

THE STATE AND SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE EARLY
REPUBLICAN ERA: THE STATE CAPACITY AND THE
HEGEMONIC POWER OF THE TURKISH STATE

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims to examine the incapacity of Turkish state and the limitations of Kemalist regime to materialize the reforms. The study emphasizes that since the hegemonic and infrastructural power of the Turkish Republic was insufficient, the Kemalist regime partially failed to transform the society as it wished and could not legitimize the ideal behind the reforms because of the weak state structure.

Firstly, theories about the state and society were touched upon. Three main theories which are liberal, Marxist and Weberian approaches were evaluated in order to position the state's role and capacity in state and society relations. Secondly, the infrastructural power of the state through which the state exercises its power was analyzed. In this sense, economic structure of the state, the state's ability to monopolize the physical force and transportation system during the early Republican Era was examined to analyze the insufficient authority of the Turkish state. Lastly, the hegemonic institutions and symbols of the Turkish state around which the state and society relations were shaped were focused on. In this part, the health and education institutions which the state directly uses to maintain hegemony over the society were analyzed. In addition to these institutions, the position of women under Kemalist regime and anti-veiling campaign was evaluated as one of the hegemonic tools of the Republic since transition to modern clothes symbolized the replacement

of non-modern and tradition with modern and civilization. However, resistance shown by some segments of society also depends on the infrastructural and hegemonic limitations of Kemalist regime.

Keywords: Hegemony, Infrastructural Power, Early Republican Era, Clothing, Reforms

ÖZ

ERKEN DÖNEM CUMHURİYET DÖNEMİ'NDE TÜRKİYE'DE DEVLET-TOPLUM İLİŞKİLERİ: DEVLETİN YÖNETİM KAPASİTESİ VE DEVLETİN HEGEMONİK GÜCÜ

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Bu çalışma Erken Dönem Cumhuriyet Tarihi'nde devletin yetersiz yönetim kapasitesi ve buna bağlı olarak Kemalist rejimin öngördüğü reformların uygulanmasının önünde duran engelleri incelemeye çalışır. Bu bağlamda devletin altyapısal ve hegemonik iktidarının yetersizliğinden ötürü, Kemalist iktidarın toplumu dönüştürmeye yönelik projelerinin başarısız olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Bunun yanında Kemalist iktidar güçsüz devlet yapısından ötürü reformlarını yeterince meşrulaştıramadığı incelenmiştir.

Bu doğrultuda, ilk olarak, devlet ve toplum ilişkisi üzerine literatür taraması yapılmıştır. Sırasıyla liberal, Marksist ve Weberci yaklaşımlar incelenmiş ve devletin yönetim kapasitesinden hareketle devlet ve toplum ilişkilerinde devleti rolü üzerine araştırma yapılmıştır. İkinci olarak devletin yetersiz altyapısal iktidarı ülkenin ekonomik durumu, devletin kontrol ettiği topraklarda şiddet tekeli eline geçirmeyi ne derecede gerçekleştirdiği ve dönemin ulaşım sistemi göz önüne alınarak incelenmiştir. Son olarak yeni kurulan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin toplumla direkt olarak iletişim kurduğu ve devletin hegemonik kurumları olarak işlev gören kurum ve semboller analiz edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda devletin ve Kemalist iktidarın toplum üzerinde hegemonya kuran kurumlar olarak ülke genelinde eğitim ve sağlık

kurumlarının yetersizliđi incelenmiřtir. Bu kurumların yanında, bu bölümün son kısmında, Kemalist rejimin kadın kılık-kıyafetinde yaptıđı reformlar, yeni Türk devletinin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun toplumsal hayattaki mirasını reddetmesi ve modern devlet ve toplumu sembolize etmesi bakımından hegemonik bir sembol olarak deđerlendirilmiřtir. Fakat toplumun bazı kesimlerinin bu reforma karřı gösterdiđi direniř aynı zamanda devletin altyapısal ve hegemonik gücünün sınırlılıđından kaynaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hegemonya, Altyapısal İktidar, Erken Dönem Cumhuriyet, Kıyafet, Reformlar

To the Losses of #Occupy Gezi

Ethem Sarısülük

Abdullah Cömert

Ali İsmail Korkmaz

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Ottoman Archive of Prime Ministry)
BCA	Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Republican Archive of Prime Ministry)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)
CUP	İttihat ve Terakki (Committee of Union and Progress)
EGMA	Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi (Archive of General Directorate of Security Archive)
IHS	International Historical Statistics
TÜİK	Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Statistical Institution)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Turkish historiography has usually evaluated the modernization process of Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic in the sense of transformation of the state and superstructure. Even though the transformation of the state is well-analyzed due to extensive research made by historians and social scientists, whether the Turkish state was strong enough to transform the daily and social life of Turkey and whether the hegemonic tools of the state could effectively be used or not was usually out of question. For this reason, although the reforms and ideals of Kemalists behind these reforms were closely examined by social scientists and historians, the low level administrative and penetration capacity of Turkish and resistance coming from society has been, in general, neglected.

After the emergence and rise of nation-states, social sciences has been (ab)used to legitimize the nationalist movement and the existence of nation-states. As Iggers pointed out, during this process, historians were going to archives so as to support their nationalist ideology and to find “scientific bases” for their arguments.¹ Pioneered by Leopold Von Ranke, this trend of historiography has focused on the nation-state and at the end; history became a tool for the rulers to maintain their hegemony over society and to build “national” identities. On the other hand, ordinary people were seen as “unimportant elements of history” which did not have the capability to change the direction of history. It is simply assumed that “the impact of policies upon the population would be identical to what policy makers projected”.² Therefore, as outlined above, ordinary people’s reactions to state implications and

¹ Georg G. Iggers, *Bilimsel Nesnellikten Postmodernizme: Yirminci Yüzyılda Tarihyazımı*, 5th ed., trans. Gül Çağalı Güven (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), 29.

² Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and the State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 11.

whether the state successfully implied all the planned policies or not was not paid enough attention.

After the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the same approach was adopted to Turkish historiography. The rulers of the Republic saw history as a tool to strengthen to legitimize their rule and a field which would contribute to the formation of Turkish national identity. Newly established Turkish Republic, in the way of Westernization, has legitimized itself by rejecting the Ottoman Empire, the East and the Eastern culture. In this sense, as portrayed in the West, the official Turkish historiography portrayed the Ottoman Empire as a non-modern, and unprogressive entity. The official historiography has usually focused on the conflict between those who support “progressive, secular and civilized” and those who are “conservative, reactionist” and always sided with the “secular and civilized” side. Those who see the foundation of the modern and a secular Republic positive usually tend to describe this process independent from societal actors. This trend in Turkish historiography would continue to exist in the coming years of Republic as well.³

In reaction to this point of view, the liberal-leftist and conservative ideas gained popularity in Turkish intellectual life, especially after 1980. Liberal and conservative intellectuals had tried to theorize the state and society relationship by emphasizing the conflict of Turkish state and civil society. According to this narrative, while the society tries to gain its autonomy from state, the state and Kemalist ideology represents the anti-democratic, oppressing side. By demonstrating societal forces as homogenous, whole Turkish history is read through the conflict of civil society and state.⁴ This point of view also sees the conflict of modern and non-

³ For related account, see Feroz Ahmed, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, trans. Yavuz Alogan, 8th ed. (İstanbul:Kaynak Yayınları, 2010), Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University,1964) Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), Stanford Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2, *Reform, Revolution and Republic: the Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

⁴ Sungur Savran, *Türkiye'de Sınıf Mücadeleleri (1908-1980)*, vol.1, (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2010), 31.

modern as the central point and neglects the state's low capacity to establish hegemony over society.⁵

In this direction, infrastructural and hegemonic power of Turkish state will be examined by taking the state's ability to control its territories and establish the hegemony of the official ideology of the Turkish state. Therefore, it will be emphasized that the less the state exercises its infrastructural and hegemonic power, the more societal forces gain their autonomy. In this sense, the first purpose of this thesis is not to evaluate the essence of Kemalist regime or its modernization project but to examine to what extent the state exercised its power in daily life and to demonstrate how the state was ineffective to practice its power in daily life. In addition to the state incapacity, it will be analyzed that how this ineffectiveness of the state affected the implications of laws aiming to transform the society.

Secondly, theoretical approaches about state and society relations will be given careful attention. After closely reviewing the theories about state and society relations in the first chapter, in the following chapters it will be stated that state and society are not two separate entities which exist independently from each other. In this sense, in this thesis, it will be emphasized that the capacity of the state and the reactions of society are two determinant factors in shaping the state and society relations and neither of them should be ignored. Thus it would not be wrong to say although the state has the tools to control and to transform the society, the power of state could be established to the extent that the society and state capacity allows. The state and society relationship should be analyzed by stressing this dualism. This dualism also helps us understand to what extent the state exercises its authority over society. These two structures interact with each other and the outcome of this interaction reflects the main characteristics of state and society relationship.

⁵ For a more detailed information about this approach, see Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931)*, (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı,1999), Erik Jan Zürcher , *Turkey: A Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005)

One of the another most common and mistakes assumption made by historians is that if the state decides to do something, then the state can imply the laws and rules regardless of the power of state and state institutions. In any country in the world, it is not a rare case that the state, especially in local regions, cannot execute the laws and rules implied by central government. However, in 1930s' Turkey, the state is exceptionally incapable of implying the laws and rules, not just in everyday life but also in state institutions. As it will be shown in the following chapters, the state lacks the most basic state institutions which legitimize the existence of state in local regions. Even in the regions where there are state institutions which are supposed to provide basic services for local population, it is seen that state institutions are far from being systematic; they are mostly unorganized and cannot properly execute the laws.

The incapacity of Turkish state inherits from the Ottoman Empire and this is one of the most significant factors explaining the insufficient state capacity. Though Kemalist regime constructed itself by rejecting its connection from Ottoman Empire, newly established Turkish state and Ottoman Empire had many similar points. Therefore, in the third chapter, the continuity of the economic structures between the Ottoman Empire and Turkey will be emphasized. Although the economic policy of Turkey were radically different than the policies of Ottoman Empire, agrarian and unindustrialized structure inheriting from Ottoman Empire seriously affected the Turkish state's administrative capacity. The immature production relations did not only decelerate the foundation of nation-state but also made the integration of different parts of the country difficult. For this reason, the state faced tremendous problems to practice its infrastructural and hegemonic power in order to dominate and transform the society. Since the nation-states emerged as the result of the need of capitalist economies to integrate the remote regions into a central economy, the immaturity of capitalist mode of production negatively affected the centralization of Turkish state over its territories. In connection with this, in Early Republican period, what we see is that the Turkish state had significant tackles during the monopolization of physical force. During the early Republican period, especially

until 1940s, the rate of violence in cities and everyday life is high and bandits still continue to exist, especially in the Eastern part of the country. This is another reason explaining the weak infrastructural power. In the last part of the third chapter, the insufficient transportation system and the state's partial inability to penetrate into the local regions will be analyzed.

Finally, the hegemonic institutions and the symbols of Kemalist regime and Turkish state will be touched upon. The Kemalist regime, to create a nationalist, secular and modern society, tried to use the health and educational institutions effectively. These institutions were not only functionally used to establish the hegemony of the Kemalist ideology but also glorified the transition to modernity and enlightenment. However, when we look at these institutions after the foundation of Republic to 1940s, what is seen is that these institutions are far from being sufficient enough in functioning to establish the Kemalist hegemony over society. The number of schools and teachers are not enough and ordinary people still continued to use their own traditional methods in treatments because of the insufficiency of health system. In addition to these hegemonic institutions, in the last part of this chapter, clothing reform, as the reflection of the Kemalist hegemony in daily life will be paid attention since the conflict over clothing refers to the conflict over who is going to control and shape the everyday life. Like any other political movements, the Kemalist regime aimed to form a fashion trend which represents the philosophy of government. With this purpose, the Kemalist regime used the women clothing to symbolize the transition to modernity by taking advantage of already developing position of women in late Ottoman Empire and of discussions about women's clothing. In this sense, Kemalist regime, by banning *fes* and *çarşaf*, tried to destroy the existence of Ottoman traditions in everyday life and replace traditional clothes with the modern ones. In contrary to official historiography, however, it should not be assumed that the clothing reform would be willingly accepted. While on the one hand, there were upper-class women, bureaucrats' wife, and state officers who willingly accepted to abandon the traditional clothes, other segments of society resisted against it. Even though the resistance of society to clothing reform cannot be

only explained with the incapacity of the state, the infrastructural and hegemonic weakness of the state made the adaptation of modern clothes difficult. Thus, the resistance to such reforms should be evaluated as a legitimacy problem for Turkish state and low capacity of the state should certainly be taken into account.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW ON STATE AND SOCIETY

In the first chapter of this thesis, the literature related to state and society relations will be examined since theories of the state and society relationship was not paid much attention by historians. This is more or less is related to the hesitation of historians to integrate theory into the historiography. Because historians are mostly dealing with the human societies in plural, placing the emphasis on the differences between them and demonstrating the uniqueness of their phenomena, generalizations and theories have commonly been neglected by the historians.⁶ However, as emphasized by Burke, “without the combination of history and theory, we are unlikely to understand either the past or the present”.⁷ Because history is interested in human experiences and human experiences are composed of billions of events which seem disconnected from each other, it is important to apply the theory to establish a connection between the human experiences and to make them “meaningful” for historians. In Turkish historiography, however, though state and society relations has often been examined especially for the Republican era, both official and unofficial historiography have failed to adapt a proper theoretical approach which could contribute to understand this period in a better way. As a result, it is vital to examine and to understand the existing and changing trends of state and society relationship in sociology and political science literature. In this direction, a wide range of research on state and society relations, from liberal theory to Marxist and Weberian challenges will be examined. The review of the existing literature will not only help us understand the state and society relations from different perspectives, but will also contribute to our understanding about the concept of the state and the society. Furthermore, though the theories are differentiated in evaluating the concept of state

⁶ Peter Burke, *History and Social Theory* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 19.

and society, they, at some point, complete each other. Therefore, while discussing the different and similar aspect of theories on state and society literature, this interaction between different perspectives will also shape the theoretical approach of this thesis.

According to Marinetto, there are three groups of the contemporary era of state theory.⁸ As he emphasizes, these groups are not homogenous groups. Their representatives, though, analyze the state and its relations with society differently, they do have some common points and this categorization is made according to the points that they share. The first category composes of liberal approaches. Under this category, “there are those theories for which the state is organized around competing sets of interests”.⁹ The theories in this category have commonly been used by American social scientists during the 1950s. By emphasizing various interest groups that have the ability to affect the state policies, the representatives of these approaches underlined the importance of non-state actors in shaping the policy of the states. Furthermore, because state is a structure that has been shaped by these interest groups, those who apply this theory overlooked the concept of state and preferred to use the term of “political power” as the state and government is not neither politically nor economically autonomous structure and is open to interventions from non-governmental organizations. Although the approaches of pluralists and elite-centric are fundamentally different from each other, it will be examined under the same category as both of them refer to “multitude of competing interest groups”.¹⁰ The second set of theories about the state structure is the class-based theories adopted by Marxist social scientists. The theories under the second category usually put an emphasis on the capitalism and analyze the state structure in terms of its connection with capitalism. Though, they have more differentiated approaches than any other theory, what they basically claim is that the state reflects social relationship and interests of classes. Therefore, according to social scientists under this category, the

⁸ Michael Marinetto, *Social Theory, the State and Modern Society: The State in Contemporary Social Thought* (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2007), 11.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

state mechanism should be perceived as a cooperative unity of hegemonic classes. The third group of theory is composed of Weberian or state-centric approaches. According to theories under this category, the state is seen as separate and independent structure which is relatively autonomous from the societal actors. Those who hold this Weberian approach supports the idea that “the state operates as a purposeful and independent actor which can bring about social and economic changes.”¹¹ In opposition to liberal and Marxist theories of state, Weberian conceptualization of state depends on the state’s ability to act without affected by non-governmental actors and classes. This point of view does not reject the fact that the state may cooperate with non-governmental actors and classes as Marxists and liberal approaches claim but from Weberian perspective, the state can also conflict with societal actors according to its institutional logics. At the end, the state can isolate itself from the societal actors and can make its own way. All of these theories will be examined respectively with details in the coming parts of the first chapter.

2.1 THE LIBERAL THEORY OF STATE

2.1.1 Interest Groups vs. State: Pluralist Theory of State and Society

Pluralist approach underlines the importance of state as a concept and states that state is not alone in shaping the policy. With Marinetto’s words, as a social theory, it is concerned with the fragmentation of interests and power in society; as a theory of policy, it focuses on “how the democratic system balance the diverse social interests to ensure that benefits are equally distributed amongst all citizens”.¹² Therefore, from liberal and pluralist perspective, it would not be wrong to say that the main function of the state is to protect the liberty among interest groups and to preserve an environment in which non-governmental organizations and interest groups try to maximize their benefits under the control of state. As can be concluded from this perspective, the pluralist theory sees the conflict and relations of these interest groups as the main power in the political arena. This point of view is

¹¹ *Ibid*, 11.

¹² *Ibid*.,12.

completely consistent with liberal political ideas; the state is minimized to allow the interest groups' action for their benefits and this minimization of state and the freedom of interest groups is prerequisite to establish and to improve a democratic system. To analyze the pluralist theory in a better way, David Truman's book named as *The Governmental Process* and *A Preface to Democratic Theory* written by Robert Dahl will be touched upon.

In his book, *The Governmental Process*, David Truman, in general, focuses on the essence and the functions of different groups. If we attempt to define these groups basically, an interest group is a shared-attitude group that makes claims upon the institutions of government and this fact transfigures these interest groups into political groups.¹³ By taking that definition into account, labor organizations, political parties, non-profit organizations can be examined under the category of interest groups. The interest groups are important as they interact with state institutions and can be involved in decision making process. However, because modern societies are very complex and the interest groups are so diverse, it is impossible for an interest group and political faction to act alone and independently. Therefore, the state and the society relationship, in pluralist theory, is evaluated through the negotiation of state and interest groups. The outcome of these relations determines the position of state and civil society in pluralist theory.

Robert Dahl, in line with David Truman, tries to theorize the concept of democracy by depending on the pluralist perspective. Though it purely focuses on various types of the theories of democracy, it nevertheless gives us a clue about the relationship between the state and the society. He emphasizes the importance of checks and balances for democracies and says that numerous groups of officials in competition conflict with one another and that balances the distribution of power.¹⁴ His understanding of "state" is no different than the definition of Truman. According to Dahl, as a result of the pressure of different groups, the state cannot act

¹³ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁴ Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956), 136-7.

independently from non-state actors. Thus, the state from this perspective has little or no autonomy to follow its course of action.

The pluralist theory, as mentioned, has found its basis on American sociology. This approach was also “functional” since, in a way, it legitimized the American political system under the conditions of Cold War. However, the critics for this approach have also been voiced by many scholars. First of all, because the pluralist approach seems to represent the “ideal democracy” and put an emphasis on various political actors among which balance the power, it usually neglects the “severe inequality” in the distribution of resources.¹⁵ Therefore, while there are different groups which have the ability to shape the policies, they do not compete under equal opportunities. Thus, even though there is a balance between different powers, this balance always exist for the benefits of upper and rich classes which hold the power of capital. Instead of governments being receptive to a diverse range of interests, they are more open to be influenced by powerful factions in society.¹⁶ Although the pluralism, as a theory, can be seen positive in terms of pointing out the inclusion of different interest groups, the portrait drawn by pluralist theories neither represents the existing essence of “democracy” nor provide a good analysis in understanding the real position of interest groups and political powers.

2.1.2 Sharp Distinction between the Ruler and the Ruled: The Elitist Approach of State

Elitist approach, as a theory, has been used and contributed by various numbers of social scientists and as a result of that it is difficult to examine this approach under one title. Nevertheless, although fundamentally different explanations have been made, those who use this elitist approach have shared some common points in evaluating the position of state and the effectiveness of elites in

¹⁵ “How Pluralistic is American Government?,” H. T. Reynolds, accessed May 1, 2013 <http://www.udel.edu/htr/American/Texts/critique.html>.

¹⁶ Marinetto, *Social Theory*, 14.

decision making process. By taking those common points into account, the basic points of elitist approaches will be analyzed in this part of the thesis.

If we attempt to start defining the concept of “elite”, as defined by a standard dictionary of social science, elites are “the most influential and prestigious stratum in a society” or “the highest stratum within a field of competition”.¹⁷ The following expression of Gaetano Mosca basically explains the elitist perspective:

In all societies... two classes of people appear- a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first.¹⁸

Rather than analyzing the state and society relationship, by mostly ignoring the societal actors, the elitist approach analyze the position and the essence of elites in a social structure because the elites which take place in hegemonic state institutions, either with their political or economic power, determines the action of the state. The elites, in this sense, have the ability isolate the societal actors and autonomously make the decisions related to super-structure. Though classical elitism supports the idea that the rulers of society constitute a socially cohesive group, this perspective have recently been revised and replaced with the idea that the rulers of society are engaged in an ongoing process of competitive elitism.¹⁹ With this revised position, the elitist approach recently more focused on the different actors of the elites. That is to say that even if a group of elites are the representative of big capitals, or a group of politicians share the same ideological background, they may still conflict among each other. Therefore, an “elite” concept would not be sufficient enough to understand the position of elites in society, it is also important to separate

¹⁷ G.A. Theodorson and Theodorson A.G., *Modern Dictionary of Sociolgy* (New York: Cromwell, 1969), 129. Cited by Murray Knuttila, *State Theories: From Liberalism to the Challenge of Feminism*, 2nd ed. (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1992), 49.

¹⁸ Mosca Gaetano and Hannah D. Kahn, *The Ruling Class (Elementi di Scienza Politica)*, ed. Arthur Livingston (New York: McGraw-Hill book Company, 1939), 50. Cited by Mark Evans, “Elitism,” in *The State: Theories and Issues*, ed. Colin Hay et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 39.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 40.

the elite groups playing roles in policy making process. Nevertheless, the elites and the state, from this elitist perspective, are dependent on each other and the elites have the capacity to negotiate with state over policies.²⁰

Although, at the first glance, this elitist perspective seems highly parallel in terms of analyzing the interaction of elites and the state, they are completely different at one point. In contrary to Marxist theory of state, the elitist approach rejects the notion that economic elites are the real holders of state power and thus theoreticians of elitist approach intends to differentiate the concept of “power elites” and “ruling class” by assuming that the power of the elites do not only come from the economic power.²¹ Though it is true to an extent that the elites holding political power and the ones those possessing the economic power may sometimes function independently, in the big picture, high level of integration of political and economic powers should not be completely neglected. Therefore, the line between the elites possessing political and economic power is more blurred than the elitist theoreticians think.

Though elitist theory gives us a good approach of how the state is controlled by the cooperation of various elite groups, it does not pay enough attention to developing a broader understanding of the relationship between the state and civil society.²² Thus, this perspective does not offer a decent analysis which would help us understand the state and society relations during the interaction of ordinary people and state in everyday life. The ordinary people, in this perspective, are not usually taken into account and portrayed as a “silence mass.” Nevertheless, when compared with pluralist approach, the elites approach is eye-opening in terms of demonstrating that the system offered to us as “democracy” actually represents the uneven power distribution which is an inevitable result of liberal democracy and capitalism.

²⁰ Marinetto, *Social Theory*, 15.

²¹ Evans, “Elitism,” 44.

²² *Ibid.*, 57.

2.2 THE MARXIST THEORY OF STATE

2.2.1. The State as an Oppression Mechanism of Bourgeoisie: Classical Marxist Theory of State

Classical Marxist theory has offered fruitful perspectives on state theory and it forms the core point of all Marxist analysis even though the Marxist analysis, in general, has experienced a serious evolution process. The most basic but fundamental point that has been adopted by Marxists to the state theories is that the state is used by ruling class to assert economic interest and domination over society.²³ The meaning of the relationship between the state and its subjects, by Marxist literature, is explained through the production relations. Those who hold the capital and economic power also use the state so as to protect their class advantages. Since capitalist system, by its very nature, is open to economic crisis and social instabilities, the state also functions to protect the bourgeoisie class by using its various oppression mechanisms. Following expressions of Engels does well point out the explanation made below:²⁴

In order that... classes with conflicting economic interests, shall not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power seemingly standing above of society that would moderate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of “order”; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state.

The state theory of classical Marxism can be best understood from *German Ideology* written by Karl Marx and Engels. In this book, under the chapter of the relations of state and legal order with property, it is emphasized that by taking advantage of the high level of debt of state, the private property owners have captured the modern state mechanism by means of taxes provided by private

²³ Marinetto, *Social Theory*, 20.

²⁴ Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Peking: Foreign Language Press), 205-6. Cited by Colin Hay, “Marxism and the State” in *Marxism and Social Science*, ed. Andrew Gamble et al. (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 155.

property owners.²⁵ For this reason, the state is under direct control of bourgeoisie and the state has to depend on this class to carry on its existence. Because of the capture of state by bourgeoisie class, the state protects the private property and continues its existence to serve for this class. The state, in this direction, directly serves bourgeoisie to protect the interest of bourgeoisie. Marx's understanding of state becomes clearer in the following lines:

As a result of the segregation of private property from communal goods unity and community, the state has gained a new special existence both near and out of the civil society; however, this state is not anything rather than that the bourgeoisie choose themselves by necessity as an organization style in order to mutually assure their own properties and benefits inside as much as outside.²⁶

In addition to giving detailed information about Marx's understanding of the state, these lines also demonstrate that the state, though it is well-integrated with upper classes, is a relatively autonomous structure in Marxist theory. Even though Marx is the one who emphasized this autonomous structure of state, neo- Marxists will take this idea much further in the Marxist literature. The contributions of Neo-Marxists to argument related to autonomy of state will be examined in the next part in detail.

Vladimir Lenin's book *The State and Revolution* should also be evaluated under the classical Marxist state theory. The title of the first chapter also gives us an excellent clue of how Lenin approaches to the concept of state: "*The State: A Product of the Irreconcilability of Class Antagonisms*". By rejecting the ideas of petty bourgeoisie, Lenin emphasizes that state is not a structure in which different classes may compromise but a structure which should be abolished for the emancipation of labor class.²⁷ The reason why Lenin thinks that way is that the state actively exploits wage labor through its repressive forces of the police and army and

²⁵ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Alman İdeolojisi(Feuerbach)*, trans. Sevim Belli, (Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 1976), 126.

²⁶ Marx and Engels, *Alman İdeolojisi*, 129.

²⁷ Vladimir İ. Lenin, *Devlet ve Devrim*, 4th ed. (Eriş Yayınları,2003), 16.

this is the result of the cooperation between the state and the capitalists.²⁸ Thus, it would not be wrong to state that the core point of *The State and Revolution* and the position of state in Lenin's approach is that state is an oppression tool which is functionally used by the bourgeoisie class to provide and to maintain the domination over the exploited masses. Lenin adds that the state needs oppression tools such as army or the police because of the disconnected relationship between state and society.²⁹ Therefore, hegemony, in Lenin's ideas, is something which is evaluated only through the armed forces of the state.

In conclusion, it should be obviously stated that classical Marxism made a huge contribute about the theorization of the state. The state, the state power and the relationship between state and society, in Marxist analysis, has been analyzed related to the main motto of Marxist ideology; "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." The position of the state and cooperation of state structure with the bourgeoisie is not independent from the class relations and in fact is the direct result of capitalist mode of production. Classical Marxist literature has also focused on the "state and society relationship" from this perspective. The state and society relationship was also addressed around this class struggle. Marxist social scientists have also played an important role as by focusing more on the grand political and economical structures. However, the classical Marxist views on the state and society is highly narrow-scoped. The state is only seen as an oppression mechanism and ignores the hegemonic institutions of the state in which the power of the state is exercised with the consent of people. In addition to that, social movements and actions of masses was usually evaluated in the sense of class struggle. The motivations behind the actions of masses were not paid much attention. Nevertheless, Neo- Marxists, especially Antonio Gramsci, by realizing this gap, have more focused on the practices of states by examining power relations between the state and society and thus have positively revised the classical Marxist views.

²⁸ Marinetto, *Social Theory*, 21.

²⁹ Lenin, *Devlet ve Devrim*, 17.

2.2.2 From Class Reductionism to Hegemony: Neo-Marxist Theory of State

Neo-Marxist approach emerged with the intent to revise the classical Marxist approach and contribute to it. Neo-Marxist intellectuals usually adopted the structuralist approach for the theorization of the state. In a broad sense, neo-Marxist intellectuals argue that since capitalism is open to crisis by its very nature, the state is responsible for producing and protecting the social structure of capitalists, by mediating the class struggle. ³⁰ Among the representative of structuralist approach, we will focus on the state theory of Antonio Gramsci who formed the basis of Neo-Marxist ideas and Nicos Poulantzas who studies mostly on the theorization of state.

Antonio Gramsci was one of the first intellectuals which criticize the economic reductionism of classical Marxism and attempted to revise it by enriching the Marxist arguments. In this sense, he was more interested in how the capitalism system continues to exist and examined the role of state in protection of the capitalist dominance. It would not be wrong to say that though economy and politics are not independent from each other, Gramsci paid more attention to the political system which was produced capitalist mode of production. He argued that capitalism continuously produces its hegemony by means of the state ideological apparatus. By labeling the formation of dominance by using the apparatus of state as “hegemony”³¹, he made it clear that “dominant class, in order to maintain its supremacy, presents its own moral, political and cultural values as societal norms, and constructs an ideologically-engendered common sense.”³²

In opposition to Lenin’s ideas that the state represents the capitalists and maintain its dominance by oppressing the masses through armed forces, Gramsci

³⁰ Clyde W. Barrow, *Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Post-Marxist* (Wisconsin: Wisconsin University Press, 1993), 51.

³¹ Antonio Gramsci, *Modern Hükümdar* (İstanbul: Arya Yayıncılık, 2013), 10.

³² Colin Hay, “(What’s Marxist about) Marxist State Theory?,” in *The State: Theories and Issues*, ed. Colin Hay et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 69.

supports the view that the dominance and hegemony created by the cooperation of the bourgeoisie and the state structure is much more complex than classical Marxist ideas claim and that hegemony is not only established by means of the armed forces but also by consent.³³ Under the control of intellectual and cultural leadership of dominant ideology, capitalist class manages to convince the masses that the system is normal and legitimate.³⁴ Therefore, for Gramsci, the barrier standing in front of the working class to have the class conscious was not only about working class' insufficient realization of their economic position under the current political system but also the hegemonic ideology which is created by the state structure.³⁵ Thus, according to Gramsci, the politics of capitalist class holds a relative autonomy from the economy in terms of legalizing the system. From these explanations, it can be concluded that apparatus of hegemonic ideology should be paid attention as much as the class emphasis in Marxist literature. Carnoy supports this argument by stating that “*consciousness itself* becomes the source of power for the proletariat in laying siege to the state and the means of production, just as lack of proletarian consciousness is the principal reason that the bourgeoisie remains in the dominant position.”³⁶

The analysis of Gramsci is especially on the super-structure and the state acting as a political shield of capitalist system. Because he is more interested in the ideological tools helping capitalism to reproduce itself and how these tools affect labor class and integrate the masses into capitalist system, Gramscian perspective of state inevitably deals with the society and how hegemony is established in ordinary life and among ordinary people. The essence of the relation between the state and the society cannot be properly understood without paying attention to hegemonic

³³ Benedetto Fontana, *Hegemony&Power: On the Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 58.

³⁴ Marinetto, *Social Theory*, 23.

³⁵ Martin Carnoy, *The State and the Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 69.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 88.

institutions in which ordinary people and the state structure interact.³⁷ Thus, analysis of hegemonic institutions and their functions to legitimize the existing political system cooperating with capitalism directly brings the need to examine to what extent these hegemonic institutions have been successful to convince the ordinary people that the capitalist and existing political system is legal and normal. In this sense, Gramscian perspective opens a great door to understand the relations between the super-structure and ordinary people and this relation, more importantly, is not examined independently from capitalist mode of production.

Another theory of neo- Marxist state theory is offered by Nicos Poulantzas. As Antonio Gramsci did, he tried to demonstrate the inability of classical Marxist theory to explain the state structure. He, similar to Gramsci, criticized the economic reductionism of classical Marxist literature and adopted a less economically deterministic analysis in explaining the state.³⁸ With reference to his book named as *Political Power and Social Classes*, we will try to explore how the concept of state is evaluated in his understanding.

According to Poulantzas, the role of the capitalist state is responsible for the protection of the ruling class from self-destruction as capitalist system is naturally open to crisis even among the bourgeoisie class.³⁹ What is meant by this statement is that because there is an intense competition within the free market economy and this competition may bring political, economic and social instability which could seriously threaten the capitalist system, the state's role is to create the environment in which the capitalist system continue to exist in order. In this perspective, "because of several levels dislocated by uneven development inside the structure, the state has particular function of constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of a

³⁷ Hegemonic institutions can be both moral and material institutions in which the state and capitalism legitimize their existence. Therefore, schools, hospitals or transportation facilities are hegemonic institutions(or help dominant ideology to survive) as much as religion, moral values or beliefs which state and capitalist class use functionally to practice the hegemonic ideology in daily life.

³⁸ Marinetto, *Social Theory*, 23.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

social formation”.⁴⁰ Because Poulantzas’ portrayal of state depends on the long term interests of capitalist class, it would not be wrong to conclude that the state sometimes may act against the some group of big capitals to protect the capitalist system. On the other hand, this does not mean that the bourgeoisie do not control the state structure but in opposition to classical Marxist view, this control of bourgeoisie over state is indirect. As can be summarized from this perspective, it can be concluded that the state structure, in Poulantzas’ approach, is relatively autonomous. From this autonomy, the state’s main aim is to create cohesion and unity for the capitalist system. However, similar to Gramsci, Poulantzas emphasizes that the domination over society does not purely come from the class positions but does come from multiple power centers. Although, for Poulantzas, it is true that the state is the centre of the exercise of political power, various economic, political, military and cultural institutions also carry much significance to constitute the power.⁴¹

There are two main important points Poulantzas made. First of all, he rightly pays his attention to the complex relationship between state and the bourgeoisie. By doing that, in opposition to classical Marxist theory of state, he discovers that the bourgeoisie is not a single group: there may be different groups from upper classes conflicting with each other. That is to say that the state’s main mission for capitalist system is to provide the maintenance of order under intense economic competition. The relative autonomy of state is the result of this economic competition. Therefore, the state structure cannot be basically seen as the instrument of the bourgeoisie, although the state does not act independently from this class. Second point that Poulantzas makes is that there are multiple powers which the power is practiced. In this sense, rather than a pure class-based explanation, he proposes to analyze the various ideological apparatus of state in which the power of the state is practiced. In conclusion, it should be said that Gramsci, Poulantzas and many other Marxist intellectuals, with their deep and eye opening analysis on the essence of super

⁴⁰ Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, trans.&ed. Timothy O’Hagan (London: NLB, 1975), p.44

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 44.

structure, contributed a lot to state theory and state and society relations. In one way, they also opened new perspectives for society- based approaches as well.

2.3 WEBERIAN THEORY OF STATE

2.3.1 Monopolization of Physical Force: Classical Weberian Theory of State

As sociology is interested in understanding the action of society and because the state plays a crucial role in shaping the social life, in Weber's sociology, the state concept holds an important place. That is why Weberian and neo-Weberian approach represents the state centric approach in literature related to the theorization of state and state and society relations. Weberian approach basically claims that the state holds an autonomous power which exists independently from societal forces.

The state, in Weberian sociology, has been explained around the concept of "domination". As we can see in the following lines:⁴²

Of course, not every form of social action reveals a structure of dominancy. But in most of the varieties of social action domination plays a considerable role, even where, it is not obvious at first sight Without exception every sphere of social action is profoundly influenced by structures of dominancy.

It is this domination concept in which we should understand the position of state, in Weberian sociology. In Weberian sociology, the domination is defined "imposing one's own will upon the behavior of other persons." This dominance, in a society, can be established by a force which "successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."⁴³ According to Weber, the dominance of the state requires legitimization and Weber talks about three basic principles for the legalization of the state.

⁴² Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, trans. G. Roth & C. Wittich, eds. (New York: Bedminster, 1978), 941. Cited by Murray Knuttila, *State Theories: From Liberalism to the Challenge of Feminism*, 2nd ed. (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1992), 105.

⁴³ Max Weber, *Max Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations* ed. John Dreijmanis & trans. Gordon C. Wells 156 (New York: Algora Publishing), 2008

First, the authority of “the eternal past” of custom is sanctified by a validity that extends back into the mists of time and is perpetuated by habit. This is “traditional” rule as exercised by patriarchs and patrimonial rulers of the old style. Second, there is the authority of the extraordinary, personal gift of grace or charisma, that is, the wholly personal devotion to, and a personal trust in, the revelations, heroism, or other leadership qualities of an individual. This is “charismatic” rule of the kind practiced by prophets or- in the political sphere- the elected warlord or the ruler chosen by popular vote, the great demagogue, and the leaders of political parties. Lastly, there is rule by virtue of “legality,” by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statutes and practical “competence” based on rational rules. This type of rule is based on a person’s willingness to carry out statutory duties obediently. Rule of this kind is to be found in the modern “servant” of the state” and all those agents of power who resemble him in this respect.⁴⁴

Therefore, Weber focused on how the states legitimize themselves as well as the state structure. By this legitimization process, the state protects its existence and legitimizes itself in the eyes of people. In Weberian sociology, this point has a critical importance since this is the point around which the state and society relation was shaped. This state centric approach to state and society relations was further followed by Neo-Weberians.

2.3.2 The State as an Independent and Autonomous Actor: Neo-Weberian State Theory

It is this tradition, in a broad sense, which neo-Weberians are inspired in the theorization of state. There are many scholars who can be examined under the category of neo- Weberians. However, because Theda Skocpol and Michael Mann will directly contribute to our topic in this thesis, I pick these two scholars to specifically focus on. Their contributions will be in two ways: I will benefit from their studies both by adopting the points that they made and that they ignored.

The book “*Bringing the State Back in*” edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol gives us a good opportunity to understand how Theda Skocpol positioned the concept of state in her analysis. By criticizing the sociological trend of 1960’s pluralist approach and later neo-Marxist approach, she says that, even though, neo-Marxists contributed positively to the literature, these accounts of pluralist and neo-Marxists did not take the autonomous structure of the

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.

state both in national and international area into account.⁴⁵ She, then by pointing out the autonomous structure of the state, develops an argument that state elites may at times need to be free from a specific dominant class group in order to forward the long-term interest of an entire dominant class.⁴⁶ She does not claim that the classes do not play any role in state's decision process but, for her, it is a reductionist point of view that the state is an instrument of bourgeoisie class. Furthermore, the degree which classes takes place in decision making process is also related to the capacity (in the sense of being weak or strong) of a class, the level of class conscious among class members and the essence of the state. She supports this argument by comparing the attitudes of French and British working class. Because the centralized and bureaucratic French state was distanced and differentiated from the society, that resulted in the rise of anarchist and Marxist ideas among the French working class whereas the centralized but less distanced or differentiated of British government from society encouraged workers to support parliamentary gradualism and collective bargaining.⁴⁷ Therefore, what determined the attitude of the working class and the state cannot be only explained with class struggle. The structure of states and the relation of the state with working class also shaped the essence of conflict between the state and working class.

Skocpol's emphasis on autonomy of the state structure also brings the result that the states are rational actors whose first priority is to protect the state structure. To be able to do this, "the state, partially or fully autonomous, may be able to address problems and even find "solutions" beyond the reach of societal actors and those parts of government closely constrained by them."⁴⁸ Regardless of the ability and qualification of officers in local regions, state may act coherently.⁴⁹ While doing that,

⁴⁵ Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back in*, ed. Peter B. Evans et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 25-6.

⁴⁶ Evans, "Elitism," 47.

⁴⁷ Skocpol, "Bringing the State," 25-6.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

some policies may favor a group of a class and may conflict with another group's interest. Nevertheless, the state follows the policy of which the state itself may take advantage in the long term. Skocpol's statist view can be understood from the six principles that she proposed to analyze the state:⁵⁰

1. The class upheavals and socio-economic transformations which have characterized social revolutions have been closely intertwined with the collapse of the state organizations of the old regimes and with the consolidation and functioning of the state organizations of the new regimes, hence, we can make sense of socio-revolutionary transformations only if we take the state structure seriously;
2. the administrative and coercive organizations are the basis of state power;
3. these state organizations are potentially autonomous from direct-dominant class control;
4. state organizations necessarily compete to some extent with the dominant class(es) in appropriating resources from economy and society;
5. although a state usually functions to preserve existing economic and class structures, it nonetheless has its own distinct interest vis-à-vis the dominant class(es); and
6. states exist in determinant geopolitical environments in interaction with other actual or potential states/ geopolitical environments as well as economic and class structures condition and influence a state structure and the activities of the elite.

Michael Mann is also one of the scholars who should be focused when analyzing the neo-Weberian perspective of state. To understand the analysis of Michael Mann, his article "*The Autonomous Power of State: Its Origins, Mechanism and Results*" and his book "*The Sources of Social Power*" will be paid attention. As many scholars coming from Weberian and Neo-Weberian tradition, Mann simply emphasizes that the state is the source of social relations. According to Mann, the state structure is above all the classes and the societal forces which have the ability to dominate and to transform the "other" actors. However, he is opposed to the idea that the state is a homogenous structure as there are plural elite autonomies in state structure.⁵¹ He, as other neo-statist writers points out to the infrastructural power, i.e., the state's ability to penetrate, control, supervise, police and discipline modern

⁵⁰ Evans, "Elitism," 48.

⁵¹ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States 1760-1914*, vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 67.

societies through its own specialized capacities.⁵² Although he, in his explanation, mostly ignores the classes and societal actors, he has made a remarkable contribution in understanding the state power.

Basically, for Michael Mann, the power of the state appears in two different forms. The first form of this power is the despotic power. What makes this power “despotic” is that it is a range of actions which “state elites can undertake without routine negotiation with civil society groups.”⁵³ The second form of the power refers to infrastructural power of the state. The infrastructural power means the capacity of the state to penetrate and the ability to implement the decisions according to the will of the state.⁵⁴ The state penetration into the social life is composed of four important techniques:⁵⁵

1. A division of labour between the state’s main activity which it co-ordinated centrally. A microcosm of this to be found on the battle-fields of history where a co-ordinated administrative division between infantry, cavalry and artillery, usually organized by the state, would normally defeat forces in which these activities were mixed up- at least in ‘high intensity’ warfare.
2. Literacy, enabling stabilized messages to be transmitted through the state’s territories by its agents, and enabling legal responsibilities to be codified and stored.
3. Coinage, and weights and measures, allowing commodities to be exchanged under an ultimate guarantee of value by the state.
4. Rapidity of communication of messages and of transport of people and resources, through improved roads, ships, telegraphy and etc.

Formation of these structures and institutions related to these structures of the state has resulted in the rise of the infrastructural power of state. According to Weber, though, the rise of infrastructural power also led to the rise of despotic power

⁵² Bob Jessop, in his article that he focused on the recent developments in state theorization, he says that scholars such as Anthony Giddens and Eric Nordlinger makes similar points about the functions of the state. See Bob Jessop, “Bringing the State Back In(Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections and Redirections,” *International Review of Sociology/ Revue internationale de sociologie* 11(2) (2001): 149-73.

⁵³ Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, 59.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”, *European Journal of Sociology* v.25/2 (November 1984); 197.

of state, Mann thinks otherwise: The rise of infrastructural power also increases the interaction between civil society and the state. Thus, the rise of infrastructural power of state also refers to the fact that civil society will be more involved in state affairs.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, it should be stated that the state, through its infrastructural power, have increased the level of penetration of the state. In the meanwhile, the territorial integration of the regions which is controlled by the state has been maintained through this infrastructural power. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that infrastructural power of the state did bring the result that the state, by being able to reach remote regions, started practicing its power in a more centralized way. These two dimensions of power are not separate from each other and both can be used by a state at the same time. According to various state categories, Michael Mann demonstrates how two dimensions of power is practiced.⁵⁷

Table 1. Two dimensions of state power

<u>Infrastructural Power</u>		
Despotic Power	Low	High
<u>Low</u>	<u>Feudal</u>	<u>Bureaucratic-Democratic</u>
<u>High</u>	<u>Imperial/Absolutist</u>	<u>Authoritarian</u>

As it can be seen in this table, while the feudal state both lacks the despotic and infrastructural power, imperial/absolutist states are weak in terms of their infrastructural power but despotically strong. Because, when compared to feudal regime, imperial/absolutist states are much more centralized, these states have the ability to practice its power in a broader territory. But that does not mean that the imperial/absolutist states are strong in terms of infrastructure. They practice their power with traditional ways and from above in a relatively isolated way from

⁵⁶ Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, 59.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

society. If we talk about the modern states which emerge after the Industrial Revolution, these states are strong in terms of their infrastructural power as they had the chance to imply the center-based rules through the divaricated institutions of state in local regions. The states whose infrastructural power is strong are composed of two types of the state which are the democratic and authoritarian states. While the democratic state enforces more infrastructural power rather than the despotic power, the authoritarian states both exercise infrastructural and despotic power on society effectively.

Neo-statist approach examines the state and society as two distinct and separate structures. In fact, he rarely refers to the society in his studies. Therefore, as many neo- statist writer, Mann sees “the state and society are mutually exclusive and self-determining and they can be studied in isolation”.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, his contribution to the studies related to the theorization of state cannot be ignored. His analysis about the political power or the state can also contribute to society-centric approaches as without analyzing the mechanism or dynamics of the state, its relations with classes and societal forces, the relationship between the state and society cannot be well understood. Thus, it would be hard to deny that the state is not a outsider in the relationship of state and society. Even though the state may not completely change the minds of every individual, unhesitatingly, the state has a transformative power and it does have the ability to affect the actions of society by means of hegemonic institutions and infrastructural power.

2.3.3 A Response to Neo- Weberian approach: State in Society

Despite of the fact that there are some similar points between the Neo-Weberian approach of state and the state in society approach, the state in society approach differs from Neo-Weberian approach of state at fundamental points. In opposition to Neo-Weberian state theory, the state in society theory downplays the importance of state in state and society relationship. State in society theory, by rejecting the view that the state is autonomous and homogenous structure, claims that

⁵⁸ Jessop, *Bringing the State*, 149-73.

the state is not an isolated structure from society. In this part, the state in society approach will be examined with reference to Joel S. Migdal's book "*State and Society: Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another*".

He begins his book by criticizing the Weber's and neo- Weberian's perspectives of state and complains from the fact that those acted upon played little role in the theories of state and society relationship.⁵⁹ On the contrary to the silence and oppressed portrayal of masses, Migdal sees the society as the main structure shaping the social life and the state structure. The society, in Migdal's approach, however, similar to state structure, is not homogenous; "... all societies have ongoing battles among groups pushing different versions of how people should behave. The nature and outcomes of these struggles give societies their distinctive structure and character."⁶⁰ Migdal, though, agrees with the fact that the state operates with the motivation to transform the people lives as it wishes, "the political leaders have not accomplished to handle the tremendous obstacles which were put by the leaders of other social organizations."⁶¹ To handle these obstacles, the state sometimes make decisions which contradict the law put into execution by the state itself or the laws adopted by center may be difficult to implement in local regions. Therefore, while there are different actors conflicting to obtain power, the state is also the part of this environment of conflict in which its own parts struggle with one another.⁶²

Under this environment of struggle, the state may try to operate autonomously and may establish institutions to monopolize the coercive means in society to ensure that other organizations do not stand as a barrier standing in front of the state control.⁶³ According to Migdal, the state control can be increased by *compliance* of population, *legitimization* of state rule and *participation* of people in

⁵⁹ Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 9.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 50.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 52.

state institutions either in a direct or in an indirect way.⁶⁴ However, by emphasizing that the state is not alone in using these methods, the leaders of other social organizations may also increase his/her power by benefiting from them or some leaders from social organizations may earn the right to have a position in the state structure.⁶⁵ In this sense, by opposing the idea that the state is a homogenous, coherent and purposeful actor, Migdal says the state is a highly complex structure whose objective is not single but many since the actors in state have different motivations and may serve not for the state but for their groups to obtain the power.

States do not always bring the macro-level societal changes as international environment is also important.⁶⁶ The international politics, the policies followed by the state in an international area may also affect the state's position. Thus, the state is neither separate from the society in which it constitutes nor from the international politics. For example, a socialist revolution happening in Greece may also bring the result that Turkish bourgeoisie may also push the state to take rigid measures against the working class in Turkey. At the same time, a revolution happening in Greece may also foster the Marxist ideas among working class in Turkey and revolution, or macro-level change, may be realized by working class, i.e., a societal force.

In this part, I have tried to emphasize the basic but important points of the state in society literature with reference to Joel Migdal. First of all, I completely agree with the fact that the state is not a homogenous structure. However, on the other hand, the state structures are so complex that the individuals are not capable of acting on their own. They may have a choice not to imply the laws in local regions but they cannot follow the policies that they determined themselves. In other words, they may resist to policies but they are incapable of implementing the decisions that

⁶⁴ What is meant by direct participation is a person that is working in or state institutions. The indirect way, on the other hand, broadly refers to any connection between social groups and the state. A student going to the state approved schools or a bourgeoisie which make business with state are some of the examples that can be given for indirect participation.

⁶⁵ Migdal, *State in Society*, 53.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 56.

they determine according to their own will. In this sense, this non-homogenous structure of state does should be evaluated as a factor which decreases the state-capacity. Second of all, Migdal's statement that the state is not a separate and independent entity is true. As we have mentioned before, the modern-capitalist state is highly integrated with classes, especially with upper classes. The state structurally reproduces capitalism⁶⁷ and hegemony over society in which capitalism system can effectively function. On the other hand, the upper classes are not alone in shaping the state character: the lower or middle levels of social strata push the state for their rights and may be included in decision making process. The essence of this ongoing battle between classes may be economical or can be related to other hegemonic institutions serving for the capitalist system. Thus, the state is open to intervention from societal actors or classes in general. Intervention may come from trade unions or other associations but at the same time this intervention may be practiced in daily life by ordinary individuals. This, however, should not bring the assumption that the state and lower classes or ordinary people compete with dominant classes in equal conditions. The armed forces or courts do start to function "effectively" at this point. The problem may be deepened to the extent that oppression mechanisms are insufficient to overcome the crisis. When these hegemonic institutions have such legitimacy crisis or when the states are incapable of founding its hegemonic institutions for various reasons, they may be given a new form and a new dominant ideology is built with different motives. In any case, as long as there is not a search for a radical solution, the famous expression "living for a proletarian is not to die" will continue to exist in different forms.⁶⁸

There were many ways which were functionally used to legitimize the bourgeoisie revolution by Kemalists. Alongside with six principles of Republican People's Party, discourse of modernization and westernization, sovereignty of Turkish nation, emphasis on women's equality with men or even Mustafa Kemal's

⁶⁷ See Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*.

⁶⁸ David Harvey, *Paris, Modernitenin Başkenti*, trans. Berna Kılınçer (İstanbul: Sel Yayınları, 2010), 222.

sculptures in city centers were some of the ways used in this direction. However, what may describe the characteristics of the state in Early Republican Era is the fact that even most basic institutions are missing or are not properly working to maintain, with Mann's words, the infrastructural power or hegemony of the state, with Gramscian perspective. This weakness of hegemonic and infrastructural power of the Turkish state is one of the most important facts which stand against the modernization project of Kemalist regime. The Turkish state and Kemalist regime faced tremendous problems in adopting the official ideology of Turkish state and partially failed to transform the society as the Kemalist regime wished. The infrastructural and hegemonic weakness of the Turkish state could also be seen as one of the causes which made the Kemalist regime authoritarian. The state's inability to transform the society by means of hegemonic and infrastructural power of the state pushed Kemalist regime to govern the people from above, without the consent of its subjects. The weakness of infrastructural and hegemonic institutions of the state also alienated and distanced the state from society.

The hegemonic and infrastructural power of the state carried a special importance for the Kemalist regime since Kemalists aimed to transform the country from bottom to the top. However, as a result of the weakness of hegemonic and infrastructural power of the state, the connection between the state and society was weak and the desire of Kemalist regime to transform the everyday life, the authoritarian essence of the regime led to a widespread discontent among people. Next chapter of this thesis will be specifically dealing with the ineffectiveness of the state to establish the hegemonic ideology of bourgeoisie revolution over society. By taking the weak hegemonic and infrastructural power of the state into account, it will be emphasized that the Kemalist regime had serious obstacles to materialize the reforms.

CHAPTER III

THE INFRASTRUCTURAL CAPACITY OF THE TURKISH STATE IN EARLY REPUBLICAN ERA

3.1 INVOLVEMENT OF NATION-STATES IN EVERYDAY LIFE

In transition from absolutist regimes to modern states, the most important change emerging in state and society relations was that the states have gained incredible strength and became more involved in the everyday life of people. This, more or less, has been the outcome of the rise of nation-states. The rise of nations was not because of the fact “nations” have decided to remember their identity or nationalities which have existed throughout the history but rather they were the “production” of developing production forces. At this point, it should be emphasized that the emergence of nation-states are highly related to the emergence of capitalism.⁶⁹ Basically, the concept of nation-state was born because of the need for a unified market in which the bourgeoisie may act relatively independent. This, alongside, brought the unification of a wide range of institutions from educational institutions to law system. Therefore, nation-state can simply be defined as a structure which aims to consolidate social and cultural integration around a unified market.

The nation-states’ intervention to everyday life can be explained with the changing relationship between state and its “citizens”. The modern-capitalist nation state is the structure which organizes to guarantee the profitability of higher levels of social strata, to improve the technology and labour efficiency within national borders.⁷⁰ Therefore, the state functionally operates and reproduces the capitalist

⁶⁹ Örsan Akbulut, *Küreselleşme Ulus-Devlet ve Kamu Yönetimi* (Ankara: Bizim Büro Basımevi, 2007), 263.

⁷⁰ Akbulut, *Küreselleşme*, 259.

relations. The surplus taken by the state, in the form of “tax”, is redistributed through the public investments. At the end of this process, the state is able to practice its power even in the most remote areas of the country. The whole organization of the state, in local regions, functions in this direction. Local state institutions such as municipalities and municipal buildings, schools, health institutions, police stations and officers working for these state institutions are some of the most basic and fundamental subjects which state functionally uses to practice its power in local regions. It is not just the power or the discipline that the modern capitalist states have produced; it is the body of rules aiming to educate how people should live and act for the individuals’ best interests under the capitalist system. It is this way in which the state becomes more and more apparent in everyday lives of ordinary people. In addition to that, by means of those hegemonic institutions, the state legitimizes its existence and demonstrates why it is there. The state can be there for various reasons; to civilize people, to protect the religion from infidels, to educate people or to provide health services and a clean environment. Thus, in one way or another, the state structure needs convincing people about why it exists.

This was the point, convincing people, where the problems of Early Republican Era started. The reason, why the newly established Turkish state was partially unsuccessful to convince people will be analyzed through the capacity of the state. When we take a close look at the state structure in early era, what we see is the disorganization and insufficiency of the state institutions. It would be difficult to deny that the Kemalists tried to transform the society in many ways but they faced tremendous problems in establishing the hegemony because of the incapacity of state institutions. It is this assumption that Kemalist Turkey had dominated every part of the country and transformed the society individual by individual will be challenged in this part of the thesis. It is true that politicians of opposition were excluded from the political area and those, for instance, who revolted against the hat reform were executed. However, that does not mean that the Turkish state was “strong”. In fact, these implications of early Republican period demonstrate that the Turkish state was weak and incapable of following the policies since the penetration level of the state

into the minds of people was not powerful enough. Thus, it would not be wrong to describe the Turkish state as *despotically* powerful but weak in terms of infrastructural power. Because of the weakness of civil organizations and the state's incapacity to penetrate and to influence the society, the decisions were taken from above and imposed to below without any consultation or negotiation process and non-governmental organizations played a little or no role in decision making process.⁷¹ Furthermore, since the Turkish state faced tremendous difficulties in penetrating into the society, the society, to an extent, remained relatively autonomous. Especially in local regions, because Republican's People Party is highly fragmented and because the state administrative capacity was dramatically low, those decisions are not accepted by the society since the Turkish state did not have the apparatus to convince its subjects. Even the most basic institutions of the state were not efficiently working. Therefore, as Mann emphasizes, even though we cannot talk about a complete insulation process, insulation of the state from society exists to an extent that the state fails partially to penetrate into the lives of ordinary people.⁷² There are not enough schools, but even in the places where there are schools, people do not attend them. There are not enough hospitals but even in the places where hospitals exist, people still tried to get rid of their illnesses by using their own methods. The transportation system was not well-developed or broken in some parts of the country and some cities or villages remain unreachable by the state authority. The cities and villages are not safe and bandits are still there, in spite of the hard efforts of the state to beat them. The state structure of early Republican era carries most of the characteristics which are common in weak states. Below, the certain characteristics of the weak states will be examined in detail.

⁷¹ This is not to say that the society played no role and did not negotiate the implementations of the state. The society was not weak in early Republican Era. The ordinary people had the ability to negotiate and affect the implementation of the laws. However, because the reactions were not organized; society did not directly get involved in decision making process but affected it with daily practices.

⁷² Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, 63.

3.2 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAK STATES

The concept of a weak state is a blurred definition. In addition to that, the single examples which the state fail to establish hegemony do not make this state weak. Even the strongest states may, from time to time, fail to implement some policies. As Migdal emphasizes, “all states have had limited capabilities at some time, or with some groups or on some issues”.⁷³ By taking these points into account and by avoiding overgeneralizations, it is still possible to define why weak states, at some points, failed to achieve what was planned by their leaders.⁷⁴ In other words, by attempting to define why the weak states are defined as “weak”, I will search for a conceptual framework which will help us to define the weak states. Low level of industrialization and agrarian structure in economy, high level of criminal violence and destroyed or insufficient transportation system are some of the characteristics of the weak states which will be examined in this part of the thesis.⁷⁵

First of all, the economic conditions which have a great impact on state capacity were not developed enough. The Ottoman Empire was periphery country whose economy mostly depends on the agricultural production. When the Turkish Republic was founded, the industry was not well-developed and Turkish economy continued to carry the characteristics of agrarian economies. Existence of fragmented markets depending on the lack of integration of the country’s remote parts, weak market institution and insufficient production for market⁷⁶ demonstrate the agrarian

⁷³ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies*, Prologue XIV.

⁷⁴ It should also be taken into account that the early Republican era has greatly contributed to the increase of the state capacity. Nevertheless, what, in theory, had been planned by Kemalist regime was not completely achieved. Therefore, the weakness of the Turkish state, in this thesis, depends on the difference between what was intended by the state and what we see in practice.

⁷⁵ Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,” in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3-9.

⁷⁶ Nicolas van de Walle, “The Economic Correlates of State Failure: Taxes, Foreign Aid, and Policies” in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 99.

character of Turkish economy. Although certain steps were taken in developing the national economy, the Great Depression of 1929 and World War II seriously affected the economy of Turkey. The export rate of the country seriously declined and in domestic market the prices of the most basic nutrients increased by half. While the population in cities had to deal with starvation, the peasants who had a fundamental role in Turkish economy became unemployed. The period of economic crisis did not only lead to a discontent among ordinary people, but also prevented the development of infrastructural power of the state.

Another main characteristic of a weak state is the high level of criminal violence. In a weak state, the state authority is not seen as a problem solving mechanism. In addition to that because, in those states, it is relatively easy to reach the guns, the citizens usually solve their problems by themselves. As we will see in detail in the next part of this chapter, this is more or less the case for the Republican period. The reasons of the high crime rate depends on various reasons; the bandits fighting against the central state, the fight between creditor and debtor, an event of theft or robbery, basically any event including violence is a fact increasing the crime rate.⁷⁷ One of the most interesting fact, at this point, is that the state is also included in criminal activities to provide the social control. Police shot people without having a legal basis and hang people without sufficient investigation. Even those who are accused of simple crimes are sometimes given death sentence. Thus, it would not be wrong to say that hanging people is not only a practice which is used to oppress the political opposition but also a common practice which was functionally used to maintain the order in social life. Nevertheless, during the Early Republican era, the violence in everyday life was common and bandits were strong enough to raid the city centers. The state is far away from being a dissuasive power for those who were included in criminal events.

⁷⁷ The points made above, in history and even today, can be seen in any state and in social lives of people. For this reason, in the related chapter, I will be focusing on criminal events in a short period of time and examine the specific events happening in this short period of time. In this way, I will try to demonstrate how often criminal activities are happening.

The weaknesses of the state mostly depend on the last factor which is the weakness of transportation system. Similar to the policies of every nation-state, the Kemalist regime tried to improve the integration of domestic market and policy about transportation was followed accordingly.⁷⁸ In this way, not only the conditions for the improvement of capitalist economy would be provided but also the state, by being able to penetrate easily into the local regions, would contribute to the increase of state control throughout the country. By replacing the feudal structures with capitalist economic relations, the transportation system would also ease to break the existing social relationship. For this reason, a well-developed transportation system would also help Kemalists materialize the ideal bourgeoisie society that they idealize and make the implementations of policies in local regions easier. However, the transportation system that remained from Ottoman society was a typical transportation schema of a semi-colonized country.⁷⁹ Existing transportation system was not enough for the state to create a national economy and infrastructures that may connect the remote regions were absent. By realizing this under-development of transportation system, Kemalists tried hard to improve and took important steps in developing the transportation system. However, the under-developed transportation system inherited from Ottoman Empire always stood as an obstacle for Kemalists to penetrate into the local regions more effectively.

These factors, mentioned above, can be counted as the main characteristics of low state capacity. When we evaluate the Early Republican Era by taking these factors into account, what we see is that the newly established Turkish Republic experienced such difficulties in penetrating to social life. This perspective will not only help us realize the weaknesses of Turkish state, but also will make it easy to demonstrate to what extent the society was involved in shaping the policies of state which will be discussed in the third chapter. Here, in the coming parts of this chapter,

⁷⁸ İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken*, vol. 3, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), 437.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 35.

the factors playing role in the low capacity of Turkish state will be examined respectively and in detail.

3.2.1 Turkey as a Peripheral Country: Political-Economy in the Early Republican Era

When analyzing the low administrative capacity of Turkish state, the economic conditions of Turkey in 1920s and 1930s should certainly be taken into account. Furthermore, since the Turkish Republic inherited from Ottoman Empire which was a later comer in transition to capitalism and a semi-colonial country, it is important to evaluate the Ottoman economic structure and Turkish Republic together. Therefore, it would not be wrong to point out that when the Republic was founded, the Kemalist regime had to deal with the semi-colonial past of the Empire and continued to carry the peripheral features of it. In addition to the existing economic problems, the Turkish state faced tremendous economic problems which result from the Great Depression of 1929 and World War II. The Great Depression of 1929 and World War II were other facts which weaken the Turkish state economically. All of these facts, economic structure of the Ottoman Empire, Great Depression of 1929 and World War II which decreased the state capacity will be examined respectively in this part of my thesis.

The inner dynamics of production relations in Ottoman Empire did not allow capitalism to emerge and this was one of the facts which make the Empire semi-colonial.⁸⁰ Because of this, the Ottoman Empire did not join to the capitalist world economy by its own initiative but rather was pushed by external powers as a result of the need of capitalist economies to expand their zone of influence.⁸¹ The Ottoman Empire, similar to China and Iran, continued to exist politically independent and it

⁸⁰ The question of why the Ottoman Empire was a late-comer in transition to capitalism is a topic beyond of this thesis. For a detailed discussion on this matter, see Şevket Pamuk's book "*Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme*" (1994)

⁸¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Modern Dünya Sistemi: Kapitalist Dünya Ekonomisinin Büyük Yayılımının İkinci Evresi 1730-1840*, vol. 3, trans. by Latif Boyacı (İstanbul: Yarın Yayınları, 2011), 143.

was not under direct control of capitalist countries.⁸² Nevertheless, Ottoman Empire which did not experience Industrial Revolution became a country which is responsible for providing raw materials to industrialized countries. The integration process of Ottoman economy with world system was completed with the Treaty of Balta Limanı. According to this treaty made between Ottoman Empire and United Kingdom, the control of Ottoman state over import and export was abolished, tariff for foreign goods were decreased and foreign merchants were allowed to make trade without paying internal tariff.⁸³ Because of the fact unindustrialized Ottoman economy could not compete with the industrialized powers, Ottoman's industrial production never matured enough. This made the Ottoman Empire to depend on agricultural production and prevented industrial development. In the last quarter of the Empire, foreign indebt, Ottoman Public Debt Administration, foreign capital investments having entered the country by looking for constant privileges gradually becoming heavy and common capitulations were the main indicators of semi-colonial structure of Ottoman Empire.⁸⁴ According to the industrial censuses carried out in 1913 and 1915, in West Anatolia and Marmara Regions which are in today's Turkey's border- in other words, the most developed regions of the country, there were 20 flour mills, 2 pasta, 6 canned food, 1 beer factories, 2 tobacco shops, 1 ice, 3 brick, 3 lime 7 box, 2 oil, 2 soap, 7 porcelain production shops, 11 tannery, 7 carpenter workshops, 7 wool, 2 cotton thread and weaving, 26 raw silk, 1 silk weaving and 5 other weaving mills, 35 press, 8 cigarette paper, 5 metal ware and a chemical goods factors had been established before 1908 and these statistics demonstrate that the Ottoman industry was not well-developed.⁸⁵

When the Turkish Republic was founded, the development level of industry and technology was no different. Agricultural production constituted 90% of

⁸² Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı- Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), 196.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 196.

⁸⁴ Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi (1908-1980)" in *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2011), 300.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

imported goods and 77% of population were agricultural laborer.⁸⁶ As Boratav says, in the hierarchical economic system of capitalist world, Turkey had taken a place in the world economy by importing industrial goods and exporting agricultural production.⁸⁷ Although Ottoman and Turkish economy depended mostly on the agriculture, it would still be wrong to assume that agricultural production was well-developed. Even after the foundation of Republic, in 1920s, the agricultural production methods were primitive.⁸⁸ The peasants mostly produced on a subsistence level; the poor yields, the annual change depending on the natural conditions, the limited transportation and the high costs of it were some of the significant factors which prevent the production for the market.⁸⁹ In addition to the failure in getting industrialized, the insufficiency of agricultural production made the Turkish economy both instable and weak. Furthermore, because of this economic structure of the country, the Turkish economy was foreign-dependent.

So far, it was made clear that Turkish Republic inheriting from Ottoman Empire was economically weak and one of the periphery countries with its agricultural economy. In addition to the structural problems of Turkish economy, the Republican regime also had to deal with the conjunctural economic problems. First of these problems was the Great Depression of 1929. Economic crisis at first hit the U.S. and then spread to Europe. Turkey's economy was also negatively affected and the bad economic conditions continued to be seen until the mid-1930s. The first impact of the Great Depression in Turkey was that export incomes of the country decreased half.⁹⁰ Although the export rate of the country increased, the main reason of decrease in export income was that the prices of agricultural production and raw

⁸⁶ Gülten Kazgan, *Tanzimat'tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*, 4th ed. (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009), 67.

⁸⁷ Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi", 317.

⁸⁸ Yahya S. Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Yurt Yayıncılık, 1986), 91-2.

⁸⁹ Kazgan, *Tanzimat'tan 21. Yüzyıla*, 67.

⁹⁰ Oktay Yenal, *Cumhuriyet'in İktisat Tarihi* (İstanbul: Creative Yayıncılık, 2001), 84.

materials dropped as three time as.⁹¹ Impact of crisis on agricultural products has negatively affected the economy of the state. Furthermore, in 1929 when the Great Depression emerged, the Turkish state had to pay the debts of Ottoman Empire and finance various public works.⁹² Under these circumstances, the peasants whose products were sold below under their value struggled to pay their taxes. While the Turkish state found the opportunity to increase the tax income, tax burden on peasants got heavier.⁹³

The peasant's inability to pay the taxes has resulted in a serious crisis both in the village life and urban life of Republican Turkey. The peasants who could not pay their taxes were bound to go to loan sharks and landlords; either they become indebted with high interests or the land baron would occupy the land of the peasants.⁹⁴ The existence of loan sharks and the pressure of land barons over the peasants also refer to the decreasing capacity of the state in local regions. In this way, Capture of the peasants by the land barons and loan sharks weakened the bound between peasant and central government. To be able to pay their taxes, the peasants had to sell their lands dirt cheap and immigrated to cities.⁹⁵ Therefore, as Köymen points out while on the hand land barons obtained some sort of capital accumulation, the peasants immigrated to cities constituted the lower classes and became the cheap labor.⁹⁶ The Republican regime tried to deal with this problem of peasants by executing the law of land reform in 1929 and 1945. According to Karaömerlioğlu, the main motivation behind the land reform was to prevent the opposition of peasants against the regime, to make the peasants loyal to the regime and to hinder the rise of

⁹¹ Gülten Kazgan, *Türkiye Ekonomisinde Krizler (1929-2001)*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Bilgi Yayınları, 2008), 59.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 66.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁹⁴ Oya Köymen, *Sermaye Birikirken: Osmanlı, Türkiye, Dünya*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2007), 99.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

left opposition.⁹⁷ However, alliance of Republican's People's Party(CHP) with land barons such as Adnan Menderes, Emin Sazak⁹⁸ prevented the execution of these reforms. CHP's intention to execute the land reform was stopped by its own party members.

World War II is another critical point in Turkish economic history. Although the Turkish Republic did not join the war and remain neutral, the economic and political crisis in which the world went through affected Turkish economy. The first main problem was that because most of the males were taken into the army and this fact drastically decreased the production level of agriculture.⁹⁹ According to Owen and Pamuk, production of wheat which is one of the basic nutrient sources fell by 50%.¹⁰⁰ As a result of the decrease in agricultural production and the state's stock policies, prices of sugar and bread rose about %400-500.¹⁰¹ While on the one hand, the prices dramatically increased, on the other hand, the quality of the basic consumption goods reduced.¹⁰² In addition to the fact that production rate decreased, spread of black market was the another important factor which led to increase of prices. To prevent the black market, Turkish Grain Board (*Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi*) was assigned to collect the agricultural products. Such decisions led to a widespread discontent since the peasants thought that the officers riddled with graft and seized

⁹⁷ "Bir Tepeden Reform Denemesi: "Çiftçiye Topraklandırma Kanunu"nın Hikayesi," M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, accessed July 21, 2013

<http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim/dergiyazi.aspx?did=1&dsid=99&dyid=2340>

⁹⁸ Köymen, *Sermaye Birikirken*, 100.

⁹⁹ İrfan Bülbül, "İkinci Dünya Savaşının Türkiye'de Sosyal Hayata Olumsuz Yansımaları," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları Dergisi* 9, (2006): 14.

¹⁰⁰ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *20. Yüzyılda Ortadoğu Ekonomileri Tarihi*, trans. Ayşe Edirne (İstanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002), 39.

¹⁰¹ M. Selçuk Özkan and Abidin Temizer, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye'de Karaborsacılık" *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi* 2(9) (Fall 2009): 320-1.

¹⁰² Murat Metinsoy, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye: Savaş ve Gündelik Yaşam* (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2007), 66.

illegally the collected goods.¹⁰³ Metinsoy also points to the same fact by stating that the officers of Turkish Grain Board abused their authority for their own sake.¹⁰⁴ This refers to the complex structure of the state; while on the one hand the state was trying to deal with the black market, on the other hand the state and the officers of the state became the source of black market. This also decreases the state capacity since the policies that the state determined were obstructed by its own officers.

3.2.2 Criminal Violence in Everyday Life and Bandits

One of the most basic duties of the modern state is to monopolize the authority with its armed forces and maintain the internal security throughout the country. The monopolization of state in terms of holding the power also brings the centralization and increases the domination of state. As Üngör points out, “the fewer individuals in society who bear arms, the higher level of state formation”.¹⁰⁵ The existence of violence does not only decreases the level of state authority but also obstructs the penetration of the state’s infrastructural and hegemonical power into the different parts of the country. In this sense, it would not be wrong to say that any group or individual holding gun is a potential threat for the state existence. Furthermore, the existence of armed groups and common violence in daily life does not only prevent to create the conditions in which economic development can be carried but also obstructs to establish the hegemony of state over society. In this part of the thesis, the existence of bandits, violence in everyday life and the state (in) capacity to provide the internal security will be focused.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, it will be

¹⁰³ Şinasi Sönmez, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türk Hükümetlerinin Temel Gıda Maddelerinin Temini Konusunda Aldığı Tedbirler,” *Atatürk Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 47 (Spring 2011): 615.

¹⁰⁴ Metinsoy, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı*, 112.

¹⁰⁵ Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Rethinking the Violence of Pacification: State Formation and Bandits in Turkey, 1914-1937,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54, no.4 (October 2012): 746, accessed April 4, 2013, doi:10.1017/S0010417512000400

¹⁰⁶ First of all, I need to make it clear that violence in everyday life refers to the use of criminal tools by ordinary people. Second of all, since it is impossible to examine all the criminal activities taking

emphasized that the incapacity of the state to overcome the security problems leads the state itself to be the actor of this insecure environment.

The common violent action in daily life is another indicator of the fact that the state authority struggles to maintain the social control over society. Almost in every newspaper published daily, it is possible to see how ordinary people do not recognize state authority and get involved in violent actions regardless of their gender and ages. Violent action in daily life is not only common but also bloodcurdling. The state, in return, does not hesitate to take rigid measures to prevent violent actions and become a part of these violent environment created by society. Death sentence is almost an ordinary action of the daily life in Republican era. Despite such measures, implication of rigid measures by the state, in a way, also demonstrates that the state is incapable of fighting against this violent environment in normal ways. In this part, by focusing on the newspapers, it will be examined how common the violent was a part of daily life.

As mentioned, almost all segments of society were included in violent actions in daily life. To support this argument, we will firstly focus on the violent actions of children and old people in 1930s of Turkey. In all of the actions that will be touched upon, it is surprising to see how easy even for a child to pick up a gun and shoot someone in the street. The results of such violent actions are usually devastating. In addition to that the old people are also included in violent. To begin with, according to a news report in *Köroğlu* newspaper, a-15-year-old armed child have killed a youth man whose name is Recep because Recep had witnessed against his brother killed three months ago.¹⁰⁷ By connecting this with an event in which another child killed the killers of his father in Trabzon, the newspaper demands from the state for taking harsher actions against juvenile delinquents. In the same newspaper with a different date, the newspaper tells about a story which a-12-year-old (Mehmet) child shot one adult (Hamdi) and his two children since Hamdi was having a fight with the

place in the Early Republican Era, I specifically focused on the criminal incidents happened between the years of 1934-36.

¹⁰⁷ Köroğlu, 19 Birincikanun 1934, p.3

elder brother of Mehmet.¹⁰⁸ In another event took place in Balıkesir, a-14-year-old child killed a child whose age is 15.¹⁰⁹ The children did not only take place in violent actions to protect themselves or their relatives, but they also resort to violence to steal the money and goods of people. Some other news of Koroğlu exemplifies this with a story that a-15-year old and a-20-year old teenagers, by stabbing a shoes-maker man, have the stolen not only the man's three hundred liras but also a gilded tooth.¹¹⁰ The older people have also been engaged in violent action. Koroğlu, in another news, reports that while a thief whose age is 90 years old was caught by the policemen, a-60-year-old drunken man attacked a man with a knife.¹¹¹

The newspapers as the sources helping us to observe society also demonstrates that women as much as men have been included in violent actions. We can divide the violent events in which women have played role. Under the first category, the events in which women actively played role in violent actions will be examined. In the second category, however, the events in which the women are the passive actors of violent actions will be focused. To begin with the first category, there are many examples which women have been the main factor in violence. First of all, according to the news taken from Koroğlu states that a woman whose name is Muzaffer with her friend was caught when dragging another woman in grand bazaar.¹¹² It is additionally reported that Muzaffer has been involved in snatching for a long time and has more than one hundred criminal records. In another case of violent event, in a village which is close to Alaiye, a woman (Emine) have beaten the arms of his step son, just because he ate corncob, and killed him by hitting his head with an axe.¹¹³ Another women living in Doğaca village of Biga, the newspaper says, killed her grandson by an axe since he wanted the women to give some money from

¹⁰⁸ Koroğlu, 29 Birinckanun 1934, p.2

¹⁰⁹ Koroğlu, 15 Nisan 1936, p.2

¹¹⁰ Koroğlu, 12 İkincikanun 1935, p.2

¹¹¹ Koroğlu, 6 Nisan 1935, p. 2

¹¹² Koroğlu, 30 Mart 1935, p.2

¹¹³ Koroğlu, 2 İkincikanun 1935, p.2

his father's income.¹¹⁴ In our last example of a women directly getting involved in violent action, it is seen that while fighting, a woman (Şerife) attacked her neighbors with an oar due to the some sort of disagreement which was not known in detail by the newspaper.¹¹⁵

As it was already stated, women were not always the source of violence. Disagreement between two man about a woman, a woman cheating her husband or a woman abused in the streets were the other reasons which resulted in violent actions in the society of early Republican era. Sometimes a woman walking on the street alone was a sufficient reason for a violent activity in everyday life. A woman, for example, going to Tire from İzmir, have been threatened by two men with a gun and these men attempted to rape this women.¹¹⁶ Later on, these men have been arrested by the gendarmerie of the region. However, the men, who abuse or try to abuse women sexually, were not always successfully caught. For instance, in Dere village of Gönen, a man whose name is Ahmet led a woman by the nose to forest and killed her after raping.¹¹⁷ After the event, Ahmet was found in Manisa but resisted by blazing away at gendarmerie. At the end of gunfight, he was captured dead. In another incident of women abuse, upon his refusal or marriage proposal, a man (Mümin) have tried to keep a women (Emine) in his home forcibly.¹¹⁸ Despite the fact that she achieved to escape from Ali's home, she has been re-captured and taken to the forest by Ali. Interestingly, because he fell asleep in forest, Emine ran away and informed the police about the incident. Upon her notification, he has been arrested. The women have not been abused in everyday life by stranger men, but also were exposed to domestic violence. In one of such incidents, because he was jealous, the husband killed his husband by choking. The incident has been reported by neighborhood residents and judicial process has been started for further

¹¹⁴ Koroğlu, 16 İkincikanun 1935, p. 2

¹¹⁵ Koroğlu, 29 Nisan 1936, p. 3

¹¹⁶ Koroğlu, 4 Ağustos 1934, p.2

¹¹⁷ Koroğlu, 11 Ağustos 1934, p. 3

¹¹⁸ Koroğlu, 26 Birincikanun 1934, p.2

investigation.¹¹⁹ Therefore, with the reference to newspapers, that the abuse of a woman was a common practice is not difficult to predict. A news proving that report that upon the new regulations of police, in fifty days, forty men have been caught when they bother or abuse the women in streets and they were put into prison.¹²⁰ Though the state tries to control the social life and prevent such violent activities, the society itself also resists against such actions. For example, a woman walking with her husband in Kağıthane, İstanbul, has been abused by two “louts” and her husband attacked them with an iron and injured them.¹²¹ The resistance coming from society, however, in some cases, complicates the violent actions and result in unintended results. In Sivas, for example, while Ali Rıza was walking in the street with a woman, two men stops them and says to Ali Rıza that “you cannot enjoy this woman while we are here”.¹²² Thereupon, Ali Rıza and two men started fighting and the man who tried to end the fight was mistakenly shot by Ali Rıza.

The incidents shown above are striking in terms of showing how easily people get involved in violent actions. Furthermore, it is obvious that even a minor conflict can easily turn into a violent event in which cutlery or firearms are used. The news taken from Akşam newspaper by Öztürk complains about this situation with the following expression:¹²³

The constabulary investigates the suspected places. Even though, it is forbidden to have guns without the official permission of the state, even in minor cases, people attack each other by using knife and gun and even unimportant incident result in murder. Especially in suburbs, the previously convicted people gather in coffeehouses and barrelhouses still carry numerous guns. To stop this, the police have taken new measures. The constabularies are investigating the suspected places at night and under Ali Bey’s thumb, a special crew which composes of polices has been established. With this crew, various coffeehouses and barrelhouses have been busted and many guns and knives have been found.

¹¹⁹ Sivas Postası, 16 Nisan 1938, p. 1

¹²⁰ Köroğlu, 8 Eylül 1934, p. 2

¹²¹ Köroğlu, 16 Nisan 1936, p.3

¹²² Köroğlu, 26 Birincikanun 1934, p.2

¹²³ Akşam, 19 Mart 1931. Cited by Serdar Öztürk, “Eşkiyalar, Kabadayılar, Külhanbeyiler ve Silah Toplama,” *Bilgi ve Bellek* 5, (2006): 149.

The newspaper seems right in complaining about the common use of knives and guns in criminal incidents. In Ayntab(Gaziantep), for example, a hashish addict bullying a man for no reason was stabbed and killed.¹²⁴ The other incident that the knife has been used was that two men putting his animals out to grass in someone else's farm were warned by the village headmen. By getting angry after this warning, the two men have killed the headmen by scratching his eyes out and by stabbing him seventy seven times.¹²⁵ In another case, the woman claiming that her money was stolen and bad rumor about her have been spread burned the face of a man with the gunpowder of a gun in Bartın.¹²⁶ In another incident, the two men arguing about how to irrigate their farms fought and one of them stabbed the other man.¹²⁷ Lastly, according to Milli Gazete, a woman has been stabbed by a man twenty four times.¹²⁸ There is no further detail about the incident in the newspaper. There are many further examples in newspapers which demonstrate that the use of knives and guns are so common in criminal events.

Death sentence is resorted by the states because of two main and simple reasons. First, such punishments aim to decrease the rate of crimes. Second, such punishments are functional for the states, especially for the ones having trouble in dominating the everyday life, as the death sentence can be seen as an attempt to make its existence visible. The Kemalist regime, which rules the country without a common consent and powerful hegemonic apparatus, too has practically used death sentence both to consolidate its power and establish the state authority. By drawing such perspective about the death sentence, what we see, in early Republican era, is that the state resorts to death sentence to increase the state control over society. For instance, in Adana, a hired killer by a man to kill another man has been punished with death sentence.¹²⁹ In another example, two men named as Vahram and Ohanes

¹²⁴ K ro lu, 11 Nisan 1936, p. 3

¹²⁵ K ro lu, 25 Nisan 1936, p.2

¹²⁶ K ro lu, 29 Eyl l 1934, p.2

¹²⁷ Ekekon, 12 Haziran 1935, p.2

¹²⁸ Milli Gazete, 2 Temmuz 1934, p.2

¹²⁹ K ro lu, 26  kincikanun 1935, p.2

to commit a burglary killed a man, his wife and daughter. Those two men have been sentenced to death as well.¹³⁰ A woman who killed his husband by smothering with her two friends is another person hanged by the decision of high criminal court.¹³¹ There are also cases in which three people, at the same time, were hanged because of burglary and murder.¹³² Frequently resorting to death sentence is probably not an expression of the value given to killed people but rather the states' desire to control the social life more effectively.

In addition to high rate of criminal violence in everyday life, another main factor standing in front of the Turkish state was the existence of bandits. The state tried to deal with the bandits by disarming the population in general and fight against the bandit groups in especially in eastern parts of the country. The quotation of army headquarters taken from Üngör's article shows the desire of the state to monopolize the violence: "The first objective of the government, which is determined to make radical reforms in the east, is to collect the weapons in the population's possession. Even if it is a gradual process, this job certainly cannot be neglected."¹³³ Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that the demolishing the bandits and controlling the means of violence is one of the priorities of the Turkish state to increase the capabilities of Turkish state.

First of all, it is critical to understand how and why armed organizations like bandits emerge and what socio-political factors play role in the formation of bandits. According to Hobsbawm, the number of bandits increases when societal and economic conditions get worse. For this reason, social instability, economic crisis and administrative inability of state can be counted as the important factors which fasten the formation of bandits and bandit-like structures.¹³⁴ By taking advantage of

¹³⁰ Köroğlu, 19 İkincikanun Cumartesi, p.2

¹³¹ Ege, 18 Şubat 1936, p.1

¹³² Babalık, 16 Temmuz 1934, p.2

¹³³ Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları, 197. Cited by Üngör, "State Formation and Bandits," 751.

¹³⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1969), 15-6-7-8.

social instability and war conditions, the bandits may aim to obtain power against the central state and gain autonomy as far as they can. Thus, in this way, the bandits or bandit-like organizations do not only decrease the power of state but also by replacing the state organization, they may find the opportunity to interact directly with the local people. As a result of the autonomy that bandits gained because of the state's incapacity to control them, they may act like a state in the local regions that they dominate. One of these bandits, for example, under Ottoman rule, Bişare Çeto, has been forcibly collecting money from the Armenian and Syriac and Kurdish population of Xerzan and the state was so powerless that he forced local people to write petitions to state institutions that he was innocent and benevolent.¹³⁵ Also, the late Ottoman state was so incapable of dealing with bandits that the state had to cooperate with other bandit groups to beat the bandits that the Ottoman state directly fought.¹³⁶ The method that the Ottoman state deals with the bandits by using other bandits shows dramatic weakness of the Ottoman state structure.¹³⁷ These examples provided above shows that the existence and domination of bandits is a significant factor causing the destruction of the state authority.

From the explanation made above, it can be concluded that the “bandit problem” of Republican Period has inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the socio-political conditions of the transition era have been suitable for the emergence of such groups. The war conditions of World War I and absence of central authority for a while after the dissolution of Ottoman Empire are the reasons which helped to continue their existence. In this perspective, the bandits have not

¹³⁵ BOA, DH.EUM.EMN 38/30, Vice-Governor of Bitlis Mehmed Kadri to Ministry of Justice, 6 Dec. 1913. Cited by Üngör, “State Formation and Bandits”, 751.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ It is important to emphasize that historically the existence of banditry is not unique to Ottoman Empire. In some southern European countries, Balkans, Latin America, Africa and South Asia, the bandits existed. See Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, 24. In Turkey, in the Eastern regions, bandits continued to exist until 1940s. Although it would be wrong to say that the banditry was a countrywide problem, the existence of bandits until 1940s until which the state had enough time to consolidate its power, can be counted as one of the indicators referring to low state authority.

disappeared with the dissolution of Ottoman Empire and continued to become an obstacle standing in front of the Turkish state. The documents taken from Republican Archieve of Prime Ministry support our argument. According to two reports related to public order;¹³⁸

1. On 26/05/1930, the gendarmerie conflicted with five armed bandits in Hacı Village of Elaziz(Elazığ). Three bandits were caught but other two have achieved to escape from the gendarmerie.
2. In Dersim (Tunceli), the bandit group composing of 15 people stole a number of animals of a shepherd and killed him/her.
3. In Malazgirt, a town of Muş city, an amount of money and dress have been stolen. From Sarısu district, a horse has been taken away.
4. The gendarmerie encountered four mounted (bandits) crossing the border of Turkey to go to Iran. One of the bandits has been killed by the gendarmerie.
5. By cooperation of two (bandit) groups, the Şişik village of Siirt has been attacked and kidnapped two supporters and the wife of village headmen.
6. Twelve armed bandits have attacked to Eğriağaç village of Adana and a man whose name is Ahmet was robbed.
7. A bandit group raiding the village of Medih and Tamerzi of Mardit city seized one hundred animals and one villager got wounded. The suspicious are being followed.
8. Three bandits whose names are Kahraman, Eyüp and Kaco have been caught.

In addition to these examples, the statistics of the state demonstrates how common the bandits get involved in violent actions. For example, according to security report of Eastern cities, in one month, thirteen villages and twenty houses have been raided. The number of robbery incidents, on the other hand, is one hundred four.¹³⁹

The state, under these circumstances, looked for the ways to extend its authority in the country. With this purpose, to fight against the bandits and violence, some measurements have been taken by the state. According to Öztürk, after putting the law about organization of police force into execution, the state sweepingly started

¹³⁸ Republican Archieve of Prime Ministry (BCA) 30.10.0/128.920.4 and 30.10.0/ 128.920.36. The other incidents that took part in documents but bandits did not play role were not mentioned here.

¹³⁹ BCA 30.10.0/ 128.923.2

a campaign to disarm the society.¹⁴⁰ The number of collected violence tools show that the state was partially successful in following the policy to disarm the society.¹⁴¹

Table 2. The number of weapons collected in 1932

	Bulunan Silahlar	Eslahai Harbiye	Bıçak	Kama	Saldırma	Süngülü Baston	Kasatura	Sustalı Çakı	Av Tüfeği	Kılıç
Adana	27		95	51	2					
Afyonkarahisar	26	18	60	18	4	1				
Aksaray	8			10						
Amasya	4		4	7						
Ankara	39	23	80	34					6	
Antalya	14		27						1	
Artvin										
Aydın	11		24							
Balıkesir	18		16	1			1			
Bayazıt										
Bilecik										
Bolu	9	1	2	5	1				5	
Burdur	18		5	67						1
Bursa	53		135	14		2		8		
Cebelibereket	9			2	2					
Çanakkale										
Çankırı	15	1	15							
Çorum	31	3	114	49					1	
Denizli	47	4	36	12				6	10	
Diğarbekir	16		11							
Edirne			2	1					1	
Elaziz										
Erzincan	108	3	3	4						
Erzurum	2			4						
Eskişehir	49		43							
Gaziantep	11	3		41					1	
Giresun	652	1308	241							
Gümüşhane										
Hakkari										
İçel								1		
Isparta	10	2	6	3				49		
İstanbul	71		179	37			1			
İzmir	56		154	31			6			
Kars										
Kastamonu										
Kayseri	59	5	20	16						
Kırklareli	3	3								
Kırşehir	4		4	13						
Kocaeli	14			2						
Konya	79		37	110						
Kütahya	4		18	1						
Malatya	14	1	3	6						
Manisa	-									
K.Maraş										
Mardin	2			1						
Mersin	23		17			1		2	1	
Muğla	13	2	22	5			1		4	
Muş										

¹⁴⁰ Serdar Öztürk, *Eşkiyalar, Kabadayılar*, 149.

¹⁴¹ I have seen this table in Serdar Öztürk's article. However, the number of the document provided by Öztürk about the collection of weapon is not correct. The correct number of the document is; BCA 30.10.0/54.360.1.

Table 2 (Continued)

İller	Bulunan Silahlar	Eslahai Harbiye	Bıçak	Kama	Saldırma	Süngülü Baston	Kasatura	Sustalı Çakı	Av Tüfeği	Kılıç
Niğde	33	2		10	4					
Ordu	19	1								
Rize	27		46							
Samsun	52	23	103							
Siirt										
Sinop	7	9	2	5						
Sivas	27	1	23		23					
Şebîn K.Hisar	4	5	13		3					
Tekirdağ	7	1	2							
Tokat										
Trabzon										
Urfa	8	2		4					1	
Van										
Yozgat	2									
Zonguldak	41	5	61	1	156	5				
Toplam	1836	1427	1623	565	195	10	9	66	32	1

According to these statistics, in total, 5792 tools which can be used in crimes have been collected by the forces of the state. While Giresun is the city from which the criminal tools have been collected at most, in seventeen cities, there could not be found any sort of criminal tools. By depending on this table, it would be wrong to assume that there are no criminal tools in these cities.¹⁴² Even in the cities from which amount of criminal tools have been collected, the use of such tools continued. In Diyarbakır, for example, sixteen armed men have been seen in Hoşat village in 1937.¹⁴³ Therefore, the state's project of disarmament society is not complete yet. However, the state continued to follow the disarmament policy. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the state aimed to collect the guns, not only from bandits, but also from all actors in society including the tribes.

Despite the hard efforts of the state and a partial success of disarmament campaign, the state could not still succeed to disarm the bandits and other actors. Even when it comes to the 1940s, the bandits or armed people still exist and they are still threatening the ramification of the state especially in local regions In Siirt, for example, where no criminal tools have been collected, twenty armed people who have military uniform by tying the village headmen and his son and stolen 200 lira of

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ BCA 30.10.0/ 116. 805. 14

them in 1938.¹⁴⁴ In another example, the Şavaklı tribe has been attacked by Koçuşağı bands and some animals have been of the tribe have been taken away by the members of the band. The governor of Erzincan warns the ministry of interior to take more measures since it has been determined that the band may further attack to some other disarmed villages in the region.¹⁴⁵ (Appendix A) In addition to that, some of the bandits groups are as strong as to attack directly to Turkish military. For example, a troop of cavalry man of Turkish military which goes back to Meydan village from Kerho, have been attacked by one hundred fifty bandits.¹⁴⁶ (Appendix B) In another case of such incident, in 1937, one soldier has been killed and one got wounded by the attack of 35 bandits.¹⁴⁷ Linke, one of travelers in Turkey in the midst of 1930s, writes that the police cannot overcome the bandit problem and bandits were as strong as to stop the military trucks and steal the money of soldiers in Erzincan.¹⁴⁸ In another document used by Üngör in his article, we see that how the robbery of a bandit group on 15 March 1937 frustrates the Interior Ministry. According to Şükrü Kaya, “ The reason why special importance must be assigned to the Karaköprü robbery is that the band could approach Diyarbakir as close as 15 kilometers, commit the robbery on a busy main road for the duration of seven hours with nobody hearing or seeing it, and return on the same road they arrived on, without getting caught”.¹⁴⁹ As Üngör points out, “the holdup was a humiliation because the culprits proved they could provoke the regime on its own turf and thereby demonstrate its relative powerlessness”.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁴ BCA 30.10.0/ 105.686.19

¹⁴⁵ BCA 30.0.10/ 111.747.2

¹⁴⁶ BCA 30.10.0/ 116.805.9

¹⁴⁷ BCA 30.10.0/ 116.805.10

¹⁴⁸ Lilo Linke, *Mustafa Kemal Türkiyesi*, trans. Rauf Tektaş (İstanbul: İkarus Yayınları, 2008), 81.

¹⁴⁹ BCA 30.10/70.461.1. Cited by Üngör, “State Formation and Bandits,” 764.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

3.2.3 Incomplete Centralization: Weak Transportation Facilities

The development level of transportation throughout the country is a decent information which could help us understand the capabilities of a state. If a country has a well-developed transportation system, that means that relations of production are mature enough to integrate the country around a common and central market. By considering that the central market among national borders was the main reason which causes the nation-state structures to emerge, the fact that to what extent the transportation is well-developed is a significant factor in understanding the maturity level of nation capital and the nation-state. The development level of transportation system also refers to the rise of central power of the state.¹⁵¹ The state, if it has a well-developed transportation system, could penetrate more easily to local regions and obtain the chance to practice its power even in the most remote parts of the country. As Scott points out, development of transportation means to connect the provinces to central state, bound the population to central authority and to maintain security in local regions.¹⁵² Thus, the level of centralization of a state could be well-understood by looking at development level of transportation system in a country.

In Republican era, what we see is that because of the World War I and Independence War, the highways in Anatolia were mostly collapsed and railroads were insufficient to connect the different parts of the country. In addition to that, because Ottoman Empire was a semi-colonized country, the transportation system of the Empire was mostly shaped according to the benefits of foreign capital. According to Tekeli and İlkin, the railway route between İzmir- Aydın, for instance, is a typical example of a semi colonized country's transportation system since in this route, we see that there is a seaport which is surrounded by railways and there is not a further connection which links this railway with inner parts of the country.¹⁵³ In this way, by preventing integration and connection between the railways in different regions,

¹⁵¹ Harvey, *Paris Modernitenin Başkenti*, 150-1.

¹⁵² James Scott, *Devlet Gibi Görmek: İnsanlık Durumunu Geliştirmeye Yönelik Projeler Nasıl Başarısız Oldu?*, trans. Nil Erdoğan (İstanbul: Versus Kitap, 2008), 130.

¹⁵³ Tekeli and İlkin, *Modernitenin Harcı*(vol.3), 373.

every imperial power protects its own sphere of influence.¹⁵⁴ The process starting with entrance of Ottoman to the free trade system has resulted in complete domination of European powers over Ottoman Empire and transportation system was affected from this fact too.¹⁵⁵ The fact that railways built in late Ottoman Era by foreign capital has been a block for Turkish Republic to centralize its authority over the country when the Turkish Republic have just been founded.

In addition to the weak conditions of railways, the highway system of Ottoman Empire was also under-developed. Tekeli and İlkin says that the highway system of Ottoman Empire was far away being from sufficient and it was even worse and more under-developed than the railway system.¹⁵⁶ The statistics about the highways remained from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic seems to prove that this argument is completely correct. When the Republic was founded, the length of the highways throughout the country was 18.335 km. While 13.885 km of these highways are broken and in need of repair, 4.450 km of 18.335 km is unpaved road.¹⁵⁷ The conditions of Ottoman Empire was not the only reason playing role in the weakness of transportation system but also the extreme conditions of Balkan Wars, World War I have been the another factors which further weaken the existing transportation system. Filiz Çolak also adds that because the Ottoman transportation system was built according to the previous borders of the Ottoman Empire, the territorial loses after Balkan Wars and World War I have affected the transportation system of Turkey negatively.¹⁵⁸ The weakness of transportation system was not only a factor standing against the centralization of the state but also obstructs the carriage of goods and products from one place to another. Türkan Çetin's statement related to difficulties of carriage agricultural goods depending on the insufficient transportation

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ Orhan Kurumuş, *Emperyalizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi*, (Ankara: Savaş Yayınları, 1982), 15-6.

¹⁵⁶ Tekeli and İlkin, *Modernitenin Harcı*, 377.

¹⁵⁷ Filiz Çolak, "Türkiye'de Karayolu Ulaşımı(1880-1940)," *Türk Kültürü* 411 (July 1997); 433.

¹⁵⁸ Filiz Çolak, "Atatürk Dönemi'nde Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Ulaşım Politikasına Genel Bir Bakış," *International Periodicals For The Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic* 8/2 (Winter 2013): 347.

system explains the case well; “because the production for market was not yet well-developed and transportation system was limited, while in one part of the country, people were dying of famine, in another part, the people were burning the agricultural surplus.”¹⁵⁹

The Kemalist regime by realizing the insufficient transportation system of Turkey, have attempted to improve the existing transportation system. During the early Republican period, the main policy to improve the transportation system was to build railways which could integrate the different parts of the country and maintain a unity for common domestic market.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, Kemalists was well aware of the fact that the development of transportation system would not only improve the economic and social life but also would strengthen the state authority by maintaining security in various regions.¹⁶¹ With this purpose, the railways in Anatolia whose length is about 3.500 km was nationalized and the railways constructed between Erzurum-Sarıkamış, Toprakkale- İskenderun, Fevzipaşa-Meydanekbez have been taken over by the Republican regime.¹⁶² After the Great Depression in 1929, the process of nationalizing the railways was accelerated as the foreign companies controlling the railways put high freight tariff for passengers and goods. Because of this policy, export declined and the economy of the country faced a serious economic crisis.¹⁶³ After this period, many railways including the lines between Mudanya-Bursa, Samsun-Çarşamba, Toprakkale- Payas and Aydın Railway Company have been bought by the state.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, for the first time, the railways were introduced in central Anatolia and railways to Kayseri in 1927, Malatya in 1931,

¹⁵⁹ Trkan Çetin, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Ky Kanununa Bakış: Ky Kanunun Çıkarılması” *Dokuz Eyll niversitesi Çağdaş Trkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* v.2/4-5 (1994-1995): 31.

¹⁶⁰ Tekeli and İlkin, *Modernitenin Harcı*(vol.3), 378.

¹⁶¹ İsmail Yıldırım, “Atatrk Dnemi Demiryolu Politikasına Bir Bakış,” *Atatrk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 12/35 (July 1996).

¹⁶² Arif Mendol, “Cumhuriyet Dnemi Ulaşım Modelleri” *Cumhuriyet Dnemi Trkiye Ansiklopedisi* 10 (1985); 2772.

¹⁶³ Tekeli and İlkin, *Modernitenin Harcı*(vol.3), 302.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 303-6.

Niğde in 1933, Elazığ in 1934, Diyarbakır in 1935 and Erzurum were completed. % 78.6 of newly constructed railways in the Early Republican Era were in the Eastern parts of Turkey and in general the length of railways increased approximately to 7.500 km throughout the country in 1945.¹⁶⁵

At first glance, the Kemalists seems to make considerable progress in developing the transportation system of Turkey. However, when we compare the statistics of Turkey and European countries, we see that Turkey is still far away from having a well-developed transportation system. According to the data taken from International Historical Statistics (IHS), as of 1945, the length of railways in France as a country whose surface area is more or less same with Turkey is 40.500 km.¹⁶⁶ In some other European countries as of 1945, the length of railways are as follows:¹⁶⁷

Table 3. The Length of Railways in Some European Countries

<u>Countries</u>	<u>Length of Railways(km)</u>
Spain	17.930
Italy	18.655
Germany	61.940*
Poland	17.938
Great Britain	31.984

¹⁶⁵ Mendol, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ulaşım*, 2772.

¹⁶⁶ Brian R. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics (IHS) 1750-2005*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 743.

¹⁶⁷ Because there is no data about 1945's Germany, the number provided in the table belongs to 1939. When evaluating this table, it is important to pay attention to the fact that the some of the railways were seriously damaged or lost because of the World War II. In Italy, for example, the lenght of railways decreased to 18.655 km from 23.227 km.

The other problem faced during the construction of new railways in Turkey was that some of the construction plans could not be brought into being because of the financial and geographical difficulties. Afyon-Karakulu route, for instance, could not be completed because of the geographical difficulties and financial incapacities.¹⁶⁸ The Burdur-Korkuteli, Adapazarı-Düzce-Bolu-Gerede-İsmet Paşa, Bursa- Mustafa Kemalpaşa-Okçugöl, Somucak-Osmancık-Gümüşhacıköy-Merzifon-Amasya were the another construction plans which could not be applied by the Republican regime for various reasons.¹⁶⁹

Condition of roads inheriting from Ottoman Empire was no better than the railways. As it was emphasized, the Republican regime tried to integrate the country by railways and construction for roads was of secondary importance. The investments on roads usually depend on the closeness of area to ports and railways.¹⁷⁰ On the other hand, the reason why construction of roads was of secondary importance could be explained with insufficient number of vehicles, lack of qualified personnel, technical incompetence and economic difficulties.¹⁷¹ Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that the Kemalists have completely neglected to construct roads. Especially after 1929, with introduction of a new law and the foundation of Department of Macadamized Road and Bridge (Şose ve Köprüler Reisliği), the Turkish state concentrated the construction of new roads.¹⁷² Because of the financial difficulties of the time, the state has tried to improve the road system by

¹⁶⁸ Gülpınar Akbulut, "Osmanlı Devleti'nden Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne Gerçekleşmeyen Demiryolu Projeleri ve Etkileri(1876-1939)," *Atatürk Üniversitesi Atatürk Dergisi* 2012 1(1) (2012): 248.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 248-50.

¹⁷⁰ Erdal İnce, "Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Türkiye'de Karayolu Ulaşımına Genel Bir Bakış ve Köyde Ulaşım," *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* v.12/24 (Spring 2012): 176.

¹⁷¹ Birol Çetin, Serap Barış and Serap Saroğlu, "Türkiye'de Karayollarının Gelişimine Tarihsel Bir Bakış," *Çankırı Karatekin Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi* v.1/1 (Fall 2011): 126.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

taking tax from the people either by cash or body force.¹⁷³ After World War II, the Turkish state continued to increase the length of roads throughout the country.

Despite these attempts of the Kemalist regime, the newly established Turkish state did not radically improve the roads. For example, according to Tekeli and İlkin, the length of roads have increased from 18.335 km to 41.582 km but as Arif Merdol emphasizes only 4.464 km of the roads constructed in Republican era are of good quality.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, despite this slight improvement of roads, the length of the roads was still not sufficient. According to the statistics, as of 1938, while the length of roads in France is 1842 km per 1000 km², in Turkey the length of roads per 1000km² is just about 50km. The length of roads in Turkey is shorter even than the length of roads in Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁵ One of the most important factors leading to this slight improvement of roads is the insufficient budget of the state. As Durgun emphasizes, Most of the roads were not constructed and only basic transportation vehicles were being used. As for the available roads of the time, they were far away from the concept of road that we define today. Most of them were the paths in the valleys that had been shaped in the long term as a result of the use of the pedestrians, caravans and carriages.¹⁷⁶ In a newspaper news, titled as “Not a joke: How did I go to Gözne?”, the reporter says that the tires of the car has flattened twice and complains that “I do not want to say that the road is damaged since in reality there is not a road to talk about. What we call “road” is just the track of cars which passed before.”¹⁷⁷ (Appendix C) In addition to that, because the priority in improving the transportation system is given to railways and because railways were not effective enough to penetrate into the local regions, especially villages continued to

¹⁷³ Nuray Özdemir, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi’nde Türkiye’de Yol Vergisi,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil-Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* v.32/53 (March 2013): 218.

¹⁷⁴ Mendol, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ulaşım*, 2769.

¹⁷⁵ Birol Çetin, *Türkiye’de Karayollarının*, 128.

¹⁷⁶ Bülent Durgun, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Türkiye’de Karayolu Ulaşımı ve İzmir Uygulamaları,” *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* v.5/13 (Fall 2006): 30.

¹⁷⁷ Ege, 15 Temmuz 1936, sf.1

face tremendous problems about the insufficient transportation system. In most of the villages, there was not a road and the only way of transportation was the paths that were constructed by the villagers.¹⁷⁸ When the rain or snow falls, on the other hand, these roads could not be used by the villagers and villages remained isolated especially in winters. In a village law which would be later put into execution, the Kemalist regime put the burden of construction of roads to villagers by making the headman of villages responsible for the construction of new roads.¹⁷⁹ The construction of roads took years to be completed and some places such as Alany were not reachable by road.¹⁸⁰ In general, the Turkish state was incapable of providing an effective transportation system which could help the state to increase its authority. Ineffective transportation system and lack of state authority also refers to the weak infrastructural power of the state.

¹⁷⁸ İnce, *Cumhuriyetin İlk Yılları*, 184.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ Zürcher, *Savaş, Devrim*, 289.

CHAPTER IV

HEGEMONIC POWER OF THE STATE AND THE LIMITATIONS OF KEMALIST TRANSFORMATION PROJECTS

4.1 WHY “LIMITED”?

In this part of my thesis, I will specifically focus on the hegemonic institutions of the state through which the state and the society directly interact. In this sense, I will first of all focus on the educational and health institutions of the state. When we examine these institutions, however, what we see is that the medical and educational system is not enough to provide the necessary health and education services and public facilities are decrepit or neglected.¹⁸¹ The medical system that the Turkish Republic had was insufficient to fight against the most common and dangerous illnesses of the time. Malaria, one of those illnesses, cause many people to die in local regions and the government, though, tries to take measures to fight against it, partially fails. Furthermore, the number of well-qualified doctors does not meet the need of society. The number of health institutions is not enough or they are not materially well provided. The education system is not different. Only a minority of the population are attending the state schools. Even if they do, they mostly quit their schools when they complete the elementary schools. In this sense, it would not be wrong to say the new Turkish state does not have the ability to use effectively its most important institution to legitimize its existence and to establish its hegemony over the society. Ineffectiveness of these state institutions also brings the failure of official ideology of Kemalist regime.

In addition to the incapacity of these state institutions, the clothing reform and the reactions from society will be examined by taking the continuity between late Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic into account. Although the Kemalist

¹⁸¹ Rotberg, *When States Fail*, 7.

functionally used the women for a bigger political project, as we will see, the importance of clothing comes from the fact the newly established Turkish Republic denied all of its connections with “non-modern” and religious hegemony of Ottoman Empire and attempted to replace the traditional with modern and civilized. Thus, radical changes in the daily life would not only symbolize the transition to modern life but also help the Kemalist regime to materialize the ideal of Kemalists in everyday life. However, the infrastructural and hegemonic weakness of the state became a tremendous obstacle standing in front of the Kemalist elites and the social life could not be transformed as Kemalist wished. Thus, the Kemalists project to transform the daily life and women clothing was met with resistance coming from society.

4.2 EDUCATION AND HEALTH AS HEGEMONIC INSTITUTIONS

Educational and health services are the most basic services which the modern state is responsible to provide for its citizens. The functions of these institutions are many; they do not only demonstrate the state is there for the citizens of the country but by means of these institutions, the state finds the opportunity to legitimize its existence and to entirely dominate its subjects. In this part, the health and educational institutions in Early Republican Era will be examined. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that the Kemalist regime partially fails to use these hegemonic institutions effectively. Thus, it would not be wrong to say that the Kemalist regime's struggle to dominate its own subject seems to continue when we take the statement of educational and health institutions into account.

To support the argument that the educational and health institutions are the hegemonic institutions which are functionally used by the modern state, we need to understand “how” the state uses them to spread the hegemonic ideology among its citizens. As emphasized many time before, legitimization and ideology are the two important tools of the state and these two cannot be examined independently from each other. What is legitimized can be a kind of behavior, information, belief or attitude, but when we take all of these into account, it is the ideology which is

legitimized.¹⁸² Through this legitimization process, the ideology of the state is practiced and this also helps hegemony to be established over society.¹⁸³ In this process, according to Gramsci, law system, educational institutions, alongside with religion, media, cinema and other artistic organizations, are the most significant institutions which bourgeoisie used to maintain its hegemony over society.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, for Gramsci, it would not be wrong to say that the state institutions are the mediators which connect the state to society and these institutions are responsible in spreading the dominant ideology of the state. National educational system, standardization of a national language, and invention of national flags, national anthems and national ceremonies are some of the basic features which creates a dominant ideology in nation-states.¹⁸⁵

4.2.1 Education

Similar to other modern states which functionally use education in nation-building process, the Kemalist regime has also tried to benefit from this function of education in establishing the hegemony of the state over society.¹⁸⁶ By means of educational institutions, the Kemalist regime has tried to build a new dominant ideology around modernization and nationalism. However, because the education system of Ottoman Empire was dualistic and fragmented, the first aim of the Kemalist regime was to unite the all educational institutions under direct state control. By aiming to standardize the education, the Kemalist regime put “*Tevhid-i*

¹⁸² Kemal İnal, Eğitim ve İktidar: Türkiye’de Ders Kitaplarında Demokratik ve Milliyetçi Değerler, (Ankara:Ütopya Yayınları,2004), p.55.

¹⁸³ İsmet Parlak, Kemalist İdeolojide Eğitim: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Tarih ve Yurt Bilgisi Kitapları Üzerine Bir İnceleme, (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2005), 47.

¹⁸⁴ Stanley Aronowitz, “Gramsci’s Concept of Political Organization,” in *Perspectives on Gramsci: Politics, Culture and Social Theory*, ed. Joseph Francese (New York: Routledge), 10.

¹⁸⁵ Charles Tilly, *Avrupa’da Devrimler: 1492-1992*, trans. Özden Arıkan (İstanbul: Literatür Yayınları,2005), 38.

¹⁸⁶ Ufuk Şimşek, Birgül Küçük and Yavuz Topkaya, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi Eğitim Politikalarının İdeolojik Temelleri,” *International Periodical For The Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 7/4* (Fall 2012): 2811-3.

Tedrisat” law into execution. With this law put into execution, according to Serter, the state aimed to;¹⁸⁷

1. connect all educational and scientific institutions to ministry of education
2. assign all educational institutions of pious foundations to ministry of education.
3. transfer the whole funding for education into the ministry of education.

After closing all educational institutions of Ottoman Empire in 1925, the state, with this law, has completely taken the educational institutions under its control. The centralization of education system was not the only aim for Kemalist regime. In the coming years, the curriculum and course books have been changed,¹⁸⁸ the Arabic alphabet of Ottoman- Turkish language have been replaced with the Latin alphabet and Turkish Historical Association have been founded to strengthen the nation building process in Early Republican Era.¹⁸⁹ When changed course books and curriculum is closely examined, it is open that a new education system with nationalist and secular motives have been attempted to be established.¹⁹⁰

Despite the attempts to use the educational institutions to spread the dominant and national ideology and despite the Kemalist regime was well-aware of the function of education in establishing the hegemony over society, the archive documents show that neither the number of school nor the number of teachers were enough to establish an effective education system. Even in the regions where there are schools, the teachers were not being paid regularly. On the other hand, most of the schools were not materially sufficient and students usually quit the schools after completing the elementary schools.

¹⁸⁷ Nur Serter, *Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1994), 49. Cited by Dilşad Türkmenoğlu, “Tek Parti Döneminde Ulus İnşa Politikalarının Eğitim Boyutu,” *Türk Eğitim Bilimleri Dergisi* 5(1) (Winter 2007): 149.

¹⁸⁸ Erdal Aslan, “Osmanlı'nın “Mekatib-i İptidai”yesinden Türkiye'nin “İlk Mektepler”ine Geçişte Tarih Programlarında Değişim,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 48 (Fall 2011): 753.

¹⁸⁹ Türkmenoğlu, “Tek Parti Döneminde,” 166.

¹⁹⁰ Aslan, “Mekatib-i İptidai,” 765.

The education system of the early Republican period cannot be examined independently from the education system of Ottoman Empire. The weaknesses of the education system of Turkish Republic mostly inherit from the Ottoman Empire. When the Turkish Republic have just been founded, the rate of illiterate people whose ages are above 6 is %80,8. While this rate among women rises up to %90,2, %70,7 of the men population do not know how to read and write. Furthermore, while the number of elementary schools is approximately 5000, there are just 72 secondary schools and 9 colleges throughout the country.¹⁹¹ In 1923-24, the number of teacher is about 12.000.¹⁹² When these low numbers are considered, it is obvious that the newly established Turkish Republic and the Kemalist regime had an ineffective education system to establish its hegemony over the society.

In the coming years, the Turkish state has taken some positive steps and partial progress has been made in education. When it comes to the 1931-32, for instance, the number of teachers rose to 17000 approximately and number of students has become 567.361 while it was 341.941 in 1923-24.¹⁹³ Although the rise of numbers cannot be neglected, it is also important to take the rising population of Turkey into account. From 1927 to 1935, the number of population rose about 2 million people.¹⁹⁴ Despite the progress in student number, the number of illiterate people is still 10.387.105 and that means that the number of people who do know how to read and write is just about 2,5 million people throughout the country in 1935.¹⁹⁵ As we have mentioned, after completing the elementary school, statistics show that people rarely continue their education life by going to the secondary schools. In 1934-35, for example, there are only 45.812 registered students who are attending a secondary school. What draws attention in the statistics is that the number of female attending a secondary school is extremely low, just about 12.000.

¹⁹¹ Serter, *Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı*, 154. Cited by Türkmenoğlu, "Tek Parti Döneminde," 168.

¹⁹² Turkish Statistical Institution(TÜİK), *Statistical Indicators 1923-1960.*, (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu Matbaası), 62.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 18

The number of students going to a high school, when compared to secondary schools, is even lower. The number of registered students to any high school is 13.622 and while 10.691 of this number are male students, 2.103 are female. That the number of students per teacher is just 9 students in high schools does not demonstrate how excessive number of teachers is but how low number of students who attend the high schools.

“The education problem” in the Eastern parts of Turkey was much deeper. Bahattin Demirtaş shows that there were only 2 schools in Hakkari and %98 of people do not know how to read.¹⁹⁶ On the other hand, schools alone were not enough to solve the problem about education. For example, in Elazığ city where there are 74 schools, in average only 4.000 students were going to schools while there are more than 30.000 young people who were supposed to go to the schools.¹⁹⁷ According to other statistics taken from Demirtaş’s article, in ten cities including Elazığ, Erzincan, Urfa, Mardin, Gaziantep, Van, Siirt, Bitlis, Erzurum, Ağrı and Muş, there are only 11 secondary schools. (Each city has just one school) In those schools, there are only 144 teachers and 2.662 students.¹⁹⁸ In Bingöl, the situation of educational institutions is not different. In the city, as of 1936, there are just 9 schools and 15 teachers. Thus, it can be seen that there is just one teacher in some schools and only %6 of the young people are going into the schools.¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, %80 of population, which is mostly composed of Kurds, did not know and speak Turkish language.²⁰⁰ In Erzurum, according to a report written by the minister of culture, he complains that although the number of students increased seven times more than before, the number of teachers remained same.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁶ Bahattin Demirtaş, “Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgelerinde Eğitim ve Öğretim,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 41 (Summer 2008): 68.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 71.

¹⁹⁹ Tuba Akekmekçi and Muazzez Pervan, ed., *Doğu Anadolu ve Cumhuriyet Bürokrasisi(1939-1951)* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2011), 17.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁰¹ BCA 30.10.0/ 142.20.7.2

In addition to these problems, the Turkish state also struggles to pay the monthly wage of teachers. This problem was not a temporary problem and could not be solved for a long time. The first document that I matched in the archive related to this topic belongs to 1931 and what we see is that the problem continues to exist for at least four more years. To start with, in Kilis district, the teachers have not been paid since May, 1931 until August 1932. In the same document, we see that in Besni and Nizip districts, the teachers could not get their wages for one month.²⁰² When it comes to 1934s, despite the debt amount is different for every city, the state is in debt to teachers in Gümüşhane, Maraş, Sivas, Bursa, Çoruh, Niğde, Edirne, Burdur, Kütahya, Çorum, Siirt, Kayseri and Kars.²⁰³ As of 1935, we see some more documents related to the debt of state to teachers and teachers in İçel, Balıkesir, Gaziantep, Bursa, Çanakkale, Çoruh, Giresun, Niğde and Tekirdağ have not been paid for a while.²⁰⁴ It is also possible to see the letter of complaints coming from teachers to state institutions. In one of these letters, the teacher asks for the state's help and informs the state that he has not been paid for a while.²⁰⁵

4.2.2 Health

After the foundation of Turkish Republic, the newly established Turkish state have taken some important steps to get involved in health affairs of the country. Like any other state institutions, control of the state over health institutions also means the domination of state in everyday life. It does not only function to legitimize the state's existence in the eyes of people, but also through the health institutions, the modern states also aimed to replace traditional ways of fighting against illnesses with the modern ones. Ending superstitions and replacing them with modern medicine methods would glorify the enlightenment projects of Kemalists.²⁰⁶ Furthermore,

²⁰² BCA 30.10.0/ 142.17.1

²⁰³ BCA 30.10.0/ 142.17.6

²⁰⁴ BCA 30.0.10/ 143.24.14

²⁰⁵ BCA 30.0.10/ 142. 17. 7

²⁰⁶ İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken*, vol. 2, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), 138.

projects of the states related to public health also refer to the state's increasing involvement in shaping the everyday life of ordinary people.²⁰⁷ Therefore, it would not be wrong to see the health services of the modern state as a hegemonic institution. However what we see is that, because of the inefficiency of health system in Early Republican era, this function of the health services could not be used efficiently by the state as a hegemonic institution.

When the Republic was founded, there were only 554 doctors, 69 pharmaceutics, 700 health officer and only 4 of nurses were certificated. In addition to that, Ottoman health system was far from being systematic and very little had been done to fight against illnesses such as trachoma and malaria.²⁰⁸ By realizing the weaknesses of the health system inheriting from the Ottoman Empire, the Kemalist regime tried to widen the network of health institutions throughout the country. Especially after the appointment of Refik Saydam who would continue to be the minister of health until 1937, the health policies of the Turkish state aimed to;

1. improve the conditions of health institutions and widen them throughout the country,
2. raise the number of doctors and health officer,
3. educate the existing health officers,
4. increase the number of nurseries for new born infants and to maintain an healthy and clean environment for mothers,
5. increase the number of sanatoriums in cities,
6. fight against the illnesses such as tuberculosis, trachoma and pox.²⁰⁹

To successfully achieve these aims, the minister of health, under Refik Saydam's directorate, established health departments in cities and government

²⁰⁷ Alexandra Yerolympos, "A New City for a New State: City Planning and Formation of National Identity in the Balkans (1820s-1920s)," *Planning Perspectives* 8 (1993): 236.

²⁰⁸ Halis Akder, "Forgotten Campaigns: A History of Disease in Turkey," in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Celia Kerslake et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 220.

²⁰⁹ İstanbul Üniversitesi Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi, *Cumhuriyetin İlk 15 Yılında Sağlık Hizmetleri* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Yayınları, 1998), 334. Cited by Fatih Tuğluoğlu, "Türkiye'de Sıtma Mücadelesi(1924-1950)," *Türkiye Parazitoloji Dergisi* 32(4) (2008): 351.

offices of health (*Hükümet Tabiplikleri*) in districts.²¹⁰ While the health departments in cities aimed to serve the services protecting the health of citizens, the government offices of health in districts was executed by the local authority mechanisms and served to offer inpatient treatment of cities. Therefore, the Turkish government tried to improve the health services through the local administrations.²¹¹ In addition to this new structuring, to increase the personnel of health officers, schools were opened in Sivas and İstanbul in 1924. In addition to that a nursing school was introduced by Kızılay.²¹² Alongside with these initiatives of the government to improve the health conditions, some laws have been put into execution against tuberculosis, trachoma and pox in 1921, 1925 and 1930. Furthermore, National Health Conference in which the main topic was the struggle against trachoma has been organized in 1927.²¹³

Owing to these attempts of the state in improving the health conditions, to some degree, the Turkish state has successfully extended its sphere of influence. Nevertheless, the maturity and improvement of health institutions and personnel in country was still far away from being sufficient. For example, even until 1945 in which the regime had enough time to consolidate itself, the number of doctors did not exceed 2.000 and the number of nurses is just 409. In 1934-1935, in which clothing reform has been made, while the number of doctors is about 1200s, the number of nurses is 325.²¹⁴ According to these numbers, while there was only 1 doctor for 12.909 people and 1 nurse for 49.372 people. The number of pharmacies and pharmaceuticals was not sufficient either. The statistics demonstrate that the whole country had only 478 pharmacies and 125 pharmaceuticals. When it is taken into account that the population of the country at this time was about 14 million people,

²¹⁰“Cumhuriyet’ten Günümüze Türkiye’de Sağlık Politikaları,” Recep Akdur, accessed May 16,2013 http://www.ata.boun.edu.tr/htr/documents/312_4/Akdur,%20Recep_Cumhuriyetten%20Gunumuze%20Türkiyede%20Saglik%20Politikolari_bilanco.pdf

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² Mustafa Öztürk, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi’nde Sağlık Hizmetleri,” *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Tıp Fakültesi Dergisi* 6(1) (1999): 38.

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ TÜİK, *Statistical Indicators*, 50.

these numbers are extremely low in improving the health services. The other statistic that is provided by Frederic C. Shorter shows that the improvement the health conditions were not enough. According to the data of Shorter, the average life expectancy in Turkey was 35.4 between the dates of 1935-40 and until 1955 no considerable process has been made.²¹⁵ This low number of average life expectancy can be explained by the insufficient number of health personnel as well as the insufficient number of hospitals. According to the following table:²¹⁶

Table 4.The Number of Sickbeds and Hospitals with Sickbeds between 1923 and 1950

	1923	1925	1930	1935	1940	1945	1950
Number of Health Institutions	86	167	182	176	198	197	301
Rate of Increase	-	94,18	8,98	-3,29	12,50	-0,005	52,79
Population-per sickbed	1920	1260	1240	1160	1100	690	600
Rate of Decrease (%)	-	29,16	7,35	1,59	-	6,45	13,04

Even though the number of health institutions has considerably risen, this rise could be explained with the extremely low numbers of health institutions inherited from Ottoman Empire. In addition to that, after 1925, the rise in the number of health institutions with sickbed was far away from making a radical progress until 1950 since the population of country also rises. Furthermore, as we see in the table, rate of increase in health institutions with sickbed decreased in 1935 and 1945. In addition to the insufficient health system of Ottoman Empire, the years during World War II, Turkey also affected the health system negatively. During those years, the Turkish state faced tremendous problems in importing medicine and medicine prices terribly increased.²¹⁷ In the meantime, the number of qualified personnel and equipment was

²¹⁵Frederic C. Shorter, “The Population of Turkey after War of Indipendence,” *International Journal of Middle East Studiees*, vol. 17, no.4 (Nov.,1985), 419. Cited by Murat Metinsoy, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye: Savaş ve Gündelik Yaşam* (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2007), 360.

²¹⁶ Yasemin Yeginboy and Şevket Sayın, “Cumhuriyet Döneminden Günümüze Sağlık Politikaları ve Sorunları,” (Unpublished paper presented at the National Economy Congress, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, İzmir, February 20-22, 2008).

²¹⁷ Akder, *Forgotten Campaigns*, 225.

not sufficient.²¹⁸ In the light of this information, it would not be wrong to conclude that the Republican regime had serious troubles in improving the health services throughout the country.

The insufficient health service of the state could also be understood by newspaper news. The news in various newspapers refer to insufficient number of health personnel. For example, by referring to complaints of the doctors that they cannot find jobs, the author of the news suggests doctors to go to Anatolia as most of the districts there do not even have one doctor. According to the news, Tavşanlı district whose population is about 5000 people does not have a doctor.²¹⁹ In other example, the newspaper says there is an urgent need in Hakkari that the state should appoint at least one doctor as soon as possible.²²⁰ In Ekekon newspaper, a local newspaper of Konya, there is news informing the state authority that in some districts of Konya, some of the dispensaries were closed because of the insufficient number of doctor and medicine. Furthermore, the newspaper demands more obstetricians to be appointed by the state.²²¹ In another news, it has been expressed there are at least 100 villages without doctors, and in one of them, Gümüşhacıköy village, there is neither a doctor nor a pharmaceutics.²²²

From local newspapers, it can also be concluded that the Turkish state also faced tremendous problems in maintaining a healthy environment in local regions and cities. Especially marshes in cities did not only affect the hygiene of the cities but also were the source of many illnesses. In a letter of complaint took place in Babalık newspaper, it was stated the marshes are so common and dangerous that a man trying to rescue another man from the marsh fell into the marsh himself. In the same news, by complaining about the bad conditions of the city, the author refers to a garbage collection area which is in the center of city and says that the municipality

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹⁹ Köroğlu, 3 Teşrinisani 1934, p.2

²²⁰ Köroğlu, 23 İkincikanun 1935, p.2

²²¹ Ekekon, 8 Nisan 1935, p.2

²²² Köroğlu, 10 Haziran 1936, p.3

does not take enough measures to fight against the unhygienic conditions of the city. The author also adds that the streets are so dusty that it is almost impossible to walk without falling and streets are turning into a very muddy place when the rain falls.²²³ These marshes did not only affect the hygiene of cities and local regions negatively but also became the sources of malaria.²²⁴ As of 1935, approximately 80 people in one thousand people had malaria virus in their bodies.²²⁵ When we consider the number of population in Turkey at this time, more than 1.500.000 million people were infected with malaria virus.

It is possible to see similar news related to the unhygienic environment of cities. Entitling his/her news as “City Center or a Breeding Ground for Germs?” , the author complains that the city center of Mersin was being used for various purposes such as that cattle were being sold and bought and that weevil were being eliminated by the farmers or even the coal were kept in the square of the center. By claiming that such activities pollute the center of the city by which hundreds of people pass, such activities should be forbidden as soon as possible.²²⁶ In another news of the same newspaper, the author says that no progress was made in cleaning the city from the dust and mosquitoes in Tarsus.²²⁷ Dirtiness of cities was a general problem in the country. The villages and the cities, in general, were extremely dirty and this articulated the spread of illnesses.²²⁸ The fact that some of the cities do not have a well-developed infrastructure and that clean water cannot be reached into the people are the another factors which obstruct to maintain a clean and healthy environment. For example, according to the newspapers, there was not potable water until 1936 in Edirne and until 1936 in Mersin.²²⁹

²²³ Babalık, 13 Mart 1935, p.2

²²⁴ Tuğluoğlu, *Türkiye’de Sıtma*, 35.

²²⁵ Tekeli and İlkin, *Modernitenin Altyapısı(vol.2)*, 141.

²²⁶ Ege, 1 Mart 1936, p.1

²²⁷ Ege, 18 Nisan 1936, p.1

²²⁸ Erik J. Zürcher, *Savaş, Devrim ve Uluslaşma(1908-1928)*, trans. Ergun Aydınoğlu (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), 293.

²²⁹ Milli Gazete, 3 Eylül 1934, p.1 and Ege, 19 Mart 1936, p.1

4.3 CLOTHING AND WOMEN: CONTINUITY AND POSITION OF WOMAN IN LATE OTTOMAN AND EARLY REPUBLICAN ERA

After the dissolution of Ottoman Empire and foundation of Turkish Republic, the Kemalist regime, by radically transforming the structure of the state and the society, attempted to create a new state structure and a modern society. In this direction, the sultanate of Ottoman family has come to an end and the caliphate has been abolished after the foundation of Turkish Republic. This structure of Ottoman Empire achieving to survive for centuries was replaced with a new system which depends on the sovereignty of Turkish nation and a secular Republic. On the other hand, by realizing that the transformation of the state, even a radical one, would not be enough to create a modern society and thus the sub-structure should have been transformed alongside with the super-structure. In this direction, to materialize the desire of Kemalists to create a modern bourgeoisie society which capitalism can effectively work, the Kemalist have made a series of reforms which could regulate the social life and society according to modern and Western principles.²³⁰ Dervish lodges, zawiyah foundations and shrines were closed, and to reach to a highest level of integration with Western world, calendar and units of measurements were replaced with the modern ones. The Arabic alphabet of Ottoman Turkish was also replaced with a Latin alphabet. The desire of Kemalists, to completely adopt the modern principles into the social life, also brought the need to create an ideal type of man and woman. The reforms and regulations made related to clothing in Republican era should be evaluated within this context.

It is a frequent mistake in Turkish historiography that the projects of modernization aiming to transform social life are regarded as the initiative of Kemalist rulership. Rather, the modernization processes of both Ottoman Empire and Turkey went through was an ongoing process, and none of them can be examined separately and independently from each other. Although it is true that the Kemalist regime have taken much more radical steps in the way of modernization, neither the

²³⁰ Savran, *Türkiye’de Sınıf Mücadeleleri*, 101-2.

transformation of super-structure nor the extension of women's right and clothing reform was not materialized purely in the hands of Kemalist movement. It is possible to see that the roots of many reforms depend on the "incomplete" modernization project inheriting from Ottoman Empire. Especially in the years that Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) have been active, we see that there are broad ranges of discussions, including the nationalization of education, discussion on replacing the Arabic alphabet with a Latin alphabet or following a national economy.²³¹ Furthermore, related to the increase in the significance women's position in society, the CUP has also specifically made gender reforms before the Republic was founded. For example, the Family Law Code of 1917 recognized the right of women to divorce from her husband and brought the right to women that the women may ask from her husband to be the man's only wife if she wishes to.²³² Therefore, in general, the women started to take some steps in gaining their rights during the CUP rulership. By taking this into account, it would not be wrong to say that the reforms related to gender and non-gender issues made after the foundation of Republic was built on this changing social and intellectual life of Ottoman Empire.

It is also possible to see that during the CUP era, the women started to get involved more in socio-economic life of Ottoman Empire.²³³ In fact, according to Zafer Toprak, "the Young Turk period was a time of rising aspiration and Ottoman

²³¹ Taner Aslan, "İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Düşüncesinin Cumhuriyete Tesirleri," *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 21 (Ağustos 2008): 359-61.

²³² Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, trans. Yavuz Alogan, 8.th ed. (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2009), 107.

²³³ The process which the Ottoman women started to play roles in socio-economic life goes back until the Tanzimat period. As of 1859, the first high school for female students was opened and in the following term technical high schools for females have been founded in Rusçuk and Istanbul. That the women started to take education would accelerate the process of women in adaptation to social life. The rising involvement of women in social life can be counted as the result of such policies taking place in Ottoman Era. See Ayşe Durakbaşı, *Halide Edib: Türk Modernleşmesi ve Feminizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 97.

women became increasingly more integrated to social life.”²³⁴ During these periods, women started to express themselves by means of women associations and magazines. As of 1908, the number of women magazines has considerably risen and women journals such as *Demet* and *Mehasin ve Kadın* began to be published.²³⁵ Some other women magazines published between 1908-1923 were *Musavver Kadın*, *Kadın(İstanbul)*, *Kadınlar Dünyası*, *Erkekler Dünyası*, *Türk Kadını*.²³⁶ In addition to these journals, the women associations, most of which had philanthropic aims were the other important ways in integrating more women into social life and public space.²³⁷ Although the purposes of these women associations were differentiated, thanks to the existence of these women associations, the women in Ottoman society found a space in which the demands of the women have been voiced by the women themselves. It is also important to realize that with the help of these associations, women have been organized and became more conscious about their identity and rights. For example, women’s right to elect and to be elected gained in 1930 had already been expressed by the Women’s People’s Party in 1923.²³⁸ It was not only the women who think that they deserve to have the right to elect and to be elected. Baha Tevfik, one of the members of Ottoman Socialist Party, states that that women do not have the right to elect and to be elected is very unfair while the males can vote and get elected.²³⁹

The conditions which Balkan Wars and World War I created can be counted as the other important factor which increased the role of women in social and economic life. Because of the insufficient population of men, during these wars, the women found more space for themselves in public space and started to be included in

²³⁴ Zafer Toprak, “The Family, Feminism and the State during the Young Ottoman Period, 1908-1918,” in *Premiere Rencontre Internationale sur l’Empire Ottoman et la Turquie Moderne*, Istanbul-Paris, Editions ISIS, 1991, p.446

²³⁵ Serpil Çakır, *Osmanlı’da Kadın Hareketi*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2011), 74.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.80

²³⁷ Toprak, *The family feminism*, 448.

²³⁸ Çakır, *Osmanlı’da Kadın*, 126-7.

²³⁹ Aslan, “*İkinci Meşrutiyet’in*”, 361.

production activity both by working at home and industry.²⁴⁰ We can talk about a similar process during the Independence War of Turkey. During these wars, women, willingly or unwillingly, were much more visible in the public space as they also worked in banks, hospitals and served as nurses on the war fronts.²⁴¹

Under these circumstances, women had already gained a relative autonomy in Ottoman society by integrating themselves into the social life more than ever. This relative autonomy provided by the roles of women organizations, the attempts of CUP to secularize the society and the war conditions, also reflected to the clothing of women during II Constitutional Era. In this era, veiling was challenged and abandoned by women especially in Turkey's western cities.²⁴² This should be seen as a result of secularization of society and ongoing discussions of women about their rights. Alongside with the aim to integrate the women to modern life, to create job opportunities and to educate them, changing the way of clothing was also on the agenda of women movement as of II Constitutional Era.²⁴³ On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that the women's views on clothing were highly differentiated and it is impossible to say that all women have aimed to completely abandon the veiling. The dualist structure of Ottoman Empire in the way modernization could also be seen in women's clothing; the women did not give up wearing their traditional clothes but combined them with modern ones.²⁴⁴ Despite of the fact that traditional clothes were not completely abandoned, among intellectual women, there was a common opinion that the clothing of the women should have been reviewed and some kind of reform should have been made not just to abolish the barricades of women in social life but also to follow the fashion of the time. The

²⁴⁰ Cemile Burcu Kartal, "II. Meşrutiyet'in Cumhuriyet'e Mirası: Makbul Kadınlar," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 38 (March 2008): 219.

²⁴¹ Valentine M. Moghadam, *Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

²⁴² Nikki R. Keddie, *Women in the Middle East: Past and Present*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 81.

²⁴³ Toprak, *The Family Feminism*, 447.

²⁴⁴ Nilüfer Göle, *Modern Mahrem*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1998), 71.

first reform, according to *Kadınlar Dünyası* magazine, should be to take the face veil (*peçe*) off from the faces of women as because the women started to get more included in social and economic life, the face veil would be a barricade and prevent the women to work more effectively.²⁴⁵ Furthermore, according to the journal, the *peçe* was seen something as humiliating. Opposed by women by stating that because there is nothing to be ashamed of in women body, the women stated that it is meaningless to hide the face.²⁴⁶ The existence of *peçe* was not only evaluated in the sense of modernization and extension of women right. According to the magazine, wearing *peçe* and *çarşaf*(body veiling) is not hygienic and an illness beginning with cold could easily turn to very dangerous illness, tuberculosis, because of the fabric used in making *peçe* and *çarşaf*.²⁴⁷ The discussions among the clothing of women never remained in the intellectual level and to some extent, these discussions affected the clothing of women and shaped the social life accordingly. In one of the examples proving such case, we see a surprised European writer who was shocked to see a woman without *peçe* talking to a man in one of the most central areas of Istanbul, on Galata Bridge.²⁴⁸

The clothing of women was also a hotly debated issue among the male intellectuals. The representatives of different ideologies (Turkism, Islamism and Westernism) have come up with different analysis and different solutions to the “problem” of clothing of women. By emphasizing that from the perspective that it is a must to transform the Ottoman society according to the principles of West and modernism, Westernist intellectuals suggested that from the way of clothing to the moral values, from law system to the family structure of West, the Western culture and way of living should be totally adopted to Ottoman society so as to reach success in civilization process.²⁴⁹ In this sense, the Westernist intellectuals such as Abdullah

²⁴⁵ Çakır, *Osmanlı'da Kadın*, 253.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 255.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 256.

²⁴⁸ Demetra Vaka, *İstanbul'un Peçesiz Kadınları*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, 2003), 10-11.

²⁴⁹ Taner Aslan, “Garpçılar ve Garpçılar Arasındaki Fikir Ayrılıkları,” *Kastamonu Eğitim Dergisi* 2(October 2006): 631.

Cevdet, Kılıçzade Hakkı and Salahaddin Asım perceived the clothes covering the body of women as the barricade which prevent integration of women to social life by excluding the women from society and daily life.²⁵⁰ While Turkist intellectuals also supported that the women should stop covering their bodies for the sake of “development of Turkish nation”, Islamists continued to have conservative but revised ideas. By adopting a distanced approach to veiling, Islamist scholars such as Said Halim Paşa claimed that taking off veils, without a serious advancement of women socially and economically, does mean nothing but imitation of European culture.²⁵¹ On the other hand, there were also Islamists strictly opposing the abandonment of veiling by women. By taking all of these ideas and ideologies, regardless of what they support, it is possible to see that the clothing of women was a matter of discussion among the Ottoman intellectuals even before the foundation of Turkish Republic. Furthermore, it is also possible to see that Kemalist regime and its regulations about the clothing of women did not remain isolated from these debates. In fact, partially, it was this intellectual discussion which Kemalist ideas were built on.

Basically, although it is true that the Kemalist regime radically attempted to transform the state structure and society, the basis of Kemalist ideology depends on the changing socio-economic and political conditions of late Ottoman era. During CUP era, the Ottomans had already progressed in the way of modernization and these changing conditions also brought the transformation of women’s status in social life. The women, in various associations, have voiced their pretensions and complaints about the position of women. Women, in this era, have not only increased their influence on Ottoman society, but also pushed for a space in which the women could become autonomous political actor. In connection to the improvement of women’s status, break from tradition come into the forefront in the agenda of women and the clothing style of women began to be debated. The outcomes of these debates were also reflected in social life and women’s clothing changed or the traditional

²⁵⁰ Melek Öksüz, “Tesettür Tartışmalarının Dünü: II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi,” *International Periodicals For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish and Turkic Volume 7/4* (Fall 2012): 471-2-3.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 476.

clothes were combined with modern clothes. In the sense of modernization, the male intellectuals also discussed the women's clothing and evaluated the issue from the own ideological and philosophical perspectives. The increasing status of women, ramification of women's movement and discussions in the intellectual level related to women and clothing would both ease and push the Kemalist reforms about clothing reform of women which would be applied during the early Republican era.

4.3.1 The Importance of Clothing Reform: The Hegemonic Symbol of the Modern State

After just two years Turkish Republic was founded, the Kemalist regime had put "Hat Law" into execution which aimed to transform the traditional *fez* into the modern hat which was used in Europe. The abandonment of *fez* was had a symbolic importance since the law meant that everything that is traditional would be replaced with the modern. Furthermore, by rejecting the Ottoman legacy with its all means in daily life, the Turkish Republic tried to build a new legacy through the clothing of men in the daily lives of subjects. On the other hand, regulation related to clothing was not only about the men's clothing; alongside with extension of women's rights, the Kemalist regime had also an encouraging attitude for women to change their traditional clothes with modern ones and the policy aiming the abandonment of *peçe* and *çarşaf* of women was materialized through regulations of local administrations. In the last part of my thesis, first of all, I will discuss how the clothing reform functioned as an important tool of Kemalist regime to establish its power and hegemony over society in daily life. In this sense, it will be examined that clothing reform was not only a step to westernize the appearance of society but served as a power mechanism of government. Secondly, although the right of women seriously extended and the woman was attempted to be modernized during the Kemalist era, the new roles were adapted to the women identity and thus Kemalist regime has created its own "conservatism" for women. Although the Kemalists' desire to extend the right of women should not be completely neglected, by means of these societal norms which women became responsible for, the position of women and clothing reform comes to foreground as a fact which Kemalist regime has effectively used to

exercise its own hegemony rather than aiming the true emancipation of women. Lastly, it will be emphasized that despite of the attempts to change the clothing of women, it is seen that the society, both males and females, has considerably resisted against the clothing reform of women and women continued to use their traditional clothes. The weakness of hegemonic institutions of the state plays an important role at this point. On the other hand, in contrary to main assumption, the source of the resistance was not purely the reflection of conflict between modern and tradition. Rather, the sources of resistance depend on many various social, cultural and economic reasons. By considering the resistance coming from society, the Kemalist regime also adjusted the implication method of clothing reform accordingly. Therefore, how the society transformed the method of Kemalist regime will be touched upon.

Every political movement creates its own fashion.²⁵² In the world history, it is not a rare case that the political movements aiming to transform the existing political system assign a meaning to the clothes. The clothing does not only give the feeling of belonging but it is also a way of expression for a person to define himself/herself. As Lynn Hunt emphasizes;²⁵³

During the [French] Revolution; even the most ordinary objects and customs became political emblems and potential sources of political and social conflict [...] Such symbols did not only the express the political positions; they were the means by which people became aware of their positions. By making a political position manifest, they made adherence, opposition, and indifference possible. In this way, they constituted a field of political struggle.

The symbols, in this sense, are important instruments for any political movement. Through these symbols, the political movements make themselves “visible” in daily life. The political powers exercise their existence by means of these

²⁵² Nurullah Abalı, *Geleneksellik ve Modernizm Açısından Kılık Kıyafet*, (İstanbul: İlke Yayıncılık, 2009), 126.

²⁵³ Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 53.

symbols. The symbols can also be used to legitimize the power. Lynn Hunt, to her argument, further adds that:²⁵⁴

Governing cannot take place without stories, signs, and symbols that convey and reaffirm the legitimacy of governing in thousands of spoken ways. In a sense, legitimacy is the general agreement on signs and symbols. When a revolutionary movement challenges the legitimacy of traditional government, it must necessarily challenge the traditional trappings of rule as well. Then it must go about inventing political symbols that will express accurately the ideals and principles of the new order.

The legitimization of symbols also depends on the denial of the past's symbols. While during the Second Empire in France, for example, women wear long dress and long hair, in following years, this has changed and women started to wear shorter dress and make their hair shorter.²⁵⁵ In 1917 Socialist Revolution of Russia, we also see a wide range of symbols from the name of streets to flags and emblems. The clothing was also a part of destroying the old regime with the new one. The revolutionaries marked their clothes "with red ribbons and flowers tied to epaulettes, red stripes added to uniforms, and so on".²⁵⁶

As we can see in these examples, in revolutions and political movements, the symbols have effectively been used. This was also the case in revolutionary period of Turkey. Although the Ottoman Empire was officially dissolved, the impacts of the Empire still continued especially in daily life. By realizing this, the Kemalist regime, by attempting to demolish all visual impacts of Ottoman Empire in everyday life, has made the clothing reform one of its tools practicing the power of modern, secular and civilized state. Therefore, the existence of Ottoman Empire which was seen through the clothing in the daily life of Turkish Republic tried to be replaced with the new and modern clothes which represent the new face of Turkey. As Göle points out, while Hat Reform aimed to pull away the men population from Ottoman identity,

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.

²⁵⁵ Philippe Perrot, *Fashioning the Bourgeoisie: A History of Clothing in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Richard Bienvenu (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 23.

²⁵⁶ Orlando Figes & Boris Kolonitskii, *Interpreting the Russian Revolution: The Language and Symbols of 1917* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), 33.

with the abandonment of *peçe* and *çarşaf*, the religious authority and the private life restricted by shari'a laws would be exterminated.²⁵⁷ When the clothing reform is examined from this perspective, its importance is much more visible than it was usually assumed.

A wide range of reforms, from changing the alphabet to the demolition of Ottoman dynasty and caliphate, has taken place during the early Republican era. However, reforms related to clothing and women's position in society was one of the most radical reforms since these reforms demonstrated that the Kemalists, through these reforms, tried to penetrate into the social life. These attempts also show the intent of Kemalist regime to affect and change the society from down to the top. In this sense, the Kemalist regime did not hesitate to create new roles for women and the identity of women has been shaped according to these new principles and norms determined by the Kemalist regime. When these roles are taken into account, we see that these new roles changed the existing role of women in society but gave new responsibilities to women identity.²⁵⁸

In similar to many countries which are late-comers in modernization process, Kemalists evaluated the position of women in Turkish society through the paradigm of nationalism.²⁵⁹ Nationalist identity of Kemalist regime also made a serious impact in creating the "ideal type of women" in modern Turkey. In this direction, according to Kemalist point of view, because it is the woman that biologically produces new generations of Turkish nation and is responsible for taking care of their children.²⁶⁰ In a broad sense, Kemalist regime connected the under-development of Ottoman Empire to the under-development of women and development of women status was

²⁵⁷ Göle, *Modern Mahrem*, 87.

²⁵⁸ Ahmet Yılmaz, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Kadın Kimliğinin Biçimlendirilmesi," *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 20-21 (Spring-Fall 2010): 201.

²⁵⁹ Tezcan Durna, "Türk Modern/Muhafazakar İmgeleminde Kadının Kamusal Varlığının Sınırları: Falih Rıfkı Atay ve Peyami Safa Örneği," *Kültür ve İletişim* 11(2) (Summer 2008): 77.

²⁶⁰ Ayça Gelgeç Bakacak, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi Bir Kadın İmgesi Üzerine Değerlendirme," *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 44 (Fall 2009): 631.

seen as prerequisite in civilization and modernization process of Turkey. Therefore, as we can see from Mustafa Kemal's sentences, the women's position and status should have been improved for the progress of Turkish nation.

When a nation empowers only one gender, it becomes weak. The main reason why our nation failed is due to the failure of our attitude towards our women. To reach the success, we should accept all the reasons and conditions that bring success and development, and we should make the both genders benefit from it. For this reason, if knowledge and science is what we need, they should be obtained by our men and women equally.²⁶¹

Therefore, the women, in Kemalist perspective, would not be only used to destruct of traditional and religious values in Turkish society visible²⁶², but also to bring and improve the science. Thus, the education of women was seen necessary by the Kemalist regime.

Another reason why Kemalists needed well-educated women in Turkish society was that it is the women raising the children of Turkish nation. During the early Republican period, the responsibility of Ottoman women to raise Muslim individuals was replaced with the responsibility of Turkish women to raise well-educated, nationalists Turkish children.²⁶³ The women would raise benevolent individuals as long as they are educated and integrated to modern life of new Turkey. Furthermore, when educating the Turkish women, the existing social roles of men or women continued to be reproduced in some educational institutions. For example, in Village Institutes, while male students were educated in using the agricultural tools, the women were learning how to sew and cook. Also in elementary schools, after fourth-grade, the female students were given basic lessons about the home affairs and adjusting the budget of the house and etc.²⁶⁴ In a way, the educational institutions of the state were teaching women to be a modern housewife.²⁶⁵

²⁶¹ Rauf İnan, *Atatürk ve Türk Kadını: Tarihte Türk Kadını* (İstanbul:Arkın Yayınevi, 1991), 41-2. Cited by *Ibid*.

²⁶² Durna, "Türk Modern/Muhafazakar İmgeleminde," 81.

²⁶³ Yılmaz, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Kadın," 202.

²⁶⁴ Bernard Caporal, *Kemalizm'de ve Kemalizm Sonrasında Türk Kadını*, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1982), 97.

While the Kemalist discourse have commonly referred to the “emancipation of women”, the abortion policies in early Republican era also shows how the state was included in decisions related to women. According to Ece Cihan Ertem, depending on the insufficient population in Turkey and the need for new and younger generation, being a mother and motherhood was encouraged and the birth-control education and birth-control propaganda were prohibited. In addition to that, “mothers who had more than six children were awarded with money and families having five or more children used the advantage of reduced taxation.”²⁶⁶ We do not know how properly and effectively these policies were followed but these policies of Turkish state show that the state, without hesitation, intervened the women’s body and choices when it was seen necessary.

Although the Kemalist regime encouraged women to integrate themselves into the social life, the Kemalist approach about the ideal type of women shows that the Turkish women should also be modest (*namuslu*) as well as being a good mother. In Yakup Kadri’s ideas, this idea of Kemalists becomes more apparent.²⁶⁷

Turkish women would have forsaken their *charshafs* and veils to be able to work with more ease and comfort. The meaning of participation into social life would not have led them to join this sort of social gathering. Yes, a Turkish woman should have claimed her freedom and used it not to dance and to polish her nails... to be a puppet, but to undertake a demanding and serious role in the constitution and development of a new Turkey.

Therefore, the ideal type of women should be included in social life but also those who are included in social life should, at the same time, prove that they are not threatening the moral values of society.²⁶⁸

If we review the Kemalist image of women, we see that the women are given new roles but these roles combined the modern and the traditional roles. For instance,

²⁶⁵ Semiha Tuna, “Köy Enstitüleri’nde Kadın Olmak,” *Fe Dergi* 1(1) (2009): 22.

²⁶⁶ Ece Cihan Ertem, “Anti-abortion Policies in Late Ottoman Empire and Early Republican Turkey: Intervention of State on Women’s Body and Reproductivity,” *Fe Dergi* 3(1) (2011): 52.

²⁶⁷ Nilüfer Göle, *Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 68.

²⁶⁸ Göle, *Modern Mahrem*, P.109

the women should work for the sake of the nation but should not neglect his children at home.²⁶⁹ An ideal woman should go to dancing in the night and attend to parties but should be modest at the same time.²⁷⁰ This combination of modern and traditional about women can also be seen in the state level. While the state supported the expansion of women's rights in making "the modern life" visible in the country, the Kemalist regime, at the same time, did not allow women to emerge as an autonomous political subject. After the foundation of Republic, the foundation of Women's People's Party was forbidden and instead of a political party, the women were allowed to establish Turkish Women's Union whose manifesto were purified of political demands of women.²⁷¹

If we take this contradictory perspective of Kemalist regime into account about women, it would not be wrong to say that although Kemalist regime has supported the extension of women to some extent, the integration of women into social life remained highly restricted. These restrictions drawn by Kemalists were fundamentally different than the restrictions on women in Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the woman, for Kemalist regime, was a subject which could help the Turkish nation's progress and symbolizes the modernization process which the country has been passing through. The visibility of women and their disconnection with traditional values and clothes was one of the most important hegemonic tools of Kemalist regime proving that the life regulated by Islam was replaced with Western life style.²⁷² Despite the attempts of Kemalist regime to transform the women clothes, the regulations on women clothing has been met by resistance from society.

4.3.2 Regulations and Resistance

In contrary to Hat Reform in 1925, the regulations on women clothing were carried forward by Kemalist regime step by step. When compared to regulations on

²⁶⁹ Bakacak, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi Bir Kadın," 634.

²⁷⁰ Fatma Acun, "Görsel Verilerde Kadın İmajı(1923-1960)," *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 16 (Aralık 2007): 98.

²⁷¹ Çakır, *Osmanlı'da Kadın*, 129.

²⁷² Göle, *Modern Mahrem*, 100.

women clothing, the Kemalist regime had a more strict attitude during the execution of hat law and enacted a law about the abandonment of fez(fes) and adaptation of hat.²⁷³ This strict regulation about hat resulted in serious reaction from society. After the Hat Law, many people have revolted against the law and while some of these people were arrested and put into prison, other people were given death sentence.²⁷⁴ The attitude of Kemalist regime about the regulations of hat reform was notably different than the execution of hat law and the central government did not directly attempt to regulate the women clothing. Rather, the transformation of women clothing tried to be materialized by the initiatives of local governments. Only after 23 April 1937, up to which most of the local governments had already regulated the women clothing, a circular was issued about the abandonment of veiling.²⁷⁵

In some cases, rather than the direct state involvement, by means of the press, local people were encouraged to abandon the traditional clothes.²⁷⁶ As of 1934, for example, in a letter taken from Sivrihisar, the newspaper was informed that most of the women, in this area, were still dressing traditional clothes and veiled their faces and bodies.²⁷⁷ By implying that the veiled women seemed like an ogre (monster), the author hopes that the women will abandon their clothes with the support of their husbands, municipalities and Republican's People's Party (CHP). In another newspaper, by referring to the meeting of women supporting the abandonment of veiling, it is proposed that the veiling should be abandoned as soon as possible by the step which should be taken by the women.²⁷⁸ In addition to the encouragement of

²⁷³ Fahri Sakal, "Şapka İnkılabı'nın Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yönü: Destekler ve Köstekler," *Turkish Studies International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic* 2(4) (Fall: 2007): 1310.

²⁷⁴ Burcu Özcan, "Basına Göre Şapka ve Kılık Kıyafet İnkılabı" (master's thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2008), 63-73.

²⁷⁵ Ayten Sezer Arıg, *Atatürk Türkiye'sinde Kılık Kıyafette Çağdaşlaşma*, 2nd ed., (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2007), 130.

²⁷⁶ Sadık Sarısan, "Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Kılık Kıyafet Meselesi," *Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 21 (1998): 101.

²⁷⁷ 22 Birincikanun 1934, Köroğlu, p.2

²⁷⁸ 20 Birincikanun 1935, Ege, p.2

women by the press, the press also seems to push the local governments to take more rigid actions against veiling. With reference to the rising level of involvement of local governments in women clothing issue, the newspaper suggests that all municipalities in the country should declare that veiling is forbidden.²⁷⁹ In the same news, it was also emphasized that such decision would help all women to get rid of their monster-like appearances. In a similar example, by implying that the number of veiled women is not so high and those who veil continue to wear traditional clothes as they cannot afford to buy clothes, the local newspaper of Konya questions why the municipality of Konya still did not take a decision related to prohibition of veiling.²⁸⁰

The first decision about the prohibition of veiling came from the municipality of Tirebolu in 7 September 1926. In December of 1926, provincial council of Trabzon also forbade the veiling of women. Sivas followed these cities and *peçe* and *çarşaf* was forbidden in 1928, by the approval of board of aldermen.²⁸¹ The regulations on women clothing have gained a new momentum in 1930s. In cities and towns including Mersin, Bergama, Gaziantep, Antalya, Konya, Akşehir, Burdur, Bafra, Ankara, Ordu and Zile, the veiling was forbidden in 1934 and 1935.²⁸² In addition to these cities, we also see similar regulations in Bodrum, Fethiye, Rize, Adana Çorum and Afyon.²⁸³ Therefore, even though the central government did not directly attempt to transform the clothing of women, the local administrative mechanisms tried to transform the clothing of women. This indirect attitude of Kemalist regime could be explained with two main reasons. First of all, beware of resistance to Hat Reform, the Kemalist regime might have decided to adapt less compeller attitude against the clothing of women. Secondly, this indirect attitude of

²⁷⁹ 29 Birincikanun 1934, Köroğlu, sf.3

²⁸⁰ 20 Kanunevvel 1934, Babalık, p.2

²⁸¹ Arıg, *Atatürk Türkiye'sinde Kılık*, 121.

²⁸² To see decisions related to veulings; see 11 Temmuz 1935-Köroğlu, 12 Birincikanun 1934-Köroğlu, 17 Teşrinievvel 1934-Köroğlu, 29 Birincikanun 1934-Köroğlu, 19 Eylül 1935- Ege, 22 Ağustos 1935- Ekekon, 23 Nisan 1935-Ekekon, 26 Nisan 1935- Ekekon, 30 Nisan 1935-Ekekon, 7 Ağustos 1935-Ekekon.

²⁸³ Arıg, *Atatürk Türkiye'sinde Kılık*, 124-9.

transforming the clothing of women may be explained with the rise of internal opposition and external pressure on Kemalist regime and increasing level of accusation of Mustafa Kemal with dictatorship.²⁸⁴ Therefore, it can be concluded that the Kemalist regime might have aimed to lessen the burden on central government.

Since the society is not a homogenous structure and the reactions to the state policies depends on many other factor, it would be wrong to say that these attempts never reached to society and the transformation of clothing was totally resisted by all segments of society. The reactions to clothing reform among societal factors differed according to the class position of people, regions and ideological values. In fact, some segments of the population pushed the local government to forbid the veiling. Although it is impossible to map the people who actively resisted and supported, the documents still give us some clues about the different attitude of people coming from different classes and regions. The first group of the people who actively supported the clothing reform was the wives of male state officers and women state officers. For example, after the municipality decided to forbid the veiling, in Gaziayıntap, 550 women whose husbands are the state officers have decided to abandon the veiling and “started to see the sun.”²⁸⁵ In Trabzon, we see a similar case. The women members of the provincial council whose names are Saliha, Zehra, Kadriye and Sakiye pushed the provincial council to abolish the veiling.²⁸⁶ Upon their suggestions, the provincial council took the decision related to the prohibition of veiling. In another example, it is seen that the wife of the head official of Tirebolu district and women teachers of the district encouraged the women to abandon their veils and wear modern clothes.²⁸⁷ Among the women state officers, the teachers were given special importance in adopting the society to modern clothes. In her article

²⁸⁴ I have adopted this argument from Şirin Tekeli’s views on the extension of women’s rights. According to Tekeli, extension of women’s rights was a message to both domestic opposition and to international public opinion that Turkey is a democratic country. See Şirin Tekeli, *Kadınlar ve Siyasal-Toplumsal Hayat* (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1982), 213-4.

²⁸⁵ Köroğlu, 17 Teşrinievvel 1934, p.2

²⁸⁶ Ekekon, 10 Nisan 1935, p.2

²⁸⁷ Sarısamam, “Cumhuriyet’in İlk Yıllarında,” 104.

that she analyzed the clothing reform by means of visual data, Acun observes that since the clothing of the officers was regulated according to the laws, the teachers started to abandon their veils and almost all of the teachers wore modern clothes.²⁸⁸ She further analyzes that while on the one hand, the women who have jobs were integrated to social and economic life usually accepted the adaptation of modern clothes, the housewives struggled to abandon their veils.²⁸⁹ Although such certain categorization could not be made, her analysis is true to an extent, since, in some regions, the documents demonstrate that the wealthy women encouraged the women to replace their traditional clothes with modern ones. In an example supporting this argument, we see that upper class women living in Antakya try to prod the women population to abandon their veils.²⁹⁰ Another dynamic that affected the implication of clothing reform depended on the locations. In big cities such as Ankara, İzmir and İstanbul where the state authority is stronger, women could wear the modern clothing more comfortably. In one document sent from the Ministry of Interior to local governments, those who wore modern clothes in Ankara, İzmir and İstanbul veiled themselves as soon as they went back to their hometown.²⁹¹ This shows that in addition to the state's relatively weak penetration into the minds of its citizens, even the women who were willing to wear modern clothes could not wear them not as a result of their choice but because of the societal pressure in local regions.²⁹² Therefore, although there were people who accepted the clothing reform, the clothing reform, in general, could not be materialized as the Kemalist wished. As Murat Metinsoy points out as follows:²⁹³

²⁸⁸ Acun, "Görsel Verilerde Kadın," 106.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁰ Ege, 20 Birincikanun 1935.

²⁹¹ 75. Yıldönümünde Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, Özel sayı(1998), s.89-90. See Archive of General Directorate of Security Archive (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi[EGMA]) [13216-7/1]

²⁹² *Ibid.*

²⁹³ Murat Metinsoy, "Negotiating the Kemalist Image of Women: Everyday Forms of Resistance to Unveiling in Early Republican Turkey" (Unpublished paper presented at the conference for the Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford, September 23, 2011).

Ordinary women's customary ways of dressing persisted almost everywhere, except for a limited change in a few big city centers, in which a transformation in clothing codes of some middle class women had already been underway before the republican regime.

There are many examples which support this argument. Travel books of the time, archive documents and newspaper show that the society, by using different methods, have resisted against the prohibition of traditional clothes and veiling. Many women continued to veil either with their own desire or because of the pressure coming from men.²⁹⁴

One of the biggest challenges for historians and social scientists who study the everyday life of Ottoman Empire and Turkey is that there is not sufficient sources and documents which gives us a deep understanding of social and everyday life. However, Lilo Linke's book named as *Mustafa Kemal Türkiyesi* (Allah Dethroned: A Journey Through Modern Turkey) is an excellent source which gives us the chance to closely observe the everyday life of Turkey in 1935 and 1936. According to Linke, even after the foundation of Republic, most of the women even in big cities continued to wear *çarşaf* and *peçe*. Istanbul was the first city that she had visited Turkey and there she observed that the women who were deeply loyal to the traditions and religion continued to wear cotton *çarşaf* and some of them continued to hide their faces by *peçe*.²⁹⁵ In Sivas, she made a similar observation. Most of women in Sivas also continued to wear *çarşaf* and *peçe* and the impression that those clothes had created on Linke was "frightening".²⁹⁶ During a train journey that she took, Linke was sharing the cabin with two other women and she saw that the women were wearing European style of clothing under their *çarşaf*. Nevertheless, their European style of clothes was so ragged and for Linke, that fact was explaining why the Turkish women were so loyal to the veiling.²⁹⁷ Linke seems right in this argument of her since financial incompatibility of women to buy modern clothes was a serious barrier standing in front of the abandonment of veiling. In a letter coming

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ Linke, *Mustafa Kemal Türkiyesi*, 19.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 37.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

from a woman to K ro lu newspaper, she complains that while it is so easy to buy and sew * ar af* and *pe e*, buying modern clothes and overcoat is not affordable for many women.²⁹⁸ (Appendix D) In another letter, the woman, after celebrating the transition to modern clothes of women in Anatolia, questions how the poor people will afford to buy modern clothes.²⁹⁹ In the response, given by the newspaper, the author still encourages the women to abandon their traditional clothes by saying that “it is not a shame to be poor”. From Linke’s book, we also observe that even in the official institutions of the state, the women continued to veil their bodies and faces. In a court of Giresun city, for instance, she sees that women in the court were fully veiled with * ar af*.³⁰⁰

In newspapers, it is also seen that the decision of prohibition on veiling taken by local governments were not much taken into account by the society. For example, after the prohibition of veiling in Tirebolu, despite of the local governors’ attempts, the women continued to veil their faces.³⁰¹ Trabzon had gone through a similar process about the abandonment of *pe e*. In spite of the warning of that the women who continue to veil would be sent to police station for verification of their identities, the women did not abandon the traditional clothes. Furthermore, those insisting on veiling did not prefer to go outside and this fact created further problems in financial life.³⁰² The warnings of newspapers and the emphasis on the expression that “nobody will remain unpunished” also indicate the women did not give up veiling in spite of the approaching prohibition date. In such a news, the author says that “the decision is firm and no apologies will be listened”.³⁰³ He/she further adds that “those who resist against the decision will have to face the power of government”.

²⁹⁸ 9 İkincikanun 1935, K ro lu, sf.3

²⁹⁹ 9 Mart 1935, K ro lu, sf.2

³⁰⁰ Linke, *Mustafa Kemal T rkiyesi*, 204.

³⁰¹ 29 Te rinievvel 1926, Ye il Giresun, Numara:30. Cited by Sarısamam , “Cumhuriyet’in İlk Yıllarında,” 104.

³⁰² 10 Kanunievvel 1926, Ye il Giresun, Numara:36, 6 Kanunisani 1926, Numara:39. *Ibid*.

³⁰³ Ekekon, 12 Eyl l 1935, s.1

The documents from state archive also show the resistance of society against the clothing reform of women. In the related document, we see that there are awomen in Istanbul wearing *peçe*. For this reason, in the same document, Minister of Interior suggests that such appearance of women and traditional clothes in public places should be prevented as soon as possible. In another document, we see that despite of the prohibition of veiling, because of the strong reactionary mindset, it was difficult for women to wear the clothes as they wish in Çorum.³⁰⁴ Furthermore, the governor of Çorum says that it cannot be denied that there are still some people veiling themselves especially in street alleys. Not only women did resist but also the men population reacted negatively to clothing reform of women. As Metinsoy emphasizes, extension of women's rights, including the abandonment of veiling, was a serious threat to men since these developments had the potential to reduce the men's authority in family and social life.³⁰⁵ In a document related to the men's resistance to modernization of women clothing, it is observed that the men verbally abused the women who abandon veiling and wear traditional clothes.³⁰⁶ He, then by taking a further step, dragged her by grabbing her arm. Such practices of men pushed the state to take more rigid measures and those who verbally abuse the women also decided to be punished by the officials.³⁰⁷ The producers of traditional clothes were also a part of resistance. For example, in Maraş, after the prohibition of traditional clothes of both men and women, one of the producers (Biçuv İbrahim) complains that he and other producers would be affected negatively unless the new law related to is not abandoned.³⁰⁸

Lastly, it is important to take the dilemma of CHP's administrators about the method in enforcing the law related to clothing reform. In addition to that, some of the party members did oppose the clothing reform of women. These two facts also play an important role in the strength of resistance by society. Some party members

³⁰⁴ Ibid. p.94

³⁰⁵ Metinsoy, "Negotiating the Kemalist image."

³⁰⁶ Ibid., 96.

³⁰⁷ 12 Birincikanun 1934, Koroğlu, s.2

³⁰⁸ BCA 490.01/17.88.1

complained about the prohibition of veiling and proposed to adopt a softer attitude against those who continue to veil. Furthermore, the number of administrators who were against using the police force to those continue veiling were not low at all. For example, during the 4th Congress of Republican's People's Party, upon the objections of Aka Gündüz(Ankara), Şükrü Kaya, it was given up to execute a law related to prohibition of veiling throughout the country.³⁰⁹ In another example, upon the request of governor of Antalya to use police force against the veiled women is rejected by the Ministry of Interior with the statement that "this will happen by enlightening our women and their husbands....Police forces should not be used".³¹⁰ According to Metinsoy, some party members were also unwilling to encourage women to be unveiled. In Eskişehir and Konya, party members of CHP did not follow the anti-veil policies of local governments.³¹¹

³⁰⁹ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı, 144-47. Cited by Hakkı Uyar, "Çarşaf, Peçe ve Kafes Üzerine Bazı Notlar," *Toplumsal Tarih* 33 (September 1996): 7-9.

³¹⁰ EGMA [13216-7/1]. Cited by Hale Yılmaz, "Reform, Social Change and State-Society Encounters in Early Republican Turkey," (PhD diss., University of Utah), 60-1.

³¹¹ EGMA [13216-7] (February 7, 1936) and BCA [490.1/677.289.1]. Cited by Metinsoy, "Negotiating the Kemalist Image."

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Although there are many researches for the early Republican period of Turkey, the structure of state and society's reactions to the reforms have usually been neglected. By referring to the authoritarian structure of Kemalist regime, the state was portrayed as if the state has the absolute power over society and the society, in this portrayal, was a passive receiver. Although it is true that the Kemalist regime was despotically powerful and did not allow any opposition movement to emerge, the Kemalist regime was infrastructurally weak. For this reason, Kemalist regime remained ineffective in practicing its own hegemonic power over society. For this reason, the Kemalist's desire to transform the society was met by a resistance from society. Although it is true that the resistance of society, of course, depends on many economic, social, cultural and political reasons, the incapacity of the state, nevertheless, was a significant reason explaining the partial failure of transformation projects.

After introduction part, to be able the position the state and societal forces, the different theories about the state and society relationship were discussed. What remained from this discussion was that the state, although it is open to be affected from society, desires to transform the society as it wishes. This transformation process, on the other hand, cannot be put into practice only through the oppressive forces of the state and requires a consensus of society. To maintain this consensus, the state's infrastructure needs to be powerful. That is to say that without effective legitimization tools and without a strong capability of the state, the hegemony of the state cannot be maintained over society. On the other hand, it was emphasized that it is important to differentiate the despotic power and infrastructural power of the state. The despotic character of a state does not mean that the state maintained its hegemony over society. Rather, it is the infrastructural power and hegemonic institutions of the state which creates the hegemony of dominant classes over society.

Through these hegemonic institutions of the state, the states create political, cultural and moral values which all contribute to the legitimization of the state structure and existing system over masses. During this process, the society is not silent. The reactions of the society may affect and change the essence of hegemony.

When it comes to the Kemalist regime and Turkish state, it is seen that the state had a serious trouble in controlling and penetrating to the everyday life. In the chapter related to the capacity of the Turkish state, the economic structure inheriting from the Ottoman Empire was paid attention. In addition to the agrarian and unindustrialized structured economy, the immaturity of market-focused production led to low level of integration between the regions. Thus, this economic structure of the state did not only weaken the state's infrastructural power, but also decelerate the integration process of different regions. In the coming parts of this chapter, I focused on to what extent monopolization of state over physical force was materialized and how the under-development of transportation system became an obstacle for the state to exercise its infrastructural and hegemonic power. By discussing these topics, I attempted to show how the Turkish state was ineffective in dominating the social life and ordinary people during the early Republican period. The second reason of this ineffectiveness was the low level of monopolization of state over physical force. In Republican era, what we see is that the violence in everyday life is so common and accessibility to criminal tools were so easy that the ordinary people acted like there was no state, police or laws and this created an insecure environment which the state had trouble in maintaining its authority over the ordinary life of people. Furthermore, the bandits still existed and challenged the state authority when the opportunity arose. This insecure environment comes into the prominence challenging the state authority in everyday life. Lastly, transportation system in early Republican Turkey was also insufficient. Insufficiency of transportation system also refers to the low level of integration throughout the country and for this reason, especially local regions and villages remain isolated both politically and economically. Therefore, insufficiency of transportation system was another important factor obstructing the penetration of the Turkish state and foundation of hegemony of the Kemalist regime.

In the last part of my thesis, I focused on the state's hegemonic institutions and symbols through which the relationship between the state and society was shaped. The hegemonic institutions and symbols have the ability to change the values, ideology and the minds of the people. As hegemonic institutions, the health and education system were examined. The health and education system play a crucial role during the transformation eras since these institutions would transform the ordinary people and create the ideal citizens. The Kemalist regime attempted to use these institutions effectively. While, through the health, the Kemalist regime glorified the modern methods of medicine, the educational institutions have been used to replace the "backwardness" with modern and secular. However, since the infrastructural power of the state was insufficient, the Turkish state could not use the hegemonic institutions effectively as well. Although the partial progress was made in improving the conditions of health and educational institutions, they were far away from functioning effectively.

In the last part of the chapter, I examined the reform on women clothing during the Early Republican Era. Since the clothing reform's aim was to symbolize the transition to modernity from backwardness rather than to emancipate the women, the clothing reform on women's clothing was evaluated as one of the hegemonic symbols of Kemalists. To prove this argument, the women and the clothing issue was analyzed by emphasizing the continuity between the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. When the position of women is analyzed during the late Ottoman Empire, it is seen that the reforms related to women issue had already been underway and women *gradually* started to be included in social and economic life. Women, by means of women organizations, also had the chance to discuss on their clothings and modernized their clothes to an extent. When it comes to Kemalist regime, although the women's right continued to extend during the Kemalist era, the Kemalist regime functionally used women to make the official ideology of the Turkish state visible. While, on the one hand, the women, as the subjects of everyday life, with their clothing, with their life styles represented the secular and modern, on the other hand, the responsibility of the ideal women was to "raise children to advance the Turkish nation". Therefore, the traditional roles of women did not change much during the

Kemalist regime and it can be said that the anti-veiling policies of women did not aim to emancipate the women but symbolized the disengagement with Ottoman Empire and transition to a modern, civilized and a secular country. Thus, the anti-veiling campaign was a part of Kemalist regime to destroy the hegemony of traditions and religion and to maintain its own hegemony over society and make its power visible in everyday life. The resistance of the society to anti-veiling campaign, as we have seen in documents, in this sense, also represents the partial failure of Kemalist regime and insufficient penetration of the state into daily life.

LIST OF FIGURES



Figure 1 The women in bazaar wearing charsaf in Sivas after 1935

(Lilo Linke, *Mustafa Kemal Türkiye*, trans. by Rauf Tektaş (İstanbul: İkarus Yayınları, 2008), 47.)



Figure 2. The Women around Kayseri Kursunlu Mosque in 1939

(Neslihan Altuncuoğlu, “Evinin Dışında Kayserili Kadınlar (1923-1970),” *International Journal of Social Science* 5(6) (December, 2012): 11.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

The Letter Written by Ministry of Interior about the Attacks of Bandits

T. C.
Dahiliye Vekâleti
Hesab Kaleme MÜDÜRİĞİ
5695

Geldiği yer	Tig. No.	Tarihi	Şifre Numarası	Gözetim	Açılım adı
Erzincan	1633	30.6.938	Em.2/260/44	544	Aksöley

Telgrafhaneye verildiği	Tarih	Sa.	Da.	Telgrafhaneye alındığı	Tarih	Sa.	Da.
	30.6.938	18	00		30.6.938	20	39

Kaleme geldiği	Tarih	Sa.	Da.	Kaleme açıldığı	Tarih	Sa.	Da.
	30.6.938	22	07		30.6.938	22	45

T. C.
BAŞPAKADILIK
Dahiliye Vekâleti

Dahiliye Vekâletine

H A Y A T

I- 29/6/938 gecesi Kemaliye'nin Bahre belinde oturan Çemişkezek kazasının Şavaklı Ağiretinin 35 kişilik Koçuşağı haydut kolunun baskınına uğradığı ve Şavaklılardan iki yaralı bulunduğu ve bir kısım hayvanlarının gasbedilmiş olduğu ve haydutların, silâhsız Türk köyleri üzerine hareketlerini teşmil edeceklerini haber almaları üzerine Aşağı Gübüşkan, Soğukedil köylerinin Tavuk ve Higdard köylerine muhaceret etmekte oldukları ve o civarda otlandırılmakta olan hayvanların Higdard köyü etrafına toplattırılarak civardaki bekçi ve gömüllü bekçilerle muhafaza edilmesi ve karakolun toplu ve uyanık bulunması gibi tedbirler alındığı Kemaliye Kaymakamlığının 30.6.938 günlü şifresiyle bildirilmiştir.

2- İcâbeden tedbirlerin alınması, bekçi ve muavin bekçilerle ilîq nahiyesinin hemen takviye edilerek haydutların başka fenalık yapmalarını için karakol komutan ve Nahiye Müdürünün gerekli tedbirleri alması ve geçitlerde pusu kurulması ve haydutların hangi sente doğru gitmekte olduklarına dair alacakları haberlerin acele bildirilmesi hususunun Kaymakamlığa yazılmış olduğunu arz ederim.

Erzincan Valisi

F. Özen

Başvekkâlete suret sunuldu.

030 10 111 44 22

(Republican Archive of Prime Ministry, dated 30.06.1938, 030.10.0/111.747.22)

APPENDIX B

A Document about a Bandit Attack

T. C.
DAHLİYE VEKÂLETİ
JANDARMA
UMUM KUMANDANLIĞI

GİZLİLİĞİ KALDIRILDI 963

Ankara
10 Tem 93

III. Ş. I. Ks.
Sayı 165
İlgiği / Karşılık / 193

T. C.
BÂŞBAKANLIK
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

Özü Sasun hareketi Hakk.

Başvekâlet yüksek katına

7-Tem.-937 Tah.ve J.Gn.K.lığı 106 sayıya ektir;
I- Sasun bölgesindeki son hadiseler hakkında I.U. Mf.likten en son alınan 8-Tem.-937 Tah.ve 7275/4456 sayılı şifre sureti ileştirilerek sunulmuştur.Bu son bildirise nazaran Bir süvari bölüğü muhafazasında I/Temmuz'da Kerho'dan Meydan köyüne dönen kafilenin 28/Haziran'daki olgu yerinde yine (150) kadar şakinin tecavüzüne uğradığı ve çarpışma yapıldığı anlaşıldığını arz ederim.

2- Başbekâlet yüksek katına, Rs.C.U.Kâtipliğine arz edilmiştir.

Dahiliye Vekili V.

M.O.

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34harita

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(Republican Archive of Prime Ministry, dated 10.07.937, 30.10.0/116.805.9)


APPENDIX C

A Complaint Letter about the Weak Infrastructure of the Roads



APPENDIX D

The News to Encourage Women to Wear Modern Clothes



Koroğlu Newspaper, dated 09.01.1935

APPENDIX E

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

☐

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü

☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı :

Adı :

Bölümü :

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

☐

Doktora

☐

1.Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

☐

2.Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

☐

3.Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

☐

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:

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