to tell me that it is unrealistic to expect the public to show these efforts?

Musa answered these questions affirmatively, which eventually supported my assumption regarding the marginality of islamists.

Alienation and disdain sometimes gave rise to interesting viewpoints to the degree of disdaining the whole life of the "ignorants". It was almost ten years ago. One day, one of our elders Hüseyin (50) came to us from downtown. He had influenza:

While I was coming here by minibus, a young girl was sitting next to me. When she noticed my coughing and my runny nose, she took out a handkerchief and gave it to me by saying "get well soon". And I thanked her. Then I thought that although some people are devoid of faith and consciousness, there can still be values of kindness, compassion, friendship and respect in them. (Hüseyin 50)

Hüseyin had considered that girl as in total heresy and the values he mentioned couldn't be attributed to her. But later a gentile gesture overwhelmed him. This instance manifests how closed ideological structures lead to create monopolization over whatever exists in behalf of values of good, just and virtue. This instance however belongs to a period when Islamic radicalism and opposition against traditional religiosity were highly intensive. The last ten years witnessed significant changes with respect to the moderation produced by the interaction of formerly closed structures. Although such repudiative attitudes transformed today into more moderate relationships, it is illustrative to show how Turkish society has been sectarian and subdivided within the same public space.

5.2. Alienation to the Realities of the Folk

Wealth and Poverty

On a Saturday morning, the mechanical engineer Murat (34), was invited to an islamist association in order to give lecture. The lecture was largely about wealth and poverty. "How should we muslims think on this issue?" was the central question. Murat broadly mentioned about the the diversity of the companions of the Prophet in terms of their wealth and concluded that the rish companions used to give charity, and the poor one used to make dua (pray) and being patient. This was the final message for todays muslims. "Wealth and poverty belong to Allah's will, if we become rich we should give charity and if we are poor then we have to be patient" after a couple of similar questions, Kadir's (25) question was remarkable:

> Is this the only explanation of the issues of wealth and poverty? When there is an exploitative system of capitalism which systematically enriches a segment of society and at the same time systematically impoverishes the other segments; how can you only advice us patience? I agree with you on that absolute equality of property is impossible. But before talking about patience and submission, shouldn't we university students primarily try to decompose the very mechanisms of this exploitation?

The question was passed over by some general advices and acknowledging him to be right. This strategy as it is touched upon previously, was a common attitude among islamists. A rapid change in the established ideas is extremely difficult among islamists just as it is the case for all religious or ideological groups. People like Kadir afterall were feverish, ambitious, impatient and they were talking big.

Kadir's challenge was pointing to one of the critiques against the alienation of islamism of the social realities of the people. During the participations and interviews I deliberately asked questions about the lates popular figure İhsan Eliaçık and his approach to wealth and poverty, in order to understand the reaction of islamists. Actually there is a considerable literature on islamic approach to economic conditions. Seyyid Kutub's Social Justice in Islam, (2006), general framework of Ali şeriati's works,

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Mustafa Sıbai's Islamic Socialism (2010), hasan hanefi's islamc left, In Turkey Hayri Kırbaşoğlu, İlhami Güler, Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu and many other scholars wrote on this issue. İhsan Eliaçık however who used to write on the same issues since 90's, became highly popular especially with the influence of mass media, and social media, and islamists' answers to the issues such as labor-capital, weatlh-private property etc were generated mainly on Eliaçık's claims. Recently, this issue has been a vibrant discussion point among our islamist friends. Generally there emerged two types of approach; one affirmative, the other critical.

According to one explanation, muslims have to be powerfull in economic conditions just as it is tha case for politics. There is no ordained limit for the private property in islam; hence chairty (infak) is a personal choice rather than a governmental sanction. These kind of issues are popular matters of discussion among islamist circles. The dominant approach is in parallel with legitimizing and even considering it necessary the particular levels of wealth, luxury and standart of living for those who have particular political and economic status.

> If a man is millionaire and gives alms additionally with charity, it is quite normal for him to live in luxurious houses or using luxurious cars. This is not actually luxury for him, rather it is a necessity of his social and economic status. Besides, it is not our job to talk on their wealth, to calculate and to question them. Afterall if he performs his obligatory duties as I said, nobody can criticize the amount of their wealth.

According to the founding president of Müsiad Erol Yarar, the philosophy of "a morsel and a khirkah[79] (fleece) is a trick for deceiving muslims[80]. The approbation of poverty is a means used for preventing muslims to be powerfull in the world. Though today, this religion appeals not only to the poor but also to the rich, and this is a new

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[79] Khirkah: long cotton or wool outer garment worn by dervishes. "Bir lokma bir hırka"

[80]http://www.medyafaresi.com/haber/29907/yasam-bir-hirka-bir-lokma-yutturulmus-zokadir-erol-yarardan-bombalar.html)

process which requires to be gratefull to Allah on behalf of muslims. These points are mainly shared by the vast majority of muslims in Turkey, including the islamists.

Another approach refers to charity organizations in Turkey and their international activism. Enrichment of muslims in Turkey brought out global charity organizations which contributed both to stability and reputation of Turkey in international arena.

> Turkey now exports charity to the world. In this sense we are the top exporters. The economic sensitivity of muslims lies behind this power. Also the factor behind the tangency of the 2008 world economic crisis is again that barakah (fertility). (yasin, 45)

Whenever the topics such as labor, capitalism, wealth and poverty are being talked about, there follows a popular saying which eventually turned into a humor among islamists: "Komunist komunist konuşma" (Don't talk like communists)

The ones who try to discuss these issues among islamists are mostly blamed of a psychology of frustration stemming from the imitation of leftism or socialism. The most popular copycat in these days was İhsan Eliaçık, and my questions were mostly answered in response to what Eliaçık was saying in social or visual media. Thus the issue was vulgarized and mostly neglected.

It's difficult to vindicate that muslims created an alternative islamic model to neo-liberal economic system. By referring to the number and quality of academic studies, Döndüren (1993) admits that islamic economy as a discipline is still in its initial periods. The studies are mostly carried out with the individual efforts due to the lack of an academic institution at undergraduate or gradute level (Döndüren, 1993: 22). Tabakoğlu (2010: 12) on the other hand states that the existence of islamic economics as a discipline itself is controversial, based on the absence of it as a governmental practice.

The economic problems among islamist were far beyond the theoretical issues. I heard many experiences regarding the conflicts and secessions many of which were caused by economic problems occuring in the daily transactions. Many commercial enterprises had failed and dissolved. The sense of muslim brotherhood was falling short

of against the commercial benefits. These stories however were infact no different than ordinary disagreements or conflicts which can frequently occur in commercial life such as failure of fulfilling commitments or delays in payments, etc. But these were highly disturbing islamists and they were often expostulating.

After a conference in an islamic NGO, we were chatting with Remzi (44) on the way home. The topic of the conference was internal problems and unfavourable attitudes occuring among the community. Remzi shared his own experiences with me. He had worked in a company affiliated to the community and had come across some corrouptive methods and eventually had to quit his job. He hadn't also been paid the required compensation. He was telling me that he had obviously been wronged. When I asked him whether he resorted to the leading members of the community, and before anything else whether he tried to make them realize their misbehaviour; he told me that he partially did it, thought that nothing had significantly changed. In spite of everything however, based on his 15 years of experience he concluded with an important comparison.

> Corruption may appear wherever human is in question. Due to the scope of my job, I have relations with many enterpreneurs and employers from different lifestyles. We often get angry with muslims due to their mistakes and improper behaviours in bussiness life. But I assure you brother, projects which are done by muslim bussinessmen are always more conscientious than others. Surely there may be improprieties; but I witnessed that those who possess even a little fear of Allah and his judgement in afterlife, are always better than those self-interested shrewd bussinesmen. This doesn't however entail to shut our eyes to the bad ones among us.

The son and the daughter of two leading families of a community were planning to mary. After a while we had heard of the break off the engagement. I was assuming that the young folks didnt like each other and failed to agree on marriage. Later on we learned that the real reason was the young boy's not-having a permanent job in a governmental position and that the source of disagreement which had occured mostly between the elders, had stemmed from the economic disputes and expectations. We were

talking on this issue with a couple of friends who know the two families well. Atilla (28) was reproaching:

> Sometimes I am thinking... that we muslims are talking about islamic call, gathering in weekly sohbets and reading about the islamic morality and islamic way of life etc. And then I am getting surprised when I hear these kind of stories. They make me rethink over what we are doing. Verily what do we learn from the books? and what kind of moral training are we talking about? How can it be possible for two muslim families to dispute over material reasons, i.e. economic expectations?

Atilla's words reminds us the ideational change in Tarık's (27) mindset mentioned above. Tarık told us that his attitude towards the leading members of the community had changed on the basis of human reality rather than fanciful attributions. Both of these examples can be related to the theoretical frame of the unification of Aristotles' approach on how morality which is socially constructed and maintained regardless of an immutable doctrine, and Hegel's focus the ethical life which forms the empty morality (Yıldırım, 2001). We will further discuss on this in the following chapter. The above mentioned results however seemed not as inevitable transformations of the hypothetical moral drives into practical ethical life, rather stems from not including some forms of morality into the very discourse of religiousity.

We had a family visit to the sufi brother Şinasi. His house was a three storeyed villa and was relatively expensive compared to the ordinary houses of the district. This had attracted my attention long before, albeit it took time to find opportunity to ask him about how he reconciles his beliefs and his lifestyle. That evening we were watching a police operation in the news on TV associated to a famous sufi leader's house. His deluxe house and luxurious cars were on the screen. While watching, I asked to myself vocally "How can a muslim, besides a tariqa leader live such a luxurious life? I felt that he got offended and started to talk in a defence mood. He told me that I was wrong by referring to a saying of the prophet that "Allah gives knowledge to the ones who want it,

and wealth to whoever He wants to give" [81], that there were no limits of private property and that we had no right to question one's wealth if he was giving the alms. When I asked him about his own situation i.e how he reconciles sufism and his own standart of life, he answered by repeating a very common saying among muslims in general: "Having wealth is not a matter, the key is not to let it have you"[82]

Şinasi legitimated his own situation by repeating a variance of the phrase attributed to the sufi Cüneyd-i Bağdadi[83] who defines the concept of "fakr" (poverty): "Fakr does not mean not to have anything, it rather means not to let it have you even if you possess the whole world."

The concept of poverty by this way refers much rather to spiritual poverty (Eraydın, 2008: 182), hence the material wealth is not directly criticized i.e not regarded as a problem itself.[84] With the aphorism attributed to Bağdadi, we come across a subjective mystic interpretation where any comment or critique on the material conditions were thwarted.

Consequently I felt that my question disturbed Şinasi and we couldn't continue on the same subject. Thence I couldn't ask him how he interpreted the difference between his lifestyle and a secular's lifestyle with respect to the practical experience and pleasure obtained from the worldly possessions.

Along with the examples above, I have passed on to discussing the second group of islamists who are mostly critical againts the failed trials of muslims on wealth. For these islamists, muslims in general had lost their trials on wealth and political power or the current view of islam had already neglected what islam says for the poor and

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[81] "Allah gives knowledge and wisdom to those who ask for it, and gives wealth to whom He wishes." Is a common phrase among islamists known as the saying of prophet Muhammad.

[82] "Mesele mala sahip olmak değil, malın sana sahip olmasına izin vermemendir."

[83] Although in academic sources it is attributed to Ebu Abdullah El-mukrinin. (Eraydın, 2008: 184)

[84] Besides this, Eraydın also refers to some tariqas according to whom poverty and decency are interpreted with respect to the very physical conditions.

deprived. While some of them were telling that the mujaheds of yesterday turned today into the building contractors, and after coming across wealth and power, they had abandoned their sincere and pure ideals; some others were criticizing muslims mildly by referring to human nature.

During a metro travel from Batıkent to Kızılay, we were chatting with my anthropologist friend Hakan (28) on our recent readings. The topic turned to the relationship of the leftist groups with the exploited religious workers.

> The biggest problem of the leftist ideology in Turkey is that, they rigidly and vulgarly attack the naive belief of the workingman which is indeed the last resort for a dream of paradise albeit postmoned to afterlife. No matter how miserable his condition becomes, he never gives up believing. The biggest problem of we islamists however is that we don't regard the conditions of poverty and production/consumption relations among the constituents of the religious discourse.

When I asked him of what kind of an alternative economic model islam refered to, he replied by smiling: "Unfortunately what we understand of islamic economy consists only of the prohibition of the interest and the institution of zakat."

Although there exists a considerable literature on islamic approach to labor, capital or production-consumption relations, the popularity of the issue stems from the political and ecnomic shift of the late years. Eliaçık who has been emphasizing these issues for almost twenty years, had a remarkable statement in the protest meeting for the demands of Texim workers who had been dismissed due to asking for 8 hours of working time and insurance:

> If there are hungry people in a city, a region, or a neighborhood; what all the religious communities, associations and foundations located there do is useless and worthless. (Eliaçık, 2012[85])

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[85] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S6mpBywvLh4 (25.08.2013)

Ali Bulaç in his book written in 1995, touches on a similar point:

> Imagine for a split second that one day drinking alchool is prohibited in the entire islamic world, all beaches were closed, all men grow beard and women covered hijab. Men and women sit separately at the universities, homes and in all public spaces. Howbeit all homes, kitchens, markets and malls are filled with the materials of modern consumption. Would this harm the world system or foster it? Methinks it will foster. (Bulaç, 1995: 83)

Bread and struggle for bread always seemed to islamists as simple, worthless and insignificant. It was the struggle of faith which determined the meaning of life, not struggle for bread. Therefore they mostly despised the leftists. As Kadir's challenge exemplifies, a significant ciritique of the capitalist system among islamists never became dominant.

Although islamists are fairly open to discuss and deliberate on many issues, whenever one tries to talk about the economic issues such as labor, undeserved gains or the rights of the employers; interestingly the first and constant reaction always refer to the threat of socialism or communism. In all instances I had come across almost the same reaction. By disregarding these issues, the islamist thought therefore was alienated to the social realities and concerns of the people and as a consequence marginalized.

> We were expecting the poor muslim surviving with the minimum wage, to devote himself to the dawah. When our workmen brothers used to come to the sohbet late or be unable to attend, we were despising them by blaming of slack; though we never cared about the difficulty such as of changing tires for 13 hours a day in a car repair service. (Yakup, 27)

> Naming hunger and thirst as ordinary and despising as non-authentic, is to ignore their pure aspects far from hypocrisy. […] the greatness of Marxist philosophy departure point of which is the economic lives of men, lies behind its ability to be close to the hypocrisy of sermons. (Levinas, 1995: 45)

One of the distinctive dynamics fostering the theoretical transformation of islamist thought is the change in the way they (particularly islamist youth) interpret the relationship between islam and wealth and poverty. The abovementioned exemplary

discussions corresponding to the increasing tension between the established and the novel is anticipated to create a moderate ground of deliberation open to "the other". These two poles in other words are believed to contribute to the emergence of more authentic approaches on the ground of the conceptual paradigm of islam.

Ahmet (50) had come across frazzling problems throughout his duties in the community. Therefore he had become cynical, resentful, and sometimes angry. But still he didn't sever his affinity with muslims. According to him, being muslims;

> Being muslim is abstaining from lying and deceiving people. It is avoiding exploitation of employers; helping needy people even when he is in need. Avoiding from corruption or rig a bid, obeying the traffic rules for example, or keeping the environment clean or it is avoiding favouritism. As the Prophet said, "if there is a good deed, believing that muslims deserve more to do it than others." (Ahmet 50)

Ahmet's example of traffic rules had reminded me a recent dialog I had with an islamist brother. While we were driving on the road, I saw the warning sign of the speed limit of 70km/h. I slowed down accordingly. The brother next to me told me that if I exceed the limit, I would call him in five minutes and then he would prevent me from getting ticket. He added that he was among the engineer team of the software programmers for that electronic system. I asked him whether that was a kind of citizen right (such as regarding the cases of lapses or not seeing the warning signs) or an infraction of rules. He answered by laughing at me "of course an infraction". When I told him that such a behaviour would be "haram" (forbidden by religion), he just looked at me by smiling. Then we dropped the subject. My answer had come to him quite naïve.

One day, after a protest meeting for the massacres in Syria, we were sitting with middle aged islamist brothers in the branch of an NGO. One of the brothers had come from another city. He was a leading member of an islamist community in Anatolia and also a civil servant. Before leaving, he asked whether there were any hotels around that we were acquainted with. When we asked the reason for it, he told us that he would pretend as if he stayed at the hotel, in order to get the travel allowance from the government. The president of the NGO, Fikret, answered that according to him that

would be haram in islam. The issue was not prolonged and they dropped the subject, albeit the silence was fostering the tension.

These and similar examples manifest the meaning and the scope of religious responsibility to which islamists attribute. Sensitivity in ritual worships and consciousness of political opposition. Apart from that, the routines of daily life, commercial relations, and established social norms and regulations had never seriously interested them. This indifference resulted from their oppositional and exclusionary attitude towards the political system of Turkey. Although perceptions change in time, reverberation to a communal practice requires a certain extra time.

CHAPTER VI

ETHICS AND THE OTHER

During my interviews and focus groups I usually encountered with a common answer to the reasons of secession and fragmentation among Islamists: Moral weakness. According to many muslims, moral attitude and responsibility had for long been neglected and confined only to some major cliché behaviours most commonly of sexuality. As self-criticism, it is usually complained that muslims have forgotten their moral responsibilities of living together and what we have been experienced among islamist communities and NGO's are simply moral weakness? posed as ideational disputes (Ibrahim 45). One important indicator of a religious behaviour is undoubtedly fraternal behaviour among the adherents of a religious community. As for Islamists however, issues on fraternity seems to be one of the foremost problems. They generally complain about the lack of brotherhood, altruism, and sincerity all of which have long been acknowledged as distinguishing characteristics of muslims against leftist or nationalist groups. Many muslims who broke with Islamic communities legitimize their contradictory behaviour (being muslim and living individualistically) by referring to artificial veneer of brotherhood among community members. Emotional bonds which is considered as the most motivating dynamic for creation of Islamic society seems to be neglected on behalf of ideational sensitivity, i.e. the idea of Tawhed. In other words muslims who so far opposed to individualism of modernity could not create an alternative habitus (Bourdieu).

Ethics and Morality

> In 1506 Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming defended a civil servant by challenging a eunuch who had unjustly sent a police officer to jail while the officer was investigating corruption at the highest level of the administration. He then had to go into exile, leave his position and forgo his potential privileges in order to remain true to his own morality. Wang Yangming had a vision that led him abandon the classical values of official Confucianism. (Ramadan, 2010: 96)

According to Socrates, Plato and many other ancient Greeks the answer to the question of "*What traits of character make one a good person?*" was related with virtue (Rachels, 2002: 173). Aristotle -who thinks that everything in the universe has a telos, a purpose in itself- considers the telos of human life as the realization of the self, i.e. reaching to the excellence. The Greek equivalent of excellence was arête, which was translated as virtue (Stewart, 2009: 59). The virtuous life however was inseparable from the life of reason. (Rachels, 2002: 173). Yet in the course of time, along with the emergence of Christianity, the ground of good and evil was attributed to God as the law giver. Particularly with the contributions of St. Augustine subordination to the will of God i.e. obedience became central and the philosophers of the Middle Ages were discussing good and evil on the basis of divine law. (Rachels, 2002: 174)

Nevertheless with the emergence of enlightenment moral philosophy re-secularized and divine law turned out to be moral law. (Rachels, 2002: 174) the central question this time changed into "*what is the right thing to do*?". Rachels lists the philosophical approaches based on obligation rather than virtues:

- Each person ought to do whatever will best promote his/her own interest (ethical egoism)

- We ought to do whatever will promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number. (utilitarianism)

- Our duty is to follow rules that we could consistently will to be universal laws –that is, rules that we would be willing to have followed by all people in all circumstances. (Kant)

- The right thing to do is to follow the rules that rational, self-interested people can agree to establish for their mutual benefit. (Social Contract theory) (Rachels, 2002: 174)

According to Hobbes and Rousseau morality is a socially constructed aposteriori category (Rousseau, [1762] 2008: 171; Hobbes, 1996: 97; Rachels, 2002: 141). Especially for Hobbes morality has not significant meaning except functioning for social and political order. For the common religious thought however, morality does not depend on the consequences of our actions, but on the rules God gives us for living good lives. These do not depend on our reason, or on intuition, but on God. (Stewart, 2009: 48)

While Kant who tried to ground morality on reason succeeded to dismiss transcendental from his ontology, he couldn't desist from appealing to religious or mystic grounds while elaborating on morality (Badiou, 2002: 152; Ramadan, 2010: 98). Spinoza on the other hand who wrote in the same time period, referred to the concept of ethics. He argues that, people do not desire something because they judge it to be good, or avoid because they judged it to be bad, but rather they judge what they desire as good and what they dislike as bad. (Spinoza, 2009: 14) He defines ethics by not to be submissive (what he calls servitude) to personal desires, and refers to freedom and power as the capacity to overcome these impulses (Spinoza, 2009: 240). Hence Spinoza's ethics;

> … was the means that allowed man to become an active agent, and to subordinate the imperfect illusions of the imagination to the reasoned and rational controls of the human understanding. It gives the conscience the power to transform a being into a subject. (Ramadan, 2010: 98)

In the course of time, Latin morality and Greek ethics gained different meanings and connotations. While morality referred to a commanding, dominating, external and universal authority (Kant); ethics on the contrary referred to a motivation of mastering subjective capacity which is particular and immanent (Spinoza) (Ramadan, 2010: 98). Following Kant, Habermas also related ethics to the material principles of the sensibility

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and determinants of the individuals' quest of the good, and the moral law to formal principles that have universal implications (Ramadan, 2010: 98). Yet he differs from Kant by stressing that the universal law should also be subject to critical study and discussion.

Hegel interprets the first act of the self as the recognition of itself as a distinct existence from the other (Yıldırım, 2001: 34). "That is why Hegel starts his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* with a discussion of the abstract will and personality because it is the will (and thus, personality as such) that which creates the right by simply existing." (Yıldırım, 2001: 34). Unlike Levinas, Hegel starts with ontology and "the idea of a morality comes into picture for the first time as the expression and organisation of the thought of 'me' desiring to construct itself as a unique whole (in its duality) distinct from the rest of existence (the other)" (Yıldırım, 2001:36). This point of awareness is aslo the point in which morality (devoid of content) gains content by encountering the externality and thus interrelating with the ethical life.

> When the self tries to extend over to its external, the empty organising moral activity, enriched this time with content, 'externalises' itself to pose an order on the external (composed of both the body of the self and the non-self, the other) which is social. It is at this moment of confrontation that morality can acquire its content and thus both morality and ethical life of the self becomes closely connected to each other. (Yıldırım, 2001: 39)

Though this point where subjective will confront with objective universal spirit (Yıldırım, 2001: 45) subjugates morality to the external, to the proper one, i.e. to already routinely being done. This final point is parallel to Aristotle, who judges good and just on the basis of cultural habits and customs (Yıldırım, 2001: 56), and Hume whose central criterion is to reach simple formulations on the basis of experience and the routines generated by the experience (Yıldırım, 2001: 53). Nevertheless, attempts of considering morality as devoid of content and believing that it can only be transformed into ethical life in the form of what is socially proper; are in fact the attempts to ground morality on the basis of reason that would always eventually fail for Bauman (Bauman,

2011: 298). Unlike rational action, moral action is not calculable, contractual, goal oriented or reciprocal. (Bauman, 2011: 79)

> The motivation which constitutes the morality of living together stems from the primal and basic forms of the moral impulse, moral responsibility and moral privacy. After hundreds of years of efforts to prove the opposite, "the mystery of morality in me (Kant)" once again seems to be an impossible thing to get rid of. (Bauman, 2011: 49)

Morality which is transformed into the ethical life in Hegel, is divided by Bauman as being for the other and being with the other. "Being with the other can be regulated with codified rules. But the impossibility of the codification of being for the other is obvious." Says Bauman (2011: 80)

By saying on the other hand that state and community negate the individual's moral discretion right (Bauman, 2011: 62), Bauman admits that the limitless, undefinable (that's why empty for Hegel) impulse of morality which was rejected by the philosophers and policy makers (Bauman, 2011: 83) is limited, defined and structured (ethical codes) for the sake of living together. Yet unlike Aristotle and Hegel, he wishes for the return of morality as a possibility of liberating the subjectivity and privity of the individual against the structure (constructed ethical codes) (Bauman, 2011: 48).

Bauman (2011: 11) quotes from Lipovetsky's tiding of "the era of the void and the empire of the ephemeric". Lipovetsky heralds that we entered the post deontic age (when moral obligations are based on contextual social conditions) and the age of l'apres devoir (post-duty) when our behaviours were freed from the last remnants of oppressive, endless duties, commandments, and absolute liabilities.

> In our age, self-abnegation lost its legitimacy; people are not encouraged anymore to reach moral ideals or to protect moral values and they are not enthusiastic to push the limits for these; politicians destroyed the utopias, and yesterday's idealists turned today into pragmatists. This is a completely new situation which ought to be acclaimed and enjoyed the freedom it brought with it.

The first and the second world wars however had brought serious critiques on what western modernity turned the world into. The leading figure of Frankfurt school, Adorno, had made a call for justice and ethics. Ethics for Adorno was the first philosophy (Knoll, 2002**.**)

> What we had to set out to do was nothing less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism" (Knoll, 2002: 1). …There is only one expression for truth: the thought which repudiates injustice. (Knoll, 2002: 181)

Levinas who lost his entire family in concentration camps and who himself had been captive in a camp for French soldiers in Germany had declared that Nazism was the culmination of the tyranny of the same and the intolerance for the other. (Burggraeve, 2005: 60-61)

Post war period overlapped the quests of Levinas with the quests of the western philosophy for a way out of the destructions modern progressive reason caused. Yet Levinas who had a religious oriented discourse had not been acknowledged for long time by the French philosophy due to the atheistic influence of Sartre and Marxism. After Derrida's famous article of "Violence and Metaphysics" published in 1964 in France (Derrida, 2001) the interest in him began to rise.

The strongest defender of Ethics in our contemporary age is indubitably Levinas. What is particularly significant for us in Levinas is his thinking of ethics on the grounds of the other and connecting the other with the absolute Other (God). What is ethical in Levinas is the moment of "saying" (Levinas, 1981: 15) which is the flowing impulse in Bauman. When we take into account the historical process of morality and ethics I outlined above, this time we encounter with both the subject and the transcendence. Yet neither this subject is the tyrant western ego-centered subject, nor the transcendence is the bundle of orders of the commanding and imperious God.

Levinas who starts with Pascal's statement "That is my place in the sun", that is how the usurpation of the whole world began" (Hand, 1989: 4) has admittedly a different beginning point than Hegelian assertion of the self as "I am I, they are they".

The moment of encountering with the other starts not with ontology but with ethics, and not with "*true*" but with "*good"* (Hand, 1989: 1). This in other words means beginning not with reason but sensibility (Levinas, 1981: 61). Levinas calls this moment "proximity" where at the same time the beginning of responsibility (Levinas 1981: 139; 1985: 95). Furthermore he relates this proximity with a theological reference by considering "the other" in front of the "self" as "the other as the trace of God". (Alford 2004: 147). At this point the self is hostage to the other.

> A hostage who substitutes himself for the others; all this is the self, a defecting or defeat of the egos identity. And this pushed to the limit, is sensibility, sensibility as the subjectivity of the subject. It is a substitution for another, one in the place of another, expiation. (Levinas, 1981: 15)

Levinas also believes that dialog (hence sociability) begins only with such an ethical positioning.

> Communication would be impossible if it should have to begin in the ego, a free subject, to whom every other would be only a limitation that invites war, domination, precaution and information. To communicate is indeed to open oneself, but the openness is not complete if it is on the watch for recognition. (Levinas, 1981: 119)

The centrality of "the other" in Levinas on which all philosophy is grounded and his emphasis on practicality i.e. responsibility is an important contributory theoretical perspective in terms of understanding the dilemma of islamists on encountering "the other" (muslim or secular other).

Tariq Ramadan on the other hand is our inner voice (muslim perspective) exposing the ideational problems related to muslims' approach to their own identity, the role of the other for the muslim self and most importantly his emphasis on intellectual humility as an ethical beginning point in order to open room for the other.

> There has never been more talk of diversity and plurality than in this era of globalization and modernization, and yet, more so than ever before, we seem to be trapped into our identities and differences. The global world is a village; they say… a village of villagers who know nothing of each other. (Ramadan, 2010: ix)

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The relationship between ethics and morality for Ramadan, is shaped by the authority of secularism. While morality is undestood by the west in religious terms, ethics is based on secular grounds. As he puts it: "The modern era is afraid of morality and enamoured of ethics." (Ramadan, 2010: 99). Nevertheless he prefers to use ethics for his approach, presumably due to taking the situated meanings into account: "It seems that morality is imposed and ethics is negotiated." (Ramadan, 2010: 99)

As a muslim living in Europe the importance of Ramadan in the context of this thesis is his unceasing quest for the question of "Is it possible to live together?" and thinking of the answer on the basis of an ethical starting point. The central concept of such an initial point is humility (Ramadan, 2010: 197). Humility for him constitutes the main ethical ground for a possibility of dialog and relationship. Yet he never defines humility nor specifies the scope or the limits of it, except the reservation that humility should accompany with dignity (self respect). Presumably he is showing that his ethics is contextual, subjective, unrestricted and belongs to the moment in question. This in other words is an attempt to integrate both the orders of God and the ethical impulses of the self. It is an association which gives freedom howbeit responsibility to any believing subject for connecting the moral imperatives with the specific moment.

The most important starting point for Ramadan is "the other" as in Levinas. He argues that what one's religion says about the truth of the others is more crucial than what it says about one's own truth (Ramadan, 2010: 16). Centralizing the other within the process of sociability does not entail to relinquish the truth claims of the self; it rather hinges upon the belief that God's command calls for the other. Believing in a truth claim in other words ought to bo thought in conjunction with the way that truth to be defended.

What do islamists mean by referring to morality when they relate it to the reasons of secession of fragmentation?

During my participations and interviews sometimes I was coming up with palpable reasons such as underestimating hadith literature, approving party politics, behaving with nationalist feelings; sometimes I was listening to more abstarct and

ambiguous explanations such as the ways of practice, manners of approaches, methodical or procedural differences; and sometimes I was told that the problems were stemming from moral weakness of muslims. Their answers to my further question of "what kind of moral weakness?" were much rather related to intersubjective matters such as not being honest, pride, egocentrism, insincerity. These complaints were associated with the concept of personality along with morality. It was sometimes being alleged that personality/morality and faith were different categories. If one had a distinctive personality/morality, his/her service to islam would be greater and contrarily one who has moral vices would be a burden by converting to islam. During a sohbet[86] with our brothers, we were discussing the role of islam in shaping the personality/morality of a believer. We had eventually revolved around the following preponderant question:

If Islam had no agenda on disciplining the manners, then what was the content of islamic education and calling?

In one of our sohbet programs Zafer (35) had said:

> If one is virtuous, morally upright, and principled, he will be the same when he becomes muslim; similarly if one is liar, dishonest, unprincipled and unreliable, he will be the same even after he becomes muslim.

I had asked him "Then you believe that islam has no transformative role in human behaviours and manners, do you?". He had hesitated awhile and began to think aloud with a self-critical manner, admitting that such a viewpoint should have sprang from the fact that islamic call had been deprived of a content corresponding to practical life. According to Zafer what gave rise to such an outlook was muslims themselves. This was precisely a matter of re-invoking morality, addressing to muslims as well.

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[86] Sohbet refers to muslims' gatherings for carrying out programs and discussions. Since it connotes a more religious orientation and an ambient of brotherhood and intimacy, I preferred to use the original word.

While we were talking with Cihan (28) on the relationship between political consciousness and religious motivation he had told me about the impact of a book called "Kardeşlik Çağrısı" (Call for Brotherhood) written by Ramazan Kayan:

> Kardeşlik Çağrısı had been published. This book was being read and discussed almost in all sohbet groups in our neighborhood. It was being circulated among muslims. Truly it was possible to see and feel the changing manners and attitudes of the readers. A strong sense of brotherhood was spreading out. Honestly we were loving each other only in the name of Allah and as the writer had said "I" had turned into "we" and "being for the self", turned into "being for the other". This synergy however did not take long, and as the number of muslims who strived to be brothers decreased, the spirit of bortherhood faded.

Ramazan Kayan whose book aimed to contribute to revitalize the sense of brotherhood among muslims which had been dramatically dissolved in modern times, was certainly calling from a moral standpoint. By narrating from the lives and experiences of the first generation of islam i.e the prophet and his companions, he was asking from muslims to face their awful truth. In a way that evokes Levinas he was calling muslims to see Allah on the face of the others and expiation. (Levinas, 1981: 15)

> Consciousness of brotherhood is humility and expiation. It is being honored and praised within expiation. Existing on the basis of brotherhood… In spite of the operations of overriding muslim identity, dehumanization and languishment; it is self-discovery within the brotherhood. (Kayan, 2000: 47)

One of my interviewees Musab (27) told me the experience he lived a couple months ago:

> We as young muslims of university students who had some involvements with islamic communities (mostly of tevhidi communities) but who were not organized members of any groups, had decided to arrange a meeting in Hacı Bayram Mosque. The goal was to be acquainted with each other and establish a ground of coordination for our activities at universities together with sharing our experiences. As I had expected, we gathered as almost 30 brothers most of whom had a considerable backgorund of islamic literature and community activism. Everybody talked one by one and shared their ideas.

But unfortunately it seemed to me that most of them were showing off. This disturbed me very much. When it was my turn I suggested to put all those theoretical issues aside and try to be brothers first, to get to know each other and to be able to drink a glass of tea together. I added that if we started our theoretical and practical issues on the basis of such a sense of brotherhood, then it would be easier to overcome our disputes and we would be able to realize that most of the issues were in fact minor details. I had realized that what I said were received by some as naive and dull. Anyway, after the meeting while I was heading home, someone called me. I didn't know him but he was one of the participants of the meeting. He told me that he got disturbed too from the ambient of the meeting and wanted to thank me for what I said. I must admitt that this call made me happy. Because there was somebody else there who was thinking like me.

Musab was implicitly talking about the ethical dimensions of coming face to face. Smiling, humility and sincerity were the grounds that open up self to the other. It was what Levinas called "sensibility". And mutuality of such an ethical attitude would constitute the relationality eradicating domination, exploitation and uniformity.

While searching for the answer to the question of whether there can be a different form of community organization, we have found ourselves in a hypothetical point which transcends our practical realities. It is an ideal point where the others are values instead of individuals or groups and where it is possible for the constructed social categories of religious and seculars to get closer and unite under common concerns such as of justice, equality and peace.

Everybody knows that we like those who resemble us, those who think and feel as we do. But the opposite is no less true. It very often happens that we feel kindly towards those who do not resemble us, precisely because of this lack of resemblance. (Maffesoli, 1996: 113)

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Islamists from Modernity to Postmodernity: Moderation Continues

In this study, I have tried to descriptively analyse tevhidi Islamist communities and NGO's in Ankara with respect to how they construct their religious identity and we-and-others dichotomy and to understand the theoretical and practical reasons of secession and fragmentation among Islamist groups and NGO's. The transformation of Islamist discourse with respect to changing internal and external dynamics was focused together with bringing up anticipation on the future of Islamism in Turkey.

Based on Bulaç's (2005) and Eliaçık's (2010) theoretical contributions, I located the scope of analysis (tevhidi islamists) to the second wave islamism which started at the beginning of the '70s and transformed into the third wave islamism or post islamism (Bayat, 1996) at the end of the '90s. One of the main queries in the background was to understand whether tevhidi islamist discourse was intrinsically dichotomist and monolithic. The methodological ground comprised of my former personal experiences, readings of the islamist literature, participant observation and in-depth interviews. I also included some important discussions such as on the concept of secrecy, islamists' approach to democracy or democratic methods, and marginality of islamism. These are central themes which contributed to better understand the discursive and practical dimensions of secession and fragmentation within islamist communities.

As mentioned in the methodology part, one of the main aims of this study was to introduce a realistic and sincere picture of islamist ideology in order to contribute to the moderation of socially constructed dichotomies. It is believed in this sense that transparency leads to the emphases on similarity rather than peculiarity. It is shown in

this thesis that constructed paradigms do not generally go beyond human condition and differences based on jargons cannot singly be adequate justifications.

Habermas, Levinas and Tariq Ramadan were my main references both for understanding the current situation of islamists and for generating valid anticipatory frameworks. Habermas' concepts of communicative reason and ideal speech situation are connected with Levinas' and Ramadan's emphases on the ethical stance, humility, self-respect and the beautiful struggle as the preliminary conditions of facing the other. Hence, as the results of the study showed, I have reached a hypothetical point where ethical responsibility –regardless of its references- determines the whole possibility of deliberation and coexistence.

It is a common idea that muslims suffered much from the crude secularization, colonization and so called universalization of the west in the name of freedom, democracy, progress and science. Yet as it is argued throughout the thesis, indispensably the counter movements of muslims carried many methodological tools of the oppressors themselves. It had always been too rare to go against the dominant paradigms in the world and succeed in the lifetime of a person. As it is touched on, according to Watt (1961) however Prophet Muhammad was one of them who managed to upside down the dominant discourse in politics economics and society albeit soon overthrown again with the adoption of Persian and Roman culture and traditions.

Similarly it had been the destiny of islamists to reformulate themselves in accordance with the dominant paradigm of the modern nation-state world. As any political or ideological thought committed in the 20th century, the crime of imposing uniformity despite the vast diversity found its partner from muslims as well. Furthermore the quests for a remedy of destructive modernism found its equivalent idea among muslims as well. It has been a period for muslims to take new aspects into consideration such as the context, culture and history. Studies on Islamic history, culture and Arabian contexts are increasing and muslims are now seriously discussing about how to understand islam from the very beginning. The problem of diversity for a monotheistic religion, and prioritizing the social reality over the abstract idealism are

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among the highly discussed issues. This new wave partly influenced the islamists of Turkey who had for long time refused each other on the basis of belief now have a more moderate attitude towards each other by considering differences on the ground of strategies or multiple perspectives. Their attitude towards the common population also positively changed because of which we are not hearing about the former emphases on polytheism or infidelity.

Despite all its epistemological or methodological difficulties, the popular discussions on Islamic left or Islamic socialism can be considered as a new phase of the experience of Islamic struggle which radically changed the jargon of Islamic call. The preceding theoretical and abstract tawhed-polytheism centred jargon was transformed into/connected to an inquiry of the very realities of an ordinary citizen. One began to realize that islam doesn't consist only of praying, fasting, mystic rituals, sheikhs, obedience, and otherworldly oriented practices; and that islam has things to say on economic injustice, corruption, labour, sharing the national wealth more equally and justly.

Muslims' trial with the other still continues with flux and reflux. Resistance to change in the name of consistency transformed into/lead to a bilateral dynamism. On the one hand islam turned out to be understood as a dynamic thought, thence is bound to take the contextual and historical conditions into consideration. The practical repercussion of this is the acceptance that what one claims on the meaning and the scope of islam as a religion is in fact the product of what s/he understands from the very contextual condition of himself/herself and the reflections of the doctrinal references on that very particular context. On the other hand it is realized that the more muslims encounter with the others, the more it contributes to re-evaluate their existing claims on the scope and content of islamic thought.

According to the results of this study, three important inextricable developments constituted to the emergence of this dynamism of change. The first important contributory development is the emergence of a significant theoretical literature on the new forms of community in late modern society. This is discussed in detail in the light

of Yelken's (1999) contributions. The second remarkable change is the increasing critical approaches and theoretical expansions towards muslims' existing community formations. These critical contributions gained significance to the extent that islamists increased their relationship and involvement with both their own theoretical literature and western-eastern literature. Third wave islamism of post islamism is centrally related to these expansions. Finally the increasing emphasis on the primary relations regarding morality/ethics, friendship and brotherhood contributed to rethink on the ways of coexistence. As it is mentioned, the increasing scope and content of moral/ethical attitude turned into the central concept of the thesis with respect to understanding current reasons of secession and fragmentation and future prospects of the direction of islamism.

When combining these three factors, by agreeing with the critics of Bauman (2011), I reach a determining ground of morality/ ethics rather than ontology. Albeit by the reservation that ethical codification to a certain extent is an unavoidable necessity of sociability; it is argued that morality which requires being free of rational and ontological categories, provides a legitimate ground on thinking beyond the constructed categories of we and others. This is in other words sticking to determinative power of the moral essence over the already codified content. The final point reached is parallel to this commitment on morality where I concluded with an indeterminate sphere of undefined and unstructured determinacy of moral stance, rather than suggesting certain concrete political solutions. This is the point where the subject is free and responsible at the same time.

It is anticipated that the more islamists become aware of diversity and the more they read about the contemporary Islamic literature, the more they will have comprehensive and deliberative approach towards the other. Although dialog, deliberation and negotiation are not one-sided, and not a problem waiting only for the islamists to be solved, the scope of my thesis consists only of the islamists' responsibility.

Due to the fact that deliberation and dialog is not one-sided, the most contirbutory future research would indubitably be the self critically uncovering of the

other constructed social spaces and structures. In this way, the structures whose motivation used to be on differences, will turn out to see the similar; this will lead to proximity (Levinas) and a ground of deliberation where the truer (or at least more legitimate) argument will govern (Habermas). Furthermore, conducting studies on small scale autonomious communities of islamists will also shed light on generating new insights on the way they influence the massive communities.

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Appendix A: ORIGINAL QUESTIONS

Questions Directed to Community Members

1. Öncelikle yapacağımız bu görüşme açısından yapı olarak kapalı kalmasını isteyeceğiniz konular var mı? Eğer varsa bunu islami hareket açısından nasıl temellendiriyorsunuz? Aktiviteleriniz bu anlamda ne ölçüde şeffaf?.

2. Bir cemaat olarak gizlilik ve sır kriterleri ve şartları nelerdir? Dini ritüeller açısından kapalı gizli İslami yapılar hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? Bu durumu politik baskı açısından nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

3. Kendinize İslamcı denmesinden rahatsız mısınız? Bu kavramı kabul ediyor musunuz?

4. Kuruluşunuz kısa tarihi: ne zaman kuruldu, merkez şubeniz var mı?

   Cevaplar müslümanların dernekleşme serüveninin başladığı 90'lı yıllar hesaba katılarak değerlendirilmeli. Yani daha önceden neden kurumsallaşmadınız?

5. İslami hareket açısından Ankara nasıl bir durumdadır? İstanbul yada başka şehirlerle karşılaştırabilir misiniz?

6. Ayrı bir yapı olarak ortaya çıkmanızdaki gerekçeleriniz nelerdi?

   Kuruluşunuz yokken o sırada başka islami yapılar kuruluşlar var mıydı? Ve sizi farklılaşmaya, ayrı bir yapı oluşturmaya sevk eden nedenler nelerdi?

7. İslami birlik ve bunun imkanı konusunda düşünceleriniz nelerdir?

Hem cemaatler hem de devletler bazında müslüman ümmetin birliğini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

8. İslami yapıların mevcut ayrışmalarını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

Ayrışma ve parçalanmanın sizce normal ve anormal örnekleri nelerdir?

9. Kuran'ın müminlerin birliği beraberliği ile ilgili ilkeleri ile bugünün müslümanlarının realitesi arasındaki ilişkiyi nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

10. Diğer vakıf dernek ve cemaat yapılarıyla diyaloğunuz nasıldır? Hepsiyle iletişim kurabiliyor musunuz?

11. Hangi kriterlere göre kendinizi diğer islami yapılardan ayrıştırıyorsunuz? İtikadi ve faaliyet ilkeleri açısından kırmızı çizgileriniz nelerdir? Müslüman olduğunu söyleyen kişi ve cemaatlerden hangileriyle (isim vermeden, sadece özelliklerini belirterek) bir araya gel/e/mezsiniz? Hangileriyle ayrışmanız sadece pratik ve hareket yöntemine dairdir?

12. Müslümanların parçalanmışlığının fikri ayrılıklarda ilgili sebepleri nelerdir? Hangi düşünsel sebeplerle müslümanlar birbirinden ayrılıyorlar?

13. Diğer yapılarla ortak eylem ve aktivitelere ne ölçüde ve sıklıkta katılıyorsunuz? Örnekler verebilirmisiniz? Ortak eylemler düzenleme konusunda problem yaşadığınız durumlar oldu mu? Genellikle ne tür problemlerdir?

14. Kullandığınız İslami jargonun (tevhid, tağut, cihad, belam, şirk vs) birlikte yaşadığınız toplumla ilişkisi açısından halkın diline yabancı olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?

15. Cemaatlerden ayrılan, bir yerden diğerine geçen müslümanlar için ne düşünüyorsunuz?

16. Türkiye'nin son 20 yılını ve müslümanların siyasal alandaki performansını nasıl buluyorsunuz? Bakış açınızda zamansal bir değişim oldu mu?

17. İslam toplumu ya da islam devletinden ne anlıyorsunuz?

18. Demokrasi kavramına nasıl bakıyorsunuz?

19. Sizce islam devletinde diğer dini grupların, seküler veya ateist grupların yaşam hakları ve sınırları nelerdir? Bu sınırlar islam hukuku açısından belirlenmiş sabitlenmiş midir?

20. İslamın siyasal, hukuki ve sosyal emir ve yasaklarının hangi kıstaslarla uygulanabileceğini düşünüyorsunuz?

21. İdeal toplum algınızda sizin gibi düşünmeyen ve yaşamayanlara karşı hoşgörüyü mü tahammülü mü yoksa yasaklamayı mı tercih edersiniz?

Questions to Seceded Islamists

1. Kendinizi kaç yıldır bilinçli bir Müslüman olarak değerlendiriyorsunuz? Önceki dönemlerinizle hangi açılardan farklı olduğunuzu düşünüyorsunuz? Farklılığınızı hangi düşünsel değişime bağlıyorsunuz?

2. Şimdiye kadar içinde bulunduğunuz farklı cemaatler oldu mu? İsim vererek yada vermeden süreleriyle birlikte belirtebilir misiniz? Sürekli cemaat, grup değiştirmek sizce olağan bir durum mudur? Böyle kimselere karşı bakış açınız nasıldır?

3. Cemaatleşme ve cemaatle hareket etme konusunda düşünceniz nedir? Dinsel bir gereklilik midir, toplumsal ya da siyasal bir gereklilik midir yoksa herhangi bir gerekliliği yok mudur?

4. Şu anda neden bir cemaatle birlikte değilsiniz?

5. İslamın bireysel olarak yaşanabileceğini düşünüyor musunuz? Şu anki durumunuz geçici midir yoksa kalıcı mı? Eğer bireyselliği savunuyorsanız ;

   İmanı yaşamanın bireysel bir vicdan meselesi olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Din vicdan işidir söylemini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

6. Bir cemaate bağlı olmanın sosyalleşme, yalnızlıktan kurtulma gibi pratik veya pragmatik bir sebebi olabilir mi?

Giriş

Bu çalışma Ankara'daki tevhidi İslamcı cemaat ve Stk'ların dini kimliklerini ve biz-öteki ikiliğini nasıl inşa ettiklerini anlamaya ve Türkiye'de islamcılığın ortaya çıkışından bu yana süren ayrılma ve parçalanma ilişkilerinin ardında yatan teorik ve pratik unsurları ortaya çıkarmaya yöneliktir. Arka planda, İslamcı düşüncenin içkin olarak dışlayıcı ve ayrıştırıcı olup olmadığı sorusuna da yanıt aranacaktır. Ayrıca çalışmadan elde edilen sonuçlar İslamcı hareketin diyalog zeminine sahip, çoğulcu ve müzakereci bir toplumsal geleceğe dair potansiyeline de ışık tutacaktır.

Çalışmanın sonuçlarına göre İslamcı düşünce her ne kadar tarihsel süreç boyunca ve son dönemlerde de hakim olan düşünce açısından diyalog ve müzakere ilişkilerine kapalı göründüyse de, islamcılar arasında demokrasi, islam toplumu ideali ve 'öteki' ile ilişkiler konularında dikkat çekici bir düşünsel dönüşümün yaşanmakta olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Ayrıca çoğulcu bir toplum ve siyasetin geleceği açısından, islam söz konusu olduğunda tarikatlar ya da geleneksel cemaat yapılarından ziyade, islamcıların ciddi bir potansiyel taşıdıklarını söylemek mümkündür. Geç modern dönemde yeni cemaatleşme biçimlerine dair ortaya çıkan teorik açılımlar, üçüncü dalga islamcılığı ya da post-İslamcılık olarak tanımlanan süreçte ortaya çıkan eleştirel yaklaşımlar ve cemaatleşme süreçlerinde ahlak/etik, kardeşlik, dostluk gibi kavramlara artan şekilde yapılan vurgular, birlikte yaşamanın yolları üzerine yeni düşünsel açılımlar sağlamış ve islami siyaset tartışmalarına da yeni ufuklar kazandırmıştır

Tezimizin temel odak grubu kendilerine tevhidi bilinçlenme hareketi olarak tanımlayan, kendilerine ise türkiyede değişen dönemlerde islamcı, radikal, köktenci, irancı, vahhabi, selefi gibi isimler takılan müslüman gruplar cemaatler ve onların kamusal alandaki kurumları olan STK'lar (vakıf, dernek) olacaktır.

Örneklemimiz yalnızca Ankara'daki STK'lar olsa da, zaman zaman bu kurumlarla bağlantısı olup diğer şehirlerde yaşayan müslümanlarla da görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. İki eksende süren görüşmelerimizin birinci ekseni cemaat, vakıf, dernek mensupları ve yöneticileridir. Bu kişiler çoğunlukla 70'li yıllardan itibaren islami aktivizm süreçlerine dahil olmuş kişilerdir. Büyük çoğunluğu hala islami mücadeleyi sürdüren bu kişilerin geçen 40 yılı nasıl değerlendirdiklerini ve islami mücadelenin geleceğine yönelik öngörülerini öğrenmek bizim için merkezi önemdeydi. Cemaat olmak, müslümanlarla birlikte hareket etmek, tüm yerel ve bölgesel farklılıkları aşan ümmet bilinci ve müslümanların geçen 40 yıldaki ayrılma, parçalanma, ihtilaf ilişkileri gibi meseleleri en iyi bu sahada aktif olarak var olan bu müslüman kuşaktan öğrenebileceğimi düşündüm. Müslümanların kendi aralarındaki ihtilaf ve ayrılıklarının yanında toplumun diğer kesimleriyle kurdukları ilişkinin 40 yıllık serüvenini de öğrenmemiz gerekiyordu. Bu süreçte ne değişti ve geleceğe yönelik nasıl bir muhtemel toplumsal tablo çıkıyor ortaya?

Önceki dönemlerinde de ağırlıklı olarak milliyetçi, tasavvufi öğeleri içeren gelenekçi bir çizgide de olsa islami bir duruş ve mücadeleleri olan bu kişiler 70'li yılların çeviriler döneminde (özellikle Seyyid Kutub ve Mevdudi'nin eserleri) islama ve genel olarak hayata bakışlarının keskin ve radikal bir biçimde değiştiğini ifade etmişlerdir. Kısaca tevhidi bilinçlenme süreci bu müslümanlara yepyeni bir düşünsel ve eylemsel ufuk açmıştır. Çoğu bugün çeşitli islami dernek, vakıf veya cemaat birlikteliklerinde faaliyetlerini sürdüren bu kuşakla görüşme konusunda herhangi bir zorluk yaşamadım. Bunun öncelikli sebebi araştırıcının içlerinden olması, ikinci olarak da islamcıların samimiyet ve iyi niyet konusunda emin olduktan sonra eleştirel her türlü fikri açılıma ve sorgulamaya açık olmalarıdır. Bununla beraber bu açıklık tavrının dışarıdan gelen herhangi birine de gösterilebileceği aynı derecede kesin değildir.

Tezimizin ikinci ekseni ise bu cemaatlerle daha önce örgütlü bağı olmuş fakat daha sonra ayrılan 20-30'lu yaş kuşağı gençlerle yapılan görüşmeleri içermektedir. İnanan müslüman birey ve inanan cemaat karşıtlığı açısından tezimizin

temel sorunsalına ışık tutacak kesim bu kesimdir. İslamcı gençlik, hem cemaatlerin kendi aralarında ayrılma ve parçalanma ilişkilerini hem de cemaatlerden bireysel kopuşları bize en iyi açıklayacak odak grubumuz olması açısından önemliydi. Birincisi islami hareketler ve cemaatlerin yetiştirdikleri insan profilini anlayabilmemiz ve böylece ayrılma ve parçalanmanın benimsenen islamcı söylemin kendisinden mi kaynaklandığı yoksa dışsal faktörlerden mi etkilendiğini anlamamızı sağlayacak; ikinci olarak ise çoğunlukla gençliğin ilgisini çeken farklı okuma alanlarının (islami düşünceye dair yeni ufuklar açan yaklaşımlar ve batı düşünsesi okumaları) cemaatlerin düşünsel-pratik gidişatlarını nasıl etkilediğini ve geleceğini nasıl biçimlendireceğini öngörebilmemize yardımcı olacaktır.

Tevhidi uyanış bilinci dediğimiz düşüncenin belirleyici özellikleri nelerdir? Bu düşüncenin 70'lere kadar Türkiye'de yerleşmiş islam algılarından farkları nelerdir? Bu farklılığı ortaya koymak bizlere islamcı cemaatler arası ayrılma ve parçalanmanın düşünsel sebeplerini anlamamıza yardımcı olacaktır. Şimdiye kadarki tecrübelerimizden edindiğimiz algı, tevhidi düşünce sisteminin türkiyede genel geçer bir homojenliğe sahip olduğudur. Bu düşünce esas itibariyle Mısır'da Hasan El Benna ve Seyyid Kutub, Pakistan'da Mevdudi gibi düşünce ve fikir adamlarının temsil ettiği, islam'ın en temel ilkelerinden tevhid düşüncesinin modern düşünce, kurumlar ve ideolojiler üzerinden yeniden ve politik, anti-emperyalist ve yer yer devrimci biçimlerde yorumlandığı, müslümanlara ideolojik bir aktivizm kazandıran dolayısıyla eylemlilik içinde oldukları her ülkede siyasal mekanizmaların baskılarıyla karşı karşıya kalan aksiyoner bir müslümanlık, literatürdeki yaygın kullanımıyla bir islamcılıktır.

Islamcılık nedir? Geleneksel Müslümanlıktan Farkı Nedir?

Ortadoğuda ihvanı müslimin ve pakistanda cemaati islami gibi hareketler islam dünyasında bütün küçük çeşitlenmelerine rağmen temelde oldukça homojen bir islami hareket yarattılar. Seyyid Kutub ya da Mevdudi'nin islam düşüncesini

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incelediğimizde aslında düşünsel olarak açık ve yalın bir islami jargon ürettiklerini söylemek mümküdür. Bu hareketin en temel özellikleri islam'ın liberal kapitalist ya da sosyalist batıdan çok farklı kendine özgü bir islami devlet ve toplum modeline sahip olduğu, Allah'ın yalnızca bir yaratıcı olmasının ötesinde toplumsal düzene müdahale etme hakkı da olan bir kanun koyucu olduğu, toplumların insan ürünü kanunlar yerine ilahi kanunlarla yani Kuran'ın ahkamıyla yönetilmesi gerektiği, hukuki ve siyasal alanda Allah'ın hükümlerini kabul etmemenin şirk olduğu ve islami devlet modelini hakim kılmak için mevcut bütün küfür sistemlerini hem düşünsel hem de pratik anlamda reddetmek, ayrışmak ve onlara karşıt bir güç oluşturmak gerektiği, böylece alt tabandan eğitim davet yoluyla kitleselleşerek islami devrimi gerçekleştirmek gerektiği gibi temel argümanlardır. Böyle bir islam düşüncesinin Türkiye müslümanlarını etkileyen en önemli iki özelliği uzun yıllardır milliyetçi düşünceyle iç içe geçmiş islam algısının karşısında daha otantik bir dil ve üsluba sahip olması ve cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan beri dışlanan dindarlığı çok daha üst düzeyde bir entellektüel seviyeyle ele alması ve savunmasıdır. Bunun yanında iç dinamik olarak türkiyede de Necip Fazıl, Sezai Karakoç, Nureddin Topçu gibi edebiyatçılar tarafından oluşturulan ve daha çok siyasal bir üsluba sahip islami söylemle, özellikle İsmail Hatip Erzen, gibi daha çok fıkhi konularda kültürel ve tarihsel tortuları aşarak Kuran ve Sünnet islamına ulaşma çabaları Mısır ve Pakistan islamcılığının Türk toplumunda kitle kazanmasının ardındaki hazırlayıcı zemindir (Yıldız, 2010). Çeviri eserler yoluyla bu düşünce Türkiye müslümanlarınca benimsenmiş ve bir yandan milliyetçilik düşüncesi yerini daha ümmet merkezli bir islami dile bırakmış, diğer yandan ise rejim karşıtı bir siyasal toplum modeli iddiasına dönüşmüştü.

Ne varki bu temel düşünceler ekseninde Türkiye'de şekillenmiş onlarca hatta yüzlerce farklı cemaat veya stk mevcuttur. Görüşmelerimden birinde 30 yıldır Ankara'da islami çalışmalar yürüten Çetin (45) sadece ankarada 50'den fazla kendilerine tevhidi müslümanlar denilen islami yapılanmanın olduğunu söylüyordu. Bu tablonun en dikkat çekici yanı hemen hemen aynı metinleri okuyan, siyasete, topluma veya dinin toplumsal rolüne bakışları hemen hemen aynı olan bu yapıların

farklı kurumsal çatılar altında nasıl bu kadar parçalı hareket ettikleridir. Bu parçalılığın mekansal ya da pratik bir zorunluluk mu, yoksa bir arada ortak eylem ve aktivite yapmayı da engelleyen dışlayıcı bir parçalanma mı olduğunu görüşmelerimizde edindiğimiz intibaya göre irdeleyeceğiz.

70'lere kadar Nurculuk, İskenderpaşa, Süleymancılık gibi geleneksel cemaat, ve Kadiri, Nakşi gibi çeşitli tarikatların etkinliğini sürdürdüğü Türkiye'de, islamcı düşüncenin filizlenmesi 70'lerin başına denk gelir. Seyyid Kutub'un idam edilişinden 4 ay sonra türkçeye çevrilen Yoldaki İşaretler adlı kitap ve daha sonrasında çevrilen Fizilal-i Kuran tefsiri ve Mevdudi'nin kitaplarıyla milliyetçilik, sağcılık, tasavvuf, mezhepçilik, devletçilik ve ekseriyetle anti-komunist gibi belirli reflekslerle ilişkili olan müslümanlığa alternatif reaksiyoner, itirazcı ve sistem (hem küresel olarak kapitalist sistem, hem de demokratik ulusal sistemler) karşıtı bir eylemliliği ortaya çıkarmıştır. Tez çalışmamız sürecinde görüştüğümüz cemaat ve STK mensuplarının ve cemaatlerden ayrılanların çoğunluğu 70'lerde bu islamcı söylemi benimseyip bugüne kadar mücadelesini sürdüren nesil ve o neslin eğittiği, düşünsel olarak biçimlendirdiği 20-30'lu yaş kuşağıdır.

Yöntem

Tezimizin yöntemsel içeriği, yılları alan katılımcı gözlem ve içeriden bakış çabası, son bir yılda ise en az 1-1,5 saat süren derinlemesine birebir mülakatlar, 2'li 4'lü veya daha kalabalık odak gruplarıyla tartışmalar, islamcı hareketlerin tarihi, temel düşünsel motivasyonları ve toplumsal birlik ve kutuplaşma ilişkileri üzerine teorik çalışmalardan ibarettir. Görüşmelerimde muhataplarıma genel hatlarıyla aşağıdaki hususları tartışmaya yönelik sorular yönlendirdim:

İslamcı düşünme biçiminin geçmişini ve bugününü anlamak, islamcıların kendilerini toplumda nasıl konumlandırdıklarını, kendi hakikat sınırlarını ve islami camianın diğer cemaatleriyle ilgili fikirlerini ve ilişkilerini nasıl belirlediklerini açıklığa kavuşturmaya çalıştım.

Aynı veya benzer islam düşüncesine sahip cemaatler ve yapılar arasındaki iletişim, koordinasyon ve birliktelik sorunlarına dair genel tabloyu öğrenmeye ve bu tabloyu islamcıların nasıl yorumladığını anlamaya çalıştım.

Cemaatlerindeki gençlik potansiyelini ve kendi cemaatlerinden ya da genel olarak cemaatlerden ayrılan gençlerle ilgili ne düşündüklerini anlamaya çalıştım.

İslamcı söylemin marjinalliği, genel toplum kesiminde bir yankı uyandırmaması, halkın diline ve islam anlayışına yabancılığı gibi eleştirileri yönelttim.

İdeal devlet ve toplum algılarına, demokrasi'ye nasıl baktıklarına, çoğulcu bir toplumda müslümanların ve diğer kesimlerin hangi koşullar ve sınırlarla birarada yaşayabileceklerine dair fikirlerini sordum.

Son 20-30 yılda müslümanların siyasal alandaki performanslarını nasıl değerlendirdiklerini sorarak hem sistem içi bir aygıt olarak parti siyasetine bakışlarını, hem de toplumsal değişimi tedrici mi yoksa bütüncül ve devrimci mi algıladıklarını anlamak istedim.

Ayrılan Gençler

Çalışmamızın ikinci odak grubu daha önce bazı islamcı cemaatlerde bulunmuş, sorumluluk almış fakat daha sonra ayrılan ve kimi bireysel olarak, kimi küçük arkadaş gruplarıylai kimiyse otonom islami örgütlenmeler ve üniversite gençlik hareketleriyle islami hassasiyetini korumaya çalışan 20-30 yaş kuşağı gençlerdir. Bu gençlerle görüşmelerimde:

Öncelikli olarak muhataplarıma islami mücadele geçmişlerini ve kendilerini ne zamandan beri müslüman saydıklarını sordum. Bu soru görüşmecilerin geleneksel dindarlık ile islamcılık arasında nasıl bir ayrım yaptıklarına dair bize fikir vermesi açısından önemliydi.

Görüşmecilerin şimdiye kadar içinde bulundukları islami cemaatler hakkında bilgi vermelerini isteyerek, bugünkü düşünsel pozisyonlarını etkileyen faktörleri anlama çalıştım.

Cemaatleşme, cemaatle hareket etme konularında düşüncelerini sorarak mevcut ayrılıklarının düşünsel sebepleri olup olmadığını anlamaya çalıştım.

Şu anda neden bir cemaatte olmadıklarını sorarak islam'ın bireysel mi yoksa bir cemaat içinde mi daha doğru yaşanabileceğine dair fikirlerini öğrenmek istedim.

Bazıları 4-5 kişilik bazıları ise 40-50 kişilik bağımsız olarak örgütlenen gençlik gruplarına cemaatlerle, dernek vakıf gibi kurumlarla, bir diğer anlamıyla yaşlı kuşak islamcılarla ilişkilerini sorarak, diyalog durumlarını ve kendilerini ayıran sebepleri öğrenmeye çalıştım.

Temel Varsayımlarımız ve Bulgularımız

Ayrılma ve parçalanma islamcı düşüncenin temel yorumundan kaynaklanmaktadır.

Hakikatle kurulan sahiplenici ilişki "öteki"nin varlık imkânını kısıtlamakta; tek tipleştirme, hakikat tekelciliği ve bu kapalı özgüvenden kaynaklanan iletişimsizlik ayrılma ve parçalanmayı beslemektedir.

Toplumda etkinlik gösteren diğer islamcı yapılar ya da geleneksel cemaat ve gruplara karşı sürdürülen düşünsel kapalılık, toplumun diğer kesimleriyle (seküler, gayri müslim, ateist, solcu vs) çok daha fazla çatışma alanı yaratmaktadır.

Resmi ideolojinin baskılarının yoğun olduğu dönemlerden kalma bir refleks olarak cemaatlerde yerleşmiş gizlilik, sır anlayışı ve kapalılık bugün farklı toplumsal kesimler arasındaki diyalog imkanına zarar vermektedir.

İslamcılar tevhid'i anlama ve savunma konusunda aslında üzerinde çok durdukları şirk tehlikesiyle kendileri yüzyüze kalabilmektedirler.

Sistem karşıtlığı islamcıları kamusal ve siyasal alanlardan uzaklaştırdığı ölçüde yabancılaştırmış, toplumsal alandaki marjinalliğiyle de kitle gücünü kaybetmiştir.

Demokrasi'ye iman-küfür sınırları ekseninde yaklaşıldığı sürece islamcıların pratik eylemlilik imkanları kısıtlanmakta, ben-öteki ayrımı, islami devlet ve toplum idealleri oldukça soyut kalmakta, neticede islamcılara çelişkilerle dolu küçük bir yaşam alanı kalmaktadır.

Geleneksel cemaat ve tarikatlere göre akli muhakemeye, farklı düşünsel perspektiflere (farklı islam okumaları ve batı düşüncesi okumalarına) açık oluşları, islamcıların değişim ve dönüşüm imkanlarını artırmaktadır.

Cemaatler genel olarak değişime direnmekte, parçalanmakta ve direndikçe de küçülmektedir. Bu süreç bir süre sonra "küçük olsun, benim olsun" düşüncesine götürmektedir.

Cemaatlerden ayrılan gençler çoğunlukla cemaatleri yetersiz ve sınırlayıcı gördüğünden dolayı ayrılmaktadır. İnanan yapılara göre inanan bireyler düşünsel ve gündelik hayat pratikleri açısından toplumsal gerçeklikle ve farklı hayat perspektifleriyle daha yakın ve sağlıklı ilişkiler kuruyorlar.

Tezimizin temel tartışma sorunsalı Türkiye'de islami düşüncenin hakikat tekelciliği ile hakikatin göreceliği arasında tutturması gereken yolu anlayabilmek, bu konudaki muhtemel imkanları ortaya koymaktır.

Türkiye'de Islamcılığın Tarihi

Islamcı hareket 70'lerden itibaren toplumsal alanda gittikçe güçleniyor, siyasal alanda Erbakan hareketinin de etkisini arttırmasıyla birlikte yeni soru ve sorunlarla yüz yüze geliyordu. Siyasal alana katılıp katılmamak, sistemin araçlarından biri olan particilik yoluyla islami mücadele verilip verilemeyeceği tartışmaları uzun süre müslümanları meşgul ederken, esasen iki yoldan da islami düşünce hala ötekiyle yüzleşemiyor, toplumsal ve siyasal alanda farklılıklarla

birlikte yaşama formülleri geliştiremiyorlardı. Sistem içi mücadele veren Erbakan hareketi aslında bunu realiteye dayalı bir zorunluluk olarak yapıyordu. Fakat siyasal mücadele açısından bu tür bir stratejinin islami temelinin çok da açıkça ifade edilebildiğini söylemek zordur. Netice itibariyle sistem içi mücadele sistemin islami açıdan kronik problemlerini de belli düzeyde benimsemeyi gerektiriyordu. Yönetimine talip oldukları bu devlette içki satışı, kumar, genelevler, faiz, Atatürk ilkelerine ve laikliğe bağlılık gibi sorunlu alanlar müslümanların zihnini bulandırıyordu. Sistemi ve araçlarını reddettiğini iddia edenler açısından herhangi bir sorun yoktu. Ne varki mesele yalnızca siyasal partiler yoluyla mücadele verme meselesi olmaktan çıkmıştı. Islamcılar vakıflaşma, dernekleşme yoluyla kamusal alanda meşruiyet alanları yaratmaya başlamışlardı. Bu sefer sorun sistemin başka bir aracını kullanarak sistem karşıtı mücadele vermenin meşruiyeti tartışmasıydı. Uzun yıllar devletin baskısına maruz kalan, bu yüzden cemaat faaliyetlerini gizlilik içinde sürdüren islamcılar için sivil toplum kuruluşu çatısı altında çalışmak hem hukuki olarak meşruiyet kazandıracak hem de kamusal alanda görünür olmayı ve dolayısıyla topluma açılma imkanını verecekti**.** Devletin baskısından dolayı gizliliği ve kapalılığı esas alan faaliyetler yürüten, 70'lerden itibaren kitapevleri etrafında toplanan ve mahalle çalışmaları yürüten islamcı cemaatler 1990'lardan itibaren dernek vakıf çatıları altında örgütlenmişlerdir. Aslında cemaat çalışmasının kamusal alanda hukuki meşruiyeti olan bir ayağı olarak islami STK'ların 20 yıllık deneyimini gözden geçirdiğimizde müslümanların öteki ile imtihanının hala devam ettiğini söyleyebiliriz. Bir diğer deyişle, islamcı hareket ayrışma ve parçalanmayı üreten islami söylemlerini muhafaza ediyor görünmektedir. Müslümanların islam toplumu ve islam devleti idealinde ötekinin (hem müslüman, hem de seküler ya da gayrimuslim öteki) varlık imkanı hala belirsizliğini korumaktadır.

Ne varki islamcılığın 90'lardan sonra etkisi gittikçe artan üçüncü evresi siyasal toplumsal alanlarla karşı karşıya gelmiş ve bu yüzden artık "islam ne değildir?" değil "islam nedir" sorusu üzerinden tartışmalar yürümeye başlamıştır. Bu soru ister istemez islamın siyasal, ekonomik ve toplumsal hayata dair somut alternatif iddialarını ve çözüm önerilerini konuşmayı, tamamı müslüman olmayan ve

muhtemelen hiçbir zaman olmayacak bir toplumda, devlette islami yönetim, islami toplumun imkan ve sınırları, sorumlulukları nedir sorusunu ön plana çıkarmıştır. Ali Bulaç'ın (1992, 1998) Medine vesikası üzerine yaptığı çalışmalar çoğulcu bir toplumda islami tavrın nasıl olması gerektiğini irdelerken, Yasin Aktay'ın islami siyaset ve islami mücadele ilkeleri üzerine yaptığı çalışmalar (2005, 2013) da islam'i hareketin pratik imkan ve alternatifler üzerinden yürüdüğünü; pratikte mümkün "daha iyi'nin" her zaman pratiği eldeki koşullarda imkansız ideal "en iyiye" tercih edildiğini, böylece inatçı idealizm ile kenara çekilmiş kinizm arasında bir yol olduğunu gösterme çabalarıdır. Islam dünyasında Fazlurrahman, Gannuşi, Hasan Hanefi, Cabiri, Tarık Ramazan gibi düşünce adamlarının çalışmaları modern dünyada müslüman olmanın imkanlarını arayan, geleneksel fıkha dinamizm kazandıran, batıyı körükörüne taklitçi ya da apologetic olmanın dışında hem batı düşüncesini ve seküler toplumu veri olarak ele alırken ve batı dünyasından hakikat adına ne varsa ona açık olduğunu gösterirken, diğer yandan islamın modernite ile ilişkisini kendi öz kaynaklarına dayanarak ve dinamik ictihad yöntemiyle özgüvene dayalı bir mücadele verebilmenin yollarını aradılar. Tabiki "bu süreçte Türkiye'deki islamcı yapılar ne ölçüde bu üçüncü dalga literatürüne açık oldular?" sorusunu sormamız gerekiyor. Tezimin konusunu teşkil eden islamcı yapıları esas alırsak islamcıların bu literatüre çoğunlukla cemaat düzeyinde kapalı, bireysel düzeyde ise oldukça açık olduğunu söyleyebilirim. Bu durum aslında belirli bir hedefe kilitlenmiş, "ne yaptıklarını bilmeyen (marx), ya da bilen (zizek), ama yine de yapan", manheim'in deyişiyle birey ya da yapının içinde doğduğu, o tek biçimli bakış yoluyla tüm hayatın anlamlandırıldığı ideoloji çerçevesi ile yine mannheim'in ifadesiyle (free floating intelligentsia) herhangi bir cemaatle aidiyeti olmaması ve belli bir düşünce kalıbına hapis olmaması dolayıyla farklı perspektiflere açık birey (çoğunlukla) olma durumu arasında gidip gelen bir süreçtir.

Islamcı cemaatlerde en belirgin farklılık olarak mistisizm ve karizmatik lider kültünün bulunmadığını söyleyebiliriz. Hiçbir islamcı tarikat şeyhlerinin otoritesi inanmaz ve körü körüne bir lidere itaat etmenin insanı dinden çıkarabileceğini düşünür. Farklı islamcı yapılarda dereceleri farklı olsa da belirli düzeyde bir

rasyonelliğin bu yapıların temel özelliği olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Bu çok kaba bir biçimde üyelere bir cemaatte özne kalabilmenin imkanını verir. Kuran ve sünnetin hakim olduğu asrı saadete dönüş çağrısı yapan islamcılar doğal olarak bütün islam tarihi tecrübesini kritik bir yaklaşımla ele aldılar. Sonuçta Anadolu müslümanlığı, içinde hurafe, şirk ve bidatlar dolu heterodoks bir kültür dini olarak ortaya konulmuş ve eleştirilmiştir. Bir yandan Osmanlı'nın devamı olan Türkiye toplumuna yerleşmiş ve dinin bir parçası haline gelmiş kültürel kodlara, rituel ve inanışlara karşı bu radikal itirazı barındırması sebebiyle, diğer yandan ise bu "cahili" (Kutub, 1980), topluma karşı kullandıkları üst dil ve aşağılayıcı üslup dolayısıyla toplumda her zaman marjinal bir konuma itilmiş olan islamcılar, sahip oldukları düşünsel derinliği kitleselleştirememişlerdir.

İslamcı cemaatler, tarikatlar veya geleneksel cemaatler gibi yumuşak bir dil kullanmak yerine genelde farklılıklarının gerekçelerini ifade etme konusunda daha açık ve tutarlıdırlar. Görüşmelerim sırasında ayrı bir yapı olarak ortaya çıkmanızdaki gerekçe nedir? Diye sorduğumda aldığım açık yanıtlar bunun göstergesidir. Tarikat veya geleneksel cemaatlerle ilişkileri konusunda genellikle akidevi, inanç esaslarıyla ilgili farklılıklardan söz ederlerken, çoğunlukla kendileri gibi tevhidi esas alan cemaatlerle farklılaşmalarını ise iş tutuş, yöntem, strateji, kapalılık açıklık, sertlik modernlik gibi kavramlarla ifade ediyorlar.

Sır

Görüşmelerimde çoğunlukla karşılaştığım ilk intiba "bizim sırlarımızı seküler, gayri müslim insanlara mı açacaksın?" şeklinde oluyordu. Uzun yıllar siyasi baskılarla karşı karşıya kalan islamcılar için gizlilik ya da sır artık Hz. Muhammed'in "savaş hiledir" hadisi kapsamında değerlendiriliyor ve cemaatler faaliyetlerini genellikle gizlilik içinde yürütüyordu. Bu bağlamda dördüncü bölümde Sır kavramı tartışılacak ve özellikle Simmel (1950) ve diğer teorisyenlerin yaklaşımları ele alınacaktır. Özellikle Chilson'un (2007, 2010) ezoterik sır ve sosyal sır ayrımı islamcı cemaatleri incelerken en önemli teorik aracımız olacaktır. Genel

olarak gizleme saklama eyleminin laik ulus devletin baskı ve gözetimine muhatap olmuş olan islamcıların tarihsel tecrübelerinden kaynaklanan bir refleks olarak bugün de sürdürüldüğünü söyleyebiliriz.

Islamcılar Neden Kitleselleşemediler

Islamcılar entelektüel olarak yetişmiş olmalarına rağmen kitleselleşemediler. Bunun temel sebebi sahip oldukları tevhidi islam anlayışının içkin özellikleridir. Bu özelliklerden en dikkat çekici olanları, yukarıda sözünü ettiğimiz özelliklere parallel olarak, geleneksel dindarlığa karşı sert tutumları, milliyetçiliği yadsımaları, islam'ın Kuran ve Sünnet kaynaklarında çerçevesi çizilmiş bir model olarak hayatın bütün alanlarında yeniden uygulamaya konulması gerektiğine inanmaları ve islami düşünce söylemlerini entelektüel bir jargonla çerçevelendirmeleri, bir diğer deyişle dini yalnızca iman ekseninde temellendiren geleneselliğe karşı rasyonaliteye başvurmalarıdır. Bu faktörleri bir arada düşündüğümüzde genel toplumsal algı ve kabullerle çatışacağını öngörmek oldukça kolaydır. Erkilet'e (2010: 24) gore, "belli bir hareketin ideolojisinin düşünsel içeriği halkın dinsel meşruiyet anlayışı ile örtüşüyorsa hareketin başarı şansı artar." Ne var ki düşünsel ve eylemsel konumlarını halkın genel inanışlarıyla mücadele ederek inşa etmeye çalışan islamcılar, bunun yanında halkın yaşam gerçekliğine hitap eden bir jargon üretememişlerdir. Dolayısıyla bu iki faktör bir arada islamcıları marjinalleştirmiştir.

Etik/Ahlak

Tez çalışmamız süresince yaptığım görüşmelerde problemin kaynağının çoğunlukla ahlaki zaafiyetlerle ilgili görüldüğünü müslümanların ahlaki sorumluluklarını unuttuklarını, hatta aslında ortada yalnızca düşünsel problemler kılıfına girmiş ahlaki problemler olduğuna dair bir çok özeleştiriyle karşılaşıyordum. İslamcılar sürekli kendilerini özellikle sol ve milliyetçi, ulusalcı kesimlerden gruplardan ayıran özellikleri olarak onların anlayamayacağı düzeyde bir kardeşlik hukuklarının bulunduğunu söylerken; bir yandan da cemaat ya da STK'larda

müslümanların kendi yalnız hayatlarını sürdürdüklerinden, herkesin kendi problemiyle başbaşa kaldığından, kısaca bireyselleşmeden ve sekülerleşmeden şikayet ediyorlardı. Bu tabloyu önemsememizin nedeni çağdaş modern bireyselci hayata ve topluma itiraz eden islamcıların aslında pratikte farklı bir habitus (Bourdieu) yaratamadıklarını vurgulamak içindir. Cemaatlerden yapılardan ayrılan birçok genci yalnızlığa iten sebeplerden biri olarak cemaatlerdeki soğuk ikincil ilişkilerin karşımıza çıkması dikkatimizi çekmiştir. Bu durum, görüşmelerimde bazı islamcıların sözünü ettiği gibi yalnızca islamın hakikatine dair düşünsel ayrılıkları aşmanın en önemli aracı olarak görülen etik bir sorun değil aynı zamanda modern hayatın yalnızlaşma, bireyselleşme ve bencilleşme süreçlerini besleyen bir problemdir de. Bu noktada Levinas'ın (1981, 1995) etik üzerine vurgusu ile bir müslüman düşünür olarak Tarık Ramazan'a (2009, 2010) başvurduğumuzda islamcı cemaatlerdeki iç ilişkilerin ve dışa dönük ilişkilerin etik açıdan sorgulanmasına imkan veren teorik araçları bize sunmaktadırlar. Aslında araçlardan ziyade temel çıkış noktası olarak etik sorumluluğu ön planda tutmalarıdır. Bu anlamda tezimiz yalnızca düşünsel ayrışmaların betimleyici bir analizi olmaktan öte, düşünsel pozisyonları besleyen veya üreten etik/ahlaki duruşa da odaklanmaktadır.

Sonuç

İslamcılar arasında değişime ve dönüşüme menfi bir anlam yükleyen ve tutarlılık adına eski iddialarından vazgeçmeyen bir kitlenin olduğunu söylemek gerekiyor. Onlara gore "dün sistemi küfür sistemi kabul edenler bugün siyasal alanlarda koltuk peşindedirler." Bu tutarlılık hassasiyeti bir diğer yandan toplumsal, siyasal ve bireysel düşünsel değişim süreçlerini göz ardı etmeyi gerektirmektedir.

Tezimiz, dışlama ve tek tip insan (mümin), tek tip toplum (şeriat toplumu) ve devleti (islam devleti) yaratma hedefindeki müslümanların farklılıkla, çoğulculukla tanışma serüvenini ele alırken bir yandan da müslümanların bir hakikate inanmakla çoğulcu bir toplumda var olma arasındaki ilişkiyi nasıl kuracaklarının geleceğe dair resmini görmeye çalışıyor. Ulaştığımız sonuca gore İslamcılar farklılıkların farkında

oldukça hem tam olarak kendisi gibi düşünmeyen müslümanlarla, hem sıradan halk olarak görülen genel toplum kesimleriyle, hem de seküler ya da sol düşünceden kesimlerle adalet ve barış temelleri üzerinden belli düzeylerde ortak dil ve pratik yakalama imkanına yaklaşıyorlar. Biz bu imkanı belli bazı geleneksel dini kalıplarından kurtulması, kendi tarihine ve medeniyet tecrübesine dahi insani temelde bakabilmesi oldukça zor olan geleneksel ya da tarikat tipi yapılardan daha ziyade islamcılarda gördüğümüzü söyleyebiliriz. Bu farkın temel dinamiğinin de eleştirellik olduğunu öne sürüyoruz. Ne varki bu eleştirelliği yalnızca batı aydınlanma düşüncesinin Kant'tan gelen mirasından bir parça olarak görmenin islam tarihi tecrübesine de haksızlık olacağını düşünüyoruz. Eleştirelliğin, sorgulamanın islam tarihi söz konusu olduğunda daha Hz. Muhammed döneminde başladığını ve islam medeniyetinin tam da değişim ve statüko taraflarının tarihi olduğunu söyleyebiliriz.

Appendix C:

<div align="center">

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

</div>

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ☒ X

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : ÇAPIK
Adı   : KENAN
Bölümü : SOSYOLOJİ

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Secession and Fragmentation in Tevhidi Islamist Communities: Believing Subject vs. Believing Community

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☒ X   Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☒ X

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: