

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-COMMUNAL
FIGHTING IN CYPRUS: 1948-1974**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

BY

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**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

DECEMBER 2012

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ABSTRACT

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-COMMUNAL FIGHTING IN CYPRUS: 1948-1974

ÇALIŞKAN, MURAT

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December 2012, 166 pages

This thesis aims to examine the development of inter-communal fighting in Cyprus between 1948 and 1974. It focuses on the domestic factors of inter-communal fighting by analyzing the gradual evolution of Greek and Turkish Cypriot stances. The thesis argues that the inter-communal fighting of Cyprus is rooted in the historical and domestic factors. This thesis analyzes the continuities and changes in Cyprus politics. This work accordingly will examine the articulation of various political and social factors in Cyprus. Contrary to the prevailing dominant perspective, this thesis mentions that the inter-communal fighting was not the product of only external forces but their articulation with domestic factors as they evolved historically. Therefore, the issue of “ethnic polarization” will be emphasized as the basic source of the conflict. Evaluating the development of inter-communal struggle, this thesis also emphasizes the gradual mobilization and the eventual politicization of the main aims of the Greek and Turkish communities.

Keywords: Turkish Nationalism, Greek Nationalism, Civil War, Cyprus Question.

ÖZ

KIBRIS' TA TOPLUMLAR ARASI ÇATIŞMANIN GELİŞİMİ : 1948-1974

ÇALIŞKAN, MURAT

Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç

Aralık 2012, 166 Sayfa

Bu tez 1948-1974 tarihleri arasında Kıbrıs'ta toplumlararası çatışmanın gelişimini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tez, Kıbrıs Rum ve Türk toplumlarının aşamalı dönüşümünü inceleyerek, toplumlararası çatışmanın yerel etkenlerine odaklanmaktadır. Çalışma, Kıbrıs siyasetindeki süreklilikleri ve değişiklikleri de incelemektedir. Bu tez toplumlar arası çatışmanın tarihsel ve yerel etmenlere kök saldığını iddia etmektedir. Tarihsel süreç içinde Kıbrıs'ta gelişen çeşitli siyasi ve kültürel yapıların birbirine eklenmesini de incelenecektir. Tezde genel iddianın aksine, Kıbrıs'taki toplumlararası çatışmanın sadece dış kaynakların bir ürünü olmadığı belirtilmektedir. Bu nedenle, “etnik kutuplaşma” konusu toplumlararası çatışmanın temel kaynağı olarak vurgulanacaktır. Toplumlararası çatışmanın gelişimi değerlendirilirken, ayrıca Kıbrıs Türk ve Rum toplumlarının amaçları doğrultusunda harekete geçip siyasallaşma süreçleri de incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Milliyetçiliği, Yunan Milliyetçiliği, İç Savaş, Kıbrıs Sorunu.

To My Mother Selma

And

To the Memory of My Father Mustafa

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç for his guidance, patience, criticism and insight about the thesis. I am also extremely grateful to his valuable friendship whenever I became low-spirited.

I record my sincere thanks to my committee members Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevilay Kahraman for their contribution and kind help. I also owe thanks to all academic staff of the Department of International Relations for their deep knowledge and friendship.

I am deeply grateful to all special people in Cyprus who helped me in many ways during my field work in North Cyprus. In addition, I wish to express my sense of gratitude to one and all who, directly or indirectly, have lent their helping hand in this work.

I would like to express my special thanks to Instructor Şükran Gizem Güzel from METU Department of Modern Languages and my Greek friend Georgios Giannopoulos from the University of Athens for the translation of Greek Cypriot newspapers.

Finally, I express my deepest thanks to my mother Selma Çalışkan and my sister Feyhan Çalışkan (Caymaz) who have supported me throughout my life.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKEL	<i>Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou</i> (Progressive Working People's Party/The Communist Party of Cyprus)
EOKA	<i>Etniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston</i> (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)
EM	<i>Ethnikon Metapon</i> (National Front 1968-1970)
EU	European Union
FTA	<i>Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu</i> (Federation of Turkish Association)
KATAK	<i>Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu</i> (Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus)
KITEMB	<i>Kıbrıs Türk Mukavemet Birliği</i> (Cyprus Turkish Resistance Union)
KTKKF	<i>Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Kurumları Federasyonu</i> (Cyprus Turkish Cultural Associations)
KTMHP	<i>Kıbrıs Türk Milli Halk Partisi</i> (Cyprus Turkish National People's Party)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHEN	<i>Orthodoxos Christianiki Enosis Neon</i> (Orthodox Christian Union of Youth)

PEO	<i>Pankypria Ergatiki Omospondia</i> (Pancyprian Federation of Labour)
PEON	<i>Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis Neolaisas</i> (Pan-Cyprian National Youth Organization)
TMT	<i>Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı</i> (Turkish Resistance Organization)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus
US	United States of America

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Objective and Content:

This work will attempt to make a detailed examination of inter-communal fighting in Cyprus between 1948 and 1974 by focusing on the importance of domestic actors. Generally speaking, the thesis argues that inter-communal fighting in Cyprus was the inevitable outcome of deep ethnic rivalry. In other words, this thesis attempts to challenge to the mainstream argument of “divide and rule” policy pursued by the British. This approach merely reduces the conflict into the level of imperialist manipulation. Needless to say, it largely ignores the domestic factors which are the root cause of inter-communal clashes in Cyprus.

The historical context and the psychological environment shape the ethnic conflicts. This thesis focuses upon one specific area: the process of the development of inter-communal struggle in Cyprus that is generated in historical, psychological and social perceptions. In other words, this work examines how the way domestic factors are articulated and developed historically. After the Ottoman conquest, large numbers of Turkish settlers were exported from Anatolia to Cyprus. Therefore, dual society emerged with total cultural, linguistic and political differences. The separateness of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus during British and Ottoman times was fed by growing suspicion, mistrust and antipathy based on the two historically different communities’ roles. Therefore, when Greek armed campaign appeared in 1955, it immediately revived the “negative passions” on both sides (Reddaway, 2001: 28). The emotional-psychological dispositions and ethnic bonds of solidarity

constituted the basis of social and political thinking among the Turks and Greek of Cyprus.

This thesis will attempt to highlight some neglected points in the literature because academic research related to the island of Cyprus especially that concerning the ongoing dispute has tended to focus on the island's geopolitical importance. The recent oil crises and the dispute on exclusive economic zones which deteriorate intercommunal relations sharply underline the geopolitical importance of the island. While the literature on Cyprus conflict largely focuses on material issues such as great power politics, Cold War relations, property issue or energy issue, the internal dynamics of the conflict have been ignored. In other words, the autonomous political forces of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been largely underweighted. The primary aim of this work is to address the internal dynamics of the development of intercommunal fighting in Cyprus. In order to achieve this, this work discusses the role of domestic actors and factors in the Cypriot civil-war.

Secondly, the analysis of Cyprus inter-communal fighting contributes to the literature of civil war within context of the contemporary conflicts of its time such as the Algerian War (1956-1962), the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1991) and the Troubles of Northern Ireland (1968-1998). There can be no doubt that post Cold War era had been characterized by increasing numbers of ethnic and religious civil-wars. A special emphasis is given on the late period of the British colonial administration (1870-1960), particularly after 1948, in order to explore the rapid mobilization of the Greek and Turkish communities. Consequently, historical analysis and sociological explanations have been essential parts of the work.

This thesis comprises four main body chapters. After the introduction, the second chapter presents a detailed history of Cyprus since the first Greek-speaking people arrived on the island. The articulation of a variety of domestic factors (the establishment of autonomous Church, Turkish settlers, Ottoman administration and British Colonial administration) are also being examined. Generally speaking, the

chapter is a reflection on the Byzantine, Latin, Ottoman and British rule of Cyprus in a historical perspective.

The third chapter is devoted to the discussion of the rapid politicization and mobilization of Greek and Turkish communities. Social and political factors which contributed to the development of the political consciousness of Greek and Turkish communities will be analyzed. Special consideration is given to the emergence of political consciousness within the Greek and Turkish Cypriot intelligentsia. Meanwhile, the idea of being the descendants of Ottoman conquerors and upholders of the republican Turkey constituted the basis of Turkish political consciousness, whereas Orthodox Church of Cyprus, Hellenic education network and the ages-old dream of uniting Cyprus with its ancient homeland Greece, *enosis* (*Ενωσης*), paved the way for Greek political cause.

In the fourth part, the late British colonial period (1878-1959) is examined by taking into account the political developments of the era. Firstly, as a kind of internal socialization, Greek Cypriots had an uncompromised insistence on *enosis*. From mid-1950, such claims were answered by the Turkish thesis of partition (*taksim*). Secondly, the chapter mainly explains the emergence of armed movements with the period between 1948 and 1959. Therefore, the period between 1948 and 1959 was marked by increasing tension, inter-communal street fighting and the increased involvement of Greece and Turkey in the conflict.

In the fifth part, the post-independent period (1960-1974) is analyzed. Whilst, London and Zurich agreements established an independent republic of Cyprus, the enmity between the two communities was still very powerful. Then, in the first part of the chapter, the constitutional disputes are discussed. My analysis focuses on the uncompromised insistence of the Greek Cypriot uncompromised insistence on a unilateral amendment of the constitution in favor of the Greek majority. It will be emphasized that such insistence is the main source of inter-communal violence between 1963 and 1964. In the second part of the chapter, a detailed analysis of the

inter-communal fighting in the island will be presented. Therefore, the inter-communal tension was fed by the stubbornness of Greek Cypriots whenever Turkish Cypriots claimed some sort of political autonomy. Following the analysis of the inter-communal relations between 1964 and 1968, I will examine the new wave of *enosis* movement which developed in its own path. Although, it was largely promoted and defended by Greece, the power of the *enosis* spirit was undeniable among the Greek Cypriots. The chapter concludes with the Turkish operation of 1974.

The sixth chapter concludes with an overview of the evaluation of Cypriot politics by taking into account of the debates in previous chapters.

1.2 The Argument and Theory:

The thesis argues that the basic cause of the inter-communal conflict in Cyprus was long-simmering resentment stemming from historical differences between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. In other words, the inter-communal polarization in ideological and ethnic senses paved the way for the bloodshed. The inter-communal struggle was motivated by the deep group rivalry between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. The priorities for these communities have been the Greek Cypriot insistence on union with Greece and Turkish Cypriot concern about the communal survival. Consequently, I argue that this conflict was historically rooted and based primarily on the internal factors.

The issue of civil war has caught the great attention of social scientists from various disciplines since the end of the Cold War. The literature on the issue flourished in the 1990s in response to the increase of ethnic and religious conflicts in the post Cold War era. Due to gradual evolution of warfare, new concepts have been developed. The concept of total war (First World War, Second World War) gives place to the new wars¹ such as anti-colonial wars, wars of liberation and civil wars in post-

¹ Between 1945 and 1999, 146 civil wars took place (Kalyvas, 2006: 54).

colonial countries. The majority of analysis of inter-communal conflicts that had occurred during the Cold War emphasized the importance of external factors in the generation of conflict. Thus, in the civil war literature, Cyprus was largely ignored. Exceptionally, Azar (1990) identifies the Cyprus conflict as a “protracted conflict” by focusing on its internal developments. Lake & Rotchild (1996: 41) argue that “ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future. Political memories and emotions also magnify these anxieties, driving groups further apart”.

This work has been inspired by the sociological approach of Stathis Kalyvas to the civil wars, and psychological approach of Theodor Adorno. Kalyvas (2003) took a neo-Clausewitzian approach to the civil wars, claiming that the study of civil wars requires a sociological approach. According to Kalyvas (2003:19) civil wars have been associated with the “deep pre-war divisions and conflicts, referred to as polarization”. Although Kalyvas (2006: 85) points out that each polarization does not necessarily lead to a civil war, it is a compelling account of the origins of such war. In other words, violence is the expression of long-established strife, separateness and mistrusts which Kalyvas (2006: 65) calls “theory of *ex ante* or prewar conflict”.

The root of polarization theory is traced to the Schmittian concept of politics. According to Schmitt the term “politics” can be understood “only in the context of ever present possibility of friend and enemy grouping” (Mouffle, 2000: 49). In Cyprus, the gradual evolution of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot stances approached to extremes of in-group and out-group distinction due to various historical reasons. Needless to say, such distinction was fed by growing distrust and antipathy. Schmitt (2007) also points out that “ideological polarization” constituted the basis of such local conflicts. In Cyprus, leaving aside the ideological enmity, the ethnic polarization reached its peak when the Greek Cypriot armed campaign appeared in 1955. There can be no doubt that the roots of polarization goes back to the pre-existing historical circumstances. It can be argued that an “uncompromising and

passionate commitment for a particular cause” (union with Greece or partition of the island) created a strong sense of polarization in Cyprus (Kalyvas, 2006: 66). Theodor Adorno had similar observations. Adorno (1950) argues that psychological dispositions which were fuelled by ancient blood feuds, uncertainty, aspirations and mutual fears constituted the basis of social thinking. Therefore, civil war turns out to be the product of the established authoritarian group relations.

With these theoretical inspirations, the thesis explains the historical development of inter-communal fighting in Cyprus. With regard to high-sense of inter-communal polarization as Schmitt and Kalyvas argue, it shows that the perpetuated ethnic conflict is continuous and protracted, but depends on changing conditions. Therefore, I have presented an interdisciplinary response to the Cyprus inter-communal fighting.

1.3 Cyprus, the People and the Dispute:

The name of Cyprus was derived from a Hebrew word of *Kopher* or Acadian word of *Cuprom* which referred to the abundant copper resources (Çevikel, 2000: 4). While Arabs and Turks called it *Kıbrıs*, it was *Κύπρος* (Kypros) in Greek language. French Historian Braudel (1972) pointed out that like Crete, Sicily and Rhodes, Cyprus was like a “miniature continent”. Alan James emphasized that “throughout recorded time, the political experience of Cyprus has reflected the interlocking impact of two utterly basic geographic factors: size and location” (Joseph, 2009: 377). Cyprus is the third largest island lying in the north-eastern part of the Mediterranean with an approximate area of 9.251 square kilometers (3,572 square miles) including the small Cape Andreas Island (Crouzet, 1973: 31). It has approximately the same size “as the Lebanon, Puerto Rico or the English counties of Norfolk and Suffolk combined” (Stavrínides, 1979: 9). Cyprus occupies a very strategic position between the Middle East, North Africa and Anatolia. It is located 60 miles west of Syria, 40 miles south of Turkey, 240 miles north of Egypt and 575 miles from the Greek mainland. The island has rocky coastal line with sandy beaches (Taeuber, 1955: 4). While Troodos Mountains (rising to 1,951 metres) hosting several mountain villages occupies the south-west of the island, Kyrenia (Beşparmak) mountains (rising to 1,024 metres)

stretch from the village of Kormatiki (Koruçam) to the Carpassian peninsula (Morag, 2004: 596). The Mesoria and Morphou (Güzelyurt) valleys, “arsenal of granary, wheat and barley since the Venetian times”, constitute the two main central plateau of the island (Jennings, 1993:1).

The population of Cyprus is made up mainly Turks and Greeks. Maronites, Armenians and Latins constitute the rest of the population. The Turks were both originally exported from Anatolia and descended from those participants who took place in the conquest. The Turks of Cyprus are followers of the Islamic faith. They speak a very close language with an accent to the mainland Anatolian Turkish (*Oğuz Lehçesi*). Greek Cypriots adopted the Eastern Orthodox Christianity. They speak a dialect of Greek (known as *Arcado-Cypriot*) (Morag, 2004: 599). In 1862, the British vice-council of Cyprus described the Cypriots as follows: “Christians are less active and enterprising but they have a reputation in the Levant for cunning and keenness in business. The Muslims have little of the fanatical spirit and bigotry of the Arabs but they assert their superiority” (Luke, 1969: 210).

Historically, the demography of Cyprus changed several times due to locust, epidemics, plague, hunger and political developments. It was estimated that the island had approximately 200,000 inhabitants in the wake of the Ottoman conquest (Taeuber, 1955: 7). In 1571, the Ottoman sources recorded that 120,000 taxable people lived in the island (Jennings, 1993: 174). Archimandite Kyprianos, a historian of 18th century, put Turkish population at 47,000 and Greek population at 50,000 in 1764-1777 (Çevikel, 2000: 217). Towards the end of the 18th century, historian De Vezin estimated that there were 60,000 Greeks and 20,000 Turks (Luke, 1969: 76). The Turks constituted 32 percent of the population by 1640 when the population of the island was 120-140,000 (Dodd, 2010: 1; Jennings, 1993: 198). The Greek consul of Cyprus estimated that population was 165,000 in 1865 (Mirgabheri, 2010: 17).

After Great Britain took administration of Cyprus as a result of the Russian-Turkish War of 1878, many Turks left the island. The first British census reported that the

population of Cyprus was 186,000 (71 percent Greek Orthodox and 24,4 percent Muslim Turks) in 1881 (Melamid, 1956: 356). The following decades were marked by an increasing flight of Turks in Cyprus to mainland Anatolia. When the Republic of Cyprus came into existence, the Greek Cypriots constituted 78 percent of the population (approximately 600,000) while Turks constituted 18 percent. Because of their former status as the ruling community, urbanization among Turkish Cypriots was higher than Greeks. In 1881, 25.4 percent of the Turks lived in towns while only 13.0 percent of the Greeks did (Taeuber, 1955: 12).

According to the 4 December 2011 population census, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Public Information Office and the TRNC State Planning Organization, TRNC has 294,906 citizens (<http://www.kktcenf.org>) while the statistical service of the Republic of Cyprus (the de-facto Greek Cypriot administration of South Cyprus) claims that “the population in the Government controlled area is estimated at 796,900 at the end of 2008” (<http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics>).

The definition of the Cyprus question is a hard issue. For Turkish Cypriots, the unilateral annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain in 1915 signaled the beginning of the Cyprus question. According to Greek Cypriots, there was already a Cyprus question because Cyprus, sharing Hellenic culture and religion, had been detached from its Hellenic motherland for about 800 years. The establishment of an independent Greek Kingdom (1830) had significant impact on Greek Cypriot national consciousness. While Greek Cypriots demanded union with Greece, Turks adamantly opposed such claim from the beginning. Similarly, the dramatic end of the Ottoman rule in Cyprus removed the former status of Turks as the hegemonic community of the island. In the Turkish view, the island was an “integral and geological part of Turkish homeland” (Morag, 2004: 597). Dodd (2010: 7) argues that the Cyprus question was a “living example of, and inspiration for, the struggle for *enosis* from the Greek Cypriot perspective, and for the struggle to resist *enosis* from the Turkish Cypriot perspective”. Therefore, 19th and early 20th century

signaled the beginning of first inter-communal conflicts due to the Cretan question (1896-1913), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the Greek occupation of western Anatolia (1919-1922). Until the 1950s, the inter-communal relations had been characterized by mistrust, antipathy and hostility without manifested hatred. As Luke (1969: 9) stated, the Greek armed campaign in 1955 converted “the enchanted island into the disenchanting island”. From that date forward, Cyprus had been associated with bloodshed and violence.

When Greek Cypriots embarked the policy of union with Greece, Turks changed their position to *taksim* (partition) which was seen as a just solution to the Cyprus question. When the republic of Cyprus was established by the London and Zurich agreements in 1960, the communities’ desire for *enosis* and *taksim* desires were still very powerful. Armed clashes took place on December 1963 after Makarios’s insistence on unilateral amendments of the agreements in favor of Greek Cypriot majority. The following months were marked by increasing fighting between Greek and Turkish militias. From December 1963 to 1967, inter-communal fighting spread to every corner of the island. On 4 March 1964, the United Nations was authorized to form a peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) in Cyprus. While Turkish Cypriots retreated to the armed enclaves for the survival of the community after the inter-communal clashes of 1963-1964, Greek Cypriots affirmed a recognized and prosperous administration by ignoring the sufferings of their Turkish compatriots.

After 1967, Makarios focused on the consolidation of his regime instead of *enosis*. Therefore, he was ousted by a military *coup d'etat* by pro-Athens forces in Cyprus on July 15. Turkey decided that this was not tolerable because of the implications for the security of Turkish Cypriot community. Then, it embarked upon military intervention (*Operation Attila*) to stop the disorder and violence on 20 July 1974. Following the collapse of negotiations, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots launched a second operation on 14 August 1960. In consequence, 38 percent of the island came under Turkish control. Therefore, Turkish Cypriots enjoyed their liberation after long-years of suffering and humiliation. In 1975, the Turkish Cypriot Federated State

of Cyprus was declared. On 15 November 1983, The Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared independency and re-named this state as Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

Since 1968, inter-communal negotiations had continued. Nonetheless, the Greek and Turkish sides did not reach a solution. In 2004, Secretary General of United Nations Kofi Annan proposed a solution based on federal system. While 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the plan, more than 75 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected it. As of 2012, TRNC President Derviş Eroğlu and Greek Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias continue to negotiate. The Turkish side declares that they are unwilling to continue the negotiations after Greek Cypriot administration affirms the presidency of European Union (EU) on 20 July 2012. TRNC President Eroğlu publicly declares that “in case of the failure of the negotiations, the time of the recognition of the TRNC comes” (<http://www.kktcenf.org/tr/>).

Greek Cypriot scholars have proposed a history of Cyprus question “with the idea of integrated Cypriot society, devoid of any national, ethnic or even religious tensions” (Nevzat: 2005: 29). The mainstream Greek Cypriot argument is to claim that the peaceful environment of Cyprus and peaceful coexistence of Greek and Turkish Cypriots were destroyed by the imperialist Anglo-American conspiracy and the eternal desire of Turkish expansionism. Greek Cypriot scholars went so far to delegitimize the Turkish factor in the island. Kyriss (1976: 244) claims that the Ottoman settlers already had Christian roots because the relocations had a punitive nature. According to Jennings (1993: 12) Kyriss’s work was totally provocative. Such works were seen as a part of Greek Cypriot machinery of “propaganda and bribery employed by the Orthodox Church” (Nevzat & Hatay, 2009). Another Greek Cypriot narrative, particularly dominant among communist Greek Cypriots, argues that “it is imperialism, and particularly British imperialism, during the British colonial rule that engineered inter-communal strife, as far as 1958” as stated by the Secretary General of the Cyprus Communist Party (AKEL), Ezekias Papaioannou (Reddaway, 2001: 125). While emphasizing “the traditional coexistence” between

Turks and Greeks of Cyprus, AKEL has accused Greece, Turkey, and other foreign powers of having destroyed this coexistence (Papadakis, 1998: 155). Similarly, Pollis (1973: 580) claims that the inter-communal differences have been “institutionalized” and “sharpened” by British colonial rule. British Marxist historian Perry Anderson (2008) took a biased and partisan view of the Greek Cypriot to the Cyprus dispute, claiming that it was the British imperialism that manipulated the Turks and it was the Turkish extremist demands which caused frictions in the island in contrast to their disproportionate population.

On the other hand, Morgan (2005: 256) stresses that Great Britain had no such “deliberate plan to drive a wedge between the two communities”. On the contrary, “such divisions evolved from attempts to respond to the situation on the ground” (Morgan, 2005: 256). Reddaway (2001: 28) argues that “when the Cypriot peoples were left on their own and face to face, they would have greater difficulty in living together” because “inter-communal distrust and antipathy were rooted in the history”. Similarly, Turkish Cypriot views (Denktaş, 1988; Sonyel, 2003; Gazioğlu, 1994) centre on the fact that Cyprus was ruled by the Turks for three centuries and Turkish community has never been treated as a minority. The official Turkish Cypriot history thesis is based on the fact that Turks of Cyprus belong to the Turkish nation in Anatolia which they constitute the majority in the region while Greeks were a “a small minority” in regard to the whole geography (Bilge, 1961: 34). Volkan (2008) points out that Turks and Greeks of Cyprus had uneasy relations without manifested hatred until the development of Greek irredentist projects in the Balkans and Anatolia. Camp (1980: 69) points out that Turkish views of Cyprus were more consistent than Greek Cypriots because they “pushed for somehow partition” from the beginning.

Putting aside the absurdity and baselessness of the Greek Cypriot arguments, none of the Greek Cypriot or Marxist arguments addresses to the Greek Cypriot uncompromised insistence on union with Greece which devastated the inter-communal relations or the Greek Cypriot unilateral attempt to amend the


constitution. Moreover, Greek Cypriot arguments display hostile feelings toward Turks by ignoring and minimizing their separate existence, culture and claims. Greek Cypriot senior politicians and media refer to the TRNC as “self-styled Turkish regime in occupied Cyprus”, “illegal entity”, or “pseudo-state” (*O Filelefteros*, 8 April 2012). The ignorance of the autonomous force of Turkish political consciousness was the main weakness of such arguments.

As Reddaway points out (2001: 125) the Greek Cypriot arguments were “not history, but hysteria”. Such arguments were actively supported by the Greek Cypriot administration particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. The aim was not academic, but political. Indeed, as Papadakis claims “the recognition of the force of autonomous Turkish national-consciousness” or any inter-communal fictions in the pre-1974 period might “undermine Greek Cypriot arguments” (Nevzat, 2005: 29). In the diplomatic arena, the Greek Cypriot administration attempts to present the Cyprus question as an international issue. Greek Cypriot administration appears to be the victim of overwhelming Turkish forces. While Greek Cypriot arguments have largely centre on the Turkish intervention of 1974, the persecution of Turkish Cypriots under the Greek-led Cypriot administration has been being ignored. The recent Greek Cypriot leaders repeatedly point out the internationalization of the question, claiming that the Cyprus question is the outcome of illegal occupation by the Turkish army. As stated by Kouvetaris (1988: 193) the Cyprus question is “the survival of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign, united and territorially integral state” according to the majority of the Greek Cypriot senior politicians. For example, Greek Cypriot president Christofias stated that “sword of Damocles of the occupation, partition and settlements threaten the existence of the Cypriot people” (*Haravgi*, 9 April, 2012). Needless to say, such expressions not only display hostile feelings but also ignore the whole dynamics of inter-communal history of Cyprus.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CYPRUS

Map 1: Ottoman Map of Piri Reis: *Cezire-i Kıbrıs* 1526 (The Map of Cyprus 1526)



Source: Çevikel, Nuri (2000) *Kıbrıs Eyaleti: Yönetim, Kilise, Ayan ve Halk* (1750-1800), (The Cyprus Province: The Administration, Church, Ayan and the People (1750-1800)), p: 18

This chapter attempts to analyze the historical background of Cyprus and its cultural and demographic impacts on the island. The formation of explicit Greek identity in Cyprus, the Catholic heritage and emergence of Turkish community in Cyprus are the outcomes of that historical legacy. Therefore, to understand better the reasons of complex ethnic policies in Cyprus, which is analyzed in a detailed way in the third chapter, historical focus of this chapter requires a special consideration. Briefly, the chapter focuses on main debates on the historical context. This chapter also is devoted to discuss the major differences between the Byzantine, Frankish/Venetians, Ottoman Turkish and British Cyprus.

2.1 Ancient and Byzantine Cyprus (2000 B.C.-1191):

The history of Cyprus, indeed, was the history of successively dominant powers in the Middle East. The Hittites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Achaeans, Phoenicians, Persians and Romans controlled the island. Especially, Phoenicians brought eastern influence and modern agricultural methods to Cyprus by establishing some trade posts. The alphabetic writing was taken from the Phoenicians as late as the early 4th century BC (Mirbagheri, 2010:12). As pointed out by Hill (1948: 484) Cyprus is seen as “clearing house of near eastern craft, art and powers”.

Pre-Christian history of Hellenism in Cyprus was traced to 1400 BC when first Greek speaking Mycenaean came to settle from Asian Minor and the Aegean. Obviously, Achaeans and Mycenaean migration marked the transmitting of mainland Greek culture to the island. Ancient Cyprus was a collection of city states sharing Hellenistic cultural pattern. Despite the conquests of Persians, Phoenician, Assyrians, Egyptians and Romans, Hellenic cultural pattern remained dominant in early periods.

The Romans annexed the island in 58 BC as a part of Cilicia province. Christianity became the popular religion under the Roman Empire when Paul and Barnabus landed on the island. The Cyprus Church was founded by St Barnabus, a Hellenized Jew, when he converted the Roman Governor, Sergius Paulus, in AD 45. Cyprus was left to the Byzantium Empire (East Roman Empire) after the Roman Empire was divided in 395 AD (Taeuber, 1955: 6). Due to shattering Arab raids, Nicephorus Phokas consolidated Byzantine sovereignty over the island after 965 (Mirbagheri, 2010: 14).

The Byzantine period (AD. 300 to AD 1192) established a deep Greek culture under the sovereignty of Greek Orthodox Church. “Hellenic ties of Greek Cypriots” were associated with the Byzantine era, rather than ancient times (Ehrlich, 1966: 1025). One importances of the Byzantine period was the formation of self-governing (*autocephalous*) church that is to say, ecclesiastical autonomy. In 431 AD, the

council of Ephesus and in 478 AD, Byzantine Emperor Zeno granted complete independence to the Cypriot church with certain rights and privileges such as “signing with red ink”, “carrying imperial scepter in place of a pastoral staff” and “wearing a purple cloak”, reserved only for Emperors, patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem (Dodd, 2010; Hill, 1949: 278; Luke, 1969: 16). The autocephaly or independence of the Cypriot church and these privileges continued to exist to this day. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus was ranked equally with the churches² of Antioch, Jerusalem, Alexandria and Constantinople (Solsten, 1993). For this reason, Church and orthodox clergy have played vital role in Greek Cypriot socio-political affairs.

Greek Cypriot scholars such as Markides (1974) and Mavratsas (1999) argue that the Byzantine period united Cyprus with the rest of the Greek world. It had been the last time that Cyprus was part of a Greek state. “One must not forget that since 1191, when Cyprus was detached from Byzantine Hellenism, Cypriot institutions, with the exception of religious and educational ones, have never been identical with Greek ones” (Mavratsas, 1999: 98). Thus, Cyprus followed a different historical evolution after the Byzantine era.

2.2 Latin Cyprus (Frank and Venetian Rule 1192-1571):

Cyprus was subject to the political changes in Middle East. When the Egyptians crushed the Catholic Kingdom of Jerusalem, the surviving Catholic Franks came to Cyprus. During Third Crusade, the King of England Richard I (The Lion Heart) captured the island from renegade Byzantine noble Isaac Komnenos, “the most evil of all evil men”, who had styled himself “Emperor of Cyprus” (Mirbagheri, 2010: 15). Then, King Richard I sold the island to the surviving Knights Templar and

² To the five autocephalous (self-governing) Greek-speaking Orthodox Churches of that time were the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, and the Church of Cyprus. Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople is considered as the first among equals. The Church of Athens was recognized autocephalous in 1850. Each of them was ruled by different patriarchs (Solsten, 1993).

expelled Franks for 40,000 besants³ (Hill, 1948: 448). In 1192, the island came under the rule of Catholic French-speaking rulers led by Guy de Lusignan. Thus, the surviving members of Frankish nobles and several Italians came to settle in the island. From that date forward, the kingdom of Cyprus played a vital role in the crusades.

Since the beginning of the 15th century, the power of Lusignan had declined because of famine, plagues, and unstoppable raids of Egyptian Mamluks and ever-increasing privileges of Italian states, Venetia and Genoa. The last queen of Lusignan family, Caterine Cornaro was forced to relinquish her rights to the Venetians. Then, the Venetian republic formally annexed the island in 1489. The Venetian rule meant changing feudal overlords with the worse. According to Cypriots “they have escaped from the grasp of the dog to fall into that of lion” (Kinross, 1954:729).

Latin rule (Franks and Venetians) established western European style feudal system in Cyprus. The European/Frankish nobles, their retinues and Italian merchants came to the island and the native population was reduced to the level of serfs. Latin regime established a harsh system that was based on hierarchy of segments. While Frankish and Italian overlords occupied the upper segment of society, it was followed by *Frankomatis* (Free Tenants) that is, free peasants who paid their taxes regularly. *Pariçi* and *Perpiriai* constituted the bottom of the society.

The Latin rule underlined the sectarian division. Due to Vatican’s policy of “unitarism”⁴, the orthodox population was subjected to the forced conversion by the Catholic Church. Several Latin churches were established in Famagusta, Nicosia and Paphos. After the loss of Acre, the last outpost of Christendom in the Syria, Cyprus became “the outpost of Latin Church” in the east (Luke, 1969: 2). In 1260, Pope Alexander IV issued the *Bulla Cypris*, recognizing the Latin Archbishop as supreme

³ 320,000 sterling

⁴ Unitarism: Holy See (Vatican) rejected the sectarian division and recognized only the Catholic Church in the east. In 1990, Vatican abdicated that policy.

chief of all religious groups (Latins and Orthodox) of the island (Solsten, 1993; Luke, 1969: 13). Therefore, forced Latinization took place. The Orthodox Church was subordinated and harassed, nevertheless hardly survived. Despite their impact on Cyprus architecture, the feudal period had no significant impact on the native culture. The Greek language and orthodox form of Christianity continued to exist:

Greek nationalism could not have emerged in a latinized Cyprus where the practiced religion of the population was Catholic and the spoken language French or Italian. Indeed, the language of the Cypriots remained Greek and their religion Byzantine culture, and for that reason the potential for the emergence of Greek nationalism in Cyprus remained alive. Perhaps the island would have become latinized had the French and Venetian epochs lasted longer (Markides, 1974: 311)

Latin legacy brought Cyprus into direct relations with western Catholic world and Muslim Levant. Especially Venetian presence underlined the geo-political importance of Cyprus in terms of commercial relations with East. Significantly, Latin rule left outstanding French-Gothic architectural legacy: St Hilarion, Kolossi, Buffavento, Kantara, and Othello Castles, the abbey of Bella-Paix as well as Famagusta and Nicosia fortifications.

2.3 Ottoman/Turkish Cyprus (1570-1878):

In the summer of 1570, Ottoman Sultan Selim II, chief of Navy Piyale Pasha and his Grand Vizier Lala Mustafa Pasha decided to annex Cyprus because of its strategic position off the coast of Anatolia and its proximity to the major Turkish ports in the East Mediterranean. Indeed, the Ottomans had transformed the eastern Mediterranean into a Muslim sea by driving Italians from the Aegean islands and annexing most of North Africa. Grand Vizier sent an ultimatum to Venetian ambassador Barbaro, demanding the cession of the island. The Turkish demand was rejected by the senate of Venice. According to the Ottoman historian Peçevi (1982: 387), it was necessary to conquer Cyprus “because of bothersome pirate and brigand raids on merchant and pilgrim ships”. The conquest of the island was necessary to secure the Ottoman trade routes. On 27 June 1571, Turkish troops led by Grand

Vizier Lala Mustafa Pasha landed on the island. On 9 September, Nicosia was captured. The Venetians were largely deserted by the Greeks in the field (Braudel, 1972, II: 156). Within two years, entire Cyprus was captured by the Ottoman troops despite huge man losses⁵ and naval defeat in the Battle of Lepanto in which Braudel (1972, II: 1088) described that “the great Turkish armada fell into decay”. The conquest of Cyprus eradicated the last remaining possession of western Catholic world in the Levant.

After the conquest, Cyprus was formed as *beylerbeyliği* (Ottoman province) including some provinces from Anatolian coast (Tarsus, Silifke and Alaiye) and a *pasha* (pasha-Ottoman general or governor) was installed from Istanbul. In 1670, Cyprus was attached to the *Kaptan Pashalık* of *Ceza’ iri Bahr-i Sefid*⁶ (the Admiral of the Navy) in Gallipoli (Çevikel, 2000: 34). A *muhassıl*⁷ (vice-pasha) was appointed by admiral.

The Turkish conquest entirely changed the demographic and political structures of Cyprus as such: “its effects were tantamount to a true revolution, but a revolution imposed from outside” (Markides, 1974:311). Firstly, Frankish/Italian overlords were eradicated and persecuted and feudal estates were distributed to the both native Orthodox Christians and newly arriving Muslims. Secondly, the Ottoman regime recognized the Orthodox Church as only legitimate Christian institution in the island. In other words, the power of the Orthodox Church was restored and consolidated under the Ottoman rule. Hence, the Latin feudal nobility was replaced by the ecclesiastical power of the Church (*ethnarchy*) and Ottoman military oligarchy. As put forward by Markides (1974: 311):

⁵ The Ottoman losses were estimated around 40,000 or 50,000. The battle of Lepanto left 30,000 Turkish deaths (Braudel, 1972, II: 1102).

⁶ The admiral of the Turkish navy was responsible for the administration of the islands of Rhodes and Archipelagos.

⁷ *Muhassıl* was a tax collector with the executive and administrative powers.

The Sultan vested the Church with special administrative privileges (*pronomia*), such as the collection of state taxation and the official representation of the Orthodox Greeks to Constantinople. The Archbishop was elevated to the status of the *Ethnarch* (*millet başı*), national leader or political spokesman for the Greek population.

Louis Lacroix, a traveller in the Cyprus in mid-18th century described the position of Archbishop as follows:

From his palace, the Archbishop administered the whole island, filled up the office in every district, assets the amount of annual contributions, sent the sums for which the island was formed out to the Grand Vizir, or the imperial treasury. Certain privileges, purposely granted, attached the Turkish Agas to the support of his authority, and all the inhabitants, Turks and Greeks alike, looked upon him as the real governor (Luke, 1969: 127).

Roudemetof (2009:44) argues that the church turned out to be an integral part of the Ottoman administration as an “intermediate element (*modus operandi*)” between Sultan and orthodox subjects of Cyprus. It guaranteed the flow of tax revenues into the imperial treasury, lended money and acted as the vanguard of Orthodox community. Moreover, by improving status of *ethnarchy*, the Sultan preserved a system of check and balance against local governor and unruly local Janissaries.

Thirdly, new Turkish settlers from Anatolia were sent to Cyprus. First settlers were drawn from Lala Mustafa’s victorious army (Luke, 1964: 75). Subsequently, 8,000 settlers arrived to the island by the imperial decree of Sultan Beyazıt II (*Kanunname-i Livay-ı Kıbrıs*⁸) on 24 September 1572 (Jennings, 1993: 218). Mostly, skilled craftsman such as tailors, blacksmiths, weavers, and tin platters from the provinces of Sivas, Niğde, Larende, Karaman, Zulkadiriye and Kayseri were chosen to be sent. These regions were called as a “country of Turkmens (*Turkmen Yatağı*)” in the 14th century by traveller Ibn-Battuta⁹ (Ibn-Battuta, 1929: 123). 4,000 soldiers remained

⁸ *Kanunname*: the codes of temporal ordinances issued by Turkish Sultans.

⁹ Ibn-Battuta described that the region from Alaiye (Alanya) to Sivas, all the lands were inhabited by the Turkmens (Ibn-Battuta, 1929: 125).

on Cyprus. In the subsequent years, new settlers arrived from ‘Anatolian heartland’ including *Yörük*¹⁰ or Turcoman tribesmen from Bor, Ürgüp, Eregli, Güngördü, Delili, Akşehir and Koçhisar of Karaman and the Kırıntılı regions (Yeşilada, 2009:51). The main features of settlers were listed in the decree as follows:

They will be chosen from among the people. Those who have unfertile lands and rocky soil will be selected first. Next will be brigands and other evildoers. Finally, some craftsmen and artisans were required: shoemaker (*papuçcu*), makers of coarse shoes (*başmakçı*), tailors (*terzi*), hatmaker (*takyeci*), weavers (*dokumacı*), wool-carders (*hallaç*), cooks (*aşçı*), blacksmith (*demirci*), grocers (*bakkal*), tanners (*debbag*), goldsmith (*kuyumcu*), copper smith (*kazancı*)... You should (Kadı) encourage emigration and make known that according to my (Sultan Beyazıt II) orders two year’s exemption from taxes will be granted those who settle in Cyprus... (Jennings, 1993: 218-219).

Ottoman military class (Janissaries¹¹, *Sipahis*¹² and *Zapitie*¹³) and Muslim settlers constituted the ruling segment of the island. Furthermore, they established new villages in the island which did not exist before 1572. For example, Beyköy, Dizdarköy, Kanlıköy, Gönyeli (Konya-ili), Yeniceköy in Nicosia (*Lefkosia*) district, Paşaköy, Sandallar, Topçuköy in Famagusta (*Magusa*) district (Gazioğlu, 1994). Beckingham (1957b: 168) pointed out that the settlement names were brought from Anatolia by Turkish immigrants who founded them. The Muslim settlers not only changed the population of Cyprus, but also carried their distinct Turkish cultural heritage, family traditions and Islamic belief.

¹⁰ Yörük: Nomadic tribesman of Anatolian plateaus.

¹¹ Janissaries: The regular-standing force of Ottoman armies since the 14th century. They were made up from Christian levies, particularly Balkan subjects.

¹² Sipahi: holder of a estate constituting heavy cavalry, ethically made up from only Turks and Muslims under command of *Zaim*. They purchased land from the governor.

¹³ Zapitie was a local police in Ottoman administration.

Lastly, the Ottoman *millet* system had significant impact on the existing order in Cyprus. The *millet* system transformed Cyprus into religiously segregated political structure. Ottoman *millet* system defined identities on the basis of their belief. Indeed, subjects were divided into two main groups: true believers (Muslims) and *Zimmis* (non-Muslims). Thus, non-Muslims were categorized into Orthodox Christians, Armenians, Catholics, Jews etc. According to this system, the people of Cyprus was made up from Muslims, Orthodox (*Rum*), Armenian (*Ermeni*), Maronite (*Suryani*)¹⁴, Jews, and Latins (*Nasara*). Significantly, as observed in the practical role of the Orthodox church in administration, the *millet* system was in effect a means of indirect rule “that was not only a system of governance compatible with the prevalent interpretation of Islam, but was also found to be beneficial to the maintenance of Ottoman rule” (Nevzat, 2005: 61). Briefly, the hierarchy of structures was essential for the imperial administration.

The Ottoman regime realized that diversity was natural (God-given) ability. Thus, the *millet* system institutionalized the difference. In contrast to the mainstream Marxist argument of peaceful co-existence as some authors (Pollis, 1973; Kızılyürek, 2002) have emphasized, they indeed experienced a cantonized and segregated life in which the Muslim *millet* was the ruling segment (*millet-i hakime*). Volkan (2008) claims that whilst both communities outspread to the island, customs and habits had developed in a bi-polar form. Since the Ottoman era, they developed an ethno-religious identity, and when ethnic incidents emerged, the hostility between the groups became inevitable. Volkan (2008) underlines that both communities considered inter-religious marriage as a taboo. Thus, two national units remained unconnected. Therefore, despite many years, “civic Cypriot community” did not exist (Volkan, 2008). On the contrary, a dual society in Cyprus had emerged since Ottoman times. Nevzat notes (2005: 56) that “while religious identity was the significant factor of collective identification for the individual, the two main

¹⁴ Actually, Maronites and Assyrians (*Süryani*) were different communities who were the members of different churches. While Maronites followed the Roman Catholic Church, Assyrians were member of their own church. In the Ottoman administration, they were seen as Syrian Christians.

religious communities on the island possessed identifiable cultural characteristics of the Greek and Turkish ethnic groups, through particularly their language''. Similarly, Luke (1969: 75) suggests that "Turks of Cyprus preserved their purity of language, to an extent unequalled in few other parts of Turkish speaking world before the language reform carried out by the Turkey''.

As Mardin (2006: 211) points out there was an ethnic division of labor in the Ottoman realm. In Cyprus, as was the case in the other regions of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim Turks dominated the administrative strata and security apparatus, while the commercial activities were occupied by non-Muslims. Çevikel (2000: 268) examines that Greeks of Cyprus were active in carpentry, ironworking, marine, particularly commercial activities. Turks occupied a significant proportion of manufacturing such as butchery, tanning, hot-making, watch-making and shoe-making. This did not mean that inter-communal economic activities were rare. In large plantations, Greeks and Turkish peasants worked together. The receiving of loans was common between Turkish and Greek merchants. Significantly, the traditional economic life of Cyprus illustrated the self-sufficiency of two national units.

The exact ratio of religious conversion was not well-known. Jennings (1993) argues that that conversion took place only at individual level, not as groups. The religious conversion was not tolerable in the eyes of Orthodox Church of Cyprus, the most powerful and influential church in the Orthodox world. There is no clear evidence that truly extensive religious conversion took place during Ottoman rule.

Obviously, the only exemption was the emergence of esoteric sect, namely, 'Linovamvakoi', 'Linsey-woolsies'. This so-called sect was believed to combine "Christian and Muslim practices, baptizing and circumcising children and bestowing on every child two names, one appropriate to each religion"(Beckingham, 1957b: 173). In 1880, the wife of a British officer Esme Stevenson described them as follows: "they are thus called from belonging neither to the Christian nor Muslim

faith; though in outward appearance they resemble Turks. They are in reality members of the Greek Church” (Bryant, 2004: 65). It was believed that they were the descendants of the Latin ruling class who followed a unique “religion a mixture of Islam and Christian Orthodoxy” (Pollis, 1973 583).

The political and economic recession devastated Ottoman administrative system from the beginning of the 17th century to the mid-18th century. Through the end of the 18th century, nationalism in Balkans gained ground among the orthodox subjects of the empire. Significantly, local Turkish governors had increasing suspicion toward local Christians after the Greek revolt (1821-1830). The execution of all the higher clergy, including Archbishop Kyprianos by *musellim* Silahşör Küçük Mehmet (Mehmet the Small Gunslinger) has been still canonized as martyr for Greek cause. In the latter years, the Ottoman rulers and native Turks began to display hostile feelings toward Greek Cypriots because Ottoman rule (*Tourkokratia*) was portrayed as “400 years of bondage” and “disastrous period for Hellenism” by the church and Greek schools (Theododssopoulos, 2007: 52). As Kitromilides (1990: 10) argued that “ancient memory of the depository of a sense of history” was preserved by the Greek Church.

During the *Tanzimat*¹⁵ reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, centralization and modernization took place. The representation of non-Muslims in government was encouraged. Thus, an orthodox administration council was established. As the Ottoman government promoted a sense of Ottomanism, Greek national consciousness gained more ground. When, British took the control of the island, Cyprus had already been a special district (*Mutasarraflik*) under Besim Pasha, directly run by Istanbul since 26 May 1868. Dodd (2010: 2) points out that “the condition of the island improved towards the end of the Turkish rule”.

¹⁵ These reforms (1856) included several administrative, legal and political changes in the Ottoman Empire. From that date forward, the Christians and Muslims were regarded as absolutely equal citizens of the empire.

To sum up, Cyprus under the Ottomans was neither an “island of persistent interethnic hostility, nor one of political, social and cultural uniformity or integration” (Nevzat, 2005: 65). Turkish rule produced three main patterns in the island: the consolidation of the Orthodox Church, demographic change and *millet* administration system. The significance of Turkish rule was pointed out by Reddaway (2001: 18) as follows:

Other alien regimes such as Lusignan, Genoese, Venetian had come and gone without impinging deeply on the Greek character of the island; no doubt the British occupation in its turn would go the same way. But the Turkish occupation was different; it lasted longer and had an abiding effect on the demographic and ethnic character of Cyprus.

2.4 British Cyprus (1878-1959):

The Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 had drastically changed the fate of Cyprus. In 1878, Great Britain temporarily took the administration of Cyprus as a result of the Berlin Congress which ceased the hostilities between Russia and Ottoman Turkey. According to 4th June 1878 Cyprus convention, the government of Cyprus was ceded to Britain in exchange for British support on the eve of a possible Russian aggression to the Anatolia. Technically, it was a convention of defensive alliance, principally stating that:

If Batumi, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the Defensive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join His imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms. ... In return, His imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England (Luke, 1969: 259-260).

Actually, Cyprus was still considered part of Ottoman Turkey. Moreover, the island was the annual payment of tribute of Turkey. British colonial rule also had to pay special tribute to Ottoman Turkey. According to Anglo-Turkish convention¹⁶, the British had to pay 92,770 pounds for the control of Cyprus in the form of rent (Varnava, 2009: 132). Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli wrote the following to Queen Victoria a few days after end of the Turkish-Russian war (1876 war):

If Cyprus be conceded to your majesty by Porte (Istanbul government) and England ... enters into a defensive alliance with Turkey, guaranteeing Asiatic Turkey from Russian invasion, the power of England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely increased in that region, and your Majesty's Indian Empire immensely strengthened. Cyprus is the "key of Western Asia" (Varnava, 2009:85).

The change of administration in Cyprus brought some changes such as introducing new laws, new institutions, and new practices. Britain displayed a sense of national romanticism. It justified the possession of Cyprus on the ground that King Richard I of the England captured the island in the 12th century. Actually, the island was seen as a strategic asset for the development of the empire. Gladstone government (May 1880) applied several economic and political projects on Cyprus. Therefore, both communities (Greeks and Turkish) would experience a new system of rule. The British notion of administration in Cyprus was based mainly on two assumptions: the British perception of Cypriots and pre-existing ethno-confessional structure of the Ottoman system. Consequently, "Under British rule both Greeks and Turkish communities were able to retain and develop their peculiar cultural features, and also promoted their nationalism" (Reddaway, 2001: 26).

Great Britain regarded the inhabitants of Cyprus as a "civilized community". Indeed, the colonial powers (such as Britain, France, Dutch) in conformity with their habit of classifying nations as either civilized or barbarian, thought Cypriots as part of the civilized world. They believed that some sort of direct rule could be exercised in Cyprus. In the eyes of the British, both Greeks and Turks were respected communities. In 1904, one ministerial official in London argued the following:

¹⁶ Article III of the Anglo-Turkish Convention.

It does not seem to me to be practicable to adopt the legislation suited to India, an Asiatic country conquered and held by the sword, to a European community like Cyprus. In that Island $\frac{3}{4}$ of the population are Greeks and hence by language and traditions attached to liberal institutions (Nevzat, 2005: 119).

Similarly, the military-administrative skill of Turks of Cyprus which reflected Ottoman-Turkish imperial past was emphasized by Cyprus High Commissioner Bulwer as follows:

Ottoman in race and Mohammedan in religion are far fewer in numbers; but they are more masterful in character and physical strength and still possess many of the qualities which mark the members of a ruling race and which more than make up for inferiority in numbers (Nevzat, 2005: 120).

The British administration established a legislative council in 1882 including 6 appointed British, 9 Christians (Orthodox, Maronite) and 3 Muslim representatives all of whom functioned both autonomously and within their own groups (Pollis, 1973). Those elected ones would be determined according to 1881 population census. "The British census of 1881 estimated the population at 136,629 Greeks, 46,389 Turks, 691 English, and 2,400 others (Arabic-speaking Maronite-Catholics, Armenians and *Linobambakoi*)" (Pollis, 1973:583). In 1925, the council was revised to include 12 Greeks, 3 Turks and 9 British members appointed after the status of island was elevated to crown colony on 1 May 1925. The British were aware that the participation of native in colonial administration was necessary and inevitable.

British followed the same administrative policy methods of the Ottoman system. It was clear that the British rule perpetuated the divisions between the Muslim and Orthodox communities. It did not exacerbate ethnic division despite Greek propaganda. Indeed, the communal diversity had already appeared without manifest hatred. Politically speaking, "the division between two communities was created by Greek uncompromising insistence on *enosis*, not by any devious design on the part of the British to set Turks against Greeks in Cyprus" (Reddaway, 2001: 20). As a result

of the uncompromising insistence on *enosis*, pre-existing inter-communal tolerance shifted to the inter-communal suspicion. To sum up, the British administrative policy in Cyprus, firstly, was based on the idea that Cypriots (Greeks and Turks) were respected and civilized communities so they were allowed to function autonomously. Secondly, colony administration only adopted the pre-existing ethno- confessional communal model. So, “the function of the representative did not differ materially when Cyprus was under Ottoman rule” (Pollis, 1973: 591). In this environment, the political community of the Turks and the Greeks developed independently of one another.

The communal diversity had already existed. The inter-communal relations were far different from the narratives of peaceful coexistence. It should be cleared that the inter-communal relation was not one of group hatred but the reflection of each community was an unbridgeable social and cultural gap. The psychological separation was definitely observable after centuries of Ottoman rule as Volkan (1997: 109) stated:

To a stranger, even after the ethnic tensions began, the crowd of Cypriot Greeks and Turks appeared to be a homogeneous group of Mediterranean people dressed alike and taking pleasure in the cool evening air. But to the islander, minor differences among members of the crowd were “obvious” and “important”.

The separateness of Greek and Turkish communities was underlined by several observers. As analyzed by Kitchener at the end 1870s: “Though Greeks and Turks may live together in the same village in their lives, they associate very little together. Generally the village is divided into quarters: the Greek houses in one part, and the Turkish houses together in another” (Nevzat, 2005: 76). Similarly, Melamid (1956: 356-357) claimed that “socially, the communities are entirely separate; for example, inter-marriage is rare. The two major communities, Greek and Turk, are economically largely self-sufficient in their activities, and their agricultural, industrial, and commercial functions rarely complement to one another”. Buxton agreed on the fact that “Turks and Greeks do without any doubt represent a very

strong line of social cleavage, separated as they are by language, religion, social customs, and so on. The west and east do not mix here” (Buxton, 1920: 197). Even British colony administration realized that inter-communal antipathy had already existed when they arrived to Cyprus. On 31 January 1882, E. Fairfield from British Colonial Office underlined that customs, history and religion had divided two communities in Cyprus. He stated that “Greeks and Turks lived at peace under our rule but they hated each other all the time” (Sonyel, 2003:2). In 1902, British High Commissioner Haynes Smith pointed that “whenever I ask to hear the children sing, it is a war song; forward, follow the drum that leads us against the Turks” (Coughlan & Mallinson, 2006: 580). Similarly, the undersecretary of Cyprus colonial administration Reddaway (2001: 28) claimed that “distrust and antipathy were rooted in the history”. The officers observed that Turks and Greek totally experienced segregated life. They lived in different quarters, villages and hang out different cafes. In mixed villages, they had elected separate headmen (*muhtars* or *Arhontes*). In the face of such clear observations, it should be underlined that such divisions were more pronounced in Cyprus, the historic borderland between east and west. Actually, the attitudes of each national community were increasingly characterized by suspicion and fear as the decades past.

The Muslim and Christian reaction to the establishment of the British regime was different. Muslims were aware of the fact that Cyprus was a concession for the sake and survival of the Ottoman Empire. Although, Muslims were skeptical of the British rule, they made it clear that occupation of Cyprus should not have led to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Winston Churchill who worked in the undersecretary of colony office emphasized that “the mission of Britain in the Levant should not be to impair the sovereignty of the Sultan, is one which His majesty’s Government are equally bound to regard with respect” (Varnava, 2009:185).

British rule caused several strains for Turkish Cypriots. Thousands of Turkish Cypriots and elements of the Ottoman administration left the island combined with heavy migration of Greeks from Greece and Anatolia to Cyprus. Thus, it would damage the demographic balance of the island. “By 1881 Turkish population had fallen to 23 percent, by 1946 to 18 percent” (Melamid, 1956: 356). The changes in the demographic balance altered the percentages of participation in the civil and military services in favor of Greeks. Briefly, Muslim Turks did not welcome British rule enthusiastically, nevertheless they acknowledged the status. As shown in Table 1, the population ratio of Greeks to Turks changed. This culminated Turkish fears that while the numbers of Greeks were increasing, they were disappearing in Cyprus in terms of demography and wealth. Briefly, the fear for national survival was a significant factor for shaping the political mindset of the Turkish community in Cyprus.

Table 1: Ratio of Greeks to Turks in Cyprus in Census Years

Census Year	Ratio of Greeks to Turks
1881	3.3:1
1891	3.3:1
1901	3.56:1
1911	3.8:1
1921	3.99:1
1931	4.3:1
1946	4.48:1
1956	4.52:1
1960	4.3:1
1973	4.3:1

Source: Morag, N. (2004) “Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalism” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 10(4): 609.

Turks of Cyprus accepted British occupation only if their rights, privileges and institutions (especially *Evkaf* and status of *Shari'a* Courts), created with 1878 Anglo-Turkish convention¹⁷, were protected. According to convention, the property of Muslim population and religious freedom were guaranteed. *Evkaf* had dual administration. One was a Turk of Cyprus resident in the island and appointed by the Ottoman Board of *Evkaf*, while the other was a British official. *Shari'a* Courts (*Mahkeme-i Şeriye*) continued to deal with civil affairs of the Muslim community. In the end, the Turkish community believed that the island would remain part of Ottoman Turkey because according to convention¹⁸ British administration was temporary. “The Turkish Cypriots continued under the British to refer to the Ottoman Empire as, ‘our eternal Ottoman state’, ‘the Sultan as their Sultan’, and to emphasize that Cyprus was still Ottoman territory” (Nevzat, 2005: 104).

Turks experienced the bitterness of colonial rule. British regime replaced ruling Muslim class in accordance with majority rule which was unacceptable for Turks. As mentioned earlier, British executive committee included 12 elected representatives. Therefore, there would be 9 Christians and 3 Muslims in the council. The unequal representation frustrated Muslim Turks. Therefore, they protested the colony regime, demanding equality. They sent a memorandum to the governor Lord Kimberley:

With regard to this proposal we beg to point out that no provision or authority exists in any of the laws or regulations of the Ottoman Government for the election of Moslem and non-Moslem councillors in proportion to the respective numbers of the two communities, and it is owing to this that in Rumelia and Anatolia all tribunals and councils

¹⁷ Article I: That an Islamic religious Tribunal (*Mahkemé-i Sheri*) shall continue to exist in the Island, which will make take exclusive cognizance of religious matters, and of no others, concerning the Muslim population of the island.

Article II: That a Muslim resident in the Island shall be named by the board of Pious Foundation (*Evkaf*) to superintend, in conjunction with a delegate to be appointed by the British Authorities, the administration of the property, funds and lands belonging to mosques, cemeteries, Muslim schools, and other religious establishments existing in Cyprus (Luke, 1969: 261)

¹⁸ Article VI: That if Russia restored to Turkey Kars and the other conquest made by her in Armenia during the last war, the Island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England, and the convention of the 4th June 1878, will be at an end. (Luke, 1969: 261).

are composed of equal numbers of Moslem and non-Moslem members even where nine-tenths of the whole population consists of Muhammedans only (Nevzat ,2005: 121).

Turks of Cyprus believed that they turned out to be a vulnerable minority. British were aware of the discontent of Muslims. It was reported that “the Muslim official class which had dominated the majority of the public employees were greatly injured due to the British occupation, it cannot be denied ” (Nevzat, 2005: 106). From that that date forward, the insistence on equality would be the main issue for Muslim Turks.

When Great Britain directly annexed Cyprus in 1914 as to response to Turkey’s entry to the war on the side of Germany, some Turkish Cypriots believed that the annexation was a proper alternative in the wake of rising Greek nationalism. The *Mufti* and Irfan Bey, the senior Councilor, affirmed his loyalty to the High Commissioner (Beckingham, 1957). Mufti wanted the guarantee that “Britain would not hand Cyprus over to Greece” (Coughlan & Mallison, 2006: 581). On the other side, British officers realized that “act of disloyalty occurred amongst the Muslim members of police” due to increasing tension between Ottoman Turkey and Imperial government. (Morgan, 2004: 75). The annexation culminated a wave of discontent among the urban Turks of Cyprus in Famagusta and Nicosia. In 1915, British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey offered the island to Greece in exchange for Greek involvement in the war. Nevertheless, it was rejected by pro-neutralist King Constantine I of Greece and Prime Minister of Greece, Alexandros Zaimis (Mirgabheri, 2010: 18).

For Greek Cypriots, British rule was a step towards their national cause. Indeed, the Greek independence war (1821-1830) politicized the Greek Cypriots. They believed that Great Britain would give Cyprus to Greece in short term. Garnet Wolseley, on his arrival on the island on 22 July 1878 as the first British governor, was greeted by Bishop of Kition with the following words: “We accept the change of government

inasmuch as we trust Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands¹⁹, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected” (Dodd, 2010: 39). Despite Greek expectations, Great Britain had no such aim. On the other hand, they went on consolidating their position in the Cyprus, the “most strategic asset”.

Secondly, British government with highly secular background showed little respect for the traditional authorities (*ethnarcy*) of the Greek community. *Ethnarcy* lost its political and economic significance during British colonial rule. Hence, secular forces emerged as dominant players in both communities. British officials particularly picked secular individuals for the legislation council. Markides (1977) argues that erosion of traditional authorities, forced secularization and economic strains paved the way for the rise of anti-British feelings. In later years, such feelings found its outlet in the *enosis* movement.

The British rule brought extensive development of infrastructure such as the development of Famagusta (*Magusa*) and Kyrenia (*Girne*) ports. They also built new highroads which linked geographically separated North and South Cyprus. Those ports were the export center of British textile industry to the Levant. Relative economic growth, market system and liberal environment developed urban, secular, pro-British strata. In addition, the industrialization and growing commercial activities culminated in the emergence of strong labor activities which would deeply affect the political structure of Cyprus politics.

¹⁹ Ionian Islands were ceded by British Prime Minister Gladstone's Liberal Government to Greece in 1864 after Britain took control of the islands from Napoleonic France.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICIZATION AND MOBILIZATION OF TURKISH AND GREEK COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS

This chapter focuses on the important events which deeply influenced the rise of national consciousness in the context of the total socio-cultural environment among the Turkish and Greek communities. This chapter also provides a link between historically developed domestic factors and the national consciousness. Although it does not neglect the British imperial policies which paved the way for the rise of national consciousness; the main focus is the specific structures this consciousness that is generated in historical, sociological, territorial and religious perceptions. Hence, in the first part of the chapter the emergence of national consciousness among Turks, and in the second part, the emergence of national consciousness among Greeks will be analyzed.

3.1 The Politicization and Mobilization of Turkish Community of Cyprus:

In this part, the impact of the Ottoman historical heritage on the collective memory among Turks of Cyprus will be examined. The politicization of Turkish Cypriot community will be divided into four eras. Firstly, the period between 1878 and 1919 is going to be examined by focusing on the how collective memory based on the fatherland assumption of Turks and conquest metaphors dominated the early phase of national consciousness. Furthermore, the impact of the emergence of Young Turk movements will be examined. Secondly, the impact of the enlightenment project of republican Turkey over Turks of Cyprus is emphasized. Thirdly, the military and political mobilization period (1943-1960) is analyzed.

3.1.1 The Collective Memory and Conquest Metaphor:

There can be no doubt that fundamental differences between Greek and Turkish communities contributed to the collective perception of their historical experiences. For the Turks of Cyprus, the Ottoman period was seen as an era of prosperity and hegemony in the island. The Ottoman conquest of 1571 illustrated a tradition of heroism, patriotism and martyrdom. Bryant (2004) specifically points out that blood spilled in Cyprus during the 1571 conquest was an expression of spiritual kinship with land. Therefore, the conquest metaphor turned out to be an instrument of legitimization because Turkish Cypriots saw their community as heirs to the conqueror Ottoman ancestors. The Muslim community thought that they had legitimate rights in the island because thousands of forebears sacrificed themselves and spilled their bloods²⁰.

The Turks of Cyprus asserted their hegemony in the island during the Ottoman rule. They displayed discontent to the excessive privileges of the Greek clergy. As British council Thomas Sandwith stated “the exclusive spirit of the Muslims were kept alive by the presence of the government” in the early 18th century (Luke, 1969: 220). Needless to say, the change of regime had the most far-reaching effect on the status of Turks, who turned out to be minority subjects although they were the ruling elites of the island once. Especially, British administrative policies paved the way for discontent of Muslims in the island. From the beginning of British administration, Turkish legislature members complained about *enosis* agitation. Turkish community of Cyprus considered themselves as the rulers of the island until the British takeover. As a result, they insisted on preserving their respected status because they were the descendants of the heroic Ottoman conquerors. The British became aware the discontent of Muslim elites: The struggle for rights and sovereignty of Muslim community showed that the idea of collective representation and communal spirit

²⁰ In 1933, Turks of Cyprus had sent a bottle of Cyprus soil to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a tribute. Later, the Cyprus soil spilled by the bloods of conquerors was added to Mustafa Kemal’s mausoleum. Colony administration was aware that Ataturk’s death, “caused considerable sorrow among the Turkish community” (Nevzat, 2005: 419).

already existed. The end of Ottoman period was increasingly marked by nationalist passions.

The concept of fatherland occupied the primary position among the Turks of Cyprus. The origin of Turkish Cypriot concept of fatherland was based on the common notion of solidarity, the consciousness of the Ottoman descendants, and self-concept of lordliness of the island (Volkan, 2008). In the Ottoman context, Muslim nation (*Millet-i Hakime*) had been the sovereign element of the state. The concept of fatherland depended upon underlying sociological and psychological roots. Namık Kemal²¹, the well-known Turkish poet describes fatherland “as being not only a geographical unit, but also an emotional bond in which the memories of ancestors, the recollections of one’s own youth and earliest experience all had a place” (Mardin, 1962: 327).

It seems that Turks of Cyprus had already embraced such “collective memory” and “fatherland notion”. They immediately reacted when they realized that their rights and existence were under threat. Thus, they developed a communal identity which would later take the form of Turkishness. Due to large emigration of Turkish Cypriots to Anatolia after the first large scale inter-communal violence in 1912 in which 5 people died and 134 were wounded, a meeting was held. One of the speakers was reported to say to the crowd:

We must remember that our Muslim forebears shed their blood and lost sixty-thousand souls in this island. The ground we stand on contains the blood and remains of our forebears. We hear that a good many of you intent leaving the island, but you are not to do so. You ... stay here and assert your rights and die (Bryant, 2002:517).

²¹ Namık Kemal was a Turkish intellectual, writer and poet who was also a member of the Young Ottoman Society. He spent just over three years in exile at Famagusta of Cyprus. The tradition of Namık Kemal was influential among the Turks of Cyprus. His *Vatan* play was first played on 26 January 1908 in Famagusta.

Turkish community gave a special attention to their sovereign rights and memories in the island. On 10 March 1928, Turkish Cypriot newspapers *Söz* and *Birlik* distributed a manifesto, criticizing British celebration of 1878 convention under the headline of the “Fiftieth Anniversary is a day of mourning for the Turks of Cyprus”:

We Turks, have not for a moment failed to respect other people’s feelings and have never tried to cause misunderstandings by recalling our past of fifty years ago. It is to be regretted that Government has decided to hold festivities during these days of mourning for us... (Nevzat, 2005: 362-363).

It is therefore possible to suggest that the strong communal spirit existed within the Turkish community of Cyprus, which protected its communal identity, language and customs. Although, an organized nationalist movement emerged later²², the Turks of Cyprus had “sacred idealism” which was portrayed by the idea of being the descendants of Ottoman conquerors. In other words, the pre-existing notion of communal identity was transformed into Turkish identity because of some shared common elements of Turkish ethnic heritage and language.

Since the late 19th century, the emerging Ottoman intelligentsia had begun to discuss the problems of the empire. Indeed, the empire was subject to several threats: economic strains, social disorders, Christian irredentism. The idea of Ottomanism was seen as a solution. In other words, the communal identity was portrayed in the form of Ottomanism. Significantly, the Ottoman elites interchangeably and synonymously used the words Ottoman, nation, Turk, tribe in their articles. Actually, despite the Ottomanist discourse, the history and glory of Turks were being emphasized. According to Namık Kemal, the Turk and the Ottoman were synonymous:

²² The question here is why did the organized Turkish nationalist movement emerge late? The ethnic designation of the Turk was used for many centuries to refer to the crude peasants and nomads of Anatolia in the Ottoman Empire, which was named after the family name, Ottoman State (*Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye*), like other Sunni dynasties (Timurids, Ayyubids, Abbasids, Umayyads). Since the 15th century, the Ottoman Empire had followed a divine mission (*tewhid*) instead of an ethnic cause (*Kavvmiyet*).

The blood that runs in our veins too is that Ottoman blood which bears the distinction of having been shed to provide even the smallest benefits to the fatherland... are not the Turks the nation in whole medresses Farabis, Ibn Sinas, Gazalis, Zemahşeris propagated knowledge? (Mardin, 1962: 328).

The political nationalism emerged later because of the failure of Ottomanism and Islamism. According to Gökalp (1959:72):

The fact that nationalism appeared last among the Turks was not accidental; the Ottoman state was formed by Turks themselves. The state is nation already established (*nation de fait*), whereas the ideal of nationalism meant the nucleus of a nationality based on will (*nation de volonté*). With intuitive cautiousness, the Turks were reluctant, in the beginning, to endanger a reality for the sake of an ideal. Thus, Turkish thinkers believed not Turkism but in Ottomanism.

In the Turkish case, politicization of the ethnic identity relied on the strength of traditional ties, collective shared memory and aggressive Christian irredentism toward Ottoman realm. As Gökalp (1959: 70) argued the idea of nationalism is a “product of the social environment of the past”, focusing the “sacredness” of the nation. This sacredness existed in an unconscious state in the psychological unity of the social group. The metaphor of 1571 conquest and the self-concept of lordliness of the island proved the existence of such an unconscious state in the psychological unity among Turks of Cyprus. The link between collective memory and communal identity was reinvested ideologically within the framework of politicization of Turks after 1950s.

The mental transformation of Turkish Cypriot intellectuals was exposed to ensuing social change such as the emergence of Young Turk and republican movements. Turkish nationalism revived in the first decade of the 1900s. Its main spokesmen were the members of Young Turk movement²³ with new ideas had profound effect on Turkish community of Cyprus. Inspired by Young Turks ideas, the some Muslim

²³ Young Turks were a group of military and intellectual elites. The movement emerged in the mid-19th century by advocating modernization, constitutionalism and Ottomanism. They established the Committee of Progress and Union Party (CPU) which ruled Ottoman Turkey between 1908 and 1918.

intellectuals founded a political association Ottoman Public Reading House (*Kırahathane-i Osmaniye*) and several newspapers such as *Zaman* (1891), *Feryat* (1899), *Kokonoz* (1900), to discuss the future of the island in the 1890s (Evre, 2004: 46). Meanwhile, first inter-communal problems occurred in 1898 when Prince George of Greece was appointed High Commissioner in Crete, signaling dramatic persecution of Cretan Turks. In March 1897, British Governor Sendal reported that Greek consul of Cyprus recruited “volunteers for Cretan uprising” from Cypriot Greek that contributed to the agitation on Cyprus (Coughlan & Mallinson, 2006: 601).

The Young Turk revolution of 1908 in Turkey had significant impact on Muslim community of Cyprus. With the Young Turk revolution of 1908, a process of Turkification was set in motion. In 1908, just a few months after the revolution, it was the first time that an association which used the name of “Turk” was established in Nicosia. The growing national inclinations among Turks of Cyprus were accompanied by the impact of Young Turk revolution of 1908. *Türk Teavün Cemiyeti* (Turkish Solidarity Association) showed that Turkishness and national self-consciousness had been emerging among the Muslim community. In 1910, “*Lefkoşa Türk Futbol Ocağı*” (Nicosia Turkish Football Club) was established (Nevzat, 2005: 209). In 1909, the official branch of Committee of Progress and Union was established in Nicosia.

3.1.2 The Effects of the Establishment of Republican Turkey on Turkish Community in Cyprus:

The enormous changes in the mental life of Turkish Cypriots that accompanied their embrace of republican ideas and values precipitated far-ranging results. One effect was psychological, as reflected in the imagination of Mustafa Kemal as the hero, liberator and father of the Turks of Cyprus. They enthusiastically observed the Turkish victory over the invading the Greek Army (1919-1922) in western Anatolia.

The warrior-hero, father of the Turks, *Ghazi*²⁴ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk became a role model for the Turks of Cyprus and they turned out to be zealot followers of his principles. Many became convinced that in such a British colony every aspect of life would be regulated according to the developments in Turkey. Furthermore, “the liberation of Izmir had left a lasting imprint on the Turkish Cypriot psyche” (Nevzat, 2005: 267). The victory marked the end of long-established “psychology of defeat” after several humiliating defeats by western powers. Actually, Turkish Cypriots believed that Mustafa Kemal would also liberate them (Evre, 2004: 58). As mentioned before, the existing communal spirit among the Turks of Cyprus was now transformed into national pride. It should be underlined that “news of the liberation of Izmir was received joyous and spontaneous celebrations were seen on the streets of all the main Moslem centers, noting this as clear evidence of a strong communal spirit” (Nevzat, 2005: 266).

The second effect was Turkey’s increasing cultural and social involvement with the Turks of Cyprus. In 1925, the Turkish embassy in Cyprus was opened. The first ambassador Asaf (Güvenir) supported the organization of Turkish Cypriots in a pro-Turkey way. Even *Söz* newspaper which propagated nationalist ideas and news from the young republican Turkey, claimed that the Turkish embassy was a “national guide” (*Milli irşad*) for Turkish Cypriots (Evre, 2004: 66). The regular celebration of the Republican Day (29 October) took place by Turkish Cypriots.

Turks of Cyprus adopted motherland reforms such as customs, language, secular codes. The Arabic alphabet was replaced with new Turkish one which was “coming rapidly into use” (Beckingham, 1957:75). The republican reforms in Cyprus aimed to bear resemblance of Turks of Cyprus to the motherland more closely. The traditional *fez* was replaced by European hats. In 1925, Mehmet Remzi Okan a journalist from *Söz*, argued that by “wearing hat, they (Turkish Cypriots) will look like their brothers in Turkey” (Evre, 2004: 66). Significantly, in Cyprus the Turks remained

²⁴ *Ghazi* is a title for Islamic holy warriors.

“free to accept or to reject the revolutionary changes which were made compulsory in the Republic” (Beckingham, 1957: 65). Briefly, the function of reforms served to the politicization of Turkish community of Cyprus.

Lastly, the most important developments of the period were seen in the field of education. As colonial subjects, Turkish Cypriots needed to be nationally organized in order to get rid of social and economic backwardness in contrast to their Greek counterparts. Indeed, they had so many disadvantages. In order to deal with their disadvantages, the notion of “progress and enlightenment” became a cornerstone of political thought. Bryant (2004:131) argues that “education already embodied community traditions and represented communal continuity”. The education campaign in both Turkey and Cyprus was an essential part of the enlightenment project.

The original roots of project depended on the simplification of language. Since the 19th century, Turkish intellectuals complained about the gap between language of masses and language of elites. Both Committee of Progress and Union and Kemalist elites believed that rationality, knowledge, science and progress occupied the primary position in the agenda of Turkish enlightenment project. Ömer Seyfettin (1884-1920) who himself was a prominent literary agent and a member of the Young Pens (*Genç Kalemler*)²⁵ movement argue that: “Turks can maintain their sovereignty only by vigorous and serious progress, and progress depends upon the dissemination and spread of knowledge, science and literature among us all” (Aydingün, 2004: 418).

Following Gökalp’s distinction between culture (*hars*) and civilization (*medeniyet*), Turks of Cyprus envisioned their own “new life”. While culture referred to the area of spiritual values such as beliefs, moral duties, ideals, aesthetic feelings, civilization implied the material progress of the world, namely, scientific truths, industry,

²⁵ Young Pens (*Genç Kalemler*) were a group of literary agents advocating Turkish nationalism and national literature in the Ottoman port city of Salonica.

modern law or technique of agriculture. Like in Turkey, the new life would be based on mixing up of the material progress of developed world and power of Turkish culture. This idea, in fact, both excluded cosmopolitan and Marxist expression of modernism and reactionary form of traditionalism. Gökalp (1959: 95) claimed that “our new life avoided both radicalism and conservatism; we must, first of all know the traditions and historical growth of the institutions peculiar to the Turks”. The Turkish leaders wanted to restore the spiritual qualities of the communal life.

Education was another important area for communal development during this period. It served the enlightenment of self-consciousness which was going to be the motor of politicization and mobilization. It served to re-awake the cultural and national consciousness of Turkish Cypriots, that is to say, re-awake the sacredness of nation. Söz claims in 1931, “for us, a national education system is necessary before everything, this truth we will seek in the motherland, in the great Turkish spirit ... ” (Bryant, 2004: 176). Rauf Raif Denktaş²⁶ who earmarked the politics of Turkish Cypriots claimed that his nationalist primary school teacher Turgut Sarıca inspired them. Denktaş mentions about his teacher, Turgut Sarıca in the 26 July 1960 issue of the *Nacak* newspaper as follows: “we took notes in a lecture about Turkish thinkers, Turkish history, and Turkish struggle ... Namık Kemal, Ziya Gökalp, Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, İbrahim Alaettin and Atatürk. The lectures addressed to the national feelings (*milli duygular*)” (Evre, 2004:100). Similarly, Alparslan Türkeş²⁷, a Turkish Cypriot originally born in Nicosia and was, the founder of the Turkish Nationalist Action Party stated that: “our teachers were Turkish Cypriots, they were all nationalist. Especially, Turgut Sarıca informed us that Turks of Turkestan, Crimea, Azerbaijan and Balkans lived under slavery. We were discussing about those captive

²⁶ Rauf Raif Denktaş (1924-2012) was born in Paphos/Ktima in 1924. Having educated in Great Britain during Second World War, he served as a prosecutor in Colonial Cyprus between 1948 and 1958. He was elected as the head of the Turkish Communal Chamber after the establishment of the republic. He stayed in Turkey between 1964 and 1968 because his entrance to Cyprus was banned by Makarios. In 1973, he was elected as the president of provincial Turkish administration (vice-president of the republic of Cyprus, in titular). In 1975, he declared Turkish Cyprus Federation on north of Cyprus. Denktaş appeared in the Turkish politics from the politics of Cyprus and within few years dominated the foreign policy of Ankara as no man was able to do before him.

²⁷ Alparslan Türkeş immigrated to Turkey with his family in mid-1933.

Turks'' (Türkeş, 1974: 79). Furthermore, the works of prominent Turkish nationalist scholars such as Ziya Gökalp and Namık Kemal were more pronounced among the Turks of Cyprus. Mustafa Kemal's *Nutuk* (Speech) was published in 1939 (Evre, 2004: 90). Turkishness had been emphasized in every aspect of the education.

During the 1930s, the Turkish Cypriots had been split into two political groups, the gap between them widening as the popularity of republican Turkey gained ground. On the one hand, there were traditionalists (*Evkafçıklar*) suggesting cooperation with the British officials; on the other hand there were populists (*Halkçılar*) favoring Turkish nationalism. In the 1930 legislative council elections, *Halkçılar* Mehmet Necati Özkan and Mehmet Zeka gained two seats out of three Turkish posts in the council. The decisive victory of the *Halkçı* group showed that nationalist agenda had popular support. In other words, the elections witnessed that Turkish nationalism was backed by the majority of the Turkish Cypriots.

On the eve of the Second World War, Turkish nationalism became a mass movement. Colony governor Sir Richmond Palmer acknowledged the existence of a growing nationalist movement after Turkish cruiser *Hamidiye*'s visit to Famagusta for two days. Thousands of Turks from every corner of the island came to see the cruiser. The visit of *Hamidiye* turned out to be a very big event. The discomfort of British colony governor Sir Richmond Palmer about the growing popularity of Turkey (especially the visit of *Hamidiye*) can be observed in his letter sent to the Ministry of Colonies Sir Malcolm Macdonald in 24 July 1938. Sir Palmer noticed that:

While the ship was in Famagusta harbor ... continual streams of Moslems such as have not been seen for many years poured in to Famagusta from all parts of the Island to see the vessel. Both in Nicosia and Famagusta the crowds, although large and enthusiastic, were orderly and well-behaved ... At that date it was already common knowledge in the island that visit of *Hamidiye* was in contemplation and news exploited with growing exuberance, covert disloyalty and restraint by two local Turkish language newspaper *Boz* and *Ses*. These publications, despite frequent warnings, for a long period previously

been indulging in a campaign of Turkish nationalistic propaganda, seditious use of such expressions as 'Fatherland' (applied to Turkey) and 'our Atatürk' (Çakmak, 2009: 233).

To sum up, the republican period marked three significant developments: Firstly, the recruitment of young and energetic leaders among the Turkish Cypriots; secondly Turkey's cultural and social involvement in Cyprus; thirdly, the development of a new national cause, namely attachment to the motherland. The popularity of Turkey had been decisive among all segments of Turkish community of Cyprus. Actually, the contribution of republican Turkey was cultural and intellectual, not political. The republican foreign policy rejected irredentist and expansionist agenda. Turkey's influence reinforced the internal development of Turkish consciousness in Cyprus. Since the 1920s, Turkish Cypriot intellectuals were pursuing their own path to reform and political change. The growing influence of Turkey offered a method of struggle and moral support on the eve of the *enosis* movement. Nevertheless, Turkey continued to preserve good relations with Great Britain and did not propagate dissent among the Turkish community.

3.1.3 The Consolidation and Institutionalization of Turkish Cypriot Community:

The Turks of Cyprus experienced institutional growth by the end of 1930s and during the 1940s. That was the outcome of two main developments: rapid politicization of the 1920s and increasing Greek Cypriot agitation for union with Greece.

Cypriot Turks reacted critically to the Greek riot of 1931. They showed a strong determination and will to resist the *enosis* movement. Britain suppressed the revolt, as well as all communal rights in response to the unrest. Thus, the Turkish community suffered from this state of emergency. Following the post Second World War era, Turks of Cyprus had doubts that new British Labor government, Prime Minister Clement Attlee and his colonial secretary Creech-Jones were eager to put an end to British imperial mission in the world. Indeed, Greece and Great Britain allied against the Axis forces during the war. Historically, liberal and labor governments of

the British Empire and the philhellenes²⁸ of the British state had sympathy toward the Greek cause. Consequently, expectation that Cyprus would be ceded to Greece after the war alarmed the Turkish community.

In the previous chapter, moral and cultural developments of the Turkish community had been examined. Turks of Cyprus believed their society as a whole was in need of political regeneration. The nationalist leadership under the guidance of Dr. Küçük had been dominating the institutions of the Turkish community since 1930s. Indeed, the Turkish community matured and consolidated through the late Second World War, creating most of the social and political institutions that would serve to the Turkish Cypriot national cause.

After the Second World War, anti-colonial movement gained ground in Cyprus. *Enosis* demands caught attention of the young Greek Cypriots. The communist movement was strong so they captured the majority of Famagusta and Limassol municipality councils in the 1943 elections. Such adroitness and activity of Greeks alerted Turkish community. On 18 April 1943, the Turkish leadership responded to these developments by establishing KATAK, *Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu* (Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus). The main objective of the association was to protect the rights of the Turkish community. Similarly, a new newspaper *Halkın Sesi* (the Voice of People) was founded by Dr. Küçük in 1942. According to Dr. Küçük, the aim of the newspaper was to “give a voice to the many complaints of the Turkish Cypriot people against the British colonial authorities” (Dodd, 2010: 10). Denктаş (2005: 89) pointed out that “*Halkın Sesi* was welcomed by the majority of Turkish Cypriots professionals (bureaucrats, police) because it limited the Greek and British action over Turks”. Even British governor Wooley became aware of the nationalist mobilization among the Turkish community in 1943.

It is becoming restive and apprehensive and is forming its own “self-defensive” organizations. This development accentuates racial

²⁸ Philhellenism was the expression of romantic Greek nationalism among senior liberal European politicians. British Prime Minister Lyold George was the most well-know philhellene.

animosity. Doubts about our intentions, which are unimpeded displays of Hellenic ‘patriotism’ arouse, are throwing this usually loyal minority into the hands of Turkish nationalist politicians who preach that they should look to Turkey and not to Britain for inspiration and protection (Coughlan & Mallinson, 2006: 589).

The members of KATAK fell into dispute in terms of strategy. Dr. Fazıl Küçük believed that a hard line policy was needed. Thus, he established *Kıbrıs Türk Milli Halk Partisi* (KTMHP-Cyprus Turkish National People’s Party) in 1944. The establishment of Turkish political parties showed the importance of building self-contained opposition to the Greek agitations. KATAK and KTMHP formed *Kıbrıs Milli Türk Birliği* (Cyprus National Turkish Union) on 23 October 1949. When Greek armed insurrection emerged in 1955, all national organs came under the control of new political party, *Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi*, (Cyprus is Turkish Party, CTP) under the supervision of Fazıl Küçük and Hikmet Bil who was originally a Turkish Cypriot from Ankara. A branch was set up in Turkey under the name of “‘Cyprus is Turkish Association’” by Turkish Cypriot émigrés to Anatolia, and here they became highly influential among domestic political framework. As understood from its name, Cyprus is Turkish Party was an ambitious movement. Hikmet Bil argued that “‘it was a perfectly proper title. If and only if, Britain decides to abdicate Cyprus, then we shall put forward our claim to regain the island for Turkey. If necessary, we shall fight’” (Foley, 1964: 29). There can be no doubt that Fazıl Küçük shared the views of Bil. On the arrival of British Colony secretary Lennox-Boyd, Dr. Küçük published an article and stated the following:

Cyprus is Turkish ... The duty of Great Britain is to give the house to the real owner and let the owner deal with the unruly subtenants. Turkey and Turks of Cyprus consider Great Britain as a nation of gentleman. They feel that, if she decides to leave Cyprus, it will invite the true owner (*Halkın Sesi*, 9 July 1955).

The consolidation of the community continued by uniting all 108 Turkish Cypriot social and cultural associations under *Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu* (Federation of Turkish Association-FTA) which was established on 8 September

1949 (Bilge, 1961: 6). On 23 July 1955, the dual administration of *Evkaf* was ceased to exist. The colony administration delegated all its rights to the Turkish communal leadership due to strong communal pressure. A substantial capital and various properties scattered all over the island came under full control of the CTP and FTA. Indeed, according to Dr. Küçük “the meaning of the *Evkaf* is money that can be spent on benefiting the community” (Nevzat & Hatay, 2009: 922). In 1957, Denктаş was installed as the chief of FTA by the suggestion of Ankara.

FTA experienced economic as well as social developments. The emphasis was given on the communal self-sufficiency. Firstly, it established a separate Turkish bazaar advocating the “from Turk to Turk” campaign. Then, trade with Greeks totally was banned. For example, “Turks caught using Greek products and shops” were punished (Crawshaw, 1959: 138). A good indication of economic expansion of the community was the rapid acceleration of the establishment of Turkish enterprises such as small shoemaking companies, dairy facilities and hotels (Gazioğlu, 2000: 170-171). Secondly, the separate Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Commerce was established in February 1958. By this way, commercial dependency was eliminated (Gazioğlu, 2000: 179). The economic activities by no means were associated with the policy of *taksim*, that is to say, the economic partition.

Table 2: Land and Property in Cyprus (1957)

Population, Asset, Production	Turkish	Greek	Total
Land (*)			6.919.392
Cultivable Land (*)	1.495.203	3.035.783	4.530.986
Population	92.462	416. 986	509.628
Agricultural Revenue (£)	7.206.437	14.631.253	21.837.690
Number of Cooperations	199	713	912

* Land is not abundant in Cyprus. The average value of one acre cost 30 Sterling, that is, 1000 TL. In 1957, Turks of Cyprus had land worth of 45.000.000 Sterling (38 percent the of Island cultivable land).

Source: Aydemir, S. (2011) *İkinci Adam*, Vol.3: 200, Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi

In the wake of Greek armed movement, many different Turkish militias were established: *Volkan* (Volcano), *KITEMB-Kıbrıs Türk Mukavemet Birliği* (Cyprus Turkish Resistance Union), *9 Eylül Cephesi* (9 September Front), *Kıbrıs Türk Komandoları* (Turkish Cypriot Commandos) in the mid-1950s. Turkish Cypriot leadership decided that a new force was necessary for the purpose of self-defense because they judged that the British administration was not reliable for protection. In a short-time, the armed groups accreted in 1957 renamed as *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı* (Turkish Resistance Organization-TMT²⁹). Dr. Burhan Nalbantoğlu, Rauf Dektaş and Kemal Tanrıverdi set up the executive committee of the organization. On 26 November 1957, the establishment of TMT was announced by leaflets. Denктаş was registered as the first member of the organization with the name of *Toros* (Taurus)³⁰ as his *nom de guerre*. After discussions between Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, Foreign Minister Fatih Rüstü Zorlu agreed that TMT was to be supported³¹. On 1 August 1958, Colonel Rıza Vuruşkan, the veteran of Korean War, arrived to the island with other 5 officers³² and took the *nom de guerre* “Akınjı” (Raider) for the organization of TMT (Tansu, 2001: 61). From that date forward, TMT followed defensive, retaliatory and hard-line policies towards Greek Cypriots.

TMT was the natural reaction of Turkish community against ever-growing Greek extremism. In the beginning, TMT emerged as a national movement advocating military action for self-defense of the Turkish community. Since 1957, TMT regarded itself as the military reflection of *Taksim* policy which viewed armed

²⁹ The sources disagreed about the exact date of TMT’s founding. While Turkey considered the arrival of first military officials on the islands (1 August 1958), Cypriot Turks claimed that the exact date was the formation of first cell (9 November 1957). First leaflet was disturbed on 26 November 1957. Here, I simply say, it was established through late 1957s.

³⁰ *Toros* (Taurus) mountains are range of mountains stretching along south Anatolia.

³¹ The ammunition was sent from Southern Turkey via Anamur and Silifke to Erenköy, Famagusta and Balalan Village (Carpassin Peninsula) (Tansu, 2001:153).

³² Colonel Rıza Vuruşkan, Colonel Necmettin Erce, Colonel Şefik Karakurt, Captain Mehmet Özden, Captain Rahmi Ergün (Tansu, 2001: 61).

rebellion against Greek majority as both inevitable and necessary. In other words, its existence was destined to repel the tyranny of foreign will on Turkish community. TMT kept alive the spirit of communal preparedness in pursuit of the national goal: the partition. It effectively triggered the collective consciousness of the nation. The organization propagated the idea of partition among Turkish community through *Nacak*³³ newspaper that was to be published under auspice of FTA and Denктаş³⁴.

As discussed in the previous chapters, Turks of Cyprus possessed a strong sense of communal solidarity. *Enosis* demands implied a mortal threat to the well-being of Turkish community. Significantly, most Turks feared that union with Greece would mean the end of their survival in the island. “The fate of the small Turkish minorities in Rhodes and Cos (Istanköy) has been of great interest to Turks elsewhere and is regarded in Cyprus as an indication of what might be expected to result from *Enosis*” (Buckingham, 1957: 76). Historically, Turks of Cyprus opposed the idea of *enosis* from the beginning because *enosis* would be a “matter of changing colonial master for the worse” (Stavrinides, 1976: 33). On 9 February 1958, Dr. Küçük emphasized the fate of Turks under Greek regime: “where today are the Turks of Crete, where are the Turks of Rhodes and other brothers of our people? Why almost no Turks did stay around here? They have vanished under ‘just’ Greek regime” (*Halkın Sesi*, 9 February 1958).

TMT succeeded in establishing a pattern of sustained armed struggle. It was loosely organized, composed of selected volunteers and strongly associated with right-wing Turkish nationalism. During inter-communal struggle, TMT operated branches for training and recruitment in all villages and towns. In the beginning, it aimed to train 5000 militias. Within a short time, TMT succeeded in establishing armed cells through the island. Actually, in some places armed cells appeared simultaneously.

³³ *Nacak* was an ancient Turkish sword. *Nacak* was published on 29 May 1959.

³⁴ Denктаş argued that *Nacak* was published on behalf of him. TMT central committee decided to plan the publishing policy (Personal interview with Rauf Raif Denктаş in his office in Nicosia on 24 March 2009).

For example, İsmail Bozkurt, a TMT activist described how he personally initiated to establish a TMT cell as follows:

I met with TMT in the Namık Kemal High School of Famagusta. Then, I immediately found myself in the organization. When I returned to my native village, I realized that there was no organization. Everyone was talking about setting up a resistance organization. Realizing the situation, I found reliable 5-6 friends, asking them to form a TMT cell in the village. They all agreed. Then, we were sworn into the TMT in a ceremony before pistol, Qur'an and Turkish flag.³⁵

The chief of TMT was called *Bayraktar*³⁶ (flag man) who was answerable to the Turkish General Staff. The island was divided into several administrative units (*Sanjacks*³⁷), namely; Nicosia, Famagusta, Paphos, Larnaca and Limassol. The *Sanjacks* were ruled by *Sanjactors*. They were assisted by Turkish Cypriot chiefs (*Serdar*). The Namık Kemal High School of Famagusta, Nicosia Turkish Collage and Çetinkaya Spor Club were the centers of TMT activities. Significantly, it was the lawyers, teachers, doctors and merchants who helped to lodge and subsidize the organization. TMT can be classified as an autochthonous defensive partisan organization with urban and elite background. In other words, the politically consciousness professionals constituted the local chiefship (*Serdars*). Aydın Samibeyoğlu, *Serdar* of Nicosia, claimed that a specific emphasis was given on some professions:

I studied in the Faculty of Language-History of Ankara University between 1956 and 1960. After graduation, I started to work as a teacher on the island. The teachers were kept in the forefront by the

³⁵ Personal interview with İsmail Bozkurt (Former TMT Activist) in the Association of Turkish Cypriot Fighters in Famagusta/ North Cyprus on 5 May 2010.

³⁶ See Table 3

³⁷ Alongside the start of mobilization, the TMT began to be reorganized. Until 1970, new *sanjacks* were formed: Yeşilirmak (January 1965), Boğaz (July 1964), Erenköy (August 1964), Serdarlı (September 1969) and Ortaköy (January 1970).

organization. Each village had a teacher so that TMT easily could spread out to the rural areas.³⁸

In isolated hamlets, TMT cells were formed by armed peasantry driven from the villages by Greeks. The organization remained secret until December 1963. After December 1963, TMT structure was expanded into a relatively professional army known simply as the *Mujahideens*³⁹ while major posts were controlled by Turkish army officers who secretly entered the island under fake professions such as imam, journalist or banking inspector.

The main goal of TMT was to foster unity among Turkish Cypriots, to protect the Turkish community and to create consensus regarding the purpose of communal leadership. It was vital to keep the community as a whole and undivided. In fact, TMT and the communal leadership monopolized the ideological stream among Turks of Cyprus. They embarked on a propaganda campaign against communist penetration into the Turkish community. For example, the Communist Party of Cyprus, AKEL's 1952 party program stated that:

Only common struggle with the daily common problems of Greek and Turkish working people, the mutual understanding and help of the Turks in their social problems, will forge an inseparable unity and the Turks will be convinced that the right path to their own liberation is not with the *agas* and the *beys* of Turkey, but with the common struggle and democratic movements of the Greeks (Adams, 1971: 44).

The communist propaganda never gained ground among the Turks of Cyprus. Firstly, communist and unionist movements in Cyprus were merely Greek dominated. Turkish leaders saw in communism another threat and a possible threat to the integrity of Turkish community. After the establishment of Turkish Trade Union Confederation in 1943, Turks left Greek-dominated unions. Many of them thought that it was “their patriotic duty to oppose the communist system which, in a period

³⁸ Personal interview with Aydın Samibeyoğlu in the Brotherhood Lodge in Nicosia/North Cyprus on 18 January 2012.

³⁹ Holy Warriors.

of cold-war, threatened Turkey’’ (Dodd, 2010: 12). Secondly, Islamic faith was a strong deterrence against communist philosophy. As Beckingham (1957: 80) puts: ‘‘Among the Turks of Cyprus, as in the Turkish Republic, Communism is very rare and is often seen as a disguise for Russian imperialism’’. Thirdly, the Turkish Cypriot leaders and TMT chiefs were the most stringent anti-communists. On 27 July 1949, Dr. Küçük clearly displayed his antipathy towards communists in *Halkın Sesi*: ‘‘Communism is the regime of Muscovite. They had neither God nor conscience. For communist, there is only Stalin whom they blindly worshipped and there is only Moscow. Their encephalon, idea and belief were fed by these two words’’ (*Halkın Sesi*, 24 July 1949). In the coming years, the conflict in Cyprus would have been portrayed as war between Turkishness and communism by native Turkish media.

Needless to say, AKEL was an ardent supporter of the *enosis* cause. Therefore, this made it so unpopular among Turkish Cypriots. In the eyes of TMT, working with AKEL or Greek unions was intolerable because of their pro-*enosis* stances. Dr. Küçük made it clear that ‘‘if a Turk becomes a communist in Cyprus, then he also becomes a Greek’’ (Adams, 1971: 197). On 27 May 1958, TMT sent its ‘‘last warning’’ to the Turkish members of Greek unions (Evre, 2004: 134). Therefore, most of them registered to the Turkish unions⁴⁰. The Turkish Cypriots leaders made concerted efforts to mobilize the community for the national purpose. The unity and solidarity among Turkish Cypriots was seen a vital and necessary action against highly-polarized but demographically pre-dominant Greek Cypriot society. In contrast to Greek Cypriots, the Turkish community displayed a ‘‘high sense of internal homogeneity’’ (Kalyvas, 2006: 64).

In the wake of the establishment of the Cyprus Republic, Turkish Cypriot community had highly talented, politically consciousness group of elites, ideologically homogenized community and effective military-political establishment. In the case

⁴⁰ AKEL and left-wing unions continued to cause dissent in the Turkish community through their remaining Turkish members such as Derviş Kavazoğlu, İbrahim Aziz and Nurettin Seferoğlu until mid-1960s.

of Turkish Cypriots, there was a “top-down defensive and preparatory mobilization” for the proscribed purpose (Tilly, 1978: 76). Under the auspice of authoritarian communal leadership, the Turkish Cypriot community moved to a new and intense confrontation.

3.2 The Politicization and Mobilization of Greek Community of Cyprus:

In this part, the domestic factors of Greek-Cypriot national consciousness will be examined. The factors that contributed to the Greek Cypriot insistence on union with Greece will be discussed. As discussed in the previous chapter, such insistence would be the source of inter-communal frictions. In the first part, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and Hellenic education are taken as key feature of Greek Cypriot political consciousness. In the second part, the impact of the establishment of Hellenic Kingdom on Greek element is issued. In the third part, the contribution of the Cyprus Communist Party to the domestic politics in the island is discussed.

3.2.1. The Hellenic-Orthodox Values and the Cyprus Church:

As argued in the previous chapters, desire for union with Greece was the center of inter-communal tension when the Ottomans left the island. The gradual evolution of the stance of the Orthodox Church contributed to the basis of such political thought among the Greeks of Cyprus. In the second chapter, the status of an autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus (AD 478) has been discussed. Indeed, the background of Christianity in Cyprus was traced back to the conversion of the Roman Governor, Sergius Paulus, in AD 45 by St Barnabus, a Hellenized Jew. From that date forward, the Church of Cyprus was going to dominate the political and social affairs of the Orthodox community of Cyprus. However, it was being persecuted and harassed under Catholic Frankish and Italian overlords, The Turkish conquest of 1571 restored autocephality of the Church by elevating its status to the *ethnarch*, the political and religious leader of the Orthodox community of Cyprus. According to the French historian Francois Crouzet (1973: 102) “the autocephality has consolidated the

religious afflictions of Cypriot Greeks with their ethnic identity; lay society came to be perfectly adapted to religious organization”.

Christianity in the east followed a quite different path than Christianity in the west. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the philosophy of enlightenment and secular establishments replaced the domineering status of the Church in the west. In the east, the Orthodox Church often remained strong. Here, “a Greek was a Greek to the extent that he was Orthodox” (Holland, 2002: 6). Since its detachment from Greek Byzantine world in 1191, the Church of Cyprus remained “the guardian of Hellenic ethnic and cultural identity” (Morgan, 2004: 14)⁴¹. As Crouzet (1973: 102) points out the “active politics” was an ordinary habit of the Cyprus Church. Sir Luke (1969: 130) put similar views: “it is true that for this community, the bishops are rallying points. It preserves some kind of existence so that it suits the people to give their prelates political importance”. Similarly, Holland (2002: 7) points out that “If few Eastern politicians are religious men, nearly all Eastern Churchmen are politicians”. Greek Cypriots believed that the church was deterrence against Latinization, Islamization or Anglicanization of the Orthodox Cypriots. “The Church, in the eyes of the Greeks, was not only the symbol of their ethnic and religious identities, but also their protector against mistreatment by local officials” (Markides, 1974: 312). Similarly, Crouzet (1973: 102) notes that “the Orthodox Church became something more than simply the forum of Christian devotional life. It emerged as the most distinctive expression of an often besieged community”

The Greek Orthodox Church fostered unity among Eastern Greeks scattering through from Cappadocia, Pontus to the Cyprus. In the words of Augustinos (1992:190): “they feel themselves one with the Hellenes of Greece because of the Orthodox Church”. There can be no doubt that the church protected the Hellenic ties of Cypriots. The regular church festivals and the cult of saint kept the spirit of

⁴¹ Holland (2002: 6) argued that “the survival of the Church and Hellenic nation on the island was indissolubly connected in the same way as the Catholic faith and the *Gael* of Ireland or Catholic Church in the island of Malta”.

Greekness alive in countryside. As Holland (2002: 6) pointed out the Church of Cyprus became the core of “Ethnic, linguistic, literary, and religious conventions shaped around a Hellenistic consciousness”. Therefore, such Hellenistic consciousness found its outlet in the call for union with Greece, that is, *enosis*.

The root of *enosis* was traced to the uneasy relations between Cyprus Church and British colony administration. The Church of Cyprus welcomed the arrival of the British as a stepping stone towards union with Greece. As discussed in the previous chapters, the church began to comply about “the anti-clerical mentality of British” within a short-time (Roudemetof & Michael, 2009: 41) when the secular-oriented Great Britain removed the privileges of the church. There was no doubt that British colonial administration followed the same ethno-confessional administration system of the Ottomans. In contrast to the Ottomans, British preferred secular representatives. The Church of Cyprus met with increasing “de-legitimization” by the British governors (Roudemetof & Michael, 2009). For secular-minded British, the separation of politics and church was an act of necessity. Therefore, the status of the church was reduced to a consultative authority. New British administration system clearly determined the borders between the church and the administration (Roudemetof & Michael, 2009). The result was increasing antagonism between the church elites and colony administration. Markides (1973: 313) notes that “to the British, who were nurtured with doctrines which stressed that religion and politics must be kept separate, recognition of the Cypriot archbishop as the political representative of the Greeks struck them as ludicrous, at the least”.

The advocates of the church see such initiatives as “policies of de-Hellenization” and “de-Christianization” of the island. It alerted the *ethnarchy*. The anti-British atmosphere suffused the clergy. In effect, “the faith of the Church and of the leadership were transformed into the nationalist opposition movement to the British colonialism” (Roudemetof & Michael, 2009: 43). The erosion of the traditional power and the appearance of the secular political power such as Communist Party of

Cyprus culminated the growth of church-led *enosis* movement. As Markides (1973) pointed out “the crisis of traditional legitimacy” spearheaded the *enosis* movement.

The Orthodox Church of Cyprus represents the tradition of militant Christianity. Roudementof (2009: 45) points out that in south-east Europe, “the orthodox Christianity has been redeployed in the service of the formation of the nationalist passions”. The Church of Cyprus acted like the prolongation of Hellenic nationalism. As many EOKA members points out it was the “last ecumenical movement of the Hellenism” which refers to the totality of the Hellenic Church (*O Filelefteros*, 1 April 2011). The Church of Cyprus mobilized the Greek Cypriot community for *enosis* struggle when the Second World War was over. *Etharchy* gave full support to the armed insurrection of 1955. The president of EOKA Fighters Associations, Thassos Sophocles makes it clear that *ethnarchy* represented the “political wing of the Greek Cypriot insurrection as a blessed purpose” (*O Filelefteros*, 1 April 2012). Indeed, Milios & Kyprianidis (2011: 49) mentioned that “EOKA was subordinated to the policies and orders that came from the joint leadership in Athens and *Ethnarchy*”. It was not surprising that EOKA often made references to the religious values. The archbishop Makarios pointed out that “the religiously practicing youth” have been the major factor of victory (Varnava, 2004: 80). During the 1955-1959 armed insurrections, the church wanted an aggressive armed policy towards the Turks. On 1 June 1958, the bishop of Kition sent a letter to the EOKA leaders: “we should confine our attacks to the Turks, indeed inflicting upon them as much as damage as possible. They must be dealt with mercilessly because only in this way they will be frightened into minding their own business” (Milos & Kyprianidis, 2011: 50).

The popularity of EOKA also gained ground in the rural villages which were under the strong influence of the church. EOKA’s strength lay in the rural areas, where it was fed by frustrated village-youth and the monasteries. The priests, Bible study groups and prominent figures of the Cyprus Church strengthened and encouraged the fighting zeal of EOKA members in the villages or detention camps. EOKA militants,

fully armed, were allowed to enter the monasteries, which they received food and supplies. Moreover, the memorial services of death militants kept the issue alive in the villages so that young Greek boys could join the struggle. Without shadow of a doubt, “it was the Church, the transcended of political ideology, that ended up spearheading *enosis*” (Coughlan & Mallinson, 2006: 601).

The second important aspect of the politicization and mobilization Hellenic elements was education. Indeed, education was seen as a “weapon in the battle for the survival of Hellenism” (Morgan, 2004: 43). Since the establishment of independent Greek kingdom (1830), the Hellenic education was seen as fundamental to Greek national consciousness. This education network often constituted a link between the Greek Kingdom and other Hellenic elements scattering through Asia Minor, the Aegean Islands and Cyprus. Kitromilides (1990: 7) points out that “the expansion of the system of the Greek schools in the east caused the penetration of the national ideas” into the distant and isolated regions which they had no direct link with the Greek kingdom.

One aim of Hellenic education was to foster the Greek spirit (*Ellinopsychoi*), a primordial inheritance. Stavrinides (1976: 19) argued that the idea of Greek spirit was based on the belief that “Greeks of the Near East are the descendants of the Alexander the Great, Plato, Sophocles and the heroes of the Byzantine”. The ancient Greek “high civilization” which was fed by the legacy of Socrates and Plato could only be regenerated through the resurrection of *Ellinopsychoi*. The use of force was the only way if Greeks resurrected. In Cyprus, *Ellinopsychoi* is “the spirit and the deeds of EOKA” as stressed by Greek Cypriot linguist Menelaos Christodoulou (*O Filelefteros*, 1 April 2011). True Greek Cypriot spirit would have been associated with his insistence on union with Hellenic motherland.

In the wake of increasing Greek nationalist sentiments in the beginning of the 20th century, Greek education centers had been the hotbeds of Hellenic zeal. British colonial administration in Cyprus realized that these schools (Pan-Cyprian

Gymnasiums) inflamed the inter-communal tension in the island by loading anti-Turkish sentiments and advocating union with Greece. High Commissioner Haynes Smith reported that “a system of terrorism” was widely used in the schools: “through the educational system which was maintained and controlled by the Church, The expansion of primary and secondary schools, first in the cities and later in the countryside, . . . opened up new audiences for Hellenic nationalistic values” (Coughlan & Mallinson, 2006: 580). Similarly, in 1895, the inter-communal enmity was described by the Chief Magistrate of Nicosia, Mr Seager as follows: On the anniversary of Greek war of independence, the songs “which referred to the slaughter of the hated Moslems” were sang by Greek school children when they paraded through the Turkish Quarter (Coughlon & Mallison, 2006: 579). Furthermore, In Greek Cypriot schools, *Tourkokratia* (The period⁴² of Ottoman Turkish rule in Greece) was displayed as “400 years of bondage” and “disastrous period for Hellenism” (Theodosopoulos, 2007: 52). The main lecture of the Greek youth was the resurrection of enslaved Greeks (*Anastasi*). In other words, all true Greeks should struggle for “the unity of the all ancient and Byzantine Hellenic world” (Stavrinides, 1976: 19).

It would not be surprising that elementary schools were the source of militants when EOKA embarked an armed campaign in 1955. The zealot student mobs were the ardent supporters of armed insurrection. Indeed, the Hellenic zeal of youthfulness principally through youth organizations (PEON and OHEN) contributed to the emergence of the armed campaign. EOKA leaders were aware that:

It is among the young people that one finds audacity, the love of taking risks and the thirst for great and difficult achievements. It was to the youth of Cyprus that I made my main appeal and called on to give their all to the struggle (Markides, 1974: 319).

The passionate Greek youngsters (especially elementary schools) organized several meetings to support EOKA cause. In the first half of autumn 1955, “students from

⁴² The period refers from the conquest of Istanbul (1453) to the recognition of Hellenic Kingdom by Ottoman Turkey in 1830.

twenty one schools engaged in forty-six strikes and took part in demonstrations” (Demetriou, 2007:181). In return, British colonial government closed down several schools as a result of which five-sixths of young Greek Cypriots was deprived of their education (Bryant, 2004: 170). The colony administration believed that schools were the centers of the organization of “lawlessness, riot and violence” (Bryant, 2004: 170).

The education was seen as integral process of the gradual politicization of the Greek Cypriot community. Sociologically, the joint deeds of church and Hellenic education network foster the communal mobilization in Cyprus. As Greek historian Sakkas argued “Church, School and commerce kept ablaze the torch of Greek civilization and of the great idea” (Llewellyn Smith, 1998: 2-3).

3.2.2 The Establishment of Hellenic Kingdom, Great Idea and Resurrection:

The Greek Kingdom was established as a result of a war between central Ottoman forces and Greek rebels (1821-1830) and active participation of European diplomacy. The new Greek state acted as a focus of Hellenic elements in the Ottoman realm. British consular agent in Cyprus, Vondiziano witnessed that “many Orthodox Cypriots proceed to take the Hellenic citizenship” from the newly established Greek kingdom (Lukes, 1969: 166). Hellenic elements in the Ottoman Turkey embarked a policy of union with Greece through political resurrection and armed insurrections such as the Macedonian (1904-1913) and the Cretan uprisings (1870-1908). As British Prime Minister, Lord Curzon pointed out “every Greek war is waged for the recovery of a national Frontier” (Peckham, 2000: 78). From that date forward, the Hellenic Kingdom followed an aggressive and irredentist foreign policy: namely, The Great idea (*Megali idea*).

Inspired by Platonic and messianic view of ideal state, the newly emerged Greek kingdom was seen as a safe haven for the Hellenic elements in the Near East. The emerging Greek Kingdom had a civilization mission which was based on liberal and

Hellenic values in the orient (Llewellyn Smith, 1998: 70). Such values consisted of mainly “western Hellenic identity (modernist in perspective and inspired by classical Greece)” and “eastern *Romeic* ” (Byzantine and Ottoman) values (Theodossopoulos, 2007:7). According to Mango (1965: 35) great idea was a form of “messianic Byzantinism”. In his words, “The Parthenon and St. Sophia were seen as complementary expressions of the same national genius” (Mango, 1965: 42). The modernity did not replace traditionalism. On the contrary, it overlapped with traditionalism in Greek world.

Greeks in the east looked forward to union with “idealized haven of Greece ”. Such idea was based on the thought that “the Greek nationhood is about eternity, a denial of cultural change and infinitum” (Theodossopoulos, 2007: 12). Holland (2002: 10) put a similar view: “cult of *Enosis* was perfervid and prone to excess emotion; a dream-world where Greek myth and feeling easily slid from reality, a hypnotization of a living self by a dead self ”.

In 1864, King George I of Greece adopted the title of King of Hellenes by a constitutional provision. In other words, the Greek monarchy considered itself as the true head of all Greeks in the area stretching from sea of Pontus to Cyprus. The Great idea was accepted as official policy of the Greek Kingdom. From that date forward, Kingdom of Hellenes followed expansionist, irredentist and colonialist policy towards Ottoman Turkey. In 1844, politician Ioannis Kolettis openly declared before the Greek National Assembly that:

The Greek kingdom is not the whole of Greece, but only a part, the smallest and poorest part. A native of Greece is not only someone who lives within this kingdom, but also one who lives in Ioannina, in Thessaly, in Serres, in Adrianople, in Constantinople, in Trebizond, in Crete, in Samos and in any land associated with Greek history or the Greek race...There are two great center of Hellenism. Athens is the capital of the Kingdom. Constantinople is the great capital, the city, the dream and hope of all Greeks (Peckham, 2000: 85).

As Markides (1974: 315) points out although Great idea refers to “a dream shared by Greeks” that one day the Greek-speaking part of the Byzantine empire would be restored and united under the banner of a Greater Greece. The Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the annexation of Crete, Salonika, Ionnina and Aegean Islands accelerated Great idea project. Greece almost doubled its territory and population (Llewellyn Smith, 1998: 19). There can be no doubt that despite its geographical proximity, Cyprus was affected by the developments. The domestic aspect of the political life (the church and education network) was the leading advocates of the idea.

The Greek Cyprus *enosis* movement had “internal logic”. It would be reductionist to claim that *enosis* movement was a simple agitation of Greek foreign policy. Holland (2002: 5) made it clear that “Cypriot *Enosis* lay a consciousness of belonging to Greek culture and civilization”. That is to say, 800 years old detachment of Cyprus from the Hellenic world constituted the basis of this logic. As it lay on the philosophy of Great idea, “it is the destiny of Hellenism to Hellenize that vast stretch of territory which by natural laws the Greeks believe to be theirs”, like Cyprus (Peckham, 2000: 85).

Greek Cypriot armed insurrection of 1955 could only be understood from historical and spiritual perspectives. Bryant (2004: 160) argues that “the struggle of Greek Cypriots was not simply a struggle born of the insults and mismanagement of British, but was a struggle rooted in a past”. Markides (1974: 319) points out that in contrast to colonial Algeria, neither economic nor social oppression existed: “the peasants of Cyprus were not being pushed out of their land by colonial settlers”. It was the idea and spirit culminated the Greek Cypriot armed movement in the island. “The Greek Cypriot armed movement (1955-59) was “the expression of the aspirations and instincts of all the Greek Cypriots to Generation of '55 who had irresistible vigor of necessity” (*O Filelefteros*, 1 April 2012). Such necessity was the long-established desire of *enosis*.

3.2.3 Communism in Cyprus:

Cyprus offered a fertile ground for the growth of an organized leftist movement because Marxist thought found a free and liberal environment in the British Cyprus unlike Greece and Turkey where Marxism was officially banned. Furthermore, the growing commerce of the port cities of Limassol and Larnaca paved the way for the establishment of organized labor unions. According to Holland (2002: 11), it was “urbanization, proletarianization, secularism” that culminated communism in Cyprus. Significantly, the development of a strong left-wing politics in Cyprus was free from hostile administration.

The first communist activities appeared in the port city of Limassol. Although they emerged in early 1920s, British administration outlawed them along with other Greek Cypriot organizations after the 1931 revolt. In 1941, AKEL (Progressive Working People’s Party/ The Communist Party of Cyprus) was established. In 1943, the leftist victory in the municipalities of Famagusta and Limassol became a turning point in Cypriot politics. From that date forward, AKEL became a permanent political actor in the island.

AKEL served a dual purpose for the rise of *enosis* cause. Firstly, the adroitness and activities of communists alarmed the Church. *Ethnarchy* made it clear that “Communism is totally at odds with Christianity and Hellenism and no true Christian Hellene can be at the same time a communist” (Markides, 1974: 317). The conservative and nationalist Greek Cypriots believed that union with Greece was the only alternative to the growing communist power. Disorganized ecclesiastical right-wing forces thought that struggle for *enosis* was necessary and vital.

Secondly, AKEL itself began to support *enosis* band-wagon. After the decisive right-wing victory in 1948 municipality elections, AKEL became aware that *enosis* cause caught the attention of the Greek Cypriot population so it became an ardent supporter of union with Greece. In 1949 AKEL sent a memorandum to the United Nations,

demanding “national restoration” of Cyprus (Adams, 1971: 36). Moreover, AKEL supported unofficial plebiscite between 15 and 22 January 1950 for the union with Greece. AKEL also participated in the large *enosis* meeting led by the Church on 13 August 1954 (Holland, 2002: 40). There can be no doubt AKEL realized that “whoever controlled *Enosis* ultimately controlled the society” (Markides, 1974: 317). It was ironic that the communists of Cyprus wanted union with conservative monarchy of Greece. On 29 April 1954, the General Secretary of AKEL, Papaioannou made it clear that:

Some people abroad find it difficult to understand why the people of Cyprus should fight for the union of Cyprus with Greece when Greece itself has a monarcho-fascist regime and is actually under American subjugation and control. The struggle of the people of Cyprus for national rehabilitation must be viewed in relation to the struggle of the Greek people for peace and national independence and not separately. It is part and parcel of the same struggle. Governments come and go in Greece but the Greek people are always there (Adams, 1971: 42).

In the face of such perception, AKEL saw Cyprus as an indivisible and undisputed Hellenic island. *Enosis* was, therefore, a legitimate right for the Greek Cypriot community. On the other hand, AKEL was skeptical of the armed campaign of EOKA. Actually, AKEL opposed to the violent method of the EOKA and the strict anti-communist attitude of EOKA leaders, not to *enosis* cause. On the contrary, AKEL tried to represent itself as true champion of the *enosis* cause as an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist cause. In fact, both were pursuing the same goal, *enosis*, but had different ideas how to achieve it.

AKEL’s attitude toward the Turkish Cypriots was irrational and sarcastic. For them, Turkish Cypriots were under the strong influence of “chauvinistic (mainland-oriented) Turkish bourgeoisie” and “landlords” (Adams, 1971: 40). Turkey was a double enemy in the eyes of communists; it was both part of imperialist circle and crude enemy of Hellenism. On the other hand, AKEL called Turkish Cypriots to join the communist-led *enosis* movement. Needless to say, such call made no echo among Turkish Cypriots. AKEL remained silent when Turkish Cypriots were attacked by

Greek rebels. Moreover, the communists participated in the “joint defense committees” of the Greek Cypriot settlements against TMT raids (Adams, 1971: 53). Until 1967, AKEL would advocate the idea of unfettered independence and genuine *enosis* policy. It remained politically blind to the most legitimate rights of Turks in the island.

The Church of Cyprus and the Hellenic education centers in Cyprus were the hotbeds of *enosis* activities. Finally, the communists of Cyprus served a dual function: they accelerated the *enosis* struggle by entering a political competition with the church and they provided tactical support for the nationalists. Unlike, Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots displayed a dual mobilization: Church-led *enosis* movement and AKEL-led *enosis* movement. Such dualism would be widening in the latter years. Although, the Greek Cypriot community lacked high internal homogeneity as Turkish Cypriots had, the broader pattern of Greek Cypriot social thinking displayed a strong sense of externalization of Turks. All Greek Cypriot political forces agreed on the fact that the enemy was Turkish expansionism while union with Greece was a national aspiration.

CHAPTER 4

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-COMMUNAL FIGHTING BEFORE INDEPENDENCE (1948-1959)

This chapter starts from the premise that 1948 was the date of Turkish and Greek Cypriot adroitness. It explores the development of inter-communal struggle during the last years of British administration. The chapter also evaluates the active involvement of mainland Greece and Turkey into the Cyprus dispute. In this context, it will present a picture of colony Cyprus where a deep ethnic rivalry gained ground.

4.1 The Gathering Storm:

The senior leaders of Turkish and Greek Cypriots embarked an aggressive propaganda policy for the best future of their communities in the late 1940s. Britain found itself under simultaneous pressure from Turkish and Greek sides. In 1948, British government offered to give Cyprus a new constitution with self-administration. It was a kind of genuine autonomy in favor of Greek Cypriot majority. There was no prospect of a change in the international status of the island as a British colony. Nevertheless, it was rejected by both Turkish and Greek sides. Greek Cypriots wanted self-determination that is union with Greece, not self-administration. Turkish Cypriots also opposed to such demand. Therefore, the inter-communal struggle was triggered by its own momentum.

The Turkish Cypriots mounted a powerful political campaign. Turkish Cypriot leadership organized a meeting with 15,000 people which made a great impression on the motherland press and youth, to condemn the rising demand for *enosis* on 28 November 1948. Now, Turkish Cypriots had publicly expressed that they would contest the idea of *enosis* whatever it might cost. Meanwhile, Fazıl Küçük, the communal leader, sent a telegram to the president and prime minister of Turkey

claiming that: “Fifteen thousand Turkish Cypriots decided unanimously to reject the Greek demand for the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. They believed that annexation would result in the annihilation of Turks” (Stavrinides, 1979: 27). The 28 November meeting brought a dynamic and energetic figure with his inspiring speeches to the scene: Rauf Raif Denktaş was now twenty-four, a lawyer, a stern and main element of the continuity in communal leadership. Denktaş (2005: 89) pointed out that 28 November 1948 meeting eradicated “the curtain of fear” over Turkish Cypriots.

Indeed, since late 1940s, native Turkish Cypriot press had already been emphasizing the incoming danger. On 3 September 1949, *Halkın Sesi* mentioned that “the capture of Cyprus by Greece meant the slaughter of 82,000 Turks as it was done in Crete and Western Thracia” (*Halkın Sesi*, 3 September 1948). The native Turkish Cypriot media referred to the Cyprus question as “second (*Hatay*) Antioch cause” (Bilge, 1961: 37). On the other hand, the voice of Turkish Cypriots was taken account by motherland press. Indeed, *Ulus* and *Hürriyet* newspapers demanded the government to take action in late 1940s. The adroitness of Turkish Cypriots culminated a public interest in Turkey for the Cyprus question. Although, Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak stated that “there was no Cyprus issue” on 17 December 1949, his speech was based on the idea that Britain would not leave the island (Bağcı, 2001: 101). Actually, the upcoming Cyprus question had been already embraced by the mainland media. On 13 August 1948, the editor of *Hürriyet*, Sedat Simavi wrote a headline to emphasize the Cyprus question: “What about Cyprus”?

The star of *enosis* movement was shining in 1948 as well. The young bishop of Kition, Michael Mouskos (Makarios)⁴³ founded the *Ethnarchy* Bureau and struggled

⁴³ Michael Christodoulou Mouskos (Makarios) (1913-1977) was born in Pano Panaglia village of Paphos district on 13 August 1913. He entered to the Kykko Monastery. He affirmed the name of Makarios, “meaning blessed” (Kosut, 1970: 9). In 1939, he took up a scholarship from the Theological School at the University of Athens. He stayed in Athens during the Second World War. After his theology education in US (School of Theology of Boston University), he returned to Cyprus in 1948. He was elected as *ethnarch* in October 1950. After the establishment of the Cyprus republic, he became president and remained in the office until his death.

for *enosis* (Stavrinides, 1979:27). The ambitious Makarios made it clear to the Greek newspaper *Eleftheria* in 12 October 1947: “*Enosis* and only *Enosis* and nothing else but *Enosis*” (Markides, 1977: 317). In December 1949, Makarios stated that “we don’t believe, as some traitors and friends of England do, that *Enosis* will be realized within the framework of Anglo-Hellenic friendship, *Enosis* is not granted; it can only be won by the continuous struggle”(Reddaway, 2001: 73). The *Ethnarchy* Bureau organized an unofficial plebiscite between 15 and 22 January 1950. Interestingly, it was a public voting in where voters signed one’s name under a petition. The communists also supported *enosis* movement and participated in the plebiscite. The result was 95,7 percent in favor of union with Greece. As expected, the Turks boycotted the poll *en masse*. Post- 1948 period marked the increase of deep ethnic polarization between Turkish and Greek communities.

Just after plebiscite, Michael Mouskos, aged 37, was elected as *Ethnarch* Archbishop Makarios III of Greek Orthodox Cypriots. New archbishop immediately declared in his oath the following: “I take the holy oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom, and shall never waver from our policy of uniting Cyprus with mother Greece” (Sonyel, 2003:6). New hero of *enosis*, Makarios established a youth organization PEON, *Pancypria Elliniki Organosis Neoleas* (Pan-Cypriot Greek Youth Organization) in 1951 in order to attract young Greek Cypriots to the “national cause”. A young Nicosian Greek Cypriot, Tassos Papadopoulos would be the chief of the organization.

Early 1950s marked the internationalization of Cyprus dispute. While Makarios showed effort to gain the support of Greece, several Turkish Cypriot committees together with Fazıl Küçük and Faiz Kaymak visited Ankara and got promises that the annexation of Cyprus by Greece was impossible. In autumn 1953, General Papagos, the hero of Greek Civil War and the prime minister of Greece, demanded Britain to hand over Cyprus within a short-time. After Britain refused the demand, claiming that it was a purely British affair, Greece brought the question to United Nations

General Assembly's 20 August 1954 session⁴⁴. Prime Minister Papagos wrote to the UN Secretary General that "Greece alone has been the lasting element, the unalterable factor, the only permanent reality in the island of Cyprus. It would not be enough to repeat that Cyprus belongs to the Greek world; Cyprus is Greece itself" (Ehrlich, 1974:13). Greek opinion had genuinely believed that "once Cyprus came to the agenda of United Nations' machinery, self-determination, and, therefore, *Enosis* would surely follow" (Holland, 2002). Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Küçük protested Greece by sending a telegram to the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. Dr. Küçük declared that "100,000 Cyprus Turks strongly protest against the Greek government's position regarding the union of Cyprus with Greece and vehemently reject *enosis*, self-government or a plebiscite" (Kosut, 1970: 18).

Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü expected a calm and moderate attitude from Greece; otherwise, Turkey would consider it a hostile attitude that would damage relations between the two countries. Similarly, US Secretary of State Dulles warned Greek PM Papagos: "UN's adoption of any resolution would harm good relations between some of our friends and allies ... we shall be obliged to oppose the adoption of any substantive resolution" (Bölükbaşı, 1999: 508). Indeed, both countries joined NATO in 1952 under American auspices. Moreover, In February 1953, Greece and Turkey signed a treaty of peace and friendship, by forming the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia at Bled in August 1954.

Athens insisted on the right of self-determination of Greeks of Cyprus in UN until 1958. Greeks used the words of "self-determination" and "union" (*afto diathenesi ke enosi*) interchangeably and synonymously in the text of memorandum submitted to UN (Sonyel, 2003: 121). As Greek Cypriot linguist Menelaos Christodoulou points out at nights invisible hands of the children filled the walls with Greek voices: "Greece, freedom, union" (*O Filelefteros*, 1 April 2011). Significantly, for Greek

⁴⁴ 30 votes in favor of Greek demands while 19 against and 11 abstentions. All western European and NATO countries voted against it. Five Soviet bloc countries, half of Latin Americans and five out of six Arab states supported Greek cause. 2/3 majority of General Assembly was required to pass a resolution.

side, right of self-determination was freedom and freedom meant *enosis*; being part of Greece. For Turks, it was slavery and persecution. For Greek Cypriots, the union with Greece would mean peace. For Cypriot Turks, it meant war.

Cyprus question begun to caught the attention of Turkish public view. In addition to popularizing Cyprus cause in Turkey, The Cyprus is Turkish Association gained support of both government (Democrat Party) and opposition parties such as Republican People's Party and National Party. The Cyprus is Turkish Association claimed that it had "half million" members in Turkey (Stefanidis, 1999: 123). The association argued that it could recruit "30,000 volunteer" for the precipitated civil war (Alleman, 1958: 23).

The new and energetic Turkish Foreign Minister Fatih Rüştü Zorlu prepared for a larger and more determined diplomatic campaign. According to him, Turkey had same rights with Greece on Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots should be supported against the oppression of Greece until a final solution is reached (Bağcı, 2001: 109). In August 1955, Zorlu claimed that the unification of the island with Turkey was necessary. On 29 August 1955 in the London Conference, he showed great determination which surprised the Greek delegates. Zorlu briefed Turkish position in the London Conference (Tripartite Conference) as follows: Turkey's stake in Cyprus rested on "foundations of 400 years of Turkish sovereignty", "life and the security of the Turkish community", geographical proximity and strategic importance (Dodd, 2004; Bağcı, 2001). Zorlu argued with emphasis that "Great Britain could not turn over to Greece a country taken from Turkey" (Dodd, 2004: 22). Any change in Cyprus would automatically throw the legal basis of the Lausanne Treaty. Thus, the island should have gone back to the Turkish rule in the event of any changes. Turkish government also pointed out the political de-stability of Greece and Cyprus where communist agitation was very strong. Obviously, Turkey had to take into account the fate of the Turkish community of Cyprus. Zorlu argued that "when we take into account the state of the population in Cyprus, it is not sufficient to say ... that 100,000 Turks live there. One should rather say that 24,000,000 Turks live there"

(Holland, 2002: 73). Dr Küçük also supported the views of Turkey: “Greeks have no claim on Cyprus because geographically as well as strategically Cyprus is part of twenty-five millions Turkish groups and cannot be treated as a separate unit from this overwhelming majority ...” (*Halkın Sesi*, 16 July 1955).

Greek Cypriot side discussed the method for national cause. Despite Makarios’s skepticism of armed struggle, several Greek nationalists insisted on the fact that they could settle the issue by force of arms. The prominent figures were semi-retired colonels in the Greek Army, Cypriots by birth from Trikomo of Famagusta, Ghiorgos Grivas and Grigoris Afxentiou. Driven by their Hellenic zeal, they believed that the use of force was the only way if Greek Cypriots were eager to gain independence. Grivas had participated in the Greco-Turkish war (1919-1922) and Greek Civil war⁴⁵ (1946-49). Significantly, he witnessed the guerrilla tactics used by Turkish irregulars in Greco-Turkish war and communist ELAS fighters from Greek Civil war. The name of Dhignesis⁴⁶ appearing in the EOKA leaflets was his *nom de guerre* which was a name of epic Byzantine hero in the 9th century.

Duplicitous, aggressive, and prone to violent behavior, Grivas began to travel whole Cyprus to get support for his movement in early 1950s. As Stavrinides (1976) argued most of the Greek Cypriots were not psychologically ready for such struggle. Furthermore, “Makarios doubted that colonel would find fifty men to follow him” (Evans, 1993: 21). For Grivas, it was not a serious issue although he realized that some Greek Cypriots lacked “faith and spirit” due to foreign rule in their long history. In the end, Makarios and Grivas agreed that a “dynamic solution” was needed (Xydis, 1966: 10). Then, they formed a liberation committee in Athens where generous military and diplomatic contribution would be provided. On 2 March 1954, first arms and explosives were smuggled into Cyprus (Stefanidis, 1999:51). Consequently, “the forthcoming armed struggle in Cyprus would have been the

⁴⁵ Grivas formed the organization of X (Khi) in order to fight against communist militants.

⁴⁶ Basil Digenes Akritas was a hero of Byzantine epic sect in Asia Minor. His father was a Muslim Arab, his mother was Christian Greek.

struggle of whole Greek nation’’ (Stavriniades, 1979:31). Then, EOKA made its move and the wave of violence erupted.

4.2. The Emergence of Armed Insurrections:

On 1 April 1955, EOKA led by colonel Ghiorgos Grivas, being a guerrilla warfare expert, started armed struggle⁴⁷ to overthrow the British rule in Cyprus with the distribution of first leaflet. The military campaign of EOKA displayed the characteristics of urban guerrilla warfare. The island-wide act of violence including sabotages, bombing of public buildings, radio stations and military installations, setting up ambushes and assassinations of British, Greek and Turkish targets were the methods of EOKA. It was obvious that EOKA could not carry out a revolutionary war in which whole population joined the struggle like Algerian war⁴⁸ (1954-1962) or Angola (1961-1975). It never aimed to control a part of the island. The Cypriot case showed similarities with urban warfare of Northern Ireland (1970-1988) where various armed groups battled in main towns. Kalyvas (2003: 14) argued that ‘‘Algerian war was classical war of de-colonization including civil war in a more general sense’’. While Muslim Algerians fought on both sides, the European settlers (*Pied-Noirs*)⁴⁹ set up their own defensive organizations to resist against the insurgency. Similarly, French historian Crouzet (1973: 166) argued that the situation of the Turks in the island was connected in the same way as the European settlers of the Algeria.

Grivas was aware of the fact that he could not defeat the strong British garrison or he was not able to capture a particular territory of Cyprus. Even after his first reconnaissance mission in Cyprus, he realized that the island had well-develop

⁴⁷ It was estimated that EOKA had 47 urban cells and 75 part-time village bands armed with shotguns, but no more than 200 active fighting men. The main section commands were those of Nicosia, Morphou, Orinis (mountainous Nicosia district), Famagusta, Varosha, Karpass, Larnaca, Limassol, Kakopetria (Varnava, 2004: 54). Despite the scarcity of EOKA militants, they proved extremely successful.

⁴⁹ *Pied-Noirs* (The Catholic European Algerians) was made up from French, Spanish and Maltese settlers.

infrastructure such as roads, bridges and ports. The violent mean could only be an instrument for national cause. For Grivas, the armed campaign was seen as “a means for supporting diplomacy” (Xydis, 1966: 10). As Grivas noted in his memoirs:

There was no intention or expectation to win militarily. It should not be supposed that by these means we should expect to impose a total defeat on the British forces in Cyprus. Our purpose is to win a moral victory through a process of attrition, by harassing, confusing, and, finally, exasperating the enemy forces ... By demonstrating Cypriot resolve and self-sacrifice, we are prepared to continue until international diplomacy exercises through the United Nations, and the British in particular, are compelled to examine the Cyprus problem (Corum, 2006: 25).

EOKA focused on the mobilization of Greek Cypriot population for the national cause. While pro-British feelings were strong among urban middle class Greeks, the working class was already dominated by left-wing unions and parties, especially AKEL and PEO. Despite its support of *enosis*, AKEL was skeptical of Grivas because of his strong anti-communist background. AKEL-backed press described the EOKA struggle as “suspicious, its leader as a Pseudo-*Dighenis*, and the fighters as bravos and masqueraded liberators” (Varnava, 2004: 90). In reply, Grivas argued that “AKEL took orders from behind the Iron Curtain” (Adams, 1971: 51). Nonetheless, he did not neglect to call the patriotic leftists for national cause. On 15 May 1956, an EOKA leaflet called for “all honest leftists” to join the national cause (Kosut, 1970: 37). Indeed, the attitude of AKEL during 1955-1959 has been widely disputed among the ranks of EOKA follower. The President of the Association of EOKA Fighters Thassos Sophocleous argued that “attitude and behavior of AKEL towards struggle of EOKA was wrong from the start. They continue to insult us, calling masked killer-Grivas” (*I Maxi*, 31 January, 2011).

There was no doubt that EOKA needed to expand its social base. It disseminated propaganda and psychological terror extensively. Potential traitors were either warned or executed⁵⁰. EOKA also challenged urban pro-British Greeks. Especially,

⁵⁰ See Table 2

Greek-Cypriot personnel in the police were main targets. In one of the leaflet, EOKA threatened a parent not to send his children to the government school:

With we regret we have observed your anti-national behavior in sending your child to the technical school where our enemies may corrupt his spirit with their propaganda. There exist our own proper schools which offer Greek culture and education. If you don't decide to transfer your child to a Greek school then you and your child will be branded as common traitors. Your own name and that of your child will be published so that you will be despised by the people and condemned wherever you may be. There is still time (Crawshaw, 1957:424).

EOKA 14 July 1957

EOKA miscalculated one major fact: the Turkish community of Cyprus and Turkey. The emergence of EOKA and demand for union with Greece were nightmare of Turks since the British arrived to the island. Although Grivas urged his followers not to attack the Turks yet and warned the Turks to refrain from collaborating with the British colonialists, it should come as a surprise that long standing enmities between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus would result in a civil war. Markides (1977) points out that the failure of the EOKA campaign (1955-58) was largely the outcome of strong Turkish reaction. One of the former EOKA members from Dhali village confessed: "The leaders ... started a struggle without taking into consideration the Turkish Cypriots, as a great mistake in method on the part of the leadership at that time" (Walker, 1984: 481).

The Greek armed insurgent radicalized the Turkish Cypriots as well. While the shadow of inter-communal war was strolling over them, Turkish reaction came from three levels: first, as a result of EOKA campaign, Greeks had to leave their position in colonial bureaucracy, particularly police. Hence, the Turks began to dominate the auxiliary police forces whose tasks were to control Greek rebels. Secondly, Turkish paramilitary organizations such as Volkan and TMT started to embark military campaign by arming Turks against the EOKA. The villagers began to stand guard at night, often armed with old shot-guns or hunting rifles. In other words, Turkish

armed opposition appeared on the scene, establishing defensive organizations in every village. TMT followed an active policy of retaliation: Greek attacks should have been answered by forceful Turkish responses. Thirdly, the growing frustration of Turkish public opinion against violent EOKA campaign alerted Ankara to take several measures. For example, hundreds of Turkish youngsters applied to the Cyprus Turkish Association to give an answer to Greeks in Cyprus after 14 Turks were wounded on 22 June 1955 as result of EOKA assault at the Divisional Police Headquarters in Ataturk Square of Turkish quarter of Nicosia (Evre, 2004:125; Holland, 2002: 60). Tachau (1959: 269) observed that “in Turkey the public discussion of the Cyprus issue in the summer of 1955 became permeated with sentiments of anger and frustration”. Moreover, a riot broke in Istanbul and Izmir against the Greek minorities on 6-7 September 1955 in which most of the Greek properties and churches were sucked and looted. Now, Turkish side entered the scene with their own battle cry.

Since February 1956, Turkey voiced the idea of *Taksim* (partition) as the only viable solution. Turkey claimed that if the status quo were to be altered in Cyprus, each community should have the right of self-determination (Ehrlich, 1974: 19). Reddaway (2001) claimed that the violent nature of Greek political campaign pushed the Turks to the idea of partition. Nevertheless, the British government acknowledged the idea that the concept of self-determination could be applied to both communities in Cyprus. The Secretary of State for the British Colonies Lennox Boyd claimed that “the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed island must include partition among the eventual option” (Dodd, 2004: 32). In the British parliament, he stated that “if the Greek Cypriot majority asked for union with Greece there would be as second ballot for the Turks alone. If the Turks voted to join Turkey, the island would be divided between two countries” (Foley, 1964: 87). Reddaway (2001: 98) claimed that the majority of the British officials did not favor partition but it was a “Democlean sword” against *enosis*. Needless to say, the discussion of partition option, even as a remote possibility, “came as a bombshell to

the Greeks” (Reddaway, 2001: 88). Greek Cypriots refused self-determination of the Turkish community which was seen as a minority in the Greek island.

For mainstream Turkish Cypriot view, *Taksim* was a political necessity. Fazıl Küçük argued that Turkey would demand those lands that corresponded to above of 35th parallel of Cyprus (half of the island). Meanwhile, Cyprus is Turkish Party (Fazıl Küçük’s Party) declared that it opposed both to the idea of independence of Cyprus and *enosis* which would cause the persecution of Turks (Evre, 2004:130). On 6 June 1958, a TMT leaflet in Limassol called the Turks of Cyprus to join into the national struggle in the name of partition: “The day is near when you will be called upon to sacrifice your life and blood in the partition struggle to struggle for freedom ... (Crawshaw, 1959:138). As a result, “Partition or death” turned out to be the most echoed countrywide slogan in Turkey and in Turkish Cyprus. Following the developments in Cyprus, Turkish student organizations held a pro-partition meeting in Istanbul on 8 June 1958. Similar demonstrations which attracted large crowds took place in Izmir, Ankara and Bursa. According to *Hürriyet*, “there were 43 meetings with 790 speakers with an attendance of two and half million people within one month” (Dodd, 2004: 33). Prime Minister Menderes made it clear that he refused to consider anything less than partition. Otherwise, he threatened to take the whole. On 2 July 1956, Menderes threatened to “imperil the future of NATO” (Kosut, 1970: 40) if the Turkish view was not accepted. It should be cleared that “Turkey’s policy on Cyprus underwent changes because it was not policy of active irredentism, but one of reaction to Greek irredentism” (Bölükbaşı, 1999:508). On 1 March 1958, Gaziöglü⁵¹ advocated *Taksim* as only viable peace for Cyprus:

There is no doubt that Turkey completely stayed out from selfish and imperial ambitions by claiming partition instead of demanding the whole island. While willing to *Taksim*, Turkey makes a great sacrifice for the sake of the Middle East peace and the maintenance of Turkish-Greek friendship ... (*Halkın Sesi*, 1 March 1958).

⁵¹ Ahmet Gazioglu was a journalist and author. He was born in Larnaca in 1931. During the inter-communal fighting, he took an active role. This has led to his exile in London from 1967 to 1973 by the Makarios administration.

Britain had strategic interests in Cyprus. London became aware that Cyprus was essential for the defense system of the West. Prime Minister Eden believed that it was essential to preserve the status of Cyprus as “sure and unfettered British base” (Kosut, 1970: 32). On December 1954, British Middle East Headquarter and military forces were moved from Alexandretta to Cyprus because the Egypt government abrogated 1936 Anglo-Egyptian convention which allowed British to keep large bases near Suez. It was obvious that loss of Palestine and Egyptian bases increased the strategic importance of Cyprus. The Air Ministry in London stated in the late 1948 that “the strategic importance of Cyprus has grown enormously since the Second World War” (Holland, 2002: 21). In 1954, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden made it clear that “there was no Cyprus question at the present time or in the future” (Adams, 1971: 42). Field-Marshal Lord John Harding of British Army, the former Commander in-Chief of the Far East Land Forces, and the present general governor of Cyprus since 25 September 1955 emphasized the importance of the island in an interview with Charles Foley, the editor of the *Times of Cyprus*:

Look at the map. We have been forced from Jordan, Russia is rumbling threats. We have duties from which a secure Cyprus base is needed. Suez is vital importance. The Prime Minister has said that this may become a matter of life and death for us all (Foley, 1964: 68).

General Harding, firstly, declared state of emergency in the island on 26 November 1955 just after EOKA assaults with seventy-six regulations: “carrying arms brought the death penalty⁵²; sabotage or the possession of explosives meant a life sentence; boys under eighteen could be whipped; public meeting was banned; strikes made illegal” (Foley, 1964: 41). Indeed, the British army had experiences against guerrilla insurgences from Zionist insurrection of Palestine, Kenya and Malaysia cases. Harding also improved the status of colony police. He mostly relied on new Turkish dominated anti-riot police⁵³ (Special Mobile Reserve Unit and Auxiliary Police). On

⁵² The first execution was the Michael Karaolis case. Rauf Denктаş was the prosecutor of the court.

⁵³ Many Greek Cypriot senior politicians and scholars believed that “the Turkish Auxiliary Police” force was the strongest evidence of Anglo-Turkish collusion policy leading to the partition. The Colony Undersecretary Reddaway (2001: 90) stated that it was act of military necessity, not a

January 1 1956, Harding declared that EOKA was about to be over. After the collapse of Harding-Makarinos meetings, Archbishop Makarios was sent to exile to the Seychelles island on 9 March 1956 because of his involvement with EOKA activities. His silence with EOKA murders convinced the British administration that he was the mastermind behind Greek armed activities. According to Harding, the population of Cyprus detested from EOKA, “its brutal deeds and dastardly murders”. Harding believed that EOKA was the “work of fanatics without a following, not a patriotic rising” (Foley, 1964: 68). In a telegram to London, Harding described the situation in Cyprus as follows: “either there must be offered some prospect of ultimate self-determination or a regime of military government must be established and the country runs indefinitely as a police state. No middle course was any longer open” (Holland, 2002: 91).

New governor Sir Hume Foot, the former Governor of Jamaica, a well-known liberal, was installed in December 1957. He followed a flexible policy towards the EOKA. He ceased the state of emergency, claiming that “they had military initiative and they had run EOKA into the ground” (Reddaway, 2001: 70). Furthermore, Archbishop was allowed to return from exile. After his brief stay in Athens, he returned to Cyprus in March 1959. Such tolerance of Sir Foot frustrated Turkey and Turks of Cyprus because “it was who Makarios had become for Turks ‘the personification’ of all they most hate and fear in Greek expansionism” (Holland, 2002: 221). Consequently, Ankara accused the new governor for being too liberal and tolerant of “savage Greek terror” and “closed the Greek-Turkish Hellenic Union and arrested its secretary” (Kosut, 1970: 44).

deliberate policy. In British rule, the number of Turks in local police force was higher than their proportion in the population because “Turkish Cypriots took more readily to this discipline service than Greek Cypriot”. It was not surprising that Turks occupied the security apparatus in Ottoman administered areas in accordance with the ethnic division of labor in the empire. Morgan (2004: 69) pointed out that “nearly two thirds of the police are Turks” in 1882. Until 1939, *Kavass* “the ceremonially armed Turkish Cypriot guards” protected the Government House (Morgan, 2004: 47). Reddaway also accepted that the Turks in auxiliary police might have cooperated with TMT. On the other side, Greek Cypriot police was working with EOKA.

Between 1956 and 1957, the inter-communal tension was rapidly mounting. The manipulative words (*Enosis*, EOKA) written on the walls of Turkish high schools and mosques provoked Turkish youth. On 10 May 1955, by a letter signed by Grivas, Dr. Küçük was threatened with assassination unless he ceased his activities (Bilge, 1961: 86). Actually, EOKA aggression backfired. On 28 April 1956, Dr. Küçük made it clear that: “If they infiltrate into our quarters, if they assassinate our policemen, we will take it as a direct attack on our community” (Bilge, 1961: 111). Moreover, EOKA violence had begun to orient to the Turks, particularly Turkish police. Actually, until the mid-1956, 8 Turks had died and 39 were wounded in Cyprus (*Hürriyet*, 26 July 1956). On 19 March 1956, Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish quarter of the Vasilia village near Kyrenia (Kosut, 1970: 35). Vasilia event marked the first major inter-communal violence. Dr. Küçük protested “the barbarity of Greeks” in the Vasilia (Kosut, 1968: 35).

The tension steadily increased between two communities. Turkish senior police officer Mustafa Ahmet Beyaz with his fiancé was assassinated on 9 November 1957. Terrifying shock and fear dominated the mood of Turkish masses. Thousands of people who were terrified by the Greek assault attended to their highly emotional funeral in the Great Selimiye mosque. “The Selimiye spectacle may be taken as marking a new phase in Greco-Turkish separation within Cyprus” (Holland, 2002: 216). Therefore, Turks of Cyprus briefly deviated from passive resistance. The spilling of Turkish blood sent shock-waves among the Turks of Cyprus, further polarizing the island in the two hostile camps. At the end of November 1957, more militant than its predecessors, TMT emerged by absorbing other small fractions. Foley (1964: 152) observed that “ethnic violence had emerged as a real rather than possible factor in the Cyprus political tangle”. On 7 June 1957, in a letter to the Colony Minister Lennox-Boyd, Governor Sir Harding mentioned that “the Cypriot Turks decided to take the law into their own hands” (Holland, 2002: 198).

The emergence of EOKA violence exposed all fundamental differences. The “psychological wall” separating two communities became consolidated (Volkan, 2008: 121). British diplomat Anthony Parson observed that “a general feeling both in towns and villages of depression, bitterness, hostility and disillusionment, which was extremely uncomfortable” (Holland, 2002: 239). On 9 December 1957, US Consul Belcher noted that “the inter-communal tension had escalated into a very dangerous factor” (Holland, 2002: 220). In an interview Ismail Bozkurt, former activist of TMT claimed that uncertainty and fear were everywhere in the 1950s:

I was living in the Tuzla of Larnaca district. The atmosphere in the towns was that of terror. The streets were deserted. After 1 April 1955, we realized that the environment had changed. Even their looks, their views, their behaviors ... Terror reigned over all. Young Greeks had begun to threaten us from time to time crossing the road. We felt incredible breathtaking sensation of fear. It has been still in front of my eyes how people lived that panic, fear that mess.⁵⁴

Upsurge of terrorism triggered a wave of Turkish counter-assaults against Greek crowds and properties. Punitive Turkish raids were launched against Greek quarters. The disruption and destruction often brought by the Turkish raids to Greek urban society in Cyprus were extensive. On 19 January 1957, the Turkish riot in Famagusta culminated the destruction of some Greek churches and hospitals (Kosut, 1970: 41). Therefore, the vicious circle of violence turned out into an ethnic blood feud. TMT assassinations of EOKA activists in Nicosia and Famagusta were replied by EOKA retaliations. Buses carrying Turkish workers were ambushed in the rural areas. On 5 December 1957, three Turks were found hacked in a village close to Paphos. 48 hour later, similar inter-communal clashes erupted in streets of Nicosia. On 12 June 1958, eight Greeks were found death near the Turkish populated village of Gönyeli. Since 1957, EOKA followed the policy of “indiscriminate violence” (Reddaway, 2001: 65). According to Crawshaw (1959: 140) “many of the EOKA’s Turkish victims were peasants or shepherds living in isolated hamlets surrounded by Greek villages”

⁵⁴ Personal interview with İsmail Bozkurt in the Association of Turkish Cypriot Fighters in Famagusta/ North Cyprus on 5 May 2010.

because Turks showed strong determination to keep their positions in the main towns. The struggle existed in level of everyday life. For instance:

English lettering was forbidden by Grivas: every paintbrush in the island seemed to be at work as English street names vanished in a blur. Next the Turkish names were painted out. The Turks retaliated by obliterating the Greek names. Soon there were no street names at all (Foley, 1964: 114).

Turkish Cypriot leadership declared that *Taksim* was the national goal of Turkish community as a reaction to the increasing inter-communal violence. On 27-28 January 1958, the leadership organized a meeting in Nicosia, gathering 3,000 people, shouted '*Taksim* or die'. Nevertheless, the meeting turned out into inter-communal clashes. Hence, the intervention of British forces took the life of eight Turks (Evre, 2004:136). British officers witnessed that "Turks were more to be feared than the Greeks. As one informant stated, a Greek demonstration could be cleared in a matter of seconds, whereas a Turkish crowd was not dissuaded by tear-gas or even gunfire" (Holland, 2002: 239). The Grand National Assembly of Turkey⁵⁵ made three minutes homage for the Turks who had felt victims to the British forces and EOKA (Bağcı, 2001: 121). *Hürriyet* wrote as follow: "the greatest sorrow: 8 martyrs" (*Hürriyet*, 30 January 1958).

On 7 June 1958, the explosion of Turkish Republic information Bureau in Nicosia started a riot. The news of explosion therefore created an electric sense of uprising. Turkish Cypriot youth gathered at the scene, attacking and looting many Greek houses and cars in the ethnically mixed suburbs of Nicosia and Larnaca. Two Greek Cypriots were killed as a result of this clash. In some districts both communities ransacked and damaged the properties belonging to other (Crawshaw, 1959). Until the end of July, Greek lost fifty-five people while Turks lost thirty-five (Foley, 1964:128). 30,000 British forces were insufficient to halt inter-communal clashes. Till the end, Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaca and Nicosia clashes left 127 deaths and 300 injured (Markides, 1977: 321). Now, "a cloud of vulnerability settled over

⁵⁵ The Grand National Assembly of Turkey-GNAT: *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*.

Greek Cyprus, and engendered a deep mood of pessimism among them” (Holland, 2002: 252). Colony Governor Foot outlawed TMT on 23 July 1958 and arrested 70 members of the organization (Gazioğlu, 2000:35). On 14 July, Sir Foot called for an end to violence the communal leaders, claiming that “general conflict between the two communities could destroy the island” (Kosut, 1970: 47). Indeed, Sir Hugh Foot confessed that island was in total state of anarchy and civil war. In his words: “what looked like the whole of Nicosia aflame ... what we had always most feared, civil war between the Greek and Turkish communities in the island” (Morgan, 2010: 244).

The division of Nicosia provided an insight into the dynamic of ethnic conflict in Cyprus. Since 1956, Nicosia had been already divided by Mason-Dixon Line between Turkish and Greek sectors. British troops set up barbed wire in the line. Actually, the actual division of Nicosia was a first step for partition. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from central municipalities, claiming that municipality councils became the center of *enosis* agitation. Therefore, they created communal town councils in the four largest towns.

The atmosphere of the time was obvious in a TMT leaflet which was distributed Nicosia by TMT Cental Committee on 20 July 1958:

Our community has no more faith in either British government or Foot’s administration. Foot has been sniggering in his comfortable armchair while our brothers are shot in the back... We don’t want such a government ... Turks of Cyprus will not remain without action against barbarian attacks of the Greeks. No power can throw the Turks out of this island. We, the sons of Turkish fatherland will display the bravery and heroism of our ancestors when the defense of our country and nation is at stake. We are ready for all kinds of struggle... Our struggle is for PARTITION (Gazioğlu, 2000: 52).

The military policy of Turks of Cyprus was based on setting Greek houses and churches on fire or verbal and psychological threats in order to expel them from ethnically mixed settlements. Despite the spread out of the Turkish community through island, one way or another, they aimed to form homogenous Turkish sectors

by enlarging Turkish urban areas (particularly on north) which would lead to partition. On the other hand, EOKA launched a systematic campaign of terror to break Turkish determination and resistance. While, Turkish violence followed a “calculated political strategy” against Greeks mainly in towns, Greek violence against Turks were “more random and to occur in rural areas” (Holland, 2002: 265). In other words, ethnic violence appeared in which Arendt (1970: 19) says “violence is a phenomenon in its own right”. Consequently, “both sectors of the mixed Cypriot community were attacking one another whilst each conducting separate rebellions against the British” (Morgan, 2010: 243).

Map 2: The Settlement Distribution in Cyprus (The census of 1946)

District	Turkish Villages	Greek Villages	Mixed Villages	Total
Famagusta	24	47	26	97
Kyrenia	8	29	10	47
Larnaca	8	28	23	59
Limassol	7	87	19	113
Nicosia	27	105	45	117
Paphos	38	73	23	134
TOTAL	112	369	146	627

Source: Beckingham (1957b), “The Turks of Cyprus”, *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 87(2): 165.

On 4 August 1958, Grivas declared cease-fire against British and the Turks possibly for tactical reasons, “but reserving right to future action in the event of provocations” (Crawshaw, 1959: 141). TMT agreed on the term of reciprocity principle: “no Greek property should be touched unless Turkish property was touched, that no pressure should be brought to bear on Greeks in minority unless pressure was brought to bear on Turks in the minority” (Crawshaw, 1959: 141).

Despite sporadic incidents, there was no significant inter-communal fighting until 1963 December. Consequently, while Greeks experienced their geo-political and strategic vulnerability, Turks realized their short-comings in terms of organization and military equipment. Greek Cypriots understood that vicious circle of attacks causing flight of Greeks and migration of Turks to the northern villages would end up with partition. For example, a large group of Turkish community in the Paphos district migrated to a site in the safe Nicosia plains with their furniture and livestock through late July 1958 (Crawshaw, 1959: 140). Moreover, the failure of urban fighting caused *etharchy* council and Makarios to doubt the capabilities of Grivas and his men. On the other hand, Turkish side took cognizance of limited military support from Turkey.

Like many other civil and ethnic conflicts, the Greek-Turkish conflict in Cyprus in 1955-1958 was shaped by both historical and psychological factors. Once EOKA evoked the pattern of violence, it assumed a substantial inter-ethnic character. The deep inter-communal enmity sustained the conviction of both sides in historical correctness of their position. In the second chapter of this study, the strong presence of collective memory among Turks and Greeks was discussed. As pointed out by Adorno (1950), physiological dispositions of the communities which were fuelled by ancient blood feuds, uncertainty, aspirations and mutual fears constituted the basis of social thinking. Obviously, the war consolidated such dispositions by “hardening identities” (Kalyvas, 2006: 78). Tachau (1959: 263-264) points out:

The Cyprus issue involved relations between Turkey and Greece. Historically, these relations have not been good. The average Turk, in conformity with his habit of classifying nations as either friends of Turkey or enemies of Turkey, continues to think Greeks as national enemies. In a nutshell, then, the Turkish attitude regarding Greek demand for *enosis*, may be summed up as unwillingness to see yet another strategic island, formerly under Turkish sovereignty, close to the shores of Turkey, and with a sizeable Turkish population, fall into the hands of national enemy, Greece.

When the news of violence reached Turkey, it infuriated the Turkish public view. Turkish press tended to portray Greek Cypriots as primitive, malevolent, fanatic and terrorist. The Turkish masses began to remember countless terrifying stories of Greek atrocities in Crete, Balkans or Western Anatolia combined with the fear of national survival of the Turkish community of Cyprus. Prime Minister Menderes who himself was from Western Anatolia (Aydın) reminded the atrocities of Greek occupying army in the Anatolia (1919-1922). In order to refute the Greek argument of majority rights in Cyprus, Menderes stated that “what was the Greek Army seeking at the gates of Ankara? Was it right of majority? The root of problem in Cyprus was based on Greek irredentism” (Bağcı, 2001:110).

EOKA movement was devoted to launch an anti-colonial struggle. Such colonial conflict was “wrapped up tightly with a vicious communal struggle” (Morgan, 2004: 242). For Greeks, the Turkish militant reaction and involvement of Turkey reincarnated the old image of “terrible Turks who were dark and ruthless people” in their eyes. The Turks who had supplanted the glorious Byzantine Empire, eternal enemy of Hellenism, stood their way. As mentioned in the second chapter, *Tourkokratia*, Turkish rule, was portrayed as the dark age of Greek enslavement and persecution under Turks. The Turkish armed reaction and active involvement of Turkey reincarnated the long established image of “eternal desire of Turkey to take Cyprus” what is generally referred to as “Turkish expansionism” (Bryant, 2004:226). Indeed, such idea of Turkish expansionism still occupies a primary position in the minds of Greek Cypriot politicians. According to Stavrínides (1976: 34):

The Greeks saw themselves as fighting not only for *Enosis*, but against all those who opposed it, who were, once again, the Anglo-Turks. The old image of terrible Turk, representing the dark, crude forces which stand in the way of the realization of Greek national-rights, was re-activated. The Turks themselves as fighting against Greek ‘terrorist’ who were trying to bring about *Enosis* and so make Turks impotent and unprotected minority in a state dominated by an enemy people.

Today, Greek Cypriot president stated that Greek Cypriot population lives under “constant threat of potential new adventurist actions of Turkey” (*Haravgi*, 9 April, 2012). As explained in this part, the first wave of inter-communal conflict between 1955 and 1958 was a natural reaction of two communities towards the political developments in Cyprus. The pre-determined Turkish and Greek Cypriot struggle triggered an old national feud. Indeed, “the Cyprus dispute has once more demonstrated the unfortunate durability of such national feuds as that between Greek and Turkish people” (Tachau, 1959: 262). There is no doubt that the conflict took an international outlook. Stavrinides (1976: 34) pointed out that Greece and Turkey became “the protagonists, with the result that whole situation changed dramatically”. It is clear that the armed actions of Cypriots determined the future of the conflict. The emergence of the Greek armed insurgency consolidated the polarization between Turkish and Greek communities. EOKA bombs sowed terror in the Turkish community of Cyprus. The Greek armed campaign appeared to have helped moderate Turks the need to resist Greek terrorism and joined the ranks of TMT. Many realized that there would not be a common future with Greek Cypriots.

Table 3: The Casualties in Cyprus: April 1955-February 1959

	Killed by EOKA	Killed in clashes with security forces	Killed in Communal Strife
United Kingdom	142*	-	-
Greeks	218+	95	60
Turks	29	8	55
Others	4	-	-

*104 Servicemen, 12 police, 26 civilians.

+ 15 police, 203 civilians.

Source: Crawshaw, Nancy (1959) “Cyprus, Conflict and Reconciliation”, *World Today*, 15(4):147.

4.3. The Road to Independence:

The British government realized that it was impossible to preserve colonial status because of massive unrest in the island, international political pressure and decreasing British prestige in the Middle East. After December 1956, the British government recognized that “Cypriots were part of the Turkish and Greek nations” and hence, “as a means of reconciling amicably the conflicting demands of Turkish and Greek Cypriots to be united with their motherlands” (Sonyel, 2003:9). NATO and USA discussed the possibility of a war between two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey) while civil war was ongoing in Cyprus. The transatlantic dialogue started with NATO initiatives because NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak was consciousness of threat to southern flank of NATO due to the Cyprus question.

A rapprochement between Greece and Turkey was made through NATO. Turkish Prime Minister Menderes and Greek counterpart Karamanlis met in the Zurich on 5 January 1959 and discussed a possible independent Cyprus without *enosis* or *taksim*. They formed a Joint Constitutional Commission under the leadership of Marcel Bridel⁵⁶ who was officially “Legal Adviser to the Commission”. After the declaration of a joint notification in 11 February, Turkey (Prime Minister Menderes), Greece (Prime Minister Karamanlis), United Kingdom (Prime Minister Macmillan) and leaders of Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities (Archbishop Makarios III for Greek Cypriots and Dr. Fazıl Küçük for Turkish Cypriots) met in the Lancaster House of London on 19 February 1959. The draft version of the constitution (including the treaty of establishment⁵⁷, the treaty of alliance⁵⁸ and the treaty of

⁵⁶ Marcel Bridel was a professor of law and one-time rector of the University of Lausanne.

⁵⁷ Treaty of establishment recognized that the island became an independent republic except two sovereign areas. It was the basic structure of the republic including 27 articles (Basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus).

⁵⁸ Treaty of alliance (six articles) provided the station of Greek (950 officers) and Turkish military contingent (650 officers) in the island. They would be under joint command and be responsible for the training of proposed Cyprus Army. The agreement also recognized two sovereign British bases and use of Famagusta harbor by British in the island.

guarantess⁵⁹) was accepted. On 23 February 1959, the covenant text was published at London, Ankara, Athens and Nicosia.

The basic standards of the constitution devolve from “the European Human Rights Convention of 1950, the Paris Protocol of 1952” and the “draft Constitution of Lord Radcliffe” (Adams, 1966: 482; Ehrlich, 1966: 1037). The constitution of Cyprus was one of the most complex ethno-confessional systems. The republic of Cyprus emerged as a bi-communal republic in where two communities were to be co-founder of the state⁶⁰. The constitution had 199 articles. The first 27 articles were the “basic articles of the constitution of the Cyprus” which could not be altered (Kosut, 1970: 59). The president of the state would be Greek while vice-president who had also right of final veto power would be Turkish according to the constitution. President and Vice president were to be elected by their own communities.

According to Article 10, two communities constituted sub-legislative organs (Communal Chambers) to deal with communal and local affairs with power and authority. Those chambers had competence to exercise legislative power on the matters of “all communal religious, educational matters, judicial, financial and cultural issues” (Ehrlich, 1966: 1035).

⁵⁹ Treaty of guarantee (four articles) pointed out that Greece, Turkey and Great Britain would guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, the provisions of the basic articles of the constitution (Article 2). Treaty of guarantee agrees not to participate, in whole or in part, in “any political” or “economic” union with any state whatsoever. Article 4 pointed out that any of the guarantor nations should consult each other and act jointly in the event of a constitutional break-down. If joint action is not possible, any of guarantors was allowed to act unilaterally (Adams, 1971: 54).

⁶⁰ The constitution offered a type of power-sharing system. The percentages of participation in the civil services would be based on 70:30 ratios between the Greek and Turkish communities. The council of minister was made up from seven Greek and three Turkish ministers designated by president and vice-president. The House of Representatives consisted of fifty deputies (elected for five-year terms in the ratio of seven Greeks for every three Turks). Two-thirds of the majority of the each community was required for resolution. In addition, Supreme Constitutional Court included Turkish and Greek judges as well as judge of a neutral country. “The neutral judge, ex officio president of the Court, is appointed for a six-year period and is always from outside the island” (Adams, 1966: 481).

Article 20⁶¹ was the most controversial article of the constitution. It allowed to formation of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five large towns: Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos with their own council. The municipality crises would trigger inter-communal fight in the late 1963.

In Cyprus, where ethically centered thinking became dominant, both communities had different ideas of the constitution regarding their aspirations and cultural ideas. The constitution of the republic was “unique in its character” because of the very complex situation of the island (Ehrlich, 1966: 1037). It was not territorial but a functional federation where two communities enjoyed their social and political rights. In other words, “the republic is federated along ethnic, rather than territorial lines” (Fairfield, 1959: 240).

Greek Cypriots analysts and politicians accused the constitution of having so much divisive elements. The majority of the Greek Cypriot scholars largely believed that the constitution was “inherently unworkable” and “imposed by foreign powers” (Camp, 1980: 49). Pollis (1973: 594) charged the constitution with “polarizing the two communities by institutionalizing and legalizing”. Similarly, AKEL believed that “the constitution was the seeds of subversion and strife” (Reddaway, 2001: 125). Marxist scholar Perry Anderson (2008: 11) stated that “the constitution inflated the Turkish position in the state far beyond what a minority of its size could in normal circumstances”. Such perceptions ignored the fact that polarization and

⁶¹ Article 20: Separate municipalities shall be created in the 5 largest towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns. However:

(a) In each of the towns a coordinating body shall be set up which shall supervise work which needs to be carried out jointly and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of cooperation. These bodies shall each be composed of 2 members chosen by the Greek municipalities, 2 members chosen by the Turkish municipalities and a president chosen by agreement between the 2 municipalities.

(b) The president and the vice-president shall examine within 4 years the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the 5 largest towns shall continue.

(c) With regard to other localities, special arrangements shall be made for the constitution of municipal bodies, following as far as possible the rule of proportional representation for the 2 communities (Kosut, 1970: 58).

strife has been already there. The spirit of the constitution was based on the idea of two equally sovereign communities, not a majority-minority dichotomy.

Historically speaking, the constitution legitimized the self-government of two communities which existed as a de-facto situation since the Ottoman and British eras. In other words, Cyprus was transformed from a dual society to a “dual sovereignty” system under those agreements (Fairfield, 1959: 245). Ehrlich (1966: 1039) points out that the history of Cyprus comes to prove that division and separation have existed there long before the constitution due to segregated life of Cypriots “in separate villages, in separate stores, in separate businesses, in separate hospitals and in separate cemeteries”. There is no doubt that the constitution necessitated tolerance, fair-play and pluralism. Needless to say, either *enosis* or *taksim*, the real aspirations of the two communities, were constitutionally excluded.

The United Kingdom and the United States were to be satisfied. US President Dwight Eisenhower considered agreements as “a victory for common sense”, an “imaginative act of statesmanship”, and “a splendid achievement” (Sonyel, 2003: 11). On 19 February, Prime Minister Macmillan described the agreements as “a victory for reason and cooperation” (Kosuti 1970: 64). British rule ended by keeping two strategically important military bases (area of the British Sovereign Bases⁶² covering 256 square kilometers including the two bases of Akrotiri and Dhekalia) according to treaty of establishment (Joseph, 2009: 381; Morgan, 2004: 254). These military bases were seen as the “spinning victory out of a defeat” (Constantine and Richmond, 2005: 65). For London, “military requirements were met” (Ehrlich, 1966: 1031). On 26 September 1959, British Prime Minister Macmillan stated that: “why do they hold Cyprus against us? It was nothing but a quarrel between Turks and Greeks. We settled it” (Foley, 1964:149).

⁶² The Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East Air Force, and RAF was in control of the bases.

Athens seemed satisfied. Greek government believed they had faced with the situation “the choice of cooperation or ultimate partition” (Reddaway, 2001: 115). Greek Foreign Minister Averoff explained the reasons which had led to the signing of the Zurich-London Agreement: “the guns could force things towards the imposition of the worst kind of partition” (Varnavas, 2004: 337). Even Makarios changed his position by announcing that “he was no longer determined to achieve ‘*enosis* and only *enosis*’ and was now prepared to consider independence after an interim period of self-government” (Morgan, 2004: 247). On 20 February 1959, in a letter to the Grivas, the Archbishop Makarios argued that “the British domination of Cyprus was over and a little Greece was established in the Eastern Mediterranean” (Millios & Kyprianidis, 2011: 59). Actually, the Greek side realized that EOKA was becoming militarily weaker. Indeed, it showed a poor performance in the inter-communal struggle. Moreover, the Greek government was reported that Grivas was about to be captured, “so would the things be more favorable after say, another year’s armed struggle?” (Stavrinides, 1976: 36). Athens thought that the government of Cyprus somehow would be in the hands of the Greek majority. On 28 February, Athens recognized the agreements by 174-122 vote (Kosut, 1970: 65).

Independent Cyprus was seen as a “frustrating delay on the road to *enosis*” by many Greek Cypriots (Morag, 2004: 600). Significantly, the real opposition emerged from the ardent supporters of EOKA. They believed that Makarios betrayed the national cause. Pro-Grivas newspaper *Estia* (Hearth) began to criticize Makarios. Cyprus Annexation Front formed by former members of EOKA accused Makarios of betraying the national cause. Similarly, Grivas was not satisfied with the situation. On his return to Athens, he described the agreements as “an unforgivable concession to the Anglo-Turkish demands” (Kosut, 1970: 67). For him, the peace should have been based on the idea of “no bases, no commonwealth ties, and no links with Britain” (Foley, 1964: 160), however he was promoted to the ranks of Lieutenant General and awarded by a gold medal by King Paul of Greece. Greek parliament declared that he was the “worthy of the motherland” (Varnava, 2004: 342). Even Makarios tried to convince him that *enosis* was not a forgotten issue on 7-9 October

in Rhodes. The rift between Makarios and Grivas, “two leader of *enosis* struggle”, would be deepening throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

Similarly, communist Greek Cypriots and AKEL were reluctant to accept the agreements. Communist Greek Cypriots embraced *enosis* cause as an “anti-imperialist” and “anti-capitalist” cause. On 20 February 1959, The Deputy General Secretary of AKEL Andreas Fantis expressed his discontent with the treaty in these words: “Under the regime imposed by the Zurich-London Agreements and since we are far away from having gained true independence, the basic goal of Cypriot people continues to be: the real independence of Cyprus” (Adams, 1971: 38). In fact, the idea of real independence or national restoration can be seen as the demand to have Greek-dominated state without guarantees and bases. Moreover, the communists claimed that idea of independence was the outcome of British imperialism. British sovereign bases were seen as “neo-colonialism ... similar to the U.S bases in Okinawa” (Adams, 1971:4). On 21 February 1959, AKEL-inspired newspaper *Haravgi*⁶³ criticized the agreements as follow:

The vassals have signed the enslavement accord, not the nation. The Cyprus question may have closed for the colonist, but it has not closed either for the Greek or for the Cypriot people. The struggle for freedom continues. The slave merchant of Washington, London and Ankara put their pistols on the round table of London, near their documents. The government of enslavement stood at their side. The ‘Trustess of the Cypriots’, Mr. Karamanlis and Averoff, openly undertook the role of grave-diggers (Fairfield, 1959: 242).

Turkey believed that the agreement was beneficial for each side. Prime Minister Menderes and Foreign Minister Zorlu thought that the *enosis* danger was over by the agreement. For Turkey, partition existed on functional or administrative bases. Moreover, the guarantee of Turkey was provided with placement of Turkish contingent (650 people) on the island. The equality of each community was to be

⁶³ *Haravgi* (Dawn) was a Greek language newspaper mostly inspired by AKEL. He was founded by Tefkros Anthias, an AKEL central committee member in February 1956.

guaranteed under the agreements. Actually, the reason of pragmatist shift of the Turkish government has long been called into question. Actually, the political developments in the Middle East alarmed Ankara. On 14 July 1958, the king of Iraq Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri Said were overthrown and ruthlessly killed. Following the coup, Iraq left the Baghdad Pact⁶⁴. There was also unrest in Lebanon. Syria came under Soviet influence since the summer of 1957. Menderes government thought that pro-communist penetration gained ground in the Middle East. Radical Arab nationalism was a growing threat to the interests of Turkey. On the eve of encirclement by communist-Arab states London-Zurich solution was the only feasible solution to the Cyprus. On 4 March 1959 Turkish National Assembly ratified the agreements by 347 to 138 (Bağcı, 2001: 127). On the other hand, the opposition led by Ismet İnönü⁶⁵, the cautious and persistent hero of Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) claimed that incidents of violence and inter-communal enmity continued so agreements were not calculable. İnönü also questioned why Turkey abandoned the partition claims. Moreover, İnönü believed that an independent Cyprus was not a feasible option for Turkey in case of a crisis:

Cyprus will become a UN member and in case of a conflict, the UN would deal with it. Therefore, Turkey could prevent *enosis* only if it acted quickly. However, no one can be sure that conditions would always enable Turkey to act quickly (Bölükbaşı, 1999: 510).

Turkish Cypriot leadership had doubts about the agreements, nevertheless acknowledged them. Foley (1964: 151) observed that Cypriot Turks seemed confused: “Two simultaneous demonstrations were in progress, one supporting independence, and the other still carrying banners advocating Partition or Death”.

⁶⁴ Baghdad Pact (1955) was western sponsored collective security agreement between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain. The aim of the pact was to form a bulwark of the "northern tier" states against the Soviet Union. In July 1958, the Iraqi monarchy was ousted by the Ba'athish coup. Therefore, Iraq left the pact, denouncing it as a tool of western imperialism.

⁶⁵ Ismet İnönü (1884-1973) was a Turkish Army General, Prime Minister and the second President of Turkey. He served in the Yemen and Thracia in the wake of World War I. He was the one of the leader of Turkish National Struggle (1919-1922), defeating the invading Greek army. He remained the head of Republican People's Party until 1971.

Denktaş and Fazıl Küçük believed that Greeks had no will to share the government with them. Indeed, the old enemies had to work together. Denktaş never believed such reconciliation to be possible as their community was targeted from the start. On 1 March 1959, Gazioğlu sent warning from *Halkın Sesi*, to the all parties:

This agreement guarantees all rights of the Turkish Cypriots including a free and independent life. There is no doubt that it has occurred with the mutual engagements of all sides. From that date forward, expectation of a new concession, fraudulent behavior or the absence of co-operation cause serious and very dangerous conflict, possibly cause a civil war. We, the Turkish community, have come to prove our good-will. Greek community always and always should take into account these delicate and vital points (*Halkın Sesi*, 1 March 1959).

The general amnesty was declared for EOKA and TMT militants, including the “most wanted ones” on 1 March 1959 as a result of London-Zurich agreements. Therefore, Turkish Cypriot leadership continued to observe Greek internal developments and political wrangling. The uneasy coalition between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots would last only three years.

CHAPTER 5

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-COMMUNAL FIGHTING AFTER INDEPENDENCE (1960-1974)

In this chapter concrete examples of the constitutional disputes between Turkish and Greek communities will be examined. The focus is primarily on the events in the independent republic of Cyprus. It will be demonstrated that Makarios' unilateral attempt to amend the constitution is the source of the break-down of the order. Driven by Hellenic zeal, Greek Cypriot senior politicians triggered a conflict to change the balance of power in favor of Greek majority. In other words, the constitutional dispute is the expression of ethnic polarization. The chapter presents a detailed analysis of the inter-communal fighting between 1963 and 1964. This period is characterized by constant ethnic tension and involvement of Turkey and Greece with the dispute. While the Turkish community consolidated its position in the enclaves, the inter-communal relations totally collapsed. After analyzing the political developments in Cyprus, the road to 1974 will be examined.

5.1. The Constitutional Disputes of 1960-1963:

The agreements were followed by a transition period (February 1959-August 1960). During this period, self-government system under British supervision was organized. Both Greek and Turkish communities went to the elections in order to choose president, vice-president and members of representatives. Makarios formed Patriotic Front composed of ex-EOKA militants⁶⁶ and some left-wing supporters. His front received 67 percent of the Greek Cypriot votes⁶⁷. His electoral triumph against Ioannis Clerides of Democratic Front (made-up mostly former EOKA followers)

⁶⁶ EOKA leaders were divided about agreements; one faction took side with Makarios while others supported Grivas's hard line.

⁶⁷ Makarios received 144,501 votes while Clerides had 71,753 votes (Crawshaw, 1960:531).

marked his long-lasting presidency of the republic. After elections, Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff declared that “for the first time in eight centuries the government of the island has passed into Greek hands (Sonyel, 2003: 12).

In the Turkish side, elections were held on 13 December 1959. Fazıl Küçük was the only candidate for vice-presidency. All Turkish posts of House of Representatives were filled by his party. Denктаş was elected as the president of Turkish Communal Chamber. On 16 August 1960, the republic of Cyprus was officially recognized and last British governor Sir Foot and most of the British officials left the island.

As one expert indicated “the state is thus, the realization and expression of the cultural ideas of every party” (Schmitt, 2007: 23). The interpretation of the constitution was totally different regarding Greek and Turkish views. From the beginning Greek Cypriots claimed that the constitution denied them their right of majority or unfettered self-determination to rule the island. Makarios argued that Turkish Cypriots had certain rights “beyond what was fair, the sole purpose being their protection as minority” (Drousotis, 2008: 23). For them, the constitution granted explicit guarantees to the Turks.

The constitution was based on the idea of two equally recognized separate communities so notion of majority or minority was inapplicable. In other words, bi-communalism was the dominant spirit in the constitution. Turks attributed vital importance to the constitution and rejected the minority-majority paradigm. The Turkish side argued that “Cyprus is not one united ‘general will’ is to find expression in a united government. Cyprus had a population composed of two peoples, with different “general will” which must somehow be accommodated to one system of political institution” (Stavriniadis, 1976: 53). Obviously, that point of view contradicted with the Greek Cypriot claims. The newly born state, however, was already marked for death.

The inter-communal mistrust and antipathy were clearly observable. Greek Cypriots thought that Cyprus was an indivisible Hellenic island so sharing power with the Turks was unthinkable. On 1 April 1960, on the fifth anniversary of the EOKA struggle, Makarios declared:

The realization of our hopes and aspirations is not complete under the Zurich and London Agreements...The glorious liberation struggle, whose fifth anniversary we celebrate today, has secured us advanced bastions and impregnable strongholds for our independence. From this bastion, we will continue the struggle to complete victory (Stavriniadis, 1976:40).

According to Makarios, it was a victory that was far from complete. On 4 January 1962 at the Orthodox Christian Youth (OHEN), Makarios stated that “The struggle of the people of Cyprus will go on ... Agreements were simultaneously a starting point and a bulwark for further struggles with object of capitalizing on what has been achieved for further conquest” (Drousiotis, 2008: 23). On February 1962, in Limassol Interior Minister Polycarpos Georkadjis stated that “a broad stage is opening up for new struggles, where everyone is once more summoned to play a part in the arena of the great conflict ... let our fighters be once more at the helm of this campaign” (Drousiotis, 2008: 25). Similarly, on 4 September 1962, Makarios made his most provocative speech at his native village of Panayia. He stated that “until this small Turkish community that forms part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA cannot be considered as terminated” (Reddaway, 2001: 133). In the face of such statements, inter-communal fighting seemed inevitable.

The war of words escalated. The provocative discourses of Greeks gave opportunity to express frustrations and anger of Turkish communal press. *Nacak* and *Halkın Sesi* newspapers reacted *enosis* agitations, claiming that “Anatolia is the sole owner of the green island. There can't be two mothers of one son” (Evre, 2004: 151). *Nacak* threatened Makarios with partition: “there are only two solutions; either to ensure the full implementation of the constitution or to divide the communities”

(Drousiotis, 2008: 24). Arthur William Clark, the British High Commissioner of Cyprus, claimed that “Greek and Turkish presses were completely irresponsible to exacerbate communal difference” (Sonyel, 2003:22).

Within a short time, Makarios decided to remove “negative elements” from the constitution (Foley, 1964: 167). Greek Cypriot public view had already regarded constitution “unjust”, “unworkable” and “imposed by foreign power” (Sonyel, 2003: 25). Greek Cypriot historians exaggerated the constitutional rights of Turks, claiming that “the constitution offered the Turkish minority the lion’s share of almost everything” (Reddaway, 2001: 129). The constitutional debate was centered on three points: sharing civil service, proposed Cyprus Army and municipality question. Makarios claimed that for a smooth functioning state, a constitutional amendment was necessary. For Turks, the constitution was a non-negotiable issue. On 20 March 1962, referring to the constitutional revision, Vice-President Küçük stated that “the constitution will not be amended in any way and the Turks will never tolerate even its slightest revision. Everybody ought to be aware of that” (Drousiotis, 2008: 29). The majority of the Turks thought that they had already done significant concessions by “giving up partition claims” and “accepting a Greek-Orthodox president” (Adams, 1966: 486). Any other concession was intolerable⁶⁸.

Makarios lobbied for constitutional revision in favor of Greek Cypriots. In his visit to USA, he told President Kennedy that “had I known beforehand that you would be president, I would not have signed the London-Zurich agreements” (Sonyel, 2004: 31). Nevertheless, Makarios did not get the support that he had expected. On 22 November 1962, Makarios made an official visit to Ankara. His visit would be the first and last visit of a Greek Cypriot politician to the Turkey. Prime Minister İnönü

⁶⁸ Actually, any attempt to revise the constitution was itself an unconstitutional act. Especially the basic articles of the constitution (referring to the treaty of establishment) that displayed character of state were untouchable. Article 182 of the constitution clearly stated that “these fifty-five paragraphs of Annex III deal with the basic structure of the republic cannot in any way amended, whether by way of variation, addition and repeal” (Adams, 1966: 486). The constitution made it clear that “basic articles cannot be changed without the agreement of all four signatories” (Ehrlich, 1966: 1031).

warned Makarios, claiming that “if any attempts was made to change the constitution, this would be regarded by Turkey as a most serious matter” (Sonyel, 2004: 34). “Between 13 February 1962 and 21 December 1963, Prime Minister İnönü delivered 14 diplomatic notes against the violation of the Cyprus constitution” (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 511). Furthermore, Greece was reluctant to support Makarios’s dangerous adventure. Athens believed that such unilateral action would be harmful to Hellenism and beloved Cyprus. Greek Foreign Minister Averoff clearly opposed unilateral revision of the constitution. He suggested to solve the constitutional frictions with “mutual agreement in an atmosphere of friendship, trust and good Greco-Turkish relations” (Drousiotis, 2008: 51).

Despite Turkey and Greece’s negative stance, Makarios aimed to convince the Greek Cypriot public view. Despite his anti-communist stance, Makarios turned his attention to the communist elements, the most organized political structure among Greeks. It was estimated that AKEL controlled the 35 percent of the electorate as well as 40 percent of the Greek Cypriot population (Adams, 1971: 2). Makarios’s attempt to amend the constitution gained support among communist ranks. On 5 May 1963, AKEL’s newspaper *Haravgi* stated that “AKEL lends full support to president of the republic in his efforts to amend the one-sided provisions of Zurich in democratic way”, for AKEL constitutional revision was an “patriotic rallying” and “unified action” (Drousiotis, 2008: 53). Since then, AKEL was going to be the ardent supporter of Makarios regime. Makarios was tolerating the communists in exchange for their loyalty. For Makarios, “the card-carrying communists were all Greeks, and in his eyes the Turks were the enemy” (Sonyel, 2003: 26). Makarios and Communists agreed the unilateral constitutional amendment on the ground that Cyprus would have been a Greek, unitary and non-aligned state. Briefly, communists moved steadily to the Makarios line, while Makarios became close to the Eastern bloc, the Soviet Union and Afro-Asian world; the result was an ever closer partnership between them. Afro-Asian orientation was going to be the cornerstone of the foreign policy of Makarios in order to get support of their votes in the UN. There can be no doubt that “Makarios was the latest example of an illustrious Byzantine

tradition” (Camp, 1980: 43). Even today, AKEL hails the foreign policy of Makarios.

Makarios became the constant friend of the Third World, Arabs, and Africans. He was a fierce opponent of dictatorships and lack of freedom anywhere in the world. But such a policy line was strongly adverse to any form of imperialism and immoral policies of Kissinger, who always sought to beat Makarios, calling him a ‘Castro of the Eastern Mediterranean’ (*Haravgi*, 19 January, 2011).

The increasingly dire situation in Cyprus and 27 May regime of Turkey produced some opposition to the traditional Turkish Cypriot leadership. Especially the ousting of the Menderes government by the 27 May Junta in Turkey motivated some leftist groups in Cyprus. They greeted the junta with great enthusiasm, establishing *Kıbrıs Türk Halk Partisi* (Cyprus Turkish National Party) and *Cumhuriyet* daily. The founder of the party Ahmet Muzavver Gürkan, Ayhan Hikmet and Dr. Ihsan Ali⁶⁹ publicly declared their loyalty to the republic of Cyprus. In foreign policy, they took side with Asia-African world. Obviously, they supported Makarios-AKEL line against Turkish leadership. Furthermore, they went so far as to support Makarios intension to amend the constitution. On the other hand, Denктаş and TMT believed that bi-communalism and conciliation with Greeks were misplaced and futile. Therefore, they remained concerned about the communal security. They ridiculed the Turkish left for their nativity and pro-AKEL stance. The result was the ever increasing verbal tension⁷⁰ between *Nacak*, *Halkın Sesi* and *Cumhuriyet* newspapers.

⁶⁹ Dr Ihsan Ali would be appointed as the advisor of Makarios. He was on the execution list of TMT. Denктаş stated that execution was averted by his personal contact. Kenan Çoygun (2nd *Bayraktar* of TMT) claimed that Ihsan Ali sometimes provided Turkish officers to move freely in the island through Greek check-point. Nevertheless, Çoygun stated his post as advisor of Makarios and his quietness while his community had been suffered under Makarios regime was unforgivable mistake. He remained deaf and dull for Greek atrocities against his native community (personal interview with Rauf Raif Denктаş on 17 November 2008 in his office in Nicosia).

⁷⁰ On 23 April 1962, Gürkan and Hikmet were found dead. Interior Minister Georkadjis confessed after his cross-examination with Denктаş that Gürkan and Hikmet informed the Greek authorities about TMT, Turkish embassy and Turkish Cypriot leadership and commanders of Turkish regiments (Drousotis, 2008: 40). Meanwhile, *Nacak* and *Halkın Sesi* regarded them traitors who helped the information machine of Greek Cypriots. On 26 April 1962, *Nacak* wrote the following: “traitors who had betrayed everything to the Greeks so as to earn their favor. When your coffin was passing in front of Atatürk’s bust did you not feel a shudder of emotion?” (Drousotis, 2008: 40). Denктаş rejected the

The new Turkish administration in Ankara regarded TMT as “the private army of Menderes regime” (Tansu, 2001: 232). The new regime’s ambassador to Cyprus, Emin Dirvana suggested the disbanding of TMT (Tansu, 2008: 243). Moreover, Dirvana did not hesitate to have good relations with Makarios and the opposition leaders such as Muzavver Gürkan and Dr. Ihsan Ali. Despite Denктаş’s repeated warnings about evil intentions of Makarios, Dirvana just ignored him, reporting that Denктаş and his followers were “bunch of oppressing extremists” (Denктаş, 2005: 135). According to Denктаş (2005: 123) “Dirvana was inexperienced in dealing with Greek mentality. Nonetheless, the new regime in Turkey did want trouble in Cyprus” (2005: 123). The attitude of new regime also frustrated the leading figures among Turkish Cypriot politicians. TMT *sanjactar* Aydın Samibeyođlu argued that “27 May regime⁷¹ was a sheer waste of time”⁷². Similarly, Ismail Tansu, the commissonal colonel for TMT in the Department of Special Warfare, claimed that “years between 1960 and 1963 had been wasted” due to political turbulence of the 27 May regime (Tansu, 2001: 258). Indeed, after the *Deniz*⁷³ incident, Ankara gave little support to TMT, leaving Turkish community to the hands of Makarios until the outbreak of violence.

The struggle for the ownership of the municipalities had become part of broader struggle for domination of the state. In multi-ethnic territories, it was a common practice that ethnic groups had their own local governments where they were majority. During the 1955-1958 conflict, Turks had already established their own

argument that killings were carried out by TMT. On the contrary, he argued that it was a matter of personal settlement or Greek conspiracy.

⁷¹ 27 May regime replaced all upper hierarchy of Turkish army including the Department of Special Warfare. 6000 colonels and 243 Generals were forced to retire (Tansu, 2001: 248). According to Colonel Tansu (2001: 258) the replacement of Turkish officers in Cyprus and the inactive policy of the new regime towards Cyprus resulted in the December 1963 disaster.

⁷² Personal interview with Aydın Samibeyođlu in the Brotherhood Lodge in Nicosia/North Cyprus on 18 January 2012.

⁷³ The *Deniz incident*: The British Coastal Guards captured a Turkish arms ship registered to Izmir port with 3 Turkish crew smuggling to Cyprus on 19 October 1959. Ankara stated that *Deniz* was hunting dolphins.

municipalities because EOKA declared that Turkish quarters were “no-go areas” so these quarters did not receive enough funds and investments (Reddaway, 2001:131). Reddaway (2001: 131) pointed out that the “Turkish quarters of the main towns in Cyprus were well-established and fairly demarcated even though it is true that population had overlapped to some extent”. The separate municipalities were recognized by colonial authorities (Turkish municipal law of 1959). Moreover, the establishment of separate municipalities was recognized by London-Zurich agreements (Article 173). Greek Cypriots believed that separate municipalities displayed the spirit of partition, the nightmare of Greek community.

The crisis became more determined. On 27 December 1962 Turkish deputies proposed a bill for the extension of the existing municipal laws. Makarios and Greek Cypriots rejected it. On the contrary, Makarios was trying to bring town councils under central authority. For him, separate municipalities were “impracticable” (Adams, 1966: 485). On 2 January 1963, despite the Turkish veto, the council of ministers approved a decree⁷⁴ “on the strength of which all former municipal areas are now declared areas of Administration and Development which would be managed by council appointed by the government” (Drousiotis, 2008: 43). Needless to say, united municipalities reduced the position of Turks into the minority status. Turkish Communal Chamber chaired by Denktaş launched a surprising move by legalizing Turkish municipal councils (Turkish Municipal Law). Furthermore, Turkish mayors stated that “they would not obey the unlawful and unconstitutional regulations of the governments” (Sonyel, 2003: 38). Both sides applied to the Constitutional Court. On 25 April 1962, Dr. Ernst Forsthoff, neutral judge of the court⁷⁵ claimed that both attempts were unconstitutional, and then he resigned from the office. The municipality crisis remained the most fundamental disagreement between Greeks and Turks.

⁷⁴It was a Decree for the establishment of Administration and Improvement Areas.

⁷⁵ The constitutional court included one Turkish (Münir Ertegün), one Greek (Michalakis Triantafylides) and one neutral judge (Ernst Forsthoff).

Denktaş was right for his scepticism of Makarios' intentions. Makarios opened the Pandora's Box in the end. On December, 5 1963, he proposed a constitutional amendments including 13 main points, however Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkish Foreign Minister Cemal Erkin made it clear that "Turks would never accept any deviation from the agreements" (Drousiotis, 2008: 49). Driven by his constitutional ignorance and blindness, Makarios outlined his constitutional amendments under a presidential memorandum that was called "suggested measures for facilitating the smooth functioning of the state and for the removal of certain causes of inter-communal friction" (Adams, 1966: 486). These measures were:

- 1) The right of veto of the president and the vice-president of the republic to be abandoned.
- 2) The vice-president of the republic to deputize for the president of the republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
- 3) The Greek president of the House of Representatives and the Turkish vice-president to be elected by the house as a whole and not, as at present, the president by the Greek members of the House and the vice-president by Turkish members of House.
- 4) The vice-president of the House of Representatives to deputize for the president of the republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
- 5) The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
- 6) Unified municipalities to be established.
- 7) The administration of justice to be unified.
- 8) The division of the security forces into the police and gendarme to be abolished.
- 9) The numerical strength of the security forces and of the defense forces to be determined by law.
- 10) The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the public service and the forces of the republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
- 11) The number of the members of the public service commission to be reduced from ten to five.
- 12) All decisions of the public service commission to be taken by simple majority.
- 13) The Communal Chambers to be abolished and a new system devised (no constrain on Turkish communal Chamber to abolish itself (Adams, 1966: 487; Reddaway, 2001: 136).

The proposals came as bombshell to the Turkish community. Vice-president Küçük refused them, claiming that “they were totally unacceptable on the ground that they attacked the very roots which gave life to the republic and that their intention was to leave the Turks at the mercy of the Greeks” (Reddaway, 2001: 137). The Turks, therefore, reverted to their partitionist position. Since discussing the review of the constitution, native Turkish press advocated partition. Turkish Cypriot press claimed: “we are ready to cooperate with the framework of the law. In the event of the abolishment of the agreements, however, we shall revert to our national demand: Partition or death” (Drousiotis, 2008: 66). In the eyes of Turks, Makarios betrayed the agreements that he had signed few years ago. Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin thought that “if we start amending the constitution, where are we to stop?” (Reddaway, 2001: 139). Ankara and Turkish Cypriot leaders made it clear that “it will not be the Turks who start fighting” (Drousiotis, 2008: 77).

The intention behind the amendments has long been called into question. Clerides, the president of the House of Representatives wrote that “Makarios’s intension was to abolish Turkish Cypriot rights step by step and ultimately limit them to those universally recognized minorities” (Drousiotis, 2008: 64). The Consul General of Greece in Cyprus Angleos Vlachos stated that Archbishop continued the policy of *faith accompli* by “a single stroke” (Reddaway, 2001). Moreover, Makarios’s 13 points show that he desired a unitary state dominated by Greek majority. Indeed, amendments would reinforce unitary structure of the state and balance the percentages of participation in the civil and military services in favour of Greeks. It was obvious that amendments were unacceptable for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots so the conflict would have been inevitable. There can be no doubt that Makarios violated the most fundamental character of the international law, *pacta sunt servanda*, the sanctity of the treaties (Camp, 1980: 50).

The Turkish side always made it clear that playing with the constitutional order would lead to a civil war. The discourse of inherently unworkable constitution was only a cover because “the ultimate objection of Makarios was unrestricted

independence followed by *enosis*” (Drousiotis, 2008: 94). Needless to say, Makarios’s attempt was too early, provocative and suspicious. The fault is not in the constitutional system but inter-communal distrust which was fed by Greek provocations, particularly Greek unilateral attempt to amend the constitution. British H.C Sir Clarck noted that situation was “touch and go” so armed clashed could break out (Drousiotis, 2008: 79). In this atmosphere, with the political temperature rising, both Turks and Greeks prepared for armed conflict.

On 21 December 1963, the Greek Cypriot police wanted to search a Turkish car on the borderline between Turkish and Greek quarters of Nicosia, asking their identity cards. Turks refused while an angry Turkish crowd was gathering. In a battle for control of the borderline, the first casualties occurred: two Turks⁷⁶ had been killed while one Greek policeman was heavily injured. Within minutes, whole of Nicosia flamed to the mixed suburbs in the north and west. Within few days, the inter-communal clashes spread out to the every corner of the island. As a result, Cyprus was moving toward a new and more intense confrontation.

5.2. Inter-Communal Fighting 1963-1964:

Following this event, armed conflict escalated throughout the island until 10 August 1964. In main towns, the civil war was characterized by continuous street fighting between Greek Cypriot police, the special constables and TMT *Mujahideens*. It can be argued that the conflict between 1963 and 1964 took place between more regular units in contrast to 1955-1959 insurgent. On the eve of the conflict, TMT had all together 6,000 trained or half-trained militia. Only 1,448 of them were trained in Turkey (Mutlu, 2007: 85). When violence had been broken, The Turkish police and gendarme left their stations to join the ranks of their community. The weapons were provided from the Turkish contingent but ammunition was in short supply. Main problem during the first weeks of the conflict was a lack of heavy weapons. Actually,

⁷⁶ Zeki Halil and Cemaliye Emirali.

Turkish Cypriot community politically and militarily relied on proscribed Turkish intervention.

For the Greek side, they had already occupied the security apparatus of the joint republic. Since the beginning of January 1963, Glafkos Clerides (Deputy-Minister), Tassos Papadopoulos (Minister of Labor) and Polycarpos Georkadjis (Interior Minister) convinced Makarios that a private army was needed. By December 1963, “Greek Cypriots had 5000 fully-trained men with another 5000 in various stage of readiness” (Foley, 1964: 167). Following the outbreak of civil war, both sides substantially increased their forces. The Greek Cypriot forces were made up from several armed groups: the ex-EOKA militants led by Nicos Sampson, the socialist militias or “Red berets” under the command of Vassos Lyssarides and Special Constables⁷⁷ under the command of Polycarpos Georkadjis. Since February, Makarios government had been establishing “National Guards” (*Ethniki Forea*) to organize ill-disciplined Greek armed elements.

With the outbreak of violence on 21 December, Greek Special Constables and irregulars attacked Turkish quarters in the towns. Moreover, the civil Greek Cypriots joined the carnage. Greek Cypriots with superior number attacked repeatedly on Turkish part of Nicosia (21 December) and Larnaca (23 December). The fighting was fierce in the Nicosia. Turkish fighters took their positions in the balconies, supermarkets, minarets while Greeks constables captured the English town and Ledra Palace commanding the main road of Nicosia and Turkish quarter (Foley, 1964: 169). The streets of Nicosia descended into chaos. Instead of reconciliation with his Turkish citizens, Makarios exploited the military superiority, launching full-scale attack on Turkish community. Major assault on Turkish Nicosia was sanctioned by Makarios. Greek Cypriots tried to knock-out Turkish community of Nicosia, the hearth of the communal leadership, by a single blow. If they were able to do, it was assumed that whole Turkish community would be automatically surrendered. Greek

⁷⁷ The Special Constables were formed under supervision of Interior Ministry Georkadjis.

Cypriot forces led by Nicos Sampson, ex-EOKA fighter, captured the Omorphita/Küçük Kaymaklı and Çağlayan suburbs, taking 700 hostages including woman and children (Crawshaw, 1964: 341). On 25 December, 3 Turkish jets flied sortie over Greek quarter of Nicosia. Then, the Turkish national contingent (650 people) took a strategic position between Ortaköy and Gönyeli controlling the Nicosia-Kyrenia road. Turkish national contingent refrained from participating in the conflict. Turkish Cypriot *Mujahideens* captured the crusader castle of St Hillarion, on peak 3,000 feet above Kyrenia, commanding the road linking capital to the coast. It seemed that Turkish military maneuvers aimed to control the strategic roads for the prescribe intervention of Turkey. Therefore, the large Turkish fleet was reported on approaching to Cyprus on 23 December. Makarios applied to British and American diplomatic missions for cease-fire on 25 December. After Makarios and Dr. Küçük meet with the foreign diplomatic representatives, cease-fire was arranged under British supervising. Prisoner exchange was sanctioned by the British Commonwealth and Foreign Secretary Duncan Sandy. 2,700 people of Joint Truce Force were made up from British, Turks and Greek contingents under major-general Peter Young. The Joint Truce Force patrolled on the borderline, establishing permanent cease-fire lines, known as “Green lines” in Nicosia and Larnaca across which rival forces faced each other (Crawshaw, 1964: 341). British officers clearly stated that “any attack across the Green Line by either side would be resisted by the peace force” (Crawshaw, 1964: 338). Without major battles, sporadic fire exchange continued in Nicosia and Larnaca. Greek mortars were answered by Turkish snipers. Nicosia and Larnaca remained the center of tension until august 1964.

The failure of Greek Cypriots to capture main Turkish urban areas persuaded them to switch their focus to the countryside. In the countryside, indeed, Turkish villages were in a totally vulnerable position because Greek Cypriots enjoyed a demographic edge, as the Greeks were generally on the offensive and the Turks were usually on the defensive. Marauding Greek bands caused havoc in the Turkish countryside. Ethnic cleansing was the instrument in the countryside. Being better armed, Greek Cypriots drove many Turks out of the villages. Furthermore, ruthless massacres took

place in some mixed villages such as Mathiati/Matyat (23 December) and Ayios Vasilos/Türkeli (24 December). On 12 January 1964, a mass grave was exhumed which contained 21 Turkish Cypriots at Ayios Vasilos/Türkeli by Red Cross officers. “The observers verified that victims were tortured, their hands and feet were tied and had been shot” (Patrick, 1976:50). In retaliation, On 1 January, *Mujahidins* stroke against Greek Monastery at Glaktrofousa, left two monks death and three wounded (Kosut, 1970: 80). 6 Greeks were also abducted between 12 and 18 January (Patrick, 1976: 54).

Duncan Sandy arranged a tripartite conference in London on 15 January with the participation of Greek Foreign Minister Costopulos, Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin and the representatives of two Cypriot communities (Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou and Defense Minister Osman Örek). Both sides made their position clear: while Greeks insisted on unitary state without treaty of guarantees, Turks insisted on territorial division and federal government. Obviously, the conference collapsed on 31 January and inter-communal fighting continued.

The British government claimed that its forces were not enough to take the burden of peace-keeping in Cyprus. In fact, British commanders complained that their forces faced “increasing hostility from local Greeks” and “humiliating incidents” during their routine duties (Crawshaw, 1964: 342). An Anglo-American initiative that aimed to deploy a NATO forces in Cyprus was stated. General Lyman Lemnitzer, a NATO commander in Europe, visited Ankara and Greece to discuss the NATO option (Foley, 1964: 174). Greece, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots favored the NATO option but Makarios under communist manipulation refused the deployment of NATO forces. He rejected the idea of foreign intervention in what he insisted was an internal Cypriot issue. Meanwhile, Greek student demonstration took place in front of the US embassy, shouting that “American Fascist, back to Texas” (Foley, 1964: 175). Then, demonstrators were saluted by the Soviet ambassador Yermoshin when they came in front of the embassy. Just after demonstrations, an explosion took place in the American Embassy, which “expressed Greek Cypriots feeling against NATO

intervention” (Patrick, 1976: 55). The US diplomatic representatives and their families left the island to Lebanon. US ambassador Mr. Fracer Wilkins stated that “he had no confidence in the Cypriot police” (Foley, 1964: 175). He stated that “the Cypriot press was conducting an organized campaign against the US” (Kosut, 1970: 80).

The possibility of a Soviet-Greek Cypriot alliance captured the imagination of Makarios for many years. Since London-Zurich agreements, the Soviet Union propagated that “the agreements formed a condominium of Greece, Turkey and Britain against the wishes of the Cypriot people” (Adams, 1971: 58). Indeed, the Soviet Union thought that an independent, non-aligned Cyprus under Makarios-AKEL hegemony could serve Moscow. Soviet leader Khrushchev made it clear that “Moscow cannot remain indifferent to the situation that is taking shape in the Eastern Mediterranean ... not very distant from the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union” (Kosut, 1970: 88). On February 17, first Soviet weapons were shipped from Port Said (Egypt) to Cyprus. Driven by the Soviet support, Makarios aimed the internationalization of the Cyprus question. He thought that Afro-Asian countries and the communist bloc would support him in the UN. US Ambassador in London, David Bruce stated that “in Cyprus, Makarios is moving with his characteristics of Byzantine deviousness” (Sonyel, 2003: 88).

As weeks passed, Greeks Cypriots had formed massive military build-up. Once the immediate danger of Turkish intervention had passed, Greek Cypriot forces again launched attacks on Turkish quarters and villages on the western and south-western edge of the island. Since February, Much of the fighting took place in Paphos, Polis/Poli and Limassol. On 14 February, the news of violence came from the city of Paphos. The Turkish population of Polis (800 people) were besieged in the Turkish secondary school by Greek forces. They remained besieged within school ground until the Makarios government removed the restrictions in early 1968 (Patrick, 1976: 56). While Greek marauding bands devastated Turkish mountain villages in the western and South-western part of the island, TMT *Mujahideens* of Ayios

Ioannis/Aydin, Stavrokono and Anadhiou launched some raids on neighbouring Greek settlements. On February 6, Turks from wholly Turkish populated village Arpalik/Ayios Sozomenos staged an ambush against a convoy consisting of Greek armed elements and repelled the assault of Greek Cypriot forces to the village. The clashes left four Turks and twenty four Greeks deaths (Patrick, 1976: 56). The escalation of violence was characterized by “reciprocal restraints” although Greek Cypriots enjoyed a military edge (Kalyvas, 2003: 4).

In February 1964 serious escalation of the conflict not only in the main towns but elsewhere in Cyprus would be seen. Greek assaults on Turkish villages and quarters became more systematic and organized. The Greek Cypriot terror squads launched a campaign of harassment against the Turkish population in the rural villages. The cleansing operations was carried out with great brutality : “Greek Cypriot forces, police and irregulars in overwhelming strength, attack with heavy weapons from safe range, wear down an ill-defended community, finally occupy the village, and complete the actions with mopping-up operations” (Crawshaw, 1964: 342). In other words, Greek forces aimed to carry a policy of ethnic cleansing of Turks by driving them from either isolated Turkish villages or mixed settlements. The occupation was followed by massive looting or destruction of the abandoned Turkish houses by the irregulars and Greek Cypriot civilians. Turkish Cypriot houses were systematically ransacked or burnt down while civilians were captured. The following months were marked by increasing flight from certain rural areas to the well-defended Turkish areas. Once news of atrocities spread, many of those Turks who feared they might be attacked to flee before they were targeted.

On 4 February, Turkish part of Limassol and Gaziveren village were attacked by Greek forces. Greeks fully captured the port of Limassol by destroying a large part of Turkish property (Crawshaw, 1964: 338). The US Undersecretary of State George Ball described the situation in Limassol as follows: “the situation of civil disorder here has deteriorated markedly overnight. It was advised me that there are 150

casualties at Limassol where the Greek Cypriot police are now firing heavy explosives into the Turkish quarter” (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 514).

On February 13, the Undersecretary of State in Nicosia, George Ball informed Dean Dusk from the US State Department about the tragic situation in Cyprus, explaining the strategy of the Makarios administration as follows: “They try to neutralize Turkey by a Security Council resolution, condemning aggression and guaranteeing territorial integrity ... so that ‘the government of Cyprus’ can proceed happily with systematic genocide, without outside interference” (Gibbons, 1969: 145).

On February 15, Great Britain applied to the Security Council of the UN to discuss the Cyprus crisis. On 18 August, Turkish ambassador to US in the council debate claimed that “Greek terrorist were planning a hideous massacre of Turkish Cypriots” (Kosut, 1970: 90). On 28 February, Denktaş was invited to give a speech in UN on behalf of Turkish community while Zenon Rossides, an AKEL member, was the representative of Makarios. It was the first appearance of Denktaş in the UN. He represented the views of Turkish side as follows:

The question is: are we entitled to live with human dignity as free people in land where we had lived for 400 years, or are we to be put at the mercy of the Greek Cypriots and to be treated as a mere minority when we have never had that status in 400 years? Are we to be tricked out of our right to bargain equally just because they have killed some of us? That is the main issue before the Security Council today ... (Moran, 1997: 130-131).

Denktaş’s speech frustrated the Greek Cypriot leaders. His entrance to Cyprus was banned by Makarios with the threat of prosecution as “arch-rebel” (Dodd, 2010: 82). He believed that Denktaş was the mastermind behind Turkish armed activities in the island. Since then, Denktaş name installed fear among Greek Cypriots.

On 4 March UN Security Council passed its resolution. The resolution 186 (S/5575)⁷⁸ reached a conclusion:

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, its Article 2 and paragraph 4, which reads: All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of United Nations...

(2) *Ask* the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop the violence and bloodshed in Cyprus...

(4) *Recommends* the creation of with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force...

(7) *Recommends* further that the secretary general designate, in agreement with the government of Cyprus and the government of Greece, Turkey and the UK, a mediator⁷⁹, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities ...

The resolution addressed the sovereignty and integrity of the Cyprus state. Significantly, it recognized the Greek-Cypriot ruled Cyprus administration as “Government of Cyprus” of the whole island. It seemed that resolution totally ignored the unilateral attempt of Greek Cypriots to violate the constitution and persecution of Turks in the island. On the contrary, it rewarded Makarios administration with the title of “Government of Cyprus”. Technically, the republic of Cyprus was formed a bi-communal state but the destruction of constitutional order should have made Greek-Cypriot administration illegitimate. Ironically, neither Turkey nor Great Britain as guarantor powers, questioned the legitimacy of the government of Cyprus at that time. Denktaş claims that “Turkey was aware of her inability to intervene military in Cyprus and its main priority was to stop the shedding of Turkish Cypriot blood” (Sonyel, 2003: 75). According to Dr Küçük, “Greek Cypriot attempt to abrogate the treaty of guarantee has been rejected”

⁷⁸ (<http://www.unficyp.org/media/resolutions>).

⁷⁹ Finnish ambassador to Sweden Sakari Severi Tuomioja was appointed as mediator on 25 March 1964.

(Kosut, 1970: 94). Nonetheless, from that date forward, the Greek-occupied Cyprus administration was recognized as “Government of Cyprus”. The resolution also proposed the formation of United Nations Peace-Keeping Force with an appointed mediator in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was authorized with the consent of the Government of Cyprus. According to Sir Anthony Kershaw, the Chairman of Common Select Committee on Foreign Affairs:

The Turkish Cypriots pointed out that this was not the legal Government of Cyprus, but such was the pressure of the times that UN said: “Look your people are dying. Let’s get the troops out right away and lawyers can sort it out later”. So it was decided, but since that time the UN has treated the Greek Cypriots as the only Government of Cyprus, basing this upon a treaty and constitution which has been repudiated by Greek Cypriots Government itself. (Sonyel, 2003: 75).

Makarios welcomed the resolution with great enthusiasm, claiming that: “we have secured a resolution in the first phase of our struggle in the international field. Turkey cannot, in future, threaten intervention in Cyprus invoking the treaty of guarantee” (Sonyel, 2003: 95). Similarly, Greek Cypriot foreign minister stated that “the resolution was a victory for all the people of Cyprus because it protected them against foreign interference” (Kosut, 1970: 93). Greek Cypriots had succeeded in internationalizing the conflict.

In a systematic campaign, the Greek terror squads followed an orderly ethnic cleansing policy: on 5 March, 200 Greek Cypriot irregulars ran amuck the villages of Templos/Zeytinlik and Kazaphani/Kazaphan in Kyrenia district. Greek attacks were reported from Hamitköy, Melusha and Ayyani (Sonyel, 2003: 96). 5 Turks were wounded as a result of explosion in the Turkish Communal Chamber of Nicosia on 5 March (Kosut, 1970: 97). On 7 March, Greek security forces from Limassol attacked Malia/Bağlarbaşı of Paphos district in where large number of Turkish refugees stayed. “It is alleged that most of the casualties were unarmed and occurred when cease-fire was supposed to be in effect” (Patrick, 1976: 62). On 10 March, Makarios claimed that “British forces protected Turkish rebels” (Kosut, 1970: 98).

On 7 March fighting broke out in the town of Paphos and Ktima (*Kasaba*). Organized Turkish attack was launched against the Greek quarter of Paphos. The attack was partly triggered by sniping from Greek quarter at Turkish side. Some of the Greek quarter's houses were captured by Turks. Six Greeks and one Turk were killed and 300 Greeks were seized. 230 Greeks were released as a result of cease-fire (Foley, 1964: 178). In retaliation, Greek Cypriot forces launched all-out attack on Turkish quarter. Mosques were destroyed by Greek mortars (Foley, 1964: 179). "Greeks called for Turks abandon and destroy their fortifications and accept the authority of legal forces to patrol the whole town, including the Turkish quarter" (Kosut, 1970: 98). Dr. Küçük rejected the demands. A week of hand to hand fighting had followed until the cease-fire. The result: fourteen Turkish, eleven Greek Cypriots were dead and 60 wounded (Foley, 1964: 178).

The news of fighting galvanized Turkish government and public view. On 10 March, Dr. Küçük sent messages to UN Secretary General U-Thant, the foreign ministers of Turkey, UK and Greece, saying that "if an effective UN force cannot be dispatched forthwith, we ... call upon rescue the Turks from threat of genocide" (Kosut, 1970: 98). Turkey seriously decided a military operation after Paphos clashes. On 13 March, Ankara sent an ultimatum, declaring that "it would intervene within 36 hour unless all Turkish-Cypriot hostages were released, all sieges of Turkish localities were lifted and freedom of movement, communication and correspondence was restored to the Turkish community" (Patrick, 1976: 62). Prime Minister İnönü stated that "if heavy fighting resumed and the Turkish Cypriot minority faced annihilation, such a thing would leave us no choice but to intervene" (Kosut, 1970: 99). A huge student demonstration took place in Ankara, "singing martial songs and shouting, thirty million Turks are coming" (Foley, 1964: 181). Makarios reacted that "Turkish Cypriots were trying to create a situation that would give the Turkish government a pretext for intervention" (Kosut, 1970: 101). Turkish intervention was halted by US

and UK pressure, the declared Soviet support to Makarios and arrival of first elements of the UNFICYP.⁸⁰

On 27 March 1964, UNFICYP⁸¹ under Indian General Prem Singh Gyani was declared to be operational. Then, it took over the former British observation posts. Its mandate was to prevent recurrence of fighting, monitor cease-fire, restore order and maintain law. The Secretary General U-Thant pointed out that “UNFICYP forces were to go to any scene, and the local commander was to try to get both sides to withdraw. If not, troops may be deployed in such threatened areas in the interest of law and order” (Kosut, 1970: 103). Actually, the irregularity of fighting caused troubles for UNFICYP in many cases. “UNFICYP was powerless to intervene during a number of clashes in the first months of the crisis. Furthermore, the Force had no power to arrest or disarm Cypriots except on the Force's premises” (Ehrlich, 1966: 1050). In simple terms, UNFICYP could use its guns only for self-defense. Therefore, UNFICYP remained only an observation force in the conflicts. Turkish Cypriot officials were in deep disappointment with the passive attitude of the peace-keeping force, claiming that “passive attitude of UNFICYP only served to encourage Greek Cypriot terrorists in police uniform to continue their brutal crimes on an ever larger scale against Turks”(Kosut, 1970: 108). While Greek Cypriot expected that UNFICYP would disarm the Turkish rebels, Turks thought that it would protect them from illegal Greek actions. According to Secretary-General U Thant, the most delicate problem in Cyprus was explained as follows: “UN is not only in the midst of a bitter civil war but it is dangerously interposed between the two sides of that war premises” (Ehrlich, 1966: 1051).

Within a short-time, UNFICYP lost the confidence of the Turks. “Measure against arms smuggling” discriminate against Turks while there were more than 20,000 armed Greek Cypriots (Crawshaw, 1964: 344). As time passed, the balance of power

⁸⁰ The Canadian and Finnish Contingents.

⁸¹ The force was made up from Canadian, Finnish, Irish and Swedish forces. There were already 3,500 British forces in the island. UNFICYP had 7,000 troops in total. By the end of 1965 it included about 5,800 men (Ehrlich, 1966: 1050).

grew in favour of Greek Cypriot majority as they increased their strength while *Mujahideens* declined in numbers. According to UN Mediator Gazo Plaza:

The most conspicuous fact of life in Cyprus was that large numbers of armed men, in and out of uniform and apparently under widely varying degrees of control, were facing one another from fortified positions in many parts of the island. Their numbers had been greatly increased and, their armament greatly enlarged, especially on the Greek-Cypriot side, and with assistance from Greece in particular, by the end of the period (Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, 1965, S/6253: 19)

Similarly, “plans for dismantling Greek and Turkish fortifications” and barricades only weakened the Turkish defense (Crawshaw, 1964: 344). Actually, “many Turkish Cypriots were reported to believe that Gyani’s alleged partiality towards the Greek Cypriots was connected with India’s known opposition to Turkish proposals for Cyprus’s partition”(Kosut, 1970: 113). Dr. Küçük accused senior UN officers in Cyprus of “having anti-Turkish bias” because of Greek-Cypriot propaganda (Kosut, 1970: 125). Hence, both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots thought that UNFICYP was ineffective and only Turkish military intervention could ensure the security of Turkish community in Cyprus. UN tried to consolidate “existing situation” which was totally unacceptable for Turkish side (Camp, 1980: 62). “According to one Turkish-Cypriot observer, the UN’s methods of persuasion and negotiation only served to prolong the agonies and sufferings of the Turkish Cypriot community” (Mirbagheri, 1998:80).

Battle of St Hillarion Castle was one of the cornerstones in the Cyprus inter-communal conflict. The ancient crusader castle occupied a strategic position in front of the Kyrenia pass. The castle was captured by *Mujahideens* just after outbreak of the violence. Turkish positions were strongly fortified. *Mujahideens* received reinforcements and supplies from the surrounding Turkish villages. They were able to blockade the road and harassed the Greek Cypriots from the villages of Karmia, Bellapais, Kato Dhikomo. The mountainous area was deemed the safest place for the Turkish armed activities. The operation to re-capture the Kyrenia pass and Nicosia-

Kyrenia road from Turks had long been aimed. On 25 April, Greek special units which became known as Lyssarides' Men (variously estimated at 300 to 1,500) under the command of ex-EOKA fighter Dr. Vassos Lyssarides⁸² threw into the Turkish positions with the aim of taking the castle and cleansing the roads (Foley, 1964: 183). Greek mortars pounded at the Turkish positions along the castle. The civilians were taken to Gönyeli in where Turkish National Contingent stationed (Kosut, 1970: 112). For UN forces, this indicated that "Greek Cypriots only intended to cooperate when it suited to do so" (Crawshaw, 1964: 344). UNFICYP commander General Gyani warned Makarios that "the assaults had serious implications regarding the obligations of the Cyprus government and the role of UN forces" (Kosut, 1970: 113). For three days, the Greek special units and *Mujahideens* battled from hill to hill with grenades and sub-machine guns until Greeks at last withdrew by the order of Makarios on 29 April. St Hillarion and Kyrenia pass remained in Turkish hands. *Mujahideens* put out a gigantic Turkish flag on the peak 3,000 feet above Kyrenia as a sign of victory. Volkan (2008: 122) emphasized the importance of St Hillarion as such: when the despair descended upon the Turkish Cypriots, the eyes in Nicosia sought to see the flag as a "sign of hope and omnipotence".

In the beginning of the events, the views of Ankara did not reflect the real situation in Cyprus. Turkish Foreign Minister Erkiner claimed that "hostilities are not planned by either side, that leadership of both communities is making genuine efforts to halt fighting" (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 512). Despite the optimistic predictions of Ankara, the conflict escalated rapidly through the island. Then, Ankara raised its tone of voice. Turkish president Cemal Gürsel called US president Johnson to halt the violence. Gürsel stated that "atrocities committed against Turkish woman and children bordered on genocide" (Kosut, 1970: 75). Similarly, Orgeneral Sunay stated: "our nerves are too tense" (*Hürriyet*, 25 December 1964).

⁸² Dr. Vassos Lyssarides was the personal doctor of Makarios. Then, he formed the socialist EDEK party and remained the most loyal figure to the Makarios regime.

Ankara usually favored diplomatic solutions. Actually, Turkey demanded active participation of the US in the Cyprus issue. Prime Minister İnönü mentioned to a journalist that “I could not imagine that US would ignore its responsibilities” (Bölükbaşı, 1999: 513). On 28-29 CENTO meeting in Washington Foreign Minister Erkin claimed that “Cyprus could become the Cuba of the Mediterranean” if the conflict goes on (Kosut, 1970: 116). Ankara believed that US would back its position in the Cyprus issue because of strategic importance of Turkey and activity of unruly communist elements among Greek Cypriots.

It seemed that a strange myopia dominated the views of Turkish foreign policy during crisis. Ankara welcomed UN resolution of 4 March 1964 without objecting the title for “Government of Cyprus”. Nihat Erim, the chief negotiator, claimed that the ‘Government of Cyprus’ addressed to the constitutional government of London-Zurich agreements (Dodd, 2004: 64). Indeed, US President Johnson convinced İnönü that “resolution was absolutely essential in the interest of world peace” (Dodd, 2010: 62). Indeed, Ankara focused on the formation of peace-keeping force, than constitutional frictions. The weakness of post-1960 Turkish diplomacy only served to the sufferings of the Turkish Cypriot community.

Despite the increasing violence in Cyprus, post-1960 military staff was totally unaware of the crises (Tansu, 2001: 254). The Turkish colonels who had experience on the Cyprus issue were expelled from the army after the 27 May coup. Chief staff and Foreign Ministry decided that Cyprus question was merely over by the establishment of joint republic. When the violence had broken, Ankara was caught in surprise. Indeed, there was neither naval nor aerial plan. “Early in the new year, the opposition leaders asked Prime Minister İnönü at a private meeting what plans had been prepared for invading Cyprus, and the old man answered with military bluntness: none”(Foley, 1964: 182). Such unpreparedness caused the death of hundreds of Turks in the island.

May-June of 1964 was also a bloody and shattering month. The increasingly dire and desperate Turkish defenders barely managed to stave off Greek assaults. During May, there were occasional *Mujahideen* raids from Akıncılar/Louroujiana across the Nicosia countryside. On 11 May, The Greek armed elements which were approaching to the Famagusta, one of the well-defended Turkish areas, were hit. Three Greek army officer of the Greece National Contingent and one Greek Cypriot police were killed; three soldiers were also wounded (Patrick, 1971: 65). Greeks took revenge in Famagusta and Larnaca countryside by abducting 32-35 Turks⁸³. Although, UNFICYP tried to arrange the release of the hostages, Makarios reacted that there were no such hostages. On 15 June, U-Tant said that “little hope remains that they are alive” (Sonyel, 2003: 103).

Since May, the re-establishment of Greek Cypriot army had been planned. Makarios was distressed by the irregularity of Greek bands, Turkish armed activity and Turkey’s threat of invasion. On 1 June, Makarios administration authorized the full conscription law, establishing “Greek Cypriot National Guard” (estimated 30,000). Needless to say, the veto of the vice-president Dr. Küçük was ignored. General Grivas was called back to Cyprus to take command of the National Guard because he was seen as the real leader by most of the Greek irregulars. Despite scepticism of Makarios, Grivas returned to Cyprus with 5,000 mainland volunteer soldiers on 12 June 1964. On his return, Grivas stated that he has come to Cyprus as “a national leader, not a politician” (Kosut, 1970: 128). Henceforth, Grivas declared that “he comes as the apostle of *enosis*” (Reddaway, 2001: 225). Leaving aside the popularity of Grivas, Makarios thought that mainland Greek soldiers constituted a force of deterrence against the intervention of Turkey. The numbers of mainland Greek soldiers would have reached to the 20,000 until 1967. On 27 October 1964, Makarios expressed his enthusiasm when he met with Greek Minister of Defence: “I firmly believe that the Pan-Hellenic struggle for the union of Cyprus with motherland Greece will shortly be crowned with success” (Reddaway, 2001: 163).

⁸³ Greek irregulars also abducted UNFICYP liaison officer to the Turkish Cypriot leadership Major Masey and his driver (Patrick, 1971: 67).

In June, Turkey began to consider more seriously the option of sending in its army in response to these developments in Cyprus. Ankara thought that warlike preparations of Greek Cypriots, illegal mainland Greek soldiers, mass abductions and uselessness of UNFICYP made Turkish intervention necessary. The National Security Council in Ankara urgently demanded military operation on 2 July (Dodd, 2010: 67). The US took note of Turkey's military preparations. On 5 June 1964, the infamous Johnson letter was delivered by the US ambassador to Turkey, Raymond Hare. Johnson letter had undiplomatic and cheeky overtone. The US President strictly emphasized some vital points:

A military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO alliances have not had a change to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of NATO allies ... (Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, 1966: 387).

Johnson letter frustrated Ankara. Now, from right wing to the left-wing, a wave of anti-Americanism dominated the Turkish public view. As a result, numerous anti-American demonstrations took place in Ankara and Istanbul throughout the summer and fall of 1964. Turkey cancelled its participation in "American-sponsored multilateral nuclear force" in January 1965 (Ehrlich, 1966: 1059). Actually, the threat of intervention was a Democlean sword over Makarios to halt the escalation of violence. Since the beginning, Prime Minister İnönü realized that Turkish army was not ready to embark a military campaign on Cyprus. Johnson letter was used as a cover for İnönü from the frustration of public view (Bölükbaşı, 1993).

In the end, US took initiative. On 24 June, the ex-secretary of State under Truman administration, Dean Acheson was appointed as a mediator to provide "appropriate helping to resolve the Cyprus Crises" (Kosut, 1970: 131). Acheson proposed a plan including the union of Cyprus with Greece in exchange for a large but fully sovereign Turkish base area (particularly on Carpassian Peninsula). The plan also proposed to establish some autonomous Turkish Cypriot areas out of Turkish sovereign areas. Turkey accepted the plan "as a basis of negotiation" (Ehrlich,

1966: 1086). However, the Greek side objected the plan, offering instead a 25-year lease on a base (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 518). On 27 July, Makarios claimed that “there were efforts made by various partners (US and UK) to find, or rather impose, a solution outside the framework of the United Nations” (Kosut, 1970: 132). Then, second version of plan was proposed including a 50-year lease on a base without full sovereignty, minor concession in the Thracian border in favor of Turkey. Greek government offered the island of Meis/Kastellorizon in exchange for *enosis* (Patrick, 1971: 56). Turkey insisted on the cessation of either large territory in Cyprus or western Thracian corridor. Makarios stated that he opposed “the ceding one inch of Cyprus” to Turkey (Kosut, 1970: 133). Makarios and AKEL believed that partitions plans were backed by US. AKEL declared that they wanted “genuine *enosis*, not kind of proposed by the imperialists as in the recommendations of Dean Acheson” (Adams, 1971: 126). Therefore, Acheson realized that “there was little hope for peaceful solution as long as Makarios remained in control of Cyprus” (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 519). The stubbornness of Makarios made him “unreliable, demagogic, anti-western and obstructive to any final settlement in the Cyprus” in the eyes of west (Camp, 1980: 52). Meanwhile, news of fresh confrontation came from Cyprus.

The Battle of Erenköy/Kokhina played an important role in the shaping of the Cyprus inter-communal conflict. Erenköy/Kokkina region was the only shore area that Turkish Cypriots were in control. Denктаş (1996: 364) noted in his memoirs that the region hosted several Turkish villages (Erenköy, Alevga, Sellain, Mansura, Ayios Theodoros) following large Turkish town of Lefka. According to Denктаş (1996: 364) “If they had been able to unite them, they would have assured territorial continuity from Morphou bay to Erenköy”. Since early July, large number of weapons and Turkish officers and mostly Turkish Cypriots students⁸⁴ were smuggled into Cyprus via Erenköy/Kokkia beach. Then, they had established fortified positions around the region. The fronts had remained under truce since early March. Makarios promised

⁸⁴ Turkish Cypriots students studying in Turkey and UK (nearly 500) convinced Turkish General Staff that they would like to support their brothers in Cyprus. Since March, lightly armed students under guidance of Turkish officers began to land on Erenköy/ Kokkina.

that “the Government had no intention of attacking any Turkish Cypriot positions” (Ehrlich, 1966: 1076). Actually, Erenköy was locked into Makarios’s thinking about the shape of the Cyprus republic. The northern shore areas had always been strategically vital to him due to constant threat of Turkish invasion. On 5 August 1964, Greek Cypriot National Guards led by General Grivas (estimated 2,000 men) launched a surprise attack despite “a strong written protest” of the UNFICYP (Ehrlich, 1966: 1076). Greek mortars pounded the Turkish positions. For two days, a fierce and stubborn battle took place in whole Tylliria region. In UN General Assembly, Greek Cypriot representative claimed that “Turkish Cypriot terrorists were carrying out a plan ... to spread and intensify the rebellion in Cyprus, and resort to warfare” (Ehrlich, 1966: 1076). On 7 August night, *Mujahideens* retreated to their last position for a last ditch stand. Despite the warning sorties of Turkish jets, Grivas continued to march to Erenköy where more than 2,000 civilian stayed. On 8 August, Turkish Air Forces attacked Greek forces in Polis, Heros and Pakhyammos. In reply, Makarios declared that “thousands of innocent Greek civilians had been killed in the indiscriminate Turkish attack” (Sonyel, 2003: 111). Furthermore, Makarios went so far as to threat to attack every Turkish Cypriot village if Turkish air raid did not stop. Turkish Foreign Office replied that the aim of the air raid was to prevent “the annihilation of civilians around the Mansoura area” (Kosut, 1970: 135). On 9 August, Turkish jets stroke against Greek forces in Khrysokhous, Limni, Yialia, Pamos, Paki Ammos and Polis. One Turkish jet⁸⁵ was shut down over Polis. Due to shattering air strike of Turkish Air Force, Makarios ordered to halt demoralized Greek armed elements. On 10 August, cease-fire was arranged despite the discontent of Turkish General Staff because Greek Cypriots did not withdraw to the positions of 5 August. Therefore, UNFICYP set up several observation posts around the region. The Battle of Erenköy/ Kokhina left fifty five Greek Cypriots dead and one hundred twenty five wounded. Turkish losses included twelve deaths, four missing and thirty two wounded (Patrick, 1976: 72).

⁸⁵ The sources disagreed about the fate of Turkish pilot Cengiz Topel. Greek sources claimed that Topel was heavily wounded when he had landed. He died when he was on the hospital road. Turkish sources claimed that Topel was lynched and tortured to death.

Turkey took some lessons from the incidents. Majority of Turkish General Staff thought that the walking in the corridors of international diplomacy was a waste of time. New Turkish Foreign Minister Sabri Çağlayangil accused the previous Turkish diplomacy of “burying its head in the sand” (Dodd, 2010: 78). There can be no doubt that if the military intervention of Turkey was not a main foreign policy priority before 21 December events, it was certainly so after the escalation of inter-communal fighting.

Makarios witnessed the devastation of Turkish Air Force but, he still recognized to be responsible for the whole island. He declared that “struggle would be continued by political and economic means” (Patrick, 1976: 72). Makarios administration unleashed economic restrictions as an instrument of terror which caused food shortages in Turkish enclaves. On the other hand, “faith in Mother Greece suffered a damaging blow, with a corresponding cooling off of feeling for *Enosis*” (Markides, 1974: 321). Greece remained quiet and inactive when Turkey bombed the Greek Cypriot positions. The Consul-General of Greece in Cyprus Angelos Vlackos made it clear that the “disadvantageous position of Greece visa-vis Turkey in regard to Cyprus” made the active intervention of Greece not feasible because of Turkish aerial control of Cyprus and vulnerability of the East Aegean Islands from Mytilene to Rhodes (Reddaway, 2001: 217).

5.3. The Conflict and Inter-Communal Relations:

The post-1964 era marked the period of “endogenous polarization” (Kalynas, 2006: 78). The vicious cycle of violence from December 1963 to August 1964, no doubt, destroyed the all inter-communal relations. Many Turkish Cypriots thought that the events of December 21 were a part of broader Greek Cypriot strategy to liquate them. Indeed, when infamous *Akritas* Plan was published by Greek Cypriot newspaper *Patris* on 21 April 1966, such concerns of Turkish Cypriots come to be proven. The plan envisioned “a conspiracy to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus, and to bring about the union of Cyprus with Greece” (Stavriniades, 1976: 135). The first part of the plan was to amend the constitution. Then, Greek armed forces would “suppress any


resistance by the Turks within a day or two, before outside intervention would be possible, probable or justifiable” (Stavrinides, 1976: 135). The plan reinforced Turkish suspicion and doubtless about the intention of Greek Cypriot administration. The professor Ernest Forsthoff, the former head of Cyprus Constitutional Court made it clear that “these proposals represented the culmination of persistent Greek Cypriot attempts to amend the negative parts of the 1960 constitution in accordance with the first stage of *Akritas* Plan ...” (Reddaway, 2001: 137).

The inter-communal fighting played a central role in the destruction of Turkish Cypriot socio-economic situation. 25,000 Turks became refugees and 103 villages (either wholly Turkish or mixed villages) were destroyed as a result of the escalation of violence (Dodd, 2010: 55). The principal cause of mass expulsion was fear of Greek attacks, “harassment, abductions or killings by Greek Cypriots” in their villages or vicinity (Patrick, 1976: 78). Approximately, 30-40 percent of the all Turkish-owned land was abandoned (Stavrinides, 1976: 80). According to UN Secretary General Report (S/5950: 43) the abandoned properties⁸⁶ were either confiscated or ransacked by Greek irregulars. UN Secretary General reported that the Turkish community was deprived of “its income including the salaries of over 4,000 persons who were employed by the Cyprus Government” since December 1963 (UN S/5950: 51). Since December 1963, “the average annual income per head has dropped by 70 percent” (Crawshaw, 1968: 434). Dr. Küçük protested UNFICYP commander General Kodendera Thimayya, claiming that “the number of Turkish Cypriot villages were faced with imminent starvation” (Kosut, 1970: 145). Secretary General of UN observed that Turkish community had been harshly suffering under economic restrictions: “The policy of economic pressures has nourished bitterness on the Turkish side; it has hardened the Turkish position; it has greatly increased tension and would no doubt lead to a new eruption of fighting if continued” (UN Secretary General Report S/5950: 64).

⁸⁶ 527 houses were destroyed while 2,000 of them suffered from looting. UN Secretary General Report (S/5950: 43).

The ethnic cleansing had crammed more Turks into a smaller territory. The Turkish Cypriots, therefore, established their own administrative units (enclaves)⁸⁷ where they were in geographical control after inter-communal fighting. In total, they established “39 enclaves of varying sizes” (Morag, 2004: 601). These enclaves protected the majority of the Turkish Cypriots, offering security, accommodation and jobs. The Turkish *muhtars* (headman) out of safe enclaves never recognized the legitimacy of Greek administration of Cyprus (Patrick, 1976: 82). The emergence of Turkish Cypriot enclaves resulted in the birth of Turkish Cypriot administration and total separation of the communities.

Map 3: Turkish Cypriot Enclaves (1970)



Source: King, Russel (1982) “The Cultural Reconstruction of Political Reality: Greek and Turkish Cypriots since 1974”, *Anthropological Quarterly*, 55(1): 3.

⁸⁷ See Map 2.

The post-1964 period was characterized by increasing inter-communal polarization in which Kalyvas (2006: 78) called “endogenous polarization”. Here, the conflict entered a new phase. The inter-communal fighting reinforced the pre-polarization by destroying all intermediate levels. Although, the historical dispositions were obvious and important before December 1963, it certainly became extreme antagonism after the escalation of inter-communal fighting. The roads were blocked and neighborhoods cut off from each other⁸⁸. The arrival of thousands of angry and traumatized Turks who fled in terror from their homes sowed the seeds of ethnic conflict. As a result, the Turkish-held territory and Greek-controlled territory became totally separated. Therefore, any inter-communal contact, personal or commercial, was cut down. All Greeks were seen as essentially untrustworthy. UN mediator Gazo Plaza pointed out that:

The physical impediments to normal contacts between the communities were serious enough; hardly less so was the psychological impediment caused by the suppression of the healthy movement of ideas, for which were substituted slogans and counter-slogans shouted by propaganda machines across the dividing lines in uncompromising, provocative or hostile tones (United Nations Mediator Report on Cyprus to the Secretary-General S/ 6253: 20).

The enclave life was characterized by a “mix of civil-military administration” (Patrick, 1976: 84). In spring 1964, Turkish Communal Chamber was replaced by General Committee mostly made up from Turkish members of the Council of Ministers, House of Representatives and Judiciary (Patrick, 1976: 84). Headed by Vice-President Dr. Küçük, General Committee acted as representative and executive body of Turkish community in Cyprus. In isolated hamlets, *serdars* (chiefs) possessed an extensive authority with *muhtars*. In large settlements (Turkish quarters of town), Turkish Army officers were dealing with military affairs while civil affairs were dominated by the General Committee. The enclave life was the expression of their desire for self-management in their own territories. *Mujahideens* followed a

⁸⁸ Turkish Cypriot director Derviş Zaim (2011) described the ethnic polarization in the isolated mixed village in his famous movie *Gölgeler ve Suretler* (The Shadows and the Faces). Zaim (2011) focused on the mutual distrust, suspicion and fear which lead to the ethnic violence.

“telluric character of the partisan organization” and remained defensive behind armed enclaves (Schmitt, 2007: 92). In consequence, Turkish Cypriots established a state within state with regular army (*Mujahideen* force), police force, judiciary, taxation system and schools.

The enclaves were surrendered by armed Greek irregulars and National Guards. Turkish Cypriot freedom movement was denied. Otherwise, they might have faced with abduction, harassment or mental cruelty. On 1 March 1965, Turkish Cypriot Missing Persons Bureau put the number of missing Turks at 209⁸⁹ (Denktaş, 1988: 44). Despair was the dominant mood in the Turkish sectors. Foley (1964: 11) described his observation in Turkish Nicosia just after the fighting as follows: “in the office of *Halkın Sesi*, I was treated to more stories of murder, atrocity and political chicanery. My guide said: The latest thing is that Makarios will go to the UN. Let’s hope his plane crashes”.

As conflict began to spread, the refugees crowded the settlements. Several refugee camps were established to host the expelled Turks. The Turkish community depended on the annual grant of £ 10 million from Ankara (Stavrinides, 1976: 80). Needless to say, most of the grant was spent for security issues. Half of the Turkish Cypriot population depended on the relief provided by the Turkish Cypriot General Committee and Turkish Red Crescent (Sonyel, 2003: 67). The miserable conditions of the refugee camps were described by a journalist George Mikes as follows:

Hamit Menderes used to be a village of two hundred souls; now it has become a tent town of 3,500 inhabitants. They are all Turkish refugees from a nearby village called Omorphita/Küçük Kaymaklı, and they all live in tents in indescribable filth, without proper sanitation, without proper food. The place is sink of filth and squalor, poverty and hopelessness (Stavrinides, 1976: 128-129).

⁸⁹ Denktaş (1988: 44) stated that Turkish Cypriot authorities gave up finding the missing, believing that the missing Turks had been murdered in cold-blood by their abductors.

Greek Cypriot population, on the other hand, enjoyed the fruit of their recognized government. The island experienced an economic growth during the 1960s. Therefore, the standard of living improved in terms of health conditions, educational standards and housing facilities (Stavriniades, 1976: 74). During the period of independence, Gross National Product (GNP) per capita increased about 7 percent at constant 1958 prices. “In actual figures, the per capita GNP almost doubled during this period” (Markides, 1974: 323). The island was portrayed as “land of peace, prosperity and tourism” (Denktaş, 1988: 48). Ordinary Greek Cypriots realized that independence offered much more opportunities than *enosis* would ever offer.

Greek Cypriot administration believed that 1963-1964 events were a politically organized Turkish Mutiny (*Tourkoantarsia*) for the partition (Papadakis, 1998: 159). In the end, Makarios became the master of the island, capable of keeping Turks in isolated enclaves. Makarios thought that behind armed enclaves, the determination and solidarity of Turks would fall apart under economic restrictions. All Turkish posts and rights were eliminated so Greek population completely dominated all civil services Makarios, who was *etharch* since 1950, had emerged as a national leader from the ashes of inter-communal fighting with a tremendous prestige. He declared vice-president and other Turkish members of the administration as rebels. He was the president of republic, “but from 1964 on he was the leader of the Turkish Cypriots in name only” (King, 1982: 3). Needless to say, Greek Cypriots had already affirmed a unitary, sovereign and Greek character of Cyprus administration.

The December 1963 events exposed all fundamental differences and negative passions in each community. Turkish Cypriots displayed a sense of fear and distrust while Greek Cypriots simply ignored the existence and sufferings of Turks. Such ignorance blinded Greek Cypriots to the ruinous effects of inter-communal relations. Although, two communities physically were separated, the sporadic shootings could occur any time. The situation displayed an explosive character in every part of the island as it had been on December 1963. *Serdar* of TMT, Samibeyoğlu described the communal mood during December 1963 crises as follows:

We expected that such an attack would take place whenever it was possible. When it happened, everyone including children and women rushed to the line. All lines had been occupied by *Mujahideens* within 24 hours. We had been imbued with determination and courage. We had been already prepared. Everyone was ready.⁹⁰

Such communal preparedness or readiness has been the basis of social thinking among Greek and Turkish Cypriots since dual society emerged in Cyprus. Here, communal readiness was not one of military preparedness but each community reflected a sense of long-simmering inter-communal antagonism. The roots of communal readiness were based on the historical and psychological dispositions of each community as discussed in the previous chapters. Indeed, 1963-1964 crises reinforced and fed the imperishable hatred between Turks and Greeks. Each military action brought in train renewal of inter-communal distrust. All inter-communal connections collapsed. Consequently, the post-1964 “endogenous polarization” fed by historical developments constituted the broader pattern of social thinking.

5.4. Cutting the Gordian Knot:

Despite the presence of *enosis* as a discourse, Makaios had to deal with the growing frustration of pro-*enosis* forces in Cyprus. On 12 December 1965, he told US Ambassador to Cyprus, Taylor Belcher, that many people had concerns about “the recent unhappy example of Greece’s parliamentary democracy and its social and economical problems” (Sonyel, 2003: 173).

On 21 April 1967, a group of Greek colonels launched a coup, ousting King Constantine II of Greece and established a regime of military dictatorship. The colonels aimed to put an end to political instability in Greece. That coup started a period of protracted military rule in Greece and instability in Cyprus. Actually, the establishment of this regime in Greece had caused resurrection of *enosis* enthusiasm in Cyprus. Nonetheless, the military junta had no significant impact over “the

⁹⁰ Personal interview with Aydın Samibeyoğlu in the Brotherhood Lodge in Nicosia/North Cyprus on 18 January 2012.

Cypriots' trust and affection toward the mother country'' (Markides, 1974: 322). A deep political rift gradually opened between *enosis* activists led by Grivas, backed by mainland Greek officers in Cyprus and pro-independence forces who were dominated by Makarios and AKEL. Junta leader Colonel George Papadopoulos declared that “*enosis* was only just and historically acceptable solution for Cyprus” (Dodd, 2010: 80). In reply, Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil made it clear that “everyone, especially Greece and Greek Cypriot administration knows very well that Turkey will never accept a solution based on *enosis*”(Sonyel, 2003: 222).

Tension between Turks and Greeks in Larnaca-Limassol countryside increased during the summer of 1967. In July 20, inter-communal shooting took place in the mixed village of Ayios Theodoros/Boğaziçi. In July-August 1967, about 10 Greek and Turkish Cypriots were killed around Kouroukas and Geçitkale (Kosut, 1970: 175). The most serious incident was the explosion of a booby-trap in the village of Alaminos/Çeşmem which left 5 Turkish Cypriots killed and one children blinded (Crawshaw, 1968: 429). On 15-16 November 1967, National Guards under the command of General Grivas prepared an attack on mixed village of Ayios Theodoros/Boğaziçi and the Turkish village Kophinou/Geçitkale. The tension in the area was intensified by the insistence of the Greek Cypriot police on patrolling in the village of Ayios Theodoros/Boğaziçi. Indeed, such police patrolling often had mounted in tension in some sensitive areas. *Mujahideens* established roadblocks, claiming that there would be resistance to the patrols. An attack was planned to take control of the Limassol-Nicosia road and eradicate Turkish elements from the area. In retaliation to the attack on police patrol, General Grivas and 3,000 National Guards with heavy machines, pounder guns and mortars attacked the Turkish positions. Within a short time, Greek Cypriot forces occupied and devastated several villages. 27 Turkish Cypriots were ruthlessly massacred. In Kophinou/Geçitkale, Turkish houses were ransacked. The observers verified that victims were tortured and a “80 year old man was wrapped in a petrol-soaked blanket and burned alive” (Sonyel, 2003: 225). Greek Cypriot government declared that “National Guards neutralized all resistance” in both villages (Kosut, 1970: 176).

Brutality of Greek Cypriot assault alerted Ankara. The mainland Turkish press was furious. Indeed, perpetuated conflict in Cyprus sensitivised Turkish public view. Large crowds in Istanbul and Ankara called for intervention. On 17 November 1967, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey⁹¹ declared that Turkey “would go to war with Greece, if necessary” (Sonyel, 2003: 227). On 24 November President Cevdet Sunay declared that Turkey intended to solve “the Cyprus problem once and for all, from the roots up” (Dodd, 2010: 85). Turkey concentrated its forces in Southern Anatolian ports of Mersin and Iskenderun. It was the manner in which Turkey said enough is enough. While foreign residents moved to the British bases, Greek Cypriots fled to the Troodos Mountains (Crawshaw, 1968: 430). Turkey claimed that intervention could be cancelled if its demands were met. The demands were:

- 1) The immediate recall to Greece of General Grivas
- 2) The withdrawal of an estimated 12,000 Greek troops in excess of the 950 detachment provided for under 1960 agreements
- 3) Compensation for the Turkish Cypriot victims of the recent attack on the two villages
- 4) The relaxation of restrictions on Turkish Cypriots living in enclaves
- 5) Guarantees against any further assaults on the Turkish Cypriots.
- 6) The disbandment of Greek Cypriot National Guards (Dodd, 2010: 85).

As Denktaş (2005: 176) stated, the island had been already under “Greek military occupation”. On 24 November, In UN, Turkish representative, Orhan Eralp stated that “the presence of illegal Greek army of occupation with the collusion of Greek Cypriot administration” constituted the basis of threat to peace in Cyprus (Kosut, 1970: 179). Due to US intervention by Mr. Cyrus Vance, military Junta of Greece accepted the Turkish demands. The majority of the illegal mainland Greek troops and Grivas were called back, however several Greek officers remained in the command of National Guards. Makarios indeed, notified a greater Turkish military preparedness to intervene Cyprus. Nevertheless, he did not dissolve the National Guard, claiming that the disbandment of Greek Cypriot National Guards must be associated with the issue of total de-militarization of the island (Kosut, 1970: 180).

⁹¹ The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT): *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*.

Significantly, Makarios became seriously aware that *enosis* was impossible as long as Turkey had opposed to it, however he still publicly advocated *enosist* slogans.

Ayios Theodoros/Boğaziçi and Kophinou/Geçitkale events restored the morale of Turkish Cypriots. Large number of mainland Greek troops was removed from the island. On 7 March 1968, Makarios declared that all restrictions were lifted and Greek forces and road blocks around Turkish enclaves were removed. Actually, Makarios would like to see the dissolution of Turkish enclave system (Morag, 2004: 602).

On 28 December 1967, Turkish Cypriot Provincial Administration was established by Turkish Cypriot elites in Nicosia. It was “provincial” until the 1960 constitution was implemented (Dodd, 2010: 88). On 13 April 1968, Rauf Denктаş was allowed to come back to Cyprus. The Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry Zeki Küneralp and constitutional expert Professor Suat Bilge participated to draft the framework of the constitution of the new administration. Both Turkish diplomats and Turkish Cypriots claimed that the changes aimed to “facilitate the smoother administration, not to promote partition” (Crawshaw, 1968: 432). Furthermore, they believed that “the re-organization and the adoption of a set of regulations” were necessary (Kosut, 1970: 183). Makarios reacted that the establishment of Turkish Cypriot Provincial Administration was “flagrantly unlawful” and he adamantly opposed any form of federal state (Dodd, 2010: 89). The establishment of the Provincial Administration consolidated the Turkish Cypriot position while their Greek Cypriot counterparts were falling apart. In 1973, Rauf Denктаş was elected as the president of the administration. From that date forward, he remained the most influential and inspiring figure of his community with no rival.

Makarios realized that the situation was extremely dangerous. He also seemed to be satisfied with the eradication of mainland Greek troops and Grivas who was his main rival. “Makarios was left in a stronger position than before” (Crawshaw, 1968: 432). Glafkos Clerides argued that the “withdrawal of the Greek forces had a catastrophic

effect on the morale of the Greek Cypriots, which sunk to its lowest ebb” (Dodd, 2010: 90).

On January 1968, Makarios officially declared that there will be a solution in Cyprus “within the limits of what was feasible, which did not always coincide with the limits of what was desirable” (Sonyel, 2003: 242). Makarios naturally feared that *enosis* agitation could provoke Turkey. From that date forward, Makarios made a clear distinction between “policy of feasible, realistic” and “policy of desirable, unattainable”. The policy of desirable (*efkteo*) has been associated with the long-age aspirations of Greek Cypriots, that is, union with Greece, but it was unattainable (*efikto*) because Turkey adamantly opposed it. According to Makarios, the duty of Greek Cypriots was to consolidate independency, sovereignty and unity of Greek administration of Cyprus. In other words, the “feasible policy” referred to “the policy of establishing a unified, independent state free of foreign intervention” under Greek Cypriot domination (Markides, 1974: 321).

Makarios believed that he had already affirmed a recognized, Greek administration of Cyprus so consolidating independency was attainable. The main reason why Makarios changed his policy was based on that “constant fear of Turkish invasion” (Markides, 1974: 321). Makarios became aware that Greece had no will to make war with Turkey. Otherwise, Greek Cypriots would face the devastating power of the Turkish army. Makarios also did not trust the colonels in Athens because of their political incapability and harsh military rule. From the beginning, Makarios remained loyal to the conservative-monarchy and King of Greece; however Greece was under the control of colonels now, not the King. Makarios was the president of a recognized republic but he would be nothing under the regime of military junta of Athens. Finally, the idea of union with Greece was losing its momentum among the Greek Cypriot population. Especially AKEL realized that they would be perished if Cyprus was to be part of Greece which was under anti-communist junta control. Therefore, AKEL supported the policy of consolidating the independence and sovereignty under Greek Cypriot administration. Polis (1973: 599) argues that it was

the “strength of AKEL which brought about attitudinal changes among the Greek Cypriot population”. Moreover, ex-EOKA fighters still desired *enosis* but they were unwilling to launch a new military campaign for the cause. Furthermore, the new policy of consolidating and protecting the independency and sovereignty of Greek Cyprus seemed to receive the support of Greek Cypriots. In consequence, Makarios was re-elected as president in the 1968 elections⁹². He utterly crushed his opposition Takis Evdokas who advocated *enosis*, receiving 96 percent of the votes.

Following the policy of feasible, Makarios entered into negotiations with Turkish Cypriots who were seen as “rebels” by the Archbishop. Actually, the negotiation was only an act of necessity because of pressure from Turkey and US. The negotiations were run by Denktaş and Clerides. Turkish side offered reasonable and moderate demands. Denktaş accepted to decrease Turkish quotas (in civil services, police, electoral roll and House of Representatives) from the 30 percent to the 20 percent. He also accepted the unified judiciary. Moreover, the veto power of Turkish vice-president would be removed. However, the Turkish side also insisted on the local political autonomy where they would be in control (enclaves). It seemed that Turkish side came to accept nearly all constitutional amendments of 1963 December. Clerides confessed that he favored “the gradualist approach of Denktaş” (Sonyel, 2003: 264).

Despite the optimistic attitude and recommendations of Clerides, the Greek Cypriot Council of Ministers rejected all offers on the ground that Makarios opposed “any arrangements which smacked of federation or cantons” (Sonyel, 2003: 244). Makarios also insisted on unitary state, “the common electoral roll” (based on the idea of one vote one person) and “the abolition of vice-presidency” (Dodd, 2010: 94). Makarios only offered equal citizenship in unitary and sovereign Cyprus with minority rights (cultural, religious an educational autonomy). In the eyes of the Archbishop, there was no place for separate political status for Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, Archbishop refrained official denouncing of *enosis* which was a key

⁹² Makarios received 220,911 votes to 8,577 in the 1968 elections (Kosut 1970: 183).

issue for Turkish Cypriots. Denктаş claimed that the “problem was not the local administration”, but that the Greeks wanted to transform Turks from a national community to “the favored minority” (Sonyel, 2003: 269). According to Clerides, “it is a fact of history, which cannot be denied, that the uncompromising attitude of Makarios on the issue of local government prevented a solution of the Cyprus problem” (Dodd, 2010: 98). Such stubbornness exhausted all hope to restore order in Cyprus. For Makarios “the aim has become maintenance of the island’s Hellenic character and its unity” (Millios & Kyprianidis, 2011: 64). In his speech at Yialousa village, on 14 March 1971 he declared: “Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of the history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have inherited her. Greek and undivided we shall keep her, and Greek and undivided we shall hand over” (Dodd, 2010: 96). The Turkish side demanded an explanation of Makarios’s speech whether he was genuine or not in the wake of negotiations. Yialousa speech once again fed the suspicion and anger of Turks towards Makarios. From that date forward, Turkish side realized that the negotiations were meaningless, so they collapsed after a last meeting on 20 September 1971 (Denктаş, 1988: 55).

Pro-*enosis* forces in Cyprus and military junta of Athens were frustrated by the new policy of Makarios. For them, Makarios was de-Hellenizing the island by consolidating independence. Indeed, significant proportion of Greek Cypriot community still wanted union with Greece. Therefore, a new wave of polarization emerged between Greek Cypriots. On 1 March 1969, *Ethnikon Metapon* (National Front) was established by the ardent followers of *enosis* cause. National Front stated that Makarios regime posed serious danger to the root of Hellenism in Cyprus. The members of National Front raided police stations and governmental offices. On October 1971, Grivas “escaped” from Greece to the Cyprus (Dodd, 2010: 98). Meanwhile, Grivas publicly declared his opposition to Makarios administration. Thus, the opposition gained more and more ground. The several pro-*enosis* groups were formed: Akritas Organization, *Enosis* Youth Phoenix, the Nationalist Youth of Paphos, the Organization of National Salvation (Moran, 1997: 86). On 8 March 1970, an unsuccessful assassination took place against Makarios. Meanwhile, pro-

enosist groups veered rightward through late 1971, established EOKA-B (EOKA VITA) including extremist Greek Cypriot elements, mainland Greek officers and gunmen loyal to the military junta of Athens. It was the irony of the history that Makarios became the victim of a machinery of terrorism he had supported once upon a time.

The Soviet News Agency (TASS) stated that “the reactionary Greek officers who continued to occupy significant position in the Cypriot National Guards” were the mastermind behind the plot against Makarios (Danopoulos, 1982: 262). On 23 March 1972, Soviet ambassador publicly declared his government’s support to Makarios (Crawshaw, 1972: 333). Needless to say, the Soviet Union became aware that “the survival of Makarios regime” was vital for its interests in the East Mediterranean (Crawshaw, 1971: 30).

The Greek military regime emphasized that Athens was the “national center of Hellenism” (Dodd, 2010: 101). According to military junta, Makarios should respect and obey to the national center. Otherwise, “Athens will find itself in the awkward necessity to take those steps dictated by the national interests ... however bitter these measures may be”⁹³ (Danopoulos, 1982: 263). For many years, Makarios had exploited the weak governments in Greece until military junta took over. In this way, Makarios was able to move freely. Now, strong military government of Athens wished to impose its will and lordship on Makarios. As a result of the increasing tension between Athens and Nicosia, Greek colonels had decided to get rid of Makarios. EOKA-B launched a guerrilla campaign to overthrow him. The Greek Cypriot police force had been dominated by pro-EOKA forces since the establishment of the republic. AKEL, Makarios, British properties and even the moderate center-right party of Clerides were the targets of EOKA-B. The rapid escalation of violence deeply polarized Greek Cypriot society. The EOKA-B assaults were answered by loyal troops to Makarios: Tactical Reserve Forces and irregular

⁹³ The statement was taken from the letter of Greek dictator Papadopoulos to the Makarios on July 18 1971.

socialist militias under Dr. Lyssarides (Sonyel, 2003: 338). The conflict became radicalized due to Makarios-Grivas feud and AKEL dominance of political scene. Archbishop often claimed that the activities of pro-*enosis* forces were working in favor of partition plans. In this way, he tried to obliterate the size of pro-Grivas forces among Greek Cypriots. He realized that such aggressions were run and directed by Athens. According to him, the military regime of Athens organized and supported “the terrorist activities of EOKA-B” and “the involvement of Greek officers of the National Guard in lawful acts of conspiracy” (Demopoulos, 1982: 267). By the summer of 1974, the Makarios administration was like an apple eaten out inside by disease.

As Clausewitz (2007: 127) stated, “enemy of a good plan is the dream of perfect plan”. The archbishop envisioned a unitary, sovereign “perfect Cyprus” without Turks, Turkey, guarantees and military junta of Athens where he was going to be the sole master of the island. Sharing Cyprus with the Turks or the military junta was unthinkable. It did not mean that Makarios totally abandoned the national cause. He was still ideologically supporting *enosis*. On the 150th anniversary of Greek independence, on 25 March 1971, he declared that “Cyprus will remain faithful to Greece, its motherland, goal of its struggles and target of the sacrifices of its son” (Reddaway, 2001: 197). As Markides (1974: 321) pointed out “the constant fear of Turkish invasion” made *enosis* unattainable according to Makarios. Archbishop made it clear that he was ready for *enosis* if the military of Greece was to support such an adventure (Sonyel, 2003: 334). While Makarios followed “a low-gear approach”, Grivas desired an immediate *enosis* (Denktaş, 1988: 61). In long-term, *enosis* could be achieved if the monarchy was to be restored. When Clerides recommended Archbishop to accept the official prohibition of *enosis* from the constitution, Makarios answered as follows: “you see Glafkos, these hands, they can cut them off, but I will not sign any constitution excluding *enosis*” unless Greece and Turkey sign first a protocol excluding *enosis* and partition (Dodd, 2010: 107). Actually, only viable and just agreements with Turks could save Makarios from the position that he was in. According to Denktaş (1988: 62) there were minor difference between Grivas

and Makarios: “In fact, both men were pursuing the same goal, *enosis*, but had different ideas how to achieve it”.

In that respect, Greek Cypriot scholars, mostly communist-oriented, argue that Greece and Turkey had secret agreement for some kind of partition of the island. According to this conspiracy theory, the main aim of the alliance was to remove the Archbishop from the office. AKEL argued that the plot against Makarios could be linked with “the imperialist solution to Cyprus” (Crawshaw, 1971: 28). According to AKEL, the imperialist circles (Greece, Turkey, NATO, USA etc.) colluded to conspire against the independency of Cyprus. Similarly, Makarios thought that *enosis* camp was “becoming an ally of Turkish partitions plans” (Sonyel, 2003: 325). The Greek conspiracy theory defied the logic. Greek Cypriot claimants showed no clear evidences to such agreements. US undoubtedly disliked Makarios regime. US had no such visible intention to remove Makarios because it would culminate a new wave of instability in the region. US tried to keep a relatively stable environment in East Mediterranean. Otherwise, a Greco-Turkish war would have been inevitable. Furthermore, despite the non-alignment orientation of Makarios, he permitted the “US activities including U-2 Flights from British bases as well as American intelligence monitors along Kyrenia” (Camp, 1980: 52). The western powers had no reason to risk their position in Cyprus by supporting adventurist policies. Nevertheless, the so-called western plot conspiracy was widely used by pro-Makarios force in order to distract the attention of Greek Cypriot population away from the growing opposition to Makarios.

In analyzing the source of “western plot conspiracy theory”, it seemed that the majority of rumors were fabricated by either the Soviet Press (TASS) or AKEL circles. There can be no doubt that the future of Soviet interest in East Mediterranean was totally based on the survival of Makarios regime. Putting aside the baselessness of these rumors, Ankara-Athens alliance sounded irrational. The Greece-Turkey relations were terrible during the early 1970s. Although, the Greek junta was willing to reach an agreement with Turkey, any agreement with Greece was unthinkable for

Turkey because of failed negotiations with junta on September 1967 (Evroz-Meriç meetings) and oil crises in Aegean Sea. Turkey made it clear that any Greek-inspired coup in Cyprus would be answered with “all Turkish forces and strengths” (Crawshaw, 1971: 28). In 1973, no room was left to reach an agreement: The Greeks wanted a complete union while Turks wanted complete partition; Greeks insisted on completely unitary state and Turks insisted on a geographical federation (Camp, 1980: 62)

On 27 January 1974, Grivas died due to a heart attack. His demise became a parade of pro-*enosis* Greek militancy where more than 100,000 Greek Cypriots (a significant number regarding the total population of 500,000 Greek Cypriots, the number was significant) participated in the funeral. Makarios declared a day of national mourning. The Grivas spectacle was taken as a strong presence of *enosis* feelings among the Greek Cypriots. According to Clerides, “it would be possible for junta to proclaim *enosis*, and that Turkey would be prevented by the allies of Greece from carrying out an invasion” (Stavrinidies, 1979: 112). Beyond any doubt, a significant proportion of Greek Cypriots were in favor of union with Greece. Indeed, neither Turkish Cypriots nor Greek Cypriots thought that any Turkish intervention was less likely to occur under such circumstances.

According to EOKA-B followers, the independent republic of Cyprus was useless. Therefore, consolidating such independency would de-Hellenize the island. The western plot discourse was used by Makarios as a cover against instability in Cyprus. In the wake of such domestic political turbulence, Cyprus was in “a state of desperate anarchy” (Molan, 1997: 87). The real intention behind the EOKA-B movements was discussed by a one of the former chief of the organization, Moustakas, as follows:

The Cypriots believed that coup meant *enosis*. Obviously, the events over the years argue against independence. It worked through the use of force and so on. The force sometimes should be countered by

another force. As Alexander the Great said: Cut your Gordion Knot!
(Cocayannis, 1974, *the Attila* 74).

As understood from the statement, it was the growing Greek Cypriot extremism and the adventurist policy of Athens that resulted in the events of 1974. As argued in the previous chapter, domestic factors often shaped the policy of Cyprus. The western plot thesis ignored the growing *enosis* demands in Cyprus. Nevertheless, the so-called thesis of western plot was going to be widely used after 1980s by the Greek Cypriot senior politicians and scholars. Indeed, Greece could only rely on the power of the growing *enosis* feelings. There can be no doubt that the fault lies were now even deeper with the political bluntness of Makarios refrain Makarios and his personal hatred towards Turks who would from giving the legitimate rights of the Turkish Cypriots since the beginning.

5.5. Operation Attila:

On 15 July 1974 in the morning, the National Guards led by Greek colonels stormed⁹⁴ the presidential palace of Archbishop. Makarios left the island to Malta via British base of Akrotiri. The Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation declared that “Makarios is dead. Long live the Hellenism in Cyprus” (Sonyel, 2003: 343). Meanwhile, EOKA-B militants launched assaults over pro-Makarios groups. Now, intra-Greek violence escalated through the island. An EOKA-B gunman, Nicos Sampson was installed as president of the republic. Armed irregulars arrested the pro-Makarios elements, socialists and communists in the villages and towns. The left wing Greek Cypriots described the coup as follows: with the exception of Paphos and Limassol, the militants of “EOKA-B terrorized the countryside with dozens of democratic citizens, members of AKEL and other popular organizations of the left in first wave” (*Haravgi*, 15 July 2011). On 16 August, Greek delegates in UN claimed that “despite its Greek officers, the National Guards were under control of the Cyprus government” (Dodd, 2010: 109). On 17 January, new president Sampson mentioned that the aim of the coup was the restoration of the order. Sampson added

⁹⁴ Operation Aphrodite.

that “he sees no reason for Turkish invasion” (*Haravgi*, 15 July 2011). According to Sampson, the replacement of Makarios was an act of necessity:

I realized that those imprisoned by Makarios regime who had been tortured came out shouting: ‘Death to our torturers’, ‘to Makarios’, ‘to communists’, then I realized that their threats would be carried out. Therefore, I decided to take responsibility and to impose law and order at all levels and I succeeded (Cocayannis, 1974, *the Attila* 74).

Ankara thought that the aim of coup was *enosis*, believing that it was backed by the military regime of Athens. On 17 July, Prime Minister Ecevit met with British senior politicians Prime Minister Harold Wilson and the Foreign Secretary James Callaghan for the joint operation. Although London was unwilling to make war in Cyprus, in the secret meeting of The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT), Prime Minister Ecevit stated that “my impression from our meetings with Americans and British in London that there was no ‘green light’ for the Turkish intervention in Cyprus but ‘red light’ did not seem obvious” (GNAT, 1974, Secret Meeting Official Records, 2/2). United States realized that any pressure on Ankara would cause a new wave of anti-American dissent among Turkish people. Moreover, United States became aware that it was not able to assert its will on Ecevit who was quite different from Demirel. Therefore the *realpolitik* necessitated that United States stayed neutral. Turkish General Staff pressed the government to launch order of the operation. The coup undoubtedly awakened the Turkish military giant. On 18 July 1974, in a secret meeting of Turkish National Assembly, Prime Minister stated that the “Athens and colonels in Cyprus were the mastermind behind the coup. A secret *enosis* has been implemented in Cyprus” (GNAT, Secret Meeting Official Records, 1974, 1/4). PM stated that he did not expect an instant declaration of *enosis* because the puppet regime of Cyprus would be used by Greece as a Trojan horse in the third world and the communist bloc. All senior Turkish politicians agreed on the fact that a military intervention was necessary and vital.

On 20 July 1974, Turkey launched Operation *Attila* as an answer to the Operation *Aphrodite*. Militarily speaking, operation to the island was difficult. Due to

mountainous geography and a hostile Greek population, the success in Cyprus was based on determination, velocity and active participation of Turkish Cypriots. The operation consisted of a two prolonged attacks: the para-trooper landing on Nicosia-Kyrenia road (which was already under the control of Turkish Cypriots) and immediate capture of a defensive bridgehead around Kyrenia. Prime Minister Ecevit declared that “the action was not an invasion but an act against invasion” (Sonyel, 2003: 347). Similarly, vice-president Denktaş (1988: 69) declared that “the intervention was not directed against the Greek community with whom the Turks of Cyprus wished to live on friendly terms”. Despite peaceful intensions of Turkey, Greek population thought that it was an invasion which was seen as a part of Turkish expansionism. Cyprus radio declared: “anybody who can carry gun must appear at the police station, well, everybody, you know, all the people from right-wing, left-wing, communists, everybody went” (Walker, 1984: 487).

In the first stage, the Turkish Armed Forces intended to open a corridor from sea to the Nicosia enclave. For many years, Makarios administration constructed fortifications against a prospective Turkish intervention. Greek Cypriot National Guards were supported by artilleries and armored vehicles but they lacked military discipline. Following the defeat of Greek forces in Lapta/Lapitos battle, Kyrenia was captured by Turkish Armed Forces. The Nicosia-Kyrenia road was held by Turkish Cypriot *Mujahideens*. No reinforcement was able to be sent here because *Mujahideens* harassed and staged ambushes in the strategic positions. Severe fightings took place in Kyrenia (Beşparmak) mountains where Turkish commandos landed. *Mujahideens* from Nicosia and Boğaz (2000) *sanjaks* and Turkish National Contingent joined them to repel Greek night assaults. Greek National Contingent and Greek Cypriot National Guards (estimated 8,000-10,000 soldiers) launched a frontal attack in an attempt to cleanse Turkish armed elements from the mountains. There can be no doubt that bravery of *Mujahideens* saved Turkish commandos, in fact the future of whole campaign, from disaster. By the next morning, Greeks had been retreating by taking so many casualties under the constant threat of Turkish Air Force. In Nicosia, the National Guards and *Mujahideens* clashed from house by

house and street by street before the main Turkish army arrived. Consequently, *Mujahideens* liberated the captured quarters of Nicosia which had fallen during inter-communal fighting of 1963-1964. When the cease-fire was established, Turkish forces captured a triangular area stretching from Turkish part of Nicosia to the Kyrenia. The capture of Kyrenia and repulse of Greek assault ended all hope of Greek Cypriots to push Turks into the sea.

The failure of Greek Cypriots to repel main Turkish forces persuaded them to switch their focus to the civilian targets. Therefore, Greek Cypriot forces unleashed attacks on Turkish enclaves. National Guards occupied the Turkish quarter of Limassol where no natural barrier divided the Turkish sector. The following days were marked by the falls of Turkish enclaves in Paphos, Yeşilirmak and Larnaca and brutal behaviors of Greek armed elements against Cypriot Turks. The Greek irregulars and the National Guards massed outside Famagusta which was protected by Venetian Walls. According to Denktaş (1988: 70) “21,000 thousand Turkish Cypriots were expelled from twenty-seven villages and 26,150 were surrounded in sixty villages”. The captured civilian Turks were put in concentration camps under terrible condition. Alper Faik Genç described the harsh conditions in Larnaca concentration camps as follows: “we suffered from sleeplessness and stress. We had nothing to eat except five olives a day and a piece of bread. There was no doctor, no medicine” (Denktaş, 1988: 71).

In Greece, dictator Ioannides prepared for a war⁹⁵ with Turkey by declaring total mobilization. Actually, Greece was totally unprepared: “only four of its 12 divisions were at war strength” (O’Malley & Craig, 2001: 188). The rest of the junta, aware of Turkish military power, disagreed with Ioannides, believing that a total war with Turkey would bring catastrophe to Greece. Therefore, they ousted Ioannides, calling former Prime Minister Karamalis from Paris to save the country from the disaster. Consequently, the military junta of Athens collapsed on 24 July. New Prime Minister

⁹⁵ On 21 July, Greek Dictator Ioannides ordered to strike Turkey from Thracian border. The order was met with military mutiny among the ranks of Greek colonels (Camp, 1980: 57).

Karamanlis made it clear to his people that “his country’s defenses were too weak to risk going to war with Turkey” (O’Malley & Craig, 2001: 218). In Cyprus, Sampson realized that there was no hope so he stepped down. On 22 July 1974, a cease-fire was established. The situation gave place to the diplomacy. Glafkos Clerides temporarily took over the administration of Greek Cypriots.

Despite the optimistic results⁹⁶ of the First Geneva conference (25- 30 July 1974), the unwillingness of the Greek Cypriot side to respect the conditions frustrated Ankara. In the Second Geneva conference (8-14 August), Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş sent its last warning to the Clerides: the unconditional withdrawal of Greek armed forces from Turkish enclaves and establishment of Turkish Cypriot autonomous administration, at least in principle, (34 percent⁹⁷ of the island) including Famagusta and Nicosia-Kyrenia triangle. When Clerides became aware of the situation, he asked for about 48 hours to discuss the ultimatum. Ankara thought that it was a waste of time. Indeed, Turkish commanders in the field complained that Greek Cypriots violated the cease-fire by laying mines around the Turkish bridgehead and harassing the Turks in the enclaves. There can be no doubt that tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots were under constant threat of annihilation. Therefore, on 14 August, a second operation was launched (*Attila 2*). Now, 30,000 tough Turkish soldiers plus with 15,000 *Mujahideens* launched attacks on ill-prepared Greek forces. The second operation was merely a cat-and-mouse game between retreating Greek forces and advancing Turkish forces. The ill-discipline of Greek Cypriots, general feeling of weakness among them and shattering power of Turkish army determined the outcome within a short time. Less than 60 hours, 38 percent of the island (stretching from Famagusta to the Morphou/Güzelyurt bay) came under

⁹⁶ A joint declaration was signed. According to the declaration, “all the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces should be immediately evacuated. These enclaves would continue to be protected by UNFICYP” (Denktaş, 1988: 72).

⁹⁷ Prime Minister Ecevit stated if Greek Cypriots had accepted to leave 17 percent of the island; there would have been no further military advance (Dodd, 2010: 129).

Turkish control. On 16 August, Turkish forces established a secured border area and territorial unity of scattered Turkish populated enclaves.

The expansion of the fight brutalized the fighters. The retreating Greek Cypriot forces committed several atrocities to the native Turks. In return, *Mujahideens* took few prisons. The advancing Turkish army and peace-keeping forces exhumed several mass graves in the village of Dohni/Tashkent, Muratağa and Sandallar/Sandallaris which more than hundred Turks were killed. While Turkish armies proceed, Majority of the Greek Cypriots abandoned their houses⁹⁸.

1974 was the last military confrontation in the island. Stability returned to the island by Turkish armed intervention. It put an end to the long-established suffering of Turkish Cypriots. On 1975, Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) was declared by Denktaş after 99,4 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of it (Dodd, 2010: 134). Since then, Denktaş wanted to “construct a purely Turkish future”, not a bi-communal one (Russel, 1982). From that date forward, his tradition became exclusively identified with the policy of the partition. On 1983, Denktaş elevated the status of TFSC to the independent republic, namely Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus⁹⁹. He never had hidden his determination not to live in united Cyprus. For him, it was the end of history. Nowadays, Turkish feeling of mistrust to the Greek Cypriots and the European Union depended upon the failure of Annan Plan¹⁰⁰ and conflictual attitude of the EU. Therefore, large proportion of Turkish Cypriots is in favor of two-state solution, that is to say, the purely Turkish future of Denktaş.

⁹⁸ Greek Cypriot authorities' claimant of 200,000 refugees seemed excessive. According to 1960 statistics, the number of Greek Cypriot population was 138,823 in Turkish controlled areas (Dodd, 2010: 132). On the other hand, 60,000 Turks in Greek controlled south tried to move to the north.

⁹⁹ Denktaş stated that Turkish Cypriots will have the final word regarding their national future, claiming that independence has been an undeniable right of the Turkish Cypriots after all the bitter memories of the past and failed negotiations. He argued that he already had such an intension of the independence declaration (Personal interview with Rauf Raif Denktaş in his office in Nicosia, 24 March 2009).

¹⁰⁰ 67 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the plan while 75 percent of the Greek Cypriot community rejected it.

For Greek Cypriots, 1974 marked the beginning of their sufferings. The question of Greek Cypriot refugees and missing persons¹⁰¹ occupied the discourses of Greek Cypriot senior politicians. Indeed, war was costly for Greek Cypriots. On his return, Makarios realized that there was no hope of a military solution because of the shattering power of the Turkish army. Clerides admitted: “both sides have made mistakes. Our biggest was that when we were in a position of strength we did not give a little more to finish the Cyprus problem” (O’Malley & Craig, 2001: 230). Instead of a settlement, Makarios launched a “long-struggle policy” or “aggressive diplomacy” which referred to the internalization of the dispute which entailed tightening the economic, social and diplomatic embargos on Turkish Cypriots. According to Makarios, “Turkish invasion of Cyprus was the greatest blow to the Hellenism since the disaster of 1922” (Moran, 1997: 88).

For right-wing Greek Cypriot media, During the celebrations of 57th anniversary of EOKA struggle, “the heroes of EOKA are a source of courage, patience and struggle ... young and old all *Pallikaridis*¹⁰² and so many others did not sacrifice their lives to see the Turkish flag at the Kyrenia Castle, the Monastery of Apostolos Andreas¹⁰³” (*I Maxi* 1, April 2012). On the other hand, Greek Cypriot left has never forgiven the right. General Secretary of AKEL Andros Kyprianu argues that “Cyprus was betrayed in 1974 by the far right those who opened the door to *Attila*” (*O Filelefteros*, 8 April 2012). In 2004, the majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan on the ground that it was going to destroy the unity of the Cypriot state. Leaving aside their political quarrels, today, Greek Cypriot politicians are still following “long-struggle policy of Makarios” by imposing embargos on Turkish Cypriots and manipulating world public view against Turkey and Turkish Cypriots.

¹⁰¹ The question of missing persons has been one of the tragic issues of the Cyprus conflict. In 1981, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) was established under the auspice of UN. Since 1963 December, “502 Turkish Cypriots and 1493 Greek Cypriots were officially reported as missing” by both communities. To date, “314 remains of individuals exhumed including 253 Greek Cypriots and 61 Turkish Cypriots. (Available at: <http://www.cmpcyprus.org/media/attachments>).

¹⁰² Evangelos Pallikaridis was the first executed EOKA militant by the British colonial administration.

¹⁰³ A monastery is located in the south of Cape Apostolos Andreas (Turkish: Zafer Burnu) on the Carpassian Peninsula (Mirgabheri, 2010: 14).

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study attempts to relate the entire story of the Cyprus conflict in an integrated fashion from the 1880s and to 1974. The preceding analysis in this thesis has shown that inter-communal conflict in Cyprus is historically and ethnically rooted. The long-standing enmities existing between Greek and Turkish Cypriots surfaced in the ethnic civil war. The internal dynamics of the conflict and rapid politicization of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus have been emphasized as the most important determinants of the conflict.

This study has adopted an inter-disciplinary model by paying attention to the social, historical, ethnic and psychological aspects of the issue. In other words, this study is overly-domestic policy oriented and focuses on largely non-material aspects of the Cyprus question. Therefore, this work is devoted relatively more space to the internal politics of the Greek and Turkish communities that inhabit the island.

As was explained in the introduction, this thesis aims to give an adequate picture of the Cyprus conflict. This thesis is also devoted to explain the relevance of the “pre-war polarization theory” to the specific case of Cyprus. In this thesis, I asked what the logic is in Cyprus inter-communal conflict that tends to assume a highly brutal character. After a short overview of Cyprus history, the questions of how the domestic factors articulate and develop historically and how it led to the inter-communal violence have been discussed in detail. Briefly, deep group rivalry was the main source of the inter-communal struggle. In other words, the basic cause of the conflict was long-simmering ethnic polarization. While the inter-communal conflict in Cyprus was characterized by high ethnic polarization until 1964, it turned into an endogenous polarization after 1964.

In first part of the thesis, the historical background of Cyprus has been examined. The parameters of the internal dynamics of the Cyprus conflict has been formed by various socio-political developments: In Byzantine period, an autocephalous Church was established, so the church of Cyprus possessed extensive authority over political and social affairs of Greek community. Therefore, mental Hellenization of Cyprus gained ground. The Latin period marked the persecution and harassment of orthodox Greeks under Frankish and Italian lordship. Under the Ottoman period, large numbers of Turks were exported from Anatolia to the island. Through the Ottoman *millet* system, both communities experienced an autonomous administration. The status of head of the Church was elevated to the status of *ethnarch*, that is to say, the head of Orthodox community in Cyprus. In this way, the root of polarization was traced to the emergence of a dual society during the Ottoman times. The British colonial administration perpetuated this existing separateness. Then, as the decades past, the polarization was fed by growing suspicion, dislike and genuine mistrust of mutual intensions, not by a particular design of the imperialist powers. Hence, the increasing inter-communal hostility and dislike were reinforced by the internal and external political developments (Greek revolt of 1821 and Greco-Turkish wars of 1919-1920) in Cyprus. Such feelings became the basis of hostile relations. There is no doubt that as a part of gradual evolution of Greek Cypriot community, uncompromising insistence on *enosis* deteriorated inter-communal relations.

The second chapter explains the emergence of political-consciousness among Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities experienced a partially free environment to institutionalize their communities under British administration. This thesis rejected the mainstream argument of “divide and rule” by British policy as the most important factor in the deterioration of the inter-communal relations. Such argument neglects the internal dynamics of the dispute. The civic Cypriot identity did not develop historically due to predominance of ethnic, religious and linguistic differences. Greeks remained Greek and Turks preserved their culture and language. Indeed, both communities blamed British colonial administration for depriving them of their national aspirations and culture. Actually,

it followed a strict policy of impartiality and non-involvement during the inter-communal clashes. Needless to say, British administration undertook to rule over Cyprus in a climate of increasing suspicion and nationalism on both sides.

It is obvious that internal dynamics alone cannot explain the genesis of the conflict because each conflict can be explained in the light of specific concrete factors but viewed as whole. Cyprus is situated in a critical geographical region, therefore it is vulnerable to the penetration of external powers. Leaving aside the ambitions of the external powers, the division is already there. In time, ethnic polarization and psychological dispositions of the two communities pave the way for conflicting political consciousness.

Fundamental differences between the Greek and Turkish communities are the collective perception of their historical experiences. As discussed in the third chapter, the idea of being descendants of the ruling Ottoman conquerors and the bitter memories of Turks in Crete and Rhodes made Turkish Cypriots fierce opponents of the idea of union of Cyprus with Greece. Therefore, Turks of Cyprus developed hostile feelings towards Greek Cypriots because of protracted Greco-Turkish conflicts in Crete, Macedonia, Asia Minor. Turks of Cyprus were frustrated by the British takeover of the island because they lost their former dominant position. Until the First World War, they still considered the island as an integral part of the Ottoman Turkey. The end of the Turkish rule marked the rise of political consciousness among the Turks of Cyprus. Here, the strong collective memory of the Turkish community and the communal solidarity were stressed. The impact of republican Turkey on the Turkish community in Cyprus was also crucial. Turkish community in Cyprus became ardent supporter of republican reforms, adopting them voluntarily although they were out of the jurisdiction of Republican Turkey. Under the guidance of their ethnic brethren in Anatolia, Turkish Cypriot mobilization was a defensive and preparatory.

The anachronistic religious establishment of Greek Cypriots and Hellenic education network were the centers of Greek Cypriot mobilization. There can be no doubt that the uncompromising insistence of *enosis* constituted the basis of Greek Cypriot thinking. As a matter of fact, the union with Greece was seen as an inevitable destiny of Hellenism. The emergence of a strong left-wing movement transformed Greek Cypriot mobilization into the dual, preparatory and offensive mobilization. In the end, Greek Cypriots found themselves a highly polarized environment in both ethnic and political sense. Therefore, *enosis* was left to freewheel under the force of internal momentum of Cyprus.

The historical context and the psychological environment shaped the military conflicts. As explained in the fourth chapter, since 1948, an active campaign for *enosis* started by Greek Cypriots. Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriots started an active anti-*enosis* campaign by sending committees to Turkey, organizing large meetings and demanding *Taksim*. Therefore, the struggle of Turkish and Greek Cypriots were a struggle rooted in a past. The latter years of British colonial administration was marked by increasing inter-communal fighting between various Turkish and Greek Cypriot armed groups. From that date forward, central issue was whether Cyprus remained an undivided and Hellenic island or divided by sovereign Turkish Cypriot homeland. Inter-communal antagonism grew, as the aims became clearer. This period was characterized by high polarization.

Chapter Five described the crucial events between 1960 and 1974, leading up to war and its progress once the fighting had started. The transition to independent state was a challenging issue for the people of Cyprus. Considering the historical developments in the previous chapters, this part presents a detailed analysis of the 1963-1964 inter-communal fighting. The rapidity and thoroughness of the polarization led to a deterioration of the inter-communal relations. The protracted conflict was followed by the clashes between Greek and Turkish militias and maneuvers of international diplomacy which kept Cyprus in a state of war. A special

attention was given to the domestic factors (re-emergence of *enosis* movement and establishment of separate Turkish administration) which led up to 1974.

It is clear from the analysis set out above that Cyprus conflict to be sure, was a milestone in a contest between two national movements over a piece of territory. “The problem of Cyprus is that the Turkish Cypriots can’t forget what happened between 1960 and 1974 and the Greek Cypriots can’t remember” (Reddaway, 2001: 177). It is clear that there are many overlapping factors that contribute to the development of inter-communal violence. The inter-communal violence had a broader historical connection. This thesis attempts to demonstrate that there is a crucial link between the pre-existing historical polarization of two communities and violence in Cyprus, as well as Cypriot perception of those developments. When the armed Greek campaign emerged in 1955, the hostile feelings already dominated the minds of the two communities. Indeed, the violent campaign of EOKA exposed all fundamental differences between two communities. In other words, it opened Pandora’s box of violence. After 1964, the conflict was characterized by endogenous polarization between Greek and Turkish communities. In other words, the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus had become essentially divided into two ideologically hostile camps. Therefore, all inter-communal connection was cut down as rivalry became acute.

The analysis of ethnic, religious and sectarian polarization is beneficial in future researches of civil war. The increasing number of ethnic and religious civil wars in the post-cold war era shows that internal dynamics of the disputed territories are determinants of the political developments. The increasing number of civil wars in the Balkan, Africa and Middle East prove that such ethnic and religious polarizations surfaced in the form of civil war.

Cyprus remained a scene of continuous diplomatic games and constant warfare until 1974. Thus, understanding the root of inter-communal conflict in Cyprus may contribute to the general understanding of the Cyprus dispute. The roots of ethnic,

religious and ideological divisions were much deeper. Such divisions were pronounced in Cyprus, the historic borderland between the east and west.

To understand the Cyprus question requires an understanding of the history of protracted Greek-Turkish dispute, Cold War politics, geo-politics, energy issue and various other issues. Recently, the material and international issues such as oil excavations and exclusive economic zones in the East Mediterranean occupy the primary position in the agenda of the Cyprus dispute. There is a real danger of escalation and a descent into a more general conflict. Especially disputes over the exclusive economic zones certainly increase tension in the region and do not bode well for the permanence of the peace process.

Today, the Cyprus dispute is still going on along with many others post Second World War conflicts. As in the past, the significance of domestic actors occupies a primary position in explaining the Cyprus conflict. It shows that Cyprus is more inclined toward alienation and confrontation than reconciliation. Despite the ongoing negotiations, tension continues between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. Cyprus remains the most prominent case of protracted dispute. The principal policy of Turkish Cypriot nationalist side, the movement that continues the tradition of TMT, is the consolidation of Turkish Cypriot state in Cyprus. The aim of Greek Cypriots is to “liberate” the occupied territories. This means that Greek and Turkish Cypriots stand Clausewitz on his head, making diplomacy the continuation of war by other means.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A:

TEZ FOTOKOPİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Çalışkan

Adı : Murat

Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : The Development of Inter-communal Fighting in Cyprus:

1948-1974

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılsın ve kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla tezimin bir kısmı veya tamamının fotokopisi alınsın.
2. Tezimin tamamı yalnızca Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi kullanıcılarının erişimine açılsın. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)
3. Tezim bir (1) yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olsun. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)

Yazarın imzası

Tarih