

THE FORMATION OF THE BOSNIAK NATION

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ABSTRACT
THE FORMATION OF THE BOSNIAK NATION

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This study examines the process of the formation of Bosniak nation with references to the approaches to nationalism. In this study four approaches to nationalism, modernists, primordialists, perennialists and ethnosymbolists, are analyzed first and ethnosymbolist approach is taken as the basis of the study in evaluating the formation of the Bosniak nation due to the fact that ethnosymbolists put emphasis on formation of nation rather than nation-state and they argue that subjective elements such as myth of common ancestry, shared culture and values have great importance in constituting nation. It is argued that there are three turning points in the history of Bosnian Muslims that led to the formation of the Bosniak nation. These are Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia in 1878, the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a separate nationality in 1968 and Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995. In this study, these turning points and their relevance for the formation of nation is analyzed.

Key Words: Bosnian Muslim, Bosniak, nation formation, Bosnia, ethnosymbolism,

ÖZ

BOŞNAK MİLLETİNİN OLUŞUMU

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Bu çalışmada Boşnakların millet oluşum süreci milliyetçilik yaklaşımları üzerinden incelenmiştir. İlk olarak modern yaklaşım, primordial yaklaşım, perennial yaklaşım ve ethnosembolik yaklaşım incelenmiş ve daha sonra Boşnakların millet oluşum süreci ethnosembolist yaklaşım üzerinden anlatılmıştır. Ethnosembolist yaklaşımın seçilme sebebi bu yaklaşımı savunanların millet oluşum sürecinde subjektif unsurlara önem vermeleridir. Ortak ata miti, paylaşılan kültür ve değerler gibi subjektif unsurlar ethnosembolik yaklaşımı benimseyenlere göre millet oluşum sürecinde büyük bir önem taşımaktadır. Bu çalışmada Bosnalı Müslümanların millet olmasını sağlayan üç dönüm noktası olduğu savunulmaktadır. Bu dönüm noktaları Avusturya Macaristanın 1878’de Bosnayı işgal etmesi, 1968’de Bosnalı Müslümanların ayrı bir millet olarak tanınmaları ve 1992 ile 1995 arasında gerçekleşen Bosna savaşı olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu dönüm noktaları ve bu noktaların millet oluşum sürecindeki önemleri bu çalışma kapsamında incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:Bosnalı Müslümanlar, Boşnaklar, millet oluşum süreci, ethnosembolizm,Bosna

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Following the break-up of Yugoslavia, the world, once again, had witnessed a bloody war within the territories of old Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia. Nationalist policies increased the tension among political elites and the independence declaration of individual nations had accelerated the nationalism within newly-independent states. As the Yugoslav idea was approaching to its end, political elites from each nation started to discuss possible future for them. Each nation had claim on resources, on territory that they have inhabited throughout history and on distinctiveness of their identity. However, these claims were generally overlapped due to the multi-ethnic structure of the republics. Yugoslavia was composed of six republics and the strict separation of these republics according to ethnic ground was not simple. Bosnia, among other Yugoslav republics, accommodated the most complex population. It was the sole republic that was not constituted according to the ethnic or nationality principle. Bosnia reflected the multi-ethnic composition of Yugoslavia; there were Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats as well as a-national minorities. In such a complex society the vanishing away of the Yugoslav ideal, which constituted a supra-national identity and thus reduced national claims for a period of time, increased the tensions among the population and paved the way for the increasing nationalist discourse among political elites at first and then, the spread of nationalism en masse, which resulted with the Bosnian war.

The reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian war will be evaluated intensely in the second chapter but it is important here to highlight that none of the republics, except Bosnia, had encountered with such a war during the disintegration period. The independence of other republics such as Croatia and Slovenia were peacefully settled. The first and foremost reason for breaking out such a violent and bloody war within Bosnian territory was its multi-ethnic composition. The decision of Serbs to boycott the declaration of independence of Bosnia signaled

the upcoming war. The Serb boycott manifested increasing nationalism among Serb population and nationalism in general and in this study, it is argued that nationalism makes nations. It is also argued that the Bosnian war was the final step in the creation of Bosniak nation as it mobilized people en masse and spread the nationalist discourses and ideas to whole population.

Nationalism is highly debated subject and almost every discipline in social sciences have addressed the question of what is nationalism, under which conditions it emerge, what are the carriers of nationalism and so on. The first chapter will deal with these questions thus the detailed information will not be given here. Rather the importance of the topic will be discussed here. Some historians and theorists argue that nationalism lost its importance in the late twentieth century. For instance Hobsbawm claim that “yet nationalism, however inescapable, is simply no longer the historical force as it was in the era between the French Revolution and the end of imperialist colonialism after World War II” (2010:169). He continues to say that the attempts to make states in the Third World is generally the opposite to the idea of nation-state of the nineteenth and mid twentieth century’s, which predicated on the principle of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of the population (ibid, 169). However the Bosnian case shows the opposite. The Bosnian war broke out due to the Serbian effort to capture the Bosnian territory, and the reason for Serbian army to attack Bosnia is due to the fact that Serb population within Bosnia is high and also Bosnian Muslims were counted as Islamicized Serbs throughout history. Serbs claim that Bosnian Muslims are ethnically Serbs and thus Bosnia was accommodated mostly by Serbs and it should be unified with Serbia. It can be argued that Bosnian war demonstrated that ethnic and linguistic homogeneity was still relevant in the 1990’s as each nationality within Bosnian territory claimed their ethnic distinctiveness and tried to create a unique language for their nation.

In this study four approaches to nationalism will be discussed. These are; modernist approach, primordial approach, perennial approach and lastly ethnosymbolist approach. These approaches explain the reason for the emergence of the nation-states, the basis of nations, the continuity of the nations and the component of the nations relatively. Modernist approach explains the emergence of nation states through relating it to the carriers of modernity such as print capitalism,

technology development and industrialization. Modernists argue that nation states are possible only in modernity. Primordial approach insists on the primordial character of the nations, it claims that nations are natural and the first social organization can be named as nation. Primordialists explain the nations, not nationalism. Perennialists on the other hand argue that nationalism is a modern phenomenon but nations are not modern, ethnicity is the basis of nation-states. Ethnosymbolists also argue that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and nationalism makes nation but the source of nationalism and nations cannot be explained solely through processes such as industrialization or spread of capitalism rather the ethnic core is emphasized in construction of nationhood. The symbols, values and features that unite people around an ethnicity may turn into nation.

The case of the Bosnian Muslims can be best explained by ethnosymbolist approach due to the fact that the consequences of industrialization within the Bosnian territory did not create the nation immediately. Modernity itself fell short in explaining the emergence of Bosniak nation in the twentieth century. There were many other developments that took place within Bosnian territory that led to the emergence of Bosniak nation and carriers of modernity can be only parts of explanation. The national awareness of the Serbs and Croats had triggered the efforts on the construction of nation of the Bosnian Muslims. It was hard to make distinction between South Slavs before the seventeenth century, the ethnic differences between them was absent until the Ottoman occupation of Bosnia. The elites of the Bosnian Muslims from the beginning of the Austro-Hungarian occupation up until to the Bosnian war had to rediscover their authentic and unique past in order to emphasize their distinctive nationality. Bosnian Muslim elites, through highlighting their distinct value system, their past and their sources of identities created a national identity and a nation. Only ethnosymbolist approach underlines the importance of the values and identity sources for the emergence of a nation. If the Bosniaks are to be counted as nation, they need to be analyzed with reference to the ethnosymbolist approach.

Another important feature of ethnosymbolist approach in evaluating the formation of Bosniak nation is its understanding of nationalism. For the advocates of modernist approach nationalism and nation-state are automatically something secular

and secularism means “the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols” (Berger, 1969:107). Secularism is not in the scope of this study but it has great importance in the formation of nation-states. The retreatment of religion and religious institutions from the public sphere resulted with the establishment of public institutions separate from religion. Whether secularism preceded nation-state or nation-state preceded secularism is another discussion topic that is not included in this study but either way nation-states are expected to be secular by nature. Modernist approach underestimates the power of religion as the processes that led to the emergence of nation-states also resulted with secularism and secularism means the diminishing appearance of religion in public institutions. For modernists nation-states are secular and religion cannot be the driving force in the formation of nation in the modern era. For ethnosymbolists, on the other hand, religion is a powerful source for identity formation and religious nationalism is not something oxymoron, as Smith states

Nationalism is a fundamentally secular ideology, there is nothing unusual about a religious nationalism. Not only have nationalists often found it necessary to appeal to the religious sentiments of the masses, but they have also found it relatively easy to identify the nation with the religious community (1991:49)

So Smith argues that religious sentiments are crucial for nationalist to mobilize the masses and the identification of nation with already established religious community is an easy task. Nations, from an ethnosymbolist approach, are constituted on the basis of ethnic elements and ethnicity, in many cases, is coincided with religious differentiation. Religious discourses, elements and symbols are important in the period of nation-formation and also for nationalist discourses. As it will be discussed in the following chapters religion is a crucial element in the formation of Bosniak nation. Muslim nationalists appeal to their religious differences in order to mobilize the masses and the nations of Bosnia has separated according to their religion. There is equation of nationality and religion and only ethnosymbolists highlight the importance of this equation. For these reasons, the study is generally based on the argument of ethnosymbolists in analyzing the establishment of Bosniak nation. At the same time, as it is argued that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and

nationalism makes nations, modernist arguments are also included in ongoing chapters.

The importance of the topic is that although there are very important writings in relation to the formation of Bosniak nation there are no attempts, in these writings, in evaluating this formation through approaches to nationalism. By relating the formation with approaches to nationalism, the processes of the evolution can be seen more clearly. Each step taken by Bosnian Muslims to protect their distinctiveness and survival under domination of different power can be analyzed within a historical perspective as well. However, the importance of these steps can be understood better if they are analyzed through approaches to nationalism. These steps cannot be seen as random steps, they aimed at formation of nation. Thus in this study the history of Bosnian Muslims will be evaluated in relation with approaches to nationalism in order to appreciate the significance of each step taken in the formation of nationhood.

This study is composed of three chapters. In order to give a comprehensive framework for nationalism and nation state, in the first chapter approaches to nationalism and nation-state will be given in detail. Modernist approach, primordial approach, perennial approach and ethno-symbolist approach will be given with their basic characteristics and components. The fundamental questions to be answered in the first chapter will be when and what is the nation, what is nationalism, what is the relationship between nation and nationalism.

In the second chapter, the history of Bosnia will be evaluated. This chapter will not be only about Bosnian Muslims. It will cover the whole territory. The reason for a geographical explanation is the assumption that the identity formation and nation formation of South Slavs cannot be separated from one another. The interaction among them is very high. In order to understand Bosniak, one has to found what does Serb mean or in order to understand the features of Serbs, one has to know who is Croat. The nationalism, when it began in somewhere, triggered the other constituent parts of Yugoslavia republics. It grew through interaction and thus the history of South Slavs will be given in general.

Second chapter begins with the history of Slavs. Their history will be explained first in order for the reader's better understanding of the background of

South Slavs. Secondly, the history of Medieval Bosnia will be given. This part is important as during the identity formation period of the Bosnian Muslims, there were attempts to rediscover the medieval history of Bosnia. Those who did not accept an Islamic identity tried to base their distinctiveness and identity to the Medieval Bosnians. Thirdly, the Ottoman suzerainty will be analyzed in detail as during the Ottoman rule, South Slavs were to be recognized as a different millet. Differentiation in the Ottoman Empire was made by religious affiliation and this is called the millet system. Religious differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Ottoman period and diverse treatment arose from the religious differences created dissidents among non-Muslims, and resulted in the emergence of national consciousness of the non-Muslims. However, Muslims did not develop a national consciousness during the Ottoman Empire as their positions in relation to the non-Muslims were much better. Fourthly, Bosnia under Austro-Hungarian rule will be analyzed. This period had crucial importance for the Bosnian Muslims. They encountered a Christian rule for the first time after Islamization. It is argued that during this period Bosnian Muslims became an ethnic community. Fifthly, Bosnia under the Yugoslav administration will be explained, the period when Bosnian Muslims developed the features of their ethnicity, recognized as a separate nationality. Sixthly, the disintegration of Yugoslavia will be evaluated. This is also important as during the disintegration period, the nationalists' arguments increased throughout Yugoslavia and in this study nationalism is treated as the maker of nations. The Bosnian war will also be given in this section, which is argued to be the last step in making the Bosniak nation. And finally, Bosnia after the war will be briefly given in order to understand the conditions within the federation.

. In the last chapter, the focus will be solely on Bosnian Muslims. At the end of each section, the nationalism theories and the developments that occurred in the Bosnian Muslims will be evaluated in relation. Firstly, the millet system will be explained in order to understand why Bosnian Muslims did not develop a national identity whereas Serbs did constitute one. Secondly, the developments that occurred in the Habsburg Empire will be analyzed. In this section the main theme will be that Bosnian Muslims during this period have strengthened their communal feelings and they formed an ethnic community. They lost privileges of having the same faith with

the rulers, their status were threatened and led to the seeking rights for their community. They mobilized en masse during this period and mass mobilization strengthened their communal feelings, Bosnian Muslims became political, which eventually gave them autonomy. Thirdly development of national consciousness of Bosnian Muslims will be evaluated through analyzing the arguments of Bosnian Muslim elites. In this period, the elite conflicts among Muslims and Yugoslav administration contributes to the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a separate identity. Last section also will focus on the intellectual debates and also the only institution of Bosnian Muslim, Islamic Religious Community in structuring the features of the national identity of Bosnian Muslims. The nationalist party of Bosnian Muslims (SDA) and its contribution to the spread of nationalism to the Muslim population will be also explained. Besides the Bosnian war will be also discussed as it is argued that the war has the greater role in the creation of the Bosniak nation eventually. Through intellectual discussions, party politics and war, Bosnian Muslims became Bosniaks, a separate nation.

CHAPTER II

Theoretical Framework

Throughout the history, there were certain crucial events that structure and restructure the world system or generate new systems and these events did not appear at the same time around the world. There would not have to be parallel timing or simultaneous happenings. This is also the case for the emergence of nations, nationalisms and nation-states. Roots of nations, the processes of nation formation, and the emergence of nation-state have diverse echoes in accordance to the scholars' background, i.e whether they are historian or sociologist, in accordance with their ideological commitments and so on. Also approaches to nationalism differ in their analysis, with their emphasis on the history, sociology, anthropology or economics and politics. The basis of their theory, the starting point for them shape and re-shape their interpretation of what is meant by nation, or what triggers the nationalism. So, it is clear that there is no single, comprehensive theory that encompasses all the components or all the structural changes within it. Rather there are approaches and distinct interpretations of nationalism, which lead to not to theory of, but to approaches to nationalism as Smith argues

there can be no single 'history of the nation' or of nationalism, but neither is there an infinite number of such histories. What we have instead is a finite number of competing histories determined in large part by the historiographical debates generated by rival paradigms for understanding and explaining the character, historical location, and social and political role of nations and nationalism (2000: 2).

The fundamental questions to be answered in this chapter, if successful, would be 'what is the nation', 'what is nationalism', and 'when nations emerged'. Although there is no definite formula for these questions, each approach has given some processes which lead formation of nations. The theories of the formation of nation-state are excluded from the study, as this study deals with nations, not nation-state. And in this study, the relationship between the state and the nation will not be evaluated because contrary to the modernists definition of nation, which prerequisites the state for the formation of nation such as Giddens' formula that stated "a nation...only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory

over which its sovereignty is claimed” (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994: 34), in this study, Connor’s argument on nation and nationalism will be the starting point, nation will not be equated with a state, and nationalism is interpreted as loyalty to nation not with state (2005: 40). And in this study nation will be defined as “a named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memoires, a common public culture and common laws and customs” (Smith, 2002: 15).

In this chapter, the characteristics of modernist, primordialist, perennialist and ethno-symbolist nationalist approaches will be briefly given with reference specifically to the roots of nations and nationalism and nations will be analyzed within the context of nationalism and the reason this is the assumption that nations are only possible in an age of nationalism, which is accepted by both modernists and ethno-symbolists. For this reason, nationalist approaches in general and their perspectives on nation, and nation formation in particular will be evaluated.

Modernist approach and ethnosymbolist approach will be the approaches that will be discussed in relation to the formation of Bosniak nation. The basic premise of the modernist approach is that nations are the product of modernity and that nationalism makes nations will be the focal point of the study. However the idea of nation and the role of nationalism in making nations will be analyzed within the context of ethnosymbolist approach. The constitutive elements of nation, in the eyes of ethnosymbolists, can be found in the very ethnic past of the so called nation and ethnicity is a named community whose members share solidarity, myth of common ancestry, common culture, territory (Smith, 2009:27). Ethnicity gains political meaning with nationalism and ethnicity can turn into a nation through nationalism. The nationalism among Bosnian Muslims was, if not absent, salient. It was not the driving force among Muslims until 1980’s. Ethnic awareness of Bosnian Muslims occurred in Austro period and reinforced during Yugoslav rule. However the possibility of having a distinct nation emerged only after the politicization of Bosnian Muslims and nationalism of the neighbors, triggered the nationalist discourse among Muslims. The increasing nationalist ideals and claims made the Bosniak nation with references to their ethnic differences, their distinct value system and to symbols that include Muslim elements in creating their nation. It is the

ethnosymbolist that put importance of subjective elements thus the main approach in explaining the emergence of Bosniak nation.

2.1. Modernist Approach to Nationalism

It is proper to start with the definitions of nationalism and its components for modernist in order to give a comprehensive framework. Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson are the most prominent names for the modernist interpretation of nationalism¹. Although they can be categorized as modernists, their theories or approaches do not automatically fit one another. They share some basic assumptions, which is summarized by Anthony Smith very clearly in almost all of his works (1998, 2000, 2010, 2002, 2009). These characteristics are best and comprehensively summarized in his book called “Nationalism and Modernism”, in which he states that

(1) nations were wholly modern—; (2) nations were the product of modernity... (3) nations were therefore not deeply rooted in history, but were inevitable consequences of the revolutions that constituted modernity...; (4) nationalism likewise was embedded in modernity, or more accurately, in the processes of modernisation and the transition to a modern order, so that when these processes were completed, nationalism too would wane and disappear; (5) nations and nationalisms were social constructs and cultural creations of modernity, designed for an age of revolutions and mass mobilisation, and central to the attempts to control these processes of rapid social change (1998, 21 22)

Although these are the common elements that can be found within modernist approach, there are diversification of interpretation of nations, and nationalism. It is proper to start with Gellner’s explanation for nationalism, which is, “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (1983:1). It means the people (the nation) and the representatives of the people (political unit) should be same, in the sense that their race or language or culture should be same. Gellner continues that minorities cannot disrupt this principle. “The nationalist principle, as defined, is not violated by the presence of *small* numbers of resident foreigners, or even by, the presence of the

¹ John Breuilly, Liah Greenfeld

occasional foreigner in , say, a national ruling family” (ibid, 2). Gellner gives some important factors that pave the way for the rise of nationalism. He makes a division between agrarian society and industrial society and then he argues that “the social organization of agrarian society, however, is not at all favorable to the nationalist principle, to the convergence of political and cultural units , and to the homogeneity and school-transmitted nature of culture within each political unit” (ibid, 39). First, he states that agrarian society and its organization was not proper for the emergence of nationalism as it cannot produce homogeneity, the distance between the common people and the ruler, or the feudal lords were high, there were no shared culture among them, and illiteracy were high and there was no standardized education system.

In other words the modern world necessitates nationalism because that there is a transition from agrarian to industrial societies and in order for industrial societies function well, there should be, at least on a minimum level, connection, similarity and unity among people. In agrarian societies, the gap between people was not important. The reason for a nationalist sentiment occurs in industrial society is that, the modes of production has changed, and in order to implement the new modes of production, more people should be trained and trained in a similar way so a need for homogeneity emerged due to the new modes of production. This can be done, for Gellner, through sustaining a similar, united, and integrated society which is possible with nationalism.

What is nation for Gellner? Gellner states that nations are possible in an age of nationalism, which means that, without nationalism, nations cannot exist. With his most famous words “nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, rather than, as you might expect, the other way round” (ibid, 55). He suggests that, the conditions that created through the transition from agrarian society to industrial one, which in turn created the sense of nationalism, was the only reason that generated the nations. Nations cannot exist without

general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify” (ibid, 55)

An important Marxist historian and theorist, who had worked throughout his life on races and nationalism, is Eric Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm uses the Gellner's famous definition of nationalism, 'primarily political principle which holds that political and national unit should be congruent' and he continues that

nation belongs exclusively to a particular, historically recent, period...Nationalism comes before nation. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the way around.. Nations exist not only as functions of a particular territorial state or the aspiration of establish one... but also in the context of particular stage of technological and economic development...Nations are dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below...National consciousness develops unevenly among the social groupings and regions of a country (2012: 9 -12)

As the other advocates of modernist approach and scholars, Hobsbawm claims that nationalism makes nations and both of them are products of modernity. For Hobsbawm, the characteristics of nation are historic association, cultural elite and written literary, and capacity of conquest, are constantly reproduced in order to meet the needs of the masses, to create a united, connected, sharing nation (ibid, 38). For Hobsbawm, the primary meaning of the nation is political.

It equated the people and the state in the manner of the American and French Revolution... The nation, so considered, was the body of citizens whose collective sovereignty constituted them a state which was their political expression. For, whatever else a nation was, the element of citizenship and mass participation or choice was never absent from it (ibid,18-19)

Hobsbawm argues that the nation, is a product of liberal bourgeoisie because "development of nations was unquestionably a phase in human evolution or progress from small group to larger' and 'the nation itself was historically novel, it was opposed by conservatives and traditionalists, and therefore attracted their opponents" (2012: 38-40). So as the liberal bourgeoisie gained wealth and demand some power in the administration, the nation served their purpose, it is represented as a development in human history and it encompasses the people en masses, not a privileged strata. Hobsbawm equated nation and state, and also interested in nation-building process rather than nation itself as he argues that the principle of nationality comes after the formation of nation-state. The formation of nation-states, its

pervasion to society makes nationality, so without mass participation or without citizenship, one cannot speak of a nation.

It is clear that, for Hobsbawm, nation-building, rather than nation itself does matter as he thinks that nation has a political meaning. Without state as an institution, nation did not fulfill its task. There is an equation state=nation=people. Nation is a product of liberal bourgeoisie, with an emphasis on progress and the ways in which progress can be best achieved. The idea of nation is also against the conventional ways of community, that's why it is supported and in a way produced by the liberal bourgeoisie, who were opposed what is traditional and conservative.

Another important name in modernist approach is Benedict Anderson. Anderson. In his book called "Imagined Community", defines nation as "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (2006: 6). Anderson defines the nation as imagined due to the fact that inhabitants do not know each other, there is a 'supposed' link among them and people live within it think them as a part of the same nation. It is limited as nations are finite, no nation can claim its universality and it is sovereign as the rise of nation is linked to the Enlightenment, where divine order lost its validity, so nation itself is the new sovereign according to the democratic ideals. Anderson's argument in general is based on the development of capitalism and in relation to that, development of print technology.

Anderson seeks for the roots of national consciousness, he examines the cultural roots for the nation to be thought. He first argues that the declining power of religious communities and dynasties had made it easy for nation to be 'imagined'. He offers two reasons for waning power of religious communities, first was the discovery of non-European countries (ibid, 16) and second was the "gradual demotion of sacred language itself" which was sustained by print capitalism. (ibid, 18). Then, he analyses dynastic realm which he defined as "appeared for most men as the only imaginable 'political' system" (ibid, 19). Dynastic power derives from the divinity itself, and the divine power of the dynastic realm began to lose its legitimacy during seventeenth and eighteenth century. Then he analyses the shift in 'apprehension of time'. He starts with examining the religious figures and reveals out that "the figuring of imagined reality was overwhelmingly visual and aural"(ibid 23) and these figures,

for instance religious figures, were not in accordance with the history, as there were no sense of history in medieval Christian mind or as Anderson puts it very impressively “the mediaeval Christian mind had no conception of history as an endless chain of cause and effect or of radical separations between past and present... a simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present” (ibid, 23 24). The transformation is “an idea of 'homogeneous, empty time,' in which simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calender” (ibid 24). What is meant by homogenous empty time is evaluated in the following pages. The summary of the arguement is that, through newspaper and novels, the simultaneous happenings were given, the news from the unknown lands or the relations and their effect on unknown persons were given. Anderson claims that “these forms provided the technical means for 're-presenting' the *kind* of imagined community that is the nation” (ibid 25). Without these three transformations, Anderson argues, it was not possible to think about imagined communities or the nations.

All reasons mentioned above necessitate new forms of reunification brotherhood, power and time and for Anderson, this was sustained through the print capitalism. The role of print capitalism, in the latter pages, is defined very clearly by Anderson. He argues that

These print-languages laid the bases for national consciousnesses in three distinct ways. First and foremost, they created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars...Second, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation...Third, print-capitalism created languages-of-power of a kind different from the older administrative vernaculars Certain dialects inevitably were 'closer' to each print-language and dominated their final forms (ibid, 44 45 46)

Print technology paved the way for a new communication technique, through which people from a distant or unknown place became known through paper. The translations of Bible into vernacular languages, the ability of people to reach the sources in their own language, and the fixity of the language spoken had closed the distance between elites and the masses, the loss of power of the sacred languages in comparison to the vernacular language.

Modernist approach, in general, put greater emphasis on the transformations of the society, of the economy, of the structure. It uses a macro-level analysis, structural changes and economic dimensions of these transformations. It does not touch upon the 'nation' itself, upon the people. It juxtaposes the necessities of the formation of nation, and explains how nation is formed, but it lacks an analysis of the nation itself.

2.2. Primordial Approach to Nationalism

As an idea, primordialism can be traced back to the German Romanticism, in the writings of Fichte and Herder. Primordialism "refers to the idea that certain cultural attributes and formations possess a prior, overriding, and determining influence on people's lives, one that is largely immune to 'rational' interest and political calculation" (Smith, 2000: 5). There is no single type of primordialism as there is no single type of modernism. Smith identifies three types of primordialism, which are organistic, sociobiological and a cultural primordialism (ibid, 5). It is not in the scope of this study to evaluate them separately and deeply. Rather, it is important to identify some of the most known primordialists' arguments and general characteristic of primordialism.

For some primordialist, nations are organic, they are natural. Since nations are treated natural, from the beginning of the emergence of individual's social organization, there have been nations. They may not be called nation-state but they become one. As Pierre Van den Berghe puts it "the very concept of the nation is an extension of kin selection" (1978). The *kinship* is seen as the lasting bond among people. *Language, race, culture and religion* are seen crucial and basic features for primordial bonds and attachments. What is to be highlighted for primordialism is that, the important elements of it are seen as given or natural. These 'givens' are the things that shape and keep the society, it doesn't matter what kind of a social organization is there, whether a tribe or nation-states, these are the essential elements in all type of social organizations and social mobilizations.

Religion might be the most important element of the primordialist discussion. Clifford Geertz makes a substantial definition of religion which makes it easy to understand what is role of religion for primordialist

(1) a system of symbols which act to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura factuality that (5) moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. (1973: 90)

So it is clear that, religion presents a form of existence for men, it declares its symbols, rituals maybe, through them it unites people and this processes seem realistic to people. It is clear that Geertz does not find them real motivation but he states that there is a belief that assumes these motivations are real, which makes these motivations is more powerful and pervasive in a sense. Geertz, also defined what constitutes primordial attachment and how it is important;

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’—or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed ‘givens’—of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves... But for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural—some would say spiritual—affinity than from social interaction (1973:259-260).

So what is the relationship between cultural givens or religion with nationalism? Although their role to generate nationalism might differ, they are significant for the rise of nationalism or nationalist sentiments. Geertz, while analyzing the rise of nationalism in Javanese people, argues that the rise of nationalism can be bound to and is generated through the use of the existing values. “The highly urbanized elite forged their bonds to the peasantry not in terms of complex political and economic theory, which would have had little meaning in a rural context, but in terms of concepts and values already present there”(1973:166). Geertz thinks that primordial attachment is used by elites. Geertz argues in Javanese case, what is religious became political. It might be said that, the existing values, as overwhelmingly pervaded into the social organization and individuals within it, are became the main actors in

mobilizing the masses. Mobilizing the masses is one part of the subject, the other part is the vitality of religion and kinship even in the modern societies, as Shils argues, which are witnessed by their symbols and public ceremonies (Smith, 1998,:131).

Pierre Van Den Berghe, who can be classified as sociobiologist primordialists, has put his emphasis on kin selection. He argues that kin selection is crucial in human relations. However, kin selection itself does not explain all human sociality. He put two additional foundations for human sociality, which are reciprocity and coercion (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994: 97). He argues that “both ethnicity and race are, in fact, extensions of the idiom of kinship and that, therefore, ethnic and race sentiments are to be understood as an extended and attenuated form of kinship” (ibid, 97). He defines ethnic group as

what geneticists call breeding populations, in-breeding superfamilies, in fact which not were much more closely related to each other than to even their closest neighbours, which almost without exception explicitly recognized that fact, maintained clear territorial and social boundaries with each other ethnic groups... The common ancestry of the people was always partially fictive... that the extended kinship of the ethnic group was sometimes putative rather than real was not important point (ibid, 98).

Primordial arguments are dealt with subjective sources as cultural primordialists do or biological factors, as socio-biologists do. They put greater emphasis on the sources of attachment rather than nations or nationalism in general. These arguments accept the role of the cultural or biological ‘givens’ and base any theory on them. For the nationalism, they offer the same formula. As in the Geertz, what triggers the rise of nationalism is what keeps that society, their value system or their rituals or symbols. “Although nationalism, the ideology and movement, might be recent and novel, nations were seen as forms of extended kinship and as such were ubiquitous and coeval with the family” (Smith, 2009:8). In sum, at the bottom of nation and nationalism, there are these givens and they shape the nationalist sentiments and gather people around them but what it matters is the basis of nations or nationalisms rather than the nationalism itself. However, as Smith argues, ‘primordialist contribution is significant in stressing exactly those dimensions of

subjective emotion and intimate belonging that the cultural nationalists had singled out and that political economic, and military history failed to address' (2000: 23)

2.3. Perennial Approach to Nationalism

Perennialism refers to “the historical antiquity of the type of social and political organization known as the ‘nation’, its immemorial or perennial character” (Smith 1998:159). For perennialists, nationalism as an ideology is a modern phenomenon but they assume that nations are not modern, there were there from the beginning of history. For instance, Adrian Hasting, who is the leading figure in perennial approach, argues that “nation-state does not inherently belong to modernity” (1997: 6). This argument is just the opposite of the modernist theory of nationalism in which nationalism treated as a product of modernism. Ethnicity is an important element of the perennialist approach and for Eriksen “ethnicity refers to the social reproduction of basic classificatory differences between categories of people and to aspects of gain and loss in social interaction. Ethnicity is fundamentally dual, encompassing aspects of both meaning and politics” (1991:264).

Hasting argues that ethnicities are the basis of nation-state and what is distinctive between both pre-modern and modern societies is ethnicity. Hastings defines ethnicity as “a group of people with a shared cultural identity and spoken language. It constitutes the major distinguishing element in all pre-national societies, but may survive as a strong subdivision with a loyalty of its own within established nations” (1997:3). For Hastings, “ethnicities turn into nations or integral elements within nations at the point when their specific vernacular moves from an oral to written usage to the extent that it is being regularly employed for the production of a literature, an particularly for the translation of the Bible” (ibid; 52). The relation between religion, especially Christianity and nation is important in Hastings’ theory as he relates the birth of nations to Christianity.

The emphasis of the perennial approach is to the existence of the category of nation from the beginning of the history. The perennial character of nation does not mean that each nation has existed over time, it does not add this feature to a specific

nation, rather, it is the characteristic of nation in general. Its origins can be found in human biology. (Smith, 2009:3)

For the perennialists, the nation is a politicised ethno-cultural community, a community of common ancestry that stakes a claim to political recognition on that basis... the nation is persistent and immemorial, with a history stretching back centuries, if not millennia... the nation is 'rooted' in place and time; it is embedded in a historic homeland... the nation is a popular or demotic community, a community of 'the people' and mirroring their needs and aspirations... belonging to a nation means possessing certain qualities. It is a state of being... nations are seamless wholes, with a single will and character... the underlying principles of the nation are those of ancestral ties and authentic culture. (Smith, 2003: 22 23)

The nation is far more complicated than the ethnicity for perennialists. Although ethnicity is the first constituent element of nation, it is not the sole actor in formation of nations. Hastings argues that

A nation is a far more self-conscious community than an ethnicity. Formed from one or more ethnicities, and normally identified by a literature of its own, it possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy as a people, together with the control of the specific territory, comparable to that of biblical Israel and of other independent entities in a world of thought of as one of nation-states (1997: 28)

For Hastings, nations have perennial character. He argues that, in the pre modern period, nations preceded nationalism whereas in the modern era nationalism produced nations. (ibid: 50). However, nationalism, as it is stated above, belong to modernity. He argues that

Nationalism, on the other hand is strong only in particularistic terms deriving from the belief that one's own ethnic or national tradition is especially valuable and needs to be defended at almost any cost through creation or extension of its own nation-state...it arises chiefly where and when a particular ethnicity or nation feels itself threatened in regard to its own proper character, extent or importance, either by external attack or by the state system of which it has hitherto formed part" (ibid,)

What triggers the transformation of an ethnicity to a nation state is, as Hasting argues, a sort of ethnicity that "one with control of a clear *territorial core*, one sufficient in size of population and *local economy to be able to avoid economic strangulation*; one with something of a *literary vernacular of its own*; and one which

possesses a religion or historical tradition markedly different from that of the majority in the state of which it has been part” (1997:30,31). So an ethnicity which possesses necessary conditions such as territory, self-sufficient economy, population, literacy of its own and a religion or tradition that has distinguished it from the rest might become a nation.

The role of ethnicity in nationalism can differ. For instance Eriksen claims that “nationalism entails the ideological justification of a state, actual or potential. Judged on this criterion, ethnicity can sometimes be interpreted as a form of stagnant nationalism which may eventually, or periodically, become manifest as nationalism” (1991:264). So it is the ethnicity that came first, the nation-states are the products of modernity. Ethnicities may turn to nationality at some points; they may also disappear in a nation state through assimilation, or integration. In sum, “the sources of nations and nationalism must be sought not in the blueprints of secular intelligentsia nor in the interests of the middle classes in the modern epoch, but in the deep cultural resources of language, ethnicity and religion” (Smith, 2010:98 99)

2.4.Ethnosymbolist Approach to Nationalism

Distinguishing element between perennial approach and ethnosymbolist approach is that ethnosymbolists do not claim the perennial character of the nations, their survival since the antiquity, what is in common is the stress on the role of ethnicities on the formation of nations. The common point between modernist approach and ethnosymbolists is their agreement on the idea that both nations and nationalism belong to modernity, whereas they differ due to the fact that whereas modernists disregard subjective elements in the formation of nations such as myth, symbols, historical antecedents and based their theories on changes that occurred in modes of production, namely to industrialization and its upbringings, ethnosymbolists based their theory on these subjective elements.

According to Anthony Smith, who is the most important figure in ethnosymbolist approach, and can be identified as the founder of ethnosymbolism, there are two important forms of social organization these are *ethnies* and nations and Smith defines these as

an ethnies as a named community of shared origin myths, memories and one or more element(s) of common culture, including an association with a specific territory; and a nation as a named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs (2012:15).

Although ethnies and nations share many of the elements such as shared origin of myth, memories and association with a specific territory, a nation possesses more than ethnies. A nation has its own public culture which is shared by members who live in it, it has the ability to regulate the masses through common law and customs, it is, in a sense, bearer of law and duty. The similarities or common points between ethnies and nations, for ethnosymbolists are crucial in the process of nation formation as nations are formed through and around ethnies.

Political action, when combined with existing cultural differences, constitutes a powerful and recurrent source of ethnic community... it was on the basis of an ethnic model and around a dominant ethnic core population that political actors and institutions helped to forge the nation (Smith, 2009:28).

Political action is necessary for the transformation of an ethnies to a nation. Politics can be used in order to reveal the uniqueness of the culture, which is a marker of differentiation of the ethnies from other ethnies. And besides from politics, institutions also help to construct a nation through using existing values, rediscovering the old ones and transferring it to the modern world.

Smith argues that there are different types of nations and the Western type is one of them whereas there is also an ethnic form of modern nations, he says "different forms of nation, while featuring the basic elements of territory, culture, customs and laws, and shared myths and memories, may vary the proportions of, and/or add to, the common elements of the pure type" (ibid, 15). Ethnosymbolism put emphasis on the symbols and myth in both formation and in the maintenance of the identities. "Myths of ethnic descent, particularly myths of 'ethnic chosenness', lie at its core. Of all these myths, the myth of a 'golden age' is perhaps the most important" (Conversi, 2006: 21-22)

Another important figure in ethno-symbolism, John Armstrong, distinguishes between ethnicity in pre-modern epochs as a constant group identity that 'did not ordinarily constitute the overriding legitimization of polity formation', and nations in

the nationalist era emerges ‘when consciousness of ethnic identity became a predominant force for constituting independent political structures’ (1982:4)

Ethnosymbolism, in general, puts greater emphasis on the subjective elements rather than economical factors in formation of nations or in formation of national identities. While modernist approach can trace the origin of the nation into a moment, in which economical and technological changes such as industrialization or print capitalism took place, at the core of ethnosymbolist approach lies, as Smith argues, “the subjective elements of attachment, will and imagination of groups of individuals, it (ethnosymbolist approach) also points to the institutional expression of these elements – in recorded myths, memories and traditions, in symbols and values, and in the various forms of styles of art, music, literature, law, ritual and activity that give concrete and recurrent embodiment to these elements” (2002:29,30)

Nationalism is an

ideological movement to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population, some of whose members believe it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’. Nationalism is not simply a shared sentiment or consciousness, nor is it to be equated with the ‘rise of nations’. It is an active movement inspired by an ideology and symbolism of the nation (Smith, 2009: 61)

As it is stated before, modernists see nationalist movement as an elite led project. Ethnosymbolist approach also put emphasis on the people’s role in nationalist movement but these people do not have to be necessarily from the higher classes. Smith argues that the character of a nationalist movement might differ in accordance with the people who led the movement, but these movements may be led by different actors, there can be no strictly defined elite that lead nationalist movement.

It seems that most social classes and strata have been involved in varying degrees in nationalist movements and activities, and there is usually either no single ‘bearer’ class in any given case, or it varies from period to period, so that the quest for the social origins of nationalism, at least in terms of class composition, can tell us little about ‘nationalism-in-general’, only about the character and role of specific nationalist movements in given historical circumstances (Smith, 2009: 64).

For ethnosymbolists, nationalism is not a political movement, it is an ideology and it is more than an ideology. It comprises of many elements that lead the criticism of nationalism about its divergence from mainstream ideologies such as liberalism or

socialism. Smith argues that complexity of nationalism stems from "... appearing as a political ideology on one level, it reveals itself on other levels as a form of public culture and a surrogate political religion" (2001: 36)

Hutchinson another important name in ethnosymbolist approach offers a model for nation formation "one that conceives of the nation as a species of ethnic project, only contingently related to the state, and which recognises that the power of states to regulate populations is limited and fluctuating. This model should explicitly address

- the enduring character of nations based on a sense of being embedded in much older (ethnic) communities that have survived centuries of vicissitudes;
- the internal cultural revolutions required before nationalists are able to overcome established identities, including ethnic traditions;
- the persistence and functions of cultural difference in nations; and
- the episodic character of nationalist resurgences throughout the modern period. (2004: 4)

Although there are several points that modernist and ethnosymbolist share, the divergence among them is very important. Hutchinson argues that "the major difference, however, between modernists and ethnosymbolists arises over the question of the invention or the construction of the nation and the centrality of modern political elites and state institutions in its formation" (ibid, 33). The analysis of ethnosymbolists include subjective elements such as "la longue duree, ethnic myths, memories and symbols" and the reason for them to be re-operated within the nationalist discourse cannot be disregarded or cannot simply treated as parts of a political agenda. They are not 'invention' of political elites or intellectuals". Culture, then, for ethno-symbolists means not just symbols, traditions or rituals, but also the meanings and orientations to collective action that these evoke (ibid, 37). Hutchinson further argues that, although there occurs many changes between pre-modern and modern societies, long established cultural systems are transported by modern institutions into the modern era and in times of crisis, this historic cultural systems are re-evoked or redeveloped (ibid, 41)

In the context of this study, ethno-symbolist approach will be taken as the base while examining the process of the formation of Bosniak nation. The Bosniaks

have constituted a nation on the basis of their cultural distinctiveness in relation to other Slavs in the region. Their nationality is constructed through the differences that stem from the religion in the first instance. As it is stated in the introduction part, nationalism, in this study, is treated as a modern phenomenon, which gained power with the secularism. So nationalism is explained without references to religion in most of the theories of nationalism whereas ethnosymbolist approach emphasizes the role of religion in making nationalities. Nationalism, for ethnosymbolists

however secularizing its thrust, nationalism is ultimately more akin to political religion than to political ideology...we can grasp the nation as a 'sacred communion of citizens' – a characterization that accords with an interpretation of nationalism as surrogate religion (Smith, 2010:35)

The power of secularism and modern nation-states excludes religion from their very existence. However, for many nations religion plays great role in the period of formation. Ethnosymbolism, through stressing the subjective elements of the nation, does not exclude religion. Rather it gives religion proper role in the formation of nations. Religion is not the only subjective element that ethno-symbolists propose, but for Bosnian Muslims, it is the subjective element over which nation is constituted.

Besides being Muslims, Bosniaks have an ingrained territorial identity, which is relatively weak for other Slavic nations. The Bosniak nation is constituted by the same processes that each nation had passed, through re-inventing tradition, reviving customs, rediscovering history and purifying language. However, it did not have a perennial character, As it will be explained in the second chapter, Bosnia had always have territorial integrity however there was no consciousness of being bound to a territory, this would become just one part of the Bosniak national identity later. Living in Bosnia does not have the same meaning with being Bosniak. Also the Bosniak nation did not emerge as a result of some economic concerns or industrialization. Industrialization of Bosnia had started with the Austro-Hungarian occupation and with an effort of the Benjamin Kallay who was the joint minister of Finance. At that time, as it will be explained in the third chapter in detailed, Kallay tried to spread the concept of Bosnianness, a concept that diminishes the cultural and religious differences and offered a source of identity through territory in a sense. Although there were supporters of the concept both within the Muslim population and other Slavic ones, did not fulfill the purpose of the Austro-Hungarian

administration. Primordial approach, on the other hand, lacked the political meaning of the nations so it is hard to analyze the difference between an ethnic group and a nation.

The emergence of the Bosniak nation is a process, and it is hard to determine a single point or a single cause where it becomes a nation. It is a result of chains of causes and the struggle for survival. Ethno-symbolist approach assesses great value to the subjective elements in creation of nation more than other approaches. For Bosniak nation, it is very important because they had to define themselves through subjective elements such as culture, tradition and religion. Without an emphasis on the subjective elements, or without expressing the value of subjective elements on the construction of nation and national identity, it is hard to recognize the Bosniaks as a nation. Ethnosymbolist approach, contrary to the modernist approach, is not necessitated a sovereign state for a nation to exist. Smith argues that there should be a degree of self determination but possessing a sovereign state of its own would not be necessary (2001: 12). If modernist approach will be taken as the sole base of this study, then it would be hard to define Bosniaks as a separate nation whereas they define themselves as such. So within the context of this study, ethno-symbolist approach will be applied to evaluate the formation of Bosniak nation and national identity.

Ethnosymbolist approach will facilitate to recognize the Bosniaks as a separate nation. It doesn't mean that from the perspective of modernists Bosniaks will not constitute a nation, rather arguments of modernist approach are more related with the first nation-state and the structure and conditions that they emerged. In this study the focal point is not nation-state but nation. As a newly emerged nation, Bosniaks have had different conditions and motivations. At the same time, as they emerged later, for instance, from England, it doesn't mean that perennial approach would refute the 'nationness' of Bosniaks. The argument of perennial approach is simply that ethnicity matters and some nations have perennial character. What is highlighted here is that the conditions that led the emergence of Bosniaks as a nation would be better explained by taking the premises and arguments of ethnosymbolists into account. Nation formation is not a sudden action rather it is a process that has shaped through structural changes as well as historical conditions. In order to give a

coherent framework for the formation of the Bosniak nation, the history of the Bosnia will be given in the second chapter.

CHAPTER III

History of Bosnia

In this chapter, history of constituent parts of the Bosnia-Herzegovina (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks) in general and history of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) in particular will be evaluated in order to understand the conditions and structure of the Balkans. The reason why other ethnicities will be subject of this chapter is due to the fact that there was not clear cut division between the South Slavs. There were divisions between ethnicities but it is important to remember that it is hard to separate Serbs from Croats or from Bosniaks. Therefore, each ethnicity's history, for the sake of a better analysis, will be evaluated. Of course the main subject will be the Bosnian Muslims, Bosniaks. Nevertheless as what happens in the last years of the SFRY and after the collapse of SFRY is generally analyzed and explained through the lenses of "historical conflicts" among these three ethnicities, it is crucial to find out the historical processes of these three and their social as well as political structures.

There will be detailed information on the religion adapted by the people or by the ruler. The reason for this is the assumption that the distinguishing feature between these three ethnicities is religion. Serbs are Orthodox, Croats are Catholic and Bosniaks are Muslim. There are five headings, Bosnia before Ottomans, Bosnia under the Ottoman Rule, Bosnia during the rule Austria-Hungary Empire, Bosnia in the SFRY and current conditions will be briefly analyzed.

3.1. General Framework of the Balkans

Before giving detailed information on the subject, it is necessary to give a general framework of the Balkans. "The Balkans is a borderland where four of the world's great civilizations overlapped to produce dynamic, sometimes combustible, multilayered local civilization. Here the cultures of ancient Greece and Rome, Byzantium and Ottoman Turkey and roman catholic Europe met, clashed and

sometimes merged – a land that no single culture was ever able to dominate completely” (Wachtel, 2008: 1). The Balkans has been dominated by almost all expansionist Great Empires and therefore, the culture and traditions in the Balkans were incrementally changed throughout history. However, the impacts of these great empires on the Balkans were rather limited, they were never fully dominated the Balkans culturally and structurally. Total pervasive of an empire to the Balkans was never subject. Hupchick (2002) gave a description of the Balkan population that would last until the arrival or the invasion of the new comers, namely, Huns, Avars, and Slavs

By the mid-sixth century the Balkan Peninsula’s populations mostly were acculturated into Rome’s Hellenic civilized society. In the south, the Greeks and the Greek language predominated. To their northeast, the Thracians were Hellenized. The Illyrians, who lived north and west of the Greeks, fell heavily under Latin cultural influence from Italy. Their Dalmatian and Istrian lands in the northwest formed part of the Latin-speaking Roman prefecture of Italy, although Illyrians in the central regions of the peninsula were under the sway of the Greek-speaking prefecture of Illyricum (23).

Many different cultures and relatively different people have lived together and geography is not the only reason. The empires that dominated the area were all multicultural, which contained and constructed by different groups of people. To put it differently, “the mixture of peoples in the region was encouraged not merely by Balkan geography but also by the character of the Ottoman Empire, which like the Roman and Byzantine empires that had preceded it, was explicitly multiethnic and multicultural” (Wachtel, 2008:5). Each empire influenced the Balkans, but an exact penetration of a specific empire, with its culture, political structure and language, was not the issue. Although homogeneity may be the last feature for the Balkans to look for, it is easy to capture a dominant race in the Balkans, which is Slavs

3.1.1 Arrival of the Slavs

It is generally acknowledged that Slavs started to reside to the Balkans in the sixth century. In spite of the uncertainty, the Pripet River is recognized as the homeland of Slavs (Karatay, 2006:89, Schevill, 1991: 73, Curta, 2006: 56). They moved on South, West and East Europe and this tendency have led to the separation of these into three families and variation among languages (Karatay, 2006: 89).

Some Slavs were associated with the Avars whereas some of them were associated with the Turks. “The Slavic raids of the late sixth century were often associated with Avar raids and attacks against key points of Justinian's system of defence” (Curta, 2006: 61). Unlike Avars, Slavs were disunited in the sense that they didn't have a state structure or a political organization. They were primitive; they were organized as a tribe in a sense. “The Slavs disunity and lack of state structure made them difficult for the empire to deal with in the traditional manner. They had no important or sufficiently powerful tribal leaders who could be bribed or subsidized with any assurance of effectiveness” (Hupchick, 2002: 29). In the beginning of the seventh century, with the loss of control of Byzantium in the North, Slavs were slowly settled down to the Balkans. This settlement was completed by the beginning of the eighth century, the old population of the Balkans were not erased or assimilated immediately right after the settlement; though their number reduced.

Byzantium Empire has called for help from Croats to fight against the Avars and the alliance with the Byzantium against Avars led to the appearance of the Croats on the stage of history. Although the Serbs were not asked for help, they were with Croats and by this way, they arrived to the Balkans too (Malcolm, 1999: 37; Karatay, 2006:96). The origin of the Croats and also the Serbs are not known but there were two related but different stories on the origin of the Croats and Serbs; Either the Croats and the Serbs were the Slavic tribes who had a Persian ruling class or they were originally Persian tribes who had afterwards dominated Slav subjects (Malcolm, 1999: 38). Although Croats and Serbs can be categorized differently now, they were closely related groups, who lived and migrated together and they both have Persian elements.

Croats in the Balkans were settled in two different places, one of the places was in the northern Dalmatia, and the original Croats state developed there and the other was in western Pannonia and this was the first target of the invasions and that has protected the Croats in the Northern Dalmatia. Croats were supported by the Byzantium and this had created a peaceful and stable environment for the Croats. The sovereignty of the Byzantium Empire in this area was conceptual and direct control of the area was limited. Along with the Franks gained strength, the state of rest in the Croats was disrupted. Charlemagne invaded the Croats area, but the cost

of Dalmatia and Venice remained in Byzantium (Karatay, 2006: 98). Croats region were dominated by Franks until the end of the ninth century. In the tenth century, Croats had an independent state and Tomislav (910-928) became the king of the state. The independence of Croats did not last long though. The monarch of the Hungary became the king of Croats too at the end of the eleventh century and from then on, Croats lived under the Kingdom of Hungary with a special status and relative autonomy (Jelavich, 2009: 25-26)

As it is stated before, the Serbs had arrived in Balkans with the Croats. Although it is now possible to separate Serbs from Croats, in the sixth century, there were no such divisions at least in the eyes of the foreigners. They were both called Slavs. Though, studies are able to clear away the ambiguity. Serbs settled the area between Danube and Adriatic. "They occupy the heart of the peninsula and are an out-and-out Balkan people, whose evolution will be one of our most conjant interests" (Schevill, 1991:77). Serbs became independent in the course of Crusades. The rise of Serbian state in the Balkans dates back to the mid twelfth century under the Nemanjic. Nemanjic rebelled against the Byzantium with the assistance of Venice and Hungary, and he unified several knezs through taking his brothers under his yoke. By accepting the vassalage of the Byzantium, Nemanjic exerted dominance (Kayapinar, 2006: 129). In the beginning of the thirteenth century, for the first time, a Serbian ruler took the title of the King, who was the son of Nemanjic, Stefan I. At the end of the thirteenth century Serbian state expanded its territory and in the mid fourteenth century, it became almost the most powerful Balkan state.

The Slavs were pagans when they first arrived at the Balkans. They were polytheistic and the name of Gods they worshipped lived through the name of Yugoslav places (Malcolm, 1999: 39). Some of the sources on the Christianization of the Slavs dated back to the seventh century (Vlasto, 1970) while others claim that it was not until ninth century Slavs were Christianized. The adoption of Christianity among the ruling class and among the subjects may not be matched and the ruling class may be the first who adopted Christianity. It is for sure that the rituals of the paganism did not end immediately after the Christianization, as Wachtell argues, "pagan rituals and Christian practices coexisted... Nineteenth century ethnographers, the first scholars to make systematic studies of the rural Balkan populations

discovered many peasants beliefs and rituals that retained element of pagan practice, though they had long been incorporated into a Christian structure” (2008: 41). However it is important to note that the adoption of Christianity and feudal type of organization went simultaneously. Adoption of one might trigger the adaption of the other but it is hard to say which one came first.

The Slavs that were settled in the Balkans created shifted balance of power within the Balkans. Until the spread of Ottoman invasion there were independent Serbian State, Croats who lived under the kingdom of Hungary, and Medieval Bosnian State in the Balkans.

3.2. Bosnia before Ottoman Rule – Medieval Bosnian State

Bosnia, due to its geographical factors, was not exposed to external invasion too much. Though the Balkans was not static, the rareness of the external invasion did not create stable conditions for the tribes or empires. Within the Balkans, there were shifts in power relations; there were temporal sovereignties of Balkan states and temporal triumph of one Slav nation over others.

In the tenth century, Bosnia was briefly part of short-lived Serbian state of Caslav: after Caslav died in the battle in about 960, much of it was briefly incorporated into the Croatian state: soon thereafter in about 997 Samuel of Bulgaria marched through Bosnia and may well asserted his overlordship over part of it. After Byzantines defeated Samuel and annexed Bulgaria in 1018, Byzantium asserted its suzerainty over Bosnia: This lasted until later in the century, when some of Bosnia was incorporated into Croatia and some into Duklja...soon thereafter in 1137 Hungary annexed most or all of Bosnia only to lose it to the Byzantine empire in 1167 (Fine, 1996:3-4).

John Fine gives a clear map of domination of Bosnia until the creation of independent Bosnian state. So Bosnia was one of the states that were dominated by external powers and neighbors in the Balkans and at the same time, it sometimes gained sovereignty over its lands and its subject. Penetration into Bosnian culture and religion was never fully achieved and Bosnians protected their distinct character under the independent Medieval Bosnian state between 1180 and 1463. There were three important figures in the history of Bosnia, whose rule meant independence for Bosnia. These were Kulin, Stjepan II Kotromanic and Stephen Tvrtko.

Bosnia was under the yoke of Byzantium Empire. However, from time to time, Ban of Bosnia supported Hungary and allied itself with Hungary. Along with the Croats joining the Hungary, the history of Bosnia was usually referred with the Hungary. Under the administration of the Byzantium Empire, Bosnia was relatively autonomous, though the ban (ban Kulin for instance) was crowned by the Byzantium Empire. Under the administration of Ban Kulin (1180 – 1204) the country was in a state of relative stability due to the Ban's relations with Hungary. Bosnia increased its wealth and enjoyed prosperity under the Ban Kulin (Karatay, 2006:157). However, with his death, relative stable conditions had destroyed.

In Bosnia, noble families were crucial especially for the stability of the country when there is no strong ruler. When Ban Kulin died, Bosnia was under the constant pressure of the Hungary (Malcolm, 1999: 48). The lack of a strong ruler had led to the increase in the external pressure to Bosnia. In order to gain power again, inheritor of the Ban Kulin needed the strength and the help of local powers. During the rule of Stjepan II Kotromanic, Bosnia expanded its territory, Herzegovina was taken from the Serbs. Through taking Herzegovina, Catholics Bosnia started to include the Orthodox population.

The nephew of Kotromanic, Tvrtko (1353-1391) had regained the authority over its land and he did not stop with it. He also meddled with Serbian nobles and annexed more territory over the lands of Serbs and Croats. Tvrtko claimed the Serbian kingship and was crowned as the king of Serbia and Bosnia in 1377. And then, "Tvrtko then participated in civil war over the Hungarian throne that involved many Croatian nobles; as a result he acquired more Croatian territory... and by 1390 had added 'Croatia and Dalmatia' to his royal title" (Fine, 1996:10)

In the fifteenth century, the interactions between Ottoman Turks and the Balkans accelerated. As it is said before, nobles were important for the power relations within the Balkans. With the growing enmity between nobles and kings, Ottomans stood in a very crucial place and had the ability to change power relations between them.

3.2.1. Religion

In Bosnia there were three faiths. “Each (faiths) existed only in particular with geographical area: Catholics to the north, west, and from 1340s the center; Orthodox in the south and east; and the Bosnian church in the center, extending east to the Drina and south along the Neretva River into Hum” (Donia, Fine, 1997: 36). Bosnian church was relatively autonomous from the Papacy. However, this is not a special characteristic for religion. In Bosnia, state affairs were also autonomous. The geography, the political structure and the culture within Bosnia were affected from each other. Relative autonomy of the Church, of the Bans and lack of too much external invasion isolated Bosnia in a sense. This isolation created some features peculiar to Bosnia and diverse interpretation of Bosnian Church and the state itself.

Ban Kulin was known as a Catholic ruler, however, through the end of his rule, a belief system, called Bogomilism, seemed to take its part the history of Bosnia. Although many writers accept that Bosnia is deviated from Catholicism and its rituals, there is no consensus among the adoption of Bogomil by Bosnia. The reason to think that Bosnia was departed from Catholicism is that some of the features or rituals belonged to Catholicism were not applied in Bosnian Church. Noel Malcolm analyses the relations and the clues that might led to think Bosnia as Bogomils (1999: 66-88) and his analysis reveals out that the distance between the Roman Catholic Church and Bosnia has led dissimilarities among rituals and religious practices. After the separation of Eastern and Western Churches, Bosnian Church reserved some of the Eastern conventions, and that created conflict in rituals and practices. Malcolm also argues on the basis of his findings that Bosnia did not use Roman calendar and this has led to the missing some important religious days. Religious practices among Bosnian Church were different than the western church and some conflicting rituals were spread in the Bosnian Church. This might have led to the characterization of the Bosnian church as pervert. However, many of the scholars and historians supported the idea that Bogomilism was widespread within Bosnia such as Robert Donia, John Fine, Sabrina Ramet,

In order to convert Bosnian Church to one that fully adapted Catholicism, at the end of the thirteenth century, Franciscans are sent to the Bosnia by Papacy. Those who think that Bogomilism was widespread and highly accepted by Bosnians argue that Bosnian people were once again, Catholicized. The others, who claim that

Bosnian Church was nothing but distant, mild and more flexible church, argue that the entrance of Franciscans into the land of Bosnia was an end for Bosnian Church autonomy. The religion for Bosnia became highly problematic in the sense that even a crusade was organized for ‘perverted Bosnians’ and Orthodox Serbs (Karatay, 2006:159). Crusade was unsuccessful and Tvrtko defeated the army of Hungary and later with the support of a Serbian administrator and became the King of Serbia and Bosnia by taking Sandjak. From the fourteenth century and till the mid fifteenth century, the relations and encounters with Ottoman had started.

3.3. Bosnia under Ottoman Empire

The relations between Ottomans and the Balkans were date back to the early fourteenth century. The decaying power of the Byzantium Empire with the death of Andronicus III had led to the rise of the Turkic powers and especially Ottomans in the area. Power conflict created an environment where conflicting parts looked for alliances that will turn into their enemies later.

In the fourteenth century, due to the power conflict, Serbian king became powerful enemy of the Byzantium and in order to conquer Istanbul, he tried to collaborate with Ottomans, but *Orhan Bey* rather supported *Kantakuzenos*, who was the tutor (*vasi*) of the *Paleologos V*. In return, Orhan Bey was rewarded with Castle of Cimpi, which was settled in Southeastern Balkans. Deployment of the Ottoman army into the castle of Cimpi was a turning point for Ottomans to expand their territories to the Balkans. After the castle of Cimpi, conquests of Gallipoli and surrounding villages, and Edirne, which became the capital, accelerated the Ottoman expansion in the Rumelia and Balkans.

By 1400, apart from Dalmatian coast and some cities in Morea, most of the Balkans were under Ottoman rule. Serbia, Bosnia, Wallachia were vassal states and Byzantium Empire was reduced to great city and its immediate surroundings. The rest of the peninsula was divided into Ottoman provinces (Sugar, 1977: 23).

Ottoman pressure to the Balkans, especially to Serbian territory also led to migration to eastern Bosnia and that also led to the increased in Orthodox population within Bosnia. Meanwhile, by the 1450’s Ottoman picked off parts of eastern Bosnia.

At that time, Bosnian king was close to the Hungary and Ottomans used it as an excuse to attack Bosnia in 1463 and kingdom fell rapidly. Though, with the withdrawal of some of the Ottoman forces, Hungarian attacked and took some part of Bosnia, and in 1465 Ottomans were dominated Bosnia and in 1481, Herzegovina too (Donia and Fine, 1994: 32-34)

3.3.1 Ottoman Rule in Bosnia

Bosnia, during Ottoman period, did not lose its relative autonomy, which it enjoyed throughout its history. After the Ottoman conquest, Bosnia is divided into three separate districts, which were Bosnia, Herzegovina and Zvornik. The administration of these districts was under the province of Rumelia until 1580 when Bosnia became a separate province. Bosnia was conquered in 1463 and until the Austrian occupation in 1878 it was under the control of the Ottoman Empire. The conquest of Ottomans or later Habsburg Empire did not change, at least one thing, which is territorial integrity of Bosnia. As Donia states that “there is a state tradition in Bosnia which can be attached to the territorial stability that last for 500 years” (1995: 72). Before the Ottoman conquest, there were Orthodox, Catholics and Bosnian Church members within Bosnia. After the conquest, Islam began to spread among Christians. The religion was important as it shaped the rituals, customs and conventions of people. The religion was the main marker of differentiation among the Slavs as they speak of the nearly the same language. So, Ottoman conquest was a beginning of a new era for the Bosnian people as they encountered with Islam.

Ottoman Empire was an expansionist empire and its power lies in its methods of conquest in a sense. So it is important to give brief information on it. Halil İnalcık (1954) clarified the ottoman methods of conquest in the fourteenth and fifteenth century. He states that

Before the army of conquest was withdrawn, small garrisons were immediately placed in several fortresses of strategic importance...Then as a rule sipahis (cavalrymen) who composed the main force of the Ottoman army were given timars in the villages throughout the newly conquered country...Even with a limited number of fortified places the Ottomans found it necessary to employ

the native population as auxiliary forces...The faithfulness of these native forces was encouraged by special privileges, such as exemption from certain taxes...The conquered lands which were usually preserved in their pre-Ottoman administrative boundaries were entrusted to one or several sancak beyis, according to the size of these territories (104- 108).

So the conquest of the Bosnia was similar to that. Under the administration of Ottomans, the sixteenth century experienced Ottoman expansion to the Balkans and in the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth century encounters with Habsburg Empire had started. Before going into details, several points should be made to clarify the administration of Bosnia. As Ottomans was Muslim, with the beginning of the Ottoman entrance to the Balkans, Islam gain visibility within these territories. Ottomans did not put pressure on the conversion to Islam but among the nobility and the military class, conversion started to increase. "The noble families in the Balkan countries were assimilated in the mass of Ottoman timariots and became Muslim. Islamization was actually a psycho-social phenomenon among the Christian sipahis, who were definitely the first converts in the Empire (İnalçık, 1954:116)

Islamization of Bosnian people was highly debated issue. Some people argue that conversion to Islam was spread among those who practiced Bogomilism. As there was conflicts between Catholics and Orthodox and also there was a Bosnian church which was blamed for being perverted, adoption of Islam offered a new alternative. Some others think that, Islamization was a pragmatic issue among the Bosnian nobility to benefit from the advantageous of having the same faith with the ruling class (Todorova: 2009). Islamization was not a sudden action in Bosnia, there were no mass conversion, it was rather gradual. However, at the end of sixteenth century, Islamization was almost complete (Fine, 1996: 13).

John Fine (1996) states that acceptance rather than conversion is more suitable for Bosnian people who became Muslims due to the fact that "probably few Bosnians in accepting Islam underwent any deep changes in patterns of thought or way of life. "Most of those probably continued to live as they always had, retaining most of their domestic customs and many Christian practices" (19). After the conquest of Bosnia, conversion was not one-dimensional phenomena; conversion from Catholicism to

Orthodoxy was realized too, due to the fact that Orthodoxy, under the patriarchy of Istanbul, was more advantageous than Catholicism which was under the control of Papacy.

Administration of Bosnia under the Ottoman Empire did not change the climate of Bosnia too much. Inalcik argues that “the Ottomans maintained the old Bosnian nobility on their hereditary lands (bashtina), confirming their property rights which had been previously granted by the Bosnian kings. Thus, in Bosnia the old nobility which gradually adopted Islam maintained themselves on their own hereditary lands until the 20th Century” (1954:116, 117). The Bosnian nobility maintained their privileges. The local nobility were crucial actors in the Ottoman administration, their power increased with the declining power of the Ottoman central administration. The local powers were partially legitimized by the Ottoman administration. The local powers chose the governor that is appointed by the Sultan himself, the administration mechanism that is imposed from the center was balanced with the local administration itself (Faroqhi, 2002: 420 – 425).

Late sixteenth and seventeenth century has faced several battles between Ottomans and Habsburg (between 1593 – 1606, in 1663 and again between 1683 and 1699). These battles caused several damages both for Ottoman Empire in general and for Bosnia in particular as Bosnia was borderland with Habsburg. Wars led to the increase in poverty and increase in taxes, it also weaken the army. Demography had also affected by the war. At the end of the seventeenth century, Bosnian Orthodox population was more than Catholic population, during after these wars Catholics flee to the Habsburg land.

A more important result of these wars was the diminishing power of the central authorities and ascending power and influence of the local nobility in administration. At the end of the sixteenth century, Ottoman Empire, in order to protect the borders established military ranches to the borderlines, which were called ‘kapudanlik’.

The kapudan system had evolved from the Ottoman timar system that involved giving military leaders control of conquered lands and allowing them to use the proceeds from the lands to support their soldiers. The soldiers were to keep the peace in the region and make themselves available when the sultan called them

to war...The kapudans were organized into local military units whose main purpose was the defense of Bosnia (McCarthy, 1996: 71)

These institutions were comprised of the local nobility, who had military experience and contributed to the welfare of the society in the long run. However, during the wartime and due to the diminishing power of the central authority, these institutions became the main actor within their borders (Bora, 1999:24). The governors of the Sultan had limited affect on the mobilization of the people rather; these kapudans were much more effective in mobilization of the masses, if it is the interest of the Bosnia in general and kapudans in particular were at stake (Malcolm, 1999: 159).

During the eighteenth century, the disorder both within the Bosnia and outside the empire had continued. The last quarter of the eithteenth century had led many changes that affected social life of Bosnian people. With the treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774, the order of Bosnia deteriorated more excessively due to the content of the treaty which gave Russian auspices to Orthodox population. Russia became the representatives of Orthodox population in Ottoman Empire and this meant that subjects of the Ottoman Empire were open to Russian influence (Karpat, 2012: 32)

Beginning of the nineteenth century was a turning point for the Christian population in Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans encountered with the Serbian peasants' revolt in 1804. This revolt, at first, was an upheaval against the janissaries and local notables, which were mainly Muslims. However, it transformed itself to a national struggle through gaining the support of the masses. In 1806, Ottoman-Russian war broke out and Serbs were supported by the Russians but Austrian Empire did not see the emergence of a Serbian state with the support of the Russia. Russia stopped supporting Serbs and then revolt was suppressed by Ottomans. However, this revolt is crucial for both Ottoman history and for Serbs, as it paved the way for the creation of, first the autonomous Serbia and then sovereign Serbian Kingdom in 1878 (Afyoncu, 2006: 355-356)

Nineteenth century also witnessed the Ottoman attempts in regaining the power through centralization of the administration. The first incidents started with the abolishment of Janissaries during the reign of Mahmut II. During the seventeenth

and eighteenth century a vast numbers of janissaries settled in Bosnia, and most of them resided in Sarajevo, Mostar and Travnik (Jelavich, 2009: 97) So the abolishment of Janissaries did not welcomed in Bosnia as the number of janissaries were high. In 1831, a revolt led by Husein-kapetan emerged within Bosnia as a result of the discontentment of Bosnian notables about the newly appointed kapudans by the Sultan. This revolt was suppressed in 1832, but it was not an end of tensions between central authority and Bosnian notables (Gölen, 2006: 375). This was a revolt for Bosnian autonomy, and both Muslims and Christians joined the struggle. As it will be explained in the subsequent chapter, this revolt had shown the dual character of the Bosnian Muslims identity, they were loyal to the Sultan and they were part of the Muslim ummah, but at the same time, they had loyalty to their territory and their autonomy over their territory.

Promulgation of Tanzimat reform led another resistance movement in Bosnia, which was about equality of all subjects, a new tax system based on wealth rather than privileges and modernization of the army. This new reform led to the suspicion both among Bosnian Muslims and Christian subjects. Bosnian Muslims, especially begs, against the reform processes, portrayed an Islamists traditionalists reaction that led them to called ‘Turks more than Turks’ (Bora, 1999: 26). Bosnian Muslims did not want to lose their privileges and thus they explicitly opposed the reforms. In 1840 another revolt occurred within the territories of Bosnia on the implementation of Tanzimat reforms. This revolt has been suppressed before the subjects and central authority came across but resistance to the reforms did not end immediately so that implementation of Tanzimat reforms was suspended until 1848 (Gölen, 2006: 376-377). Between 1849 and 1851 an upheaval due to the implementation of Tanzimat reforms occurred and this was a large scale revolt. Many Muslim elites were removed and imprisoned or were sended to exile.

In 1858, struggles between Christians and Muslim had started in Herzegovina. Although the struggle was between the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, as Russia became the auspices of the Orthodox subjects in Ottoman, the external powers became the part of the struggle too. Struggle was not ended immediately as the size of the struggle expanded. Montenegro helped the Christian population in

Herzegovina and with a treaty signed in 1862, struggled was ended. Until 1875, there were no large-scale revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina but 1875 revolt has marked the history which resulted with the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Habsburg Empire.

In 1875, another large scale revolt occurred due to the miserable conditions of the peasants (who are mostly Orthodox and called kmets). Revolt first started in Herzegovina, where Orthodox population was the majority but it soon spread to the Bosnia. Due to the failure to suppress the revolt, Ottomans turned to Habsburg and Russia. By this time, Montenegrins and Serbians want to benefit from this situation (Jevalich, 2009: 384). Russian commander led the Serbian army and Russian-Ottoman war started. At that time, Montenegro was already in war with Ottomans, Serbia signed a peace treaty and Greece was hesitant in waging war to Ottomans. The time she waged war to Ottomans, Ottomans and Russians were signed a temporal peace treaty, so Greece had to step back. At the end of the war, first treaty of San Stefano, which provided Bosnia-Herzegovina autonomy under Ottoman Empire, signed but this treaty was against the Habsburg and British interests. So Germany called European Powers to Congress of Berlin and as a result Treaty of Berlin signed and through this treaty, Habsburg Empire had right to occupy and administer Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3.3.2. Occupation of Bosnia Herzegovina

The decision of Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina divided Bosnia through the social lines. Wealthy landowners saw the occupation as continuation of their prestigious and advantageous position in Bosnia, whereas religious authorities and lower-class Muslims strictly opposed to the occupation as Austro-Hungarian was a Christian Empire and to be ruled by Christians is a constant threat to Islam. Petition was written by the conservative people to urge people to unite against the Austro-Hungarian but this petition was not signed by the landlords or by non-Muslims as it contained anti-Christian elements in it. So this petition was rewritten, anti-Christian elements were removed and the context was the need to be ruled by a popular assembly and unite in opposition to Austro-Hungarian occupation.

During this time, Ottoman Empire did want to prevent the occupation, but when it was certain that the occupation would happen, Ottomans tries to restrict the period of the occupation and share the administration with Austro-Hungarian administration. Ottoman policy towards occupation was ambiguous. High level administrators were close to the rebellions of the Bosnian people but they never supported the rebellion explicitly, but on the other hand, arms were provided to the rebellious (Karpát, 2012: 165)

Bosnian occupation was realized by force and Austro-Hungarian did not foresee this. Bosnian people resisted the occupation with all their forces. The occupation was tense in the sense that Austro-Hungarian army was accused to be cruel to the Bosnian people and Ottoman protested it by sending a memorandum to the European powers. At the of the 1878 October, the main resistance center to the occupation was annihilated and occupation was completed with a treaty signed in 1879 about the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which gave the religious authority to the Ottomans.

The importance of this rebellion for the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina is that even though the rebellion was started by the Muslims residents of Bosnia, during the occupation, Muslims and non-Muslims united for their cause, which was territorial integrity and autonomy of their land. Karpát (2012) argues that the resistance against the opposition replaced the religious opposition between Muslims and non-Muslims with unity for Bosnian identity and Bosnian autonomy (139). From the 1878 and until 1914, Bosnia was under the rule of Austro Hungarian administration and it was a beginning of a new era for the development of the ethnic consciousness among Muslims.

3.4. Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian Rule

After 1867, Habsburg Monarchy had three government, on the top, there were joint foreign, defense and finance minister, there was an Austria government and also Hungarian government (Jelavich, 2009a: 153) The Austro-Hungarian government, with the Treaty of Berlin, gain the right to occupy and administer the Bosnia-

Herzegovina but it is important to note that, from the start of the occupation Austro-Hungarian administrators treated Bosnia as if it is their territory (*ibid*, 61). Bosnia-Herzegovina was neither in the administration of Austria nor the Hungary, rather, it was made a part of the monarchy and administrated through Joint Finance Ministry.

Although Ottoman administration differed in the past from the Austro-Hungarian administration, with the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ottoman administration had remarkable changes (McCarthy, 1996: 81). Bosnia was in the economic sphere of Austro-Hungary, Bosnian trade market had been Adriatic costs (McCarthy, 1996: 69,81). So Bosnia was not an alien place for Austro-Hungarian administration, and with the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the administration of it did not go through serious changes. Rather, the useful Ottoman administration structure was kept; their names and public servants were changed (Malcolm, 1999: 228).

The Austro-Hungarian occupation was not accepted immediately as it is stated above. After the occupation, migration occurred both to Ottoman lands and to other countries, but immigration did not happen among the Muslim population only. Non-Muslims were also migrated. Migration occurred due to several reasons such as the bad conditions of peasants, job opportunities in foreign lands and dissatisfaction of the Muslim population due to being ruled by Christians.

There were two important figures in Austro-Hungarian administration for the social and development of the Bosnian Muslims. These were two Joint Finance Ministers, first one is Benjamin Kallay who served between 1882-1903 and Baron Burian between 1903-1912. Benjamin Kallay is very crucial figure for the development of Bosniak identity under Austro-Hungarian administration, which will be explained later. During the Austro-Hungarian administration, Bosnia had went industrial developments in the sense that, railroads and highways were built, factories were opened, employment increased, coal and iron mining was opened up. These changes happened under Kallay administration, which “rested on the assumption that political reforms should wait on economic progress” (Okey, 2007: 59)

Ottoman Bosnia was ruled in accordance with the *millet* system in which religion not ethnicity is the main differentiation marker among people². Under Austro-Hungarian administration, religion was also a differentiating point, but Kallay, rather than dividing religious communities, wanted to unite them under the category of ‘Bosnian’, he wanted to create the Bosnian Nation which comprised of different religious groups.

In Kallay’s plans, therefore, the first imperative was to provide that strong government in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs were to be officially a religious group... While Bosnian Catholics were strengthened and Muslims cajoled, the ultimate aim was to be the complete emancipation of Bosnians from allegiance to Belgrade, Zagreb, or Constantinople and their acknowledgment of a common Bosnian identity based on traditions which it was supposed the Muslim nobility had particularly preserved (Okey, 2007: 62)

The reason for Kallay to think that Muslim nobility had preserved the Bosnian identity is that, Bosnian Muslims did not have a country which they rely on for their emancipation or for their national cause. The Bosnian Serbs had Serbia to realize their Greater Serbia dreams, whereas Bosnian Muslims’ association with Ottomans was only in religious terms. So Bosnian Muslims may adopt the Bosnian identity as they didn’t have a national identity but presumably a religious and territorial one whereas Bosnian Serbs had a national identity. However, as it will be explained later, Bosnian Muslims, under the Austro-Hungarian administration had to develop an identity of their own as, for them, it was the first time that they were different – they were not co-religious with the ruling class - they were the others. In other words, Bosnian Muslims had to define themselves, but it is questionable whether this need to define can be attributed to the national identity or not. For instance, Mark Pinson (1996) states that it was a political awakening, as “it does not include elements of subsumed under the term national revival so central to other Eastern European groups... This absence of an earlier prototypical state with borders that had enjoyed at least some kind of recognition might have contributed in later periods to anxiety over recognition of boundaries and border areas” (91)

² The Millet system will be explained in details in the third chapter.

For Kallay, Muslim population had greater role in creating the Bosnian identity, so that's why he knew that he should satisfied the Muslim population. "The Muslim landowners should be guarded, he told the Austrian delegation in 1892 because they were 'the most stable element for the country and people, with whom they feel at one nationality and language'" (Okey, 2007: 60). However, Kallay's regime did not satisfy the whole Muslim population. For instance, as they deprived of their advantageous positions under Austro-Hungarian administration, they wanted to maintain their institutions as it was. Religious institutions such as vakifs and religious authority were the main reason for conflict between Muslim religious intellectuals and Austro-Hungarian administration. In 1882, Austro-Hungarian administration, in order to "wean the Muslim from the religious establishment in Istanbul an attempt was made by "the creation of four man council, the mejlis al ulema" where council was chosen by Austro-Hungarian administration, but it did not work (Pinson, 1996: 95). The administration of vakifs was also an important subject of discussions between Bosnian Muslims and Austro administration. The administration of vakifs was given under the control of the people who were chosen by Austro-Hungarian administration in 1883 until 1909 when political and religious liberal movements were taken.

The dissatisfaction was not spread only among the Muslim population. Bosnian Serbs did not also satisfied with the Austro-Hungarian administration. The first and foremost problem of the peasants was not solved under this administration. Falling of agricultural prices led to a crisis between the peasants and their Muslim landlords, so the agrarian problem was not solved. The reason for this may lay in the fact that Kallay did not want to lose support of the Muslim landlords and thus, he didn't make an agrarian reform for the peasants (Adanır, 2002:310). There were also problems caused by nationalists sentiments which were triggered by religion. Religious hierarchies were autonomous under the Austrian administration; however, this did not cease the nationalisms in Bosnia Herzegovina. "Rather than serving as a counterweight to Serbian and Croatian nationalist influences, the traditional religious hierarchies were frequently a catalyst for ethnically-based political movements that challenged the Austrian government policies" (Donia and Fine, 1994: 99)

The opposition to the Austro-Hungarian regime first came from the local notables and landlords and then the religious authorities started to be mobilized. The prominent figure in opposition to Austrian administration was Ali Dzabic, who was a mufti of Mostar. His argument was conservative in the sense that, he thought that being ruled by Christians is against Islamic ideas and Kur'an forbids Muslims from serving non-Muslims (Pinson, 1994: 103-104). His opposition did not contain only religious elements, he also created an environment where tax system or the superiority of the Sarajevo was criticized. Another prominent figure was Mujaga Komadina, he was more progressive than Ali Dzabic and established kiraathane which lectures people, assists needy students and make loans to deserving artists. Struggle emerged between these two figures but then as people were more conservative, Komadina used conservative arguments to attract more people. Petitions were written to warn the government and to urge the government to take an action for eliminate the conditions that made Muslims dissatisfied. First petition in 1899 was rejected by Kallay, another was written, Kallay did accept the petition but this time, the demands were rejected (ibid, 105-108) During this period, many Muslim migrated to Turkey, Kallay, used this and promulgate a law on illegal immigrant, which prohibit the return of the immigrants to the Bosnia, so the prominent figure of the opposition, Ali Dzabic who went to Istanbul, was declared immigrant and could not enter the country in 1902. So opposition, in a sense, was being controlled by Kallay regime.

With the death of Benjamin Kallay in 1903, Baron Burian became the Joint Finance Minister of Bosnia Herzegovina. The strict administration of Kallay started to loosen due to the perception of Burian on the policies' of Kallay, which was seen as the source of conflict (Pinson, 1994: 109) Burian encouraged political activities and first political parties were constructed by Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats.

SNO (Serbian National Organization) was established in 1907, echoing the argument of nationalists in Serbia proper, the SNO boldly asserted in its political program that Bosnia and Hercegovizna were Serbian lands and that Bosnian Muslims were Serbs by nationality...In December 1906 the Bosnian Muslim landowners created a formal political party, Muslim National Organization (MNO). ...The MNO was the formal embodiment of the

leadership that had controlled the Muslim autonomy movement since 1900 (Donia and Fine, 1994 102-109).

In addition political parties, social organization were constructed under Burian administration. For instance, Gajret was a Muslim cultural organization consisted of intellectuals of Bosnian Muslims and it played a crucial role in Muslim literature and press (Bougarel, 2008: 317-318). Another example can be found in Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), it was a youth movement of Bosnian Serbs, which became the main foundation of the nationalism of Bosnian Serbs.

Although the opposition had been controlled by the administration from the beginning of the Kallay era until the relaxation period of Burian, as it will be explained in the next chapter these oppositions were crucial for the development of a distinct Bosnian Muslim identity. The Bosnian Muslims were struggle for their demands. There were distinct groups and they all had diverse demands. Due to the struggle between the Kallay regime and the subjects of the Empire, Burian adopted a policy of relaxation, which meant, for Bosnian Muslims' elite to possess a distinct place within society. They became political actors, at the end they started to organize around a common goal and this can be recognized as the politicization of the Bosnian Muslims

During the relaxation period of Bosnia, Ottoman had several political developments which affected and changed the balance within the Balkans. Young Turks took the administration of the Ottoman Empire in 1908, proposed a new constitution which liberated the regime. This revolt surprised and also frighten the European powers. As a result several developments had occurred in the Balkans

On October 5, 1908, in the ancient capital of Tirnovo, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria declared his country free of the last vestige of dependence on the sultan and, in sign of his new status, took the title of tsar; on October 7 the Austrian emperor finally and fully annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina; and on October 12 the Cretan assembly voted its union with the kingdom of Greece (Schevill, 1991: 455).

In 1909, Ottoman Empire accepted the annexation. Schevill explains the reason why Ottomans immediately accepted the annexation on the condition of a money indemnity and the evacuation of Novibazar (Schevill, 1991: 461). However,

annexation did not welcome everywhere as in the Ottomans. For Serbia, it was the second disappointment that they lived after the Berlin Congress, Their Greater Serbia dream, was one again, undermined by Austrian administration. In order to realize their dreams, Serbia and Montenegro prepared to wage war on Austro-Hungarian with an expectation of Ottoman assistance, Russians also protested but Germany was side by the Austro-Hungarian. However, the acceptance of Ottomans, again, disappointed the Serbs and Montenegrins and any country took a step with a fear of a general European war (Hupchick, 2002, 311).

After the annexation, the balance within the Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, and in the Balkans in general had changed. The ethnically based political parties increased their support. For instance, Mlada Bosnia, Serbian youth movement shifted its nationalistic policies and it adopted a more inclusive argument, which is Yugoslavism, to expand its level of influence (Malcolm, 1999: 248) At that time, another phenomenon occurred in the Balkans. Secret agreements were made between Serbs and Montenegrins on the one side, Bulgaria and Greece on the other side in regard to the division of Ottoman territories. These states waged war on Ottomans to expand their territories.

When the war in the Balkans had started, Bosnian politics had also began to dissolved, government disbanded in 1912 and 1913 (Pinson, 1994: 111). Bosnian politics deteriorated and among Bosnians, many people had joined the war. For instance, many Mlada Bosnia members joined the Serbian army in their war but under the administration of General Potiorek a Serbian opponent policy was adopted (Malcolm, 1999: 250-251). The balance within the Balkans was once again devastated with the second Balkan wars. The relations between the Kingdom of Serbia and Austria-Hungary got tensed up due to the Serbian territorial expansion acquired by the consequent of the Balkan Wars. The maintenance of conquest of Serbia was a strategic threat to the Austria-Hungary, thus Austro-Hungarian administration started to adopt anti-Serbian policies in places where Serbs had the power that can cause unrest among the society. Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the places that adopted anti-Serbian policies under the administration of General Potiorek. The journey of the Archiduke Franz Ferdinand to Bosnia to observe the

operational preparation caused irreparable damages for world history. The day that Archiduke traveled to Bosnia was the day when Serbs lost the battle of Kosovo, and it was the date for Serbian history, roots of their national myth lays. Archiduke was assassinated at that day on 28 June. The assassination of Archiduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was the last move that pull the trigger for the Austria-Hungary. Enmity between Serbs and Austro administration grew, external powers involved in the relations between Serbs and Austro administration and First World War began. At the end of the war Austria Hungary Empire was replaced by a Unified South Slav Kingdom which will be called, first Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes at first and then Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

3.5. Bosnia under Yugoslavia

. As it is stated above, Austria, due to the Balkan wars, was in a state of disorder, especially in places where ethnic divergences were high. The assassination led Austro-Hungarian administration to blame the Serbs. The enmity against Serbs both among the population and administration grew immediately and Austria-Hungarian sent an ultimatum to the Serbian King to eliminate the violence and hatred to Austria, to stop the provocation of the public servants within Austro administration and so on (Malcolm, 1999:254). The tumult that grew between these two countries affected other countries as well. For instance, Germany start to push Austria to wage war on Serbia with an expectation that Russia would support Serbia and Germany would have a chance to fight against the Russia. Germany disturbed from the Russian expansion and wanted to stop it, this tumult was a chance for Germany. So with the pressure from the Germany, Austria waged war on Serbia. Until 1915, Serbia had resisted the Austrian army and fought back. However with the entrance of Germany and Bulgaria, Serbs started to lose its resistance.

The World War I is not in the scope of this work, detailed information will not be given about the war. However, what remain crucial for this work are the attitudes and the conditions that prevailed during the World War I, which later led to the disintegration of Habsburg Empire and the unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Before the World War I, Serb began to gain prestige with the successes that it displayed during the Balkan wars and through this, Serbia attracted the Serbs

who inhabited outside the Serbia, especially those in Austria-Hungary. Serbs, in 1914 Nis Declaration, stated that that Serbia was fighting for the liberation and unification of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This led to the resurrection of Yugoslav ideas among Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Pavlowitch, S. K., 2003 :59, 60).

The unification of the South Slavs under an umbrella was not a design that comes with the World War I. Rather it was nineteenth century idea inspired by the German romanticism and mostly emerged from the Croatian intellectuals

The core Yugoslav idea, first formulated in the 1830s by the 'Illyrianist awakeners' (mostly Croats, with Ljudevit Gaj as their chief ideologist), held that the South (*Jugo-*) Slavs, having the same origin and speaking variants of basically the same language, are actually or potentially a single people or nation and consequently endowed with a 'natural right' to independence and unity in a state of their own (Rusinow, 2003: 12).

The idea of the unification of the South Slavs, from the beginning of the World War I and until the end of the Second World War was the main problem between the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and also Bosnian Muslims. The unification was approved and demanded nearly by all South Slavs but the terms of the unification, the administration of the newly unified state, and the constituent parts of it were being discussed until the establishment of the Tito's Yugoslavia, and it always created major problems for people, which may also pave the way for the dissolution of the Yugoslavia in 1990's.

3.5.1. The Unification of the South Slavs

During the World War I, South Slavs tried to find a way to unify under a roof, however, this idea is not simple one, and cannot be formulated easily. Behind this idea, there had been the dreams of the South Slavs, each ethnicity wanted to realize their dream. So they used "Yugoslavism as an extension of their own aspirations, and both had expected to carry out unification on their own terms, within the framework of their own historical agendas" (Pavlowitch, K. 2003: 28)

As it is known, during the war, Serbs had sovereign state and there was an Austrian state, in which, many ethnicities such as Serbs, Croats and Slovenes inhabited. This created a problem for the sovereign Serbs due to the fact that the

loyalty of the South Slavs to the Austrian administration was maintained, and the demand for autonomy under Austrian administration was widespread among South Slavs. However the South Slavs who lived outside the empire had different perception on Austria and the idea unification. There were Croats and Slovenes who lived abroad and were against Austria-Hungary administration and support the unification ideal. In 1915, a Committee was established by the Croatian émigrés in Italy and then moved to London and it “began an intensive campaign of lobbying to persuade the British government that a Yugoslav solution was the answer” (Benson, 2001: 22). This committee was Yugoslav Committee (JO, Jugoslavenski odbor) comprised of the anti-Austrian Croats and Slovenes politicians. At that time, Serbian government was already declared their demand to unite the South Slavs through Nis Declaration. On the one hand, the establishment of JO was an opportunity for Serbia to spread their unification idea, it was a strong ally for Serbian leaders within the Austria-Hungary but on the other hand JO challenged the Serbian leader, Pasic, because in order to unify the South Slavs, he needed to persuade the Croatian and Slovene politicians and they needed to compromise on the terms of unification.

The split between the Serbian leader and the JO was about the basic tenets of the unification. The common argument of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were one people. Serbs claimed that they were one people but consisted of different tribes whereas Croats and Slovenes did not emphasize the differences of tribes. Croats and Slovenes “believed that the principles of national right and self-determination, and not simply Serbia’s wartime performance, entitled the South Slavs to a state of their own, which would have to be worked out by an agreement between the JO and the Serbian government” (Banac, 1984: 118). The emphasis here was that, as Serbia improved its prestige, it acted like the savior of the South Slavs, thus, demanded more from the unification whereas Croats and Slovenes put emphasis on rights of the nation at the end of the World War I and for them, equality among nationalities should be sustained.

During the World War I Croats, Slovenes and also Bosnian Muslims were loyal to the Austrian administration. Although there were anti-Austrian movement outside the Austria, within these territories, loyalty to the Empire was maintained. In May 1917, Slavs who lived under the Austrian administration promulgated a

Declaration “which called for unification of all South Slav lands as a separate unit within the Monarchy, the Habsburg government concluded that ‘the development and solution of the Yugoslav question is the vital issue for the survival and future of the Monarchy’ (Mitrovic, 2003: 52). So it is seen that, Slavs within Austria-Hungary chose to live as an autonomous unity under the Empire. However, for Serbs, this was not the aim of the unification. The unification for them was the realization of the Greater Serbia dream. Serbia wanted an extension of their territories which would be independent and contained Austro-Hungarian territories.

So it is clear that there were divisions between the Serbian and Croat/Slovene/Muslim politicians on the unification idea. However, Allied powers, as the collapse of Austria-Hungary became obvious, started to put pressure on the Serbian leaders to find a way to solve the split of opinion between them and JO. At Corfu in 1917, Pasic and JO leaders met to confront their different perspectives and to reach a compromise; and they made an agreement. “This agreement known as Corfu Declaration, proclaimed the determination of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to form a united and independent state that would be constitutional, democratic and parliamentary monarchy headed by the Karadjordjevic dynasty” (Banac, 1984: 123). This was the beginning of a new era for the South Slavs. This was the sign for the establishment of new states rather than an autonomous state within Austria-Hungary. However, again, the new states meant different things for Serbs and other Slavs. In Banac’s words “Trumbic and Supilo fought for a new state entity, whereas Pasic envisioned only the expansion of Serbia’s institutions to new territories (1984: 119).

3

On August 1918, a National Council was established on the purpose of the unification, this council represented the South Slav inhabitants of the Austria-Hungarian Empire. On October, National Council declared that South Slavs were ready to enter to unification with Serbia and Montenegro. On November, an armistice treaty was signed between the Austria and the Allied forces which allow them to occupy the territories which were promised to Italy. On December the first “a delegation was sent to Belgrade to invite Serbia's regent, Crown Prince Alexander,

³ Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbic were Croatian politicians and members of the JO

to proclaim the union and assume the regency of the new state” (Pavlowitch, S.K., 2003: 62). So the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (KSCS) was established. At that time, peace conferences started to being held, and only the Serbia was among the winner side within the KSCS and also KSCS was not recognized by the Allied powers and due to this only Serbia was invited to the peace conferences. However, Serbia did not accept it and the delegates of the KSCS were tolerated. Greece was the first country that recognized the KSCS and then recognition of USA were followed by Britain and France.

3.5.2. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

The unification of the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bosnian Muslims did not bring stability to the country. The terms of the unification was still being discussed after the unification and first and the most important topic among the South Slavs was on the structure of the administration, whether it would be a centralist or federalist. For the realization of the Greater Serbia dream, Serbs want it to be centralist and for the autonomy of their people and as a mean of national assertion Croats, Slovenes and Bosnian Muslims wanted it to be federalist (Sugar, 1971: 126). So the conflict between the constituent parts of the KSCS rose on this topic and it was not solved until the beginning of the Second World War.

The internal political life of Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1941 went through three stages. The first stage covered the period from the unification in 1918 until the introduction of royal dictatorship on January 6, 1929. The second stage was the personal rule of King Alexander which lasted until the proclamation of the new Constitution of 1931, which was granted by the King (*ibid*, 129).

The tension within KSCS was never ceased and the Croats were the most dissatisfied ethnicity within the KSCS. The reason behind this is that, among other ethnicities the Croats were the one that wanted more power within the Kingdom. Slovenes were distant from the Belgrade, and within the Slovenian territory, Slovenes constituted homogenous population, and they had also a distinct language from the Croats and Serbs, so for Slovenes, the Serb dominated bureaucracy did not mean too much as long as Slovenes sustained their integrity (Banac, 1984: 345-346). Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, were pragmatic in a sense. For the autonomy of

their population, they exchanged their votes. Although there were Bosnian Muslims who chose between Serb and Croat nationality among Muslim intellectuals, most of the Bosnian Muslims, especially the members of Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO)⁴ were sided by the ones who had offer more for the cultural autonomy and territorial integrity of the Bosnian Muslim. Bosnian Muslims “early developed a ‘clientele strategy’ of supporting whomever was ruling them, be these rulers Ottoman, Habsburg, Serb, Axis, or Communist, in return for favors and concessions” (Rothschild, 1979: 208).

In November 1920 elections were held, The People’s Radical Party won 91 seats, The Democratic Party won 92 seats, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia won 58 seats, the Croatian Republican Peasants Party won 50 seats, the Slovene People’s Party won 27 seats and Yugoslav Muslim Organization won 24 seats (Benson, 2001 : 32,33). Following the election, the need to promulgate the constitution was immediate however, as it is stated above, even the basic administrative characteristic created insolvable conflict especially among the Serbs and Croats. Nevertheless a constitution was proposed on the national Serbian Holiday and named after it, Vidovdan, and the administration of the state was strictly unitary according to the Constitution. Although the Constitution was approved by the Constituent Assembly, it was boycotted by many parties, including Croatian Republican Peasants Party, Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Slovenian People’s Party, which were among the biggest parties in KSCS. Serbian government did nothing but ignored this strong opposition and even the leader of the strongest Croat party, Croats’ Republican Peasants Party, Radic was sentenced twice during the Pasic’s government. Serbian government did not only exclude the constituent nationalities of the Kingdom, but also, ignored nationalities such as Macedonians, Kosovo Albanians, Bosniaks, Turks, and treated them as if they were all Serbs. In other words, while trying to constitute a unitary and centralized state, the policies of the Serbian government were far from the political integration within Kingdom (Türkeş, 2006: 5). The Vidovdan

⁴ Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) was found on 1919 in Sarajevo. The founder of the party was Mehmed Spaho. This party was successor of the Muslim National organization (MNO), which was the first Muslim party in Austro-Hungarian period.

Constitution was approved with the support of the JMO in exchange “for the preservation of old Bosnian borders within the new administrative division of the country, the maintenance of the autonomy of Islamic religious institutions, and guarantees of financial compensation for properties affected by the land reform” (Bougarel, 2003: 102). Bosnian territorial integrity was protected by Vidovdan Constitution.

Bosnian Muslims had played crucial role in KSCS’s political life. On the one hand, in order to achieve demographic majority, Serbs and Croats needed the support of Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, Bosnian Muslims needed to create an alliance for maintenance of their integrity and autonomy of cultural as well as religious institutions (Donia, Fine, 1994: 105). So for Bosnian Muslims, creation of an alliance with Serbs or Croats did not make any differences if they could both provide with the needs of Bosnian Muslims. However, when KSCS is the case, the power of the Serbs within bureaucracy and military offered more and seemed to guarantee the rights of the Bosnian Muslims so that it can be said that the political party of the Bosnian Muslim, the JMO mostly supported the Serbian government.

The death of Pasic and assassination of Radic in 1928 created turmoil and due to the public upheaval King Alexandar banned all the political parties and took the authority of all power thus the short term constitutional political life of the KSCS ended, the assembly was disrupted (Jelavich, 2006a: 166). After taken all power, King Alexandar changed the kingdom’s name immediately to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This change had more than just a change in name, it stressed a centralized kingdom, without separated the nationalities within it, called for a whole centralization in which Serbs were dominant (Türkeş, 2006: 6). The change was not limited to the Kingdom’s name. The territories were renamed too, there were no more ethnically denominated lands, rather whole Yugoslav territories divided into nine banovina and this banovina’s named after the rivers (Malcolm, 1999: 271). As many other provinces “under Alexandar’s dictatorship, Bosnia lost its distinctive status as a provincial unit for the first time in centuries” (Donia, Fine, 1994: 129). Serbs were appointed to the offices and this led to dissidence among populations.

By 1929, a paramilitary Ustasha was established by the anti-Serbian Croats who desire to create a sovereign Croatia and Italy assisted Ustasha by 1930 (Türkeş,

1994: 125). On September 1931, King promulgated a Constitution due to the internal dissidence and external pressure especially from France. A bicameral legislature was established with an Assembly and Senate, which were partly appointed by the King. An official party was established called United Radical Peasant Democratic party, which would become in 1933, Yugoslav National Party. However, the dissidence within Yugoslavia did not cease with the new Constitution. Enmity to the Serbian administration grew. King Alexander died in 1934. In 1935 a general election was held, Yugoslav National Party won 60% of the seats whereas the opposition won 37%. A Croatian politician as the head of government and he stayed in office until 1939 (Malcolm, 1999: 275). After 1939 internal and external conditions of Yugoslavia were getting worse.

In 1941 Yugoslavia was invaded by German, Italian and Bulgarian troops. This was not the only challenge that Yugoslavia has faced during 1941, German invasion was only a part of the war within Yugoslavia. There was also a civil war that was between Chetniks and Ustasa militants, there were wars between Allied and Axis power within Yugoslav lands, and there was also a war between Chetniks and Communists partisans. Disorder and state of wars were at peak. Independent State of Croatia (NDH), which was a puppet state of Nazi Germany, was established. NDH consisted of today's Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory. NDH was governed by Ustasha movement, and throughout its survival, NDH caused many deaths among Jews, Bosnian Muslims, and Serbs.

The conditions of Bosnian Muslims were as complicated as the Yugoslavia itself. On the one hand, Bosnian Muslims were tortured by the Chetniks and they did not want to live that through more, on the other hand, their interwar ally, Zagreb, started to adopt fascist policies, which would damage Bosnian Muslim population too. By that time, Communists partisans became more powerful and distinguishable from the Chetniks and this had led to participation of some of the Bosnian Muslims to the partisans. For instance Pozderac, one of the famous Muslim politician, was among the first who joined the partisans. There were Chetnik members and Ustasha members among Bosnian Muslims. In 1942, a 'Memorandum' was sent to Nazi Germany, which demand protection against Ustasha's massacres, and autonomy under German protection. As a result, a SS troop was established among Bosnian

Muslims. By the 1943, the relation between Chetniks and Germany on the one side and Ustasha's massacres on the other side, shaped the Bosnian Muslim politics towards these movement. Tito's successes at war and policy towards Muslims constituted an alternative for Bosnian Muslims and most of the Bosnian Muslim preferred partisans to the other movements. As Babuna points out

The Communist policy towards the Slavic Sunni Muslims of Bosnia shifted during the war. In the official documents, the Muslims were considered one of the Yugoslav nationalities, but the term *muslimani* (Muslims) was used in a religious, not in an ethnic sense (2004:302).

In 1945, Tito rescued the Bosnia, a National Government was established with an offer which guaranteed autonomy and territorial integrity of Bosnia under federative administration (Malcolm, 1999: 298-304)

3.5.3. Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia*

The success of the partisans during the Second World War led to the communist takeover of the administration of the new state after the war. Banac (1997) argues that without communism, the emergence of the Yugoslav state would not be possible in the post-war period (104). There were six republics in Yugoslavia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Except from Bosnia-Herzegovina, republics were established on the basis of nationalities. Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, by being composed of three different ethnicities and by not having a majority among these ethnicities, was not constituted on the basis of ethnicity; rather it was a territorial state. There were also two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina.

First years after the war, communist rule tried to consolidate its power, determine the basic principles of the federation and realize the social revolution it had promised during the war (Donia Fine, 1994: 159). The basic principles of the federation were determined during the Second World War by the Council of National

* The name of the federation has been changed to the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1963. Thus, it will be referred as Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FRPY) at first, then it will be referred as SFRY.

Liberation (AVNOJ). The national equality principle, for instance, recognized in the first session of the AVNOJ which held in 1942 and in the first session the Council “stressed as its goal the establishment of conditions for the "full freedom and equality in the liberated brotherly union" not only for the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but also for the Macedonians, Montenegrins, and other” (Frankel, 1995: 420). The first constitution was promulgated in 1946, which defined the federation as “a federal people's State of republican form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, basing themselves on the right to self- determination, which includes the right to separation, have expressed a will to live together in a federal State” (*ibid*, 422). The motto of the Yugoslav federation was “brotherhood and unity” which would use to demise the nationality differences and stresses loyalty to a supreme Yugoslav nation.

As it is stated above, the basic principles were determined with the 1946 constitution. Religious affairs were also set by this constitution. “The church was separated from the state, while religious education in schools was banned. Funds from the state were radically reduced and gradually all three churches were marginalized” (Radic. 2003: 205). Religious affairs had affected Bosnian Muslims, which were not counted as separate nationality, but mainly a religious community and ethnic community. Bosnian Muslims were split between opposition and support for the Communists. Although the new 1946 constitution recognized the Muslims as a separate entity and guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, the reforms of the administration caused damage for the Muslim community. There were many more changes that affected Muslim population within the Yugoslav territory. Sharia court system was abolished, the mektebs had lost their function as educational institution, religious instruction was prohibited, the financial power of the Islamic community was reduced, mosques were converted into museums, tekkes were closed down (Babuna, 2004:302). Also, agrarian reform, that affected mostly the Muslim community, was a source of the intensification the anti-Communist stance within Muslim community. However these developments were not meant to decrease the power of Muslim community rather it was planned to decrease the role of religion in individuals’ life, it was a secularization process. However since

Bosnian Muslims did not have a state of their own but constitute a religious community, the diminishing power of religion in public sphere affected mostly Bosnian Muslims.

The condition of the Muslim population in times of censuses were rather complex. In the first census of 1948 they were classified as ‘undecided Muslims’, in 1953, there was an option as ‘undetermined Yugoslavs’. However due to the conflict between the Serbs and the Croats over the ‘nationality’ of the Bosnian Muslims, as Poulton points out,

the Tito regime attempted to end the competition between Serbs and Croats over the ethnic ownership of the Bosnian Muslims by constructing the term “Muslim” as referring to a separate ethnic group. In the 1961 census they were referred to as “Muslims in the ethnic sense” (*Muslimani u etnicĭ kom smislu*) while in the census of 1971 they were defined as “Muslims in the sense of nationality” (*Muslimani u smislu narodnosti*) (2000:54).

Yugoslavia had expelled from the cominform, and economic as well as military pressure started to be felt by Yugoslav Federation, which led Tito to develop close relations with the West (Batovic, 2009). The years of 1950’s were the reform years for Yugoslavia. The split between Soviet Union and Yugoslavia led to serious changes in policies of Tito. Tito’s internal and foreign policy, which is called Titoism, were shaped after Yugoslavia’s expulsion from Cominform, which signaled the independence from Soviet Union, and the uniqueness of Yugoslav Federation. The first pillar of the Titoism is self management. In Soviet Union, there was a leading nation. Yugoslav Federation, as opposed to the Soviet type, “reject the thesis of the "leading socialist nation," of the "largest socialist state," which is to lead the socialist countries and direct the policies of the socialist world” (Macridis, 1952: 233). The other pillar of Titoism is the non-alignment in the foreign affairs. Non-alignment in the foreign affairs has helped Bosnian Muslim to increase their status within Yugoslav Federation as most of the non-aligned country has substantial Muslim populations (Donia Fine, 1994: 172).

During 1950’s there were also economic development in Yugoslav Federation, employment rate rose, however the labor productivity remain low due to the state determined rates. Within Yugoslav Federation, there was no equality

between republics in economical terms. Slovenia and Croatia were more developed than other republics and developed republics were in a relatively disadvantaged position as opposed to the undeveloped areas due the fact that the incomes of the developed republics were transferred to the undeveloped republics.

Huge transfers were arranged in the 1950s and early 1960s for advancement of underdeveloped territories which Slovenia had to pass on up to one third of income...Because of defective implementation the resources passed southwards were insufficient to narrow the gaps in regional development... The apparent waste of development resources therefore fostered division rather than unity (Palarait, 2003 :199).

The distribution of income and federal funds would later create dissidence among republics, and eventually become the one of the reasons of the dissolution of Yugoslav Federation.

The reform process was neither stable nor univocal. The conflicting ideas among the party members on the centralization and decentralization began to arise in the mid 1950's and continued until mid 1960's. Rankovic, who had control of the foreign service and was a very powerful person in party, was one side of the coin

Rankovic himself was less a Serb nationalist than a fanatical unitarist. He believed that all power should remain in Belgrade and that republican capitals, like Zagrep, Ljubljana or Sarajevo should act as ciphers charged with carrying out orders from the centre. 'Unitarism', or 'conservatism', therefore, became readily associated with Serbian nationalism: both aimed to preserve a status quo that favored the Serb elite (Glenny, 1999: 580).

On the other side of the coin, there were those who favored decentralization led by Kardelj. Tito, at first, seemed to favor centralization, but in 1962, he explicitly supported Kardelj. In 1966, Rankovic was forced to resign from the party, and it was a turning point for Yugoslav history as it symbolizes the victory of the Tito and the federation over the Serbian hegemony and centralization. After the resignation, the relations between government and nationalities and minorities were loosened and rights and liberties of both nationalities and minorities were further extended (Banac, 1997: 106-107). Religious liberties were sustained to the Yugoslav population. Another important development occurred in 1963 with the recognition of Muslims as a separate nation and in 1968 with the approval of party leadership, Muslims became a nation. This was a turning point for Bosnian Muslims as official recognition

guarantees the increasing public appearance of Muslims in terms of political representation.

1960's and 1970's were marked by changing dynamics within the society. Decentralization of economics and politics led to the diminishing control over politics and society. Media control loosened, the conflicts related to the history, culture and language were opened to debate. The economic reforms did not satisfy ordinary citizens, as well as individual republics. The banking system of the federation was controlled by Serbian banks mostly. Individual republics had less control over their earnings than federation. Croat liberals demanded to exercise more control over their earnings and prepared a proposal (Glenny, 1999: 581). Not only economics and politics but also language and culture were affected by decentralization. The Yugoslav Writer's Union, which was an important provider of cultural, linguistic and literacy unity among separate republics in Yugoslavia, demanded decentralization on the basis of national and regional basis (Dragovic-Soso, 2003: 270). The cultural uprising among population meant growing nationalist ideas among population. In Kosovo Albanians rebelled and as a result granted representative power. In Slovenia people took the streets due to the dissatisfaction about the financial arrangement of the federation. Croatian intellectuals argued that Yugoslavism is just another source of Serbian nationalism and thus opposed Yugoslavism. Animosity among population was further intensified by the 1974 constitution (Glenny, 1999: 586-593).

The 1974 constitution gave greater power of self-governance to the two autonomous provinces of Serbia, namely, Kosovo and Vojvodina, which, in turn, triggered the Serbian nationalism. This constitution also weakened the federal power and granted more power to the republics (Wachtel, Bennett, 1999: 24). Under this constitution, Tito planned the days when he was not there, when he died, he proposed a system of collective presidency in which chairmanship would rotate each year among the eight federal units of the federation. However, this system did neither produce effective policy, nor consensus (Ramet, 1998: 170-171). The developments within Yugoslavia started from mid 1960's and got tensed up with the death of Tito had led to the dissatisfaction of the nationalities, created power vacuum that was deepening with the decentralization efforts of the federal units, and widened the gap

between nationalities and urban-rural population. Besides cultural uprisings and increasing nationalist sentiments eventually led to the dissolution of the Yugoslavia

3.6. The Dissolution of Yugoslavia

The reasons and the background of the dissolution of Yugoslavia have been widely discussed. There were many works regarding this issue and each one of them had different perceptions on the reasons of dissolution. However, there were scholars, who tended to believe that a single cause led to misinterpretation of the dissolution, rather than focusing on a sole cause, using different perspective and correlating them within historical framework might well explain this phenomenon. For instance, Sabrina Ramet (2005) provides a summary of the works related to the dissolution of the Yugoslavia, the reasons scholars put on their book, and analyzes them in a very systematic way. Each book she referred have different focal points regarding the issue, one based its book on economic reasons, the other based on cultural developments (Wachtel) or others put political illegitimacy of the regimes (Allock). At the end of every analysis she makes, she comes up with her ideas concerning the dissolution. Her argument covers almost all of the reasons that being discussed on the dissolution of the Yugoslavia, thus, they will be at the core of this writing and will be treated as the reasons for dissolution. She argues that

From my standpoint, thus, the central systemic factors in the decay of socialist Yugoslavia were (1) problems associated with system illegitimacy, (2) economic deterioration, and (3) the ethnically based federal system, while (4) human agency (Milosevic especially, but not solely) played a central role in taking the country down a violent path (67).

Each of these reasons had crucial effect on collapse of Yugoslav Federation, but in order to understand their uniqueness in the context of Yugoslav Federation itself, neither of the reasons should be treated as sole destructive force, rather, they should be regarded as a set of reasons which cannot be separated and should be examined together.

First reason she comes up with is the system illegitimacy. The existence of Tito was important for the survival of the Yugoslav Federation. For most parts of the federation, loyalty to Tito exceeded loyalty to the federation itself due to the fact that

it was Tito that kept the federation from becoming a Greater Serbian state for non-Serbs. In 1953 census, Yugoslavism was a federal state policy which aimed at flourishing 'the unity' among South Slavs (Malcolm, 1999: 312). Wachtel and Bennett (2009) argue that "any discussion of the basic conditions leading to Yugoslavia's breakup must truly begin from the moment when the balance of power began to shift from unity to brotherhood" (18). The shift emerged with the decentralization movements of the federal units. Centralist/unitarist and decentralist/federalist polarization led to separation of ideas among party membership as well as between republics, which was resulted with the regime illegitimacy as proponents of each side accused the regime for support the other sides.

Second reason that Ramet gives is the economic deterioration. Yugoslavia, after separating its role with Soviet Union, relied heavily on Western support for its economics and its military. Beginning with 1950's economic reforms had taken place. As it was stated earlier the earnings of the republics were partially transferred to the federal funds and federal funds distributed these earnings. This situation had affected both the developed and less developed republics. More developed republics, Slovenia and Croatia were reluctant to give their earnings and less developed countries, as Ramet states "The less developed republics complained that the federation was not doing enough for them and noted that payments from the more developed republics were frequently late, sometimes by as much as a year and a half" (2005, 55). Economy of the federation was not doing well. Unemployment rate were gradually increased especially in the less developed parts of the federation. So federation.

To combat this problem and in order to meet the material expectations provoked by the reform, Yugoslavia followed the same path ad Poland, Hungary and Romania- it borrowed heavily on the international money markets. By 1982, Yugoslavia's debt stood at \$18.5 million. Each year, government had to find new loans merely to finance the interest repayments (Glenny, 1999: 623).

There was another important source of conflict in the area of economics. As it is known, except from Bosnia-Herzegovina, five republics of the federation dominated by a single majority, which means, "the distribution of federal funds was also a

national issue and the national leadership of each republic demanded more than its share” (Donia Fine, 1994: 180). Distribution of the funds accelerated the nationalist sentiments among the republics as each having asserted that their “national income” were distributed to the other nationalities. As John Allcock put it:

The steady republicanization of the economy, however, meant that the commitment of liberals to widening the scope of market forces came increasingly to be posed in terms of a conflict of interests between the federation and the republics. As republics were readily conceptualized in national terms, the dispute over economic modernization came to be represented (certainly in popular and journalistic discourse) as a matter of the adverse effects of the power of ‘Belgrade,’ working together with the ‘backward South’ (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro), upon the economic development of the ‘advanced’ North (Croatia and Slovenia). Economic modernization thereby came to be linked generally to the forces of nationalism which the Tito regime had worked so hard since 1945 to defeat (2000: 90).

The third reason Ramet had provided with was the ethnically based federal system which cannot be separated from the previous two reasons. The federation was separated into republics on the basis of the nationality principle. Each of the republics, except from Bosnia, was dominated by a majority of a certain nationality. Bosnia, on the other hand, composed of three dominant nationalities, neither of them had a strong majority. The conflicts on economic agenda, on structural changes and on cultural topics, had affected all of the nationalities within federation. Each republic and nationality tried to maintain their nationalities’ distinctiveness and tried not to be assimilated under ‘Yugoslavism’ or Serbian hegemony. Federal structure and decentralization had resulted with the loosening ties with the republics and federation on the one hand, and led to the emergence of nationalist agendas in order to gain support of their populations. Nationalist agendas were closely correlated with the cultures and languages of the nationalities. For instance, Slovenes had different language than Serbs and Croats, Slovenes were resented by the fact that, their children had to learn Serbo-Croatian language whereas Serbs or Croats did not have to learn Slovenian language (Wachtel Bennett, 2009:24). Croatian intellectuals’ declaration can be examined through the lenses of nationalist agendas as it aimed at

A sharp reduction in the number of Serbian writers being taught (in this respect, Croatian intellectuals hoped to bring their education program in line with that of the Slovenians, who were admired for basically all but ignoring

the literatures of the other Yugoslav peoples), as well as the elimination of any attempt at demonstrating that such a concept as a unified Yugoslav literature had ever existed (*ibid*, 23).

So due to the federation structure which was ethnically divided, as the national interests became more important than the federation's own interests as the idea of Yugoslavism faded out. Also when nationalism emerged in a republic, it triggers the other nationalism of the constituent parts. As the argument of Dragovic-Soso which is summarized by Ramet (2005) "nationalism do not develop in isolation, but interact with each other to produce a spiral of radicalization. Moreover, the rise of extreme nationalism is context-specific and relational, rather than historically immutable and isolated" (153). It was hard to sustain the conditions in a federation that reserved five distinct nationalities; each had an assimilation fear and survival instinct, to create the safe conditions in which the emergence of one nationalist sentiments that would not create disturbance of other nationalities.

Forth reason she gave with reference to Bennett's work (1995) is the role of human agency in dissolution of Yugoslavia. Human agency can be comprised of political elites, intellectuals or other important figures for society such as religious leader. Each republic had its own political leaders, and intellectuals who may or may not be in the same line with the political elites. What is more crucial for Yugoslav Federation is that, religious leaders also played a key role in political and cultural affairs of the republics. Thus, the human agency cannot be ignored in Yugoslavia's dissolution. Intellectuals are as important as the political leaders in determining the political agenda. For instance, Kosovo Albanian riots have had a great impact on the Slovenian Writers' Union, and later have disputed on governmental level. So intellectuals of Yugoslav federation "rather than crystallizing this initial momentum into a new integrative ideology, however, Yugoslav intellectuals for the most part showed themselves to be just as incapable as their republican leaderships in fostering a spirit of compromise and bridging national differences" (Dragovic-Soso, 2003: 268).

Another important reason she gives is the developments within Europe that paved the way, or at least, accelerated the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The need for a federative state, for most of the republics in federation, was felt by the conditions of the KSCS' experiences between the interwar period, and the Second World War. The

growth of the strength and economics of the EC, on the one hand, and the developments within USSR was a sign for the republics that, there is no need for federation in order to foster economic developments or for the security reasons. This has led to spring of independence ideas mostly among Slovenia and Croatia, who did not want to share their economic prosperity with less developed regions and who did not want to suffer from extreme nationalism's of Serbia.

All of the reasons stated above reflected a side of the dissolution and they draw a framework within which all of the reasons are correlated. For a better understanding of the dissolution, it is important not be deterministic in a certain conceptualization but try to see them as they are parts of a bigger picture. Although there were republics in favor of separation, or at least, loose confederation, or there were the Serbs who want their territory expand and include all the Serbs living under different republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina did not want federation to wither away. Bosnia was the fortress of Tito and Yugoslavism (Donia Fine: 1994: 194). Bosnia-Herzegovina, composed of three different ethnicities, was always in favor of the idea of Yugoslavism up until the nationalisms in the neighboring republics severely affected Bosnia-Herzegovina. The nationalist discourses became visible among Bosnian Muslims in 1983 when a group of Muslims, including Alija Izzetbegovic, who would become the leader of Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and later became president of BiH, were blamed to establish an Islamic state, and labeled as Pan-Islamists, were put to trial. These men were subjected to accusation of being nationalists and pan-Islamists. During 1980's prosecutions on nationalists ideas increased. Another example is that a Serb, Vojislav Seselj, who would become a well-known nationalist, was put into jail for his counterrevolutionary activities (Andjelic, 2003:43-44).

The early developments within Croatia, their demands of a distinctive culture rather than Yugoslavism, did not find an echo in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, Milosevic's call for a union of Serbs find supporter within Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early 1990's, the mosaic had reversed, some of the Bosnian Croats were sided with Croatians and Bosnian Serbs were sided with the Serbians, demanding annexation of territories of Bosnian Serbs to Serbia. This was the beginning of disastrous years for Bosnian peoples.

3.6.1. The war and the End of Yugoslavia

Economic deterioration led Ante Markovic, Prime Minister, to make economic reform under the consultation of IMF. However, at that time, the unity among Yugoslav republics had already diminished. Rather, national interests of the republic began to reveal themselves both in republican and federal level. The Slovenian and Serbian republics were the first two republics who demanded more sovereignty for their republics. Though they had different rhetoric, they both use the nationalist sentiments in a sense. The Republic of Slovene was the most developed republic within federation and the distribution of its wealth always created a disturbance. Serbs, on the other hand, as the leadership in the federal level become impossible wanted to unite all Serbs within Yugoslavia in a single united territory. The interests of the Slovenes and Serbs united in one level, they did not federal administration or federal constitution interrupts and destructs their demands and dreams.

The first confrontation in the republican level was among the Serbs and Slovenes on the case of Kosovo Albanians. Serbs decrease the power of two autonomous provinces and forced the leaders to resign their offices. Slovenes arguments on Kosovo were comprised of the human rights and the right of self-determination, which also constituted the foundations of their demand for sovereignty. The enmity between Serbs and Slovenes grew rapidly after Slovene's support for Kosovo Albanians. "When the federal presidency sent the military into Kosovo, more than 1 million Slovenes—half the total population—signed a petition against the state of emergency, 450,000 in one day" (Wachtel, Bennet: 2009, 33).

The parliament of Slovenia adopted constitutional amendments and with this amendments they declared "the 'complete and unaliable right' to self-determination, including the right of secession and specifying the conditions under which federal legislation and decisions would be invalid in Slovenia" (Woodward, 1995: 110). The Serbs also reduce the level of influence of the federal administration by, for instance, neglecting 1974 constitution, which provided with more power to the two autonomous provinces in other words Serbs removed the autonomy of the provinces.

In a way, Milosevic and Kucan used national right as a legitimizing factor for their actions. In other words,

Although the two party leadership, those of Slovene president Kucan and Serb President Milosevic were different... both claimed national rights over territory and a duty to protect the nation and its territory: in one case asserting the right of Slovenia to define the terms of its defense of territory and individual rights as Slovenes in the army, and in other, asserting the right of Serbia and the individual rights of Serbs 'not to be beaten in their lands' (Woodrow, 1995: 91).

The conditions within Yugoslavia has increasingly deteriorated, and at last in each republic, started with the Slovenes, multiparty elections were held. The winners in each republic were nationalist parties. In Bosnia elections were held in 1990 and three ethnically based parties together most of the votes. The Democratic Action Party of Muslims (Stranka Demokratska Akcije: SDA) won 38% of the votes and 86 seats, Serbian Democratic Party (Sirpska Demokratska Stranka:SDS) won 30% votes and 72 seats, and Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) won 16% votes and 44 seats. Three nationalist parties, in the meetings concerning the future of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, could not find a way that would satisfy the all parties. HDZ and SDA favored the loose confederation without a Serbian hegemony, which was supported also by Croats and Slovenes whereas SDS sided with Serbia and Montenegro in every aspect.

The SDA and its leader Izzetbegovic were aware of the fact that there would be economic crisis as well as ethnic clashes among the population in the case of separation from Yugoslavia and after the establishment of a new nation-state. The maintenance of the existence of the Muslim community within Yugoslavia was directly related to the Croatian and Slovenian existence to balance the Serbian power. After Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, Bosnia declared its independence too in October 1991 but it was not recognized by EC, and a referendum was made for EC and but Serbian leader Karadzic boycotted the referendum nevertheless in April 7, 1992 EC recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina

Starting from 1990 and until June 1991, the leaders of the six republics were met to discuss the future of Yugoslavia, however, they could not reach to an agreement, as they all defend their national interests at the meeting and their interests

mostly clashed with each other. And on June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, JNA), which composed of Serbs, in order to protect Yugoslav territorial integrity, moved to Slovenia's border and Slovene territorial forces fought back and military confrontation lasted only ten days and resulted with Serbia's realization that due to the lack of Serbian population in Slovenia, Slovenia was not in their scope of influence, they didn't have a chance in Slovenia (ibid, 218). So Serbs, in order to realize their dreams, turn to the territories in which there is sizable Serbian population, namely Croatia and Bosnia. The first attack on Croatia was from the Serbs who lived in Croatia and wanted to establish an autonomous Krajina, in the region, where inhabitants were mostly Serbs, in 1991 (Malcolm, 1999:338). The war in Croatia had started to affect Bosnia

The international community started to get involved in circumstances within Yugoslavia with the Slovenian's and Croats' interested in independence. However, by 1992, there were no measures taken by international power to prevent the upcoming war in Yugoslavia. Germany encouraged the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. The independence of Bosnia recognized a year later after the official declaration of independence at the very same day that war broke out. After the war broke out between Serbs and Croats and during 1991's, the only measure taken by international powers was to put a general arms embargo on all five Yugoslav Successor states. Declaration of Independence in Bosnia on March 1992, and the outbreak of war between Serbs and Bosnian Muslims had led to the growing attention among Western and Islamic states.

The European countries and U.S. did not have a consensus among themselves on the future of the successor states. US, at first, did not want to enter the conflict as it was Europe's problem. European countries were divided by their historical associations. So the intervention or involvement of the Western states was slow. On June U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) took the control of Sarajevo airport and from then on, Western states were involved in Bosnian War through arrangement of peace proposals.

The First proposed plan for the future of the Bosnia-Herzegovina was offered by Cyrus Vance and the former British Foreign Secretary, Lord David Owen. This

plan was called Vance-Owen peace plan or VOPP. This plan divided the Bosnia into ten cantons where Muslim cantons would be separated from other Muslim cantons so would Serb cantons and Croat cantons alike. The proposed plan was mostly supported by the Croats. The Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan at first so as US. However, Bosnian Muslims and US later accepted the terms of the peace plan and pressured Bosnian Serbs to do so (Glenny, 1999:639). At that time, Milosevic also put pressure on Karadzic to agree on the terms and at last Karadzic signed it, but he indicated the need for the ratification of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. Assembly rejected the plan, and this was the beginning of the split between Milosevic and Karadzic.

The failure of the Vance-Owen plan led to accelerate tension between Bosnian Muslims and Croats in general. There was another war to break out between Bosnian Muslims and Croats, who were, at that time, allies against the powerful Serbian army. At that time, Owen and Thorwald Stolenberg who replaced Cyrus Vance worked on a new peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The plan was formulated between June and September, which divided Bosnia into three ethnic states in a confederation. The central government in the proposed plan lacks the authority. The new plan legitimized Republica Srpska (RS) and Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosnia. Legitimization was not the only problem. It also gave republics the possibility to join their homeland (Bora, 1999:127). Bosnian government was not willing to sign the agreement. However, during the international community's peace process, Bosnian government was more willing to cooperate, even if the conditions of the proposed plan did not satisfy the interests of the Bosnia in general and Bosnian Muslims in particular. In the end, Bosnian government decided to impose conditions and accept plan. Bosnian government was willing to achieve a peaceful settlement. With the growing tension among Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and the tone in the proposed agreements, Bosnian government lost their hopes about diplomatic agreement.

In a radio broadcast of the meeting to the Bosnian population, he (Izzetbegovic) announced that the Muslims would now have to fight for territory to ensure their survival as a nation...Despite strong evidence that public opinion favored an end to the war, the Izzetbegovic-Silajdzic leadership insisted it had no choice but to shift from diplomatic to military

means and to continue campaign to reclaim territory lost to Serbs and Croats (Woodward, 1995: 310-311).

Bosnian Muslims attitude toward West and to the circumstances within Bosnia itself had started to change due to the unwillingness of Western states to intervene militarily and due to their lack of devotion of the preservation of the multiethnic Bosnia. Bosnian Muslims turn to their own resources and isolated themselves (Donia and Fine. 266). The tension between Muslims and Croats accelerated. The leaders of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs decided to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina territories. This has led international community to take cautions to protect the cities where Bosnian Muslims had the majority of the population. The Safe Haven Plan aimed to protect six cities where Muslims were surrounded. These cities were Sarajevo, Tuzla, Srebrenica, Zepa, Bihac, Gorazde. They were put under UN protection. However, Safe Haven Plan was highly criticized as for Bosnian Muslims it was nothing but the legitimization of the attacks on Bosnian Muslims

The winter of 1993 and 1994 were the most violent period of Bosnia-Herzegovina. An explosion in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994 changed the attitude of the Western states. The U.S. called an emergency meeting, which demanded the withdrawal of heavy weaponry of Bosnian Serbs within ten days to the UN troops (Glenny, 1999:646). The Bosnian Serbs agreed to bring their weaponry on the condition that Russia would join the peace-keeping forces. Agreement has been reached but it never be fulfilled truly. Bosnian Serbs also violated no-fly zone with six aircrafts, in return, US downed Serbian planes with the NATO and UN authorization (Donia and Fine, 268).

US active and military involvement to the war in Bosnia had changed the atmosphere as before military action taken, Bosnian Serbs' aggressiveness was given no serious consideration, and even, the proposed peace settlements were seemed to approve the Serbian aggression. As Burg and Shoup argued that "the Europeans avoided significant military involvement on one side or the other, and refrained from any effort to impose a settlement on local actors. Instead, it was the United States that finally emerged as the decisive actor in the Bosnian conflict" (1999: 316). US started to put pressure on Zagreb to form a federation between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Tudjman and Izzetbegovic were persuaded and on 18 March 1994

Bosnian-Croatian Federation was formed through the Washington Agreement (Glenny, 1999:647). Serbs, on the other hand, were not willing to be part of the Washington Agreement. According to the terms of the agreement, RS would have 49% of the territories and BiH would have 51%. The West put pressure on Serbia to persuade Bosnian Serb leader, Karadzic to agree on the terms in exchange to remove economic sanctions. Although Milosevic tried to persuade Karadzic, Karadzic did not accept the plan. The tension between Serbia and Bosnian Serbs started to grow and Milosevic stop supporting Karadzic. In the summer of 1995, Bosnian Serbs attacked Safe Havens and these were the last straw. NATO prepared air operation against Bosnian Serbs and through this way diplomatic relations were empowered by military operations. Bosnian Serbs started to lose the territories they won during the war and the terms offered by Washington Agreement became attractive for Bosnian Serbs and through Dayton Peace Agreement the war ended.

Agreement was signed by President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izzetbegovic, President of Croatia Tudjman, President of Serbia, Milosevic and by the delegations of Contact Group members. According to agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a complete state but it was composed of two autonomous entities, Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republica Sirspka. They can both have their own army. Bosnia Herzegovina is highly decentralized state, the authority of the central government is highly limited and presidency is composed of the three ethnicities, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The constituent parts had no right to separate from Bosnia with an exception of legal process. On the one hand, Dayton Peace Agreement has led to the tremendous intervention of international community in Bosnian affairs. Although agreement set limits of the Bosnian government itself, it does not properly define the limits of the international power. On the other hand it was not a success for the constituent parts of Bosnia Herzegovina as well as it was not a loss. For Bosnian Muslims, the most important thing to achieve was the territorial unity and security for Bosnian Muslims and the protection of Bosnian mosaic. It was partly achieved through Dayton Agreement. For Bosnian Serbs, the general tendency was to be part of a Greater Serbia dream, and this was not achieved. Nevertheless, Bosnian Serbs gained 49% of the territories, which can be counted as a

success and for Bosnian Croats, although they lost their hope to join their homeland, general attitude was positive towards Dayton Peace Agreement.

3.7. Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia-Herzegovina establishes its state apparatus and its structure and organization through Dayton Agreement. It means that, in a way, BiH is surrounded by international community.

In effect, Bosnia, under Dayton, has been governed by a network of international community institutions representing the major world powers, with NATO, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMiBH) and the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina as leading implementing organs (Chandler, 2000:64).

BiH has little capacity and authority to act as a sovereign state. The decisions are made usually by international community, even if in the state level some policies are made, international community has the authority to disapprove.

The structure of the state and the two entities are complicated. At the state level, parliamentary Assembly consists of two chambers: the House of People and the House of Representatives. House of People is composed of fifteenth delegates, each constituent ethnicity have equal share, and they have five delegates. House of Representative has forty-two delegates. Delegates were selected by proportion of two-third from the federation and one-third from the Republica Srpska. Federation is also designed in the same matter as the Parliamentary Assembly, only differs in numbers. House of People comprises of sixty delegates, thirty Croats and thirty Bosniaks and House of Representatives are composed of hundred and forty selected delegates. There is also subdivision within the federation. Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina is composed of ten cantons; each has their own cantonal government. There are also many municipalities, all have their local governments. The civil implementation is supervised by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is established through the Dayton Agreement. High Representative has many powers that exceed the authority of the state itself. It has governmental and legislative powers; it has the power of dismissal of elected and non-elected officials, which is highly used for removal of the nationalists' political leaders from the election, or from their office.

In September 1996, first election was held but it was not a usual election for a sovereign state. Before the election, international community appealed to the Dayton Accords in order to prevent some nationalists' win the election. The Dayton Agreement stated that no person under indictment by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 'may stand as a candidate or hold any appointive, elective, or other public office' (Annex 4, Article 10). International community has the capacity to put pressure on national parties, to demand political party leaders' resignation, or to give them fine. International Community tried to offer alternatives to the nationalist parties and nationalist programs. International community, with reference to this annex, forces Karadzic to relinquish politics. Karadzic abandoned presidency, all of the office related to it, withdraws from all political activities, he accepted not to participate in any election, not to be seen in media or in public in general (Chandler, 2000: 119, 120). The relinquishment of Karadzic did not bring end of concerns of the international community due to the electoral campaign of the SDS. International community, especially OSCE, was worried about the campaign which is about greater autonomy for RS and as a result of these concerns, SDS was penalized. It is not only SDS that came under investigation of the international community. In the election of municipalities, HDZ also came under investigation.

The results of the 1996 election reflected the Bosnian people's tendency to vote for their nationalist party. The three parties, SDA, HDZ and SDS won the most of the seats. SDA has the higher proportion. This can be interpreted as the hatred or the fear of the war was still there even after the peace was sustained. The 2000 election reflected a change in the voter behavior. Although SDA gained, again, the majority of the votes, their votes have reduced. In fact, most of votes of the nationalists' parties have reduced to some extent. The internationally supported party, which is the successor of the League of Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, SDP won 26.1% of the votes whereas SDA won 26.8%, HDZ won 17.5%. The next election is held in 2002, SDA extended its supporters again. The reason for this may be the externally supported SDP, aligned itself with the anti-nationalist alliance, which, in turn, meant the loss of voters (Alkan, 2007: 197). In 2006 election, SDA again came first and won 25,5% of the votes, preceded by

another Bosniak led party won 23,3%, whereas SDP won 15,4%. In 2010, SDP won 26,07% whereas SDA won 19,4%.

Although international community was welcomed and needed during the war, after peace settlement, opposition to the international community grew in Bosnia. In general, leaders of the nationalist parties concerned about their autonomy, their ethnic rights, which was supposed to be guaranteed under Dayton Agreement. Leaders of the political parties wrote open letters to the representatives of international community, blaming international community to disregard their rights.

The steps to establish and maintain a union within Bosnia-Herzegovina have started after the first elections were held. The first step towards establishing a union was taken in the financial areas, it was the transition to a single currency.

The June 1998 introduction of the Bosnian convertible mark (KM) was one of the first institutions and symbols of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be accepted across the entire country...The single currency was expected to replace the multiple currencies in use during and immediately after the war, thus helping to consolidate a single and shared Bosnian identity through common usage, and to assist in Bosnia's economic recovery (Coles, 2007: 69).

However there were problems due to the inconvertibility of the KM and financial loss when it can be converted. The use of single currency did not immediately spread. Merchants were not willing to use the currency. International community was also slow to use the single currency, to pay their national and international workers with KM. The next step was the acceptance of single flag and instrumental national anthem (Alkan, 2007:199)

The fundamental problems of the Bosnia-Herzegovina that had led to the Bosnian war were still being discussed after the peace settlement, which were the centralization and decentralization, unification and ethnic partition. During the peace negotiations, Bosnian Serbs were favor of the ethnic partition whereas Bosnian Muslims were supported unification. Although peace settlement created a decentralized state, international community, starting with the late 1990's put pressure on the centralization of the state. However, centralization did not have equal meaning for the constituent parts of the Bosnia-Herzegovina. The federation was partly in favor of the centralization as they were also the advocate of the unitary state

during the Bosnian war. For the Croats members of the Federation, the centralization was tactical, in a means of using Muslim power as leverage against Serbs, some of the Croats still dreamed about unification with the Croatia. On the other hand, Republica Srpska did not support the centralization; they were in favor of more sovereign republic for themselves. Although Bosnia-Herzegovina is a sovereign state, as it is stated above, international community has tremendous power both in governmental level and in the level of legislature. The resistance or noncooperation of the Bosnian Serbs to the reform process meant nothing but involvement of international community more.

Centralization was not the only issue discussed within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Another important topic was related to the military. After the end of the war, the new constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, did not include defense competencies, there was no state-level regulation. The armies of the constituent parts of the Bosnia were still there. There were three armies, their number and their structure were not touched at first. Both European Union and NATO also insisted on the unification of army in the state level. "NATO and the EU reiterated that unification of the Bosnian army was a prerequisite for membership" (Kuperman, 2006:41). In January 2006 separate armies of RS and federation was abolished and it gave the picture of a unified state with a single army.

After the war and with the new federation, there were several important steps that had taken by Bosnian Muslim intellectuals and politicians in order to enhance their national identity. The first and maybe the most important step taken considering the name of the nationality. Before 1993 Bosnian Muslims were called Muslim with capital M. However, the name of the nationality created dissensus among Muslims as the name of the nationality is also the name of their religion. Therefore in 1993, In 1993, the Bosniak assembly, composed of politicians, clerics and intellectuals changed the name of nationality to Bosniak. The adoption of the term Bosniak indicates that Muslims adopted a secular name. The term Bosniak had also historical roots from the times of the Ottomans and also Austro-Hungarian period. Thus, through adopting Bosniak as their national name, Muslims not only adopted a secular name but also created a connection between past and present, which is, from an ethnosymbolist approach, important in creation of nations. Another important step

had taken in relation to the language. The idea that a nation should have its own language was internalized by the Bosniak intellectuals and thus they created a language of their own. The official languages of the federation were made Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian. Bosniak chose the term Bosnian for their language. However in order to prove that their language is original several attempts has been made to distinguish Bosnian from Croatian as well as Serbian. Bugarski explains these attempts as follows

The only viable option here was to stress the Oriental aspects of its cultural and linguistic heritage, as revealed mainly in the large number of Turkism. This was achieved with only limited success; apart from elite, particularly religious, usage the language still lacks an authentic and coherent overall profile (2012: 231).

Bugarski further argues that construction or deconstruction of states coincided with the same processes taken for the language. The creation of a separate language has a political meaning, “political separatism coupled with ethno-national identity, hard borders and the Serbian, Croatia, Bosnian and Montenegrin languages” (ibid, 232).

There are important turning points in the history of the Bosnian Muslims. The first is the occupation of Austro Hungarian Empire. Due to the occupation of a Christian Empire, Bosnian Muslims had to develop an ethnic community, which is crucial in formation of nation. Ethnic community made demands and in order to achieve its goal, it turned itself into a political community. A politicized ethnic community paved the way for the creation of nation. The second was the recognition of the Bosnian Muslims as a separate nationality. Recognition provided with the necessary rights to the Bosnian Muslims in order to enhance their position within Yugoslavia and their existence and evolution as a nationality. The third was the Bosnian war through, which Bosnian Muslims developed a secular identity, loyalty and visibility. These turning points and their relation to the nation formation and nationalism will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

The Formation and the Evolution of the Bosniak Nation

In the second chapter, the history of the Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims is evaluated within an historical perspective. This chapter will rather focus solely on the Bosnian Muslims. In this chapter the Bosnian Muslims will be evaluated in relation to their emergence as a distinct ethnic community at first, and then as a nation. Starting point will be the developments that occurred after the Austro-Hungarian occupation as it is assumed that the Bosnian Muslims emerged as ethnic community after the occupation

The Austro-Hungarian occupation is taken as the first starting point for the emergence of the Bosniak nation. The reason for this is that within Ottoman Empire religion, rather than ethnicity or nationality, was matter. The subjects of the Ottoman Empire were classified according to their religion after 1453, and their religious as well as cultural affairs were organized according to their religion, which is called *millet* system. The millet system, which will be evaluated later in detail, had sustained the Bosnian Muslims a distinct position from that of the Serbs or Croats who are Christians and Bosnian Muslims identified themselves with the state more than the Serbs and Croats. The occupation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire meant, for the Bosnian Muslims, the fear of losing the privileges of being the same belief system with the ruling elites. The fear that this privilege would have taken from them triggered the Bosnian Muslim to form an ethnic community. Under Ottoman rule, Serbs and Croats as they belonged to the Christian *millet* developed a sense of distinct religious identity which resulted with establishment of distinct ethnicities. The need to form an ethnic group for Bosnian Muslims and made demands from the ruling elites emerged with the occupation of a Christian Empire, namely, Austro-Hungarian Empire. The struggle between the empire and the Bosnian Muslims led to the creation of cultural association which helped flourishing of the society as well as

the spreading the intellects and ideas which were foreign to Muslim society at first. The occupation and later the creation of the first Muslim political party in Bosnia, which eventually led granting religious and educational autonomy to the Bosnian Muslims, will be taken as the first turning point in the creation of Bosniak nation.

The second important turning points in the history of the Bosnian Muslims will be the recognition of the Bosnian Muslims as a separate nationality under the Socialist Federal Republics of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1968. This is taken as a turning point due to the fact that before the recognition of a separate nationality, Bosnian Muslims were not fully recognized as a distinct ethnicity. The tendency was the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as Muslim Serbs or Muslim Croats. The attempts of Bosnian Muslims to be recognized as distinct from Serbs or Croats by themselves and without an official recognition would have resulted with the unavailability of some the rights and resources, though the importance of these efforts should not be underestimated as without these efforts official recognition would have never realized. The official recognition of the Bosnian Muslims as a separate nationality granted them basic nationality rights and resources that would cultivate cultural as well as national identity.

The third important, although undesirable, development was the Bosnian war. The importance and the role of the war in development of nations will be evaluated later but it is known that the wars are crucial instruments in making nations. The war has strengthened the unity among the Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian Muslims also acquired a secular name, Bosniak. During and after the war, the Bosnian Muslim political leaders showed high commitment to the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and political leaders became visible to the international community and played an active role in peace negotiations. All these factors facilitate the recognition of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosniak as a separate nation, with its language, history, public culture and so on

So there will be three main focal points in relation to the formation and evolution of the Bosniak nation. These are the occupation of Bosnia and the creation of first Muslim political party, the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as the sixth nationality of the Yugoslav Federation in 1968 and the Bosnian war that started in

1992. These are the turning points, first, for the developments of the self-consciousness among Bosnian Muslims and then for the formation of the Bosniak nation and their national identity.

4.1. Reflections of the Millet system on the Subjects of the Ottoman Empire

The *millet* system was the fundamental administration system of the different religious groups within the Ottoman Empire. It is a political organization that assigns some of the religious and cultural affairs of the non-Muslims to their own ecclesiastical leaders. Millet system was a socio-cultural community structure that is, first, based on the religious differentiation and then ethnic differentiation that is expressed through language diversification (Karpát, 2011:140). The *millet* system started to be implemented after the conquest of the Istanbul by the Mehmed II in 1453 and the first millet that has established in 1454 was the Orthodox Christian *millet* and this was the beginning of the separation of religion and politics. Orthodox Christian *millet* was not a homogenous community, the members were from different ethnic origins, they lived within their community and use their own vernaculars but where there is a majority of an ethnic community, and their religious practices were done with the language of the majority group. Under *millet* system, religious consciousness was strengthened and turned out something else and at the same time linguistic and cultural differences and the particular identity that they sustained merged into religious identity (Karpát, 2012:22-23). The *millet* system, as Karpát (2012) argues, has no political meaning until 1850's when the educational and judicial authorities were taken from the millets and given to the state and until when the millets became just a religious organizations (*ibid*, 173). The lack of autonomy and the authority of the ecclesiastics on the educational and judicial system turned these institutions into savior of the 'national' interests of newly emerged ethno-national identities.

The administration and socio-economic position of the Christian *millet* and the Muslim population was not the same. Christian *millet*, through the ecclesiastical institutions, was given cultural, educational and religious autonomy until mid

nineteenth century. And the role of the millet system on the national identity development of Christian *millet* is crucial as Karpat points out Churches were the first political institutions of the nation-states in the Balkans (2012:37). Loizides also highlights the importance of religious institutions by claiming that “religious institutions adapted to the needs of the modern nationalist movements and provided financial and human resources for the national awakening” (2009:210). Millet system did not hinder the development of identity within the non-Muslim population. The culture and tradition of a certain ethnic community maintained its importance for that community. Under the Christian *millet*, there were local churches that help to maintain the local customs and traditions. These local churches, for instance the local church of the Serbs and Greeks, were crucial in sustaining a value system to the members of the communities. Orthodox Patriarchy was disintegrated into ethno-national churches because of the enhancing autonomy of the local churches, and these churches used vernacular as a marker of different political groups and mobilized the masses. The Christian *millet*, by being subject to the Ottoman Empire with an Islamic belief, developed their national identity through and with the help of the autonomy and also the loss of autonomy of the religious and educational institutions which was granted by the *millet* system itself.

Muslim population, on the other hand, was in a privileged position as they share the same religion with the ruling elites. Although it was highly beneficial for the Muslim subjects, it had also some drawbacks in relation to the ethnic consciousness and national identity developments. For Bosnian Muslims the situation was rather complex. They were Slav in origin, they spoke Serbo-Croatian like their Christian neighbors except from intelligentsia of the Bosnian Muslim⁵, and they were Muslim at the same time. They were different from the ruling elites in an ethnic sense, but they were part of the Muslim ummah. As it is stated above, religion is the differentiation marker within the Ottoman Empire until the mid-nineteenth century and thus a Muslim is a Muslim, the ethnic identification had secondary meaning. For the Bosnian Muslims, it was, first, religion that gave a sense of identity

⁵ The Muslim intelligentsia used Arabic script for local version of the language later called Serbo-Croatian (see Bugarski, 2004, 2012)

and later played an important role in the national development of the Bosnian Muslims (Babuna, 1999:199).

It is also known that, under Ottoman Empire, the Bosnian Muslims developed a distinct identity from that of religious identity. Neither Ottoman Empire nor the Bosnian Muslims identified Bosnian Muslims with Ottomans; they were recognized as distinct entity with their own name and language. On the one hand, within the legal Ottoman documents the Bosnian Muslims, besides the term Muslim, were referred as ‘Boşnak taifesi’, ‘Bosnalı takımı’, ‘Bosna kavmi’, and on the other hand Husein kapetan, who was the leader of the rebel against the Ottomans defined Bosnian Muslims as “bosnjastvo” and “the people of Bosnia” (Babuna, 2012:16). So it is obvious that, there was another source of identity for the Bosnian Muslim, their territorial loyalty, their homeland. However, this loyalty did not exceed their religious identity.

The Bosnian Muslims were sometimes in conflict with the Sultan after the reform process of the Ottoman Empire. The abolishment of janissaries, the abolishment of timar system, and the Islahat fermani were the main reasons behind the conflicts between the Bosnian Muslim leaders and the Ottoman Empires. Above all of these reasons, the centralization process of the Ottoman Empire and relative loss of autonomy of Bosnia in general and the declining power of the Bosnian Muslims in particular was the main reason behind the rebel against the Ottoman Empire. There were also conflict between Muslim population and Christian population within empire in general. These clashes of interests between the Christian millet and Muslim population on the one hand, and the struggle of power of Bosnian Muslims with the Ottoman Empire on the other hand created a double identity source for the Bosnian Muslims. This duality of identity would always be part of the Bosnian Muslims in general. As Babuna rightly claims that

the conflicts between the Ottoman state and the Bosnian Muslims on the one hand and the Christian nations on the other hand strengthened the ‘Muslim’ identity of the Bosnian Muslims, while the conflict between the Ottoman state and the Bosnian Muslims contributed to their ‘Bosnia’ consciousness (Babuna, 2006:405).

There were struggles for power between the Christian *millet* and the Ottoman ruling elites and also between Muslim population and the ruling elites. However the contents of the struggles were different. Christian millet saw the ruling elites as the protector of the status-quo and the implementer of law, not as their religious leader whereas for the Muslim population, the Sultan, before anything else, was the Caliph, protector of the Islam and the delegate of the prophet on earth. There were other Christian Empires that the Ottomans were always in a conflict with. For instance, Russian Empire was an Orthodox empire and Ottomans had Orthodox subjects within its border. That Orthodox *millet* saw the Russian empire as their protector and Russia influenced and most of the time Russia interfered the relations between the Orthodox millet within Ottoman and the Ottoman Empire especially after the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca which gave Russia the power of protection of the Orthodox subjects within the Empire. This kind of relations between Ottoman ruling elites and its non-Muslim subjects had always created tension between them. This was not the case for the Muslim population.

The Bosnian Muslims had close relations with the Empire. Although they were Slav as the Serbs or Croats, they had never had a desire for sovereignty as they neighbor did. The Bosnian Muslims always wanted to maintain the autonomy over their territory and of their leader. Under the Ottoman rule and especially after centralization efforts of the Empire in the nineteenth century, the tension between Ottomans and the Bosnian Muslim grew gradually due to the loss of power of the Bosnian Muslim leaders within administration of their territory and their affairs. This has led to the rebellions of the Bosnian Muslims. The most important rebel that led to the short term independency of the Bosnian Muslims against the empire, as it is stated in the second chapter, was led by Husein kapetan in 1831, but in 1851, the tension between the Bosnian Muslim notables and the Ottomans were settled down (Babuna, 2012:19). But the declining power of the Ottoman Empire and the Austro occupation and ‘...the consequent recognition that this state was ceasing to protect the interests and identity of the Muslim population in Southeastern Europe... led to the development of ethnic and national identity among the Muslims’ (Bieber, 2000:13).

The ethnic consciousness became an integral part of the Bosnian Muslims under the Austro Hungarian rule. Although Bosnian Muslims constitute an ethnic category under the Ottoman suzerainty through their distinct language as well as their Slavic origin they did not constitute an ethnic community. For nations to emerge, from an ethnosymbolist approach, there need to be first the awareness of being member of an ethnic community and this has achieved during the Austro-Hungarian period.

4.2. From Ethnic Category to an Ethnic Community

Ethnicity is an important element in the construction of nation and nationhood. From an ethnosymbolist approach to nations and nationalism, without previous ethnic ties and ethnic consciousness, nations cannot be thought of. According to Smith (2010)

the nation is inconceivable outside a world of ethnicity, and particular nations are unlikely to emerge except on the basis of prior ethnic ties...nations are specialized developments of looser ethnic groups and that the ethnic community has historically served as the model and basis of many nations (85)

So it was important to begin with the ethnicity although ethnicity and nationality are the terms that were not used in the Ottoman period. For Ottomans there were Muslims and non-Muslims and further classification was not necessary as administration of the subjects was according to the religion. Religion was the only source of collective identity available within the borders of the Ottoman Empire until the nineteenth century. Although there are ethnic categories, they did not form a community of its own; people were not differentiated according to their language, to their customs or to their value system. They were what they believe. It was the religion that unites people, and around the religion people constitute communities. After the occupation, the Bosnian Muslims became subjects of a Christian Empire. In other words, “Bosnian Islam for the first time had to deal with non-Muslim rulers, a condition that persisted from 1878 to the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1992” (Pinson,

1993:84). From then on, the struggle of the Bosnian Muslims in search for identity began.

Orthodox Christian in the Balkans started to call themselves as Serbs after nineteenth century, before that they were Christian. So it can be argued that religion became a part of the ethnic identity in the Southeast Europe, especially among the Serbs, Croats and the Bosnian Muslim. In order to understand the relation between religion and ethnicity, the term ethnicity is needed to be analyzed first. Enloe (1980) argues that ethnicity “requires a sense of belonging and an awareness of boundaries between members and nonmembers, however vague and mutable those boundaries may be from situation to situation or from time to time” (350). The boundary between the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs or Croats was religion and customs or values based on religion. For Eriksen (1991) “ethnicity refers to the social reproduction of basic classificatory differences between categories of people and to aspects of gain and loss in social interaction” (264). So ethnicity includes social interaction based on differences. Ethnicity is perceived through interaction and differences between the parties of interacted. The defining oneself as different from other means self-identification and related to that, Enloe (1986) argues that “ethnicity depends on self-identification, not on objective categorization, although the way an individual defines himself is partly response to other people perception of him” (16)

For the Bosnian Muslims, ethnicity did not matter when they live under Ottoman Empire. They were a part of a bigger community, ummah. The Bosnian Muslims did not need to fight for their existence or they did not have to demand rights from the Empire. They were, even the peasants, in a privileged position in relation to the non-Muslims. After the occupation, with the treaty of Berlin and Novi Pazar Convention, the status of the Bosnian Muslim had changed and “this was the first period of non-Ottoman rule, it was the one in which the need to define themselves in this way and the attendant problems of self-definition emerged” (Pinson, 1993: 89). It was the first time for Bosnian Muslim, differences became a matter of dispute, and the first difference emerged in religion and tradition and customs that aroused from religion. The need to define themselves, and the

perception of being different led to the emergence of an ethnic community among the Bosnian Muslims. According to Brass

There are two stages in the development of a nationality. The first is the movement from ethnic category to community....the second stage in the transformation of ethnic group involves the articulation and acquisition of social, economic and political rights for the members of the group or for the group as a whole (1980:8-9).

The transition from an ethnic category to an ethnic community requires recognition of that group as distinct from other communities, and also the acquisition of some rights (it may be educational, religious or cultural rights) as a group. The Bosnian Muslims, by being subject to a Christian Empire, needed a different way to communicate with that empire as their status has changed from belonging to same ummah to minority. The cultural differences between the Christian subjects and the Bosnian Muslims has being felt and through this perception of difference, the Bosnian Muslims started to construct gradually an ethnic community as Eriksen argues “it is only when they make a difference in interaction that cultural differences are important in the creation of ethnic boundaries” (1993:39)

For Bosnian Muslims religion is the primary source for identity. When the maintenance of relatively privileged position of the Bosnian Muslims in economic sphere and the religious lives of the Bosnian Muslims were perceived to be threatened, the Bosnian Muslims started to come into conflict with the administration. Brass (1980) argues that “ethnic self-consciousness, ethnically-based demands, and ethnic conflict can occur only if there is some conflict either between indigenous and external elites and authorities or between indigenous elites” (15). From this argument, the struggles among the elites and the struggles between the elites and the Austro administration will be analyzed as these struggles helped to shape and define the Bosnian Muslims’ position within the Empire.

Hobsbawn argues that “the acquisition of national consciousness cannot be separated from the acquisition of other forms of social and political consciousness” (130). Thus the acquisition of political consciousness of the Bosnian Muslims will be evaluated through analyzing the struggles between elites. Bosnian Muslims began to

be mobilized and this mobilization was the first step towards forming an ethnic community. Economic and religious demands, although seems different, were closely related in the Austro-Hungarian period as well as in the Ottoman Empire. As Babuna (2004) points out that “in a society with this social structure it was extremely difficult to separate religious rights from economic ones. The rights of the landowners meant Muslim rights and the rights of the kmets meant Christian rights” (292). So the economic and religious demands went hand in hand, while the weight of the subject had changed according to the circumstances and elites’ positions who led the mobilization. After the occupation, the first problems occurred in the economic sphere and the landowners were the first who complained about the conditions of the Bosnian Muslims in general but it was the religion and appealing to religious demands that help to mobilize the Bosnian Muslims en masse. Successes or failures of the Bosnian Muslims in achieving political as well as cultural and economical rights will be evaluated through analyzing the elites’ opposition, developments in religious and educational area as well as the creation of the first Muslim political party and its reflection on the status of the Bosnian Muslims. As Smith (2009) argues that “political action, when combined with existing cultural differences, constitutes a powerful and recurrent source of ethnic community” (28)

4.2.1. The Opposition of the Bosnian Muslim Elites between 1878-1909

Enloe (1980) argues that “many political historians have noted that religious mobilization is the earliest phase of ethnic group political development” (361) and ethnic group political development, as it will be later explained, is crucial in the development of nation and national identity. Although not all religious mobilization led to the emergence of an ethnic community, as Smith (1991) argues “most religious communities coincided with ethnic groups” (6) and a group’s self-realization as an ethnic community can be triggered by the religious differences especially in societies where religion recognized as the most important difference so the religious mobilization is an effective vehicle for the development of group consciousness for of the Bosnian Muslims. It had created necessary environment for the development of the Bosnian Muslim ethnic identity as well as for the political awakening of the

Bosnian Muslim, which is the most crucial step towards the emergence of a national identity.

After the occupation, the constant conflicts between Austro-Hungarian administration and Muslim elites on the one hand, and between indigenous elites (ulema, landowners and urban intellectuals or intelligentsia) on the other hand accelerated the Bosnian Muslims' transition from an ethnic category to an ethnic community and helped the construction of the Bosnian Muslim identity. The result of the opposition was a turning point for the Bosnian Muslims and created the necessary conditions for the foundation of a nation such as the creation of a distinct ethnic consciousness, political mobilization and creation and spread of the public culture. Within the Bosnian Muslim perspective Babuna (2004) defines three kinds of conflicts. He points out that

The elite conflict constituted the main dynamics of the emergence of Bosnian Muslim nationalism. The Muslim elite, composed of the intellectuals, landowners and clerics (*hodzas*), was in conflict with the Catholic Austro-Hungarian administration and with the elites of the other ethnic groups. There was also rivalry and conflict within the Muslim elite itself. The basic forms of the elite conflicts were: (1) conflict between the government (*Landesregierung*) and the landowners; (2) conflict between the government and the Muslim clerics; (3) conflict between the Muslim and Croat clerics; and conflict between the radical and the moderate wings of the Muslim elite (293)

So the role of the elite's conflict in construction of the nation and of the national identity will be evaluated, first by analyzing Muslim landowners, then, Muslim Ulema as "the turn of the century there were two main social classes among the Muslims who were capable of leading the Muslim opposition: the landowners and the Hodzas (clerics)" (Babuna, 1999:207). Muslim intelligentsia started to emerge after the Austro occupation but their effect on the construction of nationhood and national identity would rather become visible in the interwar period. Each group, with their representation of the distinct strata among the society and with the different needs and the interests had helped to shape characteristics the future Bosniak nation and national identity.

4.2.1.1. Opposition of the Muslim Landowners

Landowners were crucial actors for Bosnia throughout its history and this has not changed until the land reform of the KSCS. From the beginning of the sovereign medieval Bosnian state, the landowners had special status within the administration and they were part of the local nobility. This position had not changed under the Ottoman Empire. They were strong part of the local nobility. The Bosnian local nobility were the first that accepted Islam and this has contributed them to sustain and even advanced their position within the administration. Under the Ottoman rule, the Bosnian nobility had certain autonomy over their region and local nobility was consisted of the landowners. During the Ottoman era, Bosniak begs were part of both urban and central authority. They were the representatives of the urban as well as they were part of the central authority. They were semi-autonomus and semi-central in that sense (Bora, 1999:26). Bosnia was very important for the Ottomans as it placed in the borderlines, so that, the conditions and the satisfaction of the population as well as the maintenance of order was crucial for Ottoman administration. As Babuna points out that

The landowners of Bosnia-Hercegovina were largely Muslims and, because of the fact that Bosnia-Hercegovina was a military border zone, the position of the landowners was strengthened by some privileges...The special status of the Muslim landowners contributed to the development of the Bosnian Muslim self-consciousness (1999:199).

However during the centralization efforts of the Ottoman administration, the positions of the Bosnian nobility especially landlords was tried to be weakened and this has led to the increasing discontent among the Bosnian Muslim population.

The Bosnian Muslims were crucial for the Austro-Hungarian administration, especially for the joint Finance Minister, Benjamin Kallay. As it is explained in the second chapter, Kallay tried to establish a Bosnian identity and he knew that the Muslims were very important actors in establishing such kind an identity as he thought that only Muslims maintained the conventional Bosnianhood. This is why at first Austro-Hungarian administration did not make too many changes that affect the positions of the Bosnian Muslims. The first years after the occupation, landowners

were curious about their position within the administration. As it is said above, Bosnian Muslims were part of the Ottoman administration. This situation had changed rapidly after the occupation. Local notables, especially landlords, started to lose their position in the administration due to the efforts of increasing administrative units and bureaucrats of the Austro administration and these new bureaucrats were not chosen always among the Muslims.

Austro-Hungarian administration had maintained the land reform of the Ottoman Empire that had been implemented since 1859. This land reform has protected the peasants but at the same time it gave privileges to the Bosnian begs (Muslim begs) by providing them higher status within the society and also Bosnian begs could demand even half of the gaining from the kmets in times of extraordinary situation (Adanır, 2002:312). However, at the same time, the administration tried to increase the production and thus immigrants were brought to the Bosnia. Those newcomers were threat to the landowners as they were given the lands of the landlords with the efforts of the administration that would help to provide with sufficient agricultural credit for the tenants of the lands (ibid, 312).

1880's were relatively salient for the landowners. Although they knew that they had lost their privileges day by day, they were not organized en masse. However some development had changed the situation. For instance in 1895, the private lands had transformed to the state-owned land, the selling of the lands were prohibited without permission from the administration. There was also a problem regarding forests. The Austro administration did not recognize the property rights over forests. So landlords wrote a petition regarding these issues including administration of vakifs. In the petition there was also complaints about the lack of authority over the production methods, landowners aimed to strengthen their position within the system, they demand that particular changes should be done with their approval and the relations between the kmets and the landlords after the death either of them should be reorganized with a contract, the terms of the expulsion of the kmets from the land should be alleviated (Babuna, 2012: 54-56). However the petition was disregarded.

The effort of the landowners that aims to strengthen their position within the society and in the eyes of administration did not spread among the Muslim population. These were the concerns of the landowners, with an exception of vakif administration. Not all Muslims were landowners; there were peasants that did not share the same concerns with the landowners. Nevertheless it had triggered the pull. The upper strata of the Bosnian Muslims were discontent and this was very important for the encouragement of the masses. This was also important from the eyes of the Austro administration as they were losing the Muslims. However, religious concerns were shared by all population, including landowners, who were tried to gain support from the masses.

4.2.1.2. Opposition of the Bosnian Religious Leaders

Religious discontent among the Muslim population and particularly among the Ulema had started immediately. After the occupation Muslims had declared that they demand their own religious representation. In 1882 the Mufti of the Sarajevo became the Reis-ul-Ulema. Besides that, there were Meclis-i Ulema and the members of the meclis and also the reis-ul-Ulema were chosen by the emperor. Being subject to a Christian ruler was unacceptable for some religious leaders, for the others, religious affairs should only be maintained by the Muslims.

The first dissidents regarding religious issues start with the Austro-Hungarian decision to control the vakif administration. Vakifs were important for the Muslim population. Cultural, social and educational issues were mostly maintained by the vakifs in Islamic states.

In the Islamic countries many of the cultural and social functions of a modern state had throughout history been carried out by the multipurpose religious foundations. Foundations played an important role in the cultural, social and religious lives of the Bosnian Muslims, as in the other Muslim communities within Ottoman Empire (Babuna, 1996:143)

The Austro administration took the control of the vakifs in 1882. In 1883, a commission was found to control the vakifs, within this commission there were well-known Muslim leaders and governments' public officers. The president of the

commission was appointed by the emperor. The education funds also transferred to the vakifs funds and through this, a connection emerged between the education and religion (Babuna, 2012:62). Although Austro administration had developed a successful system for the vakif administration, Bosnian Muslims, who thought that issues regarding vakifs were Islamic in content and should be governed by Muslims and according to the Islam, were discontent about the system developed by the administration. In the eyes of the Muslims, both educational and religious rights had taken from the hands of the Muslim. Muslims thought that they were gradually made powerless in the control of their lives.

There were also efforts to convert Muslim to Christianity and this has led to the increasing tension among Muslim population. An incident occurred and triggered the Muslim opposition, brought it and carried it another level. In 1899 a sixteen-year old Muslim girl, Fata Omanovic, disappeared from Mostar. To quote from Donia and Fine (1994) "...fled to Dalmatia under Church protection, and converted to Catholicism in order to marry a Catholic suitor...Mostar Muslims demanded that government intervene and return the girl to her familial home (106). This incident united the Bosnian Muslims and their leaders and was a vehicle for the mobilization of the Bosnian Muslim. A committee was established, the Committee of Twelve, and they prepared petitions to send Benjamin Kallay. Ali Dzabic, who was the mufti for Mostar, was one of the leading figures in the committee and he thought that Austrian rule is incompatible with Islam (Pinson, 1999:104).

Under the leadership of Dzabic, the Hodzas and the religious personnel gained the upper hand in the Muslim opposition against the government. In this period, the Muslim leaders, mainly Hodzas, would often use Islamic symbols in their political maneuvers (Babuna, 1999:208).

So the second wave of the opposition was rather related to religion and religious institutions. In 1899 Twelve Committee wrote direct petitions to the Government and Joint Finance Minister and to the Emperor. Fata Omanovic was an example for the bad conditions of the Bosnian Muslims. In these petitions, there were also complaints about the weak religious education. The governments were held responsible for the conditions that Muslims live in. Twelve Committee prepared a draft for the religious

and educational system for Mostar but both the draft and the petitions were disregarded (Babuna, 2012:67). The opposition began to spread all around the country (Mostar, Travnik, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Sarajevo). Mostar was the capital of the opposition, Dzabic was from Mostar, literacy rates were high and “the Muslims from Mostar in Herzegovina, which included a higher proportion of merchants than the Sarajevo contingent, were the first to organize for sustained political action. Mostar was thus considered ‘the birthplace of Muslim movement of cultural and religious autonomy’” (Friedman, 1996:65). The government did not take the opposition seriously at first. They tried to separate the opposition movement from the Muslim population in general and to do this, the government demanded loyalty declarations from the Muslim population. There were some signatures but in 1900, the color of the opposition and the perception of the administration had changed.

In 1900 the leader of the Twelve Committee, Ali Dzabic, organized an activity to become the sole representative of the Muslims. It means that the opposition will continue and this time, opposition will not be the political activity of the local nobility and religious leaders only, different social classes will be included (Babuna, 2012:73). There was also another important name in the Committee of Twelve, Mujaga Komadina. He was more progressive in comparison with Dzabic, he opened up Kiraethane, which lectures people, assists needy students and makes loans to deserving artists (Pinson, 1993:105). He was progressive but as the Muslim population in general was not that progressive, he softened his ideas to attract more people. In 1900 Muslim leaders presented a memorandum to the Joint Finance Minister Benjamin Kallay. It was more comprehensive than the previous petitions. Muslims, in the memorandum, argued that Islam is in danger, for them Islam is a state religion and thus religion and state cannot be separated. The medreses and mektebs were not sufficient both qualitatively and quantitatively, they didn't fulfill the needs and the demands of the Muslims in the rural areas. Muslim leaders were also complaining about the funds of the vakifs. They argued that the vakif funds were not used for religious purposes and the employees of the vakifs were overpaid and they were unqualified. Muslim leaders also offered a regulation draft for the control of the religious institutions and this control, in the draft, should be done by the Muslims. It is also important to note that in the memorandum, the Muslim leaders define

themselves as Muslim nation (Islamski narod). Babuna claims that from this and the previous memorandum or petitions that were given to the government and administration, it is obvious that the most influential component of the Muslim movement is religion. (Babuna, 2012:77-82)

Negotiations were held with the representative of government, Kutschera and the Muslims. Babuna argues that from the official reports of the negotiations it is understood that Muslim delegates wanted more than the religious autonomy. He also argues that the negotiations were not just a competition between modernism and conservatism; it was a power struggle (Babuna, 2012:89). During the negotiations Muslim leaders had close contact with the Ottoman Empires. Muslim leaders traveled to Istanbul and Budapest and government take cautions for this. The most important step that government took was the migration decree on October 30, 1901. With this decree, Dzabic, who went to Istanbul On January, 1902 declared illegal immigrant and this has slowed the opposition movement and left the movement without their leader. Religious opposition, with the prohibition of the return of the Dzabic to Bosnia, stopped for a while but when Kallay died and Burian became the joint Finance Minister, the policies of Austro-Hungarian administration had changed and another era for the opposition is opened.

4.2.1.3. Muslim Intellectuals

Under the Ottoman administration, the education level within Bosnia was very low. Those who had opportunity to study were generally among the higher class and they worked at public offices. This was also the case for the Austro-Hungarian rule. During the Austro-Hungarian administration, the level of education was tried to be strengthened and the curriculum of the education was changed from the religious education to a more secular one. Higher education was not spread. For the Muslim population, those who studied abroad generally took the student scholarship and paid this through working in public offices by being bureaucrats. This meant to be in dept with the Austro administration. This situation resulted with the lack of intellectual contribution and lack of existence of intellectuals in the opposition movement of

Muslim population. For instance leading figures of the religious and educational movement of the Bosnian Muslims were landowners and religious leaders, Muslim intellectuals had no or little contribution to the autonomy movement. Nevertheless, there were some intellectuals that should be mentioned for the sake of the political and cultural perception of the Bosnian Muslim intellectuals. These intellectuals can be categorized into three. The first group consists of those who support the idea of *Bošnjastvo*, which means the unity of the people of Bosnia. Second group can be defined politically as pro-Serbian and the third group is culturally pro-Croatian. As it is said above, in the religious and educational autonomy movement, these intellectuals were quiet silent; they did not have powerful impact on the preparation of memorandums or petitions. Rather, these intellectuals were the writers of the magazines and newspapers; they were not activists in that sense.

The idea of *Bošnjastvo* first developed during the Joint Finance Minister Benjamin Kallay. The aim of the policy is to create a Bosnian nation and enhance the Bosnian identity, which includes a language of its own, Bosnian language and a supra identity that contains three religion and equal rights for the members of the each religion. Lopasic argues that “the greatest endeavours of which can be summarized as the preservation of the social status quo between the three groups, and the attempt to create 'the Bosnian nation' to keep that balance” (1981:119). This policy, *Bošnjastvo*, was mostly supported by the Muslim intellectuals due to the fact that Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, before the Austro-Hungarian occupation, started to develop a national identity whereas Bosnian Muslims had no such consciousness. Thus advocating such policy for Bosnian Muslim intellectuals is to avoid Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats claim about the Bosnian Muslims that they were Islamicized Serbs or Islamicized Croats. The concept of *Bošnjastvo*, as it was supported by the Austro administration, offered an alternative for Bosnian Muslims, an alternative for them not to accept any other nationality through being Bosniak, or Bosnjak.

During the Kallay regime, many developments occurred in the intellectual arena in favor of the development of *Bošnjastvo* both among the Muslim population and within the Bosnia in general. For instance the language of the Bosnia was recognized as Bosnian language but this idea was generally rejected by the Serb or

Croat population, instead the Bosnian Muslims were the ones that accepted the Bosnian language. For the Muslim population one of the important steps toward the acceptance of the concept of Bošnjastvo or the Bosnian nation was the use of the Cyrillic alphabet or Latin alphabet. With the emergence of the newspaper such as *Bosnjak*, the use of Cyrillic or Latin has spread instead of Arabic. As Ranko points out that “Muslims, being of Islamic faith, in the former centuries used a local version of Arabic writing but in modern times adopted Latin and to a lesser extent Cyrillic” (2004:24). This helped Bosnian Muslims to adopt and internalize the Bosnian language, which was officially recognized as the language of the Bosnian people by the Austro administration.

The most well-known supporter of the concept of Bošnjastvo was Mehmed Beg Kapetanovic Ljubusak. He was the most influential Muslim intellectual who sided with the Austro administration and who, at the same time, was the consultant of the administration (Babuna, 2012:156). He was the most crucial representative of the Bosnian nation idea. He was in favor of the development and not looking back the old Ottoman day. He defined the Austro administration as “‘cultured and powerful regime’ and thinks that the empire is leading Bosnia to ‘well-being’” (Karic, 2002:401-402). Ljubusak was in favor of progress, in favor of the secular education and advocated that Islam encourages reform. He argues that “no people remains at the level it was formerly at, but advances in accordance with its potential and with time. There is no need to remain eternally true to the old days which were once of value; instead one should move in step with the times” (ibid, 405). Another important development around the Bošnjastvo idea was the two volumes Muslim folk songs that published in 1888 and 1889 by Kosta Hörmann. It did not only contribute to the Muslim cultural awakening but also balanced the Serb and Croat national movements. It encouraged the Bosnian local elements through Muslim population. The works Hörmann’s represented the idea of Bošnjastvo by claiming that Muslims were conversed but they protected the Bosnian traditions and national consciousness (Babuna, 2012:159)

The Bošnjak magazine, which was first published in 1891, was the most important publication of the Bosnian nation policy. It was the media organ for the Bosnian Muslims. This magazine reject the Serb and Croats claims on the nationality of the Bosnian Muslims, the writers of the magazines also argued that until 1860's any Slav population had such national consciousness and it was the foreign powers that led to the emergence of such consciousness. In 1900 an article published on the historical foundations of Bošnjaštvo and according to this article the elements that constitute Bosnian nation was Bosnian language and Slavic root (ibid, 159-160). Bošnjaštvo idea was an alternative for the Bosnian Muslim population until the opposition movements began to rise. After the opposition movement, this idea has lost its influence on Muslim population.

Pro-Serbian Muslim intellectuals, on the other hand, gained visibility after the Austro-Hungarian occupation. During the autonomy movement of Bosnian Muslims and Serbs, the two entities came in contact with each other and interaction accelerated between the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs as they "realized that they shared some common goals, such as wanting religious and educational autonomy" (Friedman, 1996:70) In 1903, the establishment of Gajret, cultural association, helped to flourish the pro-Serbian attitude among the Muslim population as it was a pro-Serbian cultural association. "Gajret became the main actor in providing education to Muslim children, thus facilitating the emergence of a small Muslim educated social stratum, the so-called inteligencija" (Giomi, 2009:495). Through Gajret, the pro-Serbian cultural and educational activities started to spread.

Osman A. Đikić was one of the well-known pro-Serbian Muslim intellectuals. He defined himself as Serbian. He published the magazine of the cultural association, Gajret between 1906-1911. Avdo Karabegović was another famous pro-Serbian intellectual. Đikić was a Bosnian patriot whereas Karabegović, rather, identified himself with Serbian ideology. During 1890's Serbian national movement found its expression in cultural, educational and literature areas as political activities were limited. Pro-Serbian Muslim intellectuals admired Serbian national movement politically. This was the difference between pro-Serbian and pro-Croatian Muslim intellectuals, as they envy for Croatia was rather cultural (Babuna, 2012:164-166).

The most important literature magazine of the Bosnian Muslims was Behar that means Blossom and published between 1900-1911 (Bougarel, 2008:318). Behar was a pro-Croatian magazine. During the first years, Safvet-beg Basagic was the editor of the magazine then Causevic became the editor and these two names would later become most prominent intellectuals of the interwar period of the Bosnia. The supporters of the pro-Croatian ideas among the Bosnian Muslims were quite distant from the autonomy movement of Bosnian Muslims. They supported the Austro administration and whereas pro-Serbian Muslims were supported the religious and cultural autonomy movement of the Bosnian Muslims, pro-Croatian Muslims were basically active in cultural sphere and passive in the autonomy movement.

As it is stated above, there were three main actors in the opposition movement, However, their opposition did not have a unified cause. Thus individual actors did not make much progress in achieving their demands. Opposition movement accelerated and became more functional with the creation of first Muslim political party.

4.2.2. The Emergence of First Muslim Political Party: Muslim National Organization

All parties in the opposition against the Austro administration advocated their interests at first. However, it was clear that advocating one sided interests would not result with the success of the Bosnian Muslims in general. So they had to find a common ground, the well-being of the Muslims in general. From this point it can be said that The Bosnian Muslims united around a common cause and organized and mobilized en masses. The mobilization of the Bosnian Muslims was not an easy activity. Illiteracy was widespread especially among the Muslims. Opposition movements were held in different cities and inhabitants of each city might have different concerns regarding the Austrian administration. So leaders of the opposition movement, in order to mobilize the masses around the country use two methods. Babuna argues that first one is to hold the conferences in order to unify the Muslim elites in a common political program. The second one is to use personal networks in order to attract more people systematically.

During Kallay regime, Muslims were not the only ones that declare their complaints about the regime. Bosnian Serbs were also discontent. Bosnian Serbs right after the occupation increased their claim on the nationality of the Bosnian Muslims. They argued that Bosnian Muslims were just Muslim Serbs. There were also administrative attempts that aimed to eliminate the Serb nationalism. For instance during the last phase of the Kallay regime, government prohibited Serbian names that contain national meanings. Government also prohibited the music communities or reading sessions, and tried to keep the number of national schools low. Kallay tried to change the language's name to Bosnian language during the 1890's and a grammar book is written to be studied on schools but this attempt created discontent among Serbs and Croats. Bosnian language, on the other hand, gained acceptance among the Muslims. So it is obvious that Kallay tried to erase the differences among the population and created a Bosnian nation, but this has contributed to the flourish of the distinct Bosnian Muslim identity whereas it failed to soften Serbian nationalism.

The death of Kallay opened up a new era for the Bosnian Muslims. It can be argued that "important factor underlying the emergence of the first Muslim party was the liberalization of the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the new Joint Finance Minister Burian" (Babuna, 1996:146). The period of Burian can be defined as relaxation period for all constituent parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For instance, instead of the music communities or reading sessions or kiraethanes that prohibited during Kallay regime, the constituent parts of the Bosnian population started to evolve to a different, but modern, direction. For instance, in 1900 the first culture magazine of the Bosnian Muslim, Behar, is published. Before Behar, there was Bosnjak magazine, which supported the idea of Bosnjastvo, Bosnianness. It was first published in 1891; its purpose was the education of the Bosnian Muslims and close the distance between Europe and the Muslims. For instance the newspaper Bosnjak "used both terms Muslim and Bosnjak. Though these terms and descriptions had predominantly religious origins they constituted the starting points for later political and national development of the Bosnian Muslim" (Babuna, 1999:211). However Behar had different path from Bosnjak, Behar was the symbol of the national

resurrection of the Bosnian Muslims. Another example of the cultural development of the Bosnian Muslims can be found in a cultural society, Gajret.

A first generation of Muslim intellectuals educated in Austro-Hungarian secondary schools and universities played a key part in the emergence of Muslim press and literature, and the creation of the cultural society *Gajret* – the use of Turkish was abandoned in favor of the Bosnian/Serbo-Croat language (Bougarel, 1997:317,318).

The establishment of Gajret paved the way for the opening new clubs and association. Babuna argues that in 1908 there were 124 registered associations of the Muslims in Bosnia (2012: 150). The cultural associations were important for the development of a group consciousness as it will be explained later. As Burg points out “there can be no doubt that the development of such parallel organizations hastened the transformation of the meaning of self-identification as a "Muslim" from the narrowly religious to the national” (1983:12).

While there was cultural development in Bosnia, the opposition movement decelerated. However, in 1905 conditions had changed again and opposition began again. A new tax increase and agricultural reform led to the arising opposition. In other words, “Tax increase to meet the needs of religious education and agricultural reform which stop protecting landowners, were the main reasons behind the revival of the opposition among Bosnian Muslims” (Babuna, 1996:146). This time, landowners lead the opposition movement. The new agricultural reform that put the future of the landowners to the danger had created discontent among the landowners. Even the loyal landowners were sided with the opposition this time. At the same time, Serbian autonomy movement had successfully resulted in 1905 and religious authority was given to the Bosnian Serbs and this encouraged the Bosnian Muslims. On April 22, 1905 a new petition were given to Burian, and Muslims demanded that the oppressive attitudes and cautions against Bosnian Muslims should be removed. On 1906 a meeting was held between Bosnian Muslims from different cities at Slavonski Brod and the first Bosnian party and the first Bosnian Muslim party was established, Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija (Muslim National Organization). Although the conditions to establish a political party were sustained in 1900, the

political parties of Bosnia could be established during the Burian's liberal period as it was believed that

the continued absence of Serb and Muslim religious and political autonomy could only worsen the confrontational political mood. The Habsburg regime hoped to encourage the development of moderate political parties that could be manipulated to sympathize with the monarchy's interest (Friedman, 1999:70).

As it is stated above, Muslim landowners were in the leading position. However the party, besides having economical concerns, also advocated the religious autonomy and through this way they tried to create a link between Muslim concerns and their interests. On December 1906, negotiations between MNO and Austro administration began and it last until the annexation of the Bosnia on 1908. These negotiations were rather different from the negotiations of 1901. This time, Muslims demanded political as well as civil rights. Freedom of press, rights of assembly, and activities of the legal persons were some of them (Babuna, 2012:182-183). Although the political and civil rights were secondary for the Muslim landowners, to demand such rights is crucial for the establishment of ethnicity. After the annexation, MNO and the Austro administration concluded the negotiation and Muslims were given religious and educational authority. It was the result of the first collective expression of neo-millet strategy of the Bosnian Muslims (Bougarel, 1997:335). In a way religious and educational autonomy was also the beginning of the stagnation period for the Bosnian Muslim identity. As Babuna points out "recognition of the Muslim religious autonomy in 1909 turned the Muslims into an element loyal to government (Babuna, 1999:209). Religious and educational autonomy had many important consequences for the development ethnic consciousness of Bosnian Muslims.

4.2.3. Manifestation of the Opposition Movements on the Emergence of Ethnic Community and on Nationalism Literature

The importance to form an ethnic community or an ethnic group lies in the differences between the category and community or group itself. Brubaker (2002) argues that a category is not a group by stating that "if by 'group' we mean a mutually interacting, mutually recognizing, mutually oriented, effectively

communicating, bounded by collectivity with a sense of solidarity, corporate identity and capacity for concerted action” (169). Without including the concept of ethnicity, it is clear that a category does not form a group, again Brubaker strongly asserts that “it is at best a potential basis for group-formation or groupness” (ibid, 169). For a group to be formed there is need for interaction, a consciousness of constituting a group, a need for collectivity. For ethnic group to be emerged it is also necessary to take joint action. Brubaker continues with Bourdieu’s argument by stating that “if we treat groupness as a variable and distinguish between groups and categories, we can attend to the dynamics of group-making as a social, cultural and political project, aimed at transforming categories into groups or increasing level of groupness” (ibid, 170-171). So transformation of an ethnic category to an ethnic community, for Bourdieu and Brubaker, necessitates a consciousness. It is not the concern of this study what leads such a transformation; rather the transformation itself is important if ethnic communities are treated as the basis of the nations. Brass, for instance, defines nations as politicized ethnic communities with political rights (1980:4)

Smith defines ethnic category as “a distinctive category on the basis of one or more cultural makers, usually language, customs or religion, and its members have no known myth of ancestry and little or no sense of solidarity” (2009:27) whereas he argues that ethnic community or ethnies as

A named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the upper strata” (ibid,27).

As opposed to ethnic category, ethnic communities have, for Smith, a perception of their own, a commonality among the members. So Brubaker and Smith have the same idea that to constitute an ethnic community, there should be a sense of solidarity, a mutual recognition of being member of the same community, it may be through a myth of common ancestry as Smith argues, a name of their own, a perception of the self and others, or territorial commitment. When the Bosnian Muslims were considered, they constituted ethnic category in the Ottoman period. Their language was different from the administrative units as well as from the many

other subjects, and their religion differed from their neighbors, and the common ancestry thesis was nearly absent or not important until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Although they differed both from the ruling elite and from their neighbors through one or more cultural markers, the upper strata of the Bosnian Muslims were nevertheless close to the Ottoman administration due to the fact that they took part within the bureaucracy and learned and used of the language of the ruling elites, which were Arabic and Turkish. Besides from these, territorial identification of the Bosnians was existed long before the Ottoman occupation and that would contribute to the formation of ethnic community and later the nation. However neither territorial identification nor the closeness to the Ottomans had unified all Bosnian Muslims.

The process of formation of an ethnic community cannot be explained with a sudden decision of an elite group to transform the category to a community. Rather it is a process in which the so called ethnic category began to realize its distinctiveness due to the varied implementation of, i.e. rights and duties or opportunities that they have. There should not be definite distinction on the opportunities that different ethnic groups or categories enjoy, even the perception of the distinction is enough to trigger an ethnic category to define itself and displayed itself in a mobilized, and in institutionalized way. The Bosnian Muslims encountered with such threat with the Austro-Hungarian occupation. During the last era of the Ottoman suzerainty, some members of the local nobility tried to create consciousness among Bosnian Muslims based on territory and on the Bogomil ancestry. These efforts, although important, did not find reflection among the whole population. It was elite led phenomena in order to protect their power over their territory and the rest of the population was unresponsive to the struggles between Ottoman administration and Bosnian Muslim nobility. However, the elites that took part in the opposition movements towards Ottoman Empire had helped to create a Bosnian entity different from Ottomans, with an insistence on the territory and conventional Bosnian culture and this creation had found more support during the Austro-Hungarian rule.

The politicization of the Bosnian Muslim was the first step towards foundation of an ethnic community and the politicization began when the opposition

movement spread to the Bosnian Muslim population, from nobility to the peasantry. Politicization is important as it laid the basis for the solidarity between the Bosnian Muslim. So it can be said that, with the efforts of, first, Muslim landowners and then religious leader, this process began. Although it is hard to speak of a national consciousness, as Friedman argues, “their communal feeling based on religious identification allowed them to resist nationalist pressures for self-identification as Serbs or Croats” (1996:68). So during the Austrian period, one can find the seeds of the national consciousness either in refusal of Serbs and Croats’ claim on nationality of the Bosnian Muslims or in their insistence upon the religious and educational autonomy of Muslims and the seeds of the national consciousness, in this study, will be sought first in the emergence of ethnic consciousness.

The opposition movements of the Bosnian Muslims paved the way for the creation of the first Muslim political party. Establishment of a political party is very important not only for the Bosnian Muslims, but also for the political life of Bosnia in general (Babuna, 1996:148). The Muslim National Organization (MNO) was mainly established by the landowners. However, it also included religious leaders and intellectuals and through this way, it became the representatives of the Bosnian Muslims in general. “Whereas these politicians continued to pursue their own class interests, they were also careful to press for cultural, religious, and educational autonomy” (Friedman, 1996:71). The MNO by being representative of the Bosnian Muslims in general introduced them as a community with their own interests, needs and demands. This is crucial for the enhancement of the communication of the members of the society. It makes them community. As Smith argues ‘It is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity’ (1991:26).

When differences become visible between the ethnic categories or groups, these differences created a consciousness through which each of them makes their individual demands. Brass (1980) argues that, “the process of nationality-formation is one in which objective differences between ethnic groups acquire increasingly subjective and symbolic differences, and translated into a consciousness of and a desire for group solidarity, and become the basis for successful political demands”

(8-9). For the Bosnian Muslims, the objective difference was their faith. During the Ottoman period, their faith did not have any other meaning. They were Muslims whereas in Austro-Hungarian period their faith became their cultural marker and may be the most important of the markers. Although religion does not necessary for the construction of or maintenance for ethnic groups as Enloe argues “it does provide valuable resources—organizationally, symbolically and ideologically—for groups in need of collective mobilization” (1980:366). Religious and cultural differences of Bosnian Muslims from the ruling elites became a matter of dispute. As Brass states that it gained a symbolic meaning. Through this, the Bosnian Muslim leaders, from different social status, started to make demands to protect the Muslims in general and this is where they became an ethnic community.

The common ground for the Muslims that led to the mobilization was Islam. As it is stated above, the Muslim notables were also discontent from the regime but they did not have the necessary instrument to mobilize the masses whereas religion was important for whole population. When religious and cultural subjects acquired subjective meaning, Brass argues, “religion becomes not only a matter of personal belief and a deity, but a collective experience that unites believers to each other” (ibid, 8). Religion, for the Bosnian Muslims, became the symbol of their existence under a Christian Empire. Hobsbawm is right to claim that “religion is an ancient and well-tried method of establishing communion through common practice and a sort of brotherhood between people who otherwise have nothing much in common” (Hobsbawm, 1990:68). The aim of the MNO, in relation to their support for the religion and cultural autonomy movement, was to attract more followers. They realized the symbolic meaning of the religion and thus they also became the advocates of the religious issues. Pinson argues that

Muslim-Habsburg conflict functioned as a kind of incubator for Bosnian Muslim national identity both in the discussions among the Muslims and their struggles over the role and scope of the old Muslim institutions or new ones that appeared in this period such as political parties (1993: 96).

The MNO, through advocating religious and educational autonomy movement, became the political actors of Bosnian Muslims. At this point, communal feeling of Bosnian Muslims started to flourish and enhance. They united for a common cause,

they demand political as well as social and cultural rights from the Austro administration and these demands were just for Muslim population in Bosnia. They represent the whole Muslim population in Bosnia through advocating different subjects from land reform to education. This led to an emergence of a group consciousness. This is how an ethnic category can turn into an ethnicity and in turn, ethnicity becomes their identity as Hutchinson argues “in many periods in history ethnicity provides an important framework of collective identity and of collective political action (2004:12).

In the wake of the Austro-Hungarian annexation of the Bosnia, Bosnian Muslims gained religious and educational autonomy. This success led to a stagnation period for the national development of the Bosnian Muslims due to the fact that as opposed to the Serbs and Croats within the Empire, the Bosnian Muslims were seemed satisfied with the religious and educational autonomy. As Friedman points out “the Bosnian Muslim politicians attempted to participate in stable political coalitions that would protect a multinational environment to counter centrifugal nationalist forces” (1996:72). Though the stagnation did not last long. The autonomy movement paved the way for further national development of Bosnian Muslims. Conclusion can be made with the analysis of Ramet

Bosnian Muslims gradually became national in the wake of the Austrian occupation of 1878, that the development of their national consciousness was sparked by relative deprivation and the perception of cultural threat, and this process is even now not complete, giving rise to alternative convictions among the Muslim themselves (1985:184).

So with the Austro occupation, Bosnian Muslims and their struggle for their survival turned into their struggle for ethnic as well as national identity. Struggles had begun due to the relative deprivation and perception of cultural threat in a sense.

4.3. Development of Ethnic Consciousness

The concerns for Bosnian Muslims after the Austro occupation were about the landlords’ position and religious and educational affairs. Struggles between

Muslims and administration or struggles among Muslims were to improve the conditions of Muslims. After the success of the religious and educational autonomy movement, the role of Bosnian Muslims in Habsburg Empire diminished in a sense. The annexation, as it is evaluated in the second chapter (2.4.) was welcomed by Ottomans as opposed to Serbia. The balance of the Balkans had changed with the annexation though Muslims were content with the relative autonomy they gained. They, in Brass's words, engaged in group politics and made their demands, in return, they

be given not just individual educational opportunities on the same basis of others, but that they be given control over the public system of education in their areas of concentration so that they can teach history, language, and culture of their group to their own children" (1980:4).

The aim of the struggles between the Austro administration and Bosnian Muslims were different from that of Serbs. Bosnian Serbs had motivation outside from Bosnia whereas for Bosnian Muslims the only alternative was Ottoman Empire, and religious and educational autonomy bound Bosnian Muslims and Ottoman Caliphate, at least in religious issues. So while Bosnian Serbs did not settle with the autonomy, Bosnian Muslims became the loyal ally of the Habsburg Empire under the conditions that religious and educational autonomy sustained.

The accelerating Serbian nationalism had found echoes within Habsburg land. During the Balkan wars between Serbia and Ottomans, many Bosnian Serbs joined the war and sided with the Kingdom of Serbia. Territorial expansion of Serbia as a result of their victory over Ottomans accelerated the enmity between Austro-Hungarian administration and Serbia and anti-Serbian policies started to be adopted where Serbs were in majority within Habsburg territory and Bosnia was among them. The journey of Archiduke Franz Ferdinand and his assassination led to the increase tension all around Europe and it was also the beginning of the disintegration of Habsburg Empire.

During the WWI, Bosnian Muslims were loyal to the Austro administration. They joined the war with the Empire. However, some argues that they joined the war due to the alliance of Ottoman and Habsburg Empire. For instance, Friedman argues that

Many Muslims supported the Austro-Hungarian monarchy simply because it had become an ally of Turkey. They believed the sultan and Franz Joseph had agreed that a victory of the Central Powers would mean that Bosnia and Herzegovina would again become part of the Ottoman Empire. To many Yugoslav Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, therefore, World War I was a sacred war, and the Serbs were their enemy (1996:78).

During the Balkan wars and after the WWI, Kingdom of Serbia gained prestige among South Slavs especially for the Serbs living within Austro territories. So during the WWI, Serbia claimed that it fought for all the South Slavs and that was the resurrection of the idea of unification of South Slavs. During the war, activities began to spread the idea of unification of South Slavs and a Committee was established (Chapter, 2.5.1.). Bosnian Muslims were concerned about the unification. They were ally of the Austro-Hungarian administration and they wanted an autonomous Bosnia. Basagic, a Muslim politician, who was in favor of the unification of Bosnian Muslims with Croats, explains the hesitation of Bosnian Muslims by saying that

The representatives of the two other elements responded, but only Muslims remained silent. It was not a simple negative answer, rather a sort of uncertainty that kept their lips sealed. It seems that they preferred Bosnia and Herzegovina autonomous, because they believed it to be the safest model of rule for the future of Muslims (Pelesic, 2009:7).

Though, on July 1917 Corfu declaration is signed and they agreed to establish democratic and parliamentary monarchy and in 1918 declaration had published, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (KSCS) has established. A new Muslim party established in 1919, Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO, Jugoslavenska Muslimanska Organizacija). This was a new era for Bosnian Muslims.

4.3.1. Contribution of the Party Politics to the Protection of the Ethnic Consciousness of Bosnian Muslims

JMO had established as a continuation of the first Bosnian Muslim political party, MNO. The founder of the party was Mehmed Spaho. He favored the idea of

Yugoslavism (Babuna, 2004:297). It is important to note that, the founder and the leader of the party wanted to name the party as Bosniak.

The son of Mehmed Spaho, Dr Mehmed told me that he has documents indicating that his father wanted to label his party 'Bosniak' but was told that it was out of the question, and that the Bosniak national identity had been the invention of Benjamin Kallay, the Austrian governor of Bosnia; therefore reviving it would imply a hostile attitude towards the new Yugoslav state and inevitable lead to the party's isolation. (Zulfikarpasic, et al., 1998:90).

Although the party has established in order to represent the Bosnian Muslims in KSCS, before the establishment of the kingdom, Bosnian Muslims were not all support the idea of Yugoslavism. Even after the establishment, pro-Serbian and pro-Croatian political leaders existed. As Palesic states that

The Bosniak politicians diverged into three directions. Šerif Arnautović, earlier known the partisan of the union of Serbs, Muslims and Orthodox, approved of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Hungary. Safet-beg Bašagić, former president of the local parliament at that time, decided on the unification of all the Croatian countries, with a possible preservation of the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dr. Halid-beg Hrasnica, a lawyer, and Dr. Mehmed Spaho, supported the concept of Yugoslavianism (2009:9).

It is clear that the main purpose of the JMO was the protection of autonomy of Bosnia and Bosnian Muslims. Autonomy is an important concept in the formation of nations. Smith argues that

autonomy can mean, as the etymology implies, self-regulation, having one's own internal laws or rhythms...this leads on the notion of self-determination advanced by German Romantic intellectuals of the early nineteenth century...but autonomy can also signify political freedom and collective self-rule of and by the people as a result of the national self-determination of the collective will and a struggle for national self-government (2010:25).

Although one cannot speak of national self-determination or a struggle for national-self government during the KSCS, the insistence of JMO on the autonomy of Bosnian Muslims in general has contributed to the protection of communal feelings among Bosnian Muslims. Spaho favored the concept of Yugoslavism in order to prevent Muslims to feel pressure on them to declare themselves as Serbs or Croats (Babuna, 2006:406). The decision of JMO is crucial for the continuation of the survival of Bosnian Muslims as a distinct ethnicity. From the beginning of the Austro

occupation and later with the annexation, there were Muslims who choose to declare themselves as Serbs and Croats. Existence of an alternative as such for Serbian or Croatian nationality, and the identification of the political party with that identity was something new for the Bosnian Muslims. Although JMO was not the sole representative of the Bosnian Muslims, it was the only representative in politics. For instance Donia and Fine argues that “throughout the era of royal Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Muslims displayed remarkable political cohesion by voting in overwhelming numbers for the Yugoslav Muslim Organization... a testimony to the solid foundations of Bosnian Muslim identity and the stability of Muslim voting patterns (1994:124)”. For this reason JMO has the potential to lead the population by offering a new alternative for identity, Yugoslavism that would not destroy the previous attachments of Bosnian Muslims.

Another important point for the maintenance of Bosnian Muslims was JMO’s persistence on the territorial integrity and autonomy of the Bosnia-Herzegovina. As it is stated in chapter II and also in chapter III section II, Bosnia had protected its territorial integrity throughout its history. Territory, for the Bosnian Muslims, is a source of identity. The JMO, through advocating the autonomy of Bosnia has cultivated the concept of ‘homeland’ among Bosnian Muslims. Nationalism literature and approaches to nationalism always stress the importance of the existence of homeland for the formation of nationhood and nation. For instance Smith argues that “nations, as we said, are felt and lived communities whose members shared a homeland and a culture” (2010:12) or Hastings argues that a nation is “normally identified by a literature of its own, it possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy as a people, together with the control of the specific territory” (1997:28). Stalin also points out that “a common territory is one of the characteristic features of nation” (Smith, Hutchinson, 1994:19). By bounding up to a territory, Bosnian Muslims had always a territorial identification, and it created a link between past and present, which is an important source of national consciousness from an ethnosymbolist approach. Babuna (2006) argues that “the JMO put a special emphasis on the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was thought to be

of great importance for the security and the national interests of the Bosnian Muslims” (406).

The territorial attachment to Bosnia had always crucial importance for the Bosnian Muslims. Whereas Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, even today, had territories outside from Bosnia to call homeland, Bosnian Muslims have only Bosnian territories to attach. Beginning with the Medieval Bosnia and with the conversion of Islam, Bosnian Muslims had two sources of identity; their territory and their religion. JMO, by pushing for the territorial autonomy, enhance the relation between territory and community.

As a political party, JMO did not follow a nationalist discourse. Rather it displayed a cliental strategy in order to protect the Muslims. However, this does not mean that it did not contribute to the development of Bosnian Muslims. As Babuna points out “it contributed to the national development of the Bosnian Muslims by stressing their history, traditions and cultural and social characteristics” (2004:297). It can be also argued that through not pursuing a nationalist program, JMO gained trust from the KSCS, which, at least for a short period of time, ensured a relative freedom for the Bosnian Muslims.

4.3.2. Intellectual Debates on the Future of Bosnian Muslims in the Interwar Period

During Austro-Hungarian administration Muslim intellectuals had little influence on the opposition movement of Bosnian Muslims. Muslim landlords and religious leaders were active in opposition movement. It was due to the fact that literacy was low during the Ottoman Empire and first generation of intellectuals was active rather in the development of literature and they became visible through newspapers and magazines. However, the interwar period can be identified with the increase of intellectual debates among Muslims. During the Austro-Hungarian period, Bosnian Muslims began to study within these territories and thus the literacy level began to rise. It can be also argued that during the Austro period, Bosnian Muslims were educated in a Westernized way and thus intellectual debates were also increased and took a different shape from the debates of Ottoman period.

Debates were mainly about the place and the role of Islam in public and private life of Bosnian Muslims. Debates on religion and religious practices led many intellectuals to also discuss national issues or define nationality and its role. Nationality debates and religious debates were handled together by some intellectuals. For others, discussions were made through separating religious and national issues. Interwar period can be identified with three main intellectual groups. The first one is secular reformists who had Western orientation, the second group can be called as religious reformists who favored reform in religious issues, the third one is religious revivalists who thought that Islam and Western values are incompatible. The importance of the intellectual debates is that during interwar period all parts of the intellectual debates were concerned about the future of Bosnian Muslims and tried to enhance the conditions both in religious affairs and in public life. Islam was tried to be reconciled with the reason and European values were debated, especially the nation-state. As Bougarel argues

The importance of the inter-war period in the overall history of Bosnia-Herzegovina is confirmed by the fact that, in the 1960's and 1970s, the increasing assertiveness of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as the sixth constitutive nation within the Yugoslavia federation went together with the publication of several major works on this period...The same holds true at the religious level, and the revival of the Islamic Community from the 1960s onwards was accompanied by a return to the religious debates of the inter-war period" (2008:313-314)

So it can be argued that, the inter-war period discussions constituted the backbone of the idea of Bosniak nation. Thus the arguments of secular reformists, religious reformists and religious revivalists will be evaluated.

4.3.2.1. Secular Reformists

Secular reformists were the ones that favored Westernization of Bosnian Muslims. In general intellectuals were educated in cities like Vienna, Zagreb or Belgrad. The common background of the intellectuals is their education was completed outside of Bosnia (Giomi, 2009: 499). "Secular modernists were the members of intelligentsia, favoured the "nationalisation" of the Bosnian Muslims and

had sometimes sympathies for the Yugoslav Communist Party” (Bougarel, 2008:319). Dzevad-beg Sulejmanpasic, Edhem Bulbovic, Sukriya Kurtovic were among the secular modernists and they favored “the suppression of Shari’a courts, permission for Muslim women to be completely unveiled, and encouraged Muslim men to wear a hat instead of fez” (ibid, 319). Secular reformists took Western model of development as guidance. “Influenced by Immanuel Kant’s Enlightenment and above all Auguste Comte’s positivist ideas, they had great trust in progress, science, and the separation between spiritual and secular domains in social life” (Giomi, 2009: 501). Western Europe was ideal for the secular reformists. However, Turkey was a reachable end for modernization. Some of the members of the Reforma, such as Sulejmanpasic, Kemalist Turkey was best examples for Bosnian Muslims (ibid, 501)

Secular reformists formed an association, which is Reforma – Organization of Progressive Muslims in 1928. The purpose of the association was very clear, to enhance the condition and the position of the Muslims, to make Muslim women visible in public life, to eradicate practices that had never been customs, to eradicate superstitions. As it is stated above, secular modernists were trying to nationalize Bosnian Muslims and another important purpose of the association is “to promote the nationalization of the Muslims in a way in which, as an autochthon element, they could perceive this land as their destiny and their homeland, lovingly accepting every sort of sacrifice for it” (Giomi:2009,498). The main issue for the secular reformists is to eradicate backwardness of Bosnian Muslims that were induced from religion and to develop and to spread national identity. Bougarel explains the basic tenets of the reformists’ ideas

On the one hand, issues such as the duty to perform hijra and the use of the Turkish language became obsolete, while the need to fight the “backwardness” (zaostalost) of the Bosnian Muslim community and to adapt to the “spirit of the time” (duh vrijeme) was unanimously acknowledged, at least in principle. On the other hand, socio-cultural issues such as the adoption of Western dress-codes and the role of Muslim women in public life became new bones of contention between the advocates and adversaries of reformist ideas, and new divisions began appear among the reformists themselves (Bougarel, 2008:317).

Secular reformists did not only try to cultivate Muslim society but they also try to consolidate the differences between Muslims and other nationalities. They tried to unify all cultural associations under *Reforma*. They favored the unification of all intellectuals for the development of whole society. In an article called ‘How Our Newspaper Should Be’, the writers of the *Reforma*, when talking about intellectuals,

we don’t refer just to the Muslim ones—they are not in satisfactory number—but also to our beloved friends of other faiths, because they have good ideas and know how to write. Such cooperation will enormously contribute to another goal, i.e. to achieve brotherhood (*bratimljenja*) and unification (*ozjednac̆avanje*) between the Muslims and their national brothers of the other faiths (Giomi: 2009: 498).

So it is clear that, the aim of the *Reforma* and the intellectuals within it is to create unification among the constituent parts of the Bosnia in general and to cultivate the position of Muslims in particular.

Nationality ideas of the secular reformists reflected the conditions within KSCS, the unification of the South Slavs. The members of the *Reforma* favored the eradication of ethno-religious boundaries. “In *Reforma*’s writings, the dismissal of the symbols of Muslim isolation and inferiority should also be followed by a sincere adherence to the national idea, the only process that could hallow the complete union with their Christian fellow citizens” (ibid, 504). For secular reformists, it is not important whether a Muslim adopts Serbian or Croatian nationality; rather to have a nationality is important. “As admitted by Dugalic’ ‘we Muslims are still in a development stage of our national awareness. . . for us the terms ‘Serb’ and ‘Croat’ should be equivalent. It does not matter if a Muslim feels as Serb or Croat. It is important that he not be a-national’ ” (ibid, 504).

Reforma’s political activism did not last long however the ideas that spread from the association were important and intellectual activities of the *Reforma* brought a new dimension for the national development of Bosnian Muslims. Although as an association *Reforma* lost visibility from the public arena, the members of *Reforma* maintained their activities under different associations and newspaper.

4.3.2.2. Religious Reformists

Religious reformists favored re-interpretation of Islam and Islamic rules and traditions in general. The members of the religious reformists generally belonged to the *ilmiyya* and supported Yugoslavism and the political party of Bosnian Muslims, JMO (Bougarel, 2008:319). Religious reformists, like secular reformists, wanted to increase the cultural and educational level of Bosnian Muslims. They too found religious institutions and old Islamic practices as obstacles towards the improvement of Muslim society. “The characteristics of reformists perception and writings on Islam defined it as “ a faith not opposed to reform, one that is congenial to rejuvenation, one that is open to the new, the modern and the contemporary” (Karić E, 2002:395). Džemaludin Čaušević., Fehim Spaho, Abdulah Ajni Busatlic were among the religious reformists and they “wanted to modernize the interpretation of Shari’a and the administration of waqfs, and maintained that Muslim women did not have a duty to hide their face, especially if this was an obstacle to their education and to their participation in economic life” (ibid, 319).

Čaušević, the leading figure of the religious reformism, was elected as Reis-ul-Ulema in 1913 and he served in this position until 1930. His ideas about women’s position, unveiling of women and wearing hat instead of fez attracted attention among intellectuals. However, not all members of the *ilmiyya* supported Čaušević’s ideas and some of them blamed Čaušević and declared him as infidel. As it is seen, the intellectual debates were revolving around daily issues and Enes Karić (2002) explains why Muslims of Bosnia dealt with rather daily issues than that of state, language, nation and so on through saying that “after the fall of Ottoman Empire, the European powers did not allow the Muslims of the Balkans to have a state of their own. Muslims survived simply as religious entity” (393). Besides from this explanation, it can be said that among the Muslim intellectuals, the first problems to be solved was in relation with the Muslims’ position, their education and their cultural development. After these have been discussed and solutions were found, the nationality question can be a matter of dispute.

Čaušević favored the separation of religion and nationality. He argues that

There are in our state Croats and Serbs who are closely following their Islamic faith, and this has to be taken into account. I am firmly convinced that the most accurate solution is that neither the Catholics nor the Orthodox link their Croat or Serb identity with their religious feelings, since it causes a great confusion among those Croats who are not Catholics and those Serbs who are not Orthodox (Bougarel, 2008:334).

It is clear that, Čaušević didn't advocate the identification of religion with nationality. He thought that it created confusion and thus it should be renounced. Čaušević also favored rapprochement of Bosnian Muslims with other constituent parts of Bosnia. For Čaušević, Bosnian Muslims should emulate the non-Muslims of Bosnia in educational and cultural areas. He argues that "The Catholics, the Orthodox and the Jews take care – and this very aptly – of the education of their youth, of assistance to their poor, but we Muslims stay motionless, as we would sleep in the Arabian Peninsula, and not find ourselves in this corner of Europe" (ibid, 331). As religious reformists favored the idea of re-interpretation of religious institutions, improvement of Muslims and close the distance between Muslims and others, they advocated "the necessity of keeping pace with the other ethno-religious communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina" (ibid, 332).

The religious reformists, in short, favored the re-interpretation of religious issues in relation to the modern ideals. They argued that Islam and reason is compatible, Islam and the West is also compatible. In order for enhancement of Muslims in Bosnia, the interaction with other religions should be improved and non-Muslim population should be taken as example in educational and cultural areas. The debates on religious issues and practices had caused the division among the members of *ilmiyya*. Those who accused Čaušević and his partners began to develop their own terms on the cultivation of Muslim society and religious revivalists came into scene.

4.3.2.3. Religious Revivalists

Religious revivalists emerged as a reaction to the religious reformists. One of the leading figures of religious revivalists was Mehmed Handžić. It is important to consider the historical conditions that led to the emergence of such debates. Religious revivalism had emerged when ethnic-tensions increase in the Kingdom of

Yugoslavia (Bougarel, 2008:324). Religious reformists and revivalist had shared some common points: they both stressed the compatibility of Islam with reason, importance of education and use of vernacular language (ibid, 325). The main difference between them is religious revivalists saw Western values as corrupt and materialistic and argued that these values deteriorate the Muslim societies and Islamic values whereas religious reformists envied Western civilization and suggested emulating them. Another important difference is the insistence of religious revivalists in keeping the ethno-religious boundaries. The reason behind this is the historical context that religious revivalists emerged. As it is stated above, in 1929 the kingdom's name has been changed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In 1930, with the new constitution, religious and educational autonomy of Bosnian Muslims had abolished and Islamic Religious Community (IVZ, Islamska Vjerska Zajednica) has established. The tension between religious entities within Yugoslavia had accelerated and thus religion had gained importance again.

Religious revivalism is important for the formation of Bosniak nation. Religious revivalists had published many works that written during the Ottoman period and also Austro-Hungarian period. Bougarel (2008) argues that Handžić laid the foundations of contemporary Bosniak nationalism as he stated that "Islam was compatible with nationalism, promoted a definition of nation (narod) close to the German definition of Volk and, more specifically, introduced a new notion of bošnjaštvo which applied solely to the Bosnian Muslim community" (334). Handžić argued that

Islam has reinforced the innate patriotism of the Bosniaks and they have become in this way the most patriotic element of this country and almost the only element which sincerely perceives Bosnia-Herzegovina as his native soil. Almost nobody perceives Bosnia-Herzegovina as his homeland in the same way as the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina do, and this is the reason why, when it comes to the interests of our homeland, almost nobody strives (to defend them) but the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ibid, 335).

The history of Bosnian Muslims, as it was shown, always related with the territory and the idea of homeland. This loyalty constituted a part of the identity of Bosnian Muslims and it is clear that Handžić also stressed the importance of homeland and he argues that only Bosnian Muslims had saw Bosnia as their homeland.

All these discussions among Muslim intellectuals are the reflections of search for an identity. It is clear that some of the intellectuals wanted to create a unified South Slav identity without referring to religion and religious differences whereas some of the intellectuals highlighted the importance of Islam in the history of Bosnian Muslims. Some of the intellectuals advocated Western values whereas some of them found them corrupt. The existence of such intellectual debates is important as they offer many options for the population. The inter-war period discussions were laid the basis for future Bosniak national identity and its features. The intellectual debates of inter-war period were cut down with the WWII but the war and Socialist administration had had diverse effects on the identity development of Bosnian Muslims.

4.3.3. Bosnian Muslims in World War II

The politics of Bosnia had deteriorated before the WWII started. Nationalist paramilitary groups were established by Croats and Serbs as well. These groups, in many ways, damaged the so-called unified Yugoslav idea. Each group had tried to become the sole power and in relation to that neither Serbs nor Croats recognized the Bosnian Muslims as a separate group. Serbs claimed that Bosnian Muslims are Serbs; Croats claimed that Bosnian Muslims are Croats. Nevertheless, with the beginning of the war, most of the Bosnian Muslims and especially intellectual leaders of the interwar period, felt closer to the Croats.

Establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was welcomed by Bosnian Muslim intellectuals in spite of the fact that “in this period the national identity of the Muslims was not recognized by the Croatian regime and the Muslims were considered Muslim Croats” (Babuba, 2004:301). Independent Croatia was seen as the best solution for the autonomy and territorial integrity of Bosnia and also survival of the Bosnian Muslims.

There was a certain hope that its establishment would create conditions for a more liberal economic, political and spiritual life of Bosniaks, especially because Bosniaks and Croats had been political allies in the struggle to limit the Great Serbian dominance in interwar Yugoslavia (Filandra, 2009:21).

NDH was seen as the ultimate option for the Bosnian Muslims. Serbs were more aggressive towards non-Serbs and Croats and Bosnian Muslims were ally during the interwar period. Also “the Ustasa view was simply that the Bosnian Muslims were Croats, and therefore their lands was Croatian. The Bosnian Muslims accordingly were to be treated as brothers and allied, the purest of all Croats” (Friedman, 1996:122). Thus, being part of NDH, as stated by Handžić and Čaušević “was the unlimited God’s will that gave us the independent state of Croatia as a blessing in these tempestuous times” (ibid, 21)

However, during the war violence had increased and alliance of Bosnian Muslims with Croats had worsened due to the massacres that Bosnian Muslims had encountered. To secure Bosnian Muslims from massacres, in 1942, a memorandum was sent to the German troops that demands protection from the Ustasha’s massacre as a result of this memorandum a SS troops were established. Bosnian Muslims also demanded autonomy under German protection. Filandra explains this autonomist orientation by stating that

The autonomist orientation was an expression of disagreement with all of the existing options – the Communist, pro-Serbian and pro-Croatian, or Chetnik and Ustasha, where Muslims had been active participants – aspiring towards the true ethnic legitimacy and an attempt at establishing an independent politics, even with the help of Germans. It was characterized by a local and defensive attitude, which found its expression in military formations of Bosnian Muslim militia (2009:23).

During the WWI and the war within Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims were active participants and their participation cannot be identified with a certain group. Bosnian Muslims had always diverse affiliation and cannot be categorized easily according to their orientation. However demand for autonomy from Germany was a turning point for Bosnian Muslims. It reveals out the dissatisfaction and disappointment of Bosnian Muslims from the existing options. It shows that Bosnian Muslims necessitates autonomy and independent politics for survival. Bougarel argues that

Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the specific manifestation of this nascent Bosniak nationalism just as the movement for religious and educational autonomy had been the first collective expression of the neo-millet strategy during the Austro-Hungarian period (2008:335).

The demand for autonomy was crucial in development of national feeling among Bosnian Muslims. It shows that Bosnian Muslims were neither Serbs nor Croats. They could not be part of the war that existed among Serbs and Croats through taking part in one of them. They demanded autonomy from an external power as they thought that this was the only option that led to the maintenance of the survival of Bosnian Muslims. Though with the rise of the Communists and their separability from Chetniks created another alternative for Bosnian Muslims. During the war Communists policies had shifted towards Bosnian Muslims, and they recognized Muslims as separate ethnic group. For instance, “the Fifth Conference of Community Party of Yugoslavia “resolved that, “Muslims have not forged a nation, but (are) an ethnic group” (Ramet, 1985:172). As communist partisans recognized the separate identity of Bosnian Muslims, many of them participated in partisan movement.

4.3.3.1. Mladi Muslimani

The most important organization that maintained its existence until the dissolution of Yugoslavia and also took its position during the Bosnian war is Mladi Muslimani (Young Muslim)⁶. Mladi Muslimani was established by a group of young intellectuals who aspired by Islam and wanted to live in an Islamic environment. Those group of young Muslims is defined by Behmen as follows; young Bosniak intellectuals who, on the one hand, did not accept being in the same platforms or identifying themselves with Serbs and Croats, on the other, who did not define themselves in ethnically or nationally. They only adopted Islamic values. 1939 was a turning point for these young people. The indefinite position of Bosniaks under Yugoslav Kingdom led to the establishment of this organization de facto (2008:iii). So the Mladi Muslimani was established in 1939. Their motivation was Islam. Young Muslims were willing to enhance their lives and their fellows through Islamic

⁶ During the text, Mladi Muslimani and Young Muslim will be used interchangeably

doctrines. For them state, society, human and the world where love dominates, can be imagined through an Islamic system (Behmen, 2008:vi)

The goal of the organization is to ideological improvement of individual, the role of being community in the struggle, to construct Islamic society and Islamic environment, unification of Islam world in political and economical areas, to establish Islamic system, to establish Islamic culture and civilization (Behmen, 2008:127-130). After the establishment of Socialist Yugoslavia, Mladi Muslumani applied to be a legal organization of Bosnian Muslims. However, administration had rejected this application as they saw the organization as nothing but a unnecessary religious association. Although the official application to the Yugoslav authorities for the status of the organization has been rejected by the administration, the organization continued to work to nurture the Muslims in cultural and educational area with a spirit of Islam (Behmen, 2008:4)

Young Muslims were, ideologically, pan-Islamist. They didn't have nationalist discourse and even they thought that being a Muslim and nationalist at the same time is not possible. Muslims cannot fight for a glory of a nation, they can only fight in the name of God. However, Bougarel thinks that "pan-Islamism was nothing but a form of proto-nationalism as illustrated by the hostility of the Young Muslims to the Yugoslav idea during and after the Second World War (2008:336). Although it will be shown in the oncoming sections, the members of the Mladi Muslumani would try to create a Muslim nation with an emphasis on religion, when the organization had established, there was not a clear nationalist program. The organization wanted to elevate the Muslim population, to unite them and to cultivate their spiritual beings through Islam.

Between 1946 and 1949, many members of Mladi Muslumani were arrested by the socialist regime and accused of being fundamentalists and anti-communists, threat to the regime. Izzetbegovic, who would become president of Bosnia, was among them. The arrestments, although important, did not stop the activities of Mladi Muslumani but slowed them. They came to the scene, again, with the Islamic revivalism of 1970's in a more liberalized environment.

4.3.4. National Recognition of Bosnian Muslims

The establishment of Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (later will be called Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was important for the Bosnian Muslims. During the Communist Party Conferences, as it is stated above, Bosnian Muslims were recognized as separate ethnic community. Nevertheless the idea that Bosnian Muslims were either Croats or Serbs, did not lose its validity during Communist regime. Pressures for Muslims existed throughout SFRY and also after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The situation, however, for Bosnian Muslims was different from that of Serbs and Croats. Bosnian Muslims had different identification and they did not consider themselves as Serbs or Croats. The most important indicator of Muslims' national affiliation was the censuses.

1948 census indicated that...Of the Muslims of Slavic origin located in Bosnia, over 89 percent, or 788,403, declared their nationality "undecided Muslim" in the census, while just over 8 percent (71,991) declared themselves as Serbs and less than 3 percent (25,295) declared themselves as Croats... 1953 census In Bosnia, however, an overwhelming proportion--over 93 percent--of those who declared themselves adherents of Islam were also recorded in terms of nationality simply as "undetermined Yugoslavs" (Burg, 1983:21-22).

The censuses reveal out that there were Muslims that accepted Serb or Croat nationality but they were few in numbers. In 1948 census, Muslims did not have Yugoslav option, the option available to them was undecided Muslim and they chose it. 1953 census brought an 'undetermined Yugoslav' option. Both of the concepts that took place in censuses 'undecided' and 'undetermined' are crucial here as they stressed that Muslims had two alternative, either Serb or Croat, but those who did not decide yet can choose undetermined Yugoslav. Although Yugoslav administration did not propose an acceptable solution to Muslims of Bosnia in either two censuses, Muslims were seemed determinate that they were not Serbs or Croats. The insistence of Bosnian Muslims to choose the option that is alternative to Serb or Croat stressed the ethnic individuality of Bosnian Muslims (Babuna, 2004:304)

Besides from the non-availability of a national affiliation for Bosnian Muslims, first years of the Communist regime re-regulated the relations between

religion and state. For instance, in 1947 Islamic courts were abolished, vakifs were nationalized, religious schools were closed and women were prohibited to veil (Bougarel, 2003: 106). So the role of religion in public life has reduced to minimum. However, this re-organization of religious affairs did not only target Muslim population. It was rather part of the regular Communist program. In particular IVZ was an ally for Yugoslav administration as opposed to the Christian Churches. As Babuna points out

During the communist period, the Islamic Community (Islamska Vjerska Zajednica) was a pan-Yugoslav multi-ethnic federation of autonomous Muslim institutions and associations, while the centralized and hierarchical Christian churches were linked to their respective national communities (2006:411).

Islam did not constitute a threat for Yugoslav administration at first. They supported Tito's government and in turn "Islamic institutions were legitimized under the Communist regime, and the vakuf system in particular was permitted to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's major Islamic cultural institutions" (Friedman, 1996:151). A crucial development emerged with the new federal law of 1953, "with the enactment of the Legal Status of Religious Communities Act, which transformed religious organizations into legal entities" (Velikonja, 2003:188). This law paved the way for the religious revivalism for Bosnian Muslims. "While this law established restrictions on the use of religion or religious organizations" for political goals, it also specified the scope of permissible religious activity and thereby formally sanctioned specific forms of religious activity" (Burg, 1983:25). Burg also argues that from 1957 and onwards, with the new appointment of new Reis-ul-Ulema, the Islamic institutions began to develop as a community (ibid, 25). "The election of a new, activist Reis-ul-ulema, Hadzi Sulejman ef.Kemura, in 1957 ensured that the Islamic community would control its own spiritual and material affairs to the greatest extent possible" (Friedman, 1996:153). The most important development that occurred during the new Reis-ul-Ulema that contributed to the national consciousness of Bosnian Muslims is "the decision to require the introduction of "appropriate" religious sermons in "our national language" --presumably, this would vary from region to region --during major holidays" (Burg, 1983:29). So in a way, religion and nationality began to interwoven to each other.

During 1960's, nationalists discourses increased within Yugoslav territory and the increasing power of Islamic communities and religious hierarchy in everyday life can be explained as a caution or a response to the threat of Serbian and Croatian nationalism (ibid, 38). The identification of religion and nationality was not foreign for the constituent parts of Yugoslavia. An early advocate of Bosnian national idea, Husag Cistic argues that ‘

We have a healthy basis for a specific national though just as much as the Serbs and the Croats, and what appear to be national communities are, in reality, both in form an in ideological content, both foreign and inaccessible, because they actually represent their own religious communities (cited from Ramet, 1985:174-175).

So Cistic argues that if Serbian and Croatian nationalist ideas are acceptable and legitimate then Bosnian Muslims’ argument about their nationality should be legitimate too because each represent religious communities at the same time. Ramet quoted from a Sociologist who argues that

Religion was a factor for ethnic differentiation not merely in the case of Muslims, but also among our other nationalities. And not merely in the past but even today for a large number of people, especially those living in ethnically and religiously heterogeneous districts, religion is a synonym for nationality” (ibid, 175).

So 1960's had witnessed also the emergence of nationalist discourses among the Bosnian Muslims. This had enhanced through religious institutions and religious revivalism at the same time. Purivatra, the leading figure in recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a separate nationality argues that “the Bosnian Muslims were not only adherents of the Islamic religion but also members of a separate nation” (Babuna, 2004:305). Another prominent name in construction of nationhood was Muhammed Filipovic and he demanded, for the first time, national status for the Bosnian Muslims (ibid, 305).

Bosnian Muslims were recognized as a separate nation in 1963 and party leadership approved it in 1968. However, this recognition did not have only one dimension, which means, Yugoslav administration had different motivation in

recognizing Muslims as a separate nation. For instance Robert Donia and John Fine (1994) argue that

The Bosnian Muslims contributed to and benefited from the Yugoslav commitment to nonalignment. Since many of the nonaligned nations were Islamic or had substantial Muslim populations, the Bosnian and Kosovo Albanian Muslims were touted as trophies by Tito...Yugoslav leadership in the nonaligned movement unquestionable made it easier for the Party, in 1968, to recognize the Bosnian Muslims as a distinct nationality in the pantheon of Yugoslav nations (172-173).

Nonaligned movement was important for Tito and the Islamic adherence of the members of the movement had led Tito to take action in favor of the Muslims within Yugoslav territory. It was the one motivation that led to the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a separate nationality. Mirsad Karic, on the other hand, argues that recognition of Muslims was not an achievement of Islamic Community or religious Muslims. He argues that

it was led by the Communists and other secularized Muslims who wanted the Muslim identity in Bosnia to develop into something more definitely non-religious. Therefore, two quite distinct trends can be seen in Bosnia during this period: this movement of secular "Muslim nationalism" and a separate revival of Islamic religious belief (2011:84).

So it is hard to make a certain judgment in analyzing the reasons and driving forces behind the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a separate nationality. The reasons and driving forces are important but they cannot be reduced into a single comprehensive reasoning. Each of the reason had contributed to the recognition of Bosnian Muslims such as intellectual debates, the world politics, internal dynamics and increasing nationalism. Recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a separate nationality poses great importance for this study as the ethnic individuality of Bosnian Muslims had turned into a nationality and recognized officially.

4.3.5. Creating Future through Rediscovering the Past

With the Austro occupation, Bosnian Muslims started to take Western type of education. This had led to the increase in intellectual debates as well as increase interaction with people from different background, especially with intellectuals who

adopted Western values. Thus the intellectual profile of Bosnian Muslims started to change. Although during Austro-Hungarian period Bosnian intellectuals were few, during the era of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (KSCS) Bosnian Muslim intellectuals took their positions either in administrative units or in politics.

Bosnian Muslim politicians, rather than providing new sources for the development of national consciousness among Bosnian Muslims, tried to protect and cultivate already existing sources of identity, such as the concept of homeland and religious attachment. JMO leaders behaved pragmatically in order for their communal existence. Instead of creating a new alternative for Bosnian Muslims in general, they adopted the Yugoslav idea as they thought that Yugoslavism would better serve to the interests of the Bosnian Muslims and would protect the very identity of them. The role of JMO in development of national consciousness is its ability to generate and enhance the solidarity among Bosnian Muslims through stressing the two important sources of identity, homeland and religious attachment. The politics of JMO had always shaped by the conditions that these sources were guaranteed. Brass argues that “insofar as an ethnic group succeeds by its own efforts in achieving and maintaining group rights through political action and political mobilization, it has gone beyond ethnicity to establish itself as a nationality” (1980:9). JMO acted on behalf of Bosnian Muslims and achieved rights for the ethnic group in general. JMO used politics for the maintenance of communal solidarity among Muslims. However, as it is stated above, rather than contributing to the development of national consciousness, JMO protected the necessary sources for ethnic group maintenance

The party politics paved the way for the increase in intellectual debates through guaranteeing the very existence of Bosnian Muslims, their autonomy and their territory. So intellectuals could discuss different subjects other than their survival. The role of intellectuals is summarized by Smith very clearly. He states that “these scholarly disciplines provide the tools and conceptual frameworks for finding out ‘who we are’, ‘when we began’, ‘how we grew’ and perhaps ‘where are we going’” (Smith, 2010:28). The intellectual debates among the Bosnian Muslims, at first, were about the conditions that Muslims were in. Intellectuals rather than

analyzing who they were at first began to think who will they be, and how they will grow. First years of the growing intellectual debates were among the secular reformists and religious reformists. Both groups were aimed at re-interpretation of religion. They accused religious elites for the backwardness of Muslim society in Bosnia. Although they had different motivation, they both favored the reducing ethno-religious boundaries. Both secular reformists and religious reformists tried to answer the question where are we going and how can we achieved development. They accused past traditions for their societal backwardness, they tried to find a way for the development of community in a westernized way, whereas another intellectual group, religious revivalist did much more than this.

The role of religious revivalists in the formation of Bosniak nation and national identity is immense. Religious revivalists tried to answer the question ‘who we are’ and ‘when we began’ and they tried to construct an identity on the basis of these. Smith argues that “the ethnic past or pasts that are rediscovered create the boundaries and frameworks in and through which we make sense of the community and its place in the world” (1981:37). The aim of the religious revivalist was to determine the basic characteristics of Bosnian Muslims through looking pasts and thus maintain the ethno-religious boundaries with their neighbor. The leading figure of religious revivalists was Mehmed Handžić. He tried to create a link between past and present and on this basis, he tried to construct the identity of Bosnian Muslims. Smith argues that

Intelligentsia attempts to provide new communal self-definitions and goals, involving the mobilization of formerly passive communities. These redefinitions should not be seen simply as inventions or constructs of intellectuals. Rather they are attempts to marry an understanding of Western processes of forming nations with a programme of rediscovering an ethnic past or pasts that will elevate the people and their vernacular culture to centre stage, often in place of (or reinterpreting) the old religious traditions (Smith, 1991:63).

Handžić and religious revivalists in general took their past and rediscovered it through publishing books that written during Ottoman and Habsburg Empire. Bougarel argues that

He borrowed from works written during the Austro-Hungarian period by authors such as Franjo Rački (1828-1894), Ćiro Truhelka (1865-1942) and Safvet-beg Bašagić (1870-1934) the idea that the Islamisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina resulted from a massive conversion of Bosnian Bogomils and that the literature published in Oriental languages during the Ottoman period represented a first manifestation of Bosnian cultural identity (2008:334).

So religious revivalists, through focusing on the past tried to create a future. They found the basis of the identity of Bosnian Muslims in the antiquity and they tried to resurrect it. The elevation of the society, for religious revivalists, can only be achieved through loyalty to the past and tradition. As opposed to secular reformists and religious reformists, who saw the elevation of society in Western values in a sense, for religious revivalists the answer is in the protection of existing values and sources of identity. Religious revivalists put greater importance on the culture of Bosnian Muslims and the features that constitute the culture. The basic premise of the religious revivalists is the compatibility of Islam and reason and incompatibility of Islam and West. They emphasized the uniqueness of their culture by connecting it, first to Bogomil heritage and then to Islam. As Smith argues “it is through a shared, unique culture that we are enabled to know 'who we are' in the contemporary world. By rediscovering that culture we 'rediscover' ourselves, the 'authentic self'” (1991:17)

The role of intellectuals in constructing national identity is very important though it is not the only important thing. In a society where the division is made through religion, religious institutions also have great importance. During Communists regime, the idea of Yugoslavism was spread around the country and none of the nationality was the state nationality. Each nationality had equal share in administration and in resources as long as it had the status of nationality. The category of Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslavia was complex. They did not have a state of their own; they were not recognized as nationality until 1968. They had religious institution that protects the interests of Bosnian Muslims. For the Bosnian Muslims, religious institution that became the guardian of population and that provided sources of identity and customs was IVZ. The role of Islamic Religious Community was reduced with the establishment of Tito's Communist Yugoslavia. However, alliance of Bosnian Muslims and Community with Tito's regime provided them with sort of

autonomy and power. Beginning with the election of new Reis-ul-Ulema in 1957, the power of the community expanded. IVZ, rather than implementing the state law, developed itself and its community. The re-organization of state and religious affairs with the federal law of 1953, made IVZ's task easier, it gained a capability of regulation of education, religious sermons and religion became representative nationality for Bosnian Muslims in a sense. The new Reis-ul-Ulema, besides expanding religious instructions, "sanctioned sermons in Serbo-Croatian, which, an observer recorded, contributed to an 'awakening of Islamic consciousnesses within the Muslim community'" (Friedman, 1996:153). Religious institutions are powerful as Smith argues

In the absence of a state, then, religious institutions may become the guardians as well as the source of common observance of shared customs and laws, and create a strong sense of ethnic cohesion, which in favorable circumstances can be transferred to the emerging nation (Smith, 1981: 51).

Islamic Religious Community had helped protection of the traditions and culture of Bosnian Muslims due to the lack of state of Muslims that would represent the Muslims in general. Although Bosnian Muslims were categorized as ethnicity, they lacked the category of nationality. Within Yugoslav territories, recognition as nationality is crucial. Non-recognition as nationality meant limited access to administrative units, economic resources and lack of representation in federal level. It is also important to note that due to the non-recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a separate nationality, the growing Serbian and Croatian nationalism had directly affected the position of the Muslims in Bosnia. They had claimed on nationality of Muslims. Although Bosnian Muslims did not have a nationalist discourse, the nationalists' discourses within the rest of the Bosnia accelerated during 1960's. Due to the internal dynamics and external affairs that were given in section 3.3.4., Bosnian Muslims gained recognition in 1968 and their status had changed. They were recognized as Muslim by nationality (Muslimani). Official recognition is crucial not only because it provided resources that were available only to the nationalities but also it created influential apparatus for maintenance and enhancement of that nationality. Smith argues that

a nation, on the other hand, must occupy a homeland of its own, at least for a long period of time, in order to constitute itself as a nation; and to aspire to nationhood and be recognized as a nation, it also needs to evolve a public culture and desire some degree of self determination (2010:12).

Bosnian Muslims had already defined themselves as distinct from Serbs and Croats. For Bosnian Muslims official recognition meant that “the change was simply one of de facto to de jure status” (Bringa, 1995:28). However this change can be interpreted differently. As they were recognized as a nationality, now Bosnian Muslims had to create a national identity. Through official recognition, the ethnicity of Bosnian Muslims gained political meaning. Gellner argues that

Ethnicity becomes political, it gives rise to a ‘nationalism’, when the ethnic group defined by these overlapping cultural boundaries is not merely acutely conscious of its own exercise, but also imbued with the conviction that the ethnic boundary ought also be a political one. The requirement is that the boundaries of ethnicity should also be the boundaries of the political unit, above all, that the rulers within that unit should be of the same ethnicity as the ruled (Gellner, 1994:35).

The cultural boundaries between Bosnian Muslims and rest of the population within Bosnia had always existed. However, with the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a nationality, their ethnicity became political in the sense that the appearance of Bosnian Muslims in politics, in representation, in allocation of resources, and in negotiation increased. They became equal partners within the administration. And through this recognition, nationalist discourses of Bosnian Muslims increased due to the need to define the boundaries and features of the nation, which is the most important driving force in the formation of nation and national identity.

4.4. From Muslim to Bosniak: Structuring the Nationality and National Identity

1970’s encountered with liberalization policies within Yugoslavia. With the resignation of Rankovic in 1966 the relations between federal government and individual nationalities were loosened (Banac, 1997:106). In economics, political and religious affairs, Yugoslavia’s administration had shifted the rigid centralized politics towards decentralization. All of the republics as well as two autonomous provinces within Yugoslavia celebrated the decentralization policies. Muslims, as a newly

recognized nationality, had also benefited from the policies of administration. However elevation of Muslims to the nationality status created fractions among Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders. This fraction was among the members of Islamic Religious Community, secular intellectuals and religious intellectuals. The debates among them and then the Bosnian war created the features of Muslim national identity. So in this section, the role of IVZ and its attitudes towards national identity of Muslims, the secular intellectuals' arguments on the Muslim national identity and as opposed to them, the arguments of religious intellectuals will be analyzed. Besides from the internal struggle among Muslim intellectuals, the effects of increasing Serbian and Croatian nationalism on the Bosnia and of nationalist discourses in shaping Muslim national identity will be evaluated in relation with the Bosnian war, which was crucial for the consolidation of Muslim national identity.

4.4.1. Islamic Religious Community

Islamic Religious Community was at first named as Muslim Religious Organization. It was autonomous but it supported JMO. Muslim Religious Organization was an ally of the Yugoslavia administration and Belgrade regime also supported Muslim Religious Organization and JMO and used them to balance the power of two nationalities, namely Serbs and Croats (Perica, 2002:11). Islamic Religious Community was the only authority for religious affairs during the Tito's Yugoslavia. Although in the beginning of the communist regime, religion and state was strictly separated and religion was put in the private sphere, with the promulgation of 1953 federal law, religion had again gained power.

After 1957, religion played important role in the development of solidarity among Muslims. Religious instructions began to be given; religious practices began to increase among Muslims. It is also important to note that

One of the important decisions taken by the new *Reis-u'l-ulema* was the introduction of religious sermons in the "national language" during the major holidays. This was to contribute to the awakening of the Islamic consciousness among the Muslims. The Muslim believers began to give active support to their religious Community during the 1960s (Babuna, 2004:302).

The authority of the Islamic Religious community had shaken with the recognition of Muslims as a separate nationality. Islamic Religious Community had the power to represent the interests of the Muslim population in Yugoslavia due to the fact that Muslims were recognized as a religious and ethnic entity. However with the recognition the status of Muslims had changed. Besides from the status, the availability of resources (economic, political and cultural) had begun to change. Since Muslims recognized as a nationality, intellectuals began to discuss the features of that nationality as well as the non-existence of national institutions. So by being the sole representative of Muslims in religious and cultural affairs, the Islamic Religious Community's role in Muslim lives had changed with the emergence of challenges within Muslim intellectuals.

In the late sixties and early seventies, the patriotic leadership of the Islamic Community encountered a challenge from Muslim ethnic nationalism that came from above, namely from the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as from below, for example, in the religious nationalism advanced by the outlawed "Young Muslims" organization (Perica, 2002:74).

National recognition of Muslims created a vacuum that cannot be filled by religious institution only. So Islamic Religious community had to organize itself in a way that it would also be the national institution of Muslims. Islamic Religious Organization took some important step in order to stress its role in nationalization of Muslims. For instance, in 1969 the organization changed its name to Islamic Community (IZ, Islmaska Zajednic) and it adopted a national role for itself.

From 1969 through 1970 the Islamic newspaper Preporod complained in a series of articles and editorials that Muslims were not allowed to establish national institutions of their own that would serve as an equivalent to national cultural institutions in Croatia and Serbia. Under the new name Islamic community aspired to become de facto Muslim national institution that would compensate for the lack of what were national academies of sciences and arts and cultural umbrella organizations in Serbia and Croatia (ibid,78).

During the Communist period, Islamic Religious Community had benefited by being ally with Yugoslav administration and due to its support to pan-Yugoslav idea. After the liberalization period and especially beginning with the 1970's, IZ was

actively participating in reconstruction of mosques and in spreading religious practices into public lives.

Indeed, as soon as the nationhood of the Bosnian Muslims was officially recognized, the religious hierarchy began to pursue a more active and public role in the lives of Bosnian Muslims, seeking to play the role of intermediary between them and the rest of Yugoslav society and to be spokesperson for the Muslim community and its interests (Friedman, 1996:163).

IZ benefited also from the federal funds and took the most financial support among three major religion in Yugoslavia, it had the higher numbers of clerics. However, through supporting Yugoslavism, IZ lacked the necessary autonomy in advocating and contributing the nationalization of Bosnian Muslims in general. It was always a loyal ally for Yugoslavism. Even after the death of Tito, under the acceleration of nationalists discourses among other nationalities and churches, IZ had always been supportive for supra identity, Yugoslavism For instance on May 1985, Reis-ul-Ulema, Naim Hadziabdic stated that “only united as brothers we will be able to march forward and defend our freedom and self management. Religious officials in our mosques will have special responsibility to preserve these ideals and achievements” (Perica, 2002: 81). The 1980’s had witnessed the church and state cooperation in spreading nationalism and nationalist discourse. However the position that Islamic Community took during this period is rather different. During 1980’s and also in the first years of 1990’s IZ isolated itself from nationalist discourses. Babuna argues that “the absence of a churchlike hierarchical organization dedicated to the worship of ethnic nationalism made Muslims uneven partners in the religious nationalist competition in Yugoslavia” (2006:411)

In 1988 and also in 1989 Muslim clerics started to protest Islamic Community’s policies and demanded reforms such as full autonomy, democratization and self-administration of Islamic Community without state’s interference. Clerics also demanded reintroduction of some traditions and improvement of the status of imams (ibid, 411). After this protest, in 1991, a democratic election was held within Islamic Community and Selimoski, who was from Macedonia was chosen as the new Reis-ul-Ulema. With the establishment of Party of Democratic Action (SDA, Stranta Demokratske Akcij) and its emphasis on

the relation between religion and nationality, Selimoski and Islamic Community openly declared their noninvolvement in party politics (Perica, 2002:88). Although Islamic Community had declared their neutrality in nationalist discourses, an important development occurred in the census 1991, “calling on the Bosnian Muslims to declare their mother tongue as ‘Bosnian’ rather than Serbo-Croat” (Babuna, 2006:412). With the growing power of SDA and its religious affiliation, Islamic Community and the Reis-ul-Ulema became a problem for the party and in 1993, Selimoski was removed from the office and IZ became the instrument of SDA in nationalist discourse of SDA.

4.4.2. Secular Intellectuals

The national recognition of the Muslims created intellectual debates on the features and the name of nationality. On the one hand, the Muslims that were part of the Yugoslav administration and those who had secular affiliation were keen on the adoption of secular features for the nationality. On the other hand, for the Muslims that took within the communist administration, the term Muslimani (Muslim) did not contain religious affiliation. The founder of the Yugoslv Sociology of Religion, Cimic argues that

Muslims have a consciousness in which the national and the religious are often interwoven and reinforce each other...Because of that sometimes adheres to this confession not from religious motives, but out of the desire to establish his own national distinctiveness, individuality (Burg, 1983:38).

So the term Muslimani or Muslim, although religious, also meant national distinctiveness. It is known that religious practices of Bosnian Muslims were low before the liberalization policies of administration. “In effect, the leading Islamic scholars’ accommodation to the communist authorities led them to encourage Muslim to put their obligation to the state before their obligations as practicing Islam” (Bringa, 1995:199). For those who advocate the concept of Muslim for the name of the nation, labeling nationality as Muslim did not erase the secular character of the nationality itself. Both for Muslims within the administration and the administration itself did not equate the concept of Muslim with being Muslim in

religious sense. For instance, insistence of some secular intellectuals on the change of the name of the nationality, communist leader Nijaz Durakovic responded by saying that “the label ‘Muslim’ as a national name was ‘the only possible name, whether one likes it or not’” (Perica, 2002:76). This position of Bosnian Muslims can be explained by their adoption of Yugoslavism as supra-national identity and the administration’s insistence on the term of Muslim can be explained by the fact that Muslims did not pose threat to the Yugoslav administration and Islamic Community did not have a hierarchical organization that can support or generate nationalism based on religion. Muslims were the most loyal ally of the administration, thus the name indicates nothing religious.

The secular intellectuals, however, were more concentrated on the name of the nationality as for them it had religious affiliation and it would damage the secular features that they wanted for their nation. They favored the separation of religion and nationality, and thus they favored different name for the nation. For instance, “Bosnian Muslim politicians like Hamdija Pozderac and Fuad Muhic’ are quoted as saying that religious integrism was weakening Muslims’ national identity and emancipation” (Velikonja, 2002:226). Pozderac was one of the influential politician within the Yugoslav administration. He was president of Bosnia-Herzegovina and later, vice president of Yugoslavia. So for Pozderac, the emancipation of Bosnian Muslims can be achieved through breaking ties with religious affiliation. National identity can be only achieved through secular features

Adil Zulfikarpasic can be classified among the secular intellectuals. He offered the name Bosniak when the Muslims recognized as a separate nationality and he was in exiled. He wrote Bosniakdom in an unsigned editorial in 1963. Zulfikarpasic was not a nationalist, he states that

We reject nationalism for ourselves in all of its forms as democrats, as humanists, and above all as Muslims”...Muslim national engagement was not developed in a way that transcended the rudimentary political orientation towards the Serbs or the Croats (Zulfikarpasic et al., 1998: xiii).

For Zulfikarpasic Bosniakdom is not something religious or geographical. It is not also cultural. It is more than these. It is the real and only national affiliation (ibid, xiii). He also argues that “any identification with nationalism or with other centres,

national or cultural, with Zagreb or Belgrade, was intolerable for the population of Bosnia” (ibid, 87). So Bosniakdom or the term Bosniak is necessary for the national affiliation of Bosnian Muslims not only in terms of separation from other two nationalities but also for the other constituents of Bosnia. “The bosniak ethnic identity must be accessible to the Catholic or Orthodox, just as in the past. My library contains many books from the Austria-Hungary period, published outside Bosnia, where the non-Muslim population of Bosnia is called Bosniak” (ibid, 96).

Zulfikarpasic returned to Bosnia before the Bosnian war began. He collaborated with Izzetbegovic and his party SDA. However, they soon disagreed about the nature of the party and its program. Zulfikarpasic favored the name Bosniak for the nation whereas Izzetbegovic insisted on Muslim for a while (Babuna, 2006:408). There were many other disputes between Izzetbegovic and Zulfikarpasic. Zulfikarpasic did not use Islam as a nationality marker whereas Izzetbegovic used Islam as a source of identity. So Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic left the SDA and created Muslim Bosniak Organization. This party, which was supported mainly by the intellectuals, favored the idea of bosnjastvo as the defining element in Muslim national identity and attributed a purely religious meaning to the definition of ‘Musliman’ (ibid, 409).

Secular intellectuals, in general, wanted a separation between religion and nationality. They favored the secular national affiliation and did not consider Islam as a part of national identity. Although there were divisions among secular intellectuals regarding the name of the nationality, the main argument of them cannot be considered as different. They wanted Muslims to increase their national awareness, which can be only achieved through adoption of secular features. However the increasing tension among nationalities and the increase of nationalist discourses among church like institutions underrated the secular nationalist ideas among Bosnian Muslims. It can be concluded that

Recognition of their nationalhood was expected to have only secular implications, since previously the Bosnian Muslims had shown little religious predilection. However, when they gained national recognition and began to increase their communal self-identification as a nation- their religiosity was

concomitantly asserted as a main part of their national self-identification and differentiation (Friedman, 1996:162).

4.4.3. Religious Intellectuals

Although during the inter-war period, secular reformists and religious reformists were paid more attention, after 1970's religious revivalists' and their arguments found more support than other intellectuals. 1970's and onwards had witnessed the rise of religious revivalism not only in Bosnia but also in other countries. 1970's witnessed the politicization of Islam everywhere. Although the recognition of Muslims as a distinct nationality had secular intentions, manifestation of this newly emerged nationality cannot be understood without religious inferences. It is important to highlight the features of religious revivalism. John Epsosito, who is a professor in Islamic Studies, argues that

While the westernization and secularization of society are condemned, modernization as such is not. Science and technology are accepted, but the pace, direction and extent of change are to be subordinated to Islamic belief and values in order to guard against the penetration and excessive dependence on western values (cited from Karčić H, 2010: 523).

Religious revivalism did not emerge, in Bosnia, during 1970's. It has longer existence within the Bosnian territories. As it is stated above, the arguments of religious revivalists were in agenda of the intellectual debate of the inter-war period. However, the premises of religious revivalists became more visible and supported during 1970's. The reason for this is the general liberalization period that had began after the resignation of Rankovic in 1966. With the promulgation of new constitution of 1953 and then 1974 that reduced the control on religious affairs, religion became more visible in public life. As Bougarel argues

It was not until the 1970's that this Pan-Islamist current was informally reconstituted... through "a general political liberalization and the national affirmation of the Bosnian Muslims allowed some former Young Muslims to take part in the renewal of Islamic religious institutions (1999:2).

The religious revivalism in Bosnia increased due to some internal and external conditions that happened during 1970's. Fikret Karcic had offered several reasons for increasing revivalism such as;

the increased power of all Yugoslav citizens, including Muslims, due to the loans they received from abroad and the remittances of the guest works in Western Europe...massive reconstruction of mosques throughout Yugoslavia...the 1970s also saw the emergence of a new generation of young Muslim graduates, not only from the Middle Eastern universities but also from state universities of Yugoslavia...the first M.A and P.H.D. graduates returned to Bosnia (1997: 568).

The visibility of Islam in public life increased due to the massive reconstruction of mosques. During the first years of Tito's regime, most of the mosques were turned into museums, or were not reconstructed after the war. 1970's had witnessed the increase number of mosques. Another important reason derived from the new generation of intellectuals who were educated within and outside Yugoslavia. An important aspect of the religious revivalism is the language that it used. With the public appearance of religion and with its increased role in individuals' lives, a new language emerged among the Muslim population in Bosnia. "One of the main characteristic of the Islamic revival is the increasing use of Islamic vocabulary in political life and the emergence of organizations inspired by Islam" (Karcic F, 1997:573).

The death of Tito had created dissident among the Yugoslav citizens and nationalists discourses and ideas, after Tito died, had increased. Religion, during 1980's became an instrument for the spreading nationalists' ideas not only for Bosnian Muslims but also for Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia. Some of the most important figures in the development of national identity of Bosnian Muslims were among the religious revivalists and who were also the members of Young Muslim Organization. Alija Izzetbegovic and Omer Behmen were among them. Izzetbegovic, who later became the president of Bosnia and the leader of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), wrote Islamic Declaration in 1969. In the declaration, Izzetbegovic offered his views on modernization and Islam. He favored the pan-Islamist ideology not a nationalist discourse in the declaration. For instance, he argues that nationalist

ideas in Muslim world had no Islamic origin. Rather, pan-Islamism had an Islamic root (1990, 64). Muslims should not sacrifice themselves for a nation, “a Muslim can die only in the name of Allah and for the glory of Islam, or flee the battlefield” (ibid, 7). In order for Muslims to cultivate themselves, they should ‘move towards Islamic renewal, or passivity and stagnation. For the Muslim peoples, there is no third possibility’ (ibid, 7). He continues with saying that “Islamic rebirth cannot begin without religious revolution, but it cannot be successfully continued and completed without a political one” (ibid, 51). So within declaration, the pan-Islamists ideas were written, the conditions of Muslim population within and outside Bosnia was analyzed. However declaration was understood as the propaganda of Muslims of Bosnia in search for a Muslim state. On the basis of the declaration Izzetbegovic and twelve of his friends who were also members of Mladi Muslimani were accused of being Islamic fundamentalist and spreading Muslim nationalism. Omer Behmen and Hasan Cengic were among the well-known members of Mladi Muslumani. Izzetbegovic and his friends accused for their effort to construct a Muslim state within Bosnian territory and Islamicized Bosnia (Behmen, 2008:108). Izzetbegovic sentenced to twelve years but released in the fifth year of imprisonment.

Islamic declaration can be interpreted as a Muslim nationalist propaganda or it can be interpreted as a devout Muslims’ understanding of Islam and the relations between Islam and society. Either way Yugoslav administration considered it as a threat to unity of Yugoslavia due to the increasing nationalist ideas. During 1980’s not only Muslim intellectuals, but also Serb and Croat intellectuals were put to trial. For instance, “Vojislav Seselj, later a notorious Serb nationalist, was prosecuted and sentenced to eight years in prison in 1984. He was ‘guilty’ because of ‘counterrevolutionary activities” (Andjelic, 2003:44). Nationalist ideas among Muslims were not widespread, rather a cultural or religious revivalism can be observed until the beginning of 1990’s. Although the seeds of the nationalist ideas, as it will be explained in the next section, derived from the ideas of Mladi Muslimani, the revivalist ideas of 1970’s and 1980’s had cultural and religious meaning. Fikret Karcic argues that ‘the revival of Islamic cultural identity was a Muslim reaction to an existing threat to their vital rights and interests’ (1997:578). It was not until 1990’s that the nationalism among Bosnian Muslims began to accelerate and took its

shape. The debates before 1990's did not have a nationalist discourse; it was rather to protect the very identity of Bosnian Muslims. However with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and aggressive nationalism within individual republics had also pulled the trigger among Bosnian Muslims. The political party of Muslims, SDA, adopted a party program in which religious and national identity interwoven. It can be argued that "the Communist attempts to create a Muslim nation in Bosnia without Islam... have failed. Both Bosnaiks and Pomaks eventually realized that without Islam they cannot keep their identities nor exist as nations" (Karcic, 1997:578).

4.4.4. The Politics of the Party of Democratic Action and the Bosnian War

The end of 1980's and beginning of the 1990's had witnesses a shift from one party rule to multi-party politics in Yugoslavia. The new conditions that emerged with a shift towards democracy and political pluralism and due to the acceleration of nationalism among Serbs and Croats, the necessity for Bosnian Muslims to balance power of other nationalities and to protect the interests of Bosnian Muslims emerged. This need, in turn, necessitates a political party that represents Muslims in general. Not long after, a political organization emerged, and this organization was comprised of Muslim intellectuals who were put to trial in 1983 and their supporters (Behmen, 2008:111). This newly emerged party named as Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA).

The leader of the Party was Alija Izzetbegovic. Izzetbegovic was a member of Young Muslim (Mladi Muslumani) during and after the Second World War and after the war ended, many members of Mladi Muslumani were arrested as being member of an anti-communist and Islamist terrorist organization. Izzetbegovic was among them and had been tried twice (in 1946 and in 1983) and in both of the trials, he was found guilty and sentenced to three years in 1946 and to fourteen years in 1983 though after five years of imprisonment, he was released (Behmen, 2008). As it is stated, Izzetbegovic was a member of Young Muslims and the party was also closely associated with the Young Muslim organization. Behmen argues that the decision related to the establishment and later regulation of SDA was taken by the

organization of Young Muslims. He also states that Izzetbegovic was the father of the party and other intellectuals who were arrested in 1983 were the masterminds of the party (2008:111). SDA was founded in order to protect Muslims of Yugoslavia, and the party was closely associated itself with Islam. As Fikret Karcic argues

SDA defined itself as a political union of citizens of Yugoslavia who belong to Muslim cultural and historical circle'. The party used certain Muslim symbols such as the green colored flag with the crescent and introduced into public discourse almost forgotten Muslim greetings (1997:574).

When the multi-party elections were held in the republics of Yugoslavia nationalist parties won the elections without exception. First election was held in 1990 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and SDA won 38 % of the votes. During 1990 and 1991 nationalist tendency and discourses increased and discussions on the separation from the republics had begun especially among Slovenes and Croats. However the idea of secession did not welcome within the Bosnian territory. The leaders of SDA and Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) were in favor of the loose federation whereas Serbian Democratic Party (Sirpska Demokratska Stranka:SDS) sided with Serbia and favored the idea of Greater Serbia. SDA had three main themes on the discussions about the future of Bosnia; "sovereignty of the Bosnian Muslim nation, the independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and territorial autonomy of the Sandjak" (Bougarel, 1999:7).

The SDA did not have a secessionist policy during the disintegration of Yugoslavia and also during the Bosnian war. At the same time, it did not advocate the idea of Yugoslavism, it had a clear national aims as Babuna points out that

In contrast to the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, the major Muslim party in the interwar period, which had been forced to conceal its Muslim identity behind Southslavism, the SDA had clear national aims. This party described the Bosnian Muslims as an autochthonous Bosnian nation (narod) and as one of the historical nations of Yugoslavia (2006:410).

In 1991 Slovene and Croatia declared their independence and the members of European Community recognized these states. Bosnia Herzegovina did also declare its independence but EC did not recognize it. It proposed a referendum for Bosnian population. In 1992 a referendum took place and Bosnian population declared that they were in favor of independence. However Bosnian Serbs boycotted the

referendum. The day that referendum passed for independence was the beginning of the Bosnian War. The detailed information about the Bosnian War was given in the Second Chapter under the heading of 'The War and End of Yugoslavia' (2.6.1), so further information on the war will not be given in this section. Rather the position that SDA took during the war and also the ideas of some important intellectuals and political leaders will be given in order to understand the rising nationalist discourses among Bosnian Muslims importance of war for the Bosnian Muslims.

It is important to begin with the party politics in general as the party represent most of the Muslims in Bosnia. Bosnian war had great importance for Muslim populations in Bosnia. SDA did not want to create a Muslim state; party wanted to protect territorial integrity and supported the idea of living together, maintaining the mosaic within Bosnia. As Babuna highlights "the fact remains that the creation of the Muslim state has not been the priority of the Bosnian Muslim leadership" (2006:416). The most important policy that party adopted during the war was favoring federalism in which each nationality within Bosnia will be equal partners and share equal power in governance. The protection of Bosnian Muslims and the territorial integrity of Bosnia were not new in Muslim politics. Both Muslim National Organization and Yugoslav Muslim Organization had the same goals. So the new political party had also the same motivations while entering the new federation. During the war, SDA had against the partition of Bosnia and Bosnian Muslims, and rejected the drafts of agreements that did not propose integrity, autonomy and federal state. So the policy of the party can be summarized as "the preservation of the federal state, its integrity and a large degree of self-rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were to be the consequences of a 'modern federation'" (Andjelic, 2003:156).

Although SDA had favored the living together with other nationalities, it did not advocate a supra-national identity like Yugoslavism or Bosnian. The party wanted to enhance the national identity of Bosnian Muslims. Bougarel (1999) argues that

On the one hand, the SDA wanted to carry on the Muslim national affirmation... by providing the Muslim community with all identity attributes

of a nation (language, literature, history, etc.). On the other hand, it wanted to reassert the central place of Islam within this nascent national identity (10).

The Party had never denied its closeness and openness to Islam. The members of the party had always found the foundation of their identity in religion. However its closeness to religion and the name of the nationality had created discontent among the Muslim population, especially among elites. The name of the nationality was Muslim until 1993 and this name was not supported by some of the intellectuals. Some of the intellectuals offered Bosniak for the name of the nation as it can be interpreted as a secular name. So the discussions on the name of nationality had resulted in 1993. “the Bosniak Assembly, a body composed of 349 politicians, clerics and intellectuals, convened in Sarajevo to function as a consultative body of the Bosnian Muslim. This assembly accepted bosnjastvo as the national identity of the Bosnian Muslims” (Babuna, 2006: 417) and the name of the nationality was changed to Bosniak. This change had been made in order to increase the national consciousness and recognition by providing a secular name. Bougarel argues that

The members of the pan-Islamist current were only ratifying a change which was by this time favored by a large majority of the Bosnian elites, and was made necessary for the insertion of the Muslim community into a European political order resting on the nation-state principle (1999:12).

The Assembly created a consensus among Muslim elites through choosing a secular name. The concept of bosnjastvo was adopted, and this concept stressed the territorial attachment to Bosnia, and meant being Bosnian historically. However, SDA also attached a religious meaning to the national identity of the Bosnian Muslims and this can be best seen in the speeches of some intellectuals. For instance, Rushmir Mahmutcehavic, who was the chief at the Commission of Social questions, stated that

The culture of the Bosnian Muslims is sacred in its foundations, even though some people (...) have attempted to impose a brutal secularization on it. In fact, this secularization consisted of a separation of the cultural superstructure from its sacred basis (Bougarel, 1999:10).

So for Mahmutcehavic, the culture of the Bosnian Muslims is attached to its religion and the secularization effort the culture and religion is tried to be separated meant “destroying the Muslims’ awareness of their own culture of its historical forms”

(ibid, 10). Fikret Muslimovic, then the chief of the Department for Morale at the general staff of the Bosnian Army also created a link between nation and religion by stating that

Officers... adapt their behavior to the religious tradition of their nation...when respect is expressed with a great emotion for the victims of the genocide against our nation, the officers must show that they are aware that the genocide against our nation has precisely the purpose of eliminating our religious traditions (ibid, 11)

So in general, the government officers and who were close to the Party were in favor of a national identity that is composed of a historical territory and a culture that created out of religion. However in order to be recognized as a secular nation and to be supported by other secular intellectuals, Bosnian Muslims took the name Bosniak.

The war in Bosnia created solidarity among Bosnian Muslims. Although there was not a homogenous idea of Bosnia and the nation, through war it through consensuses and through negotiations between Muslim intellectuals a common ground was likely to be found in relation to the past. What is also important to note that due to the war the Bosnian Muslims became the object of the conditions and this has contributed to the national awareness and increasing solidarity among Muslims. War and the increasing nationalism in neighbor states also led to the emergence of nationalism for Bosnian Muslims. Loyalty to the territory, being a single unit against the enemy and the idea of fighting for a national cause spread among the population. In 1994 Izzetbegovic made a speech concerning the war in the Congress of the Party. He argued that Muslims in Bosnia or more properly Bosniak nation has decided to be an active agent in what was going after the dissolution of Yugoslavia rather than being object of it (Izzetbegovic, 2011: 68). To be an agent meant solidarity and loyalty to the nation. Another important speech of Izzetbegovic, again in 1994, also showed the commitment of Izzetbegovic and his supporter to the national cause. He argues that Bosniak nation demands its state since a nation without its state is like homeless family (ibid, 89).

The argument of the ethnosymbolist and modernists to nations and nationalism which states that nationalism makes the nation, not the way around is

valid for the case of Bosnian Muslims. The increasing nationalisms of other nationalities within Yugoslavia increase the Muslim consciousness and they had to be nationalists in the Bosnian war to protect their survival. The role of war in making nations will be analyzed in the next section but it is important here to note that the Bosnian war, while erasing a supra-national identity, help to the creation of a national one, with a name, a specific territory that can be called homeland, a language and a newly emerged public culture peculiar to that nation.

4.4.5. Construction of the Nation and National Identity

After the recognition as a separate nationality, the conditions that Bosnian Muslims in had drastically changed. Although most of the Muslims defined themselves different from the Serbs and Croats, the Serbs and Croats were not willing to recognize the distinctiveness of the Bosnian Muslims. Through recognition, the status of Bosnian Muslims recognized as separate nationality de jure. This paved the way for Bosnian Muslims to create their national identity so Muslims began to discuss the possible features of their identity. The importance of intellectual debates was given during the study however the context within which intellectual debates were done has also crucial importance. After 1970's it is known that political as well as religious liberalization had took place in Yugoslavia. Republics were given the power of self-administration; religious institutions were given the authority for education and cultural affairs. In such an environment, where freedom prevails over pressure, the intellectual debates were much more nourishing than other periods.

The role of Islamic Religious Community (later became Islamic Community) in preserving the cultural and traditional structure of Bosnian Muslim was given above. They were in favor of a supra-national identity rather than a national one, and wanted to protect the existence of Bosnian Muslim within Yugoslav mosaic. Secular intellectuals, on the other hand, can be categorized into two, those who were in favor of a Yugoslav identity while protecting the individuality of Bosnian Muslims and separating nationality and religion and those who wanted to construct a secular Muslim identity, based on Bosniakdom. The second category, those who were in favor of the concept of Bosniak, had crucial importance for the creation of a secular

national identity. They highlighted the attachment to a territory, a common culture that was deteriorated in time and need to be constructed again without reference to a specific religion. However, the most important components of the Bosniak national identity was proposed by the religious intellectuals at first and then by the SDA, through its policies during and after the war.

The multi-party elections that were held within Yugoslavia were the most important indicators of the increasing nationalism throughout Yugoslavia as nationalist parties won most of votes. The declaration of independence of Croatia and Slovene and Serbian aggressive response to these declarations was another important indicator of accelerated nationalism. Serbian demands to become the sole representative of the Serbs throughout Yugoslavia and its efforts to become one had a domino effect on Yugoslavia. In order to prevent Serbian aggressive nationalism, each republic had increased their discourses on nationalism and as Smith argues “it was nationalism that energized and legitimated the discontents of ethnic communities, large and small” (1981:23).

The nationalist party of Bosnian Muslim was SDA. SDA became the most influential representative of the Bosnian Muslims in political area and it won most of the votes of Bosnian Muslims. There was another party, Muslim Bosniak Organization, but they gained only two seats in the assembly. So it can be argued that, SDA is the sole representative of the Bosnian Muslims in the Assembly. Izzetbegovic and SDA had national claims for the Bosnian Muslims. They wanted to increase the solidarity among Muslims and for them Islam is the most influential marker of identity. They used religious symbols during their public meetings, and Izzetbegovic used Islamic vocabulary during his public speeches (such as *esselamu aleykum* or [bismillahirrahmanirrahim](#)). Before the war broke out, SDA had already created their public image as devout Muslims. As Lederer (2001) points out “the ruling party has had pronounced Islamic orientation and the symbiosis of ethnic national identities, ideology and power” (9). However SDA did not really represent the Bosnian Muslims in relation to religion as it cannot be suggested that Muslim population in Bosnia were devout Muslims. Tone Bringa (1995) explains the relation with religion among Muslim population

Attendance at mosque was at a low during the restrictive fifties and once more in the eighties, when alleged fears of pan-Islamic demonstrations led to a harsh attitude on the part of the authorities toward all public Islamic activities. The late 1980's saw a new openness toward religion, reflected, among other things, in the number of new mosque being built. The fall of communism opened the way for the free expression of religious faith and devotion without the fear of being accused of Muslim nationalism or fundamentalism (204).

So it is clear that religious practices had increased with the religious liberalization and also with Islamic revivalism. The devoutness of Bosnian Muslims cannot be proven objectively. However, what is important about religion in Bosnia is that, although it is highlighted several times during the study, it is the only differentiation marker between Serbs, Croats and Muslims. So being Muslim means not being Serb or not being Croat. Again Bringa rightly argues that “although the collective identities of ‘Bosnian’ and ‘Muslim’ referred to different categories, they shared one essential characteristic in the way that they were constructed, as against ‘Serb’ and ‘Croat’” (ibid, 33).

The war, however, changed the situation for Bosnian Muslims. During the war, religion had gained more importance due to the discourses of SDA and Izzetbegovic. The war was displayed a religious war between Serbs and Croats. Bougarel argues that

the slogan promoting the idea that the Serb and Croat genocidal projects or Western indifference to the plight of the Bosnian Muslims were ‘just because we are Muslims’ (*‘samo zato što smo muslimani’*) was already present in speeches held by political and religious leaders on the eve of the war and remained one of the key elements of the war rhetoric aimed at the local Muslim population (2005: 170).

So the aggressive nationalism of Serbs and Croats were displayed by the Muslim politicians as if they were targeting to the Bosnian Muslims just because of their religion. The validity of the argument is not in the scope of this study, but its meaning is. The nationalism among Muslims grew during the war and religion and nationality started to be equated by the leaders. Hobsbawm argues that “the links between religion and national consciousness can be very close...In fact, the relation seems to grow closer where nationalism becomes a mass force than in its phase as a minority ideology and activists’ movement” (2010:67). War has widened the scope

of nationalism from an elite phenomenon to an ideology of the population. So during the war, religion became the massive force in the creation of national consciousness and became an instrument for nationalists. In other words “in wartime circumstances, Islam was expected to bolster the fighting spirit of the Bosnian Army and to broaden the primarily local motivation of its soldiers” (Bougarel, 2007:172)

The role of nationalism in making nations is immense let us briefly recall nationalism. For Breulliy nationalism is “a political movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population, some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential nation” (2005:17). Smith defines nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' (1991:73-74) or Gellner defines it as ‘a primarily political principle which holds that political and national unit should be congruent’ (2006:1). While Breulliy and Gellner argues that it is political, Smith argues that it is ideological. However the common point among them is “Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the way around” (Hobsbawm, 2010: 10). It is the mass mobilization that is created through nationalism that paves the way for the possibility of nations. It is also valid for the Bosnian Muslims and the mobilization en masse was made possible by the Bosnian war. As Smith argues “not only do wars mobilize large sections of the community, often under extreme circumstances, they also give rise to myths of battle and furnish examples of heroism and collective sacrifice for emulation by subsequent generations” (1981:47). The reason for the spread of nationalism to the Muslim population in general is can be found in the war itself. It created a common suffering among Bosnian Muslims and also a common cause to fight. The war bounded people together in their deceased, in their lost and in their sufferings.

Nationalism, as a self-reflexive ideology of community, preaches the need for liberty, fraternity, and solidarity, particularly in suffering; and nowhere are these sentiments and bonds more palpably expressed than in the common fried and collective piety for the sacrifice of war heroes who fell in defense of the fatherland or motherland (Smith, 2000:74).

The role of war in making nations is also analyzed by Hutchinson and he argues that “most of the nation-states that came into existence before the mid-twentieth century were created by war or had their boundaries defined by wars or internal violence” (2007:42). There is no reason to think that the role of war diminished in the twenty-first century as the function of the war did not change. It unites people for a common cause, the common cause will be territory, autonomy or freedom.

The nationalists use pre-existing ties and unique cultural resources to provide a national identity to the population so “the task of nationalists is to rediscover the unique cultural genius of the nation and restore to a people its authentic cultural identity” (Smith, 2010:27). For Bosnian Muslims, or at least for SDA, the authentic cultural identity can be found in religion and religious traditions. The ethnicity and religion, and later the nationality cannot be separated for the Muslim politicians. So it is not surprising that during the war religious-tone of the SDA had increased, they began to use religious terms more and they also equated the religion with nationality. Smith argues that

In earlier epochs, ethnicity is rarely separated from religious tradition; and as a result the cultural resources which can be sanctified and used by pre-modern ethnic or national leaders and by modern nationalists come with a definite religious aura...the more of these sources, and the more intense and potent they are, the more likely are we observe to the formation and persistence of given nation (2005:101).

So the potential sources for SDA leaders to establish a nation were found in religious traditions and in Islam. They used Islam as a source of identity and tried to make it a part of the national identity. However, national identity is something secular and thus religion is not the only element. Nationalism is also a secular ideology but Smith argues that “not only have nationalists often found it necessary to appeal to the religious sentiments of the masses, but they have also found it relatively easy to identify the nation with the religious community” (Smith, 1991:49). The adoption of a secular name of Bosnian Muslims can be evaluated as their effort to establish a secular national identity. In order to be counted as a nation, at least in the eyes of the Europe, they needed to adopt secular identity and the change in the name of the nationality was the first step. It should be also noted that another reason behind the adoption of secular name was to satisfy the different Muslim elite groups. There

were secular intellectuals who were not content with the name of the nationality. To have popular support and to become the sole political representative was important for SDA and for the mobilization of masses so in the Assembly SDA also favored the secular name. As Brass argues “the important goal for nationalist movements in this regard is exclusivity, the drive to become the sole political representative of the community so that the community may act cohesively and unitedly” (Brass, 1980:42).

Another step for secularizing the identity can be found in the change of the meanings of some religious vocabularies or traditions. For instance, the term ‘*šehid*’ is used for the ones who died in the battles that are done for the name of Allah, or for the sake of the protection of Muslim ummah. During the Bosnian war, the word ‘*šehid*’ were used for the Bosnian Muslims who died in the war. ‘*šehid*’s were war heroes as well as heroes of religion. Their places are reserved in heaven according to Islamic belief. However the term started to lose its religious meaning and gain a secular meaning, people who died for the nation, without making exception according to religion were started to be named as *šehid* . Bougarel (2005) argues that

at the same time as the term ‘*šehid*’ has been gaining currency, it has also partly lost its religious meaning...A clear sign that the term ‘*šehid*’ has been undergoing a process of secularisation are the graves marked ‘*Bosanski šehid*’ (‘Bosnian *Šehid*’) that can be found in parks and other public places. In this case, the title ‘*šehid*’ is given to an unknown person whose personal beliefs and motivations, and possibly even religious identity, remain a mystery (175).

Nation-states are the product of modernity and also they meant to be secular. The efforts of Bosniak political leader to gain a secular identity are due to the idea that modern nations are secular, the devotion to religion had to be replaced by some other things, in this case, by nation. Through some processes stated above, Bosniak leaders transformed some of the religious rituals or religious names into secular one as “the modern democratic state needs a healthy degree of what used to be called patriotism, a strong sense of identification with the polity, and a willingness to give oneself for its sake” (Taylor, 1998:44).

Another important development occurred during and after the war. Theories of nationalism put great importance on the language. For instance, Anderson (2006) claimed that print capitalism had reinforced the use of vernacular language, which ultimately led to the emergence of nationalism. At the same time, development of literature has contributed to the emergence of national consciousness (Smith, 2002:21). Language and religion are the main sources of the public culture, which is important for the development of nation. For Smith the common language and religion are not by themselves enough to create a public culture. “This language or religion must become a common public property and part of an acknowledged, or official, distinctive culture” (ibid, 20). During the disintegration period and onwards, Croats, Serbs and lastly Bosnian Muslims tried to separate their language to have a unique one. “After the break-up of Yugoslavia, the constitutions of the newly founded states declared Croatian (1990) and Serbian (1992) as the official languages in the respective states” (Holmes, 2004:8). With the abandonment of Serbo-Croatian language, Bosnian Muslims too had to change the language of the name. In 1993, they replaced it with Bosnian language, which only used by ethnic Bosniaks. However the change in the name did not mean that the language is unique, so Bosniak linguists tried to bring in its uniqueness through

by stressing – in pronunciation and orthography, but especially in vocabulary and phraseology – the Oriental heritage of the Bosniaks, whose Islamic faith had for centuries been reflected in proportionately greater usage of Turkisms (themselves not infrequently derived from Persian or Arabic sources) by comparison with Serbs or Croats (Bugarski, 2004:32).

The attempts of Bosniak linguists to create a language continued during and after the war. For instance in 1995 a dictionary has written. In this dictionary the authors

Launches a passionate analysis of peculiarities in the Bosniak vocabulary, although without a consistent method and without stating clear criteria for the ‘Bosniak’ character of words. At the same time, the Muslim nationalist press abounds with ‘Turkisms’, that is Turkish words and verbal forms, and the use of ‘h’ – peculiar to Turkish – is growing, as is the frequency of Arabic words (Malobotta, 2004:810).

The attempts of Bosniaks to create their own language had political implications. They tried to create a standard for the language that they use so to establish the

public culture. The attempts had also showed that Bosniaks, in order to construct the language, used their authentic past, which is unique for the. Hobsbawm argues that

national languages are therefore almost always semi-artificial constructs... the main in their construction being usually, which dialect to choose as the base of the standardizing and homogenized language...Sometimes this choice is political or has obvious political implications” (2010:54).

So it can be concluded that Bosnian Muslim became a nation with Bosnian war. They enhanced their sources of identity. Spreading nationalism within Yugoslavia had triggering effect for the emergence of Muslim nationalism and during the war the features of Bosniak national identity has been shaped by rediscovering the past, revaluing some sources of identity. Through nationalism and the Bosnian war, the Bosniaks constituted a nation and constructed a national identity by using religion at first and then transforming some of the religious traditions into secular one. In the words of Velikonja

the Bosniaks strengthened their own Bosniak nationalism “by giving greater emphasis to the most distinctive thing about it, its religious component” on one hand, while emphasizing “that they stood for the preservation of Bosnia’s unique character as a multi-national, multi-religious republic” on the other (2003:253).

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

Before giving concluding remark for the study, brief information on Bosnia will be given as a reminder. Bosnia has deeply rooted history. Its existence in history can be dated back to the tenth century. Its geography had always provided with some autonomy over its land. Byzantium and Hungary ruled over Bosnia until the end of the twelve century. However their rule did not change the climate within Bosnia. Bosnian people developed a territorial attachment and it still exists today. Bosnia always protected its own culture. It can be argued that Bosnia had protected its autonomy, culture and religion even under the powerful empires. In medieval Bosnia, there were three churches; Orthodox, Catholic and Bosnian Church. The bans of Bosnia were generally Catholic. However, some historians argued that Bogomilism, rather than Catholicism was adopted by Bosnian Church and the Bans of the Bosnia. Several attempts were made in order to convert Bosnian Church to a fully Catholic one. In 1180 Bosnia gained its sovereignty and it lasted until the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia in 1463.

The Ottoman occupation of Bosnia had important consequences for the history of Bosnia. After the Ottoman occupation, the population of Bosnia started to convert to Islam gradually. The reasons for the conversion will be given in the second chapter in detailed however it is important to note that conversion to Islam had affected the history of the Bosnian Muslims for good. Due to the conversion, many Bosnian notables became Muslim and being Muslim in a Muslim Empire brought some privileges to the notables. During Ottoman period, Bosnian Muslims protected their territorial attachment and developed a religious identity because of the millet strategy of Ottomans. During Ottoman rule, the distinction between South Slavs started to be made easily. There were Orthodox millet, Catholic millet and Muslims. The differentiation marker between South Slav was religion and their identity affiliation evolved around religion and turned into distinct ethnicities. The diminishing power of Ottomans created uprisings among Balkan population in

general and Bosnian population in particular. However Muslim revolts did not aim at overthrowing the Ottoman rule rather they were to protect the Bosnian Muslims individuality and privileges as it is explained in the second chapter (2.4.2.). At the same time, the decreasing power of the Ottomans in the Balkans resulted with the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia.

Bosnian Muslims during Austro-Hungarian rule had developed an identity based on territory and religion. They wanted to protect their status in society as well as they wanted to maintain their religious practices. Austro-Hungarian period was marked by the struggle of Bosnian Muslims for their existence. In this period, for the first time, Bosnian Muslims mobilized en masse, they created a political party and they won religious and educational autonomy, which is crucial for their sense of community and formation of ethnicity. After the WWI, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established, and renamed to Yugoslavia and during the interwar period, Bosnian Muslims used a clientele strategy in order to protect their distinct identity so they adopted, at least in the political arena, Yugoslavism. After the Second World War and with the Communist regime, religion was oppressed and was brought under state control. However from the beginning of the 1950s when the new constitution adopted and especially with the election of new Reis-ul-Ulema in 1957, the balance of religious affairs had shifted in favor of the Muslim institution, Islamic Religious community. In 1968 Muslims were recognized as separate nationality.

Recognition of Bosnian Muslim as a separate nationality was a turning point. From then on intellectuals tried to construct a national identity. Intellectual debates were mainly between Islamic Community, secular reformists and religious revivalist. Religion gained public appearance during 1970's and 1980's. The liberalized environment paved the way not only for religious revivalism but also for nationalism. Nationalist ideas spread all around the Yugoslavia. Each republic established its own Writers' Union which meant separate historiography and separate linguistic. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was felt in every republic without exception but Bosnia was the last to feel it. Aggressive nationalism of Serbs in Serbia as well as reactionary nationalism of Croats affected Bosnia as there were Serbs and Croats in Bosnia. The independence declaration of Croatia and Slovene did not welcome by Serbs whereas the Europe recognized their independence. The declaration of

independence of Bosnia, however, was not accepted by European Community, and a referendum was made with the proposal of EC. Although Serbs within Bosnia boycotted the referendum, the result was in favor of independence and Bosnia declared its independence and EC recognized it. The next day after the declaration of independence, Bosnian war had began.

During the war, national consciousness of the Bosnian Muslim increased due to the emergence of a common goal among Bosnian Muslim. It created a unity and enhanced the solidarity. War erased the differences between elites and made them to find a common ground. The elites increased their interaction to fight back and protect the Bosnian Muslims. In 1993, the Bosnian Muslims started to call themselves Bosniak. They entered the war as Bosnian Muslims but they existed from it as Bosniak, as a separate nation, with a separate and unique national identity.

In this study the arguments of modernist approach in relation to the modernity of nations and the role of nationalism in making nations are taken for granted. These arguments are not only supported by modernists, they are also arguments of ethnosymbolist approach. Thus, the study is based on ethnosymbolist approach. The basic argument of ethnosymbolism is it “regards the central components of ethnic and national phenomena as both socio-cultural and symbolic, rather than demographic or political” (Smith, 2000:66). Modernists generally regard nation formation and nationalism as something political without measuring their impact on individuals. Nationalists might have political interests in mobilizing the masses but people, who are to be mobilized, had different motivations in response to nationalist discourses. The symbolic component of ethnosymbolism is its emphasis on homeland, shared culture, and ancestral memory. Although Smith argues that ethnic and national phenomena are socio-cultural and symbolic, these are not just subjective and perception of individuals. In the words of Smith

Such symbolic clusters are both subjective, in their reference to individual perceptions and beliefs, and objective because their patterning produces a structure of social relations and cultural institutions that persist across the generations, independent of any individual beliefs and perceptions (*ibid*, 66).

Smith argues that although the idea of nation had subjective meaning as it touches upon individuals’ perception, it also had an objective side as it produces cultural institutions that maintain its existence through generations. Cultural elements are not

invented by the nationalist during the formation of the nation. Rather nationalist uses existing cultural elements and Smith argues that “cultural elements are as much part of social reality as any material or organizational factors; indeed social reality is inconceivable outside of symbolism” (2009:25)

Making a nation from an ethnic community, for the Bosnian case, was a collective movement. Intellectuals and politicians were actively involved in the process but they were not the only participants. Ordinary citizens were also actively involved in the nation-formation process. If the censuses of Yugoslavia are examined it is obvious that Muslims did not consider themselves as Serbs or Croats. They always knew that they were different from them. Thus the alternative options given for the Bosnian Muslims and also for the other ethnicities that was not counted as nationalities, such as ‘undecided Yugoslav’ and ‘undetermined Yugoslav’ were the options that Muslims had chose until the Muslim option emerged. It is not a scientific way to interpret the things that did not occur but if many Muslims had chose Serbian or Croatian nationality in the censuses, the nationalists of the Bosnian Muslims may not be successful as they were in creation of the nation. Nationalism and nation formation for ethnosymbolists is not just an elite led project, or political agenda. Smith argues that “ethnosymbolic approaches also helpful in directing our attention away from an exclusive concern with elites and their strategies... emotional and moral dimensions of national identity back into focus” (*ibid*, 70). The censuses of the Yugoslavia were best examples of the emotional and moral dimensions of national identity.

Ethnosymbolist approach regards ethnicity as the basis of the nation. The basis of the ethnicities, on the other hand, might be varied but Smith argues that some religious community can turn into ethnicity. “Religious communities are often closely related to ethnic identities. While the 'world religions' sought to overstep and abolish ethnic boundaries most religious communities coincided with ethnic groups” (Smith, 1991:6). This argument is valid for the Bosnian Muslims. Bosnian Muslims, by being an Islamic faith, did not develop an ethnic consciousness at first, they maintained their existence as a religious community; but after ruled by a Christian Empire they use religious differences in creating first their ethnicity and their nation. In this study, ethnicity is taken for the basis of a nation and Brass’ premise on the

development of nationality is taken as a way to examine the process of nation formation.. He states that

There are two stages in the development of a nationality. The first is the movement from ethnic category to community....the second stage in the transformation of ethnic group involves the articulation and acquisition of social, economic and political rights for the members of the group or for the group as a whole (1980:8-9).

Ethnicity played great role in the formation of nations as Hutchinson argues “In many periods in history ethnicity provides an important framework of collective identity and of collective political action” (2004:12). To speak about ethnicity first we need to analyze transition from ethnic category to community. The community requires a consciousness and for the consciousness emerged interaction and solidarity is needed. Under Ottomans, Bosnian Muslims were the members of Muslim community. This had changed with the Austro occupation. They had to create their own community and with the effort of landowners and religious elites, ulema, they created a Muslim community under Austro-Hungarian Empire. The path towards a community for Bosnian Muslims was established step by step and at the end they established a political party (MNO) that represents Bosnian Muslims in general. Party advocated every stratum among the Bosnian Muslims.

The efforts of the intellectuals during Yugoslavia to protect their individual identity had helped to maintain the link between the past and the present. Ethnosymbolist approach put great importance on the ethnic past of ethnicities. Smith argues that “the ethnic past may influence the national present through established continuities” (2000:63). The sources of ethnic identity of the Bosnian Muslims are transferred to the national identity and it is due to the fact that Muslim nationalists and intellectuals never departed from their history and kept their sources of identity alive. After being recognized as a separate nationality Muslim intellectuals and politicians tried to construct the features of their national identity. During this period, many books written during Ottoman period or Austro period had republished in order to link the past and presents. The sources of national identity were found in the sources of ethnic identity. As Smith puts it “the past influences the present through the tendency of later generations, especially of nationalists, to

rediscover, authenticate, and appropriate aspects of what they assume is their ethnic past” (2000:63)

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia nationalist ideas increased and Muslims did not drop behind. In the first multi-party election throughout Yugoslavia, nationalist parties won most of the votes and Bosnia was not an exception. The motivation behind Muslim nationalist party, namely SDA was religion. They used religious symbols and religious flags in their meetings. They used Arabic vocabulary and they always appealed to Islam and its rules during their meetings. For ethnosymbolists appealing to religion is not unusual for nationalists. “Not only have nationalists often found it necessary to appeal to the religious sentiments of the masses, but they have also found it relatively easy to identify the nation with the religious community” (Smith, 1991:49). The nationalism developed first among the leaders of the SDA and then it spread to the Muslim population. Nationalism is the key to the development of nations. “Nationalism has endowed ethnicity with a wholly new self-consciousness and legitimacy, as well as fighting spirit and political direction” (Smith, 1981:20). It pulls the trigger and if it is successful, it makes the nations.

The Bosnian war had accelerated the public appearance of religious symbols. Wars are important in making nations. Hutchinson argues that

warfare by itself may strengthen and reinforce identities but cannot by itself create them. For a population to defend itself militarily, there already has to be a sense of common values and interests around which they can be mobilized (2007:45).

During the war, Bosniak population had reinforced their already existing solidarity. Those who did not feel solidarity to the Bosniak population started to develop a loyalty and a common cause for their population. SDA leaders defined the war as a war against the Muslims, and they tried to mobilize people with religious motivations. In 1993, the name of the nationality was changed to Bosniak, which is a secular name and did not include religious theme. Smith argues that

In transition from a population whose members know only who they are not to one that know who they are, the act of conferring a collective proper name is critical to ethno genesis...Only when a collective proper name is conferred on a population, highlighting the unity of its parts, and only when it becomes

widely accepted by the members of the population, can a sense of distinctive ethnic identity begin to emerge (2009:46).

The term Bosniak is important for the ethno genesis of the Bosnian Muslims. It had a historical roots and it is a secular name. The name itself specified its historical existence and the abandoning a religious name increase the unity among Bosnian Muslims. Nevertheless SDA leaders had never denied their devotion to Islam. Though for the recognition as a secular nation they needed to change their discourses and adhere themselves to the secular ideas. The Bosnian war had united Bosnian Muslims. In a sense, it created a common enemy, a common past to mourn for, it created sorrow for the whole nation. At the end of the war, the Bosniaks, as a separate nation, had even their own language, 'Bosnian' language.

Ethnosymbolist approach

stress the importance of treating history of collective cultural identities and ideologies like nations and nationalism over long time spans...modern nations are not created ex nihilo; they have premodern antecedents that require investigation in order to establish the basis on which they were formed (Smith, 2000:63).

History, in the study of nations and nationalism, is regarded as a decisive factor for ethnosymbolist. Bosniak case is best explained through considering the historical path of the Bosnian Muslims, their evolution and their struggle for the search of an identity. History determines and shapes the future. During the Austro-Hungarian period many of the Muslim wrote their histories and during Tito's Yugoslavia and with the liberalization period, these writings were rewritten and published in order to create a link between past and present. These writings were represented as the bulwark of Muslim identity. Another important, also related point that ethno-symbolists advocate is that

only those symbolic elements that have some prior resonance among a large section of the population will be able to furnish the content of the proposed nation's political culture...we need to take into account pre-existing traditions, memories and symbolism among non-elites, just as elites themselves often had to alter their own ideas and symbols if they were to carry the majority of the population with them (Smith, 1981:31-3).

For the Bosniak nation their territory and religion had prior resonance. From the beginning of the medieval Bosnian state, territory was integral part of the Bosnian identity and with the Ottoman occupation religion became a part of the identity.

Bosnian Muslims, when feel threatened, necessitated the guarantee of the territorial integrity of Bosnia. Even in the war, the value of the territorial integrity was never abandoned. The peace plans that divide Bosnia was immediately refuted by SDA and Bosniak intellectuals. Another point that Smith made also manifested itself among Muslim political leader. For instance, the adoption of Bosniak as the national name reflected pre-existing traditions among non-elites. The term Bosniak was used for centuries and political elites of 1990's had to alter their position in relation to the name of the nationality and changed it to the Bosniak in order to 'carry the majority of the population with them'.

Modernists explain the emergence of nation-state in relation to some structural and economical changes such as industrialization that necessitates a homogenous society (Gellner, 2006) or some argues that in the construction of nation-state the aim was political (Hobsbawm, 2010) but at the same time they argue that nations are modern and can be imagined only in the age of nationalism. Primordialists, on the other hand, treat nations as something given, something biologically given and natural. Perennialists support the idea that nations exist since the antiquity. Ethnosymbolism explains the nations rather than nation-states and it "regards the central components of ethnic and national phenomena as both socio-cultural and symbolic, rather than demographic or political" (Smith, 2000: 66). And also argues that nations are modern and nationalism makes nations. Another important point is about secularism; secularism and nation-state are something complementary. They are the products of modernity. "the secularization thesis asserts that modernization brings in its wake the diminution of the social significance of religion" (Wallis and Bruce, 1992:11). So the nation-states are treated as free from religion and its impacts. As modernist nationalist approach deals with the emergence of nation-states rather than nations, it falls short to highlight the importance of religion and modernist approach and secularism thesis is closely associated with each other. For instance,

The elite condition often became generalized too, by the fact that modern society inducts everyone into the same mode of life, tends to wipe out the distinction between town and country, and inculcates in everyone the same social imaginary, relating to the society as a whole, particularly with the penetration everywhere of electronic media (Taylor, 2007:424).

The explanation of Taylor in relation to secularization is similar to that of Gellner's argument on the emergence of nation-states. In this argument he states nation-state cannot exist if

general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify" (1983: 55).

Although at the end, Bosniak had to develop a secular identity, they used religion at first and ethnosymbolist approach treats nationalism as a political religion. Modernity did not eradicate religion from individuals' and public life. As Taylor states "religious longing, the longing for and response to a more-than-immanent transformation perspective, remains a strong independent source of motivation in modernity (Taylor, 2007:530). Ethnosymbolist approach stresses the importance of religion as a source of motivation and in the formation of identity. To conclude ethnosymbolists focal point is nations, not nation state and thus it examines the subjective elements on the formation of nation. It analyzes the role of religion and religious institutions, the symbols and transformation of these subjective elements into objective institution. For these reasons, the formation of Bosniak nation is analyzed from the arguments of ethnosymbolists

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APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY

Dünya tarihinde birçok dönüm noktası yaşanmıştır ve bu noktalar hemen hemen bütün insanları etkilemektedir. Sovyetler Birliğinin ve Yugoslavya'nın dağılması da 20. Yüzyılın son çeyreğinde yaşanan en önemli dönüm noktalarından biri olarak adlandırılabilir. Bu ülkelerin dağılması sadece bu ülkelerde yaşayan insanları değil bütün dünyayı ilgilendirmektedir. Ancak bu çalışmanın konusu ne bu ülkelerin dağılması ne de dünya üzerindeki etkileridir. Bu çalışmanın konusu Yugoslavya'nın bir parçası olan, 1968 sonrasında ayrı bir millet olarak tanımlanan Bosnalı Müslümanların millet oluşum süreçlerinin incelenmesidir. Bu süreç milliyetçiliği tanımlayan, millet oluşum süreçlerini ve ulus-devletin inşasını sistematik bir şekilde inceleyen dört yaklaşıma referansla analiz edilecektir. Bu çalışma üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölümde milliyetçilik teorilerinin genel çerçevesi verilmiştir. Bu bölümde dört temel yaklaşım anlatılmıştır. Bu yaklaşımlar modern yaklaşım, primordial (kökense) yaklaşım, perennial yaklaşım ve etnosembolik yaklaşımdır. Milletlerin nasıl oluştuğu, milliyetçiliğin taşıyıcılarının neler olduğu, milletlerin veya milliyetçiliğin tarihsel olarak ne zaman ortaya çıktıkları bu bölümün ana konusudur. İkinci bölümde genel olarak Bosna tarihi ve özel olarak Bosnalı Müslümanların tarihi anlatılmıştır. Bu bölümün asıl amacı Balkan coğrafyası hakkında genel bir bilgi vermek böylece Bosnalı Müslümanlar hakkında daha genel bir çerçeve sunabilmektir. Üçüncü yani son bölümde ise Bosnalı Müslümanların millet oluşum süreçleri üç dönüm noktası baz alınarak milliyetçilik yaklaşımları üzerinden incelenecektir. Bu üç temel dönüm noktası Avusturya Macaristan'ın 1878'de Bosna'yı işgal etmesi, Bosnalı Müslümanların Yugoslav otoritesi tarafından 1968'de ayrı bir millet olarak tanınması ve 1992 ile 1995 yılları arasında gerçekleşen Bosna Savaşı olarak belirlenmiştir.

Bosnalı Müslümanların millet oluşum süreçlerinin incelenmesinde daha önce de belirtildiği üzere dört temel yaklaşım üzerinden incelenmiştir. Bu yaklaşımlar sırasıyla modern yaklaşım, primordial yaklaşım, perennial yaklaşım ve etnosembolizmdir. Modern yaklaşım ulus-devlet inşasının taşıyıcılarını

anlatmaktadır. Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm ve Benedict Anderson bu yaklaşımın en tanınan savunucularındandır. Bu yaklaşımın ana hatları Anthony Smith tarafından kısaca anlatılmıştır (1998:21-22). Buna göre milletler moderndir ve modernitenin ürünleridir ve bu sebeple milletler tarihin bir parçası değil moderniteyi oluşturan devrimlerin kaçınılmaz sonuçlarıdır, milliyetçilik de modernitenin bir parçasıdır daha doğrusu modernleşme sürecinin bir parçasıdır ve bu süreç tamamlandığında milliyetçiliğin de kaybolacaktır. Modern yaklaşım aynı zamanda milliyetçiliğin milletleri oluşturduğunu savunmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, milliyetçiliğin itici gücü milletleri oluşturur, bunun tam tersi, yani milletlerin milliyetçilikten önce var olduğu savı modern yaklaşımın savunucuları tarafından onaylanmamaktadır. Milletlerin sosyal olarak oluşturulduğunu ve modernitenin kültürel eserleri olduğunu savunmaktadırlar. Modern yaklaşımın savunucuları homojen bir grup oluşturmaz, kendi içlerinde farklı görüşlere sahiptirler ancak genel olarak modern yaklaşımın savunucuları sosyal, ekonomik ve yapısal dönüşüm süreçlerinin milliyetçilik ve milletleri oluşturduğunu iddia ederler. Ulus-devlet ve milliyetçiliğin oluşmasına makro düzeyde açıklama yaparlar ve milletlerin temel unsurlarını açıklamaktan çok, ulus-devletin ve milletin var olma sebebini, oluşum sürecini açıklarlar. Modern yaklaşımın savunucuları milletin kendisini açıklamaz.

Ele alınan ikinci yaklaşım olan primordial (kökensel) yaklaşımın temelleri Alman romantizmine dayanmaktadır ve temel görüşleri bazı kültürel niteliklerin siyasi hesaplar ya da rasyonel çıkarlardan insanların hayatında belirleyici ve aşkın rollerinin olduğu yönündedir. Bu yaklaşımın savunucuları da kendi içlerinde gruplara ayrılırlar. Fakat ortak özelliklerine bakacak olursak milletlerin doğal bir şey olduğunu savunurlar. Doğal derken insanların ilk örgütlenmeye başladığı tarihten itibaren milletler vardır. Milletlerden kasıt ulus-devlet değildir ancak her millet nihai olarak ulus-devlet olabilir. Bu yaklaşım bazı kökensel bağlılıklardan bahseder. Bu kökensel bağlılıklar hımsal yakınlık, din, kültürel veriler olarak özetlenebilir. Primordial (kökensel) yaklaşımın savunucularına göre milliyetçilik ise var olan değerlerin elitler tarafından kullanılması ve kitlelerin harekete geçirilmesiyle oluşur. Milliyetçiliğin güçlü olabilmesi değerlerin toplumla ne kadar özdeşleştiğiyle ve toplumun kitle halinde ne kadar mobilize olabildiğiyle alakalıdır. Primordial (kökensel) yaklaşım genel olarak bağlılık kaynaklarına, subjektif değerlerin nasıl

bağlılıklar oluşturduğuyla ilgilenmektedir. Siyasi, ekonomik ya da tarihi olarak milletlerin veya milliyetçiliği açıklamamaktadır.

Üçüncü olarak perennial yaklaşım ele alınmıştır. Bu yaklaşım millet denen siyasi ve sosyal örgütün tarihsel eskiliğini ya da daimiliğini ele almaktadır. Bu yaklaşımın en ünlü savunucusu Adrian Hastings'dir. Bu yaklaşımın savunucuları sadece milletin tarihsel olarak eski bir örgütlenme biçimi olduğunu savunmaz, aynı zamanda ulus-devletin de moderniteye ait bir kavram olmadığını söylerler. Perennial yaklaşımda milletlerin temelinde etnisite yer alır. Hastings'e göre ortak kültürel kimlik paylaşan ve aynı dili konuşan insanlar bir etnik grup oluşturmaktadır. Bu dil konuşma dilinden yazı diline geçtiğinde etnisite millete dönüşür (Hastings, 1997:3). Millet etnisiteden daha bilinçli bir örgütleniş biçimidir. Kendine ait bir edebiyat, siyasi kimlik, özerklik ve toprak parçası barındırır. Bu yaklaşımın savunucularına göre modern dönem öncesi toplumlarda milliyetçilik milletlerden sonra gelirken modern toplumlarda milliyetçilik milletleri doğurur. Milletlerin ve milliyetçiliğin temelinde seküler bir aydınlar sınıfı değil etnik, dinsel ve dilsel kültürel kaynaklar aranmalıdır.

Son olarak etnosembolizm ele alınmıştır. Bu yaklaşımın en bilinen savunucuları Anthony Smith, John Hutchinson ve John Armstrong yer almaktadır. Bu yaklaşım modern yaklaşımla milletlerin ve milliyetçiliğin modern kavramlar olduğu konusunda hemfikirdir. Ancak analiz birimleri modern yaklaşımdan farklıdır. Bu yaklaşım milletleri oluşturan makro düzeydeki değişimlerden çok subjektif değerlere önem vermektedir. Diğer bir deyişle milletlerin modernitenin bir ürünü olduğunu kabul etmekte fakat aynı zamanda bu tür örgütlenme biçimini doğuran subjektif değerleri, ihtiyaçları ve taşıyıcıları ele almaktadır. Perennial yaklaşımla da ortak noktası vardır; millet oluşumunda etnisitenin önemi. Smith etnisiteyi ortak mitleri olan, bir veya daha fazla ortak kültüre sahip olan, bir toprağa bağlılığı ve ismi olan bir topluluk olarak tanımlarken milleti tarihsel bir toprağa sahip olan, ortak mitleri ve hafızası olan, ortak kamusal kültürü, hukuku ve değerleri olan topluluk olarak tanımlamaktadır. Etnik kimliğin milli kimliğe dönüşmesini ise milliyetçilik yardımıyla açıklamıştır. Eğer bir etnisite siyasallaşırsa ve bunu derinleştirecek kurumlar varsa, etnisiteler arasındaki farklılıklar başka bir boyuta geçerek milleti oluşturabilirler. Yani siyasi hareket etnisitenin millete dönüşmesi için gereklidir.

Etnosembolizmi savunan düşünürler millet oluşum sürecinde makro düzeyde yaşanan değişimlerden çok subjektif unsurlara, etnik kimliğe, etnik kimliği oluşturan kültürel, mitsel ve tarihsel unsurlara önem vermekte, insan isteği ve tasarısına önem vermektedir.

Bu çalışma da Boşnak milletinin oluşum süreci etnosembolizmin argümanlarından yola çıkarak incelenmiştir. Bunun sebebi, Boşnak milletinin sanayi devriminin ya da ilk modernleşme çabalarının bir ürünü olmamasının yanı sıra, bazı kültürel değerlerin (din gibi) bu milletin oluşum sürecinde önemli bir rol oynamasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Boşnak milleti kültürel farklılıklardan oluşturulmuştur. Aynı zamanda Boşnak milleti milliyetçilerin eski değerleri tekrar keşfetmesi, yeniden ortaya sunması, eski dönemde yazılan kitapların tekrar basılması ve siyasileşmeleri sonucunda ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu milletin oluşumu hem ortak iradenin hem de ortak bir tasarımın ürünüdür. Herhangi bir ekonomik dönüşüm sürecinin ya da bir orta sınıf mücadelesinin ürünü değildir. Tüm topluma yayılmış kitlesel bir tasarıdır. Bu sebeplerden ötürü etnosembolizm Boşnak milletinin oluşum sürecini daha iyi açıklamaktadır.

İkinci bölümde Bosna'nın ve Bosna'yı oluşturan unsurların tarihi incelenmiştir. Slavların Balkanlara yerleşme tarihi altıncı yüzyılın sonlarına ve yedinci yüzyılın başlarına dayanmaktadır. Bizans İmparatorluğu Avarlarla karşı yürüttüğü savaşta Hırvatlardan yardım istemiş ve Sırlarda Hırvatlarla beraber gelmiştir. Hırvatları ve Sırları o günlerde ayırmak bir hayli zordur. Slavlar Balkanlarda üç ayrı bölgeye yerleşmiş ve böylece aralarındaki ayırım netleşmeye başlamıştır. 11. Yüzyılda Hırvatlar Macaristan İmparatorluğunun yönetimi altına girmiştir. Sırlar ise bağımsızlıklarını Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun işgaline kadar korumuşlardır.

Bosna'ya baktığımızda, Orta Çağ Bosna Krallığının 12. Yüzyıldan 15. Yüzyıldaki Osmanlı işgaline kadar hüküm sürdüğü görülmektedir. Bosna devleti özerkliğini her zaman korumuştur. Bu özelliği Bosna'nın coğrafi yapısından da kaynaklanmaktadır. Büyük imparatorluklar hiçbir zaman Bosna'ya tamamen nüfuz edememiştir. Bu sebepten ötürü Bosna kendi kimliğini kısmen hep korumuştur. Yerel eşraf her zaman için Bosna'nın yönetiminde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Bosna'nın yönetiminde yakaladığı özerkliği dinsel alanda da görmek mümkündür. Üç

farklı kilise Bosna'da varlığını devam ettirmiştir. Bu özerklik Osmanlı işgalinden sonra da Bosna'da görülmektedir.

Osmanlı işgaliyle yerel eşraf aşamalı olarak Müslümanlığa dönmüştür. Müslümanlığa dönüş onlara bazı avantajlar sağlamıştır. Bosna'nın yönetimi Osmanlı idaresi tarafından Bosnalı yerel eşrafa bırakılmış, onlara özerklik sağlanmıştır. Bosna'nın Osmanlı yönetimi altına girmesiyle beraber Bosna tarihi farklı bir evreye girmiştir. Müslüman Slavlar yönetimde söz sahibi olmuştur ve bu durum Avusturya-Macaristan işgaline ve hatta Avusturya yönetiminde de devam etmiştir.

Avusturya-Macaristan 1878'de Bosna'yı işgal etmiş fakat yönetimi tamamen devralmamıştır. Bosna'nın ilhakı 1908'de gerçekleşmiştir. Avusturya Macaristan işgali Bosnalı Müslümanların tarihinde geri dönülmez etkiler yaratmıştır. Bu sebeple Avusturya Macaristan işgalinden sonraki Bosnalı Müslümanların tarihi milliyetçilik yaklaşımlarıyla birlikte anlatılacaktır. Avusturya Macaristan döneminde Bosnalı Müslümanlar etnik kategori oluşturuyorlardı. Bir yandan Müslüman bir cemaatlerdi ve diğer taraftan, dilsel olarak Slavlarla aynı kategoridelerdir. Brass (1980) milletlerin oluşumunda iki dönüşümden bahsetmektedir. Bunlardan ilki etnik kategoriden etnik topluluğa geçiş, ikincisi ise etnik grubun üyelerinin bir kısmı için ya da tamamı için sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasi haklar edinmesidir. İşte Avusturya Macaristan'ın işgali ve sonrasında yaşanan gelişmeler Bosnalı Müslümanların etnik kategoriden etnik topluluğa geçişini sağlamış ve millet olma süreçlerinde ilk adımı teşkil etmektedir.

Avusturya Macaristan döneminde Bosnalı Müslümanlar arasında yönetime karşı birtakım ayaklanmalar gerçekleşmiştir. Bu ayaklanmaların temel sebepleri Bosnalı Müslümanların sahip oldukları imtiyazların devam etmeyeceği korkusudur. Müslüman yerel eşraf tarih boyunca imtiyazlı bir şekilde yönetimde yer almıştır ve Osmanlı döneminde Müslüman yerel eşraf imtiyazlı konumlarını güçlendirmiştir. Bu sebeple Bosnalı Müslümanların arasında huzursuzluk ilk yerel eşraflarda başlamıştır. Avusturya Macaristan yetkilileri bürokrasiyi güçlendirmek için yönetime yeni idareciler atamaya başlamış ve yönetimdeki Müslüman çoğunluğu git gide azalmıştır. Aynı zamanda Avusturya Macaristan yetkilileri tarafından uygulanan bir takım yenilikler Müslüman toprak sahiplerini tedirgin etmiştir. Böylece muhalefet hareketleri Müslüman toprak sahipleri tarafından başlatılmıştır. Ancak Müslüman

toprak sahiplerinin talepleri halkın geneliyle uyuşmadığı için bir kitle hareketine dönmemiştir. Kitle hareketine dönüşen muhalefet hareketi ise dini liderlerin öncülüğünde başlatılmış ve ilk Müslüman siyasi partinin oluşumuyla devam etmiştir. Siyasi partinin kurulması Bosnalı Müslümanların etnik kategoriden etnik bir topluluğa dönüşmesinin bir simgesidir. Bu siyasi parti Bosnalı Müslümanların temsilcisi görevi görmüş, Müslümanların yaşam koşullarının iyileştirilmesi için uğraşmış, başta toprak sahiplerini temsil ediyor gibi görünmüş olsa da, bütün Bosnalı Müslümanlar için uğraşmıştır. Muhalefet hareketinde Bosnalı Müslümanları birleştiren unsur onların dini kimlikleriydi. Siyasi parti (MNO) hem dini talepleri hem de ekonomik ve sosyal talepleri sistematik bir şekilde yetkililere sundu ancak halkı mobilize eden daha çok din temelli taleplerdi. Siyasi partinin de yardımıyla Müslümanlar dini ve eğitimsel özerklik kazanmıştır. Bu özerklik onlara bir takım sosyal ve siyasi haklar tanımış ve böylece etnik topluluk oluşturma özelliklerini yerine getirmişlerdir. Bu özerklik aynı zamanda Bosnalı Müslümanların etnik bilincinin gelişmesinde bir duraklama dönemine yol açmıştır. Müslümanlar var olan haklarıyla yetinmiş daha fazlasını talep etmemişlerdir. Ancak bir duraklamaya sebep olsa da bu muhalefet hareketi ve sonrasında gelen özerklik grup bilincinin oluşumunda önemli bir yere sahiptir.

Birinci Yugoslavya'nın kurulmasıyla birlikte Bosnalı Müslümanlar Osmanlı İmparatorluğu fikrinden tamamen vazgeçmişlerdir. Birinci Yugoslavya'da Bosnalı Müslümanlar kurucu unsur olarak tanımlanmamıştır. Bu dönemde ikinci bir siyasi parti (JMO) kurulmuştur. Bu parti bir öncekinin devamı niteliğindedir. JMO'nun parti programı Bosnalı Müslümanların özerkliğini devam ettirmekten yanaydı. Bu yüzden JMO diğer partilerle işbirliği içerisinde olmuştur. Müslümanların dini ve eğitimsel özerkliklerini devam ettirebilecek siyasi partiyle anlaşmaya varmıştır. Hırvatların veya Sırpaların çoğunluk elde edebilmesi için JMO nun oylarına ihtiyacı olmuş ve JMO bunu parti politikasına dönüştürmüştür. Oylarına karşılık taleplerini karşılatmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra JMO Hırvat veya Sırp kimliklerine karşı çıkmış, Yugoslav kimliğini bir üst kimlik olarak benimsemiştir. Ancak bu durum Müslümanların etnik gelişimine katkıda bulunmaktan çok varlıklarını devam ettirmeleri ve kimlik yozlaşması yaşamamaları için güdülmüş bir politikadan öteye

gidememiştir. Birinci Yugoslavya döneminde Bosnalı Müslümanların etnik grup bilinci devam etmekle beraber milli kimliğe dönüşmemiştir.

İki savaş arası dönemde Bosnalı Müslümanlar arasında okuma yazma oranı artmış, yurtdışında eğitim yaygınlaşmıştır. Bunun toplumsal bazı yansımaları olmuştur. Entelektüel tartışmalar bu dönemde artmış kimlik inşası tartışmaları başlamıştır. Bu dönemde üç farklı entelektüel gruptan ve üç farklı kimlik oluşturma çabalarından bahsetmek mümkündür. Bunlardan ilki seküler reformist olarak adlandırılan gruptur. Bu grup Batı tarzı modernleşmeden ve kimlik inşasından yanadır. Dini kimlikle milli kimliğin ayrılması gerektiğini savunurlar, şeriat hukukunun kaldırılmasından yanalıdır. Kadının toplumdaki yerini tekrar belirlemenin gerekliliğini, dinin Müslümanların gelişiminde negatif bir etkisi olduğunu bu sebeple dini eğitimin kaldırılmasını yerine Batı tarzı seküler eğitim sisteminin getirilmesi gerektiğini düşünürler. İkinci grup ise dini reformistler olarak adlandırılabilir. Bu gruptaki entelektüeller de din ve milletin ayrılması gerektiğini savunurlar. Ancak bu grup dinin ortadan kaldırılması ya da şeriatın kaldırılması yerine dinde yeniden yorumlama yapılması gerektiğini savunurlar. Modernleşme de Batıyı takip etmenin gerekliliğinden bahsederler. Etnik farklılıkların ortadan kalkmasını ve diğer topluluklarla bütünleşmenin sağlanması gerektiğini savunurlar. Üçüncü grup, dini uyanışçılar (revivalist) ise etnik sınırların devam ettirilmesinin ve dinsel kimliğin güçlendirilmesinin gerekliliğini savunurlar. İslami değerlerle Batı tarzı modernleşmenin birbirine uymadığını iddia ederler ve Müslüman toplumların Batının empoze ettiği değerler yüzünden yozlaştığını öne sürerler. Bu tartışmaların Boşnak kimliğinin oluşumunda çok önemli yerleri vardır. Bu dönemde yapılan tartışmalar 1980'lerin sonunda ve 1990'ların başında tekrar gündeme gelecektir. Ethnosembolizm bu tarz entelektüel tartışmaların kimlik inşası sürecinde çok önemli olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Smith'e göre "biz kimiz", "nerede başladık", "nereye gidiyoruz" gibi sorulara cevap veren tartışmalar kimlik inşası için gereklidir. Böylece topluluklar etnik geçmişlerini tekrar keşfederler, sınırlarını tekrar çizerler ve dünyadaki kendi yerlerini belirlemiş olurlar (1981: 37). Bu dönemde dini uyanışçıların argümanları savaş dönemi Bosna'da tekrar gündeme gelmiştir. Aynı zamanda bu tarz tartışmalar geçmiş ile gelecek arasında bağlantı kurmaya da yararlar ki ethnosembolizmin temelinde geçmişte yaratılan değerlerin ve bağlılıkların

günümüzde tekrar canlanması, tekrar gündeme gelmesi vardır. Ancak bu tartışmalar o zamanlarda çok yankı uyandırmamış, kimlik inşası 1968’de Müslümanların ayrı bir millet olarak tanınmasına kadar beklemek zorunda kalmıştır.

Müslümanların ayrı bir millet olarak tanınmasının arkasında birçok sebep vardır. Bu sebepler çalışma da detaylı bir şekilde anlatılmıştır. Burada söylenmesi gereken şey bu tanınmayla beraber de facto bir gerçekliğin de jure statüsünü kazanmış olmasıdır (Bringa, 1995: 28). Bu statüyle beraber Müslümanların ayrı bir millet olduğunu Yugoslav yetkilileri de kabul etmiş oldu ve böylece Sırp ve Hırvatların Müslümanların kimliği üzerindeki iddialarının gerçeklikten uzaklığı biraz kanıtlanmış oldu. Ayrı bir millet statüsü Müslümanların kendi aralarında tekrar kimlik tartışmalarına başlamasına sebep olmuştur. Aynı zamanda bu statüyle beraber Müslümanlar siyasi olarak tanınmışlardır yani etnisite tamamen siyasallaşmıştır. Gellner’in da belirttiği gibi etnik sınırlar aynı zamanda siyasi sınırlara dönüşmüş, etnik sınırlar sadece o grubun deneyimlediği bir şey olmaktan çıkıp siyasi bir anlam kazanmıştır ve bu da milliyetçiliğin doğmasına sebep olmuştur (Gellner, 1994: 35). Diğer bir taraftan da Smith’in de belirttiği gibi, bir milletin millet olabilmesi için millet olarak tanınması da gerekmektedir (2010: 12). Müslüman entelektüeller arasında yapılan tartışmalar 1968 den sonra bir anlamda resmi bir boyut kazanmaya başlamıştır.

1970’lerden itibaren, daha önce de belirtildiği üzere, entelektüel tartışmalar yeni bir boyut kazanmıştır. Bu dönemde üç farklı gruptan söz etmek mümkün. Bunlar İslami Topluluk (öncesinde Islamic Religious Community adıyla karşımıza çıkıyor fakat sonra ismini Islamic Community olarak değiştiriyor), seküler entelektüeller ve dini entelektüeller. İslami Topluluk Yugoslav yetkilileri tarafından desteklenen bir kurum. Bu kurum üst kimlik olarak Yugoslav kimliğini benimsemiştir. Bu sebepten ötürü yönetimle arası hep iyi olmuştur ancak Müslümanların kimlik inşasına, milliyetçi bir söylem benimsemedikleri ve milliyetçi bir söylem benimseyecek yeterli özerkliğe sahip olmadıkları için, çok katkıda bulunamamışlardır ancak Müslümanların sosyal ve kültürel anlamda gelişmelerine yardımcı olmuştur. İkinci grup olan seküler entelektüeller ise iki savaş arası dönemdeki seküler entelektüel grubunun bir devamı niteliindedir. Bu grup Müslüman kimliği ile millet kimliğinin birbirinden ayrılması gerekliliğini savunurlar.

Milli kimliklerini seküler değerler üzerinden oluşturmak istiyorlar. Din ve milletin ayrılması gerektiğini ve hatta milletin isminin değiştirilmesi gerekliliğini savunurlar. Fakat bu entelektüeller de homojen bir grup oluşturamaz. Bazıları isim değişikliğinin gerekli olmadığını düşünür. Bu grup içerisinde bazı entelektüeller Bosnalılık kavramının milli kimlik olarak benimsenmesi gerektiğini ileri sürer. Bu Bosnalılık kavramı Orta Çağ Bosna devletinden kalma bir kimliktir. Milli kimlik tartışmalarındaki üçüncü grup ise dini entelektüellerdir. Bu grup Batılılaşmaya karşıdır fakat modernleşme taraftarıdır. İslami değerlerin Batılılaşmayla beraber kaybolduğunu ve bunların kaybolmaması gerektiğini savunurlar. Bu grup içerisinde daha sonra devlet başkanı olacak İzzetbegovic'te yer alır.

Bu entelektüel tartışmalar kimlik oluşturma süreci için çok önemlidirler. 1980lerin sonlarına doğru, Yugoslav ideası sona yaklaştığında çok partili seçimler siyasetteki yerlerini aldı. Her cumhuriyette seçimler yapıldı ve milliyetçi partiler seçimleri kazandı. Bosna'da da durum farksızdı. İzzetbegovic'in önderliğini yaptığı SDA (demokratik hareket partisi) oyların çoğunu kazandı. Fakat milliyetçi partilerin seçimi kazanması, Yugoslav ideasının çöküşünü simgeliyordu. Hırvatistan ve Slovenya bağımsızlıklarını ilan etti ve arkasından Bosna'da etti. Ancak Bosna'nın ilanı, Sırp tarafından boykot edilmişti ve Avrupa Komitesi halk oylamasına gidilmesini istedi. Halk oylamasında da bağımsızlık kazanmıştı fakat referandumdan bir gün sonra Bosna'da savaş başladı. İşte Bosnalı Müslümanların Boşnak olmasını sağlayan fakat bir o kadar da vahim olay Bosna Savaşıdır.

Savaş sırasında Bosnalı Müslümanların birlik duygusu artmıştır. SDA savaş boyunca dini semboller ve dini kelimeler kullanmıştır. İlk başlarda Bosna'da yaşanan savaşı Müslümanlara karşı yapılan bir savaş gibi aktarmıştır daha sonraları bu söylemden vazgeçmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra savaşın kimlik inşasındaki ve kimlik güçlendirmedeki rolünü hemen hemen bütün yaklaşımlar kabul etmiştir. Savaş iki şekilde Bosnalı Müslümanların millet oluşum sürecinde etkili olmuştur. Birincisi milliyetçilik artmıştır ikincisi ise ortak bir kader yaratmıştır. Bu çalışmada milliyetçiliğin milletleri oluşturduğu savı kabul edilmiştir. Bosna savaşı öncesi artan Sırp ve Hırvat milliyetçiliği Bosnalı Müslümanların milliyetçiliğini de arttırmış ve savaş sırasında bu milliyetçilik itici bir güç haline gelmiştir. Milliyetçilik sadece milliyetçilerin kabul ettiği bir söylem, bir ideoloji olmaktan çok kitlesel bir araç

haline gelmektedir. Eđer milliyetçiler kitlelere nüfuz edemezse millet oluşum süreci gerçekleşmez. Bosna savaşı milliyetçilerin savının topluma yayılmasına sebep olmuş ve kitlesel mobilizasyonu sağlamıştır. Bosna savaşı, Bosnalı Müslümanlar için ortak bir amaç yaratmıştır, ortak bir cefa kaynağı olmuştur. Smith'in dediđi gibi milliyetçilik ideolojisi özellikle acılarda toplumsal bir ideoloji halini alır (2000: 74). Milliyetçilerin görevi bu süreçte kendilerine has kültürü tekrar keşfetmek ve insanlara otantik bir kültürel kimlik vermektir (Smith, 2010: 27). SDA liderleri Bosna savaşında dinsel kimliklerini otantik kimlik olarak yeniden sundular ve toplumsal acının verdiđi birlik ve beraberlik duygusuyla Müslümanları birleştirdiler. Bosnalı Müslümanlar savaşa Müslüman olarak girdiler fakat 1994'te alınan bir kararla, Boşnak olarak çıktılar.

Etnosembolizmin Boşnakların millet oluşum sürecini açıklamada ki bir diđer önemli nokta ise sekülerlikle alakalıdır. Milletler ya da ulus-devlet oluşum itibariyle sekülerdir yani dinden arındırılmıştır. Bu sebepten ötürü mesela “dini milliyetçilik” kavramı modernist bir bakış açısıyla bir tezat oluşturur. Smith'in ileri sürdüğü üzere milliyetçiler dini duygulara dokunmakla kalmaz aynı zamanda dini bir toplulukla milleti özdeşleştirmeyi hayli kolay bulurlar (1991: 49). Aynı zamanda etnosembolizm milliyetçiliğin çeşitli şekillerde ortaya çıkabileceğini ve dini milliyetçiliğin de var olabileceğini savunmaktadır. Milliyetçilik seküler bir ideoloji olabilir fakat dini milliyetçilikte olağan dışı bir şey yoktur (Smith, 1991:49).

Sonuç olarak bu çalışma tarihsel bir perspektifte Bosnalı Müslümanların millet oluşum sürecini incelemiştir. Bu süreci anlamada milliyetçilik teorilerinden yardım alınmıştır. Dört temel yaklaşım incelenmiştir bu yaklaşımlar sırasıyla modern yaklaşım, kökensel yaklaşım, perenyal yaklaşım ve etnosembolik yaklaşımdır. Bu dört yaklaşım arasından etnosembolizm yaklaşımı baz alınarak Boşnakların süreci millet oluşum süreci detaylı bir şekilde irdelenmiştir. Bosnalı Müslümanların Boşnak milletini oluşturmalarını tetikleyen üç temel dönüm noktası belirlenmiştir. Bunlar Avusturya Macaristan işgali, Yugoslavya yönetiminin Bosnalı Müslümanları millet olarak tanınması ve Bosna savaşıdır. Bu süreçler Brass'ın millet oluşum sürecinin temelini oluşturduğunu ileri sürdüğü iki temel dönüşüm süreci üzerinden incelenmiştir. Brass millet oluşumunda iki temel dönüşümden bahseder, bunlardan ilki etnik kategoriden etnik topluluğa geçiş ikincisi ise etnik topluluğun, topluluk

üyelerinin bir kısmı veya tamamı için sosyal ekonomik ve siyasi haklar edinmesidir. İşte Boşnak milletinin oluşumu bu sav üzerinden, milliyetçilik teorilerinin de yardımıyla analiz edilmiştir. Sonuç olarak Boşnakların Bosna savaşı sonucunda millet olarak tanımlanabileceği yönündedir ve bu tanımlama etnosembolik yaklaşım üzerinden yapılmıştır.

APPENDIX B: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU**ENSTİTÜ**

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı :

Adı :

Bölümü :

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :**TEZİN TÜRÜ** : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: