

REPRODUCTION OF NATIONALISM (ULUSALCILIK) IN THE
PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC OPENING IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF
TÜRK SOLU MAGAZINE

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ABSTRACT

REPRODUCTION OF NATIONALISM (ULUSALCILIK) IN THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC OPENING IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF TÜRKSOLU MAGAZINE

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The aim of this thesis is to analyse how the Türksolu magazine reproduced *ulusalcılık* during the democratic opening process in 2009-2011, which was oriented toward solving the Kurdish Issue being one of the most burning problems of the Turkish social and political life. For this reason the nationalism theories have been examined, the relationship between socialism and nationalism, tactical positions and the ideas of Sultan Galiev, who was one of the fundamental sources of Türksolu's *ulusalcılık*, as well as the ideas of Lenin and Stalin have been discussed. In light of this analysis, the political line of Türksolu, its symbols within the Turkish socialist movement as well as its fundamental orientations have been discussed and the organization of Türksolu from a magazine circle towards a

political party by reproducing history and theory around *ulusalcılık* has been explained. The way Türksolu reproduced *ulusalcılık* during the Democratic Opening process by using the myths it produced through anti-imperialism and through the enemy within and without has been examined.

Keywords: Nationalism (*Ulusalcılık*), Democratic Opening, Kurdish Issue, Turkey Socialist Movements, National (*Ulusal*) Left

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE DEMOKRATİK AÇILIM SÜRECİNDE ULUSALCILIĞIN YENİDEN ÜRETİMİ: TÜRK SOLU DERGİSİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tezin amacı Türksolu dergisinin, Türkiye toplumsal ve siyasal yaşamının yakıcı sorunlarından birisi olan Kürt Sorunu'nun çözümüne dönük, 2009 – 2011 yılları arasındaki demokratik açılım sürecinde ulusalcılığı nasıl yeniden ürettiğini analiz etmektir. Bunun için milliyetçilik teorileri incelenmiş, sosyalizmin milliyetçilikle kurduğu ilişki, taktik pozisyonlar ve Türksolu'nun ulusalcılığının temel kaynaklarından birisi olan Sultan Galiev'in düşünceleri Lenin ve Stalin'in düşünceleriyle beraber tartışılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu analiz ışığında Türksolu'nun politik hattı, Türkiye'deki sosyalist hareketteki sembolleri ve temel yönelimleri tartışılmış, Türksolu'nun tarihi ve teoriyi ulusalcılık etrafında yeniden üreterek bir dergi çevresinden siyasal bir partiye uzanan örgütlülüğü açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Türksolu'nun anti-emperyalizm, içerideki ve dışarıdaki düşman

ile oluşturduđu mitleri kullanarak Demokratik Açılım sürecine Türksolu'nun ulusalcılığı nasıl yeniden ürettiđi incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusalcılık, Demokratik Açılım, Kürt Sorunu, Türkiye Sosyalist Hareketleri, Ulusal Sol

To the memory of my father, Abdullah Kütküt

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ	vi
DEDICATION	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	xi
LIST OF SYMBOLS/ABBREVIATIONS	ix
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. THINKING NATIONALISM: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..	10
2.1. The Enemy and Symbols	14
3. A TACTIC AGAINST IMPERIALISM: NATIONALISM IN	
SOCIALISM	19
4. THE BASIC MATTERS AND SYMBOLS OF TÜRK SOLU	32
4.1. The Moments of Nationalism in Turkish Left	34
4.2. A Short Summary of The History of Organizing in	
Türksolu	37
4.3. Türksolu's Approach and References to Fundamental	
Issues	41
4.4. Democratic Opening Process	62
4.5. The Perceptions of Türksolu Concerning Democratic	
Opening Process	67
5. CONCLUSION	82

REFERENCES	88
APPENDICES	
A. Tez Fotokopisi İzin Formu	98

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADKF	Federation of Atatürk Thought Associations
AKP	Justice And Development Party
CHP	Republican People's Party
ÇYDD	Association for Supporting Contemporary Life
DSP	Democratic Left Party
DTP	Democratic Society Party
KCK	Union of Communities in Kurdistan
KGB	Committee for State Security
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
MİT	National Intelligence Organization
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
THKO	People's Liberation Army of Turkey
THKP/C	People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey
TİKKO	Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army in Turkey
TKP	The Communist Party of Turkey
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Nationalism is described as the most universal and legitimate value of today's social/political life (Anderson, 2006: 3). Today, nationalism is becoming an "actual global phenomenon" omnipresent everywhere and "the globalisation of nationalism" covers the social/political sphere as a "strong reality" (Smith, 1991: 143). In short, today, nationalist discourses are more hegemonic than ever.

Nationalism has not only become more globalised, it also started to cover the discursive space and elevates its importance in the social domain. All of these is accompanied by the erosion of the notion of nation-states. This points out to "a danger for the nation state", which keeps its borders "with a zeal bordering on neurotic," and it is observed that the nation state fails short "in providing a roof to sustain democratic citizenship in the near future in the face of problems becoming more and more globalised" Habermas (1996, s.120). Accordingly, Hall's words serve as an important warning:

Entities of power are dangerous when they are ascending and when they are declining and it is a moot point whether they are more dangerous in the second or the first moment.[...] So when I say the decline or erosion of the nation-state, do not for a

moment imagine that the nation-state is bowing off the stage of history. [...] All I want to say about that is, that when the era of nation-states in globalization begins to decline, one can see a regression to a very defensive and highly dangerous form of national identity which is driven by a very aggressive form of racism (Hall, 1991: 25-26).

While trying to understand how nationalism is losing its power, it would be appropriate to look at the state models described by Poulantzas at the second half of the twentieth century. According to Poulantzas, the state models emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century can be characterised as "authoritarian states" (1978). For Poulantzas, the reason behind this trend is the weakening of institutions of social democracy and the increasing state control on every aspect of the socioeconomic life as a result of the multifaceted manipulation of the so-called official freedoms. In this structure, which provides ideology with a large room for manoeuvre, official ideology and state party play an important role. According to Poulantzas, one can observe that parallel power networks in the formal structure of the state generate the material and ideological relations of interest between the dominant state apparatus and the public. Moreover, an additional state-like instrument of oppression other than the state's basic instruments for security and control, in other words, the deep state, starts to gain power in order to monitor mass movements or any possible attack targeting bourgeois sovereignty or the state's status quo which is deemed as sacred (Poulantzas, 1979). An organisation parallel to the

state also suggests nationalism's positioning within the authoritarian state. Nationalist content of deep state organisations becomes much clearer in this context.¹

In summary, in nation-states, which have lost their authenticity with globalisation, structures of the dominant classes change. Socio-economic and cultural structures of dominant classes have started to change as a result of global policies, the withdrawal of the state as an actor from the economic sphere in the face of economic transformations and the increasing internationalisation of capital. Micro nationalisms emerging out of this rapid change try to secure their position by appropriating interstate mechanisms.

Out of this framework comes a form of nationalism, namely *ulusalcılık*,² hailed by leftist structures choosing to stay within the state, as a consequence of their discussions about socialist tactics in the face of rapid change. *Ulusalcılık* is a political actor, which has started to show itself in the political arena at the end of the 1990s and grown stronger with the AKP rule, while trying

¹ For an explanation of the biased nature of state authority and a comprehensive study of the role of nationalism in the authoritarian state model in this context, see (Poulantzas, 1975; Jessop, 2005).

² *Ulusalcılık* is seen as the synonym of nationalism in Turkish. However *ulusalcılık*, emerging in the 1990s is used in the Turkish politics as a concept as people deploy to describe themselves as remaining outside of the traditional nationalist political structures. Another concept used in the academic literature for *ulusalcılık* is neo-nationalism. As nationalism includes an orientation towards the Turkish right, the usage of this concept does not point to the relation *ulusalcılık* has with the Turkish left. Therefore, instead of using the concepts nationalism or neo-nationalism, the term *ulusalcılık* itself will be used in this study.

to hinder the transformations within the state and appropriate the deep state itself in ways we have been trying to describe in the above sections.

Although the concept *ulusalcılık* is being used by various structures, Kemalism particularly and secularism and nationalism, which are regarded as inseparable from it, have underlined *ulusalcılık*. At the same time it has been suggested that *ulusalcılık* contained a position, which was claimed to be leftist. As such, it has become inclusive of the proximity of the socialist movements in Turkey to nationalism and a leftist nationalist ideology, pervaded by Kemalism, has emerged. Because of this aspect, as well as its thoughts, which converge with racism at some points, and its ambition to protect not the Turan (as opposed to Turkish nationalism) but the nation-state from the enemies all around, *ulusalcılık* differentiates itself from the traditional nationalism in Turkey.

Published since 2002, the magazine *Türksolu* appears as one of the examples of *ulusalcılık*, which we have been trying to explain above, and is the focus of this study. Since its start, the magazine increasingly supports racism against Kurds and advocates it as part of its leftism. The magazine has continued to adopt this extremist stance during the process known by the public as the democratic opening and later called by AKP as the Project of National Union and Solidarity aiming to solve the Kurdish issue. This study will examine the *ulusalcı* nationalism of *Türksolu*, which is itself an *ulusalcı* organisation, during the process of the democratic opening. As said before, it is essential

to understand how nationalism is produced in order to explain the survival of nationalism which has been otherwise expected to lose its status. How nationalism constructs an “imagined” solidarity and unity despite the existence of current class-based, cultural, ethnic/racial and gender differences/divisions and discrepancies? That is to say, how is nationalism produced? Smith, Gellner and Anderson’s theories will be helpful while answering these questions. Consequently, this study will examine how Türksolu has reproduced nationalism during the course of the democratic opening process and which concepts they relied on for their arguments.

The study will examine and make an analysis of Türksolu magazine’s published issues between the years 2002 and 2011. The study will benefit from the abovementioned theoretical framework while focusing on the main issues which have been highlighted during the democratic opening process and affected the political stance of Türksolu. Most of the references in this study are from the articles published on Türksolu magazine’s website www.turksolu.org, however a few number of articles, which are not on the website, are obtained from printed sources.

The reasons behind choosing Türksolu as the focus of this study are as such: The racist solution advocated by the Türksolu magazine to the Kurdish issue becomes more and more popular in the *ulusalcı* wing and therefore nurtures hate speech and facilitates hate crimes. Similarly, it makes use of socialist figures and concepts by presenting tactical nationalism in socialist

literature as the essence of socialism; in this way leftist concepts are transferred to *ulusalcılık*, losing class as their basis, which in turn are replaced by the concept of nation. Moreover, Türksolu also becomes organised through its political party, namely *Ulusal Parti* (The National Party), and propagates its influence. The most visible sign of this was the fact that Türksolu, which started as a small-scale magazine in 2002, entered the 2011 general election with independent candidates. The factors that led to their presence in the election will also be one of the issues that will be opened up to discussion in this study.

The most important constraint for this study is the lack of academical sources, apart from a couple of master thesis and a few articles on the subject, which could be instructive for this study. Among the studies that were conducted on the subject, the most comprehensive is Direnç Erşahin's study entitled "An Emergent Form of Reactive Nationalism In Turkey: Türksolu" (2010). In this study, Erşahin argues that Türksolu represents a reactionary nationalism. Erşahin successfully discusses the influence of Kadro and Yön magazines on the thinking of Türksolu magazine. The thesis of the study encompassing the years between 2002 and 2007 focuses on the reactionary nationalism of Türksolu magazine and stresses that the discourse of the magazine has become more and more nationalist as a response to the reactions in the society. In this study, contrary to what Erşahin argues, I would argue that the ulusalcı discourse has systemic tendencies that can also be

identified with racism and suggest that even though the magazine did not organize the reactions that appeared in the society at the beginning, it has constantly tried to influence that domain. On the other hand, Erşahin's study exemplifies the ways in which this subject can be examined academically and moreover, demonstrates the relation of Türksolu to ethnic nationalism and how Türksolu interprets and modifies the views of key figures in the Turkish socialist movement in line with its political tendencies. Erşahin's is the only study that has as its focus Türksolu magazine.

This situation limits the access to resources which can be related to this subject matter and which can enhance the analysis. Apart from this, the different appearances Türksolu assumes according to the changing agenda requires to extend the analysis to various axes.

Together with these consideration, I will try to draw the theoretical framework of nationalism in the second chapter and to discuss how nationalism is produced. I will especially emphasize concepts such as symbol, myth and enemy.

In the third chapter, I will look at the relation between socialism and nationalism. Following Marx and Engels, I will criticize Lenin and Stalin which have influenced the discussions in Turkey. After discussing the nationalism was formulated in the Soviet Union as a tactic, I will try to provide a summary of the thought of Sultan Galiev, who has influenced Türksolu.

In the fourth chapter, I will provide the outline of socialism and nationalism in Turkey, as it is not possible to create a new discussion by transcending the previous discussions. After examining in brief the relationship between nationalism and socialism in Turkey starting from TKP, I will try to cover the relationship with nationalism established by structures such as THKO, THKP/C which were also important for Türksolu. According to the result of this examination, I will touch upon the history of Türksolu in brief and then conduct a discourse analysis on how it deals with which fundamental issues. The main issues we will be dealing with in this analysis consist of the concepts which compromise the discourse of Türksolu. These concepts, especially the concept of anti-imperialism, are mentioned in the magazine as "the enemies within and without." AKP, the Kurds and the minorities are seen the internal extension of the enemy without, whereas all the neighbours of Turkey are perceived as the enemy without. The imperialist, on the other hand, are seen as USA, EU and Russia. In order to fight against these enemies, it is argued that we need Atatürk, Turkishness, the left and the army. I will try to show how all these concepts have become the reference points during the historical course and to explain how a political line has been constructed through these points. Because the intellectual ground which was formed through these concepts has been put in place during the Democratic Opening process and has reached to wide audiences through widespread propaganda which was rendered possible by the general elections of 2011. I will discuss how Türksolu has deal with the

findings, which we will obtain as a result on the analysis, during the democratic opening process and I will try to reveal how it reproduced and popularized nationalism on this axis.

At the end of the study I am intended to explain the relation of nationalism with Türksolu and its reproduction. In addition to this, I will try to mention the concepts, which have played an important role in the politics of Türksolu, and how it has constructed nationalism with socialism. Another subject that I will try to discuss will be how a narrow circle of magazine was able to enter into general elections at the end of the 9 years with independent candidates and how its field of discourse has enlarged.

CHAPTER II

THINKING NATIONALISM: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To argue that nationalism is a political and cultural positioning which takes the concept of nation as the basis of its values and reasoning may produce a description to rely on while starting to characterise nationalism. On the other hand, it is necessary to go further in order to describe the concept of nation and its relation to nationalism.

It is possible to name two approaches concerning the subject. The first can be described as the primordialist approach which has lost its legitimacy today. As opposed to that, a modernist approach is prevalent, treating the concept of nation as a historical construct.

Gellner, Hobsbawm, Smith and Anderson are among the leading theoreticians advocating this approach. Although they have differing opinions on certain points, they all argue that the concept of nation is not natural, given and static, rather they assert that the concept of nation has emerged as a result of modern developments. According to this approach, nations and nationalisms are products of solely `modern` developments

such as capitalism, industrialism, the establishment of centralised states, urbanisation and secularisation.

A prominent figure of the literature on nationalism with his book "Nations and Nationalisms"(1983), Gellner argues that nationalism is a product of the modern age and one can only talk about "nations in the age of nationalisms" and adds that "it is the age of nationalism that engenders nations, not the other way around" (Gellner, 1983: 55). For Gellner, nationalism, as a by-product of the process of industrialisation is "a principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent". Pointing out that the nation is constructed in different ways in different social and political conditions, Gellner stresses that nationalism can only emerge when social conditions require a homogenous and high culture. In this sense, nationalism as a cultural project is the imposition of a high culture on a society, which previously had a variety of low cultures (Gellner, 1983: 74-75). In short, for Gellner, nationalism can be seen as an effort to create a single high culture out of various public cultures for the congruence of political unity and cultural unity. The principle of nationalist organisation of the society requires the engagement of the state with the culture; therefore the state becomes the protector of the culture (Gellner, 1994: 49). Because of this feature, nationalism also means the containment of culture within the state; in other words, the culture, which has become dominant, bypasses the others and thus becomes common.

Parallel to Gellner, Hobsbawm points out that (1990) nations become visible only after the emergence of "(territorial) states that are dependent on land" and stresses that the state and the nation cannot be examined separately, and adds that:

[The nation] belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent, period. It is a social entity, only insofar, as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the 'nation-state,' and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it. (Hobsbawm, 1990: 9-10).

Therefore, "nationalism comes before nations." In Hobsbawm's words "nations do not make states and nationalisms, but the other way around." For this reason, nation as an invented tradition, is not a "primary nor ... an unchanging social entity) (Hobsbawm, 1990: 9). On the other hand, although Hobsbawm (1990: 25) argues that nations are constructed from above, they are not to be understood unless they are examined with a perspective from below, that is to say, in relation to ordinary people's hopes, needs, desires and interests (25). In studies of nationalism, this important remark should be taken into consideration.

According to Anderson, the nation is imagined as a community because despite the existence of relations of inequality and oppression in every nation, the nation is always seen as a strong comradeship and brotherhood (Anderson, 1983: 21). In other words, more than a political ideology, nationalism should be understood together with large cultural systems, which have

preceded and also given birth to nationalism, as well as with notions such as religion or kinship (Anderson, 1983: 26). Stressing that nations are "imagined communities," Anderson underlines that imagination and "inauthenticity" are not to be confused with one another. Criticising Gellner, Anderson states that Gellner was wrong to examine "invention" together with "fiction," instead of "imagination" and "investment" (Özkırmı, 1996: 169). With this intervention, Anderson underlines that what should be taken into account are the thoughts and perceptions of people constituting a nation.

Smith (1986) also considers the nation as a modern phenomenon and stresses that nationalism emerged as an ideology and movement in the 19th century. Yet, Smith underlines that there have been *ethnies* (ethnic communities) especially in Europe and the Middle East whose existence goes back to centuries ago and thus, suggests that modern nationalism and *ethnies* should be analysed together. In this sense, Smith stresses the fact that contemporary nations have traces before the modern period, but does not propose a direct relationship between *ethnies* and contemporary nations. In other words, for Smith modern nationalisms cannot be understood without their relation to preceding ethnic communities and loyalties. What nations are can be understood by looking at ethnic roots of nations. Therefore, the nation is "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a

common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith, 1991: 14).

Smith opens up to discussion two basic typologies of nationalism: territorial and ethnic nationalism (1991: 129). Territorial nationalism is compliant with Western norms and attributed to the West. That is to say, it is based on the principle of territory and citizenship whereas ethnic nationalism is based on the principle of a cultural and historical national identity. This one is attributed to the Balkans and the East (Bora, 1995: 72). What Smith stresses with his words "Chameleon-like, nationalism takes its colour from its context" (Smith, 1991: 79) is also important here. Thus it is possible to argue that nationalism is hazy, fragmented and vague (Torfing, 1999). For this reason, we can consider these typologies not in relation to the east and west, but as two sides of nationalism. Moreover, this vagueness suggests that these typologies might sometimes become intertwined. What facilitates nationalism to engage with other phenomena and concepts is this vagueness. Thanks to that, an Islamic nationalism and a left-wing nationalism are both possible.

2.1. The Enemy and Symbols

At the beginning of this study, we have underlined that nationalism is visible everywhere and has pervaded into the political/cultural arena, and argued that nationalist discourses have become hegemonic. In order for this to happen, nationalism has to speak for a nation instead of people. In this

certain type of discourse, various characteristics are attributed to the nation and they are hegemonised. Along with that, a nation can only exist if it defines its enemies in and outside of the country (Torfing, 1999: 192-193). On the one hand, ties are formed between people, who constitute the nation and have those attributed qualities; on the other hand, because of the same ties the idea that people from the same nation are different from the others is advocated. Therefore, those who remain outside become foreigners and potential enemies (Beck, 1993: 118-119). There are always others who hate from "us" or plot against "us" on a universal level (Hobsbawm, 1990: 205). As argued by Balibar, (1991: 269) this presents a crucial paradox, and the nation is equal to a completely alienated society in the political sense. Because on the one hand, a nation-state where individuals are "alone together" and therefore feel themselves "at home" is imagined retrospectively, on the other hand the same state becomes inhabitable. Constantly, an inside enemy is discovered and the nation is presented as a community that has united against "outside" enemies (Balibar, 1991: 269). That way, nationalism can cover up all conflicts and contradictions starting with class struggle. With the suggestion that those who are defined as enemies are threats to citizens' lives and the survival of the nation, militarism and increased police presence are legitimised. Moreover, as a result of this approach, citizens become compelled to react against this situation. When the presence of an enemy is portrayed as the only contradiction, a struggle of

life and death is inevitable. Images of the enemy serve to create sources of consent that are outside of, in contradiction and against democracy. As a consequence, all kinds of inquiry are prevented and the notion of state secrets and a discourse on the survival of the state are legitimised (Beck, 1993: 28-129, 131-134).

Nationalism not only created images of the enemy, it also ensures the continuous reproduction of the national identity. With this aim, it emphasizes the similarities of the ones who are inside the periphery of the nation and differences of the outsiders. Symbols and rituals serve to create the national identity. Those who are inside the periphery of the nation are knowledgeable about and understand these symbols and thus those who are unknowledgeable are distinguished easily. Certainly, this is valid for almost all kinds of communities.

In Smith's words, (1991: 16-17) by the use of symbols such as flags, coinage, anthems, uniforms, monuments and ceremonies, individuals are reminded of their common heritage and cultural kinship to strengthen their sense of common identity and belonging. "The nation becomes a 'faith-achievement' group, able to surmount obstacles and hardships." On the other hand, members of the nation can internalise some of the symbols, values, beliefs and traditions and see them as part of their being. Emotional investments made by individuals on their territory, language, symbols and beliefs while constructing their own identity facilitate the reproduction and propagation of nationalism (Guibernau, 1995: 131).

National symbols and ceremonies are two of the most effective and continuous aspects of nationalism. These possess collective emotional qualities underlined by Durkheim. Nationalist symbolism and ceremonies help to reproduce the nation as an abstract collective that has a common history and destiny by bringing together the ideology of nationalism and concepts related to the nation, and making them tangible (Smith, 1991: 127).

Nationalism is successful in creating a common identity using all of these symbols and ceremonies. National identity as a collective feeling should be exalted and reinforced periodically and through certain means (Guibernau, 1995: 128). National identity is a source for solidarity that holds people together despite their differences. In this sense, nationalism is also indicative of people's mutual commitment. National identity is a complex structure made out of various interrelated ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political components. This concept, which indicates a bond of solidarity between people brought together by collectively shared memories, myths and traditions, is completely different from the state's legal and bureaucratic ties (Smith, 1991: 34). Another component is the "territorialization of memory." Memories are associated with a certain territory and this gives way to a "homeland" with defined borders. That is to say, we cannot talk about homeland without the presence of memory. This is one of the most important components of national identity (Smith, 2004, 74-75). The "collective suffering" and "collective remembering" of the nation

become possible around this idea. Therefore, a mission is assigned to the national identity, which has been created together with memories, and those who remain outside of this mission are easily seen as enemies (Smith, 2004, 75-77).

National identity incorporates all other elements of collective identity. Even at times when its superiority over other identities is stressed, national identity always tied to other identities (Smith, 1991: 25-32). On the other hand, it should be taken into account that national identity and its components are subject to change in time and even in shorter periods of time (Hobsbawm, 1990: 26).

CHAPTER III

A TACTIC AGAINST IMPERIALISM: NATIONALISM IN SOCIALISM

This chapter will try to examine theories on nationalism and theoretical relations between nationalism and socialism. This way, we will have a basis for describing the position of *ulusalcılık* in Marxism within which it situates itself and its overall position in relation to theories of nationalism.

Nationalism and socialism have an uneasy relationship, which seems problematic from the perspective of Marxist theory and is determined by political reactions given mostly to concrete events, as well as by positions that are taken. In order to further examine the issue and give a reference to figures that have been directly influential on Türksolu, as well as on socialist circles and organisations in Turkey, I will try to convey discussions around Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

Marx and Engels never had a systematic discussion about nationalism and treated it as a central issue for socialist revolution. (Avineri, 1991: 638) Yet, it is possible to say that they had a reductionist approach when nationalism is concerned, by examining a small number of works they have

written on the issue. In a letter to Bernstein, Engels stated that Ireland and Poland have a duty to become nations and added that as long as they are nations, these countries can be international (Aydın, 2007: 545). Marx and Engels saw becoming a nation equal to the arrival of capitalism and argued that those, which have developed into nations, i.e. capitalists, might become socialist societies. Marx states that the British colony in India has eliminated the old Indian world and that way free competition and rules of the market have been able to enter India. According to Marx, this will pave the way for modern classes and the road to a classless society will open up (Marx, 1976: 589 - 596). Nimni also points that Marxism has been unsuccessful in conceptualising nationalism and it remained Eurocentric (Nimni, 1994: 4). Reiterating the limitations of Marxism concerning the national problem, Munck states that Marxism was unconcerned with the right to self-determination (Munc, 2003: 155).

As opposed to that, it is understandable that for Marx and Engels, nation was not decisive factor and this issue had less importance. Because they have a strong theory predicting that the working class will go beyond the bourgeois state and its boundaries, and establish socialism as a result of an international struggle. They also had a practical struggle for this theory and tried to envision a form of politics that would change the destiny of the working class and restructure all relations of production instead of a systematic thesis for nations in the light of the praxis of their era and geography. Along with that, with

the saying strongly manifested in the Communist Manifesto as “working men of all countries, unite!” they pointed out that the interests of the working class go beyond nations. (Balta, 2001: 154-155).

The socialist vision of a classless world failed in the Soviet Revolution, however nation emerges as an important determinant. Lenin’s suggestion that the head of the state should rotate between a Russian, Ukrainian and a Caucasian is also indicative of that (Mandel, 1991: 181). Balta explains this on the basis of the underdevelopment of the Soviet territory and the difficulties in transforming the current old structures. (Balta, 2001: 155-156). It is necessary to add that, Lenin’s intervention becomes evident when the separation between nationalisms of the oppressor and the oppressed nations are considered. The reason behind this can be seen as economic and social underdevelopment as Balta states, but Lenin also created a socialist struggle programme against reactionary nationalisms and the nationalisms of coloniser nations. Lenin’s contribution to Marxist literature summarized by the words “even though it does not negate the revolution, it is the crudest distortion that slurs over the revolution” he wrote in *The State and the Revolution* against the conception that capitalism withers away is parallel to that. Using Kürkcü’s description, the State and the Revolution, which is “the utmost theoretical leverage that has facilitated the transfer of the soul and perspective of the Communist Manifesto to the 20th century”, is a theoretical departure with which Lenin shows the basic connections

between the state and socialism. In this book, his aim is to point out that the protectors of the bourgeois state have lost their connection with Marxism. This book can also be considered as a theory of revolution coming out of the practice of revolution (Kürkçü, 2010: 274-276). The State and the Revolution is also complementary with what Lenin has said during his speech on the national programme about classlessness.

In his speech on the national programme given at the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in December 1913, Lenin said that democratic bourgeois revolutions would evolve together with national movements, drawing the framework for a politics of "self-determination of nations." In the same speech, he adds that:

The national programme of working-class democracy is: absolutely no privileges for any one nation or any one language; the solution of the problem of the political self-determination of nations, that is, their separation as states by completely free, democratic methods (Lenin, 1998: 18).

On national culture, Lenin also suggests that:

The elements of democratic and socialist culture are present, if only in rudimentary form, in every national culture, since in every nation there are toiling and exploited masses, whose conditions of life inevitably give rise to the ideology of democracy and socialism. But every nation also possesses a bourgeois culture (and most nations a reactionary and clerical culture as well) in the form, not merely of "elements", but of the dominant culture. Therefore, the general "national culture"

is the culture of the landlords, the clergy and the bourgeoisie (21).

As can be seen, Lenin stresses that an internationalist struggle and union are the only way out for the working class and argues that the right to self-determination of nations is only significant when such a struggle exists. In other words, Lenin supported the working class for its right to self-determination and explained that this means to be a part of the international struggle. His rejection of nationalism becomes apparent in these words:

Marxism cannot be reconciled with nationalism, be it even of the "most just", "purest", most refined and civilised brand. In place of all forms of nationalism Marxism advances internationalism, the amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity, a unity that is growing before our eyes with every mile of railway line that is built, with every international trust, and every workers' association that is formed an association that is international in its economic activities as well as in its ideas and aims (Lenin, 1998: 31).

This is how Lenin defined the relation between nationalism and Marxism and underlined that they would not have any relationship with nationality, an absolute condition for the bourgeoisie, but they would support the most progressive of national movements.

Lenin's arguments on the right to self-determination of nations and his political stance at the time have also been repeated for the continuing political-military struggle. For this reason, these

tactical interventions have started to be followed in the realpolitik axis in time. This trend has continued during the history of the Soviet Union and criticisms of real socialism mostly targeted such tactical interventions.³ Here, it is possible to argue that with this intervention, Lenin was able to develop a political move against the Wilson principles and yet towards the right to self-determination of nations represented by Wilson and tried to find a way to include progressive aspects of nationalism to the struggle (Aydın, 2002: 548). Lenin's condemnation of Polish, Jewish, Georgian bourgeois nationalisms, along with the Russian nationalism, as obstacles on the way of socialist struggle (Lenin, 1970: 90) was key to the success of the Soviet Revolution. It should be admitted that the revolution itself did not bring these nationalisms to an end and after the fall of the Soviet Union from the stage of history, these nationalisms returned to the forefront and incorporated anti-communism to their agenda.

Lenin's strategy to support progressive elements in liberation movements gained a new shape under Stalin's rule when it

³Along with this, following Lenin's death, the political strife between Trotsky and Stalin played a critical role in in the Soviet Union. This strife, which has caused a division in the socialist movement all over the world, did not end with the assassination of Trotsky on Stalin's orders, on the contrary it left out a socialist tradition in which proponents of these ideas contested each other from opposite ends. Ironically, both movements defining themselves Trotskyist and Stalinist embrace Leninism. A manifestation of this strife in today's Turkey (with the condition that other specificities are also taken into account) can be observed during the process of the constitutional referendum on 12 September 2010 and in the Devrimci Karargah and Oda TV trials. The aforementioned groups explained their positions in their respective publications with reference to Stalin-Trotsky discussions.

came together with the strategy to protect socialism in one state. The National Revolution thesis supporting the struggles of anti-imperialist countries even though they do not move towards socialism is based on Stalin's article entitled "Marxism and the National Question" (Stalin, 1976). In this article, Stalin defines a nation as a community consisting of a common language, territory and economic life, as well as a common culture (Stalin, 1976: 45). In addition to that, Stalin argues that the necessary capitalist stage before a community of people's transition to socialism is the constitution of people into nations. According to Suavi, Stalin's analysis points out that nations which have modern classes and went through a democratic revolution can initiate a transition to socialism (Aydın, 2002: 553).

Written by Stalin, Marxism and the National Question was published in 1913. It is interesting that Lenin did not refer to this article in any of his speeches and writings on the right of nations to self-determination. It becomes apparent that Lenin and Stalin have very different approaches concerning this issue. By including nation to the capitalist phase defined by Marx and Engels, Stalin tried to find a solution to the problem of nation, which presented a challenge for the socialist movement and had been an important subject of discussion in Russia at the time. On the other hand, his writings were not only embraced by Lenin, but also contradicted with Lenin's thesis.

This text in which Löwy talks about the contradictions between Lenin's and Stalin's theses is worth examining. According to this text, the concept of the psychology of nations mentioned by

Stalin is not Leninist; on the contrary, it is the heritage of Bauer who was criticised by Lenin. Taking into consideration Lenin's aforementioned arguments on national culture, it is possible to verify that Stalin's ideas lag behind Lenin's. The determinism of Stalin's concept of nation is also very limiting. His approach can be an answer to the presence of dispersed nations across Russia, but it is clear that it is not functional when a worldwide revolution is concerned. Besides, Lenin's conceptualisation of oppressor and oppressed nationalisms has no counterpart in Stalin (Löwy, 1999: 84 – 108). Aydın also states that Stalin's ideas and the consequent National Democratic Revolution framework misrepresent Lenin's ideas (Aydın, 561).

In addition to theses developed by Lenin and Stalin, another important contribution is by Sultan-Galiev when discussions in the Soviet Union are considered. Galiev was born in 1898 and joined the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party during the October Revolution and held important positions.⁴

To sum up Galiev's thesis, we see that he modified the notion of class struggle which is at the centre of Marxist theory. For him,

⁴ These positions are as follows: Member of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities, Member of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party's Central Committee, Tatar-Bashkhir Communist Organisations Central Bureau, Head of the Committee of Federal Soil Works, Chairman of Central Executive Committee of Public Alliance, Commission for Agricultural Affairs and Assistance to Agricultural Industry, Member of the Special Council of Supreme Audit Institution for Matters of Disputed Territories, Member of the Posledgol Central Committee, Head of the Division of Muslim Military Council - which was founded by Galiev to enlist Muslim soldiers to the Red Army (Kakinç, 2004: 38).

the most important struggle is between oppressor and oppressed nations. For this reason, he refused the thesis that a revolution will emerge in developed Western countries where there is an established working class. Instead, he adopted a strategy that gave prominence to colonised eastern countries. In this sense, he disagreed with the concept of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" in Marxist literature. He believed that the road towards a "colonial international" requires the establishment of a "Socialist Federal State of Turan" (Erdem, 2011: 85).

Galiev's separation of the East and the West is mostly a geographical distinction, yet Galiev also describes under-developed or in today's terminology, third world countries as part of the East as well. For him, all the colonised people belong to the East. For Galiev, the social structure of western countries embodies slavery. In the feudal period, the land slavery system is actually a slavery economy. In the capitalist era of the West, class oppression is a form of slavery; it is the exploitation of people by other people, but this time, in a different manner. Save for the exceptions, when western nations took control of world trade routes, markets and sources of raw materials, western nations have transferred their own national slavery systems to their colonies in Asia and Africa and therefore, they added an international dimension to their own slavery systems. Thus, peoples of Asia and Africa have become slaves working for the wellbeing of their civilised masters who do not own a property right on the wealth of their country (Galiev, 1998).

According to Galiev, the Soviets' efforts for a revolution in the UK, France, USA and Germany, where the powers of international exploitation were concentrated and therefore material conditions for a class-based revolution were thought to be present, were not enough to make a revolution. Although material conditions for a social revolution were present in Western countries, the efforts of Western European proletariat were insufficient to take power, overcome the bourgeoisie and establish a proletarian dictatorship controlling capital (Galiev, 1999: 264-265). Since, for Galiev, Western European proletariat was not in a powerful position yet to overcome the Western bourgeoisie. Western European proletariat was chasing after false socialist leaders, in other words, a false socialism as manifested in the Second International (Gültekin, 1998: 29; Galiev, 1999: 265).

The fact that Western European proletariat was not successful in making a revolution in their own societies does not necessarily mean that a socialist revolution is not going to happen. Galiev is optimistic on that. For Galiev, the socialist revolution in Russia is only the start and one of the phases of international socialist revolution. At last, two irreconcilable enemies and powers, that is to say, international proletariat and international colonialism will enter into a revolutionary war (Galiev, 1995: 156). Since, the East is the reservoir for international capitalism (as well as colonialism), in the case of a worldwide socialist struggle, colonised East will be in an advantageous position, whereas international colonialists will be highly disadvantaged. Because,

the Western European colonialism cut off from the East and its colonies will fade away and disappear (Galiev, 1995: 162-163).

Galiev argues that the reasons behind the absence of an anticipated socialist revolution in the West are the transfer of the wealth of the East to the West and the disappearance of revolutionary demands and potential of the working class as a result of sharing some these transferred goods with the Western working class. He believes that the main contradiction seen in the current conditions of the world is between coloniser and colonised (master and servant) nations by looking from the perspective of an Eastern country, to which he also belonged. Galiev recognised and admitted the struggle between labour and capital in Western nations, but thought that the primary struggle was between nations. Galiev's approach was different from Bolsheviks concerning the conditions of a revolution in the East. For Galiev, in the East, it was not possible to find proletarian class similar to Western proletariat. There were no class divisions across Muslim peoples and Western colonialists were exploiting the East without making a differentiation between different social strata. For this reason, regardless of their social strata, colonised people were all proletarians (Yamauchi, 1998: 49).

The main emphasis of Galiev's arguments on Muslim peoples is their ethnic structures. He sees all Muslim people living across the Soviet territory within the periphery of Turkishness. Along with this, Galiev also stated that he was an atheist. The reason behind his interest in Muslimhood is because Muslims were

within the periphery of Turkishness and included in his description of the East.⁵ Galiev states that there is no doubt that an antireligious propaganda is necessary for communists including himself in his article *Methods of Antireligious Propaganda among the Muslims*. On the other hand, the reason behind his execution in 1940 was his anti revolutionary efforts as the leader of Muslims. Galiev, did not perceive nationalism as a tactic for socialism, on the contrary for him, socialism became a tactical strategy for nationalism. In this sense, he situated nationalism within leftist literature and secured its position by employing Marxist concepts for his political arguments.

Galiev's opinions become fully accessible to readers only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of KGB archives. But his main texts have been a source of reference for third worldists. In Turkey, his opinions were opened up to

⁵ Galiev's ideas show some similarity to what Yusuf Akçura has argued in some of his writings of the period. Like Galiev, Yusuf Akçura was born in Russia. In his book *Üç Tarzı Siyaset*, which can be considered as the manifesto of Turkism, and other articles, Akçura voices similar opinions. Akçura's family migrated to Istanbul at the end of the 19th century and his political life actually started in Istanbul. On the other hand, he went to Kazan in 1903 and has been influenced by the socialists of the region. In addition to the influence of Turkism, his writings of this period were also shaped by socialism. Akçura, then came back to the Ottoman Empire, joined the War of Independence, became a member of the parliament and acted as the president of the Turkish History Institution. During this time period, he has distanced himself from socialism and become part of the team that has shaped the Republic's understanding of history. In this context, it can be argued that Turks in Russia of the time have been influenced by ideals of nationalism and also in contact with socialists who had a new vision of society and were fighting against the Czar, which was seen as an enemy by both parties. For more information, see Georgeon, F. (2005) *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri Yusuf Akçura (1876 - 1935)*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları: İstanbul.

discussion with the publication of Aclan Sayılğan's book *Soldaki Çatlaklar* in 1966 and this intensified the nationalist tendencies in the Turkish left. Losing its ideological axis with the coming of third world nationalisms, the leftist movement in Turkey also drifted away from the internationalist line of thinking as a result of the influence of discussions focusing on the specificity of Turkey. Readers of Turkish rediscovered Galiev after the 1990s with the translation of KGB archives to Turkish. Following 12 September, socialists in Turkey have mostly abandoned the National Democratic Revolution ideology, but for those who are closer to Kemalist ideology, Galiev's texts served as a lifesaver. With their focus on nationality, left and third worldism, as well as its distance to religion, Galiev's works have been widely translated and studied, and were very effective on the *Türksolu* magazine which is the focus of this study.

CHAPTER IV

THE BASIC MATTERS AND SYMBOLS OF TÜRK SOLU

Nationalism is always hard by Turkish Left since the appearance of TKP. Many structures that define themselves as leftist used and advocated nationalism more or less and formed their own ideas on the basis of nationalism. Specially, this situation which developed under the influence of USSR led to the appearance of the significant corpus concerning the nationalist aspects of Turkish left. With the dissolution of USSR in 1990s, not only the death of socialism was announced but also the regeneration and violence of nationalisms was experienced and witnessed. Indeed, this has given an idea regarding the examination of the reel socialism on nationalism, on the other hand, but nationalism and its violence have come into our lives. All over the world that has been recognized as a village on the name of globalization, on the contrary; many new borders have started to appear as from East Europe. Although, to the extent that, Europe became successful at removing the borders by making those new borders flexible and by including those countries in its own economic system, for the rest of the world, that is, each country, those borders remained as borders. That

is to say, nation-states were on the scene once again and draw the borders through the bloody wars. Within the geography of USSR, the countries existed as two collateral Soviets demanded the historical rights on each one's land, fought against each other and slaughters were experienced. The solution to take care of all of these is the idea of the dissolution of borders in time with the regulatory or integrative influence of the market. Under these conditions, those who wanted to resist faced with three alternatives namely a third world leftism, Islamism and socialism again. In Turkey, as the alternatives were shaped in the same way more or less and as the radical changes in the situated state system appeared, the nationalist left came into existence again and reappeared on the scene. Concerning all continuing problems which cannot be solved from the point of Turkey, it was stated the solution can be found with the idea of golden age in some way.

Türksolu also has become one of the main structures framing this idea widely as well. The brief summary of its references would enable us to explore which sources underlie behind its existence. After this, we will order the basic matters seen as problems and express their common points and, as a final point we will look at symbols of its thought world from within Turkish Socialist Movement. Thereby, this study aims at discussing the general tendency of Türksolu.

4. 1. The Moments of Nationalism in Turkish Left

The magazine of Türksolu sees itself as related to some part of socialist movement in Turkey and says that it claims the heritage of the movement more or less. Actually, this way brings the historical resources of Türksolu to the fore. However, as there are lot of studies on those issues and as it is not possible to contribute the analysis of literature easily, we will confine this study to embarking these historical references and we will give some information concerning the basic debates and our analysis.

With 1920s, Soviets supported Ankara Government that struggled with Imperialist countries and won wars against them. Even the reason of the silence of Bolsheviks against the murder of Mustafa Suphi and his friends can be seen as a struggle with imperialism. That is, Soviet's this silence against the murders is not a political attitude but more correctly it can be defined as a tactical attitude. At the root of Soviet's relation with Turkey, as we mentioned before, the right of national self determination exists. 1921 Moskova Treaty is the clearest expression of this situation. As a result of the treaty, Ankara Government was recognized, Kars and Ardahan were surrendered and arms aid to Turkey was provided. All articles of the agreement were linked to the tactical support of Soviets. These types of the intimate relations between two countries took the form of Mustafa Kemal's affinity with socialism in the following years. However, there is no proof that indicates that this agreement is non-pragmatic from the point of two countries.

This relation continued somehow until detention of communists in 1927. When it came to 1927, as a result of detention and judgments, the judged received light sentences, but because of this arrest, the tactical relation between Socialists and Kemalists was terminated. At this point, Küçük's evaluation is significant that the judged were incorporated into the status quo by means of imposing light sentences. Likewise, the Comintern accused TKP cadre, except Şefik Hüsnü, of being nationalist. The *Kadro Movement* in which TKP were involved started to publish by holding the heritage of Soviet tradition from which it came and by leading to debates on exceptionalism and national development and this has paved the way for discussing left and nationalism in a theoretical and institutional frame on this lands.

Debates started with the *Kadro* were of course shaped through transformations in the world, especially Soviets' tactic of popular front against fascism and third world revolutionary movements as well. On the historical line, such a process, respectively; the *Kadro*, *Yön- Devrim* Magazines and *Milli Demokratik Devrim* can be followed.

Milli Demokratik Devrim thesis, which Mihri Belli coined, that was actually formed by the increasing youth movement and working class movement brought about the appearance of theorists who overcame Mihri Belli from within its own young generation and the steps which were taken so as to narrow the distance between nationalism and socialism. Particularly, the theoretical and practical actions of the armed communist parties such as THKP/C, THKO and TİKKO which was under the

leadership of Ibrahim Kaypakkaya resulted in a different way; these parties wrestled with as a common organization of Kürt, Türk, Armenian, Rum and Laz socialists. What was left from those days when practical debates were prior to theoretical ones indicates that THKO and THKP/C recognized the reality of Kürt and Türk peoples, criticized the state, status quo and turned Imperialism into a target to struggle but established a warm relation with Kemalism. As to TİKKO with Kaypakkaya's writings within Turkish Socialist tradition put forward the first critique of Kemalism. Besides this, these movements were in solidarity with third world revolutions and for an example they fought against Israel in Palestine. The large part of these three organizations were killed by the state powers and sentenced to long imprisonments. However, the new organizations which protected what left from these movements have appeared and come into conflict with Kemalism and the state.

When we look at the political tendencies of Turkish socialist parties after 12 September coup, except Aydınlık under the leadership of Doğu Perinçek, there is no any main socialist organization that finds itself close to Kemalism⁶. However, the emphasis on Kemalism became strong in Aydınlık in the years of 2000 and increased as a result of adaptation of Turkey to the

⁶ In the last years, especially Yurtseverlik appeared on *TKP-Gelenek* line and similar tendencies are in conjunction with the tactical nationalism of Soviets, but it does not conform to any certain definition of nationalism. Besides this, except Aydınlık route, it can be seen that some organizations following Dr. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı's way and Alevi's references gets close to Aydınlık from place to place; but any one of them is as widespread as Aydınlık, only the emphasis is in this manner.

free market economy and of the capitalization of Turkey and of the relatively increasing power of Islamism as a political subject. There are two main factors which can be explained in relation to the involvement of other organizations and individuals into the critique of Kemalism; the first one is that those who advocated the army were violently repressed by the army; the second one is that transformation was resulted from theoretical readings and debates at the jail.

With the beginning of the years of 2000s, the dominance of Atatürk nationalism which is in Turkish Constitution was raised by the interventions of the Turkish Armed Forces which had a great influence on politics against the increasing Islamism and PKK's actions. This nationalism has given a basis to *ulusalcılık* and become characterized with the so-called left through the reproduction of the nationalist references in Turkish socialist movement by those who believed in the laical and unitary state. The main difference of *ulusalcılık* from the widespread nationalism and *ülkücülük* as a right-wing in Turkey is to use symbols and myths peculiar to the left such as Deniz Gezmiş, Mahir Çayan and Che Guevara with its emphasis on secularism. Türksolu has started to conduct a radical nationalism with the concepts of the left by coming into existence through such a tendency in such an environment.

4. 2. A Short Summary of The History of Organizing in Türksolu

Gökçe Fırat Çulhaoğlu, founder of the Türksolu team, joined the Workers' Party in around 1993-1994. He was the Istanbul

Provincial Chairman at *Öncü Gençlik* and moved up the ladder as far as the Central Committee. As he came to playing a rather influential role, Perinçek suspended him from the party, with allegations of him being an MIT agent.⁷ Following his suspension from Workers Party Çulhaoğlu joined CHP with a small group, and then this time, in his words, he himself chose to resign with the arrival of Kemal Derviş to the party (Çulhaoğlu, 2010).

Left without party as of 2000, this milieu started publishing the magazine *İleri*. Figures like Sunay Akin, Yekta Güngör Özden, Öner Yağcı contributed to the magazine, which was published in editorship of Erkin Yurdakul and Çulhaoğlu. In its first issues *İleri* was published with the subheading "Atatürkist Review", in which one could see the traces of a Galievist discourse we now know, which nevertheless did not embrace any nationalist ideas as biting as they are today.

Federation of Atatürkist Ideology Clubs (ADKF) was formed by this milieu to gear up its activities in universities. Particularly ADKFs carrying out the organising in Yıldız Technical University and Istanbul University started attacking the revolutionary and patriotic (*yurtsever*) dispositions in areas where it thought it would garner sufficient supporters. By the year 2003, as the ADKFs started carrying out ID checks and removing banners of revolutionary groups, a serious reaction grew which culminated

⁷ Ahmet Şık, in an article he wrote for a website, says that Perinçek has identified Çulhaoğlu and his friends as agents and has notified the government and MIT. He also adds that many issues remain in the dark from the Akin Birdal association of Çulhaoğlu team to their relationship with the Ergenekon indictee Sevgi Erenrol (2012).

into reactions with choppers and sticks. In May, following the beating of this group a bunch of revolutionary and patriotic students, the tension has turned into a huge clash in front of Yıldız Technical University. The clash, joined by full cadres of ADKF, ended with serious injuries to many ADKF members, including group's leading figures. When ADKF students under Türksolu command forced clashes over other leftist groups, and a subsequent news report by Zaman Paper quoted TKP Secretary General Kemal Okuyan saying that students are being sucked into clashes, this was declared by Türksolu as a "sharia-'communist' collaboration", implicating TKP in collaboration with AKP. Accusing TKP of being an armed organisation, they portrayed themselves to be defending against separatist activities within universities. They alleged that the consequence was the intervention by Fetullah Gülen over Atatürkist youth, who were to protect the army (Türksolu, 2003). Subsequently, ADKF's work and the organising of Türksolu in universities came to a close (Keten, 2012). If Yıldız Technical clashes represented the first phase of Türksolu group's transition from a perspective of creating a mass student mobilisation around anti-imperial and Kemalist rhetoric to a perspective of creating provocations with racist rhetoric, the second phase was marked by the suicide of its "second man" Erkin Yurdakul (Keten, 2012). After his dismissal from the university on grounds of walking up to Kemal Alemdaroğlu, Istanbul University Rector, Yurdakul committed suicide on December 22nd 2003 as he jumped off his

office in Türksolu in Beyoglu. In the following days, Türksolu praised pages for Yurdakul.

From this day onwards, publications directly targeting Kurds came one after the other. There were two reasons behind this. First, with the absence of any access to universities since Yurdakul himself organized the previous entries came the need for a new discursive field and an organizational strategy. Second, it seemed easier to mobilize the anger resulting from increased soldier deaths with the scaling up of PKK activities. Thus, they had the option to grow their own organisation instead of "stealing people" from the socialist movement.

Türksolu started picking the fruits of this new approach in 2007. Founding the Association of National Movement, they kicked started a new mobilisation whereby finding a Türksolu magazine in the rooms of every academic in every university became possible. Another tactic of this campaign was to sell the magazine door to door (Keten). In April 23, 2007, they joined the Curse the Terror Rally in Çağlayan carrying the banners; "Army to Iraq". They had a tough debates with ÇYDD, one of the organizers of the rally, due to this provocative nature of their banners (Çulhaloğlu, 2007). Following that, they fell at fouts with not only long disputed Workers' Party, but with all the *ulusalcı* groups. What was needed now was a political party.

The process they commenced in 2009 with the slogan of Atatürkist Party was finalized in 2010. A bunch including academics like Prof. Şener Üşümezsoy, Prof, Türkkaya Ataöv,

Prof. Emin Sami Arisoy formed the Nationalist Party in 2010. Party ideology was declared to be the Atatürkist Six Arrows. Then the party, whose chairman was Gökçe Fırat, started opening up offices in many provinces. Having participated 2011 elections with independent candidates for Istanbul, İzmir, Mersin and Balıkesir, the party's election slogan had statements including "We'll rid Balıkesir of PKK, "We'll rid Mersin of PKK". In their speeches, candidates declared the biggest problem of these cities to be the invasion by the Kurds. Despite no victory, the party did succeed in extending its discursive field by utilizing the election atmosphere. They managed being subject of debate in national TV channels, through which their ideas made it into homes of people.

4.3. Türksolu's Approach and References to Fundamental Issues

Türksolu has come to describe itself and others over Turkey's contemporary issues. Under such circumstances, constructing a certain narrative of history for the past has lent itself as an inevitable necessity. This made a lot of sense for a political movement that has placed leftism as a sub-category under anti-imperialism and brought nationalism to the forefront. Such constructions of history were valid also in reference to contemporary issues of Turkey. In its analysis of contemporary events, it consciously tried constructing a very distorted history of the Kurds through a retrospective reading of history. Besides, by taking them out of their context it adopted certain references of the socialist convention as part of its own history. That's why, to lay out the mental map of Türksolu is possible only in looking

at the debates it has put forward and the people it has adopted as its reference points - which was made by way of decontextualizing and subjecting of them to a subjective reading. In doing this reading, we will be able to present all the tendencies they have reflected during the democratic opening process.

Türksolu started publication in 2002. In the article penned down by Erkin Yurdakul in its first issue dated April 8, it emphasized all its contributors to be university students and to be following the path of Deniz Gezmiş. Yurdakul was marking their objective as creating a politics rooted in these lands, not outside, when he said that "all the intellectual predicaments of the Westernism should be left aside" (Yurdakul, 2003). Thus, starting with the first issue of the magazine we get to see Galiev's East - West dichotomy. Also Çulhaoğlu, in highlighting the imperialism and the colonial system, called for the exploited to fight against the USA:

For 500 years we've been living with colonialism and imperialism. There should be something to learn for the oppressed nations from these 500 years. All the retreats that we, the oppressed nations of the world, have won against imperialism until now has been possible only with fighting. (...) The alternative to not fighting is to surrender. Surrender cannot be vindicated as being presented an anti-war position (Çulhaoğlu, 2002: 3).

As such, from the beginning they came to define themselves as a movement with no abstention from going into war. And as we

will touch upon later, the easiest and most realistic way to war was through an army as they happen to represent.

As one of its fundamental issues, Türksolu declares imperialism to be anti-civilized, rather barbaric. The reason the barbaric is rich is because of constant plunder. Those who resist it represent civilization. Çulhaoğlu depicts those who are barbars as follows:

Barbars of our age are led by Americans, including their British partners, Israeli supporters and all those other big and forceful states who silently approve all this! The joint character of barbars is their high national income. These barbars are very rich. That's because they've operated as barbars until now and landed on all the richness of the world's civilization. Now with the help of the rich heritage they've plundered, they attack again and again (Çulhaoğlu, 2003).

As such, all the nations except for third world countries are regarded as on the ranks of barbars. According to Turkisheft, there is also the internal and external extensions to imperialism. These are listed as AKP, Kurdish and Minorities internally, and Turkey's neighbors of Iraqi Kurdistan, Armenia, Southern Cyprus, Greece and Georgia externally. Atatürkism, along with the spirit of generation 68, are all that is needed to combat all this. In shouldering Atatürkism, anti-imperialism and the spirit of 68, it could realize the ideals of a national left both historically and conjunctionally. These constantly intertwining issues formed the backbone of Türksolu agenda.

Türksolu started publication as the DSP-MHP coalition started to resolve following the big economic crisis and in response AKP stepped up on political scene. The real threat until elections were TÜSİAD and the internal enemies of imperialism connected to it; which includes Aydın Doğan and Kemal Derviş's CHP. Derviş was also the reason why Çulhaoğlu left CHP. The emergence of AKP by a rate of %38 from the elections did not bother Türksolu at first, as they trusted the army for taking care of the so-called reactionist AKP. To them, AKP was to hold on to power in collaboration with imperials, but eventually army was to do what was the responsible thing to do (Özsoy, 2002; İlhan, 2002; Çulhaoğlu, 2002b; Ayas, 2002). And one month after the elections, they were to announce the real results of the elections. According to this, the original plan of the AKP was to pacify the army and to form a war government under command of the USA. Çulhaoğlu declared war against the war government with these words:

War is now inevitable for Turkey. But on the contrary to common assumption, this is not a war against Iraq for imperial stakes. It is a war with a puppet Kurdish state to be established in Iraq. A war with the EU Army wanting to throw Turks away from Cyprus (Çulhaoğlu, 2002c).

And when Turkey's lending its bases for US to intervene Iraq came on the table, Turkisheft raised its voice one level higher and defined AKP under the command of evil, defining what was happening to be a Christian - Jewish coalition, under which AKP was operating as the sub-contractor for the plans of Greeks',

Kurds', EU's, Eurasianists' to divide Turkey (Yurdakul, 2003). Çulhaoğlu, on the other hand, was blaming Erdoğan for being dishonorable, presenting the fine examples of a male-dominant political discourse:

When American 6th first fleet arrived Turkey, as the anti-imperialist revolutionary youth were chasing these punk-ass US soldiers across the streets, those following sharia were attacking these revolutionary kids to let those American bastards enjoy the whorehouses in Turkey. In fact, during Armistice years, they turned whole of Istanbul to a whorehouse and presented it to the infidel. All of Turkey have lived to see that it was Mustafa Kemal who saved the honor of Turkish people. Therefore this tradition, the tradition of the caliphate, not only has no nation, but also has no honor. What they understand from honor is to serve the infidel. Nation to us is the most sacred thing, for which we die but don't lay hands on it. Whereas these people sell the nation with a glimpse of the eye (Çulhaoğlu, 2003a).

This is how the most important determinants of Türksolu's opposition to AKP were becoming evident. The headline "Army to Duty" was prepared during time, in its 33th issue published in June 23rd 2003, presenting a critical tendency.⁸ The magazine that has always claimed itself to side by the army was, with this

⁸ October 25th, 2003, when the poster which made a scene in the public opinion and which was included in the Indictment of Ergenekon, corresponds to 4 months before of the walk of the rectors. Apart from this, it has ben also established that the poster in the rally of rectors was unfurled by the members of Türksolu and they were returned an acquittal at the end of the proceedings (Şık, 2012; Arslan, 2008).

cover, referring to the slogan imprinted at the sub-consciousness of the people. In the editorial of this issue, Gökçe Fırat said the following:

Army's intervention has become inevitable. (...) It is absolutely certain that the Turkish nation, who has been abandoned to its fate for long, is now waiting for this intervention to happen and it fully supports it. Similar concerns also existed during the February 28th. Yet February 28th showed us that such concerns were misplaced as it became evident that the Turkish nation fully supported its Army.

In the ensuing issues this call was repeated. Loud and clear, calls for coup followed one after another.

It's not bearable anymore. The army will either remain silent to policies under initiative of the snake that will eventually bring its elimination and disbanding, or will crush the head of the snake. Today, the Army has to put a stop to such state of affairs. Just like in February 28th, or maybe with even a severer intervention than in February 28th, The Army should exert its authority over the process and spoil these plans (Çulhaoğlu, 2003c).

For a long time we've been waiting for the Turkish Army's call for the unarmed forces to take action. We know and see that the unarmed forces, namely the prominent Atatürkist organisations, institutions and individuals of Turkish nation have taken action. From now on, it's the Armed Forces itself that should take action. After that, just like in February 28th, Turkish nation will pour into streets and rejoice. (...) Nation is

waiting for someone to come out and say "enough, let the people have their say". Today, there is only one power who can say that, and it is the Turkish Army. Turkish Army is the most national, legitimate, legal command that comes from the heart of Turkish nation. Now is the time for this command to be made the rule (Çulhaoğlu, 2003d).

Government has hit the end of the road. It is just a matter of call by the unarmed forces. From its intellectuals to students, workers to peasants, Turkish nation is waiting for someone to say enough to AKP government. Attention to the call for the unarmed forces: Bring down this government (Kahramanoğlu, 2003).

However, the awaited intervention did not come. Following the expectations fizzled by the entrusted army after elections, Türksolu's public request for intervention and calls for duty were reiterated, as they carried banners during the rally of the rectors. The road to Erdogan's fall from power was declared similar to that of Menderes, as they implicated his execution with the statement "He came like Menderes, will leave like Menderes" (Kahramanoğlu, 2003b).

As the awaited reply from the army somehow did not arrive, Çulhaoğlu finally started asking "All the nation is expecting the attitude of Mustafa Kemal from his soldiers. Is there anybody in those barracks to take the attitude of Mustafa Kemal?" (Çulhaoğlu, 2003e).

It could be said that Türksolu has come to a deadlock at this point. The only thing that gave them hope was the presence of

an enthusiastic crowd in the Rally of the Rectors. However, their only leader capable of organizing in universities was now dead, and all the political groups inside were sided against them. Hence, they chose creating a new way for themselves in a context in which solution to Kurdish Problem was pursued as the conflict went on. For a long time they wrote about the Turkishness of Cyprus and the ambitions of Russia over Turkey. As such, they ended up having a lengthy analysis of the external enemies. They regained their power during this time and in the meantime masterfully used the pile of discourse they've gathered.

They told that no Kurdish language ever existed, following Kurdish broadcasting in TRT 6 in search of normalization of Kurdish Problem (Billur, 2004). In order to not fall into the trap of Imperialism in acknowledging Kurdish and Kurdishness, the only viable recipe was advocated to be one nation, one tongue, one state, all defined under Turkish Unity (Ataberk, 2004).

The issue on 2005 published with the title "We don't have Kurdish Problem! We have Kurdish Invasion" represented the closest point of Kurdish hostility reaching at racism.⁹ Presenting the cities in which Kurdish migration took place with various maps in his article, Çulhaoğlu wrote that the current problem is more than just a simple matter of terrorism, but a matter of

⁹ 2005 is a year when the Kurds were pointed as a target on the grounds that they had burned the flag during the Nawruz celebrations in Mersin and when there were lynch attempts towards the Kurds. In other words, Türksolu has toughened up its theses over the existing atmosphere, because the setting was suitable for this.

Kurds invading Turkey. Explaining the faster growth in Kurdish population compared to Turkish as a PKK policy, he depicted this to be an annoying matter for Turkish people if not for Turkish administrators. He presented the lynch attempts after 2005 Newroz to be the way people demonstrated this discomfort:

Turks who for years welcomed these invaders to their lands, neighborhoods, homes have slowly started seeing the true ill-intentions of their neighbors and where they do, they give their reactions. In recent months, the tensions seen in Gönen, Çerkezköy, Bursa, Istanbul are testimonies of this. Such a possibility appalls the Americanists. As the government takes measures against provocations, Americanist media on the other hand steps in and tells the lies of Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood. That's why when Perinçek speaks in Lausanne in safeguard of Tayyip Erdogan, he says that Turks have fought the Independence War together with Kurds. We say you gotta be kidding us! We had 33 thousand martyrs during the War of Independence, of these only 700 were Kurdish: Meaning %2! (Çulhaoğlu, 2005a).

In the next issue, Çulhaoğlu immediately finds a way to take his racist argument on "Invasion" to another level, writing the article "Son of Turk, Daughter of Turk, Protect your Turkishness" adorned with eugenic ideas. Çulhaoğlu suggests the Kurdish Problem to emerge with the PKK and calls for Turks to protect their Turkishness, as he warns Turks for being assimilated into Kurds. He suggests the following for protection: 1. Every Turk should shop from Turks. 2. Every Turk should speak Turkish, should not watch Kurdish series or get in a dolmuş playing

Kurdish song. 3. Turks are urbaners, Kurds are villagers. 4. Turks should look after their food, stay away from kebab and lahmacun. 5. Above all, Turks should reproduce. "Every new Turkish baby is a savior to take us out of Ergenekon" (Çulhaoğlu, 2005b).

The army's neglect to react was deemed to be due to Hilmi Özkök's lack of Atatürkism. Upon the removal of Atatürk's picture from the Land Forces Command badge a direct criticism was raised towards a Turkish General Staff for the first time, saying "Remove the commander, not the badge". Accordingly, Hilmi Özkök's side was evident in looking at the positive critique he received from columnists of Vakit, Gündem, Radikal, Hürriyet papers (2005).

This is how the internal enemies were also defined. They were even inside the army, and are pro-EU, USA and Russia.

It has come to be told that AKP was sitting with the enemy inside and trying to solve the problem by negotiation. Türksolu re-instigated the masculine language upon this, putting a picture of an upside down table on the cover, with a headline that goes "here is your table, those who want can sit on it" (2007).

Türksolu turned to Deniz Gezmiş not having found the support it expected from the army and the university. In fact, the conjuncture provided them an opportunity. Atv series depicting the period between Menderes presidency and the execution of Erdal Eren triggered increased public attention towards the 68 movement (Evrensel, 2008). Deniz Gezmiş became a prominent

figure during this period and Türksolu didn't miss the opportunity. Deniz Gezmiş was on the cover of the 3rd issue, whose path was declared to be adopted in their first issue. In another issue in which Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Arslan, Hüseyin İnan were commemorated depicted their braveness in the face of execution, with no mention of Deniz Gezmiş's talk on the fraternity of the Turkish and Kurdish people (Yurdakul, 2002). Same conventions were repeated in 107th issue. The fact is, in the main texts of THKO the word Kurdish is not a difficult one to come across with. In the brochure "Road to Turkey's Revolution" (*Türkiye Devriminin Yolu*) written by Hüseyin İnan, one of the fundamental texts of THKO, under section "National Issue", it says the following:

As part of our struggle for building socialism; we deem it necessary to integrate wide masses from Turkish, Kurdish, Arab etc. nations and to form a strong coalition against the joint enemy in the making of a working class ideology and a strategy for Turkey's Revolution. We meticulously respect the equality of all nations and the "right of every nation to self determination". Within the unique economic and social structure of Turkey, class based interests of Kurdish laborers are also to be realized only by the joint struggle of People of Turkey (İnan, 2012: 536).

What Türksolu persistently did was to take Deniz Gezmiş out of its THKO context and place him in a desired historical construct of their desire. The effort in this direction we've seen before becomes crystallized at this period. Ertuğrul Kürkçü as well

makes the following observation on the way *ulusalcıs* tried to appropriate Deniz Gezmiş:

The truth is, behind the images covered in flags, it requires more talent to create a martyr of "Republic" out of Deniz Gezmiş, then to defend his execution. One needs subjecting history to certain distortions in order to excuse for, on the one hand legitimizing the [military] court that convicted Deniz Gezmiş to execution, while on other had embracing Deniz Gezmiş himself during the same "anti-communist" cold war climate" (2005).

In doing this historical distortion, Türksolu places Deniz Gezmiş to where it wants to against two fronts. The first are *ülkücüs*, while the second are the Turkey's socialist movement. Against *ülkücüs*, it says that righist killers cannot be equated with revolutionaries, that *ülkücüs* in fact protect the interests of the USA, and the real nationalists are Deniz and his friends (Çulhaoğlu, 2006).

Turning back at the socialist movement, it says that the first stop of revolutionism in these lands is Atatürk, while the second is Deniz Gezmiş, and the third is Türksolu, and that real revolutionism and leftism is *ulusalcılık*. They advocate that today we need to be like Deniz Gezmiş and his friends, so that everyone is called to struggle under the slogan "either nation, or death" (Kahramanoğlu, 2006).

In following issues, next to Deniz Gezmiş Türksolu adds also Mahir Çayan into picture. In his article titled *Leftists are*

nationalists, after claiming Deniz Gezmiş and Mahir Çayan to be nationalists, Özgür Erdem goes on to describing the two people of that same tradition, Mustafa Yalçınar and Ertuğrul Kürkçü, to be tails to the Kurdish and counter-revolutionarists (2008).

This way, the two figures of the living and active members of that movement living were to be portrayed as in fact not representing these traditions. In the coming days, many things as defamation kept on being said for both these two figures, along with for many others representing the 68 generation. In other words, on this matter as well persistence was achieved.

Adding Che Guevara next to Mahir Çayan and Deniz Gezmiş, Türksolu went on to manufacture a similar historical construct for an international socialist figure as well. The first step in this direction was the emphasis placed on the similarity between Che and Atatürk. They made a long list of similarities, as both being guerilla leaders, anti-imperialists, being side by side with the oppressed, fearless and so on. The following was their statement, claiming the legacy of Che for Atatürkists:

Until today it has only been separatist and terrorist groups that made a claim for Che and they degraded him to an ordinary guerilla leader. However, Che's most important political identities were his fight for national independence and for anti-imperialism. He therefore did not actually contradict with Atatürk, on the contrary, was similar to him. Therefore, with the claim of Atatürkist on Che the

aspect of him promoting national independence has come to day light (Erdem, 2005).

Thereafter, similarities between Che and Deniz Gezmiş were accentuated and the ways in which Deniz Gezmiş embraced Che were told. The most highlighted issue was Che's leaving of ministry in Cuba for defending national independence over imperialism. They consistently highlighted his return to his gun for independence (Çulhaoğlu, 2007b). It is without a doubt that Che represents a resisting, emancipatory aspect in third world revolutions within the revolutionary movement. However, he also used to think hard on a socialist life beyond this, and left a political-economic legacy as a guide for today's efforts to socialist transitions from Venezuela to Bolivia. Lebowitz depicts one example of this in the following:

Nobody reflected the need for new socialist people better than Che. He understood that trying to form a socialism with the help of blunt tools legated from capitalism (commodity as an economic unit, individual material interest as a lever, etc) would result in harming the development of a new consciousness (2008).

In order to form a new society on new social basis, he thoroughly analyzed the experiences elsewhere of real socialism, and made a rigorous criticism of the Yugoslavian model. Hence, it was not reasonable reducing Che to a category of "national independence", isolating him from all his various aspects and theoretical contributions. Whereas Türksolu viewed also the

growing waves in Latin America from this angle. Let's take a quick look at the intellectual stock they have piled in writing about Deniz Gezmiş, Che Guevara and the many regimes they have melted under the same pot of third world revolutions.

The main emphasis in 14th issue, where Che Guevara was on the cover, was on the themes of anti-imperialism and the sacrificing of life over motherland and exploited nations. The sameness of the resistances by Castro, Saddam and Chavez were promoted in this third-worldist review (Yurdakul, 2002c).

Türksolu carried this solidarity to a whole new level in its 26th issue when they put the slogan "Hold on Iraq, Hold on Saddam" on its headline, with the approaching US invasion over Iraq. Around the same dates, a solidarity event with Saddam was organized and in 27th issue an article of Saddam Hussein was published, taken from the archives of BAAS party. In this article, Hussein was talking about their wish to extend the Iraqi socialism, the unacceptability of dividing the unitary structure of Iraq, coming of peace with the Arab unity and impossibility of reconciliation with Israel, the pawn of imperials in Middle East (Hüseyin, 2003). Putting Hussein in the magazine, a mass murderer who killed millions with chemical weapons in Halabja, constituted one of first signs of Kurdish hostility later to revealed more clearly.

Constructing of a Bolivarian socialism by Chavez was also deemed Atatürkist, by the Türksolu. To them, Chavez carried the ideals of Atatürk, which is why he was a nationalist and

socialist. What Chavez trusted most was the national will, and for Türksolu national will already signified the national capital, national army and the war against imperialism - all of which was represented by Atatürk (Erdem, 2009).

Although the living revolutions claim themselves to be Marxists, Türksolu argued them to be Atatürkist and compared in two new categories what Atatürkist socialist with Marxist socialist were. According to Çulhaoğlu, Marx's vision of socialism had collapsed as manifested in experience. Therefore, experiments with real socialism and proletariat dictatorships were all dead end streets. The reason why this was the case was due to the absence of a nationalist ideology. The only way for socialism to survive was through its adopting of the idea of national independence incepted by Lenin as the fundamental determinant of socialism. This idea was verified beyond Lenin, by Atatürk (Çulhaoğlu, 2008b). Çulhaoğlu's reasoning concludes by saying that where Marx leaves, Atatürk arrives and that's how socialism can survive. And this is how all the other categories of socialism become enemies, making it possible for Türksolu to put forward and regenerate nationalism.

Their differences with other alleged Atatürkist groups constituted another basic determinant by which Türksolu drew its friend-enemy framework. Association of National Struggle joined the Curse the Terror Rally in April 23th 2007 with banners calling "Army to Iraq". Due to provocative nature of these banners they went through some polemics with ÇYDD, the organizer group of the rally (Çulhaoğlu, 2007a). Çulhaoğlu

stated the following in reference to Büyükanıt's speech when talking of the necessity to enter Iraq in order to finish off the terror:

The view that sees entering into Iraq a trap, which as deep down as to ÇYDD administrators which is explicitly reflected, shows the degree of success PKK has in the psychological war. Today, even the rally against terror is carried out within the framework driven by the PKK (Çulhaoğlu, 2007a).

After defining ÇYDD as a Masonic leak into the ranks of Atatürkism, Kahramanoğlu goes at length to summarizing the objectives of the Association of National Will:

In setting off to its journey, different from other Atatürkist organisations, Association of National Will identified the fundamental problems of Turkey not only as secularism, but also as colonialism and the threat of partition, and accordingly set itself the objective of building a front of motherland defense. Kurdish separatism under custody of Western imperialism is identified as the fundamental problem of Turkey, and a need for Turks to organize, a Turkish barricade against this Kurdish separatism supported by imperialism, has been put forth. When we look at the parties that Kurds have voted who live from East and Southeast to metropol, we see that we are facing a Kurdish-Islamist joint front. These Kurdish-Islamist fascists have set themselves to an all around assault over Turkish identity and to build Kurdish nationalism, who since the foundation of Republic have tried to annihilate the regime. (...) And there is not a single movement that suggests a policy of struggle with this Kurdish separatism, which we observe to be

spreading like a plague outside the Association of National Will. Therefore, there is no other organization outside National Will in which Turks can take refuge to and put up a fight (Kahramanoğlu, 2007).

This is how Atatürkism and leftism become solely represented by the Türksolu. Another category of enemy for Türksolu were the internal representatives of its external enemies. In this line of thought, Turkey's situation were to be compared with the post-Sevres period, as this was achieved with AKP's increased activity in politics. They the welcoming of minorities of the occupation forces. To them, the AKP period is similar; Turks are humiliated, minorities are praised and separatists are protected. This is how they depict the collaboration of all the enemy lines:

Government is complicit in serving a US led plan leading to the partitioning of Turkey. And Turkey's partition to a Kurdish state is only one aspect of the total partition. Collaborationist government is passing legislation and practices that will drive Turkey into corner against Greek and Armenian separation plans, as minorities are being provoked towards that direction. Today, threats of a Kurdistan, Greek Cyprus, big Armenia, Pontus Greece stand as brutal realities in the face of Turks (Türksolu, 2003).

The most striking examples on this issue will reveal following the murder of Hrant Dink. According to Çulhaoğlu, killer of Hrant Dink is an "organization controlled by Menzil Kurds used by Kurdish-Islamist government". That's because AKP wants to

arrest and prison all *ulusalcı* forces in the pretext of this assassination. Çulhaoğlu did not feel sorry for the killing; referring to his TİKKO membership, he places Hrant Dink next to Abdullah Öcalan, adding that Turkey has lost one of its internal enemy (Çulhaoğlu, 2007). On that same issue Türksolu also held an interview with Kemal Kerişsiz. Due to fears of being implicated with the murder, Kerişsiz in this interview has repetitively said he wouldn't be in a position to say something like that, mentioning his sadness for the death of a human being. Drawing attention to the Kurdish and Armenian cards in play, Kerişsiz connects Dink's becoming target to his disagreements with the Armenian Diaspora, implying the presence of US supported organizations behind the killing. Not only that, but he went on to claim that the door to United Nations intervention was intended using the pretext of a possible chaos after the funeral (Kerişsiz, 2007).

Similar ideas continued in ensuing issues. That's how the relations between all the enemies were defined, along with the Türksolu's declared position against all. As Beck has pointed out, this way Türksolu constructed a single contradiction. This was how it demanded the consent for non-democratic solutions (1993: 129, 131-133).

We have already mentioned that the masses to demand the non-democratic solutions were intended to be manufactured through the Association of National Will. What they started to do with that association through campaigns like "I shop from the Turk, so my money does not go to PKK" was to try and pull

those masses within their ranks, who already were leaning towards fighting the enemy with lynch attempts in western cities of Turkey.

We should protect the Turkishness and the Turk in all fields. That's why we have to shop from Turks. We should never use any language other than Turkish. Wherever Turkishness is under attack that's where we should protect it. (...) That's why we should embrace the campaign "I shop from the Turk" in the same spirit of Independence War and the militancy of the 68 revolutionaries (Ataberk, 2009).

In calling for the embracing of the campaign with a spirit of 68, Ataberk injects the leftist references of the past to its call. Sources provide no evidence of any boycott of small business owners with respect to any ethnic background during the 68 movement, yet the memories of September 6-7 incidences remain vivid as racist attacks towards craftsmen. In any case, the campaign's objective was not about shopping, but about cutting the threat directed at Turkey from its economic relations.

The operations that have kicked started the Ergenekon investigations and with the arrest of 33 *ulusalcı* figures have created huge sensation were labeled by the Türksolu as fascism.

Çulhaloğlu starts his article titled Operation Intimidation by giving an anecdote from Müller's Nazi Germany, and carries on:

We should be wary of AKP's plans. What they care about is not a gang but national powers. That's because they are against any national organization that lives through democratic politics.

This is why they treat any form of national power able to stand against their collaborators in this way. The critical point here is to organize. In fact, fascists have always been against the organizing of society against itself. What they want is a silent, intimidated society. The society is to remain silent, unorganized, so that they could easily bring fascism. But this operation of intimidation has also an opposite effect. It is proven by experience that, on the contrary to preventing it, fascist politics make the organization an inevitability (Çulhaoğlu, 2008).

Later on, as the operation deepened, Türksolu continued this policy. They made from time to time appeals at the military officers, asked for a fight against the enemy Kurdish-Islamist fascists, a vague term which they even could not define in any tangible boundaries. The only thing to do, according to them, is to "organize", as Turkish army is being targeted (İşbecer, 2008).

The need for organizing finally crystallized in the idea of a political party. Türksolu then started preparations to move its organizational form from an association to that of a party, announced in May 2009 with the words "Atatürkist Party is on the way". Çulhaoğlu defined the party to be against USA, EU, Russia, separatism, reactionism, capitalism; and for Six Arrows, Atatürk nationalism and as a party of the Turk (Çulhaoğlu, 2009a).

This definition provided by Çulhaoğlu summarizes the orientations of Türksolu. Everything they list one by one and the

things they incorporate within them is a point where they reproduce nationalism. The definition that they provide concerning Turkish and Atatürk does not contain anything other than their own truths. In other words, the nation of Türksolu does not share the historical territory, which was noted by Smith, with anyone, appropriates the common myths and the rights and tasks that it allocates excludes what is left out of the definitions. While a socialism which is based on the common ownership of the means of production does not mean anything to them, they claim that they will take the worker class out of the equation and put the nation in its place and will therefore reach to socialism. However socialism involves an envisagement of statelessness, as we have discussed before. But the state and its nation in Türksolu becomes superior to and more important than everything else. Throughout the time it is published, it discusses a state which is not based on the happiness, health, tastes, concerns of the human beings, but rather the interests of a state which is sacred and which must be obeyed. Therefore it turns every group which does not obey and which does not perceive the state as sacred into a target of its hatred and announce them as enemies. The period when this situation has reached to a peak was the democratic opening process.

4.4 Democratic Opening Process

As Türksolu has been trying to reclaim every opportunity it could find to enlarge its own populace in line with its own aims and ideology and to produce nationalism, the democratic opening has provided a unique opportunity. Before analysing these

orientations, we will first look at the course of democratic opening briefly and to see the important points.

After the local elections of March 2009, a commission of state authorities goes to Imrali to talk to Abdullah Öcalan. In the meeting, Öcalan is asked what can be done for a solution and replies that he will prepare a roadmap for this. During the time these meetings take place Abdullah Gül says that "nice things will happen" and an expectation for serious steps towards a solution arises in the public opinion. Öcalan says through his lawyers that he is expecting ideas both from Turkey and outside of Turkey, ideas that you contribute to the roadmap and denotes that he will announce the roadmap in August. There are both moderate and reserved expression on the AKP front. According to what Öcalan says, during this period the newspapers, which are let in, are being handed after being censored. As a result of this he states that he will announce the roadmap to the public instead of handing it over to the government. The prison administration backs down as a result of this. In the meantime The Minister of Interior, Beşir Atalay, holds meeting about democratic solution with people from different fractions, Erdoğan meets with DTP and finally in August 20th Öcalan gives the roadmap to the state and says that he is expecting a response from the state. No answer is given for a long time and during this time the name of process which was called democratic opening or Kurdish opening turns to National Unity Project. There is an anxious wait on the part of the public opinion. After Öcalan expressively states that he is expecting a

commission to meet him, one such commission goes to İmrâli and asks Öcalan to call for a peace group to Turkey. A similar demand was also raised in 1999; in order to test the command of Öcalan over PKK the state asked for a commission to come. Öcalan agrees for the commission to come and as a result a group from Kandil camp and Mahmur commission comes to Turkey from the Habur border and surrenders (Kapmaz, 2011: 487- 495).

A highly crowded group of people are waiting for the PKK guerillas in Habur. No arrest warrant is issued in the courts held on the border. The peace group moves towards Diyarbakır with a flood of people. While the mood for peace was dominant in the eastern Turkey, on the west the gloves were taken off. The people who has bearen enmity for all these years could not understand what is happening as the guerillas are greeted enthusiastically. The harsh objections that were being made claim in general that this is a show, that these were "tent courts". In the media, many families and relatives of the martyr soldiers have been covered and the process has been judged with sentences like "we don't give our blessing." The statement of the government comes tardily. The Prime Minister Erdoğan is not approving what is happening (2009a, Hürriyet). The President of the High Court says that he has opened an investigation about DTP. Hürriyet uses the expression "Habur turning into a PKK show" in the news with the title "be at ease" (Hürriyet, 2009b). Supreme Board of Justice and Prosecutors

makes a similar statement and claims that they did not regard the court as ethical (Hürriyet, 2009c).

Cengiz Çandar, being close to the state during this time, makes a coolheaded analysis and suggests that the process will continue with its ups and downs (Çandar, 2009a). This is what happens exactly; however the downs are so sharp that its compensation results in difficult confidence crises. At about the same time Öcalan is punished with a 10 day cell confinement and KCK operations gain speed. On November 17th Öcalan is sent to a new prison block in İmrâli and days of protest are carried when his lawyers learn that there is not circulation in the new cell because of the door and window system. On December 11th DTP is closed down (Kapmaz, 2011: 495-496). As such a serious door in the Democratic Opening process is closed down, as well. When this process comes to an end, the new process will be the Oslo meetings held behind closed doors.

The Turkish public opinion still does not know exactly when the Oslo Meetings has started and ended. The public opinion has learned about these meetings when a section of the meetings was uploaded on the website of Dicle News Agency, which is close to the Kurdish movement, on September 13th 2011, with the title "The Lowdown of the Meetings will Burn Erdoğan Up." Dicle News Agency has said in its statement that these meetings were uploaded by cracking the web passwords of the record and that they did not have knowledge about it (2011, Cumhuriyet). Although there are much speculations about the Oslo Meetings, it is suggested that the Prime Ministry Deputy Secretary of the

day, The MİT's Secretary Fidan, MİT's Deputy Secretary Afet Güneş, Mustafa Karasu from KCK, Sabri Ok and Zübeyir Aydar from PKK has participated to the meeting held in Oslo, the capital city of Norway (Bianet, 2012).

We have already mentioned that it was not known how long the Oslo process has continued. However we can give an exact date for the Democratic Opening process: July 14th, 2011. Two critical events happened on this day. The first one was that 13 soldiers and 7 PKK guerillas died when PKK attacked a troop in Silvan and the second one was Democratic Society Congress in Diyarbakır declared the democratic autonomy. The most serious solution process that Turkey has ever entered in was closing down as a result of these two events. After these two events President Abdullah Gül met on the same day with Prime Minister Erdoğan and the Chief of General Staff Işık Koşaner. Afterwards Erdoğan came together with Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay, Minister of Interior İdris Naim Şahin, Chief of General Staff Işık Koşaner, the Commander of the Gendarmerie Forces Necdet Özel and MİT Secretary Hakan Fidan. The day after Erdoğan stated that the democratic opening process ended as follows:

These malevolent actions should not expect any good intentions from us anywhere, anytime. Neither them nor their political extensions. We also have displayed very good intentions towards their political extensions. We have made our approaches with all our good intentions and prepared the grounds so that they could pursue their struggle in the democratic realm. But the proposals they always offer are

approaches which are seen nowhere in the world and mealy-mouthed. And as AK Party and AK Party government, we will never sit on a table with them with these insincere proposals. If they want peace, if they demand peace, there is only one thing they should do: First of all, the terrorist organization should lay down arms. Unless they lay down arms the operations won't stop and this process won't go to a different point. The process from now on will reveal itself with very different strategies and practices. They should also know this (Hürriyet, 2011).

With Erdoğan's open statement the democratic opening process closes down. PKK also changes course towards increasing the conflict and there occurs very harsh conflict during the summer 2011. As such the process becomes difficult to reverse. Everytime a soldier dies, reactions also increase.

4.5 The Perceptions of Türksolu Concerning Democratic Opening Process

Once the lawyers share with the public opinion that Öcalan will provide a roadmap, Türksolu first announces that it was right. According to Yeşiltuna Türksolu has shown with its articles since 2002 that the process would come to this point (Yeşiltuna, 2009). In other words, the pages-long threats of Türksolu are now real. The solution against this threats is organizing and implementing the Turkish model (Erdem, 2009b). It tries to send message to the nationalism in the collective memory by assesing the meeting of Erdoğan with DTP co-president Ahmet Türk as AKP's sitting to the table with PKK and by arguing that the "we cannot sit to the same table with the terrorist" thesis of

he state, defended for years, has now become invalid. The issue which was published on August 17th is about the heroic symbols which have been created all this time long, about the martyr soldiers which is a very delicate matter. The whole issue consist of the pictures of tens of soldiers, their birth and death days and an agitative and long article (Türksolu, 2009a). This issue was also published as a brochure by expanding the content. This brochure, which consists of the map showing the Kurdish invasion, the tables displaying the distribution of those who participated to Çanakkale and Independence Wars according to their regions, agitative articles and a poster of Atatürkist Party Is On Its Way is distributed through a campaign. Thereby Türksolu has entered into a period where it can use the nationalist-racist pile it has built until then within the populace. This situation causes it to toughen and to accelarete its endeavours for organizing.

For Türksolu, welcoming of PKK militants on Habur border following Öcalan's call was unacceptable. They carried the execution issue to their cover, which for years has been brought to agenda by the right wing, saying: "We will execute all those who took it to mountains, who let them take it to mountains and who brought them down from mountains" (Türksolu, 2009b). That's how they brought the execution to the agenda, in the form of an imagined ceremony. Türksolu was the right address for those who wished to experience this, just as Guibernau explained (1995, 128). With this, Türksolu also came up with a description; from now on Turkey was under occupation, since

the PKK militants were freely strolling around the country. Also, a warning was to be made for the masses, reminding them a history long embedded in their sub-conscience:

Maybe we are not fully aware, but we are witnessing the occupation of our land by an occupation force as we watch them freely enter our country . We become collaborators. We become cowards. We become dishonored. We get to become no different than Vahdettins, Ali Kemals (Çulhaoğlu, 2009b).

All the rest that was emphasized in this same issue pleading for execution were in similar line. Yet, in his article that stands out, Üşümezsoy constructed a retrospective historical account in which he argued that since Seljuks, Kurds in fact had never fought along with Turks. Those who fought together were Alawite Turkmen tribes, who in time lost their identities to assimilate into Kurds (Üşümezsoy, 2009).

That's how, in parallel with the assertion that "there's no Kurdish problem, there is a Kurdish invasion", a historical account extending all the way to Malazgirt was constructed in which the argument for Kurds not having fought in none of Independence War or Battle of Gallipoli gets sharpened.

This way, they falsify the particular the claim of center politics and official ideology that Turks and Kurds have a common history and destiny. It's useful at this point to go back to the invasion argument, as every time a new issue arises on the Kurdish Problem, Türksolu continued advertising in their magazine and website the brochures, books, documentaries

promoting this view; over and over they remind the masses to convince them.

The process that Türksolu calls invasion in fact describes the intense human mobility from east to west of Turkey resulting from forced migration during 1990s. This process has led to serious transformations in the socio-economic structure of Turkey, and Kurds, just like any other group or people without urban professional skills struggling to make it in cities, were compelled to work at insecure jobs and subsist off crime networks. Neighborhoods spelled in same breath with crime like Fiskaya, Bağlar in Diyarbakır; Çay, Çilek, Özgürlük in Mersin; Kadifekale in İzmir started mushrooming just like *gecekondu* settlements prior to 1980. Besides, in cities of Mediterranean and Aegean where you have opportunities of greenhousing and four-season agricultural labor, urban transformation areas of metropolitans, abandoned structures and intensive workshop manufacturing areas, Kurds have started populating substantially in certain regions. The electors of the Labor, Democracy and Freedom Bloc candidates in Istanbul, Mersin, Adana in 2011 elections were mostly from these regions. The intertwined state of the Kurdish political organization along with the victimhood on which migrations were constructed turned these people into very active subjects in politics.

The phenomenon of migration has surprising consequences also for the non-Kurdish residents of the metropol, who consider themselves to be part of the Turkish division. First, in fields of daily wage the fees have dropped substantially. Also, having

brought the traditional family-tribe relationship into city, Kurds have come to be feared as they got involved with crime. On the other hand, with the above mentioned political identity, came a new Kurdish politics that previously had no place in the world of perception of the cities' former residents, which first made it to the streets and then started competing. All this has started a process whereby, as pointed out by Cenk Saraçoğlu, the middle class have moved away from total denial and assimilation to the exclusion of Kurds through recognition. In other words, as the urban middle-classes started coming across with the Kurds in the cities they live in, the existence of which was denied before, they then started excluding them in the process of recognizing their existence, as these people did not belong to the urban life style and were associated with crime (Saraçoğlu, 2011). This state of affairs created fertile ground on which to organize for Türksolu. A crystal example of this found expression in a Çulhaoğlu article titled "One day gallows will be set up in the garden of the Assembly that made the opening of betrayal" in following words:

Supporters of PKK, speak, what do you want? You have slaughtered 6 thousand of our soldiers, is that not enough? You have killed our fellow citizens, doctors, teachers, is that not enough? You've burned our buses, killed our passengers, is that not enough? You have formed drug networks, is that not enough? You have created your mafia and held us to ransom, is that not enough? You have invaded all our cities and neighbors, is that not enough? Tell us, what else do you want! (Çulhaoğlu, 2009c).

Previously I've tried to show that Türksolu did not take the path of excluding by recognition; instead it carried out a systematic anti-Kurd propaganda since day one. However, they did read this process of "exclusion by recognition" correctly, and tried to mobilize itself using this as an opportunity. In that sense, democratic opening has created the very proper environment for Türksolu to convince wider masses.

In taking this path, Türksolu also took the argument of Kurds being racists from the shelves and started formulating it, as it continued calling for execution and inviting masses to organize. From now on, the mainstream argument in Turkish politics of PKK being Kurdish nationalists were to transform into all Kurds being racists, with the touch of Türksolu. According to this, Kurds have been squeezed in mountains between Turk, Arab and Persian tribes. Since Turks have been conqueror, Arabs trader and Persians artist tribes, after years of being squeezed up between these have turned Kurds into insidious, ambusher and looter people. At the same time, Kurds have no Ancestors cause no one can think of a Kurdish Ancestor; they have no family as they live the life of a trib; they have no honor as they live with more than one woman. Being surrounded by all these civilized nations has led to a feeling of inferiority for Kurdish. To overcome this, they took Turkmens as migrants and assimilated them. If they had a single claim to any virtue, that was the reason why. This inferiority had also turned into a form of racism, since in order to quench the feeling they had to claim being superior (Çulhaoğlu, 2009d).

Hereby, for Turks "excluding by recognition" so offended by the welcoming in Habur, Türksolu presented a new chapter in history. After equating all Kurds to PKK, they did more than exclusion; humiliation and uncompromised hostility.

Upon closing of DTP, and prior to passing away of Serap Eser, who was heavily injured and eventually killed by a molotov cocktail from PKK, Türksolu once again appealed to the masses. Having rejected the words of a columnist saying "Serap was killed by people she did not know", they said Serap knew her killers. Later, they added to the list of people she knew those who met with DTP, those who prepared the new legislation for the "stone throwing kids", and those who did not execute Öcalan (Yeşiltuna, 2009b). Thus, all the anger directed at Kurds were extended over to everyone supporting the opening, including those who did not hang Öcalan. They continued to insult Kurds, as they published an article upon the closing of DTP, titled "Our suggestion to DTP: Get back to your caves!" (Türksolu, 2009b).

Extremely pleased with the closing of DTP, they made an appeal calling for closing the Turkish cities to Kurds:

Now, the Turkish nation will take matters to its own hands and apply its own solution against the Kurdish separatists who invade their country, city, neighbor, street. Enough, let the people have their say! (Kahramanoğlu, 2009).

Thus, in referring to its own quotation, it started the propaganda that its contentions are coming true, that the Turk is waking up from its sleep. Thinking that the it has come near the mass

mobilization it has dreamt of, Türksolu finally established the National Party in 2012. In about this time, the first phase of the democratic opening was over, as meetings behind closed doors were ongoing.

Following the opening of the party, another incident took place that is of the sort that Türksolu would like to call the wake up of the Turk. In his way out of a hearing in Samsun about the incidents which has led to the dying of two people following the shooting of protesters in Muş Bulanık, Ahmet Türk was hit in the face by a person named İsmail Çelik and his nose was broken. Türksolu announced this with the headline "Turkish fist on separatist Ahmet" along with a photo showing Ahmet Türk with blood in his nose. Inside, they said that they would not approve this violent action against Ahmet Türk, yet they also would never denounce it; Türksolu wanted everything to be legal. That was the reason of their request for bringing back the execution (Özsoy, 2010). There appeared an article with parallel claims, with slightly lower tone also in Hürriyet. In his review of the remarks in media of the attack wrong, Yılmaz Özdil said that it was the easy and the right thing to denounce it as the attackers was a bandit, adding the following:

If the shooting and killing of this country's kids are considered a "democratic right", why is it "racism" to beat up a party leader? If mine goes to democracy... Why does fist goes to fascism? (2010).

As such, the all too radical views of Türksolu seem to be changing space and tone to leak into mainstream papers, sometimes without even full recognition. Similar views were expressed in reader comment sections. This was to such an extent that Türksolu carried these to its own website, calling it the wake up of Turks (2010).

Following the founding of the party, Türksolu on the one hand called up Turks to join National Party, while on the other criticized CHP and MHP. The leading criticism on MHP was that the legislation preventing Öcalan's execution came during their coalition government. Reminding of this, Çulhaoğlu wrote a letter called "wake up Bozkurt", arguing that the top administration of the party were in the hands of outside powers (Çulhaoğlu, 2000d). On the other hand, Deniz Baykal's resignation from the general presidency with the surfacing of a video tape revealing his affair was to be understood as the "completion of a Kurdish coup in CHP" (Çulhaoğlu, 2010b), whereby Kılıçdaroğlu were professed to be the candidate of the PKK and the USA, as he was from Dersim (Çulhaoğlu, 2010c), and was finally to be called an "Armenian convert" (Erdem, 2010b). That's how the National Party worked to specify its standing with regards to both Atatürkists and nationalists.

Following this, Türksolu started out with the campaign promises of the National Party. The magazine dated July 7, 2010 came out with a headline saying that "Atatürk hang Sheik Sait, we will hang the rest of the dogs", and the editorial inside went on "As we please, we can either hang Apo, or even transfix him!"

Insults, erasing from history, calls for execution were now turned into a hysteria of violence:

We first would bring the table to sit with PKK, from the four legs of which comes out our four piles... These four piles should be more than enough to satisfy the four betrayers who have carried out the opening with the PKK... Here it is the formula we have, called the four executions for one table (Çulhaoğlu, 2010e).

The polarization in society exploded in Bursa's İnegöl district in July 25, in Hatay's Dört Yol in July 26, with the start of lynch attempts towards Kurds. (Radikal 2010; Bianet 2010; Korkut, 2010). Upon these news, once again Türksolu started circulating the discourse of Turks and Kurds not being brothers, arguing the only-Kurdish presence in migration receiving neighborhoods to be a result of Kurdish racism, and yet again spreading a new wave of fear:

Before, separatism could be summarized with one slogan: freedom to Kurds! Now we have a totally different slogan: Turkey is for all of us! Meaning Turkey belongs to both Turks, and Kurds, and all the other ethnic groups. That's why while previously the separatist method was in fact to separate people, nowadays the biggest separatist slogan is Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood. That's because the non-existent brotherhood heralds only one thing: These lands in future will not belong to Turks... Just like in Sevres. Well, what was Mustafa Kemal's answer to Sevres that united Anatolia against imperialism: Turkey belongs to Turks! (Çulhaoğlu, 2010f).

Turks' anger towards Kurds on the streets was a righteous reaction, according to them. But since a civil war would lead to an intervention by the West into Turkey, such state of affairs had to come to an end, for which they as National Party were to offer a road map. According to this, the Kurdish neighborhoods in West should be closed and dispelled, severest punishment to be brought against PKK terror and the youth in İnegöl and Dörtöyl should be emphasized with. Türksölu promotes this plan as the way to prevent civil war and to bring peace (Çulhaoğlu, 2010g). Afterwards, it was again reminded that the Kurds should forcefully be migrated, and that there was no solution left other than the one applied for Armenians (Çulhaoğlu, 2010h). As such, once again Türksölu had started circulating its discourse, thinking it had an opportunity to bring about the reaction in society through its own account of history. This new policy sitting on the discourse of Turk's natural reaction has led Kurdish MPs like Sezgin Tanrıkulu to head to CHP.

Turkey was now on the path to elections, and as all the parties were working to articulate their openings on Kurdish Problem, Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP was also trying to formulate a new policy of change. Within this framework of change, they also met with Sezgin Tanrıkulu, former president of the Bar of Diyarbakır, which has led to his eventual joining to the party. Judging Kılıçdaroğlu's presidency to be the new concept of USA, Türksölu also claimed the joining of Tanrıkulu in CHP to be by the orders of USA. Çulhaoğlu was certainly pointing at National Party when

saying that CHP electors were not sheeps and that the party would be routed in elections (Çulhaoğlu, 2010i). In its 9 years having started with a small group of students organized around the magazine, Türksolu managed extending their organisation to a level capable to enter the 2011 elections with four independent candidates. They had 3 male, 1 female candidates in İstanbul, Mersin, İzmir and Balıkesir, and these candidates were portrayed to be the independent candidates of Turks as opposed to PKK's candidates (Çulhaoğlu, 2011a).

Among these, Serap Yeşiltuna, independent candidate from Balıkesir, did attract some attention. In posters "Free Balıkesir from PKK", Yeşiltuna appealed to electors, saying "vote for the young, brave, clean Atatürkist and *Ulusalcı* candidate for a Balıkesir free of terrorism, separatism and filth". Upon these posters, she was invited to TV channels, which helped her ideas to circulate and find approval. Especially following the program 5n1k broadcasted in CNN Türk, many messages circulated in social media in support of Yeşiltuna.¹⁰

Thus, for Türksolu the elections represented a step in the right direction for their desired mass organisation. They managed to

¹⁰ For instance, in *ekşisözlük*, a user nicknamed *siyah turk* found it ironic for Yeşiltuna to be declared fascist, implying the real fascist to be BDP. Another user with the nickname *heao* said that BDP was doing similar things like Yeşiltuna, therefore it was wrong to only label her as the fascist. A user nicknamed *amateur* agreed with every word of Yeşiltuna and presented her as courageous. See;

<http://www.eksisozluk.com/show.asp?t=serap+ye%C5%9Filtuna>

both present radical ideas as if ordinary political views, and to multiply their discursive field during this period. In the issue just before election, Çulhaoğlu mentioned these and made an agitative call for support to *Ulusalçı* candidates in drawing parallels with Serap Eser, who lost her life after PKK's mototov protest, and Serap Yeşiltuna they put on the cover (Çulhaoğlu, 2011b).

Candidates of Türksolu don't make it, but that was not the point. Türksolu had now started presenting the many topics it has since the beginning covered, occupied and decontextualized in an ideological formation. Masses had met with these ideas and their supporters have multiplied manifolds. Türksolu was now to become the right address for those excluding by recognition. Türksolu underlined this in their evaluation after the election. To them, as of today the ethnic split in Turkey is represented only by the Kurdish, yet in the coming days, the same was going to be valid for the Turks. It was National Party, according to Çulhaoğlu, who told the Turks fooled by stories of brotherhood about the Turkishness. Turks who heard these for the first time embraced them, yet did not reflect it in ballot boxes. Despite this, however, the love of electors is a clear indication that in cities where Turk-Kurd duality are deepened, awakening goes on.

Evidently, they too are happy with the sphere of influence they have created resulting from the societal conflicts during the democratic opening and the elections.

Following elections, Türksolu again began calling to account the election speeches of the candidates of Labor, Democracy and Freedom Bloc and calls AKP to throw BDP out of the parliament (Erdem, 2011). Hence they start a campaign: We don't want terrorists in the parliament! They print out t-shirts and hand out leaflets in squares (Ataberk, 2011).

On the other hand, as we mentioned before, the Democratic Opening has come to a halt with the attack of PKK to soldiers in Silvan on July 14th. Upon this, Respect to Martyrs Rallies were held all around Turkey. One of the speeches in Mersin demonstration clearly shows the extent to which the discursive pile that's been gathered by the Türksolu since before democratic opening has reached its objective. A group¹¹ assembled in Mersin arrived at Metropol Rally Square. Here, speaker Ferdi Kale reminded the crowd that during elections BDP's Akdeniz Municipality raised banners of Hrant Dink and Ahmet Kaya, telling that Kurds were to dominate the ports and entertainment sector in Mersin's free zone, to where Turks were not allowed to enter and the thing to do for them was to stop shopping from Kurdish shopkeepers (Özsoy, 2011; Mersin İmece, 2011).

In this way Türksolu made the best of the elections during the democratic opening process and obtained the chair in the Reverence Walk for the Martyrs by increasing its organization

¹¹ Bugün Newspaper states that the group has organized through social networking sites: <http://www.bugun.com.tr/son-dakika-haber/?id=24366>

during the election process of the independent candidate in Mersin. This example show us that Türksolu, due to the path it has taken during the democratic opening, has expanded its field of discourse and has produced nationalism by putting whatever it has accumulated since its first publication into circulation. "Us" and "enemy" categories were formed (Hobsbawm, 1990: 205), enemies were discovered both inside and outside (Balibar, 1991: 269), the idendity of the mass was built through flags and curses (Smith, 1991: 35, 127).

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study is to explain how the *Türksolu* magazine, which defends *ulusalcılık* in the Turkey of 2000s going through transformations, reproduced nationalism during the democratic opening process. In order to show this, the discourse of the *Türksolu* magazine was analysed, which symbols it contains, how it reads history, who it counts as one of them and its political practices were tried to be examined.

First of all I discussed concerning how nationalism and its reproduction was realized and tried to explain how its definition of enemy, the myths and symbols emerged. Next I criticized the affinities of socialist theory with nationalism and how socialism perceives nationalism as a tactic. Especially in light of the ideas Sultan Galiev tried to develop, I tried to explain the relation between socialism and nationalism.

In the early 2000s the two serious economic crises Turkey has gone through pushed all the parties in the parliament out of the assembly and brought with itself new quests. Especially with the concerns about AKP government to spread an Islamic

reactionism and with the PKK who restarted its actions after Öcalan was caught, Kurdish Problem has come to the agenda once again. The neoliberal transformations in the economic realm have also changed various relations within the Turkish regime. *Ulusalcılık*, which was incorporated into politics towards the end of 1990s, was generally presented as a new alternative and a way of resistance in this setting of transformation by the parties and circles who were left out of the assembly. The conflict between AKP and TSK was protested in mass because of the concerns about being distanced from the Atatürk's Turkey. In this point, different from the other *ulusalcı* groups, Türksolu openly invited the army to make a coup and keep its distance from other groups.

This group, which has announced itself as the carrier of the '68 movement, Atatürkist, *ulusalcı* and socialist, has carried the conceptual set and line of thinking, which it was using from the beginning, to the democratic opening process. These concepts were "enemies within and without", anti-imperialism being one of the most important ones. AKP, the Kurdish and the minorities were seen as the internal extensions of the enemy without, all the neighbours of Turkey were regarded as the enemy without and their accomplices and USA, EU and Russia were seen as imperialists. In order to fight against these enemies, it was argued that what was needed was Atatürk, '68 generation, Turkishness, the left, the army.

As mentioned before, Türksolu has chosen to build itself upon the theories which stand on the periphery of Marxism, which

uses its concept and which are tactically incorporated into Marxism. By selecting the practical references, among the historical references that it consults, it has created new myths and symbols and it has proceeded by vulgarizing the overcome and consumed historical discussions. There was a productive past to do this in this country. It has first incorporated this.

Subsequent to this, it has ripped off the leftists values from their contexts, has blended with the discourse of Türksolu and has resubmitted them. In this way it has maintained the propaganda of its leftism through different symbols which covered its nationalism. Various ethnic conflicts remained from the legacy of Soviet Union which collapsed in the 1990s. Türksolu has built *ulusalcılık* upon this and has saluted to the left in the context of anti-imperialism, on the one hand, and has envisaged the sovereignty of a nation instead of worker's class, on the other. This has certainly brought with itself ignoring the other *ethnies* in this land and during the process, massacres such as Dersim, prosecution, lynch attempts were even presented as solutions.

It was facilitated on the parts of the Kurds, who were turned into enemies through "exclusion through knowing" to be excluded from Turkishness and citizenship. For this reason the thesis such as the Kurds were racists and that the Kurdish was not a language were put forwards and the Kurds were turned into enemies through various campaigns. Afterwards the minorities, who were undeniably seen as being out of the nation, were regarded as the natural collaborators of the enemy. A discursive

pile was built in this way and the mass was tried to be organized through associations and party.

The pile was called out once more during the democratic opening process and the ideas reached to a vast audience through the widespread propaganda which was made possible by the 2011 general elections. Türksolu has moved from the political realm where it was a small periodical circle and turned into a structure organized within various cities in Turkey. Its discourse was repeated in various channels in the internet by a vast populace. The nationalist discourse it produced was hence reproduced and became widespread.

In the period ahead, we can say that Türksolu will determine its politics according to the course of the Kurdish issue. In case AKP opts for war instead of a peaceful solution for the Kurdish issue, it can support this orientation conditionally. What is important for them in principal is the emphasis on the Turk and the elimination of the politics which they perceive as the enemy. In other words, even if Turkishness is praised by a rights party with imperialist discourses, Türksolu will provide an implicit or explicit support. They will probably prefer to read this as the recognition of the demand of the people by the government. Nevertheless they will generalize the hate discourse as they increase their organization within the mass.

As the writings of people who lived within the boundaries of the Soviet Union and who were somehow influenced by the socialist movement, but also got in touch with Turkishness became

available in Turkish, Türksolu attempts to read a brandnew history and put new symbols and myths into circulation. It will be the case that they will carry on this orientation and that they include the people embraced with reservations by the majority of the socialist in Turkey entirely within the boundaries of their own movement. If the left does not take a sound position of defence about this issue might cause a historical loss. The Ottoman Socialist Party¹², which included the Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews and the Turks might be the antidote of all these possibilities. The study of what kind of a socialist movement was inherited once the majority of the minorities left, is one of the significant subjects to be analysed.

In addition to these, the issue of how the racist politics has become widespread today especially through the new media technologies is a burning subject which deserves further investigation. The nationalist content collage faced by the internet users contains various discourses and carry them to a new ground.

Türksolu also influences the discourses of all political parties which define themselves as leftist and which are close to ulusalcılık. The increase in the emphasis on Turkishness and the definition of the enemy, though not entirely accepted by all the other ulusalcı political structures, influences the audience that they address. This carries the discourses of Türksolu indirectly

¹² The Ottoman Socialist Party was the first Turkish socialist political party founded in the Ottoman Empire in 1910 and was mainly made up of minorities, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews and Turks.

to other ulusalçı parties. We will probably see the examples of this situation in the period ahead.

Türksolu pursues its political activities as a marginal group. However, it can communicate its ideas to people who are not within its periphery through its discourse which has become widespread. As such, its discourse can be put into circulation, although independent of them, in the critical problems Turkey is going through. As we know from the experience of the Golden Dawn Party in Greece, when hopelessness increases during times when crises deepen, such structures can become an alternative in so far they become normalized or, as Trotsky has put it, "fascism turns into a party of the counter revolutionist hopelessness." (1998: 67).

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APPENDICIES

APPENDIX A

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
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YAZARIN

Soyadı : Kütük
Adı : Özgür Mehmet
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Reproduction Of Nationalism (Ulusalcılık) in
The Process of Democratic Opening in Turkey: The Case Of Türksolu
Magazine

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☒ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☒
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