

HEIDEGGER ON THE CLAIM OF THE PHENOMENON: LOGOS AND BEING

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

GÜLŞAH NAMLI TÜRKMEN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

AUGUST 2013

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

HEIDEGGER ON THE CLAIM OF THE PHENOMENON: LOGOS AND BEING

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August 2013, 422 pages

In this thesis, our aim is to bring into view Heidegger's thinking in a comprehensive sense with regard to its fundamental premise. As we shall see, the latter lies in what phenomenological breakthrough brought forward in terms of an idea of showing in its manner of giving itself. This problematic has its own genesis as itself in the sense that what is to be thought comes to revealing as the way of thinking which is not based on metaphysical stances, but finds itself on the way to itself. Although for Heidegger, metaphysical thought consists in an essential forgetting, metaphysics is not set aside; but rather, his thinking provides us with an originary direction in the sense that metaphysics is appropriated. This becomes obvious when we see that our thinking appeals again to the basic issues such as 'truth', 'to be self or human' or 'to be a being', not as subject matters of this or that system of thinking, but in such a way that *the matter itself* keeps itself in thinking as its claiming. This amounts to saying that what is at stake is a kind of nearness or intimacy with the distance proper to it in such a way that it gives time *and* being. As we follow Heidegger in his path of thinking, we shall see that this is not a product of any human capacity; instead it is the language in its speaking *essentially* where human being dwells.

Keywords: Being, Truth, Human being, Language, Time.

ÖZ

HEIDEGGER’DE FENOMENİN İDDİASI: LOGOS VE VARLIK

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Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam

Ağustos 2013, 422 sayfa

Bu tezde amacımız Heidegger düşüncesini, temel vaadi bakımından, kapsayıcı bir biçimde ele almaktır. Göreceğimiz gibi, bu vaat, fenomenolojinin ileri sürdüğü kendi verililiğinde gösterme fikrinde yatmaktadır. Bu sorunsal, kökenine, düşünülecek olanın ortaya çıkışının, bir yol olarak, metafizik bir duruşta temellenerek değil de kendine doğru bir yol olması anlamında, kendisi olarak sahiptir. Her ne kadar Heidegger için metafizik düşünce, özsel bir unutuştan ibaret olsa da, metafizik bir kenara atılmamıştır; aksine Heidegger’in düşüncesi, bize, metafiziğin sahiplenildiği kökensel bir yön sağlamaktadır. Bu durum, düşüncemizin, ‘hakikat’, ‘kendi ya da insan olma’ veya ‘bir varolanın olması’ gibi temel mevzulara, şu veya bu düşünce sisteminin konuları olarak değil de, *meselenin kendisini*, düşüncede, kendi iddiası olarak muhafaza etmesi anlamında, yeniden müracaat ediyor oluşu dikkate alındığında açıklığa kavuşur. Bu, önemli olanın, zaman ve varlığın birlikte verililiği olarak, kendine özgü uzaklığıyla gelen bir yakınlık olduğu anlamına gelmektedir. Heidegger’i kendi düşünce yolunda takip ederken göreceğiz ki bu, herhangi bir insan yetisinin üretimi değildir, bunun yerine, insanın ikamet ettiği yer olarak *özel* konuşmasında dilden söz edilmelidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Varlık, Hakikat, İnsan, Dil, Zaman

To My Family

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam for his insight, encouragements and comments.

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my husband Faysal Türkmen for his invaluable support and unique kindness without which I could not accomplish this work.

I express my gratitude to my family for their support, especially, to my mother who has encouraged me in each case.

I would like to thank Emrah Günok for our invaluable philosophical discussions and friendship. I am also grateful to my friend Aylin Demir for her support, suggestions and comments.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my teacher Tahir Kocayiğit who taught me how to think.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the following work, our aim is to see thinking in its originary dimension. Martin Heidegger will lead us into the grounding of such thinking through his venturing the questioning in its utmost. However, it should be seen that what is at stake is not to ground a basis behind everything, but to let the grounding ground. Then, it is a kind of releasement through which we find a letting free. But as long as in each releasement we find confinement as that from which we release, it is necessary to ask from what the thinker releases. Indeed, Heidegger also speaks of forgetting, but insisting that this is not something negative. It could be argued that Heidegger, from the beginning to the end in his path of thinking, comes to see that forgetting cannot be understood negatively. Thus, it is a matter of seeing that nothing or concealing essentially belongs to being and we shall see how this becomes obvious in its different aspects. In this sense, this kind of showing happens, not because it leaves something behind, but in the sense that it happens in its concealing in such a way that it remains a claim. And Heidegger begins with the idea that insofar as that showing happens in and as its claim, truth must be a central theme for thinking. In other words, intimacy of showing, which means that showing keeps itself in and as its claim is what truth originary means. Accordingly, as we shall see, in the beginning of his thinking, Heidegger tries to show truth in terms of such an intimacy which becomes visible to him through Aristotelian *tigein* or contact in such a way that he finds an originary truth or *aletheia* which lies in Dasein's disclosure. Heidegger, until *Kehre*, discusses Dasein as the prevailing dimension of that happening in order to show that what happens is Dasein in its being metaphysical. And the idea of originary truth will constitute the background of his consideration of truth as the intimacy of Da-sein as grounding itself of truth and its historicity. Then, we will see that Heidegger, in the final period of his thinking, reaches the idea of nearness that he finds in language in its speaking in the sense that *aletheia* cannot be understood in terms of truth, even as the origin of what we traditionally understand by truth, but it is nearing of the nearness which shows itself as its showing within the

proper distance to it in terms of poetic happening. Thus, as it will become obvious throughout this work, we look for a kind of intimacy or nearness through which showing is preserved as its claim in such a way that ‘nothing’ or concealing *essentially* belongs to that happening.

In the seventh paragraph of *Being and Time*, Heidegger gives us the definition of phenomenon as ‘that which shows itself in itself’ (*Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende*). With such a few words, he, indeed, basically defines what phenomenology, beginning from its Husserlian constitution, seeks for in its ongoing making itself problematic to itself. Such words are easy to understand just because, either, as one may claim, they imply something so trivial that everything already show itself in itself or its intention is so magical that one immediately lets oneself believe it. For the second option, we can say that for Heidegger, if there is something which is excluded from philosophy, this is belief. It is not a matter of attitude which tries to eliminate ‘doubt’. Indeed, for Heidegger, doubt which finds its constitution in Cartesian philosophy and endures throughout all modern philosophy is not a mere doubt, but a strategy to find a way for believing in something. Thus, it is already belief. However, for Heidegger, what is at stake is not to find something to believe, but to let showing show itself as its very self. Insofar as we focus on ‘showing’, indeed, it is trivial. All is in the manner of showing, either this way or that way. And Heidegger is aware of this fact which for him, is not a lack, but the heart of showing that he talks about. This becomes understandable when we see that for Heidegger, showing is a showing ‘itself in itself’. One may argue that the latter is a norm on showing and is nothing but Heidegger’s belief in such a way that the aim of the phenomenologist is, from the outset, imaginary. However, for Heidegger and for phenomenology in general, showing itself in itself is nothing normative. Rather, that something shows itself in itself has the function of letting what is indicated come to sight, the indication that something does *not* show itself in itself. This does not mean that we find again ourselves in the realm of doubt. Rather, phenomenon, namely, self-showing is the claim itself insofar as a claim remains a claim only in its *not*. It consists of a way ‘to the things themselves’, as Husserl has already set it forth. And for Heidegger, what is at issue is to be ready for that claim in its claiming.

Readiness or preparedness is not something determined beforehand. Indeed, the claim claims us, human beings. It could be said that Heidegger, from the beginning, knew that it is a matter of belongingness of human being and being, but still there were the paths to go through. His strange thinking remains so before the idea of that enigmatic phenomenality. How could one understand that showing is showing itself in itself but still ‘not showing itself in itself’? How can one conceive concealment with unconcealment at the same time? Or is it time itself which gives itself as that phenomenon in its claim? We should know that ‘Zeigen’ (to show) is one of the key words of Heidegger’s thinking but this does not mean that his responses to the claim of the phenomenon are identical throughout his path of thinking. Rather, how to understand self-showing of the phenomenon differs with regard to how we have already designated it although its very meaning as a claim of showing itself in itself remains the same. In that respect, Heidegger’s description of ‘phenomenon’ in *Being and Time* gives us a whole account of his early thinking until *Kehre*. As we have said, he defines phenomenon as showing itself in itself in such a way that it is open to ‘not showing itself in itself’. Heidegger calls the latter possibility ‘semblance’ (*Schein*) and the core of discussion is how to delineate that semblance. First, we should bear in mind that semblance is not appearance. It does not refer to an appearing of something which itself does not appear. Rather, it is the essence of self-showing as Heidegger insists, we might say “yet so much semblance, so much ‘Being’”.¹ Thus, the phenomenon, that is, self-showing is being, but what about semblance? When Heidegger talks about semblance, we see that he returns to beings. Then, semblance points to the fact that a being either shows itself as itself or it shows itself as it is *not*. This is different modes of a being’s showing itself from itself. Beings look like as...and for Heidegger, in order that something looks like so-and-so, it must already have a pretention of self-showing. This pretention as that which shows itself and indeed remains hidden for the most part is being, not beings. But this self-showing happens through the manifestation of beings which is semblance. This is how Heidegger, until 1930s, understands being in terms of beings.

¹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquire&Edward Robinson, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1962. p. 60.

One may immediately ask in what way semblance of beings in their showing themselves or not showing themselves is related to the phenomenality of being in its hiddenness. As we know, for Heidegger, self-showing in its hiddenness belongs to being. Thus, that which shows itself while remaining disguised or covered over, that is, phenomenon in its primordial sense, is not beings, but being itself. If this is so, what does it mean to say that ‘yet so much semblance, so much ‘Being’’. Through the manifestation of beings, being is forgotten and this forgottenness belongs to the self-showing of being. But if this is so, forgottenness of being must also belong to the manifestation of beings. In other words, being is forgotten where it has already originated as manifestation of beings. This means that beings show or does not show themselves in such a way that showing or not-showing belongs to their being what they are. This is how truth enters into discussion. Accordingly, something is true when it is uncovered as what it is and it is false or disguised when it is covered over as what it is not. However, truth does not merely consists in what is true, but in being-true or being-false and in this sense, there should be an already ‘letting something be seen’ which for Heidegger, means *logos*. In other words, a table may show itself as itself or not according to the semblance which belongs to its being, but this requires that what we are talking about is already made manifest. Thus, *logos* is talking, speaking or as Heidegger calls it discourse (*Rede*) and its main function is to let what is talked about be seen in such a way that what we say is drawn from it, not from anything else. This is the only way to speak whereby what is said is communicated to the others and more importantly, what is said is grounded from out of the very thing which the discourse is about. We can say that this is nothing but self-evidence which Husserl looks for in intuitional truth. Thus, truth is such that it approves itself, that is, it is proof. Husserl understands this self-evidence through the absolute being of consciousness, which does not mean that consciousness is a static being which constitutes the objectivity of the objects, but rather, it is the dynamic or genetic self-giving of self-appearing of what appears. For Heidegger, however, Husserl does not see that this self-appearing belongs to a simpler seeing rather than the intentional acts of consciousness. This simple seeing belongs to ‘letting be seen’ that Heidegger finds in Aristotle’s notion of *apophansis*.

Indeed, Heidegger's reading of Husserl and Aristotle reveals a primary fact: truth is intuitional, that is, something (*Etwas*) is already opened up in such a way that it confirms itself as its own claim. As we have seen, this is also the definition of phenomenon. Husserl already knew this when he lets the experience be given in its infinite self-givenness. But according to Heidegger, for Husserl, the way to self-evidence is already closed off insofar as for Husserl, what is seen is extant or real in such a way that consciousness cannot be saved from that naturalness. This already hinders grasping 'seeing' in its belonging to 'what is seen' because the latter is understood as its being belongs to a theoretical constitution. However, in Aristotle, Heidegger finds out that what is seen or what we have proximally is in an immediate co-belonging with 'letting something be seen'. Thus, it would be wrong to claim that Heidegger's falling into subjectivism or metaphysics in *Being and Time* is due to the influence of Husserlian thought in his thinking. Indeed, what leads Heidegger to constitute Dasein in *Being and Time* is his discovery that self-showing of the phenomenon requires an encounter with beings, instead of a theoretical seeing of them. The fact that Dasein is not consciousness or subject does not eliminate human being from phenomenality. Rather, in his early thinking, for Heidegger, *logos* is a kind of discourse whereby human beings stand in a relationality which is world. Thus, Husserl's thought in its phenomenological breakthrough teaches Heidegger that truth is not a matter of normativity, but self-evidence, self-giving insofar as we understand phenomenon as self-showing. Husserl's idea of bodily presence points to the fact that experience is infinite and still it is given in its very self. For Heidegger, in order to understand this, we should grasp that what we see is not extant things in their 'being for consciousness', but beings in their being. Accordingly, to say that a being is uncovered is not to say that a being is determined in this or that way. Rather, what we have proximally is that something is uncovered *as* something. In other words, what is at issue is an indicative showing-something as, which is *apophansis*. What is indicated is not this or that being, but being of a being. This refers to the pre-thematical understanding of being which belongs to the comportments of Dasein.

We should see that Heidegger understands self-showing of the phenomenon on the basis of the encounter with something, not a determinate or theoretical something, but something in the unity of all its possible determinations. This enables

him to constitute being as understanding of being, that is, in its ontological aspect. As we know, in *Being and Time*, Dasein becomes the center of all analysis due to this distinctive understanding of being which belongs to its being. However, Heidegger, from early on, insists that truth is not just the disclosure of beings through Dasein's comportments. Rather, in order that this ontological aspect has a firm ground, its ontic side should be taken for granted. In other words, beings are encountered or uncovered not because their being leads disclosure, but rather, they are what they are as being-true is their being. This is why Aristotle's question 'what is a being?' is important as long as for Aristotle, being-true is the being of beings. The primordial something is uncovered in hermeneutical-as in such a way that a being is already with itself as what it is. This amounts to saying that what we see in what we have proximally is a being in its outward appearance which is *eidos*. In this way, Aristotle is the first philosopher to think *logos* in a distinctive sense because if individual is always endowed with the universal, then, what is at stake is letting something be seen. In other words, for Heidegger, Aristotle discusses *logos* in its utmost possibility because to say that a being is what it is in the fact that it is uncovered is to say that it is understood as completed or limited to itself in its coming to being. Thus, beings are true as they are themselves and since this refers to their coming into being in their completeness that we find in aesthesis, in simple encounter, they are there as what we have proximally, that is, they are characterized as ready-to-hand. This is why for Heidegger, *ousia*, in its customary sense, means what is disposable before us. And insofar as primary givenness of beings refer to their what they are, not only, beings are there, but also they are there in the how of their being in such a way that *ousia* means *being-there* (Da-sein).

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger determines Dasein in terms of human existence due to his consideration of *logos* as discourse. Thus, in letting something be seen, that which we talk about is revealed. Given that this something cannot be being, but beings in their bare uncoveredness, we should ask how this being-true of beings gives the very thing that which we talk about as being. If truth belongs to beings in their coming to being whereby human being is understood from within this revealing, the fact that beings are covered over should also be taken into account as well as their being uncovered because if there is no possibility of semblance, there would be

no need to look for what a being *truly* is. Indeed, Heidegger carries out this problematic before *Being and Time* and takes for granted that coveredness belongs to uncoveredness. Without something is uncovered in its what-as, we cannot fall into semblance. Insofar as this kind of primordial uncoveredness is being of beings, it seems that this gives us the co-belonging of semblance and self-showing. But things are more complicated because as we have mentioned, for Heidegger, primordial phenomenon is being and its coveredness or hiddenness cannot be understood on the basis of the semblance of beings. This becomes obvious when we follow Heidegger in *Being and Time* and in the following works until *Kehre*. Accordingly, being shows itself through its being understood as Dasein and Dasein's being becomes an issue for itself in its totality where, in anxiety, beings ready-to-hand becomes insignificant to us so that as nothing ready-to-hand, world means 'something'. In this way, Dasein is individualized in such a way that it is free for being which it has been delivered over. Thus, in being, nothing already prevails and this is not falsity of beings; rather, in the nothingness of being, beings are insignificant. The similar result is obtained through the discussion of profound boredom that Heidegger takes up in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. In the same way, Heidegger speaks of the telling refusal of beings in their manifestation as a whole. This indifference of beings impels Dasein to its possibly-actual, to its extremity in such a way that it becomes a making possible of being or not-being. Dasein is thrown into that it is and that it is not at the same time. Heidegger also determines this as the being-historical of human being. But before discussing this, we should see that being shows itself in a primordial nothingness through the indifference of beings. Heidegger does not still call this revealing-concealing truth. But it is remarkable that his early conception of *logos* which is grounded in the truth of beings which consists in meaning of being as the horizon for beings leads him to the truth of being. In a sense, Heidegger recognizes that he has not yet discussed truth as long as truth is the truth of the phenomenon in its self-showing, not the truth of beings. Insofar as *logos* is understood as letting something be seen, it implies that being is understood *through* beings, in the sense that they are brought into uncoveredness in such a way that their very being is this uncoveredness. However, even in *Being and Time*, it is shown that disclosure of Dasein has another sense of concealing. It could be said that what leads Heidegger to

his Aristotelian insight is the search for self-evidence required by the phenomenality. Instead of Husserlian idea of constitution of being-object, Aristotle's philosophy proposes the self-evidence of constitution in being-there of being. However, it is still questionable whether this Aristotelian beginning is the utmost way of seeing the matter itself. Although in Aristotle, being is left open in its thereness or question-worthiness due to his conception of *logos* and *apophansis* as letting be seen, since he looks for beings *as* beings, being still remains a horizon; open to itself but not self-grounded in phenomenological sense. And, Heidegger, after *Being and Time*, tries to transform this conception of being insisting that what matters is no longer beings in their being, but being *of* beings, as the difference as such.

In order to understand *logos* in its relation to beings, we should remember that *logos* indicates an ability for speaking in a manner either true or false. However, Heidegger recognizes that what is at stake here is this either/or and it requires a pre-logical openness for beings in their manifestation as a whole. In *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, he tries to show that *logos* is not that which determines our relation to beings, but rather, it is grounded in our openness for beings in such a way that we are free for being bounded by beings. Indeed, before that work, he also carries out a discussion of transcendence and freedom in order to show that Dasein passes over beings while it is toward world. Thus, what characterizes Dasein is more than its being-in-the-world, its world-formation. We do not begin with something in order to say it as something. Rather, 'as-structure' is already opened up and we are bounded by it. For Heidegger, this refers to the ontological difference between being and beings. Accordingly, beings in their manifestation as a whole can only be designated in their undifferentiatedness, that is, we just say 'a being'. And for Heidegger, this undifferentiatedness already refers to the realm of an ongoing making-possible through which a being or human being is in this or that way, it is or it is not in such a way that being of beings is already unveiled. It can be seen that beings are understood not with regard to a specific character, either as being-true or as being-ready-to-hand. Rather, all of these possible characters of beings is considered from within a primordial making-possible which is a between or difference as such. Heidegger calls this betweenness Da-sein as he, later in

Contributions to Philosophy will discuss with regard to the grounding of truth of being.

Thus, it is no longer that beings signify being as those beings ready to hand. Rather, what is at stake is 'being or non-being', namely, truth of being. Beings are not merely what lies there, but Heidegger finds out that as they lie there, what is at issue is this lying-there. In this way, beings presence in their absence, a kind of absence which can only be revealed by putting itself into work of truth in the sense that a being is understood in its work-character, *relying on* itself in its absence. An equipment is useful due to its reliability which points to the abundance of its being. Thus, before a being is understood in its being, it already preserves itself in its being. Heidegger tries to understand this with respect to Aristotle's conception of *phusis* which refers to the endurance and preservation of *eidos* in a particular being. In this sense, a being presences in its absence insofar as self-appearing of its *eidos* is a going forth of itself in it whose particularity relies on the potentiality or absence of itself. For Heidegger, this is truth as *aletheia* as a bringing into unconcealment from out of concealment. The question where this truth does happen, either in equipment, in natural things or in artworks as Heidegger suggests depends upon the essence of *phusis*. In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger discusses being in terms of *phusis* which means self-appearance or un-concealment. But he notices that for Greeks, *phusis* is understood as it is restricted by nothing and seeming. Thus, again, we find the co-belonging of seeming and self-showing. He insists that seeming essentially belongs to self-showing in the sense that seeming means lying-at-hand or present-at-hand in a broader sense. Thus, if one uses a pair of shoes, before in its usefulness, shoes lie there in such a way that not the shoes, but its lying-there becomes the issue in such a way that in all seeming, there is already the claim of self-showing. However, *nothing* may happen *yet* or *no longer* and this possibility also belongs to *phusis* insofar as *phusis* seems and needs to seem in the manner of 'not yet and no longer'. For Heidegger, this is the overwhelming of *phusis* in the openness of these three paths as Parmenides suggests; path of being, path of nothing and path of seeming. The beginning is characterized by that scission as the beginning it is. Thus, for Greeks, human being has a sense not because he always reaches an absolute truth, but because he is characterized by that scission which is an in-between in such a way

that he is the one who has the passion for truth. This also means that essence of human being is understood through the essence of being in the sense that his being is historical just because being or *phusis* has that inceptuality in its inception. In other words, being human is being historical through the inceptuality of the inception which lies in a struggle of truth.

Against this overwhelming of being, human being has *techne* which means art in a broad sense in the sense that he knows how to deal with being in the manner of putting being into work. Thus, in the inceptuality of being historical, it is first not a matter of saying something as something, but to set being in a being. Heidegger discusses this in *The Origin of the Work of Art* as setting itself into work of truth. In artwork, decision is put into place in its struggle as the struggle of earth and world. In this way, unconcealment is preserved in its concealment in art in the manner of bringing forth. More importantly, since being human is understood through that historicity of truth, it becomes obvious that being in its historicity needs or requires human being as the site for its opening in the 'that it is' of the artwork. For Heidegger, this points to the fact that what we ordinarily know as truth is already the truth of essence because as the lecture on artwork shows us, the decision on what a being is requires inquiring into how its being is set into it in a way 'that it is'. In other words, essence of truth through which traditionally metaphysics understands beings in their being is the truth of essence. There is an immediate turning from the first to the latter or the reverse. Heidegger takes up this issue by claiming that essence (*Wesen*) means bringing forth. When we look at something as to its essence, its *eidos*, for Heidegger, this means that essence is already called for or claimed in such a way that it produces itself out of itself. In this way, essence in its essentiality or truth becomes the utmost need and due to the compelling of this need, *Da-sein* is. In other words, *Da-sein* is insofar as it is constrained by the need which lies in the essentiality or the truth. Accordingly, in *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger presents *Da-sein* as the grounding of truth of *beyng* in such a way that truth always keeps letting itself be grounded as itself. This is truth of *beyng* where beings are abandoned by being and if being is no longer understood through beings, it is given in its *ab-ground*, that is, *beyng* is in its *not-granting*. Heidegger sees this 'not' in terms of 'not yet' and 'no longer' of the passing of the last god. This means that the

last god needs beyng as long as its remoteness becomes near through the abandonment of beings by being. And only through the passage of the last god that human being abides in Da-sein as his destiny by restoring beings and thus belongs to beyng. In other words, human being stands in his destiny insofar as it makes the absencing of the god come near in such a way that being is sheltered in a being. But god always remains remote due to the fact that being abandons beings. For Heidegger, this points to the overwhelming of beyng in its turning midpoint as the strife between god and human being. In this midpoint, concealing is cleared in the manner of self-sheltering, which is the truth of beyng.

Da-sein refers to the origination of truth which begins as its owning. This inception requires human being which is no longer understood in its metaphysical sense, but from within the truth of beyng which takes place through the between of god and human being. It is remarkable that for Heidegger, this necessity to begin whereby human being happens as a sheltering of truth in a being, in the work. In other words, *techne* of human being is co-original with the *dike* or fittingness of being. This is what it means to claim that art is the happening of truth in its putting itself into work. Thus, as Heidegger argues in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, art founds truth and this foundation has a triple sense; founding as bestowing, founding as grounding and founding as beginning. This becomes understandable when we recall that *phusis* overwhelms, that is, work is a foundation of truth in its bestowal; it is not produced with respect to something ordinary. Insofar as this bestowal is not arbitrary, art also founds truth in its ground in the sense that ground bears bestowal and is ground. This ground is earth where for Heidegger, human beings already belong to. And when this bestowal-grounding happens, there begins history *as* the beginning. Art, in this triple manner of founding, is called *Dichtung*, namely, poetry. Heidegger uses here the word 'Dichtung' in a broad sense, that is, in a way the verb 'dichten' means 'to compose' or in a more Heideggerian sense, 'to gather'. But what is at stake is that art as poetry founds truth in its historicity in such a way that this foundation makes *it* begin. Due to the abundance of the bestowal in its grounding, history does not once begin, but begins again in that openness in such a way that it is the beginning that it is. Thus, poetry, in this broad sense, already conceals in itself the beginning in its otherness in the sense that being turns back to itself in and as its

self-concealing. As we have seen, Heidegger grounds this self-concealing in the between of gods and human being. Then, poetry presents itself as a founding-grounding beginning which is the strife of gods and human being in such a way that there is a turning in being as the self-showing itself. In this respect, for Heidegger, it is the poetic word which becomes the true poetry. Although in 1930s, Heidegger gives us his insights on word and language, it is after his confrontation with Hölderlin that language becomes the essential domain for the openness of being.

Heidegger's Hölderlin interpretations belong to the problematic of historicity of being. Insofar as historicity is a need and necessity which requires human being, this history is the essence of human being. This does not mean that human being is determined by what he has lived up to present in a successive way. Human being is understood by the 'inbetween' or Da-sein which is opened up in such a way that this betweenness leads to self-showing in its struggle with its own seeming in a way seeming is left to itself and therefore owned. In other words, essence of human being is understood within the relation of being to himself. He is called by the beginning to begin. This is why for Heidegger, there is no longer a metaphysical or humanistic definition of human being. Human being can only be understood as long as he inhabits the Da-sein which is the self-concealing revealing of being. In a sense, in 1930s, Heidegger refers to the transformation of humanity or a people into its utmost destiny. Accordingly, in his lecture on the work of art, we find out that for Heidegger, human beings are historical as that they are either creators or preservers. Art is the origin of being human as long as it is the origin of everything which comes into the open in the work. This origin is nothing but the inception in its inceptuality. Thus, what is at stake is the origin in its origination which for Heidegger, means self-showing. Then, for Heidegger, this kind of self-showing is founded in the poetry of Hölderlin. The poet is understood as the between of gods and human beings in his founding which preserves what remains to be remembered. In this sense, Hölderlin's river poetry is the return of the poet from the foreign, from the beginning to the home in such a way that beginning accomplishes its turning by turning from forgottenness into homely. But since origin or beginning is already a self-turning or self-refusal which remains so and indeed founded so by the poet, Hölderlin's poetry is the showing of the origin its flowing and withdrawal.

In other words, the poet shows being unhomely in becoming homely and in this showing, turns into a demigod. We can see that as the poet, the creator is resolved into the work composed in the essential sense; human beings are destined to be preservers in their historical being.

However, this is not the only and the main reason why for Heidegger, poetry has a privilege over other works of art. Besides its giving historical being, poetry reveals another crucial fact; the fact that it is originary language and only in and by word, showing is founded in the triple sense we mentioned. Language is not an expression or communication of signs. The word is not a sign or designation of something which is already there. Rather, Heidegger understands language in terms of *logos* which, now, means gatheredness of being. In this sense, human beings are gatherers in the sense that their speaking which is *legein* is a 'letting-lie-before'. Thinking with Parmenides, Heidegger claims that to this *legein* accompanies *noein* which means 'taking-into-heart'. This co-belonging depends upon the fact that what matter is not just what lies there, but the latter in its relation to letting-lie-there. Accordingly, in all letting-lie-there, we already keep it at heart in the sense that what already lies before us always remains manifest. In this sense, letting-lie-before is a letting-appear or self-showing. For Heidegger, what calls such a co-belonging is the duality of beings and being, which he, now, describes as presencing of what is present. In this duality, *aletheia* occurs in the sense that what is unconcealed conceals unconcealment as such while standing in unconcealment in such a way that what is to be thought remains giving food for thought and remains thought-provoking. As it can be seen, Heidegger is no longer concerned with the historical being of human beings, not because historicity loses its importance, but because it is to be shown to what extent human being is required. In other words, co-belonging of human being and being is so essential that essence of human being is not something which needs to be remembered. Rather, what is to be recalled in memory or in thinking is that call which already disposes us as a relation. And for Heidegger, this relationality is the language. In language, what speaks is essence (*Wesen*) in a moving and showing way to itself. If Heidegger defines human speaking in terms of listening and responding, this is not because human being is subordinated to a prevailing occurrence, but because, there is no other way of being human other than 'hearing'. This refers to

being mortal and for Heidegger, to be capable of death as death is rare as that hearing. But still, language speaks as the claim of the showing in its claiming human being. We no longer need to say ‘self-showing’ because speaking of *Wesen* is not yet truth, not in a negative sense, but in the positive sense that before any discussion of ownhood, measure is taken or the dimension is opened in ‘there is’ given through the word in such a way that this hidden ground keeps nearing in the distance in and as its ground-lying. As Heidegger suggests, this may be called ‘tautological thinking’ as the phenomenology of the inapparent.²

Accordingly, in the second chapter, we will consider ourselves with Heidegger’s early analysis of *logos*, which he tries to dismantle through the general project of logic set forth in 20th century by the works of Neo-Kantians and Husserl’s phenomenology. Although Heidegger’s acquaintance with philosophy begins with his reading of Brentano’s book on Aristotle, it is obvious that it is the problem of truth which makes him think the question of being. While recognizing the deficiencies of Neo-Kantian idea of logic, Heidegger finds in Husserl the possibility of genuine philosophy which depends upon the discovery of intentionality and categorial intuition. The latter is what gives philosophy in its rigorous sense insofar as intuitional truth is the key for self-evidence or self-givenness in its infinity. However, Heidegger also recognizes that this self-showing cannot be restricted to the theoretical framework of Husserlian phenomenology and as we shall see, he returns to Aristotle. First, he tries to understand how logic is based on a self-appearing whose origin he finds in Aristotle’s notion ‘apophansis’. This notion enables us to see that truth, that is, being-true or false requires the primary uncoveredness of something as something. In this hermeneutical-as, for Heidegger, being is pointed out in such a way that human being is already understood in terms of being-unto-beings. Then, we shall see that disclosure of beings presupposes a primary sense of being which is their being-true. This primordial sense of being also refers to the fact that being is understood as constant presence in such a way that beings present themselves immediately as what they always already are. Thus, truth belongs to beings just because *beings are* in a distinctive sense. This can be found in

² Martin Heidegger, ‘Seminar in Zähringen’ in *Four Seminars*, trans. Andrew Mitchell and François Reffoul, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003. p. 80.

Aristotelian *ousia* which both means beings that are there and being of those beings that are there. In this sense, beings are understood in their being-available and being-completed. In other words, if being is understood as an openness whereby truth is at issue, being already means being-there (Dasein) in such a way that it is the grounding of its own problematic. Heidegger calls Dasein our own being and in this chapter we will see the Aristotelian basis of this determination which prepares the way to *Being and Time*.

In the third chapter, our aim is to follow Heidegger in his discussion of Dasein. As we shall see, the existential analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time* is based on an understanding of being as being of beings. We know that being-there belongs to being there of beings. However, we can speak of being there of beings as long as being is understood as being-there. Thus, the matter itself is already there for itself. In other words, Dasein refers to the fact that being is already projected in its understanding as its own, that is, as thrown. Thrown projection will enable to constitute Dasein's being as care whose meaning Heidegger finds in temporality. However, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger cannot accomplish the task of understanding beings as they are present, that is, in their presence (*Anwesenheit*). Instead, in following lectures, he still interprets being in terms of temporality of Dasein but insists that being cannot be merely understood as being of beings, but as the difference between being and beings. We shall inquire into how the idea of ontological difference dominates in the works taken up until *Kehre*. Accordingly, in *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* and in *On the Essence of Ground*, Heidegger understands Dasein in terms of transcendence and freedom whereby the question of being is considered on the basis of grounding. This makes Dasein metaphysical in a distinctive sense. In the lecture, *What is Metaphysics?*, we will find out that Dasein comes face to face with the overwhelming of the difference whereby 'that beings are' strikes it as 'nothing'. However, it is through his reading of Kant that we understand how Dasein is metaphysical in its being ground for beings *as* beings. Metaphysics of Dasein points to the fact that metaphysics, that is, the difference between being and beings, which Heidegger sees as a problem of ground-laying, occurs as Dasein. As we shall see, this requires an inquiry of Dasein from within metaphysics itself. Heidegger handles this issue in his lecture-course *Fundamental Concepts of*

Metaphysics. Dasein is attuned by profound boredom in such a way that it is not just thrown into its utmost possibility, but impelled to its extremity through which the possibility of 'being or non-being' is understood in its very making-possible itself. Accordingly, world is not grounded in the involvement of beings ready-to-hand which are let seen through a prevailing *logos*, instead *logos* is grounded in that ontological difference which is Da-sein. Heidegger no longer considers Dasein as a being among other beings which has an understanding of being. Rather, he speaks of Da-sein in human being in such a way that human being is both present and absent *temporally*, as raptured.

However, Heidegger still does not determine Da-sein as the grounding of truth of being. As we shall see in our forth chapter, he accomplishes this task in *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. Before this, we shall also look into how Heidegger reconsiders the question of being within the perspective of ontological difference. This requires to see being not through beings, but in its own terms. But for Heidegger, this does not mean that beings are left aside; rather, beings are considered again. Accordingly, we shall discuss beings from the point of ontological difference in such a way that their being as readiness-to-hand is understood in its relation to extantness in a broad sense. Although Heidegger gives hints of this discussion in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, we will find its full account in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's *ousia* again in terms of *phusis*. Then, a being is understood in its work-character in the sense that its *eidos* is sheltered in it in the manner of self-appearing. This will provide us with the possibility to understand Heidegger's discussion of work of art through which Heidegger thinks equipment, work and mere thing in their possible relatedness. We will also discuss in what way this requires taking into account being in its historicity and destiny whereby human being is understood within the essence of being, as Heidegger sets forth in *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Thus, the way that beings are determines the way human being is. Both are subjected to a change of understanding with regard to their prior, metaphysical considerations and this turning lies in the inceptuality of the inception. We shall also see that the turning of being is a turning of essence into its truth in such a way that truth becomes a groundless grounding, an inbetween, namely, Da-sein for gods and human beings.

In our fifth chapter, we shall look into the strife of gods and human being in *Ereignis*. This will show us how for Heidegger, essence of human being is understood as the historicity of being in its self-concealing clearing. This will also give us the ground of metaphysics which consists in the unconcealment of beings in that historicity and in this grounding, human being is required by the compelling need of being in its withdrawal. As Heidegger claims in *What is called thinking?*, human being is understood as pointer or a sign toward that withdrawal as long as he is drawn toward it. In this respect, we will inquire into how and why Hölderlin becomes a sign through his poetizing. As we shall see, Hölderlin's being a sign is about historicity of being and its turning in such a way that the poet is the between of gods and human beings. But more importantly, this requirement depends upon the need of being in its withdrawal which is its suffering in the sense that it becomes obvious that 'the poet must be'. This happens due to the showing in poetizing through which origin shows itself in its coming and going. On the other hand, the thinker also dwells in the Same with the poet and we will try to understand their neighborhood in terms of their divergence which becomes manifest through timely character of their pointing. Time as showing in its endurance and movement indicates a nearing through which time is already space. This nearness as showing is called by Heidegger language or Saying which can only reveal itself through the neighborhood of poetry and thinking. Accordingly, Heidegger's thinking keeps listening to other poets and in this dialogue, we find out the inner nature of nearing which is a gathering of fourfold, namely, world in a thing. In the bidding of the poetic word, the thing and the world are appropriated in their thinging and worlding respectively in such a way that this bidding is the bidding itself of difference into itself. In poetic naming, thus, language stills in its ringing in the sense that the word keeps 'is' or the movement of essencing (*Wesung*) in reserve. For Heidegger, in this sense, word's naming is both a revealing and concealing which lies in the presencing of what is present and therefore, it is a calling and remains so, as that which calls on us to think.

Accordingly, we should say that in this thesis, our aim is to allow Heidegger's thinking keep its calling.

CHAPTER II

LOGOS

2.1. Logical Roots – The problem of truth

Heidegger's early thinking is dominated by a discussion on logic which is determined by both neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. On the one hand, this new way of studying logic is an attempt to save logic from human faculties, on the other hand, considering logic as a structure on its own on the basis of a critique of judgment, it relocates logic with respect to its question worthiness, where and why it is needed. Heidegger studies the logical theories of his time in his dissertation presented in 1914, entitled '*Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus, ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik*'. In this work, Heidegger considers four main theories of judgment which belong to Wilhelm Wundt, Heinrich Maier, Franz Brentano and Theodor Lipps as instances of psychologism. According to psychologism, laws of thought which are the conditions of being true or being false can be obtained through the mental occurrences of our thinking in such a way that logic is founded on thinking activity itself. However, Heidegger suggests, despite all misunderstandings in psychologism, we can still have a positive result insofar it provides the fact that the object of logic is judgment. Then, the main issue is to determine the identical element in judgment. Heidegger notices that mode of existence of this identity can neither be physical, psychological nor metaphysical. Instead, following Lotze, we should say that "beside each 'this is', there is an 'it is valid'".³ Validity is the actuality form of judgment process and as Heidegger says, "when I speak or write, I say *something*, I want to tell *something* (*etwas*)"⁴ and this something (*Etwas*) has a special ontological status in the sense that it gives us logical judgment and opens up the domain of pure logic. This identical moment is the sense (*Sinn*) of judgments which makes them either true or false. Thus, sense does not exist, but it is valid. As

³ Martin Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, GA1, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978. p. 170. "neben einem 'das ist' gibt es ein 'das gilt'" "GA" in notes will refer to Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*.

⁴ Ibid. "wenn ich spreche oder schreibe, sage ich *etwas*, möchte ich *etwas* mitteilen"

we shall see, those insights also constitutes the Husserlian breakthrough which is based on a genuine critique of psychologism.

Heidegger, criticizing psychologism in his early studies on logic, stresses on the fact that judgment is not a mere mental act, but already about *something* (*Etwas*). If we ask where sense comes from, we see that “it is certain that we have a determinate something before ourselves, that is to say, it is object, ‘stand-in the face of’, though not in literal spatial sense”.⁵ Then, identity of each judgment depends upon something out there. Objectivity (*Gegenständlichkeit*) is not constituted by cognition. Rather, it has its autonomy as the realm of validity. This already shows us early Heidegger’s interest for studies of Emil Lask and Hermann Lotze. As we mentioned above, the idea of validity as a solution to the problematic twofoldness of sensible and suprasensible belongs to Lotze and maintained by Lask in his *Kategorienlehre*. Both thinkers together with other neo-Kantians object to the psychologism in Kant’s *Critique* insofar as for Kant, objectivity is constituted by the synthesis of the subject. Their aim consists in securing a realm of pure logical sphere. This task is transcendental insofar as it gives us being-object as such. In other words, it is no longer a matter of synthesis of representations but the givenness of sense as a matter of signification. In this sense, Lask determines its task as aletheiology according to which object is identical with truth. The realm of validity is what gives being to object in such a way that object becomes logical or determined with regard to truth. In other words, it is not truth which rotates around the objects but the reverse: “objects rotate around the logical validity, in the case of objects, it is about logical validity, their objectivity *is* valid truth”.⁶ Regions of objects may be sensible or suprasensible, but beyond this distinction, there is something in general as the condition of the intelligibility as such. This non-sensible realm of truth is transcendent to the thinking subject and pervades the latter as the necessity of doing philosophy.

⁵ Ibid., p. 169. “so sicher haben wir ein bestimmtes Etwas vor uns, d.h. es ist Gegenstand, ‘steht gegenüber’, allerdings nicht im wörtlich räumlichen Sinne.”

⁶ Emil Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre, Die Lehre vom Urteil*, Jena : D.Scheglmann, 2003. p. 27. “Die Gegenstände drehen sich um das logische Gelten, bei den Gegenständen drehst es um logisches Gelten, ihre Gegenständlichkeit *ist* geltende Wahrheit”.

Although Lask is the one who carries the task of neo-Kantian school to the end, he shares the fundamental motive with other neo-Kantian thinkers: to determine philosophy as a primordial science. Indeed, this is what gives motivation to Heidegger's early thought, namely, the idea that philosophy should be responsible for its own possibility, not as a panlogism in Hegelian sense, but as the logic of logic. This could be possible through a study on the logic of sense whereby the possibility of logic is both questioned and grounded. In other words, differentiating factor of logic should be understood from out of itself as itself. There is no need for the dialectic of thesis and antitheses because philosophy already puts itself as a claim, as a matter of meaning. Logic of validity, thus, distinguishing sense from being, gives primacy to the possibility of philosophy itself as a logic of truth. But, as Lask rightly sees, sense or what is valid is not wholly separate or independent. Rather, it is the unity of categorial form and material, or the form fulfilled with the material.⁷ Although for Lask, categorial form is always relative to a material, he still rejects that material has a role in logic. He defends his position in terms of Kant's Copernican Revolution, according to which being is a transcendental logical category; object is always true in the sense that its formal categoriality is non-sensibly valid. Heidegger finds extreme case of primacy of validity in the philosophy of Rickert. In his lecture course given in War Emergency Semester 1919 under the title of *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview*, Heidegger questions the normativity principle of the logic of validity. If normativity provides us with an ideal 'ought-to-be', this implies that truth is already taken up as the primary goal or *telos* of our project because it is the function of norms to tell us how to regulate facts in order that these facts become true and universal. But how do we know which one to choose among those facts? For Heidegger, this selection requires that material is already given in such a way that norm is a norm for a material. In other words, for critical-teleological method, "the material is a Being [*Sein*], psychic Being. The norm is as such '*norm for*'; the norm character refers away from itself to something that it ought to fulfill. The norm as value refers to a Being [*ein Sein*]"⁸ How could we

⁷ Ibid., p.30. Lask states that "Form weist *hingeltend* auf Inhalt hin, und Inhalte stehen *in der Form*".

⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, trans. Ted Sadler, Continuum London New York, 2002. p. 45.

understand the connection between Being and Ought? For neo-Kantianism, this is not a problem because it is based on the necessity of such a distinction with the presupposition of truth. Truth remains a presupposition because normativity is understood as a theoretical endeavour. Thus, under the guidance of a theoretical attitude, neo-Kantianism evaluates the connection between being and ought as a secondary issue. However, as Heidegger writes, “so long as the original experiential directedness of the lived experience [*Erlebnis*] of the ought, of ought-giving and ought-taking, is not set forth, the already problematical method remains obscure at its very core”.⁹ Subject-correlate of ought-giving should be discussed otherwise our method will destroy itself in the sense that we become presupposing what we are already looking for, that is, norm. Thus, it is not enough to say that material is just a subject-matter. Rather material is material insofar as it is ‘in regard to’ a norm; it is already beyond itself. We cannot understand material givenness with regard to the totality of norms, because what we are looking for is the norm. Thus, what will give us whole structure consists in truly understanding the material givenness itself. In other words, since it is always a material for a norm, our questioning of material will give us the connection between being and ought. Thus, giving of the ideal should be seen throughout the givenness of the material. However, material givenness, namely, psychic sphere is a complex structure as long as it consists of a continuous process. It seems impossible to determine flux of experience as an entity and as Heidegger insists, empirical psychology is not sufficient for complete characterization of material because it can only give us hypothetical provisionality and relative validity. However, this does not mean that we leave the ground of material givenness, rather, “we must immerse ourselves, with the highest degree of clarity, in this lability of the fact and factual knowledge, of the *factum*, until it is unmistakable in its givenness”.¹⁰ Is this unmistakable givenness of the fact possible at all? Heidegger, here, makes a Cartesian move, a move which aims at excluding all doubt. Then, for Heidegger, we are not looking for this or that being, but we ask ‘Is there something?’

⁹ Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 49.

To experience this question will save us from the presuppositions of critical-teleological method. What we are interested now is neither material givenness nor ideal giving. As Heidegger states:

We are standing at the methodological cross-road which will decide on the very life or death of philosophy. We stand at an abyss: either into nothingness, that is, absolute reification, pure thingness, or we somehow leap into *another world*, more precisely, we manage for the first time to make the leap [*Sprung*] into the world as such.¹¹

In the question ‘Is there something?’, there is a rift as well as a leap. This rift is the situation through which the questionable as such comes into view. In other words, this question does not aim at a physical or psychical entity. It just brings before us the questionable as questionable. Something as such is what is to be questioned in each case and this can be made possible as our comportment to the world as such, as vital experience. What leads us is not the relationship between the giving of ideal and material, but given that connection, what lies beyond it, as truth. Thus, our guiding stance is no longer theoretical, but pre-theoretical insofar as it is not in the theoretical comportment to the world that we find ourselves both as *telos* and source of what we are looking for. Thus, discussion of logic, insofar as it is already about truth, leads us to the discussion of experience as a bare something in its questionability. Truth is not an already determined and finished issue for philosophy; rather it is maintained in the vigilance of questioning. This is why something as such (*Etwas*) is a potential environing world as ‘anything whatsoever’. Heidegger says that “living in an environment, it signifies to me everywhere and always, everything has the character of world. It is everywhere the case that ‘it worlds’ [*es weltet*], which is something different from ‘it values’ [*es wertet*]”.¹² Experience does not primarily have a thingly (material) and theoretical character (formal); rather, what is given is the meaningfulness as such (formed matter).¹³ Heidegger, in his example of lectern in its

¹¹ Ibid., p. 53.

¹² Ibid., p. 61.

¹³ Theodore Kisiel discusses the way from Lask’s influence on Heidegger to the 1919 lecture course in his article ‘Why Students of Heidegger will have to read Emil Lask?’. For him, *Ur-etwas* points to the universality of formalization in such a way that “phenomenology needs only to improve upon the schematization of formalization and expand it into the full intentional structure dictated by the phenomenon of life”. (Theodore Kisiel, ‘Why Students of Heidegger will have to read Emil Lask?’ in *Heidegger’s Way of Thought*, ed. Alfred Denker and Marion Heinz, New York: Continuum, 2002. p. 133.) Such a phenomenon of life considered, through Lask, as a material embraced by form, is then

vivid givenness shows us that even for a Negro from Senegal, although for him, the lectern remains *something* ‘which he does not know what to make of’, this ‘instrumental strangeness’ implies a meaningful world. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to distinguish something as ‘anything whatsoever’ from the theoretical something which is de-vivified in the sense that “the formal objective *something of knowability* is first of all motivated from this pre-worldly something of life [*Lebens-etwas*]”.¹⁴ In the first case, directedness to the object is fixed and de-vivified but in the second case, experience is lived through as the directedness itself. Heidegger even uses the

the most immediate living in the truth in a pretheoretical way and therefore it is life as *factic*. This is a life which is lived through, that is, already articulated or hermeneutical. According to Kisiel, the language that we find in life’s brute factuality is not ordinary language, but a formal indication through which “the *Ur-etwas*, the ‘something’ is the comporting relation (*Verhalten*) itself, without any prior determination as to who or what is doing the comporting or is being comported”. (Theodore Kisiel, ‘On the Genesis of Heidegger’s Formally Indicative Hermeneutics of Facticity’ in *Rethinking Facticity*, ed. François Raffoul, Eric Sean Nelson, Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2008. p. 59.) Formal indication is not an objectification; primal something is not an object that is opposite to us, but it is pure out-toward (*das Worauf*). As we shall see, Heidegger examines the phenomenological sense of *Worauf* through his interpretation of Husserl and now what matters us is the fact that Kisiel passes over Husserl’s influence on Heidegger’s discussion of pure directedness in terms of *Worauf*. As Stewen Galt Crowell discusses in his work *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning, Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology*, Kisiel’s neglecting of Husserlian contribution becomes visible through his work entitled *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time* where Kisiel, especially through Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, shows how factual life is a self-interpretation from within life itself as a historical repetition. For Kisiel, Heidegger finds out a possibility of self-interpretation of factic life through Aristotle’s understanding of being where “factic life is always already interpreted and is in fact accessible only in and through such interpretations, from which it receives its meaning and through which it is understood”. (Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1993. p. 241.) What Kisiel has in mind is a kind of practical truth or *phronesis* as life’s expressing itself as truth. And Kisiel even writes that “the problem does not really lie in ‘truth’ but in the simplicity of the apprehension” (Ibid., p. 226.) Thus, Kisiel does not see that Heidegger’s main aim is not to give an account (truth) of the simplicity of life but rather to make visible truth in its simplicity in such a way that truth is destined to be kept *as* truth in its questionability. As we shall see, such a misunderstanding can be overcome only if we interpret ‘*worauf*’ of primal something not just as a simple immediacy, as a fact, but in terms of Husserlian phenomenology through which immediacy as such is discussed in terms of intuition. This will enable us to see that immediacy of the facticity is already an immediacy of the coming to visibility that Heidegger finds in Aristotle’s conception of truth. Accordingly, living in truth is different from preserving truth without determining beforehand what it is, in such a way that we let truth show itself or speak for itself. In other words, as Crowell suggests, we should consider that “if philosophy seeks a *categorical* elucidation of what gives itself in primal experience, it is seeking to make explicit the *Bewandtnis*, or mode of involvement, in which that primal ‘material’ already stands *in* such experience. At the same time, it must show how such ‘making explicit’ is itself possible – all the more so since, as it concerns what lies at the deepest, original, ‘pretheoretical’ level, philosophy cannot simply proceed on the basis of presupposed ‘theoretical’ canons of self-justification.” (Stewen Galt Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning, Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, 2001. p. 122.) Truth never gives up turning upon itself by transforming the way for itself and Heidegger’s essential insight is that this happening of truth is not a mysticism as a way of life even from itself, but itself is *the matter itself* (*die Sache selbst*) for philosophy.

¹⁴ Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, p. 98.

expression ‘event of appropriation’ (*Ereignis*) and says that “lived experience does not pass in front of me like a thing, but I appropriate [*er-eigne*] it to myself, and it appropriates itself according to its essence”.¹⁵

Up to this point, we have seen that, for Heidegger, discussion of the idea of logic leads us to the experience as such insofar as we are not directed to any definite region of being but to the structure of being as meaning. Although neo-Kantianism distinguishes level of meaning from the being, this distinction itself is not questioned. We shall see more detailed criticism of the idea of validity with regard to truth and being while discussing Lotze but for now, it is sufficient to say that for Heidegger, what we need to see is the seeing itself as a pre-theoretical occurrence in order to appropriate the possibility of truth that we are striving for and this necessarily implies the subject correlate of the discussion of logic. Then, it is not surprising that Heidegger, against neo-Kantianism, locates himself at the side of phenomenology. Neo-Kantianism functions as a selection with regard to truth, but what it chooses is the theoretical something. The most intimate regard shows us that psychic experience is not consummated by theoretical thinghood. Indeed it cannot be fixed in any way. Thus, we should give up considering this duality and instead should look at a deeper level by asking ‘Is there...?’ Then, there is ‘something’, not as an entity or their totality but questionability or possibility of a situation where what is lived is not fixed or distinguished from living. This ‘something’ does not refer to the realm of beings, but to the way of being.

We find this consideration of *Etwas* in its relation to truth in Brentano. As it is well-known, Brentano has a special role in Heidegger’s thought for the reason that in his book *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, he focuses on the fact that for Aristotle, beings are said in many ways. Then, for Brentano, being does not signify this or that thing. Instead, he distinguishes ‘thing’ or ‘entity’ from the existent or non-existent by saying that “the area to which our judgments may be applied is unlimited, and the content of judgment may be as we like. But our judgment always pertains to some entity or other. And what does ‘entity’ signify? It is a term that can

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 63.

be applied to God or to the world, to anything whatever, and to any non-thing”¹⁶ and consequently he claims “that the area to which affirmative judgment is appropriate is the area of the *existent*, a concept to be sharply distinguished from that of *thing*; and that the area to which the negative judgment is appropriate is the area of the *non-existent*”.¹⁷ Thus, following classical ontology, Brentano classifies ‘thing’ as a more general category than the existence or non-existence of a being and modifies Aristotelian definition of truth by saying that “a judgment is true if it asserts of some object that is, *that* the object is, or if it asserts of some object that is not, *that* the object is not— and a judgment is false if it contradicts that which is, or that which is not”.¹⁸ Hence, truth is not a simple correspondence between judgment and thing because when we judge, we do not only judge about existent things outside us but about everything possible or real, even about absence and lack. This shows us that in order that a correspondence between judgment and object takes place, the object should already be known to us otherwise our knowledge would not be evident since we would not have *the about what* the correspondence is. Then, for Brentano, if we still want to work with the correspondence theory of truth, we should change our perspective in the sense that “to correspond does not mean to be the same or to be similar; but it does mean to be adequate, to fit, to be in agreement with, to be in harmony with, or whatever equivalent expressions one may choose to apply”.¹⁹ Correlate of judgment is not the existent or non-existent thing but ‘entity’ (*Etwas*) or ‘something’ due to the fact that it *is*. Truth is not similarity between judgment and this or that thing because it is already ordered by the fact that something is; it is just adequate or not to this fundamental fact.

It was Husserl who takes on Brentano’s fundamental insights, especially, intentionality in order to arrive at a common aim with neo-Kantianism: to make philosophy a rigorous science. As we have seen, this requires letting philosophy

¹⁶ Brentano, ‘On the concept of truth’ in *The True and the Evident*, ed. Roderick M. Chrisholm, trans. Roderick M. Chrisholm, Ilse Politzer, and Kurt R. Fischer, London, Routledge & K. Paul, 1966. p. 14. §48

¹⁷ Ibid. §50

¹⁸ Ibid. §51

¹⁹ Ibid. §52

ground itself from itself as a method. In that sense, phenomenology shares the metaphysical neutrality of neo-Kantianism in the sense that meaning is completely distinguished from object. It can be said that Husserl's *Prolegomena of Logical Investigations* is the most comprehensive criticism of psychologism that is written at that time. However, against neo-Kantianism, Husserl rejects ignoring noetic level and this is why he is accused of falling into psychologism again. However, if we look at Husserl's critique of psychologism, we see that like Lotze, for Husserl too, the correlate of judgment or act of thinking cannot be something empirical or temporal. There is a sharp distinction between act of thinking and what is thought; a distinction missed by psychologism. The fact that both 'A is B' and 'A is not B' cannot be true at the same time is not about our inability of thinking but about the judged content itself; truth is absolute and apodictic independently of our mental states. Since it is independent of empirical or real, what is thought or judged, that is, the content of act is ideal. After summarizing in that way Husserl's critique of psychologism in his lecture course '*Logic: The Question of Truth*', Heidegger accuses Husserl to be imprisoned to an old philosophical distinction between real and ideal and asks:

Can we simply brush off the act of judging, its enactment, or the statement, as something empirical and mental, as contrasted with a so-called ideal sense? Or does an entirely different dimension of being finally press to the fore here, one that can certainly be very dangerous once we glimpse it and expound it as something fundamental.²⁰

For Heidegger, the problem is not Husserl's attachment to the primacy of ideal over real but the fact that philosophy is not saved from the same problematic since Plato which is the problem of participation between αἰσθητόν and νοητόν. Although it is questionable whether Husserl deserves such an accusation, Heidegger, even at the end of his career, holds a similar view when he, in *Zähringen Seminar*, objects to the Husserlian distinction between sensuous and categorical vision.²¹ However, it is clear that Heidegger still sees a new possibility of philosophizing in the critique of psychologism of his master whose lack of questioning opens up an original way of thinking.

²⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Logic: the question of truth*, trans. Thomas Sheehan, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010. p. 43,44.

²¹ Heidegger, 'Zähringen Seminar' in *Four Seminars*, p.66.

Heidegger begins with looking into the negative aspect of Husserl's critique of psychologism. For him, securing the field of ideal being by means of the content of judgment creates confusion. First of all, we should notice that Heidegger in his lecture course 'Logic', reads Husserl's theory of logic in the following way: for Husserl, while contents of judgment are ideal and permanent, judgments or acts of thinking are real instantiations of those contents and Heidegger claims that "this concept of the ideal, specifically in its triple meaning of the *self-identical*, the *permanent*, and the *universal*, is the guiding thread of Husserl's critique of psychologism".²² It is obvious that Husserl's insight is opposed to such a reading which fails to grasp the nature of intentionality. However, Heidegger's strategy is still significant insofar as we remember that for Husserl, content of judgment or proposition is characterized by its ideality whose nature needs to be questioned. The basic confusion with regard to the so-called ideality of judgment shows itself when we try to understand whether the ideality in question is also the universal in Platonic sense as the genus of the acts of judgment or not. For Heidegger, there must be a crucial difference between universal as genus and universal as content or meaning in the sense that

The universal—the idea corresponding to real acts (of judgment)—is the universal essence of 'act in general', but never the *content* (or *meaning*) of the act (of judgment). To say that the *content* of the judgment is the γένος, the universal, the Platonic idea for the *acts* of (actual or possible) judgment, is as absurd as saying that the genus or concept 'table in general' is the genus for a bunch of teacups²³

Despite this obvious absurdity, for Heidegger, Husserl confuses two meanings of ideal which are the 'propositional validity and the subsistence of the universal essence'. While the first refers to the non-sensible being, the second is nothing other than the Platonic idea or genus. And the main reason which leads Husserl to such a confusion is the lack of questioning what it means *to be*.

Thus, Husserl rightly sees that the entity which logic studies, namely, truth cannot be about empirical or mental being as it is suggested by psychologism. However, once Husserl differentiates ideal being of logic from empirical being of thinking, he closes the eyes to reconsider the ontological status of logic. In other

²² Heidegger, *Logic*, p.48.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

words, if we are allowed to say that the subject matter of logic is truth, the following question becomes necessary: “what kind of being is something’s being-true? And how is truth itself to be understood in relation to the idea of being in general?”²⁴ For Heidegger, Husserl never asks this question and it is obvious that being of ideal being in Husserlian logic is determined on the basis of ‘validity’; a concept inherited from Lotze. On the other hand, as we mentioned above and as it is recognized by Heidegger too, Lotze introduces the concept of validity not as a substitute for being but tries to open up a realm for ideality in order to save the ontological status of true propositions from empirical reality. In other words, for Lotze, a true proposition is just valid in the sense that “a proposition neither exists like things nor occurs like events...the reality of a proposition means that it holds or is valid and that its opposite does not hold”²⁵ Thus, for Lotze, reality or actuality of validity should be distinguished from the reality of Being or existence. It is important to see that Lotze’s attempt consists in excluding existence or Being from ideal entities such as propositions. He introduces ‘reality’ as a more general notion encompassing both validity and existence which are distinguished from each other. Then, Lotze does not hesitate to claim that even the traditional readings of Plato’s theory of ideas are wrong insofar as they maintain the idea that Plato ascribed existence to ideas in a similar way to the existence of things.²⁶ Instead, ideas have reality as valid entities whether they exist or not. Although Lotze’s theory of reality seems to open up a new way of understanding the validity of eternal truths independent of their mental occurrences, for Heidegger, his notion of reality or actuality needs to be questioned with regard to its genesis.

According to Heidegger, if we look into Lotze’s theory of validity more closely, we could see that what he understands by being is the empirical reality of things in terms of out-there-ness. On the other hand, ideality is defined by actuality which, for Lotze, is a more universal concept than being. In other words, while we

²⁴ Ibid., p. 42. “was für Sein ist das Wahrsein von etwas, und wie ist wahrsein selbst aus der Idee des Seins überhaupt zu verstehen?” (*Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, GA 21, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. p.50.)

²⁵ Hermann Lotze, *Lotze's system of philosophy : of thought, of investigation, and of knowledge*, trans. and ed. Bernard Bosanquet, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1884. p. 439.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 440.

can say that sensible things are, we cannot say that ideal is, but it is valid. Nevertheless, it is obvious that as Lotze noticed too, ideal is more than nothing. Ideal contents are not nothing; they are something but they do not exist. They are real as things, events and relations but in a different way. If we question the origin of this reality or actuality, Lotze says that “when we call anything Real, we mean always to *affirm* it, though in different senses according to the different forms which it assumes, but one or other of which it must necessarily assume, and of which no one is reducible to or contained in the other”.²⁷ Heidegger recognizes that Lotze uses the term ‘affirmedness’ in a general way ascribing it to things, events, relations and valid propositions and claims that “he calls affirmedness as such ‘actuality’, without even defining what affirmedness is. So in the general and formal term ‘actuality’, we do not find at all *what* is affirmed or whether it is something real or ideal or some other kind of actuality. We find only affirmedness in general”.²⁸ Then, it is not difficult to see that for Lotze, actuality in that sense refers to the different modes of being even though Lotze tries to avoid himself ascribing being to ideas. The basic presupposition which leads Lotze to such an avoidance is his belief that being should be understood in terms of a being or a thing which is produced. And this presupposition shows us that for Lotze as it is the case with Greek philosophy, being is already understood as *thereness*, in terms of something out there. This leads to the conclusion that being cannot be defined; a conclusion which Lotze would agree and this is why true propositions still have a mode of being in terms of actuality distinguished from the everyday sense of being. As Heidegger states, “truths—as much as things, events or relations—‘are’. Regardless of whether propositions can be heard, tasted, or touched, the essential thing about them (in our interpretation) is their *thereness*”.²⁹ In other words, while Lotze points to the difference between the modes of being of a simple thing and a proposition, he still presupposes the being of true proposition through an understanding of being in terms of *thereness*. However, like in all history of philosophy, in Lotze’s theory of validity, the same neglect prevails; a neglect which ignores the very meaning of this *thereness* or *producedness*.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 439.

²⁸ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 58.

²⁹ Ibid. p. 65.

Thus, for Lotze, actuality is a general term which refers to both real and ideal being and affirmedness which is the basic character of actuality belongs to all kinds of being even though we do not know affirmedness as such. And this ambiguity with regard to affirmedness shows us that Lotze stands in front of the question of being in such a way that he posits four different modes of actuality, rejecting to reduce one into another: “we call a thing ‘actual’ when it *is*, in contrast to another that is not; we call an event ‘actual’ if it *occurs*, in contrast to another that does not occur; we call a relation ‘actual’ if it *obtains*, as opposed to one that does not obtain; and lastly we call a proposition ‘actually true’ if it *is valid*”³⁰ With regard to this description, Heidegger notices the fact that Lotze, while describing proposition, says ‘actually true’ instead of simply saying ‘actual’. This means that he equates being-true with being-valid or being-actual as long as validity refers to the affirmedness of truth but for Heidegger, there is something to be questioned here:

In Lotze’s derivation, ‘being-true’ means ambiguously the same as ‘the being *of* the true’, i.e. the being of the true proposition; but one also understands this ambiguous ‘being-true’ as what *truth* itself is, or the essence of truth. And then the two are taken as identical: being-true as *the actuality of true propositions*, and being-true as *the essence of truth*. And because the first of these two is defined as validity, one also says that the essence of truth is validity.³¹

However, the essence of truth cannot be founded on Lotze’s theory of validity because truth can only be understood when we show why it is about being or actuality in Lotze’s terms. Since Lotze never questions the very meaning of being in terms of its thereness, we could not see why propositions are the primary locus of truth and thereby it becomes impossible to say what *truth is* in its original relation to being. Then, Husserl and Lotze, while immediately co-positing truth with being in a specific sense either as ideality or validity, already presuppose that we already know what truth is and this amounts to say that we already understand what being is. In other words, if truth belongs to the ideality or validity of propositions whose status is decided on the basis of a certain sense of being, which is *thereness*, we should ask why being primarily has such a meaning, which will show us how truth *is*. For Heidegger, this problematical consequence gives us a hint concerning the intimate

³⁰ Quoted by Heidegger in *Logic*, p 61. cf. Lotze, *Lotze's system of philosophy : of thought, of investigation, and of knowledge*, p. 439.

³¹ Heidegger, *Logic*, p .62.

relation between truth and being which waits to be questioned with regard to its legitimacy.

Logic of validity presupposes that true propositions have a certain kind of being which makes them true and the circularity in that presupposition depends upon an ordinary understanding of being which differentiates being as real and ideal or temporary and eternal. For Heidegger, in order that we can dismantle the reciprocal relation between truth and being, we should reconsider the way we understand being or what we mean by real and ideal. Is the relation between real and ideal a real or ideal relation? How can we understand the being of validity if it is distinct from what Lotze primarily calls being, namely, temporal thing? Is philosopher's only task to bridge the gap between two realms? It is obvious that questioning what we understand by being will lead us to grasp the essence of truth. And removing our old beliefs about being requires not to throw them away but to think them together in their possibility. In that case, we need a method which will present us both real and ideal in their possibility as belonging together without determining them. We need a way of seeing which will give us the structure itself as 'the act of thinking-what-is-thought'. We do not want to determine objectivity from the point of what is thought but try to understand how knowledge is already and should be objective. And this refers to nothing but to *intentionality* which, besides *categorical intuition* and *the original sense of the a priori*, is one of three main discoveries of phenomenology that Heidegger takes into account in his *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time*. This leads us to the positive aspect of Husserl's phenomenology developed in fifth and sixth investigations which raises in his contemporaries certain doubts whether Husserl falls again into psychologism. However, as Husserl insists, intentionality is not a property of consciousness but lies in the very essence of knowledge; he claims that "there are (to ignore certain assumptions) not two things present in experience, we do not experience the object and beside it the intentional experience directed upon it,...only one thing is present, the intentional experience, whose essential descriptive character is the intention in question"³². This amounts to saying that what is at issue is the directedness itself and besides the well known

³² Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations, V*, trans. J. N. Findlay, London, Routledge and K. Paul; New York, Humanities Press, 1970. §11 p. 558.

definition of intentionality ‘consciousness is always consciousness of something’, for Heidegger, in Husserlian phenomenology, intentionality essentially means that being is always being for consciousness or as Levinas describes it with a Heideggerian insight, intentionality means “that *every object calls forth and as it were gives rise to the consciousness through which its being shines and, in doing so, appears*”.³³ Phenomenology is concerned with the being-object which necessarily implies consciousness. On the other hand, this emphasis on the side of being indicates a change of perspective which constitutes the ground of major differences in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology. While Husserl always considers directedness or consciousness’s being toward things from the point of consciousness, Heidegger concentrates on things as correlates of knowing and asks “what characterizes each of those things insofar as it is and can be a ‘toward-which’ (*Worauf*) of knowing? We are asking about the toward-which of knowing as such— its (if you will allow the phrase) toward-which-ness (*Woraufheit*), so as to pin down what is intended”³⁴ Keeping in mind this clarification, we can notice that what prevents Husserl from an originary questioning of truth, as we shall see, is his avoidance of such an approach insofar as essence of truth requires a fundamental questioning of the meaning of being. And this leads to the consequence that as Daniel O. Dahlstrom states “while Husserl directs his attention primarily to the question of the way sense is provided and constituted, for Heidegger the primary question for a philosophical logic is the question of truth”.³⁵ Heidegger, both in his *Logic* lectures and *Prolegomena*, accuses Husserl not to recognize the importance of what he discovered with regard to the discussion of truth. Although categorial intuition is a new way of seeing being in its transparency, Husserlian phenomenology blocks itself at the very outset by putting forward itself as a scientific and theoretical project. Before considering Heidegger’s accusations in their relation to our subject matter, we should explore the importance of intentionality for phenomenology as such.

³³ Emmanuel Levinas, *Discovering Existence with Husserl*, trans. and ed. Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith, Northwestern University Press, 1998. p. 119.

³⁴ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 83.

³⁵ Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth*, Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. p. 16.

We have begun with a situation that young Heidegger searches for the genesis of the identical element, something out there in each judgment. And now we are looking for sense of being of this something in order to grasp logic in its ground. If the identity pole of logical judgment, namely, object does not have physical, psychological or metaphysical being, we should understand it in its being for us or as Heidegger stated above, we should look at what is intended *insofar as* it is a ‘toward-which of knowing’. As we have seen, intentionality suggests a certain answer but if we look at Brentano’s famous definition of intentionality, we could see that there is a certain ambiguity. Brentano claims that “every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity”.³⁶ However, if intentionality is directedness to an object, what about representations without object such as a round square? Do we need a third term ‘content’ presented in an act as the image of object *through which* object is presented. Husserl rejects such a solution and points to the sense-giving character of the act by defining the matter of act as “*that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly definite that it not merely fixes the object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in which it is meant*”.³⁷ Thereby, Husserl distinguishes ‘the object as it is intended’ from ‘the object which is intended’ in a similar way what Heidegger suggests and considers objectivity as a problem of constitution in order to give an account of the status of ideal being. It seems that both Husserl and Heidegger take up the *intentum* from the point of *intentio*. However, as Rudolf Bernet suggests while in Husserl correspondence between ‘the object which is intended’ and ‘the object as it is intended’ is taken to be as an epistemological issue, in Heidegger, these different meanings of *intentum* refers to an ontological concern in the sense that “being (l’étant) taken in the ‘how of its being-directed-intentionally’ is nothing other than ‘being in-itself’, it is this being as it is interrogated with respect to its mode of being

³⁶ Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. Linda L. McAlister, trans. Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell and Linda L. McAlister, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York, Humanities Press, 1973. Book II, cpt.I, p. 88.

³⁷ Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, V. §20. p. 589

from its intentional appearance”.³⁸ How can something be as it is *only* through the manner of its being-intended?

Here, intentionality becomes the fundamental key for such an inquiry as long as “by intentionality, we do not mean an objective relation which occasionally and subsequently takes place between a physical thing and a psychic process, but the structure of a comportment as comporting to, directing itself toward”.³⁹ Instead of Husserlian term ‘act’, Heidegger uses ‘comportment’ in order to remove the psychological associations of intentional directedness. Then, whether the thing which is intended is real or unreal, what matters is the fact that it belongs to this or that comportment. Whether it is a hallucination or a fictitious object like round square, one thing is crucial: the thing is intended and it is given through the manner of its being intended. In the case of perception, we are looking for the perceived as the perceived of this or that perception. In *Prolegomena*, as an example, Heidegger talks about a chair. First of all, it may be described insofar as it belongs to a specific class room, next to a desk and has a particular function, that is to say, chair belongs to our environing world. If we look at chair with regard to its weight, its color and its height, then it can be described as a natural being besides its environmental being. Finally, chair as a natural being can be designated in terms of its materiality and extension. Now we are concerned with not the chair but with the thinghood which may belong to each thing. For Heidegger, this example shows us that when we deal with something, we *see* it in a simple cognizance; we do not see the representations of chair but the chair as it immediately shows itself. However, we should look for a more strict kind of perceivedness in the sense that being-perceived of the perceived becomes revealed. In that sense, environmental being, natural being or thinghood is not sufficient as long as what we deal with is still the entity in itself whereas “the expression *the perceived as such* now refers (not to the perceived entity in itself but)

³⁸ Rudolf Bernet, ‘Intentionnalité et Transcendance (Husserl et Heidegger) in *La Vie du Sujet Recherches sur l’interprétation de Husserl dans la phénoménologie*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994. p. 45. (my translation) “l’étant pris dans le ‘comment de son être-visé-intentionnellement’ n’est pas autre chose que ‘l’étant en lui-même’, il est cet étant en tant que celui-ci est interrogé quant à son mode d’être à partir de son apparaître (appar-être)”

³⁹ Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time, Prolegomena*, trans. Theodore Kisiel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. p. 37.

to this entity in the way and manner of its being-perceived”.⁴⁰ Being-perceived of perceived is a general structure; it belongs not to chair as chair or stone as stone but to every real or possible being. Thereby, Heidegger points to the structural character of intentionality which for him, is ignored by both Brentano and Husserl. But in what way could we understand the structure of intentionality as Heidegger describes it? What does it mean to see something in the manner of its being-intended? More importantly, what did we gain about the discussion of the problem of truth?

Answer of those questions lies in what perceivedness is in Husserlian phenomenology and Heidegger describes it in its own way by saying that “the perceived as such has the feature of *bodily presence (Leibhaftigkeit)*. In other words, the entity which presents itself as perceived has the feature of being *bodily-there*. Not only is it given as itself, but as itself in its bodily presence”.⁴¹ Husserl’s concept *Leibhaftigkeit* (bodily presence) refers to intuition because besides my empty intentions, what gives something as it is in its bodily presence is the fact that my empty intention is fulfilled. For instance, I can imagine my old desk in my old room; even if the desk in question is itself given in my intention, it only becomes bodily given, when I go back to my old room and find it before me. For Heidegger, we live with such empty intentions by assuming that something is given as itself despite all of its changes or despite the fact that we can only perceive it from just one perspective whereas other sides are not seen. Then, while the thing is bodily there, the thing-totality is presumed. This is why in material sense perception, we cannot acquire total fulfillment. The thing always shows itself in adumbrations and therefore there are always new empty intentions which call for intuitive fulfillment. Then ‘*definitive and thoroughgoing fulfillment*’ happens “when on the side of presuming *all the partial intentions are fulfilled* and, on the side of the intuition which bestows fulfillment, that intuition presents the *whole matter in its totality*”.⁴² Through sensible

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 40.

⁴¹ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 40 “Das Wahrgenommene als solches hat den Character der *Leibhaftigkeit*, d. h. das Seiende, das sich als wahrgenommenes präsentiert hat den Character des *Leibhaft-da*. Nicht nur ist es als es selbst gegeben, sondern es selbst in seiner Leibhaftigkeit.” (*Prolegomena Zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, GA 20, Frankfurt am Main : Vittorio Klostermann, 1979. p. 53)

⁴² Ibid., p. 49.

intuition, a book may be given to us with its infinite manner of qualities, such as being-red. In fact, in sensible intuition, we can only see the book and red but not the fact that it is red. Being-red of book is another presumption and the question is to where it belongs. The same is true for all other categorial forms such as ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘is’, ‘but’, ‘the’, ‘then’, ‘something’, ‘number’ etc. and essences such as ‘red’ or ‘triangle’ and according to Husserl, we apprehend them again through intuition which is not sensible but categorial. If we look at again Heidegger’s definition above, we could say that such partial intentions exceeds sensible intuition and they are fulfilled by categorial intuition which gives us whole matter in its totality. This amounts to saying that all possible partial intentions with their possible fulfilments are already *given* otherwise intuition cannot present *the matter as a whole*. We are not bringing together different parts of sensibly given in a categorial unity; we already live the whole in its possibility as given. But how could this givenness of the whole become possible given the fact that presumptions are always infinite?

According to Jean-Luc Marion, this becomes possible due to a prevailing givenness of being and he claims that “givenness precedes intuition and intention because they make sense only for and through an appearance, which counts as the appearing of something that appears (a phenomenon being) only by virtue of the principle of correlation—and therefore of givenness.”⁴³ As Marion rightly suggests, the correlation which gives us ‘phenomenon being’ is the correlation between appearing and that which appears. For Heidegger, this means that an intuition does not only give us what is intended as it is intended, it also presents us *Sache* itself insofar as “knowledge of and speaking about must, so to speak, show their cards to the thing of and about which they make the claim that it has been ‘revealed’ in the broad sense— i.e. *logos*, as previously defined. They must let themselves be checked out by the thing itself”.⁴⁴ The thing itself here is *Sache* itself as the totality of what is intended with all of its possible confirmations. What is empty intended

⁴³ Jean-Luc Marion, ‘The Breakthrough and the Broadening’ in *Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger and Phenomenology*, trans. by Thomas A. Carlson, Northwestern University Press, 1998. p. 32

⁴⁴ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 87 “Die Kenntnis vor und die Rede über muß gleichsam dem, wovon und worüber sie ‘Offenbarung’ im definierten weiteren Sinne (λόγος) zu sein beansprucht, ihre Karte zeigen, von der Sache selbst sich kontrollieren lassen” (GA21, p. 105.)

modifies itself with regard to the thing itself (*Sache*) by identifying itself with the latter. We know that this identification is not an additional character of the empty intention but belongs to its essence insofar as what is intended is already determined by the thing itself through which it becomes open to modifications. To be open to modifications is an essential characteristic of any intention. Let us imagine my old room in my old apartment. Even if it would be possible that I can describe it exactly as it is by checking out my descriptions with my friend's who is present there, there would be no fullness because my descriptions would end ultimately. It is not bodily present. Contrary to that, the desk on which I am studying now, even if I cannot describe it as exactly as my old room, is bodily present because it is or I am open to experience. This means that what differentiates intuition from intention is not the degree of determinacy of their content, that is,

Intuition fulfills not simply by giving fullness but also by redeeming the expectation that in a certain way can be found in the empty idea. In speaking, I intend something and intend it in this sense: that it can be confirmed at every moment by a concrete intuition of the thing and the state of affairs I am talking about.⁴⁵

My desk is bodily present because my intentions are open to confirmation by the thing itself (*Sache*). Through each intuitive confirmation, I have more expectation. This becomes possible due to the fact that what is intended already implies those expectations otherwise intuition would not direct itself to the same thing which is intended. In other words, through empty intention, the thing is merely intended but through intuition the intended thing is brought before itself. There are not two different objects but different modes of being-object or as Dan Zahavi suggest, "instead of emptiness and fulfillment of meaning-intention, we could speak of presence or absence of the object".⁴⁶ Thus, identification of intention with the thing should be conceived in its intentional sense. It is an unreflected play between intention and intuition or as Marion stated above, intention and intuition are two aspects of a prevailing fact which is appearance (appearing of something which appears). However, contrary to Marion who questions 'what gives', Heidegger's way

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 87.

⁴⁶ Dan Zahavi, *Intentionalität und Konstitution, Eine Einführung in Husserls Logische Untersuchungen*, Kopenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, University of Copenhagen, 1992. p. 84 (my translation) "Man könnte auch, stat von Leere und Erfüllung der Bedeutungsintention, von der An- oder Abwesenheit des Gegenstandes sprechen"

is determined by *how* things are. This does not mean that he condemns himself to an open-ended experience which belongs to nowhere, rather he wants us to learn that the ‘how’ of appearance shows us that intuition is not the last word of phenomenology but it clears our way by providing us with the proper site of phenomenon. Intuitive fulfillment does not primarily mean to acquire something by bringing it to an end; it does not procure ease to our knowledge, rather it is the questioning of knowledge by itself in an uncanny way by forcing us to situate ourselves in each case. Then, we can say that if knowledge is legislation, it should question its own possibility. Kant has already seen this simple fact but Husserl taught us that we are condemned to it. And Heidegger’s contribution is based on the idea of *preserving* it. This helps us to understand the twofold sense of fulfillment for Heidegger “as providing fullness in the sense of *the full*; and as *providing* fullness in the sense of the confirmation”.⁴⁷ We should notice that translation here is apparently misleading. Instead of what english translation suggests, Heidegger uses *Bewähren* which means preservation, not confirmation and instead of ‘providing’, it would be better to use ‘giving’ for *geben*. Thus, when he insists on the *giving* of the phenomenon, he refers to *preservation*. Heidegger, in the present context, does not explain what he means by preservation. But, we know that it refers to the preserving of the giving of what shows itself in its showing, that is, phenomenon. What is intended is fulfilled when it is identified with the very thing intended but this is possible insofar as the thing is already preserved. This amounts to saying that something’s appearing should already belong to its appearance and this requires that belongingness of the thing and human being should be essentially grounded from out of itself.

Here we gain the opportunity to focus on the legitimacy of intuition with regard to the finitude of human being. Intuition, either in Kantian or in Husserlian sense, does not mean that beings are created or produced. Only God’s *intuitus originarius* which is infinite brings possible beings into actuality by creating them. Contrary to that, human-beings together with other worldly things are finite and this leads to conclusion that “they have to announce themselves to each other. The

⁴⁷ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 87 “als *Fülle* geben: das Volle; und als *Fülle geben*: als Bewähren.” (GA 21, p. 106.)

commercium between these worldly things is based on this announcing of one for the other”.⁴⁸ If there will be a *commercium* between human being and things, first looking at the side of worldly things, we should say that they should announce themselves. And if beings have to announce themselves, there must be some entity which is oriented to apprehend them. *Commercium* becomes a fundamental concept of phenomenology in the sense that both Husserl and Heidegger would say that before phenomenology there was only juxtaposition, either juxtaposition of beings before human being or that of both before God. But relationality or knowledge *as a possibility* becomes a problem only if it is questioned with respect to its own genesis. And this genesis is nothing other than being as such. Through such an origin, both worldly things and human being are oriented *to be* with regard to a certain correlation between them. This correlation is not about identity of each side or their difference in identity but through this correlation, they both show themselves different from each other as they *are*, since Kant already had realized, ‘being is not a real predicate’; being is not added to something, either worldly being or human-being, which is possible. Being is already at work in the simple thereness of beings, as their possibility of *coming into view*.

Thus, it is not surprising that phenomenology reaches at categorial intuition. As we have briefly noticed, sensible intuition brings with itself a *surplus* of meaning. A white book as a simply given entity in sensible intuition presents itself in terms of partial intentions and it becomes obvious that those partial intentions imply the being of another vision which is already at work. Then, we come across with new objects such as ‘white’ as a general object or ‘unity’ as a categorial form given to us not through founding sensible acts but through categorial acts founded on the sensible acts. And, categorial acts point to the very possibility of being-object in the following way, “founded acts disclose the simply given objects *anew*, such that these objects come to explicit apprehension precisely in what they are”.⁴⁹ In other words, object in its straightforward sensible level implies higher level acts through which it shows itself *as itself*. Here we should recall Husserl’s concept of ‘real’ because as

⁴⁸Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 96

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 62

Heidegger recognizes, for Husserl “a real object is by definition a possible object of a simple perception”.⁵⁰ In order that we enquire into the reality of the real object, Husserl wants us to remember that it is a possible object of a simple perception. Once we understand object, in its simple form, with respect to its relation to perception, we open the way to other objectivities because being-object is already defined by being-perceived in its simple level. Then, objectivity of real world shows itself in an absolute being which is consciousness. But, what kind of conviction leads us to such a conclusion? Husserl does not hesitate to say that transcendent being is described, in contrast to absolute being, as ‘Being declaring itself in consciousness’.⁵¹ This is similar to what, for Heidegger, announcement of world and human-being means in their *commercium*. Then, we are allowed to say that for Husserl, meaning of real being becomes a problem insofar as real beings declare or manifest themselves or more importantly insofar as they *are* in a way which depends upon *declaring or manifesting*. Again, this manifesting character of things shows us the idea of reality or being in Husserl’s philosophy in the sense that “anything real manifests itself in consciousness as a possible object of a directing-itself-toward-it. Reality is to be specified in each case in view of this self-manifesting aspect as such”.⁵² Heidegger would not argue against the self-manifesting aspect as such. However, the problem is about the starting point whereby Husserl determines self-manifesting beings as *real*; a decision which makes human being a natural entity occurring in the world. Thus, although Husserl tries to analyze the reality of something real, he could not escape from determining consciousness in its being on the basis of such a starting point which is already understood as reality. Then, *commercium* between human being and world is based on a certain scientific relationship of human being with its other in a way which human being locates himself through naturalistic attitude by assuming the role of constituting things. This leads to the conclusion that Husserl does not question the *being of intentional*; intentional acts remain an appendage to being-human which is understood on the

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 61.

⁵¹ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas I*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, London, Allen & Unwin; New York, Humanities P., 1969. p. 212.

⁵² Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 111.

basis of a definite attitude toward world. However, in-between of world and human-being should be kept away from any attitude as long as we are striving for pure seeing of what is seen.

This objection becomes understandable when we look into *epoché*. We know that for Husserl, self-manifesting of beings takes place in *epoché* through which we bracket the natural thesis. Bracketing the natural thesis does not mean removing it but carefully studying it. Now a being becomes ‘something’ in order to be as itself as long as it is taken ‘in the face of’ through which subject posits itself. This is nothing other than constitution which belongs to such a particular study. We should remember that for Husserl, object does not only mean real object but has a more general meaning determined by intentionality. Then to say that beings are constituted does not mean that an intellect produces them according to its will or, as Heidegger says, “*constituting* does not mean producing in the sense of making and fabricating; it means *letting the entity be seen in its objectivity*”.⁵³ Thus constitution is not based on an active participation of a subject rather it manifests a simple fact: *beings are* insofar as they are taken into consideration in their being. Such a special attitude requires phenomenological *epoché* without which we cannot decide whether beings are or not insofar as “this phenomenological suspension of the transcendent thesis has but the sole function of making the entity present in regard to its being.”⁵⁴ Thus any claim on being requires *epoché*. However, before *epoché*, there should be something which leads us to perform *epoché*. Does this thing still belong to being? We should say ‘yes’ otherwise *epoché* would be impossible. Then there is still a crucial question raised by Heidegger against Husserl: “how is it possible that lived experiences constitute an absolute and pure region of being and at the same time occur in the transcendence of the world?”⁵⁵ How is it possible that we still live in a reality disconnected from us? Or does the so-called disconnection imply a deeper correlation?

⁵³ Ibid., p. 71. “*Konstituieren* meint nicht Herstellen als Machen und Verfertigen, sondern *Sehenlassen des Seienden in seiner Gegenständlichkeit*.” (GA 20, p. 97.)

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 99.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 101.

Heidegger does not try to learn how consciousness goes beyond itself as absolute being but he asks why beings in their being require being-conscious. What does it mean to say that beings in their simple givenness need to be seen from a logical or categorial vision in order *to be*? We should be aware that we are not first looking at beings which stand together and then say that they are ‘aggregate’ or ‘unity’ in order to obtain objects of categorial intuition. Categorial objects are not abstractions; they are not added to simple objects. Even if according to Husserl, we acquire categorial intuition in an analogical way to sensible intuition, this is not a lack because what matters most is not the fact that we gain new objects such as ‘unity’ and ‘white’ through categorial intuition, but the fact that the realm of objectivity (*Gegenständlichkeit*), namely, being-object is open to expansion and that we are motivated from the start to such an expansion. This expansion is justified if it is required by beings’ presence to being, given that we are looking for beings in their being. Since beings become present to being by announcing or declaring themselves, which is correlated by the announcement of a being (human being or subject) which asks for their being, we should reconsider this correlation as being of intentional. Thus, a being is more truly what it is in categorial intuition because its *entry into being* requires such an expansion of objectivity. To say that we are concerned with the same object in categorial intuition is not to say that it is the same book in question. Rather, it is the same in the sense that it is what it is *as* it is and identity lies in that preceding ‘as’. And the latter becomes possible if entities are *seen* and for Husserl this mode of vision refers to a new mode of intuition which is categorial. However, we should recall that the main issue is not the fact that sensibility requires a categoriality which makes possible a vision of identity. That would not be different from Kantian endeavour concerning the relation between receptivity of sensation and spontaneity of understanding. Moreover, it is not the reverse; not the fact that categorial needs sensible in order to concretize itself, rather the origin of this relationship is the case. Identity which is usually equated with categorial, lies implicitly in the as-structure which catches us in our primary way of being, natural attitude in Husserl and everydayness in Heidegger so that it is reflected through its manner of being-apprehended and grounded in the way proper to it.

This points to the intentional relationality or correlation between subject and object, or this ‘between’ itself and it leads us to reconsider the phenomenological conception of knowledge in its relation to truth, which will help us to understand the latter with regard to categorial intuition. As Heidegger insists in his *Logic* lectures,

The legitimacy of an act of knowledge or of speech is its ability to be proven. (The state of having-been-proven is the identity of the intended and the intuited, an identity that is seen in the proof.) As an act of knowledge whose legitimacy can be provided at any time by an intuition of the thing it intends, it is true. Truth is the identity of the meant and the intuited.⁵⁶

In other words, knowledge means justification and it requires to be grounded, that is, it needs proof. We have to prove that what we mean is identified with the thing (*Sache*) in question. This shows us that entity in question truly is. First, we know that this kind of identification is not external to the meant or to the intuited. They both are already characterized *intentionally* with regard to identification. This also means that identification is not carried out by reflection; it is not something added, attached or thematically apprehended, but rather we live through identification. Second, as Heidegger notices, identification points to a relation; “identity is a relation. And truth as an identity is a relation between the meant and the intuited. Therefore, truth is the specific relation (of identity) of a certain ‘just-as’: something is meant *just as* it is intuited.”⁵⁷ Thus, intuition comes first; truth is primarily intuitional truth. When I say ‘the chair is yellow’, “I can stress the being in the *being-yellow* and so mean that the chair is *really* and *truly* yellow”.⁵⁸ For Heidegger, this is based on an intuitional truth and called truth-relation (*Wahrverhalt*) instead of a content-relation (*Sachverhalt*). The latter becomes visible when I look at being-*yellow* of the chair. And, “this time I do not want to say that the judged state of affairs truly is, but to express the being-P of S, the pertinence of the predicate to the subject”⁵⁹, that is, I am concerned with a state of affairs; I deal with something with regard to its predicates (the chair and its being-yellow) and here ‘being’ is understood merely as copula. An expression contains both, namely, truth-relation and content-relation and the question is about their connection. According to Heidegger, Husserl interprets truth-relation in a

⁵⁶ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 89.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 53.

⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 54.

similar way with the content-relation. He merely changes the terms of relation but the way he understands the identity relation between the meant and the intuited is similar to the relation between subject and its predicate. As a result, truth relation seems to have the same kind of being with proposition, that is, ideal being.⁶⁰ Thus, being which shows itself in truth-relation is understood in terms of being as the copula of a statement and we should ask ourselves legitimacy of this operation.

Here we should notice that Husserl, in *Logical Investigations*, discusses four concepts of truth and equates truth with judgment or relational acts whereas being is attributed to their objective correlates.⁶¹ This does not mean that Husserl thinks being and truth apart from each other. Rather by remaining true to the sense of intentionality, we should easily recognize that as Jocelyn Benoit suggests, this amounts to “a consideration of being from the point of meaning, in order that being becomes ‘verifying’, and, from this point of view, we should rather talk about veritable *correlation* there where we are on the ground of truth”.⁶² Object taken in its *being* verifies so that being and truth are correlated. As it can be recognized, this conforms to the novelty of intentionality; we are not dealing with proposition in itself but in its genesis as the correlate of an object taken in its being. Since the being-object is determined in terms of expansion given that its nature is nothing but *manifesting*, we consider it in terms of perceivedness as such. There is no longer one determinate object but ‘intentional object’ or in Heidegger’s terms, perceived as such in the manner of its being-perceived. It is obvious that this leads Husserl to one step beyond Lotze insofar as by means of intentionality, we are now closer to the intimacy between being (objectivity) and truth (of relational acts). Heidegger does not ignore Husserlian contribution to the discussion of truth and recognizes the primacy of intuitional truth over propositional truth in the following way “the proposition is true because it is one relational member of the relation of truth. If this relation of identity between the intuited and the intended holds, then *eo ipso* the

⁶⁰ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 93.

⁶¹ Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, VI, p. 768.

⁶² Jocelyn Benoit, *Intentionnalité et Langage dans les Recherches Logiques de Husserl*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2001. p. 144. (my translation) “la considération de l’être du point du vue du sens, pour que l’être se mette à devenir ‘vérifiant’, et, de ce point de vue, il faut bien plutôt parler de véritable *corrélation* là où on est sur le terrain de la vérité”

relatum holds in the sense that what is intended can itself now be designated as true”.⁶³ Thus, propositional truth is a derived mode of intuitional truth. This becomes possible insofar as proposition is understood as the ex-pression of intuition by articulating it⁶⁴ and this is why Husserl still understands truth-relation in terms of content-relation. Heidegger does not reject this co-belonging between truth-relation and content-relation but finds necessary to question it. Why is propositional truth founded on intuitional truth? Why does intuitional truth need propositional truth? Those are not ‘meta’ questions but help us to find the way not to reduce the one to the other. More importantly, phenomenological subject matter itself (*Sache selbst*) forces us to introduce such questions.

Those phenomenological originary questions about truth can be summarized by looking at how truth is traditionally understood: “truth is so originally a determination of knowledge that we can say that true knowledge is a tautology, because knowledge is knowledge only if it is true knowledge”.⁶⁵ This means that truth is primarily intuitional truth, that is, it must be proved, justified or grounded. Furthermore truth is always understood in terms of identity. And as we have seen, for Husserl, it is the identity of the meant and the intuited. For Heidegger, Husserl’s discussion of truth fails insofar as he understands identity of truth relation in terms of the identity of content-relation. Reason of this failure lies in an attitude which Husserl imposes on human-being by considering his status as a real entity. This becomes evident when we realize that for Husserl, beings in their being, that is, in their self-manifesting are determined as present-at-hand (*Vorhanden*), and therefore it is not surprising that human-being could not be saved from a reality exterior to him. This makes consciousness a being *next to* beings, but more importantly, present-at-handness does not deliver the self-manifesting character of beings as it is supposed to be. Beings are self-manifesting insofar as this self-manifesting already belongs to their being in such a way that any possible *epoche* is not enacted *by* a subject, which turns out to be real, but from out of itself. As we shall see, for Heidegger, this

⁶³ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 91.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

manner of being of beings is called *Zuhandenheit* which gives beings *simply* as they are, as true. Thus, for Heidegger, if Husserl's theory of truth is not satisfying phenomenologically, this is not so just because it is based on a conception of truth of judgmental acts, rather from a deeper analyse, we can grasp that it is not still phenomenological because it does not still capture the meaning of "perception as such and the simple perception of something".⁶⁶ The latter is nothing other than the being of the intentional which, for Heidegger, implies the simple belonging or correlation between world and human-being. Husserl misses this simplicity just because his starting point prevents him to see that beings in their being do not require consciousness.

For Heidegger, as we have seen, Husserl's neglect is based on a *care about* scientific knowledge. This may explain why consciousness becomes a theme for philosophy. He writes that "the determination of the characters of an entity's being becomes possible through the interpretation of the *care* in which such an entity is located as this determinate entity".⁶⁷ The determinate entity here is consciousness and it is shaped beforehand by such a care about science and culture. This prevailing care leads Husserl to determine being of intentional in terms of real by taking his point of departure from natural attitude. This is why Husserl never seeks for being of consciousness but posits consciousness as a being. On the other hand, for Heidegger, questioning being of the intentional will save consciousness from being a theme and resituate simple perception to where it already belongs, that is, to being of beings. Consciousness is not the originary site where beings call for. One should let beings speak from themselves, that is, from being. How could that be possible? This requires learning how to look at beings and contrary to Husserl's fundamental insight, it does not consist in a presuppositionless attitude because philosophy cannot be started by any attitude. In a later work on Plato, Heidegger does not hesitate to say that:

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 55. "...die Wahrnehmung als solche und schlichtes Wahrnehmen von etwas..." (GA 21, p. 73) For Heidegger, this refers to the Greek concept of truth which we deal with in the next chapter.

⁶⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. p. 42.

Not freedom from any standpoint (something fantastic), but the right choice of standpoint, the courage to a standpoint, the setting in action of a standpoint and the holding out within it, is the task; a task, admittedly, which can only be enacted *in* philosophical work, not prior to it and not subsequently.⁶⁸

Philosophy cannot be decided before or after doing philosophy. For Heidegger, philosophy is not something to be talked over; it refers to already being at work. This means that ‘the right choice of standpoint’ is not what we usually understand as choice, which is determined with respect to our preferences. Rather, choice already implies an ‘ability to see’ the right standpoint, which is already there. And we know that for Heidegger, this right standpoint or beginning is found in Greeks whose interpretation of existence already “remains within existence”⁶⁹ as a seeing which sees beings as they are.

2.2. Genesis of truth and the as-structure

In the previous section, we have briefly dealt with Heidegger’s basic questioning of Husserl’s conception of logic and truth. It is easy to notice that Heidegger’s main aim consists in a grasping of truth as such. He considers truth in its possibility by looking for its origin or its genesis. Thus, his rejection of a kind of truth reduced to ideal content of propositions can be understood as an attempt to deepen the problematic in its ground. Basically, he realizes that if a thinker arrives at a conclusion which posits truth as ideality of propositional content, such a thinker, without noticing it, already understands being in such a specific manner that the so-called propositional truth finds its ontological value and becomes grounded with respect to this understanding of being. Thus, ideal content cannot give us truth as such because it already presupposes the belongingness between truth and being. Even Husserl, recognizing that truth means being-true, is still far from showing us being character of truth in its origin. Then, we should ask ‘what is the essence of truth?’ When we utter the statement, ‘the chalkboard is black’, traditionally, it is assumed that truth occurs when the state of affairs (blackness of chalkboard) agrees with the thing in question (chalkboard). But, Heidegger sees more in a statement in the sense that we do not have to understand it as a collection of words, but as a specific kind of *speech* which

⁶⁸ Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth, On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*, trans. Ted Sadler, London; New York : Continuum, 2002. p. 58.

⁶⁹ Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, p. 42.

is *apophansis*, which means showing something *as*, from (*apo*) itself. In a statement, something is uncovered as something; the chalkboard as black. Then, even *apophantic* truth involves uncovering, insofar as it is a pointing out or indicating. But point out what? Is it the chalkboard as black or the ‘as’ insofar as statement always shows *something as* something? Before answering this question, we should notice that for Heidegger, in a statement, what is already intended or indicated is the *Sache* in the following way:

What a statement says about something is drawn from that thing itself, so that in this kind of speech, what the speech is about comes into the clear, becomes available for comprehension. In the expressed statement, therefore, the very thing it indicates has become available and, as it were, preserved (*verwahrt*).⁷⁰

This reminds us of our preceding discussion about intuitional truth as the identification of what is intended with what is intuited. As we have seen, Heidegger interpreted intuitive fullness in terms of preservation of the thing itself so that our expectations are redeemed. Now, he discovers in assertion an ability to be determined by a prevailing thing itself insofar as, as Kisiel suggests, “the signifying act finds its fulfillment in an act of intuition in which (a) the object itself is present *just as* it is in itself, and (b) this presence is *just as* it was initially intended in the signifying act”.⁷¹ Obviously, there is a difference between (a) and (b). It is one thing to say that the chalkboard is black and another to be sure of that it *is really so*. As we have seen, the second implies proof which intuition provides. And we have also seen that Heidegger accused Husserl of understanding the second in terms of judgmental structure. However, we are now close to the fact that in *S is P*, what is intended becomes identified with what is intuited and this is more than the relation of being-*P* of *S*. We are not looking for being-*P* of *S* but *S* as such or something as something. Something is what it is only if that thing shows itself from itself, something as... that is, if, in our first encounter, it directs our seeing into its existence. This explains why *φαινόμενον* is not a conceptual category but “a manner of being, *how something is*

⁷⁰ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 112. “Aussage: Gesagtes von der Sache selbst her sagen, so daß in dieser Rede ihr Worüber sichtbar, zugänglich für das Erfassen wird. In der ausgesprochenen Aussage ist dann die aufgezeigte Sache selbst zugänglich geworden und gleichsam verwahrt.” (GA 21, p.133.)

⁷¹ Theodore Kisiel, ‘Heidegger (1907-27): The Transformation of the Categorical’ in *Heidegger’s way of thought*, ed. Alfred Denker and Marion Heinz, New York: Continuum, 2002. p. 94.

encountered and, indeed, encountered in the *first* and, as such, *first legitimate way*".⁷²

Our first encounter with beings as beings occurs at the *apophantic* level as a showing. However, what we indicate or point out through assertion is not the entity which is present, but the presence of what is present or the 'as' through the showing of something as... This becomes possible if we are already directed to the second by the matter or the thing itself and this is why "Heidegger will go further and try to show how an advance notion of the thing itself in some way even prompts the initial signifying intention and thus provides it with its sense of direction".⁷³ Thus, our initial position, assertion as pointing out, is not a choice of will. If *apophantic logos* is determined in terms of uncovering, this is due to the thing itself which becomes accessible through the possibility of *commercium* between human-being and world. In other words, it has its sense coming from the meaning of presence or existence. Then, if we are ready to grasp that "*φαινόμενον* means the existing entity itself; it is a determination of being and is to be grasped in such a way that the character of *showing itself* is expressed"⁷⁴, it remains just to say that it is through *apophantic logos* "what is spoken about is held onto as existing".⁷⁵ Other modes of speech such as requests, questions, prayers or even names and verbs taken on their own are indifferent to existence. While they are meaningful, that is, *semantikos*, they are not *apophantic*, because they are neither true nor false; they do not *point out* as being-thereness which points out the correlation between being-human or being-world. Then, what distinguishes *apophantic logos* from other modes of *logos* is the fact that only through such a kind of speech, existence or presence is pointed out. What is at issue here is, corresponding to the *pointing out* character of assertions, the fact that being of an entity needs to be pointed out. What is meant in an assertion, namely, being of beings, is pointed out or indicated so that it could have the possibility to prove itself by means of itself. This amounts to saying that truth does not occur in an

⁷² Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, p. 10.

⁷³ Theodore Kisiel, 'Heidegger (1907-27): The Transformation of the Categorical' in *Heidegger's way of thought*, p. 95.

⁷⁴ Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, p.10.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

assertion insofar as assertion is not understood as a collection of words but a mode of being; it is speech in which we already find ourselves. Even without words, human-being has the ability to address to beings. In other words, we live in an already expressed world or as Heidegger states in *Prolegomena* “we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what *one says* about the matter”.⁷⁶ We do not first look at the world and then express what it is, rather we live through expression. Then, there cannot be any correspondence between assertion and thing because it is impossible to find a starting point where nothing has already said.

Thus, being true or false means uncovering or covering-over. What is meant is brought to the fore in such a way that something is already uncovered in its possibility to be. What Heidegger tries to accomplish is to free ‘what is meant’ from all presuppositions. As we have seen, in Husserl’s case, what is meant or meaning as such is determined by a preceding conception of other as nature. For Heidegger, otherness emerges from a prevailing correlation which is forgotten. It is forgotten because we live self-evidently in apophantic speech. However, the latter is necessary insofar as it is in speech, human being and world become for each other; a way of being Heidegger sees in Greek conception of world and speech:

Insofar as a human being is in the world and *wants* something in that world and wants it with himself, he speaks. He speaks insofar as something like a world is *uncovered* for him as a matter of concern and *he* is uncovered to himself in this ‘for him’.⁷⁷

What is uncovered through *apophansis* is not an individual entity but an entity in its existence, that is, world. This amounts to say that for Greeks, truth has never been understood as the correspondence of thing and thought. It is already more than what it seems to be. Once human being posits himself before beings by addressing to them, he is in truth. On the other hand, truth is among beings insofar as we address to beings when we consider them with regard to being. We consider them in our everydayness by pointing something out in a self-evident way. Now, we could see that self-evident everyday way of being penetrates into another dimension which is originary truth. On the other hand, one may still ask why we do not start with that proper dimension. We should know that we are not looking for a foundation for

⁷⁶ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 56.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

propositional logic; rather Heidegger finds another moment in proposition which is originary, that is, ground-giving. Propositional determination is nothing but a derived mode of *phenomeno*-logic. Then, what is at issue is the original meaning of *logos* which is always already related to being.

Heidegger, in his Marburg lectures, finds the traces of that originary *logos* in Aristotle. Accordingly, for Heidegger, Aristotle's main aim, contrary to how he is interpreted throughout history of philosophy, is not to construct a bridge between mental states and entities. He is not the founder of correspondence theory of truth. If for Aristotle, assertion has a relation to truth, it is not because it is the place of truth but because it is an indicative *showing as*, that is, it is necessarily *either true or false*. Heidegger then looks for the meaning of this either/or. What makes a statement necessarily either true or false? This leads us to inquire into the structure of *logos* as assertion. Heidegger, reading Aristotle, notices that any statement is based on both synthesis (σύνθεσις) and taking-apart (διαίρεσις). The statement 'the chalkboard is black' as an uncovering or true statement is the synthesizing of being-black with the chalkboard and 'the chalkboard is not black' as a covering-over or false statement separates being-black from the chalkboard. While the first statement is determined as affirmation, second refers to denial or negation. However, this does not mean that synthesis and taking-apart just belongs to affirmation and denial respectively. Contrary to that, both affirmation and denial include synthesis and taking-apart at the same time. When we say that 'the chalkboard is black', in order to synthesise, we should take the parts apart. Again, in order that we take apart being-black from the chalkboard, they should already be taken in their togetherness. Thus, σύνθεσις-διαίρεσις structure precedes affirmation and denial. Since each affirmation and denial has the possibility of being true or false, structure of assertion should be understood on the basis of σύνθεσις- διαίρεσις structure. It is obvious that Heidegger does not refer to a linguistic or formal structure while suggesting the primacy of synthesis and taking-apart. He is looking for a phenomenon as the unity of both, which is "a phenomenon that in itself is both synthesis and separation, one that is prior to linguistic relations of expressions and to their attributions and denials, a phenomenon that, on the other hand is what makes it possible that λόγος can be true or false,

relevatory or covering-over”⁷⁸. That phenomenon certainly cannot belong to the inner and formal structure of assertion. Heidegger does not claim that Aristotle gives a full account of this originary phenomenon. But, Greeks had the wisdom of one thing: *logos* is *Rede*, speech which means uncovering or covering-over of beings with regard to their what and how they are. This requires to take up *logos* not as a fact in its individual occurrences, but as a possibility, as *logos* as such, in its either/or.

This amounts to saying that Heidegger is looking for the meaning of *logos*, that is, meaning of either/or in order to show us *logos* as a possibility. This requires enquiring into very being of that about which *logos* is. In other words, *logos* as such can be made visible following its already aboutness. Thus, logic cannot be posed in its originariness as a realm ruling over another one. Rather, it is the genesis of any directedness or transcendence. This is why Heidegger points to the underlying structure of statement in terms of σύνθεσις- διαίρεσις. Insofar as one once understands it as either uncovering or covering-over, in a statement, something is uncovered or covered-over. This something is what holds together any statement as what it is. To say that statement should be understood on the basis of σύνθεσις- διαίρεσις structure is to say that statement is primarily not predication constituted as affirmation or denial since those presuppose something which is uncovered or covered-over as unification of synthesis and taking-apart. Now, we should see that something in question is phenomenologically understood as *bare something*; it is not real or existent entity but characterized as what could pertain to each possible being. In that sense, bare something (*Etwas*) is indifferent to theoretical construction; Heidegger, in *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, while describing *Etwas* as *experienceable as such*, suggests that “it is ‘not-yet’, i.e. not yet broken out into genuine life, it is the essentially *pre-worldly*. But this means that the experienceable implies the moment of ‘out towards’ (*auf zu*), of ‘direction towards’, ‘into a (particular) world’, and indeed in its undiminished ‘vital impetus’”.⁷⁹ We could now understand how originary dimension of truth is differentiated from apophansis. Since

⁷⁸ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 119.

⁷⁹ Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, p. 97.

we self-evidently live in already belongingness of human-being and world, that which Greeks already know in their specific experience of beings, this *direction into* a world should be implied by a *not-yet* revealed phenomenon of truth. It is *not yet*, entirely other, because it is the whole matter itself which is the fullness of life or existence. Then, for Heidegger, existence fully shows itself from itself only if it already bears in itself its *not-yet*. This *not-yet* is legitimated if our self-evident and preliminary encountering with beings implies it. However, this is not an issue which can be proved by theoretical argumentation. We should look at it from where it emerges, that is, in Greeks. This is why for Heidegger, truth is neither theoretical nor practical but an historical phenomenon.

We are searching for a basic Heideggerian insight: truth is presence of the present. The structure of statement leads us to uncoveredness of something which gives to statement its possibility to be either true or false. This conception of truth belongs to what Greeks understands *legein* as genesis of directedness and being for each-other of human-being and world. For Heidegger, this is already what Plato puts forward in the *Sophist* while saying that λόγος is λόγος τινός, that is, “speaking is speaking of and about something. The unity is constituted and becomes intelligible from what is being spoken about”.⁸⁰ What is being spoken about in an assertion is its *Worüber* and should be distinguished from its *Wovon* in the sense that the first refers to the statement’s subject matter whereas the latter is what the statement predicates about that subject matter.⁸¹ In other words, *apophansis* means saying something (*Wovon*) about something (*Worüber*). In a statement, what is visible is its *Worüber*, which is already present and from which the predicative attribution is lifted out or highlighted. Going beyond Husserl, Heidegger now questions the meaning of that already-presentness so that measure of truth can build itself from itself. Truth is not placed in proposition because about-whatness of proposition is not something propositional; before predication, we should already familiar with the chalkboard as *Worüber* of statement, as something unitary, as this or that. As we have seen, this implies a prevailing structure of σύνθεσις- διαίρεσις, through which chalkboard is

⁸⁰ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 120.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

already apprehended *as something*. As Heidegger states later in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*,

In principle we may say that in order to point out something in general—whether as it is or as it is not—i.e., in order to be able to reveal or conceal by way of pointing out, *whatever* is to be pointed out must already *be apprehended* in advance in the *unity of its determinations* in terms of which and in which it can be determined explicitly in its character *as such and such*. This is why it is already apprehended in advance as this or that.⁸²

Once again, we should remember that pointing out is “pointing out something in and according to what it is or is not”.⁸³ This is possible if something is already apprehended as such, in the unity of its determinations. Thus, in our first encounter with beings, they are already apprehended with regard to all possible determinations. But, this becomes possible due to the fact that it is already a something, a this or that. Then, it is not surprising that Heidegger understands predicative determination on the basis of such a unity forming apprehension. He claims that “in order for something like a predicative highlighting and determining to be possible, the subject matter must have already become accessible”.⁸⁴ But is it not through predication I determine it as a chalkboard? Yes, but only as a mere thing on hand. For Heidegger, however, primarily, I do not determine the chalkboard, but I *point out it with regard to its what*. Then, the chalkboard which is the subject matter of a statement is not that kind of thing which is simply determined as there. It is the chalkboard which is understood as nothing but *one*. It is not its color, its weight or its shape which constitute its what. It is something *as such*. Thus, instead of determinability, we need another term in order to understand something as such. This means that we need to consider an entity with regard to the *accessibility* to it. And, something is accessible not with regard to some qualities, but with regard to its serviceability through which it makes sense. Here, we can easily notice that beings are no longer understood with regard to an ontological structure which consists in attributing something to something (blackness to chalkboard). Rather beings are considered in a meaning structure through which their being, their *what they are or not* comes into scene.

⁸² Martin Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, World, Finitude, Solitude*, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. p. 314.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

⁸⁴ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 120.

In other words, beings are posited within meaning; we are not determining them by attributing some properties to them. Before all thematic dealings, beings make sense because what is already given is that meaning structure. This leads to the conclusion that “every act of having something before our eyes and perceiving it, is in and of itself a matter of ‘having’ something *as* something. Our directional being-onto-things-and-people functions within this structure of ‘something as something’. In short, it has the *as-structure*”.⁸⁵ Heidegger determines this as-structure as the hermeneutical-as. Obviously, the σύνθεσις- διαίρεσις structure, that which we have discovered through the analysis of assertion which is now determined as propositional-as, leads us to such a ground-lying as-structure. In other words, for Heidegger, when we ask which phenomenon possesses the σύνθεσις- διαίρεσις in a unified way, we should know that this phenomenon is the primary or hermeneutical as-structure.⁸⁶ If we achieve to show that it is the as-structure which possesses both synthesis and separation, we will be able to show that origin of apophantic logos lies in that primary as-structure. For now, we know that the latter is based on taking or having something as something. In our everyday dealings, we take this door as it is, that table as it is. Where does the so-called ‘as’ come from? As we briefly mentioned above, our first encounter with beings takes place in terms of what-they-are-for. I have the door as itself insofar as I enter or exit the room, in terms of what it serves-for. Moreover, through such a comportment, I already understands the thing’s what-as. Heidegger notices that this implies a crucial fact: my first and immediate encounter with things is not direct but structural. In other words, I have the door as it is insofar as I have already understood it as something in accordance with its what-as. Thus, the expression ‘something as something’ does not refer to a one-dimensional experience, rather it is stratified. Pre-thematically I understand *something as* this or that. Then Heidegger says the following:

So in this apparently direct understanding of the things closest to me in the lived world, when I apprehend and understand something, I have *always already* gone *further ahead* than the thing that is given (in an extreme sense) ‘directly’ to me. I am always already further ahead by understanding the end-for-which and the what-as in terms of which I am taking the thing that is given and encountered at the moment. And only *from* the what-as and end-for-which

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 121.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 126.

(in terms of which the thing in question can serve)—only *from* this end-for-which, where in fact I always already am—do I return to the thing that I encounter.⁸⁷

The temporal expressions ‘always already’ and ‘further ahead’ indicates that we are not dealing with *something* as if it is first given and then we attach its meaning. Rather, what is directly given is this door here or the table there. We are always already ahead the thing given directly in order to be able to return to it. What does that mean? What does that kind of experience tell us; returning to the thing that we encounter? It is obvious that Heidegger tries to teach us something essentially phenomenological. First, experience cannot be constructed by subjective manipulations although it has depth. In other words, I do not first see something white and decide that it is chalk; rather ‘I understand this thing as chalk’⁸⁸. I do not bring together some qualities and then relate them to an underlying thing. Rather, it is due to a pre-thematical understanding of something, I recognize things. However, something is already given in its end-for-which and its what-as. This amounts to saying that I return to the thing that I encounter because I *have to* return to it. There is no other sense of being human rather than creating a *there* for beings. Returning here is not to be understood in its spatial sense as long as it signifies a moment of existence. Since I always deal with the *same* door or with the *same* chalk, it is evident that I am *always already* with those things as they are. That sameness is what relates Dasein’s belongingness to the experience so that what is there is always re-grounded through Dasein. I cannot take a break from experience. Even if I close my eyes for a while, when I open my eyes, it is evident that it is the *same* door. This *is so* because the door is not what it is due to the coherence of its qualities, but it *is* insofar as it already makes sense according to its end-for-which. This is why we are *further ahead* the thing. But, we are *always already* further ahead the thing, that is, its serviceability has already gone. What we have is not thing’s serviceability, but the thing itself. This means that the thing emerges from its meaning. Its sole peculiarity is its sameness, which refers to its *possibility to be what it is*. This is the phenomenological sense of *letting beings be*. Thus, returning from the end-for-which to the thing means that what is at issue is the fact that I *have* things in a peculiar way.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 124.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Heidegger does not try to describe what goes around us. Rather, he wants us to see that we make sense of something (*Zu-tun-haben mit etwas*) insofar as we are concerned with things. Otherwise put, things make sense due to our directedness to them. And, we should recognize that door does not signify its serviceability, rather its serviceability is its absence through which it is for the first time has the opportunity to be what it is. In other words, as long as the thing is used up in everyday dealings, it has already been returned to and makes sense. Insofar as it makes sense, it signifies to have been looked at. It signifies to have been seen; it signifies *to be*.

Our last phrase may lead us again to our discussion of truth. We were searching for the meaning of *to be* in order to locate truth. Indeed, we are on the path which Heidegger suggests as the sole phenomenological questioning. He deliberately asks in his *Logic*: “what does *being* mean such that *truth* can be understood *as a characteristic of being*?”⁸⁹ In our first chapter, we have tried to show that truth, in its phenomenological sense, should be intuition, that is, it gives its own ground from itself, from its own direction, which is its about-what. Then, we have seen that about-what of any speech is not something substantial but it is let free in order to correlate itself to *possible* human concern. This is nothing other than what Heidegger has designated as *commercium between human-being and world*. Thus, truth is not a result of a logical analysis, rather, it is a need for being-there. If it is a character of being, this is due to the fact that it occurs while opening room for being-there. Now, we could see that if truth will be *Seinscharakter*, human being should find itself where it already belongs to, that is, it should not be added to that world from somewhere else. As we shall see later, Heidegger will introduce Dasein of human-being as a *Seinscharakter*. Although without any analysis of Dasein our discussion of truth remains missing, we could nevertheless determine our task on the basis of ‘what being means’ in order to prepare ourselves for the analysis of Dasein.

Then, we have learned that truth as such cannot be founded on assertion since the latter, understood as a mode of showing, presupposes an already uncoveredness of something. As we have tried to analyse, Heidegger aims at deconstructing

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 161. “Was besagt *Sein*, damit *Wahrheit* als *Seinscharakter* verstanden werden kann?” (GA. 21, p. 191.)

traditional logic at its origins by showing us that *logos* or speech is not constituted by coming together of some elements such as words or voices. Although we should begin with an analysis of statement, this strategy has the purpose of making clear that any assertion needs an about-what in order to measure itself, in order to be true or false. It seems that Heidegger is concerned with the conditions of possibility of traditional logic, but with the following emphasis: our destruction should oblige us to philosophize differently, a mode of being which once is lived by Greeks self-evidently. As it is well-known, transcendental philosophy deals with the limits, but Heidegger takes one more step by making human-being live the crisis of limits. Thus, the discussion of truth as such is more than a transcendental inquiry insofar as truth is already about being. Heidegger's main insight is to grasp that we cannot arrive at being from what we know as truth. Rather, what we know as truth is already conditioned by being. But, we cannot touch being; it is always already a this or that, either a door or a valid proposition. Thus, what we *have* is our starting point and more than something to be overcome. Then, Heidegger looks for what we have in the closest way. And these are not propositions, images or representations. What we have primarily is what we see in our daily life. I am not directed to my images, but to the door as itself. I *am* always already *with* those things. But how do I encounter with beings? Is it due to the ability of subject to see beings or is it because *beings are* only within self-showing? If it is the first, then we arrive at the conclusion that *beings are* only by signifying *to be*, arousing in Dasein the ability to apprehend them and thereby being becomes something *signified*. If we want to avoid this problem, we should concern with the second way and ask: what are beings so that they show themselves from themselves? Obviously, this will force us to think again status of human being in other terms. We should see that metaphysics is not a natural inclination of human being as Kant claimed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Rather metaphysics requires a continuous re-building from the simple seeing; a mode of apprehension which, for Heidegger, Husserl's phenomenology lacks but Aristotle was already familiar with.

2.3. On the conception of being in Aristotle:

‘τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς’

To claim that Aristotle’s philosophy was already familiar with phenomenology is to claim that Aristotle, with other Greek thinkers preceding him, had the simple mode of seeing which is oriented to the beings in such a way that beings show themselves from themselves. In what way did Aristotle describe human-being in its relation to beings? Obviously, this is a wrong question. For Aristotle, as for Heidegger, there is no other way to be human except that being unto beings. That was the primary sense of *logos*, as we have seen, which understands human-being and world in their already belongingness. They are always already for each-other and nevertheless this belonging is not theoretical or practical but something truthful. If being human requires a necessary mode of being-towards, we should ask with regard to what it takes its direction. For Heidegger, this directedness takes its ground from a prevailing sense of being which shows itself through the most primary way of experience of being through which beings are uncovered. If truth has any relation to human-being, this is not because it is constructed by a subject from simple elements, but because it is what makes being human possible. We have already mentioned that in order that truth has a character of being, we should ask what being means. However, to answer that question is not possible through theoretical argumentations. We should look at what *we have*. We should consider ourselves with the philosophy of our day. For Heidegger, what is before us is not the mass of philosophical industry but the burden of tradition, not to overcome it but to be aware of the fact that we are not isolated from the past. History is the happening of Dasein as its understanding of being, otherwise there would be no responsibility, and no philosophy at all.

For now, we are not regarding Dasein with regard to its own structure and existentials as it is developed in *Being and Time*. We just want to recognize that truth as uncoveredness of something already calls for human-being into its proper site. We are not concerned with Dasein in its technical sense because Greeks also did not know it in their way of life. And if we want to learn the basic *sense of being* according to Greeks, we should ask the question in their way of understanding the matter. Now, we just know that truth as uncoveredness is possible through the comportment or concern of human-being for beings, as a *being-unto-beings*. Thus, as

Heidegger expresses this in *Plato's Sophist* "this uncoveredness does not apply to things insofar as they are, but insofar as they are encountered, insofar as they are objects of concern. Accordingly, uncoveredness is a specific accomplishment of Dasein, which has its Being in the soul".⁹⁰ This does not mean that truth is subjective. Since we have seen that *truth is* as long as *to be* is pointed out, we are ready to understand that uncoveredness is not a property of this or that being, but it belongs to *something as encountered*. In other words, Dasein is not directed to this or that being or to their totality, but he finds himself in a directedness to beings as a whole, which awakens in it its being. And this is possible only if *what is encountered* is left to itself. For Greeks, this did not require a further effort because they had the ability not to disturb Dasein in its being. Then, for Greeks, soul was not a subjective category, but the way of being of human-being. Dasein's comportments or modes of disclosure did not refer to a subject which waits to be understood in its relation to objects. Dasein, for them, by its nature means being-with-beings. There remains just to understand Dasein in order to understand being. But, for Heideggerian problematic, what is at issue here is not just to bring up this discursive order of *cosmos* but its *how*, its ground. What kind of experience of being did lead Greeks to such a way of philosophy? We should know that Greek way of life, as the beginning of philosophy, does not imply perfectness of a satisfied existence. Rather, it indicates a striving coming from a hidden possibility which makes any openness possible for being human. And this is what it means to say that "ancient philosophy is a gigantic beginning, and as such it contains within itself a wealth of truly undeveloped and in part completely hidden possibilities".⁹¹

In what follows we will look at some basic texts in order to reveal being in its question-worthiness where it comes to birth *as a mere possibility*, that is, in Greeks. Thus, while Heidegger portrays Greek philosophers, his aim is not to narrate an actual past, but to put forth what is unthought or unsaid in Greeks. Indeed, this is the original sense of destruction, which is not a simple assembling, but a synthesis as

⁹⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, Bloomington, Ind. : Indiana University Press, 1997. p. 17.

⁹¹ Martin Heidegger, *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Michael Heim, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. p. 9.

taking-apart; dismantling. Thus, there should be *something* which makes us to believe that there is an unthought in Greeks. As we have seen, hermeneutical something grounds propositional truth by securing truth with regard to being. If truth does not belong to human-being, but the reverse, that is, if *truth is* in such a way that human-being finds himself in truth by finding himself with beings, there remains before us human-being not as rational animal, but in his *Seinscharakter*, as the site of uncoveredness of beings. Then, our logical discussion leads us to the disclosure of being. Now, we want to learn *in what way* our preceding discussion of truth on the basis of *primal something* shows itself through the disclosure of being. In other words, we should see that what we grasped as *uncoveredness of something* already lies in Greeks as a hidden possibility.

Heidegger, in the introductory part of *Plato's Sophist*, reading Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, discusses truth as ἀλήθεια with an emphasis on α-privative. This amounts to say that for Greeks, truth means to let beings come into unhiddenness from hiddenness. Then, we could see that “this privative expression indicates that the Greeks had some understanding of the fact that the uncoveredness of the world must be wrested, that it is initially and for the most part not available”.⁹² Thus, truth is a character of being and it is possible insofar as we have beings in their being, in our encounter with them or “insofar as beings stand in relation to a regard aimed at them, to a disclosure circumspecting them, to a knowing”⁹³ given that only through a being which looks at them, beings are encountered with regard to their being. Then, Heidegger turns his attention to the modes of this looking as modes of ἀληθεύειν, which refers both to disclosure of beings and comportments of Dasein. What remains is to understand how Aristotle, in *Nicomachean Ethics*, distinguishes ἀληθεύειν into five, which are, following Heidegger's translation, know-how (τέχνη), science (ἐπιστήμη), circumspection (insight) (φρόνησις), understanding (σοφία) and perceptual discernment (νοῦς).⁹⁴ For Heidegger, Aristotle carries out

⁹² Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, p. 11.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Cf. Aristotle, ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. W. D. Ross, Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1984. 1139b14-1139b18 “Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in

such a distinction with respect to two criteria: “1. What is the character of beings which the mode of ἀληθεύειν uncovers, and 2. Does the respective mode of ἀληθεύειν also disclose the ἀρχή of those beings?”⁹⁵ First, regarding *what is disclosed* in each mode of disclosure and second, considering each mode of disclosure whether it preserves the ἀρχή of those beings which are disclosed or the ἀρχή is escaped. According to those criteria, ἐπιστήμη is not a genuine mode of disclosure because, although that which is disclosed through ἐπιστήμη is something eternal as that which cannot be otherwise, it presupposes that from out of which knowledge is possible. Further, we look at τέχνη, and see that that which it relates to is something coming into being, to be produced, that is, its object is what can be otherwise. With regard to the ἀρχή of those objects, it is obvious that ἀρχή is not in those things to be produced insofar as what is produced is always for the use of something or someone. Thus, in the case of τέχνη, ἀρχή escapes its object and this makes it a deficient mode of disclosure. With regard to φρόνησις, we can observe that like τέχνη, its object is what can be otherwise but still it is different from τέχνη insofar as through φρόνησις, we are deliberately related to something which is determined in its relation to us, which is not the case with τέχνη. In other words, in technical know-how, τέλος of our comportment is outside its object whereas in practical deliberation, τέλος and ἀρχή is identical with being of the deliberator. Thus, object of φρόνησις is human existence itself. Nevertheless, φρόνησις does not consider ἀρχαί as ἀρχαί, a characteristic which belongs to νοῦς. Although it gives us the basis of human existence from out of itself, insofar as man is not an eternal being, it is not the most genuine mode of disclosure.⁹⁶ Then, only mode of disclosure oriented to eternal beings is σοφία which is concerned with beings which *always already* are. The proper sense of ἀρχή comes from this always already presentness and leads us to think that our two criteria which classify five modes of disclosure are already related with each other. In other words, that which is disclosed in each

number, i.e. art, knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, comprehension; for belief and opinion may be mistaken”

⁹⁵ Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, p. 22.

⁹⁶ Cf. Aristotle, ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, “it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world.” 1141a20-1141a33

disclosure already determines its relation to the ἀρχή. In the case of φρόνησις, that which is disclosed is human existence itself and gives us its own for-the-sake-of-which. τέλος of the act is the existence of man himself. However, the latter requires a guide or direction because through praxis, we do not have the chance to deliberate over something rather we live through either/or. This means that in order to deliberate well, we should already be good. We should have a more autonomous orientation to the beings. Since each mode of disclosure is determined by what is to be disclosed, this means that in the most autonomous sense, that which is to be disclosed should be that which always already are, not subject to change or destruction. For Heidegger, as for Aristotle, this mode of disclosure is nothing other than σοφία and its privilege over φρόνησις becomes plausible insofar as it deals with beings which *always are* in the manner of pure seeing; θεωρεῖν, a word comes from θέα, which means ‘look’ or ‘sight’.

From all of these, we learn two fundamental facts: first, the hermeneutical something which we have discovered in our preceding discussions is now founded in its relation to truth as that which always already is. Second, we could see that this becomes possible due to a classifying of truth or disclosure in accordance with its object. This last point shows us that truth is always considered with regard to comportments of human-being, not in order to reduce it to subject but in order to save human-being in its utmost possibility through which truth is seen from its genesis. In other words, we are not *in* Dasein but we look at it from its regard or from its looking at beings so that it can own such a distance and be what it is. We force Dasein to transform itself in each case, a transformation which is determined by how beings are or what being means. As we have recognized above, before *Kehre*, for Heidegger, how beings are is nearly equivalent with what being means. Since beings are always encountered *as* something, and since this ‘as’ points out being, truth becomes a character of being. This can be possible insofar as we understand *logos* as *apophansis*, as a showing by saying something about something, and now we can see that necessity of Dasein is shown from within that prevailing structure. However, as Heidegger mentions in *Plato’s Sophist*, here we come across a problem. Aristotle carries out the distinction of modes of disclosure within *apophantic logos*, that is, ‘by way of affirmation or denial’ with one exception: νοῦς destroys that rule because

while other modes of disclosure are all μετὰ λόγου, νοῦς is ἄνευ λόγου, that is, ‘without *logos*’. For human-being, we know that νοεῖν is always διανοεῖν, that is, it is always speaking of something as something but on the other hand “what is utterly simple, ἀπλοῦν, is what can no longer spoken as something else. Everything ἔσχατον and πρῶτον can be grasped properly only if the νοεῖν is not a διανοεῖν but a pure onlooking. Here the disclosure in the mode of the carrying out of λόγος fails and recedes”⁹⁷. It seems that it is not possible for human-being to acquire the wisdom of what always is, but Heidegger adds “that λόγος can recede here is a fact grounded in λόγος itself. For λόγος as λόγος, according to its very sense, is *not* already ordered toward ἀληθεύειν, toward the disclosure of beings, toward truth”.⁹⁸ What does that mean?

Heidegger here refers to the fact that *logos* is not primarily *apophantikos*; it is not primarily either true or false but being already *semantikos*, it means something. Indeed, we have already mentioned this fact about *logos*. We have seen that being true or false belongs particularly to apophantic logos, although outside that sphere, logos is still meaningful. We can recognize that in the quotation above, Heidegger does not say *logos*, but talks about *logos as logos*; ‘*not* already ordered toward ἀληθεύειν’. Logos is logos if the question of being is awaked and this enables us to see that logos as logos is still not apophantic; it bears a simple possibility as to be true or false and it is this possibility or lack which makes logos what it is and which calls for Dasein. Heidegger in his talk entitled ‘*Dasein und Wahrsein nach Aristoteles*’ delivered in December 1924 points to the same issue by saying that “it becomes clear already that being-true is thus a possible way that Dasein itself can be. To put it more precisely: being-true is not a possibility of λόγος as λόγος; rather, ἀληθεύειν, the uncovering of the concealed, can be completed in λόγος”.⁹⁹ Truth is a possibility and needs to be owned by Dasein. In order that we understand the

⁹⁷ Heidegger, *Plato’s Sophist*, p. 124.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Martin Heidegger, ‘Being-there and Being-true according to Aristotle’, in *Becoming Heidegger: on the trail of his early occasional writings, 1910-1927* ed. Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan trans. Brian Hansford Bowles, Evanston, Ill. : Northwestern University Press, 2007. p. 225.

involvement of Dasein in the happening of truth clearly, we should show that truth already belongs to beings.

Truth is not a matter of thinking but it is about that which is. In the above discussion of *Plato's Sophist*, we have seen that each mode of disclosure is levelled with regard to what is disclosed. But, we should know that what is disclosed is not simply there; it is disclosed in respective disclosure. The table is disclosed in τέχνη and τέχνη is not a genuine mode of disclosure because, as it is the case with other modes of disclosure except σοφία, ἀρχή escapes what is disclosed. The thing in question refers to its absence. The table comes from its use and matter, science comes from fundamental principles, or human existence comes from wisdom. We may argue that their *what* implies absence. Indeed, this is the case. Then, what is at issue here is not the fact that those are not genuine modes of disclosure. Rather, we should see that each one of them presupposes ἀρχή, which is “that which already is, that from out of which every being is properly what it is”.¹⁰⁰ Otherwise, how could something show itself as this or that in its absence? But, presupposing ἀρχή is not enough, rather it should be preserved. For Heidegger, something is preserved when it is in rest. ἀρχή is in rest when we do not speak of *something as something*. This does not mean that we leave the region of *legein ti kata tinos*. Rather, we let beings show themselves *from themselves* because the latter already means that *something* is *uncovered*. And, this amounts to saying that we are not going to truth from the being of beings but we see that truth, to be unconcealed, essentially, belongs to *what beings are*. In other words, being means such and such because beings are and *they are* insofar as they are uncovered and they are uncovered because they are. Truth is secured if we can understand *what beings are*. We should ask what it means to say that a being *really* is, so that its truth *is*.

We were searching for the sense of being in order to understand how truth is a character of being. Now, we see that the question of how beings are uncovered or encountered leads us to the question of ‘what are beings?’ or in its Greek sense ‘τί τὸ ὄν’ insofar as truth is primordial sense of being. The latter claim is emphasized by Heidegger in several places and we now will discuss this claim in its relation to

¹⁰⁰ Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, p. 97.

Aristotle's philosophy. In his lecture course entitled *The Essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger looks into the four meanings of being in Aristotle. He takes into account Aristotle's phrase 'τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς'¹⁰¹ and notices that for Aristotle, *beings are* with regard to *categories*, *their so-and-so-being*, *their being-possible and being-actual* and they are with regard to *being-true or being-false*. And as Heidegger realizes, Aristotle, in *Metaphysics E*, dismisses second and fourth meanings of being from the field of metaphysics. Thus, so-and-so-being, namely, τὸ ὄν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, and being-true, namely, τὸ ὄν ὡς ἀληθές cannot be considered as modes of proper being for the reason that the first involves contingency and the second belongs to thought, not to beings themselves. However, according to Heidegger, this urges us to discuss the situation of *Metaphysics Θ 10* in which Aristotle argues that being and not-being refers properly to being-true and being-false. Aristotle says the following:

The terms 'being' and 'not-being' are used not only with reference to the types of predication, and to the potentiality or actuality, or non-potentiality and non-actuality, of these types, but also (in the strictest sense) to denote truth and falsity. This depends, in the case of the objects, upon their being united or divided; so that he who thinks that what is divided is divided, or that what is united is united, is right; while he whose thought is contrary to the real condition of the objects is in error.¹⁰²

Heidegger reminds us that here, Aristotle, against what he argues in *Metaphysics E*, does not consider truth as a character of thought but instead he understands being and non-being in terms of being-true and being-false. If metaphysics is concerned with the being of beings, being-true, 'in the strictest sense', that is, most properly, is the being of beings. Then, for Heidegger, we could say that for Aristotle "being-true is the being-true of the πραγμάτων, the things, thus is not a property of conceptual thought of things, is not truth as pertaining to knowledge of beings, is not a property of propositions, of the λόγος about beings, does not concern opinion of...as such; none of that, but being-true pertains simply to the beings themselves".¹⁰³ Claiming that *Metaphysics Θ 10* does not belong to the spirit of the whole book indicates a

¹⁰¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics Books I-IX*, trans. Hugh Tredennick, Harvard University Press, 2003. Book VI 1026a "but since the simple term 'being' is used in various senses..."

¹⁰² Ibid., Book IX 10. 1051a34-1051b17

¹⁰³ Martin Heidegger, *Essence of Human Freedom, An Introduction to Philosophy*, trans. Ted Sadler, London; New York: Continuum, 2002. p. 62.

misunderstanding because it is in this passage that Aristotle gives us hints to learn what we already understand while *saying being*. As we mentioned above, Aristotle teaches us that we say beings in many ways. When we say that ‘the chalk is white’ we say that the chalk is so-and-so. When we say that ‘the chalk is material’, we refer to its *what*. We may also say that ‘the chalk is present’ meaning that it is actual. For Heidegger, however, we can also emphasize on ‘is’ in each sentence; for instance, ‘the chalk *is* white’. In that case, what is true in the strict sense is not the proposition, but the being which is uncovered. Then, before being *so-and-so*, a *what* or a *thing*, being-true already belongs to beings. This becomes understandable when we realize that in order that a being *be* so-and-so in its what as a thing, we need a leading sense of being through which we say in several ways about beings and this sense of being lies before our eyes as primordial truth of beings which *are* in their uncoveredness.

Thus, that which *most properly* belongs to beings is their being-true. Inquiring into being-true of beings in Metaphysics Θ 10 where Aristotle discusses τὸ ὄν κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν does not indicate incoherence insofar as being-true is the proper name for being of beings. Following *Plato’s Sophist*, we have described being-true of beings in terms of their respective disclosure, which is determined by being of beings, but in Metaphysics Θ 10,

Aristotle does not begin by inquiring into the being of proper beings in order to then discuss their characteristic being-true, but he immediately inquires into the being-true of proper beings, in order to then determine their being—in other words and more pointedly, in order to define this being-true itself as the most proper being of the most proper beings, as that which is most proper about proper beings.¹⁰⁴

This amounts to saying that in each mode of disclosure, being-true prevails so that being of beings can give us the possible disclosure. It is crucial to notice that being of beings has degrees, neither in quality nor in quantity. It is a levelling coming from the sense of being as such. Even in accidental being, we are in truth insofar as it has its own disclosure. Indeed, questioning being requires us to be open to each possible occurrence of being since we cannot grasp being itself as a being. As we have mentioned, what we can do is to bring being into question. Thus, first, we should look into possible modes of disclosure of beings in order to see that their being is their truth. However, there still remains a further step which throws us back. We

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 70.

need to show that being-true is the most proper and primordial characteristics of beings before beings are uncovered *in this or that way*. If being of beings is the truth of beings, something *is* most properly what it is when it is most properly true. What is at issue here is to notice that this truth is not added to beings insofar as their being requires that they are, which means that they are true. In that sense, beings are always true; there is no possibility of distortion. This reminds us of our conclusion from *Plato's Sophist*, where we see that νοῦς is ἄνευ λόγου, that is, there is that something *about which* nothing can be said. We are at the situation that we are no longer guided by being of beings rather the latter forces us from within our ownness which is disclosure of beings. This requires another mode of philosophizing which Heidegger gives start in *Being and Time*. But, for now, we are asking ourselves in what way this kind of truth leads Greeks. It is not accidental, for Heidegger, Greeks lives through the *leading* question: what are beings? This question has no answer but indicates that being leads them and this leading is not a leading forth but a leading back insofar as being is what gets forgotten in each case human being puts itself forth. Being is the play of inbetween of human-being and beings through which both strives for *being* most properly what they are. Now, Heidegger tries to understand the most proper being according to Aristotle, which means that it most properly *is*, that is, it is most properly true. This is the hidden possibility of Greeks where their philosophy begins and ends. Although in his early works on Greeks, it seems that discussion of truth moves around a transcendental questioning, being-true as the most proper being of the most proper beings is not an investigation about the conditions of possibility of the truth of the less proper being of less proper beings. Rather, it is to say that being has its own language. It does not need a transcendental inquiry to be talked about because it is *logos* itself, and this may involve receding in order to be itself, *logos as logos*.

Heidegger's aim is to make us familiar with the hidden possibilities of Greek manner of experience. To say that truth is the most proper character of beings is not to be understood as if we are looking for what lies behind our everyday experience. It does not consist in looking for another world beyond ordinary life. Rather, the fact that being or truth has gradations or levels is essential to the sense of being. Thus, *noein without logos* is not a result of Platonic insight and does not diminish the role

and importance of Dasein. As distinct from the different modes of disclosure which Heidegger discusses through *Nicomachean Ethics*, with truth as the most proper being of the most proper beings, he wants us to see that question of being is the question of truth which is nothing but involvement of Dasein in Being. It is such an occurrence through which being becomes questionable including its unsaid. Thus, against what Jacques Taminiaux puts forth in his article *La réappropriation de l'Éthique à Nicomaque*, we should argue that it is not a paradoxical job to criticize Greeks being naive with regard to their everyday existence developed around *poiesis* and then to say that through praxis, they have an authentic experience.¹⁰⁵ In that work, Taminiaux argues that Heidegger reads *Nicomachean Ethics* with an underlying Platonic insight which is determined by a transcendent good and thereby pure theorein, ignoring doxic aspect of praxis¹⁰⁶ and criticizes Heidegger's reappropriation of Greek notion in *Being and Time* as an injustice to the original sense of praxis which should be considered as a multiplicity of city. First of all, we should notice that for Heidegger, if Greeks will be characterized in terms of naivety, this is so because this naivety implies an *originary* aspect. In other words, Greeks was naive not only because they did not perform the question of being as a question, but also because in this ignorance, they are already guided by the sense of being and their conception of being-human has the traces of such an understanding which is pre-philosophical. This is how for Heidegger, *sophia* also involves *poiesis*, as bringing into being, which precedes all other modes of making.¹⁰⁷ Thus, Heidegger, while re-appropriating Greek notions, does not try to construct a parallelism between his thought and Greeks. Against Franco Volpi, we do not reduce Heidegger's relation to Aristotle to the ontologization of Aristotelian praxis as Dasein.¹⁰⁸ Rather,

¹⁰⁵ Jacque Taminiaux, 'La réappropriation de l'Éthique à Nicomaque: *ποίησις et πράξις* dans l'articulation de l'ontologie fondamentale' in *Lectures de l'ontologie fondamentale: essais sur Heidegger*, Grenoble : J. Millon, 1989, p. 168, 69

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 186. Taminiaux says "parce que cette lecture est axée sur la primauté de la σοφία 'comme possibilité suprême du Dasein', elle est pour ainsi dire, hyperplatonisant".

¹⁰⁷ Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, p. 116.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Franco Volpi, 'Being and Time, a "Translation" of the Nicomachean Ethics?' in *Reading Heidegger from the Start*, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, trans. John Protevi, Albany : State University of New York Press, 1994.

Heidegger looks for the ontological sense of a pure phenomenological seeing or *theorein* which shows us that for Greeks, being means visibility.

For Heidegger, this leads us to claim that for Greeks, being, namely, οὐσία is understood as constant presence. This also shows us that Greeks understand being in terms of what they *have* in their daily life, such as, houses and possessions whose particularity is nothing but to be constantly attainable. Accordingly, for Greeks, constant presence which is usually understood as παρούσία is the underlying sense of both so-and-so being and what-being. Even being-actual is grounded on constant presence insofar as it is understood as the ‘παρούσία of the εἶδος’. This means that Greeks understand beings *in their being*, that is, they are encountered with beings as present. Constant presence belongs to all beings without being universal. If it were universal, there would not be different modes of disclosure as we have seen in our discussion of *Plato’s Sophist*. Thus, constant presence belongs to being of beings and already involves Dasein insofar as it is through Dasein beings are encountered in their being. This is truth as disclosure and explains our first criterion in *Plato’s Sophist*, that is, how what is disclosed determines the corresponding mode of disclosure. However, we are also concerned with the preservation of ἀρχή in each disclosure because that which primarily leads us is not this or that present thing but *present as present* (beings in their being). Thus, when Greeks ask ‘what are beings’, they do not mean the totality of existing beings but they mean being of beings, or “what a being is when it is, despite the fact that there is no necessity for it to be”¹⁰⁹ so that ἀρχή, what always already is, is preserved. Beings never give up constantly presenting themselves; and respectively Dasein, in each case, is called, not because it reflects on each situation, but because it is already open. This explains truth of beings when there is no necessity for them to be. There is truth not only because beings are encountered, but also for the reason that their being is awakened through the already openness of Dasein. This already openness refers to a simple fact; *beings are* in such a way that they *really* are. What kind of truth is this?

Although it seems that there is a tautological relationship between truth and being, this tautology will be dismantled when we will see its *temporal* sense. For now, it is obvious that neither Aristotle nor Heidegger would be satisfied by simply

¹⁰⁹ Heidegger, *Essence of Human Freedom*, p. 33.

saying that ‘it is’. Aristotle already sees that the answer ‘because it is itself’ may be applied to everything and is not what we are primarily looking for. He argues in the following way;

To ask why a thing is itself is no question; when we ask the reason of a thing, the fact must first be evident; *e.g.*, that the moon suffers eclipse; and “because it is itself” is the one explanation and reason which applies to all questions such as “why is a man man?” or “why is the cultured person cultured?” (unless one were to say that each thing is indivisible from itself, and that this is what “being one” really means); but this, besides being a general answer, is a summary one. We may, however, ask when a man is an animal of such-and-such a kind. It is clear, then, that we are not asking why he who is a man is a man; therefore we are asking why A, which is predicated of B, belongs to B. (The fact that A does belong to B must be evident, for if this is not so, the question is pointless.) *E.g.*, “why does it thunder?” means “why is a noise produced in the clouds?” for the true form of question is one thing predicated in this way of another.¹¹⁰

This passage proves that for Aristotle, beings are accessible only through *legein*, that is, the question of what a being is or beings as beings are available through *apophansis* which is the predication of something of something. As we have seen, Heidegger’s main aim is to understand *apophansis* in its phenomenal sense. Is the synthesis in predication a mere formal synthesis or indicates something else? Does it refer to hermeneutical-as or to the derived and flattened out ‘as’ of predication? Heidegger believes that Aristotle sees the phenomenal sense of *apophansis* although he never gives up emphasizing on the formal-synthetic aspect of *logos*. However, the latter fact does not prevent Aristotle’s thought from being phenomenological insofar as Aristotle characterizes being-true of beings as the most proper sense of being. That is why for Aristotle, truth is not a character of thinking, but a character of beings. There is no theory of correspondence between things and images which is merely derived and levelled down form of truth. As Heidegger’s analysis shows us in *Logic* lectures, an assertion such as ‘the chalk is white’ is a derived mode of *logos* insofar as in it, we are merely concerned with the thing in question as something just there where what is phenomenological is withdrawn. The chalk is determined *as* white but ‘whiteness’ is not understood in its relation to the subject-matter itself whence it comes. In other words, ‘what-as’ of a thing does not come together with *being* of that entity but from the thing as it is just there. This shows us that predicative determination is a synthetic relation and “this synthetic relation can be isolated over against the primary function of λόγος, which is to show-something-as.

¹¹⁰ Aristotle, *Metaphysics Books I-IX*, trans. Hugh Tredennick, Harvard University Press, 2003. Book VII, 1041a

Then, when λόγος gets cut loose, so to speak, from the specific relation of the subject matter (the about-which) and the predicate (the as-what), it gets passed off as the relation of anything to anything, equivalent to formal synthesizing as such”.¹¹¹ This seems similar to Heidegger’s critique of Husserl; truth-relation cannot be understood on the basis of content-relation. Truth occurs or needs a simple mode of apprehension where the subject-matter (Sache selbst) is directly included, not ignored for the benefit of a functioning logic which may be applied to everything in the same way. If philosophy is not a logistics, to speak with Heideggerian terms, this is due to the fact that it is responsible for interpreting synthesis in depth taking it into account not as a function but as a fact, as Aristotle says above.

Thus, synthesis in *apophansis* should be understood with regard to the hermeneutical structure of showing-as. In predication, before the synthesis of predicate with the subject, there is a primordial unity of the being with itself so that it is *what* it is. Heidegger describes this in the following way:

When, in what we have characterized as a statement, we indicate and determine something as something, the being does indeed come to light. What is present is indicated as something, in such a way that the *what* as-which the being is shown “lies” there in that being (cf. κείμενον-κείται [“lying there-to lie there”]). That is, the *thing*, the statement’s subject matter, is brought together as something that lies together. The being is understood as something lying-there-together. But that means that the being is characterized on the basis of the σύν- of σύνθεσις.¹¹²

First of all, this quotation reminds us again that what is *indicated* in a statement is the being *as* being, the chalk as chalk so that *what* of a being lies there. This showing-as in that level may be understood as corresponding to different modes of ἀληθεύειν that we examined through *Plato’s Sophist*. However, we were looking for a primordial sense of truth which precedes all modes of ἀληθεύειν, which Heidegger finds in *Metaphysics Θ 10*. Could we understand this mode of truth through what Aristotle points out in above quotation in parenthetical way, when he says that ‘unless one were to say that each thing is indivisible from itself, and that this is what “being one” really means’. Is Heidegger looking for the meaning of ‘being one’? There is no doubt for this and it is obvious that ‘being one’ implies indivisibility from itself. But, what does it mean to say that a being is still divisible through

¹¹¹ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 135.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 138

ἀληθεύειν? This means that, as Heidegger notices at the end of the quotation, the being is understood on the basis of a primordial synthesis. Its *what* is brought together, that is, it is seen in a seeing, which is the genuine sense of ἐνέργεια for Aristotle who says that “where there is no other result besides actualization, the actualization resides in the subject; e.g. seeing in the seer, and speculation in the speculator, and life in the soul”¹¹³ However, seeing of the *what* by a seer should be grounded with regard to the sense of being/appearing. We know that for Greeks, being means constant presence in such a way that proper beings exclude all not-yet, which means that their absence is not reduced to non-being. However, when we say that ‘the chalk is white’, this so-and-so-being is open to a not-yet or no-longer in a way our statement may turn out to be false at random. In the case of the chalk in its materiality, although its *what* seems to be constantly together with the thing, insofar as it involves *what* cannot belong to it, e.g. ‘deceitfulness’, it still implies divisibility. In all of this cases, divisibility means that not-yet and no-longer is understood on the basis of a present thing whose presence is *already* meant. Heidegger, in the *Essence of Human Freedom*, describes this situation as distortion or untruth and in *Logic* lectures as falsity. Then, why is it distortion? Because, philosophy is never concerned with this or that present thing, but the present as present; something in its pure possibility of being a ‘*what*’. Thus, Heidegger tries to lead us back to a level of pure possibilization. Indeed, the chalk is only ‘*what* it is *when* it is’. There is a moment of temporality here that we are still not captured. But we could grasp that the chalk is *what* it is as a possibility. We could never say that ‘yes, the chalk, that it is’; our saying ‘that it is’ is always bounded by an openness to being to say about being, otherwise there would not be language at all. The ‘*what*’ of a thing should bring its own distance in each case so that it could be *as* it is. This is why for Aristotle, actualization is ‘where there is no other result besides actualization’, that is, when actualization is made necessary by the being of beings, when it is not destroyed by something else; when the other becomes *its* other, which is potentiality. Then, for Aristotle, to ask the cause of unity of potential and actual is “to ask the cause of unity in general; for each individual thing is one, and the potential and the actual are in a sense one. Thus, there is no cause other than whatever initiates the development from

¹¹³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics Books I-IX*, Book IX, 1050a35

potentiality to actuality”.¹¹⁴ And we know that Heidegger asks the question of that unity in general, not its cause but its *how* insofar as it is its *how* that is the genuine subject-matter.

Heidegger maintains that for Aristotle, what is one is the individual thing. In *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, he says that “where we have the *ἓν*, there we also find the *ὅν*”.¹¹⁵ Although Aristotle, in *Metaphysics* Θ 10, discusses truth and falsity with regard to composite and simple beings, as we shall see, the core of the discussion is about unity or oneness which is the basic character of all beings and indeed this is what Greeks means when they say that being is constant presence. As we have seen, primarily, a being is nothing but a synthesis with itself and now we are concerned with its relation to the phenomenological synthesis in *apophansis*. On the one hand, such a synthesis involves distortion or falsity. However, we know that something is still *one* even if it presents itself as something else. We are oriented to its oneness even in our unexpressed false assertions. In a dark forest, when we see *something* as a deer, which is actually a bush, it is evident that our unexpressed statement ‘it is a deer’ is false and for Heidegger, this proves the prior having of *something*. The latter is what Aristotle, in *Metaphysics* Θ 10, calls *ἁσύνθετα* (simple or non-synthetic beings) whereas each uncovering (truth) and covering-over (falsity) refers to synthesis. We always have something as something, but before something is had as something even in falsity, we are guided by the fact that it is simply with itself. Heidegger describes this in the following way:

For a being is to be disguised, and for the disguising to result in a mistake (a wrong understanding of the being in question), the being must be intended at some point. There must be a tendency to uncover, a specific tendency directed toward the being. But a being can be disguised only insofar as something can be synthesized with the being *as* something. Given that “something”, the being can be seen and determined-as, and deception means alleging and pretending that something *is* something. But nothing can be synthesized with a simple being because as simple, the being stands in no need of synthesis with anything. In fact, here we have an absolute exclusion of the possibility of synthesis.¹¹⁶

Since in each synthesis, ‘as’ is indicated, prior uncoveredness of the simple already occurs. This refers to the specific tendency of Dasein to uncover and this tendency refuses all synthesis. Truth, then, means the primary relatedness of Dasein to beings

¹¹⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Books I-IX, Book VIII, 1045b

¹¹⁵ Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, p. 318.

¹¹⁶ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 155.

so that their being is now in question. Thus, oneness of the something with itself, that is, its being, reveals itself as a synthesis in its utmost possibilities in the sense that “the thing offers the possibility of synthesis, indeed demands synthesis with another being. That is, the thing must be what it is only within the unity of such a synthesis”¹¹⁷ and this leads us to the underlying unity of presence (*Vorhandenheit*). In other words, through synthesis, something is brought together with something else but this apartness proper to the apophantic revealing does not exclude oneness which properly belongs to ὁσύνθετα. And, Heidegger claims:

Compositeness is the state of being-together-with, which is possible only within the unity of a more fundamental, underling presence. The differentiation between what is present and that-as-which we encounter it (a deer) is such only within the unity of a presence that encompasses and precedes the differentiation and lets the present being appear as differentiated. The ἔν indicates a prior presence within which alone presence-together-with is possible as a mode of presence.¹¹⁸

There is an underlying presence (*Vorhandenheit*) characterized by oneness, which precedes all modes of *Vorhandenheit* such as *Vorhanden* and *Mitvorhanden*. In other words, being of synthetic beings refers to a *Vorhandenheit* ‘im Sinne des Mitvorhandenseins von etwas mit etwas in der *Einheit* eines Vorhandenen’, which is nothing but presence (*Anwesenheit*)¹¹⁹. Thus, there is not first an underlying present being whose determinations are to be defined. Rather, all differentiation becomes explicit due to this prior having-present (*Anwesendhaben*) of the about-which. This means that simple beings cannot be thought together with something else and require a direct having which Aristotle calls ὅψεϊν (touching-contact).¹²⁰ This direct mode of apprehending refers to the fact that “the relevatory tendency of an act of showing already has in view, from the outset, the subject matter of the determination; indeed, this persists throughout”.¹²¹ The subject matter/about-which (*Worüber*) of any statement is already uncovered and we can notice that we have already arrived to this conclusion in our discussion of hermeneutical-as. However, now, Heidegger, while

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 156.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 160.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 161. “presence-together of something with something in the *unity* of a present being” Cf. GA. 21, p. 191.

¹²⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Books IX, 1051b20

¹²¹ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 159.

reading Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Θ 10, tries to show one more thing: un-coveredness is the proper being of beings. This amounts to saying that between underlying presence (*Anwesenheit*) and prior uncoveredness, there is an essential connection. Once again, we should look at what happens when we have *something* directly through θιγεῖν.

The uncovering of, the unhiddenness of a being that in and of itself is not composed offers no possibility of seeing anything else in the being other than that being's own self. Such uncovering offers no possibility of focusing on something else in the being, or of showing the being in terms of something else. The being is present simply in and of itself and "as" itself.¹²²

Those are simple or proper beings; constant presence (*Vorhandenheit*). Uncovering of those beings refuses apophansis or synthesis and characterized by φάναι (addressing/simple utterance), which is a specific mode of showing. It is not possible to be deceived about simple beings; we may just have no knowledge of them (ἄγνοια). Deconcealment of the simple excludes the possibility of distortion insofar as it refers to what always already is. What is at issue is not this or that being, but their essence or ground, their ἀρχή. Then, what is the ground of beings?

It is being itself, αὐτό τὸ ὄν, the beings themselves considered purely in their being. Being does not just sometimes belong to beings and sometimes not, but belongs to them constantly and before everything else. Being as such, simplicity, unity, cannot be further analysed. Being is the simple itself, and as such it is the primary and ultimate ground of the possibility of every actual and conceivable being. That which is most simple is also that which is most proper in beings.¹²³

First of all, we should summarize Heidegger's strategy. We were searching for the possibility of being-true or being-false by examining apophansis in its genuine sense as a showing-as. After, we recognized that apophansis as showing-as requires a primordial uncoveredness of something characterized by as-structure which implies a synthesis. Synthesis signifies the emerging of the 'as' through which something is something. However, this 'as' structure already means that something is what it is in how it is, that is, through the manner of its being uncovered. This is why in *Plato's Sophist*, Heidegger insists on the respectiveness between beings as-what and their disclosure. This leads us to the crucial aspect of his analysis in the sense that truth is the primary sense of being. Different modes of disclosure refer to truth insofar as they are determined by *what is disclosed*, namely, beings. But, what are beings?

¹²² Ibid., p. 152.

¹²³ Heidegger, *Essence of Human Freedom*, p. 72.

Greeks did ask this question and we can realize that they use the word οὐσία primarily for beings that is closest to us. However, as Heidegger suggests, this does not indicate a lack rather proves that they are already guided by being and it is obvious that they could not arrive at this conclusion if they did not understand *logos* and being-human in terms of showing-as. This mode of existence has no beginning in the sense of taking a decision from outside. Their fundamental insight was that οὐσία is constant presence and this leads Greeks to consider beings in their being through which truth overwhelms. In other words, there is no way other than living in truth. Nonetheless, Heidegger's aim does not consist in announcing this trivial fact but carrying out a questioning about the primacy of the presence. What does it mean to say that οὐσία is constant presence? It means that beings needs a looking or regard in order that they are understood in their being through which truth happens. This implies that truth will be intuitional, that is, saying something includes its about-which. Is that possible? Is not experience of truth open-ended and does it not always consist of 'distortion'? Heidegger would answer in affirmative but he would say that what is at issue is not whether adequate intuition is possible or it is just an Ideal of reason as Husserl suggests. Rather, what is noteworthy is to see that truth is nothing but the fact that it occurs when sense of being is awakened. The fact that being as such cannot be exhausted implies that truth is always truth of beings and does not need to be classified. Modes of uncovering may be distorted in such a way that something white may turn into black and our statement 'it is white' becomes false. Here what is essential is not the fact that our statement becomes false but the fact that the being in question waits to be verified again in order to be true or what it is. This is why here being sometimes belongs to being and sometimes not, that is, this mode of uncovering is concerned with the being as there, not with the subject matter itself, which is the *what* of the thing. However, this distortion is not nothing and proves that the being presents itself constantly. It is important to notice that only through differentiation, something becomes a subject-matter without being a mere thing. In a sense, there is a fold between oneness and differentiation which reflects human situation in the world. In other words, it is oneness *and* differentiation insofar as *that this is so* is owned by human being whose existence promotes the fold as such.

While reading Aristotle, we are not looking for an answer but we just want to see what happens when philosophizing language or existence is guided by being. We have seen that in Aristotle's case, truth is understood as belonging to beings insofar as beings already mean being as such. To say that beings mean being as such is to say that language and truth happens through the correlation between beings and human-being given that being as such is awakened through the indicative showing-as. As Pierre Aubenque's analysis shows us, the latter is what differs Aristotle from sophists and even from Plato himself insofar as all of them understand language as 'total adherence of the word and the thing' in such a way that language is closed to itself whereas for Aristotle, due to apophantic character of logos, "proposition is therefore the privileged place where language, in any manner, exits from itself, that is to say, from simple signifying intention, to attempt to take hold of things themselves in their reciprocal liaison and by that in their existence. In modern terms, it looks like judgment is both synthesis of concepts and affirmation of this synthesis in being".¹²⁴ Language cannot be considered as a closed entity upon itself, rather it should already be outside itself if it is not an empty collection of words, that is, if it means something. Thus, we should notice that there is not only a synthesis of concepts in a language, but also affirmation of this synthesis in being. From what we have discussed in this chapter, we can conclude that in Heideggerian terms, disclosing, in each case, affirms its own synthesis. However, this affirmedness is not similar to Lotze's concept of affirmedness. In other words, given that truth is uncovering or covering-over of beings, "if λόγος is presumably able to be this possibility in a specific form of performance, then, as λόγος, it must already have a relation to beings. It is one of existence's ways of being unto the world and unto itself (as existence)—in short, being unto beings".¹²⁵ Thus, synthesis of *apophansis* which is the basis of revealing and concealing, affirms itself as a unity through the existence of Dasein, its being unto beings where truth is already there as the possibility of *logos*. This means that while Lotze's idea of affirmedness remains an

¹²⁴ Pierre Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1962. p. 111 (my translation) "la proposition est donc le lieu privilégié où le discours sort en quelque manière de lui-même, c'est-à-dire de la simple visée signifiante, pour tenter de ressaisir les choses elles-mêmes dans leur liaison réciproque et par là dans leur existence. En termes modernes, on dirait que le jugement est à la fois synthèse de concepts et affirmation de cette synthèse dans l'être"

¹²⁵ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 141.

ungrounded source of possibility of truth, affirmedness of truth is not what makes *logos* possible, rather gives us *logos* in its utmost possibility. This is another way of saying that proper being of beings is their being-true if there will be any language. Beings *are* insofar as they already are in such a way that they are possible as something encounterable. As we have seen, this is nothing but the underlying unity of a present thing and for Heidegger, such a presence requires a correlative relating which is pres-ential, *Gegenwärtigen* as a making-present.¹²⁶ This does not mean that language and being is constructed by human subjectivity but points to the fact that truth *as* truth in *being* is only possible through such an encountering. Heidegger says that “corresponding to the act of making-present or rendering present there is the presence of the thing that underlies and fulfills the making presence, the thing that gets uncovered and disclosed in the very act of making-present”,¹²⁷ and as we can recognize here, fulfillment acquires its original sense as an affirmation of language itself, which occurs as truth. Being of beings fulfills itself by fulfilling truth of beings. Even though complete uncoveredness of something is not possible, only presence of a present being is completely uncovered through the pure act of making-present so that “the thing to be uncovered is brought into pure, direct nearness”.¹²⁸ As we have seen through the simple beings of Aristotle, this pure and direct nearness excludes all not-yet and no-longer and makes us see that it is a kind of nearness which implies a certain distance because otherwise we could not say that being-true belongs to beings. In other words, to say that beings already are true is to say that their being is already awakened and this is possible only if beings are understood as beings. For Heidegger, this refers to existence of human-being who finds himself in the situation of *logos*. And insofar as existence of human being as a making-present is correlative to language of being, we need to reconsider human-being from the standpoint of where it already belongs, that is, through the light of being.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 162.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

2.4. On the facticity of being

For Greeks, where there is speech (*logos*), there we find truth (unhiddenness). Then, truth refers to the in-between (*Dasein*) of the world and human-being. Here, we should remind ourselves what we have discussed in our first section while analyzing Husserl's theory of logic. Our discussion can be characterized as a description of an effort which consists in determining truth as the proper object of logic. Husserl's reconsideration of intentionality helped him to gap the bridge between ideal and real in order to clarify the being of what is true. Husserl is, more than anyone else, aware of the fact that logic means saying something about something, that is, in speech, what is spoken about is brought to the fore; it is revealed. Thus, as Heidegger insists, logic should not primarily be concerned with the formal structure of propositions but with the revealing and showing itself. However, the reason why Husserl cannot save himself from the propositional attitude lies in his so-called presuppositionless attitude which leads him to perform the biggest presupposition by taking his point of departure from reality. As a consequence, consciousness becomes a being next to other beings. However, we are looking for a correlation, which implies nearness with its own distance. We are not demanding for a consciousness which will take in all beings, which is not possible. This is not possible because being is not something to be decided either on the side of the subject or on the side of the object. Then, does Husserl decide over being? For Husserl, something *is* insofar as it is *seen*. The relationship between being and what is seen is given to us through either sensual or categorial intuition. However, the first thing that we should consider is not the relationship between being and what is seen, but that relationship between seeing and what is seen, whose ground is nothing but being as such. This is why Heidegger, following Aristotle, insists on the showing or indicating character of *logos*. The latter always means that something is what it is when it is. This already refers to the identity of what is meant with what is intuited that which leads Husserl to understand truth in terms of propositions. Although this urge itself is phenomenological, what is more phenomenological is to see that this identity, this 'just-as' structure already belongs to *logos* as such. As we have seen, Heidegger discussed this aspect of *logos* in terms of hermeneutic-as in its relation to Aristotelian *apophansis* and this analysis eliminates formal structure of proposition from being the bearer of truth. It is

essential to remember that for Husserl, expression is understood as the ex-pressing of intuition. Contrary to that, Heidegger equates the level of expression with *logos*, that is, there is nothing to be expressed; we live in an expressed world. This helps us to understand how seeing is essentially determined by what is seen, not the reverse. Both belong together as calling for each other insofar as this is what *logos* means.

Truth belongs to beings in such a way that beings show themselves from themselves. This requires that beings are encountered within the proper relationship to them. This does not indicate this or that mode of comportment but the being-unto-beings as such, being-directed to beings. With regard to our first section, this refers to what Heidegger was searching for as the general structure of the perceived in its perceivedness. According to Heidegger, this structure is more evident in Aristotle than it is in Husserl who still understands truth in terms of content-relation of propositions. What we have seen up to this point has just a negative result: truth does not belong to thinking. In order to grasp that truth resides in beings, we should show that truth needs a *there* to be open up. As we have seen, simple beings are simply true in such a way that their truth *indicates* a possible way of being which looks at them. Dasein is a possibility in order that truth is completed and its possibility is grounded. And it is interesting to notice that this corresponds to the way Aristotle interprets actualization as that which is what it is when it is completed, when there is nothing outside. In other words, true sense of showing reveals itself when it *has been seen*. For Heidegger, Aristotle was the first who interprets *logos* in this specific sense. Contrary to Plato, as it is well-known, for Aristotle, being or εἶδος does not belong to super-celestial realm separated from individual entities but it is primarily *this-here*. Even though traditionally, Aristotle's philosophy, compared to Plato's, is considered as involved with concrete facts rather than abstract things, as Jean Beaufret suggests, "Aristotle has neither more nor less taste for the concrete or for the abstract than Plato. Between them, there is no opposition of 'tendencies'. Aristotle limited himself to following the λόγος more faithfully, scrupulously, and farther than Plato".¹²⁹ Aristotle was also concerned with εἶδος or what a being is but he also recognized that εἶδος cannot be οὐσία in the most proper sense insofar as it can be still predicated of a subject. Then, οὐσία should be *that which cannot be*

¹²⁹ Jean Beaufret, *Dialogue with Heidegger, Greek Philosophy*, trans. Mark Sinclair, Bloomington, IN : Indiana University Press, 2006. p. 84.

predicated of something else. This opens the way, for Aristotle, to the primacy of *this-here*. But, again, we should emphasize that primacy of *this-here* does not abolish the importance of εἶδος, rather the first enforces the latter. How? And how is it related to our subject-matter, truth as the most proper being of beings? Indeed, what we have discussed in terms of as-structure and its relation to the synthesis of apophansis has already made clear that something is already uncovered *as* something, through which it is *what it is*. In other words, this-here is always a *this-here as...* which means that εἶδος is already there. This happens due to the fact that being is understood as presence. The latter refers both to what is present and presence of the present. Otherwise put, what is present implies its presence in the sense that each *this-here* comes with the εἶδος. As Beaufret says, for Aristotle, this means that “the most immediate manner to be in the presence of something, namely, αἴσθησις, is already in itself, τοῦ καθόλου. It brings us ‘into the presence of the universal’; we see the man named Callias advance toward us *as* a man, far from seeing only Callias”.¹³⁰ For Aristotle, individual is always said of a universal. And Aristotle is one step beyond Plato insofar as he interprets universal where it emerges giving its ground. Since this emerging belongs to language which is a showing something as something and since this showing is the most immediate way of being-human, his greatest insight consists in understanding human-being as belonging to language. And, for Heidegger, this is the genuine sense of saying ‘ζῶον λόγον ἔχον’.

As we have seen, for Plato, λόγος is λόγος τινός; saying something: Callias is a man. For Aristotle, λόγος is λέγειν τι κατά τίνος; saying something of something: Callias as...Leibniz would say that Callias is a man, a man is a two-legged animal, an animal is...and *ad infinitum*. However, for Aristotle, what matters is not searching for the inclusion of the predicate in the subject which is primary. Rather, what we should see is that what is present before us (Callias or number 3) *presences* in its possibility as it is. Callias may be this or that, but only in language, *as* this or that. If something is present, its way to be present is already cleared insofar as each being bears with itself this fold of coming into presence. A being may be or not but this belongs to the essence of presence due to the fact that presence *is* when it has been seen. The book may be white or red or it may disappear but the deeper fact is that it is always what it

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 81.

is because *its what* (εἶδος) is already implied insofar as it is (this-here). Since, for Aristotle, this is the origination of language, this difference should be owned by a seeing which sees beings in their immediate presenting of themselves. This refers to our immediate way of seeing, namely, αἴσθησις, which is, as the correlative of the difference, always already τοῦ καθόλου; universal. This amounts to saying that truth as the proper being of beings is already truth of perception. In other words, as we have learned from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Θ, if beings are primarily characterized by their being-true, which is their being-uncovered, this means that beings are looked at from their hiddenness, that is, they are not this or that but they *simply are*, which means that they are nothing determinate but something in its absence. Now, we should pose a question that we did not ask in our preceding section: how could we understand simple and incomposite beings with respect to synthesis in apophansis? As we have seen, apophantic sense of synthesis is best understood when we analyze falsity through which being's with itself, its being one is brought to the fore. In other words, falsity is possible insofar as we take something as something and this is possible due to the prior having of something. This direct mode of touching to the being refers to the underlying presence from which differentiation of 'as' occurs. Oneness and differentiation are intertwined because oneness not only underlies differentiation, it is also appropriated by it in each case. If something *simply* is, we should know that "something *is* only when it is determined. Something appears only when λέγειν functions as διαλέγεσθαι, and not just as φάναι".¹³¹ It is not through a mere addressing that something is, but δια, along with another thing. On the other hand, it is obvious that we could never know red by means of the relations of other colors. We need to have red before ourselves in order to say what it is. However, we know that for Aristotle, what we have before ourselves, what lies there is the being in its being. Then, being-one with itself belongs to beings in such a way that they are already in *being* so that oneness always implies to be open to differentiation. This is for Heidegger, what we find in Aristotle and explains why οὐσία means both beings and being. This also shows us why for Aristotle, αἴσθησις is always τοῦ καθόλου in the sense that something is always something-as. However, Heidegger moves one step beyond and asks how and why proper sense of being shows itself through

¹³¹ Heidegger, *Logic*, p. 156.

διαλέγεσθαι. Or, does it already belong to being to be said in that way? Then, genuine question is nothing but ‘what does it mean to say *being*?’ as long as we know that beings are said in many ways.

First of all, we should remember that for Heidegger, in Aristotle, we may find two kinds of synthesis in an assertion; one belonging to the formal structure of predication in the sense that ‘is’ will be a mere copula, and the other refers to apophantic synthesis when we emphasize on the showing and indicating character of assertion so that assertion can be understood with respect to its about-which, that is, in its origin for being-true or being-false. The latter leads us to think the about-which of an assertion as *something*, in its prior being-true, as always one with-itself as a primordial *presencing*. If we regard a being in its self, and if this being-one itself already implies being-taken-apart, then we should see that we do not deal with a being which is just there, but a being in its thereness. However in αἴσθησις, we have the particular thing, namely, καθ’ἑκαστον. Heidegger, in *Plato’s Sophist*, discusses the relationship between καθόλου and καθ’ἑκαστον and describes this distinction by means of the corresponding distinction between λόγος and αἴσθησις by saying that:

The καθόλου is a determinate ὅλον; its distinctive feature derives from the fact that its Being is determined by accessibility in λόγος: it is a ὅλον λεγόμενον. The καθόλου can never be uncovered by an αἴσθησις, which is limited to mere visual appearance. In order to grasp the καθόλου I have to speak, address something as something.

As ὅλον, καθόλου implies the full presence of a being, that is, completeness. On the other hand, καθ’ἑκαστον is what we straightforwardly have before ourselves; it is in relation to us and has little with being. Thus, καθόλου gives beings on their own, in its completeness. Nevertheless, as Heidegger notices, Aristotle in *Metaphysics Z*, suggests that we should depart from the particular to the universal¹³² because, even if it is straightforwardly, we are familiar with the particular. We should not ignore this starting point rather we should appropriate it. Heidegger compares this with what in *Physics*, Aristotle suggests in the opposite way: from the universal to the particular. Aristotle says that

Now what is to us plain and clear at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from

¹³² Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book VII, 3 1029b9

universals to particulars; for it is a whole that is more knowable to sense-perception, and a universal is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts.¹³³

According to Heidegger, Aristotle wants us to see that what is more familiar to us is not what is more knowable by nature. Although both καθ'ἑκαστον and καθόλου belongs to αἴσθησις, they may be found in it in different senses. In order to grasp this difference, we should consider them again with respect to each other. We know that universal refers to the whole, completeness or totality. What about the particular? In a particular, all parts are mingled together and particular is characterized as what is unseparated, unarticulated, that is, συγκεχυμένα. The particular is not in its being until its parts are brought to the fore. On the other hand, unseparated and intermingled particular already implies whole, namely, universal. Thus, Aristotle's claim in *Physics* is not contradictory to his claim in *Metaphysics* insofar as he tries to show that αἴσθησις is already τοῦ καθόλου. The parts and elements which are implicitly there in particular are taken apart in discourse so that particular can be delimited, or completed. According to Heidegger, against its traditional translation, in Aristotle's philosophy, this delimitation, which is called ὁρισμός by Aristotle, does not primarily mean definition but refers to the fact that individual determinations of a being is delimited in a sense that a being is understood in its limitedness, in its being. When ὁρισμός does not take place, a particular is not a being insofar as nothing is said about it in its completeness. Although it implies the whole, its ἀρχαί, its reasons are not yet delimited. Insofar as the particular is what is close to us, it seems that we begin with it. On the other hand, when we realize that the particular implies the whole and without universal, it is not what it is, it is evident that we begin with the universal. Indeed, we should say that we have already begun with the universal and we should give an account of this by appropriating universal in particular so that particular is appropriated too. Heidegger summarizes this in the following way:

It is necessary to press on, from what is in a single case initially most familiar, to the ἀρχή and to appropriate the ἀρχή in such a way that from this appropriation there takes place a genuine appropriation of the καθ'ἑκαστον and so that the transparency of the procedure itself is gained and the καθ'ἑκαστον is understood on the basis of the ἀρχή.¹³⁴

¹³³ Aristotle, 'Physics', in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. I. ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1984. Book I, I 184a22

¹³⁴ Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, p. 62.

For Aristotle, as we have seen, primary οὐσία is this-here, namely, the particular. In other words, it is what is there; present. Otherwise, λόγος would not be possible in its being-true or being-false because everything would be said about everything without *limit* as it is the case with sophists. However, what is at stake is not to determine this or that as being but to show that being is the ground of saying being. This could only be possible if being is present-there in such a way that being is understood as thereness. And, we know that the most immediate way of being-present or being-there is sense-perception. However, since beings are already in being, sense-perception is always categorial, which means that what we have is always less than what we *can* see. There is an excess and this excess comes from being, not from us. Rather, being-human originates from this excess.

Heidegger, in the *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, analyzes οὐσία in depth and its fundamental characteristics. Related to our topic, we can see that his elaboration of οὐσία is more detailed and acquired its original sense. As we have remarked before, οὐσία for Greeks, has a customary meaning which refers to property, possessions and household. Heidegger now emphasizes that this customary meaning co-intends the terminological meaning in the sense that οὐσία refers to a being which is always designated ‘in the how of its being’. These *definite beings* which are *genuine beings* for Greeks have a *there-character*. Then, a more comprehensive description of οὐσία is the following:

Οὐσία is a being that is *there for me in an emphatic way*, in such a way that I can use it, that it is at my disposal. It is that being with which I have to do in an everyday way, that is there in my everyday dealings with the world, as well as when I engage in science. It is a privileged, fundamental being considered in its being, in the how of its being, and in the customary meaning the how of being is co-intended. The how of being refers to *being there in the manner of being-available*.¹³⁵

Οὐσία means being-there in a twofold sense: *beings* in the how of their being and the *how of being* of beings. In its customary meaning, ousia is what is available at hand, that is, what is there. This refers to the fact that *beings are* always in the how of their being. The latter is co-intended as the terminological sense of ousia and it means being is thereness in such a way that ousia just means *being-there*. Thus, we should not deduce the second from the first, but we need to find the terminological sense of ousia in its the customary use insofar as for Aristotle, remaining true to the

¹³⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 2009. p. 19.

customary meaning of οὐσία as just being-there or there-character of beings, being of beings is not indifferent to beings. This becomes visible when we notice that as Heidegger insists, for Aristotle, beings first show themselves in σώματα, which should not be translated as corporeality but as obtrusiveness and self-evidence of a being in such a way that σῶμα later means ‘slave’, ‘prisoner’, that which is at my disposal. Being investigation begins with beings as they show themselves within this natural mode and this is why for Aristotle, being of beings belongs to αἰσθησις and οὐσία, for Greeks, primarily means that which is perceived in its perceivedness. This already implies the sense of there and Heidegger points to Book V of Metaphysics where Aristotle inquires into the being-characters of σώματα, which will give us beings in their being-there. We find five being-characters, which are ὑποκείμενον; ‘that which lies there in advance’, αἴτιον ἐνυπάρχον; ‘that which is also at hand therein’, μόριον ἐνυπάρχον; ‘that which constitutes the possible being of something’, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ‘what-being as it was already’ and εἶδος; ‘that which is seen, sighted’. Heidegger, throughout all his life, will never give up thinking those concepts. But, three of them will dominate his thinking, namely, ὑποκείμενον, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι and εἶδος. He points to the meaning of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι and against its traditional translations as essence, he gives us a more originary definition:

Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is a character of being, specifically that character on the basis of which λόγος as ὁρισμός addresses beings...It refers to ‘being’, that is, ‘the what-being as it was already’. It means a being in itself, that is, with respect to what it was already, from which it stems in its being, with respect to its *descent*, its having come into being there. Therefore, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is the ‘being of a particular’, which is not ‘everything’, or even ‘what is singular’ or ‘what is individual’.¹³⁶

Then, we learn that τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι implies both ὁρισμός and καθ’ἑκάστον. We have already discussed their relationship. Unarticulated particular needs to be articulated by being delimited to its possible determinations thereby its unseparated parts are taken apart. But, this does not explain why being is primarily understood by particulars, in a natural mode. Heidegger examines four being-characters in order to see whether this customary meaning speaks in them. This means that we are looking for there-character of beings until we see that there is no other way except their being in the way they are. Does this not mean that we presuppose *what* beings are? We do not presuppose what-being because any whatness or definition becomes possible

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 23.

through our use of things; “we know *what* it is *for*, and thus we represent something general to ourselves. We who know the use that one could make of it have the concept of house”.¹³⁷ This is what οὐσία means as being-there in the manner of being-available; οὐσία as what we see immediately. However, now, for Heidegger, it is obvious that we do not only see a particular in an immediate way, but also this immediateness and self-evidence of particular implies a thereness in such a way that “it is so self-evidently there that I see beyond it; I do not notice it”.¹³⁸ Thus, we have particular *as what it was already*. We already see what-being in our having of a particular. We do not notice this or that being as present, and this not noticing gives us the self-evident way that we immediately find ourselves. Since this self-evidence includes thereness, a particular only becomes present from a distance; “ἐκάστου means ‘what is particular’ insofar as I linger with it, insofar as I see it at a certain distance”¹³⁹; a distance that a being needs in order to be or not. In order to grasp this point, we should remember our previous discussion on being-true of beings. We have seen that proper *being* of beings is their being-true, which means that their primary uncoveredness; their being calls for a seeing and now we can see that this is so because being means being-there, which can be best seen in terms of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. This amounts to saying that being of beings are always ‘has been’ for us because we are called by truth, not created it. This temporality refers to the sense of being-human. This is true sense of θιγγεῖν (touching-contact) where truth is not made up from outside but understood within being. This happening refers to the fact that a being is *limited* to its being in such a way that it is καθ’ἐκάστων. Thus,

I see a being that is there with respect to its being, in the way that it is there as *coming from out of*...I see a being that is there genuinely in its being when I see it in its *history*, the being that is there in this way coming from out of history into being. This being that is there, as there in this way, is *complete*; it has come to its *end*, to its *completeness* just as the house is complete in its εἶδος as ποιούμενον.¹⁴⁰

Being-there has two fundamental senses: being-present and being-complete. We have already discussed being-present in its relation to being-true. Now, we can see

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 27.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 26.

that this relation becomes more evident by discovering being as being-there which is given through being-complete. In other words, a being that is there is complete in such a way that its being is there so that we could say that it is present. This corresponds to what ὁρισμός is, which is not a formal definition, but a being-character which points to the *entry into being*. We are not merely considering beings because it is impossible to say that there is a being without considering its being. In other words, to say that something *is* is to say that it is *in being*. Underlying presence of what is there implies its completeness, its coming into being; it comes into unhiddenness from hiddenness. This refers to the fact that the question ‘what are beings’ does not consist in a classification of beings. Insofar as beings are always in being and understood in their thereness, being is already at work.

According to Heidegger, this refers to a definite mode of speaking to the world which Greeks lived through without noticing it. Being is not a determinate thing which is there and then understood by human-being. Rather, it is because Greeks understood being as thereness that they have the λόγος. In other words, since Greeks understood being in terms of limit (πέρας) which is revealed through ὁρισμός, for them, speaking always refers to the being-in-the world in the following sense:

The ὁρισμός is a λόγος, a *definite being-in-the-world*, which meets with the world that is there in its genuine there character, that addresses it in its genuine being. We have a concrete reference to that place where the genuinely indigenous character of the concept is to be sought. Conceptuality is no arbitrary matter, but rather an *issue of being-there* in a decisive sense, *insofar as it has resolved to speak radically to the world—to question and to research*.¹⁴¹

Basic concepts of Aristotelian philosophy, those we have discussed up to now, namely, οὐσία, εἶδος, ὁρισμός, λόγος, etc. are not the tools of a theoretical endeavour; rather, those concepts indicate a radical speaking to the world in such a way that being is always already understood. And this becomes possible since Greeks understand world in its being-there, as completed “that is to say, insofar as humanity lives in a world, and the world is overarched by οὐρανός, ‘heaven’, insofar as the world is οὐρανός, which is enclosed within itself and is completed in itself”.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁴² Ibid.

As we have seen, in our daily life, we are familiar with the particular which provides us with the proper distance in order to see a being in its being. This is why self-evidence of everyday life is an indication of there-character of the world. Thus, Aristotle begins with the particular not because he is more concerned with the concrete, but because it is the particular and its self-evidence that make possible the necessary distance for being to be searched, if we are not looking for a determinate being which would be exemplary for all but being in its question worthiness, that is, as there-ness, which is the basic character of being. If Aristotle has a special importance for Heidegger, this is due to the fact that he is the first philosopher who thinks λόγος from such a distance in order to save λόγος in its character of being-true or being-false.

Recapitulating what we have discussed up to now, we should say that being is always being-understood. This was discussed in terms of hermeneutical-as while we were analyzing being-true or being-false. This prior having of *something* refers to the letting something encounter us. This prior uncoveredness of something is what most properly belongs to beings, that is, it is their being-true in the most proper sense in the sense that being is always there. The latter point becomes clear when we analyze beings in terms of being-character, which is being-there of being. Being-there of being reaches its ultimate sense when we see that it is through ὁρισμός that beings are first articulated from the distance proper to them. This is the only way beings are understood *as* beings in such a way that their what *is* always already. Thus, beings are always in the mode of entry into being, that is, they may be or not. This belongs to their what. However, since λόγος is only possible through such a possibility, what-being as it was already does not indicate a lack, rather it indicates a situation where being is owned by Dasein. As we have seen, the prior uncoveredness of something rejects synthesis; it is not this or that being with its possible determinations. It indicates being in the mode of being, from absence to presence, which is truth in the proper sense. Now, we can see that this refers to being-there of being or better, being-there as such, which points to a situation of truth as the condition of any synthesis. We also know that being-there of being speaks in being that is there. Why is that important? Although we have said that underlying presence of something requires the making-present of Dasein, we did not actually understand why. After we

have discussed being-true as the most proper being of beings, we were closer to see that being-present of beings does not only refer to this or that comportment, but to *being-unto-beings as such*. And, now, following the discussion of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι and ὁρισμός, we can realize that *radical speaking to the world* belongs to Dasein (being-there). This becomes possible when beings are understood with regard to their *there-character*; coming into being from its history as a descent, a being is limited in its being. This tells us that what we self-evidently have, οὐσία in its customary sense, already implies a definite meaning and understanding of being. Since λόγος springs from this split of οὐσία, Dasein becomes the place where this truth happens. If speaking of beings points to an understanding of being, this understanding should speak for itself from where it originates, which is nothing but being of Dasein. In other words, we do not first determine this or that as beings, and then look for being in its possible sense. Rather, calling something being occurs with the understanding of being although the latter is not noticed. The more self-evidently we live in the world, the more being is *there*. All that which belong to beings in a self-evident way, their presence, their truth, their completeness, gives being insofar as οὐσία means *beings* in the how of their being. Thus, what is at issue is being-there, not only of being, but *of beings*. If there were no being that is there, we could not think of being of beings. For now, we should see that being is not a being behind everything else; it is given insofar as beings are there, that is, insofar as beings are seen in their being. Since οὐσία refers to being-there, this there-character (Dasein) is assigned to itself in such a way that being is already understood. This understanding requires questioning of itself as its own being because what is understood is not beings, but being as being-there (Dasein) as such. This is the phenomenon itself and Dasein is being-drawn into this situation by preserving it.

And, this is why for Heidegger, being of beings, from now until *Kehre*, will be understood on the basis of being of Dasein. However, in order that being of Dasein *is* being of beings in such a way that being is *transitive*, that is, factual, beings should be encountered in such a way that their being is there. For now, we do not know whether this is the case or possible at all. In other words, we should ask: does the distance created in the in-between of Dasein give us the nearness proper to being in its claiming itself as the being *of beings* in such a way that being of being-

there gains its question-worthiness? Are being-characters such as being-present, being-true and being-complete also characters of beings? At first look, it seems that they are not. When we consider the particular, which is determined by those being-characters, we see that as Heidegger admits, “what is particular is precisely not what is seen initially and directly, but is accessible only when I take a certain distance from it, and it presents itself to me in this way at this distance”.¹⁴³ But, should it not be the case that beings in everydayness already present themselves from such a distance? Is ‘taking a distance’ a wishful decision as epoché? And if this is so, does this not mean that Dasein is a being as a part of beings that are there? If this is so, there will be no questioning of being-there because there will be no space for beings in their being, but just beings. Which sense of being will justify the claim that Dasein is the in-between for *being* of beings and *beings* in their being in such a way that it always remains the in-between? Without answering those questions, we can now see that Heidegger will take up being in its there-character, namely, Dasein as the fundamental object of philosophical research.

As we have mentioned above, Heidegger describes the transivity of being and beings (being-there) in terms of facticity or factual life through which Dasein becomes the sole object for and in itself. Heidegger takes up this issue in his early work entitled ‘*Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle, An Indication of Hermeneutical Situation*’. In that work, he has twofold task; as the title tells us, what is at issue is the factual life of Dasein as a bringing together of ontology and logic. However, this will become possible only if we search for the origin of ontology and logic, again, through Aristotle. First, to say that Dasein is factual is to say that being is factual, that is, it is always there. Due to its factual character, being is not a universal but a mode of questioning or research which belongs to Dasein whose *how* of being is grounded in this questioning. As Heidegger clarifies in his lecture-course *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity*,

“Facticity” is the designation we will use for the character of the being of “our” “own” Dasein. More precisely, this expression means: *in each case* “this” Dasein in its being-there *for a while at the particular time* (the phenomenon of the “awhileness” of temporal particularity, c.f. “whiling,” tarrying for a while, not running away, being-*there*-at-home-in ... ,being-*there*-involved-in ... , the being-there of Dasein) insofar as it is, in the character of its being, “*there*” *in the manner of be-ing*. Being-there *in the manner of be-ing* means: not, and never, to be there primarily as an object of intuition and definition on the basis of intuition, as

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 24

an *object* of which we merely take cognizance and have knowledge. Rather, Dasein is *there* for itself in the "how" of its ownmost being. The how of its being opens up and circumscribes the respective "there" which is possible for a while at the particular time. Being-transitive: to be factual life! Being is itself never the possible object of a having, since what is at issue in it, what it comes to, is itself: *being*.¹⁴⁴

Facticity or the transivity of being means that being is not an object for an understanding and this is why it is being-there for a while as a particular time as itself, not running beforehand. Rather, it is in each case its there in the sense that what is at issue is Da-sein; 'being-there in the manner of being' (*Seinsmäßig dasein*). This amounts to saying that categories of being are the categories of factual life of Dasein, which will be called *existentials* in *Being and Time*. Since with beings, being is already addressed, being of Dasein is also addressed and interpreted in the factual life of Dasein and for Heidegger, this ontology that considers Dasein as its sole object should be named as 'fundamental ontology' and respectively 'logic' will have a new sense as "the interpretation [*Interpretation*] of the categories of this addressing and interpreting [*Auslegen*]"'.¹⁴⁵ Although it seems that problem of logic and ontology is transposed to the factual life of Dasein, our aim is to show that what is transposed is nothing but being into its question-worthiness as meaning as such.

If being has a transitive sense as facticity, this means that it overwhelms beings and nevertheless it speaks in beings. In its overwhelming, being possibilizes understanding, not any kind of understanding but an understanding which is a philosophical questioning insofar as it originates from being. For Heidegger, this questioning can only be carried out through questioning, at work from within being. This means that "the object of philosophical research is human Dasein insofar as it is interrogated with respect to the character of its being. This basic direction of

¹⁴⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. John van Buren, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1999. p. 5. "Faktizität ist die Bezeichnung für den Seinscharakter 'unseres' 'eigenen' Daseins. Genauer bedeutet der Ausdruck: jeweilig dieses Dasein (Phänomen der Jeweiligkeit; vgl. Verweilen, Nichtweglaufen, Da-bei-, Da-sein), sofern es seinsmäßig in seinem Seinscharakter 'da' ist. Seinsmäßigdasein besagt: nicht und nie primär als *Gegenstand* der Anschauung und anschaulicher Bestimmung, der bloßen Kenntnissnahme und Kenntnissabe von ihm, sondern Dasein ist ihm selbst *da* im Wie seines eigensten Seins. Das Wie des Seins öffnet und umgrenzt das jeweils mögliche 'da'. Sein — transitiv: das faktische Leben sein! Sein selbst nie möglicher Gegenstand eines Habens, sofern es auf es selbst, das *Sein*, ankommt. (*Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, GA. 63, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988. p. 8.)

¹⁴⁵ Martin Heidegger, 'Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation', in *Supplements*, ed. and trans. John van Buren, Albany : State University of New York Press, 2002. p. 121.

philosophical questioning is not externally added and attached to the interrogated object, factual life. Rather, it needs to be understood as an explicit taking up of a basic movement of factual life”.¹⁴⁶ In its facticity, life always cares for being even if it is inclined to fallenness. Indeed, for Heidegger, the fact that life tries to make itself easy for itself shows that essentially it finds itself difficult or hard to bear, which means that it cares for itself. Accordingly, understanding which belongs to factual life cannot be an improvement of itself; because there is not a lack of itself, but rather it is always already with its world as with itself. In that way, factual life is not an indifferent process, but makes itself own by itself as itself. In other words, “the basic sense of the movement of factual life is *caring (curare)*. Life’s ‘being out for something’ in which it is directed toward and cares about it is such that the toward-which of this care, namely, its historically particular world, also is there”.¹⁴⁷ Thus, factual life always keeps working on itself as its own being due to its having-been-interpreted from being and this unfolding of itself from itself is its temporalization as an *hermeneutic situation* where present speaks from out of past. Thus, the inauthenticity, self-evident way that being *has been interpreted* is the departing point in order to appropriate the original possibilities or sources. Accordingly, understanding of factual life is a repeating of the past in an original thought evoking sense, as *destruction* whereby our ‘own’ present becomes questionable. Heidegger writes:

What we have not interpreted and brought to expression in an original manner amounts to something we do not truly have in an authentic safekeeping of it. And it is factual life itself (i.e., also the possibility of existence found in it) that needs to be taken up into, temporalized by, and unfolded in this true safekeeping. Thus, if this life relinquishes the originality of interpretation, it relinquishes the possibility of ever coming into possession of itself in a radical sense, i.e., the possibility of radically *be-ing* [zu sein] itself.¹⁴⁸

As we can see, in this early text, Heidegger paves the way for his major work *Being and Time* by introducing some primary terminology such as care, fallenness, temporality or existence. Moreover, in his understanding of facticity as a coming into possession of itself, as *Sein* in its most radical possibility, which needs to be taken up in true safekeeping, we find the traces of *Ereignis*. It is also interesting to see that

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 113.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 115.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 124.

existence is a possibility in facticity, that is, facticity and existence are not identical. Existence is a countermotion to the fallenness or a worry of life as Heidegger calls it and “as the worry of life about not becoming lost, this countermotion is the way the possibility of seizing upon the being of life, stirring it, and authenticating it is temporalized and unfolded”.¹⁴⁹ Existence is preservation of the facticity of being-there as questionable, not through a universal employment of reason, but destructing its own time in such a way that it is from out of itself that it speaks and therefore unfolded and temporalized. Now the question: what grants this stirring in such a way that Dasein or factual life is kept, by holding to the possibility of its failing to exist, as the sole object of philosophy? Or as Heidegger asks: “in what kind of *forehaving of being* did this object stand? Further, how was this being of the human being explicated in concepts, out of what soil did this explication arise as a phenomenon, and which categories of being grew out of what was viewed in this manner as its explicata?”¹⁵⁰

Heidegger claims that the most self-evident answer of this question lies in Aristotle’s philosophy, in that, as he finds in Aristotle, the primordial sense of being is *being-produced*.

The domain of objects supplying the primordial sense of being was the domain of those objects *produced* and put into use in dealings. Thus the toward-which this primordial experience of being aimed at was not the domain of being consisting of *things* in the sense of objects understood in a *theoretical* manner as facts but rather the world encountered in going about dealings that produce, direct themselves to routine tasks, and use. What *is* amounts to what has been finished and made ready in the movement of going about the dealings of production (ποίησις), i.e., what has come into a being-on-hand and is now available for certain tendencies to use it.¹⁵¹

Only as being-produced, beings are addressed or discussed in the way they look, in their *eidos*. The latter is also their ‘what’ because they are what they are only if they are safeguarded in their being through such an addressing. In that way, beings are called possessions, because their being is not only secured for them, but also in them in such a way that they are looked at in their *eidos* thereby they are at one’s disposal for use. In other words, beings in their being is safeguarded when beings are

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 119.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 127.

addressed with respect to their look in such a way that what is at stake is this addressing or safeguarding of being of beings. What is secured is neither merely beings nor just being; indeed such a separation is impossible, but being of beings, namely, there-character of being, a distance with intimacy. Dasein or the facticity of being gives itself as the necessity of 'being of beings', a necessity which shows itself from itself, as the phenomenon as such or truth. Thus, truth or *a-letheia* is not given beforehand, but it *is* as it needs to be secured. Only beings are given in their possible 'as-what' determinations, in *legein* in such a way that beings are either unveiled or veiled. But we should not forget that "beings in the how of their possible 'as-what-definitions' are not simply there for one, but rather they are a 'task'. And beings in the how of their being-unveiled, i.e., ὅν ὡς ἀληθές [being as being-true], needs to be taken into true safekeeping and protected against possible loss".¹⁵² The preservation of truth becomes a task because being of being-true finds its genesis in being-there of being which presents itself in each case as being (of being-there).

The fact that beings are there, that they are ready for use involves the fact that being-there is. Because only if there is *being-as it was already* in such a way that the latter is preserved in beings, we can say that a being is *ready* for use. However, the fact that being *has already been* does not mean that it makes or produces beings because having-beenness of being is nothing but the showing as such through the 'what' of beings. Accordingly, the phenomenon 'being of beings' is a showing as being of *logos* secured by beings' being-there. This intimacy of difference, that is, transitivity of being is called facticity or Dasein and gives itself as being-producedness as such, being-produced of beings in the sense that the matter itself (*die Sache selbst*) becomes the self-securing of the phenomenon. Thus, if Heidegger, in his early thinking, considers Dasein in terms of human existence, this should be regarded as the influence of this phenomenological reading of Aristotle. Because for Aristotle, as we have discussed through Heidegger's *Plato's Sophist*, uncoveredness is the accomplishment of the soul. Uncoveredness is both disclosure of beings and therefore comportment of Dasein. Each disclosure of beings is accomplished by different mode of comportment and *sophia* is the primordial one because it is pure seeing or happening in ontological/categorical sense. In other words, truth is based on

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 132.

being-encountered of beings until we reach at the ownmost mode of seeing whereby beings are kept in truth. For Heidegger, what leads such a research is Aristotle's claim for looking or *seeing more*. Thus, while being is primarily understood as being available, in terms of everyday dealings, it also forces its understanding to be secured in those beings by giving up usual concerns and arriving at pure seeing. For Heidegger, this shows us that "Aristotle arrives at an understanding of the meaning of philosophy *through an interpretation of a factual movement of care with respect to its ultimate tendency*".¹⁵³ And this is what brings Heidegger closer to Aristotle in such a way that Heidegger sets forth Dasein in terms of human existence without really asking for the essence of human being. As we shall see, this approach will dominate in *Being and Time* where the producedness leads as the primordial sense of being and it is after 1930 that Heidegger will inquire into the essence of human being, only after he reconsiders truth in its relation to producedness. However, to say that there is a care with respect to the ultimate tendency of life is to say that this ultimate tendency is the care for the very being of life. Does this very being of life consist in being-produced? In the work we are discussing and in *Being and Time*, the answer is yes. But here Heidegger also points out that what distinguishes *sophia* from *phronesis* is that what is disclosed in *sophia* is not factual life in its how; rather life in its pure temporalization, that is, in its movement. Then, here, we find a special kind of being in the sense that "it is the motion of *production* that is taken into forehaving as exemplary for these kinds of beings and for the possibility of bringing into relief their structural sense".¹⁵⁴ Heidegger refers here to being-moved as the forehaving of being although he does not carry out this discussion to the end. Nevertheless, he writes that "the phenomenon of motion provides of itself the structures that are primordial and ultimate in it: namely, δύνσμις [potentiality], i.e., the in each case particular availability of...; ἐνέργεια [actuality], i.e., the putting the work of this availability; and ἐντελέχεια [the fulfillment in which something has reached its end], i.e., the maintaining (in true safekeeping) of this availability that has been put to work".¹⁵⁵ As it can be seen, motion provides the ultimate ground of

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 139.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 136.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 143.

being-available or being-produced in its threefold structure; *dunamis*, *energeia* and *entelecheia*. Availability is considered from within its 'for' (*dunamis*) and 'in' (*energeia*) in such a way that this 'being available for that is put into work' is maintained or preserved. This shows us that Heidegger's consideration of *Dasein* in terms of human being depends upon the fact that following Aristotle, he understands being as being of beings, that is, *through* beings in such a way that beings show themselves in their what they are already, in a way limited to their being and are available. Since the latter implies being-there, what is at stake becomes the safe-keeping of the phenomenon as such and therefore needs a being which cares being as being-there. Now, our aim is to follow Heidegger in his early Aristotelianism which is a specific transcendentalism in order to grasp how the problem of being resolves into itself by leaving itself in question.

CHAPTER III

DASEIN

In our previous chapter, we have seen that Heidegger begins with an investigation on the fundamental problems of logic and truth which are inherited from Aristotle and developed through the works of neo-Kantians and Husserl. The possibility of logic is made a problematic by considering logic in its being-true or being-false. For Heidegger, to question judgment as the object of logic shows us that judgment is intentional in the sense that it is always about something. However, this Husserlian beginning does not end in the primacy of absolute consciousness. Heidegger's underlying insight consists in interpreting judgment in its *apophantic* sense, that is, with regard to the fact that it lets *something* show itself. This leads us to say that we have something *in advance* in order that logic would be possible in its unitary sense. Then, prior-having of something is interrogated through Aristotle's thinking where being is understood as presence of what is present. Being has a double structure in the sense that it both means a being and being of this being. This helps us to see that what is at issue is not to say that there are beings before ourselves, but the fact that this encounter with beings are guided by a prevailing sense of being. We have discussed being-characters until we find out that it is through being-produced of beings that thereness of being is most self-evidently preserved in beings. Then, being-there of being implies two things: in each being, being is there and being is there insofar as there are beings which are there. This facticity of being results in the involvement of human existence as Dasein because Heidegger finds the genesis of this structure in Aristotelian correlation between perception (*noein*) and being (*einai*). According to this Aristotelian standpoint, the leading sense of being is grounded in a corresponding manner of seeing through which being is preserved in its coming to sight. Nonetheless, we should notice here a fundamental difference between Aristotle and Heidegger. As we have discussed, for Aristotle, it is essential to begin with the particular which is already surrounded by the universal. As a consequence, Aristotle's thinking consists in a research of universal structure of beingness without noticing that this research is already motivated by its very

meaning of questionability. Thus, Heidegger's aim is to designate how this universal structure needs to be secured as a question, *being-there*. This is why for Heidegger, before any determination or *telos*, being *speaks* or *means* while preserving itself in its question-worthiness.

3.1. Dasein and being

Heidegger, both in *Being and Time* and in *History of the Concept of Time*, stresses on the *Fragestruktur* of the question of being. He describes being as such as a question in the sense that:

The question must be *articulated*, that is, *it must be raised as a question for research*. It is asked with the intention of doing investigative work. To articulate the question of being means to elaborate it as a question in such a way that this elaboration will arrive at the secure horizon of inquiry into the being of entities (the horizon of the question) along with the outline of the way and the steps of the investigation which seeks to find the answer.¹⁵⁶

Raising the question of being allows us to do research in philosophy. Indeed, it is the fundamental condition to open the way for philosophy. We should remark that for Heidegger, philosophy or phenomenology is not a mode of research based on obtained results. Rather, discovery of phenomenology lies in this: "it is the *discovery of the very possibility of doing research in philosophy*" insofar as "a possibility is rightly understood in its most proper sense only when it continues to be taken as a possibility and preserved as a possibility".¹⁵⁷ Only raising the question of being can preserve the possibility of doing philosophy since phenomenon of being gives us the *matter itself* of phenomenology by being understood by itself. Being is nothing but its own understanding in such a way that we no longer distinguish being as such from an understanding of it. We begin with the fact that being is already understood. In other words, when we ask 'what does being mean?', we do not ask whether being as such is given or not. Rather, we raise the question in order to ask for "what is meant by it, what is understood under it, under 'being'".¹⁵⁸ Thus, Heidegger moves within a self-evident situation and in our previous chapter, we have tried to grasp the foundation of this situation in its relation to *logos*. As we have seen, in order that logic becomes possible, what always already is must be given. We have shown that

¹⁵⁶ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 143.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 136.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 143

this always-already givenness refers to the there-character of being which is revealed from a distance of Dasein's being-with-beings. Thus, what is at issue is not to ask *whether* of being, but its *how* because necessity of Dasein already shows us that being as meaning is already put into question. In other words, what matters is how being is accessible and this is possible through the horizon of being as being of beings which is owned by Dasein itself. Thus, we can see that as Marion suggests, "the privilege of Dasein is strictly phenomenological, not anthropological. Indeed, it is characterized ontically as having access to Being, as having Being for its sake, as having Being for its depth. Of itself, as a being, it refers, or better refers *itself*, back to Being".¹⁵⁹ Insofar as being is already there, and insofar as this is possible through Dasein's having access to Being ontically, then alongside the being of beings, being as meaning is already at issue. This is also reinforced by the fact that ontic accessibility needs ontological existence because as we have seen, speaking of beings means that beings are already in being. Dasein always is unto beings for the sake of the being of beings. Since it is also one of beings, in its questioning of being of beings, being is an issue for it and for Heidegger, this is why being of Dasein or its existence gives us being as meaning. In this chapter, we shall try to understand how this is possible by analyzing Dasein in its structure of being. However, before that, we need to reconsider what Heidegger suggests for the formal structure of the question of being.

For Heidegger, we can designate a formal structure of the question of being which will help us to grasp the inner necessity of this questioning. Accordingly, like each question, the question of being consists of three elements such that *Erfragte*; what is asked for, *Gefragte*; what is asked about, *Befragte*; what is interrogated. Then, concerning the question of being, *what is asked for*, that is, what is to be attained in the question is *the meaning of being*. *What is asked about* in such a questioning is what determines an entity as an entity, namely, *being of beings*. As we can notice what is asked for implies what is asked about. However, these two elements of questioning are possible only if the entity to be interrogated is accessible

¹⁵⁹ Jean- Luc Marion, 'Beings and the Phenomenon', in *Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger and Phenomenology*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson, Northwestern University Press, 1998. p. 70.

in its being. This means that what is asked about already implies what is interrogated; the entity itself. Only if the accessibility of beings is secured, there could be a questioning *for* the meaning of being because only in this way meaning of being could be grasped in its own way. This amounts to saying that being of beings is no longer understood in term of beings, but its meaning is its own questioning. In order that meaning of being becomes its own questioning, the meaning of being, that is, the way how being is looked at, understood or grasped should be determined. Then, Heidegger says that “looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it—all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being for those particular entities which we, the inquires, are ourselves”.¹⁶⁰ Thus, the being, that which is to be interrogated is Dasein for whom questioning is one of the possibilities of its being. From this formal structure, we can conclude that for Heidegger, what comes first is the meaning or questionability of being. However, he will reject that being is presupposed in this questioning insofar as question of being is not a question to be solved but a question to be worked out. This becomes understandable when we remember that being becomes a question, when it is accessible. And since it is already accessible, “here what is asked about has an essential pertinence to the inquiry itself, and this belongs to the ownmost meaning [eigensten Sinn] of the question of Being”.¹⁶¹ Being of beings can be asked only if it relates to the being of the questioning of the questioner because the question of being *of* beings is nothing but the articulation of being as a question or meaning. Thus, to the Aristotelian question ‘what is being’, Heidegger responds by saying that being is its own questioning insofar as being of beings calls for the questioner through which being as meaning is already there. Then, what we need is an entity which, while looking at being of beings, is related in its being to being. This may be understood in the following way “the questioning is itself an entity which is given with the question of the being of an entity in the act of carrying out the questioning, whether it is expressly noted or not”.¹⁶² For Heidegger, Dasein is the questioning entity itself insofar as in this questioning, its own being becomes

¹⁶⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 26.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁶² Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 147.

questionable. It has a special relation to being and this shows that its privilege is not only ontic, but also ontological. In other words, Dasein lets beings be what they are and this happens on the basis of a deeper relation to being through which phenomenon of being is also kept secure. This is what it means to say that meaning of being is the questioning itself; what is at issue is not only asking for the being of beings but also seeing that in this questioning lies the very meaning of the question itself.

However, in order that this becomes possible, we should consider Dasein *as an entity*. Heidegger says that “to work out the articulation of the question of the sense of being thus means to exhibit the questioning, that is, the Dasein itself as an entity; for only in this way does what is sought become something sought in its most proper sense. The questioning is here co-affected by what it asks for, because the questioning is after being and questioning is itself an entity”.¹⁶³ Heidegger stresses on the fact that Dasein is an entity in order to remove doubts whether it is chosen on the basis of psychological or anthropological reasons. If Dasein is given as an entity, this shows us nothing but a prevailing experience or sense of being. In other words, Heidegger does not choose Dasein in order to construct the meaning of being, rather Dasein like other beings is given according to a sense of being. Moreover, this sense of being is given through Dasein’s existence in such a way that distinction between being and beings is appropriated. This means that unitary structure of Dasein as an entity will give us the articulation and conceptuality of the meaning of being. However, since the meaning of being is not something on hand but to be worked out, exhibition of Dasein is still provisional. Heidegger says that “our analysis of Dasein, however, is not only incomplete; it is also, in the first instance, provisional. It merely brings out the Being of this entity, without Interpreting its meaning. It is rather a preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being may be laid bare”.¹⁶⁴ In other words, we can conceptualize the meaning of being insofar as Dasein as an entity makes this conceptualization necessary as its own being.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 148.

¹⁶⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 38.

Thus, Dasein as an entity should make necessary why we start with Dasein. In other words, Dasein should exist in such a way that meaning of being find its proper site to be articulated. This will show us how this questioning entity is the meaning of being by preserving the distinction between being and beings. Within the terminology of *Being and Time*, this amounts to saying that Dasein is ontically ontological, that is, it is the place where being as a question becomes accessible from its own ground. However, this requires looking at Dasein solely on the basis of the average understanding of being because only in this way Dasein acquires its ontical privilege. We should look at Dasein from the point of being of beings, not from the point of meaning of being which will be result of our investigation. In other words, “Dasein should not be Interpreted with the differentiated character [Differenz] of some definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered [aufgedeckt] in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part”.¹⁶⁵ We do not determine Dasein according to a definite idea of existence but we construe it from what is closest to it. This will give us Dasein with respect to what is ontically closest to it thereby it is determined by being of beings. Heidegger calls this undifferentiated character of Dasein *average everydayness*. Accordingly, Dasein is being-in-the-world and now we should remark that world should be understood from this average mode of being in order to ground Dasein in its being. In other words, what we need to grasp is the worldhood of the world, that is, how it shows itself of itself. Since world is not an entity out there, but wherein or with-which of Dasein, Dasein is already concerned with the world in its preoccupation with the world. This is why Heidegger, in *The History of the Concept of Time*, defines world as Dasein’s leeway of encounter by saying that “when we ask about the phenomenal structure of the world, we are asking about the *how* of the being in which the entity we call the world *shows itself of itself as the encountered*, we are asking about the being of the entity which is encountered in the leeway for encounter granted by concern”.¹⁶⁶ The world is the encountered and its being refers to being of Dasein insofar as encountering is a phenomenon which becomes possible through the average mode of being of Dasein. As long as we take up the world in this perspective, that is, in its

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁶⁶ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 169.

showing itself of itself, we should call this phenomenon worldhood of the world which is no longer a character of the world, but a character of the being of Dasein. Thus, Heidegger brings together being of the world with the being of Dasein which is given in its averageness. This becomes understandable insofar as world is defined in terms of encountering which belongs to Dasein's everydayness. From this initial point, Heidegger will try to ground everydayness which is still considered provisionally as a beginning, in the worldhood of the world.

Heidegger suggests that being-in-the-world as a unitary phenomenon has three items which are not to be thought as distinct from each other, but as implying each other, they constitute the structure of being-in-the-world. These ontological items are called *existentiale* and determined as 1. 'in-the-world' which will give us the ontological structure of world, 2. the entity as the *Who* of Dasein's everyday existence and 3. 'being-in' as such.¹⁶⁷ Heidegger begins with a brief discussion of being-in as such. His aim is to show the difference between 'being-in' of Dasein and 'insideness' which belongs to present-at-hand entities within the world. Accordingly, Dasein's 'being-in' the world is not like that the water is in the glass or the bench is in the classroom. 'Being-in' does not refer to a spatial 'in-one-anotherness' of present-at-hand things. Rather,

'In' is derived from '*innan*'—'to reside', '*habitare*', 'to dwell' [sich auf halten]. '*An*' signifies 'I am accustomed', 'I am familiar with', 'I look after something'. It has the signification of '*colo*' in the senses of '*habito*' and '*diligo*'. The entity to which Being-in in this signification belongs is one which we have characterized as that entity which in each case I myself am [bin]. The expression '*bin*' is connected with '*bei*', and so '*ich bin*' [I am] means in its turn 'I reside' or 'dwell alongside' the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way.¹⁶⁸

Thus, 'being-in' signifies 'being-familiar-with' or 'being-involved-with' and in that sense it has the character of pre-occupation or concern. In such a structure of 'being-in' the world, the world should already be revealed. Dasein *is* as *bei* the world, that is, it is the only entity who touches the world. When we say that 'the table stands by (*bei*) the wall' we mean that the table touches the wall. However, for Heidegger, a present-at-hand entity cannot touch another one, not because there is still space between them but because in principle, the first can touch the latter "only if by its

¹⁶⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 78

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 80.

very nature the latter entity has Being-in as its own kind of being—only if, with its Being-there [Da-sein], something like the world is already revealed to it, so that from out of that world another entity can manifest itself in touching, and thus become accessible in its Being-present-at-hand”.¹⁶⁹ As we have seen, ὁτιγῆν is the most direct mode of apprehending *the matter itself*. This refers to the fact that beings are primordially understood as *encounterable* through which they are *for* an apprehending. Now, we can see that this encountering means that the world is already revealed to Da-sein. In its concern with beings, Dasein lets the world show itself. Thus, Being-in co-intends the phenomenon of the world. However, since the world is only given with Da-sein, we should ask for the meaning of Dasein. If Dasein is being-in-the-world, we need to consider worldhood of the world as a character of Dasein. This could be possible only if we do not look at Dasein as a *what*, but in its *how*. In other words, we do not look at it from somewhere, but we will consider it in terms of how of its being. Since being-in-the-world belongs to Dasein, we will study it through *how* world shows itself.

We have already seen that Heidegger thinks world in terms of encountering which is revealed through the everyday being of Dasein. This amounts to saying that world is already revealed to Dasein, that is, beings are accessible in such a way that being is already understood. We arrived at this conclusion by following the analysis of ‘being-in’ which is no longer understood as ‘insideness’, but as concern with beings. Starting from what is closest to Dasein, world gains its ontic meaning as the ‘wherein’ of a factual Dasein. Indeed, world primarily has an ontic meaning although we are looking for the a priori structure of all ‘worlds’, namely, worldhood of the world. In order to gain access to the worldhood of the world, we need a right point of departure, and for Heidegger, this is the world of average everydayness, namely, *Umwelt*; environment. Accordingly, entities which we encounter in our environment are not understood by traditional categories such as reality or extension. Rather, following Aristotelian meaning of being as being-produced, pre-ontologically, they are called ‘equipment’ (*Zeug*) and their being is determined as *Zuhanden*; ready-to-hand. Accordingly, Heidegger states that “equipment is essentially ‘something in-order-to...[‘etwas um-zu...’]”. A totality of equipment is

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 81.

constituted by various ways of the ‘in-order-to’, such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability”.¹⁷⁰ Equipment cannot be considered as isolated. Each equipment becomes what it is due to the totality of equipment and since being of equipment is defined in terms of ready-to-hand, ‘in-order-to’ belongs to its being. Heidegger defines the structure of ‘in-order-to’ as assignment or reference of something to something (*Verweisung*). Thus, in our immediate encounter with the world, we use or manipulate things. This manipulating cannot be reduced to theoretical sight but it has its own proper sight which is called by Heidegger ‘circumspection’ (*Umsicht*). It should be noted that in such circumspection, we do not primarily deal with the tool itself. Rather, our dealings are subordinated to the context of ‘in-order-to’. As Heidegger suggests in the *History of the Concept of Time*, “that which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered”.¹⁷¹ The work to be produced is the towards-which of any equipment and by emphasizing the productive aspect of environment, Heidegger tries to show that equipment is not an entity that we find out there by staring at it, rather its being is unveiled within the context of referentiality.

Does not this explication of the entities around us by means of circumspective concern lead to the conclusion that world is a subjective construction? Common sense has a tendency to say that in order that something becomes ready-to-hand, it should be already present-at-hand. Indeed, Heidegger does not object to this, but what should be there is not any objectivity or nature in the sense of present-at-hand, but the world itself. Why this should be so, we still do not know. However, we know that being as being-produced requires us to leave the objectivity of sense-perception behind insofar as being shows itself as its own saying. For Heidegger, objectivity is a free-floating beginning whereas non-objectivity of work-world gives us the world itself. This becomes possible when the worldly character of the ready-to-hand can show itself. Accordingly, equipment is understood as equipment, that is, in its

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 97.

¹⁷¹ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 99.

readiness-to-hand, in three ways. First, its readiness-to-hand comes to the fore when it is damaged or unuseful. Thereby equipment becomes conspicuous and it turns out to be un-ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. However, Heidegger suggests that “this presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand *in this way* is still not just a Thing which occurs somewhere”.¹⁷² The present-at-hand should be understood as *un-ready-to-hand*. The same is true for that which is missing and that to which our concern refuses to turn. When something is missing, what is ready-to-hand becomes *obtrusive* and shows itself as present-at-hand. In the case of something for which we have no time, we realize the *obstinacy* of what we have to do. Then, concerning these modes of *conspicuousness*, *obtrusiveness* and *obstinacy*, we should know that “the ready-to-hand is not thereby just *observed* and stared at as something present-at-hand; the presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment”.¹⁷³ Heidegger explains this by means of the structure of assignment or reference which belongs to equipment. As we can notice, equipment is understood *in itself* insofar as it is inconspicuous. When it becomes conspicuous in such a way that there is a break or damage in the structure of reference, what is lit up is neither a ready-to-hand entity nor a present-at-hand one. Rather, what becomes explicit is the environment so that the world is disclosed and ready-to-hand acquires its worldly character. Thus, inconspicuousness, unobtrusiveness, and non-obstinacy, although they are negative expressions, refer to the positive aspect of equipment in the sense that being of equipment is revealed as ‘holding itself in’. However, this is just the ontic meaning of ‘in itself’ of equipment. As we have seen, ready-to-hand is revealed first due to the disclosure of world which occurs through the breaking down of the context of reference. Or as Heidegger says “if it is to be possible for the ready-to-hand not to emerge from its inconspicuousness, the world *must not announce itself*”.¹⁷⁴ If the world does not announce itself, there is no sense to begin with ready-to-hand. Then, our question consists in seeking for why we first encounter with ready-to-hand. This will enable to

¹⁷² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 103.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 104.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 106.

ready-to-hand to be freed for its being. For now, we have shown that, our circumspective concern is absorbed in references and this absorption is not thematic. This means that world is already lit up and we should say that:

If the world can, in a way, be lit up, it must assuredly be disclosed. And it has already been disclosed beforehand whenever what is ready-to-hand within-the-world is accessible for circumspective concern. The world is therefore something 'wherein' Dasein as an entity already *was*, and if in any manner it explicitly comes away from anything, it can never do more than come back to the world.¹⁷⁵

We have already seen that ontically, the world is 'wherein' of Dasein. Now, Heidegger insists that Dasein *was* in that world, that is, its encounter with ready-to-hand entities already determines the being of those entities. Ontically, the world is passed over. However, in these passing over, Dasein always returns to the world. This means that ontically invoking the being of the ready-to-hand is just a beginning and needs an ontological assertion. Indeed, for Heidegger, environing world is not a beginning which determines beforehand where to go. Rather, our aim is to let the world constitute itself in its being. We return to the being of the world departing from the invoking of its being and this shows us that we return to the world due to our 'already having been' in the world. Thus, ready-to-hand is already what it is insofar as world belongs to the being of Dasein.

In order to give an account of the latter claim, we should look at more closely to the concrete structure of referential context. We know that ready-to-hand is characterized by 'in-order-to' and it is thought in terms of a structure of reference or assignment. Heidegger's aim is to show that beings around us are not mere things or present-at-hand entities; rather they are to be understood in their being. This becomes possible only if we understand ready-to-hand in terms of referentiality. Here, we can determine two kinds of reference; reference of serviceability and reference of indicating. According to the second, equipments, insofar as they indicate or show something, are signs. Red arrow in motor cars indicates the direction the vehicle will take. This is not only a sign for the driver but also for others not travelling with the driver. What is at issue is how to understand this reference as indicating. For Heidegger, the ontological structure of the sign as equipment cannot be grounded on the reference as indicating, and it should be understood on the basis of serviceability-

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

for. A hammer is an equipment but not a sign. It does not indicate but used for something. Indicating is just a concretization of serviceability and based on it. Red arrow is not grasped thematically but it indicates insofar as it enables us to take on an orientation and the latter belongs to the being-in-the-world. Thus, “a sign is not a Thing which stands to another Thing in the relationship of indicating; it is rather *an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself*”.¹⁷⁶ Red arrow is not a present-at-hand entity next to the other. It already refers to a world where we live. In other words, if we are not ready or not-ready for the indicating of the sign, there would be no signs. With a sign, ‘towards-which’ of serviceability just becomes concrete and this shows us that reference of indicating is founded on the equipment-structure as such. As Heidegger adds, “*a sign is something ontically ready-to-hand, which functions both as this definite equipment and as something indicative of [was...anzeigt] the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and of worldhood*”.¹⁷⁷ Sign may be this or that definite entity and has an ontic character. On the other hand, the referentiality determines the being of equipment or readiness-to-hand as such and it is something ontological. Then, we need to grasp how the ontological priority of the referential totality leads us to the phenomenon of the world. In order to describe this relationship, we should ask what reference or assignment means. Heidegger states in the following way:

To say that the Being of the ready-to-hand has the structure of assignment or reference means that it has in itself the character of *having been assigned or referred* [*Verwiesenheit*]. An entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred to something, and referred as that entity which it is. *With* any such entity there is an involvement which it has *in* something. The character of Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand is just such an *involvement*. If something has an involvement, this implies letting it be involved in something. The relationship of the “with...in...” shall be indicated by the term “assignment” or “reference”.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 110.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 114.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 115. “Das Sein des Zuhandenen hat die Struktur der Verweisung-heißt: es hat an ihm selbst den Charakter der *Verwiesenheit*. Seiendes ist daraufhin entdeckt, daß es als dieses Seiende, das es ist, auf etwas verwiesen ist. Es hat *mit* ihm *bei* etwas sein Bewenden. Der Seinscharakter des Zuhandenen ist die *Bewandtnis*. In Bewandtnis liegt: bewenden lassen mit etwas bei etwas. Der Bezug

It is difficult for us to catch the meaning of ‘Bewandtnis’ with the term ‘involvement’. However, it seems that a ready-to-hand entity is a being in its being, that is, *it is* in the manner of being proper to it, insofar as it is already involved in something. Involvement occurs *with* a being *in* another. For Heidegger, this is an ontological assertion in the sense that a being is let free for its being by being let involved in something. This ontic ‘letting something be involved’ does not mean that we produce a being by bringing it into its being, “it means rather that something which is already an ‘entity’ must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and that we must thus let the entity which has this Being be encountered”.¹⁷⁹ Thus, ‘letting something be involved’ is the ontical condition for a ready-to-hand entity to be encountered. On the other hand, this ontic ‘letting something be involved’ is already ontological in such a way that *each* ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand is freed for its being regardless whether it is involved or not. Before something is discovered in our concern, it is already something ready-to-hand. With a hammer, we find an involvement in hammering, with hammering, involvement in making something fast, with the latter, involvement in protection...etc. However, what Heidegger wants us to see is that any singular item of involvement is determined in advance by the totality of involvements.

Thus, it is due to the prior discovery of the totality of involvements, with-which and in-which of involvement are freed. Only in this way, we can grasp the ontological relationship of readiness-to-hand to the world. This becomes understandable when we see that ultimate towards-which of the totality of involvements is not a ready-to-hand entity but Dasein as the being-in-the-world. This ultimate towards-which is called ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ and as we have already discussed, it belongs to the being of Dasein which is determined as the entity for whom in its being, this being is essentially an issue. And Heidegger states that:

That wherein [Worin] Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for which [das Woraufhin] it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The “wherein” of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the

des ‘mit...bei...’ soll durch den Terminus Verweisung angezeigt werden.” (*Sein und Zeit*, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 2006. p. 83.)

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 117.

phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which [woraufhin] Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the *worldhood* of the world.¹⁸⁰

That for which beings are let be involved is the for-the-sake-of-which Dasein is itself. This corresponds to the understanding of being which belongs to Dasein. Dasein, due to its understanding of being, is referred to itself from the familiarity with which it already lives. Thus, insofar as Dasein understands or assigns itself, entities are always encountered as ready-to-hand. Since it understands itself from what it is closest to it, this understanding of its own being already includes the interpretation of the meaning of being in general. This happens due to Dasein's assigning-itself which points to the relational character of this process. As we can see, being of the world and being of Dasein constitutes a relational union and Heidegger tries to consider this unity from within as the structure itself. Then, the relationality from the 'for-the-sake-of-which' to an involvement, while constituting world, happens insofar as Dasein assigns itself the task of understanding its being in the mode of being-in-the world. Heidegger calls this process *signifying* (*bedeuten*) and claims that "in its familiarity with these relationships, Dasein 'signifies' to itself: in a primordial manner it gives itself both its Being and its potentiality-for-Being as something which it is to understand with regard to its Being-in-the-world".¹⁸¹ Thus, the world is encountered as a mode of understanding of Dasein itself insofar as what is understood is not this or that entity or their totality, but the meaning of being. Then, the totality of this self-signifying is named *significance* (*Bedeutsamkeit*). Heidegger, already in *History of the Concept of Time*, designates references as *to mean* and calls the structure of encounter through references meaningfulness or significance and claims that "being-in-the-world as concerned understanding lets us encounter something self-signifying in self-meaning. This self-signifying meaning [sich bedeutendes Bedeuten] constitutes meaningfulness and is the presence of the world, insofar as it is discovered in understanding concern. *Presence of the world is the worldhood of the world as meaningfulness*".¹⁸² Understanding as concern lets the world become present (*anwesen*) in such a way that *presence* (*Präsenz*) of what is of

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 119.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁸² Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 213.

concern is already placed under care. For Heidegger, how this becomes possible can be explicated through the discussion of *time* but for now, we should see that *placing under care* belongs to the essence of Dasein which has always already submitted (*angewiesen*) itself to a world. In other words, Dasein *is* in such a way that the structure of the ready-to-hand is already discovered and this becomes possible insofar as being of ready-to-hand or the presence of what is of concern is taken as a task in the being of Dasein. By taking this task on itself, Dasein signifies to itself its own being, which understands itself as *meaning* (of being).

In addition to Aristotelian insight that meaning of being needs Dasein, Heidegger claims that this meaning is appropriated by Dasein as the being of this entity itself. Dasein is not just a being among beings by looking at them from a distance, rather, this distance is always preserved in Dasein's being. Thus, Dasein is not just needed but its being is required insofar as world calls for an existence which cares about its involvement within concern. Heidegger says that "the world solicits concern: This means that, as it is discovered in concern, the world does not meet with a mere looking and staring at something on hand; rather, it primarily and constantly meets with—even in looking at the world—a caring being-in-it".¹⁸³ It is specifically in everyday dealings that Dasein is called for as the entity which places under care this concern. If there is a meaningfulness of world, this is possible insofar as Dasein cares it. This does not mean that Dasein first finds itself and then constitutes a world. Rather, Dasein always finds itself in the world in this or that way and this is not a result of the disclosure of the world. Disclosure of the world and Dasein's finding itself in the world is co-original. Thus, letting something be involved does not take place in an inner realm of subject by means of reflection. Heidegger's Dasein analysis shows us the ontological impossibility of any worldless subject. Nevertheless, although Dasein's encountering with beings is not reflective, it still implies that Dasein is affected. Or, in Heidegger's terms, Dasein is attuned to the world. This amounts to saying that discoveredness of ready-to-hand is ontologically possible if the world matters to Dasein. Then, it is one thing to determine the being of the world in terms of readiness-to-hand, and it is another to say that this world as it is understood as ready-to-hand matters to Dasein. Being of ready-to-hand should

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 254.

affect us in such a way that our being is already put into question and for Heidegger, this structure can be understood in terms of Dasein's *state-of-mind* (*Befindlichkeit*).

State-of-mind refers to the fact that Dasein, ontically, is always in a mood; it is attuned. As we have pointed out, encountering something within the world implies being affected by it. However, for Heidegger, this affectedness cannot be explained in terms of sensation; rather, in order that senses have any effect on us, Dasein should already submit itself to the world which matters to it. He argues that “*existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us*”.¹⁸⁴ Dasein's mood is determined in advance by this submission to the world. Thus, state-of-mind belongs to the disclosure of the world or being-in-the-world. Indeed, “*the mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something*”.¹⁸⁵ Thus, the mood does not signify a movement from ‘inside’ to ‘outside’. Rather it discloses all possible ways of *directing oneself towards* (*Sichrichten auf...*) in the sense that encountering with beings, with other Daseins and with our being becomes possible. This is how being-in-the-world *as a whole* is disclosed. Thus, attunement of state-of-mind points to the disclosure of the world, to the possibility of all encountering by letting the world matter to Dasein. This means that being (of Dasein) is brought to its ‘there’ insofar as encountering-with is grounded in Dasein's state-of-mind. We should explain this in the following way: meaning of being, namely, being as there itself, can be brought to the fore in encountering with beings. The latter becomes possible through the disclosure of world where Dasein is already in a mood through which this world matters to it. The world can matter to Dasein, if the being of Dasein is called for by this world where being is already at issue. In other words, being of Dasein should be ‘there’ in the sense that it always finds itself within the claim of being. Thus, Heidegger does not aim at constructing a subject beginning from ready-to-hand which is the first and proximate claim of being. What is at issue is to see how Dasein understands itself from within this claim of being. Thus, we are not looking for what

¹⁸⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 177.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 176.

Dasein is, rather, for how it is, or, what it has to be. If there is being as meaning, Dasein has to be in such a way that this very being is an issue for it. In other words, Dasein brings its there; it is never completed but always open to the happening of being by being affected by beings in its mood. It is not because Dasein is affected by beings, being is unveiled, but because in this being affected, 'there' is disclosed where Dasein comes into scene as the place where being happens. Heidegger writes that "in having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be".¹⁸⁶ In encountering with beings, Dasein is 'there' for its being; what it has to be is outlined by this encountering insofar as it assumes being in its question-worthiness as being-in-the-world. This means that Dasein is delivered over to the 'there' in its 'that it is and has to be', in its everyday mood. And "this characteristic of Dasein's being—this 'that it is'—is veiled in its 'whence' and 'whither', yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the 'thrownness' of this entity into its 'there'; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the 'there'".¹⁸⁷ In ontico-existential sense, Dasein evades the being of the 'there' whereas in ontologico-existential sense, the 'there' is disclosed due to the fact that Dasein is thrown to the 'there'. This becomes understandable when we see that for Dasein, 'that it is' is not something to behold as if it is a property which belongs to present-at-hand. This is why Heidegger calls it *facticity* in order to distinguish it from the *factuality* of present-at-hand. This table may be in such a way that it has this color or this shape. We say that it is that it is when we look at it. However, for Dasein, there is no point to stare at itself. Its being is always 'there', it is always what is at issue. Thus, Dasein, in its everyday mood, is thrown before itself in such a way that it always has to find itself. We should notice that Dasein does not find itself by thematically grasping its 'there', as Heidegger, in *History of the Concept of Time*, suggests:

In-being as finding-itself rather means that this 'there' is unthematically, but for this very reason, authentically discovered, so that this discoveredness constitutes nothing other than the way to be. Discoveredness as a constitutive state of an entity whose essence it is to be, can therefore only be understood as a *kind of being and possibility of being of Dasein itself*.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 173.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 174.

This is only the application of a general ontological principle which is valid for all characters of the being of Dasein, that they are not properties but are all *Dasein's possibilities to be*, modes of its very being.¹⁸⁸

What being-in discloses is the possibility of Dasein itself. It is not any properties of Dasein that we find in the disclosure of the world, but Dasein in its possibilities to be. Thus, in the structure of being-in, 'there' is unveiled in such a way that very being of Dasein is put into question so that being as meaning comes to view. Dasein is thrown before itself as the striving itself and it is not surprising that it, for the most, turns away from its being insofar as it has to find itself in a mood, that is, it has already submitted itself to the world in order to let the world matter to it. This implies the disclosure of being-in-the-world on the basis of for-the-sake-of-which. In other words, Dasein could not be thrown to its being, if it does not have a potentiality-for-being through which it *understands* for-the-sake-of-which it is.

This pre-ontological tendency-of-being refers to *understanding* which, besides state-of-mind, is another way to maintain the being of the 'there'. Understanding includes both disclosure of the world and the disclosure of self-finding. In other words, Dasein finds itself in its situated involvement with the world. As we have seen, Dasein does not find itself as a complete entity, but as a possibility. We should remark that this possibility does not refer to what is *not yet actual* which is a capacity of present-at-hand. It is not an empty logical possibility. Rather, Dasein is being-possible insofar as it has its being as a potentiality-for-being. Since as Dasein's understanding of being, this potentiality is disclosed, we could say that "*understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of*".¹⁸⁹ Dasein already knows what it is capable of, that is, in each case, it understands what it could be. In other words, it understands itself as potentiality-for-being, or, in terms of its possibilities to be. However, this potentiality-for-being is not free-floating but insofar as Dasein is thrown to its there, it is a *thrown possibility* in the sense that "Dasein is the possibility of Being-free *for* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Its

¹⁸⁸ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 257.

¹⁸⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 184. "*Verstehen ist das existenziale Sein des eigenen Seinkönnens des Daseins selbst, so zwar, daß dieses Sein an ihm selbst das Woran des mit ihm selbst Seins erschließt.*" (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 144.)

Being-possible is transparent to itself in different possible ways and degrees”.¹⁹⁰ As a thrown possibility, Dasein always fails to recognize itself in its everyday mood but this enables Dasein to find itself again in its possibilities. On the other hand, Dasein is not the only entity who is freed for its possibility. Insofar as understanding points to the disclosure of being-in-the-world on the basis of which world is disclosed as significance, both ready-to-hand and present-at-hand entities are freed for their possibilities. For Heidegger, all of these happen as long as understanding is always towards possibilities and this gives us the existential structure which is called *projection* (*Entwurf*). Projection is a character of understanding. It should be noticed that for Heidegger, projection does not primarily mean designing or sketching, rather, it preserves its root meaning of *entwerfen* which means throwing off. Accordingly, understanding throws Dasein either upon its for-the-sake-of-which or upon its world. From here we come across the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. What is crucial is to see that inauthenticity is not a lower mode of being but belongs to the disclosure of being-in-the-world. In other words, inauthenticity does not refer to the factual state of Dasein’s being, but to its facticity. Heidegger says that “Dasein is never more than it factically is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially. Yet, as Being-possible, moreover, Dasein is never anything less; that is to say, it is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being, it is *not yet*”.¹⁹¹ If we observe Dasein as if it is something present-at-hand, its existentiality may be more than what it is factually; if this is possible. However, in its facticity or inauthentic being, Dasein, while concerning with world, never gives up being itself. Authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of understanding and engaging with one does not mean that the other is set aside. Rather, insofar as understanding belongs to Dasein’s disclosure as being-in-the-world, diverting from one to the other shows us that “*this diversion of the understanding is an existential modification of projection as a whole*”¹⁹² and this modification of projection shows more truly that understanding is nothing but being-possible in the sense that “projection, in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 183.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 185.

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 186.

be as such. As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities".¹⁹³ Thus, Dasein is always being-towards-possibilities in the sense that understanding of its existence and understanding of its world is co-original. There is no sense for Dasein other than being thrown to its own possibility.

Insofar as Dasein is the entity which in its very being, that being is an issue for it, Dasein's possibilities to be implies the understanding of being. This means that being is not a substance behind other beings but its meaning depends upon whether it becomes intelligible for Dasein. However, to understand being with regard to its intelligibility for Dasein does not mean that Dasein produces the meaning of being. Rather, Dasein *is* in such a way that it already understands being, that is, beings are interpreted within the meaning structure of being. Thus, Dasein, ontically, encounters world as it is interpreted. In that sense, Heidegger calls this process *interpretation* (*Auslegung*) which provides us with the enactment of the possibilities which are given through understanding. In interpretation, Heidegger says "understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it".¹⁹⁴ Understanding preserves its own possibility by developing itself in interpretation. We can say that Heidegger's discussion of interpretation points to the fact that the world is not only already understood, but also, it is already understood by a circumspective concern which works out those possibilities so that understanding of world is appropriated in interpretation. Accordingly,

The ready-to-hand comes *explicitly* into sight which understands. All preparing, putting to rights, repairing, improving, rounding-out, are accomplished in the following way: we take apart in its 'in-order-to' that which is circumspectively ready-to-hand, and we concern ourselves with it in accordance with what becomes visible through this process. That which has been circumspectively taken apart with regard to its 'in-order-to', and taken apart as such—that which is *explicitly* understood—has the structure of *something as something*.¹⁹⁵

We have already discussed the structure of *something as something* under the title of hermeneutical-as. Now, Heidegger calls it *existential-hermeneutical as* and relates it to the process of interpretation which is grounded in the understanding of being.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 185.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 188.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 189.

Accordingly, that which is taken apart in its 'in-order-to' shows itself *as* ready-to-hand. In other words, we encounter ready-to-hand as table, as door, as book. We do not begin with a mere present-at-hand entity, rather, anything is given in its possibility to be, in its *what*. In *History of the Concept of Time*, Heidegger suggests that "the interpretation appresents the *what-for* of a thing and so *brings out* the reference of 'in-order-to'. It brings to prominence '*as what*' the encountered thing can be taken, how it is to be understood".¹⁹⁶ The thing in question is encountered *as something* in such a way that its being is its as-what. What enables us to claim this is the fact that entities within the world is always encountered as belonging to a context of involvement and when we take something apart within this involvement, what becomes explicit is the involvement itself which is given through the understanding of being. We should remind that in such an interpretation of circumspective concern, we do not look at things, as if they are objects of perception, but we use them. And in our using them, their involvement context comes to view so that we find ourselves in this world as thrown to our being which means that we understand being. Thus, interpretation as the cultivation of understanding is based on understanding. For Heidegger, this also amounts to saying that in interpretation, in the structure of hermeneutical-as, we do not need to have a thematic grasping of the totality of involvements. Rather, "in every case this interpretation is grounded in *something we have in advance*—in a *fore-having*".¹⁹⁷ In interpretation, we have already understood the totality of involvements and hermeneutical-as need not be expressed in propositional form. In addition to fore-having (*Vorhabe*), in order to articulate something in interpretation, we need a *fore-sight* (*Vorsicht*) which shows us the right point-of-view leading us to let something be unveiled which is veiled. And the last term which Heidegger introduces is the *fore-conception* (*Vorgriff*) through which conceptualization of what is interpreted is decided either with regard to the being in question or in terms of concepts. Then, we should say that interpretation is founded on the fore-structure of understanding, that is, we cannot find a presuppositionless beginning.

¹⁹⁶ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 261.

¹⁹⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 191.

What is more crucial is to see that for Heidegger, a unitary phenomenon is revealed through the relationship between fore-structure of understanding and as-structure of interpretation and this phenomenon is the *meaning (Sinn)*. He states that “that which has been articulated as such in interpretation and sketched out beforehand in the understanding in general as something articulable, is the meaning”.¹⁹⁸ In order to understand why meaning shows up as a unitary phenomenon, we need a double perspective. From an existential framework, we can say that due to the co-operation between interpretation and understanding, entities within the world are freed for their possibilities to be. We know that this happens insofar as entities are projected upon world or significance. Since the latter is already understood by Dasein as being-in-the-world, for Heidegger, entities have meaning when they are understood in their being which occurs as the disclosure of the being of Dasein. This shows us that “that which is understood, taken strictly is not the meaning but the entity, or alternatively, Being. Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility [Verständlichkeit] of something maintains itself”.¹⁹⁹ Thus, meaning is neither a property which belongs to entities, nor an intermediate realm between reality and thinking. Rather, “*meaning is the ‘upon-which’ of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception*”.²⁰⁰ In that sense, meaning belongs to understanding insofar as in understanding and in its appropriation of itself as interpretation, being of the ‘there’ is preserved. In other words, meaning is the existential horizon of intelligibility through which being is kept in view. Since the latter task belongs to existence of Dasein, Heidegger claims that “Dasein only ‘has’ meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be ‘filled in’ by the entities discoverable in that disclosedness. *Hence only Dasein can be meaningful [sinnvoll] or meaningless [sinnlos]*”.²⁰¹ Dasein ‘has’ meaning insofar as it ‘has’ being in advance. Thus, Heidegger does not designate a subjectivist framework, but he wants us to see that very being of Dasein and entities can be either understood or

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 195.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 192.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 193.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

not. Meaning and being is co-original in understanding insofar as meaning is the formal-existential framework of Dasein's disclosedness. With respect to the second aspect of the discussion of meaning which relies on the first, we should say that primary and fundamental givenness of meaning as an *existentiale* of Dasein proves that meaning cannot be found in assertion. Thus, assertion is a derived mode of interpretative concern in the sense that apophantical-as is a modification of existential-hermeneutical-as. This existential meaning finds its proper *sight* in beings themselves, not in any human attitude.

Dasein's sight lets entities show themselves from themselves. It should not be confounded with seeing with bodily eyes or with intuition of essences. Here, we should remember that meaning is the upon-which of projection which throws Dasein to its there. Insofar as 'there' is meaning, Dasein is its sight; it is circumspection (*Umsicht*) of concern and considerateness (*Rücksicht*) of solicitude in its being-with others. Dasein also becomes transparent (*durchsichtig*) to itself insofar as its existence is primordially revealed along with the world and others as being-in-the-world. Moreover, in Dasein's being, being as such is sighted, which means that access to being, access in general becomes possible. Thus, insofar as Dasein's potentiality-for-being discloses its there, that is, insofar as its being is projected upon itself and its world, being as such is also disclosed. Heidegger says that

Understanding of Being has already been taken for granted in projecting upon possibilities. In projection, Being is understood, though not ontologically conceived. An entity whose kind of Being is the essential projection of Being-in-the-world has understanding of Being and has this as constitutive for its Being.²⁰²

In understanding, Dasein always finds itself as a possibility in such a way that possibilities remains as possibilities. This means that Dasein does not observe itself as a closed self, but it *is* primordially along with all of its existentials. This explains how Dasein's existence, its relationship to being, is also a mode of being. In other words, Dasein does not posit being by positing itself. Rather, in its being, as an issue for itself, as a *there* for its being, being is already understood. Thus, the question of the meaning of being can be answered by working out the very possibility of the understanding of being as the being of Dasein. This also amounts to saying that in

²⁰² Ibid., p. 187.

understanding being, Dasein understands itself so that it can be made manifest to itself as a possibility in its totality.

3.2. The problem of Dasein's being in its totality

Our previous section provides us with various phenomena which constitutes Dasein's being, such as everydayness, projection, thrownness and understanding. However, as we can notice, it is understanding which gives us Dasein as a possibility in the sense that Dasein, in its understanding of being, understands itself as 'there' for its being. For Heidegger, this becomes possible only if we grasp Dasein's being-possible in its totality. In other words, each existential of Dasein is primordial and constitutes a structural whole through which being of 'there' is grounded. If Dasein's being were not a whole, it would be a posited entity, not a disclosed one. As we have seen, in thrownness, Dasein is delivered to itself, not only to its possibilities, but to its being as a possibility. Dasein *is* its possibilities upon which it is projected itself. Indeed, the expression 'thrown projection' already gives us the hints of a structure of a totality. However, Heidegger rejects interpreting totality of Dasein's being by gathering together previously disclosed phenomena. Rather, what we need is to understand Dasein 'from its own standpoint' in such a way that we should ask for what already lies in the totality of Dasein's being. Up to now, we know that Dasein is distinguished from other entities as long as it is ontically ontological, that is, its *being* among beings makes possible the understanding of being. This is a provisional beginning in such a way that it should be grounded by *being*. In other words, Dasein is the entity whose being is disclosed to itself in such a way that being is already understood. The latter should be preserved as a possibility and this requires that ontico-ontological access to Dasein should be appropriated. In other words, Dasein is not an entity which is chosen by methodological reasons. Leaving the task of analyzing Dasein provisional thus means that understanding of being is secured as possibility in the sense that Dasein has its own truth, not because it has an idealist structure, but because it owns truth which *is*. Thus, we cannot determine beforehand which possibilities Dasein have, but "if the existential analytic of Dasein is to retain clarity in principle as to its function in fundamental ontology, then in order to master its provisional task of exhibiting Dasein's Being, it must seek for one of the *most far-reaching* and *most primordial* possibilities of disclosure—one that lies in Dasein

itself”.²⁰³ Since the disclosure of Dasein’s being as the disclosure of ‘there’ is always constituted by state-of-mind and understanding, which are always intertwined, primordial possibility should be a state-of-mind where understanding of being occurs. And as we shall see, this primordial phenomenon is nothing but *anxiety* (*Angst*) which will provide us with Dasein’s being in its utmost possibility as Dasein’s totality of being.

Heidegger analyzes anxiety within the dimension of *falling* (*Verfallen*) which gives us Dasein’s disclosure in its everydayness. This phenomenon implies that Dasein is absorbed in the world in such a way that it is lost in the publicness of the ‘they’. Thus, Dasein is not only absorbed in the world, but also in being-with-others which is characterized by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. It is obvious that those phenomena point to the inauthentic being of Dasein in the sense that Dasein has fallen away from its authentic self. However, as we have noticed before, inauthenticity or not-being-self does not refer to a being-no-longer-in-the-world; it just gives us Dasein with regard to what is closest to it.²⁰⁴ Then, Heidegger says that “in falling, Dasein *itself* as factual Being-in-the-world, is something *from* which it has already fallen away. And it has not fallen into some entity which it comes upon for the first time in the course of its being, or even one which it has not come upon at all; it has fallen into the *world*, which itself belongs to its Being”.²⁰⁵ Here, facticity of Dasein has a primal importance. First of all, as Heidegger insists, falling does not refer to a situation of ‘original sin’ or to the ‘corruption of human nature’. Rather, due to the *fact* that Dasein is always already itself, which is its facticity, we are allowed to say that Dasein has fallen away from itself without making itself an isolated ‘I’ and the world an object. In other words, Dasein’s falling is already contained in its being-in-the-world insofar as according to its facticity, “it is in a manner of its being this being, *that it is*; more accurately: *it is its very ‘there’ and*

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 226.

²⁰⁴ As Françoise Dastur shows, Heidegger’s terminology of authenticity-inauthenticity (*Eigentlichkeit-Uneigentlichkeit*) can be based on Husserl’s distinction in Sixth Investigation between proper mode of intuitive thought and improper mode of symbolic thought; a distinction inherited from Brentano. See Françoise Dastur, *Heidegger et la question du temps*, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1990. p. 48.

²⁰⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 220.

‘in’.”²⁰⁶ Dasein is disclosed to itself where it finds itself proximally and for the most part. Since the latter is possible through Dasein’s understanding of being, falling is an existential of Being-in and gives us Dasein in its existentiality, which is potentiality-for-being. Thus, “in falling, nothing other than our potentiality-for-Being-in-world is the issue, even if in the mode of inauthenticity. Dasein *can* fall only *because* Being-in-the-world understandingly with a state-of-mind is an issue for it”.²⁰⁷ What is at stake is the fact that Dasein *can* fall into the *world* because insofar as this happens, we can guarantee that being-in-the-world is an issue for Dasein’s being. Since this constitutes Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-being, what remains is to interpret Dasein within a state-of-mind which will give us Dasein from its being. Thus, Heidegger, departing from falling, aims at showing the totality of Dasein’s being as authentic possibility. Since the latter becomes visible more explicitly in falling, anxiety as a state-of-mind which arises from the structure of falling will give us the primordial understanding of being as a potentiality-for-being.

Accordingly, in falling into the ‘world’ and into ‘they’, we acquire the only possibility to bring Dasein face to face with itself insofar as in falling, Dasein flees in the face of itself. Heidegger says “that in the face of which Dasein flees, is precisely what Dasein comes up ‘behind’. Only to the extent that Dasein has been brought before itself in an ontologically essential manner through whatever disclosedness belongs to it, *can* it flee *in the face of* that in the face of which it flees”.²⁰⁸ Although, ontically, Dasein turns away from its being-one’s-self, this becomes possible due to the fact that Dasein is already brought before itself. In this situation, that in the face of which Dasein flees is disclosed ‘there’ and disclosive state of mind which corresponds to this phenomenon is anxiety. However, as Heidegger suggests, not all turning away is fleeing in the face of itself. In the case of fear which is another state-of-mind, Dasein flees but that in the face of which it fears is a detrimental entity within the world. Contrary to that, in anxiety, Dasein turns away from itself and that in the face of which it shrinks back is Dasein itself. In other words, that in the face of

²⁰⁶ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 291.

²⁰⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 224.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

which of anxiety is neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand; it is indeterminate in such a way that entities within the world becomes irrelevant and the world lacks significance. In such insignificance, that in the face of which one has anxiety is nothing and nowhere. This ‘nothing and nowhere’ refers to the situation of *uncanniness* (*Unheimlichkeit*) in the face of which Dasein flees. While in everydayness, Dasein is familiar with its world, in anxiety, it is ‘not-at-home’. However, this does not mean that the world is missing. Rather, in the insignificance of entities within the world, the world obtrudes itself in its worldhood. Heidegger explains this in the following way: “the ‘nothing’ of readiness-to-hand is grounded in the most primordial ‘something’—in the *world*. Ontologically, however, the world belongs to Dasein’s Being as Being-in-the-world. So if the ‘nothing’—that is, the world as such—exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this means that *Being-in-the-world is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious*”.²⁰⁹ In anxious state-of-mind, the world as world is disclosed. This also shows us that that which anxiety is anxious about is being-in-the-world. Anxiousness of anxiety is not about any concrete kind of being of Dasein. The world means nothing to Dasein and this throws Dasein to its being in the sense that it takes over what it is anxious about, namely, its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, this is also what individualizes Dasein for its ownmost being-in-the-world. Here, individuality should not be understood as personality. Rather, anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, “as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualized in individualization [*vereinzelt in der Vereinzelung*]”.²¹⁰ Individuality makes Dasein what it *can* be in each case. Thus, in the insignificance of the world and public interpretation, concern with ready-to-hand and solicitude for others becomes *possible* in the *being-possible* of Dasein. The other in its being becomes accessible through the annihilation of the world because that the world becomes nothing means that what is at issue is to bring Dasein face to face with its world and with itself so that its very being is constituted as being-in-the-world not as an isolated and worldless subject. As Heidegger says “*here the disclosure and the disclosed are existentially selfsame in such a way that in the latter the world has*

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 232.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

been disclosed as world, and Being-in has been disclosed as a potentiality-for-Being which is individualized, pure, and thrown; this makes it plain that with the phenomenon of anxiety a distinctive state-of-mind has become a theme for Interpretation".²¹¹ In other words, we do not first come across a world and then recognize ourselves as being-in-the-world. Rather, anxiety refers to the fact that what is disclosed, namely, the world and the disclosure, namely, being-in-the-world, are the same. This is why that *about which* anxiety is anxious and that *in the face of which* it is anxious are selfsame as being-in-the-world or as Dasein itself.

This selfsameness which is revealed through anxiety can only be grounded on Dasein's being as a structural whole because putting Dasein in question in this way, we are inquiring into the equiprimordiality of its existentials in its possibility. Dasein is not composed of some parts; rather, its being is constituted as a totality by its existentials in such a way that its being becomes an issue for itself. To say that its being is an issue for Dasein is to say that it is towards its potentiality-for-being. Anxiety shows us that in its potentiality-for-being, Dasein is free for its being. Since it is pure and thrown individualization, it is always what it can be in each case, either authentic or inauthentic. Those are concrete possibilities just given to Dasein,

But ontologically, Being toward one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being means that in each case Dasein is already *ahead* of itself [ihm selbst...*vorweg*] in its Being. Dasein is always 'beyond itself' ["über sich hinaus"], not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is *not*, but as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself. This structure of Being, which belongs to the essential 'is an issue', we shall denote as Dasein's "*Being-ahead-of-itself*".²¹²

Dasein is ahead of itself but given that it is not a worldless subject, it is thrown to itself by being thrown into a world. Thus, insofar as Dasein is a factual existence, its 'being-ahead-of-itself' already means 'ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world'. Furthermore, according to its factual existence, in its thrown potentiality-for-being, Dasein is always concerned with entities within the world; it has fallen into the world and therefore 'ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world' implies 'being-alongside' ready-to-hand within the world. Then, Dasein's ontological structural whole can be designated as 'ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 233.

²¹² Ibid., p. 236.

(entities encountered within-the-world)’ and this structure is called *care* (*Sorge*). If we want to analyze this articulated phenomenon, we see that ‘being-ahead-of-itself’ corresponds to existentiality or potentiality-for-being, ‘being-already-in-the-world’ is based on thrownness and facticity and ‘being-alongside-entities’ refers to fallenness. With regard to the latter, we should grasp that both concern with ready-to-hand and solicitude for others acquire their ontological foundation in care insofar as they are understood on the basis of Being-in which becomes explicit in care. Moreover, we should notice that although ‘to be an issue for itself’ is explained through ‘being-ahead-of-itself’, care does not only refer to existentiality excluding facticity and falling. Heidegger emphasizes on this point in order to remove the idea that care is an isolated attitude of a subject. Care is not ‘care for oneself’, that is, “‘care’ cannot stand for some special attitude towards the Self; for the Self has already been characterized ontologically by ‘Being-ahead-of-itself’, a characteristic in which the other two items in the structure of care—Being-already-in...and Being-alongside...—have been *jointly posited* [*mitgesetzt*]”.²¹³ Those three items should be considered together but what does give them their unity? Now, we should look for a more primordial phenomenon which will give us ontological basis for the unity of this structural manifoldness of care.

Heidegger’s aim is to articulate the question of the meaning of being. This requires that we have the horizon where this question becomes intelligible. Such a fore-having is given to us through Dasein’s understanding of being which is its existence, the fact that in its being, that being is an issue for it. Existence is potentiality-for-being. However, since Dasein is in each case mine, it can be either authentic or inauthentic. Thus, although starting with everydayness, we have reached the structural totality of Dasein’s being as care, this analysis remains inauthentic insofar as fore-having of this analysis is inauthentic being of Dasein. For Heidegger, *primordial* interpretation of Dasein’s being requires us to reconsider Dasein in its authenticity and totality. In other words, Dasein should be brought into fore-having as a potentiality-for-being-a-whole so that fundamental ontology becomes possible. However, ontically, as the phenomenon of anxiety and care shows us, we cannot grasp Dasein in its wholeness insofar as “the ‘ahead-of-itself, as an item in the

²¹³ Ibid., p. 237.

structure of care, tells us unambiguously that in Dasein there is always something *still outstanding*, which, as a potentiality-for-Being for Dasein itself, has not yet become ‘actual’.”²¹⁴ That which is still outstanding indicates the *end* which is death. In that sense, death determines Dasein in its possible being-a-whole, in its totality. In other words, the phenomenon of death gives evidence for Dasein’s existence as long as it presents Dasein in its possibility of being a whole. On the other hand, it is obvious that Dasein loses its being if it reaches its death. Thus, death is an aporetic phenomenon and Dasein’s existentiell potentiality-for-being-a-whole and its being-a-whole as an existential should be considered again. This means that death is not an event which happens to Dasein. Here, we should notice that Dasein not only cannot experience its own death, but also, death of others is not accessible to Dasein. Heidegger writes that “dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it ‘is’ at all”.²¹⁵ Although in everyday being with others, one Dasein may be represented by another under the predominance of the ‘they’, “*no one can take the Other’s dying away from him*”.²¹⁶ Thus, we cannot grasp Dasein’s being-a-whole in dying of the other. However, this is not just a negative result but grounded on the phenomenon itself which needs to be regarded only existentially.

Analysis of death is existential because what forces us to consider this phenomenon is Dasein’s being as care; the fact that as being-ahead-of-itself, Dasein lacks totality. If we look at ontologically this lack of totality, we can see that what is still outstanding in Dasein’s being cannot be reduced to entities ready-to-hand whose totality is grounded in the continuity of its parts. In other words, what is outstanding in Dasein’s case does not refer to missing part which otherwise would belong to the entity in question. Dasein is not already together with its not-yet because when it reaches its end, it already loses its being. Thus, not-yet in Dasein’s being is not so due to our inability to grasp it, rather “Dasein must, as itself, *become*—that is to say,

²¹⁴ Ibid., p. 279.

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 284.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

be—what it is not yet”.²¹⁷ We should bear in mind that although the realm of becoming shows some similarities to the case of Dasein’s being, it has still crucial differences. In the case of ripening of a fruit, although its not-yet is included in its being, it still implies the fulfilling of the fruit. Contrary to that, Dasein does not fulfill its possibilities in death, rather it loses all them. Indeed, all ending does not mean fulfillment, but all fulfillment rests on finishedness which belongs to the entities either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. Then, Dasein’s ending cannot be considered as a kind of finishing or fulfillment.

On the contrary, just as Dasein *is* already its “not-yet”, and is its “not-yet” constantly as long as it is, it *is* already its end too. The “ending” which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s Being-at-hand [Zu-Ende-sein], but a *Being-towards-the-end* [*Sein zum Ende*] of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon it is.²¹⁸

Indeed, Dasein’s not-yet cannot be regarded as something outstanding. Insofar as Dasein exists, it *is* its not-yet. This positive result can be understood insofar as we show that Being-towards-the-end is grounded in Dasein’s basic state of being which is care. In other words, ontological structure of Dasein’s being-towards-the-end can only be understood when we see the existentiell possibilities of being-towards-death. Then, when we look at *existence*, *facticity* and *falling* through the phenomenon of death again, we realize that although death is not something still outstanding, it is something impending. Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility in the sense that it brings Dasein before the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-there. As Heidegger states, “death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein”²¹⁹ and in such a standing before itself, Dasein loses all of relations with others. Since this possibility belongs to Dasein’s potentiality-for-being as being-in-the-world, it cannot be outstripped. As we have seen, Dasein is thrown into this possibility which is non-relational and not to be outstripped. Since thrownness reveals itself as a state-of-mind which is anxiety, anxiety can be designated as anxiety in the face of death which is Dasein’s potentiality-for-being. Besides, proximally and for the most part, by way of falling, Dasein flees in the face of death. This occurs because as a factual being,

²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 287.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 389.

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 294.

Dasein is absorbed in a world. Then, this analysis shows us that being-towards-the-end is constituted by existence, facticity and falling; it is grounded in care.

Why does Heidegger try to connect care with death? We know that care gives us the Dasein's structural totality. However, what we need to see is whether this problematic is a correct one. While starting with everydayness, we already bring into our view Dasein as the entity to whose being, understanding of being belongs. This means that Dasein is not just a being among other beings, but it is distinguished by the fact that in its very being, that being is an issue for it. Thus, 'its very being' as a whole should be *there* in such a way that it is its there otherwise Dasein would not *exist*, but be a mere thing. But, we take into view Dasein's very being insofar as there is an understanding of being. This understanding of being belongs to Dasein. We should say that for Heidegger, this circularity cannot be avoided. Indeed, factically, there is no circularity at all; Dasein is the entity in each case what it can be. The fact that it is its possibilities reveals being in understanding. Heidegger does not hesitate to say that what we can do about this circularity is to consider it 'in the right way' as long as "the 'circle' in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein—that is, in the understanding which interprets".²²⁰ If we take being (meaning) as *Sache selbst*, then we should say that fore-structures of Dasein, its very being should be articulated in such a way that being is already understood. This will not provide us with a fulfillment of meaning as an absolute result as long as we know that meaning is not a theoretical content but it is that wherein something becomes intelligible as something. Meaning reveals itself through that *wherein* which is Dasein, but not identical with the latter because neither Dasein nor meaning are present-at-hand. More importantly, what belongs to Dasein essentially is its understandingly relationship to itself as disclosure or openness. Dasein understands itself in its being as a potentiality-for-being. Insofar as its understanding itself happens due to a pre-ontological understanding of being, understanding of being constitutes Dasein's being. Thus, we can give an account of Dasein's being, care, only if we consider it with regard to a distinctive understanding of itself which will have in view *being* as *Sache selbst*. Since the latter can only be regarded in terms of accessibility to it,

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 195.

ontological investigation requires maintaining Dasein's possibility as a possibility. For Heidegger, this amounts to saying that Dasein understands authentically its ownmost possibility; the possibility of the impossibility of existence, which is death. Thus, we should say that *being-towards-death* is *being towards a possibility*.

We know that death is not a possibility to be actualized as it is the case with present-at-hand entities. Rather, death should be preserved as a possibility. Moreover, it is not a possibility to be expected insofar as expecting is based on the idea of actualization of what is possible. Dasein's comporting to the possibility of death is not expecting, "but Being towards this possibility, as Being-towards-death, is so to comport ourselves towards *death* that in this Being, and for it, death reveals itself *as a possibility*. Our terminology for such Being towards this possibility is '*anticipation*' of this possibility".²²¹ *Anticipation* (*Vorlaufen*) does not mean coming close to a possibility in order to make it available. If there is a coming close in anticipation, this just makes the possibility of the possible greater. This is so because Dasein, as anticipation of itself, anticipates its potentiality-for-being. Dasein projects its own possibility to itself from itself and this refers to its understanding of its being as a whole. Thus, for Dasein, the possibility of the impossibility of existence is the possibility of *authentic existence* insofar as it understands itself in its revealing as a whole. This is why death is Dasein's ownmost possibility. Besides, it is non-relational in the sense that this ownmost possibility matters to Dasein alone in the sense that Dasein has to consider its ownmost possibility. This means that this ownmost, non-relational possibility cannot be outstripped; in its authentic understanding, Dasein accepts this fact in the sense that, "in anticipation, Dasein guards itself against falling back behind itself, or behind the potentiality-for-Being which it has understood".²²² Dasein already understands itself as a potentiality-for-being insofar as it anticipates this potentiality-for-being for itself, that is, it anticipates its being as a possibility. This means that the possibility of death is certain. Death makes certain that Dasein is the potentiality-for-being. However,

²²¹ Ibid., p. 306. "Das Sein zur Möglichkeit als Sein zum Tode soll aber zu *ihm* sich so verhalten, daß er sich in diesem Sein und für es *als Möglichkeit* enthüllt. Solches Sein zur Möglichkeit fassen wir terminologisch als *Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit*." (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 262.)

²²² Ibid., p. 308.

certainty of death is indefinite with respect to its 'when' in such a way that Dasein comports to its ownmost possibility from a constant threat. This constant threat is disclosed on the basis of Dasein's thrownness which is its 'that it is there'. As we have seen, in anxiety, Dasein comes face to face with the nothing of the possible impossibility of existence. Anxiety is anxious about Dasein's own potentiality-for-being in its totality so that being of Dasein becomes an issue for it, in its being. Then, for Heidegger, the existential analysis of death shows us that in this ownmost possibility, for Dasein, the possibility of being itself is already opened. This is why Heidegger characterizes death as 'freedom towards death', in a sense, Dasein is destined to it. However, this becomes plausible only if we are convinced that there is no other way *to be*. This means that mere possibility of death does not make it necessary to say that death is the ownmost possibility of Dasein. We should also make clear that Dasein is thrown into this possibility. In other words, we should project death into its ontic grounds; or with more Heideggerian terms, we should see how it is already projected there.

Being-towards-death constitutes the possibility of authentic existence of Dasein. However, for Heidegger, what we need is to ask whether Dasein *demand*s this authentic possibility. Thus, authenticity of Dasein's existence should be more than an ontological possibility in a way that it is demanded by Dasein's being. Heidegger describes this phenomenon as Dasein's attestation of the authentic potentiality-for-Being and since it means that Dasein is given to itself to be understood, such an attestation directly leads us to the problem of *potentiality-for-being-one's-self*. As we have seen, in everydayness, 'who' of Dasein is not 'I myself', but the 'they-self'. What characterizes Dasein under the guidance of 'they-self' is the fact that Dasein makes no choices, or it does not matter 'who' makes those choices. Dasein is lost in the 'they-self'. As a modification of this inauthenticity, in its authenticity, Dasein is brought back to itself and "when Dasein thus brings itself back [Das Sichzurückholen] from the 'they', the 'they-self' is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes *authentic* Being-one's-self".²²³ It is difficult to understand the transition from the 'they-self' to the 'being-one's-self' (*Selbstsein*). However, what motivates Heidegger's thought can be understood in

²²³ Ibid., p. 313.

terms of the following phrase: “but because Dasein is *lost* in the ‘they’, it must first *find* itself. In order to find *itself* at all, it must be ‘shown’ to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its *possibility*, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested”.²²⁴ One may ask why Dasein has to find itself. But, this would be the most wrong question to be raised against Heidegger. We should notice that Heidegger’s aim, in starting with everydayness, does not consist in saving practice. *Being and Time* is not the book which tells us how to cope with the world around us. As our previous chapter shows us, being ready-to-hand or being-produced is the primary way that beings are said. Indeed, it is the unique way where we can locate Dasein into the realm which is grounded on nothing but a logical exigency. When we look at *Being and Time*, everydayness, Dasein’s ordinary understanding itself in terms of ready-to-hand is the first and foremost way that sense of being is revealed. This is why Heidegger, after exploring each existential phenomenon, returns to the ontic level. His aim is not to give us proof of the ontological by means of the ontic because this returning to the ontic already determines Dasein’s being. This is not a demonstration, but attestation (*Bezeugung*), a testimony, or in Husserlian terms, evidence. However, it is not an evidence which is based on making present. It is the evidence of making possible in the sense of how Dasein appropriates its being-possible from itself. Thus, it is wrong to ask why Dasein has to find itself. Its finding itself is already determined by its losing itself which is grounded in being as such. However, we should bear in mind that Dasein is not thrown into a determinacy which forces it to choose itself. Rather, Dasein is thrown into its very being and as a possibility, it is already a potentiality-for-being-its-self. And it appropriates its possibility by appropriating its potentiality-for-being-its-self by coming to understand that its very being is demanded by itself. Dasein is potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen*); it does not choose itself but it chooses to make choice; it chooses *to be*.

For Heidegger, this amounts to saying that Dasein’s potentiality-for-being is attested by the *voice of conscience* (*Stimme des Gewissens*). At first, it should be said that phenomenon of conscience belongs to the disclosure of Dasein, to the being of the ‘there’. In that sense, it gives us *something* to understand in such a way that

²²⁴ Ibid.

Dasein is 'there' for itself. Insofar as Dasein, proximally and for the most part, understands itself in terms of its world, it is lost in the idle talk of the 'they'. It does not hear its authentic self; instead it listens away to the 'they'. However, this listening away is interrupted by the possibility of a hearing which comes from Dasein itself. If there is such a calling, Heidegger names it the conscience. As a disclosure, to the conscience belong understanding, state-of-mind and discourse. Heidegger emphasizes on the discursive character of conscience in order to explicate its existential structure. Then, conscience, as a mode of discourse is a call to which what is talked about belongs. There remains to approach to the call from three perspectives. First, we should ask: to what is the appeal made? The answer is obviously Dasein. Insofar as Dasein always understands itself in terms of its world, the call is directed to the 'they-self' of everydayness. The second question is about the what of the calling. To what is Dasein called? To one's own self. When the call is appealed to the 'they-self', it passes over it and in this passing over, 'they-self' is called to the self. Finally, in the call, Dasein is called to 'nothing'. The call does not give us information about daily matters; it is not a part of communication. Indeed, the call of conscience is nothing but reticence or keeping silent. However, this tripartite structure still does not explain the relationship between the one who is called and the one who does the calling. Although it shows that it is the 'they-self' who is called to the 'self', it still looks at the matter on the side of the 'they-self'. Indeed, in an existentiell way, the problem may be seen as the appealing to the 'they-self' from the self. In such a way of regarding the issue, the caller may be seen as indefinite. Thus, in its existentiell sense, one may say that Dasein calls itself. "Ontologically, however, it is not enough to answer that Dasein is *at the same time* both the caller and the one to whom the appeal is made. When Dasein is appealed to, *is* it not 'there' in a different way from that in which it does the calling? Shall we say that its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self functions as the caller?"²²⁵ We cannot easily use 'at the same time' without understanding the *being* of Dasein. But, the being of Dasein is care. Heidegger tries to understand the split of the self which becomes visible through the phenomenon of call by considering this split as it belongs to the very being of Dasein. The call belongs to the existential constitution of

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 320.

Dasein in the sense that “‘it’ calls, against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes *from* me and yet *from beyond me*”.²²⁶ To say that the call comes both from and beyond me is another way of saying that ‘it’ calls. What Heidegger wants us to see is that this ‘it’ is not an entity other than Dasein. When we accept that it calls Dasein to its ownmost self, which means that Dasein’s potentiality-for-being-self is projected in its being, we should realize that this existential phenomenon is based on the fact that there is no free-floating self-projection. In other words, Dasein’s projection, even the ownmost one, requires a thrown basis. As thrown into existence, Dasein comes to face with the fact ‘that it is, and that it has to be something with a potentiality-for-being as the entity which it is’. Since for the most part, Dasein is lost in the ‘they’, it flees in the face of its thrownness or its uncanniness which is revealed as anxiety through which Dasein comes face to face with the ‘nothing’ of the world, that is, itself as *Seinkönnen*. Then, Heidegger says, “The caller is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as the ‘not-at-home’—the bare ‘that it is’ in the ‘nothing’ of the world”.²²⁷ Dasein is called by itself (abandoned to itself) from its falling to its potentiality-for-being. Thus, for Heidegger, the call of conscience is ontologically possible as long as Dasein is care.

However, it is still obscure how the caller and the one to whom the appeal is made are *at the same time* Dasein itself. We have seen that the caller is Dasein in its thrownness. But any calling requires to be considered with respect to the possible *hearing* corresponding to it. Although the caller is indefinite, its *whence* which is thrownness, is not so in the sense that in this calling, thrownness is called too as the *whither* to which Dasein is called back. Thus, the call of conscience is both a calling forth and a calling back. As Heidegger insists, “when the call gives us a potentiality-for-Being to understand, it does not give us one which is ideal and universal; it discloses it as that which has been currently individualized and which belongs to that

²²⁶ Ibid.,

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 321.

particular Dasein”.²²⁸ When the call calls Dasein forth to its potentiality-for-being, it already calls Dasein back to its thrown individualization. This becomes understandable when we remember that the call is a mode of disclosure through which we understand something. What is understood or disclosed in the calling can be manifest in what we hear in the experience of conscience. For Heidegger, in conscience, what is disclosed is the fact that Dasein is addressed as guilty (*schuldig*). Being-guilty is ordinarily understood either as *having-debts* (*Schulden haben*) or as *being responsible for* (*schuld sein an*). In those senses, being-guilty is still understood with respect to a law or ‘ought’ according to which guilt is connected with a failure to comply with the law. As it can be seen, being-guilty in this way implies a lack in the sense of something present-at-hand which ought to be but missing. Still, Heidegger does not deny that being-guilty in its existential sense includes ‘not’. Insofar as we understand this ‘not’ as a ‘not’, we also grasp that being-guilty has a sense of ‘having responsibility for’ as the being-the basis for. “Hence we define the formally existential idea of the ‘Guilty!’ as ‘Being-the-basis for a Being which has been defined by a ‘not’—that is to say, as ‘*Being-the-basis of a nullity*’”.²²⁹ This also means that being-guilty does not arise from the indebtedness, but the latter is based on the primordial being-guilty. Dasein is not even indebted to itself; it does not produce its thrown basis, its ‘that it is and has to be’ from its self. In other words, thrownness is not something which happens to Dasein. Dasein is always ‘that it is’ in the sense that “to this entity it has been delivered over, and as such it can exist solely as the entity which it is; and *as this entity* to which it has been delivered over, it *is, in its existing*, the basis of its potentiality-for-Being”.²³⁰ Dasein does not lay the basis for itself, rather it *is* its basis. In other words, “it is never existent *before* its basis, but only *from it* and *as this basis*. Thus, ‘Being-a-basis’ means *never* to have power over one’s ownmost Being from the ground up. This ‘not’ belongs to the existential meaning of ‘thrownness’. It itself, being a basis, *is* a

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 326.

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 329.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 330.

nullity of itself”.²³¹ Dasein cannot have a control over its being; it does not need to give a reason for its being because Dasein is already a being which is the being of its basis. Thus, as being the basis of itself, Dasein’s being is constituted by a nullity, not as a lack, but in the sense that being-the-basis has a character of ‘not’; it is null. This means that Dasein is guilty, not because it is indebted to something other than itself, but because in its being, it always has to take over its being-the-basis.

This becomes understandable when we grasp how nullity constitutes thrownness, projection and falling. In the case of thrownness, we have said that Dasein is always ‘that it is’ but it should be noticed that Dasein is thrown to its being, *not* as itself as long as it is not in Dasein’s power to be thrown to its being. In projection, insofar as Dasein understands itself in terms of its possibilities, it has already chosen some possibilities and *not* others. Heidegger calls this nullity in projection *freedom* for existentiell possibilities in the sense that Dasein tolerates not choosing some possibilities or its inability to choose all of them. What about falling? The nullity of falling is described by means of the nullity of thrownness which is regarded as the basis of inauthentic Dasein. Insofar as Dasein is closed off in falling, conscience is possible so that there is something to be understood as guilty. Then, “that this primordial Being-guilty remains proximally and for the most part undisclosed, that it is kept closed off by Dasein’s falling Being, *reveals* only the aforesaid nullity”.²³² It can be recognized that ‘not’ in the case of falling refers to the negativity of Dasein’s being as care. Insofar as Dasein calls itself as ‘they-self’, this calling happens from uncanniness towards its potentiality-for-being. But Dasein does not first find itself as guilty due to some deficiencies in everydayness, rather it is guilty in the way it is. Thus, this is a two-dimensional phenomenon which happens *at the same time*, which means that “the appeal calls back by calling forth: it calls Dasein *forth* to the possibility of taking over, in existing, even that thrown entity which it is; it calls Dasein *back* to its thrownness so as to understand this thrownness as the null basis which it has to take up into existence”.²³³ Nullity reveals itself

²³¹ Ibid.,

²³² Ibid., p. 332.

²³³ Ibid., p. 333.

through the interaction between projection and thrownness in such a way that what is at issue is not only thrown projection, but also projected thrownness. The fact that Dasein is thrown into its being is already projected by its very being. This helps Heidegger to reinforce the idea that call is the call of the care. But, it is still not clear how fallen Dasein involves 'not'. In the case of thrownness and projection, negativity belongs to their being. In other words, when we say that as thrown, Dasein is *not* itself, we mean that thrownness *is*. The same is true for projection. Then, if as fallen, Dasein is *not* itself, falling must *be*. However, in calling, 'they-self' is *passed over*; it is neither *from* nor *towards*. How can its nullity be constituted?²³⁴ Dasein is *not* itself in falling and the fact that it is not itself is determined by its thrownness which is already projected to itself. Thus, 'they-self' is summoned to being-guilty through which Dasein stands before itself as a possibility. In such an understanding of itself, Dasein becomes ready for the appeal which calls itself to itself. Accordingly, the fallenness *is* insofar as Dasein's being 'as a whole' is already taken into view. This is what it means to say that Dasein chooses itself. Heidegger says: "understanding the call is choosing; but it is not a choosing of conscience, which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is *having-a-conscience* as Being-free for one's ownmost Being-guilty. '*Understanding the appeal*' means '*wanting to have a conscience*'".²³⁵ Wanting to have a conscience does not mean that Dasein voluntarily chooses what it is. Rather, Dasein is ready for its 'that it is', for being the null basis of itself as itself.

Thus, in 'wanting to have a conscience', Dasein understands itself as disclosing itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This understanding occurs as Dasein's projecting itself upon its factual possibility of having potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. In addition to understanding, as a disclosure, to the call of conscience belong state-of-mind and discourse. As we can notice, insofar as hearing the call, Dasein is brought face to face with its uncanniness, wanting to have a

²³⁴ Put differently as David Wood asks "if the authentic self were dissatisfied with its lostness in the 'they', why would it need the call of conscience to effect a break?" For Wood, behind this, there may be a metaphysical desire of a philosopher for an idealization in order to protect oneself against the uncertainties of the sign. This Derridian critique, although it is valuable, goes beyond our inquiry. (David Wood, *The Deconstruction of time*, Northwestern University Press, 2001. p. 199, 200)

²³⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 334.

conscience means to be ready for anxiety. In its discursive site, as we pointed out before, call of conscience does not come to utterance therefore defined as reticence or keeping silent. Heidegger brings together this phenomenal structure in terms of another phenomenon which is *resoluteness* (*Entschlossenheit*) by saying that “this distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—*this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety*—we call ‘*resoluteness*’”.²³⁶ What is at issue is that resoluteness is a mode of Dasein’s disclosedness in a distinctive way. Its distinctive character lies in that as a resolute being, “in understanding the call, Dasein lets its ownmost Self *take action in itself* [*in sich handeln*] in terms of that potentiality-for-Being which it has chosen. Only so it can *be* answerable [*verantwortlich*]”.²³⁷ Authenticity of Dasein’s being as a whole can only be laid bare when we see that how Dasein is *responsible* for *being*. This means that in resoluteness, Dasein’s very being is attested in such a way that this very being is left to its factual possibility so that it is answered and this possibility is appropriated too. Thus, it would be wrong to ask ‘on what basis does Dasein disclose itself in resoluteness?’. What we need to see is that

*The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factually possible at the time. To resoluteness, the indefiniteness characteristic of every potentiality-for-Being into which Dasein has been factually thrown, is something necessarily belongs. Only in a resolution is resoluteness is sure of itself. The existentiell indefiniteness of resoluteness never makes itself definite except in a resolution; yet it has, all the same, its existential definiteness.*²³⁸

Resoluteness is not a voluntary action by which indefiniteness of Dasein’s being is made definite. Rather, through resoluteness, this indefiniteness as thrown basis is made possible so that Dasein’s potentiality-for-being is attested. Without this attestation, we cannot claim for Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole because only in resolution, Dasein is ‘there’ for its self as an *existing* being, in the fact *that it has to be*. Since only as existing, an understanding of being belongs to Dasein, resoluteness gives us the possibility of a horizon where being becomes a question. Thus, we can say that resolution is *resolving* of Dasein’s being for that with

²³⁶ Ibid., p. 343.

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 334.

²³⁸ Ibid., p. 345.

regard to which it is already understood, that is, being. Heidegger calls this kind of disclosure *Situation*; “the ‘there’ as which the existent entity is there”.²³⁹ In situation, being of the ‘there’ is in such a way that Dasein exists. In other words, being-there *is* in the sense that existence is not an empty ideal for Dasein, but the name of its being.

This is what it means to say that Dasein’s being as a whole is always what is at issue. Even resoluteness as the attestation of Dasein’s potentiality-for-being is understood with regard to existence through which Dasein’s existentiell possibilities are designated in order to ‘think these possibilities through to the end’.²⁴⁰ The latter means that existential phenomena are projected upon existentiell possibilities in order to be answered in each case. Then, we should notice that in the case of resoluteness, Dasein’s being is projected upon being-guilty which is an existentiell possibility. However, in order that resoluteness becomes transparent, Heidegger insists, being-guilty should be understood as something constant. Insofar as being-guilty is a potentiality-for-being, “to say that Dasein ‘is’ constantly guilty can only mean that in every case Dasein maintains itself in this Being and does so as either authentic or inauthentic existing”.²⁴¹ Thus, constancy of being-guilty is not to be understood in terms of presence-at-hand. Rather, Dasein *is* guilty in each case as existentiell possibility. And this constant understanding of itself is possible if Dasein’s potentiality-for-being is disclosed. Heidegger writes that:

This understanding maintains itself, therefore, in a primordial possibility of Dasein. It maintains itself *authentically in it* if the resoluteness is primordially that which it tends to be. But we have noticed that Dasein’s primordial Being towards its potentiality-for-Being is Being-towards-death—that is to say, towards that distinctive possibility of Dasein which we have already characterized. Anticipation discloses this possibility as possibility. Thus, only *as anticipating*, does resoluteness become a primordial Being towards Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-being. Only when it ‘qualifies’ itself as Being-towards-death does resoluteness understand the ‘can’ of its potentiality-for-Being-guilty.²⁴²

Primordial interpretation of Dasein’s being that Heidegger looks for in section 45 of *Being and Time* is given now through the possible interconnection between anticipation of death and resolution. Heidegger attracts our attention to this

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 346.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 350.

²⁴¹ Ibid., p. 353.

²⁴² Ibid., p. 354.

possibility by asking at the beginning of section 61 in the following way: “what if it is only in the *anticipation* of death that all the factual ‘*anticipatoriness*’ of resolving would be authentically understood—in other words, that it would be *caught up with* in an existentiell way?”²⁴³ For Heidegger, this is nothing but to think the phenomenon of resoluteness through to the end. Existential understanding of ‘anticipatoriness’ (*Vorläufigkeit*) of resoluteness, (which comes from the word ‘vorläufig’, namely, ‘provisional’), requires that what is put forward at the beginning as provisional constitutes itself in its own possibility, indeed, as the sole possibility. This means that Dasein is possible as its very being, that is to say, its potentiality-for-being is disclosed to itself ‘right to its end’. We know that Dasein’s being-at-an-end is its being-towards-death. Thus, resoluteness, when it is thought through its end, is already *anticipating*. Only anticipating Dasein’s ownmost possibility, resoluteness can resolve upon Dasein’s being-guilty as a factual potentiality-for-being. For Heidegger, this helps us to see that anticipation of death is not a free-floating possibility but attested in resolution. Since this anticipation is towards Dasein’s being a whole, we should remark that our underlying problematic which is Dasein’s being in its totality, rests on an ontic possibility of Dasein in terms of an existentiell attestation.

However, for Heidegger, this does not mean that existence of Dasein is wholly bounded by existentiell possibilities. Rather, we have Dasein’s existence in advance and what we have in advance is guaranteed by the way Dasein understands itself as a whole in its authenticity, which now becomes visible through anticipatory resoluteness. Thus, analytic of Dasein is just letting this entity understand itself with regard to the projection of its own being for the first time. Since Dasein is not a worldless subject, but being-in-the-world, its being is already *cared* or understood by itself. What is at stake here is not the possibility of a subject, but the totality of Dasein’s structural whole, in its self-constancy as care. The latter becomes possible through anticipatory resoluteness which is primordial mode of Dasein’s being as care. This means that Dasein’s being as care constitutes its own meaning as itself. In section 65 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger clarifies this point by saying that “that upon

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 350. “Wenn im *Vorlaufen* zum Tode erst alle faktische ‘*Vorläufigkeit*’ des Entschließens eigentlich verstanden, das heißt existenziell *eingeholt* ware.” (*Sein und Zeit* p. 302.)

which the Being which has been disclosed and is thus constituted has been projected, is that which itself makes possible this Constitution of Being as care. When we inquire about the meaning of care, we are asking *what makes possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of care, in the unity of its articulation as we have unfolded it*”.²⁴⁴ Meaning of care can be seen with respect to the upon-which of projection where it becomes possible as itself. Since this means that we have already begun studying projection, upon-which of the projection can only be made explicit through what has been projected in this projection. We know that that which is projected primordially in Dasein’s existence is anticipatory resoluteness. This is an authentic being-a-whole of Dasein and it is possible with regard to the unity of its articulated structural whole

...only in that Dasein *can, indeed*, come towards itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus letting itself come towards itself—in other words, that it exists. This letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the *future as coming towards*.²⁴⁵

Dasein’s being as being-towards-death is futural in the sense that Dasein is the entity in its being which comes towards itself. Thus, to be futural (*zukünftiges*) does not point to a *now* which is *not yet* actual. Insofar as Dasein as being-towards-death is its not-yet, futurity belongs to Dasein’s being. With regard to what is understood in anticipatory resoluteness, Heidegger reminds us that as anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein takes over itself as guilty, as the thrown basis of nullity. “Taking over thrownness, however, is possible only in such a way that the futural Dasein can be its ownmost ‘as-it-already-was’—that is to say, its ‘been’ [sein ‘Gewesen’].”²⁴⁶ Dasein comes towards itself as it already was, that is, Dasein’s coming-towards, its futurity is a coming back. On the other hand, anticipatory resoluteness lets Dasein encounter with entities which are ready-to-hand. This happens as the disclosure of the Situation where Dasein is alongside entities which are present by *making* them *present*. Then, with regard to the unity of this structure, we can say that “the character of ‘having been’ arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which ‘has been’ (or

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 371.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 372.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 373. “Die Übernahme der Geworfenheit ist aber nur so möglich, daß das zukünftige Dasein sein eigenstes “wie es je schon war”, das heißt sein ‘Gewesen’ *sein* kann.” (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 325.)

better, which ‘is in the process of having been’) releases from itself the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as ‘*temporality*’.²⁴⁷ It should be noted that temporality (*zeitlichkeit*) is not a sequence of now points as it is accepted by our ordinary understanding of time and its infinity. Instead, ordinary time is a derived mode of original temporality and Heidegger points to this difference by calling each moment of temporality *ecstase* in the sense that “*temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself*”.²⁴⁸ Only in this way, temporality gives us the primordial unity of the structure of care. As futural, Dasein’s existentiality becomes possible insofar as as coming-towards itself, Dasein always projects itself as potentiality-for-being. This projection occurs as long as Dasein is already its ‘having been’, that is, as a thrown entity, Dasein’s self-projection is always open to the impossibility of its existence which means that Dasein is its null basis in the taking over this thrownness. Thus, existing is to be in ownmost nullity. This determines the *finitude* (*Endlichkeit*) which is proper to Dasein and its temporality. Moreover, insofar as as coming-towards itself as having-been, Dasein makes present, for Heidegger, this shows us how falling is also grounded in temporality. Thus, temporality is the meaning of care if we are allowed to say that ‘temporality is...’ Heidegger prefers to say that “temporality ‘is’ not an *entity* at all. It is not, but it *temporalizes* itself”.²⁴⁹ Dasein’s being as care does not happen throughout time, but it *is* temporal. This is the only way for Dasein to understand itself as “ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)” and only in that way, as temporal, Dasein’s being becomes an issue for itself as a potentiality-for-being-a whole. But, this is possible only if Dasein projects itself to itself as the primary ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, which means that Dasein understands being *in advance* as *that* being which finds itself in such a pre-ontological understanding.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 374.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 377.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Einar Øverenget claims that Heidegger’s analysis of temporality does not result in a collapse of egology, does not eliminate subjectivity as such. For him, Heidegger’s discussion of primordial

3.3. Transcendence, world and ground

In the preceding sections, we have dealt with the structure of the Dasein's being, first in its relation to being, then, in its relation to itself. Given that, as we have already articulated in the first chapter, philosophical *logos* and its truth needs a distinctive kind of being whose mode of being is based on a pre-ontological understanding of being which becomes manifest as being-produced as the primordial sense of οὐσία, what makes Dasein distinctive seems to be that it is ontically-ontological. Thus, it would be wrong to think that Dasein is *fundamental* just because it has a relation to its being. Indeed, this is possible insofar as Dasein is not just a being among other beings, but it has an understanding of being which is grounded in how it finds itself among beings according to the basic sense of οὐσία, which is being-produced. Only if Dasein has been affected from within this being-in-the-world, its very being which is already made necessary by the meaning of being becomes an issue for it. In other words, horizon of the questioning is always being of beings, and since it is always being *of* beings, meaning of being is constituted as the disclosure of Dasein's being which happens through the encounter with beings, which is world. Insofar as being is not a being, but meaning as such, understanding of being is made possible through the analytic of Dasein where Dasein's being-possible is constituted as the place of a primordial happening. This becomes possible when we see that even the utmost impossibility of Dasein, its death is presented as its ownmost possibility. Only in that way, *already* being its own null basis, Dasein resolves into *being*, as that it has to be in each case, as that it is. This alreadyness refers to the priority of Dasein's existence, the fact that it is temporal as a coming towards itself as it has been and its prior understanding of being as such. In the section 63 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger questions this hermeneutic situation in the following way:

How have the steps in the analysis of inauthentic everydayness been regulated, if not by the concept of existence which we have posited? And if we say that Dasein 'falls', and that therefore the authenticity of its potentiality-for-Being must be wrested from Dasein in spite of this tendency of its Being, from what point of view is this spoken? Is not everything

temporality does not give us time as a pre-egological phenomenon. "Rather, temporality is prior to Dasein in the phenomenological sense of this term, that is, temporality brings out the full meaning of Dasein and by doing so it in fact cements the primordial status of this entity". (Einar Øverenget, *Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity*, Dordrecht ; Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998. p. 310.)

already illuminated by the light of the ‘presupposed’ idea of existence, even if rather dimly? Where does this idea get its justification?²⁵¹

Heidegger answers by saying that “the idea of existence which we have posited gives us an outline of the formal structure of the understanding of Dasein and does so in a way which is not binding from an existentiell point of view”.²⁵² This formal idea of existence, although it is independent from existentiell possibilities, presupposes the idea of being in general. As Heidegger emphasizes, this presupposition should not be regarded as an axiom through which we deduce conclusions. Rather, we should carefully ask “does this pre-supposing have the character of an understanding projection, in such a manner indeed that the Interpretation by which such an understanding gets developed, will let that which is to be interpreted *put itself into words for the very first time, so that it may decide its own accord whether, as the entity which it is, it has that state of Being for which it has been disclosed in the projection with regard to its formal aspects?* Is there any other way at all by which an entity can put itself into words with regard to its Being?”²⁵³ Idea of being as such as ‘presupposed’ primordially leads Dasein to decide its own destiny. Only if Dasein has the possibility to be what it could be, sense of being is kept into view. As we have seen, this circularity belongs to the being of Dasein and Heidegger, in the final paragraph of *Being and Time*, returns to this issue by saying that

Something like ‘Being’ has been disclosed in the understanding-of-Being which belongs to existent Dasein as a way in which it understands. Being has been disclosed in a preliminary way, though non-conceptually; and this makes it possible for Dasein as existent Being-in-the-world to comport itself *towards entities*—towards those which it encounters within-the-world as well as towards itself as existent. *How is this disclosive understanding of Being at all possible for Dasein?* Can this question be answered by going back to the *primordial constitution-of-Being* of that Dasein by which Being is understood?²⁵⁴

In the constitution of the being of Dasein, being is already disclosed. Put better, it is through Dasein’s being as temporal, the fact that being is already disclosed becomes manifest. Thus, fundamental ontology not only consists in an exposition of this distinctive being called Dasein, but also, in such an investigation, preliminary

²⁵¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 361.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 362.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 488.

understanding or sense of being is brought to near. Accordingly, as Heidegger states in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, “by a fundamental ontology we mean the basic grounding of ontology in general. This includes: 1) a grounding that exhibits the intrinsic possibility of the being question as the basic problem of metaphysics—the interpretation of Dasein as temporality; 2) an explication of basic problems contained in the question of being—the temporal exposition of the problem of being; 3) the development of the self-understanding of this problematic, its task and limits—the overturning”.²⁵⁵ We can argue that the first corresponds to what is worked out in *Being and Time*. Second refers to the missing part of this major work and Heidegger tried to handle this issue in his lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. With regard to the third, we come across a period of thinking which Heidegger calls *metontology* including his works produced between 1927-1930. It is wrong to think those three aspects of fundamental ontology as distinct from each other. It seems that for Heidegger, when he is saying that “fundamental ontology does not exhaust the notion of metaphysics”,²⁵⁶ what is problematic is to think the first without others. Up to now, we have seen that, being is there insofar as beings are accessible and this accessibility refers to Dasein’s understanding of its world and its self. Now, Heidegger states that “since being is there only insofar as beings are already there [im Da], fundamental ontology has in it the latent tendency toward a primordial, metaphysical transformation which becomes possible only when being is understood in its whole problematic”.²⁵⁷ What lies hidden in the existential analysis of Dasein, that is, the fact that Dasein is destined to being, is now called into question from within the questioning itself. This amounts to seeing that what is latent in the constitution of Dasein’s being is the being as such, not as a presupposition but as the phenomenon *par excellence* which constitutes the possibility of any inquiry as possible. Fundamental ontology needs to turn back to its origin, to the being problem as such, not to overcome the hermeneutical circle, but to enter into it. Thus, Heidegger’s analysis in *Being and Time* has no result, but comes with a more originary *claim* as the question-worthiness of being. It is already given for such an

²⁵⁵ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 154.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 156.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

ontology to be grounded as its own questioning *to the end*, and Heidegger adds “this new investigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and is the result of its overturning [Umschlag], its μεταβολή. I designate this set of questions *metontology*”.²⁵⁸ As we have mentioned above, this overturning, not to be confused with famous *Kehre*, consists in the self-understanding of the fundamental ontology—setting its task and its limits before itself.

Alexander Schnell is one of those commentators who argues that in this period of metontology, “Heidegger defends himself (at the latest beginning from 1928) against the identification of being (in general) and being of Dasein on behalf of the reconciliation of being and world”.²⁵⁹ Indeed, for Heidegger, what matters is not the character of relation between being in general and being of Dasein, but the fact that this relation or correlation finds itself again within the general problematic of being as such. This is a fact; not a brut fact, but a happening as Dasein. Thus, overturning in the sense of changing the perspective does not leave aside Dasein but refers to an intrinsic possibility of the general problem of being which requires to reconsider the correlation between being and Dasein in order that this relation can be grounded primordially. If being no longer refers to the being of Dasein, but to the world, this does not mean that Heidegger, after *Being and Time*, tries to reduce the role of Dasein within the discussion. It rather means that that which remains silent in *Being and Time*, the fact that being is always being *of* beings, shows up again in order to ground Dasein more originally as the entity which finds itself among beings with an understanding of being. Thus, it is not surprising that after *Being and Time*, *ontological difference* becomes a fundamental issue for Heidegger’s thinking. Ontological difference is possible insofar as Dasein understands being, but in order that Dasein as a factic entity becomes possible, beings as a whole should be already revealed. In other words, ontological difference refers to human existence in the sense that only if being-there of being is occurred, understanding of being as the subjectivity of the subject takes place. Being is there only if beings as a whole are already revealed. Thus, it is a matter of understanding Dasein with regard to this

²⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 157.

²⁵⁹ Alexander Schnell, *De l’existence ouverte au monde fini, Heidegger 1925-1930*, Librairie Philosophique Vrin, 2005. p. 44. (my translation)

already revealing so that its relation to being as such to be grounded again. Heidegger, gradually in his path of thinking, turns his attention from the basic constitution of Dasein's being as that being which takes over the questioning to the general problem of being as the possibility of ontology as such or metaphysics. In other words, in *Being and Time*, he looks at the *Sache selbst*, being as such from the side of Dasein as the possible occurrence of being, but following *Being and Time*, he starts to look at Dasein from the side of the phenomenon itself. Dasein is no longer a subject which is assigned the task of taking over the question of being, not because being is not always there, but because there is no need to determine Dasein within the scenario of questioning in order to make visible the horizon of being. Rather, being is there in such a way that it is already awakened in its *Da*, though pre-thematically. Beings and the understanding of their being happen in a unique way. Does this mean that we are looking for the ground of beings? For Heidegger, we are not looking for the being of beings, but for the being *of* beings. In other words, we have no right to think of difference by means of the differentiated terms; rather, we let the difference happen in such a way that we see that we are already with beings in their manifestation as a whole. Thus, against traditional philosophy which asks for the ground of beings, and determines this ground as being, the grounding of beings cannot be answered by beginning from beings. Rather, what should be held in view is being as such and this can be possible insofar as Dasein exists as the understanding of being. And what we should know is that this understanding of being is possible insofar as Dasein is primarily towards beings in their manifestation as a whole which is world. Heidegger describes this primordial happening as *transcendence* of Dasein, which will show us that Dasein is never once closed and then opened to the world. For Dasein, it is not a matter of choice to be in the world, rather, it always has its world. There are not first beings and then their being through which being of Dasein gains its meaning. Rather, the very difference between beings and being is Dasein itself in the sense that it is towards beings and towards itself at the same time.

We know that Dasein is not towards this or that being, or towards their totality; Dasein does not indicate an interiority as opposed to an exterior reality. Dasein is towards beings *as a whole*, which corresponds to the fact that they are accessible, in their entry into the world. As we have seen, in order to say something

as something, we already have to do with *something*. This primary encounter with beings implies an understanding of being. Moreover, we now know that this understanding of being whose main character is its thereness speaks in beings there. In other words, we are already with beings. Heidegger, in *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, calls this situation transcendence of Dasein and distinguishes it from intentionality in the following way: “this phenomenon of transcendence is not identical with the problem of the subject-object relation, but is more primordial in dimension and kind as a problem; it is directly connected with the problem of being as such”.²⁶⁰ Although intentionality aims at dissolving the problem of relation between subject and object, it is still insufficient insofar as it does not think over this relation itself. For Heidegger, when we carefully analyze this relation itself, we will see that it belongs to the essence of subject, not external to it. Thus, subjectivity of subject should be determined as this relating itself in the sense that Dasein is already with beings. In other words, while intentionality is an ontic transcending comportment of subject towards object, it presupposes more original, ontological transcendence. The fact that this ontological transcendence is directly related to the problem of being can be understood in the following way:

This primal transcendence makes possible every intentional relation to beings. But, this relation occurs in such a way that beings are in the ‘there’ of Da-sein in and for Dasein’s comportment for beings. The relation is based on a preliminary understanding of the being of beings. This understanding-of-being, however, first secures the possibility of beings manifesting themselves as beings. The understanding-of-being bears the light in whose brightness a being can show itself.²⁶¹

This original transcendence does not signify a relation towards beings, but to the being of beings in whose understanding beings can show themselves. Thus, there is a relationship between original transcendence and understanding of being. This relationship becomes understandable when we grasp that it is through the transcendence of Dasein, being as a possibility is there. Insofar as Dasein constitutes a ‘there’ for beings, being becomes an issue. But, being is an issue for Dasein insofar as Dasein essentially means transcendence; crossing over. In other words, Dasein does not first exist and then crosses over. Rather, it is the passage itself. What happens in that crossing-over? What does it mean to say that this original

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 135.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

transcendence is not between subject and object, but a crossing-over as such? What does Dasein surpass?

What gets crossed over is the being itself that can become manifest to the subject on the very basis of the subject's transcendence. Because the passage across exists with Dasein, and because with it beings which are not Dasein get surpassed, such beings become manifest as such, i.e., in themselves. Nothing else but transcendence, which has in advance surpassed beings, first makes possible for these, previously surpassed *as beings*, to be ontically *opposite* [Dasein] and as opposite to be apprehended in themselves.²⁶²

What is crossed over is not a distinction between subject and object, but beings themselves. We should notice that Dasein surpasses beings *in advance* in order that they become accessible ontically, which means that beings are understood in their *being* only opposite to Dasein, from a distance. We have already seen that this distance comes from the being-character of being as it was already. Now we can see that this what-being as it was already is appropriated by Dasein *in advance*. This is the fundamental aspect of Dasein's being which gives it privilege so that it is ontically ontological, that is, in its surpassing of beings, being of beings is already an issue for it. Thus, Dasein exists through the understanding of being, and it surpasses beings not in favor of a more universal structure, but towards their possibility to be in order that they are discovered as this or that being.

Thus, being is there insofar as beings are accessible and beings are accessible insofar as Dasein exists as transcending. In other words, beings are accessible if their being is already owned. It should be 'already' because in order that something is, there should be a transcendence which is required by being as such which is always the being of beings. This need for understanding 'being' *throws* Dasein into its proper possibility to be. Thus, Dasein, due to its mode of being as transcendence, like other beings, acquires its own possibility to be. This is possible insofar as Dasein's transcendence which makes possible each being in its being, including itself, is the only way that being reveals itself. This becomes evident when we remember that original transcendence surpasses beings in advance. Beings are crossed over in advance, that is, what is at issue is that being is already understood through this inbetween or crossing over. This secures being in two ways: first, being is secured by showing itself in its 'whence', namely, from this inbetween. Second, since being is

²⁶² Ibid., p. 166.

understood as this transcendence, its *saying* is guaranteed insofar as *logos* or truth is nothing but the happening of the correlation between world and human-being. We know that this correlation is not a present-at-hand entity but depends upon an excess of being. In that respect, world is not an entity, or their totality but towards-which of Dasein's transcendence. In the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger reminds us that world in its wholeness indicates 'beyond' in the sense of οὐ ἔνεκα of Platonic idea of good, namely, 'for-the-sake-of-which'. Since the latter implies a purposiveness, there must be a willing which is defined by this for-the-sake-of (*Umwillen*). And, this willing is Dasein in the sense that "it is Dasein's defining characteristic [Auszeichnende] that it is concerned with this being, in its being, in a specific way. Dasein exists for the sake of Dasein's being and its capacity-for-being".²⁶³ Thus, transcendence of Dasein gives us Dasein as the possibility of understanding being through which other beings could enter into the world. Dasein signifies a way-to-be through which being is cared in advance. Since 'to be' or being as such is the question itself, what is at issue is not Dasein's difference from other beings, but the fact that this difference keeps the difference between being and beings alive.

To interpret Dasein in terms of the basic question of being as being *of* beings, which is for Heidegger nothing but metaphysics of Dasein gives us Dasein in its utmost possibility, as a being which *essentially* transcends. "In other words, it must become clear from the metaphysics of Dasein why, in conforming to the essence of its being, Dasein must itself take over the question and answer concerning the final purpose, why searching for an objective answer is in itself a or *the* misunderstanding of human existence in general".²⁶⁴ Why Dasein takes over the question of being lies essentially in Dasein's being and Dasein's being is made possible by its very being which is in question in each case. As we have seen, in *Being and Time*, in the discussion of call of conscience, Heidegger deals with how Dasein is called by itself as itself. This means that Dasein is the only entity which has the possibility to choose its own self. Dasein *can* choose itself and this 'can' lies in Dasein's being. Insofar as

²⁶³ Ibid., p. 186

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 185.

Dasein's projection of its being is grounded in its thrownness into where it was already found itself, Dasein commits itself to itself, "not to where it might not yet be, but to where and how it already always is, qua Dasein, insofar as it already exists".²⁶⁵ This shows us that Dasein is already for-its-own-sake and the latter does not indicate an ontic act of will "but means rather the intrinsic possibility of willing: *freedom*. In freedom, such a for-the-sake-of has always already emerged".²⁶⁶ Dasein projects a world due to its possibility to be. We can realize that Heidegger tries to find transcendence in freedom. Insofar as Dasein is for and towards itself, it can give itself something to understand as world. This primal projection is the primal understanding which occurs as utmost possibility. However, this possibility is not arbitrary but insofar as it lies in Dasein's freedom, in its ability to be which is determined by its very being, its counter-hold is already given in this freedom. In that sense, "the world is maintained in freedom counter to freedom itself. The world is the free counter-hold of Dasein's for-the-sake-of".²⁶⁷ Thus, neither world nor Dasein is to be characterized as present-at-hand entities. To the surpassiveness of the world belongs the upswing of Dasein. Freedom does not only give us the purposiveness of Dasein's for-the-sake-of, but also, it is the appearance of all happening whereby the world becomes the counter-hold to this for-the-sake-of in order that Dasein, being bounded or committed, finds the place of choice. This is the original sense of transcendence in such a way that the world gains its true sense, as no-thing. The world is nothing of beings, which means that it cannot be captured or grasped by a subject or ego. It is the primordial towards-which and still its no-thing is not *nihil negativum*; "the world: a nothing, no being—and yet something; nothing of beings—but being".²⁶⁸ We cannot talk about world in terms of this or that being; rather, world is always to be considered as *beings' entry into the world*. Heidegger says that:

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 190.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 191.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 192.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 195. "Die Welt: ein Nichts, kein Seiendes—und doch etwas; nichts Seiendes—aber Sein." (*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, GA.26, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978. p. 252.)

At any rate, beings (extant things) could never get encountered had they not the opportunity to enter a world. We are speaking therefore of the possible and occasional entrance of beings into world. When and how is this possibility realized? Entry into world is not a process of extant things, in the sense that beings undergo a change thereby and through this change break into the world. The extant's entry into world is 'something' that happens to it. World-entry has the characteristic of happening, of history [Geschichte]. World-entry happens when transcendence happens, i.e., when historical Dasein exists. Only then is the being-in-the-world of Dasein existent. And only when the latter is existent, have extant things too already entered world, i.e., become intrawordly. And only Dasein, qua existing, provides the opportunity for world-entry.²⁶⁹

As we shall see later, Heidegger, with *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, reconsiders *Vorhandenheit* (extantness) in its relation to *Zuhandenheit*. For now, we can say that beings as extant things does not refer to beings of objective thinking as it is the case in *Being and Time*, but to beings as they lie *there*. Then, extant things lie there even if there is no world-entry. In other words, world-entry does not make extant things extant in order to be understood by us accordingly. "Rather, world-entry and its occurrence is solely the presupposition for extant things announcing themselves in their not requiring world-entry regarding their own being".²⁷⁰ Beings are there even if there is no world entry, but they emerge *as* the beings they are only through the transcendence of Dasein whereby they enter into the world. Thus, Dasein does not understand itself with regard to the way it encounters with beings; rather, it is that it is insofar as there is a possibility of a distinction between being and beings, a possibility which is already revealed. Before any encountering, beings should already enter into the world in such a way that the question of being as a question is already taken over by Dasein. This is primal history (*Urgeschichte*) and has no beginning in the sense of scientific historicism. What happens as primordial is the ongoing transformation of the subject as Dasein with regard to the question of being as long as this primordial occurrence is a possibility which needs to be made possible in each case. This explains why Heidegger wants us to determine Dasein in its metaphysical essence throughout this work. This does not mean that Dasein is a closed substantial entity. Contrary to that, it is never static; it does not hold a place, but being-held in each case, it meets the requirement of the primal happening as its own being.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 194.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 195.

We say that world-entry, emerging of beings into being, happens *when* Dasein transcends. Is there not a temporality in this happening? What we know as time is measuring but for Heidegger, this measuring means that we are reckoned by time. We never use ‘now’, ‘then’ or ‘formerly’ on their own, but always as an indicator over to beings. In other words, it is always ‘now when...’, ‘then when this and that...’ or ‘formerly when...’. Those time designations are always forward-indices, which show us their character of datability (*Datierbarkeit*). ‘Now’ is always ‘now—I am writing’, ‘then’ means ‘then, I am planning to finish my work’ or for ‘formerly’, ‘formerly, the work was not ready’ etc. In each case, we use these indicators unthematically, that is, we do not first have ‘now’ or ‘then’ and apply them to things that we encounter. We immediately say ‘now’, ‘then’ or ‘formerly’ insofar as we are with beings. Heidegger says: “in the ‘then, when...,’ an onward-reference occurs in the manner of an *indicator over to* beings, which themselves have a ‘when’ and thus date the ‘then’”.²⁷¹ Each time designation can be determinable by beings. Thus, the matter is the origin of these time designations. We know that they indicate over to beings; ‘now’ does not belong to this or that being, but it is dated as now by being in its being. For Heidegger, this datability of time is grounded in existence insofar as beings are surpassed in Dasein’s transcendence. Thus, time designations are grounded in existence; for instance, in the case of a planning, “we utter ‘then’ from out of a *mode of existence* in which we are *expectant* of a thing to come, of something to be accomplished”.²⁷² The same is also true for ‘now when’ and ‘then when’; for the first, the mode of existence is making-present, for the second, it is retention. Thus, time is dated by beings from out of existence. In other words, time is not determined by intentional comportments such as hoping, fearing or awaiting because these comportments would not be possible “if the Dasein that hopes, fears, etc., did not, as Dasein as such, stretch itself into a then-quality, completely aside from what it might encounter from the then”.²⁷³ Dasein is carried away into this then-quality in terms of expectance. There, beings are overleapt towards a ‘then-quality’, that is, the way beings are indicated is constituted by the

²⁷¹ Ibid., p. 205.

²⁷² Ibid., p. 201.

²⁷³ Ibid., p. 205.

way beings come to being. This event of ‘stepping out itself’ is called ecstasis in terms of a *raptus* (rapture). Dasein does not gradually traverse beings which are factually there towards a future, “but this traversing rather goes gradually through the open path made way by the raptus of temporality itself”.²⁷⁴ According to this ecstatic phenomenon of time, time is no longer understood on the basis of ‘now’ which, as a center, will constitute having-been and future. The unity of time comes from the temporality itself in its ecstatic structure as temporalization. This means that the unity of time is based on the unity of horizon. Heidegger insists that the word ‘ὀρίζειν’ should not be understood in terms of looking and intuiting. It primarily refers to what delimits, encloses, or the enclosure in the sense that each ecstasis determines its own limits. And it is the expectance, which as being-carried-away overleaping beings, provides the possibility pure and simple. Heidegger states “of itself the ecstasis does not produce a definite possible, but it produces the horizon of possibility in general, within which a definite possible can be expected”.²⁷⁵ *There is* horizon only in the oscillation of ecstases in such a way that “time reaches and contracts itself”.²⁷⁶ In other words, horizon is the temporalization of temporality and for Heidegger, “this ecstatic unity of the horizon of temporality is nothing other than the temporal condition for the possibility of *world* and world’s essential belonging to *transcendence*”.²⁷⁷ As we have seen, transcendence is Dasein’s upswing to the world and now we can see that this upswing and beings’ entry into world is a happening which is grounded as a temporal occurrence which temporalizes. The latter gives us pure and simple possibility as world-entry and this is why “the primal fact, in the metaphysical sense, is that there is anything like temporality at all”.²⁷⁸ In that sense, world is the *nihil originarium*; no-thing of the world belongs to the no-thing of temporalization of temporality insofar as the latter is not a being, but a primal fact.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 208.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 209.

The discussion of transcendence that Heidegger carries out in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* points to the fact that Dasein is already determined by a toward-which, namely, world and this transcending happens as the world-entry of beings. As a consequence, what is at issue is not Dasein's comportment toward beings, but the fact that it is already captivated by beings so that the difference between being and beings happens. This makes Dasein *metaphysical* as long as its being is *subjected* to the general problem of being which needs to be appropriated as the difference itself in each case. Only in that sense Dasein is the subject of this primordial history, not as the subject which underlies this primordial happening, but as the subject which needs to be taken up in each case insofar as only as Dasein, primordial phenomenon is made visible. This is why Heidegger, in this period, does not hesitate to call Dasein the fundamental structure of subjectivity. What is at stake here is not the subject in its modern sense or in its metaphysical grounds, but the fact that there is subjectivity; what it means to be a subject; to be out there while still caring its own being. In his treatise *On the Essence of Ground*, Heidegger writes that

If one chooses the title of 'subject' for that being that we ourselves in each case are and that we understand as 'Dasein', then we may say that transcendence designates the essence of the subject, that it is the fundamental structure of subjectivity. The subject never exists beforehand as a 'subject', in order then, *if* there are objects at hand, *also* to transcend. Rather, to *be* a subject means to be a being in and as transcendence. The problem of transcendence can never be worked out by seeking a decision as to whether or not transcendence might pertain to a subject; rather, an understanding of transcendence is already a decision about whether we are able to conceptualize such a thing as 'subjectivity' at all, or merely import a truncated subject, as it were.²⁷⁹

Once again, we should point out that Dasein is not a subject which surpasses a boundary or gap. As we have seen, what is surpassed is not a distinction between subject and object, but beings as a whole. And we know that towards which of this surpassing is the world, which means that beings are surpassed *in advance* in such a way that Dasein returns to itself as itself. Thus, Dasein's selfhood is grounded in transcendence, in the fact that it is being-in-the-world. Only through transcendence, we can distinguish Dasein from other beings which are not Dasein thereby we recognize the possibility of selfhood. In other words, Dasein does not first comport toward beings, and then exists as self. Rather, the possibility that it is as itself

²⁷⁹ Martin Heidegger, 'On the Essence of Ground' in *Pathmarks*, ed. and trans. by William McNeill, Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 108.

grounds the possibility of the fact that beings are which preserves the being *of* beings, ontological difference. In that sense, Dasein is the *subject-matter* of philosophy, neither as a subject which actively grounds the structure of entities, nor as a subject which passively constitutes their being in its immanence. Rather, Dasein is always already the subject-matter whose destiny is decided by its transcendence which is the primordial happening.

Although transcendence gives us the primordial happening of the ontological difference, this does not mean that our inquiry finds a solution here. Rather, even if it is the occurrence of the difference itself, insofar as difference is the difference between being and beings, what is at issue is always being as such. We should bear in mind that being is always already unveiled as the being *of* beings, as *that with regard to which* beings are discovered. This is why traditional way of inquiry is always stick to beings while taking beings in their being in terms of their what-being or that-being. Heidegger finds this explicit situation in Leibniz's famous 'principle of reason': *nihil est sine ratione* (nothing is without reason) or *omne ens habet rationem* (every being has a reason). This principle constitutes the basis of logic insofar as logic is understood as the logic of proposition. Then, in S is P, P is always in S, and this *inesse* is *idem esse* (identity). This identity between S and P is not an empty identity, but refers to the prevailing unity of their agreement which takes place as a taking apart. In our first chapter, we have already dealt with this primordial occurrence of being-true in the case of Aristotle claiming that propositional truth is based on the being-true of beings, namely, uncoveredness. Now, both in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* and in *On the Essence of Ground*, Heidegger determines the relation of this ontic truth to ontological truth (unveiledness of being) in terms of *ground*. Both works lead us to ask: what kind of relation do we find between transcendence and ground? Indeed, after *Being and Time*, transcendence becomes an issue insofar as it is thought together with ground through which being is taken into account as a grounding its self so that prevailing truth gains its appropriation. As we have seen, transcendence refers to Dasein's understanding of being, but not only that, it also tells us that Dasein is towards world (being) as long as beings enter into the world *as* the beings they are. This occurrence is primordial as the uniqueness of temporality. However, it can be argued that ground, at first glance,

belongs to logic. Principle of sufficient reason enables us to ground something as something. We know that for Heidegger, this 'as' is already hermeneutical, that is, it passes beyond the realm of proposition. Then, grounding of something implies an understanding of being which is Dasein. In other words, when we explain something with another, our aim is not merely to ground this or that being, because what an assertion points out is never this or that, but something as such in the sense that we let the truth be with regard to a sense of being to which the ground as such pertains. While it seems that ground belongs to logic, but, insofar as logic is determined by truth which happens as the uncoveredness of beings or as understanding of being, ground essentially belongs to being as such. In other words, what is at issue is not to constitute the truth, but to clear the way for it and this clearing is the ground as such insofar as it refers to the beings' entry into the world alongside the understanding of being as a primordial happening. We appropriate truth in its possibility. This possibility implies that if there is truth, there must be also untruth or concealing and this is why Heidegger insists that beings are still there without their world-entry. This amounts to saying that truth needs a struggle for its happening and it happens insofar as beings gain the opportunity to come from concealment into uncoveredness. In this happening, neither beings nor their being is the center of the interpretation but the difference itself, as the ground as such which occurs not on the basis of another thing, but from within itself as a freedom to be bounded by its possibility. This is nothing but Dasein as free which projects or casts for itself its for-the-sake-of-which so that world can be given as binding or obligation for Dasein. In other words, as free, Dasein is always towards itself out of its for-the-sake-of, out of the future and since the world is the towards-which of this transcending, Dasein is out of the world. Freedom lets the world prevail for Dasein in such a way that world is not a constitution, but it worlds.

Thus, in this letting the world prevail as freedom, we find a kind of ground, and "freedom as transcendence, however, is not only a unique 'kind' of ground, but the *origin of ground in general. Freedom is freedom for ground*".²⁸⁰ Heidegger, in *On the Essence of Ground*, discusses how freedom as the freedom for ground is a *grounding* which becomes manifest in manifold ways. Then, corresponding to the

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 127.

basic structure of Dasein constituted by futurity, having-been and making-present, we find this grounding in three ways as establishing (*Stiften*), the grounding as taking up a basis (*Bodennehmen*) and the grounding as the grounding of something (*Begründen*). The first refers to the projection of the ‘for-the-sake-of’. However, in order that beings as such become manifest, Dasein, projecting itself, should be already in the midst of such beings. Finding itself among beings, Dasein is attuned by beings and this being-attuned belongs to transcendence. Accordingly, “*transcendence means projection of world in such a way that those beings that are surpassed also already pervade and attune that which projects*”.²⁸¹ Thus, Dasein’s absorption by beings provides Dasein with the ‘ground’ in the second sense as taking up a basis. Dasein grounds itself insofar as finding itself among beings, it is bounded by the world in this facticity. It withdraws certain possibilities which are already projected excessively in establishing the world. But, it is due to this withdrawal that the world gains its binding character and becomes the world *for* Dasein. Thus, transcendence both means *excess* and *withdrawal* and one is never after the other, but they are simultaneous according to the ecstatic-horizonal structure of temporality. However, neither projection of world nor our being-absorbed by beings is concerned with our *comportment toward beings*. Instead, they co-temporalize a third mode of grounding as the grounding of something which makes possible the manifestation of beings as the possibility of ontic truth. We should notice that this ontic truth does not consist in the restricted sense of theoretical or objective truth, but it should be considered in a fundamental originary meaning and “according to this meaning, grounding something means *making possible the why-question in general*”.²⁸² In order to capture this, we should consider the relationship between ontic and ontological truth. Heidegger states that:

Ontic and ontological truth each concern, in different ways, *beings in their being*, and *being of beings*. They belong essentially together on the grounds of their relation to the *distinction between being and beings* (ontological difference).²⁸³

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 128.

²⁸² Ibid., p. 129.

²⁸³ Ibid., p. 105.

In order that propositional truth becomes possible, beings should already be manifest; ontic truth. Since this manifestation has a relation to truth, it already implies the being of those beings; ontological truth. However, essence of truth is neither one nor another, but it is forked by them. In other words, beings and their being which is understood in advance work together whereby there is a distinction between being and beings. Accordingly, truth in general can be expressed in terms of being *of* beings, as a difference which is ontological in broader sense. Thus, to ask ‘why is there a question of being?’ becomes trivial because the most primordial ‘why’ already presents itself as the happening of difference. It is such an happening that it includes the ‘why’ in general. It is the ongoing occurrence of ‘why’ insofar as it does not have an absolute basis with regard to which it can be answered. We can grasp that this helps us to reconsider the question of being as it is taken up in *Being and Time* as long as we see in what way ontology turns back to itself as the ground as such as its own movement. Ontology is *fundamental* not only because being of Dasein is secured but also for the reason that being of Dasein gives itself as *being* for ground. Ontological difference is rooted in the essence of Dasein insofar as through the comportment of Dasein towards beings, very being of this beings are already revealed so that beings in question in each case gains the opportunity to be grounded as they are. This is how ontic truth is already ontological. Dasein binds itself with the world, with beings in their entry into world so that beings gain the possibility to be as they are in such a way that this possibility is already owned by Dasein whereby it is its own for-the-sake-of; it is free. Thus, Dasein does not only have a tendency to ground beings, but also it is free for ground their grounding as a possibility as the place where the difference happens. And, for Heidegger, Dasein, understood as the ground of ontological difference, can be designated as transcendence.

Ontic truth can give an account for itself by being ontological, that is, grounding grounds itself as it is already grounded in the difference itself which makes this grounding possible. Thus, what is at issue is not to constitute something, but to be free for ground. This refers to transcendence or temporality which is understood as freedom for being in the world. And, Dasein transcends beyond beings insofar as “it is beyond in such a way that it, first of all, experiences beings in their resistance, against which transcending Dasein is powerless. This powerlessness is

metaphysical, i.e., to be understood as essential...”.²⁸⁴ As we have mentioned, beings need not to be as they are; uncoveredness involves concealing. Before this possibility, Dasein is powerless, but it also binds itself with this powerlessness in the sense that it lets the beings be *truly*, that is, it lets the possibility of grounding be grounded as this very possibility. Thus, Dasein’s irruption into beings does not contradict with its powerlessness because the latter does not lie in beings but in the ontological difference itself. In other words, Dasein is not powerless because it is forced by beings, but because being *of* beings prevails as freedom for ground. This freedom is not a mere oscillation between possibility and basis as thrown projection, but through this oscillation, Dasein is thrown into a deeper fact of possibility. In that sense, freedom is a situation of preference whose most basic form becomes visible in the question ‘why is there something *rather than* nothing?’. It should be realized that what matters, for Heidegger, in this question is neither ‘something’ nor ‘nothing’, but the expression ‘rather than’ (*potius quam*), “for this *potius* is only the expression of the surpassingness of world, of the upswing of freedom into possibility”.²⁸⁵ When we ask this question, we ask the possibility of something with regard to its being; we bring it into nearness as far as possible and this means that being in general is already opened up as the being of beings thereby Dasein’s understanding of being is grounded in and as this openness or transcendence. This becomes possible if Dasein, grounding beings, is destined to ask the ‘why’ question with a ‘rather than’, no longer just with regard to *being of* beings, but from out of the being *of* beings. It comes close to beings from out of a proper distance, from the givenness of truth which is demanded by the questioning itself which gives also Dasein to itself as the deepest possibility. Thus, this shows us that “we inquire into the why in our comportment toward beings of every sort, because in ourselves possibility is higher than actuality, because with Dasein itself this being-higher becomes existent”.²⁸⁶ Dasein is thrown into an already actual possibilization, to the fact that there is being-possible, which makes it be a why-questioner, and therefore metaphysical in this fundamental sense.

²⁸⁴ Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 215.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

This originary sense of being metaphysical should not be reduced to the traditional sense of metaphysics although for Heidegger, it is the traditional metaphysics which presents itself in this originality. We do not surpass beings by getting beyond them in theory or practice; rather, they are in each case surpassed as the beings to be grounded in their being in such a way that ‘to be’ (being *and* beings) is at stake. Thus, this ontic grounding is already ontological, not because being precedes beings, but because being earlier *is* in such a way that the distinction between being and beings happens as *existence* from ground. If metaphysics deals with being as such as the surpassing of beings through which beings are grounded in their coming into being, then Dasein, as the being which is over beings and toward being, is metaphysical in that primordial sense. Thus, Dasein is not only among beings (ontic) and understands being (ontological) but also comporting towards beings, it is already captivated by the movement of being. Dasein’s being is pointed out by this movement as the being which is always face to face with beings as a whole. Its being is so pointed out that Dasein is in truth (and in untruth), that is, it is the utmost possibility to be and this is how it is always in a situation of preference with a ‘why’ and ‘rather than’ although this is pre-thematical. This ‘why’ question in general underlies all metaphysical questions insofar as it originates as its own questioning which Dasein is. Thus, as Heidegger, at the beginning of *What is Metaphysics?* writes, “metaphysical inquiry must be posed as a whole and from the essential position of the existence (Dasein) that questions”.²⁸⁷ We do not deliberately ask for the ground of beings around us in order to find their ultimate origin; we do not choose our relation toward beings. Rather, Dasein has a distinctive relation toward beings in such a way that it irrupts into beings so that they are revealed as they are.

In *What is Metaphysics?*, Heidegger describes this distinctive stance as science. Accordingly, science, in its relation to the world, stance and irruption, is interested in the beings themselves—and beyond that, *nothing*. But what happens when science wants to know only beings? What happens when we are toward beings? How does being speak ontically (and ontologically if ontic is already

²⁸⁷ Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’ in *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill, trans. David Farrell Krell, Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 82.

ontological)? In accordance with our scientific existence, we want to explain beings in their totality, beings by beings, and in this way, we need to eliminate what there is *not*. Thus, for us, nothing is the negation of something, and since we want to have beings in their totality, nothing is the negation of beings in their totality. But, is it possible for us, finite beings, to comprehend beings as a whole? We can think it as an idea thereby nothing becomes an imagined nothing as the negation of this idea. However, since nothing is the indistinguishability as such, how can our thinking arrive at nothing? It is obvious that thinking can only reach at a negation. On the other hand, although, we cannot comprehend it, our metaphysical stance says that *we are in the midst of beings unveiled as a whole*. Thus, “in the end an essential distinction prevails between comprehending the whole of beings in themselves and finding oneself [*Sichbefinden*] in the midst of beings as a whole. The former is impossible in principle. The latter happens all the time in our Dasein”.²⁸⁸ Metaphysical stance is a kind of attunement whereby Dasein brings itself face to face with beings as a whole. And as we know, this mode of attunement is anxiety through which one feels uncanny in the following way:

All things and us sink into indifference. This, however, not in the sense of mere disappearance. Rather, in their very receding, things turn toward us. The receding of beings as a whole, closing in on us in anxiety, oppresses us. We can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings only this ‘no hold on things’ comes over us and remains.²⁸⁹

This is how nothing becomes manifest in anxiety. It is not derived from negation, but the reverse. Nothing does not become manifest as the annihilation of beings as a whole. Rather, what happens is a *abweisende Verweisung*²⁹⁰ (repelling gesture) in the sense that in anxiety, there is a shrinking back before and this happens as the

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 87.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 88.

²⁹⁰ As Jean-Luc Marion suggests, “Being shows itself here in a pure and simple movement of reference (*Verweisung*) that signals, in return, only to the strict (and inversely proportional) degree that being is assigned to expulsion. Thus, Being appears not as the end of anxiety (result, residue and therefore still being), but as the completion of its movement.” (Jean-Luc Marion, ‘Beings and the Phenomenon’ in *Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger and Phenomenology*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson, Northwestern University Press, 1998. p. 73.) Being shows itself in the repelling of beings, in its difference from beings. This is why for Marion, “what in 1927 *Sein und Zeit* designates (without attaining it) under the title of ‘meaning of being’ the lecture of 1929 aims at—without including it explicitly—under the name of ontological difference”. (Ibid., p. 74.) According to Marion, in this lecture, Heidegger tries to show the difference between being and beings from the point of being, not of beings.

repelling of nothing. In such a repelling, beings are referred in their slipping away as a whole in such a way that being *of* beings is already there. Accordingly, “in the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the original openness of beings as such arises: that they are beings—and not nothing...The essence of the originally nihilating nothing lies in this, that it brings Da-sein for the first time before beings as such”.²⁹¹ Beings are given in their full strangeness, as the possible other for Dasein. Thus, in order that Dasein is toward beings, it should be held out into the nothing and insofar as in this ‘being held out into the nothing’, beings as a whole are surpassed, it is transcendence. It is no longer sufficient to say that Dasein is among beings with an understanding of being. Rather, the fact that it is so is an occurrence of being which determines Dasein as metaphysical in its transcendence. In other words, anxiety not only gives us Dasein in a way its being in its totality is in question; rather, more directly, it gives Dasein in the unique fact that it comes face to face with the strangeness of beings insofar as *they are*. Obviously, the latter is the manifestness of nothing. This is no longer a mere circularity, but the appropriation of the manifestation of nothing ‘at one with’ beings as a whole. Heidegger describes this situation in the following way:

Only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of Dasein can the total strangeness of beings overwhelm us. Only when the strangeness of beings oppresses us does it arouse and evoke wonder. Only on the ground of wonder—the manifestness of nothing—does the ‘why’ loom before us. Only because the ‘why’ is possible as such can we in a definite way inquire into grounds and ground things. Only because we can question and ground things is the destiny of our existence placed in the hand of the researcher.²⁹²

Only the possibility of grounding things (*Begründen*) gives Dasein in its question-worthiness because only this possibility opens up the ground as such in its metaphysical essence. This happens insofar as Dasein is held out into the nothing, in its transcendence. But, this ‘being held out into the nothing’ already puts its being into question or gives it as the questionable as such insofar as this transcendence is a going beyond beings whose unveiledness as a whole already attunes Dasein. Thus, Dasein is already metaphysical in the sense that it is always beyond beings in a way beings as a whole is manifest. The fact that this manifestation of beings *refers* to the difference between being and beings points out that Dasein is held out into the

²⁹¹ Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics’ in *Pathmarks*, p. 90.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 95.

nothing which is manifest 'at one with' beings as a whole. And, as being-held out into nothing and being-towards beings, Dasein is possible as such as the place for the occurrence for beings' coming into being. However, it is not only the possible as such, but this being-possible is subjected to be put into question as long as Dasein *is* the difference itself. In its being towards beings, it already takes over the 'why' question in general which consists in the primordial wonder about beings that they are beings, *rather than* nothing. This wonder puts Dasein's being into question insofar as it is only in Dasein the fact that beings are or being *of* beings shows itself. But, more importantly, to say that Dasein is put into question, is to say that its being has no other sense than being metaphysical, that is, what is in question is the tasks and limits of metaphysics as such. This is not a formal determination for Dasein; rather, being as such shows itself due to a distinctive insertion of Dasein's existence and this is why Dasein always needs to be subjected to an ongoing questioning and transformation.

3.4. At the *limits* of being: Metaphysics of Dasein

As we can see, in his lecture *What is Metaphysics?*, Heidegger inquires into the possibility of metaphysics as such. The latter is the essence or primordial possibility of Dasein insofar as being shows itself in the transcendence of Dasein, in the night of nothingness whereby beings as a whole are unveiled. In other words, the fact that Dasein, in each case, finds itself among beings as a whole means that Dasein is already metaphysical in the sense that its being is a preparation for metaphysics which is a task never to be ended. In a sense, being of Dasein is the projection of the inner possibility of metaphysics. Here, we should note that metaphysics is not an empty possibility for Dasein. Rather, it is essentially metaphysical because it already finds itself among beings which are unveiled as a whole. Since this manifestation of beings implies a surpassing of beings, being of beings is already opened up. This means that being is always of *beings*, that is, the difference itself does not only indicate being of beings, but also and at the same time the fact that Dasein is always with beings in a manner they are. Thus, metaphysics has a double aspect: insofar as it is the question of being in general, it refers to the primordial transcendence of Dasein, but insofar as being is always being of beings, its possibility is based on a grounding which gives account for itself. In other words, if beings are not revealed

for Dasein *as* the beings they are, we cannot find an ontological problem. Thus, we are looking for a proper distance or mode of comportment of Dasein towards beings in order to show that in this comportment, beings are revealed *as* they are. In *On the Essence of Ground* this refers to the grounding of something, and in *What is Metaphysics?*, Heidegger discussed this mode of comportment in terms of science. From these, we can conclude that Heidegger's main aim after *Being and Time* consists in showing that transcendence is based on the manner how beings *as* beings become an issue for Dasein, that is, to see that grounding is the grounding of Dasein's understanding of being or its being-in-the-world as an utmost possibility in the manner that it springs forth from itself as this possibility and *nothing* more. Thus, grounding belongs to the essence of metaphysics or to the being as such, as that is to be grounded and this grounding of the ground gives Dasein as the place of this happening.

Only if Dasein is metaphysical, its being gains the character of question-worthiness as the possible as such and this indicates that very being of Dasein grounds itself as the ground as such, within the problem of being (of beings), within metaphysics. For Heidegger, this is a kind of ground-laying and in that sense, Kant becomes a fundamental figure as long as it is Kant who takes up this issue as a laying of the ground for metaphysics as science. It is necessary to note that Kant understands metaphysics in its Scholastic sense in a twofold manner which corresponds to the above mentioned double aspect of metaphysics. In its first sense, metaphysics is the *Metaphysica Generalis*; the science of the being in general and the other sense refers to the science of supersensible being as *Metaphysica Specialis* which is divided again into rational theology, rational cosmology and rational psychology. Although when Kant discusses metaphysics, his aim is to articulate it in its second sense, for Heidegger, what makes Kant so crucial is the fact that in his attempt to lay the ground for the science of beings, he considers beings in the manner they are revealed as they are and this is nothing but to consider them with respect to a possible knowing through which beings are there *as* beings. In other words, the question of how beings are surpassed makes us think that how *beings are* in general. Kant's aim is not to give an account of a region of beings, but to ground a science of beings in general. Accordingly, for Heidegger,

The fundamental question as to wherein a science of beings in general is grounded first leads back to the question: What constitutes scientific knowledge as such? We must explain what constitutes science by honing in on how *knowledge is, how it comes to the fore*; we must explain how what belongs to sciences is possible from certain exhibitable principles.²⁹³

Knowledge is scientific knowledge and what is exemplary or ideal science for Kant is the mathematical natural science. For Heidegger, this is not an accident but relies on the fact that from ancient times, beings are considered as the beings they are insofar as they belong to nature. What does this scientific knowing provide us? We know that even pre-ontological understanding of being whereby our daily comportment toward beings and their technical manipulation becomes possible, is a mode of uncovering that which is covered up, “but *scientific* knowing is characterized by the fact that the existing Dasein sets before itself, as a freely chosen task, the uncovering of the beings which are already somehow accessible, *for the sake of their being uncovered*”.²⁹⁴ As its free choice, Dasein struggles with the concealment of beings in order to bring them into unconcealment. Thus, what is at stake here is beings for the sake of their being uncovered. Heidegger calls this *objectification* which does not mean that beings become beings for the first time by becoming object; “rather, as the beings which they already are, beings are to respond to the knowing which is making the inquiry. By responding to the question as to what, how, and whence beings are, they stand *vis-à-vis* the inquiry which reveals them”.²⁹⁵ Thus, it is one thing that in daily use of things, they are uncovered and it is another thing to ask for their uncoveredness for the sake of this uncoveredness itself. We have already described this aspect of truth as a kind of struggle for it. The fact that *beings are* should be taken over by Dasein in advance in a proper inquiry in order that this primordial fact can be appropriated from itself, through the understanding of the principle of their being, an understanding which belongs to Dasein. Heidegger insists on such an ‘in advance’ struggle in order to reconsider what he, in his early period, discussed under the title of facticity. As we have seen, facticity refers to the happening of the world as worlding as the sole thing to be investigated. However, in that perspective, transcendence was not taken up as the

²⁹³ Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. p. 30.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 18.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 19.

underlying ground of such an existence. After Dasein is determined as understanding-of-being, this primordial occurrence of the world becomes transcendent to Dasein in each case although Dasein is nothing but this transcendence. In other words, the fact that world worlds or that something is should be grounded in the understanding of being of Dasein in such a way that the latter becomes *grounding* of the being in question in its coming into being from concealment into unconcealment. The grounding of something with a 'why' and 'rather than' refers to the uncanniness of transcendence whereby Dasein makes its *possible* ground question-worthy for itself so that it can be the questioning as such. This change of perspective into ground is not the result of an ethical ideal in order to locate Dasein more securely in its world, rather, it is metaphysical or ontological whereby Dasein is destined to become more uncanny from the depths of its being, as the being who freely comes face to face with the necessity of its being in its openness.²⁹⁶ And this is nothing but the grounding of metaphysics from its own claim or limits.

For Heidegger, by Kant, metaphysics is for the first time, put into question. This becomes possible insofar as Kant considers the problem of beings *as* beings as a problem of knowledge whereby this 'as' itself is thought in its origin. The objectification which is carried out in the sciences points to an understanding of being of beings. What determines those sciences is not experiment or facts as long as "facts can only be grasped and experimented with when the realm of nature as such is circumscribed".²⁹⁷ In science, essence of science is already given. Science itself cannot give an account of its pure concepts insofar as it *thematizes* the pre-ontological understanding of being. However, "laying the foundation of a science is not something externally annexed to the science. Rather, laying the foundation of the sciences of beings means developing the preontological understanding of being (which is already necessarily implied in the sciences) in an investigation into and

²⁹⁶ Frank Schalow insists on reading Heidegger's path of thinking called metontology and transcendence as a factual impetus which should be characterized as a basic form of praxis. See Frank Schalow, 'The Kantian Schema of Heidegger's Late Marbourg Period', in *Reading Heidegger from the Start*, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, Albany : State University of New York Press, 1994. p.322.

²⁹⁷ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 22.

science of being, i.e., ontology”.²⁹⁸ Insofar as beings are understood as an object of science, there is regional ontology but in order that beings becomes possible *as* the being they are, as objects, there must be a preontological understanding of being which needs to be taken over as a science in order that possibility of beings as beings, possibility of metaphysics can be grounded. We should not forget that in this grounding, what is to be grounded gives itself in advance in the sense that we let this grounding spring forth in such a way that it owns its possibility, the possibility of access to the beings *as* the beings they are. Thus, there is a kind of knowledge or science which determines experience while it does not stem from experience. And for Heidegger, when Kant asks for the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments, he has in mind such an ontological knowledge. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, he writes:

This (other type of synthesis) should bring forth something about the being which was not derived experientially from it. This bringing-forth of the determination of the Being of the being is a preliminary self-relating to the being. This pure ‘relation to...’ (synthesis) forms first and foremost the that-upon-which [*das Worauf*] and the horizon within which the being in itself becomes experienceable in the empirical synthesis.²⁹⁹

What is at stake is not the being itself, but the manner it becomes the being as the being it is. It is the question of knowability as such whereby beings become accessible *as* beings. Indeed, for Heidegger, this is what Kant means by ‘transcendental’³⁰⁰ in the sense that beings are insofar as they are for knowledge (Copernican Revolution) but this transcendental knowledge has its own principles to be determined because the possibility that beings are as they are already implies an understanding of being. In other words, it is a matter of considering the fact that a being is and the pre-conceptual uncoveredness of being at the same time, that is, as the possibilization of the possible, under the title of the being *of* the being, remaining true to the difference itself as the utmost happening of philosophy. For Heidegger, this is the *Sache selbst* for philosophy although it was not so clear for Kant.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

²⁹⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. p. 10.

³⁰⁰ Kant, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, states that “I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*”. (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. B25.)

Our aim is not to discuss the legacy of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant by following step by step what Heidegger sets forth in his two main books on Kant. What is crucial is that: according to Heidegger's phenomenological reading, for Kant, critique of pure reason, delimiting the realm of knowledge, is based on the general idea of philosophy or metaphysics. Indeed, in the *Architectonic of Pure Reason*, Kant says that "philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science which nowhere exists *in concreto*, but to which, by many different paths, we endeavour to approximate, until the one true path, overgrown by the products of sensibility, has at least been discovered, and the image, hitherto so abortive, has achieved likeness to the archetype, so far as this is granted to (mortal) man".³⁰¹ Philosophy or metaphysics is not a mere transcendence because it is nothing fixed. There is only philosophizing because knowledge is knowledge insofar as it is always possible and pure. Philosophy is the task of criticizing those pure principles from its origin. In this sense, critique is the metaphysics of metaphysics; it is the ontological knowledge which is implied by the grounding of beings *as* beings. However, we do not first encounter things ontically and then find ontological knowledge as its ground. Rather, what is given first is knowability as the possibility as such through which human being and beings become other. This means that human being has an a priori relation to beings in order that they are given as the beings they are. Insofar as this implies the prevailing difference between being and beings, the fact that beings are given as they are, puts subject into question with regard to its origin which is transcendence and finitude. Now, Heidegger considers the first through the second.

We have seen that transcendence is going-beyond in which beings are crossed over. This crossing-over refers to the grounding of beings through which powerlessness of Dasein becomes manifest. But this powerlessness does not happen suddenly; rather, Dasein already finds itself in this powerlessness and this means that it has already irrupted into beings. Thus, there is transcendence insofar as Dasein has already related to beings. This a priori relation, as we have mentioned, is characterized as synthesis and it also refers to the finitude of Dasein insofar as this relation is a self-relation, that is, in this very relation, Dasein puts its own self in question as transcendence. Only in this transcendence, a being can show itself from

³⁰¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A838/B806

itself, as the being which is not Dasein. This means that beings are not created in an *intuitus originarius*. Even to speak of beings requires that their being is already understood. But this understanding of being can only be grounded if its origin, the fact that beings are can be considered in the right way. Accordingly, for Heidegger, we can speak of beings as beings as long as they are already taken in stride, that is, beings are not present-at-hand but they affect us or matter to us, which, for Kant, constitutes sensibility as finite intuition. This is another way of saying that human being is already with beings. And this makes clear why knowledge is primarily *intuitus derivativus* in the sense that what is given in intuition is already accepted as a being. From this specific relation to being, we can understand the Kantian distinction between thing-in-itself and appearance. While the first belongs to the intuition of infinite knowledge, the latter refers to the finite relation to the beings. As Heidegger insists, appearance is not a mere illusion of the thing-in-itself insofar as “the double characterization of the being as ‘thing-in-itself’ and as ‘appearance’ corresponds to the twofold manner according to which it (the being) can stand in relationship to infinite and finite knowing: the being in the standing-forth [*Entstand*] and the same being as object [*Gegenstand*]”.³⁰² For God, the being can never become object; there is not a distance between God and being but for human-being, being is always something to be encountered and in this sense, it is always *Gegen-stand*. This amounts to saying that beings are not created; rather, they announce themselves.

What does it mean to say that the being is always *Gegen-stand*? It announces itself as standing-against. The table that we encounter affects me in sensibility. It has a color, hardness and a specific shape. At first sight, I do not realize these characteristics although the table is given as a being. This means that the manifold, the matter of sensation is not a confused mass, but it has an order. Its matter has been organized with respect to spatial and temporal determinations which make possible the table to be empirically given. These determinations consist in ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘beside’, ‘next to’, ‘behind’, etc. For Heidegger, this a priori order as the pre-view for the manifold of sensation is what Kant introduces as pure forms of intuition as space and time. In other words, we *have a view of* space and time in advance in order that something can be encountered in accordance with the definite relations it has as the

³⁰² Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 22.

being that it is. Accordingly, finitude of intuition means that it is in intuition that beings are allowed to be given as they are. But, insofar as this a priori intuition is what enables beings to show themselves, it is a priori, that is, it is independent of experience. In other words, without the actual presence of any object, subject has already such an orientation, not affected by objects, that is, it is towards its self. Heidegger explains this aspect of intuition by referring to the fourth stage of Kant's metaphysical exposition of space and time through which space and time are discussed as infinite *given* magnitudes. According to this exposition, for Heidegger, it can be claimed that space and time are not mere modes of intuiting, but also something intuited. This is why time, as the form of all appearances, is the self-affection of subject; therefore "space and time are *intuitus derivativus* and nonetheless *originally* so, i.e., *stemming from the finite subject itself*, i.e., they are rooted in the transcendental *power of imagination*. Hence space as well as time were designated as *ens imaginarium*".³⁰³ This makes possible to understand how intuition immediately gives objects as they are, not as illusions of thing-in-itself, and still remains subjective. For Heidegger, this shows us that the problem of ontological knowledge cannot be solved by inquiring into the one stem of knowledge. Thus, "neither the one stem of knowledge alone nor the other stem of knowledge, thinking, should be grasped by itself, but the *original unification of intuiting and thinking*—an intuiting which understands, in fact, as *a priori*. *Synthetic knowledge a priori is to be grasped in its possibility*".³⁰⁴ Against Neo-Kantianism which tries to reduce intuition to understanding, Heidegger's aim consists in showing the co-belongingness of intuition and understanding insofar as they stem from a common root which is imagination. However, in his main books on Kant, Heidegger gives priority to intuition by claiming that understanding is a means for intuition. This makes sense when we remember that for Heidegger, what is at issue in this discussion is the finitude of subject. 'Knowledge in its possibility' becomes understandable when we accept that beings are already given in such a way that they affect us. In such a finitude, understanding is called for assuming the claim which lies in the announcement of beings. But forms of intuition are still pure insofar as they let

³⁰³ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 84.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

something already given be encountered. Thus, they are not merely affected by object; they let us encounter that which is already given. This is nothing but the standing-against of the object according to which understanding refers to the standing on the side of the subject. Here we should note that understanding is not considered as the bringing-together of a manifold under concept. Indeed, what distinguishes Heidegger's interpretation from others is his claim that before this logical synthesis, there is a more originary synthesis. Accordingly, we can talk about three kinds of synthesis; first, the synthesis that we find in intuition insofar as space and time are given as magnitudes, as unities though non-objective, which is called *syndosis*. Second, we find synthesis of understanding in its logical function as unification. We usually understand this synthesis, as Kant mentions in *Critique of Pure Reason*, as "the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one (act of) knowledge".³⁰⁵ As Kant puts forth in his example in *Logic*, we say that we see a pine tree, a willow tree and a lime tree and then say for all of them, they are tree so that we can constitute their concept. However, for Heidegger,

In order that I begin the logical act of concept-formation, I must already see a pine tree, a willow tree, and a lime tree. What does it mean and how is it possible that I intuit a pine, a willow and a lime tree, this *manifold* of given objects? Here we are concerned with the *primary intuitive giving* of the manifold of objects; and if synthesis is to be constitutive for this giving, then synthesis cannot mean the act of logical reflection.³⁰⁶

If there is a synthesis, it is the in advance putting-together of what is given as given because I do not successively grasp trees by losing sight of the one seen before. In other words, "this 'grasping in *one*' is by no means the logical act of concept-forming reflection, but rather is the act of the same synthesis on the basis of which a many is pre-given as *a* many for a thinking seeing".³⁰⁷ This synthesis cannot also be understood only by means of intuition because what matters here is the fact that manifold is given as *this* determinate manifold for thinking. Thus, it belongs neither to intuition nor to understanding. Nevertheless, it is both receptive, insofar as it *gives*, and spontaneous as long as it is an *act*. This giving-act belongs to imagination which,

³⁰⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B103.

³⁰⁶ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 186.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

as intuition, gives to itself. But, differing from intuition, it gives to itself without the actual presence of the object; thus, there is no affection in imagination, but only function. Pure knowledge cannot be gained by the affection of object on the subject because in that sense, it would be empirical. However, this does not mean that subject produces object according to its existence. There is a third way wherein objectivity is determined without being dependent upon the existence of object. Here we can recognize the role of categories of pure thinking whereby objectness is determined in general, not with regard to this or that object. “*Hence pure thinking is a thinking of determinations which thinks toward and anticipates them in such a way that this thinking-toward as such constitutes first of all the standing over against of what is intuitively encountered*”.³⁰⁸ Pure concepts are the thinking toward what is intuitively given; something is given as the being it is only if objectness as such is already determined by thought. In other words, in a being which is encountered, its being or objectness is already anticipated but we should not forget that this becomes possible as long as this being as the being it is is encountered in intuition. Only in intuition, ‘as’ announces itself and in understanding, it finds an answer to its call. For Heidegger, this makes understanding be in service to intuition and thus mediated in a sense it is more finite than intuition. However, understanding is not added from outside, because what is intuited in intuition is not this or that object, but pure forms of intuition as space and time. Although space and time is not given without objects, their mode of being, that is, their meaning is given without objects. Thus, time, as the form of all appearances, gives itself from itself as a pure synthesis of imagination. However, the fact that this pure synthesis has a meaning or it is possible means that it is brought into concept. Only if objectness is anticipated by the concept, pure synthesis unifies itself from itself.

For Heidegger, this anticipation of the concept also belongs to imagination, not to understanding. For him, proof of this can be found in three synthesis of imagination which consists in the synthesis of apprehension, the synthesis of reproduction and the synthesis of recognition, that Kant sets forth in A edition of Transcendental Deduction. Accordingly, it is the synthesis of recognition in concept which enables us to *reproduce* something as the *same* thing *apprehended* as present

³⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 217.

because “*in identifying—and that means apprehending and reproducing—we are always already awaiting a unity of beings*”.³⁰⁹ This means that future has a priority and since all synthesis is temporal, they are unified on the ground of time from out of future. This is nothing but what we have designated before as temporalization of temporality. On the other hand, priority of future or recognition as pre-cognition explains the idea of standing-against (*Gegenstand*) which leads ontological knowledge from the beginning. It is not because we are affected by beings we need to give an account of *objective* reality of categories. Rather, since beings speak in that way, subjectivity is constituted in order to give opportunity to beings to reveal themselves *as* beings. In other words, subjectivity binds itself with the objectness as such in its transcendence. This resistance does not come from the extant being, but it is given to subject by itself as transcendental apperception. We should notice that for Heidegger, Kant fails to see the priority of recognition of the objectness: “precisely because Kant grounds thinking in intuition and places understanding at the service of intuition, therefore he must necessarily also limit the comportment of understanding to the present and must see the basic function of understanding and of the faculty of understanding—transcendental apperception—precisely in the identification which renders (things) present”.³¹⁰ However, nothing extant or present can give us the prevailing dimension that something is encountered as it is. Since the latter already refers to objectness, this dimension can only be given as anticipated by a subject in its formal unity as ‘I think’ which is already an ‘I can’ in the sense that “the ‘ad’ in *ad-percipere* (‘apperception’) is not saying that something still *will be added*. Rather, ‘ad’ is meant in the sense of ‘*toward myself*’; ‘ad’ emphasizes ‘*taking-onself*’ in ‘I can’; it emphasizes transposing oneself into oneself”.³¹¹ This does not mean that subject is first outside itself and then finds itself. Rather, subject is already toward itself and giving the horizon of unity in advance as itself, it makes possible the anticipation of unification in recognition. Object-relatedness is possible if the synthesis of objectness belongs to the ‘I think’ as a binding character thereby ‘I think’ becomes ‘I can’. For Heidegger, this shows us again how possibility is higher

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 246.

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 248.

³¹¹ Ibid., p. 254.

than actuality in the sense that subject as a free self-bindedness, exists in its existing as a self-standing self. Unity of this self-standing subjectivity is articulated as the unity of three synthesis. Since these synthesis are unified in time as the horizon of objectness which is binding for self, self-giving of the self can be understood on the basis of the self-affection as time, “that is to say that *the central element of givenness and the a priori having-to-do-with the self is constitutive of the idea of objectness as such*—not only idea of individual objects”.³¹² What holds together time and ‘I think’ is the objectness as such in such a way that self reveals itself as self-affection of time insofar as time belongs to the constitution of the objectness through which self is already concerned with itself. In other words, self gains its unity as a possibility only in its being affected which means that objectness is a priori given as a relation to objectness.³¹³

Here we should remember that for Heidegger “the question is not how categories are referable to objects and how they, as it were, are to be brought to the track which relates subject to object. Rather the question concerns the very possibility of this track; it concerns how something like relation to something is constituted in general”.³¹⁴ The problem is the problem of transcendence in such a way that what is at issue is the relation between Dasein and beings as beings, not any kind of thing. Thus, ground of beings as the pure and possible knowledge leads us to think this possibility with the existence of Dasein which shows itself again in its possibility as ‘I can’, as freedom. If in Heidegger’s reading, there is confusion with regard to the relation between objectness and ‘I think’ as to which one is prior, this is not a conceptual confusion, but a philosophical mystery which Heidegger tries to

³¹² Ibid., p. 265.

³¹³ David Carr explains this a priori structure of objectness in the following way: “Heidegger’s insight is that if Kant’s theory of the a priori is to have any significance, it must be more than a designation of what belongs to the mind, to the exclusion of object and world. It must consist in the claim that the Gegenstandsbeziehung – intentionality – is essential to the mind itself, not some external fact about it that has to be proved”. (David Carr, ‘Heidegger on Kant on Transcendence’ in *Transcendental Heidegger*, ed. Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas, Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2007. p. 39.) As Carr argues, Kant’s aim is not to bridge the gap between subject and object, because he rejects this so-called gap as an assumption. It is not a matter of proving that subject is toward world, but showing *how* this is so. And for Heidegger, this knowledge *in advance* is a matter of ontology where a priori gains its true sense.

³¹⁴ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 226.

make speak. Indeed, neither objectness nor ‘I think’ is prior insofar as what matters here is the *absencing* of such a positing. This mystery consists in the synthesis of imagination as schematism. There is not a production based on an actual presence; rather, it is a production ‘without experience’ modeled with *regard* to the very possibility of ontological knowledge as such. Objectness or categories does not come from outside or it is not produced by a subject; rather, what is at issue is its producedness as such in the sense that image of pure concepts or their *look* is already given by time.

The Transcendental Schematism is consequently the ground for the inner possibility of ontological knowledge. It forms [*bildet*] that which stands against in the pure letting-stand-against in such a way that what is represented in pure thinking is necessarily given intuitably in the pure image [*Bilde*] of time. Thus it is time, as given a priori, which in advance bestows upon the horizon of transcendence the character of perceivable offer. But not only that. As the unique, pure, universal image, it gives a preliminary enclosedness to the horizon of transcendence. This single and pure ontological horizon is the condition for the possibility that the being given within it can have this or that particular, revealed, indeed ontic horizon.³¹⁵

Insofar as time builds the image for concepts, objectivity becomes something in-opposition-to the subject in the perception proper to it. If transcendence means passing-beyond the being which is not Dasein, this means that this being is already there for Dasein. But, it is not opposite to Dasein. Rather, the fact that the being shows itself *as* the being it is needs to be appropriated by Dasein. In Kantian terms, objectivity *is* in-opposition-to the subject. But, more importantly and what Heidegger tries to accomplish in his Kant reading is that this horizon of transcendence is also enclosed. It is ontically determined, that is, it is finite. It is because there is the *possibility* that beings show themselves *as* beings, there is ontological knowledge. In other words, ontological knowledge is always finite knowledge whereby beings announce themselves in the ‘as’. If there is both generality and singularity in this happening, this is the revealing of time which is both single and as the image for concepts, general, not general in the sense of genus but in the sense of possibility. Accordingly, time is not merely image for concepts, but as long as it is single, it is also a *certain* image or look for those concepts, which means that it also reflects the finitude of the subjects. We can see that this is another way of saying that intuition and understanding spring from the same root which is imagination. Insofar as

³¹⁵ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 76.

intuition as the unity which is singular (*syndosis*) *presents* objectivity as being-in-opposition-to, understanding or ‘I think’ is already put into play as self-binded by this objectivity in its freedom. In other words, *Metaphysica Specialis* (going beyond beings) and *Metaphysica Generalis* (being in general) are intertwined and for Heidegger, this is the problem of metaphysics.

It seems that Heidegger reaches the same *results* that we have obtained in *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Here, again, what becomes visible is the transcendence, freedom and its self-binding structure unified within imagination as a givenness without object which can be articulated as temporalization of temporality. However, it should be noted that it is the originality of imagination which provides us with the ground-laying in the sense that metaphysics is taken up from its own possibility. Insofar as finitude of subject is taken into account, beings gain the opportunity to be encountered as the beings they are so that being in general becomes a problem from this ground. This is no longer the metaphysics of the concept of being, but the metaphysics of being as such which becomes possible throughout revealing of beings as beings and insofar as being as such is grounded in the understanding of being, it is metaphysics of Dasein. In that sense, Heidegger says, “the metaphysics of Dasein is not just metaphysics about Dasein, but is the metaphysics which occurs necessarily *as Dasein*....It must already be built up anew amid the transformation of its idea in the working-out of the possibility of metaphysics”.³¹⁶ This is why for Heidegger, we should distinguish the outcome of *Kantbook* from its result. The result of this discussion is the fact that imagination is the ground of ontological knowledge. But what lies hidden in this result, as the outcome of ground-laying, is that: “the grounding of the inner possibility of ontology is brought about as an unveiling of transcendence, i.e., [an unveiling] of the subjectivity of the subject”.³¹⁷ To ground metaphysics in its possibility is to ground Dasein by transforming it in each case as this possibility. Thus, results that we have obtained up to now including *Kantbook* imply a more ‘transcendental’ result, that is, the fact that Dasein as understanding of being is needed in order that the question of

³¹⁶ Ibid., p. 162.

³¹⁷ Ibid., p. 144.

being or metaphysics is grounded as ‘a problem’. For Heidegger, this is what a retrieval of the metaphysics means.

By the retrieval of a basic problem, we understand the opening-up of its original, long concealed possibilities, through the working-out of which it is transformed. In this way it first comes to be preserved in its capacity as a problem. To preserve a problem, however, means to free and keep watch over those inner forces which make it possible, on the basis of its essence, as a problem.³¹⁸

One may still ask: ‘why do we have to preserve metaphysics as a problem?’. In that case, the question is the ‘why why?’ and for Heidegger, the first ‘why’ always lies in the second ‘why’.³¹⁹ The second ‘why’ belongs essentially to the being of Dasein in such a way that the first ‘why’ finds its ground in this being as a possibility. In a sense, we also find in Heidegger the question ‘why why?’; ‘why is there the question of being?’ but he wants us to see that this questioning is possible through its own working-out or its transformation. This is what metontology means in the sense that ontology carries in itself its own possibility of change, that is, its own power of μεταβολή, its possible transformation or questioning. It imposes us its own limits. In other words, we have a right to ask the first ‘why’ because we have already asked the second ‘why’. Even in our everydayness, we are already metaphysical insofar as we pass over beings in a way that they are manifested as a whole. We have discussed this occurrence in terms of transcendence, world and grounding. Thus, being as such shows itself as being *of* beings. This is one aspect of *the same* in the sense that this grounding points out that beings are encountered as beings, which refers to the finitude of Dasein. Heidegger’s aim is to decide the distance between beings and Dasein in such a way that beings shows themselves *as* beings because only in that way there is a need for Dasein as understanding of being. However, once Dasein is characterized by finitude, being as such is already opened up. In its finitude, in its forgetfulness or in its dependency upon beings which are already manifested as a whole, being as such is at work. Indeed, being is a ‘problem’ insofar as it is always being *of* beings. And only in that way, it becomes understandable to say that to preserve being as a problem means to preserve Dasein in its finitude.

³¹⁸ Ibid., p. 143.

³¹⁹ Heidegger, *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 215.

We can notice that Heidegger no longer understands finitude (*Endlichkeit*) merely by means of death which has priority in Dasein's existence as the projection of its being. Although in *Being and Time*, anticipation of death is considered by means of resolution in order to show that projection is guided by thrownness, now, he makes clear this role of thrownness by saying that "all projection—and consequently, even all man's 'creative' activity—is *thrown*, i.e., it is determined by the dependency of Dasein on the being already in the totality, a dependency over which Dasein itself does not have control".³²⁰ We should note that this dependency upon beings does not weaken the role of projection through which being of Dasein becomes an issue for itself. On the contrary, the more Dasein is dependent upon beings which are manifested as a whole, the more its self in its being becomes an issue for itself. Here what is at issue is the character of this dependency. It is not because Dasein is motivated by the question of being that it finds itself within the world. Rather, it is always already thrown into the world in such a way that the meaning of being is not only a horizon, but also grounds itself as its primordial occurrence. Thus, its thrownness into beings in their totality refers to the fact that Dasein already becomes witness to the question-worthiness of being. This makes Dasein finite and in this finitude, its being is enclosed and limited in the sense that it is open to itself or it makes *possible* itself for the first time. As we have seen, this finitude is metaphysical; it is metaphysics as Dasein. Dasein goes beyond beings admitting that it has no control over beings, it lets beings *be* as they are thereby being as such is already in question which happens along with Dasein's putting itself into question as this questioning. In other words, Dasein does not only encounter beings, but also, in this encountering, it opens the way to the claim of this encountering, namely, being *of* beings by letting itself to be found in this happening. Thus, Dasein is both questioner and questioning. Or we should say that Dasein is questioner only in or as questioning. It does not ask or reinvent metaphysical questions; rather, it lets itself *be* metaphysical questioning itself. But this amounts to saying that Dasein is in such a way that metaphysics is always awakened in its being. Given that Dasein's being is temporalization of temporality, now, we should ask: how does temporality let Dasein be *that it is*, as metaphysical, that is, as that being which makes visible

³²⁰ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 165.

being as such in its proper invisibility, in its thrownness and falling? Or as Heidegger asks: “*from whence in general are we to comprehend the like of Being, with the entire wealth of articulations and references which are included in it?*”³²¹

Those questions require an answer from within metaphysics as the questioning itself through which questioner becomes visible. In other words, if metaphysics as a ‘problem’ is preserved as the being of Dasein, we should show that how metaphysics gives Dasein as Dasein, that is, as the utmost possibility. Here, what is at issue is no longer a matter of speaking *about* metaphysics, but *from out of it*. Heidegger undertakes such a task in his voluminous work *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. It is in this work that metaphysics is considered *as Dasein*, as the working-out of the very problematic which poses itself in advance. Accordingly, this phenomenological attempt on *being* metaphysical does not aim at asking questions about metaphysics under the titles of world, finitude, and solitude; rather, it is based on letting free of an ‘actual living philosophizing’ through those concepts, although only the first is considered therein. We do not first construct questions and then decide our position alongside them; “on the contrary, we must first of all let these questions arise in their necessity and possibility *from out of a fundamental attunement*, and seek to preserve them in their independence and unambiguousness”.³²² Heidegger insists that this refers to *awakening* an attunement, instead of ascertaining it; awakening in the sense that what is sleeping becomes wakeful. This means that Dasein always finds itself ‘in such and such way’; it is always disposed or attuned. There is no way to think Dasein without attunements which gives us the way (*Weise*) Dasein is as Dasein, as being-there and being-away. But, what is at issue is to awaken *a* fundamental attunement, not anyone and this requires questioning the situation wherein one finds itself. In that respect, against the philosophy of culture of his time, Heidegger declares that his aim is not to define the role of man in world history. Thus, the main question for him is not ‘where do we stand?’ (*wo stehen wir?*), but ‘how do things stand with us?’ (*wie steht*

³²¹ Ibid., p. 157.

³²² Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, World, Finitude, Solitude*, p. 57.

es mit uns?) insofar as we find ourselves within this tendency or necessity to define the situation of man or to give a role to him. Then,

The *decisive question* now is: What lies behind the fact that we give ourselves this role and *must* do so? Have we become too *insignificant* to ourselves, that we require a role? Why do find no meaning for ourselves anymore, i.e., no essential possibility of being? Is it because an *indifference* yawns at us out of all things, an indifference whose grounds we do not know? Yet who can speak in such a way when world trade, technology, and the economy seize hold of man and keep him moving? And nevertheless *we* seek a *role for ourselves*. What is happening here?, we ask anew. Must be first make ourselves interesting to ourselves again? Why *must* we do this? Perhaps because we ourselves have become *bored* with ourselves? Is man himself now supposed to have become bored with himself? Why so? *Do things ultimately stand in such a way with us that a profound boredom draws back and forth like a silent fog in the abysses of Dasein?*³²³

Those questions refer to an unawareness of the way that Dasein finds itself. And, in this situation, a profound boredom already draws back and forth in such a way that what remains to do, for Heidegger, is just to ‘let it resonate’.

Profound boredom does not only indicate that there is an essential kind of attunement with which Dasein is disposed, but it also implies that boredom has *depth* which will give us Dasein in the possible depth it is. If boredom has depth which cannot be determined beforehand, we should let it resonate and this means that it is not a psychological experience or lived-experience but an attunement which will provide us with transformation of Dasein which lies hidden in its being. The only way of considering boredom without making it an object is to look at what is happening in boredom, which is *passing the time* (*Zeitvertreib*). Accordingly, first kind of boredom can be called ‘becoming bored by something’. Heidegger’s example is that: sitting in a station four hours until the next train arrives. In such a situation, we constantly look at the clock and we want to kill the time. We want to pass the time by finding something to occupy us in order not to occupy with the time. This means that dragging of time oppresses us or as Heidegger says, it holds us in limbo. Moreover, we occupy ourselves with something in order not to fall into being left empty. In this case, being left empty means that things around us offer nothing to us. They can offer something only if the train departs as quickly as possible. Thus, it is not time which bores us, but “the fact that particular things, in what they offer us or do not offer us and in the way that they do so, are in each case *co-determined* by a

³²³ Ibid., p. 77.

particular time, in each case have *their* particular time”.³²⁴ If we do not want to be bored in the station, we should come in a *specific* time, which means that it is not station which bores us but the fact that time has a relation to things thereby we are attuned by boredom. Second form of boredom, being bored with something, can be detected in an invitation for the evening which we have a nice time. One may say ‘I was bored’ after such an evening even though he or she has a charming night. Here what bores us is not particular things, but ‘I know not what’. Joining in everything, we let ourselves be swept along by everything and in such a casualness (*Lässigkeit*), a more profound being left empty shows itself as ‘abandoning ourselves (uns überlassen) to our being there alongside and part of things’. We seek nothing more in this evening for us and this is why we are left empty in the sense that our proper self is left behind. In this abandoning us, time does not drag as in the first case. Time does not belong to things as it flows away. Rather, it shows itself as it stands, as the whole evening that we leave for ourselves and in this standing of time, there is a more originary holding in limbo which is oppressing insofar as time simply whiles or endures. In other words, while we are leaving time for ourselves, time does not leave us. In this ‘during’, sequence of nows becomes a stretched ‘now’ which does not flow. This means that Dasein, as it goes along with what is happening around it, lets time stand by making everything present in the sense that Dasein is entirely present in this situation. Being cut off from its having been and its future, Dasein leaves its proper self behind which means that its being is bound to time. And this being bound to time oppresses Dasein or holds it in limbo thereby boredom announces itself.

In those two kinds of boredom, passing the time determines the attunement in question in the sense that, in the first, passing the time shows itself as the struggle against and in the second, it is self-forming of the evening itself as the evasion in the face of...However, boredom opens up itself from its depth where neither struggle against nor evasion occurs. In other words, there is a profound boredom within which passing the time is missing. It does not permit us to struggle against; rather, due to its overpowering nature, it makes us listen. We are compelled to listen; “being compelled in the sense of that kind of compelling force which everything *properly authentic* about Dasein possesses, and which accordingly is related to Dasein’s

³²⁴ Ibid., p. 105.

innermost freedom”.³²⁵ For Heidegger, this profound boredom can be expressed as ‘it is boring for one’. Once again, this boredom is to be described with respect to being left empty and being held in limbo. In this boredom, emptiness shows itself as the indifference of beings as a whole, including ourselves as individual subjects. This does not mean that beings disappear; rather, they show themselves in their indifference in such a way that we find ourselves in the midst of beings as a whole. Heidegger makes clear that it is not I or You when we say that it is boring for *one*. However, even if we are indifferent too, emptiness is not indifferent to us insofar as “the indifference of beings as a whole manifests itself for Da-sein, but for Da-sein as such”.³²⁶ Heidegger wants us to see that insofar as Dasein is delivered over to the indifference of beings, to their telling refusal, in the sense that those beings refuse to offer anything for Dasein’s possibilities of acting and doing, this refusal is a telling refusal (*Versagen*), that is, it tells or announces something. This means that the emptiness through which Dasein is suspended by the indifference of beings as a whole points to the possibilities of Dasein which are left unexploited. In that sense, it is telling announcement (*Ansagen*) and as a telling lying in refusal, it holds Dasein in limbo. Now we should see how this structural unity of telling refusal and telling announcement gives us Da-sein as such.

In ‘it is boring for *one*’, it is not this or that thing which is boring, or it is not us which is bored. All beings refuse themselves in the full *expanse* in such a way that Dasein as such is placed before this ‘it is boring for one’. It is not us which looks at the situation from one respect; rather, it is boring for one in its full expanse, in prospect and in retrospect. In this situation, the self of Dasein becomes irrelevant but still does not lose its determinacy. Heidegger writes: “this peculiar impoverishment which sets in with respect to ourselves in this ‘it is boring for one’ first *brings the self* in all its nakedness *to itself* as the self that *is there* and has taken over the being-there of its Da-sein. For what purpose? *To be that Da-sein*”.³²⁷ In *Being and Time*, the case was that: Dasein is thrown into its being to be that it is. Now, Dasein is delivered to

³²⁵ Ibid., p. 136.

³²⁶ Ibid., p. 139.

³²⁷ Ibid., p. 143.

its being to be that Da-sein. This means that Heidegger does not reject what he has said in *Being and Time*; rather, he wants to ground it as the sole possibility which makes itself possible. However, what is at issue is no longer to understand Dasein in its making-possible itself with *regard* to the meaning of being which remains an horizon. Rather, it is a matter of grasping that very being of Dasein is this possibilization itself or possibility as such which is already begun to show itself from itself. Heidegger says that “what concerns a possibility as such, however, is whatever *makes it possible*, that which lends it *possibility* as this very thing which is possible”.³²⁸ Insofar as Dasein is affected by this telling refusal of beings, its potentiality-for-being and its possibilities become possible as possible. Thus, telling refusal of beings as a whole does not point to arbitrary possibilities of Dasein, but to “*whatever it is* that makes possible, sustains and guides all essential possibilities of Dasein, that for which we apparently have no content, so that we cannot say what it is in the way that we point out things present at hand and determine them as this or that”.³²⁹ In this sense, it is a calling (*Anrufen*) which calls Dasein in human being in order that it is *there*. In other words, telling refusal as telling announcement, in its expanse, makes possible Dasein as possible and for Heidegger, this amounts to saying that Dasein is impelled toward the *extremity* (*Spitze*) of whatever originally makes possible. Dasein is more originally held in limbo insofar as it is impelled toward making-possible of Dasein as such. Thus, emptiness (expanse of the indifference of beings as a whole) and being held in limbo (being impelled toward extremity) gives us the unitary structure of this profound boredom through which Dasein as such is preserved as the possible as such so that it can be compelled to listen what is said in this attunement.

According to Marion, it is in this profound boredom that we can see the nonontological possibility of another claim insofar as “boredom, which hates what is and hence also Being, by exerting itself at the heart of *Dasein*, turns it away from the obligation of having to be the Being of being; it weighs on the joint where *Dasein* is articulated with Being; it attacks the fold where being is subjected to Being, that is,

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid.

Dasein itself”.³³⁰ Marion stresses upon the enigma of *Being and Time* according to which in order that *Dasein* makes possible its being as that it has to be, it has already admit the destiny of being. He rightly sees that if *Dasein* has to be, it can also not be so that we can understand what Heidegger means by making-possible of *Dasein* as possible attuned by boredom. For him, if this is the case, then it means that *Dasein* is liberated from the claim of being in such a way that boredom lets *there* free “in order better expose it to the wind of every other possible call”.³³¹ Although Marion refers to a crucial point, we should ask whether for Heidegger, there is ‘beyond’ being. Indeed, we cannot speak about being, neither through *Dasein* nor through beings. If we try to speak about being through *Dasein* (*Being and Time*), we see that it is through beings that the meaning of being is first given so that *Dasein* gains the possibility to be itself. Following this, if we try to speak about being through beings (in their grounding or announcing themselves *as* beings), we find out that very possibility of this occurring lies in the possibility of *Dasein* (outcome of Kantbook). But if we cannot speak about being, does this mean that we are liberated from being? In what sense does Heidegger still preserve being? This difficulty refers to the impossibility of understanding *difference* without the distinguished elements. Being as such is given neither through beings nor through *Dasein*, but this does not mean that we are not concerned with beings and *Dasein*. It is true that we are neither concerned with beings nor with *Dasein* from one perspective as we mentioned above. We are concerned with beings and *Dasein*, with ‘and’. It is the matter of seeing that in the telling refusal of beings as a whole, there is a manifestation of beings as whole within which *Dasein* finds itself in a way it already let itself be transformed in its being. Thus, phenomenon of being is not something to be decided over from the perspective of ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’. As well as there is not an ‘inside’ of being as such in terms of beings or *Dasein*, we find no ‘outside’ of being as such; rather, it is already *difference* whose appearance lets its own language be produced as the openness not to be overcome.

³³⁰ Jean-Luc Marion, ‘The Nothing and The Claim’ in *Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger and Phenomenology*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson, Northwestern University Press, 1998. p. 196.

³³¹ Ibid.

This becomes more understandable through to the end of the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, where Heidegger, after showing that world is formed throughout the ‘as’ structure of Aristotelian *logos*, discusses ontological difference in its happening as world-formation. He considers again assertion in terms of pointing out and argues that in order that assertion becomes possible, beings as such as a whole should be manifested in advance. In addition to what we have discussed in our first chapter, now, he claims that as-structure belongs to the world. In other words, the fact that beings show themselves as beings gives us the world as a whole. Since world-formation belongs essentially to Dasein, it means that Dasein is bound to this pre-predicative manifestation of beings as whole. In other words, Dasein lets itself be bound to the manifestation of beings as a whole in the sense that it is open for beings. In ordinary understanding, we do not grasp this ‘as a whole’ although pre-logically, as being open for beings, we have already completed beings in the direction of this ‘as a whole’. In other words, ‘as a whole’ is formed in advance so that Dasein can hold itself toward the binding character of beings. This provides us how we speak of beings, but insofar as we speak of beings, this amounts to saying that being of beings is already unveiled. Then, manifestness of beings as a whole happens as a tripartite structure which consists in *holding the binding character of beings toward us*, *completion* and *unveiling the being of beings*. It is obvious that unity of this structure comes from the ‘as a whole’. In this ‘as a whole’, we find an undifferentiatedness of beings as long as it is trivial to say that a being is a being. Human-being or another being is not differentiated with regard to their being. But, still, there is being of beings in this undifferentiatedness and, traditional philosophy tries to decide about being in its empty speculations. In deciding philosophically about being, philosophy always sticks to beings because it believes that it invents being. However, instead of inventing it, as Heidegger suggests, “it must somehow *find itself before* it, and indeed find itself before it as something belonging not to the realm of the arbitrary, but to the essential, indeed to very essentiality of everything essential”.³³² Thus, being of beings has been already found without knowing it. It refers to a difference which underlies everything ontological. In that sense, it precedes ontological. Insofar as we are concerned with beings as beings, we are moving in the ontic sphere. If we take

³³² Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, World, Finitude, Solitude*, p. 355.

into consideration *being* of beings, which constitutes beings as such, we are in the sphere of ontological. However, ontological difference is ontological not because it makes beings what they are in their being, but because it makes such a being-there possible. Thus, neither ontic truth nor ontological truth in its narrow sense can give us difference itself as long as “with the intrinsically clear distinguishing of ontic and ontological—ontic truth and ontological truth—we indeed have that which is different in its difference, but not this difference itself”.³³³ We should again argue that for Heidegger, the fact that ontological difference cannot be reduced to ontological truth (ontological in the narrow sense) does not mean that difference points to ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ being. We do not invent a solution to the difference between being and beings as if we have both together and then look for another term. Here, what creates confusion is the fact that in the being of beings, “the unifying connection is missing, or rather the origin of this distinction in which, in accordance with its uniqueness and originary character, the distinguishing is *earlier* than the two terms that are distinguished. That is, we are missing the origin that first lets these two terms spring forth”.³³⁴ What is first given is not beings in their being, but being *of* beings as the origin.

This origin is not a mere possibility, but a possibility in its being made possible and in that sense, it is originary projection. As a pro-jection (Ent-werfen), this projection removes who is projecting away from itself without abandoning it. It is a raising away into the possible, “into the possible in its possibly being made possible, namely into something possibly actual”.³³⁵ *Possibly actual* does not refer to mere possibility or actuality. It is possibility’s being made possible as possibility. In other words, Dasein does not only make possible the question of being, but this occurrence is also possible insofar as Dasein is already happened as this being compelled to making-possible. Thus, on the one hand, Dasein brings toward itself beings in their binding character insofar as possibly actual presupposes making-possible. But since beings binds in their manifestation ‘as a whole’, there is already

³³³ Ibid., p. 360.

³³⁴ Ibid., p. 362.

³³⁵ Ibid., p. 363.

completion in this occurrence. In other words, projection does not raise us away toward an indeterminate possibility; rather, what has been made possible is where we are already brought back. Then, this raising away which is binding is an *opening* (*Sichöffnen*), not a fixed opening for something possible; it is not a striving for the possible because it would lose its character of being possible when we speak about it. Rather, Heidegger insists, “what is possible only essentially prevails in its possibility if we bind ourselves to it in its being made possible”.³³⁶ We irrupt into the possible which is making-possible insofar as where we belong to is already determined by this making-possible of the possible or as this openness. Put otherwise, Dasein is open for making-possible. On the one hand, beings in their being become possible only if Dasein is raised away toward the possibility of being made possible, toward the possibly actual in such a way that being of beings, the ‘between’ is already irrupted in this projection. On the other hand, in projection, Dasein is removed from itself into the possible in general in the sense that “what is possible is in itself already articulated into possibly ‘being in such a way or otherwise’, into the possibility of ‘being and not being’”.³³⁷ In other words, the possibility that is making-possible is already made-possible as possible. It shows itself as the situation of Dasein which is ‘in such a way or otherwise’.

Does this not refer to the manner that Dasein finds itself from the depths of its being? Although Heidegger does not explain the relationship between boredom and projection, it is not difficult to grasp the first through the latter. Projection, as the unitary character of tripartite occurrence gives us world-formation; how beings as such as a whole become manifest. As we have seen, this projection is not a concrete and arbitrary action, but a kind of movement which removes Dasein to the possible which already makes possible the possibility that Dasein is. This is *how* Dasein is; it lets world prevail in advance. In other words, Dasein always finds itself before the manifestation of beings as a whole. As we have seen, this expanse of beings as telling refusal refers to Dasein’s being impelled toward its extremity. But, how is this telling refusal of beings possible ‘as a whole’? For Heidegger, this ‘as a whole’

³³⁶ Ibid., p. 364.

³³⁷ Ibid., p. 365.

implies a single and unitary universal horizon of time insofar as beings withdraw with regard to temporal dimensions which are future, present and having-been. But it is also *as a whole*, that is, withdrawal of beings tells us that Dasein no longer goes with beings; it is not bound to beings, but to itself insofar as its possibilities are put into question. This means that Dasein is entranced as Da-sein and for Heidegger, “*what entrances is nothing other than the temporal horizon. Time entrances [bannt] Dasein, not as the time which has remained standing as distinct from flowing, but rather the time beyond such flowing and its standing, the time which in each case Dasein itself as a whole is*”.³³⁸ In its entrancing, it is time which refuses, not beings because it is what makes possible. Thus, in its refusing, time tells something; it makes possible for Dasein to liberate itself, to resolutely disclose itself to itself. This possibility for Dasein to be itself is time itself insofar as Dasein always finds itself in the midst of beings as a whole. In other words, time is ruptured by time itself as Dasein and Heidegger calls this rupture moment of vision (*Augenblick*). Only as moment of vision, Dasein is not a being present-at-hand, but rather it is *there (Da)* in its manifestness insofar as moment of vision is the look through which Dasein’s being-possible is already looked at. Thus, as a rupture of moment of vision, Dasein owns itself as time in such a way that it owns time as *its time*. Time is always time of Dasein, it is not a container around beings; rather, it belongs to the manifestation of beings as a whole insofar as it entrances Dasein so that beings can reveal themselves in a particular possibility which is made possible as a specific Dasein in each case. Thus, “*Dasein’s being impelled into the extremity of that which properly makes possible is a being impelled through entrancing time into that time itself, into its proper essence, i.e., toward the moment of vision as the fundamental possibility of Dasein’s existence proper*”.³³⁹ Dasein’s existence is proper not because it finds itself before the possibility of moment of vision; rather, in boredom, in *lengthening of while*, this possibility vanishes. This lengthening of while is so indeterminable that Dasein is captivated by it in such a way that it is entranced by it. It is the expansion of temporal horizon in the sense that Dasein is oppressed in this expanse. As it oppresses Dasein, it indicates shortness, but insofar as it expands toward extremity,

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 147.

³³⁹ Ibid., p. 149.

lengthening of while is a vanishing of shortness of the while. Thus, even if Dasein loses the possibility of moment of vision, in its being refused, moment of vision still imposes itself upon Dasein as that possibility which makes possible Dasein.

Profound boredom as rupturing of time itself express how Dasein brings itself before itself. It grounds itself upon its being-possible. In other words, here, what is at issue is a possibility which makes possible. However, in order that we can talk about a possibility which makes possible, we already imply possibility of not to be. Indeed, Dasein can be or cannot be and it is in this sense we find Dasein in its extremity, as Da-sein, not only as the being with a *Seinkönnen*, but also as that being which takes over itself as *this Seinkönnen*. This means that very being of Dasein matters to itself *from out of the origin*. This originary task cannot be imposed from outside; what we can do is to be prepared for it by awakening an attunement. This is what Heidegger expects from a fundamental attunement. Indeed, it is one particular attunement as profound boredom which demands contemporary Dasein for itself. As we have seen, in this boredom, Dasein is attuned through the emptiness as a whole. Insofar as this emptiness is not a mere Nothing, as telling refusal, it is self-withdrawal or need (*Not*) and “...the need in question is not the fact that this or that need oppresses [bedrängt] in such and such a way. Rather, what oppresses us most profoundly and in a concealed manner is the *very absence of any essential oppressiveness* [Bedrängnis] *in our Dasein as a whole*”.³⁴⁰ And this absence of oppressiveness announces the moment of vision; a rupture in Dasein’s being in the sense that it experiences this oppressiveness as oppressiveness without merely being entranced by it. It is open for this oppressiveness in such a way that it resolutely discloses itself to wherein it was already possible. Thus, Dasein brings itself before itself and “before itself—not as a fixed ideal or rigidly erected archetype, but before itself as that which must first precisely wrest its own possibility from itself again and take itself upon itself in such a possibility”.³⁴¹ This is nothing but the inner necessity (*Notwendigkeit*) of the freedom of Dasein. We should say again that Heidegger does not impose such a necessity from outside; rather, it is the necessity of the possibilization which is

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 163.

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 165.

temporalization of time itself. In other words, awakening of an attunement does not refer to choose a proper place wherein we can move arbitrarily; rather, it is evoking Dasein in man or to liberate the humanity of man in such a way that man is burdened with its Dasein and it is demanded *to be there*. Then, for Heidegger, “questioning concerning this fundamental attunement— this means: questioning concerning *what fundamental attitude as such gives us to question*”.³⁴² The fundamental attunement is the very possibility of questioning; it is wherein metaphysical questions arise. Thus, the questions such as ‘what is world?’, ‘what is finitude?’ or ‘what is individuation?’ are not questions arising from books insofar as their possibility lies in Dasein’s existence. Those questions resonate in boredom, that is, they spring from the possibility of the questioning as that Dasein which is attuned by this possibility to be held to itself. Since the latter refers to the temporalization of temporality, we can say that those three questions lead us back to the question concerning the essence of time. And not only for those questions, “but the question concerning essence of time is the *origin of all the questions of metaphysics* and of their potential unfolding”.³⁴³

Then, time is the origin; it is told *of being* insofar as metaphysics is a happening from its own depths. It is not only the meaning of being of Dasein, but also, it is this meaning insofar as Dasein makes itself possible as the possible as such in its being ruptured as its time. Concerning *Kantbook*, we have seen that, the problem of metaphysics gives us Dasein as the outcome of discussion. We have said that in order that metaphysics is preserved as a problem, Dasein should be reconsidered in its finitude. This is how Dasein is given through metaphysics in the sense that it is open for metaphysics. Now, we can see that this openness is an attunement of Dasein through which its very possibility is made possible. In other words, metaphysics gives us Dasein as such insofar as it speaks from out of itself, from out of a fundamental attitude. And it speaks from out of itself insofar as *it* is possible to enter into the difference between being and beings. The latter already refers to the Dasein as such. As we can notice, here we find another circle, not identical with the circle of the understanding of being. Rather, this is how Dasein

³⁴² Ibid., p. 166.

³⁴³ Ibid., p. 171.

enters into the hermeneutical circle letting itself be given to its extremity by limiting being as time (horizon) or Dasein as such. Then, we can say that time is the *outcome* of this inquiry, not as a solution to the question of being, but accepting its authority by throwing Dasein into its limit, into *its* time as the sole possibility. As *Miguel de Beistegui* suggests, this means that Dasein is historically disposed which leads us to ask “whence, by what, and for how long is the historical Dasein thus situated? If the Dasein is a destiny, whence does the latter unfold? Does the fundamental tone originate in the Dasein itself, or is the Dasein itself always disposed from out of a more ancient horizon and from a deeper time?”³⁴⁴ Indeed, time is deeper insofar as it now speaks of being *of* beings, not only about the being of Dasein. It speaks of being as such insofar as the possibility to enter into the very horizon of being is already made possible as that extremity or limit which is Dasein ruptured as time. Thus, although the result of this investigation is *Dasein as such* as the making-possible of the possible, its outcome is the time itself insofar as the fact that Dasein is projected to the possibly actual already involve the horizonality of being, its need to be enclosed as historical or epochal, as a need to be evoked in man as his Da-sein. Then, Heidegger writes:

Man is that inability to remain and is yet unable to leave his place. In projecting, the Da-sein in him constantly *throws* him into possibilities and thereby keeps him *subjected* to what is actual. Thus thrown in this throw, man is a *transition*, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence. Man is history, or better, history is man. Man is *enraptured* in this transition and therefore essentially ‘*absent*’. Absent in a fundamental sense—never simply at hand, but absent in his essence, in his *essentially being away*, removed into *essential having been* and *future*—essentially absencing and never at hand, yet *existent* in his essential absence.³⁴⁵

Dasein no longer merely exists; rather, it exists in its absencing. What is at issue is not merely how Dasein makes itself possible with a sight of being, but how this making possible is already possible as projecting, that is, as an existing which is also

³⁴⁴ Miguel de Beistegui, *Thinking with Heidegger, Displacements*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. p. 68.

³⁴⁵ Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, World, Finitude, Solitude*, p. 365. “Der Mensch ist jenes Nicht-bleiben-können und doch nicht von der Stelle Können. Entwerfend *wirft* das Da-sein in ihm ihn ständig in die Möglichkeiten und hält ihn so dem Wirklichen *unterworfen*. So geworfen im Wurf ist der Mensch ein *Übergang*, Übergang als Grundwesen ‚des Geschehens. Der Mensch ist Geschichte, oder besser, die Geschichte ist der Mensch. Der Mensch ist im Übergang *entrückt* und daherwesenhaft ‘abwesend’. Abwesend im grundsätzlichen Sinne- nicht und nie vorhanden, sondern abwesend, indem er *wegweist* in die *Gewesenheit* und in ‚die *Zukunft*, abwesend und nie vorhanden, aber in der Abwesenheit *existent*.“ (*Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit*, GA 29-30, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. p. 531.)

absent. This is nothing other than liberating Dasein for itself by truly locating it before the beings as a whole which manifests itself as the absence of oppressiveness. In this manifestation of absence, Dasein is both existent and absent from two aspects: it exists insofar as being of beings is already unveiled and it exists insofar as being *of* beings as difference itself already escapes it so that it can be already attuned to be itself as the utmost possibility. Then, it is absent insofar as it is the possibility as such of making-possible, that is, it is absencing; raising away to the possible as such, it is never to be closed off. It is also absent as long as in its not being closed off, it is already enclosed by itself by rupturing itself within itself as time. Not leaving its place, it is always *there*. As this unfolding of existing and absencing, it is transition. Dasein happens as this transition, as an oscillation between absence of oppressiveness and astonishment before being.

This (*Geschichte*) occurs not as a mere process of happening but as the occurrence itself. Rather, it happens *when* it happens. It presents itself not as the possible which is to be actualized, but as the possible in its being made possible, *limited* to the end which is only possible. This is why Heidegger insists that it is a matter of understanding ‘and’ in the expression ‘being and time’. Being is always already owned by Dasein, that is, it gives itself *there* ruptured and awakened. Thus, being gives itself temporally in such a way that Dasein is the transition between the possible and its being made possible. Then we ask: is this seeing more *simple* than the existential analytic of Dasein? It seems that for Heidegger, it is so simple that it gives itself as truth. But in what way? In the next chapter, we shall begin with discussing *what it means* to interpret being temporally or historically in such a way that its truth becomes visible in its untruth. In this chapter, we have carried out the transformation of the question ‘what does being mean?’ (Being and Time) into the question ‘what does it mean to speak of being as such?’ (metontology) following the transformation of Dasein itself which lies in its being as an utmost possibility. The second question resolves into an absencing which exists as the temporal presenting. In the next chapter, we shall inquire into the meaning of this result looking not for another outcome by forcing *the matter itself* to the manner of its being given, but for an essential need for *turning* which will gather the matter itself into a *clearing* of it.

And if there will be a clearing, as we shall see, it is so due to that concealing, to that which always remains hidden.

CHAPTER IV

ALETHEIA

Heidegger's analysis of Dasein aims at letting being show itself from out of itself. Being reveals itself as meaning, as that upon which everything becomes intelligible. This refers to the facticity of Dasein in its care for its own being. Accordingly, Dasein, in its whole structure, is understood as that entity which gathers being in its possible givenness. It *exists* as bringing itself into view as the utmost possibility. *Being and Time* paves the way for that possibilization as such by determining being of Dasein in terms of temporality. However, in *Being and Time*, due to the incompleteness of that work, we cannot find the delimitation of being in terms of temporality. We have designated the period after *Being and Time* up to 1930 as *metontology* where we let being speak from itself with regard to its limits and its tasks. Transcendence, freedom and finitude have become the new names of Dasein or the new ways through which we try to enter into the circularity of being. The latter *grounds* itself in its enigmatic nature insofar as transcendence and freedom are considered by means of finitude. Dasein finds itself among beings in such a way that it is over beings and toward being, if there is the possibility that beings show themselves *as* the beings they are. As we know, this 'as' belongs to truth that we have discussed in our first chapter. For Heidegger, truth essentially belongs to philosophy insofar as we speak *about* philosophy as a science of being. But we want to speak *from within* philosophy as Heidegger tries to carry out in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. What is at issue is to awaken Dasein or to liberate it in order that it takes up itself as Da-sein, in its extremity as the utmost possibility. However, the fact that Dasein is thrown into its extremity, into its being or not-being creates the situation of Dasein as a situation of preference which lies hidden in 'rather than', which implies that being is a matter of struggle. The latter lies in the fact that Dasein is thrown into *either* that it is *or* that it is not through the indifference of beings as a whole in such a way that it is hold in limbo, in transition. Thus, in the very being of Dasein, we find a kind of concealing which already happens as its being. This is the truth of being which becomes visible as the limitation of itself in its

very turning. In this chapter, we shall discuss the way Heidegger takes towards the truth of being in its concealing and turning. Thus, we ask: how does the *turning* of being become visible to itself as an appropriation of itself?, that is, we ask for *a-letheia*.

4.1. Productive horizon of being: on *Vorhandenheit*

It could be argued that this turning (*Kehre*) has already begun with *Being and Time*. This idea can be defended taking into account the fact that *Being and Time* is not completed. According to this common reading, the unpublished third division of the first part, namely, *Time and Being*, already refers to the possibility of a transformation which lies hidden in the very problematic of being. Indeed, Heidegger, in *Letter on Humanism* where he announces the abandoning subjectivity on behalf of other thinking, affirms this idea by saying that: “the adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that abandons subjectivity is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of *Being and Time* the third of the first part, ‘Time and Being,’ was held back”.³⁴⁶ This makes sense when we remember the promise of *Being and Time*, a promise which is set forth in the following way: “time must be brought to light—and genuinely conceived—as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any, way of interpreting it”.³⁴⁷ Since being is always being-understood, meaning of the being of that being which understands being (*Dasein*), namely, temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*), is already an horizon for the meaning of being in general. Being is already projected upon time and “thus the way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, is what we shall call its ‘Temporal’ determinateness. Thus, the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the *Temporality of Being*”.³⁴⁸ It should be noted that here Heidegger no longer refers to the *Zeitlichkeit* of *Dasein*, but to the *Temporalität* of being. What is at issue is to consider being insofar as it is ecstatically understood, that is, insofar as the difference between being and beings has already become manifest. In that sense, discussion of

³⁴⁶ Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ in *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 249.

³⁴⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 39.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

Temporalität (Temporality) involves the discussion of the origin of the ontological difference. As it is well-known, Heidegger takes up this issue, not accomplished in *Being and Time*, in his *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. It is the question of how being gives itself temporally, that is, within the horizon of ecstatic existence of Dasein. This will enable us to ground being as a primordial grounding from within itself so that as Heidegger points out in the introduction of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, philosophy can be considered as a science of being, not a world-view. As we can notice, considering being from within its very question-worthiness is what we have already discussed as metontology through which Heidegger tries to grasp how to preserve being as a 'problem'. Thus, it could be argued that as Jean Grondin suggests, we find *Kehre* already in *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, and the fact that it does not cover Heidegger's thinking at this time can be explained by the political interlude of 1930s.³⁴⁹ However, if we characterize *Kehre* as the abandoning subjectivity for other thinking, for the thinking of *aletheia*, then it is obvious that neither in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* nor in the texts of metontology that we have analyzed in our second chapter, we find a discussion of *aletheia* which promotes *Kehre*. Rather, as Heidegger clarifies in *Letter on Humanism*, the turning from *Being and Time* to *Time and Being* is carried out through the lecture *On the Essence of Truth*.³⁵⁰ The fact that Heidegger does not mention *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* or texts before 1930 is not an accident. 'Language of metaphysics' prevents the happening of this turning both in and after *Being and Time* until the concealing of being comes into scene. But how does the latter happen? Could we find the traces of this turning in *Being and Time*? Indeed, we should find it *there* and it is not surprising that Heidegger still describes it as a turning from *Being and Time* to *Time and Being*. In this turning, being is sighted through the manner of its being understood, that is, temporally, in such a way that there is a difference between being and beings. Considered *temporally*, being turns to itself within its very occurrence.

³⁴⁹ Jean Grondin, *Le Tournant dans la Pensée de Martin Heidegger*, Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 1987. p. 75,76.

³⁵⁰ Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism' in *Pathmarks*, p. 250.

We know that our commerce with beings is grounded in the temporality of Dasein. But in addition to this, we should know that through this commerce with beings, we also understand being in terms of this temporality. And for Heidegger, when we characterize temporality as the horizon through which being is understood, we call it Temporality (*Temporalität*). Thus, Temporality, in a sense, can be described as the temporalizing of temporality and “in connection with it we have always already oriented our considerations toward the question of the possibility of a specific understanding of being, namely, the *understanding of being in the sense of extantness in its broader signification*”.³⁵¹ Being gives itself as the understanding of being, that is, as temporally, only if we have already oriented toward a specific sense of being and what is confusing is that here for Heidegger, this specific sense of being is characterized as extantness (*Vorhandensein*) in its broadest sense. In *Being and Time*, as we have seen, analysis of the world begins with the analysis of that which is closest to Dasein, namely, with *Zuhanden*. Then, we come across a present-at-hand (*Vorhanden*) entity when the referential context of ready-to-hand is broken down. However, this does not mean that presence-at-hand is devoid of readiness-to-hand; it is just a mode of readiness-to-hand in such a way that present-at-hand is now understood as *un-ready-to-hand*. As we shall see, in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, the discussion of Temporality will also turn around the basis of those beings which are ready-to-hand insofar as “we shall attempt a *Temporal interpretation of the being of those extant entities in our nearest neighborhood, handiness...*”.³⁵² Thus, although Heidegger will take into account the being of ready-to-hand, or the being of handy while discussing being in terms of its temporal horizon, leading sense of being, differing from *Being and Time*, is *Vorhandensein*. However, this change of perspective should not be regarded as a contradiction as long as Heidegger, in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, as he mentions in the above quotation, is concerned with the extantness (*Vorhandensein*) in its broadest sense. Accordingly, we should distinguish extantness in its narrow sense from the

³⁵¹ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1982.p. 302. “Wir haben die Betrachtungen dabei immer schon auf die Frage nach der Möglichkeit eines bestimmten Seinsverständnisses orientiert, *des Verständnisses von Sein im Sinne des Vorhandenseins in der weitesten Bedeutung.*” (*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA. 24, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975. p. 429.)

³⁵² Ibid., p. 303.

extantness in its broader sense; while the first refers to the being un-ready of beings, the latter is considered in its fundamental ontological sense, as that which is always already there. Now we should ask for the reasons which lead Heidegger to make such a distinction and whether the primacy of *Vorhandensein* in the broadest sense, referring to a more originary demand, already goes beyond what Heidegger tries to carry out as the possibilization (of understanding) of being in terms of the horizontal-ecstatic being of Dasein, and if so, why?

As we have seen in our previous chapter, according to *Being and Time*, present-at-hand in its narrow sense comes into fore as a deficient mode of ready-to-hand. It is through the breakdown of the context of reference that equipment becomes conspicuous, obtrusive or obstinate in such a way that presence-at-hand announces itself in equipment. However, present-at-hand does not indicate the mere thingness, instead, through the damage of the equipment, the worldly character of the ready-to-hand first shows itself. In this way, “the environment announces itself afresh. What is thus lit up is not itself just one thing ready-to-hand among others; still less is it something *present-at-hand* upon which equipment ready-to-hand is somehow founded; it is in the ‘there’ before anyone has observed and ascertained it”.³⁵³ We know that this ‘there’ belongs to the existential constitution of Dasein thereby it refers to the disclosure of the world before any thematic seeing or unthematic circumspection. In other words, there we never find a present-at-hand substantiality colored with subjectivity which enables us to encounter entities as ready-to-hand. It is due to the pre-ontological sense of being which shows itself as being-in-the-world that the being of ready-to-hand is ontically invoked. And, the disclosure of world requires an ontological constitution and as we have seen, *Being and Time* is devoted to undertake this issue as its primary task. If there is not a substantial basis, but an ontical ground, this means that this ground is already established in accordance with the ground-laying of that which is always already there, world, in its disclosing itself as itself. Thus, in a sense, we ‘presuppose’ the phenomenon of the world, as Heidegger puts forth in the following way:

With those entities which are encountered within-the-world—that is to say, with their character as within-the-world—does not something like the world show itself for concerned

³⁵³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 105.

Being-in-the-world? Do we not have a pre-phenomenological glimpse of this phenomenon? Do we not always have such a glimpse of it, without having to take it as a theme for ontological Interpretation? Has Dasein itself, in the range of its concernful absorption in equipment ready-to-hand, a possibility of Being in which the worldhood of those entities within-the-world with which it is concerned is, in a certain way, lit up for it, *along with* those entities themselves?³⁵⁴

Although Heidegger does not express it in *Being and Time*, according to what we have discussed in the previous chapter, we can say that this pre-phenomenological or pre-ontological possibility of being shows itself as the difference itself between being and beings; being *along with* beings. This difference is ontological insofar as it makes ontological interpretation possible in its being made possible. Now, Heidegger tries to understand this issue by the prior disclosure of world. Although *Being and Time* constitutes itself as a whole as the carrying out of this problematic, we find most concrete analysis about this issue in the *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time*. In accordance with *Being and Time*, here also, it is argued that when something ready-to-hand becomes unuseful or it is missing, this does not mean that we stare at it theoretically, rather, it becomes present-at-hand due to a background of the totality of references, that is, it is now *un-ready-to-hand*. In addition to this, Heidegger describes this breach of reference as absence of something by saying that “*to be missing always implies an absence of a something belonging-here within the closed context of references...we could put this in a very extreme form by asserting that the specific handiness of the enviroing world of equipment as the world of concern is constituted in the absence of handiness, in not being handy*”.³⁵⁵ Being-ready-to-hand is constituted in its absence, in not being-ready-to-hand. Since this already refers to the prior disclosure of the world, “this means that *absence has this function of encounter on the basis of the world always already being present*”.³⁵⁶ Encounter with the entities within the world refers to the world in its always already being present, in its *Anwesenheit*. Thus, the world of concern gives us world in a double direction, “first relating to the *presence of the nearest available things* and then relating to *the presence of extant things always*

³⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 102.

³⁵⁵ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 189.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 190.

already on hand".³⁵⁷ Here again we find *Vorhanden* (extant thing) in its broadest sense, as that which is always already there. It should not be concluded that Heidegger tries to grasp that which is farthest (*Vorhanden*) by means of that which is nearest (*Zuhanden*). Rather, it is a matter of seeing how this farness vanishes itself in its coming into nearness in such a way that it is always already there.

In order that we can understand this, we should both inquire into the presence of the nearest available things (*Verfügbare*) and the presence of extant things always already on hand (*Vorhandene*). Then, for Heidegger, the presence of the nearest available things is grounded not in tools themselves, but in the work as the 'towards-which' of each instrument. Equipment already refers to the 'work to be produced', and it is in this sense not an isolated term, but determined within the structure of reference. In other words, "occupation with the tool [its very use] is performed as absorption in the reference on the basis of already having present that to which the reference is directed, namely, the *work* to be produced".³⁵⁸ This means that if equipment always refers to something, we are already concerned with the production itself as a using of something for something. Thus, work refers to what is to be produced, what is to be uncovered. The prior presence of the work helps us to understand how equipment has its being ready-to-hand in its absence insofar as the 'work' already implies something to be produced in its being finished. In that sense, work is already a work-world. For Heidegger, moreover, work-world does not only give my *own environing world*, but also, *public world* and *world of nature*. Both public world and world of nature are extant entities in the broadest sense; they are *always already there*. Work essentially gives them. Then, the world of nature becomes visible, as Heidegger states in *Being and Time*, when we see that "the production itself is a using of something for something. In the work, there is also a reference or assignment to 'materials': the work is dependent on [angewiesen auf] leather, thread, needles, and the like".³⁵⁹ Thus, work does not only refer to as usable for, in its usability, it also refers to the materials upon which it is dependent. Nature

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 191.

³⁵⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 100.

is not raw material as it is in theoretical observation. In *Being and Time*, accordingly, Heidegger describes the being of nature as ready-to-hand, that is, it is something encountered with the discovery of environment. In 1925 lectures, he also points to the worldly character of nature emphasizing that *it is always already there* for concerned preoccupation. In that sense, nature is *that which does not need to be produced*. “Thus, along with reference to the public environment, the work refers to the world of *nature*, but nature here understood as the world of the disposable, nature taken as the particular world of products of nature”.³⁶⁰ Nature-world as well as my own environing world and public world are all defined on the basis of work-world.

However, we can talk about the priority of the work-world insofar as work-world carries in itself the worldhood of the world. Heidegger writes that: “the work-world appresents both what is always already on hand and what is immediately handy for the particular concern. It is thus becoming clear that the analysis of the worldhood of the world is centered more and more on this *distinctive presence of what is of concern*”.³⁶¹ This is another way of saying that being-handy is not an original presence; what is original is what is of concern in the world of concern, namely, worldhood of the world. Then, he says, “such a presence of the environmental, which we call handiness, is a *founded presence*. It is not something original but grounded in the presence of that which is placed under care”.³⁶² What is at issue is not the fact that we are concerned with the world, but *how* it concerns us. Presence is a distinctive giving itself in such a way that concern is awakened due to an already preserving itself of this presence as the primary ‘for-the-sake-of-which’. Only with regard to this prior presence, nature also has presence, that is, it is uncovered as extant, as being always already there. Accordingly, nature is uncovered in a double sense: on the one hand, public world refers to the nature in such a way that in the roads, bridges and rails, the nature and earth is already made concern. On the other hand, not only public world, but also environing world and its tools refer to the nature; a clock already takes into consideration the position of the sun. It is

³⁶⁰ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 193.

³⁶¹ Ibid., p. 199.

³⁶² Ibid., p. 195.

helpful to repeat that in both cases, nature is uncovered as nature which concerns us and for Heidegger, this means that it is uncovered as something always already there, on hand, or extant. It is *Vorhanden* in contrast to *Zuhanden* and Heidegger explains both on the basis of the world of concern or work-world, with regard to the very concern of this world of concern, which is the worldhood of the world. This is possible only if world gives itself as coming into presence, that is, as something which is always to be uncovered or produced. This is the *work* as it is in itself, as being-produced. All other producing or uncovering is dissolved in the work because what matters is not producing, but the fact that *there is* always something to be produced or uncovered. This arises from Heidegger's insight that being and uncoveredness are the same. But in order to ground this, it should be shown that it is being and un-coveredness. It is not because being shows itself, there is uncoveredness; rather, un-coveredness *is*. Thus, if work-world appresents the environing world, public world and nature world, this should not be analogically. Being of *Zuhanden* and being of *Vorhanden* cannot be put together as being-true simply because they are uncovered keeping in view the prior presence of the world. Rather, they let the truth be in their co-belonging in such a way that being gives itself as its own truth. Thus, to say that there is presence insofar as something is made concern in its uncoveredness, is to say that that being gives itself as coming into presence, as *un*-coveredness. In other words, it is a matter of seeing that being needs to show itself from out of its producedness only because that which does not need to be produced is already in being. And this requires us to interpret being within the horizon of production, not the reverse.

Indeed, Heidegger, points to this issue already in the *History of the Concept of Time* by saying that: "it should be emphasized from the start that what we are here distinguishing in the environing world as a whole—*my own environment, public environment and world as nature*—are not regions juxtaposed in themselves. Rather, they are themselves environmentally present on the basis of a peculiar *exchange of presence*, as we have yet to see".³⁶³ This is why the sense of worldhood cannot be derived from the nature, although the latter is always already present there. This amounts to saying that "the entitative relationships of dependence of worldly entities

³⁶³ Ibid., p. 194.

among themselves do not coincide with the founding relationships in being”.³⁶⁴ Very occurrence of being shows itself as an exchange of presence in order that something shows up as the entity that it is. It should be seen that this exchange of presence happens as a letting those entities be as they are, even in their primordial absence, as the entity which does not need to be produced, such as nature. It is obvious that both in *History of the Concept of Time* and in *Being and Time*, Heidegger does not follow this idea but instead tries to give an account of the prior presence of world in order that the disclosure of ‘there’ in Dasein becomes evident. We know that this is the characteristic of Heidegger’s transcendental approach which dominates the period of *Being and Time*, and consists in projecting being upon time, upon Dasein’s being. Although, as we shall see, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* does not pass beyond such an approach, it, nevertheless, presents us the hints of another reading of being insofar as it is in that book we find Heidegger’s attempt to reconsider being in its productive sense. This will be asking for being in its most self-evident givenness and for Heidegger, it can be observed through Scholastic ontology which originates in Aristotle. Heidegger takes up this task in the second chapter of the first part of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* which is called “The Thesis of Medieval Ontology derived from Aristotle: to the Constitution of Being of a Being there belongs Essence and Existence”.

This title already tells us too much about the content of the chapter. However, Heidegger’s aim is not so obvious by the title. It should be noted that he does not try to criticize medieval ontology for the reason that the latter interprets being by means of essence and existence. On the contrary, Heidegger wants to destruct this history by taking apart each stratum and insofar as each taking apart is already a bringing-together, we should see both equiprimordially in their towards-which. In other words, he tries to make us see the primordial sense of being in such a way that being is constituted by essence and existence. Thus, “each being, as a being, can be questioned in a twofold way as to *what it is* and *whether it is*. To each being the what-question and the whether-question apply. At first we do not know why this is

³⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 199.

so”.³⁶⁵ Heidegger asks for the ground of this self-evident distinction and it should be noticed that putting into question this distinction is to put into question the necessity of existence or the whether-question. In other words, even if we accept that each being has a whatness or essence, this does not mean that it also should have an existence, to be such and such. In what sense did existence, or as Heidegger calls it, *Vorhandenheit*, become an issue for Scholastic thought? Thus, if we understand the meaning of existence or actuality, we will grasp the meaning of the distinction between essence and existence. Heidegger proposes three approaches about the nature of this difference which can be observed in medieval ontology. Accordingly, the first doctrine which he discusses is that of Thomistic philosophy which claims that the distinction between essence and existence is a *distinctio realis*, that is, essence and existence are two realities in the sense that actuality of an actual being is a reality on its own. Existence is added to the essence of a being and this is what it means to say that something is created; each being is caused by God, not by itself. Second doctrine of medieval ontology belongs to Duns Scotus for whom the distinction between essence and existence is a *distinctio modalis* in the sense that existence is a mode of essence. Existence essentially belongs to a being. Third doctrine of Scholastic ontology, then, can be found in Suarez who defends the *distinctio rationis*. For Suarez, *distinctio modalis* of Scotus already refers to the *distinctio rationis*. Rejecting *distinctio realis* of Thomistic school, he believes that we can only *conceptually* distinguish essence and existence while still referring to one and the same thing. Hence, for Suarez, existence adds nothing. It remains to thing a being either as possible or as actual. The fact that this is so, *Sache*, belongs to God’s thinking of the possible. However, this should not be regarded as something positive about the being of beings, but should be considered from its negative side, as beings’ not yet having actuality. In other words, creation is not a mere causing of God upon beings, but coming into being of a being in such a way that only in creation, the possible first receives a being. “Expressed more exactly, the problem of the distinction between *essentia* and *existentia* in *ente creato* depends on whether in general the interpretation of being in the sense of existence is oriented toward

³⁶⁵ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 88.

actualization, toward creation and production”.³⁶⁶ In order to decide this question, the distinction between essence and existence should be reconsidered in its ancient formulation. However, for Heidegger, Scholastic ontology, especially in its first and third interpretation, presents the problem on the basis of production insofar as being is discussed within the limits of the idea of creation. Thomistic thesis bases its argument on the necessity of the finite being claiming that only if existence is added from outside, creation is possible. For Suarez, however, what is at issue is the actually given being and the relationship between essence and existence in that being itself. It is not surprising that Heidegger finds Suarez’s attempt more phenomenological than Thomistic doctrine as long as it argues that existence adds nothing. This thesis is more phenomenological not because it presents existence as a trivial category, but because, it involves the phenomenological insight that it is already as existing that something is what it is.³⁶⁷

However, the latter, on its own, says nothing but needs to be clarified by asking: “what was it that loomed before the understanding and interpretation of

³⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 98.

³⁶⁷ John D. Caputo discusses Heidegger’s interpretation of being in its ‘possible’ dialogue with Thomas Aquinas and rightly sees that the latter is not an exception to Heidegger’s reading of the history of being. He writes that “one takes a stand either with Thomas and against Heidegger or with Heidegger and against Thomas. But one cannot maintain that Thomas is somehow an exception to what Heidegger objects to in Western metaphysics, that he somehow eludes Heidegger’s criticisms, that he falls outside the scope of what Heidegger criticizes”. (John Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas, An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics*, New York : Fordham University Press, 1982. p. 209.) The reason why Thomistic doctrine is so central in the destruction of the history of being can be found out when we, as Caputo does too, take into account the arguments of French commentator Etienne Gilson for whom the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas is a response to what is lacking in Aristotle’s philosophy. For Gilson, Aristotle’s philosophy gives privilege to the actualization of essence, instead of questioning how existence of a substance is caused. It only knows the being of a substance, but does not take into consideration the possibility that this substance may not be. Thus, for Gilson, “the true question is to know whether, eternally or not, God causes only substances, or whether its causality extends even to the existence of those substances”. (Etienne Gilson, *Etre et Essence*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1972. p. 79. (my translation)) Then, Thomas Aquinas as a Christian philosopher captures this moment of existence as creation of being of beings as a Christian metaphysics in such a way that he truly studies ‘être en tant qu’être’. Although it seems that the notion of existence, insofar as it involves the possibility of non-being as a question, is more akin to the ‘rather than’ (potius quam) aspect of being, it just seems so. As Jean-François Courtine also mentions, the faith cannot ask the question of ground or ‘rather than’ “because it always and necessarily pre-supposes a being ‘outside question’, a being for which putting into question would not be pertinent: un-created being, God.” (Jean François courtine, ‘Différence métaphysique et différence ontologique’ in *Heidegger et la Phénoménologie*, Paris: Librairie Philosophique Vrin. 1990. p. 45. (my translation)) As Courtine argues, and as we have seen before, Heidegger’s question of ground is possible only on the basis of ‘beings as a whole’. Thus, we should distinguish Gilson’s metaphysical difference between God and beings from Heidegger’s ontological difference between being and beings. (Courtine, Ibid., p. 52.)

beings in the development of the concepts *essentia* and *existentia*? How did beings have to be understood with regard to their being so that these concepts could grow out of the ontological interpretation?”³⁶⁸ Thus, what is at issue is the legitimacy of those concepts in the sense that we establish their birth certificate, in Kantian terms. From what horizon are those concepts understood? In order to give an answer to this question, we should look at more closely those concepts. Then, for Heidegger, “the verbal definition of *existentia* already made clear that *actualitas* refers back to an *acting* on the part of some indefinite subject or, if we start from our own terminology, that the extant [das Vorhandene] is somehow referred by its sense to something for which, as it were, it *comes to be before the hand*, at hand, to be handled”.³⁶⁹ This does not mean that extant refers back to the apprehending subject, “but in the sense of a relation to our Dasein as an acting Dasein or, to speak more precisely, as a creative, *productive* Dasein”.³⁷⁰ Heidegger, thus, interprets the concept of existence in terms of *actus*, *agere*, *agens*, or *energein*, that is, as actualization or being-enacted, and for him, the sense of actuality or existence lies in the productive behavior of Dasein, in the fact that Dasein already understand being in such a way that actualization of beings become possible. This is, for Heidegger, unavoidable due to the standing riddle of existence. Because, when we say that something is extant or actual, we do not mean that its existence is also actual in a way it is also created like being; rather, here Heidegger has in mind Suarez’s doctrine of existence, actuality of something actual is not an appendage to that being but concreated with the being in question. However, although actualization is not a being, still this does not mean that it is nothing. It involves a relation or relatedness to something. Thus, existence, due to its *essence*, presupposes a productive comportment. Unless there is a comprehension of being by way of production, we cannot claim for the actual in its actualization. Although Heidegger also interprets Kant’s thesis on being from that perspective, since Kant builds his philosophy on the basis of the relation of extantness to the perception, it is easier to recognize this intrinsic referring of the actual to the subject in Kant’s philosophy. However, in Scholasticism, actual is

³⁶⁸ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 102.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 101.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

understood in its actualization without explicitly taken in its possible referring to an apprehending subject. But this does not mean that here, there is no reference to the subject, insofar as the extant is understood “in the direction in which the extant [Vorhandenes] comes to hand and first can be *at hand* at all, as something that it is possible subsequently to apprehend or lay hold of, in general as something at hand. Thus here, too, there appears, even though still indefinitely, a relation to the ‘subject’, to the Dasein: to have at hand the at-hand as something pro-duced by a pro-duction, as the actual of an actualizing”.³⁷¹ Insofar as it is pro-duction, or *Herstellen*, the extant is already placed *here* of Dasein as itself, as the actual of actualizing. In order to grasp this point, we should give up modern terminology, and return to the ancient concepts. Because, for Heidegger, the concepts of essence and existence are derived from a fundamental experience of Greeks which is based on an understanding of being in terms of production.

We are looking for the birth certificate of the concepts ‘essence’ and ‘existence’. Something is extant when it is at hand, on hand, that is, it is actual in such a way that its actuality belongs to its being, not an addition. As we have seen, in order that this becomes possible, we should already understand the being of this being in the sense that its very being, its to be such and such, is included in itself without being added from outside. Extant imposes being upon us in such a way that as at-hand, it is already before the hand as something to be handled *with regard to its being*, if the latter will still say something. In other words, the sense of extant lies in the fact that it is already pro-duced, placed *here* in such a way that it gains the opportunity to be revealed by coming to itself in its being in its possible finishedness and completeness, which makes it a thing of use. This means that in the productive comportment, something is *supposed to be* extant on hand, that is, a being is supposed *to be* the being it is, in its own self. Heidegger writes that “the sense of direction and apprehension peculiar to productive comportment toward something involves taking that to which the productive activity relates as something which, in and through the producing, is supposed to be extant as finished in *its own self*”.³⁷²

³⁷¹ Ibid., p. 104.

³⁷² Ibid., p. 113.

The understanding of being of the being produced releases that being as the being it is. This amounts to saying that “the *being* [Sein] that is *understood in productive comportment* is exactly the *being-in-itself of the product*”.³⁷³ In other words, the product as it is intended beforehand as the being in its own being is not tied by the action of production, but rather, it is released to be itself through the production. Thus, producedness belongs to the being of the being to be produced by way of a discharge and release of the being to its being. However, does this not mean that we have already decided *what a being is*? Indeed, for Heidegger, whatness of a being or its essence is also determined with a view to production and that this is so will support productive nature of extantness. In ancient terms, what something is, its thingness is understood by different terms such as *morphe*, *eidos*, *to ti en einai*, *phusis* or *horismos*. Heidegger distinguishes *eidos* or look of a being from its *morphe*, its form or figure. Contrary to the common sense, he claims, for Greeks, *eidos* is not grounded in the form or *morphe*, but the reverse. Thus, although in perception, I first encounter a being in its form and then I obtain its *eidos* or look, in apprehension, I have the form *through* the look or *eidos*. Then, this shows us that perception on its own does not explain the relationship between form and *eidos*. Rather, it is with regard to production that they come together. Insofar as product is a shaped form, shaping or producing needs an anticipated look of that which is to be produced. Thus, “the *eidos* as the look, anticipated in imagination, of what is to be formed gives the thing with regard to what this thing already was and is before all actualization”³⁷⁴ and, it is, in that sense, *to ti en einai*, that which a being already was. The look as that which something always already is, gives measure to the production and in that sense, it lets something produce its own self and this is what *phuein* means. Moreover, the look, “as being *always* earlier, that is, as what a being—always conceived of as producible and produced—was already beforehand, it is what is true in and of the being of a being”.³⁷⁵ Thus, being-true of a being is also conceived from the horizon of production. Insofar as *eidos* encloses the being in its

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 107.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

being, it also determines it as something finished and complete whereby the concepts of *telos* and *horismos* are defined on the basis of productive activity.

This is how Heidegger interprets the basic concepts of Greek ontology within the horizon of production. But we have said, the fact that essence is also subjected to the productive activity supports the productive sense of extantness (existence). In order to grasp this, we should look at what production means for Heidegger. Up to now, we can say that extantness refers to the *producedness* of the product; letting something be its own self through the production. On the other hand, essence or *eidōs*, as long as it encloses a being with regard to what it has been and what it will be, indicates the *producibility* of the product. When we think both together, and in fact, they should always be brought together in their co-belonging, we find Heidegger writing that:

But, to *pro-duce*, to place-*here*, *Her-stellen*, means at the same time to bring into the narrower or wider circuit of the accessible, here, to this place, to the *Da*, so that the produced being *stands for itself* on its own account and remains able to be there and to *lie-before there* [*vorliegen*] as *something established stably for itself*.³⁷⁶

It is more than *essentia*, the *existentia* or *Vorhandensein* as standing for itself of something refers to *hupokeimenon*, to that which lies-before, to those beings in the primary sense. All things that are present (*vorhanden*) in this way are disposable for use, including implements, sun, light and heat. Insofar as those are beings in the primary sense; by Greeks, they are called *ousia* which refers to properties, possessions and goods. Thus, for Heidegger, a being is an *at-hand* (*extant*) *disposable* (*vorhandenes Verfügbares*)³⁷⁷ in the sense that it is *Anwesen*. Accordingly, we should say that “*essentia* is only the literal translation of *ousia*. This expression *essentia*, which was employed for whatness, reality, expresses at the same time the specific mode of being of a being, its disposability or, as we can also say, its at-handness, which belongs to it due to its having been produced”.³⁷⁸ A being is an at-hand disposable according to what it has been, which constitutes what it is. In

³⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 108.

³⁷⁷ For Courtine, “*Vorhandenheit* appears here clearly as an originary category which does not need to be grounded in *Zuhandenheit* which would be a deficient mode of it”. (Jean François Courtine, ‘Donner/Prendre: La Main’ in *Heidegger et la Phénoménologie*, Paris: Librairie Philosophique Vrin, 1990. p. 299.(my translation))

³⁷⁸ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 109.

other words, the possibility that a being is an extant on hand belongs to its being and this can only be grounded if this being is already made concern by Dasein in such a way that that being on hand is already disposable. Then, if Heidegger describes things of use not as *Zuhanden*, but as *Vorhanden*, he wants to show that something becomes a thing of use only if it is placed into there in such a way that its being becomes an issue so that it is released to be its own self in its being. If producedness *essentially* belongs to a being, this productive process already implies that a being is disposable, in its at-handness and it is before the hand for dealing only because this mode of being, its disposability lies in its being as it is extant at-hand to be released or uncovered. In that way, the analysis of *Vorhandenheit* gives us the ontological ground of the analysis of *Zuhandenheit* in *Being and Time* in the sense that now, it becomes clear what it means to describe a being as equipment.³⁷⁹ Being of a being becomes an issue only if it is seen from the perspective of coming into being of that being, in its producedness or uncoveredness as the being that it is. In other words, the mode of being of a being, its disposability or its being ready-to-hand belongs to a being, only if it already belongs to the coming into being of this being, to the being as such in such a way that that being is what it is as long as it is un-covered, produced.

This is why Heidegger emphasizes on *Her* in *Her-stellen*. This emphasis refers to the movement from coveredness to uncoveredness and insofar as production is the releasing a being to its own self, to its being it can be claimed that being as such shows itself as a letting something be uncovered or produced. This releasing of beings gives beings to themselves in the sense that they are nothing but what they are in their being; they are ready for use. However, for Heidegger, this makes sense only if being of those beings is already understood or projected by Dasein. Indeed, as we have seen, the sense of being an extant on hand presupposes Dasein according to a pre-conceptual relatedness. It is obvious that in *Basic*

³⁷⁹ Throughout this deconstructive reading of existentials, we can be convinced that as Mark Sinclair points out, “the analysis of equipment does not result from a narrow or primitive, that is, pragmatist view of the world but rather arises on the basis of Greek thinking. The analysis would find its *raison d’être* in the thought of Greeks, for whom *episteme poietike* – a knowledge of producing, a practical know-how, that is otherwise denominated as *techne* – was fundamental for their determination of what is”. (Mark Sinclair, *Heidegger, Aristotle and the Work of Art, Poiesis in Being*, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.p. 49.)

Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger takes up this fact within the limits of transcendental approach and for us, this is why *a-letheia* cannot show itself yet. It could be remarked that as Heidegger puts forth at the final section of his analysis of the medieval thesis, the aim of the discussion is to show that not every being is an at-hand disposable. Dasein is an exception to extantness even if it is proved that essence and existence belong to each being. Moreover, in order to claim that essence and existence belong to each being, we should consider Dasein in the specific way it is. Heidegger writes: “in point of fact, the being that can least of all be conceived as extant, at hand, the Dasein that in each instance we ourselves are, is just that to which all understanding of being-at-hand, actuality, must be traced back”.³⁸⁰ Insofar as the sense of being extant is already understood as producedness, we find here a being, Dasein, through which the difference between being and beings happens. In other words, being-produced is being-in-itself of each being and this means that the ontological difference already occurred. Accordingly, there is a kind of being which is not placed in a possible relatedness to something else, even to being as such. It is neither at-hand nor has a what. It exists as a ‘who’. Thus, ontological difference precedes the difference between essence and existence. But this precedence arises from the possibility of the latter insofar as this gives way to another possibility as Existenz or Dasein. Dasein is non-relational and this can be seen through the fact that being as such is projected upon its being as the difference itself. It is only through the possibility of the being-in-itself of a being that being as difference happens as a ‘Who’, as an opening up of a primordial ground in its utmost givenness as Dasein. In a sense, we can say that Dasein is a mirror that we do not know that it is a mirror. We pretend not knowing that it is a mirror because we do not yet appropriate the fact that being as difference itself has already begun to happen. Analysis of *Vorhandensein* in its broadest sense, indeed, already calls for being in its un-coveredness in such a way that being does not need to be projected upon Dasein as long as it already gives itself as the presencing of the present (*Anwesen* or *ousia*). But as we shall see, Heidegger, in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, steps back here on behalf of a transcendental interpretation of being.

³⁸⁰ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 199.

As we have said at the beginning of this section, for Heidegger, the being as such, as a primordial occurrence of the ontological difference, leads us to the Temporality which refers to the temporalization of temporality. In other words, being is understood by Dasein and its temporality as long as it is already differentiated. This makes temporality *horizon* of being and insofar as understanding of being occurs with respect to this temporality, the latter is called Temporality. Thus, Temporality refers to the interpretation of being as it gives itself as already differentiated. On the other hand, destruction of *Vorhandenheit* enables us to open up this already differentiated happening insofar as it gives us being as the being-in-itself of a being, that is, in its coming into being as itself. In that way, the being of Dasein shows itself in its already givenness and becomes a non-relational occurrence of the difference itself. Then, it is not surprising that as we have quoted above, Heidegger deals with the Temporal interpretation of extant entities in our nearest neighborhood, that is, handiness. Extant entities are at hand only as they are before the hand to be handled with regard to their being. What is at issue is the fact that being of a being is revealed as already understood as difference itself by a being which is non-relational. This is why we never encounter with an extant entity, but always with an entity ready-to-hand thereby being of a being is made concern by Dasein. Heidegger writes that “the thing to be produced is not understood in productive action as something which, as product in general, is supposed to be extant [at hand] in itself. Rather, in accordance with the productive intention implicit in it, it is already apprehended as something that, qua finished, is available at any time for *use*”.³⁸¹ Analysis of *Vorhandenheit*, thus, gives us the prevailing happening in a being, that is, it shows how mode of being of a being, its availability or disposability, belongs to its being and to the being as such. In that sense, that which is extant does not need to be produced and the most explicit case of this is nature. Heidegger, here again, discusses nature and its being always already there. He claims that “what is not in deed of being produced can really be understood and discovered only within the understanding of being that goes with production”. I comport myself to the material or nature only because what is at issue is what is to be produced. In other words, nature is discovered as long as production already includes within itself that from

³⁸¹ Ibid., p. 114.

which a product is produced, as long as production is always production of something *from* something. Thus, there is uncovering or production through which nature or extant in general is also discovered in such a way that being of what is always already there is also understood. We can say that

The understanding of being in production is so far from merely understanding beings as produced that it rather opens up precisely the understanding of the being of that which is already simply extant. In production, therefore, we come up against just what does not need to be produced. In the course of producing and using beings we come up against the actuality of what is already there before all producing, products and producibles, or of what offers resistance to the formative process that produces things.³⁸²

In production, being of what does not need to be produced is opened up and it is opened up as a resistance to the productive activity. It seems that on the one hand, there is being of what is to be produced and on the other hand, being of what does not need to be produced. However, Heidegger insists that for Greeks “...matter is a basic ontological concept that arises necessarily when a being—whether it is produced or is not in need of being produced—is interpreted in the horizon of the understanding of being which lies as such in productive comportment”.³⁸³ Thus, there are not two different beings next to each other; rather, there is a productive horizon of being through which a being is interpreted as a coming into being from out of a resistance to be and it does not matter whether we look at it as coming into being or in its resistance which lies there because both belong to *one*. It seems that Heidegger has in mind Aristotle’s phrase ‘beings are said to be in several ways’ and tries to open up the unitary sense of being according to *a-letheia*, un-coveredness. Thus, to be a being already involves a struggle of un-coveredness in the sense that a being involves also not being in need of being uncovered and this possibility belongs to its being. This is why Aristotle has a wonder while discovering that *logos*, to be said, to be taken out of coveredness, essentially belongs to being. However, for us, this is not so ordinary as it is for Greeks and this is why our attunement is boredom. As we have discussed in our previous chapter, even that boredom implies the struggle of truth and indeed it appropriates it. Thus, turning back to *Dasein*, to the manner of which the question of being is awakened in it, is not a novelty insofar as being of extantness already refers to the being of the subject. In that sense, Greeks

³⁸² Ibid., p. 116.

³⁸³ Ibid.

also has an understanding of Dasein, and what is naïve about Greek ontology, for Heidegger, is not a neglect of reflection about Dasein, but the way that Dasein is conceived. Although Greeks cannot pass beyond the common conception of Dasein, insofar as origin of the concepts of essence and existence lies in their experience of being which is already related to the being of Dasein, they understand being as *a-letheia*, in a productive sense. And, “it is always a sign of the greatness of a productive achievement when it can let issue from itself the demand that it should be understood better than it understands itself”.³⁸⁴ Thus, for Heidegger, Greeks’ understanding of being is productive in the sense that it gives itself as what is to be understood. Their forgetting of the question of being or their naivety is not a lack but it shows us that the matter itself (*Sache Selbst*) produces the demand to be understood better from out of its own concealing.

For Heidegger, this demand shows itself as the interpretation of being in the understanding of Dasein. It is not just a matter of analysis of Dasein, but an analysis which provides us with an interpretation of being. Thus, it is not only that being as such should be understood as coming into being of a being, as the difference itself but also this understanding or difference should be appropriated in such a way that it is preserved. We are not concerned with improving what Greeks have studied as being, but with preserving it in its question-worthiness. This amounts to understanding Greeks better than they understood themselves because they did not see that the matter itself, that is, coming into being of a being, into uncoveredness from coveredness requires understanding Dasein or human-being, not as one being among other beings, but as the place of the occurrence of this difference. If Dasein is not just a being among other beings, but a being through which being as difference happens as the openness of this place, this means that happening of being or uncoveredness is destined to be a struggle. Thus, it is not just a letting oneself to the adventure of this struggle, as Aristotle does, but this struggle also needs to be kept *as* struggle; a need which originates there. Now our question is that: is it possible, through Heidegger’s transcendental approach, to listen to this demand? As we have seen, coming into being of an extant is understandable insofar as it comes to the *Da* of Dasein, that is, as ready-to-hand. It is understandable only as handy because only

³⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 111.

in that way being of a being becomes an issue for Dasein in such a way that being-in-itself of a being becomes possible. Thus, both beings and being are unveiled and Heidegger's aim is to show that both happen through Dasein. In the previous chapter, we have discussed this problem in terms of Dasein's temporality, transcendence and world. Now, Heidegger prepares the way for this discussion by claiming that when beings are unveiled as they are, their being is already at issue, as we have pointed out through the discussion of *Vorhandenheit*. Then, the Temporality of extant beings in their closeness to us refers to the fact that this very understanding of being is a projection of being upon time. We do not merely encounter beings, but in this encountering, their being is let show itself. With Heidegger's terms, when we enpresent entities around us, this enpresenting happens with respect to a specific direction through which being of those entities is already given. Thus, each ecstase of time has its own horizon in such a way that time is not only the meaning of the being of Dasein, but also it gives being as such, in a unitary sense. Heidegger describes the horizontality of the ecstase of present in the following way:

From the reference to the possible modification of the being of the handy in becoming unavailable, we can infer that *handiness* and *unavailability* are specific *variations of a single basic phenomenon*, which we may characterize formally as *presence* and *absence* and in general as *praesens*.³⁸⁵

This single basic phenomenon is the showing itself of being as such. The latter is supposed to occur through the unveiling of a being itself. However, we claim that here we cannot find this primordial occurrence insofar as unveiling of being as such is not understood through the movement which lies in the possibility of being-in-itself of a being, as *Vorhanden* in the broadest sense, but through the modification of being handy into becoming unavailable, into *Vorhanden* in its narrow sense or as Heidegger calls it here *Abhandene*. Thus, the discussion presupposes that being of equipment traces back to the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of the Dasein in such a way that "we can now interested solely in the mode of being of equipment, its *handiness*, with regard to its *Temporal possibility*, that is, with regard to how we understand handiness as such in temporal terms".³⁸⁶ First, we should see that, for Heidegger, *whatness* of a being is handiness, being-handy or being-produced.

³⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 305.

³⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 305.

However, in our daily life, we do not always know how to deal with a thing unless we do not already have a previous familiarity. This explains why unavailability is not nothing, but belongs to this prevailing familiarity with world. This means that we enpresent something in a retentive projection, as an ecstatic temporality. Now, if whatness of being, that is, being of a being, is given through this temporality in a prior way, for Heidegger, this shows us that being is already projected upon time thereby being-handly or handiness (being of a being) is understood *temporally*. In a sense, this is self-projection of temporality; enpresenting projects itself upon its horizon and since enpresenting of what is encountered is pre-designated by this horizon which projects being of this being, it becomes clear that enpresenting enpresents something as what it is. Thus, “everything that is encountered in the enpresenting is understood as a presencing entity [Anwesende]—that is, it is understood upon presence—on the basis of the horizon, praesens, already removed in the ecstasis”.³⁸⁷ We have seen that *Anwesen* is what a being properly is, ousia or Vorhanden in the sense of taking an entity as its own self, not related to something else but absolutely. Even if extantness calls for the being of Dasein, the latter is responsible only to release the entity to be itself, not to give its being from outside. Indeed, Dasein is *there* or needed only for this release and discharge. Then, what is at issue is to see that to say that a being is is to say that this being is un-covered; it is allowed to show itself from itself as coming into uncoveredness out of coveredness. Thus, a being should be looked at from out of a horizon of producedness in such a way that its being not in need of being produced is also there. Now the question is whether the modification of a being into unavailable, into absence, as Heidegger describes it above, does correspond to a being’s being-produced preserving its not being in need of being produced. Does the discussion of *praesens* give us the essence of *aletheia*? We claim that the play of presence (*Zuhanden*) and absence (*Abhanden*) within the horizon of *praesens* does not meet the requirements of releasing a being to be its own self whereby being gives itself in its concealing.³⁸⁸ Absence of a being

³⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 307.

³⁸⁸ Thus, we disagree with Thomas Sheehan who argues that Heidegger, in this discussion of praesens, already takes up the thing itself, which is a-letheia. According to him, Heidegger points to a privative absence which corresponds to the concealing dimension of being. And for Sheehan, “The point where GP breaks off and Heidegger's next phase begins is the brink from which he sees that the lēthē-

just belongs to the discussion of possibility of Dasein, not to the uncoveredness as the utmost possibility that is. This is why Heidegger says that "...if the Dasein were not a temporal Dasein in the original sense of time, then the Dasein could never find that something is missing".³⁸⁹ Very being of the unavailable is possible only if it is already projected upon time in such a way that what is concealed there is Dasein's being, its being as a possibility to be or not to be the being that it is. Since the preliminary sense of being is given through the commerce with beings, in such a way that their whatness is being-handy, this already revealing of being is given insofar as it is uncovered *through beings* in such a way that Dasein appropriates itself in each case as the *Da* for those beings which are either available or unavailable. However, uncoveredness should not be thought through beings, but as being as such, as that *Sache selbst* so that we can call it a-letheia. This could be achieved only if we ask for beings, not *with regard to* their being, because this already imposes upon being what it could mean, rather, as they are stood in themselves, as *Vorhanden*, *Anwesen* or in Greek terms, as *ousia* so that the fact that being gives itself already becomes visible in its proper hiddenness. Thus, being-produced, the fact that a being owes its being to itself in being, is not only to be considered as *Her-stellen*, but more truly, it is now to be regarded as *Her-stellen*, in such a way that we do not merely respecting the fact that something comes into itself with a view to being, but we appropriate the fact *that a being is* in the sense that question-worthiness of being is placed where it is impossible to speak *about* being, but only *from within* being. We can only say that beings are, but we are no longer merely cared *about* the very uncoveredness which lies there as the unitary sense of being. Rather, before beings and their being, we find the movement (*phusis*) of presence in its presencing whose visibility is a coming out of its invisibility; that which Heidegger calls *a-letheia*.

dimension is intrinsic to being itself. The privative absence is not forged by man's projective self-absence, nor is it merely the unexplainedness of this or that entity (which finally is embedded within a claim of the total intelligibility of reality) nor is it some occasional limit. Rather this privative negativity is intrinsic to being as pres-ab-sence". (Thomas Sheehan, 'Time and Being', 1925-27, in *Martin Heidegger, Critical Assessments*, ed. Christopher Macann, London and New York: Routledge, 1992. p. 61.) For us, this pres-ab-sence structure is not still sufficient to understand what a-letheia means. Thus, since Heidegger does not or cannot consider *Vorhandenheit* in its broadest sense while discussing being according to the transcendental approach, aletheia in its originary meaning cannot come into view.

³⁸⁹ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 311.

4.2. Truth at 'work': on *phusis* and *a-letheia*

Previous section enables us to catch a sight of *the matter itself* from different but nonetheless related perspectives. We have seen that Heidegger, in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tries to accomplish the task which is promised but not carried out in *Being and Time*. Accordingly, it is required that being should be interpreted in its projection upon time insofar as meaning of the being of Dasein, namely, its temporality, is supposed to give us being as such in its very occurrence. To this purpose corresponds analyzing our everyday commerce with beings in terms of this specific temporality which prevails in this commerce, a temporality, when it is interpreted in its very possibility, which is called Temporality. Then, ready-to-hand is regarded from the point of view of its possibility to be that it is, according to the absence which already lies in it. As we have seen, both in *History of the Concept of Time* and in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, being of ready-to-hand is discussed according to the possibility that it is absent in a narrow sense, as present-at-hand, as to be missing, and also according to the very possibility of an absence or *Vorhandenheit* in its broadest sense, as that which always already lies there. According to *History of the Concept of Time*, that which is *Vorhanden* in the broadest sense, is the world as such and this helps us to grasp that world as such or being of Dasein is never posited beforehand but it is a task which has itself as its own possibility to be. However, this conception of *Vorhanden* still does not accomplish the task of interpreting being *temporally* because what is at issue there is just being of Dasein. What is needed is to let being show itself as it is projected upon time, that is, upon *how* it is understood by Dasein. Being is understood in the manner that being of beings is revealed through the commerce with beings where a being is what it is in the play of presence and absence. For Heidegger, the horizontality which becomes visible here, namely, *praesens*, points to the very occurrence of being as such in the possible way it gives itself. As we have argued, this result still considers being from a transcendental perspective, that is, being is understood through beings, not from out of itself. And the latter becomes possible only if being as such is to be seen as a matter of showing itself of a being in its being, as it is stood on its own. Thus, it is not the case that we should take aside beings from the discussion of being, but we should give up trying to understand being from out of beings because it is *possible*

that beings already open the realm of being in their way of being. This is not an empty logical possibility to be actualized. Rather, the very problematic of being is *just possible* otherwise it would be decided on behalf of *something* and destined to be closed. Thus, what remains is to let this possibility show itself by letting beings reveal themselves as a whole and this is nothing but releasing beings into themselves in order to let them show themselves as that which lie there, as *Anwesen* or *Vorhanden* in the broadest sense.

As we have seen, essence or *eidos* belongs to the producibility of a being, to what it will be and what it has been. On the other hand, existence or at-handness refers to the producedness of a being, to that fact that it has been produced in such a way that it is released to be that it is. In the latter, we have found an occurrence of being as a movement of coming into uncoveredness from coveredness. Heidegger's interpretation of Scholastic thinkers points to the problem of existence insofar as it is through existence that being is made concern in its own terms. In other words, since essence is accepted as that which makes possible, existence refers to whether a being is; here, we are not merely concerned with the possibility of a being, but with its coming into being. According to Heidegger, existence adds nothing because only as existing, a being is what it is, because only by means of existence, being of a being is made problematic, which means that being is opened up as being of a being. Indeed, being as such is this openness itself through Dasein insofar as existence already calls for a subject. However, it is obvious that to say that existence belongs to the essence of a being presupposes the essence or what a being is. In other words, according to this reading, what a being is is to come into being. This is what leads us to interpret being through beings in such a way that Dasein prepares the very realm where being becomes the issue. In other words, when we say that existence of a being belongs to its essence, we already decide what beings are in such a way that beings are presupposed in their way to be, in their disposability. This is why we never encounter with an at-hand entity, but we can just suppose that it is extant, that there is a possibility in order that a being is in itself. We believe in *eidos*, in what a being always already is, and a being comes to itself once there is an opportunity for being to show itself according to its what. This latter task is assigned to Dasein as long as it is already there in this problematic and it is due to this primacy of *eidos* that

Heidegger does not give up transcendental approach in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. In other words, if it is accepted that beings come into being due to their essence, their coming into being where being as such is made concern is merely understood in terms of very acceptance of beings in the sense that being is seen as the horizon of those beings. But how could we know that beings *essentially* come to being? Indeed, what needs to be supposed is not extantness, but *eidos* itself as long as the Aristotelian question ‘what is a being?’ rejects a unique answer. As we know, Aristotle claims that a being is said to be in many ways. Thus, beingness is not a concept or genus. What we have is that when we say a being as the being that it is, we already say being. Thus, what is ordinary is to say beings as beings, as they lie there, which is the primary sense of *ousia* for Greeks, and what is extraordinary is the fact that in this saying, being (*einai* or *Sein*) is already said. However, this extraordinary fact occurs once there is ordinary, once Greeks speak of beings as beings. Thus, they do not suppose that beings are extant; rather, they *see* beings in this way, as they are in themselves, as *ousia* in such a way that look or *eidos* of beings prevails in that seeing. But, if *ousia* is seeing something as something, due to the latter, this proper seeing already refers to an openness which could not be determined beforehand which means that look or *eidos* always produces itself as what is to be produced. Then, essence is not something about which we can decide, but it is essencing or *Anwesung* as Heidegger will call it later. Essence is such a happening as long as being is not something but shows up when beings are *said to be* in different ways. Thus, essence of a being is to come into being as that it is in such a way that being is already put into question. There is not a unitary sense of being apart from being because being comes to view only if it is made question-worthy and this happens already when we say beings as beings in the way that they are gathered in each case within *legein* which means collecting, bringing together. Thus, insofar as beings are seen in terms of *legein*, manifoldness and unity both belong to being. But if *there is* unity and manifoldness at the same time, this means that *some beings are more than* others. Then, there are some beings in whose appearance their very being is already seen. For Heidegger, as he sets forth in his lecture *On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics B, I*, those are beings according to nature, or φύσει ὄντα as Aristotle calls it.

It should be noticed that this is not a graduation of being, but taking the responsibility to decide. If we remember what we have discussed in the first chapter, through the analysis of *Plato's Sophist*, where different modes of being-true are classified according to their position with regard to *arche*, we recognize that this classification occurs insofar as we give privilege to the being-true of beings. However, here, following our analysis up to now, we can conclude that being-true of beings is not the privileged sense of being because it does not lie in being of beings, but in the being of Dasein, a conclusion which explains the path of Heidegger's transcendental approach until *Kehre*. Now, we are looking for a domain of beings which gives us beings in their being. In a sense, we can say that Heidegger's path of thinking prepares for himself choosing to choose and reading Aristotle's Physics B, I, can be regarded as a part of this resoluteness. Thus, Heidegger's decides to read Aristotle's Physics in order to point out what is unsaid before that reading. It is meaningless to look for a privileged sense of being, because being has different senses in its unity. Therefore, it is a matter of deciding what domain of beings will present itself as the nearest to being. It is the ability to differentiate (*krinein*) what appears of and by itself from what does not appear from and by itself. Then, φύσει-beings as those beings which are determined by movedness have this character of showing themselves from themselves in such a way that "Φύσις is the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, origin and ordering of change, such that each thing that changes has this ordering within itself".³⁹⁰ For Heidegger, in Aristotle, what is at issue is not movement in its modern use, as a change of place, but as a state of movedness as such which includes both movement and rest. Since phusis belongs to being, movement and rest are not attributed to beings from outside; rather, each being has its order and origin in itself according to be moved. Thus, change, in its Aristotelian sense, is not a mere motion from one position to another; even a plant which does not change its place has been moved in the sense that rest also belongs to movedness as such. For Heidegger, this shows us that for Greeks and specifically for Aristotle, change has a broader meaning; it is not a mere alteration, but a coming into appearance of that which is hidden. Moreover, φύσει-beings have the order and

³⁹⁰Martin Heidegger, 'On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle's Physics B, I,' in *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill, trans. Thomas Sheehan, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 191.

origin of their movedness not incidentally but “inasmuch as they are themselves and are in and with [*bei*] themselves”.³⁹¹ The latter refers to the basic sense of *ousia* for Aristotle, which is *hupokeimenon*. Heidegger translates the latter as ‘laying-present’ instead of ‘something that lies present’. Although *hupokeimenon* includes the second meaning, “it can also mean ‘something distinguished by lying-present’ and so it can mean the very lying-present itself”.³⁹² Thus, *ousia* means lying-present there, standing on its own, being-present of and by itself, presencing. Now, if *phusis* is *ousia* and given that *phusis* is movedness as such, we should understand movedness as a mode of being or presencing in order to understand *phusis* in its essence.

How can we understand being-moved of a being as its being-present? The latter refers to a being’s placing itself into appearance in order to stand on its own. Heidegger insists that this is why for Aristotle, *morphe* as it is interpreted on the basis of *eidos*, has priority over *hyle* or matter. *Eidos* is prior because it is the ‘aspect’ or ‘look’ of a being; it is the sightable. For Aristotle, as we know, contrary to Plato, *eidos* is not above all individuals which are non-beings, rather, *eidos* is through which a being stands on its own in such a way that it is. Thus, “we call an individual thing *das Jeweilige*, ‘that which is there for a while’, because as an individual thing it ‘stays for a while’ in its appearance, and, by preserving the appearance, stands forth in it and out of it – which means that it ‘is’ in the Greek sense of the word”.³⁹³ *Eidos* is not that which is participated by beings as something common to them, but *it is* only as put into presencing by beings so that it can be preserved there. This happens only if there is *legein*, that is, only if beings are addressed *as* beings. Thus, *eidos* should not be characterized in terms of beings, but in terms of the being of beings, their coming into being which happens through *legein* as an emergence, as movedness as such. The same is true for the matter; *hyle* is not a raw material which can be described as a being, but it is *dunamis* which means the appropriateness for...The wood is appropriate for a table, not as any wood, but as this specific wood in order to be cut. This amounts to saying that matter

³⁹¹ Ibid., p. 198.

³⁹² Ibid., p. 200.

³⁹³ Ibid., p. 211.

should be understood with regard to production, to the movedness as such. Then, for Heidegger, this approach places Aristotle both beyond the philosophers of nature before him and beyond Plato as long as they either understand *phusis* only by considering matter as a being or considering *eidos* as a being. In other words, “they do not grasp, much less conceptualize, φύσις as being, i.e., as what makes up the stability or standing-on-its-own of φύσει ὄντα. Such being can be understood only if we use λόγος as our clue”.³⁹⁴ Appearance is understood as it is preserved through the addressing beings as beings in such a way that a being is put itself into appearance and it stands there on its own. What is at issue here is not this or that being or that which is paradigmatic for them, but saying a being as that it is, namely, saying its being in being, in its emergence.

We could say that λόγος is our clue in understanding movedness as such as long as we understand Aristotle’s conception of movedness in its simple sense. Accordingly, essence of movedness should be distinguished from movement. Although the latter is understood as it comes to a rest in cessation, movedness as such is what determines both movement and rest. Thus, even in rest, we find movedness as its essence. Then, Heidegger says: “the purest manifestation of the essence of movedness is to be found where rest does not mean the breaking off and cessation of movement, but rather where movedness is gathered up into *standing still*, and where this ingathering, far from excluding movedness, includes and for the first time discloses it”.³⁹⁵ We know that this ‘ingathering’ means *legein* as bringing something into unity by putting this unity itself forth. In other words, movedness as such is to bring itself into its unity as owning this unity in such a way that something comes into its end (*telos*). And gathering itself into its end, a moving being has itself in its end: ‘ἐν τέλει ἔχει, ἐντελέχεια’. The latter refers to the essence of movedness and as Heidegger notices, Aristotle, instead of this word, also uses ἐνέργεια which means ‘standing in the work’ in the sense that ‘work’ (ἔργον) refers to what is to be produced and what has been produced. Now, it is a matter of understanding how ‘what is to be produced’ and ‘what has been produced’ both belong to the *essence* of

³⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 215.

³⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 217.

movedness as such. What kind of being (of a moving being) presents itself both as ‘to be produced’ and as ‘has been produced’? Obviously, being-moved is a kind of *ousia* as long as it refers to a ‘standing still’. When something is changed into its end; for instance, when the appropriate wood becomes a table, “the very appropriateness of what is appropriated emerges more fully into view and reaches its fulfillment in the appearance of a table and thus comes to stand in the table that has been produced, placed *forth*, i.e., into unhidden”.³⁹⁶ Thus, material is not a non-being; rather, it is as *dunamis*, a mode of presencing. Its holding itself back belongs to its essence and fulfilled when it comes into view in appearance. In his lecture course on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Θ 1-3, Heidegger discusses the being-actual of the *dunamis* at length. Referring to Aristotle’s rejection of Megarian thesis according to which actuality of *dunamis* lies in its enactment, he writes that:

The Megarian thesis must collapse: this implies that the being present of the δύνασθαι qua δύνασθαι cannot be sought in enactment. If that happens, then ἐνέργεια is the actual δύναμις; both are one and the same, so much so that δύναμις as a potentially proper actuality disappears; it does not receive its due. The questioning concerning δύναμις qua δύναμις and not qua ἐνέργεια has no basis at all. If the Megarian thesis is thus relinquished, then, in any event, (at least) one thing is won: the view to the phenomena is not covered over by a violent theory; instead, one sees that being capable of something, and precisely thereby being at work, are in each case something different (ἕτερον). Accordingly, if ἐνέργεια is to be defined in the right way, then we must try in a reverse manner to save δύναμις and its way of being present in its proper essence, in order to put ἐνέργεια for its part into relief against this.³⁹⁷

The Megarian thesis collapses because it considers presence in a narrow sense, as the presence of the actual being. This implies that ‘work’ is understood in a narrow sense too, as the present work. However, as Heidegger insists, for Greeks, ‘work’ has a double sense; it means either occupation or what is worked upon, and it should be bear in mind that “ἐνέργεια are the activities, the ways of working (ἔργα in the first sense), which are occupied with work (ἔργον in the second sense): the ways of being-at-work”.³⁹⁸ What is at issue is not the work as what gets actualized, but the fact that work holds itself in this actualization. This is the true sense of being-at-work and saves *having capability* in its transition or change into the actualization in the sense that “something which is capable is capable in that it ‘has’ a capability; it *holds itself*

³⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 218.

³⁹⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 1-3 On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek, Indiana University Press, 1995. p. 182.

³⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 41.

in this capability and *holds itself back* with this capability—and thereby precisely does not enact”.³⁹⁹ Thus, in each case, what is already at issue is being-at-work of a work where *dunamis* is also present. Only if a being has a capability to have itself, its being itself as itself can be granted through this very delimitation.

However, this does not mean that for Aristotle, *dunamis* precedes *energeia*; rather, the reverse is true because although *energeia* is delimited or determined by means of the very presence of the *dunamis*, this is so insofar as both are considered as modes of being in movement, that is, with regard to the movedness as such which is a kind of *ousia*. Thus, we should not forget our point of departure which is *ousia* or presencing of what is present. Accordingly as Heidegger states, “ἐνέργεια more originally fulfills what pure presencing is insofar as it means a having-itself-in-the-work-and-within-the-end that has left behind the entire ‘not yet’ of appropriateness for...or better, has precisely brought it *forth along with it* into the realization of the finite, fulfilled [voll-‘endeten’] appearance”.⁴⁰⁰ ‘Work’ cannot be regarded as something which is present now excluding its not-yet; rather, it is already in being in such a way that its not-yet is preserved as not-yet and this is how *phusis* is *ousia*, having its control and origin in itself and only as itself. Thus, on the one hand, work has itself in its end as a self-placing of the appearance. On the other hand, since in this self-placing, its not-yet is also brought forth along with it, ἐνέργεια is always ἐνέργεια ἀτελής; it is the standing-in-the-work that has not yet come into its end. This is what *genesis* means and enables us to understand how *phusis* is considered in terms of ὁδός (way). For Heidegger, the latter does not refer to the way between two determined points as it is understood in the ordinary use, but it is to be grasped as way-ness of a way, as the passage from something to something else, that is, as *being-on-the-way*. Thus, in *phusis*, self-placing is neither making something out of something nor the thing made. Rather, self-placing of *phusis* is to bring forth what is to be produced into the appearance as the being-at-work itself. In other words, if we look for the *whereunto* of the genesis, we find that “φύσις is ὁδός ἐκ φύσεως εἰς φύσιν, the being-on-the-way of a self-placing thing toward itself as what is to be

³⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 157.

⁴⁰⁰ Heidegger, ‘On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics B, I,’ in *Pathmarks*, p.219.

produced, and this in such a way that the self-placing is itself wholly of a kind with the self-placing thing to be produced”.⁴⁰¹ The thing to be produced is its very self-placing in the sense that it is present in its absence. It is obvious that this is not a circling back upon itself because this self-placing is a self-placing into appearance, that is, when appearance becomes present through this self-placing, it is always present in an individual this or that. Thus,

Certainly, φύσεως ὁδός εἰς φύσιν is a mode of coming forth into presencing, in which the ‘from which’, the ‘to which’, and the ‘how’ of the presencing remain the same. Φύσις is a ‘going’ in the sense of a going-forth toward a going-forth, and in this sense it is indeed a going *back* into itself; i.e., the *self* to which it returns remains a going-forth.⁴⁰²

This presencing is a presencing-by-absencing insofar as *phusis* is a going forth toward itself as a going forth. Something while placing itself into appearance places this appearance into the present in such a way that what is appropriate for is also appropriated in this placing forth. This is why privation (στέρησις) also belongs to *phusis*. However, this becomes understandable when we notice that privation is not a mere denial of something from something. When we say that something is missing, we mean that its being missing is present. Thus, what is at issue is being absent or an absencing for presencing. In other words, we are not concerned with absentness but with the presence of the absence, that is, with absencing. This shows us that absence is already understood with regard to *eidos* or appearance. Thus, for Heidegger, the twofold essence of *phusis* as presencing-by-absencing supports the idea that *morphe* or *eidos* has priority. Indeed, *phusis* can preserve the meaning of having the origin and control of movedness as and by itself only if *morphe*, as self-placing into appearance, has such a priority. This is the priority of the *a-letheia*, to unconceal itself. *Phusis* is absencing insofar as it produces its very essence as this absencing, that is, *eidos* is already understood in terms of producedness or un-concealment. Heidegger finds the more original form of this happening in Heraclitus’ saying ‘φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ’ which means ‘being loves to hide itself’. This does not mean that it is hard to get at being, but it means that to the essence of being, self-hiding already belongs.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., p. 223.

⁴⁰² Ibid., p. 224.

And the essence of being is to unconceal itself, to emerge, to come out into the unhidden – φύσις. Only what in its very essence *unconceals* and must unconceal itself, can love to conceal itself. Only what is unconcealing can be concealing. And therefore the κρύπτεσθαι of φύσις is not to be overcome, not to be stripped from φύσις. Rather, the task is the much more difficult one of allowing to φύσις, in all the purity of its essence, the κρύπτεσθαι that belongs to it.⁴⁰³

It is a matter of preserving un-hiddenness by letting it conceal itself. This self-concealing revealing both means φύσις (being) and ἀλήθεια. Then, truth does not belong to assertions or to the behavior of human-being; rather, it belongs to being itself.

We have said that *phusis* is a kind of *ousia* given that for Greeks, *ousia* means constant presence. We know that the pre-philosophical meaning of *ousia* refers to artifacts such as assets, possessions or household. Now, if *phusis* refers to the *ousia* in a primordial sense, this is because it gives us what it means to say something in its constant presence. It is emerging from out of its very self in such a way that something abides in this unfolding. This means that *phusis* should not be understood in its narrow sense as natural processes. As Heidegger, in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, insists, it is emerging-abiding sway and although it can be experienced in natural processes, Greeks do not first experience this emerging sway through those natural processes, that is, “this emerging and standing-out-in-itself-from-itself may not be taken as just one process among others that we observe in beings. *Phusis* is Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become and remain observable”.⁴⁰⁴ Not only a restricted realm of beings, but beings as such and as a whole can be experienced as *phusis* insofar as constant presence already means emerging-abiding sway, abiding in its unfolding from out of concealment in such a way that the latter is preserved. This is to inquire into how being belongs to beings *while* they are in being. This whiling as ‘enduring’ preserves the happening of being in its concealing in such a way that being as such always first *seems* to us under ‘aspect’, under ‘*eidos*’, that is, with a view to being. As Heidegger sets forth this becomes obvious when we consider being in its restriction by seeming (*Schein*). The latter has three senses: seeming as luster and glow, seeming as appearing, self-showing and seeming

⁴⁰³ Ibid., p. 230.

⁴⁰⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, New Haven : Yale University Press, 2000. p. 15.

as the semblance. The first and the third senses of seeming, Heidegger claims, lies in its second sense. In other words, even in the shining of the sun or in its seeming as the semblance of rising of it, we find that the sun still shows itself; it appears. We know that appearance as *phusis* is a stepping-forth and stepping away and it is always found through something *as* what appears. Insofar as something is *as* what appears, it is given through an aspect, namely, *dokei*. Then, Heidegger writes, “*Doxa* is the respect (*Ansehen*) in which someone stands, and in a wider sense, the aspect (*Ansehen*) that each being possesses and displays in its look (*Aussehen*) (*eidos*, *idea*)”.⁴⁰⁵ Everything presents itself from this or that viewpoint and this leads us to construct views on the basis of the outlook of beings thereby *opinion* is built. Thus, in accordance with the outlook of beings, we first assume something as this or that and this is what seeming as semblance means. What is crucial for Heidegger is that *phusis* is an appearing which always offers a view, that is, *phusis* needs the semblance insofar as only as *doxa*, being first shows itself. In other words, seeming does not contradict with being; rather, it belongs to it as long as for Greeks, seeming is a kind of appearing. Insofar as there is seeming, there is a struggle for the unconcealment of being. For Greeks, seeming is not ‘subjective’, thus, “the Greeks experienced it otherwise. Again and again, they had first to tear Being away from seeming and preserve it against seeming”.⁴⁰⁶ Heidegger emphasizes on the fact that for Greeks, truth or un-concealment does not refer to a state of affairs but to a kind of experience which can be described by the passion for the unveiling of being. Sophocles’ Oedipus can be regarded as an instance of this passion for wresting being forth from concealment through which Oedipus gains the possibility to be who he is. Only through the concealing of seeming where *eidos* or *doxa* already resides, unconcealing can be carried out and in this carrying out, it is preserved for itself in its concealing because only through the self-placing of *eidos* in concealing, it can be claimed for. But more importantly, it (being or *a-letheia*) happens in that way as long as Greeks characterize their being-human in terms of a passion of bringing something into unconcealment from out of concealment. Thus, understanding being

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 109.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 111.

only through its own terms requires understanding Dasein in more originary terms, that is, in its situatedness within the happening of being.

This analysis shows us that *phusis* as self-placing of *eidos* is a matter of seeming of being. Something seems to be as this or that, but even this seeming is a self-appearing because when we say that something seems *to be as...* this means that it tries to show itself as itself. Thus, Greeks are not afraid of the uncertain character of seeming; rather, for them, seeming is already an accepting or supposing that *eidos* is already at work. For them, being and seeming belong to each other. However, in this belonging-together, they are also disjointed because seeming both destroys beings as they are and in this distortion, it also covers itself off, if it belongs to being. For Heidegger, this is why human-being is always subjected to delusion or *errancy*. In other words, seeming may not lead to unconcealment but endures as concealment. In this sense, it is described as nothing or becoming where there are no longer constant views. However, for Heidegger, becoming, as arising, also belongs to being insofar as it points to the absence of a being. The latter is always understood by means of coming to presence, that is, within the scope of appearance. Then, he writes, “just as becoming is the seeming of Being, seeming as appearing is the becoming of Being”.⁴⁰⁷ Becoming or nothing is not a pure not-being, but it is a not-being as a ‘no longer and not yet’. It is the seeming in its struggle with being and according to this very struggle or strife, seeming as appearing is the nothing of being. Now, we could understand better Heraclitus’ word ‘φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ’ as the confrontation or struggle between unconcealment or being and concealment or seeming. Thus, being should be distinguished from seeming in their co-belonging, and it should also be distinguished from nothing insofar as seeming may cover itself off. This means that seeming is also distinguished from nothing because seeming may lead to unconcealment which also knows nothing. Thus,

The human being must distinguish among these three paths and, accordingly, come to a decision for or against them. At the inception of philosophy, to think is to open up and lay out the three paths. This act of distinguishing puts the human being, as one who knows, upon these paths and at their intersection, and thus into constant de-cision. With de-cision, history as such begins. In de-cision, and only in de-cision, is anything decided, even about the gods. [Accordingly, de-cision here does not mean the judgment and choice of human beings, but

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 122.

rather a division (*Scheidung*) in the aforementioned togetherness of Being, unconcealment, seeming and not-Being.]⁴⁰⁸

Greeks knew to distinguish these three paths of being, seeming and nothing. As Heidegger insists, this de-cision (*Ent-scheidung*) is not a matter of choosing one of them, but to be able to distinguish them by dividing them in their togetherness, that is, to be resolute before any choosing. Heidegger refers to the fragment 6 of Parmenides where it is discussed those three paths and states that “So the man who truly knows is not the one who blindly runs after a truth but only the one who constantly knows all three ways, that of Being, that of not-Being, and that of seeming”.⁴⁰⁹ Truth requires a struggle and this means that only for the one for whom not-being is not pure nothing, seeming provides the possibility to preserve being in its concealment.

The latter struggle between unconcealment and concealment is made present insofar as it *is supposed* that *eidos* is already at ‘work’. Self-placing of the appearance is the putting into work of truth. We have come to face with the most explicit form of this situation through Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s *Physics*. However, for Heidegger, Aristotle and Plato is the end of this great beginning insofar as through their thinking, *logos* gains precedence over being. In order to grasp this point, we should recall that for Heidegger, both Heraclitus and Parmenides, while discussing being either as *phusis* or as *einai*, make visible that in happening of being, *Dasein* is considered as it is raised into a decision about being. This means that in their saying or in all saying of poetic thinking of the great inception including all works of word and stone, being is pointed out or indicated in terms of struggle or strife. Even if human-being or its apprehension is placed as *there* of being, as in the saying of Parmenides, ‘but thinking and being are the same’, for them, being of human-being is always for the sake of being. However, indicating being in terms of struggle also indicates the way to be taken over on behalf of being which finds its end in Plato and Aristotle and this is why the de-cision of great inception is the beginning of history. As Heidegger notices, in Plato’s philosophy, *phusis* turns out to be *idea* and the distinction lies in that “*phusis* is the emerging-sway, the standing-

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 116.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 120.

there-in-itself, constancy. *Idea*, the look as what is seen, is a determination of the constant insofar as, and only insofar as it stands opposed to a seeing”.⁴¹⁰ For pre-Socratic thinkers and poets, appearing does not yet offer an outlook to be looked at although appearing involves such a meaning. Accordingly, in this second sense of appearing, “the visage offered by the thing, and no longer the thing itself, now becomes what is decisive”.⁴¹¹ Thus the thing itself (*Sache selbst*), the originary fact that being needs struggle thereby human-being is called for, remains concealed, but the fact that it offers itself to *us* is considered. This is why logos or thinking gains precedence over being. Again we should notice that in the inceptive happening or appearing of being, this second sense is already included in such a way that being gives way to its own concealing, to the history. Being is its own concealing insofar as it is self-appearing, insofar as it is understood against seeming and nothing. However, for Heidegger, in the inceptive thinking, this distinction between being and seeming implies the togetherness of being and thinking more than their disjunction as long as de-cision as dividing requires an apprehension which corresponds to it. As Parmenides says, thinking (*noein*) and being (*einai*) are the same and in this great inception, being and thinking, although they are considered in their togetherness, are not yet disjointed. Thus, Parmenides’ statement can be interpreted in the following way:

Being means: standing in the light, appearing, stepping into unconcealment. Where this happens, that is, where Being holds sway, apprehension holds sway too and happens too, as belonging to Being. Apprehension is the receptive bringing-to-a-stand of the constant that shows itself in itself.⁴¹²

For Heidegger, the emphasis should be put on the fact that apprehension necessarily occurs insofar as being holds sway. In other words, apprehension is for the sake of being, not the reverse. It holds the constancy of being in a stand. Moreover, this also means that essence of human-being should only be understood on the basis of the essence of being.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., p. 194.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., p. 195. “Das Gesicht, das die Sache macht, wird jetzt entscheidend, nicht mehr sie selbst.” (*Einführung in die Metaphysik*, GA 40, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. p. 192.)

⁴¹² Ibid., p. 147.

Here, Heidegger takes into consideration Sophocles' *Antigone* as the work where this belonging-togetherness between being and human-being occurs. First of all, it should be said that "this is not a matter of describing and clarifying the domains and behavior of the human, who is one being among many; instead, this is a poetic projection of human Being on the basis of its extreme possibilities and limits".⁴¹³ Human being is understood in its extremity only if there is the overabundance of being. Then, for Heidegger, the word 'deinon' becomes the core of the selected ode as long as it both refers to the overwhelming sway of being and violence-doing of human-being. Insofar as human-being, being exposed to the violence of being in its overwhelming sway, uses violence against this overwhelming of being, it is *to deinotaton*, the most violent. Doing violence, human-being violates the homely, the ordinary toward the uncanny of the overwhelming sway and in that sense, it is the uncanniest. Then, Heidegger claims that this violence-doing happens according to a knowing which is *techne* in its broad sense, as art. Here, "knowing is the ability to set Being into work as something that in each case *is* in such and such a way".⁴¹⁴ In that sense, work of art is a form of *techne*, not because a work is produced or made, "but because it puts Being to work in a being".⁴¹⁵ This is *being that is*, namely, *das seiende Sein* as long as putting into work of being happens as coming into being of a being in its being. We know that both aspects give *phusis*; indeed, it is through the work of art *phusis* comes to seem or it has aspects. Heidegger writes that "to put to work here means to bring into the work—a work within which as what appears, the emerging that holds sway, *phusis*, comes to seem".⁴¹⁶ Being as *phusis* is set to work (*Ins-Werk-Setzen*) in such a way that it is obtained or secured (*Erwirken*) in beings. *Das seiende Sein* preserves the concealing insofar as it comes to seeming, insofar as it points out the being of human-being from within this limitation of being by seeming in such a way that the sense of human-being is first set forth through this belonging. Thus, work of art refers to concealing insofar as it preserves being *in a being*, but it also refers to un-concealing as long as

⁴¹³ Ibid., p. 165.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., p. 170.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

it is already understood as putting *being* into work in *that* being. In other words, in the work of art, the struggle between unconcealment and concealment happens. Concealment prevails in the work of art, not because it is a being but because the fact that a being is in its being needs being of human-being because coming-to-being of a being is already in being. Thus, concealment refers to the fact that being needs an Other, that is, human-being. However, this concealing belongs to being as such insofar as it is being itself which needs an open-site as Dasein in order to self-showing or *phuein*. But if this concealing belongs to being as such, this means that for Greeks, being is already gathered; as Heidegger repeats in several texts, it is *logos* as the gatheredness of gathering of concealing. *Logos*, then, does not primarily mean discourse or saying; rather, its original sense lies in *phusis* itself, being gathered in and from itself, as Heidegger sets forth with respect to Heraclitus. Thus, the struggle between unconcealment and concealment cannot be without direction or fittingness; indeed, *das seiende Sein* already implies a joint (*Fug*). Heidegger, then, describes this fittingness as *dike* which belongs to the overwhelming sway of being. Accordingly, the struggle happens as the standing over against of *techne* of violence-doing with the *dike* of overwhelming being, or better said, their reciprocal relation is. It remains to say that for Heidegger, this reciprocal relation between *techne* and *dike* corresponds to the belonging-togetherness of *noein* and *einai* that we have discussed in Parmenides' word.

Thus, Greeks in their inceptive thinking, has understood human-being from within the essence of being insofar as overwhelming of the beings as a whole and violence-doing of human-being are co-originary. However, this belonging-together involves their opposition or struggle which prepares history. In its violence-doing, human-being lets the overwhelming sway appear by raising himself into the uncanny or homeless. But it still shatters against being because it is being itself which requires human-being. Thus, "historical humanity's Being-here means: Being-posited as the breach into which the excessive violence of Being breaks in its appearing, so that this breach itself shatters against Being".⁴¹⁷ Human-being is a breach into the overwhelming of being whereby being is put into work in beings so that there is history (*Geschichte*). In that sense, for Heidegger, human-being is in-cident

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., p. 174.

(*Zwischen-fall*); it lets the sudden emergence of being be released by saying Yes to the very fittingness or gatheredness of being. As Heidegger notices, this is not inferiority; “instead, it occurs solely in the manner of setting-into-work itself. The overwhelming, Being, confirms itself in works *as history*”.⁴¹⁸ It is to be remarked that for Heidegger, being no longer confirms itself in Dasein, but in works as history. This gives us the essence of the *Kehre* in the sense that being is no longer considered as it is projected upon Dasein. Instead, being holds sway in beings insofar as beings are understood as the beings that are, in their coming-into-being as work. Human-being has the role to preserve the un-concealment by responding to the concealing of beings in their manifestation as a whole. Since this emergence of being involves un-concealment whereby essence is together with the non-essence, human-being, as Dasein, has a more glorious sense than ever. Dasein, now, is the open-site for the happening of being in its self-concealing revealing. Since being always conceals itself, human-being is already needed and the self-showing of being-human corresponds to the decline of being, a decline which is already grounded in being. In other words, human-being lets the essence of being show itself in its invisibility; here we no longer need the being of human-being as the possible as such, because we have history (*Geschichte*) itself; or history has us. Heidegger sees this *Geschichte* in the work, especially, in the work of art, because only in a work, self-working of being happens in a being whereby ‘struggle’ in un-concealment is grounded. Here we should notice that when transcendentalism breaks down, ontological difference shows itself as difference itself for the first time. *Das seiende Sein* is the joint where this difference is preserved as the difference and this happens insofar as human-being is recognized by its in advance knowledge, *techne*, which puts being into work in beings by daring to struggle against the overwhelming so that it can first become who he is. And being who he is, he both accepts *that a being is* and being-at-work of being. Thus, in the work, the ontological difference which precedes the difference between *being of* beings and *beings in* their being is resolved by turning to its very essence in such a way that now we say *das seiende Sein*. This very essence lies in that being as such has been understood from out of unconcealment, gatheredness or pro-ducedness, insofar as being is discussed with respect to its delimitation by its

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

other. In this delimitation, human-being is given as the preserver of this happening or *Geschichte* in such a way that its being-here is already historical.

Thus, in addition to our discussion of Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's *Physics*, B, I, *Introduction to Metaphysics* has more originally shown us that "truth, as un-concealment, is not an addendum to Being".⁴¹⁹ It is not sufficient merely to claim that *eidos* is put into work as its own appropriation; but also, it should be shown that this is the work of being itself. This becomes possible if following Heidegger, we consider being or *phusis* only from out of itself, in its own delimitation by its other. Although we know that Aristotle's *energeia* means the having itself of a being in its end which gives us *phusis* as un-concealment, if Heidegger does not mention 'setting being into work' or *das seiende Sein* in that lecture, this is because it is not possible to interpret *phusis* in its originary sense, in its belonging and opposition to the becoming, seeming, thinking and ought within the limits of Aristotle's philosophy. However, Aristotle's thinking is still close to that originary inception not because it does not belong to the decline of being, but because it appropriates this decline more than Plato. As we have seen, *phusis* becomes *idea* when self-appearing is considered as a paradigm for a seeing. And we have also seen that Aristotle tries to turn down this interpretation by interpreting *eidos* as self-placing of appearance in a being whereby it is preserved in this enduring. But what is at stake here, as we have seen, is the primacy of *legein* for Aristotle in the sense that *eidos* is placed into beings in their being as long as being is understood as saying beings as beings. As Heidegger shows us toward the end of the section 'Being and Thinking' in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, this Aristotelian effort belongs to the decline of being as such but insofar as this decline itself belongs *essentially* to being itself, Aristotle appropriates being as such. We should say that decline of being, for Heidegger, is not the decadence of being, but an *enkklisis* or falling over (*casus*) of being as it is the case with the infinitive 'Sein' which is falling over of being as such. Then while discussing the opposition of seeming and being, Heidegger writes that "now we see that seeming, as a variant of Being itself, is the same as falling over. It is a variant of Being in the sense of standing-there-straight-in-

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., p. 107.

itself”.⁴²⁰ Thus, becoming, seeming, thinking and ought are deviations of being as long as we understand being as self-appearing. In that sense, history of being consists of variants of being and produces itself within this producedness which is a historical happening. This is why contrary to the way we have followed in the first part of our study, Heidegger no longer takes Aristotle’s theory of *logos* for granted in order to arrive at the question-worthiness of being; instead, now, Aristotle’s thinking has been subjected to the happening of being in such a way that it is placed as historical. In a sense, we could say that Aristotle is the first metaphysician as long as through his philosophy, being and *logos* is first disjointed according to the very essence of happening which lies in their belonging-togetherness. Although the latter has been veiled, in this veiledness, un-veiledness of being already happens. Due to this already happening, Heidegger tries to wrest the unsaid from out of it. Heidegger tries to achieve this by pointing to the self-placing of the appearance in a being, but the unsaid or what Aristotle really wants to say is that in this self-appearing, being is already at work in its concealing. This is why Aristotle considers *phusis* or movedness as *ousia*, as lying-present as such, distinguishing it from mere artifacts. This is not because artifacts or what is near to us is non-being as it is the case in Plato’s thinking, but because for Aristotle too, what is at stake is not the work as that which is produced, but the putting-itself-into work of being, producedness or unconcealment as such or as Heidegger says in *the Origin of the Work of Art*, work-being of the work whose most immediate form that we find in the artwork.

Now it remains to understand why it is “through the artwork, as Being that *is* (*das seiende Sein*), everything else that appears and that we can find around us first becomes confirmed and accessible, interpretable and understandable, *as a being*, or else as an unbeing”.⁴²¹ For Heidegger, beings around us, that is, *Umwelt*, gains accessibility as the beings that they are through the artwork. Why does artwork have such a priority? Indeed, Heidegger, in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, in addition to the work of stone in temple and statue, speaks of other modes of work which are the work of the word as poetry, the work of the word as thinking and the work of the

⁴²⁰ Ibid., p. 114.

⁴²¹ Ibid., p. 170.

polis.⁴²² All of them are again regarded in terms of the striving for the unconcealment of beings or putting being in the work. Given that, as Françoise Dastur points out, Heidegger, while discussing artwork, gives privilege to the Greek temple because it is non-figurative, the primacy of artwork can be explained in the following way: “because the work of art portrays nothing, but simply stands there, it opens a space in which everything can become visible”.⁴²³ Artwork has priority because it has a more originary relation to *a-letheia* due to the fact that it just stands there as the open space for each being in their coming into being. Then, temple or statue are the most originary space for *a-letheia* because they are, first of all, characterized as standing-there or as lying-present as Heidegger calls it. But we know that lying-present is the meaning of *ousia* which we, pre-philosophically, find in artifacts. Thus, if artwork is the open space where beings first become visible, this is due to the sameness which we find in both artifacts and artwork, insofar as they are described by lying-there. We should remember that in his work on Aristotle’s *phusis*, Heidegger distinguishes lying-there from that which lies there. Thus, insofar as we consider them as they are that which lie there, they seem different, but insofar as we see that what is at stake here is lying-there as such, they are not merely different things, because in this difference of beings, we find a *sameness*, not identity, which is supposed to produce itself in a special *case* in such a way that it is the producedness as such which is in question and which gives itself as evidence for all beings that they are, as different beings. Then, artwork has privilege because it is in that work that this ‘same’ lying-present is at work or it is put to work so that it is the work. How this is so, we should seek for.

First of all, we should see in what way artifacts are also characterized as *ousia*. We return to Aristotle’s discussion of *phusis*, because it was Aristotle who distinguishes artifacts from φύσει-beings. However, Heidegger argues, for Aristotle, “the issue is here to show that artifacts *are what they are* and *how they are* precisely

⁴²² Ibid., p. 204.

⁴²³ Françoise Dastur, ‘Heidegger’s Freiburg Version of the Origin of the Work of Art’ in *Heidegger toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s*, ed. James Risser, State University of New York Press, 1999. p. 127.

in the movedness of production and thus in the rest of having-been-produced”.⁴²⁴ It should be grasped that here Heidegger points to the fact that what-being or that-being of a being should be understood from within the discussion of movedness as such. More importantly, we should notice that the distinction between what-being or that-being belongs to the realm of artifacts and it has to be considered with regard to its origin which is *phusis*. Then, for Heidegger, artifacts also have movement in themselves because even if they stand there before us, this ‘rest’ as lying-present indicates movedness as such. But, artifacts do not have the origin and control of this movedness in and by themselves; instead, they need an artist to be produced. *Arche* of artifacts is *techne* which Heidegger describes, now, as know-how in, familiarity with. Although this *techne* is in the artist, not in the artifact, insofar as it means knowing the production with regard to its end (*telos*), that is, with regard to the being-finished of the artifact, it gives us how artifacts are related to their *arche* in other way than φύσει-beings. This happens due to the antecedently envisioned appearance or *eidos* so that a table is addressed as a table, or a bedstead as a bedstead. Thus, artifacts can also be described in terms of movedness as such as long as they lie there before us, that is, their rest refers to the movedness as such. The only thing that we must see is that their relation to their *arche* or to the *techne* is different from that of φύσει-beings. The latter involves the origin of its movedness in themselves in such a way that *eidos* places itself into a being. However, for artifacts, *eidos* is not in them, but as it is envisioned, it is in the person. But this does not mean that movement of *techne* refers to the manipulating of things by someone, because insofar as *techne* consists in dealing with beings with regard to their being-finished, it belongs to the essence of beings. In other words, *techne* is a know-how as long as *eidos*, whereby something is addressed as something in its being-finished, is already its end and this means that it already deals with beings themselves. This is how artifacts are also moving-things, not because they are created by an artist, but because their resting lies in production or *techne* which is controlled by the antecedently envisioned *eidos*. Thus, what enables us to consider artifacts from within the realm of production or movedness is the fact that *eidos* already prevails in that production. On the other hand, insofar as it is necessary that this *eidos* should be

⁴²⁴ Heidegger, ‘On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics B, I,’ in *Pathmarks*, p. 192.

envisioned by a person, artifacts are distinguished from φύσει-beings. For Heidegger, this is not a lack, but indicates a different kind of relation of those beings to their *arche* which is *techne*. This aims to show that being of artifacts is already given through the movedness as such. Heidegger explains this point by considering both growing things and artifacts in terms of generation. We can both talk about generation of an generation of animal and generation of a table. Indeed, for Heidegger, generation can be described as derivation (*Ent-stellung*) “which is not to be taken in its usual sense but rather as meaning: to derive from one appearance that appearance into which something pro-duced (in any given instance) is placed and thus *is*”.⁴²⁵ It is obvious that one kind of this derivation or its most originary form occurs when appearance derives itself from out of itself as its self-placing in *phusis*. However, in the case of the artifacts, this happens in another way:

Something generated (say, a table) can be derived from one appearance (the appearance of ‘table’) and placed forth into the same kind of appearance without the first appearance, from which the table is derived, itself performing the placing into appearance. The first appearance (εἶδος), ‘table’, remains only a παράδειγμα, something that certainly shows up in the production but does *nothing more* than that and therefore requires something else that can first place the orderable wood, as something appropriate for appearing as a table, *into* that appearance.⁴²⁶

Through the production of a table, *eidos* ‘table’ only accompanies to the production; it does not perform self-placing. It is just a paradigm which guides *techne* as its end and therefore it requires something else because, if it does not perform its self-placing, how could it become knowable that the orderable wood is appropriate for the production of the table? In other words, if this or that wood is appropriate for the production of a table, this means that this wood is already orderable. *Eidos* ‘table’ cannot put this orderable wood as appropriate wood into appearance because it is just a paradigm. It functions insofar as it is the end of *techne* which belongs to that production. But as we have seen, *techne* considers beings as they are finished, as they lie present, as *ousia* which for Heidegger, means presencing of the present. *Techne* is the know-how of the end where a being reaches its being as lying-present but this requires that *techne* is also an in advance knowledge of the meaning of lying-there. Thus, we can say that although Heidegger does not express, in Aristotle, *techne*, in

⁴²⁵ Ibid., p. 221.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

its narrow sense, belongs to the production of artifacts, but in its broader sense, it is a familiarity with beings, not with regard to their being addressed as beings, but knowing the primacy of this addressing, it sees what is at stake here; the fact that in this addressing, being or un-concealment is already at work in those beings otherwise it is meaningless to take up beings with regard to their being-addressed, or their being-completed. In other words, it would be meaningless to look for the beings with regard to their being if their being would not already be revealed. But this already revealedness of being is nothing but the difference between being and beings due to its alreadiness in such a way that the difference is preserved in beings as their being, therefore we say *das seiende Sein*. Thus, the generation of *phusis* is not the condition for the generation of artifacts because in their distinguishing as different beings, we find the overwhelming sameness which tries to confirm itself in beings in this or that way.

This is why Heidegger, in his discussion of Aristotle's *phusis*, does not point to a specific case of being, *das seiende Sein* as artwork. That reading merely gives us work-being of work as *phusis*. The latter is understood as self-emerging appearance, as being-on-the-way in such a way that "Φύσις is the self-productive putting-away of itself, and therefore it possesses the unique quality of delivering over to itself that which *through it* is first transformed from something orderable (e.g., water, light, air) into something appropriate for it alone (for example, into nutriment and so into sap or bones). In *phusis*, the transformation of something orderable into something appropriate is given for and by itself. This helps us to understand how *phusis* happens as presencing-by-absencing. However, it is not clear which kind of beings appropriates itself as its own being-appropriate for. Artifacts cannot be regarded in terms of this self-appropriating because their production requires something else in order to transform something orderable into something appropriate. Here Heidegger, concerning Aristotle's philosophy, refers to growing things; for instance, in the growing of a tree, fruit comes to light while the blossom disappears. However, following *Introduction to Metaphysics*, we know that *phusis* does not merely belong to growing things, but to the beings insofar as they emerge from out of themselves in such a way that their being is preserved there as conflict. This refers to the *das seiende Sein* whose most immediate form is artwork and if we still try to ask for the

origin (*Ursprung*) of the artwork, our asking finds itself in another ground insofar as for Heidegger, this origin already involves a leap (*Sprung*). Concerning the leap, he writes that “according to the genuine meaning of the word, we call such a leap that attains itself as ground by leaping an originary leap (Ur-sprung): an attaining-the-ground-by-leaping”.⁴²⁷ The origin can only be attained by leaping as this leaping itself and this will lead Heidegger to his other beginning in *Contributions to Philosophy*. Such originary questions ‘why why?’ or the question concerning the origin of the artwork which can be formulated as ‘why is there a being in which being is put to work in such a way that that being is a work (of being itself)?’ are so originary that they require a leap whose leaping will be the origin as such. Before considering what it means to leap, we should turn back to beings in their transformation. Then, what is work? It is not the artifact because in artifact, *eidos* remains a paradigm; it does not place itself into appearance. *Phusis* in the sense of growing things that we find in Aristotle’s *Physics* is the self-placing of the appearance but for Heidegger, this is a narrow sense of *phusis* insofar as *phusis* is not understood within its co-belonging and opposition with its other, as it becomes visible in *Introduction to Metaphysics*. This is why the distinguishing artifacts from work, in its Aristotelian employment, has sense: insofar as we always understand work as a being produced which lies present, we look for the lying-present of *that which lies present* and this is nothing but bringing forth of *being* from out of its own delimitation with regard to artifacts. One knows how to bring beings into their end, only if one already *knows how to* deal with ‘beings in their being’ in such a way that being is put into work in a being. Then, should we say that work refers to a mere thing in its general sense? If it is a mere thing, how could we understand thingly character of the work? As we shall see below, those are questions that Heidegger discusses in his lecture *The Origin of the Work of Art* and they have no answers but only points out a leap in this very questioning.

Before discussing the relationship between thing and work, Heidegger points to the circularity between art and artwork. Only if we know what art is, then we find

⁴²⁷ Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 7. “Einen solchen, sich als Grund er-springenden Sprung nennen wir gemäß der echten Bedeutung des Wortes einen Ur-sprung: das Sich-den-Grund-erspringen.” (GA. 40, p. 8.)

something as an artwork, but it is also obvious that art is present only through the artwork. Heidegger takes the second step, that is, he begins with discussing what work is. At first look, artwork has a thingly character; a picture is just a thing which hangs on the wall. But what is a thing? The thing, as long as it means 'entity' has a very general sense including everything that we can come across such as thoughts, a shoe, natural beings, artifacts and even God. But when we say a 'mere thing', we mean natural thing which is simply a thing such as the block of granite. Then, Heidegger refers to three traditional ways of understanding thing. According to the first, a thing is the substance which is composed of accidents. Second view argues that a thing is what we perceive, that is, it is the unity of manifold of the senses. And the third conception of thing consists in the idea of 'formed matter'. Heidegger develops his discussion on the thingly character of the work through this third conception of world because in the first, the thing is kept away from us whereas in the second, it is too close. In other words, the notion of 'formed matter' seems to provide us with the proper proximity with the so-called 'thing'. Then, the block of granite is a material in a form although the latter is not shaped by us but resulted by the distribution of matter. On the other hand, equipments seem to be such things with one difference, in equipment, form determines the material. It is the usefulness of the equipment according to which this or that material is chosen. But this means that form and matter are not the original categories which constitute equipment, because they are also founded on its usefulness. Thus, equipment has a strange position in the discussion of the thing. If it is usually regarded as authentic thing, this is because it has an intermediary place between thing and work. Insofar as it is produced by human being in such a way that it is interpreted by form-matter framework, it is similar to the artwork. On the other hand, since this producedness also refers to the being-finished of the equipment, it is self-contained like a mere thing such as granite block. However, neither equipment is self-sufficient like a mere thing, granite block, as long as it is not shaped out of itself and nor artwork is just a mere thing just because it is self-sufficient insofar as it is also produced. Thus, the traditional way of considering thing as formed matter leads to an impasse but it is this impasse which suggest to begin with equipment insofar as equipment, as long as it is determined in terms of producedness which is understood within the 'formed matter' framework, is

both similar to mere thing and artwork leaving those on their own way to be. It should be said that Heidegger, while recognizing the impasse here, also condemns his own beginning in his *Being and Time* as captured by this framework.

However, this impasse is not a circle of being, that is, it does not need to be deconstructed preserving its essence; instead, it just needs to be corrected. In other words, this impasse will not end by resolving into its origin but leaves its place to the origin. It is not a matter of questioning why we begin with the equipment, but accepting this very conception of form-matter duality from out of a leap in such a way that we find out that they have their origin, in another place, in the work. This becomes possible when Heidegger proposes that being of equipment, its usefulness, or *Zuhandenheit*, already lies in the reliability (*Verlässlichkeit*). Heidegger writes, “The equipmental quality of the equipment consists indeed in its usefulness. But this usefulness itself rests in the abundance of an essential being of the equipment. We call it reliability”.⁴²⁸ Thus, using Heidegger’s example, a pair of peasant shoes is what it is only if the peasant uses them in such a way that even that using becomes usual. But this usefulness is possible due to the reliability of the equipment so that equipment rests within itself. If we have an inclination to determine the being of equipment as usefulness, this is because in being worn-out of the equipment, usefulness becomes visible in its nakedness. This is what leads us to consider equipment as a mere fabricating which impresses form upon the matter. And this is so because human making anticipates the human thinking or subjectivity. But where do we find the equipmental character of the equipment? As it is well-known, Heidegger, here, points to the Van Gogh’s painting, not because it is in the painting that the equipment is represented, but because the equipmentality of the equipment stands there. In other words, in the painting, equipment is in truth. Since it is denied that equipment is understood in terms of fabricating as ‘formed matter’, what remains is to listen what its reliability says. Then, if equipment is characterized as something reliable, this means that what is at stake is not its being, but the truth of its being in its abundance. We are not only concerned with how being looks like within the producedness of a being, but with how a being stands within its being; using

⁴²⁸ Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the work of Art’, in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, New York, Harper & Row, 1971. p. 34.

something, we rely on the fact that being shows itself within the world of the producedness, but more importantly, we rely on the fact that being shows itself in such a way that there is a need for our being and that unconcealment belongs to the essence of being. Thus, the work does not represent or portray the truth of equipment, because, here, what is at stake is not only the being of the equipment, but the fact that to call equipment as equipment or a thing as a thing requires that being already holds sway as preserved and concealed, that is, received by human being in a work. This is the happening of truth in such a way that work is where truth happens. Thus, since truth needs a place that it happens in the work and it needs another being than equipment because it needs human-being, as the preserver of truth and this requires considering Dasein within another relation to being rather than as an understanding of being. Thus, work is a work of truth in the following way: “in the work of art the truth of an entity has set itself to work. ‘To set’ means here: to bring to a stand. Some particular entity, a pair of shoes, comes in the work to stand in the light of its being. The being of the being comes into the steadiness of its shining”.⁴²⁹ Then, the problem of the equipmentality of the equipment leads us to the prevailing occurring of truth as setting itself into work of truth. We, now, see that the producedness which arises from the concepts of matter and form has a deeper origin which is unconcealedness and this origin is where a pair of shoes already belongs; as Van Gogh’s painting shows us, “this equipment belongs to the *earth* and it is protected in the *world* of the peasant woman”.⁴³⁰ Disclosure of world is no longer understood with regard to the breaking down of the environmental world because now, usefulness, even in its becoming usual, holds the world open. Thus, a peasant woman has world in such a way that “her equipment, in its reliability, gives to this world a necessity and nearness of its own. By the opening up of a world, all things gain their lingering and hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits”.⁴³¹ We can see that this usualness of the environmental world which refers to its reliability is nothing but the seeming of self-appearing *phusis* that we have already discussed and world is protected due this already concealing which makes each being

⁴²⁹ Ibid., p. 36.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., p. 34.

⁴³¹ Ibid., p. 45.

earthy by giving them their limits. Thus, world and earth are not notions which replace form and matter; rather, they ground the conception of 'formed matter', the possibility of coming into appearance as the ground itself. This grounding happens in the work in such a way that what is at stake here is not this or that being or their being, but the setting itself into work of truth as the being *of* beings.

Heidegger's aim was to understand what work is by means of thing. The latter led us to the equipmentality of the equipment which becomes visible through the artwork as the setting itself into work of truth. It is obvious that we attained nothing with regard to the thingly character of the work; we just know that in artwork, truth sets itself into work. We also did not learn what a thing is. Thus, we just learned that workly character of work is setting itself into work of truth. And Heidegger argues that thingly character of the work should be understood on the basis of its workly character in such a way that thingly character of the thing will also become visible. In other words, the way is from the work to the thing, not the reverse. In order that something is called a thing, either as equipment, growing thing or artwork, truth should already happen as un-concealment of being in such a way that we already know how to put being into work in a being. But insofar as this putting into work is carried out by human-being in the sense that being of human-being is already opened, there is a being, that is, artwork, which is revealed as the happening of truth. Thus, truth as that which is already at work co-originate with the work in such a way that for Heidegger, what is at stake is the work-being of the work. The latter consists in the self-sufficiency of the work or its thingly aspect. Heidegger, again, argues that artwork cannot be considered as a mere thing which will be exhibited in art museums. It has self-sufficiency due to the setting-itself-into-work of truth and this is why Heidegger dedicates the second section of the *Origin of the Work of Art* to the relationship between work and truth. Truth can only be understood in terms of work, in terms of the open place which is opened through the happening of truth. Thus, work-being of work refers to the setting up (*Aufstellen*) of a world and setting forth (*Herstellen*) of the earth. The setting up of a world gives us the holy in its presence. In that sense, it makes work a dedication and praise. Heidegger uses again the phrase 'World worlds' by claiming that "world is never an object that stands before us and can be seen. World is the ever non-objective to

which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and curse keep us transported into Being”.⁴³² The Greek temple gathers itself as this relational context and it is through this relationality of world which becomes a destiny for human-being in such a way that human-being takes over its being and becomes historical. Thus, *work is* by setting up of a world. And in setting up of a world, it sets forth the earth. It is noteworthy to say that for Heidegger, what is set forth or produced is not work, but the earth. In an artwork, material is not used up; on the contrary, it is pro-duced for the first time through the artwork:

The rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak. All this comes forth as the work sets itself back into the massiveness and heaviness of stone, into the firmness and pliancy of wood, into the hardness and luster of metal, into the lighting and darkening of color, into the clang of tone, and into the naming power of the word.⁴³³

In setting itself back into the earth, “the work moves the earth itself into the Open of a world and keeps it there. *The work lets the earth be an earth*”.⁴³⁴ The earth resists to disclosure and in that sense, it is concealing or sheltering; it rejects all penetration and therefore it is self-secluding. Work is the happening of the struggle or opposition between world and earth. Heidegger writes that “the work-being of the work consists in the fighting of the battle between world and earth. It is because the struggle arrives at its high point in the simplicity of intimacy that unity of the work comes about in the fighting in the battle”.⁴³⁵ Thus, the self-sufficiency or repose of the artwork lies in the struggle between world and earth, which happens as setting-itself-into-work of truth.

As Heidegger admits at the end of second section, we did not yet attain the thingly aspect of work. The reason why Heidegger insists on the thingly aspect of work is the fact that work is created or made by an artist. Even if work-being of work is understood as setting-itself-into-work of truth, createdness of work remains a problem insofar as truth is at work *in work*. Thus, the relationship between createdness and work should be understood. Here Heidegger appeals again to the

⁴³² Ibid., p. 44.

⁴³³ Ibid., p. 46.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., p. 49.

Greek word ‘*techne*’. For Greeks, *techne* means neither making of artifacts nor creation of artworks. Rather, as we have seen before, it is a mode of knowing in a broad sense which refers to the apprehending of what is present as such. Thus, “*techne*, as knowledge experienced in the Greek manner, is a bringing forth of beings in that it *brings forth* present beings as such beings *out of* concealedness and specifically *into* the unconcealedness of their appearance; *techne* never signifies the action of making”.⁴³⁶ Insofar as we consider *techne* as it belongs to the *aletheia*, we understand bringing-forth (*Hervorbringen*), not as mere making or craftsmanship, but as a bringing forth of beings into unconcealedness out of concealedness. Accordingly, creation cannot affect this kind of bringing forth; instead, it should be determined by the work-being of the work. Still we can ask: in what way does truth happen that it happens *in the work*? Here Heidegger reminds us that unconcealment is un-concealment, that is, in truth, there is always un-truth. The latter happens either as refusal or as dissembling and this double concealing reminds us of the path of Nothing and path of seeming. As we have seen, paths of *phusis*, seeming and Nothing are distinguished by Greeks in such a way that they belong to each other in a striving manner. Now, Heidegger repeats that in unconcealment, both ways of concealing take place in such a way that we, most of time, do not recognize them. But one thing happens: “in the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is clearing, a lighting. Thought of in reference to what is, to beings, this clearing is in a greater degree than are beings”.⁴³⁷ Heidegger, thus, speaks of the clearing for the Open in which beings both stands and withdraws, as the conflict of clearing and concealing. However, “the openness of this Open, that is, truth, can be what it is, namely, *this* openness, only if and as long as it establishes itself within its Open. Hence, there must always be some being in this Open, something that is, in which the openness takes its stand and attains its constancy”.⁴³⁸ Thus, there is not only clearing for the Open, because this is possible insofar as Open sustains itself or takes possession of itself by establishing (*Einrichten*) itself in a being that is and this is what *thesis* means for Greeks. As Heidegger emphasizes in the *Addendum*, the

⁴³⁶ Ibid., p. 59.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., p. 53.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., p. 61.

word ‘thesis’ does not mean placing something before a subject but letting something lie forth. What stands there is the constancy of the self-appearing of being itself and this explains why truth has an impulse toward the work. But how does the conflict between world and earth belong to the establishing of truth itself in the work? In order to understand this, we should see that:

The conflict is not a rift (*Riss*) as a mere cleft is ripped open; rather, it is the intimacy with which opponents belong to each other. This rift carries the opponents into the source of their unity by virtue of their common ground. It is a basic design, an outline sketch, that draws the basic features of the rise of the lighting of beings. This rift does not let the opponents break apart; it brings the opposition of measure and boundary into their common outline.⁴³⁹

As it can be noticed, the word ‘rift’ (*Riss*) mostly refers to ‘common ground’, ‘basic design’, ‘an outline sketch’ rather than a mere cleft. This is the way how truth sustains its constancy in a being. A being occupies the Open of truth as long as the conflict between world and earth is brought into a common outline or sketch whereby truth takes a stand and this means that the rift or design is set back into the earth because placing of truth needs a particular being and for Heidegger, particularity of being indicates that which resists to the openness of the Open, that is, earth. Then, he writes, “the strife that is brought into the rift and thus set back into the earth and thus fixed in place is *figure, shape, Gestalt*. Createdness of the work means: truth’s being fixed in place in the figure”.⁴⁴⁰ Truth is established or ‘created’ in the work in the sense that the very composedness or figure of truth is accepted by the earth as belonging to its boundary. In other words, “the earth juts up within the work because the work exists as something in which truth is at work and because truth occurs only by installing itself within a particular being. In the earth, however, as essentially self-closing, the openness of the Open finds the greatest resistance (to the Open) and thereby the site of the Open’s constant stand, where the figure must be fixed in place”.⁴⁴¹ Figure or constancy of the truth is installed in a being if that being *sets forth* the earth as that which essentially rejects this placing. That being, the work, always sets itself back into the earth and preserves it because only through this concealing, it becomes a being. Thus, here, we have *das seiende Sein*.

⁴³⁹ Ibid., p. 63.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 64.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., p. 69.

It could be seen that work is understood *as a being*, not merely due to its *own* outlook or *eidos* because work is *a being* when it owns *its* outlook as the outlook as such through the setting-itself-into-work of truth. What comes to outline or appearance is being as such or truth itself because although a work has a form “the *forma* once took its light from Being as the isness of what is”.⁴⁴² Thus, setting-itself-into-work of truth points to being as such before it turns into *eidos*; it is the shining of the Open place of truth where the ‘that it *is*’ of ‘*what* is’ reveals itself as ‘*that* it is’. And with regard to our first section, this means that if we consider existence and essence within the domain of producedness, we see that both of them resolve into another kind of producedness or createdness in the sense that for work, the fact that it is belongs to its being. Accordingly, ‘*that* it is’ means “that unconcealedness of what is has happened here, and that as this happening it happens here for the first time; or, that such a work *is* at all rather than is not”.⁴⁴³ For Heidegger, this is the thrust on ‘*that* it is’ which constitutes its self-sufficiency. The latter becomes more visible when the work is more solitary and thereby stronger. Thus, even the creator of the work depends upon the work-being of the work. However, it could be argued that in equipments too, producedness becomes a part of the product. Although it is true that equipment also has a ‘that’ in such a way that creator dissolves in the equipment, for Heidegger, ‘that’ of a work differs from any other that it is as long as it is not usual, but unusual, extra-ordinary. With regard to equipment, we also know that it is, but this knowledge is so usual that it is forgotten. Indeed, being of the equipment, as usefulness, reinforces this oblivion. Rather, work offers ‘that it be’ as such which is unusual and as we have said, this requires the thrust on that happening. Thus, createdness of work becomes visible not with regard to the artist, but within the work-being of work itself where truth establishes itself in the work. As Heidegger says, “createdness revealed itself as the conflict’s being fixed in place in the figure by means of the rift. Createdness here is itself expressly created into the work and stands as the silent thrust into the Open of the ‘that’”.⁴⁴⁴ We speak of the artisan of a hammer as its producer because in a hammer, the fact that it is disappears. But in a

⁴⁴² Ibid., p. 81.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., p. 65.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 66.

work, its createdness, ‘that it is’ or its thingly aspect that Heidegger looks for, refers to its workly being. Thus, even if it is allowed to speak of the thingly nature of a work, this requires cutting all of its ties to human being, including its creator. Put otherwise, it requires transforming human being out of the ordinary into extraordinary. And,

To submit this displacement means: to transform our accustomed ties to world and to earth and henceforth to restrain all usual doing and prizing, knowing and looking, in order to stay within the truth that is happening in the work. Only the restraint of this staying lets what is created be the work that it is. This letting the work be a work we call the preserving of the work. It is only for such preserving that the work yields itself in its createdness as actual, i.e., now: present in the manner of a work.⁴⁴⁵

Thrust into the createdness of the ‘that’, into the self-establishment of truth, refers to letting the work be the work it is and for Heidegger, this letting be is a standing-within (*Inständigkeit*) which is preservation (*Bewahren*). As creators are understood with regard to the work, now, preservation which becomes visible through the fact that creation belongs to work, is also understood with regard to the work. Thus, even if there are no actual preservers for the work, this does not mean that work does not need preservers. Even in its waiting for preservers, the work needs preservers insofar as preservers already belong to the createdness of a work.

Thus, what is at stake is the createdness of the work or setting-into-work of truth. And as Heidegger insists, the latter is what art means. As we have seen, work-being of work shows us how creators and preservers belong to each other in work but it is the art which shows us how *both* creators and preservers belong to the work. Accordingly, art, setting-into-work of truth has a double aspect. Insofar as it is self-establishment of truth in the figure, this refers to createdness specific to the work which is bringing forth of a being. On the other hand, if setting-into-work means bringing of work-being into movement and happening, it is preservation. In this sense, preservation confirms the createdness of the work; better said, setting-into-work of truth confirms itself as long as the thrust on the Open of the ‘that’ does not cause violence in human-being while transforming it into extra-ordinary; rather, truth happens in such a way that work is let be the work it is thereby human-being is simply placed into the openness. “Thus, art is: the creative preserving of truth in the

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

work. *Art then is the becoming and happening of truth*".⁴⁴⁶ Art is the origin of the work because it lets the truth happen in its coming into the Open and it is in this sense that art is poetry (*Dichtung*). Poetry, for Heidegger, should be distinguished from poesy although the latter has priority over other arts. The reason for this priority will become obvious when we inquire into the essence of language. However, for now, we should see that poetry, in its broad sense means bringing-forth into unconcealedness out of concealedness, that is, it is *poiesis*. Then, Heidegger returns to the essence of art in order to understand truth not merely with regard to the work, but from within truth itself to the extent that truth establishes itself in the work. This is why he insists on the projection in truth. He writes that "what poetry, as illuminating projection, unfolds of unconcealedness and projects ahead into the design of the figure, is the Open which poetry lets happen, and indeed in such a way that only now, in the midst of beings, the Open brings beings to shine and ring out".⁴⁴⁷ The Open of the openness of the unconcealedness is projected in truth's setting-itself-into-work in such a way that the Open is opened up in the midst of beings for beings. This is the genesis of truth or its origin and since the latter is art, art is the founding of truth. And, "we understand founding here in a triple sense: founding as bestowing, founding as grounding, and founding as beginning".⁴⁴⁸ Insofar as truth is not understood on the basis of what is available but a thrust into the extra-ordinary, it is a bestowal (*Schenken*) in the sense of overflow or endowing. However, the demand of this overflow is not arbitrary, but it is drawn up from the earth which is the ground for this happening. In that sense, truth is grounding (*Gründen*) itself as its own ground. And the unmediable character of truth in its overflow and grounding, for Heidegger, refers to a beginning (*Anfang*) which as unmediated, always happens as a leap. In that way, history begins as a genuine beginning "in which everything to come is already leaped over, even if as something

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 71.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 72. "Was die Dichtung als lichtender Entwurf an Unverborgenheit auseinanderfaltet und in den Riß der Gestalt vorauswirft, ist das Offene, das sie geschehen läßt und zwar dergestalt, daß jetzt das Offene erst inmitten des Seienden dieses zum Leuchten und Klingen bringt." (*Holzwege*, GA 5, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. p. 60.)

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 75.

disguised”.⁴⁴⁹ History enters upon when the abundance of truth takes over itself as the strife between unfamiliar and familiar.

Art as foundation of truth happens in such a way that “always when that which is as a whole demands, as what is, itself, a grounding in openness, art attains to its historical nature as foundation”.⁴⁵⁰ Heidegger here points to the *geschichtliche Wesen* of art as foundation, as a happening essence or essencing/presencing (*Anwesenung*) as such. This becomes possible when beings as a whole demands for their manifestation an open place thereby their manifestation as a whole is grounded *there*. This is nothing but the origination of truth but this does not only indicate a founding; it is a founding as long as it needs preserving through which we understand how work *as a being* essentially belongs to truth which happens as the conflict between world and earth. Then, art is a founding preserving; it refers to the founding of truth insofar as truth establishes itself in work, that is, insofar as it is *earthy*. Without the latter, truth would not be preserved as the Open in its unmediated essence and it would be taken up as ‘something’ which needs mediation, that is, it would not *begin* at all. Thus, we should see that:

Art lets truth originate. Art, founding preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth of what is, in the work. To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out of the source of its nature in a founding leap—that is what the word origin (German *Ursprung*, literally, primal leap) means.⁴⁵¹

Through the art, as the bringing forth of what is present into the unconcealment out of concealment, truth springs forth from itself. This, as a leap, is ‘from itself’, from its essence, because work, as that which essentially holds this happening, in its concealed nature, already belongs to or confirms the essence of truth which gives itself as self-concealing clearing. Once truth gives itself as this self-concealing clearing as such through an unusual ‘that it is’, a work *is* in its *essentiality*. As we have seen, for Heidegger, a work *is* when truth establishes itself in the work in such a way that work is that particular being preserved by its concealed earthy character.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 76.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid. “Immer wenn das Seiende im Ganzen als das Seiende selbst die Gründung in die Offenheit verlangt, gelangt die Kunst in ihr geschichtliches Wesen als die Stiftung.” (GA 5, p. 64.)

⁴⁵¹ Ibid., p. 77. “Die Kunst läßt die Wahrheit entspringen. Die Kunst erspringt als stiftende Bewahrung die Wahrheit des Seienden im Werk. Etwas erspringen, im stiftenden Sprung aus der Wesensherkunft ins Sein bringen, das meint das Wort Ursprung.” (GA 5, p. 65.)

This immediacy or unmediacy between work and truth refers to a beginning which has its own destiny. Thus, our aim does not consist in understanding truth from out of a concrete instance of it, but grasping that to be an *essential* being (work) happens as the putting into question of the *essentiality* or being of the essence which is truth as such. Neither work nor truth is factually given in the sense that what remains the most question-worthy is their being. And we know that for Heidegger, being of a being (work) is the guiding question of the first beginning whereas the being of the truth is the grounding question of the other beginning which Heidegger calls for the future thinking. Now we need to inquire into how Heidegger finds himself between these two questions, within *a transition* which is a *Kehre*.

4.3. *Die Kehre* and the Need (*Die Not*)

Heidegger, in his *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, clearly distinguishes the guiding question of the first beginning which is ‘what is a being’ from the grounding question of the other beginning as ‘how does being hold sway? (*Wie west das Seyn?*)’. The latter no longer refers to the truth of the being of the beings, but to the being of truth which he calls being (*Seyn*) and in this sense it is the truth of being. The understanding of truth in the first beginning, as we have seen, consists in *a-letheia*, that is, the unconcealedness of beings. Then, even if after Greeks or even through them as in Plato and Aristotle, truth is understood in terms of the correctness of the assertion, in this conception of the correctness as the essence of truth lies the understanding of *a-letheia*. In other words, even if truth turns out to be the correction of the assertion, this already means that for Greeks, truth means the unconcealedness of beings, the prevailing openness which lies there. For Heidegger, what leads to the decline of such an originary understanding into a conception of the essence of truth as correctness is the fact that Greeks did not think over the *aletheia* or truth as such. Now what matters for Heidegger is to see that even this ignoring of the truth as such which becomes visible through the conception of the essence of truth as correctness indicates that the essence of truth is considered as correctness due to the fact that truth of essence prevails. Thus, the essence of truth in its declined sense already moves within the truth of essence. In order to grasp this point, we should recall what constitutes the understanding of being in its first beginning. As we know, Heidegger points here to the primacy of the idea as the look of something in

its coming into presence. Accordingly, it is through its outlook which is already visible that a being shows itself from itself and this is what it means to understand being in terms of what a being is. More importantly, the ground of this understanding of being is *a-letheia* which means that Greeks deal with as a bringing forth into unconcealedness from out of concealedness.

Thus, the first beginning works with an understanding of producedness in its understanding of being. For Heidegger, putting being into question requires putting this understanding of being which draws its sense from what a being is, into question and this is why after *Being and Time*, in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger attempts a reading of the history of being in terms of producedness. In that work, he tries to keep the promise of his major work which consists in interpreting being as it is projected upon time, upon the encounter with beings. However, as we have shown, interpreting being as the horizon for the encounter with beings, still remains within the framework of the productive metaphysics without putting it into question as long as it is assumed that beings need being in order that they are what they are, as *Anwesen*. In order to break away from this traditional understanding, it should be grasped that for Greeks already, the fact that a being stands in its being is the claim of being itself. Thus, self-appearing of the *eidos* is the fact that a being *is*. As we have seen, Heidegger finds this in Aristotle's *phusis*. For Greeks, that a being is is self-evident according to the pre-philosophical sense of *ousia* which means household, assets or possession. However, for Heidegger, Greeks and all history of philosophy forgets that 'that a being is' already implies non-being. Thus, Greeks understand *phusis* as self-emergence only because they also keep for themselves open the path of Nothing and seeming, as Heidegger discusses in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. This is the main reason for that *phusis* is not to be understood merely in terms of growing things, but as self-emerging as such. As self-emerging as such, it should also be distinguished from the mere artifacts in such a way that this distinguishing releases the 'as such' by giving us the hidden aspect of *the matter itself*, namely, the fact that the way to unconcealment as such is already irrupted by the concealment in the self-sufficiency of truth. This hidden fact or *mystery* can no longer be understood through any kind of beings because it is the truth of 'that it is'. We have tried to deal with one instance of this truth as the artwork that Heidegger

sets forth in the *Origin of the Work of Art*. This lecture gives us the possibility of carrying out the discussion of truth going beyond the limits of the difference between being and beings. Insofar as truth establishes itself in a being in such a way that this very occurrence is kept in its concealedness, what is at issue is not the truth of a being in its being, but the truth in its emergence in such a way human being is understood as the preserver of truth in its establishing itself into a being. There is no longer a hermeneutical circle, but the simultaneity of a being with beyng in its self-seclusion. This simultaneity which happens as the inbetween of Da-sein is called *Ereignis*, a counter-resonance between beyng's needing human being and human being's belonging to beyng.⁴⁵²

Thus, Heidegger does not look at a being (work) in order to grasp its truth in its being because all beings are already abandoned by being. It is in this sense that beings do not need beyng; they are already understood in terms of being in such a way that being is forgotten. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, we find the following words,

Be-ing (as enowning) needs beings so that be-ing may hold sway. Beings do not need be-ing in the same way. Beings can still 'be' in the abandonment of being, under whose dominance

⁴⁵² Against this, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann interpretes Ereignis as a kind of hermeneutical thinking. He refers to Heidegger's rejection of system thinking in *Contributions to Philosophy* where Heidegger defines thinking as a joining its jointure. For Heidegger, this jointure (die Fuge) in its joining (Fügung) takes place as the standing for itself of six joinings of the *Contributions to Philosophy* which are Echo, Playing-forth, Leap, Grounding, Ones to Come and the Last God, "in order to make the essential onefold more pressing. In each of the six joinings the attempt is made always to say the same of the same..." (Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy, From Enowning*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1999. p. 57.) For Heidegger, the jointure has its own rigor and access (Verfügung) due to the endowment (Fügung) of beyng as a hint in its withdrawal. Hermann interprets this joining the jointure, this hinting-throw, on the basis of a for-having and he writes that "this fore-having from within the the enowning-hinting-throw is the hermeneutic fore-having of being-historical thinking". (Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, 'Contributions to Philosophy and Enowning-Historical Thinking' in *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. p. 123.) The question is whether projective enopening of the projectable which is thrown as a hint is to be understood within the discourse of fore-having or not. It is obvious that the Heidegger refers to the enowning of hinting-throw in order to emphasize on the self-withdrawal in the truth of beyng. However, if we understand the hinting-throw in terms of fore-having, we would allow that the hint might be betrayed and no longer hint. As we shall see, Heidegger's historical thinking does not need fore-having because saying the same of the same already means a need to return to the groundless ground.

the *immediate* availability and usefulness and serviceability of every kind (e.g., everything must serve the people) obviously make up *what is a being* and what is not.⁴⁵³

We have ‘what a being is’ before us without grounding this decision as a decidedness. Thus, the sense of being a being is already lost or forgotten and insofar as this forgotten sense is forgotten through beings with regard to what they are or not, it is no longer a matter of re-considering beings, but creating them again by restoring them. This creating of beings either as artwork or as in other forms of *techne* such as poetry or thinking shelters truth in its concealing. This creating does not aim at bringing beings before Dasein, but rather transforms Dasein into its ownmost as ‘in the midst of beings’ where the hidden history (*Geschichte*) already occurs. This transition is from the ordinary toward the extra-ordinary and it is not a personal decision of a thinker. Rather, what is ordinary itself prepares the way for the extra-ordinary. Thus, as Heidegger tries to describe in his *Contributions to Philosophy*, truth of beyng sounds in the first beginning in such a way that the first beginning leaks to the other beginning in the sense that it needs to be understood by being limited for the first time. The other beginning, then, refers to the beginning in its otherness, in its coming to itself and therefore what matters most is not passing from one point in history into the other, but the transforming thinking into its *initiality* (*Anfängliche Denken*) as inceptual thinking which holds sway as a leap (*der Sprung*). If one still asks how we know that we belong to this leap, Heidegger will say that it is the leap which prepares us for such a belonging. Then, there is a leap as long as beyng stays away. “The whole cleavage of be-ing is thus already co-decided in the direction of the cleavage’s inceptual manifestness and hiddenness”.⁴⁵⁴ The leap does not refer to a passage from somewhere to somewhere else, “but rather the leap lets the t/here [*Da*] – belonging to and enowned by the call – first emerge as the site for the moment for a ‘somewhere’ and ‘when’”.⁴⁵⁵ The leap indicates that beyng comes to itself through keeping itself in its refusal as not-granting by releasing the there to itself to be guarded by human-being. It holds sway as a clearing for self-concealing sheltering. This is why Heidegger writes *Da-sein* instead of *Dasein*.

⁴⁵³ Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy, From Enowning*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1999. p. 22.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Beyng needs Da-sein as enownment of its grounding. Heidegger points out that “talk of relation of Da-sein to be-ing obscures be-ing into something over-against [*ein Gegenüber*] – which be-ing is not, since be-ing itself always en-owns primarily *that to which* it is to hold sway as over-against”.⁴⁵⁶ Beyng holds sway as the very enabling of the self preserved as non-*self*. Thus, Da-sein should be understood as *Da-sein*, as it is grounded by the being of truth. However, it is also *Da-sein* as long as truth of being needs and grounds Da-sein. Heidegger, then, determines this counter oscillation as “a turning or rather *the* turning, which points out precisely the essential sway of being itself as the counter-resonating enowning”.⁴⁵⁷

The turning (*die Kehre*) belongs to the essencing of beyng. This becomes understandable only if we consider this turning as the turning from within the essence of truth as the truth of essence. We know that already before the *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger points to the discussion of the truth with regard to the essence as such. With the beginning of 1930s, Heidegger’s main question is ‘what is truth?’. His aim is not to find out a concrete answer to this question but to put into question what we understand by ‘truth’. According to our self-evident determination of truth, truth is the correspondence between a proposition and fact, that is, it is the correctness of an assertion. We understand the essence of truth as correctness in such a way that we understand essence, either as essence of truth or as essence of a table, as the what-being which is known in advance. But, Heidegger asks, “how do we know that what is understood in this way is really secured? How do we know that what is self-evident is so and is true? How do we know that the self-evidence of something – assuming that this does obtain – is a guarantee for the truth of the relevant thing or proposition?”⁴⁵⁸ In other words, what kind of necessity is the necessity of in advance knowledge of the essence in such a way that it is self-evident that *essence* of truth is correctness? It is obvious that correctness cannot give an account of its essence because in order that an assertion

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 179.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 184. “Eine, ja *die* Kehre, die eben das Wesen des Seins selbst als das in sich gegenswingende Ereignis anzeigt.” (*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, GA. 65, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989. p. 261.)

⁴⁵⁸ Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*, trans. Ted Sadler, London: New York: Continuum, 2002. p. 4.

and a fact correspond to each other, what is true should already be opened. Thus, we need the openness of beings as true. However, the truth as correctness is still too close to us; in our daily affairs, we comport within this self-evident truth in such a way that we do not even notice it. For Heidegger, “so the first thing must be to distance ourselves from this self-evidence, to step back from it so that what we so readily conceive as truth can be left standing and resting in itself”.⁴⁵⁹ This is the clue to grasp what Heidegger means by historical reflection (*Besinnung*) which thinks truth in its essence because when we ask for where and whither of the stepping back, we see that it is “from what has earlier been *said* about all this, back to the way in which truth was *earlier* conceived; therefore by looking around in the *history* of the concept of truth!”.⁴⁶⁰ Historical reflection is not a reporting of the past and in this way it is distinguished from historiography. It refers to the distancing from the present in order to overcome it. Thus, when we look at what has been *said* in the history of philosophy, it is confirmed that truth was conceived as correctness. However, this historical orientation, insofar as it confirms the Same, is also a historical return, a return to the Same which has been *earlier* conceived. Thus, in historical reflection, the Same, in its concealedness, comes towards us and it is in this sense that “genuine historical return is the decisive beginning of authentic *futurity*”.⁴⁶¹ Thus, for Heidegger, history is neither present nor past, but future. Due to this futurity, history compels us in the sense that what has been concealed through our habitual affairs is put into transformation. In this way, beginning begins by coming to itself. Accordingly, as Heidegger states in his lecture course entitled *Basic Problems of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic”*, “the word ‘historical’ [*geschichtlich*] means ‘happening’ [*Geschichte*], history itself as a being. ‘Historiographical’ refers to a kind of cognition. We will not speak of a historical ‘consideration’ but ‘reflection’. For reflection [*Be-sinnung*] is looking for the meaning [*Sinn*] of a happening, the meaning of history”.⁴⁶² Historical reflection is

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 5.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁶² Martin Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic”*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1994. p. 34.

to reflect on what happens as a happening, as the transformation of the Same. This is why Heidegger never gives up reflecting on the self-evident as long as what matters is to let the extra-ordinary come towards us in its revolutionary character through the self-evident. However, this means that historical orientation is carried out neither just on the basis of truth as correctness nor merely through the primordial openness of beings which is *a-letheia*. Rather, “we want to see how these two concepts have become entangled with each other. The transition itself, of ἀλήθεια *qua* unhiddenness to truth *qua* correctness, is an *occurrence*, indeed nothing less than *the* occurrence wherein, already at the beginning of its history, Western philosophy takes off on an erroneous and fateful course”.⁴⁶³

Heidegger carries out the thinking of this intertwinedness of correctness and *aletheia* in his lecture *On the Essence of Truth* where, as he mentions in *Letter on Humanism*, the turning is considered for the first time, as a turning of the essence of truth into the truth of essence. In the note added to this lecture, he writes that

In the question of the truth of essence, essence is understood verbally; in this word, remaining still within metaphysical presentation, Beyng is thought as the difference that holds sway between Being and beings. Truth signifies sheltering that clears [lichtendes Bergen] as the fundamental trait of Being. The question of the essence of truth finds its answer in the proposition *the essence of truth is the truth of essence*.⁴⁶⁴

Wesen is understood in its verbal sense as *Wesung*. Now it is a matter of grasping how the essence of truth leads to the truth of essence. As Heidegger insists, this is not a dialectical proposition; indeed, “it is no proposition at all in the sense of a statement. The answer to the question of the essence of truth is the saying of a turning [*die Sage einer Kehre*] within the history of Beyng”.⁴⁶⁵ Thus, to say that the essence of truth is the truth of essence is to say Being in its *Kehre*, that is, to say Beyng. First of all, we should ask in what way an inquiry into the essence of truth

⁴⁶³ Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*, p.12.

⁴⁶⁴ Heidegger, ‘On the Essence Of Truth’, in *Pathmarks*, trans. John Sallis, ed. William McNeill, Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 153. “Die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens versteht Wesen verbal und denkt in diesem Wort, noch innerhalb des Vorstellens der Metaphysik verbleibend, das Seyn als den waltenden Unterschied von Sein und Seiendem. Wahrheit bedeutet lichtendes Bergen als Grundzug des Seyns. Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit findet ihre Antwort in dem Satz: *das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit des Wesens*.” (*Wegmarken*, GA 9, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. p. 201.)

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

finds its 'essence' in the self-sheltering clearing of beyng. Heidegger again points out that in order that we understand the essence of truth, in its most usual form, as correctness, in order that there is correspondence between fact and an assertion, an open region should already be entered into as that relatedness. The relation of an assertion to the thing is a comportment (*Verhalten*) and it prevails as this relation insofar as it stands in that open region. Standing in an open region as a relation requires that this comportment is bounded by a being which is opened up. Thus, if we want to understand why there is a pregiven relatedness or directedness, why we understand truth as correpondance, we should see that this directedness binds us in such a way that we let ourselves free for that binding directedness. And, "to free oneself for a binding directedness is possible only by *being free* for what is opened up in an open region".⁴⁶⁶ What is opened up in an open region is a being (*Seiende*) and therefore freedom should be understood as letting beings be. We should mention that here Heidegger once again refers to the relation between freedom and truth. Freedom is the essence of truth insofar as truth is not understood as correctness, but in an originary sense which grounds truth in the ordinary sense. Now insofar as openness of comportment which is the condition of correctness is grounded in freedom, the latter has an essential relation to truth as a letting beings be. Heidegger, then, mentions that this letting beings be is an engagement (*Sicheinlassen*) with the disclosedness of beings. In that way, freedom is to expose itself to beings as such in such a way that the openness of the open region is preserved as *Da* for disclosedness. Heidegger describes this exposure to the disclosedness as ek-sistence of human being. Thus, human-being ek-sists only if *Da* is already preserved for this ek-sistence, only if we speak of *Da-sein* as the groundless ground of ek-sistence.

It is also true that *Da*, as the essential ground, is preserved only through the exposure of human-being to beings as such as a whole. Indeed, this is what happens in the sense that through the ek-sistence of human-being, history begins as the questioning of beings as such as a whole which lets the human-being be historical. In that sense, freedom has human-being, not the reverse. We can see that Heidegger's aim consists in showing the open region of openness preserved as *Da*. Indeed, we have already seen that in the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 142.

refers to Da-sein as Dasein's being impelled toward its extremity by telling refusal of the manifestation of beings as a whole, which takes place as the entrancement of time itself. There, the historical (geschichtlich) nature of this extremity was not taken up to the end because the veiling of that happening was not discussed at length. In the lecture *On the Essence of Truth*, however, Heidegger emphasizes on the veiling of being of the *Da* in such a way that the expression 'Da-sein' gains its proper sense.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶⁷ It could be argued that Heidegger, already in *Being and Time*, refers to the concealing of truth while announcing that Dasein is in untruth. Indeed, due to the fallenness of Dasein, untruth belongs to Dasein's disclosure. Dasein's facticity leads to the covering up of beings in their uncoveredness. Thus, semblance and uncoveredness belong together. Heidegger, remaining true to the fundamental ontology, explains this belonging together by means of Dasein's thrown projection. However, as we shall see, in the texts after 1930s, Heidegger puts into question the fact that Dasein is both in truth and in untruth. This occurrence of a-letheia means that being withholds itself in its clearing in such a way that Dasein becomes the space of this happening as Da-sein. Here we should take into consideration Ernst Tugendhat's criticism of Heidegger's conception of truth. Tugendhat builds his criticism upon Heidegger's discussion of truth in section 44 of *Being and Time* where it is argued that "to say that an assertion 'is true' signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, 'lets' the entity 'be seen' (ἀποφάνσις) in its uncoveredness. The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering." (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 261.) ["Die Aussage ist wahr, bedeutet: sie entdeckt das Seiende an ihm selbst. Sie sagt aus, sie zeigt auf, sie »läßt sehen« (ἀποφάνσις) das Seiende in seiner Entdecktheit. Wahrsein (Wahrheit) der Aussage muß verstanden werden als entdeckend-sein." (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 218)] According to Tugendhat, the fact that Heidegger no longer describes the uncovering of assertion in terms of 'just as it is in itself' (so wie), but merely as 'in itself', creates ambiguity with regard to 'uncovering'. Insofar as assertion is understood as ἀποφάνσις which is a letting something come into unhiddenness from hiddenness, all assertions are true. This is uncovering in its broad sense. However, if there are false assertions, these are covering over as well as uncovering in the broad sense. And for Tugendhat, covering over here is understood with regard to an uncovering in its narrow sense and Heidegger's dropping the expression 'just as it is in itself' makes it impossible to understand how and what a false assertion covers over. "We then have to say that the true assertion is precisely not directed toward the entity as it manifests itself immediately but toward the entity as it is itself. This difference, within the self-showing, between an immediate and, as it were, obtrusive givenness and the thing itself is never taken into consideration by Heidegger." (Ernst Tugendhat, 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth', in *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Volume III*, ed. Christopher Macann, London and New York: Routledge, 1992. p. 86.) Thus, for Tugendhat, Heidegger, while equating being-true (ἀληθεύειν) with self-showing (ἀποφάνσις), broadens the concept of self-showing as givenness as such by ignoring the necessity that self-showing needs a distinctive givenness in order to be true or false. In other words, if I have a false view, this could be false insofar as it covers over with regard to the thing as itself, not with regard to any givenness in general. For Tugendhat, since this givenness as such becomes Dasein's disclosive horizon, "it becomes pointless to inquire into the truth of this horizon since that would only mean inquiring into the truth of a truth" (Ibid., p. 89.) And what underlies this consequence is that "it made possible an immediate and positive truth-relation, an explicit truth-relation which no longer made any claim to certainty and so could not be disturbed by uncertainty either". (Ibid., p. 90.) It could be seen that what leads Tugendhat to such an argumentation against Heidegger is nothing but Heidegger's insistence on the immediacy of the self-showing. For Heidegger, beings that are encountered constitutes the realm of hermeneutical-as, that is, in order that they are true or false, there is an uncoveredness in terms of 'as' in such a way that there is 'truth'. Thus, for Heidegger, mere self-showing is not sufficient. Or better said, self-showing of beings already implies that they offer themselves in their view. Thus, there is a double claim. Heidegger discusses this issue in his work *The Essence of Truth, On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*. In Plato's *Theaetetus*, he finds out the same discussion in terms of 'δόξα' (view). Heidegger writes that "at first sight this twofold

Then, it should be seen that letting beings be also means not letting beings be. This amounts to saying that being exposed to beings as such as a whole, human-being conceals this ‘as a whole’. Thus, disclosure of beings as a whole and concealing of beings ‘as a whole’ happens at the same time and this is why un-truth is not irrelevant to truth but it is the nonessence of truth. In other words, letting beings be is related to the concealing. And what keeps this relation is the *mystery* as the concealing of what is concealed as a whole, “not a particular mystery regarding this or that, but rather the one mystery – that, in general, mystery (concealing of what is

requirement seems to be met by the δόξα, and indeed in its double meaning. On the one hand, view as the look of something, as what the thing offers (whether rightly or otherwise is a further question; it is always the inner *claim* of a view to present the thing itself); and on the other hand the *comportment*, a stance-taking that springs from the soul itself, i.e. to be of the view, to hold something for such and such”. (Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth, On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*, p. 183.) It is crucial to notice that for Heidegger, the view that a being offers, its what-being, always presents the thing itself. To be itself is the claim of doxa and insofar as doxa has a double aspect as what-being (essence) and to be of the essence or view, as we shall see, what is at stake is the being claimed of the essence. Moreover, Dasein does not merely refer to the comportment side of this occurrence, but to the essence of knowledge as the whole structure “where the soul itself has dealings with beings – in short, in the sphere of the soul’s relationship to beings (striving for being), in the sphere of the possibility of the possession of the unhiddenness of beings”. (Ibid., p. 181.) Dasein is being-with beings while striving for being. Only in this way, there is the utmost possibility to possess the unhiddenness of beings thereby unhiddenness is preserved as un-hiddenness. Thus, if we have a distorted (false) view, this is due to the double claim of doxa and for Heidegger, in order that we can speak of a distinctive givenness as Tugendhat suggests rightly, we should secure this realm of seeming or semblance because “anything which can *be* existent to us [was uns ein Seiendes *sein* kann], in so far as it shows itself as unhidden, also *seem* (appear)”. (Ibid., p. 228.) Unhiddenness involves seeming, as we have already mentioned with regard to *Introduction to Metaphysics*. It should be remarked that for Heidegger, to the coming into being of a being belongs seeming *essentially*. Either being-true or being-false is the realm of seeming and this ‘either-or’ is unhiddenness in its hiddenness insofar as a being is *either* uncovered *or* covered over, not absolutely or eternally true or false. What matters, then, is the un-hiddenness as such in its occurrence as its own. Thus, Tugendhat would have right to the end, if we presuppose that there is a kind of truth which is exempt from concealing. However, for Heidegger, truth is this coming into being, un-hiddenness, never something apart from beings. But Tugendhat still has right as long as in *Being and Time*, Heidegger does not analyze concealing in its being-hold to by unconcealing. Here it would be helpful to recall John Sallis’ suggestion that for Heidegger, originary truth, that is, a-letheia, is an interrupting truth. For Sallis, it is not possible to understand a-letheia or that older truth which is also untruth in its opposition to traditional concept of truth. Instead, we should see that “In the word *older* Heidegger would say—but in a way that could also unsay—an ordering that would exceed all the words by which it has been named in the history of metaphysics. It is this excess, this reserve of concealment, that withholds the essence of truth from the demand for self-showing and that limits the possibility of phenomenological discourse on the essence of truth. It limits also—and finally interrupts—every progression by which one would attempt to move step by step—that is, by reiterated appeal to evidence, to self-showing—from the traditional concept of truth to that essence of truth to which the still older truth would—essentially, one would have said—belong”. (John Sallis, ‘Interrupting Truth’ in *Heidegger toward the Turn: Essays on the work of the 1930s*, ed. James Risser, State University of New York Press, 1999. p. 29.) It remains to ask whether as Sallis claims, truth in its concealing originarity does not show itself in the phenomenological sense or Heidegger’s thinking the older truth leads him to approach the original sense of self-showing.

concealed) as such holds sway throughout the Da-sein of human beings”.⁴⁶⁸ What is concealed through the disclosure of beings as a whole is already concealed and preserved thereby it becomes understandable how un-truth is nonessence of truth, or its pre-essential essence. Thus, not only ‘as a whole’ is forgotten, but also the mystery is forgotten. Human being loses himself among the available and ready-to-hand to the extent that he forgets that forgottenness. Heidegger calls this being held to available beings *in-sistence*. The latter belongs to ek-sistence because turning toward beings means that beings are taken as standard in ek-sistence. And insofar as beings are taken as standard, human-being turns away from mystery. This turning away from the mystery by turning toward beings is *erring*. In that way, “the concealing of concealed beings as a whole holds sway in that disclosure of specific beings, which, as forgottenness of concealment, becomes errancy”.⁴⁶⁹ Erring as the forgottenness of the concealing preserves the open place as the counter-essence of truth and thereby it preserves the possibility “that humans are capable of drawing up from their ek-sistence – the possibility that, by experiencing errancy itself and by not mistaking the mystery of Da-sein, they *not* let themselves be led astray”.⁴⁷⁰ Errancy oppresses Dasein insofar as Dasein ek-sists and through this oppression, mystery holds sway in such a way that human being as Dasein is subjected to the both. In other words, errancy and mystery *are* in their counter movement and both takes place as a constraint on human being which makes him Dasein. One may ask why there is a need for Dasein and for Heidegger, to find ourselves before this question is the originary essence of truth. He writes:

...in the ek-sistence of his Dasein the human being is subjected to the rule of the mystery and *at the same time* to the oppression of errancy. He is in the *needful condition of being constrained* by the one and the other. The full essence of truth, including its most proper nonessence, keeps Dasein in need by this perpetual turning to and fro. Dasein is a turning into need.⁴⁷¹

Thus, we should not forget that the rule of the mystery in errancy is nothing but the questioning what beings are as such as a whole, the truth of being as the unique

⁴⁶⁸ Heidegger, ‘On the Essence Of Truth’, in *Pathmarks*, p. 148.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 150.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 151.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., p. 151.

question of philosophy. For Heidegger, what is at issue is to preserve the question-worthiness of this questioning by keeping it in view as a question. This happens when the rule of the mystery and oppression of errancy takes places *at the same time* which means that they *are* as compelling and from that compelling, a need arises and remains as a need as long as this compelling or strife is the unique phenomenon of philosophy as the question of being. Dasein is now understood as this arising need from out of the unique phenomenon, *Seyn*, in its self-concealing clearing, as that which is destined to be preserved. Therefore, what is at stake here is Da-sein insofar as what is at stake is the relation between human being and *Seyn*, the need as such as the necessity as such (*Notwendigkeit*). Thus, we should see that “from the Da-sein of human beings and from it alone arises the disclosure of necessity and, as a result, the possibility of being transposed into what is inevitable”.⁴⁷² This necessity or truth is the necessity or the truth of the essence in its verbal sense insofar as what is at issue is the self-concealing clearing, a self-producing as the necessity for a need. In that way, the truth is a groundless ground.

Heidegger’s aim is not to remove this groundlessness of the ground, but to appropriate it into the ground. This could be done by keeping the ground as a grounding. In the lecture course contemporary to the *Contributions to Philosophy* entitled *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic”*, he discusses the ground problem of philosophy which is the essence of truth grounded by Greeks. Then, when we try to understand the essence of truth even as a ‘problem’ of ‘logic’, the essence of truth as correctness whose roots we find in Aristotle leads us to put into question the essence as such insofar as with regard to correctness, essence means what-being which grounds beings in their being. But even if we understand truth as the correctness of an assertion, where is this claim for ground grounded? It should be noticed that Heidegger no longer asks for the ground of the truth as correctness in order to arrive at an understanding of being as being-true. Different from such an inquiry of his early thinking, he asks for the grounding as such. Accordingly, claim for the ground or the positing of the essence is the claim of the essence as such. In other words, it is not only that Greeks understood the essence of truth as correctness due to their prevailing understanding of being as a-letheia, but

⁴⁷² Ibid.

also, the latter indicates something else: the essence of essence was open to them. This is why essence cannot be founded on the pre-given knowledge of facts; essence cannot be obtained by bringing together individual facts. Rather, it is the bringing-forth (*Hervorbringen*) of the essence. Heidegger suggests that here we should understand this bringing-forth not as a making or fabricating, but in its Greek sense. Accordingly, “the essence is brought forth, brought out from its previous obscurity and hiddenness. Forth—into what? Into the light; it is brought into view”.⁴⁷³ This is not staring at something available but as a peculiar seeing, it brings what is to be seen into view “therefore, we call this seeing, which first brings forth into visibility that which is to be seen, and produces it before itself ‘productive seeing’ [*Er-sehen*]”.⁴⁷⁴ Here it is not a matter of correspondence between seeing and what is to be seen; rather, there is an ongoing production of seeing itself as what is to be seen. Thus, the positing of the essence as correctness moves within the producedness in such a way that essence is pro-duced out of un-thought as what is to be thought. In other words, un-thought of the essence in terms of correctness is what is to be thought which founds correctness on the essentiality of the essence although the latter has its ground not in a pre-given fact, but in its own truth.

Now the question is to ground the essentiality of the essence, the bringing forth as *Er-sehen*. Heidegger writes that “the productive seeing of the essence is not founded, but it is grounded, i.e., accomplished in such a way that it brings itself upon the ground which it itself lays. The productive seeing of the essence is itself the laying of the ground—the positing of what is to be the ground, ὑποκείμενον”.⁴⁷⁵ It is grounded insofar as it is ground-laying, that is, it is grounded once there is a claim for ground. Heidegger refers here to the accomplishment (*Vollzug*) of the *Er-sehen*, because once there is a claim for ground, the un-thought is already revealed as what is to be thought as a task to be accomplished. This is why productive seeing cannot

⁴⁷³ Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic”*, p. 76.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 77. “Das Er-sehen des Wesens wird nicht begründet, sondern gegründet, d. h. so vollzogen, daß es sich selbst auf den Grund bringt, den es legt. Das Er-sehen des Wesens ist selbst Gründung des Grundes - Setzen dessen, was Grund, ὑποκείμενον sein soll.” (*Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte ‘Problem’ der ‘Logik’*, GA 45, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984. p. 86.)

be communicated as it is the case in the propositions of science. Rather, “the knowledge of the essence must be accomplished anew by each one who is to share it; it must genuinely be co-accomplished”.⁴⁷⁶ Now we can see that positing the essence of truth as correctness is not arbitrary, “but is itself a grounding, the laying of a ground and thereby a return to the ground”.⁴⁷⁷ Each ground-laying is necessarily a return to the ground as an accomplishment of the productive seeing as long as we now know that “when a thing is determined as to its essence, then this essence is productively seen. The productive seeing of the essence brings something into view for the essence and claims it for the essence, out of which it— the essence— becomes visible for what it is”.⁴⁷⁸ Essence *is* in being claimed for itself; put better, essence and being claimed is the same. Accordingly, essence does not need to be founded in a fact, not because this founding is impossible, but because it does not need any such founding due to the fact that essence itself is what need (*Not*) means as such as the claim itself (*Anspruch*) in its claiming.

Does this mean that the necessity (*Notwendigkeit*) of the laying of the ground as the ground as such gives itself as the matter itself? Here what is difficult with Heidegger’s thinking shows up. One should see that Heidegger *really* inquires into this necessity through a path that goes on. Thus, necessity is not given beforehand, but it is appropriated through thinking. “Therefore we could not have begun with a reflection on the necessity of the question of truth, but instead the first task had to be to develop this question according to its initially graspable basic features, in order for this development itself to lead us to the necessity of the question”.⁴⁷⁹ Indeed, this can be regarded as the essence of all Heidegger’s works, namely, to let the matter itself speak for itself in its basic terms. Now Heidegger finds himself before the necessity of the question of truth throughout his development of this questioning in its emergency, in Greeks. This is so not because Greeks teach us the task of thinking,

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 78. “Wesenserkenntnis muß jeweils von jedem neu selbst und nachvollzogen, im eigentlichen Sinne mitvollzogen werden.” (GA 45, p. 87.)

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 84.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid. “Wird etwas in seinem Wesen bestimmt, so wird dieses Wesen selbst er-sehen. Das Er-sehen des Wesens nimmt für dieses selbst etwas in den Blick und in den Anspruch, woraus es — das Wesen — als das, was es ist, ersichtlich wird.” (GA 45, p. 94.)

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 104.

but because for Greeks, thinking became a task as a ground-laying ground in its primordial sense.

The destiny and task of thought of the Greeks was not to think this or that but to begin thinking itself and to establish it on its ground. Thinking, as the form of the act of philosophy, here means that eruption and that procedure of man thanks to which he is established in the midst of beings, in face of beings as a whole, and knows himself as belonging to these beings. The basic work of this thinking is therefore the question of beings themselves, what they are as such and as a whole.⁴⁸⁰

Greeks answered the question of beings in terms their unconcealedness, namely, *aletheia*. This answer, for Heidegger, should not be regarded as an ordinary answer which eliminates the question. Greeks' answer does not aim at satisfying the question, but it completes the questioning by making it the ownmost task. In other words, with the answer 'beings are unconcealedness', "the questioning does not stop but precisely begins and unfolds itself as the beginning".⁴⁸¹ Then, what is at stake is the inceptuality of the inception which is retained as the primary task of thinking. This is why for Heidegger, the lack of inquiry into the *aletheia* in Greek thinking is not a neglect of their thought, but a sign of their remaining faithful to their destiny; their neglect shows us the unsurpassability of the beginning as such and "because every beginning is unsurpassable, in being encountered it must be placed again and again into the uniqueness of its inceptuality and thus into its unsurpassable fore-grasping. When this encountering is inceptual, then it is originary – but this necessarily as *other* beginning".⁴⁸² The necessity of going back to Greeks lies in the uniqueness of the inceptuality and this going back is necessarily other because what is at stake is the *inceptuality* of the inception whereby "the beginning is what grounds itself as it reaches ahead: It grounds itself in the ground that is to be engrounded by the beginning; it reaches ahead as grounding and thus is

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 112. "Die denkerische Bestimmung und Aufgabe der Griechen war nicht, dieses oder jenes zu denken, sondern *das Denken selbst anzufangen* und auf seinen Grund zu bringen. Denken meint hier als Vollzugsform der Philosophie jenen Aufbruch und jenes Vorgehen des Menschen, kraft dessen er sich inmitten des Seienden vor das Seiende im Ganzen bringt und sich selbst als . zu diesem Seienden gehörig weiß. Die Grundleistung dieses Denkens ist daher die *Frage nach dem Seienden selbst*, was es, das Seiende als solches, im Ganzen sei." (GA 45, p. 129.)

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., p. 114.

⁴⁸² Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, p. 39.

unsurpassable”.⁴⁸³ To be grounded of the beginning lies in the reaching ahead of the beginning as grounding this very groundlessness. Thus, beginning is itself the *Ereignis* or Beyng in the sense that Greeks sets forth the beginning of philosophy as a beginning through which man is determined in his belongingness to beings as such as a whole. In its unsurpassability lies its turning which grounds the truth of itself. And for Heidegger, since this is the simplest interpretation of being, the fact that Greeks does not ask for the essence of truth as such does not indicate a lack of power, but means that they persevere in the task meted out to them which is encountered by the inceptual thinking which is a crossing.

Thus, the necessity of the inceptual thinking, a crossing which Heidegger tries to describe in *Contributions to Philosophy*, lies in the beginning which claims or needs itself as the beginning. We can notice that with claiming and needing itself of the beginning as the beginning, the claim or the need is kept in its inceptual character. This is why Heidegger emphasizes that all necessity lies in a need (*Not*). This means that necessity is grounded in the inceptuality of the inception as its own turning. Then, if every necessity emerges from a need, we should understand the need in its originary sense thereby beginning gains its necessity. Although in ordinary use, need or distress implies a lack, absence or ‘not’, that is, negativity as deficiency, for Heidegger, negativity does not have to mean absence but, when we consider need in terms of the inceptuality of the inception, we can see that it comes from the abundance and gift. He writes that:

The need we have in mind arises from the distress of not knowing the way out or the way in; but that is by no mean to be understood as a perplexity in some particular circumstances or other. What then is it? Not knowing the way out or the way in: that is to say, out of and into that which such knowing firsts opens up as an untrodden and ungrounded “space”. This space (time-space) – if we may so speak of it here – is that “between” where it has not yet been determined what being is or what non-being is, though where by the same token a total confusion and undifferentiation of beings and non-beings does not sweep everything away either, letting one thing wander into another. This distress, as such a not knowing the way out of or into this self-opening “between”, is a mode of “Being”, in which man arrives or perhaps is thrown and for the first time experiences – but does not explicitly consider – that which we are calling the “in the midst” of beings.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸³ Ibid., p. 38.

⁴⁸⁴ Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic”*, p. 132. “Die Not, die hier gemeint wird, ist das *Nicht-aus-und-ein-Wissen*; dies aber keineswegs in irgendeiner, dieser und

The need or the distress peculiar to the truth of *beyng* is a ‘not knowing the way out or the way in’; the need rejects any determinate whence and whither. However, this indeterminacy of the whence and whither of the need does not mean that we cannot positively speak of the need due to this negativity. Rather, the indeterminacy of the way out or the way in happens as an open space (*Raum*) where beings and non-beings are not distinguished yet. This open space is the between or the ‘in the midst of’ (*Inmitten*) through which beings and non-beings stand as a whole in their undifferentiatedness. And, “since the between is the *whole* of these undifferentiated beings, there is nothing outside to which an exit would be possible. And because it is a whole that is *undifferentiated*, there is nothing to which a way might lead to a standpoint inside. What here permits neither an out nor an in oscillates back to itself in an extraordinary sense as this ‘between’”.⁴⁸⁵ This means that opening of the between is always a self-opening which occurs as a self-return. Heidegger, thus, refers to a between where there is no exit and outside; there is no exit because the between is the manifestation of the whole and there is no inside, because due to the undifferentiatedness of this manifestation, nothing is determined as being or non-being. Thus, there is just the need as such and it can be determined only by itself in terms of its compelling (*Nötigen*). In other words, there is just *das Nötigen der Not* (*compelling of the need*). For Heidegger, it is in that respect that human being occupies the between. We should remark that insofar as the need is the compelling as such which makes space for the undifferentiated wholeness of beings, it belongs to the truth of *beyng*, not to human being. And it takes hold of human being due to the fact that it makes space as compelling through which it rests as a need. In other words, it is the need which determines human being, not the reverse. Thus, “man himself first arises out of this distress, which is more essential than he himself, for he

jener Gelegenheit als einer Verlegenheit, sondern? Das Nicht-*aus*-Wissen und das Nicht-*ein*-Wissen: aus *dem* heraus und in *das* hinein, was sich durch solches Wissen erst als dieser unbetretene und ungegründete »Raum« eröffnet. Dieser »Raum« (Zeit-Raum) — wenn wir hier so sprechen dürfen — ist jenes Zwischen, in dem noch nicht bestimmt ist, was seiend ist und was unseiend, und wo doch auch schon nicht mehr die völlige Verwirrung der Ungeschiedenheit des Seienden und Unseienden alles in alles fort- und umherreißt. Diese Not, als solches Nicht-*aus*-und-*ein*-Wissen in diesem so sich eröffnenden Zwischen ist eine Art des »Seyns«, in die gelangend oder vielleicht geworfen der Mensch erstmals das erfährt - aber noch nicht bedenkt -, was wir das *Inmitten* des Seienden nennen.” (GA 45, p. 152.)

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 139.

is first determined by it”.⁴⁸⁶ The need displaces human being into its very essence thereby human being surpasses himself in order to return to beyng. Human being is displaced into the between, into the space of undifferentiatedness of beings which is the space of decision about beings or non-beings. This means that although the need is indeterminate with regard to its whence and whither, it has a determinacy in its needfulness, “in that it provides to thinking its essential space, and indeed does nothing else than that. For thinking means here to let beings emerge in the decisiveness of their Being and to let them stand out before oneself, to perceive them as such and thereby to name them in their beingness for the first time”.⁴⁸⁷ Thinking arises out of a need for the decision about beings’ relation to beyng, that is, out of letting them be whereby human being is already called for.

Accordingly, if every necessity (*Notwendigkeit*) is rooted in a need (*Not*), the highest necessity is the making itself inevitable of the need in its needfulness. Through such a needfulness of the need, the highest possibilities are owned. Thus, necessity of the truth of beyng has its ground in the inevitability of that necessity, and it is inevitable because it thinks the essence as such which is *Wesung* of beyng whereby the abundance of the gift becomes visible as a space of decision occupied by man. But what does it mean that human being is called for the decision? Who is man? To think this question is the only way to bring the openness into ground which is not grounded in the history of philosophy because “this question will point in the direction of the possibility of whether man is not only the preserver of unconcealed beings but is precisely the custodian of the openness of Being”.⁴⁸⁸ History of being considers man as the preserver of the unconcealedness; for instance, against the self-emerging of the *physis*, *techne* is the grasping of this unconcealedness in order that the latter is retained. As we have seen, an understanding of concealing is already at work in this conception of being. However, although *aletheia* is preserved by man, this self-concealing clearing, namely, beyng, is never considered as such. Beyng is

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 133.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 163. “Diese Frage wird in die Richtung der Möglichkeit weisen, ob gar der Mensch nicht nur der Wahrer des unverborgenen Seienden sei, sondern der *Wächter der Offenheit des Seyns*.” (GA 45, p. 190.)

forgotten in the sense that man do not know who he really is; the fact that man is determined by being is forgotten. Thus, it is not only a matter of preserving openness by caring beings, but also there is a need for asking the question of being from where it clears in its withdrawal, that is, man. This will make man the custodian of beyng whereby beyng is not just preserved, but it owns its owning as a self-concealing clearing thereby 'ownhood' grounds its-self as groundless. Thus, the necessity of the truth of beyng lies in the necessity of the question of the essence of man. It should be noticed that Heidegger does not look for the answer of one question by means of the other. What is at issue is to reveal the enowning of the grounding question in its grounding as such through which necessity is owned as the need of owning. It is a matter of seeing human being *and* beyng in their intimacy.

4.4. Da-sein: intimacy of the between

Heidegger, in *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, describes this counter-resonance in terms of the *between* of Da-sein in the following way: "Be-ing needs man in order to hold sway; and man belongs to be-ing so that he can accomplish his utmost destiny as Da-sein".⁴⁸⁹ What is at stake here is to see that this needing-belonging is an en-owning. Da-sein as the between is the self-being as such. There is a needing-belonging as long as the self-being grounds its grounding in terms of ownhood. Thus, Heidegger's main aim is not just to ask for man's being, but to show that to ask 'who is man?' is to ask for the self in that self-being because "how are we to *be* ourselves, if we are not *selves*? And how can we be *ourselves* without knowing *who* we are, so that we are certain of being *the ones* who we are?"⁴⁹⁰ The question of self as the essence of human being is not a question of subjectivity through which self is understood as extant either as I or as We. Rather, the question is what is ownmost to the selfhood. Then, "man's selfhood – the historical man's selfhood as the selfhood of the people – is a domain of events wherein man will be owned unto himself only when he himself reaches into the open time-space in which an owning can take place".⁴⁹¹ This is historical man, not theoretical, practical or biological. Man

⁴⁸⁹ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, p. 177.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 36.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

grounds Da-sein by inhabiting in Da-sein and in that way he grounds what is ownmost to him because only as Da-sein, be-ing comes to truth in such a way that its truth is also grounded in Da-sein whereby owning as such occurs and we are able to ask *whether* man is so that he is enowned. This refers to the transformation of man and this transformation, as it can be seen, can only be enacted as an ‘er-gründen’ (engrounding). Heidegger writes: “to enground the ground of the truth of be-ing and thus to enground be-ing itself means to let this ground (enowning) *be* the ground through Da-sein’s steadfastness. Accordingly, engrounding becomes grounding of Da-sein as engrounding the ground, i.e., the truth of be-ing”.⁴⁹² The question of the ‘why’ for grounding grounds itself as the grounding, that is, the grounding is the call for grounding. This can be understood insofar as owning-to (*Zu-eignung*) is already an owning-over (*Über-eignung*) in such a way that both owning-to and owning-over belongs to enowning. Thus, Da-sein never comes to itself as if it is an extant thing waiting to be reached, “rather, Da-sein first comes to itself when owning-to the belongingness becomes at the same time owning-over-to enowning. Da-sein means steadfastness of the t/here [Da]. The own-hood as mastery of owning occurs in the joinedness of owning-to and owning-over-to”.⁴⁹³ Belonging to beyng, Da-sein, always transfers itself to *itself* as enowning insofar as it is an already owning-to. This is why Da-sein is the inhabiting carriability (*Ertragsamkeit*) of clearing. In other words, in letting the ground be the ground as *Da*, beyng is the inhabiting carriability in the sense that “the t/here [Da] does not mean a here and yonder that is somehow each time determinable but rather means the *clearing* of be-ing itself, whose openness first of all opens up the space for every possible here and yonder and for arranging beings in historical work and deed and sacrifice”.⁴⁹⁴ In this clearing, beyng is sheltered and sacrificed for the sake of ownhood as its own in such a way that any ‘to one-self’ happens *there*.

Such an inhabiting carriability refers to the fact that in enowning, there is always enownment as Da-sein. What is en-owned is man in such a way that

⁴⁹² Ibid., p. 216.

⁴⁹³ Ibid., p. 224.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 210.

inabiding, man both grounds Da-sein and he is grounded by Da-sein. This is why carriability is unabiding; Da-sein is abided by man in such a way that belongingness to being is en-owned. In other words, *Ereignis* is the owning of the ground as to be grounded and this makes sense when we consider clearing of the *Da*, of the ‘in the midst of’ as springing from its ‘where’ as its ‘to which’. This leads us to say that clearing or the openness does not merely belong to beings, but to being itself. Then, for Heidegger, clearing should not be understood as ‘lightening’ or ‘brightness’ (*Helle*) as it is maintained in its Platonic sense because the metaphor of light implies that a being is unconcealed without questioning the ground of the unconcealment itself. Insofar as *aletheia* is understood as light, it becomes accessibility to a being whereby perceiving is already implied and as a consequence, it loses its privative sense in such a way that it is understood as the between of a being and soul. What Heidegger finds question-worthy, however, is the openness as such (*Offenheit als solche*) which is,

1. originally the *multiple-onefold* – not only that ‘between’ [*Zwischen*] for what is perceivable and for perceiving (ζυλόν) and not only what is several and various. Rather, openness must be questioned as this *onefold*.
2. not only perceiving and knowing, but every kind of comportment and stance and especially that which we call *attuning* – all belong to openness, which is not a state, but rather an occurrence.
3. the open as what is enopened and self-openning, *the enclosing, the dis-closing* [*Entschließung*].⁴⁹⁵

What is at issue is the openness of the open in its onefold. It is a matter of seeing *aletheia* before it is divided into sides of a being and its perceiving. In that sense, the word ‘aletheia’ is not sufficient because it, even as *phusis*, always takes a being as a being. What we need to see is how being comes to a being in such a way that truth happens. Then, this openness is not an ordinary emptiness; it does not indicate a place where everything is possible for everything. Rather, it is the giving to each being what is ownmost to it according to its being that which it already is. Thus, the openness determines while still it is not a being. In that sense, as Heidegger mentions, openness may be regarded as the hollow medium of a jug as long as we grasp that it is not the walls which determines the hollow medium, but the hollow medium determines the walls and their edges. This allegory shows us that openness,

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 233.

as self-opening, lets itself be enclosed or encircled. In that way, it is sheltered in a being as concealed.

This is the essential swaying of truth as clearing for self-sheltering concealing and different from *aletheia*, this truth of beyng does not assume man as the subject of receiving what happens because what happens rejects such an assuming. Instead, this occurrence (*Geschehnis*) requires to be placed there by being attuned, by being reserved (*Verhaltenheit*) from within what happens. Thus, first, we should see that truth is not only clearing, but a clearing for self-sheltering concealing in such a way that

Both, clearing and sheltering-concealing, are not two but rather the essential swaying of the one, of truth itself. In that truth holds sway and *becomes* truth, enowning becomes truth. 'Enowning enowns' says nothing other than: It and only it *becomes* truth, becomes that which belongs to enowning, so that quiet essentially truth is truth of be-ing.⁴⁹⁶

Enowning becomes truth because truth is that which belongs to it in such a way that truth belongs only to it and *only* truth belongs to it, not a truth which is extant, but as it *essences*. Thus, granting itself, *Ereignis* also means not-granting as such. This is letting the ground be the ground for grounding and can only be enacted when the ground brings forth itself as the ab-ground. Then, there is the essential swaying of the ground and since ground is ownmost to truth as enowning, ab-ground also belongs to truth in its essential swaying. In *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, Heidegger determines this ab-ground as time-space (*Zeit-Raum*) which is the originary onefold of time and space. First, we should grasp that ab-ground is the staying-away of ground. As the ground stays away, ground sustains itself as towering-through (*Durchragen*), as what is to be grounded. In that way, ground is self-sheltering concealing and therefore not-granting (*Versagen*). In other words, ground in its letting be the ground by staying-away, that is, ab-ground is a letting be empty (*Leerlassen*) which is already determined by this refusing and hesitating in such a way that there is a clearing where hesitating and refusal shows itself. Then, what is at issue is the ur-ground (*Ur-grund*) which lets the ground ground by sustaining itself through which grounding, now as enowning, overwhelms. This (ab-

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 244. "Beide, Lichtung und Verbergung, sind nicht zwei, sondern die Wesung des Einen, der Wahrheit selbst. Indem Wahrheit west, Wahrheit *wird*, wird das Ereignis Wahrheit. Das Ereignis ereignet, sagt nichts anderes als: Es und nur es *wird* Wahrheit, wird dies, was zum Ereignis gehört, so daß eben Wahrheit wesentlich Wahrheit des Seyns ist." (GA 65, p. 349.)

ground) is nothing other than the *lichtende Verbergung*, sheltering that lights up which is the essential swaying of truth or beyng; it is the clearing for the open as ‘emptiness’ (*die Leere*), as cleared. We can see that Heidegger discusses this emptiness or the openness in terms of time-space. It should be noticed that Heidegger, here, aims at maintaining what is onwmost to the emptiness of time-space in its hesitating self-refusal, not any emptiness in the sense of the absence of the extant. Thus, it is the question of the ab-groundness of the ab-ground. In other words, we should always understand ab-ground as *ab-ground*. For Heidegger, this shows us that emptiness never refers to ‘not being occupied’, but as hesitating self-refusal, as enowning, which is the between for the counter-resonance of belonging and call in enownment, it is attuning and attuned; ab-ground, insofar as it is *ab-ground*, is an attuned and enjoined ab-ground. But how could we understand that ab-ground is the onefold of the temporalizing (*Zeitigung*) and spatializing (*Räumung*)? Given that ab-ground is attuned by itself, by self-refusal, we find emptiness in the form of a removal-onto (*Entrückung*) futurity, a rapture whereby the past is broken up and the present is moved into abandonment. Here concealment occurs as the remembering of the belongingness to beyng and as the expecting the call of beyng at one *moment* which is the moment of decision. All removals-onto are gathered in this moment and this gives us the grounding of self-refusal as ab-ground in temporalizing. However, this self-refusal is also hesitating otherwise temporalizing of the moment would result in ‘a’ decision. But what is at issue is not this or that decision, but to *stand* in the moment of decision. This means that temporalizing is held in the encircling hold (*Umhalt*) whereby the possibility of the gift in that hesitating is *spatialized* in terms of a charming-moving-onto (*Berückung*). Thus,

‘Staying-away’ of ground, its ab-groundness, is *attuned* from within hesitating self-refusal; it is above all temporalizing and spatializing, removing-onto and charming-moving-onto. Spatializing grounds and is the site for the moment. As the onefold of originary temporalizing and spatializing, time-space is itself originally the site for the moment; and this site is the temporality-spatiality of the openness of sheltering-concealing, i.e., of the t/here [*Da*] – a temporality-spatiality that is essential and holds to abground.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 268. “Das »Wegbleiben« des Grundes, seine Abgründigkeit, ist *gestimmt* aus dem zögernden Sichversagen, zeitigend und räumend, entrückend und berückend zumal. Das Einräumen gründet und ist die Stätte des Augenblicks. Der Zeit-Raum als die Einheit der ursprünglichen Zeitigung und Räumung ist ursprünglich selbst die Augenblicks-Stätte, diese die ab-gründige wesenhafte Zeit-Räumlichkeit der Offenheit der Verbergung, d. h. des Da.” (GA 65, p. 384.)

This can be called the truth of ur-ground and Heidegger also calls it the hint in the sense that “this hint is the self-enopening of what shelters and conceals itself as such and indeed the self-opening for and as en-ownment, as call to belongingness to enowning itself, i.e., to the grounding of Da-sein as the domain of decision for being”.⁴⁹⁸ Thus, in order that unconcealment is kept as ‘unconcealment’, that is, in quotation marks, in such a way that there is just revealing of self-sheltering concealing, concealment itself should be set free from out of itself in the sense of a self-enopening of what is concealed. It should be seen that what is strange here is leaving concealment in quotation marks too.

This is why Heidegger, instead of unconcealment, prefers to say ‘clearing’ in the sense that there is a clearing for and of concealing. Once beings come to unconcealment, ‘concealing’ stays in by enabling its opening as concealing for ‘unconcealment’ which grounds by staying away, as ab-ground and that *ab-grounding* is the openness as such, an emptiness which is still hold for the decision of the truth of being. Thus, hint (*der Wink*) is without that which hints; sign without signifier. What is at stake is the hinting of the hint in such a way that “this *hint* comes to hint only in the echo of be-ing out of the distress of abandonment by being and only means further that enowning opens up neither from within the call nor from within a belongingness but only from within the ‘between’ [Zwischen] that resonates both”.⁴⁹⁹ Neither belongingness to being nor the needfulness of being in its call for human being comes first. Opening up of the openness happens as that between, which is the grounding as ab-ground. *There* being as such withdraws in such a way that beings are abandoned by being and this abandonment makes being belong or not belong to beings in the sense that truth is already hinted for and by *essence*.

It is from within the originary essential sway of truth that what is true and thus is a being is above all determined, and in such a way that now a being no longer *is* but *be-ing* arises unto ‘a being’. Therefore in the other beginning of thinking, be-ing is experienced as enowning, such that this experience, as arising, transforms all relations to ‘what is’. From now on a human being – i.e., essential human being – and the few of its kind must build its history from within Da-sein and that means must effect a being in advance, from out of *be-ing* unto a

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 269.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid.

being. Not merely like heretofore, where be-ing is something forgotten and unavoidably only meant in advance, but so that be-ing, its *truth* expressly bears every relation to a being.⁵⁰⁰

The hint hints in beings' not deserving the 'is'. Because all beings, as 'what is' involves the supposition that 'is' or being is known in advance as common or empty. Thus, the problem with the history of metaphysics is not its not knowing being, but rather its assumption that being could be known with certainty arising from a doubt on that certainty. It is so easily admitted that being is given and intended in advance as the conditions for beings even if it is put forth as the empties of the empty, as it is the case with Hegel. But for Heidegger, if being is unconcealment, which is not passed over in metaphysics, it is not an addendum to beings which are supposed to be as 'what is'. The latter consists in an omission as its constitution, still keeping the mystery in that omission. Thus, it is not a matter of leaving aside beings, but transforming them by having the courage of seeing that being cannot be thought or found out. Its *un-thought* is its arising, *unto* a being. Necessity no longer comes from a pretending to know being in advance but rather from thinking counter to being in such a way that the truth of being, as a matter of ownhood, is at stake, as the struggle itself, as an intimacy where we stand in all our relations to beings.

Only Seyn 'ist' as long as 'is' belongs to the essencing of truth in the sense that "in this saying, be-ing is said out of 'is' and, as it were, is said back into 'is'".⁵⁰¹ Thus, a being cannot be determined by 'is' because 'is' cannot be attributed to anything, but it is enowning which enowns truth. If one still says 'Seyn west' instead of 'Seyn ist', for Heidegger, this indicates that here metaphysics speaks because for metaphysics, only a being is in such a way that being is the most common being. Indeed, history of being shows us that if we take up 'is' as belonging to beings, this means that being is a priori for beings. However, *Seyn* is not something a priori or beyond. It is even not the difference as such or the relation as such. Thus, thinking through ontological difference is still too metaphysical. As Heidegger points out in *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*,

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 175.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid., p. 333.

Be-ing and a being cannot be distinguished immediately, because they are not at all immediately related to each other. Although a being as what is resonates only in enownment, be-ing is – in the manner of abground – remote from all beings.⁵⁰²

To distinguish being from beings remains formal and metaphysical because this still implies that being could be understood from beings. Beings do not and cannot point out being in any way because ‘what is’ is already cleared by withdrawal. This is why ab-grounding truth of beyng is remote from all beings; beings can only preserve this truth as they are abandoned by beyng. Thus, rather than that beings are, that they are lost in beingness makes beings belong to be-ing of truth. In other words, beings are abandoned by being in such a way that it is too ordinary that there are beings. And for Heidegger, beings can be wrested from their ordinarieness by being put into this clearing-withdrawal in the manner of creating of a work. “But this does not mean how a being would approximate and correspond to be-ing but rather how a being preserves and loses the truth of the essential swaying of be-ing – and therein comes into what is its ownmost, which consists in such *preserving*”.⁵⁰³ What is ownmost to a being is how it preserves the truth of beyng and as we have seen, this happens through the strife between world and earth. What matters most is that we can only speak of a being in terms of a ‘between’ of enowning. Thus, a being no longer is, but either beyng arises unto a being, or not. In this way, a being is owned in the sense that this owning is already owned as the very ownhood. And Da-sein is enowned in such a way that man abides in the space of decision. For Heidegger, this makes us think the inbetweenness of the between in terms of man and gods. Only if god reigns over, there is a need for man in his belonging to beyng. Thus, there is a need to decide whether gods pass again, which means that gods need beyng in such a way that “god’s passing demands a steadfastness from a being and thus from man in the midst of beings – a steadfastness in which a being above all withstands the passing, thus does not stop it, but rather lets it reign as passing, always in the simplicity of what is regained as ownmost to a being (as work, tool, thing, deed, view, and word).”⁵⁰⁴ Here what is at issue is not to determine how a being is *as* the being that it *is*. Rather, what is true (*das Wahre*) comes into preservation (*Verwahrung*) so that

⁵⁰² Ibid., p. 336.

⁵⁰³ Ibid., p. 340.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 290.

man names ‘a being’. Thus, what is ownmost to a being, the simplicity of this ownmost, is not its difference from beyng, but the fact that a being finds itself in the strife of the ‘between’ of earth and world which is gathered as the ‘between’ of man and gods in such a way that “everything (god, man, world, earth) recoils in swaying into itself and thus leaves to be-ing the unique decidedness of en-ownment”.⁵⁰⁵ What is ownmost to each is allotted to each (god, man, world and earth) and this enownment is the ab-ground of the ‘between’ as long as this space of decision happens as the withdrawal of beyng.

Now, when that which man as historical subsequently names a being shatters on be-ing – be-ing which is the needfulness of god – then everything is thrown back into the weight of what is allowed to everything as its ownmost and so becomes nameable of language and belongs to the reticence in which be-ing withdraws from every reckoning among beings and still lavishes its essential sway in the grounding – that is held to the abgrund – of the intimacy of gods and world, of earth and man.⁵⁰⁶

What is named ‘a being’ shatters on beyng in such a way that the ‘between’ of enowning bursts open, as the cleared space of the *intimacy (Innigkeit)* of this ‘between’. What is at stake is no longer an estimation of beings where being is attributed to them. Now for Heidegger, at the crossing from the first beginning to the other, the saying of beings break down in such a way that everything is placed into what is ownmost to it so that what is nameable comes to language in its reticence, that is, *a-new*.

But with regard to what do we talk about this everything in its showing itself through the originary intimacy? It is obvious that intimacy of the ‘between’ rejects all talk of ‘inside’ or ‘outside’. Thus, ‘with regard to’ cannot be applied to such an occurrence. It is the clearing of the self-sheltering concealing. How could we understand this clearing? It must be a clearing in the sense of a *gathering* of everything with itself. As we have mentioned above, it is no longer understood just as coming into unconcealment from out of concealment. Rather, concealment is put into question in the sense that what is at stake is holding to the concealment. In other words, if unconcealment is always un-concealment, what does it mean to say that unconcealment occurs in such a way that concealment endures as concealed within

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 341.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 342.

unconcealment? This is the abandonment of beings by being and Heidegger suggests that this lack of distress is the utmost distress whereby the inceptuality of thinking comes to fore. As we have seen, *Contributions to Philosophy* and other contemporary works are devoted to such a preparation. We have seen that what lies behind such an effort is Heidegger's originary insight that *Wesen* is not something 'in itself', but it *is* in its being claimed, the claim whereby truth is considered as the struggle as such. The question is not how we get truth as if it stands there on its own; what is at stake is not to grasp how we know the true distinguishing it from the false. For Heidegger, there is no such a thing as 'the true', but 'what is true' comes to preservation because 'what is' has no other sense than 'to be owned'. Thus, for Heidegger, what is at stake is that there is *either* unconcealment *or* concealment. The space arrived is the space for this either-or, as the space of decision to be hold. It is clear that un-concealment already implies such an occurrence but this makes sense only if concealment is held in everything in such a way that the un-thought always stays there as what is to be thought. The space of decision is not-granting itself of unconcealment, but still *of* unconcealment. Thus, it is a matter of understanding unconcealment, not merely as a movement from out of concealment, but *within* unconcealment, in its holding to concealment.

CHAPTER V

BEING

It could be seen that concealing, ab-ground is opened up through the ‘inbetweenness’ of *Ereignis*. The ‘between’ of man and god, the ‘between’ of earth and world, is the struggle of each for their own. There is no violence here as long as the intimacy of the between, the essential swaying (*Wesung*) of beyng, is the transformation of itself along the way of being itself. In other words, ‘what is’ is not determined beforehand by thinking, but rather, it transforms itself with thinking in each case, as historical. Thus, *it* gives its ownmost (*Wesen*) to everything in the sense that this enownment enowns itself in the manner of a withstanding. This is no longer the ontological difference which man has to put up with. Rather, *Wesung* is distinct from beings because *inceptually*, it is already not ‘in itself for beings’, but, if we can put this way, it is ‘for itself in beings’ if beings are to be grounded in truth. Thus, differentiating being from beings obscures the ‘between’ which is the origin of this difference. Now the between, as the truth of beyng, is the *Wesung der Wesen* and as we have seen, this essencing is the belongingness of human being to the essence. It should be remarked that this happening is not merely grounded on this belongingness and the call. ‘Everything’ does not occur for man. Rather, occurrence of everything in a being, that is, ab-grounding of beyng, is always a returning to the Same of the between, not into an identity of essence, but into its being owned as essencing in the sense of a clearing in its withdrawal and for Heidegger, in such a returning, the required one is human being. This is why human being no longer has to put up with the essence of beyng; not because s/he has another option, but because s/he has already returned to being. Thus, there is no definition or determination of human being before or beyond this occurrence of the essence or being. However, it is obvious that Heidegger will not discuss human being in order to obtain a determination of human being. Rather, what is required is to inquire into the essential swaying, clearing of beyng, letting the un-thought be thought as the call which calls human being into his belongingness to beyng in such a way that human being always remains the required one.

5.1. Human-being: the stranger and the pointer

Human-being belongs to essence as essence is the essencing or truth of beyng/essence in such a way that belonging to the essence is owning the essence in its to be ownedness. Since the truth of beyng is a happening of withdrawal, then, it would not be wrong to claim that the essence of human being is the history (*Geschichte*) of concealment. We should bear in mind that beyng does not *have* a beginning which declines into its degenerate forms. As we have seen, history is a returning to the same, that is, history is the inceptuality of the beginning. As Heidegger puts it by a metaphor, what happens there is like a fire whose brightness consumes its blaze in such a way that it is darkened by its own glow. Accordingly,

Be-ing is the hearth-fire in the midst of the abode of gods – an abode which is simultaneously the estranging of man (the ‘between’ [*das Zwischen*] in which he remains a (the) stranger, precisely when he is at home with beings).⁵⁰⁷

Estranging (*Befremdung*) of man is the estranging of the open where what is ownmost to man is grounded. But do we know what is ownmost to man? For Heidegger, this is not something produced by human being for himself, “but which he is capable only of venturing as possibility, in *Da-sein*”.⁵⁰⁸ This is throwing-oneself-free and “by throwing himself free of ‘a being’, man first becomes man. For only in this way does he return to a being and is he the one who has returned”.⁵⁰⁹ As the one who returns to a being, human being has already distinguished beyng from beings without grounding this difference (*Unterscheidung*) itself. Thus, the re-turn (*Rück-kehr*) is based on a view of being (*Seinsblick*) through which a being is found as a being, whereby metaphysics begins. The re-turn is forgotten in the sense that man does not ground it in such a way that beings are taken up as objects and then man defines himself as subject. This forgetting of the returnership (*Rückkehrerschaft*) is not-being-able-to-retain the return. But the ‘not’ here is not something negative, rather it belongs to the ab-ground of beyng. “Therefore all that remains is the return, i.e., retaining beingness (ἰδέα), which is a forgetting of what is

⁵⁰⁷ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, p. 343.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 320.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 318. “Indem der Mensch sich vom ‘Seienden’ loswirft, wird er erst Mensch. Denn nur so kehrt er zum Seienden zurück und ist als der Zurückgekehrte.” (GA 65, p. 452.)

enowned”.⁵¹⁰ This means that even though it is hidden, throwing himself free of human being is already en-owning. In other words, in throwing-oneself-free, what is ownmost to man is first opened up. Forgetting of the difference is the essence of beyng and the essence of human being insofar as human being, first through this forgetting, ventures the open. Accordingly, “throwing-oneself-free, venturing the open, belonging neither to oneself nor to what is over against and yet to both – not as object and subject but knowing oneself as countering in the open – intimating that *what* throws itself free and that from which it throws itself free holds sway in the same way as the over against”.⁵¹¹ It is not man who throws oneself free of a being and therefore this throwing-oneself-free cannot be understood on the basis of such an opposition between man and beings. Rather, there is countering, a ‘between’ which needs the open. This amounts to saying that both human being and beings *can* find themselves in their countering to each other although this countering, as encountering, becomes the loss of what is ownmost to each. Then, what is ownmost to human being or beings is a matter of possibility of ownhood. Once re-turn happens, a being is remote from truth because beyng is already forgotten through this re-turn. What is strange is lost, and it can be named ‘a being’ only if what is strange comes to preservation in that being. But this happens only if the ‘between’ is enowned as Da-sein which is the possibility for human being to be transferred into its ownmost.

It should be remarked that this discussion of ‘what is ownmost’ which is hidden in the re-turn refers to the essence of human being in the *inceptuality* of beyng which is the truth of beyng. Since the latter is grounded as Da-sein, it is necessary to look for ‘what is ownmost to human being’ in Da-sein’s own grounding. Da-sein grounds as renouncing which lets soar the refusal of beyng in its ab-ground. As we know, this is not a mere negation, and now for Heidegger, as this renouncing, there is standing (*Stehen*) as unsupported in the unprotected. And,

This standing keeps up with *possibility* – not with an arbitrary possibility and not with ‘the’ possibility in general but rather with what is ownmost to possibility. But that is enowning itself as the ability for what is most unique to en-ownment, an ability that withdraws unto the

⁵¹⁰ Ibid., p. 319.

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

utmost. *Such* withdrawal sends the severest storm against renouncing and grants to it the nearness of the ab-ground and thus the cleavage of be-ing. This is of course the mark of Da-sein, to stand unsupported and unprotected downward into the ab-ground and therein to surpass the gods.⁵¹²

And he adds, “the *surpassing* of gods is the going-*under* into the groundership of the truth of be-ing”.⁵¹³ If Da-sein grounds the truth of beyng, this is in such a way that renouncing belongs to the ab-ground. In this way, Da-sein is unsupported and unprotected, that is, ab-ground always prevails in the sense that nearness to beyng is granted as a de-cision or ‘between’. Now Heidegger also says that standing in the ab-ground indicates the surpassing of gods, recalling that “but be-ing en-owns Da-sein for itself, for grounding its truth, i.e., its clearing; because without this lit up, separating-deciding [*lichtende Ent-scheidung*] of it itself into the needfulness of god and into the guardianship of Da-sein, be-ing would have to be consumed by the fire of its own unredeemed glow”.⁵¹⁴ Again we find the ‘between’ of human being and gods. Beyng or the grounding of Da-sein originates from a clearing scission into the needfulness of god and guardianship of human being whereby the space of decision is also enowned. If beyng does not consume itself, this is because both the refused (god) and the belonged (human being) is in strife with each other *essentially* as refusal and belonging. And, “refusal is the highest nobility of gifting and the basic thrust of self-sheltering concealing, revelation [*Offenbarkeit*] of which makes up the originary essential sway of the truth of be-ing. Only thus does be-ing become estranging itself, the stillness of the passing of the last god”.⁵¹⁵ Beyng does not need the last god, but the reverse. The last god is the staying away of its passing and arrival; it belongs to de-cision. The last god is not the end in a calculative sense, rather, it holds sway as the decision for what is highest. Through the passing of the last god, a being is abandoned by being in the sense that utmost distress for being-human is awakened. In that way, it needs beyng as the refusal grants in refusal or the

⁵¹² Ibid., p. 343.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid. “Das Seyn er-eignet aber sich das Da-sein zur Gründung seiner Wahrheit, d. h. seiner Lichtung, weil es ohne diese lichtende Ent-scheidung seiner selbst in die Notschaft des Gottes und in die Wächterschaft des Da-seins im Feuer der eigenen ungelösten Glut sich verzehren müßte.” (GA 65, p. 488.)

⁵¹⁵ Ibid., p. 285.

hint hints in enowning. Thus, to say that god needs beyng is to say that there is a distinguishing between being and beings which is not grounded. However, this distinguishing is already in being in such a way that even the arrival and flight of gods admit this. As for each being, for god also, for that being as the most being, it is no longer allowed to say that it is or it is not. Here we should notice that Heidegger does not talk about an indifference as to the existence of beings, an indifference suggested by phenomenology, especially in Husserl's idea of intentional inexistence, whereby it is claimed that whether a being is or is not does not matter but needs an epoche for a study of being. Rather, here, Heidegger claims for delivering 'is' to its very truth.

This destroys the language of beings and instead of that, now, what is at issue is the language of beyng, in the sense that what is remote speaks near to us. Thus, as for each being, what matters is the nearness and the distance in terms of a not-granting which grants. However, different from beings, God arrives and flees, that is, it needs beyng. As the so-called most being, its remoteness is utmost, it mostly distances from 'is' in such a way that, in that refusal, nearness is granted more as the space of decision for human being to stand as the guardian of the truth of beyng whereby belongingness of human being to beyng is enowned.

That belongingness to be-ing and this needing of be-ing above all reveals be-ing in its self-sheltering concealing as that turning [*kehrige*] midpoint in which belongingness surpasses the need and the need towers over the belongingness: be-ing as en-owning, which happens out of its own turning [*kehrigen*] overflowing and so becomes the origin for the strife between god and man, between the passing of god and the history of man.⁵¹⁶

Turning is always counter-turning in such a way that "*the call unto leaping-into enownment is the grand stillness of the most sheltered and concealed self-knowing*". Da-sein belongs to enowning as it is enowned. In other words, "only the onset of be-ing as enownment of the t/here [*Da*] leads Da-sein to itself and thus to the enactment (sheltering) of the inhabiting and grounded truth into a being which finds its site in

⁵¹⁶ Ibid., p. 291. "Jene Zugehörigkeit zum Seyn und dieses Bedürfen des Seyns enthüllt erst das Seyn in seinem Sichverbergen als jene kehrige Mitte, in der die Zugehörigkeit das Bedürfen übertrifft und das Bedürfen die Zugehörigkeit überragt: das Seyn als Er-eignis, das aus diesem kehrigen Übermaß seiner selbst geschieht und so zum Ursprung wird des Streites zwischen dem Gott und dem Menschen, zwischen dem Vorbeigang des Gottes und der Geschichte des Menschen." (GA 65, p. 413.)

the lit-up sheltering-concealing of the t/here [*Da*”⁵¹⁷ It should not be concluded that before enowning, there is the enownment of the there. Rather, Heidegger speaks of the onset (*Anfall*) of beyng as the enownment of the there which is ‘the most sheltered and concealed self knowing’. The leaping-into enownment is called as long as ‘to be self’, that is, ownhood, truth in its grounding as Da-sein always remains concealed in this grounding. Thus, “the *call* is befalling *and* staying-away in the mystery of enownment”⁵¹⁸ This is the call of utmost hinting as the most hidden enownment. The mystery lies in that the call befalls *and* stays away at the same time and belongingness of man to beyng is understood from within such a mystery. In that sense, mystery refers to returning of man to a being through which he becomes man. This is the overflowing of beyng in its onset where beings are abandoned by being, beings are understood from out of beings in such a way that they no longer need beyng. And the more beings are abandoned by being, the more the remoteness of gods is utmost in their needfulness of beyng. In this utmost remoteness, in not-granting, Heidegger finds a unique kind of nearness, that is, a granting in such a way that the strife of human being is no longer with beings, but with gods. Human being surpasses god and god overpowers human being. What remains in its *stillness*, thus, is the passing of the last god and belongingness of human being to that happening, as the ‘between’ where man empowers god’s necessity, does not stop it “in order that the self-sheltering-concealing of enownment prove to be the midpoint and enownment prove to be the midpoint of self-sheltering-concealing, in order to foster deep resonance and thus to give rise to freedom as freedom unto the ground of being, as grounding of the t/here [*Da*”⁵¹⁹ The enownment of beyng as onset or overflowing becomes ‘open’ as the midpoint, as the ‘between’ of self-sheltering-concealing in such a way that this midpoint of enownment is already the ‘between’ of human belongingness and divine needing, as a strife which conceals while granting.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid., p. 286.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid., p. 287.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid., p. 291.

God overpowers or towers through human being as it needs beyng, that is, it does not grant itself while there is granting. In other words, remoteness of god is the nearness of the essential sway of beyng through the utmost distress of abandonment by being, that is, in its self-refusal which never comes to an end, but keeps increasing in the not-granting of the god. This distress of the abandonment by being is, on the side of human being, a return to a being whereby he first becomes himself in a possibility. However, this possibility, Da-sein, does not refer to an empty possibility, but to a possibility of ‘to be self’ which is enowned by the beginning. Accordingly,

The *last* god is not an end but rather the beginning as it resonates unto and in-itself and thus the highest shape of not-granting, since the inceptual withdraws from all holding-fast and holds sway only in towering over all of that which as what is to come is already seized within the inceptual – is delivered up to its [the inceptual’s] determining power.⁵²⁰

The last god is inception (*Anfang*) insofar as it is ‘the highest shape of not-granting’, insofar as inception, as revealing, already withholds and conceals. Inceptual rejects all capturing or detaining, but rather, as the last god, towers over human being in its coming to its ownmost, as belongingness to beyng. In that sense, human being is *Künftige*, not because the essence of his being is a future task for him, but because he is futural, that is, never *is* but already seized within and entrusted to the inceptual in its not-granting gift. Human being surpasses gods and their place of mastery because due to the inceptual concealing, he is always *more* than that which the realm of ‘what is’ offers to him as its having been or will be. In other words, human being also no longer *is*, but rather elevated to the belongingness to the truth of beyng, a belongingness which rests on the distress of the abandonment by being through which god *needs* self-refusal in its not-granting itself. “However, this experience is the first burst of the storm into Da-sein. For only when man comes from this distress does he bring to light the necessities and with these above all the freedom of belongingness to exultation of be-ing”.⁵²¹ Heidegger here takes up human being and Da-sein as identical insofar as for Da-sein, what matters is the enowning in enownment which is hidden but resonates as the between of the god and human

⁵²⁰ Ibid., p. 293. “Der letzte Gott ist kein Ende, sondern das Insichschwingen des Anfangs und somit die höchste Gestalt der Verweigerung, da Anfängliches allem Festhalten sich entzieht und nur west im Ueberragen alles dessen, was schon als Künftiges in ihn eingefangen und seiner bestimmenden Kraft überantwortet ist.” (GA 65, p. 416.)

⁵²¹ Ibid., p. 290.

being, a midpoint which already bursts open as not granting or ab-ground to be held in letting the ground for truth sheltered in a being, that is, as Da-sein. In that sense, “*not-granting* as nearness of the un-avertible makes Da-sein the one who is overcome; that is to say, not-granting does not crush Da-sein but lifts it up into grounding its freedom”.⁵²² Here, also, we can read Da-sein as human being, as who is overcome; human being grounds such a freedom insofar as ‘belongingness’ to beyng or truth is grounded in Da-sein as coming to *self* of truth, as such.

Not-granting, the hint in its hinting, that is, clearing of self-sheltering concealing both refuses and calls for to be belonged as a matter of ownhood which is the struggle of truth. In that case, belongingness is the ‘belongingness’ to beyng whereby all beings are refused *to be* in such a way that man is placed into the call of belongingness. Now the question is that: how could we understand the ‘belongingness’ to beyng, ab-grounded in Da-sein as the *man’s* belongingness to beyng? What does it mean to say that such a ‘belongingness’ which resonates in the ‘between’ of Da-sein is *mine*? It resonates in the ‘between’ of god and man but it is still not clear what it means to say that it is *man’s*. As we have seen up to now, Heidegger reaches such a point following the question of being as the question of truth until the question is to be settled as the unique one in its question-worthiness. This is the way from the essence of truth to the truth of essence in the sense that the essence/the claim is considered as to be claimed. Then, Da-sein is considered as the grounding of the truth of beyng in such a way that it opens itself up in its concealing remaining true to the essencing of the essence where it comes to its abode which becomes the essence of man. We are suggested to say ‘beyng’ instead of being in order to keep the distance of beings near to ‘itself’ as truth. Beings are refused to be although their refusal does not stand on its own. This is so because what leads us is the question of truth in its originary essence, that is, beyng and this makes beings the only places where truth is sheltered. Thus, refusing the being of beings is making room for naming ‘beings’ by placing truth for the first time, not in order to say them truthfully, but to preserve truth in *need*. And this requires that this very happening,

⁵²² Ibid., p. 289. “Die *Verweigerung* als die Nähe des Unab-wendbaren macht das Da-sein zum Überwundenen, das will sagen: schlägt es nicht nieder, sondern reißt es hinauf in die Gründung seiner Freiheit.” (GA 65, p. 412.)

namely beyng, is needed, by gods whose remoteness is the utmost in such a way that nearness is prepared. We also know that this needfulness of gods, not-granting, is already a counter-turning whose other side is the guardianship of man in his belongingness to beyng. Heidegger argues in this way because not-granting preserves *self-refusal* and in order that this ab-ground remains *ab-ground*, it needs the grounding of itself as the very and, so it seems, *any Selbstsein* grounded in ownhood enabled by 'to be ownness' as Da-sein. Now Da-sein inhabits, that is, beyng arises unto a being, it is sheltered in a being. Truth; *of* beyng: 'is' in the most essential way, it arrives while 'withdrawing unto the utmost'. Heidegger overcomes the guiding question of metaphysics by placing truth into its essence as *being that is* by transforming essence into its truth. But it seems that human being remains so 'stranger' that his situation provokes more questioning.

The problem of truth necessitates the result that the origin of human belongingness to truth as the utmost of being human remains question-worthy. Michel Haar mentions this ambiguity in the following way: "our most intimate and constant essence would be being and no longer us! Being would be our interiority which is not individual. More intimate than my more intimate, and nevertheless not mine."⁵²³ As Haar maintains also, in *Contributions to Philosophy*, instead of *Eigentlichkeit*, we find *Eigentum* "with this difference that *Eigentum* throws back a non-individual sphere of belonging: being itself is being human; being human, this is being the character of being! I am no longer myself, I am merely my belonging to being".⁵²⁴ Thus, *our* ambiguity lies in Heidegger's giving up discussing the problem of mineness which constitutes the heart-core of *Being and Time*. However, it is questionable whether the theme of individuality is also put aside in *Contributions to Philosophy* and in later works. Indeed, Heidegger writes: "the law of the last god is hinted at in these hints, the law of the great individuation in Da-sein, of the aloneness

⁵²³ Michel Haar, *Heidegger et l'Essence de l'Homme*, Grenoble : Jérôme Millon, 1993. p. 199. (my translation) "Notre fond plus intime et le plus constant ce serait l'être et non pas nous! L'être serait Notre intériorité non individuelle. Plus intime que mon plus intime, et pourtant non mien".

⁵²⁴ Ibid. "Le 'règne-propre' (*Eigentum*) remplace l'*Eigentlichkeit*, avec cette différence que l'*Eigentum* renvoie à une sphère d'appartenance non individuelle: être soi c'est être homme; être homme, c'est être la propriété de l'être! Je ne suis plus moi, je suis seulement mon appartenance à l'être".

of the sacrifice, of the uniqueness of choosing the shortest and steepest way”.⁵²⁵ It seems that individuation (*Vereinzelung*), aloneness (*Einsamkeit*) and uniqueness (*Einzigkeit*) are the new names for a mineness that we are looking for but in such a way that even the manner of considering human being with regard to the question ‘who’ is transformed. What this does mean, we shall see in the following pages but for now, it should be admitted that in *Contributions to Philosophy*, we cannot find the deepening of this new questioning. It is in section 267 of *Contributions*, that Heidegger sets forth *Ereignis* in its jointure from eight points which are en-ownment (*Er-eignung*), de-cision (*Ent-scheidung*), countering (*Ent-gegnung*), setting-free (*Entsetzung*), withdrawal (*Ent-zug*), simpleness (*Einfachheit*), uniqueness (*Einzigkeit*) and aloneness (*Einsamkeit*). Accordingly, *Ereignis* is en-ownment because beyng needs its grounding in Da-sein in the sense that the between is already enowned by the needfulness of gods which are owned thereby. This overflowing of the ground or enownment brings the space of de-cision as holding to the ab-ground as long as enowning of enownment holds sway as the distress through which man and gods counter each other. This non-ordinary inabiding of Da-sein sets a being free from its ordinariness by always withdrawing from the ordinary. However, beyng is not what lies behind. Holding sway of the between is unmediated and so simple that it is unique, that is, “it does not at all need any distinguishing or differences, not even the difference from beings”.⁵²⁶ This does not mean that beyng is a ground of identity which consumes all differences. Rather, beyng, as always ab-ground, is the neighbor of nothing which is its aloneness as always already differentiated which is enowned as the difference. However, among eight joints of *Ereignis*, we cannot find individuation because still concealment is *not* thought in its concealment. Better said, un-thought of beyng does not arise as what is to be thought despite all Heidegger’s efforts which prepare the ground of this un-thought through the distress of the *lack* of distress, that is, as ab-ground. The truth of Da-sein as ‘to be self’ prevails whereas staying away of this truth does not still touch *us*.

⁵²⁵ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, p. 287. “In diesen Winken wird das Gesetz des letzten Gottes zugewunken, das Gesetz der großen Vereinzelung im Da-sein, der Einsamkeit des Opfers, der Einzigkeit der Wahl der kürzesten und steilsten Bahn.” (GA 65, p. 408.)

⁵²⁶ Ibid., p. 331.

The situation of human being is not decided and for Heidegger, this decision does not belong to a human capacity, but rather, Da-sein, as the space of decision, decides human being. Human being: inhabiting this decidedness.

As inhabiting, Da-sein grounds the ab-ground that is thrown out and yet carried by be-ing in enownment, grounds it in that being as which man is. But the being of this being is itself primarily determined from Da-sein, insofar as from out of Da-sein man is transformed into the guardianship of the needfulness of gods. The man of such and primarily futural way of being 'is', as a being, not originary, insofar as only be-ing is. However, the man who is determined in terms of Da-sein is again distinguished over against all beings, insofar as what is his ownmost is grounded on projecting-open the truth of be-ing, a grounding which surrenders him, as one who is mediately enowned, to be-ing itself. Thus, man is excluded from be-ing and yet directly thrown into the truth of be-ing in such a way that the exclusion – one that belongs to being [*seinshaft*] – prevails in renouncing, with Dasein as its measure.⁵²⁷

Da-sein is enowned in enowning, that is, enowning is letting the refusal arise as the 'between' of human being and gods. Enownment of Da-sein renounces; it renounces being affected by beings. It happens through the very truth of the 'is'. This is why a being is not, but only beyng is. In other words, difference or otherness does not come from outside, but what is ownmost (*Wesen*) is also what is ownmost from out of the other as such. Now the problem is the situation of man. Is it legitimate to say that man is? As Heidegger suggests, as 'a being', man is not insofar as only beyng is. But does this mean that man is a being like other beings? Why does Heidegger hesitate to admit this? For Heidegger, here, insofar as man is determined through Da-sein, he is distinguished from other beings. What is ownmost to man (*Wesen*) is grounded in the truth of beyng. Man is surrendered (*überantwortet*) to beyng, mediately, in such a way that he is exclusion (*Anschluß*), that is, there is an exclusion in *Ereignis*. Is this exclusion proper to *Ereignis*? For Heidegger, this is so insofar as exclusion belongs to being, insofar as it rests in being of that being (man) which is already *daseinsmäßig*, that is, measured by the truth of beyng. Thus, exclusion of man does not turn him again into subject in the manner of an 'I' or community. Rather, what is at issue is the transformation or thrownness of man into the guardianship of the truth

⁵²⁷ Ibid., p. 344. "Das Da-sein gründet als Inständigkeit den vom Seyn in der Ereignung ausgeworfenen und doch getragenen Ab-grund in jenes Seiende, als welches der Mensch ist. Aber das Sein dieses Seienden bestimmt sich selbst erst aus dem Da-sein, sofern aus ihm der Mensch in die Wächterschaft der Notschaft der Götter verwandelt wird. Der Mensch solchen und erst künftigen Wesens »ist« als Seiender nicht ursprünglich, sofern nur das Seyn ist. Aber der da-seinshaft bestimmte Mensch ist doch wieder gegen alles Seiende ausgezeichnet sofern sein Wesen auf den Entwurf der Wahrheit des Seyns gegründet wird, welche Gründung ihn als den mittelbar Ereigneten dem Seyn selbst überantwortet. Der Mensch ist dergestalt vom Seyn ausgeschlossen und doch gerade in die Wahrheit des Seyns hineingeworfen, so daß der Ausschluß als ein seinshafter daseinsmäßig in der Verzichtung bestanden wird." (GA 65, p. 488.)

of beyng. This transformation or throwing-surrendering occurs suddenly because it is already removal-onto (*Entrückung*) beyng. In other words, man is thrown into *Wesen* because there is already a removal unto beyng as the turning from the essence of truth to the truth of essence. Heidegger adds,

But the removal-onto is also not man's being-outside-of-himself in the form of a getting-rid-of-himself. Rather, it grounds what is ownmost to selfhood, which is to say that man has what is his ownmost (guardianship of be-ing) as his ownhood, insofar as he grounds himself in Da-sein. But to have what is ownmost as ownhood means having inabidingly to enact the appropriating and losing the 'that' and 'how' of man's enowned (removed into be-ing). What makes up the ownmost of selfhood is to be *owned*, to be what is ownmost to the owner and inabidingly to sustain and not to sustain this ownness, depending on the ab-groundness of enownment. Selfhood can be grasped neither from the 'subject' nor at all from the 'I' or the 'personality' but rather only from inabiding [*Inständnis*] in the guardianship of belongingness to be-ing, i.e., however, according to the forth throw [*Zuwurf*] of the needfulness of gods. Selfhood is the unfolding of the ownhoodship of the ownmost. That man has what is his ownmost as his ownhood says that man's ownhood stands in constant danger of loss. And this is the resonance of en-ownment, is the surrender to be-ing.⁵²⁸

To say that man has what is his ownmost as ownhood (*sein Wesen zum Eigentum haben*) requires understanding the essence of selfhood in such a way that selfhood is the ownhoodship of the essence (*Eigentumschaft des Wesens*). Whether the essence of owner is *eigentlich*, that the essence is his essence, depends upon the fact that this ownedness (*Eigentlichkeit*) is either sustained or not sustained through the ab-groundedness. This happens inabidingly, as Da-sein because only in Da-sein, ground grounds by staying away. Thus, there is the essence of man, insofar as ownhood remains in the danger of loss under the mastery of 'owning' where Da-sein abides as the counter-resonance of refusal. In other words, essence is owned properly as man's essence only if the loss of the ownhood is essential in the manner of ownhoodship.

But when nevertheless Da-sein gains a priority, then this means that man, grasped with Da-sein as measure and projecting be-ing open, grounds what is his ownmost and the ownhoodship [*Eigentumschaft*] of what is his ownmost and is therefore – in all comportment and every relationship – held within the domain of the clearing of be-ing. But this domain is

⁵²⁸ Ibid. "Die Entrückung ist aber auch kein Außersichsein des Menschen in der Form eines Sichloswerdens. Sie begründet vielmehr das Wesen der Selbstheit, die besagt: Der Mensch hat sein Wesen (Wächterschaft des Seyns) zu seinem Eigentum, sofern er in das Da-sein sich gründet. Das Wesen zum Eigentum haben bedeutet aber: Aneignung und Verlust dessen, daß er und wie er der Ereignete (in das Seyn Entrückte) ist, inständlich vollziehen müssen. *Eigentlich*, des Wesens eigens Eigentümer, sein und diese Eigentlichkeit je nach der Ab-gründigkeit der Ereignung inständlich bestehen und nicht bestehen, das macht das Wesen der Selbstheit aus. Weder vom 'Subjekt' noch gar vom 'Ich' oder der 'Persönlichkeit' kann die Selbstheit begriffen werden, sondern nur das Inständnis in der wächter-schaftlichen Zugehörigkeit zum Seyn, d. h. aber aus dem Zu-wurf der Notschaft der Götter. Selbstheit ist die Entfaltung der Eigentumschaft des Wesens. Daß der Mensch sein Wesen zum Eigentum hat, sagt: es steht in der steten Gefahr des Verlustes. Und dieses ist der Widerklang der Ereignung, die Überantwortung an das Seyn." (GA 65, p. 488,89.)

through and through not human, i.e., not determinable and not sustainable by *animal rationale* and even less by the *subjectum*. The domain is not at all a being but rather belongs to the essential swaying of be-ing.⁵²⁹

We can speak of the essence as the essence of man in terms of man's grounding his essence and to be ownedness in Da-sein. Since the latter is grounding of truth of beyng, man is held within the clearing of beyng. This is the surrender of man to beyng in the sense that man is determined within a call to belongingness to beyng. This domain is not human because it already puts into question human being as a being. This domain is the domain of decidedness as the surrender of man to beyng which takes places due to the fact that on the one hand, man is a being, on the other hand, he is the owner of to be ownedness of the essence. Here it may be helpful to remember our discussion of the work of art. In an art work, truth is placed into a being in such a way that we have *das seiende Sein* whereby we say that a being is. However, for man, we cannot say the same, "because with Da-sein as measure, man is grasped as that being which, while being, can lose what is his ownmost and thus is always most uncertainly and most daringly certain of himself – but this on the basis of being surrendered to the guardianship of be-ing".⁵³⁰ Man refers to be on the way of loss while being (*seiend*) his essence. As a being, he holds to his essence by letting the essence as 'to be owned' and guards it against nothing and this means that as a being, he carries with himself the impossibility of being the being *who* he is. Its essence does not belong to him in the same manner that the essence arises unto any other being because in the case of man, to be ownedness of essence, essence in its turning, which is essence as such, is at stake and guarded. In other words, man is the only being which rejects to be named by essence, but called essentially in such a way that he belongs to this calling as what is his ownmost. Thus, Heidegger tries to eliminate all humanizing of man in favor of the essence in its coming to be owned so that man could be transformed into what is his ownmost or better said, he keeps *coming to him-self* through the transforming of the essence into its own as being owned. Thus, "on the basis of Da-sein, man is primarily transformed into that being to which the relation to be-ing allots what is deciding, which immediately indicates

⁵²⁹ Ibid., p. 345.

⁵³⁰ Ibid. "Daseinsmäßig begriffen ist der Mensch jenes Seiende, das seiend seines Wesens verlustig gehen kann und somit am unsichersten und gewagtesten je seiner selbst gewiß ist, dieses aber auf Grund der Überantwortung an die Wächterschaft des Seyns". (GA 65, p. 490.)

that the talk of a relation to be-ing expresses what is actually to be thought into its opposite. For the relation to be-ing is in truth be-ing, which as enowning shifts man into its relation”.⁵³¹ To think man as a being is to think immediately the relation to beyng because as a being, man’s being the being who he is already means the turning in beyng/essence in such a way that man as a being points to this turning in the possibility to leave his very selfhood in question. And for Heidegger, this refers to ownhood where man has his *essence* while losing *his* essence. Man can never be the object of an inquiry because man means always ‘beyond man’. It is no longer the access to the excess, but excessing of the excess as the relation to beyng. The latter allots what is deciding to that being, to man, but in such allotting and granting, what is supposed to be discussed, namely, man is immediately transformed into the relation as *his* relation and therefore names the essential as what is to be thought. What is deciding is the concealing of the essence when it is unconcealed and this is the truth of beyng which owns man as a being in such a way that “man now becomes *even more* essential for be-ing while at the same time esteemed as unimportant in the perspective of a ‘being’”.⁵³²

Thus, it is not sufficient to say that man is a being which understands being. Rather, man is a being (*Seiende*), being (*seiend*) *more* essential. Essence of or what is ownmost to man lies in that being ‘more’ of essencing (*Wesung*). As being (*seiend*), man is already surrendered to beyng as a being, which means that man’s being a being is unimportant because man has already returned to himself by returning to a being through which truth of beyng has already begun. Man has the essence as *his* essence only if essence is lost as his *essence*, only if his situation as a being is kept question-worthy or ‘strange’ within the truth of being. In this way, man is elevated into Da-sein, into the space of decision for the essence. In other words, essence is *man’s* essence due to the fact that man is transformed into a space of decision for the essence as such in a way what is at issue is nothing but to be decidedness or to be ownedness. Truth or essence turns into its self, that is, grounds its self-grounding as

⁵³¹ Ibid., p. 345. “Auf dem Grunde des Da-seins verwandelt sich der Mensch erst in jenes Wesen, dem der Bezug zum Seyn das Entscheidende zuweist, was sogleich andeutet, daß die Rede von einem Bezug zum Seyn das eigentlich zu Denkende in sein Gegenteil ausdrückt. Denn der Bezug zum Seyn ist in Wahrheit das Seyn, das als Ereignis den Menschen in seinen Bezug rückt.” (GA 65, p. 490.)

⁵³² Ibid.

itself as not-granting in Da-sein, while still granting in a being which is man because only man has already been overcome immediately as a being once there is a difference between being and beings and now only man can sacrifice himself for a decision of being or non-being, that is, for the decision of truth of being. Being is not only the being of beings, but also there is being in its essential sway because there is a being (man) who is overcome and sacrificed once the moment of decision calls through the difference. And this moment of decision is granted if being is needed by gods, if there is the distress of the lack of distress on whose ab-ground man is thrown into truth by returning to beings and to himself and owned by essence as a being, that is, left stranger. Thus, “man as the *stranger* in the executed free-throw, who no longer returns from the ab-ground and who in this foreign land *keeps* the remote neighboring to be-ing”.⁵³³ Man is the stranger because no other being is owned by being: man is owned in such a way that to be decidedness of the essence is preserved in its decidability, in its ownhood. There is no such time that man once has had a definite nature and then lost it and there is no possibility that man gives up the ab-ground in order to substantialize a ground. Rather, the essence of man is the unfolding of to be ownness of the essence as loss and appropriation at the same time. It is a loss because man is owned as a being in his strangeness and it is appropriation because ownhood turns into a decision through this strangeness of man. Heidegger does not speak here of the nature of man, but of “a totally other essential history of man, one that is never graspable in terms of metaphysics and thus also not in terms of ‘anthropology’”.⁵³⁴ Inception in its inceptuality and *Geschichte* being unfolded as to be unfolded is the essence of man. To repeat once more, man is not a being upon which any essential inquiry is directed. Rather, man as a being is so ordinary that he is thrown into the truth of the depth. There is such a free-throw into the depths through which man remains the stranger (*Fremde*), and in this foreign land, remoteness and nearness are kept together. It is not man *who* is *eigentlich* or *uneigentlich*, rather what is at stake is ownhood, mastery of ‘owning’, that is, nearness in its remoteness which comes from and goes through the ownmost (*Wesen*).

⁵³³ Ibid., p. 346. “Der Mensch als der im ausgetragenen Loswurf *Fremde*, der aus dem Ab-grund nicht mehr zurückkehrt und in dieser Fremde die ferne Nachbarschaft zum Seyn *behält*.” (GA 65, p. 492.)

⁵³⁴ Ibid., p. 345.

This is why the question ‘who is man?’ should be overcome. Heidegger writes: “for the one who has grasped the history of man as history of *what is ownmost* to man, the question of who man is can only mean the necessity of inquiring man out of his hitherto metaphysical sphere of dwelling and inquiringly referring him into another way of being and thus overcoming this very question”.⁵³⁵ Overcoming the question ‘who is man?’ means overcoming man in its metaphysical sense by letting him be transformed into historical man, by putting his *essence* into question and letting essence come to *him* as the preservation of essentiality of the essence itself which is un-concealment, *ab*-grounding or truth of beyng. It should be seen that this is also how man is the only being which is preserved by the truth of beyng, not as any other being, but as a being which is the stranger, a being for which everything becomes questionable and remains so.

The fact that man is left as *the stranger* in the land of *ab*-ground can be seen through the fact that whose question ‘who is man?’ is also left aside. For Heidegger, besides the guiding question of metaphysics, ‘What is a being?’ and the grounding question of the other beginning ‘how does beyng hold sway?’, there is no longer the question ‘who is man?’. In other words, both beings and beyng has their questions, but man just questions, or as we shall see, he thinks. To understand man with a question, for Heidegger, means that we understand man as a being among other beings by claiming that man is different from other beings because he understands being. This involves an estimation both on behalf of being and man. However, the truth of beyng is neither a matter of estimation nor value as Nietzsche thinks it. What happens historically (*geschichtlich*) is neither the over-estimation of man nor the under-estimation of being or the reverse. Man is not just a being among other beings, not because he is superior, but because his being (*seiend*) the being *who* he is is already sent to enowning, that is, overcome and thus preserved by being elevated into the mastery of owning once beings and being are first distinguished. In that sense, *Ereignis* is the origin of ontological difference. Man is owned by the truth of beyng; he is not a being whose being is in question because as a being, he does not just preserve the truth of being, but he is the guardian of being as long as he is the only being who has returned, that is, thrown and in this throw, as he has returned from his

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

ownmost *as a being*, as each being, he is already transformed into the relation to being which is concealed. But different from other beings, he is not the place where truth places and shelters itself, but rather, he is the inhabiting itself through which being holds to and guarded against nothing. Thus, man does not come after or before, he is owned by the inceptuality of the inception where unconcealment conceals. It should be remarked that this owning of man owns itself as remaining always to be owned without being accomplished in this ownhood due to the concealing of unconcealment. Since there is no end, but just the inceptuality of the inception, namely, un-concealment as such, man is the sending of that history of the *Wesen*. In other words, man's belonging to that happening is his destiny. We cannot determine or define the essence of man in a metaphysical way as long as man is already destined to own the essence as his. Also, all humanism is rejected by Heidegger because as it is set forth in *Letter on Humanism*, all humanism is metaphysical. Humanism determines the essence of man on the basis of an interpretation of being of beings without asking for the truth of being: "metaphysics closes itself to the simple essential fact that the human being essentially occurs in his essence only where he is claimed by being. Only from that claim, 'has' he found that wherein his essence dwells".⁵³⁶ Heidegger refers to this dwelling as ek-sistence in order to appropriate *Being and Time* and in order to remove the misunderstandings of the phrase: "the 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence". He puts the word essence into quotation marks because here the essence that Heidegger speaks of is not *essentia* in its traditional sense which is considered in its distinction to *existentia*. We have already seen how Heidegger deconstructs these two terms within the project of productive metaphysics. Accordingly, the essence is the essence in its essencing (*Wesung*) whereby *Da* of being is cleared, which means that being throws or sends; it throws and sends human being into *the claim (Anspruch)*, that is, into *Wesen*. This throw of being (*Wurf des Seins*) in its clearing is *Da-sein* and it is not created by human being but sustained by him. In that way, the thrown projection designated in *Being and Time* gains its original sense because now we can more originarily see that

⁵³⁶ Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism' in *Pathmarks*, p. 247. "Die Metaphysik verschließt sich dem einfachen Wesensbestand, das der Mensch nur in seinem Wesen west, indem er vom Sein angesprochen wird. Nur aus diesem Anspruch 'hat' er das gefunden, worin sein Wesen wohnt." (GA 9, p. 323.)

“what throws in such projection is not the human being but being itself, which sends human being into the ek-sistence of Da-sein that is his essence. This destiny appropriates as the clearing of being – which it is. The clearing grants nearness to being”.⁵³⁷ The nearness to being (*die Nähe zum Sein*) is *Ereignis* where the being of essence, being of being-claimed sends being-there as the essence of human being. Thus, it would be wrong to say that human being has an essence; rather, essence or being has human being. This becomes understandable when we remember that for Heidegger, essence is always a counter relation, a turning within, thereby a need originates as compelling. In such a relatedness which ec-stases, in Da-sein, human being stands. Human being is the name of this standing or insistence even and especially in his failing to recognize the nearest in such a way that in this remoteness, truth of being happens as the nearness itself, as mystery.

This nearness to being refers to the clearing of self-sheltering concealing in such a way that being’s concealing is sheltered in the manner of clearing. Its essence always remains hidden and concealed, in its unconcealment. Thus, if being or nearness means *un*-concealment, it requires the open region or the ‘in the midst of’ through which beings are unconcealed. It is this openness itself through which being is always understood as being of beings, which makes its essence be concealed. Thus, even this concealing of the concealment also belongs to being whose essence always compels as a need in the form of a turning from within the essentiality of the essence. As long as this mystery or nearness happens as ‘in the midst of’ or Da-sein whereby beings are taken into hand, happening of being is the history (*Geschichte*) of metaphysics. Then, it is not surprising that for Heidegger, history of metaphysics is the nihilism proper where there is *nothing* to Being. In the history of metaphysics, in nihilism, being or unconcealment has never been put into question not because being was overlooked, but because the decision was already made in such a way that what is interrogated was always beings. And it is obvious that metaphysics does not grasp the essence of being by its own terms and therefore being remains unthought. Heidegger, in his work *Nihilism as determined by the History of Being*, tries to understand the essence of metaphysics or nihilism through which being is preserved in its self-withdrawal. Accordingly, metaphysics cannot think being itself “precisely

⁵³⁷ Ibid., p. 257.

because in the most proper sense of metaphysical question Being is thought as the being in its Being. Inasmuch as metaphysics thinks the being on the basis of Being, it does not think Being as *Being*".⁵³⁸ Even Nietzsche, in his critique as the reversal of Platonism, with all other philosophers before him takes up being as the condition for beings. For metaphysics, being is always the a priori, a self-evident fact, not questioned. Metaphysics does not think being itself and this omission of the self-concealing of being means that metaphysics always deals with beings as such in their unconcealment without thinking this 'as such' itself, the happening of the unconcealment itself. Being in its refusal is not a priori because remaining-unthought of being is un-concealment as such. Thus, we should say that the happening of unconcealment withdraws when it happens.

Being stays away and this default (*Ausbleiben*) of being remains unthought in metaphysics. Indeed, for Heidegger, being is itself this default. He writes that "*the essence of nihilism proper is Being itself in default of its unconcealment, which is as its own 'It,' and which determines its 'is' in staying away*".⁵³⁹ Being is (*Es gibt Sein*) as remaining unthought. This means that thinking is not something over against being, "on the contrary, thinking belongs to Being itself, insofar as thinking, true to its essence, maintains access to something that never comes to Being as such from just anywhere, but approaches *from* Being itself, indeed as It itself, and 'is' Being itself *withal*. What is that?".⁵⁴⁰ First, we should see that staying away of being does not mean that being stands somewhere as isolated. Rather, since in this staying away of unconcealment as such, concealment stays, there is a relation (*Bezug*). Heidegger describes this relation as the relation to a place (*Ort*) which is a shelter (*Bleibe*) or an abode (*Unterkunft*). Thus, there is a sheltering (*Bleiben*) of the concealing and the

⁵³⁸ Martin Heidegger, 'Nihilism as determined by the History of Being' in *Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism*, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, Harper&Row, Publishers, Inc. 1982. p. 207.

⁵³⁹ Ibid., p. 216. "*Das Wesen des eigentlichen Nihilismus ist das Sein selber im Ausbleiben seiner Unverborgenheit, die als die seine Es selber ist und im Ausbleiben sein »ist« bestimmt.*" (*Nietzsche*, GA 6.2, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997. p. 356.)

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 217. "*Dagegen gehört das Denken zum Sein selbst, insofern das Denken aus seinem Wesen in das eingelassen bleibt, was zum Sein als solchem nie erst irgendwoher noch hinzu-, sondern aus dem Sein selbst und zwar als Es selber herkommt und das Sein selbst mit »ist«.* Was ist dies?" (GA 6.2, p. 356.)

staying away (*Ausbleiben*) of unconcealment in an abode. “But the staying away of unconcealment as such and the staying of concealment do not subsequently search about for an abode; rather, the abode occurs essentially with them as the advent that Being itself is. The advent is in itself the advent of their abode. The locale of the place of Being is Being itself.”⁵⁴¹ Abode is the advent of being as itself in such a way that shelter becomes ‘there’; Da-sein. Locale of the advent of being is the abode of the default of being. This locale is the essence of man because man is already comported to beings in the sense that he is as he is through the essence’s giving itself in being’s relation to him which takes place through his comportment to beings whereby being stays away by staying there. In other words, being is already committed to the unconcealment and saves itself by refusing itself. The place as the ‘there’ belongs to being itself thereby Da-sein is the essence of being and

‘The *Dasein* in man’ is the essence that belongs to Being itself. Man belongs to that essence in such a way that he has to be such Being. Da-sein applies to man. As his essence, it is in each case his, what he belongs to, but not what he himself makes and controls as his artifact. Man becomes essential by expressly entering into his essence.⁵⁴²

Essence essences as it is the essence of man who grounds himself in Da-sein. Thus, man essentially occurs in the relationship of being itself to him insofar as man stands in the unconcealment of beings in such a way that concealment is preserved. Man does not have essence beforehand, but rather, there is an entering into essence, or being more essential which happens through the advent of being itself into its abode. This clearing of self-concealing is the essence of being and the essence applies to man, that is, it requires man. This is the need in the sense of *Brauchen* through which the essence of human being is placed under a need, on the side of the essence, to be belonged, a need that arises from its essentiality. In other words, the fact that essence compels as the need to be belonged to or to be claimed is the needfulness of the essence for its truth. We have already discussed the need in the sense of compelling. Now Heidegger refers to the compelling of the need in its twofold sense:

⁵⁴¹ Ibid. “Aber das Ausbleiben von Unverborgenheit und das Bleiben von Verborgenheit sehen sich nicht erst nachträglich nach einer Unterkunft um, sondern diese west mit ihnen als die Ankunft, als welche das Sein selbst ist. Diese Ankunft ist in sich die Ankunft ihrer Unterkunft. Die Ortschaft des Ortes des Seins als solchen ist das Sein selber.” (GA 6.2, p. 357.)

⁵⁴² Ibid., p. 218.

*Being is compelling in a twofold, harmonious sense: it is unrelenting and needful in relating to an abode that essentially occurs as the essence to which man belongs, man being the one who is needed. What is doubly compelling is, and is called, the need. In the advent of the default of its unconcealment, Being itself is need.*⁵⁴³

Heidegger thus gives us the original sense of the need in its compelling. First, it is compelling as unrelenting (*Unablässige*), that is, being never relents from the unconcealment of the beings as such. However, in this unconcealment, it always stays away. And as we have seen, this self-concealing clearing is a relation in the sense that “in it Being itself lets its abode come to it, that is, draws it forth”.⁵⁴⁴ Being never abandons its place and in this relentlessness, it is compelling as requiring human being. Thus, being does not only let its abode come to it, because if this happens as a relentlessness of unconcealment, this means that being holds sway *there* (*Sein west*) as its provenance and therefore it requires (*brauchen*) its abode where essence essences (*Wesen west*). In this requiring, it claims for its abode to which human being belongs as the one needed (*Gebrauchte*). This is the advent of being to itself as the utmost need. We should notice that Heidegger’s aim does not consist in just showing that being compels in such a way that it requires its abode as its own. Rather, “the relentlessness of its usage extends so far in the default of its unconcealment that the abode of Being – that is, the essence of man – is omitted; man is threatened with the annihilation of his essence, and Being itself is endangered in its usage of its abode”.⁵⁴⁵ Unrelenting usage (*Brauchen*) of the abode, that is, compelling in its double sense, goes to extreme in such a way that being *itself* is in danger, though still in its requiring and claiming for an abode. This is the need as needlessness of the need whereby the essence of human being comes across the threat of annihilation.

It is remarkable to see that Heidegger discusses the essence of being as the history of its withdrawal. Being stays away by staying in the unconcealment, which is appropriated by metaphysics as the unconcealment of beings. In other words,

⁵⁴³ Ibid., p. 244. “Das Sein ist in dem zwiefach einigen Sinne nötigend: es ist das Un-ab-lässige und das Brauchende im Bezug der Unterkunft, als welche das Wesen west, dem der Mensch als der Gebrauchte gehört. Das zwiefach Nötigende ist und heißt die Not. In der Ankunft des Ausbleibens seiner Unverborgenheit ist das Sein selbst die Not.” (GA 6.2, p. 391.)

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 245.

metaphysics never thinks being itself in its default, and this omission belongs to the essence of being insofar as it shows itself as the unconcealment of beings. Being is unrelenting in the sense that it keeps to itself as the unconcealment of beings. In that way, being withdraws unto the utmost and for Heidegger, this utmost is being itself, as the advent into an abode which is the essence of human being. As the advent of un-concealment, being always needs unconcealment in order to be preserved in its staying away. It requires an abode of unconcealment and since this unconcealment is provided through human being's comportment to beings, advent of being requires or claims human being. As it can be seen, this is not a secure ground, because being does not merely require an abode as the essence of human being for its truth; it requires that 'essence' in such a way that the essence always remains in concealment. Thus, "to think to encounter the extreme need of Being suggests that we broach the extreme threat to man; that is, the danger that threatens to annihilate his *essence*. It means thinking what is dangerous".⁵⁴⁶ It is worth noting that Heidegger writes 'his *essence*' not '*his* essence'. Here what is in question is the fact that from the point of metaphysics, it is needless to think (being) but with the remark that this needlessness of the need of being is the utmost essence of man. He says, "yet neglecting to think about the omission of the need of Being itself, an omission that takes place as metaphysics, is blindness in the face of needlessness as the essential need of man".⁵⁴⁷ What is dangerous is to elevate this need of being into its extremity until being as unconcealment provides within itself un-thought as what is to be thought, as the need of needlessness.

This is being's calling thinking in its unthoughtness. Accordingly, overcoming (*Überwindung*) of nihilism or metaphysics does not mean that human being puts that history against himself in order to assail the default of being. This is not possible because the essence of human being itself is claimed by being in its default or withdrawal.

Instead of such overcoming, only one thing is necessary, namely, that thinking, encouraged by Being itself, simply think to encounter Being in its default as such. Such thinking to encounter rests primarily on the recognition *that Being itself withdraws, but that as this*

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 246.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

*withdrawal Being is precisely the relationship that claims the essence of man, as the abode of its (Being's) advent. The unconcealment of the being as such is bestowed along with that abode.*⁵⁴⁸

Heidegger rejects suggesting a formula for overcoming of metaphysics since all formulation would be metaphysical and therefore suffers from omission; rather, he speaks of thinking to encounter (*Entgegendenken*) which is provided by Being in its self-concealing clearing. Thinking to encounter does not mean that human being gains control over the default of being; it does not refer to a progression of thinking. Rather, “thinking stays behind by first taking the decisive *step back*, back from the omission – but back to where? Where else than to the realm that for a long time has been granted to thinking by Being itself – granted, to be sure, in the veiled figure of the *essence* of man”.⁵⁴⁹ Thinking is granted (*gelassen*) insofar as being is the unconcealment of beings as such saving itself by withdrawing and this happens as man’s entering into this abode. In that sense, being is the promise (*Versprechen*) of itself. Being stays away and keeps itself as the promise in the history of nihilism or metaphysics which is the destiny of being. Then, through the overcoming of metaphysics in the sense of thinking to encounter, in the step back, being in its self-withdrawal arrives, as an advent in such a way that “thinking no longer omits Being, but admits it: it admits it *into* the originary, revealing unconcealment of Being, which is Being itself”.⁵⁵⁰ This return, as we have already mentioned, is a return to the Same, but not to a trivial identity, because in this self-giving of being, being gives ‘to be self’ as itself. In other words, “Being is that which of its essence gives only that essence to be thought. It, Being, *gives food for thought*, and indeed not just sometimes or in a particular respect, but always and from every point of view, because essentially the fact that It, Being, hands thinking over to its essence – this is

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 225. “Statt dessen ist nur Eines nötig, daß erst das Denken, vom Sein selbst angemutet, dem Sein in dessen Ausbleiben als solchen entgegen denkt. Solches Entgegendenken beruht zunächst in der Anerkennung: *Das Sein selbst entzieht sich, aber als dieser Entzug ist das Sein gerade der Bezug, der das Wesen des Menschen als die Unterkunft seiner (des Seins) Ankunft beansprucht.* Mit dieser Unterkunft begibt sich schon die Unverborgenheit des Seienden als solchen.” (GA 6.2, p. 368.)

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid. “Das Denken bleibt zurück, indem es zuvor erst den entscheidenden *Schritt zurück* vollzieht – zurück aus dem Auslassen und wohin? Wohin anders als in den Bereich, der vom Sein selbst schon längst dem Denken gelassen ist, gelassen in der allerdings verhüllten Gestalt des *Wesens* des Menschen.” (GA 6.2, p. 368.)

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 227.

a mark of Being itself. Being itself is the enigma”.⁵⁵¹ What is to be thought is the enigma (*das Rätsel*); it does not arise particularly, but calls for the whole and it is given by being which “is also the unique matter which of itself and for itself raises the claim of being what is to be thought; it ‘is’ as this very claim”.⁵⁵² Being is the very claim of being given to be thought. Thus, what is at issue, as Heidegger sets forth in the *Letter on Humanism*, is to understand how thinking is enabled to be (*Denken zu sein*). Rather than just saying that being makes possible thinking, Heidegger’s aim is to show that there is an enabling (*Vermögen*) which embraces thinking in its essence. When something enables something by embracing it, for Heidegger, this refers to loving or favoring. In that sense, being, as enabling-favoring, is the possible (*das Mögliche*) and keeps thinking possible, not as a possibility against actuality in the traditional sense, but rather in the sense that “to enable something here means to preserve it in its essence, to maintain it in its element”.⁵⁵³

Thus, thinking belongs to the essence of being as it is essential thinking, as a thinking promoted by the unthought in such a way that it preserves itself in the *un*-thought. Thinking is enabled as this thinking of unthought insofar as essence of being lies in the unconcealment in its withdrawal, as an advent which claims man. The relation thinking-man-being can be summarized by the following words:

From the abode of its advent – It being this abode – Being itself applies to man along with his essence. As the one approached by Being, man is the one who thinks. The ‘whether it be this, whether it be that’, in which the essential possibility of being one way or other is revealed for thinking, stands in a *certain* way in *man’s* thinking; but it rests on Being itself, which can itself withdraw as such and *does withdraw* by *showing* itself in beings as such. But because it concerns the essence of man, even that possibility of thinking is in some sense founded on his essence, which as the locale of Being in turn rests on Being itself.⁵⁵⁴

Here we can notice another circularity between man and being. Thinking is supposed to be the immediacy between man and being in the sense that man and thinking belongs to each other insofar as they meet in the essentiality of the essence or in the

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., p. 228.

⁵⁵² Ibid.

⁵⁵³ Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ in *Pathmarks*, p. 242.

⁵⁵⁴ Heidegger, ‘Nihilism as determined by the History of Being’ in *Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism*, p. 218.

Same. In other words, man is understood as the one who thinks insofar as thinking is the thinking from out of essence so that essence belongs to man as man's entering into the abode of essence. However, it could be seen that Heidegger hesitates to surrender this thinking to man because man is placed into the abode insofar as the latter is already the advent of being. Thus, everything is understood on the basis of being's showing itself in beings, in its unconcealment because only in such an unconcealment whereby metaphysics begins, concealment is preserved in an abode. This is why "what happens is the history of Being, Being as the history of default."⁵⁵⁵ Thinking to encounter is to think the default of being as history of nihilism so that unconcealment as such is now put into question. This provides us with experiencing the essence of metaphysics in such a way that "the provenance of metaphysics in the history of Being remains what is to be thought. In this way the essence of metaphysics is preserved as the secret of the history of Being".⁵⁵⁶ The origin is let come into thinking in its utmost concealment. It is not a matter of grasping essence as such, but preserving the unthought as what is to be thought, essentially. And this happens essentially insofar as "thinking in terms of the history of Being lets Being arrive in the essential space of man".⁵⁵⁷ Thinking to encounter happens essentially if being needs unconcealment as itself, that is, it needs an abode where it both clears and withdraws as its very claim, a claim for man. For Heidegger, in this way, man is liberated into his essence.

As we have seen, in *Contributions to Philosophy*, man's relation to being was understood on the basis of man's belongingness to being. The latter is based on the truth of beyng which originates as the 'between' of man and gods which is enabled by their strife so that the very belongingness to beyng is grounded through the groundless grounding of Da-sein. This is *Ereignis*; letting the to be ownedness be owned as the ownmost in such a way that selfhood is the ownhoodship of the ownmost. Heidegger's aim is to understand this happening in more immediate terms and now he suggests that being requires (*braucht*) man. In this way, he understands

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 243.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 244.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 243.

the distress/need of the lack of distress or needlessness through which ownhood is made questionable, not in terms of the grounding of truth of being in Da-sein, but through the historicity of being because only in this way, truth as the unconcealment of being is put into question directly, and only in this way we can see that un-concealment itself refers to *Ereignis* in such a way that we are closer to the concealing of the concealment because only if concealment in its concealing endures in the unconcealment, man is required *and* there is a need (*Not*) that keeps compelling in a needlessness; thus there is *Ereignis*. In other words, historicity of being provides us with how to understand man as required by being because there is the claim of being, as its abode, only through its withdrawal that happens historically, as metaphysics. Thus, metaphysics is not a doctrine or the product of the individual thinkers. It is the happening (*Geschichte*) of the truth of being. Then,

What happens in the history of Being? We cannot ask in this manner, because there would then be an occurrence and something which occurs. But occurrence itself is the sole happening. Being alone is. What happens? Nothing happens if we are searching for something occurring in the occurrence. Nothing happens, Appropriation appropriates. Perdurating the opening out, the origin takes the parting to itself. The appropriating origin is dignity as truth itself reaching into its departure. Dignity is what is noble which appropriates without needing effects. The noble of the worthy Appropriating of the origin is the unique release as Appropriation of freedom, which is unconcealment of concealment—because it belongs to the ground-less.⁵⁵⁸

Beginning (*Anfang*) begins as metaphysics, as differing as such into being and beings. This is how it takes the parting to itself (*Abschied nehmen an sich*). This happens once there is unconcealment of beings but we should remark that Heidegger writes Ent-bergung, disclosure, instead of Unverborgenheit because what happens is not just unconcealment but unconcealment of concealment (*Verbergung*). In other words, there is dis-closure, a bringing forth into the unconcealed from out of the concealed in such a way that disclosure is preserved. This is why the phrase ‘*Ereignis ereignet*’ is not a tautology because here there is no possibility of identity, but rather,

⁵⁵⁸ Martin Heidegger, ‘Recollection in Metaphysics’ in *The End of Philosophy*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, New York, Harper & Row, 1973. p. 79. “Was geschieht in der Geschichte des Seins? Wir können so nicht fragen, weil dann ein Geschehen wäre und ein Geschehendes. Aber das Geschehen selbst ist das einzige Geschehnis. Das Sein allein ist. Was geschieht? Nichts geschieht, wenn wir nach einem Geschehenden im Geschehen fahnden. Nichts geschieht, *das Ereignis er-eignet*. Der Anfang nimmt - austragend die Lichtung - den Abschied an sich. Der ereignende Anfang ist die Würde als die in ihren Abschied ragende Wahrheit selbst. Die Würde ist das Edle, das ereignet, ohne des Wirkens zu bedürfen. Das Edle des würdigen Ereignisses des Anfangs ist die einzige Befreiung als Er-eynis der Freiheit, die Ent-bergung ist der Verbergung -und dies, weil das Eigentum des Ab-grundes.” (GA 6.2, p. 485.)

a differing which differs as the beginning begins. Therefore, what is at stake is the *Eigentum des Ab-grundes*, that is, ownhood is not just a matter of correspondence, but the happening of the ground in its grounding while staying away. Thus, metaphysics is not a fact, but the happening of this truth which is already a turning or returning. In that sense, “metaphysics is the history of Being as the progression out of the Origin. This progression allows the return to become a need, and allows recollection in the Origin to become a needful necessity”.⁵⁵⁹ Metaphysics is the Fortgang out of the Anfang. It is going away out of the beginning but in the sense that this going away as the staying away of being returns into the origin because origin or beginning just begins, not leads, in such a way that truth also takes its departure, not resulted. Thus, while human being returns to beings and to himself whereby ontological difference begins, he has already returned to the beginning. In this way, the return becomes a need which compels. Better said, need is only a need when it compels in needfulness because return is not directed to a firm ground, but to a foreign land, to the ab-ground as the beginning which takes the parting to itself. However, since this foreign land is the beginning in its beginning which allows what happens (*Geschehen*) to happen as what is to happen (*Geschehnis*, event), human being is already in the land of *Eigentum* which belongs to the ab-ground.

Beginning begins as the going away of metaphysics out of the beginning in such a way that beginning takes the parting to itself and therefore begins and also truth takes its departure, that is, it comes into scene because truth originates from this concealed occurrence that distinguishes beings from being. Thus, at the beginning, truth is the truth of being of beings; it consists in the fact that beings are. From then on, precedence of beings is not questioned and the most essential question is taken to be the question ‘what are beings?’. In this way, metaphysics goes away out of being or beginning, to beingness which consists in the *whatness* of beings. For Heidegger, this truth of beings does not relinquish the beginning insofar as it rests on the difference between being and beings. However, metaphysics never grounds the origin of this distinction; it never sees that there is already a returning to the origin in

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid. “Die Metaphysik aber ist Geschichte des Seins als der Fortgang aus dem Anfang, welcher Fortgang die Rückkehr einstmals zur Not und die Erinnerung in den Anfang zur notvollen Notwendigkeit werden läßt.” (GA 6. 2, p. 486.)

such a way that essence already belongs to being. Metaphysics does not question the essence of truth because that metaphysics begins means that beginning begins in truth, that is, Being is. In other words, openness where beings are unconcealed in such a way that their being is distinguished and becomes a theme already belongs to being or essence (*Wesen*). It is not just that metaphysics conceals its essence because being is distinguished from beings, but rather, origin of this difference also involves concealment and owes to unsayable. Thus, “the distinction is primarily rather the presencing of Being itself whose origination is Appropriation”.⁵⁶⁰ Being is inceptually *das Wesende* in the sense that its *beginning*, its inception is *Er-eignis*. Being happens as an appropriation which is a giving or granting by staying away as the beginning of truth which *in turn* belongs to being. Indeed, this shows us that at the beginning, even being itself is overcome (*verwunden*) in its essence. In *Overcoming Metaphysics*, Heidegger writes: “this essence is the Appropriating in which Being itself is overcome”.⁵⁶¹ This does not mean that being is left behind, but as ‘*verwunden*’, being is granting what is to own by sending what is to be owned. This owning always returns to itself as its self as *Ereignis* not because there is a substantiality behind it, but because truth is non-truth, essence is non-essence. Thus, being is always the being of truth and since truth is the sign of the enigma of being as the history of metaphysics, being is already consigned to where it already belongs in its staying away. Accordingly, we should see that:

The history of Being is neither the history of man and of humanity, nor the history of the human relation to beings and to Being. The history of Being is Being itself and only Being. However, since Being claims human being for grounding its truth in beings, man is drawn into the history of Being, but always only with regard to the manner in which he takes his essence from the relation of Being to himself and, in accordance with this relation, loses his essence, neglects it, gives it up, grounds it and squanders it.⁵⁶²

Man signifies the venturing the essence and this venturing is the grounding of the truth of being which is engrounded as that essence is man’s essence. Man can lose,

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 82. “sondern die Unterscheidung ist anfänglich das Wesende des Seins selbst, dessen Anfängnis das Er-eignis ist.” (GA 6. 2, p. 489.)

⁵⁶¹ Martin Heidegger, ‘Overcoming Metaphysics’ in *The End of Philosophy*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, New York, Harper & Row, 1973. p. 85. “Es ist das Er-eignis, in dem das Sein selbst verwunden wird.” (*Vorträge und Aufsätze*, GA 7, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000. p. 69.)

⁵⁶² Heidegger, ‘Recollection in Metaphysics’ in *The End of Philosophy*, p. 82.

neglect or ground his essence and all of these make man be overcome and as overcome, man is transferred into his essence. On the other hand, being is both cleared and concealed at the same time, that is, essence/being also can be grounded or squandered, with the difference that this is fate of being. And the fate of being is being itself; it is not determined by human relation to being. What is at stake is not human relation to beings or to being, but being's relation to human being, its claim for an abode in such a way that it is cleared by withdrawing. In this clearing-withdrawal, being is always overcome, in the sense that this space is of returning and as a returning which never finds a firm ground, it just claims. This claim claims for man to make the fate of being his fate.

Thus, it is not plausible to ask whether the fate of being is also the fate of man because fate belongs to being as long as it is also man's fate and for Heidegger, this is not something which could be designated before but happens when it happens in the sense that "what is, is what takes place. What takes place has already taken place. That does not mean that it is past. What has already taken place is only what has gathered itself into the essence of Being, into the having-occurred-essentially [das Ge-wesen], from which and as which the advent of Being itself is—even in the form of the self-withdrawal that stays away."⁵⁶³ The abode of being as the essence of man is thus *Ge-wesen*, it is already gathered itself into the essence of being in such a way that being comes by staying away. Thus, 'what is' is neither a being determined with regard to its being nor man considered in its relation to being. Rather, the truth of 'what is' is changed in the sense that now, 'what is' itself is destined to reside in and hold to the question worthiness. Thus, Heidegger's aim is to preserve *what is* question worthy by letting 'what is' itself be put into question in such a way that this questioning always remains question worthy. All 'what is' is overcome and with this overcoming, truth is renewed from out of itself because it is already the truth of 'what is' in its need and claim. Thus, 'what is' conceals what is already gathered into essence. It conceals in such a way that even this concealing is concealed because it

⁵⁶³ Heidegger, 'Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being' in *Nietzsche, Volume 4*, p. 242. "Was ist, ist das, was geschieht. Was geschieht, ist schon geschehen. Das meint nicht, es sei vergangen. Was schon geschehen ist, ist allein jenes, was sich ins Wesen des Seins versammelt hat, das Ge-Wesen, aus dem und als welches die Ankunft des Seins selbst ist-und sei es auch in der Gestalt des ausbleibenden Sichentziehens." (GA 6.2, p. 388.)

conceals in the manner of unconcealment of beings, which is metaphysics. Then, what happens is the unconcealment of beings. This is why history of being is being itself; it is not determined by beings, which are already a ‘what’ which conceals, preventing thinking from concealing. It is also not determined by a being (man) in its relation to being, not because man is a ‘what’ but because taking up man as a ‘who’ renders other beings a ‘what’. But still the fate of being begins as the difference between beings and being, where man has already been drawn into play, which happens as *un-concealment*. Concealment conceals by claiming, or better said, for Heidegger, if we speak of concealment in its concealing, we just mean that there is a claiming, we mean this without assuming or predicting any answer to that claim. We let the claim claim. This claim in its claiming both indicates a needlessness from where it claims and a needfulness towards which it claims. Thus, the fate (*Verhängnis*) of being, which happens as metaphysics, is a kind of necessity. In other words, “this fate, which is to be thought in the manner of the history of Being, is, however, necessary, because Being itself can open out in its truth the difference of Being and beings preserved in itself only when the difference explicitly takes place.”⁵⁶⁴ Being preserves itself as the difference between being and beings, not by keeping itself as that according to which beings are, but as keeping to itself as to be questionable in each case. Now for Heidegger, the real question is that:

But how can it do this if beings have not first entered the most extreme oblivion of Being, and if at the same time Being has not taken over its unconditional dominance, metaphysically incomprehensible, as the will to will which asserts itself at first and uniquely through the sole precedence of beings (of what is objectively real) over Being?⁵⁶⁵

Heidegger names the happening that beings are unconcealed *and* being stays away *will to will* (*Wille zum Willen*) which is incomprehensible in terms of metaphysics. To say that metaphysics does not think will to will is to say that metaphysics does not ground the difference between being and beings. And we should know that for Heidegger, thinking does not consist in finding a ground for the difference, but in

⁵⁶⁴ Heidegger, ‘Overcoming Metaphysics’ in *The End of Philosophy*, p. 91.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid. “Wie aber kann er dies, wenn nicht das Seiende zuvor in die äußerste Seinsvergessenheit eingegangen ist und das Sein zugleich seine metaphysisch unkennbare unbedingte Herrschaft als der Wille zum Willen übernommen hat, der sich zunächst und einzig durch den alleinigen Vorrang des Seienden (des gegenständig Wirklichen) vor dem Sein zur Geltung bringt?” (GA 7, p. 76.)

letting the origin originate, that is, venturing the difference until there is the difference in its utmost.

In order to arrive that point, we should see that will to will belongs to the truth of being, that is, it neither belongs to subjectivity nor to any human capacity. Here it will be helpful to take into consideration Heidegger's distinction between subiectity or subjecticity (*Subiectit  t*) and subjectivity (*Subjectivit  t*). He makes this distinction in a clear way in his lecture entitled *Metaphysics as History of Being*. He writes:

*The name subiectity should emphasize the fact that Being is determined in terms of the subiectum, but not necessarily by an ego. Moreover, the term contains at the same time a reference to the hypokeimenon, and thus to the beginning of metaphysics. It also presages the progression of modern metaphysics which actually does claim egoness, above all the selfhood of the spirit, as an essential characteristic of true reality. If one understands by subjectivity the idea that the essence of reality is in truth—that is, for the self-certainty of self-consciousness—mens sive animus, ratio, reason, spirit, ‘subjectivity’ appears as a manner of subiectity.*⁵⁶⁶

In that lecture, Heidegger follows the traces of metaphysics. Metaphysics consists in giving precedence to beings, that is, to *idea*. For Heidegger, this refers back to the beginning that being announces itself as *aletheia* and *phusis*. As we know, those refer to beings' coming into unconcealment from out of concealment. Although this inceptual sense of being is preserved in Aristotle who considers being or presencing as work-being of the work, namely, *energeia*, with Plato, it was already subjected to the primacy of idea and therefore thought one-sidedly. This can be seen in terms of Aristotle's distinction between primary and secondary *ousia*, namely, *hoti estin* and *ti estin*. Accordingly, the primary *ousia* is a this or that, the singular, as the persisting, lasting or presencing of what lies present. The secondary *ousia* is the showing itself of the outward appearance, *eidos*. However, for Heidegger, both that-being and what-being belongs to presencing or to its primordial difference. He asks:

But doesn't a quite different, more far-reaching distinction underlie the difference of *hoti estin* and *ti estin*, namely that of what presences and presencing? In this case, the difference as such first named lies on one side of the distinction of beings and Being. The *hoti estin* and the *ti estin* name manners of presencing to the extent that what is present in them presences in the lasting of each thing or else remains hidden in the mere showing itself of outward appearance. The distinction between what something is and that it is comes from Being (presence) itself. For presencing has within itself the difference of pure nearness of lasting

⁵⁶⁶ Martin Heidegger, 'Metaphysics as History of Being' in *The End of Philosophy*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, New York, Harper & Row, 1973. p. 46-47.

and of levels of being in the origins of outward appearance. But how does presencing have this *difference within itself*?"⁵⁶⁷

If Aristotle is the first thinker who thinks being, this is so because he sees in presence a nearness which lies there and a hiddenness which just appears through that persistence. And for Heidegger, although Aristotle keeps *idea* in his thinking, he is more truly Greek than Plato because he considers *ousia* primarily as the singular, which means that he rejects to define the essence of being, but lets the essence come to itself where it originates, in a being, in such a way that *eidos* presences in the singular as hiddenness presences as the essence of presencing. What is crucial for Heidegger is that presencing of what presences is open to be divided into that-being and what-being due to the more primordial difference between what presences and presencing. Thus, the fact that being is understood in terms of that-being and what-being is not a failure but a necessity because if at the beginning, being means unconcealment of beings or *phusis*, this means that beings are looked at and the primacy of *eidos* is the emphasize on this looking at in such a way that there are beings (that-being) in the sense that they also look at us; they appear (*eidos*). This amounts to saying that once *eidos* gains precedence, that beings are are given precedence "whereby the 'is' and Being thought in that 'is' are simply taken for granted".⁵⁶⁸ In other words, the fact that being is understood in terms of a looking at beings in their showing themselves in outward appearance is what makes 'that beings are' so usual that 'is' is not questioned or thought in this 'that they are'. Thus, what-being and that-being confirms each other but the point that Heidegger wants to emphasize is that this co-belonging shows us that being is primarily understood as *energeia*, as a co-belonging of what being and that-being, whose origin is a more primordial difference which belongs to *phusis*, which prevails throughout metaphysics even though metaphysics does not think this primordial essence as such. After Greeks, *energeia* and co-working of what-being and that-being in it turns out to be *actualitas* and Heidegger describes this co-working as a manner of effecting and being-effected at the same time. *Eidos* becomes *idea*, as that which causes or makes possible and that-being becomes existence, as that which is produced or caused

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

through this production in the sense that “Being presences as effecting in the unified-manifold sense according to which what effects, but also what is effected and also what is the effected-effecting and the effective being, is what-is”.⁵⁶⁹ Work is no longer understood in terms of its workness but as a result of causal effectivity. Accordingly, *hypokeimenon* becomes *subiectum* in such a way that being is understood as self-effecting which is the ground of *re-praesentare*. As a consequence, self-producing of *subiectum* is understood in terms of *percipere* in such a way that *subiectum* becomes equivalent with ego or ‘subject’. *Percipere*, a self-effecting in effecting, belongs to *subiectum* or *ens actu*, as it becomes more visible in Leibniz’s monads. Re-presenting shows itself as striving (*appetitus*) for unification thereby self-containedness is preserved. Existence is the attraction of itself in such a way that essence becomes causality or effecting. Both thought together constitutes the understanding of being as *subiectum*. In other words, “beings in their Being are *exigent* with respect to themselves. ‘To exist’ means in itself: attraction and unifying capability which is an effecting”.⁵⁷⁰ Essence or possibility does not stand there in order to become actual. Rather, all *potentia* has an inclination (*vis*) due to its already driving (*conatus*). Thus, all beings *are* exigent for the way that they are by *forcing* its very essence into its self although the ‘is’ is not questioned. For Heidegger, this means that “ever since the developed beginning of modern metaphysics, Being is will, that is, *exigentia essentiae*”.⁵⁷¹ Being is self-effecting in an effecting, that is, will to will, in such a way that a being wills the way that it is whereby its very essence what it is is willed in and as this willing.

Accordingly, subjectivity relies on *subiectity* insofar as *subiectum* is understood in terms of self-willing which consists in *percipere* and *appetitus*. Then, we should see that

Everywhere, the being as such has brought itself into an unconcealment that lets it appear as what posits itself on itself and brings itself before itself. That is the fundamental trait of subjectivity. The being as subjectivity omits the truth of Being itself in a decisive way, insofar as subjectivity, out of its own desire for surety, posits the truth of beings as certitude. Subjectivity is not a human product: rather, man secures himself as the being who is in

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 18.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 43.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid., p. 47.

accord with beings as such, insofar as he wills himself as the I-and-we subject, represents himself to himself, and so presents himself to himself.⁵⁷²

Subiectity, namely, will to will is not a product of any human capacity. Rather, “man wills *himself* as the volunteer of the will to will, for which all truth becomes that error which it needs in order to be able to guarantee for itself the illusion that the will to will can will nothing other than empty nothingness, in the face of which it asserts itself without being able to know its own completed nullity”.⁵⁷³ Finding himself in the midst of beings which are unconcealed, man defines his essence as subjectivity in order that the withdrawal of being is preserved as will to will in such a way that the illusion that there is *nothing* to being is affirmed. In other words, metaphysics confirms itself by confirming being as will to will, as a self-effecting which produces what is to be produced. This ground of surety enables man to define his essence with regard to certainty and as a consequence, his relation to being is determined in terms of the ordering of beings, that is, metaphysically. But for Heidegger, the inner dynamism of metaphysics which consists in the distinction and the correlation of that-being and what-being still conceals insofar as this metaphysical distinction rests on the distinction between being and beings, insofar as being, namely, *phusis*, is already meant for unconcealed beings. Metaphysics takes up this ontological difference one-sidedly, by considering difference merely as the difference of being *from beings* and decides that there is nothing to being just because being shows itself through beings’ unconcealment. However, this difference is the difference of being or presencing, as the difference between what presences and presencing and for Heidegger, it is so mysterious that it is a difference which keeps differing as a coming to near while remaining hidden. Mystery is destined to remain as mystery and therefore declines as metaphysic in such a way that it is forgotten and ordered. It leaves its place to an illusion which consists in the covering over the withdrawal of

⁵⁷² Heidegger, ‘Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being’ in *Nietzsche, Volume 4*, p. 238.

“Überall hat sich das Seiende als solches in eine Unverborgenheit gebracht, die es als das Sich-auf-sich-stellende und Sich-selbst-vor-sich-bringende erscheinen läßt. Dies ist der Grundzug der Subiectität. Das Seiende als die Subiectität läßt die Wahrheit des Seins selbst in einer entschiedenen Weise aus, insofern die Subiectität aus dem ihr eigenen Sicherungswillen die Wahrheit des Seienden als die Gewißheit setzt. Die Subiectität ist kein Gernächte des Menschen, sondern der Mensch sichert sich als der Seiende, der dem Seienden als solchem gemäß ist, insofern er sich als das Ich- und-Wir-Subjekt will, sich sich vor- und so selbst sich zu-stellt.” (GA 6.2, p. 382.)

⁵⁷³ Heidegger, ‘Overcoming Metaphysics’ in *The End of Philosophy*, p. 86.

being. Indeed, we know that, for Heidegger, withdrawal conceals itself while keeping to itself in the manner of its advent through which essence of man is the abode of being. Thus, the more being adverts in its withdrawal, the more the essence of man is concealed. This shows us that man is a being which, by the beginning, is left to uncertainty with regard to his essence and it is not surprising that from out of this uncertainty that he never knows, he strives for self-surety which is supported by metaphysical illusion, as the relation between subjectivity and subjectivity proves. Accordingly we should see that,

What becomes evident thereby is that, of all beings, man is transposed into uncertainty in a special way. This allows us to assume that man, particularly in his relation to his own essence, is at stake.⁵⁷⁴

That man is transposed into uncertainty means that he is transferred into Da-sein, whereby he is left the stranger in such a way that he is always already at stake with regard to *his* essence.

This does not mean that man is a being which thinks his essence as a duty as if he is determined to fulfill a task deliberately. Rather, man signifies a thinking which is always kept thought-provoking. We should notice that Heidegger speaks of a revealing which is destined to remain hidden. As being adverts into its space, it withdraws. As we have seen, this happening shows itself in the manner of will to will whereby 'is' in 'that a being is' is concealed while being of beings keeps effecting or causing in such a way that this effecting is already effected by concealing of 'is' and therefore becomes effective. What is crucial is to see that 'essence' un-thought as *eidos* or *idea* is required or willed in each case in such a way that this willing wills itself by willing un-thought as such because once there is a willing in order that beings *are what* they are, the 'is' is already concealed while it is kept so near. Thus, the essence metaphysically willed does not determine the essence of the will, because it is not just a will, but will to will in such a way that un-thought of the essence already prevails everywhere. Accordingly, "'will' contains a manifoldness of essence. It is the will of reason or the will of spirit, it is the will of love or the will to power".⁵⁷⁵ *What* beings are may change as reason, spirit, love or power, and this just

⁵⁷⁴ Heidegger, 'Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being' in *Nietzsche, Volume 4*, p. 235.

⁵⁷⁵ Heidegger, 'Metaphysics as History of Being' in *The End of Philosophy*, p. 47.

means that they are accepted as *that* they are, which shows us that what is at stake here is just to demonstrate that there are beings *rather than* nothing. Insofar as being is taken up as the being of beings, as their ‘what’, the latter gives testimony to a concealing in its very being willed. But there is no escape from this willing because it is *clear* that beings are unconcealed, which means that willing is already will to will. Thus, in this occurrence, withdrawal is never removed and it is from this impossibility to be captured or to be grasped, any claim of identity collapses. If there is no identity in the happening of being, this is so because it is both near and distant or hidden. It keeps to itself by withdrawing and “from the respective distance of the withdrawal, which conceals itself in any given phase of metaphysics, such keeping to itself determines each epoch of the history of Being as the *epochē* of Being itself”.⁵⁷⁶ Each epoch of being is the Same, that is, each indicates a clearing while concealing, *in respective ways*, that is, each epoch is determined by being itself, not by each other and only in that way they are Other and the Same. In *The Anaximander Fragment*, Heidegger says that “the *epoche* of Being belongs to Being itself; we are thinking it in terms of the experience of the oblivion of Being”.⁵⁷⁷ Epochal thinking is to think being from being, that is, to think from and towards the un-thought in such a way that what remains is that which is thought-provoking and question worthy.

Indeed, for Heidegger, there is nothing to be thought about in the realm of beings, neither man nor beings. As the beginning of *What is called thinking?* suggests, what is to be thought about (*zu-Bedenkende*) is what is thought-provoking (*Bedenkliche*). With regard to *Bedenkliche*, he writes that “*most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking*”.⁵⁷⁸ It should be noticed that our ‘still not thinking’ is not an inability on our side. Accordingly, “the assertion says neither that we are no longer thinking, nor does it say roundly that we are not thinking at all. The words ‘still not’, spoken thoughtfully, suggest that we are already on our way toward thinking, presumably from a great distance, not only on

⁵⁷⁶ Heidegger, ‘Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being’ in *Nietzsche, Volume 4*, p. 239.

⁵⁷⁷ Maartin Heidegger, ‘The Anaximander Fragment’ in *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, San Francisco : Harper & Row, 1975. p. 26.

⁵⁷⁸ Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, trans. J. Glenn Gray and F. Wieck, New York: Harper & Row, 1968. p. 6.

our way toward thinking as a conduct some day to be practiced, but on our way *within* thinking, on the way of thinking”.⁵⁷⁹ As the beginning begins, thinking begins and become epochal due to the clearing-withdrawal. We are on the way of thinking ‘from a great distance’, not because we turn away from what must be thought, but because the latter conceals itself in concealment and remains thought-provoking. In a sense, thinking provokes itself by remaining un-thought in such a way that this provoking gives food for thought to be of the what is to be thought. It is not only that thought-provoking keeps secure what is to be thought, but also and more importantly, what is to be thought is so concealed or withdrawn from man that it is always and solely as what is thought-provoking. “But how can we have the least knowledge of something that withdraws from the beginning, how can we even give it a name? Whatever withdraws, refuses arrival. But—withdrawing is not nothing. Withdrawal is an event”.⁵⁸⁰ Here what is at issue is *Ereignis* in or as withdrawal which happens inceptually where there is clearing and concealing at the same time in such a way that man is first claimed as man; what is at issue is the ‘and’ of being and man. Heidegger thinks of this happening more clearly than before in the following way:

What withdraws from us, draws us along by its very withdrawal, whether or not we become aware of it immediately, or at all. Once we are drawn into the withdrawal, we are drawing toward what draws, attracts us by its withdrawal. And once we, being so attracted, are drawing toward what draws us, our essential nature already bears the stamp of ‘drawing toward’. As we are drawing toward what withdraws, we ourselves are pointers pointing toward it. We are who we are by pointing in that direction—not like an incidental adjunct but as follows: this ‘drawing toward’ is in itself an essential and therefore constant pointing toward what withdraws. To say ‘drawing toward’ is to say ‘pointing toward what withdraws’.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 30.

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 9. “Das zu-Denkende wendet sich vom Menschen abo Es entzieht sich ihm. Doch wie können wir von Solchem, das sich einsther entzieht, überhaupt das Geringste wissen oder es auch nur nennen? Was sich entzieht, versagt die Ankunft. Allein -das Sichentziehen ist nicht nichts. Entzug ist Ereignis.” (*Was Heisst Denken?*, GA 8, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002, p. 10.)

⁵⁸¹ Ibid. “Was sich uns entzieht, zieht uns dabei gerade mit, ob wir es sogleich und überhaupt merken oder nicht. Wenn wir in den Zug des Entziehens gelangen, sind wir -nur ganz anders als die Zugvogel -auf dem Zug zu dem, was uns anzieht, indem es sich entzieht. Sind wir als die so Angezogenen auf dem Zuge zu dem uns Ziehenden, dann ist unser Wesen schon durch dieses »auf dem Zuge zu ...« geprägt. Auf dem Zuge zu dem Sichentziehenden weisen wir selber auf dieses Sichentziehende. Wir sind wir, indem wir dahin weisen; nicht nachtraglich und nicht nebenbei, sondern: dieses »auf dem Zuge zu ...« ist in sich ein wesenhaftes und darum standiges Weisen auf das Sichentziehende. »Auf dem Zuge zu ...« sagt schon: zeigend auf das Sichentziehende.” (GA 8, p. 11.)

What withdraws (*Sichentziehen*) draws (*zieht*) us while withdrawing and in this drawing toward (*Auf dem Zug zu...*), man points, shows (*Weisen, Zeigen*) what withdraws. Man is only as pointing (*ziehende*) and as pointing, he is a pointer (*Zeigender*). It should be seen that “man here is not first of all man, and then also occasionally someone who points. No: drawn into what withdraws, drawing toward it and thus pointing into the withdrawal, man first *is* man”.⁵⁸² We are allowed to say that man ‘is’ as long as the clearing-concealing of being is pointed by that pointer. And insofar as man, by his essence, is a pointing, he is a sign (*Zeichen*). Heidegger writes:

As he draws toward what withdraws, man is a sign. But since this sign points toward what draws *away*, it points, not so much at what draws away as into the withdrawal. The sign stays without interpretation.⁵⁸³

Thus, what is at issue is that man points, not toward a what, but toward the drawing away of withdrawal. This is not a pointing in the objective sense, that is, both what is pointed and pointer is *away* in this pointing. Accordingly, man is a sign without interpretation, which means that we cannot speak humanly. Rather, ‘we’ *are* human beings in such a way that the ‘is’ always remains thought-provoking and therefore what is to be thought. Thus, drawing toward what withdraws, man points the enigmatic and this is what it means to think. The enigmatic is the keeping to itself of being in its withdrawal. For Heidegger, man always thinks even if there is concealment of what is concealed because man, as the beginning and by essence, points toward in such a way that where he is drawn is still unsaid, that is, he is not read. Like all signs, man, as a sign, indicates in a direction but different from other signs, direction of man’s indication is not sustained by other signs. Rather, this direction is from withdrawal, from concealing or nothing which remains inaccessible from out of which sign signs. How could that be possible if concealment is not the concealment of the unconcealment in such a way that there is *un-concealment* whereby *un-concealment* is concealed? Better said, what kind of unconcealment preserves a kind of pointing toward concealment in such a way that there is a sign

⁵⁸² Ibid.

⁵⁸³ Ibid. “Auf dem Zug in das Sichentziehende ist der Mensch ein Zeichen. Weil dieses Zeichen jedoch in das Sichentziehende zeigt, deutet es nicht so sehr auf das, was sich da ent-zieht, als vielmehr in das Sichentziehen. Das Zeichen bleibt ohne Deutung.” (GA 8, p. 11.)

without interpretation just because unconcealment is granted in that way? Can this show or point itself from out of itself as the phenomenon as such? Is the latter man as such or being as such or is it the unsayable or unnamable as the claim of any 'as such' in its inaccessible concealment? We can now better see why we are not discussing or interpreting man as long as we now know that man is a sign whose signing waits to be said, that is, essence 'is' *man's* as the latter is being more and more individual and alone as being a sign in that special sense. But what is the truth of this individuality and this solitude?

5.2. Signs: the poet and the thinker

We have described human being as the stranger and the pointer. Thus, there is a being which points toward withdrawal in its staying-away, or better said, the truth of being is pointed through a sign. This is *Ereignis* through which human being is that sign. Moreover, in this pointing-toward, what is to be thought becomes what is thought-provoking. In other words, like essence of human being, essence of thinking is being on the way cleared by and for itself. This means that we are *still not* thinking, not because we are unable to think, but because what is at stake is essential thinking in its essentiality which becomes visible through the concealing-clearing of being. In other words, thinking does not mean that there is something out there that we are able or unable to think some day. Rather, what there is is always subjected to the mystery of un-concealment. In that sense, thinking requires always remaining underway for thinking. As we have seen, at the end of metaphysics, all 'Seiende' are abandoned by being, which means that the fact that beings are looked at in their being let this looking turn to itself in the manner of a coming of being into its space. Indeed, this is the truth of being in its withdrawal whose abode is abided by human being. Thus, beings are ordinary, not merely now, but in such a way that their presence has already been in its coming and for Heidegger, they are so ordinary that this ordinariness involves extra-ordinariness in the sense that being comes to its abode whereby there is a turn in the essence of truth into its essentiality which stays hidden by the beginning. What presences keeps presencing with regard to the inceptuality of the inceptual difference. Thus, this happening, namely, presencing of what presences, is not an after-fact in the course of the history. Rather, it is put into decision at the beginning by beginning. And for Heidegger, this de-cision that is put

into question at the beginning indicates a scission between human being and being. Thus, the transformation of the truth into its being is an already transformation of human being into this between, into Da-sein which is the grounding of the ground of being. This is why human being is a sign, pointing toward what withdraws. This means that human being abides in the historicity of being or truth, in unconcealment and for Heidegger, this amounts to saying that human being is the uncanny one.

We have already discussed Heidegger's elucidations of the 'uncanny' that he found out in Sophocles' *Antigone* and depicted in *Introduction to Metaphysics*. In 1942, in his lecture course *Hölderlin's Hymn 'Der Ister'*, we see that Heidegger returns to the same issue from a different aspect. In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger's aim was to conceive the situation of human being within *phusis*. There it was noticed that human being is the uncanny, that is, violence-doing against the overwhelming of being. Human being is understood in terms of his struggle against the realm of seeming which is also appearing, belonging to being. Human being goes beyond the homely, beyond seeming toward the uncanny due to his specific knowing which is *techne* in a way that human being lets being set into work. But since self-appearing, namely, seeming belongs to being, *techne* stand against *dike* which is the jointure of being in its coming into unconcealment while withdrawing. Outcome of this analysis was that human being is the in-cident (*Zwischen-fall*), that is, inbetween, thereby being is set into work as its truth. We have followed the result of this approach until we describe the truth of being as Da-sein in its grounding in such a way that we reconsider human being in terms of his belonging to the essence or to the truth of being which is history. Thus, in the lecture *'Hölderlin's Hymn 'Der Ister'*, we have such a background and this means that Heidegger's aim is not merely to discuss the truth of being in its origin but the origin in its being truth or history. Heidegger does not merely discuss the truth or essence (*Wesen*) of being but *shows* or *points* how this essence poetizes itself as being historical. As we shall see, this showing will delimit thinking into what is ownmost to it, namely, poetic, through which poetry is delimited by thinking and this will lead to the Same of Saying in this primordial difference.

After what we have discussed in this chapter, we should say that for Heidegger, human being is not rational animal or laboring animal; he does not have any metaphysical determination but human being is that being which occupies the site of being, that is, beings are unconcealed in the open and human being stands in that open where withdrawal happens or clears historically. Now to say that human being is the uncanny one is to refer to man's pointing toward the concealing in being a sign. With regard to the uncanny, we take into account *Hölderlin's Hymn 'Der Ister'*, where Heidegger points to the same choral ode of *Antigone*, that he discussed in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, lines between 332-375, and translates again *deinon* as *Unheimlich* (uncanny) but now insisting that it also means un-homely (*Unheimisch*). He writes: "we mean the uncanny in the sense of that which is not at home—not homely in that which is homely".⁵⁸⁴ Thus, here, different from *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger's aim is to show that *deinon* does not only mean uncanny (*Unheimlich*) but also and primarily un-homely (*Unheimisch*).

Heidegger does not discuss that selected ode of *Antigone* step by step but selects four parts of it which are the first two lines of the first strophe, the middle part of the second strophe (I. 360), the middle part of the second antistrophe (II. 370-71) and the end of the second antistrophe (II. 373-75).

1. Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing
more uncanny looms or stirs beyond the human being.
2. Everyway venturing forth underway, experienceless without anyway out
he comes to nothing.
3. Towering high above the site, forfeiting the site
is he for whom non-beings always are
for the sake of risk.
4. Such shall not be entrusted to my hearth,
nor share their delusion with my knowing,
who put such a thing to work.

In order to understand Heidegger's focus on the 'un-homely' instead of uncanny with regard to the first part above, we should look at his interpretations of the following three parts. Then, in the second part, Heidegger sees the tragedy of being human.

⁵⁸⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn 'Der Ister'*, trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1996. p. 71.

Human being finds himself in the midst of beings in such a way that he addresses to them but this experience ends up with nothing because he always forgets being. And “the ‘nothing’ to which they come is that which, turning counter to being, directly excludes human beings altogether from being”.⁵⁸⁵ We have already discussed that for Heidegger, human being is excluded from being, that is, he is *Anschluß*. Human beings are also refused by beings since they forget being. Thus, human beings neither understand themselves nor beings because forgetting being prevents all essential understanding. While he ventures forth beings, he is without experience due to the forgetting of being and finds no way out, that is, destined to be there because he is that being which finds itself in the midst of beings. In other words, “thinking they are homely, human beings are those who are unhomely”.⁵⁸⁶ Uncanniness of human being does not mean that human being has an inaccessible aspect, but rather, inaccessibility belongs to the essence of human being, that is, he is un-homely at home. This shows how in being human, ‘nothing’ turns counter to being and in this sense, for Heidegger, human beings are a catastrophe, a reversal (*Umkehrung*); “a reversal that turns them away from their own essence”.⁵⁸⁷

Thus, uncanniness of human being is not a property that belongs to him as if he is the most fearful, powerful or inhabital. All of these can belong to any other being in the sense that in each case there is a counterturning to them in an extrinsic way. However, uncanny in the sense of un-homely involves a counterturning which is intrinsic to the essence of human being. In other words, the ‘nothing’ or the inaccessibility of death is not something added to the essence of human being but essential to it. In that sense, “that which is un-homely is not merely the non-homely, but rather homely that seeks yet does not find itself, because it seeks itself by way of a distancing and alienation from itself”.⁵⁸⁸ Distancing from itself while seeking itself so as to become homely refers to that counterturning of ‘nothing’ to being and for

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 76. “Das ‘Nichts’, zu dem er kommt, ist das, was, gegenwändig zum Sein, den Menschen unmittelbar vom Sein schlechthin ausschließt.” (*Hölderlins Hymne ‘Der Ister’*, GA 53, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984. p. 93.)

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 77.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 84.

Heidegger, the counterturning of ‘venturing-forth’ and ‘experiencelessness’ that we have discussed with regard to the second selected part shows us specific uncanniness of human being. In a similar way, with regard to the third part, Heidegger points out the counterturning between ‘towering high above the site’ and ‘forfeiting the site’. Heidegger does not consider the site (*polis*) as a political concept but describes it as the pole, the swirl (*Wirbel*), that in and around which everything turns. This polar character of the site refers to the manifestation of beings as a whole, namely, *phusis*, and insofar as human being stands in that openness, the site gives the essence of human being too. Thus,

The πόλις is here not some indifferent space that in turn admits of the empty possibilities of ‘towering high’ and of downfall; rather, it is the essence of the πόλις to thrust one into excess and to tear one into downfall, and in such a way that the human being is destined and fitted into both these counterturning possibilities and thus must be these two possibilities themselves. Human beings do not ‘have’ these possibilities in addition and extrinsic to themselves, rather their essence consists in being those who, in ascending within the site of their essence, are at the same time without site.⁵⁸⁹

Again counterturning in the essence of human being is what makes him unhomely. It should be remarked that here Heidegger, does not mention violence-doing against seeming of being where there is non-beings, instead what matters is to let prevail this counterturning. This letting prevail takes places as undertaking the risk of comporting to non-beings in such way that the risk indicates the tension in the uncanniness of human being; “for in the realm of risk all forces and abilities may be awakened and set in motion and brought into play, so as thereby to attain a stand within the site in the midst of beings”.⁵⁹⁰ The fact that human being is the being in the midst of beings is always at risk or at tension because human being always take non-beings as beings and this means that the homely, encountering with beings, refuses itself to human being. But for Heidegger, this risk should be preserved because human being is nothing but standing in that homely even though homely refuses itself to human being. This counterturning of un-homely refers to the concealedness of the uncanniness of human being and therefore to his unhomeliness in a deeper sense. Towering high above the site, human being forfeits the site, which means that being, the site, is not only forgotten through the encounter of beings, but

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 86.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 89.

also, this forgottenness is so concealed that homely refuses itself to human being. In other words, human being is unhomely, not only because ‘nothing’ comes to being, but also for the reason that this ‘nothing’ is preserved or concealed because beings are always non-beings, that is, they always seem.

The forth part speaks of the expulsion of the uncanny from the hearth saying that the knowledge that belongs to human being is a mere delusion. Heidegger focuses on the word ‘hearth’ (*Herd*), namely, ἐστία, claiming that “the hearth is the site of being-homely. Παρέστιος (from παρά and ἐστία): ἐστία is the hearth of the house, the locale at which there stand the gods of the hearth. What is essential to the hearth, however, is the fire in the manifoldness of its essence, which essentially prevails as lighting, illuminating, warming, nourishing, purifying, refining, glowing.”⁵⁹¹ The hearth is the site of all sites; everything presences toward the hearth. It is the determinative *middle* toward which everything is. We have already seen that Heidegger calls *Seyn* hearth-fire (*Herdfeuer*) and here again he argues that the hearth is being because as two preceding parts show us, human being is uncanny as unhomely, that is, his uncanniness lies in his being among beings. Accordingly, human beings have a delusion with regard to their own and this delusion is opposed to the knowledge of the hearth which is *phronesis*, as the knowledge of being homely. If human being is expelled from the hearth, this means that the hearth already knows being. “The hearth is accordingly the middle of beings, to which all beings, because and insofar as they are beings, are drawn in the commencement. This hearth of the middle of beings is being. Being is the hearth.”⁵⁹² Indeed, for Heidegger, it is the beginning of the choral ode that confirms this. In the phrase, ‘manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing/more uncanny looms or stirs beyond the human being’, we find the verb πέλειν which means “stirring and looming, abiding in itself amid change, emerging from out of itself, yet as this coming and going, remaining nevertheless within itself”.⁵⁹³ It is obvious that πέλειν is a word for being

⁵⁹¹ Ibid., p. 105.

⁵⁹² Ibid., p. 112.

⁵⁹³ Ibid., p. 108.

for Greeks by means of which we grasp the uncanniness of human being in terms of being, that is, as un-homeliness.

For Heidegger, thus, the closing words of the choral ode give us the ground of the unhomely, not because it approves the expulsion of the unhomely, but because this expulsion refers to the becoming homely which always remains a risk. In other words, “the closing words do not merely reject the unhomely one but rather let *being* unhomely become worthy of question”.⁵⁹⁴ In those words, we find that being unhomely is not a mere condition for being human, but it indicates, points toward a potential for becoming homely. The latter is a potential insofar as it is not yet awakened and not yet decided. Better said, the closing words hold the decision in reserve and this holding in reserve is what essentially belongs to the knowledge of the hearth, of being-homely. Thus, there is a risk of being unhomely in an inappropriate way through which human being is lost among beings and an appropriate way through which being unhomely is already becoming homely. Contrary to the traditional reading, for Heidegger, the counter-play in *Antigone* is not between state and religion, but “between what constitutes the innermost counterturning of the *δεινόν* itself, insofar as the *δεινόν* is thought as the unhomely. The counterplay is played out between being unhomely in the sense of being driven about amid beings without any way out, and being unhomely as becoming homely from out of a belonging to being”.⁵⁹⁵ To be this risk, becoming homely in being unhomely, is the essence of human being and it is what is poetized in the poem. However, what is poetized in the poem is not a product of the imagination of the poet. What is poetized is always what is to be poetized. As the artist of the artwork, the poet can be understood only through the essence of poetizing, not the reverse. “The truth of the choral ode cannot, therefore, lie in the first words of its beginning, nor merely in its closing words. It is concealed in that which the directly said not only leaves unsaid but through its saying first poetizes into the unsaid”.⁵⁹⁶ The essence of poetizing consists in that poetizing always poetizes toward what is to be

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 115.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 118.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid.

poetized. The latter is not something actual, that is, we cannot find it among beings. Heidegger writes: “what is to be poetized, essentially prevailing in the poetic work, is never something that is, but rather being”.⁵⁹⁷ And as we have seen, Sophocles names being ‘hearth’ in such a way that “being is not some thing that is actual, but that which determines what is actual in its potential for being, and determines especially the potential for human beings to be; that potentiality for being in which the being of humans is fulfilled: being unhomely in becoming homely”.⁵⁹⁸ What is worthy of poetizing is that being unhomely in becoming homely. Antigone is the uncanny one not because she is presumptuous towards beings in order to find a way out. Rather, she is the uncanny one because she takes over unhomeliness upon her in the supreme manner: she finds out that she is unhomely amid beings and this makes her homely within being.

This being unhomely in becoming homely is, contrary to presumptuousness toward beings, a thoughtful remembrance (*Andenken*) and for Heidegger, what happens in being unhomely in becoming homely is something singular, unique (*Einzig*). Referring to Sophocles’ words, ‘the singular onslaught of death he can/by no flight ever prevent’, Heidegger points to that which cannot be mastered by venturing around amid beings, namely, death. It should be noticed that Heidegger never speaks *about* death because death or ‘nothing’ like being is not some thing to be captured or found. However, this should not be considered as indeterminacy in an empty or vague sense. Rather, “what appears to be indeterminate is what is supremely determined as One, the singular thing that, for the entire poetic work, remains that which is, in advance, to be poetized by it”.⁵⁹⁹ If there is a finding here, this may be called finding out (*Erfinden*). Here what is at stake is a finding which is determined merely by pure seeking and “such finding is supreme, not because what is to be found [*das Zu-findende*] here remains entirely concealed, but because it is that which is always already revealed for human beings and is the nearest of all that

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 120.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 121. “Das anscheinend Unbestimmte ist das im höchsten bestimmte Eine, das Einzige, was für die ganze Dichtung das von ihr im voraus Zu-Dichtende bleibt.” (GA 53, p. 151.)

is near”.⁶⁰⁰ Thus, it is not because death or being is and must be concealed for human beings that they belong to the essence of human beings, but rather, for Heidegger, this concealedness of the concealed is what is nearest for human being, as if it is the hearth of the essence of human being. As the hearth of human being, it is singular, unique in such a way that “Antigone herself *is* the poem of becoming homely in being unhomely”.⁶⁰¹ Insofar as nearing of the near happens through the distancing of the near, this singularity always poetizes itself in advance as what is to be poetized. Thus, being unhomely in becoming homely is the essentialization itself of the essence, but here, it *is* the essence of human being insofar as we read human being as un-homely. Now putting itself into work of truth does not only belong to the work of art but understood by being unhomely in becoming homely because “such is our belonging to being itself”.⁶⁰² As we have discussed before, there is a compelling need for the unconcealment of beings and withdrawal of being (Nothing) in its advent at the same time, that is, being requires human being by not relenting from the unconcealment of beings. Now, for Heidegger, this is what makes truth *poetic* as long as “what essentially prevails as being, and is never a being or something actual and therefore always appears to be nothing, can be said only in poetizing or thought in thinking”.⁶⁰³ Truth of being is the truth of poetizing *and* thinking. With regard to poetizing, Heidegger says: “the poetically true word is that word that names that which poetically is”.⁶⁰⁴ Sophocles names being ‘hearth’: being ‘is’ poetically because ‘is’ remains thought-worthy in that poetic word/naming in such a way that poetizing poetizes itself in advance.

The uniqueness of this naming, that is, its truth lies in the counterturning or counterplay in being unhomely in becoming homely. It should be remarked that what constitutes the core of Heidegger’s interpretation of being unhomely in becoming homely is this emphasis on the counterturning (*Gegenwendigkeit*) or counterplay

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 119.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid., p. 121.

⁶⁰² Ibid., p. 120.

⁶⁰³ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 119.

(*Gegenspiel*) in this happening. This emphasis overlaps with Heidegger's thinking of historicity which can be designated as the leading theme which determines his dialogue with Hölderlin. Up to now, we can demonstrate Heidegger's understanding of historicity in three steps. First, as it is set forth in *Introduction of Metaphysics*, after the inception, being declines in the form of metaphysics. Following that work, in *Contributions of Philosophy* and the other contemporary lectures, Heidegger stresses on the inceptuality of the inception claiming that it is already in turning counter to itself in such a way that beginning already prepares the way for its other, as the other beginning. His interpretation of the transformation of the essence of truth into the truth of essence also confirms this understanding of historicity. Finally, we have seen that after 1940s, Heidegger speaks of the epochality of being in such a way that supported by the idea of will to will, being both clears and withdraws as the *time* belonging to it. This happens due to the respective relationality between what-being and that-being through which will-to-will shows itself. While the first and second approach of historicity complement each other insofar as they enforces the idea of a continuous history, it remains questionable how to understand the relation of the third approach to them insofar as will to will refers to a respectivity in clearing-withdrawal of each epoch. If there is respectivity in clearing-withdrawal, it seems inappropriate to speak of 'continuity', even as a decline. Here we should take into account what brings together two approach. It should be seen that historicity, for Heidegger, in its all possible forms, is understood by the inceptuality of the inception. Thus, the possible difference between two approaches depends upon how Heidegger understands the inceptuality of the inception. For the first, it could be seen that the great inception is regarded in terms of *phusis*, as a self-emergence. The latter gives itself in such a way that it *immediately* turns as other, that is, it declines. As if it is an excess, it overflows until it begins anew, as another beginning. What is unsaid at the beginning is preserved throughout the history of metaphysics in such a way that it transforms beings. Beings no longer *are* and truth of essence is sheltered in works. But truth does not only need to be sheltered but also to be grounded because it is already a turning in being. In other words, the essence of truth whereby beings claim being turns into the truth of essence where 'is' claims its own as truth, which is grounded as Da-sein. The latter as the 'between' refuses beings, but it cannot refuse

human being because human being is already called by the essence of truth. Accordingly, inceptuality of the inception should already be abided by human being while still granting its preservation. However, this is something difficult to think if inception, a-letheia is a self-concealing clearing in its turning. This requires putting into question the essence of human being in its uniqueness. In order to become near to this uniqueness, it is necessary to think from out of concealment. It could be recognized that for Heidegger, concealing is for clearing in such a way that clearing *turns* into itself. Indeed, in *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger maintains that view by claiming that even the inception is not originary because it considers clearing as a robbery from concealing. Rather, for Heidegger, unconcealment *is* in its holding to concealment. Thus, concealment should not be taken up as a failure or deficiency, but rather, it is for unconcealment. Now our question is how the idea of counter-turning provides us with thinking the ‘between’ of clearing and concealing; how is it enable us to enter into the ‘between’? How can we understand ‘epochs’ of being in terms of turning? When we look at the idea of will-to-will, we find out that inception is considered as self-emergence, a-letheia, but now what is at stake is the presencing of what presences, the originary difference as the origin. It is preserved in an epochal way in such a way that withdrawal is proper to itself as the Same. There is respectivity in concealing-clearing in each time as time. Here what matters is not the decline of the inception in its turning. Rather, what presences presences; it gives the Same although it also turns into home as the other beginning. Heidegger finds here a primordial difference deeper than the ontological difference, that is, deeper than the turning of the essence of truth into the truth of essence. Does this mean that Heidegger is drawn into thinking beyond the ‘dimension’ of being and of truth? We know that for Heidegger, thinking is always essential, namely, truthful. What he does, however, may be called thinking dimensionally.

Thus, inceptuality of the inception, historicity and truth need to be decided or transformed. Here, Heidegger’s dialogue with Hölderlin is the testimony of this thoughtful moment. As we have seen in *Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘Der Ister’*, even though Heidegger considers concealing, being unhomely, as intrinsic to becoming homely, he focuses on the counterturning in being unhomely in becoming homely. Given that the fundamental aim of this lecture course is to discuss historicity of being, this

insistence becomes understandable. As Heidegger describes, Der Ister belongs to Hölderlin's river poetry. 'Ister', as it is called by Romans, corresponds to the lower Donau and known by Greeks as Ἰστρος. For Heidegger, essence of the rivers consists in their flowing, as a passing between what is bygone and what lies in the future. On the one hand, the river determines where human being dwells upon earth, that is, it determines the resting of human abiding in its abode and in that sense it is the locality of the locale (*die Ortschaft des Ortes*). On the other hand, insofar as the river, in its flowing, both vanishes toward what has been and it is full of intimation toward what is coming, it is a journey. Moreover, the river is the dwelling itself as it flows, in its journey. The locale is intrinsic to the river as it flows in such a way that the river is the locality of journeying. It is also the journeying of the locality, that is, locales are not given successively, but rather, 'here' and 'there' are transitively. Accordingly, for Heidegger, "the river is the journeying of human beings as historical in their coming to be at home upon this earth"⁶⁰⁵, being unhomely in becoming homely is a journey, in its coming, which dwells unhomely, that is, upon this earth: the river is thus not an aesthetic symbol for the actual, because it is the home of the poet who is a sign.

The river is the poetizing of the essence of the poetry insofar as it is the journeying of locality and the locality of the journeying through which the counterturning in being unhomely becoming homely takes place as the 'between'. Heidegger maintains that this being unhomely in becoming homely presences the Same in Greeks and in Germans as they are different. Accordingly, he finds in Hölderlin the idea that what is ownmost to Greeks is the 'fire from the heavens' whereby gods arrive. What is foreign to them, however, is the 'clarity of presentation' which alienates them from their own so that their own becomes a property in pure presence. Conversely, what is ownmost to Germans is the clarity of presentation and in order that they come to home, for Germans, it is necessary to call the 'fire from the heavens' so that they appropriate what is their own. And for Heidegger, "Hölderlin is the one who has been struck by the god of light. He *is* on

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 32.

his return from the journey to the ‘fire’”.⁶⁰⁶ Hölderlin speaks the law of being unhomely in becoming homely, that is, being-homely. Heidegger writes,

The law of being homely as a becoming homely consists in the fact that historical human beings, at the beginning of their history, are not intimate with what is homely, and indeed must even become unhomely with respect to the latter in order to learn the proper appropriation of what is their own in venturing to the foreign, and to first become homely in the return from the foreign. The historical spirit of the history of a humankind must first let what is foreign come toward that humankind in its being unhomely so as to find, in an encounter with the foreign, whatever is fitting for the return to the hearth. For history is nothing other than such return to the hearth.⁶⁰⁷

In this passage, Heidegger neither just refers to the Germans nor to the Greeks, but to the historicity of being human. Being historical requires returning from the foreign, not to the foreign. This is why Hölderlin *is* on his return from the journey, that is, he is already returning from the foreign, which means that he finds out something ‘fitting’ in being unhomely so that becoming homely is preserved. And “that which is fittingly destined for human beings is what ‘spirit’ thinks, and thinks as directed toward human beings, so that it is ‘spirit’ in historical human beings that determines historicity”.⁶⁰⁸ Here ‘spirit’ does not have a Hegelian sense but referring to Hölderlin’s ‘communal spirit’, Heidegger interprets it as that which “in being, thinks for all beings what is fitting [das Schickliche] to their being”.⁶⁰⁹ Thus, spirit is the destiny (*Geschick*) of being. As far as what is fitting is given, there is also what is unfitting, non-ground. This means that destiny is never decided, but rather, it consists of destinings (*Schickungen*); it *is* always in its coming and it is through poetry that what is coming is preserved in its coming. Accordingly, “‘poetizing’ is the telling of the thoughts of the spirit: Poetizing is spirit poetizing. The poets are ‘of spirit’”.⁶¹⁰ The poet names what is sent fittingly, that is, the poet tells the holy (*das Heilige*); he

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 136.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 125.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 128.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 127.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid., p. 128.

lets the spirit *think* fittingly “insofar as the poet in poetizing lets spirit prevail among beings in letting beings appear in their spiritedness in his telling of them”.⁶¹¹

The return from the foreign is the return to the hearth, to home. In this way, the foreign, here, Greeks, is let own its ownmost. As we have seen, the Same, now called, spirit, gives the Same as this difference which lies in the counterturning of the Same. This amounts to saying that at the beginning, spirit is also not ‘at home’. Heidegger’s refers to Hölderlin’s words: ‘namely at home is spirit/not at the commencement, not at the source. The home consumes it’ and claims that this does not mean that being-homely does not belong to the spirit originarily. Rather, here, what the poet points to is that spirit, although it grounds the being homely, is *not* straightforwardly, *not* at the commencement, homely because home consumes it. Thus, in the beginning, for spirit, there is the risk of being consumed and indeed for Heidegger, this is the weakness of Greeks, namely, “their inability to grasp themselves in the face of the excess of destiny and its destinings [Schickungen]”.⁶¹² Accordingly, we can speak of spirit, insofar as spirit *is* alongside itself. In other words, Heidegger sees at the beginning a still ‘not yet’ which gives movement to the excess of the spirit while preventing it from being homely ‘at the source’ because spirit, given that it is a sending or granting, is nothing but its happening as it is the case with the river and its flowing. “In spirit there thus prevails the longing for its own essence”.⁶¹³ This longing for its own essence makes spirit unhomely at the beginning in such a way that it wills the foreign which now refers to the Germans. Thus, spirit is not something which is put into work by the poet, neither by Sophocles nor by Hölderlin, but it happens in poetizing, because it happens as being named in the word, as the longing of the spirit for coming to the word. Hölderlin names the spirit ‘holy’ and by this naming, he ventures into what is foreign to the German, to the ‘fire’ in order to learn how to name gods and mortals. As the river itself which keeps issuing from the source, the poet does not forget the source, namely, the hearth and this flowing essence becomes its locality and dwelling insofar as it points to the

⁶¹¹ Ibid.

⁶¹² Ibid., p. 135.

⁶¹³ Ibid., p. 131.

being unhomely upon *earth* in becoming homely as such. Thus, to say that Hölderlin is in dialogue with Sophocles may be misleading, rather, what happens here is a dialogue or conversation which is both telling and hearing, speaking and responding. In other words, what matters for Heidegger is not just uncovering a possible dialogue between two poets, but rather, to be the witness of that saying which is already a responding, a listening.

Heidegger calls this saying language (*die Sprache*). Language speaks originally, that is, there is a naming of the spirit, of gods and man once there is language. In his lecture, *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*, he focuses on Hölderlin's saying 'since we have been a conversation/and able to hear from one another'. Then, we are a conversation, not we are in a conversation. There is a hearing from one another not because there is a talking to each other, but because there is already speaking or word in such a way that "being able to talk and being able to hear are co-original".⁶¹⁴ In such a language, we find a naming of gods, of things and of mortals and therefore the appearing of world. "But again it is important to see that the presence of the gods and the appearance of the world are not merely a consequence of the occurrence of language; rather, they are simultaneous with it".⁶¹⁵ Thus, Heidegger suggests that language is grounded in poetry, in naming of gods and of things through which everything comes into the open. Better said, poetry is the primary language because poet founds being. For Heidegger, Hölderlin's words from his poem 'Remembrance', 'but what remains is founded by the poets' points out that poetry, as a naming, founds being in the word in such a way that "this naming does not merely come about when something already previously known is furnished with a name; rather, by speaking the essential word, the poet's naming first nominates the beings as what they are. Thus, they become known *as* beings. Poetry is the founding of being in the word".⁶¹⁶ Insofar as poetry is a founding of being as naming of

⁶¹⁴ Martin Heidegger, 'Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry' in *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, trans. Keith Hoeller, Amherst, N.Y. : Humanity Books, 2000. p. 57.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., p. 59. "Dieses Nennen besteht nicht darin, daß ein vordem schon Bekanntes nur mit einem Namen versehen wird, sondern indem der Dichter das wesentliche Wort spricht, wird durch diese Nennung das Seiende erst zu dem ernannt, was es ist. So wird es bekannt als Seiendes." (*Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*, GA 4, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981. p. 41.)

beings, it enables people to remember their belongingness to being. Then, the poet “is the one who has been cast out—out into that *between*, between gods and men”.⁶¹⁷ Naming the spirit, the poet says the holy which is beyond gods and men. The poet regards the passing of the gods as the passing of the river in its being unhomely and he calls this passing into word in such a way that that passing is becoming homely. The poet is neither merely human being nor a god. Rather, Heidegger claims, “from the perspective of this ‘between’ between humans and gods, the poet is a ‘demigod’”.⁶¹⁸ Thus, Hölderlin, as a demigod, is the poet who is thrown into that ‘between’ in such a way that his naming of what is to be poetized becomes a saying of being or primary language. In other words, in Hölderlin’s poetry, essence of poetry is poetized because in this poetry, language reaches its utmost possibility as a founding of being, as the ‘between’. This is why for Heidegger, Hölderlin is the poet of the poets.⁶¹⁹

It could be seen that the poet is placed into the ‘between’. Insofar as the latter is the leading matter of *Contributions to Philosophy*, it is clear that Heidegger’s Hölderlin interpretations with which we are concerned have the similar insights with the idea of turning and historicity which lies therein. Indeed, for Heidegger, the fact that the counterplay in being unhomely in becoming homely shows itself as the coming into word of the truth of being ‘inbetween’, that is, as poetizing of the poet, leaves unnecessary to seek for an evidence for the happening of the truth of being because poetizing is that primary language of being through which what remains is founded. The latter takes place when the poet does listen to the passing of the gods. We have seen with respect to *Contributions to Philosophy* how the ‘between’ is the between of gods and human beings. Only as this between, namely, Da-sein, being is grounded as its lack and necessity, that is, in truth in the utmost sense. Now it is said that the poet, Hölderlin, stands in this between, between gods and human beings. Founding being in its naming, this poetry founds being in the word in such a way that truth comes to word, to language as its own work. For Heidegger, this does not mean

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., p. 64.

⁶¹⁸ Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘Der Ister’*, p. 139.

⁶¹⁹ Heidegger, ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’ in *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, p. 64.

that Hölderlin determines the essence of poetry for all times, rather, what he does is to let time give itself. He gives us a new time in the sense that “it is the time of the gods who have fled *and* of the god who is coming. It is the *time of need* because it stands in a double lack and a double not: in the no-longer of the gods who have fled and in the not-yet of the god who is coming”.⁶²⁰ The poet abides in the passing of the gods which is a passing in its double ‘not’ and he founds what remains in this double lack. But how can we understand the founding of what remains in the passing of the gods? Heidegger does not reject the transitory character of the passing of the gods. Accordingly, what remains does not refer to that which is always already present at hand. Nevertheless, “precisely what remains must be secured against being carried away; the simple must be wrested from the complex, measure must be opposed to excess”.⁶²¹ But how? Heidegger warns us that what is at stake here is not a derivation of what endures from transient, the simple from the complex or measure from the excess. Indeed,

We never find the ground in the abyss. Being is never a being. But because being and the essence of things can never be calculated and derived from what is present at hand, they must be freely created, posited, and bestowed. Such free bestowal is a founding.⁶²²

Here, different from the idea of ab-ground that we find in *Contributions to Philosophy*, it is claimed that abground does not pertain to the ground. Now abground refers to the transitory, complex or excess/measureless. Instead of a transformation which will issue from that ab-ground, Heidegger mentions free creating of the poet.

This is the betweenness of the poet. Here we should turn back to Hölderlin’s *Hymn ‘Der Ister’*. Heidegger refers to the words: ‘...not in vain do/Rivers run in the dry. Yet how? Namely, they are/To be to language. A sign is needed/Nothing else, plain and simple, so that sun/And moon may be born in mind, inseperable, /and pass on, day and night too, and/The heavenly feel themselves warm by another’ and

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ Ibid., p. 58.

⁶²² Ibid., p. 59. “Den Grund finden wir nie im Abgrund. Das Sein ist niemals ein Seiendes. Weil aber Sein und Wesen der Dinge nie errechnet und aus dem Vorhandenen abgeleitet werden können, müssen sie frei geschaffen, gesetzt und geschenkt werden. Solche freie Schenkung ist Stiftung.” (GA 4, p. 41.)

claims that the sign which is needed is understood here in terms of its passing through the day (sun) and through the night (moon) in such a way that sun and moon is preserved in the mind of this sign. Having a mind, it looks like a human being, and as long as through its passing, gods warm each other; it is not a god, yet it still conditions them. Thus, a sign is a demigod, the poet.

Then the words ‘a sign is needed...’ are saying ‘only’ this: A poet and poets must be. A poet is needed. The poet would then himself be a sign. The poet would not merely be something designated by a sign, by the rivers. The poet himself would be a sign, yet not for designating something else but in such a way that as poet, he is a ‘sign’.⁶²³

For Heidegger, this shows us that in the words, ‘to be to language’, language is not understood as expression, but as ‘word’. It is not because poets need to express something by language that there are poems, or words. Rather, the poet and his word is needed as a pointing. Accordingly, “the poet is a sign that has a ‘soul’ in which the thoughts of spirit quietly end: a sign to which a ‘mind’ is appropriate, in which it bears the stars of the heavens. The showing is of such a kind as to first let appear that which is to be shown”.⁶²⁴ In order that the poet shows what is to be shown, he should already be blinded by the ‘fire’. For Heidegger, this explains Hölderlin’s words from *Mnemosyne* (IV, 225), ‘we are a sign that is not read/Without pain we are and have almost/Lost our tongue in foreign parts’: the poet is a pointing, a showing because he is the one who would have been annihilated by the fire in such a way that he cannot initially find the word, that is, he is not read (*deutungslos*); unable to show. The poet feels no pain in the fire, because pain belongs to the essence of showing. Only if pain stirs, there is showing through which human beings and gods belong to each other in their proximity and distance. Thus, the poet as a sign, is a showing which shows itself. This means that sign is not an indicating something, “but rather a sign that stands only at the very beginning of its being a sign”.⁶²⁵

It is remarkable to see that for Heidegger, “‘language’, that is, here, the ability to tell, is the essence of showing, and being able to show determines the poets in

⁶²³ Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘Der Ister’*, p. 150.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

their essence as signs”.⁶²⁶ The pain belongs to this showing because ‘word’ is not ready to hand for the poet; rather, the poet names for the first time, or better said, this naming is not a mere expressing, but a pure inception as inceptuality. The word/language gives the Same both for Greeks and Hölderlin as the gatheredness of gathering through which human being abides in the midst of beings and this is why Heidegger finds in Hölderlin the possibility of the other beginning. The latter becomes possible not only because Hölderlin returns to the Greeks in such a way that he grounds the existence of a people, but also because he creates and founds being anew, that is, in word and by word as that turning. Thus, the turning relation is not between Hölderlin and Sophocles, or between Germans and Greeks, but rather, it is the turning in being, in the inceptual Sameness of its speaking. Thus, along with the turning, there is the emergence of saying as naming which is a showing. The latter does not indicate something else apart from itself, even that turning. It is unique in the sense that it *gives* beginning in its to be rememberedness. Thus, Heidegger chooses Hölderlin, not because Hölderlin gives us the universal essence of poetry, but because in this poetry, language comes to essence as a mere showing, pointing, in such a way that we are forced to think of ‘essence’ in its utmost sense thereby essence comes to language, that is, to its own.

Heidegger suggests that this showing from out of itself is a pointing toward the most dangerous. In other words, Hölderlin’s poetry is showing itself of language in its dangerousness. But why is it dangerous? To respond this will enable us understand the turning. In *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*, Heidegger recalls Hölderlin’s words on language as ‘the most dangerous of goods’ and he writes, “it is the danger of all dangers because it first creates the possibility of a danger. Danger is the threat that beings pose to being itself. But it is only by virtue of language at all that man is exposed to something manifest: *beings* which press upon him and inflame him in his existence, or *nonbeings* which deceive and disappoint him”.⁶²⁷ Language

⁶²⁶ Ibid., p. 152.

⁶²⁷ Heidegger, ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, in *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, p. 55. “Sie ist die Gefahr aller Gefahren, weil sie allererst die Möglichkeit einer Gefahr schafft. Gefahr ist Bedrohung des Seins durch Seiendes. Nun ist aber der Mensch erst kraft der Sprache überhaupt ausgesetzt einem Offenbaren, das als Seiendes den Menschen in seinem Dasein bedrängt und befeuert und als Nichtseiendes täuscht und enttäuscht.” (GA 4, p. 36.)

is that danger wherein beings and nonbeings come to scene, that is, it is the space of truth in its unconcealment and concealment. Moreover, language endangers itself because even if there is an essential word, the latter is not always guaranteed; it is usually disguised until it is made common. But nevertheless, throughout its dangerous happening, language speaks insofar as it guarantees the danger, namely, world which grants human abiding in the midst of beings, even as dangerous.

We find the similar approach about the danger (*Gefahr*) in Heidegger's lecture *The Turning*. Following the ideas on technology presented in *The Question Concerning Technology*, Heidegger, here, determines the danger as Enframing (*Gestell*) which lies in the essence of technology. Enframing is the entrapping of the truth of coming to presence of being in the manner of oblivion. Enframing, the danger, is not known as the danger. It always disguises itself as the coming to presence of being in its concealment. In other words, the clearing-withdrawal of being is now described as the essence of technology which is being itself. Insofar as technology, by essence, belongs to being, it cannot be mastered by man. But we have seen that clearing-withdrawal of being requires man and for Heidegger, this means that there is cooperation between the coming to presence of man and the coming to presence of technology. However, this cooperation does not lead to an overcoming of technology, which is impossible, but a surmounting or getting over it "in a way that restores it into its yet concealed truth".⁶²⁸ Now it is a matter of grasping this restoration of being. Heidegger writes:

But the surmounting of a destining of Being—here and now, the surmounting of Enframing—each time comes to pass out of the arrival of another destining, a destining that does not allow itself either to be logically and historiographically predicted or to be metaphysically construed as a sequence belonging to a process of history. For never does the historical—let alone happening itself as represented historiographically—determine destining; but rather happening, together with the representation of the constancy assigned to it, is already in each instance that which, belonging to a destining of Being, has the character of destining.⁶²⁹

As it is the case with the overcoming of metaphysics in terms of 'verwindung' not mere 'überwindung', here, Heidegger emphasizes on the same point in order to show that historicity is not a kind of historiography which is based on the understanding

⁶²⁸ Martin Heidegger, 'The Turning' in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt, New York : Harper & Row, 1977. p. 39.

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

of events in their continuity or sequence. What is at issue is destining (*Geschick*) as fitness, fittingness and therefore fate. And if instead of the sequence or continuity of events, historicity is the sending of the Same, this is due to the turning in being. He says:

In the danger there holds sway this turning about not yet thought on. In the coming to presence of the danger there *conceals* itself, therefore, the possibility of a turning in which the oblivion belonging to the coming to presence of Being will so turn itself that, with *this* turning, the truth of the coming to presence of Being will expressly turn in—turn homeward—into whatever is.⁶³⁰

Through the turning-in, the danger is as the danger, that is, it is not allowed to fall into oblivion, but rather, it is held in the manner of safekeeping belonging to being. Turning, thus, is the passing of the danger in such a way that the danger abides. This is what Hölderlin's words means: 'but where danger is, grows/the saving power also' in the sense that to save means "to loose, to emancipate, to free, to spare and husband, to harbor protectingly, to take under one's care, to keep safe".⁶³¹ This refers to the restorative surmounting of the essence of technology in such a way that it is not a matter of conquering or mastering it, but of corresponding to the claim of being and for Heidegger, "*this primal corresponding, expressly carried out, is thinking*".⁶³² Heidegger does not refer to activism or passivism before being because for him, the genuine activity is thinking which means "to prepare (build) for the coming to presence of Being that abode in the midst of whatever is into which Being brings itself and its essence to utterance in language".⁶³³ Language does not mean expression or communication. Rather, "language is the primal dimension within which man's essence is first able to correspond at all to Being and its claim, and in corresponding, to belong to Being".⁶³⁴ Man returns to the space proper to his essence in order that it is needed and used by being in such a way that being comes to saying in language. This way back to the essential space as the abode for being is becoming attentive to the danger of technology, not affirming it. We can say that Heidegger, as

⁶³⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

⁶³¹ Ibid., p. 42.

⁶³² Ibid., p. 41.

⁶³³ Ibid., p. 40.

⁶³⁴ Ibid., p. 41.

the thinker, builds that space through his dialogue with Hölderlin as long as we know that for Heidegger, language should always be understood as the neighborhood of poetry and thinking. Thus, the way to language lies in the historicity of being which refers to endangering itself of being, as the danger which keeps itself in its showing itself as poetizing of Hölderlin.

One may object that for Heidegger, still, language or being has precedence over the essence of human being in such a way that human being is subordinated to that primacy. However, what is at stake is not a mere correspondence between being and human being, saying and listening either as poet or as thinker, but the coming to presence (*Ereignis*) of what presences. This is why Heidegger insists on the immediacy of the turning-in—to the homeward. He writes:

When the turning comes to pass in the danger, this can happen only without mediation. For being has no equal whatever. It is not brought about by anything else nor does it itself bring anything about. Being never at any time runs its course within cause-effect coherence. Nothing that effects, as Being, precedes the mode in which it—Being itself—takes places so as to adapt itself; and no effect, as Being, follows after. Sheerly, out of its own essence of concealedness, Being brings itself to pass into its epoch.⁶³⁵

The turning of the danger flashes suddenly. This flashing (*blitzen*) is also a glancing, looking (*blicken*) into what is. The latter is not this or that being, but their truthless being in such a way that being brings itself to passing into its truth. Heidegger calls this flashing glance ‘insight’ (Einblick) whereby being is brought to itself, that is, disclosed in the sense that “disclosing coming to pass [Ereignis] is bringing to sight that brings into its own [eignende Eräugnis]”.⁶³⁶ Thus, disclosing Ereignis is also a bringing to sight as its own, namely Eräugnis. It should be noticed that it is not human being which looks at whatever is because any being is insofar as ‘is’ belongs to that being as its being. In other words, “that which is, is in no way that which is in being. For the ‘it is’ and the ‘is’ are accorded to what is in being only inasmuch as what is in being is appealed to in respect to its Being. In the ‘is’ ‘Being’ is uttered: that which ‘is’, in the sense that it constitutes the Being of what is in being, is Being”.⁶³⁷ Thus, we should understand ‘that which is’ in such a manner that ‘is’

⁶³⁵ Ibid., p. 44.

⁶³⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

⁶³⁷ Ibid., p. 46.

remains a claim. This is so just because beings are already appealed to in their being which is forgotten, suddenly. This forgetful appealing, for Heidegger, is the essence of human being, the ontological difference whereby human being stands in the midst of beings. Accordingly, sudden flash of the truth of being into truthless being, that is, insight into that which 'is' points to that happening through which human being is already caught sight of, left armless. He says: "in insight, men are the ones who are caught sight of".⁶³⁸ Human being is the one who is looked at, who is beheld.

For Heidegger, the only weapon that remains for being human is the words. In his interpretation of Hölderlin's poem 'As When On a Holiday...', he writes: "the essence of what is named unveils itself in the word. For by naming the essential, the word separates the essence from the non-essence. And because the word separates them, it decides their combat. The word is armed; it is a weapon".⁶³⁹ The words are the unveiling of the essence (*Wesen*), but they do not just determine what is essential. Rather, they decide the difference between the essence and non-essence, which means that word names and calls 'inbetween'. But how does it happen that naming and calling of the words do not destroy the immediacy of the 'inbetween' or 'turning-in'? This is to ask for the *how* of coming to words of the holy or the open. Heidegger handles this issue in his interpretations of Hölderlin's poems 'As When on a Holiday...' and 'Remembrance' (*Andenken*). In the first poem mentioned, he discusses Hölderlin's naming nature 'the holy'. Then, nature, for Hölderlin, means 'all present', 'powerful', 'all embracing'. Nature embraces the poet in its awakening. As the spirit, it inspires everything and the poet. In this sense,

The open mediates the connections between all actual things. These latter are constituted only because of such mediation, and are therefore mediated. Thus, mediatedness must be present in all. The open itself, however, though it first gives the region for all belonging-to and –with each other, does not arise from any mediation. The open itself is the immediate.⁶⁴⁰

Mediating of the open in its immediacy is the awakening inspiration of nature out of its sleeping, its coming into day breaking with night, and can only be understood by its coming. This happens in the manner of a shaking of All that seems sleeping. And

⁶³⁸ Ibid., p. 47.

⁶³⁹ Martin Heidegger, 'As When On a Holiday...' in *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, trans. Keith Hoeller, Amherst, N.Y. : Humanity Books, 2000. p. 81.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 83.

this awakening is preserved in the poetizing of the poet in such a way that “the holy is quietly present as what is coming”.⁶⁴¹ In this sense, the poet is inspired, embraced and penetrated by the holy. But still the poet needs good fortune. Although the light of the holy blazes in his soul, this light needs to be kindled by a god. This does not mean that the poet possesses the god, but rather, he preserves the law of mediatedness between gods and men. In other words, coming to word of the holy keeps the belonging together of gods and men, the ‘inbetween’ as the poet. Through this mediating ray of the holy, men are without danger whereas the poet is sent into the extreme danger because “the poets must leave to the immediate its immediacy, and yet also take upon themselves its mediation as their only task”.⁶⁴² Although the poet does not grasp the immediacy, it still offers his hands to its mediating ray because the holy is “the primordial and as this, what is enduring. Its remaining is the eternity of the eternal. The holy is the former intimacy, ‘the eternal hearth’”.⁶⁴³ The holy is the *Anfängliche*, that is, inceptual and as inceptual, it is what remains to be founded by the poet. However, as Heidegger suggests, it is still note worthy to ask whether the immediacy of the holy is threatened by this mediatedness. Here Heidegger refers to the concluding words of the poem: ‘The father’s ray, the pure, does not sear it/And deeply shaken, sharing a god’s suffering,/The eternal hearth yet remains firm’ and claims that the eternal hearth, the pure intimacy, namely, the holy which is deeply shaken still remains firm in such a way that “by offering itself to the decisiveness of the ray which is a suffering, the holy nevertheless abides radiating in the truth of its essence, so it suffers primordially”.⁶⁴⁴ In other words, the holy is not exempt from the claim of its truth. Indeed, it is this claim itself in the manner of a suffering. For Heidegger, this shows us again the inceptuality of the inception in its turning which always leads to begin as the law of intimacy which keeps bestowal. In

⁶⁴¹ Ibid., p. 89.

⁶⁴² Ibid., p. 93.

⁶⁴³ Ibid., p. 95. “das Anfängliche und als dieses das Bleibende. Sein Bleiben ist die Ewigkeit des Ewigen. Das Heilige ist die einstige Innigkeit, ist ‘das ewige Herz’.” (GA 4, p. 73.)

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 96.

this sense, the holy, the open remains firm and “in remaining firm, the holy is to be spoken”.⁶⁴⁵

In its remaining firm, in its enduring, the holy comes to word in its coming. Then, there is both enduring and coming/movement. This is why the holy suffers from the truth. In other words, the holy is never sufficient to itself while springing forth. For Heidegger, this is what the origin means: “taken for itself, the origin can only be poor, because, notwithstanding all that it lets spring forth, it needs to secure itself in its essential ground. Only that which moves backward to secure itself is capable of letting flow forth out of itself without thereby losing its essence”.⁶⁴⁶ The holy or the open is not a container which keeps everything and thereby discovered by the poet or the thinker. Rather, it is the origin (*Ursprung*) which secures itself in its flowing and withdrawal. This is *poiesis* or bringing-forth of the poet who dwells near to the source in the manner of nearing. The latter requires following the source backward as it conceals itself in its ground, that is, the poet always remains behind as the origin flows backward. Heidegger calls this *poiesis* of the poet ‘An-denken’, namely, thinking-of what has been in its coming. Following the source means holding to firm law of the holy “in such a way that it shows the origin in its self-securing, and in its letting-flow-forth”.⁶⁴⁷ Thus, this following or thinking-of is a showing (*Zeigen*) in the sense that “the showing brings what is shown near, and yet keeps it distant. The showing only draws near to what is shown. The more essential the distance which is maintained in this drawing near, all the nearer is the showing to what is shown”.⁶⁴⁸ What is at issue is not a showing of what is shown, but rather, the nearing and distancing between showing and what is shown or better said, that ‘between’ itself. The nearing is granted in the essential distance which is the self-withdrawal of the origin. It should be noticed that it is not showing which founds the origin, but rather, the showing is a remaining steadfast in the beginning which

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid. “Das Heilige in seinem Fest-bleiben ist zu sagen.” (GA 4, p. 73.)

⁶⁴⁶ Martin Heidegger, ‘Remembrance’ in *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, trans. Keith Hoeller, Amherst, N.Y. : Humanity Books, 2000. p. 167.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 168.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid. “Das Zeigen bringt das Gezeigte nahe und hält es doch fern. Das Zeigen nähert sich nur dem Gezeigten. Je wesentlicher die Feme ist, in der diese Näherung sich hält, um so näher ist das Zeigen dem Gezeigten.” (GA 4, p. 147.)

belongs to its inceptuality in such a way that “the showing itself is pinned down in the steadfastness of the origin”.⁶⁴⁹ The origin shows itself as the showing nears to the origin which originates in the manner of a returning back. Thus, the showing is remaining firm, getting fixed of the origin because it is the openness of showing and what is shown in their nearing and distance which gives measure as the originary origin. In this way, the showing is founded by the poet as ‘what remains’ or in its ‘originariness’. “Accordingly, founding is what remains, which approaches the origin, and it endures because, as the shy approach to the source, it finds it difficult to leave this place of nearness”.⁶⁵⁰ The origin, in its flowing and self-withdrawal requires coming near to it as what is to be founded. But since it flows by withholding, it, as to be founded, remains as the founding itself. Its remaining (*Bleiben*) should not be understood as the enduring of a present-at-hand entity. Rather, “what this founding, as a remaining which shows, founds is itself. What remains here is the remaining”.⁶⁵¹ The origin remains or endures because founding cannot give up being founded as long as it keeps itself by giving itself as what is to be founded *while* remaining. Thus, the openness of the showing through which the holy comes to word as the *poiesis* of the poet is the opening up of the holy or the open whereby the unconcealed is.

For Heidegger, then, Hölderlin’s word which founds as a remaining which shows is calling word (*das rufende Wort*) in such a way that “the holy bestows the word, and itself comes into this word. This word is the primal event of the holy”.⁶⁵² The word is the primal event, coming to presence (*Ereignis*) of the holy which is founded in its remaining what shows. In other words, if the word comes to be said, this is due to the founding which always remains itself in its to be foundedness and this means showing in drawing near while keeping distance, that is to say, the originating origin which both lets spring forth and still secures itself. It is crucial to

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid. “Was dieses Stiften als zeigendes Bleiben stiftet, ist es selbst. Das Bleiben ist hier das Bleibende.” (GA 4, p. 147.)

⁶⁵² Heidegger, ‘As When On a Holiday...’ in *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, p. 98. “Das Heilige verschenkt das Wort und kommt selbst in dieses Wort. Das Wort ist das Ereignis des Heiligen.” (GA 4, p. 76.)

see that *Ereignis* is now understood as that showing which shows by and in word. Here it will be helpful to recall Heidegger's interpretation of Stefan George's poem 'The Word'. In the three lectures that he presented under the name 'The Nature of Language' and his lecture entitled 'Words', Heidegger focuses on the final line of that poem: 'So I renounced and sadly see:/Where word breaks off no thing may be'. For Heidegger, the renunciation of the poet provides us with a poetic experience of language in the sense that the poet recognizes that there is a relation between the thing and the word. But he renounces because the word for the word still escapes him. In other words, the poet knows that the word for the word cannot be found even in the poetry. It should be seen that here, for Heidegger, the poet does not understand the word as a mere sign or designation, but rather he refers to the word as 'in the name of...', that is, 'at the call, by the command'.⁶⁵³ Then how can we understand the relation between the word and the thing? When we think over the last line of the poem, it seems that the word bestows being to the thing in such a way that when the word is available, the thing is. Then, the question is whether the word, as bestowing being, is also a thing. But, for the poet, there is a distinction between the word and the thing. Indeed, the word bestows being to the thing insofar as it is not a thing.

Thus the poetic experience with the word gives us a meaningful hint. The word – no thing, nothing that is, no being; but we have an understanding of things when the word for them is available. Then, the thing 'is'. Yet, what about this 'is'? The thing is. The 'is' itself – is it also a thing, a step above the other, set on top of it like a cap? The 'is' cannot be found anywhere as a thing attached to a thing. As with the word, so it is with the 'is'. It belongs no more among things that are than does the word.⁶⁵⁴

As it is the case with 'is' which is not a thing, the word also, while giving 'is', is no thing (*Ding*). For Heidegger, then, the relation between the word and the thing implies the relation between the word and 'is' insofar as both the word and 'is' is not a being. But still they are not nothing. Poetic experience with the word gives us something thought-provoking in the sense that "it shows what is there and yet 'is'"

⁶⁵³ Martin Heidegger, 'The Nature of Language' in *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz, San Francisco : Harper & Row, 1971. p. 61.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 87. "So gibt uns denn die dichterische Erfahrung mit dem Wort einen bedeutenden Wink. Das Wort -kein Ding, nichts Seiendes; dagegen sind wir über die Dinge verständig, wenn für sie das Wort zur Verfügung steht. Dann 'ist' das Ding. Doch wie verhält es sich mit dem 'ist'? Das Ding ist. Ist das 'ist' selber auch noch ein Ding, aufgestuft auf ein anderes, ihm aufgesetzt wie eine Kappe? Wir finden das 'ist' nirgends als ein Ding an einem Ding. Dem 'ist' geht es wie dem Wort. So wenig wie das Wort gehört das 'ist' unter die seienden Dinge." (*Unterwegs zur Sprache*, GA 12, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985. p. 181.)

not”.⁶⁵⁵ The word is not; rather it gives. Heidegger writes: “if our thinking does justice to the matter, then we may never say of the word that it is, but rather it gives—not in the sense that words are given by an ‘it’, but that the word itself gives. The word is the giver”.⁶⁵⁶ The word gives being (*Sein*) although it itself is never given.

Thus, the word gives being, not the reverse. The word for the word cannot be found because language is already to speak in and by word whereby clearing and withdrawal happens in its immediate turning. In other words, for Heidegger, what is at stake is that language speaks itself as itself. But how does this happen? He says: “Curiously enough, when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries us away or encourages us”.⁶⁵⁷ Language touches us when there remains something unspoken in such a way that this remaining is founded. Heidegger finds out this in the poetic experience of the poet who does not hesitate to renounce from his prevailing experience of language. The same is true for the thinker who also knows that language is always ahead of himself. This shows us that for thinking, language is not a matter of method or calculative analysis. Rather, it is the region, the country (*die Gegend*) whereby thinking abides. Then, “in thinking there is neither method nor theme, but rather the region, so called because it gives its realm and free reign to what thinking is given to think. Thinking abides in that country, walking the ways of that country. Here the way is part of the country and belongs to it.”⁶⁵⁸ The region, for Heidegger, is that open freedom (*Freie*) or clearing where all revealing and concealing occurs and this freeing and sheltering is called way-making (*Be-wägung*). Thus, reaching to the open is a way-making movement, not that our thinking moves in an already prevailing way. Then, “to a thinking so inclined that reaches out sufficiently, the way is that by which we reach—which lets us reach what

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 87. “Sie zeigt solches, was es gibt und was gleichwohl nicht ‘ist’.” (GA 12, p. 182.)

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 88. “Vom Wort dürften wir, sachgerecht denkend, dann nie sagen: Es ist, sondern: Es gibt -dies nicht in dem Sinne, daß ‘es’ Worte gibt, sondern daß das Wort selber gibt. Das Wort: das Gebende.” (GA 12, p. 182.)

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 59.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 74.

reaches out for us by touching us, by being our concern”.⁶⁵⁹ The way reaches us by letting us reach what concerns or summons (*be-langt*) us. Thus, ‘belangen’ does not just mean to put oneself into question, but also to summon (*berufen*), to protect (*behüten*) and to keep (*behalten*). The way should always be understood as way-making in the sense that the country always gives ways or clears the way in such a way that it gives movement (*be-wägt*). In other words, for Heidegger, ‘Be-wegen’ (to move) refers to the country (*Gegend*) with its ways as the Swabian dialect shows us that ‘wägen’ means ‘einen Weg bahnen’, that is, to clear a way.

For Heidegger, to clear a way, that is, way-making “understood in this sense no longer means to move something up or down a path that is already there. It means to bring the way...forth first of all, and thus to *be* the way”.⁶⁶⁰ The way to language enables us to transform our relation to language or better said, to transform our being into a relation in such a way that being the way itself, we come face to face with a possibility of experience with language of being. The relationality of our being in terms of language becomes understandable when we grasp that language, first of all, manifests itself as our way of speaking. The way allows us to reach the speaking (*Sprechen*) of language (*Sprache*) in such a way that language speaks or as Heidegger suggests, “we try to speak about speech *qua* speech”.⁶⁶¹ But how is it possible to show that language is not a human property but still requires ways to speak in such a way that it requires human being? First of all, for Heidegger, our speaking is a listening. We listen to language *before* we speak because language speaks. What does it mean that language speaks? For Heidegger, this is nothing but that “language first of all and inherently obeys the essential nature of speaking: it

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 91. “Der Weg ist, hinreichend gedacht, solches, was uns gelangen läßt, und zwar in das, was nach uns langt, indem es uns be-langt. Wir verstehen freilich das Zeitwort ‘belangen’ nur in einem gewöhnlichen Sinne, der meint: sich jemanden vomehmen zur Vernehmung, zum Verhor. Wir können aber auch das Be-langen in einem hohen Sinne denken: be-langen, be-rufen, be-hüten, be-halten. Der Be-lang: das, was, nach unserem Wesen auslangend, es verlangt und so gelangen läßt in das, wohin es gehört.” (GA 12, p. 186.) Here we also find the omitted part in the translation.

⁶⁶⁰ Martin Heidegger, ‘The Way to Language’ in *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz, San Francisco : Harper & Row, 1971. p. 130. “Be-wegen (Be-wegung) heiBt, so gedacht, nicht mehr: etwas nur auf einem schon vorhandenen Weg hin-und herschaffen, sondern: den Weg zu ... allererst erbringen und so der Weg ‘sein’.” (GA 12, p. 249.)

⁶⁶¹ Ibid., p. 112. “Die Sprache als die Sprache zur Sprache bringen.” (GA 12, p. 230.)

says”.⁶⁶² Thus, language says; it is Saying (*Sage*). Then what does saying mean? He writes: “‘say’ means to show, to let appear, to let be seen and heard”.⁶⁶³ Saying is already a Showing through which “saying pervades and structures the openness of that clearing which every appearance must seek out and every disappearance must leave behind, and in which every present and absent being must show, say announce itself”.⁶⁶⁴ Thus, there is a saying which shows or a showing which says. In the language with its spoken and unspoken, that is, as the language spoken or to be spoken by speakers, the present already comes to presence while the absent fades away. The language both consists of the spoken and unspoken in speaking of speakers in such a way that each belongs to language in its own way. If we seek out a unity in that essence of language, Heidegger calls it design (*Aufriß*). The latter means cutting a trace (*ritzen*) in the sense of carving, and drawing (*ziehen*) in such a way that all is apportioned. Thus, “the design is the drawing of the being of language, the structure of a show in which are joined the speakers and their speaking: what is spoken and what of it is unspoken in all that is given in the speaking”.⁶⁶⁵ Speaking belongs to the design of saying through which presencing and absencing is said, promised (*zusagt*) or refused (*versagt*) in the manner of showing or withholding. In other words, for Heidegger, since the design of language is pervaded by the spoken and unspoken, speaking already belongs to that structure, and this is why it is a listening.

We, accordingly, listen to language in this way, that we let it say its Saying to us. No matter in what way we may listen besides, whenever we are listening to something we are *letting something be said to us*, and all perception and conception is already contained in that act. In our speaking, as a listening to language, we say again the Saying we have heard.⁶⁶⁶

⁶⁶² Ibid., p. 124.

⁶⁶³ Ibid., p. 122.

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 126.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 121. “Der Aufriß ist die Zeichnung des Sprachwesens, das Gefüge eines Zeigens, darin die Sprechenden und ihr Sprechen, das Gesprochene und sein Ungesprochenes aus dem Zugesprochenen verfügt sind.” (GA 12, p. 240.)

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 124. “Demgemäß hören wir auf die Sprache in der Weise, daß wir uns ihre Sage sagen lassen. Auf welche Arten wir auch sonst noch hören, wo immer wir etwas hören, da ist das Hören das alles Vermehmen und Vorstellen schon einbehaltende *Sichsagenlassen*. Im Sprechen als dem Hören auf die Sprache sagen wir die gehörte Sage nach.” (GA 12, p. 243.)

Sichsagenlassen, that is, that language speaks in its own saying, is a self-showing whereby what is present presences while appearing or absencing. Language shows while letting presencing say or presence. Since all presencing is appearance and disappearance, showing is a self-announcing, self-saying which originates from the spoken and therefore from the unspoken which is to be said, that is, from its essence (*Wesen*) as the way for itself in the manner of clearing. Thus, language does not consist of signs of grammar, but rather, it is the signing of all presence in its presencing. When it seems that showing is accomplished by human being, this just means that in that showing, a self-showing is indicated in such a way that the way to language is concealed.

We know that for Heidegger, only through poetizing and thinking, there is the possibility of undergoing an experience with language of essence. Indeed, it is the neighborhood of poetry and thinking which provides us with such a possibility, as Heidegger's own poetizing thinking shows. "But we should become familiar with the suggestion that the neighborhood of poetry and thinking is concealed within this farthest divergence of their Saying. This divergence is their real face to face encounter".⁶⁶⁷ The neighborhood (*Nachbarschaft*) of poetry and thinking lies in that they are divergent (*Auseinander*) and face-to-face (*Gegen-einander-über*) at the same time. Indeed, it is in their divergence that their neighborhood is concealed. Each is understood from out of the other. However, this does not mean that poetry gives us what thinking is or thinking gives us what poetry is. Rather, Heidegger finds thinking through poetic revealing and poetizing through thinking revealing in such a way that their neighborhood is secured. In other words, poetizing points toward thinking while pointing toward itself in its revealing which is also a concealing and thinking points toward poetizing while pointing toward itself in its revealing which is also a concealing. For Heidegger, what is at issue is the origination of the word in its naming and saying. What is concealed is concealed in the calling word which calls in the manner of naming and saying. This happens through poetry and thinking. As Heidegger suggests in his *Postscript to 'What is Metaphysics?'*, we should say that

⁶⁶⁷ Heidegger, 'The Nature of Language' in *On the Way to Language*, p. 90.

“The thinker says being. The poet names the holy”.⁶⁶⁸ This does not mean that saying and naming are separated from each other in a formal way. Rather, they belong to the Same in a concealed way insofar as both thinking and poetizing arises from a care for word whose origination is a calling upon human beings.

The Same of the saying is unsayable. In other words, saying says in difference, in the divergence of poetizing and thinking, which is also their encounter as the arising of the word.⁶⁶⁹ But, saying is a showing. We have discussed that showing-saying in Hölderlin’s remembrance of the homely through which poetic saying or following shows the origin in its flowing and withdrawal. In this sense, showing is placed in the solidity, in the steadfastness of the origin. Accordingly, what remains is remaining in the sense that what founding founds is itself. For Heidegger, this steadfastness, this remaining which keeps remaining, points to the coming to pass of the festival which is the birth of the poet. Heidegger points to Hölderlin’s word ‘holiday’ which means celebration. For him, this holiday should not just be considered with respect to the cessation of the work day. It is not a mere interruption, but rather, in the putting aside of the work, a keeping-to-ourselves takes place. This is when the open opens up and only the unaccustomed (*Ungewöhnliche*) can keep the open open. This occurs through poetizing, in the celebrating of the celebration. For Heidegger, what the poet celebrates is the festival, namely, ‘the wedding festival of men and gods’. He says: “Hölderlin’s word *festival* has a lofty and at the same time simple meaning. The *wedding festival* is the encounter of those men and gods from which there issues the birth of those who stand between men and

⁶⁶⁸ Martin Heidegger, ‘Postscript to ‘What is Metaphysics?’ in *Pathmarks*, ed. and trans. William McNeill, Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 237. “Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige.” (GA 9, p. 312.)

⁶⁶⁹ As Henry Birault claims, there is thought in poetry and poetizing in thought in such a way that “If man as that being who is capable of thinking “poietizes” insofar as he thinks authentically, this depends first not on himself but on the essence of Being in its essential relationship to man’s essence. Before he “poietizes,” man is the outline of a poem, the poem started by Being. The poem in man precedes the poet in man. There is a “poematico-poetic” essence of man.” (Henry Birault, ‘Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger’ in *On Heidegger and Language*, ed. and trans. Joseph J. Kockelmans, Northwestern University Press, 1972. p. 167.) Thus, we can say, it is not with regard to the neighborhood of poetry and thinking that Heidegger builds the essence of human being, but in terms of nearness which grounds that neighborhood in its divergence, as the language of being.

gods and endure this ‘between’.”⁶⁷⁰ As we have seen, the poet is the demigod, the sign or the ‘between’ of men and gods. Although the poet, as the demigod, is unequal to god, for him, there is still the risk of not enduring this inequality in such a way that his being may fall into doubt and division by measuring himself in terms of human beings. Through the poet’s desire to become either human being or a god, the openness of the ‘between’ is closed. However, by this closing, the destiny is already allotted to each by the holy and “this destiny, which is sent by the holy, is the festival”.⁶⁷¹ According to this destiny, the poet preserves his difference from men and gods in such a way that he expresses the unlike, the unequal (*Ungleiche*), which is neither man nor god. And,

Destiny finds its equilibrium when and only when what is unlike abides as unlike. Here the equilibrium is not at all an equalization, realizing what is undifferentiated, but rather the letting reign of what is different in its difference. The equilibrium is not the effacing of those who are different—the gods and the men—but rather their return into their own proper being. What is unlike, then, is able to last on account of that returning. And as long as the unlike can last, so long is the moment in which destiny can linger for a while.⁶⁷²

Heidegger finds the equilibrium of the destiny through the unlikeness of the ‘between’ whereby men and gods are sent to their own. Thus, the destiny lingers for a while insofar as the unlike lasts, remains or abides. He says: “it is the waiting time of destiny that sets a measure for any genuine abiding”.⁶⁷³ What remains remains as a time, a moment (*Weile*) which cannot be calculated by successive time or duration. Indeed, the true time is a lingering (*verweilen*) for a while; it is unique and unsurpassable. It is not possible to repeat it in the sense that a poem cannot be composed in advance. It is so unique that it is always toward what is coming in such a way that it allows the advent of what is coming as this advent remains its being. Accordingly, “the moment is neither finite nor infinite. Its time of endurance is *prior*

⁶⁷⁰ Heidegger, ‘Remembrance’ in *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, p. 126.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid., p. 128.

⁶⁷² Ibid. “Das Schicksal findet daher dann und nur dann seinen Ausgleich, wenn das Ungleiche als das Ungleiche west. Hier ist der Ausgleich kein Gleichmachen in das Unterschiedlose, sondern das gleiche Waltenlassen des Unterschiedenen in seinem Unterschied. Der Ausgleich ist nicht das Auslösen der Unterschiedenen, sondern ihre, der Götter und der Menschen, Rückkehr in das eigene Wesen. In solcher Rückkehr gründet das Bleiben des Ungleichen. Wann dieses bleibt, dann allein ist die Weile, in der das Schicksal rein verweilen kann.” (GA 4, p. 105.)

⁶⁷³ Ibid., p. 129. “Die Weile des verweilenden Schicksals ist das Maß des eigentlichen Bleibens.” (GA 4, p. 105.)

to those measures. This moment harbors that rest in which all the sending of destiny is contained”.⁶⁷⁴ In his interpretation of ‘As When on a Holiday...’, Heidegger also describes the nature, the holy as ‘the oldest time’(*die älteste Zeit*). Following Hölderlin’s words ‘For she, she herself, who is older than the ages/And above the gods of Occident and Orient,/Nature is now awakening with the clang of arms’, he writes:

‘Nature’ is the oldest time, and not at all ‘supertemporal’ in the metaphysical sense, and definitely not ‘eternal’ in the Christian sense. Nature is more temporal than ‘the ages’, because as the wonderfully all-present she has already bestowed on everything real the clearing in the open where everything real is first capable of appearing”.⁶⁷⁵

The open, the holy clears the space for everything in order that they appear. The holy is older than all ages not because it gives presence to everything actual. Rather, it is primordial because its immediacy is unapproachable and remains so in such a way that “the holy confronts all experience with something to which it is unaccustomed, and so deprives it of its ground”.⁶⁷⁶ The awakening of the holy is a shaking which destroys the accustomed in an awesome way. This is both the revealing of the world and the saying of language in the manner of coming to word of the holy. The immediacy of the holy which cannot be destroyed either by men or by a god is its primordality which shows itself as the emergence of the world through language. In other words, language and world are co-original. And “only where world holds sway is there history. Language is a good in a more primordial sense. It holds good for the fact that man can *be* as historical, i.e., it guarantess that”.⁶⁷⁷ Language as a saying which shows is the lingering for a while of the destiny through which what remains is founded by the poet as a moment (*Weile*). The latter is coming to pass of the festival as that which is celebrated by the poet in his poetizing. Then, it is not surprising that for Heidegger, “the festival, first sent by the holy, remains the origin of history”.⁶⁷⁸ By showing the origin in its originariness, the poet lets the unlike

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁵ Heidegger, ‘As When on a Holiday...’ in *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, p. 81.

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 85. “Das Heilige setzt alles Erfahren aus seiner Gewöhnung heraus und entzieht ihm so den Standort.” (GA 4, p. 63.)

⁶⁷⁷ Heidegger, ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, in *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, p. 56.

⁶⁷⁸ Heidegger, ‘Remembrance’ in *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, p. 129.

endure or abide as the moment, as primordial time. In this lasting of the unlike or the ‘between’, the world emerges as the confrontation of men and gods. This foundation prepared by the poet is carried out by naming the holy in the sense that the word no longer means a relation to a thing, but rather, the very relation itself whereby human being dwells upon this earth. Thus, language guarantess that human being *is* historical in the sense that “he is the one who must bear witness to what he is...To his belonging to the earth”.⁶⁷⁹

The moment (*Weile*) is not an eternal now. It is a lingering, tarrying for a while. As Heidegger says, it is the rest (*Ruhe*), not in the sense of cessation of movement, but as the stillness of the open, of the holy. He writes: “nature is at rest. Her rest in no way signifies cessation of movement. To rest is to gather oneself in view of a beginning (and the beginning of a movement remains always present in the movement)—it is to concentrate on the coming of the beginning.”⁶⁸⁰ The rest is the self-gathering which is a becoming-present of the beginning in its coming whose origination produces movement. Movement begins when the beginning is made present in its coming. In this sense, the rest or self-gathering and movement are the same. Language is both endurance (*bleiben*) and movement (*Bewegung*). It is endurance because in language, either as poetry or as thought, what remains is remaining in such a way that both the poet and the thinker remains behind the gift of language. But since this withholding of the language belongs to its originary character, what remains always remains in movement. Here we should think again the poet and the thinker in their divergence which is also their encounter. Although Heidegger does never explicitly talk about the difference between the poet and the thinker, we find a passage claiming that:

⁶⁷⁹ Heidegger, ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, in *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, p. 54.

⁶⁸⁰ Heidegger, ‘As When on a Holiday...’ in *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, p. 78. “Die Natur ruht. Ihre Ruhe bedeutet keineswegs das Aufhören der Bewegung. Ruhe ist das Sichsammeln auf den in aller Bewegung gegenwärtigen Anfang und sein Kommen.” (*GA 4*, p. 55.)

The thinker thinks toward what is un-homelike, what is not like home, and for him this is not a transitional phase; rather, this is his being *at home*. The poet's questioning, on the other hand, is a commemorative questioning that puts the homelike itself into poetry.⁶⁸¹

As we have seen, the poet cares being unhomely in becoming homely in such a way that what is at stake is being-homely, the hearth or the fire. The poet ventures or risks being burned by the fire of the home and this is why he is in the extreme danger. In other words, the poet throws himself into danger by being neither a god nor a human being. This is how he finds what remains, by letting the beginning be present (*Gegenwart*) in its coming. But the present is never a now point. Nature does not endure as hovering all, but rather, "her coming is the coming to presence of all-presence itself, and thus it is the very essence of the 'all-present'".⁶⁸² Indeed, if the poet lets the beginning be present in its coming, this is so insofar as there is movement as the coming to presence (*Anwesen*) of all-presence. The poet shows the beginning in its coming through which everything shows itself. Thus, the poet shows showing, which means that showing shows itself in its own movement just because the poet is now a demigod, not 'zu Hauß', but 'the between' itself and this is what for Heidegger, remembrance itself is. However, the thinker is *zu Hauß*, not the between. This does not mean that the thinker is homely as the poet because for Heidegger, it is not a matter of being at home, but being-homely as the poet is the river itself in its flowing backward. For the thinker, it seems, this is not possible. The thinker thinks toward the unhomely and stays there. The thinker is at home where he cannot escape from the unhomely whose concealment is made steadfast only by the poet in his remembrance. The thinker is the one who cannot be 'the between'. However, this is not due to the incapacity of the thinker. Rather, what calls thinking is the fact that endurance of the moment, namely, its rest is always already movement which does not mean the change of location, but the movement of coming to presence (*Anwesen*) of everything in the gathering of itself as itself. In other words, if time has a primordially or inceptuality in Heideggerian sense rather than its chronological sense, this just means that time is already space. Thus, to say that the thinker is *zu*

⁶⁸¹ Heidegger, 'Remembrance' in *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, p. 151. "Der Denker denkt in das Unheimische, das ihm nicht ein Durchgang, sondern das *zu Hauß* ist. Das an-denkende Fragen des Dichters dagegen dichtet das Heimische." (GA 4, p. 129.)

⁶⁸² Heidegger, 'As When on a Holiday...' in *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, p. 78. "Ihr Kommen ist die Anwesen der Allgegenwart und so das Wesen der 'Allgegenwärtigen'" (GA 4, p. 55.)

Hauß is to say that there is time in its primordiality, that is, in its own claim as itself, which emerges from the neighborhood of poetry and thinking.

The poet thinks of what remains in such a way that he shows the movement itself as the originariness of the origin. Concealment and revealing of the origin which occur at once in poetizing is what remains in its remaining, for poetizing. The poet poetizes in such a way that he is embraced by what remains in its light and darkness. For the thinker, we might say that he thinks of the movement of *Anwesenung*, the world in such a way that he shows what remains. Now what remains is the world or movement of *Anwesenung*. Accordingly, the thinker thinks in such a way that his thinking is called by *Anwesenung* in its remaining. Indeed, for Heidegger, this is what it means to say that “thought is in need of memory, the gathering of thought”.⁶⁸³ Memory (*Gedächtnis*) is a unrelenting, gathered enduring, abiding with...(unablässige, gesammelte Bleiben bei...). It is not merely retention of the past, but a remaining with what has been, what is present and what may come in such a way that “what is past, present and to come appears in the oneness of its own present being”.⁶⁸⁴ In thinking as memory, past, present and future is gathered as the coming to presence of the presence (*An-wesen*). In this sense, thinking (*Denken*) is understood in terms of its root meaning that Heidegger finds in the word ‘thanc’ (*Gedanc*) which also means ‘thanking’. Accordingly, thinking is a thinking back that recalls; it always thinks by recalling what is to be thought as that to which it already belongs. Heidegger also calls memory heart (*Gemüt or Herz*) in the sense that the heart, thinking, gives thought to itself in the sense that it is already beholden. The heart thanks for its being beholden because for Heidegger, to be able to think is the highest gift. This does not mean that human being has the gift, but rather, his essence is to devote his thinking to what is to be thought in such a way that he is the gathering itself which keeps being gathered as the most thought-provoking. This is what the word ‘Anliegen’ means, namely, contiguous or contact. Essence of human being is understood in terms of ‘being in touch with...’ which occurs as memory or thinking. Accordingly, “the *thanc*, the heart’s core, is the gathering of all that

⁶⁸³ Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?* p. 138.

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 140. “Das Vergangene, das Gegenwartige, das Kommende erscheinen in der Einheit eines je eigenen *An-wesens*.” (GA 8, p. 144.)

concerns us, all that we care for, all that touches us insofar as we are, as human beings”.⁶⁸⁵ This does not mean that human being is determined by beings next to it and then collects what is there. This is not possible just because for Heidegger, what is is not an actual or factual being. Rather, what is also involves ‘what can be’, ‘what must be’ and ‘what has been’, that is, beings are always in being in such a way that being is there as the being of beings. In this sense, he says, “man is the being who is in that he points toward ‘Being’, and who can be himself only as he always and everywhere refers himself to what is”.⁶⁸⁶ Human being is not next to beings; rather, his essence, that is, memory that recalls, consists in keeping ‘being-neighbor’ in safety.

This amounts to keeping or preserving the duality of being and beings in safety where human being dwells. This keeping gives itself as the keeping *hidden* of what is to be thought and therefore keeps being recalled in thinking as what must be thought in such a way that the keeping remains the most thought-provoking. Accordingly, thinking, like language, can only be understood as a way itself, as ‘to be underway’. It is movement (*Bewegung*) in the sense that

The movement, step by step, is what is essential here. Thinking clears its way only by its own questioning advance. But this clearing of the way is curious. The way that is cleared does not remain behind, but is built into the next step, and is projected forward from it.⁶⁸⁷

Thinking as memory is the gatheredness of the way in its clearing. It moves itself as its movement insofar as it keeps or preserves ‘being in contact’ with what nears it. What, in its nearing, arrives or concerns thinking is ‘what is’ or beings in their being in such a way that being is their being. As we know, the latter is what Heidegger determines as the ontological difference. However, here, it should be noticed that Heidegger’s aim is to say the origin of the ontological difference. Then, what is at stake is to see that thinking is not a mere gathering, but a gathering that recalls, that is, it keeps thinking back what demands to be thought as itself in such a way that it is

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 144. “Der Gedanc, der Herzensgrund ist die Versammlung alles dessen, was uns angeht, was uns anlangt, woran uns liegt, uns, insofern wir als Menschen sind.” (GA 8, p. 149.)

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 149.

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 170. “Die Bewegung, Schritt vor Schritt, ist hier das Wesentliche. Das Denken baut erst im fragenden Gang seinen Weg. Aber dieser Wegebau ist seltsam. Das Gebaute bleibt nicht zuruck und liegen, sondern es wird in den folgenden Schritt eingebaut und diesem vorgebaut.” (GA 8, p. 174.)

gathered as itself. But how could we understand this kind of gathering? For Heidegger, as he sets forth in his lecture *Logos*, that gathering can be found in what Greeks means by ‘legein’ which means ‘laying’ or ‘letting-lie-before-us’ in the sense that “to lay means to bring to lie. Thus, to lay is at the same time to place one thing beside another, to lay them together. To lay is to gather [lesen]”.⁶⁸⁸ To gather (*Lesen* or *Sammeln*) can only be understood in terms of legein as ‘laying’. Then, what does it mean to say that something is let lie there? He writes:

What must be laid lies there, and henceforth belongs to what *already* lies before us. And what lies before us is primary, especially when it lies there *before* all the laying and setting that are *man’s* work, when it lies there prior to all that man lays out, lays down, or lays in ruin.⁶⁸⁹

Thus, what lies in something that lies there is primary in its lying-there. It lies there before all human making. But how could we still claim that human being in his essence as memory is in contact with what lies there? For Heidegger, indeed, this is what memory means as long as we understand it as ‘noein’. The latter should not be understood as perception or thinking in its traditional sense. Rather, *noein* is ‘taking-to-heart’ (*in die Acht nehmen*) in the sense that “what is taken to heart, however, is left to be exactly as it is. This taking-to-hearth does not make over what it takes. Taking to heart is: to keep at heart”.⁶⁹⁰ In this sense, *noein* is not apprehending of what lies before us, but rather, it lets what lies lie in its lying-there. Accordingly, *legein* and *noein* penetrate each other. When we take up something that which lies there, we take it up insofar as its lying-there is also gathered. In other words, thinking as memory can only come to presence when it refers to the duality of beings and being which manifests itself through the letting-lie-before of the *legein*. Once this relatedness is thought, the duality of beings and being is no longer considered as ontological difference, but as the presencing of what is present.

The latter is what Parmenides understands by the word ‘ἐόν’ which means neither just an individual being nor being as such, but their duality. Thus, as Heidegger insists in his lecture *Moira*, it is essential to see that thinking can only be

⁶⁸⁸ Martin Heidegger, ‘Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)’ in *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, San Francisco : Harper & Row, 1975. p. 61.

⁶⁸⁹ Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, p. 205.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 203.

understood within this duality “because thinking belongs with εὖν in the gathering that εὖν calls for; and because thinking itself, resting in the λέγειν, completes the gathering called for, thus responding to its belonging to εὖν as a belonging which εὖν uses”.⁶⁹¹ In order to understand the relation of thinking to the duality, we need to grasp how thinking rests in *legein*. Here Heidegger again refers to Parmenides’ saying: ‘thinking, which as something uttered is in being’. Thus, thinking belongs to being because it is something uttered. Utterance or speaking is *legein*, but for Heidegger, *legein* is not the vocalization (φωνή) of the word as the expression of something interior. Indeed, the true understanding of *legein* requires inquiring into that φωνή, not as the system of signs and significations, but as ‘bringing-forward-into-view’ (φάσις) which is nothing but ‘letting-lie-before’. Thus, as Heidegger keeps repeating, it is language that speaks in the sense of *legein* and thinking belongs to *legein* as long as it is a hearing or listening insofar as speaking or telling is a laying and gathering, not signification. He writes: “to belong to speech—this is nothing else than in each case letting whatever a letting-lie-before lays down before us lie gathered in its entirety. Such a letting-lie establishes whatever lies before us as lying-before. It establishes this as itself. It lays one and the Same in one”.⁶⁹² The gathering of thinking in terms of a listening that recalls gathers letting-lie-before into itself, into laying-before in such a way that letting-lie-before manifests itself as laying-before. In other words, thinking or speaking does not manipulate what lies before because for Heidegger ‘heart’ of thinking already belongs to gathering in its hearing. This becomes understandable only if we see that speaking is not vocalization of sounds, but a ‘bringing-into-view’ in such a way that words does not name like terms which designate things, but rather, “to name means to call forward. That which is gathered and laid down in the name, by means of such a laying, comes to light and come to lie before us. The naming (ὄνομα) in terms of λέγειν, is not the expressing of a word-meaning but rather a letting-lie-before in the light wherein something stands in such a way that it has a name ”.⁶⁹³ Thinking belongs to being

⁶⁹¹ Martin Heidegger, ‘Moir (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)’ in *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, San Francisco : Harper & Row, 1975. p. 91.

⁶⁹² Heidegger, ‘Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)’ in *Early Greek Thinking*, p. 66.

⁶⁹³ Ibid., p. 73.

because the duality of beings and being *speaks* in such a way that through the naming of the speaking, a being stands in the open which is gathered by taking-to-hearth of the *noein* as laying-before of *legein* and both refers to the duality in its concealing or calling. This is why naming is not a matter of depicting something, but a calling forward; it calls forward thinking in order to respond to the call of *ἐόν* which arises from its concealing in such a way that *ἐόν* uses *noein*.

5.3. Clearing of the open

What is at issue is not determine what thinking is, but to follow the call which calls thinking. In this sense, for Heidegger, the question ‘what is called thinking?’ should be read as ‘what is it that calls and commands us to think?’. And now we can see that this call comes from the duality of beings and being, which Heidegger defines as presencing of what is present. Both *legein* and *noein* refers to that duality in the sense that they are used by it, which means that speaking is already a letting-lie-before in its coordination with the taking-to-heart of *noein*. Thus, Parmenides’ saying ‘*χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐὼν ἔμμεναι*’, which is traditionally translated as ‘one should both say and think that Being is’, should be translated as ‘useful is: letting-lie-before-us and so (the) taking-to-heart too: being: to be’.⁶⁹⁴ In metaphysical thinking, *ἐὼν ἔμμεναι* is considered as ‘beings in being’, but for Heidegger, in order to speak of an individual being and its participation in being, the duality of beings and being should first lie before us in such a way that we take it to heart as it lies before. Accordingly, *ἐὼν* does not mean individual being, but what is present (*Anwesende*) while *ἔμμεναι* refers not to being in itself but to ‘to be present’ (*Anwesen*). Then, Heidegger translates *ἐὼν ἔμμεναι* as presencing of what is present (*Anwesen des Anwesenden*) and the reason is that “yet we must admit that the word ‘to be’ always dissipates like a vapor, into every conceivable vague signification, while the word ‘present’ speaks at once more clearly: something present, that is, present to us. Present and presence means: what is with us. And that means: to endure in the encounter”.⁶⁹⁵ Presence

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 217. “Es brauchet: das Vorliegenlassen und so (das) In-die-Acht-nehmen auch: Seiendes: sein.” (GA 8, p. 221.)

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 233. “Gleichwohl müssen wir zugeben, daß das Wort ‘sein’ uns stets in alle möglichen unbestimmten Bedeutungen zerflattert, wogegen das Wort ‘anwesen’ sogleich deutlicher spricht: Anwesendes, d. h. uns Gegenwartiges. Anwesen und Anwesenheit heißt: Gegenwart. Diese meint das Entgegenweilen.” (GA 8, p. 237.)

shows itself in the present (*Gegenwart*) as an encountering enduring (*Entgegenweile*). Again as in Hölderlin's case, we find here the mentioning of *Gegenwart* and *Weile*. For Heidegger, as we know, *Gegenwart* does not merely mean the presently present, but signifies a coming to or going away from the presence. In his *Anaximander Fragment*, he writes: "the *gegen* in *gegenwärtig* [presently] does not mean something over against a subject, but rather an open expanse [*Gegend*] of unconcealment, into which and within which whatever comes lingers".⁶⁹⁶ Presencing of what is present is an arrival into the region or expanse of unconcealment where it lingers for a while. It is obvious that such an arriving involves the departing of what is absent from unconcealment or its coming toward it in such a way that absent also belongs to that presencing. This coming and going constitutes the lingering or awhiling of the present in its presence. "But what is at the present time present is not a slice of something sandwiched between two absences. If what is present stands in the forefront of the vision, everything presences together: one brings the other with it, one lets the other go. What is presently present in unconcealment lingers in unconcealment as in an open expanse".⁶⁹⁷ Thus, 'to be present', *Anwesen*, that is, ἐὼν means both coming closer (*herbei-παρά*) and going away (*hinweg-ἀπό*) as the verb εἶναι is used in Greek as παρεῖναι and ἀπεῖναι. For Heidegger, this leads us to think *Wesen* in its verbal sense in such a way that it means 'währen', that is, 'to endure, to last'. In *The Question Concerning Technology*, he writes: "it is from the verb *wesen* that the noun is derived. *Wesen* understood as a verb is the same as *währen* [to last or endure], not only in terms of meaning, but also in terms of the phonetic formation of the word".⁶⁹⁸ But what kind of endurance do we find here? It is *Weile*, duration of unconcealment. When a mountain is present, this means that it has arisen from unconcealment into the unconcealed. Although unconcealment is itself an arrival from or departing into the concealment, it is crucial to see that Heidegger insists that

What is present has arisen from unconcealment. It takes its origin from such a rise in its being present. Having arising from unconcealment, what is present also has entered into what was already concealed: the mountain range lies in the landscape. Its presence is the rising entry

⁶⁹⁶ Heidegger, 'The Anaximander Fragment' in *Early Greek Thinking*, p. 34.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 37.

⁶⁹⁸ Martin Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology' in *The Question Concerning Technology and the Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt, New York : Harper & Row, 1977. p. 30.

into what is unconcealed within unconcealment, even and especially when the mountain range keeps standing as it is, extending and jutting.⁶⁹⁹

This is not to underestimate concealment that lies in unconcealment, but to see that concealment always conceals itself, that is, it never comes to the fore. Presence itself does not come out, but only what is present or unconcealed beings.

Thus, we should see that “even, and in particular, that unconcealment in which this rise and entry takes place, remains concealed, in contrast to the unconcealed present beings”.⁷⁰⁰ This amounts to saying that presence is always presence *of* what is present and therefore it claims unconcealment; it needs the *Weile* of unconcealment in such a way that a continuous rising into lasts. Thus, “presence does demand unconcealment, and is a rising from unconcealment—though not generally but in such a way that presence is the entry into a duration of unconcealment”.⁷⁰¹ Endurance of the *Weile* is a luminous self-appearance. It both involves movement and rest; it is coming-to-the-fore which is at rest. Then, *Weile* is a gathering (*Versammlung*) of rising and absenting (*Abwesen*) as unconcealment, that is, “it gathers the rising to the coming-to-the-fore, with the hidden suddenness of an ever-possible absenting into concealedness”.⁷⁰² Thus, the gathering of the endurance of unconcealment gathers while letting arising from happens through the sudden absenting of the absent. It is a ‘*Her- und schon bei-wesen*’, that is, coming to the near in its arising from, what is present presences while presencing keeps itself as nearing as such in such a way that unconcealment is preserved or sheltered. This is why laying as gathering refers to the protection of what lies before us as itself. In this sense, “what lies together before us is stored, laid away, secured and deposited in unconcealment, and that means sheltered in unconcealment”.⁷⁰³ Thus, for Heidegger, unconcealment refers to the concern of *legen* to protect itself as the very ‘*Sache*’

⁶⁹⁹ Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, p. 236.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 237.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid., p. 237. “Anwesen nimmt Unverborgenheit in Anspruch und ist Aufgehen *aus* dieser. Aber nicht nur überhaupt, sondern so, daß Anwesen je das Eingehen in eine Weile von Unverborgenheit ist.” (GA 8, p. 241.)

⁷⁰² Ibid., p. 237. “Sie versammelt das Aufgehen zum Hervorkommen mit der verborgenen Jähe des stets möglichen Abwesens in die Verborgenheit.” (GA 8, p. 241.)

⁷⁰³ Heidegger, ‘Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)’ in *Early Greek Thinking*, p. 63.

which lies there. In other words, *lesein* does not concern itself with protecting a being in its being because what is present already presences, but rather with protecting ‘what lies before us’ in the laying before us of beings. Accordingly, *bei-wesen* does not refer to a being in its coming towards us, but to nearness “in the sense of the radiance issuing from unconcealedness into unconcealedness”.⁷⁰⁴ We should see that to say ‘from unconcealedness into unconcealedness’ is to say ‘from unconcealedness into the unconcealed’, that is, what is at issue is the fact that something is unconcealed in such a way that it is unconcealed by entering into something that is already unconcealed. In this way, unconcealment is the preserving itself of presencing as the presencing of what is present in the sense that it *rests* concealed. And this is why for Heidegger, “what has come near in such nearness may be very distant”.⁷⁰⁵

Now we can understand why the thinker is at home (*zu Hause*) in un-homely. The thinker always thinks toward the un-homely, which is not a transitional phase. It is not transitional because thinking is called by the duality of the presencing of what is present, the duality whose only concern is to protect itself or to conceal itself in order to be taken to heart as its own laying itself. Thus, we found a nearing in its distancing as that we found in the poet’s becoming the showing itself of the origin in its flowing and withdrawing. In different manners, both poetizing and thinking are the keeping of presencing in its concealing and indeed, for Heidegger, it is this kind of nearness as the Saying which constitutes the neighborhood of poetry and thinking. It should be reminded that Heidegger’s aim is not to inquire into the essence of language through the neighborhood of poetry and thinking. Rather, his aim is to understand essence (*Wesen*) and language (*Sprache*) in their belonging together in such a way that it becomes possible to enter into a thinking experience with language. And the thinker needs the poet. He writes: “it is well, therefore, to give thought to the neighbor, to him who dwells in the same neighborhood”.⁷⁰⁶ What makes the thinker and the poet neighbor is the fact that they *dwell* together. We

⁷⁰⁴ Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, p. 237.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁶ Heidegger, ‘The Nature of Language’ in *On The Way to Language*, p. 70.

should know that for Heidegger, *Wesen* means nearing while distancing, not for human being, but in such a way that human being is also conditioned by that presencing. As we shall see, this being-conditioned by presencing of what is present means ‘to dwell’. Thus, in order to understand how poetizing *and* thinking, that is, language belongs to being human essentially, we should see that for Heidegger, it is not a matter of speaking about language, but letting the essence of language come to the sounded word as language. When we undergo a thinking experience with the essence of language, what we do is not a mere talking about something, because language is already that very space where presencing holds us, as that which initiates our being. Thus, in a thinking experience with language, our relation to language is already transformed in the sense that what is at case is the language of essence through which we are allowed to dwell in the world, not just found ourselves in the midst of beings. This means that *Wesen speaks* in such a way that “language belongs to this persisting being, is proper to what moves all things because that is its most distinctive property. What moves all things moves in that it speaks”.⁷⁰⁷ *Wesen*, insofar as it is both *Anwesen* and *Abwesen*, is being-moved of everything including human being. And for Heidegger, to say that ‘it moves’ is to say that ‘it speaks’. Insofar as language is considered in its relation to the movement of essence, it is called Saying (*Sage*). Accordingly, Saying which also means showing, is that which moves all things. Insofar as Saying is the essential moving, it means nearness (*Nähe*) which constitutes the neighborhood of poetry and thinking in the coming to word as that self-movement.

Thus, nearness is the ground of the neighborhood of thinking and poetry. It grounds the essence of language in such a way that what is at issue is the essential language in the manner of moving and whiling. It is not neighborhood which constitutes the nearness or Saying, but the reverse. This leads us to understand language as Saying, as that which moves all things, that is, as nearness. Then, it is necessary to inquire into the nature of that nearness and distancing. For Heidegger, nearness and distance cannot be measured parametrically, that is, it cannot be grounded in the spatial-temporal relations of mathematical physics because in its

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 95. “Die Sprache gehört in dieses Wesende, eignet dem alles Be-wëgenden als dessen Eigenstes. Das All-Bewëgende be-wëgt, indem es spricht.” (GA 12, p. 190.)

mathematical sense, time and space cannot give us nearness as a nearness which creates neighborhood. In other words, for Heidegger, nearness has sense, not because it can be measured by the parameters of space and time, but because it gives neighborhood which he calls ‘to be face-to-face with one another’ (*Gegen-einander-über*). The latter should not merely be considered as the neighborhood of two human beings or the neighborhood of poetry and thinking,

Yet being face-to-face with another has a more distant origin; it originates in that distance where earth and sky, the god and man reach one another... The movement at the core of the world’s four regions, which makes them reach one another and holds them in the nearness of their distance, is nearness itself. This movement is what paves the way for being face-to-face.⁷⁰⁸

In the fourfold (*Geviert*) of the world, earth, sky, the god and man near each other while keeping this nearing in their distancing from each other. This cannot be calculated parametrically because in the parametric time, all ‘nows’ are considered in a sequence in such a way that “one ‘now’ is never in open face-to-face encounter with another”.⁷⁰⁹ Thus, Heidegger’s aim is to understand ‘now’ or the present (*Gegenwart*) as it is already *gegen* or encounter to itself from within itself. As we have seen, this is nothing but *Wesen* in its *An-wesen* and *Ab-wesen*, namely, presencing *of* what is present. And we also know that *wesen* is a whiling (*weilen*) which is an absencing as presencing. This means that absencing either as going away of what has been or coming toward of what will be approaches us or concerns us. Then, he asks:

How are we to determine this giving of presencing that prevails in the present, in the past, in the future? Does this giving lie in this, that it reaches us, or does it reach us because it is in itself a reaching? The latter.⁷¹⁰

What is at issue is not to understand being in terms of time, but to show that both ‘there is being’ and ‘there is time’, a task that Heidegger tries to handle in his lecture *Time and Being*. Accordingly, presencing of what is present is reaching of time, its extending (*Reichen*) in its absencing which still holds us. The interplay of time’s three dimension gives time itself as its own unity. In this sense, for Heidegger, time

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 104.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁷¹⁰ Martin Heidegger, ‘Time and Being’ in *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, University of Chicago Press, 2002. p. 13.

is four-dimensional in the sense that the forth dimension becomes the giving of time itself. This giving itself of time is the opening up for reaching out of each dimension in their mutual reaching each other. In that openness, dimensions of time reach each other in such a way that they are held apart from each other. This nearness in its distancing, which Heidegger again calls *Nahheit*, is the forth dimension which gives time. Thus, with respect to this forth dimension, it should be seen that “it brings future, past and present near to one another by distancing them. For it keeps what has been open by denying its advent as present. This nearing of nearness keeps open the approach coming from the future by withholding the present in the approach”.⁷¹¹ The present is, thus, never presently present, but an absencing as presencing either as it *presences* as the denial of itself for the advent of the past or as the withdrawal of itself before the coming of the future.

This shows us that time times or ‘it gives time’ (*Es gibt Zeit*) as an extending or reaching which opens up. Again we should remark that Heidegger’s aim is not to give an account of being in terms of time or the reverse. Rather, to say that ‘it gives time’ is to say that ‘it gives being’ in such a way that the matter is that giving itself. This becomes understandable when we see that for Heidegger, “presence means: the constant abiding that approaches man, reaches him, is extended to him”.⁷¹² Thus, presence is an abiding in lasting in such a way that *we* are concerned or reached out and this reaching out is timing of time. Now *Ereignis* is understood as this belonging together of being and time. Insofar as time (being) is a reaching out or extending, it removes us and “in removing us and bringing toward us, time moves on its way what simultaneity yields and throws open to it: time-space”.⁷¹³ The true time times by throwing open, conceding or granting (*einräumen*), that is, time is always time-space (*Zeit-Raum*). Time carries us away towards the simultaneity of time in its three dimensions in such a way that that simultaneity is brought to us and thus spent. This is a granting and concession in the sense that being human is admitted as this timing-

⁷¹¹ Ibid., p. 15.

⁷¹² Ibid., p. 12. “Anwesenheit besagt: das stete, an Menschen angehende, ihn erreichende, ihm gereichte Verweilen.” (*Zur Sache des Denkens*, GA 14, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007. p. 17.)

⁷¹³ Heidegger, ‘The Nature of Language’ in *On The Way to Language*, p. 106. “Entriickend-zubringend be-wegt sie das, was das Gleich-Zeitige ihr einraumt: den Zeit-Raum.” (GA 12, p. 202.)

spacing which means ‘to dwell’. Thus, timing and spacing belong to the Same as *Zeit-Spiel-Raum* and “this Same moves the encounter of the four world regions: earth and sky, god and man – the world play”.⁷¹⁴ Although time-space moves as that world-moving Saying or nearness, they are themselves are not moving; they are at rest. Accordingly, that movement which moves four regions of the world as a world-play is called stillness (*Stille*).

This does not mean that time-space, Saying or nearing in its world-moving has a being in itself. In other words, the world cannot be considered as being as such. What is at issue is the worlding of the world through which each region of the world belongs each other in their distance. On the one hand, that nearing in the showing of Saying is the presencing of what is present. On the other hand, it is the worlding of the world in its unifying itself as fourfold, which is also a time-space of dwelling. Indeed, Heidegger thinks those two aspects together. Insofar as presence means reaching of constant abiding to human being, being and time belongs together. And insofar as time grants or admits in its carrying us away, it means ‘making room for’ dwelling. Thus, presencing of what is present and dwelling of human being confirms each other. However, Heidegger thinks the second through the first. In order to understand this, we should remember what for Heidegger, ‘to dwell’ means. He writes that “to be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell”.⁷¹⁵ It could be recognized that dwelling, together with mortality, is the basic character of being human. However, this is so as long as human being is on the *earth*. It remains to ask how earth shows itself. In order to answer this question, Heidegger looks at the presencing of what is present, which he also calls ‘thinging of the thing’. In the thinging of the thing, not only earth, but also sky, divinities and mortals are gathered and appropriated as the fourfold. He writes: “the thing things. Thinging gathers. Appropriating the fourfold, it gathers the fourfold’s stay, its while, into something that stays for a while: into this thing, that thing”.⁷¹⁶ Thing presences as it

⁷¹⁴ Ibid.

⁷¹⁵ Martin Heidegger, ‘Building, Dwelling, Thinking’ in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, New York, Harper & Row, 1971. p. 147.

⁷¹⁶ Martin Heidegger, ‘The Thing’ in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, New York, Harper & Row, 1971. p. 175.

stays the fourfold of the world by bringing each region into its own in the distance proper to them. Thus, thinging is also nearing in the sense that “the thing is not ‘in’ nearness, ‘in’ proximity, as if nearness were a container. Nearness is at work in bringing near, as the thinging of the thing”.⁷¹⁷ The thing is not ‘in’ the world, but rather, it is the worlding of the world insofar as thinging or presencing of the thing is nothing but nearing of nearness. Moreover, the thing is no longer what is proximate or next to us given that we, as mortals, are also gathered through that thinging of the thing. As a consequent, the thingly character of the thing, an issue which is not decided in *The Origin of the Work of Art* is now considered again. Confirming *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger distinguishes also the thing from the artifact. Thus, the thingly character of the thing does not lie in that it is produced or made by us. Rather, the thing is as the thing as it presences the nearing of the fourfold in such a way that the distance is preserved in this nearing through which nearness keeps or conceals itself.

In this way, we preserve the thing in its thingly character in the sense that thinging becomes the nearing of the world and “as we preserve the thing *qua* thing we inhabit nearness”.⁷¹⁸ The thinging of the thing gives us nearness in its nearing. The latter is how nearness presences, it is the movement which keeps itself at rest as worlding world. This is to understand the thinging of the thing from out of the worlling world and this is also our dwelling because “thinking in this way, we are called by the thing as the thing. In the strict sense of the German word *bedingt*, we are the be-thinged, the conditioned ones”.⁷¹⁹ Inhabiting the nearness, we are conditioned by things. Accordingly, “dwelling itself is always a staying with things. Dwelling, as preserving, keeps the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things”.⁷²⁰ Dwelling also gathers and appropriates the fourfold and this happens as long as dwelling is a ‘staying with things’ (*Aufenthalt bei den Dingen*). The latter is not added to the fourfold from outside. Rather, insofar as things secures the nearing

⁷¹⁷ Ibid., p. 178.

⁷¹⁸ Ibid., p. 181. “Insofern wir das Ding als das Ding schonen, bewohnen wir die Nähe.” (GA 7, p. 182.)

⁷¹⁹ Ibid.

⁷²⁰ Heidegger, ‘Building, Dwelling, Thinking’ in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 151.

of the world in their presencing, dwelling, as staying with things, “preserves the fourfold by bringing the presencing of the fourfold into things”.⁷²¹ And insofar as dwelling is understood as it preserves the worlding of the world in things, it is building (*Bauen*). Heidegger does not have in mind building in its narrow sense either as cultivating or as construction. What he points to is the built thing insofar as it, through its gathering the fourfold, brings about location (*Ort*) which provides for space (*Raum*). In this way, the thing gives itself as a site (*Stätte*) for the fourfold. There is no location before the thinging of the thing, but rather, location is given by virtue of the thing. In the same manner, space is not before human beings as an external object or inner experience. Rather, “a space is something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely within a boundary, Greek *peras*. A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something *begins its presencing*”.⁷²² A space is the beginning of *Wesen* in such a way that through that dwelling, presencing (*Wesen*) is preserved. How does *Wesen* be initiated while secured in its initiality? This becomes understandable when we see that only mortals dwell. For Heidegger, “to say mortals *are* is to say that *in dwelling*, they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations”.⁷²³ Thus, *to be* mortal is to let presencing (*Wesen*) presence through the thinging of the things in their locality, which means dwelling as staying with things through spaces. This is nothing but to say that “mortals dwell in that they initiate their own nature—their being capable of death as death...”.⁷²⁴ In dwelling, besides the saving the earth, receiving the sky and awaiting the divinities, to be mortal is also initiated as being capable of death as death.

It could be seen that *Wesen* in its beginning as itself immediately means to be capable of being mortal, that is, dwelling as initiating being human as that initiality. This becomes understandable when we see that thinging of the thing is understood

⁷²¹ Ibid.

⁷²² Ibid., p. 154. “Ein Raum ist etwas Eingeräumtes, Freigegebenes, nämlich in eine Grenze, griechisch πέρας. Die Grenze ist nicht das, wobei etwas aufhört, sondern, wie die Griechen es erkannten, die Grenze ist jenes, von woher etwas *sein Wesen beginnt*.” (GA 7, p. 156.)

⁷²³ Ibid., p. 157.

⁷²⁴ Ibid., p. 151. “Die Sterblichen wohnen, insofern sie ihr eigenes Wesen, daß sie nämlich den Tod als Tod vermögen...” (GA 7, p. 152.)

from out of the worldling of the world. Heidegger reaches such a point through the analysis of presencing as the presencing *of* what is present, which refers to the showing which is moved in Saying as nearing. In Saying as nearing, as we have seen, there is a showing of *Wesen* in its absencing as presencing whereby *Wesen* also means whiling. Among its different senses, this owning is one aspect of *Ereignis*. In *The Way to Language*, he writes:

*The moving force in Showing of Saying is Owning. It is what brings all present and absent beings each into their own, from where they show themselves in what they are, and where they abide according to their kind. This owning which brings them there, and which moves Saying as Showing in its showing we call Appropriation.*⁷²⁵

Ereignis means coming to its own of what presences and what absences. This is an abiding for a while, which does not mean that it is transitory, but means that it is not derived from something else. It is a matter of understanding what is present in its presencing/absencing, that is, the thing in its thinging. As we have seen, the latter is the presencing of nearing of the world in its worldling whereby four regions are gathered and appropriated. This nearing requires time-space through which nearness is no longer calculated by parametric time and space, but gives itself as the ‘there is’: ‘there is being’ *and* ‘there is time’. The co-belonging of being and time is the origination of time as space in the sense that nearing of the world as the thinging of the thing is nothing other than the dwelling of mortals in its reaching out. This means that *Ereignis* is already *Er-äugen*, that is, it beholds human being towards its being capable of mortal. Thus, “appropriation, in beholding human nature, makes mortals appropriate for that which avows itself from everywhere to man in Saying, which points toward the concealed”.⁷²⁶ Human being is beheld and seen as the mortal and in this way appropriated to his own which is promised to him in Saying which speaks everywhere in its remaining concealed. As we have seen, human being is appropriated as he answers Saying. For Heidegger, however, what matters is neither Saying itself nor inventing a way to language in the manner of answering, but to see

⁷²⁵ Heidegger, ‘The Way to Language’ in *On The Way to Language*, p. 127. “*Das Regende im Zeigen der Sage ist das Eignen. Es erbringt das An-und Abwesende in sein jeweilig Eigenes, aus dem dieses sich an ihm selbst zeigt und nach seiner Art verweilt. Das erbringende Eignen, das die Sage als die Zeige in ihrem Zeigen regt, heie das Ereignen.*” (GA 12, p. 246.)

⁷²⁶ Ibid., p. 129. “*Das Ereignis ereignet in seinem Er-äugen des Menschenwesens die Sterblichen dadurch, daß es sie dem vereignet, was sich dem Menschen in der Sage von überall her auf Verborgenes hin zusagt.*” (GA 12, p. 249.)

that “the way is appropriating”.⁷²⁷ In other words, if there is a way, this is so because Appropriation always gives itself as a relation, indeed for Heidegger, the owning which endures in Saying is the relation of all relations in such a way that “our saying – always an answering – remains forever relational”.⁷²⁸ Being human as mortal, that is, to dwell is to be committed to the essence of language, which is not a lack, “but rather an advantage by which we are favored with a special realm, that realm where we, who are needed and used to speak language, dwell as *mortals*”.⁷²⁹

In a sense, we are close to understand the relationship between mortal dwelling and language as long as we see that *Wesen* is a showing in Saying which is moved from out of itself by giving itself as time-space which nears in distancing, whereby thing things, world worlds and human being dwells as that nearing. This relation is usually thought in terms of co-belonging of human being and being, which is also called *Ereignis*. Indeed, Heidegger, in his lecture entitled *The Principle of Identity* stresses on that relationship. With regard to the principle of identity, he claims that “everywhere, whenever and however we are related to beings of everykind, we find identity making its claim on us. If this claim were not made, beings could never appear in their Being”.⁷³⁰ It could be argued that for Heidegger, from the beginning of his path of thought, being is to be understood as this relation of identity which is claimed through the appearance of beings. Identity claim consists in that each being claims to be the same with itself. This means that being is not to be thought in terms of beings, but as that very relation which claims itself as itself. This is nothing but that which we have already discussed in terms of truth of essence and then as presencing *of* what is present. Moreover, since *Being and Time*, Heidegger recognizes that this requires to take into account the situation of man insofar as it is man who is related to beings so that being becomes a claim or better said, insofar as

⁷²⁷ Ibid.

⁷²⁸ Ibid., p. 135.

⁷²⁹ Ibid., p. 134.

⁷³⁰ Martin Heidegger, ‘The Principle of Identity’ in *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, New York, Harper & Row, 1969. p. 26. “Überall, wo und wie wir uns zum Seienden jeglicher Art verhalten, finden wir uns von der Identität angesprochen. Spräche dieser Anspruch nicht, dann vermöchte es das Seiende niemals, in seinem Sein zu erscheinen”. (*Identität und Differenz*, GA 11, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006. p. 35.)

presence presences as that which concerns human being. This is why Heidegger, in this lecture, insists that the identity that claims itself on us in such a way that it speaks to us is what is at stake in the sense that what we need to think again and again is that identity relation or claim itself which immediately refers to the belonging together of being and man.

However, *Ereignis* as co-belonging of being and man is not the last word of Heidegger's thinking. Rather, it is the foreword which always remains what is the most thought-provoking. To think being in terms of itself as a relation is to follow beings until what concerns us most becomes visible in its originary givenness. What is crucial is to see that human being and what concerns or reaches him are not separated but appropriated to each other. In other words, presencing of what is present as the relation of all relations which speaks in its stillness is also the relationality as mortal dwelling which listens to that speaking. It is noteworthy to see that Heidegger's main insight, as he sets forth in his lecture *Language*, is that we encounter the speaking of language in what is spoken "for here speech has come to completion in what is spoken".⁷³¹ Only when language completes itself (*sich vollendet*) in what is spoken (*Gesprochene*), it persists or presences as the speech of essence, that is, it stills. If the thing things by gathering the fourfold into its nearing, this happens in language because the thinging of the thing is a bidding or inviting of the thing into its thinging, which only happens through the calling or naming of the word in such a way that what the calling calls is itself. Thus, "in the naming, the things named are called into their thinging. Thinging, they unfold world, in which things abide and so are abiding ones. By thinging, things carry out world".⁷³² Heidegger finds this kind of naming in the poem of Georg Trakl, entitled 'A Winter Evening'. Accordingly, in the poem, things are called into a place of arrival which itself is absent. Thus, in their being called, things are made present but since calling keeps its call in its calling in such a way that calling is always coming to near of what is uncalled, presence of what is present in the poem is sheltered in absence. In

⁷³¹ Martin Heidegger, 'Language' in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, New York, Harper & Row, 1971. p. 194.

⁷³² *Ibid.*, p. 199.

this way, “it invites things in, so that they bear upon men as things”.⁷³³ Things are invited into their thinging or presencing in such a way that they, gathering the fourfold of the world, concern human being but this calling also calls into absence because calling also calls the thing into absence in the sense that the thing called is not present as any other thing around us. In a sense, we are concerned by the absence of the thing which is preserved *there* insofar as we are upon the earth. The latter is to dwell but for Heidegger, we are not just ‘upon the earth’ but as we have seen, we dwell as upon the earth by staying with things. And we can now see that we are upon the earth with things in their absence whose presence is provided by the world as long as we dwell, through which world is brought into things. Thus, we find an intimacy between the calling things to come to world and world to things. And “the intimacy of world and thing is not a fusion. Intimacy obtains only where the intimate—world and thing—divides itself cleanly and remains separated. In the midst of the two, in the between of world and thing, in their *inter*, division prevails: a *dif-ference*”.⁷³⁴ The difference is not a relation and cannot be understood apart from the separateness and towardness of thing and world. Indeed, it is the dimension that gives measure for their presence.⁷³⁵ In this sense, “the dif-ference, as the middle for world and things, metes out the measure of their presence. In the bidding that calls thing and world, what is really called is: the dif-ference”.⁷³⁶

We could say that the intimacy between world and thing, namely, dif-ference is the intimacy between human being and being. For Heidegger, the belonging-together of human being and being can be understood only if we give up thinking

⁷³³ Ibid.

⁷³⁴ Ibid., p. 202. “Die Innigkeit von Welt und Ding ist keine Verschmelzung. Innigkeit waltet nur, wo das Innige, Welt und Ding, rein sich scheidet und geschieden bleibt. In der Mitte der Zwei, im Zwischen von Welt und Ding, in ihrem *inter*, in diesem Unter-waltet der Schied.” (GA 12, p. 22.)

⁷³⁵ David Webb shows us the background of Heidegger’s account of dimension in its relation to movement and difference. Accordingly, given that movement or relation, in Heideggerian sense, is not something to be counted in terms of number, “then it does not require uniform, and therefore countable, units. In this case, the *continuity* of the dimension *need no longer entail undifferentiatedness*; and insofar as there is no longer undifferentiatedness in the dimension of the relation, it will no longer *appear* to precede the saying or marking of relation. The form of manifestness does not precede the relation of manifestness in any given case, but is dependent on the mark by which the relation occurs as it is instantiated in language”. (David Webb, *Heidegger, Ethics and the Practice of Ontology*, London ; New York : Continuum, 2009. p. 81.)

⁷³⁶ Heidegger, ‘Language’ in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 203.

human being and being in terms of their traditional conception because each is already challenged in their belonging-together. But this is not a mere shift of attitude. The thinging of the thing and the worlding of the world are co-original in the sense that bidding of the thing into world and bidding of the world into things is preserved as the dif-ference which stills. In its stillness, dif-ference is called in its bidding the world and thing to come into dif-ference. There is no escape from the dif-ference because it is preserved as the primal call whose bidding of world and thing is the authentic bidding or speech of being. Calling both world and thing into dif-ference, difference remains unspoken. It gathers them by calling them from out of itself into its between and “this gathering calling is the pealing”.⁷³⁷ *Läuten*, pealing or ringing, is not mere coming to sound of words. In the pealing of stillness through which language speaks, all bidding is commanded toward that primal call in such a way that dif-ference of world and thing takes place. Thus, stillness rings as long as the thing bears the world and the world suffices to the thing. This amounts to saying that bidding of things and bidding of world are penetrated; things give birth to the world which grants them their presence. It should be seen that for Heidegger, the table named in the poem is present, not along with the things presently present around us, as long as the call has already called out to it, “where to? Into the distance in which what is called remains, still absent”.⁷³⁸ In other words, “the calling calls into itself and therefore always here and there—here into presence, there into absence”.⁷³⁹ Thus, the call, in its naming, also calls the table into where it is not, into the there through which dwelling is also as a letting-dwell or worlding. There are no two kinds of things, one around us and other in the poem. “As the calling that names things calls here and there, so the saying that names the world calls into itself, calling here and there”.⁷⁴⁰ The play of *Wesen* in its *An-wesen* and *Ab-wesen*, constitutes ‘here’ and ‘there’ in such a way that calling calls into itself as its ringing in soundlessness. What is at issue is the giving itself of the ‘here’ and ‘there’ as time-space in such a

⁷³⁷ Ibid., p. 207. “Das versammelnde Rufen ist das Läuten.” (GA 12, p. 27.)

⁷³⁸ Ibid., p. 198.

⁷³⁹ Ibid., p. 199. “Das Rufen ruft in sich und darum stets hin und her; her: ins Anwesen; hin: ins Abwesen.” (GA 12, p. 18.)

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 201.

way that the thing things as the worlding of the world or as the presencing of what is present in its concealment. What is called in the poem presences here in the poem and absences there. Thus, there is the thinging of the thing in such a way that the thing things as presencing of its absencing in the distance through which its claim to be the same with itself is *heard* and preserved as the presencing of an absencing because it is that claim itself which calls into itself as the unconcealment of the unconcealed in its concealment. It is in this way that the duality of presencing *uses* us, human beings. This means that all presence and absence is already brought into things as their thinging in such a way that four regions of the world is located and made room for nearing in its distancing, which means ‘to dwell’. Indeed, what is at stake is not the fact that we dwell, but there is a calling of difference which calls itself into itself as itself as ‘letting dwell’.

We have seen that in the bidding of things and world in language, presence and absence are called here and there, that is, presencing of what is present as the thinging of the thing is held in absence whose presence is to dwell, to bring world into things. In this way, language preserves itself in reserve through which four regions of world comes to each other in their fourfold through this bidding and difference bids or invites world and thing into difference in such a way that this bidding becomes the primal call or command in its ringing of stillness and “reserving itself in this way, as saying of the world’s fourfold, language concerns us, us who as mortals belong within this fourfold world, us who can speak only as we respond to language”.⁷⁴¹ Why do we still consider ourselves in what way language concerns us and whether we respond to it given that the presencing of what is present, that is, the thinging of the thing is already our dwelling? Because our dwelling is always habitual, usual or ordinary, as German word ‘*Gewohnte*’ makes visible in its relation to ‘*wohnen*’.⁷⁴² Due its ordinariness, it is always forgotten that dwelling is the basic character of human being. However, it should be bear in mind that for Heidegger, this forgetting is not something negative. Being always speaks in that forgetfulness even if that forgetting is itself forgotten. As we have seen, each being claims to be

⁷⁴¹ Heidegger, ‘The Nature of Language’ in *On The Way to Language*, p. 107.

⁷⁴² Heidegger, ‘Building, Dwelling, Thinking’ in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 148.

the same with itself, that is, being claims and we cannot even say that there would be nothing without this claim. Rather, Nothing or concealing penetrates into that silent speaking. This is how in dwelling, the world is brought towards the thing while the thing, as location, is brought before what is already present which is granted by that location. In other words, to bring the thing before its presence is already to let the presence be brought towards the thing; it is letting-dwell in such a way that the thing is let open to be present and absent as the presence and absence of the world. This intimacy or difference of world-thing does not take away, from dwelling, its ordinariness or soundlessness but preserves it in its ringing, in its bidding of here and there. In other words, bidding of difference which bids the thing to the world and the world to the thing, by calling itself into itself in its play of present-here and absent-there, makes that difference repose as stillness or presencing. The latter is the speaking of being or *Wesen* and insofar as being always keeps its claim or language always speaks, human being always listens and responds. This is appropriation of human being into language from out of his speaking. "Such an appropriating takes place in that the very *nature*, the *presencing*, of language *needs and uses* the speaking of mortals in order to sound as the peal of stillness for the hearing of mortals".⁷⁴³ What sounds first is not words, but the ringing of the primal call which calls human being into being mortal, into dwelling through which that call which bids world and thing in their intimacy is preserved as the calling of difference itself into itself. Accordingly, "the origin of the word—that is, of human speaking in terms of Saying—its origin which is in the nature of Appropriation, is what constitutes the peculiar character of language".⁷⁴⁴ The origin of the word involves two aspects of language: first, language needs to be voiced in the word, that is, it uses human speaking, "but man is capable of speaking only insofar as he, belonging to Saying, listens to Saying, so that in resaying it he may be able to say a word".⁷⁴⁵ Thus, our speaking does not consist in giving voice to 'something' by words. Indeed, language speaks lonesomely (*einsam*), that is, it speaks due to the absence of something in

⁷⁴³ Heidegger, 'Language' in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 208.

⁷⁴⁴ Heidegger, 'The Way to Language' in *On the Way to Language*, p. 133.

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

common in such a way that it *is* monologue.⁷⁴⁶ This amounts to saying that in its need to be voiced, language remains unspoken because its need cannot be fulfilled due to the absence of something in common which is provided beforehand. Language rings in the usualness of the unspoken where its *Wesen* begins its presencing as mortal dwelling in the simplicity of its ringing and as *Wesen*, it already moves everything into itself as the primal call or command, as showing or letting-appear. Thus, human responding, either as written or as speaking, is not directed to a *telos*, but it is a destiny. Here it would be helpful to remember Heidegger's interpretation of Stefan George's verse, namely, 'where word breaks off no thing may be'. Heidegger's translation of the verse into a supposition is that an 'is' arises where the word breaks up and "to break up here means that the sounding word returns into soundlessness, back to whence it was granted: into the ringing of stillness which, as Saying, moves the regions of the world's fourfold into their nearness".⁷⁴⁷ For Heidegger, the poet's experience testifies that he does not have any control over words. In its sounding, word reveals the 'is' in its thought-worthiness and thus breaks up, returns into silence. The relation between word and thing indicates the bestowal of being by and in word which goes into soundlessness in the sense that language speaks from out of itself; it is an effort on the way.⁷⁴⁸ When we say a word, the word gives being as if it is still not said, because what gives word is language's need to be voiced which manifests itself in its ringing. And no word is given for that very presencing of language. Thus, in its naming, word calls towards that which always veils itself in its primal bidding. But still, "Language speaks. It speaks by bidding the bidden, thing-world and world-thing, to come to the between of the difference".⁷⁴⁹ Language speaks by calling the intimacy of 'thing-world' and 'world-thing' whose simplicity remains unspoken due to its stillness. When we speak, silence speaks. And, "this breaking up of the word is the true step back on the way of

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 134.

⁷⁴⁷ Heidegger, 'The Nature of Language' in *On The Way to Language*, p. 108.

⁷⁴⁸ Hans-Georg Gadamer describes this character of speech as linguistic need (*Sprachnot*) in the sense that "authentic speaking always involves searching for the word". As Gadamer sets forth, the word must be as 'the sought-for, and just-found for'. (Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger and in Hölderlin's 'Andenken'', in *Heidegger toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of 1930s*, ed. James Risser, trans. Richard Palmer, State University of New York Press, 1999. p. 153.)

⁷⁴⁹ Heidegger, 'Language' in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 206.

thinking”.⁷⁵⁰ Thinking is a venturing the breaking up of the word. It does not consist in a shift of attitude. This is why Heidegger prefers to write ‘the being of language: the language of being’ instead of writing ‘the being of language is the language of being’. This indicates the turning in its immediacy, in its ringing and stillness.

For Heidegger, the word *is* the thinging of the thing. The thing things by revealing the claim of being or the ‘is’ in the breaking up of the word. Thus, the word does not represent the thing in an image but respects the soundlessness of the ordinary by keeping it in measure and in the dimension proper to it in such a way that presencing of what is present keeps reaching us in its simplicity through the space granted by the locality of that presencing. Thus, the world-thing intimacy keeps reaching us, mortals. To be mortal does not refer to ‘being-in-the-world’, but ‘to be upon the earth’ staying with things. Human being does not consist in looking at beings whose being becomes an issue in terms of ‘being-towards-death’. Rather, human being, in his looking, is who is already looked at. The Nothing or concealing of death does not merely consist in the end of his being, but drawing of a spatial limiting where he is away. We are “away from the sheer oppression of what lies before us, which is only presently present, away to what is absent; and at the same time away to what is presently present insofar as this is always only something that arrives in the course of its coming and going”.⁷⁵¹ In this sense, for Heidegger, human being is a madman (*der Rasende*). What makes him mad is that what is present reveals the region of unconcealment insofar as it comes and goes as that present thing while at the same time it covers over that presencing in order to keep itself unconcealed in the sense of *non-concealed* and thereby sheltered and secured. This open place is cleared as the enigma or the mystery and explains the need which calls the unique difference and intimacy of thing and world, through which the fact that thing gives birth to the world and that the world suffices to thing is granted as presencing of primal bidding in its differing. To say that this dimension is reposed or stilled in calling word is to say that it is held in measure which is already provided by that presencing itself insofar as unconcealment is not just a removal of concealment

⁷⁵⁰ Heidegger, ‘The Nature of Language’ in *On The Way to Language*, p. 108

⁷⁵¹ Heidegger, ‘The Anaximander Fragment’ in *Early Greek Thinking*, p. 35.

but concealing or sheltering of itself through the unconcealed thing in its thinging which is word. “If this were so, then the opening would not be the mere opening of presence, but the opening of presence concealing itself, the opening of a self-concealing sheltering”.⁷⁵² In this self-concealing of the opening of presence, Heidegger finds the untrembling heart of unconcealment “which gathers in itself what grants unconcealment to begin with”.⁷⁵³ Unconcealment begins or endures as it lets appear everything present and absent, which Heidegger finds in showing of Saying. Then, “*aletheia*, unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not yet truth”⁷⁵⁴ as Heidegger suggests. The open of the presencing grants being as appropriating relationality whose destiny is already called by and as the stillness of that presencing in such a way that presencing *is calling*. This is why for Parmenides, *aletheia* is well-rounded in such a way that “it is turned in the pure sphere of the circle in which beginning and end are everywhere the same. In this turning, there is no possibility of twisting, deceit and closure”.⁷⁵⁵ There is no possibility of closure because the heart of the unconcealment of presencing already is its concealing. Language speaks as letting that concealing heart prevail among beings and human being in such a way that word gives being by keeping it silent in its remembrance; it keeps measure while saying as the calling itself of difference into itself in such a way that human being is away or dwells as mortal while letting-dwell through which the thing is appropriated into thinging and the world is appropriated into worlding. Still Heidegger asks: “but where does the opening come from and how is it given? What speaks in the ‘It gives’?”⁷⁵⁶ The measure that word gives being while saying in such a way that this saying speaks from out of itself as responding of human being through which he is invited to be mortal remains unthought, even for Heidegger. He writes:

⁷⁵² Heidegger, ‘The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking’ in *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, University of Chicago Press, 2002. p. 71.

⁷⁵³ Ibid., p. 68.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 69.

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 67.

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 73.

Saying and Being, word and thing, belong to each other in a veiled way, a way which has hardly been thought and is not to be thought to the end.⁷⁵⁷

The essential relation between death and language flashes up before us, but remains still unthought.⁷⁵⁸

⁷⁵⁷ Heidegger, 'Words' in *On The Way To Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz, San Francisco : Harper & Row, 1982. p. 155.

⁷⁵⁸ Heidegger, 'The Nature of Language' in *On The Way to Language*, p. 107.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

In thinking, the final word is denied. If we ask to Heidegger from which directive he speaks about being, he would answer us as he answers one of his students at the end of a letter:

Everything here is the path of a responding that examines as it listens. Any path always risks going astray, leading astray. To follow such paths takes practice in going. Practice needs craft. Stay on the path, in genuine need, and learn the craft of thinking, unswerving, yet erring.⁷⁵⁹

On the way, there is always the danger of the wrong way (*Irrweg*), but despite erring which is unavoidable, Heidegger advises to unswerve. The way is not a metaphor. As we have seen, it means ‘to make a way’ and ‘to be in motion’ (*wegen*). But it also means, as Heidegger suggests in *What are Poets For?*, ‘to shake’ and ‘to weigh’ (*wiegen*).⁷⁶⁰ What shakes gives balance (*die Wage*) and in this way, it weighs down. We may say that to be downward implies to be *upon the earth*. The latter is to be mortal in the sense that dwelling is to be way itself. This consists in human responding to the saying of language in its listening. Heidegger, from the beginning, responds to a primordial urgency that he never determines as something to be found. Being is that which lacks word but still given in and by word. Indeed, it is given as this lacking of itself through the word *logos*. It is not surprising that Heidegger’s path of thinking begins and ends with that word which is a word for both being and speaking. It is remarkable to see that Heidegger neither just looks for being nor for speaking, but rather, for their belonging together. And what is more remarkable is that through that co-belonging, being and speaking penetrate into each other in such a way that being means nothing or concealing and speaking means silence for a listening. In this sense, Heidegger either says ‘being is’ or ‘speaking speaks’ in the sense that ‘is’ does not belong to *logos* as long as *logos* is the word for the concealing of the ‘is’ and a word for being. Thus, Heidegger inquires into *logos*

⁷⁵⁹ Heidegger, ‘A letter to a young student’ in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, New York, Harper & Row, 1971. p. 186.

⁷⁶⁰ Heidegger, ‘What are Poets For?’ in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, New York, Harper & Row, 1971. p. 103.

either as logic or as language in order to release the truth of being in its self-sheltering concealing, that is, leaving 'being' as always what is to be thought. Accordingly, his questioning is concerned with *logos* and being, not in the sense of a circle, but as a way which constitutes itself as the center of gravity.

Heidegger always looks for a simple thinking, for an utmost immediacy that he first finds out in Aristotelian *tigēin*, that is, contact. This is a touching that he later finds in nearing of the nearness. He also calls it *Anliegen*, namely, to be neighbor, to be in contact with. It seems that the leading motive of *Being and Time*, which considers Dasein in its familiarity with beings acquires a more originary sense. As we have seen, the way to *Being and Time* is prepared by the reading of two figures; Husserl and Aristotle. In Husserl, Heidegger finds the primacy of intuitional truth. Heidegger respects and recognizes this Husserlian contribution for the reason that it is through the intuitional truth that truth becomes a problem in its relation to being. Besides this primordial fact, Husserl's consideration of intentionality is regarded insufficient insofar as it ignores the ontological aspect of being-intentional which gives us the co-originality of human being and world. However, this requires reconsidering *logos*, not as a logic which is the theory of theories, but in its simple sense, as self-showing, as *apophansis*. In the latter, the 'as' is pointed out in such a way that beings are no longer understood as something to be determined, but *as something* accessible. Accordingly, in each statement which is determined as either true or false, something is already uncovered. The origin of proposition lies in its uncovering character which becomes visible through hermeneutical-as. For Heidegger, this amounts to saying that logic is a matter of meaning which gives itself as a structure of what we have. Indeed, this approach is similar to what phenomenology suggests in its beginning, especially Brentano's notion 'Etwas' comprises that Heideggerian move through which he also analyzes as 'experientiable something' distinct from theoretical something. However, Heidegger finds in Aristotle that meaning structure in its full ontological givenness. Thus, Aristotle's philosophy does not only carry out a discussion of *logos* in its uncovering, self-showing, it also presents this as a pre-theoretical givenness of being in such a way that truth, that is, being-uncovering or being-covering over, requires a being-unto-beings. In other words, intuitional truth that Husserl revives in his phenomenology is

already understood by Aristotle as a matter of being in the sense that beings are uncovered as an accomplishment of Dasein, as we have seen through Heidegger's reading of *Plato's Sophist*. Despite different kinds of revealing, their *arche* lies in that their being is 'to be uncovered'. This is why Aristotle ask: what is a being? We know that for Aristotle, beings are said to be in manifold ways. And Heidegger gives privilege to the sense of being-true instead of categorial revealing of being in the sense that what is at stake is not just a question of being of beings, but *what* beings *really* are. In other words, Heidegger, even in those early readings of Aristotle, tries to show that being is not just being of beings, but its own question-worthiness in such a way that it arises from out of itself by preserving itself. For this, it should be shown that beings are true, not just because they are encountered but in such a way that this encountering is already appropriated by being as such. This is difficult to accomplish because beings are in their uncoveredness as they are *what* they are, as Heidegger's elaboration of true beings as simple beings has shown us. And once we say 'what', we understand being as being of beings, that is, through beings. Thus, the difficulty lies in this: beings are what they are as they are encountered in the sense that their truth, their being-encountered immediately refers back to their 'what' in such a way that being remains just being of beings and therefore truth cannot be shown in its genesis, in its origin, that is, as it is in being.

Thus, so-called encounter or being-onto-beings should be considered again. This is why we stressed on Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's theory of perception in its relation to the understanding of being which prevails there. Given that since Plato, what-being is understood as *eidos* and the fact that Aristotle locates *eidos* to this-here or individual makes Heidegger believe that the problem of truth can be shown as a problem of being. The underlying reason for that belief is that if *eidos* is not above individuals but rather conceived as a being which is this-here, this means that in individual, we already come across with the universal as Husserl suggests in his theory of categorial intuition. Insofar as categorial intuition gives us object in its being-object, simple perception gives us a being in its coming to being, in its being-limited, horizoned or defined as the later metaphysics understands 'horizon' as definition. More importantly, this kind of seeing indicates a certain way of understanding of being in the sense that a being is *there* for me. A house is *ousia* for

Greeks in that it is there, available or ready for use. Thus, being-there of beings refers to beings in their how. However, this also implies that how of beings is already there. In other words, insofar as beings are there for me, they are there in their being. Heidegger insists that this does not mean that beings and being are to be thought apart. Rather, what is at stake is there-character of *ousia*. Thus, when I say a being, I let it be there in such a way that its being is co-intended. Then, *logos* is a delimitation of beings in their there-character. But in everydayness, this delimitedness of beings are not self-evident. Usually, I do not recognize beings as they are there, that is, as they are limited as individual. However, for Heidegger, this shows us that we live through a being-character of beings which in advance, makes beings accessible in their thereness. This being-character is τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, what-being as it was already. Beings are already uncovered as what they are in the sense that we address them in their coming to being and in their limit. This means that *logos* involves an understanding of being-present and being-completed as the same. In a way, being of beings is thereness when beings are limited to their being. Although customarily, I encounter the individual, I always begin with the universal in such a way that I let the universal make possible the articulation in terms of the individual so that it never gives up grounding itself or giving itself, which for Heidegger, Anwesen, ousia or presence means. This also shows us the leading motive of Aristotelian philosophy which consists in moving from the unguenly there, namely, being, to the genuinely encountered. Thus, Aristotle does not ignore the self-evident ground of everydayness but sees in this self-evidentness an already irruption of the unusual. What leads Aristotle to such an understanding of being is for Heidegger, the fact that for Greeks, the world is understood as something completed in a way that the world is enclosed by the heaven.

Before *Being and Time*, Heidegger already calls this definite experience of world being-in-the-world. As we have seen, this experience of the world is based on Greeks' understanding of being in its twofold sense; both as beings that are there and being of beings that are there. *Ousia* gives itself as the simultaneity of this twofoldness. Towards the end of our second chapter, we have called this twofoldness of being-there transitivity that we find in Heidegger's concept of facticity. Thus, facticity is the name that Heidegger gives to the there-character of beings whose

other formulation is Dasein. Insofar as being gives itself in its transition to itself, it is obvious that after his dialogue with Aristotle, for Heidegger, the only object that must be studied is the factual life or Dasein itself. Indeed, Dasein, in its falling and existence, gives itself as the sole object in its question-worthiness. This is why in *Being and Time*, Heidegger presents us a formal structure of questioning which prepares the way for the existential analysis of Dasein. However, it is obvious that what grounds the basis of *Being and Time* is, more than a formal basis, Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotle, not only his grasping of *ousia* in its twofoldness or facticity but also the fact that what provides us with such a structure of being is that being primarily means being-produced which Heidegger calls *Zuhandenheit*. If beings are understood in their thereness, limitedness and completeness, this already means that in their finishedness, they are ready for use. In other words, producedness is the primary sense of *ousia*, which grounds it in its twofoldness. As we have seen, Heidegger also accuses Lotze and Husserl not questioning that primary sense of being. For them, the fact that beings are there is not something question-worthy but usual in the sense that they ascribe ideal being to propositions from out of that primary sense of being. In other words, in the usualness of there-ness, they do not find a claim of self-showing but just presuppose it. Contrary to this, Heidegger follows Aristotle's path and listens to the self-evidentness of everyday life believing that primary sense of being, namely, being-producedness will let itself be constituted as its own appearing, as fundamental ontology works out. Indeed, this also corresponds to Aristotelian idea of *seeing-more* which proves that factual life has already a tendency of caring itself through its falling and existence.

Thus, it is his Aristotelianism which leads Heidegger to constitute his master piece *Being and Time*. Being as being-there (Dasein) enables him to understand *logos* or truth as its own claim insofar as being-present is understood as being-completed of beings in their ready-to-handness in such a way that being is being of beings. What underlies this perspective is obviously being-character of being as τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι which means what-being as it was already. This makes possible to understand what-being (*eidōs*) in its intertwinedness with that-being in such a way that *logos* refers to a structure of meaning in its addressing to beings. In accordance with this Aristotelian basis, Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, begins with everydayness

assuming that the primary sense of being, being-produced, will provide us with the constitution of the very world which prevails in its there-character. Indeed, Heidegger shows us the worldhood of the world from out of such an inauthentic but self-evident beginning. This amounts to Dasein's disclosing itself as its there through understanding, thrownness and falling. Then, the totality of Dasein's being as being-in-the-world is made the center of the discussion because as it is for Greeks, the world must be given in its completeness or totality, as something enclosed. The fact that inauthentic character of everydayness, due to the being aheadness of Dasein in its being which lies in the projection of understanding, lacks the totality which is necessary for Dasein's being is not a problem for Heidegger; rather, he returns back to falling in order to find a state of mind, namely, anxiety, which will provide us with the possibility of Dasein in its totality. Although in anxiety, Heidegger finds the total structure of Dasein as care, this is still not an authentic existential totality insofar as structure of care is bounded by the inauthenticity of everydayness. Thus, it could be said that Heidegger begins with everydayness in order to attain an undifferentiated sense of being which will ground being as its meaning. However, it also becomes unavoidable to show that Dasein is not a being among other beings insofar as to its being, an understanding of being belongs. In other words, Dasein is not merely ontic, but it is ontically-ontological. Its being has a distinctive sense in that it exists, that is, it is as it can be that it is and has to be. For Heidegger, thus, Dasein's being in its totality is a primordial task, not because what we are looking for is the anthropological explanation of our being, but because what we are seeking is the question of the meaning of being which shows itself through an understanding of itself which belongs to Dasein in a distinctive way. This amounts to saying that Dasein should be grasped from its own standpoint. In this sense, Heidegger finds in Dasein's being which is care, not a mere lack of totality, but interprets it as between 'birth and death' in such a way that death, as an end, becomes the utmost possibility of Dasein as an anticipation of itself as a potentiality-for-being. Accordingly, being-a-whole is being-towards-death. Heidegger first shows that existentiell possibility of being-towards-death is an authentic one. However, it should also be shown that this authentic existentiell possibility is attested by itself. In other words, he asks how Dasein is thrown into the existentiell possibility of being-towards-death. This

requires taking into account Dasein in its calling itself to itself through the call of conscience. The call calls Dasein into its potentiality-to-be-its-self or into its being-guilty, which means that Dasein is its own thrown basis. Hearing the appeal, Dasein chooses to have a conscience in the sense that it becomes free for the possibility of its existence as that it is and has to be. This situation is called resoluteness which is the distinctive and authentic disclosure of Dasein. However, for Heidegger, resoluteness as an existentiell possibility should be considered in its relation to the anticipation of death which already gives us existentiell possibility of being-towards-death in its existential-ontological sense. In other words, anticipation provides resoluteness with its authentic character while resoluteness grounds anticipation in an existentiell way. Thus, they already work together. Accordingly, he introduces anticipatory resoluteness as the authentic being-a-whole of Dasein. Since the latter also means potentiality-for-being-its-self whose selfhood should be grounded in care, care, Dasein's being, acquires its fundamental sense through anticipatory resoluteness whose existential structure reveals temporality as the meaning of care or of Dasein's being.

In the sections discussed of *Being and Time*, Heidegger tries to show that Dasein factically is, that is, it is always that it is and has to be in such a way that it has been thrown into its existence. Heidegger does not deny that existence is presupposed; rather, for him, this presupposition has its ground as itself, as Dasein's being a null basis of nullity. This is why beginning from *Being and Time* until *Kehre*, for Heidegger, Dasein remains the main issue to be thought over. However, if Dasein is that being which resolves into being in general in its being-basis for its very being, this also means that fundamental ontology, that is, the question of being in that distinctive givenness, has its own self-determination in terms of its limits and its tasks, which means that ontology is always already in turning into itself, that is, it is metontology. We may say that since existential analytic of Dasein cannot provide us with its limits through which Dasein is enclosed, Heidegger looks for that delimitation by taking over the question of being as such, recalling that what makes possible an understanding of being as Dasein's being is that being is being *of* beings. However, different from *Being and Time*, Heidegger does not merely insist that being is being *of beings* which present themselves as *zuhanden*, whose horizon gives

meaning but emphasizes on the difference as such; being *of* beings. Ontological difference is first understood by means of transcendence through which Dasein is toward world, passing over beings. Dasein's upswing toward the world and being's entry into world happens as the temporality of Dasein. Then, in Dasein's passing over beings toward its world, there is a grounding. Beings are ontically grounded and due to the transcendence of Dasein, this ontic truth is already ontological. What is at stake is that Dasein becomes free for itself as an utmost possibility, but now, Heidegger shows us that this refers to taking up the question of being or metaphysics from the ground up. Dasein is always a why-questioner with a 'rather than' and as this questioning itself, it grounds that beings are *rather than* nothing. In this way, fundamental ontology leaves its place to the metaphysics of Dasein through which Dasein becomes a destiny in its grounding of beings so that it lets the ontological difference originate. Heidegger reinforces this point at the end of his Kantbook whose outcome is the fact that Dasein is metaphysical, that is, in its transcending, it grounds by letting the ground be grounded by itself. This is achieved through a reading of Kant's theory of knowledge as a problem of metaphysics where *metaphysica generalis*, namely, ontological truth is intertwined with *metaphysica specialis*, namely, ontic truth. However, having Dasein in its extremity, in its limit requires an analysis of metaphysics from within itself as Heidegger tries to handle in his lecture-course *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. Here Heidegger arrives what he has already set forth in *Being and Time*, that is, to understand Dasein as the utmost possibility, in its extremity as time which is ruptured as itself. And the outcome is that Dasein is so extreme that it is possible either as that it is or as that it is *not* at the same time, indeed as time where being is limited and horizoned in that way.

This requires taking up that 'not' or nothingness in being of Dasein in a way proper to it. It is not something to be understood in terms of the covering over of beings. Rather, it becomes obvious that a prevailing concealing is there in the phenomenon 'being'. In this sense, being will not be understood through beings. Heidegger also finds ontological difference insufficient for the comprehension of the problem because, although he tries to understand the difference independently of the differentiated parts, ontological difference always presupposes that being is being of

beings. Indeed, for Heidegger, until the late period of his thinking, the fact that being is being of beings seems unavoidable otherwise we would lose the ontic ground for the question of being. However, the same obvious fact also leads us to a concealing which cannot be grounded in that so-called ontic level although it belongs to Dasein. It becomes obvious that concealing cannot be grounded in being-absent of *Zuhanden*. It belongs to being of Dasein in such a way that being is already projected upon time. This is why Heidegger, in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, endeavours a destruction of *Zuhanden* and *Vorhanden* in terms of production. The aim is to show that *what* a being is, its essence, is already determined by its being-produced as the being *that* it is, as something extant. Thus, Heidegger returns again to the Aristotelian distinction between what-being and that-being in their relatedness but now he tries to understand what-being in terms of that-being. This is why he reconsiders Aristotle from such a perspective by reading *phusis* as self-appearing of *eidos* whereby an individual being stays for a while. Heidegger understands this as the emergence or presencing of a being in the sense that in its staying as itself, its not yet is included. This is *energeia* by means of which a being is understood as work (*ergon*) in its having its end with itself. In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, he gives us a more comprehensive sense of *phusis* as *aletheia* in its relation to human being. Accordingly, for him, belonging to *phusis*, human being, as the uncanny one, puts being into a being, that is, into work. Work-being of the work refers to that fact that we already know (*techne*) how to deal with beings in their being in such a way that they are their coming into unconcealment. Then the question is this: is the work a mere thing? For Heidegger, the work is not a mere thing, a growing entity, but an artwork because even for Aristotle, growing things are understood in their delimitation by artifacts in order to show that *phusis* or *aletheia* is a matter of struggle. Thus, artifacts are the mediation between thing and work in such a way that they are both self-sufficient like things, and produced like artworks. In its relation to the artifact, it is shown that work is establishing itself of truth into a being in such a way that work reveals itself as the struggle between earth and world. Heidegger, in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, shows us that work-being of work is putting itself into work of truth. And for Heidegger, this also gives us thingly aspect of the work, that is, its self-sufficiency. The self-sufficiency of the work refers to the inner movement

of truth through which 'work' stands in the open place of truth due to the fact that it is. Thus, truth is not just the truth of beings whose being gives itself as uncoveredness, but a happening or founding which preserves its very origin in the work of art. This refers to truth in its turning which already happens as a turning from the truth of essence to the essence of truth. Thus, essence of truth through which 'essence' is traditionally understood with regard to beings already indicates 'essence' as a bringing forth. The latter is the essentiality of the essence in the sense that essence of truth is the truth of essence. Heidegger grounds this turning in Da-sein as the truth of beyng, which means that truth does not belong to beings, but to its own grounding in its coming to be grounded, which he calls *Ereignis*.

In this way, *Contributions to Philosophy* consists in an effort to send 'is' to the truth of beyng in the sense that we no longer say 'a being is'. Da-sein, the between, is the grounding of the truth of beyng in its not-granting. Thus, Heidegger is concerned with the grounding of truth as ground-laying for itself in its groundlessness. In a sense, Da-sein is that grounding where truth comes to a being by letting itself be concealed through the openness of the space of decidedness. More than how truth establishes itself in work, Heidegger refers to the self-concealing sheltering of truth because he thinks that the latter already shows us how of being-human and how of a being without taking them as opposed to each other, but located in the intimacy of the between. In this sense, human being is understood in terms of the concealing-revealing of being. In a similar way to the no-thing of world in anxiety, the indifference of beings in profound boredom, Heidegger understands human being through an 'undifferentiatedness' of beings. Where human being is thrown is the space where it is still not said 'being' or 'non-being'. Human being abides that open space in such a way that it is required and needed by that primary need of the unconcealing of being in its compelling due to its concealing. This compelling need shows itself through the inceptuality of the inception and this beginning in its holding to itself in its concealing or turning, that is, historicity of being is the essence of human being. Accordingly, for Heidegger, historicity of being is being unhomely in becoming homely of human being. Human being is venturing the essence, to become at home despite the fact that he is always unhomely. Human being belongs to being as becoming homely only if being

unhomely belongs to his being intrinsically. For Heidegger, this is something only to be poetized and he finds the Same in the poetry of Sophocles and Hölderlin. Hölderlin knows the law of becoming homely in such a way that in his returning from the foreign, he shows the origin in its overwhelming and withdrawal, as that which remains or to be remembered. In this sense, Hölderlin is a sign which signs as the 'between' of gods and human being. This being-historical is a manner of showing through which *Wesen* speaks in its *Anwesenung* as the intimacy or immediacy of its own turning in its inceptuality or openness.

Thus, for Heidegger, this kind of poetizing which gives human being as historical is the originary language in the sense that the holy comes to word as its own showing. Insofar as the poet, in its naming the holy, is the between of gods and human being, through poetic language, the world emerges as the shaking of the All. In poetic naming, the between is preserved in its unlikeness in such a way that human being and gods confront each other in the world. Naming is letting-lie-before and poetic naming is pure *legein* in its endurance in such a way that the poet finds what remains in its originary movement as something remaining. But in thinking, *legein* works with *noein* which means taking-into-heart. Thinking is to be on the way, to let the open place for the movement of self-appearing or showing. This is why it is memory; an unrelenting gathering of all presencing in its demand to be thought. For Heidegger, this means that what calls thinking is the duality which lies in the presencing of the present. The latter endures as unconcealment which conceals itself in its nearing. Nearness is what makes poetry and thinking neighbour in their dwelling in Saying. To dwell means to be conditioned by the duality of presencing of the present and this is possible insofar as nearness is a showing which moves as presencing in absencing. Accordingly, nearness is understood as the nearing of four regions of the world; earth, sky, divinities and mortals through which language speaks as the language of *Wesen*. Thus, language is not expression or communication. Words are not combinations of sounds and meaning. Rather, word is the thinging of the thing whereby world worlds. Words are silent; they break up when they come to sound. If *phone* means 'to bring into view', words are silent because they bring into view while keeping the concealing concealed in such a way that they return into the soundlessness. For Heidegger, this is how world is brought

to things in such a way that thing bears the world. This is a primary calling through which the intimacy or difference between world and thing is called to itself and secured as this intimacy. We can understand this call as letting-dwell, as a call to be upon the earth as mortal. And, as we have seen, the relation between death and language still remains hidden in the path of Heidegger's thinking. However, it is obvious that for Heidegger, to dwell, that is, to be capable of death as death, means a measure taking. This measure taking, insofar as it leaves what is concealed as concealed happens only in and by the poetic word. In poetic word, the dimension between thing and world is given as the dimension of being upon the earth with things, that is, to dwell. Thus, poetic word, either as naming of poetry or as saying of thinking is a letting-dwell. Heidegger, finds in the poetry of Hölderlin, a giving of time where gods are absent. Only if such a giving of time is there, there is being, the fact that we are the ones looked at by gods. This is the saying of being in its historicity where we are owned as mortals in the sense that time already means space (*Raum*). However, we can ask: is it not the task of the thinker to render *spatial* that historicity given that 'end' means 'place'.⁷⁶¹ However, this is not a matter of attitude. What that does mean can only be decided on the way to thinking. Indeed, Heidegger is aware of this insofar as he suggests, 'to discuss' (*Erörterung*) means 'to point out the place' (*in den Ort weisen*).⁷⁶² The thinking experience with poetry teaches us to dwell where we already are by showing this 'where' which, due to its essence, always remains forgotten. In other words, what matters, for Heidegger, is to be the way itself in its approaching us. Then, for the thinker,

“All is way.”⁷⁶³

⁷⁶¹ Heidegger in 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking' states that "the old meaning of the word 'end' means the same as place: 'from one end to other' means: from one place to the other." (Heidegger, 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking' *On Time and Being*, p. 57.)

⁷⁶² Heidegger, 'Language in the Poem: a Discussion on Georg Trakl's Poetic Work' in *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz, San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982. p. 159.

⁷⁶³ Heidegger, 'The Nature of Language' in *On the Way to Language*, p. 92.

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APPENDIX A

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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Namlı, G. 'Heidegger on the Poietic Truth of Being' in *Analecta Husserliana CXIV*, pp. 89-104, Springer, 2013.

APPENDIX B

TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tez Heidegger düşüncesini fenomen yani kendini kendinden gösterme fikri çerçevesinde incelemek amacını taşımaktadır. Bilindiği üzere, görünme, 20. yüzyıla damgasını vuran ve temelleri Husserl tarafından atılan fenomenoloji akımının temel unsurudur. Bu bağlamda, Husserl, yönelimsellik ve kategoryal görü kavramlarıyla kendisinden önce tartışılmalı ontolojik ve epistemolojik temalara yeni ve devrimsel bir bakış açısı getirmiştir. Husserl'e göre, nesnenin nesnelliği, nesne-olma üzerinden anlaşılmalı ve anlam zeminine taşınmalıdır. Heidegger'e göre ise, Husserl her ne kadar teorik ve nesnel zeminden kendini kurtaramasa da, ileri sürdüğü yaklaşım çok önemli bir konuyu yeniden düşünmemiz konusunda bizi ikna etmektedir. Bu konu, açıktır ki, hakikatten başkası değildir. Başka bir deyişle, Husserl, hakikatin görüye tabi olduğu yönündeki ısrarında haklıdır ve bu anlamda kendi varsayımlarını bile yeniden düşünmemizin önünü açmıştır. Husserl'in varsayımı yönelimsel edimlerden oluşan bilinçtir ve bu varsayım, yönelimsel nesnenin, doğalcı anlayıştan kurtarılamamasına dayanmaktadır. Ve bu nedenledir ki, aşkınlık, kökensel bir biçimde ele alınamamıştır. Yönelimsel edimlerin bilince içkinliği tam olarak gösterilememiş ve dolayısıyla insan, doğal bir varlık olarak kalmaktan kurtulamıştır. Heidegger'e göre, bunun nedeni, Husserl'in düşünme biçiminin, teorik ve bilimsel bir kaygıda temelleniyor olmasıdır. Demek ki, Husserl, nesnelliği, nesne-olma ya da yönelimsel mevcudiyet olarak incelemek fikrinde haklıyken, bu mevcudiyeti, teorik bir zemine oturtma çabasında haksızdır. Heidegger için ise, bu tartışmada asıl önemli olan, mantığın imkanının incelenmesi ve buradan hakikat konusuna yeni ve kökensel bir anlayış geliştirilmesidir.

Bu tezin ikinci bölümünün ilk kısmında ele alındığı gibi, Heidegger'in erken dönem felsefi çalışmaları, mantık, psikolojizm eleştirisi, ve anlam üzerinedir. Neo-Kantçı düşünceyle girdiği diyalog sonrası ise hakikatin normatif olamayacağı üzerine vurgu yapmıştır. Neo-Kantçı düşünce, özellikle Lotze, yargının özdeşliğini anlam, anlamı da geçerlilik kavramı üzerinden anlamaktadır. Buna göre, anlam var değildir, fakat geçerlidir. Benzer bir şekilde, Lask nesne-olmayı doğru olma üzerinden ortaya

koyarken geçerlilik fikrine bağlı kalmıştır. Fakat, her ne kadar anlam, varlıktan bağımsız bir geçerlilik alanına tabi olsa da, yine de bir içerik veya maddeden bağımsız değildir. Bu bağlamda Lask, formu yani anlamı madde için form olarak düşünmüştür. Heidegger benzer bir sorunsalı Rickert düşüncesinde bulur. Rickert, geçerliliği normatif bir alan olarak ele alır. Heidegger'in de belirttiği gibi, norm bize hangi olguyu nasıl anlayacağımızı gösteren bir zorunluluk dayatır. Fakat eğer madde ya da içerik hal-i hazırda norm için değilse nasıl olur da normun zorunluluğundan, normu varsaymadan bahsedebiliriz? Başka bir deyişle, normun zorunluluğundan bahsedebilmemiz için, normun, hakkında olduğu şeyde zaten verili olması gerekir. Aksi takdirde, normu yani aradığımız, kesinliğini göstermeye çalıştığımız şeyi, varsaymış oluruz. Heidegger'e göre, bu maddesel verilik, bizi psişik alanda temellenen özne-korrelatını dikkate almaya sevk eder. Fakat bu psişik alan deneysel psikolojiden kurtarılmalı ve kendi verililiği bir *factum* olarak incelenmelidir. Burada söz konusu olan, artık şu veya bu şeyin verililiği değil, verililiğin kendisidir. Bu da Heideggerci genel olarak şeyin (*Etwas*) verililiği olarak karşımıza çıkar. Herhangi bir şeyleştirme ya da idealizasyondan öte, deneyimin anlamlılığı esastır.

Bu felsefi çerçeve, Heidegger'in Husserl düşüncesine neden ve nasıl yakınlaştığını ortaya koymaktadır. Husserl ideal olanı, duyulur olandan ayırmadığı ve sadece verililiği incelediği ölçüde Neo-Kantçı düşünceyi aşmıştır. Fakat, Heidegger'e göre, Husserl yine de ideal ve duyulur olan ikilemine hapsolmuştur. İdeal olanı deneysel olandan net bir biçimde ayırmakla birlikte, ideal olanın ontolojik statüsü yeterince irdelenmemiştir. Heidegger, *Mantık* adlı eserinde, bu eksikliğin kökeninde Lotze'nin geçerlilik anlayışına olan bağlılığın yattığını ileri sürer. Lotze'nin öne sürdüğü geçerlilik fikri, ideal önermelerin ontolojik statüsünü, deneysel gerçeklikten kurtarmak amacını taşımaktadır. Bu bağlamda Lotze, önermelerin geçerliliğini, aktüel olmaları olarak görmektedir. Buradaki aktüellik, hem gerçek şeyleri hem de önermeleri kapsayan genel bir terimdir ve kökeni Lotze'nin varlığı 'oradalık' olarak anlamasında yatmaktadır. Heidegger'e göre ise, buradaki sorun, varlığın 'oradalık' olarak anlamının sorgulanmadan varsayılmasıdır. Öyleyse, ideal ve gerçek arasındaki ayrım ve ilişki öyle bir şekilde ele alınmalıdır ki, varlığın 'oradalık' olarak anlamı kendini bu ilişkide, bu ilişki olarak vermelidir. Heidegger, buradan Husserl felsefesindeki olumlu yöne geçer ki bu yenilikçi ve

olumlu yön yönelimsellik ve ketegoryal görü fikrinde ortaya çıkar. Bu bağlamda, yönelimsellik, düşünüleni düşünülme ediminde anlama çabasıdır ve ideal-gerçek ikilemine hapsolmadan, her ikisini kendi imkanında sunar. Dolayısıyla, yönelimsellik, psişik bir şeyle fiziki bir şey arasındaki nesnel bir ilişki değil, yönelmiş olma hali veya tavrıdır. Algılanan, sadece algılanmış olması olarak anlaşılır ki elimizde olan sadece algılanmış olmasında algılanandır. Yani yönelimsel mevcudiyet bütünsel bir yapıdır ve Heidegger için önemli olan buradaki yapısallıktır. Bu da şu anlama gelmektedir: yönelimsellikteki amaç, şeyi, öznel bir idealizmdeki gibi, sadece algı olarak tanımlamak değil, şeyi algılanabilirliğinde yani bilinç-için olmasında göstermektir. Bu da duyumsamadan önce ketegoryal bir görü olduğuna işaret eder. Heidegger'e göre, önemli olan bir şeyin yönelildiği gibi görünmesi değil, yönelilmiş halinin en dolayimsız verililiği olması yani sadece 'öyle' görünmesidir. Bu da bize, yönelinen ile görünen arasında bir özdeşlik olduğunu gösterir ki hakikat bu özdeşlik üzerinden anlaşılır. Unutmamak gerekir ki, bu özdeşlik yönelimselliğe içkindir, dışarıdan eklenmiş olarak anlaşılmaz. Ve Heidegger'e göre, Husserl'in hatası, bu hakikat ilişkisini, önermelerin içerik ilişkisi üzerinden değerlendirmesidir.

Bununla birlikte, Heidegger önermenin yapısını analiz etmekten vazgeçmez. İkinci bölümün ikinci kısmında gösterdiğimiz gibi, önermeyi Aristotelesçi anlamında değerlendirmek gerektiğini iddia eder. Buna göre, önerme, kelimelerin bir araya geldiği bir ifade biçimi değil, bir şeyi kendisi olarak göstermek yani *apophansis*'dir. Dolayısıyla, bir önermenin doğru ya da yanlış olması, önermenin içeriğinin bahsedilen şeye karşılık gelmesi değil, önermenin bir ortaya koyma ya da üzerini örtme olmasıdır. Bu nedenledir ki, her doğrulama ya da reddetme, hem sentez hem de ayrıştırma içerir. Sentez-ayrıştırma yapısallığı bir şeyin, şu veya bu şey olarak belirlenmeden önce bir şey olarak ortaya konduğunu gösterir. Dolayısıyla, apophansis düzeyindeki gösterme, bir şeyi göstermek değil, bir şeyi varlığı bakımından göstermek, varlığını kendi ne'liği üzerinden işaret etmek demektir. Önermenin birliği ise bu anlamda bir göstermeden, yani hakkında konuşulan şeyden kaynaklanır. Başka bir ifadeyle, Heidegger, hakkında konuşulan şey ile bu şey hakkında yapılan yüklelemeyi birbirinden ayırır ve sadece ilkinin bize önermenin mantıksal yapısını sunduğunu iddia eder. Herhangi bir şey, özne-yüklem belirlenimliğinde anlaşılmaz. Önemli olan, şeyin, olduğu gibi, daima bir şey olarak

erişilebilir olmasıdır. Heidegger'e göre, varolanlarla varolanlar olmaları bakımından bu türden bir karşılaşma hem *logos*'un hem de insan olmanın kökenidir. İkinci bölümün üçüncü kısmında bu iddiayı ve Aristotelesçi temellerini değerlendirdik. Eğer varolanlar hal-i hazırda ortaya konmuş ya da üzeri örtülmüş ise ve bu ortaya konmuşluk *logos*'un temel karakteri ise, hakikat önermede değil, önerme hakikatte temellenmektedir. Heidegger, bu anlamda hakikate *aletheia* demektedir. Ve bu ortaya konmuşluk aynı zamanda bir karşılaşma ise, insanı varolanlarla olma olarak anlamalıyız ki ortaya konmuşluk olarak *aletheia* aynı zamanda insanın olma tarzı olan ortaya koyma anlamına da gelir. Heidegger bu konuyu, *Platon'un Sofisti* adlı eserinin giriş bölümünde Aristoteles'in *Nikomakhos'a Etik*'ini merkeze alarak tartışmıştır. Buna göre, Aristoteles, ortaya koymayı, sanat (*techne*), bilim (*episteme*), aklı başındalık (*phronesis*), bilgelik (*sophia*) ve us (*nous*) olmak üzere beş şekilde ele alır ve bunlar içinde insan için, bilgeliğin en üstün ortaya koyma biçimi olduğunu söyler çünkü ancak bilgelikte, ortaya konan şey ile birlikte ilk yani *arche* muhafaza edilebilir. Bilgelik söz konusu olduğunda, ilk olan ise her zaman olmakta olan anlamına gelmektedir. Heidegger'e göre, bu sınıflandırma ve bilgelige verilen öncelik bize, antik Yunan düşüncesinde, varlığın ilk anlamının, kendini muhafaza etmesiyle ortaya konmuş olma yani hakikat olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu aslında, 'varolanlar nedir?' sorusuna da bir cevaptır. Bilindiği gibi, Aristoteles'e göre varolanlar, ilineksel olma, kategoryal olma, aktüel ya da potansiyel olma ve doğru ya da yanlış olma olarak farklı şekillerde söylenir. Heidegger, burada sonuncunun, yani doğru ya da yanlış olmanın varlığın esas anlamı olduğunu iddia eder. Bu bağlamda, Metafizik Θ 10'a vurgu yapar ve basit ve bileşik olmayan varolanların durumunu inceler. Burada, yanlışlığın ya da yanlışmanın da imkanını sunan, varolanın kendisiyle bir olmasını, onun daimi mevcudiyeti yani ortaya konmuşluğu olarak gösterir. Varlık öyle bir basitlikle ve ısrarlılıkta kendini sunar ki varolanlara asıl özgü olan olur ve bu da varolanın birliğinin sadece kendisiyle birliği, yani ortaya konmuşluğu olması anlamına gelir.

Burada, varlık ve varolanlar arasında bir geçişlilikle karşı karşıya olduğumuz açıkça görülebilir. İkinci bölümün son kısmında, bu geçişliliğin, Heidegger'in ilk dönem düşüncesinin temel unsurlarından biri olan faktisite nosyonunun temeli olduğunu, bu geçişliliğin Aristotelesçi anlamını tartışarak göstermeye çalıştık.

Gördüğümüz gibi hakikat varolanların, var olmalarındaki olmaya ait. Yani varlık, *ousia*, hem olma hem de varolan demek. Heidegger'e göre, bu ikililik, varolanlar olarak varolanların söylenmesinde yani *logos*'da kendini gösterir. Fakat Aristoteles'in de bize gösterdiği gibi, insan her zaman ilk önce tikel olan ile muhataptır. Burada Heidegger, Aristoteles'in varlık anlayışına vurgu yapar ve biz farkında olmasak bile, tikel olanın daima bir tümelle birlikte verili olduğunu söyler. Yani *aisthesis* her zaman *legein*'i içerir. Bu da şu demektir; geleneksel anlamıyla, orada olan varlıklar anlamına gelen *ousia*, terminolojik olarak ise orada olan varlıkların orada-olması anlamına gelir yani sadece varolanları değil, nasıl olduklarını da işaret eder. Dolayısıyla, bana en yakın olan yani tikel varlıklar artiküle edilmemiş haldedir ve bir yapısallığı kendilerinde gizlerler. Yani, henüz artiküle edilmeyip söylenmeseler de vardırırlar. Buna göre, orada-olmalarının bir varlık karakteri olarak en temel anlamı ise zaten olmuş olmalarındaki ne'likleridir. Bir varlık, varlığa gelmesinde *bir* varlık, yani ne ise o olur. Bu anlamda kendi varlığına sınırlanmış ve kendi varlığında tamamlanmıştır. Heidegger, yine Aristoteles düşüncesine dayanarak, bu varlık anlamının el-altında olma demek olduğunu iddia eder. Unutmamak gerekir ki, varlık soruşturmasının amacı, şu veya bu varlığı araştırmak değil, varlığın varolanların varlığı olarak nasıl ortaya çıktığına, bu ortaya çıkışın kendisi olarak tanıklık etmektir. Bu nedenle Heidegger orada-olma durumunu kendi soru değerini korumak zorunda olması ölçüsünde değerlendirir ve bunu insan-olma üzerinden anlar. Yani, varlık, varolanların varlığı olarak ele alındığında varolanlar üzerinden anlaşılmış olur ve bu da bir başka varolanı yani *Dasein* olarak insanı gerektirir çünkü ancak bu şekilde bir çevren olarak orada-olma kendini koruma altına alabilir.

Böylelikle, bu tezin üçüncü bölümünün alt yapısını oluşturmuş olduk. Üçüncü bölümde Heidegger'in *Dasein* çözümlemeleri ve burada karşımıza çıkan problemler tartışılmıştır. Bu bölümde *Varlık ve Zaman*'dan *Kehre*'ye kadar olan dönem bu çerçevede incelenmiştir. İlk ve ikinci kısım Heidegger'in *Varlık ve Zaman*'ında *Dasein*'in ortaya konusu üzerinedir. İlk kısımda göstermeye çalıştığımız ölçüde, eğer varlık kendini soru olarak muhafaza etme eğiliminde anlaşılabilecekse, varlık sorusu, sorgulama olarak ortaya çıkacaktır. Bu da varlığın esas anlamının korunması ve kendini kendinden göstermesi anlamına gelir. Bu noktada *Dasein*,

sadece varlığı anlamakla kalmaz, varlıkla varolanlar arasındaki geçişliliği de sahiplenir ki bu da ancak ontolojik olmasının ontic boyutunda yatar. Yani, Dasein sadece varlığı anlamaz, varlığı vaolanlar ile karşılaşmasında anlar. Dolayısıyla, Dasein dünyada olma olarak görülebilir. Fakat Heidegger, Dasein'ı, belirli bir varoluş içinden değil de, belirlenimsiz yani her günkü varolma tarzında incelemekle işe başlar. Dasein dünyadır derken bir nesnenin bir yerde olması gibi bir içinde olmaklık kastedilmez. Dasein'ın dünyada olması tanışık olma ya da aşına olma olarak anlaşılmalıdır. Bu en basit ve en açık olduğu farz edilen karşılaşmada şeyler, Aristotelesçi anlayışın da bize gösterdiği gibi, el altında olmalarıyla yani gereç (*Zeug*) olarak kendilerini gösterirler. Gereçler, yalıtılmış halde bulunmazlar yani her bir gereç 'bir şey için'dir. Bir gerecin varlığı, her bir gerecin bir ilintililik taşıması nedeniyle yapısal bir bütünlüğe tabidir ve Heidegger bunu imlenim olarak betimler. İmlenimde ilintililik 'bu şey içinlik' üzerinden anlaşılır ve bu da temel bir 'bir-şey-uğrunalık' gerektirir. Heidegger'e göre bu temel, Dasein'ın kendini anladığı yer olarak, varlıkların karşılaşılabilir kılındığı yöneliklidir. Bu anlamda, bu yer fenomen olarak dünyadır. Burada söz konusu olan dünyanın dünyasallığıdır ve bu da Dasein'ın varlığını kendisi için bir mesele olması anlamına gelir ki bu anlamda Dasein varlık imkanındır. Yani Dasein, kendi oradalığıdır. Buna göre, varolanların el altında olarak ifşa edilmesi için, dünyanın Dasein'ı zaten ilgilendirmesi gerekir. Bu bize Dasein'ın oradalığının bulunuşu (*Befindlichkeit*) gerektirdiğini gösterir. Başka bir ifadeyle, Dasein her zaman kendi oradalığına fırlatılmıştır yani bir imkan olarak kendine fırlatılmıştır. Bununla birlikte, Dasein'ın kendi varlığına fırlatılmış olduğunu söylemek onun uğruna olduğu şeyi anlıyor olduğunu söylemek anlamına gelir. Bu bağlamda, Dasein'ın varlığının oradalığı anlamayı gerekli kılar. Anlamadaki tasarım (*Entwerfen*) ile Dasein kendini imkanlarına bırakır ve böylece kendini sadece bu imkanlar olarak sunar.

Dasein, bir imkan olarak kendisini sunmasının yanı sıra aynı zamanda varlık imkanındır. Heidegger'e göre bu, Dasein'ın en kökensel açılanmasını araştırmayı gerektirir ki artık söz konusu olan şey Dasein'ın bütünlüğünde ele alınmasıdır. Bu bölümün ikinci kısmı Dasein'ın bütün olması ile ne anlaşıldığı ve bunun sonuçları üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Dasein'ın açılanması yani orada-olması bulunuş ve anlama ile anlaşıldığından, ve bunlar her zaman iç içe olduğundan, Heidegger her iki

eksistensiyali en kökensel anlamında bize verebilecek bir fenomen aramaktadır ki bu fenomen kaygıdır (*Angst*). Kaygı durumunda Dasein'in kaçıyor olduğu şey kendisidir. Dünya içindeki varlıklar hiçleşir ve bu hiçleşmeyle dünya kendini bir şey olarak dayatır. Dolayısıyla, kaygının karşısında kaygı duyduğu şey aslında dünyada olmanın kendisidir. Bu da Dasein'ı kendi varlığına fırlatılmışlığında bireyselleştirir ve her durumda olabileceği şey yapar. Yani Dasein varlık imkanı olmaya doğru hep kendini önceler. Bu önceleme ise kendine fırlatılmışlığı sayesinde olur. Başka bir ifadeyle, Dasein'ın varlığı 'bir-dünya-içinde-zaten-var-olarak-kendini-öncelemek'tir. Bununla birlikte, fırlatılmışlığında kendini önceleme, dünyadaki varlıklarla birlikte olması ile düşünüldüğünde Dasein'ın varlığı '(bir-dünya-) içinde-zaten-var-olarak-kendini-önceleme olarak (dünya-içinde karşılaşılan varolanların) beraberinde var olmak' olarak anlaşılır ki Heidegger buna ihtimam (*Sorge*) der. Daha sonra, Dasein'ın varlığı olarak ihtimamın birliğinin nereden geldiği sorgulanır. Dasein'ın her zaman kendini öncelediği dikkate alındığında, varlığında henüz gerçekleşmemiş bir şey olduğu kaçınılmazdır. Heidegger'e göre bu bize, Dasein'ın varoluşa-dair (*existentiell*) anlamda ölüme doğru olduğunu gösterir. Ölüme doğruluğun existensiyal ve sahih verililiği ise varoluşa-dair bir tasdik ile mümkündür ve bu tasdik vicdan ile elde edilir. Bu anlamda, Dasein'ın sahih varlığı, vicdana-sahip-olmayı-isteme'yi gerektirir ve bu türden bir kararlılık Dasein'ın sahih varlığının tasdikidir. Fakat bu kararlılık içi boş bir olasılığa dayanmaz aksine ölümün öndeleyiciliğini varsayar. Kararlılık ve öndeleyicilik yan yana gelmiş iki fenomen değildir. Aksine Heidegger, kararlılığın her zaman öndeleyici olduğunu iddia eder ve bu sayede Dasein, kendini, kendine doğru gelmeye bırakır ki kendisiyle bir imkan olarak yüzleşir. Burada Dasein'ın kendiliği öznellik üzerinden anlaşılmaz. Öndeleyici kararlılığın da bize gösterdiği gibi Dasein sahih olarak bütünsel bir yapıdır. Kendine doğru gelmesinde ortaya çıkan fenomen yani gelecek bu bütünselliğin temelini oluşturur ki Heidegger bu sayede, ihtimam olarak Dasein'ın varlığının anlamını zamansallıkta bulur. Bununla birlikte, Dasein, zaten olmuş olmasında kendine yöneliktir ve bu şekilde varolanları şimdide mevcut kılar. Yani zamansallık, geçmiş, gelecek ve şimdinin ekstatik bütünlüğüne dayanır. Dasein'ın varlığının anlamının zamansallık olması için şu söylenebilir: Dasein zamanda olan değildir; Dasein zamansaldır.

Dasein'ın varlığının anlamının zamansallık yani kendine yönelme olması, Dasein'ın olmak zorunda olduğu şeyi olabilmesini yani onun varoluşsallığını varsaymak anlamına gelir. Bu bağlamda, temel ontoloji kendi kendini sınırlama özelliğine sahiptir. *Varlık ve Zaman*'dan sonra Heidegger bu sınırlamanın kendine özgü doğasına vurgu yapar. Bu bölümün üçüncü kısmında, temel ontolojinin içsel devinimi ya da dönüşümü olarak anlaşılan ve Heidegger'in metontoloji dediği soruşturma biçimini aşkınlık, dünya ve zemin temaları üzerinden değerlendirmeye çalıştık. Vurgulamaya çalıştığımız gibi, bu süreçte ön plana çıkan olgu ontolojik farktır. Yani, varlığın varolanların varlığı olmasının yanı sıra, bunun aynı zamanda varolanların kendilerini varolanlar olarak ifşa etmeleri anlamına gelmesi fikri, Heidegger'i farkın kendisini ele almanın imkanını sorgulamaya itmiştir. Heidegger, *Mantığın Metafizik Temelleri* adlı eserinde, bilinen yönelimsellik kavramına karşı ve onun temeli olarak kökensel aşkınlık kavramını ileri sürmüştür. Buna göre, söz konusu olan, özne ve nesne arasındaki ilişkisellikten öte, Dasein'ın dünyaya doğruluğunda varolanları aşması ve bunun varolanların dünyaya girişi olmasıdır. Dasein, bu aşkınlıkta dünya tarafından sınırlandırıldığı ölçüde özgürdür ve bu özgürlük varlık anlayışının temelidir. Ayrıca bu aşkınlığın temeli yine zamanın zamansallığı olarak anlaşılmıştır. Heidegger'e göre, özgürlük hakikatle ilişkilidir. Varolanların kendileri olarak olmasına ontik hakikat denir ve bu Dasein'ın aşkınlığını gerektirir ki bu aşkınlık bir varlık anlayışı olduğundan ontolojik hakikattir. Ontik ve ontolojik hakikatin iç içe geçmişliği, varolanlar ve varlık arasındaki farkın kendisidir. Yani varolanlar varlıkta, varlık ise varolanlarda temellenir. Bu fenomen, Heidegger'in *Zemin'in Özü Üzerine*'de gösterdiği gibi, zemin için özgürlüktür. Bu anlamda, Dasein metafiziksel bir varlıktır çünkü varolanlar daima varlığa gelmelerinde anlaşılır ve böylece varlık sorusu soru olarak muhafaza edilir. *Metafizik Nedir?* adlı konuşma metninde, Heidegger, varolanların aşılmasını ve aynı anda oldukları gibi olmalarını, hiçliğin varoluşa içkinliği ile anlatmaya çalışmıştır. Varolanların hiçbir şey olmak yerine olmalarındaki tuhaflık varlığı temelinden anlamımızı sağlamaktadır. Bu nedenle metafizik yani varlık sorusu ancak Dasein olarak anlamlıdır.

Heidegger bu duruma Dasein'ın metafiziği demektedir. Bu bölümün son kısmında bu anlayışın bir sınırlama olarak kendini nasıl sunduğu tartışılmıştır.

Heidegger'in Dasein'in metafiziği anlayışını Kant ile olan diyalogu üzerinden anlamaya çalıştık. Heidegger'e göre, varlık sorusu, varlığın kendi sorunsallığını temellendirmesi olarak anlaşılacaksa, bu türden bir temel-atmayı Kant'ın metafizik eleştirisinde buluruz. Bu anlamda Kant, varolanları incelerken aslında genel olarak varlığı sorgulamaktadır. Yani *Metaphysica Specialis* aslında *Metaphysica Generalis* ile iç içedir. Heidegger'e göre bu Kant'ta bilinebilirlik problemi olarak ortaya çıkar. Kant, varolanları, bilinebilirlikleri yani varolmaları bakımından ele alır ve böylelikle ön-ontolojik bir varlık anlayışını kabul eder. Bunu da görü ve anlamının karşılıklı ilişkisinde temellendirir. Varolanlar her zaman karşılaşılabılır olmalarında anlaşılır ve Heidegger'e göre bu çeşit bir orada-olma ya da karşıda-durma ancak görü ile verililik kazanır. Fakat görüdeki verililik bir senteze tabidir ve bu sentez anlamının mantıksal sentezi değil, imgelemin zamansal sentezidir. Bununla birlikte, bu sentez kavram tarafından bekleniyor olmalıdır. Heidegger, nesne-olmayla kavram ilişkisini de imgelem üzerinden açıklar. Böylelikle, özne olmanın temelinde kendisini karşıda-durmayla sınırlandırmak yatar ki Heidegger buna yine özgürlük der. Yani Dasein varolanlardan varolmaları bakımından etkilenmesiyle, kendi kendini etkiler halde saf bir imkandır. Burada, Heidegger aşkınlığı Dasein'in sonluluğu olarak anlamaktadır. Dasein, varolanların toplu ifşasına fırlatılmıştır ve bu atılmışlık üzerinde kontrol sahibi değildir. Fakat bildiğimiz gibi bu hiçlik olumsuzluk içermez; aksine varlığın kökensel hareketine işaret eder. Böylelikle, Dasein varlık hakkında olmaktan çıkar, varlıktan anlaşılır. Bu aynı zamanda metafizik hakkında konuşmak yerine, metafizikten hareketle konuşmak demektir. Heidegger bu konuları *Metafiziğin Temel Problemleri* adlı dersinde tartışmıştır. Burada, Dasein metafizik olma biçiminde ele alınmıştır ve fırlatılmışlığı ya da sonluluğu sıkıntı kavramı üzerinden tartışılmıştır. Heidegger üç çeşit sıkıntıdan bahseder ve ancak derin sıkıntının Dasein'i nihai imkanında verdiğini iddia eder. Derin sıkıntıda, varolanlar bütün olarak kayıtsızlık içinde kendilerini sunarlar. Bu, Dasein'i en uç olasılığına zorlar. Fakat varolanların bütünsel kayıtsızlığı aynı zamanda onların kendilerini göstermeleri olduğu için ve bu bütünsellik zamansal bir kendini sınırlama anlamına geldiğinden Dasein zaman olarak bir kırılmadır. Bu anlamda Dasein sadece bir imkan değildir, her daim mümkün kılan bir imkandır. Yani varolanların bütünselliğindeki reddedici yön, zaman olarak sınırlanmadır ve bu Dasein'i Da-sein yapar. Böylece, ontolojik fark,

dünya formasyonun bu bütünsel yönüyle her iki taraflı anlaşılır ve Da-sein'in kökensel tasarımına yani bir imkan olarak imkanlara açık olmaya ve böyle kalmaya denk gelir.

Böylelikle *Varlık ve Zaman*'daki Dasein ve varlığının anlamı olarak ele alınan zamansallık, varlığın kendi kendini ortaya koyması üzerinden anlaşılmış olur. Bu zamansal kırılma da varolanların bütünsel kendini gösterişi ve aynı anda gizlenişi olarak Dasein'ı olabirlik olarak bir imkan yapar. Bir başka ifadeyle, zaman sadece Dasein'ın varlığının anlamı olmaktan çıkar ve varlığın kendi hareketine karşılık gelir. Heidegger'in, *Varlık ve Zaman*'dan hemen sonra, *Fenomenolojinin Temel Problemleri* adlı eserinde, bu anlamda Dasein'ın zamansallığını (*Zeitlichkeit*) varlığın zamansallığından (*Temporalität*) ayırdığını biliyoruz. Bu bağlamda, tezimizin dördüncü bölümü, bu noktadan hareketle, varlık ve zaman ilişkisini tekrar düşünmeye dayanan ve aslında varlık ve hakikat ilişkisini tartışan bir biçimde şekillenmiştir. Bu bölümün ilk kısmında, *Fenomenolojinin Temel Problemleri* çıkış noktası kabul edilerek, Heidegger'in varlığın zamansallığını inceleme amacıyla, geniş anlamıyla 'mevcut' (vorhanden) nosyonuna değin analizleri ve bunun temel ontoloji ve sonrasında beliren hakikat düşüncesiyle hangi anlamda ilgili olduğu tartışılmıştır. Öncelikle el altında olan ve sınırlı anlamda mevcut yani el altında olanın eksik bir biçimi olarak mevcut üzerine Heidegger'in dünyanın dünyasallığını temel alarak gerçekleştirdiği açıklamaları ele aldık. Buna göre, geniş anlamıyla mevcut, *Varlık ve Zaman*'ın aşkınsal çerçevesini aşan ve varlığı üretilmişlik üzerinden anlamayı gerektiren yeni bir bakış açısı gerektirmektedir. Bunu, Heidegger'in *Fenomenolojinin Temel Problemleri*'nde, ortaçağ metafiziği ve kavramlarını yani öz ve varoluşu incelediği bölümü dikkate alarak anlamaya çalıştık. Buradaki varoluş analizi bize, bir varlığın, üretilmişliğinde varlığa sınırlanmış bir biçimde anlaşıldığını ve böylece el altında olabildiğini vurgulamaktadır. Dolayısıyla öz ya da önceki analizlerimizdeki şekliyle *eidos* ise üretilebilirlik anlamında gelmektedir. Varolanlar varlıklarına bırakılır yani varolurlar ve böylece *orada* olarak el altında karşımıza çıkarlar. Burada önemli olan varoluş ve öz arasındaki ayrımın ontolojik ayrım tarafından öncelendiğini görmektir. Yani varlık, varolanlar içinden kendini göstermeye bırakır ve bu şekilde gizlenir. Burada zaman varlığın sınırlanması olacaksa, her bir ekstasin varolanların varlığının verilişi anlamına gelen

özel bir yönelime sahip olması gerekir ki varlığın birleştirici bir verililiğinden söz edebilelim. *Fenomenolojinin Temel Problemleri*'nde Heidegger bu temel sezgisini mevcut namevcut ilişkisi bağlamında ele almıştır. Fakat gösterdiğimiz gibi, bu ilişki el altında olan ve kayıp olan üzerinden kurulduğu için, varlık hakikati tartışması söz konusu olamamıştır.

Başka bir ifadeyle, Heidegger öz ve varoluş arasındaki ilişkiyi varlığın ontolojik fark olarak ortaya çıkmasında yani varlığın kendi dinamizminde göstermeye çalışmıştır. Bu bölümün ikinci kısmına Heidegger'in öz-varoluş ilişkisini Aristoteles'in *Fizik*'i bağlamında nasıl ele aldığını tartışarak başladık. Buna göre, Heidegger, Aristoteles'in doğal varlıklar ve hareket üzerine yaptığı analizlerden yola çıkarak, özün varolanın olduğu şey olmasında kendini sürekli ürettiğini ve bunun, varolanın orada yatan şey olmasının orada-yatıyor olmayla birlikte anlaşılmasında ortaya çıktığını iddia eder. Buna göre varolanlar üretilmişliklerinde bir eser (work, ergon) olarak görülürken, bu üretilebilirliğin kendisi yani özün bir varolanda görünüme yerleştirilmesi, ergon'un bir diğer anlamıyla 'iş' olarak anlaşılmalıdır. Heidegger'e göre, bu ikili yapıya Aristoteles'in *phusis* kavramı karşılık gelir. Burada, hem bir mevcudiyet hem de maddenin henüz olmamışlığını koruması ölçüsünde namevcudiyet bulunur. Bu durum daha önce bahsettiğimiz *aletheia* yani varlığın hakikati olarak anlaşılabilir. *Phusis* sadece şu veya bu varlığa ait değil, Yunanlılar'ın varlığı, ortaya çıkma olarak asıl anlama biçimidir. Bu kısımda bahsettiğimiz gibi, Heidegger bu konuya *Metafiziğe Giriş* adlı dersinde değinmiştir. Bu bağlamda, varlık, görünme ve hiçlik arasındaki ilişkiyi, düşüncenin bu başlangıç haline dönerek incelemek gerekmektedir. Yine aynı metinde, insanın özünün varlığın özü bağlamında ele alınması gerektiği yönündeki iddiaya vurgu yapılır ve *techne* yani varlıkla ilk tanışıklık sonucu varlığın esere daha doğrusu Heidegger'in de öncelik tanıdığı gibi, sanat eserine yerleştirilmesinin gerekliliği üzerinde durulur. Görülebileceği gibi, Heidegger için sanat eseri hakikatin kendini icra ettiği mecra halini alır. Bunun nedenlerini, şey, araç ve sanat eseri arasındaki ilişkiyi tekrar düşünerek anlamaya çalıştık. Burada, eser ve hakikat ilişkisi, hakikatin ihtiyaç duyduğu ve bir varlıkta temin ettiği açıklık üzerinden anlaşılmıştır. Bu ilişki bize hakikatin ortaya çıkmasının varlığa içkin bir *Kehre* yani dönemeç olduğunu göstermektedir.

Bu bölümün üçüncü kısmında bahsi geçen dönemeç anlayışı üzerinde durduk. Dönemeci, Heidegger'in kendi düşüncesindeki bir değişimden çok, varlığın hakikati bağlamında düşünmeye çalıştık. Heidegger, hakikat ve eser arasındaki ilişkiye vurgu yaparken aslında hakikatin varlığını yani kendini üretme ve temellendirme halini tartışmaktadır. Burada, sıradan anlamıyla hakikat yani doğruluk ile Heidegger'in işaret ettiği kökensel hakikat arasındaki ilişki ön plana çıkmaktadır. Heidegger, kökensel hakikatin *aletheia* olduğunu, bunun Platon ve Aristoteles ile birlikte doğruluk anlayışına dönüştüğünü ve bu anlamda doğruluğun aslında *aletheia*'da temellendiğini savunur. Böylelikle, sıradan doğruluk anlayışı tamamen konu dışı edilmez; aksine bu türden bir hakikatin özünün sorgulamaya tabi tutulması gerekir. Ve Heidegger'in *Hakikat'in Özü Üzerine*'de belirttiği gibi, bu sorgulama yapıldığında görülecektir ki, hakikatin özü, özün hakikatidir. Burada Heidegger, doğruluk anlayışın gerektirdiği bir açıklık olarak Dasein'dan bahseder. İnsan, kendini ekstatik olarak, hem varolanların bütün olarak açılmasında hem de gizlenmesinde bulur. Buna göre, hakikat-olmayan da hakikate dahildir ve Heidegger buna gizem der. Fakat burada gizlenme kendini de gizler ve bir unutuş hali belirir. İnsan sadece varolanlarla ilgilenir ve yanılgı ortaya çıkar. Yanılgı kaçınılmazdır ve hakikat-olmayanın en saf halidir. Fakat burada bile varolanlar çıkış noktası kabul edildiği için ve bu da ekstatik varoluşa denk geldiği için, yanılgı aslında gizemden kaçış hareketinin kendisidir. Yani, yanılgının kendini dayatmasında gizem hüküm sürer. Heidegger'e göre bu durum Dasein'ı gerekli kılar. Daha doğrusu, Dasein bir ihtiyaç, bir mecburiyettir. Dasein'ı bir mecburiyet (*Not*) olarak görmek hakikatin özsellğine tanık olmaktır. Heidegger'in bu konuya dair düşündükleriyle, *Felsefenin Temel Soruları* adlı dersinde tekrar karşılaşıyoruz. Gördüğümüz gibi bu metinde, kendi hareketinde öz ve bunun doğruluk ile ilişkisinin bizi nasıl kökensel hakikate götürdüğü anlatılmaktadır. Burada Heidegger hakikat sorusunun tarihsel ya da başlangıçsal yönüne vurgu yapmış ve zorunluluğu bu başlangıçsallıkta temellendirmiştir. Bu anlamda, ihtiyaç ya da zorunluluk varlığın tarihselliği yani başlangıçsallığındadır. Heidegger'e göre, ihtiyaç artık bir eksiklik olarak görülmez; aksine bir bolluk ve hediyedir. Ve bu ihtiyaç ve zorunluluk insanı belirler.

Böylece Dasein, Da-sein olarak yani hakikatin vuku bulduğu zemin olarak anlaşılır. Artık sorgulanması gereken şey insanın Da-sein'a olan aidiyetidir. Sonraki

kısımda, bu soru çerçevesinde, hakikatin kendini temellendirmesi olarak Da-sein'ı inceledik. Bu noktada, Heidegger'in *Varlık ve Zaman*'dan sonraki temel kitabı sayılan *Felsefeye Katkılar* adlı eseri ön plana çıkmaktadır. Burada, Da-sein aradalık olarak ele alınmış ve varlığın özsel hareketinin insanı, insanın yazgısının da varlığı gerektirmesi ölçüsünde kendilik problemi tekrar tartışılmıştır. Kendilik sadece sahip olmak anlamında değil, uygun olmak (*eignen*) olarak düşünülmektedir. Yani, hakikatin ya da varlığın sahiplenmesi, insanın uygun olup olmadığını sormayı gerektirir ki bu da hakikatin kendi zeminini kendine veriyor olması demektir. Heidegger burada sadece açıklıktan bahsetmektedir ve bu açıklık kendini kendi sınırlaması olarak bir varolanda muhafaza ederek verir. Bu muhafaza her zaman bir gizli kalmayla birlikte hareket eder. Yani açıklığın ortaya çıkışı gizlilikle birlikte olur. Bu açıklığın zemininin kendini geri çekmesi olarak anlaşılır ve bu geri çekilmeye, zemin temellendirilmek üzere belirir. Heidegger bu zemin-zeminsizlik ilişkisini zaman-mekan olarak betimler ve zeminden kaçışın zeminin zeminselliğine ait olduğunu göstermeye çalışır. Gördüğümüz gibi, Heidegger'in asıl amacı hakikati hem bir açıklık hem de bir gizlenme, saklanma olarak sunmaktır. Bu açıklık ne sadece varlığın insanı çağırması ne de sadece insanın varlığa olan aidiyeti üzerinden anlaşılabilir. Hakikat, tam da varlığın varolanlarda unutulmuş olmasında ortaya çıkar ki bu da insan ve tanrı ilişkisi biçimindeki aradalık olarak Da-sein demektir. Da-sein, insanın, tanrının ve varolanların aslında kendilerine özsel olana kavuşmaları demektir ve bu anlamda, bir yakınlık (*Innigkeit*) halidir.

Burada, insanın hakikat bağlamındaki durumu sonraki tartışmalarımızın temelini oluşturmuştur. Dolayısıyla, tezimizin son bölümü, varlığın hakikatinin muğlak ve biricik halini yani insanı ortaya çıkarmak amacını taşımaktadır. İlk kısımda, Heidegger'in Dasein anlayışını, insan ve tanrı arasında olmaklık bakımından detaylı bir şekilde inceledik. Böylelikle gördük ki, tanrı varlığın hakikatine ihtiyaç duyar çünkü tanrının kaçışı ya da artık gelmeyişi tanrının özsel olma halidir ve varlığın unutulmuşluğuna işaret eder. Bahsettiğimiz gibi, bu zeminsizlik (*Abgrund*) zemine yani hakikatte temel-atma olarak Da-sein'a aittir. Bu kısımda gösterdiğimiz gibi, insana özgü olan, bu hakikat olayında (*Ereignis*) belirir ve bunun nedeni de bu olayın başlangıcın başlangıçlığına işaret etmesidir. Buna göre, insan çoktan diğer varolanlara ve kendine dönmüştür ve ontolojik farkın zaten ortaya

çıkması demek olan bu hareket olarak görülür. Burada söz konusu olan artık ontolojik fark değil, bu hareketin ya da dönüşün kendisidir ki ancak insan bunu olduğu gibi üstlenir. Daha doğrusu insan olma, bu ilişki olarak anlaşılır. Dolayısıyla Heidegger, insan olmanın tüm metafizik ve hümanist yorumlarını reddeder. İnsanın, olayın tikelliği ve biricikliği dışında bir tanımı yoktur ve buna tarihsel insan denir. İnsan, varlık tarafından fırlatılmış ve bu fırlatılmada iddia edilmiştir. Böylelikle, Da-sein olarak açıklık varlığa yakınlığı, kendine özgü bir uzaklıkla ya da mesafeyle verir ve bu hakikat insanın yazgısıdır.

Heidegger'e göre, kendi mesafesiyle gelen yakınlık varlığın kendisidir. Bunu anlamak için metafizik tarihini, varlık tarihi olarak görmek gerekir. Metafizik düşünce hiçbir zaman varlığı bu yönüyle sorgulamamış, varlığa dair kesin bir hükümle başlamış ve varolanları incelemiştir. Fakat Heidegger'e göre, bu tam da varlığın tarihsel kendini ortaya koyuşudur. Varlık her zaman varolanlara ihtiyaç duyar çünkü daha önce de belirttiğimiz gibi, varlık bir ortaya-konmadır. Önemli olan ve metafiziğin gözden kaçırdığı nokta ise bu ortaya konmada gerçekleşen geri çekilme ya da gizlenmeyi görmektir. Metafizik sadece ortaya konmaya odaklanır ve varlığın gizliliğine dair *hiç bir şey* söylemez, yani aslında nihilizmdir. Varlık gizliliğinde bir ortaya konma olarak düşünüldüğünde sadece bir ilişki yani Da-sein olarak anlaşılır ve bu anlamıyla Da-sein, varolanların ortasında olmak demektir. Heidegger artık insanı bu bağlamda anlar çünkü sadece insan varolanların ortasındadır. Yani varlık bir ilişki biçiminde kendine gelir ve bir yer edinir. Bu yeri ise insan doldurur. Dolayısıyla, varlık özsel biçimde gizlenmesinde olur. İnsan ise bu tarihsellik ile anlaşılır çünkü ancak varolanların ortaya konmasında varlık ısrar eder ve geri çekilir böylelikle de insana ihtiyaç duyar. Heidegger'e göre, varlık, bu gizleniş ve ortaya çıkışta, çoktan kendini, düşünülmek üzere olmasında söz vermiştir. Başka bir deyişle, varlığın düşünülmemişliği düşünceyi besleyen unsurdur. Bu bağlamda, düşüncenin amacı metafiziği aşmak değil, metafiziği kökenine iade etmektir. Bu da bize, metafiziğin ya da hakikatin bir iddia olarak ortaya çıkmasının, varlık ve varolanlar arasındaki ayırmadan önce varlığın gizliliğinde ortaya çıkışını gerektirdiğini söyler. Yani varlık hem varolanlarda kendini gösterir ve böylece gizlenir hem de bu gizlenmede bir iddia olarak sürer. Heidegger bu durumu istenç için istenç (*Wille zum Willen*) olarak tarif eder. Buna göre, metafizik tarihinde,

varolanların ortaya konmuş olmalarında beliren ne'liğine öncelik verilir ve şu veya bu varlık olmalarındaki varlık anlamını varsayılır. Fakat yine de varolanlar ilk anlamıyla yani ortaya-konan, üretilmiş olan olarak görülmüştür ve ne'lik etki eden ya da üreten olarak anlaşılmıştır. Böylece, varlık, gizli kalmasında aslında kendi kendini etkilemektedir. Heidegger'e göre bu varlığın hakikatine aittir ve insan üzerinden anlaşılamaz. Aksine insan veya öznellik bu çeşit bir varlık anlayışı üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Bu da bize düşünülecek olanın varlıktan geldiğini ve insan üretimi olmadığını tekrar göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, Heidegger'e göre, düşünüp taşınması gereken şey, aslında zaten düşündürücü olandır. Düşündürücü olan ise aslında hala düşünmüyor olduğumuzdur. Burada Heidegger yine varlığın ortaya çıkmasındaki gizlenmeyi kasteder. Bu anlamda, insan bu geri çekilme tarafından çekilir ve bu şekilde geri çekileni gösterir. Bir gösterme olarak ise insan bir işaretir.

Böylece insanı şu veya bu metafizik belirlenimin öncesinde bir ilişki olarak görmenin önu açılmış olur. İnsan, varlığın hakikatinin gerektirdiği yerde ikamet eder. Burada söz konusu olan artık varolanların hakikati değil, hakikatin kökensel ortaya çıkışıdır, yani varlığın gizliliğini muhafaza ederek görünmesidir. Bu anlamda insan, tarihsellik içinden anlaşıldığı ölçüde, tekin olmayandır (*Unheimlich*). Bu bölümün ikinci kısmına Heidegger'in Hölderlin'in İster şiirini yorumladığı eserini incelemekle başladık. Burada Heidegger, tekinsizlik durumunu Sofokles'in Antigone'si üzerinden tartışmıştır. Bu metinde, Heidegger tekinsiz olmayı yurtsuz ya da evsiz olma olarak ele almıştır. Buradaki vurgu sadece yurtsuz olmak değil, kendi yurdunda yurtsuz olmak üzerinedir. Yani, insan, varolanların ortasındaki varlık olara aslında kendi yurdundadır. Fakat varlık unutulmuş olduğundan, her zaman hiçlikle karşılaşır ki bu da onu aynı anda yurtsuz yapar. Heidegger'e göre önemli olan hiçliğin varlığa karşıt dönüşünü dolayımsızlığında anlamaktır. Yani insan hem varlık ile ödüllendirilmiştir hem de ceza olarak varlığı kaybetmiştir. Bununla birlikte, Antigone şiiri, yurtsuz olmayı aynı zamanda kendi yurduna dönme olarak varlıksal ilişki bağlamında bize sunar. Bu durum, şiirde koruma altına alınmıştır ve ancak bu şekilde yurtsuz olma düşünülmeye değer bir şey olmaya bırakılır. Heidegger'e göre bu insan olmanın özüdür ve ancak şiirselleştirilebilen bir şeydir. Bu şiirselleştirme, kelimeler ve onlara karşılık gelen anlamlar olarak görülmemelidir. Aksine, şiir, söylenmemiş olana doğrudur ve her durumda böyle kalır. Heidegger'e göre, varlığın gizliliğinde ortaya

çıkması, ancak şiirde şiirselleştirilerek söylenmesi demektir. Burada, varlık ve hiçlik, ortaya konma ve gizlenme arasındaki karşı-dönüşe vurgu yaptık ve Heidegger'in Hölderlin yorumunun tarihsellik bahsinde nasıl bir yere sahip olduğunu tartıştık. Bu bağlamda, Heidegger, Hölderlin şiirini nehir teması üzerinden inceler. Nehir, akışındaki geride bırakma ve ileri doğru olmaya binaen, insanın ikametini belirler. Bu akış, insanın kendi yurduna dönmesi olarak tarihsel bir yolculuktur ve bu anlamda Hölderlin, nehir şiiriyle, yabancı olandan yani yunandan kendi yurduna dönmektedir. Heidegger'e göre, bu şekilde varlık ya da kutsal kendini şiirde kelimeye ya da söze döker. Böylece dil (*Sprache*) ile varlığın tarihselliği arasında bir köprü kurulmuş olur. Şiir varlığın kelimedeki kurulmasıdır ve bu kurulmada zemin her zaman zeminsizlik olarak tezahür eder. Bu kökensel hareket bir göstermedir ve şair yani Hölderlin ise bir işaret olarak ihtiyaç duyulandır. Böylelikle, Heidegger'in Hölderlin diyalogu bize, varlığın tarihselliği ve insan arasındaki ilişkinin kendisinin dil olduğunu göstermektedir. Buna göre, dil, gösterme olarak bir söylemedir. Heidegger, dili, şiirin ve düşüncenin komşuluğunda anlar. Bu nedenle, düşünceyi çağırmanın ne olduğu üzerinde durduk. Heidegger düşünceyi hafıza (*Gedächtnis*) olarak ele almıştır. Hafıza, bizi ilgilendiren vazgeçmeksizin kalmaktır ve bu da düşünülmesi gerekeni unutmamak demektir. Heidegger, bu durumu Parmenides'in *legein* ve *noein* kavramlarının birbiriyle olan ilişkisinde bulur. Sonuç olarak, düşünceyi çağırın, varlık ve varolanlar arasındaki ikiliktir.

Heidegger, dili, şiir ve düşüncenin komşuluğunda ararken, bu komşuluğu belirleyen ikamete özsel bir hareket atfetmektedir. Dilin özünü, şiir ve düşüncede ararken, amacı özün diline, kendi ortaya çıkışında vurgu yapmaktır. Yani, öz, şiirde ve düşüncede konuşur çünkü öz (*Wesen*) mutlak bir kendindelik değil, mevcudiyetin ve namevcudiyetin hareketidir. Bu anlamda, dil yani söyleme (*Sage*) yakınlık (*Nähe*) olarak anlaşılmaktadır. Bu bölümün son kısmında, Heidegger'in yakınlık ve özsel bir hareket olarak dil anlayışına değindik. Buna göre, şiirin ve düşüncenin komşuluğu çok daha temel bir karşı karşıya olmayı yani yakınlığı gerektirir. Öncelikle, bu yakınlığın ve beraberinde getirdiği mesafenin matematiksel zaman ve mekan kavramlarıyla anlaşılamayacağını görölmesi gerekir. Heidegger'in mevcudiyet ve zaman ilişkisine dair düşüncelerini bu kökensel yakınlık bağlamında inceledik. Heidegger'e göre, yakınlık, yeryüzü, gökyüzü, tanrı ve insanın birbirlerine

uzaklığında verilidir. Bu yakınlık fikrini, Heidegger'in 'şey' (*Ding*) anlayışı ve insanın ikameti arasındaki ilişki bağlamında anlamaya çalıştık. Şeyin şeyleşmesi, dünyanın dünyalaşması ve insanın ikameti dilin gösterme olarak bir hareketidir ve bu, *Ereignis* olarak anlaşılır. Bu mevcudiyetin verililiği, zamanın verililiğidir. Buna göre, insanın ikameti ölümlü olmasıdır ki bu da insan konuşmasının hep bir cevap olması anlamına gelir. Başka bir deyişle, insanın konuşması her zaman bir ilişki olarak kalır. Burada, Heidegger'de kelime ve şeyler arasındaki ilişki dikkate alınmalıdır. Heidegger'e göre, kelimeler, şeylere karşılık gelmez. Kelime, şeyin şeyleşmesi ve dünyanın dünyalaşması karşılıklığını bir fark halinde sunar. Yani, kelimeler, sesler ve anlamları değil, aksine sessizliğe zorunlu bir geçiştir. İnsanın konuşmasının dile aidiyetini yani insanın ölümlü olmasını bu çerçevede anlamaya çalıştık. Sonuç olarak, bu temalar eşliğinde, düşünür için, düşündürücü olanın yeniden ortaya çıktığına ve bunun düşünceye özsel olduğuna, düşüncenin en yakın halini takip ederek tanıklık etmiş olduk.

APPENDIX C
TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Namlı Türkmen
Adı : Gülşah
Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Heidegger on the claim of the phenomenon:
logos and being

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☒

- | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: