

ARMENIAN TERRORISM AND THE TURKISH PRESS (1973-1984)

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ABSTRACT

ARMENIAN TERRORISM AND THE TURKISH PRESS (1973-1984)

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This research examines how Turkish newspapers approached the Armenian terrorism which emerged in the years between 1973 and 1984 as the third wave since the late 19th century. The Armenian terrorist organizations officially emerged in 1975 in order to show the world their rightfulness in terms of the so-called Armenian genocide, assassinating Turkish diplomats, including ambassadors and their families, in a planned and systematic fashion within these 11 years. These terrorist activities accelerated from time to time. Along with the accelerated Armenian terror, domestic terrorism and political disorder were the other developments in Turkey. Within the context of such difficulties, the extent of Armenian terrorist activities and the changes in the politically varied Turkish newspapers' regarding Armenian terrorism within these 11 years are examined thoroughly.

Key words: Armenian question, Armenian terrorism, Turkish press, Turkish diplomats, ideological cleavages.

ÖZ

ERMENİ TERÖRÜ VE TÜRK BASINI (1973-1984)

Çağan, Hazel

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ebru Boyar

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Bu çalışmada, 1973 ve 1984 yılları arasında, 19. Yüzyılın sonlarından itibaren zaman zaman patlak veren Ermeni terörünün 3. dalgasının yeniden ortaya çıkışı ve bu terör faaliyetlerinin Türk gazeteleri tarafından ele alınış biçimi irdelenmiştir. Resmi olarak 1975 yılında ortaya çıkan Ermeni terör örgütleri, Ermeni soykırım iddiaları konusunda haklı olduklarını bütün dünyaya duyurmak için, aralarında büyükelçilerin de bulunduğu, Türk diplomatlarını ve aile fertlerini 11 yıl boyunca sistemli ve planlı bir şekilde katletmişlerdir. Bu terör saldırıları zaman zaman yoğunluk kazanmıştır. Ermeni terörünün yoğun bir şekilde yaşandığı bu dönemde, ülke içindeki siyasi karışıklıklar ve terör faaliyetleri de yoğun bir şekilde devam etmiştir. Tüm bu gelişmeler yaşanırken, Ermeni terör saldırılarının bu 11 yıllık dönemde siyasileşmiş Türk gazeteleri tarafından mevcut ideolojik ayrılıkların yaşandığı bir dönemde, Türk halkına ne kadar sağlıklı bir biçimde aktarıldığı ve Türk basınının Ermeni sorununa yaklaşımındaki değişim mercek altına alınmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ermeni sorunu, Ermeni terörü, Türk basını, Türk diplomatlar, Türk gazeteleri, ideolojik ayrılıklar.

To My Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
ARA	Armenian Revolutionary Army
EOKA-B	Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston
JCAG	Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide
JP	Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)
MİT	National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı)
NMP	Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
NSP	Nationalist Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RPP	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
RRP	Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi)
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television Corporation

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the period between 1973 and 1984, Turkish diplomats were assassinated by Armenian terrorists in 18 cities¹ all over the world. These terrorist activities created fear and sorrow among the Turkish public. The world press closely followed developments about the Armenian terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats as well as Turkish press coverage of these events.

Turkey experienced Armenian terrorism three times in history. Armenians and Turks lived in peace for nearly four hundred years until Tsarist Russia invaded the Caucasus and the relationship between the Armenians and the Turks began to deteriorate after the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman War² as Russians made use of Armenian secret organizations and political parties. Shortly after the Russo-Ottoman War, an Armenian union was formed under the name of "Black Cross" and attacked Muslims and Armenians in Van and the surrounding area.³ There had been 37 Armenian rebellions in Anatolia prior to 1909.⁴ However, the rebellions started with Sassoun rebellions in 1894 by Hamparsum Boyacıyan with the promise of English support for the rebellious Armenians.⁵ Therefore, Turkey faced the first period of Armenian terrorism.

The second period of Armenian terrorism started in the beginning of the First World War with the second Zeitun rebellion in 1914.⁶ The Zeitun rebellion triggered other uprisings during World War I. British, French and Russian troops

¹ Ömer Engin Lütem, *Armenian Terror*. Ankara: Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 8.

² Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p. 8.

³ Kamuran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, Ankara Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983, p. 129.

⁴ Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p. 10.

⁵ Ömer Karayumak, *Ermeniler, Ermeni İsyanları, Ermeni Katliamları*. Ankara: Vadi Yayınları 2007, p. 172.

⁶ Karayumak, *Ermeniler, Ermeni İsyanları, Ermeni Katliamları*. p. 187.

again cooperated with the Armenians and they tortured Muslims as well as Armenians in Anatolia.⁷ The well-known "Armenian atrocities" were actually a part of Armenian terrorism.⁸ Armenian terrorism continued even after the end of World War I, until Turkish armed forces secured these places towards the end of 1920.⁹

In 1973, the third wave of Armenian terrorism emerged in order to demonstrate how Armenians suffered badly in the events of 1915. In the following 11 years, Armenian terrorism accelerated and various Armenians terrorist groups emerged. The main target of these terrorist groups was the Turkish diplomatic representations abroad; through this method, these groups aimed to make their case against Turkey known in the countries where these attacks materialized. Turkish public opinion was informed by the Turkish state Radio and Television (hereafter, TRT) and newspapers. While the former directly represented the state view, the latter provided different views about Armenian terrorism, the historical roots of Armenian grievances against the Ottoman Empire and hence Turkey, and international and national connections of Armenian terrorist organizations.

In this thesis, the position of the Turkish press regarding Armenian terrorism will be investigated. In the second chapter, the multi-vocal Turkish press which existed in the 1970s will be examined in relation to Armenian terrorism. The answers to questions such as to what extent Turkish press was able to understand, analyze and reflect the seriousness of the Armenian challenge to Turkish public opinion; whether the Turkish press was able to develop a common stance in relation to such a national question and if the political divisions in the domestic political arena in this period affected the capabilities of Turkish press in truly comprehending Armenian terrorism targeting Turkey abroad, will be investigated.

In the third chapter, the position of the Turkish press in relation to Armenian terrorism after the 12 September 1980 coup will be examined. After the coup,

⁷ Karayumak, *Ermeniler, Ermeni İsyanları, Ermeni Katliamları*. p. 232.

⁸ Lütem. *Armenian Terror*, p. 12.

⁹ Lütem. *Armenian Terror*, p. 12.

journalists were imprisoned along with political leaders. Furthermore, political parties and *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet* and *Tercüman*¹⁰ were closed. While there were huge political changes in Turkey, assassinations of Turkish representatives abroad by Armenian terrorist groups accelerated and in a short time, the number of casualties exceeded the number of casualties in the period between 1973 and 1980. Alpay Kabacalı argued that the period started with the military 12th September 1980 coup d'état, when the Turkish press was “depoliticized” owing to the “elimination of the political institutions and foundations”¹¹. Hence, in the third chapter, it will be questioned whether this so called “depoliticization” forced Turkish newspapers which had previously held conflicting political affiliations to develop a common language and front vis-à-vis Armenian terrorism and to what extent these newspapers developed their understanding of Armenian terrorism and its roots. Furthermore it will be investigated if the political divisions of the previous era actually found a new channel of revealing itself in analysing and publishing about Armenian terrorism, i.e. whether Armenian terrorism allowed journalists to carry their political hostilities to the international platform as there was no room for political discussions about domestic matters due to the martial law and political suppression.

¹⁰ Mehmet Ali Birand, *12 Eylül Türkiye'nin Miladı*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, p. 163. In between 12 September 1980 and 12 March 1984, the implementations of the law became severe. For instance, *Cumhuriyet* was closed four times, for 41 days; *Milli Gazete* was closed four times for 72 days; *Tercüman* was closed for 29 days; *Milliyet* was closed once for 10 days and *Hürriyet* was closed two times for 7 days. For more detailed information see: Hıfzı Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003. p. 259.

¹¹ Alpay Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Milli Kütüphane Basımevi, 1994. p. 334.

1.1. Turkish Press (1973-1984)

In the years between 1973 and 1984, Turkish diplomats began to be victimized as a result of Armenian terrorist attacks and Turkish newspapers were divided according to their political affiliations. Even if a terrorist attack was a national problem and hence required a united front to cope with it, the political division among central left and central right parties was so severe that a newspaper was even capable of using the news on Armenian terrorist attacks to accuse others with opposite political views of being part of these attacks. Such a division stemmed from the nature of the Turkish political scene of the period. From 1973 to 1980, the government mainly oscillated between the Republican People's Party (RPP - Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), whose leader was Bülent Ecevit, and the Justice Party (JP - Adalet Partisi), whose leader was Süleyman Demirel¹², in addition to major political actors such as Alparslan Türkeş of the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP - Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) and Necmettin Erbakan of the National Salvation Party (NSP - Millî Selâmet Partisi). Moreover, Turkey had experienced short-lived coalition governments and technocratic rule in this period. The newspapers were so blinded by their political tendencies that they were not in a position to grasp and sufficiently analyze the developments about Armenian terrorism. They focused intently on their political battles against each other¹³. Table I, created by Salih Bayram, shows that from 1973 to 1980, the majority of newspapers tended to serve primarily their affiliated political parties and took their places firmly in the left-right polarization of the period.¹⁴

According to the table drawn by Salih Bayram based on the data provided by Nuri İnuğur, Orhan Koloğlu, Alpay Kabacalı and Hıfzı Topuz, there were seven major newspapers published in the 1970s. These were *Tercüman*, *Son Havadis*, *Hürriyet*, *Günaydın*, *Ayrıntılı Haber*, *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*. Accordingly, while *Milliyet*

¹² Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, p. 39.

¹³ Salih Bayram, "Political Parallelism in the Turkish Press, A Historical Interpretation", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No.4, 579-611, December 2010, p. 587.

¹⁴ Bayram, "Political Parallelism in the Turkish Press, A Historical Interpretation", p. 608.

and *Cumhuriyet* were categorized as central-left newspapers and supporting mainly RPP under Bülent Ecevit's leadership, *Tercüman* and *Son Havadis* were classified as central-right and closely affiliated with Demirel's JP. *Hürriyet* and *Günaydın* however were identified as "impartial" and *Ayrıntılı Haber* was not put in any category¹⁵. Of course in this period, there was *Milli Gazete*, affiliated with Necmettin Erbakan's NSP as well as *Zaman*. However, according to Alpay Kabacalı, the obviously observed truth was that between 1973 and 1980, the central-leftist Turkish newspapers Nezih Demirkent's *Hürriyet*, Ali Naci Karacan's *Milliyet* and Nadir Nadi's *Cumhuriyet* clearly expressed their political attitudes as close to RPP, and Kemal Ilıcak's *Tercüman*, Cemil Sait Barlas's *Son Havadis* and journalists Abdurrahman Dilipak and Sadık Albayrak from *Milli Gazete* were inclined to the rightist political parties JP and NSP.¹⁶

After 12 September 1980, publications were banned and a state of emergency was declared.¹⁷ According to the amendments in the Press Law, the articles became harsher. The penalties were increased from 5.000 to 150.000 Liras.¹⁸ Especially in between 12 September 1980 and 12 March 1984,¹⁹ the implementations of the law became severe. For instance, *Cumhuriyet* was closed four times, for 41 days; *Milli Gazete* was closed four times for 72 days; *Tercüman* was closed for 29 days; *Milliyet* was closed once for 10 days and *Hürriyet* was closed two times for 7 days.²⁰

1.2. Armenian Terrorism and the Turkish Press

The Turkish press was in a very politically divided period as it faced Armenian terrorism. As the newspapers were very much linked to Turkish political parties

¹⁵ Bayram, "Political Parallelism in the Turkish Press, A Historical Interpretation", p. 608.

¹⁶ Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, p. 324.

¹⁷ Hıfzı Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003. p. 263.

¹⁸ Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. p. 262.

¹⁹ Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. p. 259.

²⁰ Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. p. 259.

and ideologies, journalism was shaped by these political parties and ideologies. Kabacalı expressed the link between the political parties and the newspapers;

"At first, it can be seen that diversity of thoughts and the defense of all kinds of aspects may indicate the existence of a democratic context; it is possible to mention only a "dialogue of the deaf" for the rest of the publications except for the high-circulation newspapers share their opinion with the similar quarters. It is apparent that the reason is political polarization."²¹

According to Kabacalı's analysis, the clash of contradicting thoughts demolishes the democratic system, rather than strengthening it. Kabacalı summarized the transition from the politicized political period before 1980 to the depoliticized period after 1980 in his work. The confusion and lack of experience among Turkish newspapers transformed national news like Armenian terrorism into tools of domestic political competition. Until the newspapers began to comprehend these issues as a national question, this competition carried on.

The best-known Armenian terrorist organization in Turkey was ASALA. ASALA is the abbreviation of *L'Armée secrète arménienne de libération de l'Arménie*, or Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.²² After the terrorist attacks, the Turkish press perceived these various terrorist groups as branches of the ASALA. Although the attacks against Turkish diplomats started in 1973, the Armenian terrorist organization ASALA became well-known with the assassinations of Daniş Tunalıgil and İsmail Erez²³ in 1975. Only after these assassinations did Turkish public opinion and the Turkish government realize that these assassinations were supported and financed by other groups and countries.²⁴ It is not sufficient only to give information about ASALA while talking about the

²¹ Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, p. 324.

²² Bilal Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız – 2*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000, p. 17.

²³ Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, p. 18.

²⁴ Michael Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism." *Conflict Quarterly*, 5, Fall 1985.], p. 31. (1985). [Online]. <http://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CC0QFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fjournals.hil.unb.ca%2Findex.php%2FJCS%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F14692%2F15761&ei=IZ5NUOKSIsbEsgb2uYHoDw&usqAFQjCNFbTwPQyL9bwhPUjQfKeMq0iBZ2hQ&sig2=RSf6NE6SKGbmAB2HbajWqA> [11.06.2011].

Armenian terrorism. There were some other Armenian terrorist groups which prepared attacks in Turkey and in many other states. The reason behind Armenian terrorism was to express the claims of Armenians about the events of 1915, and bring forward their political and economic demands from Turkey, which was taken as the direct heir of the Ottoman State. Even though the Armenian terrorist groups were considered the same, these terrorist groups were classified into two main groups. These groups are Hinchaks and Tashnaks, and they have the same ultimate goal for Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora. However, Hinchaks and Tashnaks are in struggle in terms of ideologies. Hinchaks follow the Marxist- Leninist ideology and Tashnaks adopted right-wing principles.²⁵ The first attack on Mehmet Baydar and Bahadır Demir in Los Angeles was committed by Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan, who apparently was incited by Tashnaks to commit the crime.²⁶ On the other hand, the infamous ASALA was founded by leftist-Hinchak supporters and followed leftist principles. The less well-known Armenian terrorist organization Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) was right-wing and was supported by Tashnaks. While most of the attacks were committed by leftist Armenian terrorist group ASALA and there were attacks by JCAG too. One of the attacks by JCAG was on Administrative Attaché Bora Süelkan in Bulgaria, an Eastern Bloc²⁷ country, in September 9, 1982. The ideological struggle between leftist ASALA and rightist JCAG ended whenever they united against Turkish diplomats and Turkish foreign diplomacy. Their ultimate goal eliminated their ideological clash.

The list of the countries and organizations supporting ASALA and Armenian terrorism provided by Michael Gunter is oddly varied. It includes Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Soviet Union, France, Cyprus, the United States of America, Greece, Iraq and Syria. Assistance was provided both financially and militarily. Moreover, these countries became shelter for Armenian terrorists. Unusually for the Cold War period, the Soviet Union and the US acted

²⁵ Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p. 9.

²⁶ Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p. 19.

²⁷"Süelkan Doğu Bloku'nda Öldürülen İlk Diplomamız Oldu." *Son Havadis*, 10 September 1982.

similarly in their support for Armenian terrorism, due to various motives related to their own national interests.

According to Michael Gunter's article on the transnational financial and physical support for Armenian terrorism, Russians opened their doors for the Armenian population to live in Russian territories and this also continued after the establishment of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet Union integrated into itself the Armenian state. Nevertheless, Russian support for the Armenians was not solely about compassion and mercy. The Soviet Union allowed Armenians to express their national feeling by using Mt. Ararat as their national symbol. Furthermore, the Soviet Union allowed Armenians to keep and nurture convictions about their national goals even in the Soviet Union territories. Hence, the grateful Armenian population was ready to serve Soviet needs. The Russians thought to organize Armenians in the Caucasus and in Eastern Anatolia like they organized Greeks and Slavs in the Balkans.²⁸ The Armenian terrorists were hence serving also the Soviet desires for Turkish territories.²⁹

On the other hand, American support for the Armenian case is very much related to the lobby activities of Armenians who were very well established in the USA. According to the record of 1985, 600.000 Armenians were living in the USA. Armenians joined society as entertainers, university professors, doctors, attorneys, engineers, athletes, politicians, soldiers and mass media members. 28 different periodicals and research centers on Armenian allegations were released.³⁰ There have been Armenian members who took part in important political activities. Americans took for granted Armenians within their land and let them speak out loud as Levon Marashlian, a Glendale College professor Armenian history and culture, said "patriots who have been waiting for 70 years ..."³¹ After the so-called Armenian genocide in 1915 in Eastern Anatolia, apart from neighboring countries,

²⁸ Mahmut Niyazi Sezgin. *Ermenilerde Din, Kimlik ve Devlet - Ermeni Sorununa Ermeni Milli Kimliği Açısından Bakış* Ankara: Platin Yayınları, 2005, p. 56.

²⁹ Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, p. 34.

³⁰ Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, p. 38.

³¹ Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, p. 39.

the highest proportion of Armenian migrants went to the US. Support for the Armenian Diaspora for the migrated Armenians' claims on the events of 1915 has continued. The Presidents of the United States still have concerns about expressing the events of 1915 as "genocide". Even if the US stands on the side of the Armenian Diaspora, the Armenian terrorist activities and the foreign affairs of the US prevented them from expressing the word "genocide" and the US cannot jeopardize relations with Turkey by using the word "genocide".³²

Besides the Soviet Union and the USA, many Armenians settled in Lebanon in 1966 and ASALA members emerged behind the anarchy in Lebanon.³³ Furthermore, twenty seven years later, in 1983, Sonner Nayir and Varoujian Garbidjian, the two ASALA militants were accused of the bombing in Orly Airport, which resulted in seven dead and over sixty wounded recruited by ASALA, in Beirut.³⁴

Another Middle Eastern country, Syria, opened the doors to ASALA militants. Ekmekjian and other ASALA terrorists possessed Syrian passports. Experts verified the connection between Syria and the Armenian terrorist organization ASALA.³⁵

France was another supporter of Armenian terrorist organizations. The relationship between France and Armenians is based on historical affinities.³⁶ The bond between France and Armenians was so strong that French courts have ordered light sentences even against Armenian terrorists who admitted that they murdered Turks. The French government even made secret deals with ASALA. Furthermore, France became one of the headquarters of ASALA in Western Europe.³⁷

³² Ömer Engin Lütem, *President Obama's 24 April Statement*. (2011). [Online]. Available: <http://www.avim.org.tr/degerlendirmetekli.php?makaleid=4778> [10 December 2012].

³³ Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, p. 33.

³⁴ Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, p. 33.

³⁵ Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, p. 46.

³⁶ Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, p. 41.

³⁷ Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, p. 41.

The Cyprus Peace Operation, led by Turkey in 1974, antagonized Greek Cypriots. Thus, after the Armenian terrorist attacks, Turks felt that Greek Cypriots supported the Armenian terrorist organizations in revenge.³⁸ Moreover, leaflets and press clipping with statements made by Armenian and Greek Cypriots supposedly verify the accusations.³⁹ Historical enemies Greece, Syria and Iran manifested their sympathies for Armenian terrorist acts against Turkey. Greek hostility was very current because of the Cyprus issue.⁴⁰

However, this unity did not extend to the Turkish press. It was observed that, as a national question, terror was handled by both left-wing and right-wing newspapers according to their political affiliations. Therefore, newspapers were differentiated through their leftist and rightist principles even on such a national issue, and the danger which would come from the other side was highlighted to warn the people who belong to that particular ideology. While center-right-wing newspapers *Milli Gazete*, *Son Havadis* and *Tercüman* released national factors and reported the danger of communism, center-left-wing newspapers *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Akşam* mostly expressed their concerns about socio-economic and political situations. While center-left newspapers like *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Akşam* remained calmer and objective, in comparison to the roaring headlines of center-right-wing newspapers *Son Havadis*, *Tercüman* and *Milli Gazete*.

1.3. Sources

While a wide range of Turkish newspapers were consulted for this thesis, *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Tercüman* and *Son Havadis* were the newspapers primarily used. These four newspapers are specifically selected in order to create an equilibrium among the political tendencies, as these newspapers exhibited the left-right division in the Turkish political arena very clearly. In addition to these four newspapers, *Milli Gazete* as well as *Akşam* were examined.

³⁸ Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, p. 44.

³⁹ Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, p. 44.

⁴⁰ Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, p. 45.

Hürriyet is deliberately left outside the scope of this study, except to make some minor points, since its neutrality did not reflect the ideological division of the period despite the fact that it was the highest circulated newspaper, and very much market oriented. For instance, conducted in research by Şenyapılı, advertisements covered 54% of *Hürriyet's* pages, the highest ratio among the newspapers *Tercüman*, *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Akşam* and *Son Havadis*.⁴¹ Hence this thesis focused on newspapers more closely aligned with ideologies in the 1970s, and their stance against Armenian terrorism in the period after the coup of September 12, 1980 was also examined.

⁴¹ Önder Şenyapılı, "1970'lerin Başında Sayılarla Türk Basını" *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, vol. 4, number: 4, 1971. p. 83.

CHAPTER 2

TERRORISM AND DIVISION (1973-1980)

Armenian terrorism was exacerbated when Consul General Mehmet Baydar and Consul Bahadır Demir were murdered by an Armenian in Santa Barbara, California, 1973.⁴² These first two assassinations could not have been identified as a part of an organized attack by Armenian organizations, but it evolved in the years to follow and by the mid-70s, Turkey had started to grasp the seriousness of a well-organized and efficient world-wide international terrorist network.

2.1. Assassinations in Santa Barbara, California



Consul General Mehmet Baydar⁴³ and Consul Bahadır Demir⁴⁴

A 77-year-old American citizen professing to be of Iranian origin made an application to Turkey's Consulate General in Los Angeles to donate a painting which had been stolen from the Ottoman palace and a souvenir banknote to the Turkish Republic.⁴⁵ The Consul General Mehmet Baydar in Los Angeles arranged

⁴² Bilal Şimşir, *Ermeni Terörü ve Tehdit: Türk Diplomatları Üzerine Bazı Tespitler*, Ermeni Araştırmaları 1. Türkiye Kongresi Bildirileri, Cilt II, Ankara:2007, p. 399.

⁴³ Mehmet Baydar, 27 Ocak 1973 Los Angeles / ABD Available: http://www.ermenisorunu.gen.tr/turkce/diplomatlar/mehmet_baydar.html [01.12.2011].

⁴⁴ Bahadır Demir, 27 Ocak 1973 Los Angeles / ABD Available: http://www.ermenisorunu.gen.tr/turkce/diplomatlar/bahadir_demir.html [01.12.2011].

⁴⁵ Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, p. 83.

an appointment to meet the old man. Two Turkish diplomats, Consul General Mehmet Baydar and Consul Bahadır Demir went to the Biltmore Hotel in Santa Barbara in order to be closer to Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan as they had decided. Nevertheless, they did not foresee the exact purpose of the old American man. The old "Iranian-American" prepared two guns for his victims in order to shoot them. The two Turkish diplomats were shot by Yanıkyan in January 27, 1973 in Santa Barbara and both died.



Hürriyet, January 29, 1973.

The real identity of the murderer was revealed after the incident. He was an Armenian-American, Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan. This attack was definitely a shock both for the US and Turkey. As a result of this unprecedented event, Turkish newspapers could not conceal their denunciation of the negligence of the United States and Diaspora Armenians. The assassinations were covered widely by the Turkish press, and the press published all details about the incident.

Two days after the attack, newspaper *Akşam* published a front page item with a huge title "Our Two Consuls Were Killed in the USA"⁴⁶ and the subheading of the news continued, "Armenian Grudge Arose Again".⁴⁷ Although this title and content of the article accused the "Armenians" of murdering the Turkish diplomats, no Armenian group accepted this accusation. However, in the following days a group appeared under the name of "soldiers of Gourgen Yanikyan"⁴⁸ and gave an impression that the assassinations were not simple isolated events.

The titles of the related news encapsulated the reaction towards the attack. On the one hand Yanikyan was described as "Despicable Assassin"⁴⁹, on the other hand the newspaper questioned the power behind him: "Who enraged the insidious Armenian?".⁵⁰ However, *Akşam* also published the statements of the Armenian Patriarch in Turkey in its front page under the title of "The Attack Created Hatred".⁵¹

A few days after the incident, the American police found the letters written by the murderer Mıgırdıç Yanikyan. Yanikyan in these letters explained how he nurtured hatred against Turkey and by the assassination he had taken the revenge of his ancestors who had been killed in 1915. Mıgırdıç Yanikyan claimed in court that he was not guilty and repeated that he had taken revenge for his slain ancestors who had been murdered by the Ottomans/Turks. *Akşam*, which covered these letters and Yanikyan's defense in the court, suggested that in fact Yanikyan planned these murders, in all these years he spent in the USA, and strove to commit atrocities.⁵²

⁴⁶ "Amerika'daki İki Konsolosumuz Öldürüldü -Ermeni Kini Yine Hortladı" *Akşam*, 29 January 1973, p. 1.

⁴⁷ *Akşam*, 29 January 1973, p. 1.

⁴⁸ Francis P. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism The Past, The Present, The Prospects*, San Francisco: Oxford, Westview Press, 1991. p. 19.

⁴⁹ "Alçak Kaatil! [sic]" *Akşam*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

⁵⁰ "Hain Ermeni'yi Kimler Kudurttu?" *Akşam*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

⁵¹ "Ermeni Patriği: Olay Nefret Yarattı" *Akşam*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

⁵² "Yanikyan Masum Rolüne Büründü" ["Yanikyan pretends as if he was innocent."] *Akşam*, 1 February 1973, p. 1.

Son Havadis was the most nationalistic newspaper among the newspapers analyzed in this study. *Son Havadis* gave the news about the first incident in the US with the title of “An Armenian Murdered Our Two Diplomats in Los Angeles”⁵³ on 29 January. The next day, *Son Havadis*'s caption read as: “Attempts of the US government for the security of our representatives”⁵⁴ Nevertheless, this attempt for the security of our diplomats would rewind several times in the following years. On the 30th of January, *Son Havadis* published further details about the murderer Yanıkyan. Among these details, Yanıkyan's marriage to a Russian woman was highlighted as a caption on the front page.⁵⁵ *Son Havadis*'s special emphasis on such a minor detail was a deliberate attempt of this politically right-wing newspaper to imply a possible Soviet or communist conspiracy in relation to these assassinations. Nevertheless, the rest of the newspapers did not mention the Russian connections of Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan. In the following days, *Son Havadis* also provided the information about Turkish society's cancellation of the dinner organized by the Turkish-Armenian society in Los Angeles.⁵⁶ As a result of the lack of the flow of information in Turkey, Turkish people merely reacted against the USA. However, the US was not the only country which formed a base for the Armenian attacks. The connection among Armenian Diaspora, the US and the Soviet Union was underestimated by the Turkish press. Thus, the inadequate transformation of the intelligence on the first Armenian attack in 1973 started to damage Turkey's image.

The political struggle among the newspapers prevented them from researching and transmitting information clearly to Turkish society. For example, *Son Havadis* was affiliated with Süleyman Demirel's JP⁵⁷, which was in opposition in that period.⁵⁸

⁵³ “Bir Ermeni, Los Angeles'ta İki Diplomatomızı Öldürdü” *Son Havadis*, 29 January 1973, p. 1.

⁵⁴ “Temsilcilerimizin Emniyeti İçin Teşebbüse Geçildi” *Son Havadis*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

⁵⁵ “Katil Ermeni Bir Rus Kadınla Evli” [“Assassin Armenian had been married to a Russian lady.”] *Son Havadis*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

⁵⁶ “Türk Cemaati, Los Angeles'taki Türk-Ermeni Derneği Yemeğini İptal Etti” [“Turkish side in Los Angeles cancelled the supper in Turko-Armenian Council”] *Son Havadis*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

⁵⁷ Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, p. 324.

Hence it gave Demirel's condemnation of the terrorist attack its front page.⁵⁹ What is more interesting is that *Son Havadis* only provided Demirel's statements about the murders. So, this one-sidedness did not let newspapers like *Son Havadis* transmit the news as it was. *Son Havadis* continued to follow the case of Yanıkyan in the following days and reported that in his defense, Yanıkyan had urged the Armenians to act everywhere as he did in Los Angeles.⁶⁰ *Son Havadis* also reported that Yanıkyan claimed he was not guilty but the judge refused the demand of release.⁶¹

The emotional editorial front page of *Son Havadis* published on 31st January, 1973 provides important clues about the standpoint of the newspaper vis-à-vis the Armenian terrorism:

Our newspapers are interpreting the hideous assassinations as "a new view of enmity against Turks". As usually, this is a quick judgment taken feverishly. In our opinion, it is wrong to evaluate this incident as a fanatical revenge attempt of a furious Armenian. It is inconceivable for a psychopathic Armenian who interpreted the historical Turkish-Armenian relationship in a wrong way, waited until his seventy to take revenge by killing two Turks by chance.⁶²

⁵⁸ <http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/pCabinetRoot.aspx> [01.12.2012].

⁵⁹ "Demirel: Cinayeti Nefretle Karşıladık" ["Demirel: We Condemn The Assassination with Hatred"] *Son Havadis*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

⁶⁰ "Katil, 'Ermeniler Her Yerde Bu Taktiği Uygulamalı', diyor." ["Yanıkyan has told that Armenian should apply this method everywhere."] *Son Havadis*, 31 January 1973, p. 1.

⁶¹ "Yargıç, Kaatilin [sic] Serbest Bırakılması Talebini Reddetti" *Son Havadis*, 1 February 1973, p. 1.

⁶² "Başyazı" ["Editorial"] "Gazetelerimiz, Los Angeles'taki işlenen iğrenç cinayeti, 'Türk düşmanlığının yeni bir görüntüsü' olarak yorumluyorlar. Bu çoğu zaman olduğu gibi, olayın heyecanı sırasında verilmiş acele bir hükümdür. Bu olayı fanatik bir intikam teşebbüsü, gözü dönmüş bir Ermeni'nin kişisel bir tecavüzü olarak değerlendirmek kanatımızca yanlıştır. Tarihsel Türk-Ermeni ilişkilerinin tatsız bir dönemini, yanlış yorumlayan bir Ermeni'nin hasta bir ruhla, intikam alması için bunca yıl beklemiş olması rastgele iki Türk'ü tuzağa düşürerek arkadan vurması için yetmiş yaşını beklemiş olması, aklın alacağı bir durum değildir." *Son Havadis*, 31 January 1973, p. 1.

Son Havadis, in its news on the burial of the two diplomats, referred to Yanıkyan as "a Maniac Armenian", a description in the Editorial quoted.⁶³

Son Havadis did not simply provide intelligence or views on the current murders, but also focused on the historical roots of the Armenian enmity towards Turks. Kemal Bingöl in his column "Fikir Meydanı" questioned how people could be so cruel and build their relations on atrocity. According to Bingöl, the brotherhood between Turks and Armenians had been damaged. Bingöl, who was from Erzurum, directed the attention of his readers to the fact that Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan was also born in Erzurum, and condemned the seeds of hatred planted between these two ethnic groups.⁶⁴

Son Havadis, nine days after the assassinations, published an article written by Armenian origin Turkish citizen Torkom İstepanyan. *Son Havadis*'s giving a space for this author was related to the fact that İstepanyan openly expressed his feelings of belonging to Turkish nation and pointed out the strong link between the Armenian statesmen and the Ottoman Empire through his publications in the following years.⁶⁵ İstepanyan began his article with a quotation from *Ansiklopedia Americana*, claiming that "In 1915, the 'Turkish' government, because of the fear of Russian invasion of 'Turkey', decided to solve the Armenian question and massacred the Armenians and forced women and children to convert to Islam."⁶⁶ İstepanyan says in his article that the Armenians had never been Islamized. This

⁶³ "Bir Manyak Ermeni Tarafından Öldürülen 2 Şehit Hariciyecimiz Toprağa Verildi" ["The two Turkish Diplomats who were murdered by a maniac Armenian had been buried"] *Son Havadis*, 4 February 1973, p. 1.

⁶⁴ "Fikir Meydanı – Hınçaklar ve Taşnaklar" ["Hinchack or Taschnaksutian"] *Son Havadis*, 31 January 1973, p. 7.

⁶⁵ Torkom İstepanyan, *Atatürk'ün Doğumunun 100. yılında Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri*, " Mareşal Garabet Artin Davut Paşa (P.T.T Bakanlığı ve Bayındırlık Bakanlığı) (Ministry of Organization of Post and Telegraph and Ministry office, responsible for Urbanism), Andon Tıngır Yaver Paşa (P.T.T Bakanı), Oskan Mardikyan (P.T.T Bakanı) (Ministry of Organization of Post and Telegraph), Bedros Hallacyan (Bayındırlık Bakanı) (Minister of Urbanism), Avukat Krikor Sinapyan (Bayındırlık Bakanı) (Minister of Urbanism), Krikor Agaton (Bayındırlık Bakanı) (Minister of Urbanism), Gabriel Noradunkyan (Bayındırlık Bakanlığı ve Dışişleri Bakanlığı) (Ministry of Urbanism and Ministry of Foreign Affairs)" İstanbul: Bolis-Constantinople, 1984.

⁶⁶ *Son Havadis*, "1915'te Türk hükümeti Ruslar Türkiye'yi işgal ederse Ermenilerin onlarla birleşmesinden korkarak Ermeni meselesini halle karar verdi, katliam yaptı kadınlar ve çocuklar zorla müslüman yapıldı." 06 February 1973.

truth is known by Armenians themselves including American, Lebanese, Syrian and French Armenians.⁶⁷ İstepanyan further argued that Armenians were not forced to convert in mass numbers and this is a truth known by Armenians living in the USA, Lebanon, Syria and France. For hundreds of years, according to İstepanyan, Turks and Armenians lived peacefully together and Islam allowed such a peaceful co-existence. He boldly argued that claims of genocide did not make sense in such a cosmopolitan empire as the Ottoman Empire.

Torkom İstepanyan continued that Turkish-Armenian hostility stemmed from the fact Armenians were armed by Russia, the United Kingdom, and France and were promised independence by these powers. These armed Armenian mobsters attacked Turkish villages. İstepanyan in his article also addressed the Armenians in the USA:

...It is reality that there are still people who are insulted, tortured just because of being Muslim, Buddhist and black people are still being tortured. Besides these tragedies, Turkish people have succeeded to heal their wounds.⁶⁸

The day *Son Havadis* published İstepanyan's article, the newspaper also reported the Armenian Patriarch Kalustyan's view on the assassinations. Especially his remark on cursing "The fingers of a maniac which intends to reopen the healed wound" was highlighted. Like İstepanyan, Kalustyan gave a message of "let bygones be bygones."⁶⁹

Son Havadis however, did not stop covering the incident even one month later. This time the issue was covered by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, the famous author, journalist and politician who was also a close associate of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Unlike the previous articles, Karaosmanoğlu focused on the international

⁶⁷ *Son Havadis*, 06 February 1973.

⁶⁸ "Yemek Listesindeki 1914 Ermenistan'ı ve Bir Türk Ermenisi'nin Dünya Ermenilerine Açık Mektubu," ["Armenia of 1914 in Menu and the Open Letter to Armenians in the World."] *Son Havadis*, 06 February 1973, p. 4.

⁶⁹ "Bir manyağın kapanan bir yarayı deşmeye yeltenen parmaklarını lanetliyoruz." ["We deeply curse the fingers of a maniac which intends to reopen the healed wound"] *Son Havadis*, 06 February 1973, p. 7.

connections of the Armenian terror. He highlighted the significance of the French attitude against Turkey especially in terms of the Armenian question. Karaosmanoğlu, accused Nihat Erim's government (1971-1972) of not pursuing effective foreign policy despite Erim's visits to foreign countries and Turkey was perceived "powerless" and "inadequate" abroad owing to the image created by him.⁷⁰ Unlike Armenian authors, Karaosmanoğlu's article in *Son Havadis* moves away from the emphasis of brotherhood between Armenians and Turks. Rather, he accused Erim's government of not representing Turkey abroad properly. Especially, Erim's statements during his visit to France did not please Karaosmanoğlu as according to him, Erim spoke about his loyalty to "democracy, human rights and principles of justice" to every statesmen he met as if he wanted to account for Turkish internal affairs to the foreigners.⁷¹ In his article, Karaosmanoğlu not only accused the Armenian Diaspora, France, the French press, European Council and even M. Yanıkyan, but also Nihat Erim's government of being guilty. Karaosmanoğlu highlighted that Yanıkyan had been supported by both the East and the West.⁷²

Son Havadis continued to pursue the news on the incident such as Yanıkyan's defense until the beginning of March.⁷³ However, the approaching presidential elections changed the agenda.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ "Fransız Basını, Erim Hükümeti, Avrupa Konseyi ve M. Yanıkyan" ["French Press, Erim Government, European Council and M. Yanıkyan"] "Nihat Erim Bey biraz sonra Fransa'ya gittiğinde, sanki, dış kamuoyuna açıklayacak başka birşeyimiz yokmuş gibi her görüştüğü devlet adamına demokrasiye, insan haklarına ve adalet prensiplerine sadakatinden bahsedışı onu hiç yoktan yabancılara kendi devlet ve hükümet işlerimizin hesabını vermek ister gibi göstermiştir." *Son Havadis*, 26 February 1973, p. 5.

⁷¹ "Fransız Basını..." *Son Havadis*, 26 February 1973, p. 5.

⁷² "Mesela, son seksen veya yüz yıl boyunca Ermeni teröristlerinin Türkiye'de yaptıkları suikastları, kurdukları komploları gözlerimiz önünden geçebilir ve Washington Büyükelçimizin yukarıki sözüne ekleyerek bütün bu cinayetlerin kâh doğudan kâh batıdan büyük devletlerin himayesi altında yapılmış olduğunu, fakat, eski yaraları deşmek ne bunları açanları ne açtıranların hayrınadır." *Son Havadis*, 26 February 1973, p. 5.

⁷³ "Yanıkyan, mahkemede "masumum" diye konuştu." ["Yanıkyan expressed that he was innocent in the court"] *Son Havadis*, 28 February 1973, p. 1.

⁷⁴ "Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimine 10 gün kaldı" ["10 Days for the Presidential Elections"] *Son Havadis*, 3 March 1973, p. 1.

As *Son Havadis* did, *Tercüman* released the first news about the assassinations under a headline written in large fonts. “Two Turkish Diplomats Murdered in the United States”.⁷⁵ *Tercüman* did not simply provide the information about the assassinations, but also provided photograph of the location of the murder as well as Mehmet Baydar's family. The following day, Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan's words "I took revenge"⁷⁶ became the main headline on the first page once again. At every opportunity, Yanıkyan expressed that he was the pioneer of the battle against Turks.⁷⁷ The editorial published in the first page of *Tercüman* argued that the attack was not personal but was against Turkishness and this attack was a result of Hinchak and Tashnak manipulations, which created the grudge of Yanıkyan and revealed itself in his murders. Like *Son Havadis*, this article also emphasized the good historical relations between Turks and Armenians.⁷⁸ Ahmet Kabaklı, the famous literary figure and *Tercüman* columnist since 1961, condemned the groups of Hinchak and Tashnaks and did not view these assassinations as an isolated event in his column "Gün Işığında".⁷⁹

Kabaklı continued to write on the Armenian issue parallel to excerpts from Mayewski's book which will be discussed shortly. According to Kabaklı, Russia had never been influential over the Armenian culture. However, Russia had never intended to make any other minorities work for them. There had been an opportunity for Armenians to continue their lives without being assimilated. Kabaklı asks The Soviet Union did not assimilate Armenians.⁸⁰

In the next day, Ahmet Kabaklı wrote on the significance of Turkish nationalism and preservation of the notion of being Turkish, but being Turkish did not imply that it was impossible for Armenians to feel as if they were Turkish. However,

⁷⁵ “Amerika’da iki Türk Diplomatu öldürüldü.” *Tercüman*, 29 January 1973, p. 1.

⁷⁶ “İntikam Aldım!” [“I have taken revenge!”] *Tercüman*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

⁷⁷ “Yanıkyan: Türklere Karşı Savaşın Öncüsüyüm!” [“Yanıkyan: I am the Pioneer of the War Against Turks!”] *Tercüman*, 31 January 1973, p. 1.

⁷⁸ “Başyazı” [“Editorial”] *Tercüman*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Ahmet Kabaklı, “Gün Işığında” *Tercüman*, 30 January 1973, p. 2.

⁸⁰ Kabaklı, “Gün Işığında - Erivan” [“Yerevan”] *Tercüman*, 04 February 1973, p. 5.

enemies of Turkey both inside and outside should be blocked as Kabaklı writes. Turkey had enemies and all Turkish citizens should act for the interests of the Turkish Republic to protect the country against hostilities.⁸¹

Tercüman, like *Son Havadis*, emphasized the importance of understanding the past to analyze current events. Thus it started to publish historical articles. For example, doctor⁸² and the most eminent expert on the history of Ottoman medicine Professor Bedî N. Şehsuvaroğlu⁸³ published an article about the historical roots of Turkish-Armenian relations only four days after the assassinations. Şehsuvaroğlu demonstrated how the "bonds of brotherhood" between Turks and Armenians weakened and the relations turned into enmity in the late Ottoman period.⁸⁴ Professor Bedî Şehsuvaroğlu continued to provide further information about the "well-off" position of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. He pointed out that many Armenians were assigned to administrative positions⁸⁵, and Armenians achieved great standing in commerce.

Tercüman was very quick to bring more articles about the history of Turkish-Armenian relations and in this way, aimed not at simply enlightening the public about history but to show that the deep-rooted Armenian hostility due to Ottoman massacres and deportation of Armenians was not grounded in history and actually the Turks also suffered in the hands of Armenians. Hence, *Tercüman* published in

⁸¹ Kabaklı, "Gün Işığında – Kendimize Gelelim" ["We Need to Regain Our Consciousness"] *Tercüman*, 05 February 1973, p. 5.

⁸² Ayşegül Demirhan Erdemir, *Ünlü Tıp Tarihçisi ve Tıp Etikçisi Prof. Dr. Bedî N. Şehsuvaroğlu'nun Deontoloji ve Tıp Etiği Üzerine Görüşleri* [Access date: 06.11.2012] <http://www.medimagazin.com.tr/authors/aysegul-demirhan-erdemir/tr-unlu-tip-tarihcisi-ve-tip-etikcisi-prof-dr-bedi-n-sehsuvaroglunun-deontoloji-vr-tip-etigi-uzerine-gorusleri-72-25-161.html>.

⁸³ İsmail Küçükkılınç, *Şemsi Paşa'nın Katlinin Meşrutiyetin İlanına Etkisi: Bedî Şehsuvaroğlu'nun İkinci Meşrutiyet Ve Atif Bey Makalesi*. [Access date: 10.10.2012]: http://ismailkucukkilinc.com/articles.php?article_id=87

⁸⁴ "Tarihte Türk Ermeni İlişkileri" ["History of Turko-Armenian Relations"] *Tercüman*, 31 January 1973, p. 5.

⁸⁵ "Fikirler, Görüşler, Düşünceler – Son Olayların Işığında Ermeni Mes'elesi, Prof. Dr. Bedî Şehsuvaroğlu" ["Ideas, Opinions and Thoughts – Armenian Question after the Latest Developments"] *Tercüman*, 05 February 1973, p. 4.

the selected excerpt from “*Facts on Turkish Armenian Question*”⁸⁶ which was written by Russian Van-Erzurum General Consul General Mayewski. Mayewski's book was first translated from Russian into Ottoman Turkish in 1914 by Cavalry Commander Mehmet Sâdık who was an officer in the General Intelligence Bureau. However, it took seventy years for the book to be translated from French into contemporary Turkish, and it was published in 1986.⁸⁷

Tercüman apparently used the French text.⁸⁸ Mayewski was responsible of the Van-Erzurum area during the World War I. He reported in his book that the Armenian rebellions emerged as a result of Armenians' long-term efforts and agitation in the Ottoman politics; the nationalist idea planted with the French Revolution had been spread into public opinion and these ideas, which had been supported by Western countries and the efforts and indoctrinations of Armenian clergymen, had created the Armenian rebellions.⁸⁹ According to the documents used by *Tercüman*, Mayewski reported the activities of Armenian insurgents around Van and Erzurum. Moreover, *Tercüman* did not simply rely on Mayewski, but published pieces from the Yellow Book, published by the French government in 1897, referring to the M. Combon, French ambassador, who accused British Prime Minister Gladstone of preparing the ground for the organization of Armenian committees and the rise of "Armenian mobsters". The United Kingdom became a symbol of hope for the Armenians. Gladstone even "formed hostile groups" who complained about "Turks". So, starting from the late 19th century, the Armenians of the Ottoman State became the target of this British propaganda.⁹⁰

Mayewski's claims were supported by various photographs published in *Tercüman* such as the photograph of Nubar Paşa, an Armenian who served as an Armenian

⁸⁶ “Türk Ermeni Meselesinin İçyüzü”, Rusya’nın Van – Erzurum Genel Konsolosu General Mayewski, Yazı Dizisi [“Series of Articles, Russian Erzurum Consul General Mayewski, Facts Behind the Turko – Armenian Question”], *Tercüman*, 31 January 1973. p. 7.

⁸⁷ V.T. Mayewski, *Ermenilerin Yaptıkları Katliamlar* [“Massacres by Armenians Against Turks”] Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1986, p. 2.

⁸⁸ *Tercüman*, 01 February 1973.

⁸⁹ Mayewski, *Ermenilerin Yaptıkları Katliamlar* [“Massacres by Armenians Against Turks”], p. 16.

⁹⁰ Mayewski, *Ermenilerin Yaptıkları Katliamlar* [“Massacres by Armenians Against Turks”], p. 5.

Egyptian administrator in the Ottoman Empire. Nubar Paşa was presented as proof of good treatment and equality of Armenians to the Turks.⁹¹



Tercüman, 01 February 1973.

According to Mayewski's report, in 1893 the people in Sassoon lived in peace with the Armenians until the emergence of Hamparsum Boyacıyan.⁹² Boyacıyan was a graduate of İstanbul Medical School who had studied in Geneva in order to be qualified specialist.⁹³ Later, he had involved in the Hinchak committee. With the order of the committee, he had been sent to Muş in order to start an agitation and changed his name to Murat. Since Boyacıyan had been talkative, he had been able to tempt the ignorant peasants of the region. Furthermore, he told them that Russian soldiers and Armenians from the Caucasus and Iran would come to help.⁹⁴ Thus, the seeds of enmity against Turks began to be planted. A part from the historical texts, *Tercüman* also published visual material such as a illustration depicting Armenians as an aggrieved people on its front page:

⁹¹ *Tercüman*, 01 February 1973.

⁹² *Tercüman*, 01 February 1973.

⁹³ *Tercüman*, 01 February 1973.

⁹⁴ "Ermeni İhtilalciler Rahip Bogos'u Kilisede Öldürmüştü" *Tercüman*, 02 February 1973.



"A well-known painting on a slate. On one side, there is an eagle which breaks its chains symbolizing Armenian people, on the other side there is a crescent with a star which brings death symbolizing Turkey and at the center an Armenian girl which symbolizing the motherland."⁹⁵

For ten days *Tercüman* continued to publish this series of articles containing historical data such as Armenian massacres of Muslims and the murder of Armenian Saint Bogos by Armenians⁹⁶ and attempted to explain the roots of the Armenian question, also producing proof demonstrating how Armenian accusations against Turks, which encouraged Yanıkyan to kill the Turkish representatives abroad, were not true.

Besides the historical document written by Mayewski, towards the end of the series another purpose was to denote how the Armenians tempted the European countries with Armenian lies.⁹⁷ In general, the series built upon the Turkish-Armenian brotherhood living in peace since they began to share the same land.

⁹⁵ "Türk Ermeni Meselesinin İçyüzü" *Tercüman*, 02 February 1973.

⁹⁶ "Türk Ermeni Meselesinin İçyüzü" ["Facts Behind the Turko – Armenian Question"] *Tercüman*, 02 February 1973, p. 5.

⁹⁷ "Türk Ermeni Meselesinin İçyüzü – Avrupa Yalanlarla Kandırılıyor" *Tercüman*, 09 February 1973, p. 5.

Tercüman did not only pursue the matter in the past, but two Turkish journalists in Santa Barbara, California, Örengül Kakmacı and Necdet Berkant followed the case on Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan's case and provided fresh intelligence to the newspaper.⁹⁸



Örengül Kakmacı and Santa Barbara Sheriff John Carpenter. *Tercüman*, 09 February 1973.

In the following days, the news on Armenian atrocities continued to be reported. Örengül Kakmacı had reported that the mayor of Los Angeles⁹⁹ was silent on the case of Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan¹⁰⁰ and Yanıkyan's lawyer did not respond to the questions of journalists. However, with the elections of the 6th President of the Turkish Republic the news ceased to appear, but the historical articles continued to be published in the inner pages of *Tercüman*.

⁹⁸ "Yanıkyan Davası Yetkilileri Susuyor." [The Responsibles of Yanıkyan Case are Silent] *Tercüman*, 09 February 1973, p. 5.

⁹⁹ "Yanıkyan Davası İlgilileri Susuyor" ["The Responsibles of Yanıkyan Case are Silent"] *Tercüman*, 10 February 1973, p. 7.

¹⁰⁰ "Katilin Avukatı Gazetecilerden Kaçıyor" ["Murderer's Advocate Gets Away From the Journalists"] *Tercüman*, 11 February 1973, p. 7.

Aside from the news on Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan, the news of the erection of a statue in Marseilles, symbolizing the Armenians who were victimized during the so-called Armenian genocide, hit *Tercüman's* pages. According to this news, French ministers had attended the opening ceremony of this monument. The editor of *Tercüman* read the erection of the monument as well as the presence of French government members at the opening as a clear demonstration of French support of the Armenian allegations about the 1915 events.¹⁰¹ This was considered a sign of deteriorated relations between Turkey and France, which supported the claims of the Armenian Diaspora. As the news on the statute in Marseilles was published, this monument was considered a part of "ugly propaganda" by Şehsuvaroğlu in *Tercüman*.¹⁰²

The attitude of the French and American public to the Armenian claims became a subject of an article by Oğuz Türkkkan, an anthropologist and historian.¹⁰³ Türkkkan argued that American people were sick and tired of hearing Armenian mournings about the 1915 events which had had happened more than a half century earlier.¹⁰⁴ Türkkkan expressed that, Armenians were called in the US "starving" Armenians. This "starving" did not mean only "prolonged lack of food," but expressed that Americans were tired of hearing how miserable Armenians suffered terribly in 1915.¹⁰⁵

Cumhuriyet, which was a leftist newspaper, presented the murder of Turkish diplomats on its front page, although in smaller captions, in the following days.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ "Başyazı – Ermeni Anıtı Altındaki Fransız Günahı" ["Editorial – French Sin under the Armenian Monument"] *Tercüman*, 15 February 1973, p. 7.

¹⁰² Prof. Dr. Bedi Şehsuvaroğlu, "Marsilya Ermeni Anıtı ve Çirkin Propaganda" ["Armenian Monument in Marseilles and Inappropriate Propaganda"] *Tercüman*, 26 February 1973, p. 2.

¹⁰³ Reha Oğuz Türkkkan. Access Date: [10.10.2012]
<http://www.biyografi.net/kisiyrinti.asp?kisiid=2751>

¹⁰⁴ R. Oğuz Türkkkan, "Fikirler, Görüşler, Düşünceler – Amerika'da Türkler ve Ermeniler" ["Ideas, Opinions and Thoughts – Turks and Armenians in the United States"] *Tercüman*, 21 February 1973, p. 5.

¹⁰⁵ Türkkkan, "Fikirler, Görüşler, Düşünceler – Amerika'da Türkler ve Ermeniler" ["Ideas, Opinions and Thoughts – Turks and Armenians in the United States"], p. 5.

¹⁰⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

This caption was followed by the item about the US government's remarks of condolence.¹⁰⁷ *Cumhuriyet* followed the news about the assassinations in the following days and published an item on a proposal of a bill by members of Parliament providing allowances to the families of the murdered diplomats.¹⁰⁸ Another interesting news item published in *Cumhuriyet* was the opening of a statute in Marseilles in the memory of Armenians "massacred" by Turks. *Cumhuriyet* also provided a short list of those who attended the opening ceremony. This as well as France's open support of the Armenian case led to the withdrawal of the Turkish ambassador from France.¹⁰⁹

2.2. Killing of an Ambassador



"Turkish Ambassador to Vienna Daniş Tunalıgil had been murdered"
Cumhuriyet, October 22, 1975.

Two and a half years after the assassinations in Los Angeles, Daniş Tunalıgil, the Turkish ambassador in Vienna, was killed on October 22, 1975. He was the first ambassador who was murdered by the Armenian terrorist organizations. Three

¹⁰⁷ "Amerika Cinayet Konusunda Üzüntüsünü Bildirdi." ["The United States Reported That Their Upset About the Murder"] *Cumhuriyet*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ "Öldürülen Konsolos ve Başkonsolos'un ailelerine maaş bağlanması için kanun teklifi yapıldı." ["Monetary Bill for the murdered Consul and Consul General's families"] *Cumhuriyet*, 1 February 1973, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

gunmen with two Hungarian-made Wallam automatic guns, one British-made MP Sten and one Israeli-made MP Uzzi entered the Turkish Embassy in Vienna located in Prinz Eugen Strasse 40 in the daylight and killed Tunalıgil in his office, which was on the first floor of this historical building. Tunalıgil was 60 years old when he was murdered.

The confusion in the Turkish press was denoted by Bilal Şimşir. According to Şimşir's book, *Tercüman* reported that "The Greek Cypriots want to blame Armenian organizations with murdering our Ambassadors".¹¹⁰ The Turkish press was not able to comprehend who were the murderers of Tunalıgil. Initially, the assassination of the ambassador was blamed on anarchist Greek Cypriots by the press. The reason why the press focused on the Greek Cypriots as culprits of the crime was the Cyprus Peace Operation led by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in 1974. Turkish newspapers thus drew a correlation between the resentment of Greek Cypriots and the assassination. For instance, *Tercüman* argued that the murderers might have been Greek Cypriots or Armenian Anarchists.¹¹¹ The day after the murder of Tunalıgil, *Tercüman* carried on publishing repetitive news on the assassination.

While there was confusion over the culprits of Tunalıgil's murder, *Tercüman* was the first Turkish newspaper to name the terrorist organization ASALA and claimed that ASALA members had been trained in Lebanon, Beirut.¹¹² According to the news that *Tercüman* reported, Austrian police officials reported that, the Armenian terrorists had been trained in Lebanon along with the Greek Cypriot terrorist group Ethniki Organosis Kyprian Agoniston (EOKA-B). Thus, EOKA-B had been among the possible responsible terrorist groups.¹¹³ In the following days,

¹¹⁰ Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız* "Rumlar, Elçilerimizin öldürülüşünü Ermeni örgütlerinin üzerine yıkmak istiyorlar." p. 122.

¹¹¹ "Daniş Tunalıgil" *Tercüman*, 23 October 1975, p. 1.

¹¹² *Tercüman*, 23 October 1975.

¹¹³ *Tercüman*, 25 October 1975.

Tercüman was certain that the attackers were Greek Cypriots and the headline ran: “The Greek Terrorists murdered our diplomats”.¹¹⁴

This headline demonstrates the confusion of the Turkish press about Armenian terrorism. Ahmet Kabaklı in his column asked who the murderers were¹¹⁵ and listed the possible candidates: Hinchak, Tashnak, EOKA-B and Turkish Communist Groups¹¹⁶; the last possibility in particular was clear proof of how internal political differences blurred the perceptions related to the attacks on Turkish diplomats abroad.

2.3. Another Assassination

Only two days after the assassination of Daniş Tunalıgil, Turkey's ambassador to Paris İsmail Erez and his driver Talip Yener were shot by Armenian terrorists, while they were on their way to the Turkish embassy.



Milliyet, 25 October 1975.

Later it was learned that the assassination was executed by three or four terrorists who ran away after the attack. Ambassador Erez received bullets to his heart and

¹¹⁴ “Elçilerimizi Yunanlı Tedhişçiler Öldürmüştü” *Tercüman*, 25 October 1975, p. 1.

¹¹⁵ Kabaklı, “Katil Kim?” *Tercüman*, 29 October 1975.

¹¹⁶ Kabaklı, *Tercüman*, 29 October 1975.

neck and died on the spot, as did the driver. After the attack a phone call from the ASALA threatened the Turkish embassy with a possible explosion. *Son Havadis* grew suspicious about Greek Cypriots, running a headline reading "Greek Cypriots raised doubts"¹¹⁷ and reporting the news as follows:



Son Havadis, 26 October 1975.

The assassination of İsmail Erez led to various speculations about the identity of the murderers. According to *Akşam*, Turks, Greeks and Armenian citizens in Paris were interrogated after the incident.¹¹⁸ There was a phone call to Turkish embassy in Paris and the person on the phone said that the murder had been committed by the Armenians. However, in another phone call another person on the phone claimed this time that EOKA-B was responsible for the murder of Ambassador İsmail Erez. But, *Akşam* apparently did not give credit to the allegations about EOKA-B and so mentioned the possibility of EOKA-B terrorism only once.

¹¹⁷ "Bütün Şüpheler Kıbrıslı Rumlar Üzerinde Toplandı" *Son Havadis*, 26 October 1975.

¹¹⁸ "Paris'teki Rumlar Sorguya Çekiliyor" *Akşam*, 26 October 1975.

Akşam also published condemnations of and protests against the terrorist activities.¹¹⁹

Unlike *Akşam*, *Tercüman* published news and comments supporting the allegations of EOKA-B's responsibility for killing the Turkish ambassadors.¹²⁰



Tercüman, 25 October 1975.

In October 26, 1975, the information that Turkish newspaper provided enlightened the assassination of Turkish ambassadors. For instance, *Tercüman* reported the release of three Greek suspects.¹²¹ This discredited the previous observations and assumptions of *Tercüman*. In any case, as the real murderers were not found, the confusion and speculations about the identities of the terrorists continued.¹²²

¹¹⁹ *Akşam*, 26 October 1975.

¹²⁰ "Elçilerimizi Yunanlı Tedhişçiler Öldürmüs" *Tercüman*, 25 October 1975.

¹²¹ "Atina Şüpheli 3 Rum'u Serbest Bıraktı." ["Athens has released 3 Suspicious Greeks"] *Tercüman*, 26 October 1975, p. 1.

¹²² "Caniler Hakkında İpuçları Aranıyor" ["The Clues About the Murderers is being searching"] *Tercüman*, 26 October 1975, p. 1.

Among the political party leaders, Vice Prime Minister Alparslan Türkeş had been given place in *Son Havadis*. According to the news in *Son Havadis*, Türkeş stated that these attacks were against the existence of Turkey.¹²³ There was not any political party leader who was given place in *Son Havadis*. This constituted an example of diversity not only among Turkish political parties, but also showed the diversity in the rightist Turkish political parties.

Tercüman columnist Ahmet Kabaklı, in line with the front page of the newspaper, threatened that the ones who dared to attack Turkish ambassadors would give an account of this attack. He also put the blame on EOKA-B, which Kabaklı described as a "blood thirsty terrorist group,"¹²⁴ for committing this attack. Moreover, in his article, Ahmet Kabaklı asked Turkish public opinion to unite against the Cypriot terrorists.¹²⁵

The 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation and enmity of Greek Cypriots towards Turkey led *Tercüman* to believe that the murderers of the Turkish diplomats were Greeks. Although Yanıkyan's murders for the Armenian cause had happened only two years before, the link between these two incidents was not established, but instead *Tercüman* searched for the reasons behind the assassinations not in the past but in the present. This attitude can also be interpreted as a sign of lack of understanding of the Armenian terrorism in 1975. Hence, *Tercüman* put great emphasis on the ungrounded intelligence leaked from the French Police Department such as "a vast number of Greek and Armenian officers in Turkish embassies helped the murderers."¹²⁶

The murders triggered a strong nationalist response among the Turkish nationalist groups and parties which emphasized national solidarity, and *Tercüman* gave substantial space to such calls. For instance, the leader of the Youth Section of the

¹²³ "Devletimize karşı siyasi bir tavırdır." *Son Havadis*, 27 October 1975.

¹²⁴ Kabaklı, "Kimsenin Yanına Kalmaz" ["Nobody got away with what they had done"] *Tercüman*, 26 October 1975, p. 7

¹²⁵ Kabaklı, "Kimsenin Yanına Kalmaz" ["Nobody got away with what they had done"] *Tercüman*, 26 October 1975, p. 7

¹²⁶ "Caniler Paris'te" ["The Murderers are in Paris"] *Tercüman*, 27 October 1975, p. 1.

NMP, Sami Bal, declared that "It should be known well that such perfidious and insidious attacks may have an effect on another nation but it only shows its effect on great Turkish nation by uniting it."¹²⁷

For the nationalist newspapers it was important to highlight the nationalist factors to bind people to each other in order to show a strong stance. Therefore, it was not important which country or which terrorist group was behind the terrorist attacks. The idea of nationalism was the ultimate concern for the newspapers. That is why *Tercüman* put the blame on the Greek Cypriots, who were the usual suspects.¹²⁸

When the Austrian Police Department released the three Greeks arrested after the assassination of Ambassador Tunalıgil, *Tercüman* stopped accusing the Greeks of murders. But the failure of the French and Austrian authorities finding the real culprits created an atmosphere of defeat and frustration among Turks both at home and abroad. For instance, Turks in Paris protested the French press and the murders.¹²⁹ The atmosphere of frustration stemming from the fact that the murderers would go unpunished led to Ahmet Kabaklı's strong reaction in his column "Gün Işığında". After listing terrorist organizations such as Hinchaks, Tashnaks, EOKA-B and Greek Cypriots which targeted Turkey and Turks, he declared that Turkish nationalists were getting stronger and would not give in to such terrorist attacks. He also expressed that he had been yearning for the period of Süleyman the Magnificent's rule.¹³⁰

The exact name of the terrorist group had never been heard until 1975. As the news on the assassinations reached the newspapers, *Akşam*, reported the news as: "It is denounced that the ASALA and its members are acting in order to take

¹²⁷ "Çok iyi bilinmelidir ki bu gibi kahpece ve alçakça saldırılar, bir başka millet üzerinde belki etkili olabilir, ama büyük Türk milleti üzerinde ancak ve ancak birleştirici bir tesir icra eder." *Tercüman*, 28 October 1975, p. 1.

¹²⁸ *Tercüman*, 28 October 1975, p. 1.

¹²⁹ "Yürüyüş Yapan Gençler İntikam Diye Haykırdı" *Tercüman*, 26 October 1975.

¹³⁰ "Batıya karşı korunmanın iki yolu kalmış görünüyor: Biri sersem batıcıların istediği tarzda Hristiyan olarak, manevi teslim bayrağını çekmek... İkincisi: İslam aleminin önündeki yerimizi tavizsiz ve dürüst bir tarzda alarak güçlenmek ve batıya Kanuni gibi, ısıramadığı elimizi öptürmek..." *Tercüman*, 30 October 1975.

revenge of the Armenian massacre and to found an independent Armenia."¹³¹ Armenia was not free from the Soviet Union and was under the Soviet regime. Correspondingly, ASALA was a left-wing Armenian terrorist organization. Armenian terrorism was adduced as a communist threat by the nationalist based Turkish political parties. Moreover, *Akşam*, as a left-wing daily, reported the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's fear about communism: "The ones who support the leftists do not consider communism as a danger."¹³² *Akşam* found it necessary to highlight Demirel's words. While the rightist political parties ended with their comments on the assassinations in Paris and Vienna, Ecevit criticized the Demirel administration: "The government has faced accelerating difficulties which could not take positive decisions within six months,"¹³³ addressing the rising Armenian violence.

Like *Tercüman*, *Son Havadis*, too reached a conclusion about the murderers of Turkish Ambassador to Vienna Daniş Tunalıgil, on the basis of the Austrian Police Department's arrests of three Greeks who were suspected to be members of the EOKA-B.¹³⁴ *Son Havadis*, like *Tercüman*, did not establish any immediate link between the murder in Vienna and ASALA, but focused on EOKA-B and further supported its thesis by claiming that three Greek terrorists had arrived in Vienna two days before the attack against Daniş Tunalıgil.¹³⁵ However, there was a contradiction in *Son Havadis*'s news on the assassination. On the front page there was a big caption read as "All suspicion focused on the Greek Cypriots".¹³⁶ One of

¹³¹"Beyrut'ta 'Ermenistan Gizli Kurtuluş Ordusu'nun kurulduğu, üyelerin de Ermeni katliamının intikamını almak ve bağımsız bir Ermenistan kurmak için faaliyette bulundukları açıklandı." *Akşam*, 24 October 1975, p. 1.

¹³²"Demirel: Sol düşüncüyü benimseyenler komünizmi tehlike saymıyor." *Akşam*, 24 October 1975, p. 1.

¹³³"Ecevit: Altı Ayda Olumlu Kararlar Alamayan Hükümetin Zorlukları Daha da Arttı" *Akşam*, 28 October 1975, p. 1.

¹³⁴"Tunalıgil'i Öldüren 3 Yunanlı'nın Olaydan 2 Gün Önce Viyana'ya Geldiği Açıklandı." ["Reported that, 3 Greeks had just arrived in Vienna 2 days before they shot Tunalıgil."] *Son Havadis*, 25 October 1975, p. 1.

¹³⁵ *Son Havadis*, 25 October 1975, p. 1.

¹³⁶ *Son Havadis*, "Bütün Şüpheler Kıbrıslı Rumlar Üzerinde Toplandı" ["Suspicion is on the Greek Cypriots"] 26 October 1975, p. 1.

the main reasons for such great confusion in the Turkish press over the real identities of the murderers in Vienna and Paris was the different intelligence provided by the French and Austrian police. For instance, *Son Havadis* reported in one news item that the French police pointed out Greek terrorists while the Austrian police released Greek suspects.¹³⁷

Son Havadis, as it did after the assassinations in Los Angeles, opened its pages to Turkish-Armenian authors. One of these was Torkom İstepanyan who also published a series of articles in the same newspaper in 1973. İstepanyan basically underlined the brotherhood between Turks and Armenians living in peace together and claimed that the recent events were the outcomes of international terrorism, not the results of grievances of Armenians in Turkey.¹³⁸

On the left of the spectrum of the Turkish press, *Cumhuriyet* provided news about the assassinations and its columnists focused on the dynamics behind these incidents. One day before the assassination of Erez, *Cumhuriyet* published a piece on the inadequacy of the Viennese police to find the murderers of Tunalıgil on its front page.¹³⁹ Even after the Viennese police release of information about the possible identity of the attackers, *Cumhuriyet* was cautious and did not name EOKA-B as the organization responsible for the murder of Tunalıgil like the other newspapers, but instead gave the news as, "this time, it is claimed that the murderers whose identities have not been determined were the members of EOKA-B".¹⁴⁰

While *Cumhuriyet*, as a newspaper, was cautious not to put definite blame on EOKA-B, its columnists were not. Uğur Mumcu, who would be the pioneering journalist in analyzing the Armenian terrorism correctly, did not link the attacks in

¹³⁷ "İki cinayetin de profesyonel katiller tarafından işlendiğine muhakkak nazarı ile bakan Avrupa polisi meçhul örgütü meydana çıkarmak için alarm durumunda çalışmaktadır." *Son Havadis*, 26 October 1975. p. 1.

¹³⁸ İstepanyan, "Fikir Meydanı 'Ermeniler ve Son Olaylar'" *Son Havadis*, 27 October 1975. p. 7.

¹³⁹ "Viyana Polisi Yeteri Kadar Çaba Sarfetmemiştir" *Cumhuriyet*, 23 October 1975. p. 7.

¹⁴⁰ "Kimlikleri Saptanamayan Katillerin Bu Kez de EOKA-B Mensubu Oldukları İddia Edildi" ["It is claimed that the murderers whose id's have never been determined were the members of EOKA-B"] *Cumhuriyet*, 24 October 1975, p. 1.

Vienna and Paris to Armenian terrorism but relied on the speculative news about the role of Greeks/Greek Cypriots in the assassinations. He commented that, "According to the initial clues, both assassinations were committed by Greeks or Greek Cypriots. If these clues reflect the truth, we are exposed to an organization which intends to solve the Cyprus issue by individual terrorism."¹⁴¹ Uğur Mumcu was one of the confused journalists in 1975. Mumcu expressed that there could be some groups which intended to retaliate, but that this was not a solution and there was not any international problem which could be solved by terrorism.¹⁴² Mumcu considered the retaliation to Cyprus Peace Operation by the possible responsible actors, Greeks and Greek Cypriots, in his column in *Cumhuriyet*. Ali Sirmen, who was a columnist in *Cumhuriyet*, also asked what the aim of Greek Cypriots was in killing two Turkish ambassadors.¹⁴³ There was not even a word on Armenian terrorist organizations by these columnists.

As Uğur Mumcu highlighted, national unity and solidarity is the name of the domestic union.¹⁴⁴ Uğur Mumcu was not alone in pointing to the Greeks as the main suspects for the murders. Ali Sirmen in his column accused the Greek terrorist groups of murder. Moreover he claimed that Greece's hesitation in condemning the assassinations strengthened this accusation.¹⁴⁵ Uğur Mumcu was one of those journalists who followed the developments and shared them with the Turkish public. In 1979, Mumcu argued that even if EOKA-B was not the only terrorist group which committed the terrorist attacks, EOKA-B was one of the

¹⁴¹ Uğur Mumcu, "Cinayetlerin Ardından" ["After the Assassinations"] "Ele geçen ilk ipuçları, her iki cinayetin de Yunanlılar ya da Kıbrıslı Rumlar tarafından işlendiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu ipuçları gerçeği yansıtıyorsa, Kıbrıs sorununu bireysel terörle çözmeye çalışan bir çeteyle karşı karşıyayız demektir." *Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 1975, p. 7.

¹⁴² Mumcu, "Cinayetlerin Ardından", *Cumhuriyet* "Bazı çevreler misilleme yapmayı düşünebilirler, bu çözüm değil, uluslararası hiçbir sorun terörle çözülemez." 26 October 1975.

¹⁴³ Ali Sirmen, "Acaba Rum militanlar iki Türk diplomatını öldürürken ne gibi hesaplar peşinde koşmuşlardır?", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1975.

¹⁴⁴ Mumcu, "Cinayetlerin Ardından" ["After the Assassinations"] *Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 1975, p. 7.

¹⁴⁵ Sirmen, "Dünyada Bugün 'Cinayetler ve Sağduyu'" ["In the World Today 'Assassinations and The Common Sense'"] "Gelen haberler ve Atina'nın tutumu, cinayetlerin Kıbrıslı Rum ya da Yunanlılar tarafından işlendiği kuşkularını yoğunlaştırmaktadır." *Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 1975, p. 5.

supporters of ASALA. Nevertheless, Uğur Mumcu would express that Armenians were not alone in the organization of these terrorist organizations, and the terror inside Turkey was related to international terrorism. Moreover, he would argue that drug smuggling was closely related to the hidden leaders of these terrorist groups.¹⁴⁶ The journalists in Turkey were blinded by the international questions that Turkey was subjected to. The thought which had been wanted to be created was chauvinism or real patriotism. The Turkish press played a role in social engineering. Even if the newspapers' intention was not to create a public mind, those newspapers are in competition to deliver news to the public. Whatever the released latest news, newspapers conveyed the news to people without any filters. The journalists realized that Turkey faced international isolation and expressed their annoyance under the title, "The loneliness that we have been left day by day" Turkey's problems about the Cyprus issue has been a focus of analysis. According to the governments in Turkey, the key question for domestic politics is the Cyprus issue. Nevertheless, the international terrorism was another important problem that Turkey had to cope with. As the newspapers highlighted the domestic problem became an international issue.

2.4. Murder in Lebanon

Three months after the Armenian attacks on two Turkish ambassadors in Vienna and Paris, another Turkish diplomat was assassinated in Beirut, Lebanon on February 16, 1976. This time the victim was Oktar Cirit, the First Secretary of the Turkish embassy in Berlin. Cirit, who was promenading in one of the high streets of Beirut, was chased by his attacker to a poolroom of a casino and shot by a gun with a silencer. He was taken to hospital but he was already dead on arrival.

The newspapers reported that the eye witnesses claimed the assassin had spoken Armenian. *Tercüman* is one of the newspapers which provided this information.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ Mumcu, "Gözlem - İç terörle diplomatlarımıza karşı gerçekleştirilen saldırılar, üstelik uyuşturucu ve silah kaçakçılığı birbiriyle doğrudan alakalıdır." *Cumhuriyet*, 27 December 1979, p. 5.

¹⁴⁷ "Oktar Cirit'i Vuran Suikastçi Kaçarken Ermenice Konuşmuş" ["The assassin had been speaking in Armenian"] *Tercüman*, 18 February 1976, p. 1.

In following days further details about the incident appeared. A terrorist group called "Antranik Pasha", connected to ASALA had undertaken this terrorist activity.¹⁴⁸ ASALA had declared that Oktar Cirit deserved death for his propaganda activities abroad. ASALA's responsibility for the assassination of Cirit was verified by a pro-government Greek newspaper *Apotyematini*, which published that the murderer and its collaborators were Armenians.¹⁴⁹

Three days after the murder, Ahmet Kabaklı from *Tercüman* dwelled on the Armenian terrorist groups and claimed that on one hand they had been doing many deceptions and setting traps to show Turkey as a "criminal" country to the American and European public.¹⁵⁰ On the other hand they continued to murder "Turkish ambassadors and diplomats." Kabaklı also pointed out that not only the "young diplomat Oktar Cirit" but also other employees of the Turkish embassy in Beirut were targets of assassination attempts previously.¹⁵¹

Son Havadis perceived the assassination of Oktar Cirit and hence Armenian terrorism not as a result of an international "reel politik," but the result of a vendetta against the Turkish race. On 19 February 1976, the murder of Cirit was explained to the readers as "His only guilt was being a Turk."¹⁵²

The Turkish press, after Cirit's murder, became very much aware of Armenian terrorism - the confusion which blurred the perception of the real culprits of 1975 assassinations was not present in 1976. But still Turkish newspapers heavily relied on foreign news sources to get basic information about the attacks blatantly targeting Turkey abroad. For example, newspapers in Turkey had spelled the name

¹⁴⁸ "Cirit'i Antranik Paşa Örgütü öldürmüş" ["Cirit had been assassinated by a terrorist group called 'Antranik Pasha'"] *Tercüman*, 19 February 1976, p. 1.

¹⁴⁹ "Yunan Basını Ermenileri Suçluyor" ["The Greek Press blame Armenians"] *Tercüman*, 19 February 1976, p. 7.

¹⁵⁰ Kabaklı, "Gün Işığında 'Yeni Bir Cinayet'" "... bizi Amerikan ve Avrupa kamuoylarına karşı "suçlu" göstermenin binbir hile ve tuzağını kurarken, bir yandan da masum elçi ve diplomatlarımızı şehit etmeye devam ediyorlar" *Tercüman*, 19 February 1976, p. 4.

¹⁵¹ Kabaklı, "Gün Işığında 'Yeni Bir Cinayet'" "Beyrut'ta yalnız bu zavallı genç şehit Oktar Cerit değil, öbür diplomatlarımız da Ermenilerce her vakit tehdit edilmişler, birkaç kere suikastten kurtulmuşlardır." *Tercüman*, 19 February 1976, p. 4.

¹⁵² "Tek Suçu Türk Olmaktı" *Son Havadis*, 19 February 1976, p. 4.

of Turkish diplomat in various ways. For instance, in *Son Havadis*, Oktar Cirit's name was written as "Oktay Cerit"¹⁵³, while *Cumhuriyet* spelled it as "Oktar Cerit"¹⁵⁴. This was not a simple mistake but a clear indication of how the Turkish press relied on non-Turkish sources to get information, while for instance the Turkish Foreign Office did not create a clear stream of information for the Turkish press on such important national matters. This of course was not a good reference for the reliability of the Turkish press at home and abroad.

Perhaps this lack of clear information about the case of Oktar Cirit was not simply a result of the press's lack of news channels but could be seen as a part of growing disinterest in Armenian terror activities as well as "normalization" of Armenian terrorism. For instance, *Son Havadis* was more agitated about the quarrel between RPP and Republican Reliance Party (RRP - Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi) during the general meeting in the assembly. This quarrel created an opportunity for JP and *Son Havadis* to accuse the RPP of creating a disturbance.¹⁵⁵



Son Havadis, 18 February 1976.

¹⁵³ "Lübnan Polisi Diplomatımızın Katilini Arıyor" *Son Havadis*, 18 February 1976, p. 1.

¹⁵⁴ "Beyrut'ta Elçilik Kâtibi Oktar Cerit [sic] dün öldürüldü" *Cumhuriyet*, 17 February 1976, p. 1.

¹⁵⁵ "Meclis Kürsüsüne Saldırı Kınanıyor" *Son Havadis*, 18 February 1976.

Akşam became a more obvious case to verify the argument that as the number of assassinations increased, the news on them, ironically, lost its importance. *Akşam*, which was considered a leftist newspaper supporting the RPP, prioritized news on quarrels in the Turkish Parliament during the 1976 state budget talks¹⁵⁶, although news on Cirit's assassination was covered but not highlighted.¹⁵⁷



Akşam, 17 February 1976.

This murder also provided a great opportunity to criticize the government under Demirel. *Zaman*, a newspaper affiliated with Erbakan's NSP, was published on 19 February 1976 with a headline reading: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which did not take precautions, is deemed guilty" and over this big headline, it was written: "Armenians' Turkish Diplomat Hunt Will Have Continued!"¹⁵⁸



Zaman, 19 February 1976.

¹⁵⁶ *Akşam*, 17 February 1976.

¹⁵⁷ *Akşam*, 17 February 1976.

¹⁵⁸ "Ermeniler'in 'Türk Hariciyecisi Avı' artarak devam edecekmiş!..." *Zaman*, 19 February 1976, p. 1.

The ideological struggle among the Turkish newspapers emerged while reporting which groups were responsible for the assassinated Turkish diplomats. As a result of the investigations on the assassination of Oktar Cirit, the ideological struggle among the newspapers can be seen with particular clarity. For instance, while *Tercüman* and *Son Havadis* reported the exact name of the Armenian terrorist organization as "Antranik Paşa Örgütü"¹⁵⁹ which was a branch of ASALA¹⁶⁰, *Cumhuriyet*¹⁶¹ and *Akşam* reported that the murderer was "unknown".¹⁶²



Tercüman, 19 February 1976.

¹⁵⁹ "Cerit'i 'Antranik Paşa Örgütü' Öldürmüş"[sic] *Tercüman*, 19 February 1976.

¹⁶⁰ "Cerit'in Katlini 'Ermeni kurtuluş Ordusu' Üstüne Aldı"[sic] *Tercüman*, 19 February 1976.

¹⁶¹ "Beirut'ta çıkan bir gazete de, gizli bir Ermeni örgütünün Cerit'in öldürülmesinden sorumlu olduğunu bildirdiğini yazmıştır." *Cumhuriyet*, 18 February 1976.

¹⁶² "Başkâtip Cerit saat 18.00 civarında Beirut'un Elhamra Caddesi'nde kimliği tespit edilmemiş bir şahıs tarafından vurularak şehit edilmiştir."[sic] *Akşam*, 18 February 1976.

Since ASALA was a left-wing Armenian terrorist organization and most of the assassinations were seem to be undertaken by ASALA¹⁶³, *Cumhuriyet* and *Akşam*, as the center-left-wing newspapers, could not name the identity of the Armenian terrorist organization while reporting the news.¹⁶⁴

2.5. Murder in Rome

Taha Carım, the Turkish ambassador to the Vatican, was shot in his face and back by an Armenian in the garden of his house while he was unlocking his house door in June, 1977. He was taken to hospital immediately after the attack, where he died. Semih Akbil, Turkey's Ambassador to Rome started an investigation into the assassination of Taha Carım and he directed the Italian police department to the Armenian organizations in Italy. Meanwhile, a phone call came from an Armenian terrorist group to the Turkish embassy and the group undertook the assassination. After the incident, the Turkish Embassy in Rome was alerted and extensive security measures were taken.¹⁶⁵


According to the facts which surfaced after the assassination, Taha Carım did not carry a gun, although there were warnings about possible attacks on Turkish representatives abroad. This rejection of carrying a gun was a deliberate decision on Carım's part as he wanted to show that he was not afraid of such threats, as a symbol of Turkish national courage. However this decision of Carım was criticized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for not demanding guards.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p. 53.

¹⁶⁴ "Beyrut'ta çıkan bir gazete de, gizli bir Ermeni örgütünün Cerit'in öldürülmesinden sorumlu olduğunu bildirdiğini yazmıştır." *Cumhuriyet*, 18 February 1976.

¹⁶⁵ "Carım'ın cenazesi Salı günü yurda getiriliyor. Diğer elçiliklerimiz ikaz edildi ve koruma tedbirleri artırıldı." *Tercüman*, 12 June 1977, p. 1.

¹⁶⁶ "İnsan avına çıkan İtalyan polisi, Taha Carım'ın koruma muhafızı istemediğini açıkladı." *Son Havadis*, 11 June 1977, p. 1.



Milliyet, 11 June 1977.

But there was also another explanation as to why Carım did not carry a gun: Carım did not take the threats seriously as he did not perceive any real danger coming from Armenian terrorist groups. Furthermore, Carım challenged the Armenians terrorists, by giving the assassination of Paris Ambassador İsmail Erez as an example: "This will not happen to me. If they dare to come to my residence, it will cost them dearly."¹⁶⁷ Besides Taha Carım's negligence and his mortal failure of rejecting guards, *Cumhuriyet* blamed the Demirel government for not assigning guards to Carım regardless.¹⁶⁸

After Carım's assassination several questions about the Turkish Foreign Ministry's negligence of the security of its personnel abroad were raised. The Ministry defended itself: According to a news item published in *Milliyet*, explaining that

¹⁶⁷ Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız* "Bu benim başıma gelmeyecek. Evime gelecekleri varsa görecekları de var. Hayatımı onlara pahalıya ödetirim." p. 218.

¹⁶⁸ "Görüldüğü gibi, Büyükelçi'yi koruma önlemleri alınsaydı, katil amacına ulaşamayacaktı. Bir tek görevli olayın gidişatını değiştirebilirdi. Gazeteler Taha Carım'ın koruma polisi talep etmediği için yalnız olduğunu yazıyorlar. Oysa Ermeniler konusunda yayın yaparak bazı gerçeklerin gün ışığına çıkmasına hizmet etmiş diplomatımızı savunmasız ve korunmasız bırakmak çok büyük aymazlıktır." *Cumhuriyet*, 11 June 1977, p. 1.

Carım had ignored security measures, the Ministry was not in a position to enforce security measures if ambassadors did not want to implement such measures.¹⁶⁹

The period of Carım's assassination was politically very volatile in Turkey. This was a period when Süleyman Demirel's government was on the verge of collapse and Ecevit was getting power again. He formed the new government on 21 June 1977, 12 days after Carım's murder. Within this atmosphere, the Turkish press was trying to understand the motives and culprits behind the murders and now seeing the Armenian terror as a continuous trend. But still the name of the organization was not clear yet. *Tercüman* declared that Carım's assassination was undertaken by an organization named "The Armenian Genocide".¹⁷⁰ *Tercüman* further provided details about the assassination. Accordingly, Carım did not accept the bodyguards offered by the Italian Police Department. The Italian Police pointed out that some Turkish Armenians were suspects of the assassination.¹⁷¹ *Tercüman* also noted some interesting details about the murder weapon. The pistol which was used to kill Carım was found in a pub nearby Carım's house¹⁷² and later found out that this pistol was made in "Kırıkkale" - i.e. produced by the Turkish state arms factory in Kırıkkale.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ "...Carım'ın yanına bu arada bir de koruma polisi verilmiş, ancak büyükelçi kısa süre önce polise gerek kalmadığını söyleyerek muhafızının görevine son vermişti." *Akşam*, 11 June 1977, p. 1.

¹⁷⁰ "Suikastı "Ermeni Soykırımı" adlı bir teşkilat üzerine aldı." *Tercüman*, 10 June 1977, p. 1.

¹⁷¹ "İtalyan Polisi Ermeni Mahallelerine Baskın Yapıyor" *Tercüman*, 12 June 2012, p. 1.

¹⁷² "Carım'ın öldürüldüğü yere yakın bir barda tabanca ve 2 şarjör ele geçirildi." *Tercüman*, 13 June 1977, p. 1.

¹⁷³ "Carım, Kırıkkale yapısı bir tabanca ile öldürüldü" *Tercüman*, 15 June 1977, p. 1.



Tercüman, 17 June 1977.

According to *Tercüman*, Carım's murder finally alarmed all Turkish embassies and security measures were augmented.¹⁷⁴

Son Havadis also published news about Taha Carım's murder and pointed to the Armenian terrorists as culprits. The newspaper further published the list of six Turkish representatives killed in recent years by Armenian terrorists. By doing so *Son Havadis* demonstrated the persistence, continuity and seriousness of the Armenian terrorism.¹⁷⁵ *Son Havadis* provided further details, reporting that Taha Carım refused to have police guards based on the information provided by the Italian police department.¹⁷⁶ The Armenian terrorist organization JCAG was responsible for the murder, and all the assassinations organized in Paris, Vienna and Lebanon were undertaken by JCAG.¹⁷⁷

Like other newspapers, *Akşam* too highlighted that Taha Carım had never requested police security, although he had received threats from terrorist

¹⁷⁴ "Dışişleri Teşkilatı Yeni Tedhiş Eylemlerine Karşı Uyarıldı" *Tercüman*, 20 June 1977, p. 1.

¹⁷⁵ "Suikastın bir Ermeni örgütü tarafından yapıldığı ihbar edildi." *Son Havadis*, 10 June 1977, p. 7.

¹⁷⁶ "Tedbir Almayan Dışişleri Suçlu Görülüyor" *Zaman*, 19.02.1976.

¹⁷⁷ "Cinayeti Ermeni Soykırımı Örgütü'nün işlediği telefonla bildirilmiştir. Paris, Viyana ve Lübnan suikastlarının da bu örgüt tarafından üstlenildiği bilinmektedir." *Son Havadis*, 11 June 1977, p. 7.

organizations.¹⁷⁸ This incident had happened as a result of Carım's and the Italian police department's carelessness in the first place.¹⁷⁹ According to *Cumhuriyet*, the responsibility of insufficient security measures could not simply be bestowed upon Carım. Although Demirel's government had promised to take necessary security measures for protecting Turkish representatives abroad, this apparently was not the case as was revealed by the assassination of Carım.¹⁸⁰ So, *Cumhuriyet* accused Demirel's government of negligence. 11 days after *Cumhuriyet*'s item on the government's responsibility for Carım's murder, Ecevit, the head of the RPP, formed a new leftist government on 21 June 1977.¹⁸¹

Tercüman reported on 11 June 1977 that in March of that year, an Armenian secret organization proclaimed to the Italian police that, "Unless political detainees in Turkey are released, one of the Turkish diplomats in Italy will be murdered." Subsequently, all Turkish diplomats including Carım were given guards. Nevertheless, after a while Carım requested the removal of the security. It was reported that Carım had a pistol, but could not find an opportunity to use his gun.¹⁸² After this incident, the security measures were further increased in the Turkish embassies abroad.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁸ "...Carım'ın yanına bu arada bir de koruma polisi verilmiş, ancak büyükelçi kısa süre önce polise gerek kalmadığını söyleyerek muhafızının görevine son vermişti." *Akşam*, 11 June 1977, p. 1.

¹⁷⁹ "Olayda hem Büyükelçimizin, hem de İtalyan polisinin tam bir gafleti vardır." *Son Havadis* 11 June 1977, p. 1.

¹⁸⁰ "Bu olaylar karşısında Hükümetimizin önlemler alacağı söylenmişti. Ama böyle bir şeyin söz konusu olmadığı görülüyor. 'Olayların Ardındaki Gerçek'" *Cumhuriyet*, 11 June 1977, p. 1.

¹⁸¹ "Korutürk, Ecevit kabinesini onayladı" *Cumhuriyet*, 22 June 1977, p. 1.

¹⁸² "Mart ayı içerisinde İtalyan polisine gizli bir Ermeni teşkilatının tehdit mektubu yolladığı, 'Türkiye'deki siyasi tutukluların serbest bırakılmaması halinde İtalya'daki bir Türk diplomatının öldürüleceğinin bildirildiği söylenmiştir. Bunun üzerine, Carım dahil bütün Türk diplomatlarına birer muhafız verilmiştir. Ancak, Taha Carım bir süre sonra ilgililerle konuşarak korumanın kaldırılmasını istemiştir. Carım'ın tabanca taşıdığı ancak olay anında silahını çekecek zaman bulamadığı bildirilmiştir." *Tercüman*, 11 June 1977, p. 4.

¹⁸³ "Suikastlerden Sonra Yabancı Ülkelerdeki Temsilciliklerimizde Güvenlik Tedbirleri Arttırıldı" *Tercüman*, 19 June 1977.

2.6. Double Murder in Madrid



Milliyet, 03 June 1978.

A year after the assassination of Turkey's Ambassador to Vatican City Taha Carım, the wife and brother-in-law of Ambassador Zeki Kuneralp's, Necla Kuneralp and Retired Ambassador Beşir Balcıoğlu, were killed in an attack. This was the first but not the last attack of Armenian terrorists against the families of diplomats. Balcıoğlu served as an ambassador in Khartoum and Oslo, and was subjected to assassination attempts by "Black September", a group of Palestinian militants, twice in 1973.¹⁸⁴

The incident in Madrid hit the headlines in Turkey like the previous assassinations. The headline of *Tercüman*, for instance, ran as "Another barbarity of the Armenian terrorist organization: The Turkish ambassador Zeki Kuneralp's wife Necla Kuneralp, his brother-in-law and his driver were killed."¹⁸⁵

According to the information provided by *Tercüman*, Zeki Kuneralp had received threats from the Armenian terrorist group JCAG, which even dared to threaten the Spanish government after the murder of Necla Kuneralp, Beşir Balcıoğlu and the Spanish driver, stating that if the Spanish police did not leave the assassins alone, the Armenian terrorists would act against the Spanish government.¹⁸⁶ Despite the

¹⁸⁴ Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, p. 261.

¹⁸⁵ "Ermeni Terör Örgütünün Bir Vahşeti Daha" *Tercüman*, 03 June 1978, p. 1.

¹⁸⁶ "Suikastçi Ermeniler rahat bırakılmazlarsa İspanyol hükümetine karşı eyleme girişileceği bildirildi." *Tercüman*, 05 June 1978, p. 1.

open threats, Zeki Kuneralp, according to *Tercüman*, demanded protection neither from the Turkish government nor from the Spanish government. After the assassination, the Spanish police started investigation in order to find the murderers.¹⁸⁷

Son Havadis, in reporting the news about the assassinations in Madrid, listed the previous assassinations by the Armenian terrorists in Los Angeles, Paris, Vienna, Beirut and Rome.¹⁸⁸ According to *Son Havadis*, the Kuneralp family was expecting such an attack, as were many other diplomat families. It was even reported that Necla Kuneralp had told her son Sinan Kuneralp that "Armenian attempts are known and if something happen to me, take care of your father".¹⁸⁹

Cumhuriyet had not given up its stance as mediator among the other Turkish newspapers. Until the news was certain enough to be declared, *Cumhuriyet* kept its silence. In this case, *Cumhuriyet* again waited to be certain about the case and they compiled the most enlightening points of the case. *Cumhuriyet* preferred to act through the ideas and manner of the nation against the assassination. *Cumhuriyet* was aware of the importance of acting together in terms of social and demographical developments. The mediator role drawn by *Cumhuriyet* has been justified with the news that *Cumhuriyet* published. While allocating space for the words by Fahri Korutürk, without any political polarization, *Cumhuriyet* also gave room to Alparslan Türkeş on its pages. This manner in which *Cumhuriyet* carried out its reporting belied its concern for communicating this message to the international newspapers and international audience in order to show that Turkish newspapers were able to stand against the terrorism without any domestic political fears.

¹⁸⁷ "... bir yıl kadar önce Madrid Büyükelçimiz Zeki Kuneralp'a "Ermeniler" tarafından tehdit mektubu gönderildiği öğrenilmiştir. Ancak Kuneralp, bu tehdidi ciddiye almamış, ne Türk ne de İspanyol makamlardan koruma istemiştir." *Tercüman*, 05 June 1978, p. 10.

¹⁸⁸ "...emekli Büyükelçi Beşir Balcıoğlu'nun dün öldürülmelerinden önce 1973 yılından bu yana üçü büyükelçi, üçü ise konsolos olmak üzere altı diplomatımız düzenlenen suikastler sonucu hayatlarını kaybetmişlerdir." *Son Havadis*, 3 June 1978, p. 9.

¹⁸⁹ "Biliyorsunuz Ermenilerin girişimlerini, eğer bana birşey olursa babaya iyi bakın" *Son Havadis*, 3 June 1978, p. 9.

While all these assassinations abroad continued, Turkey was very much polarized politically, and so the priorities of the highly-politicized Turkish press was not to deal with and understand a very serious security problem, but to serve further divisions with the society. On the day news about the assassinations in Madrid hit the headlines, *Son Havadis* reported the "Bayrak Mitingi" in İzmir on 3 June 1978 organized by Demirel, who alleged that a flag with hammer and sickle was hoisted in 1 May 1978, replacing the Turkish flag in the castle of Kars.¹⁹⁰ Although these allegations were refuted¹⁹¹, Demirel used this to organize a series of meetings in İzmir, Erzurum and İstanbul and hence to attack the RPP government.

Almost a year after the assassination of Beşir Balcıoğlu and Necla Kuneralp, in October 1979, Ahmet Benler, the son of Turkish Ambassador to the Hague Özdemir Benler, was murdered in the Hague. When Ahmet Benler, a PhD. student in Delft University, was on his way to the university, he was shot by a gunman. The incident was undertaken by both JCAG and ASALA.¹⁹² This was the second time that an ambassador's family members were targeted and subjected to Armenian terrorism.

2.7. Another Murder in Paris

For a second time, Paris became a stage for Armenian terrorism. This time Paris Tourism Attaché Yılmaz Çolpan became the target of the Armenian terrorists. On December 22, 1979, when Çolpan was walking around, he was shot and fatally wounded in his back and heart in the middle of Champs-Élysées. This attack was undertaken by JCAG, which called the Turkish embassy in Paris after the assassination.

Two days after Yılmaz Çolpan's murder, Uğur Mumcu in *Cumhuriyet* published an article analyzing the Armenian terrorism. According to Mumcu, "racist Armenian

¹⁹⁰ "Demirel, '1 Mayıs 1978 tarihinde Kars Kalesi'ndeki bayrağın indirilerek yerine orak çekiçli kızıl bayrak çekildiğini ve bu bayrağın asılı kaldığını' öne sürmüştür." *Milliyet*, 25 May 1978, p. 9.

¹⁹¹ "Kars Vali Vekili ve Savcı Demirel'in iddialarını yalanladı" *Milliyet*, 25 May 1978, p. 9.

¹⁹² *Ahmet Benler*, http://www.ermenisorunu.gen.tr/turkce/diplomatlar/ahmet_benler.html [26.11.2012].

terrorist groups were a part of "a bloody chain" which encircled Turkey. One side of this chain was tied to drug trafficking and the other side was tied to arms smuggling."¹⁹³ According to him, solving the Armenian terrorist question was very much related to finding out about the details of the smuggling between Germany and Iran.¹⁹⁴ While Mumcu saw Armenian terrorism as a part of a greater picture, in the same article he wrote how he himself become a target of *Hergün*, a pro-NMP newspaper, which accused him and the head of Turkish Bar association Orhan Apaydın of joining the "decision of death" of NMP supporters in Germany; hence in return Mumcu became a target himself, due to this article in *Hergün*.¹⁹⁵

While Mumcu was involved in internal polarizations discussing the Armenian terror, *Tercüman* and *Son Havadis* started to focus on the international dimension of terrorism. This, however, might have stemmed from the changing political scene in Turkey. Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the right-wing Justice Party, formed a new government on 12 November 1979, replacing the short-lived government of Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the left-wing Republican People's Party, in a period of augmented political domestic violence and a highly polarized political environment.¹⁹⁶ Demirel's government's foreign minister was Hayrettin Erkmen.¹⁹⁷ It seems that *Tercüman* and *Son Havadis* avoided undermining the legitimacy and power of the newly formed government by criticizing the Foreign Ministry for not taking necessary precautions to protect the lives of its members abroad. However, these two newspapers were not so considerate when the RPP was in power.

¹⁹³ Mumcu, "Türkiye bir ucu uyuşturucu madde, öteki ucu silah kaçakçılığına bağlı kanlı bir zincirle sınıksız sarılmıştır. Bu kanlı zincirin halkaları arasında İrkçı Ermeni örgütlerinin de bulunduğu gün gibi açıktır." *Cumhuriyet*, 24 December 1979, p. 11.

¹⁹⁴ Mumcu, "Ve Almanya'dan İran'a kadar mal götürüp, getiren TIR filoları, şirketleri, bu TIR kamyonlarının sürücüleri teker teker inceleme konusu olmalıdır." *Cumhuriyet*, 24 December 1979, p. 11.

¹⁹⁵ Mumcu, "MHP yanlısı *Hergün* Gazetesi, benim ve İstanbul Barosu Başkanı Orhan Apaydın'ın Almanya'da "MHP'lilerin ölüm kararına" katıldığımızı yazacak kadar gözü kanlı cinayet kışkırtıcılığına başvurmuştur." *Cumhuriyet*, 24 December 1979, p.11.

¹⁹⁶ "A Game Of Musical Chairs Demirel Again Replaces Ecevit, As the Country Founders." *Time*, 10/29/1979, Issue 18.

¹⁹⁷ Dışişleri Bakanları Listesi, [Online]. Available: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_disisleri-bakanlari-listesi.tr.mfa [28/03/2012].



Son Havadis, 17 October 1979.

While these two newspapers kept silent about the "deficiencies" of the Foreign Ministry, they used information to show the successes of the newly formed Demirel government in the international arena to gain support against Armenian terrorism. According to *Tercüman*, the BBC, The British National Broadcasting Company, for the first time condemned the activities of Armenian terrorists and even denied any parallelism between the Jewish and Armenian cases.¹⁹⁸ *Tercüman*, like other newspapers, correctly reported the identity of the Armenian terrorist group JCAG, as the same group had planted a bomb in the Turkish Airlines Bureau in Amsterdam on 23 December 1979. Along with the attack on the Turkish Airlines Bureau, *Son Havadis* gave place to the news on the attacks of leftist groups on two police soldiers in order to highlight the threat of communism in Turkey.¹⁹⁹

2.8. Assassinations in Athens

Administrative Attaché Galip Özmen and his daughter Neslihan Özmen were assassinated in Athens on June 31, 1980. The attack was committed when Galip Özmen, his wife and his three children were on their way to their house.

¹⁹⁸ "BBC ilk defa tedhişçilerin eylemlerini eleştiren bir yorum yayınladı: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 50 yıl önce sona erdi, Ermenilerin Yahudilerle bir paralellik yakalamaya çalışması yanlışır." *Tercüman*, 23 December 1979, p. 1.

¹⁹⁹ "Solcular Örnektepe'de devriye gezen 2 jandarma erini şehit ettiler." *Son Havadis*, 23 December 1979, p. 1.



Milliyet, 02 August 1980.

These attacks attracted the attention of the Turkish public from the domestic violence and terror in Turkey to Armenian terrorism once more. Within this atmosphere, it was inevitable that *Son Havadis* would further emphasize the idea of Turkishness and nationalism, declaring heroically that the Armenian terrorists would be "regretful".²⁰⁰

Starting with *Tercüman*, another assassination of a Turkish diplomat created another wound in the hearts of Turkish people. This time, a family was targeted and there was a huge impact on public morale. *Tercüman's* caption was; "A Turkish Diplomat and His Daughter have been assassinated in Athens."²⁰¹ *Milliyet* also published Neslihan Özmen's photo after the attack. The assassination was undertaken by an Armenian terrorist group. The terrorist group was not indicated in the newspapers the first day after the assassination. Greek Prime Minister

²⁰⁰ "Demirel: Perişan olacaklar" *Son Havadis*, 4 August 1980, p. 1.

²⁰¹ "Atina'da Bir Türk Diplomat ve Kızı Öldürüldü" *Tercüman*, 01 August 1980, p. 1.

George Rallis also declared that he had condemned the atrocious actions internationally.²⁰²

Tercüman also published a list of assassinated Turkish diplomats and briefly mentioned their backgrounds: “Armenian terrorist organizations had assassinated 12 and wounded 5 Turkish diplomats within 7 years.”²⁰³ After this murder, *Tercüman* accused the Greek police of not taking necessary measures against assassinations as *Tercüman* of 21 January 1980 had warned Athens to take necessary measures to protect Turkish embassy members as the Armenian terrorist organizations were preparing to act again as follows:



Tercüman, 03 August 1980.

Not only Greece, but also other European states did not or could not protect Turkish representatives and representations abroad. On 6 August 1980, more than one month after the assassinations in Athens, *Tercüman* reported that Armenians had broken into the Turkish Consulate-General in Lyon, and this attack was committed by ASALA²⁰⁴, the organization which was responsible for the attacks

²⁰² “Rallis: Özmen’in katlini hudutsuz kınıyorum.” *Tercüman*, 02 August 1980, p. 1.

²⁰³ “Ermeni Örgütleri 7 Yılda 12 Diplomatımızı Öldürüp, 5’ini Yaraladı.” *Tercüman*, 02 August 1980, p. 7.

²⁰⁴ “Saldırıyı Paris’te, Madrid’te ve Atina’daki suikastleri düzenleyen ‘Ermenistan’ın Kurtuluşu İçin Gizli Ordu’ adlı teşkilat üstlendi.” *Tercüman*, 06 August 1980, p. 1.

in Paris, Madrid and Athens. Even after all these attacks, Greek authorities did not strive to increase protection for Turkish diplomats in Greece²⁰⁵ and even in France, Armenians threatened the French government that in case of arrest of ASALA members, they would act against the French interests.²⁰⁶ *Tercüman*, by putting all these news together in fact demonstrated alienation of Turkey abroad. In August 1980, another article by Zafer Atay highlighting the significance of the Armenian attacks and their background was published on the pages of *Tercüman* under the title of “Burası Dünya”.²⁰⁷ According to Atay, Armenian supporters took part in the international relations stage as human rights fighters. They claimed that "Turks have murdered 1,5 million Armenians"²⁰⁸, but these statements were not correct as ending an uprising was every country's right in order to maintain unity and integrity. Atay argued that if there had been human rights violations, the attacks against Turkish diplomats should had been considered crimes against humanity within the context of international relations, but he complained that while Turkish diplomats had been attacked, no voice was raised against this international terrorism. Moreover, the Greek police department disregarded these attacks and Greece supported the Armenian terrorist organizations.²⁰⁹ Besides Greece, the US had been listening to and supporting the claims and complaints coming from the Armenian people for decades and in 1977, President Jimmy Carter showed his support to Armenians by stating that “Armenians are an aggrieved group of people.”²¹⁰ and declaring US support for these people.

²⁰⁵ “Yunanistan’daki Diplomatlarımız Korunmuyor.” *Tercüman*, 06 August 1980, p.1.

²⁰⁶ “ASALA, Ermeni yurttaşlar Fransa’da tutuklanırsa Fransız çıkarlarına karşı saldırıya geçeriz dedi.” *Tercüman*, 07 August 1980, p. 1.

²⁰⁷ Zafer Atay, “‘Ermeni Saldırıları ve Perde Arkasındakiler’ – ‘Burası Dünya’” *Tercüman*, 10 August 1980, p. 4.

²⁰⁸ Atay, "Ermenilerin işledikleri cinayetlerin ardından insan hakları savunuculuğunu kimseye bırakmayan batı ülkelerinde sanki öldüren değil de ölen suçluymuş ki: 'Ama Türkler de 1,5 milyon Ermeni'yi kesmişlerdi...yaveleri başlamaktadır." *Tercüman*, 10 August 1980, p. 4.

²⁰⁹ Atay, "Yunan Gizli Polisi (KYP), Ermeni militanların Kıbrıslı Rumlarla işbirliği yaptıklarını bildiği halde görmezden gelmiştir." *Tercüman*, 10 August 1980, p. 4.

²¹⁰ Atay, "1977'de Başkan Carter'ın seçildikten sonra yaptığı ilk iş Ermeni liderlerini kabul ederek onlara hitaben 'Siz çok ezilmiş bir ırksınız...' diye bir konuşma yapmak olmuştu." *Tercüman*, 10 August 1980, p. 4.

But this "alienation," according to *Tercüman* writers, had its domestic collaborators. Since the mid-1970s, *Tercüman* writers had been trying to create a link between the Turkish left and Armenians and terrorism. For instance, on 21 February 1976, Ahmet Kabaklı claimed that the terrorist organization "Revolutionaries of March 12" were mostly of Armenian origin.²¹¹ In order to solve all the difficulties Turkey was in, the solution was martial law. Nazlı Ilıcak, while inviting the army to take over by writing "The Last Stand... Martial Law"²¹² on 8 August, 1980, pointed out that the attack against the Özmen Family helped people to comprehend how necessary martial law was along with the domestic terrorism.

On August 10th, 1980, Armenians in Greece declared the date as the "Revenge day against Turks"²¹³ Thereon, Greek police warned Turkish people against possible attacks which might come from Armenians. As *Tercüman* published on its pages, Turkey faced the truth of terrorism across the world, not only the Armenian Diaspora but also the nations which opened their gates to the groups which were nurtured during the "revenge process". As the fever of the Armenian attack against the Özmen family had been quenched, Armenians became active in Germany. The Armenian terrorist groups worked to spread the belief which claimed that Enver and Talat Paşa along with Atatürk had been responsible for the massacres of Armenians.²¹⁴ In particular, ASALA had been working with Germans to create a perception against Turks by making propaganda in Bonn according to the news on *Tercüman*.²¹⁵ Furthermore, a magazine called *Pogrom* which emphasized the victimization of Armenians started to be published in Germany. The propaganda magazine *Pogrom* was never sold in markets, but delivered by mail to foundations,

²¹¹ Kabaklı, "Suçlu Kim?" *Tercüman*, 21 February 1976.

²¹² Nazlı Ilıcak, "Sıkı Yönetim... Son Çare!" *Tercüman*, 08 August 1980, p. 1.

²¹³ "Yunanistan'daki Ermeniler 10 Ağustos'u Türklere karşı 'intikam günü' ilan ettiler" *Tercüman*, 09 August 1980, p. 1.

²¹⁴ "Ermeniler Almanları Aleyhimize Çeviriyorlar" "Pogrom adlı dergide Enver ve Talat Paşa'lar ile Atatürk, Ermeni katliamının faili olarak gösterildi." *Tercüman*, 10 August 1980, p. 7.

²¹⁵ Fahir Ersin, "Ermeni Kurtuluş Örgütü, Alman Halkı Üzerinde yoğun bir propaganda girişimi başlattı." *Tercüman*, 10 August 1980, p. 1.

politicians, journalists and universities. These targets were chosen in order to spread the idea that Turks should face the historical truth according to Armenians in Germany.²¹⁶

Son Havadis was another newspaper which tried to highlight the Armenian terrorist attack in Greece. In the first day of the attack, *Son Havadis*, which could not report the name of the Armenian terrorist group, reported that the assassination of Galip Özmen had created fear in Greece.²¹⁷ The reason why *Son Havadis* highlighted this point was that Greece was one of the supporting countries for the Armenian terrorist organizations²¹⁸, and hence their activities in Greece put the Greek government in a difficult position. For instance, due to the attempts of Greek police department to find Armenian assassins, under the pressure of Turkey, ASALA declared from Lebanon that if any Armenians were arrested by the Greek police department, the terrorist activities would continue with the assassination of Greek diplomats.²¹⁹ In other words, Armenian terrorism became an international threat even for the hosting countries. *Son Havadis* also reported that the Turkish embassy in Athens received threatening phone calls during the funeral of Galip Özmen.²²⁰ These "bold" Armenian groups even extended their threats to Greek diplomats. After all these developments the Greek Patriarchate condemned the atrocious incident a week after.²²¹

As before, *Son Havadis* opened its pages to Turkish citizens of Armenian origin. Levon Panos Dabağyan wrote an article in *Son Havadis* entitled "Armenian

²¹⁶ “‘Pogrom’ piyasada satılmayan ancak posta yoluyla çeşitli kuruluşlara, politikacılara, gazetecilere ve üniversitelere gönderilen bir dergidir.” *Tercüman*, 10 August 1980, p. 7.

²¹⁷ “Türk Ataşesi Özmen’in Katli Yunanistan’da Telaş Uyandırdı.” *Son Havadis*, 01 August 1980, p. 1.

²¹⁸ Prof. Dr. Mehmet Saray, "Ermeni Terörü (1887-2002)" In *Ermeni Araştırmaları I. Türkiye Kongresi Bildirileri II. Cilt.* ed. Dr. Şenol Kantarcı, Dr.Kamer Kasım, Dr. İbrahim Kaya, Dr. Sedat Laçiner, 383-475. Ankara: Ermeni Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2003 p. 389.

²¹⁹ “Lübnan’da bir Ermeni Örgütü – ASALA; Yunan polisi Ermenilere karşı bir tavır takınırsa bundan sonraki hedefimiz Yunan Diplomatları olacaktır.” *Son Havadis*, 02 August 1980, p. 1.

²²⁰ “Tehdit Yağıyor – ‘Atina Büyükelçiliğimize yöneltilen tehdit mesajları cenaze töreni sırasında da devam etti.’ ‘Bundan sonraki hedefimiz Torino’dur.’” *Son Havadis*, 07 August 1980, p. 1.

²²¹ “Patrikhane Olayı Kınadı” *Son Havadis*, 07 August 1980, p. 1.

Assassinations”.²²² Dabağyan declared that he was one of the Armenians who had been living in peace with Turks in Turkey and he defined himself as a "Turkish-Armenian", meaning that he felt part of the Turkish nation without forgetting his Armenian origins. According to Dabağyan, Armenians came under the influence of other states during the end of the Ottoman Empire, especially in 1915 when Armenians all over the world were still the captives of "monster comitadjis".²²³ Dabağyan family had been a part of the “Lusavoriçagan” (Englise Armenienne Catholique - the Armenian Catholic Church) sect which was directly related to the Armenian Catholic Church.

Dabağyan, who did not attribute any value to the statements of the Armenian Diaspora, claimed that the Armenian Patriarch was even frightened, implying that he could not stand boldly against all these anti-Turkish allegations as well as threats. Dabağyan explicitly declared that he was not one of the Armenians who wanted to leave Anatolia, his homeland, but still he warned the authorities that the division between Turks and Armenians was deepening. Authorities were warned to do something about the Greek support to the Armenian terrorists who were located in the EOKA-B; as long as this situation continued, the murders would never cease.²²⁴

The other newspapers also reported, commented and protested the assassinations in Athens. *Hürriyet* highlighted Ecevit's statement that these attacks were not simply against Turkey but against humanity.²²⁵ Besides the right-wing newspaper's nationalist expressions *Cumhuriyet* was observed as the calmest newspaper. The front pages of *Cumhuriyet* in the following shows that *Cumhuriyet* preferred to give messages to the Turkish public with its mediating journalists like Uğur Mumcu. There were not any bloody pictures or big captions with words like

²²² Levon Panos Dabağyan, “Ermeni Cinayetleri” *Son Havadis*, 08 August 1980, p. 7.

²²³ “Ermeniler, hala 'canavar komitacılar'ın tutsağı konumundadırlar.” *Son Havadis*, 08 August 1980, p. 7.

²²⁴ Dabağyan, "Kıbrıs Rum kesimindeki 'EOKA-B' tedhiş örgütü içinde beslenen komitacılar, Yunan Hükümeti tarafından devreden çıkartılmadıkça ve ikili bir siyaset takip edilmekten vazgeçilmedikçe, bu cinayetlerin sonu gelmez." *Son Havadis*, 08 August 1980, p. 7.

²²⁵ *Hürriyet*, 02 August 1980.

"revenge!" about Armenian terrorism. But this does not mean that *Cumhuriyet* was neglecting the Armenian terrorism or the assassinated Turkish diplomats.



Cumhuriyet, 01 August 1980.



Cumhuriyet, 03 August 1980.

Prime Minister Demirel, like Ecevit, expressed his sorrow and declared the bullets which shot Özmen targeted the Turkish nation, and of course promised revenge.²²⁶ But such words and promises did not satisfy the people anymore. Uğur Mumcu asked for a real strategy against Armenian terrorism rather than repeating such conventional words of promise: "We will make them pay in blood."²²⁷

Mumcu, who attracted the attention of his readers to different dimensions of Armenian terrorism as early as 1975, went deeper in his analysis on 2 August 1980. Mumcu asked who supported the terror, added, "Is the American secret

²²⁶ "Demirel: Özmen'e sıkılan kurşunlar Türk milletinedir." *Milliyet*, 02 August 1980.

²²⁷ Mumcu, "Atina Elçiliğimizde görevli İdari Ataşe Galip Özmen'in öldürülmesi olayından sonra, Başbakan Demirel'in yaptığı gibi, "Kanı yerde kalmayacak" gibisinden beylik sözlerin dışında, ne yapmak gerekir acaba?" *Cumhuriyet*, 02 August 1980.

service? Is the Counter-guerilla? Are the Soviet agents? Is the Chinese Communist Party? Are Armenian merchants? Are Greek richmen? To investigate and reveal these is especially state's duty." He then wrote:

For our own account, we revealed event by event; document by document that terror and arms smuggling are committed in return of drugs, mafia organizations in European capitals involved in this dirty barter and these organizations hold bridge heads in state bureaucracy. Nobody denied these events and could refuse the documents.²²⁸

Not only documents published by Mumcu, but also the relationship highlighted by Esat Uras in his book "*Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*" demonstrated the connection between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and ASALA.²²⁹ These documents include cooperation acts and an agreement between the PKK and ASALA, as well as documents showing the connections of these organizations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Bloc and other socialist countries.²³⁰

In this article, Mumcu also accused the Turkish press of being apathetic about all these illegal connections, writing:

While we were doing all these [i.e. revealing all these connections], the press, we call "colorful press", that "neutral", that "nationalist", that "Atatürkist" (!) press, that bourgeoisie press kept silent, it did not allocate a space for these events even as much as the death of a high society dentist.²³¹

²²⁸ Mumcu, "Biz kendi hesabımıza, terör ile silah kaçakçılığının, uyuşturucu madde karşılığı yapıldığını, bu kirli takasa Avrupa başkentlerindeki Mafia örgütlerinin karıştığı ve bu örgütlerin devlet bürokrasisi içinde köprü başları tuttuğunu, olay olay belge belge açıkladık. Hiç kimse bu olayları yalanlamadı, yayınlanan belgeleri çürütemedi." *Cumhuriyet*, 02 August 1980, p. 7.

²²⁹ Cankara, Yavuz and Ercan Karakoç, Gökem Kılıçoğlu. "ASALA Terör Örgütü ve Ermeni Terörü" In *Ermeni Araştırmaları I. Türkiye Kongresi Bildirileri II. Cilt*. ed. Dr. Şenol Kantarcı, Dr. Kamer Kasım, Dr. İbrahim Kaya, Dr. Sedat Laçiner, 383-475. Ankara: Ermeni Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Yayınları 2003, p. 446.

²³⁰ Cankara, Yavuz and Ercan Karakoç, Gökem Kılıçoğlu. "ASALA Terör Örgütü ve Ermeni Terörü" p. 446.

²³¹ Mumcu, "Biz bunları yaparken, "renkli basın" dediğimiz, o "tarafsız", o "milliyetçi", o "Atatürkçü" (!) basın, o burjuva basın sustu; bu olaylara sosyete dışçısının ölümü kadar bile yer ayırmadı." *Cumhuriyet*, 03 August 1980, p. 7.

Years later all the connections which were revealed by Mumcu became an accepted common fact. Ercan Çitlioğlu wrote that on April 8, 1980, the PKK and ASALA reached an agreement to work together against Turkey and so the ASALA wanted to use its "Kurdish warrior brothers" to reach the aim of getting Armenia back.²³²

Mumcu was not the only *Cumhuriyet* columnist who criticized the Prime Minister Demirel's conventional promises and statements. Ali Sirmen on 6 August 1980 wrote:

Among all these developments, besides our citizens whose lives we cannot protect within the country, we will bury Galip Özmen and his daughter Neslihan. During this ceremony, perhaps, the representatives of Demirel's government will give statements full of empty words. Demirel does not have a right to talk in Özmen's funeral.²³³

One day after Sirmen's article, another *Cumhuriyet* writer, Sedat Ergin, wrote on the Armenian issue. However, he emphasized Greek support of the Armenian terrorism. According to him, the Greek newspapers, despite their political differences, united only in the case of anti-Turkey; hence the Greek press was always interested in the news about Armenian organizations and the Greek government did not need to prevent such an interest.²³⁴ Turkish political parties' attention focused on the Greek Cypriots and EOKA-B because of the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974. This assumption was not completely wrong, though. However, the point missed by the Turkish press and Turkish politicians was the

²³² Ercan Çitlioğlu, "Savaşçılarımız çok yakın bir gelecekte Kürt savaşçılar ile yan yana geleceklerdir. Bu faşist Türk rejimine karşı en büyük silahımız olacaktır. Biz Türkiye dışında iken Türk Ermenistanını kurtarmamız mümkün değildir. Biz Ermenistan'ı Kürt savaşçı kardeşlerimizle birlikte kurtaracağız. Çok yakında varlığımızı işgal edilmiş Ermenistan'ın en iç noktalarında göstererek kanıtlayacağız. Bu ASALA'nın atacağı gelecek adımdır...", "Ermeni Terörü Üzerine Analiz" In *Ermeni Araştırmaları 1. Türkiye Kongresi Bildirileri II. Cilt.* ed. Dr. Şenol Kantarcı, Dr.Kamer Kasım, Dr. İbrahim Kaya, Dr. Sedat Laçiner, 383-475. Ankara: Ermeni Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Yayınları 2003, p. 430.

²³³ Sirmen, "Tüm bu gelişmeler arasında yurt içinde de canını koruyamadığımız yurttaşlarımızla birlikte Galip Özmen ile kızı Neslihan'ı da toprağa vereceğiz. Bu tören sırasında belki de, Demirel iktidarı temsilcileri büyük laflarla dolu demeçler de vereceklerdir. Demirel'in Özmen'in cenazesinde konuşmaya hakkı yoktur." *Cumhuriyet*, 06 August 1980, p. 4.

²³⁴ Sedat Ergin, "Yunan gazeteleri farklı çizgilerine rağmen, sadece Türkiye aleyhtarlığında birleşmektedir. Yunan basını, Ermeni örgütlerinin haberlerine büyük rağbet göstermiş, Yunan hükümeti bunu önleme gereği duymamıştır." *Cumhuriyet* 07 August 1980, p. 1.

collaboration between Armenians and Greek Cypriots. This collaboration was revealed years after the murder of Turkish ambassadors.

As the Cyprus issue was deepened and became armed conflict, the relationship between Armenian question and Cyprus strengthened. The military intervention by Turkey in 1974, Greece's Turkey phobia became paranoia. Greek public opinion even exaggerated that Turkey would invade the mainland besides the Aegean islands around, soon. (...) Within this context, the natural ally Armenians were considered as one of the most important collaborator and Cyprus became the most important place for this kind of meetings besides providing Armenian terrorists convenience.²³⁵

Such Greek support stemming from Greek fear of a Turkish invasion appeared after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation.²³⁶

In the heat of August 1980, the period when internal chaos in the country was at its peak, the Armenian terrorism inevitably became part of this discussion. Therefore, the tension between the leftist and rightist press as shown above was revealed also in the discussions about the activities of Armenian terrorist groups. This is the period when leftist ideas were labeled as "communist", while communism was perceived as the most imminent danger even by the centre-right.²³⁷

In the years between 1973 and 1980, Turkey did not only face internal terror but became the target of international terrorism in the form of attacks on Turkish diplomatic missions as well as other Turkish institutions abroad. The Turkish press facing such a new challenge, initially failed to understand the serious character of these threats; however, in the passing years, due to the intensification of the attacks, it developed a more nuanced understanding of these actions, although within the politically divided atmosphere of 1970s, internal political discussions dominated the agenda and Armenian terrorism, a very serious national security issue, became secondary. As Retired Ambassador Bilal Şimşir witnessed, the

²³⁵ Sedat Laçiner, *Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası*. Ankara: USAK, 2008, p. 165.

²³⁶ Laçiner, *Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 165.

²³⁷ "Demirel: Sol düşüncüyü benimseyenler komünizmi tehlike saymıyor." *Akşam*, 24 October 1975, p. 1.

history of assassinated Turkish diplomats highlighted that Turkish people were frustrated, and instead the reading public had to be content with the headlines such as "Pooches were pegged out this time".²³⁸

²³⁸ Şimşir, Bilal. "Köpekler Bu Kez Geberdi!" *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000, p. 728-729.

CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING ARMENIAN TERRORISM (1980-1984)

The 12 September 1980 coup was not only the beginning of a new era in Turkish political life, but also symbolized the beginning of a new period for the Armenian terror targeting Turkey abroad. The frequency of attacks had increased and the number of people killed in these attacks had exceeded the previous seven years period. There were 16 assassinations between 1980 and 1984, and in these attacks 19 people were killed. These attacks took place in twelve different cities all over the world. However, in the previous period the number of people killed was 13 in different assassinations. Apparently political developments in Turkey encouraged the Armenian terrorist groups to intensify their attacks and achieve their goals of making the "Armenian case" known worldwide and forcing Turkey to give concessions. This acceleration in Armenian terror could be also interpreted as a challenge to the new Turkish military government which wanted to present a strong image of itself and a united Turkey to the outside world.

While the Armenian terrorism accelerated in this period, the Turkish press became more aware of the facts behind the Armenian terrorism as well as its international and national connections. Although Uğur Mumcu as early as 1975, was already drawing attention to the link between drug smuggling, arms trafficking and the Armenian terror²³⁹, as discussed in the previous chapter, and developed an in-depth analysis of Armenian terrorism in connection with the current international political and economic relations in his articles published before 1980, his views remained marginal and the Turkish press in general preferred to discuss the Armenian terror in relation to history and nationalism as well as left and right division within Turkey. Hence, only after the coup and declaration of martial law on September 12, 1980, the Turkish press, which did not have any space for

²³⁹ Mumcu, "Türkiye bir ucu uyuşturucu madde, öteki ucu silah kaçakçılığına bağlı kanlı bir zincirle sımsıkı sarılmıştır. Bu kanlı zincirin halkaları arasında İrkçı Ermeni örgütlerinin de bulunduğu gün gibi açıktır." *Cumhuriyet*, 24 December 1979, p. 11.

discussion about internal politics²⁴⁰, focused on Armenian terror more, and while Mumcu's and similar ideas become more pronounced and accepted, divisions in Turkish press persisted, this time in discussing Armenian terrorism.

3.1. Assassinations From Sydney to Paris

Only three months after the coup, Turkey woke up to news of the murder of a Turkish diplomat and his guard. This time, the victims were in Sydney: Turkish Consul General to Sydney Şarık Arıyak and his guard Engin Sever were shot by two attackers in the embassy car while on the way to the consulate on December 17th, 1980.²⁴¹



Milliyet, 18 December 1980.

Cumhuriyet gave the news about these murders on its front page as "Yet another martyr diplomat"²⁴², implying the inexhaustive nature of the assassinations as well as desperation on the part of the Turkish press and public. According to *Cumhuriyet*, a phone call to the *Associated Press* pointed out the culprits of the

²⁴⁰ Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, p. 343.

²⁴¹ *Milliyet*, 18 December 1980.

²⁴² "Bir Şehit Diplomat Daha" *Cumhuriyet*, 18 December 1980, p. 1.

assassinations. The woman on the phone claimed that the murders were committed by JCAG, the Armenian terrorist organization which was responsible for the previous assassinations in Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Paris and Vatican and she also declared that the murders would carry on.²⁴³ Interestingly, the woman on the phone emphasized that JCAG was not related to ASALA.

Cumhuriyet, on page nine, gave a space to the statement of General Kenan Evren, the head of the military government who, similar to civilian leaders of the previous era, expressed his "hatred" and "sorrow" due to the "incident".²⁴⁴ On the same page, İlhan Öztrak, state minister and deputy foreign affairs minister, declared that "this assassination was an action which disregarded the principles of humanity and heedlessly trampled down these principles".²⁴⁵ The Minister of Foreign Affairs, İltar Türkmen, also condemned the assassination in a similar style.²⁴⁶

The Australian government and its ambassador in Ankara promised that the attackers would soon stand before justice. However, before the assassination, the Australian intelligence received information about threatening messages sent to Consul General Şarık Arıyak, but according to the Turkish government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Australian authorities did not pay enough attention to these messages to prevent the assassination.²⁴⁷ The Australian government,

²⁴³ "Olaydan 40 dakika sonra *Associated Press* ajansına telefon eden yabancı aksanlı bir kadın şunları söylemiştir: "Çok önemli bir mesajım var lütfen konuşmamı kesmeyin, Ermeni Soykırımı Adalet Komandoları adına telefon ediyorum. Şu anda Türkiye'nin Avustralya Başkonsolosu öldürülmüş bulunuyor. Bu olay 1975 yılından bu yana komandolarımız tarafından Türklere karşı Viyana, Roma, Madrid, Paris ve Vatikan'da başlatılan harekâtın devamıdır. Bu öldürmelerin nedeni 1915 yılında Türklerin vatandaşlarımıza yaptıkları haksızlıklardır. 'Ermeni Gizli Ordusu' diye bilinen örgülle hiç bir ilişkimiz yoktur, saldırılarımız Türk diplomatlarını ve kuruluşlarını hedef almaktadır. Cinayet ve saldırılara devam edeceğiz." *Cumhuriyet*, 18 December 1980, p. 9.

²⁴⁴ "Olayı nefret ve üzüntüyle karşılıyoruz." *Cumhuriyet*, 18 December 1980, p. 9.

²⁴⁵ "İnsanlık ilkelerini hiçe sayan ve bu ilkeleri pervasızca çiğneyen bir harekettir." *Cumhuriyet*, 18 December 1980, p. 9.

²⁴⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 18 December 1980, p. 9.

²⁴⁷ "Başkonsolosumuz ve koruma görevlisinin öldürülmesinden 24 saat önce, Türk Diplomatlarına muhtemelen bir saldırı yapılacağı Avustralya polisine bildirilmiş Sidney polisi, Avustralya gizli servisinin uyarısını dikkate almamış" *Tercüman*, 18 December 1980, p. 9.

which could not prevent the murders, offered 10.5 million Turkish liras²⁴⁸ as a reward to anyone who reported the murderers.

The right-wing *Son Havadis*, too, reported the attack in Sydney on Şarık Arıyak and Engin Sever on its front page. The headline read: "We had two more martyrs". Similar to *Cumhuriyet*, the *Son Havadis* headline underlined the continuity of attacks on Turkish foreign office members abroad and also revealed a sense of desperation.²⁴⁹ *Son Havadis*, accentuated this desperation vis-à-vis Armenian terror and power of the Armenian terrorist organizations by writing that "Armenian terrorists are spreading death even in the farthest continent."²⁵⁰

Son Havadis, too, provided news about the Australian police department's reward of 10.5 million Turkish liras for anyone aiding the police in capturing the Armenian terrorists.²⁵¹ When *Son Havadis*'s coverage of the assassination Sydney is examined, it is seen that the quality and quantity of the news are almost on the same scale as *Cumhuriyet* in terms of selected words and highlighted points. In *Cumhuriyet* in the following days, the accession of Greece to the European Economic Community sat on the top of the news²⁵² and once more assassinations lost news value. *Tercüman* covered the assassination in Sydney extensively. It did not simply report the news about the incident, but presented it in a more personal and tragic way, as in the headline of the front page in December 18th, 1980: "Black news arrived at dawn - our superintendent of police who was killed in Australia was planning to marry in May".²⁵³

²⁴⁸ "Avustralya Hükümeti'nin Açıklaması: Katilleri ihbar edene 10,5 milyon lira mükafat verilecek." *Tercüman*, 18 December 1980, p. 9.

²⁴⁹ "2 Şehit Daha Verdik" *Son Havadis*, 18 December 1980, p. 1.

²⁵⁰ "Ermeni Teröristler En Uzak Kıtada Bile Ölüm Saçıyor" *Son Havadis*, 18 December 1980, p. 1.

²⁵¹ "Başkonsolosumuz ile Koruma Polisnin Katillerini Yakalatana 10.5 Milyon Lira Verilecek" *Son Havadis*, 19 Aralık 1980.

²⁵² "AET'de Artık Yunanistan da Var" *Cumhuriyet*, 22 Aralık 1980.

²⁵³ "Kara Haber Sabaha Karşı Geldi, Avustralya'da öldürülen Komiserimiz Mayıs'ta Evlenmeyi Planlıyordu." *Tercüman*, 18 Aralık 1980, p. 1.

Apart from such presentational differences, *Tercüman* covered the story of the assassinations very similarly not only to *Son Havadis* but also to *Cumhuriyet*. The enforced cessation of political hostilities apparently forced the Turkish press to develop a common language and style at least in the case of giving news about the assassinations in Sydney.

Tercüman, which listed all terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats abroad, reminding its readership about the continuity of terror against Turkey and presenting a united front against Armenian terrorism, was the most enthusiastic newspaper in supporting the military coup. Two days after the assassinations in Sydney, *Tercüman* was celebrating the 100th day of the 12th September movement of protection and preservation of the republic and declared that "Citizens reached the tranquility they missed. In 100 days, about 15,000 militants were arrested. 142,000 guns and 1.000.000 bullets were seized."²⁵⁴

Perhaps "tranquility" had not yet arrived to Turkey abroad. The Armenian terrorism continued. This time the targets were Labour Attaché Reşat Moralı and Religious Affairs Attaché Tecelli Arı, who were killed in Paris on March 5th, 1981 approximately four months after the assassinations in Sydney. This time, the Armenian terrorist group undertaking the murders was ASALA. While the newspapers covered the murders in a similar fashion, *Akşam* openly accused the French government of being primarily responsible for these murders.²⁵⁵

Only two months after the assassinations in Paris, Consulate Secretary Savaş Yergüz was murdered in Geneva on June 9. Almost 10 days after Savaş Yergüz's murder, *Tercüman* published statements by Agop Agopyan, one of the leaders of ASALA, on the sources and support of ASALA. According to *Tercüman*, leftist groups in Turkey as well as Kurds cooperated with ASALA.²⁵⁶ Ecevit's support to

²⁵⁴ Vatandaş Özlediği Huzura Kavuştu. 100 gün içerisinde 15 bine yakın Militan yakalandı. 142 bin silah ve 1 milyon mermi ele geçirildi." *Tercüman*, 20 December 1980, p. 1.

²⁵⁵ "Sorumlu Tedhişçilerden de Öte Fransız Hükümeti" *Akşam*, 5 March 1981, p. 1.

²⁵⁶ "Ermeni Gizli Kurtuluş Ordusu Lideri 'The Middle East' dergisine açıklama yaptı: 'ASALA Türkiye'deki solcu ve bölücülerle işbirliği yapıyor'", "ASALA adlı gizli Ermeni örgütünün liderlerinden Agop Agopyan, Ermeni militanların Lübnan'da Filistin örgütleri El-Fetih ve Demokratik Cephe tarafından eğitildiğini, ASALA'nın Türkiye'deki solcu gruplar ve Kürtlerle işbirliği yaptığını açıkladı." *Tercüman*, 20 June 1981, p. 1.

Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)²⁵⁷ therefore was put forward as a reason to further discredit Ecevit and his outlawed political party the RPP after the military coup, in the eyes of the Turkish public.

Three months after the murder of Savaş Yergüz, on 24 September, ASALA took 40-50 Turkish as hostages in the Consulate General in Paris and the security guard Cemal Özen was murdered.²⁵⁸

While *Tercüman* was accusing the Turkish left of cooperating with Armenian terrorists, Uğur Mumcu in *Cumhuriyet* warned the public about the danger of such allegations against the left. He wrote:

There can be those who want to exploit such a sensitive subject...in the internal public opinion in order to provoke new incidents. It is necessary to be vigilant about such adventures and avoid, uttering excessive words and behaviors.²⁵⁹

The Turkish press, in any case, was in search of understanding forces behind the Armenian terrorism more than ever. *Milli Gazete*, which was pro-Erbakan before the coup, published a caricature depicting an ugly, dark gangster looking like man with a gun who was climbing a staircase on which steps were numbered as 14,15,16... representing the number of the victims. In the caricature this gangster was being pushed by two hands, one with a Chinese and the other with a French flag on their sleeves while the same man was pulled from the top of the stairs by a hand whose sleeve was made of an American flag.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁷ "Ecevit FKÖ'nün olumlu katkılarından dolayı Arafat'a teşekkür etti." *Milliyet*, 16 July 1979, p. 9.

²⁵⁸ "Paris Başkonsolosluğumuzda 40-50 Türk, ASALA militanlarının elinde rehin. Koruma polisi Cemal Özen şehid edildi." *Tercüman*, 25 September 1981. p. 1.

²⁵⁹ Mumcu, "ASALA" "Ermeni sorununu yaratanlar, yaratmaya çalışanlar, uluslararası terörizmin kanlı aletleri olan "ASALA" gibi terör örgütleridir. Bu gibi olaylarda iç kamuoyumuzda bu duyarlı konuyu sömürüp, ülkemizde yeni olaylar çıkartmak isteyenler olabilir. Bu tür sertüvenlere karşı da uyanık olmak ve taşkın söz ve davranışlardan özenle kaçınmak gerekmektedir." *Cumhuriyet*, 25 September 1981, p. 6.

²⁶⁰ "Armenian Terror is Accelerating" *Milli Gazete*, 26 September 1981.



**"Armenian Terror is Accelerating" *Milli Gazete*,
26 September 1981.**

Son Havadis in 1981 was busy giving more space to Levon Panos Dabağyan's views. Dabağyan, who had previously provided articles to *Son Havadis*, this time published a long series of articles which lasted for more than 100 days.²⁶¹ Dabağyan, who even served as a spokesman for the Patriarch Kalustyan in 1976²⁶², approached Armenian terrorism from various viewpoints. After underlining the close historical bond between Turks and Armenians, he asserted that the fear created by terrorism could only be stopped by knowledge about the truth.²⁶³

²⁶¹ Levon Panos Dabağyan, *Türkiye Ermenileri Tarihi*. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2006, p. 784.

²⁶² Dabağyan, *Türkiye Ermenileri Tarihi*, p. 784.

²⁶³ Dabağyan, "Ermeni Meselesi'nin Gizli Yanlarını Açıklığa Kavuşturabilecek Eserle, Dünya Dillerine Tercüme Edilmesi, Milli Menfaatlerimiz ve Türk Milli Propagandası Açısından Elzemdir." *Son Havadis*, 19 April 1981.

3.2. Back to Los Angeles

Turkish Consul General Kemal Arıkan in Los Angeles was killed by JCAG²⁶⁴ almost ten years after the first assassination which killed Mehmet Baydar and Bahadır Demir in Santa Barbara 1973. Arıkan, who was alone in his car, was shot by two assassins while he was waiting in traffic lights. The assassins fired their guns at the victim until they were sure that he was dead. 14 bullets were found in Arıkan's body, in and around the car.²⁶⁵ This event was not simply the continuation of the series of assassinations but also had a symbolic value. The identity of the new victim, the location of the assassination and even the timing of the attack pointed out that this attack was deliberately planned and executed to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the beginning of the Armenian terror by Mıgırdiç's gun in Santa Barbara, 1973.

The revisiting of Santa Barbara with yet another bloody attack demonstrated that in the last ten years Armenian terrorist organizations had strengthened and their activities became bolder and more sensational. With this self-confidence, they dared to challenge authorities all over the world and managed to get an international channel of communication through the use of terrorism to spread their genocide claims and demands from Turkey, as part of a successful propaganda operation.²⁶⁶

Tercüman gave the news about the murder of Kemal Arıkan as the main news item on the front page. It said, "Yet another diplomat of ours was murdered." But the main caption was read as, "Disgrace for the world." Actually, *Tercüman* linked the assassination of Arıkan to the developments in the Council of Europe against Turkey. Due to human rights violations in Turkey, certain delegates in the Council

²⁶⁴ Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism The Past, the Present, the Prospects*, p. 186.

²⁶⁵ "Dünya için Yüzkarası" *Tercüman*, 29 January 1982.

²⁶⁶ Kenneth Payne, "Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology and Terror" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Oxford: Routledge, 2009, p. 113.

of Europe wanted Turkey to be expelled from the Council of Europe²⁶⁷ Furthermore, it is known that European institutions have not been willing to admit Turkey as a part of Europe.²⁶⁸ *Tercüman* pointed out that the day these discussions were held in the Council, Arıkan was killed.²⁶⁹



"Disgrace for the World" *Tercüman*, 29 January 1982.

Tercüman, by presenting the news about the murder in Santa Barbara in a certain way, wanted to achieve two goals. On one hand, it wanted to inform its readers about yet another murder; on the other hand, it claimed out that human rights violations Turkey suffered in the hands of international actors were supported by "the world" and so wanted to prove that allegations against the Turkish military government about human rights abuses were groundless and Turkish government officials were the real victims of such abuses. Therefore, *Tercüman* used this assassination to support Kenan Evren's regime. There was strict pressure on the Turkish press by the military government such as restriction on the Turkish Radio and Television (hereafter TRT), to broadcast only foreign news which was not

²⁶⁷ "İnsan haklarına saygı göstermediğimiz iddiasıyla bizi Avrupa Konseyi'nden çıkarmaya çalıştıkları gün... Bir diplomatımıza daha katledildi." *Tercüman*, 29 January 1982. p. 1.

²⁶⁸ Kemal Karpat, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi 1800-2012* Timaş Yayınları: İstanbul, 2012, p. 272.

²⁶⁹ *Tercüman*, 29 January 1982.

against Turkey and, obviously, the government; and not to broadcast any news about anarchy, small fires and traffic accidents of no interest, and news against the National Security council and martial law²⁷⁰. Despite this, there was apparently no order to use Armenian terrorist activities in support of Evren's government.

After Kemal Arıkan's murder, Mumcu wrote another article reminding his audience once more about the fact that the Armenian terror was not a simple act of violence stemming from historical desires of some Armenians who felt victimized, but an international conspiracy involving arms and drug trafficking as well as smuggling.²⁷¹ *Cumhuriyet* did not only give news about the murder but also tried to analyze the Armenian terrorism. Three days after Arıkan's murder, Uğur Mumcu published an article called "Armenian Terror" in his column "Gözlem".²⁷² Since 1975, Uğur Mumcu had emphasized the relationship between Armenian terrorism, arms trafficking and drug smuggling.

The Armenian pressure was so effective and high in that period that a lecture which was to be given by Professor Stanford J. Shaw, the eminent Ottoman history at the University of California, Los Angeles, was blocked by the university administration. The Ankara University Department of Political Sciences wrote a letter to the Rector of UCLA, Charles E. Young condemning the pressure on Professor Stanford J. Shaw.²⁷³ However, Armenian terrorism, receiving the support of the Armenian Diaspora and lobbies behind it, did not allow any alternative views uttered by even American historians in the USA.

²⁷⁰ Birand, *12 Eylül Türkiye'nin Miladı* "14 Eylül 1980 günü TRT'ye yollanan üç maddelik emir şunları kapsıyordu: - Dış haberler: Aleyhimize olmayan dış haberler verilebilir. - İç Haberler: Anarşiye ait haberler verilmeyecektir. - Herkesi ilgilendirmeyen küçük yangın ve trafik kazası gibi haberler verilmeyecektir. - Milli Güvenlik Konseyi ve sıkıyönetime karşı haberler verilmeyecektir. - Aksi belirtilmedikçe MGK bildirileri günde üç defa, sıkıyönetin bildirileri iki defa yayınlanacaktır. - 12 Eylül Müdahalesi'yle ilgili halkla röportajlar yapılacak, daha ziyade orta yaşlılarla konuşulacaktır. Röportaj yayına girmeden önce de tasvip alınacaktır.", p. 165.

²⁷¹ Mumcu, "Gözlem 'Ermeni Terörü'." *Cumhuriyet*, 01 February 1982, p. 7.

²⁷² Mumcu, "Gözlem 'Ermeni Terörü'." *Cumhuriyet*, 01 February 1982, p. 7.

²⁷³ "SBF, Prof. Shaw'ın Ermeni Sorunları ile ilgili dersinin engellenmesini kınadı. Los Angeles'taki Kaliforniya Üniversitesi rektörüne yollanan mektupta, 'Saygın bir araştırmacı olan Prof. Shaw'a yapılan baskıdan kaygı duyduğumuzu bildiririz' denildi." *Cumhuriyet*, 06 February 1982. p. 4.

3.3. The Bloody Year: 1982

The assassination of Kemal Arıkan was the beginning of an acceleration of Armenian terrorist attacks. From April until August, each month an attack against the Turkish diplomatic corps was executed in different parts of the world. Kani Güngör, who was Counselor for Commercial Affairs, was shot in Ottawa on April 8, 1982.²⁷⁴ Less than a month later, Orhan Gündüz, Honorary Consul was murdered in Boston on May 4.²⁷⁵ Erkut Akbay, Administrative Attaché and his wife Nadide Akbay were assassinated in Lisbon on June 7.²⁷⁶ Following the murders of these diplomats, for the first time, a military member, Military Attaché Air Pilot Staff Officer Colonel Atilla Altıkat was murdered in Ottawa, Canada in his car.²⁷⁷ The terrorist attack was undertaken by JCAG and Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA).²⁷⁸



Milliyet, 28 August 1982.

²⁷⁴ "Yeni bir Ermeni saldırısı olduğu öne sürülüyor - Ottawa Ticaret Müşaviri Güngör vuruldu." *Milliyet*, 09 April 1982, p. 1.

²⁷⁵ "Boston Fahri Konsolosumuz Orhan Gündüz şehit edildi - Reagan: Ermenilere ödün verilmeyecek" *Milliyet*, 05 May 1982, p. 1.

²⁷⁶ "Evren: Suçluların yakalanmasını sabırla bekliyoruz - FBI Uyardı: Hedef Washington Büyükelçiliği - Şehit ataşe Akbay'ın eşi Nadide Akbay'ın sağlık durumu çok ciddi." *Milliyet*, 09 June 1982, p. 1.

²⁷⁷ Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, p. 551.

²⁷⁸ Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism The Past, the Present, the Prospects*, p. 199.

The frequency of these attacks was closely related to the martial law that Turkey was subjected to.²⁷⁹ The militarist image of the state made the Armenian terrorist organization more active than before. According to Laçiner, Turkey's image was not positive in Europe due to the coup and Turkey failed to communicate its case to the European countries properly.²⁸⁰ Kamuran Gürün, too, criticized the Turkish failure to even follow the publications on Armenian allegations and have an archive about the matter.²⁸¹ Moreover, Turkish administrations did not even look into their own archives, let alone research foreign archives and have serious debates on them.²⁸²

Besides this lack of knowledge and intelligence about the Armenian allegations on the part of the Turkish state, the Turkish press failed to present a better understanding of Armenian terrorism. These all emboldened Armenian terrorist organizations; hence they aimed to harm Turkey, especially its new military regime, as much as they could. The assassination of Atilla Altukat was planned to serve this purpose.

Armenian terrorist attacks were not limited to the murder of Turkish diplomats. By 1982, in a period of strict martial law in the country, ASALA was able to commit crimes in Turkey.²⁸³ Three Armenian terrorists killed 3 security guards and 5 civilians, also injuring 72 people at Ankara Esenboğa Airport on August 8, 1982.²⁸⁴ One of the terrorists was killed and two others were captured wounded. The terrorists were members of ASALA. Levon Ekmekjian, who was captured,

²⁷⁹ Laçiner, *Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 203.

²⁸⁰ Laçiner, *Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası*, "Özellikle Avrupa ile ikili ilişkileri büyük sekteye uğrayan askeri yönetim, Ermeni saldırıları karşısında Batılı ülkeler ile ciddi bir iletişim eksikliği yaşamış ve argümanlarını dünyaya ikna edici bir şekilde anlatamamıştır.", p. 203.

²⁸¹ Kamuran Gürün, *Fırtınalı Yıllar, Dışişleri Müsteşarlığı Anıları*, "Türkiye henüz o tarihe kadar Ermeni iddialarını içeren kitapları, belgeleri, dergileri vb. dahi takip etmemiş, bu konuda bir arşiv dahi oluşturamamıştır." İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1995, p. 205.

²⁸² Laçiner, *Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası*, "1980 tarihi itibarıyla Türk arşivleri kapalıdır ve diğer ülke arşivlerindeki bilgiler ise Türkiye'ye getirilmemiş, ciddi bir değerlendirmeden geçirilmemiştir.", p. 203.

²⁸³ "ASALA Cinayetlerini Türkiye'ye Taşdı" *Milliyet*, 08 August 1982, p. 1.

²⁸⁴ "3 Terörist Esenboğa'da, 3'ü güvenlik görevlisi 8 kişiyi öldürdü, 72 kişiyi yaraladı." *Milliyet*, 08 August 1982, p. 1.

was taken to court and sentenced to death²⁸⁵ by the military court.²⁸⁶ After the declaration of his sentence, Ekmekjian expressed his regret and cried.²⁸⁷ While the Bulgarian police searched for the Armenian terrorists who were members of ASALA, the Ekmekjian case became a tool of propaganda for the benefit of Turkey. For instance, ASALA terrorist Levon Ekmekjian's regretful expressions were intended to be integrated into a documentary on the Armenian genocide claims.²⁸⁸ On January 29, 1983, Armenian terrorist Levon Ekmekjian was executed in Ankara.²⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the news on Armenian terrorism provided a contribution to ASALA's goal with the mass destruction in Ankara Esenboğa Airport.

According to *Son Havadis*, Ekmekjian's statements of regret over killing innocent Turks and his apologies from Turks were circulated in the press both abroad and in Turkey by Turkish authorities. Ekmekjian's blame of historians writing about the Armenian representation of history took its place in newspapers, too.²⁹⁰ But in any case, Ekmekjian was executed in Ankara at the beginning of 1983.²⁹¹

3.4. An Assassination in the Eastern Bloc and more

While the case of Ekmekjian was on the agenda, five days after the funeral of Military Attaché Air Pilot Staff Officer Colonel Atilla Altıkat in Ankara, on

²⁸⁵ "Ekmekçıyan İçin Karar Tek Celsede Verildi." *Milliyet*, 08 September 1982, p. 1.

²⁸⁶ "Ankara Özel Sıkıyönetim Komutanlığı 3 nolu Askeri Mahkemesi'nce ölüm cezasına çarptırılan Esenboğa katliamı sanığı Ermeni terörist Levon Ekmekçıyan'ın dosyasına Askeri Yargıtay 1. Dairesi bakacaktır." *Milliyet*, 29 September 1982, p. 12.

²⁸⁷ "Ermeni Terörist Konuşurken Ağladı - Ekmekçıyan: Bin Kere Pişmanım" *Milliyet*, 06 October 1982, p. 6.

²⁸⁸ "Ermeni ASALA Örgütü teröristi Levon Ekmekçıyan'ın Ankara'da yargılanırken yaptığı açıklamaların dünyaya dağıtıldığı, bu konuda bir de film hazırlandığı bildirildi. *Son Havadis*, 11 September 1982, p. 1.

²⁸⁹ "Ekmekçıyan İdam Edildi." *Milliyet*, 29 January 1983, p. 1.

²⁹⁰ "Ekmekçıyan'ın yargılanması, ölüm cezası ve mahkemede söyledikleri, pişmanlığı ve Türklerden özür dilemesi anlatılmış. Ekmekçıyan'ın Ermeni tarihini yazan tarihçileri suçlaması ve terörün hatalarını belirtmesi de gazetelerde yer aldı." *Son Havadis*, 11 September 1982, p. 6.

²⁹¹ "Ekmekçıyan İdam Edildi." *Milliyet*, 29 January 1983, p. 1.

September 9, 1982, Administrative Attaché to Burgas Bora Suelkan was murdered²⁹². Bulgaria was the first Eastern Bloc country in which Armenian terror showed its face. A phone call to the Associated Press expressed that the murder was undertaken by ASALA.²⁹³ Around the location where Suelkan was murdered, a surgical glove, 7.65 mm "Walter" pistol and a piece of cloth, on which "We shot the Turkish diplomat" was written were found.²⁹⁴



Milliyet, 10 September 1982.

Three days after Suelkan's murder, some newspapers were celebrating the anniversary of the September 12 coup. *Son Havadis* declared: "A peaceful September 12"²⁹⁵ and "Terrorism had been drained".²⁹⁶ However, Armenian terrorist activities continued as the Ambassador Galip Balkar in Belgrade was killed on March 9, 1983. This terrorist attack was undertaken by rightist Armenian terrorist groups JCAG and ARA.²⁹⁷ The JCAG and the ARA increased the density of their attacks. In the following four months, two more Turkish diplomats were murdered in two different cities. Dursun Aksoy, Administrative Attaché to

²⁹² Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, p. 584.

²⁹³ "Associated Press ajansına telefon eden biri olayı ASALA'nın üstlendiğini söylemiştir." *Milliyet*, 10 September 1982, p. 8.

²⁹⁴ "İdari ataşemizin şehit edildiği yerde, bir cerrahi eldiveni, 7.65mm'lik bir 'Walter' tabanca ve üzerinde 'Türk diplomatını biz vurduk' yazılı beyaz bir kumaş parçası bulundu." *Son Havadis*, 10 September 1982, p. 1.

²⁹⁵ "Huzur ve Barış İçinde Bir 12 Eylül" *Son Havadis*, 12 September 1982, p. 1.

²⁹⁶ "Terör Kurutuldu" *Son Havadis*, 12 September 1982.

²⁹⁷ Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism, The Past The Present The Prospects*, p. 206.

Brussels was murdered on July 14, 1983 and Cahide Mıhçıoğlu, wife to the Counselor in Lisbon, was murdered on July 27, 1983.²⁹⁸ However, it was observed that after the execution of Levon Ekmekjian in January 1983, ASALA stopped its activities until April 28, 1984, and with the assassination of Embassy secretary Sadiye Yönder's husband Işık Yönder in Tehran²⁹⁹, ASALA activities started again.

3.5. Cessation of Armenian Terrorism

ASALA's bloody bombing in Orly Airport, in front of the Turkish Airlines Bureau on 15 July 1983, is considered the beginning of the end of ASALA's terrorism. According to Lütem, "Especially the death of four Frenchmen in this incident changed the attitude of French government."³⁰⁰ France exerted its influence upon other European countries and terrorists began to be taken under surveillance.³⁰¹ Interestingly, Varoujian Garbidjian, who had been educated as a commando in Palestine terror camps since 1975 and organized the bombing at the Orly Airport, was given a valid passport and resident permit in France.³⁰² Eight people were killed and more than 60 wounded as a result of the attack. One French, one American with his Turkish fiancé, and one Greek-American were killed besides the Turks.³⁰³ Among the casualties were French citizens and hence this weakened the French support to the ASALA. In any case ASALA and other Armenian organizations achieved their goal of making the Armenian case known world-wide

²⁹⁸ Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism, The Past The Present The Prospects*, p. 211.

²⁹⁹ Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism, The Past The Present The Prospects* p. 216.

³⁰⁰ Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p.44.

³⁰¹ Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p.44.

³⁰² Laçiner, "*Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası*," p. 172.

³⁰³ Laçiner, "*Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası*," p. 270.

and created a unity in the Armenian Diaspora around the aim of making genocide claims accepted by international public opinion.³⁰⁴

The Armenian terrorist activities took place in 19 different countries including Turkey and caused the death of 70 people while 524 were injured during these attacks. Not only Turkish people but also citizens of the host countries were killed, injured or taken hostage. The Orly Massacre, which was considered a mistake even by ASALA itself³⁰⁵ led to the cessation of support for Armenian terror from France and similar countries and forced ASALA to abandon its murder policy.

Table V: Distribution of Incidents of Murder, Injury and Hostage-Taking According to Armenian Terrorist Organizations and Countries

Countries	ASALA				JCAG				Other Organizations				Total
	Murder	Injury	Hostage-Taking	Total	Murder	Injury	Hostage-Taking	Total	Murder	Injury	Hostage-Taking	Total	
France	18	205	68	291	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	292
Turkey	15	95	25	135	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	135
Spain	3	16	0	19	0	48	0	48	0	0	0	0	67
Italy	0	23	0	23	1	0	0	1	0	9	0	9	33
Switzerland	1	31	0	32	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	33
Lebanon	4	26	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	31
Germany	2	25	0	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	27
Canada	0	1	0	1	2	1	12	15	0	0	0	0	16
USA	0	0	0	0	2	7	0	9	2	3	0	5	14
Iran	3	6	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	10
Austria	1	0	0	1	2	5	0	7	0	0	0	0	8
Portugal	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	2	3	0	5	7
Denmark	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	6
Yugoslavia	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
Greece	3	2	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Australia	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	2	0	2	4
Belgium	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
The Netherlands	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Bulgaria	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	53	435	93	581	13	67	12	92	4	22	0	26	699

Distribution of Incidents of Murder, Injury and Hostage-Taking According to Armenian Terrorist Organizations and Countries³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2010. p. 409. The Armenian terrorism was stopped with the efforts of National Intelligence Organization (MİT - Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı). The operations on cessation of Armenian terrorism run with the help of Abdullah Çatlı. For more detailed information see: Tuncay Özkan, *MİT'in Gizli Tarihi*, İstanbul: ALFA Basım Yayım Dağıtım, 2003. p. 298-300.

³⁰⁵ Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism The Past, The Present, The Prospects*, p. 59.

³⁰⁶ Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p.44.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

In the period when Armenian terrorist activities started to target Turkish diplomats in 1973 (officially in 1975), the Turkish political scene was polarized. Each newspaper in general represented an ideological stance and was affiliated with a political party and its leader. Within this polarized atmosphere, the Turkish press could not initially comprehend the seriousness of the terrorism targeting Turkey abroad. Even in 1975, with the killings of Turkish ambassadors in Paris and Vienna, the Turkish press focused on the possibility of Greek terrorism towards Turkey due to the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, rather than understanding that although the Armenian terrorist organization had links with Greek and Greek Cypriot paramilitary groups, they had a separate agenda to pursue and challenge Turkey accordingly.

Instead of finding out the roots and connections of Armenian terrorism and putting pressure on Turkish governments to solve this problem, the Turkish press indulged in using this national issue as a part of its domestic quarrel. Nationalist newspapers published heroic speeches and articles representing the benevolence of Turks towards Armenians, while accusing the Turkish left of being in cooperation with Armenian terrorist organizations. On the other hand, Turkish leftist newspapers accused of the other newspapers of ignoring the connections of Armenian terrorism and hence implying a general conspiracy against Turkey, in which these newspapers somehow took a part.

After the September 12, 1980 coup, Turkey entered a new political phase in its history, the political parties were closed, their leaders were jailed, thousands of people were arrested, but the Armenian terrorist activities accelerated rather than stopping. Within this atmosphere of pressure, the Turkish press's attitude did not change dramatically, but it changed dimensionally.

On the whole, the years between 1973 and 1984, the political cleavages were the ultimate question for Turkish newspapers. Between 1973 and 1980, the political

challenge was explicit. When martial law was declared on September 12, 1980, the clash at least appeared to have ceased. Even a national question could not prevent the newspapers and political groups in Turkey from challenging each other. The insufficient intelligence of the newspapers prevented Turkey from expressing herself even domestically. Furthermore, even today, Turkey cannot defend herself abroad. Turkey will become much better equipped and effective about the Armenian question only if information is transferred to the Turkish public. Hence, Turkey should take the Armenian question seriously and use the fertility of historical materials. Thus, Turkey will be able to persuade the countries which are blinded by Armenian allegations.

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APPENDIX A

The List of Victims of the Armenian Terrorism (1973-1980)

27.01.1973	<i>Los Angeles, Santa Barbara / Consul General</i>	<i>Mehmet BAYDAR</i>
	<i>Consul</i>	<i>Bahadır DEMİR</i>
22.10.1975	<i>Vienna / Ambassador</i>	<i>Daniş TUNALIGİL</i>
24.10.1975	<i>Paris / Ambassador</i>	<i>İsmail EREZ</i>
	<i>Ambassador's Driver</i>	<i>Talip YENER</i>
16.02.1976	<i>Beirut / First Secretary</i>	<i>Oktar CİRİT</i>
09.06.1977	<i>Vatican City / Ambassador</i>	<i>Taha CARIM</i>
02.06.1978	<i>Madrid / Ambassador's Wife</i>	<i>Necla KUNERALP</i>
	<i>Retired Ambassador</i>	<i>Beşir BALCIOĞLU</i>
12.10.1979	<i>the Hague / Ambassador's Son</i>	<i>Ahmet BENLER</i>
22.12.1979	<i>Paris / Tourism Attaché</i>	<i>Yılmaz ÇOLPAN</i>
31.07.1980	<i>Athens / Administrative Attaché</i>	<i>Galip ÖZMEN</i>
	<i>Athens / Attaché's Daughter</i>	<i>Neslihan ÖZMEN</i>

APPENDIX B

A List of Assassinated Diplomats between 12 September 1980 and 1984

17.12.1980	<i>Sydney / Consul General</i>	<i>Şarık ARIYAK</i>
	<i>Guard</i>	<i>Engin SEVER</i>
04.03.1981	<i>Paris / Labour Attaché</i>	<i>Reşat MORALI</i>
	<i>Religious Affairs Attaché</i>	<i>Tecelli ARI</i>
09.06.1981	<i>Geneva/ Secretary</i>	<i>M. Savaş YERGÜZ</i>
24.09.1981	<i>Paris/ Security Attaché</i>	<i>Cemal ÖZEN</i>
28.01.1982	<i>Los Angeles / Consul General</i>	<i>Kemal ARIKAN</i>
04.05.1982	<i>Boston / Honorary Consul General</i>	<i>Orhan GÜNDÜZ</i>
07.06.1982	<i>Lisbon / Administrative Attaché</i>	<i>Erkut AKBAY</i>
	<i>Wife of Erkut AKBAY</i>	<i>Nadide AKBAY</i> (08.01.1983)
27.08.1982	<i>Ottawa / Military Attaché Colonel</i>	<i>Atilla ALTIKAT</i>
09.09.1982	<i>Burgas / Administrative Attaché</i>	<i>Bora SÜELKAN</i>
09.03.1983	<i>Belgrade / Ambassador</i>	<i>Galip BALKAR</i>
14.07.1983	<i>Brussels / Administrative Attaché</i>	<i>Dursun AKSOY</i>
27.07.1983	<i>Lisbon / Counsellor's Wife</i>	<i>Cahide MIHÇIOĞLU</i>
28.04.1984	<i>Tehran / Secretary's Husband</i>	<i>Işık YÖNDER</i>
20.06.1984	<i>Vienna/ Labour Attaché</i>	<i>Erdoğan ÖZEN</i>
19.11.1984	<i>Vienna / International Officer</i>	<i>Evner ERGUN</i>

APPENDIX C
TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ☐

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : ÇAĞAN
Adı : Hazel
Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Armenian Terrorism and the Turkish Press
(1973-1984)

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☐

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: