

THE ROLES OF INTERGROUP THREAT, SOCIAL DOMINANCE
ORIENTATION AND RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM
IN PREDICTING TURKS' PREJUDICE TOWARD KURDS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

SEPTEMBER 2013

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ABSTRACT

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September 2013, 105 pages

The aim of the current thesis was to investigate the prejudice of Turks toward Kurds and to explore the possible role of the perceived threat in this prejudice. Kurds are the biggest ethnic minority in Turkey with a history of cultural oppression and assimilation. Opposing to Turkish governments' policies toward themselves, the Kurdish movement in Turkey has been asserting the cultural and political rights of Kurdish citizens in Turkey since the 1970s and onwards and in 1980s and 1990s, Turkey witnessed an intense guerilla war between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) and the Turkish armed forces. From the Turks' point of view, the conflict stems from PKK's perceived bad intentions targeting Turkey's harmony and the assumed support for PKK from the foreign forces against Turkey's unity. While this authoritarian perspective is highly prevalent among Turks in Turkey, more liberal policies toward Kurds and other minorities have been followed by the recent Turkish governments since the end of 1990s in order for Turkey's accession to the European Union. More recently, peace negotiations have been taking place between the Turkish

government and the prominent Kurdish leaders and politicians within the last year. Under these transforming circumstances, Turks' attitudes toward Kurds were studied within the frameworks of two prejudice-explaining theories: the Dual-Process Model and the Integrated Threat Theory. The dual process model ascribes two pathways both leading to prejudice but each characterised by different values and motivations. These pathways correspond to two widely-studied predictors of prejudice: right-wing-authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. The integrated threat theory on the other hand, emphasises the role of threat in out-group attitudes and categorises intergroup threat into four basic types. In the current study, these two theories were incorporated in a mediational model expecting that Turks' attitudes toward Kurds would be predicted by RWA rather than SDO and among the four types of threat, the group-level ones would mediate the relationship between RWA and prejudice. The findings, as well as the contributions and limitations of the study, were discussed.

Keywords: prejudice, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, intergroup threat, Kurdish issue

ÖZ

TÜRKLERİN KÜRTLERE YÖNELİK ÖNYARGISINI YORDAMADA GRUPLAR ARASI TEHDİDİN, SOSYAL BASKINLIK YÖNELİMİNİN VE SAĞ KANAT YETKECİLİĞİN ROLÜ

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Eylül 2013, 105 sayfa

Bu tez çalışmasının amacı Türklerin Kürtlere yönelik önyargılarını araştırmak ve algılanan tehdidin bu önyargıda oynayacağı olası rolü incelemektir. Kürtler tarihte kültürel olarak bastırılmış ve asimilasyona uğramış Türkiye'deki en kalabalık etnik azınlıktır. Türk hükümetlerin kendilerine yönelik politikalara karşı çıkan Kürt hareketi 1970'lerden bu yana Kürtlerin kültürel ve politik haklarını savunmaktadır ve Türkiye 1980'lerde ve 1990'larda Kürdistan İşçi Partisi (PKK, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) ile Türk silahlı kuvvetleri arasında yoğun silahlı çatışmalara tanıklık etmiştir. Türklerin bakış açısına göre problem PKK'nın Türkiye'nin düzenini bozma amaçlı kötü niyetlerinden ve Türkiye'nin bütünlüğünü bozmak isteyen dış güçlerin PKK'yı desteklemesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu otoriter perspektif Türkler arasında oldukça yaygın olsa da, 1990'ların sonundan bu yana Türk hükümetleri Avrupa Birliği'ne girebilmek için Kürtlere ve diğer azınlıklara yönelik daha liberal politikalar güder olmuştur. Daha yakın geçmişe bakarsak, son bir yıl içinde Türk hükümeti ile önde gelen Kürt liderler ve politikacıları arasında barış görüşmeleri yapılmaya başlamıştır. Bu

değişmekte olan şartlar altında, Türklerin Kürtlere yönelik tutumları önyargı yordayan iki teori çerçevesinde incelenmiştir: İkili İşlem Modeli ve Birleşik Tehdit Teorisi. İkili işlem teorisi her ikisi de önyargıya çıkan fakat değerleri ve motivasyonları açısından farklı niteliklere sahip iki yoldan oluşur. Bu yollar çokça çalışılmış iki önyargı yordayıcısına tekabül etmektedir: sağ kanat yetkecilik ve sosyal baskınlık yönelimi. Öte yandan, birleşik tehdit teorisi dış gruplara yönelik tutumlarda tehdidin rolünü vurgular ve gruplar arası tehdidi dört temel çeşide ayırır. Bu tez çalışmasında, bu iki teori aracı değişkenli bir modelle birleştirilmiştir; Türklerin Kürtlere yönelik önyargısının sosyal baskınlık yönelimindense sağ kanat yetkecilik tarafından yordanması ve dört tehdit çeşidinde grup düzeyi olanların sağ kanat yetkecilikle önyargı arasındaki ilişkiye aracı olması beklenmiştir. Çalışmanın bulguları, katkıları ve sınırlılıklarıyla beraber tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: önyargı, sağ kanat yetkecilik, sosyal baskınlık yönelimi, gruplar arası tehdit, Kürt problemi

In memory of lonely Alice

&

To all the whales

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. General Introduction

Prejudice has an extensive coverage in social psychology, reflecting the important role it plays in our everyday perceptions and interactions. Prejudice is defined as “attitudes toward members of specific groups that directly or indirectly suggest they deserve an inferior social status” (Franzoi, 2005 p.254). Allport (1979) defines it as feelings adding that they are not necessarily based on real experiences. Prejudice can be on account of religion, race, nationality, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, political opinions, mental disorders, addictions, physical appearance, any kind of disability and such. So, prejudice can be regarded as the opium of masses in terms of various grounds.

Two concepts in social psychological research have shined out as the roots of prejudice in personality: authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) and social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallwarth, & Malle, 1994). Authoritarianism is defined as strict obedience to authority and to society, unquestioned adherence to the rules and orders set by them and perceiving the world in a black-and-white fashion. Social dominance orientation reflects one’s acceptance of and support for social hierarchies and domination of inferior groups by superior ones. The main purpose of the present study is to investigate the role of authoritarianism and social dominance orientation in predicting prejudice of Turks toward Kurds, the ethnic majority and minority in Turkey, respectively. In doing so, this study further examines the mediating role of perceived threat from Kurds.

Kurds are the biggest minority in Turkey consisting of more than 12.5 million citizens (Milliyet, 2008, June 6). The Republic of Turkey was founded as a

nation-state in 1920s, and assimilationist policies have been imposed on Kurds (and other minorities) since then (Icduygu, Romano, & Sirkeci, 1999; Yegen, 2004; Yegen 2007). The conflict between the Turkish state and Kurds caused many tribe-based rebellions during the earlier decades of the republic. Since 1984, a guerrilla war between the Turkish military forces and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan), established in 1974 and has been regarded as a terrorist organization, has been intermittently taking place (Van Bruinessen, 1998). Whereas the earlier rebellions were against the secularity of the state, the Kurdish movement has developed a more ethno-nationalist approach throughout the recent decades. As a reflection of this, PKK's main agenda consists of entitling Kurds to cultural and political rights and gaining democratic autonomy in Kurdish-dominated south-eastern parts of Turkey (Icduyu, Romano, & Sirkeci, 1999). This internal ethnic conflict has been occupying a prominent place in foreign affairs of Turkey, as well. Accession to European Union (EU) has always been included in the political and economical agenda of the Republic of Turkey and the Kurdish issue has been one of the central topics of Turkey's EU progress reports since 1998 (Karakoc, 2010). Regarding this topic, accession to the union requires Turkey to entitle Kurds to their cultural and political rights.

Relatively conservative perceptions of this problem interpret the demands of Kurds and/or the requirements of accession to the EU as aimed at weakening Turkey by threatening the national unity and territorial integrity of it whereas relatively liberal views recognise Kurds as an ethnic group and advocate their freedom of expressing their culture and exercising their respective rights (Cornell, 2001; Kirisci, 2011). Throughout the 2000s, there have been major improvements toward the resolution of the Kurdish issue although further developments are still required (see Bengio 2011; Kirisci 2004, 2011). Parallel to these political developments, the place that the Kurdish identity has had in the media and the civil discourse of the Turkish citizens has been increasing throughout the years (Somer, 2005). However, according to the point of view shared by the lay people in Turkey, the Kurdish issue is prevalently addressed as an intra-national conflict, due to the common belief that PKK is aimed at harming Turkey's harmony, with international elements, due to another common belief that foreign powers are supporting PKK and its cause against Turkey (Ulug & Cohr, 2012). Due to this

perceived conflict between Turks and Kurds by Turks, having Kurdish individuals in close proximity, representation of Turkey by Kurdish citizens in public and/or international spheres and such are sources of discomfort for self-identified Turks of Turkey (Cingoz-Ulu, 2008). In the current study, Turks' prejudice toward Kurds is studied considering the Kurds' demands, Turks' corresponding fears and the impact of recent improvements on Turks' perception of this issue.

In examining prejudice toward Kurds by Turks in Turkey, first, the roles of authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are investigated in the light of the dual-process model of prejudice (Duckitt, 2001). Duckitt links personality, environment, ideology, and politics in his model, and suggests that authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are broad socio-political attitudes, rather than personality characteristics. The model depicts certain personality and environmental characteristics that potentially bring about these socio-political attitudes and differentiates between authoritarianism and social dominance orientation with respect to the characteristic values and motivations developed through them. Therefore, the model consists of two pathways corresponding to authoritarianism and social dominance. Authoritarian individuals value social order, social cohesion and security rather than individual freedoms and autonomy and they are motivated to maintain these. On the other hand, individuals with high social dominance orientation value dominance and power rather than egalitarianism and humanism and they are motivated to obtain an advantageous position in the society and maintain it. Despite the motivational differences between them, both pathways lead to similar prejudiced, nationalist, and ethnocentric attitudes and behaviours. The predictive powers of authoritarianism and social dominance orientation regarding Turks' prejudice toward Kurds will be compared considering the historical and current interethnic context in Turkey within the framework of this model. While testing the dual-process model, perceived threat is expected to mediate the relationship between socio-political attitudes and prejudice. In this respect, Integrated Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Stephan et al., 1998, Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999), a theory explaining prejudice in a more specifically threat-oriented way, is incorporated into the dual-process model.

The integrated threat theory explains prejudice with regard four basic types of threat, which are realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes (Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Stephan et al., 1998, Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). Realistic threat arises when in-group's physical existence, well-being, resources or power are perceived to be threatened by out-groups whereas symbolic threat arises from differences in morals, values, beliefs, norms and such; out-groups perceived as not supporting those of in-group are regarded as threatening by the in-group members. Intergroup anxiety results from expecting interactions with out-group members to produce negative consequences arising either from out-groups or within in-group. Finally, stereotypes play an important role in shaping our expectations from out-groups; therefore negative stereotypes bring about prejudice either directly or indirectly through other types of threats. In the present study, perceived threat from Kurds by Turks is conceptualised with regard to the central threat types, and especially symbolic and realistic threat outlined by this theory.

The sum and the substance of the current study are to understand Turks' prejudice toward Kurds. To this end, firstly the dual-process model is taken as a framework to reveal the basic values and motivations triggering this prejudice. After that, the integrated threat theory is used in order to depict the perceived threat by Turks from Kurds in social psychological terms. For a better understanding, historical and current dynamics of the Kurdish issue is briefly mentioned before proceeding to the review of the dual-process model and integrated threat theory. The theories are then introduced in detail along with findings relevant to the Kurdish-Turkish relations. Upon presenting the interethnic dynamics of Turkey related to Kurds and Turks and the relevant literature, the introduction part will be concluded with an overview of the aim and the hypotheses of the study.

1.2. The Interethnic Context in Turkey: Kurds & Turks

Five years ago, a report commissioned by the Turkish National Security Council revealed that there were more than 12 million 600 thousand Kurds living in Turkey and 2 and a half million of them had already been identifying themselves as Turkish, rather than Kurdish (Milliyet, 2008, June 6). According to the World Factbook of the Central Intelligence Agency (2008), Kurds constituted 18% of the

population in Turkey in 2008, which makes them the most populous ethnic minority in the country. Despite their current presence as a minority in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran; Kurds missed the opportunity to establish a national formation toward the end of Ottoman Empire (Loizides, 2010). Republic of Turkey was founded as a nation-state based on the Turkish culture and identity; hence assimilationist policies were subsequently imposed upon the Kurdish culture (Icduygu, Romano, & Sirkeci, 1999). The construct of Turkishness never included non-Muslim minorities; however, Kurds have been allowed to assimilate into Turkishness and from the beginning of Turkish Republic till recently, Kurds were perceived to be future-Turks (Yeğen, 2007). While assimilationist policies were still been maintained, sudden exclusion of religion from politics led to inconsistencies and brought about conflicts between the state and Kurds on the ground of nationalism (Saatçi, 2002). In line with this change, whereas the early Kurds rebellions in 1920s and 1930s had been more tribe-based and religious, opposing the secular state; the Kurdish movement gained an ethno-nationalist characteristic in 1970s and onwards (Van Bruinessen, 1998).

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan), the most prominent Kurdish movement in Turkey, was founded in 1974 to fight for the democratic autonomy and cultural and political rights of Kurds with an ethno-nationalist approach and the Turkish government has been in a guerrilla war with PKK intermittently since 1984 (Icduygu et al., 1999). It became the top threat in the threat list of the National Security Council in 1990s and it was labelled as a separatist terrorist movement, threatening the unity and indivisibility of the state (Bayramoglu, as cited in Karakoc, 2010). During 1980s and 1990s, the Kurdishness of the Kurdish problem was not recognised by the Turkish state (Loizides, 2010; Yegen, 1999). Whereas the ethnic recognition of Kurds was always the main motivation of PKK; the problem was framed as a regional problem stemming from the backwardness of the regional population and/or political and economic resistance of them against modernity, rather than an ethno-political problem. Due to the intensity of the armed conflicts between the Turkish army and PKK in 1990s, the military aspect of the issue became so prominent that PKK and civil Kurdish population started to be perceived as almost indistinguishable from each other (Van Bruinessen, 1998). The emphases on the

regional backwardness and the fierce guerrilla war in the region have led to the heightened feelings of threat and danger from Kurds and the places populated mainly by them. Therefore, the threat that is perceived from Kurds, especially within the context of PKK and civil bombings, had some realistic (armed conflict and death of civilians as well as armed forces) as well as symbolic (political and cultural) elements in it.

How the Kurdish movement has been perceived in the West and within Turkey considerably differs from each other (Cornell, 2001). The common perception in the West is that it is a national liberation movement. The perceptions within Turkey can be categorised into two loose views (Kirisci, 2011). One view ignores the ethnic dimension of the problem as mentioned above; it focuses on terrorism arguing that it is supported by the international forces whose purpose is to weaken and divide Turkey. Solving the terrorism problem and improving the socio-economical conditions of the south-eastern Turkey are expected to be the remedy. The second view, on the other hand, recognises the Kurds and their demand of expressing their culture and ethnic identity. The resolution, according to this liberal view, requires the Turkish state to adjust itself according to Kurds' demands.

This liberal view started finding itself a place within the political efforts aimed at accession to the European Union (Kiricsi, 2011). Both the Kurdish nationalist movement and the legal reforms that the European Union required Turkey to make in order to join the union have been enforcing the recognition of the Kurdish identity and the resolution of the related problems. In 1992, the then president Turgut Özal was the first politician who accepted the problem of Kurds, naming it as "the Kurdish question" and suggested policy changes (Efegil, 2011). However, due to his sudden death in 1993, his policies were abandoned by his successors who were opposed to the inclusion of the Kurdish identity in the national identity (Karakoc, 2010). Still, having deeply analysed a prominent Turkish newspaper, *Hurriyet*, from 1984 to 1998, Somer (2005) concluded that recognition of Kurds and their separate identity increased throughout this time and so did the place that the topic had in Turkish civil discourse.

In December 1999, Turkey was recognised as a candidate state by the European Union (EU) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MFA, 2011) and many reforms followed this improvement such as liberalisation of political parties and press, amendments in law on ground of which Kurdish politicians and civilians had been targeted, improving civilian control while diminishing the military control, abandoning state security courts and death penalty (Kirisci, 2011; Tezcur, 2010). In 2002, Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) came into power and they acknowledged the Kurdish problem, too, criticising the assimilationist policies of the former governments (Bianet, 2005, August 12). Actions favouring Kurds continued to be taken by the AKP governments especially during the first half of 2000s within the scopes of the harmonisation packages set to meet the EU's Copenhagen Criteria which included respect for and appreciation of minority rights as a must (Kirisci, 2011). Following these efforts, EU decided in December, 2004 that, having considerably met the political criteria, Turkey could start accession negotiations on October 3, 2005. However, the Kurdish problem continues to be an obstacle for Turkey's accession to the EU (Bengio, 2011; Kirişçi, 2004).

Two topics come to the forefront in the EU's progress reports on Turkey with regard to Kurds; which are political representation and cultural rights (for a brief review of the reports with respect to the Kurdish issue, see Karakoc, 2010), coinciding with the demands of the Kurdish movement to a considerable extent. From 1998 to 2010, every report mentioned the difficulties Kurds faced in establishing political organisations to represent themselves in the politics. For example, the closure case of Democratic Society Party (DTP, Demokratik Toplum Partisi, *tr.*) was addressed negatively in the 2008 report, while accession of Kurdish deputies to the parliament had been evaluated positively in the 2007 report. The reports emphasise entitling Kurds to their cultural rights through constitutional amendments. As an example, using Kurdish language had been forbidden by law but since 1999, there have been improvements such as legal permission to talk and to broadcast in Kurdish. Even so, accession to EU requires more than language rights such as education rights. Education in mother tongue has been a prominent demand of Kurdish nationalists yet it had been legally forbidden on account of dividing the country. Nonetheless, as a consequence of

the EU harmonisation process, Kurdish has been included as an elective course in Turkish education system since June, 2012 (Aljazeera, 2012, June 12).

The general opposition to Turkey's membership among EU member states, however, has led to setbacks and decrease in the pace of policy implementations since 2006 (Kirisci, 2011). The ceasefire between PKK and the national military forces which had started on 1 January 1999 lasted until 1 June 2004 (Milliyet, 2013, 15 February) and from then on, the armed attacks of PKK targeting both military forces and civilians started again and continued fiercely. These have led to increases in nationalism and conservatism among Turkish public (Uslu, 2008). Currently, terrorism and disarmament of PKK, the European Union (EU) harmonisation process, and constitutional amendments that will entitle Kurds to their cultural and political rights continue to be the hot topics of the Kurdish question (Efegil, 2011).

1.3. The Dual Process Model of Prejudice

Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1998/2004) and social dominance orientation (SDO, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallwarth, & Malle, 1994) have been two widely studied constructs in social psychological prejudice literature. Altemeyer (1998/2004), in his influential review of RWA and SDO, revealed that these constructs are strong and distinct predictors of prejudice as well as other various socio-political attitudes such as ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, militarism, political conservatism (see also Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson, 2006; Wilson & Sibley, 2012). In the earlier conceptualisations of these constructs, they were regarded as distinct psychological bases of prejudice in one's personality. However, Duckitt (2001) proposed that RWA and SDO are ideological beliefs and attitudes which are consequents of different psychological bases and environmental factors, and which in turn trigger different motivations while leading to quite similar socio-political attitudes including attitudes toward out-groups.

Authoritarian people, as defined by Adorno and his colleagues (1950), rigidly obey to authority and society; strictly adhere to their rules and perceive the world in black-and-white fashion. Initially, authoritarian personality was explained with

nine traits that covaried with each other to a considerable extent. These traits were conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intellectualism, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotyping, power and toughness, destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and exaggerated concerns over sex. Altemeyer, having showed that these traits were too distinct to tap a single underlying construct (for a review, see Altemeyer, 1998/2004), concluded that a coherent authoritarianism concept consists of three out of the previous nine traits which were conventionalism, authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission, and named this construct as right-wing authoritarianism. Both the nine-dimensional F scale of Adorno and his colleagues and the three-dimensional RWA scale of Altemeyer assessed the authoritarian personality through the items expressing ideological opinions and beliefs; and these items were assumed to reflect the authoritarian personality. Later developed social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), which was introduced as a personality trait as well, referred to one's overall tendency to accept inequality and hierarchy in a society. The same assumption of reflecting personality was the case for the SDO scale, too. However, personality was never directly assessed in these and subsequent studies. The dual-process model, defining RWA and SDO as attitudes, extends the study of these constructs by including personality variables and individuals' cultural socialisation characteristics (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Duckitt and Sibley, 2010a). It investigates the psychological bases of individual propensities for authoritarianism, either authoritarian submission (RWA) or authoritarian dominance (SDO) as named by Altemeyer (1998/2004), and the consequent values and motivations individuals differentially develop through them.

The dual-process model consists of two pathways characterised by RWA and SDO (Duckitt, 2001). In terms of values and motivations, high RWA people value social order, societal cohesion and security; tradition and stability as opposed to individual freedom, autonomy and self-expression whereas high SDO people value personal or group power, dominance and superiority as opposed to values like egalitarianism, humanism, and universalism. Accordingly, RWA people are motivated to maintain the social order, in-group conformity, and collective security; SDO people are motivated to gain power, superiority and dominance. In Jost, Nosek and Gosling's (2008) recent two-dimensional formulation of

ideology, RWA and SDO correspond to advocating or resisting social change and rejecting or accepting inequality, respectively.

Ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) can be given as an explanatory example for the motivational distinction between the two pathways. Sexism is gender-based prejudice and discrimination toward women as a consequence of gender stereotypes and gender roles. Glick and Fiske (1996) define two components of sexism: hostile sexism and benevolent sexism. Together, they give sexism an ambivalent nature. Hostile sexism, in line with the general prejudice characteristics, reflects acceptance of male dominance and men's power while the latter reflects the women's need for men's protection and the complementary nature of conventional gender traits which ascribes women an inferior position. Hostile sexism stems from men's desire to maintain their dominance over women; thus women behaving against prescribed gender roles pose a threat on men's advantageous position. This threat perception is a consequence of competition and dominance motivation reflecting the characteristics of SDO pathway and it brings about hostility. Benevolent sexism is positive in the sense that stereotypical women elicit prosocial attitudes and behaviours. The adherence of women to the gender roles guarantees the maintenance of social order, which considerably coincides with right-wing authoritarian motivations. In line with this conceptualisation, Sibley, Wilson, and Duckitt (2007a) found that RWA predicted increases in benevolent sexism and SDO predicted increases in hostile sexism throughout time.

The dual process model posits that cultural socialisations and personality play an important role in development of authoritarian attitudes (Duckitt, 2001). Roughly, punitive and strict parenting leads children to develop socially conformist personalities and embrace a dangerous worldview; while unaffectionate and harsh parenting leads children to become tough-minded and embrace a competitive worldview. Later studies revealed that social conformism corresponds to low openness and high conscientiousness, and tough-mindedness corresponds to low agreeableness among the big five personality traits (Duckitt, 2009; for a meta-analysis, see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). In a longitudinal study, openness and

agreeableness are again found to be the temporal antecedents of RWA and SDO, respectively, within a year (Sibley & Duckitt, 2010).

One's personality determines her/his ideological attitudes through her/his worldview. Worldviews are schemas about the nature of the social world (Perry & Sibley, 2010) and people adopt values and motivations that will lead them to their survival in the world that they perceive. Threat-driven RWAs adopt a dangerous worldview which implies a good-bad dichotomy. Danger perception stems from that bad people threaten the values and the way of life of good people; therefore they value social order and security. Competition-driven SDOs, on the other hand, perceive the world as a competitive jungle which is in an amoral struggle for power and resources in a Darwinian fashion. The dichotomy characterising this competitive world view is based on superiority and inferiority; SDO-driven people strive for superiority and dominating inferiors to be able to survive.

Research studies confirm the relationship between worldviews and ideological attitudes (e.g., Perry and Sibley, 2010). Perceiving the social world as inherently dangerous, unpredictable, and threatening (as opposed to safe, stable, and secure) predicts higher RWA, whereas perceiving the world as a cold-heartedly competitive jungle (as opposed to cooperative harmony) predicts higher levels of SDO. Similarly, in a longitudinal study for five months, the degree of change in dangerous (competitive) worldview predicted changes in authoritarian (social dominance) attitudes (Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007b). Because RWA and SDO are proximal predictors of out-group attitudes, cultural worldviews are important determinants of out-group attitudes, either directly or indirectly through RWA and SDO. Additionally, since worldviews are schematic knowledge structures about one's environment, cultural worldviews and consequent prejudices are common for people sharing the same environment to a considerable extent (Duckitt, 2001).

Several studies investigated RWA and SDO separately (for a brief review, see Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a); yet, since they lead to different motivations, individuals endorsing them differ from each other in terms of out-groups they dislike, contents of myths legitimising their out-group attitudes, the right-wing policies/parties they support etc. In this respect, Duckitt and Sibley (2010b)

investigated whether RWA and SDO predict prejudice toward different immigrant groups differentially in an experimental study with hypothetical immigrant groups. The results showed that both RWA and SDO predicted opposition to economically competitive immigrants; while only RWA predicted opposition to deviant immigrants and only SDO predicted opposition toward socio-economically disadvantaged immigrants. Regarding the motivational characteristics of the two pathways, the results were interpreted by the researchers as follows: Competitive immigrants can pose a threat on both the social order and the existing intergroup hierarchy; deviant groups can threaten the group cohesion and social order by thinking and acting against in-group norms and values; and disadvantaged groups can elicit dislike since they may tend to have a share in scarce resources. A meta-analysis of national differences in attitudes toward immigrants (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010) confirmed this hypothetical study considerably. The correlation between RWA and attitudes toward immigrants was higher in the countries where immigrants were perceived as increasing the crime rates and not contributing to the economy; thus threatening the national security and social order. On the other hand, the correlation between SDO and attitudes toward immigrants was higher in the countries where immigrants had a high unemployment rate, which probably led to the perceptions of an economic competition between the natives and immigrants. These studies indicate that RWA and SDO moderate attitudes toward different out-groups differentially.

The mediators of the relationship between ideological attitudes and prejudice differ from each other, as well. Duckitt (2006) studied prejudices toward out-groups varying in terms of social threat and social subordination and found that competitiveness mediated the relationship between SDO and attitudes toward subordinating groups and perceived threat mediated the relationship between RWA and attitudes toward deviant groups. To put it differently, individuals high in RWA are more responsive to the threats posed on social order and hence, more prejudiced toward deviant out-groups while individuals high in SDO are more responsive to the threats posed on social hierarchy and hence, more prejudiced toward competitive groups. In another study by Thomsen, Green, and Sidanius (2008), RWAs showed out-group hostility toward the immigrants that refused to assimilate which was against in-group uniformity; while SDOs showed out-group

aggression toward the immigrants that assimilated because assimilation blurred group boundaries and posed a threat on in-group's dominant position in the hierarchy. Ideological motivations demonstrate why RWA and SDO lead to prejudiced out-group attitudes more clearly in these studies.

The dual-process model indicates that RWA and SDO are not necessarily dispositional personality traits. Therefore, they may change over time or in immediate contexts with respect to the social situational and cultural factors. Research shows that the roles RWA and SDO play in attitudes toward out-groups differ across countries (e.g., Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006; Sibley, Wilson, & Robertson, 2007; for a meta-analysis, see Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010). Esses et al. (2006) studied the attitudes toward immigrants in two different countries in terms of their approaches toward immigration: Canada that supports the integration of immigrant groups and Germany that opposes the integration but supports segregation and assimilation. There were three identity conditions in Esses and her colleagues' study: a common national in-group including both immigrants and non-immigrants; a national identity inclusive of only host nations; and a control condition. When the common national in-group was salient, Canadians with high SDO scores reported less negative attitudes toward immigrants compared to the national identity and the control conditions. However, making a common national in-group salient did not decrease the negative attitudes of Germans with high SDO scores toward immigrants; they were similarly prejudiced in all three conditions regardless of whether they had been primed with a common national in-group inclusive of immigrants, a national identity exclusive of immigrants or none (the control condition). Cohrs and Asbrock (2009) presented Germans with four different types of Turkish immigrant groups and they found that RWA was a stronger predictor of negative emotional attitudes toward these groups compared to SDO. The cross-national meta-analysis of Cohrs and Stelzl (2010), including 155 samples from 17 countries, confirmed that the countries matter regarding what kind of authoritarianism leads to prejudice. In line with the aforementioned study, the meta-analysis revealed that the relationship between RWA and attitudes toward immigrants was stronger in Germany while SDO and attitudes toward immigrants was stronger in Canada. These results show that shared worldviews concerning

immigrants lead to prejudice through shared ideological attitudes. The definition of in-groups and group boundaries, the general behaviours of immigrant groups and the government policies targeting the immigrants in these countries have all together shaped the immigrant-receiving populations' perception of the immigrant groups.

Ullrich and Cohrs (2007) showed with an experimental study that terrorism salience increases individuals' tendency to perceive the existing social structures and dynamics as fair and justifiable (system justification motive; see e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2005), hence increase their admittance and adherence to the existing social order. Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede (2005) conducted a quasi-experimental study by collecting data before and after the terrorist attacks targeting the railways in Madrid, Spain on 11 March 2004 and they found that such terrorism incidents increase authoritarianism and conservatism in individuals. Similarly, SDO of highly identified high-status group members become heightened upon exposure to threats to their relative position or power (e.g., Morrison, Fast & Ybarra, 2009; Morrison & Ybarra, 2008). Threats to the existing group hierarchies influence the SDO levels of low-status groups in the opposite direction, though (Pratto et al., 2000). Low-status group members with lower SDO scores express more negative emotions and attitudes toward high-status groups when faced with such threats (e.g., Levin et al., 2012; Morrison, Fast, & Ybarra, 2009) because SDO is acceptance of inequality among groups and, unlike high-status groups, low-status groups can improve their relative position only through diminishing the existing hierarchies. Therefore, threats decrease SDO in low-status group members while increasing it in high-status group members. Overall, both RWA and SDO are sensitive to threats and subject to change.

Among the two paths of the dual-process models, one may be more predictive of out-group attitudes than the other (e.g., Sibley & Liu, 2004; Weber & Federico, 2007). For example, in New Zealand, the government has been implementing bicultural policies that would integrate indigenous Maoris to the national identity and that would close the socioeconomic gaps between Maoris and European-descendant Pakehas (Sibley & Liu, 2004; Sibley, Wilson, & Robertson, 2007).

While Pakehas support incorporation of symbols and values of Maori culture such as Maori language, the haka dance, the marae greetings; they oppose to affirmative actions such as land and monetary resource allocations favouring Maories. In other words, symbolic implications of the bicultural policy are welcomed by the majority while resource-specific implications are opposed. Because the inequality and intergroup competition are the salient issues in New Zealand, the results of the study revealed that SDO, but not RWA, predicted the variation in opposition/support for both the symbolic and the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy. In another study with an American sample (Weber & Federico, 2007), RWA was a stronger predictor of left-right self-placement than SDO. The researchers attributed this result to the current ideological conflicts in the United States in which the emphasis is on cultural issues rather than allocating economical resources.

The main purpose of the current study is to find out which pathway of the dual-process model reflects the characteristics of Turks' attitudes toward Kurds in Turkey better than the other. In the light of the aforementioned studies, the path characterised by RWA is hypothesised to be more predictive of Turks' attitudes toward Kurds.

First of all, in the perceptions of ordinary people, the political motivation of PKK is to ruin the harmony and peace in Turkey and this is the most salient dimension of the Kurdish issue (Ulug & Cohr, 2012). Therefore, PKK can be conceived as an apparent threat to the security in Turkey and security is a RWA-characterised motivation according to the dual process model. Besides, unlike the New Zealand case, the recognition of the Kurdish identity has been the triggering motivation of the Kurdish movement. From the Kurds' point of view, the Kurdish issue is strictly associated with their cultural oppression and the main motivation of the Kurdish movement is asserting their cultural and political rights (Ulug & Cohrs, 2012). Given that the place that the Kurdish identity has in the media and civil discourse in Turkey has increased (Somer, 2005), the identity-related symbolic demands of Kurds should have become more prominent than before. Kurds' demands such as democratic autonomy, education in mother tongue, and further recognition of their ethnic identity in different domains might be perceived as

threats to the established social order of Turkey. Due to the assumed concerns about the social order, RWA is expected to be a stronger predictor of Turks' attitudes toward Kurds. Consistently, in a recent study investigating both Turks' and Kurds' attitudes toward teaching and learning mother tongue as a absolute right revealed that RWA, but not SDO, was a significant predictor of Turks' attitudes (Cingoz-Ulu, Idiz, & Ulkumen, 2011). Moreover, constitutional amendments favouring Kurds in terms of social rights and freedoms may be perceived as fundamental changes in Turkish law, which would be very non-conventional and thus, trigger authoritarian attitudes, too.

Furthermore, RWA-related values and motivations have a more intra-group nature while SDO-related ones have a more inter-group nature (Pratto et al., 2013, p. 141). RWA drives individuals to strive for coherence and harmony within a group while SDO drives individuals to compete with out-groups and dominate them to ensure a relatively superior position. Proceeding from assimilation to recognition of the Kurdish identity within Turkishness implies changes within the in-group; hence this may contribute to the predictive power of RWA, rather than SDO. Moreover, as emphasised in the previous section, the armed conflicts between PKK and the Turkish army have always had a central place within the civil and political discussions of the Kurdish problem. In a study about international terrorism conducted in the United States, RWA, but not SDO, predicted the threat perceived from terrorism (Crowson, 2009). Moreover, authoritarian individuals become more restrictive regarding civilian liberties when they perceive a threat from terrorism (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005). Regarding the ongoing restrictions on Kurds' cultural and political rights, these studies support the expectation that RWA would be more predictive of Turks' attitudes toward Kurds than SDO. Finally, contact quality plays an important role in reducing Turks' prejudice toward Kurds (Tuzkaya & Cingoz-Ulu, 2012) and contact influence the out-group attitudes of individuals with high RWA scores, but not SDO (Asbrock, Chris, Duckitt, & Sibley, 2011). Therefore, the findings of the former study, too, support the present expectation.

To sum up, the dual-process model expresses that ideological attitudes of RWA and SDO develop as a result of specific social worldviews and it posits both the

environmental factors and personality characteristics leading to these attitudes and the consequent values and motivations individuals adopted through their ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001). Considering the historical and current interethnic dynamics of Turkey, RWA-characterised pathway is expected to be more predictive of Turks' attitudes toward Kurds. Threat is included as the expected mediator of the relationship between ideological attitudes and prejudice in the present study. Considering the important role that threat plays regarding out-group attitudes; a more specifically threat-focused theory of prejudice, the Integrated Threat Theory, is introduced next in order to better identify the threats perceived by Turks from Kurds.

1.4. The Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice

The dual-process model depicts different values and motivations leading to prejudiced out-group attitudes. In investigating attitudes of Turks toward Kurds within the framework of this model, another theory that explains prejudice is incorporated into the Dual-Process Model, namely the Integrated Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Stephan et al., 1998, Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). After their analysis of the literature regarding the role of fear and threat in intergroup attitudes, Stephan and his colleagues concluded that perceptions of threat, regardless of whether they are real or not, lead to negative out-group attitudes (Stephan & Stephan, 1996) and identified four basic types of threat as proximal predictors of attitudes toward out-groups: realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes.

1.4.1. Types of Threat as Proximal Predictors of Prejudice

Realistic threat in this theory resembles the threat in realistic conflict theory (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). Threats to physical existence (e.g., wars, armed conflicts) and well-being (e.g., health) of in-group, any resources (e.g., houses, job opportunities) or sources of power (e.g., economical or political power) that in-group possess are conceptualised as realistic threat. Hostile attitudes and discriminative behaviours occur as a result of perceived competition between groups over scarce resources or power. In this sense, the armed conflict that has been taking place between the PKK and Turkish Armed Forces would be an

example of realistic threat. Symbolic threat, on the other hand, includes threats stemming from clashes of morals, values, norms, standards, beliefs and attitudes. Group members believe in the moral rightness of their group, thus feel superior to other groups. Out-groups can be perceived as symbolically threatening without directly opposing or apparently violating the in-group's values, norms and such; even regarding them as unsupportive can be enough to perceive them as threatening the in-group (Biernat, Vescio, & Therno as cited in Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). For example, political or economic competition, or cultural and religious differences between Kurds and Turks may be categorised as a type of symbolic threat.

Dynamics of the intergroup context and the groups being examined matter in determining the type of threat perceived by those groups (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). For example, in India, symbolic threat predicts Hindus' attitudes toward Muslims whereas realistic threat predicts Muslims' attitudes toward Hindus (Tausch, Hewstone, & Roy, 2009). Muslims are the minority group and the majority group Hindus perceive their dominant status as highly stable; so realistic issues do not concern them as much as they concern Muslims. The nationalist Hindus emphasise the cultural differences between the two groups to promote their anti-Muslim opinions; thus Muslims are targeted as a source of symbolic threat in a way. Similarly, Israelis perceive Russian immigrants in their country as a realistic threat due to the Russian's recent political gains (Bizman & Yinon, 2001); whereas Protestants and Catholics in Ireland perceive each other as a symbolic threat due to the sectarian conflict between the two groups (Tausch et al., 2007). Another study with Blacks and Whites in America revealed that realistic threat was a somewhat stronger predictor of Whites' out-group attitudes than Blacks' (Stephan et al., 2002), although both realistic and symbolic threats predicted both groups' attitudes toward each other. Whites might perceive Blacks as posing a threat on their power and wealth especially when the affirmative actions favouring Blacks are considered, as the authors interpreted. Overall, the specific nature and dynamics of intergroup relations determine what kind of threat is perceived by those groups, and in turn, their attitudes toward each other.

Intergroup anxiety, as defined by Stephan and Stephan (1985), results from expecting negative consequences for the self from interactions with out-group members. Prior intergroup relations, cognitions about out-groups and situational factors may lead to intergroup anxiety and this in turn influences one's cognition, affects and behaviours toward those groups and their members. Intergroup anxiety may arise due to various reasons (see Stephan & Stephan, 1985). For example, one can feel embarrassed among out-group members because of a lack of knowledge about them or one can feel excluded among in-group members because of one's interactions with out-group members. Intergroup anxiety has been found to be the strongest predictor of out-group attitudes in many studies (e.g., Aberson & Gaffney, 2009; Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000; Stephan et al., 2002).

Finally, stereotypes play an important role in shaping one's expectations from social interactions with out-group members, explaining their behaviours (Stephan & Stephan, 1996) and justifying relative status of groups (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Especially stereotypes that are negative in valence are strong predictors of prejudice and justify discriminative behaviours toward out-groups more strongly than the ones with a positive valence. Stereotypes play a more important role in majority groups' attitudes toward minority groups than vice versa (e.g., Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; Stephan et al., 2002). Conceptualisation of negative stereotypes within ITT has been a problematic issue since stereotypes have both direct and indirect effects on out-group attitudes. Negative stereotypes were initially conceptualised as an independent threat variable (e.g., Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000; Stephan et al., 1998). Later, considering the criticisms, Stephan and his colleagues revised their model and placed stereotypes as a distal predictor of prejudice whose effect is mediated by other threat types and found supporting results (Stephan et al., 2002). For example, for both Blacks and Whites, the effect of negative stereotypes on negative racial attitudes of groups toward each other was significantly mediated by realistic threat, symbolic threat and intergroup anxiety. Similarly, negative stereotypes of Blacks and Whites had indirect effects on both explicit and implicit out-group attitudes through other threat types, but it had a direct effect only on explicit out-group attitudes (Aberson and Gaffney, 2009). Another study tested three different

models studying Dutch people's prejudice toward Muslim minorities (Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008). Stereotypes were conceptualised as a distal predictor whose effect on prejudice is mediated by other threat variables in one model, as a proximal variable that directly predicts prejudice mediating other distal predictors' effect on prejudice in the second model, and as a threat factor that mediates other threat variables' effects on prejudice in the third model. When compared, the study revealed that the best model was the one in which negative stereotypes were an independent threat variable, mediating distal predictors' effect on prejudice together with realistic threat and symbolic threat. Gonzalez and his colleagues attributed such differences in threat research to studying different groups and using different traits in stereotype measures.

These four types of threat are strong predictors of prejudice in many different contexts (e.g., for Blacks and Whites in the United States, see Stephan et al., 2002; for Cuban, Mexican, and Asian immigrants in the United States, see Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; for immigrants in Israel and Spain, see Stephan et al., 1998; for Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, see Tausch et al., 2007; for Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands, see Gonzalez et al., 2008; for Russian immigrants in Israel see Bizman & Yinon, 2001; for women and men, see Stephan et al., 2000). Besides prejudice, they have been useful also in predicting in-group bias (e.g., Tausch, Hewstone, & Roy, 2009), perceptions about whether immigrants want to assimilate (e.g., Croucher, 2012), and support for/opposition to social policies (Sibley & Liu, 2004). The types of threat in the integrated threat theory have been found to be significant predictors of implicit out-group attitudes, too, although it has been better at predicting explicit attitudes (Aberson & Gaffney, 2009). Furthermore, a meta-analytic study of intergroup threats revealed that the integrated threat theory, compared to other threat models or individual threats alone, is a better predictor of out-group attitudes (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006).

The types of threat that lead to prejudice toward a group depends on the intergroup context and the groups in question (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan and Stephan, 1996). Therefore, the predictive powers of threat types can change across contexts and this can be interpreted as a manifestation of empiric

and conceptual differences among the threat types. Some studies reveal results indicating the existence of a single latent threat variable underlying all these different threats (e.g., Stephan et al., 1998) while others reveal that the aforementioned threat types differ from each other both empirically and conceptually (e.g., Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). In addition to the central types of threat, integrated threat theory also posits some antecedents of these threats (Stephan et al., 2002), which are presented next.

1.4.2. Antecedents of Threat/Distal Predictors of Prejudice

The types of threat represented so far constitute the proximal predictors of prejudice. The integrated threat theory addresses not only the proximal predictors of threat but also the antecedents of threat, whose effect on prejudice are mediated by the proximal variables of the threat types. Antecedents of prejudice include in-group identification, negative contact, intergroup conflict, and perceived status differences (Stephan et al., 2002). These are referred as distal predictors as well; since their effects on prejudice are indirect.

The strongest antecedent of threat has usually been found to be negative contact with out-group members (e.g., Stephan et al., 2002). For both Blacks and Whites, negative contact had both direct and indirect effect on attitudes toward the respective out-group. Its indirect effect was mediated by all three threat variables, namely realistic threat, symbolic threat and anxiety (negative stereotypes were included as an antecedent of threat in this study). On women's attitudes toward men, negative contact had both direct and indirect effects, too (Stephan et al. 2000); yet in this study, its indirect effect was mediated by symbolic threat and anxiety but not by realistic threat and stereotypes. In another study by Stephan and his colleagues, the relationship between quality and quantity of contact, and attitudes of Mexicans and Americans toward each other was investigated (Stephan, Loving-Diaz, & Duran, 2000). Quality of contact had both direct and indirect effects on out-group attitudes whereas quantity of contact had only indirect effects. Not every threat mediator was common for Mexican and American samples yet all of the four threat variables were mediators of contact effects in at least one of the samples. In contrast to the contact quantity's indirect effect in Stephan and his colleagues study, another study with Protestants and

Catholics in Ireland (Tausch et al., 2007) revealed that contact quantity affected prejudice only directly. While the effect of contact quality was fully mediated by realistic threat and intergroup anxiety, contact quantity did not have any indirect effects. To conclude; contact, especially quality of contact, is a strong predictor of perceived threat and in turn, prejudice toward different social groups yet characteristics of its effects on prejudice, whether direct and/or indirect and through which threat types if indirect, differ across contexts.

Identification is another antecedent of prejudice. Social identity theory, developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979), has been one of the widely studied theories in social psychology aimed at explaining the relationship between group memberships and intergroup interactions. Social identities are parts of personal identities stemming from the knowledge of affiliation with a social group. Belongingness to a group leads to adoption of thoughts, values, emotions and behaviours related to that group; and this is how social identities become a part of personal identities (Tajfel, 1978). Identification leads individuals to adhere to in-groups' norms and values and to act in accordance with other in-group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Individuals not only define themselves but also perceive and evaluate others with regards to their group memberships. Just as individuals differentiating themselves from other individuals, group members differentiate themselves from other groups (Tajfel, 1982). This process leads to perceptions of in-group heterogeneity and out-group homogeneity and attitudes of in-group favouritism and out-group hostility, through which stereotypes and prejudices inevitably develop.

Regarding perceived threat; the stronger individuals' identification with their in-group is, the more individuals perceive threat toward their in-group from out-groups (Stephan et al., 2002). Among the four types of threat outlined by the integrated threat theory, realistic and symbolic threats are more likely to be perceived as group-level threats, whereas intergroup anxiety and negative out-group stereotypes have relatively interpersonal implications (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Stephan et al., 1998). Identification moderates the relationship between group-level threat variables and prejudice (Bizman & Yinon, 2001). Bizman and Yinon hypothesised that group-level threats influence highly

identified group members' attitudes toward out-groups whereas individual level threats influence relatively less identified group members' out-group attitudes with an Israeli sample and found partial support for their hypotheses. Only realistic threat (not symbolic threat) was a strong predictor of high-identifier Israelis' attitudes toward Russian immigrants while only intergroup anxiety (not negative stereotypes) was a strong predictor of low-identifier Israelis' attitudes. Similarly, Tausch et al. (2007) in their study with Protestants and Catholics in Ireland found that symbolic threat (not realistic threat) was a strong predictor for high-identifiers while again intergroup anxiety was a stronger predictor for low-identifiers. Overall, the type of threat that plays a mediator role depends on the characteristics of the groups studied yet findings support the individual and group-level distinction among the threat types and the moderation by identification to a considerable extent.

The predictive power of perceived status differences depends on the social structure of the intergroup context. For example, perceived relative status of groups was not a significant predictor of any threat variable in stable contexts (e.g., for Blacks and Whites, see Stephan et al., 2002; for Native Canadians and Euro-Canadians, see Corenblum & Stephan, 2001). On the other hand, in Tausch, Hewstone, and Joy's study with Hindus and Muslims in India (2009), perceived status differences was found to be the only predictor of realistic threat perceptions of Muslims, even in the presence of contact. Considering that the Muslim minority in India regards their position as illegitimate and unstable (Ghosh and Kumar, as cited in Tausch, Hewstone, & Joy, 2009), stability of group hierarchy in the former contexts might be hindering status differences to influence threat perceptions. Stephan and Renfro (2002) suggest that while decreases in the gap between majority and minority groups induce threat to majority groups, increases in the gap do so to minority groups. Consistently, large gaps are perceived as threat only by low-status groups and status gaps are associated with realistic threat (Tausch et al., 2008). Finally, intergroup conflict is a significant predictor of threat perceptions and, in turn, out-group attitudes (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; Stephan et al., 2002), too.

1.4.3. Integration of the ITT to the Turkish – Kurdish context

With regard to the group-level and individual-level distinction among threat types, only the group-level ones are included in the current study due to the clear boundaries between Kurds and Turks. For example, the majority of Turks live in the western part of Turkey while the majority of Kurds live in the east (Koc, Havcioglu, & Cavlin, 2008). Besides, interethnic marriages are not very common, which leads to the conclusion that there exist certain ethnicity-based group boundaries between Kurds and Turks. Moreover, the recognition of the Kurdish identity and the armed attacks between the government troops and PKK are both group-level issues. Therefore, using the group-level threat types makes more sense. Additionally, considering the salience of cultural identities within the Kurdish issue and identity's aforementioned relationship with the group-level threats, Turkish identification is also included as an antecedent of threat along with RWA and SDO in the current study.

When we try to integrate the predictions from ITT into the Turkish context, we may expect that realistic threat would mediate the effect of identity and ideological attitudes on Turks' attitudes toward Kurds. In Israel, the threat types that predicted attitudes toward Russian immigrants changed from intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes (Stephan et al., 1998) to realistic threat, but not symbolic threat (Bizman & Yinon, 2001), as the time passed. The authors of the latter study attributed this to the seats that the immigrants' political party had after the 1996 elections; the increase in the political power of immigrants might have been induced realistic threat perceptions to the locals. Similarly, pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP, *tr.*) had 20 seats in the parliament prior to the 2011 elections (Sabah, 2011, January 19). In the elections, 35 independent deputies supported by BDP were selected (T24, 2011, July 12) and BDP currently has 29 seats out of 550 in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT, 2013). Now, BDP, along with other three parties in the parliament, has three members in The Constitution Conciliation Commission that is working on the preparation of the new constitution of Turkey (Yeni Anayasa, 2013). The inclusion of BDP representatives in this process might foster the recognition of Kurdish identity and its rights at the judiciary level. Hence, we

can say that the Kurdish movement has been gaining political power, especially within the last decade. Moreover, the government of Turkey and the national intelligence services recently declared that they have been engaging in talks with the jailed Kurdish leader, Abdullah Öcalan, about the disarmament of PKK (BBC, 2013, January 1). Meanwhile, starting from the beginning of 2013, groups of pro-Kurdish politicians, mainly BDP deputies, have been meeting with Öcalan in his prison on İmralı Island (Birgün, 2013, January 3; Birgün, 2013, February 24; Birgün, 2013, March 18; Birgün, 2013, April 3) and passing Öcalan's messages on both to the government of Turkey and to the PKK militants in Iraq. After the third meeting in March, the visitor deputies of BDP read a letter from Öcalan in both Kurdish and Turkish languages to the mostly Kurdish crowd celebrating the new year (Newroz) in Diyarbakır this year (Radikal, 2013, May 22). The prominence and the increased power of pro-Kurdish actors in politics might have been induced perceptions of realistic threat to Turks in Turkey.

Along with the political power dimension, the centrality of the terror issue within the Kurdish problem might be another strong contributor of realistic threat perception (Ulug & Cohr, 2012). In the report on acts of terror and violence prepared by the Commission of Human Rights in 2013, PKK had the most central place. According to the report, almost 8 thousand public servants and approximately 5 and a half thousand civilians died because of terrorism while more than 22 thousand terrorists were captured dead between 1984 and 2012. Although PKK is not the only terrorist actor responsible from these numbers, it has the biggest share. Additionally, the terror incidents has been given a wide media coverage throughout these years. Like Van Bruinessen's 1998-dated conclusion that distinguishing between civilian Kurds and PKK became very difficult, the salience of terrorism might make it very difficult for some to distinguish between terrorism and the Kurdish question, as well.

The Kurdish issue waits to be solved both at the civil and the military level for Turkey's accession to the European Union. Therefore, Kurds might be regarded as preventing Turkey from gaining political and economical power in the West. Moreover, by creating an insecure condition in the south-eastern Turkey, PKK might be regarded as posing threats on Turkey's position in the Middle East, as

well. In addition to PKK's perceived harmful intentions, another common theme with regards to the terror issue is the belief in foreign forces' support for PKK (Ulug & Cohrs, 2012). Due to their assumed material and moral support for PKK, foreign forces are perceived as adversaries of the Republic of Turkey threatening its national unity indirectly via PKK. Finally, democratic autonomy is worth-mentioning. The extent and content of the democratic autonomy is highly ambiguous and this ambiguity stems from the Kurdish and pro-Kurdish actors themselves (Yeğen, 2011); in one hand, it is presented as aimed at the democratisation of Turkey and peaceful living of all without targeting Kurdish ethnicity and, on the other hand, it suggests regionalisation of diplomacy and security by founding confederate states which reflects separatist orientations. From the state's and Turks' point of view, the demand of democratic autonomy has been perceived as a serious threat to the national unity and territorial integrity (Bayramoglu, as cited in Karakoc, 2010; Yeğen, 1999). Considering all these; realistic threat is expected to be a significant predictor of Turks' attitudes toward Kurds.

Armed struggle is the most prominent method of PKK; however it has been struggling for obtaining democratic autonomy and for entitling Kurds to their cultural and political rights with a nationalist approach. Therefore, although terrorism may be regarded as a realistic threat through causing deaths, the ultimate aim of the terrorist attacks might be posing symbolic threats, threats to the social and cultural cohesion of Turkey. The difficulties of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic make both national unity and geographical integrity of Turkey extremely valuable. Demands of democratic autonomy oppose such values as if Kurds do not adhere to the same history and the same antecedents. Also, recognition of a separate culture within the national culture can be perceived as a symbolic clash. Consequently, symbolic threat, too, is expected to mediate the relationship between ideological attitudes and attitudes toward Kurds. Consistently, in a study about attitudes toward terrorism, RWA predicted the perceived symbolic threat from terrorism but not realistic threat whereas SDO did not predict any kind of perceived threat (Crowson, 2009).

1.5. The Current Study

The current study investigates Turks' attitudes toward Kurds in Turkey and the relationship between perceived threat and these attitudes. In light of the dual-process model, it is hypothesised that RWA-characterised pathway will be more predictive of Turks' prejudice toward Kurds compared to the SDO-characterised one. Regarding the threat types depicted by the integrated threat theory, the group-level threats of realistic threat and symbolic threat are included in the current study and both of them are expected to mediate the relationship between identification and socio-political attitudes of RWA and SDO and prejudice toward Kurds, as explained in the previous section.

Additionally, a comprehensive identification scale (Leach et al., 2008) will be adopted into Turkish to measure the participant's Turkish identification. Another scale developed for this study is also included to measure the participant's identification with Turkey without referring to any group or ethnicity. Moreover, Stephan and his colleagues threat scales (Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman, 1999) and negative out-group affect measure (Stephan et al., 1998) will be adapted to Turkish.

The following three main research questions are investigated in the current:

1. *Does one pathway of the dual process model predict Turks' prejudice toward Kurds more strongly than the other?*
2. *Does identification predict Turks' prejudice toward Kurds and do Turkish identification and identification with Turkey differentiate from each other?*
3. *Does group-level perceived threat mediate the path from socio-political attitudes and identification to Turk's prejudice toward Kurds?*

Based on the above overview, the hypotheses generated from these research questions are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: RWA, rather than SDO, will predict Turks' prejudice toward Kurds.

Hypothesis 2: Identification will predict Turks' prejudice toward Kurds.

Hypothesis 3: Both realistic threat and symbolic threat, the group-level threat types, will mediate the effect of RWA and identification on Turk's prejudice toward Kurds.

CHAPTER 2

METHOD

2.1. Participants

The data of the current study was collected via an online survey and the participants were recruited through convenience sampling. A total of 770 participants started the survey; however not all of them reached the end of the survey questions. Because the target of the current study was Turkish participants, initially individuals who regarded themselves as Turkish were removed from the data set. There were 287 Turkish participants yet one of them did answer any demographic questions or scale items. Of the remaining 286 participants, 84 were students who participated in the study in exchange for bonus course credits. The link to the online survey was shared on Facebook accounts and Facebook group pages, and also in some mailing lists of various social clubs and societies. The remaining 192 participants were volunteers who came across with the study link through these lists. The 286 participants consisted of 150 women (52.4%) and 136 men (47.6%). Two persons did not report their age. The age of the remaining 284 participants ranged from 18 to 64 ($M = 27.48$, $SD = 8.00$).

The education level of the participants was asked in terms of the highest degree they had completed (see Appendix A). Majority of the participants reported that they were university or college graduates ($n = 136$, 47.6%). While 85 individuals (29.7%) reported to have graduated from high school, 62 individuals (21.7%) reported to have completed a graduate school (doctoral or master's degree). Of the remaining, one person (.03%) was a secondary school graduate and two (.07%) were answered as "None". Regarding the cities participants lived in, three participants did not give an answer to this question. Twenty one

participants (7.3%) reported that they were living abroad, mainly in the Netherlands ($n = 9$, 3.1%). Ten of them (3.5%) were living in Northern Cyprus. The majority, consisting of 252 participants (88.1%), were living in Turkey. Of the total; 138 were from Ankara (48.3%), 80 were from Istanbul (28%) and 9 were from Izmir (3.1%). The rest (8.7%) were from various Turkish cities such as Antalya, Eskisehir, and Bursa.

2.2. Instruments

The survey set of the current study consisted of various measures as well as demographic questions. The first group of scales included Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, Turkish Identification and Identification with Turkey scales. These measured the independent variables. Perceived threat was measured with Threat Scale which was a combined version of realistic and symbolic threat scales adjusted according to the intergroup context in question. Prejudice, the dependent variable, was assessed via three different measures which are Negative Out-group Affect Scale, Social Distance Scale and Feeling Thermometer (see Appendices). All questions and scales were self-report measures. The response format was a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) for all the scales unless otherwise indicated. The factor analyses of the scales that were newly adapted to Turkish or specifically created for this study will be represented in the results section. The reliability statistics of the scales which are calculated with the scores of those who completely filled each scale are given in Table 1 together with the respective number of participants.

Table 1*Reliability Statistics of the Major Study Variables*

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Cronbach α</i>	<i>n</i>
1. RWA	.93	425
2. SDO	.92	334
3. Turkish identification	.94	263
4. Identification with Turkey	.93	425
5. General threat	.97	374
6. Cultural difference threat	.83	382
7. Social distance	.93	390
8. Negative affect	.91	389
9. Positive affect	.90	180
10. Warmth	-	-

Note. RWA = Right-wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. Higher scores on RWA, SDO, Turkish identification, identification with Turkey, general threat and cultural differences indicate higher endorsement of respective constructs. Higher scores of social distance and negative affect indicate more prejudice toward Kurds; whereas higher scores on positive affect and feeling temperature indicate warmer feelings, thus less prejudice, toward Kurds.

2.2.1. Demographic Questions

Participants were asked of their ages, sexes, education levels, the city they lived in, their political orientations and religious identities, and which political party they had voted in the 2011 elections. How much important their political opinions were for them, how much they followed the news related to Kurdish issue and how often they talked about the Kurdish issue in their daily chats were assessed via single questions. The questions of how much they supported the peace process and how they evaluated the actions taken within the scope of this peace process were included, as well. A 7-point Likert scale was used as the response format by adjusting it according to each question. Finally, contact questions of whether they had any acquaintances or relatives considering themselves as Kurdish and whether they or someone they knew got harmed due to the armed conflicts in the south-eastern Turkey were included with a yes/no response format.

2.2.2. Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale

In measuring right-wing authoritarianism, the Turkish version of Altemeyer's 1996 scale that was adapted by Güldü (2011) was used (see Appendix C). The scale consisted of 18 items, half of which were reverse items. Examples of these items are as follows: "It is always better to trust the judgments of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds", "There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action" and "Gays and lesbians are just as healthy as any person" (reverse item). Higher scores indicated more authoritarian attitudes. The scale had a satisfactory internal reliability ($\alpha = .93$, $n = 425$) in this study, as well.

2.2.3. Social Dominance Orientation Scale

Social Dominance Orientation was measured by using the Turkish version of the 16-item SDO scale developed by Pratto et al. (1994) and adapted to Turkish by Akbas (2010, unpublished master thesis). Half of the items were reverse items. The scale included items such as "Some groups of people are simple not equals of others", "To get ahead, it is sometimes necessary to step on others" and "No one group should dominate in society" (reverse item) (see Appendix D). Higher scores indicate higher levels of social dominance orientation. The internal reliability of the scale was found to be satisfactory ($\alpha = .92$, $n = 334$).

2.2.4. Turkish Identification Scale

To measure Turkish identification, the Multi-component In-group Identification Scale (Leach, van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Ouwerkerk, & Spears, 2008) was adapted to Turkish (see Appendix E). According to the hierarchical conceptualisation of identification by Leach et al., identification is a two-dimensional construct with five components. These dimensions are group-level self-investment consisting of solidarity, satisfaction and centrality components; and group-level self-definition consisting of self-stereotyping and in-group

homogeneity components. The scale consisted of 14 items such as “I feel a bond with Turks”, “It is pleasant to be Turkish” and “I have a lot with the average Turk”. Higher scores indicated stronger levels of identification. The scale was translated to Turkish for the first time for this study. The Turkish version of this 14-item scale was found to be internally consistent with a Turkish sample, as well ($\alpha = .94, n = 263$).

2.2.5. Identification with Turkey Scale

Another scale that intended to assess identification with Turkey as a country without explicitly referring to membership to a particular group within Turkey (e.g., Turkish) was also created for the purposes of this study. It measured how much one feels belonging to Turkey with the questions such as “How much do you feel like belonging to Turkey?” and “How much would you miss Turkey if you lived abroad?” (see Appendix F). The final scale consisted of 5 items and had high internal consistency ($\alpha = .93, n = 425$).

2.2.6. Threat Scale

The threat scale consisted 20 items that were devised specifically for this study considering the unique aspects of the current context in Turkey and strongly inspired by the original realistic threat and symbolic threat scales developed by Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman (1999) (see Appendix G). The scale was designed to tap the symbolic and realistic threat perceived from Kurds. 10 items were constructed for each aspect. Example items from realistic threat scale would be “Kurds are decreasing the social welfare in Turkey” or “Kurds harm the national unity of Turkey by conserving their Kurdish identity”. An example item from the symbolic threat scale would be “Kurds are not like Turks regarding their life styles”. The factor analysis, described in more detail in the Results section, yielded two factors with 16 symbolic and realistic threat items together in one factor, named as “general threat” ($\alpha = .97, n = 374$); and a second factor with only 4 items, labelled as “cultural difference threat” ($\alpha = .83, n = 382$). None of the items were reverse coded and higher scores indicated higher levels of perceived threat.

2.2.7. Negative Out-group Affect Scale

In order to measure prejudice towards out-groups, the negative out-group affect scale developed by Stephan et al. (1998) was revised. The scale consists of 12 evaluative or emotional reactions which were hostility, admiration, dislike, acceptance, superiority, affection, disdain, approval, hatred, sympathy, rejection, and warmth. It was a balanced measure in the sense that half of the items had a positive valence while the other half had a negative valence. The response format was a 7-point scale, from 1 (it does not reflect my feelings towards the out-group at all) to 7 (it completely reflects my feelings towards the out-group). In the analyses of the current study, negative affect ($\alpha = .91$, $n = 389$) and positive affect ($\alpha = .90$, $n = 180$) are included as separate variables.

2.2.8. Social Distance Scale

Social distance between Turks and Kurds from the Turks' viewpoint, another indicator of prejudice, was measured by an adaptation of Bogardus' (1967) social distance scale (see Appendix H). This was a scale consisting of questions depicting different social relations between different group members; and participants were asked to rate how comfortable or uncomfortable they would have felt if they were to be related to an out-group member in a way specified in each question, such as "as a spouse" and "as neighbours on the same street". The response format was a 7-point scale from 1 (I would not feel uncomfortable at all) to 7 (I would feel highly uncomfortable). Higher scores indicated greater felt social distance and thus more prejudice toward the out-group. The internal reliability of the scale was satisfactory ($\alpha = .93$, $n = 390$).

2.2.9. Feeling Thermometer

A third measure of prejudice, feeling thermometer, measures feelings of warmth toward various out-groups. In this measure, feeling toward a given group is expressed as a temperature from a 100-degree scale in which 0° means very cold feelings while 100° means very warm feelings. Warmer feelings/higher degrees mean less prejudice. In this study, the participants were asked to evaluate 11

different groups which were Turks, Kurds, Laz people, Circassians, Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Christians, Jews, Muslims, Alevi people in terms of how warm or cold they feel towards these groups. Only the evaluations of Kurds are used in the further analyses.

2.3. Procedure

Prior to data collection, an approval from Middle East Technical University (METU) Human Subjects Ethics Committee (HSEC) was obtained in order to be able to conduct the study. Upon the approval of the study, an online survey was prepared on Survey Monkey and the data was collected through this website. The participants were recruited through convenience sampling. For the sake of the research purposes, the study was introduced to the participants as “Current Issues in Turkey”. The study was announced to the students enrolled in two sections of “Understanding Social Behaviour” course at METU and one section of “Social Psychology II” course at METU, North Cyprus Campus. Then, the study link was shared with the students by sending the study link to their e-mail addresses and they received bonus course credits in exchange for their participation. The link was also shared on Facebook accounts, Facebook pages and mailing lists of various social clubs and societies.

The first page of the survey briefly informed the participants about the study and asked their consent to participate (see Appendix I). Those who agreed were directed to the survey. The participants filled firstly the demographic questions. Then, the scales of the independent variables were given in the following order: RWA, SDO, identification with Turkey and Turkish identification. Threat scale followed them and then, the prejudice measures were given in the following order: Negative Out-group Affect, Social Distance and Feeling Thermometer. The survey was arranged in a way that would allow participants to take the scales according to their ethnic identities. The demographic questions, RWA, SDO and Identification with Turkey scales were open for all the ethnic groups. Then, the participants were asked whether they considered themselves as Turkish. The ones who answered “Yes” continued the survey in the order given above. The ones who answered “No” were asked whether they considered themselves as Kurdish. If they answered “No” again, they skipped the Turkish

Identification Scale and proceeded to the threat scale and on. However, if they considered themselves as Kurdish, they skipped all of the following scales: Turkish identification, threat, social distance and negative out-group affect scales. This is because these latter three scales were measuring prejudiced attitudes toward and perceived threat from Kurds and it would be meaningless for Kurdish participants to complete them. Kurdish participants completed the Feeling Thermometer scale, however, because Feeling Thermometer measures attitudes toward various groups rather than measuring attitudes toward a specific group. The demographic questions referring to Kurds, such as contact questions, and the Kurdish issue, such as how much they supported the peace process, were asked to the non-Kurdish participants upon completion of the scales. Finally, all participants were asked whether they had felt uncomfortable while filling the survey and provided with a box where they could leave their comments about the study. The students who participated for course credits filled the related questions after the survey. Having completed the study, the participants were presented with the debriefing form (see Appendix J) where they were further informed about the major variables included in the study such as RWA and SDO and the purposes of the study; and they were thanked for their collaboration. The whole survey took approximately 25 minutes for Turkish participants and less for the others.

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

Prior to the statistical analyses, the major variables were examined via SPSS (15.0) for the missing data, outliers and multiple regression assumptions. Because the data was collected online, the accuracy of the data was not questioned. For the data analyses, only the participants who considered themselves as Turkish were included ($n = 287$, $N = 770$). The considering-onself-as-Turkish question was asked toward the middle of the survey. Thus, the participants that dropped out from the initial scales were automatically excluded.

The scale scores were calculated by averaging that scale's item scores. Even when only one item was answered, a score was calculated for that participant. Among the 287 Turkish participants, 21 participants did not answer any item from the threat scale. Therefore, they were excluded. Of the remaining participants, 3 participants did not answer any prejudice scale and they were excluded, too. Both the first 21 participants and the later 3 participants were compared to the rest of the sample with respect to their existing scores such as RWA and SDO and the analyses revealed non-significant t-test results for all the previous measures that these participants filled. Therefore we can assume that the missing cases were non-systematic. After these, there was one missing value in SDO, Turkish identification and identification with Turkey variables and there were three missing values in cultural difference threat variable. All of them were replaced with the mean scores of the respective variables. Afterwards, an analysis of multivariate outliers was conducted. Calculation of Mahalanobis distances (*Mahalanobis distance* (10) = 29.59, $p < .001$) revealed that there were 4 multivariate outliers in the data. Having deleted them, there was left only one univariate outlier in the remaining data set which had a z SDO score of 3.84,

higher than the critical value of ± 3.29 . After deleting that case, a sample with a total of 258 participants remained for the analyses.

The normality assumption was not met by all the variables in the model, which is a must for multiple regression analyses. The social distance (*skewness* = 1.66, *kurtosis* = 2) and negative affect (*skewness* = 1.04) variables were non-normally distributed. This violation makes the analyses prone to Type I error; therefore the results should be interpreted with caution. Linearity and homoscedasticity assumptions were met considerably. Moreover, there was not any variable violating the assumptions of multicollinearity or singularity.

3.1. Scale Constructions and Factor Analysis

SPSS (15.0) Data Reduction was utilised and principle axis factoring method was employed for the individual factor analyses of each scale. Missing values were excluded in a list-wise way; thus only the participants who answered all the items in a scale were included in the factor analysis of that scale. Number of iterations was always kept at 25 since the included sample sizes were not extremely large and the cut-off point for loadings was set at .30. Regarding the scales translated to Turkish and used for the first time in this study, the rotation method was chosen to be direct oblimin and the reported loadings are taken from the pattern matrixes.

3.1.1. Turkish Identification

The original multi-component identification scale consisted of two dimensions correlating with each other (Leach et al., 2008); therefore, a principal axis factoring analysis with the direct oblimin rotation method was conducted on the Turkish version of the 14-item original scale. The whole scale was completed by 263 out of 770 participants and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was still satisfying (*KMO* = .91) even after the drop in sample size, meaning that the sample was adequate for the factor analysis. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity statistic was also significant ($\chi^2(91) = 3282.84$, $p = .000$), indicating that the correlations between the items were high enough to run a data-reducing analysis on them. The analysis revealed a model with two factors, which was the same as the original scale.

The first factor, self-investment, had an eigenvalue of 7.62 and explained the 54.45% of the total variance. It had 10 items. One item, “I often think about the fact that I am Turkish”, had the lowest loading on the factor; .30. Except that item, the loadings ranged from .63 to .94. The internal reliability of the factor was satisfactory ($\alpha = .93$, $n = 270$). The second factor, self-definition, had an eigenvalue of 1.30 and explained 9.29%. It consisted of 4 items and their loadings on the factor ranged from .61 to .84. The internal reliability of the scale was satisfactory ($\alpha = .87$, $n = 272$).

The factors explained 63.73% of the total variance and the internal reliability of the whole scale was satisfactory, as well ($\alpha = .94$, $n = 263$). The correlation of the two factors was .55. After the extraction, the abovementioned item with the lowest factor loading had a communality of .13 whereas the rest of the communalities ranged from .56 to .78 with an average of .64. All in all, the Turkish sample confirmed the reliability and the two-dimensional structure of the original scale.

3.1.2. Identification with Turkey

The initial scale consisted of 6 items. Its analysis revealed that the scale was internally reliable ($\alpha = .90$, $n = 424$). However, deletion of one of the items was found to be improving the scale's internal reliability. Comparing the content of that item (How much does Turkey's agenda influence your daily life?) to the rest (e.g., How well does it define you to be a citizen of Turkey?), that item was excluded from the scale. The final scale consisted of 5 items.

Both the KMO statistic ($KMO = .88$) and the Barlett's statistic ($\chi^2 (10) = 1835.54$, $p = .000$) were satisfactory. All the items loaded on a single factor with an eigenvalue of 3.71 and explaining 74.17% of the total variance. The communalities of the items ranged from .63 to .87 with an average of .74. The scale was internally reliable ($\alpha = .93$, $n = 425$).

3.1.3. Threat Scale

The analysis conducted employing the direct oblimin rotation method. Both the KMO statistic ($KMO = .96$) and the Barlett's statistic ($\chi^2 (190) = 7413.48$, $p =$

.000) were satisfactory. The model indicated a two-factor solution, although they were not exactly corresponding to the expected realistic and symbolic threat factors. The factor loadings and the communalities of the scale are given in Table 2.

The first factor consisting of 16 out of 20 items had an eigenvalue of 11.97 and explained 59.83% of the total variance. The factor loadings of the items ranged from .64 to .91. The items loaded on this factor were included all those written to be realistic threat items (e.g., “The increases in Kurds’ political power harms the unity of the state.”; “Kurds are lowering the social welfare of Turkey.”) but also the symbolic threat items measuring whether expression and practices of the Kurdish culture would harm Turkey (e.g., “Kurds are not as well-behaved as Turks.”; “Kurds are overprotecting their culture and language.”). Therefore, this factor is labelled as “general threat”. It was found to be an internally consistent factor ($\alpha = .97$, $n = 374$). The items loaded on this factor were the ones describing harmful aspects of Kurds. There were a few items referring to the perceived threat to the national unity of Turkey which were conceptualised both as realistic threat and as symbolic threat; all of them loaded on this factor.

The remaining 4 symbolic threat items loaded on the second factor. The factor had an eigenvalue of 1.40 and explained 6.98 of the total variance. Factor loadings ranged from .56 to .88. This factor included the items in which Kurds and Turks were explicitly compared in terms of their social practices (e.g., Kurds differ from Kurds regarding their family relations and child-rearing practices); consequently, the factor is named as “cultural differences”. It was found to be an internally consistent factor ($\alpha = .83$, $n = 382$), too.

The whole scale explained 66.81% of the total variance the internal reliability of the whole scale was satisfactory, as well ($\alpha = .97$, $n = 368$). The communalities of the items ranged from .34 to .79 with an average of .69. The correlation between the factors was .56. It should be noted that the loadings of the items to the two factors may be due to the wording of the items. The scale did not have any reverse items and the items of the first factor expressed a kind of harm that Kurds might be causing while the items of the second factor compared the two ethnic groups without expressing a positive or negative valence.

Table 2*Loadings on Factors for the Threat Scale*

<i>Items</i>	<i>F₁^a</i>	<i>F₂</i>	<i>h²</i>
1. Kürtler. iş olanaklarını Türklerin elinden alıyorlar.	.70		.51
2. Kürtlerin bulunduğu ortamlarda suç oranları artar.	.87		.73
3. Kürtler. Türkiye'nin sosyal refah seviyesinin azalmasına neden oluyorlar.	.91		.79
4. Kürtler. Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'da güçlenmesini engellemektedir.	.89		.76
5. Kürtlerin siyasi olarak güçlenmeleri devletin bütünlüğüne zarar vermektedir.	.86		.73
6. Kürtlere azınlık olarak birçok hak sağlanması, diğer azınlıkların da bu hakları talep etmesine ve dolayısıyla ülkede bölünmelere yol açabilir.	.79		.60
7. Kürtlerin nüfus artış hızı Türkiye'nin düzenini tehdit etmektedir.	.88		.72
8. Kürtler ekonomik olarak Türkiye'ye yarar sağlamaktan çok zarar veriyorlar.	.91		.78
9. Kürtler ülke bütünlüğüne zarar vermeye çalışmaktadırlar.	.88		.79
10. Kürtler. Türkiye'nin kurulu düzenini tehdit etmektedirler.	.84		.72
11. Kürtlerin kimliklerine sahip çıkmaları, Türkiye'nin birlik ve beraberliğine karşı oldukları gösterir.	.79		.62
12. Kürtler iş yapıları açısından Türkler kadar ahlaklı değildir.	.74		.68
13. Kürtlerin örf ve adetleri Türklerinkinden farklıdır.		.62	.34
14. Dini inanışları açısından Kürtler ve Türkler birbirlerine benzemezler.		.56	.35
15. Aile ilişkileri ve çocuk yetiştirme tarzları açısından Kürtler. Türklerden farklıdır.		.84	.75
16. Kürtler. yaşam tarzı açısından Türklere benzemezler.		.88	.79
17. Kürtler. Türkiye'nin kültürel değerlerine zarar vermektedirler.	.81		.78
18. Kürtler. Türklerin yoğun olduğu bölgelere göç ettiklerinde o bölgeyi kötü etkilemektedirler.	.84		.70
19. Kürtler kültürlerine ve dillerine gereğinden fazla sahip çıkıyorlar.	.63		.50
20. Kürtlerin kendi kültürlerini yaşatmaya çalışması Türkiye'yi olumsuz etkiler.	.85		.71
Percent of variance explained	59.83	6.98	

Note. Factor loadings are taken from the pattern matrix and factor loadings less than <.30 are omitted. Both communalities and percentages of variance explained are calculated after extraction. Items are rated on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).

^a Factor labels: F₁ = General Threat F₂ = Cultural Difference Threat

3.1.4. Negative Out-group Affect Scale

A factor analysis with direct oblimin rotation was conducted in the items. Both the KMO statistic ($KMO = .91$) and the Barlett's statistic ($\chi^2 (66) = 1759.32, p = .000$) were satisfactory. The model indicated a two-factor solution in which the factors corresponded to the negative and positive affect items.

The 6-item first factor had an eigenvalue of 5.73 and explained 47.78% of the total variance. The factor loadings of the items ranged from .74 to .93. This factor is named as "negative affect" because it included only the items with a negative valence in the scale. It was found to be an internally consistent factor ($\alpha = .92, n = 389$). The other half of the scale with a positive valence loaded on the second factor; thus it is named as "positive affect". Its eigenvalue was 2.36 and the explained variance by this factor was 19.62%. The lowest loading belonged to the "admiration" item, .47. The rest of the loadings ranged from .76 to .94. This factor met the internal reliability standards, as well ($\alpha = .90, n = 180$).

The whole scale explained 67.40% of the total variance the internal reliability of the whole scale was satisfactory, as well ($\alpha = .90, n = 178$). The communality of the "admiration" item was the lowest, .21. The communalities of the other 11 items ranged from .51 to .90. The average of the whole scale was .69. The correlation between the factors was .39. Considering the low correlation between the factors, they were included in the further analyses separately. It might be noteworthy to emphasise that the negative items were completed by 389 participants whereas the positive items were completed only by 180. This may be a reflection of that expressing negative attitudes toward Kurds is more convenient than expressing positive attitudes and/or negative attitudes toward Kurds are more available in Turks' minds than positive attitudes. Moreover, the standard deviations of the negative affect items were lower than the positive affect items, except "admiration". The "admiration" item had the lowest mean and standard deviation among all the items. The relative invariability of Turks regarding their negative attitudes toward Kurds might be indicating that these attitudes are shared by the majority of Turks.

3.2. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Study Variables

The sample consisted of 138 women and 120 men. Two male participants did not report their ages; the mean age of the remaining 256 participants was 27.39 ($SD = 8.08$). The mean age of females was 26.71 ($SD = 7.95$) and that of males was 28.19 ($SD = 8.19$). Majority of the participants were from the biggest cities in Turkey (see Table 3); 50.00% from Ankara, 27.13% from Istanbul and 2.33% from Izmir. There were 8 participants from the Northern Cyprus (3.10%) and 19 from abroad (7.40). For the education levels of the participants, see Table 4. Almost the half of the participants was university graduates (46.90%), 80 (31.01%) were high school graduates while 52 (20.16%) were graduate school graduates, either master's or doctoral degree. There were two missing participants both in city and education level questions.

Table 3
Cities that the Participants Lived in

Cities the participants lived in	<i>n</i>	%
Istanbul	70	27.13
Ankara	129	50.00
Izmir	6	2.33
Other	24	9.30
Kibris	8	3.10
Abroad	19	7.40
Total	256	99.22
Missing	2	.78

Note. The "other" category included Turkish cities other than Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir such as Antalya, Eskisehir, Bursa and Canakkale with not more than 3 participants from each.

Table 4*Education Levels of the Participants*

<i>Education level</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
Secondary school	1	.39
High school	80	31.01
College/University	121	46.90
Master's/Doctoral degree	52	20.16
None	2	.78
Total	256	99.22
Missing	2	.78

The sample distribution of the political parties the participants voted for in the 2011 elections is presented in Table 5. Although the political parties voted by the participants in the 2011 elections were quite diverse, the frequencies were not representative of the population in Turkey (Haberler.com, 2013, 23 August). More than the half of the participants, 157 (61.00%), voted for CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; the Republican People's Party, *en.*), only 22 participants voted for AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; Justice and Development Party, *en.*) and 10 participants voted for MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi; Nationalist Movement Party, *en.*). The election results for these parties were as follows; 49.9% for AKP, 25.9% for CHP and 12.9% for MHP. Table 6 presents the sample distribution of political orientations of the participants. Consistently, the most frequently chosen political opinion categories were attributable to CHP; 62 participants categorised themselves as social democrats (24.03%), 43 as Kemalist (16.67%), 32 as liberal democrats (12.40%) and 29 as secular (11.24%). Another populous category was socialist chosen by 34 participants (13.18%). Therefore, the results of this study should be interpreted with caution.

Table 5

Political Parties the Participants Voted for in the 2011 Elections

<i>Party</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
AKP	22	.09
BBP	2	.01
BDP	1	.00
CHP	157	.61
DSP	1	.00
HAS Party	1	.00
MHP	10	.04
TKP	5	.02
Independents	6	.02
Empty	7	.03
Invalid	1	.00
Did not vote	28	.11
Total	241	.93
Missing	17	.07

Note. AKP = Justice and Development Party, BBP = Great Union Party; BDP = Peace and Democracy Party; CHP = Republican People's Party; DSP = Democratic Left Party; HAS Party = People's Voice Party; MHP = Nationalist Movement Party; TKP = Communist Party of Turkey.

Table 6*Political Orientations of the Participants*

<i>Political opinion</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
Conservative democrat	9	3.49
Political Islam	1	0.39
Muslim democrat	6	2.33
Social democrat	62	24.03
Liberal democrat	32	12.40
Nationalist conservative	4	1.55
Nationalist opinion	6	2.33
Idealist?	5	1.94
Anarchist	4	1.55
Secular	29	11.24
Kemalist	43	16.67
Socialist	34	13.18
Communist	5	1.94
Neo-nationalist	4	1.55
Total	244	94.57
Missing	14	5.43

For the religious identity profile of the sample, see Table 7. Half of the participants, 129, reported themselves as Sunni. Nineteen participants categorised themselves as Muslims under the other category although two Muslim sects of Sunni and Alevi were included in the response set. The other most frequently chosen religious categories were atheist (13.95%) and agnostic (10.08%).

Table 7
Religious Identities of the Participants

<i>Religious Identity</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
Sunni	129	50.00
Alevi	15	5.81
Christian	2	0.78
Jewish	1	0.39
Agnostic	26	10.08
Atheist	36	13.95
Deist	10	3.88
Muslim	19	7.36
Other	20	7.75
Total	258	100.00

Note. The religious identity question was a multiple choice one and the participants were given also a “other” box where they could write their own religion if it was not included in the response set. The Deist and Muslim categories are retrieved from the answers written in the “other” box. Although Sunni and Alevi categories are Muslim sects, some preferred to categorise themselves only as Muslim.

Mean scores and standard deviations of the major study variables are given in the Table 8 together with the scale reliability statistic of the respective scale. Participants scored moderately low on RWA ($M = 2.78$, $SD = .94$) and SDO ($M = 2.52$, $SD = 1.12$) scales while they scored moderately high on both Turkish identification ($M = 4.93$, $SD = 1.13$) and identification with Turkey ($M = 5.04$, $SD = 1.44$) scales. This shows that the participants considered themselves as Turkish and had belonging feelings to Turkey in general. They did not perceive high levels of general threat ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.54$) and cultural differences ($M = 3.83$, $SD = 1.33$). According to the Turks’ perception, Kurds and Turks were not very socially-distant to each other ($M = 1.90$, $SD = 1.28$). Participants scored low on both negative affect ($M = 2.14$, $SD = 1.28$) and positive affect ($M = 3.00$, $SD = 1.30$) toward Kurds. Finally, the feeling thermometer scores regarding Kurds were clustered almost around the mid-point of the temperature ($M = 54.51$, $SD = 25.96$).

Table 8

Means, Standard Deviations and Reliability Statistics of the Major Study Variables for the Turkish Sample

<i>Variables</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Cronbach α</i>
1. RWA	2.78	.94	.86
2. SDO	2.52	1.12	.90
3. Turkish identification	4.93	1.13	.93
4. Identification with Turkey	5.03	1.44	.91
5. General threat	3.44	1.54	.97
6. Cultural difference threat	3.83	1.33	.83
7. Social distance	1.90	1.28	.91
8. Negative affect	2.14	1.28	.90
9. Positive affect	3.00	1.30	.86
10. Warmth	54.51	25.96	-

Note. $N = 258$. RWA = Right-wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. Higher scores on RWA, SDO, Turkish identification, identification with Turkey, general threat and cultural differences indicate higher endorsement of respective constructs. Higher scores of social distance and negative affect indicate more prejudice toward Kurds; whereas higher scores on positive affect and feeling temperature indicate warmer feelings, thus less prejudice, toward Kurds.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$.

The gender-based mean scores and standard deviations of the study variables are represented in Table 9. The only gender difference was found to be in RWA scores ($t = -2.11$, $p = .04$); the male participants scored significantly higher in authoritarianism than the females (Table 3.1). As mentioned above, contact was an important antecedent of prejudice (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006) and consistently, those who had Kurdish friends and/or acquaintances were found to be significantly less prejudiced than the others in all the of the four prejudice measures (see Table 10). Although these groups did not differ from each other in terms of their cultural difference perceptions; those with Kurdish acquaintances reported less perceived general threat than the others who did not have. Comparing those who knew someone harmed in the armed conflict in the south-eastern Turkey to the rest who did not know, the group differences were found only in RWA and identification variables (see Table 11). In line with the literature showing terrorism's authoritarianism-increasing effect, the former

group was more authoritarian than the latter and their identification levels were also significantly higher than the other group.

Table 9
Gender Differences for the Major Study Variables

<i>Variables</i>	<i>General</i>		<i>Women (n = 138)</i>		<i>Men (n = 120)</i>		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
1. RWA	2.78	.94	2.67	.84	2.91	1.03	-2.11	.04**
2. SDO	2.52	1.12	2.42	1.11	2.63	1.13	-.153	.13
3. Turkish identification	4.93	1.13	4.88	1.09	4.98	1.18	-.69	.49
4. Identification with Turkey	5.03	1.44	4.98	1.43	5.09	1.45	-.58	.56
5. General threat	3.44	1.54	3.45	1.50	3.43	1.60	.10	.92
6. Cultural difference threat	3.83	1.33	3.82	1.25	3.85	1.42	-.20	.84
7. Social distance	1.90	1.28	2.03	1.37	1.76	1.17	1.70	.09*
8. Negative affect	2.14	1.28	2.08	1.26	2.21	1.30	-.85	.39
9. Positive affect	3.00	1.30	2.91	1.35	3.10	1.25	-1.16	.25
10. Warmth	54.51	25.96	54.22	27.69	54.83	23.93	-.19	.85

Note. *N* = 258. RWA = Right-wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. Higher scores on RWA, SDO, Turkish identification, identification with Turkey, general threat and cultural differences indicate higher endorsement of respective constructs. Higher scores of social distance and negative affect indicate more prejudice toward Kurds; whereas higher scores on positive affect and feeling temperature indicate warmer feelings, thus less prejudice, toward Kurds.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$.

Table 10

The Mean Differences between the Participants who have Kurdish Acquaintances and those who do not

<i>Variables</i>	General		Have Kurdish acquaintance (<i>n</i> = 201)		No Kurdish acquaintance (<i>n</i> = 56)		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
1. RWA	2.78	.94	2.77	.94	2.83	.96	-.39	.70
2. SDO	2.51	1.12	2.48	1.13	2.63	1.11	-.89	.37
3. Turkish identification	4.93	1.13	4.91	1.17	5.03	1.01	-.75	.46
4. Identification with Turkey	5.04	1.43	5.04	1.48	5.04	1.26	.00	1.00
5. General threat	3.45	1.55	3.33	1.53	3.86	1.54	-2.30	.02*
6. Cultural difference threat	3.83	1.33	3.77	1.36	4.05	1.18	-1.43	.15
7. Social distance	1.90	1.28	1.69	1.11	2.62	1.57	-5.02	.00**
8. Negative affect	2.13	1.27	1.97	1.15	2.73	1.50	-4.10	.00**
9. Positive affect	3.00	1.30	3.10	1.31	2.62	1.20	2.47	.01*
10. Warmth	54.51	26.01	56.50	24.87	47.36	28.86	2.35	.02*

Note. *N* = 257. RWA = Right-wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation Higher scores on RWA, SDO, Turkish identification, identification with Turkey, general threat and cultural differences indicate higher endorsement of respective constructs. Higher scores of social distance and negative affect indicate more prejudice toward Kurds; whereas higher scores on positive affect and feeling temperature indicate warmer feelings, thus less prejudice, toward Kurds. The participants were asked whether they had any Kurdish acquaintances with a yes/no response format.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .001$.

Table 11

The Mean Differences between the Participants who had Someone Harmed in the Armed Conflict in South-Eastern Turkey and those who do not

Variables	General		Know someone harmed in south-eastern Turkey (<i>n</i> = 138)		Know no one harmed in south-eastern Turkey (<i>n</i> = 120)		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
1. RWA	2.78	.94	2.94	.97	2.63	.89	2.64	.01*
2. SDO	2.51	1.12	2.52	1.10	2.50	1.15	.14	.89
3. Turkish identification	4.93	1.13	5.11	1.13	4.76	1.12	2.46	.01*
4. Identification with Turkey	5.04	1.43	5.25	1.35	4.83	1.48	2.37	.02*
5. General threat	3.45	1.54	3.46	1.57	3.43	1.52	.13	.90
6. Cultural difference threat	3.83	1.33	3.80	1.41	3.85	1.25	-.30	.77
7. Social distance	1.90	1.28	1.85	1.23	1.94	1.33	-.58	.56
8. Negative affect	2.13	1.27	1.19	.11	2.22	1.35	-1.10	.27
9. Positive affect	3.00	1.30	3.06	1.24	2.93	1.36	.79	.43
10. Warmth	54.51	26.01	54.25	24.06	54.76	27.90	-.16	.88

Note. *N* = 257. RWA = Right-wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. Higher scores on RWA, SDO, Turkish identification, identification with Turkey, general threat and cultural differences indicate higher endorsement of respective constructs. Higher scores of social distance and negative affect indicate more prejudice toward Kurds; whereas higher scores on positive affect and feeling temperature indicate warmer feelings, thus less prejudice, toward Kurds.

* *p* < .05.

Pearson's two- tailed correlation analyses were conducted via SPSS to see the pattern and the strength of the associations between the study variables. The results are given in **Table 12**. RWA did not correlate with cultural difference threat and the reverse prejudice measures of positive affect and warmth. RWA positively correlated with both Turkish identification ($r = .56, p < .01$) and identification with Turkey ($r = .37, p < .01$); its relations with these constructs were stronger than those of SDO. SDO positively correlated with Turkish identification ($r = .33, p < .01$); however the only variable it did not have a relation with was identification with Turkey. Identification with Turkey is an inclusive construct compared to Turkish identification, which has a specific ethnic orientation; considering that SDO is related to accepting social hierarchies, the differential association of identification variables with SDO is quite reasonable. The two identification variables positively correlated with each other to a moderate extent ($r = .63, p < .01$), indicating the identification with Turkey's convergent validity. On the other hand, while Turkish identification significantly correlated with all the other major study variables, this was not the case for identification with Turkey, which can be considered as an indicator of the divergent validity of the latter construct. Identification with Turkey did not correlate with the prejudice variables except social distance; the more one identified her/himself with Turkey, the more s/he felt distant from Kurds. This relation indicates the strong association between Turkey and Turkishness.

As given in Table 13, Turkish identification negatively correlated with the control questions about the acceptance of the peace process ($r = -.33, p < .01$) and the approval of the actions taken within the scope of this process ($r = -.27, p < .01$) while identification with Turkey positively correlated with the questions about the importance of one's political opinion ($r = .18, p < .05$), how much they follow the Kurdish problem-related news ($r = .22, p < .01$) and how much they talk about this in their daily lives ($r = .18, p < .01$). These results imply that identification specifically with Turkish identity is related to opposition to interethnic peace while identification with Turkey as a home country is related to caring about it and its problems unlike the former type of identification. Additionally, all of the prejudice variables significantly and consistently

correlated with the two questions about the peace process; the higher prejudice scores predicted greater opposition to the peace process.

Table 12*Bivariate Correlations of the Study Variables*

<i>Variables</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. RWA	1	.50**	.56**	.37**	.39**	.12	.33**	.26**	-.09	-.10
2. SDO		1	.33**	.12	.49**	.23**	.35**	.45**	-.23**	-.28**
3. Turkish identification			1	.63**	.51**	.21**	.40**	.31**	-.18**	-.22**
4. Identification with Turkey				1	.15*	.07	.20**	.11	-.05	-.00
5. General threat					1	.52**	.69**	.66**	-.52**	-.63**
6. Cultural difference threat						1	.41**	.40**	-.26**	-.34**
7. Social distance							1	.71**	-.40**	-.62**
8. Negative affect								1	-.34**	-.59**
9. Positive affect									1	.49**
10. Warmth										1

Note. $N = 258$. RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. Higher scores on RWA, SDO, Turkish identification, identification with Turkey, general threat and cultural differences indicate higher endorsement of respective constructs. Higher scores of social distance and negative affect indicate more prejudice toward Kurds; whereas higher scores on positive affect and feeling temperature indicate warmer feelings, thus less prejudice, toward Kurds.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 13*Bivariate Correlations between the Study Variables and the Control Variables*

<i>Variables</i>	1. The importance of political opinion	2. Keeping oneself updated about the Kurdish issue	3. Frequency of talking about the Kurdish issue	4. Approval of the interethnic peace process	5. Support for the peace-building actions
RWA	-.15*	-.10	-.14*	-.11	-.03
SDO	-.21*	-.28**	-.23**	-.22**	-.13*
Turkish identification	.06	.12	.06	-.33**	-.27**
Identification with Turkey	.18*	.22**	.18**	-.06	-.04
General threat	-.07	-.08	-.01	-.54**	-.46**
Cultural difference threat	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.19**	-.20**
Social distance	.04	.00	-.00	-.41**	-.30**
Negative affect	-.02	-.08	-.02	-.35**	-.25**
Positive affect	.16*	.18**	.10	.31**	.32**
Warmth	-.06	.01	-.08	.44**	.38**
<i>M</i>	4.84	5.10	4.05	4.28	3.52
<i>SD</i>	1.82	1.60	1.72	1.91	1.69
<i>n</i>	256	256	257	256	256

Note. RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. Higher scores on RWA, SDO, Turkish identification, identification with Turkey, general threat and cultural differences indicate higher endorsement of respective constructs. Higher scores of social distance and negative affect indicate more prejudice toward Kurds; whereas higher scores on positive affect and feeling temperature indicate warmer feelings, thus less prejudice, toward Kurds. 1. How much important are your political opinions for you? (rated on a 7-point scale, 1 = not important at all; 7 = very important). 2. How much do you follow the news about the Kurdish issue? (rated on a 7-point scale, 1 = never; 7 = very often). 3. How often do you talk about the Kurdish issue in your daily conversations? (rated on a 7-point scale, 1 = never; 7 = all the time) 4. Do you support the current peace process? (rated on a 7-point scale, 1 = I am completely against it; 7 = I am completely supporting it). 5. How do you evaluate the actions taken within the scope of the peace process? (rated on a 7-point scale, 1 = I am completely against it; 7 = I am completely supporting it).

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

3.3. Mediation Analyses

The hypotheses of the current were tested by conducting separate multiple regression analyses on the prejudice variables of social distance, negative affect, positive affect and warmth feelings toward Kurds. In each model, Turkish identification, identification with Turkey, RWA and SDO entered the analysis as independent variables while general threat and cultural differences entered as mediators. Four separate multiple regression analyses were conducted with SPSS Regression in order to assess the mediational model for each dependent variable. In testing the significance of paths through mediators, Preacher's (2011) Calculations for The Sobel Test was used. Hayes' (2011) mediation macro for SPSS was also utilised for calculating confidence intervals of the indirect effects of independent variables on dependent variables through mediators by a 95% bootstrap confidence interval based on 5000 bootstrap samples. The results of the regression analyses, significant Sobel Test statistics and confidence intervals of significant indirect effects will be presented for each dependent variable separately.

Before proceeding to the dependent variable-specific analyses, the two regression analyses in which independent variables were regressed on the mediator variables will be reported first. In the following dependent variable-specific sections, only the regression analyses predicting the respective dependent variable will be reported.

3.3.1. Predicting the Mediator Variables of General Threat and Cultural Difference Threat

For testing the mediation hypotheses, first I investigated whether socio-political attitudes and identification variables predicted general threat and cultural difference threat (i.e., the mediators). In the initial model, RWA, SDO, Turkish identification and identification with Turkey were simultaneously regressed on general threat ($R^2 = .40$, $F(4, 253) = 42.64$, $p = .000$) and cultural difference threat ($R^2 = .29$, $F(4, 253) = 5.64$, $p = .000$) separately. Of the four variables, significant predictors of general threat were SDO ($\beta = .34$, $p = .000$), Turkish

identification ($\beta = .54, p = .000$) and identification with Turkey ($\beta = -.23, p = .000$); whereas those of cultural differences were significantly predicted by only SDO ($\beta = .21, p = .004$) and Turkish identification ($\beta = .24, p = .006$).

The standardised regression coefficient of identification with Turkey was found to be negative when it was regressed on general threat with RWA, SDO and Turkish identification although it has a positive correlation with general threat ($r = .15, p < .05$) (Table 11). The change in the sign of the relationship indicates that this variable is suppressed by one of the other predictor variables in the model (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Since the correlation between Turkish identification and identification with Turkey is moderately high ($r = .63, p < .01$), Turkish identification was suspected to be the suppressor variable. The same analysis was repeated in a stepwise fashion in which identification with Turkey entered the equation in the second step while the other three variables entered in the first step. In this analyses, the standardised regression coefficient of Turkish identification was .40 ($p = .000$) in the first step; yet it became .54 ($p = .000$) with the inclusion of identification with Turkey ($\beta = -.23, p = .000$) in the second step. In order to overcome this suppression problem, the mediation hypotheses was tested separately with each of the identification scales.

Firstly, Turkish identification and the socio-political attitude variables were regressed on general threat ($R^2 = .37, F(3, 254) = 50.02, p = .000$). Both SDO ($\beta = .37, p = .000$) and Turkish identification ($\beta = .40, p = .000$) were significant predictors of general threat while RWA was not. Then, they were regressed on cultural differences ($R^2 = .08, F(3, 254) = 7.27, p = .000$). Again, both SDO ($\beta = .21, p = .002$) and Turkish identification ($\beta = .20, p = .006$) were significant predictors of cultural differences while RWA was not. These results indicate so far that only SDO and Turkish identification might have indirect effects on prejudice toward Kurds, but not RWA.

Secondly, identification with Turkey regressed on general threat together with RWA and SDO ($R^2 = .26, F(3, 254) = 30.41, p = .000$). However, identification with Turkey ($\beta = .04, p = .486$) was not a significant predictor of general threat

while both SDO ($\beta = .39, p = .000$) and RWA ($\beta = .17, p = .010$) were. When these three were regressed on cultural difference threat, the model was again significant ($R^2 = .05, F(3, 254) = 4.83, p = .003$) but identification with Turkey was not a significant predictor ($\beta = .05, p = .420$). SDO was again a significant predictor ($\beta = .23, p = .001$) while RWA was not. Therefore, the degree of identification with Turkey was excluded from further analyses (see Baron and Kenny, 1986).

3.3.2. Predicting Turks' Social Distance to Kurds

In order to analyse the model predicting the perceived social distance towards Kurds, first the three independent variables of RWA, SDO and Turkish identification were regressed on the dependent variable of social distance ($R^2 = .21, F(3, 254) = 23.03, p = .000$). RWA was not a significant predictor of social distance while both SDO ($\beta = .22, p = .001$) and Turkish identification ($\beta = .30, p = .000$) were significant predictors. Then, both the independent variables and the mediators were regressed on the social distance variable ($R^2 = .48, F(5, 252) = 47.20, p = .000$). Of the six predictor variables, only general threat ($\beta = .60, p = .000$) was a significant predictor. The latter analyses revealed that none of the predictor variables in the model had a direct effect on social distance and the indirect effects of SDO (95% CI [.16, .36]; *Sobel Test statistic* = 5.23, $p < .000$) and Turkish identification (95% CI [.17, .39]; *Sobel Test statistic* = 4.58, $p < .000$) on social distance were mediated by only general threat (95% CI [.13, .25]), but not by cultural difference threat (95% CI [-.00, .02]). Overall, RWA had neither direct nor indirect effects on social distance; SDO and Turkish identification had only indirect effects mediated by general threat. The higher one's social dominance orientation was, the more s/he felt general threat which, in turn, increased the distance between her/him and Kurds. Similarly, the higher one's Turkish identification was, the more s/he felt general threat which, in turn, increased the distance between her/him and Kurds. The mediational model is presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Mediation Model predicting Social Distance

3.3.3. Predicting Negative Affect toward Kurds

The role of perceived threat on the negative feelings of Turks toward Kurds were analysed in the same manner above. First, the independent variables were regressed on negative affect ($R^2 = .48$, $F(3, 254) = 25.30$, $p = .000$). SDO ($\beta = .41$, $p = .000$) and Turkish identification ($\beta = .21$, $p = .002$), but not RWA, were significant predictors of negative affect. Then, both predictor and mediator variables were regressed on negative affect ($R^2 = .46$, $F(5, 252) = 25.30$, $p = .000$). SDO was still a significant predictor of negative affect even in the presence of mediator variables ($\beta = .41$, $p = .001$) and among the two mediators, only general threat significantly predicted negative affect ($\beta = .56$, $p = .000$) but not cultural differences (95% CI [-.00, .02]). In this model, SDO had both a direct effect (95% CI [.22, .07]) and an indirect effect through general threat (95% CI [.14, .33]; *Sobel Test statistic* = 5.06, $p < .000$). Higher levels of social dominance orientation was directly related to higher levels of negative affect toward Kurds and besides, the more social dominant one was, the more general threat s/he perceived from Kurds and this, in turn, increased the negative affect they felt toward Kurds, too. Turkish identification had only an indirect effect on negative affect which was mediated by general threat (95% CI [.16, .36]; *Sobel Test statistic* = 5.19, $p < .000$), too. The relationship between RWA and negative

affect, either direct or indirect, was non-significant. The mediational model is presented in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Mediation Model predicting Negative Affect

3.3.4. Predicting Positive Affect toward Kurds

The same analyses were conducted for positive affect, too. When the independent variables were regressed on the DV, the overall model was significant but the explained variance was really quite low ($R^2 = .07$, $F(3, 254) = 6.52$, $p = .000$). SDO ($\beta = -.23$, $p = .001$) and Turkish identification ($\beta = -.17$, $p = .020$) were significant predictors. Then, these variables, along with the two threat variables were regressed on positive affect ($R^2 = .29$, $F(5, 252) = 20.44$, $p = .000$) and only general threat ($\beta = -.60$, $p = .000$) was found to be a significant predictor of positive affect. The indirect effect of SDO on positive affect through general threat was significant (95% CI [-.38, -.15]; *Sobel Test statistic* = -4.96, $p < .000$) and so was that of Turkish identification (95% CI [-.38, -.18]; *Sobel Test statistic* = -5.08, $p < .000$). Cultural difference threat was again not a significant mediator (95% CI [-.00, .02]). Briefly, none of the independent variables affected positive affect directly but both SDO and Turkish identification affected it indirectly by the mediation of general threat. The mediational model is presented in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Mediation Model predicting Positive Affect

3.3.5. Predicting Warmth toward Kurds

Finally, the mediational model predicting the feeling of warmth toward Kurds measured by the feeling thermometer scale was tested. Firstly, the independent variables were entered into the equation alone ($R^2 = .11$, $F(3, 254) = 10.57$, $p = .000$) and all of them turned out to be significant predictors (RWA, $\beta = .17$, $p = .034$; SDO, $\beta = -.29$, $p = .000$; Turkish identification, $\beta = -.21$, $p = .003$). While the zero-order correlation between RWA and warmth was negative, though not significant, RWA turned out to be a significant predictor of warmth with a positive sign in the present regression analysis, which was an indicator of suppression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In order to find out the suppressor variables, an additional hierarchical regression analysis was conducted in which the three predictor variables entered the equation one by one. First, RWA entered the equation predicting warmth and its regression coefficient was non-significant. In the second step, SDO entered the equation and the model was improved significantly ($\Delta R^2 = .07$, $F(2, 255) = 11.02$, $p = .000$). While RWA remained non-significant in the presence of SDO, SDO ($\beta = -.31$, $p = .003$) was a significant predictor of warmth. In the final step, Turkish identification entered the equation improving the model further ($\Delta R^2 = .03$, $F(3, 254) = 10.57$, $p = .000$); however it also turned out to be the suppressor variable since with its inclusion in the model; RWA became a significant predictor of warmth with a positive sign. Therefore, the mediational model predicting warmth was tested in

the absence of Turkish identification considering the main research purpose of this study about comparing the predictive powers of RWA and SDO.

Firstly, RWA and SDO were regressed on general threat ($R^2 = .26$, $F(2, 255) = 45.47$, $p = .000$). Both RWA ($\beta = .19$, $p = .002$) and SDO ($\beta = .39$, $p = .000$) were significant predictors of the first mediator variable. Secondly, they were regressed on the cultural difference threat ($R^2 = .05$, $F(2, 255) = 6.93$, $p = .001$) and only SDO ($\beta = .23$, $p = .002$) had a significant regression coefficient. Then, both the predictor and the mediator variables were regressed on warmth ($R^2 = .42$, $F(4, 253) = 45.17$, $p = .000$). In this case, SDO was a non-significant predictor of warmth while general threat was a significant one ($\beta = -.67$, $p = .000$). However, RWA ($\beta = .18$, $p = .002$) was suppressed, again, in the presence of mediator variables. Therefore, the mediational model was not tested considering that the model would not be reliable due to the suppression.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

In the present study, prejudice toward Kurds by Turks was investigated with regard to the differential roles that socio-political attitudes of RWA and SDO could play as well as the strength of national identification and it did this by examining the mediator role of intergroup threat. The results of the study only partially supported the hypotheses. For all the prejudice measures except warmth, SDO and Turkish identification predicted Turks' prejudice toward Kurds, but RWA failed to do so in the presence of SDO and Turkish identification; and the former two's effects on prejudice were indirect, mediated through only general threat but not cultural difference threat. The higher Turks' social dominance orientation were and the more they identified themselves as Turkish; the more threat they perceived from Kurds and in turn, the more prejudiced they became toward Kurds. Specifically, they felt socially more distant to Kurds and endorsed more negative and less positive feelings toward them. The only exception in this mediational model was SDO's additional positive direct effect on Turks' negative affect toward Kurds; higher SDO was directly related to feeling more negative affect.

Identification was a significant predictor of Turks' prejudice toward Kurds, as expected. Initially, both Turkish identification and identification with Turkey were included in the analyses. However, there occurred a suppression effect of the former on the latter in the regression analyses. In the presence of ethnic identification, identification with the country turned out to be negatively related to Turks' prejudice toward Kurds despite the positive zero-order correlation between identification with Turkey and prejudice. For the sake of the analyses, the mediational models were tested by including only one of the two national identity

variables. While testing the models with identification with Turkey, it failed to predict the mediator variables at the first step. Therefore, Turkish identification remained as the only identification variable in the further analyses.

Although, identification with Turkey was not included in the mediational model, its relations with the other study variables and the control variables are worth mentioning. While the two types of identification were moderately related to each other; they meaningfully differed from each other regarding their associations with the other questions and constructs included in the study. First of all, unlike Turkish identification, identification with Turkey did not correlate with SDO and cultural difference threat. Identification with Turkey is a more inclusive construct than Turkish identification regarding the latter's use of a specific group name, perceived by some as an exclusive ethnic group rather than an inclusive nationality. When a specific ethnic group was not targeted to identify with, identification was not related to group-based hierarchies or differentiations; in other words, to SDO and cultural differences, respectively. Furthermore, identification with Turkey was positively related to how important one's political opinion for oneself, how much one followed the news about the Kurdish issue and how often one talked about the Kurdish issue in her/his daily conversations while Turkish identification was not. On the other hand, Turkish identification was negatively related to supporting the peace process and the actions taken within its scope while identification with Turkey was not. These differential correlational characteristics of these two constructs disclose the conceptual difference between the types of identification and in the light of these results; the aforementioned suppression effect may be interpreted as follows: Turkish identification suppressed the nationalist elements in identification with Turkey and the remaining patriotic elements predicted prejudice negatively or, put it differently, predicted positive attitudes toward Kurds. Due to lack of significant correlations between identification with Turkey and the other major study variables, it was excluded from the analyses of the current study. However, more research can be conducted with identification with Turkey to conceptualise it more clearly and to

explore its possible relations with constructs other than the ones included in the present study.

The mediational model predicting warmth could not be tested due to occurrence of another suppression effect among the study variables. First, RWA was suppressed by Turkish identification. Therefore, the model was to be tested by including only RWA and SDO since comparing the predictiveness of the two was among the main research questions of the present study; however, in the further steps of the analyses, the shared variance between RWA and threat variables led to a second suppression effect, rendering the mediational analysis incomputable with greater RWA seemingly leading to warmer feelings towards Kurds. Thus, the model could not be tested.

Contrary to the expectation that RWA, rather than SDO, would predict Turks' prejudice toward Kurds, the analyses of the data revealed that the opposite was the case. Although unexpected, this result is still conceivable. Firstly, in ordinary Turks' opinion, the most prominent aspect of the Kurdish issue is the terrorism and the assumed support it receives from foreign forces to separate Turkey (Ulug & Cohrs, 2012). The high salience of terrorism and the perceived separatist nature of the Kurdish movement might be inducing dominance motivations to Turks in order to keep the country safe and united. Despite the recent liberal developments in terms of cultural and political minority rights, the strength of SDO in predicting attitudes toward Kurds indicates that the Kurdish problem should still be regarded as an intergroup conflict over the resources, territory and physical integrity of group members.

Regarding that social dominance means domination of inferior groups by superior ones (Pratto & Sidanius, 2004); the predictive power of SDO, rather than RWA, might be indicating the existence of a social segregation in Turkey in which Kurds deserve an inferior position and need to be dominated. RWA, on the other hand, values social order and adherence to the existing norms and rules; it is not necessarily related to social hierarchies but to status quo. As mentioned before, the Kurdishness of the Kurdish issue had strongly been denied until 1990s (Efegil,

2011, Loizides, 2010; Yegen, 1999). Instead, it had been framed as a regional problem about modernity; identified with adherence to tradition and resistance of the periphery to growth and progress. Therefore, the segregation might not be on the ground of ethnicity but of socio-economical differences and geographical terms in an intertwined way. Even though the national and geographical unity have been the core concerns in following assimilationist policies (Icduygu, Romano, & Sirkeci, 1999), the way the problem had been framed might have brought about segregation anyhow. Still, the point the issue has evolved into cannot be considered as ethnicity-free at all.

As mentioned before, RWA is related to intra-group dynamics such as coherence and harmony whereas SDO is related to intergroup dynamics such as competition and dominance (Pratto et al., 2013, p. 141). Among the two identification variables, Turkish identification with specific ethnic elements correlated with SDO but identification with Turkey did not; and SDO was a significant predictor of prejudice toward Kurds by Turks but RWA was not. This ethnicity-based intergroup nature of the predictive variables can be taken as an indicator of segregation between Kurds and Turks on the ground of ethnicity. Consistent with this line of discussion, the participants that know someone that has been harmed in the armed conflicts between the PKK and the national security forces in the south-eastern part of Turkey both scored significantly higher than the others in both of the identification scales. The guerrilla war between the Kurdish militias and the Turkish army has inevitably brought about awareness on the ground of ethnicity with elements of hostility and opposition.

Furthermore, the internally displaced Kurds' contact and interaction with the other segments of society might be giving an ethnic flavour to the above-mentioned segregation even more. Saracoglu (2010) interviewed a number of middle-class Turkish citizens from Izmir investigating their perceptions of immigrant Kurds in their city. Although informal economy has been a part of the Turkish economy since 1950s; unemployment and social and economic inequality have increased throughout the last three decades due to the neoliberal policies followed by the governments. Despite the increasing unemployment, the internal flow of

immigrants from the eastern parts of Turkey to the industrialised regions has continued as before and Izmir has been one of the favourite destinations. In addition to these conditions, immigrant Kurds are not appropriately educated or qualified for proper jobs. Under these circumstances, Kurds are ascribed as “benefit-scroungers” living with undeserved gains and “urban life-disrupters” as they have been increasing insecurity and behaving deviantly. Saracoglu emphasises that these perceived deviance and insecurity are identified with immigrant Kurds in Izmir and regarded as markers of Kurdishness in general. Considering that the majority of the current sample was from big cities, Saracoglu’s study can shed a light on the current findings. Perceiving Kurds as occupying industrialised cities and making money through ill-gotten ways might be fostering perceptions of a competition over the resources and welfare and also SDO-characterised opinions such as regarding Turks as superior to Kurds and justifying the segregation between “us” and “them”.

In addition to this interpersonal-level competition, a more group-level competition may be perceived due to Turkish governments’ social welfare policies. In the New Zealand studies about Pakehas and Maoris (Sibley & Liu, 2004; Sibley, Wilson, & Robertson, 2007), the majority opposed to the minority-favouring resource allocation policies of the government. Similarly, a recent analysis of the Turkish governments’ social assistance policies throughout years (Yoruk, 2012; Yoruk, 2013, August 11) revealed that the target of these state assistance programs has shifted from the poor people living in suburbs to Kurds including both those living in the south-eastern Turkey and those displaced to urban and metropolitan cities. This is not because Kurds are the poorest group within Turkey but because they are politicised and can create social unrest. In developing countries, it is a widely employed policy that social assistance programs target, not the poorest segments of the society groups but politicised segments that are posing a threat on governments’ political power and control over their country. Considering that SDO, but not RWA, predicts opposition to socio-economically-disadvantaged groups (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b), Turks’ possible awareness about the changing

target of the government's welfare provision politics might be an explanation for the predictive power of SDO.

Finally, the Kurdistan Regional Government in the northern Iraq which has been an autonomous entity since the beginning of 2005 is worthy of considering (Toktamis, 2009). It was established after the United States' invasion of Iraq and while the political expressions of Kurdish ethnicity had been strictly prohibited within Turkey, the international recognition of an autonomous Kurdish government within a neighbouring country might be heightening the already existing fears and expectations of Turks from Kurds in Turkey. Moreover, the establishment and the political and economical integration of the autonomous Kurdish region revealed how dependent such issues are on international political and economic actors and the interplay between (Toktamis, 2009). Therefore, the regional instability and the questionability of perceived control over the Turkish territory might make Turks in Turkey worried even more.

Regarding the hypotheses about the mediational role of threat, the expectations are met only partially. First of all, the threat scale created specifically for measuring Turks' perceived threat from Kurds did not factor into the expected two types of threat, namely realistic threat and symbolic threat. Although, there occurred two distinct types of threat named as general threat and cultural difference threat, the former included not only realistic threat items but also some of the symbolic threat items and these items commonly measured whether Kurds were perceived as harming Turks, Turkish society and/or Turkey. The shared emphasis on harm among the general threat items renders it as realistic threat rather than symbolic threat. The latter, cultural difference threat, included only those items that measured whether Kurds and Turks were similar or not in terms of some social and cultural aspects. It was hypothesised that both realistic and symbolic threat would mediate identification's and socio-political attitudes' effect on prejudice and among the emerging threat constructs, only general threat had a mediational role in the model. Therefore, it can be inferred from the mediational role of general threat that realistic threat significantly mediated the

aforementioned relationship; however symbolic threat did so to only a limited extent.

The majority of general threat items had been created to be realistic threat items. One conclusion to draw from this can be that the perceived opposition of Kurds to the national unity and territorial integrity of Republic of Turkey is more likely to be perceived as a realistic threat rather than a symbolic one. PKK's terrorist acts and the guerrilla war between the State and the Kurdish militias in the south-eastern Turkey should be the main reason of this perception. The military casualties and civil deaths due to these armed conflicts have had a wide place in the Turkish news for a long time and the regionalism of the guerrilla war might have made the democratic autonomy demands of the Kurdish movement more salient and threatening than their other demands about cultural and political rights. The current study revealed also that those who know someone that got harmed during the armed conflicts in the south-eastern Turkey had significantly higher identification scores, both Turkish identification and identification with Turkey, than the rest. Regarding all these, the Kurdish problem might generally be perceived as a struggle between Turks and Kurds over the lives of group members and the land; hence as a realistic threat.

On the other hand, majority of the previous studies testing the integrated threat theory utilised research paradigms with immigrants (e.g. Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1998; Stephan et al., 1998). However, in the current study, two ethnic groups that have been living together since the foundation of Turkey, even before, were studied. Since Turks have already been interacting with Kurds, cultural and symbolic differences between the two groups might have been not posing a threat since long ago.

In methodological terms, there exist some ITT studies in which realistic threat and symbolic threat did load on the different factors (e.g., Renfro, Duran, Stephan, & Clason, 2006) and others in which they were highly correlated to each other (e.g., Aberson & Gaffney, 2009). A meta-analytic study of intergroup threat (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006) confirms that the threat types are generally moderately

to strongly correlated with each other. The high correlations or the overlap between the threat types does not necessarily imply that they are the same construct, but suggest a common underlying threat factor. Future research should focus on whether the threat perceived from Kurds by Turks is depicted better as a single factor (e.g., Stephan et al., 1998) or with more distinct realistic and symbolic aspects (e.g., Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). Compared to the general threat items, the cultural difference threat items lacked a threat theme. Harm was a common theme among the general threat items; however, cultural difference items were just comparative opinion sentences without any positive or negative valence. Harmonising these items with a more apparent threat theme may bring about significant results in the future studies. Qualitative research methods can be utilised where needed in order to create better and distinct threat scales specific to Kurdish and Turkish relations. The issues at hand such as terrorism, democratic autonomy, cultural rights and such can be studied separately and more specifically in order to differentiate the realistic and symbolic threats perceived from them more precisely.

The SDO-characterised and realistic threat-related nature of the Turks' prejudice toward Kurds demonstrates the relatively high importance of terrorism and territorial claim-related aspects of the Kurdish issue in forming Turks' perceptions of the issue. Although the methods of terrorist organisations might lead to realistic threat perceptions by harming out-groups, the organisational ideologies of these groups are more likely to stem from a symbolic opposition against its target group or entity. Consistent with this yet contrary to the results of the present study, Crowson (2009) investigated the threat perceived from international terrorism with a sample from the United States and found that the threat perceived from terrorism was symbolic rather than realistic. The international terror might be regarded as stemming from the cultural clash between the United States and the Muslim groups; hence the symbolic aspects of the issue might be relatively more prominent for the United States citizens. In this sense, Turks' attitudes toward Kurds can be regarded as lacking integrative complexity (e.g., Tetlock, 1984), which means that individuals do not take different aspects of issues into

consideration simultaneously and do not interpret issues in multidimensional ways; they rather evaluate issues on grounds of a few salient dimensions. Turks' attitudes toward Kurds are formed with regards to the realistic outcomes of the Kurdish movement, rather than the underlying symbolic causes. Similarly, if the above-mentioned welfare provision policies of Turkish governments are leading to the perception of a realistic competition over the state assistance in Turks as assumed, this would be another indicator of the absence of integrative complexity because the underlying motivation of the Turkish governments has been to keep the politicised segments of the society under its control rather than helping the poor (Yoruk, 2012). Perceptions of Kurds in Izmir can be given as a specific example at this point (Saracoglu, 2010). The stereotypes ascribed to Kurdish immigrants in Izmir are the consequences of national and macro-level processes which are migration of Kurds from eastern Turkey to the west due to the intense armed conflicts between the PKK and the national security forces in the eastern regions and the neoliberal policies of the Turkish governments; however, Izmiris attribute their problems to the Kurdish ethnicity perceiving them as benefit scroungers and urban life-disrupters. Regarding these, it can be concluded that Turks' realistic threat perceptions are likely to be resulting from their shallow understanding of the Kurdish issue and the government policies.

Compared to the United States, where the threat from terrorism is perceived as symbolic, Turkey is more instable both politically and economically. Realistic threat is more likely to be perceived by groups who regard the existing order as instable (Tausch et al., 2008), because relative group statuses can be altered under instable circumstances potentially bringing about loss of power. In this regard, the lack of integrative complexity in Turks may be attributed to the instability and the perceived insecurity of the circumstances both within the country and in the Middle East region. With regards to the Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943), evaluating political issues at hand in a more complex manner with symbolic aspects may require individuals to have their basic needs satisfied to a considerable extent, such as safety and security. Confirming this line of thinking, although there have been many violent conflicts between Protestants and

Catholics in Ireland in history, the conflict between the two groups are perceived to be a symbolic one nowadays (Tausch et al., 2007). The violent conflicts are temporally distant now; the situation in the Northern Ireland has been placated to a considerable extent and the economic and political circumstances in the country are more or less stable and satisfying. Therefore there may be a room for evaluating issues at hand in symbolic terms. Consequently, while studying intergroup threat, perceived stability of intergroup context should be taken into account more thoroughly in future studies.

The presence of Turks' prejudice toward Kurds is apparent even when the number of participants who completed the negative affect items toward Kurds is compared to the number of those who completed the positive affect items; 116% more people completed the former compared to the latter. However, the issues that seem to be leading to prejudice waits remedy at the policy-level rather than at the social level. For example, positive social contact is extremely important in reducing prejudices toward out-groups (Pettigrew, 1998); however this is the case only if prejudice is RWA-driven (Asbrock, Chris, Duckitt, & Sibley, 2011). SDO-characterised prejudices are resistant to positive contact experiences because contact does not change the perceived competitiveness of an out-group over the resources or power although it can help to change one's mind about perceived differences in, for example, values and morals. Therefore, alleviation of the interethnic conflict in Turkey requires Turkish governments to take action to placate the terror issue and to overcome Kurds' socio-economical problems so that Turks' perceived threat can cease and they can overcome their prejudice in time.

One serious limitation of the current study concerns the representativeness of its sample and hence, generalisability of its results. The majority of the participants were from the largest cities of Turkey and half of the participants were from those who voted for the Republican's People Party in the 2011 elections although it actually received 25.9% of the total votes in the elections. In the future studies, more representative samples should be recruited to be able to make more reliable generalisations. Secondly, the present study was a correlational one and the

inferred directions of the relationships between the study variables may not actually be so. Future research should eliminate this risk by conducting experimental studies in which perceived threat is manipulated.

The order of the scales in the study survey was arranged in a way that the focus of the study on the Kurdish issue became apparent to the participants after they had completed the RWA and SDO scales. However, Lehmiller and Scmitt (2007) hypothesised and found that RWA and SDO scores in one context do not predict attitudes in another. For example authoritarian attitudes about war do not predict attitudes toward religious fundamentalism or social dominance orientation regarding genders do not predict racist attitudes. In the light of this study, sharing the main focus of future studies with participants in advance might improve the validity and the strength of the found relationships between the variables.

Lastly, the present study focused only on Turks' attitudes toward Kurds. In the future studies, Kurds' attitudes toward Turks and the threats they perceive from Turks should also be examined to be able to see the whole picture of the interethnic relations of Kurds and Turks in Turkey. Also, the data for the current study was collected during a period in which the peace-oriented meetings between the government and the Kurdish actors and the negotiations about the disarmament of PKK were hot topics. Similar future studies should follow the current one so that the changes in Turks' attitudes can be monitored illuminating the peace policies' impact on Turks.

As a study attempted to explain Turks' prejudice toward Kurds with social psychological terms, findings of the current study provided some evidence supporting the dual-process model. The results indicated that it is a useful theoretical tool in understanding the values and motivations of groups that lead them to develop prejudice toward out-groups. Regarding the integrated threat theory, the threat types obtained in the current study failed to correspond to the theory's existing threat types in the theoretically expected way. Still, when taken together, the findings of the current study constituted a meaningful whole. More studies should be conducted to overcome the methodological and theoretical

shortcomings of the present one and to contribute to the ongoing peace process in Turkey as much as possible.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

1. Doğum yılınız: _____
2. Cinsiyetiniz: ☐ Kadın ☐ Erkek
3. Eğitim düzeyiniz nedir? (Tamamladığınız en yüksek derece):
 - a. İlkokul
 - b. Ortaokul
 - c. Teknik okul
 - d. Lise
 - e. Yüksel okul/Üniversite
 - f. Yüksek lisans/Doktora
 - g. Hiçbiri
 - h. Diğer: _____
4. Etnik kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?
 - a. Türk
 - b. Kürt
 - c. Çerkez
 - d. Laz
 - e. Arap
 - f. Alevi
 - g. Ermeni
 - h. Rum
 - i. Yahudi
 - j. Diğer: _____
5. Dini kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?
 - a. Sünni
 - b. Alevi
 - c. Hristiyan
 - d. Yahudi
 - e. Ateist / Agnostik
 - f. Diğer: _____
6. Şu anda hangi şehirde yaşıyorsunuz? _____
7. Kendinizi aşağıdaki siyasal kimliklerden hangilerine daha yakın hissediyorsunuz? Lütfen seçeneklerden iki tanesini işaretleyiniz.
 - a. Muhafazakar demokrat
 - b. Siyasal İslam
 - c. Müslüman demokrat
 - d. Sosyal demokrat
 - e. Liberal demokrat
 - f. Milliyetçi muhafazakar
 - g. Milli görüş
 - h. Ülkücü
 - i. Sosyalist
 - j. Anarşist
 - k. Laik
 - l. Kemalist
 - m. Komünist
 - n. Ulusalcı
 - o. Diğer: _____

APPENDIX B

CONTROL QUESTIONS

1. 2011 seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy verdiniz? _____
2. Kendini Kürt olarak tanımlayan/hisseden eşiniz dostunuz veya akrabanız var mı?
☐ Evet ☐ Hayır
3. Siz ve tanıdıklarınız arasında Doğu ve Güneydoğu'daki çatışmalardan doğrudan etkilenenler var mı?
☐ Evet ☐ Hayır
4. Lütfen aşağıdaki soruları sizi yansıttığını düşündüğünüz sayıyı yuvarlak içine alarak cevaplayınız.
 - a. Siyasi görüşleriniz sizin için ne kadar önemlidir?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hiç Çok önemli
önemli değil
 - b. Kürt sorunu ile ilgili gündemi ne kadar takip ediyorsunuz?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hiç Sürekli
 - c. Kürt sorunu ne sıklıkta günlük konuşma konunuz oluyor?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hiç Oldukça sık
 - d. Gündemdeki barış sürecini destekliyor musunuz?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Kesinlikle Tamamen
karşıyım destekliyorum
 - e. Barış süreci kapsamında yapılanları nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Kesinlikle Tamamen
karşıyım destekliyorum

APPENDIX C

RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE

(ALTEMEYER, 1996, as cited in GULDU, 2011)

SAĞ KANAT YETKECİLİK ÖLÇEĞİ

(GULDU, 2011)

1. Mevcut otorite, genel olarak pek çok şeyde haklı çıkarken, radikaller ve her şeye karşı çıkanlar cehaletlerini sergileyen boşboğazlardır.
2. Kadınlar, evlendiklerinde eşlerine itaat edeceklerine dair söz vermelidirler.
3. Ülkemizin, bütünlüğümüze kasteden radikal yönelimleri ve kötülükleri ortadan kaldırmak için ne gerekiyorsa yapabilecek güçlü bir lidere ihtiyacı var.
4. Eşcinseller ve lezbiyenler, herhangi biri kadar sağlıklı ve ahlaklıdır.*
5. Yönetimdeki saygın otoritelere ve dini yargılara güvenmek, toplumumuzda zihin karıştırmaya uğraşan “gürültücü ayak takımını” dinlemekten daima daha iyidir.
6. Hiç kuşkusuz, mevcut dinsel öğretilere isyan edenler ve ateistler düzenli olarak camiye gidenler kadar iyi ve erdemlidirler.*
7. Ülkemizi krizlerden kurtarmak için, geleneksel değerlerimize dönmek, sert liderleri iş başına getirmek ve kötü fikirleri yayanları susturmak gerekmektedir.
8. Çıplaklar kampının olmasında yanlış bir şey yoktur.*
9. Birçok kişiyi tedirgin etse bile ülkemizin, geleneksel uygulamalara karşı çıkma cesareti gösterebilen özgür düşünceli bireylere ihtiyacı var.*
10. İnançlarımızı ve ahlaki yapımızı yiyip bitiren geleneksel olmayan değerleri zamanında yok etmezsek, günün birinde ülkemiz yıkılacak.
11. Kendilerini herkesten farklı kılacak olsa bile bireyler, yaşam tarzlarını, dini inançlarını ve cinsel yönelimlerini kendileri belirlemelidir.*
12. Eski moda adetler ve değerler hala en iyi yaşama biçimini gösteriyor.
13. Kadınların siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik alanlarda daha aktif rollere sahip olması, okullarda din derslerinin isteğe bağlı olması ve hayvan hakları için yeni düzenlemeler yapılmasını talep ederek mevcut yasalara ve çoğunluğun görüşlerine karşı çıkanlara hayranlık duymalısınız.*

14. Ülkemiz, kötülükleri yok ederek bizi doğru yola getirecek güçlü ve kararlı bir lidere ihtiyaç duymaktadır.
15. Ülkemizin en iyi bireyleri hükümete karşı çıkan, dini eleştiren ve doğal kabul edilen şeyleri göz ardı edebilenlerdir.*
16. Kürtaj, pornografi ve evlilik konusunda Allah'ın koyduğu yasalar çok geç olmadan titizlikle uygulanmalı ve bu yasaları ihlal edenler şiddetle cezalandırılmalıdır.
17. Bugün ülkemizde dini değerlerden yoksun, kendi amaçları için ülkeyi yıkmaya çalışan ve otorite tarafından mutlaka etkisizleştirilmeleri gereken radikal ve ahlaksız birçok kişi var.
18. Kadının yeri, nerede olmak istiyorsa orasıdır. Kadının kocasına ve toplumsal geleneklere itaat etmek zorunda kaldığı günler artık geçmişte kalmıştır.*
19. Atalarımızın yaptıklarıyla onur duyarsak, otoritenin yapmamızı istediklerini yaparsak ve her şeyi berbat eden çürük elmaları ayıklarsak ülkemiz müthiş olur.
20. Yaşamak için bir tek doğru yol yoktur; herkes kendi yolunu kendi çizmelidir.
21. Feministler ve homoseksüeller, geleneksel aile değerlerine karşı koyabilecek kadar cesur oldukları için takdir edilmelidirler.*
22. Bu ülkede işler, sorun çıkaran gruplar seslerini keser ve kendi gruplarının toplumdaki geleneksel yerini kabullenirlerse, biraz daha iyiye gidecektir.

* Items were reverse-coded prior to the analyses.

APPENDIX D

SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION SCALE

(PRATTO ET AL., 1994)

SOSYAL BASKINLIK YÖNELİMİ ÖLÇEĞİ

(AKBAS, 2010)

1. Bazı gruplar diğerlerinden daha üstündür.
2. İstedığınızı elde etmek için bazen diğer gruplara karşı güç kullanmak gerekir.
3. Bazı grupların hayatta diğerlerinden daha fazla şansa sahip olması kabul edilebilir bir şeydir.
4. Hayatta öne geçmek için, bazen diğer grupların üstüne basmak gereklidir.
5. Eğer belirli gruplar yerlerini bilselerdi, daha az sorunumuz olurdu.
6. Belirli grupların üstte, diğer grupların ise altta olması muhtemelen iyi bir şeydir.
7. Daha alttaki gruplar yerlerini bilmelidir.
8. Bazen diğer gruplara hadleri bildirilmelidir.
9. Tüm gruplar eşit olabilseydi, iyi olurdu.*
10. Grupların eşitliği idealimiz olmalıdır.*
11. Tüm gruplara hayatta eşit şans verilmelidir.*
12. Farklı grupların koşullarını eşitlemek için elimizden geleni yapmalıyız.*
13. Toplumda gruplar arası eşitliği arttırmalıyız.*
14. Eğer farklı gruplara daha eşit davransaydık daha az sorunumuz olurdu.*
15. Gelirleri olabildiğince eşit hale getirmek için çabalamalıyız.*
16. Toplumda hiçbir grup baskın olmamalıdır.*

* Items were reverse-coded prior to the analyses.

APPENDIX E

TURKISH IDENTIFICATION SCALE

(LEACH ET AL., 2008)

TÜRKLÜKLE ÖZDEŞİM ÖLÇEĞİ

1. Türklerle aramda bir bağ olduğunu hissediyorum.
2. Kendimi Türklerle dayanışma içinde hissediyorum.
3. Kendimi Türklere bağlı hissediyorum.
4. Türk olmaktan memnunum.
5. Türklerin gurur duyacak çok şeyi olduğunu düşünüyorum.
6. Türk olmak güzel bir şey.
7. Türk olmak bana iyi bir his veriyor.
8. Türk olduğum gerçeği hakkında sık sık düşünürüm.
9. Türk olduğum gerçeği kimliğimin önemli bir parçasıdır.
10. Türk olmam, kendimi nasıl gördüğümün önemli bir parçasıdır.
11. Benim ortalama bir Türk'le birçok ortak noktam vardır.
12. Ben ortalama bir Türk'e benzerim.
13. Türkler birbirleriyle ortak birçok özelliğe sahiptir.
14. Türkler birbirlerine oldukça benzerler.
15. Kendimi Türk kabul ediyorum.
16. Kendimi diğer Türklerle özdeşleştiriyorum.
17. Türk olmak bana oldukça doğal geliyor.
18. Türkler eleştirildiğinde ben de kendimi kişisel olarak eleştirilmiş hissediyorum.
19. Türkler benim için önemli bir gruptur.
20. Türklere oldukça saygı duyuyorum.

APPENDIX F

IDENTIFICATION WITH TURKEY SCALE

TÜRKİYE İLE ÖZDEŞİM ÖLÇEĞİ

1. Türkiye'ye kendinizi ne kadar ait hissediyorsunuz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç ait hissetmiyorum					Tamamen ait hissediyorum	

2. Türkiye'nin gündemi sizin günlük yaşantınızı ne kadar etkiliyor?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç etkilemiyor					Son derece etkiliyor	

3. Türkiye'de yaşıyor olmak sizin için ne kadar önemlidir?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç önemli değildir					Son derece önemlidir	

4. Türkiye vatandaşı olmak sizi ne kadar iyi tanımlıyor?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç iyi tanımlamıyor					Son derece iyi tanımlıyor	

5. Türkiye ile bağınız ne kadar güçlüdür?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç güçlü değildir					Son derece güçlüdür	

6. Yurtdışında yaşasanız Türkiye'yi ne kadar özlersiniz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç özlemem					Çok özlerim	

APPENDIX G

THREAT SCALE

(STEPHAN, YBARRA, & BACHMAN, 1999)

TEHDİT ÖLÇEĞİ

1. Kürtler, iş olanaklarını Türklerin elinden alıyorlar.*
2. Kürtlerin bulunduğu ortamlarda suç oranları artar.*
3. Kürtler, Türkiye'nin sosyal refah seviyesinin azalmasına neden oluyorlar.*
4. Kürtler, Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'da güçlenmesini engellemektedir.*
5. Kürtlerin siyasi olarak güçlenmeleri devletin bütünlüğüne zarar vermektedir.*
6. Kürtlere azınlık olarak birçok hak sağlanması, diğer azınlıkların da bu hakları talep etmesine ve dolayısıyla ülkede bölünmelere yol açabilir.*
7. Kürtlerin nüfus artış hızı Türkiye'nin düzenini tehdit etmektedir.*
8. Kürtler ekonomik olarak Türkiye'ye yarar sağlamaktan çok zarar veriyorlar.*
9. Kürtler ülke bütünlüğüne zarar vermeye çalışmaktadırlar.*
10. Kürtler, Türkiye'nin kurulu düzenini tehdit etmektedirler.*
11. Kürtlerin kimliklerine sahip çıkmaları, Türkiye'nin birlik ve beraberliğine karşı oldukları gösterir.*
12. Kürtler iş yapıları açısından Türkler kadar ahlaklı değildir.*
13. Kürtlerin örf ve adetleri Türklerinkinden farklıdır.†
14. Dini inanışları açısından Kürtler ve Türkler birbirlerine benzemezler.†
15. Aile ilişkileri ve çocuk yetiştirme tarzları açısından Kürtler, Türklerden farklıdır.†
16. Kürtler, yaşam tarzı açısından Türklere benzemezler.†
17. Kürtler, Türkiye'nin kültürel değerlerine zarar vermektedirler.*
18. Kürtler, Türklerin yoğun olduğu bölgelere göç ettiklerinde o bölgeyi kötü etkilemektedirler.*
19. Kürtler kültürlerine ve dillerine gereğinden fazla sahip çıkıyorlar.*
20. Kürtlerin kendi kültürlerini yaşatmaya çalışması Türkiye'yi olumsuz etkiler.*

* General threat items

† Cultural difference threat items

APPENDIX H

SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

(BOGARDUS, 1967)

1. Kürt biri ile evlenseniz
2. Kürt bir yakın arkadaşınız olsa
3. Kürt bir kapı komşunuz olsa
4. Kürt biri ile aynı sokakta yaşıyor olsanız
5. Kürt biri ile aynı yerde çalışıyor olsanız
6. Kürt bir patronunuz olsa

APPENDIX I

NEGATIVE OUT-GROUP AFFECT SCALE

**(STEPHAN, YBARRA, MARTINEZ, SCHWARZWALD, & TUR-KASPA,
1998)**

DIŞ GRUBA YÖNELİK OLUMSUZ DUYGULAR ÖLÇEĞİ

- 1. Düşmanlık**
- 2. Hayranlık***
- 3. Antipati**
- 4. Benimseme***
- 5. Üstünlük**
- 6. Sevgi***
- 7. Hor görme**
- 8. Onaylama***
- 9. Nefret**
- 10. Şefkat***
- 11. Dışlama**
- 12. Sıcaklık***

* Positive affect items.

APPENDIX J

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

GÖNÜLLÜ KATILIM FORMU

Bu çalışma, Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü öğretim üyesi Y. Doç. Dr. Banu Cingöz Ulu gözetiminde, Sosyal Psikoloji bölümü yüksek lisans öğrencisi Damla Balaban tarafından yürütülmektedir. Çalışmamızın amacı Türkiye vatandaşlarının ülkelerine bağlılıkla ilgili duygu ve düşüncelerine, Türkiye’deki farklı kökenlere sahip grupları ne şekilde gördüklerine ve Türkiye’deki güncel politik konulara dair düşünceleriyle ilgili bir fikir edinmektir. Bu sebeple sizden istediğimiz hazırlamış olduğumuz anketleri doldurarak bu konulardaki görüşlerinizi bize iletmenizdir. Çalışmaya katılım tamamıyla gönüllülük temellidir. Çalışma süresince, sizden kimlik belirleyici hiçbir bilgi istemiyoruz. Cevaplarınız tamamen gizli tutulacak ve sadece araştırmacılar tarafından değerlendirilecektir; elde edilecek bulgular bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılacaktır.

Bu çalışmada size öncelikle yaşıınız, cinsiyetiniz, eğitim durumunuz ve kendinizi farklı köklere göre tanımlayıp tanımlamadığınıza dair birtakım sorular soracağız. Bu soruları kendinizi Türkiye ile ne kadar bağdaştırdığınızı, çeşitli sosyal ve ekonomik konulardaki görüşlerinizi, çeşitli etnik politikalar hakkındaki fikirlerinizi ve Türkiye'deki farklı gruplara yönelik duygu ve düşüncelerinizi ölçen anketler takip edecek. Çalışma uzunlukları birbirinden farklı 9 bölümden oluşmaktadır ve yaklaşık 20 dakikanızı alacaktır.

Çalışma sırasında sorulan sorular, kişisel rahatsızlık verecek herhangi bir ayrıntı içermemektedir. Sorularda belirtilen görüşler bizim görüşlerimizi dile getirmemektedir. Sizden belirtilen görüşleri değerlendirmenizi ve onlara ne derece katıldığınızı ya da katılmadığınızı belirtmenizi istiyoruz. Soruların doğru ya da yanlış bir cevabı yoktur; önemli olan sizin ne düşündüğünüz ve ne hissettiğinizdir. Çalışmanın sonuçlarının güvenilirliği açısından sorulara içtenlikle cevap vermeniz bizim için çok önemlidir. Daha önce de belirttiğimiz gibi sizi temin ederiz ki burada vereceğiniz kişisel bilgileriniz ve görüşleriniz tamamen anonim ve dolayısıyla gizli kalacaktır. Vereceğiniz cevapların kimliğinizle ilişkilendirilmesine olanak yoktur. Sizin yanıtlarınız diğer katılımcılarınkilerle birleştirilecek ve bir bütün olarak istatistiksel analizlere tabi tutulacaktır. Bu çalışmanın sonuçları bilimsel dergilerde yayınlanabilir veya bilimsel toplantılarda sunulabilir.

Katılım sırasında herhangi bir sebepten ötürü kendinizi rahatsız hissederseniz, bir neden göstermeksizin, çalışmayı yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Çalışmadan ayrılmak için internet tarayıcınızın penceresini kapatmanız veya “anketten çık” linkine tıklamanız yeterli olacaktır. Araştırmadan çekilmeye karar verirsiniz, sizin verileriniz kullanılmadan yok edilecektir. Bu araştırmaya katılmanızla ilgili öngörülen herhangi bir risk bulunmamaktadır. Çalışmanın veri toplama aşamasının sonunda, çalışmayla ilgili daha detaylı bir şekilde bilgilendirileceksiniz. Çalışmamıza katıldığınız için şimdiden teşekkür ederiz. Çalışmanın sonuçları bilimsel dergilerde yayınlanabilir veya bilimsel toplantılarda sunulabilir.

Çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için Psikoloji Bölümü öğrencilerinden Damla Balaban (e-posta: damdambanban@gmail.com) ve/veya Psikoloji Bölümü öğretim üyelerinden Y. Doç. Dr. Banu Cingöz Ulu (e-posta: cingoz@metu.edu.tr) ile iletişim kurabilirsiniz. Çalışmamıza katılmayı kabul ediyorsanız, lütfen aşağıdaki cümleyi okuyup “Evet” kutucuğunu işaretleyerek “İleri” düğmesine basınız. Bu şekilde sayfa sizi ankete yönlendirecektir.

Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılıyorum ve istediğim zaman çalışmayı yarıda kesebileceğimi biliyorum. Vereceğim bilgilerin kimliğimde eşleştirilmeyeceğini biliyor ve bilgilerimin bilimsel amaçlı yayımlarda kullanılmasını kabul ediyorum.

☐ Evet ☐ Hayır

APPENDIX K

DEBRIEFING FORM

KATILIM SONRASI BİLGİ FORMU

Çalışmamıza katıldığınız için teşekkür ederiz. Bize verdiğiniz bilgiler gizli tutulacak ve anonim şekilde saklanacaktır; sonrasında sadece bilimsel araştırmalarda ve yayınlarda kullanılacaktır.

Bu çalışma, daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, ODTÜ Psikoloji Bölümü yüksek lisans öğrencilerinden Damla Balaban tarafından ve öğretim üyelerinden Y. Doç. Dr. Banu Cingöz Ulu gözetiminde yürütülen bir çalışmadır. Çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’de yaşayan kendini Türk olarak tanımlayan kişilerin, Türkiye’deki Kürtlere yönelik önyargılarını tespit etmek; bu değerlendirmeler ile etnik politika tercihlerini öngörürken tehdit algısının rolünü incelemektir.

Aşağıda çalışmamızdaki anketlerde değinilen konular kısaca açıklanmıştır. Çalışmamızın amacı Türkiye’de yaşayan ve kendini Türk olarak tanımlayan vatandaşların Kürtlere yönelik önyargılarını incelemek olduğundan kendini Kürt olarak tanımlayan katılımcılar Türklükle özdeşleşme (ulusal özdeşleşme), Kürtlere yönelik önyargı ve gruplar arası tehdit anketlerini doldurmamışlardır. Diğer katılımcılarımızdan ise kendini Türk olarak tanımlayanlara Türklükle özdeşleşme ölçeği verilmiş, tanımlayanlara ise verilmemiştir. Yukarıda bahsi geçen anketlerin yanı sıra çalışmamıza katılan tüm katılımcılar, sağ kanat yetkecilik, sosyal baskınlık yönelimi, etnik politikalar ve Türkiye ile özdeşleşme anketlerini doldurmuşlardır. Bahsedilen ölçeklerin her biri aşağıda kısaca anlatılmıştır.

Bu çalışmada değinilen konular şunlardır:

Ulusal özdeşleşme: Bu kısım kendinizi Türklerle ne kadar yakın ya da benzer hissettiğinizi, Türklerle aranızdaki ne derecede bir duygusal bağ kurulu olduğunu ve kendiniz tanımlarken Türklüğün ne derecede önemli olduğunu ölçüyordu. Kendinizi Türklerle ne kadar yakın ve bağlı hissediyorsanız ve Türklüğü ne kadar önemli görüyorsanız Türklükle kendinizi o kadar özdeşleştiriyorsunuz demektir.

Sağ kanat yetkecilik: Sağ kanat yetkecilik kişinin güçlü kalıplaşmış düşüncelere sahip olduğu, yetkeye/otoriteye itaat etmeye ve dünyayı siyah ve beyaz olarak görme eğiliminde olduğu anlamına gelir. Sağ kanat yetkecilik özelliği yüksek kişiler toplumsal kurallara ve hiyerarşik düzenlere körü körüne bağlıdır ve

toplumda düşük konumlara sahip kişilere/gruplara karşı önyargılı olma eğilimindedirler.

Sosyal baskınlık yönelimi: Sosyal baskınlık yönelimi, kişinin farklı sosyal gruplar arasındaki eşitsizliği ne kadar kabul edilebilir gördüğü ile ilgilidir. Sosyal baskınlık yönelimi kuvvetli olan kimseler dünyanın, insanlar arasındaki hiyerarşik düzenden meydana geldiğine ve bunun da zaten böyle olması gerektiğine inanırlar.

Gruplar arası tehdit: Gruplar arası ilişkiler yazınına göre, özellikle Stephan & Stephan'ın Entegre Tehdit Teorisi'ne göre, gruplar birbirlerini farklı sebeplerden dolayı tehdit unsuru olarak görebilir. Toprak, doğal zenginlikler ya da iş imkânları gibi grupların paylaşması gereken sınırlı kaynaklar söz konusu ise bu gerçekçi tehdide girer. Öte yandan gruplar birbirlerinin değerlerini ve inançlarını paylaşmıyorsa, bu durumda gruplar birbirleri için sembolik tehditler oluştururlar. Bu iki çeşit tehdit, grup seviyesinde algılanabilecek tehdit çeşitleridir ve çalışmamızda Türklerin Kürtleri bu iki çeşit tehdit çerçevesinde nasıl gördükleri araştırılmaktadır.

Bunların yanı sıra ankette sizlere yaşınız, cinsiyetiniz, dini ve siyasi görüşleriniz, barış süreciyle ilgili tutumlarınız ve benzeri konuları kapsayan çeşitli demografik bilgileri toplamaya yönelik sorular da verilmiştir. Bu çalışmamızdan beklediğimiz sonuç, yukarıda belirtilen ilk üç kavramın Kürtlerden algılanan grup düzeyindeki tehditle ilgili tutumları ve dolayısıyla kişilerin Kürtlere yönelik önyargılarını ve etnik politikalar konusundaki görüşlerini belirlemesidir.

Tekrar etmek isteriz ki anket sorularında geçen görüşler kişisel olarak bizlerin görüşlerini yansıtmamaktadır. Çalışmada geçen sorular birtakım güncel fikirler olup sizin bunlara ne kadar katıldığınızı/katılmadığınızı ölçmek üzere çalışmamızda yer verilmiş görüşlerdir.

Çalışmamıza katıldığınız için çok teşekkür ederiz. Soru, görüş ve önerileriniz için, çalışmamız hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak ya da çalışmamızın sonuçlarını öğrenmek için aşağıdaki isimlere başvurabilirsiniz:

Y. Doç. Dr. Banu Cingöz Ulu (cingoz@metu.edu.tr)
Damla Balaban (damdambanban@gmail.com)

APPENDIX L

THESIS PHOTOCOPYING PERMISSION FORM

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