FROM HASAN AL-BANNA TO MOHAMMAD MORSI;
THE POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

JULY 2013

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

FROM HASAN AL-BANNA TO MOHAMMAD MORSI; THE POLITICAL
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M.S. Program of Middle East Studies

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July 2013, 141 pages

This thesis analyses the political and ideological transformation of the Society of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from its foundation in 1928 to 2012. In its very establishment, the movement was aiming the Islamization of the public. However, after its engagement with politics the movement experienced a shift in its ideology and in its stance towards number of concepts such as democracy, pluralism, women and minority rights. This study examines the transformation of Brotherhood's attitude towards these issues by going through its official documents, electoral programs and public speeches. Secondly, despite the movement operated as an oppositional group, its political status shifted towards power in the span of two years. January 25 Revolution in 2011 that ousted Hosni Mubarak allowed Muslim Brotherhood to test its political experience by establishing its own political party, Freedom and Justice Party and fielding a Presidential candidate, Mohammad Morsi. The paper demonstrates the identity of the party and the performance of Mohammad Morsi during first six months of his presidency until the Constitutional Referendum in December 15, 2012.

Keywords; Egypt, The Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammad Morsi

ÖZ

HASAN EL-BENNA'DAN MUHAMMAMED MURSİ'YE; MISIR'DAKİ MÜSLÜMAN KARDEŞLERİNİN SİYASET TECRÜBESİ

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Yüksek Lisans, Orta Doğu Araştırmaları Programı

Tez Yöneticisi; Prof. Dr. İhsan D. Dağı

Temmuz 2013, 141 sayfa

Bu tez Mısır'daki Müslüman Kardeşler'in kurulduğu 1928'den 2012'ye kadar geçirdiği siyasi ve ideolojik dönüşümü analiz etmektedir. Hareketin en başından beri amacı toplumu İslamileştirmektir. Ancak siyasete dahil olması ile birlikte hareketin ideolojisinde ve demokrasi, çoğulculuk, kadın ve azınlık hakları konularındaki duruşunda dönüşümler gözlemlenmiştir. Bu çalışma, Müslüman Kardeşlerin bu konulardaki dönüşümünü, resmi kaynakları, seçim programları ve konuşmaları inceleyerek araştırmaktadır. İkinci olarak, her ne kadar Müslüman Kardeşler hareket uzun yıllar muhalif bir güç olarak siyaset yürüttüyse de bu durum son iki yılda hareketin iktidar olması yönünde değişti. 25 Ocak 2011 Devrimi ile Hüsnü Mübarek'in devrimi Müslüman Kardeşlere siyasi tecrübelerini, kendi partilerini, Hürriyet ve Adalet Partisi'ni kurarak ve kendi başkan adaylarını, Muhammad Mursi'yi göstererek test etme olanağı buldular. Bu çalışma partinin kimliğini ve Muhammed Mursi'nin Cumhurbaşkanlığının ilk altı ayını incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler; Mısır, Müslüman Kardeşler, Muhammed Mursi

To My Beloved Parents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The debate over the Islamic political movements in the Middle East and North Africa intensified with the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. The period between 1980s and 1990s was the era of political participation for Islamic movements, either by establishing their own parties or contesting as independent candidates. "Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)" in Algeria, "Islamic Constitution Movement" in Kuwait, "Islamic Action Front" in Jordan, and "Justice and Development Party" in Morocco can be counted as some examples. Although in Kuwait and Jordan they remained in opposition, in Algeria and Morocco these parties were able to obtain the highest votes in parliamentary elections. Despite they differ in attitude towards various issues, what makes these cases significant is that they began to moderate as they entered into political competition. For the last two years these movements attracted more attention within the policy circles and academia, as they rapidly rose to governance in Tunisia and presidency in Egypt.

The Muslim Brotherhood, in Egypt, has a significant place amongst the Islamic movements as the oldest and the most organized of them. With its 85 years of political and social experience, Muslim Brotherhood has been regarded as the mother of all Islamist movements. During this long history of activism the movement was unable to achieve the position of government but rather had to act as an illegal opposition movement that challenged the state's legitimacy by struggling within the system. However, the January 25 Revolution in 2011, which ousted Egypt's longest served president Hosni Mubarak, was a milestone in the history of Muslim Brotherhood since the movement saw this chaos as an opportunity to fill the power vacuum in the country. Within the span of two years, the movement had to transform itself from an opposition movement to a political party that, in the meantime, was promising to bring change for a country that was in the period of transition.

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The Brotherhood's long history allowed the movement to witness three different political systems and operate under different circumstances. It was established in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna when the country was ruled by Kingdom and with significant British influence in political, economic and cultural level. Brotherhood was a social movement aiming to transforming the society within the religious coordinates. It enjoyed relative freedoms provided by the system and spread across the country in less than ten years. The first wave of change came with the Free Officers' military coup in 1952 that ousted the King and announced the foundation of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Despite good relations with the military elite in early years of the coup, second President Gamal Abd el-Nasser announced the ban on the organization. This period was urging the movement to re-evaluate its stand towards politics and radicalized most of its members who eventually preached violent struggle against the regime. It was not until mid-1970s under the presidency of Anwar Sadat when Brotherhood was allowed to operate, without being recognized as a legitimate player, in the social level. Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, initiated a relative liberalization of Egyptian politics by holding, largely manipulated, elections every four year where Muslim Brotherhood permitted to take part with its independent candidates. The movement was allowed to compete for the parliamentary seats, established alliances with ideologically different political movements, and increased its influence in university campuses and professional syndicates. Compared to its very foundation the movement engaged more with oppositional activities and transformed its stance concerning certain issues such as democracy, pluralism and the rights of women and non-Muslims. In this period the movement was adopting a strategy of evolutionary change and struggle within the system, instead of developing a radical revolutionary understanding.

The peaceful anti-government demonstrations that began in late 2010 in Tunisia ended up by forcing President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to leave the country. This new political activism opened a new phase for regional politics and opportunity for the well-organized grass roots movements. Soon the example of Tunisia was imitated in different parts of Arab Middle East; Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and

Bahrain. Nation-wide protests that erupted on January 25, 2011 forced Hosni Mubarak to leave his powers to Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. This unexpected political change compelled the Muslim Brotherhood to re-visit its political ideology and seize the opportunity in the post-Mubarak era by mobilizing its supporters for Parliamentary and Presidential elections. This was further explained by Pargeter stated;

> Despite the fact that the popular uprisings that gripped parts of the Arab world in 2011 were largely non-ideological in nature, driven largely by youth who came together with no political agenda other than to oust the authoritarian regimes that had gripped the region more or less since independence, it was the Brotherhood that was to reap the advantages of the revolutions.[1]

For the first time in its history, Muslim Brotherhood was operating as a legal entity with its political party called; Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). As the movement increased its popularity within the political competition, soon it decided to nominate one of its members as candidate for Presidency; Mohammad Morsi. In the new political environment that Egypt was trying to transform itself from an authoritarian regime into a democracy, Muslim Brotherhood, with its party and president, became the major player. In a very limited period FJP occupied the largest number of seats in the Parliament, in the committee that was responsible for drafting the new constitution and the post of Presidency. However, due to both political turmoil in Egypt and the inexperience of the Muslim Brotherhood, FJP and Mohammad Morsi in governance, soon the opposition arouse in the public.

Goals of the Thesis

This thesis analyses the political and ideological transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood from Hasan al-Banna to Mohammad Morsi and researches the legacy of its main ideologues on FJP. The tranformation of the movement was triggered overwhelmingly by Egyptian politics which caused internal debates within the Muslim Brotherhood; this paper analyses this change within a historical framework.

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[1] Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood; From Opposition to Power*, (Saqi Books, 2013), 7

The Muslim Brotherhood was established with a goal to Islamize Egyptian society. In its early years the founder of the movement, Hasan al-Banna, was distant towards the ideas such as democracy and party politics. However, in the meantime he was preaching for Islamic governance as one of the Brotherhood's long term goals, which showed the pragmatic nature of the group's political vision. This became apparent after the movement had to revaluate its discourse on participating parliamentary elections and establishing alliances, as the dynamics of the Egyptian politics changed under the Presidency of Hosni Mubarak. After the January 25 Revolution, the FJP and President Mohammad Morsi are under immense pressure than ever before and their sincerity is questioned, as these concepts gained a new momentum in Egypt. This study researches the Brotherhood's changing stance towards the concepts; democracy and pluralism by analysing the published documents during the course of the movement's political struggle.

The ideas of Muslim Brotherhood regarding the women and non-Muslim rights since the movement's very foundation has been one of the most criticized subjects. Contrary to its eagerness of change towards democracy and pluralism, the rights of women and non-Muslims are the ones that saw the least change in both rhetoric and practice. Brotherhood approached to these critical questions with a conservative outlook. Starting from the times of Hasan al-Banna, the movement supported equality in citizenship for both women and non-Muslims in Egypt. However, with regards to their rights, the movement perceived women's place as her home. Even during the election times, Brotherhood was reluctant to declare its commitment to the legacy of its founder with a limited change as it allowed women to participate social, grass roots activism instead of running for Presidency. The question of non-Muslim rights, especially Coptic Christians, under the Muslim Brotherhood rule gained a new momentum since the ousting of Hosni Mubarak. The movement was calling for a national reconciliation and avoiding any confrontation between Muslims and non-Muslims. This was evidenced as the FJP allowed Coptic Christians to join its founding membership and President Mohammad Morsi

appointed non-Muslim advisors. This paper researches how these policies affected the relationship between Muslim Brotherhood and their opposition.

This study also aims to explain ideological differences within the movement from conservative and radical to more reformist approaches and effects on the identity of FJP and decisions of Mohammad Morsi. Throughout Brotherhood's history, none of the leaders in the movement was able reach to the charisma and influence of Hasan al-Banna. The vision that he sat for the movement was the most significant reference point of the Brotherhood in their social and political struggle. During the years of imprisonment and pressure from the government, specifically Nasser's presidency, some Muslim Brotherhood members decided to re-interpret their relationship with the state more radically and mostly inspired by the writings of Sayyed Qutb. Although he appeared to be the movement's second most significant ideologue, those members who declared their allegiance to Hasan al-Banna distanced from Qutb's political and religious explanations. Hasan al-Hudaybi, Brotherhood's second General Guide outlined their attitude towards radical interpretations in his book *Preachers, Not Judges*. His ideas were also used by the forthcoming generation of Muslim Brotherhood members. Reformist group within the movement gain strength after Brotherhood's decision to enter into political activism. In the immediate aftermath of the January 25 Revolution, Muslim Brotherhood antagonised its reformist movement, as many of them left to form their own political parties. Muslim Brotherhood obliged to associate the ideas of its main ideologues with reformist thought to reach out masses in the elections.

Further, this paper will pursue answers for the following sub-questions;

- What are the effects of January 25 Revolution on the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood?
- Is Brotherhood abandoning its socio-religious roots to become a political party?
- Does the legacy of Hasan al-Banna exist in the decisions of Muslim Brotherhood, FJP and President Mohammad Morsi?

The first chapter of this thesis analyses the political transformation of Muslim Brotherhood and its stance towards Egyptian politics. In this chapter the early stages of the movement's establishment, its relationship with the Monarchy, the Free Officers Movement and the regimes of Nasser, Sadat and finally Mubarak will be covered. The Muslim Brotherhood rapidly spread around Egypt and was recruiting fighters for Palestinian war under the Monarchy. Following the crackdown of President Nasser on the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement was on the brink of complete dissolution. The relative freedoms that they obtained under Sadat and later Mubarak allowed the Muslim Brotherhood regain their legacy and reach to the level of the largest opposition movement before January 25 Revolution.

The second chapter discusses the ideological transformation of Muslim Brotherhood from Hasan al-Banna to its recent General Guide Mohammad al-Badie. The Brotherhood emerged as a socio-religious movement that devoted itself to the Islamization of the society by distancing itself from political competition. However, during the Mubarak era, Muslim Brotherhood started to use certain terminology such as "democracy", "freedom of speech", "civil state" etc. which signalled another wave of transition in the ideological history of the movement. This chapter will trace the causes of this evolution.

The third chapter explores the immediate effects of the January 25 Revolution on the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood and its' experience of politics in post-Mubarak Egypt. The mass demonstrations that forced former President Hosni Mubarak were a milestone for all political groups including Muslim Brotherhood. This chapter will be analysing the identity of this new party, its policy orientations, relations with Supreme Council of Armed Forces, alliances and confrontations with different political parties and the performance in Parliamentary elections.

The fourth and the last chapter will research the period between the Presidential Elections and constitutional referendum. First the attitude of Muslim Brotherhood towards the presidential elections was examined. In the aftermath of

this process, the movement was able to occupy the highest authority in the country, as one of its members Mohammad Morsi being the president. Later the experience of Muslim Brotherhood in power was discussed in detail while analysing Morsi's policies of SCAF, the judiciary and relations with the different political actors such as secular liberal and Salafi movement. The chapter ends with a discussion of opposition towards both President Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood as it rose as they performed weak in the period of transition.

One of the most significant assistance for the development of this thesis was achieved by the author's six months visit to Egypt between July and December 2012. The experience of joining to both pro and anti-Morsi protests in Cairo and Alexandria, attending the Friday sermons, listening TV debates and talking to both opponents and supporters of Mohammad Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood allowed the author to observe the political transformation in the post-Mubarak Egyptian society.

CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

2.1. Birth of Muslim Brotherhood; Life of Hasan al-Banna

Hasan al-Banna is regarded as one of the most influential people on the modern Islamic movements with his foundation of a sample for others. He was born in October 1906 in a small town of Mahmudiyya when Egypt was under the British occupation. This widely affected on the politics, economy and culture of the then Egypt. Banna grew up in a religious family and he was influenced from his father Sheikh Ahmad Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, who was a watch repairer that studied in Al Azhar University (the most influential school for Sunni Islam) at the time of Muhammad Abduh, one of the pioneers of Islamic revival. Banna became familiar with the teachings of Muhammad Abduh and his disciple Rashid Ridas' commentary of Quran, Al Manar. In their understanding, Muslims had fallen behind of other nations because they distanced themselves from the main sources of Islam, Quran and teachings of the Prophet (Hadith). Muslims had to return to these sources if they wanted to regain their power. This is the reason why, for Banna, "Islam is understood as a religion, a civilization, a way of life, an ideology, and a state."[2] Banna was socially active he participated and directed organizations such as Society of Moral Behaviour and Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden in his primary school. In addition to these activities, Banna joined to a Sufi group, Order of the Hasafiyya Brothers. His education coincided with the rise of nationalist tendencies in Egypt against the British occupation where Banna participated as an activist.

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[2] Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* State, (University of New York Press, 1995), 65

The most important change in Bannas' life was when he left his hometown to study in Dar'ul Ulum in Cairo, a school that teaches both Islamic and modern sciences. His difference from previous contemporary Muslim leaders was that Banna took a secular formal Egyptian education. Despite having strong affiliation with the Cairo branch of Order of the Hasafiyya Brothers where he became full member in 1922, Banna also joined to the Islamic Society for Noble of Character and often visited Salafiyya bookstore, which led him to engage more on the subject of Islamic cause[3]. Banna appreciated both Sufi sheikhs, although they are sincere they withdrew from society, and formal school teachers, who is very much able to influence the society but, for Banna's view, they also stray society from Islam.[4] Banna did not distanced himself from the idea of Sufism even after he established Brotherhood and the leader of the society received the title *al-murshid al-amm* (Supreme Guide), as in the case of Sufi orders.[5] In the social aspect Banna was exposed more widely to the British influence in Egyptian society, on daily bases from politics, economic as well as growing Christian missionary organizations. The environment that Banna faced in Cairo led him to become idealist about the future position of Islam in Egyptian society. After seeing such scenes deviated from Islam, Banna organized students from both Al Azhar and Dar'ul Ulum to train for "guidance and preaching", because for Banna mosques did not suffice to educate people on their religion. They started to preach in places where people got together such as coffee shops.[6]

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[3] Richard P.Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 5

[4] David Commins, "Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, ed. Ali Rahmena (London; Atlantic Highlands and New Jersey; Zed Books, 1994), 131

[5] Ana Belén Soage and Jorge Fuentelsaz Franganillo, "The Muslim Brothers in Egypt" in *The Muslim Brotherhood,* ed. Barry Rubin (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 39

[6] Mitchell, 5

2.2. Establishment of Muslim Brotherhood in Ismailia

Banna was assigned as Arabic language teacher at primary school in Suez Canal city of Ismailia in 1927 after his graduation from Dar'ul Ulum.[7] For Banna, British presence in Suez Canal was more visible compared to Cairo since they were protecting their investments. As an idealist Egyptian Muslim teacher, Banna continued its preaching as he did in Cairo, of spreading the message of Islam, in coffee shops. Their speeches were more attractive to people than those they hear in the mosques, because Banna talked on the subjects of daily life and offered a solution for the current problems that society face, such as foreign domination and deviation from the Egyptian and Islamic culture. Banna supported the establishment of a society to spread the true message of Islam, Young Men's Muslim Association, (YMMA) that call for "return to the true Islam as it is found in the Quran." YMMA was the organization that Banna "emulate" in the future for Muslim Brotherhood.[8] While he was continuing his preaching in Ismailia, six members of the British labour force camp approached Banna to establish the Society of Muslim Brotherhood in March 1928. Banna accepted the offer and chose the name for the organization; "We are brothers in the service of Islam, hence we are "the Muslim Brothers"[9].

In the first three years Muslim Brotherhood worked more like any other Islamic social organization and its goal was to increase number of its members. People started to invite Banna to speak in their homes and workplace which made the Brotherhood more interconnected with the Egyptian society. In the following years new branches were opened in Canal Zone towns and in the Egyptian Delta. They built a mosque, a school and a club to attract more and more people to their cause.[10]

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[7]Commins, 132

[8]Ibid., 130

[9]Quoted in Mitchell, 8

[10]Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," Sociological Quarterly 42, no. 4 (September 2001) 501

Banna avoided commenting on the political situation in Egypt until he was transferred to Cairo by Minister of Education in 1932.

2.3. The rise of Muslim Brotherhood; Cairo

The capital was a better place for Brotherhood to spread rapidly to other Egyptian cities. Conferences played a significant role in order to set the program of what kind of organization that Muslim Brotherhood will be in the future. Five conferences that Brotherhood held reflected the activities of the organization from 1932 to 1939. In the first conference the organization started to signal its emergence into the national political scene by sending a letter to King Fuad where they advised him to limit Christian Missionary activities in Egypt. In the second conference which held in the following year, 1934, Brotherhood decided the "advertisement" by setting up weekly magazines (*Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* and *Majallat al-Nadhir*) which will be the voice of the organization.[11] The third conference that was held in March 1935 was a turning point, because of its "classification of membership". There were three layered membership process; (1) assistant, who intends to join and due a small amount of money, (2) related, those who accept the teachings of the movement and (3) active, the one that commits to the movement both physically and ideologically.[12] Ziad Munson argues that this membership process is the reason how Muslim Brotherhood had survived from political suppressions better than communist groups in Egypt of the same time.[13] Due to the increase in the number of Muslim Brotherhood and to discipline and indoctrinate its members, the organization established "rovers" based on athletic training. In 1937 following "rovers", Brotherhood set up its own "battalions" which later turned into *al-nizam al-khass* (Special Organization) or *al-jihaz al-sirri* (Secret Apparatus) that took special education on martial arts and combat technics.[14] Brothers used these battalions during

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[11]Mitchell, 13

[12] Ibid., 183

[13] Munson, 500

[14] Mitchell, 30

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Arab revolt in Palestine from 1936 to 1939, against the British mandate, that increased organizations' political activities both inside and outside of Egypt.[15] The fifth congress of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1939 which was also the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the organization occupies a special place in the history of the movement. It was in this congress that Hasan al-Banna set the principals of the movement on politics, which should shed light to coming years.

> 1) the kind of Islam in which the Brothers believe makes government an important cornerstone of their program; 2) without the power to legislate, the voice of the reformer would be as 'a scream in the wilderness'; 3) thus, shirking the quest for governmental power is an 'Islamic crime'; 4) the Brothers do no seek power for themselves and are prepared to be the 'troops' of those who would carry this burden in an Islamic way; 5) before anything can happen, there must be a period during which the principles of the Brothers are spread.[16]

The breakout of World War Two was also an important factor for the rise of support to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian society, especially after the increased pressure of Britain over politics. Egypt was in a significant position for Britain, since it wanted to secure a geostrategic position in the War, Suez Canal against the Axis Powers. In domestic politics of Egypt in 1942, there were power struggles between the palace, government and Britain. The government of the time supported the Axis forces and this led Britain to force the palace to change the government. These pressures brought al-Wafd Party, the oldest nationalist party in the country that inflamed anti-British sentiments in Egypt.[17]

The lack of faith to any political movement in the country benefited Muslim Brotherhood and increased its popularity in Egyptian society. In this environment of the political struggle, Brotherhood started to criticize the British presence in the country and current government. Despite the fact that Banna was against the

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[15] Ibid., 16

[16] Mitchell, 308

[17] Brynjar Lia, *The Society of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942*, (Ithaca Press, 2010), 256-258

establishment of political parties on the grounds of their corrupt nature, Muslim Brotherhood entered into the political rivalry and declared its own candidates for the parliamentary elections for the first time in 1941. Later however the movement withdrew its decision and negotiated with the Wafd government. On their second attempt to run for the seats in 1945, they failed to have a candidate due to fraudulent elections.[18]

The end of Second World War didn't help Egyptian politics to recover itself instead, political clashes and the economic difficulties increased. For the part of Muslim Brotherhood, there was a rise in the power of Secret Unit inside the organization. Although Brotherhood was using Secret Unit in the Palestinian war, the Unit started to get involved domestic politics by conducting assassination attempts and causing rise of chaos in the country. Jeep case in 1948 was a turning point for Muslim Brotherhood, when documents were found indicating a secret plan to over throw the government. Prime Minister of Egypt, Muhammad Fahmi Al-Nuqrashi announced the dissolution Muslim Brotherhood in December 8 1948. Many of the organizations members were imprisoned which put extensive pressure on Brotherhood that could threaten its very existence.[19] However these sanctions didn't calm down the chaos and three weeks after the declaration of dissolution of Muslim Brotherhood, Secret Unit assassinated Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi in 28 December 1948. Following this assassination, Hasan al-Banna tried to distance him from the attack by arguing that assassins were "neither Ikhwan nor Muslim"[20]. But it was not convincing enough to the Egyptian government which eventually led to the assassination of Hasan al-Banna in Cairo in February 12, 1949. [21]

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[18] John Esposito and John Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, (New York, Oxford Press, 1996) 180

[19] Barbara H.E.Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology (*Routledge, 2009*)* 13

[20] Louay M. Safi, *Tensions and Transitions in the Muslim World*, (University Press of America, 2003) 75

[21] Zollner, 67-71

2.4. New Murshid of Ikhwan and Free Officers Revolution in 1952

The assassination of both al-Nuqrashi and Hasan al-Banna damaged the public image of Brotherhood. However, by 1949 the movement was claiming to have 2000 branches and up to 600.000 members, the largest organization in the country of the time.[22] In the next two years between 1949 and 1951 Brothers operated in secrecy until they were acquitted from the assassination of al-Nuqrashi and the Jeep incident. The court came to the conclusion that; "a criminal conspiracy to overthrow the form of government, on the basis of the evidence and investigation, to be without foundation" which secured the Brotherhoods' freedom.[23]

By the time these cases were taking place, Brotherhood had to choose a new *Murshid* which was the most significant position in the organization, since the leader takes crucial decisions and has to keep the Society together. Their clash with the political authority and decrease in their popularity forced the Society to decide on a leader which was respected by both palace and government. Muslim Brotherhood leaders approached to a well-known judge, Hasan al-Hudaybi who was not an official member of the movement. His election in 1951 was contrary to the constitution of Muslim Brotherhood because the constitution indicated that the new leader has to be "a member of the Consultative Assembly for at least five years and that he must be elected from among the members of the Assembly".[24] However because of the chaotic situation, they accepted him being the second Murshid of Muslim Brotherhood. The position was critical to fill since Hasan al-Banna had a significant charisma to uphold the organization. Hudaybi had a different character and nature than his predecessors. This became more obvious after Hudaybi declared his distance towards the Special Unit, which created big discontent inside the organization especially those who are leading figures of Special Unit, Salih al-

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[22] Munson, 488-489

[23] Quoted in Mitchell, 78

[24] Zollner, 20

Ashmawi and ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Sanadi.[25] Oppositions inside the Brotherhood continued to increase after the coup against King Farouq by low ranking military personal in army, calling themselves *Haraka al-Dubbaat al-Ahrar* (Free Officers Movement) in 23 July 1952.

Radio broadcast was interrupted in the morning of 23 July; "…I assure the Egyptian people that the entire army today has become capable of operating in the national interest and under the rule of the constitution apart from any interests of its own."[26] This was one of the young members of Free Officers, Anwar Sadat announcing the coup d'état. He was going to be the third president of Egypt after following Mohammad Naguib and Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Few days after the coup Murshid of Muslim Brotherhood, Hudaybi announced their support to Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).[27] There is a widely debated issue on the involvement of Brotherhood during the Free Officers coup. It was a fact that there were some members and sympathizers, Nasser and Sadat among them inside Free Officer's Movement. Despite the fact that the coup was not the plan of Muslim Brotherhood, the group had nevertheless connections with Free Officers leadership. As Vatikiotis argued; "Free Officers movement occurred within the Brethren-led operations in the Palestine Conflict (1947-9) and those against the British in the Suez Canal Zone (1946-53)."[28] Although they didn't become official members of Muslim Brotherhood, both Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abd al-Nasser met with Hasan al-Banna.

Muhammad Naguib became the first president of newly declared Republic of Egypt on June 18, 1953. Despite the fact that their understanding of implementing a "just state system" differed completely, in the first period of presidency of Naguib the relations with Brothers were in the line of cooperation. They rather forced to see each other beneficial partners and didn't want to take radical steps, in order not to

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[25] Ibid., 23

[26] Steven Cook, *The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square* (Oxford University Press), 11

[27] Zollner, 25

[28] Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation, (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 85

lose large support from the Brothers. First confrontation emerged after Muslim Brotherhood refused the offer by the Free Officers to participate to the Revolutionary Command Council.[29] However, Brotherhood didn't cut their connections with the new regime and continued to support the Officers as long as they fit to Brothers goals. For example, the organization supported the announcement of dissolution of all political parties and established Liberation Rally to represent people directly. The ban on political parties excluded Muslim Brotherhood since it was not classified as a political party. However the conflict between Free Officers and the Brotherhood emerged after they rejected joining to the national front. On October 19, 1954 Abd Al Nasser signed the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, concerning the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. This increased concern for the part of Muslim Brotherhood and Hudaybi opposed to signing of the treaty. Husaini argues that Brotherhoods' position was to take armed struggle against the British occupation in Suez Canal.[30] Total suppression was inevitable after Mahmud Abd al-Latif, a member of Secret Unit of Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Abd al-Nasser while he was giving a speech in Manshiyya Square of Alexandria on October 26, 1954. Muhammad Heikal one of the advisors of Nasser reports the dramatic speech of Nasser, after the incident as; "Let them kill Nasser. What is Nasser but one among many? My fellow countrymen stay where you are. I am not dead, I am alive, and even if I die all of you is Gamal Abd al-Nasser."[31] Following the incident Abd al-Latif and five other members of Muslim Brotherhood was executed. The assassination attempt opened a new page in both political position and the ideological understanding of Muslim Brotherhood.

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[29] Zollner, 27-29

[30] Ishak Musa Husaini, *The Moslem Brethren : the greatest of modern Islamic movements*, (Beirut : Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1956), 136

[31] Quoted in Mohamed Heikal, *Nasser; The Cairo Documents*, (New English Library, 1972) 35

2.5. The years of prison; Muslim Brotherhood under Nasser and Sadat

The attempt of assassination to Nasser brought him into a higher position in the eyes of public. This was both a chance to suppress the most visible political rival in the country, Muslim Brotherhood and dismiss the then president of Egypt, Muhammad Naguib. For the part of Muslim Brotherhood around 4.000 members were jailed and movement leaders were arrested and imprisoned for life, Hudaybi being one of them.[32] This is the reason why during years under Nasser, although, Egypt had become a major political power in the Third World, it was a total suppression and inactive years for Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The crackdown on the movement continued through 1955, most members were executed, arrested or exiled to different Arab countries. Both, imprisoned members of Muslim Brotherhood and exiled Brothers tried to keep in contact with each other. This period opened a way for Muslim Brotherhood to spread and establish its own branches in other Arab and African countries like Syria, Sudan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Algeria. Following their release from prison in late 1960s' and early 1970s during the leadership of Anwar Sadat, there had been a rise in the number of militant Islamic groups that at the end assassinated Sadat in 1981. In order to understand this change of method in Islamic movements in Egypt one has to focus on the debates that were carried out by Muslim Brotherhood members. Their brutal treatment and excessive torture have been effective on new ideological search. One of the most significant leaders of this transformation was Sayyed Qutb. The next chapter will explain the intellectual differentiations that emerged during the years in prison.

2.5.1. Radicalization and Fragmentation of Islamic Movements

Sayyed Qutb is regarded as one of the pioneers of Islamic Revival in the 20th century. He was born in 1906 and became a teacher in 1920s in Cairo. Qutb was a literary critic who had nationalist and anti-British feelings and was a thinker in favour of a change in the Egyptian society. As in the Egyptian intellectual circles at the time, the idea of returning and re-examining Islam grabbed Qutbs' attention. In

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[32] Hrair Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir*, (University of London Press, 1972), 33-34

1940s he started to examine and write about the ethical norms in Islam and as Charles Tripp argues "he was making an effort to reconcile a liberal understanding of the individual's needs and interests with a growing appreciation of the importance and indeed uniqueness of the Islamic community."[33] What changed the understanding of Qutb from an individualist to a collectivist was his visit to United States between 1948 and 1950 where he decided on his new enemy as the West. Sayyed Qutb returned to Egypt in 1950, when political dispute was on rise and this led him to write on social and political subjects from an Islamic point of view. He started to write excessively on the subject of Islam, some of his most significant books are "Social Justice in Islam" (1949), "The Struggle between Islam and Capitalism" (1951) and "World Peace and Islam" (1951). Although Qutb stayed distanced from Muslim Brotherhood for a time period, he appreciated their way of mobilizing and spreading, the true Islam. Qutb was also informed about Brotherhood during his stay in United States as he witnessed reactions to the assassination of Hasan al-Banna and how Banna is regarded by the United States.[34] "The Muslim Brotherhood signalled its own interest in Qutb by sponsoring reprints of *The Battle of Islam and Capitalism* and *Social Justice in Islam* his books."[35] In 1952, Qutb became a member and head of Muslim Brotherhood's Section for the Propagation of the Call and Publishing because of his excessive gift on writing. During this period he started to write first chapters of his eight volumes Tafsir (commentary) to the fundamental text of Islam, Quran with the title of "*In the shade of Quran*". Following the Free Officers coup in 1952 he was offered to be the secretary-general of Liberation Rally. After the assassination attempt against Nasser, Sayyed Qutb was amongst those who were imprisoned and later that year he was sentenced to fifteen year hard labour. These years affected Qutb badly, since he had chronic health

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[33] Charles Tripp, "Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision" in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, ed. Ali Rahmena (London; Atlantic Highlands and New Jersey; Zed Books, 1994), 157

[34] Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb The theory of jahiliyyah,* (Routledge, 2006), 145

[35] John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*, (Columbia University Press, 2010), 173

problems and had to spend most of his time in prison infirmary.[36] Qutb found excessive time to extend his commentary to the Quran that contrary to the classical works he was rather trying to show a socio-political explanation of the holy text. During his time in prison he also became familiar with South Asian contemporary Islamic thinkers especially Abul ala al-Mawdudi and Ali Nadwi.

In the mid-1950s Nasser ordered the release of activists with less or no crime and Hudaybi charged with house arrest due to his old age and poor health. Because he was under constant surveillance it was rather hard for him to act as a political leader. However those younger generations that released with the pardon of Nasser attempted to recreate the dissolved Muslim Brotherhood but this time with underground activities. Their witness to torture change Brothers image of Nasserian regime as tyrant and strengthen their opposition against it. There were two reasons why it was hard for Brothers to arrange meetings; first because they were not allowed to openly criticize the government and had to operate underground with the fear of persecution. Secondly, state used the strategy of sending them to different prisons far from each other to cut their connection with each other. As there were two reasons of the hardship there were two solutions that were created by Muslim Brotherhood to find a way of communicating. Firstly, a group called Muslim Sisterhood kept this connection strong by delivering messages to those Brothers either released from prison or living as fugitive. Zainab al Ghazali was the leader of the organization and she was in close contact with the sisters of Sayyed Qutb, wife of Hasan al Hudaybi and female relatives of other members. Second chance was through the connection of those convicts who need medical assistance. They all sent Liman al Turra prison hospital and this way they were trying to keep their organization working and one of them Sayyed Qutb. Qutb wrote most his commentary on Quran during his time in hospital and his interpretation spread to other hospitals with this strategy. Sayyed Qutb became the ideologue of new created organization which later be called as "Organization 1965". In order to educate this vanguard group Qutb wrote his masterpiece which will affect future radical militant

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[36] Cook, 35

Islamic movements both in and outside Egypt, with the title of *Milestones Along the Way* (1964). In this book, Qutb focuses on a self-criticism of Muslim societies and tries to find a solution by discussing the nature of Islam that for him not understood well by the society. Islam is a system that encompasses everyday life and means full submission and obeying to rules of God rather than leaders. Since people are ruled under man made laws rather than the God's law they are regarded with a Quranic term *Jahiliyyah* (state of ignorance). What Qutb was offering in his book as a solution was that people should go back to the only original source, Quran to save them from the state of ignorance as the first generation of Muslims did during the times of Prophet Muhammad. Those who would educate themselves from the main source are more powerful in the sense of faith and will have right to rule and question or even struggle against the state of ignorance. Although, Hudaybi was supportive for the organization at the very establishment because it was regrouping of dissolved Muslim Brotherhood, he later distanced himself from Qutb and his followers for using the notion Takfir (excommunication) for the Egyptian society.[37] Sayyed Qutb after spending 10 years in prison, released for a short term in 1964. The group that was reading Qutbs' *Milestones* was discovered by the regime in July 1965 and they were accused of planning a coup against the government, since the book was encouraging uprising against the regime. Sayyed Qutb charged with death penalty this time, with Hudaybi and two other associates. Although Hudaybis' penalty was changed into life imprisonment, Qutb and his friends were hanged in August 1966.[38]

While, members of all political parties alongside Muslim Brotherhood spent their in prison time, Egypt became increasingly a significant country, in economic, cultural and international terms. As much as Nasser became the only leader of Egyptian politics with little or no opposition to himself, Gamal Abd al-Nasser emerged as the most popular leader of "Third World" with the initiative of Non-Alignment Movement in international arena. Nationalization of Suez Canal which

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[37] Zollner, 40

[38] Cook, 90

led to 1956 Suez War with Israel and Pan-Arabism policy can be counted as the main reasons behind the emerging popularity of Nasser in the world. Domestically Nasser gained the support of the lower class since he tightened the condition of private property and he increased his popularity especially after Suez War by forcing British military presence to leave the country. As Dekmejian argues; "For over a decade, Nasser was able to offer the Arabs much of what the Brotherhood had promised – dignity, unity, and popular participation, defiance of the West and a semblance of socio-economic justice."[39]

Six Day War in 1967 was a turning point for the popularity of Muslim Brotherhood in particular and Islamic movements in general around the Arab society after the defeat of Nasser against Israel. The internal debate increased after the war within the Muslim Brotherhood between those who advocated the ideas of Qutb and supporters of al-Hudaybi. The debate was on the issue of their support for Nasser during his war with Israel. For the supporters of Qutb, Nasser is a *jahili* leader and such a leader cannot be supported even if he wages war against "the enemy of Muslims". Hudaybi reacted to this argument and suggested that the support should be given to Nasser since it would create strife amongst the society.[40] Although, Muslim Brotherhood was an alternative to the idea of Pan-Arabism in the post 1967 period in Egypt, they were continued to operate as an illegal organization. Despite the fact that the ideological rise of Muslim Brotherhood and other militant Islamic movements was achieved under the leadership of Nasser, they gained their social support after a new era was opened with presidency of Anwar Sadat.

2.5.2   The presidency of Sadat; Rise of Islamic Activism

Nasser died in September 28, 1970 and succeeded by his vice-president Anwar Sadat. There was a significant shift in the attitude towards the Islamic movements during his presidency from 1970 to 1981 compared to his predecessor. Some argue that the transformation was in fact within the state from full-

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[39] R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, (Syracuse University Press, 1985), 83

[40] Zollner, 46

authoritarianism with Nasser to semi-authoritarianism under Sadat.[41] The situation was though for Anwar Sadat to replace a charismatic leader as Nasser, as a result he had chosen the way of economic and political liberalization and tried to erase the "mistakes" of Nasser. In 1971 to increase his popularity and legitimacy Sadat announced Islam as the religion of Egyptian state and the sharia is *a* source of legislation.[42] Since the morale of the Egyptian society was devastated after the defeat in 1967 War, Sadat aimed to restore the power of his country by challenging to United States and Israel. In October 6, 1973, which was also the holy day of Yom Kippur in Israel, Egypt launched an attack against Israel, in order not to retake all parts occupied by Israel in 1967 but only Sinai. Sadat named as "the hero of the Crossing" after the war in Egypt and signalled to the United States and Israel that he wants peace in the region. On the other hand opposition also rose through his presidency from different groups; Islamic movements, leftists and Nasserists against three main subjects; *Infitah* policy which aimed to open Egyptian economy to the investment of the Western countries led to the increase in the price of basic subsidies, increasing relations with the United States and his visit and peace treaty with Israel.

Starting from early-1970s members of Islamic movements were released until the declaration of amnesty in 1975 to all political prisoners arrested during the leadership of Nasser. The rise of Islamic ideology became apparent in different parts of the society. Muslim Brotherhood found chance to reorganize after the release of Hasan al-Hudaybi in 1971 and increase its popularity. In the next two years after his release from prison Al-Hudaybi worked to spread the organization until he died in November 11, 1973 at age of 82 and succeeded by Umar al-Tilmisani.[43]

Despite the fact that Brotherhood was the only major Islamic movement before the Nasser's crackdown in 1954, after most of the members released from

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[41] Marina Ottaway, *Democracy challenged : the rise of semi-authoritarianism*, (Washington, D.C. : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 31

[42] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, 86

[43] Zollner, 49

prison there were 29 different Islamic movements in Egypt.[44] During the same period as Brotherhood was trying to reorganize itself, there were other splinter Islamic movements such as *Gamaat al-Muslimin* (Society of Muslims) also known as *al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra (*Excommunication and the Hegira) and Islamic Liberation Organization that were created by those who extensively read the works of Sayyed Qutb and challenged to Hasan al-Hudaybi. Similar to these organizations, al-Gam'a al-Islamiyya became popular among students in university campuses and until the end of Sadat's presidency they were controlling nearly all Student Unions around Egypt.[45] These groups were most likely to recruit, younger generation intellectuals of Egyptian society, who are in search of a new explanations to the problems that they face, such as underemployment. Prominent members of al-Gam'a al-Islamiyya in 1970s such as; Dr. Esam al-'Aryan, Dr. 'Abd al-Mun'im Abu al-Futuh, Dr. Hilmi al-Gazzar and Eng. Abu al-'Ala Madi, later became the leading figures of Muslim Brotherhood.[46]

This is the reason why it was not just Muslim Brotherhood that increased its popularity but all other Islamic movements during the presidency of Sadat, increased their ability to operate. This came not only because people were attracted by the Islamic movements but rather Sadat used Islamic movements as a tool against his opponents especially those who supported the policies of Nasser. In addition Sadat created close connections with the Brotherhood and supported its activities as long as they operate as an alternative to militant Islamic movements that pose a threat to the regime. The organization had never been officially recognized until 2011 but rather operated as a social movement with the goal of spreading Islamic knowledge. Umar al Tilmisani as the third *Murshid* of Muslim Brotherhood after Banna and Hudaybi made a transformation in the movement which led Gilles Kepel, to describe the post-

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[44] Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution,* 88

[45] Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 116

[46] Hisham Mubarak, "What Does the Gama'a Islamiyya Want?: An Interview with Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim" *Middle East Report*, No. 198, Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East (Jan. - Mar.,1996), 40-46

prison period of the Muslim Brotherhood as "neo-Muslim Brethren".[47] Between July 1976 and September 1981 Brotherhood published a monthly magazine called *al-Da'wa*, for the first time since 1954 that dealt with various up-to-date issues from an Islamic point of view. This magazine was media organ of Muslim Brotherhood to declare his opinions not only on what was happening in Egypt but other Muslim majority countries as well. By 1979, the magazine reached to 80.000 circulations.[48]

Muslim Brotherhood with the publications in *Al-Da'wa* started to increase its criticisms against Sadat after the growing economic crisis as a result of *Infitah* policy, relations with United States, visit to and speech at Israeli Knesset and Camp David accords in 1979. It was also the period when Brotherhood developed its connections with political forces other than Islamic movements, leftists and liberals by "allowing the latter to write in their periodicals on issues of common agreement (such as opposition to the peace treaty with Israel, alliance with the United States, and in defence of democracy and civil rights)"[49]. In 1977, when Bread Riots erupted after masses gather to denounce the rise in the basic food prices, Muslim Brotherhood launched its first open critic against the state. They supported the riots and opposed Sadat's comments on riots being "a plot engineered by the communists."[50]

After protests started to question the legitimacy of President Anwar Sadat, he diverted his attention from economic problems to diplomatic relations with Israel. He openly declared on November 9, 1977 that he is ready to go and speak in Israeli Parliament. This declaration was an intention of peace with Israel and for Egyptian and other Arab states a betrayal of Egypt to the Palestinian cause. This led Arab

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[47] Gilles Kepel, *The Roots of Radical Islam,* (Saqi, 2005), 109

[48] Bruce K. Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak : liberalism, Islam, and democracy in the Arab world,* (Princeton University Press, 2008), 83

[49] Saad ed-Din Ibrahim, *Egypt Islam and Democracy*, (The American University in Cairo Press, 2002), 47

[50] Ibid., 40

League which was established by initiatives of Egypt in 1945 decided to move its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis.[51] During this era the articles in *al-Da'wa* magazine increased their tone of criticism against Sadat and dangers that can be brought by peace with Israel to Egypt.

Anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian rhetoric was the main subject that Muslim Brotherhood used from its very early years with Hasan al-Banna and Sadat's peace with Israel brought the critique of Sadat regime into its peak. Criticism was not specific to Brotherhood or other Islamic groups but wide range of intellectuals in Egypt showed their discontent on the peace treaty. The question of Sadat's presidency continued although Sadat tried to restore his image by religion and introduced a series of bills on Islamic penalties for usury, apostasy, theft, and adultery and drinking, most of which were withdrawn after protests by both Copts and liberal Muslims. In March 1980 the *shariah* was made *the* source of legislation through a plebiscite.[52] However, these announcements were not enough to calm the society against Sadat and as a final resort he ordered the arrests of significant opposition figures, Muslim Brotherhood and its *Murshid* Umar al-Tilmisani alongside with other Islamic movement's members including members of the Coptic Church, and Pope Shenouda III, secularists, liberals and closed down the opposition publications including *al-Da'wa*.[53]

Compared to the crackdown of Nasser to the opposition in 1954, Sadat's mass imprisonment was unable to prevent the rise of militant Islamic movement, called *al-Jihad* (Sacred Struggle) inside the military. In October 6, 1981, on the eight anniversary of 1973 war, 26 year old lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli with four other gunmen opened fire and killed Sadat. After the assassination Islambuli shouted to the crowd; "I am Khalid al-Islambouli, I have killed Pharaoh, and I do not fear death."[54]

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[51] Ibrahim, 140

[52] Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, 86

[53] Kirk J. Beattie, *Egypt during the Sadat years*, (New York, Palgrave, 2000), 273

[54] Kepel, 198

Although Sadat was regarded as "The Hero of the crossing" because of his achievements in 1973 war against Israel, his visit to Israel made him a notorious leader for Arabs even after his death. As Muhammad Heikal, a prominent Egyptian journalist and a close advisor to Nasser describes; "This was tragically and graphically illustrated at his funeral, when he was taken to his grave by a most imposing galaxy of foreign statesmen, including three former Presidents of United States and Primer Minister of Israel but with only a handful of his own fellow-countrymen as mourners."[55]

In the aftermath of assassination security forces launched a crackdown to the militant Islamic movement *al-Jihad*. It was a significant indicator of popularity of this group when, Egyptian security arrested 303 members from different "cross-section of Egyptian society"; most of them being college and university students and graduates, workers, engineers, landowners, professors, teachers and journalists.[56]

Two weeks following the assassination of Sadat, October 14, 1981, his vice-president Hosni Mubarak, who was sitting in the right side of Sadat in the event of assassination, became the fourth president of Egypt. For the part of Muslim Brothers, who were in jail during the assassination of Sadat, new presidency meant new opportunities in both social and political arena that made Brotherhood the main opposition force in the country for the next 30 years during Mubarak's presidency.

2.6 Muslim Brotherhood as a Political Force; The Presidency of Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011)

The term of Mubarak's presidency was the "golden age of Muslim Brotherhood" in Egypt since it became the largest and most organized opposition force against the regime during these years. However compared to the years with Hassan al-Banna, Brotherhood had also rivals from different social and political groups. The organization gained maturity during this period by participating to 1984, 1987, 2000 and 2005 elections and made alliances with ideologically different

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[55] Mohamed Heikal, *Autumn of Fury; The Assassination of Sadat*, (Andre Deutsch, 1983), 5

[56] Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, 106

political forces, for example with, New Wafd party in 1984, with Socialist Labour Party in 1987 and with Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya) in 2005. The rise of Brotherhood was also rapid in the leadership of professional syndicates and by taking part in these organizations Muslim Brotherhood extended its reach to the different classes of the society. Compared to the influence and charisma that previous General Guides Hasan al-Banna and Hasan al-Hudaybi had among the Brotherhood members, during the years of Mubarak, the organization lacked a charismatic leader. This is the why in this period, Brotherhood became popular with its political activities rather than its General Guides. In the following thirty years, the organization changed six *Murshid* in this period starting with Umar al-Tilmisani (1972-1986), Mohammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr (1986-1996), Mustafa Mashhur (1996-2002), Ma'mun al-Hudaybi (2002-2004), Mohammed Mahdi Akef (2004-2010) and Mohammad Badie (2010-).

Hosni Mubarak, in order to show his difference from his predecessor, released political prisoners that were jailed during the presidency of Sadat. However contrary to the era of Sadat, the Emergency Law was announced after the assassination of Sadat that permitted security forces to arrest those suspected criminal activity against the state and try them in military courts rather than civilian.

Mubarak announced the importance of democracy and promised that the parliamentary elections will be held regularly starting from the 1984, as part of his semi liberalization. Although, the Brotherhood was still regarded as an illegal organization and prevented from founding its own political party, the movement nominated its own candidates as independents Brotherhood announced its alliance with the secular New Wafd party, a recreation of Wafd party which was the largest and most popular nationalist party from 1919 until it dissolved in regime change in 1952. In spite of their ideological differences two movements participated and gained 13% of the votes with 58 seats that Wafd took 50 whereas Brotherhood put 8 members to the parliament. However, this was a pragmatic move that didn't change both groups understanding of politics. As Dina Shehata argues "In fact, Brotherhood and Wafd leaders refused to call theirs an alliance and preferred to refer to their

relationship as electoral coordination or cooperation. Moreover, the two groups campaigned separately for the election, raised distinct slogans and banners, and drafted separate election programs."[57] This was proved in 1987 both Muslim Brotherhood and Wafd participated to the elections separately. Although Wafd participated without a coalition, Muslim Brotherhood and Liberal Party decided to join with Socialist Labour Party candidates list. The alliance was named "Islamic Alliance" and their most widely used slogan was "Islam is the solution". Since religion was one of the most effective elements in Egyptian society, the slogan gained support of many Egyptians.[58] The alliance won 17% of the votes and Muslim Brotherhood occupied 36 seats.[59] This was seen as a challenge for Hosni Mubarak and his party National Democratic Party (NDP).

Politics was not the only place where Brotherhood spread its influence but the movement also started to become popular with its participation to student unions, and professional syndicates. The strategy was rather use the legal ways instead of clashing with the state which is the reason why new generation of Muslim Brotherhood members started to take part in associations councils. Starting from 1984, the Brotherhood members started to enter to the Doctors', Engineers', Dentists', Scientists', Agronomists', Pharmacists', Journalists', Commercial Employees', and Lawyers 'Association elections.[60] This was an indicator of support to Muslim Brotherhood by middle-class Egyptians which increased the ability of Brotherhood to reach out to the Egyptian public. "At Cairo University", as Carrie Wickham stated, "in 1990/91, the Islamists won 47 of 48 seats on the student union's

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[57] Dina Shehata, *Islamists and Seculartists in Egypt*, (New york: Routledge, 2010), 87

[58] Hala Mustafa, "The Islamists movements under Mubarak" ed. Laura Guazzeno (Reading, Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 1995), 171

[59] Hala G., Thabet "Egyptian Parliamentary Elections; Between Democratization and Autocracy" Africa Development, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, (2006), 11–24

[60] Wickham, 184

board in the science faculty, all 72 seats in the medical faculty, and all 60 seats in the engineering faculty."[61]

Although, the first decade of Mubarak's presidency was relatively liberal towards the activities of Muslim Brotherhood, starting with the early 1990s regime turned against the Islamic movements. Firstly, the state aimed to distance Muslim Brotherhood from participating to 1990 parliamentary elections by changing the election law that "allowed only individuals rather than parties to participate".[62], Muslim Brotherhood alongside the largest political parties at the time, Al-Wafd Party, Socialist Labour Party and Socialist Liberal Party decided to boycott the elections. This was a political move by the organization rather than rejecting the legitimate struggle for recognition by the system. Even though they were left out of parliament, Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, the fifth Murshid of Muslim Brotherhood, didn't hesitate to declare their willingness to establish a "Muslim Brotherhood Party".[63] However, due to both, the rise in the militant group's attacks to civilian and political figures inside Egypt and the victory of Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algerian elections in 1991, Mubarak became suspicious about the Islamic takeover of the country. This perception reached its peak after a failed assassination attempt against Mubarak during his visit to Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa; the regime launched another large scale crackdown on religious extremism. However despite the fact that Muslim Brotherhood had denounced these attacks, the organization couldn't survive from the prosecution. For example in an interview given to *Le Monde* in 1995 Hosni Mubarak stated; "They (The MB) assassinated two prime ministers and a finance minister before the (1952) revolution. Then they pretended to back the late President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasser but attempted to assassinate him in Alexandria. President Sadat did not act against them early in his tenure having been preoccupied with the

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[61] Ibid, 117

[62] Sana Abed-Kotob, "The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, (Aug., 1995), 321-339

[63] Ibid., 329

resorting the occupied territories, and so they killed him. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Jihad, the Islamic Groups, and the rest of them, are all the same."[64] One of the the main reason behind the wave of crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood was because the movement became an alternative to the regime by providing services to the people that state couldn't. This became apparent especially after the Cairo earthquake in October 12, 1992 that caused injuries and serious damage in many buildings. Within hours after the incident, Brotherhood provided first-aid, food, shelter and money.[65] This was seen as direct challenge by the state and increased people's support for the organization. In the same year, the security forces announced that they discovered a conspiracy by Muslim Brotherhood to overthrow the government. This was the case of "Salsabil"; a computer company that was affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak government saw this as an excuse to justify for a wave of mass imprisonment first time since 1960s. From 1992 to 2000 Muslim Brotherhood was unable to operate actively as in the 1980s, both in parliament and other social services like universities and professional associations. In 1993 Brotherhood members were tried in military courts and imprisoned without any concrete evidence between three to five years. In addition to unfair trails, during these arrests also, as Human Right Watch reported, there were brutalities of security forces against the detainees, such as torture and even death in custody.[66] The government, in addition to arrests to members, enforced laws to prevent Muslim Brotherhood members to join syndicate and university council elections, as in the case of Law 100 in 1993, to reorganize the voting turn out in the association's elections.[67] Parliamentary Election in 1995 was regarded as one of the most corrupt elections in the history of Egypt. Although Brotherhood was planning to participate to the next elections, with 170

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[64] Quoted in Rutherford, 86-87.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Abuses mount in 1993, October 22, 1993 Volume 5, Issue 8

[67] Gillian Kennedy, Egyptian Doctors' Strike and the Quest for Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice, Jadaliyya, November 17, 2012 http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8452/egyptian-doctors-strike-and-the-quest-for-bread-fr (accessed on 06.02.2013)

candidates, government launched another wave of arrest that led Muslim Brotherhood unable to enter to the parliament.[68] During this era, Muslim Brotherhood faced a dispute between the "old guard" represented with the General Guide and "new generation" of moderates, Abu Ayla Madi being most prominent of them. The difference between these two groups emerged as a result of younger Brothers', willingness to establish a political party with the name of *Hizb al-Wasat* (the "Middle-way" Party) in 1996. Mustafa Mash'hur then-General Guide and other members of Guidance Bureau didn't approve such an establishment, after taking into account the immense pressure that the government imposing to the Muslim Brotherhood. Later some members belonging to the new generation decided to apply for a party on their own but rejected by the state and later jailed with the charges of belonging to an illegal organization.[69]

Although most members spend their days in prison the 1990s, early 2000s were the peak for both success of the Muslim Brotherhood especially in 2000 and 2005 elections and its prosecution. Brotherhood proved that state was unable to dissolve the organization but kept its members together. In 2000 Mubarak approved the Supreme Constitutional Court decision to supervision of the elections by judges which increased chance the Brotherhood members to be elected. Even though the supervision of judges in the elections regarded as relative liberalization in an autocratic state, regime continued to suppress and tried to limit the ability of Muslim Brotherhood in the elections as in the case of previous 1995 elections. In October 2000, around 1.600 members were jailed prior to elections and detained for several months.[70] Even though there was pressure from the state, Muslim Brotherhood was able occupy 17 seats in the parliament.[71]

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[68] Soage and Franganillo, 48

[69] Wickham, 218

[70] Amira Howeydi, Capitilasing on the clampdown, Al Ahram Weekly, 16 – 22, November 2000, Issue No.508

[71] Thabet, 17

Muslim Brotherhood reached to a position of main political opposition to the regime in Egypt, after it has gone through mass prosecution since the presidency of Nasser. The era between 2000 and 2005 in Egypt was the period where social movements increased opposition towards Mubarak regime and their popularity in the country. It started with mass protests in solidarity with the Second Palestinian Intifada, activists gathered from various ideologies, Nasserist, Islamist and Liberal, under "The Egyptian Popular Committee for the Support of the Palestinian Intifada" and later organization continued against the Iraq war in 2003. In the coming year, "The Egyptian Movement for Change", also known as Kifaya, founded as an opposition force which directly targeted the domestic politics. There were numerous reasons behind this opposition; (1) the rumours of Mubarak's son, Gamal, would succeed his father,[72] (2) upcoming presidential referendum that Hosni Mubarak, 77, will contest for a fifth term in power and (3) an increase in Western pressures on the Mubarak regime to democratize the country.[73] This became obvious especially after the then-secretary of state Condoleezza Rice made a speech in her Cairo visit in 2005 stating; "President Mubarak has unlocked the door for change. Now, the Egyptian Government must put its faith in its own people. We are all concerned for the future of Egypt's reforms when peaceful supporters of democracy -- men and women -- are not free from violence. The day must come when the rule of law replaces emergency decrees -and when the independent judiciary replaces arbitrary justice."[74] The year 2005 was significant year for Egypt since it was going to face both presidential as well as parliamentary elections. Muslim Brotherhood, with its new General Guide Mahdi Akef, made a significant decision to join the Kifaya movement in its anti-government demonstrations by organizing protest with more than 3.000 members for the first time since 1952 to protest the political process in the country.[75] As a sign of

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[72] Nadia Oweidat, et al. *The Kefaya Movement A Case Study of a Grassroots Reform Initiative,* The RAND Corporation, 2008

[73] Shehata, 100

[74] Rice, Condoleezza, Remarks at the American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt. June 20, 2005 http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48328.htm (accessed on 07.02.2013)

[75] Omayma Abdel-Latif, The shape of things to come, Al Ahram Weekly, 31 March - 6 April 2005

answering to the call for democratization, Mubarak agreed to held multi candidate presidential elections in 2005 by amending the Article 76 of the constitution by a referendum in May 25. In the day of the presidential election, September 7, as witnessed with the previous elections, there were signs of antidemocratic practices. However, for the first time in the history of Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak was challenged by two civilian opposition figures, Ayman Nour, leader of *al-Ghad* (Tomorrow) Party and Noman Gomaa from the Wafd party. Although there were documented attempts to limit opposition during the voting by security forces as well as supporters of the regime, officially Ayman Nour became the second by obtaining 7% of total votes compared to 88.6% for Mubarak and 3% Gomaa.[76] However the relative freedom in Presidential elections, did not last long for Nour until he was arrested in December 24 with charges of "having forged more than a thousand signatures in an application seeking his party's legal registration."[77]

Muslim Brotherhood on the other hand used all of its efforts to use the liberalization in elections while putting its own 150 independent candidates to run for parliament positions. Although they joined forces with the Kifaya in protests, Brotherhood and *al-Ghad* didn't join the ranks of the alliance in the coming elections of 2005 under the banner of "National Front for Change". Wafd Party conditional agreed to join National Front if al-Ghad Party was excluded and Muslim Brotherhood was forced give up its campaign slogan "Islam is the Solution", a request that was rejected by the Brotherhood. In a move to disable the power of Muslim Brotherhood before the elections, security forces arrested 800 members. The violence towards Muslim Brotherhood members also continued during the day of election as Independent Committee on Election Monitoring reported; "NDP supporters beat the Al-Wafd newspaper reporter in the El-Baugur district in

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[76] Jeremy Sharp, Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, CRS Report for Congress, June 15, 2006

[77] Amnesty International, Egypt: Mixed signals - arrests of political opponents amidst talks of political reform, December 16, 1995, 1

Manufeja and assaulted a group of journalists in El-Saaf district. In the Hadeik El-Kobba district, the NDP candidate beat a Muslim Brotherhood poll-watcher" in November 9, 2005.[78] Despite all these irregularities in parliamentary elections, the result was significant achievement for Muslim Brotherhood, when it won 88 seats in the parliament whereas 11 seats gained by the National Front.[79] Muslim Brotherhood for the first time in its history since its foundation in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna reached to the position of second largest political group in the main opposition block in the parliament. Even though they were successful in obtaining the position of second largest group in the parliament, it was hard for Muslim Brotherhood to operate independently and effect the decisions that will be taken since National Democratic Party dominance continued.

The arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members continued with the charges of being a member of "an illegal organization" and some members detained for days without any charge since the Emergency Law allowed security forces for such arrests. One year after the elections, 2006, was the year of another wave of crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood leaders. In the first wave arrests was happened after, protests that organized in reaction to the irregularities in parliamentary elections, around 800 hundred members were arrested, including, Brotherhood leaders such as Esam al-'Aryan, Head of Political Committee and Mohammad Morsi, Head of Parliamentary Committee. In December 10, 2006 the demonstration by al-Azhar University students with their black hoods similar to the scenes from the rallies of Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon increased reactions and criticism against the organization. Muslim Brotherhood General Guidance Office denounced the demonstrations and announced that they do not have connections with the students. This event occupied a great space in the Egyptian media that warned the society from the dangers that Muslim Brotherhood poses to the country. The state

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[78] Independent Committee on Election Monitoring, 2nd Press Statement, Novermber 9, 2005 http://www.ndi.org/files/1943_eg_icemfirst_110905.pdf (accessed on 09.02.2013)

[79] Noha Antar, The Muslim Brotherhood's Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005: Reasons and Implications, (Euro Mesco, October 2006) 6

saw this event as the reason for second wave of crackdown on the Brotherhood.[80] These arrests included, according to Human Rights Watch, at least 140 students and 1000 Brotherhood members with the leaders including, Khairat El Shater, the deputy supreme guide and chief strategist of the organization.[81] They were tried in military tribunal and charged with three to ten years in prison.[82]

The Muslim Brotherhood paid a severe price for gaining a large number of seats in the parliament in 2005 with the constant arrests of its members. In 2008 municipal elections, which planned to take place in April 8, majority of the Muslim Brotherhood members were rejected by the government to become candidates and another 800 members of the Brotherhood was arrested before the elections which forced the organization to boycott the elections under these harsh circumstances. All these arrests were due to the flexibility that state gained through Emergency Law, which was extended for two years in April 2006 and in 2008 government decided to extend it for two more years until 2010. As Mona Farag argued, "…from 2005 to 2010 the MB had to endure some of its worst years in terms of political oppression, as the regime systematically made life difficult for the MB's members, closing their businesses, revoking their licences, and continuously and freely arresting many members thanks to the emergency law that allowed such action without recourse to the courts."[83]

The visit of President of United States, Barack Obama to Cairo in June 4, 2009, again increased the hopes for democracy in the country. As in the visit of Condoleezza Rice to Cairo in 2005, Obama stressed the significance of democracy

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[80] Samer Shehata and Joshua Stacher, *Boxing In the Brothers*, Middle East Report Online (August 2007)., http://www.merip.org/mero/mero080807#[12] (accessed on 09.02.2013)

[81] Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Police Intensify Crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood, December 18,2006 http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/12/17/egypt-police-intensify-crackdown-muslim-brotherhood (accessed on 09.02.2013)

[82] Soage Ana Belen and Franganillo J.F, 52

[83] Mona Farag, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and the January 25 Revolution: new political party, new circumstances", *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, Vol. 5, Iss. 2, (2012) 214-229

and its principles; "No matter where it takes hold, government of the people and by the people sets a single standard for all who hold power: you must maintain your power through consent, not coercion; you must respect the rights of minorities, and participate with a spirit of tolerance and compromise; you must place the interests of your people and the legitimate workings of the political process above your party. Without these ingredients, elections alone do not make true democracy."[84] However, President Mubarak was failed or not willing to achieve democratization as President Obama stated. In an environment of intense pressure towards different political opposition forces, Muslim Brotherhood alongside with Leftists, Seculars and Liberals, Egyptians was called to vote in parliamentary elections in two round elections, November 28 and December 5, 2010. In total more than 2000 Brotherhood members where jailed with the charges of "belonging to an illegal organization" and prevent for taking part in the elections.[85] The regime decided to leave the opposition forces out of parliament in 2010, which raised the anger of many Egyptians against the state. Especially during his speech before parliament in December 19, Mubarak signalled his intentions towards running for sixth term in presidential elections planned to take place in 2011 and "to reform in the coming phase".[86]

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[84] New York Times, Text: Obama's Speech in Cairo, (June 4, 2009)
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(accessed on 09.02.2013)

[85] Elections in Egypt; State of Permanent Emergency Incompatible with Free and Fair Vote, *Human Rights Watch*, (December 2010), 8

[86] A vigorous Mubarak looks set for a sixth presidential term, Ahram Online, (December 19, 2010)

CHAPTER 3

THE IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

3.1. "To What We Summon Mankind?"; Hasan al-Banna and Politics

The Society of Muslim Brotherhood's attitudes towards politics were much affected by the Egypt's socio-political environment, as well as the events that took place around the world. From 1922 to 1952, Egyptian politics were under British control that Egyptian King and parliament couldn't operate against the interest of occupying forces. This was also very much seen in the country's economy. Although common Egyptians were suffering economically, British were the main beneficiaries of the resources especially from the Suez Canal, one of the main incomes for Egypt. The years of Hasan al-Banna in Ismailia, a Canal city where Britain saw strategic, exposed him to the practices of British force's control of politics which also affected the culture of the Egyptian society. This period was also coincided with the political changes in Muslim majority countries that left scars in the political though of the time. Especially, the abolition of Caliphate by the newly founded Republic of Turkey in 1924, led Islamic movements to pursue a goal for unification and reestablishment of the Caliphate which prevent dissociation of the *Ummah* (Muslim Nation). Anti-imperialism and western sentiments by and large were seen as threats.

Solution for survival from the problems that Egypt was facing was discussed widely by intellectuals at the time. Hasan al-Banna was every much influenced by the 19th Muslim thinkers such as Gamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida who argued that the only solution for the problems can be achieved by returning to the main sources of Islam and re-Islamizing society. They were challenged by other intellectuals such as Taha Hussein. Especially in his book, *Mustaqbal Al-Thaqafa fi Misr* (The Future of Culture in Egypt), published in 1938 where Hussein argued that there is a strong connection between Egypt and Greek,

whereas its culture was inspired by Europe rather than Far East. This was the reason why, Hussein concluded, there had to be a separation between religion and political system, constitution and state.[87] It has to be noted that although, Hasan al-Banna was one of the most influential Islamic pioneers at the time, he gave his attention more on social transformation and Muslim Brotherhood rather than making an intellectual contribution. This is the reason why there are certain loop wholes that may raise doubts about the organization's definition of politics and human rights.

Muslim Brotherhood, in 1928, was established in such an environment of political and ideological turmoil. It was a charity organization with the aim of spreading, what they claimed to be "the true message of Islam". For Banna, "Islam is an all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life, adjudicating on every one its concerns and prescribing for it a solid and rigorous order. It does not stand helpless before life's problems, nor the steps one must take to improve mankind."[88] He warned his followers to the avoid "ten evils" which were; colonialism; political, personal, and sectarian differences and divisions; interest taking; emulation of foreign corporations and the West; secular laws; atheism and intellectual chaos; desires and lewdness; immorality and weak leadership; and lack of pragmatism in discourse and analysis.[89] Muslim Brotherhood established its doctrine with opposition to the current trends. This reactionary perception accurately indicated by Husaini as; "their (Muslim Brotherhood) political program with its cornerstone of liberation from foreign authority, is in reality a reaction to imperialist rule. If there had been no such rule as this it would be safe to presume that the movement would be devoid of such a political tendency."[90]

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[87] Taha Hussain, *The Future of Culture in Egypt*, trans. Sidney Glazer, (Washingtion, 1952), 4

[88] Hasan al-Banna, *Six Tracts of Hasan al-Banna; A Selection from the Majmu'at Rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949)*, (International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 2006), 61-62

[89] Abu Rabi, 79

[90] Husaini, 95

Hasan al-Banna's position on politics rose inevitably after the headquarters of the organization moved to Cairo in 1932. This was a move "from community to movement"[91] for the Muslim Brotherhood. It reached to a level that cannot be ignored by the regime, while the Brotherhood increased the number of followers. As the facilities of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as hospitals, schools and mosques rapidly spread in different parts of Egypt, it transformed into an actor in the country's politics and developed its own perception. In the very beginning of his message Hasan al-Banna didn't make any distinction between religion and politics. On the contrary he argued that religion should be controlling the government rather than the other way around. In addition, Banna was suggesting an evolutionary transformation instead of revolutionary struggle against the state. As a social movement, Muslim Brotherhood's aim was Islamize the society gradually. The strategy for him was reforming self, establishing an Islamic home, instructing and guiding the society, liberation of the homeland, reforming the government, rebuilding the international prominence of Islamic Umma and after achieving all these; Islamic state should instruct the world about the Islamic ideology.[92]

Hasan al-Banna agreed on the system of checks and balances applied by the citizens and promoted the concept of political participation. The nature of governance for him was to secure justice among society and "if the ruler goes astray, the people are obliged to force him to abide by the law and return him to the origin of justice."[93] Although Brotherhood had political demands they drew a distinction between concepts of politics and party. In a period when political parties had strong connections with the British, controlled by the elite and rivalry turned into partisan struggle, Muslim Brotherhood supported the abolishment of political parties and setting up a one-party rule. Banna claimed that it is not acceptable to divide the nation with party politics. He argued;

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[91] Lia, 53

[92] Banna, 10-11

[93] Lia, 203

> Even though it is viable in some circumstances in some countries, party politics is not feasible in Egypt at all. Especially at this time when a new era has begun, we have to cooperate, join forces, and make use of all talents to build a strong nation. We need firm stability and complete devotion to all aspects of reforms.[94]

Hasan al-Banna also announced his support for 1923 constitution of Egypt due to its conformity with Islamic principles by adding that the constitutional system as being the closest to the Islamic government.[95]

Since Islam is all embracing religion, for Muslim Brotherhood, it did not affect politics only but also the social activities as well. Muslim Brotherhood raised its power under and saw British occupation as the main source of cultural and religious decline in the moral behavior of Egyptians. The time that the organization founded and operated was a period when groups with European ideologies such as Communism and Feminism begin to emerge. Especially after the Egyptian Revolution in 1919 these groups started to operate more freely. For instance, Egyptian Feminist Movement was on the rise in the same period after it was founded by one of the most significant Arab intellectuals, Huda Shaarawi, in 1923. They became visible among the Egyptian society by stop wearing face veils in public, which was widespread tradition in Egypt at the time. In addition to feminism, antifascist Marxist groups began to appear in 1930s especially for their support to labour issues.

For Muslim Brotherhood, issues regarding personal rights have been one of the most controversial. The solution suggested by Banna for women rights was to return to the main sources of Islam, rather than inspiring from the European ideologies. He argued Islam promotes; "advancement for men and women together; the declaration of their joint responsibility and their equality: the precise definition of their respective duties."[96] However, men and women have different social roles and

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[94] Ibid.

[95] Commins, 135

[96] Banna, 27

her place is her home, her role in the society is "mother, wife and housekeeper". Similarly, for Banna, their education should be in the same direction and there is no need for them to study sciences that will not be helpful for them at home (i.e., law, foreign languages, or technical sciences).[97] Brotherhood announced a social and educational reform program with thirty articles. Banna addressed the changes regarding the women as;

> (2) To deal with the 'woman issue' - In a way which will both elevate her position and provide her protection, in accordance with the Islamic teachings. (5) A campaign against ostentation in dress and loose behaviour; the instruction of women in what is proper, with particular strictness as regards female teachers, pupils, physicians, and students, and all those in similar categories. (7) A review of the curricula offered to girls and the necessity of making them distinct from the boys' curricula in many of the stages of education. (8) The prohibition of Free Mixing between male and female students; and to consider privacy between a non-Mahram (marriageable) male and female a punishable crime.

The program also included limiting drinking alcohol, using drugs, censoring cinemas, theatres, songs and books for moral reasons, closing ballrooms and dance halls and supervising summer vacations.[98]

In addition to women's rights, Banna supported acting in favour of national benefits and avoid dispute with non-Muslim minorities. In his letters to King Faruq I and then President Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha in 1947, Hasan al-Banna outlined his group's willingness to work for the unity of Egypt. He supported working with non-Muslims and justified his argumentation by stating that the main source of Islam, Quran, gave permission to this unless they wage war against Muslims. Hasan al-Banna supported freedom of religion and argued; Islamic state will be free from injustice towards non-Muslims.[99]

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[97] Commins, 143

[98] Banna, 146-147

[99] Ibid., 138-139

3.2. The Political Thought of Sayyed Qutb and Muslim Brotherhood

The legacy of Hasan al-Banna occupied one the most significant elements in Muslim Brotherhood's political thought which even affected the decisions of the forthcoming leaders. Between 1949 and 1954, until Brotherhood officially banned, Hasan al-Hudaybi was loyal to the ideas of the predecessor and was cautious to make contributions to the Banna's thoughts either on political participation or women and minority rights. In political aspects Muslim Brotherhood welcomed Free Officers Movement in 1952, because as one of their first policy the new regime abolished all political parties, which was what Hasan al-Banna was calling for. In addition to political ideology Hudaybi followed Banna's footsteps in his attitude towards women's rights as he stated; "the woman's natural place is the home, but if she finds that after doing her duty in the home she has time, she can use part of it in the service of society, on condition that it is done within the legal limits which preserve her dignity and morality."[100] The prison years of Muslim Brotherhood were one of the weakest years for the organization in terms of developing its own political understanding. This led to divisions within the movement between radicals, followers Sayyed Qutb and moderates, followers of Murshid Hasan al-Hudaybi. Although Hudaybi was General Guide and his followers represented the main ideas of Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb contributed in a significant way to the group's political thought.

On the issues regarding Islam and political thought, according to scholars such as Yvonne Haddad[101] and Emanuel Sivan[102], Sayyed Qutb was mostly inspired by the works of Ibn Taymiyyah, Abul ala Mawdudi and Muhammad Assad (Leopold Weiss). He also referenced frequently from the works of European philosophers such

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[100] Lamia R. Shehadeh, *The Idea of Women under Fundamentalist Islam*, (University Press of Florida, 2007), 18

[101] Yvonne Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival" in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito, (Oxford University Press, 1983), 70

[102] Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam; Medival Theology and Modern Politics*, (Yale University Press, 1985), 94

as; Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Bertnard Russell, Comte, Marx, Hegel, Fichte and Nietzsche.[103] Qutb took one step further than Hasan al-Banna by defining how people can found an ideal Islamic community that will create the Islamic state, but he less dealt with the question of how Islamic state should govern. While doing this, he did not strictly follow the ideas of Banna, but he filled the intellectual infrastructure. His aim was to portray Islam as a "Third Way" to other political ideologies and people should trace these solutions at the fundamental principles rather than other "man-made political systems". In one of his major books, published in 1949, *al-'Adalah al-Ijtima'iyyah fi al-Islam* (Social Justice in Islam) Qutb proposed Islam as an integral part of politics and society, and if people want to achieve true social justice, Islam project the best solution. His aim was to create "Political Theory of Islam" which can be regarded as one of the first books that challenged to Communism and Capitalism. Qutb explained;

> Islam does not seek, and never has sought to imitate any other system or to find connections or similarities between it and others. On the contrary it has chosen its own characteristic path, and has concentrated its attention on all the problems of human nature[104]

He developed these arguments widely in his later books, *Ma'rakat al-Islam wa'l-Ra's Maliyya* (The Battle between Islam and Capitalism) and *Al-Salam al-'Alami wa'l-Islam* (World Peace and Islam) both published in 1951.

Politically, Qutb was critical of the Kingdom both because of its close relations with British forces and policies of the Palace. He supported the 1952 coup by Free Officers and worked closely with the Revolutionary Command Council for six months. Qutb advised the regime on how the new system should operate. Musallam argued, he was the only civilian who ate, slept and participated to the decision making process of Officers. However he eventually left the group after realizing that they were not willing to establish an Islamic way of life in Egypt. Similar to Hasan al-Banna, Qutb demanded to reorganization of history books,

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[103] Roxanne Euben, *Enemy in the mirror*, (Princeton University Press, 1999), 52

[104] Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, trans. John B. Hardie, (New York, Octagon Books, 1970), 88

broadcasting, singers and songs "even if this resulted in violations of individual freedom [105] Later in 1954, Qutb was imprisoned with other Muslim Brotherhood members and charged with ten years for alleged assassination attempt against President Nasser's life.

During his time in prison, Qutb continued his works on Islam and radicalized them under severe treatment and torture. He became famous among Islamic movements – both moderate and militant – of 20th century, after he wrote *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Milestones) and *Fi Zilal al-Quran* (In the Shade of the Quran). He attempted to modernize and politicize Quranic concepts such as; *Jahiliyyah* (ignorance, referring to pre-Islamic times) *Hakimiyyah* (sovereignty), and *Jihad (*struggle, often translated as holy war). Qutb started outlining his understanding of an Islamic system by defining the current situation of societies. The world was in a state of *Jahiliyya*, for him, whether ruled by Muslims or non-Muslims. Qutb wrote in Milestones; "any society that is not Muslim in is *Jahiliyya* ... as in any society in which something other than God alone is worshipped ... Thus; we must include in this category all the societies that now exist on earth."[106] Although he wrote in a highly anti-Western tone, he equally criticized the Muslim societies for being non-Islamic; "Everything around us expresses *Jahiliyya*: people's ideas, their beliefs, habits, traditions, culture, art, literature, rules and laws. Even all that we have come to consider; Islamic culture, Islamic sources, philosophy and thought are *jahili* constructs."[107] The solution for Qutb, In order to survive from this situation, people have to use the method that first Islamic generation follow and this, for Qutb, was by submitting to Allah's sovereignty (*Hakimiyya*).

Qutb criticized the idea of democracy, because of the system's European nature and creation of social injustice. In his introductory to Milestones, Qutb expressed; "It is patently clear that the West does not have additional values to give

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[105] Adnan Musallam, Sayyid Qutb's View of Islam, Society and Militancy, 71-74

[106] Quoted in Kepel, 46

[107] Quoted in Roxanne Euben, *Enemy in the mirror*, (Princeton University Press, 1999), 57

to humanity. It cannot even persuade its conscience that it deserves to live, after its democracy appears to be bankrupt."[108] Further Qutb asked; "Who will dare to claim that the hundreds of thousands of disabled beggars, who search for crumbs in garbage boxes, who are naked, barefoot, with faces crusted with dust… Who will dare to say that they are the source of authority in the nation, based on democratic elections?"[109]

Sayyed Qutb derived to a conclusion in his commentary of Quran, that Islam carries a Universalist message that not just Muslims but all humanity should obey in order to be liberated from serving to man. Ideal Islamic system cannot be reached unless *Jahiliyya* is abolished and in order to reach this goal, offensive *Jihad* should be the method. According to Haddad, Qutb inspired from the Prophet Muhammad's emigration (*Hijra*) and argued that the goal of the historical *hijra* was not the establishing of the Islamic society in Medina; rather it was the eradication of the jahili system. He counted three reasons for jihad;

> To establish God's authority in the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others, since all men are creatures of God and no one has the authority to make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws for them.[110]

Sayyed Qutb put more emphasis on the road that should be followed to establish an Islamic state and how it differs from other political systems. However, he lacked on the nature of governance and social conditions in this new system. On the debate regarding the individual rights, Qutb tried to explain Islam's perception by challenging to other ideologies, Communism and Capitalism. Similar to what Hasan al-Banna's demands from the King, Qutb supported the idea of a religion that is more respectful for women than any other system in the history. "As for relationship

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[108] Quoted in David Sagiv, *Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt, 1973-1993,* (Frank Cass, 1995), 38

[109] Quoted in Yvonne Haddad, 72

[110] Sayyid Qutb, *The Sayyid Qutb reader : selected writings on politics, religion, and society*, ed. Albert J. Bergesen (New York, Routledge, 2007), 39

between the sexes", he argued, "Islam has guaranteed to women a complete equality with men with regard to their sex; it has permitted no discrimination except in some incidental matters connected with physical nature, with customary procedure, or with responsibility, in all of which the privileges of the two sexes are not in question."[111] However, Qutb also argue that this is not a total equality but Islam puts social limits to gender. In his interpretation, men oversee the family economically and out the house, but women should be restricted to the family care. Western culture is in lack of strong family, due to women left their houses to work for demands various starting from equal wages with men until parliamentary representation.[112] "Look at this Capitalism", Qutb wrote, "with its monopolies, its usury and whatever else is unjust in it; at this individual freedom, devoid of human sympathy and responsibility for relatives except under the force of law, at this materialistic attitude which deadens the spirit; at this behavior like animals which you call "free mixing of the sexes"; at unfair vulgarity which you call emancipation of women; at these unfair cumbersome laws of marriage and divorce, which are contrary to demands of practical life; and at this evil and fantastic racial discrimination."[113] Gender relations are in a significant position in protecting the Islamic community from turning into *Jahiliyya*. Although Qutb stressed the freedom and liberation of people, he supported harsh punishments for "immorality". These include; "for married men and women it is stoning to death; for unmarried men and women it is flogging, a hundred slashes, which in most cases is fatal."[114]

Although, Qutb, with many other of his contemporaries such as Mawdudi, contributed the modern Islamic political thought by redefining the concept of *Jahiliyya* and *Jihad*, he drew the classical conclusions with regards to the status of non-Muslims in Islamic state. He argued both Muslims and non-Muslims can live

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[111] Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, 49

[112] Ibid., 52-53

[113] Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, ed. A.B. al-Mehri (Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers, 2006), 155

[114] Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, 66

together in Islamic state, if non-Muslim communities accept that they are in status of *dhimmi*. This meant that it is accepted that they are *Jahili* people but not a threat to the system. Qutb explained his proposal as an organic system and Islamic system can operate as long as it overcomes the *jahili* understandings.[115] Both, Muslims and non-Muslims have economic obligations and taxation which in return the Islamic state will provide welfare. It is the duty of Islamic state, Qutb argued, that protects non-Muslims from all external threats and from persecution, assault or violence or unlawful detention by any hostile party operating within national boundaries. He further developed that this cannot be concluded as merely human rights, but it signifies the universal spirit of *hakimiyyah*.[116]

3.3. Transformation of Muslim Brotherhood's Political Thought under Anwar Sadat

Majority of the Muslim Brotherhood members released from prison in 1974. Brotherhood benefited from the de-Nasserization policies of Anwar Sadat and operated freely. However their position towards the new president was interchangeable. "On the one hand, they refused to accept Sadat's offer to participate in his newly-formed political platforms or to register as a charity organization under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs, or be appointed to the Consultative Council. On the other hand, the movement did recognize the legitimacy of the state's legal institutions, possibly in order to use such institutions to appeal against their official ban, which had been in place since 1954."[117]

During the presidency of Anwar Sadat, Egyptian state witnessed the increase in the number militant Islamic movements in the county which mostly inspired by the teaching of Sayyed Qutb and his book Ma'alim fi al-Tariq. This situation also led

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[115] William E. Shepard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of Jahiliyya", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 4, (November, 2003), 521-545

[116] Khatab, Sayed, The Power of Sovereignty, 63

[117] Quoted in Hesham Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit Of Legitimacy The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000,* (Tauris Academic Studies, 2004) 14-15

Muslim Brotherhood to develop its ideas and distance itself from the understandings of militant groups. The book of *Murshid* Hasan al-Hudaybi entitled *Du'at la Qudat* (Preachers, Not Judges) written in 1969 but published later in 1977 where he portrayed the stance of Muslim Brotherhood against the claims of Qutb and his followers. Hudaybi avoided direct reference to Qutb in his book but he critiqued Mawdudi and his book "Four Key Concepts of the Qur'an" who inspired his contemporaries among them Qutb. Scholars such as Gilles Kepel and Emmanuel Sivan argue that *Du'at la Qudat* was one of the first critiques of Qutb by Muslim Brotherhood.[118]

Contrary to the followers of Qutb who used *takfir* (excommunication) as a method against Egyptian state and society, Muslim Brotherhood outlined its approach towards the classical Sunni interpretations of Islam. Against the claims of *jahilliya* or *takfir* Hudaybi wrote;

> We respond to those who go beyond (God's law) in claiming that people's misinterpretations regarding the creed lead to their expulsion from Islam: you depart from God's law because you make your own rules about what is actually set as law to all people. Your explanation (…) is a supposition, which bears no certainty at all.[119]

One of the most debated issues by Sayyed Qutb was about his confrontation with the nature of the state where he rejected the Nasser's regime and defined as jahilliya. Similarly, Hudaybi on this pointed criticized the secular nature of the state and encouraged the Islamic governance. He was also supporting the notion that the leaders are not unquestionable but has its limitations. He disputed with Qutb on how one should oppose the leader with reference from Quran and sayings of the Prophet. For instance, Hudaybi backed activist interpretation of the saying "command to do good and to forbid wrong" as followed;

> However, the command goes beyond a merely passive attitude, whereby one must resent to listen to [someone committing] sinful behaviour and to obey.

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[118] Zollner, 65

[119] Quoted in Zollner, 86

> [It is] an active command, which contains the necessity to reject injustice, to forbid sin, to change wrong and [to bring about] its elimination.[120]

On the subject of resorting to violence, Hudaybi argued that it should be the last option for Muslims. Instead he suggested a gradual method of opposition where first the Muslim should be patient and resent the imam with his/her heart, before speaking out or engaging in forceful means.[121] True Muslims, Hudaybi stated, should be active as propagandist, preaching, admonishing and trying to bring people back to the Right Path and these should be carried out within the system rather than by separating from the society as Qutb suggested.[122]

In late 1970s and early 1980s Muslim Brotherhood developed the arguments outlined by *Murshid* Hasan al-Hudaybi and Umar Tilmisani. The movement benefited from the limited liberalization of Sadat era where it was allowed to publish a monthly newsletter, *al-Da'wa* (the Call) from 1976 to 1981. *Al-Da'wa* mostly revealed the Brotherhood's perception on domestic and international politics which also witnessed the transformation of its ideological stance. Muslim Brotherhood openly challenged Sadat's economic and political decisions in *al-Da'wa*. The movement started to debate the concepts of *Shura* (consultation) system, democracy and civil and political freedoms. For instance, Brotherhood criticized President Anwar Sadat for being authoritarian and despotic and hiding behind the claims of democracy. An alternative system, *Shura*, was offered which claimed to promote free elections which would establish checks and balances system over the ruler. The Brotherhood demanded the expansion of all civil and political freedoms to their maximum limits, including the right to form a political religious party.[123] Contrary to Sayyed Qutb's rejectionist understanding, Brotherhood claimed that members of the People's Assembly are operating within the Shari'a. Umar Tilmisani wrote in *al-*

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[120] Quoted in Zollner, 136

[121] Zollner, 139-140

[122] Sivan, 109-110

[123] Ibrahim, 42

Da'wa; "As for us, we are indifferent to the person of our ruler, for what matters most to us is the type of government, its form and constitution…"[124] In an attempt to differentiate itself from rejectionist militant Islamic movements of the time, Muslim Brotherhood decided to cooperate with other secular liberals and leftist political forces in various fields. In addition to allowing them to write in *al-Da'wa,* Muslim Brotherhood also coordinated with other opposition groups in local trade union and professional syndicate elections.[125] The relations between the Brotherhood and President strained after the group's harsh criticisms against Sadat's *Infitah* policy and later peace treaty with Israel. Despite, they benefited the relative freedom given by the state, Muslim Brotherhood were unable to survive from the President's purge of opposition figures in Egypt in 1981.

3.4. Evolution of Political Thought of Muslim Brotherhood under Hosni Mubarak

The new of Egypt Hosni Mubarak had freed all the political prisoners jailed by Sadat and presented a new beginning for Egyptian politics by holding elections starting from 1984. Brotherhood announced its willingness to run for parliament in the coming elections and ever since with only one exception participated and won seats until 2010. In this semi-autocratic political system a debate was raised on why Brotherhood participated to elections knowingly that they will not have a chance to dominate parliament or affect the government policies. For instance, Egyptian scholar Heba Rauf Ezzat wrote; "the government benefits from their presence (Brotherhood MPs) than people or the nation."[126] However, although Muslim Brotherhood couldn't change the functioning of the existing system, as it was argued

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[124] Quoted in Kepel, 129

[125] Ibrahim, 47

[126] Quoted in Samer S. Shehata, "Political Da'wa: understanding the Muslim Brotherhood's participation in semi-authoritarian elections" in *Islamist Politics in the Middle East*, ed. Samer Shehata (Routledge, 2012), 124

by Mona el-Ghobashy, they witnessed transformation in their political thought and activity from a religious movement to a political party.[127]

This moderation was due to the fact that the new generation of Muslim Brotherhood members started to participate actively and was willing to change the operational system of prison generation. They were university graduates from variety of backgrounds, such as doctors, engineers, lawyers and urging for a change in the methodology of the Brotherhood. The movements from 1980s onwards, reinterpreted the political ideas of its founder Hasan al-Banna and distanced itself from the radical conclusions of Sayyed Qutb regarding Egyptian state and society. But Qutb's conception of Social Justice in Islam can be traced in the discourses of Muslim Brotherhood members.

The elections of 1984 and 1987 signal the transformation in the movements understanding of political participation and party politics. After their decision to occupy seats in parliament, Brotherhood engaged in political maneuvers and made alliances. The electoral law brought 8% of trash hold for any party to have seats in parliament. Brotherhood was still an illegal organization and in order to overcome this situation they decided to enter into parliament under New Wafd party list. Both movements were ideologically different since the very foundation, however with the aim of obtaining seats they had to make exceptions. In response to the disputes regarding the organizations election campaign, the then *Murshid* of Muslim Brotherhood, Umar al-Tilmissany (d. 1986) defended the group's decision by arguing;

> When we were released from the 1981 detention, we were in a state of near-recession. We set to looking for a lawful means to carry out our activities without troubling security or challenging the laws. Allah saw fit to find us a lawful way in the views of officials. The parliamentary session had just ended and thinking began on the new parliamentary elections. It was the opportunity

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[127] El-Ghobashy Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 37, no. 3, (August 2005), 373-395

of a lifetime, had the Ikhwan let it slip from their hands they would surely have counted among the ranks of the neglectful.[128]

In 1987 elections this time an alliance was found between Muslim Brotherhood, Labour Party and al-Ahrar Party under the banner of "Islamic Alliance" and with their slogan "Islam is the Solution". Brotherhood dominated the alliance and distributed a booklet detailing its electoral program in seven points. First two points of this program was outlining democracy and implementation of *Shari'a*. The first point was titled as "Reform of the system of government to a correct democracy" and suggested; the review of the constitution, repealing anti-democratic laws and practices, the safety of general elections and independence of judiciary. In its first article the program declare its aim as to; "change the political system of the country from a totalitarian regime based on political organization and one to a democratic system based multi-party."[129] Similar to its previous announcements Muslim Brotherhood stressed the interconnected nature of religion and politics and urged for implementation of Islamic laws. The program showed that it will gradually take place and spread to whole system including economy, instead of being limited to the Islamization of judiciary. Finally regarding the citizenship, program stated that "the Copts and other followers of the Book are fellow citizens in this Islamic country; they have the same rights and obligations as the Muslims do."[130] Despite programs strong claims on democratic transformation in political system, prominent Brotherhood member, Mustafa Mashour, saw participation to elections as a mean for the spread of message of Islam or another way of doing *Da'wa* where he argued;

> We must benefit from the experience of elections for our future, for elections are an art with its own rules, expertise, and requirements, and we must push

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[128] Ibid., 378

[129] Ahmad Abdalla, *al-Intikhabat al-barlamaniyya fi misr: dars intikhabat 1987* (Parliamentary Elections in Egypt: The Lesson of the 1987 Elections) (Cairo: Markaz al-Buhuth al- Arabiyya, 1990), 306

[130] Ibid., 309

those who have given up on reforming this nation, push them to get rid of their pessimism and register to vote as soon as possible.[131]

In the early 1990s the movement faced with recession in politics which led Muslim Brotherhood to develop its views on participation. This transformation and ability of the organization to change tactics indicated how Muslim Brotherhood can expand their political limits while preserving its religious nature. Especially in their political discourse, the use of the term "democracy" increased excessively. However, this didn't imply the movement's acceptance of "Western Liberal Democracy" rather it was democracy with an Islamic notion. This was made visible both through the speeches of Muslim Brotherhood leaders as well as prominent Islamic scholars in Egypt who were sympathetic towards the movement. Essam al-'Aryan, for instance, expressed the movements' consistency to the idea of democracy; "The Brothers consider constitutional rule to be closest to Islamic rule… We are the first to call for and apply democracy. We are devoted to it until death." In addition, Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, son of Hasan al-Hudaybi and sixth *Murshid* revealed that democracy identified as "respect for constitution, an independent judiciary, press freedom, party independence and man's protection from torture."[132] Scholars of Islam such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Muhammad Imara, and Muhammad al-Ghazali play significant roles in shaping Muslim Brotherhood's political thought. With regards to democracy, Imara wrote that *shura* is "Islam's and Muslim's democracy". Qaradawi supported his argument as; "Muslim state is based on the best principles of democracy." Finally al-Ghazali explained; "democracy in the West as 'the shura there".[133] However, they drew a line between Liberal Democracy and *Shura* system where the latter prioritize the popular election of the leader that will rule the country. As Tadros narrates the Qaradawi's view;

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[131] El Ghobashy, 380

[132] Abed Kotob, 325

[133] Uriya Shavit, "Is Shura a Muslim Form of Democracy? Roots and Systemization of a Polemic", *Middle Eastern Studies,* Volume 46, Issue 3, (2010) 349-374

> Where they converge is that the people choose their ruler, have the mechanisms to hold him accountable and, if he does not retract to also peacefully remove him from power. Where Islam and democracy diverge is, from el-Qaradawi's view, is in its making the individual rights supersede those of the group, in giving absolute freedoms 'and in giving the majority the right to change everything, even democracy itself'[134]

Muslim Brotherhood was struggling in a period that used mass arrests, prevented its members from entering to parliament, professional syndicates and student unions. Similarly in this era the movement was associated with attacks of militant Islamic movements against Egyptian intellectuals, Farag Foda in 1992 and novelist with Nobel Prize for Literature, Naguib Mahfouz in 1994 as well as foreign tourists and Coptic Egyptians. In an attempt to distance itself from such accusation Brotherhood organized a conference on "Freedom and Civil Society" at the medical association in 1994 and representatives from the conference visited Naguib Mahfouz in hospital expressed their support and condemned militant groups. The Brotherhood issued a testimony dealing with current issues including their opinion on political participation;

> The Muslim Brotherhood believes in the plurality of political parties in the Muslim society and that there is no need for the authorities to place restrictions on the formulation and activities of the political parties and groups. Each faction should be free to declare what it advocates and to set out its path.[135]

In 1995 elections program, *Shura and Party Pluralism in Muslim Society,* was more detailed compared to the previous statements by the movement, as it dealt with "industry, energy, external debt, health care, drugs, population growth, education and the media." Democracy and political issues covered more than how to implement Islamic law in the country.[136] In the same year, crackdowns on Muslim Brotherhood

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[134] Mariz Tadros, The Muslim Brotherhood in contemporary Egypt : democracy defined or confined? (New York, Routledge, 2012), 66

[135] Our Testimony, Issued in 1994, Ikhwanweb, May 30,2006
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=4185 (accessed on 26.03.2013)

[136] Roel Meijer, "The Muslim Brotheroood and the Political: An Exercise in Ambiguity" in *Muslim Brotherhood in Europe*, eds. Roel Meijer and Edwin Bakker (Columbia University Press, 2013), 311

reached its peak and most of the prominent members sentenced to three to five years being accused of collaborating with militant Islamic groups. The movement released its "Statement on Democracy" against these accusations and outlined the Muslim Brotherhood's views on full citizenship to non-Muslims, sovereignty of people, rejection of violence and stated that

> the legitimacy of government in a Muslim society should be derived from the consent and choice of the people . . . people have the right to invent different systems, formulas, and techniques that suit their conditions, which definitely would vary according to time, place, and living conditions.[137]

As indicated above, Muslim Brotherhood, until the 1980s had been against the idea of party politics, where they transformed their perception by allying with different political parties. The old Brothers were loyal to the teachings of Hasan al-Banna and prevented the movement from becoming an official political party. Third *Murshid*, Umar al-Tilmissany tried to redefine this understanding as he wrote;

> The Muslim Brotherhood believes that if a political party is the ideal means to achieve their principles, and its enactment, they will never hesitate ever in the establishment of a Muslim Brotherhood party, and struggle through it to establish a Muslim society that complies with God's Shari'a.[138]

However, Tilmissany's successors Hamid Abu Nasr, Mustafa Mashour and Ma'mun al-Hudaybi disagreed with him on the idea of Brotherhood party. In the mid-1990s, critique against the old guard of Muslim Brotherhood rose and led younger members, who worked in professional syndicates and engaged with politics, to resign from the movement and found a moderate Islamic party, Wasat (Center). According to Wickham, the first tension grew after the death of fourth *Murshid*, Hamid Abu Nasr in January 1996 and in the funeral, Ma'mun al-Hudaybi announced Mustafa Mashour as the new General Guide.[139] This succession was against the bylaws of

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[137] Roel Meijer, "The Problem of the Political in Islamist Movements" in *Whatever Happened to the Islamists? Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims, and the Lure of Consumerist Islam*, eds. Olivier Roy and Amel Boubekeur (Columbia University Press, 2012), 47

[138] Tadros, 72

[139] Wickham, 217

Muslim Brotherhood where they had to choose their leader after a meeting with other members. The movement justified it by giving the example of their last meeting in 1995 which was raided by security forces.[140]

The Wasat Party members were blaming the Brotherhood, for being conservative regarding political. This split was crucial for the Egyptian politics as well as the contemporary Political Islamic thought. It also differed from the previous resignations from the movement that happened after the release of Muslim Brotherhood from prison in mid 1970s and established more militant groups such al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya and al Jihad. Abu al-Ayla el Madi, Assam Sultan and Salah 'Abd al Karim, were among the most popular young Brotherhood members and along 62 other Brothers they found the new Wasat party. The group submitted its application to Political Parties Committee to gain its legal political party status from the Mubarak government in 1996, 1998 and finally in 1999. However, in all these cases the group was denied to achieve its aim according to the Law 40/1977 that gives right to sensor or reject any political party. The committee ruled against the establishment of Wasat Party by declaring that the group "failed to add anything new to the existing political parties." Later in 1996, three members of Wasat Party and thirteen Muslim Brotherhood members were arrested for "belonging to an illegal organization" and "carrying out political activities without permission."[141] On the other hand, the case of Wasat Party revealed the lack of internal pluralism of Muslim Brotherhood. Salah Abd al-Karim explained this situation as;

> The Brotherhood taught us the government was corrupt and needed to be brought down, but we found through our experience that decisions were taken by a small group of people in the Brotherhood . . . it was something that made us very uneasy with the Muslim Brotherhood. [142]

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[140] El-Ghobashy, 386

[141] Wickham, 218

[142] Joshua A. Stacher, "Post-Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party", *Middle East Journal* , Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer, 2002), 415-432

This was proven by the Muslim Brotherhood when General Guidance Bureau members, headed by Hudaybi, demanded all members who joined to the new party to withdraw immediately or face expulsion.[143] It might also be argued that the movement was planning to setup a party which Brotherhood leaders decide its leaders and its political agenda.

Wasat Party both in its discourse and structure seen as more democratic and open to discuss the subjects that Muslim Brotherhood had often avoided to clarify; democracy, equality for women and non-Muslims and on the question of sovereignty. Contrary to Muslim Brotherhood, the party had three Christians among its founding members (two Copts and one prominent Protestant thinker, Rafiq Habib) and 15% women. In an interview given to Middle East Report in 1996, el-Madi explained the party's nature; "Al-Wasat is a civil party like the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) our culture is Islamic, while theirs is Christian."[144] Since most of the party founders were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Wasat tried to differentiate its way of politics from other Islamic movements;

> Our thoughts are more developed, more moderate and more open- minded, than those of the other Islamist groups. Most of us are young; we use modern language to express   our thoughts and we are open to cooperation with the West. We have taken elements from many different perspectives.[145]

In the late 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood was struggling to reorganize itself and act cautiously since its members were imprisoned in 1995. During this term the old guard was mostly controlling the political image of the movement. Especially, after the notorious speech by *Murshid* Mustafa Mashour the movement raised suspicious about the sincerity of its political thought, especially among secular intellectuals and non-Muslims. In an interview given to *al-Ahram Weekly* in April 1997, Mashour stated "Islamic law, Shari'a, is the principal point of reference (authority) for governance. Copts must pay the jizyah instead of joining the army,

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[143] Wickham, 218

[144] Karim El-Gawhary, "We are a Civil Party with an Islamic Identity" An Interview with Abu 'Ila Madi Abu 'Ila and Rafiq Habib, Middle East Report, Vol. 26, (1996), 30

[145] Ibid., 31

lest they ally themselves with the enemy, if that enemy happens to be a Christian country"[146] This statement reminded the conservative arguments made by both Hasan al-Banna and Sayyed Qutb among other scholars which were also inspiring the militant Islamic groups in Egypt at the time. Compared to their former demands regarding the equal citizenship status for Christians in elections program, such announcements revealed the fact of heterogonous political thought inside the Muslim Brotherhood.

3.4.1. Towards a Muslim Brotherhood Party?

The early 2000s were significant for the Muslim Brotherhood as it matured politically and transformed its rhetoric towards the demands of the Egyptian society. They were able to gain seventeen seats in 2000 parliamentary elections, despite in mid-1990s the movement suffered with imprisonments. However reformation of Brotherhood started to happen after Mahdi Akef's succession of Ma'mun al-Hudaybi in January 2004. Mahdi Akef was regarded as representing the old guard of Muslim Brotherhood but he also approached to the young members who were more open to politics. In a decade, Muslim Brotherhood published three significant programs to outline its thoughts for future of Egypt; first was in 3 March 2004 called "Reform Initiative", second was 2005 electoral program for parliament and finally, "Draft Party Platform" in 2007. Two months after the new General Guide came to office; Muslim Brotherhood published its demands under the title of "Reform Initiative". In this initiative Muslim Brotherhood declared "separation of powers, the unrestricted right to form political parties, and freedom of personal belief and opinion."[147] The movement outlined its program while keeping its religious point of reference and using famous slogan Islam is the Solution. This was further explained in the program as; "The Muslim Brotherhood confirms the maintenance of a republican,

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[146] Quoted by Magdi Khalil, The Muslim Brotherhood and the Copts, April 20, 2006 http://threatswatch.org/commentary/2006/04/the-muslim-brotherhood-and-the/ (accessed on 30.03.2013)

[147] Shadi Hamid, Parting the Veil, http://www.democracyjournal.org/5/6533.php?page=all (accessed on 31.03.2013)

parliamentary, constitutional, democratic political system in the framework of Islamic principles." On the other hand, Brotherhood also announced in the initiative that supported the democratic transition in the country;

> the people as the source of the power, power rotation according to free and universal suffrage, freedom of personal conviction and religious rituals as well as of opinion and expression, freedom in forming political parties and public gatherings and demonstrations, representation of the people by a freely elected parliament, the guarantee of both male and female citizens' rights to participate in elections, hence, to be deputies in representative councils, the army's dissociation from political matters as well as the security forces' and police's, limited powers for the President, and the cancellation of laws that impede liberties and lead to political stagnation.[148]

The Brotherhood decided to clarify its rhetoric since the movements was operating in a highly intense political environment due to both Parliamentary and Presidential elections in 2005. These were also causing the rumours of presidential succession which followed by protests around Egypt.

The ideas of reform initiative of 2004, further repeated in the movement's announcement of its 2005 Parliamentary elections program. Islamic reference and implementation of *sharia* was stated alongside with other demands including; separation of powers, party pluralism and rights and freedoms to citizens. Brotherhood also used in its program the term "Civil State" and denied that Islam promotes a theocratic system. It was indicated in the program; "that the religion of Islam rejects a religious political power and establishes that the state in Islam is a civil state in which the community determines its system within the framework of the fixed norms of Islamic law."[149] However, it was not clear from the program on what the limits of Islamic law are and how it will be implemented. The electoral program supported women to participate in *da'wa* (Islamic call) and political activities by joining parliament but it didn't clarify whether their freedom would allow them to

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[148] Antar, Noha, 18

[149] Kristen Stilt, 'Islam is the Solution': Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, *Texas International Law Journal*, Vol. 46, 73, (2010), 73-108

become president of the country.[150] Prior to the 2005 Parliamentary elections, *Murshid* Mahdi Akef announced that the movement was both courageous to stay within politics but also cared not to provoke the state by running for majority in parliament. He put an emphasis that in case they gain seats they will prioritize; "freedom, human rights, democracy, education development, unemployment, and university reform."[151] The results were total success for Muslim Brotherhood and the movement became the largest opposition bloc in parliament with its 88 members. However Brotherhood paid the price of their victory by facing another wave of arrests and military trails which disabled the group to operate efficiently. Rather than rejecting the political struggle, Brotherhood worked within the system and leaders made statements to prove their commitment towards democracy, human rights and political pluralism. In an interview, Mohammad Habib, First Deputy of the Chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood, stressed their position regarding Coptic citizens as;

> We consider our Coptic brothers as citizens enjoying all rights associated with citizenship and as part of the fabric of the Egyptian society. We consider them as partners in the country, in decision-making and in determining our future. Consequently, the basis for filling public posts shall be efficiency, ability and experience, not religion or beliefs.[152]

On the other hand, the movement was criticized for not being very clear on their approach towards democracy. In Carnegie Papers on Islamic Movements argued that most of the movements, including Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt contain "Gray Zones" in their discourse. This was explained as; "The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood calls for full-fledged democratic reforms but remains reluctant to endorse equal rights for Copts"[153] Abdul Moneim Abul Futuh, a member of the

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[150] Antar, Noha, 19

[151] Akef: Freedom and Democracy are on the Top, Ikhwanweb, November 19,2005 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=5502 (accessed on 02.04.2013)

[152] Dr. Habib explains the Muslim Brotherhood's'Political Program, Ikhwanweb, March 8,2006 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=4663 (accessed on 02.04.2013)

[153] Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway "Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (March 8, 2006), 6

Guidance Bureau, wrote a commentary in response to these claims and argued that;

> Democracy remains the most effective means available for achieving human rights. Reformist Islamist movements understand democracy as coexistence among all elements of society, peaceful and constitutional alternation of power, the rule of law, and the protection of individual rights and freedoms.[154]

Abul Futuh also revealed another face of the discussion inside the Brotherhood and argued;

> There is a debate within the movement about the possibility of transformation to a political party that carries out the movement's reform agenda. Another possibility is establishing a separate political party, with a delineation of responsibilities between party and movement.[155]

The summer of 2007 was one of the milestones in the history of Muslim Brotherhood after the Guidance Bureau announced its first "Draft Party Platform". This was an indication by the movement to establish a political party and a program that identify its nature. It immediately captured the attention of both Egyptian and International media. The Platform started with reference to democracy and freedom, similar to the statements provided in the previous programs. However, the differences of this program were its thoughts regarding the situation of women and Copts and Islamization of legislation. The platform argued that every citizen without any discrimination of religion or sex can enjoy equal rights;

> with exception of (becoming) President. Only Muslim males may run for or hold this office. We view that women have the right in all administrative positions in the country except President, because religious scholars agreed that women may not hold this office[156]

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[154] Abdul Moneim Abul Futuh, "Reformist Islam: How Gray are the Gray Zones?", Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, (July 18, 2006)

[155] Ibid.

[156] Stilt, 106

In addition, the draft raised more criticism when it suggested laws to be compatible with Islamic law and "the legislature must request the opinion of a council of senior religious scholars from the Muslim community (the Council)."[157] This was seen as a contradiction inside Muslim Brotherhood since the platform was supporting a civil state. Some scholars expressed their critic against Muslim Brotherhood's idea of a religious Council and compared this idea with Iranian Guidance Council of the Constitution.[158] On the other hand, Fahmi Huwaidi, an Egyptian intellectual on Islam, claimed that the decision of this Council is not binding and it doesn't represent a top authority above elected parliament.[159] The platform was announced in a period when Muslim Brotherhood was under pressure because of military trails for its members and the media accusing the movement for involving in illegal activities. The popularity of the movement was damaged amongst intellectual circles after the declaration of the platform. After its' release a conflict emerged inside the Muslim Brotherhood whether it was published after a consultation with other members. Although Muhammad Habib defended that ideas revealed in platform was reached in a transparent manner. However for prominent members such as, Essam al-'Aryan, Gamal Hishmat and Abdul Moneim Abul Futuh the platform was the work of a small group inside Brotherhood. Abul Futuh's remarks were significant to portray the opposition bloc's stance on this issue;

> These [controversial points] were not raised in the preliminary discussions and dialogues during the consideration of the document that would be announced as the movement's draft platform. In no way does it represent the opinion of the entire Brotherhood or its branches which were deprived of the opportunity to see the program or comment on what was in it. I had earlier

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[157] Ibid., 102

[158] Mohammad Elmenshawy, The Muslim Brotherhood Shows Its True Colors, *Christian Science Monitor*, (October 12, 2007)

[159] Fahmi Huwaidi, MB in Party Program...Wrong Doers or Wronged?, Ikhwanweb, September 28, 2007, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=14288&ref=search.php (accessed on 03.04.2013)

expressed my objection to the Brotherhood, but that opinion was not accepted.[160]

While the Draft Party Platform was still disputed, Muslim Brotherhood published another program for 2008 Municipal Elections planned to take place in April 8. The program mainly dealt with socio-economic, everyday problems of Egyptian society. These include developments in the fields of; health, education, cleaning the environment, electricity, transportation, drinking water, construction planning, agriculture and unemployment. However, the last part of this program was dealing with the "Women's Role". Similar to the previous remarks made by Muslim Brotherhood, the priority for women is to work inside her home and they can work outside in case of poverty.[161] In the elections 10.000 Muslim Brotherhood candidates were planning to participate in, but only 21 of them were allowed to participate. However, before few days to elections security forces arrested more than 900 Brotherhood members. After the ruling and arrests, Muslim Brotherhood decided to boycott the elections on the grounds of government's "disregard for justice".[162]

In March 2009, after serving as *Murshid* for nearly six years, Mahdi Akef announced that he will not hold his post for the next term which ends in January, 2010. This was the first time in the history of Muslim Brotherhood. Previous General Guides starting from Hasan al-Banna protected their position until the end of their lives. Eventually this caused a discussion whether Akef made such a decision due to internal conflict between those who want Brotherhood to engage more with politics of Egypt and who want to continue with the current situation. Khalil el-Anani, explained this struggle as between "hardliners and pragmatists inside the

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[160] Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy "The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Foray Into Political Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions?", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (January 14, 2008), 8

[161] Muslim Brotherhood 2008 Municipal Election Platform,http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=16257, (accessed on 04.04.2013)

[162] Habib: Tuesday's Local Elections "A Farce", Ikhwanweb, April 7,2008 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=16593&ref=search.php, (accessed on 04.04.2013)

conservative camp" that Akef tried to balance during his leadership.[163] In an interview given to an Arab political affairs magazine, The Majalla, Akef replied to these comments by stating that

> Such talk is no more than mere allegations repeated only by seculars. We do not have such things as conservative, reformist, old guard, and new guard. We do not make classifications of the kind that puts, for instance, the "General Guide" deputy, Dr. "Mohammed Habib", among the Hawks, and puts others among the Pigeons.[164]

In January 16, 2010, Shura council of Muslim Brotherhood elected the new General Guide, Muhammad Badie, 66 year old vetenary pathology professor. He was regarded as being conservative leader. Firstly this debate arouse because Badie's imprisonment for 9 years in 1960s and influence by Sayyed Qutb's ideas during this period. Badie expressed his goal is "to follow the conservative ideals of the late Sayyed Qutb"[165] Secondly, reformist leaders such as Abdul Moneim Abul Futuh and Muhammad Habib will not be participating to the Guidance Bureau which also meant the majority of the office will composed from the conservative members. Although Muslim Brotherhood faced with strict security measures by the regime trough out 2000s, Badie announced in his first speech that "With regards to our stance from the Egyptian regime, we emphasize that the MB (Muslim Brotherhood) were never opponents to the regime, even if the regime constantly imposes restrictions on them, confiscates their money and frequently arrest its leaders."[166] Despite these statements, the relations deteriorate in the end of 2010. The year the movement elected a new leader was also the year for new Parliamentary elections in Egypt. It was the high probability for the group to gain more seats than it occupied in

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[163] Khalil El-Anani, Dissenting brothers, Al-Ahram Weekly, 5 - 11 November 2009, Issue No. 971

[164] The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ikhwanweb, October 17, 2009
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=21321, (accessed on 05.04.2013)

[165] Badee; We will continue on Qutb's path to reform, Ikhwanweb, December 26, 2009
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=22320 (accessed on 05.04.2013)

[166] Translation: Muhammad Badie's acceptance speech, Ikhwanweb, January 17, 2010
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=22674 (accessed on 05.04.2013)

2005 elections. Presidential elections were planned for the following year, 2011, and Mubarak was planning to leave his position to his youngest son Gamal and he didn't want to see Brotherhood as the main opposition may be stronger than 2005 parliament.[167] Both due to waves of arrests against Brotherhood members and fraud conducted during the elections, Mubarak was able to leave the movement outside the parliament. After the first round of elections where the Brotherhood didn't occupy any seats, *Murshid* Muhammad Badie declared;

> The violations, terror and hooliganism we were subjected to at the hands of security forces and NDP [National Democratic Party] thugs before and during elections, all of which were reported by civil and media organizations, as well as the forged results, made us reconsider taking part in the runoff.[168]

All opposition parties, similar to Muslim Brotherhood, expressed their criticism against process of elections and disappointments about the hopes for democratization in Egypt. However only, one month later after the 2010 elections, Tunisian uprising became an inspiration to all around Arab countries including Egypt. The protests in Tunisia continued three weeks and eventually forced 24 year old Ben Ali regime to fall. Egyptian activists inspiring from their Tunisian example decided to organize gatherings against the Mubarak regime in January 25, 2011. The following chapter will evaluate the transformation of Muslim Brotherhood during these waves of protests.

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[167] Egypt election routs popular Muslim Brotherhood from parliament, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1201/Egypt-election-routs-popular-Muslim-Brotherhood-from-parliament, (accessed on 05.04.2013)

[168] EGYPT: Muslim Brotherhood to boycott parliamentary elections runoff, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/12/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-to-boycott-parliamentary-elections-run-off.html (accessed on 05.04.2013)

CHAPTER 4

JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION AND MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Muhammad Bouazizi was a 26 year old street vendor in the city of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. He became the symbol of Tunisian Revolution and forthcoming Arab uprisings after his self-immolation against the police brutality on December 17, 2010. The protests started one day after the incident and continued for three weeks, demanding reform and fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's 24 years regime. Eventually Ben Ali left the country on January 14, 2011. These events popularly named as "Jasmine Revolution" or "Sidi Bouzid Revolution". After the ousting of Ben Ali, it was a rather low expectation that Tunisian people would become an inspiration to Arab countries, especially to Egypt, the most populated Arab country. Stephen Walt analysed Tunisian Revolution and wrote;

> All of this is not to say that a cascade is impossible, that events in Tunisia won't exert a long-term effect on political discussion elsewhere, or that it is not a telling sign of democratic aspirations that are likely to bear fruit eventually. But "eventually" could be a rather long time, and if you are expecting to see a rapid transformation of the Arab world in the wake of these events, you're likely to be disappointed.[169]

Egyptian journalists, such as Amr el-Shobaki also argued that "those who watched Al-Jazeera's live coverage of the great protests in Tunisia should know that what happened in Tunisia is unlikely to happen in Egypt."[170]

4.1. January 25 Egyptian Uprising

Oppositional forces, including, April 6 Youth Movement, Karama, Ghad, Wafd and Democratic Front parties announced that they will hold a protest in January 25 which was celebrated as national holiday in Egypt. Muslim Brotherhood

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[169] Stephen Walt, Why the Tunisian revolution won't spread, Foreign Policy, January 16,2011

[170] Amr El-Shobak, Egypt is not Tunisia, Egypt Independent, January 17, 2011
http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/egypt-not-tunisia (accessed on 08.04.2013)

alongside the other Islamic movements, mainly al-Azhar, Sufi orders and Salafi groups, didn't publicly announce that it will join other opposition groups for protests, due to the possibility of crackdown on the movement. The movement rather acted cautious and chose to watch the sequence of events as develop. However, young Muslim Brotherhood members participated with other movements to protest against the government in Tahrir Square on January 25. It was estimated that more than ten thousand people were gathered to protest against the Egyptian regime on January 25 in Tahrir (Liberation) Square. This was an unexpected movement which eventually spread across Egypt in the following days to the other provinces such as Port Said, North Sinai and Suez. Anti-Mubarak protesters refused to leave the streets, especially the Tahrir Square, one of the busiest squares in the city and centre for bureaucracy and tourism with the headquarters of ruling National Democratic Party and Egyptian Museum. Following the events took place in January 25; Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement that its members were participating to the protests and the government;

> must comply with the wills of the people and conduct the required reforms, abandon the policy of intransigence and oppose the demands of the people, take serious, immediate and effective measures to achieve the required reform in all fields, stop harming protestors and release all those detained in these events and the ones before.[171]

Opposition groups called for "The Friday of Rage" in January 28 following the Friday prayers. It was a turning point in the Egyptian revolution since Muslim Brotherhood declared that "its members will maintain a strong street presence."[172] This was further seen in the slogans chanted in Tahrir Square that were mostly expressing humiliations, public demands, resentment, persistence, human rights and patriotism rather than religious sentiments.[173] Alaa al Aswany, Egyptian novelist and founding member of Kifaya movement announced that the priorities for the

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[171] MB statement on January 25, Day of Rage and its consequences, Ikhwanweb, January 27, 2011 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=27937 (accessed on 08.04.2013)

[172] MB and opposition calls for largest protest, Ikhwanweb, January 27, 2011 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=27941 (accessed on 08.04.2013)

[173] Fawwaz Al-Abed al-Haq,, Abdullah Abdelhameed Hussein, *The Slogans of The Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions, A Sociolinguistic study*, 2011

protestors are to change the regime. He further justified the uprising since; "Most of them are university students who find themselves with no hope for the future. They are unable to find work, and hence unable to marry. And they are motivated by an untameable anger and a profound sense of injustice."[174]

Mubarak regime launched an early crackdown one day before "The Friday of Rage" by, arresting prominent Muslim Brotherhood members, Essam al-Arian and Muhammad Morsi, and shutting down the internet services and cell phones, to cut the communication between activists and outside world. Thousands of protesters gathered in mosques and started to march towards Tahrir square. However they were blocked by the security forces and confrontations broke where police replied to the crowd with extreme measures, by using tear gas and rubber bullets. As clashes continued throughout the day, Hosni Mubarak appeared on TV for the first time since the protests started. Mubarak promised "new steps toward more democracy and freedoms" and added that "I have asked the government to present its resignation today (Friday) and I will name a new government starting from tomorrow."[175] Hosni Mubarak announced for the first time in 30 years of his rule that he appointed a vice president, Omar Suleiman. Suleiman served as director of General Intelligence Director since 1993 and was one of the most notorious members of Mubarak regime who applied torture to the detainees.[176] This appointment was not satisfying for the opposition but increased the opposition against Mubarak.

Following the speech of the president, Egyptian military started to deploy tanks and soldiers in Tahrir square as people cheered and chanted "The people and the army are one". Although curfew was announced, same night, by the army, groups continued to protest for a regime change. In February 1, opposition groups called for a nationwide protest entitled "March of the Millions" to force Mubarak to resign. Starting from January 28 as the death toll rose after clashes grew with the pro-

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[174] Alaa Al Aswany, *Police alone can't keep rulers in power. Egypt's battle is on*, The Guardian, February 27, 2011

[175] Highlights: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's speech, Reuters, January 29, 2011

[176] Jane Mayer,, Who is Omar Suleiman?, The New Yorker, January 29, 2011

Mubarak groups, Muslim Brotherhood transformed its rhetoric into an anti-Mubarak tone. Finally in an interview in February 1; *Murshid* Muhammad Badie stated that "Hosni Mubarak must leave. It's what his people are demanding... The era of dictatorship is finished; the era of the people has come."[177] Following the mass participation to the "March of the Millions", Mubarak gave his second speech and announced;

> I took the initiative of forming a new government with new priorities and duties that respond to the demand of our youth and their mission. ...I say in all honesty and regardless of the current situation that I did not intend to nominate myself for a new presidential term. ... This dear nation is my country, it is the country of all Egyptians, here I have lived and fought for its sake and I defended its land, its sovereignty and interests and on this land I will die and history will judge me and others for our merits and faults.[178]

As Mubarak confirmed he will continue to stay in his position until presidential elections planned in September 2011, the Egyptian uprising reached to an irreversible point and the ultimate message from the squares was his resignation from his post immediately. Although he promised for a relative reform and change in the system, the events took a more violent shape.

In the following day, February 2, thugs paid by government, ran into and terrorize anti-Mubarak protesters with camels and horses. As the protests entered into eighth day the United Nations human rights chief announced that unconfirmed deaths reached to 300 and more than 3.000 people injured during these clashes.[179]

In all these events Muslim Brotherhood played an important position in Tahrir square. Amr Hamzawy, described the function of the Brotherhood as;

> The physical sense, the organization of the space is in the Brotherhood's hand. And it's not only garbage collection, teacups and so forth. It's even the one microphone or the two microphones we have to address the crowd. They are owned by the Muslim Brotherhood, which attests to the strong

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[177] Muslim Brotherhood demands that President Mubarak step down**,** France 24, February 1, 2011

[178] President Mubarak's speech after mass protest, Reuters, February 1, 2011

[179] '300 killed' so far in Egypt protests, News24, February 2, 2011
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/300-killed-so-far-in-Egypt-protests-20110201

organizational skills of the movement. Not only that, in fact. Those who defended the demonstrators on Tuesday and Wednesday were Ikhwan members, and many Ikhwan protesters started to believe in the commitment of Ikhwan members after these two nights.[180]

Clashes spread between opposition and supporters of Hosni Mubarak. Omar Suleiman, newly appointed vice president, called for a meeting on Sunday, February 6, with opposition forces, including Muslim Brotherhood. This was a historical opportunity for an outlawed movement like Brotherhood to talk with official forces which in some sense regarded as the regime recognizing the group's legitimacy. Essam al-Arian, Mohammad Morsi and Saad Katatni represented the Muslim Brotherhood during the negotiations. Brotherhood released a statement announcing that they will only deliver the demands of the streets to the state; "Mubarak must step down immediately, the 30-year Emergency Law must be abolished and transparent parliamentary elections must be held under judicial supervision"[181] However, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to withdrew from the meetings after one round because of the pressure by the protesters.[182] The same day, February 6, was announced by protestors as "Sunday of Martyrs" that revealed the diversity of the uprising. First Coptic Christians held their Sunday mass in Tahrir square while Muslims ringed around them and later Muslims performed funeral prayer with Copt's protection.

4.2. International Reactions to the Egyptian Uprising

Egypt occupies a significant geo-strategic role in the Arab Middle East. First reason is because it is the most populous Arab country in the world with more than 85 million citizens. Secondly, Egypt is the most important Arab ally of United States and Europe in Middle East and North Africa after its peace treaty with the state of Israel in 1979. In such a fragile situation international actors played a cautious role

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[180] Interview with Amr Hamzawy by PBS, February 8 2011.

[181] MB Will Join Talks with the Best Interests of Egypt in Mind, Ikhwanweb, February 6 2011. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=27966

[182] Ibrahim Al-Houdaybi, "Islamism in and after the Egypt's Revolution", in *The Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond*, ed. Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdip, (The American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 138

towards the on-going protests in Egypt. European countries and United States mostly called for the President Hosni Mubarak not to use coercion and reply to the demands of his people with dialogue instead of forcing him to step down.

U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, announced in January 25; "The Egyptian government has an important opportunity to be responsive to the aspirations of the Egyptian people, and pursue political, economic and social reforms that can improve their lives and help Egypt prosper."[183] Later, as the protests grew the U.S. President Barack Obama gave a speech about the uprising in January 28 after Mubarak's TV appearance. He stated; "I told him he has a responsibility to give meaning to those words, to take concrete steps and actions that deliver on that promise."[184] In addition, EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton called for a dialogue between Egyptian state and protesters and added; "The legitimate grievances of the Egyptian people should be responded to. Their aspirations for a just, better future should be met with urgent, concrete and decisive answers, and with real steps"[185]

There were divergent opinions in the neighbouring countries to Egypt. Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, commented on the Egyptian uprising that "we do believe the regime is strong enough to overcome it."[186] He later added that "our real fear is of a situation that could develop ... and which has already developed in several countries including Iran itself -- repressive regimes of radical Islam"[187] Prime

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[183] "Statement by the Press Secretary on Egypt", White House Office of the Press Secretary, January 25, 2011

[184] "Transcript: President Obama's Remarks on Egypt", Time, January 28, 2011
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2045085,00.html

[185] "Ashton calls for dialogue between Mubarak and opposition", EUobserver, January 31, 2011
http://euobserver.com/foreign/31724

[186] "Israel Has Faith Mubarak Will Prevail", Time, January 28, 2011
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2044929,00.html

[187] "Netanyahu warns outcome of Egypt revolution could be like Iran's", Haaretz, January 31, 2011
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-warns-outcome-of-egypt-revolution-could-be-like-iran-s-1.340411

Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on the other hand, was the first leader urging Mubarak to step down after he called; "The [Egyptian] people expect a very different decision from Mubarak, the current administration does not inspire trust so far as the democratic change wanted by the population is concerned."[188] Against the claims of danger of Muslim Brotherhood to take over power once Mubarak has fallen, two prominent members of the movement, Essam al-Aryan and Abdul Moneim Abul Futuh, published articles in February 9 to clarify these claims. Articles stated that Brotherhood is not intending to dominate in post-Mubarak Egypt and field a presidential candidate in elections scheduled for September 2011.[189]

4.3. The fall of Mubarak regime

In the next five days, the protestors in Cairo, Alexandria and Suez grew in numbers reached to more than a million people. In February 10, Hosni Mubarak made his third and final appearance on TV and addressed Egyptians. People were hopefully watching him in big screens set up in Tahrir square. It became clearer after this speech that Mubarak was rather an isolated president who is unaware of what Egyptians demand. He began to his speech by stating; "I am addressing you all from the heart, a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters."[190] Further he continued by declaring the abolishment of certain articles in the constitution which will limit the president. Mubarak concluded that he transformed his powers to vice-president, Omar Suleiman. The hope of the protestors turned into anger and pessimism as

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[188] "Mubarak should go now, says Turkish PM Erdoğan", Hurriyet Daily News, February 2, 2011 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=mubarak-should-go-now-says-turkeys-erdogan-2011-02-02

[189] Essam el-Errian, "What the Muslim Brothers Want," New York Times, February 9, 2011; Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh, "Democracy Supporters Should Not Fear the Muslim Brotherhood," Washington Post, February 9, 2011

[190] Egypt unrest: Full text of Hosni Mubarak's speech, BBC News, February 10, 2011

thousands started to shout "Leave! Leave! Leave!" Muhammad ElBaradei former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and one of the main organizers of the uprisings wrote; "Egypt will explode. The Army must save the country now. I call on the Egyptian army to immediately interfere to rescue Egypt. The credibility of the army is on the line."[191] Opposition declared that they will continue to protest until Mubarak resigns. There were also rumours about the pressures made both by military and United States to convince the president to step down. In February 11, the eighteenth day of the protests, Omar Suleiman appeared on TV. It was rather a limited speech;

> Citizens, during these very difficult circumstances Egypt is going through, President Hosni Mubarak has decided to step down from the office of president of the republic and has charged the supreme council of the armed forces (SCAF) to administer the affairs of the country.[192]

The protests that forced thirty year president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak was popularly called as "January 25 Revolution". This was turning point in the political history of Egypt which ended the reign of Free Officers who came to power with a military coup in 1952. Although, the short term goal of uprising, the ousting of Mubarak, was achieved, SCAF was in the highest decision making position which was going to rule the country until the democratic transition of the system is achieved. However SCAF with its chairman Hussein Tantawi, who served as Minister of Defence under Mubarak since 1991, was the remnants of the old regime that would create resentment by the revolutionaries. The resignation of Mubarak brought opportunity for different social groups to freely express their own opinions. Especially for a movement like Muslim Brotherhood this was a big chance to prove its 80 years of political experience.

4.4. Political Transition of Egypt under SCAF Rule

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[191] https://twitter.com/ElBaradei/status/35826754916597760

[192] Egypt crisis: President Hosni Mubarak resigns as leader, BBC News, February 12, 2011

Following the Mubarak's resignation a group of protestors released a document titled "People's Communique No. 1". They demanded the dissolution of Mubarak's cabinet, established in January 29 and "suspension of the parliament elected in a rigged poll late last year". The protestors also urged for a transitional administration appointed with four civilians and one military official to prepare for elections in nine months and to oversee the drafting of a new constitution. Further, communique demanded the freedom for the media and the formation of political parties.[193] The SCAF responded positively towards the demands of the protestors and announced the dissolution of the parliament, suspension of the constitution and it will govern only for six months or until elections took place. The Supreme Council also promised for a referendum on constitutional amendments.

In the following two weeks SCAF declared the committee of eight jurists who was tasked to amend the 1971 constitution and decided to hold the constitutional referendum in March 19. The committee was consisting of lawyers, law professors and members of the Supreme Constitutional Court. Two members of the committe created a dispute over the intention of the SCAF. First was, Tariq al-Bishri, a judge and appointed as the head of the committee who regarded as having Islamist inclinations. Secondly, Subhi Saleh was a lawyer and former MP of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2005 parliament.[194]

The committee announced proposed amendments of nine articles of the 1971 constitution in February 29. These articles were dealing with the limits of the President's powers and how should parliamentary elections be managed freer compared to Hosni Mubarak thirty year rule. The article 77 suggested that a president should serve for four years and can be elected only for two terms. The article 76 became well-known during the 2005 elections when Mubarak for the first

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[193] Jean Pierre Filiu, *The Arab Revolutions; Ten Lessons From The Democratic Uprising,* (Hurst & Company, 2011) 161-162

[194] Dalal Bizri, *Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and the 25 January Revolution*, Perspectives, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, May 2, 2011, 150-158

time was challenged by another civilian candidate, Ayman Nour. The committee decided to amendment this article in order to make it easier for a person to become a candidate. The new amendment would create three ways to get on the ballot: endorsement by 30 members of the People's Assembly or Shura Council, endorsement by 30,000 eligible votes or membership in a political party with at least one seat in either of the houses of parliament. In addition to these, it was also added by the amendment of article 75 that the requirements for the presidency are that the president should be an Egyptian, born to Egyptian parents, who "enjoys civil and political rights" and is not less than 40 years old. The candidate's parents cannot be dual citizens of another state; and the president may not be married to a non-Egyptian. Taking the example of Mubarak's not appointing any vice presidents until the uprising started in January 25, article 139 obliged the new president to appoint a vice-president within 60 days after his/her election. One of main reasons of January 25 Revolution was the abolishment of state of emergency that was in place since the period of Gamal Abd al-Nasser. The article 148 attempted to restrict the ability to implement state of emergency without the approval of the People's Assembly and more than six months. In case of renewal the decision should be given by a referendum.[195]

Although, Egyptian people forced Mubarak to resign with unity in January 25 Revolution, the harmony turned into a political competition. The most debated issue was about the nature of the state and the amendment of Article 2 of the constitution; "Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic its official language. *Sharia* is the principal source of legislation." For the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups, on the other hand, this was an unacceptable offer as Essam al-Aryan explained the Brotherhood's position on the Article 2 as; "above the constitution"[196]. Further the debate evolved as whether the priority should be parliamentary and presidential elections or writing a new constitution. Muslim Brotherhood favoured the proposed

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[195] Nathan J Brown, Michelle Dunne, Egypt's Draft Constitutional Amendments Answer Some Questions and Raise Others, March 1, 2011, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

[196] Bizri, 150

amendments of the constitution and urged its supporters to vote for a "yes". Brotherhood deputy, Khairat Shater in an interview given to Reuters stated that the constitutional amendments are the most suitable, not the most ideal solution for this transitional period that cannot drag for too long. On the other hand, liberal secular political activists were against the amendments on the grounds that they lacked time to form effective political organizations, instead this would benefit the organized political groups, especially Muslim Brotherhood. Amr Moussa, former foreign minister for ten years under Hosni Mubarak and opposition leader, stated that he would take part in the constitutional amendments referendum, voting No, because he is convinced that presidential elections should take place before parliamentary ones, to give room for new political parties to evolve.[197] Similarly, Muhammad al-Baradey, one of the important figures of opposition against Mubarak during January 25 Revolution also argued that he will vote against these amendments and added that the current constitution fell. It would be an insult to the revolution if we decided to retrieve this constitution, a new constitution, a presidential vote and then parliamentary vote."[198]

In March 19, Egyptians voted in the first referendum without Mubarak after thirty years. The turnout was 41.2% of 45 Million eligible voters and 77% of the voters supported the amendments of the constitution which started the campaign of parliamentary elections in six months.

4.5. The First Political Party of Muslim Brotherhood; Freedom and Justice Party

The Muslim Brotherhood opened a new phase with the Mubarak's resignation. The political turmoil forced Brotherhood to change its way of conducting politics, since it used to stay in opposition to the government. In the more

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[197] Amr Moussa: Vote against the constitutional amendments, Ahram Online, March 16, 2011

[198] Egypt needs new constitution, not amendments – ElBaradei, Thomas Reuters Foundation, March 9, 2011

liberal atmosphere of post-Mubarak Egypt, Brotherhood was the oldest and the most experienced socio-political movement.

Muslim Brotherhood General Guide, Muhammad Badie, announced after ten days after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, in February 21, that the movement's intention to establish its political party called Freedom and Justice Party. During the declaration of its foundation Badie stated; "party membership will be open to all Egyptians who accept the party's program and policy direction." He further clarified the party's stance regarding women and Copts that the group does not "object to the election of women or Copts to cabinet seats," however, "it does not believe it would be appropriate to nominate a woman or a Copt as head of the party."[199] Three prominent members of Guidance Bureau, Muhammad Morsi, Essam al-Aryan and Saad Katatni resigned from their position inside the Muslim Brotherhood and became the founding members of FJP. The Brotherhood announced that Saad Katatni as the leader of founders of the Freedom and Justice Party. It also declared that the party will compete for only 30 to 40 percent of Egypt's electoral districts.[200]

The generational debate that rose between the reformist Brothers and the old guard before the protests, reached to its peak after General Guide Mohammad Badie announced that the group members would not be allowed to join any political party other than the FJP.[201] The younger generation that participated to the January 25 revolution from day one and showed solidarity with the other opposition parties other than Muslim Brotherhood confronted to the decisions of Guidance Bureau. Reformist members such as Abdul Moneim Abul Futuh expressed his disagreements;

> After the revolution there is no longer a need for the Brotherhood to become
> a party or to establish a party… I have told the Brothers it is not right that
> there be a party but has to remain an Islamic da'wa movement and civil

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[199] MB announces establishment of political party: Freedom and Justice, Ikhwanweb, 21 February, 2011, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=28077 (accessed on 23.02.2013)

[200] Eric Trager, "The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood", *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2011)

[201] Hani Nasira, "The Internal Crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt", *Terrorism Monitor* Volume: 9 Issue: 16, (April 22, 2011)

organization undertaking its da'wa and activist work though legitimate means and these are the mean that the Brotherhood used from 1970s to the January revolution…[202]

Later, Ibrahim al-Za'farani, Khaled Dawood and Hamid al-Dafrawi joined Aboul Fotouh to split from Muslim Brotherhood and form their own political parties which later divided into three different parties (the Society of Peace and Development, the Nahda and Riyada parties). Second incident was the conference held in March 26 by young Brothers to discuss "transforming the Muslim Brotherhood from an organization to an institution, and discussing different scenarios for the relationship between socioreligious and political activities." None of the senior leaders of the Brotherhood participated to the conference and later most of the organizers of the decided to split from the movement in protest of Guidance Bureau. [203]

In April 30 Muslim Brotherhood announced the foundation of the party but it officially gained legitimacy in June 6. Muhammad Morsi was chosen to be the president of the Party, Essam al-'Aryan was the vice president and spokesperson and Saad El-Katatni announced to be secretary general. The significant transformation was seen in the political understanding of the Party especially after the appointment of Rafiq Habib as vice president, an Egyptian Coptic intellectual and former founding member of al-Wasat Party in 1996,. It was also announced that the party has 8821 founding members across Egypt, which includes over 900 women and 93 Copts.[204]

During the process of foundation of FJP, the Muslim Brotherhood published a number of documents in addition to the press releases and interviews by the party members. "The Founding Statement of Freedom and Justice Party" was the first document that outlined the identity of the movement. This was indicated transformation in the understanding of Muslim Brotherhood from a social

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[202] Quoted in Tadros, 75

[203] Al-Houdaybi, 139

[204] FJP Announces Names of Parties Co-founders, fjponline, November 10, 2011
http://www.fjponline.com/article.php?id=93

organization to a political party. The statement gave much emphasis on the party's loyalty to the "demands" of the revolution that eventually increased the nationalist vision of the party. This was explained; "the revolution that opened the horizon for bright hope for this country to shift towards freedom, democracy, justice and full human rights, our "Freedom and Justice Party" states that it aims at building, first of all, the Egyptian patriotic and committed citizen." The Party stressed that the Egypt is a "civil state" with an Islamic reference. "We also confirm our deep belief in the need to state in the Constitution that Islam is the official religion of the state and that the principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation, and thus, the application of Sharia in all walks of life." FJP president Muhammad Morsi clarified this point as; "It is not an Islamist party in the old understanding, it is not theocratic, it is a civil party,"[205] It continued by arguing that this system of government guarantees the rights of Christians and their freedom of belief and worship according to their laws and rules, in addition to safeguarding their litigation through Christian laws and rules in their private affairs. Finally, the statement acknowledged equality of all people however didn't make a special reference towards rights of women.[206]

Second official document, "Elections Program", that published by the Freedom and Justice Party before the Parliamentary elections that planned to held in November 28, 2011 and January 11, 2012. Although Muslim Brotherhood leadership confronted to those members who decided to establish a political party, Wasat, in mid-1990s, the movement in the post-Mubarak Egypt attempted to moderate its political thought. Compared to the previous statements by Muslim Brotherhood, the Party outlined a wider program with different layers. It stated that FJP prioritize security, economy, and corruption as urgent issues. In addition to that the program dealt with the issues on freedoms and political reform, human, urban, economic and productivity development, cultural, media, religious and political leadership and

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[205] Egypt's Islamists form own political party, contending they are not "theocratic", Al-Arabiya, 30 April 2011

[206] The Founding Statement of Freedom and Justice Party, Ikhwanweb, June 1, 2011

social justice. The program defined the state as "the national constitutional Islamic modern democracy, based on Sharia (Islamic law) as a frame of reference."

It was explained that there are four significant characteristics of the state that FJP envisages. First it is based on principle of equality for all citizenship without any discrimination regarding religion or race. Secondly, the separation of powers is required for the state between the legislature, the judiciary and the executive authority. The Party preferred to use the term *Shura* rather than *democracy*. This is the reason why in the third character FJP suggested the state should be "democracy based on Shura (consultation) principle." Finally the state must have a civilian character with Islamic reference as stated in the previous statements by Muslim Brotherhood. In a more elaborate explanation the program wrote;

> It is not a military state ruled by armed forces, who get in power by military coups, and it is not ruled like a dictatorship, nor is it a police state controlled by the security forces, nor is it a theocracy - governed by the clergy or by Divine Right.[207]

There were suspicions regarding Muslim Brotherhood's new party FJP due to previously announced 2007 Party Platform. In the Platform the movement was suggesting that the Copts and women shouldn't be allowed to occupy the position of presidency. The election program addressed these issues from a different point. In the case of women's rights the party stated that its representative seek to "ensure women's access to all their rights, consistent with the values of Islamic law, maintaining the balance between their duties and rights."[208] The Program also read that FJP gives importance of social support to women to help them perform their roles in society and to promote active participation in elections and membership of the elected legislative and local councils. Although this was one of the signs of change regarding Muslim Brotherhood's vision on Political Party, the former understanding can still be traced in the same chapter where it emphasised the role of women in the family; "The FJP has the greatest respect, appreciation and support for

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[207] FJP 2011 Program on Freedoms and Political Reform, fjponline, December 4, 2011

[208] Ibid.

women's role as wives, mothers and makers of men; and aims to better prepare them for this role."[209]

The program, similar to the former statements made in Muslim Brotherhood election documents, defined Copts as Egyptian citizens with equal rights and duties without distinction or discrimination.[210] In addition to that a special reference was made, for the first time in a Muslim Brotherhood document, about the Egyptian Coptic Church. The program developed this intention as follows;

> The Egyptian Coptic Church has had important and effective roles throughout the history of this homeland. …Hence, we believe there is a need for us to further support the role of the Egyptian Church in order to maintain society's values, morals and ethics, and also to confront the growing waves of corrupting intellectual and moral invasion, aimed at Egyptian, Arab and Muslim societies.[211]

Because, January 25 Revolution witnessed the solidarity between different genders and religions, Muslim Brotherhood aimed to portray itself as a movement dealing with larger segments of the Egyptian society. This can also be traced in the selection of FJP's motto, whereas although, "Islam is the solution" was the famous slogan used by Muslim Brotherhood, they preferred, "Freedom is the Solution and Justice is the Application" slogan for the Party.[212]

4.6. Party Politics and Electoral Competition in Post-Mubarak Egypt

The political competition was freer and more vibrant with 67 political parties and four compared to elections under the Hosni Mubarak rule. SCAF announced that the parliamentary elections would take place on three stages from November 28, 2011 to January 3, 2012 while Shura Council (Upper House) elections was planned

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[209] Election Program, 24

[210] Ibid., 15

[211] Ibid., 42

[212] FJP Abandons the Motto 'Islam Is the Solution', fjponline, November 10, 2011
http://www.fjponline.com/article.php?id=94

to be held between January 29 and February 22.[213] The political parties were competing to obtain 498 seats and SCAF was appointing 10 additional members. Similar to the previous elections Muslim Brotherhood participated, 1984 and 1987, the movement allied with other political groups. However, the alliance bloc was called "Democratic Alliance" contrary to "Islamic Alliance" formed during 1987 elections. As FJP refrained from using their historical slogan "Islam is the Solution" in the parliamentary program bloc decided to use the slogan; "We bear good for all of Egypt." Although, during the statement of establishment of the alliance there were 40 different political parties, most parties left the alliance due to disagreements with FJP. At the end there were eleven different political parties in the bloc who would compete in the elections these were; Freedom and Justice Party, Dignity Party, Revolution's Tomorrow Party, Labour Party, Reform and Renaissance Party, Civilization Party, Reform Party, Democratic Generation Party, Egyptian Arab Socialist Party, Liberal Socialist Party and Freedom and Development Party. It was stated in the Alliance's founding statement that its' members will seek to mobilize political forces that are committed to the principles of democracy and a civil state, and to secure a representative parliament that would lead to a government of national unity.[214] FJP occupied 70% of the coalition's lists and 90% of its candidates competed for individual seats in the Democratic Alliance.[215] This was also an indication for a change in the percentage of the seats that FJP will compete in the elections. Contrary to its first announcement to compete 30 to 40%, the party increased its goal and decided to contest for half of the seats.[216] The Alliance was also challenged by three different groupings; The Egyptian Bloc, the Islamist Bloc and the Revolution Continues Alliance.

[213] Zeinab El Gundy, SCAF finally reveals parliamentary elections dates and roadmap, Ahram Online, September 27, 2011

[214] Democratic Alliance for Egypt, Jadaliyya, November 18, 2011

[215] Ahmed Abed Rabbo, Egyptian Political Parties and Parliamentary Elections 2011/2012, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, December 06, 2011

[216] Noha El-Hennawy, Brotherhood contests over 50 percent of parliamentary seats, Egypt Independent, October 25, 2011

The Egyptian Bloc was regarded as the fierce opponent of the Democratic Alliance and Freedom and Justice Party. Nabil Abdel Fattah argued that the coalition was "a final attempt by the various political forces" to form an opposition group to stand against the Islamists in the elections.[217] Free Egyptians Party, the Social Democratic Party and Al-Tagammu (National Progressive Unionist) Party competed in the elections under Egyptian Bloc. The Bloc and Democratic alliance differed in their visions regarding the position of Islam in politics. The Bloc opposed what it called the "exploitation of religion for political purposes" and the transformation of Egypt into an Islamic state. In addition, the Bloc was supporting the idea of writing the constitution before the elections as opposed to Democratic Alliance's urge to have a parliament first.[218] It was consisting of fourteen different political parties, however most of them withdrew from the coalition due to discussions on party lists and rumours regarding the former regime members appeared on the lists.

The Socialist Popular Alliance Party, the Egyptian Socialist Party, the Democratic Front Party and Tahrir Sufi Party separated from the "Egyptian Bloc". The Democratic Front Party and Tahrir Sufi Party decided to run independent from any alliance. On the other hand, Socialist Popular Alliance Party and Egyptian Socialist Party joined with Egyptian Current Party, the Egypt Freedom Party, Equality and Development Party, the Revolution's Youth Coalition and the Egyptian Alliance Party and founded "Revolution Continues" Alliance. The Platform of the Alliances called, "Security, Freedom, and Social Justice", focused on re-establishing law and order, promoting social justice and closing the income gap between the rich and the poor. The platform aims to work immediately on re-establishing security and

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[217] Yasmine Saleh, Egypt liberals launch 'The Egyptian Bloc' to counter Islamists in Nov. Vote, Al Arabiya News, August 16, 2011

[218] Al-Kotla al-Masriyya (The Egypt Bloc), Guide to Egypt's Transition, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/26/the-egypt-bloc (accessed on 05.05.2013)

cleansing state institutions from corruption — particularly the police, judiciary, state media and public universities.[219]

The Islamist Bloc was the group composed of three Salafi Islamic political parties headed by Al-Nour (The Light) Party and al-Asala (Originality) Party and Building and Development Party. Salafi movements are known with their strict literalist interpretation of Islam and exclusionary position towards other ideological thoughts. Salafi groups witnessed a sharp break with the resignation of Mubarak as they refrained from their apolitical stance towards establishing their own political parties. Despite they were not participating or voting in the elections, Salafi movements increased their social appearance especially after the 2005 elections by broadcasting around twelve TV stations.[220] As the uprising started in 2011, the Salafi groups decided not to join and framed the protests as rebellion against the state. On the contrary in the post-Mubarak Egypt, Salafi groups attempted to benefit from the political turmoil by establishing their own parties and compete in elections. Similar to Freedom and Justice Party's affiliation with Muslim Brotherhood, al-Nour Party is political party of Salafi Call Society and Building and Development Party is the party of *al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya*. Nader Bakar, al-Nour Party's spokesperson stated their difference with Muslim Brotherhood as; "We have a great relationship with them (the Brotherhood), but we have different points of view. We're seeking to gradually implement Sharia, but we can't force it on the public all at once because people aren't used to it."[221] Further, al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya explained that its vision as; "Islam can contain everyone and respects the freedom of followers of other religions to refer to their own sharia in private affairs. [Islam] also guarantees public order to preserve what characterizes Egypt's identity and values."[222] Islamist Bloc's challenge

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[219] Revolution Continues, Ahram Online, November 18, 2011

[220] Nathan Field and Ahmed Hamam, Salafi satellite TV in Egypt, Arab Media and Society, Issue 8, Spring 2009

[221] Sherif Tarek, Egypt's new Islamist bloc challenges Brotherhood dominance, October 19, 2011

[222] Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya calls for unity, says minority rights guaranteed, Daily News Egypt, September 1, 2011

to Freedom and Justice Party and Democratic Alliance was signalling the rise of differential nature in Islamic politics in post-Mubarak future.

Compared to frauds and waves of arrests before the elections under the rule of Hosni Mubarak, between November 28, 2011 and January 11, 2012, Egyptians casted their votes in a freer political environment to elect the candidate they desired. The turnout was 62% of the 50 million eligible voters.[223] Democratic Alliance obtained 45.2% of the total votes and had 225 members in the parliament. Freedom and Justice Party came out as the first party from elections by gaining 43.4% of the votes which equalled to 216 seats in the parliament. This was a milestone both in Egyptian and Muslim Brotherhood's history that the largest opposition movement won the chance to occupy the largest number of seats. For a movement that was absent from political debate during the presidency of Mubarak and distanced itself from the protests that toppled Mubarak, Islamist Bloc of Salafi parties achieved a greater success by gaining 25% of the votes in their first electoral experience. As the bloc was headed by al-Nour Party, it occupied the second largest group in parliament with 109 members. The secular and left-leaning parties, on the other hand, were weak in their performance as New Wafd Party became in third largest parliamentary group with 41 members and Egyptian Bloc won 34 seats whereas Revolution Continues Alliance achieved 8 seats. There were 12 women (4 from Freedom and Justice Party list) and 13 Coptic candidates who were able to succeed in the elections. The January 25 Revolution and results of the People's Assembly (lower house of the parliament) elections brought Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party to a position that was impossible to achieve under the Presidency of Hosni Mubarak. Two significant members of the Party, Saad Katatni, the Secretary General of FJP and Essam al-Aryan, vice president of the party occupied highest positions in the parliament. Katatni was chosen to be the Speaker of the Assembly and Aryan became the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. In addition

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[223] Voter turnout data for Egypt, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=EG (accessed on 08.05.2013)

chairmen of national security committee, health committee, labour committee and youth committee were all members of FJP.[224]

The majority of the people were eager to cast their vote in lower house of the parliament (People's Assembly), however the turnout for the upper house (Shura Council) elections, held between January 29-30 and February 14-15, was only 15%. The Council in total contained 264 seats and only 180 of them were elected by ballot box whereas the rest was going to be appointed by the new president after the elections which were expected to take place in late June. The first two winners of the People's Assembly elections, Freedom and Justice Party and Al-Nour Party, became the two majorities in the Shura Council by occupying 150 of the seats. After years of long struggle Islamic movements, Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups occupied the significant legislative bodies in the country. However, due to the low election turnouts, the Council was doubted whether to represent the will of the majority of Egyptian people. These criticisms rose before the election date and certain opposition figures such as Muhammad al-Baradey and Salafi leader Hazem Abu Ismail urged their supporters to boycott the Shura Council elections. In addition, the opposition demanded the dissolution of the Council and invalidate the results as it was one of the main political tools of the former regime. Salem Mostafa Kamel explained;

> There is widespread recognition among Egyptians that legislative power was held exclusively by the People's Assembly while the Shura Council is perceived as a largely ceremonial and toothless body that lacks the power to make laws. Under Mubarak's rule, the Shura Council was largely dismissed as an ineffectual advisory council without real decision-making powers, and the public remains overwhelmingly sceptical of the Shura's political importance.[225]

Although, number of parties decided to boycott the elections, Council plays a significant role for the future of Egypt. The members of the People's Assembly joined with Shura Council select the members of the assembly that is going to write

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[224] Results of Egypt's People's Assembly Election, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/25/results-of-egypt%E2%80%99s-people%E2%80%99s-assembly-elections, (accessed on 08.05.2013)

[225] Kamel, Salem Mostafa, Shura Council Elections See Low Turnout and Voter Apathy, Atlantic Council, February 02, 2012

the new Egyptian constitution. Since, the large amount of members of both parliaments were belonging to Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups, it was expected that they would occupy the largest portion in Constituent Assembly which might give them a chance to Islamize the political system.[226]

The victory for Muslim Brotherhood and FJP made both the movement and the party the most debated and opposed group. Gamal al-Banna, the youngest brother of Muslim Brotherhood's founder Hasan al-Banna was among the ones who criticized the political position of FJP. Al-Banna explained that there are discomforts with the victories of Islamic movements;because the heads of the Brotherhood now and the Salafis who got into parliament, none of them - neither their organizations nor their ideas – reflect that they are people who live in this day and age and understand how a nation can progress.[227]

At the same time the Freedom and Justice Party members started to appear on Egyptian and International media. The chairman of FJP, Muhammad Morsi gave an interview after the first round of elections to Egyptian channel Dream TV. Morsi commented on subjects especially how FJP will govern when it becomes the majority. As the most debated issue was the question of politics and religion, Morsi defined Egypt as;

> a national constitutional modern democratic State. The principles of Sharia are a main source of legislation. Non-Muslims who belong to divine religions have the right to be ruled and judged by laws of their faiths in their own personal affairs.

Further he emphasised the importance of democratic nature of the state and argued that there is no difference between Shura (Islamic consultation) and democracy in selection mechanisms and the source of power, in authority itself and its circulation. Regarding to the FJP's attitude towards non-Muslims, Copts in particular, Morsi stressed that the party believes that the Copts are owners of this homeland, just like

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[226] Hassan, Ammar Ali, Written on the wall, Al-Ahram Weekly, 23 - 29 February 2011

[227] Fayed, Shaimaa, INTERVIEW-Brotherhood ideas questioned by founder's brother, Reuters, February 28, 2012

Muslims. "The Shura system" Morsi argued; "gives non-Muslims, including our Christian brothers, their full rights, just as they have their duties. They are not to be marginalised, and they certainly are not second-class citizens."[228] Regarding the FJP's position on women, Azza al-Garf as one of nine women members of the People's Assembly commented rather more conservatively regarding the subject. Similar to the election program published by the party Garf explained their vision on women's role in Egypt;

> I wish she would be more insistent to take part in the political life -- to make sure her vote is not rigged and her demands are not ignored. She should be developed in all aspects: health, economic, and education and most importantly taking care of her family. Our families are the future of our country.

Garf also commented on the issue of the Egyptian divorce law which gives a woman to divorce her husband. She argued although divorce is permissible the laws should be strengthen because it "affects the woman's psychology, and it disintegrates family and ruins the children's future, it is only when there is no possible solution that divorce should happen, but we should not seek it."[229]

In the first anniversary of the January 25 Revolution, countries oldest and most organized group, Muslim Brotherhood and its party FJP became the majority in the parliament. The movement transformed in a similar pace from a socioreligious group to a political party as Egypt struggles for democratization. The following chapter will analyse, the Freedom and Justice Party's experience in power, its attitude towards the Presidential elections, the constitution writing and finally the relationship with different political forces in the country.

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[228] Full English Translation of Dr. Mohamed Morsi's Interview on Dream TV with Wael Ibrashi, fjponline, December 14, 2011

[229] Topol,Sarah A., Feminism, Brotherhood Style, Foreign Policy, April 23,2012

CHAPTER 5

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN POWER

5.1. The Parliamentary Experience of Freedom and Justice Party

The Muslim Brotherhood and its political party Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) benefited from the political turmoil that country has been facing and mobilized their supporters that made the group to achieve the highest number of members in both People's Assembly and Shura Council. In the immediate aftermath of the Parliamentary elections, Egypt entered into a power struggle between judiciary and parliament dominated with the FJP and Salafi al-Nour Party members.

The country was struggling in a revolutionary situation while elections took place. None of the parties, represented in parliamentary, were allowed to form the new government until the election of a new president. Egypt during this transitional period was controlled by SCAF leader Mohammad Hussein Tantawi who appointed governments; first post-Mubarak Prime Minister was Essam Sharaf who was succeeded by Kamal Ganzouri. This set of political system indicated the fact that the transformation took place only in the leadership position with ousting of Mubarak and dissolution of the National Democratic Party. On the other hand, there wasn't a radical change in the establishments of judiciary represented by Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), military represented in the form of SCAF and police force close to Ministry of Interior, but most of these figures were appointed by former President Hosni Mubarak. Significant steps were taken by these groups in order to harden the process of the transformation and limit the forthcoming civilian Egyptian parliament which caused outrage around the country. The new parliament was unable to operate in a free environment since it was operating under the SCAF rule and took serious steps towards the Mohammad Mahmoud Street clashes and Port Said Stadium which at the end increased Egyptian's dissatisfaction.

In November 1, Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmy announced "Declaration of the Fundamental Principles for the New Egyptians State" also popularized as "Selmy Document". These "supra constitutional principles" strengthen the SCAF's rule and signalled its intention to continue to rule Egypt. Article 9 was the most controversial points of the declaration. The article granted Armed Forces with a mission to "defend constitutional legitimacy" that allowed its interference to civilian politics. In addition, SCAF who occupies a significant power in Egyptian economy was declared to be immune from "discussing its budget" with civilian authorities. Another critical declaration was made on the control of SCAF over the Constituent Assembly. The document announced;

> If the Constituent Assembly does not complete the draft constitution during the six months stipulated in the Constitutional Declaration for whatever reason, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces – given that it holds the powers of the President of the Republic – will form a new Constituent Assembly [230]

The oppositional groups that forced Mubarak to step down raised their discontent regarding this document of "supra constitutional principles", by organizing mass protests mostly in the popular Tahrir Square in November 18. Muslim Brotherhood, Freedom and Justice Party and its Democratic Alliance confirmed; "its stance towards its demands that the people's will be fully respected and not circumvented since it is the most important objective of the January 25 revolution."[231] The protests soon turned into violent clashes between protestors who threw rocks as well as Molotov cocktails and riot police, connected to Ministry of Interior, reacted by using tear gas and rubber bullets in Muhammad Mahmoud Street near to Tahrir Square. For protestors the clash was regarded as the Battle of Dignity against the rule of SCAF and the treatment of Ministry of Interior. It continued for six days until November 25, three days before Parliamentary elections, left 47 death and thousands

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[230] Declaration of the Fundamental Principles for the New Egyptian State, http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2011.11_-_commentary_on_fundamental_principles_english_final.pdf (accessed on 15.05.2013)

[231] Democratic Alliance Parties to Take Part in Nov 18 Protests Against Supra-Constitutional Document, fjponline, November 17, 2011 http://fjponline.com/article.php?id=132

injured. As a result, the Prime Minister Essam Sharaf resigned due to pressure from the street and replaced by Kamal Ganzouri in December 7. The "Battle of Dignity" had a direct effect on civil-military relations in future Egyptian politics as Hesham Sallam stated; "Without the Mohamed Mahmoud protests, the SCAF might have remained in power for two or three more years."[232]

Similar to protests in Mohamed Mahmoud Street that left large number of casualties, the Port Said riot was regarded as Egypt's the worst-ever football disasters. Following a football match between al-Masry and al-Ahly in February 1, 2012, hooligans from al-Masry team rushed into the stadium and attacked the al-Ahly fans, also known as Ultras Ahlawy who became famous with their confrontation with police during the January 25 uprising. The riot caused the deaths of 74 fans and more than one thousand injured. The riot police was criticized as they were not involving to disperse the crowd. Freedom and Justice Party declared a statement regarding the Port Said riot and the rise in the number of crimes "points to treacherous hands which are no longer hidden, intent on forcing Egypt into chaos and destruction."[233]

There were disputes not only in the streets but also in the newly elected parliament. One of the major debate emerged in March 25 after the announcement of Constituent Assembly members that will write new constitution consisting of 100 members, 50 parliamentarians and 50 non-parliamentarians. Similar to the parliamentary elections, 25 FJP MPs and 11 al-Nour MPs was selected to the committee. 25 of the 50 non-parliamentary members of the committee were also closely linked to Islamic groups. However, this overwhelming majority in both Parliaments and Constituent Assembly by FJP and al-Nour Party raised the criticism towards the Islamic movements. In protest of the "unfair proportion" of the Islamic movements in the Assembly, The Wafd Party joined with the Free Egyptians, the Popular Socialist Alliance, and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party to withdraw

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[232] Ibrahim, Ekram, Mohamed Mahmoud clashes, 1 year on: 'A battle for dignity', Ahramonline November, 19, 2011

[233] Freedom and Justice Party Statement on Port Said Stadium Events, Ikhwanweb February 2, 2012

from the assembly. Ahmed Saeed from the Free Egyptian party explained their decision as; "We refused the political bargain because it was made evident to us that the constitution will be drafted solely by Islamist forces, who gave to themselves the right to write the constitution, excluding the remaining components of Egyptian society."[234] The largest religious establishments in the country, Coptic Church and al-Azhar Mosque also decided to boycott the majority of Islamic movements in Assembly by withdrawing their members. In a consensus between all representatives who withdrew from the Assembly agreed the fact that the representation shouldn't be 50 parliamentary and 50 non parliamentary members. For instance Amr Moussa in an interview view told to al-Arabiya; "I am not against having MPs in the Constituent Assembly, but their percentage should not have exceeded 20-25%." Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party, on the other hand, defended their position by arguing that they have the number largest of seats in both People's Assembly and Shura Council but deny the fact that Islamists are monopolizing. However, party tried to strengthen its relations with the forces that withdrew from Assembly as Jamal Heshmat, Deputy of the People's Assembly Committee on Foreign Relations said;

> We extend our hands of cooperation to all. We put forward non-FJP personalities from within and outside parliament, in pursuit of the best harmonic, consensus format that would honour the Constitution of the revolution[235]

In April 10, Supreme Administrative Court ruled for suspension of the Constituent Assembly without giving reasons for the decision but the statement by SCAF said; "The constituent assembly is unrepresentative of Egyptians." Mohammad Morsi, Chairman of Freedom and Justice Party stated that the party respects the decision of the court and will not challenge the verdict.[236] In addition, critics of the suspension

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[234] Khazbak, Rana, Secular forces withdraw from constituent assembly, but next step unclear, Egypt Independent, March 27, 2012

[235] Mahmoud, Hussein, *Dr. Heshmat: We Extend Our Hands of Dialogue and Cooperation to All*, fjponline, March, 29, 2012 http://www.fjponline.com/article.php?id=552&ref=search.php

[236] *Dr. Morsi: Freedom and Justice Party Respects Verdict on Constituent Assembly*, Ikhwanweb, April 10, 2012 http://www.ikhwanonline.info/article.php?id=29867

argued that the decision is against the constitution since Article 60 of the current constitution binds the People's Assembly and Shura Council to form the Constituent Assembly but doesn't define the proportion of the representation.[237]

Despite the fact that the elections of People's Assembly and Shura Council were free and fair, Parliament was unable to operate freely due to restrictions by SCAF and SCC. The highest level of clash between elected MPs and appointed judges and generals reached when the parliament voted no confidence with the Kamal el-Ganzouri government. Large number of MPs from various political parties including, Freedom and Justice Party, announced their criticisms against SCAF and Ganzouri government. FJP spokesman Hussein Ibrahim declared the party's discontent by arguing that "This government is not a big difference from the governments of the former regime." Similar claims were made by Mohammad el-Beltagy from FJP when he stated "that we want new governments free from the pressure of the ruling SCAF."[238] In March 25, FJP released a statement regarding the parties position on the issue where it argued that the SCAF's support for the Ganzouri government "is both a shameful disgrace and an imminent danger to the revolution and its goals." Further FJP blamed SCAF for endangering the forth coming presidential elections; "we are more than fairly concerned about the integrity and the transparency of the upcoming elections and the possibility of it being defrauded, rigged in favour of a particular candidate who some may want to force on the Egyptian people."[239] Against these claims SCAF released its own communique stating; "We urge everyone to remember well the lessons of history, to avoid repeating past mistakes which we do not wish to relive, and instead to look to the future in a spirit of cooperation and collaboration, and hold the higher interests of the

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[237] *Egypt court suspends constitutional assembly*, BBC News, April 10 , 2012

[238] Essam el-Din, Gamal, *Egypt MPs move closer to vote of no confidence in Ganzouri's govt*, Ahram Online, March 11, 2012

[239] *Freedom and Justice Party Executive Office Statement - Sunday, 25 March 2012*, fjponline, March 27, 2012 http://www.fjponline.com/article.php?id=542

homeland above all else." The statement was regarded as a threat by military to dissolve the parliament and a reminder of July 1952 Free Officers coup and 1954, the year when Abd el-Nasser banned Muslim Brotherhood. The reply came from Osama Yassin, Assistant Secretary-General of FJP said; "Without a doubt, Egypt's January 25 Revolution is nowhere like the 1952 Coup. We don't fear dissolution of Parliament. We do not work for prestige, nor for glory or high positions"[240] As the political tension was high between Freedom and Justice Party and SCAF, debate increased as the country started to enter into campaigns of first Presidential elections.

5.2. The Presidential Elections

Presidential race which was planned to take place in May 23 and candidates started to register in March 10. The number of candidates had potential to be successful in the elections; former foreign minister and former Secretary General of Arab League, Amr Moussa, founder of left leaning Karama Party, Hamdeen Sabbahy, Salafi politician, Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, former Muslim Brotherhood member, Abd al-Moneim Abul Futuh and former Commander of the Air Force and Prime Minister, Ahmed Shafiq. Although, former director general of International Atomic Energy Agency, Muhammad al-Baradey, announced his candidacy as early as March 7, 2011, he withdrew from his decision in protest of military's continuing rule in the country.[241]

The position of Muslim Brotherhood from the very beginning was not to show any candidate during the presidential elections. They were announcing this intention during their speeches during the January 25 uprising and while they were establishing their political party Freedom and Justice Party. This was one of the reasons why progressive members of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Abd al-Moneim Abul Futuh was dismissed from the group after his declaration to run for

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[240] *Dr. Osama Yassin: We Do Not Fear Threats to Dissolve Parliament*, Ikhwanweb, March 28, 2012 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29821
[241] David D. Kirkpatrick, *Nobel Laureate Drops Bid for Presidency of Egypt*, The New York Times, January 14, 2012

presidential post.[242] In April 1, however, Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party released a statement announcing that they had changed their decision on nominating a candidate in the Presidential elections. It was regarded that Egypt's transition towards democracy is in danger. Deputy Chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood, Khairat el-Shater was chosen to run for the Presidency as the FJP's candidate. He was regarded as the economic leader of the Muslim Brotherhood movement with his business connections in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar and was imprisoned for a total of more than twelve years between 1992 and 2011.[243] In explanation why Freedom and Justice Party withdrew from its old stance; the statement proposed;

> the latest changes that occurred in   recent months, both in the domestic and international arenas, especially the continuous attempts to derail or obstruct the progress of democratic transition, the clear and utter failure that has become increasingly evident in the performance of the current government, and attempts to disrupt and undermine the Egyptian parliament and its decisions and actions, which did shake the people's confidence in the steps so far taken towards democratic transformation.[244]

This step was taken after the candidacy of former regime member and Mubarak's last Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq announced his presidency and rumours on the former intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman was going to declare his candidacy as well. With the announcement of Shater as candidate the struggle between old regime elements and the Muslim Brotherhood was redefined, this time for the highest position in the Egyptian politics. This decisional change can also be regarded as a revolution within Muslim Brotherhood where the movement transformed its gradualist and non-confrontational method and was forced to join the presidential struggle. Larbi Sadiki explained the situation as; "In the new polity, confrontational and revolutionary posture is a matter of necessity. If the Ikhwan did not adjust, they would risk, once

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[242] *MB Shura Council Dismisses Abul Fotouh*, ikhwanweb, June 19, 2011
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=28737

[243] Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher, *Islamist Parties in Power: A Work in Progress*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 23, 2012

[244] Freedom and Justice Party Executive Office Statement – Monday, 2 April 2012, fjponline, April 2, 2012 http://www.fjponline.com/article.php?id=572

again, confinement in and to a political space and order not of their doing and not to their advantage."[245] There were also critics within Muslim Brotherhood such as Kamal al-Helbawy former spokesperson of the movement announced his resignation from the group after the Shater's nomination and argued; "They were flip-flopping in their position and aspiring for power in a way that did not differ much from the National Democratic Party... I cannot stand in the ranks of people who turned their back on the revolution"[246] On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood *Murshid* Muhammad Badie stressed the movements respect to what comes out from ballot box. In response to these claims which compare FJP with Mubarak's Party NDP, Badie argued;

> The NDP won all elections through fraud, and it did not reflect the will of the people. The Brotherhood did not monopolize anything in the executive branch; it did not form a government and has no governors, all it won, including the legislative authority, was through elections.[247]

The debate of the presidential elections increased over the possible disqualifications of number of candidates including Muslim Brotherhood and FJP's candidate Khairat al-Shater. To prevent such a threat, FJP Chairman Mohammad Morsi nominated "as a second candidate for the presidency, as a necessary precaution to ensure the continuation of the march of the desired peaceful transition in this homeland."[248]

Muslim Brotherhood and FJP announced their presidential elections campaign for the future of Egypt which was entitled Nahda (Renaissance) Project. In the first press conference Shater outline basic parameters of the Project. Contrary to previous programs drawn by the movement Shater made frequent references towards

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[245] Sadiki, Larbi, Egypt's presidency: The revolution within the Ikhwan, Al Jazeera, April 10, 2012

[246] Elmeshad, Mohamed, Profile: Kamal al-Helbawy, a defector of conscience, Egyptindependent, April 9, 2012

[247] Badie defends decision to field presidential candidate, Al-Masr Al-Youm, April 3, 2012

[248] Muslim Brotherhood, Freedom and Justice Party Statement – Sunday 8 April 2012, Ikhwanweb, April 8, 2012 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29854

the issues of fight against corruption, economic development and restoring security, which seriously damaged during the political turmoil after the January 25 Revolution. Shater argued that the program aim at drawing lessons from the experiences of all successful countries such as Italy, Germany, South Africa, India and Norway; and to cooperate with those countries in the economic field.[249] The program was also repeating the former programs with its reference to the Islamic nature of their project by arguing that "any project should have a frame of reference. In the West they use the capitalist frame; the Soviet Union followed the communist frame, and our frame of reference will be Islamic."[250] In his interview to al-Arabiya however, Shater assured that *Murshid* Mohammad Badie will not be interfering in the decision making process, instead, he explained; "I will rule Egypt through the constitution drafted by the people."[251]

The campaign and appearance of Khairat al-Shater as Muslim Brotherhood's candidate increased rapidly in two weeks, until the verdict of Supreme Presidential Elections Committee (SPEC) declared in April 14 regarding the candidates. It was announced that 10 out of 23 registered candidates for the presidency as ineligible for running for the presidency, including Muslim Brotherhood and FJP candidate Khairat al-Shater, Salafi politician Hazem Abu Ismail and former head of intelligence Omar Suleiman. The decision was taken due to the former imprisonment of Shater under Mubarak regime. It was also regarded by the group as "an attempt by the old Mubarak regime to hijack the last stage of this transitional period and reproduce the old system of governance."[252] Although, Muslim Brotherhood and FJP challenged the verdict, Shater was unable to rerun and stated; "The issue is not who

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[249] Al-Shater Outlines Egyptian Renaissance Project at First Press Conference, Ikhwanweb, April 9, 2012 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29859

[250] Shams El-Din, Mai, MB presidential hopeful Al-Shater launches 'Renaissance Project', Daily News Egypt, April 9, 2012

[251] Egypt's Brotherhood presidential candidate says he will not follow Supreme Guide if elected, al-Arabiya, April 10, 2012

[252] SPEC disqualifies 10 candidates including Suleiman, El-Shater and Abu-Ismail, Ahramonline, April 14, 2012

will run. What matters is safeguarding freedoms and the continuation of the revolution."[253] The decision forced the party to continue with the campaign supporting Mohammad Morsi as the presidential candidate. He is a US-educated engineering academic and was elected to the parliament in 2005 elections.[254]

During the course of presidential race, the criticism against candidates with strong connections with former regime members, also known in its Arabic version "*foloul*" arouse. FJP along with other Islamic parties, called for million-man march in Tahrir square to protest against *foloul* candidates in three consecutive weeks. Secular and revolutionary groups, such as April 6 Movement, announced their support for the second protest which was called "Self-Determination Friday" in April 21 that witnessed the rising diversity on political agendas as some groups criticized Muslim Brotherhood.[255] While the protests were taking place in the streets, the People's Assembly gathered to draft the "Disenfranchisement Law" on banning *foloul* members who were part of Mubarak regime ten years prior to his resignation in 2011, from running in the forthcoming elections which included the last Prime Minister, Ahmad Shafiq. In April 24, SCAF ratified the law and Shafiq has been disqualified from the race.[256] However, he challenged the decision and argued that the Law is unconstitutional since it was passed after his application and SPEC reinstated his candidacy in the following day.[257]

The political turmoil following the Parliamentary elections caused decrease in the popularity of Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party. This was

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[253] Al-Shater, After Disqualification Decision: What Matters is Freedom, the Revolution, ikhwanweb, April 15, 2012 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29887

[254] Abdel-Rahman Hussein, *Profile: Mohamed Morsi*, The Guardian, June 24, 2012

[255] El-Kouny, Nada, On 'Self-Determination Friday' Egyptian political forces unite...somewhat, April 21, 2012

[256] Shukrallah, Salma, Egypt's political future hangs in balance as Constitutional Court prepares to issue key rulings, June 13, 2012

[257] Sarah El Deeb, Egypt Election Commission: Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak's PM, Allowed Back In Race, April 25, 2012

shown by a survey conducted by Gallup one month prior to Presidential elections, "support for the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) -- the official political party of the decades-old Islamist movement -- fell 24 percentage points to 43% in April after reaching a high of 67% in February 2012."[258] Another survey by Brookings on Egyptian Public opinion showed that among the candidates Abul-Futuh led with 32%, followed by Amr Moussa with 28%, followed by Ahmad Shafiq with 14%, and Mohammad Morsi and Hamdeen Sabbahi with 8% each.[259] In light of polls two front runner candidates, Abul Futuh and Amr Moussa, for the first time in 60 year old republic chosen for a televised debate to present their political positions.

Although the polls were not optimistic for Muslim Brotherhood and FJP candidate Mohammad Morsi as one of the possible winners of this race, the campaign continued where Khairat al-Shater left while explaining "Nahda Project". It was not until April 28 when Nahda Project was published and distributed to voters. The program is more inclusive and patriotic with its constant references to the Egyptian nation and society where the party tried to represent itself as capable of ruling the country which required them not to rely only on their own political base but as one that can join different ideologies. However similar to the pre-Revolution programs published by the movement, Islamic reference occupies a significant role. This is indicated as the program "aims to re-build the Egyptian person, the Egyptian society and the Egyptian nation, with an Islamic reference and a modern cultural identity for the enlightened, noble people of Egypt." Further in explanation of political system the project stresses that "it favours true democracy and national belonging, with Islam as a reference; and sets out with unpartable Egyptian pride." In addition it urged to establish the checks and balances over the political authority. These developments for the Egyptian state system was regarded as building the political system in Nahda Project where it should start by "approving mechanisms for public monitoring of government performance to guarantee a higher level of

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[258] Mohamed Younis and Ahmed Younis, Support for Islamists Declines as Egypt's Election Nears, Gallup, May 18, 2012

[259] Shibley Telhami, What Do Egyptians Want? Key Findings from the Egyptian Public Opinion Poll, Brookings, May 21, 2012

transparency and integrity in performance" and "Enabling all Egyptians to participate in national and political activities rather than limiting this activity to the economic and social elite of Egypt." The program also promoted the idea of political participation "rather than domination in forming a coalition government, representing all political players and stakeholders in Egyptian society to enable us to work together on building the future of Egypt without excluding any principal political party."

The program didn't bring a change on Muslim Brotherhood's stance on non-Muslim, especially Coptic Christian Egyptians who was regarded as citizens of the country which enjoy equal rights without discrimination on religious differences. On the question of women where Muslim Brotherhood has been questioned mostly, the program dealt with number of contemporary issues regarding Egyptian women. It was explained that the President will work for; a) Protection of the Egyptian woman from harassments on Egyptian streets and from all forms of discrimination when applying for public or private job positions. b) Give special support to women doing economic activities such as small businesses, and encourage pioneer women managing their own private enterprises. c) Changing the negative stance of Egyptian culture regarding women's political participation by presenting successful role models and figures.[260]

5.3. Electoral Performance of Mohammad Morsi

Mohammad Morsi was one of the late comers to the presidential race but with the help of the Muslim Brotherhood's experience of social mobilization, increased its appearance as a potential front runner. First round of elections held in May 23-24 was a major step in the history of Egypt and Muslim Brotherhood. Contrary to the results of surveys, Mohammad Morsi came out as the winner with 24.78% and followed by Ahmad Shafiq as the second with 23.66%, Hamdeen Sabbahi as the third with 20.72%, Abul Futuh occupied the fourth with 17.47% and Amr Moussa

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[260] Dr. Morsi's Electoral Program – General Features of Nahda (Renaissance) Project, fjponline, April 28, 2012 http://fjponline.com/article.php?id=654

was fifth with 11.13%. In a regional scale, Morsi won in Giza and Buhayra, two of the six major governorates whereas Shafiq became majority in Sharqia and Daqahlia, however two largest cities in Egypt, Cairo and Alexandria, favoured Nasserite candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi. Ahmed Abd Rabou suggested that the results were indicating that people who voted for Freedom and Justice Party in People's Assembly elections punished both Muslim Brotherhood and FJP in the Presidential elections by voting other candidates, because of the their weak parliamentary performance. However, Muslim Brotherhood was still capable of mobilizing its supporters for the ballot box and "they seem to be the most professional entity in electioneering."[261] The results were surprising for many analysts since two frontrunner candidates Abul Futuh and Amr Moussa came out as fourth and fifth lines where competition took place between Muslim Brotherhood candidate and a *foloul* member was going to participate to the runoff elections. Basheer Nafi argued that the elections witnessed the failure of pro-Islamic candidates both Morsi and Abul Futuh. Despite its reformist Islamic rhetoric, Abul Futuh failed to gain from those who didn't vote for Islamic Political Parties in Parliamentary elections. In addition, Salafi groups especially *al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya* and its political party al-Nour announced their support for Abul Futuh, however Salafi votes split between Abul Futuh and Morsi.[262]

After the first round two main events changed the debate from who is going to be the next president of Egypt to the democratic transition of the country. The Egyptian political environment was focused on Egyptian Court's verdict on the trails of former President Hosni Mubarak alongside his two sons, Gamal and Alaa, former interior minister Habib al-Adly and six of his aides. The trail was started in August 3, 2011 and they were charged with corruption and conspiring on killing of protestors during 18-day protests which ousted Mubarak. The court announced the decision of

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[261] Abd Rabou, Ahmed, Egypt After Elections: Towards The Second Republic?, Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 3, (2012), 20

[262] Basheer Nafi, Egypt at a Crossroads: The Presidential Elections and Their Aftermath, Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 3, (2012), 4

life sentence for both Hosni Mubarak and Habib al-Adly. However, the other tried former regime members were found not guilty of all charges against themselves. The decision of the court inflamed opposition towards the justice system as revolutionary groups including Muslim Brotherhood, April 6 movement, and al-Ahly football fans Ultras called for protests in Tahrir Square and around Egypt. There were different demands of the crowd which lacked unity among protestors. Although, some groups demanded the establishment of "presidential council" consisting of all presidential candidates to draft the new Egyptian constitution and secure the transition to civil rule, this didn't receive full support from all parties. There were also who called for the revolutionary trails, dismissal of public prosecutor Abdel Maguid Mahmoud and application for "Disenfranchisement Law".[263]

Second decision that disrupted the presidential race was the decision of SCC over the dissolution of Egyptian Parliament and unconstitutionality of "Disenfranchisement Law" two days before the second runoff of Presidential Elections, in June 14. The argument was that the Parliamentary elections breached the principle of equality when it allowed party members to contest a third of seats set aside for independents. The remaining two thirds were contested by party slates.[264] The declaration stated "The constitutional court affirmed in the details of its verdict that the parliamentary elections were not constitutional, and the entire composition of parliament has been illegitimate since its election." The common reaction was regarding this decision as a "coup" by SCAF. "Keeping the military candidate (in the race) and overturning the elected parliament after granting the military police the right to arrest (in June 13) is a complete coup and whoever thinks that millions of youth will let it pass is deluding themselves," argued former Presidential Candidate, Abul Futuh. Freedom and Justice Party as their candidate was going to compete in the runoff for presidency expressed their respect for the decision but added their doubts about the future of Egypt as Essam al-Aryan, FJP vice President, told; "If

[263] El-Gundy, Zeinab, From presidential council to revolutionary trials: What does Tahrir want this time?, Ahramonline, June 7, 2012

[264] Egypt court rules entire parliament illegally elected, orders body to dissolve after unconstitutional vote, CBSNews, June 14, 2012

parliament is dissolved, the country will enter a dark tunnel -- the coming president will face neither a parliament nor a constitution."[265] Further in an official statement of Muslim Brotherhood urged "voters turn out to cast their ballots in the presidential election, to isolate the representative of the former regime through the ballot box, and to protect the electoral process against fraud attempts."[266]

The runoff Presidential elections in June 16-17 were another turning point in the history of Muslim Brotherhood which brought one of their members, Mohammad Morsi to the highest position in the republic. The vote witnessed the historical challenge between Muslim Brotherhood and remnants of Mubarak regime. The majority of the revolutionary forces including April 6 movement, Salafi groups, former Muslim Brotherhood member, Abul Futuh declared their support for Presidency for Morsi. On the other hand, Shafiq gained the support of business tycoons, liberal political leaders and intellectuals, such as Usama al-Ghazali Harb and Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim, the liberal Free Egyptians Party, a number of leaders of the Wafd party, and the leftist Tagamu' Party.[267] In the second day of vote, June 17, SCAF declared that it amended number of articles in the constitution which was accepted by popular vote in March 2011 and expanded the powers of military but limited the new president in his decisions. According to article 53;

> The incumbent SCAF members are responsible for deciding on all issues related to the armed forces including appointing its leaders and extending the terms in office of the aforesaid leaders. The current head of the SCAF is to act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and minister of defence until a new constitution is drafted.[268]

Article 56 of the constitution allowed SCAF to assume the powers of the parliament until the new parliament is elected. The declaration was similar to the previously proposed and withdrawn Selmy document which caused outrage around the country.

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[265] Egypt court says whole parliament unconstitutional, orders dissolution, AlArabiya, June 14, 2012

[266] Muslim Brotherhood Statement on Constitutionality of Disenfranchisement Law Decision, Ikhwanweb, June 15, 2012

[267] Nafi, 5

[268] English text of SCAF amended Egypt Constitutional Declaration, Ahram Online, June 18, 2012

As in the Selmy document, the constitutional declaration stated that SCAF will appoint its own Constituent Assembly members unless current committee is unable to write new constitution on the decided date. This was apparently a threat for Egypt's democratic transition and an indication of SCAF's will for exceed its time in handing over the power to the civilian authorities, which was announced as June 30.[269]

Although both campaigners Mohammad Morsi and Ahmad Shafiq declared their victory in June 18, the official results were delayed until June 24 that led to rumours on intervention of SCAF on elections to help Shafiq to win. However, SPEC announced Muhammad Morsi as the fifth president of Arabic Republic of Egypt. He occupied a special place in political history of the country by becoming first civilian president in 60 year old republic and being a member of the largest opposition group in Egyptian history. According to the results, Morsi was able to receive 51.73% but Shafiq came as second with 48.27% with a small margin of 800.000 votes. The turnout rates were lower than expected with 51.58% compared to 62% in Parliamentary elections. These results and the victory for the Muslim Brotherhood, FJP and their candidate Mohammad Morsi were contrary to the predicaments of the analysts on the voting behaviour of Egyptian citizens which can be, similar to the first round, seen in the scale of regional. Cairo and Port Said voted for Shafiq whereas Alexandria and Suez voted for Morsi. As Abd Rabou pointed out; the rural governorates which are mostly conservative continued to vote for Shafiq while Upper Egypt, where tribes were thought to have mobilized for Shafiq, voted for Morsi.[270]

5.4. Mohammad Morsi's Presidential Performance

Election results announced Mohammad Morsi as the fifth president of Egypt in June 24 and he took official oath for Presidency in June 30 before High

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[269] SCAF expands its power with constitutional amendments, Egypt Independent, June 17, 2012

[270] Abd Rabou, 20

Constitutional Court since People's Assembly was dissolved. Between June 29 and 30 Morsi delivered two important speeches aside from his oath, first in front of a cheering crowd in iconic Tahrir Square and second in Cairo University. In both of these speeches Morsi stressed the importance Egyptian nationhood and superiority of the "People's will" rather than projecting a religious political vision;

> I say to everyone now… to all the people, the Ministries and the government, the army and police of Egypt, men and women, at home and abroad… I say it with full force "No authority is over or above this power". You are the source of power. You are the owners of the will. You grant power to whomsoever you choose, and you withdraw power from whomsoever you choose.[271]

Morsi became the president in an environment where he was challenged by judiciary and armed forces as they attempted to block the functionality of legislation by dissolving the People's Assembly and limiting the powers of the new president. "To fully preserve the country's independence and territorial integrity," Morsi explained in his Cairo University Speech "it is necessary to keep up the armed forces, police and judiciary, and to protect all the people of Egypt." Despite SCAF was trying to lengthen its term in power, he declared that "SCAF has honoured its promise and pledge not to be a substitute for popular will."[272] Morsi attempted to clarify his role as the president of Egypt by appealing to opponents of him and stated; "I will not differentiate between supporters and opponents." Finally, one of the most supported promises of Morsi was to work for freedom of all political detainees who were arrested during the revolution. However, he also mentioned Egyptian Jihadi leader Omar Abd el-Rahman (also known as Blind Sheikh) who was supported by majority of Salafi movements in Egypt and imprisoned for life in United States because of his connections with the World trade Centre bombings in 1993.[273]

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[271] President Mohamed Morsi's Speech in Tahrir Square, Friday June 29, 2012, fjponline, June 30, 2012 http://www.fjponline.com/article.php?id=871

[272] President Mohamed Morsi's Speech at Cairo University, Saturday, June 30, after Taking Oath of Office, fjponline, July 1, 2012 http://www.fjponline.com/article.php?id=874

[273]*Mohamed Morsi vows to free blind sheikh jailed in US*, The Guardian, June 30, 2012

Another significant declaration delivered by Mohammad Morsi was his "100 days plan" for five major problems Egyptians face in their daily life security, traffic, sanitation, bread and fuel. Under the heading of security; Morsi promised giving benefits to policemen whose geographic areas of responsibility are well secured and rewarding citizens who provide the police with information about crime Buying new and improved police vehicles. For traffic, as one of the biggest problems in Egypt, Morsi assured regulating the hours during which large trucks can drive within cities and requiring those working on transportation projects to cease operations at a specific time of day so that they do not impede traffic. In the post-Mubarak Egypt sanitation emerged as a serious problem that endangered the health. Morsi urged to tackle this problem by creating awareness campaigns about the importance of good sanitation and removing trash from the streets and cleaning public squares and streets. President stressed that he will work for improving the quality of bread by enhancing the nutritional value of bread. He finally promised to end the regular fuel and gas shortages by Regulating fuel and petroleum gas going to citizens on a governorate level and ensuring punishment for those who smuggle fuel and those who aid them. Revolutionary groups declared that they will impose checks and balances over the promises of Morsi's promises and established a website entitled; Morsi Meter.[274]

Mohammad Morsi assumed office without enjoying the broad powers granted for a president. He signalled his intention to challenge the anti-democratic verdicts by both SCAF and SCC to secure the peaceful transition. These attempts were also regarded as Brotherhood's takeover of the country or hijacking of the country by those who were sceptical of Muslim Brotherhood's plans. This became apparent when Morsi announced in July 8 his decision to reinstate the dissolved People's Assembly dominated by Islamic political parties. Although it was little chance that the decision will be accepted by the SCC or SCAF this created a shock for many political analysts and officials that also caused divide within the revolutionary camp. Majority of Islamic political parties, April 6 movement and Egyptian writer Alaa Al-

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[274]Available from; http://www.morsimeter.com/en (accessed in 27.05.2012)

Aswany declared their support for the decision of Morsi.[275] On the other hand, leftist and liberal political parties such as Egyptian Social Democratic Party, Tagammu Party and Wafd Party boycotted the decree on reinstatement of People's Assembly and described this attempt as Muslim Brotherhood's confrontation with the SCAF which can lead nothing but chaos in the country.[276] Hala Mustafa analysed that the relationship between SCAF and Presidency "will be like this for the coming period of time. Each side — the SCAF on one side, and the Muslim Brotherhood and the President on the other — will be trying to consolidate their power on the ground."[277] SCAF and SCC hold emergency meeting to discuss the Morsi's decree and later announced that the earlier decision on dissolution of People's Assembly is binding on all authorities of the state.

Although, Freedom and Justice Party was unable to form the new Egyptian government, since the constitution required the election of a new president, it was argued, the party gained the opportunity to achieve this aim with Mohammad Morsi. There were claims about the nomination of a well-known Brother such as; former presidential candidate of Muslim Brotherhood, Khairat al-Shater or FJP vice-president Essam al-Aryan as the next Prime Minister. On the other hand, it was also like to follow the tradition of former regime by appointing a Prime Minister with economist background since economy is regarded as the biggest problem, Egypt is facing. Abdullah Shehata, economist and member of FJP argued that the economist as "Not a dogmatic, liberal kind of economist, but one who can strike a balance between efficiency [provided by free market laws] and justice [provided by the state]."[278] In June 24, Morsi decided on Hesham Qandil who served as Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation under Kamal al-Ganzouri government to become the

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[275] *Brotherhood calls for million-man march to back Morsi's decree*, Ahram Online, July 9, 2012

[276] Egypt's leftist, liberal MPs to boycott Tuesday's parliament session, Ahram Online, July 9, 2012

[277] Hauslohner, Abigail, Is Egypt's President Morsy Really Challenging the Ruling Junta?, Time World, July 8, 2012

[278] Feteha, Ahmed, Salma Hussein, *Egypt's long-awaited new premier likely to be a Liberal economist, not a Brother,* Ahram Online, July 17, 2012

first Prime Minister of Mohammad Morsi after taking oath in August 2. Qandil was not well-known by the general public; he was educated in United States and had experience in state institutions but didn't have any affiliation with political groups including Muslim Brotherhood.[279]

The confrontation between SCAF and Morsi started especially after an attack against Egyptian soldiers in Egypt-Israeli border in Sinai in August 5 which left 16 soldiers dead. In the immediate aftermath of the incident Morsi fired his intelligence chief, the head of the military police, several Interior Ministry officials and the head of the presidential guard. Muslim Brotherhood released a statement claiming that this attack aimed to achieve goals such as; "to prove the failure of the new Egyptian government, formed just three days ago and to disrupt the new President's reform project."[280] The opposition grew against the president for not protecting the borders of the country. Morsi took a significant decision concerning military leadership in light of the recent events and announced the retirement of Defence Minister and SCAF Head, Hussein Tantawi and Chief of Staff Sami Enan. Both Tantawi and Enan became presidential advisors and awarded with the Order of the Nile medal. The order of the President replaced Tantawi with the Head of Military Intelligence Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. Aside from the positions of the SCAF leaders, Morsi issued a new four article Constitutional Declaration which abrogated the SCAF's constitutional decree in June 17 which limited the powers of the president. The decree transferred the executive and legislative powers previously enjoyed by SCAF to President as well as the authority of managing Constituent Assembly. This move was regarded with multiple outcomes, first as a step towards accomplishing the revolutionary goals. Omar Ashour described that "This move will enter history as a significant shift in civil-military balance of power towards the civilian side."[281] Secondly, however,

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[279] Jumana Al Tamimi, *Is Hesham Qandil the right man for Egypt?,* Gulfnews.com, August 1, 2012

[280] Muslim Brotherhood Statement on Unprovoked Aggression Against Rafah Border-Guards, fjponline, August 7, 2012

[281], Haroon Siddique and Lousia Loveluck*, Egypt reacts after Morsi moves against military chiefs - Monday 13 August*, The Guardian, August 13, 2012

the decree was understood as Issandr El Amrani, Mohammad Morsi acting towards obtaining powers in which can lead to the creation of a new "dictator" depending on how to use them.[282] Similarly, Rifaat Al-Saeed, head of the National Progressive Unionist Party, urged Morsi to act independent from Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau, "otherwise he will turn into a new Pharaoh, but "with a beard.""[283]

One of the significant competitors against Morsi's Presidency was diminished after the decision to sack the SCAF leadership. The opposition against the President was consisting of secular and liberal political parties and judiciary, who was appointed by Hosni Mubarak himself. In this political turmoil Salafi movement seem the closest group towards Morsi's rule since both had their roots in Islamic activism. However, Khalil al-Anani explained; "the relationship between Salafis and the [Brotherhood] is complex and variant. I see them as adversaries more than allies. Both compete over audience, influence and political interests. They occasionally cooperate, but only to hit secular and liberals."[284] The complex nature of relationship became apparent after the release of an anti-Islamic movie that was mocking Prophet Mohammad. In September 11, the anniversary of terrorist attack on the United States Salafi groups, especially *al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya* joined with al-Nour Party called for protest in front of U.S. Embassy in Cairo against the movie, where soon the number of protestors reached around 3.000. Angry demonstrators showed their anger by climbing the wall of the embassy and tore down the U.S. flag and replaced it with the black flag which "There is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God" written on it and commonly used by al-Qaeda.[285] It was apparent during the events as some protestors raised the pictures of Omar Abd el-Rahman as well as former al-

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[282]Issandr El Amrani, *The Morsi Maneuver: A First Take,* The Arabist, August 12, 2012

[283] Ibtissam Taalab, Mahmoud Ramzy and Ahmad Allam, *Politicians: the President must Exercise his Legislative Power the Least Possible and Away from the Brotherhood*, trans. Sami-Joe Abboud, Al-Masry Al-Youm, August 22, 2012

[284] Ashraf Khalil, *What the Salafis Want: An Interview with the Blind Sheik's Son,* Time, September 27, 2012

[285] Sarah El Sirgany and Ian Black, *Egypt's president pledges to protect embassies after film protests*, The Guardian, September 13, 2012

Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden. Although, the demonstrations were triggered by the release of the anti-Islam and Prophet Mohammad movie soon, it was argued that the protests turned towards demand for release of Abd el-Rahman.[286] However, his son described the scene as; "I could see it wasn't very well organized. There were people who wanted to scale the walls and people who wanted to hold a sit-in. People were yelling at each other and arguing. I and my people left and came back here."[287]

As a pre-emptive action U.S. Embassy in Cairo released a statement which read "We firmly reject the actions by those who abuse the universal right of free speech to hurt the religious beliefs of others." Protestors were not limited to Egypt but soon spread different parts of the world such as Sudan, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Similarly in September 11 in Libya, the protests took another shape as Ansar al-Sharia; group affiliated with al-Qaeda, stormed the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi and killed four people including U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens.[288] Although, the event drew attention towards the political situation in Libya, the protests might also endanger Egypt-US relations. "I call on everyone to take that into consideration, to not violate Egyptian law…" President Mohammad Morsi stated "to not assault embassies, I condemn and oppose all who… insult our prophet. [But] it is our duty to protect our guests and visitors from abroad."[289] In a similar line, Freedom and Justice Party, released a statement, in September 11 and urged for decency rather than clash; "The FJP points that the best approach to combat these negative phenomena   is by promoting dialogue among religions and cultures and to promote mutual understanding and joint action to address racism and extremism."[290]

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[286] Thomas Joscelyn, *In Service of the Blind Sheikh?*, The Weekly Standart, September 12, 2012

[287] Khalil Ashraf, *What the Salafis Want: An Interview with the Blind Sheik's Son*

[288] *What They Said, Before and After the Attack in Libya*, The New York Times, September 12, 2012

[289] Sarah El Sirgany and Ian Black, *Egypt's president pledges to protect embassies after film protests*

[290] *Freedom and Justice Party Statement on Anti-Islam Film*, fjponline, September 12, 2012
http://fjponline.com/article.php?id=1000

Muslim Brotherhood rather than engaging in an open refutation against the on-going clashes outside U.S. embassy by releasing an official statement, the movement addressed the issue by referring to the scholars of faculty of theology at al-Azhar University. Dr. Abdul-Rahman Al-Barr who was also a member of the Guidance Bureau stated; "Foreign embassies in our homeland must be secured. Islam forbids attacking them in any way."[291]

The checks and balances system was one of the main goals of January 25 Revolution. The discontent towards the new President and Government rose after Morsi failed to deliver most of the points that he promised as "100 days plan" for development. Since the country was passing through a political confrontation between President, government and the remnants of the old regime, namely, SCAF, the judiciary and police force, Morsi was unable to achieve all of his goals. However, as surveys conducted by Baseera, the Egyptian centre for public opinion research, revealed the fact that after 100 days in office; "Of the five main targets in the president's 100-programme, 73% said security had improved, 56% said traffic had improved, 48% said the garbage situation had improved and 42% said the bread situation had improved. The lowest approval rating was for fuel with only 33% saying the situation had improved compared to 34 who said it was unchanged and 27 per cent who said it had worsened." According to same poll, 78% of the respondents expressed their approval of Morsi's performance after 100 days.[292] During his speech, delivered in the 39th anniversary of Egypt's military victory against Israel in October 6, President Mohammad Morsi accepted the fact that he was unable to achieve all promises but stressed that serious steps have been taken for improvement in those fields. For instance; he stated "40 per cent of the public sanitation targets were achieved. 600.000 tons of garbage was removed from Cairo and Giza." On the issue of security Morsi assured that "Any assault on Copts is an assault on me." He responded towards the accusations made towards him on following the footsteps of

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[291] *Muslim Brotherhood: Islam Forbids Attacking Embassies in Any Way*, Ikhwanweb, September 14, 2012 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30287

[292] *Morsi approval rating at 78 pct after 100 days*, Baseera, October 4, 2012

former regime and reminded that "I still live in a rented apartment; I do not receive any illicit gains."[293]

The attempts made by Mohammad Morsi towards the democratization of Egypt were being interrupted or prevented due to internal conflicts within different segments of bureaucracy. The trials of 25 former regime members, accused for ordering the killing protestors during peaceful demonstrations, were continuing in this period. The event which became notorious with "Battle of Camel" took place in February 2, 2011 as thugs rushed into Tahrir Square with camels and horses and left 11 dead and over 600 injured. Similar to the trail of Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian court led by prosecutor general Abd el-Meguid Mahmoud acquitted 25 Mubarak officials with his decision in October 10. The decision inflamed opposition and mass protests by the revolutionary forces and the relatives of the victims. Mohammad Morsi announced his decision to replace the position of the prosecutor general and appointed him as ambassador to the Vatican. Although, people were raising their discontent with the court's decision on claiming innocence of the former regime members, it was argued that Morsi's decision was against the constitution since it prohibits the dismissal of the prosecutor general. The decision to change the position of Mahmoud soon turned into a clash between supporters and opposition in Tahrir Square. The criticism towards Morsi by secular political activists was that the President and Muslim Brotherhood for trying to take over the country. General Prosecutor after receiving the support of judges blamed Morsi for breaching the independence of judiciary and stated that he will not leave his position unless he is assassinated. Mohammad Morsi after facing harsh criticism from judges with the help of large media propaganda against the decision was forced to reverse his decision and allow Mahmoud to stay in power.[294] However, political activists raise their disappointments towards the judges who were representing the old regime. Gamal Eid, a prominent Egyptian human rights lawyer, explained this position as;

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[293] Morsi talks Egypt's future, rebuffs critics on 1973 war anniversary: Quotes, Ahram Online, October 7, 2012

[294] Mostafa Ali, *Morsi politely 'asks' defiant prosecutor-general to stay on,* Ahram Online, October 13, 2012

"The revolution will continue to lose as long as Mahmoud is still Egypt's prosecutor general."[295] This was the second major standoff between President and judiciary, first being the decision to reinstate the dissolved parliament in early July.

5.5. Towards the New Egyptian Constitution

The question of Constituent Assembly which was suspended by the decision of Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) in April 10 as a result of disputes concerning the majority of the Islamic movements in the committee was resolved in June 8 after consensus was reached following talks between representatives of political parties. The assembly was planned to consist of 39 party members and 61 independents where FJP occupied 16 and al-Nour gained 7 seats.[296] However, previous political debates, on who should write the constitution, were present as 57 MPs walk out of Parliament to protest the formation of the assembly, which signalled the fact that the constitution-drafting in post-Mubarak Egypt will be in question.[297] The boycott of the formation was followed by the decree of SCAF that dissolved the People's Assembly in June 14 which pressured the Constituent Assembly and lead to questioning of the legitimacy of the Assembly in the absence of Parliament. Several lawsuits challenged the constitutionality of the constitution-drafting assembly and the mechanism for choosing its members; however, SAC postponed its declaration of the verdict on the lawsuits until October 23 which at the end referred to High Constitutional Court to decide.[298] Although Assembly was formed following a negotiation between different political parties, the opposition towards parties such as FJP and al-Nour re-emerged in the course of writing the constitution as well. Secular and liberal forces headed by Hamdeen Sabbahi and Muhammad al-Baradey urged for withdrawal from the assembly in disapproval of its formation. They were joined by

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[295] Dalia Rabie, *Morsi Overreaches and Flops*, Atlantic Council, October 14, 2012

[296] *Tentative deal on Egypt constituent assembly*, Al Jazeera, June 8, 2012

[297] Marina Ottaway, *Egypt: Death of the Constituent Assembly?*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 13, 2012

[298] Ekram Ibrahim, *Adminstrative Court non-decision gives assembly ample time to finish constitution*, October 23, 2012

the Nasserist Party, the Karama Party, the Constitution Party, the Egyptian Democratic Party, the Socialist Popular Alliance, the Free Egyptian Party, Kifaya Movement, the Egyptian Socialist Party, and the Revolutionary Democratic Coalition. The joined statement signed by the parties read;

> Due to the lack of basic concepts of guaranteeing Egyptians basic social and economic rights such as the right to honest work, healthcare and equal opportunities in the texts that have so far been leaked from the Constituent Assembly, the national and democratic forces call for a boycott of this assembly and rejection of all that comes out of it especially after the undemocratic way it was composed for the second time.[299]

5.5.1. Preliminary Draft Constitution

The cause of this confrontation reached its peak after the sample of the drafted constitution was distributed to the press. It alarmed the human rights activists, liberal and secular forces which saw the article written as a way towards an Islamic state in Egypt. Article 1 described the nature of Egyptian state as "democratic system of government" similar to 1971 constitution. The democratic principles was described later in Article 6 as; "consultation and citizenship that establish equality among all citizens in rights and duties, political and partisan plurality, the rule of law, respect for human rights, the guarantee of rights and freedoms, peaceful transfer of power, separation and establishment of balance among powers, all in the manner set out in the constitution." One of the most controversial articles which were also the cause of long debates in the Assembly was Article 2. The article remained intact that read; "Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic Shari'a are the main source of legislation." The principles of sharia further explained with Article 221 as approved schools of the Sunni Islam. Article 3 was referring to other religious laws mainly non-Muslims specifically those religions that are regarded as "the people of the book" in Islam, Christians and Jews. They were allowed to use their own laws in

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[299] Ahmed Abdoul Enein, *Calls for boycott of Constituent Assembly*, Daily News Egypt, September 29, 2012

matters pertaining to personal status, religious affairs and nomination of spiritual leaders. This article was the only reference point for minorities in the constitution. One of the novelties of the constitution was its specific reference to the largest authority of Sunni Islam, al-Azhar Mosque in Article 4. After stating its independent nature, constitution stressed that "The opinion of Al-Azhar's Council of Senior Scholars is sought in matters pertaining to Islamic Shari'a." These led many analysts such as Magdi Khalil to argue that the constitution is aimed at following in the footsteps of Iran and its Council of Guardians. The issue of freedom of belief and speech were referred in the article 37 as; "Freedom of belief is guaranteed. The State guarantees the freedom to establish houses of worship for divine religions in a manner to be governed by law."[300] In addition the constitution was prohibiting in article 38 to defame the messengers and prophets. According to the constitution the family is the basis of the society and religion, morals and patriotism as their foundations. It was also argued that state is responsible for safeguarding and protecting morals and to taking into account indigenous Egyptian traditions, high levels of education, religious and patriotic values, scientific facts, Arab Culture and historical and the cultural heritage of the people. Article 68 was describing the vision of women's rights and gender equality. According to this article; the state will be committed to instil the principle of equality between men and women in the various fields of political, cultural, economic and social life as well as in all other fields. However, the article was questioned due to its reference that these rights shouldn't "prejudice to the provisions of Islamic Law."[301] Finally, despite the criticisms were focusing on Islamization of the constitution, it also contained provisions on controversial issues such as limiting the term of the presidency into two with four

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[300] Magdi Khalil, *Strong Echoes of a Religious State in Egypt's Draft Constitution*, Fikra Forum, November 7, 2012

[301] *Preliminary draft of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt*, Unofficial translation on behalf International IDEA, http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/draft_egypt_constitution_14_oct_2012-english.pdf, (accessed on 01.06.2012)

years each, prohibiting on civilian trials by military courts, protecting worker's rights and freedom for media.[302]

5.6. November 22 "Constitutional Declaration"

The drafting of the constitution entered in a deadlock as parties were opposing the monopoly of the Islamic groups in the Assembly. The majority of the crisis occurred following the confrontation between judiciary and President Mohammad Morsi's decision to send general prosecutor to Vatican as well as expected Administrative Court's verdict on the constitutionality of the Assembly. There were two scenarios. First, if the SAC did not dissolve the constituent assembly on October 23, a final draft will be put to a general referendum in November, according to a statement by the Egyptian prime minister, Hesham Qandil. Secondly, if it was dissolved, and in the absence of parliament, Egypt's constitutional declaration was declaring that the President Morsi was able to pick the new assembly which was undesirable for secular and liberal forces.[303] After the deadline was reached for the Administrative Court to announce the final verdict, court referred the trail to SCC which was expected to decide within 45 days.[304] As the situation was continuing with a deadlock and confrontation over the articles, representatives from secular and liberal groups and Coptic Church, 15 members in total, announced their withdrawal from the Constituent Assembly. They criticised the assembly and Islamic forces for rushing to finish drafting the constitution without having enough debates on articles. This was described by Hamdy Qandil, one of those who announced his withdrawal; "we did not withdraw for political reasons, but we did for our own reasons, because when we discussed more than half of the articles of the constitution

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[302] Maha Azzam, "Egypt's Democratic Experiment: Challenges to a Positive Trajector", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 15, No. 2, (2013), 159

[303] Abdel-Rahman Hussein, *Egyptian court decides whether to dissolve Islamist-dominated assembly*, The Guardian, October 23, 2012

[304] Ekram Ibrahim, *Egypt's Constituent Assembly referred to High Constitutional Court,* Ahram Online, October 23, 2012

and we presented amendments, they were not taken into account."[305] Similarly acting Coptic Orthodox Pope Bishop Pachomius explained their resignation by stating; "the Egyptian churches [have] sensed discomfort at the trends that prevailed [while] drafting the constitutional provisions. The constitution ... in its current form does not meet the desired national consensus and does not reflect the pluralistic identity of Egypt, [which has been] entrenched across generations."[306] On the other hand, Mohammad Beltagy, FJP member and member of Constituent Assembly criticised withdrawals and argued; "The liberals and secularists in Egypt want democracy that ushers them into power. If it did not bring them what they expect or aspire to, they want to crush democracy"[307]

November 22 was the date that confrontation between President and judiciary as well as opposition towards Muslim Brotherhood and President reached its peak. President Mohammad Morsi announced seven-article constitutional decree that provided him with substantial powers or as some later claimed beyond the powers that were enjoyed by former President Hosni Mubarak. Two of the seven articles, articles five and six received a serious amount of critic from the masses. First was an attempt to prevent Constituent Assembly from dissolving as it read; "No judicial authority can dissolve the Constituent Assembly or the Shura Council.", whereas the latter provision granted Morsi with excessive powers as it stated; "The president is authorized to take any measures he sees fit in order to preserve and safeguard the revolution, national unity or national security." Other points that referred in the article was concerning the re-trail of the former regime members that killed protestors during the January 25 uprising, extending the deadline for finishing draft constitution, from 6 months to 8 months and limited the term of public prosecutor to

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[305] *Secular figures withdraw from Constituent Assembly, call draft Egypt's 'downfall'*, Egypt Independent, November 18, 2012

[306] *Egyptian churches withdraw from Constituent Assembly*, Egypt Independent, November 17, 2012

[307] *Beltagy: Egypt Liberals and Secularists Shun Democracy When It Does Not Put Them in Power*, November 21, 2012. http://www.fjparty.org/article.php?id=1114 (accessed on 03.06.2013)

four years where he sacked Abd el-Meguid Mahmoud by appointing Talaat Ibrahim Abdullah as the new head of prosecutor general.[308]

5.6.1. The rise of anti-Morsi protests

Two camps emerged following the decree as supporters who were mainly consisting of Muslim Brotherhood, Freedom and Justice Party and most of Salafi movements whereas latter composed of various groups including the revolutionary youth movements, secular and liberal parties and supporters of the former regime. In the immediate aftermath of the declaration Egyptian politics entered into a chaos as anti-Morsi protests spread rapidly across the country as some protestors burned FJP headquarters in Alexandria the following day and clashed with pro-Morsi demonstrators. One of the first reactions against the decree came from Mohammad al-Baradey with his Twitter account as he wrote; "Morsi today usurped all state powers & appointed himself Egypt's new pharaoh. A major blow to the revolution that cld have dire consequences"[309] On the other hand, Pakinam Al-Sharkawi, assitant to President Morsi, explained that "The decrees open the door to reform and cleanse state institutions, and to fight and eradicate corruption."[310] The opposition groups headed by former presidential candidates, Amr Moussa, Hamdeen Sabbahi and Mohammad al-Baradey announced the formation of a nationwide group that would challenge the President's supra constitutional decisions; National Salvation Front.[311] Although, Mohammad Morsi announced that his decisions were temporary until the draft of the new constitution and parliamentary elections and to protect peaceful transition towards democracy, the attempts to justify President's decree didn't satisfy the crowds which soon turned into anti-Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood

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[308] *Morsy issues new constitutional declaration*, Egypt Independent, November 22, 2012

[309] https://twitter.com/ElBaradei/status/271656968341581824 (accessedin 03.06.2013)

[310] *Egypt President's Political Affairs Assistant: Morsi Moved to Secure Democratic Transition in Egypt*, Ikhwanweb, November 23, 2012 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30412 (accessed on 03.06.2013)

[311] *Sabbahi, ElBaradei launch National Front to fight Morsi's decrees*, Ahram Online, November 24, 2012

protests.[312] This became more apparent as demonstrators chanted "Down with the rule of the General Guide" (referring to Muslim Brotherhood Murshid Mohammad Badie) and hung a banner at the entrance of iconic Mohamed Mahmoud Street reading "Muslim Brotherhood members not allowed here."[313] However, there were also questions regarding the unity of the opposition as it was described by Shadi Hamid;

> While they may be "liberal," in the sense of opposing state interference in private morality, their attachment to democracy is mercurial at best. Many of them welcomed the dissolution of Egypt's first democratically elected parliament, called on the military to intervene and "safeguard" the civil state, and even cast their presidential ballot for Ahmed Shafiq, Morsi's opponent and Mubarak's last prime minister.[314]

Soon after the constitutional declaration, the protestors turned into street clashes between pro and anti-Morsi groups. The resentment against Morsi's decree rose within his presidency as well, as eight of his advisors Rafiq Habib, Samir Morqos, Sekina Fouad, Farouk Guweida, Amr al-Leithy, Ayman al-Sayyad, Seif Abdel Fattah, Mohamed Essmat, resigned in protest for both not being consulted prior to November 22 declaration and escalating violence and demonstrations.[315]

Following the declaration, SCC announced that it will soon decide on the lawsuits against constituent assembly, despite Morsi's decree protected it from dissolution. This move led Assembly to rush to finalize the constitution in the absence of secular and liberal groups. In November 30, after a week from the controversial decree, the Assembly completed and approved a draft by overwhelming majority, 85 out of 100, and sent it to Morsi who was expected to call for a

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[312] Sentgel, Richard, Bobby Ghosh and Karl Vick, *Transcript: TIME's Interview with Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi*, Time, November 28, 2012

[313] *Renewed clashes in Cairo leave scores injured*, Ahram Online, November 21, 2012 and Mayton, Joseph, *Egypt's ElBaradei, Moussa, Sabahi join Tahrir sit-in against Morsi*, Bikya News, December 1, 2012

[314] Shadi Hamid, *Is There an Egyptian Nation?*, Foreign Policy, December 4, 2012

[315] Ethar Shalaby, *Mass resignations in protest at palace clashes*, Daily News Egypt, December 6, 2012

referendum.[316] As, President Morsi announced his decision to send the constitution to the referendum planned to take place in December 15, the division in streets between Morsi's supporters and opponents was reflected to judicial forces. Supreme Constitutional Court and Judges Club announced that they will not supervise the constitutional referendum until Morsi retreat from its recently obtained powers, whereas Supreme Judicial Council argued that they were ready to over-see the process.[317] In the meantime there were clashes between different groups in different parts of the country; Suez, Ismailia, Mahalla, Port Said and Zagazig where protesters torch the offices of Muslim Brotherhood. The rallying point for the demonstrations in Cairo was moved to al-Ittihadiyah Presidential Palace where the violence reached its peak in December 5 and 6. The reports indicated that the groups attacked each other with live bullets, shot shell iron and rubber pellets, Molotov cocktails and rocks. This caused the deaths of 11, 10 of whom were members of Muslim Brotherhood, protestors and hundreds of injured from each side. According to Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies' report on the events, there were numerous cases of abduction and torture by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Morsi supporters. The police force didn't intervene until December 5 but not to disperse either group. One of the Brotherhood member reported; "The gas canisters, which were coming from our [Morsi supporters] side, were being launched by the police against the thugs [opposition protesters] who were attacking the Muslim Brotherhood." On the other hand, the rise in the number of casualties forced soldiers with tanks to deploy to protect the Presidential Palace and end the clashes. After the clashes were settled in the night of December 6, Morsi delivered a speech calling for a dialogue with opposition forces in December 8 and signalled that he is "not insisting on keeping Article 6 of the declaration if dialogue with political partners leads to that." Following his speech, Freedom and Justice Party released a similar statement calling for national unity. However the group rather than viewed the opposition not just as an anti-Morsi movement but an anti-January 25 Revolutionary movement with

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[316] *Egypt power struggle: Assembly backs draft constitution*, BBC News, November 30, 2012
[317] Abdel-Rahman Hussein, *Egypt's judicial council to oversee referendum despite calls for boycott*, The Guardian, December 3, 2012

participants paid by the former regime loyalists. Both Brotherhood and FJP defined opponents as "thugs", "hooligans", "mercenaries" and "terrorists".[318]

5.6.2. Constitutional Referendum

The rise of violence across the country forced Morsi to partially retreat from his November 22 constitutional declaration following the meeting with other political forces, but insisted on holding the referendum as planned in December 15. The opposition was undecided on their stance towards their vote in constitutional referendum where at the same time continued their street protests. Firstly in December 9, National Salvation Front was calling for boycott the voting process and explained;

> To have a referendum now with the threat of Muslim Brotherhood militias and threats and intimidation against the opposition, and absence of security is grossly irresponsible. The Front calls on Egyptians to continue to peacefully protest on Tuesday against the constitution and a president who ignores his people.[319]

However as the days prior to ballot box, opposition changed their stance towards voting "no" in the constitution as Hamdeen Sabbahi called; "The Front decided to call on the people to take part in the referendum and reject this draft constitution and vote no."[320] As H.A. Hellyer described, this indecisive nature of the opposition "damaged their credibility in front of Egyptian citizens, who are not only going to be thinking about the referendum on Saturday, but also about parliamentary elections."[321] However, the opposition gave more importance to the street protests rather than explaining people why they should vote against the constitution. As

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[318] *Al-Ittihadiyya "Presidential Palace" Clashes in Cairo 5- 6 December 2012,* Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, December 2012

[319] Abdel-Rahman Hussein, *Egypt opposition group to boycott 'irresponsible' vote on new constitution*, The Guardian, December 9, 2012

[320] Elyan Tamim and Marwa Awad, *Egypt opposition urges "no" vote on divisive constitution*, Reuters, December 12, 2012

[321] Kristen Chick, *Vote no or boycott? Egypt opposition undecided as referendum looms*, The Christian Science Monitor, December 11, 2012

opposed to rallying people for street protests, Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party joined with majority of the Salafi groups to mobilize their supporters to vote "yes" for the constitution. They distributed copies of the draft constitution, organized conferences and gave pamphlets as people went out from Friday sermons, one of the most important places of gathering for majority of the Egyptians, to explain what the new constitution say and urged people to "read, think and decide."[322]

Voters cast their vote in two round in December 15 and 22, after months of debate and turmoil on the process formation of the new Egyptian constitution. The confrontation between different groups as well as the indecisive positions regarding the vote was reflected in the ballot box with 32.9% turnout in total of both rounds. 63.8% of the voters supported the constitution whereas 36.2% voted against it.[323] The results were indicating for a divided nature of the Egyptian public two years after January 25 Revolution. The statements made by Muslim Brotherhood, Freedom and Justice Party and President Mohammad Morsi assumed the approval of the constitution as a victory for the future of Egyptian politics and democracy. However, in order not to force further social division President Morsi stated; "Regardless of the results, for the sake of building the nation, efforts must unite. There is no alternative to a dialogue that is now a necessity."[324] On the other hand, National Salvation Front leader Hamdeen Sabbahi argued that they will continue to struggle for the legitimacy of this constitution by peaceful struggles.[325]

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[322] Samar Ali Ezzat, *Being told how to vote*, The Egyptian Gazette, December 18, 2012

[323] *Egypt's constitution passes with 63.8 percent approval rate,* Egypt Independent, December 25, 2012

[324] Freedom and Justice Party: All Egyptians are Real Winner of Referendum Democratic Experience, Ikhwan Web, December 25, 2012 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30517 (accessed on 07.06.2013)

[325] *Egyptian Opposition Activists Makes Accusations of Referendum Voting Fraud*, PBS, December 24, 2012

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The political experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt developed from opposition to power in 85 years. Similar to many Islamic movements, Muslim Brotherhood spent most of its activities as an opposition group. However, in the last two years since the ousting of former President Hosni Mubarak, Muslim Brotherhood witnessed a swift change in its public image and status. Contrary to its long experience of rivalry with the regime, the movement gained legitimacy and ascended to the higher echelons in bureaucracy, Parliament, Constituent Assembly and Presidency in Egypt. In the light this historical change, thesis analysed the political and ideological transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1928 to 2012. From the very foundation of Muslim Brotherhood, the movement urged for a change in the society and politics in Egypt, what it believed to be the only solution to economic, political and social problems, Islam. This was further followed by the movement as slogan during the parliamentary elections. However, as concepts "democracy", "freedom" and "social justice" gained a new momentum in the country, Muslim Brotherhood compelled to transform its ideology towards such ideas by not breaking ties with socio-religious roots.

After outlining the historical evolution of Muslim Brotherhood's ideology, identity of Freedom and Justice Party and policies of Mohammad Morsi; this thesis argues that the Revolutionary situation in the country forced all political groups including Muslim Brotherhood to re-evaluate their ideology according to the changing political situation. In the immediate aftermath of the January 25 Revolution, Muslim Brotherhood became the most debated movement in the country with regards to their stance towards certain issues such as; democracy, pluralism, women and minority rights. In order to project how the movement transformed its position on these issues, the study focuses on the internal debates within the Muslim Brotherhood and the effects of external factors on decision-making processes.

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The political experience of Muslim Brotherhood allowed the movement to practice under different circumstances which can be divided into three different periods. First, the movement was established under the period of Egyptian Kingdom between 1928 and 1952 where Brotherhood developed as a socio-religious movement. In this period prioritized the grass roots organization and aimed to Islamize society from bottom up. Secondly, the Free Officers Revolution in 1952 opened a new page in the history of Muslim Brotherhood by classifying the movement as an illegal until the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. It was during this period when the movement experienced how to operate under continues waves of arrests. At the same time, Brotherhood developed its political activism by participating Parliamentary elections, taking part in professional syndicates and student unions, but barred from ruling the country. Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to achieve its long-term goal after the January 25 Revolution by occupying the ruling position in the country. The Brotherhood's inexperience and untested political capability forced the movement to adopt a more pragmatic agenda. Eventually, after attaining the opportunity to draft Egypt's new constitution, Muslim Brotherhood joined with other Islamic movements to implement what they believe to be the "solution"; Sharia.

The ideological transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood has been correlated with the political situation in Egypt. During the era of British control of Egypt, Hasan al-Banna was preaching for national, international Islamic unity which would lead to the reinstatement of Caliphate. Although, there were cases of violence carried out by Secret Apparatus of Muslim Brotherhood the movement was avoiding an open confrontation with the state. Under the leadership of Gamal Abd el-Nasser, on other hand, the group produced ideologues such as Sayyed Qutb, who rejected the religious nature of the society and called for an overthrow of the government. The leadership of Muslim Brotherhood, at the time, under Hasan al-Hudaybi and his successors was loyal to the legacy of Hasan al-Banna and stressed the importance of social change, distance from the violence and politics. The concepts of "democracy", "freedom of speech", "equal citizenship" and "civil state with an Islamic reference"

began to appear in the movement's publications and public speeches starting from the 1970s under the presidency of Anwar Sadat and later Hosni Mubarak. This evolution coincided with retreatment of the movement from producing a universalistic goal for the Muslim society (*Ummah*) to a local movement that addresses the current issues in Egypt. This change required Muslim Brotherhood to clear its stance on certain subject, especially the rights of women and minorities. Despite the movement was promoting the idea of equal citizenship, Brotherhood argued that their status differ with men and Muslims with regards to their duties. Contrary to its moderate argumentation of democracy and pluralism the movement chose a more conservative religious view for women and minorities.

During the course of their political struggle, Muslim Brotherhood became the largest opposition group that challenged the legitimacy of the government with its presence in both social and political levels. Although, it witnessed waves of mass arrests, Muslim Brotherhood was loyal to its earlier understanding of gradual change, instead of a revolutionary approach against the state. Therefore, the overthrow of Mubarak and transitional period affected the group's ability to mass mobilization and political vision. In the post-Mubarak Egypt, the political competitiveness was more intense as new political parties were founded, including the Salafi and Sufi Islamic movements, which challenged Muslim Brotherhood's legitimacy as the largest Islamic group in the country.

The January 25 revolution revealed Muslim Brotherhood's internal diversity over decision making. This became apparent as the younger generations decided to join with other left-wing, secular and liberal youth movements to the protests in January 25. The members of the Guidance Bureau, however, were sceptical about the developing situation in fear of new crackdowns. Further divisions occurred as the discussions on how Muslim Brotherhood should define itself in the post-Mubarak Egypt, whether a religious movement or as a political party. The reformist members of the movement, supporting the latter, were pressured by the "old guard" as Brotherhood decided to establish its own political party, FJP, and urged all of its members to participate no other party than FJP. The Brotherhood expects its

members to obey the orders of Guidance Bureau and those disagree with those decisions face the threat to be expelled from the group. Similar to the case of al-Wasat Party in 1996, reformist members of the Muslim Brotherhood were sacked following their disagreement with the idea of Brotherhood Party. These controversies might led to conclusion that, despite the Brotherhood declared its adaptation of democracy in political arena, pre-revolutionary tradition of strong internal hierarchy continues. In addition, FJP being the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm questioned the party's ability to embrace Egyptian society and reach out to the demands of those who are sceptical about the movement.

Muslim Brotherhood's inconsistent political decision, both in the case of increasing contested seats in the parliament and fielding a candidate in the presidential elections increased the suspicion regarding the political program of the movement. In the early phase of the parliamentary elections Muslim Brotherhood was promising to fielding candidates for 30 to 40% of the seats. However they re-evaluated their status after allying with other parties and witnessing support from the public and decided to run for half of the seats. Similarly, from the early days of the start of the uprising, the movement was announcing that it will not nominate a candidate. But, as the political situation changed and former regime members such as Ahmad Shafiq announced their candidacy, Muslim Brotherhood decided to challenge them with two of its own members, Khairat al-Shater and Mohammad Morsi. For a movement that was calling for a social change in the society, such pragmatic changes were concluded as Muslim Brotherhood's desire for power and its prioritization of politics over social work.

The country was on the brink without a parliament or a constitution in the post-Mubarak period as the deadly street protests across the country continued to disrupt the stability. In addition, discontent was on rise towards FJP and President Mohammad Morsi, due to their inability, joined with inexperience, to address main problems that Egyptians are facing. From the early days after assuming power, Morsi was challenged by military, judiciary and finally secular and liberal groups. In a similar line, Morsi didn't enjoy the powers of President and FJP lacked tools of mass

communications, newspapers and TV Channels to appeal general public. Further, FJP and Mohammad Morsi adopted a policy of challenging the country's oldest bureaucratic forces, armed forces and judiciary, rather than addressing the more urgent issues of the country such as economy or unemployment. Most of the opposition forces accused the president and the movement for trying to Islamize society and politics by occupying the majority of the seats in People's Assembly, Shura Council and finally Constituent Assembly. However, in response to these accusations FJP and Mohammad Morsi promoted the idea that this is their democratic right since they legitimately elected by popular vote. In order to "protect the revolution" from former regime members, radical measures can be taken such as in the case of Morsi's November 22 constitutional declarations.

The political ideology of Muslim Brotherhood was reflected to the new Egyptian constitution drafted by majority of members of Islamic movements, both Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups. Articles concerning Islamic nature of the state and legislation, specifying minorities to Christians and Jews and finally protecting rights of women as long as they don't contravene *Sharia,* raised concerns Brotherhood's attempts to monopolize power in the post-Mubarak Egypt. Implementation of these articles led to the conclusion that in the movement's 85th anniversary, Hasan al-Banna's legacy still present especially with reference to the rights of women and minorities. However, as Brotherhood stand out for more political involvement, the movement retreat from its long standing strategy of bottom up social change to top down systemic transformation.

In a conclusion it can be said that Egypt is going through an "open-ended revolutionary period" and the country's oldest and most organized movement, Muslim Brotherhood is one of the key players in this transition. However, the amount of pressure that they face is increasing from three different sides; 1) within the movement itself, 2) political rivals in Egypt, Liberals, Seculars and Salafis, 3) international powers, especially United States, European Union and Israel as well as Iran. The forthcoming Parliamentary elections will decide the political future of the Muslim Brotherhood and FJP. Unless the leadership eases the suspicions surrounding

the movement and decrease the tensions in the society, it might endanger the legitimacy gained throughout 85 years.

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