CALLICOTT’S ECOCENTRISM: STEERING BETWEEN SPECIESISM AND ECOFASCISM

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SONGÜL KÖSE

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences.

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the of Master of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Sol
Supervisor

Examinining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünder  (AnkaraU, EDS)

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Sol  (METU, PHIL)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Özer  (AksarayU, PHIL)
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Songül Köse

Signature :
The purpose of this study is to explore the possibility of a problem-free environmental ethical theory. With this intention, this work focuses on the norms, principles, disciplines, and two significant problems—ecofascism and speciesism—of environmental ethics in detail. The ethical theories of J. Baird Callicott are exemplified and evaluated for further understanding of the subject matter. One of Callicott’s theories is presented as facilitating the attainment of this study’s goal.

Keywords: J. Baird Callicott, environmental ethics, ecofascism, speciesism.
ÖZ

CALLICOTT’UN EKO-MERKEZCİLİĞİ: TÜRCÜLÜK VE EKO-FAŞİZM ARASINDAKİ GELGİT

Köse, Songül
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Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ayhan Sol

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Anahtar Kelimeler: J. Baird Callicott, çevre etiği, ekofaşizm, türcülük.
To Çağan and his beautiful mother,
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.................................................................................................................. iii

ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................... iv

ÖZ................................................................................................................................. v

DEDICATION.............................................................................................................. vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................................................................... vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................ viii

CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 1

2. ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS ASPECTS........................................ 7
   2.1. Introduction..................................................................................................... 7
   2.2. Two Main Worldviews: Anthropocentrism and Non-Anthropocentrism........ 9
      2.2.1. Two Indicatives: Intrinsic and Instrumental Values.............................. 10
         2.2.1.1. Intrinsic Value.................................................................................. 10
         2.2.1.2. Instrumental Value.......................................................................... 14
      2.2.2. Non-Anthropocentrism......................................................................... 15
         2.2.2.1. Some Important Trends in Non-Anthropocentrism....................... 15
            2.2.2.1.1. Ecocentrism............................................................................. 15
            2.2.2.1.2. Biocentrism............................................................................ 18
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2.1.3</td>
<td>Animal Liberation</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3</td>
<td>Anthropocentrism</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3.1</td>
<td>Types of Anthropocentrism</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3.1.1</td>
<td>Weak Anthropocentrism</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Two Extreme Edges: Eco-fascism and Speciesism</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1</td>
<td>Eco-fascism</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2</td>
<td>Speciesism</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CALLICOTT’S STRUGGLE</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>First Turn: Holism</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Second Turn: Quantum Theoretical Axiology</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Third Turn: Charge of ‘Environmental Fascism’</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1</td>
<td>Neither Inhuman nor Inhumane</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Fourth Turn: The Midgley-Leopold Biosocial Moral Theory</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1</td>
<td>Midgley’s Mixed Community</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2</td>
<td>The Unity of Mixed and Biotic Communities</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Fifth Turn: First and Second-Order Principles</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.1</td>
<td>First-Order Principles</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.2</td>
<td>Second-Order Principles</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Sixth Turn: Callicott’s Last Stand</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7.1</td>
<td>Introduction to Conservation Philosophy</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7.1.1</td>
<td>The Importance of Land Health</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7.1.2</td>
<td>‘Ecological Sustainability’ and ‘Biodiversity Reserves’</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7.2</td>
<td>A Synthetic Approach to Conservation Philosophy</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.7.2.1. The Functionalist Approach ........................................72
3.7.2.2. The Compositionalist Approach ..................................73
3.7.2.3. The Synthetic Approach ...........................................75
3.7.3. The Basic Conservation Norms: Health and Integrity ....78
  3.7.3.1. Health ................................................................79
  3.7.3.2. Integrity ..............................................................80
  3.7.3.3. The Relation between Health and Integrity .............82
3.7.4. The Summary of Callicott’s Last stand ..........................84
3.8. Discussion ......................................................................86
4. CONCLUSION ....................................................................89
REFERENCES ........................................................................92
APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY .........................................................95
B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU ........................................109
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Environmental ethics is a newly-emerging field of philosophical study since 1960s. The emergence of environmental ethics coincides with the emergence of human awareness of our dependence on and need for nature. Along with the realization and acceptance of the reality of an autonomous (self-organizing) nature, many issues are taken into consideration, such as the place of man within the nature, valuation of nature (intrinsically\(^1\), or instrumentally\(^2\)), moral status of nonhumans, the meaning and importance of nature for human beings, *modus operandi* of nature and the effect of people on it, conservation-preservation philosophies. That is, many teleological, aesthetic, ethical and even theological concerns of nature are examined.

Correspondingly, distinctive ethical norms, principles, maxims, valuation systems, rules and formulas are constituted in order to govern the relationship in a proper way. Different considerations of nature have

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\(^1\) Intrinsic value of nature is the value that nature posses in itself and just for the sake of itself.

\(^2\) Instrumental value of nature is the view that nature is valuable as long as it works as a means to an end.
contributed to the emergence of various ethical approaches and environmental schools, such as individualism, anthropocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism, holism; resourcism, preservationism, functionalism, compositionalism. Although all approaches and schools examine the same reality, they express this reality in various and sometimes in conflicting ways.

The two extreme points of the environmental-approach continuum are anthropocentrism\(^3\) and ecocentrism\(^4\). Environmental philosophers move back and forth on this continuum depending on their ethical theories. If one stands around the anthropocentrism edge, then it is quite probable that speciesism\(^5\) becomes a menace for her/him. On the other hand, if s/he stands at the edge of ecocentrism, then ecofascism\(^6\) may become an

\(^3\) Anthropocentrism is also known as human-centeredness. According to anthropocentrism, human beings and their needs are at the centre of everything. Other beings either have no value or have less value than human beings. Anthropocentrism has two forms: strong anthropocentrism and weak anthropocentrism. Strong anthropocentrism attributes no value to nonhumans. Weak anthropocentrism attributes value to nonhumans, but humans are still superior to nonhumans.

\(^4\) In “Ecocentrism: the Chord that Harmonizes Humans and Earth”, Stan J. Rowe gives a succinct explanation of ecocentrism: “the ecocentric argument is grounded in the belief that, compared to the undoubted importance of the human part, the whole ecosphere is even more significant and consequential: more inclusive, more complex, more integrated, more creative, more beautiful, more mysterious, and older than time. The ‘environment’ that anthropocentrism misperceives as materials designed to be exclusively by humans, to serve the needs of humanity, is in the profoundest sense humanity’s source and support: its ingenious, inventive life-giving matrix. Ecocentrism goes beyond biocentrism with its fixation on organisms, for in the ecocentric view people are inseparable from the inorganic/organic nature that encapsulates them. They are particles and waves, body and spirit, in the context of Earth’s ambient energy.” (Rowe, 1994: 106).

\(^5\) Speciesism is the notion that members of one species are superior to the members of other species.

\(^6\) Ecofascism, i.e. environmental fascism, is an annoying consequence of ecocentric environmentalism. According to theories accused with ecofascism, human beings can be sacrificed if it is needed and there is nothing wrong in killing a human being instead of a nonhuman being.
inevitable menace for her/him. Some environmental philosophers try to lie somewhere toward the middle of the continuum. Some others lie somewhere closer to one of the edges. But, almost all of them try to find a way by which they can evade from these tricky edges.

The origin of ecofascism and speciesism is the value theory regarding nature. Starting with questioning whether nature has value in itself or not, some philosophers attribute intrinsic value to nature; some others attribute instrumental value to nature. Based upon the values philosophers ascribe to nature, their environmental approaches are named as non-anthropocentric or anthropocentric.

Non-anthropocentric theories, in extreme forms, may lead to ecofascism. According to eco-fascistic theories, human beings are no different from other members of nature. Therefore, for the good of nature a human being can be sacrificed, for instance. Or, in a situation of making a choice between an endangered species and a human individual, theories accused with ecofascism vote for the endangered species in the name of integrity of biotic community.

On the other hand, strict forms of anthropocentrism may result in speciesism. According to speciesism, human beings are at the top of a hierarchy. Humans are at the center of everything and all the other things are valuable as long as they are useful for human beings and for their needs. Therefore, any nonhuman being can be sacrificed for the purpose of serving for human beings.
The purpose of this study is to scrutinize the essential problems—ecofascism and speciesism—which can drive any environmental philosopher into a corner. In this respect, the main question of this scrutiny is “is an environmental ethical theory possible without falling into the ecofascism and/or speciesism traps?”

J. Baird Callicott is a typical example of the struggle from which environmental philosophers suffer. Throughout his career, Callicott swings between ecofascism and speciesism with the ambition of constructing a problem-free ethical theory. Even though ecofascism or speciesism was no concern for Callicott at the beginning, together with the criticisms of his theories he has acquired the awareness of ecofascism and speciesism problems which constrained his attempts to develop a new environmental ethic.

In the context expressed above, there is an opening chapter (Chapter 2) concerning the foundations of environmental ethics, different approaches in environmental ethics regarding the status and value of nature, and some important problems environmental philosophers have troubles with. The first section of this chapter introduces environmental philosophy and environmental ethics in general. The second section is intended to present the two main worldviews in environmental ethics: anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. It is proposed that anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric positions are taken according to the decisions made on

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7 My advisor, Ayhan Sol, is the one who drew my attention to this tension of speciesism-ecofascism that every environmental philosophy has to deal with. He also suggested Callicott’s case as a perfect example of a philosopher who has been tormented by this tension and has spent all his career to produce solutions to this problem, and has, to a great extent, succeeded at the end.
value of nature: intrinsic or instrumental value. Moreover, some important trends in non-anthropocentrism and types of anthropocentrism are presented along with the approaches of some philosophers, such as Bryan Norton, Holmes Rolston III, John O’Neill, Paul Taylor, Peter Singer and Warwick Fox. In the third section, the core problems of environmental ethics are discussed under the titles of ecofascism and speciesism. My purpose with this chapter is to deliver environmental ethics in detail with all the norms, conceptions, attitudes, and problems which will support the reader in having a handle on the central theme of the thesis.

In Chapter 3, my intention is to present Callicott’s environmental ethical philosophy which is oriented to the main motive of this thesis given in the second chapter. In this respect, the chapter is divided into eight sections. In the introductory section, Callicott advocates Aldo Leopold’s land ethic as a solution to the anthropocentrism of the dominant Western moral tradition. The holism of land ethic looked promising to Callicott and he aimed at presenting “land ethic in full philosophical regalia” (Callicott, 1989: 7). Callicott grounded Leopold’s land ethic on Darwin’s theory of evolution, and on Hume’s value theory: “Leopold follows Darwin’s basic account of the origin and evolution of ethics and thus, through Darwin, is committed to an essentially Humean theory of the foundations of morals” (Ibid.: 119). The other six sections represent the six phases in Callicott’s struggle for constructing a new environmental ethic: holism, the unity of self and nature with the aid of quantum theoretical axiology, tree-rings model as an answer to ecofascism accusation, the unity of mixed and biotic communities, the second-order principles to manage the relation
between mixed and biotic communities with regard to moral rules and obligations, and Callicott’s last stand which results in a synthetic approach. The contents of these sections are inspected in relation to the problems of ecofascism and speciesism.

The eighth and last section is designed for the assessment of the previous sections. The essential problems of environmental ethics, ecofascism and speciesism, are discussed in all the phases of Callicott’s philosophy. Based upon the stratagems invented by Callicott, the problems are discussed in a general manner, because these are the problems that environmental philosophers should cope with. Lastly, the possibility of an environmental ethic which can stand aloof from both ecofascism and speciesism is questioned.
CHAPTER 2

ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS
ASPECTS

2.1. Introduction

Environmental philosophy is a field of study which is concerned with nature, animals, plants, as well as human beings. This branch of philosophy examines the relation between nature and mankind constitutively: the place of man within the nature, whether nature or animals (or anything else except people on earth) have intrinsic value or not, the problem of future generations, moral status of nonhumans in general, and aesthetic consideration of nature, as such. The basic questions in the minds of environmental philosophers are as follows: how to define nature, whether nature (earth, animals, plants, etc.) has a value in itself or not, what to do with endangered species and what their place is within nature.
Although most of the anxiety in environmental philosophy is about ethical consideration of nature, still there are aesthetic and theological concerns: aesthetic value of earth (by earth I put all nature, animals and plants in), restoration, the problem of future generations, and so on.

In a nutshell, first, the philosophical consideration of nature, the place of human beings in nature, and the relation between people and nature are examined. Secondly, the moral considerability of nature, plants, and animals is analyzed. Finally, the metaphysical background of environmental philosophy and environmental ethics is studied. Correspondingly, different positions or environmental movements are generated like land ethic, deep ecology, and the like.

Paul Taylor (1986) states environmental ethics in the introduction part:

Environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relations that hold between humans and the natural world. The ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the Earth’s natural environment and all the animals and plants that inhabit it. (Taylor, 1986: 3)

This branch of environmental philosophy has many questions in itself: what the place of nature is in the life of people; whether nature, animals, or plants are intrinsically valuable or not; the issue of conservation and sustainability; the case of extinct species; the problem of future
generations; how we should rearrange our lives in defense of nature; and so on.

The progress of environmental ethics started with the evaluation of nature, and later animals are taken into consideration. Through the history of environmental ethics, important main concepts are composed: anthropocentrism (strong anthropocentrism and weak anthropocentrism), ecofascism, ecocentrism, intrinsic value, instrumental value. Environmental ethics is interested in how and why these concepts can be practiced. Otherwise, examining the concepts in themselves is an issue of meta-ethics.

2.2. Two Main Worldviews: Anthropocentrism and Non-Anthropocentrism

Environmental ethics take shape as anthropocentrism or non-anthropocentrism in the light of either having instrumental value or intrinsic value: i.e. on the loci of value, mainly. The anthropocentric worldview promotes that things in the world have only instrumental value; it is a kind of human-based view. On the other hand, the non-anthropocentric worldview supports the idea that things in the world may have intrinsic value.
2.2.1. Two Indicatives: Intrinsic and Instrumental Values

2.2.1.1. Intrinsic Value

Intrinsic value is the value that something has ‘in itself’, or ‘for its own sake’, or as an ‘end in itself’, or ‘in its own right’, and so on. For instance, someone can think that a flower is just good in its own right. It is not good because that person takes advantage of it (e.g. aesthetic pleasure), but that flower is good just for its own sake. Health—for instance—can be good in itself, whether or not someone has it. In order to clarify this concept Callicott’s definition can be helpful here: “Lexically speaking, thus, to claim that the value (or worth) of something is intrinsic (or inherent) is to claim that its value (or worth) belongs to its essential nature or constitution.” (Callicott, 1999: 247).

For Callicott, not only humans, but also nonhumans have intrinsic value. Holmes Rolston III, Paul Taylor, John O’Neill and Arne Naess share the same thought with Callicott: nonhumans as well as humans have intrinsic value (Özer, 2012: 111).

John O’Neill (1992) proposes three senses of intrinsic value:

First an object has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself [as opposed to] a means to some other end; second, intrinsic value is used to refer to the value an object has solely in virtue of its ‘intrinsic properties’, and third, intrinsic value is used as a synonym for ‘objective value’, i.e. the value
that an object possesses independently of the valuation of valuers.


These three definitions of intrinsic value can be explained as: the first kind of intrinsic value is about that object’s teleological status - it is an end in itself-, the second definition resembles Callicott’s description in being related to the object’s essential nature, and the third one is about the attitude philosophers take about intrinsic value’s being either subjective or objective - valuer based or not valuer based.

There are two different kinds of intrinsic value: one is objective intrinsic value and the other is subjective intrinsic value. According to objective intrinsic value, value is in entities, humans and nonhumans objectively (independently of a valuer). Holmes Rolston III, Paul Taylor, John O’Neill defend this kind of intrinsic value (Özer, 2012: 111).

Paul Taylor (1986) focuses on biological continuity and interdependence of species through evolution and for him all individual living things -humans and nonhumans- have inherent worth. In his biocentric outlook, there are two keys: the first is that all living things have a teleological end, and the second is that all living things have inherent worth. Taylor, in his book, presents four main components of his ethical system: human beings are just members of the community and they are not superior to other living beings (looks alike Leopold’s land community and humans’ being plain members), all the living beings are interconnected and dependent on each
other, and all of them have their own ways (in teleological sense). Moreover, he makes a distinction between intrinsic and inherent value, and inherent worth. First distinction is between intrinsic-inherent value and inherent worth. They are differentiated based on the valuer. Intrinsic and inherent value are valuer-based. But, inherent worth is something that an entity has “without reference to the good of any other being [human or nonhuman, conscious or unconscious]” and without reference to a valuer, i.e. it is independent of any valuation. Second distinction is between intrinsic value and inherent value. Intrinsic value is the value which is given to “direct experiences”. Valuing a trip because of the satisfaction and fun it provides is an instance of intrinsic value, because it is related to subjective experiences. On the other hand, valuing a historical building (Taylor’s example) is a case of inherent value. Taylor defends that if that building is not considered as valuable or significant, then it lacks inherent value (Taylor, 1986: 73-75).

For Holmes Rolston III, for instance, all the valuation should be above and beyond human beings, and he locates the value in wholes, but not in individuals.

Subjective intrinsic value is attributed to both humans and nonhumans subjectively, i.e. valuation needs a valuer. Callicott defends this kind of intrinsic value. He, in his book Beyond the Land Ethic, says that “intrinsic value cannot exist objectively” (Callicott, 1999: 223). Callicott claims that there is no value without a valuer. Someone can value a thing either instrumentally or intrinsically. A person can value a hammer just because of the work it does; and when that hammer is broken, it no longer satisfies
the person in terms of its job and valuer stops to value the hammer instrumentally. On the other hand, a person can also value a thing (either a living being or not) intrinsically due to the feelings or thoughts that being makes the person feel or think. For this reason, according to Callicott both kinds of valuing something is done rationally, there is nothing irrational in valuing a thing.

Moreover, the locus of value can be either an individual or a group, and in the examination of ‘value’, there must be a ‘valuer’ and a ‘valuee’, as Callicott cites—“Subjects are valuers. And we subjects are almost always also valuees because we almost always value ourselves. But mere objects too are routinely valuees.” (Ibid.: 224). Apart from giving value to someone or something we can also value a place—for instance, landscapes and world in a broader sense. Nominalist theorists argue that value can only be attributed to individuals; on the other hand holist theorists defend the opposite and locate value to a broader locus, such as, nature, species, etc.

Later in “The Land Ethic”, Callicott also talks about the *inevitability of intrinsic value*—with the help of Leopold—: “It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relationship to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than mere economic value [instrumental value], I mean value in the philosophical sense [intrinsic value].” (Leopold, 1966: 223).
Except the intrinsic value which is the value that something has in itself, or an-end-in-itself, there is also the value which is only a means for some goals or something else, and this is called instrumental value.

2.2.1.2. Instrumental Value

Instrumental value, in environmental ethics, is considered as opposed to intrinsic value. Instrumental value is a kind of extrinsic (non-intrinsic) value. It is a sort of value in which only the goal is cared about. For instance, a glass is valuable as long as it can be used to drink something, but when it is broken, it cannot be used for its goal anymore and because of this reason it is no longer instrumentally valuable.

In my opinion, there are two kinds of instrumental value: direct and indirect. A work of art, for example, is directly instrumentally valuable as long as it gives aesthetic pleasure, etc. However, the canvas is indirectly instrumentally valuable. I think of these two values as first-order and second-order instrumental values. The direct instrumental value is a first-order instrumental value, because it is related to the first-order means: aesthetic pleasure, happiness, and so on. On the other hand, the indirect instrumental value is a second-order instrumental value, because it is related to the second-order means: toile, oil colors, color palette, etc. which helps the first-order goals to be achieved.
2.2.2. Non-Anthropocentrism

Non-Anthropocentrism is the view that not only human beings have intrinsic value and moral considerability, but also other living or non-living things in the world have intrinsic value. Nonhumans are also an issue of concern as well as humans.

2.2.2.1. Some Important Trends in Non-Anthropocentrism

In non-anthropocentrism, there are different trends in terms of how much the nonhuman world is considered and included. For instance, one attributes moral considerability to the whole world, another may defend that only living beings have intrinsic value, or one can value individuals rather than communities. Depending on the extend of value and moral considerability, they get names like ecocentrism, biocentrism, etc.

2.2.2.1.1. Ecocentrism

Ecocentrism is a holistic position that focuses on protecting natural entities like species, ecosystems, or landscapes. It also values entities, relationships and processes which take place in the ecosystem. It is a kind of ecosystem-centered ethics.

For Callicott, Leopold’s land ethic is the hallmark of ecocentrism. One can understand from Leopold’s maxim, that he values species, wilderness areas, endangered kinds, and so on. For him, the continuity of the system
is important, and for this reason everything in this process is also important.

Ecocentrism can be understood through anthropocentrism –human-centeredness- and biocentrism, because, ecocentrism is the biggest circle among these three. The narrowest one is anthropocentrism which values only human beings. And, biocentrism is more extensive than anthropocentrism, but still narrower than ecocentrism, because biocentrism gives value to animals and plants in addition to human beings as opposed to anthropocentrism. However, ecocentrism values everything in the ecosystem and it values ecosystem itself as well.

Because of the reason that ecocentrists value the whole ecosystem, they care about the relations of an individual within its species as well as the relationships between different species, and even the interaction of a species with nature. The web of relations in ecocentrism is much more complicated and complex than that of anthropocentrism and biocentrism. Ecocentrists think that this kind of web of relations is sufficient in order to understand the ecosystem properly and truly, and moreover, it is sufficient for constituting a more effective ethical system with regard to environmental ethics.

Valuing nature, animals, or plants is all about attributing them intrinsic value. According to some philosophers, the intrinsic value that is ascribed by a valuer is objective; that is, the intrinsic value of a plant—for instance—has nothing to do with someone that values it; rather that plant has the intrinsic value whether or not that person values it. These philosophers
are called as objectivist ecocentrists. One of the better-known objectivist ecocentrists is Holmes Rolston III. According to Rolston, the value that plants, or animals, or ecosystems have exists in nature independent of any human valuers (Rolston, 2001: 77).

On the other hand, there are subjectivist ecocentrists, and one of them is Callicott. For Callicott, there is no value independent of any valuer; but, it is true that a valuer can value a thing intrinsically without considering that thing as mere means. This kind of ecocentrism is human-generated (anthropogenic), but not anthropocentric (human-centered).

Ecocentrism faces some problems because of its metaphysics, basically. The first problem is about shifting its metaphysics from biology to ecology. With the extension of value to communities or wholes (including non-living beings), some epistemological and ethical questions raise. For instance, how to define a species; whether they are natural entities or human-imposed classes. The change in its metaphysics brings change in how we perceive it and relate ourselves with it, and this results in change in ethics.

Second problem is a kind of mistake in reasoning in the case of trying to get values from mere facts. It is mostly known as ‘ought-from-is’. In the argument, premises give the facts, from these premises a conclusion which is an ‘ought’ is deduced. But, the relation between the premises and the conclusion is not given, there exists a disconnection. Callicott gives an example to this: premise is “cigarette smoking is deleterious to health” and the conclusion is “you ought not to smoke cigarettes” (Callicott, 1989: 77).
121). Without the additional premise(s) which relates the given premise to the conclusion, the argument is not valid. Here, the hidden premise is a kind of universally accepted one: every one values his/her own health. And, the recognition of this hidden premise by almost everyone makes it omitted from the argument. But, what makes an argument sound and valid is mostly this hidden premise. According to Callicott, this fallacy occurs in an argument because of the lack of a premise which represents the hidden feelings. Callicott literally says that: “The mystery dissolves, on Hume’s own grounds, when the missing premise referring to passion, feeling, or sentiment is explicitly included in the argument.” (Ibid.: 122). As Callicott defends, for ecocentrism, in order to get rid of this fallacy, ecocentrists can use this solution, and in this way they can value species or communities without falling into this fallacy.

The last problem for ecocentrism is the hardest one to solve, or at least the hardest one to get rid of: ecofascism. It is shortly the idea that the value of species or communities which is constituted by individuals is superior to the value of individuals. For instance, killing an individual animal, say a deer, can be seen normal to protect an endangered species. Moreover, an individual human being can also be sacrificed and this is seen as the biggest trouble. Ecofascism is the problem that many ecocentric philosophers try to escape from, and Callicott is one of them.

2.2.2.1.2. Biocentrism

Biocentrism extends the moral consideration to individual living beings: plants, animals, human beings, etc. According to this view, human beings
are just a part of a bigger system which consists of many species interdependent on each other. All the individuals have intrinsic value. Nevertheless, there can be a hierarchy in terms of the values individuals have. It is a kind of life-centered ethics.

As opposed to ecocentrism, biocentrism gives value to individuals. Biocentrism is related with the rights and values of individual beings; it considers individuals, not wholes. One might say that biocentrism is a narrower form of ecocentrism, with its individualistic approach, because once individuals are put forward, the importance of wholes, species, relations and processes lose importance, and individuals become more of an issue naturally. For Taylor, for instance, only individuals have moral standing, because they are alive. The criterion of being alive is important for him. Because, only living things can have goals in life and in this way they become members of “earth’s community of life”. Moreover, for him, “all organisms are teleological centers of life” and each one is an individual which pursues “its own good in its own way.” (Taylor, 1986: 99-101).

Biocentrism, because it considers only living beings, has the criterion of being alive. This is one thing that differentiates biocentrism from ecocentrism, because –as mentioned above- ecocentrism values everything in the world, living or not, communities, relations, processes, etc. However, biocentrism is restricted to individual living beings.

Biocentrism can be explained under four key points: first, every individual being is a member of nature; second, all individuals are interdependent to
each other; third, there is no superiority among individuals and humans also are not superior to others; and fourth, each individual pursues its own way of life ("Biocentrism," 2013).

2.2.2.1.3. Animal Liberation

Animal liberation is also an important trend of non-anthropocentrism. Animal liberation is, like biocentrism, an individualistic position. But, as opposed to biocentrism, animal liberation only cares for animals. Animal liberationists, like other environmental philosophers, have some goals: reducing animal suffering and to stop animal deaths.

An example is Peter Singer’s ‘sentiency’ criterion for moral consideration. Any being that is sentient (or that feels) has the moral considerability. According to Singer, sentient beings are morally considerable because they can feel pain and pleasure. Singer does not consider all the individuals, he is interested in animals. Because, only animals are sentient in addition to human beings (Callicott, 1989: 262).

As the circle of value is limited, many problems come up (and vice versa is also true). For instance, imagine an area in which plants are in danger because of the uncontrollable increase of animals in that area. This is totally a damaging case for the plants. And, if nothing is done to protect that plant species, then the integrity disappears in that area which is more problematic for the health of the ecosystem. For this reason, animal liberation faces with some problem due to its limited valuation.
2.2.3. Anthropocentrism

Anthropocentrism, or human-centeredness, is basically the view that human beings are at the center of everything, and other things or beings that are external to humans are only for the good of human beings. Only human beings have intrinsic value. Seeing people at the center makes the possible ethical system only for the benefit of humans. According to anthropocentrism, only human beings have intrinsic value, so only human beings are morally considerable.

Anthropocentrism has dominated Western ethical philosophy since the Stoics. Anthropocentrism has been challenged only for the last 40 years. This challenge is made due to the changes in the understanding of intrinsic value of nonhuman entities. To put nonhuman entities into different positions brought the change in ethical consideration of those entities together.

To think that nonhuman beings do not have intrinsic value and people can take advantage of them in terms of people’s needs causes many problems, because in this kind of thinking neither endangered species nor the diversity is important. And this affects integrity of the biotic community which is affective in the future of any kind of species including human beings.

Warwick Fox (1995) gives five arguments against anthropocentrism. In summary, the arguments go like this: anthropocentrism is “…empirically bankrupt and theoretically disastrous, practically disastrous, logically
inconsistent, morally objectionable, and incongruent with a genuinely open approach to experience.” (Fox, 1995: 18-19). As Fox states, Peter Farb says in the beginning of his book *Humankind*:

Scientists now know that the chasm separating humans from animals is not so wide as it once appeared. Some animal species have evolved a rich communication system, while others make and use tools, solve difficult problems, educate their younger, live in complex social organizations, and apparently possess an aesthetic sense…So any definition of human uniqueness obviously would have to be based on differences in degree. (Farb, 1978 quoted in Fox, 1995: 15).

So that, there are lots of things that human beings are better off, but it is also true for many animals too, and this makes our thinking that human beings are superior to others is questionable, and also supports the arguments against anthropocentrism given by Fox and makes them reasonable.

However, there are some reactions to Fox’s arguments, such as: *misanthropy* which claims that being opposed to anthropocentrism is being against humans per se, but this is not true, because being against anthropocentrism is being opposed to human-centeredness, not humans per se.
Moreover, the other reaction defends that it is not possible to get rid of anthropocentrism, because we are human beings and all our thoughts are just products of what we think as being humans, so it is impossible to escape from anthropocentrism. But, this is not a good and true way of thinking about our human identities. This argument is the example of confusion of ‘human identity’ with ‘human chauvinism’. Because, in escaping from anthropocentrism we do not abandon our human identities; but we try to evade from our chauvinist thoughts and way of thinking about human beings. In a way, getting out of anthropocentrism is seeing ourselves as a part of the whole, and beside other living and non-living things, rather than seeing ourselves apart from the whole and on the top of some kind of hierarchy. For these reasons, these reactions are the examples of incorrect ways of reasoning for Fox, i.e. they are fallacies: the first one is the ‘fallacy of misplaced misanthropy’, and the second one is the ‘anthropocentric fallacy’ (or sometimes called as the fallacy of equivocation and the perspectival fallacy) (Ibid.: 21-22).

2.2.3.1. Types of Anthropocentrism

There are two forms of anthropocentrism: strong and weak.

According to strong anthropocentrism, all and only human beings have intrinsic value, for this reason only human beings have moral standing. Everything in the world is a kind of resource for human needs and they are just means without an end. To protect the environment is important just for the sake of immediate interests of humans. Norton entitles these immediate interests as “felt preferences”, i.e. “any desire or need of a
human individual” and he defines strong anthropocentrism as the satisfaction of these felt preferences. Since felt preferences do not include any deliberation of either current situation or future of nature, actualization of them harms the environment (Norton, 1984: 328). People do not have any duty to nonhuman entities.

2.2.3.1.1. Weak Anthropocentrism

Weak anthropocentrism is the view that human beings matter more than other things and beings. This has an implicit view that nonhumans also have intrinsic value as opposed to strong anthropocentrism. But, still humans are a matter of concern more than nonhumans.

Bryan Norton (1984), for instance, is a strong defender of weak anthropocentrism. For Norton, weak anthropocentrism can be a proper ethical theory, because it makes a case for two crucial points in environmental ethics. The first point is: “First, to the extent that environmental ethicists can make a case for a world view that emphasizes the close relationship between the human species and other living species.” (Norton, 1984: 328). According to this first crucial point, weak anthropocentrism makes the harmony with nature (Norton’s preferred term) conceivable, i.e. weak anthropocentrism legitimizes the relation of humans and living nonhumans. The second crucial point, for Norton, is: “weak anthropocentrism ... also places value on human experiences that provide the basis for value formation.” (Ibid.). This second aspect of weak anthropocentrism states the importance of experiences about natural objects and areas, because this sort of experiences of human beings
procures the generation of values. Briefly, there are two reasons for weak anthropocentrism in Norton’s theory: first, it provides the relationship between humans and other living beings; second, it secures the formation of values depending on human beings’ experiences. The process of value formation changes “felt preferences” with “considered preferences” which is defined by Norton as “any desire or need that a human individual would express after careful deliberation”. Norton’s understanding of weak anthropocentrism is grounded on human experiences and preferences. But they are not simple, exploitive or immediate, rather contemplated and rationally adopted preferences (Ibid.).

2.3. Two Extreme Edges: Eco-fascism and Speciesism

In environmental philosophy, there are many dangerous traps but two of them are the most dangerous ones. These are two peaks in environmental philosophy: each one is the extreme point. They determine the boundaries of environmental philosophy. One of them is ecofascism which does not distinguish human beings from others in any point –it is inhuman-, and for this reason becomes something that every environmental philosopher tries to avoid. And the second is speciesism which is extremely human-favored.

Many environmental philosophers make effort to be somewhere between these two constraints. However, whatever they do, they get closer to either one or the other. Still, anyone who works in environmental philosophy should avoid both ecofascism and speciesism either implicitly or explicitly.
2.3.1. Eco-fascism

Ecofascism is the view that the community or species is superior to individuals. Any kind of individual - either it is a human being or a plant or an animal - can be sacrificed for the good of the whole. It is a kind of violation of individuals’ rights for the good of the whole.

In the article “Ecofascism: What Is It?”, David Orton starts with a short explanation of the term ecofascism:

> What seems to have happened with “ecofascism”, is that a term whose origins and use reflect a particular form of human social, political and economic organization, now, with a prefix “eco”, becomes used against environmentalists who generally are sympathetic to a particular non-human centered and Nature-based radical environmental philosophy - deep ecology. (Orton, 2000).

In this quote from the article, Orton states that ecofascism is a term which is used against some environmentalists who put forward nonhumans, wholes, and nature before individuals and especially mankind. Deep ecology is a best-known ecological movement and Orton mostly gives examples about this movement. He mentions about Murray Bookchin’s essay “Social Ecology versus ‘Deep Ecology’” in which Bookchin criticizes deep ecology severely as being associated with fascism. Orton, in his essay, states the idea that the change in populations in deep ecology movement has a biodiversity perspective and it has nothing to do with the
social or political population and immigration (control) politics as opposed to Bookchin. Moreover, Orton evaluates deep ecology as having a new world view by which ecological problems can be solved, because, other human-centered ecological movements could not help with the ecological problems.

Orton suggests that the term ‘ecofascism’ have different usages. The first one is “Wise Use” which is labeled as the exact definition of ecofascism by Orton. In this usage, all the natural areas, parks are open to human access, they can be considered as resources for human beings. The second one is “Intrusive Research”, in which wildlife is made domesticated by conservation biologists. In this kind of understanding, interruption occurs because of the need nature has in protecting itself. And the third kind of usage is called as “Inducing Fear”. This kind has the most exact definition, because in this type human beings can be killed for the good of nature, humans have no privileges (Ibid.).

In the light of what Orton says in his article, in my opinion, ecofascism is actually a vague concept, because the meaning of the concept can change according to the way one looks at. From nature’s point of view, it can be considered as that only nature matters and man can be used for the good of nature. However, from man’s point of view, it can be considered as that humankind is at the center and a part of nature. In the first sense, humans are apart from nature; in the second, humans are a part of nature. This change in points of view makes a change in the interpretation of man’s activities in nature, and of actions that are made towards man by nature. In one example, a life of a human being can be put in danger for the
integrity of nature. And, in another example, a member of a nonhuman species can be sacrificed for the good of human beings. In the first example, human life has no privileges above other species, and this is an exact example of ecofascism in the first meaning. In the second example, it is thought that there is a hierarchy in nature and some species can be sacrificed for others, still there is fascism in environmental level which is in accord with the second meaning.

The most often used definition or type of ecofascism is Orton’s “Inducing Fear” one, and the first one of my examples.

2.3.2. Speciesism

When human beings are considered to be superior to other beings in the way that only humans are morally considerable this may lead to speciesism. Speciesism is stated by Singer (1975) as an “attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.” (Singer, 1975: 7). When there is a conflict between the interests of different species, one gives importance to the interests of one’s own species.

Although it seems that Singer, for instance, is opposed to speciesism, the opposite may be true. Because, Singer bases his ethics on something human - ‘sentience’. For this reason, speciesism can be found in Singer tacitly. Explicitly, for him, only sentient beings have moral considerability or they are members of the moral community. He defends sentience to be a member of the moral community. For Singer, animals should be
considered as morally considerable as well as humans, because animals too have the capacity for pain and pleasure, like human beings. Tom Regan, for instance, takes ‘being subject of a life’ as the criterion for moral considerability.

J. Baird Callicott analyzes both Singer and Regan, and comes up with the conclusion that: Regan’s criterion is more restricted than Singer’s criterion:

Singer called for equal consideration of the divers interests of all sentient animals. According to Regan, however, only those animals who have ‘inherent value’ have rights. And only those animals who meet the ‘subject-of-a-life criterion’ have inherent value. To be subject-of-a-life involves, among other things, being self-conscious and having the capacity to believe, desire, conceive the future, entertain goals, and act deliberately. (Callicott, 1989: 39-40)

In this citation, Callicott evaluates Regan’s position as having many criteria to have inherent value. And, it seems that, almost all the criteria appeal to human beings; at least, there is no objective clue for nonhumans’ having these criteria. Conceiving the future, for instance, requires having the ability to review the past and present, and this requires gathering and decomposing the incidents that happen in the past and present in regard to the cause and effect relation, matching up the incidents (and through that past and present), and visualizing the possible outcomes of these cases in the future. And this is not an easy work even for some people. So that, although the ‘subject-of-a-life’ criterion seems wider than the
'sentiency' criterion in terms of the population that it addresses, it turns out that the opposite is true. Thus, it can be defended that Regan is closer to speciesism than Singer is. For Singer, moral considerability is related to interests and only sentient beings have interests.

Speciesism is mostly in favor of human beings, which means -in this context- this is human speciesism for their exploitation. It is a kind of speciesism which discriminates nonhumans –plants, animals, and so on. In other words, to bestow a privilege upon humans is a kind of speciesism. The reason why Callicott encounters the problem of speciesism is because of his favoring humans in escaping from the problem of ecofascism. At times speciesism occurs implicitly (example of Singer and Regan), and other times explicitly.

Speciesists define some properties which only belong to the species they want to cover, and exclude others due to not having those particular properties. To put it simply, for instance, someone can think that people are superior to other beings because human beings possess the property of rationality and other beings do not. However, this property gives way to critical examples that endanger humans per se. Here is an example: imagine a cow that will be butchered for the purposes of providing food for and by some people, who are considered to be rational. When somebody asks those people why it is morally permissible to kill this cow, they will probably answer that it is because the cow is not a rational being, so there is nothing wrong with killing it as a source for food. However, think about people who are, for instance, suffering from Alzheimer, or senile old men, or think a fetus. All these human beings have something
in common, which is the fact that they do not have rationality, and this leads to justify the idea that they can be killed because they lack moral considerability. Is it so? Of course, not. Then, rationality is not a good criterion in having moral considerability (especially for those who are expected to have equal moral status).

Moreover, consider domesticated animals. For speciesist people, this is a problem both in practice and in theory, because those animals are from different species than humans and they share a life with human beings: they are neither the species in wild life anymore, nor they have the exact equal rights as people. Owners of cats and dogs are disgusted in eating them, but they do not question themselves when they are eating cows, fish, sheep, etc. The issue of domesticated-wild animals is perplexing for a speciesist.

Speciesism is not only relevant for living things, but it is also considerable for non-living things like mountains, waters and so on. When speciesism is the subject, one –prima facie- thinks about the living beings. Actually, in my opinion, this is the case because of the hierarchy that humans have in their minds. The order is something like this: humans-nonhuman animals-plants-waters-rocks-.... For me, they are ordered according to both closeness with regard to being alive, and having a bigger or more direct effect on people. On the other hand, from biological and ecological perspectives, every being has an effect on another being, and this comes from relatedness.
These properties that discriminate one species from another can be named as: being rational, sentiency, being subject to moral considerability, and such. As can be noticed, all these criteria are human-made; they do not exist in nature by themselves. Thus, being ecofascist or speciesist is up to us. It is our decision and our effort to get rid of these constraints although this is not easy.
3.1. Introduction

J. Baird Callicott, in the Introduction part of his work “In Defense of the Land Ethic”, calls himself an *ecocentrist* - i.e. he puts the intrinsic value in the whole system rather than just individuals-(Callicott, 1989: 3). He expresses his goal as “to build, from the ground up, new ethical (and metaphysical) paradigms” (Ibid.: 4).

Callicott proposes that “the ecocentric approach to environmental ethics is conservative, even classical” (Ibid., emphasis added). For him, together with new scientific inventions and discoveries, and new life forms which develop in tandem with these progresses, philosophy stays outside of the circle with its old definitions.
For this reason, as Callicott defends, philosophers should do what they did before:

-to define the world picture in response to irretrievably transformed human experience and to the flood of new information and ideas pouring forth from the sciences; to inquire what new way we human beings might imagine our place and role in nature; and to figure out how these big new ideas might change our values and realign our sense of duty and obligation. (Ibid.: 4-5).

Callicott, in his career building new moral paradigms, tries to articulate Leopold and his land ethic especially. Callicott asserts that Leopold’s natural and moral philosophy has Darwinian and Humean foundations. According to Callicott, Leopold takes Darwin’s theory of origin and development of ethics, and also he benefits from Hume’s (and Smith’s) value theory. In addition to this, Callicott sometimes mentions Charles S. Elton from whom Leopold was inspired with regard to Elton’s “community concept” (Callicott, 1999: 66).

In constructing his own philosophical perspective, Callicott goes through lots of different and even sometimes confronting philosophical trends. As I have stated before, there are two fundamental constraints in environmental philosophy and environmental ethics: anthropocentrism and ecofascism. In this study, they get under the titles –what I have called in the previous chapter:-: speciesism and ecofascism. These two important constraints determine the area of environmental philosophy. For this very
reason, almost every environmental philosopher tries to flee from these tricky restraints. One very characteristic example of this avoidance is Callicott: because through his career Callicott swings between these edges, and he endeavors to evade sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly.

I have divided Callicott’s struggle into six phases, and I have done this regarding chronology - i.e. all the stages are given in a historical order, moreover they have a historical and systematic scrutiny in themselves also. By the way of these periods, someone just can see how an environmental philosopher tries to find his own way as in the example of J. Baird Callicott.

Although these six stages show a continuum and development, they are all in one arena and some of them can be considered as conflicting and fighting philosophies in the arena. Although they all exist in the mind of one man, they could be defended by different persons at the same time. On the one hand there will be historically successive models, and on the other hand the relation between those models will be given as rivals in the same zone.

In splitting Callicott’s philosophy into phases, I have mostly focused on his two essential works: *In Defense of the Land Ethic* (1989), and *Beyond the Land Ethic* (1999). Many articles and books from different philosophers were examined and cited, too. While presenting these stages, I will also review Callicott’s different solutions to the problems that are raised against his philosophical positions.
3.2. First Turn: Holism

This first step consists of three articles from the book *In Defense of the Land Ethic*. These articles here will be given chronologically. The common ground of the articles is holism. Callicott introduces the idea of holism, in order to explicate Leopold’s land ethic in environmental philosophy, because the land ethic features the recognition of the whole.

Holism, in the ecological sense, is the idea that nature is a whole with all its individual parts, processes, and relations. Hence, in this kind of environmental thought, value is given to wholes: species, ecosystems, communities, societies, and the like.

The first article about holism is “Elements of an Environmental Ethic: Moral Considerability and the Biotic Community” (1977). It is the fourth article in *In Defense of the Land Ethic*. In this article, Callicott brings up the need for a new environmental ethic, after criticizing traditional human-centered morality.

Callicott suggests that there was a need for a new environmental ethic basically, and he offers Leopold’s land ethic as a solution. He starts with the dominant Western moral tradition. Callicott criticizes the Western ethical tradition as anthropocentric, i.e. human-centered. Hence, according to Callicott, there is a need for a new environmental ethic which can solve the problems that anthropocentrism causes.

Callicott’s starting point is the relation between a community and ethical limitations: “I suggest the following: if one is a member of a cooperative
group, community, or society, then one is subject to ethical or moral-like limitations on his freedom of action” (Callicott, 1989: 64). That is to say, if someone is a member of a community, then s/he is subject to the rules of that community which limits his/her freedom of action. In his assertion, Callicott gets support from Charles Darwin’s Theory of Evolution, because: “Ethics and other systems of social restraint, according to Darwin, have evolved through natural selection” (Ibid.: 65), and in a group, sacrifices are done to be a part of that group.

Callicott uses this correlation to assert that change in society carries with it change in ethical principles: “as a society undergoes transition from one form to another, its ethical precepts will undergo parallel transformations” (Ibid.: 67). As Zimmerman cites, Leopold proposes expanded altruistic sentiments as prerequisite for environmental ethics (Zimmerman, 1995: 280). First there are social sentiments which lead to a certain kind of behavior, and then social rules are constituted.

The next step is to articulate Leopold’s land ethic, and in this regard Callicott tries to enlarge the concept of community as much as possible. Because: “…if one is a member of the environmental community, then one is also subject to an environmental ethic.” (Callicott, 1989: 67). As the understanding of community expands, moral considerability accretes.

A summary of this article for Callicott is as follows:

The twentieth-century discovery of a biotic community has helped us realize the need (a prudential need) for an
environmental ethic. To address this need, however, an ethic derived from utilitarianism does not, according to Leopold (and others), go far enough. A proper ethic, a distinctly environmental ethic—founded perhaps upon love and respect, upon an expanded moral sentiment—may be the only effective way to reestablish harmony between people and the biotic community as a whole, to which people also belong (ibid.: 70, emphasis added).

The second article about holism is the first article of the book, namely “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair” which was published in 1980. This article is also the one in which holism is shown in a direct way by Callicott.

The main problem here is that Leopold’s land ethic is extended to consider humans as plain members (citizens) of the community. The extension of moral considerability from humans to nonhumans may not that much a big problem. But, to put humans on the same status with nonhumans is very problematic. Leopold asserts that the land ethic “changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it” (Leopold, 1966: 204). In this way, people become an ordinary part of an integrated community which also includes other organisms and animals, plants, waters, rocks, etc. (Freyfogle, 2009: 21). If people are plain members of the biotic community, then sacrificing people for the integrity, stability, and beauty of the land may be permissible.

Tom Regan (1983) reviews this conclusion of the land ethic as
“environmental fascism”. (Since this problem is the subject of a further part (third step), this issue will not be evaluated now).

For Leopold, the land (as a whole) has a moral regard and actions are labeled as morally right or wrong according to their effects on the land: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold, 1966: 262). Callicott promotes this idea as:

What is especially noteworthy, and that to which attention should be directed in this proposition, is the idea that the good of the biotic community is the ultimate measure of the moral value, the rightness or wrongness, of actions. (Callicott, 1989: 21, emphasis added).

Two things are important here: first, human beings are plain members of the land or biotic community. Second, morality is extended to the whole and only attitudes toward that community are considered as morally right or wrong. Y. S. Lo interprets this as an implication of the idea that “the good of an individual ought to be sacrificed whenever that is needed for the protection of the good of the biotic community” (Lo, 2001: 332). Moreover, Callicott says that “if it is possible to value people for the sake of themselves, then it is equally possible to value land in the same way [for the sake of itself]” (Callicott, 1989: 26-27). These two bring the land ethic to the conclusion that community or land has greater moral considerability than individuals of any group, i.e. even an individual
human being can be sacrificed for the good of the biotic community. This conclusion is the source of the ecofascism accusation.

The third article of this section “Hume’s Is/Ought Dichotomy and the Relation of Ecology to Leopold’s Land Ethic” published in 1982 (which is the seventh essay of the book). In this article, Callicott sets theoretical foundations of Leopold’s holistic ethic by using Hume’s is-ought dichotomy:

I show that the conceptual foundations of the Leopold land ethic, the modern paradigm of environmental ethics provide, on Humean grounds, for a direct passage from the perceived facts that we are natural beings and that we belong to a biotic community to the principal values of the land ethic. (Ibid.: 118)

First of all, according to Callicott, Leopold’s land ethic is based on Humean foundations according to which morality rests upon moral sentiments, like sympathy (Ibid.).

Another theory that Callicott uses is Darwin’s theory according to which morality evolved through natural selection, and moreover it depends upon not only reason, but also sentiments (Ibid.: 119).

Callicott uses Hume’s foundational theory in solving again Hume’s is/ought quandary. Callicott asserts that the solution is the missing premise which refers to sentiments in the argument. According to Callicott, if an argument involves a premise with ‘sentiments’, then the
conclusion can be an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. Moreover, Callicott uses this solution in making arguments valid, i.e. if one of the premises include moral sentiments, then conclusion can be an ‘ought’. In the light of Hume, Darwin, and his solution, Callicott presents Leopold’s argument as valid which extends moral considerability to nonhumans and as a result of that he validates the same for the land (environmental ethics from land/biotic community). In the direction of the things above, Leopold’s argument considering the relation between kinship and ethics becomes valid (this argument is built up by Callicott based upon a quoted passage from Leopold):

i) We have moral sentiments for our kin.

ii) Modern biology shows that people are kin to all other forms of life.

∴ We have moral sentiments for other living things (Ibid.: 125).

In his argument, Leopold aims to use kinship to validate the argument: through that concept he could extend moral considerability from humans to nonhumans. With the help of Hume and Darwin, Callicott makes Leopold’s land ethic outlook theoretically acceptable. Since human beings are kin to all other forms of life and a part of biotic community, and they have moral sentiments for their kin, as a result they have moral consideration for the rest of the land.

In the first article of this section, Callicott offered Leopold’s land ethic in order to avoid anthropocentrism.
In the second article, Callicott—in a way—defends holism. Leopold’s land ethic makes people ‘plain members or citizens’ of the land community, and morality can be considered only when it is related to the land as a whole. Here, human beings’ place in the ecosystem is considered on the same status with other members of the land community: humans become equally important and equally morally considerable as any kind of being in the ecosystem. This is the official sign of holism and its dangerous conclusion, ecofascism.

In the third article, Callicott’s aim was to construct theoretical foundations of the land ethic. In order to do that, he used Darwin’s “account of the origin and evolution of ethics” (Ibid.: 119), Hume’s moral sentiments theory and is-ought quandary, and his own solution to is-ought dichotomy. By means of these theories, Leopold’s theory of moral consideration of the land gains strength: there is one community, land/biotic community, and human beings are plain members of it and they are kin to the rest. As a result, human beings have moral sentiments for members of the land and for the land itself.

As a result, Callicott’s project of expelling anthropocentrism from environmental philosophy results in holism. According to some environmental philosophers, some weak forms of holism can be defended. However, such a strong form of holism of which Callicott tries to argue in favor cannot be defended, because it carries the problem of ecofascism with it. In the following sections, Callicott will try to transform holism of Leopold’s land ethic into an acceptable form in terms of second-order-principles (SOPs).
Holism is just one of the corners of the arena of environmental ethics. Interconnectedness is important for this type of environmental ethic, because in conceptualizing the whole it regards the parts that constitute it. Moreover, the whole is bigger than the sum of its parts. On the other hand, the exclusion of the individuals from the moral scope is an incompetence of holism. This is also a problem for which Callicott attempts to find a solution with SOPs.

Holism is defined by Michael P. Nelson (2010): “This is the position that moral significance attaches to wholes over and above the individuals they include, or the idea that environmental wholes can and do matter morally and directly, or that they possess intrinsic value.” (Nelson, 2010: 43). Like every other position, holism also has followers, and Callicott is one of them who tries to clear off the shortcomings (ecofascism, for instance) of Leopold’s holistic land ethic.

3.3. Second Turn: Quantum Theoretical Axiology

In the first step, Callicott tried to re-present Leopold’s land ethic. As Callicott stated, Leopold’s land ethic has its roots in Hume’s subjectivist value theory and Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Callicott also cited that “among existing alternatives, the Hume-Darwin-Leopold approach is the best suited for an ecocentric environmental ethic” (Callicott, 1989: 8-9).

In this second step, Callicott tries to build up a new basis for Leopold’s land ethic and tries to abandon Hume’s subjectivist axiology, because:
Although Hume’s classical subjectivist axiology, evolutionarily explained by Darwin, and ecologically informed by Leopold, provides for inherent value in nature and thus a serviceable axiology for a properly environmental ethic, it is not consistent with a contemporary or post-revolutionary scientific world view. (Ibid.: 166)

That is, the subjectivist theory of Hume is no more useful in contemporary world view which is inspired by quantum theory, because Hume’s subjectivist axiology conduces to subjective value judgments by the way of subject-object and fact-value distinctions. However, the importance of the quantum theory, for Callicott, is that “quantum theory negates the subject-object, fact-value dichotomies” (Ibid.). Callicott wants to strengthen his holistic theory with the help of quantum theory which precludes all the dichotomies that old world view created, because there can be universal value judgments with the negation of dichotomies.

In this second step – quantum theoretical axiology-, main article will be “Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics” which published in 1985.

The reason why Callicott starts to defend quantum theory is, its achievement in abandoning the dichotomies between subject and object, fact-value (Ibid.). But, the main reason is that: “The principle of axiological complementarity posits an essential unity between self and world” (Ibid.: 174). This is quite compatible with the holistic land ethic.
Throughout the essay, Callicott reiterates the idea of the unity of nature, and humans being continuous with it. In constructing the conception of unity, Callicott endorses the holistic quantum theoretical world view of Fritjof Capra and the holistic ecological world view of Paul Shepard (Ibid.: 172). For Callicott, Capra takes the feature of quantum theory of annihilating the bifurcations a step further and he posits that it also implies the unity of self and world: “‘A basic oneness in the universe’ is also implied which ‘include[s] the observer [the ‘I’] in an essential way.’ It is this unity, holism, and integration of self and world suggested by quantum theory” (Ibid.: 171, emphasis added). Moreover, Callicott cites the holistic ecological outlook of Shepard: “nature is unified and we, erstwhile monadic individuals, are, actually, continuous with it” (Ibid.: 172). Callicott approves nature as an ‘extended self’, ‘larger body’ and ‘soul with which I (in the conventional narrow and constricted sense) am continuous’ (Ibid.: 174). The conclusion Callicott infers from these two holistic world views is that: “Nature and I are conceptually as well as metaphysically integrated” (Ibid.: 172). Callicott makes use of quantum theoretical axiology in constructing holistic foundations of the land ethic.

Even though Callicott does not clearly report that he shares the same views with Capra and Shepard, he makes use of their theories in mounting his argument in order to solve the problem of intrinsic value in nature. To put it simply, the argument goes like this: I am intrinsically valuable and nature is continuous with the self [“I”], then nature is intrinsically valuable, too. (Ibid.: 173). For Callicott, “value in nature, though subjective, is not radically relative” (Ibid.: 164). Value in nature is not relative because we are continuous with (or a part of) it. Because of
this continuity “nature is intrinsically valuable, to the extent that the self is intrinsically valuable” (Ibid.: 174, Callicott’s emphasis). However, there is one thing which is problematic and it is the thing Callicott presupposes that self is intrinsically valuable. Mahmut Özer, in his PhD dissertation, finds this as “a groundless presupposition” (Özer, 2012: 118). According to Özer, the claim that human beings are intrinsically valuable is showed neither by a philosophical argument nor by empirical evidence. For him, this is just a belief which has anthropocentric and religious roots. Nevertheless it is quite a well-entrenched belief that is not so implausible to presuppose. Callicott, in his latter works, does not dwell on the issue of intrinsic value of human beings. Even later, in Beyond the Land Ethic, he refuses to present the subject in a direct way (Callicott, 1999: 187-261).

3.4. Third Turn: Charge of ‘Environmental Fascism’


In the first article of this part, Callicott basically reviews Tom Regan’s philosophy. Callicott criticizes Regan’s animal rights theory in some respects, and at the end of the essay he proposes a solution to Regan’s theoretical problems of animal rights. In the third part of the essay, Callicott states Regan’s critique which asserts that Leopold’s land ethic is a
case of “environmental fascism”. Unfortunately, reader of the essay cannot see any creative solution by Callicott to the ecofascism problem.

The essential point of Callicott’s essay is Regan’s criticism of Leopold’s land ethic. This critique of Regan is two-fold: Leopold’s holistic land ethic may be named “environmental fascism”, and “environmental fascism and the rights view are like oil and water: they don’t mix.” (Regan, 1983: 362). That is, environmental fascism is fascism, and it excludes the rights view.

In Leopold’s land ethic, moral value of an action is up to preserving the “integrity, stability, and the beauty of the biotic community” (Leopold, 1966: 262). Regan reviews the principal precept of the land ethic as a clear-cut implication of ecofascism. The “integrity, stability, and beauty” of the biotic community outweighs the individual rights of its members. He states that “the implications of this view include the clear prospect that the individual may be sacrificed for the greater biotic good, in the name of ‘the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community’.” (Regan, 1983: 361). Even human beings can be sacrificed, because they are “plain members” of the community like any other member of the community.

Regan depicts the case of ecofascism thus:

If, to take an extreme, fanciful but, it is hoped, not unfair example, the situation we faced was either to kill a rare wildflower or a (plentiful) human being, and if the wildflower, as a “team member,” would contribute more to “the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community” than the human, presumably we would not be doing wrong if we killed the human and saved the wildflower (Ibid.: 362).

The Land ethic, for Regan, allows to sacrifice human individuals in order to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the land. Callicott, tries to protect the holism of the land ethic only by saying that “it is not difficult meaningfully to assert moral rights on behalf of wholes.” (Callicott, 1989: 42). Moreover, he says that individual rights theory cannot be sufficient. Callicott deals with the rights issue of the land ethic, he does not even attempt to answer the first critique. He just says “Well, who would ever want to be an environmental fascist?!” (Ibid.). In this essay, Callicott cannot answer Regan in a meaningful way and with strong arguments.

In the second essay of this part, Callicott expresses “abstract elements of the land ethic and expose(s) the ‘logic’ which binds them into a proper, but revolutionary, moral theory” (Ibid.: 76). As in the previous parts, Callicott makes an effort to reconstruct the land ethic. While doing that, he also gives a delayed answer to the charge of “environmental fascism” (or ecofascism, in short).

Callicott starts with the question “how can altruism possibly evolve by natural selection?” (Ibid.: 78) and he cites different answers from different worldviews: for instance, for Darwin, “the answer lies in society” (Ibid.); or Western philosophy presents human reason as an answer; or for sociobiologists that answer lies in kinship; and the like.
Altruism is a good starting point in understanding the land ethic. As Callicott states: Hume, Smith, and Darwin defends that “altruism is as fundamental and autochthonous in human nature as is egoism” (Ibid.: 85). The importance of altruism, except being as essential as egoism, is that it is (or altruistic feelings) the prerequisite for forming a society. Furthermore, for Callicott, change in society carries with it change in ethical principles: “as a society undergoes transition from one form to another, its ethical precepts will undergo parallel transformations” (Ibid.: 67). That is to say, according to Callicott, morality and society are correlative, and the starting point of ethics in a society is altruism. As the conception of human society transforms into biotic community, ethical precepts involve altruistic feelings for nonhumans as well as humans: “once land is popularly perceived as a biotic community, a correlative land ethic will emerge in the correlative cultural consciousness” (Ibid.: 81-82, emphasis added). One important feature of the land ethic is the moral considerability of the community per se, as well as the moral considerability of members of that community (Ibid.: 84). So that, Callicott states, “the land ethic, thus, has a holistic as well as an individualistic cast” (Ibid.: 83).

3.4.1. Neither Inhuman nor Inhumane

In the eleventh part of the essay, Callicott, again, posits the charge of “environmental fascism” of Regan. In the continuing part, this time, Callicott gives a satisfactory answer to that charge. The land ethic’s holistic and individualistic features help in stating Callicott’s answer to the accusation. Callicott’s answer is twofold. Callicott rejects the ideas that:
the land ethic is *inhuman* and the land ethic is *inhumane* (Callicott, 1989: 93).

In rejecting the charge of being inhuman, Callicott uses two models: balloon and tree-rings. In short, for Callicott, society and morality are correlative, and as society expands, circles of morality expand too. But, the expansion of morality is not like the expansion of a balloon. Because, as the balloon expands, it loses its old forms and generates a new homogeneous one. According to this balloon model, one’s moral obligations towards his/her family and towards people in his/her state (for instance) meld. Priorities disappear. Kinship loses its significance. However, in the tree-rings-model, the lines which indicate kinship do not disappear. Priorities of moral obligations do not meld. On the contrary, as society expands, new and larger tree-rings are formed and the former ones are not precluded by the new-comers. Hence, ethical rules valid for older and smaller circles do not meld either. Kinship, priorities, relatedness maintain their importance. One conclusion that can be inferred from the tree-rings model is that, in the land ethic, human morality still persists even though the community becomes a biotic one. Callicott states this as follow:

> Family obligations in general come before nationalistic duties and humanitarian obligations in general come before environmental duties. The land ethic, therefore, is not draconian or fascist. It does not cancel human morality. (Ibid.: 94)
That is, the land ethic is not inhuman. Although the community concept expands, different small communities continue their existences and their group moralities: my duties to the state I am a member of do not override my duties to my family. It is like an interpenetrating model. For Leopold, the different stages of this expansion are “accretions”. As Callicott cites “accretion means ‘increase by external addition or accumulation.’ ” (Callicott, 1999: 71). That is, the land ethic is an addition, not a replacement. However, in this model, the decision making procedure is always a one-way process, i.e. the innermost ring will always have the number one priority and each ring takes precedence over the embracing ring. It is true that my duties to the state I am a member of do not override my duties to my family, but my duties to my family seem to always override my duties to the state. Stated more generally, my duties to more intimate communities will always override my duties to more remote communities. (We will see in the fifth section, Callicott tries to remedy this problem in terms of some second-order principles.) Callicott’s tree-rings model steers his ethics to anthropocentrism and even to speciesism, because human beings will always have a privileged status over remaining members due to being in the center of land community.

In defending the land ethic against being inhumane, Callicott says that: “nonhuman fellow members of the biotic community” do not have the same rights as human beings do, and this is natural because they are not members of the human community. Still, they deserve respect as being members of the biotic community (Callicott, 1989: 94). Yet, ‘respect’ does not mean ‘rights’. He ignores nonhuman individual rights, i.e. nonhuman individual rights are overridden by human rights. For Callicott “Leopold
provides only ‘respect’ for individual members of the biotic community, but ‘biotic rights’ for species” (Ibid.: 58). As Regan asserts, the land ethic excludes the rights view for nonhuman individuals (Regan, 1983: 362). But human beings have rights, despite the fact that they, too, are individual members of the land community. Again, human beings have a privileged status. Speciesism seems to seeps in again.

When Callicott’s defense against the charges of inhuman and inhumane are combined, the conclusion comes: the land ethic is not a case of environmental fascism. The rights of human community do not disappear, other members of the biotic community deserve respect, and the biotic community as a whole has intrinsic value. However, Callicott’s trial for relieving the land ethic from the accusation of ecofascism results in anthropocentrism and even speciesism. Furthermore, he gets into a dilemma over the status of human beings: sometimes he proposes Leopold’s “plain member” status of humans, and other times he asserts that humans have a privileged status over other beings. The first proposition gives rise to the problem of ecofascism, and the second one gives rise to the problem of speciesism.

3.5. Fourth Turn: The Midgley-Leopold Biosocial Moral Theory

The article of this step is “Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again” from In Defense of the Land Ethic, which published in 1988 and it is the last essay in chronology although Callicott made it the third article of the book.
After Callicott attempts to reconstruct Leopold’s land ethic in both theoretical and conceptual levels, he starts to divide animals into domestic and wild. In his division, his tree-rings model, seems to me, is very effective. He presented the tree-rings model as a solution to the environmental fascism problem that Leopold’s land ethic faces. With this tree-rings model, the concept of intimacy becomes important. As a result of tree-rings analogy, Callicott sees that domestic animals are in a closer relation with humans than wild animals are. In this regard, with the help of Mary Midgley, the distinction between domestic animals and wild animals appears. In this part, Callicott introduces a new theory: it is the union of Leopold’s land ethic and Midgley’s mixed community theory.

The importance of this step is that, in a way, this is Callicott’s starting point for his own philosophical stand. He no longer tries only to evaluate and articulate Leopold’s land ethic, but he also tries to formulate his own way.

### 3.5.1. Midgley’s Mixed Community

Callicott starts with stating Midgley’s moral theory. Her theory is a kind of theory which includes moral considerability of individual domestic animals. There are two important points in Midgley’s theory: the first, when humans and animals interact, the species-barrier becomes “artificial and unhistorical” (Callicott’s preferred terms, 1989: 52). Midgley interprets the species-barrier as “pseudo-speciation” (Midgley, 1983: 120).

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8 The ring that domestic animals are in is smaller than the ring that wild animals are in, and as a ring gets smaller it gets closer to the central ring that human beings are in.
For Midgley, there are two things that bore a hole in the species-barrier conception. The first one is security: every one desires a secure life free from external threats. The second pore in species-barrier is “the much greater intensity of human sympathy and curiosity” (Ibid.: 119). The extended sympathy is toward the members of the mixed community and it helps to extend the scope of our social horizon “for social horizons not limited to one’s familiar group” (Ibid.: 120). The extended curiosity is toward “inanimate surrounding objects – plants and stones, stars, rocks and water – which extends our horizon beyond the social into the ecological” (Ibid.). For her, sympathy and curiosity ‘function’ (Midgley’s preferred term, Ibid.: 121) across the species-barrier, i.e. they are ‘windows’ that link different species to each other. These two faculties may be lost in members of nonhuman species as they grow up; but because human beings are neotenous, i.e. “they prolong certain infantile characteristics into maturity” (Ibid.: 119), the faculties (like sympathy and curiosity) continue to exist throughout humans’ life. Further, according to Midgley, people make use of them because “exploitation requires sympathy” (Ibid.: 113).

The second important point in Midgley’s theory is that there is a “natural, emotional preference for one’s own species over others” (Ibid.: 124). The preference brings a hierarchy of priorities, duties and obligations in its wake. One’s duties and obligations to any member of human species have a priority over his/her duties and obligations to domestic animals. As Callicott states, there is a gradation in moral standings as “family members, neighbors, fellow citizens, fellow human beings, pets, and other domestic animals” (Callicott, 1989: 56). This gradation of moral standings

54
is built based upon *intimacy*. This point is similar to Callicott’s tree-rings model: both theories give way to speciesism via the principle of intimacy and hierarchy of moral standings measured by it. In Callicott’s model, too, human beings are prior to other members of the land community.

3.5.2. The Unity of Mixed and Biotic Communities

As Callicott proposes, duties and obligations to members of distinct communities differ depending upon the “descriptions” of communities: “The duties and obligations of a biotic community ethic or ‘land ethic,’ as Leopold called it, may, accordingly, be derived from an ecological description of nature just as our duties and obligations to members of the mixed community can be derived from a description of the mixed community” (Callicott, 1989: 56-57).

Callicott states that “the holistic dimension of Aldo Leopold’s land ethic all but overwhelms the individualistic.” (Ibid.: 58). This is what gets the land ethic into trouble, because the precedence of holism over individualism may lead to ecofascism. According to Callicott, there is “respect” for individuals in Leopold, and in Midgley individuals “matter”. Leopold’s ethical theory is holistic, Midgley’s ethical theory is individualistic. Moreover, according to Callicott, combining the theories of Midgley and Leopold results in a unified ethical theory: biosocial (animal-environmental) moral theory. Midgley’s “mixed community” is for humans and domestic animals, and Leopold’s “biotic community” is for wild animals. The rule that manages this biosocial community come from “the nature and organization of communities.” (Ibid.: 55). That is, in
a sense, the rules (duties and obligations) come from the interdependence relations of this new community. The holistic dimension of environmental ethic does not ignore our duties and obligations toward members of the mixed community. Nevertheless, “the outer orbits of our various moral spheres exert a gravitational tug on the inner ones” (Ibid.: 58), i.e. our duties and obligations to biotic community may impose certain restrictions on our duties and obligations to mixed community.

Callicott proposes such a unified theory in order to avoid the problem of speciesism via Leopold’s holism and to avoid the problem of ecofascism via Midgley’s individualism. But, because they have overlapping parts, they may conflict. In order to solve these conflicts “we are provided a means, in principle, to assign priorities and relative weights.” (Ibid.: 59). However, he does not explain the model that assigns rules, priorities and relations to solve the possible conflicts in the new biosocial moral theory. As an illustration, assume that we have to sacrifice either a human being or an endangered animal for the sake of integrity, and it is highly likely that the choice will be for the good of the endangered animal. To put it simply, Callicott’s new model composing of two distinct realms cannot solve ecofascism and speciesism problems properly due to the lack of assigning priorities, relations and rules among different species when these two approaches conflict.

### 3.6. Fifth Turn: First and Second-Order Principles

The 1999 article “Holistic Environmental Ethics and the Problem of Ecofascism” from *Beyond the Land Ethic* is the newest article of the book.
In the previous step, I have said that priorities are important for Callicott. They are important in solving problems which occur with the memberships of multiple communities\(^9\). Callicott, last time left us with the biosocial moral theory composed by Midgley’s individualistic “mixed community” and Leopold’s holistic “biotic community”. In the biosocial moral theory some problems occurred because of multiple memberships and the lack of rules which may regulate the membership system via designated duties, obligations and priorities. As Callicott states, each membership has its own rules (Callicott, 1999: 173). But there should be other rules which organize the relationships among different community memberships. There are rules, for instance, in my family which regulate my membership of the family, and there are rules in the state I am a member of which regulate my membership of the state. Moreover, there should be other rules which set the relation between the two communities.

3.6.1. First-Order Principles

The ethical principles of Leopold’s holistic environmental ethic and Midgley’s individualistic animal welfare ethic are instances of the first-order principles: one is of first-order holistic ethical principles like “Serve Thy Country” and “Love Thy Country”, and the other is of first-order individualistic ethical principles like “Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother” (examples are from Callicott, 1999: 73). The imperative outline of the

\(^9\) Callicott expresses the conception of multiple membership as follows:

At once, each of us is a member of a family, a civic society, a nation state, the global village, Midgleyan “mixed communities” (that include domestic animals), and local, regional, and global biotic communities. Each of these memberships generates peculiar duties and obligations (1999: 173).
maxim of Leopold’s land ethic, for example, is a first-order principle: “Preserve the Integrity, Stability, and Beauty of the Biotic Community” (Ibid.: 72). First order principles are principal imperatives which organize the relations of human beings with each other and with the world. Because of multiple memberships, there are different first order imperatives depending on the community at issue and sometimes imperatives may conflict due to the lack of a higher-order principle(s) which can solve the quarrel.

What Callicott tried to do in the previous step was to unite two distinct communities which are managed by peculiar first order principles. But, the unification of two theories causes some problems concerning the relation between them. To sum up: (1) Leopold’s biotic community and Midgley’s mixed community do not have one coherent community concept, because of that they conflict sometimes. As a result of this, for instance, the place of a human being is still a dilemma: either is a ‘plain citizen’ or at the top of a hierarchy. (2) The structure and nature of communities show differences. Midgley proposes a hierarchy of priorities, duties and obligations. Callicott himself generates a hierarchy in the land ethic by way of tree-rings analogy. But, Leopold does not posit any hierarchy in his land ethic. (3) The new originated community does not solve the ecofascism and speciesism problems, because even if it is to be thought that Midgley’s individualism annihilates the problem of ecofascism, it is also true that her theory results in speciesism. That is to say, the main problem with Callicott is that he cannot propose a satisfactory theory (or a unified theory) under which both holistic and individualistic ethical rules are satisfied. The reason is that both Leopold
and Midgley state the same issue (the place of human beings in nature) by means of distinctive beliefs and rules, and Callicott tries to unite them without a higher-order theory which can balance between the theories of Leopold and Midgley. He cannot achieve this neither with tree-rings model nor with Leopold-Midgley unification. Callicott offers two second-order principles to solve the main problem. He was inspired by the suggestion of Shrader-Frechette (1996), as Callicott puts it: “the land ethic must provide ‘second-order ethical principles and a priority ranking system that specifies the respective conditions under which [first-order] holistic and individualistic ethical principles ought to be recognized.’” (Shrader-Frechette, 1996 quoted in Callicott, 1999: 72). His thought is that by combining the two second-order principles, he can posit a satisfying priority ranking system under which both holistic and individualistic ethical principles are sustained (Ibid.). Nevertheless, it cannot be possible because the theories of Midgley and Leopold are not complementary as opposed to Callicott’s consideration of them, but they are conflicting.

3.6.2. Second-Order Principles

The first second-order principle (SOP-1) is “intimacy”. According to this principle, the duties or obligations to intimate communities take precedence over the duties and obligations to other communities. My duties or obligations to my family override my duties to my neighbors. The second second-order principle (SOP-2) is “stronger interests”\textsuperscript{10}. The

\textsuperscript{10} Callicott says that he uses the term “interest” due to the “lack of a better word” (p. 73), but it is a word from the utilitarian terminology. So that, “interest” is not appropriate for Callicott’s holistic environmental ethic.
duties or obligations generated by stronger interests preclude the duties or obligations generated by weaker interests (Callicott, 1999: 73).

Y. S. Lo reviews Callicott’s ethical system as follows:

Callicott’s whole ethical system 1999-2001 consists of three orders (not two orders as he suggests) of moral principles. First, there are many different first-order principles prescribed by the many different ethical accretions of the system. Examples given by Callicott include: ‘Honor thy Father and thy Mother; Love thy Country; Respect the Rights of All Human Beings Irrespective of Race, Creed, Color, or National Origin; Preserve the Integrity, Stability, and Beauty of the Biotic Community.’ Secondly, there are the two second-order principles, SOP-1 and SOP-2, for prioritizing the first-order ones when they happen to conflict. In addition, there is one third-order principle which says that ‘SOP-2 countermands SOP-1’ whenever the two happen to give contradictory second-order prescriptions (Lo, 2001: 345).

The second-order principles apply to the situations: community-community, community-individual, individual-individual. In regulating our duties towards the biotic community we live in, Callicott offers these second-order principles. Callicott renders the relation between SOP-1 and SOP-2: if there is harmony between SOP-1 and SOP-2, then the choice is in favor of SOP-1. But, if they contradict, then the choice is in favor of SOP-2.
(Callicott, 1999: 76). If we replace SOP-1 with ‘intimacy’, and SOP-2 with ‘stronger interests’, then the relation between the SOPs manifests itself as: when the duties and obligations generated by them do not contradict ‘intimacy’ wins, but when the duties and obligations generated by them contradict ‘stronger interests’ win. It is true that “SOP-2 requires an agent to give priority to the stronger interests at issue” (Ibid.), but Callicott does not propose directly that holistic environmental interests are stronger than individualistic human interests. Thus, it is not necessarily true that environmental interests are always stronger than human interests. One can deduce this idea from the second form of contradiction\(^\text{11}\) between environment-oriented duties and human-oriented duties: “when holistic environment-oriented duties are in conflict with individualistic human-oriented duties, and the holistic environmental interests at issue are significantly stronger than the individualistic human interests at issue, the former [holistic environment-oriented duties] take priority” (Ibid.). In this conditional clause, ‘when’ also comprises the sentence starting with ‘and’ between the two commas. For this reason, the case of holistic environmental interests are stronger than individualistic human interests is just one of the possibilities. The opposite may come true as well. Or, even the equality of interests may come into question.

Suppose that there is a city with an ever-increasing air pollution and the number of children suffering from leukemia gradually increases.

\(^{11}\) Callicott states the conflict between environment-oriented duties and human-oriented duties in two forms: the first one is a ‘direct conflict’ between the two which results in the priority of human oriented-duties. The second form is the one cited above which has an extra condition (environmental interests stronger than individualistic interests). But the absence of such a condition in the first form does not mean that individualistic interests can never be stronger than environmental interests. On the contrary, it can be true that Callicott refrained from verbalizing it explicitly.
Moreover, the importance of fresh air in the treatment process of leukemia is a known fact and government health officials offer a health center for children with leukemia which will be built somewhere in the huge forest land just outside the city land. Only the five percent of the forest land is thought to be used for this purpose. The governmental, environmental and academic authorities are on agreement on the idea that integrity of the forest can be tolerated. Hence, if the authorities are right, then there is no problem with the claim that the duties and obligations to humans have a stronger interest than the duties and obligations to the forest. This is a case of first form conflict: when the duties are in conflict with each other, and the environmental interests are not stronger than human interests, the human-oriented duties take priority.

In the case of contradiction of interests, the stronger interests (either environmental or individual) take priority over the weaker interests. Callicott decides on the stronger interests according to the consequences, i.e. if the results of, say, A-oriented duties can be compensated more easily than the results of B-oriented duties, then the interests of B are stronger than the interests of A. The evaluation method of Callicott can be clearly seen through an example he quoted from an article by Gary E. Varner (1991). The quotation of Varner’s case is as follows:

Suppose that an environmentalist enamoured with the Leopold land ethic is considering how to vote on a national referendum to preserve the spotted owl by restricting logging in Northwest forests.... He or she would be required to vote, not according to the land ethic,
but according to whatever ethic governs closer ties to a human family and/or larger human community. Therefore, if a relative is one of 10,000 loggers who will lose jobs if the referendum passes, the environmentalist is obligated to vote against it. Even if none of the loggers is a family member, the voter is still obligated to vote against the referendum (Varner, 1991: 176 quoted in Callicott, 1999: 74).

Varner’s example states a quandary: the spotted owl in danger of extinction on the one hand and 10,000 loggers in danger of unemployment on the other. The issue is logging in Northwest forests. According to Varner, in a case of referendum, people should vote on behalf of loggers. Callicott says that Varner would be right if there was only SOP-1. For Callicott, there are three interests that should be taken into consideration: extinction issue of the spotted owl, the destruction of the Northwest forest, and economic losses of 10,000 loggers. The first one is noncompensable, but the others can be compensated. After an evaluation process, Callicott concludes that the spotted owl has a stronger interest than the others. But the cases cannot always be that easily assessable. The problem of how to calculate which interest is stronger or weaker gets complicated as the cases get harder, e.g. to try to make a decision between equally strong interests. This is a problem of consequentialist ethic. But, the ethical theory Callicott aims to construct is deontological (duty-based) and using the method of consequentialism in deontological ethic is not true.
Consequently and briefly, when there is harmony between the interests of human beings and the interests of the biotic community, the choice results in favor of human beings because of the intimacy principle which may mean *speciesism*. Moreover, as I have pointed out above, in dealing with the problems of the first-order principles, the second-order principles sometimes fall short and the method in determining which interest is stronger or weaker is inappropriate considering that the main ethical theory is duty-based.

### 3.7. Sixth Turn: Callicott’s Last Stand


In the previous steps, we have seen that Callicott had gone through some phases: strong holism, tree-rings model as an answer to the ecofascism accusation, the Midgley-Leopold biosocial moral theory, proposal of second-order principles as regulators for priority and ranking problems of the union of holistic environmental and individual human first-order principles. It all started with the thought of a need for a new environmental ethic and Callicott proposed Leopold’s land ethic. As time passed by reinforcing philosophical (theoretical and conceptual) and historical foundations of the holistic environmental land ethic, Callicott
has encountered the problem of ecofascism. In order to escape from the grip of ecofascism, he suggested the tree-rings model. According to this model, human-oriented duties come before environment-oriented duties. Since it centered around human beings and their moral considerability, it led to speciesism. The first trial was the Midgley-Leopold biosocial moral theory. But, this unified theory needed a ranking model and higher-order principles for their first-order principles when they come into conflict. Therefore, Callicott posited two second-order principles: SOP-1 which is “intimacy”, and SOP-2 which is “stronger interest”. In addition, there was a rule: if SOP-1 and SOP-2 contradict, the second one countermands the first one. So far so good. However, when it came to determine which interest is stronger, Callicott’s evaluation method faced with problems which a consequentialist theory should have. In calculating which interest is stronger, he used consequences as base for the problems of his deontological ethic. Hugh P. McDonald interprets this as follows: “Callicott tacitly borrows utilitarian consequentialist arguments” (2004: 35).

The main issue is to avoid the dangers of ecofascism and speciesism while constructing a relation between mixed and biotic communities. Albeit all his efforts, Callicott could not construct a problem-free ethical theory up to now. But, in this step, I will introduce his last model: a synthetic approach – the union of compositionalist and functionalist approaches of conservation philosophy.
3.7.1. Introduction to Conservation Philosophy

Parallel with the changes in ideas about the place of man in nature and the relation between man and nature, different schools of conservation philosophy are presented. According to Callicott “American conservation began as an essentially moral movement” (Callicott, 1999: 321), that is, our morality affected the way we look at nature and its entities, and vice versa. Besides the sharp distinction between man and nature, the first schools of conservation philosophy with the effect of prevalent utilitarian thoughts at that time had an anthropocentric outlook, i.e. human beings have intrinsic value but nature has instrumental value (Ibid.: 321-324).

Together with the change in the belief of value of nature, from instrumental to intrinsic, ethical theories have changed too. Holistic viewpoints started to replace the utilitarian worldview. Callicott presented John Muir (1894-1901) as “the first American conservationist privately to ponder the proposition that nature itself possessed intrinsic value – value in and of itself – quite apart from its human utilities” (Ibid.: 324) and gives two reasons for the change of Muir’s belief in the value of nature: “biblical fundamentals” (Ibid.) and “an evolutionary and ecological world view” (Ibid.: 325). Moreover, Callicott asserts that “It fell to Aldo Leopold to bring the ethical implications of the ripening evolutionary-ecological paradigm clearly and fully to light” (Ibid.), and also proposes that “an evolutionary and ecological worldview implies a land ethic” (Ibid.: 327). The reasons for his second claim are: (1) nature is a whole with all the entities (animate and inanimate), relations, and processes; (2) human beings are plain members and citizens of the biotic
community (Leopold, 1966: 240); (3) all the members of the land-plants, waters, soils, animals, and humans- have intrinsic value as well as instrumental value. Leopold and accordingly Callicott believed in the possibility of coexistence of human habitation and wilderness areas. Moreover, Callicott was aware of the necessity of a conservation strategy, so that he proposed ‘a generalized version’ of Leopold’s theory as the only feasible one:

The pressure of growing human numbers and rapid development, especially in the Third World, implies, I think, that a global conservation strategy focused primarily on ‘wilderness’ preservation and the establishment of nature reserves represents a holding action at best—and a losing proposition at last. I support wilderness and nature reserves—categorically—with my purse as well as my pen. But faced with the sobering realities of the coming century, the only viable philosophy of conservation is, I submit, a generalized version of Leopold’s vision of a mutually beneficial and enhancing integration of the human economy with the economy of nature—in addition to holding on to as much untrammeled wilderness as we can. (Callicott, 1999: 329).

3.7.1.1. The Importance of Land Health

In “Aldo Leopold’s Concept of Ecosystem Health”, Callicott states the importance of land health: for Leopold, the land health is both an
implication and an objective of biological conservation. Besides, land ethic is a constraint on human economic activities which can endanger wilderness areas.

The ecosystem health is defined as “a condition of internal order and organization in ecosystems that—no less than analogous conditions of body, soul, and society—is both intrinsically good and objective (and specifiable in principle)” (Callicott, 1999: 334). Two characteristics of ecosystem health can be seen easily from the given definition: it is objective and intrinsically good (Ibid.).

The importance of land health comes from its being a regulator in the relationship of human beings and nature, because to conserve the ecosystem health and accordingly the functions of ecosystem there should be some constraints in the activities of human beings. Leopold states the relation between health and conservation as follows: “Health is the capacity of the land for self-renewal. Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity [health]” (Leopold, 1966: 258). We conserve nature for the persistence of land health. But, we need some indicators, at least one, with which we can control the status of the land health and evaluate the changes in nature made by any species. Leopold’s statement about this case is as follows:

A science of land health needs, first of all, a base datum of normality, a picture of how healthy land maintains itself as an organism.... We have two available norms. One is found where land physiology remains largely normal
despite centuries of human occupation…. The other and most perfect norm is wilderness (Ibid.: 274).

If, as Leopold asserts, wilderness is a base-datum for the land health, then the relation of health-conservation-wilderness becomes like this: wilderness is an indicative of land health, and land health implies conservation. We conserve nature for the persistence of the land health which in turn implies conservation of nature. Moreover, in conservation theory, land health is related to human interference with nature. By following the health condition, we can make judgments about the goodness or badness of human activities in nature.

3.7.1.2. ‘Ecological Sustainability’ and ‘Biodiversity Reserves’

In “Ecological Sustainability as a Conservation Concept”, Callicott asserts that there are two basic conservation norms: health and integrity (Callicott, 1999: 368). As explained above, health is a concept of conservation for ‘humanly inhabited and used areas’, and Callicott posits integrity for biodiversity reserves: “while biological integrity may well serve as a conservation norm for areas that are preserved or protected, ecosystem health may serve as a complementary conservation norm for those humanly inhabited and used areas that we can deem to be ecologically sustainable” (Ibid.). As it is understood, integrity is related to humanly uninhabited areas as opposed to health.

In the quotation given in the previous paragraph, Callicott introduces a new concept: ecological sustainability. He gives a definition of it:
“ecological sustainability, as a conservation concept, therefore, be understood to be the maintenance, in the same place at the same time, of two interactive ‘things’: culturally selected human economic activities and ecosystem health” (Ibid.). For Callicott, the ecological sustainability approach is proposed in order to fill the gap that an old school of conservation philosophy could not achieve. This old school is called ‘resource conservation’ or ‘resourcism’ in short (Ibid.). It was one of the ruling schools for a very long time, and due to the dominant conception of value of nature (only instrumentally valuable) at that time it had an anthropocentric worldview: “nature is valued only to the extent that it is humanly useful” (Ibid.: 369). The problem with resourcism is that it does not really care for ecosystem health, it sees nature as a machine which supplies things for human beings. So that, the conservation concept in resourcism is also anthropocentric: “maximum sustained yield of renewable resources” (Ibid.: 379). Resourcism had only an anthropocentric dimension. Therefore, to conserve nature for the sake of itself did not seem possible. On the other hand as Callicott cites “ecological sustainability and its associated norm, ecosystem health, have both anthropocentric and ecocentric value dimensions” (Ibid.: 374, emphasis added). This makes them compatible with the norms of ‘biological preservation’.

Another old school of conservation philosophy is ‘wilderness preservation’ or ‘preservationism’ in short (Ibid.: 368). According to this old school, nature can be conserved only if wilderness areas are protected from human inhabitation: it “understood conservation to mean excluding human inhabitation and economic exploitation from remaining areas of
undeveloped nature” (Ibid.: 379). But, this idea contrasts with the holistic outlook of land ethic, because of its dualism: it makes a sharp distinction between humans and wilderness areas. Moreover, Callicott thinks that the term ‘wilderness’ does not suit to the norms of conservation philosophy of our times: “The baggage that freight the received wilderness idea, in my opinion, makes it an unsuitable conceptual tool to meet the challenge of the biodiversity crisis [that we are in today]” (Callicott, 2000: 30). Thus, he suggests the term ‘biodiversity reserves’ for the “habitat for nonhuman species that do not coexist well with Homo sapiens” (Ibid.: 24). Moreover, he interprets this change as an ‘adaptation’ instead of a ‘replacement’ (Callicott, 1999: 380).

Callicott likens the relation between biological preservation and integrity to the relation between ecological sustainability and health (Ibid.: 373). Biological preservation and integrity are the terms of conservation philosophy in the habitats of nonhumans. Unlike the old schools resourcism and preservationism, “these two approaches to ecology [ecological sustainability and biodiversity reserves] are not competing, but complementary” (Ibid.: 376), and this is what ‘an evolutionary and ecological world view’ requires. As Callicott states “a whole and complete conservation biology must embrace both preserving biodiversity and ecological integrity, on the one hand, and sustaining ecosystem health, on the other” (Ibid.: 380). Callicott proposes that biological conservation is possible based on two complementary approaches, but (for now) he does not explicitly state how the whole system works.
3.7.2. A Synthetic Approach to Conservation Philosophy

In this section, I will try to present the new schools of conservation philosophy, namely *functionalism* and *compositionalism* which Callicott synthesizes. Callicott asserts that, the union of these complementary worldviews works both in theory and in practice.

In 1999 article “Current Normative Concepts in Conservation”, Callicott with Larry B. Crowder and Karen Mumford introduced the new schools of conservation philosophy, their norms, the reason for their unity and the synthetic approach at last. As opposed to some philosophers who prefer only one norm as ‘the *summum bonum* of conservation philosophy’, they preferred a pluralistic approach. All the conservation norms are distributed between the two approaches in accordance with the structures of functionalism and compositionalism12.

3.7.2.1. The Functionalist Approach

Functionalism is the adapted and augmented version of the old conservation school resourcism to conservation philosophy. According to Callicott et al. 1999 article, “functionalists perceive the world through the lens of ecosystem ecology, an essentially process-oriented, thermodynamical approach to ecology” (Callicott et al., 1999: 23). For

12 The distribution of norms made by the authors is as follows:

Biological diversity, biological integrity, and ecological restoration are more at home in the compositionalist glossary. Ecosystem health, ecological services, adaptive management, ecosystem management, ecological rehabilitation, sustainable development, and ecological sustainability are more at home in the functionalist glossary (Callicott et al., 1999: 24-25).
functionalists “people are a part of nature and that *Homo sapiens* is no less natural than any other species” (Ibid.: 24). In a sense, as they believe, ecofascism and anthropocentrism are not problems for functionalists any more. Since functionalism is related to humanly inhabited and used areas, the rules of functionalism are determined via ecosystem health, i.e. the sustainability of the ecosystem will be controlled considering the changes made by human beings in ecosystem health. What matters for functionalism is the continuity of functions, and therefore the identity of species is not essential to it. Even if species differ, functions do not change. Fundamental entities of functionalism are, therefore, not entities but functions and processes (Callicott, 1999: 376): “conservation ‘is almost never the preservation of a primeval condition, but rather means maintaining the critical functions of the primeval system.’” (Allen and Hoekstra, 1993 quoted in Callicott et al., 1999: 24). That’s why, there is no such problem as endangered species for functionalists.

### 3.7.2.2. The Compositionalist Approach

Compositionalism is the adapted and augmented version of the old conservation school preservationism to conservation philosophy. The outlook of compositionalism is given thus: “compositionalists perceive the world through the lens of evolutionary ecology, an essentially entity-oriented, biological approach to ecology that begins with organisms aggregated into populations” (Callicott et al. 1999: 23). For compositionalists human beings are apart from nature and the main reason is ‘culture’ in addition to others which are the biblical remark about the place of human beings in the world and rationality. So that, “any
human modification of nature is unnatural” (Ibid.: 24). In a sense, because human beings are not members of the biodiversity reserves, there cannot be any problem about the status of human beings as anthropocentrism, ecofascism, or speciesism. Moreover, because compositionalism is related to the ‘habitat for nonhuman species’, the rules of compositionalism are determined via biological integrity, i.e. biodiversity reserves will be controlled considering the changes in biological integrity. What matters for compositionalism is the continuity of species, because each species has a unique place in nature. In other words, a species is not replaceable with another one. This is stated in the article with a quotation: “according to one leading compostionalist ‘the processes of ecosystems are universal, but the species are not.’” (Soulé, 1996 quoted in Callicott et al., 1999: 25). Hence, individuals are important in this approach. Fundamental entities of compositionalism are, therefore, not functions but organisms and species (Callicott, 1999: 375-376). That’s why, there is endangered species problem for compositionalists.

When the given statements and explanations about functionalism and compositionalism are considered, it can be seen easily that they have different ontologies because of their distinctive ecologies. Functionalism has an ecosystem ecology which regards processes and functions, i.e. it is ‘process-oriented’; but compositionalism has an evolutionary ecology which regards organisms in biotic communities, i.e. it is ‘entity-oriented’. Therefore, functionalism is holistic, compositionalism is individualistic. Moreover, ecosystem ecology allows human beings and anthropogenic impacts on environment, humans are part of energy flow: ‘thermodynamical approach’. On the other hand, evolutionary ecology
excludes human beings in a strict sense: ‘biological approach’ (Callicott et al., 1999).

3.7.2.3. The Synthetic Approach

In the synthetic approach, the aim is the ‘fusion’ of functionalist approach and compositionalist approach. This new approach evades both ecofascism and speciesism problems. Advantage of functionalism is avoiding the ecofascism problem, and advantage of compositionalism is avoiding the problem of speciesism. Thus, if these approaches are complementary, as Callicott argues, then the synthetic approach should also become free of both the ecofascism and speciesism problems. Although the functionalist and compositionalist approaches seem to have a sharp distinction in theory, according to Callicott, they are complementary: “for purposes of conservation, neither the evolutionary nor the ecosystem orientation by itself is adequate” (Callicott et al., 1999: 31). Moreover, it is claimed that functionalism and compositionalism are distinguished “only for expository purposes; they in fact constitute two ends of a continuum.” (Ibid.: 24).

According to Callicott et al., both functionalists and compositionalists should agree on the dependence issue with regard to “explain(ing) and predict(ing) the behavior of” ecosystems and organisms. While fulfilling their goals, the proponents of these two approaches should realize that they are dependent on each other in order to make more accurate predictions and to explain more truly the behaviors of the fundamental entities:
Community ecologists must fuse the previously disparate ecosystem and evolutionary approaches to ecology in order to predict accurately the impact of particular species introduced into particular food webs or to predict the outcome of human ‘development projects’ at various spatial scales on the architecture of a community and hence on its biota. Such predictive power is especially important for ecosystem management\textsuperscript{13} and ecological rehabilitation\textsuperscript{14}. (Callicott et al., 1999: p.31).

The notion of “keystone species”\textsuperscript{15}, for instance, “has emerged at the fusion point of evolutionary and ecosystem ecology” (Ibid.: 30). Keystone species is a common ground and is important for both compositionalists and functionalists, because the removal of a species from its local place may change ecosystem; or the introduction of a species into a different ecosystem may make some changes in the function of the ecosystems (Ibid.: 31).

Moreover, it is claimed in Callicott et al. that the relation between species and ecosystems are ‘context dependent’, i.e. the relation between the two can change “from place to place and time to time, depending on the

\textsuperscript{13} “Ecosystem management is managing for ecosystem health with commodity extraction as an ancillary goal.” (Grumbine, 1997 quoted in Callicott et al., 1999: 28).

\textsuperscript{14} “Ecological rehabilitation is the process of returning, as nearly as possible, an ecosystem to a state of health.” (Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 1994 quoted in Callicott et al., 1999: 28).

\textsuperscript{15} A keystone species is defined as “a species whose impact on its community is large, and disproportionately large relative to its abundance” (Power et al., 1996 quoted in Callicott et al., 1999:31).
physical conditions of the habitat as well as the presence of other organisms” (Ibid.). Not only that ‘keystone species’ but also that physical conditions require the relation of the ecosystem approach with the evolutionary approach.

The two approaches should be unified not only for the purpose of predicting but also for the purpose of analyzing the changes that arise from the relation between the two approaches. That is, the success and the maintenance of each approach depends upon the other approach; therefore “neither of these approaches to conservation can effectively proceed in isolation from the other” (Ibid.: 32). When one of the approaches fell short of satisfying the conditions of conservation, the other may fill the gap. Hence, according to Callicott et al. “most conservationists lie somewhere toward the middle of the compositionalism-functionalism continuum, moving back and forth in emphasis depending on circumstances” (Ibid.: 24, emphasis added).

Hence, for Callicott et al., when the issue is management, they are complementary (i.e. not mutually exclusive) and dependent on each other; but when the issue is conservation, as proposed in Callicott et al., they form a synthetic approach which requires “cooperative and coordinated conservation strategies” and in which “reserves and other protected areas are integrated into their humanly inhabited and economically exploited matrices” (Ibid.: 32, from Figure 2). Thus, in the synthetic approach, we can use both integrity and health in the same context (Ibid.). But, this should not be understood that they are interchangeable concepts. Rather,
3.7.3. The Basic Conservation Norms: Health and Integrity

Callicott has asserted that there are two basic conservation norms, health and integrity, on which conservation approaches are dependent (Callicott, 1999: 368). But these norms belong to different conservation positions. Health is posited for humanly inhabited areas (or ecosystems) and accordingly for the functionalist approach. Similarly, integrity is posited for humanly uninhabited areas (or “biodiversity reserves”) and accordingly for the compositionalist approach. It is also proposed that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, neither are health and integrity. So then, ecosystems and biodiversity reserves can be considered as parts of a whole. As stated in Callicott et al. “one should ‘not distinguish community and ecosystem as different hierarchical levels but rather as complementary ways of viewing the same system’.” (Callicott et al., 1999: 27, emphasis added).

Moreover, we know that functionalism and compositionalism are complementary and so, for Callicott et al., they form a synthetic conservation approach. Then, this synthetic approach is also dependent on both health and integrity (Ibid.: 32). Consequently, analyzing health, integrity, and the relation between them can be helpful for us to understand how the two complementary approaches can form a synthetic one regarding conservation philosophy. It seems that, Callicott unites the two ontologies of functionalism and compositionalism on a normative
level depending upon the two complementary conservation norms: health and integrity.

### 3.7.3.1. Health

Ecosystem health is defined in three forms in the article (Callicott et al. 1999). First definition of ecosystem health is “the occurrence of normal ecosystem processes and functions” (Ibid.: 27). According to this definition, ecosystems are healthy when the processes and functions work normally. That is, there are certain mechanisms and processes in the ecosystem through time, and, unless this functioning mechanism stops or changes, ecosystem is considered healthy. In other words, the continuity of the ecosystem historically shows that that ecosystem is healthy. One possible criticism of this historicity can be – as given in the essay- that “If ‘normal’ ecosystem function is understood to mean ecological processes occurring as they have occurred historically, then what historic moment should be selected as the benchmark?” (Ibid.: 29). The ‘normal’ or ‘historical’ criterion seems really problematic with regard to the change that nature goes through constantly. The answer to the problem is that: “Ecosystem processes and functions certainly change over time -....- but they do not typically change as rapidly as species populations fluctuate in their associated biotic communities.” (Ibid.). That is, one particular species, for instance, cannot witness huge changes in nature in its lifetime; however if it does, then it may mean that ecosystem health is in danger. Change in ecosystems is slower than the change in species communities, so that the utterance of normality and historicity is meaningful.
The second definition is “the absence of its opposite, ecosystem disease (or ‘ecosystem distress syndrome’)” (Ibid.: 27). This second form represents the absence of the malfunction of ecosystem processes.

In the third definition, ecosystem health is associated with organismic health with regard to “counteractive capacity”: “the capacity to absorb external perturbations and rapidly resume normal activities after being substantially assaulted.” (Ibid.). Briefly, the ability to return to normal functioning processes after being affected by external attacks.

3.7.3.2. Integrity

In defining integrity, Callicott et al. (1999) makes a distinction between biological integrity and ecological integrity. The difference between the two comes from the inclusion of ecological processes as well as biological components. For this reason, some ecologists prefer to call it ecological integrity, because they do not make a sharp distinction between health and integrity like Callicott. But the authors of this essay prefer to call it biological integrity.

Biological integrity is defined as “native species populations in their historic variety and numbers naturally interacting in naturally structured biotic communities.” (Callicott et al., 1999: 25, emphasis added). Based on the definition of biological integrity, one can say that, for integrity there are some conditions that should be preserved. First, species should be native. Although one can increase diversity with introducing exotic species to that community, integrity in that area does not increase, even it
can decrease\textsuperscript{16}: "because ‘naturally evolved assemblages possess integrity, but random assemblages do not.’” (Callicott, 1999: 361). So that, species’ nativity is crucial for integrity.

Second, the \textit{variety and number} of species should be preserved. In order to protect the integrity of one area, variety and numbers of the species should be taken into consideration.

Third, \textit{biotic community} is important. If a biotic community is naturally structured, i.e. that biotic community consists of native species and there are no interventions, then it is much more probable to preserve the integrity in that biotic community.

Moreover, the naturalness criterion of biotic communities resembles the normality criterion of ecosystems. For ecosystems to be healthy, they are required to function normally. Accordingly, for biotic communities to have integrity, they are required to be natural. Both normality and naturalness criteria have the same problem: to set a standard, a ‘benchmark’, in order to evaluate the changes in ecosystems and biotic communities on the basis of that standard. As given in the article, one possible criticism of the naturalness criterion is “what past biotic community composition and structure that existed in a given area should

\textsuperscript{16} In the article, it is presented that biological integrity comprehends biodiversity because “the concept of biodiversity is limited to elements, whereas biological integrity comprises both biological components and ecological processes” (Callicott et al. 1999: 25). Thus it can and should supersede biodiversity. Moreover, although “biodiversity may be artificially increased by introducing exotic species, [it can cause] violating the integrity of a biotic community” (Ibid.) According to the article, biodiversity is limited to “native biodiversity” by some advocates of the biodiversity in order to avoid such criticisms (Ibid.). Moreover, in the issue of conservation, being “comprehensive as well as rigorous” makes integrity predominant among other conservation norms (Ibid.).
be selected as the target for restoration efforts?” (Callicott et al., 1999: 26). The answer given to the question is that ‘the more appropriate target is the assemblage that existed after the human invasion’ (Ibid.: 27). When the constant change in the relation of humans and nonhumans is considered, the naturalness criterion seems problematic, because the criterion is defined through human impact. Therefore, integrity is analyzed by means of something human. Besides, the given ‘benchmark’ is a very big time period, so not explanatory for all situations.

Callicott et al. 1999 states that, there are three measures for a biotic community to be natural and all are measured depending on the scale of the effect of human intervention. The first measure is “the less change, the more natural” (Ibid.: 26). The second one is “the less cultural effort [to maintain an artificial assemblage], the more natural” (Ibid.). The last one is “the more the post-settlement assemblage of an area resembles the pre-settlement assemblage, the more natural” (Ibid.). That is, the less the diversity of assemblages that settle in the same area, the more natural. This last measure is different from the first two, because, unlike the first and second measures, the last measure makes sense only for humanly settled areas. If the three are summarized, the collective measure would be: the less extrinsic (especially human) interventions both qualitatively and quantitatively, the more natural.

3.7.3.3. The Relation between Health and Integrity

Callicott, in “The Value of Ecosystem Health”, gives the definitions of health and integrity as follows:
Let “ecosystem health” mean a condition of normality in the linked processes and functions that compose ecosystems. Let “biological integrity” mean “the capability of supporting and maintaining a balanced, integrated, adaptive community of organisms having a species composition, diversity, and functional organization comparable to that of natural habitat in the region” (Angermeir and Karr, 1994 quoted in Callicott, 1999: 362, emphasis added by Callicott).

According to Callicott, under the guidance of Angermeir and Karr, the definitions of integrity and health diverge from each other based upon the “two features of ‘biological integrity’” (Callicott, 1999: 361). One of the features is that integrity relates to nature in ‘community level’, whereas health relates to nature in ‘ecosystem level’. The other feature is that integrity relates to “conditions under little or no influence from human actions” (Angermeir and Karr, 1994: 692), i.e. the integrity of a community depends upon the scale of human intervention. This feature can be interpreted as parallel to the naturalness criteria of integrity: the less human influence, the more integrity. On the other hand, ecosystems “that have been radically altered—or even created de novo (agro-ecosystems, for example)—by human action may be healthy.”(Callicott, 1999: 362).

As Callicott proposes, any change in species diversity, or species composition, or in functions of a biotic community affect integrity, because maintenance of the community function (with little or no change) is essential for integrity. That is, health is necessary, though not sufficient, for integrity.
by definition. Moreover, as long as ecosystems function and integrity is maintained, any change can be acceptable for health because of the reason that “one sure way to maintain ecosystem health is to maintain biological integrity” (Ibid.: 363). Although integrity may be required for health, it is not necessary, because, health can be increased even if there is no integrity, for instance, exotic species can be introduced to replace some native species, and the thermodynamic system still works, may even work better.

The relation between health and integrity may be summarized best with the theories of Noss (1995) and Westra (1994) as given by Callicott: “‘health is necessary for integrity, but it is not sufficient,’ while ecological integrity is sufficient for health, but not necessary” (Ibid.: 375). In addition to that, health and integrity are complementary conservation norms. But, they are not “identical or interchangeable concepts” (Ibid.: 364).

3.7.4. The Summary of Callicott’s Last Stand

Callicott’s synthetic approach is a unification that incorporates two conservation approaches: functionalism and compositionalism. This is the case, for Callicott, because of the “contemporary conservation goals” which result from “global conservation crisis” which “we are in the midst of” (Callicott, 2000: 29-30).

According to Callicott, functionalism or compositionalism cannot individually solve the crisis (Callicott et al., 1999: 32). They should work together, because only in this way there can be “a whole and complete
conservation biology” (Callicott, 1999: 380). As stated in Callicott et al., functionalism and compositionalism have different ontologies by definition (Callicott et al., 1999: 23). They have different disciplines, i.e. ecologies: functionalism is a “thermodynamical approach to ecology”, while compositionalism is a “biological approach to ecology” (Ibid.). Functionalism is holistic (“process-oriented”), but compositionalism is individualistic (“entity-oriented”). Although functionalism includes *Homo sapiens*, compositionalism finds humans dangerous for the integrity of biotic communities.

Moreover, the two approaches have two different conservation norms: health and integrity. Besides, as Callicott proposes, these norms are complementary (Callicott, 1999: 364). Since they are complementary, for Callicott, ecofascism or speciesism cannot be a problem for the synthetic approach, either. According to Callicott, this is the case, because the synthetic approach depends upon *both* health and integrity (Callicott et al., 1999: 32). In other words, Callicott unites two different ontologies of functionalism and compositionalism at a normative level and it seems unproblematic, because Callicott says that “our distinction between compositionalism and functionalism was meant to be *conceptual, not empirical.*” (Callicott et al., 2000: 575, emphasis added).

Hence, functionalism and compositionalism have different ontologies, but they belong to the same system: “two ends of a continuum.” (Callicott et al., 1999: 24) and this is the thing which makes them complement each other. Since they are complementary, the unification of the two does not eliminate one or the other and thus ecofascism or speciesism cannot be a
problem for the synthetic approach. In the final analysis, Callicott’s last stand seems convenient for his aim: building an environmental ethic free from ecofascism and speciesism.

3.8. Discussion

In this chapter, the main subject is the two significant problems of environmental ethics which are ecofascism and speciesism. These are the problems that should be coped with by environmental philosophers, because otherwise they face with inappropriate and wrong claims about the place of man in nature: either an ordinary member or ‘citizen’ of nature, or a member who is at the top of a hierarchy. Both of them undesirable because of the mentioned (ecofascism and speciesism) problems.

Most of the philosophers, all the difficulties notwithstanding, try to find a middle way in the ecofascism-speciesism continuum and their theories get closer to one or the other edge of the continuum. Callicott is one of the environmental philosophers who struggle on this issue, when his theory indicates one of the problems or gets closer to one of the edges, he tries to find a new way to go. It is given that there are six stages in Callicott’s philosophy starting with strong holism due to accepting Leopold’s land ethic as a basis. Then, he has constructed a theory which pushes him closer to the speciesist edge, and finally he has found a way out from these fatal consequences. Callicott is just an example. One can find similar endeavors in other environmental philosophers’ theories too, but Callicott is a good example for the reader in finding diverse and conflicting theories
in one carrier with the aim of constructing the most problem-free theory. Some other philosophers may stick with one theory and do not try to find a better one, but Callicott is an exception.

However, all the environmental philosophers face with the same problems in their journey although they be either holist or individualist in the end. In constructing a holistic environmental ethical theory, for instance, they may be in ecofascism difficulty because holism requires man to be an ordinary member of the biotic community as seen in the First Turn. Or, establishing a special place for human kind with the aim of ditching the ecofascism crisis may cause another equally important crisis, namely, speciesism (see the Third Turn). Some of the philosophers prefer to be closer to one of these edges always with being on guard against the other. Some others, like Callicott, try to find a middle way equally far from the edges. However, this choice is no easier. Selecting to be a member of both human community and biotic community brings different problems, such as ranking problems between the duties and obligations toward the communities and their members, i.e. a challenge to decision making processes. For such problems, they come up with some principles or rules like Second-Order Principles (SOPs) as Callicott did (the Fifth Turn). But, these rules or principles are not sufficient enough to solve the ranking problems of setting priorities among our duties to members of the both communities, either. Thus, either there is a need for more regulations and rules, or these two communities should be separated in a different dimension and gathered at another level. The second choice is preferred by Callicott and used as a solution to the main problem: constructing an environmental ethical theory which involves whole nature with its
members and which is free from two essential problems (see the Sixth Turn).
CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

This study was set out to explore the question given in the introduction chapter: “is an environmental ethical theory possible without falling into the ecofascism and/or speciesism traps?”. In order to seek out a satisfactory answer to the question, firstly, some important norms, principles, entities, disciplines, systems of environmental ethics are presented and examined. Secondly, they are questioned and exemplified through a case study which is, in this context, John B. Callicott’s environmental ethical theories. Lastly, in the discussion section, an answer to the main question is given.

In Chapter 2, the theoretical and foundational dynamics of environmental philosophy and environmental ethics are explained and evaluated for further understanding of the issue. Some important value-based ethical theories are synthesized under the two main worldviews: anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. These theories locate in the individualism-holism continuum, such as ecocentrism, biocentrism, animal liberation. This chapter also provides the implications of given theories with respect to the research question. Therefore, the two
noteworthy problems, ecofascism and speciesism, which demarcate the boundaries of environmental ethics and their significance are emphasized for further assessment.

In order to point to the facts of restrictive problems in environmental ethics, in Chapter 3, Callicott’s struggle is revealed under six phases, namely: holism, quantum theoretical axiology, charge of ‘environmental fascism’, the Midgley-Leopold biosocial moral theory, first and second-order principles, and his last stand. This chapter has offered an evaluative perspective on the main problems of environmental ethics and was conducted with this aim. Analyzing all the steps in detail can facilitate for the reader to see how demanding the main question is, because each theory which is presented as a solution has created a different challenge for Callicott: his holistic theory gave rise to the ecofascism problem, and his attempt to deal with that issue has resulted in speciesism. The limitations that Callicott has encountered are considered in a comprehensive manner. All the stages are given in chronological order with expository purposes. The first five stages, despite theoretical facilities, did not offer much solution in practice and needed some additional principles or rules, e.g. second-order principles. In the final stage, Callicott has proposed a combined theory by considering his previous experiences. This last theory consists of two approaches towards different ecosystem understandings: humanly inhabited communities and biotic communities. Callicott has presented these communities as having two distinct ontologies, and united them at a normative level.
As a final point, Callicott’s last theory seems to point to the conclusion that an environmental ethical theory is possible without falling into the ecofascism and speciesism traps, i.e. his last stand can facilitate the attainment of the main subject of this thesis.
REFERENCES


Çevre etiği felsefenin 1960’lardan bugüne yeni gelişmekte olan bir koludur. Çevre etiğinin ortaya çıkışı insanoğlunun doğaya olan bağımlılığının ve ona duyulan ihtiyacının farkına varmasına denk düşmektedir. Otonom (kendi kendini düzenleyen) bir doğanın kavranması ve kabulüyle bir çok konu göz önünde bulundurulmaya başlanmıştır: insanın doğadaki yeri, doğanın değeri (içsel veya instrumental), insan dışındaki varlıkların ahlaki statüleri, doğanın insanoğlu için anlamlı ve önemi, doğanın işleyiş biçimi ve insanın bunun üzerindeki etkisi, doğayı koruma ve saklama yöntemleri, gelecek nesiller sorunsalı, doğanın estetik yönü, gibi. Çevre etiği filozoflarının akıllardaki temel sorular şunlardır: doğanın nasıl tanımlanacağı, doğanın özsel olarak bir değere sahip olup olmaması, nesli tükenmekte olan türler hakkında yapılması ve yapılmaması gerekenler ve bu türlerin doğadaki yeri, sürdürülebilirlik problemi, insanoğlunun hayatını doğanın yararına olacaktır biçimde nasıl düzenlenmesi gerektiğini. Çevre etiğinin en çok ele alınan alanı doğaya karşı oluşan etik kaygular olsa da, filozoflar doğanın estetiği ve teleolojisi konularında da bazı problemler ortaya atmıştır: doğanın estetik değeri, restoration, vb. Yani, doğanın teleolojik,
estetik, etik ve hatta tanribilimsel bir çok yönü araştırma konusu olmuştur.

Kısacası, ilk olarak, doğanın felsefi olarak ele alınması, insanoğlunun doğadaki yeri, ve insan ve doğa arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir ve bu durum hala süregelmektedir. İkinci olarak, doğanın, bitkilerin, hayvanların ve doğada yer alan diğer varlıkların ahlaki durumu analiz edilmektedir. Son olarak da, çevre felsefesinin ve çevre etiğinin metafiziksel arka planı çalışılmaktadır. Buna bağlı olarak, toprak etiği ve derin ekoloji gibi farklı çevre hareketleri ve pozisyonları meydana gelmiştir.


Ekofaşizm ve türçülük problemlerinin temelinde doğaya karşı olan değer teorileri yatar. Doğanın değerinin olup olmadığını sorgulanmaya başlanmasıyla, bazı filozoflar ona içsel değer\(^{21}\) atfederken bazıları da instrumental değer\(^{22}\) atfeder. Filozofların doğaya atfettikleri değer doğrultusunda, bu filozofların yaklaşımları insan-merkezci ya da insan-merkezci olmayan olarak adlandırılır.

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\(^{17}\) İnsan-merkezcilik, insanları temel olan ve insanoğlunun ihtiyaçlarını merkezde tutan bir yaklaşımdır. Insanoğlu hiyerarşik sıralamada en üst noktada yer alır bu anlayışa göre.

\(^{18}\) Eko-merkezcilik, insan-merkezciliğin tersine, çevreyi bir bütün olarak ele alır ve insanlar hiçbir şekilde diğer canlılardan daha üstün ya da daha değerli değerlendirir.

\(^{19}\) Türçülük, bir tür ait bireyin kendi türünün ihtiyaçlarını ön plana alması ve diğer bütün tüyleri hiyerarşik olarak kendi türünden sonraya koymasıdır. Türçü bir insan, bütün insanların doğadaki diğer herşeyden, canlı ya da cansız, daha üstün görmekte ve onların insanlardan daha az değerli olduğuna inanmaktadır.

\(^{20}\) Eko-faşizm, bireylerin, hangi tür ait olduğuna bakılmaksızın, bütünün yararını için feda edilebilir olduğu görüşüdür. Bu düşünceyi büchemi insanların bütünün yararını için feda edilebilir olduğunu öne sürmesi yönünden problemlidir.

\(^{21}\) İçsel değer, bir şeyin kendinde var olan değerdir. İçsel değer subjektif ve objectif olarak ikiye ayrılır. Subjektif içsel değerleri savunanlar, bu değerin bir bağımsız tarafından verildiğine; objektif içsel değerleri savunanlar ise bunun herşeyden ve herkesten bağımsız olarak var olan bir değer olduğunu inanırlar.

\(^{22}\) Enstrmental değer, bir şeye bir bağımsız tarafından atfedilen ve tamamen o şeyin işe yaraması doğrultusunda oluşturulur bir değer biçimidir.

Diğer yandan, insan-merkezci teorilerin en katı olanları da türcülük problemiyle karşı karşıya kalır. Türcülüğe göre, insanoğlu bir tür hiyerarşinin en tepesinde yer alır. İnsanlar herşeyin merkezinde ve bütün diğer herşey ancak insanlar için kullanılabilir ve birer ihtiyaç olmaları halinde değerlendirir. Bu sebeple, herhangi bir insandışı varlık insanoğluna hizmet etmesi amacıyla feda edilebilir.

Bu çalışmanın amacı ise, çevre etiği filozoflarını köşeye sıkıştıran bu iki problemi – ekofaşizm ve türcülük – incelemektir. Bu bağlamda, incelemenin asıl sorusu “ekofaşizm ve/veya türcülük problemlerinin tuzaklarına düşmeden bir çevre etiği teorisi mümkün müdür?”

J. Baird Callicott23, bütün çevre etiği filozoflarının da baş etmek zorunda kaldığı bu durumun çok iyi bir örnegidir. Bütün kariyeri boyunca, problemsiz bir çevre etiği teorisi oluşturmak isteği ile ekofaşizm ve türcülük arasında mekik dokumuştür ve bunu bazen doğrudan bazen da dolaylı bir biçimde yapmıştır. Başlangıçta, bana göre, ekofaşizm veya

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türículük Callicott için kaçınılmazdı. Nina teorilerine yapılan eleştiriyle çevre etiğine sınırlamalar getiren ekofaşizm ve türículük problemlerinin önemi hakkında farkındalık kazandı.

II

Yukarıda bahsedilenler doğrultusunda, çevre etiğinin temellerini, doğanın statüsünü ve değerini, ve çevre felsefelerinin karşılaştığı bazı önemli sorunları ele alan bir açılış bölümü (Chapter 2) bulunmaktadır. Bu bölümün ilk kısmı çevre felsefesini ve çevre etiğini tanıtır. İkinci kısımlı, çevre etiğinin iki önemli dünya görüşünü, insan-merkezci olan ve insan-merkezci olmayan, sunmaktadır. İnsan-merkezci ve insan-merkezci olmayan pozisyonların doğanın değeri (içsel veya instrumental) hakkındaki görüşler doğrultusunda oluşturulduğu ortaya atılmıştır. İnsan-merkezci olmayan (non-anthropocentric) görüşe göre doğada bulunan insan dışındaki varlıklar da içsel değere sahip olabilir.


türlerin doğal bir şekilde mi oluştuğu yoksa insan yapımı bir şey mi olduğu gibi bazı epistemik ve etik sorular ortaya çıkmaktadır. Çünkü, metafizik yapıda olan bir değişiklik bizim bir şeyi nasıl algıladığımızı ve onunla olan ilişkiyi nasıl kurduğumuzu farklılaştırır ve bu da etik boyutta değişikliklere sebebiyet verir. İkinci problem, akl yürütmede ortaya çıkan bir yanlışlığı: gerçeklerden değer teorilerinin üretilmesi ('ought from is'). Callicott'a göre bu sorun saklı öncüllerin argümanda yer almasıyla son bulabilir çünkü öncüllerle sonuç arasındaki ilişki herkesin bildiği ve doğru kabul ettiği öncüllerler sağlanabilir. Örneğin, sigara sağlığı zararlı öncülünden sigara içmemenin sonucunun çıkarılabilmesi için 'herkes sağlığına önem verir' gibi bir öncülnün eklenmesi gerekmektedir (Callicott, 1989: 122). Eko-merkezciliğin karşı karşıya kaldığı üçüncü sorun ise karşılaştığı problemler arasında belki de en zorudur: ekofaşizm. Bu sorun bir türün ya da topluluğun değerinin onu oluşturan bireylerin değerinden daha üstün olması şeklinde açıklanabilir.

Hayvanların liberasyonu, biyo-merkezcilik gibi bireyci bir etiktir. Bu etik için sadece hayvanlar önemlidir. Peter Singer’in etiği buna bir örnek olabilir, çünkü ona göre sadece hayvanlar sezgili (ya da duyarlı) varlıklardır (Singer’in kriteri ‘sentiency’ dir).

bu görüş insan ve doğa arasındaki uyumu ortaya çıkarır (harmony with nature) ve böylece insan-doğa ilişkisini olanaklı kılar. İkincisi, insanların deneyimlerine dayanarak değer oluşumunu garanti eder, bu durumda doğanın insan kaynaklı daha az zarara mağruz kalması demektir.


Benim bu bölümdeki amacım çevre etiğini bütün normlarıyla, anlayışlarıyla, tavırlarıyla, ve problemleriyyle ortaya koymak ve böylece okuyucunun tezin ana konusu ve problemi hakkında bilgi sahibi olmasını desteklemektir.

III


Callicott, çevre etiğindeki eko-merkezci yaklaşımının, deyim yerindeyse, tutucu ve hatta klasik olduğunu iddia etmiştir (Ibid.). Ona göre bu durumun sebebi, yeni bilimsel buluşlar ve keşiflerle ve bunlara bağlı
olarak oluşan yeni yaşam formlarıyla birlikte felsefenin eski tanımlamalar sebebiyle bu gelişmelerden uzak kalmıştır. Bu sebeple de, Callicott filozoflarının daha önce de yaptıkları şeyi yani yeni kavramlar oluşturmayı denemeleri gerektiğini savunmaktadır.

Üçüncü bölümdeki (Chapter 3), amacı ikinci bölümde anlatılanlar doğrultusunda Callicott’un çevre etiğini sunmak ve değerlendirmektir. Callicott’un karşılaştığı bütün kısıtlamalar kapsamlı bir biçimde ve tarihsel olarak sunulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu bölümdeki bütün kısımlar açıktayıcı olmak amacıyla hem kendi içlerinde hem de kendi aralarında tarihsel ve sistematik bir biçimde ele alınmış ve incelenmiştir.


25 Charles Darwin’e göre ahlaki temeli olan duygular da insanla birlikte evrimeşmiştir çünkü altruizm insanın doğasında vardır ve doğal seleksiyonla birlikte varlığı korumuş, dahası bu süreçte bir araç olarak kullanılabilmistiştir. İnsanların bir arada yaşamaları ve ahlaki temellerin oluşturulması için de duygular gerektirdir ve evrime uyum sağlar.

26 David Hume’a göre de ahlak duygular üzerine kurulmuştur, çünkü akl bunun için tek başına yeterli değildir.


ardına gelen modellerdir, diğer yandan da bu kısımlar arasındaki ilişki rekabet gibi görülebilir.

Sekizinci ve son kısımda önceki kısımların değerlendirilmesi için tasarlanmıştır. Çevre etiğinin temel problemleri, ekofaşizm ve türcülük, Callicott’un felsefesinin tüm aşamalarında incelenmiştir. Callicott tarafından önerilen stratejiler doğrultusunda, problemler genel şekilde tartışılmıştır, çünkü ilk başta da bahsettiğim gibi bunlar bütün çevresinde etiği filozoflarının başetmesi gereken sorunlardır. Son olarak, ekofaşizm ve türcülük sorunlarından uzak bir çevre etiği teorisinin olasılığı tartışılmıştır.

IV

Callicott’un felsefesindeki bütün basamakları analiz etmekteki amacım, okuyucunun bu tezin asıl sorusunun ne kadar zorlayıcı olduğunu fark etmesini sağlamak. Buna ek olarak, tezin sonunda Callicott’un son savunmasının tezin sorusuna ve amacına olumlu yanıt verdiği ileri sürülmüş ve bunun nasıl olduğu incelenmiştir.

Callicott’un bu son savunması iki farklı yaklaşımanın bir bütün haline getirilmesidir. Callicott’a göre, bu iki yaklaşımın bir bütün oluşturmadasındaki amacı ikisinin de tek baslarına çevre etiğinde meydana gelen sorunlara yeterli bir biçimde cevap veremeyecek olmalıdır. Bu iki yaklaşımın birbirini tamamlayan bir bütün oluşturabilmelerinin yolu aynı sürerlilikte yer almalarına rağmen iki farklı ontolojiye sahip olmalıdır. İki farklı ontolojiye sahip olmalarının sebebi de farklı ekolojiler üzerine
kuruluş olmalarıdır ve her ikiside farklı kavramlara sahiptir: biri sağlık ('health'), diğeri de bütünlük ('integrity'). Bu iki yaklaşım da biri türçülük problemine, diğeri de ekofaşizm problemine çözüm getirmiştir. Dolayısıyla, bu yaklaşımın birbirlerini tamamlayan olma özellikleri oluşan yeni modelin çevre etiğindeki her iki probleme de (ekofaşizm ve türçülük) çözüm olması anlamına gelmektedir.

V

Özet olarak, öncelikle, konunun daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi amacıyla çevre felsefesinin ve çevre etiğinin teorik ve temel dinamikleri açıklanmış ve değerlendirilmiştir. Daha sonra, çevre etiğindeki sınırlayıcı sorunlara dikkat çekmek için J. Baird Callictt’un mücadele altı aşamada verilmiştir. Çevre etiğinin temel sorunlarına değerlendirici bir bakış açısı katmak amacı doğrultusunda inceleme yapılmıştır. Callictt’un felsefesindeki bütün basamakları ayrıntılı bir biçimde ele alınan okuyucuya tezin asıl sorusunun ne kadar talep edicini göstermesi, çünkü Callicott tarafından çözüm olarak sunulan her teori bir başka problemi doğurmuştur. Callicott’un içinde düşüşü durumlar kapsamlı bir tavırla açıklanılmaya çalışılmıştır. İlk beş safha, teorik olanaklara rağmen, pratikte pek çözümcül olamaması ve ekstra kurallara, prensiplere ihtiyaç duyma. Son safhada ise, Callicott önceki deneyimlerini de göz önünde bulundurarak bileşik bir teori ortaya atmıştır. Bu son teori ekosistem anlayışına karşı iki farklı anlayıştan oluşmaktadır. Callicott bu iki yaklaşıma farklı ontolojilere sahip olarak sunmuş ve daha sonra normatif düzlemde birleştirmiştir. Callicott’un bu son teorisi, bana göre,
bu tezin ana konusunu başarılı bir biçimde değerlendirmiş ve soruya olumlu yanıt vermiştir.
TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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