MARX’S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL:
STAGES IN MARX’S APPROPRIATION OF DIALECTIC

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

DOĞAN BARIŞ KILINÇ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

FEBRUARY 2013
Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha ALTUNIŞIK  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İNAM  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil TURAN  
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan (METU, PHIL)  
Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil Turan (METU, PHIL)  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Doğan Göçmen (Dokuz Eylül U., PHIL)  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Eyüp Ali Kılıçaslan (Ankara U, PHIL)  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdoğan Yıldırım (METU, SOC)
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name :

Signature :
The purpose of this thesis is to trace Marx’s critique of Hegel from the beginning to the end and to draw attention to his continuous dialogue with Hegel, which results in Marx’s appropriation of Hegel’s dialectic in all its aspects. To this aim, we will focus on the texts in which Marx criticizes Hegel and try to understand how he develops his position against Hegel’s philosophy. Marx has always become in a critical relationship with Hegel’s philosophy and considered it as a philosophy which must be transcended since it, for Marx, amounts to justify the present reality which, in Marx’s eyes, constitutes a great barrier for human freedom. However, Marx also regards Hegel’s philosophy, in which dialectic occupies a central place, as one which includes the most developed conception of science and the true scientific method, and attempts to use Hegel’s dialectic in his critique of political economy. In this thesis, by following Marx’s critique of
Hegel, we will try to show that Marx comes closer to Hegel’s dialectic even when he criticizes Hegel’s philosophy.

Keywords: Marx, Hegel, dialectic, critique.
ÖZ

MARX’IN HEGEL ELEŞTİRİSİ:
MARX’IN DİYALEKTİĞİ SAHIPLENMESİNDEKİ AŞAMALAR

Kılınç, Doğan Barış
Doktora, Felsefe Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil Turan

Şubat 2013, 256 sayfa

Bu tezin amacı, Marx’ın Hegel eleştirisinin baştan sona dek izini sürmek ve Marx’ın Hegel’in diyalektiğini tüm yönleriyle sahiplenmesinde sonuçlanan Hegel’le olan kesintsiz diyaloğa dikkat çekmektedir. Bu amaçla, Marx’ın Hegel’i eleştirdiği metinlere odaklanıp onun Hegel’in felsefesi karşısında kendi konumunu nasıl geliştirdiğini anlamaya çalıṣacağız. Marx Hegel’in felsefesiyle daima eleştirel bir ilişki içinde olmuş ve onu aşılması gereken bir felsefe olarak görmüş, çünkü bu felsefe, Marx’ın gözünde, insanın özgürliğünün önünde büyük bir engel oluşturan mevcut gerçekliği aklamaya varmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Marx aynı zamanda diyalektiğin merkezi bir yer işgal ettiği Hegel’in felsefesini en gelişmiş bilim kavrayışını ve doğru bilimsel yöntemi içeren bir felsefe olarak da görür ve Hegel’in diyalektiğini politik iktisadın eleştirisinde kullanmaya çalışır. Bu tezde, Marx’ın Hegel eleştirisini takip ederek, onun
Hegel’in felsefesini eleştirirken bile Hegel’in diyalektiğine daha çok yaklaştığını göstermeye çalışacağız.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Marx, Hegel, diyalektik, eleştiri.
To my wife, Aynur, and my son, Devrim…
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am greatly indebted to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil Turan for his encouragements and guidance. I owe a special thanks to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Doğan Göçmen and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Eyüp Ali Kılıçaslan for their criticism, advice and valuable interpretations. I also wish to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdoğan Yıldırım for their discussion and comments. Finally, I must express my gratitude to my friends, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Metin Bal, Dr. Aydı̇n Gelmez, Dr. Ersin Vedat Elgür, Dr. Zeliha Burcu Acar, Dr. Eylem Yenisoy Şahin, and Ömer Aydeniz for their support and encouragements.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM ......................................................................................... iii
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................... iv
ÖZ ........................................................................................................ vi
DEDICATION ......................................................................................... viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................ ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................ x

**CHAPTER**

1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 1

2. CRITICAL DIALECTIC....................................................................... 13
   2.1 The Significance of Marx’s *Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’* ......................................................... 13
   2.2 Hegel’s Philosophy of the State .................................................. 18
      2.2.1 Hegel’s Accommodation .................................................. 18
      2.2.2 Family and Civil Society .................................................. 22
      2.2.3 The State ........................................................................ 24
   2.3 Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the State .............. 35
      2.3.1 Hegel’s Uncritical Attitude .............................................. 37
      2.3.2 The Monarch ................................................................. 42
      2.3.3 The Executive Power ...................................................... 47
      2.3.4 The Legislative Power .................................................... 50
   2.4 An Overview .............................................................................. 57

3. WORLDLY DIALECTIC ................................................................. 60
   3.1 Marx’s Critique of Political Economy or Its Self-Criticism .... 62
   3.2 The Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic ............................................. 67
   3.3 An Overview ............................................................................ 86

4. NON-SPECULATIVE DIALECTIC .................................................... 91
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that Karl Marx is one of the great figures in the history of thought, not only for his epoch-making ideas but also for the practical results of his thought in the modern world. His ideas are so connected to the present world that, though they have been formulated almost one hundred and fifty years ago, they still make their weight vis-à-vis the problems of the modern world. One of the key factors of this great influence of Karl Marx on our age is the fact that his ideas are founded both on the affirmation and negation of the capitalist relations of production. In other words, on the one hand, he accepts this mode of production as a necessary phase of the history of human production and, on the other hand, he posits it as one which must be overcome. Although Marx estimated relatively a short life to capitalism and this system has itself proved its power against the opposing onslaughts, it is equally clear that capitalism, whose internal movement Marx devoted his life to understand, also proved and every day continues to prove that it is not free from great crises, which are immanent to its workings, and brings about the impoverishment of large masses. Marx presented a utopia, which contradicts with the original meaning of the term: it is possible to create such a society, in which freedom of each is the precondition for the freedom of all, exactly by critically overcoming it. And it is exactly this realist side of Marx’s thought which still makes it relevant and important for current issues. Further, it is exactly the survival of capitalism which helps his thought to survive because it is above all the critique of this very mode of production. As
Jean Paul Sartre once put it, “[w]e cannot go beyond it [Marxism] because we have not gone beyond the circumstances which engendered it”.¹

There have been many works on Marx’s thought, which attempted to shed light on its various dimensions, and one of the most important aspects of his thought is its philosophical foundation. And it is clear that when Marx’s relation to philosophy is in question Hegel immediately comes to mind. It seems very unfortunate that one, who is revolutionary in his character and appears to oppose, not to a specific religion, state or philosophy, but to religion, the state and philosophy in general, is still considered to be related to a philosopher like Hegel who tirelessly speaks of God, Absolute, metaphysics and regards the state as the concretization of freedom. For instance, Kant appears to be more fitted to functioning as the philosophical foundation for Marx’s thought since he limited knowledge to experience and rejected all claims concerning to know God or Absolute. However, Marx himself never referred to Kant or someone else as an indispensable source of his thought, but has always been in a continuous dialog with Hegel² and finally proclaimed himself to be a disciple of Hegel.

Hegel’s philosophical system is one of the greatest attempts in the history of philosophy; it is above all an integral system which tries to embrace all aspects of human life. Conceiving the truth as totality, Hegel develops Logic, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit as three important parts of his system. His conception of spirit reveals the historical and social dimensions of his thought and draws attention to human freedom which is rendered possible through the actions of humans throughout history. For Hegel, humans negate the natural conditions

¹ Sartre, J.P., Search for a Method, trans. H.E. Barnes, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1963, p. 30. This also implies that the existence of Marxism is limited to the existence of capitalism. Antonio Gramsci puts this as follows: “But even the philosophy of praxis is an expression of historical contradictions […] If, therefore, it is demonstrated that contradictions will disappear, it is also demonstrated implicitly that the philosophy of praxis too will disappear, or be superseded.” Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith, International Publishers, New York, 1992, p. 405.

and create the conditions of their own life and, passing beyond mere givenness, they have arrived in the modern world at a point in which an objective freedom is possible. Furthermore, Hegel presents a living, dynamic logic like his conception of spirit. His logic, of which dialectic is the decisive moment, is aimed to conceive reality in its liveliness and movement, and, contrary to traditional logic, considers the facts not in their isolation but in their relation, development, movement and contradiction. And it is clear that, as Marx himself is quite aware, such a philosophy cannot be simply set aside. Though one may not agree with its conclusions, Hegel’s philosophy constitutes a fertile ground which is suited to be further developed.

The problem of Marx’s relation to Hegel, which Marx himself left to certain extent obscure, have been discussed from many different perspectives. In his *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, Engels, who is one of the first degree witnesses of this relation, makes a distinction between ‘system’ and ‘method’ in Hegel’s philosophy, and according to this distinction the former is conservative because it results in absolute truth whereas the latter is revolutionary because it recognizes no absolute truth or end point and regards everything as transient and in its process of becoming. For Engels, Marx rejected Hegel’s system but took from it the dialectic method and conceived it not as the dialectic of Idea but as that of history and nature. Marx thus saved dialectic from Hegel’s system which obscures its revolutionary character. However, though Engels considers his work to certain extent as the final remark on Marx’s relation to Hegel, soon different approaches came to appear.

It can be said that discussions after Engels’ work had a political implication so that Marx’s relation to Hegel historically appears as a political discussion within and outside the Marxist movement in general. As early as

---


4 Ibid., pp. 40-1.
Engels’ death, Eduard Bernstein brought Marx’s relation to Hegel’s dialectic into question. Rejecting that capitalism tends to collapse due to its inner contradictions and opposing the necessity of revolution, he offered a series of revision in Marxism, which amounts to almost abandon the theory entirely. Bernstein argues against Engels that it is not so easy to extract the dialectic from Hegel’s system and once empirical facts are disregarded we are alone with the dialectic of concepts, as is the case with Hegel: this is “the great scientific danger of Hegelian logic of contradiction”. In this way, he sees Marx’s ‘mistaken’ foresight concerning an inevitable proletarian revolution as “a remnant of Hegelian contradiction dialectics”. According to Bernstein, Hegel’s dialectic has no important place in Marx’s thought; on the contrary, it brought about to obscure his thought and led to mistaken claims: “The great things Marx and Engels achieved were achieved not because of Hegelian dialectic but in spite of it.”

Bernstein’s attempt to revise Marxism thus identifies the revolutionary side of Marx’s thought with its connection to Hegel’s dialectic, and he consistently tries to eliminate both. Hegel’s dialectic, therefore, historically becomes a fundamental focus for those who want to emphasize the revolutionary side of Marx’s thought in opposition to reformists or revisionists. To Bernstein, and to revisionism in his person, the answer was immediately given by Rosa Luxemburg. According to Luxemburg, Bernstein, who disregards the necessary connection of the workings of capitalism with the rising proletariat, takes refuge in a utopian view and “transform[s] socialism itself from a definite historical phase of social development into an abstract ‘principle’”. In Luxemburg’s eyes,

---


6 Ibid., p. 32.

7 Ibid., p. 46.

Bernstein’s attempt to revise Marx’s thought and cast off the dialectic is a return to an old mode of thought which do not conceive the nature of contradictions, and thus the class structure of society, and the relationship between theory and practice. Against Bernstein, Luxemburg stresses the significance of the dialectic for Marxism:

Isn’t the dialectic the sword that has helped the proletariat pierce the darkness of its historical future, the intellectual weapon with which the proletariat, though materially still in the yoke, triumphs over the bourgeoisie, proving to the bourgeoisie its transitory character, showing it the inevitability of the proletarian victory? Hasn’t the dialectic already realized a revolution in the domain of thought?9

In this reform-revolution discussion, Hegel’s dialectic appears as identical with the revolutionary side of Marx’s thought. Later, Lenin also follows this route and during the World War I devotes himself to a comprehensive study of Hegel’s works. He especially finds Hegel’s Logic as fundamentally related to Marx’s thought and points out that, though its seemingly idealist character, this work in fact includes materialism in depth.10 What attracts Lenin’s attention in Hegel’s Logic is that it regards concepts as related with objectivity11 and conceives everything in its development, contradiction and transformation. He thus stresses the fact that the dialectic is essential to Hegel’s philosophy and indispensable for Marx’s thought; he puts this as follows:

---

9 Ibid., p. 162.


11 “Just as the simple form of value, the individual act of exchange of one given commodity for another, already includes in an undeveloped form all the main contradictions of capitalism, –so the simplest generalisation, so the first and simplest formation of notions (judgments, syllogisms, etc.) already denotes man’s ever deeper cognition of the objective connection of the world. Here is where one should look for the true meaning, significance and role of Hegel’s Logic.” Ibid., pp. 178-9.
It is impossible completely to understand Marx’s *Capital*, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the *whole* of Hegel’s *Logic*. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!

In his *History and Class Consciousness*, Georg Lukács also attempts to return to ‘tradition’ and to stress the significance of dialectic for Marxism against the revisionism of Bernstein and the neo-Kantianism. In this context, he regards the return to Hegel as a ‘revolutionary task’ because, according to him, the renunciation of dialectic means that of revolution. Lukács in this work radically emphasizes the significance of the category ‘totality’ and points out the close relation between Marx’s thought and Hegel’s philosophy “for both conceive of theory as the *self-knowledge of reality*”. Though Lukács, like Marx, is critical of Hegel, on the basis of Hegel’s conception of substance as subject, Lukács tries to conceive the proletariat as “the identical subject-object of history” which presupposes its attainment of consciousness of objective contradictions.

In the *Young Hegel*, Lukács later attempts to shed light on the development of Hegel’s thought in the light of the publication of Hegel’s early works, which remained unpublished in his lifetime. He especially stresses Hegel’s study of political economy and considers it as closely related to Hegel’s conception of dialectic:

[I]t is undoubtedly no accident that the man who completed the edifice of idealist dialectics was the only philosopher of the age to

---


13 Lukács expresses this as follows: “objection to dialectical method has been voiced most clearly and cogently by Bernstein […] it is precisely the dialectic that must be removed if one wishes to found a thoroughgoing opportunistic theory, a theory of ‘evolution’ without revolution and of ‘natural development’ into Socialism without any conflict.” Lukács, G., *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. R. Livingstone, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1971, p. 5.

14 Ibid., p. 16.

15 Ibid., p. 197.
have made a serious attempt to get to grips with the economic structure of capitalist society. Rather is it the case that the specific form of dialectics evolved by him grew out of his preoccupation with the problems of capitalism and of economics.\textsuperscript{16}

In his \textit{Reason and Revolution}, Herbert Marcuse also presents an integral picture of the entire development of Hegel’s thought and tries to clarify the transition from Hegel to Marx. He draws attention to the revolutionary implication of Hegel’s ‘negative’ philosophy, according to which “Dialectic in its entirety is linked to the conception that all forms of being are permeated by an essential negativity, and that this negativity determines their content and movement.”\textsuperscript{17}

However, as it is well-known, these attempts to establish a more intimate contact with Hegel’s dialectic are not free from resistance. It is Louis Althusser who first strongly opposes ‘Hegelianism of Marx’; arguing an ‘epistemological break’ between Marx’s early writings and mature writings, Althusser regards the attempt to revive Hegel’s philosophy and to connect it with Marx’s thought as revisionist one and asserts that even the young Marx was never Hegelian, excluding \textit{1844 Manuscripts}: “far from being close to Hegel, \textit{Marx moved further and further away from him.”}\textsuperscript{18}

It must, however, be stated that the most radical challenge to Hegelianism of Marx belongs to Lucio Colletti. Although he seems to entirely agree with Althusser, Colletti strongly opposes any distinction made between Marx’s early and later works\textsuperscript{19} and rejects both ‘dialectical materialism’, which is attributed to Engels’ standpoint, and ‘Hegelian Marxism’ of Lukács and Marcuse. Attempting


to remove the dialectic from Marxism, Colletti emphasizes Hegel’s *idealism* and asserts that Hegel uses dialectic, which is conceived by Engels and later Marxists as revolutionary, in order to show the finite and the material world has no reality.\(^\text{20}\) According to Colletti, Marx from the beginning rejects Hegel’s idealism and always holds the primacy of reality over thought against Hegel, who “absorbs the process of reality within the logical process [and] reduces the relationship in which thought is only ‘one of two’ to one in which it is the ‘totality’”.\(^\text{21}\) It is, however, very ironic that he later regards his work as unfruitful and, abandoning Marxism, attends to the right-wing party of Silvio Berlusconi.\(^\text{22}\)

Furthermore, it may be useful to mention more recent works on Marx’s relation to Hegel. There are many works devoted to the discussion of the relationship between Hegel’s *Logic* and Marx’s *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. Though the authors differ in certain points, they generally agree that Marx’s critique of political economy has more than mere similarities with Hegel’s *Logic* and consciously reflects its structure. Christopher Arthur, for instance, argues that both Hegel and Marx work with ‘a dialectical logic’ and systematically show how any given whole reproduces itself, without appealing to historical order.\(^\text{23}\) The works of Tony Smith\(^\text{24}\), Thomas Sekine\(^\text{25}\), Howard Williams\(^\text{26}\), Hiroshi Uchida\(^\text{27}\), etc. can be considered in this framework.


\(^{21}\) Ibid., pp. 118-9.


Finally, in order to draw attention to the comprehensive scope of Marx-Hegel relation, we will refer to two radical positions. David MacGregor points out that there is no difference between Hegel’s dialectic and that of Marx, and Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* already includes the fundamental elements of Marx’s conception of communism: “Marx’s did not transcend Hegelian philosophy: he merely developed and amplified ideas already available in the discussion of civil society in the *Philosophy of Right*.” The other radical position is held by Tom Rockmore: drawing attention to Marx’s continuous relation to Hegel and identifying idealism with “the idea that the subject in some sense produces its world and itself”, Rockmore argues that Marx is himself an idealist.

As we have tried to briefly indicate, there are plenty of works concerning Marx’s relation to Hegel so that the subject-matter seems to have been exhausted and it is impossible for us to even give, let alone discuss, a complete list of these works. Against this background, then, it is quite possible to ask whether a new study on this relation is required.

In this thesis, we aim to follow Marx’s critique of Hegel in his various works and to show that Marx comes closer to Hegel even while criticizing him. In this context, his critical relation to Hegel can be considered as a process through which Marx finally fully appropriates Hegel’s dialectic and adopts the main aspects of his conception of history and epistemology. It is, therefore, clear that our reading of Marx’s critique of Hegel signifies a continuity and a close relation

---


29 Ibid., p. 259.


between Hegel and Marx—a point, which may simply be supported by Marx’s continuous dialogue with Hegel from his first writings to his masterpiece, *Capital*.

We will try to consider Marx’s critique of Hegel in the following five chapters, each of which focuses on different works of Marx, and then, in the last chapter we will present a general evaluation.

In the chapter on “Critical Dialectic”, we will analyze Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state. In his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel follows the development of the concept of freedom and considers the modern state, which he essentially presents as constitutional monarchy, as rational. The rationality of the modern state results mainly from two reasons: firstly, it gives its due to the moments of the concept—universality, particularity, and individuality—and, secondly, it appears to bring a harmony between universal and particular interests. Although Marx appreciates Hegel’s profound insight into the nature of the modern state and its problems, he criticizes Hegel’s philosophy of the state and argues that the modern state is very far away from being rational and cannot bring a harmony between universal and particular interests. Furthermore, Marx attempts to relate Hegel’s ‘conservative’ conclusions with his system, which prevents him from being critical towards the modern state. We will try to follow Marx’s critique and indicate its importance for the development of Marx’s thought.

In the chapter on “Worldly Dialectic”, we will consider Marx’s critique of Hegel in his *1844 Manuscripts*. Basing himself on Feuerbach’s works, Marx attempts to criticize Hegel’s dialectic, but his critique goes beyond Feuerbach’s standpoint. The significance of Marx’s critique lies in the fact that he, on the one hand, tries to make use of Hegel’s dialectic in his critique of political economy and, on the other hand, poses his ‘worldly dialectic’ against Hegel’s ‘divine dialectic’. In this chapter, we will indicate the significance of *1844 Manuscripts*, in which Marx brings Hegel and political economy together, and argue that, despite his critique of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* and *Logic*, Marx enters into a closer relation with Hegel’s dialectic.

10
In the chapter on “Non-speculative Dialectic”, we will focus on Marx’s critique of Hegel in his *Holy Family* and in his *Poverty of Philosophy*. In these works, Marx attacks Bruno Bauer and Joseph Pierre Proudhon mainly for their abstract conception of the dialectic: they reduce Hegel’s dialectic into a ready-made schema and develop a dialectic, not of the facts, but of the concepts. For Marx, therefore, they are not able to conceive Hegel’s dialectic, and they present a caricatured version of it. Although Marx himself oversimplifies Hegel’s philosophy, he adheres to the essence of the dialectic. In this chapter, we will try to show that Marx’s thoroughly critical attitude towards Hegel in the *Holy Family* and the *Poverty of Philosophy* is consistent with his appropriation of Hegel’s dialectic.

In the chapter on “Historical Dialectic”, we will analyze Marx’s thought in his *German Ideology* and *Communist Manifesto* and show that these works include a close relation to Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* and *Philosophy of History*. History is an indispensable part of Hegel’s thought since he conceives the true as the result of process and the Spirit as historical being. Marx’s conception of history shows similarity with that of Hegel in many points, but he differs from Hegel in a fundamental point: according to Marx, ‘civil society’ constitutes the basis of history. In this context, he accuses Hegel of not seeing the decisive role of civil society in the modern world and its relation to the state. Furthermore, by pointing out the historical character of ‘private property’, Marx opposes Hegel’s conception of private property on the basis that it is not an indication of human freedom in the modern world, but causes the complete estrangement of humans. We will try to consider both Hegel’s deep insight into civil society and Marx’s critique, and show how Marx goes beyond Hegel’s standpoint.

In the chapter on “Revolutionary Dialectic”, we will analyze Marx’s discussion of the method in his *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, which takes place in the context of Hegel’s dialectic. In these works, although Marx is still critical towards Hegel, he nevertheless finally comes to call his method as dialectic. Marx’s main point with regard to the dialectic method is that it is critical and revolutionary;
according to him, Hegel obscured these aspects of the dialectic method and used it for the affirmation of the existing state of affairs. Marx thus aims to arrive at the negation of the capitalist mode of production by using the dialectic method in his critique of political economy. In this chapter, we will try to indicate that all Marx’s relation to Hegel results in his fully appropriation of Hegel’s dialectic.

In the last chapter, we will try to present a general evaluation of Marx’s relation to Hegel in the light of his critiques of Hegel which we consider in the previous chapters. To this aim, we will draw attention to mainly three important points: firstly, although Feuerbach appears to be as the third person in the relationship between Hegel and Marx, and he is hailed by Marx himself for overcoming Hegel’s dialectic, Marx’s relation to Feuerbach is a short-lived one and there is in Feuerbach no critical and revolutionary foundation for his thought, whereas his relation to Hegel is deep-rooted; secondly, Marx’s main purpose is not to continue to philosophize but the realization of philosophy, and for this reason he devotes himself to critical activity—a point, which appears as an important difference between Hegel and Marx; thirdly, in the final phase of his relation to Hegel, Marx openly calls his method as dialectical and makes use of it in his critique of political economy, but he does not need to reconsider his previous critique of Hegel—a point, which we will indicate to seem problematic. Therefore, we hope to present the stages in Marx’s critique of Hegel as a process through which Marx comes to fully appropriate the essential aspects of Hegel’s dialectic.
CHAPTER II

CRITICAL DIALECTIC

In his doctoral dissertation, “The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature”, Marx observes his time and tries to determine his position in it. After all, this time is a post-Hegelian one, and all philosophical efforts appear necessarily to be somehow related to Hegel’s philosophy. Against the background of this great philosophical system, Marx formulates his aim as ‘the realization of philosophy’ and regards ‘criticism’ as the main means for realizing philosophy.32 His later works reflect this fundamental point and assume the form of critique; even his masterwork, *Capital*, bears the subtitle of critique: “Critique of Political Economy”. Under the title of “Critical Dialectic”, however, we will consider only Marx’s critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, although it is clear that criticism is an integral part of Marx’s dialectic and immanent to all his works, because in this critique Marx draws attention mainly to the uncritical character of Hegel’s work and attempts to develop a critique both of Hegel’s philosophy of the state and the modern state.

2.1. The Significance of Marx’s *Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’*

Devoting himself to ‘the realization of philosophy’, which he formulated in his doctoral dissertation, Marx sets out to criticize all barriers to human freedom,

among which religion and political state are most important ones. The critique of religion has reached to a certain level in the attempts of David Friedrich Strauss, Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach, and their attacks on religion were somehow related to their relation to Hegel: they were regarded as the Young Hegelians. For Marx, therefore, the critique of religion appears to be completed and now it is time to pass into politics. The reason why Marx thinks that religion and politics are related, and hence the critiques of them intertwined, is exactly the fact that both invert the existing state of affairs and religion realizes this inversion more directly. In religion, human makes herself dependent on a being which is nothing other than her creation. In this sense, according to Marx, the critique of religion constitutes “the prerequisite of every critique”. And since it has been greatly completed he tries to transform the critique of religion into the critique of politics.

Just as the critique of religion grows out of the ground of Hegelian philosophy so Marx attempts to criticize the modern state (and, in general, politics, right, etc.) by subjecting Hegel’s Philosophy of Right to a sharp critique for, he thinks, it presents the modern state more or less in an accurate way. And it is clear that Marx thus aims at criticizing both the modern state itself and Hegel’s philosophy of the state simultaneously.

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right consists of three main chapters: abstract right, morality and ethical life. And the last one is again divided into three main parts: family, civil society and the state. It is the state, the last part of The Philosophy of Right, which Marx attempts to criticize.

33 In his Das Leben Jesu (1835), Strauss asserts that the historical events told in Bible are nothing other than myths which unconsciously emerged from the experiences of the community at that time. He thus opposes the historical aspects of Christianity, but not its pure form as the unity of human and divine nature, and holds that it is necessary to “substitute the idea of humanity for the historical Christ”. Toews, J.E., Hegelianism: the Path towards Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 265.

In his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel presents the constitutional monarchy as a rational state and seems to do nothing other than to justify the existing conditions in Prussia. The Young Hegelians, who conceived Hegel’s philosophy as essentially critical, thought that, if Hegel adhered to his own principles, he could not have reached at such a wrong conclusion mainly for two reasons: first, the Prussian state is obviously a reactionary state, and second, Hegel’s philosophy could not allow any finite being to be regarded as completely rational. Accordingly, among the Young Hegelians, Hegel was seen as betraying his own principles of philosophy. However, as it can be seen from Marx’s doctoral dissertation, Marx does not agree with his friends: according to him, it is true that Hegel accommodated himself with the existing conditions, but it results not from his personal choice but from the principle of his philosophy. It follows that Hegel’s philosophy is in its essence a mysticism, which amounts to nothing other than the affirmation of existing state of affairs.

Marx’s problem is, therefore, not only with Hegel’s philosophy of the state, but also with his philosophy in general. And his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state thus focuses on understanding the modern state, criticizing it, exposing Hegel’s inconsistencies in his work, and showing Hegel’s standpoint to bring about mysticism. This text constitutes an important threshold in the development of Marx’s thought because it allows him to see the relationship between the state and civil society more clearly and determines the way he follows. It is exactly after this critique that Marx finds in the proletariat the mediator who will carry out the task of the realization of philosophy. However,

the significance of Marx’s critique is not limited to these points because of the peculiarity of the work which it targets.

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right aims to establish the identity of universal and particular interests, and of the state and society, and tries to conceive the concrete development of freedom in the modern age. In this work, Hegel analyzes civil society which constitutes the realm of economic interests and in a certain extent conceives its contradictions. Furthermore, it is in this work that Hegel limits his role, i.e., the role of philosopher, to a mere exposition of a completed process, and formulates his well-known thesis that “what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational”. Finally, Philosophy of Right allows us to see the dialectic method at work. All these points are related to Marx’s later development and present a fertile ground on which Marx will develop his thought. And our thesis is that Marx never gives an end to his dialogue with Hegel; on the contrary, he continues and even deepens his relation to Hegel. Despite all his criticism of Hegel, Marx cannot help returning to him, and Philosophy of Right occupies a special place in Marx’s dialogue with Hegel.

This is not to exaggerate the place of Philosophy of Right in the development of Marx’s thought because it is Marx himself who emphasizes the significance of his preoccupation with Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in many places. When he tries to make clear the relationship between Hegel and himself in his “Postface to the Second German Edition” to Capital (1873), he states that he “criticized the mystificatory side of Hegelian dialectic nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion.” And it is obvious that what he has in mind is his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right since the “Introduction” to this work was published in 1844, but 1844 Manuscripts, which includes a comprehensive


critique of Hegel’s dialectic, remained unpublished in his lifetime. Furthermore, when he summarizes the development of his thought in the “Preface” to A Critique of Political Economy (1859), Marx explicitly draws attention to his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right:

The first work which I undertook for a solution of the doubts which assailed me was a critical review of the Hegelian philosophy of right, a work whose introduction appeared in 1844 in the Deutsch—französische Jahrbücher, published in Paris. My investigation led to the result that legal relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel, following the example of the Englishmen and Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, combines under the name of ‘civil society’, that, however, the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy.

In this brief autobiography, Marx unsubtly remarks that what brings him to a study on, and critique of, political economy, to which he will devote the rest of his life, is his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.

Again, we see Philosophy of Right to be mentioned in a discussion concerning the method of political economy in Grundrisse (1857-8), in which Marx refers to Hegel’s discussion of ‘possession’ while he speaks of the method of rising from abstract to concrete as the true scientific method. Alongside Hegel’s Logic, his Philosophy of Right is also important in terms of Marx’s discussion concerning true scientific method because it follows the route from the abstract to the concrete. In The German Ideology (1845), Marx asserts that ‘civil

---

38 Hiroshi Uchida mistakenly attributes this reference of Marx to his Holy Family; this appears not to be true because in The Holy Family Marx criticizes Hegel only en passant. Marx’s Grundrisse and Hegel’s Logic, p. 5.


society’ is the basis of all history\textsuperscript{41}; and it is clear that this assertion, on which the materialist conception of history depends, reflects Marx’s preoccupation with Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, as the long quotation above suggests. In 1844 Manuscripts, he again refers to his critique of Philosophy of Right and states that he did not give up the aim to publish his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right but he will consider right, morals, politics, etc. separately, and criticize Hegel’s “speculative elaboration of that material”.\textsuperscript{42} Finally, in his “Introduction” to his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the only published part of his critique, Marx declares the proletariat to be the mediator who will carry out the task of the realization of philosophy\textsuperscript{43}, and it is clear that this conviction is related to his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, as we will see below.

Since Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right plays such a significant role in the development of Marx’s thought, we will allocate a considerable place to both the critique itself and Hegel’s philosophy of the state.

2.2. Hegel’s Philosophy of the State

2.2.1. Hegel’s Accommodation

One of the most serious accusations which may be directed against a philosopher who devoted her entire life to philosophy and preached not to incorporate subjective opinions and ends to any scientific research is probably that she used philosophy for justifying her personal views, and even the worst is that due to her


\textsuperscript{43} “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’: Introduction”, p. 142.
personal choice and interests she justified the existing conditions. However, Hegel was really accused for such a reason, and the well-known formulation is that Hegel is the official philosopher of the Prussian state.\footnote{We are not here aiming to show that this judgment is fundamentally false. For this point see Avineri, S., *Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 115-131.} In his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel presented the constitutional monarchy as a rational state and as an embodiment of Idea, but this state appeared somehow related to the Prussian state at that time, and in accordance with the present circumstances it was nothing other than a reconciliation among the monarch, aristocrats and bourgeoisie. Furthermore, when Hegel published his work, the Prussian state already assumed an open reactionary and repressive character. Against this background, Hegel really seems to justify the existing state of affairs,\footnote{“In the tense political atmosphere of 1820-1, Hegel’s notorious phrase about the identity of Reason and actuality was immediately interpreted (not only by the Völkisch nationalists and democratic radicals, but by most of the moderate-liberal ‘progressive’ elements in the German intellectual community) as a philosophical justification of the recently instituted political repression.” *Hegelianism: the Path towards Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841*, p. 96.} but such an assertion would be thoroughly arbitrary and thus wrong, if we were content with a superficial view without understanding what Hegel tries to do in his *Philosophy of Right* and his well-known dictum concerning the rationality of actuality.

As a philosopher Hegel’s aim is to conceive the subject-matter in and for itself and find rationality in reality itself. And he argues that in this process of knowing one cannot base herself on contingent opinions and remain on the level of mere perception; thought must penetrate into the subject-matter, abolish its mere givenness and follow the concept. Therefore, the task of philosophy is to conceive what is rational and to make visible the rational and the permanent under the contingent and temporal appearances. In this sense, the philosopher cannot be expected to be content with mere appearances; on the contrary, she must extract the rational core from this realm of appearance. On the other hand, Idea, or rationality, is not beyond this realm, but is always at work in it. Therefore, the
philosopher should also stick to what is actual and not look for rationality in other places; it is neither on heaven nor in the head of philosopher. Hegel thus limits his study only "to apprehend and present the state as something inherently rational"\textsuperscript{46}. It is self-evident from this that philosophy has nothing to do with "what the state ought to be"; on the part of philosophy falls only to conceive the state as rational.

One word more about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality has completed its process of formation and attained its finished state. The teaching of the concept, which is also history’s inescapable lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal [das Ideale] first appears over against the real and that the ideal grasps this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy’s grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the falling of dusk.\textsuperscript{47}

Hegel thus bans philosophy from dealing with what the world ought to be; he thus already remarks that in his \textit{Philosophy of Right} he would not consider an ideal state, but only present the idea of the state. This means, for Hegel, to find what is rational in the existing world and "to recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present"\textsuperscript{48}. Thus, he really conceives the modern state as rational, but he does not mean that it is fully rational because it is clear from his logic that any finite

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, pp. 14-5.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 16. The relationship between the ideal and the real Hegel describes in this well-known passage is one in which the ideal reconciles itself with the real, absorbs it into itself and construct it as an intellectual world. However, Marx draws attention to another side of this relationship, and even in his doctoral dissertation, he determines his task as criticism: "It is a psychological law that the theoretical mind, having become free in itself, turns into practical energy […] The \textit{practice} [Praxis] of philosophy, however, is itself \textit{theoretical}. It is criticism which measures individual existence against essence, particular actuality against the Idea.” “Notes to the Doctoral Dissertation (1839-1841)”, pp. 61-62.

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, p. 15.
being cannot be fully actual as the unity of existence and essence. Actuality in this sense belongs only to Idea, or God himself.\(^4^9\) However, what the philosopher must do is to find the rationality of the state in its present condition; therefore, her task is, above all, not to criticize the deficiencies of the state, but to show its positive sides:

On some principle or other, any state may be shown to be bad, this or that defect may be found in it; and yet, at any rate if one of the developed states of our epoch is in question, it has in it the moments essential to its existence. But since it is easier to find defects than to understand the affirmative, we may readily fall into the mistake of looking at individual aspects of the state and so forgetting its inward organic life. The state is no ideal work of art; it stands on earth and so in the sphere of caprice, chance, and error, and bad behaviour may disfigure it in many respects. But the ugliest person, or a criminal, or an invalid, or a cripple, is still always a living human being. The affirmative, life, subsists despite such defects, and it is this affirmative factor which is our theme here.\(^5^0\)

It is, therefore, clear that Hegel is aware of the fact that every particular state stands on the realm of contingency and is burdened with defects. It is equally clear, however, that Hegel cannot be accused of justifying the present state, on the ground that he does not consider its defects, since in his *Philosophy of Right* he determines his task as to deal with “the affirmative factor”: he does not promise to

\(^4^9\) Against the accusations concerning his dictum “what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational”, Hegel says the following in his *Logic*: “the reader has enough education to know, not just that God is actual—that he is what is most actual, that he alone is genuinely actual—but also (with regard to the formal aspect) that quite generally, what is there is partly appearance and only partly actuality.” Hegel, G.W.F., *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris, Hackett Publishing Company, Indiana, 1991, § 4, p. 29. And he further explains that no finite being is also ‘true’: “God alone is the genuine agreement between Concept and reality; all finite things, however, are affected with untruth; they have a concept, but their existence is not adequate to it. For this reason they must go to the ground, and this manifests the inadequacy between their concept and their existence.” Ibid., § 24, *Addition* 2, p. 60.

\(^5^0\) *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, § 258, *Addition*, p. 234.
be critical against the modern state, and thus he cannot be accused of not keeping the promise he never makes.  

2.2.2. Family and Civil Society

In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel deals with ‘family’, ‘civil society’ and ‘the state’ in the chapter on “Ethical Life” [Sittlichkeit], which is “the concept of freedom developed into the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness”\(^{52}\). In family, characteristic feature of which is ‘love’, the individual exists as a member of family. Family appears as one person since its members do not pursue their individual ends but they devote themselves to the interest of family as a whole. In this particular unit, the members of family stand in a relation of love and have common resources. And with the growing of children and their marriage, the dissolution of family begins. Now there are families each of which have their own end with regard to others and act as an independent person.

In civil society, the individual pursues solely her own interests; for her, everyone else is a mere means of satisfying her needs. For Hegel, however, in civil society there is “a system of complete dependence”\(^{53}\) in which while one tries to satisfy her needs she necessarily produces the means for the satisfaction of another’s needs. But civil society is a realm of contingency because it depends on external circumstances and the caprices and desires of individuals. For this reason,

\(^{51}\) In addition to this aspect of Hegel’s thought, it is clear that Hegel’s state as presented in his Philosophy of Right is not identical with the Prussian state.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., § 142, p. 154. Warren Breckman explains Hegel’s term, Sittlichkeit, in the following way: “The notion of Sittlichkeit was intended to mediate between the poles of political thought: on the one hand, the atomizing, asocial vision of modern enlightened Understanding, which cannot move beyond the isolated, ‘abstract’ person, and on the other hand, the totalizing substantial vision of the ancient polis, which demanded the sacrifice of the individual to the needs of substantial ethical life.” Breckman, W., Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Social Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 75.

\(^{53}\) Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 183, p. 182.
this dependency relation does not guarantee everyone’s satisfaction; “civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and want as well as of the physical and ethical degeneration common to them both.”⁵⁴ According to Hegel, civil society cannot solve its problems and causes a great chasm between poverty and wealth. It is only the state which brings a harmony to its confusions. Before analyzing Hegel’s state, it is necessary to dwell on civil society since it plays a considerable role in Hegel’s philosophy of the state. Above all, the state represents what is universal vis-à-vis civil society which is nothing other than the realm of particular interests, and its highest aim is to provide the unity of universal interest with particular interests.

In civil society, the satisfaction of individual needs is mediated by the property of others and one’s own work. In order to satisfy her needs, the individual needs the means other individuals possess, and in return, she must produce the means for their satisfaction. Although everyone only thinks of her own interests and regards everyone else as a mere means for the attainment of her interests, there nevertheless occurs a mutual dependency relation among individuals, since in order to satisfy her needs the individual must know what others need, and with regard to this knowledge, she must work and produce the means for their satisfaction. “To this extent everything particular becomes something social.”⁵⁵ Hegel views this universality arising in civil society as significant and hails political economy as a modern science:

[Political economy] is one of the sciences which have arisen out of the conditions of the modern world. Its development affords the interesting spectacle (as in Smith, Say and Ricardo) of thought working upon the endless mass of details which confront it at the outset and extracting therefrom the simple principles of the thing, the understanding effective in the thing and directing it. It is to find reconciliation here to discover in the sphere of the needs this

⁵⁴ Ibid., § 185, p. 182.
⁵⁵ Ibid., § 192, Addition, p. 189.
appearance [Scheinen] of rationality lying in the thing and effective there.\textsuperscript{56}

However, it must be stressed that Hegel does not stop at the standpoint of political economy, and sees rationality in the system of needs as ‘appearance’. For him, civil society is not a self-sufficient whole which is able to solve its contradictions. And he is not content with what is affirmative in civil society; he “follows the negative rather than the positive aspects of this system”.\textsuperscript{57}

When civil society is in a state of unimpeded activity, it is engaged in expanding internally in population and industry. The amassing of wealth is intensified by generalizing \textit{(a)} the linkage of people by their needs and \textit{(b)} the methods of preparing and distributing the means to satisfy these needs, because it is from this double process of generalization that the largest profits are derived. That is one side of the picture. The other side is the subdivision and restriction of particular work. This results in the \textit{dependence} and \textit{distress} of the class [\textit{Klasse}] tied to work of that sort, and these again entail the inability to feel and enjoy the broader freedoms and especially the spiritual benefits of civil society.\textsuperscript{58}

Consequently, it is clear that Hegel deals with the negative aspects of civil society as well as its positive ones – an attitude which he appears to avoid assuming while considering the idea of the state.

\textbf{2.2.3. The State}

Hegel defines the state as “the actuality of the ethical Idea”\textsuperscript{59} and from the beginning warns the reader against confusing it with civil society. These are really

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., § 189, p. 187.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory}, p. 204.

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, § 243, pp. 220-1.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., § 257, p. 228.
distinct realms in the modern world, but Hegel’s point is that the state should not be regarded as a mechanism which protects personal property and freedom since, in this case, the relationship between the individual and the state would be contractual one. But the state is not such a thing; it expresses objective will and objective freedom, and the individual has objectivity and ethicality only through becoming a member of the state.\footnote{Ibid., § 258, p. 228.}

In order to understand Hegel’s philosophy of the state, this distinction between civil society and the state is essential because all his arguments concerning the state results from its relation to civil society. In the modern world, the state and civil society was separated, and between being a bourgeois as a member of civil society and being a citizen of the state there is a sharp distinction. And it is exactly this dividedness of civil society and the state that renders an abstraction of the state possible. To be sure, Hegel wants to overcome this separation, but has no romanticized tendency toward returning to the medieval age and directly identifying civil society with the state. He is of the opinion that the modern world constitutes a decisive moment in the actualization of freedom, and hence it is necessary to see the rational aspect in this separation which belongs to the modern world, and to found the identity of particularity and universality against this background. Although this separation between civil society and the state is desired, it nevertheless creates a spectacle that the state stands as an external and alien being vis-à-vis civil society. Consequently, Hegel’s main concern is to conceive the state as an organism and present the unity of universal and particular ends, without prejudice to “the principle of subjectivity”.

In civil society,\footnote{“Hegel’s use of the term ‘civil society’ (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) to refer to a distinct area of social life is increasingly recognized as embodying a significant conceptual innovation, a clear break with the dominant tradition in classical political thought”. Leopold, D., The Young Karl Marx: German Philosophy, Modern Politics, and Human Flourishing, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 70.} every member has the aim of realizing her particular ends without regarding universal end, and to this aim she regards everyone else as
mere means of the attainment of her ends. In this sense, civil society presents a spectacle of a battlefield\textsuperscript{62} in which ‘the war of all against all’ is an absolute principle, and appears as a realm of contingency and arbitrariness. The state, however, represents universal end, and is related to what is rational and necessary. Despite this dividedness, Hegel tries to show the unity of what is particular and what is universal, and that of civil society and the state in the modern world. According to him, the modern state is an organic state and is capable to found their unity. In this context, however, what is important for Hegel is that even though the interests of civil society must be dependent on the interests of the state it is nevertheless necessary not to identify them directly because such an identification would demolish ‘the principle of subjectivity’ which is one of the greatest achievements of the modern world. For this reason, Hegel does justice to their distinction and tries to present their identity without suppressing what is particular. This important point is pursued in all Hegel’s discussion concerning the state.

The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But \textit{concrete freedom} consists in this, that personal individuality and its particular interests not only achieve their complete development and gain recognition of their right for itself (as they do in the sphere of the family and civil society) but, for one thing, they also pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and, for another thing, they know and will the universal; they even recognize it as their own substantial spirit; they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit. The result is that the universal does not prevail or achieve completion except along with particular interests and through the cooperation of particular knowing and willing; and individuals likewise do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal for the sake of the universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at the universal end. The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity, and yet at the same

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, § 289, p. 278.
We see that Hegel gives a considerable significance to “the principle of subjectivity”, to individual freedom, and regards it as an integral part of ‘concrete freedom’, of objective freedom. This principle is to great extent a product of the modern world which also creates, through its organic states, the possibility of the harmony between self-interest and common interest. In his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel strongly emphasizes the significance of “the right of subjectivity” and rejects any kind of theories, like ‘Platonic communism’, which disregard it.\(^{64}\) Hegel’s point is that, whatever she does, the citizen of the state should do it because of her will; the citizen should not be sacrificed to a state which is essentially external and alien being. And for Hegel, the modern state is capable to bring a harmony to universal and particular interests insofar as it is organically structured. In an organic state, individuals know that they have rights as long as they have duties. In the state, they obtain their freedom to be recognized as an objective right, and they are also responsible for the other citizens and thus have duties because everyone has the same right; and to this extent, duty and right stands in one and the same connection.\(^{65}\)

The state is thus external neither to family nor civil society; on the contrary, the individual finds her truth within it. And Hegel reduces their existence to ‘ideal’ moments of the state. In paragraph 262, in which Marx would argue “the entire mystery of the *Philosophy of Right* and of Hegelian philosophy in general”\(^{66}\) is to be found, Hegel puts it as follows:

\(^{63}\) Ibid., § 260, p. 235.

\(^{64}\) Ibid., § 185 and *Addition*, pp. 183-4.

\(^{65}\) Ibid., § 261 and *Addition*, p. 236.

\(^{66}\) *Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’*, p. 9.
The actual Idea is spirit, which, sundering itself into the two ideal spheres of its concept, family and civil society, enters into its finitude, but it does so in order to emerge from its ideality as infinite actual spirit for itself. It is therefore to these ideal spheres that the actual Idea allocates the material of this its finite actuality, viz. individuals as a mass, in such a way that in any individual case this allocation appears as mediated by circumstances, the individual’s arbitrary will and his personal choice of vocation.

This is Hegel’s way of presentation, and in it Idea stands as the subject of whole process since it acts on the purpose of actualizing itself and getting rid of its finitude while individuals appear mere predicates of Idea since they only constitute its finite material. Hegel’s point is, however, to show that rationality is active in reality, and independent from individuals’ arbitrary wills, and is not something to be imposed from above or from the outside. *Addition* to this paragraph clarifies the situation:

In Plato’s state, subjective freedom does not yet count, because people have their occupations assigned to them by the Guardians. In many oriental states, this assignment is determined by birth. But subjective freedom, which must be respected, demands that individuals should have free choice in this matter.

It follows that in the modern world individuals freely act and have subjective freedom, but it is for the very reason that they also actualize concrete freedom, whether they are aware of it or not. In this context, the task of the state is not to determine every cell, but to provide a harmony among various organs and constitute an organic whole. For Hegel, rationality is already found in these spheres as ‘institutions’. In family, there is a direct identity of what is universal and what is individual in the sense that a member of the family has the aim of maintaining both her existence as one person and the existence of her family as a whole. In civil society, it is through ‘corporations’ that individuals are directed to

---

67 *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, § 262, p. 238.

what is universal; they pursue their interests, but it is exactly for this very reason that they part in corporations and hence pursue common interests. Therefore, institutions in family and civil society make room for rationality, though yet imperfect, on the way to the state. “What is of the utmost importance is that the laws of reason and of particular freedom should permeate one another, and that my particular end should become identified with the universal end, or otherwise the state is left in the air.”

“The political disposition” among individuals arises as a result of institutions in the state and is nothing other than knowing the community as their end. For Hegel, this political disposition, or patriotism, as subjective aspect, is integrated by the objective aspect, i.e., the organism of the state. And “this organism is the political constitution,” and Hegel now passes to explicate both its distinctions and their identity.

Hegel takes the state as an organism which has various powers; these powers have a partial autonomy, but they find their meaning and validity in the whole and as a part of it. The state allows its moments to gain a relative autonomy and thus divides itself into its moments in political constitution:

The constitution is rational insofar as the state inwardly differentiates and determines its activity in accordance with the nature of the concept. The result of this is that each of these powers is in itself the totality, because each contains the other moments and has them effective in itself, and because the moments, being expressions of the differentiation of the concept, remain utterly within its ideality and constitute nothing but a single individual whole.

The organism of the state which is, for Hegel, the precondition of the rationality of the constitution, consists in the fact that the state incorporates the moments of

---

69 Ibid., § 265, Addition, p. 240.

70 Ibid., § 269, p. 242.

71 Ibid., § 272, p. 256.
universality, particularity and singularity, and in this sense, arises out of the nature of the concept. However, this organism is the greatest guarantee for the fact that individuals’ particular interests will not be suppressed, but brought to harmony with the universal interest of the state. This concern can be clearly seen in all the arguments of Hegel with regard to the powers of the state. He considers these distinctions as, respectively, crown, executive power, and legislative power, and asserts the constitutional monarchy as “the achievement of the modern world, a world in which the substantial Idea has gained infinite form”.72 In relation to the classical forms of government, constitutional monarchy constitutes the most developed form because it does justice to all differentiations and still preserves all in a unity. In this sense, constitutional monarchy contains in it three moments of the concept: individuality (monarchy) as crown, particularity (aristocracy) as executive power, and universality (democracy) as legislative power. However, what most concerns Hegel with regard to the state is nothing other than its capability to give human freedom the opportunity to flourish.73

The principle of the modern world as such is freedom of subjectivity, the principle that all the essential aspects present in the spiritual totality are now coming into their right in the course of their development. Starting from this point of view, we can hardly raise the idle question: which is the better form of government, monarchy or democracy? We may only say that all constitutional forms are one-sided unless they can sustain in themselves the principle of free subjectivity and know how to correspond with a developed rationality.74

For Hegel, there are various powers and their activities in the state, but in a rational state they are found only as parts of the whole, and in this sense, these

72 Ibid., § 273, p. 259.

73 “Since the idea of the state is based on freedom, and since constitutional monarchy realizes freedom more than any other form of government, it follows that constitutional monarchy is the highest realization of the idea of the state.” Beiser, F., Hegel, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 253.

74 Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 273, Addition, p. 262-3.
moments of the state appear as mere *ideal*. The state is absolutely one, and various powers and their activities within it must show themselves to be non-existent without the whole itself. Sovereignty emerges from the fact that these powers are nothing vis-à-vis the state and they find their meaning only in the state itself.\(^75\) Hegel derives the monarch as the moment of ultimate decision from this conception of sovereignty:

Sovereignty, at first simply the universal *thought* of this ideality, comes into *existence* only as subjectivity certain of itself, as the will’s abstract and to that extent ungrounded self-determination in which finality of decision is rooted. This is the strictly individual aspect of the state, and in virtue of this alone is the state *one*. The truth of subjectivity, however, is attained only in a *subject*, and the truth of personality only in a *person*; and in a constitution which has progressed to real rationality, each of the three moments of the concept has its separate shape which is actual for itself. Hence this absolutely decisive moment of the whole is not individuality in general, but *one* individual, the *monarch*.\(^76\)

Hegel’s argumentation is simply that although the state includes various powers and has its differentiations it nevertheless remains as ‘one’, and what makes the state ‘one’ is “subjectivity certain of itself”; as a result, the state is one only insofar as it is represented by *one* individual since individuality does not exist except in the individual.

It is also striking that Hegel takes the determination of the monarch as given; according to this determination, one individual becomes a monarch only by his natural birth.\(^77\) Against this contingent determination, Hegel wants to reduce the role of monarch to a formal role since in a well-organized state it only symbolizes sovereignty and is a decision maker who only approves what are

\(^{75}\) Ibid., § 278, p. 265.
\(^{76}\) Ibid., § 279, p. 267.
\(^{77}\) Ibid., § 280, p. 271.
presented to him by the counsel; “he has only to say ‘yes’ and dot the ‘i’.” 78 This is, however, not entirely true since, according to Hegel, it is the monarch himself who decides who will be included in the advisory offices. “The individuals who discharge these duties are in immediate contact with the person of the monarch and therefore their choice and dismissal alike rest with his unrestricted arbitrary will.” 79

The individuals who constitute the executive power are not determined by birth but by their ability and knowledge; but in the final analysis their appointment is dependent on the decision of the monarch. These public officers deal with what is universal; they are responsible for pursuing the universal end. Although the executive power is the moment of particularity they are nevertheless devoted to the universal end of the state. In this sense, for Hegel, they constitute “the universal estate” 80 because their subsistence is provided by the state, on condition that they deal with the affairs of the state; their particularity is attached to the universal. Therefore, they are free from the contingencies of civil society which may endanger the satisfaction of their needs. It must be also pointed out that Hegel is fully aware of the fact that civil servants may degenerate into an aristocracy, and against this possibility, he asserts the control of the monarch from above and of the corporations from below. 81

As the moment of universality the legislative power includes both previous powers, i.e. crown and the executive power, alongside estates [Stände] which are represented in assemblies. The assembly of the estates mediates between the executive power and individuals. Owing to the estates, individuals cease to appear as isolated atoms, and at the same time they show themselves not to be an

78 Ibid., § 280, Addition, p. 272.
79 Ibid., § 283, p. 277.
80 Ibid., § 291, p. 280.
81 Ibid., § 297, p. 283.
undifferentiated unity. For Hegel, individuals enter into a relationship with the state by becoming a member of an estate.\textsuperscript{82} In this sense, an individual who does not belong to an estate is not a member of civil society and also a threat for the state because in Hegel’s state every individual should be organically connected with the state.

Civil society essentially consists of three estates: the universal estate, the agricultural estate, and the business estate. As we have seen, the first is devoted to the service of government. The agricultural estate and the business estate, for Hegel, bear a political significance and through assemblies attend to the legislative power. At this point, Hegel sees a danger regarding an opposition between estates which are devoted to particular ends, and the monarch who represents the universal end of the state. The executive power, which is also a part of the legislative power, stands on the same level with the monarch because both pursue the universal end of the state. An opposition which may emerge between universality and particularity in the legislative power is, according to Hegel, prevented by a specific character of one of the estates. It is the agricultural estate which plays the mediating role. In short, Hegel wants to see in one of the estates an element which has similar features with the monarch in order for there is left no room for an irreconcilable opposition in the legislative power.

The principle of one of the estates of civil society is in itself capable of adaptation to this political position. The estate in question is the one whose ethical life is natural, whose basis is family life and, so far as its livelihood is concerned, the possession of land. So far as its particularity is concerned, this estate has in common with the crown a will that rests on itself alone and the moment of natural determinacy that is also contained in the crown.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., § 308, p. 294.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., § 305, p. 292.
Hegel thus gives the agricultural estate a considerable importance in his discussion of the legislative power—an importance which justifies the position of aristocracy and even shows it as a decisive moment for the existence of the modern state.\textsuperscript{84} This estate is conceived as similar to the monarch because it is involved in the legislative power not by election but by birth. The members of the agricultural estate are also free from contingencies in civil society. They do not have the right of free use of their property and necessarily leave their property to their eldest son in order to ensure its permanence; “their wealth becomes inalienable inherited property, burdened with primogeniture.”\textsuperscript{85} As a result, in Hegel’s view, the agricultural estate functions in the legislative power as mediating element between the universal end of the state and the particular ends of civil society. It, on the one hand, belongs to civil society and has its particular interests and, on the other hand, it has similar features with the monarch such as the determination by birth.

Despite all Hegel’s arguments concerning the estates of civil society, the business estate, however, appears not only as one estate of civil society, but civil society itself. The civil service estate and the agricultural estate have an assurance which may protect their particular interests from the contingencies of civil society: the former gets its means of subsistence directly from the state itself through salary, and the latter is represented with regard to the principle of primogeniture which would forestall the splitting of the land and provide the security of the ownership of the land. Hegel calls the business estate “the mobile element in civil society” and argues that it should be represented not directly but through deputies who are, not elected by all, but appointed by institutions in civil

\textsuperscript{84} Shlomo Avineri interprets the position of aristocracy in Philosophy of Right as Hegel’s concession to the reactionary power at that time: “In the Realphilosophie [1805-6], there was no aristocracy at all, probably as a result of the immediate impact on Hegel of the French Revolutionary experience; its introduction into the system in the early 1820s is clearly a bow in the direction of the Restoration.” Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, p. 156.

\textsuperscript{85} Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 306, p. 293.
society such as corporations. This is a very important point for both Hegel’s deep insight into the nature of modern state and Marx’s critique, so we will quote him at length:

To hold that all individuals should share in deliberating and deciding on the universal affairs of the state on the grounds that all are members of the state, that its concerns are their concerns, and that it is their right that what is done should be done with their knowledge and volition, is tantamount to a proposal to put the democratic element without any rational form into the organism of the state, although it is only in virtue of the possession of such a form that the state is an organism at all. This idea comes readily to mind because it does not go beyond the abstraction of ‘being a member of the state’, and it is superficial thinking which clings to abstractions […] The concrete state is the whole, articulated into its particular groups. The member of a state is a member of such a group, i.e. of an estate, and only as determined in this objective way does he come into consideration in relation to the state.  

We do not need to further follow Hegel’s discussion since we have presented a general outline Hegel’s philosophy of the state, and now we can pass to Marx’s critique.

2.3. Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the State

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right was from the beginning open to criticism because it is above all an attempt to grasp the modern state and thus the modern world which is destined to undergo to a rapid change. Both civil society as a product of the modern world and the modern political situation are always in mobility; and though their mobile character is not to be seen as contradicting Hegel’s political philosophy in general, it is clear that his philosophy needs to be at least

---

86 Ibid., § 308, p. 294.
87 Ibid., § 308, pp. 294-5.
reconsidered in harmony with the great events of the age. Even in 1833, Eduard Gans, who is Hegel’s follower and Marx’s master, writes the following in his “Preface” to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right:

[H]is philosophy belongs to history. A development within philosophy proceeding from the same basic [Hegelian] principles will be necessary to offer a new interpretation of a changed reality.\(^{88}\)

Marx criticizes Hegel’s philosophy of the state in detail and as a whole; but this critique aims above all to expose the uncritical character of Hegel’s theory, and in this sense it is a double critique because a critique which targets Hegel’s philosophy of the state will also bring up a critique of the modern state of which Hegel gives an uncritical presentation. Marx thinks that, in his Philosophy of Right, Hegel presents the modern state in an accurate way in general, but that he has also some inconsistencies and some tendencies such as rebuilding medieval constitutions in the modern world. But the most important assertion in Marx’s critique is that what Hegel claims at the outset does not correspond to what he finally arrives.

---

\(^{88}\) Gans, E., “Vorwort zur 2. Augsgabe der Rechtsphilosophie”, cited in Marx, the Young Hegelians and the Origin of Radical Social Theory, p. 168. Eduard Gans appears as one of the most significant thinkers playing an important role between Hegel and Marx since he knew very well the Saint-Simonian socialism and contemplated the class struggles at his time. Anticipating Marx’s Communist Manifesto, he says the following: “Just as the master and slave, later the patrician and the plebian, then the lord and vassal stood against each other, so now the capitalist and the worker. Visit the factories of England and there you will see hundreds of men and women, starving and miserable, who have sacrificed their health and enjoyment of life to a single person, in exchange for mere subsistence. Is it not slavery when one exploits people like animals, even when they are otherwise free to choose to die of hunger? Is it true that no spark of ethical life can be brought to this suffering proletariat? [...] Future history will more than once have to speak of the struggle of the proletariat against the middle classes of society.” Gans, E., Rückblicke, cited in Breckman, W., “Eduard Gans and the Crisis of Hegelianism”, Journal of History of Ideas, 2001, (62:3), pp. 550-1.
Hegel wants always to present the state as the actualization of free mind; however, re vera he resolves all difficult conflicts through a natural necessity which is the antithesis of freedom.\(^89\)

### 2.3.1 Hegel’s Uncritical Attitude

In his critique of Hegel, Marx formulates his ‘last judgment’ over Hegel which he would never withdraw until the end of his life: Hegel inverts the subject and the predicate, and ascribes thought an autonomous being. But what is more important for Marx is the corollary of this inversion: as a result of the inversion of the predicate and the subject, Hegel is driven to justify the existing empirical conditions and does not give dialectic, which by its nature is critical, its due:

> In its mystified form, the dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and glorify what exists. In its rational form, it is a scandal and abomination to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokesmen, because it includes in its positive understanding a simultaneous recognition of its negation, its inevitable destruction; because it regards every historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well; and because it does not let itself be impressed by anything, being in its very essence critical and revolutionary.\(^90\)

These well-known words owe their being to Marx’s critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, and it is especially in this very critique that one should trace Marx’s relation to Hegel. We need now to understand the meaning of the above-mentioned inversion and how it brings about the glorification of what exists.

In order to try to show the relationship of the state with family and civil society, and the state as their immanent end, Hegel says the following:

---

\(^89\) *Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’*, p. 57

The actual Idea is spirit, which, sundering itself into the two ideal spheres of its concept, family and civil society, enters into its finitude, but it does so in order to emerge from its ideality as infinite actual spirit for itself. It is therefore to these ideal spheres that the actual Idea allocates the material of this its finite actuality, viz. individuals as a mass, in such a way that in any individual case this allocation appears as mediated by circumstances, the individual’s arbitrary will and his personal choice of vocation.\footnote{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 262, p. 238. We have previously quoted this paragraph above, but since Marx attaches it a great importance we quote it at length again.}

According to the paragraph ‘Idea’ is, on the one hand, conceived as a subject, or the subject as such, as if it acted according to its own principle and had a certain aim. On the other hand, however, family and civil society are regarded as ‘ideal’ moments. Idea assumes a finite existence in individuals in order to make itself infinite, and what mediates this act of Idea is “circumstances, the individual’s arbitrary will and his personal choice of vocation”. According to Marx, it is clear that in this passage, no matter what Hegel himself aims, Idea is subject itself, whereas circumstances, arbitrary wills and individual choices, which are decisive in reality, are reduced to the appearance of Idea. Accordingly, the real world submits to a law which belongs to a being different from it. However, since Idea has no content which is other than this real world, it needs the real world for its development. Therefore, Idea becomes subject, while real subjects are made into its moments. It is thus on the condition that they function as the moments of Idea and are determinations belonging to Idea that they have a rationality. At this point, Marx argues that Hegel’s philosophy of the state is very far away from being critical since he makes the empirical facts, which he reduces to appearance, the determinations of Idea. In other words, by reducing the empirical facts to the appearance of Idea, Hegel, without being critical, ascribes rationality to them. In this context, according to Marx, Hegel’s approach does not differ from any other study in terms of content since it takes the same content as its object; the difference lies in the way of phrasing and thinking since Hegel presents this
content as the appearance of Idea. However, for Marx, this formal difference gives an end to being critical and amounts to accept the things as they are:

Thus empirical actuality is admitted just as it is and is also said to be rational; but not rational because of its own reason, but because the empirical fact in its empirical existence has a significance which is other than it itself. The fact, which the starting point, is not conceived to be such but rather to be the mystical result. The actual becomes phenomenon, but Idea has no other content than this phenomenon.

It is important to note that although Marx’s point is to show the contingency of the emergence of the state he does not remain on the level of mere contingency; for him, every historical fact has its own logic and philosopher’s role is to follow her subject-matter in its inner logic. Therefore, rationality only emerges from the logic specific to a certain fact; and it cannot be conceived as separate from and beyond the fact. However, in Hegel’s case, according to Marx, rationality appears as Idea which is different from the fact itself.

Hegel regards the political state as an organism which has various powers—a point, which wins Marx’s approval. But for Marx, even here, Hegel inverts the predicate and the subject. From his point of view, the determination of being organic is considered as the subject, whereas the various powers of the state appear as the predicates of this determination. Furthermore, since Idea is made the subject, the political constitution, which means the organism of the state, appears to be a result of Idea’s development in the state; “it is a question not of political idea, but rather of the abstract Idea in the political element.” Since Hegel takes Idea as the starting point and reduces the actual subjects into mere determinations of Idea, he only looks for particular determinations which correspond to abstract

---

92 Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 8.

93 Ibid., p. 9.

94 Ibid., p. 12.
determinations. Here, Marx draws attention to two important points which is closely related to each other. First, the predicate becomes the subject; to speak in more concrete terms, a universal determination becomes an actual subject. Second, since a universal determination is made into an actual subject the role of the philosopher becomes to show this determination in every fact. To this aim, Hegel departs from abstract Idea and tries to follow the trace of Idea in every empirical fact and find the determinations which correspond to Idea itself. And instead of considering the fact in and for itself and letting himself to move with the self-development of the fact itself, Hegel starts from Idea to which he gives an independent being and, without the concern to be critical, attempts to discover it in every empirical fact:

He does not develop his thought out of what is objective [aus dem Gegenstand], but what is objective in accordance with a ready-made thought which has its origin in the abstract sphere of logic. It is not a question of developing the determinate idea of the political constitution, but of giving the political constitution a relation to the abstract Idea, of classifying it as a member of its (the Idea’s) life history. This is an obvious mystification.95

According to Marx’s interpretation, Hegel’s aim is not to expose the logic of the political state, but to apply his own logic to the political state. In this sense, what is before us in Philosophy of Right is nothing other than an application of Hegel’s Logic to right. For this reason, it is not “the logic of fact but the fact of logic”96 which constitutes Hegel’s main concern.

Posing this general critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx passes to a more detailed critique with regard to some specific points of Hegel’s presentation of the state. His critique is an immanent one; as Shlomo Avineri puts,

96 Ibid., p. 18.
it takes Hegel’s concepts and premises as given and accepts them.97 But then, it shows that he arrived at the conclusions contrary to ones he desired and asserted in the beginning. At this point, we must refer to Hegel’s *Phenomenology* since Marx’s critique calls to mind the procedure of *Phenomenology*, according to which every form of consciousness is called to review its assertion concerning truth: *let consciousness test itself*. For instance, by testing its own assertions, sensuous consciousness which is said to be the source of the richest knowledge is compelled to accept to be the poorest one since the only thing it knows is nothing other than simple ‘here’ and ‘now’, which are themselves universal.98 In a similar way, Marx’s critique also accepts Hegel’s assertions and then lets it test its own assertions; it exposes the opposition between Hegel’s assertions in the beginning and the conclusions he really arrived at.99 It must be noted, however, that, for Marx, such an opposition is not only an inexcusable defect of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*; on the contrary, it faithfully depicts the existing state of affairs in many respects. Hegel’s ‘State’ belongs, above all, to a world which is itself inverted; it is true that Hegel inverts the subject-predicate relation, but this relation is already inverted in the real world. “Hegel’s model is the true description of a false reality.”100 Therefore, Marx’s critique of Hegel also targets the existing conditions. And the main reason of Marx’s attack on Hegel is that, despite his claim to reveal the idea of state, Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* actually reflects the modern state, and presents it as rational:

97 *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, p. 13.


99 There is in general a tendency as to exaggerate the influence of Feuerbach’s “transformative criticism” in Marx’s critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. They do not mention the close relationship between Marx’s critique and the procedure of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. However, it is also clear from *1844 Manuscripts*, in which Marx accepts the premises of political economists and then invites them to test their own premises, that he consciously employs the same immanent critique.

Hegel is not to be blamed for depicting the nature of the modern state as it is, but rather for presenting what is as the essence of the state. The claim that the rational is actual is contradicted precisely by an irrational actuality, which everywhere is the contrary of what it asserts and asserts the contrary of what it is.\(^{101}\)

Now we will analyze three important points Marx’s critique directly attacks: the determination of monarch, the role of estates of civil society in the powers of execution and legislation, and the status of the agricultural estate. The first point is related to the inversion of subject-predicate and the arbitrary character of Hegel’s argument; the second indicates Hegel’s attempt to include certain elements and features of the medieval political structure into the modern political state; and the third reveals the essence of the state as an instrument of private property. As a whole, Marx’s critique tries to show Hegel’s uncritical attitude, which takes the modern constitutional monarchy as the idea of the state, and asserts that what prevails in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* is contingency, arbitrariness and naturalness rather than rationality, necessity and freedom.

### 2.3.2. The Monarch

According to Hegel, the state is an organic unity and consists of various powers which are organically connected. Within the state, these powers appear mere ideal moments; they have a meaning only as a part of the unity of the state. And this unity constitutes the sovereignty of the state, which can only exist as “subjectivity certain of itself”.

---

\(^{101}\) *Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’*, p. 64.
The sovereignty of the state is embodied in the monarch, which is the moment of final decision. And the monarch, which Hegel represents as immediate singularity has a natural determination: it is determined by birth.\footnote{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 280, p. 271.}

Hegel is aware of the fact that to see the sovereignty of the state in a specific individual who is determined by his birth would degenerate the monarch into the moment of absolute arbitrariness. And against this, he says that in an organic state, the monarch will have only a formal role and be completely dependent on his advisors.\footnote{Ibid., § 280, Addition, p. 272.} But this provision of Hegel is not sufficiently strong to prevent Marx from criticizing him.

Running into a contradiction with himself, according to Marx, Hegel delivers the state to the arbitrariness of the monarch since he makes the monarch the moment of arbitrariness, arguing that sovereignty is “ungrounded self-determination in which finality of decision is rooted”, despite his own conception of the constitution that the monarch cannot locate himself above the constitution and violate it. Furthermore, Hegel leaves the appointment of ministers to the monarch’s “unrestricted arbitrary will.”\footnote{Ibid., § 283, p. 277.} At this point, Marx accuses Hegel of giving a rational spectacle to the present situation:

Hegel makes all the attributes of the contemporary European constitutional monarch into absolute self-determinations of the will. He does not say the will of the monarch is the final decision, but rather the final decision of the will is the monarch. The first statement is empirical, the second twists the empirical fact into a metaphysical axiom. Hegel joins together the two subjects, sovereignty as subjectivity sure of itself and sovereignty as ungrounded self-determination of the will, as the individual will, in order to construct out of that the Idea as ‘one individual’. \footnote{Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 25.}
Alongside this criticism concerning the arbitrariness of the monarch, Marx directs another one with regard to the monarch: the inversion of the subject and the predicate. According to this criticism, Hegel gives sovereignty an independent being and thus objectifies it; but then he makes it subjectified in a single person. Therefore, the monarch appears as the “personified sovereignty”. In the final analysis, by identifying sovereignty with a specific individual, Hegel excludes all other individuals from the state.

According to Marx, Hegel’s argument concerning the monarch is defective and arbitrary because he first asserts that individuality exists only in the individual, and then, in accordance with this determination, he says that the sovereignty of the state is embodied only in ‘one’ individual. For Marx, however, if Hegel started from the real subjects, real individuals who make the state, and conceived the sovereignty as the “objectified spirit” of these individuals he would not call an irrational fact, which really exists in the modern world, as rational. But, in order to see the existence of the monarch as rational, he even reduces personality to a single person. Against this, Marx says the following:

> It is obvious that personality and subjectivity, being only predicates of the person and the subject, exist only as person and subject; and indeed that the person is one. But Hegel needed to go further, for clearly the one has truth only as many one’s. The predicate, the essence, never exhausts the spheres of its existence in a single one but in many one’s.

Attacking Hegel’s argumentation, Marx opposes ‘democracy’ to Hegel’s constitutional monarchy; against the point of view which limits the sovereignty of the state only to one person and excludes all other persons from the state, Marx makes democracy a current issue. On this point, Marx again accepts Hegel’s

108 Ibid., p. 27.
premise that the sovereignty of the state constitutes its individuality, but, contrary to Hegel who wants to reduce the individuality of the state only to one individual, i.e., to the monarch, he asserts that individuality can exist only as many individuals and it is exactly these many individuals or, to put it more exactly, people, that constitutes the state. In Marx’s view, Hegel first objectifies the state as separate from people who actually constitutes it, and then subjectifies it in the person of the monarch. From the viewpoint of Marx, however, the state is nothing other than a self-expression of people and thus the political constitution belongs to people itself, not vice versa. In this sense, democracy is the political constitution as such: it is not a form of political constitution. Against Hegel who rules the alternative of democracy out\textsuperscript{109}, Marx says the following:

Hegel proceeds from the state and makes man into the subjectified state; democracy starts with man and makes the state objectified man. Just as it is not religion that creates man but man who creates religion, so it is not the constitution that creates people but the people which creates the constitution.\textsuperscript{110}

Marx’s implication is clear: because of Hegel’s inversion of the relationship of subject-predicate, the political result of \textit{Philosophy of Right} is the justification of the modern constitutional monarchy; however, if Hegel did not make the activities of people into mere appearance and see only the activity of Idea in them he would arrive at the opposite result: the negation of the state in its modern form and even the state as such. As we indicated above, Marx thinks that both Hegel and the real world itself inverts the subject and the predicate, and Hegel’s philosophy of the state reflects this inverted reality, according to which man is made into a mere

\textsuperscript{109} “[A democratic form of government] cannot be further discussed in face of the Idea of the state in its full development.” \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, Ibid., § 279, p. 269. According to Frederick Beiser, “Hegel feared that radical democracy, which gave limitless power to the will of people, does not necessarily respect the fundamental rights of everyone alike. The crucial case in point was Athens’s persecution of Socrates.” \textit{Hegel}, p. 252.

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'}, p. 30.
predicate of the state which is nothing other than the objectification of human. Therefore, the critique of Hegel, for Marx, means the critique of reality which is itself irrational. And Marx’s critique which takes real individuals as its premise culminates in the denial of the constitutional monarchy in favor of democracy. And it must be remarked that Marx’s conception of democracy suggests, as he himself points out, a society in which the universal and the particular coincides, and the political state seems to vanish.\textsuperscript{111}

The last critique of Marx concerning Hegel’s conception of the monarch is related to the determination of the monarch by his birth. This determination is presented by Hegel as the “transition from the concept of the pure self-determination into the immediacy of being”.\textsuperscript{112} The fact that Hegel accepts the given concept of the monarch and even attempts to ground it from his logic has actually no significance for Marx; to tell the truth, there is no need to criticize it. But this point reveals the fact that, despite all his claims for rationality, what prevails in Hegel’s rational state is nothing other than natural determination and nature itself.

Hegel tries to justify the position of the monarch in order to preclude any arbitrariness in the state but what he presents is, for Marx, the very arbitrariness of the monarch: the monarch acts in accordance with his particular will, and what determines a person as the monarch becomes not rationality, but nature. “Thus at the highest point of the state bare \textit{Physis} rather than reason would be the determining factor.”\textsuperscript{113} As a result,

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., pp. 30-1. As Herbert Marcuse puts it: “According to Hegel, the state has no aim other than ‘association as such’. In other words, it has no aim at all if the social and economic order constitutes a ‘true association’. The process of bringing the individual into harmony with the universal would engender the ‘withering away’ of the state, rather than opposite.” \textit{Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory}, p. 214.

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, § 280, p. 271.

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’}, p. 33.
[i]nstead of the state being brought forth, therefore, as the ultimate reality of the person, as the ultimate social reality of man, a single empirical man, an empirical person, is brought forth as the ultimate actuality of the state. This inversion of subject into object and object into subject […] necessarily has as its result that an empirical existent is taken in an uncritical manner to be the real truth of the Idea, because it is not a question of bringing empirical existence to its truth but of bringing the truth to empirical existence, and thereupon the obvious is developed as a real moment of the Idea.¹¹⁴

2.3.3. The Executive Power

Hegel’s entire theory of the state depends on a fundamental fact which is a characteristic feature of modern society: the separation of the state from the civil society. The state represents the universal end, whereas civil society is the realm of particular interests in which everyone exclusively pursues her own end and regards others as mere means for its attainment. Since Hegel gives ‘the right of subjectivity’, which consists in individuals’ leading a free life in civil society, a considerable significance in his Philosophy of Right, he never thinks to suppress civil society and to let it be directly determined by the state. Hegel is, however, fully aware of the fact that civil society is burdened with contradictions which it is not capable of solving by itself. For civil society is, above all, the realm of bellum omnium contra omnes and necessarily brings about the concentration of wealth in a few hands, despite the fact that it provides, to a certain extent, a condition in which one’s interests depend on others’ welfare. Therefore, according to Hegel, the particular interests of civil society should be subjected to the universal end of the state, without violating the right of subjectivity. Hegel aims at providing the unity of the universal and the particular and precluding the conflict of the interests of civil society with the universal end of the state; and it is in these terms that he discusses the powers of execution and legislation. And it must be stressed that

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 39.
Hegel derives the organs of execution and legislation primarily from the estates of civil society.

For Hegel, public officers, who constitute the executive power and are responsible for carrying out the decisions approved by the monarch, pursue the universal end of the state, and it is exactly this universal end that constitutes their particular end. In other words, the universal and the particular, to a certain extent, coincide in the lives of civil servants. For this reason, Hegel calls them ‘the universal estate’.  

Hegel thinks the estate of civil servants as the mediating element between the state and civil society; it is represented as a remedy for the conflict of interests of civil society and the state. This estate is directly in contact with the monarch and tries to attach the interests of corporations in civil society to the universal end of the state. To the danger of degeneration of the universal estate, Hegel proposes a control from above, by monarch, and from below, by the corporations.

As to the determination of the estate of civil servants, although knowledge and ability are decisive for the affairs of the state, it is nevertheless to the monarch that the final decision in the appointment of civil servants belongs. Furthermore, in return for their service, they are paid a salary so as to ensure the satisfactions of their particular needs. And finally, the right to become a member of this estate is kept open to all members of civil society.

Arguing that the executive power presented by Hegel is nothing other than the domination of public officers, or of bureaucracy, Marx opposes Hegel’s attempt to identify the bureaucracy in the state with the corporations in civil society. For Marx, Hegel departs from the opposition between the state and civil society and sees it as an opposition which requires to be overcome, but he leaves it unresolved. He bases the mediating role of the estate of civil servants upon

---

115 “The universal estate [the estate of civil servants] has for its task the universal interests of society. It must therefore be freed from direct labour to meet its needs, either by having private means or by receiving an allowance from the state which claims its industry, with the result that private interest finds its satisfaction in its work for the universal.” Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 205, pp. 195.
similar features, which the bureaucracy representing the interests of the state and the corporations representing the interests of the members of civil society commonly share: members of both are elected; transition from one estate to the other is recognized; and they lead a particular life and take a salary.

According to Marx, what Hegel presents is nothing other than an accommodation between the bureaucracy and the corporations. Hegel thus lets corporations survive in the modern state and, in fact, makes it the presupposition of the bureaucracy. He presents the universal estate as one in which the universal and the particular combine; but it is actually an estate which makes its own end into the end of the state. Accordingly, “the corporation is civil society’s attempt to become state; but the bureaucracy is the state which has really made itself into civil society.”

In order to give an end to the opposition between the universal end and the particular end, for Marx, it is necessary to bring about a real change in the real world; in short, the universal end must be the particular end, and vice versa. In Hegel’s presentation, however, the opposition between them continues to exist, and it is even consolidated due to the introduction of the bureaucracy and the corporations:

\[\text{According to him [Hegel] these executive office holders, the executive civil servants are in reality the true representation of the state, not ‘of’ but ‘against’ civil society. The opposition between state and civil society is thus fixed; the state does not reside within but outside of civil society; it affects civil society merely through office holders to whom is entrusted the management of the state within this sphere. The opposition is not overcome by means of these office holders but has become a legal end fixed opposition. The state becomes something alien to the nature of civil society; it becomes this nature’s otherworldly realm of deputies which makes claims against civil society.}^{116}\]

\(^{116}\) Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 46.

\(^{117}\) Ibid., p. 48.

\(^{118}\) Ibid., pp. 49-50.
As a result, Marx argues against Hegel that the mediation of bureaucracy does not provide a harmony between universal and particular interests, on the contrary intensifies the opposition between them. Therefore, according to Marx, it is necessary to establish not a formal but real identification of particular and universal interests, and thus to abolish bureaucracy itself.  

2.3.4. The Legislative Power

Discussing the legislation, Hegel again considers the separation of the state from civil society and the unity of the universal interests and the particular interests, which the executive power is not capable of providing by itself. By the power of legislation, the participation of the members of civil society in the state is rendered possible.

The legislative power consists of three elements: the monarch, the government and the assemblies of the estates, but the characteristic feature of legislation is that it includes the assemblies of the estates. Hegel thinks of assemblies as mediating between the government and the civil society. The government was represented as the mediating element between the state in the person of the monarch and the members of civil society, now Hegel argues that there must be a mediator, too, between the government and the civil society, which will represent the particular interests of civil society.

When Hegel discusses assemblies in the legislative power, he departs from an important fact he insistently stresses: in an organic state, every individual must be connected to the whole. The members of the state do not constitute a formless mass; on the contrary, in civil society there are estates to which individuals

---

119 "The formalism of the bureaucratic attitude which can only deal with reified objects is dependent on the formal separation of the bourgeois state and civil society; with the elimination of the latter, the former must collapse as well." The Development of the Marxian Dialectic, p. 67.
belong. As we have previously noted, for Hegel, civil society mainly consists of three estates: the universal estate, the agricultural estate, and the business estate. The first takes part in the executive power, and the agricultural and the business estates are represented in the legislative power through assemblies. Hegel thus wants to make use of the estate distinction in civil society in his discussion on the legislative power and gives it a political meaning. He puts it as follows:

In the Estates, as an element in the legislative power, the private estate \([\text{Privatstand}]\) acquires its political significance and efficacy; it appears, therefore, in the Estates neither as a mere undifferentiated multitude nor as an aggregate dispersed into its atoms, but as what it already is, namely as divided into two, one part [the agricultural estate] being based on the substantial relationship, and the other part [the business estate] on particular needs and the work whereby these are met. It is only in this way that there is a genuine link between the particular which is effective in the state and the universal.\textsuperscript{120}

According to Marx, Hegel departs from the separation of the state from civil society and conceives the opposition between the universal end of the state and the particular end of civil society; the state constitutes the public sphere, and civil society the private sphere. However, he also sees the estate distinction of civil society as a political distinction and lets the private sphere gain a political meaning. Although the members of civil society exclusively pursue their own particular interests and, qua a member of civil society, have nothing to do with the political sphere, Hegel tries to derive assemblies from the estates of civil society and makes a distinction in civil society into a political distinction. But, for Marx, if Hegel adhered to his own premises he needed to follow the opposite path: the private persons of civil society can politically act only insofar as they denied their identity as a member of civil society because it is exactly civil society, i.e., the private sphere, that makes individuals private persons and removes them from the political sphere.

\textsuperscript{120} Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 303, p. 291.
In the Estates the universal becomes actually, explicitly \([\text{für sich}]\) what it is implicitly \([\text{an sich}]\), namely, opposition to the particular. The citizen must renounce his class, civil society, the unofficial class, in order to achieve political significance and efficacy; for it is precisely this class which stands between the individual and the political state.\(^{121}\)

On the purpose of deriving assemblies from the estates of civil society, Hegel thus, for Marx, invalidates the distinction between the state and civil society, which he at the beginning posed, and sees civil society as identical with the political society. He does not want to leave the members of civil society as isolated atoms, but, for Marx, civil society is itself atomistic, and it is possible to speak about the ‘communality’ of individuals only insofar as “the political state is an abstraction of civil society.”\(^{122}\)

Marx’s point is that the abstraction of the state is a result of history, and in this sense it is a real abstraction\(^{123}\); in other words, contrary to the medieval age, in which civil estates were directly identical with political estates, in the modern times the estates of civil society have no political meaning; they are exclusively related to the private sphere. The main reason for this change perfected by the French Revolution is that civil society is a realm of contingency, as Hegel would also accept it, and does not allow any stable position with regard to individuals belonging to an estate:

The present social class already manifests a distinction from the former class of civil society by the fact that it does not, as was formerly the case, regard the individual as a communal individual, as a communal being \([\text{ein Gemeinwesen}]\); rather, it is partly

---

\(^{121}\) *Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’*, p. 78.

\(^{122}\) Ibid., p. 79.

\(^{123}\) “The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modern times because the abstraction of private life belongs only to modern times. The abstraction of the political state is a modern product.” Ibid., p. 32.
chance, partly labor, etc., of the individual which determines whether he remains in his class or not, a class which is, further, only an external determination of this individual; for he neither inheres in his work nor does the class relate to him as an objective communal being organized according to firm laws and related firmly to him. Moreover, he stands in no actual relation to his substantial activity, to his actual class.\textsuperscript{124}

Therefore, for Marx, the members of civil society feel themselves as human only by being a citizen of the state, according to which they are defined not by their particularity but by their universal determination as human, whereas an estate confines the individual to her particular character, removes her from her universal determination and “makes him an animal whose being coincides immediately with its determinate character.”\textsuperscript{125} For this reason, to introduce the estates of civil society to the political state as they are and to give them a political significance in the assemblies are, for Marx, nothing other than to bring the medieval political structure to the modern state. Hegel, on the one hand, accepts the separation of the state from civil society and, on the other hand, wants to see the estates of civil society as political assemblies; he thus uncritically and in a mystical way interprets “an old world view in terms of a new one.”\textsuperscript{126}

Although Hegel regards the estates of assemblies as the mediating element between the executive power and civil society, he is aware of the fact that in the assemblies themselves may arise a “possibility of hostile opposition”\textsuperscript{127} since these assemblies of the estates primarily pursue their particular interests. And they may enter into a conflict with the universal interests of the state, even though they appear as the representatives of the executive power in civil society. Hegel tries to preclude this possibility of opposition by introducing another mediating element.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 81.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 82.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., p. 83.
\textsuperscript{127} Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 304, p. 292.
To this aim, he ascribes a considerable significance to one of the estates of civil society, i.e., to the agricultural estate, whose principle is family life and landowning, and conceives it as having similar features with the monarch: this estate is determined by natural birth, not by election, for attending to the assemblies. For its subsistence depends on the possession of land, it is free from the contingency of civil society and the wealth of the state. Furthermore, the members of the agricultural estate are devoid of freely using their possession; through primogeniture, it necessarily passes to the eldest son. Because of these features of this estate, Hegel gives a special importance to it so as to preclude a likely opposition between the monarch and the assemblies of the estates.

Against Hegel’s attempt to supersede the opposition by a mediation element, Marx says that the opposition Hegel remarks arises in the very institutions which are thought as mediating the universal and the particular. According to Marx, this opposition is a real one which cannot be abolished in thought; it is “the self-contradiction of the abstract political state”. Despite this fact, Hegel reduces this opposition to an appearance, and sees it as “a unity in essence”: he abolishes all opposition by finding mediations. For Marx, however, it is “an essential contradiction”\(^\text{128}\) which can be abolished only in practice:

It is remarkable that Hegel, who reduces this absurdity of mediation to its abstract logical, and hence pure and irreducible, expression, calls it at the same time the speculative mystery of logic, the rational relationship, the rational syllogism. Actual extremes cannot be mediated with each other precisely because they are actual extremes. But neither are they in need of mediation, because they are opposed in essence. They have nothing common with one another; they neither need nor complement one another.\(^\text{129}\)

Furthermore, with regard to the specific role of the agricultural estate Hegel bestows in the legislative power, Marx thinks that the status of this estate reveals

\(^{128}\) *Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’*, p. 91.

\(^{129}\) Ibid., pp. 88-89.
the secret of the modern political estate since it explicitly absolutizes private property in the modern state despite the fact that it constitutes the highest mediation in the political constitution.

First of all, Hegel tries to solve the opposition between the monarch and the estates by proposing a double assembly. One is determined only by birth, and the other consists of representatives elected by corporations. And the danger posed by civil society or, to put it more correctly, the business estate is eliminated by the agricultural estate because of its certain features which the other estates, the universal estate and the business estate, do not have. The most important feature of this estate is that it is independent both from the wealth of the state and the contingency of civil society since what is valid in this estate is primogeniture so that it plays its political role. According to Marx, however, Hegel does nothing other than to transform citizens into private persons because the members of civil society do not take part in the legislative power as citizens, but according to the estate they belong to; the distinction of estates transforms into a political distinction in the legislative power. And he also establishes a relationship between having an independent property and citizenship.\(^\text{130}\)

Furthermore, Hegel says that the basis of the agricultural estate is the natural family life, but this estate is devoid of the right of freely using its property; it is necessary to leave it to the eldest son. For Marx, this estate has thus nothing to do with the family life because what constitutes the principle of family life is love, as Hegel presents it,\(^\text{131}\) but in this estate the case is exactly the opposite; love is neglected because of primogeniture.\(^\text{132}\) Together with this, Hegel also enters into a contradiction with himself because in the chapter on “Abstract Right” he argues that the person has an absolute right over the object she appropriates so

\(^{130}\) Ibid., p. 98.

\(^{131}\) *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, § 158, p. 162.

\(^{132}\) *Critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, p. 99.
that she can freely use and alienate it. However, in the agricultural estate the property gains an autonomous being before its proprietor; “the subject is the thing and the predicate is man. The will becomes the property of property.” Inverting the relationship of the subject and the predicate, Hegel thus both poses two different rights and reveals the inverted character of the real world:

While Hegel here perceives in private rights the alienability and dependence of private property on a common will as its true idealism, in state rights, on the other hand, he praises the imaginary nobility of independent property as opposed to the uncertainty of business, the quest for profit, any sort of fluctuation in possessions, and dependence on the state’s capital. What kind of state is this that cannot even tolerate the idealism of private rights? And what kind of philosophy of right is this in which the independence of private property has diverse meanings in the spheres of private and state rights?

As a result, Marx thinks that Hegel does not consider the object of investigation in and for itself and take other elements into account than those required for an objective investigation of the state. And, from the viewpoint of Marx, it is obvious especially from his discussion concerning the determination of the monarch, corporations, the introduction of the estates as elements constituting assemblies into the state, and the exclusive role of the agricultural estate in the state that Hegel on the one hand wants to include “an old world view” in his theory of the modern state and on the other hand does not remain devoted to his own formulations. And contrary to what is asserted at the outset, i.e., the claim to present the state as inherently rational, Hegel arrives at the opposite conclusions in which contingency, nature and necessity prevail. Therefore, it is true that Hegel really attempts “to recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present”, but,

133 Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 65, p. 77.


135 Ibid., p. 102.
according to Marx, reason was really crucified both in Hegel and the present state itself. For him, therefore, to transcend Hegel’s philosophy means at the same time the transcendence of the modern state itself. “Since Hegel’s political philosophy set the seal of approval upon a reality basically defective and distorted, Hegelian philosophy cannot be reformed without reforming reality itself.”

We have just tried to outline Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state. And it is clear from our exposition that this critique deserves to be given a considerable and even decisive place in Marx’s critique of Hegel in general since it is his first critique of Hegel and his later critique of Hegel mainly depends on his conviction, as formulated in this work, that Hegel conceives Idea as an independent subject of which the real world is merely an appearance and, as a corollary of this hyphostatization of Idea, justifies the existing state of affairs.

2.4. An Overview

It is clear that Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state has a special place in Marx’s relation to Hegel in general since it is above all Marx’s first critique of Hegel and his later critique reflects more or less its general tendency. And for all his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state, Marx also tends to make use of Hegel’s dialectic.

Hegel envisages a harmony between universal and particular ends in the Sittlichkeit, which gains its real significance in the modern world. Although this harmony is not entirely actualized, Hegel thinks that, according to its concept, in the modern world the conditions for the actualization of objective freedom have already emerged. On the one hand, civil society as a product of the modern world enables the right of subjectivity to develop, and, on the other hand, the modern state has arisen as the unity of the moments of the concept: universality,

136 The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, p. 16.
particularity, and individuality. According to Hegel, thanks to the division of powers, the modern state can provide a harmony between the universal and particular interests, if it is organized as a whole. He therefore considers the mediations which would be employed for the concrete freedom and also would guarantee for the right of subjectivity not to be suppressed. And the state as presented in *Philosophy of Right* is, for Hegel, thus not the description of any empirical state but the idea of the state itself.

However, as we will later see, Hegel is aware of the fact that civil society, though it renders the development of subjectivity possible, brings about a series of problems such as poverty, crises arising from overproduction, a great chasm between poverty and wealth, colonization, wars, etc. For this reason, he designates the various organs of the state as mediations which would prevent both the suppression of subjectivity and the domination of civil society over the state. According to him, every part of the state should be organically connected so that there is no place both for the atomism of individuals and the direct identification of particular and universal interests, which would, in turn, causes the extinction of individual freedom rather than its flourishing. Therefore, it is clear that Hegel’s philosophy of the state includes a series of solutions to these problems which may emerge. However, it is equally clear that Hegel’s solutions are not in their essence revolutionary but reformist. This has mainly two reasons: first, Hegel regards the modern world as a decisive moment in the historical development of human and thus in the advancement of human freedom and gives a great importance to its achievements; and secondly, he experienced the results of French Revolution and for this reason avoids offering a radical solution to the problems of the modern world and imposing an ideal to reality.

Marx thinks that Hegel really conceives the nature of the modern state but he is devoid of a critical attitude toward the modern state. He argues that Hegel’s attempts to bring a harmony to the universal and particular interests do not solve the contradictions of the modern state and, in this sense, his solutions are only imaginary, leaving contradictions in reality as they are. According to Marx, both
Hegel’s philosophy of the state and the modern state itself do not succeed in bringing a harmony between the universal and particular interests and do not overcome the separation between the *citizen* as a member of the state and the *bourgeois* as a member of civil society, between ‘political human’ and ‘private human’: individuals continue to live in two different realms. Marx thus sees the abolition of this separation in *democracy*, not yet in communism.

In the following chapters, we will see the development of Marx’s thought, but the point we want to emphasize here is the implication of Marx’s critique of Hegel: it is through a critique of Hegel’s philosophy that Marx appropriates the essential features of Hegel’s dialectic. In other words, it is by the mediation of a negative attitude towards Hegel’s thought that Marx comes to embrace the fundamental aspects of Hegel’s dialectic. Therefore, by criticizing Hegel’s philosophy of the state, Marx first adopts the *organicist* viewpoint which is an indispensable aspect of Hegel’s dialectic. 137 Secondly, he devotes himself to the activity of critique which is a distinctive feature of the entire German idealism which has its roots in Kant’s critical philosophy and culminates in Hegel’s attempt to develop a dialectical logic without any presupposition. Lastly, in his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state Marx gives a clue for his method which would be employed in *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, according to which the object of investigation should not be presupposed but must be shown as a result 138—a point which is an integral part of Hegel’s dialectic. Consequently, by criticizing Hegel’s philosophy of the state, Marx increasingly enters into a more intimate relation with Hegel’s dialectic and becomes more preoccupied with the problems posed by his *Philosophy of Right*.

137 “It is a great advance to consider the political state as an organism, and hence no longer to consider the diversity of powers as [in]organic, but rather as living and rational differences.” *Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’*, pp. 11-2.

138 “But only with the Legislature does Hegel construct the constitution in its entirety, and thus he is unable to presuppose it. However, we recognize his profundity precisely in the way he always begins with and accentuates the antithetical character of the determinate elements (as they exist in our states).” Ibid., p. 55.
CHAPTER III

WORLDLY DIALECTIC

Marx only criticized the part of “the state” in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, and in this critique he said that he would also consider Hegel’s view of ‘civil society’\(^{139}\) –which is the realm of economic interests. However, he did not realize this project\(^{140}\), but it is clear from his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state that Marx would direct his attention to civil society. *1844 Manuscripts* is a product of Marx’s attempt to conceive civil society in its entirety and to study on the works of political economists. It is a double critique, as in the case with his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state in which he criticizes both Hegel and the modern state: Marx, on the one hand, follows the arguments of political economists and subjects them a critique; and he, on the other hand, analyses the modern capitalist relations of production and asserts that the world of private property which is based on the fact of estranged labor brings about the inhuman condition of humans and thus must be replaced by communism. Just as the state which is nothing other than an objectification of human governs humans and makes them its predicates, so the world of private property, which is nothing other than a creation of human, an indication of human’s power over nature, too, stands as an autonomous, external and alien being over against humans. Therefore, both are

\(^{139}\) *Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’*, p. 82.

\(^{140}\) Even though Marx did not develop a direct critique of Hegel’s view of civil society, certain elements with regard to the critique of his view of civil society can be found in Marx’s *German Ideology* and *Communist Manifesto*; we will return to this point while discussing Marx’s critique of Hegel in these works.
inverted\textsuperscript{141}, and having criticized Hegel’s philosophy of the state, Marx passes to criticizing political economists because they are uncritical about the modern society, just as Hegel is vis-à-vis the modern state.

It is not thus surprising to see a critique of Hegel to be included in 1844 Manuscripts too. Marx attempts, in this work, to develop a critique of Hegel as a whole, primarily focusing on his Phenomenology of Spirit, and establishes a common point between him and political economy. Therefore, 1844 Manuscripts constitutes a decisive place both in the development of Marx’s thought and his relation to Hegel since political economy and Hegel’s dialectic are topics Marx never stops dealing with throughout his life, and it is in this work that he brings both a critique of political economy and a critique of Hegel together. This point is more important when we consider the fact that Marx cannot help mentioning Hegel’s name and entering a discussion with Hegel while criticizing political economy, as is the case with, for example, Grundrisse and Capital.

In this chapter, we will consider Marx’s critique of Hegel’s dialectic in 1844 Manuscripts in detail and see it to be a consistent continuation of Marx’s first critique of Hegel. However, this work also attests to the fact that Marx’s aim is not only to criticize, but also to make use of Hegel’s dialectic. His critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state is not also devoid of such a concern, but 1844 Manuscripts allows us to see Marx’s critical appropriation of Hegel more clearly. We also aim to trace which points Marx appropriates in Hegel’s dialectic and paying attention to Marx’s attempt to determine his own position by criticizing Hegel’s dialectic. Marx’s critical appropriation of Hegel’s dialectic in his 1844 Manuscripts makes clear that his main aim is to deal with worldly problems and to find worldly solutions to these problems. An essential aspect of Marx’s dialectic therefore its being worldly –a point Marx clearly remarks in his On the Jewish Question:

\textsuperscript{141}“Man is world of man, the state, society. This state, this society, produce religion, which is an inverted world-consciousness, because they are an inverted world.” “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’: Introduction”, p. 131.
We do not convert secular questions into theological ones. We convert theological questions into secular questions. History has long enough been resolved into superstition, but now we can resolve superstition into history.\textsuperscript{142}

However, before directly focusing on Marx’s critique of Hegel, as expressed in \textit{1844 Manuscripts}, we need to briefly touch on his critique of political economy since he thinks that both political economy and Hegel share the same standpoint and his concern with Hegel lies not in, for instance, criticizing religion and on this basis developing an ‘anthropology’ in its exact sense of the term, as does Feuerbach, but in criticizing political economy and thereby arriving at the negation of its condition of existence.

3.1. Marx’s Critique of Political Economy or Its Self-criticism

In \textit{1844 Manuscripts}, Marx attempts to analyze the realm of economic interests, i.e., civil society, and to show its essential contradiction. However, he wants to do this by subjecting political economy to criticism and exposing its contradictions. The critique which Marx undertakes against political economy is not an external one, but from within: he accepts the premises of political economists, follows their steps in the analysis of capitalist relations of production and calls them to see the contradiction between their premises and the conclusion they arrive. In this sense, Marx again follows the procedure of Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology}: he lets political economy test itself.

The greatest contradiction of modern political economy shows itself in the fact that it takes labor as the source of wealth, but it is exactly labor itself which, in the very relations of production modern political economists depict, finds itself

in the most miserable situation. Marx’s attempt is to make visible this point by following the arguments of modern political economy and to show that private property taken by political economy as given has as its presupposition estranged labor.

He [political economist] tells us that originally and in theory the *whole produce* of labor belongs to the worker. But at the same time he tells us that in actual fact what the worker gets is the smallest and utterly indispensable part of the product—as much, only, as is necessary, for his existence, not as a man but as a worker, and for the propagation, not of humanity but of the slave-class of workers.¹⁴³

Political economy takes the separation among capital, landed property and labor as given; accordingly, society consists of mainly three classes—capitalists, landed proprietors and workers—each of which takes its share from the wealth of society respectively as profit, ground rent and wage. For Marx, however, it is the worker who most suffers from the fluctuations in the market since she is wholly dependent on capital and by herself devoid of the means which would set her labor in motion. It is the growth of wealth in society which is for political economy best possible condition, but, Marx argues, even if the wealth in society is increased the situation of the worker is very far from being getting better since the increase in wages brings about overwork, and the overwork of the worker is nothing other than the growth of capital, which the worker is wholly dependent on, though it is simply accumulated labor. Furthermore, in such a preferable condition for political economists, capitalists are obliged to enter into competition among themselves so as to take more share from wealth, and the result of this competition is that some capitalists lose their positions and join to the working class, which, in turn, brings about competition among the workers. Therefore,

¹⁴³ *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 25.
since for political economy the most preferable condition is the growth of wealth in society “the goal of economic system is the unhappiness of society”\textsuperscript{144}

In the capitalist mode of production, for Marx, there is no place for a constant, static condition; it is always in a continuous flux. A visible indication of the movement of private property is that the landed proprietors increasingly become dependent on capital, and the distinction between the capitalist and the landed proprietor disappears so that society consists of two great classes: capitalists and the working class.

Political economy proceeds from the fact of private property, but it does not explain it to us. It expresses in general, abstract formulae the material process through which private property actually passes, and these formulae it then takes for laws. It does not comprehend these laws–i.e., it does not demonstrate how they arise from the very nature of private property.\textsuperscript{145}

The chief defect of political economy is, for Marx, that it does not consider private property as a process, but takes its moments separately. However, what appears as contingent for political economy is in fact a necessity of the movement of private property; “since it does not grasp connections within the movement it was possible to counterpose, for instance, the doctrine of competition to the doctrine of monopoly,”\textsuperscript{146} but monopoly is not a contingent but a necessary result of competition. Therefore, political economy does not consider its laws within the inner connection of the economic system.

Since political economy takes private property as given and does not conceive the capitalist relations of production as a connected whole it does not see the negative moment in labor: the entire world of private property is a result of estranged labor. For Marx, it is clear, however, from the works of political

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., p. 69-70.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., p. 70.
economy that the worker is reduced to a commodity and, as a result of the separation of the means of production from her, she leads an alienated life. The product, which is a result of labor of the worker, is excluded from her; she cannot possess the product of her labor but only takes a share from her product which only suffices her to work again. And her labor is not conscious, free activity but a coerced labor because she does, by necessity, sell her labor to the capitalist in order merely to survive. However, the struggle of the worker to survive, to get her means of subsistence, directly results in the growth of capital on which she is wholly dependent despite the fact that it is nothing other than the result of her labor. Therefore, what the worker produces is an external, alien power which is in a direct opposition to her.

In the conditions dealt with by political economy this realization of labor appears as loss of reality for the workers; objectification of labor appears as loss of the object and object-bondage; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation.\(^{147}\)

As a result, even though modern political economy correctly conceives labor as the source of wealth it does not take notice of the negative moment lying in labor and “conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labor by not considering the direct relationship between the worker (labor) and production.”\(^{148}\) Marx thus shows that the plight of labor is not a contingent result of the movement of private property, on the contrary private property itself presupposes estranged labor. In this sense, “political economy has merely formulated the laws of estranged labor.”\(^{149}\)

\(^{147}\) Ibid., p. 71.

\(^{148}\) Ibid., p. 73.

\(^{149}\) Ibid., p. 81.
Finally, it may be useful to point out the great achievement of political economy\textsuperscript{150} for Marx that it conceives the essence of wealth not outside human but as human’s labor, i.e., it takes private property as activity and thus subjectively. Private property emerges as a subject, as person but its subjective essence is nothing other than labor in general.\textsuperscript{151} Accordingly, wealth no longer depends on something objective such as precious materials, as in the mercantilism, or on agricultural labor which is something subjective but has not yet gained the pure form of labor, as in the physiocracy. With modern political economy, however, labor as industrial labor, which is abstracted from all specific labors, becomes the principle of political economy and the essence of wealth is conceived as pure labor, \textit{labor in general}. Therefore, all externality of wealth is stripped away and its essence is identified with the essence of human, i.e., labor.\textsuperscript{152}

Land becomes subjected to the industry and emerges as a branch of industry itself, and therefore, private property shows itself as “a world-historical power” by overcoming all local ties, all external aspects of wealth. With the appearance of the land proprietor as a capitalist and the subjection of agricultural labor to industrial labor, the opposition between landed property and capital is dissolved in favor of capital.

\textit{Landed property} in its distinction from capital is private property – capital— still afflicted with \textit{local} and political prejudices; it is capital which has not regained itself from its entanglement with the world, capital not yet \textit{fully-developed}. It must in the course of its \textit{world-wide development} achieve its abstract, that is, its \textit{pure expression}.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{150} We must point to the fact that, in Marx’s view, modern political economy is nothing other than a reflection of modern capitalist relations of production in ideas and, in this sense, the achievement of modern political economy is that of the modern relations of production.

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844}, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., pp. 96-7.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p. 92.
However, according to Marx, political economists see only the positive side of labor, which historically emerges as the source of all wealth, since they ignore the fact of estranged labor; the subjective essence of wealth is posited as human essence, as labor, and all external aspects of wealth cleaned out, but in the capitalist relations of production the domination over human is completed because human is confronted with wealth, which is the product of her own essence, her own labor, as an external and alien power.

Under the semblance of recognizing man, the political economy whose principal is labor is really no more than consistent implementation of the denial of man, since man himself no longer stands in an external relation of tension to the external substance of private property, but has himself become this tensed essence of private property.154

3.2. The Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic

Marx’s critique of Hegel’s dialectic in 1844 Manuscripts aims at exposing the relationship between Hegel’s dialectic and “modern critical movement.”155 Actually, for Marx, this dialectic belongs to old philosophy, while new one is to be established by means of Feuerbach’s “Theses.” Since the Young-Hegelians, like David Strauss and Bruno Bauer, “remain wholly within the confines of the Hegelian logic”156 and Feuerbach’s success in his critique of Hegel is significant but limited, the present task for Marx is to proceed to criticize “the Hegelian dialectic generally, especially its exposition in the Phenomenology and Logic.”157

---

154 Ibid., p. 94.
155 Ibid., p. 141.
156 Ibid., p. 142.
157 Ibid., p. 141.
1844 Manuscripts is mainly aimed as a study on political economy and also as its critique from within. Against this background, it is expected that Marx needs to enter into a discussion and offer a critique of Hegel’s philosophy insofar as it has decisive common points with political economy; otherwise in a study on political economy the critique of Hegel would seem plainly arbitrary. As we have stated in the previous chapter, Marx was fully aware of the part of “civil society” in The Philosophy of Right, in which Hegel mainly discusses the objects of political economy, and promised to fulfill the critique of Hegel’s ‘civil society’. But his critique of Hegel in 1844 Manuscripts neither considers Hegel’s Philosophy of Right nor attempts to show some common points between Hegel’s discussion on ‘civil society’ and political economy. It is true that Marx thinks that Hegel and political economy share the same standpoint; however, this is a result of Marx’s aim to discuss Hegel’s dialectic in more general terms and present it as the self-creation of human. To this aim, he turns to Hegel’s Phenomenology and criticizes its concluding chapter, “Absolute Knowing”, in which, for Marx, human overcomes estrangement [Entfremdung] only in thought, even though Hegel conceives that human objectifies her potential powers throughout history and in society. Therefore, it is only after Marx presents communism as “the positive transcendence of private property” that Hegel’s dialectic becomes a current issue because it is exactly the same process at issue which is considered from different perspectives. What draws Marx’s attention to Hegel’s description of this process is “the dialectic of negativity”, which implies a return to itself from its own opposite and the transcendence of estrangement, and according to Marx, it is closely related to communism as the abolition of private

158 Ibid., p. 150.

159 Ibid., p. 102.

property and thus estrangement. It is due to this dialectic of negativity that in his *1844 Manuscripts* Marx attempts to both appropriate and criticize Hegel.

Before analyzing Marx’s critique of Hegel in detail, it may be useful to point out what Marx appropriates in Hegel and what he finds wanting in Hegel. Marx expresses Hegel’s achievement in the following way:

We learn from this passage that Hegel had achieved, in Marx’s eyes, much more than Feuerbach thought. According to Marx, *Phenomenology* presents “the self-genesis of man”: human makes herself. Before human becomes truly human, it is necessary for her to realize all her potential powers, and this is possible only through a long historical process which necessitates a mediation—a mediation, according to which, in order to become truly human, human objectifies her potential powers by entering into a relation with the objective world, working on natural objects and creates institutions, which first occurs as a process of alienation, and then ends with the transcendence of this alienation.

One may well ask to what Marx objects in Hegel and why he subjects him to a sharp critique if the case is exactly so. At the beginning of his critique, Marx explains Hegel’s fault in the following way:

[Hegel] has only found the *abstract, logical, speculative* expression for the movement of history; and this historical process is not yet the *real* history of man—of man as a given subject but only man’s *act of genesis*—the *story* of man’s origin.\(^{162}\)

\(^{161}\) Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 149.

\(^{162}\) Ibid., p. 145.
According to Marx, in his *Phenomenology* Hegel presents the history of human in an abstract way and does not explain the real history of human. In spite of all his significant achievements, Hegel does not succeed in showing human situation in its reality, but only in an ‘abstract’, ‘logical’, ‘speculative’ manner. His *Phenomenology* is in Marx’s eyes “the mystified theory of communism”\(^\text{163}\), but it presents the historical path to communism as the production of pure thought. For Marx, this is not an innocent attempt, and with regard to its conclusions it is a mystifying one. The reason why it is not innocent is not that Hegel has some secret aims other than his philosophical one, but that Hegel’s standpoint necessarily brings him to present actual situation in a mystifying way which eventually justifies the existing situation. We will now see Marx’s evaluation of Hegel’s dialectic step by step.

In his *Preliminary Theses for the Reform of Philosophy*, Feuerbach says the method of speculative philosophy to be same as that of the philosophy of religion: both invert the predicate to the subject. Therefore, according to Feuerbach, what must be done in order to achieve the truth is to invert this inversion again. In Hegel, thinking is separated from thinking being and placed before nature and human. For Feuerbach, Hegel’s main fault is to begin with philosophy instead of nature and human. For this reason, he separates thinking from thinking being and inverts the subject-predicate relation by making thinking itself the subject. In speculative philosophy, the determinations pertaining to the finite are made the determinations of the infinite, and what is affirmed is only theology itself. Pointing out the last paragraph of Hegel’s *Logic*, Feuerbach says the following:

*He who clings to Hegelian philosophy also clings to theology.* The Hegelian doctrine that nature or reality is posited by the Idea, is the

rationally expressed of the theological doctrine that nature, the material being, has been created by God, the non-material; i.e., abstract, being. At the end of the Logic, the absolute Idea even comes to a nebulous “decision” to document with its own hands its descent from the theological heaven.164

Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel depends on reading Hegelian philosophy as a rationalized theology and thus a certain comment on the status of Hegel’s ‘Idea’. As seen from the above quotation, Feuerbach interprets ‘Idea’ as the God of theology. Therefore, for the philosophy of the future he suggests to negate, and thus realize, Hegelian philosophy and to take human herself for self-consciousness, which is isolated from human in Hegel. Although Marx’s main interest does not lie in whether Hegel’s philosophy has a theological character or not, he still shares the essence of Feuerbach’s accusation of theology. Marx accepts Feuerbach’s comment on Hegel and to some extent sees Hegel’s ‘Idea’ as the God of theology; he also agrees with Feuerbach on the necessity of inverting Hegel’s philosophy in order to achieve the truth. In 1844 Manuscripts, he talks about this ‘decision’ made by Idea in Logic, as in Feuerbach.

[164] Feuerbach, L., “Preliminary Theses for the Reform of Philosophy”, trans. Zawar Hanfi, pp. 42-59, in German Socialist Philosophy, ed. Wolfgang Schirmacher, Continuum Publishing Company, New York, 1997, p. 55. In his Logic Hegel puts it as follows: “The absolute freedom of the Idea, however, is that it does not merely pass over into life, nor that it lets life shine within itself as finite cognition, but that, in the absolute truth of itself, it resolves to release out of itself into freedom the moment of its particularity or of the initial determining and otherness, [i.e.,] the immediate Idea as its reflexion, or itself as Nature.” The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 244, p. 307. It is clear, however, from Hegel’s system itself that to ascribe consciousness and personality to Idea would be wrong. Frederick Copleston regards Hegel’s use of such a theist language as “a concession to the mode of thought which is characteristic of the religious consciousness.” Copleston, F., A History of Philosophy, Vol. VII, Doubleday Dell Publishing, New York, 1994, p. 196.
to have a look at nature free of abstraction [...] This entire translation from Logic to Natural Philosophy is nothing else but the transition [...] from abstracting to intuiting.¹⁶⁵

Although, as we have seen, Marx reads Hegel together with Feuerbachian interpretation, his critique does not merely consist of repeating Feuerbach’s critiques. His main aim is not to stop in reading Hegel’s philosophy as the affirmation of theology, but to extract valuable elements from Hegel’s philosophy and to use them for a revolutionary thought. To this aim, Marx attempts to discuss Hegel’s philosophy in a general context¹⁶⁶, which is different from theology: the history of “self-genesis of man”. To this aim, Marx finds similarities in Hegel’s philosophy not with theology, but with political economy, and finally makes use of it in his critique of political economy. We will now see what an implication such a perspective has for Marx’s aims.

Hegel’s great philosophical system consists of three main parts: Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit. He takes these three parts as the determinations of Idea, according to which, Logic deals with “Idea in and for itself”, Philosophy of Nature “Idea in its otherness”, and finally, Philosophy of Spirit “Idea that returns into itself out of its otherness”.¹⁶⁷ Hegel conceives nature as the otherness of logical Idea, and regards the finite realm of nature essentially as ‘externality’. Idea can be found in nature only implicitly and is in it the ‘negative’ of itself: “Nature is self-alienated Spirit.”¹⁶⁸ And Spirit represents the return of Idea to itself from its otherness. Separating itself from nature, Spirit overcomes the externality of nature, or its own externality, and therefore is “truth

¹⁶⁵ Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 164.

¹⁶⁶ When Marx talks about “Hegel’s false positivism or of his merely apparent criticism”, he remarks that “Feuerbach designated [it] as the positing, negation, and re-establishing of religion or theology—but it has to be grasped in more general terms.” Ibid., p. 158.

¹⁶⁷ The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 18, p. 42.

of nature”; “Nature has vanished in this truth, and spirit has yielded itself as the Idea \textbf{which has attained to its being-for-self}.”\textsuperscript{169} However, spirit’s overcoming the externality of nature is a work of a long historical process, and in \textit{The Phenomenology of Spirit} Hegel, prior to his system, presented this process as the result of spirit’s own labor. The implication is clear: Idea posits itself as nature, and in the realm of spirit returns to itself out of nature, which is its otherness; what is before us is, therefore, not only substance, but also subject.\textsuperscript{170} Hegel puts this mediated identity in the following way:

\[ T \text{he living Substance is being which is in truth Subject, or what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself. This Substance is, as Subject, pure, simple negativity, and is for this very reason the bifurcation of the simple; it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its antithesis [the immediate simplicity]. Only this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself—not an original or immediate unity as such—is the True.}\textsuperscript{171}

Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} as “the Science of the experience of consciousness”\textsuperscript{172} attempts to raise ordinary consciousness, which immediately confronts with an external object, to the level of science, in which the externality of the object of consciousness is finally overcome. By considering knowledge in its process of development, Hegel shows how a simpler form of consciousness necessarily, i.e. because of its inner contradiction, passes beyond itself and gives


\textsuperscript{170} “In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as \textit{Substance}, but equally as \textit{Subject}.” Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, § 17, pp. 9-10.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., § 18, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., § 88, p. 56.
its place to a more complex form of consciousness. In this dialectic of consciousness, what changes is not merely the form of consciousness; the subject and the object of consciousness change too. By becoming aware of its inadequate knowledge, consciousness enters into a different relation with its object, and thereby changes its attitude toward its object and itself assumes a different form; and “as the knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge.”\(^{173}\) The whole process of this ever changing relation between consciousness and its object leads to, by passing through various stages, absolute knowing in which consciousness gets rid of the “alien” character of its object and conceives it as “its own essence”.\(^ {174}\) Accordingly, every form of consciousness discovers that the determination of its object is actually its own determination; for instance, in ‘sensuous or immediate consciousness’, the object is considered as ‘immediate being’, and therefore, consciousness takes its own determination as the determination of its object.\(^ {175}\) Finally, the whole process emerges as “Self’s own act” and so the opposition between consciousness and its object is overcome and the alien character of the object is given an end to. The role of philosopher is to show this process in its entirety:

Our own act here has been simply to gather together the separate moments, each of which in principle exhibits the life of Spirit in its entirety, and also stick to the Notion in the form of the Notion, the content of which would already have yielded itself in those moments and in the form of a shape of consciousness.\(^ {176}\)

Therefore, at the end of *Phenomenology*, Hegel thinks that the education of ordinary consciousness to the science is completed because the entire journey of

\(^{173}\) Ibid., § 85, p. 54.

\(^{174}\) Ibid., § 89, pp. 56-7.

\(^{175}\) Ibid., § 789, p. 480.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., § 797, p. 485.
consciousness ends in the identity of subject and object. According to him, thinking can now begin to think itself and concentrate upon itself, and *Phenomenology* gives its place to *Logic*: “we now understand that we can determine the true nature of being merely by determining the true character of thought itself”.

What Marx finds significant, and also mystifying, in Hegel is related to this journey of consciousness. He reads Hegel’s *Phenomenology* as follows: human makes herself. First, human transforms nature by working on it, stamping her mark upon it, creates institutions in order to feel herself at home in this world, realizes and objectifies her potential powers throughout history. As a result, what is before her is no longer an external world, but her own making: it is a thoroughly humanized world. Human becomes human only through her labor. Nevertheless, the process by which human becomes truly human, human revealing all her species-powers, is burdened with a serious contradiction. In this process of externalization, human first realizes herself in a situation of estrangement. Objects and institutions she created are estranged beings and opposed to her. Therefore, human also needs to overcome this estrangement. It must be pointed out that human’s objectification of her powers necessarily brings about estrangement, but it is not a necessity which must remain as unchanged throughout history. It is through this mediation of estrangement, by passing through this negative moment that human can return to herself as truly human. For Marx, the transcendence of estrangement, which occurs especially in the form of private property, is communism, and Hegel’s *Phenomenology* does nothing other than to present it in the form of Spirit’s returning to itself from its alienation.

[...] communism is humanism mediated with itself through the annulment of private property. Only through the annulment of this mediation—which is itself, however, a necessary premise—does

---

positively self-derived humanism, positive humanism, come to being.\textsuperscript{178}

It is, therefore, ‘the dialectic of negativity’ which draws Marx’s attention and he wants to draw attention to. Communism, as the establishment of human’s complete freedom from alienation and her appropriation of nature, if it is to be a possibility or even necessity of human life, must certainly have as its presupposition a historical past upon which private property, or human’s estrangement, stamps its mark. The whole process is related to human’s genesis, i.e. human’s becoming for herself and nature’s becoming for human. At the same time, for Marx, it is the genesis of communism which does not deny private property but knows it to be its presupposition; “the entire revolutionary movement necessarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the movement of private property—in that of the economy, to be precise.”\textsuperscript{179}

For Marx, what Hegel conceives in Phenomenology is exactly this genesis of human, but the result Hegel arrives is not same as that of Marx. Hegel does really conceive the movement of human’s genesis and describes it in Phenomenology but, according to Marx, in an abstract manner. Therefore, the result is also an abstract one; it is the transcendence of estrangement only in thought.

Focusing on the last chapter of Phenomenology, “Absolute Knowing”, Marx remarks that the entire movement of this work is “to surmount the object of consciousness.”\textsuperscript{180} Hegel starts to Phenomenology with the simplest form of consciousness, and to speak about consciousness is to have a non-consciousness. “Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the

\textsuperscript{178} Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., p. 103.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., p. 150.
same time relates itself to it.”181 Since consciousness as awareness implies an existence of something which is different from consciousness itself, it immediately exists together with its object. “The way in which consciousness is, and in which something is for it, is knowing. Knowing is its sole act. Something therefore comes to be for consciousness insofar as the latter knows this something.”182 For this reason, the object seems to have no true being outside this relation of knowing, and consciousness knows itself when it knows its object because the object is “its self-alienation”.183 Therefore, the entire Phenomenology from the beginning depends on the distinction between subject and object, on knowing the object and finally on overcoming its external nature. According to Marx, the main steps in this process are as follows:

In the exertion of surmounting the object of consciousness, the object presents itself to consciousness not as something self-subsistent but as something vanishing; since human is regarded as equal to self-consciousness what self-consciousness establishes is nothing other than an abstraction because it is itself an abstraction made from human: the object is its own self-externalization; this externalization has also a positive significance for self-consciousness; by externalizing itself self-consciousness establishes itself as object; in this way, self-consciousness has transcended this externality and is “thus at home with itself in its other-being as such”.184

Hegel’s significance for Marx lies, as we have noted, in (1) his conception of labor, (2) his awareness for alienation, and (3) his view of the history of human as a process which through the mediation of alienation leads to the transcendence of alienation. And according to him, Hegel presents the dialectic of human history

181 Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, § 82, p. 52.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid., p. 156.
in an *abstract* way and in his eyes human is equal to consciousness. As a result, Hegel’s conclusion is also mistaken; the abolition of alienation occurs only in thought; the solution to alienation is a solution only in thought. For Marx, therefore, “The *Phenomenology* is, therefore, an occult critique —still to itself obscure and mystifying criticism.”\(^\text{185}\)

In order to subject Hegel’s dialectic to critique, Marx, like Feuerbach, tries to invert Hegel and pass beyond his standpoint. Actually, as Marx puts it, “there lie concealed in it [*Phenomenology*] all the elements of criticism, already *prepared* and *elaborated* in a manner often rising far above the Hegelian standpoint.”\(^\text{186}\) But from the standpoint of Marx, it is not sufficiently critical, and eventually comes to justify the existing situation —a situation which marks the culmination of estrangement. So, for him, what must be done is to invert Hegel’s inverted starting point, if we really want to criticize the world of human in all its aspects, since it seems to make human the predicate and consciousness the subject, whereas consciousness belongs to human and not *vice versa*.

Before proceeding to an exposition of Marx’s critique, we need to clarify one point: in Marx’s eyes, it is true that Hegel’s standpoint does mystify and hence justify the existing world, but it is equally clear that he does not do this consciously or due to his personal views. Hegel does not falsify or distort any given condition, what he does is to present in his entire system *what is as it is*, and according to the principle of his system. For this reason, Marx does not speak about Hegel’s distortion, but simply says that “there is a double error in Hegel”\(^\text{187}\) which leads him to obscure a true understanding of the existing state of affairs. It is this double mistake which constitutes the essence of Marx’s critique of Hegel.

\(^{185}\) Ibid., p. 148.

\(^{186}\) Ibid., p. 149. Marx here mentions “unhappy consciousness”, “honest consciousness”, “noble and base consciousness” as having “critical elements”, but does not attempt to exhibit them in a detailed analysis.

\(^{187}\) Ibid., p. 147.
Since his starting point or principle is wrong, he necessarily arrives at wrong conclusions or solutions. Marx puts it as follows:

There can therefore no longer be any question about an act of accommodation of Hegel’s part vis-à-vis religion, the state, etc., since this lie is the lie of his principle.  

Firstly, Hegel treats all human products, such as the state-power, as if they were “thought-entities, and therefore merely an estrangement of pure, i.e., abstract, philosophical thinking.” According to this standpoint, what has a genuine existence is not any empirical entity, but the thought itself. Everything is reduced to only an appearance while the true reality is confined merely to Idea. In his Logic, Hegel himself seems to hold that all finite things find their ground of existence in Idea.

The true situation is that the things of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances, not only for us, but also in-themselves, and that the proper determination of these things, which are in this sense “finite”, consists in having the ground of their being not within themselves but in the universal divine Idea.

Opposing Kant’s conception of objectivity, Hegel argues that the finite things are appearances not because we have no direct connection with the thing in-itself, but because these finite things are mere appearances of something higher called Idea. It is Idea that constitutes their ground of existence. For Marx, “the existing

---

188 Ibid., p. 329.

189 Ibid., p. 147. In passing, we should note that Hegel is aware that such an accusation may be directed against philosophy from the standpoint of ordinary consciousness. “Realistic consciousness” thinks that “philosophy is concerned only with the mental entities. As a matter of fact, philosophy does have to do with them too, recognizing them as the pure essences, the absolute elements and powers; but in doing so, recognizes them in their specific determinateness as well, and is therefore master over them.” Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, § 131, pp. 77-8.

190 The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 45, pp. 88-89.
empirical world” is thus dissolved by Hegel who gives it only a status of appearance. Accordingly, the true existence shows itself only in its philosophy. Thus,

... the true existence of religion, the state, nature, and art is the philosophy of religion, of nature, of the state and of art. If, however, the philosophy of religion, etc., is for me the sole true existence of religion, then, too, it is only as a philosopher of religion that I am truly religious, and so I deny real religious sentiment and the really religious man.\(^{191}\)

This is exactly what Marx regards as one side of Hegel’s double error which as a result brings about a mystification. As a result of such a conception of objectivity, according to Marx, human objectification and estrangement assume a different meaning from their true implication:

It is not the fact that human being objectifies himself inhumanly, in opposition to himself, but the fact that he objectifies himself in distinction from and in opposition to abstract thinking that is the posited essence of the estrangement and the thing to be superseded. The appropriation of man’s essential powers, which have become objects—indeed, alien objects—is thus in the first place only an appropriation occurring in consciousness, in pure thought—i.e., in abstraction.\(^{192}\)

In Marx’s eyes, it is Hegel’s great success that he presents objectification and estrangement in human history, but he does this in an inverted way so that objectification means at the same time estrangement. Since he confines “the existing empirical world” to appearance, that is, an appearance of thought, all human objectification is regarded not only as objectification of human’s species powers, but also as objectification of human in distinction from thought. The problem, then, for Hegel, is not human’s estrangement from herself but that all

---

\(^{191}\) Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 159.

\(^{192}\) Ibid., p. 148.
human products are not directly identical with thought itself. Therefore, according to Marx, as a result of Hegel’s conception of objectivity, there occurs a fundamental change in the meaning of objectification and estrangement so that the transcendence of estrangement also means the transcendence of objectivity.

Self-consciousness has equally superseded this externalization and objectivity too, and taken it back into itself so that it is in communion with itself in its otherness as such. This is the movement of consciousness, and in that movement consciousness is the totality of its moments.\textsuperscript{193}

The second side of Hegel’s double error depends on “the vindication of the objective world for man.”\textsuperscript{194} In Marx’s view, Hegel, on the one hand, reduces the existing empirical world merely to an appearance, sees nature as Idea’s self-alienated being and so considers all human objectification not in its true implication but in its relation to abstract thought, and on the other hand, he takes human products as “phases of \textit{mind},”\textsuperscript{195} which as such bears a mark of necessity. So “the existing empirical world” is restored and justified as a phase of mind. Since, for Hegel, the true nature of human is merely thought, what is genuine in human is her thinking characteristic. Therefore, all her objectification is an objectification of thought, and even though human products are human objectification “distinct from and in opposition to abstract thinking” they nevertheless are seen as thought-entities because what produces them is human, whose essence is thought. “Just as the \textit{entities, objects} appear as thought-entities, so the \textit{subject} is always \textit{consciousness} or \textit{self-consciousness}.”\textsuperscript{196} It follows that Hegel conceives the estrangement only as that of consciousness and does not take it into account in its true meaning.

\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit}, § 788, p. 479.

\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844}, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., p. 149.
All estrangement of the human essence is therefore *nothing but estrangement of self-consciousness*. The estrangement of self-consciousness is not regarded as an expression of the real estrangement of the human being–its expression reflected in the realm of knowledge and thought.\(^{197}\)

Now, in order to fully grasp this critique of Marx we need to remember Feuerbach’s critique which accuses Hegel of reestablishing theology by the mediation of philosophy. Hegel first poses the infinite and then transcends it in philosophy by positing the finite. And again he transcends the finite and reestablishes the infinite. Therefore, for Feuerbach, Hegel’s negation of negation is “a contradiction of philosophy with itself–as the philosophy which affirms theology (the transcendent, etc.) after having denied it, and which it therefore affirms in opposition to itself.”\(^{198}\)

Marx reinterprets this critique of Feuerbach in a wholly different context. Hegel ascribes the true existence only to the existence in philosophy, and thus denies the empirical existence. However, he also affirms the existence of what is empirical as self-externalization.

In Hegel, therefore, the negation of the negation is not the confirmation of the true essence, effected precisely through the negation of the pseudo-essence. With him, the negation of the negation is the pseudo-essence, or of the self-estranged essence in its denial; or it is the denial of this pseudo-essence as an objective being dwelling outside man and independent of him and its transformation into the subject.\(^{199}\)

In this confirmation everything in human world becomes a *moment* and thus despite its transcendence it continues to exist. For instance, according to Marx, in

\(^{197}\) Ibid., p. 151.

\(^{198}\) Ibid., p. 144.

\(^{199}\) Ibid., p. 159.
Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, family is the transcended morality, civil society is the transcended family, etc. However, their existence is not denied, they only become moments. Therefore, their transcendence occurs only in thought without any real change in their existence.

On the one hand, this act of superseding is a transcending of the thought entity; thus, Private Property *as a thought* is transcended in the *thought of morality*. And because thought imagines itself to be directly the other of itself, to be *sensuous reality*—and therefore takes its own action for *sensuous, real action*—this superseding in thought, which leaves its object standing in the real world, believes that it has really overcome it. On the other hand, because the object has now become for it a moment of thought, thought takes it in its reality too to be self-confirmation of itself, of self-consciousness, of abstraction.200

Hegel’s conception of objectivity thus implies that objectivity in general, together with alienation, at the end of the entire movement of *Phenomenology* must be overcome, whereas in reality everything stands as it is since the transcendence of alienation occurs in thought. Marx puts it as follows:

*Objectivity* as such is regarded as an estranged human relationship which does not correspond to the *essence of man*, to self-consciousness. The re-appropriation of the objective essence of man, begotten in the form of estrangement as something alien, has the meaning therefore not only to annul estrangement, but objectivity as well. Man, that is to say, is regarded as a non-objective, spiritual being.201

Regarding human essentially as a spiritual being, as thinking, Hegel conceives all human labor as philosophical labor, labor of pure thought. This is immediately clear from Hegel’s conception of objectivity according to which *Logic* constitutes the *thought-value* of everything existing. For Marx, therefore, true labor in

---

200 Ibid., p. 160.

201 Ibid., pp. 150-1.
Hegel’s view is the labor of thought itself because he conceives what constitutes the essence of philosophy as the essence of labor:

Hegel’s standpoint is that of modern political economy. He grasps labor as the essence of man—as man’s essence in the act of proving itself: he sees only the positive, not the negative side of labor. Labor is man’s coming-to-be for himself within alienation, or as abstractly mental labor. Therefore, that which constitutes the essence of philosophy—the alienation of man in his knowing of himself or alienated science thinking itself—Hegel grasps as its essence.\footnote{Ibid., p. 150.}

The story of human’s self-creation told by Hegel in the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} is, in Marx’s view, of abstract character and presented as the work of spirit, and even though it reflects the main movement of the progression of human history, it does this “within the sphere of abstraction.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 161.}

It is true that human through his labor transforms nature before her, but in her labor she first objectifies herself, realizes her species powers before appropriating the object, which she works on, to herself. In this objectification is the moment of externalization immediately presented; she must externalize her powers in the object and put them outside herself. It is only through this mediation that she can truly appropriate the object to herself and develop her powers. Therefore, by transforming nature human also makes herself a human in its strict sense; it is through one and same process that human gives nature a human shape and becomes a truly human. From Marx’s viewpoint, in \textit{Phenomenology} this whole process is described as “man’s act of self-genesis”. And it is exactly this aspect of Hegel’s thought that Marx regards as a great discovery.

However, Hegel presents human’s self-creation thoroughly in an abstract and formal manner. The main problem with his description is that he considers
“sensuous reality” as mere appearance and so human is for him in its essence equal to self-consciousness. As a result, for Hegel, the dimension of estrangement in human life is not seen in that human objectifies himself “inhumanly”, but that she does this “in opposition to thought.” It is exactly for this reason that Marx says that “he sees only the positive, not the negative side of labor,” and in this sense he shares the same ‘standpoint’ with modern political economy, which conceives labor as the source of wealth but does not consider the estrangement of labor in the world of private property.

According to Marx, Hegel regards human as equal to self-consciousness, with him the transcendence of human’s alienation is an abstract transcendence remaining within the realm of thought, and so it amounts to the vindication of the existing situation of human. Above all, the subject of the process of self-creation is not human herself but Spirit, and human is degraded to merely a predicate. “Subject and predicate are therefore related to each other in absolute inversion.”204 Consequently, in Hegel’s eyes, this process is “a divine process,”205 and what is before us is a “divine dialectic” which, on the one hand, puts its abstractions outside nature and reduces it into an appearance, and, on the other hand, tries to demonstrate its abstractions in nature:

[T]he abstract thinker learns in his intuition of nature that the entities which he thought to create from nothing, from pure abstraction—the entities he believed he was producing in the divine dialectic as pure products of the labor of thought forever weaving in itself and never looking outward—are nothing else but abstractions from characteristics of nature. To him, therefore, the whole of nature merely repeats the logical abstractions in a sensuous, external form.206

204 Ibid., p. 162.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid., p. 165-6.
Against this divine dialectic, Marx poses his ‘worldly dialectic’. It is clear from Marx’s praise of Hegel that Marx has no problem with the dialectic viewpoint which characterizes the movement of Phenomenology. The problem for Marx arises as to the starting point which, in case of Hegel’s philosophy, indicates an idealist standpoint. For Marx, Hegel accepts the primacy of thought and makes thought into a subject, whereas Marx, with Feuerbach, insists on the primacy of nature, sense certainty, or sensuous reality over thought.

Marx expresses his worldly dialectic by the mediation of his critique of Hegel. He does this in his three main polemics against Hegel in general: human cannot be reduced to self-consciousness; objectivity cannot be regarded as a defect; and the real estrangement demands the real transcendence. For Marx, human cannot be regarded as equal to self-consciousness because self-consciousness is only one of the qualities of human. If the starting point is determined as self-consciousness and not as human, the relation between subject and object cannot be other than a cognitive relation. Since self-consciousness is only a quality of human being it is human being himself, not self-consciousness, whose estrangement is real. The estrangement of human nature shows itself in human thought, and it is exactly for this reason that we talk about the estrangement of self-consciousness. Therefore, if we take the real estrangement as belonging to self-consciousness the solution to estrangement can only be found within thought since in this case the only relation is a cognitive one. For this reason, Marx insists on “real, corporeal man with his feet firmly on the solid ground, man exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature,”\(^{207}\) instead of confining himself merely to self-consciousness which he sees only as an abstraction made from human.

### 3.3. An Overview

\(^{207}\) Ibid., p. 154.
In *1844 Manuscripts*, Marx aims to criticize Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Logic*, but he mainly deals with the former. It is clear from his own words concerning Feuerbach that Marx gives him credit to destroy Hegelian dialectic and tries to present a criticism of Hegelian dialectic similar to Feuerbach’s critique. However, Marx’s critique of Hegel in *1844 Manuscripts* is also an attempt to appropriate Hegel’s dialectic and to reinterpret it in the context of political economy. This is clear both from his critique of political economists who take the results of the movement of private property as contingent, whereas these necessarily arise from the nature of private property, and do not conceive the inner connections in their movement and as constituting a connected whole, and his critique of Hegel who conceives the movement of history through his conception of the dialectic of negativity and finds the solution to the estrangement only in absolute knowing for he considers the course of history abstractly.

In this chapter, we have concentrated on Marx’s attempt to distinguish himself from Hegel’s standpoint which, in Marx’s eyes, appears as ‘divine dialectic’ and to emphasize his position essentially as ‘worldly’. However, it is also clear that, for all his critique, Marx is aware that Hegel’s *Phenomenology* has serious critical implications which may only result from its close familiarity with the actual situation of human. It follows that Hegel has nothing to do with breaking from the worldly content; on the contrary, he always stresses that philosophy never parts with actuality –a point, which, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, constitutes a foundation for Marx’s accusation of Hegel for justifying the existing state of affairs. As David Carvounas puts it, “Marx is entitled to be dissatisfied with Hegel’s solution, but in stressing the need for revolution in order to overcome alienation, it seems Marx *overstresses* Hegel’s idealism to make his point.”

---

Hegel’s *Phenomenology* attempts to show how the experience of consciousness gradually leads to the standpoint of philosophy in which the subject takes itself as its object; pointing out the conceptual thinking is immanent to even most simple shape of consciousness, Hegel exhibits that every shape of consciousness indicates its own beyond and finally the series of the shapes of consciousness results in absolute knowledge. What is striking in *Phenomenology* is that it takes knowledge in the process of its becoming and incorporates in this process society and history. As Herbert Marcuse clearly puts it, “Hegel’s *Phenomenology* breaks with Kant’s transcendental conception: history and society enter into the theory of knowledge (and into the very structure of knowledge) and do away with the ‘purity’ of the a priori; the materialization of the idea of freedom begins.” Even though Marx accuses Hegel of making human equal with consciousness, Hegel replaces the knower or the subject neither with consciousness nor an abstraction of human; unlike Kant who takes the subject of knowledge independent from history and social relations, Hegel speaks of individuals in their social relations and in their historical existence. In his *Phenomenology* he really proceeds from consciousness to self-consciousness to Reason and finally to Spirit, but he points out that what is concrete is Spirit and all shapes of consciousness preceding Spirit is only its moments which can only be isolated in thinking, and it is exactly for this reason that Hegel names his *Phenomenology* not of consciousness, but of Spirit:

Spirit is thus self-supporting, absolute, real being. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstracts of it. They result from Spirit analyzing itself, distinguishing its moments, and dwelling for a while with each. This isolating of those moments *presupposes* Spirit itself and subsists therein; in other words, the isolation exists only in Spirit which is a concrete existence. In this isolation they have the appearance of really existing as such; but they are only

moments or vanishing quantities is shown by their advance and retreat into their ground and essence.\textsuperscript{210}

Hegel thus shows that Spirit objectifies itself throughout history and thereby tends to abolish the external and alien character of its object; and according to him, this abolition is only possible in philosophy. In this sense, Hegel has nothing to do with abolishing objectivity as such, and this can be clearly seen from the fact that for Hegel the identity of subjectivity and objectivity is entirely accomplished only in philosophy, not in practice. This conception has also its parallel in Marx’s thought: He argues that, no matter nature takes human form and comes to be for human being and no matter human labor is freed from estrangement, human’s interaction with nature nevertheless remains necessary one. Marx thus associates freedom with production free from utility and need, with artistic activity\textsuperscript{211} in general:

Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, while man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom […] man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms things in accordance with the laws of beauty.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{210} Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, § 440, p. 264. It is, as we will see in the chapter on “Revolutionary Dialectic”, a characteristic feature of Hegel’s procedure that he does not presuppose the concrete, but tries to show it as the result by proceeding from the simplest determination.


\textsuperscript{212} Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 77. Marx maintains this position in his Capital, arguing that human’s relation to nature even in communist society remains “the realm of necessity”: “The realm of freedom really begins only where labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends […] Freedom, in this sphere [in the realm of natural necessity], can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism
As a result, Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is also not devoid of worldly character; on the contrary, the power of his dialectic depends on being firmly related to actuality. It is interesting that Feuerbach sees in Hegel’s thought a secret theology and tries to show its truth as theology; however, nothing can be further from truth than this accusation because, for Hegel, it is exactly philosophy which is the truth of theology. Though in his *1844 Manuscripts* Marx himself praises Feuerbach, his position is not identified with that of Feuerbach because he attempts to give a worldly content to, or deepen the already existing worldly content of Hegel’s dialectic. In other words, he does not transform the worldly problems into the theological ones, as does Feuerbach. And in his critique of Hegel, no matter he desires to arrive at an atheist conclusion, Feuerbach still remains within the confines of a theological discussion, whereas Marx attempts to read Hegel’s *Phenomenology* in the context of political economy and to see in it the rise of communism. Therefore, Marx’s critique of Hegel in his *1844 Manuscripts* does not aim at rejecting or destroying Hegel’s dialectic; rather, it tries to appropriate dialectic and to interpret it in the context of political economy. It is through the mediation of critique of Hegel that Marx comes to establish a close contact with Hegel’s dialectic and further advances its worldly character.

CHAPTER IV

NON-SPECULATIVE DIALECTIC

In a letter to his father, dated 1837, Marx says the following concerning ‘method’:

The nature of the triangle induces the mathematician to construct it, demonstrate its properties, but it remains a mere idea in space and undergoes no further development. We must put the triangle beside another form. Then it assumes different positions, and the other form with its various relative positions endows the triangle with different relations and truths. On the other hand, in the concrete expression of the living world of thought–as in law, the state, nature, philosophy as a whole–the object must be studied in its development; there must be no arbitrary classifications; the rationale of the thing itself must be disclosed in all its contradictoriness and find its unity in itself.\(^{213}\)

In this passage, which is, as Hyppolite argues\(^{214}\), inspired by Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, Marx points out that in a scientific analysis the method should not be external to its object and there should be no place for a ready-made schema. It follows that, for him, the method must reflect the inner unity of the object together with its contradictions. This view concerning method applies to all Marx’s works, and even in *Capital* he maintains his position. He is fully aware of the fact that the method can also be used for justifying any aim whatsoever if it is taken as external to its object and the object is conformed to it. In his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state, he directed against Hegel such an accusation:


\(^{214}\) *Studies on Marx and Hegel*, p. 94.
… true philosophical criticism of the present state constitution not only shows the contradictions as existing, but explains them, grasps [begreift] their essence and necessity. It comprehends their own proper significance. However, this comprehension [Begreifen] does not, as Hegel thinks, consist in everywhere recognizing the determinations of the logical concept [des logischen Begriffs], but rather in grasping the proper logic of the proper object.\textsuperscript{215}

However, Marx’s critique is not limited to Hegel; he also targets the works of Bruno Bauer (and his friends) and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon because, according to Marx, they see the dialectic method as a key for any door and are not thus able to conceive its essence: in their hands, dialectic is reduced to a ‘dialectic of concepts’.

In \textit{The Holy Family} and \textit{The Poverty of Philosophy} Marx draws attention to such a failure regarding how to use the method and asserts that both Bauer and Proudhon understand nothing about Hegel’s dialectic and present only a caricatured form of dialectic, which amounts to the dialectic of concepts rather than of the fact itself. In these works, Marx gives a short account of Hegel’s dialectic and shows Hegel as one who “stands the world on its head”.\textsuperscript{216} In this chapter, we will consider Marx’s critique of Hegel in these works.

\subsection*{4.1. Against Speculative Method}

In \textit{The Holy Family}, Marx directly attacks to Bruno Bauer, who is Marx’s old friend and for a while his master, and Bauer’s friends, and in this attack Marx is

\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’}, p. 92.

now accompanied with Friedrich Engels, his new and later lifelong friend. Marx since his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state has come to pay attention to ‘civil society’ and political economy because, for him, all legal institutions originate in ‘civil society’, or rather in the material relations of production; furthermore, he has determined the proletariat to be the mediator of the realization of philosophy. And in his 1844 Manuscripts he has developed a critique both of political economy and Hegel. Marx now wants to detach himself from speculative philosophy and Bauer’s philosophy of self-consciousness which, for him, seems to fight with shadows.

To be sure, Feuerbach’s Theses caused a shift in such discussions and seemed to provide Marx with a firm foundation on which he develops his thought. But Feuerbach’s role is thoroughly limited to this sphere: he put an emphasis on ‘sense certainty’ and opposed materialism to idealism. For Marx, this is a necessary step for dealing with material relations of production and thereby grounding the communist worldview. However, 1844 Manuscripts is rather an attempt to unify idealism and materialism, even though it puts the emphasis on the materialist side. With The Holy Family, Marx openly rejects all kinds of idealism, adopts the materialist standpoint and attaches himself to the materialist tradition, and further tries to show materialism to be a presupposition of communism.

In The Holy Family, as consistent with his previous critique of Hegel, Marx argues with the abstract character of Hegel’s method, which in the hands of ‘Critical Critique’ of Bauer becomes ever more abstract. Marx’s critique is, however, no less abstract than the criticized method, though The Holy Family includes certain elements of the critique of Hegel in 1844 Manuscripts, which remained unpublished, and, arguing that “a few words will suffice to characterize speculative construction in general”\footnote{The Holy Family, p. 78.}, attempts to judge Hegel’s dialectic through a simple example of the ‘fruit’, with which we will deal below. Marx’s too general critique of Hegel in The Holy Family, however, mainly results from
the fact that his main concern in this work is to settle accounts with Bauer and his company, who still continue to remain within the limits of Hegel’s philosophy. Marx’s short critique of Hegel aims to shake the ground on which their thought is based. As Georg Lukács points out, “Marx draws a sharp distinction between Hegel and the Hegelians who have acquired only his defects.” Unlike them, Marx’s critical attitude toward Hegel prevents him from reducing dialectic to a schema and opens the way for fully penetrating the essence of dialectic.

First of all, according to Marx, Hegel’s speculative method proceeds from the data presented by understanding, which indicates that there are many different things in the world, and the fact that they are distinct consists in different sensuous properties they possess. However, what understanding has distinguished is combined by speculative reason, and thereby sensuous differences are disregarded because of their not being essential. What is involved here is a process of abstraction which gives an external existence to what it abstracts from some particular existence and present as their common characteristic. For example,

If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea “Fruit,” if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea “Fruit,” derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc.; then, in the language of speculative philosophy I am declaring that “Fruit” is the substance of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be a pear is not essential to the pear, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real being, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have extracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea—“Fruit.” I therefore declare apples, pears, almonds, etc. to be mere forms of existence, modi, of “Fruit.”

---


219 The Holy Family, p. 78.
For Marx, not the fruit, but only different fruits exist, but in the speculative method the fruit, which is only abstracted from particular actual fruits, is made what is essential and thus substance while particular fruits are reduced merely to “the forms of existence” of this substance; they are only its “semblances”. As we have already noted, this process is called by Marx in 1844 Manuscripts as “uncritical idealism.”

Marx does not think that Hegel remained at such a simple level; according to him, Hegel also wants to show why there is diversity among things, or why the fruit assumes different shapes and shows itself as fruits. To this aim, Hegel attempts to expose the transition from the true substance to the manifestations of this substance, but in order to do this he must abandon the abstraction because “it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction.”220 These are exactly the same expressions with those which are asserted in 1844 Manuscripts, and as we quoted in the previous chapter Marx’s expression that “abstraction resolves to forsake abstraction and to have a look at nature free of abstraction”221 we have already referred to the theological critique of Hegel’s philosophy by Feuerbach and Marx. This ‘resolve’, which makes Idea or concept into a subject, includes a transition “from abstracting to intuiting.”222

As a subject the concept, of fruit in the example Marx gives, must be conceived as a “living, self-differentiating, moving” because it can give an existence to its apparent forms only by abandoning its own abstraction and posing itself as diversity of particular fruits. Therefore, the differences among them are nothing than the self-differentiations of the concept itself. “Thus ‘Fruit’ is no longer a contentless, undifferentiated unity; it is oneness as allness, as ‘totalness’ of fruits, which constitutes an ‘organic ramified series’.”223

220 Ibid., p. 79.
221 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 164.
222 Ibid.
223 The Holy Family, p. 80.
Speculative method thus makes the abstraction, which it abstracts from particular existences, into substance and gives the true actuality only to this abstraction. And then, by transforming the substance into the subject, it reduces them only to an apparent form of this subject, but at the same time gives a partial truth to them because they constitute the moments in its life. Therefore, “the value of profane fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities but in the speculative quality which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of ‘Absolute fruit’”. Consequently, for Marx, what we have before us is nothing other than a mystification because speculative philosopher presents the existence of diversity in which ordinary man sees nothing extraordinary, as if it were a miracle.

In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending the substance as the subject, as an inner Process, as an Absolute Person and that comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel’s method.

Marx’s main point here is again the inverting character of Hegelian philosophy, which makes real subjects into predicates of a being which is only a creation of understanding. Despite this general picture of Hegel which he draws, Marx is still sure that Hegel does something beyond mere wordplay and, to a great extent, presents his object in an objective way or in accordance with its essence.

...Hegel very often gives a real presentation, embracing the thing itself, within the speculative presentation. This real reasoning within the speculative reasoning misleads the reader into considering the speculative reasoning as real and the real as speculative.

---

224 Ibid., p. 81.
225 Ibid., p. 82.
226 Ibid.
Marx argues that Hegel gives his object its due, but does this in a mystical way, and his speculative method obscures his real presentation of the thing itself. It is very interesting to note that Marx here praises the elaboration of the content in Hegel’s philosophy whereas he defies his method and sees it as mystifying. Another important point in Marx’s critique of Hegel in *The Holy Family* is that Marx calls Hegel’s method as ‘speculative method’ and gives no place ‘dialectic’ in his presentation of Hegel’s method: he only mentions ‘understanding’ and ‘speculative reason’. However, the decisive moment is Hegel’s method is dialectic or ‘negative reason’.

In his *Logic*, Hegel makes a distinction among ‘understanding’, ‘negative reason’ (dialectical moment) and ‘positive reason’ (speculative moment) as the moments of logical thinking. Understanding, which moves in accordance with the principle of identity, applies a universal to its content and differentiates its objects through abstraction. The problem with understanding consists in the fact that it isolates its determinations and sticks to them. Hegel also calls it “the goodness of God” in the sense that it implies an order in the world of the finite things.

*Dialectic* as the second moment of logical thinking means the self-negation and self-transcendence of the determinations of understanding. For Hegel, “the dialectical constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression, and it is the principle through which alone *immanent coherence and necessity* enter into the content of science, just as all genuine, nonexternal elevation above the finite is to be found in this principle.” Dialectic also shows how the finite things are of transient character and necessarily pass into their opposites, and in this sense it symbolizes “God’s might”.

---


228 Ibid., § 80, *Addition*, p. 127.

229 Ibid., § 81, p. 128.

230 Ibid., § 81, *Addition*, p. 130.
The final moment of logical thought is the positive reason. This speculative moment as the positive result of dialectic is the unity of the opposed determinations. And it can also be called, according to Hegel, “mystical” since it expresses a unity which can never be conceived by understanding.\textsuperscript{231} Hegel also points out that if the negative moment, dialectic, is disregarded his logic would be devoid of its distinctive feature and stand on the same level with the common logic.\textsuperscript{232}

As it is well-known, Marx would later call his method as ‘dialectical method’ in his \textit{Capital}. It follows that, even though Marx absorbs the dialectic method from the beginning, there yet appears to be some uncertainties concerning how to use it in his critique of political economy. Marx’s open appropriation of dialectic method is firstly seen only in his \textit{Grundrisse}, and in this sense his attitude toward Hegel’s dialectic has undergone a decisive change\textsuperscript{233} especially since this work; however, what drives Marx to consciously use dialectic in his critique of political economy has its signs in all his previous works, as we have tried to show: it is by the mediation of a critique of Hegel and Hegelians, who have no true insight into Hegel’s dialectic, that Marx’s discussion of the correct method results in fully appropriating all main aspects of Hegel’s dialectic.

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., § 82 and \textit{Addition}, pp. 131-2.

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid. Furthermore, regarding “the overlooking of the negative moment”, Hegel exemplifies Spinoza’s philosophy. For Spinoza gives no place to the negative moment in his philosophy “the world is determined in the Spinozist system as a mere phenomenon, without genuine reality, so that this system must rather be seen as acosmism.” Ibid., § 50, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{233} Here, ‘decisive change’ should not be taken in the sense that Marx at first opposed to Hegel’s dialectic but then adopted it; rather, Marx is from the beginning in a close relation with Hegel’s dialectic and his philosophy in general, but his previous works are in their essence in the form of critique and does not need a systematic method. However, when Marx attempts to systematically analyze the capitalist relations of production and to present the movement of capital in a scientific way, he tries to appropriate the dialectic in its entirety, though he never broke with it. As Henri Lefebvre puts it, “we have to wait until the year 1858 to find the Hegelian dialectic being mentioned for the first time non-pejoratively”. Lefebvre, H., \textit{Dialectical Materialism}, trans. John Sturrock, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2009, p. 70.
In addition to this critique of Hegel, Marx again attacks Hegel while criticizing Bauer’s conception of history, which seems to be a caricatured form of Hegel’s. The main core of his critique is that their conception of history deprives human beings of freedom and transforms history into an omnipotent subject. Because of their conception of teleological truth,

\[
[...] \text{history like truth becomes a person apart, a metaphysical subject of which real human individuals are but the bearers.}^{234}
\]

Marx’s critique here is mainly related with Bauer’s deeply negative attitude toward the role of ‘mass’, according to which the mass is “the true enemy of the spirit” since the mass cannot understand the true meaning of history and it is content with a “superficiality”. For this reason, Bauer completely separates ‘Absolute Criticism’ from ‘the Mass’ and sees in history not the actions of the mass but ‘idea’ only. Furthermore, by reducing all struggles to those only in consciousness, Bauer ascribes to the ‘Critique’ an absolute role. However, it is explicit for Marx that “material estrangement” can be overcome not by superseding it in thought but only through “exterior, palpable struggles”.

Yet Absolute Criticism has learnt from Hegel’s Phenomenology the art of changing real objective chains that exist outside me into mere ideal, mere subjective chains existing in me, and thus to change all exterior, palpable struggles into pure struggles of thought.\(^{235}\)

What is important for us here is Marx’s remark that Hegel’s Phenomenology transforms real chains into ideal ones and reduces all palpable struggles to struggles in thought. From our discussion of Marx’s critique in 1844 Manuscripts, we know that such an interpretation of Phenomenology is a part of Marx’s general

\(^{234}\) The Holy Family, p. 107.

\(^{235}\) Ibid., p. 111.
critique of Hegel: for Hegel reduces man to self-consciousness he does not seek solutions to the real problems of human life but only tries to solve them in thought and thus his philosophy affirms the existing state of affairs. However, it is very doubtful whether Hegel shares such an extremist position, which may be ascribed, for instance, to the Stoics, with Bruno Bauer. In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel clarifies what Marx calls ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ in terms of ‘body’ and ‘soul’, and expresses the fact that the ‘chains’ cannot be challenged only internally:

> It is only because I am alive as a free entity in my body that this living existent ought not to be misused by being made a beast of burden. While I am alive, my soul (the concept and, to use a higher term, the free entity) and my body are not separated; my body is the existence of my freedom and it is with my body that I feel. It is therefore only sophistical understanding, devoid of the Idea [ideelos], which can so distinguish body and soul as to hold that the ‘thing-in-itself’, the soul, is not touched or attacked if the body is maltreated and the existent embodiment [Existenz] of personality is subjected to the power of another. I can withdraw into myself out of my bodily existence and make my body something external to myself; particular feelings I can regard as something outside me, and in chains I can still be free. But this is my will; so far as others are concerned, I am in my body. To be free from the point of view of others is identical with being free in my determinate existence [Dasein]. If another does violence to my body, he does violence to me.\(^{236}\)

Hegel is simply saying that body and soul are inseparable—an idea which is originally specific to Aristotle\(^{237}\)—and, especially in my relations to others, body is not something that can be disregarded, it is one with my own personality; thus, from Hegel’s point of view, ‘chains’ cannot be overcome only in thought, even if in his thought one may feel himself free in chains.

In his polemics against Bauer, what Marx strongly opposes is that Bauer’s views on ‘Spirit’ and ‘the Mass’ continue the traditional dualism between thought

---

\(^{236}\) Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 48, p. 63.

and matter and further between idealism and materialism—a dualism which Marx
denies in 1844 Manuscripts. In accordance with this dualism, Bauer contrasts
Spirit with the Mass and sees in the Mass only the direct antithesis of Spirit.
Especially in his conception of history, “only a few chosen individuals opposed as
the active Spirit to the rest of mankind, as the spiritless mass, as matter”. What
is important for us here is that Marx relates such a dualist viewpoint with Hegel’s
philosophy of history because in his eyes Bauer’s conception is nothing other than
a “Critically caricatural realization of Hegel’s conception of history”:

Hegel’s conception of history assumes an Abstract or Absolute
Spirit which develops in such a way that mankind is a mere mass
bearing it with a varying degree of consciousness or
unconsciousness. Within empiric, exoteric history he therefore has
a speculative, esoteric history develop. The history of mankind
becomes the history of the abstract spirit of mankind, a spirit
beyond all man!239

According to Marx, Hegel sees in history the steps of Absolute Spirit whose aims
are realized in the hands of mankind which is reduced merely to a bearer of this
Spirit. The subject of this process therefore seems to be Absolute Spirit while
mankind is only its matter. However, the classical dualism Marx openly rejects
appears in Hegel as sublated to a great extent because, as Marx himself puts it, for
Hegel

the Absolute Spirit makes history only in appearance. For as the
Absolute Spirit becomes conscious of itself as the creative World
Spirit only in the philosopher and post festum, its making of history
exists only in the consciousness, in the opinion and conception of
the philosopher, i.e., only in the speculative imagination.240

238 The Holy Family, p. 114.
239 Ibid., p. 115.
240 Ibid., pp. 115-6.
The situation is exactly like what Marx says, and therefore the Absolute Spirit is not something outside and beyond mankind, its existence is limited to the thought of the philosopher. Both mankind and the Absolute Spirit make history unconsciously, and it is the philosopher who sees in history an order and an end.

The world spirit is the spirit of the world as it reveals itself through the human consciousness; the relationship of men to it is that of single parts to the whole which is their substance. And this world spirit corresponds to the divine spirit, which is the absolute spirit. Since God is omnipresent, he is present in everyone and appears in everyone’s consciousness.  

Thus we can talk about an Absolute Spirit not as a transcendent entity but only as appearing in the historical actions of mankind and, accordingly, it has no end; it is the philosopher who ascribes it an end. As Engels expresses against ‘Absolute Criticism’ of Bauer:

*History does nothing*; it “possesses no immense wealth,” it “wages no battles.” It is man, real living man, that does all that, that possesses and fights; “history” is not a person apart, using man as a means for its own particular aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.  

And it is equally clear from Marx’s words that Hegel’s Absolute Spirit is “nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims” and the retrospective reflection of the philosopher on history. Therefore, to think the Absolute Spirit as “beyond all man” would be mistaken; however, despite this argument, Marx appears to be

---


242 *The Holy Family*, p. 125.

243 For Hegel, without the will of humans, no principle bears actuality: “A principle, fundamental rule, or law is something universal and implicit, and as such, it has not attained complete reality, however true it may be in itself. Aims, principles, and the like are present at first in our thoughts and inner intentions, or even in books, but not yet in reality itself. In other words, that which exists only in itself is a possibility or potentiality which has not yet emerged into existence. A second moment is necessary before it can attain reality – that of actuation or realisation; and its principle
aware of the true implication of Hegel’s philosophy of history. And what he does not accept is Hegel’s way of presentation which, for Marx, tends to obscure and mystify the real history of mankind.

By the way, Marx’s brief explanation of Hegel’s philosophy of history stresses the role of philosopher in history as a retrospective consciousness. The philosopher reflects on the past events, and even though her main aim is to understand the existing state of affairs, “the participation of the philosopher in history is reduced to this retrospective consciousness”. 244 However, for Marx, the present is not a completed process, as if we can only think about it post festum; rather, we live in a living present and we are not only an interpreter of it, but also its actor. So, like everyone, the philosopher is, and ought to be, an active member of the present and has a share of making it.

Finally, it may be useful to state that in The Holy Family Marx sketches a brief history of materialism and emphasizes the necessary connection of communism with materialism. In many respects, this part clearly shows that Marx attaches himself to materialism irrevocably, despite his insistence on the unity of materialism and idealism in 1844 Manuscripts. 245 However, in The Holy Family Marx sees a necessary connection between communism and materialism:

There is no need of any great penetration to see from the teaching of materialism on the original goodness and equal intellectual

---

244 The Holy Family, p. 115.

245 In 1844 Manuscripts, we read: “It will be seen how subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and suffering, only lose their antithetical character, and thus their existence, as such antitheses in the social condition.” Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 109. Furthermore, “Here we see how consistent naturalism or humanism distinguishes itself both from idealism and materialism, constituting at the same time the unifying truth of both.” Ibid., p. 154. In the similar way, Engels argues in The Holy Family that “the old contradiction between spiritualism and materialism has been fought out on all sides and overcome once for all by Feuerbach.” The Holy Family, p. 126.
endowment of men, the omnipotence of experience, habit and education, and the influence of environment on man, the great significance of industry, the justification of enjoyment, etc., how necessarily materialism is connected with communism and socialism.\textsuperscript{246}

Such a view, which relates communism directly with materialism and even regards Feuerbach’s materialism as theoretical humanism which corresponds to French and English communism as practical humanism\textsuperscript{247}, really appears to have broken with Hegelian philosophy. The contrary would be unimaginable because, for Marx, Hegel reduces human to self-consciousness, overcomes the real problems only in thought and thus “stands the world on its head”; therefore, Hegelian philosophy is “the most conservative philosophy.”\textsuperscript{248} However, there is also the other side of the medallion: Marx would appropriate the revolutionary method from this “most conservative philosophy”.

4.2. Against Abstraction

Before attempting to criticize the method of Proudhon which is based on applying Hegel’s method as it is, in his \textit{Poverty of Philosophy} Marx ironically says that “Here we are, in the heart of Germany! We shall now have to talk metaphysics while talking political economy.”\textsuperscript{249} This is a very striking expression because of

\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., p. 176. It must however be stated that later both Engels and Lenin point out the necessary connection of Marxism, if not communism in general, with German philosophy and especially with Hegel: “The German working-class movement is the inheritor of German classical philosophy.” \textit{Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy}, p. 60. “It [Marxist doctrine] is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism.” Lenin, V.I., “The Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism”, in \textit{Collected Works}, Vol. 19, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 23-4.

\textsuperscript{247} \textit{The Holy Family}, pp. 168-9.

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., p. 254.

\textsuperscript{249} \textit{The Poverty of Philosophy}, p. 96.
its validity for all Marx’s writings related to political economy. As we have pointed out in the previous chapters, ‘inversion’ has a central place in all Marx’s critiques: of political economy, of philosophy, and of religion. And this repeatedly employed concept is somehow related to metaphysics, even if it is used for a critique of metaphysics. Marx first and foremost aims at inverting the inverted world of political economy, religion, and philosophy which finds its root in the inverted reality itself. And especially it is this necessary connection between a critique of political economy and that of Hegel which drives Marx to mention, criticize, despise or praise Hegel’s name whenever he dealt with political economy. And in this sense, Marx is always in Germany and vis-à-vis the metaphysical inverted character of the reality.

Furthermore, it is very interesting to see that Marx feels obliged to criticize Hegel whenever he attempts to criticize political economy. This is mainly due to his rivals who have tried to maintain their relation to Hegel or wanted to enter into a close relation with Hegel in their study. In this respect, we must regard Proudhon as one of the most important figures to whom Marx criticized because he tries to present his ideas on political economy by using Hegel’s method—an effort which seems to be identical with that of Marx especially in Grundrisse and in Capital.

While we were discussing Marx’s critique of Hegel in 1844 Manuscripts, we have quoted Marx’s remark that “Hegel’s standpoint is that of modern political economy.” Now there is also Proudhon as a third person because he presents his ideas on political economy through Hegel’s method, and it is exactly for this reason that Marx attacks him and with this attack he enters into a discussion of method once again.

What is, then, the standpoint of Proudhon? From The Holy Family, we know that Marx shares Proudhon’s ideal—an ideal which aims to transcend the

---

250 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 150.
capitalist relations of production and to establish a new society based on equality—to the great extent, and hails him for his success over political economists:

He is therefore consistent when he represents as the falsifier of economic relations not this or that particular kind of private property as other economists do, but private property taken in its entirety. He does all that a criticism of political economy from the standpoint of political economy can do.  

Proudhon attacks political economy from within and tries to show its principle itself to be irrational. Nevertheless, all this does not prevent Marx from criticizing Proudhon; this will suggest that Marx unfaithfully criticized Feuerbach in his Theses on Feuerbach and German Ideology despite all praises he and Engels made in their previous works: Feuerbach is “the true conqueror of the old philosophy” and “has in principle overthrown the old dialectic and philosophy,” and again with Engels’ words: “who, then, revealed the mystery of the ‘system’? Feuerbach.” As Marx later acknowledges in one of his letters, Proudhon plays an important role which is similar to Feuerbach. In the development of Marx’s thought, as have previously noted, Feuerbach’s role is so limited, and he only opens up a new sphere on which real problems of life are discussed. Just as Feuerbach, in contrast to other Young Hegelians who simply

251 The Holy Family, p. 48.

252 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 144.

253 Ibid., p. 143.

254 The Holy Family, p. 124.

255 “In this book [What is Property?] Proudhon stands in approximately the same relation to Saint-Simon and Fourier as Feuerbach stands to Hegel. Compared with Hegel, Feuerbach is certainly poor. Nevertheless he was epoch-making after Hegel because he laid stress on certain points which were disagreeable to the Christian consciousness but important for the progress of criticism, points which Hegel had left in mystic semi-obscurity.” Marx’s letter to J.B. Schweitzer, in Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy: Answer to the “Philosophy of Poverty by M. Proudhon, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1977, p. 214.
take one aspect of Hegel’s philosophy, attacks the ‘inner principle’ of Hegelian system and tries to go beyond it, Proudhon, in contrast to utopic socialists who merely demand for equality, too attacks the ‘inner principle’ of political economy –private property– and implies the transcendence of the capitalist system of production. For Marx, therefore, neither Proudhon nor Feuerbach introduces anything essentially new and important to the fields of political economy and philosophy; the only thing they achieve is to indicate a new foundation and the transcendence of the system, either of Hegel or of capitalism.

The difference between Proudhon and Feuerbach is that the former accepts Hegel’s method whereas the latter rejects it. But, for Marx, both points of view are incomplete and very far from understanding, and doing justice to, Hegel’s dialectic. Marx believes that he critically appropriates Hegel’s dialectic and in this sense he both accepts it, like Proudhon, and rejects it, like Feuerbach. Since Marx conceives the dialectic as scientific method he opposes Feuerbach; and since Marx argues that the dialectic must be purified from mysticism before using it and not be conceived as a predetermined schema, he also opposes Proudhon.

From Marx’s point of view, we may speak of another similarity alongside the above mentioned one between Feuerbach and Proudhon –a similarity between Bauer’s and Proudhon’s standpoint. Marx, on the one hand, argues that Bauer cannot free himself from Hegel’s logic, and the same is valid for Proudhon too because he himself wants to make use of Hegel’s method without criticizing it in his study on political economy. For Marx, on the other hand, both also suffer from a crucial defect: they can only present a caricatured version of Hegel. Therefore, their relation to Hegel is problematic because, on the one hand, Bauer, for instance in his conception of history, substitutes his own Absolute Criticism for Hegel’s Absolute Spirit which is nothing other than the retrospective consciousness of the philosopher concerning past history, and on the other hand, Proudhon does not manage to understand Hegel’s method properly and reduces
dialectic merely to “the dogmatic distinction between good and bad.”\textsuperscript{256} Thus, the problem for Marx is not only that they remain within a Hegelian framework, but also that they misinterpret Hegel and, if we are allowed to use a later expression, are not capable of extracting “the rational kernel within the mystical shell”.\textsuperscript{257}

While criticizing Proudhon, Marx roughly draws a picture of Hegel’s dialectic, as in the \textit{Holy Family}. But in this picture, the emphasis is placed on the nature and order of ‘categories’ since Proudhon claims that “We are not giving a \textit{history according to the order in time} but \textit{according to the sequence of ideas}.”\textsuperscript{258} It is mainly this point that Marx attempts to criticize, and in so doing, he makes clear his own conception of ‘categories’. We will later see that this issue is of great importance for Marx because when he tries to present his study on the capitalist mode of production systematically, when he \textit{does} science, he needs a correct method of presentation and thus ten years later, in \textit{Grundrisse}, he is forced to discuss the same point – the nature and order of economical categories – in detail once again.\textsuperscript{259} We will not follow Marx’s critique of Proudhon in detail, but limit ourselves to present Hegel’s dialectic as Marx understood it in \textit{The Poverty of Philosophy}.

In his \textit{Logic}, Hegel deals with logical categories and shows how the transition from one category to another takes place. He takes them as thought-determinations which thinking gives to itself. Therefore, in Hegel’s view, Logic, as “the science of the pure Idea,”\textsuperscript{260} is not a formal thinking, but thinking with content. Its content does not come from senses since all sensible data are excluded

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{256} \textit{The Poverty of Philosophy}, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Capital}, Vol. I, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{258} \textit{The Poverty of Philosophy}, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{259} “The point is not the historic position of the economic relations in the succession of different forms of society. Even less is it their ‘in the idea’ (Proudhon) (a muddy notion of historic movement). Rather, their order within modern bourgeois society.”\textsuperscript{259} \textit{Grundrisse}, pp. 107-8.

\textsuperscript{260} \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic}, § 19, p. 45.
\end{footnotesize}
from logical thinking; all content consists of “thinking in its activity and its production.” What thinking produces is its own determinacy which is universal. Hegel’s logic consists of these pure thought-determinations which are the foundation of all being. Thus, since logic constitutes the ground of everything existing, any philosophical science concerning the realm of the finite will presuppose logic:

When [...] we consider the Logic as the system of pure thought-determinations, the other philosophical sciences—the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit—appear, in contrast, as applied logic, so to speak, for the Logic is their animating soul. Thus, the concern of those other sciences is only to [re]cognise the logical forms in the shapes of nature and spirit, shapes that are only a particular mode of expression of the forms of pure thinking.261

Against Proudhon’s presentation of the economic categories by imitating the process in Hegel’s Logic, Marx gives a brief account of Hegel’s dialectic, and in so doing, he aims to stress his own materialist position.

Political economists, according to Marx, consider the economic categories belonging to the bourgeois mode of production as eternal and unchangeable; they really try to explain the operation of this mode of production but ignore its historical dimension. However, Proudhon attempts to investigate “the genesis of these categories”, and by reducing the relations of production to categories, he tries to present them in a rational order. For Marx, however, economic categories are nothing other than the theoretical expression of “the historical movement of production relations.” To take economic categories as separated from the real production relations would bring about ascribing these categories to “the movement of pure reason”262

261 Ibid., § 24, Addition 2, p. 58.

262 The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 98.
Impersonal reason, having outside itself neither a base on which it can pose itself, nor an object to which it can oppose itself, nor a subject with which it can compose itself, is forced to turn head over heels, in posing itself, opposing itself and composing itself -- position, opposition, composition. Or, to speak Greek -- we have thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For those who do not know the Hegelian language, we shall give the ritual formula: affirmation, negation and negation of the negation.\textsuperscript{263}

For Marx, it is a simple fact that when abstracted the subject from all its specific content and accidental feature the only thing left is logical categories. Therefore, it is possible to reduce everything to logical categories, and in a similar vein, when abstracted from all specific real movements what is before us is the abstract movement which is applicable for all movements, or, in other words, when we follow the movement of logical categories which applies to everything existent we arrive at the movement of everything. However, in this simple process of abstraction, which appears in Marx’s eyes as useless because it does not let us come close to the fact but removes us from it, one can imagine finding “the absolute method, which not only explains all things, but also implies the movement of things.”\textsuperscript{264} Accordingly, this method expresses the movement of pure reason which depends on “posing itself, opposing itself and composing itself.”\textsuperscript{265} Reason, devoid of personality, first of all, posits itself as a thesis, but this thesis is of contradictory nature and includes the negative and the positive aspects. And “the struggle between these two antagonistic elements comprised in the antithesis constitutes the dialectical movement.”\textsuperscript{266} The entire system is thus constituted by following the dialectic movement of categories.

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{264} Ibid., p. 100.

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid., p.101.

\textsuperscript{266} Ibid.
Thus, for Hegel, all that has happened and is still happening is only just what is happening in his own reasoning. Thus the philosophy of history is nothing but the history of philosophy, of his own philosophy. There is no longer a “history according to the order in time,” there is only “the sequence of ideas in the understanding.” He thinks he is constructing the world by the movement of thought, whereas he is merely reconstructing systematically and classifying by the absolute method the thoughts which are in the minds of all.267

After this short account of Hegel’s dialectic, Marx passes to express his own ideas against Proudhon. For him, first of all, there is no eternal economic category; they emerge from the relations of production, which change throughout history and are product of men’s activity. As the relations of production are changed, economic categories are also changed, surely by men themselves, since they reflect these very relations: “these ideas, these categories, are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products.”268 Therefore, for Marx, it is impossible to conceive the relations of production by a logical formula because they constitute an organic whole, which historically determined. As a result, Proudhon’s attempt to employ Hegelian dialectic in his study on political economy serves, according to Marx, not to give a true account of the relations of production, but to obscure the very structure of these relations and thus the specific nature of a given historical mode of production. As Marx will later also show in his Grundrisse, the method cannot be employed for an arbitrary classification of economic categories; it must be used only for the aim of conceiving the object of investigation concretely. Therefore, the method cannot be considered as a means of escaping from a laborious empirical study; on the

267 Ibid., 102.

268 Ibid., p. 103. For Marx, for instance, labor is a category valid for all modes of production; but the point is to conceive it in its historical determination. Accordingly, ‘abstract labor’ is specific only to modern bourgeois society, and in this sense the abstraction of labor both in theory and practice is a product of historical development. Grundrisse, pp. 104-5. Furthermore, as we have seen in Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state, though the emergence of the state is as old as the hills, the abstraction of the state belongs to the modern world and presupposes the separation of civil society from the state. Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, p. 32.
contrary, it presupposes this laborious process because to conceive the logic of the fact requires the entirely appropriation of the fact and the consideration of it in its contradictory nature.

Marx is not also of the opinion that Proudhon was really able to conceive Hegel’s dialectic: he reduces the dialectic into the opposition between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and the elimination of the bad.269 Such a conception of the dialectic is, for Marx, not dialectic at all: this makes thought devoid of ‘life’ and leaves room only for ‘morality’.270

It is not necessary to further follow Marx’s critique of Proudhon for our main aim is to take a look at his critique of Hegel in *The Poverty of Philosophy*.

### 4.3. An Overview

In this chapter, we have tried to expose Marx’s critique of Hegel as expressed in *The Holy Family* and *The Poverty of Philosophy*, however it must be pointed out that in these works Marx’s main concern is to criticize, not Hegel himself, but Bauer and his company and Proudhon: he subjects Hegel to the critique in passing since they remain within the confines of Hegelian system. It must further be stressed that Marx is very far away from identifying their position with that of Hegel; according to him, both Bauer and Proudhon present a caricaturized version of Hegel’s dialectic. In other words, they do not succeed in appropriating Hegel’s dialectic, and transform it into a ready-made schema.

In these works, Marx mainly holds that in a scientific study one never part with the fact and impose his own categories to it. If the movement of the fact itself is not followed but is conformed to a predetermined schema, thinking tends to

---


270 Ibid., p. 107.
replace its dialectic of concepts with the inner movement of the fact. For Marx, the method must reflect the logic of the fact and follow its own development. In this sense, it is neither a ready-made recipe nor a schema which the fact must be conformed to. Therefore, if the method is understood as the body of rules determined prior to the investigation of the fact, then, for Marx, it presents no advantage for the scientific inquiry; on the contrary, it serves to obscure the nature of the fact.

It may appear as a contradiction that Marx criticizes Proudhon’s attempt to employ Hegel’s dialectic in his critique of political economy because in his Grundrisse he would note that in order to conceive the nature of the capitalist mode of production one does not have to follow the historical order and in his Capital he would openly express that he used the dialectic method which has been systematically developed in Hegel’s philosophy. However, by opposing Proudhon’s attempt, Marx in fact remains to be devoted to the essence of Hegelian dialectic since dialectic has nothing to do with the arbitrary classification of some ready-made categories. Therefore, Proudhon’s model is instructive for Marx because he appears to learn from it what he should not do in using the dialectic method in his critique of political economy.

In his Logic, Hegel summarizes the method in those words:

[T]his method is not something distinct from its subject matter and content – for it is the content itself, the dialectic which it possesses within itself, which moves the subject matter forward. It is clear that no expositions can be accepted as scientifically valid that do not follow the progression of this method and are not in tune with its simple rhythm, for it is the course of the fact itself.²⁷¹

Therefore, for Hegel, the method cannot be external to its object but is the very movement of the fact; “this dialectic is not an activity of subjective thinking applied to some matter externally, but is rather the matter’s very soul putting forth

its branches and fruit organically.\textsuperscript{272} In this sense, for him, there is no place for a method, which is accepted and applied to a given object, prior to the investigation of the object itself. As Frederick Beiser puts it, “if Hegel has any methodology at all, it appears to be an anti-methodology, a method to suspend all methods.”\textsuperscript{273} However, this does not mean that dialectic is an empty phrase; on the contrary, as we will see in the chapter on “Revolutionary Dialectic”, “dialectic does involve some recommendations about how science should approach the world, what sort of to look for in it, what sorts of explanations to employ, even a theoretical program to be followed.”\textsuperscript{274}

It is, then, clear that, though it is in the form of a critique of Hegel’s philosophy, in The Holy Family and The Poverty of Philosophy Marx does not move away from Hegel’s dialectic; on the contrary, he constitutes to himself a firm and fertile ground so as to make use of it, and, by taking Hegel’s warnings concerning method into consideration, points out the fact that the dialectic cannot be a ready-made method, which may be established prior to the investigation itself.

Finally, it may be useful to mention Marx’s vigilance for any attempt to directly apply the dialectic to political economy. Once he learns, on the very dates he himself tries to make use of Hegel’s logic in his critique of political economy, that Ferdinand Lassalle is trying to interpret political economy by the help of Hegel’s dialectic, Marx writes to Engels the following:

[Lassalle] will discover to his cost that it is one thing for a critique to take a science to the point at which it admits of a dialectical presentation, and quite another to apply an abstract, ready-made

\textsuperscript{272} Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 31, p. 48.

\textsuperscript{273} Hegel, p. 160.

system of logic to vague presentiments of just such a system [political economy].

CHAPTER V

HISTORICAL DIALECTIC

One of the most important aspects of Marx’s dialectic is that it has historical aspect as its essential determination: the dialectic “regards every historically form as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well”.\(^{276}\) Regarding the historical aspect of Marx’s dialectic, we need to remember especially two important points: first, for Marx, whatever exists has its own history, and in the world nothing is absolutely permanent. Therefore, change is immanent to all things: everything necessarily changes and becomes in time something other than itself. Second, and this is more important one, according to Marx, human proves herself as a literally historical being by creating her own history: human has a history because she does not remain in a given framework, which is strictly determined, like an animal, but she continuously transcends her limits by producing and reproducing her conditions of existence. In this context, Marx radically states that “we know only a single science, the science of history”.\(^{277}\)

In this chapter, though historical viewpoint is characteristic to Marx’s thought in all his works, we will mainly deal with Marx’s *German Ideology* and *Communist Manifesto* and try to show his critique of Hegel in these works. We will argue that these works of Marx also reflect to certain extent a critical relationship with Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* alongside his *Philosophy of History*, and aims to bring into the light the historical development of property

---


\(^{277}\) *The German Ideology*, p. 34.
relations and thus showing the contradictory nature of private property prevailing in modern bourgeois society. Marx further conceives civil society as the basis of history and considers the state in its relation to civil society. Before proceeding to an analysis of these works we need to consider Hegel’s view of property and civil society; this may help us to conceive the implications of Marx’s critique.

5.1. Hegel’s view of property and civil society

Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* deals with the concept of right and its actualization.278 Since right is originated in the free will “the system of right is the realm of freedom made actual.”279 And “Abstract Right”, which is the first chapter of *Philosophy of Right*, considers the will in its immediacy, not as actualized; in this sense it is only an ideal moment of the actual Idea, which is, in case of the right, the state.

The subject appears in the abstract right as person who is “infinite, universal, and free”280, and who is devoid of any further determination; the person as immediate will can abstract from every determination and relates herself only to herself. Therefore, the external world is a limitation for her, which must be overcome and, to this aim, a person attempts to appropriate the external objects and to make them her own. However, the chapter on “Abstract Right” is not only related to person’s taking possession of the external objects, it also includes the relation with other persons through ‘contract’ and in relation with other persons the negation of right as ‘crime’.

278 *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, § 1, p. 17.


280 Ibid., § 35, p. 54.
Since the external object is devoid of any will in itself and it is only a ‘thing’ [Sache] a person existing as immediate will posits her will in the thing and makes it her own, giving an end to its appearance of independence. She realizes her end in the thing and gives it her own determination. In so doing, a person exhibits her freedom in the external world:

All things may become the property of a human being, because the latter is free will and consequently is in and for itself, while what stands over against him lacks this quality. Thus everyone has the right to make his will the thing or to make the thing his will, or in other words to supersede [aufzuheben] the thing and transform it into his own; for the thing, as externality, has no end in itself; it is not infinite self-relation but something external to itself.281

A person as free will must manifest her freedom in her external world, and to do this, she must appropriate the external things and find in them her will. By placing her will in the thing, human makes it acquire a characteristic which it does not have in itself. However, to appropriate an external object requires a series of process through which a person proves that the object is in her possession. Accordingly, a person’s taking possession of an external object depends on: holding the thing physically, which is restricted to her bodily presence282; forming of the thing so that it bears the character of who gives a form to it even if she is not directly present283; and placing a ‘sign’ in the thing so that it has no validity in itself but has its master as the signifier284.

In this context, a point must, however, be emphasized, which is also related to the discussion on ‘civil society’, that Hegel consciously uses the concepts possession [Besitz] and property [Eigentum] in order to show the

281 Ibid., § 44, Addition, p. 60.
282 Ibid., § 55, p. 67.
283 Ibid., § 56, pp. 68-9.
284 Ibid., § 58, p. 71.
abstract and universal character of property, which makes it formal. In the chapter on “Abstract Right”, a person is considered as an abstract being in which everyone is equal as persons who exhibit their free will [*freier Wille*] in their property. In this sense, according to Hegel, property cannot be regarded as mere means of satisfying a person’s particular needs; “property is the first existence [*Dasein*] of freedom and so is in itself a substantial end.”

However, though persons as property holders are equal, an equality regarding property would, for Hegel, be unjust because a person realizes her individual will in the thing and makes it her own, and therefore property necessarily bears the character of “private property” [*Privateigentum*]. It is ‘possession’ that provides a means for satisfying a particular need and depends on the needs, desires and wishes of a particular person; it is thus thoroughly related to the arbitrary will [*Willkür*] of an individual and the contingent circumstances. It follows that the amount of possession of a person directly depends on her abilities and skills, and external circumstances. Consequently, according to Hegel, possession essentially implies inequality among persons because it is related to particular aspect, while property is a sign of equality among persons but only in terms of formal aspect, according to which every person is equal as persons, as property holders, not in terms of quality and quantity of their property.

If at this stage we may speak of more persons than one, although no such distinction has yet been made, then we may say that in respect of their personality persons are equal. But this is an empty tautology, for the person, as something abstract, has not yet been particularized or posited as distinct in some specific way. ‘Equality’ is the abstract identity of the understanding; reflective thought and all kinds of intellectual mediocrity stumble on it at once when they are confronted by the relation of unity to a

---

285 Ibid., § 45, p. 61. As Herbert Marcuse puts it, “The Philosophy of Right claims that private property is the material reality of the free subject and the realization of freedom” Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, p. 201.

286 Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 46, p. 62.
difference. At this point, equality could only be the equality of abstract persons as such, and therefore the whole field of possession, this terrain of inequality, falls outside it.\textsuperscript{287}

Hegel thus conceives property as the existence of one’s freedom, and since it essentially belongs to a particular person who places her will in it, other persons have no right over her property. Therefore, how much one will possess is completely left to the particular aspect which includes both individual differences such as ability, skill, etc., and external circumstances: property indicates only the formal equality of persons, but in terms of content inequality should not be violated since in this case the abstraction of equality would harm to the concrete and natural differences among individuals. However, Hegel’s argument also involves a crucial point: since every individual is a person and thus has free will she has an absolute right to actualize her freedom, and thus to give her will an external existence. Accordingly, it is obvious that it would be wrong to prevent one from this right: the right of property cannot be violated and therefore “everyone must have property”\textsuperscript{288}.

As we have pointed out, the abstract right has no validity in itself and is only related to the immediate will, which is yet devoid of any concretization; it is a moment in which there is no particularity so that Hegel speaks of ‘person’ not of ‘persons’. It is only in civil society, as the moment of particularity of ethical life, that particular needs, the subsistence of an individual, the activity of labor and the different estates become the topic of discussion. Hegel attaches to civil society a great importance since it is a product of the modern world and enables the particularity to flourish.\textsuperscript{289}

Civil society is, for Hegel, a realm in which everyone pursues her own particular ends and tries to satisfy her own particular needs. Here, what is at issue

\textsuperscript{287} Ibid., § 49, pp. 63-4.

\textsuperscript{288} Ibid., § 49, Addition, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., § 184, pp. 181-2.
is the necessity of satisfying these particular needs, but its way is not strictly
determined but left to each individual. Therefore, what is decisive in civil society
is, on the one hand, the dependence on nature, though human’s natural needs
increasingly become human ones, and, on the other hand, the particular wills of
individuals since every individual takes her own need as absolute. Then, it is clear
that in such a society there would appear a great chaos because its members are
atomized individuals each of whom pursues only her own particular end.
According to Hegel, however, behind the semblance of disorder, universality
shows itself. It is true that in civil society each individual thinks only her own
particular needs and regards everyone else as mere means, but however civil
society also attaches one’s satisfaction of her needs to the satisfaction and welfare
of other individuals so that one attains the means for satisfying her particular
needs only by the mediation of others.

In civil society, an individual tries to provide her means of subsistence, but
she can accomplish this only by knowing what others are in need of and
producing in accordance with this knowledge. Her welfare thus becomes
dependent on the welfare of others: she attains the means through which she will
satisfy her needs only by producing the means for the needs of others. And even
though contingency prevails in civil society, from this contingency a relationship
of dependency and necessity emerges so that no one is capable of attaining the
means without considering the needs, and therefore welfare, of others. “In the
course of the actual attainment of selfish ends—an attainment conditioned in this
way by universality—there is formed a system of complete interdependence,
wherein the livelihood, welfare, and rightful existence [rechtliches Dasein] of one
individual are interwoven with the livelihood, welfare, and rights of all.”

To find the universality in this realm of contingency is the work of political
economy.

---

290 Ibid., § 183, p. 181.
291 Ibid., § 189, p. 187.
Hegel closely analyses the object of political economy and on this basis tries to conceive civil society. However, as we will see, he is not uncritical about civil society and aware of its defects, and he even conceives these defects as integral to civil society; in other words, the problems of civil society are not contingent: this society is itself a realm of contingency and thus the problems necessarily arise from civil society itself, and the individual is for the most part left to the arms of contingency. Before passing to the problems of civil society, we will dwell on Hegel’s analysis of civil society in some detail.

For Hegel, unlike animal, human continuously increases her needs due to her physical organization which leaves her more defenseless relative to animal. But it is for the very reason that she creates new needs for herself and, in so doing, she also increases the means which will satisfy them. The increase in needs brings about ever more dependency of humans on one another because in civil society a human can satisfy her needs only through the means which are produced by other humans, and, in return for this, she must therefore produce the means through which other humans will satisfy their needs. “We play into each other’s hands and so hang together. To this extent, everything particular becomes something social.”

This interdependency among humans also transforms natural needs into human ones and to certain extent gives an end to “natural necessity of need”; humans direct themselves to the needs which are produced by themselves. In other words, in civil society what is decisive concerning needs is no longer nature but society since they are needs which are marked by society and have a spiritual character. In civil society, humans therefore save themselves, to certain extent, from the necessity of nature, and the fundamental factor in this process, according to Hegel, is labor to which “the moment of liberation” directly belongs. It is

---

292 Ibid., § 192, Addition, p. 189.

293 Ibid., § 194, p. 189.

294 Ibid.
through labor that natural material is shaped and the means for needs are produced so that “it is the products of human effort which human beings consume.”

However, it must be pointed out that Hegel is fully aware of the transformation to which labor has undergone in the modern society and does not regard it only as labor in general.

The universal and objective element in work, on the other hand, lies in the process of abstraction which effects the subdivision of needs and means and thereby eo ipso subdivides production and brings about the division of labour. By this division, the work of the individual becomes less complex, and consequently his skill at his abstract work increases, as does the volume of his output. At the same time, this abstraction of skill and means of production completes and makes necessary everywhere the dependence of people on one another and their reciprocal relation in the satisfaction of their other needs. Further, the abstraction of production makes work more and more mechanical, until finally the human being is able to step aside and let a machine take his place.

Therefore, it is clear for Hegel that the universal aspect in civil society is provided by ‘abstract labor’ and as a result the interdependency among humans becomes a ‘necessity’. Furthermore, Hegel draws attention to a possibility which may liberate human from the necessity of labor thanks to the introduction of machines in production process, and in this he seems to be very optimistic. This is very important because he, on the one hand, points out “the moment of liberation intrinsic to work” and, on the other hand, talks about a possibility of liberation from labor itself. One may ask why it is necessary to liberate human from labor if it is itself emancipatory and whether the mechanization of labor and the introduction of machines really bring about the liberation of human from the necessity of labor. The answer is not given in Philosophy of Right, but can be found in Hegel’s earlier writings.

295 Ibid., § 196, p. 190.

296 Ibid., § 198, p. 191.
In his 1803-4 Jena writings, Hegel draws attention to the *negative aspect* of labor rather than “the moment of liberation” lying in labor and shows how the laborer increasingly becomes weak and worthless due to the introduction of machines in the production process. He puts it as follows:

When he [man] lets nature be worked over by a variety of machines, he does not cancel the necessity for his laboring but only postpones it, and makes it more distant from nature; and his living labor is not directed on nature as alive, but this negative vitality evaporates from it, and the laboring that remains to man becomes itself *more machinelike*; man *diminishes* labor only for the whole, not for the single [laborer]; for him it is increased rather; for the more machinelike labor becomes, the less it is worth, and the more one must work in that mode.297

And, again in his 1805-6 Jena writings:

[Individual] becomes—through the abstractness of labor—more mechanical, duller, spiritless. The spiritual element, this fulfilled self-conscious life, becomes an empty doing [*leeres Thun*]. The power of the Self consists in a rich [all-embracing] comprehension, but this power is lost. He can leave some work to machine, but his own activity thereby becomes more formalized. His dull work constricts him to a single point, and his work becomes more consummate the more one-sided it becomes.298

Therefore, for Hegel, it is clear that although labor has an emancipatory aspect since it enables to transform natural objects into human products and to certain extent provides the unity of the subjective and the objective, in civil society it bears no implication of freedom for the laborer because her labor becomes more mechanized and one-sided, and the laborer herself becomes a part of the machine.


And the introduction of machines in the production process causes her to more work and lengthen her working-time. Hegel is thus right to think that human should liberate herself from the necessity of labor which kills her spirituality and leaves no free time for her. As a result, he argues that when the mechanical labor of the laborer is entirely replaced by the machines “human freedom is restored.”

Furthermore, Hegel conceives civil society not as an undifferentiated whole but as one consisting of three main estates [Stände]: the substantial estate, the formal estate and the universal estate. This first estate is the agricultural estate and gets its means of subsistence from the products of the land. Hegel remarks that in the modern society this estate tends to get the character of industry, and despite this fact, he emphasizes that “the agricultural estate will always retain a mode of life which is patriarchal and the substantial disposition proper to such a life.”

The second estate makes natural objects into human products and thus its work necessitates reflection. Hegel considers craftsmanship, manufacture and trade within this estate. Lastly, the universal estate is composed of public officers whose task is devoted to the universal interests of the state. The members of this estate get their means of subsistence through salary which the state pays to them.

It must be also noted that Hegel sees to belong to an estate as indispensable for personality because for him in the modern state everyone must be organically connected to the whole. And it is interesting that Hegel regards the existence of estates as the basis of the right of particularity and argues that

299 Hegel, G.W.F., Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right (Heidelberg, 1817-1818), University of California Press, California, 1995, § 101, p. 177.

300 Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 203, Addition, p. 195.

301 Ibid., § 204, p. 195.

302 Ibid., § 205, p. 195.

303 “When we say that a human being is ‘somebody’ [etwas], we mean that he should belong to a specific estate, since to be a somebody means to have substantial being. A person with no estate is a mere private person and does not enjoy actual universality.” Ibid., § 207, Addition, p. 197.
“subjective opinion and one’s particular arbitrary will” are decisive in an individual’s belonging to an estate.\textsuperscript{304}

As we have pointed out, in Hegel’s view, civil society is not free from problems and, though it exhibits an appearance of universality, it is nevertheless essentially the moment of particularity and it is thus open thoroughly to the contingency. Therefore, despite the fact that civil society appears as a self-sufficient whole and all its members are strictly connected to each other, it brings about serious problems.

It is true that in civil society there is an interdependence among men, which in fact has become a necessity, and a considerable wealth, but everyone cannot get an equal share from this wealth: it depends on one’s ability and capital.\textsuperscript{305} For Hegel, this inequality is just since humans are themselves unequal by nature. However, he is also aware that in civil society even the satisfaction of most fundamental needs is subjected to the contingency, and therefore “civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and want as well as of the physical and ethical degeneration common to them both”.\textsuperscript{306} Furthermore, the increase in the needs and the means for their satisfaction brings about “luxury”, “dependence” and “want”.\textsuperscript{307}

Hegel allocates a considerable place to the discussion on the problem of poverty \textit{[Armut]} in civil society. Humans may fall into poverty due to their arbitrary will because in civil society there is no necessity of labor and they do not have to work. Further, the contingent factors in civil society may also bring about this situation of humans and they may be deprived of their means of subsistence. However, poverty is not a contingent result of civil society because even in its

\textsuperscript{304} Ibid., § 206, p. 195.
\textsuperscript{305} Ibid., § 200, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{306} Ibid., § 185, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{307} Ibid., § 195, p. 190.
most wealthy conditions it necessarily causes to poverty. Civil society is driven to concentrate wealth in a small group whereas the most part of society falls into the poverty and confronts with such a condition that for all their labor they are deprived of opportunities through which they lead a free life. This, in turn, weakens their trust in making a living through their labor and in society as a whole.

In this way there is born in the rabble the evil of lacking sufficient honour to secure subsistence by its own labour and yet at the same time of claiming the right to receive subsistence. Against nature a human being can claim no right, but once society is established, poverty immediately takes the form of a wrong done to one class [Klasse] by another. The important question of how poverty is to be abolished is one that agitates and torments modern society in particular.⁴⁰⁸

Hegel discusses some ways of solution to the poverty and then he himself refutes all. Firstly, charity, which is itself indebted its existence to the poverty, seems to alleviate it by helping the poor, but it is a contingent remedy and has no objective basis.⁴⁰⁹ Secondly, the subsistence of the poor can be directly provided by the rich or public services, but in this case they would satisfy their needs without working and “this violates the principle of civil society”.⁴¹⁰ Lastly, some work can be found for the people but “the evil consists precisely in an excess of production and in the lack of a proportionate number of consumers”.⁴¹¹ As a result, none of these ways of solution to poverty can be successful, and it is clear from Hegel’s discussion that poverty is immanent to the operation of civil society. And as Shlomo Avineri rightly puts it, “this is the only time in his system where Hegel

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., § 244, Addition, p. 221.
⁴¹⁰ Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 245, p. 221.
⁴¹¹ Ibid., § 245, p. 222.
raises a problem – and leaves it open‖. However, Hegel nonetheless seems to have some solution to the problem of poverty: corporations. According to him, individuals are organized in a corporation according to their occupation and skill, and it is like “a second family” and protects its members against contingent situations in civil society. “Within the corporation the help which poverty receives loses its contingent character and the unjust humiliation associated with it.”

Finally, it must be stressed that Hegel obviously knows the problems of modern society and in fact contemplates some solution to them. He conceives the three estates, which constitute civil society, together with their problems. Accordingly, the universal estate, i.e., the estate of public servants, is open to the possibility of degeneration and Hegel proposes against this degeneration the control of the monarch from above and of the corporation from below. He sees the tendency of the agricultural estate to become a branch of industry, and against this he requires that it preserve its patriarchal family structure and the right of eldest son (primogeniture). And finally, Hegel wants to restore corporations for the business estate in order to grant this estate a secure foundation. However, it is clear that Hegel’s solutions are not innovative ones and do not include a radical change vis-à-vis the capitalist relations of production in which “all that is solid


313 Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 253, p. 226. Stephen Houlgate asserts that corporations are Hegel’s solution to poverty and thus regards Avineri’s remark as a mistake. Houlgate, S., “Introduction”, in Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, p. xxx. It is true that corporations can provide to certain extent a more secure base for the workers and, as Hegel himself puts, abolishes the contingent character of the help for poverty, but they cannot abolish poverty itself since this problem is immanent to the workings of civil society itself. For instance, Hegel is fully aware of the fact that “… entire branches of industry, which supported a large class of people, go dry all at once because of [changes in] fashion or a fall in prices due to inventions in other countries, etc.— and this huge population is thrown into helpless poverty.” Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805-6) with Commentary, pp. 139-140.
melts into air".\textsuperscript{314} And, as we have seen, for him, there is no place for equality among men concerning the distribution of goods because he conceives property essentially as private property. The main reason for his opposition to equality lies in his idea that ‘the right of particularity’ which has gained a decisive position in civil society should not be violated.

People are made unequal by nature, where inequality is in its element, and in civil society the right of particularity is so far from cancelling this natural inequality that it produces it out of spirit and raises it to an inequality of skill and resources, and even to one of moral and intellectual education. To oppose to this right a demand for equality is a folly of the empty understanding which takes as real and rational its abstract equality and its ‘ought-to-be’.\textsuperscript{315}

We will return to this point, but now let us try to follow Marx’s conception of ‘civil society’ and his critique of Hegel as expressed in the \textit{German Ideology}.

\textbf{5.2. ‘Civil Society’ as the Basis of all History}

In \textit{The German Ideology}, Marx and Engels try to subject the Young Hegelians to a comprehensive critique and to formulate their own conception of history based on their previous critique. This work is obviously a continuation of Marx’s earlier views, in which he formulates his own conclusions, we have seen in his previous works, in an exact way. This continuation can be clearly seen in: (1) his critique of ‘ideology’ as the inverted reflection of an inverted reality –a point which we have seen especially in his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state and the “Introduction” he writes to this critique; (2) his critique of the Young Hegelians as ideologues imagining the rule of ideas and thus fighting against these ideas rather

\textsuperscript{314} \textit{“The Communist Manifesto"}, p. 248.

\textsuperscript{315} \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, § 200, p. 192.
than against the roots of these ideas, and finally getting entrapped within the Hegelian system—a point which we can explicitly see in *1844 Manuscripts* and the *Holy Family*; (3) his conception of ‘civil society’ as the basis of all history—a point which Marx has come to establish since his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state; (4) his conception of the proletariat as the subject of revolutionary transformation which will abolish the estrangement of human and put an end to the ‘natural society’—a point which comes to be developed in the “Introduction” and *1844 Manuscripts*; (5) his critique of Feuerbach who cannot conceive human’s practical activity and the dialectical and historical interaction between nature and human, and thus who falls behind Hegelian philosophy—a point which may be seen in *1844 Manuscripts*. Therefore, what is involved in this work is nothing other than a more comprehensive and complete formulation of Marx’s earlier ideas. And by devoting himself to the realization of philosophy, at least to its essence, Marx directly aims to change the existing world and formulates this idea in his “Theses on Feuerbach”, which is jotted down in the same year as *the German Ideology*, in the following way:

The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it.  

All these points are related with each other and also throw a light on Marx’s relation to Hegel. We will analyze *the German Ideology* especially by regarding in its relation to Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* and *Philosophy of History*.

5.2.1. Critique of the Young Hegelians and Feuerbach

---

German criticism has, right up to its latest efforts, never left the realm of philosophy. It by no means examines its general philosophic premises, but in fact all its problems originate in a definite philosophical system, that of Hegel. Not only in its answers, even in its questions there was a mystification. This dependence on Hegel is the reason why not one of these modern critics has even attempted a comprehensive criticism of the Hegelian system, however much each professes to have advanced beyond Hegel. Their polemics against Hegel and against one another are confined to this—each takes one aspect of the Hegelian system and turns this against the whole system as well as against the aspects chosen by the others.  

Marx’s critique of the Young Hegelians does not undergo any change in its essence, and the passage quoted above summarizes it in general. According to this critique, they cannot break their connection with the Hegelian system and the only thing they can do is nothing other than adopting only one aspect of this system and interpreting everything in accordance with this aspect. Accordingly, Bruno Bauer places himself in the standpoint of self-consciousness whereas David Strauss devotes himself to the standpoint of substance. In this regard, it can be said that they get behind the Hegelian system which reconciles these two aspects. And although they base themselves on the Hegelian system Bauer simply returns to the Fichtean position and Strauss to Spinozistic position. However, Feuerbach tries to challenge with Hegelian system as a whole and to go beyond it, and therefore, in Marx’s view, he represents a further step against Bauer and Strauss.

For Marx, the Young Hegelians mainly devote themselves to the critique of religious conceptions and assert that “political, juridical, and moral consciousness was religious or theological consciousness”. They try to liberate human from religious chains because they suppose that religion dominates the

---

317 The German Ideology, pp. 34-5.

318 Years later, Engels repeats the same argument against the Young Hegelians: “Strauss and Bauer each extracted one of its [Hegelian philosophy] aspects and turned it polemically against the other.” Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, p. 15.

319 The German Ideology, p. 35.
world. And it is exactly their opinion of the domination of religion that places them on the same level with the Old Hegelians. The only difference among them lies in the fact that the Young Hegelians want to overthrow the domination of religion whereas the Old Hegelians affirm it.\(^{320}\) According to Marx,

> Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declare them the true bonds of human society), it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness.\(^{321}\)

It follows that although the Young Hegelians really want to change the existing state of affairs they regard this change as only occurring in consciousness because the reason why humans are not free is their religious conceptions. It is evident that Marx thinks differently: he is concerned with the conditions which produces religion. Against this background, the entire text of the *German Ideology* aims to show how humans change their ideas together with changing their material life. Therefore, a change in consciousness is not a theoretical problem but a practical one which requires a material change in the material relations of life, and it is equally certain that the production of consciousness is intertwined with the production of material life. Being content themselves only with a demand for a change in consciousness, which expects humans to leave their religious conceptions, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret the

\(^{320}\) Ibid.

\(^{321}\) Ibid., 35-6.
existing world in a different way, i.e., to recognise it by means of a different interpretation.\textsuperscript{322}

In Marx’s view, even though the Young Hegelians aim to change the existing situation of humans in which religion prevails, their attempt is nothing other than a different interpretation of the existing state of affairs insofar as they propose humans only to leave their religious conceptions. Therefore, to attack religion or any product of human consciousness cannot by itself bring about any solution; the point is to attack the conditions which cause such illusions.\textsuperscript{323} For Marx, the Young Hegelians are devoid of any awareness concerning the mutual relationship between consciousness and reality.

It has not occurred to any one of these philosophers to inquire into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, the connection of their criticism with their own material surroundings.\textsuperscript{324}

In \textit{The German Ideology}, Marx separates Feuerbach from the Young Hegelians and directs a different and more detailed critique to him, since he, as different from other Young Hegelians, attacks to the principle of Hegelian system and in this sense his work attains a further step over other Young Hegelians. According to Marx, Feuerbach remains on the level of ‘perception’ and ‘sensation’; in other words, he does not conceive the world as a result of human practice. In this context, by a reference to ‘first thesis’\textsuperscript{325} on Feuerbach, it can be said that he

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{322} Ibid., p. 36.
\item \textsuperscript{323} “The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is a demand for their true happiness. The call to abandon illusions about their condition is the call to abandon a condition which requires illusions.” “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’: Introduction”, p. 131.
\item \textsuperscript{324} \textit{The German Ideology}, p. 36.
\item \textsuperscript{325} “The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things \textit{[Gegenstand]}, reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the \textit{object, or of contemplation}, but not as \textit{sensuous human activity, practice}, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the \textit{active} side was set forth abstractly by idealism — which, of
\end{itemize}
regards human essentially as a passive being and does not understand “the active side” of the human practice which does not leave the world as it is, but makes it into a human world. Unlike Feuerbach, Marx regards the world as a product of human history and thus as the result of human practice:

[Feuerbach] does not see that the sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed, [a product] in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, and modifying its social system according to the changed needs. Even the objects of the simplest “sensuous certainty” are only given him through social development, industry and commercial intercourse.  

From Marx’s point of view, although Feuerbach rightly points out sensuous reality he nevertheless conceives it only as object and he is not able to see that nothing in the human world is directly given but a product of human practical activity. In this sense, there is no nature independent of man. “Of course, in all this the priority of external nature remains unassailed, and all this has no application to the original men produced by generatio aequivoca.” However, it is equally certain that there is no longer such a nature or the original humans; “nature, the nature that preceded human history, is not by any means the nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no longer exists anywhere.”

As course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. In Das Wesen des Christenthums, he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary’, of ‘practical-critical’, activity.” “Theses on Feuerbach”, p. 569.

326 The German Ideology, p. 45.

327 Ibid., p. 46.

328 Ibid.
a result of human history, nature emerges as a human nature, and human makes herself by developing her essential capacities. Therefore, both nature and human herself are historical products.\textsuperscript{329}

Consequently, Feuerbach too does not go beyond merely offering a different interpretation of what it is and “remains in the realm of theory”.\textsuperscript{330} In this, he does not differ from the Young Hegelians; since he does not conceive sensuous world as a product of human practice and human as sensuous activity “he gives no criticism of the present conditions of life”.\textsuperscript{331}

As far as Feuerbach is a materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as he considers history he is not a materialist. With him materialism and history diverge completely.\textsuperscript{332}

\subsection*{5.2.2. Relations of Production as the basis of all history}

From Marx’s critique of the Young Hegelians and Feuerbach two things immediately follows: first, the production of ideas is dependent on the production of material life, and, according to this determination, humans have always been in a continuous activity so as to maintain their physical existence; by producing their material life they also produce their conceptions. Second, by fighting against the products of human consciousness one cannot provide any real change in the material life of humans, and so it is absolutely necessary that there must be a real

\textsuperscript{329} Marx developed this point in the \textit{1844 Manuscripts}: “It is just in the working-up of the objective world, therefore, that man first really proves himself to be a \textit{species being}. This production is his active species life. Through and because of this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the \textit{objectification of man's species life}: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has created.” \textit{Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844}, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{330} \textit{The German Ideology}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid., p. 47.

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid.
change in the material world in order to make humans free from the chains of religion, which are rooted in the material world.

Although in The German Ideology they are radically formulated, these thoughts have, as we have shown in the previous chapters, their roots in Marx’s early writings. For example, in his 1844 Manuscripts Marx says the following:

Religious estrangement as such occurs only in the realm of consciousness, of man’s inner life, but economic estrangement is that of real life; its transcendence therefore embraces both aspects.

However, The German Ideology exclusively focuses on ‘production’ and tries to read all human history on the basis of material production. As we have previously noted, what is decisive in this context is again Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. As a result of this critique, Marx establishes a crucial point: civil society constitutes the basis of all human history. And what he does in The German Ideology is to explicitly show that the realm of economic interests, in the final analysis, determines human conceptions and legal relations among humans.

In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel considers civil society in the third and last chapter of his work, which he calls “Ethical Life”. This part is again divided into three parts: ‘family’, ‘civil society’ and ‘the state’. However, he discusses property in the chapter of ‘abstract right’ and formulates it only in the general and legal terms. Although in the part of civil society Hegel conceives the realm of economic interests essentially as a realm in which the capitalist relations of production prevail, in the chapter on “Abstract Right” he defines property in a general way. Yet, as Hegel himself knows very well, property is inseparably connected with civil society and has thus a historical character. It is exactly for this reason that Marx opposes Hegel and argues that the sphere of material production has become decisive throughout all human history: without leaving

---

333 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 103.
civil society aside or fully appreciating its significance one can see neither the dependence of legal relations on production relations nor the role of the state.

To this aim, Marx attempts to consider human history on the basis of material production. It is clear that this is for Marx nothing other than the inversion of the ideas of the Young Hegelians and Hegel who appears to give an inverted picture of the existing conditions. As consistent with his ideas formulated in *1844 Manuscripts*, according to which the true starting point is not consciousness but human himself, and consciousness is only a quality of human, not vice versa, in *The German Ideology* Marx departs from humans who produce and reproduce their life in certain relations of production.

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.\(^{334}\)

For Marx, if we will talk about some kind of premises, they can be nothing other than “the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life”. Humans are born into a given web of social relations, and they try to maintain their physical existence in these relations and also add to them something from themselves. And this whole process constitutes the base on which everything else such as religion, legal relations, state, etc., will arise. Humans have to produce within certain relations of production so as to maintain their existence.

Hence, humans have always been in a continuous activity in order to live, and obliged to produce their material life before they produce anything else. To do so, they need to produce their means of subsistence, and the production of the means of subsistence paves the way for human’s becoming truly human:

\(^{334}\) *The German Ideology*, p. 36-7.
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion, or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence, men are indirectly producing their material life.335

Therefore, for Marx, human distinguishes herself from the animal through her productive activity. In this sense, human’s distinction is not a given condition; by producing her material life human begins to make herself: human is a result of her productive activity. It is this decisive role of production that drives, in The German Ideology, Marx to consider all history on the basis of production.

It is clear from the decisive role of production that it is not related only to humans’ physical existence or to mere survival, but also constitutes the ground of humans’ mode of life:

This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.336

Therefore, according to Marx, how humans produce their material life is closely associated with their way of life and social organization. Furthermore, they develop their conceptions in this framework of production; what they think is related to how they produce their life. Production has thus a central place in all pursuits of humans. “Men must be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history.’”337 This simple premise of human history should in no case be forgotten.

335 Ibid., p. 37.

336 Ibid.

337 Ibid., p. 47.
not only because it is a fundamental fact of human life but also because it gives a ground for understanding all other aspects of human life. As Marx suggests, if there will be a history at all it has to depend on this simple fact since it has a direct connection with social and political structure.

Humans produce in order to satisfy their physical needs, and the satisfaction of physical needs brings about the rise of new needs. They continuously have to produce and reproduce their material life. This has a double meaning: first, humans have to satisfy their physical needs and, to do so, they produce and reproduce their subsistence of means; second, they also produce their children and provide the continuity of their species. The latter indicates family, and Marx’s consideration of it is striking:

> The family, which to begin with is the only social relation, becomes later, when increased needs create new social relations and the increased population new needs, a subordinate one (except in Germany), and must then be treated and analysed according to the existing empirical data, not according to “the concept of the family”, as is the custom in Germany.\(^{338}\)

This can be considered as a critique directed toward Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, in which he deals with family as “the *immediate substantiality* of spirit.”\(^{339}\) Against such a conception, Marx considers family in its relation to the production of material life which depends on certain productive forces. For Marx, therefore, it is on these basic premises that society and history must be studied and never considered in their isolation from productive forces.

As these productive forces advance and population increase, new needs emerge and the division of labor further increases. With the increasing division of labor, the divisions within society also come to become evident and within the social organization each individual becomes dependent on a different branch of

\(^{338}\) Ibid., p. 48.

\(^{339}\) *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, § 158, p. 162.
work. According to Marx, however, the division of labor implies not only the different works for different individuals, but also that labor and free time are distributed among different individuals. It follows that a part of society lives in ‘enjoyment’ and ‘consumption’ whereas another part devotes its entire life to ‘labor’ and ‘production’ and the burden of whole society falls on this part.\textsuperscript{340}

A further result of the division of labor, according to Marx, is a separation between particular interests and the common interest, and here the state appears as the representative of the common interest. However, for Marx, this is an illusion because the state is itself determined according to class struggles; accordingly, the common interest is only a form of semblance, which a particular class assumes for its own interests so as to strengthen and perpetuate its power.\textsuperscript{341} Here Marx appears to target Hegel’s philosophy of the state which considers the state as immanent end of family and civil society.\textsuperscript{342} By contrast, Marx thinks that the relations of civil society are decisive vis-à-vis the state, and the state is subordinate to civil society, not vice versa. His materialist conception of history, therefore,

\begin{quote}
relies on expounding the real process of production –starting from the material of life itself– and comprehending the form of intercourse connected with and created by this mode of production, i.e., civil society in its various stages, as the basis of all history; describing it in its action as the state, and also explaining how all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, morality, etc., etc., arise from it.\textsuperscript{343}
\end{quote}

Marx thus points out the fact that civil society is the most decisive factor in human history and it is on the basis of civil society that the state and the forms of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{340} \textit{The German Ideology}, p. 51.
\item \textsuperscript{341} Ibid., p. 52.
\item \textsuperscript{342} \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, § 261, p. 236.
\item \textsuperscript{343} \textit{The German Ideology}, p. 61.
\end{itemize}
intellectual production must be considered. If this point is ignored, then one would find herself in the arms of absolute and eternal truths. According to Marx, however, ideas, which appear as absolute and are counted as to have absolute validity, in fact reflect nothing other than the ideas of “ruling class” which in civil society possesses the means of production. Therefore, for instance, the separation of powers, which Hegel considers in the form of the constitutional monarchy and relates it with the ‘the self-determination of the concept’, is in fact a result of a stalemate among various political elements: the monarch, the aristocracy, and the bourgeoisie.\footnote{Hegel puts it as follows: “It is only the inner self-determination of the concept, not any other consideration, whether of purpose or advantage, that is the absolute source of the division of powers, and in virtue of this alone is the organization of the state something inherently rational and the image of eternal reason.” \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, § 272, p. 257.}

Marx thus shows that the state is closely connected with civil society, and its historical existence reflects the relations of civil society and to certain extent fits in the level of the development of the mode of production. However, with the development of the bourgeoisie, civil society enters into an unhampered development and gets rid of all local ties. In this sense, the state emerges as different and independent from civil society as if it were representative of the common interest whereas “it is nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeois are compelled to adopt, both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests.”\footnote{\textit{The German Ideology}, p. 67.} Such a position of the state presupposes the fact that the bourgeoisie has organized itself as a class and took hold of domination throughout the country. It follows that it is only in those countries, where the rival for the power among certain classes still continues, that the state still to certain extent exists as independent.\footnote{Ibid., p. 99.}

\footnote{Ibid.}
According to Marx, the world history also owes its existence to the increasing division of labor among nations and hence the composition of a world market. The development of productive forces results in the interaction among different countries: the world market draws all countries in it and appears as “an alien power”. Humans thus increasingly become dependent on a power arising from their own actions. Marx thus argues against Hegel who regards the world history as the work of the Spirit\textsuperscript{348} that:

\[
\ldots \text{transformation of history into world history is by no means a mere abstract act on the part of “self-consciousness”, the world spirit, or of any other metaphysical spectre, but a quite material, empirically verifiable act, an act the proof of which every individual furnishes as he comes and goes, eats and drinks and clothes himself.} \textsuperscript{349}
\]

However, it must be stated that Hegel holds that the working of civil society is by necessity being directed toward the composition of a world market.

This inner dialectic of civil society thus drives it – or at any rate drives a specific civil society – to push beyond its own limits and seek markets, and so its necessary means of subsistence, in other lands which are either deficient in goods it has over produced, or else generally backward in creative industry, etc.\textsuperscript{350}

According to Marx, the world history is not a work of conscious activity of humans, but necessarily emerges as an alien power from the relations of civil society.\textsuperscript{351} Therefore, “the right of particularity”, which Hegel regards as one of

\textsuperscript{348} For Hegel, “world history is the necessary development, out of the concept of spirit’s freedom alone, of the moments of reason and so of the self-consciousness and freedom of spirit. This development is the exposition [Auslegung] and actualization of the universal spirit.” \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, § 342, p. 316.

\textsuperscript{349} Ibid., p. 59.

\textsuperscript{350} \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, § 246, p. 222.

\textsuperscript{351} \textit{The German Ideology}, p. 59.
the most important principles of the modern society since it enables humans freely pursue their interests, is nothing other than arbitrary relations in civil society, and this arbitrariness implies not human freedom but only humans’ dependence on an objective and alien power, which is in fact a product of their own action.\footnote{352} It is true that humans have been in a continuous activity throughout history so as to produce and reproduce their material life on the basis of the labor of the previous generations, and they have given nature a human shape and made it something human by appropriating it to themselves and changing it in accordance with their needs; however, they have done this only by subjecting themselves more to production and exchange relations. Neither production nor exchange is under their control since the division of labor is determined not according to the will of humans but naturally.\footnote{353} In this sense, there is really a “second nature”\footnote{354}, as Hegel puts it: humans do not live under the domination of an external and alien power, i.e., of nature, but it is humans themselves who create the relations within which they live. However, this “second nature” is, for Marx, still \textit{natural}; in other words, humans still live under the domination of an alien power, no matter whether it exists by itself or it has been created by humans. Their dependency continues to exist as a result of the fact that production and consumption are very far away from being ordered rationally and in accordance with human freedom.

\footnote{352} “The difference between the private individual and the class individual, the accidental nature of the conditions of life for the individual, appears only with the emergence of the class, which is itself the product of the bourgeoisie […] Thus, in imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie than before, because their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are to a greater extent governed by material forces.” Ibid, p. 87.

\footnote{353} Ibid., p. 53.

\footnote{354} “But in simple identity with the actuality of individuals ethical life [\textit{das Sittliche}] appears as their general mode of conduct, i.e. as \textit{custom} [\textit{Sitte}], while the habitual practice of ethical living appears as a \textit{second nature} which, put in the place of the initial, purely natural will, is the soul of custom permeating it through and through, the significance and the actuality of its existence. It is spirit living and present as a world, and the substance of spirit thus exists now for the first time as spirit.” \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 151}, p. 159.
This complete dependency of humans, however, for Marx, is not final because the alien power governing humans also creates the conditions for the emergence of ‘communism’, by divesting the great part of humans of property and causing a great contradiction between a considerable wealth and an equally considerable misery.\textsuperscript{355}

All-round dependence, this primary natural form of the world-historical co-operation of individuals, will be transformed by this communist revolution into the control and conscious mastery of these power, which, born of the action of men on another, have till now overawed and ruled men as powers completely alien to them.\textsuperscript{356}

In \textit{1844 Manuscripts}, Marx united the critique of political economy and that of Hegel and presented communism, “positive abolition of private property”, as self-creation of human on the basis of a reading of Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology}. In \textit{The German Ideology}, he now gives a historical picture of production and property relations and shows that the movement of private property, or of capital, is driven to its own dissolution by creating the proletariat. However, it is clear that he determines his position and his materialist conception of history against the Hegelian standpoint. \textit{The Communist Manifesto}, which is collaboratively written by Marx and Engels, would further develop this historical perspective and try to show the necessity of communism. This work, as a defense of communism, includes a series of replies against the accusations directed toward communism, and a closer examination will show that it also reflects an implicit dialogue with Hegel’s \textit{Philosophy of Right}.\textsuperscript{355}

\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., p. 54.

\textsuperscript{356} Ibid., p. 59.
5.3. The Abolition of Private Property

In *The Communist Manifesto*, written as a political program for the international worker movement, Marx and Engels draws attention both to the great achievements of the modern bourgeoisie and to its inevitable dissolution. They thus aim to show that communism is a current topic because it is exactly the movement of capital which paves the way for it, by simplifying and intensifying class conflicts and creating an army which is composed of the propertyless.

According to Marx, the modern bourgeoisie increasingly makes the modern state subjected to itself and creates a world market. By turning all social relations, which previously appeared as if they would eternally remain the same, the modern bourgeoisie forces everything to be in conformity with its own movement. “In one word, it creates a world after its own image.”

However, Marx also points out that the fact that the working of modern bourgeois society is not free from great problems and essentially bears within it serious crises which mainly results from overproduction. And every attempt to get rid of them, in fact, brings about new crises. Furthermore, the modern bourgeoisie creates a new class which consists of those who have no property and thus have to work for others. The members of this class are themselves a commodity whose price is determined according to supply and demand in the market. As a result of

---

357 In my article “Marx’s *Communist Manifesto* as a Critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*”, I have argued that *The Communist Manifesto* can be considered as a reply to Hegel’s critique of communism which was developed in the *Philosophy of Right* in the form of a critique of Platonic communism. This part of the thesis, “The Abolition of Private Property”, includes a part of this article. Kılınç, D.B., “Marx’s *Communist Manifesto* as a Critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*”, in *Pensare la Modernità*, ed. Giorgio Grimaldi, Limina Mentis, Villasanta, 2012, pp. 271-291


359 Ibid., p. 250.
mechanization and the division of labor, they come to be a part of the machine and are forced to work more.\textsuperscript{360}

*The Communist Manifesto* as a defense for communism also includes a series of replies against the accusations made for it. However, a closer examination shows us that in this work Marx continues to be in a dialogue with Hegel and justifies communism against the background of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. As we have seen above, Hegel opposes an equality concerning the distribution of the goods on the basis of his conception of property that property is essentially private property because in it one puts her will and makes it her own. In this sense, according to Hegel, the abolition of private property means the abolition of one’s freedom and personality.

For Marx, what is important is the historical character of property. And on this basis, he opposes a conception of property which eternally remains the same. According to him, in the capitalist mode of production, private property is not an indication of individual property; on the contrary, it is private property itself which makes most individuals devoid of freedom, and even of property itself. Therefore, Marx argues that communism would not prevent one from appropriating the product of her own labor; “the distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property”.\textsuperscript{361} For the bourgeois property increasingly makes the great masses the propertyless and does not let one appropriate the product of her own labor since those who produce only for their subsistence lose their position and become subjected to the movement of private property. In *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx strikingly emphasizes this point:

\begin{quote}
We Communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man’s own
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{360} Ibid, p. 251.

\textsuperscript{361} Ibid., p. 256.
labour, which property is alleged to be the groundwork of all personal freedom, activity, and independence. Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily.\(^{362}\)

It is clear that Marx does not oppose Hegel’s conception of property; on the contrary, he seems to support it. The problem for him is not that Hegel’s conception is false, but that it is not consistent with the modern bourgeois relation of production because of its class character. This very conception of property requires the abolition of private property since under the modern bourgeois relations of production one cannot possess the product of his labor and he only produces for the ‘capital’ which is property of those who possess the means of production. Furthermore, with the development of industry, the great masses gradually fall into poverty, and especially petty artisans and small peasants lose their positions. Therefore, Marx’s communism does not aim at abolishing property as the product of one’s own labor but the property which prevents one from possessing the product of his labor:

We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products of labour, an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command the labour of others. All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class requires it.\(^{363}\)

In *1844 Manuscripts*, as we have discussed in the chapter on “Worldly Dialectic”, Marx analyzed the conditions of the worker under the capitalist mode of production in detail, and asserted that the worker leads an alienated life because

\(^{362}\) Ibid., p. 256.

\(^{363}\) Ibid., p. 257.
he cannot possess the product of his own labor and his labor is not a free, conscious activity but coerced one external to himself. His labor which is nothing other than a fundamental characteristic of his nature is reduced merely to a means of subsistence. He has no property but his labor, and in order to live he is forced to sell his labor, i.e. this only property he possesses, to the capitalist. The only gain he receives in return is a minimum which only suffices the worker to survive and rework, whereas the product of his own labor confronts him as an external power over which he has no control. It is not the producer himself, but the capitalist, who possesses the product. And what creates the conditions for the capitalist’s appropriation of the product of labor of the worker is the fact that the capitalist owns the means of production. It is exactly this property that Marx opposes and wants to abolish because it already abolishes the possibility of possessing one’s own product by his labor.

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its nonexistence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the nonexistence of any property for the immense majority of society.364

As we have seen, this brief text, The Communist Manifesto, insistently points out that Hegel’s conception of property as a model of simple commodity production is gradually invalidated in the modern bourgeois relations of production; and in this sense, it is the existing mode of production that puts an end to personal freedom, by abolishing the possibility of one’s possessing the product of his own labor. Therefore, such a conception of property, which is respected by Marx too, does not correspond to the existing mode of production and does not recognize the historical character of property, the form it assumes in the modern bourgeois

364 Ibid., pp. 257-8.
relations of production in which one does no longer produce in order to satisfy a personal need, but the production is devoted to increase capital, which is essentially based on the exploitation of labor.

Consequently, it is evident from this that Marx tries to defend and reestablish communism also against the background of Hegel’s critique. And to this aim, by manifesting the existing state of affairs, Marx argues that Hegel’s conception of property is contradicted not by communism but by private property itself. The problem with Hegel is that in his Philosophy of Right he has a penetrating insight into the modern bourgeois relations of production under the title of ‘civil society’, whereas in the chapter on “Abstract Right” he only deals with a form of property which is specific to simple commodity production or, as Marx says, “the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant”. Consequently, Hegel’s conception of property remains abstract, although he presents civil society concretely. However, it must be also stated that Hegel’s view of civil society, for all its deep insight into the problems of this ‘external state’, comes short of conceiving the growing conflict between the capitalists and the workers, and therefore “it fails to address adequately the contradictory nature of civil society”. This is evidently clear from Hegel’s classification of the estates, according to which both the capitalists and the workers take part in the same estate: ‘the formal estate’.

In accordance with this determination, Marx later on conceptualizes communism as the expropriation of expropriators: “The capitalist mode of appropriation, which springs from the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of private property, as founded on labour of its proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its own negation. This is the negation of the negation. It does not re-establish private property, but it does indeed establish individual property on the basis of the achievements of the capitalist era: namely, co-operation and the possession in common of the land the means of production produced by labour itself”. Capital, Vol. I, p. 929. It is no accident that here Marx’s refers to Hegel’s ‘negation of negation’ because, in his Communist Manifesto, it is exactly in these terms that he defended his communism as against Hegel’s critique of communism.


Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 204, p. 195.
When Hegel discusses civil society, he refers to the interdependence of men and a process of socialization.\textsuperscript{368} It follows that, in the modern bourgeois relations of production, individual production is replaced by social production, that is, all products bear to a certain extent a contribution of many members of society, and therefore, one’s own product through his labor gives its place to a collective product through collective labor. In this sense, it is not possible to speak of ‘capital’, which has a decisive role in the modern bourgeois relations of production, as a product of \textit{an} individual since in its production many individuals involve. “Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion.”\textsuperscript{369}

On the other hand, according to Hegel’s conception of property, as we indicated above, one first appropriates something natural, transforms it by his labor, leaves his stamp on it, and finally takes it in his possession; this transformed thing, therefore, exclusively belongs to its producer because he has added it something from his. In this context, if we follow Hegel’s conception of property and consider the production in the modern bourgeois relations of production essentially as social one, we must conclude that since what is involved here is a social product it must belong to society as a whole. It is not one person or a few, but the entire society which must possess the product by the many members of society. For the production is social in the modern bourgeois relations of production, its form of appropriation must also be social.

What Marx draws attention to is exactly this social character of production vis-à-vis Hegel’s conception of property. And by emphasizing the great

\textsuperscript{368} “The fact that I must direct my conduct by reference to others introduces here the form of universality. It is from others that I acquire the means of satisfaction and I must accordingly accept their views. At the same time, however, I am compelled to produce means for the satisfaction of others. We play into each other’s hands and so hang together. To this extent everything particular becomes something social.” Ibid, § 192, \textit{Addition}, p. 189.

\textsuperscript{369} “The Communist Manifesto”, p. 257.
contradiction in the modern bourgeois relations of production –that is, despite the social character of production, the form of appropriation remains private–, Marx justifies his communism against the background of Hegel’s critique of communism. He insistently remarks that the aim of his communism is to abolish not personal property which is the basis of personal freedom, but capital which depends on the labor of society as a whole and the exploitation of this labor.

When, therefore, capital is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the property that is changed. It loses its class-character.370

Marx is very attentive to the freedom of man and tries to formulate his communism in such a way that an equality concerning the distribution of goods will not contradict the freedom of each member of society. For this reason, he goes to the trouble to justify his communism against the critique such as Hegel’s and attempts to show that equality can be consistent with freedom. And he describes communism in this regard as “an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all”.371

5.4. An Overview

Hegel’s philosophy constitutes one of the greatest turning-points in the history of philosophy. This can be said to have mainly two reasons: first, Hegel presents a dialectic logic which enables to conceive the living reality, unlike traditional logic which considers the determinations of being in their isolation and thus kills the movement inherent in all beings. And secondly, he essentially deals with the

370 Ibid.
371 Ibid., p. 262.
‘Spirit’ [Geist] which gives itself an existence only in history. Therefore, it is not surprising that history occupies a significant place in Hegel’s philosophy because it is above all a philosophy of spirit.

For Hegel, “freedom is the substance of spirit” and history is nothing other than “the progress of the consciousness of freedom”. He regards all human institutions, the state and the world history as a product of spirit’s labor, and he also points out that it is thus its own product: it makes itself what it is by the mediation of the negation of its immediate existence. In this context, history is a process in which what is implicit in human becomes actual. Accordingly, human is free but her freedom exists at first only as potential; but she does not stop in such an abstract determination and makes herself free in history through producing herself as human. It is on this basis that Hegel attempts to see in history the development of human freedom. It is also clear that, in Hegel’s view, human lives in a world she himself created, and to live in such a world becomes her “second nature”.

However, although Hegel thinks that human freedom has attained to a decisive moment in the modern world, it is clear from his view of civil society that the interdependence relation among humans tends to bring them under its sway and to transform into a blind and alien power. It is exactly for this reason that he warns that “the freedom of trade should not be such as to jeopardize the

---

372 “The moments of life, when integrated in human consciousness, develop in the form of History and human consciousness is the Absolute Subject which discovers its identity in the course of time.” Studies on Marx and Hegel, p. 13.

373 Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p. 47.

374 Ibid., p. 54.

375 Ibid., p. 50. It must be also stated that spirit, for Hegel, is certainly a supernatural entity because it is the negation of what is natural, but it is not a ghostly being which exists without human individuals; it is human self-consciousness in general, and, from the standpoint of history and society, the consciousness of a community or a nation.

376 Ibid., p. 97 and also see Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, § 151, p. 159.
general good”. He also offers some precautions such as police, the administration of justice, and corporations, so as to minimize the negative results of the workings of civil society. Furthermore, his philosophy of the state keeps in mind a likely opposition between civil society and the state, between particular and universal interests, and he discusses especially the legislation against this background. Keeping Platonic state in his mind, however, Hegel does not propose a radical solution like a strict control over civil society and pays regard to “the right of particularity”. In this, his conception of property plays a significant role, according to which property is essentially private property and “the first existence of freedom”. As a result, for Hegel, civil society remains subordinate to the state and the world history.

It is clear that Marx owes much to Hegel’s conception of history and, as we have tried to show, he proceeds from where Hegel cut short. For Marx, too, man is a product of his labor, and the world history is the self-creation of man. However, according to Marx, the modern world is very far away from being the space for the actualization of freedom mainly due to the following reasons: the freedom of trade emerges as the only freedom which disenables all other forms of freedom; capital posits itself as the sole power and subjugates the state and the world history to itself; private property in modern civil society becomes the main means for excluding the majority from appropriating the product of its own labor. If it is to be expressed in Hegelian terms, “second nature” as the negation of immediacy and what is natural becomes the affirmation of an alien power and still

377 Ibid., § 236, Addition, p. 218. Ironically, Marx defends a limitless free trade: “the protective system of our day is conservative, while the free trade system is destructive. It breaks up old nationalities and pushes the antagonism of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the extreme point. In a word, the free trade system hastens the social revolution.” Marx, K., “Speech on Free Trade”, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. D. McLellan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 296.

378 Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, §§ 45-6, p. 61.

379 “It [the bourgeoisie] has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless infeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom–Free Trade.” “The Communist Manifesto”, p. 248.
remains as natural because it operates independently from humans’ will and bring them under its control; civil society, as the ideal moment of the state and thus the world history, makes them its own ideal moments. Marx therefore concludes that the capitalist relations of production must be abolished, if it is to bring a harmony between universal and particular interests, and this is the presupposition of such an “association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all”. However, for him, this “association” is not an ideal but emerges from the self-movement of capital, which is necessarily driven toward its own crises and creates the army of the propertyless, i.e., the proletariat.

As a result, holding historical dialectic and adhering strictly to historical reality, Marx surely passes beyond Hegel’s standpoint, but equally appropriates the main implications of Hegel’s thought. It is through a critique of Hegel that Marx adheres to the essence of Hegel’s historical dialectic.

380 Ibid., p. 262.
CHAPTER VI

REVOLUTIONARY DIALECTIC

In his *Capital*, Marx points out the revolutionary character of dialectic and presents it as an irresistible power:

The fact that the movement of capitalist society is full of contradictions impresses itself most strikingly on the practical bourgeois in the changes of the periodic cycle through which modern industry passes, the summit of which is the general crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet it is only in its preliminary stages, and by the universality of its field of action and the intensity of its impact it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the upstarts in charge of the new Holy Prussian-German Empire.\(^{381}\)

According to Hegel, dialectic negates the determinations of understanding and shows their contradictory nature and the necessity of their self-transcendence: every finite being has its own contradiction in it, and it is exactly for this reason that it finds no permanent base for its existence and is destined to perish. Dialectic is, therefore, not a way of thinking which is external to its object or looks for the contradiction outside its object; on the contrary, dialectic knows that its object is essentially contradictory and what drives it to pass into another form is nothing other than its own contradiction which is the base of its movement. Dialectic as a method thus is to follow the self-movement of its object and not to give any place for something external. For Hegel, “dialectic is not an activity of subjective

\(^{381}\) *Capital*, Vol I, p. 103.
thinking applied to some matter externally, but is rather the *matter’s very soul* putting forth its branches and fruit organically.”

It is clear, however, that dialectic, as Hegel presents it, requires neither any presupposition nor any recipe; in this sense, thinking dialectically or applying the dialectic method to any branch of science is not to construct the object of the science in accordance with some predetermined rule or to apply a logic to the fact, but to follow “the matter’s very soul” and to make it visible. The only important thing for this method is to present the fact itself as something concrete which is the unity of many determinations and contradictions. In his critique of political economy, which culminates in *Capital*, Marx mainly aims at applying such a method and is certain that the capitalist society, through its own contradictions, advances to its own dissolution. And, according to him, this fact is not a result of a subjective wish or of an arbitrary thinking, but solely depends on following its own movement. The method which will make the movement of capitalist society visible is thus *revolutionary* since the dialectic of this society brings us to its negation.

In this chapter, we will take into consideration Marx’s remarks on the method, as presented in *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, and his critique of Hegel because in these works Marx’s critique of, or ‘return’ to, Hegel appears mainly on the basis of method.

6.1. The Method of Rising from Abstract to Concrete

---

382 *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, § 31, p. 48.

383 Therefore, this expression must be considered in this regard; in other words, the application of the method presupposes the appropriation of the object and conceiving historical reality in its entirety. In this sense, Dunayevskaya rightly points out that: “[a]t no time was it a question for Marx of ‘applying’ the Hegelian dialectic. At all times it was a question of what dialectical development upsurged from the Subject itself.” Raya Dunayevskaya, *Philosophy and Revolution: from Hegel to Sartre, and from Marx to Mao*, Dell Publishing, New York, 1973, p. 64.
The most instructive text concerning Marx’s relation to Hegel is perhaps his *Grundrisse*, which was written during 1857-8, because in this work Marx explicitly refers to Hegel’s method and consciously attempts to make use of it, whereas in his previous works he openly rejects Hegel’s logic and his ‘speculative’ method.\(^{384}\) In *Grundrisse*, Marx seems to have made a decision about how he would consider the capitalist relations of production and which method he would employ in his critique of political economy. Although he directs almost the same critique to Hegel there seems to occur a change in his conception of method.\(^{385}\)

We have seen that Marx, in *1844 Manuscripts*, *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology*, seems to have finished his job with Hegel’s philosophy and even he accuses the Young Hegelians of remaining within Hegelian logic. Furthermore, in the *Poverty of Philosophy* he ridicules with Proudhon for his direct application of Hegel’s method to his critique of political economy. In the *Grundrisse*, however, Marx makes Hegel a current issue again and says something new related to the starting point of a scientific inquiry and how one should conceive the ‘abstract’ and the ‘concrete.’

In a well-known letter to Engels, Marx writes the following:

\(^{384}\) Raya Dunayevskaya puts the significance of *Grundrisse* for Hegel-Marx relation as follows: “It is certainly true that nowhere, not even the ‘strictly’ philosophic essays of the young Marx, is Marx more ‘Hegelian’ than in these ‘strictly’ economic Notebooks, which turn out to be sweeping historic sketches of mankind’s, not just capitalism’s, development.” Ibid., p. 62.

\(^{385}\) In his study on the influence of Bruno Bauer on Marx, Zvi Rosen draws attention to a quite interesting point; we will quote it as a historical anecdote: “Years later, however, [despite Marx’s harsh criticism of his old friend Bauer in the *Holy Family*] Bauer reestablished contact with Marx. When he was in London in 1855-56, Bauer demonstrated that he harboured no resentment towards Marx and often visited the latter’s home, as Marx reported in his letters to Engels. In their conservations, Marx and Bauer discussed a whole range of problems: the development of German philosophy, the class struggle, political economy, the role of Germany and England in Europe etc. For Marx, who had long since ceased to deal with Hegelian philosophy, this was an opportunity to delve into these subjects once more. It is even possible that these discussions had their impact on Marx’s renewed interest in Hegel, which was to find striking expression in the *Grundrisse*, written shortly afterwards, in 1857-58.” Zvi Rosen, *Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx: The Influence of Bruno Bauer on Marx’s Thought*, Martinus Nijhoff, Netherlands, 1977, p. 132.
…] I have completely demolished the theory of profit as hitherto propounded. What was of great use to me as regards method of treatment was Hegel’s Logic at which I had taken another look by mere accident, Freiligrath having found and made me a present of several volumes of Hegel, originally the property of Bakunin. If ever the time comes when such work is again possible, I should very much like to write 2 or 3 sheets making accessible to the common reader the rational aspect of the method which Hegel not only discovered but also mystified.  

This letter is of great importance since it indicates that through “another look” Marx finds Hegel’s Logic useful so that it helps Marx demolishing the theory of profit by providing him with “the method of treatment”. However, Marx also adds that the method, which is a discovery of Hegel, is mystified by Hegel himself. Marx thus no longer regards Hegel’s Logic as mere wordplay, but thinks that it contains the true scientific method. And, therefore, it is clear that Marx becomes more preoccupied with the search for a correct method as he wants to present his thought in a scientific manner and begins to do science, and he feels obliged, though “by mere accident”, to return to Hegel.  

We will now analyze Marx’s discussion of method in his Grundrisse and also try to understand on which ground he criticizes Hegel. 

In his early works Marx does not hide his aversion for abstractions and continuously accuses both political economists and philosophers of leaving themselves to be determined by abstractions. In these discussions abstraction seems to merely have a negative meaning, and what is real is persistently emphasized against it. However, Marx’s point is not to deny the necessity of 


387 This ‘return’ should be, as we have tried to show in the previous chapters, taken to mean that Marx comes to enter a closer relation with Hegel’s dialectic and he thus appropriates Hegel’s dialectic in more comprehensive manner: since there was no clear break there was also no return. Therefore, Marx’s relation to Hegel is not one ‘by mere accident’, the entire development of his thought, from the beginning to the end, is a continuous dialog with Hegel, though it is always in a critical form.
abstraction as such in any scientific study, but only to avoid falling into schematization. In *Grundrisse*, which is of crucial importance for understanding Marx’s method in his critique of political economy, he now attempts to explicate the concepts ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ and to justify the abstract as the true starting point.

In Marx’s eyes, modern bourgeois society constitutes an interconnected whole, an organic unity, so it must be considered as organizing itself from the simple to the combined. An understanding of such a unity thus necessitates a certain level of abstraction which reveals its simplest category. It is this abstract category that, as a starting point, will enable us to rebuild our subject, which is in case of political economy modern bourgeois society, in its entirety and truth. The reason why the concrete cannot be the direct starting point is that when it is taken as it is, as given, it is merely an empty abstraction. Marx puts it as follows:

> It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real precondition, thus to begin, in economics, with e.g. the population, which is the foundation and the subject of the entire social act of production. However, on closer examination, this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage labour, capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange, division of labour, prices, etc.\(^388\)

The fact that the concrete as an immediate starting point is an empty abstraction because its content is left undetermined clearly indicates a new way of seeing the concrete and the abstract, according to which “the concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of diverse.”\(^389\) In a

\(^{388}\) Ibid., p. 100.

scientific research, to talk about the concrete as it is given, without any mediation which exposes its determinations and contradictions, is to make it into an abstraction which only serves to obscure its structure, and in this case what we have is merely “a chaotic conception of the whole.” But if we start from the abstract, the simplest category of the concrete, then we proceed to rebuild it step by step from the simplest to the combined and thus conceive it as “a rich totality of many determinations and relations.”

It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation [Anschauung] and conception. Along the first path [which starts from the concrete,] the full conception was evaporated to yield an abstract determination; along the second [which starts from the abstract], the abstract determination leads towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought.

Marx further develops his conception of these simple categories when he discusses their historical existence and its relation to the succession of categories in scientific investigation concerning political economy. The simple category, which is taken as a simple relation of a more concrete whole in comparison to this simple category, has an historical past. In this respect, it may express the dominant relation of a less concrete whole while it is only a subordinate relation of a more concrete whole. “To that extent the path of abstract thought, rising from the simple to the combined, would correspond to the real historical process.” However, the case is not valid for every historical relation. In certain societies, of

---

390 *Grundrisse*, p. 100.
391 Ibid.
392 Ibid., p. 101.
393 Ibid., p. 102.
which the development is less developed, “cooperation, a developed division of labour, etc., are found, even though there is no kind of money.”

Marx mentions two simple categories of political economy in order to explicate his views on the nature of simple and abstract categories. Firstly, money as a simple category of political economy and as a simple relation of modern bourgeois society has a long history before these relations of production exist; in this respect its historical existence is consistent with the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete. This simple category, which can be traced back to very old times, however, has arrived to its full development only in modern bourgeois society; hence, it is also justified as a simple relation of this society because it has become possible to talk about money in general.

Secondly, like money, labor has also a long history, but in modern bourgeois society it achieves simplicity and generality in reality. And its historical development also coincides with the history of its comprehension. The simplicity of labor lies not only in its being a simple relation of a more complicated whole, but also in its becoming historically simple and abstract. In this sense, it is a real abstraction which is the product of historical relations of production. Accordingly, “as a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest possible concrete development.”

To conceive labor in general, not a particular kind of labor, it is necessary for any kind of labor to have developed to a great extent. Once the different kinds of labor, labor in reality, has thoroughly developed and gradually homogenized it becomes possible to talk about labor in general, a certain “indifference towards any specific kind of labour.” And in such a condition an individual does not have to limit himself only to a specific kind of labor; hence, in general there is no longer a certain kind of labor specific

---

394 Ibid.
395 Ibid., p. 104.
396 Ibid.
only to certain individuals. Therefore, labor in modern bourgeois society becomes “the means of creating wealth in general”\(^{397}\) and accordingly, the category of labor, like labor in reality, comes to be thought as the source of wealth.

Here, then, for the first time, the point of departure of modern economics, namely the abstraction of the category ‘labour’, ‘labour as such’, labour pure and simple, becomes true in practice. The simplest abstraction, then, which modern economics places at the head of its discussions, and which expresses an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all forms of society, nevertheless achieves practical truth as an abstraction only as a category of the most modern society.\(^{398}\)

Therefore, the category of labor proves itself to be one of the predominant categories of political economy because pure and simple labor in reality has become the means of creating wealth in general in the capitalist relation of production, which is the subject of political economy. The abstraction of labor is thus not only a product of thinking, but also of the historical movement of production relations which homogenizes all kinds of labor. In this sense, abstraction in thought reflects, or corresponds to, an abstraction in reality.

In addition, the fact that although labor is present in all forms of society it achieves its full development in the complex relations of capitalist production provides us with an understanding of a less developed form of society because the more developed form of society has as its subordinate relation the predominant relation of a less developed form of society. Just as “human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape”\(^{399}\), so bourgeois society enables us to understand the previous forms of society.

\(^{397}\) Ibid.

\(^{398}\) Ibid., p. 104-5.

\(^{399}\) Ibid., p. 105. However, Marx also warns us not to obscure the historical differences between the previous forms of society and bourgeois society. “Although it is true, therefore, that the categories of bourgeois economics possess a truth for all other forms of society, this is to be taken only with a grain of salt. They can contain them in a developed, or stunted, or caricatured form etc., but always with an essential difference.” Ibid., p. 106. In a similar way, Hegel says following: “Each age and
As to the succession of economic categories, Marx surprisingly argues that the succession should not depend on the historical development of economic relations corresponding to these categories. It is according to the concrete whole, to which these categories belong, that their succession should be considered because what Marx, and all political economists, try to conceive is ‘this’ whole, this modern society.

Their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems to be their natural order or which corresponds to historical development. The point is not the historic position of the economic relations in the succession of different forms of society. And not their sequence ‘in the idea’ (Proudhon) (a muddy notion of historic movement). Rather, their order within modern bourgeois society.

Marx hence informs the reader about how he takes the capitalist relation of production into account in Grundrisse, but he is fully aware that this discussion of method is thoroughly related with Hegel, and for this reason he, on the one hand, appreciates Hegel’s greatness with regard to the method of science and, on the other hand, comes to criticize him. The critique we shall now analyze is directed toward Hegel’s idealist standpoint.

All Marx so far says about “the scientifically correct method” is consistent with Hegel’s viewpoint. However, Marx insistently draws attention to one important point: although we should start from the simple categories in a scientific study, it should not be forgotten that the subject, the concrete, is always outside the thinking subject, and in this sense it is the real starting point for each nation finds itself in such peculiar circumstances, in such a unique situation, that it can and must make decisions with reference to itself alone […] Amid the pressure of great events, a general principle is of no help, and it is not enough to look back on similar situation [in the past].

Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p. 21.

400 Grundrisse, p. 107-8.

401 Ibid., p. 101.
“observation and conception”. When we observe and represent the concrete, i.e. modern bourgeois society in case of political economy, it is immediately before us; thus it is prior to all cognitive efforts. In all our acts of observation and representation, the fundamental substratum is the concrete itself.

For Marx, the concrete is the totality of many determinations and relations and so it does not present itself to observation and representation as it is, or we cannot know the concrete in all its comprehension merely through observation and representation. It is only through thinking that we appropriate the concrete and reproduce it as “a totality of thoughts.” And to be able to conceive the concrete in all its determinations and relations, we need a series of mediation and abstraction because it does not immediately present itself to thinking; if we try to conceive it immediately by way of thought, we can have only “a chaotic conception of the whole”. Therefore, we should make the concrete into a product of thought through “the working-up of observation and conception into concepts.”402 But in all this procedure, the concrete in reality is always presupposed, and this should never be forgotten.403 It is thus necessary to see categories, which we get by way of abstraction from the concrete, as essentially belonging to the concrete; they have no validity in themselves. They express only “the forms of being, the characteristics of existence, and often only individual sides of this specific [modern bourgeois] society.”404

This point is self-evident for Marx himself, but he lays stress on it in order to show where he exactly differs from Hegel. As consistent with his previous critique of Hegel, Marx accuses him of confusing the movement of reality with

402 Ibid.


404 Grundrisse, p. 106.
the movement of thought. According to him, therefore, in Hegel 1) human being is replaced with conceptual thinking; 2) conceptual world is seen as reality itself; 3) the movement of categories is taken as real act of production; and finally 4) the product of this movement is equal to world itself.\textsuperscript{405} As it can easily be seen, this critique of Hegel in \textit{Grundrisse} is almost the same with the one in \textit{1844 Manuscripts}. And as a result of such a comment, Marx had concluded in \textit{Manuscripts} that “the only labor which Hegel knows and recognizes is abstractly mental labor.”\textsuperscript{406}

Against Hegel, Marx insistently points out that nature constitutes the foundation of life, and in the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete it should not also be forgotten that the concrete must be kept in mind as a precondition.

\textit{[…]} Hegel fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by itself, whereas the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. But this is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being.\textsuperscript{407}

This passage is very illuminating; it explicitly distinguishes between the process of reproducing the concrete in thought and the process of the becoming of the concrete, and accuses Hegel of confusing these two different processes.

The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can, a way different from the artistic, religious, practical and mental appropriation of this world. The real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before;

\textsuperscript{405} Ibid., p. 101.

\textsuperscript{406} \textit{Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844}, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{407} \textit{Grundrisse}, p. 101.
namely as long as the head’s conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Hence, in the theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must be kept in mind as the presupposition.408

Here, in order to show the priority of ‘the real subject’, Marx again distinguishes between different ways of appropriation of the world with which human being establishes a relation in a different way. And, as different from all other ways, ‘science’ must transform the real subject into a product of thought, “of the working-up of observation and conception into concepts.”409 This process of translating observation and conception into concepts implies that the real subject is from the beginning present, and the reason why science begins not directly with the concrete, but with the abstract, and then proceeds to the concrete exactly results from the nature of thought, which must be followed especially in being preoccupied with science.

Now the question is this: did Hegel forget or disregard the independence of the real subject, and was he content with beginning with the abstract without any reservation concerning the priority of the concrete itself in an ontological sense? Concerning the starting point Marx refers to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in which giving the example of ‘possession’ Hegel discusses what is abstract and its relation to more concrete historical relations. Marx appreciates Hegel taking ‘possession’ prior to ‘family’ or a more concrete relation, even though the former necessarily presupposes the latter.

Hegel, for example, correctly begins the Philosophy of Right with possession, this being the subject’s simplest juridical relation. But there is no possession preceding the family or master-servant relations, which are far more concrete relations. However, it would be correct to say that there are families or clan groups which still merely possess, but have no property […] But the concrete substratum of which possession is a relation is always presupposed. One can imagine an individual savage as possessing something.

408 Ibid., p. 101-2.

But in that case possession is not a juridical relation. It is incorrect that possession develops historically into the family. Possession, rather, always presupposes this ‘more concrete juridical category’.\textsuperscript{410}

Marx finds Hegel right in proceeding from possession to family, but at the same time adds that possession as a juridical relation cannot exist without any family relations. However, Hegel also says the same thing in the passage Marx refers to in his \textit{Grundrisse}, and explicitly warns us against confusing ‘the logical order’ and ‘the time order’:

In the empirical sciences one usually analyses what is found in representation [\textit{Vorstellung}], and when the single instance has been brought back to the common character, the latter is then called the concept. This is not our procedure; we only wish to look on at the way in which the concept determines itself and to restrain ourselves from adding thereto anything of our thoughts and opinions. What we acquire in this way, however, is a series of thoughts and another series of existent shapes; to which I may add that the time order in which the latter actually appear is other than the logical order. Thus, for example, we cannot say that property \textit{existed} before the family, yet, in spite of that, property must be dealt with first. Consequently you might raise here the question why we do not begin at the highest point, i.e. with the concretely true. The answer is that it is precisely the truth in the form of a result that we are looking for, and for this purpose it is essential to start by grasping the abstract concept itself. What is actual, the shape in which the concept is embodied, is for us therefore the further thing and the sequel, even if it were itself first in the actual world. The development we are studying is that whereby the abstract forms reveal themselves not as existing for themselves but as untrue.\textsuperscript{411}

Hegel discusses ‘property’ in the first chapter of his \textit{Philosophy of Right} entitled “Abstract Right” and makes a distinction between ‘property’ and ‘possession’. According to this distinction, the former is related to the free, objective, juridical

\textsuperscript{410} Ibid., p. 102.

\textsuperscript{411} \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, § 32, Addition, pp. 49-50.
and rational aspect, whereas the latter implies needs, subjective ends and external conditions. And he accepts that property presupposes the existence of family, although he takes property prior to family in his *Philosophy of Right* because his science requires the self-development of the concept itself. For this reason, he considers property prior to family and to a certain extent consciously disregards the time order. As to Marx, he also says that he will not follow the historical development, but consider the economic relations according to “their order within modern bourgeois society”. 

Therefore, it is clear that in his *Philosophy of Right* Hegel himself does not appear to confuse the movement of reality with that of thought and consciously disregards to certain extent the historical order in order to present the concrete as a result. In this context, Marx’s critique cannot be considered as directed against Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, but to his *Logic*, in which Hegel considers thought-determinations in their movement and apart from the finite world. By interpreting Hegel’s logical categories as transcendent which are the causes of the finite beings, Marx argues against Hegel that logical categories are but “characteristics of existence”. It must, however, be stated that for Hegel thought-determinations do not exist prior to and apart from the finite world; if the case were the opposite, his position would be same as that of Plato. All Hegel wants to show in his *Logic* is that categories are not devoid of content, and their own movement exhibits the nature of being.

**6.2. The Method of Inquiry and the Method of Presentation**

---

412 Ibid., § 49, p. 63.

413 *Grundrisse*, p. 108.

The “Postface” Marx wrote to the volume one of his *Capital* in 1873 is one of the most important texts for the research on Marx’s relation to Hegel. The distinctive feature of this text is that it was written for the aim of defending and appropriating Hegel, contrary to previous texts in which Marx primarily attempted to criticize him. On the one hand, throughout his intellectual development Marx has been in a critical relationship with Hegel and, on the other hand, he never hesitates pointing out Hegel’s greatness. It is clear that this is so mainly due to two reasons: first, Marx and Engels did not believe that no one has ever passed beyond Hegel’s great philosophical system and those who claim to do so are nothing other than poor imitators; and second, they believed that Hegel’s ‘inverted’ philosophy somehow truly reflects the inverted character of the world in which humans fall under the domination of a reality which is nothing other than his creation.415

However, we also know that, since *Grundrisse*, Marx has entered into a more positive relationship with Hegel, especially concerning the method of his critique. This positive relationship, as we have previously pointed out, depends on Marx’s desire to present the operation of capitalist mode of production in a *scientific* way. For he essentially has the aim of showing its contradictions and transient character, his work is in the form of a critique of political economy and amounts to the negation of the capitalist mode of production. But the critique, in *Capital*, is not a polemic against a given point of view or some specific theory; on the contrary, it is intended to be ‘science’ itself. In his previous works, Marx criticizes Hegel, Bauer, Feuerbach, Proudhon, or anyone else in a polemical way, but in *Capital* he attempts to correctly reflect the operation of the capitalist mode of production, together with its contradictions. In this sense, the critique in *Capital* is a precondition of presenting the capitalist mode of production in a scientific form. Accordingly, from Marx’s point of view, the true science of

---

415 Christopher Arthur draws attention to the parallel between the structure of Hegel’s *Logic* and the workings of the capitalist mode of production, both of which are, in Marx’s eyes, inverted, and thus argues that the critique of Hegel and that of political economy are for Marx closely related. Arthur, C.J., “From the Critique of Hegel to the Critique of Capital”, in *The Hegel-Marx Connection*, ed. T. Burns and I. Fraser, Macmillan Press, London, 2000, pp. 105-130.
political economy can only be accomplished in the form of a critique of political economy. And it is clear that every scientific effort needs its proper method, and it is exactly this need which drives Marx to ‘return’ Hegel once again since, as Engels puts it, “one should not ride earthorses if one intends to go coursing over the very rough ground of abstract reasoning”.  

The “Postface” is thus a text in which Marx tries to make his method clear and expresses his gratitude to Hegel; but despite all his defense of Hegel, Marx does not take a step back regarding his evaluation of Hegel and devotes to his first formulation: Hegel makes Idea the subject by giving it an autonomous being, and his standpoint, which is thus by its nature uncritical, serves to justify the existing state of affairs. However, it is not also possible to speak about Marx’s method to undergo a serious change since, as we will show below, the dialectic method which Marx shortly points out in the “Postface” is, more or less, specific to all Marx’s writings. However, when he develops the critique of political economy he cannot help reconsidering and making use of Hegel’s dialectic in detail since it is Hegel who presents “its general forms of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner”.  

In *The Poverty of Philosophy*, while criticizing Proudhon’s attempt to employ Hegelian dialectic in his presentation of political economy, as we have previously indicated, Marx says the following:

> Here we are, in the heart of Germany! We shall now have to talk metaphysics while talking political economy […] M. Proudhon is transporting us to our dear fatherland and is forcing us, whether we like it or not, to become German again.

---


**418** *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 96.
In *Capital*, Marx intentionally and willingly chooses what Proudhon forced him to do and shows once again to be a German since he aims at developing a critique of political economy, and this task can be, for him, accomplished only by employing the dialectic method which is “in its very essence critical and revolutionary”.419

For Marx, the reason why political economy must assume a critical form so as to remain as science results from the inner development of political economy itself. Political economy has essentially developed in the hands of British bourgeois political economists, and they have contributed to the development of political economy as science more or less impartially. But the subject-matter of political economy is itself a living social reality continuously developing. This reality is burdened with its own contradictions and also related to different, or even opposing, interests of classes. Therefore, the fact that political economy may develop in its beginnings as a science is due to the undeveloped situation of class struggle:

> In so far as political economy is bourgeois, i.e. in so far as it views the capitalist order as the absolute and ultimate form of social production, instead of as a historically transient stage of development, it can only remain a science while the class struggle remains latent or manifests itself only in isolated and sporadic phenomena.420

And when the class struggle developed and the proletariat organized itself as a class, it is not possible for bourgeois political economy to remain impartial since the capitalist mode of production, which political economy analyses as the last and final form of all modes of production, ceases to appear unrivalled. “It was thenceforth no longer a question whether this or that theorem was true, but whether it was useful to capital or harmful, expedient or inexpedient.”421


420 Ibid., p. 96.

421 Ibid., p. 97.
The critical character of political economy has, for Marx, a special significance for Germany. The capitalist mode of production has developed in Germany more slowly than in England and France, and when it has arrived at a certain level of development the proletariat as the rival class of the bourgeoisie has already gained a class consciousness and begun to make its efficacy feel. Therefore, it is impossible for political economy in Germany to develop impartially and scientifically at the very time the capitalist mode of production developed in this country. “Thus at the very moment when a bourgeois science of political economy at last seemed possible in Germany, it had in reality again become impossible.”

Marx thus thinks that he, as a German political economist, must develop the critique of political economy in order to raise it to the level of science again. And it is also clear that its critique can only be fulfilled from the standpoint of the proletariat since its birth was the work of the bourgeoisie; from the bourgeois standpoint, political economy developed. Since the only way political economy can still remain as science is that it must have a critical character, which the standpoint of the bourgeoisie cannot possess – otherwise it would be compelled to accept its conditions of existence to be transient and thus destroy itself – its critique needs the perspective of another class whose existence itself attests to the negation of the capitalist mode of production.

The peculiar historical development of German society therefore excluded any original development of ‘bourgeois’ economics there, but did not exclude its critique. In so far as such a critique represents a class, it can only represent the class whose historical task is the overthrow of the capitalist mode of production and the final abolition of all classes— the proletariat.

---

422 Ibid., p. 98.

423 Ibid.
In Marx’s eyes, it is thus German economic reality that renders possible a genuine political economy in the form of critique. The other aspect of the issue is German philosophical tradition which culminates in Hegel and which Marx is closely familiar. Hegel left a great philosophical system which seemed impassable. And Marx dared to criticize and try to overcome it essentially because of its affirmative character, but he was, from the beginning, fully aware of its significance: despite of all its ‘mystificatory’ side, Hegel’s philosophy possessed dialectic and exposed it in its full development.

For Hegel, as we have already noted, dialectic is “God’s might” which does not let any finite being to remain unchanged and subsist forever; it is due to its dialectic that the finite being includes in it its contradictions and is forced to pass to its opposite. Furthermore, the development of thinking is itself dialectical; it negates the abstract determinations, which the understanding poses, and shows them to be one-sided.

Hence, the dialectical constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression, and it is the principle through which alone immanent coherence and necessity enter into the content of science, just as all genuine, nonexternal elevation above the finite is to be found in this principle.

In his many works, Marx opposes Hegel’s system which takes Idea as the only self-subsistent being and reduces everything finite to mere appearances of it because it amounts the justification of the existing state of affair despite of the dialectic which it employs. However, by making use of the dialectic in his Capital, Marx attempts to give it its essential character again, which in Hegel’s

---

424 The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 81, Addition 1, p. 130.

425 Ibid., § 81, p. 128.

426 “… the things of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances, not only for us, but also in-themselves, and that the proper determination of these things, which are in this sense ‘finite’, consists in having the ground of their being not within themselves but in the universal divine Idea.” Ibid., § 45, pp. 88-89.
system appears to be sacrificed to another moment of logical thought: *speculation*. Marx aims to show the immanent development of the capitalist mode of production and thus, by making its contradictions visible, its self-negation. He desires not to criticize the capitalist mode of production from outside but to follow its own immanent contradictions. In this sense, the only thing Marx wants to do in his analysis of the capitalist mode of production is to leave himself to its own movement; the critique is fulfilled exactly by the process itself. And dialectic is nothing other than this self-exposing process. As Hegel describes it,

dialectic is not an activity of subjective thinking applied to some matter externally, but is rather the matter’s *very soul* putting forth its branches and fruit organically. This development of the Idea is the proper activity of its rationality, and thinking, as something subjective, merely looks on at it without for its part adding to it any ingredient of its own. To consider a thing rationally means not to bring reason to bear on the object from the outside and so to work on it, but to find that the object is rational on its own account [*für sich*] [...] The sole task of philosophical science is to bring into consciousness this proper work of the reason of the thing itself.\(^{427}\)

As a result, in his critique of political economy Marx consciously chooses to be a German and talks about ‘metaphysics’ since the critique can fulfill its proper task only by the dialectic method which has been fully elaborated in the hands of a German idealist philosopher, i.e., Hegel.

In the “Postface”, Marx talks about the method which he applies in *Capital* and which he calls ‘dialectic’. However, he does this not by his own words, but from the mouth of a Russian critic.\(^{428}\) By making him speak, Marx wants to remove an error which depends on confusing “the method of inquiry” and “the method of presentation”. This confusion reduces dialectic only to the presentation, which makes Marx’s work appear to be idealist, whereas it attaches the realistic

\(^{427}\) *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, § 31, p. 48.

\(^{428}\) I.I. Kaufman (1848-1916).
aspect of his work to the inquiry which is isolated from the presentation and thus from dialectic. The critic puts it as follows:

At first sight, if the judgement is made on the basis of the external form of the presentation, Marx is the most idealist of philosophers, and indeed in the German, i.e. the bad sense of the word. But in point of fact he is infinitely more realistic than all his predecessors in the business of economic criticism … He can in no sense be called an idealist. 429

It is interesting to see that a philosopher who has settled account with Hegelian idealism, on many occasions, criticized his idealist system and attached himself to the materialist tradition of thinking, is now subjected to the accusation of being idealist, at least with regard to the external form of the presentation of his work. This accusation may be thought of as the revenge of Hegel from Marx, and it is exactly for this reason that in his Capital he feels the need for clarifying his relation to Hegel once more.

This revenge indicates a simple fact: however much you emphasize your standpoint as materialist, the form of the presentation of your work may show you as an idealist. Against the accusation of being idealist, Marx argues that it is Hegel himself who is idealist. This defense is not much difficult for Marx because he has pointed out Hegel’s idealist standpoint throughout the entire development of his thought and emphasized his own standpoint as materialist especially since The Holy Family. Therefore, although he unsubtly regards himself as a disciple of Hegel, he needs nevertheless to over stressing the idealist character of Hegelian philosophy and its inversion of the subject-predicate relation.

However, the confusion Marx tries to explicate is not that he appears as an idealist in the presentation of his work; rather, he wants to show that his method of inquiry, for which the Russian critic finds Marx realistic, results exactly from his being German. In other words, what makes Marx realistic is his attachment to

the dialectic method which owes its full development to Hegel. Let us now consider what renders Marx’s method more realistic in the eyes of the Russian critic.

The Russian critic especially draws attention to the point that Marx tries to show not only the necessity of the existing state of affairs, but also the necessity of its abolition, and in this sense what strikes us in Marx’s method of inquiry is that it gives a considerable significance to exposing the necessary transition of one order of social relations into another. Therefore, Marx investigates the laws of economic phenomena and their relation to the social world, but these laws themselves reveal the fact that every social order has a given lifetime and must give its way to another social order. And this process of transition is a necessary one independent from humans’ will; it is like a process of “natural history”. In this context, it is clear that Marx analyses the phenomena he considers in their development and does not take them as a lifeless content. Accordingly, every phenomenon in economic life must be, like a biological organism, born, grow and decay. Every phenomenon has, however, its own laws specific to itself, as the case in biology; newer social organism has laws different from the previous one since it represents a different moment of development. “With the varying degrees of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too.” The Russian critic concludes in the following way:

The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the illumination of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development and death of a given social organism and its replacement by another, higher one. And in fact this is value of Marx’s books.430

This brief summary of the Russian critic concerning Marx’s method employed in Capital is approved by Marx himself, and he calls his method dialectic. As to the confusion which shows Marx as an idealist, Marx indicates that if the method of

430 Ibid., p. 102.
inquiry has fulfilled its task and succeeded in conceiving its object with all its aspects, “if the life of the subject-matter is now reflected back in the ideas, then it may appear as if we have before us an \textit{a priori} construction.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Therefore, Marx remarks that the realism of his work owes its existence to Hegel’s dialectic, and since the dialectic method is the most scientific way of exposing the nature of its object and depends on not leaving the object as it is but on reproducing it in thought it necessarily appears to deal with its object \textit{a priori}. In this sense, the distinction between the method of inquiry and the method of presentation, if it is said to exist, depends on the distinction between the movement of reality and that of thought insofar as thought does not stick to “the existing empirical data” and “the existing historical order” but attempts to reproduce the object and to present it as a product of thought in order to fully grasp its structure. To this aim, Marx attempts to grasp capital not in its empirical appearance but in its \textit{concept}, its inner nature and connection.\footnote{As Jindřich Zelený puts it, “‘concept’, according to Marx, is the intellectual reproduction of the inner arrangement, the inner structure of an object, and indeed of that inner structure in its development, its origin, existence and decline.” \textit{The Logic of Marx}, p. 38.}

However, against the fact that his position resembles that of Hegel, Marx points out the idealist character of Hegel’s philosophy and says the following:

\begin{quote}
My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which he even transforms into an independent subject, under the name of ‘the Idea’, is the creator of the real world, and the real world is only the external appearance of the idea. With me the reverse is true: the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought.\footnote{Ibid.}
\end{quote}
Marx could have considered his reception of Hegel’s philosophy because *Capital*, in which he consciously employs the dialectic method, brings about a semblance of an a priori and idealist work; however, Marx does not change his attitude toward Hegel’s philosophy, on the contrary, he intensifies his critique, regarding Hegel’s Idea as “the creator of the real world”.

### 6.3. An Overview

In the previous chapters, we have tried to show that, by criticizing Hegel’s philosophy, Marx tries to grasp Hegel’s dialectic more fully and, in accordance with this attempt, he clarifies the following points: dialectic requires being critical vis-à-vis the existing state of affairs and it takes its object in its movement and development; it does not part with its worldly ground and approaches all problems on the basis of this ground; it cannot be reduced to a recipe or schema, and it must be deduced from the inner logic of the fact itself; it is above all historical, and once it departs from historical reality it can easily turn into a dialectic of concepts. We have also pointed out that these important points are also essential to Hegel’s dialectic.

In this chapter, we have considered Marx’s critique of Hegel under the title of “Revolutionary Dialectic” since in his *Capital* Marx draws attention to ‘revolutionary’ aspect of his method. He above all tries to show how the capitalist mode of production is driven toward its own dissolution. His work is thus the critique of political economy but, as we have pointed out, his critique is aimed to be the science of political economy. Marx’s scientific study takes as its method dialectic, which he has already to certain extent appropriated in his previous works, and uses it in a systematical way. Though Marx emphasizes the revolutionary aspect of dialectic against Hegel, in his mature work Marx fully appropriates Hegel’s dialectic.
In his *Logic*, Hegel distinguishes between “analytic method” and “synthetic method” and regards them as belonging to the finite cognition. The former method takes the concrete as given and then dissolves it into its components; it tries to proceed from a concrete individual to a general determination.\(^{434}\) The synthetic method contrarily starts from a specific universal and follows the moments of the concept.\(^{435}\) In the former method perception comes first, but in the latter the concept. However, Hegel presents his method, “the philosophical method”, as the unity of analytic and synthetic methods.\(^{436}\) Marx considers the analytic method as one proceeding from the concrete to the abstract and the synthetic method as one proceeding from the abstract to the concrete. And although the latter is for Marx the scientific method, he also points out that the real starting point is always the concrete, and therefore perception and observation come first. In this sense, it is clear that, according to Marx, too, both methods are essential for any scientific effort, but the scientific presentation requires the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete because it aims to present the concrete as a complex whole which consists of many determinations and has its contradictions. Therefore, though Marx tries to make a distinction between himself and Hegel and accuses Hegel of confusing the movement of reality with that of thinking, he in fact comes to fully appropriate Hegel’s method. As Ian Fraser correctly puts it, Marx’s method is the same with that of Hegel.

In their method of inquiry, both [Marx and Hegel] begin by analysing these forms [the mode of existence of the general abstraction or universal concept in society] to discover their inner connection. In terms of presentation, both begin with the abstract and move to the concrete.\(^{437}\)

---

\(^{434}\) *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 227, p. 296.

\(^{435}\) Ibid., § 228, p. 297.

\(^{436}\) Ibid., § 238, *Addition*, p. 305.

CHAPTER VII

A RECONSIDERATION OF MARX’S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL

In the preceding chapters, we have tried to follow the steps in Marx’s critique of Hegel in his various works and thus to present his arguments against Hegel. We have seen that he always stands in a critical relationship with Hegel, but he is also in the search of appropriating Hegel’s philosophy or, to put more correctly, his dialectic. And it is clear from the exposition of his critique of Hegel that Marx attempts to give back to the dialectic its qualities as critical, worldly, historical and revolutionary. As a matter of fact, these qualities are essential to Hegel’s dialectic itself, but Marx thinks that in the hands of Hegel it was somehow mystified and hence amounted to the affirmation of the existing state of affairs rather than negating it. For Marx, the problem with Hegel’s work lies in the very nature of the principle of his philosophy; it is due to his idealist philosophy that he arrives at conservative conclusions. This point in Marx’s critique of Hegel is so important that he maintains this claim from his doctoral dissertation to his Capital, in which he for the first time calls his method as dialectic and immediately opposes it to Hegel’s. It is clear that what Marx has in mind is Hegel’s Philosophy of Right as a conservative application of dialectic. Against this background, Marx on the one hand sees Hegel as the greatest dialectician in the history of thought and tries to make use of Hegel’s Logic in his critique of political economy, and on the other hand, in order not to fall into the same error, i.e., the glorification of what exists, he continually emphasizes his materialist position vis-à-vis the idealist character of Hegel’s philosophy.

Marx’s continuous dialogue with Hegel is, however, burdened with a tension, which has its germ even in his first critique of Hegel: as it can be clearly seen in the preceding chapters, Marx’s attitude toward Hegel’s method and Logic
shows a change, but his verdict that in Hegel dialectic “is standing on its head” remains almost the same. This tension brings about a strange situation: having completed his critique of Hegel and seemed to do away with his philosophy, Marx feels obliged to deal with Hegel again, and it is exactly when Hegel is treated as “a dead dog” that he makes it public to be the disciple of Hegel.438

On the one hand, Marx and Engels attack everyone who aims at making use of Hegel, and in this sense they consider themselves as the true legitimate successor of Hegel—a point, to which Engels draws attention in a more general context when he says that “The German working-class movement is the inheritor of German classical philosophy.”439 Marx’s statement in his Capital also attests to this fact: he actually expresses to be not only a disciple, but also the disciple of Hegel; in other words, he regards himself as the sole living inheritor of Hegel. On the other hand, Marx and Engels are convinced that they are not Hegelians and extracted “the rational core under the mystical shell”. However, this two-fold aspect of their relation to Hegel, which is sun-clear to them, is still far from being obvious to the common reader,441 so that numerous works have been written concerning this topic.


439 Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, p. 60.

440 Marx writes Dr. Kugelmann in a letter dated 06.03.1868: [...] my method of development is not Hegelian, since I am a materialist and Hegel is an idealist. Hegel’s dialectic is the basic form of all dialectic, but only after it has been stripped of its mystical form, and it is precisely this which distinguishes my method.” Marx, K., Letters to Dr. Kugelmann, Martin Lawrence, London, p. 63. And Engels states: “I am no longer a Hegelian, of course, but I still retain a deep feeling of piety and devotion for the titanic old fellow.” Engels’ letter to Albert Lange, 29.03.1865, http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/letters/65_03_29.htm, (Accessed, October 2012).

441 Engels proposes Marx to make his dialectical statements in the first volume of Capital clear through additions as Hegel himself did: “It was serious mistake not to have made the development of these rather abstract arguments clearer by means of a larger number of short sections with their own headings. You ought to have treated this part in the manner of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia, with short paragraphs, each dialectical transition emphasised by means of a special heading and, as far as possible, all the excurses or merely illustrative material printed in special type.” Engels’ letter to Marx, 16.06.1867, http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867/letters/67_06_16.htm, (Accessed, October 2012).
In this chapter, we will attempt to present an integral picture of Marx’s critique of Hegel, which we have so far considered separately. And we will argue that in Capital Marx was able to solve the above-mentioned tension only by positing a distinction between the method of presentation and the method of inquiry which, in turn, necessitates a reconsideration of the argument against Hegel that he inverts the subject-predicate relation and by his principle justifies what exists. Marx is, however, is very far from such an attempt and, in fact, sharpens his argument against Hegel by presenting him as a philosopher who stands on his head and attributing him an ontology, according to which Idea “is the creator of the real world, and the real world is only the external appearance of the idea”. Yet, it is Marx’s continuous dialogue with Hegel which attests to the fact that Hegel’s dialectic which appears as if standing on its head actually stands on its feet.

7.1. Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx

It is generally acknowledged that Feuerbach stands between Hegel and Marx: by the mediation of Feuerbach, Marx transcends Hegel and gets rid of his idealist philosophy; there must be no doubt that Marx leaves Feuerbach behind too, but the critique role Feuerbach plays between Hegel and Marx is not denied. In Ludwig Feuerbach and The End of Classical German Philosophy, which was written after Marx’s death for the aim of clarifying the transition from Hegel to Marx or Marxism, Engels emphasizes Feuerbach’s significance and does not hide the fact that he and Marx became ‘Feuerbachian’ for a while:

---

442 Capital, Vol. I, p. 102. In Hegel’s Logic, such a statement is really found: “The logic rather exhibits the rise of the idea up to the level from which it becomes the creator of nature and passes over into the form of a concrete immediacy whose concept, however, again shatters this shape also in order to realize itself as concrete spirit.” The Science of Logic, p. 523.
Then came Feuerbach’s *Essence of Christianity*. With one blow it dissipated the contradiction by again raising materialism to the throne without any fuss. Nature exists independently of any philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves the products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings created by our religious fantasies are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was shattered and cast aside, and the contradiction shown to exist only in our imagination was dissolved. One must have oneself experienced the liberating effect of this book to have any idea of it. The enthusiasm was general; at once we all became Feuerbachians. It may be seen from *The Holy Family* how enthusiastically Marx greeted the new approach and how much— in spite of all critical reservations—he was influenced by it.443

In the preceding chapters, we have tried to show that Feuerbach really plays a role in the development of Marx’s thought, but this results not from the profundity of Feuerbach’s thought but from the requirements at that time in which Marx still tries to determine his position. Against the Young Hegelians such as Bruno Bauer and Max Stirner who continuously emphasize ‘self-consciousness’, despise the role of the masses in history, and do not conceive the significance of the economic reality, Marx wants to attack the ground on which they built their thought. The point is, for Marx, not to transform the worldly problems into the theological ones, but the reverse.444 In short, Marx aims at breaking the conceptual frame, i.e., Hegelian idealism, on which their theories are based, in order to give the role of the economic reality in human emancipation prominence.

For Marx, the realization of philosophy requires abolishing all barriers to human freedom, and to do so, it is necessary to expose the inverted character of reality and abolish it. Hegel devoted himself to show the rationality and the progress of human freedom in the modern world; however, according to Marx, the modern world has an inverted character and, in fact, represents the culmination of

---


444 “On the Jewish Question”, p. 223.
the estrangement of human, so it must be transcended. The realization of philosophy can be accomplished only through the action of the proletariat since this class contains in itself all slavery of human. All wealth of society depends on the proletariat but in reality it is in the most miserable conditions. The reason why the proletariat is fitted to the accomplishment of this task, i.e., the realization of philosophy, lies, for Marx, in the fact that the proletariat constitutes the universal class. The proletariat is

an estate that is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere of society having a universal character because of its universal suffering and claiming no particular right because no particular wrong but unqualified wrong is perpetrated on it; [...] a sphere, finally, that cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all the other spheres of society, thereby emancipating them; a sphere, in short, that is the complete loss of humanity and can only redeem itself through the total redemption of humanity.\footnote{\textit{A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s \textquoteleft Philosophy of Right\textquoteright}, pp. 141-2.}

The liberation of the proletariat consists in abolishing its own conditions of existence, so it cannot become a dominant class which pursues only its own interests. Therefore, for Marx, proletariat represents the identity of universal and particular interests. Hegel’s universal class, bureaucracy, cannot be conceived as providing this identity simply because its welfare consists in remaining as bureaucracy and even becoming a caste. Hegel himself also recognizes this possibility, and as a consequence sees the control over this class from both above and below as absolutely necessary, even though in it the universal and particular interests appear identical.\footnote{\textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, § 297, p. 283.} In contrast with bureaucracy, the welfare of the proletariat lies not in maintaining its position but in giving an end to modern bourgeois relations of production, which depend on the exploitation of labor, together with its own existence.
The proletariat executes the sentence that private property pronounced on itself by begetting the proletariat, just as it carries out the sentence that wage-labour pronounced on itself by bringing forth wealth for others and misery for itself. When the proletariat is victorious, it by no means becomes the absolute side of society, for it is victorious only by abolishing itself and its opposite. Then the proletariat disappears as well as the opposite which determines it, private property.\footnote{The Holy Family, p. 52.}

However, according to Marx, Hegel presents the modern state as a rational one and ignores the fact that legal relations are but an expression of the relations of property. It is exactly what Hegel appears to affirm that Marx opposes. In this sense, the transcendence of the economic reality is, for Marx, also that of Hegelian philosophy.

It is only with Feuerbach that the necessity of the transcendence of Hegelian philosophy is openly expressed since the Young Hegelians are not able to conceive this fundamental point and to go beyond Hegelian philosophy.\footnote{We read in 1844 Manuscripts: “How do we now stand as regards the Hegelian dialectic? This lack of awareness about the relationship of modern criticism to the Hegelian philosophy as a whole and especially to the Hegelian dialectic has been so great that critics like Strauss and Bruno Bauer still remain wholly within the confines of the Hegelian Logic.” Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 142. And in The German Ideology: “German criticism has, right up to its latest efforts, never left the realm of philosophy. It by no means examines its general philosophic premises, but in fact all its problems originate in a definite philosophical system, that of Hegel. Not only in its answers, even in its questions there was a mystification. This dependence on Hegel is the reason why not one of these modern critics has even attempted a comprehensive criticism of the Hegelian system, however much each professes to have advanced beyond Hegel.” The German Ideology, p. 34-5.} It is exactly this aspect of Feuerbach’s work which attracts Marx’s attention, drives him to magnify Feuerbach and causes him to adopt certain points in Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel.

\begin{quote}
Strauss expounds Hegel from Spinoza’s point of view, and Bauer from Fichte’s point of view in the domain theology, both with perfect consistence. They both criticized Hegel insofar as with him each of the two elements was falsified by the other, while they carried each of the elements to its one-sided and hence consistent
\end{quote}
development. Both of them therefore go beyond Hegel in their criticism, but both of them also remain within his speculation and each represents one side of his system. Feuerbach was the first to complete and criticize Hegel from Hegel’s point of view, by resolving the metaphysical Absolute Spirit into “real man on the basis of nature” and to complete the Criticism of religion by drafting in a masterly manner the general basic features of the Criticism of Hegel’s speculation and hence of every kind of metaphysics.\textsuperscript{449}

However, Marx’s attempt to appropriate Hegel’s dialectic, and in this sense his return to Hegel, in his later works includes to a certain extent a refutation of Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel, but it must be also stated that his position in his early works, too, cannot be called ‘Feuerbachian’. As we have previously pointed out, even in \textit{1844 Manuscripts} in which his praise of Feuerbach reaches the peak “Marx’s philosophical break from Feuerbach”\textsuperscript{450} is clear, and he regards his own critique of Hegel as “absolutely necessary” because such a task has never been accomplished despite Feuerbach’s critique.\textsuperscript{451} The problem, however, lies in the fact that although Marx increasingly dismisses Feuerbachian critique of Hegel in general he preserves the fundamental charge of Feuerbach against Hegel and does not think reconsidering his judgment over Hegel: Hegel inverts the relation between the subject and predicate, and makes Idea an independent subject.\textsuperscript{452}

\subsection*{7.1.1. The Subject and the Predicate}

In \textit{The Essence of Christianity}, Feuerbach puts the following:

\textsuperscript{449} \textit{The Holy Family}, pp. 186-7.

\textsuperscript{450} \textit{Philosophy and Revolution: from Hegel to Sartre, and from Marx to Mao}, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{451} \textit{Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844}, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{452} This is a point strongly emphasized by David MacGregor: \textit{The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx}, p. 236.
The personality of God is thus the means by which man converts the qualities of his own nature into the qualities of another being – of a being external to himself. The personality of God is nothing else than the projected personality of man.\footnote{Feuerbach, L., \textit{The Essence of Christianity}, trans. Marian Evans, Calvin Blanchard, New York, 1855, p. 288.}

In religion, human puts her own qualities outside herself and represents them as belonging to an external being, God. The qualities ascribed to God are in fact nothing other than that of human. On this basis, Feuerbach attempts to transform theology to ‘anthropology’, declaring God is human himself. He does not, however, limit his critique to theology and tries also to apply the method in his critique of religion to ‘Hegelian speculation’ because he sees in Hegelian philosophy a similar inversion to theology. Just as theology makes God, to whom human himself projects her own qualities, into the subject and human into the predicate, so Hegelian philosophy abstracts thought from thinking being and converts it into a subject under the name of Idea. Hegelian philosophy thus alienates human from her own essential quality and is a form of alienation. Therefore, although it appears as if it denied theology, Hegelian philosophy affirms theology and, in fact, is “\textit{the last refuge and the last rational mainstay of theology}.”\footnote{“Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy”, p. 55.}

Feuerbach thus attempts to unmask Hegelian philosophy, and what is to be done is, for him, very simple: it must be inverted again in order to arrive at the truth.

The true relationship of thought to being is this only: \textit{Being} is the \textit{subject}, \textit{thought} the \textit{predicate}. Thought comes from being, but being does not come from thought. Being comes from itself and is through itself; being is given only through being; being has its ground within itself because only being is meaning, reason,
necessity, and truth; in short, it is all in all. Being is because not-being is no being; i.e., nothing or nonsense.\textsuperscript{455}

First of all, it must be stated that the reason why Hegel needs dialectic is exactly that the true relationship between being and thought is not as above explained. And Marx never falls into such an illusion and nowhere asserts such an anti-dialectic view. He simply argues that

As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.\textsuperscript{456}

However,

In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing their way of earning their living, they change all their social relations.\textsuperscript{457}

For Marx, the point is not that being is the subject but that there is a mutual interaction between the material relations of production and humans themselves. Even in Engels, who is generally accused of vulgarizing the relation between being and thought, there is no room for presenting being as the subject; he only puts the problem as the primacy of being.\textsuperscript{458}

Feuerbach wants to uncritically apply the same method, which he used in his critique of religion, to Hegelian philosophy and makes a great mistake. In his critique of religion, the inversion simply means that God, which appears as the

\textsuperscript{455} Ibid., pp. 55-6.

\textsuperscript{456} The German Ideology, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{457} The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{458} Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, p. 17.
subject, is in actual fact nothing other than the projected essence of human, who appears in religion as the predicate of God, whereas it is human himself which is the subject. But in his critique of Hegelian philosophy, Feuerbach asserts that being is the subject, thought the predicate. He may well put this as follows: human is the subject, thought the predicate, which is, in turn, depends on conceiving human as separate from thought; but there is nowhere a human apart from thinking, if she is said really to be a human. Feuerbach, however, ascribes to being subjectivity and reduces thought to a mere predicate, whereas what makes a human subject is her ability to think since animal does not think and say ‘I’, and so is not a subject.459

Although Feuerbach puts the conception of ‘the inversion of the subject and the predicate’ in the center of his critique and tries to invert the inverted essence of religion and philosophy he cannot express what he meant because he opposes Hegelian philosophy which itself opposes to “the opinion that the True consists in a proposition which is a fixed result, or which is immediately known”460. If Feuerbach, who places a great emphasis on the relation of the subject and the predicate, investigated the structure and elements of proposition he could avoid from making being into the subject and immobilizing the subject-predicate relation.

Being cannot be a subject for the very reason that it is the predicate of everything which exists; it is most general determination and so the starting point of Hegel’s Logic. But he does not attempt to ascribe the character of subjectivity to being as such. And if one wants to consider thinking itself as ‘subject’ it is the subject only as “that which thinks, and the simple expression for the existing subject as thinker is ‘I’.”461

459 The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 24, Addition 1, p. 57.

460 The Phenomenology of Spirit, § 40, p. 23.

461 The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 20, p. 49.
It may perhaps be helpful to express Feuerbach’s assertion in a proposition; in this case we have: *being is thought* since, according to Feuerbach, being is the subject and thought the predicate. In this proposition, the truth of being appears as thought, but this is a conclusion from which Feuerbach avoids since he tries to firmly establish the distinction between being and thought. It follows that if we take Feuerbach’s assertion seriously and put the subject and the predicate, which themselves are elements of proposition, in a proposition we arrive at the opposite conclusion Feuerbach wanted to express. He determines a fixed subject like being and to this permanent subject ascribes a quality like thought, but the nature of proposition itself contradicts the fixity of the subject and presents the subject as passing to the predicate.\(^{462}\)

Let us invert the proposition: *thought is being*. But in this case the proposition appears to ascribe to thought an independent existence, which again is a result Feuerbach will not be content with. Then, it is clear that if we determine being as the subject and thought as the predicate, what before us is nothing other than the identity of being and thought.

Then, we need to surrender ourselves to Feuerbach’s arms: he would say that what he simply meant that thought is a quality of being and not vice versa. One can challenge with this claim, but firstly one can rightly demand from Feuerbach that he renounce the conception of the inversion of the predicate and the subject which he tries to apply to Hegelian philosophy because he now formulates his idea in a different way. The final formulation of Feuerbach that thought is a quality of being and not vice versa can be accepted, but only if we discard the requirement of ‘not vice versa’: otherwise, thought would be presented as something non-existent. If thought does not exist, if it is not, then there would be no room for thought except in language.

\(^{462}\) “In the proposition ‘God is being’, the Predicate is ‘being’; it has the significance of something substantial in which the Subject is dissolved. ‘Being’ is here meant to be not a Predicate, but rather essence; it seems, consequently, that God ceases to be what he is from his position in the proposition, viz. a fixed Subject.” Ibid., § 62, p. 38.
Leaving the abstractions of Feuerbach aside, one may well express the relation between being and thought through the concept ‘becoming’ and see them in a mutual interaction, instead of considering them separately and in a rigid opposition to each other. Therefore, the relation between being and thought is expressed as follows: being becomes thought, and thought becomes being. It is exactly on this ground that Marx conceives the relation of the subject and the object in his *1844 Manuscripts*.

According to Marx, human transforms nature through her practical activity and objectifies her essential powers in it. Neither nature nor human is immediately given because, on the one hand, by objectifying her human essence in nature, human increasingly abolishes the externality of nature and gives it a human form and, on the other hand, it is only in this process of objectification that by developing her human essence she becomes truly human.

It is just in the working-up of the objective world, therefore, that man first really proves himself to be a *species being*. This production is his active species life. Through and because of this production, nature appears as *his* work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the *objectification of man’s species life*: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has created.

Human history presents us therefore nothing other than nature’s becoming for human or its becoming human nature. Marx thus considers the relation between human and nature, or subject and object, in its historical development and points out the fact of objectification which constitutes the main core of his *1844 Manuscripts*.

---

463 “[H]uman objects are not natural objects as they immediately present themselves, and neither is human sense it immediately is—as it is objectively—human sensibility, human objectivity.” *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp. 154-5.

464 Ibid., p. 77.
It is therefore not surprising that on this basis Marx criticizes Feuerbach in *The German Ideology* because Feuerbach is devoid of conceiving the dialectic of the subject and the object and does not see the mutual interaction between them. His ‘being’ as the subject has fell victim to the historical activity of thinking being.

[Feuerbach] does not see that the sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed, [a product] in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, and modifying its social system according to the changed needs. Even the objects of the simplest “sensuous certainty” are only given him through social development, industry and commercial intercourse.\(^{465}\)

According to Marx, even though the fact of estrangement prevents human from entirely appropriating a world which is her product, by objectifying her essential powers in nature human has already given to it a human object, and there is no longer a nature or being which has not been mediated through her practical activity.\(^{466}\)

It is therefore clear that Marx never attempts to regard being or nature as the subject; on the contrary, it is an object which increasingly becomes human. And it is also clear that one can speculate about the relation of the subject and object in terms of which is primary but the primacy of nature is no avail for Feuerbach since there is no longer an external nature but a human world as a result of the interaction between the subject and the object, human and nature. Marx thus has nothing to do with a ‘metaphysical’ problem as to whether being or thought is first; “the *entire so-called history of the world* is nothing but the

\(^{465}\) *The German Ideology*, p. 45.

\(^{466}\) Ibid., p. 46.
begetting of man through human labor, nothing but the coming-to-be of nature for man.”

Such a conception is not limited only to Marx’s early works but fundamental to his thought in general. In *Capital*, he holds that through the process of labor, which is conscious and purposeful activity, human makes natural object subjected to her purpose and gets rid of its immediacy. However, the process also attests to the transformation of human and in this sense she also gets rid of her own immediacy: ‘slumbering’ potentialities both in nature and human come to begin.

Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs. Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature. He develops the potentialities slumbering within nature, and subjects the play of its forces to his own sovereign power.

Human knows what is going to emerge in the end of labor process because the finished product firstly exists in her mind; she tries to actualize by the instrument of labor a particular end, which she represents before the labor process, in her object. And, the finished product as the actualization of an end hides its process of becoming, if it has been well worked out: “labour has become objectified, the object has been worked on. What on the side of the worker appeared in the form of unrest [Unruhe] now appears, on the side of the product, in the form of being [Sein], as a fixed, immobile characteristic.”

---

467 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 113.


469 Ibid., p. 287.
Marx thus draws attention to the mediating role of labor between nature and human, between the subject and the object, and as a result of the process of labor the immediacy, or naturalness, of the natural object is stripped away and the object of labor undergoes a formal change so that it itself really emerges as a raw material for other ends and needs, though it is something produced. Human’s production thus increasingly necessitates not natural objects or objects in their natural form, but ‘products’ which are the result of a long labor process.

Animals and plants which we are accustomed to consider as products of nature, may be, in their present form, not only products of, say, last year’s labour, but the result of gradual transformation continued through many generations under human control, and through the agency of human labour.470

Therefore, it is clear, for Marx, that the natural world, which is external to human, increasingly loses its external character and becomes a human world: in other words, the object gains a subjective form while the subject objectifies through her labor. As a result, human’s relation to reality, to the external world is not only that of ‘contemplation’ or ‘intuition’ but also a practical relation in which the object becomes something subjective whereas the subject becomes something objective.

The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things [Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth abstractly by idealism — which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. In Das Wesen des Christenthums, he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence he does

470 Ibid., pp. 287-8.
not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary’, of ‘practical-critical’, activity.\textsuperscript{471}

According to this well-known thesis, idealism conceives ‘the active side’, though ‘abstractly’, whereas Feuerbach is not able raise even to this level. However, Marx’s claim is not entirely true since his statements, which we have quoted above from \textit{Capital}, are almost the translation to the language of political economy of the expressions appearing under the title of “Teleology” in Hegel’s \textit{Logic}. According to Hegel, purpose requires “the negation of immediate objectivity”.\textsuperscript{472}

The teleological relation is the syllogism in which the subjective purpose con-cludes itself with the objectivity external to it, through a middle term which is the unity of these two. This unity is both the purposive activity and the objectivity posited immediately as subservient to the purpose: [in other words] it is the means.\textsuperscript{473}

The realization of the purpose means that the object is subjected to the purpose which exists as prior to this realization, and therefore “the realised purpose is the posited unity of subjective and objective.”\textsuperscript{474} However, the realized purpose is also a means for other purposes because of the nature of external purposiveness: since the means is external to its object and the purpose is subjective, it only includes a formal change and is not able to rise to the level of ‘Idea’ as “the unity

\textsuperscript{471} “Theses on Feuerbach”, p. 569.

\textsuperscript{472} \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic}, § 204, p. 279.

\textsuperscript{473} Ibid., § 206, p. 282. In his \textit{Philosophy of Right}, Hegel says this middle term to be ‘work’ and its means. “The means of acquiring and preparing the particularized means appropriate to our similarly particularized needs is work. Through work the raw material directly supplied by nature is specifically adapted to these numerous ends by all sorts of different processes. Now this formative change confers value on means and gives them their utility, and hence human beings in what they consume are mainly concerned with the products of human beings. It is the products of human effort which human beings consume.” \textit{Outlines of the Philosophy of Right}, § 196, p. 190.

\textsuperscript{474} \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic}, § 210, p. 285.
of the concept and objectivity”. But the external purposiveness still constitutes the closest determination to Idea.

For Hegel, human’s relation to the external world, both theoretically and practically, is not that of contemplation, but a process through which human increasingly overcomes its externality, its mere givenness and integrates it into himself.

What human beings strive for in general is the cognition of the world; we strive to appropriate it and to conquer it. To this end the reality of the world must be crushed as it were; i.e., it must be made ideal.\textsuperscript{475}

Therefore, it is clear that Marx cannot find in Feuerbach any dialectical view concerning the relationship between the subject and the object, but Hegelian philosophy which is said to be ‘destroyed’ by Feuerbach remains a fertile ground. “Marx rejected Feuerbach precisely because he lacked a dialectical approach.”\textsuperscript{476} However, Feuerbach’s critique of Hegelian philosophy is not limited to the inversion of the subject and the predicate; there can be found in his \textit{Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy} another attack with which we now deal.

\subsection*{7.1.2. Abstract and Concrete}

To abstract means to posit the \textit{essence} of nature \textit{outside nature}, the \textit{essence} of man \textit{outside man}, the \textit{essence} of thought \textit{outside the act of thinking}. The Hegelian philosophy has alienated man \textit{from himself} in so far as its whole system is based on the acts of abstraction. Although it again identifies what it separates, it does so

\textsuperscript{475} Ibid., § 42, \textit{Addition} 1, pp. 85.

only in a separate and mediated way. The Hegelian philosophy lacks immediate unity, immediate certainty, immediate truth.\textsuperscript{477}

According to Feuerbach, Hegelian philosophy misses ‘immediate truth’ by mediating everything and places its abstractions before what is actual. Furthermore, he finds the method or procedure of Hegelian philosophy faulty and relates it to the standpoint of theology because it starts from ‘abstract’ instead of ‘concrete’ itself, which, for him, however, must constitute the true starting point.

The course taken so far by all speculative philosophy from the abstract to the concrete, from the ideal to the real, is an inverted one. This way never leads one to the true and objective reality, but only to the realization of one’s own abstractions and, precisely because of this, never to the true freedom of the Spirit; for only the perception of things and beings in their objective reality can make man free and devoid of all prejudices. The transition from the ideal to the real has its place only in practical philosophy.\textsuperscript{478}

In \textit{1844 Manuscripts}, Marx hails Feuerbach as the founder of “true materialism and real science”\textsuperscript{479} and presents, with Feuerbach, sense-perception as “the basis of all science.”\textsuperscript{480} Further, he attempts to base the critique of political economy on “the discoveries of \textit{Feuerbach}”.\textsuperscript{481} However, Marx’s arguments are not entirely true, since, though he becomes increasingly more concerned with the critique of political economy, he makes use of no Feuerbachian element in his critique. His relation to Hegel is, however, a life-long one, and it is clear at least from \textit{Grundrisse} that he does not entirely agree with Feuerbach’s conclusions concerning the relationship between the abstract and the concrete. Before

\textsuperscript{477} “Preliminary Theses for The Reform of Philosophy”, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{478} Ibid., p. 49.

\textsuperscript{479} \textit{Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844}, p. 144.

\textsuperscript{480} Ibid., p. 111.

\textsuperscript{481} Ibid., p. 15.
elaborating the issue, one must draw attention to a decisive point, without which
the full import of the problem cannot be properly understood.

Any science has its proper object and in this sense seems to presuppose an
external object about which it aims at knowing. However, the process of acquiring
knowledge of a particular object requires not only sense-perception but also
concepts with which the immediacy of the object is stripped away. Therefore, the
aim of knowledge is to transcend the mere givenness of the object and to mediate
it through the process of thought. In this sense, by remaining on the level of sense-
perception it is not possible to get a true knowledge of the object. Human
knowledge thus is essentially conceptual and presupposes certain concepts; what
Hegel attempts to show in his Phenomenology of Spirit is that even the most
simple shape of consciousness, sense-certainty, on the level of which Feuerbach
wants to remain, is itself conceptual and necessitates such simple universal
concepts as ‘now’, ‘here’, and ‘this’, and, let alone being the richest source of
knowledge, what it presents us is nothing other than a knowledge of a simple
‘this’. Therefore, all human knowledge operates through concepts and is thus
mediated. The objects of knowledge do not immediately show their essence, it is
only through the activity of thought that one can attain to what is true in them.
However, the mediation is also essential to the object itself.

[T]here is nothing in heaven or nature or spirit or anywhere else
that does not contain just as immediacy as mediation, so that both
these determinations prove to be unseparated and inseparable
and
the opposition between them nothing real.482

It follows that nature itself, which Feuerbach proposes as an immediate certainty,
is an empty abstraction if it is not conceived as the unity of various objects and
phenomena and in this sense it is not immediately given to us. Furthermore, from
the standpoint of human practice, it is also an empty abstraction since the sensible

482 The Science of Logic, p.46.
objects themselves are not directly present in the human world but they show themselves in relation to, and as mediated through, human practice.

Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants [sensuous] contemplation; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity.\textsuperscript{483}

Feuerbach thus opposes sensuous consciousness to the scientific thought by emphasizing immediate certainty and sensuality. He does not make any distinction between the level of epistemology and the level of ontology, and even he takes nature as given and immediate. He accuses Hegelian philosophy of being preoccupied with abstractions and lacking sensuality, and, in contradistinction to it, he points out the finite, the determinate and the concrete; he sees contradiction as accidental, secondary, holds to arrive at the truth on the basis of sensuous certainty and sticks to immediacy. And he radically argues that “[t]he course taken so far by all speculative philosophy from the abstract to the concrete, from the ideal to the real, is an inverted one.”\textsuperscript{484}

For Hegel, however, who thinks abstractly does not rely on whether one thinks through abstractions or sticks to the concrete he counts as such. Abstracting thought, which is in its one-sidedness characteristic to the understanding, isolates various determinations, leaves them in their isolation and arbitrarily highlights among them one determination which appears to be obvious; in the case of Feuerbach, this means to see in Hegelian philosophy nothing other than a mere theological project and to conceive all dimensions of it as supporting a secret theology. The concrete thinking, however, sees sunshine even in the severed head of a murderer, i.e., the fact that she is still a human, and kills “the abstraction of the murderer.”\textsuperscript{485} This simply means that, in order to think concretely, thought

\textsuperscript{483} “Theses on Feuerbach”, p. 570.

\textsuperscript{484} “Preliminary Theses for The Reform of Philosophy”, p 49.

must abstract from what appears as the most obvious, cease to stick to “this one predicate” and also take into account other determinations so that it is only through abstractions that thought conceives what is essential. According to Hegel,

everything actual contains opposed determinations within it, and in consequence the cognition and, more exactly, the comprehension of an object amounts precisely to our becoming conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations.  

Therefore, to take refuge in immediacy and to be content with a mere givenness is to disregard the fact that the object itself consists of many determinations and even of opposed determinations. The determinations of an object can be regarded as ideal moments of an organic unity, which can only be isolated through abstraction. According to Marx, for instance, every commodity has a use-value which results from the natural qualities of the product, but it has also an exchange-value since it is produced not for the direct consumption but for exchange. The exchange-value of the commodity, which is “the cell-form” of bourgeois society, is not, however, given to sense-perception; it can be dealt with only by “the power of abstraction”.  

In Capital, Marx thus proceeds from commodity and shows its two-fold character, and sets to analyze the entire structure of the world of commodity “by unfolding logically the commodity and money forms from his categories of use-value and value”.  

Like Hegel, Marx also regards the concrete as “the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse” and asserts that it cannot be taken

486 The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 48, Addition, p. 93.  
487 Capital, Vol. I, p. 90. Elsewhere, Marx states that “so far no chemist has ever discovered exchange-value either in a pearl or a diamond.” Ibid., p. 177.  
for the starting point since in this case it would seem as “a chaotic conception [Vorstellung] of the whole”. It follows that the concrete must appear as a “result” in the scientific inquiry, and it is only in this way that it can be shown in its true form and reproduced “as the concrete in the mind”. Therefore, according to Marx, “the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete” is “the scientifically correct method”. As Marx himself accepts, this conception of method belongs to Hegel and is consciously followed by him especially in his Science of Logic, Philosophy of Right and Phenomenology of Spirit.

Unlike Feuerbach, Marx thus regards “the course […] from the abstract to the concrete” not as an ‘inverted’ course but as an integral part of scientific thought and method, and does not confine it merely to “the practical philosophy”. It is true that there is an inversion in this course but only for sensuous or ordinary consciousness which must be replaced by scientific thought in any scientific study. For science cannot be content with the data provided by senses but aims to go beyond the appearance and to penetrate the essence. The problem with ordinary consciousness lies in the fact that it takes the objects as they appear whereas their appearance may to certain extent be illusory. “Precisely because we cannot rely upon the way things appear, we need scientific explanations – explanations which often appear paradoxical and contrary to everyday observation.” Therefore, the work of science is not with mere appearances and tends to grasp the inner connection of the relations it deals with: to grasp the essence is the reason for the existence of any science. As Marx puts it, “all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their essence”.

---

490 Ibid., p. 100.
491 Ibid., p. 101.
As a result, we can say that Marx finds no basis in Feuerbach’s thought in order to grasp the capitalist mode of production and develop a critique of political economy. However, Hegel’s system presents a fertile ground for Marx’s thought since it above all includes the most developed conception of science and a scientific method. Marx thus attempts to appropriate Hegel’s dialectic, despite all his criticism, and leaves Feuerbach behind, despite all his praises for him. It is so certain that after The German Ideology Marx never turned to Feuerbach for either applauding or criticizing. In fact, against to the tendencies towards ignoring Hegel, which at that time prevailed in Germany, Marx expresses his reaction to Feuerbach in his letter to Engels, dated 1868: “The gentlemen in Germany (all except the theological reactionaries) think Hegel’s dialectic is a ‘dead horse.’ Feuerbach has much to answer for in this respect.”

7.2. Philosophy and Critique

One of the decisive points in Hegel’s thought is that Idea is already actualized; it is not a ‘beyond’ or a mere ideal but an actual fact which everywhere makes itself appear. The role of philosophy is accordingly not to impose an ideal to the world but to show Idea which is always effective in it.

The notion that ideas and ideals are nothing but chimeras, and that philosophy is a system of pure phantasms, sets itself against the *actuality of what is rational*; but, conversely, the notion that ideas and ideals are something far too excellent to have actuality, or equally something too impotent to achieve actuality, is opposed to it as well. However, the severing of actuality from the Idea is particularly dear to understanding, which regards its dreams (i.e.,

---

abstractions) as something genuine, and is puffed up about the “ought” that it likes to prescribe, especially in the political field.\textsuperscript{495}

This seems a very accommodating position which limits philosophy to dealing with an actuality, by banishing it to turn its face to the world and to speculate about an ‘ought’ or the future of the world. “Hegel considers the task of philosophy as being retrospective rather than prospective.”\textsuperscript{496} It follows that philosophy does nothing other than conceiving the world in its truth and standing apart from saying it what it ought to be. However, Hegel’s point is to make clear two important points: first, philosophy is not an empty speculation but rigidly connected to actuality, and thus “its accord with actuality and experience is necessary;”\textsuperscript{497} and secondly, Idea and ideals do not live in a beyond but are realized in this world. Furthermore, for Hegel, the need for philosophy arises from the “dichotomy”\textsuperscript{498} between oppositions such as the subject and the object, and what falls on the part of philosophy is to show their identity in thought; therefore, “the task of science, and more precisely philosophy, is nothing but the overcoming of this antithesis [between subjectivity and objectivity] through thinking.”\textsuperscript{499}

Although Marx’s position appears fundamentally different or opposed to Hegel’s, a closer examination shows that Marx has completely absorbed Hegel’s viewpoint and to a great extent adopted it. For him, like for Hegel, what is ideal does not depend on some subjective wish or an arbitrary will; on the contrary,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{495} \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic,} § 6, p. 30.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{496} \textit{Diverging Time: The Politics of Modernity in Kant, Hegel and Marx,} p. 58.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{497} \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic,} § 6, p. 29.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{499} \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic,} § 194, \textit{Addition 1,} p. 273.
\end{flushright}
what is ideal is already realized in the world itself or it emerges from the very movement of the world itself. According to Marx,

Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the now existing premise.

In the modern world, there is an opposition between the subject and the object, despite the fact that human history is nothing other than the humanization of nature and thereby human’s becoming truly human, since the more modern bourgeois society creates the possibility of complete liberation of human the more the yoke over human increasingly becomes unbearable: in short, in the present mode of production there is found the necessary base for human emancipation, however, the opposition between the subject and the object continues to exist and even intensifies so that what dominates humans is not an external being but their own creation. Therefore, for Marx, the point is the abolition of this ‘alien’ power, capitalist relations of production as a whole, which have been created by humans themselves. However, though Marx holds that this opposition must be abolished practically, not only in thought, he nevertheless does not impose this role on the shoulders of philosophy. For him, philosophy is essentially an activity which solves the real problems of life only in thought:

[I]t will be seen how the resolution of the theoretical antitheses is only possible in a practical way, by virtue of the practical energy of men. Their resolution is therefore by no means merely a

500 The German Ideology, p. 57.

501 “The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is caused by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus are no longer able to control.” Ibid., pp. 53-4.
problem of knowledge, but a real problem of life, which philosophy could not solve precisely because it conceived this problem as merely a theoretical one.\footnote{Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 109.}

Therefore, such a practice is not a task of philosophy but of critique and of the proletariat as personified critique. However, the critique, or the science of proletariat, i.e., the critique of political economy, has no aim for showing to the world what it ought to be; it merely serves to make what happens to the ordinary consciousness explicit. He therefore follows Hegel’s steps in these points. “For Hegel and Marx […] what is required of the dialectical thinker is not to moralise the immanent movement of reason and reality but to surrender to it and seek to articulate it, to ‘become its mouthpiece’.”\footnote{McCarney, J., “Hegel’s Legacy”, in The Hegel-Marx Connection, ed. T. Burns and I. Fraser, Macmillan Press, London, 2000, p. 68.} According to Marx, in a time when the proletariat has not yet organized itself as a class which struggles for political power communists, i.e., “the theoreticians of the proletarian class”, can be described only as “utopians”. However,

in the measure that history moves forward, and with it the struggle of the proletariat assumes clearer outlines, they no longer need to seek science in their minds; they have only to take note of what is happening before their eyes and to become its mouthpiece. So long as they look for science and merely make systems, so long as they are at the beginning of the struggle, they see in poverty nothing but poverty, without seeing in it the revolutionary, subversive side, which will overthrow the old society. From the moment they see this side, science, which is produced by the historical movement and which associates itself with it with full consciousness, has ceased to be doctrinaire and has become revolutionary.\footnote{The Poverty of Philosophy, pp. 120-1.}

The difference, therefore, lies not between two opposed positions but only in a simple historical fact: Marx lives in a post-Hegelian world. Hegel regards history
as the embodiment of freedom and in this regard takes the modern world as a decisive moment in history because modern philosophy culminates in the philosophy of freedom which finally provides the identity of the subjective and the objective, due to the previous labors of all philosophy and especially of modern philosophy, and modern society presents a fertile ground in which individual freedom may flourish due to the labors of previous generations and particularly to Christianity, Reformation and French Revolution: History witnesses the realization of freedom.

Marx directly appropriates this viewpoint but adds that this freedom exists in the modern world only as possibility since it tends to intensify human’s subjugation to alien powers, such as religion, the state and the world of private property, which are in fact her own creation but appear as a natural necessity as a “second nature” inimical to human freedom.

Hegel says the following in his *Philosophy of Right*:

> The teaching of the concept, which is also history’s inescapable lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal [das Ideale] first appears over against the real and that the ideal grasps this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm.\(^{505}\)

In his doctoral dissertation, Marx focuses on another aspect of this relation between the ideal and the real, which Hegel is also familiar with. Philosophy, or Hegelian philosophy, really presents to a great extent the identity of the ideal and the real and intellectually absorbs the real world. What Marx is concerned, however, is to conceive what will happen exactly Hegel’s great philosophical system because he lives in a post-Hegelian world. From this standpoint, Marx reconsiders the relationship between the ideal and the real. Accordingly, this identity philosophy established between ideal and real would appear as mere ideal against the external world which is devoid of the satisfaction philosophy

\(^{505}\) *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 14.
possesses, and philosophy would attempt to bring this identity to the external world itself because the external world appears as mere real vis-à-vis philosophy. Therefore, for Marx, the point is “the realization of philosophy”. This realization involves, on the one hand, the world’s becoming philosophical and, on the other hand, philosophy’s becoming worldly. And the task of the realization of philosophy is not the business of philosophy itself but of its practice: the practice of philosophy is criticism. In his first work, Marx thus determines his task as critique; his aim is not to philosophize but to realize philosophy.506 In accordance with this result, the main task is to establish the identity of ideal and real practically, in the world itself. This appears as if what is before us was an imposition of an ideal to the world but Marx has nothing to do with such a standpoint: he would not say what the world ought to be, but show its own principles: “We develop new principles for the world out of the principles of the world.”507 The justification of this position would be found in Hegel’s philosophy which regards history as the embodiment of freedom. It is clear from philosophy itself that the world itself would want to be philosophical because humanity only poses the tasks which it can solve.508

Therefore, it is clear that Marx’s position is no alternative to Hegel’s philosophy but its outcome. It is no doubt that Marx differs from Hegel in many points but he does not develop a philosophy alternative to Hegel’s and maintains his activity on another plane both theoretically and practically. This can be summarized in the following way: Critique is a theoretical means of the realization of philosophy and in a similar way the proletariat is a practical means of the realization of philosophy. And devoting himself to both critical activity and


to the struggle of proletariat Marx tries to combine them in his person. Critique mainly targets the barriers to human freedom such as religion, the state and the conditions which bring forth these two, and those who obscures the struggle of proletariat such as Bauer, Feuerbach, and Proudhon etc. And insofar as philosophy gives an approval for the existing world it is also a target for the critique. It is exactly for this reason that Marx attacks Hegel’s philosophy since it appears to justify religion, the state and the world of private property: Hegel presents the modern world as rational and abolishes the estrangement of human only in thought. Marx’s critique of Hegel thus results essentially from Hegel’s affirmation of the existing world whereas this world is itself the greatest barrier to human freedom. However, Shlomo Avineri draws attention to an important fact that these two positions are not diametrically opposed:

‘The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk’: in this seemingly quietistic sentence, full of resignation and apparent conservatism, there lies hidden a critical message about the role of philosophy. True, to borrow and invert a phrase from Marx, philosophy cannot change the world, only interpret it; but by its very act of interpretation it changes it, it tells the world that its time is up.

The difference between Hegel and Marx lies therefore in the fact that Hegel wants to limit himself to an actuality in its completed state, whereas Marx does not recognize such a limitation and attempts to show the tendency of the present world to advance to its own negation. Hegel finds the affirmative, ‘the rose in the cross’ but Marx the negative, the chains under the roses. This is again not a comparable opposition because the planes are very different: Hegel remains within the limits of philosophy and warns philosophy against violating its own limits, while Marx transcends philosophy from the beginning by determining his task as critique: however, Marx’s transcendence of philosophy remains in a sense

\[^{509}\text{Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State},\ p.\ 130.\]
within the limits of philosophy because the main aim of his task, i.e., of his critique, is the realization of philosophy. In point of fact, this distinction between Hegel and Marx is reasonable for Hegel himself too because he does promise nothing as to changing the world and bans philosophy dealing with the future of the world, and Marx gets his message and tries to change the world not by philosophy but through both theoretical critique and the action of proletariat as personified critique.

As a result, the fact that Hegel insistently limits thought to dealing with a completed process and focusing solely on the affirmative side because Hegel himself opposes Kant’s attempt to limit human knowledge and promises to develop his philosophy as presuppositionless. To limit thinking to the affirmative side from the beginning is itself a presupposition because the negative side philosophy disregards may bring about a semblance of rationality. At this point, Marx asks “who should decide the limits of scientific inquiry if not scientific inquiry itself?”\(^5\) and attempts to show the illusion of freedom and equality in the modern world actually serves to mask the presupposition of modern bourgeois society—a fundamental presupposition which depends on the separation of the means of production from the producers themselves and thus makes the majority of people a slave.

The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, let us say of labour-power, are determined only by their own free will. […] Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to his own advantage.\(^6\)


The equality and freedom of individuals as the exchangers actually conceal the inequality and unfreedom of humans which emerge from production conditions themselves. It is exactly for this reason that Marx argues that the origins of legal relations and the state be sought in civil society. On this ground, Marx opposes both Hegel and political economists: just as the state reflects an inverted reality so political economy formulates only “laws of estranged labor”.

From the standpoint of Marx, Hegel’s mistake lies in the fact that he takes the determinations of modern world as ultimate and regards, for instance, property essentially as private property. He holds that human appropriates the natural objects through her labor and makes them her own, and the objects on which she vests her will belong to her and thus is her private property. Marx opposes Hegel’s argument on the ground that Hegel confuses a general determination with a specific one and directly identifies every production with private property. It is true that humans always are in a contact with nature and through labor change the form of natural objects so as to make them a product which will satisfy their need. Therefore, they appropriate natural objects and make them their own but private property is essentially a determination of the modern world, of capitalist relations of production. In his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel makes human activity and human appropriation, which are essential to all human history, equal with a specific appropriation in a specific mode of production, and on this ground opposes Platonic communism. However, the coincidence of capitalist production with the production in general is simply impossible.

All production is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual within and through a specific form of society. In this sense it is a tautology to say that property (appropriation) is a precondition of production. But it is altogether ridiculous to leap from that to a specific form of property, i.e., private property. [...] History rather shows common property (e.g. in India, among the Slavs, the early Celts, etc.) to be the more original form, a form
which long continues to play a significant role in the shape of communal property.\footnote{Grundrisse, pp. 87-8.}

However, when Marx criticizes Hegel he insistently attacks Hegel’s ‘principle’ and holds his principle responsible for his accommodation or his uncritical attitude towards the existing state of affairs. And this brings him to a certain extent to obscure the significance of Hegel’s philosophy because he insistently wants to read him as a theologian and thus in some places reduces his philosophy to a mere wordplay. And the main critique of Marx on this point is related to Hegel’s speculative presentation which mystifies actual relations and amounts to the affirmation of the existing empirical world, though he gives a real examination of his object and develops critical points vis-à-vis the modern society. Now we will trace this critique of Marx by considering it historically.

7.3. ‘Idealist Form’ and ‘Realistic Content’

Marx criticizes Hegel in many points, but the main core of his critique, which survives from his doctoral dissertation to Capital, remains more or less same: Hegel’s philosophy results in the affirmation of the existing empirical world and the glorification of what exists as a result of the false principle of his philosophy which makes thought into an independent subject and then tries to find a corresponding fact in the empirical existing world to this subject, i.e., Idea.

In his doctoral dissertation, Marx states that ‘Hegel’s accommodation’ lies not in his personal choice but results from the principle of his philosophy. Criticizing Hegel’s disciples who look for Hegel’s accommodation in his subjective views and aims, Marx thinks that accommodation must be sought in Hegel’s system as a whole.
In regard to Hegel, too, it is out of mere ignorance that his disciples explain this or that determination of his system by accommodation and the like or, in a word, morally. They forget that a very short time ago they enthusiastically adhered to all aspects of his one-sidedness; clear evidence of this fact is found in their writings.\footnote{\emph{Notes to the Doctoral Dissertation (1839-1841)}\textsuperscript{,} p. 60.}

Throughout his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state, this view concerning Hegel’s system is the dominant theme so that in the very beginning of his critique he finds “the entire mystery of the \emph{Philosophy of Right} and of Hegelian philosophy in general”\footnote{\emph{Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’}, p. 9.}. According to Marx, Hegel makes Idea into a subject with a certain aim and reduces real relations and conditions to mere appearances. However, Marx continues, Hegel’s Idea has no content but only these appearances; therefore, they also the determinations of Idea. In other words, being a determination or moment of Idea, they acquire rationality and are presented by Hegel as rational. But their rationality results not from themselves but from Idea. Such a view is, for Marx, nothing other than “the logical, pantheistic mysticism”\footnote{Ibid. p. 7.}.

According to Marx, however, this mysticism is essentially related to the ‘form’ of Hegel’s \emph{Philosophy of Right}: Hegel really deals with this so-called ‘appearance’ but presents it in a mystical form. This mystical form is, in turn, not an innocent one but serves to justify the existing state of affairs and make the modern state appear as rational. Marx puts it as follows:

\begin{quote}
The difference lies not in content, but in the way of considering it, or in the manner of speaking. There is a two-fold history, one esoteric and one exoteric. The content lies in the exoteric part. The interest of the esoteric is always to recover the history of logical Concept in the state. But the real development proceeds on the exoteric side.\footnote{Ibid., p. 8.}
\end{quote}
For Marx, therefore, Hegel as a philosopher appropriates his object, i.e., the modern state, and conceives it in its entirety, but the idealist form of his work brings about the object to acquire a status of being a moment of Idea and to be presented as rational, though it is in its essence irrational.

Hegel is not to be blamed for depicting the nature of the modern state as it is, but rather for presenting what is as the essence of the state. The claim that the rational is actual is contradicted precisely by an irrational actuality, which everywhere is the contrary of what it asserts and asserts the contrary of what it is. 517

As a result, concerning Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* Marx thinks that Hegel gives an actual inquiry but in a mystified form which results from his idealist philosophy; he presents the content as it is, but his presentation amounts to the affirmation of what exists because of his mystical or idealist form.

In *1844 Manuscripts*, Marx criticizes Hegel’s dialectic in general by predominantly dwelling on his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Behind Marx’s attack to this work lies his aim to show that even *Phenomenology*, which is generally regarded as critical and even revolutionary, brings about mysticism and results in the justification of what exists. Of course, this work is also related to Marx’s critique of political economy and his view of communism since it appears to include the estrangement of human and the abolition of this estrangement.

According to Marx, Hegel, on the one hand, regards the objects and the institutions as “thought-entities” and, on the other hand, equals human with consciousness because he conceives estrangement not as human’s objectification in an inhumanly way but as human’s objectification “in opposition to abstract thinking”. 518 Therefore, the abolition of estrangement occurs only in thought because this abolition is seen as that of objectivity. By regarding all human

517 Ibid., p. 64.

518 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp. 147-8.
products, institutions as “phases of mind” Hegel is content with transcending estrangement only in thought and leaves everything as it is.

The Phenomenology of Spirit, for Marx, however, still includes true criticism because its author appropriates the material before him and conceives it in its entirety.

Furthermore, Marx regards the entire process of Phenomenology as ‘self-genesis’ and ‘self-objectification’ resulting in absolute knowing. It is the production of Idea, or pure thought, which emerges as the result of this entire process, and, therefore, Idea is the real subject whereas human and nature are its predicates. And the Absolute Idea of Hegel’s Logic is nothing other than abstraction which knows itself to be nothing without content and decides to ‘intuiting’ and gives its place to nature.

Therefore, for Marx, despite its mystical form, Hegel’s Phenomenology includes an actual presentation and in fact “all critical elements” and his ‘Idea’ is nothing apart from human and nature. The problem lies not in the content of Hegel’s Phenomenology but in its idealist presentation which amounts to “the restoration of the existing empirical world”.

---

519 Ibid., p. 149.
520 Ibid., p. 162.
521 Ibid., pp. 162-3.
522 Ibid., p. 148.
In *The Holy Family*, Marx attempts to refute Hegel’s philosophy through the example of ‘fruit’ and accuses Hegel of showing an ordinary situation for ordinary man as a miracle. Omitting the decisive role of ‘dialectic’, he presents Hegel’s method, which he calls as ‘speculative’, as mere wordplay in which what understanding distinguishes is united by speculation. However, Marx also continues to repeat his argument against Hegel that he succeeds in conceiving his object but presents it in a speculative manner:

…Hegel very often gives a real presentation, embracing the *thing* itself, within the *speculative* presentation. This real reasoning *within* the speculative reasoning misleads the reader into considering the speculative reasoning as real and the real as speculative.  

Marx states that, in Hegel’s conception of history, human is reduced to mere vehicle of Absolute Spirit so that history is but the history of Absolute Spirit. However, he also adds that the existence of Absolute Spirit and “its making of history” exist only for the philosopher who tries to conceive history. Therefore, for Marx, the Absolute Spirit of Hegel is nothing other than the retrospective consciousness of the philosopher and has no existence apart from her.

In *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx criticizes Proudhon, who attempts to use the Hegelian method in his critique of political economy, and together with him Hegel too. By accusing Hegel’s *Logic* of presenting dialectic of concepts Marx opposes both Hegel’s logical categories and his absolute method. According to Marx, through abstraction Hegel reduces everything to logical categories and regards their movement as absolute which applies to everything; he believes that he found the key for every science thanks to his abstract categories and explains everything by “a ritual formula: affirmation, negation and negation of the

---

523 *The Holy Family*, p. 82.

524 Ibid., pp. 115-6.
Furthermore, Hegel disregards historical order and replaces it with his own understanding.\textsuperscript{526}

It must be stressed here that in \textit{1844 Manuscripts} Marx views Hegel’s dialectic as significant, despite all his critique of it, and tries to make use of it in his critique of political economy whereas in \textit{The Holy Family} and \textit{The Poverty of Philosophy} his attitude toward Hegel is essentially negative so that in these works Hegel appears as if he were a scholastic thinker who believes that the more he detaches himself sensible world and abstracts from all sensible content the more he may approach to the truth.

In \textit{The German Ideology}, Marx criticizes Feuerbach, Bauer, Stirner, etc., but the background of this work there is Hegel’s \textit{Philosophy of Right}. By showing the relations of production to be decisive throughout history Marx argues that if this point is disregarded or forgotten thought would necessarily fall into illusions such as the independence of thought, the impartiality of the state, etc. Therefore, Marx makes clear the real premises for scientific investigation: humans producing in society under certain conditions. And he points out “the existing empirical data”\textsuperscript{527} which scientific inquiry must depend on.

In \textit{Grundrisse}, Marx finds Hegel’s course from the abstract to the concrete useful and tries to present his critique of political economy in accordance with this procedure. Although he proclaims this procedure to be “true scientific method” he insistently emphasizes the primacy of the concrete which thought would appropriate and conceive and warns against confusing the movement of reality with that of thought. For him, Hegel confuses these two and regards the real world as a product of thought itself. However, in \textit{Grundrisse} Marx remarks that in the scientific study which deals with the capitalist relations of production the

\textsuperscript{525} \textit{The Poverty of Philosophy}, p. 98.

\textsuperscript{526} Ibid., p. 102.

\textsuperscript{527} \textit{The German Ideology}, p. 48.
historical order can be disregarded to certain extent because what is important in such a study is not to follow a chronological order but to conceive the movement of modern bourgeois society. Marx therefore analyses this society independent of any premise or presupposition, and focuses on, as it were, its ‘concept’ and follows the movement of the concept. And Marx himself is aware that such a presentation may appear ‘idealist’:

It will be necessary later [...] to correct the idealist manner of presentation, which makes it seem as if it were merely a matter of conceptual determinations and of the dialectic of these concepts.528

Finally, in his Capital, Marx proclaims himself to be the disciple of Hegel and to have learnt the dialectic method from Hegel. However, he remarks that Hegel sees the real world as a creation of Idea and thus “with him [dialectic] is standing on its head”529. But Marx is aware that his work seems as idealist, as a mere dialectic of concepts, in terms of its form, and for this reason he makes a distinction between the method of inquiry and that of presentation. However, it must be stressed that both these forms of method are specific to Hegel so that for him dialectic is not a method which can be applied but is the soul of the content.

In conclusion, in his previous works Marx accuses Hegel of his speculative manner or presentation which seems merely as the dialectic of concepts, but he also remarks that in Hegel’s works there can be found a real content which is well elaborated. However, once Marx attempts to use the dialectic method systematically in his critique of political economy he is subjected to the same accusation he has directed to Hegel many times:

At first sight, if the judgement is made on the basis of the external form of the presentation, Marx is the most idealist of philosophers, and indeed in the German, i.e. the bad sense of the word. But in

528 The Grundrisse, p. 151.
point of fact he is infinitely more realistic than all his predecessors in the business of economic criticism . . . He can in no sense be called an idealist.\footnote{Ibid., p. 100.}

It is clear that Marx’s *Capital* appears in terms of form ‘idealist’ and in terms of content ‘realist’, and Marx himself accepts that there is really such an appearance. However, in this point it is also clear that Marx can be expected to reconsider his critique of Hegel because in his previous works he has criticized Hegel and found him turned-upside because of his idealist presentation.\footnote{Even years later, Engels considers Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* in these terms: “Here we are again struck by Feuerbach’s astonishing poverty when compared to Hegel. The latter’s ethics or system of morality is the philosophy of right and embraces: 1) abstract right; 2) morality; and 3) social ethics [*Sittlichkeit*], which in its turn includes the family, civil society, and the state. Here the content is as realistic as the form is idealistic.” *The Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, p. 32.} But Marx does not set about reconsidering his critique of Hegel; on the contrary, he radicalizes his argument against Hegel by seeing his Idea as the creator of the real world whereas in his previous works he has pointed out Hegel’s Idea to have no content specific to it.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we have tried to argue that Marx comes closer to Hegel even while he bitterly criticizes Hegel, and that Marx’s critique appears as a process of making use of Hegel’s philosophy and of further developing the main aspects of his dialectic. To show this, we have focused on understanding the true implication of Marx’s critique for his thought rather than dealing with whether it does justice to Hegel or not. And in the light of Marx’s critique of Hegel, considered in our thesis, we argue that it is exactly Marx’s critical attitude towards Hegel’s philosophy that paves the way for Marx’s appropriation of Hegel’s dialectic.

In the chapter on “Critical Dialectic”, we have focused on Hegel’s philosophy of the state and Marx’s critique of it. This is one of the decisive moments both in Marx’s reception of Hegel’s philosophy and in the development of his thought. In his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel presents the modern state as rational, but he does not equate it with any given state; rather, his state is represented as a synthesis of the achievements of the modern world. What is striking in Hegel’s political thought is that the modern state is considered as an organic unity which is capable of bringing a harmony between universal and particular interests, and that it puts a great emphasis on individual freedom so that a state which does not give individual freedom its due can be in no way regarded as rational. Marx’s objection is directed against the fact that the modern state is conceived as rational. According to Marx, in the modern world individuals continue to lead a double life: they are on the one hand members of civil society and, on the other hand, citizen of the state and there is no harmony between these two realms. However, although Marx accuses Hegel of being uncritical vis-à-vis
the modern state, Hegel’s political philosophy does really have some solutions to the problems of the modern state such as corporations, primogeniture, etc. But for Marx, these solutions are insufficient and to certain extent conservative ones. As we have tried to show, despite all his criticism, however, Marx’s critical attitude is a continuation of German philosophical tradition and particularly of Hegel’s philosophy, since criticism is an essential aspect of Hegel’s dialectic. The dialectic is above all the self-movement of the fact itself, and this movement depends on its self-criticism: it is through this process that the fact exposes its own contradictory nature and passes into another fact. Therefore, we argue that Marx’s critique, which is his main intellectual activity, has its roots in Hegel’s dialectic and, by criticizing Hegel’s philosophy, Marx in fact remains to be devoted to the essence of Hegel’s dialectic.

In the chapter on “Worldly Dialectic”, we have focused on Marx’s critique of Hegel in his 1844 Manuscripts. In this work, Marx mainly deals with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and accepts that Hegel’s philosophy is in its essence a worldly one so that it contains all elements of criticism and conceives both the essence of labor and the fact of estrangement. However, Marx also strongly emphasizes the idealist character of Hegel’s thought and accuses him of bringing a solution to estrangement only in thought, whereas estrangement as a real problem of human life demands a real, practical solution. Despite all his critique of Hegel, however, Marx appears in his 1844 Manuscripts to come to a closer contact with Hegel’s dialectic. Marx criticizes political economists on the basis that they isolate the facts of political economy and do not conceive the inner connection among them, whereas, for Marx, these facts are inseparably connected and even the opposed situations, such as monopoly and competition, necessitates each other and necessarily pass into one another. Therefore, it is clear that Marx’s critique of political economists stresses that they are devoid of the dialectic viewpoint. Furthermore, as we have tried to show, it is through Hegel’s dialectic that Marx develops his conception of communism. Accordingly, human continuously transforms nature throughout history and adapts it to her needs: she
thus makes natural objects into human ones. The negative side of this process of objectification lies in the fact that human stands as powerless vis-à-vis the objects which are products of her labor and enters into their domination. In the context of political economy, the objectification of the worker appears as the process of her estrangement because she is separated from the means of production and produces for others. Marx thus conceives communism as the abolition of estrangement which requires that of private property. However, Marx does not regard it as an abstract rejection of the world of private property or as a return to a pre-capitalist society; on the contrary, he insists on the fact that the standpoint of communism is the negation of negation, according to which communism requires a return from the negative, and the sublation of the private property. In this sense, Marx calls communism as the positive abolition of private property. Finally, we have argued that Marx’s emphasis on ‘worldly dialectic’ against Hegel’s ‘divine dialectic’ in fact shows the fact that Marx tends to further develop a fundamental aspect of Hegel’s dialectic. For Hegel’s *Phenomenology* considers the development of human knowledge by the mediation of history and society, and does not present some abstract formulations but focuses on the concrete features of human life. Therefore, Marx’s critique of Hegel also attempts to appropriate important implications of Hegel’s philosophy and his dialectic.

In the chapter on “Non-speculative Dialectic”, we have focused on Marx’s critiques of Hegel in his *Holy Family* and *Poverty of Philosophy* and tried to show that, even though Marx appears to be extremely critical of Hegel, he further approaches to the essence of Hegel’s dialectic. Opposing Bauer and Proudhon who seem to reduce the dialectic to a mere dialectic of concepts and to be content with formulating abstract principles rather than dealing with the concrete facts, Marx argues that the method cannot be thought of as a ready-made schema which can be applied to any object. Furthermore, in these works Marx still regards Hegel’s *Logic* as an unfruitful attempt which reduces the world and its relations to abstract categories. However, as we have tried to show, it is exactly his critical attitude that makes Marx closer to Hegel’s dialectic because Hegel himself does
not consider the method as an abstract formulation but emphasizes the fact that it
cannot be external to its object and must be conceived as the soul of the fact.
Therefore, Hegel’s dialectic guarantees nothing and does not save one from a
laborious inquiry of the object; on the contrary, it requires the consideration of the
object in and for itself. As a result, we have argued that it is by the mediation of a
negative relation that Marx goes beyond being a poor imitator of Hegel and
remains to be devoted to the essence of Hegel’s dialectic.

In the chapter on “Historical Dialectic”, we have argued that Marx’s _German Ideology_ and _Communist Manifesto_ have a critical relationship with
Hegel’s _Philosophy of Right_ and _Philosophy of History_, and tried to trace this
relationship. In these works, Marx attempts to conceive history on the basis of
‘civil society’ or material relations of production. As we have insistently pointed
out, historical dimension is an integral part of Hegel’s philosophy in general.
Hegel regards human history as advancement in the consciousness of freedom
and, for him, the modern world has a decisive place in this progress. He is also of
the opinion that civil society as a product of the modern world constitutes a firm
base for individual freedom. However, according to Hegel, civil society must be
subordinate to the state, which is in turn a moment of the world history, since it
may jeopardize the universal end. Against this, Marx holds that civil society is
much more decisive than Hegel imagined, so that it takes the state and the world
history as its moments since the movement of capital tends to reduce the state as
its mere instrument and to destroy all national and local ties. Marx thus asserts
that freedom in the modern world is nothing other than an illusion because its sole
ground is the moment of arbitrariness. And in fact, this appearance of arbitrariness
makes humans to be more dependent on the conditions which are entirely
independent from humans’ will. Therefore, Marx regards the private property as
the greatest barrier to human freedom. It follows that human freedom is only
possible with the negation of the existing state of affairs. From the standpoint of
Marx, Hegel equalizes private property with any human appropriation of nature
and grasps neither the historical character of private property in its modern form
and the class structure of society. In this sense, Marx’s thought appears to have transcended the horizon of Hegel’s above-mentioned works. However, we argue that, for all his critique, Marx continues his dialogue with Hegel and adheres to the essence of his historical dialectic.

In the chapter on “Revolutionary Dialectic”, we have focused on Marx’s discussion of the method and its relation to Hegel’s dialectic. Marx devotes a considerable part of his intellectual life to the critique of political economy and, as we have tried to show, Capital is aimed to be the science of political economy itself rather than being a polemical work against political economists since, in Marx’s eyes, such a science can be only accomplished in the form of a critique of political economy. And it is clear that such a scientific work needs a scientific method, which Marx envisages to be revolutionary because his aim is to grasp the capitalist mode of production as a whole and present it in its contradictions. Marx has no great difficulty in finding this method since he has from the beginning been in a critical relation with Hegel’s dialectic. But with Grundrisse, Marx enters into a closer relation with Hegel’s Logic and tries to appropriate the dialectic with all its aspects. And finally, Marx calls his method dialectic and presents himself to be a disciple of Hegel. Despite the fact that he continues to criticize Hegel, as we have tried to show, Marx does not differ from Hegel with regard to the dialectic. However, we also argue that Marx’s more intimate relation with Hegel’s dialectic in his mature works indicates no decisive change in the development of Marx’s thought or no break from his previous ideas, and in this sense his previous critique of Hegel can be regarded as a process through which Marx comes closer to Hegel and appropriates his dialectic in its entirety.

In our thesis, we have tried to show the stages in Marx’s appropriation of Hegel’s dialectic by analyzing his critique of Hegel in his various works, and to do this, we have mainly relied on Marx’s own remarks and interpreted them in their relation to Hegel’s works. And on the basis of our exposition we have argued that his critical approach to Hegel’s philosophy renders for Marx possible to grasp and use the dialectic in its full import. In this context, Ludwig Feuerbach, whom
Marx regards in his early works as one who has overcome Hegel’s idealist philosophy, really plays a role in the development of Marx’s thought since Marx places Feuerbach between himself and Hegel and thus refrains from directly identifying his standpoint with that of Hegel. But, as we have tried to show throughout our thesis, it is equally clear that Feuerbach has no role in Marx’s critique of political economy and his conception of communism, and the chief philosophical source of Marx’s thought is Hegel’s philosophy. This is evidently clear from Marx’s own words: Feuerbach “gives no criticism of the present conditions of life”\textsuperscript{532} and his critique is solely limited to that of religion, whereas in Hegel “all the elements of criticism”\textsuperscript{533} can be found. As a result, as we have tried to show, Marx’s relation to Hegel is a life-long one, and even his critique of Hegel suggests a return to Hegel.

\textsuperscript{532} \textit{The German Ideology}, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{533} \textit{Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844}, p. 149.
REFERENCES


Marx, K., *Letters to Dr. Kugelmann*, Martin Lawrence, London.


APPENDIX A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Kılınç, Doğan Barış
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 27 September 1980, Gaziantep
Marital Status: Married
Phone: +90 505 452 02 01
email: doganbariskilinc@gmail.com

EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Year of Graduation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>METU Philosophy</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Hacettepe U. Philosophy</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Şehit Şahin High School, Gaziantep</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WORK EXPERIENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011-</td>
<td>Dicle University Department of Philosophy</td>
<td>Research Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>METU Department of Philosophy</td>
<td>Research Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td>Dicle University Department of Philosophy</td>
<td>Research Assistant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PHILOSOPHY

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

PUBLICATIONS


APPENDIX B. TURKISH SUMMARY


dediği gibi, her şey görüldüğü gibi olsaydı bilime ne gerek kalırdı ki? Marx başyapıtı olan Kapital'de kendisinin Hegel'in öğrencisi olduğunu açıklar ve ona “ölü köpek” muamelesi yapılmasına izin vermez.


Marx, dinin de devletin de tersine çevrilmiş olduğunu, çünkü onların kendisi de tersine çevrilmiş bir gerçekliğin ürünlerini düşünmeyi onları insannın özgürlüğünün önündeki engeller olarak görür. Marx, din eleştirisinin David Strauss, Bruno Bauer ve özellikle de Ludwig Feuerbach’ın çabalarıyla büyük ölçüde tamamlanmış olduğunu düşündüğünden ilk olarak modern devletin eleştirisine girişir ve bunun için de modern devletin doğasını ortaya koyduğu düşünüğü Hegel’in devlet görüşünü hedef alır. Marx’a göre, modern devlet rasyonel olmaktan ve evrensel ile tikel çıkarlar arasında uyum getirmekten uzaktır ve gerçekte insannın bir nesnellenmesi olmasın karşısında çarkın insanın üzerinde, hâkim olamadığı bir güç olarak durur: Modern devlette insan bir yandan sivil toplumun bir üyesi olarak tikelliği içinde, bir yandan da devletin yurtaşı olarak evrensel bir düzlemde ikili bir yaşam sürer ve bunlar arasında bir uyum getirilmemek. Marx’ın Hegel’e yönelik temel suçlaması, bu bağlama, onun modern devlet karşısında yeteri kadar eleştirel olmaması ve irrasyonel bir devleti rasyonel olarak

ilişkisini sürdürmeye, Proudhon ise politik iktisadın eleştirisini Hegel’in diyalektiğini kullanarak sunmaya çalışmaktadır. Ama burada özellikle vurgulamamız gereken nokta, Marx’ın onların Hegel’in diyalektiğini anlamadıklarını, onu karikatürelştirdiklerini ve salt bir kavramlar diyalektliği sunduklarını düşünmesidir. Dolayısıyla, Marx’a göre, onlar Hegel’in diyalektiğini tam olarak anlamayı başaramazlar. Marx, Hegel’i eleştirek kötü bir taklitçi olmanın ötesine geçmeyi amaçlar. 

eserlerinde Hegel’i, onun diyalektiğinin önemini karartacak şekilde eleştirirse de yöntemle ilgili olarak vurguladığı nesnelerin Hegel’in diyalektiğinin özsel bir yönü olduğunu açıktır. Hegel yöntemin, nesnesinden ayrı olamayacağını ve gerçekleşte olgunun kendi diyalektiğinden ve olgunun kendi seyrinden başka bir şey olmadığı ileri sürer. Diyalektik böylece öznel düşünmenin kendi konusuna düşül olarak uyguladığı bir etkinlik olmayıp konunun kendi ruhu anlamına gelir, bu anlamda filozofa düşen şey, ele aldığı konuya dışardan kavramlar getirmek değil, onun kendi hareketini takip etmektir. Marx böylece Hegel’in diyalektiğine yönelik tüm eleştirilerine karşın onun özüne sadık kalır ve bu eleştirel tavrı, Hegel’in diyalektiğini hazır bir şema olarak görmesinin önüne geçer.


Kısaca göstermeye çalıştığımız gibi, Alman İdeolojisi’nde ve Komünist Manifesto’da Marx’ın Hegel’in Hukuk Felsefesi ve Tarihi Felsefesi ile olan eleştirel ilişkisi devam eder. Ve Marx her ne kadar Hegel’in eserlerinin ufkunu aşmış olsa da onun düşüncesinin temel içeriklerini ve özellikle de tarihsel bakış açısını sahiplendir.

Göstermeye çalışığımız gibi, Marx’ın Hegel’le olan ilişkisi tek bir eleştiriyle noktalanan bir ilişki olmayıp Hegel’le olan diyalog onun birçok temel eserinde varlığını korur. Bununla birlikte, yukarıda ele aldığımız eserlerde Marx Hegel’in diyalektiğini sahıpenme ve düşüncesinin çeşitli yönlerini daha öte geliştirmeye eğiliminde olmasına karşın gene Hegel’e ve diyalektiğine yönelik büyük ölçüde olumsuz ve eleştirel bir tavır söz konusudur. Marx’ın Hegel’in diyalektiğini tüm yönleriyle sahıpenmesi, Hegel’in Mantık’ından yararlandığını açıkça belirttiği Grundrisse eserinde başlar ve başyapıtı olan Kapital’de kendi

Marx’in Hegel’e yönelik eleştirilerini takip ederek sürekli olarak onun felsefesi ve özellikle diyalektikyle ilişkili olduğunu ve çalışmalarında ondan yararlanmaya çalıştığını gostermeye çalıştır. Buna göre, Marx Hegel’i eleştirirken bile onunla daha yakın bir ilişki içinde olmayı ve bu ilişkiye derinleştirmeyi sürdürür. Ve Hegel’le olan eleştirililiği böylece onun diyalektikini tam olarak sahiplenmesinde sonuçlarım. Bununla birlikte, Marx’in konumunu Hegel’in dokümleriyle özdeşleştirmekten uzak olduğumuz tartışmamızın seyriden hareketle açıktır. Marx’in Hegel’e olan bağlığı, Hegel’in politik felsefesinin ve tarihi felsefesinin zengin içeriğinden ve geliştirilmiş olduğu bilim ve yöntem kavrayışından kaynakları ve tüm bunlar Marx’a kendi görüşlerini geliştirmesi açısından sağlam bir temel oluşturur.
Son olarak, takip etmeye çalıştığımız Marx’ın Hegel’e yönelik eleştirileri ışığında, önemli görüdüğümüz birkaç noktaya dikkat çekmemiz gerekiyor. İlk olarak, Marx’ın kısa süreliğine de olsa Feuerbach’ı Hegel’in felsefesini aşmış olarak görmesinden ve kendisi ile Hegel arasında Feuerbach’ı yerleştirmiş olmasının anlamından söz etmemiz gerekiyor. Feuerbach, Marx’ın düşüncesinin gelişiminde gerçekten bir rol oynar, ama bu Feuerbach’ın düşüncelerinin derinliğinden ziyade dönemin pratik gerekliklerinden kaynaklanır. Marx, gördüğümüz gibi, entelektüel çalışmalarına Hegel’in devlet görüşünü eleştirerek başlar ve ilgilendiği esas noktalar politik felsefenin ilgi alanına girer. Bununla birlikte, Marx daha bu ilk eleştirisinde sivil toplum ve onu doğru bir şekilde yansıttığı ve artefakt olarak suyan Hegel’in felsefesinin ilgi alanına girer. Buna da ancak iktisad ilişkilerde devrimci bir dönüşüm yaratanca saflanabileceğini düşünü. Marx’a göre, kendisinin de bizzat içinde yer aldığı Genç Hegelci akının önemli temsilerinden olan David Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner, vb. ise bu noktayı göremekten uzak olup Hegelci felsefenin sınırları içerisinde kalmaya devam etmektedirler. Feuerbach ise Hegel’in felsefesine ve diyalektiğine doğrudan karşıarak onu aşmaya yönelik önemli bir girişimi temsil eder. Marx bundan dolayı Feuerbach’ın girişimini önemsar ve onu, 1844 Elyazmaları’nda Hegel’in felsefesinin üstesinden gelmiş ve diyalektiğini yükümlü olarak sunar ve politik iktisadın eleştirisinin Feuerbach’ın keşiflerine dayandığı ileri sürer. Marx’in 1844 Elyazmaları’ndaki düşüncelerini ve genel olarak düşüncesinin gelişimini göz önünde bulundurduğumuzda, Marx’in Feuerbach’a yönelik övgüsi ve Feuerbach’ın övnemi oldukça tartışmalı görünür, çünkü Marx Feuerbach’ı övguye bağlı olduğunu eserinde aynı zamanda Hegel’in diyalektiğini eleştirisinin şimdiye dek tamamlanmamış bir görev olarak durduğunu ileri sürer. Feuerbach, yukarıda
belirttiğimiz gibi, Hegel’in felsefesinin özne-yüklem ilişkisini tersine çevirdiğini, soyuttan yola çıktığında bir türlü hakikate erişemediğini, dolayısıyla rasyonelleştirilmiş bir teoloji olduğunu ileri sürer ve ona karşı, dolaysız olanın, duyusal kesinliğin temel alınması gerektiğini ifade ederek soyutlamaları cageştirmiş olmasından dolayı, bu eleştiri, Marx için tek bir anlamı bulunur, ki o da Hegel’in felsefesinin aşılması gerektiğini işaret etmiş olmasıdır. Bunun dışında, Marx’ın bu anti-diyalektik düşünceleri benimsemesi mümkün değildir ve 1844 Elyazmaları esas olarak özne-nesne ilişkisini diyalektik bir ilişki olarak sunmaya odaklanır ve insanın nesnelleşme ve yabancılaşma süreçlerini tartışır. Marx insannın doğaya olan pratik ilişkisini sonucu olarak doğan giderek insansal bir biçim kazandığını ve insanların dünyasının bundan böyle dolaysızca verili olmayıp insanın pratik etkinliği dolayından geçtiği, dolayısıyla da tarihsel bir ürün olduğunu vurgular. Buna göre, nesnelerin öznel bir form kazanırken, özne de kendi özsel güçlerini nesnelleştirmektedir. Marx Alman İdeolojisi ve Feuerbach Üzerine Tezler’de Feuerbach’ı bu zeminde eleştirerek onun ‘kontemplatif’ tavrını hedef alır ve onun ne tarihten ne de politikadan anlamını ileri sürer. Gene yukarıda belirtmiş olduklarını gibi, Grundrisse’de bilimsel bir çalışmada soyuttan yola çıkmanın sonucu olarak doğan giderek insansal bir biçim kazandığını ve insanların dünyasının bundan böyle dolaysızca verili olmayıp insanın pratik etkinliği dolayından geçtiği, dolayısıyla da tarihsel bir ürün olduğunu vurgular. Buna göre, Feuerbach’ın yaptığı gibi dolaysız olana, duyu kesinliğine yapışıp kalmının bilimde bir yeri olmadığını gibi bu tavr olgunun gerçek bir kavramışını da karartır; buna karşın, bilim soyutlamaları gerek duyar ve nesnesini, olduğunu gibi değil, bir dizi dolayım süreci eşliğinde kavramaya çalışır. Sonuç olarak, açıktır ki, Marx’ın diyalektiği tam olarak sahiplenme sürecin kendisi Feuerbach’ın Hegel’e yönelik eleştirilerini geçersiz kılmaktadır ve Marx’ın Feuerbach’ı hemen eleştirecek bir daha ona geri dönmemesi olgusu bu noktannın önemli bir işaret olarak görülebilir. Marx’ın kendi ifadeleriyle belirtmek
gerekirse, Feuerbach “mevcut yaşam koşullarına ilişkin hiçbir eleştiri sunmaz”, oysa Hegel’de “eleştirinin tüm öğeleri” bulunabilir. Dolayısıyla, Marx’ın Feuerbach’la olan ilişkisi kısa süreli bir ilişkiyeken, Hegel’le olan ilişkisi yaşam boyu süren bir ilişkidir.

Son olarak, Marx’in Kapital’dede yöntemi diyalektik olarak adlandırması ve politik iktisadın eleştirisinde kullanıldığı belirtmesi ışığında, Hegel’e yönettiği temel eleştiriyi söz konusu değerlere paralel olarak yarıştı olabilir. Marx, Hegel’e yönelik ilk eleştirisinde, Hegel’in İdeayı bağımsız bir özne olarak kavradığını ve tüm gerçek özneleri ise onun bir ugraşına indirgediğini, böylelikle de onun felsefesinin mevcut gerçekliğin aklamasına varamasını ileri sürür. Hegel’e yönelik son eleştirisini içeren Kapital’de de bu aynı eleştiriyi yineler: Hegel İdeayı 있게 yapıcı olarak yerine ve onun diyalektiği var olan ilişkilerin yükseltildiğini belirtir ve Grundrisse’de kendisi de eserin idealistmiş gibi görünüşünü kabul eder. Buna karşın, bu görüşünün eserin formunda, сент biçiminden kaynaklandığı belirtir; diğer bir deyişle, diyalektik yöntem salt bir kavramlar diyalükti söz konusuymuş gibi bir görüntümü sunabilir. Oysa gerçekte ele alınan malzememizin bütün boyutlarıyla araştırılması söz konusudur. Bununla birlikte, Marx’in Hegel’e yönelik önceki eleştirilerini göz önünde bulundurduğu ılgıza da nokta dikkat çekicidir, çünkü Marx ısrarı ile Hegel’in ele aldığı malzemenin ayrıntılı olarak araştırıldığı, olgunun kendisini kavradığını ama onun spekülatif сент biçiminin mistikasyona yola çıktığını vurgular. Buna göre, Hegel’in eserinin realist içeriğini, eserinin idealist formu karartmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Marx’in diyalükti sıyasal olarak uygulamaya çalıştığı Kapital’de bu aynı suçlamaya karşılaşması, Hegel’e yönelik önceki eleştirilerini gözden geçirmesini gerektirmesi karşın Marx böylesine bir yorumu girmekten uzaktır. Bu, Marx’in Hegel’le olan ilişkisinde tartışmaya açılan bir suçlama bir nokta gibi görünmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, göstermeye çalıştık ki, Marx’ın Hegel’le olan tüm eleştirel ilişkisi Hegel’in felsefesinin temel içeriklerinden ve özellikle de diyalüktiinden daha öte yararlanma yönündedir ve Marx eleştirel bir ilişki dolayımıyla Hegel’in diyalektiği tam olarak sahiplenir.
APPENDIX C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü
Enformatik Enstitüsü
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı: KILINÇ
Adı: Doğan Barış
Bölümü: Felsefe

TEZİN ADI: MARX’S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL:
STAGES IN MARX’S APPROPRIATION OF DIALECTIC

TEZİN TÜRÜ: Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınmaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: