NEOLIBERAL TRANSFORMATION AND PROFESSIONAL MIDDLE
CLASSES: CASE OF ENGINEERS IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

NEOLIBERAL TRANSFORMATION AND PROFESSIONAL MIDDLE CLASSES: CASE OF ENGINEERS IN TURKEY

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This thesis aims to understand how neoliberal transformation has been perceived and experienced by professional middle classes, with a specific focus on engineers in Turkey. Neoliberalism penetrates into every field of social life by establishing its hegemony not only at discoursive/perceptual level, but also at practical/experiential level. In this respect, in an attempt to find clues for the broad question of how neoliberalism becomes hegemonic and whether middle classes constitute a social base for this project, this thesis focuses on different ways that neoliberal culture and rationality are experienced as a class practice among professional middle classes. By emphasizing that the post-1980 period's professional middle classes have been depicted as the 'ideal' neoliberal citizens/subjects who are identified with the values of self-responsibility, self-governmentality and entrepreneurship, I question the mechanisms through which privatization of state economic enterprises, change in the employment structure, social citizenship practices and practices of unionization and politics are legitimized by these classes.

By analyzing the fieldwork data gathered from engineers working and living in Ankara, I conclude that under the conditions of increasing precariousness in the labour market and commodification of social rights, with extreme concern of increasing their life standards and gaining status in the labor market, engineers

mainly seek for individualized solutions for their problems in work life and welfare issues, which make them alienated to politics and unionization for collective solutions. Consequently, professional middle classes accept neoliberal citizen/subject role despite their social egalitarian concerns and they produce different legitimization mechanisms to cope with the discrepancy between their practices and ideological position.

Keywords: Neoliberalism; Professional Middle Class(es); Engineer; Neoliberal Citizenship.

ÖZ

NEOLİBERAL DÖNÜŞÜM VE PROFESYONEL ORTA SINIFLAR: TÜRKİYE'DEKİ MÜHENDİSLER ÖRNEĞİ

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Neoliberalizm, yalnızca söylemsel/algısal düzeyde değil, aynı zamanda pratikler/deneyimler düzeyinde de hegemonik hale gelerek toplumsal yaşamın tüm alanlarına sızmayı başarmaktadır. Bu açıdan, neoliberalizmin toplumda nasıl hegemonik hale geldiği ve orta sınıfların bu proje için bir toplumsal taban oluşturup oluşturmadığı sorularına ipuçları bulmak amacı ile, bu tezde neoliberal kültür ve rasyonalitenin profesyonel orta sınıflar arasında hangi yollar ile bir sınıf pratiği olarak deneyimlendiğini anlamak amaçlanmıştır. Profesyonel orta sınıfların 1980 sonrası dönemde, öz-sorumluluk, öz-yönetim ve girişimcilik gibi değerler ile özdeşleştirilerek 'ideal' neoliberal vatandaşlar/özneler olarak tarif edildiğini vurgulayarak, neoliberal dönüşüm ile birlikte devletin üretim yapan kurumlarının özelleştirilmesi, istihdam yapısındaki dönüşüm, sosyal vatandaşlık ve örgütlenme/siyaset pratiklerindeki değişmenin profesyonel orta sınıflar arasında hangi mekanizmalar aracılığı ile ve ne derecede meşrulaştırıldığı sorgulanmaktadır.

Ankara'da çalışan ve yaşayan mühendisler arasında yapılan derinlikli birebir görüşmeler ile toplanan verinin analizi ile, emek piyasası güvencesizleşir ve sosyal haklar metalaşırken, hayat standartlarını daha da yükseltme ve emek piyasasında kaybedilen statünün geri kazanılması kaygısı ile, mühendislerin iş hayatlarında ve

refah konularında yaşadıkları problemler için bireyselleştirilmiş çözümler aramayı tercih ettikleri ve bu durumun da onların kolektif çözümler için siyaset yapma ve örgütlenme pratiklerine yabancılaşmalarına sebep olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Bunun bir sonucu olarak, profesyonel orta sınıflar, sosyal-eşitlikçi duruşlarına rağmen neoliberal vatandaş/özne rolünü kabul etmekte ve pratikleri ve ideolojik pozisyonları arasında oluşan bu çelişki ile başetmek için farklı meşrulaştırma stratejilerine başvurmaktadırlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Neoliberalizm; Profesyonel Orta Sınıf(lar); Mühendis; Neoliberal Vatandaşlık.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to question professional middle classes' perception and experience of the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. Neoliberal transformation is a broad concept that has many references related with professional middle classes. This study will focus on some aspects of this relationship. First of all, neoliberalism's construct of the 'state' has significant differences from previous forms of capitalism. In neoliberal conceptualization, state has the organizer and rule provider role for the effective functioning of markets (Harvey, 2005). Specifically for Turkey, where professional middle classes have born out of employment in the public sector; more specifically, for engineers who have been focused on in this study, public production sector had a significant place and determinative role in their identity construction. They had an organic relationship with the state and their identity was constructed around this relationship until the 1980s during which private sector has expanded as opposed to liquidation of state economic enterprises.

Withdrawal of the state from production sector has two sub dimensions that have been taken into consideration in this study. Primarily, the discourse constructed around the 'inefficiency of the state economic enterprises' has operated as legitimization mechanism of neoliberal transformation of the state. The level of penetration of this discourse among professional middle classes is a way to understand if there is consent for neoliberal transformation of the state among professional middle classes, or not. Together with this, withdrawal of the state from production sector has caused significant transformation in the employment structure of professional middle classes, especially engineers; and also in their perception of 'career'.

Table 1. Percentages of engineers and architects with respect to occupational position (%, Approx.)

	Salaried engineers in public sector	Salaried engineers in private sector	Independent engineers, employer/entrepreneurs
1978	63.1	16.2	20.7
2009	36.1	44.3	18.3

Sources: Artun, 1999 (For information on 1978) & TMMOB, 2009 (For information on 2009)

Table 1.1 indicates the radical transformation in the occupational structure of engineers in Turkey after 1980. Another striking information is that salaried engineers in the public institutions are dominantly employed in the central government institutions rather than state economic enterprises.

Table 2. Percentages of salaried engineers and architects in the public instiutions with respect to the institution they are employed in (% Approx; Dominant ones are demonstrated)

Central government institutions	State economic enterprises	Universities	Municipalities
43.9	22.8	17.5	9.2

Source: TMMOB, 2009.

As a result, withdrawal of the state has completely transformed the employment structure of the engineers; and the status of engineers in the state economic enterprises has degraded.

Second, neoliberalism's construct of state-citizenship relationship has caused a transformation in the welfare regimes of the states. The welfare regime that neoliberalism idealizes have different constructs for different classes in society. For some, transformation of welfare regime in Turkey means resignation of hierarchical corporatist structure that excluded lower classes and informal workers (Buğra and Keyder, 2006); while for others, this transformation means adopting 'social risk management' strategies towards the poor as social policy implementations without any concern of redistribution (Yalman, 2007). When middle classes are concerned, for the former point of view, state had been in a corporatist relationship with middle classes who have been dominantly employed in the state sector and with this transformation middle classes having corporatist interests with the state is being equalized with other segments of the society. From the latter perspective, transformation in the welfare regime dismissed redistributive policies and middle classes are held responsible for their own well-being. The second position has been adopted in this study and it is argued that these changes in the welfare regime have emerged as an extension of the project of creating the social basis of neoliberalism: neoliberal citizens. Neoliberal citizens are idealized as self-responsible and self-entrepreneur subjects, who do not have strong expectations from the state for their well-being. In this respect, through understanding what professional middle classes expect from the state, how professional middle classes experience transformation in the welfare regime can be shed light on. This specific aspect of neoliberal transformation will be discussed through the question of "what do professional middle classes expect from the state?" Specifically, how middle classes perceive and experience commodification process of education and health services will be discussed in detail.

Third, economic liberalization and removal of the barriers to the global markets opened a new epoch that has affected lifestyles of the professional middle classes around the concept of consumption. Although this dimension has affected professional middle classes' perception, professional middle classes' consumption, lifestyle and patterns of reproduction is not a main question for this study. The main reason is that this aspect of professional middle classes have been analyzed by many

scholars (Kozanoğlu, 1995; Ayata, 2003; Şimşek, 2005; Öncü, 1997; Balkan and Rutz, 2009), while the other dimensions such as what kind of a discourse they adopted to legitimize the transformation in the state structure and also their relationship with the state and politics has not been questioned in a comprehensive study at all. On the other hand, to be able to reach consumption materials which attracted middle classes' aspirations of higher standards of living contributed professional middle classes' developing a positive attitude towards neoliberalization. With such a concern, consumption oriented style of life of professional middle classes is a parameter to be considered throughout the analysis of the data collected around questions above.

Three aspects detailed above are interrelated with respect to how professional middle classes perceive and experience the neoliberal transformation. All three aspects are serving for construction of the 'ideal' citizens/subjects of neoliberalism. Subject who conforms secure conditions of employment in state economic enterprises conflicts with dynamic, entrepreneur and self-responsible subject of neoliberalism. Changing employment structure of engineers serves for constructing this neoliberal subject. In a strong relation with this, neoliberal citizen is expected to be responsible for his/her own well-being and commodification of social services serves for this aim. Moreover, consumption oriented lifestyle that is pumped under liberal economy conditions intersects with that basic social services such as education and health are included in the sphere of consumption, rather than social rights. All of these aspects give rise to individualization and depolitization in society.

Lastly, neoliberalism's hegemony was constructed around a wide consent that was achieved through both brutal force and ideological battles of the states. Through utilizing all weapons towards suppressing the working class and providing the conditions for the hegemony of capitalist class, depolitization of the society is achieved. In Turkey, with military intervention of 1980, political parties, unions and leftist organizations were suppressed including those mobilized professional middle classes around the organizations such as TMMOB (Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects) in the 1970s. Neoliberal discourse becomes hegemonic in

public sphere. Not only political suppression, but also neoliberal populism towards different classes in different ways contributed to depolitization of society and gaining consent of different classes. In this respect, neoliberalism caused professional middle classes' alienation to politics other than elections and decline of their public concern with an increased individualism. Throughout the fieldwork study, professional middle classes' ideas about the political atmosphere in Turkey, if they find any organization which they feel represent her/his concerns and what they think about engineers' organization TMMOB which has many political and social concerns other than occupational concerns have been questioned. Contrary to studies that assume professional middle classes are essentially ignorant for political and social issues (Varma, 2007), one of the objectives of this thesis has been determined as contributing to the broad question if professional middle classes have a potential to raise demands for their social rights.

Although at the beginning, discussion on transformation of the welfare regime and its effects on middle classes' perception of social citizenship in Turkey have attracted my curiosity, in time, I became aware of that the transformation in the welfare regime is only one dimension of the change in the relationship between middle classes and the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. At the beginning, it was aimed to understand how they perceive and experience the transformation in the social citizenship regime in Turkey and the questions were directed around the concept of 'citizenship'. At the end of this attempt, I have become aware of that citizenship and citizenship rights are the terms which do not connote middle classes so much other than the definitions taught in the national education system, especially for the younger interviewees. Moreover, citizenship connotes concepts such as nation, nationalism and ethnicity which are out of concern of this study. I have understood that although professional middle classes in Turkey constitute the educated strata of the Turkish society, while they are raising their demands from the state, they do not carry a 'vision' of social rights or social citizenship. Actually this was not a surprising situation since Turkey does not have a welfare state tradition that influenced citizens' point of view about state-society relations (Yalman, 2007). The connotations about the state and their public rights are usually disappointing

experiences and their reflex is towards the comparison with European states. Their motivation is towards establishing minimum contact with the state institutions whether they reach their rights or not. I have become aware of that these connotations of the state and rights constitute a social base for the legitimization of neoliberal transformation in Turkey.[1]

Such kind of an observation directed me to ask a more general question which also shed light on middle classes' experience and perception of citizenship. The major question should be how middle classes make sense of this transformation, not only in the realm of social policy, but also in their perception of the state and politics. In this study, state is conceptualized in a restricted framework such that mainly service provider and producer aspects of the state have been focused on as determinative on the construction of citizenship-state relation. Although bureaucracy, as a significant dimension of the state determining state-citizenship relations, has been considered to analyze the data collected with respect to above mentioned aspects of the state; it has not been a main parameter while questioning the perception of professional middle classes' perception of the state.

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[1] Nowadays when the introduction chapter of this thesis is being written, Turkey is experiencing the most widespread mass movements of (may be) the last 30 years other than Kurdish movement: "Gezi Park Protests". The characteristics of this movement which has been raised on a public park which has been initiated to be reconstructed as a shopping mall in a 'revitalized' historical building by the government, but has gone beyond this specific case are that the protesters are heavily young urban educated middle classes who feel threatened by conservative policies of the right-wing government of Justice and Development Party; but at the same time, starting point of these protests is to reject commodification of public sphere. Yet, there has not enough academic studies on this movement; however, it is seen that there is a consensus on that protesters are heavily from urban young educated middle classes/white collar workers and students. Although it is early to make a comprehensive analysis on Gezi Protests, it can be said that it showed us that young urban professionals cannot be categorized as having concerns just about their lifestyles around the concept of consumption. Instead of making an assumption that neoliberal transformation of the state in many areas is legitimate among professional middle classes, this thesis questions through which mechanisms or processes professional middle classes keep their silence and reproduce neoliberal discourse despite precarious conditions of work and depreciation of their social rights under conditions of neoliberalism. At this point, their perception about politics in Turkey gains extra importance.

With such concerns, the questions of this thesis are sequenced as:

1. What does state connote to professional middle classes? What kind of a role do they assign to the state? Do they legitimize neoliberal state in their discourses, or not? This question has three sub questions:

    a. How do they perceive and experience privatizations and withdrawal of the state from production sector? What kind of a discourse do they utilize while explaining their perception? What are the differences between their perceptions with respect to variables age and occupational position?

    b. How do they compare to be employed in the public sector and private sector? What is their motivation to work in the public sector? How do their attitude differ each other with respect to variables such as gender, the university graduated from and the branch of engineering?

    c. How do they perceive and experience the neoliberal transformation of the welfare regime in Turkey? How is commodification of public services experienced in their daily lives, especially in the fields of health and education?

2. How do professional middle classes perceive engineers' occupational organization TMMOB? What do they expect from TMMOB? How do they demand to be represented by their organization?

3. How do professional middle classes perceive the political atmosphere in Turkey? How do they define politics? Through what kind of criteria do they vote in elections? How do they relate themselves with the politics? How do their attitudes towards politics differ from each other with respect to occupational position they have?

Through these questions, the main research question of this thesis will be discussed. The main research question of this thesis is formulated as **"How do professional middle classes perceive and experience the neoliberal transformation –i.e. privatizations of state economic enterprises, changing forms of employment and commodification of public services- in Turkey and do they constitute a social base for legitimization of neoliberal discourse or do they challenge it?"** The conclusions of thesis will give clues to find answers to the question if the widespread argument that middle classes constitute a strong social base for neoliberalism and states incorporate middle classes in the project of neoliberal transformation (Lakha, 2003; Fernandes and Heller, 2006; Heiman, Freeman and Lietchy, 2012) is valid for Turkey, or not with a projection on engineers.

It should be noted that, professional middle classes are not accepted as homogeneous, rather the divergences between them are considered throughout the thesis. Considering the divergences between the individuals' experiences and perceptions with respect to different variables such as working in public or private sector, political standing, the university they graduated, the branch of engineering they have expertise, gender, age, a heterogeneous sample was formed. On the other hand, the common characteristics of the professional middle classes should be outlined to be able to understand the dominant inclination that determines their social and political effect and role in Turkey. Mainly, as sharing a common class-based culture, life concerns and rationality, professional middle classes have a distinctive role in social and political featuring of Turkish society.

In order to find answers to the questions of the thesis, a fieldwork study has been conducted with engineers as a segment of professional middle classes. As a limitation of the study, it should be noted that engineers are not representative of professional middle classes in Turkey. However, engineers occupy a significant place in the history of professional middle classes in Turkey which makes us alert about their significance to understand today. Moreover, narratives and studies on engineers in Turkey provide us a rich framework to shed light on the state –

professional middle class relations and the social position of professional middle classes in Turkey.

Engineering in Turkey has born as a result of modernization attempts in the Ottoman army, not as an extension of industrialization. After the establishment of Turkish Republic, engineers played a significant role both in the economic development and modernization of the country. They represented "modern faces" of the state in state enterprises in rural Turkey. Under such conditions, engineers in Turkey had been in an organic relationship with the state as employees of the state. As discussed in this thesis in detail, engineers shouldered responsibility of the economic development and modernization of their country under the influence of nationalist state of mind of the period. In the 1950s, engineer identity entered into a transformation under the effect of liberalization of Turkish economy. Together with state employees, the number of entrepreneur engineers and engineers employed in private sector increased. With this influence, engineers demanded to be defined independently from the state and legal framework for their occupation. TMMOB was established as an extension of this in 1954. Engineer of the period internalized dominantly the capitalist point of view. Beginning with the 1960s' relatively free environment, engineers occupied a central place in the leftist movement raised in this period and actively participated in the leftist politics of the period through their occupational organization TMMOB. The discourse of the Republican Years around "engineer in the service of the capitalist development of the state" turned to "engineer in the service of the public" in the 1970s. 1980 represents a critical turning point determining the identity of engineer of the neoliberal period, as it is for other social groups. This transformation affected engineers in two aspects. First, privatization of state economic enterprises and increase in the private sector affected the employment structure of the engineers; while they had been heavily employed by the state until the 1980s, after the transformation in the 1980s, their presence in the private sector increased. Moreover, they received their share in the flexibilization and precariousness in the labour market. On the other hand, they have not drawn a homogeneous picture. With the effect of the rise of financial markets and the importance of information technologies, engineerings such as industrial, computer, electronic-electronical have

gained extra importance, while those important for production sector such as chemical engineering and mining engineering started to lose their prestige. Some of them were brought in the significant positions in the center public institutions that are directly depended on government with the technocratic outlook of liberal governments; while some of them started to work as wage workers or managers in the private sector. Together with this occupational transformation, engineers as professional middle classes were affected not only from economic, but also the cultural and political transformation of the country. While becoming alienated to politics and unionization, they turned their faces to their private realm and their life motivation turned basically to careerism and increasing life standards.

In this respect, to ask questions of this thesis with a focus on engineers in Turkey is meaningful and it contributes to understand the transformation of professional middle class identity in Turkey. With such a concern, in-depth interviews were conducted with 20 engineers including 7 women and 13 men with ages ranging from 25 to 57. My sample includes engineers working in public sector or private sector. It has been concluded that there is not any significant difference between experiences and point of views of engineers with respect to age variable. On the other hand, the main difference between older engineers and the younger ones is the fact that older ones witnessed military interventions that left tremendous impact on Turkish society's perception of the state. The effect of this difference will be elaborated in the data analysis chapter. On the other hand, their outlook, cultural practices and lifestyle and experiences of the state and their perception about the politics does not vary significantly with respect to the age variable. Rather, it has been determined that being employed in public sector or private sector is a significant variable that affects their outlook, but not in terms of their aspirations and motivations for life. In general, heterogeneous sample of engineers provided us to draw a picture of engineers' experience and perception of the state, citizenship and politics. In this context, the variables such as age, gender, occupational position, the university graduated and the branch of engineering have been taken into consideration and their effects are discussed in the related chapter.

In order to shed light on and to create a theoretical background for this discussion, before discussing the data collected through fieldwork study, a theoretical and historical discussion will be conducted. In the first part of the second chapter, the relationship between middle classes and the state will be discussed through the concept of "neoliberal citizenship". In addition to this, a discussion on the "neoliberal state paradigm" will be discussed. In the second part, the theoretical basis of the term 'professional middle classes' utilized in this thesis will be discussed. In addition, the classical literature on professional middle class culture will be mentioned following the idea that although neoliberal transformation had significant impact on professional middle classes' character (Sennett, 2010), professional middle class culture has a historical continuity which made them a potential social base for neoliberal transformation. In the last part of the second chapter, recent literature on new middle classes will be presented. Literature mentioned in this part will provide a useful background to critically analyze the findings of the data analysis.

In the third chapter, the relationship between Turkish middle classes, state and politics will be discussed following a periodization determined with respect to critical turning points of Turkish social, economical and political history. In the first part of this chapter, a discussion of classes in Turkey will be conducted with a specific emphasis on middle classes. In the second part of this chapter, under the conditions of ignorance on middle classes in Turkey in the literature, the history of engineers in Turkey will be discussed considering their changing social and political position in different epochs of modern Turkey until 1980. In the third part of the third chapter, Turkish experience of neoliberal transformation and its effect on middle classes in Turkey will be discussed.

In the fourth chapter, data collected through fieldwork will be analyzed considering the questions in this introductory chapter and theoretical framework drawn in the second and third chapters on neoliberalism, middle classes and Turkish experience.

And lastly, with fifth chapter, the thesis will be concluded in which the general results of the data analysis will be provided.

CHAPTER 2

NEOLIBERALISM AND PROFESSIONAL MIDDLE CLASSES

In this chapter, discussion on the concepts of "neoliberalism" and "professional middle classes" which are the main concepts utilized in this thesis will be held. The relationship between these two concepts will be elaborated through a discussion on the related literature. Then, a discussion on how class is conceptualized in this thesis will be held. The literature on professional middle classes and new middle classes will be discussed to be able to make a more comprehensive analysis of the data collected through fieldwork study.

2.1 Neoliberalism and Middle Classes

In this section, the relationship between neoliberalism and middle classes will be discussed through the concept of 'neoliberal citizenship' which will be supported with a discussion on 'neoliberalism and neoliberal state'.

2.1.1 Middle Classes as 'Ideal' Citizens of Neoliberalism

Since it's born, capitalism has faced with many crises and reproduced itself in different forms each time. Each form of capitalism came with its social construct. The crisis of capitalism experienced towards the end of 1970s gave birth to not only new global economic relations, but also new social relations. Besides representing new economic relations, neoliberalism has also been the states' project of producing the "new man" of neoliberal age.

In his influential article "The Death of the Social? Re-figuring the Territory of Government" (1996) Nicholas Rose depicts the characteristics of this "new man" and argues that neoliberalism gave birth to a new citizenship regime reshaping the

relations between citizens and states. In this regime, the neoliberal citizen is idealized as self-responsible, self-governing and entrepreneur subject. Contrary to "dependent" subject who is blamed for the crisis of welfare state paradigm, neoliberal citizen has been idealized as dynamic, active and independent subject. As self-responsible citizens, neoliberal subjects are expected to survive under free market conditions through investing on themselves as human capitals to succeed in the labour market. Middle classes have been incorporated into this project as model citizens of neoliberal age. Especially professional middle classes living in the urban settings have internalized the culture of neoliberal capitalism and in the literature they are called "new middle classes" to put emphasis on their distinctive characteristics from middle classes of previous periods. Heiman, Freeman and Lietchy (2012) points out that "newness" of "new middle classes" comes from the fact that they are the products of post-1980 global neoliberal turn. In addition, they emphasize the difference between "new middle classes" and "traditional middle classes' who had emerged from populist, modernist, bureaucratic, state-driven economic policies of mid-twentieth century states. They state:

> Neoliberal policies have aimed not just at supercharging consumer cultures and organizing the consent and support of that Harvey calls "traditional middle classes" for the neoliberal state, but also at spawning a host of new middle classes worldwide who are charged with the responsibility of being independent entrepreneurs and consumers, especially in the realm of services (Heiman et. al., 2012:13).

As ideal neoliberal subjects/citizens, new middle classes have brought neoliberal rationality in life through their culture/daily life activities. The characteristics of neoliberal subject are determined as an extension of neoliberal rationality that favors the dissemination of market rationality into every sphere of life. Individual gets education to invest in himself/herself in order to be 'marketable' in the labor market; governs himself/herself to subordinate the conditions of liberal capitalism (Foucault, 1979, mentioned in Gordon, 1991); rationally calculates his/her all actions and accepts complete responsibility for his/her welfare (Rose, 1996).

Karl Polanyi is the pioneer author through whose study "Big Transformation", we can analyze how neoliberalism becomes hegemonic in the society. Polanyi shows us that originally economy is embedded into social relations and "laissez-faire" ideology that favors self-regulation of markets without any interruption by the states is the illusion of liberal economists. If states withdraw from interrupting markets for redistributive policies following the liberal assumption that self-regulating markets provide the most effective economic environment, social becomes embedded into economy. In other words, social becomes subordinate to market and market rationality that favors economic activity above social welfare disseminates into every sphere of life (Polanyi, 2011(1944)). And he notes that middle classes had always a pioneer role in economic liberalization processes (Polanyi, 2011). Polanyi's analysis reveals the strong connection between macro policies of the states towards liberalization of markets and everyday practices. In this respect, neoliberal transformation is the way towards constituting a society in which market rationality disseminates into every sphere of life. Consequently, neoliberal paradigm has a very strong social dimension and needs to become legitimate among society to operate effectively. As Heiman et. al. notes, "contemporary states have deep interests in maintaining and privileging middle classes" (Heiman, Freeman and Lietchy, 2012: 19), since middle classes have a potential to constitute a legitimate social ground for neoliberal consent.

Before conducting a theoretical discussion on professional middle classes to understand the dynamics that make them a comfortable social base for neoliberal transformation (or not), neoliberal state paradigm should be discussed. The following section serves for this aim.

2.1.2 *Neoliberalism and Neoliberal State*

Neoliberalism has dictated itself as a hegemonic project in economic, social and political spheres in many countries since the end of the 1970s. Together with the fact that neoliberalism represents a state of mind favoring economic rationality above all, neoliberalism has displayed itself in the policies of the states "in concrete" towards the change in the state structure. This transformation in the state structure favoring economic rationality has given rise to transformation in the state- society relations, since these policies have many reflections in the social sphere.

According to neoliberal theory, the main role of the state should be providing the legal and institutional conditions for the effective functioning of the markets (Harvey, 2005). Under this framework, industry and agriculture should be deregulated, financial sector should be liberated globalwise and labour power should be curtailed. State should be the guarantor of the proper functioning of markets and private property rights. In addition, according to neoliberal rationality, since provision of social rights by the states prevents people to get the "responsibility" of their lives, states should withdraw from many areas of social provision. State owned institutions should be privatized, state should take the role of organizer and rule provider for the effective functioning of the markets. Neoliberal program that states put into practice includes is outlined by Michael Peters:

> Economic liberalization or rationalization characterized by the abolition of subsidies and tariffs, floating the exchange rate, the freeing up on controls on foreign investment, the restructuring of the state sector, including corporation and privatization of state trading departments and other assets, 'downsizing', 'contracting out', the attack on unions, and abolition of wage bargaining in favor of employment contracts, and finally, the dismantling of the welfare state through commercialization, 'contracting out', 'targeting of services', and individual 'responsibilization' for health, welfare, and education (Peters, 2001: 18-19).

Such kind of an understanding of the state leads to depreciation of social rights of citizens and reducing social rights to social assistance for the poor and promotion of privatization of social services. This means reorganization of the capitalist state around neoliberal paradigm and leaving the welfare state paradigm which had born under the conditions of post-Second World War conditions. According to Harvey (2005), after Second World War, capitalist states needed a class compromise between capital and labor to ensure the domestic peace and revival of the capitalist economies. States' economic and social policies focused on full employment, economic growth and the welfare of its citizens; which directed states to intervene into industrial policy directly and construct a welfare regime around public health, education and social insurance systems. By the end of the 1960s, the crisis of capital accumulation showed itself as various crises in social area directly affecting citizens such as unemployment and inflation and Keynesian policies could not work more. As a result, neoliberalism was born as alternative of Keynesian state paradigm which was condemned to be responsible for the crisis of capitalism and not to be able to adapt to market conditions.

Although neoliberal ideology has originated from Britain and United States, it was embraced by many countries and struggle raised in different countries against this transformation was suppressed brutally. Neoliberal rationality has been normalized and pervaded as the main paradigm for describing social reality itself (Bourdieu, 1998; Peters, 2001). Public policy of the states has been changed against those concerning society towards individuals gathered around their families or communities. In neoliberal theory, it is assumed that private enterprise and entrepreneurship are the main factors for wealth creation and innovation and elimination of poverty can be best achieved through individual responsibility and free markets. As the most significant figure of neoliberal theory, Friedrich A. Hayek (1960) argues in his "Constitution of Liberty" that states by making plans for its citizens restrict their freedom; liberty means that "individual must bear the consequences of his actions" (71); both individual and societal growth can be achieved through individual responsibility where states represent "rule of law" that provides "just" and "free" democratic environment for competition among

individuals while running to the "ideal" conditions of living in society. Under such a 'philosophical' framework, states should implement some policies. State owned enterprises should be eliminated through privatization. Social rights and common properties are held responsible for making people lazy and prevent them to take the responsibility of their own welfare; so, social services should be commodified; labour markets should be deregulated and flexibilization of labour markets should be supported by the states through necessary legal regulations. Competition between individuals and firms are seen as keys making people dynamic; so states should encourage people for entrepreneurship and taking initiative.

In neoliberal construction of society, individuals are held responsible for their own wellbeing in the realms of education, health, social security etc. Individualization championed by the neoliberal ideology replaces strong collective institutions such as trade unions with weak voluntary organizations such as charity organizations. Flexibilization in labour markets and elimination of social rights give rise to the loss of the feeling of collectivity among people. Risk in the deregulated labour market is burdened on the shoulders of workers (Boratav, 2011).

Social dimension of neoliberal expansion needs a process of consent. Media, intellectuals, civil society including universities and professional associations, political parties and governments incorporated in the creation and dissemination of neoliberal discourse throughout the society. The neoliberal consent gained a material ground with the transformation of everyday practices of people with the construction of a neoliberal market-based popular culture (Bourdieu, 1998).

On the other hand, neoliberal state includes many contradictions that make it difficult to maintain legitimacy and consent. Although it seems that neoliberal consent has been established worldwide, these contradictions include the potential to mobilize people to struggle against degradation of their rights and authoritarianism that can be raised by the states when neoliberalism lose its legitimization among society (Harvey, 20005).

Although Heiman et al. suggests that new middle classes are the product of new economic, social and political conditions of neoliberal age, in this thesis it is suggested that middle classes of neoliberal age should be thought in continuity with its previous counterparts. It is believed that there is continuity in the culture of middle classes with respect to concerns of middle classes. Therefore, classical literature on middle classes gains importance for a study having questions of: 1.What is the characteristics of middle classes that make them a social basis for legitimization of neoliberal capitalism? 2. What are the dynamics behind middle classes' political apathy although their life becomes more and more insecure, their social rights are deteriorated and work conditions become precarious as capitalism becomes more advanced? These questions have many intersection points with the questions that were answered from different approaches in class literature on middle classes.

In the following section, what kind of an approach to professional middle classes is followed in this thesis will be discussed and then classical literature on professional middle classes will be provided.

2.2 Literature on Professional Middle Classes

2.2.1 Class as a Relational and "Never Ending" Process

In this study, contrary to the arguments that class does not have explanatory power for contemporary societies anymore and individuals rather than classes are the reproduction units in the society (Bauman 1992; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991); it is pursued that social classes preserve their centrality for the analysis of social relations in contemporary societies. Although it is obvious that collective class awareness has weakened in contemporary societies, it is accepted that it is not an evidence for that class has no place in explaining "the dynamic, reflexive and globalized world" (Savage et. al., 2000: 101). However, people accepting this argument diverge from each other with respect to the way they conceptualize "class" which is so significant for how to develop a class-based approach to a social issue under analysis. In this section, the theoretical framework for the concept of "class" is drawn. With the help of this conceptual discussion, relationship between neoliberalism and classes can be analysed not only as a structural relation, but also a relation shaped through the experiences of members of social classes. Another dimension of class discussion turns around what professional middle classes mean in this thesis, which will be discussed in the following part.

In this study, class is conceptualized as a relational and dynamic process following Ellen Meiksins Wood's[2] class conceptualization that is mainly inspired by E.P. Thompson. Following E.P. Thompson, Wood presents an alternative class conceptualization for Marxist social analysis. In this conceptualization, it is suggested that production relations do not determine class consciousness in a mechanical way, accordingly, class can not be defined just with respect to the

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[2] Wood, E.M. (1995) *Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism* Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

relations of production. According to Wood, structural Marxist approaches to class do not provide the means to reveal the effects of social classes under the conditions of lack of "class consciousness". Whether there is class consciousness, or not, class should be analyzed not just as a structural process and Thompson's class approach gives us the tools for this alternative analysis. Relations of production distribute people into class situations; but this is the beginning of a class process. In Wood's words, "in order to experience things in 'class ways' people must be 'objectively distributed' into class situations; but this is the beginning, not the end, of class formation" (Wood, 1995: 81). As people 'experience' and 'handle' their class situations, class is actively and continuously formed.

It is in this sense that Wood suggests that class struggle precedes class. Although classes are present to be experienced objectively, objective determinations do not impose themselves on blank and passive raw material but on active and conscious historical beings. Class formations emerge and develop "as men and women *live* their productive relations and *experience* their determinate situations, within 'the *ensemble* of the social relations', with their inherited culture and expectations, and as they handle these experiences in cultural ways"[3].

Following E.P. Thompson again, Wood suggests that class is a relation (between classes and between members of a single class) and class process can be observed through social relations, institutions and values. What makes heterogeneously formed groups class is not simple objective structures, but *experience.* In Thompson's analysis, "objective" and "subjective" are not separated dualistically. According to this class conceptualization, relations and conflicts in the production process is the basis of class; but the relation between people under the same conditions in the production process is not created directly as a result of production and exploitation process. Cultural experience has an effect on class formation process at least as

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[3] E. P Thompson, "Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?", *Social History* 3 (2) (May 1978), p. 150. n.36 quoted in Wood, 1995: p.80.

structural relations of production. According to Wood, "it is the task of the historian and the sociologist to explore what these 'structures' do to people's lives, how they do it, and what people do about it – or, as Thompson might put it, how the determining pressures of structured processes are experienced and handled by people" (Wood, 1995: 97). Relational process of class formation is not only determined with respect to the relations of production, but also how people differentiate themselves from others through class cultural practices. With such a concern class culture gains extra importance for this study and class culture serves as a main variable determining class formation.

Such kind of a conceptualization is specifically important for this study, since how neoliberalism and practices/experiences of the professional middle classes are mutually affect each other is the basic question of this study. It is accepted not only that neoliberalism dictates itself to an already existing class, but also that the process of neoliberalization is also the process of class formation. According to Bourdieu, neoliberalism takes its power from its ability to penetrate every field of social life; neoliberalism becomes legitimate not only at the level of discourse or macro-policies, but also at the experience level (Bourdieu, 1998). Neoliberal transformation is experienced as a class practice with different effects on different classes. As a form of capitalism, neoliberalism does not only produces new forms of exploitation of labor, but also new forms of class culture that make professional middle classes internalize neoliberal forms of life. Considering the conceptual framework drawn for classes above, as Heiman, Freeman and Lietchy (2012) point out, what neoliberalism does is not organizing the consent of traditional middle classes; rather, middle classes continue to be formed as capitalism evolves. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that what makes them middle classes regardless the form of capitalism under which they are formed are some structural processes and experiences.

Up to now, I sketched a framework for the concept of "class" reffered in this thesis. However, class has another relevance for this study, that is the determination and definition of the class under analysis. For an empirical research, I had to select a sample representing professional middle classes and I faced with one of the most

controversial debates of class literature. I had to apply some structural approaches using occupational categories to select the sample group; on the other hand, I believed that structural approaches have the potential to make us overlook the determinative effect of the agent/action/experience in the process of class production. At last, both approaches contributed the research process and cultural approach to class provided a basis for this. As Crompton (2008) states "the 'cultural turn' incorporates an emphatic rejection of the seperation of 'action' and 'structure', as well as the possibility of seperating the economic from the social" (p. 25).

What are the premises of cultural approach for social analysis? While Marxists are interested in the relations of production as the generator and reproducer of social classes in society, Bourdieu as the pioneer theoretician of cultural approaches puts the concepts of culture, lifestyle and daily practices at the center of his class analysis. Recognizing that property relations are determinative in generating social hierarchy, he emphasizes the role of culture and cultural symbols as the generator of class distinctions. Together with economic capital, he defines three forms of capital which can be converted to each other: cultural and social capitals. As Brubaker (1985) states:

> The conceptual space within which Bourdieu defines class is not that of production, but that of social relations in general. Class divisions are defined not by differing relations to the means of production, but by differing conditions of existence, differing systems of dispositions produced by differential conditioning, and differing endowments of power or capital (Brubaker, 1985: 761).

Although Bourdieu himself applied occupational categories in his ethnographic study on French class structure "Distinction" (1986)[4] thinking that occupational categories

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[4] Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: a Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

are good indicators of position in social space, he does not accept these categories as the constituents of classes. He is interested in the active processes of class formation rather than fixed and stable categories which exclude cultural dynamics. For Bourdieu, class is something that individuals actually live and through which they construct their identities.

In his work "Distinction", Bourdieu focused on especially middle classes' judgment on tastes and aesthetics through which middle classes struggle to create a distinction mechanism between them and working class. With a parallel concern with Bourdieu, at the end of the interviewees conducted with people from English middle class, Savage et. al (2000) concluded that middle class people want to be both 'ordinary' and 'special' at the same time. Consequently, they infer that "modes of individualization are therefore related to modes of class identity, and are not a departure from them" (Savage et. al., 2000: 117). In this framework, individualization is regarded as a component of middle class culture itself and reproduced through different practices. The individualization wave raised with neoliberalization should not be evaluated as "the death of class", but as a result of transformation in the people's experience of class practices. Crompton (2008) notes that the process of that individualism becomes an integral component of middle class culture should not be understood unless the effect of neoliberal capitalism on the structure of occupations is not understood. She concludes:

> Although contemporary societies continue to be fundamentally stratified by systematic inequalities associated with access of property, jobs and 'life chances' in general, the fragmentation of being and experiences brought about by developments such as flexibilization of employment, privatism and 'home-centeredness', and the growth of insecurity – of jobs, of 'falling off the ladder' and increasingly competitive and 'marketized' environment – make the development of a cohesive, collective, occupationally based 'class consciousness' of a Fordist, 'trade union' variety not very likely (Crompton, 2008: xii).

What we experience is "a move from collective class identities to classed individual identities" (Le Grand, 2008). Neoliberal policies directly trigger the process of individualization and vice versa.

Through drawing such a theoretical framework, this thesis investigates the interrelation between professional middle classes' cultural practices/experiences that actively form their classes and class relations and neoliberal transformation which is reflected on work life, state-society relations and political sphere. Together with experience, their perception of neoliberal transformation is questioned. Following Bourdieu, practice/experience and perception/discourse/ideology/rationality will be operated in their entirety and putting emphasis on their interrelated nature.

In the following section, first I will conduct a brief discussion on relevant classical literature on professional middle classes. This discussion will constitute a background to develop an insight to analyze the data collected through the fieldwork study. Then, professional middle classes will be defined considering the theoretical framework drawn in this section.

2.2.2 Literature on Professional Middle Classes

In the literature, there is not any consensus on how to refer the group that is referred in this thesis as "professional middle classes". In this thesis, the conceptualization of Barbara and John Ehrenreich is followed, since their definition of professional middle classes overlap with the theoretical framework that I have drawn for "class" in the previous section. Hovewer, to follow a chronological discussion, their position will be elaborated at the end of this section; but before a literature review, I have to share what I mean with professional middle class. I borrow the definition from Barbara Ehrenreich. In her 1989 book, Fear of Falling, Ehrenreich defines "the professional middle class as:

> All those people whose economic and social status is based on education, rather than on the ownership of capital or property. Most professionals are included, and so are white-collared managers, whose positions require at least a college degree, and increasingly also a graduate degree (1989: 12).

The main reason that Ehrenreich use the term 'professional middle class' instead of 'white collar workers' is their different class cultural practices that shape their relation with 'class consciousness'. As discussed in the previous section, this dimension is significantly important for this thesis. The theoretical references of this definition will be elaborated in the discussion at the end of this section.

Some of the scholars prefer to call this group as "white collars" since their main parameter is the occupational situation of these people (Mills, 1951; Braverman, 1998) some refer them as "new middle classes" but might have different concerns for this (Carchedi, 1977; Heiman et. al., 2012). Some call them as "new petty bourgeois" considering both their position in relations of production and also their different characteristics from those originally referred by Marx and Engels (Poulantzas, 1978). The reasons of these different points of view are the topic of another study exceeding the concern of this thesis. However, it should be noted that all these theories aim to understand the social place of this group better; and the arguments and findings of these different approaches contribute to understand the effect of neoliberal transformation on this class better.

In "Labor and Monopoly Capital" Harry Braverman (1998) notes that scientific-technical revolution and automation created the need for mental workers who got higher level of education. What Braverman called as scientific-technical revolution is the entrance of management principles developed by Frederic Taylor at the end of the 19th century. Taylor suggested dividing production process into petty operations so that workers can become expert in one stage of production. This transformation in the production process required bureaucratization and management in production units. Braverman maintains that while this process causes alienation of ever greater sections of working population to their labor, white collar workers are not free of this process. As a result of both routinization and bureaucratization in production process and increase in the numbers of white collar workers, white collar workers have been proletarianized. Braverman warns us that he does not deal with the consciousness, organization or activities of working class, in other words, his work is on the

working class as a class in itself, not as a class for itself. Braverman is criticized with respect to that while arguing homogenization of working class population, his thesis cannot explain cultural and consciousness differences between different subgroups of working class population and also "the possibility of class resistance and action" (Crompton, 2008: 38). In this respect, through Braverman's analysis, we cannot understand why white collar workers cannot raise their consciousness about their place in the relations of production. On the other hand, Braverman's findings on the situation of white collars in Fordist relations of production shed light on today's conditions of working for white collar workers. For some of the scholars (Bell, 1973), Braverman's thesis is not relevant for today, since knowledge producers have autonomy today as never experienced before; while for others (Kumar, 1995; Meiksins, 1994) knowledge workers are exposed to similar routinization and exploitation process as before with blue collar workers.

In a parallel way with Braverman, in his book "White Collar" C. Wright Mills (1951) points out that mechanization and bureaucratization of white collar works make white collar workers indifferent from blue collar workers. Different from Braverman, Mills is interested in their political consciousness and argues that white collar workers are politically apathetic and because of their growing number which is the result of technical developments, political importance of white collar people increases. He points out that to understand new middle classes having white collar jobs, status achieved through white collar jobs should be considered. Hierarchy in the occupational structure gives power to white collars not only in their jobs, but also in other social areas. From Marxist point of view, Mills argues that "in terms of property, the white collar people are not in between "capital and labor", but they are exactly the same property-class position as the wage workers" (Mills, 1953: 71). However, diverging from orthodox Marxist point of view, Mills adds that "to understand their class positions, we must go beyond the common fact of source of income and consider as well the amount of income" (Mills, 1953: 72). With his emphasis on income, status/power/prestige, education level, lifestyle and considering their effect on middle classes' political consciousness, Mills diverges from structural class analysis and approximates to cultural analysis. According to Mills, arguing that

white collar workers are proletariat because of their place in relations of production is a short-cut conclusion and prevents us to see the background of the lack of class consciousness and political apathy of white collars. He points out "the big" split between work and leisure time. White collar people are alienated to their work in the way that "most alert hours of one's life are sacrificed to the making of money with which to 'live'" (Mills, 1953:236). The leisure time or holiday is defined around the concept of 'consumption'. Since the work and leisure are defined in contrast to each other, "to modern man leisure is the way to spend money, work is the way to make it" (Mills, 1953:238). White collar people also want to conform their status. And this creates a panic for preserving status based on property, occupation, education, income and power. This status is claimed through consumption patterns of middle class people. Success is identified with career in the job and education has the meaning if and only if it provides a prestigious white collar job. In this way, Mills points out the significance of lifestyle, consumption practices and cultural codes to understand the dynamics affecting political position of middle classes.

According to Carchedi (1977), the rise of new middle classes is a phenomenon typical of monopoly capitalism and they occupy a middle position between capital and labor. He employs a new concept to depict the capitalist side of new middle classes "global function of capital" which means "a hierarchical and bureaucratic structure which replaces the individual capitalist in carrying out the work of control and surveillance" (Carchedi, 1977: 6). Carchedi admits that the time new middle classes dedicated to the global function of capital decreases while the time they dedicated to the function of collective worker progressively increases under capitalism. This means devaluation of new middle classes' labour; but proletarianization is the limit of this devaluation process. Unless complete elimination of the global capital function is realized, new middle classes cannot be counted as proletariat. Although he emphasizes that "also political and ideological conditions which must be met before that stratum or group will actually become part of the proletariat" (p.8), he does not conduct a discussion on class consciousness of new middle classes. On the other hand, Carchedi indicates the other side of the coin that proletarianization of white collar workers cannot be explained only through the

downgrading of life standards of white collars as Mills proposes and being exposed to same routinization process as blue collar workers as Braverman proposes. According to Carchedi, proletarianization thesis has the potential to make us overlook the capitalist function of white collar worker.

From a Marxist point of view, Poulantzas (1978) uses the term "petty bourgeois" for middle class, but draws a demarcation line between traditional and new one. For Poulantzas, new petty bourgeois occupies an intermediate position between the two basic classes-bourgeoisie and the proletariat-. By accepting that white collar workers' "mental labour" is exploited by capitalists as working class' "manual labour"; he puts emphasis on the determinative role of political-ideological position. They do not feel themselves in a subordinate situation since they focus on the career ladder they are planning to climb through which their salary increases and they get higher positions (Poulantzas, 1978:278). Mostly, this may remain as a hope, but the central position of career and promotion in their lives and individualized outlook keep them distant from working classes. Poulantzas rejects Mills' and Braverman's argument that bureaucratization brings the working conditions of white collars to the level of the conditions of working class. According to Poulantzas, this may be valid for some subaltern sections of petty bourgeois, but this is not the dominant pattern. He proposes the term "petty bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble" which is formed by the effects of "the (dominant) bourgeois ideology on the specific aspirations of the petty-bourgeois agents that function for their specific class determination" (Poulantzas, 1978: 288) and at the same time by the effects of working class ideology. "In other words, the petty bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble is a terrain of struggle and a particular battlefield between bourgeois ideology and working class ideology, though with the specific intervention of peculiarly petty-bourgeois elements" (Pulantzas, 1978:289). Their hostility against the 'rich' comes from their illusion that their exploitation comes from wage-differentials rather than being lack of means of production. With such a point of view, their political demands are restricted with 'social justice' based on redistribution of income and an 'egalitarian' taxation policy. Their constant fear of proletarianization makes them feel distant from revolutionary transformation of society and their demand for security in work

conditions emerges in the form of "monetary fetishism". Therefore, they do not experience socialization of labour in the form of class solidarity, but they drag into a competitive isolation whose ideological result is "petty bourgeois individualism". Another point that triggers their competitive isolation is their demand for a greater share of responsibility:

> Demands are made on capital for a greater share of 'responsibility' in 'decision-making' powers and for a reclassification of their mental labour at its 'true value', but this does not generally lead to questioning the actual mental/manual labour division in their relations with the working class (Poulantzas, 1978: 291).

So, they demand the decentralization and rationalization of the authority structure. Their aspiration towards 'promotion', 'career' and 'upward social mobility' is another reflection of petty-bourgeois individualism. Their demand of social justice is about their belief in "the elitist conception of society in the form of meritocracy" (Poulantzas, 1978: 292). In Poulantzas' words new petty bourgeois "does not want to break the ladders by which it imagines it can climb" (Poulantzas, 1978: 292). They imagine a state serving for the 'general interest' which corresponds to the interests of petty bourgeois as the mediator between capitalist and working classes. In this respect, 'welfare state' emerges as the ideal form of the state 'regulator and corrector' of 'social inequalities' (Poulantzas, 1978: 293).

In their study on the political alignments of affluent workers in England, Goldthrope et al. emphasized the interrelationship between lifestyle and political/ideological position. Goldthrope et al. (1969) determines that improvement in the lifestyle of industrial workers change their perception on trade unionism and politics from 'solidaristic collectivism' to more 'instrumental' orientation. In terms of social relationships, a parallel movement is observed: "away from 'communal sociability' towards more 'privatized' form of social existence, in which the economic advancement of the individual and his family becomes of greater importance than membership in a closely knit local community" (Golthrope et. al., 1969:76). They live a family-centered life in which life values are set on increasing life standards,

especially in the form of consumer durables. Wages become the most critical issue about the work. In this respect, group attachments and class consciousness of affluent workers become weaker. Although affluence in the life standards does not mean that affluent workers will show parallel characteristics with professional middle classes, they become assimilated into the middle class society.

According to Goldthrope et. al., in order to be able to shed light on political alignments of affluent workers, the ideas of middle classes about their place in the social structure, aspirations and what they expect from life should be taken into consideration. First of all, from middle classes' point of view, hierarchical social order in society which is determined with the associated prestige and lifestyle is an open one. If one has the necessary abilities and moral qualities, he/she can climb the ladder. The place somebody accesses in the end depends on what he 'makes of himself'. "Moreover, it is felt that the individual has an obligation to assume responsibility for his own life and welfare and to try to 'get on in the world' as far as he can" (Goldthrope et. al., 1969:120). Second, since everybody has the chance to climb the ladder and it is a continuous process, the objective of raising life standards and prestige does not come to an end. Third, middle class men/women are focused on their future. The life is established on the principle that for the welfare in the future, making present sacrifices is necessary and normal. And lastly, middle class outlook is an individualistic one. They are focused on their individual achievements which are determined from a family-centered perspective. The aim is both raising the life standards of their family members and providing all educational opportunities for their children so that their children attain to higher level positions in the social scale. "In other words, the expectation is again that advancement will be continuous – between generations as well as in the course of individual lifetimes. Indeed, through parental aspirations for children, it is possible for desires and hopes for the future to become virtually limitless" (Goldthrope et. al., 1969: 121) Middle class people maintain their future-centered outlook through their offspring.

The pioneer in the literature using the term "professional middle class" is Barbara Ehrenreich with her book "Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of Middle Classes".

According to Ehrenreich, professional middle class people get their economic and social status from their education rather than capital or property. They earn their living from their "mental labour". Their education is their main asset and it is not inherited from their families. This makes professional middle class families excessively anxious about their children's education. Since the only way to inherit their class position is to make their children get higher education, they make big sacrifices for their children's raising. They carry "the fear of falling" for the second generation.

According to Ehrenreich, this class was born out of the introduction of new methods of scientific management in production and educated middle class gained a distinctive status in division of labour from workers as managers of working class. According to Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1999), despite orthodox Marxian analysis that suggests that as one of the two main classes in capitalist societies, working class will expand including petty bourgeois in itself and become more homogeneous day by day, the middle classes are not simply withering away, but a new, educated and salaried middle class strata has been expanding as early as the turn of the century (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1999: 7). Although Orthodox Marxist theoricians by early in the seventies admitted the distinctive importance of educated wage earners, they analyzed them as a stratum of the working class (Braverman, 1998 (1974)) or rejected to leave classical Marxist scheme and classified them as 'new petty bourgeois' (Poulantzas, 1978). For Ehrenreichs, on the other hand, "middle class category of workers which has concerned Marxist analysis for the last two decades – the technical workers, managerial workers, 'culture' producers, etc. –must be understood as comprising a distinct class in monopoly capitalist society" (Ehrenreichs, 1999:9). The main reason for this is that they have objectively antagonistic relationship with another class of wage earners, i.e. working class. On the other hand, they cannot be analyzed as a "residual class" like the petty bourgeois. They cannot be evaluated as petty bourgeois since in contrast to classical petty bourgeois, professional middle classes have a close relationship with the capital, they are employed by capital and they manages, controls and has authority over labour. Ehrenreichs state:

A class is characterized by a common relation to the economic foundations of society -the means of production and the socially organized patterns of distribution and consumption-… However, the relation to the economic foundations of society is not sufficient to specify a class as a real social entity. At any moment in its historical development after its earliest, formative period, a class is characterized by a coherent social and cultural existence; members of a class share a common life style, educational back ground, kinship, networks, consumption patterns, work habits, beliefs (Ehrenreichs, 1999: 11).

Ehrenreichs' definition of professional middle class is based on a specific class conceptualization. Their emphasis on the concepts of 'relation' and 'class culture' as determinants of class overlaps with the conceptualization of class drawn in the previous section for this study. Following E.P. Thompson, they reject to see Professional Middle Class as a 'sociological entity'; rather they accept that professional middle class should be understood in its complementarity and mutual interaction with the bourgeoise and working class. According to them, "the story of the rise and development of the Professional Managerial Class s simultaneously the story of the rise of the *modern* bourgeoise and *modern* proletariat as they have taken form in monopoly capitalism" (Ehrenreichs, 1999: 10). In this respect, their definition differs from 'social stratification' studies of American sociology.

2.3 Literature on New Middle Classes

Although classical literature on professional middle classes preserves its explanatory power for today, there is a literature on "new middle classes" which should not be overlooked while explaining today's middle classes' relationship with neoliberalism. As Heiman, Freeman and Lietchy (2012) points out, global capitalism created its middle class which is a new phenomenon that cannot be thought as mutation of middle classes of Fordist period. They criticize the point of view that neoliberalism gained a legitimate ground among middle classes of the Fordist period, and today's middle classes' outlook raised from such kind of a process. On the other hand, for

Heiman et. al. (2012), new middle classes have not needed to be persuaded for neoliberalism, since they have been born as a result of the neoliberalization process itself, and as a part of this project all around the world. They get much public attention because of their different patterns of consumption, reproduction and citizenship. Moreover, Bourdieu (1984) puts emphasis on the new economy's interest on new middle classes' internalization of hedonistic morality of consumption, based on credit, spending and enjoyment. According to Bourdieu, new economy tries to create a social world in which people are stratified by their capacity "for consumption, their 'standard of living', their life-style, as my as by their capacity for production" (Bourdieu, 1984: 319).

Lange and Meier (2009) define new middle class as a group of professionals who does not have material capital, but human capital in the form of education through which they are employed in the jobs requiring mental labour, having high status because of their income level, adopted elements of 'western' style of living. For new middle classes in 'developing countries', the ability to reach industrial products that are more or less expensive and provide a Western lifestyle through the liberalization of markets is a reason for pride for their nations. The 'development' level and welfare of the country is indexed to the level of ability to consume. In these countries, new middle classes are considered as the vanguard of the dynamism of countries motivated to 'develop'. According to Lenge and Meier, new middle classes are alienated to labour movement and feel themselves more close to management of workers, although they depend on wage employment and do not have major impact on decision-making processes in the corporations. Lenge and Meier also outline that new middle classes have shown internal difference both in socio-structural aspects and with respect to values, cultural preferences and lifestyles; so it is more appropriate to tell about "new middle classes" rather than a single class or stratum. On the other hand, according to Lenge and Meier, the most striking feature that stretch across different groups, countries and cultures is "the four-step-ladder of consumer goods that people aspire to possess. It starts with cheap gadgets and moves to cars, houses and tourism as core features of the uppermost level" (Lenge and Meier, 2009: 16).

In "The Great Indian Middle Class" Varma (2007) investigates the transformation of Indian middle class with the liberalization of economy beginning with the 1990s. According to Varma, the dominant trend of the middle classes today is complete insensitivity to any social concerns; and removal from the notions of "Gandhian austerity and Nehruvian socialism". This ideological shift accompanied by the transformation of life motivation towards consumerism and increasing life standards. They completely spend their energies for hard work and entrepreneurship which are favored as merits together with a wide consent of the "survival of the fittest" mentality among society. With the concern of upward mobility or fear of proletarianization, parents share extravagant budget for their children's private school tuition.

Such kind of culturally oriented analyses maintain their research with the assumption that middle class is the beneficiary and proponent of economic liberalization which provided them with consumption alternatives of each kind. In this way, new middle classes constitute a social base for economic liberalization (Varma, 2007). From a critical perspective, Fernandes (2006) puts a question mark onto this assumption about middle classes. According to Fernandes, the internal differentiations within middle classes should be considered in the analysis on the relationship between middle classes and economic liberalization. From such a point of view, in his analysis on Indian new middle classes, Fernandes argues that "the rise of the new Indian middle class represents the political construction of a social group that operates as a proponent of economic liberalization" (p.xviii). In his conceptualization, "this middle class is not 'new' in terms of its structural or social basis. In other words, its 'newness' of the new middle classes do not refer to upwardly mobile segments of the population entering middle class… but rather, its newness refers to a process of production of a distinctive social and political identity that represents and lays claim to the benefits of liberalization… at a structural level, this group largely encompasses English-speaking urban white-collar segments of the middle class who are benefiting from new employment opportunities (particularly in private-sector employment)" (p. xviii). Moreover, despite precarious conditions of

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work –retrenchment, job insecurity and increased workloads- in both public and private sector for white collar workers, they do not take a political position against economic restructuring since they believe that the "new economy" has many opportunities of job and consumption for those who are equipped enough. In sum, together with beneficiaries of economic liberalization among new middle classes, there is a huge segment in this class who are deprived from the flexible conditions of work; however, their belief in the 'survival of the fittest' logic prevents them to be critical towards economic liberalization and its effects on their conditions of work and living.

Other than analyses on life style and cultural outlook of new middle classes, there is a literature on political role of the new middle classes in the advanced capitalist societies. According to these theories, as service sector expands and takes the place of industrial production in capitalist societies, a new form of society called the "Post-industrialist society" is welcomed. This thesis is pioneered by theorists Daniel Bell and Alain Tourine. Contrary to the emphasis on goods production in Fordist period, post-industrial society is an information society (Bell, 1973). As Bell states, "knowledge and information are becoming the strategic resource and transforming agent of the post-industrial society... just as the combination of energy, resources and machine technology were the transforming agencies of the industrial society" (Bell, 1980: 531,545). In accordance with this emphasis on information, professional employment has been rapidly grown; moreover, the knowledge and information producers, processers and distributers' voice is stronger about the decisions taken in every sphere of life including social issues. Post-industrial society is free of class conflicts and those having information will be most powerful group in society. According to Masuda (1981) in the future, knowledge capital will bring the place of material capital which means the certain victory of those having knowledge. Such kind of a societal change means a new mode of production free of class conflicts of industrial age. It will be the age of more decent, more democratic and more peaceful, more plentiful order. Professionals will have more initiative and be independent as knowledge capital predominates the material capital (Masuda, 1981).

2.4. Conclusion for Chapter 1

In this chapter, first, since professional middle classes are incorporated into neoliberalization process by the states as "ideal" citizens, the literature on neoliberal citizenship was presented. This discussion was complemented with a discussion on neoliberal state. What neoliberal transformation of the state means; how this transformation affects citizens; and how neoliberal rationality becomes hegemonic in society have been questioned. After these discussions on neoliberalism, a discussion on professional middle classes was conducted. Before discussing relevant literature on structural, political and cultural position of middle classes, what kind of an approach to class has been followed was outlined. Last, literatures on professional middle classes and new middle classes have been presented and differences between approaches for professional middle classes' political and cultural outlook have been outlined.

Discussion held in this chapter around the concepts of "neoliberalism", "neoliberal state", "neoliberal citizen" and "professional middle classes" will all be utilized to analyze data collected through fieldwork study.

In the second chapter of the thesis, main focus will be on Turkish professional middle classes, politics and state. While the main aim of the first chapter was to introduce the concepts sequenced above referring to classical literature, the objective of the second chapter will be to understand historical evolution of professional middle classes in Turkey with respect to their social, political and cultural position with a special emphasis on post-1980 period.

CHAPTER 3

PROFESSIONAL MIDDLE CLASSES, POLITICS AND STATE IN TURKEY

The main aim of this chapter is to understand the structural effects of neoliberal transformation on professional middle classes in Turkey. In this chapter, together with the relationship between professional middle classes, politics and the state, identity transformation of professional middle classes with respect to their aspirations and cultural and political outlook will be focused on following a periodization determined according to the critical social, political and economic turn points of Modern Turkey. Specific emphasis will be put on engineers in Turkey. In the second part of the chapter, together with a background discussion on neoliberal transformation in Turkey, the effect of neoliberal transformation on professional middle classes from above mentioned aspects will be discussed.

3.1. Professional Middle Classes in Turkey: From 1923 to 1980

3.1.1. The Place of Professional Middle Classes in Social Class Structure of Turkey between 1923 and 1980: A General Outlook

The main aim of this section is to outline the place of professional middle classes in picture of social classes in Turkey from 1923 to 1980. First, general picture of social classes in this period will be outlined. Then, literature on the place of professional middle classes in the power structure in this period will be presented.

Demographic structure in 1923 had been shaped around the effect of the subsequent wars and migrations since the late 19th century. Young Turkish Republic inherited a poor, tired and scarce population from the Ottoman State and public was almost

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completely dependent on the primitive forms of agriculture. When Turkish Republic was established in 1923, 10.3 million out of 13.6 million population were constituted by peasantry (Köymen, 2008). Under the dominance of agriculture, 9.8% of the active population was employed in industrial and service sector jobs in 1923. Since industry was mainly composed of small workshops in this period, workers were scattered. On the other hand, in 1839-1923 period, urban working class began to emerge with the transition to industrial market economy (Atılgan, 2012).

Agricultural production had to be revitalized for both economic development and modernization of the Republic. Since agriculture has maintained its role as the main sector feeding the population, agriculture and peasantry policies have preserved its importance until the 1980s (Baydar, 1999). In 1925, *aşar* which is the direct taxing of the peasantry in the percentage of ten was abolished. This decreased the role of the *mültezim*s who had been the local well-heeled people having the right of collecting taxes in exchange for an amount of money given to the state since the Ottoman period, however, traders and money lenders replaced with them (Boratav, 2011). In 1927 distribution of wealth in the rural was completely against the peasants; 76% of the agricultural population was holding just 7% of the cultivable land (Atılgan, 2012).

Moreover, there was a lack of national bourgeois. The migration of nonmuslims meant the loss of accumulation of industrial and trading knowledge in the country, since they were the carrier of the economy other than agricultural production in Ottoman Period (Zürcher, 1998). Incentives given to bourgeoisie between 1923-1929 period aiming to constitute a national bourgeois contributed to the emergence of a trading bourgeois, rather than an industrial bourgeois. Both the effects of 1929 world economic crisis and lack of an industrial bourgeois derived the state to take the role

of bourgeois and statist and inward-looking policies had been held in a systematic way throughout the 1930s (Boratav, 2011). [5]

State economic enterprises that were established in the 1930s created the conditions of capital accumulation for private sector. Contractors, trading bourgeois and businessmen having small industrial production units became active in the sub-sectors that state enterprises needed and accumulated capital. These people would constitute the industrial bourgeois of the following years (Boratav, 2011). The direct result of this industrial development had been the increase in the number of industrial workers. The laws that organize working life had been enacted and legal framework was drawn for working relations in this period. On the other hand, to prevent the rise of worker unionization, measures were taken by the state. Laws were enacted and socialist intellectuals and union leaders were arrested to suppress labour movement in this period. The impact of 1929 world economic crisis was felt among working class as wage suppression in the 1930s (Baydar, 1999).

Under the effect of industrialization attempt in the 1930s, rural to urban migration began among male population of peasantry. Resource allocation from agriculture to industry through taxes negatively affected the economic condition of the peasantry, which also contributed to the rural to urban migration wave. Land reform was in the public agenda in the 1930s, however could not be initiated because of the dominant position of land owners in the parliament (Köymen, 2008).

Between the years 1940-1945, tax policy against nonmuslim minorities called "Varlık Vergisi" (Conscription) was a conscious policy of the state towards creating national bourgeois. II. War War affected the conditions of workers harshly and real wages in 1945 pulled down to the level of 54% of the wages in 1938, despite

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[5] Economy policies held during Republican Period will be detailed in the following section while discussing development of engineering in Turkey. In this section, the main aim is to provide transformation of social class structure until the 1980s in Turkey.

enormous increase in the food product prices. Working conditions of workers reached at the level of slavery. On the other hand, traders and big land owners benefited from the inflationary environment and black-marketing; while poor peasants were called to arms (Boratav, 2011).

Liberalization wave of the post-II.World War period provided the conditions of enrichment for the traders of agricultural products. On the other hand, the share of wages and salaries in the national income decreased. Although Democratic Party came to the rule with the promises of more liberalization, expansionary condition of post-war period came to an end in 1954 and state initiated more protectionist policies. Together with the increase in the private sector enterprises, state sector expanded with the import substituting industrialization (ISI) policies. In this period, the rate of increase in the number of workers in the private sector exceeded that of the workers in the public sector (Boratav, 2011). For peasants, the most important impact of the period was losing their properties with the mechanization and modernization in the agriculture. While small land owners had to migrate to big cities, big land owners were enriched with the rise of efficiency in agricultural production. The portion of marginal works in the cities increased; unplanned urbanization and squatting raised. The proportion of urban population has increased from 19% to 26% between 1950 and 1960, in just 10 years (İçduygu and Sirkeci, 1999).

According to Mübeccel Kıray (1999), although in the first twenty years of the Republic, conditions of capitalist and modernist transformation has been prepared, industrialized and urbanized social structure could not be achieved until the 1950s. With the introduction of the technology in the agriculture, peasantry left their villages and became wage labourers in urban centers, which started an irreversible social change in Turkey.

Between the years 1962 and 1976, protectionist, inward-looking and ISI developmentalist strategy dominated the economy policies of the period. As an extension of ISI policies, in order to promote consumption, wages and salaries of

working population were not suppressed (Boratav, 2011). Social security regime was expanded and unionization was not prevented. Under relatively free environment that 1960 Constitution provided, workers and middle classes were highly politicized around leftist unions, political parties and groups.

Rural to urban migration continued in this period and the rise of urbanization exceeded the rise of industrialization. As a result of this, marginal works became widespread among those migrated from the rural. Another factor that left impact on the social structure of the period is worker migration to European countries. Between 1960 and 1980, the percentage of rural population has decreased from 74 to 55 (İçduygu and Sirkeci, 1999). On the other hand, until the 1980s, agriculture continued to be the dominant sector in Turkish economy.

What is the place of professional middle classes in this picture? Under the dominance of agricultural sector in occupational structure in Turkey, professional middle classes had not composed a significant portion in social class structure until the 1980s[6]. In the literature, the place of middle classes in the social class structure in Turkey until the 1980 has been discussed mainly through their place in the power structure. The main reason for this may be that until the 1980s, peasantry dominated the population in Turkey.

On the other hand, the place of the middle classes in the power structure is a controversial issue. Discussion on the place of professional middle classes in the power structure in the literature turns around a major theoretical controversy that is center-periphery paradigm represented by Şerif Mardin and Çağlar Keyder vs. Marxist paradigm represented by Korkut Boratav. It will be outlined that the power, social position and status attributed to middle classes change with respect to the point of view that is followed.

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[6] Demographical change in their place in social class structure after 1980 will be discussed in the related section 3.2.3.

According to Fernandes and Heller (2006), in order to understand today's middle classes, one should consider historical role they played especially in countries where the lack of strong bourgeoisie caused states' adoption the role of bourgeoisie with state-led developmentalist and inward-looking policies which are implemented by middle class employees of the states during modernization periods and at the same time where there is not strong unionized working class. In this respect, in such countries middle classes are considered as occupying a key functional position in the ruling bloc and also decisive ideological role. Is this argument valid for Turkish middle class? Young Turkish Republic did not inherit a strong national bourgeoisie from Ottoman State (Boratav, 2011). Therefore, state burdened the role of bourgeoisie. State-led developmentalism was the main paradigm determining the political and social atmosphere until the post-II. World War period liberalization wave. Although it cannot be said that state-led developmentalism continued its weight as in the Republican period in the following periods, state economic enterprises maintained their main employer role for professionals in Turkey until the 1980s' privatization wave.

Until the 1980s, because of the lack of widespread private capital, white collar jobs had been dominantly offered by the state. In addition to this, as it will be discussed in the following section, professionals had been the carriers of developmentalist ideology in Turkey. Although it is obvious that professional middle class in Turkey had organic relationship with the state, is it possible to argue that professional middle classes had been the hegemonic class in Turkey; had deep interests in their relationship with the state and determined the ideological atmosphere in Turkey?

There is no consensus on the historical role and importance of middle classes in Turkey, especially for the modernization period of Turkish Republic. For one view, middle classes played a significant and hegemonic role in bureaucratic structure of Turkish state under the conditions of lack of a strong bourgeoisie (Keyder, 2010). From another point of view, Boratav (1993) argues that those depicted as hegemonic bureaucratic class by Keyder and others are the mass of white collar public workers,

not a hegemonic class. What is called as hegemonic class by Keyder is a powerful group in the top of the bureaucracy which cannot be defined outside the capitalist class. Before elaborating this discussion, it is necessary to outline different theoretical outlooks of Keyder and Boratav while analyzing Turkish social classes.

Korkut Boratav analyzes social classes in Turkey from structural point of view with a Marxist theoretical framework. In his book "Social Classes and Distribution in Turkey in the 1980s"[7], Boratav (2005) outlines his theoretical framework. Boratav begins to elaborate his theoretical framework through criticizing stratification approach followed in American social sciences tradition where social "groups" are determined according to different variables, mostly income which causes "inequality" between different strata in society if not equally distributed. Following historical materialist point of view, Boratav accepts that social classes are determined according to the relations of production and appropriation of surplus; and class differences cannot be explained with "inequality", but exploitation of one class over others. In Boratav's theoretical framework, appropriation of surplus realizes with Primary and Secondary Relations of Production. In Primary Relations of Production, there is a dialectic relationship between two main classes of capitalist societies, namely bourgeois and working class, through which capitalists appropriate surplus of labour produced directly by the labourer himself/herself. Through secondary relations of production which is based on reappropriation of surplus labour, middle strata is produced. Middle strata/groups include bureaucracy, individual entrepreneurs and marginals who emerge as a result of redistribution of surplus collected from direct producers by the state as a redistribution mechanism or markets in which surplus flows around different agents with market mechanisms. In Boratav's framework, we cannot talk about "middle class", but middle groups/strata referred as petty bourgeois in Marxist

[7] Boratav, K. (2005) *1980'li Yıllarda Türkiye'de Sosyal Sınıflar ve Bölüşüm.* Ankara: İmge.

literature is determined according to the secondary relations of production (Boratav, 2005).

In his study on class-state relations in modern Turkey, Keyder (2010) considers bureaucracy as a social class in continuation with the Ottoman bureaucratic elites extracting surplus through the taxes collected from peasantry following center-periphery paradigm. With respect to center-periphery paradigm, the "whole history of the past 100 years of Ottoman/Turkish society as a 'class struggle' between two classes: the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie" (Boratav, 1993: 134). The dominance of the center/bureaucracy/state class prevented the rise of "independent" bourgeois which is seen as pre-condition for the rise of civil society which is the guaranteer of the democratic society. From center-periphery paradigm theoricians perspective, entrepreneur middle class should be supported by the state rather than a middle class in bureaucracy (Mardin, 1992).

Accepting that "bureaucracy includes an upper echelon whose strategic positions within the state apparatus systematically creates possibilities of material advantage originating from the handouts of the dominant economic classes" (Boratav, 1993:133), Boratav objects Keyder by arguing that 20th century Turkish bureaucracy is a salaried group within a modernized state structure, an intermediate social group which earns its revenues from a state budget through secondary relations of distribution. While proposing his argument, Boratav follows materialist interpretation of history and maintains that the economically dominant (i.e., the major surplus extracting) class controls the state as well. At some moments of transition from one mode of production to the other, state gains a relative autonomy. Keyder is one of the scholars from countries having strong state tradition and authoritarian rule who misperceives this transition period as if "the state functionaries, the civil servants, in short the bureaucracy itself … were the ruling class" (Boratav, 1993:134).

According to Neyzi (1973), with the need of trained personnel of the government, a new intelligentsia began to emerge in the 19th century. Together with 1908

revolution, this new social group has brought power in the bureaucracy. State enterprises which raised in the 1930s constituted the basis of middle class entrepreneurs of the later periods. Under the liberalization wave of the late 1940s and 1950s, a growing number of entrepreneurs entered into various economical activities. According to Neyzi, "the increasing power of the new middle class groups was the key factor in the political change in 1950" (p.124). Following center-periphery paradigm, Neyzi maintains that the rise of this new middle class during this period undermined the power of bureaucratic elite of the Kemalist period which is the remaining of the Ottoman elite. From their perspective, as opposed to elitist position of old bureaucratic middle class, this entrepreneur middle class has been the supporter and carrier of the 'democratization' in Turkey. From the same point of view, Şerif Mardin (1992) maintains that "middle strata" in the bureaucracy as civil servants could become middle entrepreneurs if mixed liberal economy followed since the 1950s could be evaluated. According to Mardin, extreme liberalization worsened the economic conditions of civil servants and they could not initiate entrepreneurial activities. In this tradition, small or middle scale entrepreneurs are considered as middle class which is accepted as the driving force of democratization in the country. [8]

In this thesis, entrepreneurs are not considered as middle classes, but capitalists because of their relation with the means of production. At the same time, bureaucracy is not accepted as a distinct class, but those having significant bureaucratic power may have organic relations with capitalist class or they might be capitalists at the same time. In this thesis, it is followed that under capitalism, bourgeouisie is the dominant class having an organic relation with the state and bureaucracy. Professional middle classes have served for the capitalist state until the 1980s with developmentalist and modernist motivation, which turned to be more market oriented one, which will be discussed in the following section through

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[8] Mardin's approach to middle classes is pursued by some of the scholars today. It is discussed in section in which post-1980 literature on middle classes is discussed. Please,

engineers. It is thought that professional middle classes have had significant effect on the development and modernization of the country. In this respect, although they have not been dominant demographically, through having status in state institutions and also in private sector, they have had significant position in the power structure.

Whether middle classes have been a dominant class in any period of modern Turkey or not, professional middle classes in Turkey owe their emergence to the modern Turkish state. At least until the rapid expansion of private sector with the 1980s, state has continued to be the main employer for professional middle classes in Turkey. Although there is not enough analysis on the political and social position of professional middle classes in Turkey for the period until the 1980s, the social position of professional middle classes in Turkey can be traced through the history of engineers in Turkey. The history of engineers in Turkey is relevant for this thesis because of two reasons: first, the sample of this study is composed of engineers; second, it is thought that engineers' history in Turkey is a reflection of the history of professional middle classes in Turkey. From now on, middle classes' political and social role in Turkey will be analyzed through the history of engineers in Turkey until the 1980s.

3.1.2 Engineers in Turkey

In this section, the social position of engineers in Turkey will be discussed through the studies conducted by TMMOB and mainly the memory books including a collection of essays written by the engineers who experienced developmental years of Turkey as engineers employed in state economic enterprises.

Conducting a historical analysis on engineers in Turkey is an effective way to understand economical, social and political transformation experienced throughout the history of modern Turkey. As Göle (1998) emphasizes, as a "developing" non-Western country, for Turkey, engineering had a specific importance in the construction of modern Turkey. Rationalist thinking which is sine qua non for modernist development is represented by engineers as enlightened people in societies in the process of modernist development. Development dream pervaded among non-Western countries puts the responsibility of change on the shoulders of engineers. As she states, "top to bottom, statist modernization understanding, anti-capitalist and anti-liberal economic change phenomenon, social engineering ideology granted privileged to engineers in non-Western societies" (Göle, 1998, p.13).

In this respect, engineers in Turkey carried a dual role in development and modernization of Turkey. However, developmental strategies of Turkey have not followed a homogeneous pattern; in a strong connection with reproduction of capitalism in different forms, Turkey has adapted to these new forms. Engineer identity in Turkey has transformed as a result of both capitalist development and social, ideological and political climate changes.

Periodization followed in this thesis has been determined according to major economical, social and political developments in Turkey which are determinant on the social position of engineers. According to Köse and Öncü (2000), the history of engineers from the 1950s to 1980 in Turkey can be divided in three periods according to changes in social conditions and their effects on the symbolic meaning

of engineering and engineers' impact on cultural and economical conditions: Capitalist Developmentalist Technicians Period (1954-1965); Social Critical Independent Developmentalist Technicians Period (1965-1973); Social Activist Independent Developmentalist Technicians Period (1974-1980). They refer to speeches which reflect dominant ideas held in engineer organizations during these periods while determining such namings. Such kind of method is effective to understand different political and social positions of engineers throughout Republican history of Turkey, since civil society organizations are not independent from social, economical and political atmosphere in Turkey. Moreover, what kind of relationship engineers develop with capitalism is crucial to understand their social and political positions. In this respect, without using such namings, such periodization is benefited and how engineers position themselves socially is analyzed referring to memory books of engineers and actions of engineer organizations. These also determine how they perceive their lives and what their life motivations are.

3.1.2.1. From the late 19th century to the 1950s: Engineers in the service of the industrializing and modernizing country

Contrary to the experience of Western countries in which engineering was born as a result of advanced industrialization and the search for more efficiency in capitalist production, engineering has raised in Ottoman period as a result of modernization attempts in the army of the state (Göle, 1998). At the end of the 19th century, reforms called Nizam-ı Cedid (New Order) was put into practice resulting with the establishment of many educational institutions including engineering schools called Mühendishane-i Berri Hümayun and Bahri Hümayun by Sultan Selim III. Educational reforms including technical education were not related with any concern of industrialization, the aim of the program was to restore state power against the internal and external enemies (Zürcher, 1997). The industrial production was for the needs of the army, not for any infrastructural enterprise. Reforms continued to be held during the 19th century. Educational reforms did not only mean modernization of army, but also the inclusion of modernist and rationalist ideology among Ottoman elite and educated class and change of the bureaucratic cadre. Educators in

Mühendishane were invited from Europe and with this flow, foreign engineers started to be active in Ottoman Empire. Under these conditions, engineering in Turkey was born with the initiation of the state to provide the needs of modernization in the state structure.

In 1883, first engineering school other than any military aim Hendese-i Mülkiye was established by Sultan Abdülhamid. Educators of this school were the same with Mühendishane-i Berri Hümayun and although they were not educated as soldier engineers, they were educated for the needs of the state for the construction of the infrastructure of the country. They were appointed to build bridges, railways and buildings as state employees. They were motivated to serve for the state in different regions of empire (Çeçen, 2013). However, number of the graduates of this school was not enough for the empire and the need for foreign engineers was high. In 1908, Ottoman Community of Engineers and Architects was established by Ottoman engineers and architects and declared their objective as "protecting the rights of Ottoman engineers and architects" (Günergün, 2004). Approximately 60 Ottoman engineers were registered to the organization and 43 of them were employed in Nafia Nezareti (Ministry of Public Works); 9 of them were employed in Hendese-i Mülkiye as educators, 3 of them were employed in the Municipality and 3 of them were employed in Maden Nezareti (Ministry of Mining). In a nutshell, rise of engineering in Turkey is not related with an industrialization movement experienced during Ottoman modernization period and their "national engineer concern" was raised as a result of both nationalist ideology among Ottoman elites and the dominance of foreign engineers and architects in the country.

Boratav notes that economy which has been inherited from Ottoman Empire to Turkish reformers of Party of Union and Progress (İttihat and Terakki Partisi) and its successor Kemalist revolutionarists between 1908 and 1922 had a semi-colonial structure, was lack of industrial development and based on raw material export.

There was not any industrial production in its modern sense.[9] According to Boratav, in 1908-1922 period, dominant inclination was towards building a national capitalism. However, there was not enough primitive accumulation of capital and there was lack of national bourgeois. Ottoman bourgeouise dealt with commerce, rather than industry, and dominantly composed of non-Muslim minorities. Although both liberal and international economy supporters and national and closed economy supporters were present among political elite, second inclination was dominant and was supported by prominent political leaders of the period (Boratav, 2011). In line with this, after Proclamation of Constitutional Regime, the Law of Teşvik-i Sanayii aiming rise of national industrial bourgeois and Law of Tatil-i Eşgali aiming to suppress workers' unionization were enacted. After 1908, there was an increase in industrial production, but it was very primitive and not modern (Boratav, 2011). In this respect, it can be said that there was not a need for independent engineers who would work in private industrial plants as experienced in Western industrialized countries. The attempts held in the 1923-1929 period for industrial development did not achieve any significant industrialization progress. However, in these years students were sent to foreign countries to get engineering education, which show that industrialization objectives were rooted to these years, although first huge enterprises were established during the 1930s. In 1924, Zonguldak Yüksek Maden Mühendisi Mekteb-i Alisi (Zonguldak Certified Mining Engineer School) was established with the motivation to turn the country's face to national resources. The most important investment of that period was on railway building under the name of Şimendifer Siyaseti (Railway Politics). Railways were critical for national economic integration and engineers played a critical role in this politics.

For Boratav, 1930 represents the beginning of a new epoch for industrial development determined with policies of "protectionism" and "statism". Contrary to

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[9] Industry was composed of 20 flour mills, 2 pasta, 6 conserve, 1 beer factories, 2 tobacco shop, 1 ice, 3 brick, 3 lime, 7 box, 2 oil, 2 soup, 2 ceramic workshops, 11 tanner, 7 joiner, 7 wool, 2 cotton weaving, 36 raw silk, 1 laminated fabric, 35 printing house, 8 cigarette paper, 5 hardware and 1 chemical product factories (Boratav, 2011).

flexible structure of previous period and with the influence of developments in the world economy mainly 1929 Crisis, Turkish economy was closed in itself and a national industrialization attempt through establishing state enterprises dominated the period. According to Boratav, the main element that distinguished the period from previous period is the fact that protectionist-statist policies aimed industrial development in a systematic and coherent way first time since 1908.

In 1931, statism was included into Republican Party's program as one of the main objectives of the state. It was emphasized that in the long run these state-owned enterprises would be transferred to private sector; the main function of state-owned enterprises was to complement private capital accumulation. This dimension of the statism was emphasized by prominent leaders of this period including Mustafa Kemal (Tezel, 1999).

Protectionist policies were complemented with statist policies after 1932. Attitude towards foreign capital changed and prime minister of the period reflected this position in his words: "While children of this country bear big responsibilities so that industry can vitalize in this country, we cannot make foreings to get all the benefits of this development"[10] (quoted in Boratav, 2011: 69). State-owned enterprises started to be planned and controlled through five year plans for industrial development followed from 1934 onwards. Priority was given to consumption materials "three whites" flour, sugar and textile which are necessary for beginning of any serious industrial progress. In addition to these, modern industrial plants that produce intermediate goods classified under metallurgy, paper and chemical industry were initiated. Under first five year plan, two large state owned holding companies were founded. Sümerbank was founded in 1933 as responsible for the industry and Etibank was founded in 1935 as responsible for mining. These were roof institutions covering many state owned economic enterprises (Zürcher, 1997). Under these

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[10] "Bu memleketin çocukları memlekette sanayi vücuda gelsin diye büyük bir külfete katlanırken bunun nimetini ecnebilere kaptıracak değiliz"

conditions, it can be argued that engineers gained significant status in the state institutions. Moreover, it can be deduced that rise of nationalism in the world and in the country influenced their motivation towards national industrial development followed during these years. These two developments can be counted as significant factors that shaped the "national engineer identity" of the period.

On the other hand, rise of state industrial enterprises supported the private industrial development and private capital accumulation in many ways (Boratav, 2011). As both Tekeli (2004) and Zürcher (1997) emphasized, technical cadre working in state-owned enterprises would play important role in the development of private industry in the following years.

In this way professional middle classes in Turkey started to emerge from state owned enterprises. With the middle of 1920s, Turkey government began to send Turkish students to foreign countries, dominantly to Germany, for engineering education. They were sent to come back again in Turkey and to contribute to the industrial development of the country. Students were selected through exams. One of these students was Selahattin Şanbaşoğlu, the first metallurgy engineer of Turkey. He was sent to Germany in 1927 with scholarship given by the government. First, he initiated to study mechanical engineering, but he discovered metallurgy engineering and thought that this area is crucial for country and continued his education in this field, because the period was the period of iron steel industry (Kuruç, 1999). Rather than following an individual career, he was motivated towards the development of his country and he felt "national responsibility". His return to the country corresponded to the planned and state initiated development period of the 1930s. He was appointed to lead the establishment of state owned Kırıkkale Steel Plant. The factory was producing military equipments and rail. Although there was not accumulated knowledge and experience, the products of the factory were in high quality compared to those produced in developed countries (Kiper, 2004). They were motivated to achieve and this was an eager to prove themselves to both Turkish state and Western World. The engineer of that period felt himself autonomous and this contributed to their motivation to achieve. Şanbaşoğlu states:

There was spirit, effort and result. Whatever desired could be realized. Laws left the engineers who manage the state economic enterprises autonomous. They had the right to select their assistants by themselves. They were free to determine the prices of the products, and select their customers (quoted in Kuruç, 1999: 8).

Status that was given to engineers in that period increased their motivation to work harder and to be successful. One of the first mining engineers of modern Turkey A. Reşit Gencer answers the question of "Is there anything you can say that you did not able to do although you were aimed to do?" in this way:

With respect to mining, no, there is not; because I took significant roles in mining sector in Turkey. I have been satisfied occupationally. May be I could not become rich as many others. This is about one's nature, personality, of course. One should carry commercial ideas to do this. On the other hand, for doing the things that I have done, one should be determined, courageous and self-sacrificing (Gencer, 2004: 236).

On the statements of Şanbaşoğlu and Gencer, it can be said that engineers of this period were given status and this increased their motivation and self-confidence. Şanbaşoğlu then contributed to the establishment of many state-owned industrial plants in different regions of Turkey. Although they were salaried employees, the motivation of engineers of this period cannot be explained as motivation for career and higher standards of living. Apart from being autonomous, they were supported by the most prominent leaders of the period and regularly visited by them. The establishment of these plants was followed by them carefully. It can be said that this made them motivated to work so hard, but this could be a short-cut conclusion, since not all of these engineers were supported by the bureaucracy. The story of agricultural engineer Zihni Derin shows us the other side of the coin:

In 1938, I was appointed for developing tea agriculture in Rize by the state. I was passionate for dealing with this job. I was working too much and impressing the love of tea into the farmers and peasants. They were saying that they would immediately begin to deal with this and cultivate tea instead of tobacco to their lands. I planned Second

Tea Law, proposed to the ministry and began to wait the result under these conditions… The days were passing by, telegrams were sending to the ministry, but I could not get any positive answer. I was feeling that the trust of farmers to me was decreasing day by day. I was deeply embarrassed of being in a position of a person who deceived the peasants; this was a failure in my occupational life that I could not have forgotten ever. I spent a lot of night unsleeping. I cannot forget it still (quoted in Suiçmez, 2004:81).

Engineers leading the state enterprises in rural Turkey represented the state in these institutions and they were the employers of the workers who were also the public of these regions. This dimension is also important to understand how the educated middle class identity in Turkey has been constructed. In this period, they internalized the role of being representator of capitalist and also modern state in their relationship with the workers. From capitalist point of view, Şanbaşoğlu analyses the motivation of the workers in Kırıkkale in this way:

People in our society are negligent. They do not like to take precautions because of their laziness. You should intimidate them. We lived work accidents; at least three or four people died in Kırıkkale. May be this is normal for this sector. But there are two motivation factors for our people: fear and interest. The first one is always present; the second one was not present in the 1930s! I heard this from a peasant in 1946: "We kiss the hand that we are afraid of, not the hand that we like" (quoted in Kuruç, 2004: 19).

Another story of Şanbaşoğlu is from the beginning of the 1950s:

Unionization started in 1951 in military factories. After military factories were renamed as MKE[11] in 1950, an order was declared by Ministry of Labor: "You have to select worker representators". I completely set workers free to select their representator. There were six or seven people who were punished since they were asleep during work hours… When the elections were held, workers selected these punished workers as their representators! I cannot explain it still. Workers of Kırıkkale were getting the highest amounts of payment

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[11] Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation

and they could wear the finest quality dresses in those times (quoted in Kuruç, 2004: 19).

On the other hand, they were carriers of modernity to rural Turkey. They designed the industrial plants as social places in which villagers meet modernity:

> There were just 13 houses outside the factory region in Kırıkkale. *Meyhane[12]*, *kahvehane[13]* and grocery were gathered in the same place. There was not road. Train was coming to the city twice in a week. We could not reach newspapers. We could go to the factory by train or passing through a muddy field. Workers were from the villages of Kırıkkale. They were coming to the factory by riding donkeys or by walk in two or three hours. Lunch and working dress were given to the workers in Kırıkkale first time in Turkey. Who was initiated this was not state. We began this through collecting money among us and routinized this procedure (quoted in Kuruç, 2004: 18).

The modernizing mission of these institutions was determined as a policy by the government of the period, too. Industrialization was a national modernization movement and engineers who get Western style education were the carriers of modernity to rural Turkey. In his speech made in the opening ceremony of Karabük Iron and Steel Plant, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü said:

> As you see, with establishing Karabük Iron and Steel Factory, we are creating not just an institution that meets the primary needs of the country in many fields, but also a cultural and modern institution of Republican and Nationalist Turkey (quoted in Kiper, 2004: 27).

Another story of Burhan Oğuz who was mechanical engineer during Republican years gives us clues about the life concern of that period's elites. After graduation from Engineering Academy in the middle of the 1930s, he should select one of alternatives to do his job. Oğuz tells:

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[12] Means 'male dominated pub'.

[13] Means 'male dominated coffeehouse'.

After finishing the first common period, the time of field selection had come, family friends and relatives gave me advices insistently such as "Don't go to Electro-Mechanical Engineering. In this case, you cannot find job in Turkey. Be a civil engineer, you can do construction business". I did not care these advices and went to Electro-Mechanic department. *I was seeing the emancipation of the country in the industrialization and I was dreaming to make the leadership of this movement* (quoted in Oğuz, 2004:190).

In 2004, TMMOB published the first book of the book series called "Engineering and Architecture Stories". In the preface of the book, the reason of publishing such a series is explained in this way:

These stories are witnessing the meeting of the science and society… There is another objective of this collected work other than fulfilling the duty of loyally for those created these stories: It is to search for the answers to the question of "What is the situation of architecture and engineering in Turkey?" What do engineers and architects who made sacrifices to serve for the public, for the development of the country under restricted conditions, lack of financial support and primitive technologies previously do today? Can they perform their jobs for the benefit of the public? Is decree which is the reason of success stories of engineers present today? What kind of economical and political conditions do present behind the fact that stability took the place of success, demolish took the place of the creation, despair took the place of enthusiasm? (Güvenç, 2004: 5)

From TMMOB's perspective, engineer identity has transformed in time and today, contrary to previous periods, engineering does not serve for the public in Turkey. They invite us to understand the economic and political conditions behind this transformation. While they consider "economic and political" conditions behind this transformation, they overlook the "social" conditions. In this thesis, social conditions gain specific importance since life motivations of engineers affecting their perceptions about their social position are strongly related with their social class and cultural positions and seek for status, in other words with their middle classness.

Although in this preface, TMMOB considers Republican years and 1970s as the same with respect to ideological and motivational position of engineers, it is

necessary to emphasize the ideological difference between these two periods to shed light on the dynamics that carried professional middle classes today.

Nationalist motivation of engineers in Republican period should be emphasized since it is one of the main points that distinguish the motivations of Republican Period engineer and engineer in the 1970s. While the "nation" was emphasized in the Republican Period, in the 1970s we see that the "nation" replaces with the "public". While the engineer of the Republican period feels himself responsible to serve for "Turkish nation", engineer of the 1970s feels himself/herself responsible to serve for the "public". The story of one of the first material engineers of Republican Turkey Mahmut Sadi shows us that the developmentalist, nationalist and modernist motivation among the Kemalist cadre in power pervades among engineers, too. They felt themselves as part of the power elite. Mahmut Sadi tells his story of being engineer and his roots of motivation:

> It was 1923. I was student in İstanbul University. I saw an announcement on the wall. They would send students to Europe for higher education. I was surprised because the country was in ruins. It seemed me impossible but I wanted to try my chance. From 150 people, 11 people including me were selected. Atatürk wrote 'he would go Berlin University" near my name on the sheet. Time to go, I was in Sirkeci train station. But my mind is so confused. Should I go? What would I do if they forgot me there? Would they send me money? For a moment, I decided not to go. At that moment a personnel called my name 'Mahmud Sadi, Mahmut Sadi, you have a telegraph'. I received the telegraph. It was from Atatürk and he wrote exactly these: 'I am sending you as sparks; you should come back as flames'. Can you think this? How do you decide not to go, not to study there and come back to sacrifice your life for this country? (quoted in Kiper, 2006:31-32)

As a conclusion, it can be said that economic and social policies held during the 1930s and 1940s shaped the engineer identity of the period. Göle analyses the motivation of engineers in this period:

> The desire for self-sufficiency in these times contradicted with factories' management by foreign technical cadre: After this,

engineers came to the scene collectively. After a short period of time, they took significant responsibilities in state policies. State to which they feel themselves indebted is the mechanism of transformation, 'revolution from above' and the founder of a society that is free of class conflict. Under the conditions of lack of bourgeois holding the capital, engineers holding the knowledge managed the production in the production institutions of the state. State emerged as warrantor of economical development and 'advancement and happiness' of the public (Göle, 1998: 114).

3.1.2.2. From the 1950s to the 1960s: Engineers' meeting with entrepreneurship and private sector

The end of the World War II opened a new epoch for Turkish economy. 1946 represents a turning point with respect to economy policies. In this year, closed, protectionist and inward looking economy policies were replaced with liberal policies. Instead of inward looking industrialization policies, outward looking developmental policies that prioritize agriculture, infrastructure investments and construction sector were preferred and focused on the development of private sector.

Republican People's Party lost the general election held in 1950. Democrat Party came into power, but this did not cause any significant change in economy policies which were liberalized in 1946 Congress of Republican People's Party. Although Democrat Party came into power with the promises of transferring public enterprises to private sector, it could not be possible directly and public enterprises maintained their importance (Boratav, 2011). The discovery of the significance of public investments for the development of the private sector made Democrat Party government to follow a mixed economy model. According to Boratav (2011), this period can be depicted as the years of the establishment of an economic structure that articulates public sector and private sector in a functional way for the sake of private sector. On the other hand, 1950s represents the liberalization of Turkish economy; state policies encouraged private sector investments and entrepreneurship. According to Ünüvar (2010), in this period, bureaucratic power in Turkey resisted to leave their places to a new rising entrepreneur middle class. In this period, engineers become

articulated to the entrepreneur middle class that is encouraged by the state. As an extension of this, engineers were united under the roof of Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) in 1954.

During the 1950s, engineers were sharing the same developmental perspective with rising upper and middle urban classes and bourgeoisie (Türel, 2005). Engineering became popular among young people because of this image of engineering (Türel, 2005). Engineers working in private sector started to develop an alternative perspective. As Akkaya mentions, engineers in the private sector developed a perception of that working in public sector was not rational because of relatively low salaries; it could only be an instrument for gaining experience (Akkaya, 1996). In this period, engineers perceived their interests intersecting with the bourgeois which would evolve the opposite direction in the 1970s.

The story of the establishment of the first mapping academy in Turkey as told by the first map engineer of Turkey Ekrem Ulusoy gives us clues about the engineer of that period who turned his face to private sector compared to the 1930s. The dynamics that determine engineers' life motivations were changing. Ekrem Ulusoy tells:

> We said that we were beginning this job as three engineers. But 3 engineers are not enough to realize this project. We tried to include younger friends among us. But, those days, individual entrepreneurs and those employed in the private sector could earn too much. Those employed in the public sector were not satisfied with the wages. For example we proposed Hasan Kıran to join us. He said, "*Hocam,* I like teaching. But there is a huge difference between wages in the public and private sectors. If state would give me the half of the wage given in the private, I will not hesitate to come". We had been so sorry while running this business as three engineers (quoted in Köktürk, 2008:118).

Private sector started to attract engineers of the period with higher salaries and also individual entrepreneurship was encouraged by the state as a component of the economic liberalization policy. Under these conditions, they did not lose their role in public institutions, but they lost their significance for the state, which means lost of

the status previously held (Göle, 1998). Under the effect of privatization wave, engineers demanded a legislative framework for their occupation by the state and demanded an identity that is independent from the state. In this period, the number of engineers raised dramatically as a result of the industrialization, the budget for the technical education increased. Qualitatively, the engineer identity of the period was different from that of the Republican period. Although engineers were dominantly employed in the public sector, they did not continue to define themselves with an organic relationship with the state. In the 1950s, the role of engineer in the development and modernization of the country lost its importance for the state, and at the same time with liberalization wave engineers started to feel the need to define themselves independent from the state. In 1954, TMMOB was established and determined its main objective as to express their occupational demands through their civil organization to the state. In those years, engineers dominantly internalized Taylorist point of view. As one of the administrators of TMMOB in 1957-1958 period Şükrü Er tells:

> In our age, industrial management issues are so complicated. It is a science now. Employer has gone out of the scene; there are representatives of the employers now. Industry has been so extended; entrepreneurs left the management job to the technicians who have the knowledge. We cannot talk about the bosses' orders anymore in the workplace. As workplace has expanded, each department has its leader as the representatives of the employer. Accordingly, when we talk about the employer, we mean these employer representatives from now on (Köse and Öncü, 2000).

Democratic Party won three elections consecutively; however, from the middle of the 1950s, it lost its widespread support. Economy worsened because of inflation, rising foreign dept and instability in economics management. In addition to economical crisis, Democratic Party replied rising oppositions with repression and restrictions on freedoms together with conservative policies on social arena. In May 27, 1960 a military coup which was supported by urban middle classes and elites who strictly embraced Republican values and secularity was initiated by Turkish Army against the Democrat Party government.

3.1.2.3. From the 1960s to the 1980s: Engineers in Leftist Politics

After military coup, in economical area, planned development policies started to be applied. State Planning Organization was established and technocrats embracing etatist policies were appointed to manage the planned development process. In addition to the changes in economy policies, constitution of 1960 provided a free environment in which progressive movements could realize their activities freely. This prepared the conditions through which the engineer identity of the 1970s was shaped. Under these conditions, leftist people gathered around two movements: Turkish Workers Party (TİP) and Yön Journal. In time, People's Republican Party became a strong component of the leftist movement. Leftist movement received strong support from students, workers and middle classes. Towards the end of the 1960s, student movements put distance to TİP and Yön movements and many student organizations gathered around *Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu*. 1970s were welcomed with worker strikes, worker and peasant demonstrations, factory and land occupations, a strong worker, student and peasant unionization (Göle, 1998). At the same time, economy worsened. Military intervention of March 12, 1971 aimed to suppress leftist consciousness and secure the hegemony of capital again. Student leaders of these movements were punished with the strictest ways. Despite the state's strict measures, leftist movement could not be suppressed. However, the conflict between leftist and rightist ideologies reflected on the streets as acts of violence.

Putting distance to the state among engineers started with articulation in the liberal economy policies until the middle of the 1960s (Köse and Öncü, 2000), and changed direction towards leftist ideology from the middle of the 1960s. From this point on, engineers started to question their social roles and with the leadership of TMMOB, they took critical position to the state and capitalist development and their roles in it. The main question was "to whom should engineers and architects serve?" The dominant answer of the 1970s was "the public". Architect of the period Gürol Gürkan stated in 1969 Architect's Seminar:

> Architecture served for powerful and rich sections of the society throughout its history. Architecture has never been the occupation of people who care for the needs of the public. Revolution in the architecture will be a movement towards the public (quoted in Köse and Öncü, 2000: 108).

While talking to engineers, the head of TMMOB Teoman Öztürk was declaring that engineer should consider the interests of the public first rather than his/her personal interests.[14] In engineers' discourse, the state was replacing with the public in these years:

> Technicians should use their knowledge and skills for the welfare of the public. Since the country is in the hands of national and foreign bourgeois, it cannot realize. Saving the country from underdevelopment is not to make capitalists earn more money, but to serve for the public. Interests of the technicians contradict with the current economical, social and political structure. Because of our objective conditions, we are at the side of the public and opposite to the ruling power groups… Our future depends on an order in which productive forces can be freely developed, there is not any hierarchy between manual and mental labor, and workers are not alienated to their labour (quoted in Köse and Öncü, 2000: 109).

Under the influence of socialist ideology, the capitalist state together with the bourgeoisie was criticized. On the other hand, it should be noted that this was the dominant inclination represented by engineer organizations, as they were representing capitalist class during 1950s. In this respect, engineer of the period was not homogeneous with respect to their occupational and life motivations, ideological, political and social positions as other segments of middle classes of the period. In this period, although middle classes in general were close to socialist (or social democratic) ideology represented dominantly by Republican People's Party, mainly young population had stronger organic relationship with the leftist movement. The dynamic among engineers was parallel to this general structure. Study conducted by

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[14] The documentary on Teoman Öztürk directed by Özcan Alper in 2010 could be seen to understand TMMOB's discourse in these years through the website
http://www.tmmob.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=6334

Ali Artun in 1976 gives us clues about the different alignments between engineers from different age groups. For 23.4% of engineers graduated from university in 1971-75 period, social-economic structure of the period was "capitalism under imperialism" ; while the percentage among 1930-1950 graduates giving the same answer was 6%. To the question of which type of social-economical system they support, 46.2% of 1930-1950 graduates, 34,6% of 1950-1960 graduates, 25.6% of 1961-1970 graduates and 14.7% of 1971-1975 graduates answered as "mixed economy". 30.4% of 1930-1950 graduates, 39% of 1950-1960 graduates, 47.5% of 1961-1970 graduates and 46.9% of 1971-1975 graduates answered as "social democracy". 2.2% of 1930-1950 graduates, 5.9% of 1950-1960 graduates, 11.1% of 1961-1970 graduates and 18.5% of 1971-1975 graduates answered as "socialism". 27.2% of 1930-1950 graduates thought that the relationship with the US was problematic, while 63.5% of 1971-1975 graduates gave the same answer. Engineers from different age groups gave the parallel answers to the question if they believe the state is independent, or not; 20.1% of them thought that "it is independent", while 52.2% of them thought that "it is not independent". And most of the engineers of the period independent of their age thought that their problems cannot be separated from the problems' of the public. Moreover, most of the engineers of the period thought that engineer organizations should deal with politics[15] (Artun, 1999).

This profile of engineers actually reflects the political position of middle classes in this period in general. According to Ünüvar (2010), middle classes' political inclination is usually towards the stability and order which are represented usually by the central right political parties. As Poulantzas points out, middle classes have the potential of an egalitarian point of view which articulated their political position with

[15] Those in private sector: 14.6% TMMOB should be politically active in an extensive way; 51.4% TMMOB should be politically active in a restricted way; 32.3% TMMOB should not be politically active. Those in public sector: 25.7% TMMOB should be politically active in an extensive way; 42.6% TMMOB should be politically active in a restricted way; 28.9% TMMOB should not be politically active. For a comparison with today's engineers' attitudes, please look at the Data Analysis Chapter.

Republican People's Party (CHP) of the 1970s with the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. According to Ünüvar, the populist discourse that was followed by CHP gained a middle class support. According to Necmi Erdoğan (1998), Ecevit transformed CHP from "state party" to "people's party". In Ecevit's construction of the notion of "people", middle classes were included in the picture. Ecevit succeeded to mobilize middle classes under the roof of social democracy. On the other hand, the following experiences would show that middle class base is not a stable base for political left. In the following section, the determinant role of lifestyle in political attitudes will be emphasized.

Post-1980 period has been a new epoch for middle classes in Turkey. Previously, they were heavily employed in the state sector, with the liberalization of economy in post-1980 period made private sector as the main employer of professional middle classes in Turkey. While the salaries of state employees were decreasing, to achieve a career in private corporations became the status symbol of professional middle class. Although state has withdrawn from production sector, liberalization of the economy did not give birth to a civil society with the democratic participation of middle classes as liberal-left writers[16] anticipated. To the contrary, professional middle classes have increasingly been alienated to politics (Lüküslü, 2009). Moreover, uncertainty and risk in labor market gave birth to a new identity for professional middle class. In the following section, political, cultural and social dimension of this transformation will be discussed.

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[16] See, Göle, N. (1998) *Mühendisler ve İdeoloji*. İstanbul: Metis.

3.2 Professional Middle Classes in Turkey: From 1980 Onwards

3.2.1. Neoliberalism in Turkey

Years towards the 1980 witnessed economical, political and social crisis around conflict between political left and political right in Turkey. With the leadership of Undersecretary of Prime Ministry Turgut Özal, Turkish government took decisions of some economic reforms[17] towards neoliberal economic restructuration in January 24, 1980. 8 months after January 24 decisions, Turkish Army made a military coup. While January 24 decisions had been the first step of structural adjustment policies held throughout the 1980s by Özal governments, 1980 military coup provided the social and political conditions for neoliberal restructuring without any opposition in society.

Between the years 1980 and 1984, the political opposition has been brutally suppressed. Under martial law measures, politicians were banned from politics; unionized labor was repressed; the martial law measures severely restricted the activities of unions and collective bargaining rights, strikes were banned and effective workers' unions were closed and its leaders were sentenced. Neoliberal program could be easily achieved under the conditions of the lack of any political opposition. In November 1983, Turgut Özal won the general elections with his political party MP (Motherland Party) and remained as prime minister between the years 1983 and 1989 and directed Turkish politics until his death in 1993 as president.

Structural adjustment policies of 1980s were composed of more liberalization both externally and internally; less state involvement in productive activities-including

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[17] With January 24 decisions, mainly public expenditure was cut down; wages were declined; foreign trade was liberalized (Boratav, 2011).

steps towards privatization; export oriented development model as a mechanism of resource allocation (Boratav, 1990: 199). According to Boratav, "regulating and shaping income distribution against labor through changing and redefining the policy parameters in general was major goal of the structural adjustment policies" (p. 199). Wage settlements were taken over by the government-controlled High Board of Arbitration which, for four years, allowed for nominal wage increases systematically and consistently below annual inflation rates (Boratav, 1990). Not only workers, but also other dependent classes' the real wages (Boratav, 2011) -such as government officials - decreased. Modes of accumulation and surplus creation mechanisms were changed structurally (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989). Public sector intensified its investments on infrastructure and energy sectors; while these became services and construction for private sector (Topak, 2012).

Towards the end of the 1980s, financial liberalization was put into practice and in this way "barriers" to the global market were almost completely removed. Despite the decline of inflation and progress in growth, distribution of wealth completely turned against labor. Another characteristic of that period is suppression of real wages and hostile measures against organized labor. Share of wages in GNP was 36% in 1977, reduced to 18% in 1987. Suppression of wages had a dual benefit for capital: reducing domestic demand in favor of creating an exportable surplus and also cutting labor costs (Boratav, Yeldan, Köse, 2001). According to Boratav (2005), changes against labour force and peasants throughout the 1980s are results of intentional interventions of the state in coalition with the capitalist class. As a result of the policies held throughout the 1980s, "cheap labour" force has been created and this attracted foreign capital, too. However, classic mode of surplus attraction through suppression of wages reached its limits in 1988 (Boratav, 1990). Union movements in 1988, approaching elections and loss of Prime Minister Turgut Özal in referendum on removal of political bans were all the factors directing Özal to implement more 'populist' policies. Beginning with 1989, an overall increase in both the share and level of public salaries, and investments on social infrastructure were realized (Boratav, Yeldan, Köse, 2001). Real wages in manufacturing increased by 90% from 1988 to 1991. However, these populist policies were not representing a

structural shift in favor of labor. Moreover, these can be evaluated as functional to prevent social tension which has the potential of threatening the hegemony of capital. Relief on inflationary pressures of the late 80s and funding of rising public sector expenditure were compensated for complete deregulation on finance sector in 1989. With hot money inflows in the country, TL was appreciated. In Boratav's words (2011), this was "temporary marriage of populism and neoliberalism".

Parameters were changing against labor. The Fordist approach that aims to provide the stability of capital accumulation with control of consumption was abandoned and policies that only aim primitive accumulation of capital through excessive exploitation of labour was adopted. Public expenditure was decreased and tax policy was changed towards a tax policy mainly based on consumers. Expenditure on public services such as education, health and social security has been decreased (Topak, 2012). Welfare policies were restructured aiming to decrease state's responsibility about social welfare of citizens. Private schools, universities and health institutions were promoted. Instead of "social rights" that cover all citizens, coherent with neoliberal ideology, "social assistance" perspective was adopted and "Social Aid and Solidarity Promotion Fund" which is funded by citizens based on a voluntary system was established in 1986.

As a result of reliance on hot money inflows, a crisis came in 1994. The reforms held in order to deal with the problems of crisis were against labor and agriculture sector. As Boratav et. al. (2001) noted "orthodox crisis management of 94-95 as in 80-81 represents the 'other side of the coin', i.e. the antithesis of populism" (Boratav, Yeldan, Köse, 2001). Capital used its flexibility to adapt and gain profit from new conditions. Besides, informally employed labor exceeded the amount of formally employed labour in 1994; subcontracting activities increased. Uncertainty in markets and loss of control of Central Bank on finance made economy more fragile. Although the reason of this crisis was capital, its devastating results were felt by labour and those in agriculture sector with decisions taken in April 5, 1994. "Economic surplus was transferred from the industrial/real sectors and wage labor, in particular, towards the financial sector" (Boratav, Yeldan, Köse, 2001:325). In 1994,

ratio of wages in value added decreased 4.6 point; real wages decreased 20 percent and terms of trade of agriculture deteriorated 12 percent (Boratav, 2011). A typical example of capital's crisis management that is against labour given by Boratav (2011) is from automotive sector. During 1994 crisis, automotive companies forced their workers for unpaid leave and invested their savings from wages to government bonds and treasury bills. While these crises were experienced in developing countries like Turkey, IMF and World Bank and the followers of neoliberal ideology pointed out the 'inability' of governments in implementation of the 'rational' and 'coherent' policies proper for open market conditions; proposed reform packages.

In 1999, IMF and Turkish government signed another structural adjustment program, although there was not any crisis. It came with a "crisis prevention aim" with the so-called lessons taken from Asian and Russian crisis. This time, IMF's priorities were shifted towards 'second generation reforms' which are about the reorganization of institutions through establishing higher 'independent' boards. While Turkish economy was under IMF guidance, a crisis of balance of payments was realized with twin crisis of banking and capital outflow.

JDP (Justice and Development Party) government came into rule after these twin crises in 2002 with a new three year stand-by agreement which is developed around a fiscal adjustment through primary surplus of capital. Inflation target and high rates of growth could be achieved; however, this could be achieved at the expense of high rates of unemployment, informal and insecure employment, 'unjust' income distribution, reduced and qualitatively worsened agricultural support, acceleration of the commodification of basic public services. On the other hand, through privatizations, 'alternative' Islamic bourgeoisie was created; however, change in the profile of the capital did not change the conditions of labor.

As one of the main dimensions of neoliberalization process, privatization of state owned enterprises has occupied a central place among JDP's neoliberal policies. Until 1988, privatization has not been realized in Turkey, but the conditions necessary for this were prepared. State withdrew from making investments in

production sector, public enterprises were restructured considering the parameters important for private sector until 1988. Between the years 2002 and 2007, the most valuable public sector institutions were quickly liquidated (Ekzen, 2009).

New capital accumulation strategy that JDP government maintained has been based on foreign investments, liquidation of public banks, and liberalization of agricultural sector. To decrease the effects of 2008 financial crisis, state followed incentive policies for capital accumulation in private sector and neoliberal arrangements in labour regime has been intensified. Significant changes in the labour sector have been experienced since the 1980s; labour market in Turkey has faced new implementations in the 2000s such as private employment agencies.

Discourse they used to legitimize deregulation in labour market was that regulations over labour sector are interventions on private sector causing inefficiency and legal framework for flexibilization of labour should be drawn by the state. Subcontracting has become widespread. In the sectors such as automotative, communication, electronic, subcontracting in secondary sector has become widespread. Labour regime in public sector has also been affected from this transformation. Because of privatization of public enterprises, worker employment in public sector has decreased. While employment of government officials increased; public employment in technical areas has been decreased as a result of privatization of state owned industrial plants. Moreover, government officials started to be employed with contractual status accelerating with the 2000s. Legislative framework for the flexibilization in working hours, worker rights such as severance payment, individualized working contracts has been provided by the state. Individualization in working places caused erosion of unionized labour power. In public sector, on the other hand, regulations such as 'performance based wage' system are planning to be put into practice.

Together with these, commodification of health and education and restructuring of social security system are major characteristics of the JDP period. Incentives have been given for private schools and hospitals. The main inclination in these changes

has been towards increasing individual "responsibility" in services and directing people for privatized alternatives of these services. The main aim is to create a citizenship regime in which citizens burden the responsibility of their welfares. Rather than 'social rights' perspective, 'consumer' perspective is tried to be established. The transformation has been realized in the areas of health, education and social security regimes. In health, the basic motivation is towards the commodification of health services and replacement of public services with private ones. This objective has been indicated in many documents of JDP. In Health Reform Package of JDP, it has been indicated that Ministry of Health would be organizer, coordinator, director, supervisor in health sector and produce health policies. On the other hand, service providing role would be transferred to private sector. Moreover, transformation in social security regime would be based on the promotion of private social security regime. General Social Security system was defined in its relationship with the private counterpart and complementary role has been given to the private. In this system, General Social Security system would provide a "basic package" of services to the citizen, and if they desire, citizens would purchase extra services from the private. Together with the transformation in the social security regime, "family medicine" system has been put into practice. In this system, primary care physicians would be responsible for the centers in its all dimensions including the renting of the health center etc. and they would be financed by the state according to a "performance" based criterion. This implementation aims to decentralization and privatization of health services. As a third major policy, "full-time act" was put into practice and with this policy it has been aimed to provide the conditions of transfer of medical doctors working in public hospitals to private health institutions (Hamzaoğlu and Yavuz, 2009). Purchasing health service from the private health institutions was encouraged with subsidies given by the state. As a result of these policies, from 2002 to 2007, services received from university hospitals was decreased with 33%, services received from public hospitals was decreased with 3%; while services received from the private institutions was increased with 64%. As Hamzaoğlu and Yavuz indicate, "efficiency" could not be achieved although it was provided as the reason of the reform package (Hamzaoğlu and Yavuz, 2009: 647). In education –as in the health- the inclination is towards

giving incentives to private schools and decentralization in public education with respect to financial issues. One of the policies that government is planning to put into practice is direct payment to private schools for each student in the amount of 1500 TL.[18] These policies are just some of the policies that AKP government has put into practice and plans to do through aiming for constructing the neoliberal citizenship regime in Turkey.

All in all, neoliberal transformation in Turkey began in 1980 and continues to be implemented by neoliberal governments. The aim of this study is to understand to what extent these policies are legitimized and through which mechanisms consent is achieved among professional middle classes.

In the following section, the effect of neoliberal transformation on social classes in Turkey will be discussed in general. Then, the effect of neoliberalism on professional middle classes will be discussed in detail.

3.2.2 Ideological/Discoursive Construction of Neoliberalism in Turkey

Together with these structural changes in the economy and social policies of the state towards neoliberalization, ideological/discursive construction of the neoliberalism in Turkey has been put into practice in a systematic way by the governments since the 1980s. It should be emphasized that under the conditions of political suppression on the opposition groups and worker unions, this process could be more easily achieved. As it has been discussed in the previous section, intentional policies have been implemented to suppress labour force after 1980. Suppression of labour force was not limited with decrease in real wages[19], but also political suppression aimed to

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[18] Accessed from http://www.stargazete.com/politika/ozel-okula-ogrenci-basina-1500-tl-odeme/haber-503549 on 26.06.2013

[19] According to Boratav, such structural changes against labour and peasants made these sections of the society to develop *defence and adaptation strategies* to preserve their life style level (Boratav,

deteriorate class consciousness.[20] Together with these, "Crooked Populism" (Yoz Populizm) strategies held by MP governments throughout the 1980s which will be elaborated below aimed to erode the class consciousness of urban workers.

In "Social Classes and Distribution in Turkey in the 1980s" (2005)[21] and "Class Profiles from İstanbul and Anatolia"[22] (2004), Korkut Boratav presents two studies having the questions of how the deterioration of income distribution against the working class and peasantry reflected on families in micro level, what kind of adaptation and defense mechanisms they developed and how ideological and political attitude of working people has transformed. First of these studies conducted in 1988 with urban working class people living Pendik-Kartal region of İstanbul by Korkut Boratav and Galip Yalman. Study revealed that workers in general began to support right wing political parties in the 1980s (Boratav, 2005: 126). One of the most important findings of the study is that white collar workers are more inclined to vote for "center-right" political parties at the end of the 1980s. Together with voting behavior, the attitudes of different social groups have been questioned through other

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2005: 103). As defence and adaptation strategies, head of family can work in another job; academically unsuccessful children may be forced to leave their education in earlier ages and work in 'marginal' jobs as cheap child labour; housewives try to contribute the family income through insecure jobs.

[20] The most effective union that organized labour power during the 1970s DİSK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions) was closed and its leaders were banned from political activities. On the other hand, the importance of unionization for workers was not completely removed. Workers continued to unionize under pro-government union Türk-İş and three important worker movements were raised to the end of the 1980s: 1989 spring protests, 1990-91 Zonguldak worker movement and 1991 general worker strike.

[21] Boratav, K. (2005) *1980'li Yıllarda Türkiye'de Sosyal Sınıflar ve Bölüşüm.* Ankara: İmge.

[22] Boratav, K. (2004) *İstanbul ve Anadolu'dan Sınıf Profilleri.* Ankara: İmge.

variables and at the end of the analysis, it has been concluded that official ideological discourse has been internalized dominanly at the end of the 1980s.

According to the results of the study, hegemonic economic discourse of the 1980s was adopted by the salaried groups with percentages between 33 and 56. The arguments that "unions should not deal with politics", "tax repayments to the salaried groups favors workers" and "financial liberalization is a beneficial policy" were adopted by workers with the percentage above 50%. On the other hand, the findings of the study revealed that acceptance level of hegemonic discourse was highest among petty bourgeois, while it had the least support among industrial workers. White collar workers, on the other hand, show inconsistency with respect to ideological and political attitudes.

Revisit of 1988 study in 1991-92 by Korkut Boratav determined that leftist attitudes in financial liberalization and social welfare state issues have increased among especially groups other than entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the increase in leftist attitudes can be explained with the decrease in the power of MP. The opposition that SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) and DYP (The Right Way Party) raised aimed to the distribution policies of the MP. In this respect, throughout these three years, the consensus around the neoliberal ideology has weakened (p. 147). On the other hand, general difference between different social grops gives us a clue for the impression level of neoliberal hegemonic discourse on different social groups in Turkey. The findings with respect to the education level are significant specifically for this thesis. First, those who get higher level education (university/high school graduates) show rightist attitudes towards liberalization contrary to leftist attitudes of those who get lower level (primary level) education. Both university graduates and primary school graduates show leftist attitudes towards the issue of social welfare state. On the other hand, these groups diverge each other with respect to religion-women issues with leftist attitudes among educated ones (Boratav, 2004: 151-152).

According to Boratav, the main reason of pervasiveness of traditional social welfare state among these groups with the percentage of 95 is that neoliberal attacks against

social welfare regime had not came on the agenda at those times. Moreover, political preferences of professionals at the beginning of the 1990s show that they have social democratic political attitude. The recent study can be evaluated as a revisit of Boratav's study under conditions of transformation of welfare regime in Turkey.

These studies revealed that between the years 1988-1992, a legitimate ground for neoliberal transformation was almost established among different social groups. It should be noted that legitimization of neoliberalism has also been put into practice as a conscious policy by public figures. It has been implemented hand in hand with a discourse change. Neoliberal restructuring around free-markets were presented as inevitable. The reason of shortages and black marketing were announced as "statist, protectionist and interventionist" policies of the pre-1980 period. Suppression of real wages was legitimized with the discourse around the slogans such as "citizens have to make sacrifices for national economic development" (Boratav, 2005: 129). Media was effectively used for this aim and figures appeared in the public sphere favoring the liberal economy. According to Boratav (2005), among educated professional groups who internalized Western style urban living, having consumption based lives, liberal economic discourse was adopted.

From 1984 on, Prime Minister Turgut Özal had been the main actor of construction of neoliberal discourse in Turkey. Neoliberal populism which is called as "crooked populism" by Korkut Boratav (2005) mainly targeted workers, civil servants, and the urban marginals who have emerged as the 'losers' of the neoliberal transformation. According to Boratav, the main difference of crooked populism from populism of ISI period had been that populist policies of neoliberal period do not make structural amelioration in the conditions of working population. Rather they are based on "saving the day" philosophy which eradicates the class consciousness, but increases the support of social groups who are searching for adaptation strategies to the new economy conditions.

Populist policies towards the urban working class and marginals were realized through municipalities which were dominantly held by MP. Policies around

municipalities included giving certificate of ownership to shanty owners. Through such kind of policies, MP did not bother power groups; at the same time the political and ideological effect of conflicts of distribution raised by production relations on working class was prevented and "turning the corner without labour", "*işini uydurma*"[23] become the mottos shaping the political behavior of the working class, urban marginals and civil servants (Boratav, 2005). Through such kind of mentality, free market gained support from a wide range of groups who believe under such kind of an order, they could become quickly rich (Keyder and Öncü, 1993).

Furthermore, populist discourse of the MP also appealed to the *orta direk* through policies such as granting housing credits to the people in these groups at relatively better interest rates, tax refund (Tafolar, 2008). *Orta direk* was referring to a group including civil servants, retired people and wage workers whose life conditions were worsened as a result of the economy policies. Through these policies which do not bother the power relations in the society, Özal tried to give the impression that MP was the representative of the "public" and the notion of social justice to the 'losers' of neoliberal restructuring of the economy.

Another dimension of the Özal's populism is relations based on clientelist ties with some business groups. State bureaucracy has been reorganized and a number of US-educated professionals/technocrats called "Özal's Princes" were assigned to significant positions in bureaucracy (Tafolar, 2008). Through personal ties with these "princes", rent-seeking tendencies were increased (Boratav, 2005). Moreover, one of the characteristics of the period had been that decisions were taken in a 'top-down' manner from a technocratic outlook. Engineers played a central role in this model.

Özal's princes had another role in the neoliberal transformation of the country. They were representing the "ideal citizens" of the neoliberal age with characteristics of young, 'dynamic', US-educated, professional and having Western-oriented style of

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[23] Managing your work no matter to what extent your way is ethical.

lives (Kozanoğlu, 1993). They contributed to the construction of neoliberal discourse in Özal period. Public administration system was reorganized from a technocratic point of view to provide the conditions of direct management of economy by these technocrats.

Turgut Özal was depicting himself as the "savior" of the country and the only way of saving the country has been declared as transition to liberal economy. Özal utilized media, especially TV channels as the main instruments of conveying this discourse and rationality to the public. "From Within the Execution"[24] program that was broadcast in state channel TRT in prime time through which Özal was speaking to public and talking about his 'icraat's. İcraat means execution, but behind it, it has a hidden meaning which puts 'icraat's and ideologies in conflict with each other. The emphasis on icraat was also a discoursal tool giving the message that 'icraat's should be favored instead of ideologies, as if 'icraat's which mainly connote economy policies are devoid of ideological basis. In one of his speeches Özal was declaring that "We always come with decrees. We have a plenty of decrees. Everyday we come up with new decrees. Turkish Republic cannot be ruled without decrees" (quoted in Tafolar, 2008: 199).

Today, the discourse that AKP government follows is similar with Özal's discourse with more emphasis on conservative politics. "From Within Execution" program was renamed by Prime Minister Ecevit in 1999 as "Adress to the *Ulus*" which was renamed by current Prime Minister Erdoğan as "In the way of Service to *Millet*"[25] with a similar rhetoric with Özal with an emphasis of their conservative look with the words 'millet' and 'service'. Together with neoliberal conservative rhetoric, populist policies towards urban working classes and the urban 'poor' created a base for

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[24] "*İcraatın İçinden*"

[25] In these namings, both *ulus* and *millet* mean "the nation". However, because *ulus* is claimed to be original Turkish word corresponding to the nation, Kemalist nationalists prefer to use this; while since *millet* is an Arabic word ferquently used in Turkish, Islamists prefer to use this word.

political support in elections. Furthermore, incentives given for private health and education institutions function as populist policies aiming to gain the support of middle classes.

All policies toward social and economic restructuring in Turkey have reflected on professional middle classes' working conditions, life style, political attitudes and aspirations for future. In the following sections, the effect of neoliberal policies on professional middle classes will be focused on.

3.2.3 White Collar Work under Conditions of Neoliberalism

With such structural changes in the economic policies of the state, exporters, rentiers and financial capital emerged as the main beneficiaries of the policies held (Boratav, 1990). Agricultural producers as a result of elimination of subsidies of the previous periods and civil servants and wage earners as a result of suppression of wages have been the losers, contrary to the populist policies held in the ISI period (Boratav, 1990). On the other hand, in this period, as a result of both increase in the opportunities in higher education and expansion of the service sector gave rise to increase in the number of educated white collar workers/ professionals whose lifestyle, aspirations and outlook have been affected by the atmosphere of the period.

Table 3. Rate of Attendance to Higher Education (%)

1990	**1997**	**2006**	**2010**
14.5	23.2	43.4	67.0

Source: Ministry of Development

Table 4. Employment of Active Population by Sectors (%)

	1988	2010
Agriculture	46.5	25.15
Industry	15.8	19.9
Services	37.7	54.95

Source: Ministry of Development

Before presenting a number of studies on cultural transformation on professional middle classes, in this section, white collar work under the conditions of neoliberalism will be discussed.

International Labour Organization (2011) provides the occupational distribution of salaried/wage workers in 2008; and they foresee the percentages in 2020.

Table 5. Employment by Occupations, 2008-2020 (wage/salaried workers)

	2008	2020
Managerial	8.8%	9.2%
Professional	6.2%	7.0%
Technician	7.1%	7.0%
Clerical	6.6%	7.3%
Services	12.0%	13.3%
Agriculture	19.4%	13.8%
Artisan	14.3%	13.8%
Machine Operator	10.8%	11.5%
Unskilled	14.7%	17.1%

Source: "Türkiye'de Mesleki Görünüm" ILO: Ankara, p. 27. Accessed through http://www.ilo.org/public/turkish/region/eurpro/ankara/areas/turkiyedemeslekigorunum.pdf on 25.06.2013

As seen in the table, professional-managerial jobs occupy place in significant proportion in the employment structure. The percentage of professional-managerial jobs in 1965 was 3.97 in employment structure (Karpat, 1973) and raised to 15 today. Although demand for professional-managerial jobs has also increased, as the studies presented below show that the conditions of professional-managerial white collar workers began to resemble the conditions of working class. Moreover, ILO also foresees that rate of increase of engineers will be above other professionals (p.28). So, the excess of the number of engineers will contribute the devaluation of the occupation, too.

The shift in the developmental strategy of Turkey from production sector to export oriented strategies with the emphasis of monetary policies changed the "occupational hierarchy" in favor of the occupations in service of trade, banking and other related sectors (Kozanoğlu, 1993). In the 1980s, private universities started to be established, departments such as management and business, industrial engineering and computer engineering gained popularity. Engineering, management and other branches related with finance became popular occupations. Specifically, engineering has been valuable if and only if it is useful for profitable sectors of the age: finance and communication. As Kozanoğlu (1993) states:

> Older engineering schools such as İTÜ (İstanbul Technical University), Yıldız University and more traditional branches of engineering such as civil engineering, chemical engineering and mining engineering were devalued in the 1980s. Available labour force in these fields was adequate to preserve the present structure…
> The reason that branches that had been identified with the name of İTÜ lost their popularity is that there was not departments such as management, economy, international relations which were popular fields in the 1980s in İTÜ (Kozanoğlu, 1993: 83).

Although it is obvious that information sector's profitability has increased which made occupations related with information rather than material production more prestigious, many studies show that professionals working in these "profitable" sectors have not gone out of the relations of labour exploitation by the capitalists. In his MS Thesis on engineers' experience and perception of new conditions of work

under "new economy", Hoşadam (2002) reveals that although they are employed in the 'prestigious' jobs, engineers always feel the pressure of losing their jobs, feel the pressure of making career not to feel themselves as 'unsuccessful', and lack of initiative and power in the workplaces which are designed according to the criteria of panoptican. Another MS Thesis written by Kodalak (2007) on the effect of new economy conditions on the work culture of engineers in the specific case of technopoles revealed that replacement of the term of job with short term projects and flexibility make engineers always feel anxiety and uncertainty. Moreover, short term work contracts make them always feel the pressure of updating their skills and lose the loyalty to the jobs which give rise to the loss of socializing function of the work for workers.

In the edited book "Did We Study All for Nothing?: White Collar Unemployment in Turkey" [26]a number of scholars has revealed that precariousness in the work life under conditions of neoliberalism affected white collars' identity, outlook and experiences in significant ways. For many years, university education has meant job security and to be included in the qualified labour force in Turkey. The term of "flexibilization" in the workforce has become more popular since the 2000s in Turkey. Employer organizations and governments have agreed on the changes in the labour market and legal regulations have been initiated by the JDP governments. Moreover, precariousness in the labour market has been championed in the name of efficiency and performance in the popular discourse; while civil service has been declared as 'invaluable' because of its job guarantee (Bora, 2011: p.55).

Bora (2011) analyzes the rise of precariousness among white collar workers through the case of engineers. Referring to the TMMOB's research on engineer profile in Turkey, Bora outlines the research finding that 32.5% of engineers who regard

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[26] Bora, T., Bora, A., Erdoğan, N., Üstün, İ (2011) *Boşuna Mı Okuduk?: Türkiye'de Beyaz Yakalı İşsizliği* İstanbul: İletişim.

unemployment as the most significant problems of Turkey are uneasy about being unemployed. Moreover, he underlines the fact that the number of engineers is above the markets needed. This situation is abused by the employers, since engineers feel that they are not irreplaceable for their employers. This creates a disappointment among white collars since they have been raised with the motivation of climbing the social ladder and having managerial positions in their work life (+İvme, 2010:2). As an occupational group, engineers feel the risk of losing their "status" in the society and create defense mechanisms against this (Bora, 2011).

In her edited book "From Class to Class: Scenes of Working Outside the Factory"[27], Ayşe Buğra (2010) also points out proletarianization of white collar workers as a result of neoliberal restructuring policies in Turkey. According to Buğra, rise of technologies have not decreased the importance of working class, to the contrary the number of workers who do not have anything other than their labor to survive has increased. Moreover, today white collar workers are lack of their worker rights because of precariousness in the working conditions. Moreover, fragmentation and diversification in the labour market prevents the rise of expansion in the labour class to be perceived. Together with this, considering white collar workers as members of middle class because of that they are educated sections of the society prevents them to raise consciousness about their proletarianization.

All in all white collar work has been devalued in Turkey as a result of the implications of neoliberalization in Turkey for white collar workers. Flexibilization and precariousness that new working conditions present to white collar workers change their relationship with the notion of 'work' and contribute to their identity transformation. Together with the transformation in working conditions, the effect of neoliberal transformation on cultural practices of professional middle classes is taken

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[27] Buğra, A. (2010) *Sınıftan Sınıfa: Fabrika Dışında Çalışma Manzaları.* İstanbul: İletişim.

into consideration throughout the thesis. In the following, studies on this topic will be reviewed.

3.2.4 Literature on New Middle Classes in Turkey

In Turkish literature on new middle classes, there is a serious confusion about which group that scholars refer to while using the term "new middle class', which make it very difficult to categorize different theoretical positions. Many scholars use the term, however, they do not define what they mean with "new middle class", moreover, they do not present their theoretical point of departure. For some new middle class refers to white collar professionals living in urban centers of Turkey; while for some of them, new middle class includes the group of small or middle-scale entrepreneurs originated from Anatolion cities –rather than 'classical bourgeoisie of İstanbul- who have emerged as a result of liberalization wave of the last thirty years. The second position is represented by Fuat Keyman[28], for whom 'new middle classes' is a significant social layer/section/identity to understand the 'transformation process' which began with 1980 and have intensified for 10 years. Following center-periphery paradigm, Keyman puts "new middle classes" and "secular and educated middle class" in opposite poles. Using this point of departure, he argues that the hegemony of the second group in the 'center' has been lost with the economic dynamism, active entrepreneurship and rapid urbanization in the 'periphery' initiated by the 'new middle classes'. For this approach, the group excluded by the Turkish modernization until the 1980s came to the centers or created their own centers through which they became powerful and determinative not only in the 'dynamism' in Turkish economy, but also that in the spheres of culture, identity and politics. According to Keyman, new middle classes have the potential to be the driving force for the democratization in the society. Actually, Keyman's position is

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[28] Keyman, E.F. (2012) "Türkiye'nin Geleceğini Orta Sınıflar Belirleyecek" *Görüş,* December, 2012, n. 76.

not a new stand point towards middle classes in Turkey. This stand point is adopted by 'center-periphery' theoricians who are pioneered by Şerif Mardin. As discussed in the related chapter[29], Mardin defines small and middle-scale entrepreneurs as middle class and see them as the force for democratization in the country.

The point of view that put importance on new middle classes as the driving force for democratization in the country is represented by different scholars (such as Ayata, 2003; Yılmaz, 2007). Their motivation towards analyzing different characteristics of new middle classes such as settlement choices or political attitudes raises mainly from the significance they put on new middle classes' political role. However, the group they refer to may differ although they commonly use the term "new middle class" in their analyses.

Other than the discussion around the role of middle classes in the 'democratization' of the country, new middle classes have been the topic of discussion because of their articulation in the neoliberalization with their consumption practices. Under the effect of economic liberalization, significant social changes have been experienced. Articulation in global consumer culture has been one of the consequences of financial liberalization. While distribution of income changes against the lower classes, the consumption materials serving for the interests of middle classes and bourgeoisie become easily accessed as Prime Minister Turgut Özal stated "I am declaring clearly. You will be able to see all products in the world in the shop windows. But, you will purchase tomato with a little higher price"[30] (quoted in Kozanoğlu, 1993: 169). As Fernandes (2004) appropriately noted, middle class consumers represent the cultural symbols of a nation that has opened its borders to consumer goods that were unavailable during earlier decades of state-controlled markets. In Turkey, to be able to integrate global consumer culture has appealed to

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[29] Please see the discussion in p. 47.

[30] "Açık ve seçik söylüyorum. Dünyanın bütün mallarını vitrinlerde bulabileceksiniz. Ama domatesi biraz daha pahalı yiyeceksiniz."

middle classes and consumerism has pervaded among middle classes as a distinction mechanism. Furthermore, together with the commodification of social services, services such as education and health became a part of the consumer culture. The discourse of "social rights" was replaced with the "consumer rights".

Neoliberal rationality that fashions individual interests pervaded among all spheres of life including economical, political and social spheres. Specifically for middle classes, this period corresponds to an identity transformation. Through media representations and ideal figures of the "new man"[31], entrepreneurship has been idealized. As Ünüvar states:

> Middle classes of Turkey whose 'life codes' and economical vision have changed and who felt that the barriers for enrichment in front of him/her were abolished and discovered that he/she can achieve this through his/her entrepreneurship skills has experienced a rapid transformation. From Polanyite point of view, economics was restructured and redefined. Being great power, benefiting from the benedictions of being great power and consuming with the conscious of being 'great power' appealed to the middle classes' perception of happiness (Ünüvar, 2010:21).

For Mills (1956), middle and upper-middle classes can be a part of the power groups in a country as "little sharers" of the cake, especially when economic distribution is based on rent. On the other hand, the real powers are big capitalists, especially the powerful representators of finance sector (Mills, 1956). According to Kozanoğlu (1995), the argument of Mills has explanatory power for the power relationships in Turkey in the 1990s. During these years, with the pioneership of the government of Prime Minister Turgut Özal, financial sector and the economic system that is based on rent economy rather than production were championed. According to Kozanoğlu, with the effect of this atmosphere, middle classes adopted enrichment dreams into their future plans. The atmosphere and the economic rationality that was pumped

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[31] The Prime Minister Turgut Özal was the pineer representator of this ideal figure (Ünüvar, 2010)

through popular media were appropriate to change the mentality of the middle classes towards individualism and "private" instead of "public" (Kozanoğlu, 1995).

The cultural codings and values of neoliberalism have been adopted by the young urban professionals. The young of the 90s had distinctive cultural codings that distinguish them from the young of the previous periods (Lüküslü, 2009). Expansion of the private sector created the category of young urban professionals who symbolize the flexibility, entrepreneurship, openness as opposed to the heavy bureaucracy and infertile state institutions (Şimşek, 2005). While professional middle classes have been depicted as representative citizens of liberalizing and "developing" Turkey, lower social classes have been marginalized. The main characteristics of this class are the obsession for career in the job; desire to increase their ability to consume and to gain status in the society through increased life standards (Kozanoğlu, 1993).

There are studies on the changing life style of urban professionals in the literature. One of them is "Representations of Life Style in Turkey 1980-2005"[32] by Ahıska and Yenal (2006). In this book, Ahıska and Yenal investigate different representations of the lifestyle that is idealized in the neoliberal rationality on media throughout the years between 1980 and 2005 when neoliberalism became hegemonic in various spheres of life. Ahıska and Yenal point to the fact that the transformation experienced with the 1980 military coup is not just the change in the "shop windows" with the introduction of liberal economy but also creation of a new type of man occupied with new cultural norms. For this new type of man, the signs of success are money and becoming rich with little support and reaching consumption materials of each kind basically luxurious automobile and home. They note that in

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[32] Ahıska, M. and Yenal, Z. (2006). *Aradığınız Kişiye Şu An Ulaşılamıyor: Türkiye'de Hayat Tarzı Temsilleri*, 1980-2005. İstanbul : Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi.

parallel with this, the number of young attending into university departments such as management and economics has increased. Under economical atmosphere of the 1980s, qualities such as individualism, competitiveness, entrepreneurship, capacity of taking risks and individualism were championed. A category of young urban professionals –called yuppies- was born. Ahıska and Yenal call this group as new middle class and label them as privileged as ideal figures of neoliberalism relative to traditional middle classes including civil servants and those self-employed. Although new middle class that they mean refers to a small group of professionals who are graduated from prestigious universities; it can be said that their lifestyle has idealized in popular discourse and other educated professionals adopted this culture into their lives as objectives to be achieved. Lifestyle determined with the consumption culture has been the main parameter of the identity construction. In line with this, shopping malls and credit cards come into the center of their lives (Ahıska and Yenal, 2006).

Such kind of an emphasis on lifestyle has brought a new phenomenon "gated communities" which is a significant extension of that for upper and middle classes, lifestyle operates a distinction mechanism. Öncü (1997) and Ayata (2003) are two scholars whose studies on new middle classes focused on this dimension. While city has been restructured with neoliberalism, housing choices and practices of new middle classes raised as a significant mechanisms of distinction. According to Öncü, the myth of the ideal home is not restricted with ownership of home, but it means reaching a segregated life from the "crowd" of the city with people from the same social class. In Öncü's words,

> What captured the imagination of İstanbul's middle classes and became the focus of their desires was the homogeneity of a life-style cleansed of urban clutter – of poverty, of immigrants, of elbowing crowds, dirt and traffic – a world of safe and antiseptic social spaces where the 'ideal home' signifies clean air, clean water, healthy lives; a homogeneous setting and a cultural milieu where adults and children lead active lives, engage in sports, socialize with each other around their barbecue sets in the gardens (Öncü, 2005: 61).

In this way, ideal home is consumed as a commodity by middle classes. Above all, for Öncü, the reason of emergence of such kind of a phenomenon is the fact that as a result of policies of liberalization, middle classes feel threatened to lose their social and economic status; and 'ideal home' raises as a strategy of rebuilding markers of distinction.

From a parallel point of view, Ayata's study on suburban areas of Ankara analyzes the practices of producing new middle class identities in their segregated places of living. People from new middle class are anxious to live in places devoid of social heterogeneity of the city center identified with dirtiness, crime and disorder. They seek for order, rule-based living places where family privacy can be preserved. Family life in these places is strictly gender based, in which women are held responsible for preserving the status of the family through consumption practices. Above all, Ayata's study reflects an alternative point of view about new middle classes. From this point of view, new middle classes are seen as "model citizens" of a democratic, liberal order. According to Ayata, with their strong desire for order, stability and predictability, new middle class raises as the supporter of rationality, individual autonomy, secularism, rule of law, environmental sensitivity and globalized vision (p.54).

Balkan and Rutz (2009) analyzes changing forms of social reproduction among middle classes under the conditions of neoliberal restructuration of welfare states, specifically focusing on the dimension of education. In Balkan and Rutz's words, "one of the most salient aspects of middle class social reproduction, old or new, is quality education as a path to occupation destinations and a cultural ideology of consumption that reinvents what it means to live 'a comfortable life'" (Balkan and Rutz, 2009: ix) New middle classes in İstanbul having professional jobs have integrated into this global culture of neoliberalism fastly since the 1980s. New middle class families have become obsessed with their children's education and future and have turned their faces to privatized alternatives of public education.

All these studies reveal that hegemonic culture of neoliberalism has many intersection points with professional middle class culture. In this respect, professional middle classes have developed adaptation mechanisms to neoliberal transformation in Turkey. Their consumption oriented lifestyle overlapped with the rise of consumption opportunities with the globalization of Turkish economy. On the other hand, choices of accommodation have raised as a significant distinction mechanism under the conditions of that neoliberalism threatened the social and economic status of middle classes. Last but not least, neoliberal destruction on the working conditions trigger the 'fear of falling' of professional middle classes and private school raises as a 'perfect' alternative for professional middle classes to prepare a 'secure' future for their offspring.

3.3 Conclusion for Chapter 3

In this chapter, the transformation of professional middle classes in Turkey has been discussed following a periodization determined based on critical social, economic and political turn points of Modern Turkey. First, the place of professional middle classes in the social class structure in Turkey from 1923 to 1980 has been discussed. It has been concluded that although demographically, professional middle classes did not have significance in the social class structure under the dominance of agriculture sector in the employment structure until the 1980s, professional middle classes had a distinct place in the development and modernization of the country. Then, the identity transformation of the professional middle classes has been traced through the history of engineer identity in Turkey.

In the second part of the chapter, neoliberal transformation in Turkey has been presented from various aspects. First, economic restructuration and its effects on the economic conditions of different segments have been discussed. Second, following the argument that neoliberal restructuring of the economy was accompanied by a discoursal/ideological construction of neoliberal rationality, different representations of this discoursal shifts were presented and its effects on ideological position of different segments of working population was discussed. After this discussion, the effect of neoliberal transformation on the work life and culture of professional middle classes has been focused on. In this section, it has been emphasized that increasing precariousness in the working conditions of white collar workers demolishes their 'distinctive' status in society and the rise in the number of professional middle classes make white collar labour invaluable in the labour market. And, lastly, cultural transformation of professional middle classes was discussed with reference to many studies shedding light on different aspects of this transformation. In this discussion, it has been concluded that the cultural practices of professional middle classes have emerged as a significant factor creating a consent mechanism for neoliberal transformation.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE ENGINEERS' NARRATIVES ON THEIR PERCEPTION AND EXPERIENCE OF NEOLIBERALISM

This chapter is divided into two main parts and their subsections which have been determined according to the questions of the thesis that were presented in the Introduction chapter. All parts in this chapter have subsections that feature the main findings of the analysis. In the first part, how professional middle classes perceive and experience the state and neoliberal transformation of the state is discussed. Under this title, there are subsections determined according to the questions of "what do they expect from the state and what do they think about privatizations?", "what is the meaning of work in the public for engineers today?" and "how do professional middle classes perceive and experience the transformation of the welfare regime in Turkey?" Third subsection has been discussed mainly through the issue of commodification of health and education in Turkey.

In the second part of the analysis chapter, the relationship of engineers with the politics and their occupational organization TMMOB has been discussed and dynamics behind their alienation to politics compared to the 1970s when engineers were highly politicized through their organization TMMOB have been discussed.

For such an analysis, in-depth interviews were conducted with 20 engineers including 7 women and 13 men with ages ranging from 25 to 57, in Ankara between April and June, 2012. My sample includes engineers working in public sector or private sector. One of my respondents, Metin is retired from public sector and now he runs a company with three partners. Metin's exceptional situation has been taken into consideration while doing analysis, because his position does not overlap with the 'professional middle class' definition given in the second chapter. Demographic information about the respondents is given in the table below.

Table 6. Demographic information about the respondents of the fieldwork study

Name	Sex	Age	Occupation	Workplace	Marital status and number of children
Metin	M	52	Geological Eng.	Retired from public sector+ Entrepreneur	Married, 1 child
Sinan	M	25	Environment Eng.	Employee, private sector	Single, no child
Aslı	F	30	Chemical Eng.	Employee, public sector	Single, no child
Erdinç	M	30	Computer Eng.	Employee, private sector	Married, no child
Pınar	F	28	Chemical Eng.	Unemployed. Have a private sector experience. Preparing for KPSS	Married, no child
Egemen	M	29	Computer Eng.	Employee, private sector	Single, no child
Deniz	M	32	Computer Eng.	Employee , TÜBİTAK	Married, 1 child
Emre	M	33	Industrial Eng.	Employee , TÜBİTAK	Single, no child
Mesut	M	41	Geological Eng.	Employee, public sector	Married, 2 children
Çağdaş	M	30	Computer Eng.	Employee, private sector	Married, no child
Ayça	F	40	Architect	Unemployed	Married, 1 child
Cansu	F	33	Industrial Eng.	Employee, private sector	Married, no child
Okan	M	41	Computer Eng.	Employee, public sector	Married, no child
Ali	M	57	Mining Eng.	Retired from public sector + Employee, private sector	Married, 1 child
Gülcan	F	38	Geological Eng.	Employee, public sector	Married, 2 children
Salih	M	35	Civil Eng.	Employee, public sector	Single, no child
Demet	F	39	Geological Eng.	Employee, public sector	Married, 1 child
Levent	M	54	Civil Eng.	Employee, private sector	Married, 3 children
Yasin	M	33	Civil Eng.	Employee, private sector	Married, no child
İmge	F	28	Chemical Eng.	Employee, public sector	Single, no child

4.1 How Do Professional Middle Classes Perceive and Experience the State?

The aim of this part of data analysis is to shed light on the relationship of professional middle classes with the state in both perceptual and experience levels - keeping in mind that both are interrelated- through the engineer-state relationship in Turkey. With perceptual (or ideological/discursive) level, I question how engineers perceive the state and to what extent they reproduce the neoliberal rationality on the function of the state. As it was discussed in the second chapter of the thesis, in neoliberal theory, state's role is to provide legislative framework for the effective functioning of the markets (Harvey, 2005). In the previous chapter, neoliberal transformation of Turkish state was discussed and it was concluded that neoliberal policies have been implemented towards the neoliberal transformation in the state structure in Turkey through privatizations, financialization and liberalization of the economy and transformation in the welfare regime. Moreover, populist neoliberal policies and discourse that have dominated various domains of the public sphere have been put into practice so that neoliberal transformation of the state becomes legitimate in society.

In addition to ideological level that is mainly shaped around the hegemonic discourse in the media and political sphere, engineers experience the state in various ways in their lives. First of all, as service receivers and social citizens, engineers experience services such as public education, health services, social insurance and municipality services. Second, state institutions provide field of employment for engineers. Third, some entrepreneurs have to be in contact with the state and sometimes enter into clientelistic relations for their business interests. Although ideological and experience levels are operationalized as two distinct categories to achieve an organized discussion for practical reasons, it should be noted that both levels cannot be thought as two different levels. For example, interviewees refer to their disappointment about public services while legitimizing their ideological position about the state. Moreover, both their experiences and ideological position about the state affect their political position and vice versa. On the other hand, most of my

interviewees do not prefer to have strict political positions while commenting on economy policies of the state and the services state provides, which will be discussed in the latter section of the data analysis in detail.

Beyond these, the special relationship between the professional middle classes – specifically engineers- and the state should be outlined. As it was discussed in the previous chapter in detail, until the 1980s, state service has been the core of middle classes in Turkey, because government has provided the most fertile field for employment, status, power and prestige (Neyzi, 1973). In parallel with this, the rise of engineering in Turkey had been strongly related with the dynamics affecting the rise of modern Turkish State. Especially, during Republican Period, engineers were in an organic relationship with the state which had started to be questioned during the 1950s by the engineers themselves. Capitalist development provided the conditions of both entrepreneurship and employment in private sector, in other words independence from the state. During 1950s when the private sector had expanded, engineers struggled to be accepted as independent occupational group by the state. Together with working in state institutions, they became entrepreneurs and began to be employed in private sector collectively. After these years, the relationship of engineers with the state had turned to be a critical one through which engineers gathered around TMMOB questioned the capitalist structure of Turkish state.[33]

Another dimension to follow the relationship of engineers and the state throughout the history of Turkish Republic is the employer role of the state. Until the 1980s which is characterized with that private enterprises have raised radically compared to previous periods and public enterprises started to be privatized or lost their previous significance for the state, engineers were dominantly employed in state economic enterprises. Neoliberal transformation experienced in the 1980s has caused a radical

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[33] Throughout the thesis, while analysing engineers' political position, dominant positions have been generalized. Reader should not forget that they are not representative for all engineers of the periods under analysis.

shift in the place of engineers in the labour market. This has not reflected only as change in the work conditions of engineers, but also the role of the engineer in the state has shifted from "producer" to "bureaucrat" or "politician", for some. For those who could not get any higher position in the center, engineer in public institutions lost their status. One of my interviewees shares his experience about this period in this way:

> In this period, there was such a cadre in the MTA, idealist like us. We are the engineers of Pre-Eighty Period. Think of the university young of the period, the young of 68'. We are looking to events ideologically. Our statist outlook was very strong. A decision was made in 87': State would not produce anymore. People working in state production institutions became anxious about their futures. What will we be? Fear of future. Will they fire us? At these times, contract employee status was introduced. Our status was changed to contractual. Özal said: "Private sector should enter into mining sector, public will not make investment in mining anymore. Public owned ones will be privatized, too." These people came into administration in 1995-2002 period. This cadre ran after people in power to get higher positions in the center organizations (Ali).

This radical disengagement from the state production institutions deserves attention to understand engineers' engagement with neoliberal culture that dictates alienation to public and survival in individualized life forms for some, and entering in the clientelist relations in bureaucratic structure for some. My older interviewees experienced this transformation and told about their experiences about this process. On the other hand, my younger interviewees entered in the work life after the 1990s since when the neoliberal ideology has been hegemonic. Recently, being employed in public institutions gained popularity among young professionals. At first hand, it gives the impression that it is contradictory with hegemonic idea that state should withdraw from production and individual careerism and entrepreneurship should be championed. However, detailed analysis shows that the dynamics behind this popularity does not have any resemblance with the dynamics of the pre-1980 period when engineers were dominantly employed in state production institutions. At the end of the data analysis, it has been concluded that being employed in public institutions is perceived as being passive engineers; however, relative secure

conditions of working makes public sector more attractive for engineers. In this respect, state does not represent a field through which engineers "serve for the public" and gain status, but relative secure conditions of working. On the other hand, it should be noted that engineers working in public sector are dominantly enrolled in the center organizing institutions, not in the production institutions.[34]

In this respect, neoliberalization transformed the relationship and perception of engineers with the state and public tremendously. At the end of the fieldwork that has been conducted for this study, it has been concluded that today, engineers do not relate state with production, but they demand better services from the state and follow an egalitarian point of view while demanding them. In other words, for engineers in Turkey, it cannot be concluded that they are completely isolated from public and completely internalized neoliberal ideology which favors withdrawal of the state from both production and services. While most of the engineers agree upon the hegemonic point of view that state should withdraw from production, nearly all of them prioritized service provider role of the state and their discontent about public services while defining the state. It should be noted that their demand about services is not restricted with 'risk management' strategies, but their reference point is mainly countries where there is strong welfare state tradition. However, they are not motivated to challenge these conditions and look from a conformist point of view which is thought to be strongly related with their middle classness. That is, rather than struggling for social rights and better public services, they struggle for increasing their life standards to access private alternatives of public services. Their perception about public services and their comparison of private and public services will be analyzed considering their middle classness since it is thought that middle class culture and neoliberal ideology intertwines each other today.

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[34] Check Table 1.2

4.1.1. What is the role of the state? : State as regulator, organizer, service provider, but not producer

During the interviews conducted with engineers, it has been questioned how engineers define the state; how they relate themselves with the state; what they think about privatization of state economic enterprises and withdrawal of the state from production sector. Only few of them have told about that state should be in production sector, but it has been concluded that their motivation arises from nationalistic ideas rather than anti-capitalist position. In general, for engineers, state is awkward, inflexible, close to change and inefficient for both production process and for employees. For all of my interviewees, the organizer role of the state is primarily important. Together with this, there is a wide consensus among them towards that state should serve for its citizens rather than repressing them.

4.1.1.1 Questioning the 'Fatherhood' of the State: "State should not be father, state should be an instrument in the service of citizens"

Although there are differences between engineers' point of view about the fatherhood of the state as a result of different life experiences of the engineers, engineers mostly critically question the authoritarian role of the state. Moreover, they give priority to their expectations from the state, while defining their perceptions about the state.

It deserves attention that my younger interviewees did not refer to authority while defining the state, too much. For my older interviewees whose ages are above 50, Ali (57), Levent (54) and Metin (52), who lived two military interventions in Turkey, 1971 and 1980, state connotes authority. Ali, Levent and Metin put this dimension at the center of their definitions of the state.

Authority does not only have "negative" connotations for Levent who is senior manager in a construction company. Rather, state should have authority so that order can be achieved in the society:

God save the state, let's start here… State is power, state is authority, state is rule, state is an umbrella. How you establish authority on your children to discipline him/her, I mean such kind of an authority. I mean an authority that provides us to live in order through the law. I don't mean an authority making pressure on ideas. I talk about an authority that determines the quality of your life.

In parallel with Levent, for Ali who is a retired mining engineer from public and now consultant of an engineering company, protectionism of the state has two connotations. First one refers to the authoritarian side of the state, and also protecting the ones who cannot meet their own needs in society. The latter one refers more to the service providing role of the state, but it is defined referring to state's authoritarian, "father" role towards its citizens. Moreover, he, as a middle class citizen excludes himself from this definition while suggesting that state is the father of *fakir fukara*[35]. The second connotation of protectionism is closed economy which is the opposite of liberal economy. Moreover, he associates protectionism with repressive side of the state hindering the free production of ideas:

State has several connotations for me: one is protectionism. Protectionism is a very frightening concept: means dominating the ideas. There can be another meaning. It can be understood as protecting the rights of *fakir fukara*.

On the other hand, for Ali, before 1980, Turkey was in dark and thanks to the liberalization of economy, country started to develop. He compares two epochs with respect to both consumption practices and production technology:

In pre-80 period, this country was the country of darkness. You did not live those years. Lambs were not glowing. There was embargo because of Cyprus Affair. We were feeding with the water. There was not technology, production technology in that period.

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[35] "Fakir fukara" is a phrase reffering to "the poor" in Turkish. It connotes pity towards the poor.

Metin, on the other hand, criticizes his older sympathetic view about the state's authoritarian side. Moreover, he is also critical about today's policies. For Metin, although we do not experience military interventions as before, state's authoritarian side survives:

> State was 'the father'. I have recently learned that state should be in service of its citizens… State should not be father; state should be an instrument in the service of the citizens. As students who had grown up in ODTÜ, we had adopted the world view that state should value the labor. Later on, we saw the father role of the state which abused its citizens. State mostly applies violence towards its citizens, rather than showing sympathy. Citizen should be the father. Since some rights were given, May 27 has a distinct place in our minds. But, as a person who lived both March 12 and September 12 interventions, I have witnessed suffer the people lived. You can feel the father side of the state under such conditions to the hilt. After 2000, I don't think so many things have changed. This time, state applies violence against those not supporting the government. Nothing has changed… State has negative connotations for me such as police force. The meaning of the state is something like that in the eyes of the public, since I am also a person from public.

As Metin, Mesut who is geological engineer working in the public institution AFAD (General Directorate of Disaster Affairs) criticizes his previous ideas about the state. Both put emphasis on the "consciousness" they reached about the state:

> Citizens are responsible for each other, too. But state is responsible to regulate this responsibility and make legal regulations for this. State is sacred among Turks. It goes to the extent of fascism, sometimes. Even among leftists, state is a little bit… They want state would be technical service. The welfare of the state is prioritized in our culture, what we have learned from our families is this. But, what about the responsibilities of the state towards us? Can it achieve this?

In the 1990s, Mesut was politically active in the young organization of Nationalist Movement Party. He criticizes his former position that overvalues the state, as well as leftists' opposition to privatizations. When I asked what he expects from the state, he referred to education, health and municipality services together with a comparison with European countries, as my other respondents.

For my younger informants, state should be service provider and regulator which do not necessarily refer to authoritarianism. For Yasin who is a civil engineer working in an engineering office in a relatively higher position, state should govern its citizens providing rules as well as it should provide justice. As Metin and Mesut, Yasin maintains that "state should be for its citizens", not "citizens for the state". However, contrary to Metin, Yasin thinks that today's policies are held towards this aim. At this point, different ideological positions of engineers become determinant in their perception about today's policies. Although all of my respondents agree on that state should be in service of its citizens, they do not agree upon if today's policies are held towards this aim, or not. For Yasin, contrary to Metin, today's policies are relatively positive developments towards this aim:

> As connotes to everybody, state is an institution established so that people can live together in an order. An institution that has power of sanction, have power and opportunity to make citizens live under the roof of some rules. Not citizens should exist for the state, but state should exist for its citizens. Although state could not overlap with this definition, recently some positive developments realized through that pro-coup generals are judged as normal citizens. They are attendants, but they are normal citizens. Jurisdiction is the most important part of the job. If jurisdiction can work effectively, it means there is state authority. Authority has positive meaning in this. That is, could state use its power of sanction for the sake of the welfare of all citizens? This is like full equity in society.

For Salih state is essential for providing the conditions that people need to live together. State should have an authority to perform its organizer role:

> Think of an organization scheme, there is state and there are subunits. And under these, there are other subunits. I mean, you cannot do something independent of the state. There are rules and order. And state determines them. As a citizen of the state, you obey the rules…
> If there is not an authority, society cannot exist. There should be state so that people can live in order.

My younger informants did not mention about the negative connotations of the state authority too much. Rather, from their point of view, engineers demand organizer,

rule and justice provider role from the state and it needs authority that is accepted by its citizens for performing this role. This kind of authority has positive connotations. In general it can be said that, younger engineers did not face with the authoritarian side of the state throughout their life as the older ones. Here, I need to open a parenthesis. The fieldwork of this thesis was conducted one year before thesis is submitted. Nowadays, Turkey has been experiencing the most widespread mass movements of (may be) the last 30 years other than Kurdish movement: "Gezi Protests". The characteristics of this movement are that the protesters are heavily young urban middle classes who feel threatened by conservative policies of the government. Another major reason of this uprising is the commodification of public places by current neoliberal government. The protest was suppressed by the police force brutally causing that at least four young protesters was killed and many others were injured. Moreover, the prime minister of Turkey increased his authoritarian tone. And the young of Turkey has faced with authoritarian side of the state than never before. In this respect, this development may affect my younger informants in the way that they can put more emphasis on the authoritarian side of the state today. However, this study preserves its relevance with respect to the expectations of engineers from the state and their ideal definition of the state. All of the interviewees agreed on that Turkish state has not achieved to be "for" its citizens rather than citizens for the state throughout its history.

4.1.1.2. State as regulator, not producer: Privatizations as inevitable end of state's production institutions

Engineers demand organizer role from the state, however, they do not make any reference to its productive role, although just about 30 years ago, engineers in Turkey had an organic relationship with state productive sector. When my respondents did not mention about the productive role of the state in their definitions, I asked their ideas about the privatizations held in Turkey. From engineers' point of view, state should provide services for citizens and regulate markets, but should withdraw from production. For them, private sector is more efficient than the state in production.

On the other hand, there emerged different stand points about privatizations with respect to the occupational position of the respondents. For those employed in private sector, public sector is completely inefficient compared to their workplaces; while those employed in the public sector are inclined to show the examples of efficient production in the public sector. With the feeling of losing their status in the public sector, they do not easily support privatization as private sector employees and entrepreneurs do, but they cannot escape from the hegemonic discourse on privatizations that bureaucratic procedures in the public sector have potential to create inefficiency in production. On the other hand, being employed in different institutions of the state may affect their point of view as in the case of working as supervisor in the Ministry of Labour vs. being geological engineer in AFAD. Above all, political position of engineers may affect their point of view about privatizations regardless their occupational position.

For Aslı, who is a chemical engineer and works in Ministry of Labor as supervisor and periodically visits private and state production sector institutions for supervision, state should be at the center to organize private sector and to provide services; but should withdraw from production:

> Actually, state should be at the center in some cases, and at the edge in others. I cannot give you an example now, but it should provide order, of course. To provide order, there should be rules and there should be society that obeys these rules. This derives us to the state, to an organization. There should be public services including health service and transportation for instance. State should be at the center in such kind of cases. But, in cases of production, it can give incentives and supervise private sector which can work more efficient with less workers. For example, may be state will finish a work in ten years with 30 people, but private can finish the same work with 3-5 people in less time since there is not bureaucracy in private. I analyze it with respect to efficiency.

Levent as a senior manager in a private company does not exclude state from production completely, but explains the situation of public institutions together with a comparison with private sector using 'efficiency' as the basic criterion. He puts emphasis on that public sector cannot compete with private sector. Public sector does

not have the 'vision' of efficiency, openness and cannot adapt to contemporary technologies:

> First, private sector invests on its research and development units, make researches, develops. There is opportunity for competition. There is not competition in the public sector. For example, we had Karabük Steel and Iron Factory once upon a time, it was state economic enterprise, and it has been privatized. It was unique at those times. Then, private sector made the same factory in different regions of Turkey, from İskenderun to İzmir. When these private ones compete, prices decreased and ours (public sector) could not decrease the prices. Because our ovens remained primitive. We did not renovate them. As a result, you make production in the value of 1 and, distribute in the value of 5 (Levent).

Ali who is a retired engineer who served for the state for 27 years in higher positions and today supervising a private company supports privatization of public enterprises and explains inefficiency in the public sector in this way:

> In the public sector, worker works maximum 3-4 hours because of his/her union rights. But in private sector, it does not go in this way; worker works efficiently throughout 8 hours of work. I mean, amount of work produced in unit of time doubles my production (in the public). The problem is this. On the other hand, when I look at the wages, cost of the worker is 6 billion TL to me (public), while it is 2.5-3 billion TL for him (private). I control the worker as engineer, everything is the same with respect to working hours, even lunch time is the same.

Ali maintains a capitalist point of view and as an engineer searches for efficiency through decreasing the labor cost. He completely internalizes the capitalist role of the state and as an engineer represents the capitalist in the field. And from an engineer point of view, he criticizes the state not being able to adapt new conditions of capitalism that is based on primitive accumulation of capital. For Ali, engineers are employed to achieve efficiency in workplaces; and decreasing the cost of labor is one of the ways of providing efficiency. When state loses this vision, there is no way that engineer achieves to provide efficiency that is needed to compete with private sector and survive in the market. In a contradictory way, he tells about his livings in public

sector as an engineer and idealizes the years during which they engaged in production in the state enterprises which was more efficient than private sector:

> It is early 80s. There was a nice cadre in the public. I was doing the drawings as engineer directing the project. We got serious amount of credit for ten years deferred from Japan etc… We got the most advanced technologies of the world, although we did not know them, we selected them from catalogs. These machines work still. We were working more efficient from private sector in 1985-1990 period. In 1987, Özal took a decision: state should withdraw from these works. He said: "In mining, we have to give way to private sector, state will not invest more. State will give those in its hands to the private" (Ali).

The contradictory position of Ali can be explained with popular neoliberal discourse that state enterprises are outmoded and states should support private enterprise and competition in the private sector for economic development. For Ali, privatization is inevitable; and challenging this fact is meaningless. Achieving complete privatization means a "third constitutional period" that completely transforms the structure of the state:

> When we look at the Western countries, whatever nice it is. There is mixed economy still in Turkey. We switch it to private slowly, but there is a serious resistance against it for many years. We oppose privatization. Ok, we oppose privatization, but we also oppose public since it functions in this way. Well, what is your solution? Structure of the state made us to lose too much thing. We need a new *Tanzimat*[36] Reform. Institutions of the state will remain. But production institutions of the state have to be privatized. You cannot resist it; it is inevitable.

From engineers' point of view, state economic enterprises bring clientelistic relationships and bureaucracy which means unnecessary procedures that cause inefficiency in the production. On the other hand, private sector is free of bureaucratic burdens that cause inefficiency. Aslı states:

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[36] The political reforms made in the Ottoman State in 1839.

There are procedures in the state; public institutions have to document everything. This makes you lose time. Let's compare public factories and private factories. Public one should exchange correspondence with up and down. Engineers have to do these according to some procedures, since there are rules, laws that engineers have to obey, too. When you look at a private firm, it can skip some of these procedures. But state will supervise it if it does the works obeying the rules or not, of course. It may prepare reports for this, but there will not procedures during the working process. It will give its energy more on production.

Private sector employees emphasized the clientelist relations in the public sector while legitimizing their point of view about privatizations. Contrary to private sector's 'objectiveness', employment in the public sector is not based on merits, but rather on clientelist relationships that cause inefficiency in the production institutions. As Levent states, state economic enterprises are seen as burdens on state's shoulders because of clientelist relations that are maintained through these institutions:

In general, state economic enterprises are burdens on state's shoulders. These institutions were used for clientelist relations for a long time. People used to go to a deputy and request him to give a job in a state institution for a niece, brother etc. Ok, you employ, but there is not production. If you do not develop the factory… there are lots of people in general directorates. You have to privatize, why, so that you can free yourself from this burden. Public institutions lose money, not because of production, but because of excessive number of personnel.

Private sector employees or public sector employees who have not lost their status because of privatizations identify themselves with the employers. They carry the bourgeois mission in the field. They internalize the bourgeois ideology, they identify themselves with employers and their critisicm against conformism of public sector employees is originated from this identification. One of my respondents, Cansu who is employed in a private company came with the interview with her husband Olgun who is an entrepreneur survey engineer. Since he does not correspond to the definition of "professional middle class" in this thesis, I have not included him into the sample of the study; but he also answered my questions that I asked to Cansu. This has been a good chance to understand the typical bourgeois point of view which

has been also carried by some of the white collar workers under conditions of extreme liberalism. Although he by himself can not be accepted as representative of entrepreneur engineers in Turkey, his responds give us clues about the divergence and convergence points between the experiences and ideas of engineers employed in private or public sector and entrepreneur engineers. Accordingly, from now on, I apply to some of responds of Olgun to have the chance of comparison and analysis. For Olgun, as an entrepreneur, inefficiency is pervaded to all institutions of the state and JDP governments' reforms are appropriate in this respect; however, clientelistic relations can prevent to apply this implementation efficiently:

> There are lots of people employed in the state, but they do not produce anything… When somebody is employed in the state, nobody can fire him/her. What does state do now? It brings contract personnel procedure now. This is a nice development. It will be able to fire contract personnel, if he/she does not work. But, this is objected because of the possibility that state employ people according to his/her political position. I mean horns of dilemma.

As Kozanoğlu (1993) mentions, professional middle classes' arguments about the state economic enterprises and their workers can reach to hostility towards public employees. Public sector employees are categorized as those exploiting entrepreneurs and private sector employees who give tax to the state in the eyes of private sector employees and entrepreneurs. Through such kind of mentality, neoliberal transformation in working conditions of public employees gain a legitimate ground among professional middle classes employed in the private sector or entrepreneurs. On the other hand, Olgun's criticism against clientelism in the state fits with the "moral economy" discourse of neoliberalism which has gained a wide legitimicy among middle classes (O'Dougherty, 1999)[37].

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[37] As O'Dougherty's qualitative study (1999) on Brazilian middle classes reveals that neoliberalism is perceived as "savior" among middle classes who strictly criticize clientelist and opportunist behaviours in the state and society. For them, "the problem was government-regulated economy, not one that responded to the imperatives of contemporary capitalism" (O'Dougherty, 1999:). Through withdrawal of the state from economy, the ideal "nation" could be constituted around neoliberalism.

Çağdaş who is employed in the private sector as computer engineer told about his observation about state employees. According to his experience during a contact with state institutions and state officials, he concludes that contrary to the "dynamism" of the private sector, public institutions are not open for change and they are awkward:

> I entered into contact with state offices for work. I observed that bureaucracy is very slow and state employees are not open to change (Çağdaş).

Although Çağdaş idealizes private sector and criticizes public sector, he supports that state should not completely withdraw from production sector. Those who support this view rationalize their idea from a nationalistic perspective rather than maintaining an anti-capitalist point of view. For them, state economic enterprises represent our "national values". Especially some sectors have strategic importance which should not be sold to foreigners. Considering national interests, transportation, communication and national banks should not be privatized. If it is obligatory, they should not be sold to foreigners which means losing national independence. They can be sold to Turkish firms. However, public sector needs revision at least to be more efficient which is obligatory to survive:

> I do not support privatization directly. I support revision. Because there is such a problem in privatization: if your company cannot compete with other companies, you can privatize it; but if your company is unique, privatization of this company, if it is belonged to the state especially, is so bad. Especially, it is so critical in national issues such as communication, informatics and agriculture. If you sell these to foreign companies and make them out of your control, it creates a risky situation. If it will be privatized, there should be at least partial privatization. The awkwardness of bureaucracy cannot be a reason for this, because what makes state a state is transportation network, communication network and banks. Privatization of communication network or transportation network of Turkey means loss of a national value, loss of national independence. In critical situations, such as war, all initiative will be in the hands of the country to which it has been sold (Çağdaş).

Çağdaş's point of view about privatizations reflects the most widespread anti-privatization discourse nowadays. From a parallel nationalist viewpoint, Levent claims that Turkey has resources that are unique and if Turkish state achieves to evaluate these "national values", Turkey can compete with worlds' biggest economies. Turkish state should control these "values" which are so precious so that Turkey becomes the strongest country in the world. Turkey can achieve the "big development dream" through these "national values":

> Now, there are some values of the nation. It has been gifted us by God. Our country is turned around by sees. There is a mine, 80% of whose reserves belong to us: boron. As long as you use this mine, you can do everything you want. There were physicians working on this, we lost them in an air clash, you know. Turkey is a big country. We have to grow up scientists. State should take initiative in this. It should not be sold to foreign companies. If you sell them, it means to sell your borders. In technical issues, foreign people can help us. On the other hand, gold mines, coal mines are not popular things. They can be sold and runned by foreign companies. But a popular mine should be controlled by the state completely.

The same capitalist nationalist point of view makes them argue that Turkish state does not regard the interests of Turkish capital in a satisfactory way. From Olgun's point of view, Turkish state and Turkish capital have intersecting interests, but Turkish state is not aware of these values:

> I do not oppose privatization, but some kind of things should be privatized. For example, factories that make the state earns money, petroleum, natural gas should not be privatized. Mines can be searched by foreign companies; we cannot make research for them. Licenses were given to the foreign companies; Turkish companies cannot make research. We sell our natural resources to foreign people.

It should be noted that Olgun is an entrepreneur survey engineer. He feels that Turkish state does not make enough support for Turkish entrepreneurs. The hidden meaning of this quotation is that Olgun thinks that through his entrepreneur motivation, he serves for the country. This motivation resembles the motivation of Turkish engineers in the developmental period of Turkey; however, his argument is

based mostly on his entrepreneurship interests. In addition, both Olgun's and Çağdaş's motivations diverge from the discourse held by engineers throughout the 1970s. There is not any reference to "the public" in their speeches; but rather they maintain capitalist developmentalist point of view while intersecting the interests of the state and entrepreneur interests in Turkey.

Up to now, private sector employees' and entrepreneurs' point of view about privatization has been discussed; and it has been pointed out that privatization of the state's production institutions do not conflict with their interests. To the contrary, they have internalized the argument that state is awkward and inefficient contrary to the dynamism of the private sector. This argument will further make them develop hostile position against public sector employees which will be discussed in the next section in detail. In the above discussion, Aslı as a supervisor in Ministry of Labor was an exceptional respondent with respect to her occupational position. However, it has been emphasized that as supervisor, contrary to engineers in the production institutions of the state, Aslı's status has not been degraded, which makes her completely support privatizations and attends the role of 'supervisor' to the state.

Gülcan and Mesut are employed in AFAD and strongly feel the effects of the loss of the status and value of engineers in the production institutions. Together with new organization structure in their institutions, they do not have any distinctive position because of being engineer, anymore, which makes them skeptical about the changes in the public institutions. They regard the workers' conditions of employees while commenting on privatizations. Moreover, they do not easily accept the argument that state is inefficient and engineers do not have vision and dynamism. According to Demet who is a public sector employee, many projects/works are realized in public sector, too, contrary to the widespread argument that public sector employees do not produce anything. Gülcan thinks that state is also capable of making efficient production if it is aimed to. For her, primarily workers' rights should be considered. If any private institution can provide these conditions, she does not object to privatization:

Together with not being so opposite for privatizations, I think that there are some public institutions that lose money. These are tried to be given to somebody and they are given. If it is intended, production in its real sense can be done. If at the end of the privatization, citizens are not suffered from them, if a huge price difference does not emerge, if employees of the public institution do not lose at the end of this, I do not oppose it too much, actually. But if they are privatized and the number of the employees is downed to 100 from 500 and the remaining personnel's wage decreased to the minimum level and the only aim of the company is reduced to the profit of the owner of the company, I oppose it. In other words, the only aim of this company becomes the profit of the boss, I oppose; but it provides new opportunities of employment, new areas of employment, people get the wages they really deserve and state do not achieve this, they should be privatized. My only concern is the public. There should be a midway. Workers should be able to unionize and should have right of strike. Ministry of Labour and Social Security is responsible for this I think. State should organize these relations. State should protect the employees.

Gülcan is optimistic about privatizations since she believes that there is a possibility for capitalists to think more about public rather than their capital. In this respect, state can organize the private sector to protect the rights of workers. As a public sector employee, under the conditions that she loses her rights and status as a professional in the public sector, her sensitivity towards the workers' rights increases. Gülcan's reference to "the public" should be noticed. She seems not completely to adopt the neoliberal discourse. On the other hand, she appoints the role of rule provider and organizer to the state which is expected to be on the side of workers.

At this point, Sridharan's determination on Indian middle class and their orientation towards liberalization, especially towards 'second generation' reforms involving privatization and downsizing of the state should be mentioned. According to Sridharan (2004), middle classes' position towards liberalization can be understood with two parameters. First one is the weight of the middle classes in the public sector. Since public employment means total job security and politically determined, not market-determined, pay scales, "they tend to oppose measures such as downsizing, public sector wage restraint, and central and state-level de-subsidization,

as well as structural changes like privatization" depending on how they are affected from these measures (2004: 406). On the other hand, other segments of the middle classes could be pro-liberalization. While those in the devaluing sectors may oppose, those employed in other sectors may support liberalization, since they could be the little sharers of the cake (Mills, 1951; Sridharan, 2004).

The findings of the analysis above can be explained through the framework that Sridhraran draws for middle classes' attitude towards liberalization. Those in the public sector for whom restructuring of the public sector means losing their status and rights for being engineer feel themselves more distant from the supporting privatizations. However, since 'efficiency' is also an important criterion for them, they support privatization with a serious consideration of workers' rights. On the other hand, for private sector employees and entrepreneurs, 'efficiency' raises as the sole criterion while comparing public sector and private sector. For them, inefficiency in the public sector arises from the close-mindedness of public sector employees. Private sector employees support privatizations and develop sympathy towards private sector. Entrepreneurs desire to be 'little sharers of the cake', however, despite increasing precariousness in their working conditions, how do engineers employed in the private sector raise as the supporters of the downsizing in the public sector? At this point, engineers' understanding of work and career should be elaborated. The following section will focus on this dimension.

4.1.2. Working in Private or Public Sector: Remaining in Between Career and Decent Conditions of Working

Until the 1980s, state had been the main employer of engineers; moreover, being employed in state institutions determined their social role and position in society. In other words, being employed in the state shaped their lifestyle, social and political position and status. While assigning the organizer role to the state, how do engineers perceive working in the public sector? Data collected through fieldwork made me conclude that today, from engineers point of view, being employed in the state institutions does not give status as before, but on the contrary it means being passive

engineers because of the awkward structure of the state institutions. On the other hand, gaining status is completely related with earning more money and career development. For example, one of my respondents Egemen who is a computer engineer working in private sector thinks that a computer engineer who is above 40 should not continue with his career through writing codes; so a computer engineer should continuously search for better positions. This is not possible in public sector. Public sector does not provide the conditions to dream for such a career for an engineer working in the public sector. According to Lüküslü (2009), such kind of a point of view means a turning point for Turkish society, since as Şerif Mardin revealed that since Ottoman period, for Turkish society, money had not played a central role for status. This transformation began with the 1950s' liberalization wave and triggered with the 1980s. For young who was grown up in this atmosphere, the cultural codings on status have completely changed.

In this section, dimension of work will be analyzed in order to understand how working relations are perceived and experienced among engineers: as an individual and private or public matter? Besides, do engineers attain themselves a missionary role for economic development of the country as followed during Republican years, or carry any motivation towards the idea that engineering should serve for the public as dominantly followed during the 1970s?

For my interviewees, work is an individual matter. Career and professionalism necessitate an individual struggle in which you compete with others. There is a career ladder which you should climb as an individual. In this respect, not having the conditions of "making career" in the public sector make those working in public sector feel isolated from the "dynamic" career opportunities of the private sector. Also working in the public sector means becoming passive engineers. They feel that they are useless. As opposed to previous periods, working in public sector does not

have any value other than "*sırtını devlete yaslamak*"[38]. When I asked the question of "how do you compare working in private or public sector?", all my respondents made this comparison referring to working hours, wages and career opportunities.

4.1.2.1. "Engineers in the public have lost their power coming from production"

Privatization of the public enterprises and decline of the importance of state economic enterprises for the state gave rise to deprivation of engineers' status in the public sector. Gülcan explains this transformation through her experiences:

> Now, in public institutions, it is not demanded to produce so much thing. Mostly, private sector is preferred. Specifically for AFAD, we have workshops here. In past, all prefabricated buildings were constructed here. Now, private sector produces them. We had Construction Affairs General Directorate responsible for this. Now, all these services are purchased from private companies. They try to downsize the state. State is tried to be turned to a governing structure. I mean withdrawal from productive activities and becoming a control mechanism. At least, that is what I see.

Engineers' role and authority has been lost in the public sector while state withdraws from production:

> As state is downsized, the role of the engineer is downsized in the state. What is the current system? Expertise system is tried to be placed. We also feel this transformation in out institution. Now, we feel as a second-class citizen in the institution. As a result of the decline of production sector in Turkey, the effect of engineer in the state has decreased. I don't think that engineers are as powerful as it was in the past… **Engineers was using its power that came from production, at least they had the right to speak.** Plus, the works they did were more significant. In both administration and production, we were powerful. At least we could produce something. Now, it seems that we have been disabled (Gülcan).

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[38] "*Sırtını devlete yaslamak*" is a statement that has been idiom in time in Turkish. It means becoming official who can not be dismmissed although he/she does not work enough.

Moreover, in the public sector, there is not long term planning to use the human resources appropriately. Gülcan complains about that she could not develop expertise in any area of geological engineering because of the loss of long term planning in public sector. She does not have any autonomy even about determining the department she works. She feels frustrated because of not producing anything:

> When Disaster Affairs was closed and AFAD was opened, nobody asked me if I want to work in information systems, or not. My name was written in this unit and I came here and started to work. Am I sufficient for this unit? No. I have been in this unit for two and a half years. Have this unit contributed to me? No. I struggle desperately. Now, I am searching for the courses I can attend. But it needs both time and money.

New regulations towards classifying public employees do not give a "distinctive" status for engineers and this disturbs Gülcan and Mesut too much:

> Now, engineering is not valuable as before. Technical personnel are completely left aside with the new regulation of expertise. Who are these experts? Among them, engineers, teachers, doctors whatever you can think exist. Nobody talks about his/her job, but says themselves 'expert'. But what is your expertise? (Mesut)

According to Gülcan, bureaucratic clientelism and "kadrolaşma"[39] prevent engineers to produce and realize projects:

> We cannot, because they do not allow us. Our head of department has changed five or six in two years. Each of them came with his own rules. We cannot produce anything serious for about two years. We start a project, then the head changes and he directs us to leave it and start another project. The changes in the institution caused groupings in the units. And if then group and the head are close each other, then they could have realized projects.

Merit is not followed as criteria for enrolling in the positions in public institutions. The only career opportunity in public sector that is being department head in a public office is completely related with political relations. People may be enrolled in public

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[39] "Kadrolaşma" means setting up one's own cadre in public offices.

institutions through KPSS; however, they cannot have the chance to be promoted through his/her successes:

> Nobody cares your merits while giving you a position in public. Usually, you are promoted or downgraded because of your relations. You can enter KPSS, but you are condemned to work there as an ordinary civil servant, if you do not have some 'merits' on you (Metin).

Although İmge was very enthusiastic to work in public sector because of more decent conditions of work, she has been disappointed because of not being able to produce anything and she criticizes cadre that has been enrolled in higher positions, but not eager to change something in the institution:

> In many cases, you miss private sector. There are advantages of being in public such as that you have rights, your wage is better than average. But, you miss private from other aspects. Cadre in the public is old and they cannot be changed.

On the other hand, Aslı who is a chemical engineer and working as supervisor in Ministry of Labour does not think as Gülcan and Mesut with respect to career development in public sector:

> While I was entering in this institution, I was thinking in this way: I feel that your labour is exploited in the private sector from many aspects including working hours. But there is an order in the state. We know that our working hours, from half past eight to half past five. You say that there is a standard, you have your weekends. When I look at my friends in private sector, their bosses do not consider their holidays sometimes and call them even in Sundays. There is a widespread argument that private grows you up. I think it depends on the person. I mean you can duly perform your duties. Or, if you intend to ameliorate something in the institution, nobody prevents you. You can develop yourself in the public, too (Aslı).

Although Gülcan and Mesut's position and Aslı's position seem contradictory, at this point, Gülcan's comment should be emphasized. Engineers are losing their power

that came from the production. On the other hand, contrary to the withdrawal from production, state tries to strengthen its organizer and supervisor role. Aslı, as an engineer working in a regulating institution of the state visits production workplaces periodically and she is very active as an engineer and satisfied with her job although continuous visits to other cities make her frustrated a little.

4.1.2.2. Private as the place of career opportunities vs. Public as the place of monotony

From engineers' perspective, labour market is seen as full of choices. To be employed in a decent job depends on one's success and ability to make right choice as Çağdaş stated. When I asked Çağdaş how he reacted to precarious working conditions he was exposed to in a software company in ODTÜ Teknokent, he stated:

> I have been working since seven years in this job. Almost one year of them was spent in overtimes. In this period, I asked myself why I am in such a situation, why things go in this was. I was angry to myself more. I thought that I could not make right choice while searching for a job. I thought that it was obvious that I would be in such a situation, I caused this, etc.

Today's engineer takes responsibility of finding a decent job for himself/herself and making a career. Seeking for a career arises as the basic motivating factor for engineering. In this respect, private sector arises as the place of plenty of career opportunities as opposed to the monotony of the public sector in which there is not a career ladder to climb.

Under 'flexible' conditions, engineers feel themselves 'free' to make choices out of 'dozens of choice' in the private sector. As Sennett determines, it is thought that flexibility that is against bureaucratic structure of the state and favors risk provides workers a realm of "freedom" to shape their own lives (Sennett, 2009: 10). Worker in the job market struggles to be employed in the companies that provide the best condition that is mainly based on wages. Work life is a continuous search for better jobs. Private is full of alternatives as opposed to monotony of the state. When I asked

Sinan who is a geological engineer and works in an engineering company what the difference between being employed in public and private sector, he replied:

> I did internship in the public. Things are routinized in time in the public sector. I mean, you have to focus on one area. This is why private appeals to me more. It can be thought with respect to wages, too. If my wage in a private company is 1000 TL, it can be 2000 TL when I change my workplace. However, in the public, it can be maximum 1200 or 1300 TL.

In this respect, private sector is seen as full of choices to develop yourself in your field. As you develop in your field, you can raise to more prestigious positions and earn more money. On the other hand, for an engineer in the public sector, there is not such a motivating factor to develop occupational skills.

Engineers in the public sector complain about not being able to develop their occupational skills. Gülcan spends individual effort to develop herself through courses organized by TMMOB; however it is not so meaningful since it does not correspond to any promotion or wage increase. Immaterial motivations are not so strong, since she spends money and time for them and does not get any benefit in exchange for this effort:

> I think I cannot develop myself in the public sector. I try to compensate for this with the in-service trainings organized by the chamber. I cannot participate in them so much, because I have two children to whom I have to share time. I have to participate in seminars in time offs, which means extra burden for me.

İmge who is a chemical engineer and employed in the public sector after a disappointing experience in the private sector is not happy to be in public sector – Kırıkkale Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation-despite its decent conditions of work. Aslı who is school friend of İmge and have the similar private

sector experience with her analyzes her friend's psychology of being employed in the public sector:

> After a certain time, people working there become depressed. I observe this from İmge's experience. First six months of İmge was very difficult. She thought that she was standing without doing anything. She thought that she was unnecessary. There are lots of people in this situation.

Under these conditions, engineers do not have any other motivating factor than having decent conditions of work to work in the public sector. From today's engineers' point of view, public sector can be selected because of obligatory conditions. In the following two sections these 'obligatory' conditions will be focused on.

4.1.2.3. Public as the place of escaping from the exploitation in the private sector

Different areas of engineering do not have equal value in the labour market. While the fields of engineering related with communication sector such as computer and electrical-electronical engineering are valuable in the labor market, engineerings that are related with production sector which were very precious previously for public sector lost their previous status and value. Gülcan's geological engineer friends working in private sector does not get much higher wages than public despite their long experience in the field:

> Now I am in a department related with my main area, but I am still not happy, because I feel that I become blunt. The workplace I work in does not satisfy me materially and spiritually. Can you find these in private sector? In private, you have opportunity to develop yourself, but working conditions are so hard. Wage is not so above the wages in the public… But state does not grow up its employees no more.

Despite widespread agreement among engineers that people in private sector have more chance to develop themselves in their job, for engineers who are graduated from "less popular" universities and "less popular" branches of engineering, private sector means disappointment with respect to working conditions and this makes them

quit searching for a career in the private sector. Young engineers in this situation prepare for KPSS (Public Personnel Selection Examination) after several disappointing experiences in the private sector. For example, Erdinç is a computer engineer graduated from ODTÜ (Middle East Technical University) and employed in a small office of an American company. His spouse Aslı is a chemical engineer graduated from Ankara University and she has two different private sector experiences. In both of these, Aslı worked in precarious conditions as opposed to more decent conditions of Erdinç. She quitted seeking for a decent job in private and now she is preparing for KPSS to be employed in public sector:

> What I observed in private sector is that many of your rights are not rights actually. You are going to work at eight o'clock and you are focusing on your work until six o'clock. You feel under serious stress, you are feeling so tired when you come back home. You cannot watch news. Normally, people enjoy home at 9 PM, I know many times I was asleep at this hour. In public, may be you cannot develop in your occupation, but you are doing your work, you get your wage, you can retire. But there is no such thing in the private.

Aslı could not find any job which makes her feel "valuable" and her disappointment made her withdraw from seeking a career in private sector. She takes the risk of losing her 'dynamism' in the public sector and struggles to be enrolled in a public sector job. Private sector puts her in "worker status"[40]; however, she wants to feel as a 'professional'. She, as an engineer feels disappointment of losing her status:

> I have developed in my occupation during my private sector experience; I have learned a lot of in my first workplace. In my second workplace, I can say that I have learned nothing. There are people who want to suppress you, put you in **worker status**. In this case, you can change your workplace. In the public sector, you do not have such kind of a chance to change your workplace…

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[40] "Feel of proletarianization" will be discussed in section 4.1.2.6.

On the other hand, especially for male engineers, the amount of money earned is more important; while women feel themselves responsible to balance their family responsibilities and career choices. While comparing public sector and private sector, Mesut puts more emphasis on the wages. As it will be discussed in the related chapter, he feels himself guilty since not presenting the financial conditions to his family to send his daughters to private school. On the other hand, for him, working in public sector is advantageous than working in private sector, since you cannot have even the time to spend the money you earn in private:

> My friends working in the private say that they had to enter into conflict with their bosses. They earn much more than me. With respect to social life, private may be better than public, but private is better from economical aspects.

In this respect, working in public sector is perceived as leaving career opportunities behind for more decent conditions of work. Women engineers who also are burdened many responsibilities socially are more inclined to sacrifice their careers in the private sector.

4.1.2.4. Public sector for women: Balancing the career and family responsibilities

Being women burdens other responsibilities to women engineers' shoulders. They cannot only consider their careers, they always have to balance their careers and family responsibilities. Aslı tells:

> I think the main reason that people prefer the public is to live in Ankara or to be married. My marriage was damaged while I was working in private. All domestic work was remaining to Erdinç. And I was in dilemma between my marriage and my job. This is why I am thinking to work in public. I am also planning to have a child. How will I balance this? I have to prepare her/him for a good future.

Aslı's analysis completely overlaps with Gülcan's experiences. Gülcan, who has been working in Disaster Affairs for 13 years, is not happy with working in public sector, since she could not develop herself with respect to engineering, but had to

choose public sector because of her 'responsibilities' as woman. However, she lost her personal motivation about being a "successful engineer having a career". Moreover, although she sacrificed her career for her family, she does not feel satisfied about her private life, too:

> When I look at the past, I cannot see so many things about knowledge accumulation. My past is empty. Ok, I have been employed in the public, but my reason was mainly being woman. I thought my children, my home. Thinking that I wanted to be more relaxed, but I do not feel relaxed now.

So, women engineers feel the tension of sacrificing their careers for family responsibilities. Since they sacrifice their careers for their family, they expect to be "very successful" in child raising and providing the best conditions of family reproduction.

4.1.2.5. To be appreciated by the boss: The motivating factor of engineers

From today's' engineers' perspective, success in their occupation is mainly dependent on to be appreciated by the employer. According to their perspective, lack of an employer in the public sector causes inefficiency in the public sector and also prevents successful ones "shine amongst others". You do not have any other chance to be an 'ordinary engineer' in the public sector which creates injustice among employees.

Pressure on employees in private sector is regarded as a positive motivating factor by Erdinç who is a computer engineer working in private sector. Thanks to the pressure on employees, successful ones have the chance to show themselves among others. Moreover, this motivates an employee to develop himself/herself. For Erdinç, if an employee is not appreciated by employers, he/she feels himself exploited. To be appreciated means that you are climbing the career ladder and you deserve higher wages. Basic motivations towards developing themselves in engineering are feeling valuable in the eyes of the employers and getting higher wages. In this respect,

private sector is more "just" than public sector in which you do not have the chance to show your "difference" from other employees. However much you work, you do not have the chance to be other than an "ordinary engineer" working in the public sector:

> There is a continuous tempo in private. There is continuous pressure, continuous effort of completing works. Because of the pressure, interpersonal relations are advanced, but tense. As an advantage, you feel yourself more motivated. You feel yourself open to development. Appreciation changes depend on the workplace. Sometimes, you cannot be appreciated even one time and feel yourself as fool. You feel yourself more **exploited**. But you are free in public. However, inequality between people is more widespread in public. You can work much more than others, but you get the same wages with them. Whatever you do, you have to get the same wage and you cannot be promoted. In private sector, you can move up higher positions. You can quit this company and make a fresh start in another. But you cannot do this in public. You can resist to stability, work too much, but cannot get any reward.

Engineers see themselves as individuals in the labour market and believe that there is a just order in the private sector based on merit. As long as you make 'right' choices in the labour market and if you are not 'unlucky' you will be rewarded in exchange of your labour in the private sector. For Gülcan, if you are lucky, you can meet "understanding" employers in private sector. However, in public sector, you do not have any chance to get rewards in return for your working:

> Working conditions is harsher in the private sector. It depends also on your luck. Of course, you spend effort, but it also depends on your luck. But there is not stability in private sector. You have the opportunity to develop yourself in private. You might not be able to get that you deserve. It depends on your luck.

According to Çağdaş, "character" of the employer determines the "welfare" of the workplace. If the employer communicates with employees and explains the reasons of overwork to employees, Çağdaş is open to embrace the workplace and tolerate employer's demands. He feels himself valuable in the eyes of his employer. Being

successful and having a career are related to each other and make Çağdaş become satisfied with his conditions:

> The reason that I was offered with this job was that I was working with my friends in the workplace in my previous workplace before. Since they were happy with my work, they wanted me to see around them. (*To the question that if he thinks himself successful*) I think that I am successful. I cannot talk about big achievements that I realized. I do not have a serious career now; I have five-six years of career now. But I tried not to disappoint my employers with my works.

Surviving in the labor market in many senses including finding a decent job and demanding rights from the employer is considered as an individual and private matter. In this respect, they see themselves responsible for finding more 'fair' employers. Çağdaş who is a computer engineer and working in a private company is the only interviewee who critically emphasized the role of the state as the proponent of the workers against capitalists:

> While I am voting, I take these points into consideration: I feel myself close politically to the side that cares for rights of employees, and declares provide the justice for employees.

However, at the experience level, Çağdaş is an individual struggling for better conditions in the labor market. When I asked Çağdaş how he reacted to precarious working conditions he was exposed to in a software company in ODTÜ Teknokent, he stated:

> I have been working since seven years in this job. Almost one year of them was spent in overtimes. In this period, I asked myself why I am in such a situation, why things go in this was. I was angry to myself more. I thought that I could not make right choice while searching for a job. I thought that it was obvious that I would be in such a situation, I caused this, etc.

To my question if he thought to demand their rights from the employer together with other workers, he answered in this way:

In such kind of places, I have observed that people do not move together. Instead of taking action together, people think that how can I save myself from this situation. On the other hand, if employer is understanding and he/she establishes dialogue with the employers and explains the reasons of overtime –as my current workplace- people feel more close to each other, share their works, make more effective plans. But as I said, **it depends on the point of view of the employer**.

In this respect, engineers always expect distillation from their employers in exchange of their successes. According to Aslı, American company in which Erdinç works 'values' the labour of computer engineers working in the company. In this way, they are motivated to work. Personal motivation and feel of success stimulates them to work harder:

There is one thing in Erdinç's workplace that I like too much. For example, a meeting is done spontaneously with US. For everything they did, they say "we appreciate you", "thank you very much", "god bless your brain" etc. There is such kind of a motivation factor. In my workplace, it was completely different. They were asking "why are you late?" "Why did you do this?" This makes you hate your job.

Unless they feel that your labour is not regarded by the employers, you start to feel that you are an 'ordinary' worker.

4.1.2.6. Engineers' resistance to proletarianization and to the loss of their status

Engineers develop to resistance mechanisms for proletarianization of white collar workers in Turkey. First, as it was discussed in the previous sections, they search for individual solutions to escape from the feeling of "downgrading to worker status" through searching for "more just" employers or preparing for KPSS for a public sector job. Aslı is one of the engineers following the second option. According to Aslı, as a chemical engineer, you do not have chance to feel as 'professional' in Ankara, since there are many chemical engineering graduates despite the lack of sector that can employ them:

As a chemical engineer, in Ankara there is not any sector that chemical engineers can be employed. I don't know other places.

Moreover, there are a lot of chemical engineering graduates. Since employers think that there is a lot of chemical engineer who can be replaced with you, you are oppressed as a group of chemical engineers. **You are in the status of workers**. There are a lot of employers who demand from you to finish your work which needs at least ten days to finish in five days. I mean, the conditions are really harsh. May be you can develop in your occupation, but forget about personal development in this sector.

According to Yasin, engineers cannot earn the money they deserve as professionals: Yasin was graduated from ODTÜ as civil engineer in 2002. After graduation, he worked in Saudi Arabia for six months. After turning to Turkey, he established a company with his partner and three employees. Then he could not earn the money he dreamed and they closed the company. For Yasin, this is an indication of that engineers are not valued in Turkey:

While I was establishing my own work, I was dreaming for better income and that I could develop my company. When I felt that I cannot get return of my workings with respect to income, I closed the company. Your responsibility is too much in entrepreneurship. If you cannot get serious amounts of money, it is meaningless… There are both office work and field work in our job. In office, you spend your life in an office. In the field, on the other hand, you cannot have an orderly life, but you can earn serious amounts of money.

Yasin analyzes the position of engineer in Turkey from a wider perspective. According to him, Turkish engineers are used as cheap labor in the global division of labor. While engineers in Western countries deal with "know-how" projects, Turkish engineers apply these into the projects. Engineers in Western countries produce knowledge which is rare, so valuable. However, engineers who apply these technologies are much in number which makes their labour invaluable:

As I have observed, what we do know had been done by foreign engineers, Europeans in the past. Current technology was not known by Turkish engineers. In time, we have learned new technologies, but foreign engineers have begun to deal with the *process* of the job. They began to sell the knowledge part of the job, i.e. "know-how" projects. Now, knowledge makes money. We are dealing with the invaluable part of the engineering.

Yasin's position can be read as a resistance to devaluation and routinization of their labour; in other words, 'proletarianization' of engineers (Braverman, 1998). He is aware of that they are used as cheap labour by developed countries. On the other hand, he is optimistic about the future of engineering in Turkey. In time, Turkish engineers will engage with know-how projects and will be able to earn more money. They will be able to deal with part of this work that makes money:

> I think this will change in some stage. We are inclined to promote upwards. There are Research and Development Offices and trials like this. What we are doing is begun to be done by third world countries such as India cheaper. If we can deal with the "know-how" part of the work, engineering will make money. For example, serious amounts of money can be earned in aircraft industry and defense industry by companies now, because good jobs began to be done in these industries. Instead of obtaining the patents from foreign countries and producing these products, in our country research activities have begun and sub-industries of them have developed. And other sectors could benefit from this development. In civil engineering, there should be such developments so that we can also deal with the part of the job that makes money. We have to focus on the know-how part of the job so that engineering become valuable in our country, too. We have the knowledge that is unique to us so that we can become valuable in the world scene.

Motivation of engineers completely depends on the money they earn. To produce knowledge means earning more and more money. He defines "know-how" activities, in other words producing science, as "the part of the job that makes money". For today's engineer, engineering is a mean to achieve high standards of living. Making science does not have any connotation related with "science should be in service of the public rather than individual interests".

All in all, it can be concluded that engineering has lost its status in both public and private sectors, however, engineers try to gain their status again. Nowadays, engineers' perception of status corresponds to earning more money and to be appreciated by employers. Working in public sector does not have any meaning other than having better conditions of working. Moreover, for most of the engineers

working in private sector making "science" does not have any meaning other than dealing with the part of the work making more money. In addition, according to those whose area of engineering is valuable in the labour market, problems about working conditions are temporary and one has the freedom of choosing another job in the sector. Problems about working conditions are regarded as individual problems requiring individualized solutions. On the other hand, as Poulantzas (1978) determines, their constant fear of proletarianization makes them concentrate on their individual lives and their demand for their security of work conditions emerges in the form of "monetary fetishism". Also, as Goldthrope et. al. (1969) determines for middle classes, wages and career are the most critical issue about the work. The results of the study conducted by TMMOB in 2009 as a revisit of the research[41] conducted by Ali Artun in 1977 to understand political and social positions of engineers, architects and city planners overlaps the findings of this thesis and the arguments of Poulantzas and Goldthrope. When engineers and architects were asked to say the first three important criteria for job satisfaction, "wage" was placed in the top with 67.9% among TMMOB members and with 70.5% among nonmembers:

Table 7. Criteria for Job Satisfaction among Engineers, Architects and City Planners

	Member	Nonmember
Status, career	33,2%	30,0%
Wage	67,9%	70,5%
Physical conditions of the workplace	11,8%	20,0%
Taking initiative	25,3%	20,4%
Doing the work that gives pleasure	44,1%	38,8%
Having the conditions to apply his/her knowledge	29,2%	22,9%
Institutionalization of the workplace	13,4%	11,3%
Human relations in the workplace	18,4%	15,4%
Jobs' being in the service of the public	22,4%	16,0%
Having the conditions of occupational development	32,6%	22,8%

(TMMOB, 2009:80)

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[41] Research was begun to be conducted in 2005 and published in 2009 (TMMOB, 2009).

Considering these, the meaning of work is reduced to earning money and making career completely determined with individualistic motivations. In this respect, group attachment is very weak among professional middle classes (Goldthrope et. al., 1969). Above all, it can be deduced that such kind of a mentality towards their work makes engineers in Turkey appropriate citizens of neoliberalism as active, self-responsible, dynamic and self-entrepreneur workers in the labour market.

At this point, it is necessary to ask the question of how such a political problem is regarded as individual problem by engineers. At the end of the analysis section, what kind of dynamics are lying behind the engineers' individualization in work related issues is questioned. However, before discussing this aspect, it is necessary to discuss "services" which are very significant in engineers' construction of the perception of state; and also adaptation to the neoliberal transformation of the state's welfare regime.

4.1.3. Taking the Responsibility of One's Own Welfare: The Services Case

Most of the engineers I have interviewed with included the service provider role of the state into their definitions of the state. For them, state should exist "for" its citizens and provide the basic standards of living.

On the other hand, recent years, public services are under transformation and social citizenship practices are changing with neoliberal policies. Different classes experience this transformation in different ways. For middle classes, through commodification of education and health, these spheres have been included in the consumption practices of middle classes in Turkey. State's policies on the transformation of the welfare regime aims to create a social structure in which middle classes are responsible for their own welfare and purchase the services from private instead of expecting them from the state under the claim of social rights. Considering this, throughout the fieldwork study, questions were directed to engineers to understand to what extent they have been adapted to and legitimized

such a system. In addition, the dynamics behind their position towards commodification of public rights have been questioned.

Considering discussion held up to now, it can be deduced that engineers do not demand from the state a leading role for economic development through public enterprises in which they work as active engineers for many years. In addition, it has been concluded that engineers do not have strong connections with the state as previously experienced during developmental years. Previous discussion revealed that engineers in Turkey demand organizer role from the state; but it is necessary to question experiences of engineers with the state as citizens to the dynamics through which engineers have internalized neoliberal conditions of living which make engineers as middle classes alienated from the public and isolated while living individualized lives. In this respect, engineers' inclusion of citizen's social rights and the term 'welfare' into their definition of the state deserves attention, because it means that they have not completely adapted to neoliberal ideology. However, beyond ideas, it is necessary to understand experiences in order to shed light on if there is potential for struggle against the deterioration of social rights; or there is a widespread conformism about replacing public services with private ones.

While analyzing engineers' experiences of public rights, one should consider their middle classness beyond their being engineers. Professional middle classes are in-between situation with respect to purchasing services from private and utilizing their social rights. On the other hand, they aspire to earn enough money to get private services. Although they demand quality service from the state, it does not turn to a collective struggle for better and free public services. To the contrary, they try to create individual solutions for their problems about services. In addition, since their experience of public services is not good, they try to weaken their ties with the state. Through focusing on how engineers make their preference from public and private services, we become able to analyze their personal motivations for life.

4.1.3.1." State should care for the welfare of its citizens"

Most of the engineers whom I interviewed with included social services of the state-especially health and education- at the center of their definition of the state. It is important that in contrast to neoliberal ideology which favors withdrawal of the state from the area of welfare, they prioritize their demands from welfare state. When I directed the question of what state connotes to her, Cansu who is an industrial engineer and works in a private engineering office stated:

> The word state connotes me social state. State is a power that protects the public, provides its public with the conditions for living in welfare.

So, state has responsibilities in line with this. They emphasize state's responsibility of primary needs that are health, education, sheltering, transportation, security. From an egalitarian point of view, they support equal opportunities that state should provide for every section of society. Some of them refer to welfare state to elaborate their ideas and equalize the state with the welfare state:

> First of all, the health. State has responsibilities about our health, education. The first thing coming to my mind is health. Other than these, the right of security. It has to provide security for us. Other than this, there are projects about sheltering. When you say state, what comes to my mind is the structure that should provide minimum conditions of living for its citizens (Deniz).

> The first thing comes to my mind is the health. I mean, state should provide equal conditions for everyone. Everybody should have a right to access health service without any consideration of money. The second is the education (Emre).

> I wish that health service is free. I wish that human health should be taken into consideration seriously. The value of human health and the human is not recognized as needed. Especially, the health is so important for me. Serious and actual steps should be taken in the issue of health (Gülcan).

Yasin, who is more sympathetic towards the policies of AKP government compared to other informants carries the same egalitarian point of view and emphasizes the role of municipalities in this respect:

> Of course, state has many responsibilities. It should provide security for its citizens. It should guarantee welfare and peace. I give importance on welfare state. Since the state exists for its citizens, it should be a mechanism that can take decisions for the welfare of its citizens. Welfare state should provide the conditions that rich people can reach themselves to the poor. State should make something for its citizens without any consideration of money. Social needs of people should be provided by the state. For instance: the water. I think that *kartlı su*[42] application is so wrong. Everybody should have a right to access water freely. It is valid for transportation, too.

In sum, for engineers, service providing role of the state is so important. In other words, in their construction of the 'ideal state', primary needs of the citizens are provided by the state. However, for Turkish state, there is a serious dissatisfaction for the services provided by the state, which raises as the main factor making them alienated to the public services. Moreover, the lack of 'social rights' perspective causes them evaluate the problems about the services of the state from 'consumer' perspective.

4.1.3.2. Disappointment with the services provided by the state: Consumer rights instead of social citizenship rights

As discussed in the previous part, respondents put emphasis on the service providing role of the state. However, they think that state does not provide the conditions that they demand from the state. State collects taxes from the working population, but do not provide the services in turn of the taxes it collects:

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[42] The system of water services in which consumers pay money of the water they will consume before they consume the water.

State connotes me an institution that should serve for its citizens hypothetically, but collecting taxes but not returning them as services actually. From the pavements in our street to our abjectness in the hospitals and public schools. For example, my child is attending to public school. Conditions of both the school and the teacher working there cannot reach to the level of the conditions of a private school (Ayça).

Çağdaş and Egemen gave oil prices, railroad and traffic examples to elaborate their discontent about the services of the state. They evaluate public services using "conscious consumer" perspective and analyses regarding price-quality association where price corresponds to the tax:

When I look from the perspective of employee, workers, civil servants, farmers who are working and burdening the responsibility of giving tax should be provided the level of life standards that they deserve. I demand that state provides a life that corresponds to the taxes employees give. As a simple example, I purchase the gas with high prices although I pay high amounts of tax. Plus, the quality of the roads and the taxes I pay do not overlap. I demand improvement in these issues. I demand quality roads, quality infrastructure, less traffic after work hours, the conditions of warming in winter. I mean, necessities of the modern life is so expensive today. And the service I got in exchange of it is of poor quality (Çağdaş)

(To the question of what is the function of the state?) First of all, the security, state is a structure that should protect its citizens. If I can sleep at night with the feel of security, it is because I feel their presence. In addition, while I am driving, it makes me crazy that there are many roadworks. When I am passing through the road near Armada, I see the building that is waiting for about 10 years to be constructed. I mention about the state when I am passing near there. Other than these, basic needs of living such as health. We are paying taxes to the state. We demand these services in exchange of these (Egemen).

Erdinç maintains the same position with Egemen and Çağdaş, but compares himself with other workers and emphasizes his professionalism. For him, he is a professional and needs more "special" service compared to other workers who have fewer earnings. For him, state should provide 'justice' and rationally distribute

unemployment and retirement payments proportional to the "quality" of the workers. He thinks that he as a "professional" deserves a better life:

> I have not entered in a serious relationship with the state other than paying taxes. I have such a profile: I am tax payer, but I cannot get anything in exchange of it. I mean, I give much more than I get. You give much kind of taxes, but when you need, state leaves me alone. If I give the state 10, when I need state gives me 2 or 3. For example, if I am unemployed, state will give me 600 TL unemployment pay. But I am giving much more amount of tax in each month. But I have not get unemployment pay yet. But if I need to get, I think that 600 TL is not fair. Especially, the fact that I will get the same amount of unemployment pay with somebody whose current wage is less than mine is unfair. It is valid for other issues, too. For example, if I am giving premium in the amount of 50 billions, I should not get the same amount of unemployment pay with the person who gives premium in the amount of 10 billion. I mean that state will not pay me back the amount I deserve at the end of years of **professional** work. **I think this system exploits the professionals like me through taxes**. We think to take out a private policy.

First, engineers demand services from the state, but it does not include a strong egalitarian, rights-based point of view. Rather, engineers oscillate between "consumer rights" and "citizen rights" perspectives. Citizen seems to be equalized with the consumer, where state has the role of seller rather than the mechanism of redistribution.

4.1.3.3. Private services as alternatives of the public services: Cost-benefit analysis to make a choice between public or private services

For engineers who think that they cannot reach quality services from the state in exchange of the tax they pay, private is full of alternatives. People can find places that are affordable for them to receive service. Recent policies in health sector provide alternatives in health service for middle classes. When I asked Deniz why he chooses private hospitals instead of public hospitals, he replies:

> Why do I prefer private hospital instead of public? Previously, I could benefit from public hospitals easily because my mother was a nurse.

My mother was arranging the doctors and we could go the hospital and did not have to wait for examination. Now, I have to go the public hospital as early as 6 AM in the morning. Under this tempo, it is risky to go the public hospital at an early hour in the morning and you do not know if the doctor is good in his job or not. When you have economical conditions to go private hospital, you prefer to go there. It is about the level of income. When I compare with the previous years, today we have such an option: private hospitals were scarce, now there are thousands of private hospitals. There are private hospitals who gains from demand. Since they have a contract with the state, we can get service through giving 10 or 20 TL and finish our job. Now, we have a midway option. You go such kind of hospitals; there are a lot of people there now. They created such a midway today for people like us.

Mesut also supports recent policies on health with the reason that more people can reach private health service now. Government's policies on including middle classes into the circle of private services seem to attract people from middle classes. As Mesut states:

Policies of current government made hospitals more accessible for citizens. People can go hospitals easily compared to previous periods. I mean, we are not restricted with several public hospitals, we can go many hospitals today.

For most of the informants, state is an institution to which we "pay" too much through taxes, but cannot receive the service that is needed for this payment. Under market conditions, we cannot get the service in exchange for the tax we pay. In line with this rational calculation, people search for an order where one can receive the service he/she needs in exchange for the payment. For example, one can get better treatment from an A level hospital, if she/he pays this amount of money, while another can get moderate level of treatment from a D level hospital, if she/he pays that amount of money. This is very "normal" and "just". As Yasin states:

There should be privatization in health. Everybody has right to benefit from the service given by the state; but some people should have right to get **more special** service. The determining factor is the price. If people have the conditions of spending more money for services, they should be able to access more private service in exchange of the

money they give. But it does not mean that these people should not go to public hospitals. Public hospitals should strive for access to the standards of the private services. But, in any case, it is inevitable that there are differences between private and public services. This is the same all around the world. There should be privatizations, I do not object it; but state should struggle to ameliorate the conditions so that people can get equal service.

As Goldthrope et. al. (1969) determines, for middle classes, hierarchical social order in society which is determined with the associated prestige and lifestyle is an open one. If one has the necessary abilities and moral qualities, he/she can climb the ladder. The place somebody accesses in the end depends on what he 'makes of himself'. Moreover, it is felt that the individual has an obligation to assume responsibility for his own life and welfare and to try to 'get on in the world' as far as he can. In this respect, middle classes are inclined to internalize the characteristics of the 'ideal' citizen of neoliberalism who is responsible for his/her own welfare. On the other hand, the emphasis some of my interviewees put on their social demands from the state deserves attention and warns us not to make reduction. For example, Sinan's position is more egalitarian than Yasin. Sinan's example is from Sweden where welfare state tradition is strong. For him, everybody should have the right to get best services for free:

> Does money purchase everything? Let's think about the health. We can observe that people whose income level is low have difficulty in getting health service. For example, I went to a private hospital for my eye examination. I thought that they would not demand payment since it has a contract with the state. But I paid 15 TL. Why do I have to pay this money? State does not provide all costs. They applied a test for my examination and I paid 100 TL for it. Maybe I can afford it, but there are people who do not have the financial conditions to afford it. State does not care about it. But in Sweden, people can go to hospitals freely and can get services of high quality. Health is so important. Does money purchase everything? Yes, to some extent.

Sinan is highly critical for tuitions that citizens have to pay to get health service contrary to Yasin's point of view that if somebody wants to get "more special" service using their money, it is a right, and moreover it is "freedom". However, for Sinan, this is not freedom, but inequality.

4.1.3.4. *Feeling the responsibility to purchase private services for family members*

Although Yasin and Sinan differ with respect to their ideological position towards how equity in society can be achieved, at the experience level, they converge to each other. Both Yasin and Sinan strive for enhancing their life standards to purchase private health and education services. When I asked Sinan if he thinks that he can achieve the standards that allow him to send his children to private school in the future, he replies:

> I can think of it. I feel myself lucky. From this point on, to develop myself depends on my effort. Through developing myself in my profession, I can reach the level of income that I need. I think that my income can reach the level of purchasing the basic services, needs. I think of that I have a car, a house and my wife has the same amount of income with me. Under these conditions, I can share certain amount of money for my children's education annually, for instance 10.000 TL.

Sinan includes his children's private school spending into his future plan. Although he advocates free public services, his optimistic point of view makes him dream for a life in which he can purchase "best" services for his family. His emphasis on the merits which he thinks bring him the life (basically depends on the money earned) he dreams for completely overlaps with the middle class outlook that Goldthrope et. al. (1969) outline. From this perspective, hierarchical social ladder is an open one and if one has the necessary abilities and moral qualities, he/she can climb the ladder.

As Crompton (2008) determines for middle classes, market inspired changes in the education system attracts middle classes, so that middle class parents ensure that their children can be enrolled in the academically "successful" schools. As a result of this, those who cannot afford to send their children to private school feel themselves unsuccessful and under pressure of 'fear of falling' (Ehrenreichs, 1999). Gülcan replied my question "have you ever been thought to send your child to private school?" in this way:

> Yes we have. But we cannot send him because of financial issues. Now, he is at fifth grade. I make him enter scholarship exams of private schools. I wish he earns a scholarship and goes to private school…

Mesut, on the other hand, compares his income with his engineer friends who own their private companies and earn significant amounts of money. Although he is very careful while selecting public school and teacher for his daughter, he is not happy about not to have another chance to send his daughter to public school because of his income level. Although he wants to send his daughter to private school, he cannot afford it:

> The current school of my daughter is in Batıkent where we accommodate. We searched for a good teacher; but what we really want is to send her to a private school. Tuitions of private schools are too high today. A high quality private school demands at least 1000-1500 TL monthly. It is too expensive for us. Now, she is at primary level, we are planning to send to private school for higher grades. I have friends who are entrepreneurs. Their income is not limited like ours. Their children go to private school since preschool level.

All in all, from engineers' perspective, under conditions which provide the "al lot of choices" for quality education through private services, not to be able to send their children to private school makes them feel that they are not 'good' parents.

4.1.3.5. Desire to be not in need of the state and to be able to control one's own life: "God save us from the state"

Another reason of such kind of feeling among those who cannot afford private school tuition fees is their constant comparison of their situation with others' situation. To need state service is considered as not having the opportunities to get private service. Using public services is not considered as reaching rights, but not having another chance:

> Rich people do not need state to get the service they want. Who needs state is the poor, I think. I mean, since everything is present as private. In any case, children of rich people can go to private school, they can

> go private hospitals, take out a private policy, can get security service from security companies, can live in luxury houses. So, rich people do not need the state at all. Relationship of the state and the poor is closer, since they cannot purchase the service from the private (Ayça).

> In any case, rich people can purchase the services from private; but the poor cannot do this. They are obligatory to the state, but there are public hospitals they can go (Çağdaş)

Engineers see themselves in-between situation. If they can purchase services, they have to make calculations since they are wage workers and have limited earnings:

> I see myself in the middle. I can reach some of them, and cannot reach other. Sometimes, I need to get service from the state (Ayça).

> I do not consider myself as a rich person. I am an employee. As long as I can, I do not prefer to use money to get services. I see myself in the middle in this respect (Çağdaş).

Public rights as an alternative among the services market are the ones which are 'cheaper'. In this respect, tuition fees added to health service around 15 TL do not bother middle classes, since public services continue to be cheaper and affordable for them. In addition, they are necessary for better public services and to prevent 'abuses'. In this case, they make cost-benefit analysis as discussed above.

Although some of them feel themselves obligatory to take services from public, having to enter into relationship with the state connotes boredom. If possible, they would prefer not to enter any relationship with the state institutions:

> God forbid us from its hospitals, schools, and judiciary! Buying a house or another thing is a big problem. They always say "go today and come tomorrow again" (Metin).

Moreover, Turkish state does not make them feel "secure" so that they plan their future and struggle to reach the standards they dream for. Security means controlling somebody's own life. Middle classes want to see their future and feel in secure. They

compare and contrast Turkey with European countries and conclude that contrary to European countries, in Turkey, people do not feel in secure. Yasin states:

> My friends who have seen there, some European countries make their citizens feel secure to a great extent. I mean citizens live in safety and do not have such concerns (finding supporter to be employed in a secure job). Social welfare state is established in some countries and people can reach basic standards of living although they are unemployed, which can be abused in Turkey. I watched a documentary on health systems in England, directed by Michael Moore. A woman who gives birth is provided by not only payment, but also nurse and taxi for hospital visits. They live in such welfare. We are in a better condition than that of American citizens have. We are like Canada may be. Those who cannot buy a medicine in United States with 100 TL, goes to Canada with two hours of voyage and buy it with 20 TL. Turkey is not in such a bad situation, I think.

They want to feel in secure, since they want to make plans for future. Ambiguousness cause them feel anxious about their life. The continuous need of security and control make them unsatisfied with Turkey:

> When I look at the relationships with the neighbor countries, I question what will be done if a war emerges. I am planning to marry. Of course, these are not so serious issues, but I think about them sometimes, since our country could not achieve many things. For example, when a person in Germany wakes up in the morning, he/she is sure that his/her basic needs will be provided by the state, he/she is in security, etc. Actually, Germany is not a good example. But those lived in the Sweden or Norway does not have a problem of obligatory military service, for example. It is valid for retirement, too. Maybe we can earn today, but you can do computer engineering until a certain age. For example, you cannot make a man write codes after the age of 40. He also does not want to do after this age. You will either deal with serious projects, or since as an engineer you have managerial abilities, you will be manager in a company. Moreover, everything is changing in the country. Education system is changing always. There is always ambiguity in the country. You do not know what will be tomorrow. If something would be more established in the country, people could live in peace and welfare (Egemen).

> I demand quality service from the state, especially in the areas of health and education. I demand a state that cares about citizens, education of the children who are our future. I demand from the state

make long-term planning with serious projects, so that people can plan their lives. Under these conditions, we cannot plan even the following year. We cannot make long-term planning, because education system may change the next year. I mean families cannot make long-term planning in Turkey (Gülcan).

Today, there is space to be independent from the state "thanks to private services". When they purchase services from private, they feel that their life is under their control which is so critical for middle classes. As Heiman et. al. (2012) points out, "middle classes are often imbued with affective traces of aspiration and anxiety and the desire for a feeling of security and belonging" (p.8). Through purchasing services from the state, they become able to plan their and their families' future, choose the service they want to get. Private provides flexibility and "freedom of choice". Moreover, they do not feel secure when they get service from the state; but the need of "to be able to control their own life" makes them feel "secure" while purchasing private services. Ayça explains referring to her experience:

I make such a comparison: physical conditions, first of all. For example, my child attended to a private kindergarten. When you pay serious amounts of money, the physical conditions of the private schools is above the conditions of public schools. Everything is so hygienic there. You do not have suspicion about the hygiene in private schools. Or about security, I did not have any suspicion about if my child was in security or not. But since he has been attending to public school, I really worry about both hygiene and security in the school. Actually, it is more about the number of children in the school. For example, if he goes to TED private school, you cannot **control** it at all.

Although private services are regarded as better alternatives than public services, they do not idealize private services, especially in the case of health. They emphasize that they are aware of that especially private hospitals behaves you as customers to be cheated. Aslı thinks that health service should not be private, since private sector is motivated towards getting more profit. In private hospitals, clients are considered only as customers:

> Private ones just consider the money they get. They do the investigations on you that are not necessary actually. This is known by everybody, but since the service is better in private, people prefer private ones. But, if public hospitals provide such kind of service, I would prefer the public ones of course.
>
> I paid around 30-40 TL each time. I have fixed income, but these amounts are very high for some people. There are many people who cannot pay even 40 TL. It should be cheaper. In exchange of the taxes, these services should be cheaper.

This kind of critique and consciousness may have two consequences: first, people may organize and demand better services and secure conditions of living and public rights from the state; second, people might seek for individualized solutions for precarious conditions of living. Engineers whom I interviewed with are inclined to second position. They do not raise demand from the state, but seek for a career through which she/he can earn more and purchase private services such as retirement and health insurance. They try to save themselves from being in need of state services.

4.1.3.6. Class based concerns while taking education service: Perception about the private schools

Up to now, it has been discussed that at the experience level, engineers do not evaluate public services from rights perspective, rather they have been internalized the consumer rights perspective. What kind of a process they follow while making their choice from public or private services? For engineers whom I interviewed with, public services are alternatives among many. For this group, receiving service from public or private is similar to a customer's making rational choice in the market. Service receivers make choice according to some variables, which are time, price and quality. For example, Egemen who works in a software company as computer engineer states that he would prefer "private hospital under significant conditions like birth", but would prefer "relatively better public hospital Bilkent Atatürk Research Hospital in simple cases such as arthlargia". Besides these rational criteria, receiving service sometimes functions as a distinction mechanism. Deniz (31) who is

employed in TÜBİTAK (Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) actually does not want to send her new born child to a primary private school, but since his friends send their children there, he feels himself obligatory in following the same way:

> Actually, I want to send my children to public school, but it should be a high quality school to which middle income people send their children. But I observe from my environment, people like me want to send their children to private school who formerly had similar idea with me in this issue, because of both that the level of income increases and they want their children get quality education. The perception about private schools today is so different than that of the times when I was a child. Now, private schools are widespread and children of people who have middle/upper-middle level of income go to private schools. And this does not mean that they are not smart, but rich.

For Deniz, children sent to private schools stigmatized as unsuccessful previously. Today, on the other hand, Deniz does not have such a concern. On the contrary, parents are anxious about education of their offspring and want to get "special" service from private which also provides the conditions that parents have the ability to control their children's education. In addition, to send their children to schools other than private schools where the people around them send their children means to be excluded from their class circle. While explaining why she and her husband decided to send their children public school, Ayça separates themselves from other families for whom environment factor is very important while taking their decisions. To be obsessed with sending their children to private schools and popular extracurricular activities is very meaningless for Ayça. She strongly criticizes this and want to get out of this circle, however she confesses herself that she cannot resist class pressure:

> As long as you are a member of the group, you cannot escape of some practices; because the child thinks that he really wants them. For example, our kindergarten was such a place, *Sihirli Bahçe*. As long as you go there, you also began to desire these practices. Our search for a private school was a result of this motivation. Most of them went to private schools such as Jale Tezer, Maya etc. Fortunately, my husband

is so conscious in such kind social motivations, pressures. He said "it is not necessary that all of them will go the same school". Through such kind of pressures, children are forced to be shaped according to your own dreams. In public schools, you feel relaxed in this respect. It is all about economical opportunities, of course. Level of income of people in public schools is lower, so such kind of pressures is less.

She is very critical about the class pressure and wants to escape from this pressure and want to be together with people feeling like her:

> In our kindergarten, parents had a general attitude. Some of them directly focus themselves on the idea that my child will be engineer, or something like this, in the future. Today, everybody desire that their children would have a visiting card, and a 'valuable' job, will earn significant amounts of money, will be so smart, will attend the best schools, will learn at least five languages, etc. I do not want to care them, but I want to care that what will make my child happy. There is a real pressure on people because of the environment they live. The activities that children go are the same, too. All girls go to ballet, gym courses, while boys go to battery courses.

Ayça's emphasis on their critical look can be evaluated as a 'defense mechanism' she operates for herself with a feel of guilt and suspicion of taking wrong decision for her son. When I asked if they are planning to continue to send their son to public school in the following years, she told me about that they are thinking on sending him to a private school in the middle level.

Aslı wants to provide best conditions for her potential children. Her environment which is composed of people from middle classes is best to get information about schools. She is very concerned about the ideas of these people. She is open to evaluate every opportunity she is able to reach for the best conditions of her potential children's education. If she cannot achieve the conditions to send her children to private school, she will send her child to extracurricular activities:

> In the primary level, environment factor is important. I mean five or six years later, I would search the school choices of people around me. I would list their preferences and I ask them from which aspects they

prefer this school. I really care about sports, since I could not do in my
school years. Maybe I could not achieve conditions to send my child
to private school; in this case, I can send him/her to extracurricular
activities. But maybe there can be a public school that provides these,
I can send there. It is about where we can access quality education.

Contrary to private hospitals, private schools are idealized from middle class
perspective. For Mesut, children who attend to private schools are more self-
confident than those attending to public schools. He uses North Korea and America
dialectic to elaborate his comparison. Children in private schools are dynamic and
self confident, while those in public schools cannot express themselves freely. While
America –private school- represents freedom, North Korea –public school-
represents repression:

First of all, psychological conditions of children are so different. How
I can say… For example, I was attending to public school, my sister in
Yükseliş College. They were like American movies; we were like
North Korea… We were dull, introvert[43].

Gülcan who is employed in the same public institution, Afet İşleri, with Mesut thinks
in the same way about public and private school comparison:

I think children getting education from private and public are different
from each other with respect to the level of self-confidence. Child
getting education from the private feels himself/herself more confident
and valuable.

On the other hand, making such a preference does not mean that they support
privatization in education:

Privatization in education brings inequality. Those having money can
get education from private; others will get education from public with

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[43] *"Bir kere psikolojik olarak çocukların halet-i ruhiyesini değiştiriyor. Nasıl söyleyeyim… Mesela ben
devlet okulunda okumuştum, kardeşim Yükseliş Koleji'nde. Onlar biraz daha böyle Amerikan filmi
gibi çocuklardı. Biz böyle Kuzey Kore… Yani biraz daha mat, donuktuk"*

minimum conditions. It is not fair, I think. But whatever political opinion you have, you have to adapt the necessities of the system so that your children can get a good education.

Although it is ideologically stated that state is responsible for providing free services for all and this is the right of citizens, in the level of experience this is not considered as a right, but a choice. Market rationality is embedded into all spheres of life. When I asked Gülcan if her concern about public education services would decline in the case of purchasing education service from private institutions, she emphasizes the importance of the experience:

To what extent does it concern me unless I do not get service from public and I do not live the problems in this system directly? I mean, now we are in a good position with respect to both status and economical conditions compared to many people. To what extent do we care about their problems? Today, everybody struggles to save their lives. Why? Unless I do have concerns about my future, I would not enter into such a struggle. I have many concerns about providing a nice future for my children. I think about the possibility that my children will not have a nice job, social security in the future. I always have to think about the future. There are many questions in my mind. Does your country provide you these conditions? Can my children survive without being dependent on other people? You have to take some steps so that they can survive independently.

Middle classes feel many responsibilities about their families and through such kind of mentality, they rationalize their family-centered living. Moreover, the precarious conditions that cause future anxiety about their offspring play central role in their lives. Big sacrifices can be made for their children's education and there is not time to struggle for demanding public rights. Rather, they feel themselves responsible for raising their income level so that they provide best conditions for their children. Gülcan's analysis on her class summarizes today's middle classes' conditions. They live in precarious work and life conditions and at the same time they have been felt responsible for their and their families' well-being through social policies held and dominant neoliberal rationality legitimizing commodification of public services.

All in all, under conditions of neoliberalism, although engineers in Turkey have not adapted to neoliberal ideology completely, it seems that they have been adapted to the neoliberal conditions of living: individualized forms of life. There are many factors that provided the conditions for engineers to adapt to private health and education services and not struggle for their social rights despite their egalitarian point of view and their expectations from the state. One reason may be that Turkey does not have a welfare state tradition. Although previously there was not private alternatives for health and education and citizens were used to get public services, people had not gained social rights perspective. The second factor might be the middle class outlook which puts pressure on these people for class reproduction, future anxiety and fear of ambiguousness. This outlook does not develop of itself, but it is the consequence of many factors including the burden of career and individual responsibility that neoliberal conditions put on engineers' shoulders. While engineers' social and economic status is being depreciated, they seek for individualized solutions for their problems arisen as a result of this depreciation. They are individuals in labour market, as they are individuals while getting services.

The reason for such kind of a state of mind is that individualization is strongly related with depoliticization among society. This point gains extra importance when engineers are considered because of the fact that during 1970s engineers dominantly participated into left anticapitalist politics and struggled for "engineering in the service of public and not in the service of capitalists considering their individual interests". Today, on the other hand, from both lifestyle and working life aspects engineers live individualized forms of lives as discussed. So, to understand the dynamics behind depoliticization of engineers in Turkey is one of the concerns of this study. In the next section, data collected through fieldwork is analyzed to shed light on this dimension.

4.3. Relationship of Engineers with Politics

What should we infer from these characteristics of middle classes about their political role in society? According to Ünüvar (2010), for those from conservative wing, mostly Weberian theoricians, the stability in society is the main political goal and middle classes serve best for this aim. For Nonmarxists, middle class functions as a buffer between capital and labor, a neutralizing force and through these qualities, middle classes' existence is significant for the establishment of liberal democracies. According to Şerif Mardin (1992), the existence of middle class is crucial for Turkish democratization. From a parallel point of view with Weberian analysis, for Bernstein who is known as Revisionist Marxist, increasing weight of white collar workers is an indication of that social pyramid resembles to a square and socialism will be the ideology of middle classes (Bernstein, 1993). While this is a positive effect of the growth of middle classes for non-Marxists, for orthodox Marxists this kind of orientation of middle classes is considered as a detrimental effect for a socialist revolution. For Marxists, middle class dominates the working class ideologically by keeping them away from the secret knowledge of production (Poulantzas, 1978). Middle classes are considered as the supporters of status-quo and in the continuous search of stability in societies; and this political behavior is explained based on middle class outlook: fear of proletarianization, individualism and competitive isolation (Poulantzas, 1978). On the other hand, historically middle classes have been a part of political movements in different countries in different periods.

At this point, it is necessary to mention different experiences of countries. In his article "Social Change, Political Elections and the Middle Class in Korea", Shin (1999) emphasizes the heterogeneity of middle classes. During the Minjung movement[44] which began in the mid-1970s around the alliance of student groups, the working class and segments of the middle class against the authoritarian regime in

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[44] *Minjung* means the people or the masses in Korean language.

Korea. The segment of the middle class was mainly composed of intellectuals and lower grade, white-collar workers, along with the student groups. On the other hand, at that time, significant proportion of Korean middle classes were employees of Korean state had a vested interest in the maintenance of the developmental alliance and the state, despite authoritarian rule (Shin, 1999). Moreover, Korean experience shows that high income white collar groups and medium to small sized entrepreneurs could be unsympathetic to the political movements because of the labour strikes and increasing demand of high wages directly endangered their own economic well-being. "Hence the distributional alliance of the working class and the middle classes, which began in the 1970s and had matured through the Minjung movement, was essentially ended by 1993" (Shin, 1999: 43). Moreover, although labor-intensive, export oriented developmental strategies eroded the rights of middle classes, it should be noted that liberalization also served for enrichment dreams of middle classes as "little sharers of the cake" (Mills, 1956). In this respect, middle classes have the potential to be engine for change and also to legitimize the authoritarian or anti-labour regimes and internalize the life forms offered by these forces for the sake of their economic welfare. Fernandes and Heller (2006) put emphasis on the contradictory historical role of middle classes in politics:

> If Eric Wright can place the middle class in a contradictory class location, we argue that its historical role is inherently contradictory. Historically, middle classes have been notoriously fickle vis-à-vis democracy… And as Polanyi has emphasized, under certain historical conditions, market liberalism and political illiberalism find each other, typically through the agency of the middle class (Fernandes and Heller, 2006: 505).

In this study, following Hang Shin about his determination on Korean middle classes, it is accepted that "the orientation of the middle classes is extremely fluid over time, and manifest varying responses to the political and economic changes" (Hang Shin, 1999: 33). Although middle classes have potential for change, it should be noted that today's professional middle classes who internalized the neoliberal values both in perception and experience levels do not have strong motivation for political participation and change.

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At the end of the analysis held up to now, it has been concluded that engineers live individualized forms of life and seek individualized solutions for their problems. First part of the analysis showed that engineers, coherent with neoliberal ideology, attains organizer and justice provider role to the state, but not producer role, despite their organic relationship with state's production units previously. Moreover, contrary to neoliberal ideology, from an egalitarian perspective, engineers support that state is responsible to provide minimum conditions of living including, health, education, shelter, security, transportation, communication and water services. However, at the experience level, since they are not happy with the services provided by the state, they aim to earn enough money to get private services. They do not have any motivation to struggle for better public services, but seek for private alternatives. Public services are considered as an alternative among many others. They become a part of consumption based lives and the meaning of being an engineer becomes earning more money and making career for more "privatized" lives. The "value" of engineering is dominantly evaluated with respect to the money earned by engineers. In addition, problems faced with in work life are regarded as "lack of chance" or "not making the right choice among many others". As in the public rights case, engineers seek for individualized solutions for their problems in work life.

While engineers live individualized lives, should it be possible to deduce that they are alienated to politics? To shed light on this aspect, throughout the fieldwork, engineers were asked what they think about the political atmosphere in Turkey and if they find any organization through which they express their problems and ideas, specifically, what they think about TMMOB.

4.3.1. Engineers' perception on their occupational organization TMMOB

According to the study conducted by TMMOB in 2009 on political and social positions of engineers, architects and city planners, 55.2% of engineers and architects in Turkey are registered to the chamber they are related under TMMOB. The reason of not being member in any chamber under TMMOB was asked to nonmembers. While 27.7% of them do not have any reason for this, 24.7% of them thought that chambers did not have any benefits for them. 17.3% of them said that they neglected; while 16.8% of them gave the reason of not having any legal obligation about being member of their chambers.[45] As the same study revealed that members propose their reason of being member as "to be able to follow occupational developments" with 50.1%; being in contact with colleagues with 46.7%; having legal obligation with 42.6%; solving their occupational/work problems with 41.7%. The table below provides a picture of what kind of a role engineers/architects/city planners give to chambers:

Table 8. Expectations of engineers/architects/city planners from their chambers and TMMOB (%)

	Chambers		TMMOB	
	Member	Nonmember	Member	Nonmember
Occupational development of its members through scientific meetings, activities, journals, in-service trainings	77.2	43.0	43.8	27.2
Producing policies towards developing and securing the economic and social rights of its members	56.9	30.6	55.0	31.3

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[45] On the other hand, for those registered to the chamber related to them, we cannot say that they embrace the organization. For example, Ayça is registered to the Chamber of Architects, but do not feel herself as a part of this organization. This point will be elaborated in the following parts of this section.

Table 9. Expectations of engineers/architects/city planners from their chambers and TMMOB (%) (Continued)				
Taking active role in democratic rights of not only its members, but also the other segments of the society	8.4	16.8	23.3	20.7
Supervising the engineers about their occupational practices.	22.1	12.1	9.5	11.4

(TMMOB, 2009:82)

From a macro perspective, TMMOB's study revealed that engineers do not dominantly expect TMMOB to take social and political role in the society[46]; rather they consider this organization as a school through which they can develop themselves in their jobs in coherence with their primary concerns of career and wage[47]. Together with this, in general, engineers/architects/city planners do not find TMMOB successful in different areas (p.86). The findings of the qualitative study I conducted reached parallel conclusions with TMMOB's study. On the other hand, with the advantages of qualitative research, this study reveals the rationality behind their ideas about unionization and politics.

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[46] For comparison with the position of engineers in 1977, please check "3.1.2 Engineers in Turkey" section.

[47] In a parallel study on growing Chinese middle classes, Fewsmith's respondents listed political participation last when they were asked to list a number of activities, including developing one's own career, consumption activities, leisure activities, political participation and family life (Fewsmith, 2007). Fewsmith comments on this in the way that the fact that the middle class exhibits no sense of class consciousness or opposition to the system reinforces this impression.

Under these conditions, engineers feel themselves alienated to their occupational organization with the argument that they do not care the necessities of its members too much. Moreover, there are other reasons that young engineers do not feel themselves as a part of this community. Ayça and Çağdaş believe that TMMOB does not represent them and TMMOB is a community in which clientelist relations survive and this excludes majority of engineers outside this circle:

> I hear many cases that indicate the fact that members cannot see what is going on in the chamber actually. For example, elections were held recently, my uncle is close to the chamber. I heard from him; he can say this in comfort: "We formed the board, the election result is apparent actually". How can it be apparent before elections are conducted? I don't know. But what I know is that the relations in it cannot be known by the ordinary members. This disturbs me too much.

> I am not a member of TMMOB. Actually I am not planning to be a member of it. I don't know why but I did not feel the need of being a member of an organization in which I can express myself. It will not be in the future, too. I do not think that this kind of an organization will support me in the cases of that I live problems in my work life. Since I have not thought that there will be benefits of it... I have not established a direct contact. Once, one of my friends called me and said "its fee is that amount, they support our rights etc." When I asked him how I can be member, he told me about the fees, the money related issues. I mean, at the first step, they demand money; this left a question mark on my mind.

As Çağdaş states, engineers are skeptical for such kind of organizations. On the other hand, this kind of approach may operate as a legitimization mechanism for their lack of support and interest towards their occupational organization. Another reason they propose for their disinterest is that TMMOB does not have any value for them, since it is not able to realize something 'important'. Organization does not have power to realize something for engineers in Turkey and it loses its respectability in the eyes of engineers. Ayça is aware of governments' attempts to make chambers inable, but at the same time, she does not trust the chamber enough to support it:

> I think it has many weaknesses. You know Ankara's situation: Melih Gökçek vs. the chamber. There are many subways etc. Ankara was

reconstructed, but none of the chambers could compete with Melih Gökçek. To what extent they tried it, I don't know, it is open for discussion. Or you can say that we should criticize the governments who try to make chambers dysfunctional. But, for example, Çankaya Municipality requests sanction from the Chamber of Architects, but Yenimahalle does not. They do not care the chamber, how can I feel that I belong in the chamber? Actually, there is a serious attack against chambers…

Although Ayça seems to be conscious about the government's effort to suppress TMMOB, she cannot accept the passive position of the organization. As seen, their union has lost its respectability in the eyes of the engineers. Such kind of psychology cannot be explained just through the "inability" of chambers to realize something. Engineers' state of mind should be understood more deeply. According to Mills (1951), "the acceptance or rejection of unions depends upon employees' awareness of their objective problems and recognition of unions as means for meeting them" (p.304). Under the conditions in which engineers feel the problems they live in work life are individual problems, they do not feel the need of a union/organization.

Parallel with the Mills' findings on the ideas of white collar people on the unions, engineers evaluate the place of the union in their lives looking from benefits perspective. If union contributes to their career development or minor changes in their work conditions, then unions are worth to go. Unions are not seen as social collectivities of the workers. As Mills states (1951):

> Unions are usually accepted as something to be used, rather than as something in which to believe. They are understood as having to do strictly with the job and are valued for their help on the job. They rest upon, and perhaps carry further, the alienated split of 'job' from 'life'. Acceptance of them does not seem to lead to new identifications in other areas of livings (Mills, 1951: 308).

Moreover, middle classes who need 'excessive energy' for their private lives consider unions as burdens. As Goldthrope et. al. (1971) appropriately states, "unions are conceived as burdens on the people who are constantly devoting energy for self-advancement".

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Gülcan, who used to be employed in the Chamber of Geological Engineering before her job in Afet İşleri evaluates the place of TMMOB in her life from "benefits" perspective:

> I am not so active in TMMOB. I was active once upon a time, I worked there professionally. This is one of my private sector experiences. Now, I am not so active now, because both I have two children and... Actually, I do not have plenty of time. On the other hand, the seminar it conducts is beneficial for me.

As Mills and Goldthrope et. al. argue, engineers do not own the organization unless it has a benefit for their career. In parallel with the expectations from neoliberal citizens, engineers are concentrated on their self-advancement for which they need support of such an occupational organization.

In this respect, engineers dominantly do not consider TMMOB as a place through which they can express their ideas about the social problems they care about. Moreover, their occupational problems are not considered as problems to maintain an 'ideological'[48] struggle for this. Gülcan does not expect from TMMOB to take any ideological position. On her explanations about the loss of status of engineers in the state, I questioned her ideas about political role of engineers and if it is possible to state that engineers have turned their faces to their private lives. She explained her ideas referring to TMMOB:

> People have turned their faces to their private lives, too. But I don't think that TMMOB's position is very well under this political atmosphere. All engineers do not have to think in the same way politically. (To the question if they should raise any political demand)

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[48] Engineers' dominant understanding from 'ideology' is restricted with 'secularism-Islamism' dichotomy in a paralel way with the political atmosphere in Turkey. This point will be elaborated in the following section.

No, no, it is not necessary. I mean, I would not be a member of any organization, just because I am an engineer.

Ali, on the other hand, does not think that TMMOB should not declare its political concerns; however, TMMOB should leave its older position and 'adapt' to the "new conditions of world". For Ali, all sections of the society should share their ideas freely including TMMOB. He criticizes government's policies towards preventing opposite ideas through using judgment mechanism:

I think some of the arguments of TÜSİAD[49] are correct. But they try to silence them. What is the difference between TÜSİAD and Chamber of Mining Engineers? In this society, everybody has a right to talk. Things done correctly should be praised and others should be criticized. As a result of opinion conflicts, good ideas emerge. If critique cannot be handled, it's a pity. We are sending either to Ergenekon , or KCK lawsuits. Everybody obeys.

In this quotation it is necessary to analyze Ali's question of "what is the difference between TÜSİAD and Chamber of Mining Engineers?" From Ali's point of view, organization of business men and engineers' organization are parallel in their reason of existence: to criticize bad '*icraat*'s[50] of the governments. Although he does not elaborate his argument, according to him engineers' and capitalists' interests are intersecting. He is criticizing TMMOB in this respect:

I was vice president in Chamber of Mining Engineers after 1990. While I was in this position, I tried to do this: we should leave our approach around some routinized slogans. We are representators of producing society. What does the chamber produce? Slogans, slogans. It opposes everything aggressively. We are angry with Shah of Iran since he did not leave his throne for many years. There are people making presidency in Chamber of Mining Engineers for 12 years. Is it

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[49] Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association

[50] To repeat, "icraat" means execution, but behind it, it has a hidden meaning which puts 'icraat's and ideologies in conflict with each other. The emphasis on 'icraat' is also a discoursal tool giving the message that 'icraat's should be favored instead of ideologies, as if icraats which mainly connote economy policies are devoid of ideological basis (ibid., p.79).

the throne of Shah of Iran? We need change now. None of opposing civil society organizations said to government that you did this correctly. I am the first in TMMOB saying that privatizations should be realized and everybody was shocked. We are fascists as much as we are democrats. They try to downgrade you. Both left and right are the same in this respect.

For him, government's 'icraat's which are "good" should be appreciated by TMMOB. For example, engineers should appreciate Turkey's becoming "country of building sites". This is an "icraat" which is not related with any ideology. This is a "neutral" icraat and it is good for the welfare of the citizens. He states:

There are good jobs, but also bad jobs. What are the good jobs? They are constructing railroads my brother! Turkey is the site of constructions today. You cannot believe that. You should praise this. Is construction planned, or not? It is another dimension of the discussion. Economy of Turkey is not bad. At least, we have begun to be self-sufficient.

Engineers should deal with production; and should find more efficient ways of production. Moreover, the "old mentality" should replace itself with "new mentality". TMMOB should be open for change:

You are criticizing the ruling party. From what aspects do you criticize it? First, criticize yourself! Leave this chair, our young engineers are coming. We have to make way for them.

While thinking that engineer organizations should express their ideas on the problems of the country, his main consideration is the capitalist economic development of the country. As "representators of a producing society", engineers should contribute to the economic development of the country, which necessitate to leave older ideological concerns.

While explaining their concerns about their occupational organization, Çağdaş and Gülcan represent the employees; on the other hand, Ali represents the entrepreneur/higher manager typology. Gülcan and Çağdaş put more emphasis on 'benefits' of the employee perspective; while Ali directly told about his ideas on TMMOB's position about the problems of the country. Employees are more

concerned about their 'personal' problems as individuals struggling for better lifestandards, entrepreneurs/higher managers –as those who left such kind of concerns behind in their lives- attend 'business organization' role to TMMOB.

On the other hand, what both employees and entrepreneur/higher managers demand from such an occupational organization is not parallel with they followed in the 1970s. While the first group who own the complete responsibility for their self-development raises demand about occupational development of the engineers in the country; second group expect TMMOB to contribute to the capitalist development of the country in conformity with the wishes of the system. This is also a result of depolitization of society under the hegemony of neoliberal discourse. At this point, it is necessary to discuss what engineers understand from politics today.

4.3.2. Perception of Political Atmosphere in Turkey: Ideologies vs. "İcraat"s

Most of my informants are not happy with political atmosphere in Turkey. While explaining their concerns, they usually refer to realizing projects in the areas of services and economic development, rather than systemic problems. For Yasin, politics in Turkey prevents governments to realize projects, to do *icraat*. As Ali's ideas on TMMOB, from Yasin's perspective, ideologies are not good for the welfare of the country. Problems of the country cannot be solved through ideological discussions; good things done by the governments should be appreciated by opposition parties. "İcraat" and taking ideological position are in conflict with each other. Yasin states:

> I think there is a simple organization. There is a ruling party and an opposition party that opposes everything that is tried to be done by the ruling party. If ruling party says A, opposition says B in every case. This creates a chaos. Since agreement cannot be achieved ever, one cannot feel that there are also correct policies. Citizens begin to think that their sole aim is to oppose each other. They never negotiate for the sake of the state or any common aim. Contrarily, they always try to oppose each other.

In this respect, being in conflict with each other for ideological concerns make the country lose time and prevent advancement. For Mesut, state should not have an ideological dimension; state should provide services and this is not about having any ideological position. State should be neutral, so that it could care for the welfare of its citizens. Making *icraat* is not about ideologies:

> State is a structure, an organization so that people who decided to live in the same political boundaries. I mean, there is not a reason to make a political fight on this structure. It is completely a necessary organization for giving service to citizens, for providing the conditions of living together in responsibility to each other.

Accordingly, every section of the society should produce projects for the welfare of the country instead of raising opposition justs because of some 'ideological' concerns. For Ayça, NGOs and political parties act impulsively while opposing some policies and do not propose their alternative suggestions. When I asked her what she thinks about the discussions held in the public about 4+4+4 project, she criticized opposition groups:

> I think it has been exaggerated in the public opinion. Maybe I cannot see its background, but I think there is not such a serious change. People should not be panic that much. Cases should be taken into consideration impassively; even it is so critical issue. Instead of saying "what is this government doing!" people should sit and discuss on what should be done in this case. It is not just in the issues of education. In every case, people should discuss on what should be done, what can be advised: "results of this kind of policy are these". Just opposing to everything done is not good. If you oppose, you should also make suggestions.

Economic development of Turkey, on the other hand, has no relation with ideologies from their point of view. Levent, who declared that he supports CHP, emphasizes the difference between economy -in other words "the future of country"-from "ideology":

> With respect to its economy policies, I cannot object AKP. With respect to neither municipal services nor investments, I cannot say something bad for them. If I object in this respect, I would behave wrongly. I like their works.

But, ideological aspect and the issues about Turkey's future are different (Levent, 54).

Mesut does not feel himself isolated from politics, but he declares that he does not believe in ideologies and while explaining this:

> Until coalition, when I was young, I sympathized MHP (National Movement Party), *ülkücü* movement. When it came to power, I saw MHP, DSP (Democratic Left Party) or ANAP (Motherland Party), they are all useless. For people, to support a political party likes to support a football team like *Ankaragücü*. This could be done just by people living in *Çinçin*. There is no such thing like nationalism, leftism. I am not interested anymore (Mesut, 41).

While defining their position towards TMMOB, engineers defined TMMOB as an occupational organization that should not be related with "ideologies", but should engage with the professional development of its members. It should produce something and should deal with the "problems" of its members, but the problems of engineers in Turkey cannot be explained from ideologies perspective. As it was emphasized their attitude towards TMMOB is highly related with their perception of politics. From such kind of a point of view, *icraat* which means economic development of the country and better services should be prioritized rather than debates on the "system". Ideology, on the other hand, in their rhetoric, is defined with JDP (The ruling party)-RP (Republican Party-The main opposition party), in other words, Islamism-Secularism/Modernism dichotomy.

When I asked Gülcan, how she defines her ideological position, she felt herself obligatory to explain her relation with religion, her ideas about religion while emphasizing her democratic leftist position:

> I define myself as democrat. With respect to my opinions, I feel myself close to left, but I perform five time prayer. I mean, I think that my belief cares nobody. But with respect to freedom of opinion, I am leftist, but being leftist does not mean that I will not be religious. In this respect, I do not feel myself close to any political group. I think

that everybody should respect each other with respect to religious, mother tongue, and ethnicity issues. Everybody should be able to live under equal conditions.

Mesut, too, referred to religion while defining his relationship with the politics. To the question if he feels himself isolated from politics, he replied:

> No, I do not feel myself isolated to politics. I mean, I do not think that political parties are bad. But, I do not wish that somebody comes and I follow him/her. I do not believe in ideologies, too; because they have been created by somebody… and who can blame somebody whose family is conservative or alevi. Is it shameful? I dismissed to be used by leaders of ideologies or some political groups.

While voting, they could regard the 'ideological position' of the political parties. As elaborated above, on the other hand, ideology refers to Islamism-Secularism/Modernism dichotomy. Erdinç defined AKP's position as "unprogressive" contrary to CHP's "modern" position. Although he is not happy with actions of Çankaya Municipality, he supports CHP in municipality elections. Metropolitan municipality, on the other hand, both could not realize any of its projects and at the same time entered into clientelist relations. Deniz could not define his ideological position clearly, but he was sure that he does not feel close to AKP or CHP:

> If you ask what my ideological position is: I neither vote for AKP nor have sympathy towards CHP. I think that both are at the extreme ends; both have different ideological objectives. So, I do not feel close both of them. At one extreme, CHP positions itself above others, but cannot understand the realities of the society; at the other extreme, there is AKP struggling to come into power through exploiting the ideas of people. How can I decide to vote under these conditions? First of all, ideological position of the person demanding vote, and then what kind of services he/she provides.

For those, who do not feel close to any of the debates above, Turkey is devoid of political parties/organizations to support. Emre does not feel himself close to the

position of prominent political parties and complains about lack of any strong political party representing working class:

> Actually, I equate all of them since there is a lack of a class party in Turkey. Actually, there are class parties, but there are not strong enough; or it is so difficult to tell their arguments to people. I mean, what is important for me is that there should be a political party that values people who produce giving their labour. The other staff is not so important for me.

However, he cannot define himself as socialist, since he is not active in any organization:

> I mean, I feel close to their arguments really. But, I can neither make a great effort that is needed, nor…

At this point it is necessary to regard Emre's analysis of his and his class' depolitization. For Emre, the most important problem in Turkey is women issue. When I requested him to tell me about other problems in Turkey, he answered my question in this way:

> We told about education and health. It may be unemployment and unequal distribution of income. However, we are isolated in Ankara. So, I cannot understand if unemployment is a real and significant problem in Turkey, or not. We say that it exists, but I cannot feel it.

Emre feels himself isolated to the country's problems. According to him, the main reason of such kind of feeling is living in the circle of his class and also being so much concentrated on his individual life. Time is so restricted for him and TV news is seen as imaginary:

> In the end, I go to school and back to home again. The people around me are like me. Most of my friends have decent jobs; they do not live the any problem of income. To be honest, I cannot see what kind of problems people have in the country. Actually, we have knowledge about them, I don't feel, but I don't know. What I read from newspapers and what I watch in TV news bothers me; but it becomes so ordinary and it began to be seen as imaginary, not real. I don't

know. Sometimes you cannot believe that you see, but you forget quickly. Your mind is always busy with other things. The job life is very busy, may be the reason is this. Actually, when we meet with friends, the topic of chatting comes to these. But there is not anything in the name of action. May be the reason is the restricted time. Or, I am used to live in this way and I cannot have any motivation to take action.

Emre might be the voice of his class. Professional life and personal life are full of individual struggles and engineers do not have time to spend for collective movements. There is not enough motivation and energy in engineers to struggle against social and political problems they wonder about. In his book on post-1980 young in Turkey, Lüküslü (2009) concludes that pessimistic point of view that is hegemonic among young population make them to concentrate on their individual lives in which they may be able to change something. What Emre cannot explain about his political apathy may be explained through this observation. On the other hand, Emre feels himself guilty not to be in a struggle for her societal concerns and relieves himself through confessing that he is concentrated on his individual life, too much. On the other hand, not to make a short-cut conclusion, it should be noted that for employees, there is a serious political gap which together with their 'highly individualized concerns' makes them alienated to politics. On the other hand, for entrepreneurs/high order managers, as it is discussed in the following section, politics has a different meaning.

All in all depolitization among engineers emerges in different ways. While most of them internalize the system and develop their opposition from within this, for those who question systemic problems, political atmosphere is not appropriate for them to express their concerns and it makes them isolated from politics. For some of them business interests come above all and for this sake, politics means just a mechanism to achieve some ends regardless of their ideological position.

4.3.2.1. Political pragmatism for the sake of "business ethics": Responsibility towards employees and bosses

Other than depolitization, for some of the engineers, politics serve as a means to realize their individual interests. For higher managers and entrepreneurs, business interests come above all. According to them one does not have 'luxury' to declare his/her political concerns without any regard of his/her business interests. Business men should give priority to his job, not politics. Business and politics should not be mixed to each other. What you believe and think is about your private life. Somebody should not declare it in the public space for the sake of his/her business. As general director of a construction company, Levent prefers to behave in "responsibility":

> I don't know the policy of the firm, of course. I am not such a rich person. But as a manager of the company, **I prefer to keep a foot in both camps in political issues**. I prefer to stand equally distant from everybody. If I am dependent on the state in my business –the state is stronger than me as a matter of fact-. I mean, I am always in need of the state. I think that I am receiving my allowance from it; in the case of its absence I would be starved. But, when you look at the policy of the company, we are known as "supporters of Özal", while another company may be known as "supporters of İnönü". Now, I have never opposed to AKP, too. **My political point of view is different, but I have never opposed them in my business life.** But, I have never entered into dialogue with them, too. I mean I do not have any commitment to the state.

In Levent's case, 'business ethics' that he takes into consideration serves as a legitimization mechanism for his pragmatic outlook in political issues. When the business interests are considered, behaving in contradiction with his ideological position does not seem 'unethical' for the managers. Moreover, he utilizes rhetoric that he makes big 'sacrifices' for his company. Levent explains his moderate position:

> I never risk my company because of my personal ideas. This is responsibility of the manager. But I do not go praying to toady up them. I keep my distance. Although I do not support headscarf in the

state offices, and I feel a deep suffer when I see a woman wearing headscarf in a state office, I do not speak out my ideas.

As an entrepreneur, Olgun who bids in state tenders for his company thinks that people feel themselves obligatory to adapt the system to survive. His spouse Cansu is a salaried engineer in a private engineering company. During the dialogue between Cansu and Olgun, Cansu was criticizing people who drink alcohol and at the same time begin praying for make up to the government. Olgun objected her:

> Olgun: There is one more thing: if you want to live in peace, you have to keep up with order.
> Cansu: To keep up with the order is different Olgun; but doesn't it mean to deprive your personality?
> Olgun: You have to, people have to.
> Cansu: I mean, what about if you keep praying while at the same time you are used to drink?
> Olgun: These are different, of course.
> Cansu: I think these people keep drinking alcohol in their houses, not in public spaces.
> Olgun: I mean this while I am saying "keeping up with order": You are in private sector and you employ many people. You have to win tenders because you have to pay your employees so that they can survive. System in the state is this and you have to keep up.
> Cansu: Do you mean not to be so sharp?
> Olgun: You have to keep up with them politically, too. (To the interviewer) you asked me what the responsibilities of the state; I said you that if clientelism disappears, then something may change. As long as clientelism based on politics and interest continues, you are obliged to move considering these. I employ many people, what will these men eat?

In a similar way with Levent's utilization 'responsibility towards the boss' to legitimate his pragmatic political behavior, Olgun utilizes 'responsibility towards employers' as a legitimization tool for his pragmatic behavior in his relationship with politics and state. In their dialogue, although Cansu resisted accepting that her spouse supports keeping up with order, she was persuaded after Olgun proposed his 'legitimate reasons' for such kind of a position. Although both do not feel close to ruling party ideologically, they do not enter into conflict with it and even some of them can pretend to be religious. This creates a tension in their mind and they put some legitimization mechanisms into practice to handle with this conflict.

All in all, individualization among engineers makes them pursue their interests above all. However, since emphasizing individual interests is considered as unethical, they legitimize their political pragmatism reffering to other 'values' that can be respected in society, such as 'being loyal to the employer' and 'feeling responsibility towards the welfare of the employees'.

4.4 Conclusion for Chapter 4

In this chapter, data collected through fieldwork has been discussed considering the questions of this thesis. In this section, I will outline the main arguments of this chapter, while detailed analysis is left to the Conclusion Chapter. First, attitudes of engineers towards privatizations have been questioned. At the end of this discussion, it has been concluded that although engineers have different concerns about privatizations according to their occupational position, all of them prioritize their concerns of 'efficiency' and privatization of state economic enterprises is legitimized in their eyes.

Second, together with privatizations and effect of neoliberal restructuring on the work conditions, it has been emphasized that their relationship with the work has transformed into more individualized forms. At the end of data analysis considering the effects of this transformation on their perception about working in public sector, it has been concluded that, under these conditions, working in the public sector represents escaping from the precarious conditions/proletarianization in private sector, but leaving 'career' opportunities behind.

Third, engineers' attitude towards commodification of public services has been discussed. At the end of this discussion, it has been concluded that although engineers have egalitarian concerns and demands from the state especially in the areas of health and education, they have internalized 'consumer citizenship' perspective, instead of 'social citizenship' perspective and public services have reduced to an alternative among many alternatives.

And lastly, engineers' relationship with politics has been questioned in two aspects. First, how they perceive their occupational organization TMMOB has been discussed; and it has been concluded that their relationship with politics and their occupational concerns make them feel alienated to be organized under such an organization which has ideological concerns other than occupational concerns.

Second, how they perceive the political atmosphere in Turkey has been discussed; and it has been concluded that from engineers' point of view, '*icraat*'s which are considered not having any relationship with ideologies should be regarded while making political preference. On the other hand, ideologies are restricted with "secularism/modernism and Islamism/antimodernism" dichotomy. Moreover, they use different legitimization tools for their political apathy or pragmatic behavior for their business interest with respect to the occupational position they have. For a manager, not to declare his/her political position is his/her responsibility towards his/her boss; while for an entrepreneur, not to declare his/her political position is his/her responsibility towards his/her employees. For salaried engineers, on the other hand, individual struggles of family and work life raise as legitimization tool for their political apathy and individualization.

In the Conclusion chapter, the findings of the data analysis will be discussed comprehensively and general conclusions of the thesis will be provided.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

According to Bourdieu, neoliberalism takes its power from its ability to penetrate every field of social life. In neoliberal rationality, human sociality is equalized to economic behavior and it is taken for granted that 'maximum growth, and therefore productivity and competitiveness, are the ultimate and sole goal of human actions; or that economic forces cannot be resisted' (Bourdieu, 1998:30-31). The social itself is evaluated with economic terms of quantifiability, calculability, cost-benefit maximization and business management techniques. In this respect, policies implemented by the states towards the liberalization of the markets are regarded as the natural processes for economic development by the citizens. Liberalization of markets and diminishing the role of the states are presented as natural and apolitical processes by media, pro-liberalization politicians, iconized businessmen and universities (Fernandes and Heller, 2006). On the other hand, neoliberalism becomes legitimate not only at the level of discourse or macro-policies, but also at the experience level. In Chopra's (2003) words:

> Neoliberalism establishes itself as doxa-an unquestionable orthodoxy that operates as if it were the objective truth- across social space in its entirety, from the practices and perceptions of individuals (at the level of habitus) to the practices and perceptions of the state and social groups (p.421).

Accordingly, to understand neoliberal hegemony in society, together with policies held by the states and mechanisms reproducing hegemonic neoliberal discourse, how neoliberalism establishes itself as doxa among individuals through their practices and perception should be elaborated. This thesis has contributed to the studies on neoliberalism in Turkey with a specific focus on experience and perception of neoliberal transformation among professional middle classes in Turkey. With such an aim, a fieldwork study has been conducted among 20 engineers living in Ankara. It

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should be re-emphasized that the group of engineers is not representative for professional middle class in Turkey; however since the transformation that professional middle classes in Turkey has experienced with neoliberalism can be read through this occupational group, this study has focused on engineers as a sub-group of professional middle classes in Turkey. Furthermore, it is thought that the sample selected shares a common fate with respect to expectations from life and labour market, despite their internal differences which have been concerned for analysis. In addition, since being professional in the labour market and the experience of middle classness shape their concerns and attitudes under analysis, conclusions reached at the end of the data analysis reflect the experiences and perceptions of professional middle classes in Turkey. In this respect, the results of this study give us clues about the relationship between professional middle classes and neoliberalism in Turkey and open discussion for further research on this topic. At the end of the data analysis, many conclusions have been achieved serving to the main research question of the thesis.

With this aim, first I have questioned how engineers perceive and experience the state and how they legitimize privatization of state economic enterprises. It has been determined that although state authority has different connotations for the respondents, all of the respondents question the "fatherhood" of the state. All of my respondents agree on that "state should be for its citizens", not "citizens for the state". In parallel with this stand point, engineers have demands from the state especially around its service providing role. On the other hand, in the minds of the engineers included in the fieldwork study, state is an awkward, inflexible and inefficient structure, so public sector does not have the ability to compete with the private sector. In their minds, public and private represent two opposite poles as "North Korea and USA" with the words of one of my interviewees. In this respect, engineers do not demand producer, but organizer and regulator role from the state. From their point of view, privatization of state economic enterprises is rational for efficiency, to prevent clientelist relations and economic development. For some of them, privatization of these institutions is inevitable which is sine qua non for economic development and democratization. Although all of my respondents agree

on that if state economic enterprises are inefficient in production, they should be privatized; they differ from each other with respect to their occupational position. For private sector employees, the sole factor that should be considered while deciding for privatization is the efficiency; for those employed in public institutions where the status of the engineer is degrading, privatizations should be made considering both efficiency and workers of these institutions should be regarded. For public sector employees, if privatization is inevitable, state should be responsible to supervise private sector caring for the welfare of the workers. Another variable that can affect their position about privatization is the ideological position. Some of my interviewees do not give unconditional support for privatizations. For them, institutions that are significant for 'national interests' should not be privatized, but restructured considering the efficiency strategies of the private sector. At least they should not be sold to foreign companies and Turkish entrepreneurs should be supported in this way. Despite their different positions, privatization of state economic enterprises is regarded as necessary if they cannot make efficient production anymore. In this case, regulator role is given to the state. Through such kind of a discourse, state's withdrawal from production sector for neoliberal transformation has been legitimized among professional middle classes in Turkey.

It has been emphasized that public sector has been the main employer for professional middle classes in Turkey until the 1980s when transition to neoliberal economy caused decrease in the public employment opportunities. This meant a significant transformation in the employment structure together with increasing precariousness and flexibility in the private sector. This has also affected engineers' identity construction related with all spheres of life.

Data analysis revealed that professional middle classes' perception about public sector is another factor that makes them support neoliberal transformation of the state. For engineers, public sector is not a place to have a career. It can be explained first with the fact that "engineers in the public have lost their power coming from the production" with the words of one of my respondents Gülcan. In this respect, engineers in public institutions where being engineer does not mean having a

'distinctive' status in the institution feel themselves 'invaluable' in the eyes of the state. In this respect, this represents a breaking point in the relationship between the engineer and the state in Turkey.

Second, neoliberal transformation changed the perception of 'work' and 'career' of engineers, which completely have reflected on their point of view about the public sector jobs. In this respect, private is considered as the place of career opportunities, while the public is considered as the place of monotony. The 'flexibility' in the private sector makes engineers feel that they are doing career; while in public sector jobs, they feel that somebody has to 'stick around' a position. Since there is not a career ladder to climb in public sector, they cannot find individual motivations to produce something in the public sector. They think that however they work, they will not be rewarded under the conditions that there is not an employer who should appreciate you with spiritual or material rewards such as promotion or wage increase. You are condemned to be an 'ordinary engineer' in public sector contrary to the full of chances to 'shine amongst others' in the private sector. On the other hand, as an individual in the labour market, private sector is considered as full of choices to find a job where the value of your labour is known. From their point of view, if you are a 'successful and lucky' engineer, you can encounter with 'understanding' employers who make you "embrace the working place".

Under such conditions, working in the public sector is regarded as sacrificing one's own career because of obligatory conditions. First, those graduated from "less popular" universities and being in a "less popular" branch of engineering, after a several years of experience, they do not dream for a career in the private sector, but try to "land" a public sector job. For these engineers, public is regarded as the place of escaping from the exploitation in the private sector. For relatively decent conditions of work in the public sector, people "take the risk" to finish their career. If one cannot escape from proletarianization in the private sector through finding more 'understanding' employers, he/she resists this through preparing for KPSS (Public Personnel Selection Exams) to enter into a public sector job. For women who feel the responsibility to balance their career and family life, public sector jobs arise as a

'midway'. Although they are not satisfied with working in the public sector occupationally, public sector jobs provide them with the chance to stay in the work life, at least.

Contrary to the engineers' feeling of "responsibility" towards the state (in the Republican Years) and towards the public (in the 1970s), for today's engineer, working in a public sector job does not have any value other than having relative secure and decent conditions of working. It has been revealed that today's engineer's motivation about their work is limited with career, to be appreciated by the employer, wage, to develop themselves in their occupation together with emphasis on the concepts such as efficiency and dynamism with an individualistic outlook. Making science is regarded as valuable as long as it has financial returns. As the state has transformed, a new engineer identity has emerged whose career expectations and motivation for their work are in coherence with the neoliberal rationality.

At the end of this discussion, it has been concluded that according to those having relatively decent conditions of work in the labor market, they are appreciated by private sector thanks to their merits, shine amongst others thanks to competetiveness in the labour market and deserve higher standards; for those complaining from the working conditions, the inclination towards seeking for individualized solutions such as preparing for KPSS or continuous search for more 'understanding' employees in the private sector. In this way, neoliberal transformation in the work conditions is legitimized and not challenged.

Another significant conclusion that this thesis achieved is that while professional middle classes have 'egalitarian' concerns about the welfare regime in Turkey, they normalized the commodification of public services through their practices. Although they prioritize services especially health and education while talking about what state connotes them, what they demand from the state, it has been concluded that they replace 'social rights' with 'consumer rights' easily. Their rhetoric while criticizing the quality of the public services is shaped around a consumer oriented perspective through referring the taxes they pay vs. the quality of public services. It has been

determined that from their point of view, public services do not have any meaning other than being an alternative among many others. 'Thanks to the recent developments'; their alternatives for health service have increased. While making a choice between public or private services, they make 'cost-benefit' analysis. Following such a point of view, tuition fee in the amount of 15 o 20 TL in public hospitals is regarded as 'normal'. The same logic is relevant while making choice between public and private school, too. In this way, commodification of education and health services does not conflict with their expectations from the state.

Moreover, with class based concerns such as fear of falling and future aspirations of middle classes, they make big sacrifices to send their children to a private school and get their health service from private hospitals. While feeling the responsibility to provide the best education opportunities for their children, those who are not able to send their children to private school feel themselves guilty. Moreover, they feel that they can find the opportunity to control all the process of their children's education in private, as opposed to public. As Crompton (2008) determines for middle classes, market inspired changes in the education system attracts middle classes, so that middle class parents ensure that their children can be enrolled in the academically "successful" schools.

It has been concluded that for engineers, it cannot be said that they have been completely alienated to public services; however, as a result of the lack of 'social rights' concern, struggle for public services becomes meaningless while the 'alternatives' are increasing day by day. While their point of view intersects on the above mentioned concerns–at least at the experience level-, they diverge with respect to the level of egalitarian concerns. For some, everybody in society should be equal with respect to social rights; for others, if somebody has more money, he/she should have the opportunity to get more 'special' service together with the condition that the state provides public service for the poor at the minimum level. Although there are different ideological positions, as emphasized their experiences converge and they do not give up the "comfort" of the private services. They internalize the individual responsibility that neoliberal citizenship regime idealizes. Moreover, transformation

in the welfare regime in Turkey towards excluding middle classes from the welfare system and the project of replacing 'collective responsibility' with 'individual responsibility' and practices of middle classes intertwine each other. In this way, commodification of public services gains a legitimate ground among middle classes. However, professional middle classes have a social concern around an egalitarian welfare regime. Although they have a consumer outlook, they are not individuals just having concern of consumption and lifestyle. They have social concerns; they have demands from the state; they have many ideas on the responsibilities of the state towards its citizens, especially around free health and education services. Notwithstanding, these do not turn to political demands; and movements around public rights cannot get wide support from professional middle classes. This creates a tension which makes them produce legitimization mechanisms. Their concerns about the well-being of their families work raises as the basic legitimization mechanism to compensate for the conflict between their ideological standpoint and experiences to rationalize their isolation from politics with individualized concerns.

Lastly, the relationship of engineers with the politics in Turkey has been discussed through the data collected through fieldwork. It has been concluded that for today's professional middle classes' conceptualization of politics is so different than the politics followed by the engineers in the 1970s. The politics in the 1970s had a significant ideological dimension; while politics today is equalized with *icraat* perspective which is mainly determined according to economic 'development' and welfare criteria. For professional middle classes, ideology has two different connotations. One of them is "socialism/communism-capitalism" or "systems" debate which does not have any benefit for the country and prevents politicians to produce concrete policies; the other connotation is "secularism-Islamism" debate which could be determinative in their selection of the political party they vote for in the elections.

On the other hand, the tension between practices and ideological position is compensated for different mechanisms of legitimization in different levels. For entrepreneur engineers, business interests come first. Entrepreneurs legitimize their

'adaptation' to the system through bringing 'their responsibilities' towards their employees. Managers, on the other hand, with feeling the 'responsibility' towards their bosses prefer to take a moderate political position. From their perspectives, business interests should be held above political concerns; a businessman should know to behave in a pragmatic way because of his/her 'responsibilities' towards the employees under them or towards their bosses.

At another level, employees utilize other mechanisms of legitimization to explain their distance to politics. From their perspective, professional life and personal life are full of individual struggles and they do not have time to spend for collective movements. Although they have significant concerns about the society, there is not enough motivation and energy in engineers to struggle against social and political problems they wonder about. Their concerns about their individual lives get ahead of their political and social concerns.

Together with these, it has been revealed that mostly, TMMOB is seen as an organization that is not able to produce for the benefit of its members; moreover, they do not demand TMMOB to be included in the politics in Turkey, rather occupational development of its members should be regarded first. It has been concluded that there is a wide consensus on this regardless of the occupational position they have. Moreover, they do not have enough time and energy to spend it for such kind of an organization that does not contribute to their career development. In this respect, it can be concluded that professional middle classes are depoliticized and turned their faces towards their private lives under precarious conditions of living and working and political suppression. On the other hand, to repeat, contrary to studies that assume professional middle classes are essentially ignorant for political and social issues (Varma, 2007), professional middle classes have concerns about democratization of the country and social welfare issues. However, at the practices level, their political activity is restricted with supporting a political party in general elections. Although findings of this study do not give clues about political activism of professional middle classes, thanks to Gezi events of January 2013, we have seen that, the young professionals living in urban centers of Turkey have

potential of political activism around their concerns some of which has been determined in this study: anti-authoritarianism, democratization, ecological sensitivity and social welfare. Although it can not be said that professional middle classes dominated the protesters demographically, it can be argued that they have been initiaters of the protests and raised as politically significant portion of the protesters since they deconstructed the label of "apolitical young of the 1990s" attached on them. Moreover, it can also be deduced that since they do not feel that they are politically represented by mainstream politics in Turkey, they opened an alternative channel for political participation.

All in all, under conditions of neoliberalism, first, engineers feel alone in the labour market where there is a career ladder to climb; second, reaching the level of income through which private services can be purchased becomes a significant dimension of future planning of professional middle classes[51]. Although they have social egalitarian concerns, it does not have a central role in their lives for two main reasons. First, they are highly individualized and individual –rather than collective- solutions are searched for the problems they face with both in labour market and welfare issues. Second, they are depoliticized and their vision on politics is restricted to *icraat* which is assumed not to have any relation with ideologies. Their concerns about democratization and social welfare issues, on the other hand, are not represented in the political field and they do not carry them to the political ground actively. Rather they try to "protect" their private realm with individual solutions as far as they can. Considering these, it can be concluded that the new citizenship regime that is constructed by social policies of neoliberal governments is not challenged by professional middle classes. Moreover, neoliberal citizenship regime

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[51] Fernandes has reached a similar conclusion in his study on Indian new middle classes: "On the one hand, the belief in the promise of access to socioeconomic mobility and future benefits can lead to support for reforms. For example, segments of the middle class employed in both the private and public sectors have been faced with retrenchment, job insecurity, and increased workloads. However, this is not necessarily transformed into resistance to economic restructuring if individuals believe they can still benefit from a globalizing economy through future job prospects or through the consumption of new commodities" (Fernandes, 2006: xix).

opened a space for them making them feel that they have the ability to control their private lives through raising life standards. To turn back to one of the initial discussion of the Introduction chapter, middle classes' exclusion from the welfare regime is achieved through such a process.

In "Engineers and Ideology"[52], following a liberal-leftist point of view and using the theoretical implications of center-periphery paradigm, Nilüfer Göle (1998) asserts that liberalization wave in the 1980s is a positive development towards construction of a democratic order in which civil society can function democratically. With this development, engineers would find the opportunity to leave their technocratic and 'revolution from above' understanding and contribute to the development of a democratic order through civil society. However, the findings of this thesis contradict with this argument. What liberalization has brought to engineers is not new ways of doing politics, but depolitization and individualization through turning their faces to their private lives. While hegemony of the capital is being reconstructed in new forms, engineers as middle classes are incorporated into this project with their cultural practices. On the other hand, as emphasized throughout the thesis, egalitarian and democratic concerns of this class should not be overlooked; and it should be reminded that as their working conditions become more precarious, their potential to raise critique against the system increases. May be what is needed is a new language of politics -whose steps began to be heard with Gezi Protests- that will establish the bond between professional middle classes and the politics again.

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APPENDIX A

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ☒ **X**

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Günal
Adı   : Yeliz
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Neoliberal Transformation and Professional Middle

Classes: Case of Engineers in Turkey

TEZİN TÜRÜ :   Yüksek Lisans   ☒ **X**   Doktora   ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.   ☒ **X**

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.   ☐

3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.   ☐

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:

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