

CONTESTING NEOLIBERAL URBANISATION: CONTEMPORARY URBAN  
MOVEMENTS IN ISTANBUL, THE CASE OF GÜLSUYU-GÜLENSU  
NEIGHBOURHOODS

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NEIGHBOURHOODS**

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## ABSTRACT

### CONTESTING NEOLIBERAL URBANISATION: CONTEMPORARY URBAN MOVEMENTS IN ISTANBUL, THE CASE OF GÜLSUYU-GÜLENSU NEIGHBOURHOODS

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The shift from Keynesian to neo-liberal economic policies marked the changes in the urban agenda and the nature of urban movements in the last three decades. The neo-liberal urbanisation reinforced outstanding transformations on the development of urban space, especially in metropolitan areas, including Istanbul. The urban transformation projects, as instruments of neoliberal urbanisation, result in serious changes in this metropolitan area and encounter resistances from groups of people in the city.

The purpose of the thesis is to analyse the relationships between the actors of these resistances and how they are organised, based on the conceptual framework of urban movements. It shows that two types of urban movements can be defined today; the first develop as reactions of deprived people of mainly low-income residential areas, against the effects of the transformation on their own property and life styles. The second type is shaped as reactions of discontented groups to neoliberal urban policies. Focusing on the former type, the thesis employs a qualitative method of analysis for identifying the internal and external relationships movement actors build, and the rights they claim. It is argued that, despite what has been argued in the literature on urban movements in general, movements of the deprived in squatter areas may mobilise incorporating a labour struggle dimension shaped around claims of right to the city, due to the labour intensive fashion of the development of these areas. On the other hand, although property-based motives may prevail among the residents, movements can still insist on collective goals, and can be advocates of solidarity among the residents. Moreover, despite their consensus seeking with the local government as a public service provider with facilitating role of external actors, the dominant antagonistic nature of the relationship between movements and the local government as a local political actor prevails.

**Keywords:** Urban Movements, Neoliberal Urbanization, Urban Transformation Projects, Urban Movements in Istanbul

## ÖZ

### NEOLIBERAL KENTLEŞMEYE BİR KARŞI DURUŞ OLARAK GÜNÜMÜZ KENT HAREKETLERİ: İSTANBUL, GÜLSUYU-GÜLENSU MAHALLELERİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Keynesyen politikalardan neoliberal ekonomik politikalara geçiş, kentlerin gündeminde ve son otuz yıldır kent hareketlerinin doğasında değişikliklere yol açmaktadır. Neo-liberal kentleşme, kentsel mekanda, özellikle de İstanbul başta olmak üzere metropoliten alanlarda önemli değişimleri beslemektedir. Neoliberal kentleşmenin temel araçları olarak kentsel dönüşüm projeleri ise, bu metropoliten alanda ciddi değişikliklere yol açmakta ve kentteki farklı gruplar tarafından direnişle karşılanmaktadır.

Bu tezin amacı, kent hareketleri kavramsal çerçevesi temelinde, bu direnişlerin aktörleri arasındaki ilişkileri ve bu aktörlerin nasıl örgütlendiklerini analiz etmektir. Tez, günümüzde iki tür kent hareketinin ortaya çıktığını öne sürmektedir; ilki daha çok kentsel dönüşüme tabi olan, alt gelir gruplarının konut alanlarında ortaya çıkmakta ve bu politikalarla bir şekilde yoksun bırakılan grupların kentsel dönüşümün kendi mülkiyetleri ve yaşam tarzları üzerindeki etkisine tepki göstermesi olarak gelişmektedir. İkinci tür ise, neo-liberal kent politikalarından hoşnut olmayan grupların bunlara tepkisi olarak şekillenmektedir. Tez, ilk tür kent hareketleri üzerine odaklanarak, hareketteki aktörlerin kurdukları iç ve dış ilişkileri, ve savundukları hakları belirlemek amacıyla nitel bir saha araştırması yapılmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, genel olarak kent hareketleri yazınında öne sürülenin tersine, özellikle gecekondu alanlarında gelişen kent hareketlerinde, bu alanların oluşumundaki emek yoğun süreç nedeniyle, kent hakkı çevresinde şekillenen bir emek mücadelesi boyutu olduğu öne sürülmektedir. Diğer yandan, mahallede yaşayanlar arasında mülkiyet temelli güdüler olabilmesine rağmen, hareketler kolektif amaçlar üzerinde ısrar etmekte ve yaşayanlar arasında da dayanışmayı savunmaktadır. Ayrıca, dış aktörlerin kolaylaştırıcı rolünün yardımıyla bir kamusal hizmet sağlayıcısı olarak yerel yönetimlerle yaptıkları işbirliğine rağmen, yerel politik aktörler olarak bu yönetimlerle aralarındaki ilişkinin hakim muhalif yönü varlığını devam ettirmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kent Hareketleri, Neoliberal Kentleşme, Kentsel Dönüşüm Projeleri

To People of Gülsuyu-Gölensu Who Remain in Solidarity

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Neoliberalisation and market-oriented policies have been affecting the way urban areas develop and function for more than thirty years now. Today, cities have become perhaps the most important intervention area of the neo-liberal agenda, since one of the most profound impacts of neoliberalism is on built environment of cities, as urban land and property development have increasingly become powerful means of wealth creation. As a result, urban development today can be characterized as neoliberal urbanisation, which has austere reflections on urban space, its users, functioning and management. This manifests itself in an intense and rapid urban change, which reinforces the cities as places of conflict and tension.

Throughout this change, neoliberal urbanisation transforms built environment and the urban form, by eliminating or keeping the urban public spaces under intensified surveillance and creating new privatized spaces of elite/corporate consumption. It enforces the destruction of the degraded residential neighbourhoods of low-income groups who formerly constituted the traditional working-class for speculative redevelopment and constructing large-scale projects to attract corporate investment reconfiguring the existing land-use patterns, creating gated communities, urban enclaves and other purified spaces (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). In a word, the rapid urban change, particularly in large metropolitan areas, which has begun earlier in advanced capitalist countries and sprawled later to the peripheral ones, comes into being through urban transformation projects. Accordingly, what is experienced in the new neo-liberal era is a project-based urban development through these urban transformation projects. In this era, the role of the planning institution has also changed substantially, while the commodification of urban land along with land and property development projects has become a means of redistribution of wealth in the society.

Whatever changes are brought by this the neoliberal regime, political action and mobilisations are still significant. In urban areas, there are different social groups, which have different claims and demands on urban space. While these urban transformation projects result in serious changes in the urban space, they continue in an intensively destructive fashion and therefore encounter resistances from these different social groups, who are either deprived of or discontented by these projects. These groups are engaged in continuous interactions among themselves and with the national, regional and local government in order to articulate and meet their demands. Thus, their collective actions and mobilisations constitute today's urban movements.

Although neoliberalism itself has become a major target for oppositional mobilisation (Brenner and Theodore, 2002), it is argued that there are now limited forms of resistance to

this order compared to times when neoliberalism had not yet been adopted as the predominant set of ideas, policies and practices. In other words, neoliberalisation is claimed to have changed people's motivations in such a way that no broad-based or strong grassroots contestation can easily occur.

On the other hand, within this trend, new bargaining mechanisms emerged as relatively new forces behind urban policy making (Mayer, 1994), and parallel to this, movements become more and more fragmented (Mayer, 2000) and intertwined with different kinds of interests. As a result, urban governments begin to work unceasingly through and alongside other interests (Stoker, 1995). In this regard, it has been stressed that in the contemporary era, the old harsh struggles and conflicts over space have neither disappeared nor settled down, but begun to be accompanied by negotiations and bargaining processes. In relation to this, articulation and aggregation of different interests and demands on urban space are now argued to come to the fore in more complementary, cooperative and/or competitive ways with the local governments (Pierre and Peters, 2006) and more with an aim of compromise seeking, rather than in mere oppositional forms.

All these new trends demonstrate an evolution of urban movements and therefore call for a new and more in-depth look into them. Urban movements are classically argued to be constituted by the processes of urban citizens' collective actions, which rise out of some kind of a grievance and deprivation and develop around issues of collective consumption (housing shortages, growing discrepancies between rents and wages, landlords' neglect of maintenance, insufficient technical and social infrastructure facilities) or identity expression. However, such a conception is deemed insufficient due to the aforementioned new types of relations. Moreover, despite this argument on its insufficiency, not enough thorough analysis of movements themselves, rather than the more general movement terrain, has been made.

These trends of change are visible in Turkey, too, though in a different way. First of all, urban movements in classical terms could not historically develop in Turkey as in Europe and North America, and even in Latin America. There were instead some intermediary mechanisms like *gecekondu*<sup>1</sup> and *dolmuş*<sup>2</sup>, which functioned as buffer institutions preventing people from engaging in collective actions to raise their collective consumption rights. Therefore, what has been experienced in Turkey is not an evolution of urban movements as in the West, but the emergence of urban movements as an opposition to neoliberal urban development.

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<sup>1</sup> The term *gecekondu* derives from the Turkish words "gece", meaning "night" and "kondu" – meaning "placed" or "landed" (infinitive: *konmak*) and can thus be translated as "placed overnight".

<sup>2</sup> *Dolmuş* is a public transportation vehicle in Turkey, which are in the form of a shared taxi or a minibus, that operate between already set routes. Its name derives from Turkish for "apparently filled (with passengers)"; it departs from the station only when a sufficient number of passengers have boarded.

Moreover, in the West, the issue of increase in urban land and property values leading to rent seeking behaviours of different parties does not function so overwhelmingly on urban areas, which is a case arising because of the higher percentage of publicly owned land as opposed to privately owned, particularly in and around urban centres. In this respect, ‘urban movements’ are induced in Turkey as reactions directed towards urban transformation as a part of neoliberal policies and the consequent uneven distribution of the benefits by urban transformation projects aiming at and successfully result in the increasing values of urban land and property, without having the similar background their Western counterparts have.

On the other hand, the organised opposition against neoliberal interventions are argued to be weak and limited in Turkey, for the residents of target areas are from the weakest segments of the social stratification, who are generally migrants, foreigners, and tenants Erder (2009).

The aim of the thesis is to analyse the characteristics of the contemporary urban movements under neoliberal urbanisation, with a view to the rights claimed as well as internal and external relations of the movement, building upon the literature on neoliberal urbanisation and urban movements as well as related experiences in Istanbul. The main questions of the thesis are as follows:

- Urban movement terrain after 1990 has become fragmented, as argued in the relevant literature. What is the situation of movements themselves in this overall fragmentation? Is there a similar trend?
- Is it possible to trace a dimension of a labour struggle in urban movements or are they entirely devoid of it?
- How can one position the issue of collective rights for today’s urban movements which are argued to mobilise based on mainly individual property-based motives?
- How and by what means do urban movements establish their relations with actors outside the movement?
- To what extent and under what conditions movements cooperate with the local state, in an era where they directly mobilise against the neoliberal urban policies implemented by the latter? Are they always so cooperative?

A qualitative field research is the method of choice of the thesis in trying to find the answers of these questions. Gülsuyu-Gülensu neighbourhoods in Istanbul are chosen as the field, which is a low-income and a residential area built in an unauthorized way, located within the boundaries of Maltepe District Municipality in Asian side of the city, to the north of E-5 Highway. Three main methods of qualitative research are employed; in-depth interviewing, group interviewing (focus group meeting) and participant observation. The information used to make the analysis is also gathered through textual analysis including reading researches, reports, and media resources; and following their activities through e-mails by being a member of the e-mail group established by a group of city-wide urban movement activists.

The thesis is divided into eight parts. The second part is a literature review on urban movements, with a view to the change in understanding of the movements and increasing

emphasis from 1980 onwards on “non-class” issues such as gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and local autonomy as bases for mobilisation of movements, along with the emerging new type of relations with the urban movements with the local state, based on more cooperation and consensus seeking, rather than purely antagonistic ones. In the third part, the dynamics of neoliberal urbanisation is examined, showing that neoliberal urbanisation reconfigures the way the urban built environment in a creatively destructive way, which lays the grounds for contemporary urban movements. Following this, neoliberal urban development in Istanbul is explained, focusing on two types of projects: territorially-based urban transformation projects and projects for global competitiveness in the form of prestige and urban infrastructure projects. In the fourth part, contemporary urban movements in Istanbul are described and analysed as mobilisations against the neoliberal policies and practices, defining the types of urban movements. Accordingly, building upon Castells’ (1977, 1983, 1996) and Mayer’s (2000, 2003, 2006b) frameworks and employing Marcuse’s (2009) analysis distinguishing the demands of those who are deprived of certain basic material and legal rights and those who are discontented about life, two main types of urban movements are defined; movements whose main mobilisation factor is deprivation and movements whose main mobilisation factor is discontent. First type of urban movements is those who mobilise against the effects of urban transformation projects on their own property or land, in a given territory, and the unequal distribution of the newly generated rent increase. They are therefore argued in the relevant literature to have been built more around individual-property based concerns. The second type of urban movements is those whose main motivation is some kind of discontent with the spatial development in neoliberal urbanization.

In the fifth part, the methodology of the thesis is explained, including the aim, method, description of the field, research questions and research method.

The sixth and seventh parts present the findings of the qualitative field research made in Gülsuyu-Gölensu neighbourhoods. It is finally argued that;

- In the neoliberal era, not only the movement terrain as Mayer (2000, 2009) argues, but movements themselves are subject to fragmentation. In this respect, fragmentation in the movement terrain among those who cooperate with the system and those who are increasingly radicalised might be observed within one movement, as Gülsuyu-Gölensu case shows.
- Gülsuyu-Gölensu case demonstrates that, provided that the development of the neighbourhoods are labour intensive, both in terms of developing an urban piece of land from an idle one, and provision of cheap labour for the surrounding industry, and as long as people put this labour into the heart of their struggle, urban movements of the deprived might still have a dimension of labour struggle, both in reproductive and productive sphere, which they link to their right to the city.
- Despite the emphasis on the individual property-based character of the urban movements of the deprived in the relevant literature, Gülsuyu-Gölensu case shows that, movements are by definition mobilised around collective rights and may even support the same orientation among all residents.



- Despite the cooperative and consensus oriented relations of urban movements of the deprived with the local state, the antagonistic relations in between never vanish, due to former's contentious nature and in view of latter's role as a local political actor.
- Movements of the deprived establish their relations with the system, mainly with the local state, through the external actors, who support them technically, legally and organisationally. The external actors facilitate the process of consensus seeking of both sides.

The thesis is concluded in the last part, by a summary of the discussions, an interpretation of the findings and further questions. All in all, it is argued that today, urban movements of the deprived might be valuable and effective tools for urban citizens to demand their right to the city. They are even one of the rare, or perhaps currently the only opportunity to defend the cities for people, but not profit, as Brenner *et al* (2010) have once emphasized.



## **CHAPTER 2**

### **URBAN MOVEMENTS AS A MEANS OF CONTESTING URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES**

Social movements, as a means of public policy making (Tilly, 2008) have become permanent elements of our societies, involving both disadvantaged groups and the middle classes (Le Gales, 2002). They are traditionally defined as socially shared activities and beliefs directed towards the demand for change in some aspect of social order (Gusfield, 1970).

Social movements therefore challenge the rules and relationships in the society, and demand changes therein. Similarly, they may mobilize to resist change. In other words, ‘a social movement develops when a feeling of dissatisfaction spreads, and insufficiently flexible institutions are unable to respond’ (della Porta and Diani, 1999). Their genesis ‘is in the co-existence of contrasting value systems and of groups in conflict with each other’ (della Porta and Diani, 1999). The point is that social movements are made of socially shared activities and built around some kind of a demand. Here, socially shared activities are not necessarily activities carried out under a formal organization, but they could take the form of informal mobilizations. The primary endeavour of social movements is to attract support and retain it. They do it in order to convert adherents into constituents and non-adherents into adherents (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Castells argues that “social movements must be understood in their own terms, namely, they are what they say they are” (Castells, 1997, p.69-70). He further claims that, “social movements may be socially conservative, socially revolutionary or both, or none” (Castells, 1997, p.70).

One of the dominant approaches in social movement theory is resource mobilization theory that developed from 1960s onwards. Focusing on a set of contextual processes, resource mobilization theory stresses that movements need organizational, human and material resources, and they are shaped by and work within limits set by these resources, which could be economic, political, cultural and communicational. For example, Morris (1984) stresses cultural resources like language and music which African Americans drew upon in civil rights movements. It is also argued that movements arise ‘because of long-term changes in group resources, organization, and opportunities for collective action’ (Jenkins, 1983). In other words, resources are argued to have an effect not only on the shaping and working of movements, but on their emergence as well.

Urban movements are a specific type of social movements, which are regarded as a means of urban policy making. The main point that distinguishes urban movements from social movements in general is that the former is based on a specific territory. They are traditionally seen as opposing the existing situation and demand change, like all social

movements. However, the demands of urban movements are related to the 'urban' and have consequences on the reproduction of the space. In this respect, they are 'processes of purposive social mobilization, organized as in a given territory, oriented towards urban related-goals' (Castells, 1997, p. 60). They politicize 'the city as a context for distinctive problems of social and economic justice' (Tornkiss, 2005).

The action repertoires of urban movements generally overlap with those of other social movements; however some items like the rent strike, squatting and developing alternative spatial plans, are specific for urban movements. They became popular in the context of urban struggles of 1970s, when 'members of the new middle strata, together with sections of the working class, challenged major planning projects demanded the transformation of cultural policies, or demonstrated in favour of opening up collective facilities' (Le Gales, 2002). For example, squatters' movements as mobilizations of young radical students and immigrants were set up in districts of cities in Germany and northern Europe against demolition and renewal and they mobilized especially young radical students and immigrants. In short, they were mobilisations against the on-going and rising restructuring of the city. In this respect, urban movements tend to have clearer and more measurable goals. These goals may be 'preventing a particular planned transformation in the built environment, seeing to it that particular buildings get repaired instead of abandoned, getting a street closed to through-going traffic, preventing the eviction of a building, or achieving a rent reduction' (Pruijt, 2003).

Urban movements diverge from general theory on social movements as the writing on urban movements has been isolated from that of general social movement theory (Pickvance, 2003). In fact, the mainstream social movement literature is full of studies that relate the rise of social movements to cities (Nicholls, 2008). However, 'while these and other studies refer to the importance of cities, they do not examine the qualities that allow cities to play this strategic role' (Nicholls, 2008). As a result, in spite of considerable efforts in the field of urban social movements, the concerns and assertions there never spilled over into the mainstream social movement literature (Nicholls, 2008).

Pickvance (2003) puts forward two reasons behind this isolation. First, those who were interested in urban movements came from very diverse disciplinary backgrounds and Castells's theorizing provided them with a Frankish language, which prevented them from looking more deeply into social movement theory. Secondly, those interested in social movements stood away from urban movements, which had the connotation of an 'old' social movement, whereas theory on social movements has more recently begun to focus on 'new social movements'. Another reason, and arguably a more fundamental reason for this isolation, is the social theory's neglect of space. As Harvey (1990, p. 231) points out, social theories (those traditions that take root from Marx, Weber, Adam Smith and Marshall) in their approaches, favour time in the expense of space. These theories assume either there has already been a spatial order in which temporal processes occur or that spatial barriers move backward, so that they make the space a contingent aspect rather than a base for the human action (Harvey, 1990). There has been, according again to Harvey (1985), a strong and even an overwhelming predisposition to give time and history priority over space and geography.

He argues that, Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Marshall all have that in common. This kind of a neglect of space in social theory in fact is based on the focus of social theory on 'becoming' rather than 'being'. To be more precise, social theory has concentrated on change, revolution and modernization, rather than being in a space or a locality (Harvey, 1990). Accordingly, general social movement theory too tended to concentrate on issues which are not spatial and isolated itself from that of urban movements.

In the thesis, urban movement is considered as a type of social movement and it focuses specifically on urban movements rather than other types of movements, since it deals with demands on space. To put in a different way, a social movement would automatically become an urban movement if it is defined by its demands on space.

It is important to identify what is understood by 'urban'? Is everything happening in cities really 'urban'? The answer to this question is certainly negative. 'Castells defined the urban through public policy -for him the urban was where collective consumption took place, and collective consumption was effectively understood to be the consumption services provided through the welfare state.' (Cochrane, 2007). Unfortunately such a circular definition – however elegant- is not very helpful for our purposes, since many of the policies that are not urban in this sense help to define the experience of urban life (including policing and economic development, the social security and benefit systems). Equally important, spending on some programs (such as education and health) might qualify as collective consumption, but they are generally only seen as urban when specific area-based initiatives are launched (Cochrane, 2007). Moreover, the emphasis on collective consumption seems to imply that urban residents were simply victims of wider forces (Cochrane, 2007). On the other hand, in the literature on social movements, some aspects of cities are emphasised as providing important context for the development of social movements. They may even go further to implicitly argue that any movement in a city is an urban movement (see Tornkiss 2005, Nicholls, 2008). However, 'urban' in this thesis is not understood as anything happening in a city, but 'spatial' processes that take place in an urban area.

As a result of aforementioned three factors, theorizing on urban movements developed as a distinct line in general social science. Castells (1977, 1983) has been the prominent theorist who introduced the term 'urban social movements' which was simultaneously and later on developed by Pickvance (1985, 1986), Olives (1977), Fainstein and Fainstein (1985), Mayer (2000) and others. A review of this literature on urban movements reveals a transformation process which comprises roughly three periods. First, 1960s-1970s is a period of exploration of theoretical discussions. In this period, class-based analysis dominated, urban movements were seen as challenges to industrial mode of development and an extension of resistance to class exploitation into urban conflict. From 1980 onwards, non-class characters of urban social movements began to be emphasized. Cultural, racial, ethnic and quality-of-life issues gained importance. In turn, 'context' was introduced as an important factor, in which movements flourished and developed. More contemporary debates which rose mainly from 1990s onwards have enriched the theory with debates around social capital, globalization, civil society, partnerships, etc. More importantly, after 1990s, urban social movements wore

a different aspect. They are argued to involve different interest groups and incorporate tactics relying more on compromise, rather than mere conflict.

There are two main groups in analysing urban movements: Those who adopt a restrictive usage and those who adopt a generic usage (Pickvance, 2003). Castells adopted a restrictive usage, for he argued that an 'urban social movement' existed only when they were successful. According to Castells, provided that an urban social movement is not successful, then it is mere an urban movement. In other words, to be 'social', an urban movement needs to be successful in bringing change to social order. On the other hand, Pickvance, Mayer, Fainstein and Hirst and many others adopted a generic usage. They did not consider success in bringing social order as a determinant of the existence of a social movement, but they saw urban movements as attempts or struggles to bring change, and therefore equated an urban movement and urban social movement. The point of consensus of Castells and others was the idea that urban movements opposed the social order or some aspect of it and aimed at participation in local decision-making. In the thesis rest of the thesis, I prefer to adopt the generic usage and therefore use the term 'urban movement', unless it is purposefully used otherwise.

In the following, a review and evaluation of the literature on urban movements in three periods as pre-1980s, 1980s and post-1990s is provided.

## **2.1 Pre-1980s: From a Non-Conflictual View of Urban Political Life to an Understanding of Urban Movements as Agents of Social Change**

The pre-1980 period can be analysed in two parts: before 1960 and 1960-1980. Until 1950s, a non-conflictual view of urban life dominated in social theory in general and in sociology in particular (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). In this respect, urban sociology dealt mainly with 'ways of life, housing, patterns of kinship, neighbouring and friendship, and urban spatial structure' (Pickvance, 2003). Scholars interested in urban processes assumed consensus and stability, rather than conflict. Power and conflict were excluded from sociological analysis and left to political science (Pickvance, 2003). As a consequence of this tendency, there was neither a real focus on urban movements and nor a need to define them.

Mid-1960s mark a turning point in the history of how scholars looked into the matter of urban movements. Civil disturbances that swept through American and European cities constitute the basis of this turning point. At the background of this was the closed political opportunity structure that favoured the emergence of radical anti-statist alternative movements, which aimed to develop an autonomous sector beyond the market and the state (Kavoulakos, 2006).

In 1960s, many urban riots took place in major cities of USA. They generally emerged in African-American areas of cities and often in response to heavy policing. With the rise of these civil disturbances, 'formal political institutions appeared increasingly unable to handle

the demands generated by urban societies and unities around a variety of dimensions' (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). In turn, urban social movements came to be seen as agents for social change, for they affected popular consciousness and their actions challenged social and political decision making. The introduction of the term urban ~~social~~-movement coincides with this period.

Most urban movements dealt with the material reality in the city and with spatially fixed groups protesting against rehabilitation, renovation and gentrification, land use change and zoning, or demanding better infrastructure provision and squatting on land in buildings (Leontidou, 2006). In this respect, they mainly focused on large-scale renewal projects, which were at the core of local business parallel to the expansion of Keynesian welfare state model of development. A massive phase of urban movements was seen, when citizens' initiatives mobilised against large-scale renewal projects and to defend living conditions (Mayer, 2000). However, the issues contested by the movements were not only this expansion of urban renewals *per se*, 'soon expanded into struggles over the cost and the use-value of the public infrastructure in which cities had begun to invest' (Mayer, 2000) as well as their quality and non-participation in its design of decision processes. In the end, these projects were not only degrading their environment, creating costs for them, but also their preparation and implementation lacked democratic processes. As a result, various types of grassroots and community groups flourished.

These urban movements 'initially used conventional and pragmatic methods to defend their neighbourhoods and chose co-operative tactics and professional strategies such as 'planning alternatives from below' (Mayer, 2000). However, where they confronted unresponsive technocratic city administrations they would resort to more unconventional forms of politics, including direct action and street protest. Thus, these movements were finally shaped around street protests, publishing newspapers, self-managing collectives, forming housing co-operatives and squattings against infrastructure expansion and their high costs, low quality and less or no participation in their design stage. For example, 'during the first half of the 1970s, squattings took place in Dutch, British, Danish and West German cities' and citizens' initiatives, tenant groups and professionals came to the support of them and formed a broad housing movement (Mayer, 2000). Their main enemy were real estate owners and speculators who were making huge profits out of these renewal projects. The relationship between them and the state apparatus was 'antagonistic and clear-cut: there was a high degree of ideological coherence amongst the different strands of the movement and its levels of institutionalisation and professionalization were low' (Mayer, 2000)

Marxist-structuralists of the era concerned themselves with cities and the aforementioned civil disturbances that occurred in cities. They did this by focusing on class struggle, taking the urban conflicts as an extension of resistance to class exploitation. This stance would later be considered as taking for granted the continuation of class cleavages of the industrial city to dominate the urban social life (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). Besides, this new framework was considered as a break with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of 'participation' studies. The most prominent product of this framework is Castells' 'The Urban Question' (1977), where he defined the urban social movements in a theoretical framework based on

Marxist-structuralist perspective. In *The Urban Question*, he argued that urban social movements were 'a displacement of class struggle from the workplace into the city' (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). In other words, the urban social movements of the era were seen as confronting wider strategies, like growth strategies of the Keynesian welfare state. They were criticizing the paternalistic state and its penetration into everyday life and attempting 'to challenge the monopoly of the state in decision-making, production and the provision of collective consumption' while being provided with important resources thanks to its welfare character, such as 'stable income, time and safety that favoured the development of collective action' (Kavoulakos, 2006).

The dominant classed-based theorisation of urban movements belongs to Castells, mainly in his book *The Urban Question* (Castells, 1977). According to Castells, a sociological problematic of urbanization needed to regard it as "a process of organisation and development and, consequently, set out from the relation between productive forces, social classes and cultural forms (including space)" (Castells, p: 8).

Castells' perspective on urban social movements began with a conception of society, in other words, of social structure. Castells saw a society (or social formation) as comprising a mix of modes of production, one of which is dominant (Castells, 1977). He emphasized

two complementary perspectives, depending on whether one places the stress on the structures or on the practices or, to put it more clearly, whether the analysis bears on a modification of the relations between the instances in the logic of social formation or on the processes of its transformation, namely, social relations as the direct or refracted expression of the class struggle (p.261).

His analysis of a social formation started at the level of either structures or practices (Pickvance, 1976). Structural level related to the fundamental (structural) elements of the system, how they were combined into systems, and how the systems were themselves related' (Pickvance, 1976). To put it in a different way, structures were related to 'modifications of the relations between the instances in the logic of social formation' (Castells, 1977, p.261). Practices, on the other hand, referred to the relations among different elements and different structures (Castells, 1977). They were about the processes of the transformation of social formation, namely 'social relations as the direct or retracted expression of the class struggle' (Castells, 1977, p.261). In short, 'the structures were merely articulated practices' and practices are 'relations between certain combinations of structural elements' (Castells, 1977, p.261). Agents, in Castells' framework, were the only supports of the structural relations, and named therefore 'support-agents' (Castells, 1977). Here, actors supported the places or positions defined by the structural elements and their interrelations (Pickvance, 1976). Agents' most obvious expression was seen in social classes (Castells, 1977).

At this point, Castells broke down the study of urban politics into two analytical fields: urban planning and policy in its various forms and urban social movements. On one side, he put 'the study of intervention of the state apparatuses, with all their variants, in the



organization of space and in the social conditions of the reproduction of labour power' (1977, p. 261). On the other side, he put 'the study of the articulation of the class struggle, including the political struggle...' (1977, p.261). In that respect, he treated planning and social movements using the same terms and situated the analysis of urban social movements, together with urban planning, in the theoretical field of urban politics.

In connection to this, he continued his discussion of urban social movements with a view to its relation to urban planning. Accordingly, he gave definitions of planning, social movement, urban planning and urban social movement, respectively. The process of planning, for him, continued at the level of structures. It was

the intervention of the political in different instances of a social formation (including the political) and/or in their relations, with the aim of assuring the extended reproduction of the system, of regulating the non-antagonistic relations and of repressing the antagonistic contradictions, thus assuring the interests of the dominant class and the structural reproduction of the dominant mode of production (1977, p.261).

For him, social movement was 'the organization of the system of social agents (conjuncture of class relations) with the aim of producing qualitatively new effect on the social structure (relevant effect)' (1977, p.261). By qualitatively new, he meant the below situations:

- At the level of structures: a change in the structural law of the dominant instance
- At the level of practice: a modification of the power relations running counter to institutionalized social domination.

He defined urban planning, on the other hand, as follows:

The intervention of the political in the specific articulation of the different instances of a social formation within a collective unit of reproduction of labour power with the aim of assuring its extended reproduction, of regulating the non-antagonistic contradictions, thus assuring the interests of this social class in the whole of the social formation and the reorganization of the urban system, in such a way as to assure the structural reproduction of the dominant mode of production (ibid., p.263).

Urban social movement in this respect continued at the level of practices. He defined it as follows:

A system of practices resulting from the articulation of a conjuncture of the system of urban agents and other social practices in such a way that its development tends objectively towards the structural transformation of the urban system or towards a substantial modification of the power relations in the class struggle, that is to say, in the last resort, in the power of the state (1977, p.263).

In defining social movements, Castells put special emphasis on contradictions and organizations where these contradictions are nested. When there was no organisation, urban contradictions were expressed either in 'a refracted way, through other practices, or in a 'wild' way, a pure contradiction devoid of any structural horizon (Castells, 1977, p.272)'. A social movement, for him, was 'born from the encounter of a certain structural combination, which contains several contradictions, with a certain type of organization' (1977, p.270). 'The more contradictions have accumulated, the more there is a potentially mobilizing social change' (1977, p.271). The role of organization was also taken as fundamental, for it was the organization that is the locus of fusion or articulation with other social practices. For a social movement to exist, argued Castells, there needed to be 'the union of a sequence of contradictions, which may be formed only by and organization imported from other practices' and 'a solely urban organization can only be an instrument of reform' (1977, p.272). As an example for contradictions, he gave renewal programmes in British New Towns, which had the following contradictions (1977, p.287):

- the deterioration of the habitat in the city centres and the formation of slums.
- the development of social conflict, particularly among the black community.
- the crisis of what may be called urban centrality in the great metropolises, with its various components.

In Castell's theorizing on social movements in Urban Question, there was a material emphasis, which revealed itself as a particular emphasis on effects the urban social movements have. He argued that, 'the political importance of an urban movement can only be judged by relating it to the effects it has upon the power relations between social classes in a concrete situation' (1977, p.377). Two types of effects are implicitly defined here. The first was urban effects which are simply defined as improvements in public services (Pickvance, 2003). The second was political effects which were, at their most simple, changes in power relations (Pickvance, 2003).

Castells (1977) defined three levels of potential urban and political effect citizen action could have: participation (lowest), protest (intermediate), and urban social movement (highest). Participation meant symbolic urban and political changes; protest meant minor reforms that did not challenge fundamental structures; and urban social movement meant fundamental changes in power at urban and societal levels (Pickvance, 2003). For Castells, urban movements had to be successful in making structural transformation, to be urban social movements. In so arguing, Castells, in fact, characterized urban issues as secondary structural issues that should be linked with other issues in the social structure. For him urban social movements were the outcomes of coming together of trade unions, political groupings and urban-based groups (Pickvance, 2003). In so doing, he did not focus on identity creation.

Pickvance is another prominent scholar who has studied on urban ~~social~~ movements, though emphasizing different aspects than Castells. While analysing urban social movements in his earlier writings, he focused on organizational resources and institutional means in achieving

urban effects (Pickvance, 1976). He attributed importance not only to non-institutional aspects, but institutional aspects as well. In this respect, he criticized the urban movement literature, basically Castells and other structuralist approaches of the time, for 'de-emphasizing the *form* of organisation in which participation takes place' and viewing the 'organisation as a means by which contradictions are linked', rather than as a means of expression and articulation of these contradictions (Pickvance, 1975, p.29,30). In doing this, he argued that there were also pressures exerted by other urban actors like land-owners, financial institutions, local governments etc. and that, urban effects might have been obtained by institutional as well as non-institutional means (Pickvance, 1976). He linked the survival and success of urban movements to the resources they were able to obtain from organizations in the community. For him, concrete movement organisations should be the focus of the analysis, particularly with regard to the problems, issues, stakes the organisation pursues and their structural determination (Pickvance, 1975).

Moreover, Pickvance also put special emphasis on the *effects* of urban movements –defined as the movement's urban objectives that have been successfully achieved- while analysing them. However, he did not consider the mobilization of social base as the only way in which urban effects were produced (Pickvance, 1975). In this respect, he saw the *authority*, especially the local authority, as another important source of urban effects and further argued that the structuralist studies often failed to offer evidence from types and that they emphasized 'the actions of the movement organisation at the expense of the actions of the authority' (Pickvance, 1975, p.32). He saw two reasons behind this negligence; one practical and one theoretical reason. The practical reason is that authorities are generally less accessible for researchers compared to movement organisations. The theoretical reason, on the other hand is, the structuralist Marxist contention that authorities would not 'grant changes which threaten the stability of mode of production' (Pickvance, 1975, p.33). Pickvance disagrees with this contention claiming that governmental institutions cannot be dismissed as sources of minor changes and must be treated as sources of urban effects, just like social movements (Pickvance, 1975). The more recent developments in movement terrain discussed in the next sections of this chapter, as well as the neoliberal agenda explained in the next chapter, through which local and even national authorities are highly effective in urban politics, confirm Pickvance's argument.

By emphasizing the authorities as sources of urban effects, Pickvance in fact attached importance to the context in which the urban movements developed, or in other words, the dynamics external to the movements, but which finally affect them. To put in a different way, as stated before, organisations were vital for urban movements for movements depended on the resources of these organisations. He argued that voluntary associations, which came to fore as key actors of urban movements in his analysis, might be engaged in either *horizontal* or *vertical* integration with other institutions (Pickvance, 1975). In this respect, voluntary associations might be *horizontally* integrated with other social systems in the community. By this he in fact meant integration with another organisation within the community, which supported the movement, for example, by providing access to its premises, secretarial facilities, personnel, funds and even additional members. On the other hand, by vertical integration he referred to integration into a national hierarchy, like a trade

union or another organisation with local branches subject to central decisions. The support provided through this vertical integration would be a more constant flow of resources of various kinds to sustain local activity. However, he did not provide further detail on the role of these organisations, arguing that 'obviously these organisations play crucial roles in the establishment, sustenance and success of urban social movements, although we cannot yet say precisely how' (Pickvance, 1974, p. 42).

Olives (1976) also continued the approach to urban movements based on class struggle with a material emphasis. He distinguished two types of effects in his analysis of urban social movements: Urban effects (e.g. success in resisting eviction) and political effects (e.g. the formation of an urban group whose aims are not restricted to a particular urban system). (Olives, 1976). He then identified the conditions that brought such effects (Olives, 1976). These were; size of the stake, presence of an organization (to link urban practices), mobilization of the social base by the organization, and type of action (not legal and reformist, but contentious).

All in all, three features of this period with a view to theorizing on urban movements can be depicted out of this review. First and foremost, urban movements were seen as an expansion of class struggle into urban related issues and they were assumed to be contentious by nature. Secondly, in relation to the first feature, a highly material emphasis was put on urban movement. This material emphasis meant a focus on what was done, namely the effects of the movements, rather than what was said. Third feature is the treating of social movements as secondary and almost meaningless, when they are not linked to broader social and political issues. Focusing on urban movements, we can also talk about a fourth feature of the movements of the era. They exhibited relative coherence and unity in their opposition to urban renewal, which is an issue mostly emphasized by Mayer (2000).

From 1970s onwards, however, this situation began to change. From then on, theorizing on general social movements underwent an explosive growth (Pickvance, 2003). Theoretical frameworks like collective behaviour, relative deprivation, resource mobilization, rational choice, political opportunity structure, new social movements, political process and framing emerged in general theorizing on social movements. This change had its reflections on urban movements as well.

## **2.2. 1980s: Urban Movements as a Category of New Social Movements**

From 1980s onwards, as the surrounding context changed, issues other than class, such as race, ethnicity, gender and identity began to be considered as increasingly important driving forces behind social movements. Thereby, literature on social movements, in general, and urban movements, in particular, directed itself from issues almost merely related to class struggle towards racial-ethnic-gender issues, namely those with non-class aspects. Thereby, they were argued to have acquired a non-class basis. Besides, in social movements literature, new types of movements under the name 'new social movements' was put into

the heart of analysis of social movements. Scholars of these 'new movements agreed that conflict among the industrial classes is of decreasing relevance, and similarly that representation of movements as largely homogenous subjects is no longer feasible' (della Porta and Diani, 1999). Literature on urban movements developed along similar lines and it also acquired a non-class basis. Culture, ethnicity, identity were introduced as motivating forces for urban movements and cases of cross-class alliances in European cities were examined. In that respect, Fainstein and Hirst (1995) considered the urban movements of this period as a category of new social movements.

Two lines of thought emerged in that period. First was introduced in his influential book *The City and the Grassroots* by Castells who aimed at a general theory of urban movements by analyzing different cases (Castells, 1983). Second line of thought, developed by Pickvance (1985, 1986) parallel to his earlier discussions mentioned in the previous section, focused on contextual features like the attitude of the local government, changing economic conditions and etc.

Castells continued to develop his theory on urban social movements, though making a U-turn from his earlier arguments in *The City and the Grassroots* (Pickvance, 2003). First, he did not deal with urban social movements as mere class struggles, arguing that social movements did not need to be based on class relationship, but that they had a non-class basis. Second, he argued that political groupings were detrimental to the success of urban social movements (Castells, 1983).

In *The City and the Grassroots* (1983), Castells refined and elaborated the concept of urban social movements. In doing this, he conducted a multiple and theory-building case study, by investigating different urban movements from different countries, which are provided below (1983, p.xix):

- The relationship between urban movements and *collective consumption* as revealed by the emergence of urban trade-unionism in suburban public housing in the *Paris Metropolitan Area*.
- The development of urban movements around the issue of *cultural identity*, as expressed in two different versions, by the Latino community in *San Francisco*.
- The subordination of urban movements to the *political system* according to the experience of urban populism in the *squatter settlements of Latin America*, with particular emphasis on *pobladores movement in Santiago de Chile*.
- The *interaction of collective consumption, culture, and politics through the urban movements*, as observed by the analysis of the movement that, during 1970s, most clearly attempted to articulate these three dimensions in its struggle: the Citizen Movement in Madrid.

Each analysis provided the occasion for the in-depth elaboration of particular elements of the theory on urban change he finally built. In so doing, he focused on urban social movements as the heart of a broader theory of urban social change. In this respect, his main

goal was to explain how and why cities change (Castells, 1983, p.302). Within this broad goal, and relying on these case studies, he intended to show how urban movements interacted with urban forms and functions, how these movements developed, why they had different social and spatial effects, and what elements accounted for their internal structure and historical evolution. His major hypothesis in *City and the Grassroots* is as follows (Castells, 1983., p.xviii):

- The city is a social product resulting from conflicting social interests and values.
- Because socially dominated interests have been institutionalized and resist change, major innovations in the city's role, meaning, and structure tend to be the outcome of grassroots mobilization and demands; when these mobilizations result in the transformation of the urban structure, we call them urban social movements.
- Yet the process of urban social change cannot be reduced to the effects produced on the city by successful social movements. Thus a theory of urban change must account for the transformation resulting both from the action of the dominant interests and from the grassroots resistance and challenge to such a domination.
- Finally, although class relationships and class struggle are fundamental in understanding the process of urban conflict, they are by no means the only or even the primary source of urban social change. Our theory must recognize other resources of urban social change: the autonomous role of the state, gender relationships, ethnic and national movements, and movements that specifically define themselves as citizen movements.

Within this perspective, according to Castells (Castells, 1983), urban social movements developed around three themes; collective consumption, cultural identity, and political mobilization. Before elaborating these themes, his perception of the city, the main concepts he used in his theory and their definitions will be presented.

First of all, Castells' theorizing was shaped by how he defined cities. For him, cities were living systems; made, transformed and experienced by people (1983, p.xv) and the material basis of most of our experience (1983, p. xvi). He saw the city as a social process (1983, p.300) and argued that cities, like all social reality, were 'historical products, not only in their physical materiality but in their cultural meaning, in the role they play in the social organization, and people's lives' (1983, p.302). The city was 'the result of an endless historical struggle over the definition of urban meaning by antagonistic social actors who oppose their interests, values and projects (1983, p.335)'. He built the relationship between space and society with such an understanding of the city and considered the interaction between space and society as producing and managing urban forms and functions. For him, cities and space were the unfinished products of historical debates and conflicts involving meaning, function and form (1983, p.318). All cities, he argued, 'were shaped by the outcome of social conflicts and contradictory projects' (1983, p. 318). Urban social movements, on the other hand, were 'collective actions consciously aimed at the transformation of the social interests and values embedded in the forms and functions of a historically given city' (1983, p. xvi).

For Castells, 'urban movements challenge prevailing cultural values, and political institutions, by refusing some spatial form, by asking for public services, and by exploring new social meanings for cities' (1983, p.xv). For him, the way to understand cities and citizens at the same time was to analyze the relationship between people and urbanization. This relationship was 'most evident when people mobilize to change the city in order to change the society' (1983, p. xvi). As a result of his emphasis on urbanization, he built his theory by making the definitions of some urban related concepts. These were; urban, urban meaning, urban function, urban form, urban movements and urban social change. From these definitions, he reached 'urban social movements'.

He defined *urban* as the 'social meaning assigned to a particular spatial form by a historically defined society' (1983, p. 302). For urban meaning, he put forward the following definition:

The structural performance assigned as a goal to cities in general (and to a particular city in the inter-urban division of labour) by the conflictive process between historical actors in a given society. Definition of urban meaning is a social process. It is a process of conflict, domination and resistance to domination (1983, p. 303).

He defined the *urban function* as 'the articulated system of organizational means aimed at performing the goals assigned to each city by its historically defined urban meaning' (1983, p.303). For example, if the urban meaning was a 'colonial centre', then the function was the use of military force and territorial control; if the urban meaning was capitalist machine, then the function is the,

extraction of surplus value in the factory, the reproduction of labour power, the extraction of profit in urbanization (through real estate), the organization of circulation of capital in the financial institutions, the exchange of commodities in the commercial system, the management of all other operations in the directional centres of capitalist business' (1983, p. 303).

He defined *urban form* in relation to his definition of urban function. In that respect, urban form was the 'symbolic expression of urban meaning and of the historical superimposition of urban meanings (and their forms) always determined by a conflictive process between historical actors' (1983, p. 303). For him, urban forms and functions were produced and managed by the interaction between space and society (1983, p. xv).

Redefinition of the urban meaning, on the other hand, was the definition of an *urban social change*. He argued that, an urban social change would happen when a new urban meaning was produced either by the dominant class through urban renewal or regional restructuring, or by a dominated class through a partial or total revolution, or by a social movement through the development of its own meaning over a given space in contradiction to the dominant meaning, or by a social mobilization, through the imposition of a new urban meaning in contradiction to the institutionalized urban meaning and against the interest of the dominant class (1983, p. 304-305). The latter was, for him, an urban social movement.

In other words, he defined an urban social movement as ‘a collective conscious action aimed at the transformation of the institutionalized urban meaning against the logic, interest and values of the dominant class’ (1983, 305). He simply saw them as urban oriented mobilizations that influenced structural social change and transformed the urban meanings, agents of urban-spatial transformation, the highest level of urban social change, and one of the sources of urban forms and structures throughout the history.

In this respect, the dominant classes imposed their urban meaning and their urban meaning was challenged by alternative meanings projected by labour, women, cultures, citizens. On the other hand, for him urban social movements ‘aimed at transforming the meaning of the city, without being able to transform society’ (p.327). He did not consider them as agents of structural social change” (p.329), since he argued that they lost their identity as they became institutionalized.

In proceeding with his theory on urban social movements, Castells focused on their goals, claiming that a movement was defined first by its goals. If it was an urban social movement, then the object of the goal was the city itself. He based this claim on a view of cities and societies as products of ‘the conflictive process of collective actors mobilized towards certain goals’ (1983, p. 320). He argued that urban movements had three goals, which were (p.319-320):

- The city as a use value: ‘To obtain for the residents a city organized around its use value, as against the notion of urban living and services as a commodity, the logic of exchange value’. The content of this use value may change from decent housing provided as a public service, the preservation of a specific building, or demand for more open space. The main aim is improved collective consumption as opposed to the notion of city for profit where space and services are distributed according to levels of income. The mobilization is called collective consumption trade unionism.
- Identity, cultural autonomy and communication: This goal refers to the search for cultural identity for maintenance or creation of autonomous local cultures, ethnically based or historically originated. The movement to this goal is named community.
- Territorially based self-management: This goal refers to the search for increasing power for local government, neighbourhood decentralization and urban self-management in contradiction to centralized state. It means ‘a struggle for a free city’. This type of a movement is named a citizen movement.

In connection with these three goals of urban movements, Castells identified the conditions for success for urban social movements. He argued that, if these conditions were not met, then urban movements would remain as they were, and would not be able to become urban social movements. He defined the following conditions for an urban movement to become an urban social movement (1983, p.322), adding that the production of such a structural formula leading to urban social movements was specific to each national-cultural context.



- To accomplish the transformation of urban meaning, and for this purpose to articulate, in its praxis, all three goals mentioned above,
- To be conscious of its role as an urban social movement,
- To be connected to the society through organizational operators like media, professionals, political parties,
- To be organizationally and ideologically autonomous from a political party.
- 1<sup>st</sup> condition commands all the others.

In sum, class-based analysis in this period did not entirely disappear, but non-class aspects of the urban social movement came more to the fore. Moreover, he argued that urban social movements aimed at changing the urban meaning. However, in so doing he adopted a restrictive approach, by not considering those mobilizations which cannot change the urban meaning, as urban social movements. For him, an urban social movement existed only when it satisfied the above mentioned conditions, namely when it was successful.

Pickvance (1985, 1986) criticized Castells for ignoring the contextual influence of urban movements while dealing very much with its characteristics. He argued that the incidence, militancy and character of urban movements were a function of their internal dynamics (their action repertoires, organizational structure, ideological frames etc) and external dynamics (structural contingencies, economic and political environment, relation to other movements and political parties). In parallel, he distinguished four types of urban movements (Pickvance, 1985):

- movements for the provision of housing and urban services,
- movements over access to housing and urban services,
- movements for control and management, which may concern housing and urban services or political institutions,
- defensive movements, against physical threats or against social threats to housing and neighbourhoods.

In 1980s, in addition to the aforementioned rise of non-class aspects of urban social movements and parallel to this, a stronger emphasis in theory on these aspects, certain shifts also occurred in the relationships between the movements and the state (Mayer, 2000), from those in rather conflictual forms to forms of cooperation building. However, these changes became more manifest in 1990s.

### **2.3. 1990s -: Increasingly More Cooperative, Fragmented and Heterogeneous Urban Movements**

Beginning in 1980s and increasingly from 1990s onwards, parallel to the rise of neoliberal social, economic and urban policies, local governments were forced to find new alternatives

to deal with fiscal restrictions imposed by economic restructuring, growing unemployment and rising welfare costs. Competitive forms of urban development, the erosion of the welfare state and the expansion of the urban political system to include non-governmental stakeholders (Mayer, 2000, p.150) came to the fore as important features of 1990s. The local governments therefore began to see community groups as carrying an alternative potential (Mayer, 2000). As a result of this new approach, in the course of time, 'a transition from urban social movements challenging the state to a less oppositional relationship between 'interests groups' and a local (welfare) bureaucracy... occurred' (Mayer, 2000, p.136). The projects of groups in urban social movements began to professionalize and were more willing to participate in the local bargaining process (Mayer, 2000). For example, in Berlin, different citizen groups formed an umbrella organisation named 'Arbeitskreis Staatsknete' in order to secure public funding for their projects. Some of their projects not only received public funding, but other kinds of support like incorporation into municipal social programmes as model projects (Mayer, 2000). In other words, movements began to engage in routinised co-operation with the state. Thus, 'the formerly antagonistic relationship to the (local) state had given way to a stance of working 'within and against' the state' (Mayer, 2000, p.138). In a word, urban movements began to be seen as innovative partners in service provision and urban policy making. Therefore, the old conflicts between the movements and the local governments began to take the form of new bargaining mechanisms based on negotiation and cooperation.

Mayer further argued that, as a result of the above mentioned changes, the urban movements terrain of post-1990s did not consist of only or primarily one kind of movement, but different kinds of movements. While some movements were developing relations with the local government based more on cooperation, some other movements continued to mobilise outside such a routinised co-operation and they increasingly radicalised (Mayer, 2000, 2009). This, in turn, resulted in the heterogeneity and fragmentation in the movement terrain, and finally institutionalization.

To explain these two major and related changes, Mayer (1999) first distinguished between three main categories of movements (1) movements in opposition to the new competitive urban politics, involving several different kinds of movements (2) movements that act against the erosion of the welfare state and 3) movements engaged in cooperation with the state. Soon after, she slightly detailed her analyses and wrote about five types of movements emerging out of the fragmentation (Mayer, 2000), which have little cooperation or even confrontation between themselves.

First of these types are 'the not-so-nimby nimby groups that struggle in the defence of the community'. They were generally middle-classed based, quality-of-life-oriented movements focusing on the protection of the home environment from too much traffic and/or development. Among their tactics and repertoires were petition drives, political lobbying, street confrontations and legal proceedings. Such movements of 1990s differ from similar ones of 1970s in the sense that they were oriented less towards social justice, but more towards particularistic interests and/or defence of privileged conditions.

The second type is 'struggles against the new politics and redevelopment' shaped by interregional competition and consequent 'large projects'. In 1990s, large projects such as Olympics, World Expo etc. and image-building had become instruments of urban politics. Against these projects, opposition movements mobilised and contested the detrimental effects of these projects and the lack of democratic participation in their development. Broad collations of local movement groups came together against such politics, which did not necessarily have overlapping goals other than being against these politics. Moreover, their potential tended to go beyond particular community interests and to involve issues related to more democratic planning.

The third type is 'routinised co-operation with the local state'. These were usually older urban movements which had oppositional character, but they began to use non-confrontational methods' by being engaged in cooperation with the local state, and were involved more in consensus organizing (Mayer, 2003). Their tactics based more on compromise rather than mere controversy. 'This shift has turned local government into merely one part -through perhaps the 'enabling' part- of broader 'growth coalitions'' (Mayer, 1994).

The fourth type is 'radical and autonomous protest(s)'. They mobilised not only against large projects, but against gentrification, displacement, highway expansion, increased policing and surveillance of public space. As against image making politics, they devised image-damaging actions. They had a broad repertoire ranging from direct action and squatting to uncovering and publicising the plans and methods of large developers and speculators, causing a scandal, and even militant attacks.

The fifth and the last type is 'protest by the marginalised: new poor people's movement'. They arose out of newly marginalised groups like the homeless. They struggle against the efforts to drive them out of city centres, occupied city halls, set up encampments, held public forums, etc.

From 1990s onwards, it was the third type of movement that increasingly dominated the fragmented movement retain. Moreover, their emergence pointed to the most radical change in the character of urban movements of 1990s as mentioned above. Therefore, this third type is deemed most important and requires further elaboration.

These 'routinised co-operation with the local state' type of movements were engaged in cooperation with different actors, specifically with the local governments, 'moving from protest to contractualisation, participation and service provision' (Le Gales, 2002). This type of involvement of urban movements and the numerous groups involved in them in public policy activities and service provision gave rise to frequent interactions among these groups and the local authorities (Le Gales, 2002; Mayer, 1994, 2000, 2003, 2006b), which made the cooperation a 'routinised' one. Many of the demands for participation that were on the agenda of the earlier movements began to be realized 'in public-private partnerships, community boards and round tables (all of which include civil society stakeholders 'at the table')' (Mayer, 2006b). As a result, these groups became recognized actors in the city

politics. In parallel, they acquired the formal structures necessary in order to qualify for funds, sought contact and coalition with other groups in order to obtain information and not be isolated from negotiations with local administrations...' (Mayer, 2000). What the movements gained from this were greater stability for their projects and recognition as partners within housing and social policy networks. The benefit for the local state on the other hand, was better or at least easier addressing of the crisis of the welfare state, by a better utilisation of the innovative potential that these movements provide. By this way, these movements came to pose counter-weight to conventional ways of local economic planning and service delivery. In sum, with the existence of this type of movements, the movement milieu of 1990s included interest groups and public institutions that were not characterised by protest politics, but provided infrastructural stability (Mayer, 2000, p.142). These movements also demanded rehab housing, community economic development, and social services, but what differed in them was that they were also acknowledged by the local state and the local state even connected them to the fulfilment of these demands. Thereby, the participation of community and/or movement groups in different policy sectors has become routinised. Parallel to this, these movements became subject to a certain level of formalisation and professionalization. In a word, they were more or less institutionalised and benefited from municipal, national or EU funding. Moreover, these new trends resulted in growing conflicts and antagonisms within the movement sectors, due to competition for more funding. On the other hand, social justice issues, formerly the main agenda items of urban, were put back on the agenda. In line with these developments, participation of urban movements in formal political organizations and administration, in other words, the question of whether they should participate or not, began to be posed (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). It should also be added that, the main aim of these studies seems to be the analysis of neoliberal development, rather than the movements. In other words, they do not provide, or in fact not intend to provide thorough analysis movements, but touch upon them as a part of the discussion on neoliberal urbanisation.

In connection with these developments, as mentioned shortly in the beginning of the section, urban movements terrain of late 1980s and 1990s were more fragmented, but not a unity as before. Before 1980, as urban social movements were much more homogenous, they involved social interests groups, namely social NGOs (organizations of consumers, women, gays, lesbians, environmentalists, ethnic/religious minorities, communities). Moreover, business interests were less manifest. Trade unions were naturally involved in social movements before 1990s too, but trade associations, chambers of commerce or even firms, which can be named business interest altogether become more active and effective in pre-1980s' entrepreneurial city, in Harvey's terms. However, from late 1980s onwards and in 1990s, 'the social composition and the political orientation of the urban movement milieu have become increasingly heterogeneous, manifesting more and more polarizations, cleavage and also forms of implosion' (Mayer, 2006a). There was limited overlap or co-operation between initiatives of middle-class citizens defending the quality of life of their neighbourhood and poor people's movements, whereas the community-based and alternative groups that have become involved in innovative municipal programmes now find themselves attacked by radical 'autonomous' protest groups. 'Campaigns against large urban development projects often appear to operate independently of any of these groups

making up the movement sectors of most European cities' (Mayer, 2000). However, all these developments did not bring about any more democratizing potential to the movement scene (Mayer, 2003). Moreover they 'reflected some features of today's society: fragmentation, individualization and globalization' (Stahre, 2004), as there are certain resourceful individuals who carry out campaigns on their own and influence the movements.

In sum, it is possible to talk about two major changes the urban movements have been subject to; first, more negotiation, cooperation and compromise seeking with the local state and consequent formalisation and institutionalisation, and second; fragmentation and gaining heterogeneity. These two waves have brought the urban social movements to their current situation.

Furthermore, in post 1990s era, theoretical arguments on urban movements began to embrace arguments related to globalization, social capital, non-progressive movements etc. (Mayer, 2000, 2003). Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler and Mayer (2001) have distinguished three different kinds of struggles delineating the contours of urban movement in the globalised city:

- 'those around the costs of striving towards the top of the global urban hierarchy', these cost corresponding to 'gentrification, displacement, congestion and pollution';
- 'those dealing with the new phenomena of urban decay and marginality', struggles aiming 'to integrate economic development with poverty alleviation';
- 'those reflecting the erosion of welfare state', producing 'with the support and direction provided by various state and foundation programmes', affordable housing, commercial establishments, social services and training programmes.

However, pessimism about urban social movements also occurred. Castells (1996) argued that cities produce no longer successful movements. He claimed that, in today's globalized space of flows, cities served no longer as basis of social power and that, local movements were undermined by larger forces of development.

In addition, Castells' conceptualization around politics of collective consumption is still deemed important, though insufficient to understand today's urban social movements. From 1990s onwards, as Mayer (2000) argued, there has also been an urban politics of production, 'associated with different forms of interest group activity and generates some complex alliances between state, market and "movement"' (Le Galès, 2000).

In summary, urban movements in time evolved from mere reflections of class struggle on the urban space to a phenomenon which encompasses non-class issues like gender, culture, identity and etc. More recently, they moved even more away from this class-based and conflictual character, and began to be based more on co-operation and consensus seeking with different interest groups. Thus, in more practical terms, it can be argued that from 1980s to 2000s, the urban movement scene have in essence experienced a transformation in material realities: 'from grassroots insurrections, squatting and opposition to renovation, to flaneur activists of transnational mobilizations; from land occupations to 'social centres';

from community to social networks; from spontaneity to NGOs; and often from the local to the global' (Leontidou, 2006). In other words, urban movements were not those who only oppose and set forth demands that were not in line with the existing social order. Rather, as Mayer (2000) demonstrated, they began to get into co-operation with those who have the power and sought to get the highest share among available funds or urban rent. They got into coalitions, acted in private-public partnerships, and came together with different stakeholders at roundtables. More generally, they began to participate in the decision making mechanisms related to the city. In addition, business interests became more active and effective. In this respect, it can be argued that, cities, rather than producing successful movements in Castells' terms, were producing movements who have a role in the shaping of the urban space.

Urban movements are therefore regarded increasingly less as collective actions of those who are oppressed and of the disadvantaged, but a continuous interaction between such social NGOs, business interests and the government. Parallel to this, 'urban problems appear less symptoms of urban decline, but as barriers to competitiveness and as reducing social cohesion which in turn leads to social and economic exclusion' (Mayer, 2003). But, a closer look at the contemporary developments in cities show that the neoliberal agenda pulls these disadvantaged groups back into the movement terrain.

#### **2.4. Focus on Contemporary Urban Movements**

Neoliberal urbanisation have caused dramatic changes in the way the urban environment is built, cities are planned and managed. Accordingly, urban development began to be dominated by projects of urban transformation aiming at and successfully result in the increasing values of urban land and property. Description and discussion of the characteristics of neoliberal urbanisation has been made in the previous chapter. As regards to the current state of urban movements, two points emphasized in the literature should be presented. First is the increasing role of the market and the business interests in urban politics and eventually in urban movements. And second point is the changing forms of resistance of urban movements, argued by some to be much limited and weaker compared especially to pre-1980s, or viewed as outcomes of the new areas of conflict brought by neoliberal development.




Figure 1: Development of Urban Movements from 1950 Onwards

As regards to the first point, in today's cities, a web of interest representation mechanisms in which business views, and the views of big business in particular, became dominant. As mentioned before, for Castells, the essential problems regarding the urban were around 'collective consumption'. In other words, collective consumption was seen as a fundamental basis for urban social movements. However today, as Mayer argues, politics of production also matters. Therefore, there is in urban politics and urban movements a greater role for markets and those who can compete within these markets. What one sees in contemporary cities is a pro-business agenda of the municipalities. Business interests are increasingly being incorporated as a function of consensus and corporatist decision-making of local governments. These changes also paved the way for mobilisations of different groups in urban areas that were not particularly active in the past. Private-sector actors, namely business interests are particularly emphasized among these different groups (Le Galès, 2000). As a result, it is argued that more particularistic or even individualistic interests are effective in urban social movements, due to the increasing representation of rent seeking business interests in general and their influence on municipal politics as well as increasing varieties of urban entrepreneurialism. Here, 'behind the scenes' influence of business is argued to have gained importance. Moreover, members of business interest groups may not act collectively, but individually. Especially 'big commercial chain shops do not want collective bodies ... and prefer to act individually because they have the financial standing and power to do so' (Nicholls, 2008). They have direct access to the Mayor even more easily and his or her senior officials when they act individually. In other words, personal connections, often channelled along party political lines are used as effective means of business influence. This process works at the local level and upward and, certainly until recently, in favour of individual business interests, against the managerialism of the municipality (Nicholls, 2008).

As regards to the second point, which is more important for the thesis, in the neoliberal era, there is now a different, and at times more pessimistic view on urban movements. Accordingly, it is argued that, there are now limited forms of resistance compared to times when neoliberalism had not yet been adopted as the predominant set of ideas, policies and practices. 'The limited and spatially targeted interventions associated with project-based urban restructuring policies' which are explained and categorized below, 'prevent these movements from transcending the localized issues associated with a project's implementation' (Swyngedouw, *et al*, 2002, p.574), since project-based urban development appears 'too divisive for the local populace to provide a basis for widespread collective mobilisation' (Loopmans and Dirckx, 2012, p.112). On the other hand, mutations of neoliberalism create weak spots that possibly and inadvertently enabled new forms of political solidarity and consciousness amongst those who felt themselves marginalized and excluded on a global scale (Peck and Tickell, 2002). To put it simply, as Mayer argues, neoliberal urbanisation brought new arenas of conflict, and thereby new arenas of mobilisations (Mayer, 2006). This proved true on a large basis especially after resistances such as 'Occupy Wall Street' and subsequent similar actions in metropolitan cities of the world. In other words, neoliberal urbanisation has its own urban opposition and mobilisations which have different characteristics than those of the previous era.



In connection to this, whatever changes are brought by this new regime and despite the pessimistic approach to urban movements, it is here argued that local political action and mobilisations are still significant, and no less than before. Neoliberal urbanisation induced 'urban movements' as reactions directed towards the transformation resulting in value increases, and the uneven distribution of the benefits of this increase. Moreover, it also gave rise to a dualism in urban movements. Accordingly, as mentioned in the first chapter, building upon Castells' (1977, 1983, 1996) and Mayer's (2000, 2003, 2006) frameworks and inspiring from Marcuse's (2009) distinguishing between the demands of those deprived and of discontented, two main types of urban movements can be defined; movements whose main mobilisation factor is deprivation and movements whose main mobilisation factor is discontent. First type of urban movements is those who mobilise against the effects of urban transformation projects on the adherent's own property or land and the unequal distribution of the newly generated rent increase. In other words, they arise out of dissatisfaction and a sense of deprivation out of the functioning of urban property markets. They are in this respect argued to have been built more around individual-property based concerns and even criticized for this. The second type of urban movements has more transcendental goals. These are movements whose main motivation is some kind of discontent with the spatial developments in neoliberal urbanization. The characteristics of each type of movements will be elaborated in the next chapters based on Istanbul case.

## **2.5. Movements or Interest Groups?**

The focus of the discussion in this final section on urban movements centres on the difference between a "social movement" and an "interest group", the latter concept originating from political science. Here, the relationships and differences between movements and interest groups are deemed important, since, as will be examined in the following sections, the contemporary social movement milieu is no longer a homogenous whole but is rather fragmented. In fact, co-operation and consensus seeking between movements and their various stakeholders, including government, helps associate them, or even implicitly equate them, with interest groups.

There are various many definitions of an interest group. One of the oldest definitions is 'any group that is based on one or more shared attitudes and makes certain claims upon other groups and organisations in the society for the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of forms of behaviour that are implied by the shared attitudes' (Truman, 1951, p.33). Such a definition permits an identification of potential along with existing interest groups. In other words, it invites an examination of interests regardless of its presence as one of the characteristics of a particular interest group. A more limited and concrete definition is a group or association which seeks 'to influence public policy in its own chosen direction, while declining to accept direct responsibility for ruling the country' (Wooton, 1970). Here the emphasis is on influencing public policy and declination of responsibility of public office, rather than shared attitudes as in Truman's. According to Wright, there are three requirements for being an interest group. First is that its name should not appear on an

election ballot. Second, it should be using 'some portion of its collective resources to try and influence decisions made by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of national, state, or local governments'. Third is that it should be organised 'externally to the institution of government that it seeks to influence' (Wright, 1996, p:22-23). A much simpler definition of interest groups could be 'groups of people who share common traits, attitudes, beliefs or objectives and who organize in order to promote and protect the shared interests' (Bellows, et al, 1971, p.182). From these definitions, it is possible to derive key features of interest groups. Interest groups have shared goals and demands, and they develop shared attitudes to raise their claims, and they try to influence government programmes, policies and implementations in line with their needs and aspirations. Interest groups are a means of articulating demands to policy makers. In this sense, interest groups seem to be very similar to social movements. When we look at the different classifications of interest groups, the picture becomes even more blurred as to what constitutes a social movement and what constitutes an interest group. One of the basic and most referred classifications is that of Gabriel A. Almond *et al.* (Almond *et al.*, 1978, 2004) who distinguishes four types of interest groups, which are anomic groups, non-associational groups, institutional groups and associational groups.

Anomic groups 'are generally spontaneous groups that form suddenly when many individuals respond similarly to frustration, disappointment or other strong emotions'. They rise and subside quickly. They are usually in the form of unorganised mobs and riots. The second group according to Almond's categorization is non-associational interest groups. Like anomic groups, they are also distinguished by the absence of any specialized organisation. They differ from anomic groups since they are based not only on a common interest or political view but, on identities of ethnicity, region, occupation or perhaps kinship. As a result of these common identities, they have also more continuity compared to anomic groups. The workers class as a whole, all farmers, or all Hispanics in a society can be considered as non-associational groups. The third group in Almond's analysis is institutional groups. These are found within formal organisations like political parties, corporations, legislatures, armies, bureaucracies and churches. These groups have political and social functions other than interest articulation and they are generally smaller groups within these formal organisations. They can be legislative blocs, officer cliques, groups in the clergy or ideological cliques in bureaucracies. They represent either their own interests or interests of other groups in the society. For example, Department of Agriculture in the US is such kind of an interest group, who often unites with the farmer lobby in advocating agricultural policies. Roman Catholic Church in many countries also constitutes an institutional interest group, who defends its own interests as well as other groups in the society. The last interest group in Almond's categorization is the associational interest groups, which are specialized structures for interest articulation. The examples of associational interest groups are chambers of commerce and industry, trade unions, employers' associations, ethnic associations and religious associations. Their most important feature is that they have orderly procedures for formulating interests and demands. For this reason, they employ full-time professional staff. Their organisational base gives them superiority over other types of interest groups. In addition, here, not only groups that organize around an economic interest, but also those that unite by a political ideology or

a policy goal are regarded as associational interest groups. Almond considers them as a subset of associational groups. He regards the environmentalists, women's associations and other civic groups as examples of this subset.

A similar though simpler categorization of interest groups is three-fold, as non-associational groups, institutional groups and associational groups (Axford, 1997). Non-associational groups are the same with those in Almond's categorization. However, institutional groups are here different. They are divided into two, as professional groups which are under associational group in Almond's categorization and as groups that are institutionalized parts of the machinery of the government, like a ministry or the military. Associational groups here are those founded by volunteers with specific goals and they can pursue unconventional, radical and even sometimes terror tactics. There are three major types of associational groups in this categorization, which are sectional groups, promotional groups and social movements. Sectional groups promote and protect the functional interests of their members, which generally refer to their material well-being. Professional organisations, trade unions and trade associations are regarded under this group. Consumer groups, groups that represent localities and ethnic or religious groups may also be considered as sectional groups, as they represent the interests of a section in a society. These sectional groups aim to influence government policy and they are able to offer technical expertise. Promotional groups on the other hand aim to promote causes, principles and values. An example of this kind may be an organisation promoting and protecting gay rights or an environmental organisation. Advocacy groups and advocacy coalitions are considered as a sub-category of the promotional group in this categorization. Social movements are the third type of associational group. They are loose forms of collective behaviour based on shared beliefs and values. On the other hand, they may involve organisations, which are called social movement organisations.

Another possible categorization would be to divide the interest groups simply into two as sectional and promotional groups (Huggins and Turner, 1997) or in a similar manner as protective and promotional groups (Dowes and Hughes, 1972). Sectional groups (or protective groups) promote or protect the interests of a certain section in a society. They are almost always concerned with the economic interests of their members. For this reason, their members are those who seek protection and promotion. Associational groups with an economic interest in Almond's categorization correspond to this type of groups. Promotional groups are the same with the promotional groups in the above categorization. They are not concerned with economic interests, but with securing a particular aim, promotion of the image of a particular society or creation of a different type of value system. Examples of global promotional groups are Amnesty International and Greenpeace. National examples are Liberty and Ginger Bread in the United Kingdom. The former campaigns for the protection and extension of civil liberties in Britain, and the latter campaigns for the well-being of one-parent families. Promotional groups are often engaged in direct actions and thereby they seek to gain publicity and public support. Their scope of appeal is generally larger than that of sectional groups, since they intend to appeal not to a special group as in the case of sectional groups, but to everybody, at least theoretically (Dowes and Hughes, 1972).

A narrower type of classification is made by dividing interest simply into two groups as producer interest groups and non-producer interest groups (Tansey, 1995). In case of producer interest groups, the interest is a professional or a business one. Doctor's representatives or trade unions are of this kind. Especially trade unions are, at least in the Western world, automatically consulted entities. Non-producer interest groups, on the other hand, are 'residents affected by planning proposals, consumers of both private and public goods and services, housewives, carers, and so-called "cause" groups who operate more altruistically on behalf of others' (Tansey, 1995:178). Examples of this type are Royal National Institute for the Blind in the UK, Greenpeace, consumer associations and many local cause groups. They have generally less permanent communication links with the government.

As these categorizations demonstrate, social movements are regarded as a separate category of interests groups by some scholars, especially of political science. There are even scholars who consider political parties, social movement organisations and interest groups as the same thing and who argue that they should be studied together (see Burstein, 1998). Although social movements are at times regarded as interest groups, they are generally not included into the classifications of interest groups. For Castells for instance, interest group and social movement are two different theoretical models of social mobilisation (1983, p.125). He also argued that, if a movement loses one of its goals of collective consumption, cultural identity, and political self-management, and a narrow self-definition turn it into an interest group (p.328). Moreover, it is generally argued that, when social movements become increasingly formalized and institutionalized as interest groups, they cease to be movements. In this respect, social movements are not groups, and therefore not interest groups and are even more than an accumulation of interest groups as again argued by Castells (1983, p.171). On the other hand, a movement may include certain interest groups. For this reason exactly, we talk about social movement organisations, which are, according to Tilly (1984), essential parts of social movements.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **NEOLIBERAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN ISTANBUL**

This chapter is devoted to characteristics firstly of neoliberal urban development in general and secondly, the way it develops in Istanbul. Focusing on different dynamics of neoliberal urban development worldwide, which are explained below with regards to the restructuring of the urban economy, large-scale urban development schemes, changing role of the planning institution and the new urban governance mechanisms, the chapter concentrates on its project-based character, which comes into being in two different types; territorially-based urban transformation projects and projects for global competitiveness, which are prestige and urban infrastructure projects. As a final section the legal and administrative environment facilitating the neoliberal interventions are elaborated.

#### **3.1. Dynamics of Neoliberal Urbanisation**

Neoliberalism and neoliberal policies, which began to be adopted at the end of 1960s and beginning of 1970s as a response to the crisis of Fordist/Keynesian capitalism, have so far attempted to impose the market rule upon all aspects of social, political and economic life, one of which was the urban restructuring. Since then, neoliberalism has become the dominant political and ideological form of capitalist globalisation (Brenner and Theodore, 2002), advocating in general the roll-back of state and the creation of a society governed primarily by market mechanisms. Rather than being a complete ideology, later it has begun to be understood as ‘a historically specific, on-going, and internally contradictory process of market-driven socio-spatial transformation, rather than as a fully actualized policy regime, ideological form or regulatory framework’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). In more practical terms, it is experienced as a set of ‘political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade’ (Harvey, 2005, p.2). Neoliberalism is also presented as a restructuring strategy, having a creative destructive role on regulatory frameworks (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2005), one of which is the urban change and the urbanisation itself. In this, it refers to the ‘historical transformation and recent expansion of capitalist market domination into every corner of globe and every moment of our waving lives’ (Forman and Tucker, 2007), one of which is the urban change and the urbanisation itself. Moreover, neoliberalism ‘inhabited not only institutions and places, but also the spaces in between’, by playing a decisive role in constructing the rules of competition between localities (Peck and Tickell, 2002). It thus constitutes the prevailing set of ideas and

practices that shape the relationships today in general and the ongoing processes of urban restructuring in particular. In other words, it is increasingly seen as an essential descriptor of the contemporary urban condition (Brenner and Theodore, 2005)

In parallel, cities have become strategically crucial arenas in which a variety of neoliberal initiatives are articulated (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). They have become ‘increasingly important geographical targets and institutional laboratories for a variety of neoliberal policy experiments...’ such as place-marketing, urban development corporations, public-private partnerships, property re-development schemes and etc., the goal of which is to ‘mobilize city space as an arena both for market-oriented economic growth and for elite consumption practices’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Today’s urbanisation and concomitant urban development projects –referred to as ‘urban transformation projects’ throughout the thesis- come to the fore as localised forms of neoliberal policies or, in other words local manifestations of neoliberalism and thereby perhaps the most evident intervention area of the neo-liberal agenda.

The new actors of neoliberal urban development on the other hand are semi-public institutions, private companies and public-private partnerships, along with the classic actor, the public agencies. What unfolds in the development of cities of the current phase of capitalism, which is discussed below more in detail, is the urbanisation that is shaped by neoliberal policies through deregulation of markets, trade liberalisation, privatization, commercialization, commodification, enhanced capital mobility, and realisation of programmes and projects through public-private partnerships. Therefore, one can call the urbanisation of the new era as neoliberal urbanisation.

The functioning of neoliberal urbanisation has austere reflections on urban space, its users, its functioning and management, as one of the most profound impacts of neoliberalism is on built environment of cities. This manifests itself in an intense and rapid urban change, which reinforces the cities as places of conflict and tension. Neoliberal urbanisation as the consequence of neoliberal forms of urban policy, transforms the built environment and the urban form in its own way by eliminating or keeping the urban public spaces under intensified surveillance and creating new privatized spaces of elite/corporate consumption, destructing the traditional working-class neighbourhoods for speculative redevelopment and constructing large-scale mega projects to attract corporate investment reconfiguring the existing land-use patterns, creating gated communities, urban enclaves and other purified spaces, and ‘rolling forward’ of the gentrification frontier and intensifying sociospatial polarization (Brenner and Theodore, 2002).

The different facets of neoliberal urbanisation can be better understood by tracing the changes in built environment, which are connected to the restructuring of the urban economy, the changes in urban governance including planning institutions and practice.

*Restructuring of the urban economy* and increasing importance of the services sector accompanied with the driving of the industry out of the city marks the current economy of the cities. Urban revitalisation is presented and promoted as an opportunity to change

economic hierarchies and functions in the urban area, creating new jobs and empowering the city in urban division of labour (Swyngedouw, Mouleart, and Rodriguez, 2002). Parallel to this, the driving force of the global urban economy becomes the real-estate and construction sectors at the service of growing and changing demands of high-qualified workforce of the services sector. Thereby, an extensive part of the neoliberal policies are today made of urban policies, which boost the private sector, construction, finance and tourism sectors being the leading ones. These neoliberal policies aim to eliminate all kinds of barriers against the construction firms involved in the urban transformation projects, pass the necessary laws and regulations as soon as possible, and change the zoning status of areas where previously no development was allowed to facilitate the operation of the construction sector.

*Large-scale urban development schemes* are one of the important features of neoliberal urbanisation, with the main objective to turn the city into a global competitor in line with the aspirations of the elites. Parallel to globalisation and increasing mobility of capital, large-scale capital investments are oriented into cities usually in the form of large-scale property development projects, as a target for capital investors, instead of small-scale property developers as in the past. They aim to reinvigorate the urban economy aiming at revaluation of the prime urban rent. The production of urban rent as well as profitable economic activities is the central goal of these projects. These at times emblematic projects are implemented as a part of place marketing strategies by urban elites in search of economic growth and competitiveness. They usually take the form of meeting the inner-city land demand for business or tourism centres, housing complexes for high or middle-high income groups or 'gentrification' projects in degraded areas of especially inner city, where rent has considerably decreased. State bears most of the risks of the projects and covers the deficits. They are legitimized through a neo-liberal discourse as the renewal of cities and revaluing the city by attributing new functions to areas, which have lost their functions. However, they are criticised for laying the ground for privatizing the already valuable public land, rather than revaluing it. Furthermore, urban land and property development through these projects also constitute a new type of income transfer mechanisms when implemented for redevelopment in degraded residential areas of the low income groups and have therefore, increasingly become means of wealth generation (Eraydin, 2012).

With regards to planning and policy procedures, these urban transformation projects, or urban development projects as used in western literature, are implemented as exceptionality measures, such as the freezing of conventional planning tools, bypassing statutory regulations and institutions, creation of project agencies with special powers of intervention and a change in national or regional regulations (Swyngedouw, et al, 2002). In this process, the zoning regulations of historical sites, archaeological sites, green areas and forest areas are changed and urban transformation projects proposing housing areas, hotels, shopping malls etc. are implemented by large-scale firms. These projects are usually realised as a part of public-private partnerships, as a result of local governments' search for new ways of financing urban development, due to tight budgets and increasing redevelopment tasks (Mayer, 2006a). So, they are engaged in partnerships with large-scale investors in their projects which aim to upgrade the central areas, or to redevelop old industrial or housing areas. In parallel, these areas have been evacuated from their residents, if any. In this,

although they have rhetorical attention to social issues, these projects accentuate socioeconomic polarisation through the working of real-estate markets that results in price rises and displacement of lower-income groups (Swyngedouw, *et al*, 2002). Certain social groups are circumvented, bypassed, ignored and marginalized and even treated as problematic.

Furthermore, this type of project-based urban policy does not treat the neighbourhoods as a unity, which results in proliferation of self-contained and isolated islands in the city, created through special plans having special construction rights that are completely disconnected from the rest of the city. Surrounding urban tissue and the capacity of nearby transportation axes are completely neglected. Consequently, 'urban islands and a patchwork of discrete spaces with increasingly sharp boundaries' in a physically and socially fragmented city are produced (Swyngedouw, *et al*, 2002).

*Changing role of the planning institution* enforcing the change in statutory planning, which is seen as the classic instrument of the Fordist era, is another outcome of neoliberal urbanisation. At this point, the planning institution is not totally displaced, since it still is the prerequisite of neoliberal urban development (Taşan-Kok, 2012), yet acquired new goals and tools incorporating more flexible intervention mechanisms. The above mentioned urban transformation projects come to the fore as important new tools of planning. Thus, it can be argued that it is now project-based urban planning, in which projects precede planning and the planner becomes the agent of neoliberal urbanisation. The process therefore of the planning as an institution going through is called 'neoliberalisation of planning', in which the planning process itself becomes not only 'more flexible and negotiable strategic one', but also a mere corrective mechanism, attempting to 'introduce changes without formulating an overall policy to regulate new development' (Taşan-Kok, 2012).

*The new urban governance mechanisms* in this era supported neoliberal urbanisation, which can be defined under entrepreneurialism, defined by Harvey (1989) as a change from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. Entrepreneurial forms of governance began to be adopted by local governments, as territorial competitiveness has become priority for them (Eraydin, 2012). Project based urban interventions brought together a more assertive and entrepreneurial style of urban governance, while formal government structures are subordinated to new institutions, which are highly autonomous organisations that compete with and even supersede local authorities as managers of urban renewal (Swyngedouw, *et al*, 2002). 'Urban development policy now involves private actors as early as the planning stage, while the local authority also has a say in implementation processes (Mayer, 1994 p.233) In these cooperation processes, which span various policy fields and bring together actors from very backgrounds, bargaining systems have emerged, characterized by a cooperative and a non-hierarchical style of policy-making. Here, instead of giving orders, the local authority moderates or initiates cooperation.

On the other hand, especially after 1990s, neoliberalisation process itself has been subject to restructuring, giving way to 'emergent combination of neoliberal economic management and authoritarian state forms' (Peck and Tickell, 2002). While neoliberalism aims to create



free markets liberated from all kinds of state interferences, it has in practice entailed a dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose the market rule in all aspects of social life (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). At urban scale, this unfolds as a centralized and more autocratic management, giving rise to creation of 'new authoritarian' state apparatuses by neoliberalism as one of its moments of creation (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002), for which Housing Development Agency (HDA)<sup>3</sup> is an example from Turkey. Furthermore, entrepreneurial forms of urban governance have a significant deficit in terms of accountability, transparency and representation. 'A system of representative urban government has been turned into stakeholder urban governance that is centred on newly established institutional arrangements, lacking formalized mechanisms of representation' (Swyngedouw, et al, 2002). Important decisions are made in closed and mostly elite circles including government representatives, excluding the urban citizens. Local authorities gained a more proactive role, playing the role of an enabler, client or partner.

In sum, neoliberalism creates its own city, by causing dramatic changes in the way urban built environment is planned and managed, though without making the state institutions and its instruments obsolete, but reconfiguring them. This neoliberal urban development, despite its power, is not left without any contestation from urban citizens. On the contrary, it comes to the fore as a new target for urban opposition. This urban opposition is the subject of the thesis, based on the conceptual framework of urban movements.

As discussed in the earlier in this section, cities are today perhaps the most evident intervention area of the neo-liberal agenda, as urban land and property development have increasingly become powerful means of wealth creation. The rapid urban change, particularly in large metropolitan areas, which has begun earlier in advanced capitalist countries and sprawled later to the peripheral ones, comes into being through urban transformation projects. Accordingly, what is experienced in the new neo-liberal era is a project-based urban development. A project-based approach in urban development has also begun to dominate the current urban planning practices of Turkey (Eraydin, 2012), Istanbul being the paramount area of exercise of this new approach.

In Turkey, urban transformation process has gained momentum in 2000s. It started with the excuse of protecting the old settlements and cultural heritage areas and reached its current intense state by projects introduced in almost all metropolitan areas of Turkey. One reason for this rapidly gained momentum is the high demand for urban land and the low amount of publicly owned urban land. In most Turkish metropolitan cities, pressure on land is so dramatic due to very high population and economic growth rates, that urban transformation projects proliferated. The legal amendments for the empowerment of the authority of the public institutions including municipalities and HDA as important actors of such projects, has been predominant in the urban transformation process. This is said to increase the pace

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<sup>3</sup> Housing Development Agency (HDA) is a public agency, functioning under Prime Ministry, established for housing supply for low- and medium-income groups.

of urban change, while at the same time decreasing its legitimacy among some of the citizens. It gives the relevant public authorities the rights to planning, making expropriation and implementation and leaves the rest to negotiation and bargaining.

The effects of urban development through neoliberal transformation projects are particularly intensive in Istanbul due to its high rates of economic and population growth as well as increasing global functions. Since the 1980s, under the liberal regime, the importance of the global economic functions in the economy of Istanbul increased substantially, supported by the increasing flow of foreign investment. Its large economic hinterland and its proximity to the European market strengthened the role of Istanbul as a city that can host some global functions. Several studies (Beaverstock, et al., 2000; Taylor and Walker, 2001; Taylor, 2001 and 2003; Beaverstock, et. al., 1999) indicated that Istanbul takes place within the second tier 'important centres' in certain global functions and in the third tier of global cities. In the study by Taylor (2003), Istanbul took the 7<sup>th</sup> place in finance and banking sector and 14<sup>th</sup> place in services sector among the European cities. This role is accelerated by the increasing inward foreign investment, especially after Turkey became an accession country to the European Union.

Increasing competitive advantages and attraction of Istanbul for global market players prevail, similar to the other metropolitan areas of the Central Eastern European countries. The increasing attractiveness of Istanbul both for foreign and domestic firms as well as migrants both from rest of the country and abroad increased the pressure on the different levels of the metropolitan government, which have rights to plan and approve<sup>4</sup>. This induced further changes in the legislation on planning, housing and urban land market and enabled the different central government institutions to have power to shape metropolitan development<sup>5</sup>. These changes stimulated the increasing interest of central government becoming a main decision maker on certain parts of the Istanbul metropolitan area, via the activities of Privatisation Agency and HDA, Moreover, Turkish Maritime Enterprises, General Directorate of State Railways, State Railways, Harbours and Airports Construction began to act as entrepreneurs to transfer the ownership rights of their existing facilities.

Therefore, beginning from the 2000s onwards, Istanbul became a playfield of different authorities and actors with different interests. The new entrepreneurial urban land regime and struggles around property and collective consumption translate into territorial projects leading to different governance practices. The so-called 'urban transformation projects' in Istanbul can be grouped into two. First group is territorially-based urban transformation

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<sup>4</sup> Metropolitan Municipalities (1/25000 and 1/5000) and district municipalities (1/1000) have rights to plan, which are approved by Metropolitan Municipal Councils and District Municipal Councils respectively.

<sup>5</sup> New laws were adopted to create new mechanisms to transfer major spending powers to Special Provincial Administrations, Metropolitan Municipalities and other Municipalities and redefined the roles for metropolitan governments in the provision of services. The new legislation that was adopted in 2005 also increased the financial resources of local governments, especially in Istanbul and introduced participatory processes, which should be evaluated as a first step towards the participation of the different social groups.

projects, which are named as ‘urban renewal projects’ in planning terminology that are implemented in a certain territory for new housing and additional urban services, which lead to gentrification of these areas. Second is projects developed as a part of broader policies for global competitiveness and place-marketing. They are in the form of ‘special projects’ which may be territorially-based or urban infrastructure projects. The numbers of these projects changes from one district to another and they are distributed all over Istanbul metropolitan area. The high number of projects, which is not even exactly known by the authorities of Metropolitan Municipality, indicates the dominance of entrepreneurial urban land regime in Istanbul. The most prominent examples that draw media attraction and trigger opposition are mapped in Figure 1 and described below more in detail.

### **3.2. Territorially-based Urban Transformation Projects**

There is a long list of territorially-based urban transformation projects in Istanbul that are mostly related to housing, but also to provision of cultural and touristic facilities and concern a specific group among the city’s citizens. As neoliberalism, contrary to 1980s, began to penetrate after 1990s into the areas where low income groups settled after 1990s, Turkey’s and especially Istanbul’s urban development developed along the same lines, though at a later stage. The illegally developed areas as well as the low quality deprived historical neighbourhoods began to be new attraction points of such transformation projects, a result of a set of concerns related to crime, welfare dependency and social breakdown; also for rent generation through revaluing the urban land and wealth transfer. Therefore, the primary method for urban transformation in Istanbul became ‘urban renewal’, which is in essence a complete pulling down of the existing building stock and reconstruction. This is particularly implemented in *gecekondu* areas. In the course of these urban renewal projects, as in most of the Turkish cities, many of such *gecekondu* neighbourhoods are being evicted for developing luxury housing, tourism, trade and etc. Units of apartments to be constructed during the course of the transformation projects are assigned to land owners<sup>6</sup>, in return of their land/property by HDA (Eraydin, 2012), which soon became a powerful actor in these urban development projects. The remaining apartment units are sold in the market, primarily to those who do not own a housing unit in the same city.

Istanbul is a special case in this regard due to the high number of such projects. The user profile is aimed to be completely changed in these areas through increase in land and property values. These renewals are legitimized by highlighting two aspects; first, these areas are informally built on public land and existing property rights are unjustly acquired, and second, they have become criminalized. On the other hand, in neighbourhoods of cultural and historical value, which have a more mixed usage rather than only residential,

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<sup>6</sup> They are generally former squatters of public land, emigrated from rural areas of the country, but later acquired their title deeds after certain of laws in 1984 and 1985 allowed up to four-storey buildings on such land.

the transformation projects mean gentrification in order to create vivid areas for touristic, commercial and cultural activities.

There are said to be more than a hundred such urban transformation areas (neighbourhoods) in Istanbul, some of which are Gülsuyu-Gülensu, Başbüyük, Tarlabası, Sulukule, Bağcılar, Derbent, Aydınlı, Fikirtepe, Tozkoparan, Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray and etc. Some of these projects are implemented in areas of cultural and historical value, such as Sulukule, Tarlabası and Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray. Only in the historic peninsula of the city there are currently renewal projects concerning at least 20 blocks. (Aksoy, 2012). The opposition and collective action that arises as a response to these projects form mainly the 'urban movements of the deprived' in Istanbul. However, 'urban movements of the discontented' also mobilise against these projects at least as external actors in the case of pure residential areas, or as main actors in areas having historical and cultural value.

In most of these urban renewal projects, HDA, the Metropolitan Municipality and the relevant District Municipality as well as the construction firm are engaged. HDA is a critical actor in these projects for it has the power to execute the urban transformation projects as well as to revise planning and zoning regulations in 'transformation' zones. Using these powers, HDA can intervene in any area it deems distressed or obsolete, evict the residents to its public housing and afterwards, regenerate and market the area to economically more powerful customers. Together with the municipality, HDA also negotiates with the residents of the area, who are land / property owners, on the property rights they will acquire at the end of the redevelopment in return for their existing property rights. In this sense, it became a rival against the old small-scale real estate developers that had long established their hegemony in the city (Erder, 2009). Some most striking and vivid examples of such projects are explained below briefly, to give an idea about the processes.

Tarlabası, an outstanding one among these examples, is a neighbourhood where the urban redevelopment, namely a gentrification project started in 2007 by a public private partnership (Çalık Holding and Beyoğlu Municipality). It is directly adjacent to the centre of the city, Taksim square, and contains historic domestic architecture along with other valuable architecture. First stage of the project corresponded to the evacuation of buildings and the residents. The project included joining of historical buildings which were between 50-100 m<sup>2</sup> into one bloc; restoration or rebuilding of some of the buildings in line with the original. The buildings would be used as shopping malls, houses, and hotels and car parkings would be constructed underneath. Some of the owners of these buildings have sold them at cheaper prices in order not to have any conflict with the municipality. Some were served an expropriation notice and put the issue on trial. Tenants on the other hand, were suggested to move to HDA houses in Kayabaşı as renters and pay an amount in between 1000 – 4000 TL in advance and an amount of 100 -400 TL as a monthly rent. Some of these tenants accepted the suggestion, whereas some could not, either because they could not afford the payment or because the distance to their work was too long. Amnesty International called on the Beyoğlu Municipality to stop the forced evacuations immediately. In this urban transformation project, there were cases where people were forced to sign the evacuation documents without being led to read them and cases where

furniture were pulled out while the residents were not at home (Source: Bianet, 18 July, 2011).

Another case, Küçükbakkalköy neighbourhood is a small area of 256 houses belonging to Roma people who have been living there for approximately twenty years. Houses in the area were demolished in 19 June of 2006 by police forces and forces of the Kadıköy Municipality, with no prior notice given to the residents. Some of residents camped in barracks on the site, despite very bad living conditions, without any bathroom or toilet, as they had nowhere to go and were provided with no alternative place. Those who resisted the demolition were taken under custody.

A very well-known case on the other hand is Ayazma. Ayazma was a neighbourhood in Küçükçekmece Municipality in European side, populated by a Kurdish population that has come to the area through internal forced migration from East and South East of Turkey. It was originally a gecekondu area where 1730 families used to live. In June 2004, the area was announced as an urban transformation area by a decree of the Prime Minister. Following this, HDA, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and Küçükçekmece Municipality decided on a new prestigious housing project in Ayazma. The area was very valuable since it had a metro connection and overlooked the Trans-European Motorway (TEM) highway, which made it highly accessible from the working places. Most of the families living in the area signed a contract with HDA after negotiation and moved to HDA houses in Bezirganbahçe, which are said to be in low quality. It was planned such that, they would live in these apartments, pay every month an amount like a rent and would own the apartment in the end. However, most of these people could not afford this monthly amount, had to sell the houses with the debt and move back to gecekondu, but this time as tenants. It is also said that they could not adapt to the 'urban' character of these apartments, as people used to living in a 'village-like' circumstances. Moreover, the 72 m<sup>2</sup> houses were too small for families with an average of 5-6 children. These people who moved to Bezirganbahçe were considered to be rightful owners, whereas 42 families were only tenants in Ayazma. Therefore, they were only forced to move out of the neighbourhood, but not offered anything else.

Another example is Gülsuyu-Gülensu neighbourhoods in Maltepe District. The immigration to the area (to Gülsuyu neighbourhood) began in 1950s and the first settlers were from Bayburt, followed by those from Erzincan. They were mainly employed at factories around, mainly in Kartal. In current situation, the area covering these two neighbourhoods is an "urban transformation area" since 2004 (Urban Renewal Plan). The area has easy access to connection axes, has a beautiful view overlooking the sea and an earthquake safe base, which makes it attractive for urban developers in the neo-liberal urbanisation.

### 3.3. Projects for Global Competitiveness: Prestige and Urban Infrastructure Projects

One of the new types of entrepreneurial governance relations in Istanbul have been shaped by the different special projects ‘towards competitive regionalism’ which characterises entrepreneurial mode of governance in urban land and property markets. Special projects such as Haydarpaşa Redevelopment Project, project for the demolition of a theatre building named ‘Emek’ in Beyoğlu for reconstruction, Beyoğlu Demirören Shopping Mall Construction, the so-called ‘crazy project’ that envisages a huge canal that would run parallel to the Bosphorus Strait and Taksim Gezi Park Project (Pedestrianisation of Taksim Area and construction of a commercial and cultural centre) show how different sites in the urban areas became the core of interest of different groups. Especially the ones developed under the privatisation schemes stimulated open and formal negotiations between public and private parties, which resulted in both collaboration and conflict among the existing and new actors of the urban land and property markets. However, the collaborative relations denote only one part of the relations due to the change in how central and local governments’ perceived urban areas. This also led to conflicts among public institutions, namely central government departments, metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities. Thereby, Istanbul became a playfield of power struggles between central and local governments. Different ministries wanted to use their legal rights and to intervene in a number of policy areas, especially in infrastructure and land use development, sometimes contrary to the interests of Metropolitan Municipality. Haydarpaşa Redevelopment Project, where the Ministry of Public Works intended to regenerate the existing harbour and very large areas at the back of it for a commercial property development project is one of the examples of conflicting interests. Civil society organisations and professional chambers have also carried out a strong opposition against this project.

Another project that forged similar oppositions foresaw the demolition of a theatre building named ‘Emek’ in Beyoğlu, the heart of Istanbul where urban transformation projects have been carried out most intensely. The opposition was mainly carried out through legal struggle. Chamber of Architects Istanbul Branch sued the project with motion for stay. The court decided on stay of execution and called for an expert report. Three experts worked on the case and presented their reports to the court on 14 April 2011. According to two of the experts, the project was not in line with the cultural fabric of the area. Parallel to this legal process, different actors including professionals, artists, journalists carried out their own struggle against the project at streets and by internet. The expert reports had been prepared in eighteen months and court finally denied the motion for stay. Despite the protests organized to prevent the demolition, and with an international support<sup>7</sup>, it took place finally in Spring, 2013.

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<sup>7</sup> Greek-French director Costa Gavras also participated in the protests (Hürriyet Daily News, 7 April, 2013).

Most prominent examples of large-scale urban infrastructure projects on the other hand are, a 3rd Bridge over Bosphorus, Haliç Metro Bridge Project, Istanbul Strait Highway Transit Project (Bosphorus Highway Tube Tunnel Project), and all the others not listed here. The 3rd Bridge project is a part of a broader highway project, Northern Marmara Highway Project of the Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications. The call for tender of the project that was to be done on 12<sup>th</sup> of January 2012 had to be cancelled since there were no bids. The new date of tendering was 20th of April 2012. The tendering process has finally been concluded and the groundbreaking ceremony was performed in May 2013. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Bridge will be named after Yavuz Sultan Selim<sup>8</sup>.

Istanbul's tube tunnel project on the other hand under the Bosphorus Strait for vehicle traffic is planned to be constructed in three-and-a-half years. It will connect both sides of the metropolitan city for vehicle traffic. The Ministry of Transportation is leading the project named 'Istanbul Strait Highway Transit Project' and upon completion, a vehicle will be able to enter the highway tube tunnel from southern shores of the European side (Zeytinburnu district's Kazlıçeşme region) and will surface in the Anatolian side's Göztepe district at south, passing through the tunnels under the Bosphorus. The contestations and collective action against these projects are usually carried out by discontented groups, which I call movements of the discontented.



Figure 2: Simulation of 3rd Bridge over Bosphorus (Source: [www.3.kopru.com](http://www.3.kopru.com))

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<sup>8</sup> Selim I, the Ottoman Emperor from 1512 to 1520.

### **3.4. Legal and Administrative Framework Underpinning Neoliberal Urban Development**

The urban transformation as stated before is a part of a broader neoliberal political programme of utilizing the urban land as a means of economic wealth creation. For this reason, it requires a strong legal background. Thus, it is backboned by a range of legal arrangements bringing a serious reorganisation in the economic and social life. This led to a massive wave of new laws regulating the urban land and its actors throughout 2000s until today. These new laws envisage changes, among others, in the reorganisation of certain public institutions including the planning institutions and professional organisations. They have thus profound influences on the urban movements in different aspects. This section focused on such laws and their consequences in terms of both urban transformation and urban movements.

One of these legal arrangements is the Law no 5366 on Renovating, Conserving and Actively Using Dilapidated Historical and Cultural Immovable Assets, published in the Official Gazette issued 25866 and dated 5 July 2005. Article 1 of the law puts forward its purpose:

Article 1- The purpose of this Law is to ensure that metropolitan municipalities, district and first-tier municipalities within boundaries of metropolitan municipalities, provincial municipalities and district municipalities, and municipalities with populations above 50,000, and special provincial administrations for the areas outside the purview of such municipalities, reconstruct and restore, in a manner consistent with area development, the areas registered and announced as protected areas by the cultural and natural heritage conservation boards and protection zones of such areas which have been dilapidated and are about to lose their characteristics, create zones of housing, business, culture, tourism and social facilities in such areas, take measures against risks of natural disasters, renovate, conserve and actively use historical and cultural immovable assets.

The motives behind the enactment of the Law no 5366 was to smooth the path for urban transformation projects in areas like Sulukule and Tarlabası in Istanbul. Chairman of Chamber of City Planners Istanbul Branch evaluates this Law in a panel he addressed, as the breach of concepts of preservation and planning:

“With the Law no 5366, the concept of preservation is pushed aside. While planning is eradicated, renewal and expropriation at building scale came to the fore. By this way, law no 5366, which ruins the unity of protected areas and historical areas, began to be discussed before being implemented”.





Figure 3: Construction of 3rd Bridge (Source: [www.3.kopru.com](http://www.3.kopru.com))

In 2008, the powers of the HDA were fundamentally increased by the Law No. 5793, published in the Official Gazette issued 26959 and dated 24 July 2008, amending the 4<sup>th</sup> Article of the Law on Mass Housing No 2985. Accordingly, HDA has the powers of planning at all scales in areas of gecekondu transformation, areas under its own property and areas which are allocated to mass housing by the Provincial Governments. In parallel, a high amount of land that belongs to the state is transferred to HDA, by closing down the Land Office and Real Estate Bank. Consequently, HDA became a powerful equity owner, a profit-making institution and a key instrument of urban transformation mechanisms.

Another important legal arrangement is Law no 5998, published in the Official Gazette issued 27621 and dated 24 June 2010, amending the 73. Article of the Municipal Law No 5393. The Article 73 of the Municipal Law is on urban transformation and development areas, and lays the rules and regulations regarding where and how the municipalities can implement urban transformation and development projects. The amendments made by Law No 5998 extend the powers of municipalities regarding urban transformation and details the related rules and regulations. First, wearing out parts of the city is included among the land types that can be declared urban transformation area, without giving further detail. Second, the authority to declare a piece of land within the boundaries of a metropolitan municipality, an urban transformation area is directly entitled to the metropolitan municipality. District municipalities can implement such projects with the approval of the metropolitan municipality. Third, the municipalities are authorized to make redevelopment plans, determine the value of the immovables in the redevelopment area, and make allocation of land to the right owners based on these values and carry urban planning practice.




Figure 4: Map of Main Urban Transformation Projects in Istanbul

The latest legal arrangement that extends the scope of urban transformation is Law No 6306 on the Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risk dated 16 May 2012. According to this Law, the decision to demolish a building will be based solely on the report of a commission working with the government and will not require the consent of building owners. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, showed their determination, stating that the government will ensure that dangerous structures are torn down even if it means a defeat in the polls. First, the areas that are at greater risk will be determined, and Cabinet will have to approve the areas. Governors will manage the process of rehabilitation, HDA and municipalities will carry out the demolition work. After the demolition, building owners will be shareholders of the land. Shareholders will decide what will be built on the land, but if they are unable to decide, the government will decide how to use the land and it may be expropriated. If needed, this land will be transformed into green space. This law in fact enlarges the amount of land that can be transformed, since central or historical popular zones are not anymore sufficient to produce the rent needed to feed the economy.

This Law was evaluated also by United Nations Human Rights Council's Special Reporter on housing rights as follows:

Alleged threat of mass forced evictions and additional violations of the right to adequate housing following the recent adoption of the Law for the Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risk. According to information received, the Law of 18 May 2012 threatens the enjoyment of the right to adequate housing of more than six million households. The Law presents a number of problematic provisions, in particular a lack of concrete definitions, accountability mechanisms, administrative or judicial recourse for affected communities, coupled with the extensive decision-making powers of Government and local authorities with regard to the determination of buildings to be demolished and the actual demolition process. The implementation of the Bill as it is may allegedly lead to mass forced evictions, infringements on the rights to property and housing, and to an increased number of people made homeless or left in worse housing and living conditions. Reports received indicate that there has been very little consultation with potentially affected communities and civil society organizations during the drafting of the Law (Communications Report of Special Procedures, 2012, p.57).

Whereas the powers of state institutions such as HDA and municipalities are increased by the above mentioned Laws, the rights of certain professional organisations, who are key actors of urban movements, are curtailed by different legal arrangements. These organisations constitute in fact the most effective part of the urban opposition through legal cases, in other words through their bringing in to the court of certain projects. As an example for such legal arrangements, the payments to be made for experts used for these cases have been increased. This increase made it more expensive and therefore more difficult for these professional organisations to go to court. Furthermore, the most recent legal change is the amendment made in the 8. Article of Zoning Law No 3194 during a midnight session on 9-10 July 2013. By this amendment, a clause is added to law no 3194, which reads:

Mapping, planning, preliminary studies and projects cannot be required to be subjected to the certification and approval of any organization, including the professional organizations, other than those authorized organizations specified in the relevant administrative laws. Registrations of the project owners and their organizations cannot be cancelled or renewal delayed for not having obtained a certification or approval, or for other similar reasons. Any commitment letter that would abolish this provision cannot be required of project owners.

So, the certification and approval obligation for plans, maps, projects by professional chambers is waived. This accounts to a serious income loss for the chambers, since this certification and approvals are liable to a certain fee paid to the chamber. In the press release against this amendment, President of TMMOB stated:

Through this procedure at midnight last night, the AKP wants to create ‘a rosary with no thorns’ by disqualifying TMMOB, which AKP views as an obstacle for its rent-seeking schemes and dirty ambitions for the cities. By this act, the AKP has disabled TMMOB and affiliated chambers, which oppose the current plunder of the country’s resources; centralized the plunder of the public resources; rescinded the rights, authorities and duties of the professional organizations and of municipalities as local governments, notwithstanding the provisions of the Constitution; excluded architectural projects from those works recognized under the Law for Literary and Artistic Works.

The legal changes summarized above that stretches along almost a decade in Turkey is a clear sign of the empowerment of the state institutions in order to eliminate any barrier against the market mechanism, which is conceptualised in the literature as the ‘new authoritarianism’ brought by neoliberalism. These legal changes in favour of an increasingly fast urban transformation have serious economic and social repercussions, let alone the challenges they bring for urban movements. At first sight, as Eraydın argues (2013), the grounds for most of these changes appear to be attractive, but their economic and social outcomes are not so positive. In economic terms, these legal arrangements supports the real estate and construction sectors, which can be detrimental in longer term if the demand for new housing cannot meet the supply. In social terms, these arrangements smooth the path for urban transformation, but do not foresee any social programmes, and thereby increase social segregation (Eraydın, 2013).

These changes and their implementation have outcomes both for urban movements of the deprived and the discontented. First of all, the opposition carried out by the urban movements is now facing state institutions with almost endless powers, namely a much more powerful and authoritarian state. Moreover, the professional chambers, as vital actors for both types of movements –internal actors of the movements of the discontented and external actors of the movements of the deprived- are less powerful, in terms of legal powers and economic resources. Nevertheless, this trend does not slow down the mobilisations. On the contrary, such arrangements appear as serious threats triggering the mobilisation of movements. Moreover, the Law no 6306 is so comprehensive and powerful

that it alarms the neighbourhoods to be proactive and mobilise before any urban transformation is planned for them.



## CHAPTER 4

### RESISTANCE AND MOBILISATIONS AGAINST NEOLIBERAL POLICIES AND PRACTICE: CONTEMPORARY URBAN MOVEMENTS IN ISTANBUL

There is an increasing number of research on urban development issues in Istanbul, ranging from *gecekondu* studies and studies on the urban poor focusing on the changing nature of *gecekondu* after 1980s and changes in the position of and perception about *gecekondu* population in the city (Erder 2002, 2009); Erman, 2001; Erkan 2009; Senyapili, 2004; Isik and Pinarcioglu, 2001; Altinok and Enlil, 2008; Pinarcioglu and Isik, 2008), to more recently emerging studies of urban restructuring in the city under neoliberal policies with a view to its socioeconomical and spatial outcomes (Genis, 2007; Eraydin, 2008; Ercan, 2010; Gunay, 2010; Dincer, 2011; Enlil, 2011; Eraydin, 2011; Lovering and Turkmen, 2011; Oktem, 2011; Ozus, Turk and Dokmeci, 2011; Turkun, 2011; Aksoy, 2012). More detailed analysis on these studies is provided throughout the thesis. On the other hand, the point here is the limitedness of the research on grassroots resistances against this restructuring. The existing studies that focus on resistances or reactions in different areas of the city generally focus on the deprived groups and usually take a supportive stance towards their struggle (Ozdemir, 2005; Bozkulak, 2005; Celik, 2008; Kuyucu and Unsal, 2010).

In the following section, urban opposition and mobilisations in Istanbul are described and analysed as regards to the movements of both the deprived and the discontented, also referring to the findings of the above mentioned case studies.

The two year work to get acquainted with the urban movements of the deprived through participation in meetings, preliminary interviews, membership to Urban Movements Forum e-mail group and textual analysis -detailed in the next chapter- enabled me to scrutinize the main urban movement categories and their subcategories based on Istanbul case. The main categories are; urban movements of the deprived and urban movements of the discontented. Two sub-categories of urban movements of the deprived develop (1) movements that mobilise against urban renewal projects in low-income residential areas, (2) movements that mobilise against urban renewal projects at sites or neighbourhoods of degradation in basically inner-city areas, having historical and cultural values. Urban movements of the discontented, on the other hand are initially mobilised against more generic and issue based projects mentioned earlier. There are three sub-categories of this type which are (1) Movements that mobilise against special projects and urban infrastructure projects what will in the end affect the whole city, (2) movements that mobilise against urban renewal projects in middle or upper-middle income residential areas, (3) movements that struggle for more rent increase in their area. These movements are generally disparate from each other,

indicating that fragmentation in the movement terrain, argued by Mayer (2000, 2009) for the movements of advanced capitalist world can be argued for Istanbul as well. The next sections introduces these two different types of movements; urban movements of the discontented and urban movements of the deprived and the cooperation in between, which has important outcomes for each.

#### **4.1. Urban Movements of the Discontented**

Urban movements of the discontented are movements whose main motivation is some kind of discontent or dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the neoliberal urbanization. Three widely different sub-categories of discontented groups can be observed in Istanbul (See Table 1).

First sub-category is the movements opposing, based on specific cases, the unjust distribution of increasing value of urban land, at the expense of alienation and impoverishment of the urban residents in general. Non-material demands are more prominent in their agenda compared to the movements of the deprived. They feel the need to reclaim and redefine the public space as both a dimension of democratic participation and an area for common use. They can be defined as movements against the loss of urban values and assets. In these movements; academics, students, lawyers, professionals and their organisations such as professional chambers, community based organisations and platforms bringing together these different actors take part. As mentioned above, these actors may constitute external actors for the movements of the deprived, in terms of providing technical expertise and logistical support or even active participation in their actions. In Istanbul, academics of city planning and architecture departments of universities in the city (Istanbul Technical University, Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University and Yıldız Technical University) and volunteers from Chamber of City Planners and Chamber of Architects are prominent ones, who give technical, legal and logistical support, such as consultancy in planning processes and court cases or providing venue for meetings. These movements of discontented groups are at times so heavily engaged with the problems of the deprived that they can even be regarded as by-product of the movements of the deprived.

On the other hand, movements under this sub-category may also engage in solely generic issues. The most prominent example of such movements is ‘Taksim Solidarity’ (Taksim Dayanışması), which mobilised in early June 2013, against the demolishment of a park in the Taksim Square of Istanbul named Taksim Gezi Park, and soon developed into an anti-government protest and spread all over the country, predominated by young, educated people. It also included people from highly divergent political backgrounds. A small group of activists in the leadership of Istanbul Chamber of Architects forms the basis of this mobilisation, which in fact can be regarded as a social movement on its own, considering its later deepening and enlargement. With regards to its heterogeneity, Taksim Solidarity may remind NOlympia Campaign in Berlin in 1991 or the opposition to the Hanover Expo 2000, ‘where broad coalitions of local movement groups have come together, joining actors and



political positions who otherwise do not have much overlap' (Mayer, 1999, p.144). Haydarpaşa Solidarity (Haydarpaşa Dayanışması), is similar to Taksim Solidarity, in that its original mobilisation was against the foreseen transformation of the historical Haydarpaşa Train Station in Istanbul into a complex of business centres, shopping malls and hotels. Another initiative mobilised against the 3<sup>rd</sup> Bridge project, a platform named 'Life Platform Instead of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Bridge', which was organised by a group of volunteers. According to their own blog, the Platform gave out a notice in front of the General Directorate of Highways against the project on the same date as the tendering process began.

There are also platforms where different neighbourhood associations can come together such as 'Beyoğlu Platform of Neighbourhood Associations'. IMECE<sup>9</sup>, as an organisation mostly of urban planners, also acts in this sphere by carrying out studies and organizes events to promote 'a more social approach to urbanism in Turkey that goes beyond market mechanism and narrow professionalism' according to the information given at their web site. They produce reports and organize meetings to inform and support the struggle of urban movements. There are other initiatives like, 'Istanbul S.O.S' and Social Rights Association, who work on various issues, but on similar terms in that they all mobilise against issue-based projects and support neighbourhoods in their struggle against urban transformation projects.

Until the burst of the protests of 'Taksim Solidarity', there was no established cooperation among these different movements. Taksim Solidarity managed to form an umbrella not only for different groups with urban related goals, but millions of people protesting against more transcendental issues such as lack of freedom of expression and interference in people's life styles. For this reason, Taksim Solidarity became a country-wide social movement. Until then, there has been no unified movement, but distinct movements for both categories of movements, namely those of deprived and discontented. However, Taksim Solidarity was able to mobilise masses involving a great variety thanks to its transcendental goals. The urban movements of the discontented on the other hand, who has specific urban-related goals are still at the stage of asking questions of what organisational practices they should develop, and what kinds of concrete relations they should build in between the different movements. In last couple of years, they have managed to come under an Urban Movements Forum and hold meetings where they discuss urgent matters as regards to neighbourhoods or broader issues like a mass demonstration on 1<sup>st</sup> of May. However, they are still far from constituting a broad-based urban movement that can bring a change, as they also admit.

Here it is crucial to add that Taksim Solidarity and its evolution into a mass movement should be regarded as a gain on the part of the urban movements in Turkey, among other gains it has brought. This clearly shows that urban related demands are in essence political in nature and therefore can easily be linked with the purely political issues. However, urban

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<sup>9</sup> Society's Urbanism Movement (Toplumsal Şehircilik Hareketi)  
[www.toplumunsehicilikhareketi.org](http://www.toplumunsehicilikhareketi.org)

movements of Istanbul have not so far proved to become a unified urban movement –not a social movement- mobilising masses, as long as they have purely urban agendas.

The last two sub-categories of movements of the discontented are minor and weak movements in Istanbul. *Second sub-category* is the movement led by elite middle or upper-middle classes who are not contented with the redevelopment in their neighbourhoods for it worsens living conditions and for they were not involved in decision-making. These movements are in fact built around collective interests, which are confined to the well-being of the community only, but not the whole city. They correspond to the elitist and defensive movements in the West, the so-called NIMBYs in Mayer's terms (Mayer, 2003). They are generally mobilised by loss of quality in their own neighbourhood and consequent worsening of living conditions, an unwanted development in the area that affects their quality of life or lack of decision making regarding the development in the area. The actors of these movements are usually middle or upper-middle class citizens and neighbourhood associations they have established. Mobilisations against the planned redevelopment in Ataköy coastal area, and those against the construction of an hospital building in a green area in Kuzguncuk District are example in Istanbul for this sub-category. *The third sub-category* is conservative individual property based movements of mainly those organised by who are dissatisfied with the level of increase in the property values generated in the area and struggle for more rent-generating urban development. They support the redevelopment projects that will increase the value of the land and private property. In this, they are built around individual interests, seeking to extract the maximum profit from the newly generated value increase out of redevelopment. The movement in Beyoğlu initiated by The Beyoğlu Beautification Association including the private entrepreneurs in the area is an example of this sub-category in Istanbul (Erman and Coskun-Yildar, 2007).

Urban movements of the discontented groups in general focus on public spaces. The key actors in the urban movements of the discontented in Istanbul are professional chambers; Chamber of Architects and Chamber of City Planner being the forerunners. Their activities that date back to pre-1980s, for example against the Bosphorus Bridge, which may argued to constitute the foundations of today's urban movements of the discontented. According to the Secretary General of Chamber of Architects Istanbul Karaköy Branch (II), their chamber was perhaps the only organisation that could be named as an *urban movement organisation*.

Middle income groups mobilising for their own community in general remain an alien in the overall urban scenery, since their residential areas are not prone to an acute threat of urban transformation. This can be regarded as a bottleneck against the formation of a mass urban movement.

As a last point, urban movements of the discontented can be regarded as one of the rare encounters of the leftist politics in Turkey with urban issues. In Turkey, the leftist politics has not been keen on urban issues and have been in difficulty in contemplating the political nature of the city, except some specific examples. It dealt with macro issues such as the contradictions of the capitalism itself. It was on the contrary interested in the local, in terms of rural areas or low-income neighbourhoods of the urban areas, seeing it as a step in

reaching the macro goals. The problems of the local in this respect were worth of consideration on condition that they were the reflections of the contradictions of the capitalism. However, the city as a whole and its political nature was neglected. To put in a different way, for an anti-capitalist revolution would already solve the problems of the city, the resources had to be mobilised for this purpose. Dealing with the city was perhaps perceived in this sense as a loss of time. This situation made it easier for the capital to sustain its power in the city. This issue is also widely accepted in urban movement actors in Turkey in general and Istanbul in particular, both by the discontented and the deprived actors. The Secretary General of the Istanbul Chamber of Architects Karaköy Branch puts forward this as such:, “In Turkey, the capital has never been put in pressure over the city” (I1).

However, urban movements of the discontented constitute an exception at that point. The actors of these movements are politically at left and put their role in the movements into the heart of their political struggle. They moreover criticize the leftist politics for not doing so. An argument made by the Secretary General of the Istanbul Chamber of Architects Karaköy Branch (I1) in a symposium shows this clearly: “The left cannot be successful unless it takes the urban contradictions in its own politics”. Her explanation upon her release after being accused of organising the Taksim Solidarity and taken into custody also points to their political dedication into urban issues: “I am accused of organising this movement. This is an honour and for this sake, I can stay in the prison for a lifetime, but this would be unfair to the people”.

The declaration of Mehmet Soğancı, President of The Union of Chambers of Engineers and Architects from, the umbrella organisation for professional chambers including Chamber of Architects and Chamber of City Planners, following the adoption of the law that strips the power of approval for plans and projects from professional chambers marks the similar political approach:

Cognizant that no rule of oppression and cruelty can tear patriotism and humanity from its heart, TMMOB remains faithful and determined to sustain all effort to put science and technique to the service of working-class people, but not to service of imperialism and exploiters. TMMOB will never stand with those who shout: ‘Long live my Sultan’ and will continue persistently to say instead: ‘The emperor has no clothes’.

Moreover, in their joint meetings with the urban movements of the deprived, the actors of the urban movements of the discontented underline the relationship between city and labour, the contradictions of capital and labour on the space. They furthermore draw attention to the fact that it is especially the working class who is affected by urban development schemes at all dimensions. In parallel, they emphasise the possible role of trade unions, criticizing them for their trade unionism focused on wages, without being involved or interested in the urban movements.

Table 1: Characteristics of the Urban Movement of the Discontented

Movement	Fields of Conflict	Actors Involved	Type of Right Defended	Action Type	Type of Project and Examples
<b>a</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- lack of participation in decision making</li> <li>- loss of quality of space</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- academics and students</li> <li>- professional organisations like chambers of planners / architects</li> <li>- platforms of different actors</li> <li>- neighbourhood associations and local activists</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- city-wide collective consumption rights, 'right to the city'</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- opposition</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Special projects (Emek Theatre Building, Beyoğlu Demirören AVM, Haydarpaşa Redevelopment Project, etc.);</li> <li>Urban infrastructure projects (3<sup>rd</sup> Bridge, Haliç Metro Bridge Project, Istanbul Strait Highway Transit Project, etc.)</li> </ul>
<b>b</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- worsening living conditions</li> <li>- unwanted development in the area</li> <li>- lack of participation in decision making</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- neighbourhood associations, planners, architects and lawyers),</li> <li>- their organisations like Chamber of City Planners, and Chambers of Architects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- collective consumption rights within the community</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- cooperationist (but not as a part of movement activities)</li> <li>- opposition</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Urban Renewal Projects in middle income residential areas (Ataköy District, etc.)</li> </ul>
<b>c</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- maximisation of individual property rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- neighbourhood associations including private entrepreneurs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- individual property rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-cooperation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Any rent increasing urban redevelopment (Beyoğlu Association, etc.)</li> </ul>
<b>MOVEMENTS OF THE DISCONTENTED</b>					

## 4.2. Urban Movements of the Deprived

Urban transformation projects in Istanbul generally result in the destruction for urban renewal generally in two different types of neighbourhoods. First type is the degraded and mostly unlawfully built *gecekondu* neighbourhoods of mainly old working-classes who migrated to Istanbul, especially after 1950s, in the process of mechanisation in agriculture and industrialisation of the country. These residents provided the cheap labour for the newly developing industry of Istanbul. Second type is again neighbourhoods in degradation of low-income groups, yet with cultural and historical assets, and located in basically inner-city areas for speculative redevelopment. Accordingly, the *first sub-category* of the movements of the deprived are those that mobilise against urban transformation projects in the former type of neighbourhoods, whereas the *second sub-category* mobilise in the latter type (See Table 2).

The first sub-category of movements, namely those in the degraded and unlawfully built neighbourhoods, develop when the residents feel deprived by these urban transformation projects or see the risk of deprivation when the project is implemented. In fact, thanks to the neoliberal urban development policies, the residents of these neighbourhoods come to the forefront of the most deprived sections of society. The deprivation they face, or the risk of deprivation, has economic, political and socio-cultural dimensions. As regards to the former, urban transformation projects usually implemented by HDA, result in the demolition of unlawfully constructed houses and eviction of the residents, causing their dispossession and moving out to the peripheral areas of the city.

In projects implemented by HDA, developer (contractor) is selected through an open tender on the basis of ‘revenue ratio’ offered, by which the bidder offering the highest share of the revenue –which is typically 25-30%- is awarded the contract (Kahraman, 2013). HDA invests this revenue in construction of apartments on state land allocated to HDA, for low and middle income residents. However, these houses are not given to the residents for free. First, in accordance with the Expropriation Law, a municipal committee determines the value of the *gecekondu*. If the owner of the *gecekondu* agrees on this price, they get an apartment unit among the newly constructed HDA apartment blocks, by paying the difference between the value of their land and *gecekondu* and that of the apartment unit in instalments to a bank contracted by HDA, for a period of 15-20 years. If they fail to do so, the apartment units are given back to the HDA. So, although there is a dispossession on the part of the residents through evacuation and demolition, as a compensation, such a new income transfer mechanism through wealth generation (Eraydin, 2012) is implemented by HDA. Thus, a new urban land and property regime is implemented, through which low quality or informal housing is transformed into new housing units and the residents’ dispossession is supposedly compensated. However, as these apartment units are not given to the residents for free, but in ‘affordable’ prices according to HDA through the above mentioned process, this is not regarded as a ‘direct revenue transfer from high-end projects to housing projects for the poor’ (Kahraman, 2013). But in the end, many of the *gecekondu* owners are satisfied or are forced to be satisfied through such transfers of higher value property as a compensation mechanism, despite their additional financial costs and remoteness from their own piece of land or property. Here, the municipalities’ ‘divide and

rule tactics' among the residents (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010) and their triggering of privileging individual interests facilitate this process. As a result, many of the residents in gecekondu areas move to other parts of the city having their 'share' from the urban land value increase and are not involved in any action that is of contentious nature. Or, they get the price of their land and leave the area, not getting engaged in a further relation with HDA. In short, thanks to this new type of income transfer, reactions of otherwise disadvantaged social groups are stabilized. In project areas which have neither land values at a considerable level nor a potential for increase in land values, residents of the squatter housing area can remain in their neighbourhoods, and they temporarily move to another area during the construction of new houses, the cost of temporary accommodation being paid for by the municipality (Özdemir, 2011).

On the other hand, there are times when the residents are not satisfied with the compensation provided to them. In example, they may find the price offered for their gecekondu low. They may think the monthly instalments are high. Moreover, they know that moving out to peripheral areas will create further economic burdens for them, due to the rising commuting distances to their workplaces. In such a situation, they decline the municipality's offer leading to the initiation of a court case by the municipality. The municipality may come up with a higher price for their gecekondu and land, and persuade them. But in the end, one way or another, the process becomes an 'unfair redistribution', since they are offered one apartment unit in a peripheral area in affordable prices, as against their previous land and gecekondu, which will be much valuable after the implementation of the urban transformation project. For those who do not have property rights of the houses they live in -such as informal housing in areas where there is no permission for construction such as forests, river basins etc.-, there is no compensation and the result is a definite dispossession. They are, along with the residents who do never agree with the offer of the municipality as a compensation, which actually never happens in reality, are finally forced by the municipality, mostly by police force, to evict their homes, which is called 'forced evictions'.

This constitutes the economic dimension of the deprivation for property owners. As regards to the political dimension, the residents of these neighbourhoods feel themselves deprived in terms of their basic citizenship rights, by not being involved in the decision making processes by the local governments, regarding the interventions that will directly affect their lives, especially in the processes while the neighbourhood was declared as 'urban renewal area'. This lack of participation in decision-making comes to the fore as an additional source of mobilisation. As claimed by Erder (2009), such exclusion from decision-making, can also hinder the organisation of a strong opposition, for people will not be sufficiently informed about their rights.

As for the socio-cultural dimension, the residents of such neighbourhoods do not want to forgo their current life styles. Although the houses are degraded and unlawfully built, they are usually detached with gardens, allowing closer contacts with the neighbourhoods and even plantation of trees, fruits and vegetables, out of both economic reasons and their longing for the rural life. They are also big in size enough to accommodate larger families;. The apartments units however do not offer these conditions, but enforce a life style that is totally alien to them. Moreover, for these urban transformation projects usually have no

social or economic programmes for the residents, such as training courses in different fields, they result in some kind of a social exclusion (Kuyucu and Unsal, 2010), which is yet another facet of the deprivation.

That is to say, the first sub-category of urban movements of the deprived mobilise against deprivation with economic, political and socio-cultural dimensions, mainly in *egcekond* neighbourhoods. However, it should be added that the economic dimension outweighs the others as a motivational factor for mobilisation, since the most concrete and profound effect of urban transformation is on the economic value of the residents' property. All in all, the main motivation of this sub-category of movements is some kind of multi-dimensional deprivation, economic one having priority.

The actors of the these movements are mainly residents (property owners, tenants and those who have no property rights), headmen, their neighbourhood associations along with supporters as external actors like academics, students, professionals and their organisations, platforms bringing together these different actors. Moreover, various coordinating initiatives at city wide level are founded such as 'The Coordination of Neighbourhood Associations', 'Coordination of Housing Rights'. Academics from especially Istanbul Technical University, Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University and Yıldız Technical University, students, professionals such as city planners, architects and lawyers, and their organisations like Chamber of City Planners, and Chambers of Architects and platforms bringing together different actors are involved in the mobilisations as external actors. They basically provide technical and logistical support to these people and help them in communicating with different movements of the deprived in the city. Moreover, as the discussions in meetings and e-mails among neighbourhood residents and external actors show, the latter encourage the neighbourhoods to unite and act together, claim their housing rights as a basic human right and contest against their exclusion in decision making processes regarding the redevelopment in their area. The role of external actors in urban movements of the deprived is elaborated in a separate section.

As discussed intensely in meetings and e-mail discussions, there are three types of oppositional ways of action the movements under this sub-category apply to; institutional, legal as well as street struggle. As a part of their institutional struggle, which is in fact the dominant one, they usually adopt negotiation tactics with the municipalities, relevant public agencies and businesses that take part in the project, by sitting around the same table and bargaining on their returns from the urban transformation project, particularly at the stage of assignment of new property rights. The movements are engaged in this institutional struggle through their neighbourhood associations bargaining with the municipality. These are usually newly established associations or remobilised existing ones, aiming to defend the residents' rights in front of municipalities, public agencies or businesses involved in the urban transformation. In almost all such project areas, an association is established by volunteer residents, as the driving force of the movement; Başibüyük, Derbent, Tarlabası, Gülsuyu-Gülensu, Tozkoparan being examples. This type of bargaining with municipalities is so determining throughout the process that, in her analysis of recent urban trends in Istanbul, Aksoy characterizes it as the reduction of citizenship into a bargaining process (Aksoy, 2012). It must also be noted that this 'bargaining process' is interestingly

mentioned even in Expropriation Law (Demirtaş-Milz, 2013), by which bargaining becomes inevitable.

Legal struggle on the other hand, which is a rarely applied method, is carried out through grating petitions or taking the case to the court. It is usually applied to, when the residents are totally unsatisfied with the plan/project in general or what is proposed by it. For example, it was applied in Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement -the neighbourhoods studied as the field research of the thesis- against the 2004 1/5000 Master Plan and resulted in favour of the movement.

As for the street struggle, demonstrations and building barricades to impede the intervention of police to stop the resistance and finalize the demolishment are among the actions. In preliminary meetings participated, the residents of most of the project areas as well as external actors claimed that they did not deny the need for legal struggle, but contended that street struggle was inevitable for them to protect their houses from demolishment. Legal struggle is also sometimes criticized for not being sufficiently representative with regard to the respective neighbourhood as a whole. Moreover, as discussed in these meetings, legal struggle is considered to be possibly difficult, remaining mostly in theory as an option, whereas street struggle is always there as an option to be utilized.

In addition to these three basic methods of action, there are some more innovative ones. In Ayazma for example, as a response to demolishment and evictions within the framework of an urban transformation project implemented by HDA, 18 families who had no property rights began to keep guard in front of the Municipality and remained there more than 35 weeks. They also established Ayazma Mağdurları Derneği (Association of the Deprived People of Ayazma) and carried on their struggle with the help of different external actors, i.e. the association named '1 Umut'. 1 Umut organised a solidarity day for the families of Ayazma with the participation of different activist. They also prepared a letter in English for international support and an 'anti-commercial' video as opposed to the famous commercial of Ali Ağaoğlu, the owner of the construction company to which the transformation project in the area is contracted. They also organised evening meals during Ramadan with the families to show their support. There are also more communicative street actions. For example, in Tokludedede neighbourhood, those who resist the demolishment, struggling for a redevelopment which would allow them to stay in their neighbourhoods, established a free rostrum on the street on 10 December 2011, World Human Rights Day, where they came up, explained their situation and spoke up how they would resist. Two Members of the Parliament from CHP and members of the Assembly of Fatih Municipality from CHP and representatives of various neighbourhood associations, experts and university students also participated in this event (Evrensel, 11 December, 2011; Sol, 11 December, 2011).

An alternative way of categorising the actions of movements was provided by Pickvance long ago as 'institutional action' and 'non-institutional action' (1974). In this categorisation, as regards to non-institutional action, which is in fact similar to the above defined 'street struggle', Pickvance emphasizes illegal action such as violent demonstrations and direct action, which can be argued to be due to the antagonistic and clear-cut relations between the movements and the state as argued by Mayer, as a characteristic of pre-1980 movements (2000). Institutional action, on the other hand, according to Pickvance were those which



took place within existing political institutions such as voting, petitions to local councillors, deputations, legal demonstrations, or the formation of legal policy parties. However, three-fold categorisation is more suitable for the analysis of the current situation including legal struggle, for institutional struggle has now become more based on cooperation and negotiation between parties, but less oppositional, whereas it is legal struggle and street struggle through which oppositional actions are used.

In this sub-category of the urban movements of the deprived, certain variations emerge among the adherents. One important reason for this is that movements under this category are area-based, and thus encompass the residents with different priorities and anticipations and at times tensions and conflicts among themselves. Accordingly, first type of adherents is land or property owners - property being the house or a shop the residents use on their own or have rented to someone else in areas where urban transformation has begun or is going to begin; second is the tenants, and third category are those with no title deeds who are actually under most severe risk in similar areas. The adherents under first type, namely property owners form the core of the movements of the deprived. The tenants are often evacuated from their houses. This situation results in segregation between the property owners and the tenants during the mobilisation (Turkmen, 2011). Moreover, as argued by Kuyucu and Unsal, the tenure structure may become the most important determinant of the form and the strength of the resistance; as formal property owners, contrary to tenants and those with no property rights, tend to finally agree with the offer of the municipality pursuing their individual interests. There are even reported cases of serious tensions between those who agree with the offer of the municipality and agree to evacuate their houses and those who are not satisfied with the offer. For example in Derbent, 14 activists were taken under custody for death threat against residents who agree with the municipality (Bianet, 2012).

The empirical studies on such movements of the deprived in Istanbul that are here categorised under this first sub-category, as well as evaluations of external actors during preliminary interviews on these movements, emphasize their property-based nature. This emphasis has also some theoretical foundations, for it reminds the new bargaining mechanisms Mayer (1994) has long been discussing as regards to the movements of post-1990s. First of all, certain empirical studies read the concern of these neighbourhoods on what they are offered in return for their property and for redevelopment, as an appetite for personal gain (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010) and their further way of communication with the local state for this purpose as the watering down of citizenship into a bargaining process (Aksoy, 2012). Moreover, Kuyucu and Unsal (2010) show in their study on Başbüyük and Tarlabası cases in Istanbul, this appetite for personal gain weakens the movements by turning them into a bargaining process as mentioned above and resulting in more residents agreeing with the offer of the municipality. Claiming 'right to the city' on the other hand is argued to remain as a discourse, rather than a motivation factor behind concrete actions. It is even perceived as a romantic slogan within the movements whose target is their own neighbourhood, rather than the whole city (Turkmen, 2011).

Table 2: Characteristics of the Urban Movements of the Deprived

Movement	Fields of Conflict	Actors Involved	Type of Right Defended	Action Type	Type of Project and Examples
MOVEMENTS OF THE DEPRIVED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Violation of housing rights</li> <li>- insufficient compensation of existing property rights</li> <li>- preservation of property</li> <li>- displacement</li> <li>- exclusion from decision making</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- neighbourhood organisations</li> <li>- residents</li> <li>- external actors: academics, students, professionals and their organisations like chambers of planners / architects</li> <li>- platforms of different actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- right to housing</li> <li>- collective rights</li> <li>- right to land rent</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- negotiation and bargaining</li> <li>- opposition</li> </ul>	Urban Renewal in lower income residential areas I (Gülsuyu-Gülensu, Başbüyük, Derbent, Ayazma, etc.)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Violation of housing rights</li> <li>- insufficient compensation of existing property rights</li> <li>- preservation of property</li> <li>- displacement</li> <li>- loss of quality of space</li> <li>- exclusion from decision making</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- neighbourhood organisations</li> <li>- residents</li> <li>- academics, students, professionals and their organisations like chambers of planners / architects</li> <li>- platforms of different actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- right to housing</li> <li>- collective rights</li> <li>- right to land rent</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- negotiation and bargaining</li> <li>- opposition</li> </ul>	Urban Renewal in sites or neighbourhoods of degradation in basically inner-city areas (Tarlabaşı, Sulukule, Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray).

Thus, it has generally been argued that mobilisations of these movements which began collectively finally evolve into a more individual interest-based one, which manifests itself in their struggle for benefiting from the value increase in urban land and property generated through neoliberal urban transformation projects. A city-wide urban movement actor, confirms this feature of the movements and expresses her discomfort with this trend:

“In time, after the bargaining starts, those with the title deeds get their share using the power of this resistance, then they say ‘good bye’ and the resistance erodes. This is then no more right to housing. This process saddens us most. Are we standing by the people for their right to housing, or so that they obtain three in return for one? This should be further discussed”. (I2)

*Second sub-category* is movements that mobilise against urban renewal in mixed-use areas having historical and cultural values. These are generally inner-city areas such as Sulukule, Tarlabası and Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray, where rents and demand for extra land have raised too high parallel to the neoliberal urban development policies. They are generally surrounded by more prestigious areas specialised in business, touristic and commercial facilities. These movements are highly similar to the first sub-category discussed previously, and they go through very similar processes. However, as these movements mobilise in areas with cultural diversity and historical buildings, collective interests against the loss of quality of space as well as cultural and historical values gain importance. Thus, the movements under this sub-category defend also use value against exchange value, though to a lesser extent. Moreover, the projects contested by these movements attract more attention from the urban ‘elites’ such as academicians, politicians, NGOs and the media as argued by Erder (2009). In parallel, the above mentioned external actors become the internal actors of these movements making them relatively more effective in general. For example in Sulukule Platform or Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray Association (FEBAYDER), many external actors together with residents of the area in street struggle and legal struggle, right reports, make interviews with the media as a part of the movement. There are also channels for alternative planning, though in a weak form. ‘Illimitable Autonomous Planers’ initiative is an example for this, who has prepared an alternative plan for Sulukule, in ‘Sulukule workshop’ in cooperation the community (Sulukule Blogspot, 2008). This also helps them to gain even more media and public attention and support. However, they are still regarded as individual property based mobilisations, since they finally go through the above mentioned bargaining process as in the first sub-category. In other words, they are similar to first sub-category in all aspects other than the more active involvement of the external actors resulting in more public attraction.

In sum, these movements are characterised in the relevant literature as interest-based, and develop around individual property motives and effects of the projects on the exchange value of their land or property. The lack of interest of the leftist politics in urban contradictions is also argued to have an important contribution in this. Finally, a selfish desire for the satisfaction of material/ economic demands is argued to soon become their priority, leading into their dissolution. This situation prevents the different movements in each neighbourhood from uniting under a political identity and showed a fragmented character which weakened the opposition. As the opposition is primarily property based, the

system somehow convinces the actors to negotiate and finally agree on a solution it proposes. The existing case studies, though limited in size, confirm this. But, are movements of the deprived individual property-based as a rule, or are there still movements whose priority is collective rights to housing? Do movements never try to overcome these individualistic behaviours? Is it not possible to make a more positive, less ego-centric account of the urban movements of the deprived? That is to say, this stress on interest-based behaviour has been a source of curiosity for the thesis.

#### **4.3. The Interrelatedness of Two Types of Movements**

Although urban movements of the discontented and the deprived deal with basically different issues, they have relations with each other. Firstly, certain actors of the movements of the discontented work with urban movements of the deprived as external actors on voluntary basis. Secondly, they come together and collaborate within city-wide, nation-wide or international initiatives. Therefore, there is an organic relation in between, which is the main focus of this section.

As regards to the first type of relation between the two movements, the external actors mentioned in the previous paragraph are; professional organisations, mainly Chambers of City Planners and Chamber of Architects, are the leading ones, together with academics, professionals and students. They have basically three broad roles in the movements of the deprived, as elaborated in the field research:

- Awareness raising on the need for an organised struggle
- Direct or indirect consciousness raising on city-wide issues and residents' right to the city
- Technical and legal information support (reliable information and translating the planning provisions into a non-technical language)

This way of allying relation between the two movements in fact forges a potential to eliminate the fragmentation in the movement terrain, since it really intertwines the two disparate movements. However, this point will be elaborated within the findings of the case study, since it is more understandable and convincing when discussed on the basis of an actual relation between urban movements of the deprived and the external actors.

Second type of relation is realised through city-wide initiatives. One example of such initiatives is 'Istanbul Neighbourhood Associations Platform', bringing together approximately 17-18 neighbourhood associations all over Istanbul together with actors of the movements of the discontented. The first seeds of this initiative were hand planted on the occasion of a symposium of Chamber of City Planners Ankara Branch on urban transformation held in Ankara in December, 2006. The representatives of seven neighbourhood associations in Istanbul (Gülsuyu-Gülensu, Sulukule, Karanfilköy, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Baltalimanı, Armutlu, Yakacık Hürriyet, and Derbent), who were facing or

was going to face urban transformation soon, came together in the Chambers of City Planners in Istanbul, to work on a paper to be presented in this symposium.

The paper submitted in the symposium, explaining the participative planning experience of Gülsuyu-Gülensu finally argued that the planning institution should have the responsibility of the urbanisation practice of Turkey and that they, as the neighbourhoods, would act together from then on. This was the kick-off event for the Platform. Later the Platform integrated more neighbourhood associations. They occasionally came together to discuss their problems and share ideas with each other and with the external actors. Until 2008, they organised each meeting in another neighbourhood to see their problems closer. They also came together with neighbourhood representatives in different cities. Chamber of City Planners organised site visits to gecekondu neighbourhoods in Ankara and Izmir, facing urban transformation. By this way, the Platform members had the opportunity to see different experiences facing similar problems, examples being Dikmen Vadisi and Mamak in Ankara; Buca, Kuruçeşme, Kadifeköy in Izmir. The share of experiences would help each neighbourhood in their own mobilisations against urban transformation projects. A city-wide and local activist who participated in these visits said:

The most important experience I have gained during these visits was that each transformation area has a structure of its own. We cannot build on an organisation as Bureaux of Housing Right<sup>10</sup> in Istanbul as in Ankara. They tried this in Sarıyer (Istanbul), but it did not work (I3).

At the same time, different city-wide initiatives joined the Platform, such as The Urbanism Movement of the Society (Toplumun Şehircilik Hareketi), Housing Right Coordination, and the Association of Human Settlements. The Platform members usually made press statements on issues about urban transformation. For example, they made in Saraçhane a press statement following Erdoğan Bayraktar's statements, President of HDA at that time, accusing those who are against urban transformation of committing crime.

This platform had unfortunately a limited level of effectiveness, since no or rarely practical results were achieved for the neighbourhoods. It lasted until 2010, and evolved into a continuous forum dealing with not only urban transformation in gecekondu neighbourhoods, but transformation in general in whole city. This forum was formally established on the occasion of 'Urban Movements Forum' held on 26-27 June 2010, in the premises of Chamber of Architects Karaköy Branch in Istanbul. A large number of activists participated in this event, from different movements of neighbourhoods of Istanbul and other cities,

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<sup>10</sup> Housing Right Bureaux (*Barınma Hakkı Büroları*) were established by the residents of the neighbourhood named Dikmen Valley in Ankara, who resisted against the urban transformation project of the Metropolitan Municipality, with the support of Halkevleri (People's Houses). People's Houses on the other hand are a national left-wing association established as an 'education, enlightenment, art and culture organisation' as stated in their web-site, organised all over the country with its branches. Halkevleri was closed in 1951 under the rule of the right-wing conservative Democrat Party and re-established in 1963 under the rule of social democratic Republican People's Party. Its branches support the deprived sections of the society in their struggles on different issues, including right to housing.

along with the actors of the movements of the discontented; city planners, architects, lawyers, social scientists, and students. I also attended in this Forum whose basic issue was the nature of urban movements of Istanbul in general. The core question was whether what has been done by the movements was a legal or a street struggle, highly specific though for a first-time event. From the point of view of the members of the Forum, it was clear that the struggle of the urban movements was generally regarded as in the form of either legal struggle or street struggle. Some people did not want to engage in legal struggle, whereas some saw these two types as intertwined, since changes in the urban form and resistances against them, like in Sulukule, inevitably had a legal dimension. Moreover, the latter believed that a successful urban movement would in the end effect the legal provisions. Some members even argued that urban movements had to have a legal commission. In addition to this discussion of legal struggle vs. street struggle, certain other issues were also debated during the forum, as provided below:

- Right to housing as a core issue for urban movements in Istanbul,
- Need for alliances with other movements, in a national and international context,
- The planner's/architect's role in the urban movements,
- Common grassroots actions vs. individual efforts.

In this respect, certain principles were tried to be established. It was highly emphasised that every citizen has a right to sufficient housing and this was the core demand of urban movements. What urban movements did, as they argued in course of the forum, was actually nothing but demanding the urban space back from the state. Moreover, for stronger movements, there was certainly need for alliance both with other movements/struggles in the city and international ones and the actors had to search for these alliances. Furthermore, again for stronger movements, common grassroots actions should be given priority over individual efforts. Some were in the view that Istanbul was lost, due to urban transformation projects implemented at the expense of the residents and social and spatial structure in the project areas, such as Sulukule, whose residents, with a high percentage of Roma people, had to leave the neighbourhood and move to Taşoluk, a peripheral location in the city.

Unlike certain initiatives like Solidarity Workshop<sup>11</sup>, this Forum has been organising joint meetings until today with participants from both urban movements of the deprived and the discontented, since the above mentioned kick-off meeting was held. In these meetings, similar issues are taken up, according to the minutes shared through the e-mail group which I am also a member of. Moreover, at times certain meetings are devoted to a neighbourhood which is under an acute risk of demolition. The meetings are organised regularly, usually once in a week, with the participation of those who were available at that day. Apart from these meetings, the Forum continued their discussions and shared information through their above-mentioned e-mail group. However, in this e-mail group, unlike in the meetings, non-

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<sup>11</sup> A civil initiative of mainly planners, architects and lawyers which work preliminary with the low-income neighbourhoods facing urban transformation.

urban issues, in other words issues with no spatial dimension are also taken up, as long as they are considered as against neoliberal policies. One outstanding example for non-urban issues in the sense adapted in the thesis is bringing up the conditions of illegal immigrants in Istanbul and criticisms to relevant authorities. In addition, though this e-mail group, certain movement leaders get access to and visit different neighbourhoods and tell them how they have organised their struggle and help them get organised. For example, Tozkoparan is a neighbourhood where there have long been social housing units, which are planned to be demolished within the framework of an urban transformation project. The leader of the Tozkoparan movement (I4), visited different neighbourhoods in Istanbul, to hold meetings with their opinion leaders and talked about how they were organised and what problems they have been facing. For example, according to I3, who is also a forum member, I4 has contributed a lot in the organisation process in the Kanarya neighbourhood of Istanbul. Besides, some neighbourhoods which are declared as urban renewal areas are approaching the forum and asking for support, mainly on how to get organised as well as on legal and technical issues. Leader of the Tozkoparan movement further explains how they have worked with the one of the neighbourhoods where urban transformation is foreseen: “To make Tokludedede more visible, we brought in the press and Members of the Parliament. We directed the lawyers there” (I4).

In addition to that, according to I4, none of the forum members, as well as other external actors, in principle get involved in the neighbourhoods by themselves, but take action once the neighbourhoods demanded for support. In other words, they do not directly go to a neighbourhood and try to mobilise them against an urban transformation project.

By using the e-mail group, the Forum also organized signature campaigns and sought for support, nationally and at times internationally. There is a wide range of signature campaigns that have been organised such as those demanding the prohibition of usage of pepper gas or those focusing on laws, such as the signature campaign demanding an urgent finalisation of the application of the Republican People’s Party to Constitutional Court for the rescindment of the Law no 6308 on the Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risk that is discussed more in detail in the following section. Another signature campaign demanded the vetoing by Abdullah Gül, President of Turkish Republic, of the Law which foresees the waiving of the requirement for Environmental Impact Analysis Reports for projects which were taken in public investment programme before 1997 and started to operate, and etc. Both during the meetings and in e-mail group discussions, international examples of urban movements are also shared, focusing on evictions and campaigns against evictions all over the world. Moreover, international support is sought for the signature campaigns organised for both neighbourhoods and public spaces in Istanbul.

Another important event that took place in Istanbul is the 6<sup>th</sup> European Social Forum held on 1-4 July 2010, during which parallel workshops were organised, two of which were on urban issues, which I also attended. During these workshops, bringing together not only the different movements Istanbul, but from all around the world, similar issues for neighbourhoods under the risk of demolition and eviction were in the agenda, as in the abovementioned Urban Movements Forum. But, more general issues such as democratisation of the police forces and fight against privatisation, as well as more specific

ones such as preservation of the collective memory of the city, diversity in the urban neighbourhoods and fight against gentrification, were also among the themes that were discussed. These workshops were also more oriented towards development of solutions or new strategies in urban struggles, such as co-operation with trade unions, squatting of places symbolising the international capital, building barricades, using performative act of walking as a way of protest, fighting in solidarity with international counterparts and etc.

To conclude, these initiatives actually do not bring concrete outcomes neither for urban movements of the deprived nor for the discontented, which would be in fact too optimistic as an expectation. But, they have been useful in bringing together movements of the deprived and the discontented, channelling opportunities for cooperation and thereby strengthening the struggle of each. In fact working together through external actors, mentioned in the beginning as the first type of relation between these two movements, is much more effective. As said before, this issue has been touched upon throughout the case study. It should be emphasized here that such city-wide initiatives can also form the basis of the first type of relation, as they bring together professionals and residents of neighbourhoods that are prone to urban transformation, by which the former began to act like and finally become an external actor for the movement in the neighbourhood. Movements in neighbourhoods with historical and cultural values and assets, mentioned before as the second sub-category of movements of the deprived, usually have this chance without such initiatives for they are by default fall under the areas of interest of the discontented. Outstanding examples are movements in Sulukule, Tarlabası and Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray. Or else, neighbourhoods that were traditionally part of a political struggle, such as Gülsuyu-Gülensu and Derbent, have already been in the same struggle with certain leftist people, among which are professionals, whom they are still in contact with. However, there are neighbourhoods without historical and cultural values nor such a strong political background, such as Tokludedede and Kanarya mentioned above, for which the Forum has been very useful to establish the first type of relation.

What has been put forward up to now is the use of the forum for the movements of the deprived. However, it has also been useful for the movements of the discontented as well. Above all, working with the neighbourhoods, namely with the movements of the deprived, brought in a higher number of participants in their signature campaigns, street demonstrations and press statements. This made them more visible and effective. Besides, working with the neighbourhoods enriches their agendas and contributed in their legitimacy among the urban movements in Istanbul in general. So, working together has been beneficial for both types of movements, though in different aspects.

#### **4.4. A Note on the Development of Urban Movements in Turkey**

Urban movements in Turkey, in the sense that it has been defined in the literature, which can be summarised as an organised opposition process with urban-related goals and demands, have developed mainly after 1990s and accelerated in 2000s, parallel to the intensifying impacts of the neoliberal policies that were started to be implemented after



1980s, as explained before. Until then, notwithstanding certain exceptional cases, there had been no pervasive tensions developing around urban issues due mainly to the toleration by the state of the initially unlawful and popular solution mechanisms citizens –mainly the newcomers to the city from rural areas- themselves found to meet their collective consumption demands and survive in the city.

However, this does not mean there had been no tensions at all that deserve mentioning here. There had been obviously certain tensions and opposition processes arising out of the functioning of these solution mechanisms. In light of these, this section focuses on one of these unlawful and popular solutions – those developed for housing- and intends to draw attention to the reasons why such tensions did not occur until 1990s in Turkey as in the West. Finally, it looks at certain resistances or opposition processes that occurred in this period and needs to be touched upon for the purposes of the thesis. Before elaborating more on this issue, it is necessary to explain what is concretely meant by these unlawful and popular solutions that citizens developed themselves for their survival in the city.

As mentioned in the introduction, the two outstanding examples of such solutions are *gecekondu* and *dolmuş*, the former being developed as a solution for housing problem whereas the latter for the issue of urban transformation. Here I will focus on *gecekondu* phenomenon. In Turkish, the term *gecekondu* literally means “landed/placed at one night”, as given in the beginning of the thesis. There is a huge literature on *gecekondu*, explaining and analysing its causes, evolution, changing physical and social characteristics and final state (for a detailed explanation and analysis see Karpat 1976; Şenyapılı, 1978, 1981, 2004; Tekeli 2007). It is not the aim here to provide a thorough review of the literature on the concept, but the intention is to shortly overview how the *gecekondu* phenomenon evolved, and focuses on the resistances –which are exceptionally organised- that had arisen in *gecekondu* areas. Moreover, in connection with this, an outstanding experience of organised urban opposition and self-management in Turkey will be discussed, through the case of Fatsa, a small town in Black Sea Region of Turkey, in the end of 1970s and beginning of 1980s.

*Gecekondu* is a housing type in Turkey, similar to what has been meant by “squatter houses” in English, constructed from mainly 1940s onwards, in an unlawful and popular fashion and mostly on the land belonging to the treasury, by people coming as a result of rural-urban migration in 1950s, due mainly to mechanisation in agriculture after the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War with the help of US’ Marshall Fund, and also rapid population growth. As capital accumulation was insufficient in Turkey at those times, the state had no opportunity to provide social housing for the newcomers (Tekeli, 2004) and these newcomers could not afford it through the market mechanism. In a word, *gecekondu* can be defined as a solution for housing problem, which was created by rural-urban migration in a country which was in her initial phases of industrialisation. Over the years from 1950s to present, *gecekondu* has been subject to certain transformations. Şenyapılı (2004) puts forward three periods in the transformation of this housing type from 1930 to 1960 in her book on the *gecekondu* development in Ankara. These periods are (1) emergence and proliferation of shanty towns in urban areas inhabited by rural immigrants from 1930 to 1940, (2) emergence and development of *gecekondus* in between 1940-1950 due to acceleration of rural-urban

migration parallel to mechanisation in agriculture, and (3) placement of gecekondu in the system and its addressing in formal documents from 1950 to 1960. Şenyapılı (1998) also emphasized that gecekondu was more than a building type constructed on someone else's land, and accented on its labour dimension in explaining this phenomenon and argued that the population of the gecekondu areas constituted the labour that moves among jobs and sectors in the economic space. This labour dimension has also emphasized by Tekeli (1982), who argued that gecekondu was the solution of the housing problem of the rural migrants, that did not lead to any rise in the in the cost reproduction of labour, namely in wages. Moreover, the construction process of the gecekondu continued not only in market but through mafia-like relations, in which the mafia parcelled the land and sold to the dwellers.




Figure 5: Transformation of Gecekondu from 1950s to Present (Source: [www.mimdap.org](http://www.mimdap.org))

In 1970s, many of the gecekondu areas had been the site of clash between the rightists and the leftists. Gecekondu areas with mostly Alevi population gained a political identity more easily and an alliance of the population in these areas with the leftist groups was formed (Erman, 2011). Tekeli defines this as the replacement of the mafia in the gecekondu areas with radical ideological groups (2004). On the other hand, ultranationalists were dominant in Sunni-conservative gecekondu areas. It is this period certain mobilisations emerged in gecekondu areas, as well as rural areas or small towns, for urban or at least municipal demands, which is an issue discussed below.

From 1980 onwards, the commercialisation process of the gecekondu areas started. In parallel, the gecekondu areas became a market where small businesses, small property ownership and small scale developers dominated, as in the other parts of the city, and thereby these areas were transformed from low-income residential areas to areas where the

poor would be able to settle only as tenants (Erder, 2009). This process was further backed by Amnesty Laws that foresaw rehabilitation through the market mechanism and concomitant Rehabilitation Plans that began to be implemented in that period. Small contractors intervened in the system, taken the land from the gecekondu resident to construct apartments, in return for apartment units given to the residents, rendering the initially unlawful situation to the advantage of the gecekondu population.

To put it in a more conceptual level, two different urban regimes prevailed in the urbanisation process of Turkey from 1950s onwards to present, which are populist and neoliberal urban regimes (Erman, 2011). Throughout the populist urban regime, which continued roughly until 1990s, gecekondu owners were advantageous because they were tolerated by the state to build gecekondus and live in them and later appropriate land rent through the small contractors (Erman, 2011). This type of urbanisation, despite serious problems it created, prevented the emergence of high social tensions in urban areas of Turkey as in Europe (Tekeli, 2004) and constitutes the reason why urban movements did not occur in Turkish cities as in the Western World. In fact, Tekeli (1982), had first taken a broader stance in this argument, including not only urban tensions but social crisis in general, argued that there had not been social crisis in the developing world as in the developed capitalist systems, due to mainly two reasons. First is the provision of employment opportunities by the modern sections for the marginal section –mainly the newcomers to the large cities from the rural areas-, although these opportunities were usually not regular. As another reason he puts forward the rural character of these marginal groups who are open to helping one another in surviving in the city.

All in all, the form of urbanisation in Turkey, allowing *fait accomplis* (*emrivaki*) in Tekeli's words (2004), in a way functioned as buffer mechanism for urban unrest.

On the other hand, a very important period in the history of certain gecekondu neighbourhoods in Turkey, mainly leftist oriented ones, is their high level of mobilisation during 1970s' political insurgency, climbing especially in between 1976-1980, known as 'the clash between the left and the right' in the society, which was ended by a *coup d'état* of 12 September 1980. Overall, these uprisings resulted in thousands of deaths, injuries, militants being put in jail, sentenced to death penalty or assassinated, mostly from the left. In that period, certain leftist groups (Dev-Yol and Dev-Sol in particular) took territorial control in some gecekondu neighbourhoods, where Kurdish and Alevi population concentrated. *People's committees* were established in these neighbourhoods with the support of leftist groups. This project of *people's committees* can be given as exceptional though important mobilisations. Through these committees, certain leftist groups, mainly the members of Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Path, a Marxist-Leninist movement which was active in Turkey in late 1970s) aimed to establish self-managing territories mainly in gecekondu neighbourhoods, villages or towns, where citizens freely discussed their social, and economic problems as well as issues of collective consumption, develop solutions, make decisions and plans to implement them. These issues were various; ranging from health, education, waste disposal, to struggles against mafia and black-marketing. The mechanism to carry out this self-management would be through coming together in these people's committees. This project was experimented in different gecekondu areas, towns or

villages with a leftist political orientation. These places are at times named as “liberated territories” by academics or residents, however the leftist groups engaged in the project, namely the founders of the idea itself, have never accepted such a labelling, arguing that it was a name made up by ultranationalists and the state, as a way of accusing them of establishing territories where the state had no control but anarchy dominated.

An important example where such people’s committees were established was Fatsa, a small town of Ordu, a province in Black Sea Region of Turkey. First, the town was divided into eleven units based on the settlement characteristics and one people’s committees were established in each unit. Each committee had three to seven members, depending on the population of the respective unit. The members were identified by election in which all citizens participated. Anyone among Fatsa’s citizens was able to be a candidate, including the supporters of Justice Party (a rightest conservative political party of the time) (Öngören, 1980). However, ultranationalists who were against the idea of these committees were not allowed. The committees held meetings once in two or three months, with participation of the Mayor and certain municipal staff. One of the issues that was taken up in these committees was maintenance and reparation of the roads in the town. People’s committee in Fatsa decided to deal with that problem first. They came up with a solution in which people of Fatsa, including children and women, would actively work in the reparation work. And the roads were repaired in six days (Öngören, 1980). The committee also carried out “Campaign against Mud”, to clean the streets off mud. They struggled against the black-marketing, making it possible for the citizens to meet their needs (such as fuel, oil, gas etc.) at affordable market prices. As an important point, the decisions of the people’s committees had to be also approved by the Municipal Assembly.

Rest of such people’s committees were established mainly in large cities, such as 1 Mayıs (May Day) neighbourhood in Ümraniye; Gülsuyu-Gülensu neighbourhoods in Maltepe, Okmeydanı in Şişli, all in Istanbul; Tuzlucaýır in Mamak, Ankara and Gültepe in Konak, Izmir (Erman, 2011).

Apart from these people’s committees, leftist young people worked together with many gecekondu neighbourhoods, and help them in construction or provided technical expertise such as drawing of the plans that were necessary for the municipality to provide certain urban services (Erman, 2010). However, these can be regarded as experiences of participative democracy, rather than urban movements, due to their more structured way of functioning through committees, rather than looser processes. Moreover, they had not only a contentious feature, but also a self-management vision, which makes them closer to a participative democracy experience.

#### **4.5. Concluding Remarks**

In contemporary era, two basic types of urban movements can be defined in Istanbul; urban movements of the discontented and urban movements of the deprived. The former type, whose actors are generally academics, students, lawyers, professionals and their

organisations such as professional chambers, and community based organisations and platforms bringing together these different actors, mobilise against urban transformation projects, transportation projects and as well as prestige projects, that concerns the citizens as a whole. In other words, they deal with assets that have no single owner, but is owned by the city as a whole. Thus, their basic claim is ‘right to the city’. Moreover, they constitute one of the rare encounters of the left with urban contradictions. The actors are generally politically at the left and see their urban struggle as a part of a broader political one. There are two other sub-categories within this type; middle or upper-middle income groups who are not content with the redevelopment in their living environments and those who are in favour of redevelopment for their individual interests. However, the last two categories, especially the latter one, are so rare that they can be regarded as exceptions. The urban movements of the deprived on the other hand have two important sub-categories. First are the movements against urban transformation in usually informally built and degraded areas. Second are those in degraded inner-city areas with historical and cultural values. These movements are generally characterised as property based, or in other words, individual interest based around motives of property ownership. They are even criticized for watering down the movement into a bargaining process with the municipality. There are relations between these two types of movements. First, the actors of the movements of the discontented; the academics, professionals and professional chambers act as external actors for this type of movements, supporting them in technical, legal and organisational issues. Secondly, the two types of movements also come together and cooperate under city-wide initiatives, which prove useful for both, though in different aspects. The chapter concludes with a note on the relatively short history of urban movements in Turkey, compared to Europe as a result of a populist urban regime.

The next chapter introduces the aims of the research, the methods used as well as the characteristics of the research field.



## **CHAPTER 5**

### **A DEPRIVED PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT: THE CASE OF GÜLSUYU-GÜLENSU NEIGHBOURHOODS IN ISTANBUL**

#### **5.1. The Aim**

The theory on urban movements has basically focused on four points. First point is on the relation between class struggle and urban movements. The basic argument here is that the determinant role of production-based class relationships over the non-class dimensions of social structure has been challenged. In parallel, urban movements now are not class based as in pre-1980s, whereas non-class factors such as ethnicity, local autonomy, gender and sexual orientation have gained importance (Castells, 1983). The second point focuses on the change in the methods used by certain urban movements. Accordingly, these urban movements are argued to use less antagonistic methods and are engaged more in cooperation and consensus organising. In this respect, they are increasingly more engaged in negotiation and cooperation with the local state. In parallel, it has been claimed that, the more recent movement mobilisations are associated with new bargaining mechanisms. In connection with the second point, the third point emphasizes the fragmentation in the movement terrain in terms of social composition and political orientation, thanks to new forms of urban development and inclusion of different non-governmental actors, incorporating some groups as cooperating partners while radicalising those whose needs are not met by these new arrangements (Mayer, 2000, 2009). To be more precise, on one side of the movement terrain were more cooperative movements which were inserted in the innovative municipal programmes, on the other side were the 'radical' and more autonomous groups. Moreover, as a result of the fragmentation in the movement terrain, a merge between the deprivation and discontentedness as moving forces behind movements have not yet emerged, and argued to be even further diverging (Mayer, 2009; Unger, 2009). As the last point; as opposed to the internal dynamics that have been emphasized in analysing urban movements, external dynamics came to fore, such as structural contingencies, economic and political environment, relation to other movements and political parties as important elements in understanding the movements (Pickvance, 1985, 1986).

On the practical side, there has been a tremendous urban transformation process under neoliberal urban policies in metropolitan cities of Turkey and elsewhere in the world, Istanbul being a prominent example. In response to this process that touches the citizens' lives directly and in a negative way mostly, people mobilise to defend their rights which are

violated by the interventions of this process. In other words, urban transformation projects trigger the urban movements of the neoliberal era. Empirical studies on urban movements at an international scale concentrate on such resistances against these neoliberal urban policy implementations. Moreover, it is argued and often lamented as a fact by the researchers that “the social justice orientations, which used to characterize the goals and practice of such citizens’ initiatives during the 1970s, have been replaced by particularistic interests and/or a defence of privileged conditions” (Mayer, 1999, p.139). There is a similar trend in empirical studies on urban movements of Istanbul, which generally argue that movements are property-based, focusing on personal gains reducing themselves into a bargaining process.

In short, the theoretical literature first defines the transformation of urban movements from class-based structures to incorporation of non-class factors; second, stresses their more cooperationist nature with the local state; third points to the fragmentation in their terrain among radicals and those who are in routinised cooperation with the local state; forth, emphasises the importance of the dynamics external to the movement. More empirical literature on the other hand, stresses their orientation for personal gains rather than collective in the Turkish context. Despite these both theoretical and empirical efforts, the motives behind these mobilisations, the internal and external dynamics shaping them and relations between these dynamics require a more in-depth analysis. Labelling them as ‘not class based’, ‘cooperative’ or ‘property-based’, however correct these definitions might be in their own context, is not a sufficient definition to analyse the contemporary movements, and pose questions challenging such explanations. Even if they might have lost their class-based character in general at least, can we not trace a labour struggle dimension in them, and how can we do this? Are movements always so cooperative, or do they still retain their antagonistic nature? If the movement terrain has become so fragmented, what about the movements themselves? Admitting that external dynamics matter, how are movements affected by these dynamics in reality? How can we position the collective interests in an urban movement of the deprived?

An attempt to answer these questions enables one understand the more complex relationships among actors within an urban movement. The thesis intends to constitute for these loop holes and provide a more insightful analysis of urban movements of the deprived, by an in-depth qualitative analysis of an urban movement with respect to these four aspects.

It is argued here first that, despite what has been put forward by the literature on the non-class characteristics of the movements, in case of squatter settlements which are constructed and further developed by the inhabitants themselves, movements with a strong dimension of a labour struggle may mobilise, linking this struggle to their right to the city claims. Moreover, in connection with this, they are also not devoid of class dimension, but have traces of it, obviously not in classical terms as defined only within the productive sphere. Secondly, movements may be engaged in non-antagonistic relations with the local state provided that the local state has the role of public service delivery, but they do not lose their antagonistic nature facing the local state as a local political actor. Thirdly, as a part of neoliberal urban development, a fragmentation might occur not only in the general movement terrain, but within a movement, namely among those who are willing to cooperate and those refuse to cooperate with the system. Fourthly, movements need to be



engaged in relation with the system and for they usually do not have the necessary resources to do this on their own, they do it together with certain external actors. Thus, the external actors constitute their main encounter with the external dynamics. And this co-working can be a basis for a future merge between the movements of the deprived and the movements of the discontented, since in reality, the latter constitute the external actors for the former. It is finally claimed that movements cannot by nature pursue personal gains, but collective gains. By the time they began to focus on personal gains, or are engaged in non-antagonistic relations with the local state in a routinised way, they are not a movement but increasingly resemble to an interest group. Based on these arguments, the thesis has five interrelated aims based on a case of a deprived people's movement:

- **Right to the City Linked to a Labour Struggle:** It aims to show whether it is possible to define the urban movements as a form of a labour struggle. In this, the movement actor's reasons for mobilisation, their claims and how they discern their right to the city are tried to be investigated.
- **Relations with Local State:** Parallel to the changing relationship between the movement and the local state as a local political actors and an executor of neoliberal urban policies, the prevailing antagonistic relations in between are aimed to be put forward.
- **Fragmentation between and within Movements:** It aims to show whether there is fragmentation not only in the movement terrain but within a movement, in addition to fragmentation in the movement terrain that took place in the West, as argued by Mayer, due to neoliberal urban planning and practice, whose effects on cities are increasingly harsh. Furthermore, it intends to find out what kind of fragmentations are these and what new challenges they bring for the movements.
- **External Actors – External Relations:** The ways of working together with the external actors and the outcomes of this co-working, both for the movements of the deprived and the movement terrain in general, are aimed to be found out. In this, the roles of external actors as well as their motives and means in contributing in the movements of the deprived are explored.
- **Individual interests vs. collective rights:** It aims to show whether urban movements of the contemporary area are individual-interest based, or are they still struggling for collective consumption rights?

The findings of the case study are discussed along these five issues. However, for these aims are closely related to each other, more than one issue may be handled in one chapter, or one section may deal with several issues. Consequently, having these basic aims, the thesis also intends by this way to analyse the new nature of urban movements, how they are organised, what they demands, and what kind of relations they build with each other and other actors, and what conflicts arise in the movement.

## **5.2. Selecting the Case Study Area**

For the case study, Gülsuyu-Gülensu, two adjacent gecekondu neighbourhoods in Asian side of Istanbul are chosen. The rationale behind the selection of this area is above all, the rich history it presents since 1960s-1970s, in terms of mainly political activeness and ethnical diversity. It has a rich history too, also a turbulent one, in terms of building an urban opposition, since 1990s; first by struggles against the demolishment and later in 2000s a more organised mobilisation against urban transformation. Moreover, a wide range of internal actors, from different ethnical and sectarian origins, and external actors actively have taken part in these mobilisations. The people of Gülsuyu-Gülensu very well fit to the definition of the urban poor as individual and collective agents who are capable of mobilizing people, resources and representations in various ways, across varying geographical distances (Jaffe, Klaufus and Colombijn, 2013). All these make Gülsuyu-Gülensu an interesting urban movement to study, in order to attain the aims of the thesis. Lastly, the area is declared to be an urban transformation zone, but the transformation has not yet started. Therefore the movement still has a stake in front. This also shows that their timely reactiveness and alertness.

In the below section, the neighbourhoods are described in detail, in terms of their history; social, political and ethnical structure as well as spatial structure.

### **5.2.1. History of the Area**

Gülsuyu and Gülensu are two adjacent neighbourhoods in Asian side of Istanbul, within the borders of Maltepe Municipality, to the north of E-5 Highway, on hills overlooking Prince Islands. Being regarded as a whole, the neighbourhoods are named shortly as Gülsuyu-Gülensu. Gülsuyu is located at the north of E-5 Highway, the highway drawing its southern border. Gülensu on the other hand is at the north of Gülsuyu.

Gülsuyu is one of the gecekondu areas of Istanbul, which is formed through the informal processes caused by the mass rural to urban migration that took place in Turkey in 1950 and afterwards. The neighbourhood existed before 1950 with the name 'Horozköy'. Immigrants working in the two industrial areas of Istanbul at those times, Kartal and Tuzla, settled in Gülsuyu due to its close vicinity to their workplace. So, the Gülsuyu was developed as a working-class gecekondu neighbourhood.

Later in 1955, it obtained its formal neighbourhood status. In 1960s and 1970s, migration increased and the neighbourhood enlarged through informal relations of citizenry, namely

through *hemşehrilik*<sup>12</sup>, towards the north. The urban facilities like water, electricity and drainage were brought to the neighbourhoods by the organised collective efforts of the residents. In 1970s, first demolition attempts in the neighbourhood took place and the residents prevented these and other attempts by organising a collective struggle and building barricades. In 1989, the southern and northern parts of the neighbourhood were divided in to two neighbourhoods, as Gülsuyu and Gülen su.



Figure 6: View of Gülsuyu-Gülen su from E-5 Highway

A very important period in the history of the neighbourhoods is their high level of mobilisation during 1970s' political insurgency, Gülsuyu-Gülen su were two of the neighbourhoods mentioned before, where *people's committees* were established as mechanisms of self-management, supported by leftists groups. This experience enhanced the culture of solidarity in the neighbourhoods and has been also helpful in their contemporary mobilisation.

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<sup>12</sup> The word *hemşehrilik* first defines a situational relationship between fellow townsmen. In this, it characterizes the situation of one of the two persons in relation to the other, whose base have taken roots in the same geography. Secondly, as a concept, it defines the relationships, ties and various identities that arise out of these ties between people whose hometowns are the same place or who have the feeling of belonging to the same geography. These ties at times function at the level of social identity. In other words, people who do not know each other in person, looking at each other's physical characteristics, way of talking etc. categorise each other with reference to a geographical area and define each other as 'us' with respect to 'they'. At times, the ties among people who have feeling of belonging to the same geographical area, are a subject of personal identity (Kurtoglu, 2005).

### 5.2.2. Social, Political and Ethical Characteristics of the Area

The population of Gülsuyu-Gülensu is 16.422 and 16.555 respectively, adding up to 32.977 in total according Turkish Statistical Institute 2011 data (Maltepe District Municipality).

Gülsuyu-Gülensu are two neighbourhoods where lower and lower-middle income groups live. Currently, residents of Gülsuyu-Gülensu have generally no more property other than their houses. There is a general content and happiness about living in the neighbourhoods. However, the on-going urban transformation in the city, including these two neighbourhoods, has caused a decrease in the level of content about the city. In this respect, urban transformation is seen as the main problem of the city.

The neighbourhoods can be described as politically homogenous, but ethnically heterogeneous. They have long been defined themselves at left, or even radical left and therefore have had serious experiences in terms of claiming rights on social and political issues, which would later become a supportive feature in their organising and struggling against the attempts to change the environment. When asked about their expectations from the city, the answer of the President of Gülsuyu-Gülensu Beautification and Solidarity Association (GÜLDAM) (I5) was: “A city where there is respect for labour”.

There is a strong culture of solidarity in the neighbourhoods for a combination of mainly two reasons. Firstly, there is a strong left-wing political stance in the neighbourhoods they were mobilised in 1970s’ political insurgency at a very high level and lived through the experience of people’s committees, which is explained in the previous section. Secondly, as in most of the gecekondü neighbourhoods, people had left their villages in a hopeless state for Istanbul with new hopes. They found the places and build their houses with their own resources, through *hemşehrilik* relations. And thereby the houses they built have been their sole source of security. In addition, they witnessed and at times helped each other settle in the area. They built the roads, and brought water, electricity and sanitary facilities working altogether. They stood together against demolishment forces. More recently they struggled against plans they saw as a threat for their neighbourhoods. All these made them strongly connected to the community, both spatially and socially. Besides, in Gülsuyu-Gülensu, people maintain their collective memory today as well, though a street culture and gathering in teahouses for men and through gathering in each other’s gardens or houses in case of women. All these also contributed in the formation of a community consciousness, regardless of people’s ethnic and sectarian background. It should also be added that these two reasons behind the strong culture of solidarity are intertwined each other. The experience of people’s committees in 1970s provides them with a strong background, reinforcing their present collective actions. For this reason, this strong level of solidarity should not be taken for granted for any gecekondü neighbourhood in Turkey. On the contrary, some neighbourhoods, for example in Izmir, are even known for the lack of solidarity among residents (Tekeli, 1982) due mainly to ethnical diversity and absence of a strong collective memory as in Gülsuyu-Gülensu.

The leftist stance and activism still persist in Gülsuyu-Gülensu, obviously not as active as in 1970s. As a result, there have always been strong radical leftist groups in the field, 'Partizan' being the most powerful one. In this respect, the Gülsuyu-Gülensu has a traditionally strong leftist political stance and activism. The political parties organised in the neighbourhoods are Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP), Freedom and Democracy Party (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi partisi - ÖDP), Labour Party (Emek Partisi - EMEP), Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi - TKP), and Socialist Party of the Oppressed (Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Partisi - ESP). The high share of Kurdish Alevi population is also a reason behind this, for Kurdish Alevis in Turkey are traditionally left-wing oriented. Furthermore, people from the neighbourhood apply to these political groups when they face a problem with the police, according to what locals say. There are moreover members of illegal groups, such as DHKP-C. According to a resident (I13), there are representatives of all leftist groups in these neighbourhoods.

In line with this, the neighbourhoods have always been sensitive towards and reacted against nation-wide social and political issues, from workers' rights to massacres. For example, in the nationally well-known Alevi uprisings in Gazi Neighbourhood in Istanbul upon the armed attacks by unknown people, the neighbourhoods demonstrated against and attempted to block E-5 Highway to traffic, stating that the police forces were late in intervening. They also marched to extend their support for the strike and demonstrations of workers of Tobacco, Tobacco Products, Salt and Alcohol Enterprises Joint Stock Company (TEKEL) that started in December 2009, which outspreaded to whole country. In the same manner, they organised protests and commemoration demonstrations for Maraş Massacre<sup>13</sup>, Sivas Massacre<sup>14</sup>, tensions in Malatya between Alevis and Sunnis<sup>15</sup>.

A high percentage of the ordinary residents vote for CHP, as a local indicates: "Perhaps here is the place in Turkey where CHP gets the highest rate of votes" (18). Another one, President of Pir Sultan Abdal Association Maltepe Branch adds, smiling: "TKP has 700 votes. Here people like the revolutionists, but vote for CHP" (P11).

There is only one part, which is in southern Gülsuyu, close to E-5 Highway, named "Fatma Hanım", whose residents are mostly right-wing conservatives, who vote for Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP). This part is economically better-off compared to the rest of the neighbourhoods, as stated by the locals and the number of cars show, 4-5 storey legally constructed apartments, and the general liveliness of the commercial life show. In this part of Gülsuyu, there are supermarkets, cafes, restaurants, internet cafes, hairdressers etc. as in a small commercial centre of a Turkish neighbourhood.

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<sup>13</sup> Maraş Katliamı- Mass Murder Attempt to Alevi Citizens in South-eastern city of Turkey, Kahramanmaraş, that led to the death of more than 100 Alevis.

<sup>14</sup> Sivas Katliamı- events of July 2, 1993 in the Central Anatolian city of Sivas, that resulted in the killing of 37 intellectuals, mostly Alevis.

<sup>15</sup> An Alevi family told the drummer to stop playing, since he was disturbing, during the Ramadan 2012.

Residents are mainly workers or retired workers. They generally migrated from Central Anatolia (Sivas, Çorum), Eastern Anatolia (mainly Tunceli, Erzincan, Erzurum) and Blacksea Region (mainly Samsun, Sinop, Trabzon, Giresun, Bayburt), between years 1950 and 1980. The population is a mixture of Kurds, Turks, Alevis and Sunnites, Kurdish Alevis being dominant in Gülsuyu-Gülensu. Some of them migrated to the area in 1990s, in the course of ‘forced migration’<sup>16</sup>.

Moreover, the residents are proud of the culture of solidarity in their neighbourhoods, high level of organising capacity and the gains acquired by the movement. The ex-President of Gülsuyu-Gülensu Beautification Association (GGBA) expresses proudly: “there is no one in Istanbul and Turkey who has not heard of Gülsuyu-Gülensu, in terms of its political view and social structure” (I6). They are also self-confident in face of the urban transformation: “We are together here as experienced people. We have overcome different urban transformation attempts” (I7). Movement actors emphasize their organising capacity:

Gülsuyu-Gülensu has its label on it. The other side (municipality) is well aware of that... If a rumour pops out now, if certain vitality occurs in the media regarding Gülsuyu-Gülensu, we are able to come together very soon. Here we see ourselves as lucky, for we are in such a neighbourhood. (I5).

Gülsuyu-Gülensu are neighbourhoods which made the mostly timely and best intervention against urban transformation. We were neighbourhoods whose solidarity and neighbourly relations are more powerful than any other neighbourhoods. .. There has developed a consciousness of being from these neighbourhoods. In that respect Gülsuyu-Gülensu is a very lucky one. Of course we should not exaggerate but we have the power to organise Istanbul Neighbourhood Associations Platform, urban movement forum, and associations at the Anatolian side. (I3).

Despite this positive self-perception in terms of its solidarity culture and successful experiences, and consequent self-confidence, the same optimism is not valid for the future of the neighbourhoods unless a transformation takes place. They believe the neighbourhoods are increasingly becoming a run-down area, with a decreasing population. A local activist expresses his concerns as follows: “In 2004, when we first started, our population was around 60.000-70.000. Now Gülsuyu and Gülensu are each 16.000. We are losing blood. Our children do not want to live here anymore” (I5).

Moreover, ethnical diversity is high in the neighbourhoods as mentioned in chapter 5. There is a high proportion of the population is of Kurdish origin, who came to the area in 1990s through the forced migration. Again, Alevis have an important share in the population. This diversity has never been harmful against the solidarity, due to their unifying political stance. Ethnical diversity is not always so harmless. For example, İmariye is a neighbourhood in

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<sup>16</sup> In 1990s, hundreds of thousand people of Kurdish origin in Eastern and South Eastern Turkey were forced by the state to migrate to the west, due to the growing tension between Turkish army and the Kurdish separatists)

Kadifeköy, İzmir, where Turks and Kurds who came through the forced migration live together. As an urban transformation project was implemented in this neighbourhood by HDA, no serious resistance took place and one of the reasons for this was argued to be the lack of solidarity among the Kurdish and Turkish residents (Demirtaş-Milz, 2013).

So, it can be argued as an important feature of Gülsuyu-Gülensu that the residents are bound to each other based more on political lines, than the ethnical ones, or at least, the former is prioritised over the latter. A local activist's words (I2) on the above mentioned protests also show this clearly: "What is interesting here is, many of the protesters are Sunnis". He continues: "We have never had tensions between Sunnis and Alevis or Turks and Kurds. On the contrary, there is a consciousness of being from the neighbourhood. In this respect, Gülsuyu-Gülensu is very lucky". (I6).

Another local emphasized voluntarily, without being asked: "We have very deep friendships here. It does not matter to us, which culture, religion or ethnicity you have". (I5).

The Sunnis are generally members of hometown associations, which are usually not political. However, as one of the activists interviewed, I7 puts forward, there are also many leftists among these Sunnis. Another local puts urban transformation as having a role in this absence of separation along ethnical lines:

This thing (urban transformation) made us forget our being Sunni or Alevi, Turkish or Kurdish. I always repeat Erdoğan's (I3) words. If there is mud on a road, the mud does not care whether you are Alevi or Sunni. It messes with all of us. With this consciousness, when we were protesting the happenings in Malatya, 2000 of the 5000 protesters were Sunnis. If the same things happened to a Sunni, the same reaction would be given. It does not matter what religion, language, gender you have here. (I5).

As a final point, there are also religious sects in the neighbourhoods, who constitute a minority and do not participate in any mobilisation, including the urban related ones.

### **5.2.3. Spatial Characteristics of the Area**

Covering an area of 144 hectares in total, Gülsuyu-Gülensu neighbourhoods are defined as residential areas in 1/100.000 Environment Plan, dated 15.06.2009, as shown in Figure 8. The neighbourhoods are in a highly accessible location in the city, with their close vicinity to important transportation axes and facilities; E-5 Highway to the south, Trans-European Motorway (TEM) to the north, the newly constructed metro line connecting two districts of the Anatolian side of the city, Kartal to the east and Kadıköy to the west at Bosphorus, and Sabiha Gökçen International Airport. All these features, along with its being among the few earthquake-safe areas of Istanbul, make the area highly attractive for urban transformation.



Figure 7: View of Prince Islands from Gülsu – 1



Figure 8: View of Prince Islands from Gülsu - 2





Figure 9: View from Gülsuyu-Gülensu towards South



Figure 10: Location of Gülsuyu-Gülensu in Istanbul (Source: Maltepe Municipality, 2012)




Figure 11: Istanbul 1/100.000 Environmental Plan (Source: Maltepe Municipality, 2012)



Figure 12: A Street in Güleusu

The parcels in the neighbourhood are very small and certain streets are too narrow for car access. Moreover, there are *cul de sacs* in certain parts of the neighbourhoods, particularly in Gülsuyu.

An important and interesting feature of the neighbourhoods in terms of land use is the existence of tea houses almost on every street. These tea houses are used as gathering spaces by working men, after work hours.

In terms of property structure, in total, %29,6 of the area is the property of Maltepe District Municipality, whereas the %65,9 is private property. In terms of property ownership, the field has residents who are property owners with title deeds, rightful owners who have documents proving that they have ownership rights (bank documents, etc.) or those who have no property rights at all. The latter is found mostly in Gülsuyu neighbourhood. There are clear differences between Gülsuyu and Gülsuyu in terms of property structure. In Gülsuyu, title deed ownership is higher with a ratio of %80-90, while it reduces to %30-40 in Gülsuyu. Those with no property rights at all mainly lie in below mentioned problematic areas.

There are three problem areas in the neighbourhoods in terms of property ownership where households with no title deeds live: (1) river basin, (2) area belonging to an Armenian citizen, (3) forest area belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

Although additional stories were began to be constructed in 1980s on existing one or two storey houses, as in almost all gecekondu areas of Turkey, the one or two storey houses are still dominant, especially in Gülsuyu.

#### **5.2.4. Planning Process in the Area**

Gülsuyu-Gülsuyu had its first plan in 1986 and the second one in 1989, the Improvement Plans, after the second law on squatter houses was passed in 1984, law no: 2981, the first one being the law No: 775 of 1966. Law No: 2981 laid the grounds for both legalisation and rehabilitation of such areas. The trend of legalisation of illegally built settlements existed in Southern European countries too (Leontidou, 2006). However in the Turkish case, it was accompanied by infrastructure provision, as the word 'rehabilitation' indicates, whereas in Southern Europe it was realised without the provision of infrastructure (Leontidou, 2006).

There were two areas in the neighbourhoods that were not included in the Improvement Plan. These are the two of the problem areas mentioned before, the private property at the northwest, and the forest area at the northeast.



## Gülsuyu – Gülenso Neighbourhoods




Figure 13: Existing Structure of Gülsuyu-Gülenso Neighbourhoods




Figure 14: 27.10.1986 - 03.03.1989 Gülsuyu Improvement Plan (Source: Maltepe Municipality, 2012)

The Improvement Plan was in power for the neighbourhoods until 2004, when the first 1/5000 Master Plan was drafted. The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality drafted the Master Plan for the area including the Gülsuyu - Güleusu in 2004, which was called “Master Plan of North of E-5 Highway” (E-5 Kuzeyi Nazım İmar Planı), scaled 1/5000 and dated 14.07.2004, as Figure 15 shows. This plan was foreseeing a large amount of land as allocated to social services, such as areas for social and cultural activities, health services, sports, schools, religious facilities and etc. As this would lead to demolition and eviction of the residents, the residents sued the plan and won the case. As a response, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) cancelled the plan.






Figure 15: Master Plan of North of E-5 Highway, 14.07.2004 (Source: Maltepe Municipality, 2012)

	Boundary of the Planning Area		
	Boundary of the Urban Transformation Area		
	K1 Residential Area		Administrative Facility
	K2 Residential Area		Religious Facility
	K3 Residential Area		Park Area
	K4 Residential Area		Sport Area
	K5 Residential Area		Fair Area
			Cemetery
	Commercial Area		Passive Green Area
	Commercial + Residential Area		Stream Protection Zone
	Small Industry Zone		Energy Transfer Line
			Military Area
	Basic Education Area		Forest Area
	Secondary Education Area		Area to be Forested
	Private Secondary Education Area		Area of Istanbul Water and Sewage Administration
	Vocational High School Area		Municipal Service Area
	Area for Health Services		Urban Service Area
	Area for Social and Cultural Facilities		

Figure 16: Legend of Master Plan of North of E-5 Highway

A year after the cancellation of the first 1/5000 Master Plan, IMM came up with a new Master Plan, Master Plan of North of E-5 Highway, scaled 1/5000 and dated 16.04.2005. The new 1/5000 Master Plan came into power envisaging urban transformation in the neighbourhood, by declaring ‘urban renewal’ in the area, with a gross density of 250 person/ha, and %40 of social areas. Moreover, the Plan had a planning note:




Figure 17: Master Plan of E-5 Highway, 2005 (Source: Maltepe Municipality, 2012)



Urban Renewal Projects will be prepared by the District Municipality, in accordance with the 1/5000 Master Plan and 1/1000 Implementation Plan and in coordination with the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, by discussing with the related parties (universities, headmen, professional chambers and other related institutions), in a participative way. In the project, besides upgrading the life standards, protection of the user profile (maintaining the social and economic conditions to encourage the residents of the area to live in the same area after the implementation of the plan) will be taken as a base.

In the following eight years, the new 1/5000 Master Plan remained in rule, but no 1/1000 Implementation Plan was prepared. In December 2012, Maltepe District Municipality finally initiated a consultation with the residents for the 1/1000 Implementation Plan, on the basis the abovementioned planning note. The consultation has not been concluded as of July 2013.

Table 3: Stages of the Field Research

<b>ACTIVITY</b>		<b>DATE/PERIOD</b>
<b>1<sup>st</sup> STAGE: Getting Acquainted with the Urban Movements of the Deprived</b>		
<b>1.a.</b> Participation in events	- Urban Movements Forum, Istanbul	<b>26-27 June, 2010</b>
	- 6 <sup>th</sup> European Social Forum, two workshops on urban movements, Istanbul	<b>1-4 July 2010</b>
	- Housing Rights Congress, Ankara (national)	<b>11 December 2011</b>
<b>1.b.</b> Preliminary interview with Secretary General of Chamber of Architects Istanbul Karaköy Branch on urban movements in Istanbul		<b>11 December 2010</b>
<b>1.c.</b> Urban Movements Forum e-mail group membership and following e-mails (events, activities, discussions, meeting minutes, etc.).		Regular: <b>July 2010 – March 2012</b> Irregular: <b>March 2012- August 2013</b>
<b>1.d.</b> Reading reports, publications, interviews, and news on urban transformation in Turkey, Istanbul in particular		<b>July 2010 – February 2012</b>

Table 3 (continued)

<b>2<sup>nd</sup> STAGE: Getting Acquainted with Gülsuyu – Güleusu</b>		
<b>Selection of the Field: Gülsuyu – Güleusu Neighbourhoods, District of Maltepe, Istanbul</b>		<b>February, 2012</b>
<b>2.a.</b> Reading articles, reports, local publications on the field, other publications on the issue		<b>February – August 2012</b>
<b>2.b.</b> Preliminary interviews	- local activist	<b>31 March 2012,</b> Gülsuyu-Güleusu
	- external actor	<b>23 April 2013</b> Office of the person
	- district municipality representative	<b>24 April 2012</b> Maltepe District Municipality
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> STAGE: Actual Field Research in Gülsuyu-Güleusu</b>		
<b>3.a.</b> 1 <sup>st</sup> round	Seven interviews in total with local activists and external actors	<b>August – September 2012</b> Gülsuyu – Güleusu /office of the person
<b>3.b.</b> 2 <sup>nd</sup> round	Four interviews with local activists and external actors	<b>February – March 2012</b>
<b>3.c.</b> Participation in local meetings and talks with residents	- Neighbourhood working breakfast organised by neighbourhood association	<b>23 December 2012</b>
	- Meeting of external actors and neighbourhood representatives	<b>16 February 2012</b>
<b>3.c.</b> Continuous update on the developments via e-mail and phone		<b>March – August 2013</b>

### 5.3. Stages of the Research and the Methods Used

In designing and applying the case study, the traditional deductive theory-building approach of building hypothesis out of the existing theory and testing it by asking certain questions in a field is not used. Instead of that, Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1970), which basically refers to theory that is developed inductively from data, is taken as the basis of the method, also utilising also the tools of stakeholder analysis for analysing the data collected via qualitative methods. Thus, the field research begins with more general ideas and questions on the issue, without putting forward concrete hypothesis.

The research is organised in three stages, which are (1) getting acquainted with urban movements of the deprived in general and selection of the field, (2) selection of the field, Gülsuyu - Güleusu neighbourhoods in Istanbul and getting acquainted with the field, (3) actual field study in Gülsuyu-Güleusu. These stages and are summarized in Table 3.

In the first stage, certain meetings of urban movements are attended both in Istanbul and Ankara, in order to have an idea on urban movements in general, and urban movements of the deprived in particular. In this respect, three meetings were attended. The first one was a two-day event of activists, residents and professionals from different movements all around Turkey, under the title ‘Urban Movements Forum’, held on 26-27 June 2010 in Istanbul, hosted by Chamber of Architects Istanbul Karaköy Branch. Second is two day-long workshops on urban development and urban opposition organised during 6<sup>th</sup> European Social Forum, held in Istanbul on 1-4 July 2010, in the premises of Istanbul University. Urban activists, students as well researchers all around Europe participated in these workshops. And the third a one is a one-day event with the participation of deprived groups from all around Turkey, mainly from gecekondu areas of Ankara as well as Istanbul under the title ‘Housing Rights Congress’ held on 11<sup>th</sup> of December 2011, hosted by Chamber of Civil Engineers Ankara Branch. In all these events, participative observation method was used, which is argued to be a suitable method for movement studies, for it ‘enables action to be observed as it takes place and thereby avoids reliance on accounts of participants given after the event in response to interviewing’ (Pickvance, 1974, p.32) . In this respect, a passive participation was preferred, through listening to people, conducting informal interviews during breaks, observing people’s behaviours and internal conversations, taking notes, analysing the personal notes and outputs produced within the group. The researcher is aware that participation in three meetings leads to a limited observation; however this was the case due to time restrictions. Moreover, although organised in three events only, the researcher was able to be engaged in participant observation five full-days long. On the occasion of the Urban Movements Forum, an e-mail group was established, of which the researcher also participated. Moreover, soon after its first large kick-off event, this forum began to organise more regular meetings in smaller groups and continued the discussions via e-mails. Via the e-mail group, the meetings organised by the Forum, minutes of their regular meetings usually held once in a week, the discussions of the Forum members via e-mails have been followed regularly, from July 2010, the date of establishment of the e-mail group until March 2013, when the case was finally selected. E-mail group membership and following of the shared information is not a typical method in qualitative research. However, it can be defined as a mixture of participant observation and textual analysis. Thus, this mixture was the second method used in this stage. In addition, an unstructured interview, which is regarded as a natural extension of the participant observation (Patton, 2002) was made with one of the leading actors of urban movements in Istanbul. No questions were prepared in advance, but spontaneity was allowed, as a requirement of unstructured interviews. In the meantime, textual analysis was made through reading reports, interviews with key actors published in journals, and articles as well as watching videos on urban transformation in gecekondu areas broadcasted via you-tube. All in all, the first stage of the research was carried out through participant observation, unstructured interview and textual analysis. This combination of methods has proved to be useful for a qualitative research based on Grounded Theory, since no hypothesis was made beforehand, but important issues were discovered during the this primary data collection phase. In turn, the next stages are designed accordingly.

The second stage begins with the selection of the field for case study. Two adjacent neighbourhoods, Gülsuyu-Gülensu in Maltepe District of Istanbul were selected, which are

described in the previous section. As a continuation of the 1<sup>st</sup> stage, three more unstructured interviews were conducted; with a local activist and a movement leader (I3), with an external actor (I8) and a city planner at the Maltepe District Municipality (I9). By this way, preliminary data, namely data on the basic characteristics of the neighbourhood as well as its social and spatial problems, and the history of the mobilisation is collected. As the interview with I3 was made in Gülsuyu, the first visit to the neighbourhoods was paid in late March, 2012. In the meantime, textual analysis was carried out by reading reports, articles on the field and local publications provided by I3.

3<sup>rd</sup> and final stage of the research, which is the actual field research, has been made through four techniques; semi-structured in-depth interviewing, unstructured interviewing, group-interviewing and participant observation.

Within the 3<sup>rd</sup> stage, interviews were made in two rounds. In the first round, in approximately three weeks from mid-August to early September, seven semi-structured in-depth interviews were made with different actors, who are I3, external actors (I1, I2, I8, I10, I11) and an activist from a different neighbourhood in Istanbul, Tozkoparan (I4). The latter actor works together with different neighbourhoods, including Gülsuyu-Gülensu. In addition, a focus group interview was conducted with the support of an associate. Six locals, who were the members of one of the two neighbourhood association in Gülsuyu-Gülensu, participated in this focus group meeting (I3, I5, I12, I13, I14, I15), which was held in the venue that belongs to the same association. Prior to the meetings, a focus group interview guideline was prepared by the researcher including an opening speech by the researcher, serving of foods and beverages, introductions of the participants and the questions and answers part. This focus group meeting was conducted in a very friendly atmosphere, which helped the researcher build closer contact with the locals. This has also been very helpful later, during the research. The second round, semi-structured in-depth interviews were made with three internal actors and one unstructured interview with an external actor. In the latter, an unstructured method was used, since the purpose was to get data on a specific issue, the recent planning attempt of the District Municipality along with certain technical details, about which there was not much clue beforehand.

Participant observation on the other hand was carried out in two ways. First, certain events organised in Gülsuyu-Gülensu were attended. Earlier of these events is a working breakfast organised by one of the neighbourhood associations that took place in a cafe operated by a hometown association in Gülensu, on 23 December 2012. The participants were local activists, representatives of political parties in the active in neighbourhoods along with external actors. I attended this meeting with an associate. During the course of the breakfast, the speeches made by the participants were listened to in cooperation with the associate, and informal interviews were made by the researcher with five locals and one external actor. The later event was a meeting held jointly by both neighbourhood associations on 16 February 2013, with local activists and external actors, in the common gathering house of the neighbourhoods, owned by the headmanship. In this meeting that took approximately four hours, a passive observation method was used, listening and taking notes simultaneously, and observing the attitudes of the participants. Apart from these meetings, I spent time in the neighbourhoods as long as I was able to. During the time I was there, I

carried on my research by sitting in a local patisserie and watching the locals walking outside, sitting in a park and chatting with the youth, walking and driving in whole of the neighbourhoods for several times, entering in the shops and etc.

Each of the interviews and speeches are recorded and carefully transcribed. In analysing the collected data, the basic tools of stakeholder analysis are utilised. Stakeholder analysis is implemented usually prior to the start of a project, for an organisation basically, but for a region or a locality as well. It is widely used in business administration, but also increasingly more in different types of projects, such as a project aiming at increasing the human resources capacity of a region. Attention should here be drawn to the fact that, the purpose in the thesis is not to conduct a stakeholder analysis *per se*, but to benefit from its tools by adapting them to the purposes of the thesis. In this respect, the following steps can be defined in analysing the data collected:

- Identifying the stakeholders
- Profiling the stakeholders
- Identifying their attitudes and anticipations
- Identifying the relationship in between
- Analysing the relationship

#### **5.4. The Questions as the Basis of In-depth Interviews**

At the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> stage, through preliminary data collection both city-wide and in the field itself, the following questions under certain headings were developed to be used as a basis for the in-depth interviews in 3<sup>rd</sup> stage, namely the actual field research. The questions are developed in parallel to the aims defined in the section 6.1. The actual interview questions are provided in Appendix C.

##### **Organisation of the movements (with a view to relationships between external and internal actors)**

- How are the movements mobilised and organised?
- Who are the actors of the movement, both external and internal and what are the relations in between?
- What are the motives of external actors in supporting movements of the deprived?
- Do the movement need external actor(s) in mobilizing and organising, or do they mobilize by themselves?
- What is the contribution of the external actors to the movement?
- What kind of relationships does the movement build with the state institutions (local government and state agencies)? Does it cooperate with the local state? If yes, how? Are there any conflicts in between? Of yes, what are they?

##### **Relationship between movements and the political stance of the neighbourhoods**

- How does the political activism and leftist stance in the neighbourhoods reflect itself in the movement?

- What are the pros and cons of political activism for the movement?
- Given this leftist stance, can one detect traces of a class struggle in the movement?

**Demands/ rights claimed in the movement**

- What is this movement defending and demanding?
- What are the individual and collective rights claimed?
- What is the basic motivation behind these claims?
- Is there a class dimension they attribute to the source of their motivation?
- What is the effect of property ownership structure in formation of the demands?

**Links with other movements (in the city, in the country, international or global)**

- What are the relationships with other movements? Do they cooperate? How?
- Does this cooperation have a supportive role in the movements' struggle?
- How does the movement perceive itself as against other movements of the deprived in Istanbul?

## CHAPTER 6

### GÜLSUYU-GÜLENSU MOVEMENT: A DECADE OF RISES AND FALLS

The evolution of the Gülsuyu-Güleusu movement, which took almost a decade from 2004 to today, can be explained as an endogenous initial mobilisation and co-acting in case of a threat, namely the threat of a Master Plan that would result in demolition; followed by disengagement after the threat was alleviated along political lines, and finally, remobilisation in case of an opportunity, which was a new plan, bringing in this time the challenge of dealing with the internal conflicts based on property structure, arising among the residents. On the other hand, the most outstanding feature of this movement is, in its current state, its strong insistence on solidarity despite the pressure of individual property-based motives. Furthermore, their somehow obligatory co-working with the external actors, who are the internal actors of the movements of the discontented, make them closer to the latter type and thereby help them attain goals that transcend the well-being of their own neighbourhood.

Castells argue that top-down involvement of political groupings in urban movements is often detrimental to their success, since it clashes with the prevalent ideal of self-management (Castells 1977). According to Nicholls on the other hand (2009, p.80), place-based social networks often strengthen the ties among activist and lead to stronger solidarity; however they also create new cleavages. If one looks at the evolution of the Gülsuyu-Güleusu movement, developments of certain periods confirm this argument. In the case of Gülsuyu-Güleusu movement, where the solidarity was strong thanks to place-based social networks as well as the strong political background, strong political groups began to put pressure on the movement. It created new contradictions among the approach of activists to urban transformation in general, and the participative planning process in particular and finally led to an inactivity and political fragmentation in the movement. On the other hand, ethnical and sectarian diversity of the neighbourhoods did not have a role in this separation, for any conflict that could arise out of this diversity was overshadowed by the strong political stance of the neighbourhoods.

This inactive period had been fortunately temporary. A remobilisation took place when the District Municipality came up with a new plan, giving the opportunity of reconstruction in the area. This remobilisation also reunited the political separations, rendering them no more relevant. However it also gave rise to new conflicts among the residents based on property, in other words in terms of sharing the returns of this opportunity. Moreover, eliminating these conflicts and preserving the solidarity around collective goals became another challenge for the movement, other than the urban transformation itself.

As Mayer has argued, urban movements use increasingly less confrontational methods but are more engaged in cooperation and consensus seeking with the local state (Mayer, 1999, 2009). This is true for Gülsuyu-Gülensu, particularly in its last period of mobilisation, notwithstanding the never vanishing serious conflicts in between. But, it is not doing this alone, but with the support of the facilitating role of the external actors. External actors are, in the last period, not only consultants to the movement, but a bridge for them to the local state. Moreover, these external actors are overall discontented by the neoliberal urban development in the city and therefore are additionally organised as urban movements of the discontented. And this close co-working with the external actors makes the two different types of movements connected. So, the experience of the Gülsuyu-Gülensu shows that, in the neoliberal era, different movement types come closer to each other, although still far from a complete merge. This, in turn empowers the urban movements of the deprived, enabling them to look beyond their neighbourhoods and claim 'right to the city'.

Lastly, as discussed earlier, Mayer (1999) has further argued that movement terrain have become increasingly more heterogeneous and in parallel fragmented. In the neoliberal era, it is not only the movement terrain, but also the movements themselves that may be fragmented, as the political bifurcation in Gülsuyu-Gülensu mentioned above demonstrates. They may also be unstable, as a result of fragmentation, despite the 'homogeneity' in their political stance and co-existence of ethnical and sectarian differences in unity under political umbrella. Neoliberal urban development presents so fearful threats or so attractive opportunities that movements become so volatile to these and therefore develop with ups and downs. However, in case of strong solidarity ties, they still have the chance of becoming a gainful process.

The next section explains and discusses these issues through the case of Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement in three different periods from 2004 to today. This last decade of the neighbourhoods corresponds to a planning process and a mobilisation going in parallel. Thereby, each planning initiative has been the driving force behind mobilisation, perceived by the neighbourhoods. This decade can be grouped into three periods. First is from roughly 2004 to 2007, an vivid planning process and mobilisations against or within it, second is the inactive period from 2007 to end of 2012, and third is the beginning of 2013 until now, again a vivid planning process and mobilisations parallel to it. These periods are explained and analysed in following sections.

### **6.1. First period 2004-2007: An Endogenous Initial Mobilisation and Co-acting in Case of Threat (Threat of Demolishment)**

Year 2004 constitutes a milestone for the neighbourhoods, as it was the year when urban transformation process was introduced in the area. As mentioned in the section on the planning process of the neighbourhoods, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality drafted a new Master Plan, which was called 'Master Plan of North of E-5 Highway' scaled 1/5000. This Master Plan envisaged large green places in the neighbourhoods which would mean destruction and eviction of many of the residents. In parallel, the mobilisations in the



neighbourhood started in 2004, as a response to the new planning decisions embodied in this new draft Master Plan.

The first acquaintance of the neighbourhoods with the 1/5000 Master Plan was through the headmen of the neighbourhoods, when the plan was publicized by the Maltepe District Municipality before it was officially approved. The party in rule of the local government then was AKP. Only about two weeks prior to the expiration of the Plan's publication period which would be succeeded by its approval, thanks to his close personal contacts, the headmen received from the Maltepe District Municipality a telephone call about the draft Plan, which was to bring 'some new things' to their living spaces. After giving a negative reaction without hesitation, the headmen contacted with the Gülsuyu-Gülensu Beautification Association (GGBA) -the neighbourhood association of the time-, along with certain opinion leaders of the neighbourhoods.

When he shared the copy with the GGBA and certain hometown associations, the Association of People From Çorum Karabalçık Village being among the most active hometown associations, they all were able to sense the disadvantageous changes the plan foresaw for their living spaces barely enough to ask for further technical clarification from fellow professionals, who had been part of the neighbourhoods during their old political struggles.

There were certain key professionals that helped the neighbourhoods, which are defined here as external actors. One of them was I11, at that time a city planning student at Mimar Sinan University of Fine Arts. He used to call himself a 'mobile planner', who voluntarily helped poor neighbourhoods by giving technical advice and advice on the need for organising, in case they needed in planning processes. He came to the neighbourhoods, as in other neighbourhoods. He played the role of a contact person with certain other external actors, like academics, other professionals and students. The other key external actor was a civil engineer who mainly helped the resident to read the plan and translate it to the residents. He was familiar with both neighbourhoods since 1970s. He was not a resident, but had close relations with the neighbourhood during the political uprisings of 1970s.

With the support of these external actors, they investigated and deciphered the plan and found out that it envisaged large areas allocated to social services for almost three third of the neighbourhood, including large green spaces, spaces allocated to a huge hospital and a library, and widening of the streets. This would mean the destruction of many of the houses and eviction of the residents.

President of GGBA of the time says:

We did not know anything about any plan, project or map. We had a look at the plan and tried to understand as far as we could. While there were only two libraries within the borders of Istanbul, from Kaynarca to Kadıköy, there were seven places for library for Gülsuyu-Gülensu. Yes, we read book as a community, but not that much! At the places of our roofs, there were places for social services. Our roofs clearly appeared as social places. There were 30.000, 40.000 square meters of social places.

Large school, hospital places. And in doing that, people living here had never been seen. As if it is a vacant space... (I6).

As a first counter action, after themselves having had fully understood the provisions of the plan with the help of professionals, the members of the GGBA, the headmen, and the political organisations in the neighbourhoods set out to disseminate their understanding to the local people as a whole. For this purpose, they again worked with the external actors and held a series of meetings with the locals together with them, in wedding salons, cafes, public spaces and even houses. GGBA had the central role in organizing these meetings. A local (I13) says: “We have perhaps organised around 100 meetings, in everywhere we could gather”.

Here, the civil engineer had a very effective role. Having been familiar with the neighbourhoods for a long time, during the political uprisings of 1970s, he was able to communicate with the residents easily. A local talked about him as follows:

Without getting into the technical details, he translated the plan to the language the residents could understand. He became the consultant of the neighbourhoods. During meetings at coffee shops or houses, Hasan Ağabey (Old Brother Hasan), put the issue into words in a very good way. He was a perfect helper of us. (I3).

By this way, in approximately two weeks, they explained the plan to the local people, discussed with them what to do and maintained a strong support to take action against the Plan. The whole neighbourhoods were informed about the plan and it had caused great concern among the residents in general as the words of a local demonstrate: “Lines were drawn on the areas where our houses were located and shown as green space in the legend. Who can accept that his land is allocated to green space? What is the use of a green place for me, when I cannot live in there?” (I3).

People in the neighbourhood collaborated in the case of this pressing threat, regardless of the sectarian or ethnic differences in between. Moreover, they succeeded in establishing a firm belief in that, any planning should take into account the people living in the area and that the residents should have a say in their future. Within that short period of time, petitions against the Plan were prepared with the legal support of the professionals. As a result, around 7.000 petitions were signed against the plan and submitted to IMM. They rented buses or used their own vehicles to get to the Municipality. Petitions were given per household, so a great majority participated in the neighbourhood. Next, they organised a signature campaign and collected 10.000 signatures against the Plan. A press meeting in front of IMM followed this. 32 court cases were opened. Those who gave petitions without being able to afford an individual case, opened the cases on street basis, sharing the costs among the residents of the street.

According to Zoning Law 3194, once a plan is prepared by the Municipality and approved by the Municipal Assembly, it is publicised for 30 days. In that period, objections to it are collected. Then, these objections are evaluated and based on this evaluation, the plan either enters into force without any change, or with certain changes, or it is cancelled. The

neighbourhoods narrowly acted within this deadline and objected to the plan. Finally, the Maltepe North of E-5 Highway Master Plan was cancelled by IMM itself. This court process and cancellation of the plan is theoretically defined as an '*urban effect*' -an antecedent event causing a subsequent event- achieved by the movement (Pickvance, 1974).

After this mass objection and final cancellation of the plan, the Anatolian Side Planning Vice Director at IMM of the time, who was in fact the head of the team that drafted the plan, adopted a position to support the neighbourhoods. She would later say in the meeting with the representatives of the neighbourhoods:

Social equipment standard was very low here. And we made a plan using the known planning methods. The proposal was to carry out the rehabilitation by the Article 18 of the Zoning Law. Then came many objections to it. It is right to criticize about the lack of participation. The reason for this is that our participatory planning practice had not developed then. We tried to carry out this communication process after these objections, the communication which we had not established during planning. These were things that had never been done until then. Planners and architects talk about these 'planning criteria', which are not that clear, and make criticism through these criteria. But while planning such areas, these 'already known planning criteria' do not function. There should have been a different method and we should have found it... Since the time I started to be in communication with the neighbourhoods, I showed the effort to stand by the neighbourhoods. (P1).

During this struggle in Gülsuyu – Güleusu, periods for objection for the plans in many other neighbourhoods in the city had already expired, without any prior notice given to the residents, and plans had been approved leading to urban transformation in different parts of the city.

During the following year, IMM Planning Directorate had a series of contacts with the headmen, GGBA, external actors, and Maltepe District Municipality, to come up to a middle course on the future planning for the neighbourhoods. In the end, the planning note given in the previous chapter was developed.

P1 explains the following process as below:

When I went to the Municipal Assembly with that note, they said 'good, you have found a good solution', although I was expecting a refusal. This was of course a postponement. At that time, this kind of a method of spreading the issue in time was adopted. They preferred to postpone rather than dealing with these neighbourhoods. The neighbourhoods also preferred to postpone with different reasons.

Here, the reasons of the residents were obviously gaining time and delay any intervention.

The planning note necessitated an implementation plan and urban transformation projects prepared through a participatory mechanism. Although there were no more detailed

decisions in the Plan concerning the neighbourhoods, this planning note can be regarded as a serious gain for them. Its introduction with the planning note triggered the evolution of the present powerful community opposition into a participatory planning practice, which is explained in the following. As argued by the key actors in the neighbourhoods, the willing and determined attitude of the neighbourhood to have a say on their future –thanks to their strong political consciousness, strong solidarity culture and a consequent organized structure- was effective in that process. And with the organised victory against the Master Plan, they felt even more prepared to be engaged in making the future of their neighbourhoods.

The two actors, I11, city planning student and the civil engineer, constituted the first and most important external actors of the neighbourhood, not only in the organisation of the opposition against the 2004 Master Plan, but in the continuing participatory planning process. These two external actors later incorporated to their efforts a larger group of city planners, architects, lawyers and sociologists along with sociology and city planning students of MSFAU, who would later become the Solidarity Workshop working on voluntary basis with poor and mainly gecekondu neighbourhoods that were or would be subject to urban transformation. Solidarity Workshop is currently working as a voluntary initiative of a group of students, professionals and academics specialised in different areas who believe that ‘cities belong to citizens who are equal in terms of access to urban services’, object to the ‘transformation of the cities into mere areas of value increase due to the profit desire of the capital and municipalities who allow this, and who do not confine their objection to mere words’, as stated in their web site. The neighbourhood residents called these external actors ‘technical team’. The overall actors of the movement in that period is summarised in Table 4.

Further mobilisations were carried out, mainly with the support of two main external actors along with the Solidarity Workshop, who altogether constituted the most active external actors for the neighbourhoods. A couple of years following the cancellation of 2004 Master Plan and introduction of 2005 Master Plan envisaging urban renewal in the area, in around 2006-2007, based essentially on the planning note of the latter Plan, the neighbourhoods conducted a ‘workshop’ with the members of Solidarity Workshop, as well as Chamber of City Planners, Chamber of Architects, Photography Foundation and Galata Photography Studio. The role of the latter two organisations was to take photos during the workshop. The aim of this workshop was primarily dissemination of reliable information in the neighbourhoods on urban transformation and planning, and preventing the different opinions regarding what will next happen. A local activist explains the situation in the neighbourhoods:

There was too much speculative thinking. Everyone was saying something else, like bulldozers are coming tomorrow; they are going to pull down our houses... Some said ‘nothing will happen, the plan will be changed’... And so on. (I3).

Table 4: Internal and External Actors as well as Ad-Hoc Supporters in the 1<sup>st</sup> Period

Internal	External	Ad-Hoc Supporters
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- headmen of both Gülsuyu and Güleusu</li> <li>- neighbourhood association: <i>Gülsuyu-Güleusu Beautification Association</i></li> <li>- hometown associations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the ‘mobile’ city planner</li> <li>- engineer</li> <li>- Solidarity Workshop</li> <li>- lawyers</li> <li>- students of city planning and sociology departments of MSFAU</li> <li>- academics at MSFAU</li> <li>- Chamber of City Planners</li> <li>- Chamber of Architects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Photography Foundation (Fotoğraf vakfi)</li> <li>- Galata Photography Studio</li> <li>- Eğitim-Sen (Trade Union of teachers)</li> </ul>

Therefore, the workshop’s main point was to build up healthy communication channels in the neighbourhood through which the residents could get first-hand information regarding the future transformation in their neighbourhoods. A large **Neighbourhood Commission** was established for this purpose, composed of the residents, representing different streets of the neighbourhoods, who later work as *street representatives*. These representatives were chosen among the most trusted residents who were also relatively knowledgeable on technical issues. Although the external actors encouraged them to involve more women and young people, they were mostly men over the age of 40. Very few women and young people became a member of the commission. In addition to this general Commission, two **Neighbourhood Sub-committees** were formed, one for Gülsuyu with 39 members and one for Güleusu with 40 members, for the purposes of representation of the neighbourhoods in relations with relevant institutions. These sub-committees were composed of the headmen, representatives of the GGBA and other hometown associations. In the very beginning of this process, on 8<sup>th</sup> of March 2006, around 30-35 members of the Neighbourhood Sub-committees, representatives of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Maltepe District Municipality, Solidarity Workshop and certain academics (Prof. Dr. Aykut Karaman and Prof. Dr. Güzin Konuk from MSFAU) came together at MSFAU’s premises. MSFAU was the forerunner of this first meeting, which finally aimed to initiate a participatory planning project. The motivation behind the Municipalities and the academics to be part of this process was their excitement to come across with neighbourhoods who can take action against a plan and their enthusiasm to find out what their alternative propositions were. The

Neighbourhood Sub-Committee members had been stating that they wanted to be an active part of the planning process, arguing that it would be the residents who decide on the future of an area, but not the planners. As a member put forward:

We said in the meeting that it is us who suffer from the problems here. We make use of the values created here. We know the social relations here. A solution, a planning process excluding us would remain incomplete. Their reply was, I never forget, "This is what we teach at schools. We always talk about a planning process bringing together all actors. And now is the first time we see an example of it". (I3).

After this meeting, which actually constituted the formal start of the cooperation between the external actors and the neighbourhoods, the external actors came to the neighbourhood to meet with the Neighbourhood Commission. The Commission members at that point were nominated as street representatives to act like a bridge between the residents and the external actors, by holding interviews with all locals and gathering their views and later telling all these to external actors and vice versa. There were two or three representatives for each street, adding up to 130 in total. Well-attended meetings were organised usually at cafés, under the moderation of street representatives, to discuss the problems and the solution alternatives. The Sunnis did not attend at first, but later began to attend after the Imam of the neighbourhood mosque was involved upon the strong insist of both external actors and the headmen. The external actors here facilitated the discussions and provided technical support, but never attempted to decide on anything on behalf of the local people. In the time being, they put on their agenda a survey to be conducted in the neighbourhoods to gather data on the existing situation and shed light on the future planning process, again with the support of the external actors. They altogether developed 3 questionnaires: physical, economic and social situation. In the physical questionnaire, the questions were as follows: In what year did you build your house? Did you get any engineering support? How many storeys does your house have? Is it sufficient for your needs? etc. The economic situation questionnaires included the following questions: How many people live in your house? How much is your income? Do you have a car? Do you have a computer? etc. Finally, the ones in the social situation questionnaire were: If you have a problem, do you solve it with the Metropolitan Municipality or District Municipality? Do you know about the Association in your neighbourhood? What/how are your relations with your headman? etc. The first idea was to implement the survey through the street representatives and the members of the GGBA. However, some of the street representatives did not work sufficiently and it was understood that the implementation would not work only with the own resources of the neighbourhoods. Upon the suggestion of Murat Yalçın, a city planner and an academic at MSFAU, and also a member of the Solidary Workshop (II0), they decided to implement it with the help of MSFAU students. However, as there were hundreds of applications from voluntary city planning and sociology students after the announcements were made, they revised the methodology and extended the survey to a week as a workshop, incorporating the photographing of the process by Photography Foundation and activities such as trainings or movies for children provided by Eğitim-Sen, a leftist trade union of teachers.

In the end of September 2007, the students came to the neighbourhoods by busses and met with the Neighbourhood Commission members. After walking in the neighbourhoods, they altogether settled down with their computers for a week in the large hall of the café operated by Association of People from Karadağlılar Village of Çorum. They conducted the survey – all three questionnaires plus one on the geological situation- in four days for the whole population, without sampling. Cemevi of the neighbourhoods, the worship place of Turkey's Alevi population, provided its dining hall for meals. The meals, tea, coffee and other incidental expenditure were financed by the money collected in a box from students and residents. Upon completion of the questionnaires, the students transferred the data into electronic form. Soon after finishing the field study, they worked for three days in MSFAU's campus, to analyse the data they had collected and made a synthesis of it, in two groups, sociological and physical. They altogether formed the analytical base of a plan.

In the meantime, in addition to this survey, Neighbourhood Commission developed the following planning principles with the support of the external actors:

A planning which;

- ensures that no one in the neighbourhoods will be deprived, sent out to periphery without their consent and defrauded,
- has not only physical but economic and social dimensions; does not damage the social relations and way of living that has developed over the years; brings solutions to problems such as unemployment, absence of women in public space, children not having the chance to be 'children' and etc.
- uses primarily its own values and resources,
- affect its surroundings in a positive way while being developed,
- puts a full participative planning model into the centre of the process, by enhancing the established public space.

The political consciousness and a spirit of solidarity in the neighbourhoods, along with concrete experiences of mobilisation in the past, was very helpful in the beginning for an endogenous initial mobilisation against the acute and precipitous threat of 2004 North of E-5 Highway Master Plan and a fast spread of the mobilisation. It was relatively easier for the neighbourhoods to get organised, disseminate information and take an action against the threat, since the people of Gülsuyu-Gülensu were used to unite under a threat thanks to their political activism and even militancy in 1970s. They had the collective experience of standing together and reacting against any violation of their rights.

The political consciousness and culture of solidarity is very much sensible in the words of the headman of Gülensu: "It really does not fit to a human to say 'I'."

In this period, they were even proactive, as the headman of Gülensu played a pioneering role in having access to the plan through his personal close contacts with the District Municipality and sharing it with the residents, who were going to question it with a view to any threat that would affect their lives. Therefore, uniting and winning against the new threat, namely the Master Plan, was relatively easy for them. Almost everyone interviewed

emphasized this collective experience in explaining their victory of the time. They are still proud of this achievement, as the words of local activist imply, about the adjacent neighbourhood Başbüyük that is known to be conservative-nationalist and later experienced urban transformation: “We as Gülsuyu-Gülensu filed thirty-two law suits. Başbüyük filed only one! And it was with our support...”. (I6).

After the cancellation of the 2004 Master Plan, they continued to be proactive through the participatory planning process. This can again be explained by their collective experience. Moreover, through the experience of being a people’s committees, they had been able to establish and sustain their own communal system against the state. This spirit of solidarity of the neighbourhoods embedded in this collective memory came into being through the neighbourhood meetings, commissions and street representatives. They had succeeded to form a public space on its own, out of state and market.

However, after the acute threat of destruction was alleviated, a sense of security among the locals arose. The participatory planning process with the Solidarity Workshop was carried on in this sense of security. At that point, the old aged political consciousness proved to be detrimental for the mobilisation, before they proceeded in the participative planning. They had altogether identified the neighbourhood’s existing situation and problems and it was time for the neighbourhood to decide what to do. The next section discusses this 2<sup>nd</sup> phase, in which these detrimental effects affected the process.

A final comment is necessary about the nature of this participative planning experience of Gülsuyu-Gülensu. The literature on local participation often focuses on participatory processes that are initiated and carried out by local states, and generally evaluate these processes with regard to their democratic qualities and finally present them as means of enhancing democracy (Font and Galais, 2011). In other words, local authorities are deemed to provide the ideal setting for participative democracy, and in parallel, much of the literature focus on institutionally recognized citizen organizations that use participation channels provided by local authorities (Martínez, 2011).

These participatory methods are implemented not only in urban issues, but in a variety of areas, including economic development, local budgeting, social welfare, and environment, culture etc. as well. Moreover, assuring citizen participation is presented by local politicians as fundamental for improving the living conditions of the inhabitants (Savini, 2011). That is to say, our knowledge about the role of urban movements engaged in planning is scarce. Martínez (2011) aims to make up for this deficiency in his comparison between the participation of urban movements in planning in Porto (Portugal) and Vigo (Spain), but he does this by equating urban movements with associations, and focusing on again municipality initiated processes. Therefore, Gülsuyu-Gülensu is distinguished from cases of other movements and cases of local participative planning that has taken place in the literature, by bringing together an urban movement and the planning process. This was even appreciated by a representative of the local state, as mentioned previously. Moreover, this distinguishing feature of Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement’s engagement in a participatory planning is even more prominent due to the proactive fashion in its initiation and further organisation by the own resources of the neighbourhoods, including its dedication, with the



orientating role of the external actors, and without any channel provided by the local authorities. Therefore, it is here argued that the participatory planning process in Gülsuyu-Gülensu was a unique one, in that it was initiated and implemented by the urban movement itself, utilising its own internal and external elements.

## 6.2. Inactivity

How did the political consciousness and activism become detrimental for the movement, by leading into a fragmentation? The fragmentation in fact began in the very beginning of decision-making, when the analysis of the existing situation was completed. Political controversies occurred in the movement when they needed to come up with concrete steps. In this respect, a divergence emerged when the time to generate new ideas and solutions came. Consequently, unification in the neighbourhoods' mobilisation eroded along political lines. As regards to the property structure, no separation or serious conflicts arose for there was not room in the provisions of the 1/5000 Master Plan of 2004 for property based differentiation between the households. On the other hand, separation along political lines is unique to this neighbourhood. This section intends to elaborate on the causes and consequences of this fragmentation along political lines.

Within this fragmentation when it was the time for them to make certain decisions on their neighbourhood, on their future, two different political views come to the fore and in parallel two groups occurred in the neighbourhood as well as in GBBA. On one side were the 'revolutionists', who were against 'urban transformation' as a concept of capitalism, namely for ideological reasons. They were usually members of radical political groups or parties in the neighbourhoods. Besides these ideological ones, they also had some pragmatic reasons behind their arguments against transformation. They thought that had the neighbourhood been renewed, it would be impossible for them to sustain there and they would be forced to move out. Later they came to rule in GGBA's management, which has become very powerful in the neighbourhood, thanks to the traditional left-wing oriented political background. This political group aimed to sustain the neighbourhood as it is, to protect their own way of life and therefore excluded the others who were not necessarily against 'urban transformation', but were ready to cooperate with the agents of this transformation such as the Municipality.

The other group on the other hand was willing to conclude the participatory planning process, even if it would be realised through an upper-level plan requiring formal relations between the District Municipality and the neighbourhoods, namely a 1/1000 Implementation Plan to be legally prepared and approved by the municipality. They believed that, what they deserved was a change towards the better in their living environments. They refused to be 'revolutionist' when the issue was the neighbourhood and its problems, believing in 'revolution' in its macro meaning, but also arguing that it would not bring any practical solution for the local in the new economic conjuncture. In that respect, they can be characterised as 'cooperationist'. Such contradictions along political lines have been evident in different movements all over the world. For example, within the movement of *Grand*

*Ensembles* in Paris in 1960s, a high-rise and highly concentrated residential area for the middle-classes, widespread urban unrest and grassroots organisation had emerged against the low-quality living conditions and lack of social spaces (Castells, 1983). The people who were involved in the movement were left-wing professionals. The movement had experienced a crisis that emerged between its neighbourhood association, Association of Sarcalles (AS) and Parti Communiste Français (PCF), reflecting deep differences in the conception of the relationship between urban demands and the political system (p.84). Whereas AS thought that residents should organise on non-political grounds and take responsibility, while expressing their political will at the municipal level, PCF objected this kind of a relation with the municipality, based on their main argument that they could not handle the urban crisis within the capitalist system. However, despite its certain detriments, this crisis did not result in an inactivity or separation in the movement, and it managed to create the Resident's Councils, imposed collective bargaining on public housing rents, and ultimately, led the local government to alter the urban form it was producing by proposing a new model of *grand ensembles* (p.86). In protests against urban renewal and poverty in Mission District of San Francisco in 1960s on the other hand, some delegates led by the black youth Mission Rebels, called for a more radical stand on the truly political issues (Castells, 1983, p.112), similar to the revolutionists in Gülsuyu-Gülensu. But their views were not so dominant to command upon the movement.

In Gülsuyu-Gülensu on the other hand, as the former group, namely the 'revolutionists' was powerful in GGBA, their views and decisions became so dominant that the cooperationists left the association. After their resignation from the membership of GGBA, only one political view had remained in GGBA, which was against all reflections of capitalism on the city, including planning for urban transformation. Those who left GGBA founded a separate association, Gülsuyu-Gülensu Beautification and Solidarity Centre (GÜLDAM) in 2006. Here, the name of the new association is meaningful, signalling that they would not only work for more beautiful neighbourhoods, but would do it in solidarity.

A local' activist's words explain the fragmentation as follows:

They thought that any plan would bring destruction. They said they did not want any plan. For them, any plan would harm the social and spatial tissue in the neighbourhoods and these were attempts to pacify leftist and revolutionist potential in the neighbourhood. They said they would tear down their villas if they came (the villas of rich people in general)... A radical movement can only sustain where it is organised. I understand them at this point. But, why I object is that this is not the whole neighbourhood's opinion. Many people wanted such an alternative planning. A planning which would not cause any fear of losing homes. A planning which would not lead to their exile from the neighbourhood. They blocked the neighbourhood's ideas with their political relations, putting forward their own agenda as if the neighbourhood's. This is what we cannot accept... In fact from time to time, we had to defend them to others. We had a meeting in Maltepe District Municipality in April 2012. They refused to come with us accusing us of marketing the neighbourhoods. The headmen insisted us to unite, but what has been said holds us back".

He later continues: “They look into the matter from their own political perspective, and we from our neighbourhood perspective. (I3). He also links the separation directly to GGBA’s exclusionary over-politisation:

We were already in the management of old association (GGBA). Problems arose among us when this association carried out political works. A neighbourhood association should be able to embrace everyone. It should address everyone regardless of their hometown. Just like a headman... There are people in these neighbourhoods who vote for AKP, but stand for the interest of the neighbourhoods. They should all be embraced. We have a macro level problem with AKP. (I3).

A local activist, who is a member of neither GGBA nor GÜLDAM, makes similar explanation regarding the separation:

When the signatures and petitions were being collected here, GGBA was the only one. However, afterwards they experienced kind of a recession. There was stagnancy. In this shrinking, some friends behaved as if the association belonged only to them. This attitude began to be harmful for the association, sterilizing it, making it close its doors to others. At that point, those others sought for a new solution and established a new association. They in fact said the same things, but did this by claiming their sole truth. (I7).

Another local (I17) and member of neither GGBA nor GÜLDAM gives similar reasons:

The directors of the old association, GGBA used to say, for example ‘Erdoğan (local movement leader, ex-member of GGBA and member of GÜLDAM) cannot be our member’. I asked ‘why?’. Their answer was, ‘he is a supporter of the European Union’. We were telling them, ‘look, there are no pure socialists or whatever in democratic mass organisations. There may be members from CHP, or even AKP. These are the associations of these neighbourhoods. Please don’t do this’.... This (separation) results from our revolutionism. Revolutionists still protect their own lodges.

Similar detrimental effects of over politicisation in neighbourhood mobilisations are also emphasized in the literature. A case study of Castells in *The City and the Grassroots* (1983) focuses one of Chile’s squatter movements in *campamentos* (a new form of settlement). People’s massive mobilisation made it possible for thousands to obtain housing and services in a few months, despite the prevailing logic of capitalist development. However, each campamento was dependent upon the political leadership which had founded it (p.201). Finally, ‘the dependency of campamentos upon the political parties opened the door to their use by each party for its particular interest, lowering the level of grassroots participation’ (p.201).

One of the external actors defines the fragmentation as follows:

Some of the friends were saying ‘there will be urban transformation anyway; it should at least be the way we want’. Some of the friends were saying ‘urban transformation is the visible face of the capitalism. (I11).

As regards to conflicts based on differences among the residents with respect to property ownership, such differences did not lead to a concrete separation in the neighbourhoods and in the mobilisation, due to general intervention the 1/5000 plans foresaw. Nevertheless, it should be added according to the information provided by an external actor who worked with them at the time that there were still property owners, especially those with higher amounts, who lost their belief in the process of acting together as a whole, hoping for a possibility in future for working with a private contractor on their own parcel, without taking into account the conditions of those who are not property owners. However, this disbelief in the process was not based on concrete and immediate concerns, but rather more vague and future ones. Besides, this disbelief did not occur among the movement activists, whose concerns were at least for the time, purely political. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the stagnation and fragmentation in their mobilisation was based on political reasons.

The external actors were also not willing to support the neighbourhoods anymore, due to this separation in the neighbourhood which would not lead to a representative implementation any way. In concrete terms, this separation led to the foundation of an alternative neighbourhood association, as mentioned above GÜLDAM, whose members continued to struggle for an alternative planning, though in a weaker form. However, the alternative planning process would freeze due to fragmentation and external actors’ retreat. As a result, there are at the moment two neighbourhood associations active in the movement, the old one, GGBA and the new one GÜLDAM. For about seven years, until the beginning of 2013, a power struggle has existed, as expressed by the external actors. On the other hand, the headman of Güleusu finds this struggle as something positive: “It is better to have two associations. There will be a competition. As one works, the other one will also work”. (I16).

In addition, the purpose of the establishment of GÜLDAM is not much different from the initial purposes of GGBA. As a member of GÜLDAM says: “We are calling the residents to act together in this issue (urban transformation) and other issues as well. We are trying to inform them. We formed this association for this purpose.” (I12).

Moreover, due to their cooperationist character and not rejecting ‘urban transformation’ as a whole, they were more active than GGBA and try to struggle within the system. They organised public meetings with the external actors, press meetings and demonstrations, basically on issues about the neighbourhoods and also more city-wide ones, such as the filling works in the seaside within the borders of the Maltepe Municipality.

To sum up, two strategies were pursued by these two groups, which accounts for the fragmentation:

- Revolutionist: Contesting urban transformation as a concept (oppositional, not willing to negotiate with the local government)

- Cooperationist: Contesting the implementations under urban transformation (not oppositional against urban transformation, but wants to be a part of it, willing to negotiate with the local government)

GGBA applied the first method mentioned above, whereas GÜLDAM chose the second one. Accordingly, GGBA was against urban transformation and active at neighbourhood level, dealing with the problems of the neighbourhood including those related to the transformation on the neighbourhood however restrained from any negotiation or discussion with the municipality. On the other hand, GÜLDAM acknowledged urban transformation and try not to be disadvantaged in the process. Therefore they held meetings with the municipality, tried to be active at city and even national and international levels, by cooperating with other neighbourhoods in the country and with international activists. However, those who pursued these two different methods united in the idea that they should protect their houses against destruction, no matter what it costs. In more concrete terms, they would act together, build barricades and resist if a ‘demolishment team’ came to the neighbourhoods as emphasized by the President of GÜLDAM, “When it comes to the moment of action, we are the same”. (I5)

Besides this general left-wing orientation, there are religious communities, though low in number. They do not participate in any struggle, thanks to their trust on the political party in rule, namely the Justice and Development Party (AKP). According to a local activist, some residents say, though in minority: “It does not matter whether they pull down my house or not. I will vote for AKP. They will certainly do something for us. They won’t victimize us”. (I3).

Here, this differentiation in the strategies of the movement actors as revolutionist and cooperationist, defined as fragmentation within the movement, is similar to what was argued by Mayer (1999) as regards to fragmentation in the movement terrain. As mentioned before, Mayer had argued that there has been a fragmentation in the movement terrain from 1980s onwards, as between the initiatives of middle-class citizens ‘defending the quality of life of their neighbourhood and poor people’s movements’ along with ‘the community-based and alternative groups that have become inserted into innovative municipal programmes’ on one hand, and the radical ‘autonomous’ protest groups on the other. (Mayer, 2000 p.138)’. She further argues that the former find themselves even attacked by the latter. So, there has been a fragmentation separating those movements who cooperate with the local state, and radical movements, who even attacked the cooperating ones. What happened in Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement in its inactivity period, namely the separation between the revolutionists and cooperationists, is a similar fragmentation in terms of the two sides along with their methods and aspirations, though this time not in a between movements but within a movement.

All in all, the marginals, either leftist or conservatives, intentionally or not, took no place in the movement. Those who were ready to cooperate with the system continued and tried to sustain the movement, and those who refused to cooperate broke up. This separation is in parallel to the fragmentation in the movements after 1990. Moreover, here the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement had begun to show similar features with the movement category of post-1990s defined by Mayer (1999), namely ‘routinized cooperation with the state’, a

fragmented movement using more non-confrontational methods (Mayer, 2003). Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement was obviously not at the stage of cooperating with the local government for service provision as in Mayer's category, but rather cooperated for future planning, since a plan was their urgent necessity. And these cooperationist and non-confrontational methods resulted in the fragmentation in the movement by being a cause for leaving for the 'revolutionist' who would never accept to cooperate with the system.

This fragmentation demonstrates that political consciousness may be helpful for a movement for initial endogenous mobilisation, but does not necessarily continue to be helpful in embracing the whole neighbourhoods' expectations. This is its first detriment for the movement. Secondly, it may cause the movement's stagnation in the neoliberal era which requires the movements to be more pragmatic and therefore willing to cooperate with the actors of the system for a solution. On the contrary, in current environment, over politisation can be a serious bottleneck for the movement, leading to internal detachment and losing power. This outcome confirms Castells, who had argued back in 1980s, that movements were nothing but urban shadows, when neighbourhoods were purely a political arena for partisan organisations (Castells, 1983, p.284). Fortunately, new opportunities would stand in front of Gülsuyu-Gülensu, preventing the movement from becoming a shadow. The next section explains and discusses the outcomes of this third period.

Before discussing the dynamics of the remobilisation period, it is necessary to add that key actors of the core of the movement continued to be active nationally and internationally, especially certain GÜLDAM members, as mentioned above. They basically built links with other movements in the city, both those of the deprived and discontented, basically through the city-wide movements, Platforms and initiatives explained in chapter five, section three. In this respect, although it was inactive at its own neighbourhood level, in this period Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement began to perceive itself a unique one as a movement of the deprived, and a potential role model for other neighbourhoods. A local activist emphasizes this role as a mission for the movement:

In Gülsuyu-Gülensu , we have to prove the possibility of a planning with the citizens, without moving anyone out, without depriving anyone, because there is no such example. Until today, there has been a deprivation in all urban transformations. There has been a top-down process. We can show that planning in which horizontal relations dominate, residents are involved in the plans, planning which can be carried out with a process of solidarity, is possible. The neighbourhoods have this potential. (I3).

Apart from being part of city-wide Platforms, Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement, via the Association GÜLDAM, took a leading role in certain ones, such as a special Platform for The Neighbourhood Associations of the Anatolian Side of Istanbul. Their aim was to gather the neighbourhoods under urban transformation to be able to act as a joint power. A member of GÜLDAM says at that point: "GÜLDAM has a serious mission in this respect. But if you ask whether it is in the desired state, no, because all activists here are working, and can come to the neighbourhood at a late time. We try to be helpful in our spare times..." (I13).

The Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement also became a supporter for less organised neighbourhoods, and continues to be so. The President of GÜLDAM explains their support as such:

We support them. For example, friends in Sarıyer, in Derbent and Pınar neighbourhoods, were taken under custody by the police. They had a press statement. We went there and showed that we were together. During the tensions in Başibüyük, some of us were there almost every day. They used to think Gülsuyu-Gülensu as the place of terrorists, radicals. They were saying 'we do not know how to throw a stone'. But once they were hit by the stick of the cop, once they got the gas bomb, they learnt how to and understood the situation. (I5).

Başibüyük is perhaps the neighbourhood Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement has built the closer links, despite the totally opposite political views of the former, being right-wing, nationalist and conservative. In Başibüyük, despite the struggles of the residents, not as a movement but as an immediate reaction though, part of the neighbourhood was demolished and high-rise HDA blocks were built, not for the residents though, but certain public servants, such as policemen, as a local indicates: "They gave 50 flats to 50 policemen. Just because they pepper sprayed and coshed people" (I18). Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement intended to support Başibüyük from their initial mobilisation period onwards, trying to forge a similar struggle there; however they were not successful in persuading the neighbourhood representatives for it. For example, they invited the headman of Başibüyük in one of their meetings. It was the AKP who was in rule of the local government then. A local explains their relation as follows:

We have always stood together with Başibüyük in all demolishments... We have always visited them. At once we invited the headman of Başibüyük to one of our meetings. The headman listened to the discussions. Then he said 'what you are doing is separatism' in an accusing way. He further said 'AKP is not involved in such a business. You are cheating people and brainwashing'. Whose brain are we washing? We are just telling the possible threats to them. He said 'NO, don't invite me again', and left the meeting... But they took the houses of people away from them in Başibüyük. People threw stones to the police. But, who got the first stone was the headman. They threw stones to the building of the headmanship, they chastised him, for he was not responsible to his neighbourhood, perhaps just by trusting the AKP government. They accused him of being for the municipality. Had he been in contact with us, this would probably not happen to him. (I18).

Apart from this city-wide cooperation, they also have international contacts, though to much lesser extent. One of the local activists gives examples for such international relations: "We became a member of IAI zero eviction based in Italy. We had contacts with movements in Paris, Berlin and Amsterdam. We paid visits to each other" (I3).

### **6.3. Remobilisation in Case of an Opportunity**

The inactivity and the political fragmentation within the movement lasted finally in the end of 2012, as a response to the declaration of intent by the District Municipality for making the 1/1000 Implementation Plan for the neighbourhoods. In March 13rd, the Planning Department of Maltepe District Municipality, invited the representatives of both GGBA and GÜLDAM as well as the two headmen to a meeting organised in Türkan Saylan Congress Centre, close to the neighbourhoods. The purpose of the meeting was consultation with the residents of the neighbourhood for the 1/1000 Implementation Plan the District Municipality was willing to draft soon, according to the planning note of the 1/5000 Master Plan in force, necessitating such consultation for larger scale planning. The representatives of the neighbourhood attended the meeting together with external actors, mainly from the Solidarity Workshop.

In the beginning of the meeting, the representatives of the District Municipality declared their intention to make the implementation plan of 1/1000 scale of the neighbourhoods, which practically meant defining building rights for the residents. As mentioned before, according to the existing 1/5000 Master Plan, the area was defined as transformation zone, urban renewal in planning terminology, and an implementation plan of 1/1000 scale would be the next step, before any urban transformation project was implemented.

Due to the areas with problems as regards to property ownership -area that is privately owned, forest area, and river basin where the residents have no legal property rights- the District Municipality suggested a two-phased planning. In this regard, the areas without any problem, namely the land with title deeds, would be planned in the first phase. The problem areas on the other hand would be left to be planned in the second phase.

The District Municipality's proposal for 1/1000 plan was in fact embraced as a very positive opportunity, since it would allow new building rights and improvement in the area. So, this time it was not a threat but an opportunity that triggered their fast remobilisation. And, this time both of the neighbourhood associations GGBA and GÜLDAM, headmen, and certain other local activists would always act together. Now, they altogether were the core of the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement. A decision to accept the proposal of the District Municipality for a two-phase planning would in fact be the easier way, for it would immediately be implemented by leading to a transformation in the area in favour of the property owners, which constituted the majority. However, the movement actors did not choose this easy option and refrained from giving an answer in the first meeting on behalf of everyone living in the neighbourhoods. They said that they had to consult with both the rest of the neighbourhoods and with certain other external actors. And this answer was the beginning of another consultation process within the neighbourhoods and with the external actors, implemented through a series of meetings in the neighbourhoods or in the venue of the external actors, and other type of events (such as working breakfasts).

In one of the initial meetings, held at the premises of MFSAU in January 2013, a method was suggested by the external actors to the core group, for a total solution for the



neighbourhoods, without leaving aside the problematic areas. It was a gradual ‘block-based construction’, since such planning would allow saving of land, that could create land usable for allocation to those living in the problematic areas without any property rights. This would also prevent a general intervention as in the cases where HDA is involved, carried out through a mass demolition, resulting in eviction of residents to peripheral areas. Moreover, since the existing parcels were very small and the area was sloped, such a block-based assembling was also the option the District Municipality was in favour of. For such an intervention, people were required to act collectively, through the establishment of non-profit housing cooperatives, for which certain membership principles would have to be defined. Here it is necessary to add that this solution through cooperatives is an increasingly less implemented model in Turkey, although such cooperatives play an important role in housing provision in the EU (Özdemir, 2011). So, Gülsuyu-Gülensu would be a rare example in that sense, if this model is finally adopted.

So, in response to this collective approach suggested by the external actors, a suggestion came from the representative of Life in Anatolia Cooperative Gülsuyu-Gülensu Branch (I17), to form a Plan Follow-up Commission, including the representatives of the neighbourhood associations, headmen, certain activists and external actors, mainly planners, architects and lawyers. The mission of this Plan Follow-up Commission would be to give information to the residents, along with the information of technical nature including the proposal of the District Municipality as well as the ‘cooperative’ solution of the external actors, to carry out and finalize the consultation process in the neighbourhoods and to represent the neighbourhoods in front of the District Municipality. So, this Commission would establish and sustain the relations with the District Municipality.

The next meeting was held in the neighbourhoods in February 2013, with the participation of headmen, representatives of GGBA and GÜLDAM, CHP District Presidency representatives, representative of Life in Anatolia Cooperative Gülsuyu-Gülensu Branch, a number of activists independent from the associations such as political party members, representatives of Chamber of City Planners and Chamber of Architects, members of Solidarity Workshop and IMECE, several planners and lawyers. In this meeting, the discussions were matured and centred on firstly the block-based construction solution and secondly, the formation of a common view among the residents that supported this solution. Here, it was clear that the external actors’ role had gone already beyond awareness raising for an organised struggle and giving technical and legal support. The external actors were at that point trying to help them carry out a more democratic process. They had a concrete roadmap proposal for the neighbourhoods and were encouraging them to represent and manage the will power of the neighbourhoods.




Figure 18: Core and Looser Segments of Gülsuyu-Gülensu Movement

In parallel, first, the block-based solution and the reasons for such a solution were elaborated by the external actors, mainly by a lawyer from Solidarity Workshop (P2). According to this solution, the residents should first had to be persuaded for a block-based solution, by being members of a building cooperative before getting their title deeds, so that they would not change their minds. By the time the District Municipality offers block-based planning, they should establish their building cooperatives and demand their new title deeds through these cooperatives. Here, the residents would be persuaded for a cooperative solution in return for a certain precedent that will be provided to them. Accordingly, those who do not want a cooperative solution but intend to build on his or her individual parcel upon agreement with a private contractor, will not be eligible for the higher building rights provided for others. In addition, the residents would obtain property rights in accordance with their existing property rights. Those who have no property rights would be provided with social housing on the land saved and allocated through block-based solution. So, what the external actors suggested would aim to force the residents for a cooperative solution: “Block-based obliges the people, if you start these processes before the plan is approved”. (P2).

The reason why the external actors proposed the block-based cooperative model was not only because it would prevent evacuation and out-migration of the residents living in problem areas, but also due to certain technical reasons agreed by the District Municipality. Words of an external actor show this clearly:

We had given a promise to the neighbourhoods. 'No one will move out of here without his/her consent'. We did not do it thanks to a 'leftist phantasy'<sup>17</sup> of ours. Our cooperative solution, block-based solution proposal is because there is no other solution for the neighbourhoods as a whole... This has nothing to do with our phantasy. It is related to the legislation, topography, location of buildings, etc. (P3).

Second topic was the formation of an agreement on a common view among the residents in favour of this cooperative solution, namely the power will behind it. The Solidarity Workshop members called the residents to be aware of the collective memory of the neighbourhoods and the movement actors to revitalize it:

You have come here and built your house on an area that is formed by the labour of tens of people. If these neighbourhoods were not in togetherness, would you be able to build your three-storey house? No. You owe it to those labourers in the history of your neighbourhoods". (P2).

If the neighbourhoods are built altogether, everyone has a right to claim. You would not be able to build your two-three storey houses, had 30.000 people not lived here". (P3).

In this recent process, the external actors had strong expectations from the movement that centred on several points. First expectation is the definition of their basic preferences, namely either abiding by the cooperative solution or bringing up another one. Other possible solutions that were brought up were totally parcel-based planning which would be to the detriment of those who are not property owners, or leaving the task of finding a solution entirely to the District Municipality. Second expectation was the organisation of the process to come up with a common will power in the neighbourhood based on their basic preferences. Last but not least, the external actors were expecting from the residents to see the neighbourhoods as a whole, together with those with no property rights, not leaving room for individual rent seeking behaviour and its provocateurs. This in fact was the main reason why they proposed the cooperative solution, looking at their general discourse, a reason more important than the technical ones they sometimes put in words. Moreover, as regards to their last expectation, they wanted the movement to prove both to themselves and the District Municipality that everybody's preference was reflected in the common will. In a word, the movement would agree on a collective solution, preferably the cooperative solution, and 'market' this to the rest of the residents, being able to show that it was beneficial for all. This in fact points to a new role for the external actors, which was

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<sup>17</sup> He emphasized that they were rational in making this proposal, and therefore the rationale behind their proposal was not purely their left-wing ideology, but certain technical conditions too.

supporting the organisation of the cooperation between the movement and the District Municipality, in other words a role of an intermediary facilitating the consensus building process between the two sides. In connection to this change in their role, they were not any more acting as mere volunteers, but also as a responsible professionals doing what a their profession required. Therefore, professionals become more active in comparison to academics and students, as shown in Table 5.

On the other hand, the movement's expectation from the external actors was to show them how to do things. A local activist puts forward their basic expectation as follows: "We want to be both the subject and the actor of this process. For this we need your technical help". (I3). Another local puts forward his expectations from the external actors as follows: "This is what I want from them. They shall draw us a road we can walk on at comfort, knowing it will not harm any citizen" (P4).

On the other hand, the 1/1000 Implementation plan process would lead to internal conflicts in the neighbourhood along property-based lines, unlike the 2004 - 1/5000 and 2005- 1/5000 Master Plans which were general enough not to divide the residents based on property ownership. In other words, both plans had treated the neighbourhoods as a unity, without getting into the details of the problematic areas in terms of property structure. Therefore, there was not much room for the residents to have conflicts based on property ownership. They resisted against the first Master Plan as a whole, and were engaged in a participatory process within the merits of the second one, which was interrupted though due to political reasons. However this time, the 1/1000 Implementation Plan had to deal with the differences in the property structure in the neighbourhoods and solve the related problems, namely the illegal constructions with no title deeds in the river basin, forest area and private property. At this situation, the movement was facing a vital dilemma: 'Shall we accept this proposal, or struggle for a unified 1-phase plan for the neighbourhoods?'

Table 5: Internal and External Actors in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Period

<b>Internal</b>		<b>External</b>
CORE	LOOSER SEGMENTS	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- headmen of both Gülsuyu and Gülensu</li> <li>- <i>Gülsuyu-Gülensu Beautification Association</i></li> <li>- representatives of city-wide initiatives</li> <li>- members of hometown associations (Association of People from Karabalçık Village Sivas being the prominent one)</li> <li>- political party members</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- members of hometown associations</li> <li>- political party members</li> <li>- other local activists</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Solidarity Workshop</li> <li>- lawyers</li> <li>- city planners</li> <li>- architects</li> <li>- Chamber of City Planners</li> <li>- Chamber of Architects</li> </ul>

A local activist explains her perception of the dilemma as follows:

Three areas are problematic in the neighbourhoods: One is river basin with 34 households. The other one is private property. And there is the forest area. The rest is getting building rights. But are we going to say, 'OK we saved ourselves', or are we going to proceed solving these problems. The neighbourhoods are expected to make a decision on that. Are we going to solve our problem, or maintain a unity? (I7).

The solution through building cooperatives was in fact adopted by the core of movement, thanks to a combination of factors; their basic ideological stance, strong solidarity ties with the neighbourhoods and its revitalisation with the support of external actors. The external actors was here effective in keeping the collective memory of the people alive and preventing them from pursuing individualistic property-based interests. By their encouragement of the external actors, they set out for a series of meetings with rest of the neighbourhood residents to ask them what they want and to persuade them for a planning that would not oppress anyone. Their aim was to come up with a common idea and put an end to the dilemma.

The same local activist puts forward these meetings as a process of understating the situation:

In the discussions during the meetings, people first tried to understand what the process would bring to them. There were around 100 people participated in the meetings. Of course meetings are not held with thousands of participants. Those who have understood, explain these in his own circles". (I7).

Being in favour of a unified plan, the core of the movement never used a discourse that would sound like an individualistic property-based motive. Solidarity messages were given in all the meetings. The headman of Gülsu:

The coming days will be either positive or negative for us. The condition of not being negative is sustaining the existing unity of us. We shall not waste this unity of ours. I am specially asking you not to lose this unity. If we stand together, we will have protected these neighbourhoods. (P5).

President of GÜLDAM: "We all want to strengthen this solidarity spirit for our neighbourhoods, for our neighbours. The more you support this, the more beautiful will be everything". (I5). A local activist: "Here is a neighbourhood that has come to the stage of getting its building rights. But we want to walk together with the rest, solving the problem areas. We do not want to victimise our neighbours". (I7).

Beside this core of the movement, there were looser segments in the movement which can be defined as the 'convinced' ones, namely those who are individually in favour of a parcel based plan that would bring them immediate building rights, possibly a two phased plan, but were convinced for a unified one by being part of the movement. They were certain local activists, political party members and members of certain hometown associations. Relations

of Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement with these hometown associations and political parties are concrete examples of horizontal integration defined by Pickvance, which was mentioned in chapter 3, literature review. On the other hand, certain hometown associations (shown in the table) are so integrated with the movement that some of their members become an actor of the movement. This is in line with Pickvance's argument that horizontal integration could bring additional members to the movement.

The people in the looser segments of the movement express similar concerns as those in the core, but may still put stress on their property ownership, as in the following words of a local, who is also a member of the political party CHP "It is important that no single family is sent to somewhere else from here. ... Here I mean I should be able to value my own land by myself, if I have the strength...". (P6).

Another local in the looser segments expresses the two views clearly:

We have problem areas in urban transformation. We say as the government of the neighbourhoods, 'all or nothing'. No one should suffer. Everyone should stay. ... For this we want block -based construction. I guess the associations, headmen, architects, engineers, they all do not want parcel-based. My individual wish is in fact parcel-based. But I should be in line with the majority. (I19).

It was at this point that conflicts based on property ownership became apparent, in the neighbourhoods and even in the movement, thanks to the looser segments of it. Many of the residents, the percentage of which was impossible to foresee, were in favour of parcel-based planning, willing to agree with a private contractor and build on their own parcel. A local woman puts forward her wish for a private contractor openly: "I do not want an apartment. Why would I want? I have recently paid all my debts for my house. Why should I get it pulled down? But, if private contractor comes, then it is different". (I20).

On the other hand, the demands of those not in the movement were sometimes not that tightly defined and were vague. A local activist expresses the vagueness as follows:

When we are in the same place, it seems they think the same way. This is at least what they say. This is in the end their housing right. Maybe they will give him some money and send off afterwards and the other without giving any money. But we do not know how these people behave in their own environment. (I7).

But in general, residents who were not in the movement were supporting a parcel-based planning, giving rise to an internal conflict in the neighbourhoods, that comes to the fore as a new challenge for the movement, and in particular for the core of the movement. The words of the local activist clearly points to this conflict:

When we go to an ordinary resident, in fact this is possible within us as well, they say 'We want to give our land to the contractor. The contractor shall give us two or three flats. We will sell or not sell'. But on the other hand, if we look at the headmen, our associations, they want

to protect the social structure, political tendency here. There is such a controversy between us and the neighbourhoods. We do not want that the social structure be ruined here, and no high-rise apartments. There will be a serious increase in the population. We don't want this. But if we look at the residents, they seriously ask for 1/1000 plans, so that they agree with the contractor, get their flats and be happy. (I3).

In this respect, there broad types of residents come to the fore according to their positions among the stakeholders, as shown in Figure 18:

- Those in the core of the movement (Plan Follow-up Commission): Advocates of a unified plan covering whole of the neighbourhoods, agreed on block-based building cooperatives, acting as consensus seekers on this solution
- Those in the looser segments of the movement: Supporters of a unified plan covering whole of the neighbourhoods, convinced by the core members
- Rest of the residents out of the movement

As the residents out of the movement in general look into the matter based on individual property ownership, there was a new challenge for the movement to develop a jointly shared opinion, a common will power in the neighbourhoods, converting these individualistic concerns into collective ones. How to establish this common view has become the basic challenge the movement faces. A local activist expresses this as in the following question: "How will we be able to make all our opinions here a common view? And also, how will we show that it is possible that everyone can stay here?" (I3).

Another local activist puts forward their concerns:

We have to be able to show the residents a solution, without giving way to any fight, any internal controversies. We have to say that we have gained everything together, and present our way of developing a solution together. We have to put forward an alternative project in front of these people. (I7).

Savini (2011), in his study where he compares local participation mechanisms in two different urban regeneration projects, one in Milan and the other in Copenhagen, argues that collective bodies of citizens especially at local level, serve to promote the needs and desires of the citizens; they often work as mediators between institutions and citizens. The Plan Follow-up Commission, as a collective body of Gülsuyu-Gülensu played a similar mediating role. Through the Plan Follow-up Commission, the movement was acting here like the advocate of unity and solidarity in the neighbourhoods, trying to persuade the residents out of the movement who were property owners for a unified solution. So, their demand was not only a transformation that keeps the residents there, but also a unified transformation that embraced both the property-owners and non-owners. They were here acting not only as the defender of their rights, but as consensus organisers in the neighbourhood as well, for a common solution, which can be regarded as a sort of

cooperation with the District Municipality and a strategy to be in a stronger position in front of it.

On the other hand, such a consensus organising in a planning area is normally among the tasks of the planners, and thereby the local state. However, this time, the movement itself was carrying out this task, for the common interest of the neighbourhoods. In this respect, the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement was working with the municipality on non-antagonistic basis.

The movement has been carrying out this difficult task of consensus seeking through a series of meetings held together with the residents, and continuing this process while this thesis is being written. In these meetings and during the internal work carried out by the Plan Follow-up Commission with the support of external actors, the following principles were developed to be proposed to the District Municipality to be taken as a basis in further planning:

- The 1/1000 Plan should cover the whole neighbourhoods, without making differentiation on the basis of ownership pattern.
- The 1/1000 Implementation Plan, as indicated in 1/5000 Master Plan, should aim the maintenance of the economic and social conditions for the residents to continue to live in the neighbourhoods after the planning.
- The renewal should not be made with the “HDA” logic, but considering the economic and social situation of the neighbourhoods, and by spreading it in time.
- The possible deprivation of those who live in the so-called problem areas (private property, forest area and river basin) should be considered within the planning practice. In solutions regarding these areas, decisions should be in favour of the people living there.
- With respect to the conservation zone of the existing stream, the protection distances should be determined according to scientific studies made together with the authorised institutions.
- No implementation should start before a final solution is reached for the situation of those in the problem areas and their consent is taken.
- In 1/1000 Implementation Plan, there should be possibility for both block and parcel based solution, according to the conditions of the areas. No one should be forced to choose one of the solutions.
- There are people in the neighbourhoods who live on the property of the District Municipality, and were not able to get their title deeds but have title allocation documents and bank receipts of 2000 TL. Thus, they have lived in the neighbourhoods since 1990 without any security despite their property rights. The prices for a square



meter land should be calculated according to the rates of the period of 2004 1/5000 Master Plan. So, that these residents can get their title deeds.

- Land developed out of the implementation of 1/1000 Plan should not be used for rent seeking purposes, but should be revalued for the neighbourhoods as facilities suitable for the common use of the residents. They should be made available, in face of the conditions, for the use of those who are not property owners.
- Precedent increases proposed in collective implementations should be made taking into account the existing population structure, and should not lead to a high population increase.
- The municipality and related authorities should take the necessary care and make contributions so that the economic burdens that will arise after the renewal do not force the residents to migration.
- Ankara Building Cooperative should be regarded as within the borders of the neighbourhoods.
- In making the 1/1000 Implementation Plan, transparent and on-site analysis should be concluded and the process should be shaped in the physical environment of the neighbourhoods, rather than the premises of the municipality.
- All meetings and interviews that will be made regarding the planning process (with residents, professional chambers, universities, civil society organisations etc.) should be recorded and documented in minutes. Care should be taken so that the planning process should be based on participation and taking into account the opinions expressed during the meetings.
- The planning notes should be written based on discussion; binding clauses should be defined to prevent any disfavourable changes in the future.

The core of the movements submitted these principles to the District Municipality under the title 'Demands of the Neighbourhoods'. This set of principles was foreseeing a unified planning in the area, considering those with no property rights. However, these principles did not envisage the enforcement of a block-based planning, which was proposed by the external actors as the only option for a unified planning, and agreed by the District Municipality for the existing zoning conditions and topography of the area. In other words, the neighbourhoods were demanding freedom to choose between block-based and parcel-based planning. Paradoxically, they were also demanding the prevention of rent seeking efforts for the land saved out of block-based zoning, but utilizing this land for social housing for those with no property rights. And the movement, as the consensus organiser, was forced to somehow incorporate all these ideas into their principles.

This paradoxical situation can be regarded as the reflection of the property-based conflict that arose in this remobilisation between the residents and the movement as well as within the movement. Although the core of the movement was in favour of block-based

cooperative solution, they had found themselves in a position to agree on a middle course, taking into account the demands of the residents out of the movement. Sometimes, the right way is the one that is against the will of the majority, but the movement was not powerful, or has not yet been powerful enough to overcome this dilemma.

All in all, the recent planning initiative of the District Municipality, based on the planning note foreseeing consultation in 1/5000 Master Plan in rule, which is yet again a gain the neighbourhoods obtained themselves, triggered a remobilisation for the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement, by constituting a serious opportunity for them. This time no political contradictions occurred, for they agreed on reaching a consensus with the system, as it was not presenting a threat, but an opportunity. In parallel, a change occurred in the role and attitude of the external actors. The external actors were now playing the role of an intermediary between the movement and the system. Thus, their role have evolved into a more comprehensive one, involving not only technical and legal consultancy, but a facilitating role in consensus building with the system.

While searching for a consensus with the system with the support of external actors, remobilisation had to face new internal conflicts, this time based not along political, but property-based lines. As the above listed principles demonstrate, the movement is in fact in favour of a unified planning in the neighbourhoods, without giving rise to deprivation for anyone. However, they cannot produce a decision on a concrete solution, due to the internal conflicts that arose in the neighbourhoods and became apparent in the meetings. There are residents who prefer to continue with parcel-based planning, with small contractors and it is unforeseeable whether their number will increase or not, when the time for the approval of the plan comes. The movement essentially supports the cooperative solution, but in the end finds itself in a situation where it should be sensible to different voices of the residents. So, a clear distinction between the people involved in the movement and the rest of the residents emerge, and the movement becomes a mediating agent trying to find a middle course among the residents. In other words, it began to act like a mediator through the above mentioned Plan Follow-up Commission, between collective and individual interests.

However, it would be unfair to make a clear-cut judgement by seeing this as a failure on the part of the movement in Gülsuyu-Gülensu. On the contrary, the ten year process of planning and counter mobilisations in the neighbourhoods should be regarded as a serious and unique gain on the part of the movement, in the light of many examples of demolition and evacuations in different neighbourhoods, Başbüyük, the adjacent neighbourhood being the closest one. In the end, they were asked by the District Municipality for their opinions on the future planning, thanks to their own efforts supported by the external actors. Moreover, in building the neighbourhoods' opinion, the movement behaves sensitive in order not to exclude those with no property rights. The situation between the movement and the District Municipality is, for the time being, stable. No further step has been taken by the Municipality and movement carried on with meetings in the neighbourhood to agree on a unified solution. Therefore, although it is proceeding into a vague future, this last decade can easily be defined as an assertive and gainful process for Gülsuyu-Gülensu.

In consequence, the deprived people's movement in Gülsuyu-Gülensu was not a smoothly developing process, but highly unstable in nature, triggered by threats and opportunities created by neoliberal urban development policies. Through these threats and opportunities, the movement was interrupted and lost power by separations along political lines and suffered from conflicts based on property ownership. Despite everything, they insisted on solidarity, simultaneously developing new strategies to survive. This consequently shows that the intervention method of the neoliberal urban development, that priorities urban renewal and polishing of the areas for marketing purposes while postponing or totally ignoring the need for improvement of the conditions of its residents, trigger new, though instable mobilisations. By crossing the neighbourhoods' paths with new threats and opportunities, it gives rise to simultaneously fluctuating and volatile urban mobilisations. On the other hand, in parallel, neoliberal urbanisation leaves much room for these movements to adopt different strategies, such as cooperation with the local state by acting as consensus organisers and become stronger negotiators. More interestingly, it may even revitalize the spirit of solidarity in cases like Gülsuyu-Gülensu, where this spirit is already embedded.

#### **6.4. Types of Rights Claimed: Who Claims What?**

In Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement, all three goals defined by Castells (1983); which are collective consumption, identity and cultural autonomy and territorially based self-management are articulated with motivations of "right to the city" and "right to housing". This section focuses on rights claimed in each period, the definition of these rights and those who claim these rights.

Right to the city, as a discourse used mainly by the core of the movement and certain looser segments is an articulating principle of urban struggle. It is however, more difficult to define right to the city, compared to other more concrete types of rights. According to Marcuse and Harvey, it is a moral claim founded on fundamental principles of justice, of ethics, of virtue, of the goods – not as a legal claim enforceable through a judicial process today (Mayer, 2009). It is defined more as an oppositional demand, challenging the claims of rich and powerful (Mayer, 2009). However, there is also a more 'tamed' and less oppositional, a 'liberal' understanding of the concept, usually used by international organisations.

Word of a local activist clearly reveals that the core of the movement put 'right to the city' into its centre, when asked what kind of a city he would like to live in:

Despite its chaotic atmosphere, I am happy to live in Istanbul. There are many reasons behind this. For example, the never ending energy of the city makes me a part of this energy. On the other hand, the facts that my children have the opportunities they would never have in any town of Anatolia, their access to various cultural activities motivate me to live in this city. But, if you ask in what kind of a city I would like to live in... Whenever I drive on E-5 Highway, I think to myself, I would never allow the construction of a shopping mall in Göztepe (a quarter of

Maltepe District). Or I would decide on how to do it, considering the traffic infrastructure there. Or I would have new orientations, to maintain that all the 'other' segments become a partner of the surplus produced in the city. We can mention those who have been discriminated due to gender, political preferences, sect, ethnicity as well as the immigrants. Istanbul is a very cosmopolite city. There is a serious discrimination in the distribution of the values produced in the city. So, I would obviously like to live in such a city. (I3).

They further emphasise their participation in city-wide oppositions: "There is a filling work going on in Maltepe sea front. Our association (GÜLDAM) is a part of the opposition against this work, together with other NGOs there". (I3).

Moreover, they perceive this city-wide engagement as an organic part of their neighbourhood struggle:

We participate in Taksim Solidarity, Urban Movements Forum, etc. ...We cannot proceed to anywhere if we focus only on our own buildings. If we are not sensitive to all matters, we cannot protect our neighbourhoods either. Hidroelectrical Power Plants, 3<sup>rd</sup> bridge, each of them is a matter of concern for us. If we begin by saying we will protect only our neighbourhoods, they will show us two options, death and malaria, forcing us to choose the latter. (Turkish proverb) (I5).

Right to housing, on the other hand, is the dominant discourse of the urban movements of the deprived frequently used as a component of fundamental human rights, by all types of actors; core of the movement, looser segments of the movement and residents out of the movement. This type of right claim involves not only the basic right of sheltering, but also the desired conditions of this shelter and preservation of a 'spatialised culture' in various ways (Jaffe, Klaufus and Colombijn, 2013). This is based mainly on the firm belief of the residents on their right to retain their existing neighbourhood relations. "*We do not want to lose the relations with our neighbours*" is a desire expressed by almost everyone.

Within the right to housing, the deprivation is defined as;

- Evacuation and resettlement in peripheral areas of the city,
- Becoming indebted to HDA, and
- Segregation from the social environment.

A local activist defines the possible deprivation as such:

I do not want to live in high-rise apartments. I do not want to live in coffins. I want a neighbourhood where there is the green; there are playgrounds, where neighbours are side by side. Don't we have problems now? Yes, we have. But we still know how to live side by side. Here there is life. You say 'hello' on the street.(I5).

Another one confirms: “You pass a word. You tease one another...”. (I12). An activist explains the demands of the residents as follows: “The people here claim to be the owner of the values they have created with their own hands”. They want to live here, stay here. They do not want to be a victim being sent off to somewhere else”. (I7). Residents in general share the same concerns. A local woman says: “We do not want to be taken into a cage. We do not want to lose neither our neighbours, nor relatives. We do not want that our structure gets ruined”. (I21).

Another one expressed similar concerns:

You do not know who you share your space with, in big apartments. Now my door is open. My neighbour can come in without permission. One day my husband got ill and I called the ambulance. All my neighbours came to my house when they saw the ambulance. The driver asked ‘did you call your neighbours before calling us?’ But I never knew that they came. So, there are such deep friendships here. We don’t want to lose it. (I20).

On the other hand, there is a disdain on this non-material dimension of right to housing among middle-income and higher-income groups, mainly among those who are materially satisfied. It is common to hear sentences like “come on, when they get the chance, they will leave their neighbourhoods for new apartment units, without even looking behind for a second”. By this way, the sincerity of the right to housing claims of residents of gecekondu neighbourhoods in general, including Gülsuyu-Gülensu neighbourhoods, is questioned by the rest of the public. This attitude can be explained by a belief that non-material demands are meaningful only for those who are materially satisfied, as a part of an overall selfishness and lack of empathy in the society.

In defining the deprivation, the residents’ consciousness about different cases of urban transformation projects in other parts of the city, Sulukule and Ayazma being the most prominent ones, is effective. Local activists’ words show this clearly:

There are examples of urban transformation such as Sulukule and Ayazma. People come to the neighbourhood and determine a debris price like 15-20 million TL, for your house you have spent 40-50 years of your life. And then they send you to places like Taşoluk or Bezirganbahçe, 40-50 km. far from the city. This does not only bring an economic pressure, but tear you off from your social environment, from the relations you have developed so far. This is a serious grievance. (I3)

Table 6: Periods of Gülsuyu-Gülensu Movement and Rights Claimed

Plan		Who Claims What?
<p>2004: 1/5000 Master Plan</p> <p><b>Threat: Demolishment</b></p> <p><b>MOBILISATION</b></p> <p>petitions</p> <p>court cases</p> <p>Cancellation of the Plan</p>		<p><b>Right to the City:</b> Core of the Movement</p> <p><b>Right to Housing:</b> Core and looser segments of the movement, residents</p>
<p>2005: 1/5000 Master Plan</p> <p>Gülsuyu Gülensu: Urban Renewal Area</p> <p><b>Opportunity: Planning Note on Consultation</b></p> <p><b>MOBILISATION</b></p> <p>Participatory planning process (Analysis of the existing situation)</p>		<p><b>Right to Housing:</b> Core of the Movement</p> <p><b>Right to the City:</b> Core and looser segments of the movement</p>
<p>2006-2007</p> <p><b>No Threat - No Opportunity</b></p> <p>Separation along Political Lines</p> <p><b>INACTIVITY</b></p>		<p><b>Right to the city, right to housing:</b> Core of the movement</p> <p>NO MOBILISATION</p>
<p>2012: 1/1000 Implementation Plan Proposal</p> <p><b>Opportunity: A New Plan</b></p> <p>2012-2013</p> <p><b>REMOBILISATION</b></p> <p>Property – Based Conflicts</p>		<p><b>Right to Housing:</b> Core of the Movement</p> <p><b>Right to the City:</b> Core and looser segments of the movement</p> <p><b>Right to the Land Rent:</b> Looser segments of the movement Residents out of the movement</p>

However a different motivation occurs and effects the movement in the last period, which can be described as “right to the land rent”, through which collective consumption goal retreats among the residents and certain looser segments of the movement. It can be defined as the demand of the residents for a sufficient share from the increase in the land values in the neighbourhoods that will result from redevelopment through the urban transformation project to be implemented. Yet, there is no consensus on what is sufficient neither in the movement and among external actors, nor among the residents.

Right to Land Rent is expressed implicitly only by residents who are not a part of the movement and certain external actors on behalf of them. In other words, such **voices** are expressed not by the core movement actors, but **individuals** through these movements. It is expressed in the demands of locals for having parcel-based development and construction rights through private contractors on separate basis, rather than on the basis of block-based planning by establishing building cooperatives, as the words of a resident show: “I should be able to revalue my land myself and rebuild on it if I can. So is the general opinion of the residents here. If we are involved in big apartments here, we never know who will come and live in front”. (I20).

This can be understood as a demand for existence against an old state of disregard. However, this is never explicitly expressed by core of the movement. The locals express this demand and external actors confirm that they have such claims. The justification here is that the houses they have built so far are already earned since they have spent much effort to survive in these conditions where they were cheap labour for the industry and not protected by the state. They also feel they have a right from the increased value of land prices/land rent to be generated thanks to their current rightfully acquired ownership rights. Moreover, this right to rent motivation is considered as something natural by some internal and external actors, since it is the rule neoliberal urbanisation rests upon and it would be naive to think a local person restrain from it, while the rich capitalists do never. In other words, there is not much abstention in this rent seeking behaviours. One of the external actors from Solidarity Workshop, who worked with the neighbourhoods around 2006-2007 expresses this clearly: “Is there something more stupid then not expecting a rent-seeking behaviour from local grocery owner Ahmet, when Ali Ağaoğlu is running after rent?”. (I10).

Moreover, there is a concern among the movement actors about the likelihood of an increase in such individual claims for right to land rent, as the words of a local activist clearly highlights: “people struggle together against urban transformation, even with those whom they are at dispute with. But, I do not know to what extent they will stand together when it is time for construction” (I7).

The different rights claimed, their causes, by whom they are claimed and ways of expression are summarised in Table 7.

In sum, as shown in Table 6 and Table 7, right to the city and right to housing has been two main claims inherent in the core of the movement, during the course of the last decade, independent from the problems faced by the neighbourhoods, namely political bifurcation and property-based concerns. However, in the period of inactivity, only the core of the

movement, mainly through GÜLDAM continued with its activities, though at a more city-wide scale, whereas, in the first period, right to housing is a common claim for everyone in the neighbourhoods. In the last period on the other hand, the movement faces a new claim from the residents, right to the land rent, which constitutes yet another challenge for the movement. Further conclusions driven from this process of differentiating rights and right holders are discussed in the next section.

Table 7: Types of Rights Claimed, Causes and Claimers

<b>Type of Right Claimed:</b>	<b>Cause</b>	<b>Who claims?</b>	<b>Expressed:</b>
<b>Right to the City</b>	general insecurity	core of the movement	collectively
<b>Right to Housing</b>	spatial insecurity	core of the movement, looser segments of the movement	
<b>Right to Land Rent</b>	to increase property rights	looser segments of the movement residents out of the movement	individually

## 6.5. Concluding Remarks on the Last Decade of Gülsuyu-Gülensu Movement

The above analysis of the last decade of mobilisations in Gülsuyu-Gülensu, divided into three periods, serves for the first aim of the thesis, namely for showing the fragmentation within the movement along political lines and later fragmentation among the residents and in the looser segments of the movement, along property-based lines, which becomes yet another challenge for the movement itself.

Moreover, this analysis also serves for the second aim of the thesis, which was to show the state of individual interests versus collective rights. The engagement of the movement with city-wide issues in the period of inactivity and its remobilisation in the last period also points to the intertwine of right to the city and right to housing claims in the movement and the strong insist for solidarity within the neighbourhoods preventing it from becoming an interest group. In doing this, this process also points to the deepening role of the external actors, as well as changing relationships of the movement with the municipality towards negotiation and cooperation, which are two issues that will be elaborated in the next chapter.

Castells (1983) had argued that, as discussed in the literature review in detail, urban (social) movements had three major goals: collective consumption, cultural identity, and political self-management. He further contended that separation of any of these goals would turn it to an interest group (p.328). He linked this also to their discourse: ‘When the vocabulary becomes so restricted (a single focus on rent control for instance) the movements lose their



appeal and become yet another interest group in a pluralist society (p.331)'. Taking a close look at the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement reveals that they have never become, at least as yet, an interest group. First, it has all three goals incorporated: right to housing as a dimension of collective consumption, cultural identity that come into being through their non-material demands on preserving their community relations, and the motivation of self-determination of their future, if not self-management. Besides, they have been sensitive to city-wide urban issues and urban transformation in different *gecekond* neighbourhoods. Moreover, the movement did not lose neither these goals in its ten years of mobilisation process, nor the sensitivity to city-wide issues. Therefore, it is argued here that, Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement articulated the claims of right to the city and right to housing, as a consequence of the presence of all three goals and sensitivity to city-wide issues. In connection with this, the movement strongly insists on solidarity between property owners and non-owners for a unified solution that will not deprive any of the residents of their right to housing. It is able to show empathy with others' concerns, which is not the case for an interest group. Moreover, the core of the movement perceives the arising individual interests or group interests (of property owners) as a new challenge. In this respect, when talking about an urban movement, one should not be confused by these interests among the residents, watering down the movement struggle into a bargaining process. If it is a bargaining process at hand, then there is no movement any more, but an interest group. Gülsuyu-Gülensu on the other hand still exists as an urban movement.

On the other hand, despite its insistence on solidarity, Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement is still prone to instability and separations when it encounters new threats and opportunities brought by the neoliberal urban development, such as demolishment and new building rights for the residents with a chance of a better life. In case of the demolishment threat, it was subject to a political fragmentation. In case of the opportunity for redevelopment, it was challenged by property-based conflicts. Although the political fragmentation was eliminated by the new opportunity, property-based motives in the neighbourhoods and in some looser segments of the movement still entails a risk of fragmentation. It is argued here that, these motives come into being under the claim 'right to the land rent'. The movement is therefore facing this powerful dilemma: will it be 'democratic', respecting the majority view shaped by property-based concerns and consequent claims of right to the land rent, or will it continue to stand in solidarity defending the collective rights, despite these individual interests shared by the majority. As is well evident in the principles put forward by the movement itself, or the 'neighbourhood demands' in their own words, the movement aims at a unified solution; however it is powerless against the dilemma mentioned above.

Thirdly, the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement is engaged in negotiation and cooperation with the municipality in their last period, confirming the argument of Mayer (2003) about the movements using increasingly more non-confrontational methods, but methods based more on compromise. They do it not in the form of cooperation in service provision as in Mayer's analysis, but by taking the role of a consensus organiser within the movement, for a smoother planning process. In a democratic and participative planning practice, the planners of the municipality were supposed get into the field and organise this consensus. However, Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement is now doing this on its own. On the other hand, the

antagonism never seizes to dominate in relations between the District Municipality and the movement, which is an issue to be elaborated in the next chapter.

Besides, and as a final point for this chapter, Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement is engaged in this consensus organising through the external actors. The traditional technical and legal support role of the external actors has deepened in the last period to incorporate support in organisation of this consensus with the municipality. In doing this, the external actors also provide them with bureaucratic knowledge, without which movements lose their bargaining power (Demirtaş-Milz, 2013). In that external actors show possible options in negotiating and assist them actively in these processes. However this time, their language attains a more didactic and enforcing character, which is an issue that deserves further discussion in the next chapter, in the framework of the fourth aim of the thesis, exploring external actors and external relations.

## CHAPTER 7

### **GÜLSUYU-GÜLENSU HAS MORE TO TELL: FURTHER FINDINGS ON THE MOVEMENT'S INTERNAL AND CONTEXTUAL FEATURES**

The above discussions and findings on the last decade of Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement focused on the effects of politisation on the movement that led to fragmentation, cooperation of the movement both with the external actors and the local state, the different types of rights claimed and the deepening role of external actors. The thesis has further goals though. This chapter therefore serves to these aims not addressed or are not fully addressed by the last chapter. In this respect, it points to new findings which deserve further discussion. These findings can be grouped under following four headings: search for a labour struggle with a view to the positioning of the residents as rightful owners or occupiers and their contemplation of being a rightful owner as a part of their right to the city, the external actors of the movement with a view to their roles and conflicts with the movement, and finally the relations with the municipality as a more complex relation involving conflicts.

#### **7.1. Search for a Labour Struggle with a View to the Positioning of the Residents as Rightful Owners or Occupiers**

This section intends to discuss the aspects of Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement which makes it closer to a labour struggle. In doing this, it is asked whether people living in *gecekondu* settlements are unrightful occupiers without any rights to live in the area, or have they become rightful owners in the process. In answering this question, it is argued that, the neighbourhoods have been formed in a social process from 1950s onwards, in which the labour of the settlers themselves has been invested. It is through this invested labour that a piece of vacant land became a living space integrated with the rest of the urbanity. In turn, 'labour' comes to the fore as an inherent part of 'right to the city' claims of today's residents and thereby strengthens these claims.

This argument derives its theoretical background from the philosophical question of 'how anyone should ever come to have a property in anything', asked by John Locke more than three centuries ago in the second one of his books, 'Two Treaties of Government'. He, with this book published in 1689; had presented the ideas he developed for a more civilized society based on 'natural law' and still sheds lights into current analysis. These ideas are later embodied in the 'Labour Theory of Property', according to which, to put it simply, it is the labour that put the difference of value on everything, and in parallel, it is one's labour which makes things belong to him or her. He further argues:

The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property... For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.' (Locke, 2003, p.?)

This 'Labour Theory of Property' may be thought to be inapplicable under advanced capitalism, where labour is of value only when purchased by the capitalist in return for money. However, the *gecekondü* phenomenon in developing countries allows for reconsideration of labour in acquisition of property. Whereas proletariat have long been connected to landlessness in the European experience, this was not the case in peripheral societies, as argued by Leontidou (1985), due to popular land colonisation that has been a recurrent massive phenomenon. Here, by popular land colonisation, Leontidou refers to the development of *gecekondü* areas in such peripheral societies. However, for I put the labour of people into the heart of the analysis, I prefer not to use the concept of land colonisation, but land appropriation, due to former's negative connotations. So, coming back to my argument, land appropriation by people themselves in peripheral societies and developing a piece of land into an urban space by their own efforts, namely through investing their labour in it -which is elaborated below as a process- attributes a dimension of a labour struggle to their contemporary urban struggles. In other words, they in the end defend and protect their homes which are the returns of their labour.

It needs to be added that Leontidou's point of departure is a little different than mine, though similar. In her analysis on the Mediterranean city, rather than the labour-intensive fashion of the development of the squatter areas, Leontidou emphasizes the role of proletariat in developing subordinate modes of land allocation in peripheral societies, as opposed to the dominant mode of land allocation, which are mainly through the market and the state. She argued:

'by collectively claiming land the squatters first surpass the stage of competitive individualism; then they question integration in the system of landownership rights imposed by the market; at some point they may even question its legitimacy consciously and collectively' (Leontidou, 1985).

She further developed her argument as follows, bringing the class issue into her analysis:

The dominant classes usually own land, and chose their residential space relatively unrestricted by material constraints. By contrast, the location and tenure patterns of the working class are constrained by a series of objective forces, which result in the emergence of a great variety of relationships to land, and produce the least homogenous housing conditions. Such variations make the proletariat perhaps the most crucial class in any study of urban development, or even urban geography more generally (Leontidou, 1990, p.17).

She then emphasized the spatiality of working-class experience, by arguing that this spatiality can be introduced through the study of the working classes' relationship to urban land, rather than focusing only on the working conditions as an influence on labour consciousness (Leontidou, 1990). .

My question here is, -abstaining from investigating a class dimension within the merits of my current research and considering it as a priority for further research- whether the residents of gecekondu settlements of the deprived are rightful owners of the land they have appropriated for themselves through their labour or they are occupiers since they appropriated something for their private use, which formerly belonged to the common. The former argument is shared as a position by the residents and individual external actors against the latter, which is the hegemonic view in the society. This is also one of the justifications behind urban transformation projects. According to this hegemonic view, gecekondu residents are occupiers, not owners of the land they live on, because they did obtain neither the land nor their houses in any of the 'legitimate' methods of the capitalist system: housing supply through market mechanism and social housing by the government. The latter method was indeed did not exist at those times in Turkey.

In the case of Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement too, the residents and individual external actors believe that the people have become rightful owners of their houses, for they have built them with their own labour. How can the concept 'labour' be defined here? It is embedded in the fifty-years history of the neighbourhoods. They came to Istanbul from their villages from 1950s onwards and;

- found a suitable piece of vacant land in *hemşehrilik* relations,
- carried/transported the necessary materials and equipment for construction themselves,
- constructed the houses themselves, through the cooperation of members of the family and help of neighbours,
- struggled to protect their houses, sometimes at the cost of their lives, from being pulled down by the state,
- reconstructed their houses each time after they are pulled down,
- had to commute long distances for years on foot due to lack of transportation facilities to get to work,
- provided water, electricity and sanitary facilities themselves,
- maintained and coordinated the construction of the main streets.

The points given above are just a humble attempt to define the labour they invested in their neighbourhood, which may not mean much unless personally experienced. However, here one should be content with words. Apart from these, as mentioned in the beginning of the thesis, since the initial years of their settlement in the area, the residents of Gülsuyu-Gülensu had worked mostly in the factories in surrounding Tuzla and Kartal Districts. (The industrial employment has obviously decreased parallel to the moving out of the heavy industry from inner city areas, which is indeed a global trend). Therefore, in addition to the labour they have directly invested in the neighbourhoods, there is the investment of the residents in terms of money, which is the return of again their labour in these industrial sites. In turn, they:

- paid for the material and equipment to construct their houses,
- jointly paid for bringing the water, electricity and sanitary facilities to the neighbourhoods,
- jointly paid for the construction of main roads.

The points enlisted above aim to represent the labour invested in the neighbourhoods, and are driven from own words of locals: “You cannot know in what conditions I built this house. I carried the water myself each day, I brought the electricity myself...”. “...People were carrying the bricks on their shoulders from down to up. They were carrying the cement on their shoulders”. “Yes, we have houses, but we all had to spend exactly the same amount as the money value of these houses, to make them liveable”. “Building of a house here takes 10-15 years. They were built step by step. People do not build them and be finished at once”.

No doubt many people suffered while building these neighbourhoods. Serious sufferings. 3 of our friends even died, it is with respect I stand before them. İbrahim Kaya, Yaşar Yiğit, Mustafa Tunç. They had put so much effort in here. But they died, like many revolutionists. (P7).

Some say for us ‘they are grabbers’, as if we came and settled in these places which belonged to their fathers, grandfathers. These lands belong to all of us. Yes, we came here, and built our houses just to claim our housing rights. We had so many difficulties. At first, wind was entering from one side of the house and going out from the other. We didn’t have roads. No electricity. We maintained all of these with our own resources. (P7).

We have a street, Telsizler Street. In 1986, we didn’t have it. But the entrance to the neighbourhood was again from that point. If fire trucks were going to enter, they would have to come from there. Roads are too steep in our neighbourhood. A house on the top burnt. Burnt totally with the children. Fire truck couldn’t come. It came, but stuck in the middle, since there was no real street. For this reason, I and the headman of the time collected money from the residents. I never forget, we had collected 690 Liras of the time. And then we had the Telsizler Street constructed with that money.... We did this many times. (P8).

In 1994, in the upper part of the neighbourhood, the military had come for demolition. The lieutenant asked ‘Whose house is this? Why did you build such a big one? We will pull it down.’ Well, he could do it. He had done it to many others. I have no difference than the others. Then he said ‘we are hungry’. We went to the groceries and bought bread, cheese and olives. After the military ate what we brought, my father asked ‘My lieutenant, look, this house is saying, forgive me for the sake of this bread’. Then they did not pull down the house... (P8).

Same local continues: “The state had really no contribution here. It had only contribution with the Amnesty Laws after 1986. The streets were drawn, but we had already defined them”. (P8). Another one stresses that she built the house she was living in with the money she laid aside throughout her whole life, accepting that this would sound like a fairy tale to

many (I20) , while another one said he invested all his post-retirement gratuity of 21 years of work into the construction of his house (I21). The same local answers the question of what they think about urban transformation simply as “We are against it, because all these are our labour”.

In short, they all firmly assert that their labour is invested in their houses. Moreover, they emphasize that their homes were not earned for free, but as a return for their employment in the surrounding industry.

The above mentioned process has resulted in the development of an idle piece of land into a vivid urban settlement, as a part of the broader city. This development is realised by the residents themselves. Therefore, as reflected in their words, the locals perceive themselves not occupiers of the land they have settled on, as opposed to the hegemonic view in the society, but as rightful owners of both the land and the houses they had constructed with their own resources and they have been living in since then. Moreover, the residents have provided for long years the surrounding industry with their cheap labour. So, the movement actors, and the residents in general, see their houses as the compensation for their cheap labour. In other words, they view the *gecekondu* as an inseparable element of the value they have created through their ‘cheap’ labour. Therefore, they not only perceive this condition of being rightful owners as a matter of right to housing, but link it with their right to the city in general and define it as the basis of their contemporary mobilisation against urban transformation, justifying it both through their labour invested in the development of the neighbourhoods, and provision of cheap labour for the city’s economy. In other words, they have created an urban space using their labour, and integrated it with the rest of the city, by direct investment of their labour in their homes and providing cheap labour for the industry.

In conclusion, the *gecekondu* phenomenon of Turkey in general and of Istanbul in particular, as a historical and social process, attributes an explicit labour struggle dimension linked to the movement’s right to the city claims, by legitimising it on the basis of the labour invested in both the reproductive and productive spheres. That is to say, people mobilise based on the contention that they have right to the city, for, and above all, they have their labour invested.

## **7.2. The External Actors of the Movement: Their Further Contributions in and Conflicts with the Movement**

The co-working of the internal actors of an urban movement of the deprived and external actors was put forward in section 5.3 as the first and main type of relation between this urban movement of the deprived and the discontented, the second type being the city-wide, nation-wide and international initiatives through which they come together. The latter type of relation was elaborated and evaluated as useful for both sides, while the former type was left for further explanation and discussion based on the findings of the case study. This section serves for this purpose.

First of all, as the case of Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement shows, external actors have a critical role in urban movements of the deprived. Here it is intended to focus more closely on four issues. First is a more detailed analysis of the roles of external actors in urban movements of the deprived and the outcomes of these roles. Second is the nature of the relationship between external actors and the internal actors of the movement. Is this relationship as smooth and peaceful as it might seem, or are there conflicts arising during the course of this relationship process? If there are, what are these conflicts? Third point is the motives behind the external actors in supporting the struggles in neighbourhoods. Why are they doing this? How do they perceive what they are doing? And the final point is the rationale behind defining the external actors as composed of professionals, but not, for example, the media and the political parties as well.

The roles of external actors for the movements of the deprived was broadly defined before as awareness raising on the need for an organised struggle, direct or indirect consciousness raising on city-wide issues and their ‘right to the city’, and finally technical and legal information support. Going one step further in defining their roles, based on the findings from Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement, it is argued that these roles can be further elaborated and categorised as below, for urban movements of the deprived in Istanbul in general, and for Gülsuyu-Gülensu in particular:

- Technical and Legal Support
  - providing the locals with necessary information (technical, legal) on their rights, and what plans will bring,
  - translating the technical and legal language to local one.
- Organisational Support
  - bringing in consciousness to the neighbourhoods for on organized struggle,
  - mobilizing the neighbourhood for alternative planning,
  - developing alternative solutions for the neighbourhoods,
  - encouraging the neighbourhoods to work on city-wide issues and cooperate with each other.
- Empowerment
  - being an intermediary between the movement and the municipality, facilitating their consensus building process
  - incorporation of non-owners and tenants
  - awareness raising against rent seeking individualistic interests,
  - building national and global links,
  - manufacturing public opinion and bringing in visibility (attracting media attention),

These roles of external actors are relevant for urban movements of the deprived in general, however can differentiate between different movements as to the extent and effect of each role. First of all, generally, neighbourhoods feel the need of carrying out an organised struggle against the urban transformation they face, but do not know where to start and apply to external actors, for example through Urban Movements Forum, mentioned in Chapter 5. Or they need to consult to the activists in other neighbourhoods. However, in



Gülsuyu-Gülensu, external actors did not have a role in initiating the struggle or raising awareness for an organised struggle, neither in the first mobilisation against the 2004 1/5000 Master Plan, nor the recent remobilisation in response to District Municipality's proposal. There has always been an endogenous mobilisation thanks to the strong solidarity culture in the neighbourhoods, along with the activism of the headmen. On the other hand, external actors step in soon after the initial mobilisation has already been there. In other words, although these external actors have a determining role, there is an endogenous potential in the field that triggers the mobilisation, which is not always the case in neighbourhoods. In Gülsuyu-Gülensu, external actors are crucial in helping the neighbourhoods in managing this endogenous potential and have a vital role in not wasting this potential.

The provision of further support from outside by the external actors can be given as a second example for differentiations between the roles of external actors in different neighbourhoods. In some movements, bringing further support from outside can be an important role for the external actors. This is realised basically in two ways: bringing in the support of political parties, and bringing in the support of international organisations (like UN Habitat, International Alliance of Inhabitants). For example in Ayazma neighbourhood, where the Kurdish population lived, who were forced to migrate to metropolitan cities in 1990s, external actors were effective maintaining the support of political parties especially for the tenants. Tenants in Ayazma were before urban transformation paying 200-250 TL as a rent, a very low price that would be almost impossible to find anywhere else in the city. Consequently, they would be left on the street -which was the case for most of them, as mentioned in chapter 4. In Ayazma, their main external actor, an activist and a writer (I2), maintained serious support for the tenants to become property owners through her contacts with two members of the parliament, both from AKP (ruling party). She explains this support as follows:

I had talked to the Mayor of the District Municipality for the tenants in Ayazma. We had an unpleasant discussion and I had to leave shutting the door. A Member of Parliament from AKP is a friend of mine from high school. He said on the phone, 'Cihan, Mayor is waiting for you, go and talk'. I said that I could not, because I had a quarrel with him. He forced me to go. The Mayor really welcomed me afoot. And he began to get his hands on the situation of the tenants, starting official correspondence with HDA. I cannot undervalue the contributions of another Member of the Parliament, also from AKP. He acted like an intermediary since he is a person of that region as well. Afterwards, a process started allowing tenants to possess property. (I2).

This shows that the deprivation can in fact be prevented even within the system, through utilising the fault lines inherent to it. Things can be kept moving in Turkey by one telephone contact with a Member of the Parliament, which is an often expressed problem of the system. Fortunately, this had served to good ends. Moreover, this also shows the extent an external actor can affect the people's lives. On the other hand, this kind of a support from external actors has not happened in Gülsuyu-Gülensu, since issues that require political support are dealt within the neighbourhoods, by the already political actors of the movement. The neighbourhoods have also two members in the CHP District Presidency,

and members in CHP Women Branch. Moreover, they have contact with CHP District Presidency. For example, CHP Maltepe District President attended the working breakfast mentioned in the methodology section.

The support from international organisations through external actors, on the other hand, is maintained not for single neighbourhoods, but for more general issues that concerns all neighbourhoods under urban transformation risk, including Gülsuyu-Gülensu. For example, I2, as a member of Urban Movements Forum, is also the Turkish local expert of Advisory Group on Forced Evictions of United Nations Habitat. This international title had a key function for her, as she states, to draw attention to neighbourhoods in Turkey and abroad and increase their visibility. With this title, she attended international meetings and provided the support of international figures working on the issue of housing right. With this support they organised an event in Istanbul in 2011 named “Neighbourhoods are Uniting”. It was first of its kind, as she said, bringing together the representatives of different neighbourhoods. Moreover, Urban Movements Forum being the initiator, the Law no 6308 on the Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risk was sent to the United Nations Human Rights Council in the beginning of 2012. The translation cost of the Law was covered by Chamber of Architects Istanbul Branch. The Law was examined by the Special Reporter on ‘adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living’. The critic of the Law by the reporter was involved in the UN Human Rights Council’s ‘Communications Report on Special Procedures’, which was given in section 5.4. on legal and administrative framework. This Joint Report, including many other issues that are deemed as violations of human rights from different countries, were also communicated to relevant states, including the Turkish Republic, asking for clarification. According to the information shared in Urban Movements Forum e-mail Group, no answer was sent back to the Council by Turkish Republic. However, this is a very concrete example of how external actors try to bring international support for neighbourhoods.

As regards to external actors’ technical and organisational support, in both mobilisations - the first in 2004 and the second in late 2013- of Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement, the support of the external actors was first in technical and organisational nature. However, after the mobilisations matured to some extent, their support became increasingly more in the form of empowerment. One of the most important contributions of the external actors was awareness raising against rent seeking behaviour. They clearly showed that only in a unified solution for the whole of the neighbourhoods, would they continue to support them, even to the extent of representing the neighbourhoods’ interest in front of the municipalities, which was one of the anticipations of the movement from the external actors. A member of GGBA, whom the locals call ‘Oya Abla’ meaning ‘Sister Oya’, stated clearly in one of the initial meetings: “We give you our opinions and you will tell these to the municipality. It is always different to talk with the qualifications of a planner or a lawyer”. (P9).

The response of the external actors to this demand was positive; on condition that individual rent seeking is not the final objective. The lawyer from Solidarity Workshop made this point clearly:

The ideal is that the neighbourhoods represent themselves. However, if there is integrity on the truth and identity between us and the neighbourhoods, then there is no problem for us in representation. We can go anywhere provided that this integrity is maintained. (P2).

Another dimension of empowerment of the movement by the external actors is the intermediary role of the latter in the former's relations with the municipality, as mentioned in section 7.3 of the previous chapter on remobilisation in the neighbourhoods. It was emphasized that the movement acquired a consensus organising role among the residents for a unified solution. In fact, this role emerged thanks to the enforcement by the external actors, within their role of awareness raising against individualistic rent seeking behaviour. That is to say, the external actors forced the movement, before sitting on a table with the municipality, to be a consensus organiser in the neighbourhoods to convince the rest of the residents for a unified solution, namely block-based allocation through cooperatives, by speaking to their mind and conscious. The external actors often encouraged the movement to do so, when it was discouraged by the rent-seeking individualistic trend in the neighbourhoods:

The way for no more deprivation here is allocation of the land itself. The legal name for it here is cooperative...You should explain all these to people. It doesn't work without explaining. They will ask 'I have my title deed already, why is my title deed given to me not individually but when I come together with other four?'. This will be the trend. You should be able to manage this trend and convince them. You should design it as something more valuable in both social and money terms, and tell to the residents. (P2).

In this encouragement, the external actors' emphasis was also on establishment of a partnership within the residents, including the terms of this agreement, as to how the differentiations between the existing property rights will be reflected in the future solution. Should it be equalized, or should the existing differences be kept? The important point here is that the external actors left this decision totally to the movement itself. And, as the principles of the movement, given in section 7.3 demonstrate, the movement left room for a flexibility here, by admitting the free choice of the residents on a parcel-based or a block-based zoning and construction. And the external actors claim or hold no responsibility in the decisions of the movements by underlining that the decision-making was solely the task of the neighbourhoods: "Don't put the responsibility to the shoulders of the experts, to those who have technical knowledge... You will give the answer here". (P2).

Moreover, within their empowerment role, external actors also aim to raise the awareness of the movement on city-wide issues. They bring the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement in particular and other neighbourhood movements in general together with the urban movements of the discontented, which they are also usually a part of, through both city-wide initiatives and throughout their activities in the neighbourhoods. It was asked before whether this bridging role of external actors can result in a merger between these two different types of movements. Mayer also asked a similar question, when discussing the possibilities for overcoming the fragmentation in the movement terrain (2009). This is both a very simple and at the same time a very difficult question. It is simple in the sense that merger does not

seem to be possible even in the long-run. Taksim Solidarity movement may seem to be a merger, but it has merged such a great variety of issues, from preservation of a park to respect to different life styles and freedom of expression, from secularism to disproportionate use of force by the police, that it was no more an 'urban' movement at the final stage. On the other hand, it is a difficult question when looked in closer. Difficulty is two-fold. First, making a distinction between institutional external actors and individual activists, which is detailed in what follows, the former actors are the backbone of urban movements of the discontented, obviously more effective than the latter type of actors. They have been the forerunners in Taksim Solidarity, Haydarpaşa Solidarity, struggles against the demolition of Emek Theatre Building, etc. However, they retreat from urban movements of the deprived, for reasons mentioned above. This constitutes the first barrier against a possible merger. On the other side of the coin is the internal situation of urban movements of the deprived. As Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement shows, such movements are busily involved in struggling against the threats or in trying to make use of the opportunities they face. Only in periods when such threats and opportunities do not exist, can they be actively engaged in urban issues that do not directly concern their own neighbourhood. Therefore, there are obstacles for a merger between urban movements of the deprived and the discontented, from both sides. Only when the 'gecekondu problem' that surrounds the Turkish cities like a 'tumour', as recently described by the Prime Minister, is totally solved, which is aimed by the government through Law no 6306, the so-called 'Disaster Law', the first obstacle may be eliminated.

All in all, this empowerment role of the external actors focuses on preventing rent seeking behaviour, smoothing the relationships process with the municipality. In other words, this time the external actors was not only giving a direct technical or legal support to the neighbourhoods, but using their own technical and legal knowledge to facilitate the negotiation process between the municipality and the movement, orientating it towards a cooperation that will be within the merits of the law, and to the benefit of all residents of the neighbourhoods, including those with no property rights, namely residents with no title deeds and tenants. Here it is necessary to add that, Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement, similar to other movements of the deprived, is mobilized and carried out by property owners. Tenants are rarely involved. They usually do not exist in the movement, even at discourse level. However, external actors try to involve tenants in the movement, raising their awareness on their potential losses (economic ones), or encouraging the core of the movement to do so. However, this is totally dependent on the conditions and sensitivity of the tenant. In other words, if the tenant finds the overall opportunity cost of being a part of the struggle higher than moving out of the neighbourhoods, then they may be part of the movement.

The second point of discussion in this section is on the conflicts arising between the external actors and the movement. Apart from these contributing roles of external actors, there may be at times conflicts in between. As a first step in discussing this issue, it would be useful to divide the external actors into two groups: The first is the voluntary individuals, the second is the institutions. In this respect, the external actors of the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement can be listed as below.

Voluntary individuals:

- professionals (planners, architects, engineers, lawyers),
- academics,
- students.

These voluntary individuals are usually members of initiatives bringing together different external actors. For Gülsuyu-Gülensu neighbourhoods it is the Solidarity Workshop.

Institutions:

- Professional organisations (Chambers of City Planners, Chambers of Architects, Bar Associations, Chambers of Engineers)
- Universities

It is important to capture attention to individual activism here. Most of the concrete support for the neighbourhoods is provided by individual activists who are part of civic initiatives, i.e. Solidarity Workshop, or who act independent from any initiative, through mainly personal contacts with the neighbourhoods, like the civil engineer. They may also have a function in a university or a chamber; however they do not use such identity in their role within the movement. On the other hand, institutional external actors are mostly effective not in urban movements of the deprived like Gülsuyu-Gülensu, but in urban movements of the discontented as mentioned above. Representative of Istanbul Chamber of Architects Karaköy Branch states this clearly:

We are interested more in public spaces than the neighbourhoods; like Haydarpaşa, Taksim. Because they do not have any owners. It is not very correct to be involved after the neighbourhoods have already organised. Chamber of Architects does not see it as politically correct. (I1).

She means here that they, in principle, do not intervene in the movement, after it has been matured to some extent to manage to stand on its own legs. However, it is actually never clear at what stage a movement has become sufficiently mature and can carry on its own, or whether a movement can reach such a stage. This is in fact the point where the conflict between the institutional external actors and the movement emerges. The value of the support of individual activists being acknowledged by the movement of Gülsuyu-Gülensu, the main actors of the movement perceive the role of institutional external actors within customary boundaries of legal and bureaucratic framework, and criticize them for not being an integral part of the movement. A local activist puts forward the situation as such:

We would anticipate a firm position from Chamber of City Planners and Chamber of Architects. I do not want to say they were insufficient, but they had kind of a diffidence. Perhaps they did not want to appear as the defender of the 'gecekondü'. But neither do we defend the gecekondu. ... People have to do this when they have no alternatives. We would expect them to be explicitly at our side. (I3).

This conflict between urban movements of the deprived and institutional external actors, who are at the same time actors of urban movements of the discontented (the first sub-

category defined in chapter 5, section 1), exacerbates the fragmentation in the movement terrain, which is different than the fragmentation between coopera(tive movements and radical movements, that was put forward by Mayer. Moreover, Strahe 2004) argues that the movements from 1990s onwards have been subject not only to fragmentation, but also individualization, which is a feature of post-1990 society. Accordingly, this individualization occurs through the individual activities of a number of people, mostly highly qualified, who carry out campaigns of their own, often through debate articles in the press or through other initiatives. The external actor, I2, may be argued to represent such an individualisation in Istanbul's movement terrain.

The above mentioned conflicts do not arise in the case of voluntary activism, thanks to the voluntarism itself. If individual external actors do not want to stand with the movement anymore, either believing that the movement can stand on its own legs or just because of personal issues or internal issues in the movement, whatever the reason might be, they can simply stop supporting them. From that moment onwards, they are not external actors any more. Therefore, if a conflict arises between the movement and the external actors, it does not sustain, since the individual actors have the chance to leave the movement by his/her own will. On the other hand, retreat by voluntary individuals can emerge in case of fragmentation within the movement. In other words, they may retreat not out of a conflict in the movement, but more as a matter of discomfort of themselves. For example, this was the case in the first mobilisation period of Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement, when a fragmentation along political lines occurred. It seems that similar discomfort can also emerge among the external actors in the future, if the movement cannot prevent the individual rent seeking behaviours from dominating the collective goals.

The third focus of this section is on the motives behind the external actors in helping the urban movements of the deprived. Above all, the external actors are engaged in these processes first as a part of a broader political struggle against neoliberal urban development, and more generally as an element of their left-wing political views, entailing a stance with the deprived. The discontented have a certain general position to which their roles in the movements of the deprived are closely related. In a word, they argue that urban transformation should not serve for profit seeking capital, but for people. Secondly, and obviously in connection with the first point, another important motive in their engagement with urban movements of the deprived is their firm belief in the fact that their disciplines, either planning, or architecture or law, should above all produce knowledge for the public. In parallel, they also anticipate a critical approach from universities as required by critical scientific thinking. In other words, the external actors view their role as a part of both their political views and in parallel, of their professions.

Final point of discussion of the section is about how to circumscribe the external actors as an important element in urban movements of the deprived. In fact, political parties and media too, might sometimes be regarded as external actors for movements. For example, Castells (1983), on his study on Madrid's Citizen Movement in 1970s, adopts a broader understanding of external actors, calling them 'operators' and defining them as organisational means for the movement to relate to society as a whole (p.277). These operators are the media, the professionals, and above all, the left wing political parties.

However in Gülsuyu-Gülensu case, the external actors are limited to professionals, excluding the media and politics. This is a conscious exclusion with certain rationales behind it. First, the attention of mainstream media in Turkey on urban movements is low, which is an issue regarded as a problem by the Urban Movements Forum as well. Protests organised by urban movements are generally not regarded as newsworthy by such media. The lack of media attention is also highlighted in the relevant literature (Erder, 2004). Moreover, for example, urban movements have also been participating in Labour Day demonstrations in Taksim Square, Istanbul. However, they are given as environmentalist groups even in leftist media organs (Toplumsol, Fraksiyon). News on neighbourhood movements on the other hand rarely appears in mainstream media, and if they appear, this is thanks to the external actors of these movements. This appearance is either in the form of publishing of an article of an external actor on neighbourhoods in a media organ, or in cases where external actors bring neighbourhoods together with certain media organs. In other words, external actors are either directly involved or act as an intermediary. For example, the external actor I2 writes occasionally in *Radikal* – a national daily newspaper- on urban transformation, including neighbourhoods. That is to say, there is neither a considerable nor a direct media support for urban movements, especially when compared to the comprehensive and vital support of professionals. The media in Turkey does not strengthen the connection between the neighbourhoods and rest of the society, as it should have, according to Castells. This obviously holds true for Gülsuyu-Gülensu.

The situation of political parties for Gülsuyu-Gülensu is on the other hand different. There have always been groupings in the neighbourhoods between representatives of certain parties, which are, as listed before, ÖDP, TKP, EMEP and ESP. However, it is not possible to treat these political parties as external actors in Gülsuyu-Gülensu, for they have already been organised in the neighbourhoods in a strong way. In parallel, these parties have no supportive role as external actors, except for the members of the district assemblies of the political parties or certain voluntary activists and party members, who are already the residents, but additionally sensitive to urban issues. On the contrary, the role of these political parties might even be detrimental for the movement, as discussed in chapter 7. Therefore, they are not external, but internal parts of the neighbourhoods. The words of a local show this clearly: “We do not get any support from anywhere in political terms. Here everyone is political! The neighbourhoods are even further ahead<sup>18</sup>”. (I5).

Moreover, these radical left-wing parties, which the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement regard as their real allies at least theoretically, are criticized by the movement actors for not being so in practice, except for certain voluntary activists and party members as mentioned in the above paragraph. A local activist explains this:

They have no situation to look at the local, except their great political goals. Besides they have different problems, their own internal conflicts. I was a member of ÖDP until 2004. From 2004 to 2008, no friend from ÖDP came to our association (GGBA) to ask what we were doing. They

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<sup>18</sup> He meant they were more sensitive and active.

never asked how can we be helpful to you?... Without such a political background, all these local struggles go forward only to some extent. (I3).

Interestingly enough, the movement actors also think that, even the more powerful left of the centre political parties, who claim to be social democratic, do not provide a political background for their mobilisation against urban transformation and related issues. For example, the criticism in this sense against CHP is for their unclear attitude towards urban transformation and inability to propose alternative solutions. The CHP Maltepe District President clearly stated that they prefer not to intervene, but watch from outside, during his address of the working breakfast organised by GÜLDAM. He continued his speech yet again touching upon macro issues, which was thought to be unfortunate by the core movement actors:

...the essential thing is the agenda of Turkey. We are watching all together. They are heating the agenda and they will continue to do so. The primary contradiction of our country at the moment is evident: AKP and the Prime Minister. Whoever believes in democracy should be side by side against this contradiction. It is certain that AKP government will be in the graveyard of the history. In the end, people will win. Leftists will win! (P10).

Why do political parties not provide any support to the movement or support only exceptionally, through individual activists? The reason for extreme left-wing parties is actually given by the residents themselves: “They are so busy with the macro-scale that they cannot look at the local”. Furthermore, this business with the macro-scale at times causes inactivity in the movement. This issue is also discussed in section 5.3 on the relation between urban movements of the deprived and the discontented. The reason why the stronger left of the centre party, namely CHP does not provide support also lies in the speech of the District President. The politics they perform, at least at local level, is limited to their target to come into power. Neighbourhoods, on the other hand, are on their agenda as a part of their electoral campaign. Conflicts between the local politics and the movement will be discussed in the next chapter.

### **7.3. Cooperation with the Municipality as a More Complex Relation**

In neoliberal urban development, diverse actors, including the local state, large-scale investors and community initiatives come together around round-tables and make decisions together or assist each other, which is defined as ‘new bargaining mechanisms’ (Mayer, ...). As put forward in chapter 3 on urban movements, relations between certain urban movements and the local governments have become less antagonistic, but increasingly based more on cooperation. Here antagonistic relations refer to contradictions and conflicts between two parties. Through these relations, movements are provided with funding and become more sustainable, whereas the local government utilizes their innovative their potential. This also results in the professionalization and institutionalisation of movements,



whereby they began to behave in fact more like an interest group, rather than a movement. On the other hand, those movements who are not engaged in cooperation with the local government become increasingly radicalised, resulting in an overall fragmentation in the movement terrain.

The case of Gülsuyu-Gülensu shows that the local government might acquire a dual character for an urban movement of the deprived. First is its role as the provider of public services, such as planning, infrastructure provision, health and safety, etc. The second is its role as a local political actor. The nature of the relationship between the movement and the local government changes according to the role the latter has. Moreover, the antagonistic relations with the municipality prevailing regardless of the political party in rule, is a factor preventing the movement from becoming an interest group. This section deals with this issue, exploring the complex relations with the municipality with a view to its dual role.

Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement has been engaged in a more cooperative and less antagonistic type of a relationship with the Maltepe District Municipality as a public service provider. As explained in the previous chapter in detail, the movement and the District Municipality has cooperated for planning in the neighbourhoods since 2004. The District Municipality even supported the neighbourhoods in its successful opposition against the 2004 Master Plan. Thus, the movement has become an important stakeholder for the municipality in the planning process. This was the reason behind the fragmentation within the movement during its engagement in participative planning, between those who cooperated with the municipality and the radicals who refused to do so, followed by a long period of inactivity. It was argued before in the thesis that, this fragmentation within the movement was similar to the fragmentation Mayer argued for the movement terrain. That is to say, until now, the evolution of the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement itself has proved to show parallelism with what has been argued for the more general movement terrain, in terms of the fragmentation between cooperationists and radicals, although in the case of Gülsuyu-Gülensu, the cooperation did result in neither institutionalisation nor interest-group like behaviours in the movement. As stressed in chapter 7, Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement has always been a movement, and never an interest group, due to its on-going right to the city claims and stance in solidarity. On the other hand, the clear-cut and antagonistic relations have never disappeared between the movement and the municipality as a local political actor. This section intends to focus on these antagonistic relations of the movement with the municipality, aggrandised by the neoliberal urban development and the municipality being its main actor.

There are two local governments that are responsible for the neighbourhoods: Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and Maltepe District Municipality. The movement actors, particularly the associations and the headmen, have contacts with both of the municipalities, but have direct and more regular contacts with the Maltepe District Municipality. And it is the Maltepe District Municipality which is the main local political actor for the neighbourhoods. The government of District Municipality is from CHP, whereas the previous one was from AKP. And, the antagonism lies mainly in the lack of trust for the District Municipality among the movement and residents in general. As a local political

actor, the District Municipality represents the neoliberal urban policies, regardless of the political position of the local government.

So, the current political party in rule in Maltepe District Municipality is CHP and it was AKP in the previous period, and the conflicts between the movement and the municipality has persisted in both governments, without any change, despite their distinct ideologies. Fikri Köse, the Mayor of AKP local government in the previous period, had asked for the support of the neighbourhoods in local elections, promising for a solution that would not victimise anyone in the neighbourhood. But the residents, especially the movement actors, were criticizing him for not being explicit and transparent, and therefore not reliable about what his government was going to do with regards to urban transformation. They made demonstrations against him and made press releases to force him to take a firm position. As the neighbourhoods were convinced that the AKP local government would not satisfy their anticipations from urban transformation process, a high percentage of residents, together with those of the adjacent neighbourhood Başbüyük, which have traditionally supported right-wing conservative parties, supported in the next elections Mustafa Zengin, the candidate of CHP. In election campaigns, Mr. Zengin had used an anti-urban transformation agenda. As a result of both distrust of the three neighbourhoods for the AKP local government and the CHP candidate's own campaign against urban transformation, CHP won the next -and the latest- elections and came into power in Maltepe District, the Mayor being Mr. Zengin. In addition, the neighbourhoods now have two members in the Assembly of the District Municipality.

One of the local activists stresses the effect of CHP's anti-urban transformation discourse in its success in the elections as follows:

In a meeting we held with Mustafa Zengin when I was the President of the Association (GGBA), we were about 40 people. We explained our situation. We said: 'Look, if you win the elections, it will be because of urban transformation. But it is very important that you respond to this. I beat a path to his door, when Fikri Köse was the Mayor. But if you become he Mayor, I break your door. (I6).

However, as the entire neighbourhood representatives interviewed agreed, the Mayor from CHP behaved exactly the same way as the one from AKP, giving promises and asking people to trust to him, while the neighbourhood was expecting openness. The same local activist continues:

We were never able to find Mustafa Zengin. We tried to make an appointment with him during six months after his elections, but we could not. Then we finally made a meeting with hem. I told him: ' Do you know why Fikri Köse lost the elections? Because he could not respond to the planning process in Gülsuyu-Gülensu. Do you know how you won? Because Fikri Köse could not respond. If you cannot respond either, you will also go.' In our last meeting in Türkan Saylan Congress Centre, he put forward certain reasons like they had been so late. He said they were waiting for some formal letters from the Metropolitan Municipality, so on and so forth... But some say this step is yet another investment for

the next elections.. If they are doing this to win, it is OK with me, they shall win... (I6).

Another local criticized the officials of the Municipality in the same meeting for not being to the point:

We all participated in the last meeting we had with the Municipality. The neighbourhood associations, the headmen, Murat Yalçın, and the engineer, were all there. We all put forward our own perception. We said that 'AKP had not been transparent. But you are the same. You never come to the neighbourhood to explicitly share your ideas. You do not form a transparent relation with us, by not answering the question of how you will solve the problem and what barriers you have against it. They passed our question over with vague answers. They said, as the District Municipality, they had a limited authority, but they would always be with the neighbourhood. (I3).

Locals have similar complaints about the District Municipality:

Municipalities make their propaganda using urban transformation and saying that they would solve it. But, the mayor never came to our neighbourhoods. Not a single time. We visited him, together with nearly 30 of us. He said he would come with an answer in a month. It has been six months. He will still come... In fact this is not because he does not want. He knows the residents here are not sheep, they will demand something if he comes. They will hold him responsible, but not applaud like elsewhere. He has such concerns. (I13).

CHP won the local elections by criticizing AKP. We can safely say that they won't buy our votes and Başibüyük's. Nevertheless, we still do not know what the municipality is doing... We had better relations with AKP municipality. At least we knew about their attitude, their desire for rent. We were able to protest against them. But, CHP municipality looks like a friend of us, but still do the same. Social democracy or conservatism makes no difference in neoliberalism. Neoliberal governments are all the same. They all go with the logic of profit. (I3).

CHP District municipality obtained votes in here by claiming it was against urban transformation. And he came into force. But it has been 3,5 years, he never came here... He has a voting rate of around %78 in Gülsu. How can he still not come? . (I5).

The neighbourhoods here in fact behaved in an opportunistic way, by using their electoral power against the municipality in rule for a favourable solution for urban transformation. However, facing the same obscurity from the newly elected District Municipality, their strategy was to force them through the Maltepe District Presidency of CHP. They asked the District Presidency to put pressure on the District Municipality and uncover the problems, by again using their electoral power and putting forward the next elections as a bargaining chip. However, they were confronted with the same attitude as the District Municipality. The same activist complains as follows: "They sent us off saying they were with us while

stroking, just like the Municipality of CHP” (I5). Moreover, the neighbourhood representatives did not limit their strategy with CHP only, but paid a visit to Maltepe District Presidency of AKP as well. The Presidency representatives asked for a file where their solution alternatives are written to submit to the Mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbaş. The neighbourhood representatives became a little hopeful with this answer, not considering it at all as a different, though cleverer, way of sending off.

It is here argued that, in analysing the relationship between a movement and a local government, attention should be paid the latter’s dual role, as a service provider and a political actor. Antagonistic relations do not seize with the local government as a local political actor, whereas they might be replaced more cooperative type of relations when the role is public service provision. While neoliberal urban policies allows opportunities for non-antagonistic relations with the municipality as a public service provider, such as partnerships, bargaining, round-table discussions and other type of cooperation in the movement terrain, they, on the other hand, reinforce the antagonistic relations when local political actor identity of the municipality comes to the fore. Moreover, such antagonistic relations are inherent in the movements. In other words, I argue that urban movements, in fact social movements in general, are contentious by nature, when the municipality is a local political actor. By the time they seize do be so and lose their antagonistic character, they became interests groups, which is a different form than movements. In such an understanding, what Mayer meant by movement type ‘routinised cooperation with the state’ can be a movement as long as it cooperates with local government as the public service provider. Otherwise, it would actually be categorized as a category of interest groups.

In sum, depending on the role the local government acquires for the movement, neoliberal policies boost cooperation on one hand, while on the other hand reproducing and reconfiguring the antagonistic relations between the movements and them.

## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSIONS

Neoliberal urban policies have resulted in serious changes in the way urban areas develop and governed. The relevant literature, reviewed in chapter two, emphasizes basically three points. First is the creative destructive role of neoliberalism on regulatory frameworks, one of which is urban development. This creative destruction encompasses the restructuring the urban economy based more on real-estate and construction sectors, large-scale urban development schemes implemented in the form of ‘urban transformation projects’ in case of Turkey, changing role of the planning institution from an instrument of Fordist era into forms of more flexible intervention mechanisms which are realised mainly through these transformation projects, and the new urban governance mechanisms which are entrepreneurial, bringing together semi-public institutions, private companies and public-private partnerships, along with the public agencies. The second point is the restructuring in the neoliberalisation process itself, giving rise to authoritarian state forms within neoliberal policies, conceptualised as ‘new authoritarianism’. Thirdly, these neoliberal urban policies might constitute new wealth generation and distribution mechanisms, creating in parallel inequalities in the access of different groups to this newly generated wealth, as the Turkish case demonstrates. While all these changes have been taking place in cities and in their management under neoliberal rule, they are encountered by resistances and opposition from urban citizens, which constitute the contemporary urban movements, which is the core issue of the thesis.

Urban movements, as a means of contesting urban development policies and demanding change in them, are obviously not a new phenomenon, but date back at least to French Revolution. They have moreover been subject to important transformations until now, as the literature review in chapter two demonstrates. In this respect, urban movements of the contemporary neoliberal urbanisation are argued to mobilise based on non-class-based factors unlike in pre-1980, function less on antagonistic terms by cooperating and negotiating with business and public agencies, and do not constitute a homogenous entity, but are highly fragmented as between movements who are engaged in cooperation with the local state in a routinised fashion, and movements who are radicalised. Furthermore, external context surrounding the movements and the dynamics therein are emphasised as increasingly more determining in the mobilisation and further organisation of the movements.

I have also described the neoliberal urban development in Istanbul aiming at becoming the most important economic and cultural hub of its region, and stressed that urban development has become increasingly more neoliberal and therefore project-based in Istanbul too, through the so-called ‘urban transformation projects’, which are either in the form of

territorially-based urban renewal projects in generally degraded residential areas, or large scale prestige projects, which I called ‘special projects’ as a part of policies for global competitiveness and place-marketing. These projects in the urban space encounter resistances from groups of people in the city, which are either deprived of or discontented by them. Consequently, two main types of urban movements in contemporary cities develop; urban movements of the deprived and the urban movements of the discontented. The former are deprived by and mobilise against the above mentioned destruction in residential or mixed-use neighbourhoods for speculative redevelopment. The latter on the other hand, mobilise generally against all kinds of neoliberal urban policies including urban transformation projects in residential areas as well as special projects as part of broader investment attraction and place-marketing goals.

The empirical studies on the movements in Turkey focus mainly on movements of the deprived. As I interpret from these studies, particularly from those on Istanbul, the above mentioned inequalities among citizens in terms of the newly created wealth are presented as the main motivational factor mobilising the urban movements under neoliberal rules. In this respect, especially in the last decade, urban movements of the deprived are argued to be increasingly based more on individual interests, mobilising as reactions to neoliberal policies’ negative effects on the adherents’ own property or land. Moreover, as regards to this type of movements, residents do not react against transformation provided that they are satisfied with what is given to them as mentioned earlier. As a consequence, no movement occurs when there is no interest to rest it upon. Researches made in poor areas of urban transformation projects indicate –also mentioned by certain external actors during interviews I made- reactions and collective action start when the residents are not satisfied with their share in the rent to be generated, having quite individualistic and interest-based concerns as discussed in the preceding. Thus, it can be interpreted from the literature that neoliberal urbanisation today redefines the opposition against itself via its own instruments like urban development as a means of income distribution. It moreover defines their content based on defence of individual property rights.

Having made these interpretations from the theoretical and empirical literature, along with the basic categorisations regarding the movement milieu, I have conducted a qualitative field research on a deprived people’s movement in Istanbul, in Gülsuyu-Gülensu gecekondü neighbourhood and reached the following arguments. Firstly, in the neoliberal era, it is not only the movement terrain but also the movements themselves who might be subject to fragmentation. The threats as well as the opportunities brought by the neoliberal urban development make movements more prone to fragmentation across political lines and conflicts based on property ownership. As the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement shows us, a new plan bringing the risk of destruction in the neighbourhoods and evacuation of the residents, resulted in a powerful mobilisation and opposition, constituting the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement itself, which was later impeded by the separation between those who adopted a cooperationist strategy with the local government and engaged in a participative planning process, and those who refused any negotiation with the system, and radicalised. On the other hand, the recent planning initiative of the local state which would provide new property rights resulted in conflicts between the movement and the rest of the residents and partly within the movement based on property ownership. This shows that, urban

movements struggle against neoliberal urban development, but they are also unstable and prone to fragmentation facing the carrots and sticks shown by the latter. Secondly, although the empirical literature stresses on their individual interest-based character, defence of collective rights might still be the core issue in urban movements of the deprived. The strong and long-lasting solidarity culture in Gülsuyu-Gülensu neighbourhoods, the movement's endeavour to defend the housing rights of each and every citizen, by trying to eliminate the individualistic concerns within the residents and their determination to have a say in their future clearly show that Castells' emphasis on collective consumption rights, cultural identity, and political self-management is still relevant under current neoliberal conditions. By this way, the case Gülsuyu-Gülensu of movement reminds us the warning by Castells that they would become an interest group in case of a loss of these goals; or, in the same manner, it shows that they would not be an interest group provided that they preserve all three goals. Thirdly, this study emphasizes the labour intensive production process of these neighbourhoods, resulting in a piece of urban land what had initially been an idle piece of land, and the cheap labour provided by the residents to the surrounding industry. These two points legitimises the ownership of the *gecekondu* in the eyes of the residents and in fact constitutes the source of the movement's mobilisation. In this respect, the movement actors perceive themselves as rightful owners as opposed to hegemonic idea in the society that they are occupiers and this self-perception comes to the fore as the basis of their right to the city claims. Fourthly, the external actors, who are usually planners, architects and lawyers providing mainly technical and organisational support to the movements of the deprived, are the key instruments for them to carry out the relations with the system surrounding them. In this respect, Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement is endogenously mobilised, but organise and negotiate with the system –the local state- through the facilitating role of the external actors. The Gülsuyu-Gülensu case lastly shows that movements may cooperate with the local state as long as the latter has the role of a public service provider; however, if it takes on the role of a local political actor, the antagonistic relationship in between parties never seize, particularly in the neoliberal era.

What these findings altogether tell us can be grouped into two broad parts. First is related to its contribution into theory, and the second is on its contribution in the practice. Its contribution in the theory is two-fold. First is on our contemplation of a movement, regarding basically what makes it different than a group, along with the social and political implications of this contemplation in the neoliberal era. Second is the labour struggle dimension of an urban movement, which can be interpreted as a latent herald of a labour struggle in the reproductive sphere. The contribution of the thesis in practice, on the other hand, is related to planning as a profession, around two issues; first is the need for a cautious stance by the planner towards participative planning, and second is the need for a more courageous stance by him/her to be able to act outside the boundaries defined by the a 'civil servant' identity. At this point I also have to add that, in making these conclusions, I take the opportunity, entreating the reader's indulgence, to approach the movements not only in a scientific way as in the rest of the thesis, but also in a more humanly manner.

## 8.1. Theoretical Implications

First of all, I argue that a refined contemplation of movements as a category in social life is needed. Movements should not be watered down to groups or a range of activities of associations; a movement is a category on its own, while associations and groups, mentioned as movement organisations in the relevant literature, are actors or segments of it, which is a deficiency of the literature on post-1980 movements. First of all, movements have a rich combination of actions; street action, legal action and institutional action. Their adherents can change in time or certain adherents might be a part of the movement to a certain extent, like participating only in street action, but not institutional action, such as the looser segments of the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement. Apart from these, the perhaps most defining feature of movements is that, as the case of Gülsuyu-Gülensu shows, they have ups and downs and at times they might become so inactive that they almost cease to exist for a while. Thus, they constitute a fluctuating process; at times enlarged and combining all three actions and certain innovative ones, and at times so passive to exist as the activities centred around one local activist. In this respect, urban movements are processes of urban mobilisations, which may speed up, slow down or be interrupted. My aim here in stressing this 'process' nature of movements is not to make a comparison between organisations and movements. Neither do I intend to argue that institutionalisation give rise to their dissolution and final disappearance, which is a point that has already been made in the literature, as I mentioned in the literature review. I have yet two different points in stressing these features. First, movements have a deep humane character, since they do not operate based on pre-determined rules, but open to surprises and in that respect they are highly unforeseeable. Moreover, they are not based solely on voluntarism, but a strong level of devotion, not necessarily ideological but political, backed by self-sacrifice and empathy for others, and it is these features that lead to fluctuations in a movement, making it a process. In connection with this, my second point is that there is, or at least there should be a political struggle dimension in a movement that will reinforce this devotedness, making it far beyond the motives for increasing individual interests while utilising the advantages of collective action. Otherwise a movement would be an interest group.

Another point that deserves to be discussed is the orientation of movements to enhance the increase in land and property values, namely the so-called 'property-based' character of urban movements. In the relevant literature and by certain external actors, urban movements are not only characterised as property-based, but also criticised for being so. However, is it not too ambitious to expect from them not to be property-based, in an environment when the entire economy is property-based, when large-scale construction is taken for granted as socio-economic development, that is to say, when economy itself has become based on redevelopment for value increase in land and property? Such critics might be in fact correct in their analysis, however, taking an implicitly elitist and thereby sarcastic stance towards them based on this criticism, at least by an academic, is wrong. I believe it is an unfair attitude against the movements. We cannot expect strong ethics only from the deprived. Another option would be to appreciate the movements for being less property-based compared to large-scale developers, or trying to understand them for their point of departure is their housing rights, which is a basic human right. And, I prefer to adapt the latter option.



What is to me even more difficult for me to make sense of is the negative attitude in the society to the urban movements of the deprived. This is in fact an issue as old as the *gecekondu* phenomenon itself in Turkey, but rediscovered in the face of urban transformation projects in such areas. Today, urban movements of the deprived are looked down on when they put forward their desire to stay in their neighbourhood, with the same neighbours around, and when they say they are going to miss their current way of living. In other words, these movements are criticised for being property-based, and accused of insincerity if they express themselves otherwise, as if non-material demands can only be demanded by those who are materially satisfied, but not the deprived. That is to say, we need to understand, before judging, obviously without losing our critical positions. I finally argue on this first point that, above all, we need a better contemplation of movements, not as a series of collective activities for personal gain, but a process of struggle and solidarity, indeed political in nature, in order not to let neoliberal understanding dominate even in our social analysis. For this, a thorough re-reading of both pre-1980 and post-1980 Castells would be useful due mainly its in-depth and insightful analysis of movements, regardless of his latter conclusions on the class aspect of the movements, which is my next point. That is to say, if one intends to understand and explain the movements, he/she needs to look not only in the movement terrain as most of the post-1990 studies has done, but also have an in-depth look into the movements themselves, as I have tried in my thesis.

The third point is related to labour struggle dimension of the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement and its relation to the right to the city claims of the citizens. In Gülsuyu-Gülensu, people are conscious not only about the labour they have invested in creating an urban land from an idle piece of land, but for they see that the rights have obtained so far –the housing right in this case- as the return of their cheap labour they have provided for the surrounding industry, and therefore conceive themselves as rightful owners although they have not obtained these rights within the ‘legitimate’ rules of the market mechanism. In relation to this, they put this labour into the heart of their right to the city claims. This implies that, defence of right to the city claims and a struggle for labour are can be linked to each other, such that right to the city claims can be founded on and built upon labour.

## **8.2. Practical Implications**

What the thesis intends to tell us in practical terms is related to planning institution as a profession and discipline, centred around two issues. First is related to the position of the planner towards participative planning or the stance he/she adopts in a process of participative planning. Second is related to the role of urban movements in enriching the professional capacity of the planner in line with its aspirations. As regards to the first issue, the planner is very often faced with a dilemma of common good of a group of people he/she is planning for, as opposed to the public good in general, which might be at times in serious contradiction. For example, in Gülsuyu-Gülensu, people living in the forest area face the risk of deprivation unless housing is provided for them at a different site, and therefore, they ask for a change in the status of the forest area by means of a participative planning practice. In this respect, the planner is in a position to find a balance between preventing the

deprivation of a group and the deprivation of a society as a whole. Former may seem to be the primary objective for a specific planning experience, but latter should be considered as a medium or long-term primary objective. In such cases, the role of the planner extends beyond what is required by his/her profession, and an important role of him/her comes to the fore, which is to raise the consciousness of people not only about their rights, but the limits to them –obviously only on those rights within the merits of their expertise-, and orientate them accordingly. In other words, the role of planner here is neither to make a plan apart of its profession, nor making a plan purely according to the needs of the residents taking into account that the majority does not always represent the correct decision, but deciphering the plan to the residents in an objective way and try to bring them to a point of consensus. What is being done by planners, as well as architects as external actors of the Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement shows that this is possible. In Gülsuyu-Gülensu, planners, along with architects and lawyers, try to convince the residents on the cooperative solution, which they propose as a solution out of both technical/professional and social concerns. Or, they try to show it is in essence not correct to change the status of a forest area, and they believe they are successful in that, when the right arguments and way of communication is used.

Secondly, Gülsuyu-Gülensu case demonstrates that planners, in case they carry out their profession under the domain of the state only, are never free, for they are tightly bounded by the bureaucratic and administrative rules and regulations. On the other hand, in case they can induce an amateur spirit and voluntarism into their job through civil initiatives like the Solidarity Workshop, they might be as free almost as an artist. At that point, urban movements come to the fore as powerful instruments for planners to execute their profession more freely or at least in line with their own aspirations with regards to the society. Moreover, as Gülsuyu-Gülensu case shows, plans are critical for urban movements and so are urban movements for plans, in that the plans constitute a concrete ground for the mobilisation of movements, and movements lead to changes in plans. That is to say, there is a powerful relationship in between. Therefore, planners, not only as volunteers but also as professionals, and even the planning education itself, should be more interested in and respondent to what urban movements say. Even if planners as professionals do not walk with movements like the volunteers, but at least they can talk and work with them..

### **8.3. Further Questions**

In conclusion, I argue that movements as processes of solidarity are valuable tools for public policy making and perhaps the most powerful weapon of ordinary citizens against the neoliberalism, if it is defined as the ‘neoliberal attack’. They moreover have a rich potential to be explored and more to tell us on different topics, which was not possible to deal with in this thesis.

The first of possible further question driven by Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement is whether urban movements; in this case the movements of the deprived has a potential to reinvigorate the class struggle in the reproductive sphere. I argue that, even in the neoliberal order, as the industry have shrunk and moved out of the city whereas construction and real estate sectors

boomed, the class struggle might still have a chance to flourish, this time though perhaps not in the productive, but in the reproductive sphere, in the form of reproduction of space. In fact, in pre-1980s, reproductive sphere had already been discovered as a site for class struggle, but this discovery has been mostly waived from 1980s onwards, as issues of gender, local autonomy, ethnicity etc. attracted more attention, without being related to class issue. However, the Gülsuyu-Gülensu case gives the signs of a class dimension to flourish from urban movements, as long as people are conscious about the labour they have invested for anything they are struggling for, whether in the productive or reproductive sphere. There is an amazingly explicit consciousness in the words of the residents on this contradiction, as the below quotation from a local shows:

Demirel had said he could even give the Çankaya President's House to capital, to Ford, for free. Then this land can also be given to the labourers. It is the labourer who creates the whole world; the streets, bridges, planes, buildings, villas of the riches. These people are those who extract mine from underground. They also need houses they can live in acceptable conditions. Otherwise our defence of our gecekondus does not mean much. (113).

Moreover, under neoliberal urban development, the residents struggle directly against the 'capitalists'. One reason why Castells had argued for the non-class characteristics of the urban movements in *The City and the Grass Roots* was that there was no capitalists for the movement to fight against, but there were only the landlords, giving the case Glasgow Rent Strike as an example. On the contrary, in Glasgow, the capitalists were supporting the movement in their rent strike, for the movement actors were mostly their workers. In the case of Gülsuyu-Gülensu on the other hand, there is an explicit class of capitalists, in the form of developers and their public or private allies, and the movement arises out of their contradiction with these capitalists. Therefore, this class dimension should be further investigated and elaborated at a both theoretical and empirical level.

Secondly, the effects of over-politisation on urban movements of the deprived, with its pros and cons, can be further analysed, also with a view to class dimension. How are less politicised or right-wing conservative local societies of gecekondu neighbourhoods mobilised, organised and look into the labour intensive production of their neighbourhoods? Can the signs of a latent labour struggle be traced in such neighbourhoods, too? Thirdly, it is not only the contradictions and conflicts within a movement what is worth investigating, but also those among the movement and residents who are not a part of it. Further study on relationship between the movement and the rest of the neighbourhood, obviously in case of an urban movements of the deprived, may help us better understand the issue of collective rights for a movement, before criticising them for being individual property-based. Urban movements of the deprived, on the contrary, may become an effective tool to overcome the individualistic trends in the neighbourhood, by being the advocates of solidarity and consensus organisers between the local authorities and the residents. Further study on the coming years of Gülsuyu-Gülensu movement would shed light into this question. A third topic might be whether and how the class dimension is integrated in the movements of the discontented and the possible contributions of this integration in the reinvigoration of the class issue in the reproductive sphere, with an in-depth look into the evolution of the way

class is understood and defined. Fourthly, the changing role of the planning profession and the planner along with the new challenges the he/she faces comes to the fore as another area to be explored, in an era where urban movements are becoming more active facing the new opportunities and threats the neoliberalism brings, in a closely integrated fashion with the planning institution. It can further be asked what kind of a planning education is needed to prepare the future planners utilising the potential of urban movements as important local policy tools. Is there a room for this within the planning education? Can this potential of planning to be executed outside the boundaries of state apparatus be reinforced through education, or is it likely to remain as personal, namely realised through personal efforts- like in the Solidarity Workshop? Finally, the thesis puts these movements into the centre of analysis, in other words movements are its main objects. How can urban opposition processes be analysed putting this time the local authority into the centre of the analysis, looking into how local authorities perceive these movements as processes, what kind of strategies they build and how do they adopt themselves, and how does this affect the opposition in turn?

All in all, in the thesis, I have tried to demonstrate the nature of being a fluctuating process of solidarity and indeed a political struggle of urban movements of the deprived, rather than a merely interest oriented entity; the on-going class dimension inherent in them due to labour intensiveness of the whole development process of a piece of land with urban functions from an idle one, and finally, the integration of urban movements and the planning profession and discipline, opening up new opportunities and challenges for the latter. Urban movements give rise to further and even never ending questions for further study in planning discipline as well as urban studies in particular, and in social sciences in general, some of which I tried to put forward above. They are perhaps, at least to me, the most exciting and promising parts of social life, deserving continuing exploration.

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
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## APPENDIX A

### CERTAIN SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS



- Private Property
- Immovables which belong to Maltepe District Municipality
- Shared (jointly owned) immovables which belong to Maltepe District Municipality
- Immovables which belong to the Treasury
- Shared (jointly owned) immovables which belong to the Treasury
- Immovables which belong to Institutions
- Immovables which belong to Foundations, Associations and Cooperatives

Figure 19: Property Ownership Structure in Gülsuyu-Gülensu




Figure 20: Number of Storeys





Figure 21: Air Photo Gülsuyu-Gülensu





## **APPENDIX B**

### **LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND MEETING PARTICIPANTS**

#### **Interviewees (I)**

- I1 - Mücella Yapıcı, Secretary General of Istanbul Chamber of Architects Karaköy Branch
- I2 - Cihan. U. Baysal, city-wide movement activist, columnist
- I3 - Local movement leader, city-wide movement activist, male, around 47 years old
- I4 - President of their neighbourhood association Toz-Der, local movement activist in Tozkoparan neighbourhood , male, 53 years old
- I5 - Local movement activist, President of GÜLDAM, male, around 45 years old
- I6 - Local movement activist, Ex-president of GGBA, male, around 45 years old
- I7 - Local movement activist, member of ESP, female
- I8 - External actor, private architect, Secretary General of Chamber of Architects Kartal Branch, female, around 40 years old
- I9 - City planner at Maltepe District Municipality, female, around 30 years old
- I10 - Member of Solidarity Workshop, academic at MSFAU Department of City and Regional Planning, male, 42 years old
- I11 - Member of Solidarity Workshop, city planner, male, 31 years old
- I12 - Local movement activist, member of GÜLDAM, female, around 45 years old
- I13 - Local, member of GÜLDAM, male, around 40 years old
- I14 - Local, member of GÜLDAM, male, around 40 years old
- I15 - Local, male, around 40 years old
- I16 - Headman of Gülenisu, local movement activist, male, around 55 years old
- I17 - Local, Member of Life in Anatolia Cooperative Gülsuyu-Gülenisu Branch, male, around 45 years old
- I18 - President of Association of People from Çorum Mecidözü Dağsaray Village, male, around 40 years old
- I19 - President of Association of Sivas Karabalçık Village, male, around 55 years old
- I20 - Local, female, around 45 years old
- I21 - Local, female, around 45 years old

#### **Meeting Participants (P)**

- P1 - Anatolian Side Planning Vice Director at IMM of the time, female, around 45 years old
- P2 - Lawyer from Solidarity Workshop, male, around 50 years old
- P3 - I11

- P4 - Local. Male ,male, around 40 years old
- P5 - I16
- P6 - Local, member of CHP District Presidency, female, around 45 years old
- P7 - I17
- P8 - Previous headman of Gülsuyu, male, around60 years old
- P9 - local pharmacist, member of GGBA, female, around 45 years old
- P10 - CHP Maltepe District President, male, around 45 years old

## **APPENDIX C**

### **LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS**

- **Preliminary Acquaintance with the Issue (Urban Movements in Istanbul)**

- ‘Urban Movements Forum’ held on 26-27 June 2010, Chamber of Architects Karaköy Branch, Karaköy, Istanbul
- Two half-day workshops on urban development and urban opposition organised during 6th World Social Forum held in Istanbul on 1-4 July 2010, Istanbul University, ..
- Talk with I1, Architect - City Planner, Chamber of Architects Karaköy Branch, Çankaya Municipality Modern Arts Centre, Kavaklıdere, Ankara

- **Preliminary Acquaintance with the Field (Gülsuyu – Güleusu Neighbourhoods, Maltepe, Istanbul)**

- Talk with I3, 31.03.2012, Neighbourhood Resident, Activist, Gülsuyu – Güleusu Beautification and Solidarity Centre (Gülsuyu – Güleusu Güzelleştirme ve Dayanışma Merkezi – GÜLDAM), Gülsuyu-Güleusu, Istanbul
- Talk with I8, (23.04.2013), Independent Architect, Secretary General of Chamber of Architects Kartal Branch
- Talk with (names), City Planners, 24.04.2012, Maltepe District Municipality, Maltepe, Istanbul

- **Detailed Analysis**

#### **In-Depth Semi-Structured Interviews Made in the Field**

- Interview with I1, 27.08.2012, Chamber of Architects, Karaköy Branch, Karaköy, Istanbul
- Interview with I3, 28.08.2012, Neighbourhood Resident, Activist, Gülsuyu-Güleusu, Istanbul
- Interview with I2, 29.08.2012, Political Scientist, Activist, Columnist, Kabataş, Istanbul
- Interview with I4, 29.08.2012, Activist, Tozkoparan Neighbourhood, Merter, Istanbul
- Interview with I16, 31.08.2012, Headman of the Güleusu Neighbourhood, Gülsuyu-Güleusu, Istanbul
- Interview with I10, 03.09.2012, Academic, City Planner, Member of Solidarity Workshop (Dayanışmacı Atölye), Taksim, Istanbul
- Interview with I11, 03.09.2012, City Planner, Member of Solidarity Workshop, Taksim, Istanbul
- Interview with I19, (16.02.2013), Chairman of the Association of People from Sivas Karabalçık Village, His Own Apartment, Gülsuyu – Güleusu, Istanbul

- Interview with I18, (15.02.2013), Chairman of Association of People from Çorum Karadağlılar Village, Café (kıraathane) operated by the Association, Gülsuyu – Gülensu, Istanbul
- Interview with I8, 09.03.2013, Independent Architect, Secretary General of Chamber of Architects Kartal Branch, her own office, Maltepe, Istanbul
- Interview with I6, 10.03.2013, Ex-Chairman and Current Board Member of Gülsuyu – Gülensu Beautification Association, Café operated by the Association, Gülsuyu – Gülensu, Istanbul

### **Focus Group Meeting Organised by the Researcher**

- Focus Group Meeting, 30.08.2012, GÜLDAM, Gülsuyu – Gülensu, Istanbul

### **Meetings in the Field Attended by the Researcher**

1. Working Breakfast held by GÜLDAM with the participation of neighbourhood residents, local activist and external actors, 23.12.2012, Association of Çorum Karadağlılar Village, Gülsuyu – Gülensu, Istanbul
2. Meeting held jointly by GÜLDAM and Gülsuyu-Gülensu Beautification Association with local activists and external actors, 16.02.2013, Common Gathering House, Gülsuyu-Gülensu, Istanbul

### **Interviews Made on the Occasion of the Meeting 1:**

- Architect, member of Turkish Communist Party (TKP)
- Chairman of Pir Sultan Abdal Association, Maltepe Branch
- I7, neighbourhood resident, member of Socialist Party of the Oppressed (ESP), technical draftsman
- I7

### **Speeches Made by Participants Either in Meeting 1 or 2:**

- a. I5, Chairman of GÜLDAM
- b. I16, Headman of Gülensu
- c. P8, Prior Headman, Chairman of the Cemevi Foundation (Cemevi Vakfı)
- d. I17, local
- e. P6, CHP Women Branch Responsible Person for Gülsuyu – Gülensu
- f. P10, President, CHP Maltepe District Presidency

## **APPENDIX D**

### **INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

#### **A. LOCALS (WHO ARE IN THE MOVEMENT):**

##### **Demands Regarding the City and the Urban Transformation**

1. Are you happy about living in this city? What kind of a city would you like to live in?
2. Did you have a chance to save money and buy anything as long as you are in Istanbul?  
Or, what would you like to buy?
3. There are many urban transformation projects in Istanbul. Historical buildings, sites and residential areas are demolished and plazas, sky scrapers are built instead. What would you say about these urban transformation projects? How do you see them?
4. Your neighbourhood is also a transformation area. What are your demands in this transformation process?

##### **Organisation (support of external actors)**

5. What are you doing for these demands? How do you struggle? What kind of concrete actions do you have?
6. How did this struggle first start? How did you come to the point of taking an action? Was there anyone in and/or out of the neighbourhoods, who have provided you with support? Who are these people? Can you tell me a little?
7. Did you get any support afterwards? I mean, did this support continue?
8. In what areas did you get support? Can you give an example? For example, do you get support especially in legal matters, or something else?
9. What do you think the best use of this support? Do you think your struggle have a chance to be successful without this support?
10. How are your relations with the municipality in this process? Do you have contacts? Are there any people in your neighbourhood who are represented in the Municipal Assembly?

##### **Social Segregation**

11. Who are you acting with in your neighbourhood in your struggle? For example, do you act with people who have a different ethnical/sectarian background or conflicting

- political views with you, or –if there are any- with people who have a different life style than yours? How are your relations with these people?
12. Are there people in this process who never stand by you, support you or who think in a different way than you do? Who are these people? Why do you think they stand away? Have you ever talked to them about this issue? What do they say?
  13. Are there people who participate in your struggle only in a limited way, from time to time? Who are these people?
  14. Urban transformation in facts results in deprivation and evacuation not only here, but in many different parts of the city, for many people. What do you think about your struggle being helpful to all these people? Is there any work or activity you have been involved for this purpose?

### **Relations with Other Neighbourhoods and Movements**

15. Do you cooperate with different neighbourhoods? How did this cooperation first start? Who initiated it?
16. How have you benefited from this cooperation?

### **B. LOCALS (WHO ARE NOT IN THE MOVEMENT):**

#### **Demands Regarding the City and the Urban Transformation**

17. Are you happy about living in this city? What kind of a city would you like to live in?
18. Did you have a chance to save money and buy anything as long as you are in Istanbul? Or, what would you like to buy?
19. There are many urban transformation projects in Istanbul. Historical buildings, sites and residential areas are demolished and plazas, sky scrapers are built instead. What would you say about these urban transformation projects? How do you see them?
20. Your neighbourhood is also a transformation area. What are your demands in this transformation process?

#### **Organisation (Support of External Actors)**

21. In the city, especially in urban transformation areas, people develop a reaction against all these, claim their rights and put forward their demands. Do you have any activity in this respect?
22. Are you a member of any association? Or do you consider being?
23. Do you have any relations with the municipality in this process? Do you contact with them?

## **Social Segregation**

24. Why did you choose this way? (not being a part of the movement)
25. What do you think should be done in the face of this urban transformation? How should people act and with whom?

## **Relations with Other Neighbourhoods and Movements**

26. Do you cooperate with different neighbourhoods? How did this cooperation first start? Who initiated it?
27. How have you benefited from this cooperation?

## **C. EXTERNAL ACTORS**

### **General Questions:**

1. What is your job?
2. How did your relations with the urban movements start?
3. How do you describe urban transformation, especially in Istanbul? What are the points you find problematic?
4. Who are affected by this transformation, and how?

### **Organisation (Support of External Actors)**

5. In what respect do you provide support to the neighbourhood(s)? For example; in the initial phase of organisation, in the legal struggle of the movement in making it more visible, in their relations with the other neighbourhoods, in their relations with the municipality? Or any other issue? I mean, how would you define your position in the movement?
4. At what point do you think the struggle in the neighbourhood(s) is/are in need of your support?
5. With whom and at what point do you build relations with the neighbourhood(s)? Is it the locals who approach you first, or vice versa?
6. Do you come together regularly? Do you come together with an agenda? Or do you meet in an ad hoc basis or in urgent cases?
7. How do you deal with the logistical issues in these meetings? For example who arrange the venue? Can the locals easily come to the meeting points?
8. Do you only act with certain people or are you able to reach most of the locals?
9. Do you have a division of tasks with the locals? I mean, do you have differentiation as to what is to be done by you and by the locals?
10. What is your priority in choosing a neighbourhood to provide support? I mean, what are your reasons for choosing a certain one? Do you try to support any neighbourhood which

is deprived of urban transformation or face any such risk? (Why did you start to help Gülsuyu-Gülensu?)

11. Do you think, throughout your support process to the neighbourhood(s), you become an inseparable part of it/them? In other words, would you define yourself as a supporter or an actor of the movement?
12. In what respect do you think you are most useful for the neighbourhood(s)? (In organisational matters, or raising awareness, or else?)

### **Social Segregation – Polarisation**

13. Can you talk about the urban transformation that is in the agenda of Gülsuyu-Gülensu?
14. Can you give some information about the neighbourhoods? (Gülsuyu-Gülensu) Are there any groupings? If yes, along what kind of distinction do they arise? Religious, ethnical, ideological?
15. Can these different groups act together in the movement? Are there any groups who are excluded or intentionally stand away from the movement? If there are, what do you think the reasons are?
16. What does this diversity bring in or take away from the movement?
17. What do you think about the political/ideological consciousness in the neighbourhoods? Can we say they act also with ideological concerns?
18. Does the movement also develop reaction towards the more general and political issues in the city? Or are they mostly busy with their own affairs? I mean can we say they are engaged in an urban opposition? Can you give an example for such kind of actions? For example, what did they and other neighbourhoods, do in 1st of May?
19. Is the movement a part of the urban opposition as a whole, or do only certain individuals in the movement participate? For example, does an ordinary local participate in a protest against 3rd Bridge?

### **Demands**

20. What are the demands of the struggle against urban transformation? What do they exactly want? And what do they not want?
21. How do you define these demands? Can you characterise them as personal ones?
22. How are these demands affected by the property ownership? What is the level of participation of owners and tenants?
23. Do you have a role in the development, definition and expression of these demands? Do you try to make the demands more collective and can you be effective in that? Or at least do you have such an endeavour?
24. What kind of relations do they develop with the municipality? I mean, how, by what means and how often?
25. What are the results of these contacts?
26. How do HDA and locals come together? Or do they, have they ever??
27. Do they come together with the construction firms?



### **Relations with Other Movements**

28. Does the struggle in the neighbourhoods have any links with other in the city/country or in the World? What kind of relations is they? How are they carried out?
29. Do such relations bring a considerable strength in the movements?
30. Do these links bring in a more political character in the movements? Or, can they?
31. Neoliberal urban policies are in fact like copies of one another. Similar interventions are observable in any metropolitan area. Do you think this can help the local struggles attain global relations?



## **APPENDIX E**

### **GUIDELINES FOR THE FOCUS GROUP MEETING**

#### **A. Introduction**

- I am Esin Özdemir. I come from Ankara. I am a PhD student at Middle East Technical University, Department of City and Regional Planning.
- I am currently making a research on urban transformation in squatter areas, the opinions of the locals about this, what they want and what they do as a reaction. I chose Gülsuyu-Gülensu as a field to make my research.
- I am here to listen to you and learn from you. I will have some questions t you for this purpose. My aim is also to make a study which is also useful to you. I would like to reflect your opinions, demands, and concerns to the public.
- I would like to have a free and relaxed atmosphere. There is no right or wrong answer. Everyone's opinion is valuable to me. You can also talk to each other when you feel so.
- Besides, your names will not be used in anywhere.
- It will not take too long, no more than one and a half hour.
- I propose to start with you introducing yourselves. Then we can proceed by you giving your names, ages, jobs, previous jobs, where you came here from, whether you are owners or tenants, how many are you in your family and how many of you have a job, and etc.

#### **B. Introduction of the Participants of Themselves**

#### **C. Questions and Answers**

#### **D. Concluding Conversation**

#### **E. Acknowledgements and Offerings**



## CURRICULUM VITAE

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

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### EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU Regional Planning	2005
BCP	METU City and Regional Planning	2002
High School	Ari Science High School, Ankara	1998

### WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2008-present	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB)	Expert
2005-2008	TOBB	Asst. Expert

### FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Fluent German, Basic Spanish

### PUBLICATIONS

- Özdemir, E., Eraydın A., (2012), Contesting Neoliberal Urbanisation: Contemporary Urban Movements in Istanbul, Association of European Schools of Planning 26<sup>th</sup> Congress, METU, Ankara
- Özdemir, E. *et al* (2009), *Comparison of Turkey and Other OECD Countries in Terms of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations*, TOBB, Ankara
- Özdemir, E. (2008), 'Evaluation of Turkish Higher Education System According to the Needs of the Economy', Economic Forum, March 2008, TOBB, Ankara

4. Özdemir, E. (2007), 'European Union Regional Policy and Enlargement', Economic Forum, September 2007, TOBB, Ankara
5. Özdemir, E. (2006), 'A proposal for the Representation of Urban Transformation', Bulletin of Chamber of Architects Ankara Branch Office, Vol. 40, May/June, Ankara

## **HOBIES & INTERESTS**

Documentary films, Comics, Fitness, Walking, Cooking