

OCCUPATION AND THE COLONIZATION OF ALGERIA
FROM 1830 TO 1870:
A STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE

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To the memory of my beloved mother

ABSTRACT

OCCUPATION AND THE COLONIZATION OF ALGERIA FROM 1830 TO 1870: A STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE

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The occupation and the colonization of Algeria had a special place in French history and politics, from the onset to the independence, and continue to be so. Understanding the mentality of the colonization and the interaction between peoples are as important as covering the series of events. Colonization of a territory brings with itself power struggles, changes in social and political structures, and turmoil in all areas of social life; and all these were present in French Algeria. This thesis focuses on these more general aspects of the colonization of Algeria from 1830 to 1870, bearing the relation between the mentality and the events in mind, and dealing with the issue under the topics of occupation, colonization and resistance in an international context.

Keywords: French Algeria, Ottoman Algeria, French colonial history, Algerian resistance, settlers in Algeria

ÖZ

1830-1870 YILLARI ARASINDA CEZAYİRİN İŞGALİ VE SÖMÜRGELEŞTİRİLMESİ: HAKİMİYET İÇİN BİR MÜCADELE

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Cezayir'in işgali ve sömürgeleştirilmesi konusu, Fransız tarihinde ve politikasında, işgalin başlangıcından Cezayir'in bağımsızlığına kadar önemli bir yere sahip olmuştur ve hala da olmaya devam etmektedir. Sömürgeleştirmenin zihniyetini ve topluluklar arasındaki iletişimi anlamak, olaylar zincirinden bahsetmek kadar önemlidir. Bir bölgenin sömürgeleştirilmesi güç çatışmalarını, politik ve sosyal yapılarda değişimleri ve sosyal hayatın her kesiminde oluşan karmaşayı da beraberinde getirir ve bütün bunlar Fransız Cezayirinde de mevcuttu. Bu tez işgal, sömürgeleştirme ve direniş olmak üzere üç konu başlığı altında, konuyu 1830 ve 1870 arasında sınırlandırarak, Cezayir'in sömürgeleştirilmesinin bu daha genel yönlerini zihniyetin ve olayların birbiriyle ilişkisini göz önünde tutarak uluslararası bir bağlam içerisinde incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Fransız Cezayiri, Osmanlı Cezayiri, Fransız sömürgecilik tarihi, Cezayir direnişi, Cezayir'deki yerleşimciler

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The colonization and the occupation of Algeria constituted an important part in French history; the fact that Algeria was no longer seen as a colony but as a part of France after 1848 is an example how this country was given a special treatment by the French politicians. This thesis aims to search answers to the question of how and why France occupied and colonized Algeria in an international context. The focus of the thesis is materialized in the bureaucratic expectations of France and the local resistance to these expectations between 1830 and 1870, until the end of the Second Empire in France and the beginning of the Kabylia insurrection in Algeria. This thesis will also analyze the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and France with regard to the French occupation of Algeria, and the Ottoman attitude, reaction and passivity that the occupation created. However, the Ottoman attitude and its relations with France in this matter do not constitute the main problem of the thesis and was mentioned only to put the events into a context; and it was seen that the Ottoman Empire stood in a position between an international context and a domestic level. The thesis will try to answer such sub-questions as well; what the motivation was behind the French occupation, what effects the occupation created in Algeria and in Istanbul, what the consequences of the occupation and the French rule in Algeria were.

The nineteenth century witnessed rivalries among European countries to acquire lands which they could colonize and benefit from their resources. Britain and France were the two most important players in this game. However, Britain had begun the competition in a more advantageous position. The developments in the British ships and maritime activities starting from the seventeenth century had given Britain a better chance to obtain colonies overseas. Britain had taken a key position in Mediterranean; Gibraltar, in the 1702-1713 War of the Spanish Succession. Moreover, in the Treaty of Paris in 1763 after the Seven Years' War, the British Empire took possession of the whole India, removing the French forces from there.

Furthermore, the Industrial Revolution was another factor in finding colonies; this way, raw materials would let her produce more and her abundant products would find markets to flow.

Therefore, the British Empire has been expanding rapidly and after the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna in 1815, it gained the upper hand in the international community, being the most important financier and organizer of the struggle against Napoleon. Now, France had to find ways to cope with this power; thus, she started to search for colonies in her near abroad. Her first attempt was the invasion of Egypt in 1798 during the Napoleonic era; acquiring Egypt would provide France a substantial position in the Mediterranean and cut the ties between Britain and India. Even though Napoleon's plans went further than that, France had to face with defeat.

After the defeat in Egypt, France had to look for other lands to colonize to block the way of England to her colonies, as well as to develop financially. One of them would be Algeria where France had plenty of reasons to occupy. First of all, France had relations with Algeria since the fifteenth century, yet after Britain proved to be the dominant power in the Mediterranean; and Algeria, which had good relations with France, started to lean on Britain; France started to shift to the idea of controlling Algeria through conquest. Algeria was in a strategic position in the Mediterranean Sea being close to Gibraltar and its potential of being a door to the Mediterranean Sea and Africa. Consolidating her power in Algeria, France had thought of expanding in the Maghreb and in the southern parts of Africa. Moreover, Algeria was the closest land for France to colonize; its geographical closeness made many French politicians think Algeria as an integrated part of France. However, colonizing Algeria was hardly an enterprise that has been planned thoroughly in a long span of time. There have been many reasons for it, yet the events occurred rather spontaneously.

In 1827, the area which is now called Algeria was not defined with clear boundaries and it was a province of the Ottoman Empire named *Cezayir-i Garb*. It was an autonomous province and enjoyed self-administration extending even to signing treaties with other countries when the French invaded. The province was famous for being a nest of piracy which owed its wealth to the collecting of revenues

from those who wished to cross its seas. It was also a home for nomads, the Kabyles, the Berbers –the original inhabitants of the country- and sedentary people; the Arabs as well as the Jews from Spain. The Turkish administration which imposed heavy revenues upon the population led to economic hardships which gave way to rebellions. Aside from the Turks, there were the Kouloughlis, who descended from Turkish men –mostly from Janissaries- and local women, and they enjoyed a better status in the society, yet the local people had no right to take place in the administrative structure. On the other hand, the province was still a part of the Ottoman Empire and the system seemed to be working. How could the little event that erupted between the *dey* and French consul turn the whole system of the country upside down and led it to be colonized for approximately 130 years?

The controversy between Pierre Deval, who was the French consul, and *Hüseyin Dey*, who had the highest authority in Algiers, started in 1827 and served as a pretext of the conquest and the colonization of Algeria in 1830. It was simple as follows: In the Napoleonic era, between 1793 and 1798 France had bought wheat from Algeria on credit through two Jewish merchant families, namely Bakri and Bushnaq. However, France did not pay its debts, the arrears were amounted eight million francs in 1798.¹ For years, when the *dey* demanded the merchants to pay their debts to the Algerian government, they responded negatively, remarking that until France paid its debts to these merchants, it was not possible to make payments to the Regency. On the other hand, whenever the *dey* insisted France to pay its debts to the merchants, his demands were somehow always neglected. Finally, in 29 April 1827, the *dey* lost his temper and hit the French consul with a fly-swatter in the face. Then a chain of events followed one another leading to the colonization.

Yet the reasons behind the colonization surely go beyond that; this was a last straw and a pretext. Regarding this debt issue as a major cause would be the same as presenting the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria by a Serbian as the major reason of the World War I. As was pointed out before, both countries had their own historical backgrounds which affected the course of events and the responses of groups of people in each side, and the groups that existed in-between,

¹ Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.249

such as the Arab Offices (*Bureaux Arabes*). These historical backgrounds, such as the French Revolution as well as the Restoration period and the position and the state of Algeria as a part of the Ottoman Empire are crucial to understand why these events took place in the first place in this particular area, Algeria, a colony, which proved to be more important for France from the rest of its colonies in the course of time.

In searching for an answer to the question of how and why France occupied and colonized Algeria, this thesis recognizes that the first stage of the colonization starts from 1827 to end in 1848. Even though the actual colonization has taken place in June 1830, the controversy between *Cezayir-i Garb* and France that gave the latter the opportunity of an expedition to the former started in 1827. As for the reason why the year 1848 is chosen, it is the date of a culmination of events which marks a shift to another stage of colonization. First of these events are the fall of Constantine and the breakdown of the opposition lead by Ahmed Bey in 1837. The second is the fall of the reign of Abd-el Kader in the western part of Algeria in 1847, a leader who had gained the respect of his enemies. Moreover, 1847 is the official date when Ottoman Empire recognized that *Cezayir-i Garb* was no longer a part of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, 1848 corresponds to the fall of Louis Philippe and the beginning of the Second Republic era in France, after which Algeria was no longer seen as a colony, but as an integral part of France, which represented a significant shift in the policies on Algeria.

The Second Republic (1848-1851) and then the Second Empire (1852-1870) turned the colonization process into something clear and concrete. Until 1848, there was not a consensus of how to proceed in Algeria; some were in favor of limited occupation which proposed that France would not extend beyond the coastlines, while some were defending full colonization. After a short period of indecision, a middle way was found. France would stay in the provinces she occupied, yet she would not touch the southern parts and some controversial areas such as the Kabylia, where some Berber tribes have been living with a traditional autonomy for centuries. In this period, the country went through a structural change with the creation of French *départements* in Algiers, Oran and Constantine. The military lost its dominance in these areas initially, but during the Second Empire, its prominence

raised once again until 1870, except between 1858 and 1860, when the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies was operative. The thesis will not go beyond 1870, when the Third Republic is established, the seeds of the Kabylia Revolt –the last prominent resistance against the French- started to grow, the military rule was toppled down and was replaced with the settler representatives while the governor-general was no longer from military but a civilian.

The actual beginning of colonization, from 1830, the landing of the French on Algerian soil, to 1870, involved the first encounters between the two peoples, who were both prejudiced to and distrustful of each other for their own reasons. It is also a time of the consolidation of power of France, trying different strategies, some of which failed or had dire consequences such as alienating the native people of Algeria completely. On the other hand, it would not be wise to regard the people of France and Algeria as two separate homogenous groups which stood against each other. On the contrary, the evidence shows that although different separate units was combined under one roof in certain aspects, the differences among various segments of the French and the Algerian society respectfully are remarkable, which this thesis will try to put forward.

The relations between the Ottoman Empire and France regarding Algeria is also included in this thesis, as Algeria was officially Ottoman territory until 1847 and the empire's claim of rights upon Algeria affected both the Algerian resistance, particularly Ahmed Bey and his forces in Constantine and the legitimacy of the French rule in the eyes of Algerian people. Furthermore, the correspondence between Ottoman Empire and France sheds light upon different aspects of the expedition, such as the French attitude toward the issue, the events and resistance in Algeria, the relations and nexus between Algerian notables and Ottoman Empire and the legitimacy of Ottoman Empire in Algeria.

This thesis is composed of five chapters. Following the introduction, the second chapter entitled as "Occupation" is divided into three parts. The aim of the first part "Influence of International Relations, the Mentality and the French Political History on the Expedition to Algeria in 1830 and on the Colonization", is to give a picture of France regarding the colonization of Algeria in order to explore the context and mentality of the colonization in general, without which the whole issue would be

nothing more than a chain of events. In this part, the evolution of the colonization issue in France will be dealt with, as well as the differences in the opinions of the politicians upon Algeria. This way, the colonizer will not be a blurry subject who is depicted as an unknown power that exists with only its actions; understanding the motivations and the political situation of France will help give the thesis to find the context it is searching for. The second part of the first chapter, I focus on the changes in the political organization of Algeria. In this part, I tried to put forward the old and the new structures in order to point out the differences occurred in them. The part will also deal with new solutions and methods found by France to ensure her dominance on the colony such as the *Bureaux Arabes*. The last part of the chapter is about the Ottoman response on the issue and the relations between France and the Ottoman Empire, and the echo of the events in Istanbul.

The third chapter deals with the colonization, that is, the settlers, confiscations and distribution of lands, and general strategies of France in order to gain from the resources of the country and dominate its inhabitants. The frictions between the settler populations and the military as well as the mother country will also be mentioned.

The fourth chapter is allocated for the resistance of the Algerians. However, the focus will be on the resistance of Ahmed Bey and Abd el-Kader, because these were prominent as both occurred in strategic points and were more powerful and effective than the others. The other resistances will also be mentioned, yet not with detail, because of limited time and space.

I tried to shed light upon the general context of the occupation and colonization more than the material facts in these chapters. Then, in the conclusion part, I will derive conclusions from these chapters and their effects and consequences both in Algeria and France, as well as its long term consequences in the international arena.

Apart from the secondary sources, which can be seen in the bibliography, I have also used primary sources in this thesis. Among them is the report of Tocqueville of 1837 which I used in order to understand the strategies of France upon Algeria. In order to have an idea on the views of the military upon the issue, I used the books that were written by the figures who has played prominent roles in

Algeria such as *Nouvelles Observations de M. Le Maréchal Clauzel, sur la Colonisation d'Alger* written by Clauzel in 1833 and *Alger: Cri de la Population Civile* written by D. J. Montagne in 1847, who was a member of the Algerian Commission. I tried to reach the settlers' opinions through their observations and petitions they presented to the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille in 1833 and to the Chamber of Deputies in 1834. In order to view *Bureaux Arabes* from the French point of view, I used the book *Les Bureaux Arabes en Algérie* written by Foucher in 1858. I have also made research in the Archives Nationales d'Outre Mer and could reach to the correspondences of the *Bureaux Arabes* as well as the decrees of Napoleon III on Algeria. Finally, I have also made research in the Ottoman Archives in order to study the relations between the Ottoman Empire and France.

I also tried in this thesis to avoid too much detail because detailed books like *Un siècle de Passions Algériennes: Une histoire de l'Algérie Coloniale (1830-1940)* by Pierre Darmon, deals with the Algerian occupation in such a way that causes the reader to miss some of the most important aspects of the issue. On the other hand, general books on Maghreb and Arab world such as *A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period* by Abun-Nasr and *A History of Arab Peoples* by Hourani do not put the issue in an international context and solely focus on events. This thesis will be different by its focus on the mentality issue, local and international contexts and events at the same time by covering them not separately but only in relation with each other. In fact, the main contribution of this thesis will be the fact that it deals with the issue both in a domestic level and in an international level. These two layers of the issue are not separated from each other; on the contrary, they fed each other; and they merged in a middle way: the Ottoman Empire. By understanding the mentality of the occupation and the colonization and putting the issue in such a context will help the colonization of Algeria and its importance to be seen from a broader perspective, which will make it easier to put the colonization of Algeria in a general history of colonization in the nineteenth century as a key study. This thesis will also try to put the studies together which focus on different aspects of the colonization of Algeria; for example, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, prejudice and race in colonial Algeria* by Lorcin deals with identity issue; *Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France* by Smith deals with Maltese settlers; *Rebel and Saint: Muslim notables, populist protest, colonial*

encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904) by Clancy-Smith deals with the effects and structures of religion on the Algerian population; and *Arabs of the Jewish faith: The civilizing mission in colonial Algeria* by Schreier sheds light upon the situation of the Jewish population of Algeria. This thesis will be also different from other studies because of a methodological aspect; that is, every researcher have a different background and even though one is careful in creating an objective study, it is recognized that some level of subjectivity in every research is inevitable. Different backgrounds of the researches have variable effects on the studies they create; from the choice of documents to grasping the nature of the issue, here, the colonial situation. Therefore, this study will put forward a peculiar interpretation of the colonial situation of Algeria.

CHAPTER II

OCCUPATION

France embarked upon the colonization of Algeria by landing on the coast of *Sidi-Ferruch*, in 13 June 1830, which was just in the east of Algiers. According to Benjamin Stora, after this first landing, everything went rather fast: First, Algiers was occupied, then on the 24th of June *Sidi Khalef*, on the 26, 27 and 28th, the plateau of *Chapelle* and on 29th of June the plateau of el-Biar was conquered. On the 4th of July *Bordj Sultan Kalassi* fell and on the 7th of July the *dey* had to leave his post.² With the Convention of 5 July 1830, the surrender of *Hussein Dey* was negotiated and it was when France "first made its claim to sovereignty in Algeria, announced in ambiguous terms a new rule based on just laws protecting property and promoting cultural respect".³ On the other hand, the just laws and protecting property would prove to be applicable only to the settlers. During the occupation of Algeria, the cities were sacked, the traditional life was destroyed, and the lands were confiscated. The epidemics and war caused a dramatic fall in the number of the indigenous population of Algeria. There were 2439 births and 5738 deaths in the native population of Algiers, Oran and Constantine⁴, which shows the striking imbalance between the birth and death rates in the population.

² Stora, Benjamin, *Histoire de l'Algérie Coloniale (1830-1954)* Paris: La Decouverte, 2004, p.14.

³ Brower, Benjamin C., *A Desert Named Peace: The violence of France's empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902*, New York: Colombia University Press, 2009, p.11.

⁴ Darmon, Pierre, *Un siècle de Passions Algériennes: Une histoire de l'Algérie coloniale (1830-1940)*, Paris: Fayard, 2009, p.129.

2.1. Influence of International Relations, the Mentality and the French Political History on the Expedition to Algeria in 1830 and on the Colonization

The decision about the occupation of Algeria was influenced by two main variables: International rivalries and domestic reasons. These two variables were in relation with each other; the rivalries in colonialism and in economic and political dominance especially with Britain as well as the problems outside the country necessitated an effective way of legitimization and a manifestation of power; while the problems at the domestic level forced France to show her power to the international community by a conquest.

The influence of international rivalry on the occupation of Algeria was based mainly on the relations between France and the British Empire. In the eighteenth century, Holland, France and Britain were the wealthiest countries, and in comparison to the situation of an average French subject, a British was visibly in a better economic condition.⁵ Moreover, the wages of the British labor force was higher than that of the French.⁶ The reason why France was overshadowed politically and economically by Britain was a result of a series of wars, industrial developments and effective diplomatic relations with other countries on the part of Britain. First of all, Seven Years' War had disastrous effects on France; she lost most of her colonies to Britain, including French Canada, her trading posts in India, and several other colonies and trading posts in America and Africa. Now, after all the humiliating defeats at sea and loss of colonies, France had to find a way to restore her power against Britain. The opportunity arose when the American colonies revolted against the British.⁷ However, helping the rebels could only worsen the economy of the French. Then, the revolution and the Napoleonic wars, even though they provided a short term of influence, did not bring France the favorable circumstances in the

⁵ Deane, Phyllis, *İlk Sanayi İnkılabı*, trans. Tefik Güran. Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000, p.8.

⁶ *Ibid*, p.132.

⁷ Treasure, Geoffrey, *The Making of Modern Europe 1648-1780*, London and New York: Routledge, 1985, pp.310-311.

international arena, and worse, alienated the international community, creating many enemies. On the other hand, France had other disadvantages which left her behind, such as economy policies. Unlike British and Dutch companies, French companies suffered from subordination to the state's economic policy and from the fact that the state chose diplomats and soldiers over merchants and sailors in its strategic objectives as was traditional.⁸ Yet France still could compete with other countries in commerce, and she was doing well economically between 1689 and 1789; nevertheless, wrong strategic decisions and incompetent officials in India led her to lose her dominance in India, and "[i]f the French had secured their position in India, their future would have been bright indeed."⁹ Having failed to capture Gibraltar from Britain during the American War of Independence with the help of the Spanish, France turned to Algeria to make it a starting point for her domination in the Mediterranean and for acquiring colonies to boost her economy. Colonizing Algeria would also give France the prestige of a peace-bringing country which was in favor of the international trade, because the privateering in the Mediterranean was a problem for all European countries and Algeria was the basis of the problem. After the Vienna Congress, Britain who stood out among all the other European countries because of her successful and active role in the Napoleonic Wars, bombarded the coast of Algiers as a warning to this privateering problem in the Mediterranean Sea, which made occupying Algeria easier on the part of France with a claim of bringing peace. For this reason, when the Ottoman Empire protested the occupation and sought the help of Britain, the latter could only try to solve the problem with ineffective diplomatic contacts with France.

Looking at all these developments, it can be understood that France was obliged to find colonies, develop her finances and industry, regain her prestige in Europe, and cope with the formidable power of Britain, or she would have to play the game according to the rules she was given. On the other hand, in her condition, it would not be easy to acquire a colony overseas, thinking about the strong British navy which she did not want to confront. The easiest way to regain her dominance would be by establishing settlements in Algeria, which was very close to France,

⁸ *Ibid*, p.86.

⁹ *Ibid*, p.87.

therefore easy to protect, it would be less costly –which proved to be wrong- and it was in a strategic point where France could hope to use in order to be more influential in the Mediterranean.

Apart from the influence of international relations, there was also a domestic level of the events. The colonization of Algeria also had its roots in the political history of France as well as in a mentality which believed in French superiority especially over the non-European people which granted France its assumed role of bringing civilization to the other parts of the world. This assumed superiority on the part of France is evident in the strategies followed in the attempt to “domesticate” the Arabs and Berbers. For example, Alexis de Tocqueville, in his Second Letter on Algeria (*Deuxième Lettre sur l’Algérie*) says that

Because it is better to imagine a powerful and civilized nation like ours, by the mere fact of its superior knowledge has an almost invincible influence on small tribes which are more or less barbaric and because it is better to force them to incorporate into it, the nation just has to be able to establish lasting relationships with them.¹⁰

These words, which at first glance may lead one to think as a manifestation of a thought which is willing to establish a better relationship between France and the indigenous people in order to strengthen France’s power, they also hide an assumption of the superiority of the French over the indigenous people, labelling them as “more or less barbaric” and contrasting the French as civilized and equipped with superior knowledge. According to this text, the fact that those native people were “barbarians” and French people were “civilized” was enough of a reason of establishing a relationship with Algerians, to incorporate them into “civilization”. Another example of how the French saw themselves as superior than the native people can be seen in an article published in 1849: ¹¹ “It has not been sufficiently remarked in France what zeal and dexterity it took to transform the Barbary cities

¹⁰ The original text : « Car il faut bien s’imaginer qu’un peuple puissant et civilisé comme le nôtre exerce par le seul fait de la supériorité de ses lumières une influence presque invincible sur de petites peuplades à peu près barbares; et que, pour forcer celles-ci à s’incorporer à lui, il lui suffit de pouvoir établir des rapports durables avec elles. »Tocqueville, Alexis de, *Deuxième Lettre sur l’Algérie*, 1837, pp. 15-16.

¹¹ Citation from Darmon, Pierre, *Un siècle de Passions Algérienne : Une histoire de l’Algérie coloniale (1830-1940)*, Paris: Fayard, 2009, p.101: « On n’a pas assez remarqué en France ce qu’il a fallu de zèle et de dextérité pour transformer les villes barbaresques en cités européens » Revue des Deux Mondes, 1849, p.926 sq.

into European cities.” Why would French want to transform the cities of Algeria into “European” cities and not to the “French” cities? Here can be seen a stereotype of a European city, which was expected to be in the same standards even if they have no relation at all, an indication of an imagined European community.

It is not surprising that many people had such ideas; after all, it was common for the Europeans to think themselves as superior than the rest of the peoples of the world in the nineteenth century, and this status of the colonized as well as the colonizer in general cannot be limited in France’s colonization of Algeria. In fact, colonialism and its negative effects on colonized people and their countries have been researched thoroughly by many scholars. However, these researches cannot be free from Eurocentric prejudices which rest upon a certain kind of worldview emerged with the discovery of the new world and with the confrontations with its people¹², because of the fact that Euro-centrism has such deep roots in the minds of the people that it is hard to notice let alone to challenge it. Nevertheless, postcolonial thinkers like Spivak, Chakrabarty and Prakash urge us to think about these taken-for-granted views about the world and encourage us to understand from which point these views should be questioned and try to shed a light upon possible solutions to the problems arisen from the colonial discourse.

The book *The Colonizer and the Colonized* written by Albert Memmi is a contribution to this quest of understanding the colonial situation. However, Albert Memmi can escape neither from recreating dichotomies nor from following the trend of Enlightenment in the sense that he believes in a linear flow of history and in the necessity and naturalness of progress as well as in the scientific rationality. On the other hand, he gives insight about in what ways the colonizer accepts his colonizer status and coming from a colonized country himself, about the fight within his mind and lifestyle to legitimize this stance, and he tries to show that the colonizer is not homogenous. This heterogeneity is also present in the history of the colonization of Algeria. It will be seen that although there are many French people who support the colonization of Algeria, there are also many who oppose it. Moreover, even the supporters of this venture are divided within themselves. Therefore, while the events

¹² See Quijano, Anibal, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America”, *Neplantla: Views from South*, 1(3), pp.533-580.

are covered, it should be remembered that these events may not represent all the French society, but the results of the actions of a powerful section of it.

Understanding the mentality of superiority is crucial to comprehend the context of the actions of the French bureaucracy and the army regarding Algeria. Bringing civilization to the so-called barbaric peoples was not the primary reason of the initiative, yet it was still a crucial component of the legitimization process for the settlers and military officers, as well as French people in the mother country. Believing in the equality of the citizens, they saw Algerians uncivilized and barbaric, not deserving the rights of French citizenship; therefore unequal. This inequality could legitimize confiscations, brutal ways of dealing with the native people, giving them no rights and surrounding them with a feeling of inferiority. This understanding showed its first signs with the French Revolution and the French Restoration.

Therefore, in order to understand the colonization of Algeria, it is of utmost importance that one should also have background knowledge on these two events which shaped the course of actions France took and the ambitions it followed in Algeria. The French Revolution was a result of the culmination of mercantilism and capitalism evolving in France since the middle ages. Bennoune says that “[t]he French Revolution is the archetype of a bourgeois, violent revolution directed against the feudal nobility, who not only hampered but also threatened the irresistible drive towards the development of a capitalist economy and its political corollary, liberal or parliamentary democracy”¹³. The revolution had brought an ideology: liberty, equality, fraternity. The meanings of these words were ideally extended to the whole of the French people, yet practically, it was the bourgeoisie who benefited from them the most while the lower classes had to be contented with the ideal meanings of these words. In the relations between the settler communities and native population in Algeria it was the same thing; the settler population would be free, equal and in solidarity, with the ease of their sense of belonging to their imagined community where the indigenous people of Algeria were never included. It was this ideology that allowed the colonization of Algeria through private companies, even after

¹³ Bennoune, Mahfoud. *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987: Colonial upheavals and post-independence development*, Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.15

Napoleon III put an end to the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies, in 26 November 1860, and let the military, the governor-general, and the *bureaux arabes* govern the country again. On the other hand, in order to attract more serious settlers, “free concessions were abolished in December 1864 in favour of sales at a fixed price”¹⁴, and most of the land on offer were bought mostly by French companies. The great private companies were also sought for establishing economic infrastructure, for example, for the construction of grand public works for which they acquired lands of the state and yet they did not always fulfil their contracts¹⁵. This transition from free concessions of land for settlers to the large-capital-owning private companies also shows how the bourgeois character of the French revolution started to be more apparent in the following years.

Another influential factor was the French Restoration. The restoration did not affect solely the way France acted towards Algeria; in fact, it is one of the very reasons why France ever attacked there. After the decisive defeat of the Napoleon in Waterloo in 1815, the Bourbons were restored with the help of other European powers but it was a constitutional monarchy this time. The first king of the restoration period was Louis XVIII who died in 1824 and he was succeeded by his brother Charles X. Louis XIII was more moderate and liberal compared to his successor; he had "embraced pragmatism and equilibrium, but his brother, Charles X, came to power in 1824 determined to roll back the Revolution"¹⁶. Charles X was the head of the Ultra-royalists of the Chamber, a group that wanted to restore the absolute monarchy, and his actions made him unpopular which eventually led to his downfall.

Fierce opposition to his rule made Charles X to search for ways to direct the public opinion to the outside of France. Ahluwalia states that “Algeria came under French rule in 1830 as a way to recover lost pride and to gain national glory when Algiers was forcibly seized from the Ottomans. The French monarchy of Charles X

¹⁴Ageron, Charles and Robert, *Modern Algeria: A history from 1830 to the present*, Trans. Michael Brett. London: Hurst & Company, 1991, p.43

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p.43

¹⁶Brower, Benjamin C., p.9

was in disarray and an invasion of Algiers was considered as an effective means to bolster a monarchy in crisis”¹⁷. Ageron argues that “The expedition of Algiers was not connected with the colonial policy of the Restoration Bourbon Monarchy”¹⁸. However, thinking of all the venture towards Algeria was only to appease the interior problems of France would narrow down the problem; Stora states that the government of Polignac¹⁹ also aimed at the renewal of the glorious times of Napoleon, consolidation of the power of France in the western Mediterranean, and opening markets for the new-born industry of France.²⁰

Even though Ageron’s statement would thus reduce the importance of the colonial policy, in addition to the benefits of colonizing this strategic land situated in the western part of the Mediterranean, so close to the Gibraltar, it is true that the conquest was also seen as a perfect decoy to be used against the revolutionaries to prevent them to revolt again, or so thought Charles X. He thought that his endeavour could only be effective if he conquered Algeria, which would enable him to make a claim on nationalism and gain support. "Cultivating sentiments of militarism and national chauvinism -legacies of the Revolution and Napoleonic era valuable for all forms of modern politics- helped the struggling regime create a climate useful to the modern state." ²¹

On the other hand, because Charles X's enemies were in France itself, he did not think about the conquest of Algeria thoroughly. In actual fact, the military plan that would be used in conquering Algiers originated in 1808, and they were the plans of Napoleon who thought of landing there.²² Moreover, the language used was the same language Napoleon used in the Egypt expedition, which stressed the good

¹⁷Ahluwalia, Pal and Davinder P. S., *Out of Africa: Post-structuralism's colonial roots*, Abingdon, Oxon, England; New York: Routledge, 2010, p.22

¹⁸Ageron, Charles and Robert., p.5

¹⁹Jules de Polignac (1780-1847) was an ultra-royalist politician who was appointed as the prime minister by Charles X.

²⁰Stora, Benjamin, p.13

²¹Brower, Benjamin C., p.10

²²*Ibid.*, p.10

intentions of France who merely wanted to rescue the people from the tyranny of their rulers.

According to John and Muriel Lough, this expedition helped the fall of the regime of Charles X despite his contrary hopes, because the troops sent to Algeria were not in disposal for the king against the government's attempt of a coup d'état²³. The expedition to Algeria indeed stirred the population up, people were generally excited about the invasion of Algeria, yet the plans for the protection of the authority of the king proved to be useless as the Bourbon Restoration was ended by the July Revolution in 30 July 1830.

The July Revolution ended up with the July Monarchy; and Louis Philippe became the new king. Like Charles X, Louis Philippe also saw the occupation of Algeria as an opportunity to strengthen his political stance. On the other hand, after the fall of the regime of Charles X in 1830, there was a period when France could not decide what to do with Algeria. Two contradictory states of affairs furthered the hesitation of the July Monarchy. On the one hand, the new government did not want to disappoint its English allies; on the other hand, it was unwilling to attract the wrath of the army which would not let go off its prey.²⁴ The supporters of the occupation and the colonization argued that the new land acquired in Algeria would solve the overpopulation and unemployment problems in France. The newly developing industry of France and the surplus from its productions would find new markets. France would reach more raw materials and could benefit from the agricultural products of Algeria. The last and not the least, the reputation of France would rise in the eyes of other countries. There was also a group which opposed the occupation of Algeria in the Chamber of Deputies; there were many who thought of the venture as a waste of time and resources. The adversaries of the occupation pointed out the immense expenditures of France and the lack of a way to compensate it, even with victories in Algeria. They also stressed that this would be an unnecessary endeavor while France had so many problems both inside and outside of the country. As Brower says, these politicians saw a continental, not a colonial future

²³Lough, John and Muriel, *An Introduction to Nineteenth Century France*, London: Longman, 1978, p.62

²⁴Darmon, Pierre, p.45

in France and the resentments about the on-going war had started in 1830 driven by the disastrous experiences from the Napoleonic and revolutionary eras. Moreover, using the resources poured for the Algerian war for modernizing and industrializing France and focusing on free trade for the goods like sugarcane and fibres seemed to be a better road to choose for many, such as the colonial critic Amédée des Jobert who believed in liberalism and saw colonialism as an archaic method.²⁵ These groups also complained that luxury commodities like sugar and cotton could not be produced in Algeria, and the climate was too unsuitable for a profitable colonization of the land. They also claimed that there were not enough markets and the venture seemed to be an endless adventure.²⁶ During these controversies, in June 1831, the Prime Minister Casimir Périer had announced that French occupation should continue to extend to the whole Algeria, but no action was taken until 1834.

Despite the oppositions against the colonization of Algeria in France, Louis Philippe persisted in continuing the efforts of the occupation because he could not risk this valuable asset which would serve for the legitimization of his power. Since Algeria was a shelter for pirates and created problems for every state which traded in the Mediterranean –even though they had agreements such as receiving taxes and gifts in return for guaranteeing safer sea routes, although the province did not keep its promise all the time - France was not regarded as an aggressive imperial power but rather as a power dedicated to bring peace, just like England was viewed when she bombarded the Algerian coast to put an end to piracy after the Vienna Convention of 1815.

After a few years of hesitation, in 1834, a final decision was made: Algeria would be conquered by France. Until July 1834, most people thought that the invasion should be limited to some coastal cities such as Alger, Oran, Bône and Bougie as well as the areas around these cities.²⁷ In 1834, the colonization was limited with the Mitidja Valley and the coast of Algiers, as well as the Plain of

²⁵Brower, Benjamin C., pp.12-13.

²⁶Darmon, Pierre, p.141

²⁷Peyroulou Jean-Pierre, Tengour Ouanassa S. and Thénault, Sylvie, 1830-1880 : La Conquête Coloniale et la Résistance des Algériens in *Histoire de L'Algérie à la Période Coloniale (1830-1962)*, Paris et Alger : La Découverte et Barzakh, 2012, p.27

Seybouse in Bône²⁸ and the coastal parts of Oran. These territories were administered not by the Parliament but by the Ministry of War through a governor-general, which was created in 22 July 1834. Yet the idea of “total conquest” could only bear its fruits after the defeat of Abd el-Kader in 1847.

The conquest had started with brutality and continued to be so. France’s harsh attacks and its retaliations and vice versa, left behind itself many deaths. Some people chose to migrate; sometimes to the death, in order to escape war or taxes levied by the French. War and migration, as well as thousands of deaths caused a dramatic fall in the number of people in the cities as well as in the rural areas.²⁹ For example, General Savary, the governor general who served from December 1831 to April 1833, “tyrannised the townspeople of Algiers, exterminated the Al ‘Quffia tribe, and executed Arab chiefs who were lured to Algiers by promises of safe-conduct”.³⁰ Policies such as these make it understandable why the population in Algeria had no faith or trust in the French promises and goodwill. The adverse effects of Savary’s devastating policies lasted for a long time, and doubled by other similar incidents, finding a nest in the minds of the local people.

Lustick says that France’s decision to establish colonies in Algeria and instate settlers there was originated from the “image of Algeria as an unincorporated extension of France”.³¹ In fact, Algeria’s place in France’s colonial possessions was special. According to Ahluwalia, the importance of Algeria, among the colonies of France can be thought as the equivalent of India’s importance for the Britain.³² The assimilation policies are directly linked to this idea of integration. According to Said, assimilation has started as early as 1830:

In Algeria, however inconsistent the policy of French governments since 1830, the inexorable process went on to make Algeria French. First the land

²⁸*Ibid.*, p.27

²⁹*Ibid.*, p.26

³⁰Ageron, Charles and Robert, p.11

³¹Lustick, Ian, *State-Building Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria*, Berkeley: University of California, 1985, p.7

³²Ahluwalia, Pal and Davinder P. S., p.26

was taken from the natives and their buildings were occupied; then French settlers gained control of the cork oak forests and mineral deposits.³³

There were two views about how to assimilate Algerian people: one was to force them to assimilation and the other was to transform them slowly. Tocqueville's view can be classified into the latter. He believed that it would be wrong to try to change the former political system of Algerians into the highly bureaucratic system of France. Instead he argued that it was necessary to conform to their rules at first and after the legitimization of the state is assured to subtly transform them into the French customs:

[A]s much as our civilization permits, rather than starting to substitute our administrative customs for theirs in the place of the vanquished, for a period of time we should yield to theirs, maintain political delimitations, give the agents of the deposed government salary, tolerate their traditions and keep their uses.³⁴


In this passage he advises that France should be adaptable "for a period of time", which means "after a period of time", that is after France consolidated her power in Algeria, she could safely continue her policies of assimilation.

The revolution of 1848, which brought about the abdication of Louis Philippe and the declaration of the Second Republic in France, made the colonization of Algeria a controversial subject once again. The date 1848 was important for Algeria, because on this date, Algeria was officially recognized as French territory in the constitution. Thus, the universal suffrage for French citizens and the division of *départements* were to be extended to Algeria. The map below shows how Algeria was divided into departments:

³³Said, Edward, W., *Culture and Imperialism*, New York: Vintage Books, 1993, p.171

³⁴The original text: « [A]utant que notre civilisation le permet, à la place des vaincus ; que loin de vouloir en commençant substituer nos usages administratifs aux leurs, il fallait pour un temps y plier les nôtres, conserver les délimitations politiques, prendre à notre solde les agents du gouvernement déchu, admettre ses traditions et garder ses usages. » Tocqueville, Alexis de, *Deuxième Lettre sur l'Algérie*, 1837, p.12.

Divisions and principal towns of French Algeria³⁵



During this time, the controversy was based upon the conflict between the reformist ideology of the February Revolution in France in 1848 and the viewpoints that feed upon conservatism. According to Amoss, for example, Leonce de Lavergne who was an elected deputy and an official at the Foreign Ministry believed that the pursuit of Algeria should be revised. Bugeaud, who had been a governor general in Algeria from 1840 to 1847, on the other hand, replied him indirectly that the solution of the social problems of France lied in the continued colonization of Algeria.³⁶. Amoss stresses that “The implicit dialogue between Lavergne and Bugeaud on the subject of colonialism -a historical argument in which the colonized land and its indigenous inhabitants remain offstage, projected, defined, and made sense of only to the extent that they intersect with the interests of the metropole...”³⁷. This exclusion of the Algerian on the subject of Algeria can be understood with the viewpoints of these two figures that is explained by Amoss; he says that Lavergne, who was sympathetic to revolutionary ideals, believed that France should make social and political reforms in herself and export their seeds into Algeria. He believed that Algeria would be the place of “a prototype of the perfect society that would nourish

³⁵Smith, Andrea L., *Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese settlers in Algeria and France*, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006, p.69

³⁶Amoss, Benjamin McRae, The Revolution of 1848 and Algeria, *The French Review*, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Mar., 2002), p. 745

³⁷*Ibid.*, p.745

France's own utopian dreams”³⁸. His thinking was similar to that of the colonists who had settled in America; the colonists of America also believed that the new country would be the manifestation of their ideals. According to Amoss, however, Bugeaud did not feel the need of exporting the French ideals to Algeria, but was determined to send her workers struggling with unemployment. He saw Algeria as a means to overcome the social problems created by the Revolution.³⁹

Another problem raised by the party of Lavergne in the Assembly was the same old problem of the cost of the occupation of Algeria.⁴⁰ In spite of stating that the colonization was a failure, Lavergne did not suggest France to withdraw completely. Instead, he argued that French and Algerian people should live in Algeria side by side, forming a partnership. This partnership would be based on the trade of these two peoples: “the Arabs will supply the land, the labor, the livestock; the Europeans, the equipment and the outlets for trade”⁴¹, and the Europeans would live in the cities and the native population would live in the country, which was an order already existent in Algeria in the eyes of Lavergne.⁴² On the other hand, Amoss clarifies that these idealistic and optimistic approaches brought by the February Revolution changed its spirit with the bloody events in June Days; this time people were moving to Algeria out of despair and lack of any other destination.⁴³ While there were many disputes upon the colonization of Algeria, there was a new emperor arising in France.

Prince Louis Napoleon, who was elected as the president during the Second Republic era, marked the beginning of the Second Empire with his declaration of his emperorship. His first action over Algeria was to suppress the office of Governor-General and to entrust the government of Algeria to his cousin, the prince Napoleon-

³⁸*Ibid.*, p.745

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 748

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p.746

⁴¹Citation from Amoss, Benjamin McRae, p.747

⁴²*Ibid.*, p.747

⁴³*Ibid.*, p.751

Jerôme, who was appointed Minister for Algeria and the Colonies.⁴⁴ The documents sent by Napoleon III shows that the prince was appointed for the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies by the decree of 29 July 1858 as can be seen in Appendix A-1, A-2 and A-3.⁴⁵ Even though the prince resigned a year after he was appointed to this post, the Ministry continued to operate until 1860, when Algeria came through a civilian rule.⁴⁶ After this year, the post of Governor General gained significance once again.

After his visits to Algeria Napoleon was very discontent about how the colonization was proceeding. In various decrees, he declared that Algerians were also the subjects of France and that their rights will be protected, yet, with the *Senatus Consulte* of 1865, it was recognized that the Algerian Muslims and Jews had to give up their rights to be judged by Muslim or Jewish laws and had to abide by the French law in order to be able to gain French citizenship. As will be seen in the next chapter, this meant for many Algerians as a proposal for an act of infidelity and many responded the offer negatively.

2.2. Changes in the Political Organization of Algeria

Algeria was first conquered by corsairs named Hızır Reis, who was later started to be called as Barbaros Hayreddin, and his brother Oruç Reis. In 1516, Oruç Reis captured Algiers, and after he died, Barbaros Hayreddin became the sole ruler of the city.⁴⁷ Ruedy says that “[i]n order to secure those victories, Khayr al-Din had in 1519 sought moral and material reinforcement of his position by offering his

⁴⁴Brett, Michael, Legislating for Inequality in Algeria: The *Senatus-Consulte* of 14 July 1865, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1988), p.446

⁴⁵Archives Nationales D’Outre-Mer, Ministère de l’Algérie et des Colonies (FR ANOM GGA 1F/3)

⁴⁶ Brett, Michael, “Legislating for Inequality in Algeria: The *Senatus-Consulte* of 14 July 1865”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1988), p.446

⁴⁷ Kuran, Ercüment, *Cezayirin Fransızlar Tarafından İşgali Karşısında Osmanlı Siyaseti (1827-1847)*, İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1957,p.3

submission to the Sublime Porte”.⁴⁸ After that, a series of events and campaigns directed by different pashas resulted in the Ottoman control over Algeria.

The Ottoman conquest helped Algeria to become a state. The Ottomans built a political structure which laid down its foundation and created an identity. The Ottomans helped to the creation of this Algerian identity by separating the country from Tunis and Morocco and by letting an autonomous political organization to flourish.⁴⁹ After Barbaros Hayreddin captured Algiers, the city has been ruled by a *beylerbey*, with the help of janissaries, appointed by the Sultan and the rest of Algeria came under Turkish rule in time.⁵⁰ In fact, it was after Kılıç Ali Pasha died in 1587 that all *Garp Ocakları* were divided and a *beylerbey* was appointed to each province; and like the other provinces in North Africa, the administration of Algeria were given to a *beylerbey*. The *beylerbeys* who were appointed were to be replaced with another in every three years in order to prevent them to become excessively powerful; nevertheless, this method was proved to be useless, as the *beylerbeys* often used their position only to get richer during their stay in the province while the janissary corps gained more and more power.⁵¹ The result was the seizure of the administration by the janissary corps which turned the *beylerbey* into a puppet under the agha of the janissaries. Lapidus says that the agha of Algiers gave himself the title of *Dey*, however, according to Ercüment Kuran, it was as a result of the revolt of the corsairs in 1671 that the age of *Deys* started.⁵² The *Deys* continued to govern Algeria until the French occupation in 1830.

According to Ercüment Kuran, it was in the age of *deys* the structure of the province was settled. Aside from the *Beylerbey*, the *diwan* functioned as a consultative assembly. The province had three *sancaks* which were the *beyliks* of *Şark*, *Cenup* and *Garp*, with a *bey* on each one, who paid taxes to the *Beylerbey* but

⁴⁸Ruedy, John, *Modern Algeria: The origins and development of a nation*, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992, p.17

⁴⁹Peyroulou Jean-Pierre, Tengour Ouanassa S. and Thénault, Sylvie, p.19

⁵⁰Lapidus, Ira M., *A History of Islamic Societies*, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.325

⁵¹Kuran, Ercüment, pp.5-6

⁵²Kuran, Ercüment, p.6

were autonomous in directing their own affairs. Moreover, *sancaks* were divided into *kaidliks* and *kaidliks* were made of *şeyhliks*. Most of the Janissaries were in the center but there were also ones who served in the *sancaks*.⁵³ In time some changes occurred in the political structure, however, the core understanding of the system remained intact; just before the occupation of Algeria, on the top of the political organization of Algeria, stood the *dey* who descended from the Janissary corps. After him came the *diwan*, a consul composed of five members; each one responsible of a prominent position; the treasury, army, navy, public affairs and registration and property. The regency was composed of four *beyliks*, the *Dar es-Sultan* was situated in Algiers and its whereabouts, as well as in the Mitidja Valley. The other *beyliks* were in Oran, Titteri and Constantine. These *bey*s were responsible for maintaining order and collecting revenues.

According to Kuran, the piracy was one of the most important incomes of Algeria, and the *ulufe* of the janissaries were given by means of its rewards. However, the piracy started to decline in parallel to the strengthening of the sea forces of European countries. England seemed especially uncomfortable with the issue, as it had interests in the safety of the Mediterranean. As a result, following of a treaty among England, Austria and Prussia in 1815, England sent a fleet in front of Algiers in 1816, which made Algeria to comply with some conditions in the end.⁵⁴ This was the start of a solid pressure over the piracy of Algeria. Aside from piracy, the population of Algeria also gained their income from manufacturing and agriculture. Algeria was an agricultural country where grains and stock raising played a prominent role.

On the other hand, even if this picture may lead one to think that the Ottoman system in Algeria was quite centred, most of the territory was controlled by using the tribes against each other and having control over them through various means, such as exemption from taxes for some of them. The movements of pastoralists were controlled by the government by “manipulating the price of grain and levying a tax on each camel load”; however, still, Kabyle, Aurès, the Sahara and some other

⁵³*Ibid.* p.7

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p.8

districts were fully autonomous.⁵⁵ Then, the control of the Ottomans over the province was not limitless. In Algeria, especially in the south, there were many rural communities that belonged to various tribes which were practically independent. When the piracy in the Mediterranean was still powerful in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this issue was solved with small professional armies, paid by the revenues acquired from piracy. Yet the relationship between the tribes and the Sufi orders, and the government was not always so fragile: From the sixteenth century on, Algeria was practically ruled with the collaboration of the janissaries, the tribal leaders and the Sufis who used their influence on their supporters by kinship and religious loyalty.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the decline in piracy, dispersion of modern weapons to a wider mass, the reduction of recruits from Anatolia as well as the decline of the credibility of the administration as a result of too much dependence on Jewish, English and French merchants caused the tribes to become out of hand increasingly.⁵⁷

Tocqueville frequently stresses how the Ottomans directed the tribes skillfully. However, as the tribal revolts before the French occupation show, some of the tribes and orders had already started to become restless in Ottoman Algeria. For example, between 1800 and 1830, Algeria witnessed Sufi-led rebellions; the Darqawa, the Qadiriya and The Tijania orders were among the rebellious groups. On the other hand, because the orders were not dispersed and belonged to a particular region, no united opposition could emerge.⁵⁸ Even so, all these rebellions showed that the Turkish administration was losing control of Algeria. Yet it seems that this was still not known widely.

After the collapse of the Ottoman power in Algeria, the tribes gained their freedom of action. Especially during the interval of 1830-1834, there was turmoil and disorder in all over Algeria; Ageron says that “[i]n the western province of the Oranais, the tribes attacked the Turkish or Kouloughli garrisons while the Moroccan

⁵⁵Lapidus, Ira M., p.326

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p.586

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p.326

⁵⁸Lapidus, Ira M., p.326

sultan attempted to win recognition of his suzerainty”⁵⁹. He adds that the tribes also started to fight each other, thus, there was initially no serious opposition to the French invaders.

On the other hand, it is evident that, even though Ottoman system had started to lose control of the tribes, it had never experienced a strategic failure on them like France did. The Ottomans had always known that their power should be in control and should be directed strategically, which meant that the tribal leaders should be included into the system. In fact, the tribal chiefs had so much power that they came after the *bey* of the area in terms of influence, because they had the power of subjugating the tribes.⁶⁰ For this reason, the administrators had to be in good terms with them. If the Turks could be in control of the interior parts of Algeria, it was due to some grand families who negotiated their support in return for financial or political privileges.⁶¹ This can explain why the French could not exercise control over the interior parts of the country. During the occupation and the colonization, France had done everything in her power –although not willingly- to alienate the tribal chiefs. Their traditional lands were confiscated, they were trapped and killed when they were called for negotiation and their traditional and autonomous society was not respected. Religious differences between the colonizers and the local population worsened the troublesome relations.

However, France was in search for ways to establish an effective administration of the tribes and the indigenous people after the vacuum left with the fall of the Turkish regency in Algiers. Perkins says that “[e]ffective expansion into the interior necessitated armed forces capable of subduing hostile tribes and an organization able to administer these same tribes”.⁶² The *Bureaux Arabes* (Arab Offices) were designed with this intention. As Tocqueville said in his *Deuxième Lettre sur Algérie* (1837), the knowledge of the French on the population of Algeria

⁵⁹Ageron, Charles and Robert., p.9

⁶⁰Peyroulou Jean-Pierre, Tengour Ouanassa S. and Thénault, Sylvie, p.22

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 22

⁶²Perkins, Kenneth P., Pressure and Persuasion in the Policies of the French Military in Colonial North Africa, *Military Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Apr., 1976), p.74

with whom they had to live with was very scarce. Therefore, *Bureaux Arabes* were also a means to study and understand the indigenous people in order to establish better relations with Algerians and thus to help with the colonial project. On the other hand, the name chosen for the offices shows how France failed to use this institution as effective as it could. “[N]ot all tribesmen were Arabs nor all Arabs tribesmen”⁶³ and the name disregarded the Berbers and the Jews. This again unfurls the inadequate knowledge of France on Algeria and its clumsy handling of affairs in the country. Nevertheless, even if its potential was higher than it could benefit, the offices were successful in terms of establishing a section of the society which stands in-between, that is, as a bridge between the settlers and the indigenous people. The officers were not only from the French but also from the original inhabitants of Algeria. The *Bureaux Arabes* proved to be able to provide a defense for the local people against the settler groups who were striving for more and more lands and rights, while they were clearly supporters of the colonization.

The first *bureau arabe* was established in Algiers, yet establishing it was not an immediate decision but a process. This process was transferred by Foucher in 1858⁶⁴: He says that from the beginning of the French occupation, France recognized the necessity of establishing an Arab government, thus the system of *aghalik* was re-established in Algiers with the decree of 18 February 1831. On 10 March, twelve Arabs were given to the disposition of the *agha*, two of which was responsible for the usual correspondence with the tribal leaders. Foucher continues that in 1834, with a decree in 10 November, the attributions of this *agha* were defined and under the

⁶³*Ibid*, p.74

⁶⁴ « Dès notre entrée à Alger, on reconnut la nécessité de pourvoir au gouvernement des Arabes, moins pour ceux de l'intérieur et pour les tribus qui se trouvaient dans la plaine. Un arrêté du 18 février 1831 rétablissant la fonction d'agha qu'on avait dû supprimer (1), en investit le grand prévôt de l'armée ; un autre arrêté du 10 mars mit à sa disposition douze Arabes montés, dont deux chefs, tant pour guider les colonnes que pour le service habituel de la correspondance avec les chefs des tribus. En 1834, un arrêté du 10 novembre vint déterminer les attributions de cet agha, chargé sous la direction immédiate du gouvernement général, des rapports avec les tribus et de la police du territoire, de recevoir les plaintes et d'assurer, par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, la souveraineté française, la paix publique et l'exécution des ordres du gouverneur général. En 1837, un arrêté du 22 avril supprima l'agha et créa une direction des bureaux arabes ; cet arrêté fut ainsi motivé : « Considérant que cette institution a pour but de faciliter et d'étudier nos rapports avec les tribus de l'intérieur, de les attirer sous notre domination en respectant leurs usages, en protégeant leurs intérêts, en leur faisant rendre bonne et exacte justice, en maintenant parmi elles l'ordre et la paix... »

La direction des affaires arabes fut elle-même supprimée en 1839, et ses attributions conférée sa l'état-major général, pour être rétablie par arrêté de M. le maréchal Bugeaud, en date du 16 août 1841. » Foucher, 1858, pp. 11-12

supervision of the governor general, he was now officially responsible for directing the relations with the tribes and the police in the region, receiving the complaints, and as much as his power permits, assuring the sovereignty of the French, the public peace and the execution of the orders of the governor general. Foucher continues that in 1837 with the decree of 22 April, the system of *aghalik* was repealed and in its place the *bureaux arabes* were established. The motivation for the establishment of the offices was to facilitate and study the relations between the tribes in the interior parts of the Algeria and the French, to lure the tribes into French domination by respecting their customs, protecting their interests, by providing justice and maintaining order and peace among them. He says that in 1839 the *Bureaux Arabes* were repealed but in 1841, with the order of the Marshal Bugeaud, it was re-established.⁶⁵

The struggle of the French to assure her domination is apparent in this text. She tried to lure the tribes into her domination through justice, respect and understanding. In fact, these offices were recognized as the actual rulers of the country by the native population because of its more moderate actions. However, they were not free in creating the environment it was expected of them; the pressure of the settler population and their strong connections with the politicians limited their freedom. Moreover, as Tocqueville had said in 1837, the strategy of creating peace among the tribes worked against the French domination; unlike the Turks who played the tribes against each other, France provided them the opportunity to revolt against her by creating a peaceful environment among themselves. However, the tribes failed to create a strong united rebellion even though the circumstances could be supportive.

2.3. The Response of the Ottoman Empire

When the response of the Ottoman Empire is researched, it could be seen that the empire could not come up with an effective resistance to the occupation. This

⁶⁵Foucher, M. Victor, *Les Bureaux Arabes en Algérie*, Paris : Imprimerie de Schiller Aine, 1858, pp.11-13

lack of effectiveness materialized in the efforts to protect the empire's prestige by nominal acts. In fact, Armaoğlu says that the Ottoman Empire could not do anything about the occupation of Algeria except for protesting France, by declaring that it does not recognize the occupation and by striving to receive help from other countries, especially from Britain.⁶⁶

Algeria had been a province of the Ottoman Empire; nonetheless, as mentioned before, it had almost been like a sovereign country. It could declare war and peace, and could manage its own economy. One of the few links that connected the province to the Ottoman Empire was the revenues sent to the latter. According to Benjamin Stora, the European countries and even the United States sent to Algeria permanent diplomatic agents⁶⁷, which unfurls the extent of Algeria's autonomy. On the other hand, the province was still the *mülk* (property) of the sultan and its population was his subjects.

Moreover, when France sent troops to Algiers, the Ottoman Empire had plenty of other interior and exterior problems. The devastating effects of the Greek Uprising, the Battle of Navarino in 1827 and the destruction of the Ottoman fleet as a result of the battle; and the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828-1829 had prepared the ground for the passivity of the Ottoman Empire in the incident. The Greek Uprising, which continued for almost a decade, starting from 1821, had forced Ottomans to pour resources into that area and to be shaken politically, financially and militarily. Moreover, Sultan Mahmut II, who could finally abolish the Janissaries and raise a new army called *Asâkir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye*, had to cope with the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828-1829. The war had devastating effects on the Ottoman Empire, partly because the new army had not been ready for such a war yet. With the Treaty of Adrianople, signed in 1829, Ottoman Empire recognized the autonomy of Serbia, the independence of Greece and had to allow Russia to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia, all of which resulted in the loss of lands from where the empire extracted a prominent amount of wealth. Furthermore, the indemnities of the war worsened the already ruined economy of the empire. Besides, with the Battle of Navarino, the

⁶⁶Armaoğlu, Fahir, *19. Yüzyıl Siyasî Tarihi (1789-1914)*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999, p.191

⁶⁷Stora, Benjamin, *Histoire de l'Algérie Coloniale (1830-1954)*, Paris: La Decouverte, 2004, p.12

whole Ottoman Armada was burned and this made the effective resistance to the occupation of Algeria difficult.

Under these circumstances, that is, without a fleet and with a devastated economy and defeated army there had been little that Ottoman Empire could do in order to protect Algeria effectively. Instead, it could only hope to bring a halt to the occupation with its diplomatic skills.

According to Ercüment Kuran, the Ottomans learned about the plans of France to occupy *Cezayir-i Garb* in 1827 with a notification handed over to them. Because Ottoman Empire was so busy with dealing with the rebellion in Morea and had lost its fleet in Navarino, it was decided that the empire should act as if it is interfering in the controversy between France and the *dey*, whereas in reality, it left the problem unresolved.⁶⁸

Just before and during the occupation of the province, intense diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and France were witnessed upon the issue. However, even though the Ottoman Empire did try to persuade both sides in 1829 for maintaining peace, it could not succeed in any way. Britain was also against the occupation of Algeria by France and tried to prevent it by diplomatic contacts and she even sent two warships in front of Algiers. The reason why Britain was worried about the conduct of France was she saw the occupation as a threat to her own presence in the Mediterranean and the potential power France would get in the sea by means of the occupation, threatening the British sea route to India as well as her other possessions in Mediterranean, namely Gibraltar, Malta and Korfu⁶⁹. Besides trying to acquire the help of Britain, the Ottoman Empire also attempted to seek the help of the European countries in general on the issue. For example, as can be seen in E, in *19 Şevval 1253* (16 January 1838), after the city of Constantine fell to the French, it was proposed that the Ottoman Empire should protest the occupation saying that France has no rights to invade these territories, and distribute this protest to other European countries. It was thought that, with the help of the other countries France would be expelled from Algeria. Nevertheless, all these acts of Ottoman

⁶⁸Kuran, Ercüment, pp.14-17

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p.21

Empire and Britain did not go beyond a protest; as long as France used her diplomatic skills and diversion tactics, the route to Algeria was open and clear.

From 1830 to 1847, the diplomatic correspondences continued intensely between the Ottoman Empire and France, however, it was soon understood that France aimed not to negotiate but to create diversions while she continues her actions.

Ahmed Bey, the *bey* of Constantine, had hoped that the Ottoman Empire would send help; indeed, after the Ottoman Empire made Tripoli a directly-ruled province, dispatching a fleet there gave the chance to send help. In fact, Istanbul wanted to send a fleet in two occasions; in 1836 and 1837, however, it was prevented by the threats of France.⁷⁰ Ahmed Bey, who was loved by his subjects because of his just rule had also requested from the Empire to give him the title of *pasha* and make him the *wali* of Algeria. As can be seen in Appendix F, which dated 29 *Zilkâde* 1252 (7 March 1837), all other means of help other than giving the *bey* these titles was seen unreasonable. It was argued that if the Ottoman Empire sends help to Ahmed Bey, it will be prevented by France just like Tahir Pasha was prevented to enter the seas of Algeria, and if help was sent from Tunis, Muslim spies who work for France would notice. Moreover, it was also stressed in this document that sending help would cost too much for the Ottoman Empire, especially when there was a chance that France would give the province back to the Empire in the end. It was argued that France was in hesitation about her venture in Algeria because of the costs and before she decided and prepare the funds, the Ottoman Empire was ought to act and give Ahmed Bey the titles which he wanted, so that he would have more legitimization and support in his fight. However, the Ottoman Empire could neither give the *bey* the title of *pasha* officially, a title which was given to him by the inhabitants of the population loyal to him, nor the title of *wali* because of the fear of deteriorating the relations with France.⁷¹ Finally, in 1847, the Sultan gave up his rights on Algeria by means of not adding the *Cezayir-i Garb* to the list of the Provinces of the empire in the *Salnâme*, indirectly accepting France's rights on Algeria.

⁷⁰Çaycı, Abdurrahman, *Büyük Sahra'da Türk-Fransız Rekabeti (1858-1911)*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1995, p.15

⁷¹Kuran, Ercüment, pp. 44-48

In this chapter, it was seen how French politics and the occupation of Algeria was intermingled with each other. Then, the old political structure of was focused on, than the methods of France to establish a similar control mechanism over the population was discussed, and in the last part the attitude of the Ottoman Empire toward the occupation was mentioned. The next chapter will be about how this occupation brought about the colonization of Algeria.

CHAPTER III

COLONIZATION

3.1. Installation of the *Colons*

The occupation of Algeria meant colonizing and extracting resources from the territory; after all, the immense expenses and the loss of people for the occupation had to be compensated with considerable profits according to the general opinion of French politicians. Likewise, according to the public opinion, the most important thing was to know whether a new colony would serve for the enrichment of France or not.⁷²

This enrichment via colonization could only be possible with the installation of settlers, or *colons*, as the French called them, who would represent the French culture, own and cultivate the land, and make the colony a part of France. Finding people who were willing to volunteer and to enlist in order to settle in Algeria was not a hard objective to accomplish: Going and finding a new life in Algeria was a profitable opportunity for many French and other European people. Most of these candidates for being settlers were peasant farmers or had working-class origins.⁷³ As a result, most settlers did not have bright living circumstances in their mother country whereas in Algeria they had the chance to own land and start things over as well as to gain a better status in the society. Marc Ferro verbalize this situation as follows: “[T]he expenses incurred by the State contributed to the enrichment of the citizens turned colonists who, in the mother country, would not have enjoyed the same advantages and would not have increased their wealth in the same manner.”⁷⁴ Sending especially young people and a section of the society which is in economic hardships; that is, people who were potential rebels, suited the interests of the state as

⁷²Yacono, X., *Histoire de L'Algérie de la Fin de la Régence Turque à L'insurrection de 1954*, Éditions de L'Atlanthrope, 1993, p.70.

⁷³Ahluwalia, P. *Out of Africa: Post-structuralism's colonial roots*. Routledge, 2010, p.25

⁷⁴Ferro, Marc, *Colonization : A Global History*, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p.68.

well as of the new bourgeois ideology which had a breaking point in the French Revolution and continued to develop in the following century:

The colonization of Algeria, offering an immense outlet, an active existence and a wealthy and easy future to the younger generations and to the poorer classes ... will calm what is feverish and abnormal in these agitations, at the same time it will open a vast field to the application of theoretical speculations and systems that concern advanced minds.⁷⁵

Among the people sent to Algeria were also the insurgents and political prisoners who had taken part in the June Days Uprising, just before the July Revolution. Of these insurgents 15.000 were taken prisoner yet most of them were released soon. In 1850, the government decided to send the remaining 459 prisoners to Algeria and as a punishment they were going to work the lands. However, after three years of working, they were going to be able to receive a land, a provisional title and a dwelling.⁷⁶

With the support of state policies, this enthusiasm to enlist for settling in this new colony materialized in the dramatic rise in the numbers of settlers and their acquisition of lands in a short notice. For instance, around 1837 and 1838, France strengthened her position in Algeria: There were 25.000 European settlers then, and a new port called Philippeville was built and the exploitation of the Mitidja Valley had started.⁷⁷ Then, after the regulations of 24 March 1843 and 21 July 1846, immense amount of lands were confiscated: 200.000 hectares of land changed hands of which 168.000 hectares was in the Algiers, 55.000 hectares of it passed to the European settlers, 95.000 hectares of the land passed to the state and only 32.000 hectares stayed in the hands of the indigenous people.⁷⁸ Table in the below shows how the settler population increased compared to years: It can be seen from this table that the

⁷⁵The original text: « La colonisation d'Alger, en offrant un immense débouché, une existence active et un avenir de fortune ou d'aisance aux jeunes générations et aux classes pauvres, ... apaisera ce qu'il y a de fébrile et d'anormal dans ces agitations, un même temps qu'elle ouvrira un champ vaste à l'application des spéculations théoriques et des systèmes qui préoccupent les esprits avancés ... » Pétition des Colons d'Alger à la Chambres des Députés Suivie de Celle de Négociant[s] de Marseille et des Délibérations du Conseil Municipal et de la Chambre de Commerce de la Même Ville, Marseille, 1834, p.10.

⁷⁶Amoss, Benjamin McRae, "The Revolution of 1848 and Algeria", *The French Review*, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Mar., 2002), p.751

⁷⁷Darmon, Pierre, *Un siècle de Passions Algériennes : Une histoire de l'Algérie coloniale (1830-1940)*, Paris: Fayard, 2009, p.66

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p.146

total sum of non-French settlers were relatively higher than the numbers of French settlers until around 1845. As the following figure shows, only after 1850s the French settler population started to outweigh settlers from other European countries.


Settler Population in Algeria from 1833 to 1872⁷⁹

According to Victor Demontes, *Le Peuple algérien*, Essais de démographie algérienne, Alger, 1906, p.620

Année	Français	Étrangers				Total	Population européenne
		Espagnols	Italiens	Anglo-Mal-tais	Autres nationalités européennes		
1833	3 478	1 291	1 122	1 213	708	4 334	7 812
1836	5 485	4 592	1 845	1 802	837	9 076	14 561
1841	16 677	9 748	3 258	3 795	3 896	20 797	37 374
1845	46 339	25 335	7 738	8 047	7 862	48 982	95 321
1851	66 050	41 558	7 555	7 507	8 813	65 233	131 283
1856	92 750	42 218	9 472	7 114	9 244	68 048	160 798
1861	112 229	48 145	11 815	9 378	11 179	80 417	192 646
1866	122 119	58 510	16 655	10 627	10 079	95 980	217 099
1872	129 601	71 366	18 351	11 512	14 287	115 516	245 117

⁷⁹ « L'évolution de la population européenne de 1833 à 1872 » Table c.f. Yacono, X., *Histoire de L'Algérie de la Fin de la Régence Turque à L'insurrection de 1954*, Éditions de L'Atlanthrope, 1993, p.144.

Figure: Evolution of the Numbers of French and Foreign Settlers in Algeria⁸⁰



Whether French or non-French, the rise in the numbers of the settlers was not surprising because of the potential opportunities of the colonization of this promising, vast land; these opportunities even made the colonists fierce supporters of the venture, since the beginning of the installation of the settlers in Algeria; an example is the petition they sent collectively to the Chamber of Deputies in 1834.⁸¹ In this petition, the *colons* requested four basic regulations to be enforced in the colony by the government, which were summarized in the last section of the document:

1. The adoption of a law that leaves no doubt about the ownership and the colonization of Algeria, which finally determines the position of this country in respect of the mother country;

⁸⁰ «L'évolution de la population européenne de 1833 à 1954(en milliers d'habitants) » Figure from Yacono, X., Histoire de L'Algérie de la Fin de la Régence Turque à L'insurrection de 1954, Éditions de L'Atlantique, 1993, pp.145.

⁸¹ Pétition des Colons d'Alger à la Chambres des Députes Suivie de Celle de Négociant[s] de Marseille et des Délibérations du Conseil Municipal et de la Chambre de Commerce de la Même Ville, Marseille, 1834.

2. Choosing a legislation adapted to the needs and to the particular position of diverse populations in this country which establishes the necessary independence between the civil power, the judiciary and the army, and present finally all the guarantees of property rights , industry and trade;
3. The organization of a trading system that favors industrial and agricultural products of France on the markets of the Colony, and provides an effective protection for our merchant navy;
4. The establishment of a military defense system which can provide a more efficient protection to the settlers than they have obtained until now with the current system.⁸²

This petition is an important document to understand the motivations of the settlers in general at the beginning of the colonization because it was sent collectively and includes many insights about the thoughts of these *colons* about the colonial venture. Having been printed in Marseilles, no doubt it has also influenced the public opinion in France, making the examination of the document even more necessary. In this list of four basic requests, it is apparent that the uncertainty of the position of France in the new colony worried the settlers. At that time, the Ottoman Empire still had not given up its rights on this territory, and officially it was still a part of the Empire. Moreover, even though France wished to colonize this territory, she did not have a decisive opinion about what to do with the country, and the British pressure was making this process harder. A law that would define and recognize the state of Algeria was very important for the settlers to safeguard their interests. Trade, property rights and military protection were other important requests of the settlers. Yet, even though the apparent requests were these four regulations, throughout the text, one can also detect an appreciation of the importance of the colonization of Algeria and the benefits it would bring to France, which was stressed repetitively and in different ways. For example, it was pointed out that Algeria was the highest

⁸² The original text:

« 1. L'adoption d'une loi qui ne laisse plus aucun doute sur la possession et la colonisation d'Alger, et qui règle définitivement la position de ce pays à l'égard de la métropole ;

2. Le choix d'une législation adaptée aux besoins et à la position particulière des diverses populations de ce pays, qui établisse l'indépendance nécessaire entre le pouvoir civil, la magistrature et l'armée, et présent enfin toutes les garanties de droit à la propriété, à l'industrie et au commerce ;

3. L'organisation d'un système commercial qui favorise les produits industriels et agricoles de la France sur les marchés de la Colonie, et accorde une protection efficace à notre marine marchande;

4. L'établissement d'un système de défense militaire qui puisse offrir aux colons une protection plus efficace que celle qu'ils ont obtenue jusqu'à ce jour de système actuel. » Pétition des Colons d'Alger à la Chambres des Députés Suivie de Celle de Négociant[t]s de Marseille et des Délibérations du Conseil Municipal et de la Chambre de Commerce de la Même Ville, Marseille, 1834, pp.31-32

preoccupation of the politicians and with every passing day, it was better understood how important it was to preserve this colony.⁸³ The petition is more like an effort to persuade the politicians to give more importance to and continue the colonization, and finance it better, emphasizing its benefits, and it apparently coincides with the period of hesitation about the issue after the July Revolution:

...[W]hich politician has not researched and measured the degree of predominance which will be given to France by a vast and rich colony, populated by her children, which is two days of her ports, with an area of 14.000 square miles, and with a development of 280 miles of coastline? Which sea power would not acquire our homeland through ports and anchorages such as Oran, Mers-el-Kebir, Sidi Ferruch, Algiers, Bougie, Stora and Bonne, parts so close that we could say that they were in the waters of the metropolis; maritime positions which control from the Strait of Gibraltar to as far as Malta, and the progress of the steamship navigation make it accessible at all times and in every possible hypothesis of war. Undoubtedly, our power will be great on this sea which bathes the coasts of France and those of Algiers, like the rest of the coasts, it is suitable for the nation which has the largest market of the Mediterranean ... the Mediterranean will be a French lake ... there will be peace, protection for the commercial activities and progress for the riparian nations.⁸⁴

In this text, the benefits France would get from colonizing Algeria were stressed, exactly when Algeria did not fulfil the financial expectations in France. For example, in 1831, the imports were composed of a little amount of wool, yellow wax, olive oil, copper and 50.000 leeches, which were considered rather insignificant and disappointed even the supporters of the colonization.⁸⁵ The text also stresses that

⁸³ «Alger a pris la haute place que son importance lui assignait. Nulle question aujourd'hui ne préoccupe aussi vivement les hommes politiques, nulle n'a une portée aussi vaste. Chaque jour la France le comprend mieux, et témoigne une sollicitude plus jalouse pour la conservation de notre colonie. », Pétition des Colons d'Alger à la Chambres des Députés Suivie de Celle de Négociant[s] de Marseille et des Délibérations du Conseil Municipal et de la Chambre de Commerce de la Même Ville, Marseille, 1834, p.6.

⁸⁴ The original text: « D'abord, quel est l'homme politique qui n'a recherché et mesuré le degré de prépondérance que donnera à la France une vaste et riche Colonie, peuplée de ses enfant[s], à deux journées de ses ports, avec un territoire de 14 mille lieues carres, et un développement de 280 lieues de côtes ? Quelle puissance maritime n'acquerra point notre patrie par des ports et des mouillages tels qu'Oran, Mers-el-Kébir, Sidi-Ferruch, Alger, Bougie, Stora et Bonne, parts si rapprochés qu'on a pu dire qu'ils étaient dans les eaux de la métropole ; positions maritimes qui commandent depuis le Détroit de Gibraltar jusqu'à Malte, et que les progrès de la navigation à vapeur rendent accessibles dans tous les temps, et dans toute hypothèse possible de guerre. Sans nul doute notre puissance sera grande sur cette mer qui baigne les côtes de France et celles d'Alger, telle, au reste, qu'il convient à la nation qui a le plus grand marché de la Méditerranée. ... la Méditerranée sera un lac français. ... il y aura paix, protection commerciale, et progrès pour les nations riveraines. » *Ibid.*, pp.9-10

⁸⁵ Yacono, X., p.83.

if France do not occupy these lands which are so close to the country, another sea power, possibly thinking of England or Spain, will conquer them instead, thus, the lands that could be so profitable for France will be a threatening factor. The ambitiousness of the petitions goes as far as claiming that Mediterranean will be a French lake, because Algeria was seen as a step for a bigger venture such as this, proven by the occupation of Tunisia in 1881. Finally, it was pointed out that the Mediterranean will be a safe sea for trade as the privateering will end.

Even though there were some disappointed supporters of the colonization, there existed also supporters who often pointed out the immense amount of land Algeria possessed. The amount of land meant the amount of potential wealth for them, and it made Algeria the most important colony, because it had the vastest land among all the other colonies. Marshal Clauzel, who served as a governor general in Algeria and had an important role in its colonization, drew attention to the striking difference in the amounts of lands between Algeria and the sum of lands from France's three colonies, in a table shown in Appendix B.⁸⁶ In this table, it can be seen that the total amount of land that three colonies of France named Martinique, Guadeloupe and Bourbon was in possession was 78.100 hectares. In turn, the total sum of sugar produced in these colonies was 76.000.000 kilograms and the amount of coffee that was produced was 3.595.000 kilograms. Then, he shows that Algiers and its hinterland had 590.000 hectares of land, and he reasons that it will provide much more than the other colonies, if cultivated.

However, Algeria did not possess a climate for the production of sugar or coffee. Even though for most people Algeria became a colony for which France poured resources and people yet gained little in return at least for the beginning, there were several reasons why the colonization could continue. Of these, three are emphasized by Yacono⁸⁷: First of all, the spontaneous influx of immigrants from all origins from Europe, including people who were desperate to find a way of living as well as large property owners and aristocrats who went to Algeria to establish model

⁸⁶Clauzel, *Nouvelles Observations de M. Le Maréchal Clauzel sur la Colonization d'Alger, Adressées à M. le Maréchal, Ministre de la Guerre, Président du Conseil*, Paris : Imprimerie Selligie, 1833, p.22

⁸⁷Yacono, X., pp.83-84.

exploitations, wishing to continue good relations with the indigenous people, led influential people such as Clauzel to the idea of turning Algeria into a European colony similar to that in North America. Another one was the attitude of the government: It did not intervene in the immigration of people; on the contrary, it facilitated it. Finally, the actions of the authorities in Algeria made the colony durable.

Thus the colonization continued, but without enough financial aid from the government. Initially, when France did not declare her intentions on Algeria firmly, settlers and the authorities often complained that the government escaped from making expenses in the new colony and tried to persuade the government, which can be traced in the petition that the settlers sent to the Chamber of Deputies in 1834 as well as in the report sent to the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille written by Dervieu who was a merchant, town councillor and landowner in Algiers, for the Chamber to send his report to the Investigative Commission in 1833. In this text, Dervieu presents a similar attitude toward the occupation:

Never before the metropolis had owned, from such a small distance of its continental territory, a colony so vast, so productive and salubrious; never before such a good opportunity presented itself to France for the compensation of the loss of her former positions in the overseas. The government should even less recoil from the necessary expenses for this occupation and the first establishment costs, since it is a vast and fertile field which will soon compensate the expenditures for which will be made with hundredfold.⁸⁸

The proximity and accessibility of Algeria, which has been mentioned in the nineteenth-century texts so often, just as this one, was one of the reasons why France was so eager to see this colony as an integral part of her. Yet another reason why Algeria was special to be made an integral part of France was the fact that there were a very large group of settlers and French army officials. However, the army had opposed to this policy, because it did not wish to lose its power in this territory and

⁸⁸ The original text: « Jamais métropole n'a possédé à une aussi faible distance de son territoire continental une colonie aussi vaste, aussi productive et aussi salubre ; jamais occasion aussi belle ne s'est présentée pour indemniser la France de la perte de ses anciennes positions d'outre-mer. Le gouvernement doit d'autant moins reculer devant les dépenses nécessaires pour cette occupation et pour les premières frais d'établissement, qu'il s'agit d'un champ vaste et fertile qui lui rendra bientôt au centuple les dépenses qu'il y aura faites. » Dervieu, *Observations Présentée à la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, sur sa Demande, Pour Servir au Mémoire qu'elle Doit Adresser à la Commission D'enquête sur la Colonie d'Alger*, Marseille : Imprimerie de Marius Olive, 1833, p.6.

continue to govern Algeria with the help of the *Bureaux Arabes* and because the civil settler population had always thrived for confiscation of more lands, which raised tensions between the local population and French officials.

Whatever the opinions of the army officials were, after the declaration of the Second Republic in 12 November 1848, Algeria was recognized as a French territory in the constitution, and it was to be organized upon the model that was in France; that is, it was now divided into *départements* which in themselves also divided into districts and communes. Now, Algeria had three provinces each of which had three territories: civils, arabs –under the military administration- and the mixed.⁸⁹ As expected, the *colons* received this decision very positively. It was a victory for them in their struggle against the reign of the military.⁹⁰ Especially after the brutal reign of Bugeaud from 1841 to 1847; which extended even to the settler population, as will be mentioned in the next part of this chapter.

3.2. The *Colons* and the Local People

The immigrants from all over Europe necessitated establishing relations with the indigenous population; and most of these relations were characterized with tension. The general sentiment of the indigenous people toward the newcomers was anger, because they lost both their lands and their prominence in the society to the immigrants and they felt threatened by their culture and religion. The fact that the convention between the *dey* of Algiers where the commanding general guaranteed the freedom of religion in the fifth article was not enough to gain the trust of the people: “The exercise of the Mohammedan religion will remain free, freedom of inhabitants of all classes, their religion, their properties, their commerce and industry, will not receive any damage, their women will be respected; the commanding general takes the commitment on honor.”⁹¹ The fact that little of those guarantees were

⁸⁹Peyroulou Jean-Pierre, Tengour Ouanassa S. and Thénault, Sylvie, p.33

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p.34

⁹¹ The original text: «L'exercice de la religion mahométane restera libre; la liberté de toutes les classes d'inhabitants, leur religion, leurs propriétés, leur commerce et leur industrie, ne recevront aucune

actually respected may explain why; cruel expeditions of Bugeaud and the rush toward the best lands of the country are few of the examples. France also alienated people by allowing the religious endowments to be bought and sold with the decree of 1843: this act was a serious blow to the already non-existent trust of the Muslim natives of Algeria. Goldschmidt summarizes the situation by saying “[i]n North Africa, the French treated Algeria as an integral part of France. European settlers held most of the cultivable land, dominated political life, and controlled Algiers and the other major cities. The Algerian Muslims, mainly Berber but including many Arabs, had no political rights...”⁹²

Thus, putting aside the land confiscations, this degradation of social status was especially visible after Algeria was divided into *départements* in 1840, after which the settler population started to hold local governments of their own, while the indigenous notables who had a prominent role as intermediaries between the government and the population for many centuries, now “were reduced to the position of subordinate officials”.⁹³ In the areas where colonization had not expanded yet, military rule was persistent, yet as Hourani says, it was getting smaller and smaller. Moreover, the settlers were advocates of local governments where they could exercise considerable influence, especially through their connections with the politicians in France to further their interests in the colony, and they saw the military as a threat to these interests, especially with the *Bureaux Arabes* sometimes protecting the rights of the indigenous people.

As a result, Algerian society was devastated with the colonization: Most families had drowned in high revenues just before the occupation, now; they had lost their traditional lands as well. In this country, where most people depended on agriculture to make their living, only a small portion of Muslim landowners could

atteinte; leurs femmes seront respectées; le général en chef en prend l'engagement sur l'honneur. » Henri Jean François Edmond Pellissier de Reynaud, *Annales Algériennes : par Pelissier E, Capitaine d'état-Major, Chef du Bureau des Arabes à Alger en 1833 et 1834*, Tome Premier, Paris : Anselin et Gaultier-Laguionie, 1836, p.74.

⁹²Goldschmidt, Arthur Jr., *The Historical Context in Understanding the Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Deborah J. Gerner, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, p. 61.

⁹³Hourani, Albert, *A History of Arab Peoples*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002, p.271

“move from subsistence to a market economy”; however, the rest of the land-owner population had such a small amount of land that they had to offer their labor for the large landowners, in order to make a living.⁹⁴ In Edward Said’s words, “after 1830 “booty capital” ran the economy, the native population decreased, and settler groups increased. ... Algerians were relegated to marginality and poverty.”⁹⁵

This forced marginality was accompanied by a strategy to lure the original inhabitants of the country toward the Sahara, leaving the most productive lands to the *colons*. However, this strategy proved to be inoperative, and the French administration tried to stress the differences between Arabs and Berbers to create a segmented population to control and assimilate them⁹⁶, basically a divide and rule strategy. This segmentation full of stereotypes was most visible between the Kabyles, Berber people living in the area called Kabylia in the north of Algeria and the Arabs. In this respect, the Kabyles were regarded as a superior race than the Arabs and they could be assimilated easily and had the potential to be “civilized” because they were seen as modern people who had similar characteristics with the European model. The Berbers were defined as sedentary, monogamous, almost indifferent to the religion, open spirited, and having democratic institutions in their communities; whereas the Arabs were seen as a nomad, polygamous, fanatic, aristocrat, unintelligent, fierce and lazy community. This differentiation was also supported with moral and physical differences between the two people.⁹⁷

Contrary to the policies towards the native population, France had to assimilate the settler populations into one homogenous population if she wanted Algeria to be a truly integral part of the homeland. As can be seen in Table I, the *colons* had many different backgrounds, and the majority of them were French, Spanish, Maltese and Italians. Regarding the assimilation policies toward these non-French settlers, there were two fractions in France: One of them supported the idea of assimilation and the

⁹⁴Lapidus, Ira M., p.588

⁹⁵Said, Edward, W., Culture and Imperialism, New York: Vintage Books, 1993, p.171.

⁹⁶ Kateb, Kemal, *Européens, “Indigènes” et Juifs en Algérie (1830-1962): Représentations et Réalités des Populations*, Paris : INED (Institut National D’études Démographiques), 2001, p.185

⁹⁷ Kateb, Kemal, p.206

other one suggested the autonomy of Algeria, and the different elements were tolerated. The supporters of the assimilation were divided into themselves, with the advocates of immediate and complete assimilation and partisans of progressive assimilation.⁹⁸ The theory of assimilation not only encompassed the non-French settlers but also the colonized people and the political, judicial and economic structure of Algeria to be assimilated into French culture and structures; however, by the end of the nineteenth century, this policy of total assimilation was viewed as an unsuccessful and unreasonable endeavor.⁹⁹

On the other hand, in the nineteenth-century France, the colonial theory not only included the doctrine of assimilation but also the doctrine of autonomy, which was linked with the theory of association and naturalization, although there was no definite and clear transition from one policy to another. According to the association policy, France was ought to associate with the colonized and respect their institutions.¹⁰⁰ The institution of *Bureaux Arabes* can be given as an example for the association policy. Yet even with the help of the *Bureaux Arabes*, the Muslim Arabs were seen as the hardest to naturalize by the French authorities because of their religion and customs as well as prejudices, and the Berbers, as has been mentioned before, seemed to have more chance to “civilize”.

Besides, native population was not only composed of Muslims; there was also a significant portion of a Jewish population present in Algeria for centuries. This population shared the language, dress codes and other customs with the Muslim population, and some French Jews who came to visit Algeria was shocked with their living standards and they dedicated themselves to reform them.¹⁰¹ However, the most important reason why assimilation or naturalization policies over the Jewish population were taken seriously was because they demonstrated a powerful demographic and economic presence in Algeria. These native Jews had also

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* p.206

⁹⁹ Lorcin, Patricia M. E., *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, prejudice and race in colonial Algeria*, London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995, p.7

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.7

¹⁰¹ Smith, Andrea L., *Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese settlers in Algeria and France*, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006, p.91

significant local, trans-Mediterranean and trans-Saharan commercial contacts, and this reality caused some conservative military officers to fear that they will keep the local economic activities in local hands; their fear even went to the point of suggesting to expel them out of Algeria or to send them to France.¹⁰² However, the naturalization policy over the Algerian Jewish population outweighed.

Naturalization policies over the Jews of Algiers started as soon as 10 August 1834, with the an ordinance which took away the rights of the rabbis to hear anything that French authorities saw as a crime, and which limited their jurisdiction to the cases related to marriage and divorce.¹⁰³ But the first general attempt to naturalize Jews came with the law called “*Ordonnance portant sur l’organisation du culte israélite en Algérie*” in November 9, 1845 under King Louis-Philippe, with the purpose of organizing Jews.¹⁰⁴ According to this law, provincial consistories were to be formed in Algiers, Oran and Constantine; these consistories were going to control the budget of the Jewish community and maintain order in synagogues, suppress religious assemblies which were not authorized, and if necessary, they were going to prevent local religious leaders to perform their services.¹⁰⁵ Naturalization of Jews also meant that they would have to give up their religious laws which permitted them, just like the Muslim law, polygamy and divorce, whether these were actually exercised or not. The religious laws of the both communities, that is, of the Muslims and of the Jews, and especially these permissions of polygamy and divorce were accepted as the major reasons why they were not given any citizenship rights.¹⁰⁶

The *Senatus Consulte* of 1865 decreed by Napoleon was also related with a naturalization policy over the native population of Algeria, the Jews as well as the Muslims. According to it, all the native Algerian population would be recognized as French because they were living in Algeria which was a French territory, however it

¹⁰²Schreier, Joshua, *Arabs of the Jewish Faith: The civilizing mission in Colonial Algeria*, New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2010, p.2 and pp.25-29

¹⁰³Brett, Michael, “Legislating for Inequality in Algeria: The *Senatus-Consulte* of 14 July 1865”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1988), p.441

¹⁰⁴Schreier, Joshua, , p.23

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, pp.23-24

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, pp.79-80

was also made clear that they were not French citizens but French subjects. This was mainly because both the Jews and the Muslims used their own laws and accepted their rights to divorce and practice polygamy even if they do not exercise them and this was not compatible with the French civil code. It was reasoned that this incompatibility and the rejection of the French civil code went against the very basis of the notion of citizenship in France, that is, equality before the law.¹⁰⁷ However, the Muslims and the Jews were also given an option: if they abandoned their religious laws and accept the French legislation, they could be French citizens. Nevertheless, for the Arabs and the Jews, it meant choosing between equal legislation and citizenship, and the membership to their own religious communities, because for both of them abiding from their religious legislation meant heresy. The response to this contradiction was clear: Only a few Jews and Muslims gave up their religious legislation. According to Schreier, “between 1865 and 1870, a mere 142 out of Algeria’s 33.000 Jews were naturalized” and “[b]y 1878, only 435 Muslims had accepted citizenship out of more than 3 million”¹⁰⁸; these striking numbers show that the *Senatus Consulte* of 1865 solidified inequality rather than overcoming it.

Even though it promoted inequality, the settlers were very displeased with this decree as well as they were with the other decrees of Napoleon III preceding it. The reason was the fact that after his visits to Algeria Napoleon III criticized the “French settlement as uneconomic, the French military presence as excessive, and the treatment of the natives as unjust”¹⁰⁹ and he made clear that as their Emperor he was going to protect his Arab subjects. Indeed, he could really bring an end to the further acquisition of lands by the settlers.¹¹⁰ However, his acts could not bring equality: Algerian Jews were recognized as French citizens with the Crimieux Decree of 1870; however, for the Muslim population, the *Senatus Consulte* of 1865 continued to be effective until the end of the Second World War.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷Brett, Michael, pp.453-454

¹⁰⁸Schreier, Joshua, p.173.

¹⁰⁹Brett, Michael, p.453

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, p.453

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, p.441

As for the non-French settlers, the French government hoped to impose French culture on this population. As early as 1847, naturalization of non-French settlers was being discussed:

It should be noted that the Spaniards, Italians and others are fixed in Algeria as stable as the French, they are also engaged in the same occupations, especially Spaniards; they devoted themselves to agriculture and they acquired properties there; but their position is wrong, because national feelings establish a boundary which is worth erasing more and more.¹¹²

The boundaries between the settler communities coming from different backgrounds were to be erased. However, the *Senatus Consulte* of 1865, also included foreign immigrants, and not only Muslims and Jews. In the Article 3, it was pointed out that “The foreigner who can prove three years of residency in Algeria can be admitted to enjoy all the rights of French citizenship”.¹¹³ Comparing to all the hardships that native Algerians had to go through for the citizenship rights, this article show how easy was this for the non-French settlers. It was perhaps because creating a homogenous settler society was a policy with high potential as the settlers shared a kind of solidarity, proven by collective demands on the colony, as many thought that they were coming from the “civilized” Europe and they had to bear the same difficulties; this shared identity was paralleled by a shared colonial racism: “Another instructive indication of the aristocratic or pseudo-aristocratic derivation of colonial racism was the typical ‘solidarity among whites,’ which linked colonial rulers from different national metropolises, whatever their internal rivalries and conflicts.”¹¹⁴ This assessment of Anderson seems to be also applicable to Algeria.

Aside from legal assaults, military tactics of France in general further alienated the native population in Algeria from France. Firstly, the brutal war policies of


¹¹² The original text: « Il est à remarquer que les Espagnols, les Italiens et autres se sont fixes en Algérie d’une manière aussi stable que les Français ; ils y exercent également les mêmes professions, les Espagnols surtout se sont livrés à agriculture, ils y ont acquis des propriétés ; mais leur position est fausse, parce que le sentiment de nationalité établit une ligne de démarcation qu’il est intéressant d’effacer de plus en plus. » Montagne, D. J., *Alger 1847, Cri de la Population Civile*, Janvier 1848, p.82

¹¹³ Schreier, Joshua, , p.169

¹¹⁴ Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, London, New York: Verso, 1991, pp. 152-153

France during the period from 1835 to 1836 affected the relations between native population and settler population adversely. Then the policy of the restricted occupation was followed between 1837 and 1840, which was more moderate and less ambitious, it was when France limited her possessions with Bône, Algiers and Oran, that is, the coastal cities and their hinterlands. However, the loss of too much wealth and people during the war with Ahmed Bey and the occupation of Constantine, which was not a coastal city, forced France to change her policy to the “total conquest”, which let France to conquer Algeria towards the southern parts, as shown in the map below:

Stages in the French conquest of Algeria¹¹⁵



This change of policies resulted in wiping out the opposition for once and all by Bugeaud, who was brought to the post of governor-general for this purpose; it was when the relations between the native population and France were devastated. Following brutal policies, he “cut down orchards, burned crops, and destroyed peoples and villages. Great numbers of people were killed as a result of war and

¹¹⁵From Smith, Andrea L., *Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese settlers in Algeria and France*, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006, p.67

famine. Algerian tribes were confined to specific districts or removed and resettled in the south to make way for French *colons*.”¹¹⁶ His policy of raids, that is attacking, damaging, and ravaging all the territory that France did not possess in order to pacify these lands ended with the suffering and hostility of the native people. It may have won Bugeaud a short time of pacification, but it alienated the people so much that in the long run any chance of making Algeria a permanent part of France with the support of its native people was ruined. These ruthless policies not only alienated the Algerian population from French officials but also even more from the settler population, rather than breaking their opposition. Marshal Bugeaud’s comments were parallel to his military tactics: For example, he argued in Chamber of Deputies that “wherever good water and fertile land are found, settlers must be installed without questioning whose land it may be”.¹¹⁷

The harsh policies of Bugeaud were not limited to the native population of Algeria. He was also against the freedom of speech and education for he believed that laborers, whether they were natives or Europeans, should not waste their time and focus on their work as much as possible. He explained to Thiers that “The nation can live only by means of hard toil which leaves the laborer in the fields or the mill-worker neither the time nor strength for studies”¹¹⁸. He was such a conservative that he believed that whoever did not accept the idea that society is composed of four pillars of work, family, fatherland and religion should be eliminated.¹¹⁹

Another issue that alienated the local population was the fact that even in the distribution of the lands to the indigenous people some ownership problems existed. In the conquered lands where France brought a different order, the property rights sometimes commingled. For example, in 10 January 1845, after Constantine fell to the French powers, a former lieutenant of the *Sipahis* of Constantine who had served under Ahmed Bey and whose father was killed by him, demanded from French authorities that the properties taken from his family by Ahmed Bey and given to

¹¹⁶Lapidus, Ira M., p.587.

¹¹⁷Ahluwalia, P. p.26

¹¹⁸Citation from Ferro, Marc, p.77.

¹¹⁹Ferro, Marc, p.77.

other Arabs who had no ownership rights on them to be retrieved to him.¹²⁰ In the document in Appendix C, one can see how French authorities approached the matter seriously. Therefore, with the arrival of the French authorities, while some people were deprived from their properties, some others could seize an opportunity, which created segmentations and discontent among the population.

In this chapter where the colonization of Algeria was examined, the installation of settlers, the settlers' views upon the colonization of Algeria and the interactions between the settlers and the native population was mentioned. It was also seen how the native population was differentiated from the settler population and how they were alienated by several political, legal and military policies that were imposed upon them. However, the oppression did not pacify the native population; instead it caused rebellions and resistance movements. The next chapter will deal with these movements.

¹²⁰Archives Nationales d'Outre Mer, Gouvernement, (FR ANOM, GGA, 1K/1).

CHAPTER VI

RESISTANCE

4.1. People, the Religion and the Resistance

It is common in historiography to disregard the people or the folk in major events. This is mostly because there is scarce evidence on them and they usually do not leave written material. Nevertheless, the fact that the prominent figures who stand out in evidences, does not decrease the importance of the role of the masses, because these masses were sometimes the actual doers of the events. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to try to understand them in order to grasp the context of the events.

Most of the local population in Algeria lived in villages or led a nomadic lifestyle. Therefore, they had the most powerful effect in the resistance against the French colonization. There were certainly leading figures, but the leaders themselves were most of the time came from the same origins with their followers, moreover, rather than dictating themselves as leaders, they were chosen by the population. Therefore, the people who lived in villages and in distant oases in Algeria were not tools to be used against the French nor were they continuing their lives as they had been doing before; even though it is hard to hear their voices, they were conscious of what was happening. Clancy-Smith says that although tribal and village folk seemed distant, they were painfully aware of the wider, threatening forces around them and that their mentality was shaped by the continuous but filtered flow of information from the “outside”¹²¹. She also complains that world-system theory often ignored the people living in the hinterland as victims who were ignorant of what was happening or who had an insignificant influence. However, these people were not passive subjects of their rulers; on the contrary, they confronted and sometimes attempted to

¹²¹Clancy-Smith, Julia A., *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904)*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, p.2

manipulate the outside forces to their advantage.¹²² Furthermore, they were influential also in an indirect manner; in some cases they were the reason why French overseers had to abide with the will of religious notables because the common folk posed a confining and repressing threat by their mere numbers, thus, by their force.¹²³

Whereas there was a sedentary population in cities and villages, there were also many nomads who travelled from the desert to the Tell -the coastal and fertile area in the north of Algeria- semi-annually, as well as a semi-nomadic people who raised crops to make their living in addition to breeding herds. These movements of nomadic people influenced collective actions and popular protests; and they had also an important effect on the religious alliances formed between the tribal groups and religious orders.¹²⁴

Nomads in Algeria were dispersed in many areas of the country: They were “scattered all over the highland steppes and the southern slopes of the Tell Atlas” as well as in “the littoral of Oran and Mostaganem”.¹²⁵ However, sedentary people and nomads did not always live in distinct geographies; there were transitional areas where huts of sedentary people and the tents merged together.¹²⁶ After the French colonization and especially after the *Senatus Consulte* in 1863, the nomadic population began to decrease in numbers; these sheep and camel herding people were adversely affected by the confiscation of non-cultivated lands.¹²⁷ This resulted in the disruption of the demographic and economic structures between the nomadic population and the sedentary people, which in turn put economic pressures on the population. These economic pressures and changes in the traditional structures in

¹²²*Ibid.* p.2.

¹²³*Ibid.*, p.3

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, p.19

¹²⁵Trautmann, Wolfgang, “The nomads of Algeria under French rule: a study of social and economic change”, *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol.15, No.2 (Apr. 1989), p.126

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, p.126

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, p.128

their society formed one of the motivations for these people to rebel and support or choose a leader among themselves, especially the ones with a pious reputation.

Choosing or supporting a leader always included a religious motivation. It was because religion and religious authority has always been important for these people, even more than the political authority. As the understanding of Islam differs from region to region, Algerian people also had different perceptions about their religion. There were two dimensions of Islam in Algeria: One was called the *odjak* and the other one was called the *baraka*. The former was related to the Janissary corps, which was the representation of the Ottoman Empire and its status as the defender of Sunni Islam. However, *baraka* was regarded as a more important aspect of the religion: Baraka meant a blessing of the God and a charisma that bestowed upon the bearer a responsibility for the *jihad*. To receive this blessing was no ordinary thing: it meant that the bearer was chosen by God because of his good acts and character, proven by various miracles.¹²⁸ This rather useful concept facilitated many rebellious leaders to legitimize their position in the society before and after the occupation of Algeria. If the profiles of the leading figures in the rebellious acts are examined, it can be seen that they could not easily obtain the respect and loyalty of their supporters without these popular beliefs. However, it would be wrong to argue that all these people who gained leadership in the rebellious acts did not believe that they were given such a mission themselves. For example, Bu Zian, the leader of the rebellion of Zaatcha and an ally of Abd-el-Kader who in the western parts of Algeria earned himself considerable influence and power, actually believed that he was the *Mehdi*, a figure that the Muslims believed will come and make Islam the victorious religion in the world and right all the wrongs; and Bu Zian even brought his family to Zaatcha, believing that the rebellion will be victorious because of the miraculous mission given to him by the God. With the support of the people, the rebels won many small victories, but in the end, the rebellion was put an end by the French army in a brutal way, by means of burning the oasis down and killing all its inhabitants in 1849; then the family of Bu Zian was killed, and after he was forced to see his family

¹²⁸Hardman, Ben. *American University Studies VII: Theology and Religion*, Volume 276 : Islam and the Métropole : A Case Study of Religion and Rhetoric in Algeria. New York, NY, USA: Peter Lang, 2009. p.1

die, he was executed by shooting. French army forbade Zaatcha to be rebuilt in order to make it a symbol of the fate of the rebels who would rise against the French authorities. Instead it became the symbol of resistance for the people.

The religious notables also played an important role in shaping the mentality and actions of the community in general in Algeria. Of these, people who were “saints” and sheikhs were the most prestigious and effective. The local Turkish rulers’ harsh taxation and behavior had an important role in giving them more power and prestige among the population, because they opposed to the Turkish measures and used their influence upon the public opinion. As a result, most of the local chiefs were Sufis which gave political leaders a more prominent status and respect, and the religious authority most of the time coexisted with the political authority. They were well aware that using religion would attract supporters and strengthen their power. Then, the notables in Algeria, especially after the Ottoman system fell apart, had almost in every case used a religious background or status. As will be seen later, the prominent figures in rebellions used religion effectively as well in order to gain the support of their followers, which exhibits how political and religious life were intermingled in Algeria.

Furthermore, before the French occupation, the religious notables were treated with respect and given prestigious posts such as the post of *Sheikh al-Islam*, and they were exempt from taxation¹²⁹ which made them powerful both economically and socially. In fact, the religious notables were effective tools for the Turkish administration, and by treating them with respect, by building tombs and mosques, and by giving them judicial positions, land and tax revenues, the zones the Regency could not reach directly could be organized with the help of these prominent figures’ influence on the people.¹³⁰

Regardless of the respect given to them by the Turkish administration, their power was nonetheless put under control. Before the French occupation of Algeria, the religious notables neither had an army of their own nor the power to direct the

¹²⁹Clancy-Smith, Julia A., p.41

¹³⁰Lapidus, Ira M., p.326.

public affairs as the Ottoman system did not permit them. This was also realized by Tocqueville who wrote a report on Algeria in 1837:

The Turks had removed the religious aristocracy of Arabs from the use of arms and the management of public affairs. The Turks destroyed, we saw it almost immediately become warlike and governing again. The fastest and most certain effect of our conquest was to give back the marabouts the political existence they had lost. ... We have let the national aristocracy of the Arabs revive; it remains for us only to use it.¹³¹

Then, it can be derived from this text that Tocqueville blamed the French policies for giving political power to religious notables, and for not following the strategies that the former administration used. This means that with the new political vacuum that was created with the fall of the Regency, multiple new series of power centers have emerged and France proved to be unable to prevent this. Because France could not take these powers from these notables now, she was ought to find ways to use them to her own advantage. Indeed, this was an attainable objective; even as early as 1833, it was seen that some of the tribes supported the French army and fought side by side with them and this fact helped Clauzel who served as governor-general in Algeria to defend that France could take the Arabs to her side, against the anti-colonizers who believed that it was a costly war without an end:

The unfriendly measures of Arabs are easy to explain. These barbarians hate us like they hated the Turks, because, as the latter, we occupy a country that is in their eyes the heritage of their ancestors, and the hatred that they bear for us naturally increases all the fervor of the religious prejudice. But ... there are some rapprochements. We have influential partisans in the Regency, among the followers of Mohammed. In Medea, and in different circumstances, have not the Arabs fought under our flag? Do we not count some tribes among our allies?¹³²

¹³¹The original text «Les Turcs avaient éloigné l'aristocratie religieuse des Arabes de l'usage des armes et de la direction des affaires publiques. Les Turcs détruits, on la vit presque aussitôt redevenir guerrière et gouvernante. L'effet le plus rapide et le plus certain de notre conquête fut de rendre aux marabouts l'existence politique qu'ils avaient perdue. ... Nous avons laissé renaître l'aristocratie nationale des Arabes, il ne nous reste plus qu'à nous en servir. »Tocqueville, Alexis de, *Deuxième Lettre sur l'Algérie*, 1837, p.10

¹³² The original text: "Les dispositions peu amicales des Arabes sont faciles à expliquer. Ces barbares nous détestent comme ils détestaient les Turcs, parce que, comme ces dernières, nous occupons un pays qui est à leur yeux le patrimoine des leurs ancêtres, et la haine qu'ils nous portent s'augmente naturellement de toute la ferveur du préjugé religieux. Mais ... il y a cependant eu des rapprochemen[t]s. Nous avons des partisans influen[t]s dans la Régence, parmi les sectateurs de Mahomet. A Médéah, et dans d'autres circonstances, des Arabes n'ont-ils pas combattu sous notre drapeau ? N'avons-nous pas compté quelques tribus parmi nos alliés ? » Clauzel, *Nouvelles*

In addition to the supporters of the French occupation, there was also a group that hoped that this occupation will bring opportunities to Algeria. When the news of the revolution of 11 August 1830 in France was heard in Algiers, some notables had raised hopes of sharing the fate of Egypt, which Napoleon had occupied in 1798. The occupation had resulted in “the isolation of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire” and the appearance of “new opportunities for the country, especially for certain classes of Egyptians”.¹³³ Yet, these Algerian notables were neither welcoming the French armies, nor wishing to see Algeria to be a colony or a French territory; they only focused on the events they hoped to witness after they leave. Furthermore, the French support of the nationalist objectives of Poles, Greeks and Belgians, furthered their optimistic thoughts.

On the other hand, even if most religious notables can be considered neutral, there were also Sufi orders which were actively involved in social upheavals against the French control. There were several religious orders which supported the rebellions whether by recruiting people to create and organize the fighting power or by giving hope and courage to the insurgents. These orders which revived in the eighteenth century were the Qadiriyyah, the Rahmaniyyah, the Darqawiyyah and the Tijaniyyah. Of these Rahmaniyyah had crucial influence in the uprisings; after 1794, this religious order had strengthened in the Jurjura Mountains, and then attracted followers from the Kabylia and Algiers, the Eastern Algeria, the Awras Mountains and the pre-Sahara, and later from the borders of Tunisia.¹³⁴ However, the fact that the Rahmaniyyah order participated in the uprisings does not mean that religious notables were actively seeking to resist against the colonial regime; on the contrary, if popular demands did not exist, they would prefer to stay in the background, allowing the French to rule as they please, or collaborating with them.¹³⁵ This is another indication of the importance of the popular demands and power.

Observations de M. Le Maréchal Clauzel sur la Colonisation d'Alger, Adressées à M. le Maréchal, Ministre de la Guerre, Président du Conseil, Paris : Imprimerie Selligue, 1833, p.2

¹³³Brower, Benjamin C., p.12

¹³⁴Clancy-Smith, Julia A., p.40-41

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, pp.5-6

It was seen that superstitions and facts often collided with each other in the resistance; it should also be noted that the rebellious leaders usually came from humble backgrounds. For example, Bu Zian, who claimed to be the Mehdi in 1849; Muhammad b. Abdullah who also claimed to be the Mehdi in Warqala between 1851 and 1855; and Lalla Fatman 'Soumer, a rebellious woman leader who was revered as a saint in Kabylia and fought starting from 1847 until she was arrested in 1857, all came from humble backgrounds. In southern Algeria, there were also rebellions by camel-herding peoples from 1851 to 1855 and from 1871 to 1872 “who were attempting to protect the passages from the northern oases and to resist French officials” and by sheep-herding peoples to assure their access to the markets and protect their economic autonomy.¹³⁶ However, there were also leaders who had more prominent backgrounds: Sidi Sadok b. al-Haji, who rebelled in 1858, was a leader of a Rahmaniyyah *zawiya* and Bu Khertash, who rebelled in 1860, had a prominent family lineage. It should also be remembered that in the Ottoman era, it was the Turks and the Kouloughlis who constituted the political bureaucracy where the Arabs and Berbers had no part. Since the Turks and the Kouloughlis were subjected to hatred by the local population because of the infamous acts of the Turkish Regency, the choice of leaders would be whether from religious notables or from people with humble backgrounds with an earned respect from the community.

There were even smaller rebellions which did not last long, but which were plenty; these can only be observed in archival documents but it does not mean that they bore no significance. These minor rebellions were an example of general discontent and they showed that people of Algeria did not accept the domination of the colonizers over them in passivity, even if there were not charismatic leaders guiding them into rebellion. This point proves that the resistance movement was a collective action and not the action of a group of leaders who manipulate the masses. The document in Appendix D is about the news of suppression of one of these small rebellions in 24 January 1845. According to this document, the rebellion which took place around Batna ended quickly; after an “insignificant” resistance, people took

¹³⁶Lapidus, Ira M., p.588

their wives and children to the mountains and abandoned all their tents and places they lived.¹³⁷

Aside from the smaller rebellions, there were two major forms of resistance which started in Constantine and Mascara that gave the French the hardest time and effort, which affected the pace of the colonization prominently. The suppression of these resistances resulted in the creation of a different perception of Algeria. It meant that there was no more hope for the Ottoman Empire to regain its province, and there was no turning back for France after too much loss of people, money and energy. After the suppression of these forms of resistances, Algeria was recognized as an integral part of France.

4.2. Resistance in Constantine and in Western Algeria

The first of these movements of resistance was based in Constantine. The person who inspired and led people in this fight was Ahmed Bey, who was the legitimate *bey* of Constantine since 1826. When France started to occupy Algeria, he was determined to bring a halt to this venture and used his prestige and power to create an army to resist and defeat the invading powers. He believed in the preservation of the links between the Ottoman Empire and Algeria, and he refused to act like a sovereign in every circumstance. Because he was a *bey* and because Algiers had fallen, he claimed that he was the successor of the *dey* and he tried to negotiate both with the Ottomans and the French.¹³⁸ However, even though the Ottoman Empire attempted to recognize this title, the Empire could not dare to go against France to the point of accepting his request. As for negotiating with France, he was not willing to give any concessions, therefore the negotiations usually had no success. Ahmed Bey was a *kouloughli* and he benefited from this status to gain power. Tocqueville explains how he used his origins for this purpose:

¹³⁷Archives Nationales d'Outre Mer, Bureaux Arabes Du Constantinois (1830/1912) (FR ANOM GGA 1K/1)

¹³⁸Ageron, Charles and Robert. *Modern Algeria: A history from 1830 to the present*, Trans. Michael Brett. London: Hurst &Company, 1991, p.12

At the time when the French took Algiers, the province of Constantine was governed by a bey named Ahmed. This bey contrary to all the common practices was kouloughli, that is to say, the son of a Turkish man and an Arab woman. It was a singularly fortunate coincidence which enabled him, after the capture of Algiers, first to be supported in Constantine with the help of compatriots of his father and later to base his power on the surrounding tribes with the help of the parents and friends of his mother.¹³⁹

As Tocqueville noted, being a *bey* with a *kouloughli* origin was no ordinary thing; as has been noted before, *kouloughlis* could only serve in lower bureaucracy according to the common practices. However, as Tocqueville had said, it provided a considerable assistance for the Ahmed Bey to gain supporters.

To defeat Ahmed Bey, France had to assure that no one will attack from behind when she is dealing with him. As a consequence, after he defeated Abd-el-Kader in a battle, Marshal Bugeaud signed the Treaty of Tafna in 30 May 1837, to make sure of the peace between France and Abd el-Kader, who also resisted French domination and established himself as the *emir* of a large part of Western Algeria. The benefits of this treaty for the kingdom of Abd el-Kader were remarkable because two thirds of Algeria would be ruled by Abd el-Kader in return for his recognizing the sovereignty of France in the other parts, such as Oran, Mostaganem, Mazagran and Algiers. However, Bugeaud did not notice the fact that the Arabic version of the treaty recognized the authority of the *Emir* in the whole of Algeria,¹⁴⁰ so, both parties broke the treaty because both had more ambitions. On the other hand, even if the treaty did not have a long term effect, it gave the peace for France to attack Constantine without worries.

Constantine was taken in 13 October 1837. However, France could only take the city with too much loss both in terms of people and money and with too many hardships. This hard-won province affected France's policy of limited occupation;

¹³⁹ « A l'époque où les Français prirent Alger, la province de Constantine était gouvernée par un bey nommé Achmet. Ce bey contrairement à tous les usages était couloughli, c'est-à-dire fils d'un Turc et d'une Arabe. Ce fut un hasard singulièrement heureux qui lui permit, après la prise d'Alger, de se soutenir d'abord dans Constantine avec l'appui des compatriotes de son père et plus tard de fonder son pouvoir sur les tribus environnantes à l'aide des parents et des amis de sa mère. » Tocqueville, Alexis de, *Deuxième Lettre sur l'Algérie*, 1837, p.11

¹⁴⁰ Ferro, Marc, p.77.

according to this policy France would only occupy coastal cities and their hinterlands, and Constantine was in the interior parts of Algeria. Yet giving Constantine up would result in turmoil in France and it would be seen as a blow to the reputation of France in the international arena. However, the shift to the policy of “total conquest” was not sooner than 1847, after the defeat of Abd el-Kader.

Ahmed Bey was the last representative of the domination of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa¹⁴¹, and with his defeat, any chance of reestablishing Ottoman control over Algeria was gone.

However, chances of establishing an independent state in Algeria were still present, thanks to a young man, who was a son of a respected marabout called Mahiddin. Many tribal chiefs had called Mahiddin to direct their affairs and to lead them in their *jihad*. However, Mahiddin rejected this offer saying that he is too old for this and pointed out his son for this venture. Thus, Abd el-Kader was legitimized by his piety -and his divine powers- as was common in Algeria, as well as his military genius, which earned him the title of “*emir*”. The rise of Abd al-Kader is portrayed by Tocqueville as such:

To the west of the province of Algiers, near the borders of the empire of Morocco, was fixed long ago a family of famous marabouts. It was descended from Muhammad himself, and his name was revered throughout the Regency. When the French took possession of the country, the head of the family was an old man called Mahiddin. As an illustration of his origins, Mahiddin took hold of the advantage of being in Mecca and having long and vigorously opposed the abuses of the Turks. His Holiness was highly honored and his skills were famous. When the surrounding tribes began to feel this unbearable discomfort of lack of power, they came to find Mahiddin and proposed him to take charge of their affairs. The old man brought them together all in a great plain, there he told them that at his age he should occupy himself with the heaven and not with the earth, that he refused their offer, but he begged them to postpone their vote on one of his youngest sons whom he pointed out to them.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹Darmon, Pierre, p.66.

¹⁴²The original text: « A l'ouest de la province d'Alger, près des frontières de l'empire du Maroc, était fixée depuis longtemps une famille de marabouts très célèbre. Elle descendait de Mahomet lui-même, et son nom était vénéré dans toute la Régence. Au moment où les Français prirent possession du pays, le chef de cette famille était un vieillard appelé Mahiddin. A l'illustration de la naissance, Mahiddin joignit l'avantage d'avoir été à la Mecque et de s'être longtemps et énergiquement opposé aux exactions des Turcs. Sa sainteté était en grand honneur et son habileté connue. Lorsque les tribus des environs commencèrent à sentir ce malaise insupportable que cause aux hommes l'absence du pouvoir, elles vinrent trouver Mahiddin et lui proposèrent de prendre la direction de leurs affaires. Le

After being recognized by these tribes like this, Abd el-Kader proved that he was to be one of the most prominent rebellious leaders, who in 1832 “declared himself Commander of the Faithful and Sultan of the Arabs, and made himself responsible for applying Muslim holy law and for waging war against the French.”¹⁴³ He then made himself acknowledged by his enemies with his successful organization of his military powers and political structure of his new emirate.

The portrayal of Abd al-Kader by Tocqueville shows how the French respected him and saw him as a prominent threat as well as a rival in Algeria¹⁴⁴, which was understandable considering the complex administration he built. What he organized was an hierarchical administration with subordinate khalifas with financial, judicial and military powers. Beneath them were aghas who collected taxes. Under the *aghass* were the *qadis* who were the chiefs of the tribes.¹⁴⁵ Thus, he embedded the system of the tribes into the administration¹⁴⁶ so that the tribes would be under control, and provide him the army he needed, an army ready for battle.

Like every Algerian leader who vow to fight against the French occupation, Abd el-Kader declared a *jihad*, a holy war against the infidels. He used this as a tactic to gain support from his followers and would-be followers, and he did not hesitate to contradict with this declaration of his, if a favorable circumstance

vieillard les réunit toutes dans une grande plaine ; là, il leur dit qu'à son âge il fallait s'occuper du ciel et non de la terre, qu'il refusait leur offre, mais qu'il les priaît de reporter leur suffrage sur un de ses plus jeunes fils qu'il leur montra. Il énuméra longuement les titres de celui-ci à gouverner ses compatriotes : sa piété précoce, son pèlerinage aux Lieux Saints, sa descendance du Prophète ; il fit connaître plusieurs indices frappants dont le ciel s'était servi pour le désigner au milieu de ses frères et il prouva que toutes les anciennes prophéties qui annonçaient un libérateur aux Arabes s'appliquaient manifestement à lui. Les tribus proclamèrent d'un commun accord le fils de Mahiddin émir-el-mouminin, c'est-à-dire chef des croyants.

Ce jeune homme qui n'avait alors que vingt-cinq ans et était d'une chétive apparence s'appelait Abd-el-Kader.

Telle est l'origine de ce chef singulier : l'anarchie fit naître son pouvoir, l'anarchie l'a développé sans cesse et, avec la grâce de Dieu et la Nôtre, après lui avoir livré la province d'Oran et celle de Tittery, elle mettra entre ses mains Constantine et le rendra bien plus puissant que ne le fut jamais le gouvernement turc qu'il remplace. »Tocqueville, Alexis de, *Deuxième Lettre sur l'Algérie*, 1837, pp. 10-11

¹⁴³Lapidus, Ira M., p.587.

¹⁴⁴Tocqueville, *Travail sur l'Algérie*, 1841, p.9, pp.12-16

¹⁴⁵Lapidus, Ira M., p.587.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p.587.

appeared. For example, he is known to negotiate with his enemies accepting their sovereignty in certain parts of Algeria in return for his rule in his domain. In the treaty he signed with Demichels in 26 February 1834, after a victorious military campaign on his part, he accepted the favorable terms he was offered, for instance. With this treaty, he gained an Arab Kingdom, where he could raise an army and carry out his own affairs. His kingdom possessed the region of Mascara and a part of Oran and the port of Arzew. Darmon says that the port was so important and strategic that Demischels had to hide from the authorities the fact that he had to make this concession to Abd el-Kader.¹⁴⁷

Emir Abd el-Kader strengthened his forces by opening up factories in order to produce arms in the French model for his army. He also created a navy which situated in Tenez and Rachgoun. Furthermore, he created a diplomatic organization and even sent an ambassador to London.¹⁴⁸ He subdued and took the support of the tribal leaders. Nevertheless, contrary to his rhetoric, he did not oppose the French presence in Algeria; on the contrary, its existence meant trade and prosperity for his kingdom, as well as a source for legitimization. On the other hand, as Darmon says, Abd el-Kader knew that soon or later he would have to confront the French.¹⁴⁹ Perhaps this was the reason why he was so careful in creating a decent organization and an army modeled on the French army. Yet this army of his, being composed of various tribes was not as dependable as he wished it to be. In fact, Abd el-Kader's real sovereignty did not extend beyond Oran, the other parts were hold with the help of the tribal leaders who respected him, yet respect alone was not enough to guarantee their loyalty in every way.

It was mentioned above that the Treaty of Tafna, which brought a short term of peace, did not last for a long time. After a two-year period of truce, in 1839, Abd el-Kader and the French army started to fight again. The governor-general Valée was replaced with Bugeaud in 1841, who became a supporter of the total conquest and who stayed in this post until September 1847.

¹⁴⁷Darmon, Pierre, p.59.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p.55

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p.65

In order to eliminate Abd el-Kader once and for all, Bugeaud followed harsh policies. It was the period when Algerian people were most alienated from French forces. His soldiers were in full discipline, but in return for that “he allowed them to plunder, rape and have fun.”¹⁵⁰ Wherever his troops passed he showed no mercy to the inhabitants. For example, “he had everything from Miliana to Cherchell burnt ... [He] used his authority to shield General Pélissier who killed a thousand Arabs by smoking them out in the caves of Dahra in 1845”¹⁵¹ Yet, finally Bugeaud defeated Abd el-Kader indefinitely. He also won over the son of Sultan of Morocco who had come to the help of the emir with his army in the battle of Isly in 1844.

Consequently, the war with Abd el-Kader ended with a total conquest.¹⁵² However, it did not mean that the rebellions were brought to a halt completely; the revolts of Bu Maza in the west of Algiers in 1845, Bu Zian in Zaatcha in 1849, Mohammed Ben Abdullah in Laghouat, in the southern parts of Algeria in 1852, a tribal leader named Bu Baghla in the western Algeria in 1850, the members of Ouled Sidi Cheikh in southern Oran because of the humiliation of their leader by the Bureaux Arabes in 1864 are some of the examples.¹⁵³

Even though all these resistance movements made France go through hardships both militarily and economically, they could not prevent the domination of France over Algeria, even though they had a limiting effect on the actions of France. If the nature of the resistance movements is examined, it can be noticed that these movements were separate from each other and there was not an attempt to unite all the rebellions under one roof. The most organized resistance was under the leadership of Abd el-Kader, who saw other powers as threats and tried to destroy them, instead of uniting them. This lack of organization in general doomed Algerian resistance from the very beginning into defeat.

¹⁵⁰Ferro, Marc, p.78.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, p.78.

¹⁵²Joly, Vincent, “Les Résistances à la conquête, 1830-1880”, in *Histoire de l’Algérie à la Période Coloniale*, eds.Bouchène, Peyroulou, Tengour and Thénault, Paris et Alger: Éditions La Découverte et Éditions Barzakh, 2012, p.97

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, pp.98-99

The resistance movements were also disadvantaged in terms of weapons technology; “when France invaded Algiers in 1830, it enjoyed little or no advantage in weapons technology”¹⁵⁴ yet they won many victories. Even though they could never get superiority in weapons technology, they effectively used technologies brought by France; that is “medicines, steamships, railways, telegraphs, and the organizational capabilities of the industrial state”.¹⁵⁵

Yet, the resistance movements should not be evaluated only with victories and defeats. Whether they were successful or not, they created the people of Algeria an opportunity to remark their opinions and seek their rights in a country they had no right to do so. Even though these resistances did not have a short term success, it can be said that they were successful in a way that they created a tradition of resistance and forced France to change her policies to include more and more people in the structures she creates in the following years. For the Algerian people, the most important benefit was this tradition of resistance, which eventually led them into emancipation even if they had to wait for 132 years.

¹⁵⁴Parker, John; Rathbone, Richard, p.97.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p.97

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I tried to look at the occupation and the colonization of Algeria by France between 1830 and 1870 from a broad perspective, which covers the French policy in the Mediterranean and the world, the Ottoman response to the occupation and the status of Algeria and the Algerian people. Therefore, I split the subject into three categories: The occupation, the colonization and the resistance; each were presented as different but strongly intermingled dimensions of the subject.

Like in all the colonizer countries, in France too, the colonization of a country was justified by a pattern of thought that had roots in the Enlightenment, which emphasized the superiority of the European race and its civilization. The French Revolution, which solidified these perceptions of enlightenment, added them the notions of equality, fraternity and solidarity; but these notions were practically applicable only to an imagined community that was created in the mind of the colonizer; in which the colonized people did not have a place.

The mentality in the colonization of Algeria was no different from that in the other places which were colonized whether by France or by other European countries. The civilizing mission of France obliged her to colonize these people; it was soon believed that Jews and Berbers gave the hope of being civilizable, but the Arabs had the least of the chances. These civilizing attempts reflected in the assimilation and naturalization policies; however, the real incentives of these policies were the complete subjugation of these people and integration of them into the system, so that the colonization process would be smooth and France's interests would be protected.

However, as has been said, the civilizing mission in Algeria was only a tool for legitimization; there were broader perspectives of this venture of France. First of all, France was searching ways to cope with the power and influence of the British

Empire. Britain had acquired vast colonies from which she gained an immense wealth, raw materials and markets. The industrial revolution and France's incapability to develop her industry to the level of industry in Britain made the latter a more prominent rival. After the Napoleonic wars and the dramatic rise of the British influence as a result of her financing and organization of the war, it became a real problem for France. To secure her hold in the Mediterranean, France needed a colony, which would be a starting point for her to expand into the North Africa, and preventing Britain to gain more power in the Mediterranean. In this respect, the choice and the special place of Algeria came from its proximity to the homeland which meant that the occupation and the protection of the country would be easier.

Furthermore, during the French Restoration, Charles X had problems to secure his reign and influence over the politicians and the population, and he needed a distraction that would turn the attention outside France. A military victory would win him reputation among his people and bring him the chance of consolidation of his traditional role as a monarch. The easiest way to achieve that was to use the plans of Napoleon to invade Algeria dating back to 1808, and without any other thoroughly prepared plan, the occupation of Algeria started.

As soon as the news of the occupation was heard, the Ottoman Empire protested the occupation of Algeria; however these protests could not solidify in an action that would bring results. Its naval power was destroyed in Navarino, and there was no way to protect Algeria without any sea power. Moreover, the Janissary corps were just destroyed and the Ottoman Empire had just created a new, inexperienced army which stood no chance in a war with France. Economic problems were another problem that forced the Empire's hand, so it had no choice but to resort to its diplomatic skills. Firstly, the Empire sought the assistance of Britain against the French occupation, but the British diplomatic efforts did not bring any results; besides, Britain did not want to come into conflict with France and was convinced that France would not give back Algeria to the Ottomans. The Ottomans also tried to negotiate with France from 1830 to 1847; however, France whether responded negatively to the claims of Ottomans on Algeria or ignored and delayed its demands. Unable to find any other solution, the Ottoman Empire had to give up its claims on Algeria in 1847.

Meanwhile, after the overthrow of Charles X with the July Revolution, the July Monarchy under Louis Philippe was declared. The first years of the July Monarchy passed in hesitation about what to do with Algeria. However, after this period, France continued in her efforts to colonize Algeria in full force. At the beginning of the occupation, France followed the policy of “restricted occupation”, during which France occupied only the coastal parts of Algeria, such as Oran, Bône and Algiers and their hinterlands. Then this policy slowly shifted to the policy of “total conquest”, especially after the fall of Constantine and Bugeaud’s war against Abd el-Kader between 1840 and 1847.

Nonetheless, these decisions did not mean that the colonization of Algeria was supported unanimously in France. There were both supporters and adversaries of the colonization. It was the same for the native Algerian population: While some of the people resented, opposed and even rebelled to the French domination, some fought under the French flag, which shows that there were not clear boundaries between the colonizer and the colonized. Moreover, there were also non-French settlers, who were a majority in the settler population at the beginning of the colonization; and they constituted another variant in Algeria. They were only accepted as French citizens with the *Senatus Consulte* of 1865, if they could prove that they had been residing in Algeria for at least three years; and they were sometimes viewed by the French as not fully trustable. Nevertheless, the solidarity between the non-French and French settlers in Algeria proved otherwise; their common interests and their shared mentality about the European superiority helped them to be incorporated into the system and to be naturalized effectively.

With the Revolution of 1848 the July Monarchy was succeeded by the Second Republic, which lasted until 1851. There were some important developments regarding Algeria’s status during this short period of time: Algeria was now identified as an integral part of France and it was now restructured according to the organization of the motherland. For example, Algeria was divided into *départements* and there were local governments responsible to the Chamber of Deputies in Paris. However, this did not last for long; after the coup d’état in 1851, Napoleon declared himself the emperor in 1852, which marked the beginning of the Second Empire.

As has been mentioned, from the beginning of the occupation, France had been installing settlers to the new colony. This meant establishing relations with the local population and change in the structures of the traditional life of the natives. Land confiscations and expulsion of the nomads from their traditional pastures to open new fields resulted in continuous alienation of native Algerians. However, France also tried to overcome the resentments and oppositions for establishing better relations with them; the *Bureaux Arabes* were formed with this intention. These offices, which were directly linked to the office of the governor-general, were responsible for understanding the traditions of the local population and direct their affairs with this knowledge.

After France recognized Algeria as an integral part and not a colony, assimilation and naturalization was seen as an obligation to break down the fierce opposition France came across by the local people. The Jews were first to deal with, and then Muslims followed. However, no real solution was found then. Then, during the emperorship of Napoleon III, the naturalization policies gained momentum. Because Algeria was recognized as a French territory and not a colony since 1848, all the population reside there were accepted as French by law. With several decrees, and with especially *Senatus Consulte* of 1865, the Jewish and Muslim native population of Algeria were also attempted to be naturalized by giving them a chance to be recognized as French citizens if they give up their religious legislations. Nevertheless, these policies were hardly successful, because according to the people it was a choice between their religion and the citizenship; and most of them chose their religion over the latter.

The Algerian people did not give in to the occupation and the colonization of Algeria passively. There have been many rebellions small and wide in scope, throughout the conquest. What was common in these rebellions was the fact that they were all legitimized by religion and by the help of the so-called supernatural powers of a marabout who acted as a leader in each one. The co-existence of religion and politics in these rebellions gave the power of belief to these people, who were not passive subjects of their leaders but the catalyst responsible shaping these rebellions and threatening the domination of France over Algeria by their numbers.

Among many forms of resistances, two stands out because of their long term effects. One of those was the resistance in Constantine led by Ahmed Bey. As the last representer of the Ottoman Empire, the defeat of Ahmed Bey and the fall of Constantine gave an end to the hopes that the Empire was going to save the people from the French. Moreover, by occupying Constantine, a city which was in the interior parts of Algeria, the beginning of the shift of policies toward the “total occupation” was started because France would not give the city up as it was gained with too much loss.

With the defeat of the last representative of the Ottoman Empire, Abd el-Kader was the most effective leader to create an alternative state. In his leadership an emirate with effective organization and an army was formed, and his defeat was accomplished with more difficulties than expected. In 1847, Bugeaud could defeat him only with excessive bloodshed and harm to the fields and oases, which resulted in the alienation of the local population even more. After the defeat of Abd el-Kader there was no prominent threat left against the domination of France until the Kabylia rebellion in 1870, which was also suppressed.

In conclusion, the occupation and the colonization of Algeria was not a smooth operation on the part of France. It was a venture full of disagreements, indecision, change of policies and a failure to establish just and good relations with the native people. It was seen that France tried to make use of the former organization and policies of the Regency in creating a new order, but was unable to subjugate people like the former administration could; instead most of her policies alienated them even more. It was also seen that from 1830 to 1870 the domestic politics in France were not smooth either; there were coup d'états, revolutions, a republic and an empire. All these changes were effective in the continuous changes in policies in Algeria, which did not help the cause of colonization. For the people of Algeria, to be conquered by a Christian power was already a hard and shocking event for both Jews and Muslims, and these continuous change of policies did not help them to adapt a new order, because their world was changing constantly and sometimes to the worse. It was also seen that when the military was in control with an effective governor general, the colonization involved brutal wars as seen in the examples of the eras of Bugeaud and Clauzel, yet the greed of more lands of the

settler populations was forced to be more balanced. On the other hand, when settler population were more powerful than the military administration through local governments, the colonization of the lands were more effective to the native people's disadvantage. In both cases, even when Napoleon III attempted to incorporate the native population into France, the native people never had the option to be equals and were always in a disadvantageous position.

However, this was no ordinary thing; as in all countries that were colonized by colonizer countries, it was seen that the original inhabitants had suffered in Algeria as well. Yet like most colonized countries, it was seen that in Algeria too the resistance movements flourished, even though they were suppressed. These suppressions could only bring temporary victories to France, because each defeat led to the formation of new legends and miracles among these highly superstitious people, as in the example of the oasis of Zaatcha; and a spirit of resistance, which would eventually end with the liberation of Algeria.

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
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
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A : ARCHIVES NATIONALES D'OUTRE-MER, MINISTÈRE DE L'ALGERIE ET DES COLONIES (FR ANOM GGA 1F/3)

APPENDIX A-1



APPENDIX A-2



APPENDIX A-3

département de Constantine, en remplacement
de M^r. Guillemain décédé.

Article 2.

Il sera tenu, avant d'entrer en fonction,
de verser le cautionnement exigé par le règlement
sur l'exercice de la profession du Notaire en
Algérie.


Article 3.

Le Prince chargé du Ministère de l'Algérie
et des Colonies, est chargé de l'exécution du
présent Décret.

Fait à St. Cloud, le 28 août 1858

[Signature]

Par l'Empereur:
Le Prince chargé du Ministère
de l'Algérie et des Colonies,
Napoléon
(signé)



APPENDIX B : Clauzel, *Nouvelles Observations de M. Le Maréchal Clauzel sur la Colonization d'Alger*, Adressées à M. le Maréchal, Ministre de la Guerre, Président du Conseil, Paris : Imprimerie Selligie, 1833, p.2


TABLEAU			
DE LA SUPERFICIE DES TERRES EN RAPPORT AUX COLONIES FRANÇAISES ET DE LEURS PRODUITS.			
PRODUCTIONS.			
		SUCRE.	CAFÉ.
A la Martinique.	22,691 hect.	28,000,000 k.	975,000 k.
A la Guadeloupe.. . . .	31,309	36,000,000	1,020,000
A Bourbon.	24,100	12,000,000	1,600,000
Totaux :	78,100	76,000,000	3,595,000

TABLEAU	
DE LA SUPERFICIE DES TERRES A METTRE EN RAPPORT A ALGER.	
(Massif d'Alger, plaine de la Mitidja, et versant N. de l'Atlas.)	
(Voir la carte).	
Massif d'Alger et du Sahell.	160,000 hectares.
Plaine de la Mitidja.	250,000
Versant N. de l'Atlas.	180,000
Total :	590,000

RÉSUMÉ.	
Alger possède donc.	590,000 hectares.
Les colonies en ont.	78,100
Différence :	511,900

C'est-à-dire qu'il y a 7 fois 172 plus de terres à cultiver dans cette partie de la Régence d'Alger, que dans nos trois colonies.

**APPENDIX C : ARCHIVES NATIONALES D'OUTRE MER,
GOUVERNEMENT, (FR ANOM GGA, 1K/1)**



**APPENDIX D : ARCHIVES NATIONALES D'OUTRE MER, BUREAUX
ARABES DU CONSTANTINOIS (1830/1912) (FR ANOM GGA 1K/1)**

Ministère
de la Guerre.

Paris, le 24 Janvier 1845.

Direction du Personnel
et des
Opérations militaires
Bureau
des
Opérations militaires
et de la
Correspondance

C 1 V 84 1 partie
Division politique
1845

3

Général, j'ai vu avec plaisir
par la lettre que vous m'avez écrite de Constantine,
le 12 de ce mois, que le Colonel Merbillon, Commandant
Supérieur de Batna avait profité des renseignements
qui lui étaient parvenus pour tenter un coup de main
sur les Beni-Ouïferma, qu'ils ont opposé qu'une résistance
insignifiante et qu'après avoir mis leurs femmes et leurs
enfants en sûreté dans les montagnes, ils ont abandonné
la totalité des tentes et du butin qu'elles contenaient.
Je suppose que, dans la répartition du butin, on n'a pas
oublié la part qui revenait au trésor et à la caisse
coloniale. Je désire qu'il m'en soit rendu compte.

Je loue d'autant plus le Colonel
Merbillon, au sujet de cette habile expédition
qu'il a su l'exécuter sans perte pour nous et
qu'elle a dû produire une grande impression
sur l'esprit des populations qui habitent l'Auris.
J'ai donc l'espoir que les troupes qui seront envoyées
dans l'Auris, lors de la campagne du printemps
prochain


TURKEY (BOA), HAT 1230/47971-I

[illegible]

HAT 1230/47971-I

HAT. 1230

APPENDIX F : PRIME MINISTRY OTTOMAN ARCHIVES, ISTANBUL,
TURKEY (BOA), HAT 1230/47971-G



APPENDIX G : TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

☒

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü

☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Halaçoğlu

Adı : Canan

Bölümü : Orta Doğu Araştırmaları

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Occupation and the Colonization of Algeria from 1830 to 1870: A Struggle for Dominance

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

☒

Doktora

☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

☒

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

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3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

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