THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE AS A TRANSPORTER/ MARKER OF IDENTITY:
THE CASE OF POLISH EU ACCESSION

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ABSTRACT

THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE AS A TRANSPORTER/ MARKER OF IDENTITY:
THE CASE OF POLISH EU ACCESSION

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This thesis analyses the relationship between identity and language by evaluating Poland's accession to the European Union. It suggests that at the national level, language is a constructer and transporter of identity, which is created and recreated as part of a political programme. Thus, it questions the role of language as an identity transporter/ marker at the EU level. Within this framework, arguing that the European identity is created by the European elites, establishment of the European identity in Poland will be discussed and the role of language in the European identity formation process in Poland will be examined. The thesis will also evaluate the results of the language policies and multilingualism that aim to establish the European identity in Poland, and will draw attention to the results such as the dominance of Anglo-Saxon culture and English. Finally, by making use of Poland's EU accession, the thesis will point out the limits of language as an identity transporter/ marker at the EU level.

Keywords: European Identity, Language, Poland, Dominance of Anglo-Saxon Culture and English.

ÖZ

KİMLİĞİN BELİRLEYİCİSİ VE TAŞIYICISI OLARAK DİLİN SINIRLARI: POLONYA'NIN AB ÜYELİĞİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu çalışma, Polonya'nın Avrupa Birliği üyeliğini değerlendirerek, kimlik ve dil arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Dilin, ulusal düzeyde, siyasi bir programın parçası olarak oluşturulan ve yeniden oluşturulan kimliğin inşacısı ve taşıyıcısı olduğu öne sürülmektedir. Bu çerçevede, Avrupa kimliğinin, Avrupalı elitler tarafından yaratıldığı ileri sürülerek, Polonya'da Avrupa kimliğinin oluşumu tartışılacak ve Polonya'da Avrupa kimliği oluşumu sürecinde dilin rolü sorgulanacaktır. Çalışma ayrıca, çokdillilik ile Polonya'da Avrupa kimliğinin tesis edilmesini amaçlayan dil politikalarının sonuçlarını değerlendirecek ve Anglo-Sakson kültürü ile İngilizcenin hâkimiyeti gibi sonuçlarına dikkat çekecektir. Son olarak bu çalışma, Polonya'nın AB üyeliği örneği üzerinden, kimliğin taşıyıcısı ve belirleyicisi olarak, AB düzeyinde dilin sınırlarına işaret edecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Kimliği, Dil, Polonya, Anglo-Sakson kültürü ve İngilizce

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is generally acknowledged that one of the first things learnt by human beings when they are born is the language; even before understanding its functions, they experience its effects on daily lives and on power relations, and the consequences of their choices to use or not to use it.

The primary function of language is that it is a means of communication. However, as well as being located at the core of the communication system, it is undeniable that language is more than that. Apart from its functions such as a vehicle of thought and expression or a means of idea transportation; language is the basis of defining oneself as well as drawing the boundaries. It may be surprising to find out that the Québécois claim not to be able to understand English when spoken in a Canadian accent, while easily responding to Anglophones who talk with a British or US intonation; or it may sound unusual that Flemings claim not to understand French spoken with a Belgian accent, while understanding French French (Hobsbawn, 1992, p.6).

What is clear from this example is that language is not merely a tool of communication but also a marker of identity, which also allows it to function as a transporter of identity. Thus, what constitutes the core of this research is the questioning of the role of language as a marker/ transporter of identity and the limits of language while defining identity in the case of the EU.

In this context, my aim is to explore the role of language as a constructer and transporter of identity, which is created and recreated –or imagined in Anderson's conceptualization– as part of a political programme like all other social phenomena (Anderson, 1991; Shore, 1993; Schöpflin, 2000; Archibugi, 2005; Petit, 2005; Mutanen, 2010). Within this perspective, I will elaborate the "European identity" that

is being created and recreated by the European elites (especially by the European Commission), and I will discuss the establishment of the European identity in Poland, which is a part of the most controversial and problematic enlargement wave of the European Union (EU). Thus, I will explore how language took part during the value (and identity) transportation from the EU to Poland with the aim of creating and diffusing the European identity. In this sense, since the EU is a supranational entity that encompasses and encourages multiculturalism and multilingualism, I will point out the limits of language to create the European identity in the EU, and to transmit the European identity to Poland.

Within this framework, I will question whether language (and multilingualism that is being encouraged by the EU) functioned as an identity transporter and triggered the formation of the European identity in Poland.

In this vein, in the first chapter, I will examine the formation of identities, which can be national, collective, or supranational, within the framework of Anderson's conceptualization of "imagined communities". I will briefly mention about the different approaches towards the creation of identity which discuss if identities are essential to human beings or constructed and reconstructed for certain purposes. While the first approach points out that identities are essential to human beings and self-structured independently from the external factors; I will support the second argument, where most researchers argue that identities are externally constructed and identity formation is a process that needs to be done continuously to maintain and renew the identity, in a mental, ideological or material way (for examples, see Anderson, 1991; Shore, 1993; Schöpflin, 2000; Archibugi, 2005; Petit, 2005; Mutanen, 2010). Furthermore, I will question if there is a distinct European identity created consciously by the European elites, within the framework of the policies of the European Commission. While doing so, I will mention the emergence and historical development of the European identity, which was shaped by the European elites, starting briefly from the 15th century and emphasising the interwar years with a special reference.

As globalisation instigates the formation of supranational identities (for a detailed discussion see Lieber, 2002; Dziemidok, 2003; Kinnvall, 2004; Koç, 2006; Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007; Antonsich, 2009; Coposescu, 2009), I will evaluate the change caused by the globalisation process, for a better understanding of the contemporary European identity, which resulted with the emergence of a new supranational set of identities that includes multiculturalism and multilingualism conceived as a threat to national, and even to the European identity. It can be argued that in the literature, there are two opinions regarding the social and economic consequences of globalisation and its relationship with the identity. First approach claims that globalization is not a threat to the national or cultural identities, as a matter of fact in some cases globalization can even fortify national belonging (Dziemidok, 2003; Kinnvall, 2004; Antonsich, 2009). On the other hand, the second view states that globalisation challenges identities by altering and breaking them down (Lieber, 2002; Koç, 2006; Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007; Coposescu, 2009). While at the national level globalisation can be threatening; at the supranational level, since a new set of identities occurred such as multilingualism and multiculturalism, it is hard to suggest globalisation challenges the supranational identities in the same way. Thus, on the one hand, I will examine the strategies initiated by the European countries as a reaction to the globalisation, which regard it as a threat to their national identity, to protect and preserve it. On the other hand, as well as questioning the effects of globalisation on the European identity and EU member states, I will argue that in practice, globalisation does not threaten European identity of the member states equally.

The increasing importance of identity issues after 1990s coincide with the further extension of globalisation. Thus, first, it was multilingualism that was unwelcomed by the Europeans who worried about the future of their national languages. However, as globalisation penetrated, the main concern of the European countries became its uniforming effect, which turned out to be a real threat with the spread of English and the Anglo-Saxon culture throughout Europe. While the linguistic diversity increased and was regarded as a threat to the European identity, it was mainly the dominance of a single language –English in the case of the European Union- that was considered a major danger.

Within this perspective, I will question the positioning of Poland, as well as analysing the policies initiated by the Polish government, so as to handle the challenge caused by the new supranational set of identities and multilingualism, and to prevent the dominance of English from deforming its national identity. For example, the website "Do you know Polska?" launched by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland in June 2011, which aimed at introducing and promoting Polish culture and language to the foreigners, especially to EU-foreigners, is a significant move that shows the concerns of the Polish government.

In this regard, I am going to analyse the relation between identity and language in Poland, since Poland has specific features that culturally, linguistically and historically make it a distinct field of study. First of all the separation of Poland from the Soviet bloc and afterwards its accession to the EU caused a recontextualization of its relationship with Europe in terms of a problematic Western orientation. Additionally, in comparison to the other accession countries, taking into account its territory and number of citizens, Poland is a relatively more significant accession country. A third aspect, the perception of Western Europe towards Poland as "European but not quite European" increases the significance of this country.

On the other hand, in order to provide a better understanding of Polish identity, first, I will mention the members of the problematic Eastern enlargement, in order to question the Europeanization process of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), as well as the consequences of the Eastern enlargement both for the EU and CEECs, with a special reference to Poland. In this respect, I will elaborate the positioning of the CEECs as "being less European" from the point of view of the Western Europe, and analyse their transformation due to the Europeanization process. While doing so, I will focus on the post-1990 policies of the EU, which concentrated on the identity and citizenship issues more than ever within a relatively bottom-up manner. I will argue that in this period the policy of the EU was to create and maintain the European identity in these countries via creating and transferring European symbols. Therefore, as far as the focus of this research is considered, in the literature there are mainly two views regarding the role of these symbols: one accepts them of secondary importance, while the other approach argues

that these symbols can be considered as identity transporters since they encapsulate European norms and values and aim to create a new 'Community history'. Within this perspective, since language is conceived as an identity marker and transporter in the national level (Bulmer and Burch, 1998; Archibugi, 2005; Christiansen, 2006; Adam, 2009; Auer, 2010), I will explore its role in the formation of European identity and point out its limits in the transmission of European identity to the member states.

Thus, regarding the debates on European identity and in the establishment of European identity in Poland, I will analyse the consequences of the emergence of multilingualism, and how it restricted the role of language as a transporter of identity in the case of the EU. I will argue that the policies of the EU regarding multilingualism resulted with the distortion of the daily and institutional use of Polish. In this regard, I will mainly assert that the distortion and deformation of Polish arose from the influence of Anglo-Saxon culture and the world-wide use of English that came as an unwelcomed but inevitable side-effect of multilingualism.

Within this framework, I will mainly assert that the EU failed to implement the language policies in an efficient way to impose the European identity in Poland; and the emergence of multilingualism weakened the role of language as an identity marker/ transporter in the countries that are members of a supranational entity.

As a follow-up of the arguments of the first chapter, in the second chapter, I will focus more on language as the "vocaliser of identity". I will briefly explain the functions of language as a vehicle of thought and expression, and their transportation; as a tool of defining oneself and otherising the rest; and as a means of value and identity transporter. In this chapter, I will focus on another aspect of language, which regards language as a means of power display. The demonstration of power via language is not a new phenomenon. For example, to preserve their empire, the Romans would take some of the most promising sons of aristocratic families as hostage and provide them with education in Latin, without even asking them to pay tuition fees (Archibugi, 2005, p.539). For example a remarking regulation for ethnic Poles that entered into force in March 29, 2008, introduced

"Karta Polaka" meaning Pole's Card, which gave certain advantages to the ethnic Poles originating from states of the former Soviet Union; Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, the (entire) Russian Federation and Ukraine, on the condition that they prove to have sufficient Polish language skills (Poland Country Profile, 2008).

Also during the nation-building process in Europe language was positioned as the core of the new nation-states. Thus, I will argue that the EU also attempted to use language in the same way. The Erasmus programme for Higher Education in 1987 and Lingua programme in 1989 are clear examples of this kind in the area of foreign language education. However, there is a slight difference in the case of the EU, because whereas in the past the use of a single language was promoted, the EU has to encourage multilingualism rather than a single language; which means that the role of language in the national identity differentiates with its role in the European identity.

In this vein, as mentioned above, I will argue that the promotion of multilingualism ended up with an unexpected result: discrimination between the languages, and the diffusion of Anglo-Saxon values and English, which will be the focal point of the third chapter. I will assert that the use of English produce and reproduce the unequal relations between the languages both within the EU and Poland. While, the aim of the EU was exactly the opposite –which was promoting multilingualism- only a single language stood amongst the others at the end. Since it was (maybe still is) only the elites who were able to speak more than one languages fluently, the promotion of multilingualism EU-wide only served for the elites at the end, because it was troublesome for the ordinary citizens to adapt. This is the dilemma of the EU: while trying to avoid the dominance of English, it also provoked its use by creating discrimination among the European languages. This is why I will argue that while the EU introduces policies in order to preserve the linguistic diversity within the Union and declares that it will grant equal rights and opportunities to every language, in practice the situation is far more complex. As a matter of fact, among the EU bodies, only certain languages are being used. This discrimination –which more and more takes the shape of promoting only English-,

reveals itself in the official documents of the EU, in the policies of the European institutions, and even in daily lives of the European citizens.

As a matter of fact, while analysing the linguistic discrimination caused by the dominance of a single language, it is indispensable to refer to the position and rights of the linguistic minorities. However, due to the extensive and contradictive character of this issue, it will be briefly mentioned in my research and will be left for further study.

Therefore, I will try to analyse how the linguistic discrimination debates affect the European identity in practice. In this sense, I will make use of the survey conducted by INRA in 2001, and the research of Ginsburgh and Weber (2005) on the fear of Europeans to become linguistically disadvantaged. Within this framework, I will compare the disenfranchisement rates among the Europeans. The concept 'disenfranchisement rate' refers to the situation in which a certain percentage of Europeans would lose their ability to understand the EU documents and some discussions, if the number of EU working languages is reduced and some Europeans are denied to use their own language for official reasons (Ginsburg and Weber, 2005). Thus, I will try to see how grave the consequences of the adoption of English EU-wide would be.

Besides, in this chapter I will also talk about the solutions offered by the EU as a response, such as controlled multilingualism, the use of a single or a number of institutional languages, or creating an artificial lingua franca. Hence, I will examine the policies conducted by the European institutions on three bases. First, I will evaluate the policies of the European Commission on the legal basis. Second, I will investigate the role of language in the education system of Europe and how it was manipulated by the European policies. Third, I will search for the differences between the adults and youngsters in terms of their level of getting influenced by the policies of the EU and their and reaction to it.

Finally, in the fourth chapter, I will totally focus on Poland, and search for the practical reflections of all these debates on Polish identity and language. As mentioned before, Poland was chosen in this research to analyze the formation and

evolution of European identity, and the change seen in the use of national language as a result of the promotion of multilingualism EU-wide. The reasons of this choice, as explained above, are the distinct relationship of Poland with Europe after its separation from the Soviet bloc; its strong national identity shaped by history, tradition and culture; its relative importance in terms of territory and population; and the perception of Western Europe towards Poland as a country that is "European but not quite European".

Within this perspective, I will explain the linguistic identity of Poland and try to analyse the differences occurred after its membership to the EU. In this vein, I will look at the policies introduced by the EU to infuse multilingualism to Poland and the Polish responses to these policies. To do so, I will mainly stress on four aspects. First, I will examine the post-accession trends in foreign language education in Poland. At this point, I will again argue that whereas Poland tries to develop plurilingualism in schools and to preserve the value of Polish, English is becoming more and more dominant across its education systems. Additionally, linguistic diversity can be developed only starting from the secondary level of education due to regional and economic factors.

Second, I will focus on the legislative developments in Poland in terms of language. As well as trying to integrate with the EU and to be accepted by the Europeans as one of them, Poland is also keen to preserve its own culture, tradition and language. Thus, I will assert that apart from the education policy, the Polish government also seeks other means to ensure the viability of its language. Throughout the history, Poland has made legislations with the aim of ascertaining the position of its language. In this sense, I will mainly emphasise the "Act on the Polish Language" as the most striking example of that policy. Then, I will question whether the laws and regulations can be used to influence the use of language in one country, and what language represents for a country as well. I will also indicate the EU pressures on Poland by making use of the official EU documents published to evaluate the compliance of Poland with the EU norms and values, as well as their reflections in Poland. In this respect, I will examine the linguistic changes in Poland by making use of five main areas: the new trends of foreign language education in

Poland, the legal basis of language policies as well as the official documents of the EU, the positioning of the linguistic minorities, the role of Polish elites that shape the linguistic practices, and the impact of media on the language issues.

Third, I will briefly mention the concerns regarding the linguistic minorities betwixt and between the language policies of the EU and Poland. Fourth, I will indicate the paradoxical situation of Poland which is between promoting multilingualism and preserving Polish against the dominance of English. Therefore, I will point out the two-legged trend in the language policy of Poland since its accession to the EU by three different examples: the role of elites in the language policy of Poland, the influence of media, and the special programmes regarding culture and language.

Thus, I will search if the gaining importance of culture and language in the eyes of the Polish government, as well as the policies being conducted in several areas such as education or legislation to preserve the linguistic identity of Poland, could be as influential as the Anglo-Saxon culture and English.

Last but not least, while by some researchers English can be easily used internationally without raising any concerns since it is no longer identified with one nation due to its global use, (Karoly, 2008) I will argue that the dominance of a single language would suppress the international function of the other languages. Thus, so as to prevent the discrimination among European languages, the EU should encourage a complete multilingualism, rather than the use of a single or a number of languages, which means a new way of linguistic pluralism.

Thus, in this research, language -the "most emotional topic in the EU" (Phillipson, 2008, p.6)- will be evaluated within the perspective of the identity struggles between Poland and the EU; and the limits of language as a marker/ transporter of identity will be discussed in this framework.

CHAPTER 2

UNFOLDING 'IDENTITY': IS THERE A DISTINCT 'EUROPEAN IDENTITY?

2.1. Introduction

When they are born, human beings cannot choose their family or which city they live in. By the same token, they cannot determine their culture, traditions or their language as a mother tongue. However, what they choose is the sense of belonging to a village, a country or a particular social group, which emerge in the later periods of life. So to speak, both the innate features and the personal choices determine one's identity.

In this regard, Erikson (1956, p.57) emphasizes the ego development and draws attention to the psychoanalytic thinking on the definitions of identity. He argues that "the term identity … connotes both a persistent sameness within oneself (self-sameness) and a persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with others". Similarly, Adams, referring to Erikson's conceptualisation, states that this "self-sameness and continuity is expressed through a 'conscious sense of individual identity', and 'unconscious striving for a continuity of personal character', a continuing process of 'ego synthesis', and an 'inner solidarity' with a group's 'ideals and social identity'" (Adams, 1998, p.3).

On the other hand, Marcia draws attention to the different perspectives to define identity, and states that identity can be regarded as a "sense", an "attitude", a "resolution", etc. He also claims that identity is a "self-structure- an internal, self-constructed, dynamic organization of drives, abilities, beliefs, and individual history" (Marcia, 1980, p.160). Moreover, identity formation, involving several factors such as sexual orientation, ideological stance, and vocational direction, is a gradual process which takes place unconsciously by repetitive decisions. (Marcia, 1980,

p.160). He does not deny the factors that affect and navigate the decision making process of identity formation, such as parentally based values or external pressures; however, claims that identity making is originally self-constructed.

As Grimson argues, the choices of these identity categories and the identification with a specific group, leads to a differentiation from different groups that are perceived as 'others'. He also demonstrates that the rejection of that particular elements defining 'who we are' is also possible. As a result, he defines identity as a notion which "refers to our feelings of belonging to a collective" (Grimson, 2010, p.63).

Furthermore, Mutanen states that the notion of identity can be used as many different identity groups; national, regional, professional or personal identity, etc.; and he indicates that identity comprises from both natural and cultural properties (Mutanen, 2010)

On the other hand, many researchers claim that identities are human constructs. **(**Anderson, 1991; Shore, 1993; Schöpflin, 2000; Archibugi, 2005; Petit, 2005; Mutanen, 2010) Explaining identity is a process of construction and reconstruction, which is a continuous process that needs to be done over and over again, mentally, ideologically or materially, to maintain and renew the identity.

The concept of identity is crucial for the European integration; since especially after 1990s, the EU focused more on the identity issues with a view to establish its own identity to ensure the continuity of the European project. Thus, Poland, as a country deeply attached to its national values such as language, was subject to the policies that were aimed to impose the European identity.

2.2. Constructing Identities

As it was mentioned in the previous section, there are mainly two approaches towards identity creation. The first approach points out that identities are essential to human beings and are self-structured, whereas not independent from the external factors. On the other hand, the second and generally accepted view in the literature

about identity creation –which I also agree- claims that identities are formed or constructed in order to realize certain political targets. Thus, in the light of the brief information about this discussion on identity formation, I will focus on the constructed feature of identities in this section in order to provide a better framework for the creation of European identity elaborated in the following sections.

The notion of identity has been a remarkable field of study for many researchers. Almost a consensus was reached on the view that identities, whether national, collective or supranational, are all constructed as a part of a political programme, so as all social phenomena: class, gender, race, the lot (for examples, see Anderson, 1991; Shore, 1993; Schöpflin, 2000; Archibugi, 2005; Petit, 2005; Mutanen, 2010).

In the heart of the discussions on whether identities are constructed or not lies in the conceptualization of Anderson. In his book *"Imagined Communities"* Anderson argues that national identity, like all others, is "imagined", meaning that they are what people make of them. First of all, Anderson indicates the "anomaly" of nationalism and he points out that nationality, nationalism, and the like are all cultural products. He asserts that historically, these cultural products were created towards the end of the eighteenth century, and spread extensively as well as combining with a variety of political and ideological elements. Anderson adds that all communities including nations are imagined political communities, since their members do not have concrete information about the other members of their community apart from the visions and images of their communion in their minds (Anderson, 1991, p.6).

Many researchers state that the 'imagined' feature of the communities is created by political programmes. In this context, Hobsbawn (1992) analyses nationalism as a political programme which is a fairly recent one in historic terms. He asserts that groups, defined as nations, have the right to form territorial states of the kind that have become standard since the French Revolution. He argues that "without this programme, realized or not, 'nationalism' is a meaningless term" (Hobsbawn, 1992, p.4). Weber also argues that it is primarily the political

community that creates the strongest belief in common ethnicity, (...) and in this vein, nations are different from ethnic groups in that nations require a sense of political legitimacy (cited in White, 2010, p.45).

On the other hand, earlier researches express that, by referring the imagined feature of identity, there exists an opposition between reason and identity. In this view, identity politics seem inconsistent with reason and reducing it to the minimum seemed as a better option. On the contrary, identity politicians assert that all problems and issues stem from identity politics, so they should be handled by the criteria of identity (Schöpflin, 2000). However, as Schöpflin notes, which I also agree, that both identity and reason are authentic and one will not triumph over the other; indeed each needs the other.

Within this scope, Shore emphasizes the "imagined" and "invented" character of collective identities, and states that all communities –European as well as national- are culturally constructed. He points out the indefinite and dualistic character of identity formation and indicates that the identity formation process requires the management and manipulation of the strategies of inclusion and exclusion (Shore, 1993, p.781). Shore, referring to the anthropological approach used commonly in the literature, makes a three level classification in the identity construction process. First, he argues that identity involves boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Referring to the anthropologists and historians, he argues that the dualistic concept of identity formation is essential, since there is always a need for an "other" or "them" in order to differentiate "us" . " (Shore, 1993, p.782). "'They are recognizable as 'not we', most usually by colour or other physical stigmata, or by language" (Hobsbawn, 1992, p.6). Similarly, Schöpflin argues that our sense of security in the world and our identity (both individual and collective) depends on the coherence of symbolic and concrete factors. "In politics, where a group is threatened as to its cultural reproduction and lacks access to institutional power, it will seek to compensate for this by emphasising its symbolic articulation and presence" (Schöpflin, 2000)

Shore, continues to assert that identity construction is often presented as a segmentary process, one that connects different orders or ascending 'levels' of

belonging. And lastly, he indicates the 'ideological nature' of identity, particularly in the case of gender and political identities.

Shore also mentions about identity shifts which occur as a result of the alteration in the conditions of defining that identity. He points out that identity's meaning changes according to the space and time, as well as the context and the position of the defining actors. This shows the changeable and dynamic character of the social identities; and also indicates that identities are constructed and reconstructed in an ongoing process of definition including self-definition and counter-definition. (Shore, 1993). In parallel Archibugi argues that new political boundaries can be a result of a shift in language, while a language shift can cause a change in the boundaries (Archibugi, 2005, p. 543).

Similarly, in her research Petit agrees on the consensus on the constructed feature of identities and she states that today, the authors from diverse disciplines of human and social sciences admit that social identities are not innate but constructed (Petit, 2005, p. 628). Her view was shared by Archibugi, who emphasizes on the nation building process and argues that the building of nation-states is an artificial process that aim to create an imaginary identity (Archibugi, 2005, p. 543).

Schöpflin asserts that identities are formed by every type of collective human activity. In the political realm, four processes of identity formation are most significant; they function together in a web of mutual dependence. He claims that the first type of identity formation is made by the state. People who live within the ambit of a particular state evolve shared habits and practices in their response to it. The identities formed by multifarious state regulations bind people living together (Schöpflin, 2000) Schöpflin also indicates the role of the civil society as a second aspect, such as the NGOs as a web of associations, and emphasizes their importance to formulate the choices of both the individuals and groups.

As the third aspect, Schöpflin mentions the effect of ethnicity which provides the state to establish the bonds of solidarity and obtain the consent of its people; however, the fourth process of identity that Schöpflin makes use of is the most relevant one to my research. Schöpflin points out the international dimension of the

identity formation process which is relatively new but a growing phenomenon (Schöpflin, 2000). He indicates that the integration of Europe caused a "new supra-national, supra-state set of identities" to come into being as the European Union started to place emphasis on political, economic, social and cultural actions which would create attachments that act as an identity (Schöpflin, 2000). He finally argues that during the formation of any identity, including the European identity, all these factors and the four processes that he draws attention to affect one after another.

In parallel, Schöpflin (2000) points out that traditionally, at least in the first six or seven decades of the twentieth century, basing political demands on identity was associated with the political Right, while the political demands of the Left were based on individualism or class deriving from the universalist values of the Enlightenment. Thus, the Left argued that all citizens should enjoy the equal rights of citizenship independently from their origins. (Schöpflin, 2000). However he continues to assert that in about 1960s this situation changed by the non-European migration to Europe and the discrimination suffered by the migrants which made the Left began to insist on identity-based rights.

From the French Revolution until the Second World War, assimilation was regarded normal and even admirable as an implicit element of modernity. Thus, it was offered that the rural population should let go of their rural (and non-political) identities so as to acquire a new political identity that provides access to a higher culture, higher standard of living and better life chances. (Schöpflin, 2000).

In practice, the migrants were faced with an assimilation that was not necessarily ethnic, but they were required to accept civic and étaic identities in a very short period of time that caused traumas and dysfunctions, which were ascribed to the racism of the majority. (Schöpflin, 2000). Schöpflin argues that after 1960s, the nature of assimilation became more reactionary parallel to the arrival of sizeable numbers of non-whites in Western Europe, and as a result the project of multiculturalism was put forward. Mainly, assimilation provide the benefits of citizenship in exchange to the individuals who accept abandoning his or her rural identity. (Schöpflin, 2000). However, with the project of multiculturalism, rural

migrants from outside Europe are encouraged to sustain their ethnic identities, even while their acculturation into the civic and étatic modes of European modernity is not helped by the forms of knowledge encoded in the ethnic identities that they bring with them.

As it is argued by Karoly, immigration also contributed to the linguistic variety of Europe particularly in the 21st century. Since then, in many large cities of Europe, such as Berlin, Paris or London, a variety of different languages is spoken. However, this diversity makes a pressure on the EU to establish a strong intercultural dialogue in order to maintain its founding principles (Karoly, 2008).

Within this scope, in order to assess the evolution of identities up to the 21st century, it is necessary to analyse the consequences of globalization and its effects on identities and languages. Thus, in the next section, I will try to discuss different approaches towards identity in the context of globalization.

2.3. Identities in the Age of Globalization

In the previous section, the debate on the formation of identities was introduced based on the conceptualization of "imagined communities" by Benedict Anderson (1991) and it was concluded that all identities, whether national, collective or supranational, are all constructed as a part of a political programme. Moreover, since otherising being one of the most effective ways of defining an identity, the process of assimilation and the situation of migrants were briefly mentioned. In this frame, it was argued that, especially after the 1960s, by the increasing non-European migration to Europe, the identity debate took a different form and multiculturalism came into prominence.

With the epoch of globalization, the situation of multiculturalism became more complicated. According to Kinnvall (2004), globalization is not a new phenomenon, "but it has involved some real changes in terms of scale, speed, and cognition". In terms of scale, she states that, the number of economic, political, and social linkages between societies is greater than at any previous time in history. In terms of speed, globalization involves a compression of time and space never

previously experienced; and in terms of cognition, there is an increased perception of the globe as a smaller place. She continues that with this perception, the consequences of the events that take place anywhere in the world affect our everyday political, social, and economic lives, as well as our sense of being. However, some of these consequences are less desirable "as people experience the effects of capitalist development, media overflow, structural adjustment policies, privatization, urbanization, unemployment, forced migration, and other similar transformative forces".

It can be claimed that in the literature, there are two opinions regarding the social and economic consequences of globalization and its relationship with the identity. First approach claims that globalization is not a threat to the national or cultural identities, as a matter of fact in some cases globalization can even fortify national belonging (Dziemidok, 2003; Kinnvall, 2004; Antonsich, 2009). However, the defenders of the second view state that identities are profoundly challenged by globalization which alters, breaks down, and sometimes even threatens the identity of communities, individuals, their forms of organisation, and their identity patterns (Lieber, 2002; Koç, 2006; Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007; Coposescu, 2009).

In this framework, Dziemidok (2003) asserts that "globalization in the economy, technology (especially in informatics), and culture is inevitable". He also admits that globalization is not only a source of hopes but also of misgivings, fears and threats; which cause many theoreticians and politicians believe that globalization is a real threat to national identity and national culture. Within this scope, he analyses the possible consequences of the processes of globalization for national cultures and national identities. He claims that, even though there are certain people who change their national identity, these cases are incidental and exceptional rather than constituting the rule. He takes side "with those who argue for the importance and durability of national identity that, at least for the present, cannot be an object of free choice. (...) A change of national identity is, as a rule, a long difficult and even painful process". He also believes that modernization of the world, globalization of culture and liberalization of social life are not always and invariably a threat to national identity.

Dziemidok (2003) accepts that all these kinds of collective cultural identity, as well as of our personal identity, are not unchangeable, and there is a danger of national cultures becoming uniform under the influence of the cosmopolitan information technology, of mass media or under the dominance of one, for example American or Anglo-Saxon culture. However, he states that "this danger is real but not great". Even, he claims that modernization of the world, globalization of culture and liberalization of social life engenders intensification of efforts to preserve, revive or strengthen national, ethnic and other forms of collective identity, as it has happened in some Western countries, namely Canada, Belgium or Great Britain. In these countries, "liberalization in fact abetted an increase in the feelings of national belongingness. This is strongly underscored by the strenuous efforts of the Flemish, Scotch, and Québéc people to gain recognition of their separate status. The fact that a culture is becoming more tolerant and pluralistic in no way diminishes neither the universality nor the intensity of people's need to live and work in a country of their own" (Dziemidok, 2003).

On the other hand, Kinnvall (2004) focuses on the concept of "insecurity" that became a widespread phenomenon in the age of globalization. He argues that we live in a world where many people feel intensified levels of insecurity as the life they once led is being contested and changed at the same time by globalization process. "Globalization challenges simple definitions of who we are and where we come from. (...) As individuals feel vulnerable and experience existential anxiety, it is not uncommon for them to wish to reaffirm a threatened self-identity. Any collective identity that can provide such security is a potential pole of attraction" (Kinnvall, 2004). In this framework, he stresses on two important "identity-signifiers" that are more likely than other identity constructions to provide answers to those in need in this process; which are nationalism and religion. He explains that the strength of nationalism and religion as powerful "identity- signifiers" lies in their ability to convey unity, security, and inclusiveness in times of crisis. Hence, the insecurity stemming from globalization may change identities and create new local ones, however "nationalism and religion supply particularly powerful stories and beliefs (discourses) through their ability to convey a picture of security, of a 'home' safe

from intruders" (Kinnvall, 2004), which points out the remaining importance of national identities.

Parallel to Dziemidok, Antonsich (2009) also asserts that in the age of globalization and political fragmentation, a re-scaling takes place in the political and economic processes, as well as in the nation-states. In this vein, Antonsich (2009) asks if the re-scaling of political and economic processes associated with a similar re-scaling of national identities. His departure point is not to discuss how we should respond to the challenges posed by globalisation to the nation-state, but to analyze how/if these 'challenges' affect the ways people perceive their own nation. Thus, in order to answer this question, Antonsich makes an analysis through the Eurobarometer Standard surveys and concludes that attachment to the national identity did not lose its significance for the European people with the influence of globalisation.

With a perspective "from below" which looks at the nation as a discursive resource that people activate in the process of social communication, Antonsich (2009) claims that globalisation does not spell out the end of 'the nation' as this retains among people the relevance it once had. "National identity still remains the primary form of territorial identity. In other words, the idea that national identities are in crisis in the age of globalisation does not find quantitative evidence for the case of Western Europe, also when analyzed in terms of 'attachment'" (Antonsich, 2009).

Moreover, Antonsich (2009) agrees with Dziemidok (2003) by stating that "globalisation does not water down the sentiment of national belonging, but fortifies it. The more the society opens to the world, the more its rootedness grows, both locally and nationally" (Antonsich, 2009).

On the other hand, a second group of researchers argue that globalisation has profound effects on every kind of identity. Lieber (2002), in the first place, makes a distinction between the cultural reactions of developed (which he associates with the modern values) and developing countries. He correlates globalization with the spread of American culture and American values and differentiates the reactions of

‘modern’ and ‘not-modern’ countries. “Cultural reactions to globalization in Europe, Japan and elsewhere where modern values prevail, tend to be more symbolic and less extreme and often have more to do with status resentments than with disagreements about fundamental values. But in large areas of the developing world and especially in many Muslim countries, reactions to globalization and to the US as the embodiment of capitalism, modernity and mass culture tend to be much more intense” (Lieber, 2002).

He claims that in the developing countries, radically different notions of values and identity are played out in the cultural realm, with much of the impetus stemming from rage at corrupt regimes and failed societies, which is then redirected at external targets through forms of transference. “Intense cultural resentments thus come to be focused upon actors, especially the US, the West and the Israel, that bear little relationship to the problems at hand yet provide convenient scapegoats” (Lieber, 2002).

On the other hand, Koç (2006) in his research states that as we go through the global, postmodern and information era, the concept of identity turns out to be more problematic and complex than ever before. “Although globalization is often conceptualized as an international economic integration and business transactions among the nations since most of the power and momentum take place in these areas, it is a highly complex process with important consequences for social and cultural dissemination and transformation” (Koç, 2006). As globalization brings a weakening of affiliation to localities, identity can no longer be comprehended as stable or fixed formation. “Through actions ‘at a distance’ with the facilitation of information and computer technologies, individuals may go beyond their physical community and interface, and form multiple identities by means of interactions with diverse cultural beliefs and behaviours on a global scale” (Koç, 2006).

Hermans and Dimaggio (2007) made a similar analysis and stated that “in a globalizing world, people have to face the challenge of adapting not only to their local culture but also to the global society”. He argues that as a consequence of globalization, most people in the world now develop a bicultural identity. It may be

constituted partly from their local culture, and may be obtained partly from the global situation. Or they may develop a hybrid identity by combining elements of global and local situations.

Furthermore, Coposescu (2009) argues that in the epoch of globalization and changing times, individuals, groups (small as well as large) communities are fearfully and hopefully searching for their identity. He claims that globalization does not only mean a process of increase of interdependences between nations and the formation of a single, structurally homogenous, world system; but also a process of intensification and deepening of differences and a process of construction/re-construction, hence negotiation, of identities.

"Through these strategic networks, globalization alters, breaks down, and threatens the identity of communities, individuals, their forms of organisation, and their identity patterns. In such a context, individuals search for strategies for conserving and defending their actual identities by reviving past patterns of identity (such as family lineage, professional/occupational associations, fundamentalist religious movements, ethnic movements) on the one hand. On the other hand, individuals search for strategies of reconstruction or construction of new identities, in an emergent virtual world, which is evolving, in an accelerated rhythm, towards new forms of structuring identities, perceived as uncertain and confusing" (Coposescu, 2009).

In this section, I have examined the relationship between globalization process and identities whether national, cultural or collective. I have argued that globalization resulted with the emergence of a new set of supranational identities, with the effect of multiculturalism and multilingualism, European identity being one of the prominent examples. Regarding the interaction between identities and globalisation, there are mainly two opinions: the first one argues that globalization is not a threat to the national or cultural identities, as a matter of fact in some cases globalization can even fortify national belonging; whereas the second approach asserts that globalisation alters, breaks down, and sometimes even threatens the identities. Within this framework, Dziemidok (2003) and Antonsich (2009) argue

that neither the diffusion of globalisation nor its influence on identities is undeniable. However, a substantial change in the national identity is a rather exceptional case, since the uniforming effect of globalisation may be a danger but not a great threat. Moreover, Kinvall (2003) points out the aspect of "insecurity" and argues that individuals may feel the vulnerable as globalisation diffuses and may search for a collective identity that can provide security for them. However he denotes nationalism and religion as two important identity signifiers that would maintain the ability to unite people and provide security against globalisation.

On the other hand, Lieber (2002) suggests that globalisation has profound effects on every kind of identity; while Koç (2006) argues that as a result of globalisation, the concept of identity turns out to be more problematic and complex than ever before. In parallel Hermans and Dimaggio (2007) indicate that as a consequence of globalization, most people in the world now develop a bicultural identity; so as Coposescu (2009), who argues that both individuals and communities are in search for their identities as a result of the change caused by globalisation.

All in all, in light of the previous debates on identity and globalisation, in the next section, I will focus on the identity of European countries and specifically on the 'European identity'.

2.4. Europeanization: Being More European?

2.4.1. The Emergence of Europeanization in the Central and Eastern European Countries

In the previous sections, the formation of identities and especially the underlying reasons of the identity shifts, as globalization being one of the most prominent reasons, were explained. As mentioned above, identities change parallel to the alteration in the conditions and factors that define an identity. So as the European integration, that has acted as a powerful actor affecting identities of peoples and nations. The European enlargement has gone hand in hand with Europeanization; creating and maintaining the European identity. Thus, in this section the emergence

of the European identity will be elaborated while making use of the conceptualization of Europeanization.

Studies on Europeanization generally referred as "being more European", and assessed the impact of the EU on domestic politics of one country, which is either a member of or a candidate for the EU. However, a definition made only by the impact of the EU would be a narrow one regarding the wide range of EU mechanisms that complement the Europeanization policies of the EU. Moreover, EU's instruments of Europeanization vary across the countries in target, mostly characterized by the enlargement conditionality. The EU also has additional mechanisms to complement and reinforce the principle of conditionality such as "gate-keeping to accession stages, benchmarking, monitoring, the provision of legislative and institutional templates as well as aid and technical assistance" (Elbasani, 2009, p.6). Furthermore, in the ex-socialist states, a whole reshuffling of state institutions might also be a part of this transformation and Europeanization. Thus, while analysing Europeanization of countries, it is indispensible to take into consideration both the EU tools and policies, and the particular transition contexts of the target countries (Elbasani, 2009, p.6).

The Europeanization concept is not a new trend for the European project; rather it has existed since the establishment of the EU, but gained momentum and became a separate research area after 1990s, parallel to the concerns of the member states regarding the European and national identities. "While adjustment of outsiders, candidates and new members thus certainly had been analysed before, the term Europeanisation was hardly used as a label to designate it as a common research area, or to provide a focal point for a coherent framework of analysis" (Sedelmeier, 2006, p.4).

Actually, the emergence and development of the term "Europeanization" was directly linked to the trend of the post-war transformation period of Europe which aimed at ensuring security and economic prosperity between the European states. Even though between the years 1960-1980, the identity debates and citizenship issues were not at stake, the European institutions implemented Europeanization

policies within an elitist nature, in a top-down manner. Actually, from the start, the European integration was initiated by political elites of the six founding member states, which was an effort to promote the diffusion of European ideas. The founders of the EU had always have the aim to create the "ever closer union" that was mentioned in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome (Öner, 2004, p.28). Thus, Europeanization can be defined as the analysis of the domestic effects of that diffusion process both in member and candidate countries of the EU (Börzel and Risse, 2009, p.5). At this point I will mention some of the different approaches regarding the Europeanization of countries.

Ladrech, as one of the researchers on the Europeanization area, emphasized more the bottom-up structure of Europeanization and defined it as an incremental process that orients the domestic politics of one country in a way to make sure that the political and economic dynamics of the EU become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making of that country (Ladrech, 1994, p.69).

Ladrech suggested that the country's domestic institutions also have an impact on the external pressures imposed on the internal policies. In this regard, the domestic organizations accept the changes in the framework of their domestic values, norms and principles in which they are embedded; which indicates that the Europeanization is a "bottom-up" process (Ladrech, 1994, p. 71-72, 86). In the case of European enlargement especially after 1990s, Europeanization functioned as a means of value transfer from the EU to the member and candidate countries.

Besides, Bulmer and Burch's (1998) use of the concept of Europeanization as "the extent to which EC/EU requirements and policies have affected the determination of member states' policy agendas and goals' and 'the extent to which EU practices, operating procedures and administrative values have impinged on, and become embedded in, the administrative practices of member states" (Bulmer and Burch, 1998, p.602). Parallel to Ladrech, they also indicate that European integration has been perceived and constructed by national elites (Bulmer and Burch, 1998, p.603).

A different definition of Europeanization has been made by Cowles et al (2001) as "the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules" (Cowles et al, 2001, p. 3). They accepted the Europeanization as a two way process and focused mainly on a 'top-down' approach from the EU level to the domestic structures, while admitting that the shaping role of national features. Additionally, they suggested that the closest the existing structures of the EU and the country, the less adaptational pressure becomes necessary (Cowles et al, 2001, p. 2).

As it is seen from the above-mentioned discussions, Europeanization, as a means to reinforce the European identity, is both a top-down and a bottom-up process. It means both the "downloading of EU policy into the national polity" and the "uploading of national preferences to EU level" (Grabbe, 2009, p.4). While Europeanization has been valid for all members very since the beginning, until the identity discussions of 1990s, it was mainly a top-down process conducted by the European institutions. During this period, the European Commission was the core of the Europeanization policies. Sedelmeier (2006, p.4) argues that Europeanization and the qualitative change in EU's impact on outsiders occurred in two enlargement waves. He suggests that the first one was the result of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement between the EU and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the accession of most of the EFTA members to the EU. With this Agreement, the non-member states unilaterally adopted the EU's rules and regulations; the "acquis communautaire (acquis)" (except for agriculture), and they were enabled to participate in the EU's internal market, which was regarded as a first step on the way to full membership by their governments (Sedelmeier, 2006, p.4).

As mentioned above, it was not until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 that the identity issues became prominent, and the importance of establishing a European identity with the inclusion and consent of Europeans was understood. Thus it was mainly after 1990s when it was understood that Europeanization was not only "becoming more European", but more than that. With the Maastricht Treaty, the

European Community was rearranged as the European Union; and the evolution towards a political union raised the question of European identity within a new aspect. The Maastricht Treaty increased the issues that concern the European Commission, that were ones under the authority of the nation-state, such as citizenship, taxation, law, policing, border control, education, and foreign policy. Additionally, the issues of legitimacy, sovereignty and identity came into prominence (Öner, 2004, p.28). This new perception about identity and the new debates about the Maastricht Treaty led the EU change its policy towards the new candidate and member states.

As a matter of fact, the Maastricht Treaty was also seen as a threat to national identities. For example in France, the supporters of the "No" campaign namely the Front National, the Parti Communist, and the anti-Maastricht elements of the Socialist and Gaulist parties regard the Maastricht Treaty as "the destruction of France as a nation-state". Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty was rejected in a referendum in Denmark, with the aim of protecting the national identity. The ratification crisis of Maastricht was an indicator of the need of a "stronger sense of community" (Öner, 2004, p.28).

Thus, the research on Europeanization as a separate field of study accelerated after the 1990s, because the construction of the European identity became highly contested after the Maastricht Treaty. This period was regarded as the second wave of Europeanization by Sedelmeier (2006, p.5) who indicates that it was not until the 1990s and especially the accession of the Central and Eastern European Countries to the EU that the Europeanization research became popular and complicated. These countries, which have substantial communist background, constituted the biggest integration challenge of the EU. Thus, it was essentially after that enlargement that the EU started to implement Europeanization policies, mostly under the name of diffusing international values as human rights, democracy and the rule of law. European identity or a "European consciousness" was deemed necessary for the successful transformation to a supranational entity (Öner, 2004, p.29).

On the other hand, whereas after 1990s and the Maastricht process, the Europeanization policies of the EU gained a more "bottom-up" aspect within the framework of diffusing the ideas, norms, and values of Europe; in the Eastern enlargement the accession conditions were the most detailed and comprehensive ones ever formulated. Thus, the diffusion of European ideas to the CEE countries became mainly a "downloading" of policy as a result of the asymmetrical power relationship they had with the EU as applicants (Grabbe, 2009, p.4). During the accession period, the first conditions set were very general and open to interpretation, but made gradually more specific and explicit, while it was the European Commission who formulated and defined the conditions rather than the applicant/ member states (Grabbe, 2009, p.14).

Before the Eastern enlargement, the Commission only had a "soft power", which mainly devised and managed the pre-accession policies in line with the formal negotiations between the member states and the candidate countries. However, during the Eastern enlargement the Commission "succeeded in demonstrating its added value, and the member-states did not adopt positions to which the Commission was opposed" (Grabbe, 2009, p.27). Although the final decision on applying conditionality was left to the Council, the agenda and management was mainly directed by the Commission. For example, the Commission cut the Phare[1] assistance of Poland in 1998 that amount to 34 million euro by rejecting its proposed projects, stating that they did not meet the priorities set out in the Accession Partnership for Poland (Grabbe, 2009, p.47).

Thus, the accession of the CEECs to the EU was the most explicit and comprehensive way to understand the influence of the EU on the candidate and member states, compared to the other enlargement waves (See Börzel and Risse, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Sedelmeier, 2006; Schimmelfennig, 2007, 2010). It is also suggested that the post-accession period has been a key test for the effectiveness of the mechanisms used by the EU to 'Europeanise' these countries (Sedelmeier, 2006, p.5).

[1] The "Phare" was created by the EU in 1989 as an aid programme, which aimed at supporting post-comunist transformation in CEECs within an economic view.

These countries declared their intention to join the EU after the regime changes of 1989. While geographically these countries are located in the European continent, they were historically regarded as "no so Europeans" or "latecomers" to Europe by the Western European countries. As a result of the "semi-orientalist" approach of the Western Europeans (Mälksoo, 2010), the accession of the CEECs to the EU had been a much wider process. The concept of Europeanization was more ambiguous in these countries, since it meant both joining to the EU, and a "return to Europe" (Grabbe, 2009, p.5).[2] Since these countries perceived themselves as the ones that stayed in the wrong side of the Iron Curtain, the accession to the EU was an opportunity for them to prove their "true Europeanness" to their Western counterparts. This background indicated the bottom-up structure of the Europeanization process of these states after the 1990s. Within this framework, there were to adopt the acquis communautaire, as well as facing with the political and economic conditionality stricter that the older members both during the accession period and after the accession.

In this regard, Europeanization, when defined as "becoming more European" by adjusting the domestic policies and regulations to the ones of the EU, does not only include the implementation of the acquis communautaire (acquis) and does not rely on only treaty-based sanctions, but also requires an explicit political and economic conditionality, "which covered many rules for which EU institutions have no legal competences vis-a-vis full member states (such as democracy and minority rights)" (Sedelmeier, 2006, p.4). This was the turning point for the study of the EU's conditionality, which framed the "Europeanization" analysis of candidate countries and broadened the focus of Europeanisation by establishing the Europeanisation of applicant states as a separate sub-field of this broader research agenda.

As it was mentioned before, the notable characteristics of Europeanization and the adjustment pressures were more prominent in the accession of the CEECs, rather than the 1995 enlargement. While many EFTA states considered the adoption

[2] Grabbe prefers to call the Europeanization process of the CEEC as "EU-ization" and defines it as "the meeting of accession requirements and the adoption of EU norms, policies and institutional models". However, also argues that this process in widely referred rather as "Europeanization", because "it is strongly connected to the wider processes of modernization and post-communist transition" (2009, p.5).

of the acquis of intrinsic value to change national regulatory practices, "the main rationale for adopting the acquis was the benefits of full EU membership rather than the intrinsic benefits of EU models in the various policy areas". In these states, the adaptational pressures were far higher, created by the legacy of post-communism, only in which the EU spell out, and regularly monitor, an explicit pre-accession conditionality (Sedelmeier, 2006, p.5).

The main requirement for the candidate countries to qualify for membership by adopting the rules and practices of the EU is that they have to adopt the acquis, which is the core of Europeanization (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p.5). As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argues (2004, p.667), Europeanization in the CEECs can be separated into two categories: Europeanization can be EU-driven or domestically driven.

The EU institutions have been the core of the EU-driven Europeanization policies. These institutions, most effectively the European Commission, while implementing the conditionality to the CEECs in their accession process, rather than completely relying on the treaty-based sanctions, felt the necessity to use softer instruments such as conditional incentives, normative pressure, and persuasion. Sedelmeier (2006, p.5) also suggests that monitoring of compliance has been much more intrusive and direct in these states.

The main aim of these Europeanization policies has been the imposition of the European values to the new member states such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Börzel and Risse (2004, p.1) suggest that with the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has been one of the core strategies of the international organizations, among which the EU undertook an important role. "The EU is making an explicit effort to project its own identity of a democratic polity into its relations with third countries. The goal of democracy promotion is enshrined in the EU treaties since the early 1990s and has been formulated in the 1999 Regulations on Democracy and Human Rights in a comprehensive fashion" (Börzel and Risse, 2004, p.19). As it is stated by Schimmelfennig (2007, p.9), "for the EU as a regionally integrated system of liberal democracies, regionalism, regulated transnational

markets, and democratic constitutionalism define the essence of being European". On the other hand, these values such as democratization, respect for human rights and minorities are so Westernized and even globalized that it is hard to claim that they are only European values. But, as a matter of fact, the CEECs have already been seeking for these 'European values' parallel to their Westernisation process after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, it can be seen that the Europeanization of the CEECs was a dual process, since the values they were requested to adjust were the ones they have been already trying to adopt.

On the other hand, since the policy of the EU to diffuse its values and norms are not always compatible with the domestic structures of the target countries, and do not respect the heterogeneity of them, this process of value diffusion is not free of resistance or conflict (Börzel and Risse, 2009, p.5). This kind of value transfer from the EU to the third countries assumed that the European model of democracy, market economy, and regional integration could be equally admissible throughout the world, and neglected the sui generis features of the CEECs. Börzel and Risse (2004, p.22) entitled this kind of approach as "one size fits all", since the EU's model for the promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law was rather insensitive for cultural and socio-economic features of these countries. Especially for the CEE countries the EU used conditionality and relied on external incentives or reinforcement through rewards. However, it was seen that conditionality was less effective in the countries which were not capable or not willing to adopt the European values because these values and ideas did not reflect the domestic structure and identities of these countries. As a result of the negligence of domestic structure of the recipient countries by the EU, the European ideas often encounter political contestation and social mobilization (Börzel and Risse, 2009, p.5). It can be suggested that this approach of the EU, especially regarding the latest members was one of the setbacks of the CEECs while adopting the European identity. Thus, Börzel and Risse argue that Europeanization does not create an explicit homogeneity and convergence in the candidate or member states, neither causes a disappearance of national institutional or cultural differences, in the case that it does not comply with their social, political, economic, cultural and historical conditions (Börzel and Risse, 2009, p.5).

In this section, I have explained the term Europeanization and suggested that the Europeanization discussions became popular after the 1990s, with Maastricht Treaty as a turning point for the identity debates. Moreover, I have stated that the Europeanization was more of a top-down process until the identity issues gained importance with the period after the Maastricht Treaty. After that, value transfer from the EU to the candidate and member states became more prominent, as well as the need to comply with the domestic values, policies and regulations of these countries. Börzel and Risse sum up the Europeanization policy of the EU as "by trying to bring third countries and other regions into compliance with its 'European' ideas, the EU projects its internal identity into its external relations and seeks to construct a distinct foreign policy identity" (Börzel and Risse, 2009, p.18). In this context, I have made mention of the CEECs, which experienced a dual process while adopting the European values such as democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights; since they were trying to overcome the ongoing division between the Eastern and Western Europe and to be accepted as "true Europeans" by adjusting themselves to the Western European values. The EU had a huge impact on these countries since between the years of 1989 and 2004, every government in each of the applicant states announced that EU membership was the first foreign policy priority. However, it is also a widely accepted argument that the conditionality principle of the EU during the Eastern enlargement was more detailed and comprehensive compared to the prior enlargements, as well as the policies of the European Commission which were more explicit and direct. Hence, directing the European values and norms without paying much attention to the domestic structures of these countries was not free from political contestation and resistance.

Thus, it can be suggested that, the spread of the European values was an important part of forming and establishing a European identity, and became much more important during the Eastern enlargement. As a matter of fact, there was both a resistance to these values since they were not entirely compatible with the domestic structures of the candidate countries; and an acceptance, because these countries have already been seeking for the "European values" parallel to their Westernisation process after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the framework of "return to Europe". Thus, in the following section, I will elaborate whether there is a European

identity, as well as analysing the components and formation of European identity both in the EU and in the member states.

2.4.2. Is There a European Identity?

In the previous sections, the discussion on the character of the identities – whether they are essential or constructed- was elaborated and it was suggested that identities are externally formed and constructed. In this vein, the identity shifts were also mentioned by emphasizing the globalisation process, as well as the Europeanization policies. While Europeanization is generally defined as "being more European", it was mentioned that such a definition itself would be a narrow one regarding particularly the new trend in the identity debates after the 1990s. It was suggested that Europeanization had different aspects; included "top-down" policies at the earlier periods of the European integration and gained a "bottom-up" aspect after the Maastricht Treaty. Likewise, the reaction of the candidate and member states towards the Europeanization policies varied as mentioned above. However, regardless of these differences, the European integration has been a powerful actor affecting identities of peoples and nations from the very beginning.

Since the people in Europe started to call themselves as 'Europeans' in 15th century, many discussions have been made on the issue of 'European identity'. An early example of the European identity discussions was point of view of the Euroenthusiasts[3], which suggested that the new identity formulation in Europe was about creating a pan-European identity, while some other people refer it as a transnational or a common identity (White, 2010, p.2). At first the original Euroenthusiasts like Jean Monnet aspired for the idea of uniting Europe in a sui generis form of a common European identity. Yet, it was seen that the efforts to create a common Europeanness using the policies of European Commission would not result with a super state or a United States of Europe that was projected earlier as

[3] According to the original Euroenthusiasts like Jean Monnet, the ECSC of 1952 was a part of a process which would end up with a European Federation transcending the nation-state. He argued that the European states should form a federation or a 'European entity' in order to avoid conflicts among themselves (Dinan, 1994, p.10-11).

a European dream (White, 2010, p.29). This was understood once again with the recent inclusion of Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007 to the European project.

Moreover, White also assumes that national identities in Europe may have changed in some ways since World War II. So as Delanty (2002) who denotes the importance of the two world wars in the unification period of Europe. He states that, the European identity was born in the interwar years out of the experience of cultural pessimism and decadence, and got stronger after the Second World War.

Following the examples of the two World Wars, the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 (which has been celebrated as Europe's official birthday since 1985) aimed at preserving sustainable peace among the European countries and smoothing the traditional enmity between France and Germany by turning "the Franco-German problem" into "a European problem" (Auer, 2010, p.137). Yet, the project did not include all other European countries with the exception of the Soviet ones. Consequently, the birthday of Europe, 'the Europe day' also regarded as the reminder of the elitist nature of the original European project. It was the Western Europe that gained an institutional structure by turning into the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958. Auer (2010) claims that the European project was being built in an elitist nature, without the inclusion of many people, since establishing and maintaining the peace in Europe depended on protecting peoples of Europe from themselves. "Indeed, in the early stages of European integration, the project was shaped by Monnet's vision of the EEC as a technocratic creation that would bring about a thoroughly 'modernized' Europe created by an enlightened bureaucracy" (Auer, 2010, p.138).

Auer (2010) also agrees with Delanty (2002) on the importance of the post-war transformation period of Europe that affected European identity the most. He calls this transformation period as a 'quiet revolution' that was implemented in a top-down manner and altered the traditional relationship between the nation-states. This transformation turned the nation-states into entities depended on a supranational legal order, which was directed by the European Court of Justice between the years

of 1960 and 1980. He claims that only after 1980s, the European elites began to recognize and reinforce the changes of the 'revolution' and started to implement necessary institutional reforms that came to a conclusion with the creation of the European Union. The Single European Act of 1986 and the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 were both necessary means to encourage more integration, which were combined with the profound social changes that have occurred since 1989 following the break- up of the Soviet Union, the re-unification of Germany and the ending of the Cold War that have provided a major catalyst for speeding up the pace of European political integration (Shore, 1993). The large-scale movement of migrants, workers and refugees throughout Europe has also contributed to the emergence of new identities and new borderlands, as the arrival of newcomers everywhere leads to new categories of 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Similar to Hobsbawn (1992), who argues that one consequence of this has been a resurgence of ethnic nationalism and a rise in xenophobia and racism throughout Europe. Against this background, the problem of 'identity' (ethnic, national, European) has become an issue of growing significance for social scientists, as well as for EC policy- makers.

Shore (1993) also agrees that the concept of 'European identity' is constructed in official European Community (EC) discourse by European Commission's attempts to forge a supranational 'European identity' through the deployment of symbolic measures in order to promote an 'ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe'. In this vein, Shore (1993) argues that "what is of anthropological significance in these measures is how the notion of 'European identity', having been created by Commission bureaucrats, became progressively transformed and reified, and then presented as a fixed, bounded and 'natural' category".

Within this context, Shore (1993) states that like all communities, European community, as well as European identity, is culturally constructed. "In the Copenhagen Summit of 1973, the heads of state and government realised the necessity to build a European identity. They realized that the success of political integration depended on the creation of a coherent community identity, which would serve as the basis for the decisions shaping their common future" (Karoly, 2008,

p.128). Petit (2005, p.628) agrees on the role of European institutions on the construction of a European identity.

The Addonino Committee on 'A People's Europe' being established by the Council in 1984 to look at a number of measures towards strengthening and promoting the EU's identity was a significant step since "identities are created both the institutional and symbolic levels and the two should be seen as functioning reciprocally. An institution creates its symbolic dimension and is reproduced in part by reference to those symbols. Thus the use of symbols –flags, monuments, ceremonies and so on- is not a superfluous extravagance, a throw-back to a pre-rational age, but a central component of identity creation and maintenance" (Schöpflin, 2000). "Following the recommendations of the ad hoc Committee and Jacques Delors's call for a "l'Europe sans frontiers *(Europe without borders)*", the Commission thus set out a programme of strategic measures designed to promote European social and cultural cohesion through an 'easing of rules and practices which cause irritation to Community citizens and undermine the credibility of the Community'" (Shore, 1993). This was a process of creating a European identity within a 'top-down' manner as mentioned previously, during which the Commission referred to the cultural heritage of the EU frequently, by stating that Europe exists for its people, as well as trying to convince them about the benefits of constructing Europe (Öner, 2004, p.30).

By this means, many researchers agree on the importance of the adoption of initiatives which would create a sense of common identity (Shore, 1993; Field, 1998; Petit, 2005; Karoly, 2008; Hersant, 2009; Auer, 2010). These initiatives included an EC passport, an EC driving licence, an EC emergency health card, EC border signs and an EC flag, and the financing of an EC TV channel contributed to the promotion of the 'European message'. Also a European anthem taken from the prelude of Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy' was regarded as the 'representative of the European idea' by the European Commission. Besides, whilst the 'Europe Day' of May 9, the anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, can be regarded as a means to overcome the widespread negative sentiment in Europe about the wars in Europe; the European anthem 'Ode to Joy' represented contrarily the positive view of the eighteenth-

century ideal of universal brotherhood and Enlightenment heritage (Auer, 2010). Auer (2010) states that "European citizenship combines the pragmatic spirit of the Schuman Declaration with the cosmopolitan ideal expressed in the European anthem". Still, he claims that by consolidating the pragmatism and idealism of Europe only supplemented the existing national citizenship, instead of replacing it with a European citizenship.

Afterwards, the 'European postage stamps' invites postal services to commemorate particularly important events in Community history. More important is the fact that it also becomes instrumental in the invention of the new category of 'Community history'.

Other initiatives included EC-sponsored campaigns over health and environmental issues, competitions - such as the 'European Community Games' and the 'European Yacht Race'-, a new ritual calendar so that in addition to the European Cities of Culture and 'European Year of Cinema and Television' or 'European Year Against Cancer', citizens of the Union can now celebrate 'Europe Weeks' and an official 'Europe Day' (May 9) to commemorate the anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, and EC shops (Shore, 1993).

As Shore (1993) designates, while some politicians regard these symbolic measures as of secondary importance or only as window-dressing, social scientists are more sensitive to the importance of symbols and the role they play in mobilizing sentiment and public opinion. "Political reality is symbolically constructed. It is through symbols that people come to know about the structures that unite and divide them. Symbols do not simply enable individuals to interpret political reality, they largely create that reality" (Shore, 1993).

As mentioned in the previous section, among the policies of the EU to establish a European identity, the value transportation gained much importance especially after the 1990s. In this period, the main aim of the EU was to spread and its values and ideas in different ways; among them the European symbols had a significant role. As a matter of fact, while the EU invented the symbols such as European anthem, flag, or "European day" for the members of the Union in order to

create and strengthen the feeling of being European; these symbols also served as means of value transformation for the candidate countries. In this vein, especially during the Eastern Enlargement, these symbols were used to create awareness of Europe for the CEE candidate countries.

Also the rapid transformation process which took place in the 1980s and 1990s gave birth to the questions of legitimacy which brought the peoples' approval for the European project and a common European identity into prominence. Thus, in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of Union citizenship, which provided certain rights to all EU citizens, a further step towards a common European identity was indicated (Karoly, 2008).

On the other hand, since the collapse of the Berlin Wall changed the initial purpose of the Western European countries about the unified Europe, it resulted with the extension of the borders of Europe to include the Central and Eastern Europe. Almost simultaneously with the top-down 'quiet revolution' of Europe in 1980s, a bottom-up revolution was taking place in Central and Eastern Europe as Auer (2010) states.

However, it took a while for the European elites to respond to this huge geopolitical change and to decide to involve the rest of the Europe. Although Western Europe was initially reluctant to respond to people's revolutions of 1989, years later EU defines them as the key for the European identity. "Insofar as the European Union wants to be seen as a 'people's Europe', it seems to make sense for it to claim ownership of the 'people's revolutions' of 1989" (Auer, 2010).

Consequently, this expansion required a more comprehensive European identity that would fit both Western and Eastern European countries. Auer (2010) argues that especially during this inclusion period of the CEECs, the EU made use of tools and methods that were being used in nation states to create and strengthen the sense of national identity. He claims that the commemoration of key moments in history as rallying points for national attachments is important while creating and strengthening national identity; which was similarly used by the EU so as to create and strengthen the European identity.

It was no coincidence to use the European anthem taken from the prelude of Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy' that was mentioned above or to choose the day of fall of the Berlin Wall as the 'Europe Day'. People were celebrating the freedom of movement across the city as well as the unification of Germany, which eventually leaded to the unification of the whole European continent. This piece of Beethoven is not only the official anthem which is identified with Europe; but it also makes people associate themselves emotively with the "European values" that are represented in it (Hersant, 2009). On the other hand, Auer (2010) emphasizes that the anthem did not have any lyrics. Politically, it was found risky to adopt a text for the anthem in German language, since it "would risk disturbing the ghost that still haunts the European Union—the ghost of Germany ascendant" (Auer, 2010). In this vein, Auer (2010) argues that the anthem was "a song without words; hope without a text".

Auer (2010) states that one of the first public celebrations of this kind took place in 1989 in East Germany, in which Beethoven's Ninth Symphony was performed by a multinational orchestra composed by German, Russian, English, American and French musicians. He adds that since that time, Beethoven's famous piece has been regarded as a significant symbol for the unity of Europe, which was also used in the celebrations of both the 2004 enlargement with the accession of ten new members comprising of eight former Eastern Bloc countries; and the 2007 admission of Bulgaria and Romania.

At the twentieth anniversary of the unification of Germany, the European Commission released a video that indicates the democratic change of the Central and Eastern European Countries since 1989 in which the key moments of this transition period was showed briefly by using the personal experience of someone born on 9 November 1989 (Auer, 2010). In the video, birth of a baby who was born in 1989 symbolised the birth of unification for Germany and whole Europe. The happiness and joy over the baby's birth consolidated the joy of the liberty from the separation. The growth of the baby represented the growth of Europe by involving the Central and Eastern European Countries. The first steps of the baby implied the first moves of the former Eastern Bloc towards the liberty and prosperity of Europe. Auer (2010) exemplifies the Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary in June 1991 and the

independence of Lithuania in November 1991. After the sixth birthday of the boy, the German family takes a vacation to France stressing on the 'open borders' of the reunited Europe. The celebration of the fifteenth birthday of the boy stood for the 2004 enlargement of the EU which included eight former Soviet Bloc countries. At the end, the boy came to the age of twenty, again celebrating his twentieth birthday (Auer, 2010).

Even though this video may seem as a harmless production that celebrates the key moments of the European integration and aims at fostering European identity, it launched a strong disturbance among the Central and Eastern European Countries, and particularly in Poland. The Western Eurocentrism that prevailed in the video (such as the choice of the German family to go to France as a holiday destination) points out to the widespread understanding of the European project as a Franco-German reconciliation that still, in a way, excludes former Eastern Bloc countries. Even though after the demise of the Soviet Union it was expected that the this Franco-German axis would shift to include whole continent, 'the Europe without borders', which was realized with the Schengen Treaty in 1995, implemented only in a limited scope the latecomers. The citizens from Poland and other Central and Eastern European Countries faced with discrimination on the freedom of movement. "They could not work in Germany before 2011, for example, owing to a transitional measure that the old member states were allowed to apply to people from the new members states. France lifted its restrictions in July 2008, four years after the enlargement, having recovered from the somewhat paranoid fear of the 'Polish plumber'[4], which contributed to the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty in the 2005 referendum in France" (Auer, 2010).

However, Polish responses to the video were quiet offensive. Simultaneously with the release day of the video, Poland was preparing for it first semi-elections of 4 June 1989, which was unluckily overshadowed by the celebrations of the demise of the Berlin Wall. Thus the video was called as an "idiotic error" by Roza Thun, the

[4] The 'Polish plumber' (originally; 'le plombier polonais') was a phrase first used by the French journalist Philippe Val symbolizing the fear of cheap Eastern European labour to threaten jobs for Western Europeans. Afterwards, in order to overcome the immigration fear of Western Europeans, the Polish Tourism Board initiated a campaign and published a poster of a 'Polish plumber' that invites French people to Poland; as well as a follow up poster of a 'Polish nurse', a female equivalent.

then head of the EC Representation in Poland; a "serious error" by Bogdan Zdrojewski, Minister of Culture; and a "stupid blunder" by Poland's Ambassador to the European Union, Jan Tombiński (Auer, 2010). As a result, European Commission needed to amend the EU representation of 1989, and released a second version of the video in which the Polish contribution was highlighted. Additionally, EC Representation in Poland cooperatively with the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) made a new video which centred a Polish young girl, emphasising on the important historical moments of post-communist Poland, and the accession to the EU (Auer, 2010). This controversial representation of the revolutions of 1989, and disregarding some key event in the history of Central and Eastern European Countries adversely affected their sense of belonging to the EU, as well as obstructing the policies of the European Commission to create a European identity.

Consequently the EU began to work to restore the sense of belonging of the Central and Eastern European Countries to the whole European continent. Thus, the European Commission's Directorate-General for Communication and the EC Representation in Berlin organized a festival called as the "Festival of Freedom" and they reanimated the fall of the Berlin Wall with domino pieces by stating on the first domino piece "it started in Poland" (Auer, 2010).

Nonetheless, different approaches of Eastern and Western European countries towards nationalism and the European project has been a source of the controversial issues of integration. The Western approach to the European unity after the Second World War derived from the rejection of traditional nationalisms; however, regarding the communist experience of the Central and Eastern European countries, nationalism became a liberating force for them(Auer, 2010). This divergence has made it difficult for the European Commission to substitute the traditional nationalisms by creating a European identity with its policies.

This divergence showed its negative effects during the creation of a European constitution. A remarkable example of these side effects is against the European anthem which was at first accepted as an important symbol of the European identity,

however at the end lost its popularity. Whereas in the foreseen European constitution the European anthem was envisaged officially, in the Lisbon Treaty that came afterwards as the Constitutional Treaty was not accepted, there was no reference to the European anthem. Thus, during the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the official status of the anthem reduced to a considerable extent.

At this point, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty of Europe plays a significant role by further weakening the European project, since the Treaty reflected the optimism of the Europeans and their belief to the European identity. Fischer argues that the Lisbon Treaty is far from fulfilling the gap caused by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty because of its legal and administrative complexity (Calliess, et al., 2011). The Constitutional Treaty was believed to intensify the sense of belonging to Europe by substituting the traditional nationalisms with the European instruments. It was also a response to the legitimacy debates on the European Union. Whereas the European Parliament (EP) is an indispensable institution for the basis of legitimacy; especially when it is compared to the national parliaments of the member states, EP's legitimacy is rather limited and also inadequate to overcome the democratic deficit that exists within the EU.

Moreover, during the debates on the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the recent economic crisis of the EU, the debates on the weakening of the devotion to the European identity accelerated. **(See …)** For example in a panel organized by the European Council on Foreign Relations and the Mercator Foundation on 6 April 2011, the speech of Jürgen Habermas was critical about the political elites who left their responsibility of embracing Europe to it citizens. He especially drew attention to Germany's position as one of the two founders of Europe, and he claimed that Germany is re-positioning itself in the world and in Europe with a renationalization process (Calliess, et al., 2011).

Furthermore, Joschka Fischer, the former Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor of Germany, points out the widespread pessimism in Europe and argues that Europeans "feel weak and rightly suspect that they could lose out" (Calliess, et al., 2011). This tendency constitutes an obstacle for the creation of European identity

by triggering Euroscepticism and xenophobia among the member states of the EU. Fischer states that "If de facto renationalization intensifies, the European project will be massively jeopardized" (Calliess, et al., 2011).

Despite the lack of confidence to the future of the European identity, the EU continues to implement several policies to strengthen the sense of belonging of its members and to impose a common European identity.

According to Field (1998), the motivations behind the attempts to create a common EU or European culture include the desire to create a new 'imagined community' along the lines postulated by Benedict Anderson (1991). The creation of such an 'imagined community' would give the EU's common institutions, and the political reality of a high degree of control by the EU's key member states of Germany and France, a legitimacy they continue to lack, which in turn results in inadequate popular support for further political integration and transfers of power to the prospective new super state which would be achieved at the end point of the integration process.

Dardanelli (1998) offers that "what would be needed then is a drive towards emphasising the large extent to which Europeans share the same cultural identity and subsequently to establish an instrumental link by virtue of which the 'cultural' Europe can legitimise the 'political' Europe." In this frame, he argues that the formal adoption of a common second language, a new lingua franca, able to act as a means of communication for all Europeans would be necessary since linguistic standardisation played an important role in the establishment of nation-states and in their economic development. Likewise, linguistic integration has a vital role to play in favouring greater mobility of the European citizens, which will be of crucial importance in an economically unified Europe. As opposed to the national cases, obviously, there is no central authority, particularly with regard to its role in the education system and the army, to bring this about.

All in all, since the 15th century, even though the main aim today is not creating a "European Federation" anticipated by the Euroenthusiasts, there is a process of creating a European identity based on common values such as culture,

history, tradition, or language. However, at the end, the European integration is an elitist project which aimed at turning the "Franco-German problem" into a "European problem" and reach sustainable peace in Europe. Within this perspective, in order to establish a European identity, European symbols and a common European history were created especially after the 1990s. Yet the elitist nature of these policies remained; celebrating the May 9, the anniversary of the Schuman Declaration as the "Europe Day" is a significant example of this kind. Furthermore, the video released for the twentieth anniversary of the unification of Germany displayed the elitist nature and the Franco-German focus of the European integration, as well as the implicit exclusion of the Eastern European countries. The failure of the EU to include all European countries into the European project showed its consequences in the creation of the European constitution and the Lisbon process. Combined with the economic crisis, the elitist aspect of the European project weakened the devotion and confidence to the EU. As a result, the EU needed to create an "imagined community" that would give the legitimacy that it lacks, by emphasizing the common values and norms of the EU such as culture, language, etc. In this regard, language was seen as a tool of value transportation to the member and candidate countries so as to create and fortify the European identity in them; and language policies of the EU gained much more importance.

Within this framework, I will elaborate language as one of the most important elements that form an identity, and argue that language is the key device of expressing the identities besides its other functions. In this respect, in the next chapter the different aspects of language will be examined and the relation between language and identity will be introduced.

CHAPTER 3

LANGUAGE: VOCALISING THE IDENTITY

3.1. Introduction

As discussed thoroughly in the previous sections, the identity formation is a complicated process whether it is self-structured or created consciously as part of a political program. Either way, some key factors are essential in this process to establish and maintain an identity; such as history, culture, tradition, or more importantly for the focus of this research, language. There is more than one reason why language has been elaborated as a more fundamental factor in the establishment of languages in this research. First of all, languages are the very first means of communication for the human beings, besides the body language. Thus the occurrence and functions of language has been questioned for centuries by several philosophers, since language has been regarded as a vehicle of thought and expression, as well as the means of transportation of these thoughts (Dardanelli, 1998; Finegan, 1994; Mamadouh, 2002; Karoly, 2008; Phillipson, 2008; Kida, 2010).

In addition to the role of language in the system of thoughts and communication, it also serves for shaping people's views of who they and the rest of the people are; which means defining and otherising them. This is why the identities are viewed as "fields of communication", shaped through the use of language (Thomas et al., 2004, p.158).

Alongside with its role in shaping individual's identity, shared language is also a powerful means of determining of the collective identity of a community. Thus in the case of the European Union, the lack of a common language raised many debates on the establishment and maintenance of the common European identity.

Finally, it should be stated that languages, among others, are significant tools of value transfer mentioned in the previous chapter, which is an inseparable part of the formation of identities, in this case, specifically the European identity.

Within this framework, in this chapter, I will analyze the relationship between language and identity at the beginning, while examining the use of language in the form of language policy to establish and sometimes impose certain identities in the second section. Then, I will briefly question the position of linguistic minorities in the process of creating an identity with a common language, since the language policies do not always comply with the rights of the linguistic minorities and imposing one language or certain languages may cause linguistic discrimination. And I will focus on the example of the European Union. Then, I will focus on the case of Poland -which will constitute my case study- in this process before analyzing the relationship between language and identity during its accession and membership period to the EU in the following chapter; as well as questioning the role of language as a means of identity transfer. Thus, I will try to elaborate the results of the integration of Poland to the EU while language being the research point as the identity transporter.

3.2. Language-identity relation

Language, as the key element of communication of human beings, has always been a focus of people's curiosity. Questions about language and its functions have been questioned for centuries by many philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle in the fourth and third centuries B.C., and other Greek and Indian philosopher-grammarians. For example, as argued by Finegan (1994), a work on the description of Sanskrit which was wrote by Pāṇ ini, an Indian sage, more than a century before the ones written by Plato and Aristotle, is regarded as one of the best grammars ever produced for any language.

"Traditionally, language has been viewed as a vehicle of thought, a system of expression that mediates the transfer of thought from one person to another, and this certainly is one of its important tasks" (Finegan, 1994). However, regarding language as a transporter of thought is only one aspect of language. "In everyday life, from

birth through old age, language serves social and affective functions as well as cognitive ones, and these are equally important tasks" (Finegan, 1994).

In this respect, According to Finegan (1994), linguists address language in two aspects; mental and social. He claims that linguists first analyse how language is organized in humans' mind, and then they examine how the social structures of human communities shape languages to their own purposes. Thus, in order to provide an adequate understanding of particular facets of language, linguistics emerged. "Linguistics can be defined as the scientific inquiry into human language – into its structures and uses, and the relationship between them, as well as into the development and acquisition of language" (Finegan, 1994). Linguists are concerned with all languages and all aspects of language. "It is an academic discipline of high social standing and at the same time it is closely connected with everyday life of human community. Linguistics not only describes language in terms of finite set of principles called grammar but it also treats it as a social and cultural phenomenon that essentially rooted in the reality of culture" (Kida, 2010).

Today, the empirical and scientific study of language has taken on additional importance in an age where communication is so critical to social, intellectual, political, economic and moral concerns. "Language is the most effective means of communication between human beings manifested in two ways by means of organized noises produced by the human vocal tract called speech or by means of graphic signs called writing" (Kida, 2010). However, as Finegan (1994) rightly argues, "Speech is more than communication; it is action. A language is a communication system that has work to perform, a system that speakers exploit purposefully. Language is used to do things, not merely to report them or talk about them" (Finegan, 1994). In this vein, "linguistics investigates language and its functions (cognitive, denominative, expressive, impressive, phatic, metalinguistic and cultural-creative) and its correlations with the process of learning and teaching." (Kida, 2010). Linguistics treats language as a social and cultural phenomenon. In this context, as a social and cultural phenomenon, language has another important aspect; it is the marker of identity.

As it was mentioned in the research of Thomas et al. (2004, p.158), one of the most fundamental ways of establishing an identity, and shaping other people's views of who we are, is through use of language. "In reality, our very sense of who we are, where we belong and, why and how we relate to those around us, all have language at their centre" (Llamas, Watt, 2010, p.9). However, it was not until 19th century that identities, especially national identities, have been defined in linguistic terms. Hobsbawn argues that "since the late 19th century –but not, commonly, much before then- it *[the principle of nationality]* has increasingly been defined in ethnic-linguistic terms. (...) Neither language nor ethnicity are essential to the original revolutionary nationalism, of which the USA is the major surviving version" (Hobsbawn, 1992, p.4).

Since identities are conceived essentially as 'fields of communication', language is the basis of defining the identity, also shared language is a key to cultural integration (Shore, 1993, p.782). "Language has a key role in establishing individuals' identity and determining their roles in society. The socialization process happens through language, so language is inevitably connected to political interests and power relations. States and other organizations implicitly use language to communicate certain ideologies" (Karoly, 2008, p.128).

The ideological aspect of language was also referred by Gal (2006) who claims that "language was invented in Europe ... and its exportation to other parts of the world is a major aspect of the European legacy". She asserts that only written linguistic forms are accepted as languages which also have literatures and norms of correctness. Moreover she claims that linguistic forms that were used in the colonies or in the peripheral territories of Europe were derogated as "not-quite-language", since they were regarded as undeveloped, not modern or civilized. Furthermore, it is accepted that social groups, due to their assumed linguistic homogeneity and distinctness, deserve a state, a territory or some kind of political autonomy. "If your language can be called a 'version' of mine, then I can claim your territory as a part of my state" (Gal, 2006). Briefly, she concludes that linguistic practices are significant in legitimating political arrangement ostensibly to be independent of human will or intent.

Similarly, Karoly makes use of the conceptualization of Gramsci who introduced the concept of cultural hegemony as a means of maintaining the power of the state in capitalist societies. "It is a basic postulate of Marxism that the dominant institutions in society work to legitimize the current order and enable the group in power to control people by spreading ideas about what is considered to be natural. They orientate individuals' thinking, their cognitive interpretation of the social world and their roles in society. (...) Althusser also claims that our identity is acquired by seeing ourselves mirrored in ideology. Ideology exists materially in the practices of various ideological state apparatuses. It is clear that language has a key role in the socialization process" (Karoly, 2008, p.128).

In this respect, if one looks at the languages used in the administration of the state, at school, and in other public linguistic situations regulated by the state, monolingual states are more common and regarded as the norm. As it was stated by Gal (2006), "monolingualism is taken to be the natural state of human life", they are assumed to be internally homogeneous as form and the barriers between languages were regarded as obvious and base on lack of mutual understandability. In this framework, the common belief that languages are core elements of national identity indicates the threat to the national identity derives from multilingualism. Mamadouh claims that "state formation and nation-building in England and France led to one single state language, which has spread into the national society, destroying other languages and dialects. Language has become linked to political loyalty as never before, as a core value of most nationalist discourses that build on the motto 'One state, one nation, one language'" (Mamadouh, 2002, p.329).

As it was mentioned above, single and common language is regarded as an indispensible constituent of a specific identity. However, in the case of the European Union, the question is whether the absence of a common language threatens the construction of a single European identity.

Before 19th century, language was not a prominent feature of identities. As Anderson claims, "whether we think of Brazil, the USA, or the former colonies of Spain, language was not an element that differentiated them from their respective

imperial metropoles" (Anderson, 1991, p.47). For example, "the Roman Empire was made up of a myriad of tribes, each with its own different language". He continues that, "prior to 'liberal neutrality', the Romans granted each tribe ample religious and linguistic autonomy, provided they paid tributes and supplied soldiers. To preserve their empire, the Romans would take some of the most promising sons of aristocratic families hostage and provide them with education in Latin, without even asking them to pay tuition fees. The young men thus often became go-betweens for collaboration and dominion: to the Romans it was quite clear that, since they were the dominators, their language should therefore be the dominating one. After the Romans, many other communities had to come to terms with differences among languages, but it seems that these differences were tolerated insofar as individuals were subjects and not citizens" (Archibugi, 2005, p.539).

However, if we consider the character of the nationalisms between 1820 and 1920, they changed the face of the Old World. "In almost all of them 'national print-languages' were of central ideological and political importance, whereas Spanish and English were never issues in the revolutionary Americas" (Anderson, 1991, p.67). He emphasizes the role of discovery and conquests that caused a revolution in European ideas about language. After this process Anderson claims that "language became less of a continuity between an outside power and the human speaker than an internal field created and accomplished by language users among themselves" (Anderson, 1991, p.70).

In his study Arzoz (2008, p.4) also contributes Anderson's argument by stating that "nation-building in Europe, was based primarily on linguistic terms: modern nations are basically "linguistic nations" in the sense that having a common language was the instrument and the symbol of each nation-state".

As well as being a defining element of identities, language also constitutes an integrative element for societies and groups. Christiansen (2006) draws attention to the importance of language that binds groups with each other. He argues that "language is one of the strongest ways of bonding with our own ethnic group(s), and it simultaneously allows bridging to other ethnic groups". Ramahobo (2008) also

claims that “Language is the DNA of culture and an integral part of ethnic affiliation. It is one of the salient boundary markers between ethnic groups as well as the most overt features of group cohesion. Language is the main instrument for the expression of ethnic identity and the culture of an ethnic group”. However, it can be also stated that language may also function as a clear sign of delimiting groups and may even constitute the main barrier to interaction between ethnic groups.

This cultural link is obvious in some tribes of Africa, which are separated by cultural, traditional or linguistic differences. For example, the case of Botswana which was explained in the article of Ramahobo (2008) is very striking. “During colonial rule, the British chose the numerically weak Tswana speaking Bangwato ethnic group to rule over others. The Bangwato then co-opted their blood relatives, other Tswana speaking tribes, the Bakwena, Bangwaketsi, Bakgatla, Batawana, Barolong Batlokwa and Balete to join them and form the clan of ruling tribes in eight districts as demarcated by the British. These tribes ruled over and suppressed the languages and cultures of 37 tribes which made up 65% of the population”.

Language can also be a powerful means of exercising social control – if you belong to a particular group, this requires adopting the linguistic conventions of that group. In this vein Christiansen (2006, p.22) states that “languages play a particularly central role in mediating ideas in information societies, and therefore critical language awareness is of paramount importance: languages are foundational for groups to negotiate their status and position. Language plays a key role in reproducing often unequal power relations and may constitute a means for the elites to colonise our minds”.

As for the question of assimilation, Schöpflin (2000) states that “urban and thus civic identities, the models for assimilation, had already been constructed by the dominant majority, and those who could be considered as being of the same language group philologically moved relatively smoothly into the same political language group. ... The acquisition of a new language and a new way of life added up to an assimilation through the acquisition of a new identity”.

Maybe one of the most noteworthy examples of the relation between identity and language is that "Québécois who refuse to understand anglophones who talk in a Canadian accent, will respond to anglophones who talk with a British or US intonation, as Flemings who claim not to understand French spoken with a Belgian accent, understand French French" (Hobsbawn, 1992, p.6). This example indicates the strong bound between language and identity, since dominance of another language is regarded as a threat to the own language of a community, which is at the same time regarded as a threat to their identity. Christiansen (2006, p.28) briefs this situation in one of his articles by stating that "language loss is not only an individual tragedy (loss of identity) but also a waste of resources for society as a whole". In this respect, it is evident that the history of nation-building has traditionally involved the promotion of the official language and the repression of others, even in liberal states.

In his article Ochs (1993) makes use of a journal essay of The New York Times on immigrant parents who react to their children learning English with a sense of pride mingled with a sense of loss. The adoption of another language alters the family values previously transferred to the children. This value transformation in the children as a result of the language change is the main source of the concerns and the sense of loss of the families. At the end, the roles within the family also change and parents happen to be dependent on their children, rather than the opposite, who become mediators for interaction with the local environment for their parents (Ochs, 1993, p.287). Thus this value transformation is a clear example of the role of languages as identity transporters.

This process of value transformation also constituted the basis of the identity shift observed in Poland, which will be elaborated in more detail in the following chapters. While Poland has been a country which is deeply engaged to its national identity and national values, its integration with the EU accompanied the transfer of a set of European values which had noticeable impacts on the Polish identity. During this process, language, among others, had been at the core of the identity politics, which is one of the most efficient means of value transfer. The use of language in Poland that gained a new shape during the integration period affected the lifestyles, the communication rituals, the preferences regarding education and occupation, and

the definition of identity. Thus, the results of this reformulation and its concrete examples will be pointed out in the following chapters.

What I have mention in this section is the relation between language and identity, and how language constructs and limits different forms of identities. As it is stated above, language can foster integration by suggesting unity that derives from the use of a single and common language; or it can promote the exclusion of different languages, accordingly different identities. This inclusion or exclusion process can either occur unconsciously, or it can be imposed as a result of a planned language policy. All of which indicates that languages are substantial means of value transfer that reformulate the identities. Within this framework, I have briefly mentioned about Poland, which will be elaborated in more detail in the following chapters, as a significant example that went through this process of transformation shaped by language policies, parallel to its accession to the EU. Thus, in the next section it will be discussed why and how language can become the subject of identity policies.

3.3. Language-identity relation as a policy tool: locating language policies in context

3.3.1. What is a language policy?

What I have explained in the previous section is that how languages happen to be key elements in the formation of identities, and how they play an important role in the identity issues. Now in this section, I will mention how language can be used as a policy tool and become an instrument of power relations.

Since the relation between language and identity is significant, language policy as a separate field of study is required. Like identities, languages are also constructs that come and go according to political need and individual or group choice (Brumfit, 2006). It is evident that "linguistic standardisation played an important role in the establishment of nation-states and in their economic development" (Dardanelli, 1998, p.14). Anderson (1991) argues that in the course of the 19th century, and especially in its latter half, Europe witnessed a philological-lexicographic revolution parallel to the rise of intra-European nationalist movements.

“The lexicographic revolution in Europe, however, created and gradually spread, the conviction that languages (in Europe at least) were, so to speak, the personal property of quite specific groups, imagined as communities, were entitled to their autonomous place in a fraternity of equals” (Anderson, 1991, p.84).

However, Karoly (2008) declares that there exists confusion in the terminology of language policy, and terminological ambiguity is still prevalent. He makes use of several definitions of language policy, and indicates that ‘language policy’ and ‘language planning’ are often used interchangeably. For some, language planning is the practical version of a language policy; similarly others consider language planning as the implementation of language policy. On the other hand, linguistic pluralism, defined as the association of several languages and language variations, may also result in language conflicts. Thus, the aim of language policy is to resolve these conflicts by reaching a compromise, which is acquired by implementing direct and explicit social control. (Karoly, 2008, p.127). In this vein, Karoly draws attention to the fact that the language policy must be examined in a very broad context, behind which exists an implicit language ideology framework related to broad political and social ideologies. Finally he briefs that “French language policy writers often use the term ‘glottopolitique’ (‘glottopolitics’), which means that language policy must take into account the broader social and political factors such as the distribution of communicative roles in society. Similarly, in German usage, there are two terms: ‘politische Sprach-wissenschaft’ (political linguistics), investigating the relationship between language issues and social groups, which is expressed in ‘Sprachpolitik’ (language policy), an ideological component of society” (Karoly, 2008, p.128).

Language policies underpin the inclusion and exclusion practices within politically conscious contexts. Thus, common language, as well as shared religious beliefs or cultural rituals, provides the continuity of affiliation to a certain identity. Even after the demise of a community, the sentiments of likeness or affiliation may continue, if the group members have originated from the same linguistic group. (Ramahobo, 2008, p.2).

The language issue is far more problematic in the multilingual communities such as multilingual states (Switzerland, Belgium, India, etc.), states with groups of minorities who have preserved their own language (like the Hispanics of the United States or Turks in Germany), and states that have incorporated indigenous populations who have maintained their own languages (such as aborigines in the United States and in Australia).

The idea that a common language was necessary reappeared periodically in European and world history every time revolutionary riots broke out as Archibugi (2005, p.538) argues. While many intellectuals attempted to design a 'perfect' language (Eco, 1995), the question has surfaced in politics all over the world. Every day, international organisations and the European Union (EU) have to deal with the diversity of languages, and they have to agree on new communication protocols among members of governments, bureaucrats and citizens.

Archibugi argues that "as a general rule, only elites are fluent in more than one language and have the chance to maintain and develop their linguistic skills continuously and feel at ease discussing political questions in different languages in a multilingual atmosphere" (Archibugi, 2005, p.542) He continues by claiming that the British in Europe and the Hindis in India are among the privileged who can afford to speak a single language, whereas many others have to speak at least two (English as lingua franca and their own vernacular language), and others already speak three (like the Catalans who need to speak Spanish as the dominant language of their state, and English as the dominant European and international language). All in all, "elites are still at an advantage and, in a globalised world, also enjoy a linguistic privilege. The development of common languages will inevitably prove advantageous to some groups than to others, although this disparity is something that public policies should try to eliminate" (Archibugi, 2005, p.553).

In this regard, Archibugi offers a common language for the multilingual communities which will not provide advantage to any group in that community. His offer is the use of 'Esperanto', which was invented by Lejzer Ludwig Zamenhof at the end of the nineteenth century to facilitate the communication between

multilingual communities and inspired George Orwell to create the newspeak of his novel 1984. (Archibugi, 2005, p.545). He emphasizes that Esperanto will not replace existing languages but it will supplement them by facilitating communication between individuals in other parts of the world. He suggests that Esperanto was meant to make communication accessible to everyone. When a linguistic medium is lacking, the prerequisite for institutions and individuals to take part in democratic life is to create one – if need be artificially. The universal language is thus the key to cosmopolitan citizenship.

Another example that Archibugi presents as a resolution to the problems derive from multilingualism, is the solution suggested by Aldous Huxley in his novel 'The Island'. The novel describes a small Utopian community in the Pacific, the imaginary island of Pala, which is as advanced as it is rooted in its own traditions. This community preserves its own local language, but all its members speak English, and this allows them access to technology, information and culture from the most advanced regions of the world. Archibugi states that "in the real world, the countries with the highest indices of human development – Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands – are very close to Huxley's ideal" (Archibugi, 2005, p.553). In short, what Archibugi offers is that a common language spoken by everyone as a second or third language.

All in all a language policy can be defined as "a formal process undertaken by governments to improve or extend the teaching and learning of languages. (…) These are all conventional and necessary steps for a systematic and reviewable process of bringing about change in some area of language, involving intervention by governments and public authorities to change the actual state of affairs" (LETPP, 2011).

The definition itself reaffirms the inclusion and exclusion made by language policies so as to improve or encourage the learning and use of a certain language. So as to fortify an identity by using the unifing effect of language, the inclusive or exclusive intervention of the governments or the institutions deem necessary. Thus, since the language issue is far more problematic in the multilingual communities, the

interventions become more direct and the idea of creating a common language becomes more widespread.

Thus, the idea that a single and common language is necessary for the creation of a sense of belonging and the unification of communities paved the way for the endeavours to implement language policies especially in the multilingual ones such as the European Union. However, the adoption of a single language such as Esperanto throughout the EU was not a long-lasting idea since an artificial language could not constitute an element that defines one's identity. Thus, the EU focused on policies to promote multilingualism by encouraging the foreign language learning in its member countries. Whereas the importance of languages made political institutions implement specific language policies to form an identity, these policies did always comply with the linguistic rights of the individuals. As a matter of fact, while the EU explicitly promoted the use of different languages both among the individuals and the European institutions; implicitly it encouraged the use of only one language, or a limited number of languages.

Thus, in the following section, I will make mention of the linguistic policies within the aspect of democracy, and point out the linguistic discrimination caused by the language policies of the EU.

3.3.2. Linguistic Diversity and Democratic Politics

In the previous section, I have introduced different approaches towards the language use and focused on the role of language as a policy instrument of shaping identities. I have suggested that language standardization has been seen as an indispensable tool for creating an identity, and in this frame, language planning became necessary in the multilingual countries. As a result of linguistic differences, the issue of linguistic minorities comes into prominence as it was stated in the previous section. Because the language standardization that aims to create a single identity does not suit the multilingual communities that involve linguistic minorities. The discrimination of language use caused by the standardization policies also end up with a discrimination of identities, since language is a core factor that determine one's identity. Thus, at this point, it should be asked whether the language policies,

especially regarding multilingual communities involving minorities are being implemented democratically or does the language planning cause segregation in linguistically diverse communities.

Language issues are being regarded in the framework of democratic politics and being discussed whether the linguistic diversity creates an obstacle to equality and participation in the political arena. In this context, Archibugi (2005, p.538) declares that "although world history has seen cities, peoples and nations enter into contact by language at least as much as by the sword, the reins of that contact were held not by the majority of the population, the demos, but by an elite, the oligos. (...) Democracy (demos + kratos, the power of the many) obviously seeks to break this monopoly, and to do so, it needs a suitable linguistic medium. (...) Democratic politics depend on a willingness to overcome the barriers to mutual understanding, including the linguistic ones".

The democratic politics in linguistic terms becomes more crucial when minority languages are at stake. For years, states have explicitly or implicitly assumed that the linguistic minorities, which are defined as basically 'non-privileged or non-dominant' linguistic ethnic groups, should accommodate to the majority language. Paulston (2000) argues that "ethnic groups within a nation state, given opportunity and incentive, typically shift to the language of the dominant group" which became easier with the voluntary migration as it is evident in the cases of America, Australia and Canada. Another important point is the dominance of English regarding the international communication. Brumfit (2006) states that by the end of 1990s, English was adopted as the first foreign language and became the single default language for international communication.

However, as Archibugi argues, sometimes the dominant language may not be the language of the majority, but the language of the groups holding power. "In Paraguay, for example, with the holding of free elections, Guarnì (the idiom spoken by the majority of the population) has at last become an official language alongside Spanish." (Archibugi, 2005, p.540). Additionally, the political orientation of the country also affects the language choice. For example, the use of neo-Latin as a

language of wider communication in Easter Europe, namely in Poland and Czech Republic, instead of Russian reflected the belief that Russian was not the means to bring them 'closer to Western Europe'. Moreover, the exclusion of Russian as an official language in Latvia, where nearly half of the population is Russian is another substantial language choice (Paulston, 2000).

Nonetheless, the importance of the use of the mother tongue is a widely accepted phenomenon. Paulston (2000) points out the question of language teaching especially in elementary schools in the multilingual states and claims that most of the studies accept that it is easier for children to learn in their mother tongue. In this respect, she asserts that policy makers know the importance of the language issues as well as the correlation between national economic development and national literacy rates; however, they also acknowledge the powerful force of the education in only the national language for assimilation of linguistic minority children. Within this scope, the EU was well-aware of threat of the mismanagement of language policies from the very beginning. Paulston (2000) declares that one of the biggest concerns of the EU was deriving from the danger that European languages may divide the once stood opposed in conflict but now peacefully united Europe. This situation was more problematic in the Central and Eastern Europe where multilingualism was a literal phenomenon.

Thus, in recent years, the language laws, which assure the use of minority languages or the languages of the non-dominant ethnic groups, have a tendency to increase so as to eliminate the feeling of 'otherness' and to preserve the ethnic identity. Paulston (2000) claims that such laws have been rejected in Central and Eastern European Countries for a long time, however, this situation had to be changed with the globalization wave.

While many researchers designate that democratic politics should be in vernacular in order to ensure full participation for both minorities and majorities to the political, economic and social life; in the case of the European Union, which has 23 official languages, ensuring both democratic use of language and linguistic diversity becomes a crucial issue. "The European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages

estimates that more than 40 million people in the EU belong to a linguistic minority. This number excludes all immigrant minorities, both immigrants who are 'legally' in the EU and those who are undocumented. If immigrant minorities are included in the calculation, it is estimated that some 50 million people belong to a linguistic minority. These linguistic minorities could be described as the most multilingual, and multicultural 'member' of the EU (and demographically among the largest), a way of thinking which emphasises their linguistic resources and their potential contribution in teaching the EU about multilingualism" (Archibugi, 2005, p.23).

The explanation of Archibugi to the paradox between 'unity in diversity' and vernacular in democratic politics is to support investment in education to allow individuals to improve their language skills in order to make people speak a common language as a second language. He concludes by declaring "it is far too easy to make a society more egalitarian by making polyglots illiterate, but an enlightened social policy must attempt to make the illiterate polyglot" (Archibugi, 2005, p.553).

In this section, I have made mention of the democratic aspect of language policies. I have stated that for many years it was believed that minorities should accommodate into the majority language, or the language of the dominant groups who hold the political power. While in the last years, protection of the linguistic rights of minorities became more widespread; as long as the significance of language in the process of establishing an identity prevails, language policies will continue to be commonly used regardless of the democratic aspect. Thus, in the following chapter I will focus on the example of the European Union as a multilingual community and mention the language policies that were being implemented by the European Commission so as to create a common European identity.

CHAPTER 4

WHOSE LANGUAGE? THINKING ON LANGUAGE POLICIES IN EUROPE

4.1. Introduction

Languages are at the core of the identity making policies. In the previous chapters, I have touched upon the process of identity formation and the role of languages especially in the multilingual communities. Furthermore, I have mentioned that in the case of the European Union, which is aiming at creating a common European identity, linguistic issues became prominent since the European Union today has 27 member states with 23 official languages while actually involving more than 60 indigenous regional or minority languages spoken throughout the continent. Thus I have stated that language policies are indispensable for the multilingual communities such as the European Union so as to create a community identity. However, another aspect of the language policies that communities face with is the problem of preserving the rights of linguistic minorities during the implementation of these language policies.

Within the framework mentioned above, in this chapter, I will focus on the linguistic identity of the European Union. Within the EU, the language issue has been described as 'explosive' and as 'the most emotional topic in the EU' (Phillipson, 2008, p.6). Thus, while analyzing the language issue in the EU, I will mention some key elements that affect and shape the linguistic identity of Europe and focus on the difficulties the EU had to face because of its multilingual structure that differentiates it from nation-states. While the nation-states need to encourage the use of a single language (which is the national language) to establish and maintain their identity; the EU has to promote multilingualism to reinforce the European identity, since it is a supranational entity that encompasses several member states.

Then I will touch upon the fear of Europeans about losing the international function of their language, as well as their linguistic identity as a result of the dominance of Anglo-Saxon culture and language, since English has become the single default international language of communication since the 1990. Moreover, I will elaborate the language policies being implemented by the European Commission to create a European identity as well as its reaction towards this widespread effect of English, with a brief historical background.

4.2. European Experience with Language

4.2.1. Linguistic Identity in Europe

As I have mentioned in the previous sections, it is clear that a single common language is an indispensable element for the nation-states. Moreover, it is also necessary for the identity formation of communities that comprise of several nation-states. In this regard, the case of the European Union is remarkable with 27 member states, several languages and the arising multilingualism debates. However, before the emergence of the nation-states in Europe and the nation-building process that took place in a wide range, multilingualism was not that unfamiliar for Europe. As it is argued by Paulston (2000), from the earliest times, multilingualism has been a natural phenomenon for Europe, which shifted to a 'one nation-one language' idea with the rise of nationalism during the 'Romantic Movement in Europe' in the 19th century. Within this framework, nation-states started to be defined in linguistic terms. "Nation-building in Europe, was based primarily on linguistic terms: modern nations are basically 'linguistic nations' in the sense that having a common language was the instrument and the symbol of each nation-state. The emergence of the European Union as a supranational entity has not modified this situation. On the contrary, concern for cultural and linguistic diversity appears to be rising precisely within the EU" (Arzoz, 2008).

As it is well-known, the original idea of establishing the European Communities (the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community) after the Second World War was mainly economic, However, After the accession of new member states the

EU became increasingly a political entity and culturally more diverse especially within the emerging global context of multiculturalism.

The attempts of the European elites in the 1950s aimed at providing sustainable peace among the European countries, by turning the "Franco-German problem" into a 'European' one. . Thus, the consequent moves of creating a unified Europe, and the institutionalization with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) all included these aims while reflecting the elitist nature of the European project. As I have mentioned in the previous section, for many researchers, this post-war transformation period of Europe has been a top-down project directed by the European institutions, among which the European Commission was the main institution at the core of the integration policies (for some examples see: Shore, 1993; Delanty, 2002; Börzel and Risse, 2004, 2009; Sedelmeier, 2006; Elbasani, 2009; Grabbe, 2009; White, 2010). Moreover, in the period of 1960-1980, the identity debates, citizenship issues and social rights were not at stake; rather, the important thing was the transformation of the nation states to a supranational entity so as to ensure security and economic prosperity between the European states.

In the late 1980s, however, the profound social changes following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the re-unification of Germany and the ending of the Cold War caused large-scale movement of migrants, workers and refugees throughout Europe. This new conjuncture brought out new identities and new borderlands, resulted with both xenophobia and racism in Europe, and a focus on identity issues. The Single European Act of 1986 and the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 were the first indicators of the new attitude of the EU, which was identity-based. Nonetheless, the top-down policy of the EU did not come to an end, but gained a new aspect, which focused more on the transfer of "European values" within a more bottom-up manner. In the enlargements after the 1990s, the candidate countries were required to adopt the European values and adjust their domestic policies and regulations to the ones of the EU. The Copenhagen Criteria that requires the satisfaction of political and economic criteria (which necessitates the adjustment of the domestic policies and regulation with the ones of the EU) as well as the complete adoption of the acquis is a prominent example of this kind. But the important point is that, these countries

were already willing to adopt the European values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights, since they were trying to make themselves accepted as European states. Thus, during the accession period and the adoption of the European values, the candidate and new member states have experienced a dual process because although they were forced to accept and interiorize the European values, they were also ready to absorb these values since they were trying to "return to Europe", as it was briefly mentioned in the previous section.

Regarding the bottom-up nature of the enlargements after 1990s, it can be suggested that the EU institutions started to use symbolic measures to foster a European identity. As argued in Chapter 1, European identity created by Commission bureaucrats was promoted throughout Europe. Since identities are created and recreated by both institutional and symbolic tools, the European Commission has been the core of the formation of the European identity. The creation and recreation of the European identity can still be seen from the policies of the European Commission, in which, the language policies are also included. The current language policies of the EU are new instruments for the recreation of the European identity. That is why the European Commission is so opposed to the extension of English throughout Europe and trying to implement policies to prevent English from becoming the single dominant language of the EU. On the other hand, as mentioned in Chapter 1, while the EU explicitly promoted the use of different languages both among the individuals and the European institutions; implicitly it encouraged the use of only one language which is English, or a limited number of languages, namely German and French.

Thus, the policies and attempts of the European Commission regarding the language policy of the EU were not without trouble. As it was mentioned above, the European Commission has been attempting to prevent the dominance of English throughout the EU by conducting certain language policies. However, while trying to avoid the dominance of English, the Commission itself was hoist with its own petard by provoking the use of English EU-wide, which will be addressed in more detail in the following sections.

Since its foundation with six member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Netherlands), EU has expanded to Union of 15 member states in mid-1990s, which added 11 languages with equal rights as official and working languages of the EU. Then the major enlargement wave of 2004 brought 10 additional states, which have generally been under the influence of the former Soviet Union and accordingly Russian, whereas in certain states such as Poland, German influence was more significant. After the last enlargement of 2007 with Bulgaria and Romania, the EU owned "the world's largest translation and interpretation services" (Phillipson, 2008, p.1).



Figure 1: Official Languages of the EU

*Irish: Treaty language since 1973. Catalan, Basque, Galician: Special status since 2006.

** These four languages were used by the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950. In 1958 the official languages were decided in Council Regulation No 1, which has been amended each time new countries joined the EU.

As seen from the above figure, not only did the enlargement process complicate the European map and introduce novel identities and languages. The laws concerning the four fundamental freedoms of the European Union (the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital) also have contributed to the multicultural and multilingual character of the European Union (Karoly, 2008). Currently the European Union has 23 official languages, but more than 60 indigenous regional or minority languages are spoken throughout the continent.

This complex linguistic structure of the EU affected the economic, political, social and cultural system of the Union. As it was acknowledged by Phillipson, Europe has always had a variety of language that derive from Indo-European of Finno-Ugric sources, or neither of them such as Basque (Phillipson, 2008, p.1-2). Phillipson also claims that many recent languages of Europe have immigrant of refugee origins, which was also supported by Karoly's views (Phillipson, 2008, p.2; Karoly, 2008).

Regarding the domestic and international functions of language, the European states have promoted single national language, which "occurred both in states with an ideology of ethnolinguistically uniform origins (with Germany as the archetype) and those with republican statist model (typically France)" (Phillipson, 2008, p.2). In this respect, until recently, local minority languages (such as Catalan, Welsh, Sami, etc.) have been suppressed by European governments.

In this framework, as seen from above, whether to regard the linguistic diversity of the EU as a "cultural wealth" or "a source of communicative chaos" was long discussed (Karoly, 2008; Phillipson, 2008).

In this debate, the official EU documents as well as EU institutions regularly declare that the multilingualism in the Union provides it with a rich cultural structure, and shows the democratic aspect of the EU which is respectful to the national values of its members. Thus it is claimed that "the Union is committed to the principle of multilingualism and to the fundamental rights of non-discrimination and equality of its citizens" (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005, p. 274). However, this assertion requires equal rights for information and access to legal documents in the

national languages of all EU citizens which complicates the situation and increases the costs of multilingualism with the burden of huge translation.

Karoly (2008) also draws attention to the difference between the European Union, and the international organizations such as United Nations, NATO, OECD, World Trade Organization and Council of Europe, in which only a few official languages are being used. He answers that, since the EU is operating through both a supranational and intergovernmental system, it requires a deeper level of integration and democratic representation of the interests of the community as a whole. He continues that, "in a democratic organization, each citizen must be granted access to legislation in their own language, which guarantees equality before the law. Ignorance of the law is no defence, so the law cannot be imposed in an incomprehensible foreign language. Therefore, EU legislation must be translated into all the official languages, making translation indispensable in the working of the European Union. As Umberto Eco said, 'translation is the language of Europe.'" (cited in Karoly, 2008).

4.2.2. Inequalities among European Languages

It has already been mentioned in the previous section that the European continent has always hosted different cultures, values, and language, likewise the EU. Furthermore every enlargement wave of the EU brought a new set of cultural and linguistic values as well as a new challenge. Since the EU is different from the previous international organizations with its supranational structure, the issue of language has gained a new perspective. That is why it has been long discussed and still being discussed whether the linguistic diversity is a wealth or a danger to the unity. Thus, as it is argued in the previous section, whereas the EU declares that the linguistic diversity is to be preserved in the Union by granting equal rights to all languages, it creates an inequality among its languages.

Currently the European Union has 23 official languages, but more than 60 indigenous regional or minority languages are spoken throughout the continent. However, for example Luxembourgish (an official language in Luxembourg) and Turkish (an official language in Cyprus) have not been accorded the status of official

languages of the European Union although Luxembourg and Cyprus are member states.

In this regard as it was stated above, the language policy of the EU contains significant inequalities regarding the language spoken in the EU. On the one hand, the EU introduces policies in order to preserve the linguistic diversity within the Union and declares that it will grant equal rights and opportunities to every language, in practice the situation is far more complex. As a matter of fact, among the EU bodies, only certain languages are being used.

Firstly, whilst the EU officially defines the languages of its members as "the official and working languages", informally, it makes a distinction between these languages and uses only certain ones in most of its institutions; namely English, French and German. Similarly, Whereas the EU established its linguistic regime on an equity basis with the Regulation No.1 of the Council of Ministers of 1958 by stating that languages of all member states are "the official languages and the working languages", the definition of these "official and working languages" was rather vague (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005, p.274). The EU also hints this inequality in the Article 6 of the same Regulation which states "the institutions of the Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are to be used in specific cases." (Ammon, 2006, p.321). The important point here is that within this clause, the "specific cases" were not defined which provides a rather wide scope of authority for the EU institutions. Furthermore, it was not made clear which languages are to be used in these specific cases. Moreover, in the Regulation, the oral communication was not regulated which also causes "a considerable liberty for the different EU institutions and organs to set their own linguistic regime" (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005, p.274).

Of course, the language challenge of the EU became even more prominent after the 2004 enlargement, since the native languages of the new member states were not commonly spoken outside their own countries. The increasing costs of translation and interpretation lead the Union to make a distinction between its

languages. “If the so-called ‘full language regime’ is maintained, 1,400 extra interpreters and translators will be needed” (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005, p.274).

Thus, most institutions, started to use only the same languages regularly, which in practice always includes English and French, sometimes German, and in some cases Italian and Spanish. “These languages, with their status declared or only based on function, have come to be referred to, informally, as the EU working languages, which implies that the remaining majority of the official EU languages are to be classified as merely official languages” (Ammon, 2005, p.321).

Secondly, the EU institutions exclude certain languages by referring them as “lesser-used languages”. Since, according to the estimation of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages there are more than 40 million people in the EU that are regarded as linguistic minorities (if the immigrant population is taken into account this number increases to 50 million), it seems that the European institutions disregard an important proportion of European languages in their official use.

Mamadouh (2002) also criticizes the institutional multilingualism within the EU. On the one hand, institutional multilingualism neglects certain languages (such as Danish, Greek, and even German as smaller official languages, and Catalan which does not have an official status). On the other hand, institutional multilingualism does not function properly, since it is too expensive and not effective. As for malfunctioning, complaints focus on translation of documents, delays caused by the interpretation of oral communication and its paralyzing effects on discussions, and the opacity of the resulting documents. Another view is that however, the miscommunication is not caused by the translators and interpreters, but is rooted in the cultural differences between linguistic communities incorporated in the EU.

“According to the special Eurobarometer (2006: 6), there are three main categories within regional and minority languages: the first includes languages which are specific to a region (such as Basque, Breton, Catalan, Frisian, Sardinian or Welsh), the second refers to languages which are spoken by a minority group, but which are official in another member state (such as Hungarian spoken in Slovakia), and the third category refers to non-territorial languages (such as Romany or

Yiddish)" (Karoly, 2008). The speakers of some minority languages outnumber the speakers of official EU languages; for example, more people speak Catalan than Danish, Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian or Maltese; similarly, Welsh speakers outnumber the speakers of Maltese. The recognition of Irish as a full official language of the European Union from 2007 has led to political tensions and stronsg demands that Basque, Catalan and Galician should acquire the same status (Karoly, 2008). Although these languages have not been acknowledged as official EU languages, their speakers have special linguistic rights: these languages can be used in written communication in certain EU institutions.

Thirdly, while the languages of the countries that initiated the European project, namely German and French are used in a large extent, parallel to the influence of Anglo-Saxon and American culture, the use of English dominated French and German. Moreover, many languages, particularly the ones of the eastern enlargement are kept in the background. Within this framework, in contrast to its official discourse, the EU is implicitly promoting the use of English EU-wide, while claiming to ensure the equal use of every language and refusing the dominance of English. While the effects of the Anglo-Saxon culture and the dominance of English will be examined in the following section, at this point it can be suggested that the language policies of the European Commission reinforce the dominance of English and reproduce the inequalities between the languages.

Thus the political context of the European language policy is obvious. The hierarchy between the EU countries parallel to their position in the world politics is also reflected in the language use of the EU institutions. The situation of languages has changed a lot over the centuries due to the continuous movement of peoples on the continent, often resulting in the appearance of new languages and the disappearance of others. According to Mamadouh (2002), the linguistic issue in the EU consists of 'old' and 'new' issues of language. The old issues were about the language minorities being opposed to the nation-state and its dominant language (for example Welsh speakers in the United Kingdom, Frisian speakers in the Netherlands, Basque speakers in Spain, etc.), while the new issues are related to multilingualism in supranational and transnational settings.

In time, the linguistic diversity of the Union started to be regarded as "a hindrance to economic progress or political integration and real democracy" (Ammon, 2006, p.322). To overcome this hindrance, several different opinions were stated such as adopting a single working language among the EU countries (at least in the EU institutions), or using two or three languages as working languages which are the most-used ones among the members. Using a *lingua franca* even outside the EU institutions to enhance the growth of regional mobility and of a common public sphere, especially through the media, was also supported by think-tanks (Ammon, 2006, p.322). Public sphere is a specific arena in which ideas spread and identities are constructed (Börzel and Risse, 2009, p.14). Mamadouh (2002) also depicted the lack of an EU-wide opinion and pointed out the linguistic limitations to the emergence of an EU-wide public sphere. The common belief is that the plurality of languages undermines the development of an EU-wide public debate that would match the decision-making process at the supranational level. Yet he emphasizes that a common language is not sufficient to create a common public opinion. For example, there are separate public spheres in Belgium and the Netherlands, in Sweden and Finland, and in Ireland and Great Britain. "In fact, Flemish-speaking Belgians rarely read Dutch newspapers or watch the news on the Dutch channels, and vice-versa. As far as the media are used EU-wide, even if by only a small group in each country, they are American media such as CNN or the *New York Review of Books*" (Mamadouh, 2002). Thus, Jürgen Habermas, among others claimed that so as to denationalize the EU and to lead to the emergence of the epoch of "postnationalism" English should be accepted as the necessary unifying language (cited in Ammon, 2006, p.322). Thus, many researchers examined the possibility to switch to "controlled multilingualism" from "complete multilingualism" (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005, p.275).

However, even it would be possible to use only one working language, to limit the single language system only within the institutions of the EU is not that easy, since "the EU institutional working language(s) and its lingua franca(s) outside the institutions have often – if only tacitly – been seen as converging, at least in the longer run" (Ammon, 2006, p.322). Thus many member countries fear about the diminishing importance of their national languages within the EU. Ammon declares

that, the main fear of the member states is not the "death" of their native language, but rather they fear about the "loss of international function" of their languages (Ammon, 2006, p.322-323). Whereas as the institutional working language or as the lingua franca of the Union, Latin and Esperanto were ones offered, but not adopted.

However recently, the inequalities regarding the language use within the EU seemed to be in favour of English. English seems to take their place as both the institutional working language and the lingua franca, at least in practice. In this regard, the above-mentioned inequality between languages best manifests itself with the dominance of Anglo-Saxon culture and its language. Especially in the recent years, English became more and more commonly used among other European languages, reducing the use of the other ones. On the one hand, the diminishing use of certain languages associates with the reducing importance of one country's decision making role in the EU institutions. On the other hand, the lesser some languages are used throughout the Union, the more difficult it becomes for certain people to access information in their mother tongues. Within this context, while the policies were being implemented to create and strengthen the European identity, the Europeans also began to fear that their identity is under threat of assimilation. That fear brings us to another topic of concern: the hegemony of English in international and transnational communication. Thus, in the following section I will draw attention to the effects of Anglo-Saxon identity on the European identity.

4.2.3. The Dominance of Anglo-Saxon Culture

4.2.3.1. The hierarchy between languages and the dominance of English

As I have stated in the previous section, as one of the results of the discrimination in language use among the European institutions, English has become the single default international language of communication since 1990s. Regarding the close relation between language and identity that was analyzed above, the concerns of the impact of English on other languages and thus the impact of Anglo-Saxon identity on the European identity have been an important field of study (Field, 1998; Mamadouh, 2002; Phillipson, 2003, 2007; Brumfit, 2006; Christiansen, 2006; Nic Craith, 2006; Karoly, 2008).

Within this framework, it can be seen that the question of European identity has been more and more identified with the dominant position of English since that time (Karoly, 2008). It is not by coincidence that some European countries think that the development of European identity is an implicit threat to their national identity and try to protect their national interests partly through their language policy. In this context, the draft Action Programme for the promotion of the Swedish language that was prepared by the Swedish Language Council upon the request of Swedish government in 1998 is a crucial example (Swedish Language Council, 1998). With this report, specific measures proposed such as guaranteeing the official language status of Swedish in the EU, the use of Swedish in school education and undergraduate higher education, and also enhancing the Swedish TV and radio programmes as well as training in Swedish for journalists. Likewise France has adopted policies to regulate the use of English in public life (Mamadouh, 2002). According to Field (1998) France was then spending US$1.1 billion a year to promote its use internationally; laws continue to be applied to prevent the entry of English words into popular use in the French language. Moreover, Germany is also introducing policies regarding the use of German in central and Eastern Europe, apart from the EU, and trying to increase the importance of its national language. Field states that Germany provides language classes for central and east European government officials. In this framework 522 language teachers were sent to this region in 1995 (Field, 1998).

However, a major problem with respect to cultural harmonisation is that this has in practice involved the increasing influence of US popular culture, and widening of the use of English. While Field (1998) argues that English cannot be a common language for Europe because of the fear of the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon culture, and the late entry of the United Kingdom to the EU; many researchers assert that English is on the way to be the common language not only for Europe, but also for the whole world. Thus, the tendency is in the direction of regarding the position of English in Europe as a threat to the European identity. For example Phillipson (2007) claims that it is among the targets of the American empire agenda to provide the dominance of English throughout Europe as a part of its cultural imperialism. Correspondingly, Karoly (2008) claims that English did not become the dominant

language in Europe because of the international hegemonic language policy of the United Kingdom, but English has become the primary language in the media, science, technology and business due to the economic (and therefore political) power of the United States. “Caviedes points out that English is a popular choice because of its pluricentric character, which gives it a de-ethnicized and culturally unbounded quality that allows speakers to use it without automatically identifying with one nation” (Karoly, 2008).

Another important point is that, “while the EU’s institutions battle the inroads of Anglo-Saxon popular culture through attempts to impose television programming quotas, its young people choose to use the assistance provided by the EU’s Lingua and Erasmus schemes to study in the UK rather than France, Germany, or other EU countries” (Field, 1998).

An additional problem from the EU perspective is that English is the official language of two member states and the mother tongue of most citizens of these countries, giving them an invaluable advantage over other EU citizens. “At the EU level, there is no overt policy against American English, but steps have been taken to maintain and promote linguistic diversity in the EU” (Mamadouh, 2002).

Actually, other languages gain importance parallel to the enlargement process of the EU. The unification of Germany and the accession of Austria to the EU have raised the importance of German in the Union which was also supported by the politicians. Moreover, Central and Eastern Europe are the new cultural or linguistic battle grounds between English and German. “German is spoken to a greater extent than English as a second language in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Kazakhstan and Georgia, but is very much second to English as the second language of most other central and east European countries” (Field, 1998). On the other hand, Russian is still important especially in the Baltic States. However, Gal (2006) argues that, after the post-Soviet language laws in the Baltic States, which require knowledge of such as Estonian for everyday and official use, the formerly privileged Russian speaking population became marginalized. She states that the “Estonian leaders justify their policies to voters inside Estonia by invoking the equation of

language with nation and state. In Europe-wide forums, by contrast, Estonian leaders claim to be considerate of minorities, thereby attempting to show themselves to be proper Europeans" (Gal, 2006,p.23).

Moreover, in her book Nic Craith (2006) states that, even with the predominance of English, the EU lacks a common *lingua franca;* and even though there have been some attempts to develop a set of EU symbols such as the EU anthem, emblem and flag, harmonized EU passports and car number-plates, these endeavors have failed to inspire individual citizens. Phillipson (2003) in his research, quoting from the US Ambassador to Denmark, Mr. Elton, affirms that the most serious problem for the EU is that it has so many languages which prevent the real integration and development of the Union.

On the other hand, Christiansen argues that Europe is not really linguistically diverse, since it is containing only 3.4% of the world's living oral languages. He continues to state that multilingualism is not actually a widespread phenomenon (Christiansen, 2006). A Eurobarometer survey of 2001 manifests that only the proportion of the EU citizens claim to be able to participate in a conversation in a 'foreign' language is only 44%. Furthermore, the linguistic resources of minorities are limited and marginalized (Eurobarometer 54, 2001). Likewise Arzoz (2008, p.47) claims that Europe's linguistic diversity is limited compared to its neighborhood. He points out that out of approximately 6,000 languages spoken in the world, only 200 are European (which means 3% of the world languages), while 1,900 (32%) are African, 1,900 (32%) are Asian, 1,100 (18%) are Pacific and Oceanic, and 900 (15%) are American. On the other hand, this limited feature of European linguistic diversity is only in relative terms according to Arzoz. He argues that even though Europe may be less diverse than some other regions of the world in linguistic terms, the linguistic variety within Europe is still an important reality of social, economic and political life of Europeans.

Furthermore, Karoly (2008) also draws attention to the imbalances in official language use in the EU, and he argues that in spite of the public ideologies, the European Union has one lingua franca, which is English. He states that although the

main input languages are English, French and German, there is a pragmatic hierarchy even between these languages (which he calls “privileged languages”). Even though French was the original working language used in the EU institutions in the first place, when the United Kingdom and Ireland became members of the Union, English dominated both the EU institutions and all other aspects of social, economic and political life of Europeans (Karoly, 2008).

Christiansen contributes to the argument of Karoly by stating that EU institutions appear to function in a remarkably undemocratic manner, and claims that in order to be informed about the EU’s policy and documents, it is indispensible to know English and sometimes French or German. Furthermore he argues that even though the high share allocated from the budget, the translation and interpretation services are also subject to inequality. He exemplifies the official speeches of EU bureaucrats which are usually translated only to a limited number of languages, such as Romano Prodi’s speech “the EU & its Citizens: a matter of Democracy” which is only available in English, French, German, Dutch and Italian (Christiansen, 2006).

Other examples given by Christiansen are on the dominance of English throughout the EU. He draws attention to the official newsletter “Innovation & Technical Transfer”, which is being published in only English. Moreover, he asserts that the inequality created by the dominance of English is also evident in the job applications. He states that in a job advertisement on information and communication, “excellent working knowledge of English, preferably mother tongue” deemed necessary, excluding a great extent of the EU citizens (Christiansen, 2006).

The spread of English as the language of global communication worries many, particularly speakers of languages that have lost their international function to English. Mamadouh draws attention to the fact that many people are worried about the long term effects of the dominance of English on the future of other European languages. He continues to state that some people even refer English as a “language killer” (Mamadouh, 2002).

Opposition to greater use of English or its being given a more formal status in Europe can be explained by the feelings of non-English mother-tongue speakers who feel disadvantaged, or feel their mother tongue or identity threatened. That gives rise to the moves which try to restrict the growing use of English as the common European language. For example the return to Latin or Greek was proposed by the cultural committee of the European Parliament, since these languages were regarded as the basis of European culture in a world surrounded by technology and pragmatism (Field, 1998).

4.2.3.2. The dominance & practice: How does it affect the European identity debates?

As it was argued above, unlike the official policy of the EU, the European institutions contain significant linguistic inequalities. This inequality reveals itself mainly as a hierarchy between languages, where English is at the top, and French and German usually coming behind. This inequality also affects the lives of the Europeans in many ways. For example, the right to access information and to reach the official documents of the EU institutions and the speeches of EU bureaucrats in the mother tongue is essential for an EU citizen. Thus, the limitation of the number of languages used in the EU restricts these essential rights of the EU citizens. One of the main researches that assess the impact of the inequality between the European languages was conducted by Ginsburgh and Weber who made an analysis on the disadvantages faced by EU citizens, by making use of the survey conducted by INRA in 2001 (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005).

Ginsburgh and Weber analyzed the fear about being disadvantaged of the members, and by making use of the survey conducted by INRA (Europe) on the order of Directorate of Education and Culture of the EU in 2001; they evaluated the language disenfranchisement[5] under the assumption of adopting a single language EU-wide.

[5] Disenfranchisement here refers to the situation in which a certain percentage of Europeans would lose their ability to understand the EU documents and some discussions, if the number of EU working

The term disenfranchisement here actually very well defines the situation that the Europeans would face in the case of adopting only one or a limited number of official languages within the EU. What I have mentioned in the previous sections is that the EU institutions are promoting the usage of certain languages over others which are used in a smaller extend (or not used outside their own country). If the EU institutions continue to this discrimination among European languages, it can be suggested that some of the Europeans would encounter with disenfranchisement, which means that they would lose their ability to reach easily to the basic EU documents and information.

In order to assess the possible effects of the tendency that has been going on, the survey of INRA was used by Ginsburgh and Weber, which included fifteen member states of the EU and approximately 1,000 interviews that were conducted in each member state to a representative sample of the national population aged 15 years and over, with some exceptions (2,000 in Germany, 1,300 in United Kingdom, and 600 in Luxemburg) (Europeans and their Languages, 2001).

In the survey, the known languages (mother tongue and other languages known), the perceived usefulness of the languages, the level and frequency of use of the foreign languages, and learning ways and reasons of the foreign languages were questioned.

According to the results of the survey, in each member state, the language cited most often as the mother tongue is the national language, while the highest rates are in Portugal (100%), followed by Italy and Greece (99% each). However, four new languages were also introduced additionally to the Eurobarometer 52.0 which was conducted a year ago, namely Irish, Luxembourgish, Turkish and sign language.

People's response to the question of the other languages they know was most frequently English (41%), followed by French (19%), German (10%), Spanish (7%) and Italian (3%). 47% of Europeans claim to know only their mother tongue.

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languages is reduced and some Europeans are denied to use their own language for official reasons (Ginsburg and Weber, 2005).

Table 1: Languages Known

	English (%)	French (%)	German (%)	Spanish (%)	Italian (%)
1st language	32.6	9.5	4.2	1.5	0.8
2nd language	6.8	7.8	4.3	3	1
3rd language	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.5	0.9
Total	40.5	19.2	10.3	6.6	3

Source: INRA, Europeans and Their Languages, 2001.

The results showed that (Figure 2) English is the first foreign language most used by Europeans (70% in Sweden, 66% in Denmark and 47% in Finland, with an EU-15 average of 33%). The second one is French (19% in Italy, 17% in the United Kingdom, 14% in Portugal and 10% in Spain and Ireland, with an EU-15 average of 10%), third German (28% in the Netherlands and 18% in Denmark, with an EU-15 average of 4%) and fourth Spanish (3% in France and the United Kingdom, with an EU-15 average of 2%).



Figure 2: First Foreign Language Known

Source: INRA, Europeans and Their Languages, 2001.
Notes: D: Germany, I: Italy, L: Luxemburg, NL: Netherlands, FIN: Finland, S: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom, DK: Denmark, IRL: Ireland, E: Spain, F: France.

Furthermore, when it comes to the usefulness of learning a foreign language, Europeans were asked to choose two languages they regard as the most useful to know apart from their mother tongue. In all member states, English was mentioned as the most useful language to know (75%), followed by French (40%), German (23%) and Spanish (18%).

However, another important point is the relation between the tendency to learn other languages and age groups of Europeans. It was seen that tendency to know other languages apart from the mother tongue diminishes as people grow older. 66% of the 15-24 year-olds claims to speak English, compared with 53% of the 25-39 year-olds, 38% of the 40-54 year-olds and 18% of the over-55s.

In this framework, Ginsburgh and Weber (2005) made use of this survey and evaluate the proportion of citizens who would lose their ability to access and understand main EU documents and discussions if only one language were chosen as a working language, which they call the " disenfranchisement rate" of the EU citizens.

So as to analyze the language disenfranchisement rates of the 15 member countries of the EU, first they used the six most spoken languages (English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Dutch). They compare the number of inhabitants who speak each language (they may speak more than one) with the native speaker population (country of origin and extensions, for instance, France and 40 per cent of Belgians for French), and found a "language multiplier" as a ratio between those who speak the language and the native speakers (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005, p.277-285).

Table 2: Main Languages in the EU

	Native Population (m)	Population that knows the language in the EU (m)	Language multiplier (units)
English	62.3	208.6	3.35
French	64.5	127.8	1.98
German	90.1	118.3	1.31
Italian	57.6	65.2	1.13
Spanish	39.4	56.3	1.43
Dutch	21.9	24.3	1.11

Source: Ginsburgh and Weber, Language Disenfranchisement in the EU, 2005.

The Table 2 shows that English is the most frequently used language, whose number of speakers is 3.35 times larger than the number of citizens whose native language is English. English is followed by French and German (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005, p.278).

Ginsburgh and Weber's main contribution can be seen in Table 3 below, which shows the percentage of citizens who would lose their ability to understand EU documents and some discussions, if only one language were chosen as a working language. Table 2 and 3 shows that English dominates, which is the widely used language among the EU countries. However, even though English is such common, in the case of the usage of only English as the single working language, 45% of the EU-15 population would be disenfranchisement anyway. On the other hand, the disenfranchisement rates increase in the cases of adopting the other five languages as the working language (66% in the case of adopting French, 69% for German, 83% for Italian, 85% for Spanish, and 94% for Dutch). Nevertheless, even though English is the best option in a case of choosing a single working language, the share of population which would lose its ability to understand and follow the EU documents and discussions is unacceptably high, especially in countries like Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain and Italy.

Ginsburgh and Weber also indicated that the disenfranchisement rates lower among the younger population as their knowledge of foreign languages is higher (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005, p.279). Among the younger population, the "English only" situation would disenfranchise only 27% of the population which is under the age of 40, which means that "if the whole EU population had the habits shared by those who are younger than 40, there would be 76 million more English-speaking Europeans than today" (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005, p.279).

Additionally, when the largest enlargement wave of 2004 and after 2007 are also considered, it is obvious that these new member countries are more German-oriented than French. "German is the EU language with by far the largest number of native speakers, and has functioned as a lingua franca in many central and eastern European countries, a role which English is progressively taking over" (Phillipson,

2008, p.3). For example, in the largest joining country, Poland, French is hardly spoken while German had a substantial effect. "According to Polityka, 27 July 2002, 58 per cent of the population know only Polish, while 16 per cent speak English, 14 per cent German and only 2 per cent have a knowledge of French. A rough calculation shows that this would add 5.4 million more German speakers, and only 0.8 million French speakers" (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005, p.283). The preeminence of German over French becomes more evident when new members such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic countries are also considered in addition to Poland, where German is spoken more often than French.

Table 3: Disenfranchisement Rates in the EU

		Disenfranchisement Rates					
	Population (m)	E	F	G	I	S	D
Austria	8.1	54	89	1	93	99	100
Belgium	10.2	60	25	90	95	99	31
Denmark	5.3	25	95	63	100	98	100
Finland	5.1	39	99	93	100	99	100
France	60.4	58	0	92	95	85	100
Germany	82.0	46	84	3	99	98	99
Greece	10.5	53	88	88	92	95	95
Italy	57.6	61	71	96	1	97	100
Ireland	3.7	5	77	94	99	98	100
Luxemburg	0.4	81	9	26	89	97	96
Netherlands	15.8	30	81	41	98	99	1
Portugal	10.8	65	72	98	99	96	100
Spain	39.4	64	81	98	98	1	100
Sweden	8.9	21	93	69	100	96	99
UK	58.6	1	78	91	98	95	100
EU-15	376.8	45	66	69	83	85	94

Source: Ginsburgh and Weber, Language Disenfranchisement in the EU, 2005.
Notes: E: English only, F: French only, G: German only, I: Italian only, S: Spanish only, D: Dutch only.

Since language is a crucial component of people's identity, as well as being the most important means of communication, sacrificing the languages of a large proportion of the European citizens cannot be acceptable. This is why, except the native English speakers, the European countries are all against the dominance of English in Europe. Nonetheless, there is a remarkable contradiction in their stance

against English, since the ones who furthered the predominance of English is themselves (Ammon, 2006, p.323).

Ammon, in this regard, exemplifies Germany as a country whose language has a wide international function and who is annoyed by the spread of English, but who at the same time has been more eager than the others to promote English as a foreign language in its country (Ammon, 2006, p.323). The initial aim of Germany to promote English was to substitute French as the most frequently used foreign language in its country. Thus, especially during the Nazi period, English was generally upgraded to replace French in schools.

The main steps of the policy of promoting English in Germany, was first of all starting to teach English from the beginning of the primary level of the schools; then introducing international study programmes in the tertiary educational level with English as a medium of teaching; and finally making English widespread in business circles (Ammon, 2006, p.325).

However, as Germany's capacity to communicate internationally in English grew, the threat of the decrease of international function of the national language increased. Since upgrading English also has side-effects such as diminishing the importance of German in the international fora, Germany has continued to promote its own language abroad parallel to the promotion of English within the country (Ammon, 2006, p.324). As Phillipson asserts, "foreign languages were learned for external communication purposes and familiarity with the cultural heritage associated with 'great' powers" (Phillipson, 2008, p.2). Thus the promotion of English as a foreign language reduced the importance of learning German as a foreign language in an unforeseen way. Teaching too much English in such an early age raised the doubts about whether the foreigners would lose interest in studying German as a foreign language together with the fears of loss of national identity tied up to national language. "Thus the Verein Deutsche Sprache, Germany's most popular private language organization, demanded that English should be accompanied at the primary level 'by additional teaching content which could stabilize students' national identity" (Ammon, 2006, p.325). Even though this offer

was not accepted and also “not supported by the smaller but more prestigious private language organisation Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache”, it clearly indicates the worries about German language (Ammon, 2006, p.325).

The aforementioned worries are not limited to Germany of course. The less their language is used in official EU institutions and documents, the less the European citizens feel that they are represented in EU institutions as European citizens. Ginsburgh and Weber states that “if the Parliament does not recognize their language, it is less likely that citizens will recognize it as being their Parliament” (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005, p.284).

As it is seen from the above-mentioned discussions, there are a number of important points that need to be addressed about the trend of the EU on language issues.

- It is well-known that the EU is promoting the linguistic diversity within the Union, whose language policies aim to protect linguistic variety and encourage the knowledge of languages. While the main reason behind this policy of the EU is to preserve the identities and ensure social integration, it is seen that the educational and professional opportunities for EU citizens are also closely related to language knowledge. Thus, it is necessary to make the EU a multilingual Union so as to provide equal opportunities for the EU citizens in the fields of education, communication, and vocation. Nonetheless, the practical implementations of the EU institutions do not comply with these aforementioned targets and priorities of the EU and its citizens. The purpose of making the EU a multilingual Union in which citizens can speak at least two other languages, is being damaged by the dominance of English. English is the most commonly known language by the European citizens. . As it can be seen from Table 1, 40.5% of Europeans declared to know English in the first place other than their mother tongue. After English, there are French with 19.2% and German with 10.3%; which means that whereas the dominance of English is obvious, the second and third language choices of the Europeans still show the Franco-German axis

of the EU. English is at the same time the first foreign language most frequently used by the Europeans, and being regarded as the most useful foreign language to learn. . As shown in Figure 2, in average 33% of the EU-15 most frequently use English as the first foreign language. This numbers increase in the countries such as Sweden (70%), Denmark (66%), and Finland (47%). Not surprisingly, the second and third languages most frequently used are respectively French (10% in EU-15 average) and German (4% in EU-15 average). As it will be discussed in the section below, the policies of the EU institutions do not aim to reverse or amend this situation; on the contrary, they reinforce the dominance of English and reproduce the inequalities between the languages.

- In the previous section, the inequality between the official languages of the EU, which was created by the EU itself, was stated. This inequality, in practice, highly affects the political, social and economic life of the EU citizens. It was mentioned that the official EU documents and speeches of EU bureaucrats are translated only into a number of EU languages, excluding smaller official languages as well as minority languages. Thus, this practice of the EU, which is certainly not complying with its official statements, damaging certain basic rights of its citizens, such as accessing information in the mother tongue. This damage becomes more crucial in the countries whose languages are used lesser out of their own country, such as the CEECs (Poland being a significant example). This situation deteriorates the inequality between the European languages to the detriment of the CEECs, by affecting them more than the other European countries (such as United Kingdom, Germany or France).
- The effects of the dominance of English and its results on the EU citizens were shown in Table 2 and 3. As a result, it is seen that, in the condition of choosing only one language as the working language of the EU, an non-ignorable proportion of the EU citizens would lose their ability to access and understand main EU documents and discussions. It is concluded that the adoption of English as the single language of the EU reduces the disenfranchisement rates in the EU member states, since English is the most

frequently used language, whose number of speakers is 3.35 times larger than the number of citizens whose native language is English (Table 2). Even in that case, however, the share of population which would lose the ability to understand and follow the main EU documents would be unacceptably high. . As seen from Table 3, if English would be accepted as the single language, 45% of the people of EU-15 would be disenfranchise in average. The disenfranchisement rates go even higher in the countries like Luxemburg (81%), Portugal (65%), Spain (64%) and Italy (61%). %). Moreover, in the case of adopting French or German as the single language, the disenfranchisement rates increase more specifically. For the EU-15 it becomes 66% in average when French is adopted and 69% in average when German is adopted.

- With respect to the disenfranchisement rates in the EU countries, another important point needs to be addressed is, while the foreign language learning has been increasing in the last years, the rate of foreign language learning is far higher among the young population compared to the elder population which means the disenfranchisement rates are also lower among the youngsters. Thus, in the case of adopting only one language throughout Europe (the language with the highest possibility for that seems to be English), the young population would be the least affected ones; the "English only" situation would disenfranchise only 27% of the population which is under the age of 40. One of the most remarkable points is that this tendency of learning foreign languages among young population is seen in each EU member country. This trend complies with the official language policies of the EU, whose policies and initiatives generally target the younger EU citizens, as it will be mentioned in the following section in more detail. However, while the EU aims at creating a plurilingual young population and promotes their learning of foreign languages, the dominance of English causes a dilemma for the European Commission. In the following section, I will mention this dilemma by making use of some key policies of the Commission.

- Another aspect of the discrimination in the language policy and dominance of English is the eastern enlargement of the EU. The eastern enlargement, which generally involved the ex-Soviet countries, as well as the ones which have been under German influence, such as Poland. Whereas in the EU-15, French had a more prominent role, the countries of the eastern enlargement have been more German-oriented than French-oriented. Thus, they have made substantial change in the language mosaic of the Union after their accession. While these countries could not be excluded from the EU-wide dominance of English, their past tendencies towards German culture and language complicated the transition for them. As a specific example, Poland had to face with the pressure of two main languages (German and English) apart from its national language (Polish).

One can understand from the abovementioned discussions that language is a controversial issue for the European Union. Whereas, in the era of globalization, in which communication regarded critical to social, intellectual, political, economic and moral concerns, languages gained a new importance parallel to their principle role for ensuring communication. Within this framework, since identities are regarded as "fields of communication", language becomes the basis for defining an identity (Shore, 1993, p.782). Moreover, while language is one of the core elements of an individual's identity, it is also an important part of the community identities, such as the European identity. This importance of language made it a crucial tool for exercising social and political control, of which the EU is well aware. Thus, regarding this important role of language on identities and on the other issues related to the EU citizens and states, the European Commission started implementing several language policies. It is stated previously that the main aim of the EU while implementing these language policies is to ensure linguistic diversity within the Union, to encourage European citizens to make them learn at least two foreign languages, so as to create a multilingual and multicultural environment. However, this target contrasts with the reality- in reality, the EU institutions cause many inequalities between the languages; and instead of promoting every language they bring certain ones forward. Within this context, English emerged as a lingua franca for the EU, both at the individual and the institutional levels, which raised the

worries of the other European countries of losing the importance of their national languages.

All in all, while the linguistic diversity increased and regarded as a threat to the European identity, dominance of a single language –English in the case of the European Union- was also seen as a major danger. The dominance of one language means that the non-speakers of that language would face a huge threat of losing their ability to communicate, to participate in discussion in the social fora and to reach information in their mother tongue. Since language is one of the most important element that create, shape and maintain one's identity, not to be able to use the mother tongue constitutes a great danger regarding the identities of individuals and nations. This is one of the major reasons for the increase of the linguistic policies conducted by the European Commission. Yet, the European Commission, while targeting the promotion of multilingualism, also paves the way for the dominance of English among the European institutions with its policies. Thus in the following section I will make mention of the language policies of the European Union as a part of the formation of the European identity.

4.2.4. Language Policies of the European Union

Regarding the threat of the dominance of English and the increasing multilingualism in Europe, the European Union felt the need to implement specific policies for both preserving the linguistic diversity in the Union and to prevent it from adversely affect the European identity. Additionally, European states have been implementing language policies in the national level to preserve their national languages against the threat of English. A few intended language policies were mentioned in the previous section such as measures to guarantee the status of Swedish language, French initiative to maintain the use of their language, and Germany's policy to spread the use of German.

As Urbaniec (2006) argues, all countries concern about the protection of their national language as a part of their national identity, whether or not being a member of the EU. The minorities inside the country, the neighbour countries and the general

economic and social structure of the world prompt the countries to fight for their identity, and strive for protecting it (Urbaniec, 2006, p.3).

Within this framework, the EU has to adopt a common language policy in the institutional level in order to respond the debates on multilingualism and to smooth the worries of the member states regarding the dominance of English. Urbaniec (2006) argues that in order to preserve and develop the richness and diversity of European culture and language, it is essential to extend the use and learning of national and regional languages, as well as the ones which are rarely used and taught. She claims that the ability of communication among the European countries is only possible in a multicultural and multilingual Europe which is beyond cultural and linguistic barriers (Urbaniec, 2006, p.4).

In this vein, Mamadouh (2002) states that there are different language policies; some with the aim of influencing the language use, some have linguistic effects by itself without any purposely linguistic intention. He claims that many policies have effects on language by affecting the position of speakers of certain languages, or the status and the continuation of these languages. Furthermore, he indicates the creation of the internal market as an example and points out the new linguistic issues that emerged by its creation; such as the debates on the necessity of language requirements for labels on consumer goods. He asks to question of whether these requirements are legitimate demands or intolerable limitations to free competition. (Mamadouh, 2002).

However, the EU also has language policies that have been conducting on purpose to affect the linguistic forms of its members. Gal (2006) argues that linguistic standardization has been one of the key features of the language policies of the EU. In this regard, the EU has introduced many initiatives on European languages, as well as minority or "lesser-used languages", and made several official regulations, which will be explained in the following section.

4.2.4.1. Policy Initiatives of the EU on Legal and Institutional Basis

It is clear that the EU regards the linguistic diversity as an asset for its members officially, and in its official documents, the preservation of multilingualism is always being mentioned. However, at the same time, it is trying to reduce the negative effects of the multilingualism throughout the Union, while preventing English from being the lingua franca.

In this framework, it is stated that the studies funded or the policies recommended by the EU contain the ideal of diversity in language and culture (Gal, 2006). Gal exemplifies the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages that was established by the EC in 1982 and has been supported by the EU. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) was adopted in 1992, under the auspices of the Council of Europe to protect and promote historical regional and minority languages in Europe. In 1995 the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) was signed by the member states of the Council of Europe. Also Gal states that a communication was published by the Commission to the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the Committee of the Regions in the Action Plan 2004-06 which called for 'promoting language learning and linguistic diversity'. She also argues that the Council of Europe is encouraging more and better language teaching to make each European citizen communicate in a minimum of two languages in addition to his/her mother tongue (Gal, 2006).

On the other hand, there have been parallel developments in the foreign language education in the EU. In 1980s, the language policy was mainly conducted through the adoption of incentive measures targeting minority languages and lesser used national languages. In this framework, since the late 1980s, supplementary mobility programmes were introduces such as Erasmus for Higher Education in 1987 and Lingua in 1989 in the area of foreign language education including at school level (LETPP, 2011).

Moreover, Article 126 of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 "encourages cooperation between member states in the sphere of education, and in particular calls

for the development of the European dimension in education through the teaching and dissemination of languages" (LETTP, 2011).

The logic of Maastricht Treaty that suggests teaching and dissemination of languages of the members is the core of the educational policy maintained and taken further in by the White Paper of 1995. In the White Paper it is stated that language learning is no longer the preserve of the elite, but it is necessary for everybody irrespective of training and education routes chosen; and every European should learn at least three Community languages (LETTP, 2011).

Besides, in 2000, the three language policy of the White Paper was included as a key element in the Lisbon Strategy, and aimed at making the EU 'the most dynamic and competitive knowledge based economy in the world'. Furthermore, this policy was reiterated at the Barcelona Council of 2004, which defined it as 'mother tongue plus two' policy "and called for 'further action… to improve the mastery of basic skills, in particular by teaching at least two foreign languages from a very early age'" (LETTP, 2011).

Afterwards, the "European Year of Languages" of 2001 was one of the significant initiatives that aim to promote and disseminate multilingualism, which was a joint initiative of the EU and the Council of Europe. "Heads of the State and Government in Barcelona in March 2002 recognised the need for European Union and Member State action to improve language learning; they called for further action to improve the mastery of basic skills, in particular by teaching at least two foreign languages to all from a very early age" (Action Plan for Promoting language learning and linguistic diversity, 2004, p.4).

"A European Parliament Resolution of 13 December 2001 called for measures to promote language learning and linguistic diversity. On 14 February 2002 the Education Council invited Member States to take concrete steps to promote linguistic diversity and language learning, and invited the European Commission to draw up proposals in these fields" (Action Plan for Promoting language learning and linguistic diversity, 2004, p.4).

The Action Plan of 2004 (Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004- 2006) and the Framework Strategy on Multilingualism of 2005 have been important indicators of the EU's vision of a multilingual Europe.

The Action Plan identified measures to support national language policy objectives at a supranational level, while the Framework Strategy on Multilingualism of 2005 introduced a comprehensive strategy for the new millennium, which was the first strategy of its kind. The Framework Strategy also included the support for the languages of minorities and immigrants of Europe (LETTP, 2011).

The language policy initiated and developed up to 2005 was reaffirmed in a series of new strategic documents between 2007 and 2009.



Figure 3: Language Policy Milestones of the EU

Also, even though it is suggested that the common market principles outlined in the Lisbon Strategy have been to increase the dominance of English as lingua franca, the Report of the Civil Society Platform on Multilingualism of 2011 states that the protection of linguistic variety was defined as a core European value in the Lisbon Treaty as well as in the accompanying Charter of Fundamental Rights, and it is placed at the heart of the European project. (Report of the Civil Society Platform on Multilingualism, 2011). Nonetheless, it is ironic that the aforementioned Report, which denies the dominance of English and defends multilingualism within the EU, was published and available only in English. Many other EU documents under the topics of "business and languages", "linguistic diversity in Europe" and "regional and minority languages" are also available only in English; only sometimes their short versions are translated into other EU languages. Publishing the key documents of the EU in only English, or in certain EU languages, other than publishing them in all 23 official languages, generates a remarkable contradiction between the official language policy of the EU and the implementation of the EU institutions.

Nevertheless, Gal (2006) asserts that this emphasis on linguistic diversity is deceptive. She points to the dearth of signatories on the key agreements on language and to the deficiency of policy enforcement.

4.2.4.2. Introducing Language Use from the Start: Language Education

As language policy is gaining more and more importance while Europe is facing with economic, social and cultural change, education policy became significant among other language policy issues. Thus, foreign language learning among European countries is being promoted by the members, while they are also promoting their national language to be taught as a foreign language to the other countries.

In this regard, Phillipson asserts that "among the key educational language policy issues in contemporary Europe are; ensuring the continued vitality of national languages, rights for minority languages, diversification in foreign language learning, and the formation of a European Higher Education Area (the Bologna process)"

(Phillipson, 2008, p.1). Germany's policy change, that mentioned in the previous section, starting from the beginning of the Second World War towards promoting English as the main foreign language taught in German schools (both in primary and higher education), and popularize English also in the business world are clear examples of diversification in foreign language learning. On the other hand, German people's fear about the degradation of their national language both within the country, and in the eyes of the foreigners, so their endeavours to promote German as a foreign language are also examples for ensuring the continued vitality of national languages.

Mamadouh (2002) highlights the substance of language education as a major part of language policies. He asserts that the discussion among experts (language teachers, linguists, etc.) concerns ways to improve foreign language teaching and to enhance the ability of pupils to enter multilingual encounters, by increasing both their proficiency in foreign languages and their awareness of multilingual and multicultural communication. "If a common language were to be adopted in the EU, education policies in member states would have to promote such a language as one of the main languages in basic education" (Mamadouh, 2002).

In parallel, Phillipson argues that foreign language learning has begun to shift to a more communicatively oriented learning style, which is starting in the earlier ages than before, though the traditional focus on literature often remains at the upper secondary and university levels. He also suggests that literature is being supplemented by an increasing focus on the cultures of English-speaking countries, particularly the USA and the UK (Phillipson, 2008, p.2).

In the EU the language policy of 1980s was mainly conducted through the adoption of incentive measures targeting minority languages and lesser used national languages. It was since the late 1980s that the supplementary mobility programmes were introduced such as Erasmus for Higher Education in 1987 and Lingua in 1989 in the area of foreign language education including at school level (LETPP, 2011). The policy of teaching at least two foreign languages at schools has been

recommended since the 1980s by the Council of Europe, and became EU policy in the 1990s (Phillipson, 2008, p.3).

As said before, the policies that aim to affect the language use of Europeans conducted by the European Commission which has the utmost importance regarding the policies of the EU. The European Commission, appointed by the national governments and pledged to act in the interests of the EU, epitomizes the supranationalism and lies at the centre of the Community system (Dinan, 1994, p.200). Besides, it has been the motor of the European enlargement and integration. In the same vein, the language policies have also been conducted under the auspices of the European Commission, and especially targeted the young population, which will be explained in more detail in the following section.

In this framework, it can be suggested that one of the mains reason behind the language policy of the Commission that aims to teach at least two foreign languages derived from the fear of English's dominance among Europe. Thus promoting the learning of foreign languages and their cultures seemed like a solution to moderate the threat of English as a lingua franca.

The Action Plan 2004-2006 of Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity that was mentioned in the previous section was also designed to restrain the focus on English in world-wide education systems. This goal was clearly stated in the Action Plan; "the range of foreign languages spoken by Europeans is narrow, being limited mainly to English, French, German, and Spanish. Learning one lingua franca alone is not enough. Every European citizen should have meaningful communicative competence in at least two other languages in addition to his or her mother tongue… Higher Education institutions play a key role in promoting societal and individual multilingualism… In non-anglophone countries recent trends to provide teaching in English may have unforeseen consequences on the vitality of the national language. University language policies should therefore include explicit actions to promote the national or regional language" (Action Plan for Promoting language learning and linguistic diversity, 2004, p.4 and 8).

The expanding role of English in the higher education also cannot be ignored. This tendency was one of the driving forces of the Bologna Process, which has been aiming at forming a European Higher Education Area since 1999. In the framework of this Process, in which governments of 45 European countries are committed, bi-annual meetings are being held to coordinate national and university policies.

The agenda set by the EU for the Bologna Process including the implementation of a monotype structure for the undergraduate and graduate degrees, as well as for the domestic and external quality control, exchanges of students, double degrees, joint study programmes and the like (Phillipson, 2008, p.4). On the other hand, Phillipson argues that whilst at first the Bologna Process was more oriented towards the autonomy of universities and respect for languages and cultures, recent policy statements focus on internationalisation and 'English-medium higher education', more than language policy and multilingualism in Europe (Phillipson, 2008, p.4).

Moreover, the only countries that hold the "observer" status in the Bologna Process are USA and Australia, due to their high earnings from the international education. Thus, one of the main aims of the Bologna Process is to make international education in Europe as attractive as it is in the USA and the Commonwealth countries (Phillipson, 2008, p.4). Though, it is not deniable that there is a commercial rational behind these goals in addition to the cultural and political aspects.

Furthermore, the "language teacher training" also gained much more importance. "The 'Education and training 2010' programme is elaborating 'Common European principles for teacher competences and qualifications', with language learning as one of twelve 'key objectives and areas of cooperation'" (Phillipson, 2008, p.3).

While the demand for learning English both as a foreign language and also as the education language in the universities increased, another discussion emerged: Whether the European language teachers are qualified enough to teach through the medium of English apart from their mother tongues. Furthermore, academics and

researchers are also expected to study and publish work in English in addition to the national language as a result of the disciplinary pressures (Phillipson, 2008, p. 5). Thus, European Universities developed new models for education language. For example, in Sweden and Denmark, multilingual universities determine a condition of "parallel competence" in both English and the national language (Phillipson, 2008, p. 5).

Finland also made a large investment on enhancing multilingualism in the universities, and indicated in the language policy of the University of Jyväskylä that it is the responsibility of the Finnish universities to strengthen Finnish, English, and other languages at the same time. Swedish, which is the mother tongue of 5.8% of the population, was also promoted as an education language in other Finnish universities (Phillipson, 2008, p. 5).

On the other hand, in the Southern and Eastern European countries, in which Russian and German were more influential , the spread of English was not that deep-rooted, as it was mentioned in the previous section. Generally, even though English has been taught as a foreign language in the primary school, teacher qualifications were not an important matter of question (Phillipson, 2008, p. 5).

Furthermore the education policy of the Ministry of Education of France was oriented to ensure the learning and monitoring of two foreign languages so as to promote the personal competence in more than one language (Phillipson, 2008, p. 5).

All in all, the learning and promoting English and the other languages end up with the same worries about the threat of English's dominance. Phillipson argues that in theory, there shouldn't be a problem since national languages such as German, Italian and Polish are very strong, and the EU always promotes linguistic diversity in its official documents. However, while on the one hand, the policies towards promoting multilingualism (at least the learning of two languages) increases the repertoire of language competence of individuals and the society; on the other hand it increases the fear of losing the international function of the national language, as well as an important component of the national identity.

Apart from the debates on the spread of English, Christiansen draws attention to the undemocratic structure of the linguistic regime of the EU, and offers a language policy that is necessary for developing a democratic, integrated Union in his point of view. In this respect, he establishes three criteria of equality: the first one is that a democratic language policy needs to *function multilingually* as well as considering the financial perspective. Second, to guarantee full citizen participation, a language policy for an intergovernmental forum needs to be democratic, to ensure full participation for both minorities and majorities. Thirdly, a language policy needs to be ecological. The meaning of 'ecological' is that, it has to contribute to the ecology of all languages, so that all the different linguistic groups are able to communicate without neglecting any of the languages used (Christiansen, 2006).

In short, he argues that a functional multilingual, democratic, ecological language policy is a requirement for intergovernmental settings if democratic processes are to take hold, and participation of all linguistic groups is to be ensured. In this framework, he offers 10 different linguistic scenarios for the future of the EU, and concludes that common use of tree working languages (English/French/German) in the short term is the most democratically sound, fair and equitable solution, while in the long term the optimal policy alternative would be employing a planned language (such as Esperanto) as lingua franca and thereby contributing to establishing a democratic public sphere in the EU.

In conclusion, Mamadouh (2002) indicates that the linguistic issue is generally framed as a dilemma between communication and identity. The promotion of EU-wide communication between social and political actors is supposed to be best served by a common language, whereas the protection national and other language-based identities necessitates the protection of the different languages in use in Europe and of language diversity itself. Since there seems to be no practicable compromise between improving EU-wide communication and respecting national linguistic identities, the issue has been avoided by both EU and national politicians, and language policies at the EU level have remained limited in scope.

4.2.4.3. Languages of the Youth: Policies of the European Commission

The foreign language learning tendency of the youth has been explained in the previous section, and it was mentioned that the foreign language learning rate is far higher among the young population compared to the elder population. Of course, the effects of globalization and the facilitation of accessing information worldwide have substantial impact on the linguistic trends of the European youth, and foreign language learning among young population is increasing every day in all EU member countries. This trend complies with the official language policies of the EU, whose policies and initiatives generally target the younger EU citizens to promote foreign language learning, translation and education abroad. It is evident that the European Commission has specialized policies on language on the young population. Whereas almost all EU policies are aimed at preserving the linguistic diversity of the Union and promoting every language in Europe, the role of English is also growing parallel to the tendency of learning foreign languages, and the dominance of English is also much more tangible on the European youth.

As it was pointed out in the previous section, the European Commission has been the motor of the enlargement and policies regarding integration. When the language policy of the European Commission is examined, it can be seen that emphasis on the language learning of the youth is significant. Apparently, youth has been indispensable for the formation of any identity. Thus, in the case of the EU, the Commission is well-aware of the fact that European youth would be influential on the establishment of the European identity, as well as the language use of Europe. That is why the Commission has targeted the youth in many of its language policies, as it will be pointed out below. Nevertheless, the contradictions of the language policy of the European Commission and the implicit promotion of the use of English are apparent in the case of its youth policy as well.

One of the clearest examples of the linguistic inequality and the dominance of English on the policies of European Commission is that the official webpage of the Commission on "youth" is only available in English, German, and French. Additionally, when the latest key documents of the European Commission on

language teaching and learning are examined, such as the reports, studies, policy recommendations and surveys, it is seen that like the other Commission documents on other areas, these are again in English, sometimes additionally in French, German, and Spanish.

In addition to the inequality while publishing the official documents, there are also several contradictions in other parts of the language policy of the EU regarding the European youth. For instance, a study made by the European Commission on the ways of motivating Europeans to learn languages, named "50 ways to motivate language learners" in 2005 is one of the remarkable examples. While the aim of the study is to motivate the European youth to learn different languages, the executive summary of the study is only in English, and the full study is available in English, French, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish (LINGO: 50 ways to motivate language learners, 2005).

Besides, it is seen that the brochures and leaflets published by the Commission on young Europeans are always available in English, some of them also in German and French, and rarely in other EU languages. For example while the leaflets about the "Youth in Action" programme of the EU in 2007 promote mobility and intercultural dialogue regardless of the education, social and cultural background of the youth; they are only published in certain languages.

Furthermore, the inequality reveals itself more clearly in a contest that was held by the European Commission for the youth by means of the 25th anniversary of the Erasmus program between the dates of 29th February and 30th April of 2012. According to the contest, the previous Erasmus students were to share their Erasmus experiences in one of the 27 EU countries or Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Croatia, Turkey, and Switzerland on Facebook. The first price was a tablet pc, while the second one is an mp4 player, and the third one was a digital camera. Anyone who has been abroad on an Erasmus exchange from any of the EU countries (or the 6 non-EU countries that were mentioned above) could take part in the contest. However, it was clearly mentioned in the advertisement that English is preferred in the contest by the European Commission; by stating "Please tell your story

preferably in English". (Youth on the Move, 2012). Thus, when the stories posted to the Facebook page of the contest are examined, it is seen that even though there are participants from various countries such as Romania, Poland, Germany, Turkey and Finland, every single post was written in only English, as it was requested by the Commission.

Apart from various education and training policies of the EU targeting the European youth, the European Commission also has several policies on European languages, including the promotion of the official languages and translation. For example, in November 2001, the European Commission held a competition among 17 year-old school students to choose the one who produces the best translation, under the name of "*Juvenes Translatores (Young Translators)".* Under the rules of the competition, the participants were to choose one of the 23 languages, and translate a text into another EU language. Even though the language composition was reached 148 (the highest since the launch of the competition in 2007), the majority of the students chose English as the source language. The students were awarded a trophy and a certificate by Androulla Vassiliou, the Commissioner for Education, Multilingualism and Youth (European Commission, 2012).

In this section, I have mentioned language policies implemented by both nation-states to preserve their national language and by the European Union to create a linguistic identity for Europe as well as other policies with linguistic effects. These policies all aimed at forming and shaping the European identity by affecting linguistic structure of the member states; which is a more complicated process in the Central and Eastern European Countries regarding their diversified linguistic structures. Thus, in the following section, I will focus on the transformation process of these countries into European countries while focusing of the linguistic changes took place in them. Within this context, with reference to the Europeanization process that was explained in the Chapter 1, I will draw attention to the Central and Eastern European Countries with a special reference to the transition period and policies in Poland.

CHAPTER 5

LANGUAGE AND EASTERN ENLARGEMENT RELATION:

POLISH EXAMPLE

5.1. Introduction

While analysing the question of identity within the context of European enlargement, it is necessary to put special reference on the Eastern enlargement, which was relatively more sensitive regarding this issue. As Mar-Molinero and Setevenson (2006) state in their book, the year of 2004 was significant which was both the 15th anniversary of the events of 1989 that ended the Cold-War era and the date of the accession of ten new member states to the EU, namely the Eastern enlargement. This development paved the way to both a process of social transformation and a process of unification which "renewed and heightened the tension between national and supra-national interests" Along the same lines, conflicting language ideologies, policies and practices were one of the most substantial indicators of this tension between the promotion of, and resistance to social, economic and political unification (Mar-Molinero and Stevenson, 2006).

Within this framework, in this section I will try to examine the effects of the latest enlargement on European identity by focusing on the case of Poland, which has a different position among other CEECs regarding its historical, national and traditional bonds and its affinity to nation, religion and especially language. As Duszak (2006) argues, the separation of Poland from the Soviet bloc and afterwards its accession to the EU caused a recontextualization of its relationship with Europe in terms of a problematic Western orientation. Additionally, in comparison to the other accession countries, taking into account its territory and number of citizens, Poland is relatively a more significant accession country. And as a third aspect, the perception of Western Europe towards Poland as "European but not quite European" increases

the significance of this country. Within this scope, I will focus on Poland among the Eastern European countries. After discussing this process of integration and transformation in Poland, I will try to focus on the language aspect, since "ethnolinguistic nationalism is thought to be a special problem of Eastern Europe" (Gal, 2006).

5.2. Eastern Aspect of the Enlargement

5.2.1. Integrating the 'European but not so European' Ones: Polish Example

Whilst the European project was said to be a unification and integration project of the whole continent; the issue of including which European countries to the project has been unclear and the borders of Europe have always been contested. Within this perspective, the attitude of the Western European countries towards central and eastern regions is of utmost importance. In this regard, Mälksoo (2010) uses Edward Said's conceptualization of orientalism and claims that it was applied as 'semi-orientalization' of Eastern Europe by the EU member states. The Eastern European countries that were denominated as the 'latecomers' by the use of the term 'new Europe', and by this means separated from the 'true Europeanness'. Having been historically regarded at the middle of the West and the East, these Eastern Bloc countries were placed as "European but not quite European" (Mälksoo, 2010). "The positioning of Eastern European countries as liminal to the project of united Europe has been constitutive for the EU, which has essentially been a Western European project, with Western European origins and core aims. ... In Derrida's terms, 'Eastern Europe' has historically been a supplement to 'Western Europe': secondary to the privileged 'West' but simultaneously necessary for the latter's self-completion and appraisal" (Mälksoo, 2010).

Even though the separation over the Cold War reinforced the "European but not quite European" attitude towards East European countries, this orientalist approach can also be seen in the writings as early as First World War era. For example, in 1919, in his book "The New Eastern Europe" Ralph Butler pointed out the lack of information of the Western Europe about the Eastern parts. He asserted that even the further regions such as the Balkans, the Islamic territories and the Far

East was better known by England. Similarly, in the drama Ubu Roi (1888), Poland was referred as “meaning nowhere” by Alfred Jarry (Mälksoo, 2010)..

Whereas the Eastern Europe seemed so far away from the Western world, the European borders were never durable. The geographical definition of Europe changed throughout the history depending on the political, economic and ideological conjuncture. Within this framework, Gal (2006) points out the changeability of European borders, and indicates the inconstancy of the geographical definition of Europe. She claims that the central and eastern countries of the continent were directly subject to the exclusion and inclusion process and the Balkans, Russia and the German lands as well as Scandinavia were well documented examples. “A surprising Scandinavian graffito exclaims: ‘Asia begins in Malmö’. In the European south, a similar fractal contrast with Africa is often invoked, producing tags such as ‘Sicily, the Africa of Europe’” (Gal, 2006). In this sense, it is seen that Europe is a moving entity, a cultural perspective with borders that are changeable in interactional time. This exclusion and inclusion practice can also be triggered for the migrant populations and their language forms, “so that European cities are divided by certain speakers into streets and neighbourhoods that are less European or ‘not-European’ at all” (Gal, 2006, p.25).

As a result, Poland has historically been positioned within the geographical Europe, but was simultaneously put in the loop of being ‘less European’ than its Western counterparts, and therefore strived to be accepted as a European country. This contradiction makes Poland a distinct field of study regarding its transition and transformation process towards the EU and as well, as a member of the EU since 2004.

Within the framework I have mentioned above, it is necessary to examine the key features of the Polish identity to understand its transition to Europe and to question the transformation of Polish identity to a European one.

Polish national identity is deeply contested. It is strongly shaped by its history: the memories of great Polish war victories; repeated uprisings against foreign domination; and years of lost independence, which served to enforce Polish

cultural identity. But it is also shaped by its historical links to the Catholic Church (Killingsworth, et al., 2010). As Ociepka and Ryniejska (2005) also argue that focusing on the past in Poland goes hand in hand with a strong stress put on national identity and religion. The Polish notion of nationality is deeply rooted in ethnicity and culture which in international politics results in slogans relating to the defence of Polish national identity. They continue to assert that the Polish society is one of the most traditional and conservative societies in the EU. "In some countries of the EU, Polish Catholicism dominates other factors important for the image of the country (as in Germany, where 'Pole' is 'Kathole')".

Regarding the importance of tradition to Poland, a survey was carried out in Poland, namely the 'European Social Survey', by the Polish Academy of Science in Warsaw, which pointed out that 70.3% of Poland thinks that tradition is a good solution for a country. The positive approach towards tradition is higher in only Greece where 83.4% of people answered 'yes' to the same question. The third highest was Portugal, which had the same results with Poland. On the opposite end of the scale, there was Switzerland (35.2%), Sweden (36.5%) and Ireland (37.3%) (Ociepka and Ryniejska, 2005).

What was remarkable in this research is that while Polish people usually compared themselves with Irish people during the integration to the EU, the difference between these two Catholic countries was significant regarding their perception of tradition. Because the Polish people generally relate tradition with Roman Catholicism. Only 21% of Polish people stated that it would be better for the country if it is inhabited by people with different religions; and only Greece was more conservative than Poland on this issue (Ociepka and Ryniejska, 2005).

On the other hand, the Polish elites have always looked at the 'West' for intellectual and artistic inspiration, and Poland's Western roots had been traditionally cherished. Similarly, Latin and French were prestige varieties in the higher circles of society. In this regard, after the Second World War, Polish society found itself in a particular form of axiological schizophrenia between the official policies being overtly pro-Soviet and the unofficial pro-Western. (Duzsak, 2006). This dilemma

explains why the transition of Poland after the Cold War primarily began with the dismantling of the communist structure of the state.

Since the collapse of communism, Poland, together with several other countries in the region, has undergone a comprehensive reform process designated to create a modern liberal democratic political system (Jablonski, 2000). This radical transformation was political, economic, social, demographic, cultural, as well as linguistic. In all, the model that was drawn sample was Western Europe. In this period, several important reforms were implemented at the level of representative institutions and the rule of law, through the establishment of liberal democratic state, political pluralism, free elections, the creation of democratically elected parliament and an independent judiciary. "There have also been reforms aimed at creating a modern civil service, and in the spheres of the system of local and regional government in accordance with the European Charter of self-government" (Jablonski, 2000). As Duszak (2006) argues, the construction of a new social order has been taking place under a mounting pressure of globalization and technological advancement, which in Poland meant an unprecedented change in people's material and mental spaces. As a result, society had to start learning how to reposition itself on a number of issues, and how to adapt its repertoires of new values and words. All in all, in that period, simultaneously with the CEECs, Europeanization was the guideline for the constitutional reforms and policies in Poland.

"Across the CEECs, political liberalization had manifested itself in different ways under the development of Mikhail Gorbachev's Glasnost ('greater openness') and Perestroika ('economic restructuring') politics, culminating in 1989 in a cascade of revolutionary changes" (Hogan-Brun, 2010). During the first stage of democratic transition in Poland that is between 1990 and 1991, attention was paid to the dismantling of the communist constitutional system and the instalment of political institutions of a liberal democratic nature. On the other hand, some measures of reform relating to fields such as the internal structures of the cabinet and the state bureaucracy were postponed to the second half of the decade.

Furthermore, in economic terms, since 1990 Poland undertook a rapid transition to capitalism, taking Western Europe as a model. Whereas this policy was implemented parallel to the other Eastern European countries, the transformation of Poland to market economy was more of a "jump-start" to the whole transition process and named as "shock therapy", which has been widely debated since its initiation on January 1, 1990 (Sachs, 1994, p.267). This "shock therapy" in economic terms is also reflected in the adoption of the European identity in Poland. The rapid transformation forced Poland to adopt the European values as a whole, and Polish people were required to adopt the European identity parallel to that "jump-start".

Parallel to the political and democratic transition, during the economic transition of Poland there were two stages as well. The first period of "shock therapy" lasted from late 1989 until mid-1993 with recession and high inflation. The second period was started from 1993 and lasted until 1997, which was considered as an advanced stage of transition with a development programme and sound economic growth (Kolodko and Nuti, 1997, p.v). As a whole, Poland had the best economic performance among all transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and had been the fastest in the integration period. This ability and willingness of Poland to integrate with the EU indicated its wish to return to Europe, being regarded the same with its Western counterparts after a long partition.

In this frame, as a country that found itself on the 'wrong' side of the Iron Curtain, Poland deemed to be eastern flank of Western Europe and, as such, the gatekeeper of Western values and defender of Western civilisation. "This being the case, Polish intellectuals, including the clergy, created an ideological image of Poland as the protector of Christianity, of Western, Latin culture and of Europe from eastern barbarians and pagans" (Killingsworth, et al., 2010).

Ociepka and Ryniejska (2005) argue that "on the one hand Poland is a country proud of its history and is therefore often focused more on the past than on the future. … The country cannot decide whether to put stress on its historical past or on modernity". This dilemma that Poland faced put the country in a position of a stubborn candidate during the accession period, and a stubborn member after its

accession. “Poland’s stubborn self-positioning vis-à-vis the EU constitutional treaty, demanding for itself almost as big a vote in the Union as allocated to far more populous Germany is a paradigmatic example” (Mälksoo, 2010).

To provide a smooth accession for the Eastern bloc countries and Poland to the EU, a strong public diplomacy and promotion campaign were implemented in these countries in order to prepare the basis for their accession to the EU especially after the 2000.

On the Polish side, the accession period that resulted with the full membership in 2004 represented the “return to Europe” (Killingsworth, et al, 2010) for Poland. “First, as in other parts of Central Europe, Poland conceived its fight against communism as a fight to return to Europe; after 1989, hence, the goal to join the European Union was widely shared across political divisions. Second, it suggests that the 45 years under Communist rule, when Poland was deemed to belong to Eastern rather than Western Europe, represented nothing more than an aberration. Third, it suggests an equally strong feeling that Poland had in some way always been a part of Europe” (Killingsworth, et al., 2010).

The literature and art also constituted a significant part of this construction process of Poland as a European country. In this context, Killingsworth et al. (2010) show Adam Mickiewicz as an important example by stating that “he created an image of Poland as both the martyr and saviour, a country that had suffered for the greater good of Europe. Even the defeat of the Russian army on the outskirts of Warsaw by General Józef Piłsudski during the Polish–Soviet War (1919–1921) was presented by Polish historians as a victory that prevented the exportation of Bolshevism to Western Europe, thus saving European culture and identity”. In summary, Polish intellectual and moral elites had created an image of the West, of Western Europe and of Latin culture and Christianity as the centre of civilization (and values such as freedom and democracy), all of which Poland was part of.

In parallel with the process that took place in Poland, a campaign to identify Poland as a European country was carried on the EU side. The first step of this campaign “was to identify the image of Poland as a country and Poles as a nation

abroad with the aim of adjusting the strategy taking into account the needs and beliefs of the target countries" (Ociepka and Ryniejska, 2005). Since, the results of the surveys carried out in the member states showed that Poland was an unknown country with a predominantly negative image, especially in the press, a campaign for 'branding' Poland with the involvement of the state institutions and the NGOs throughout the EU countries. The main goal of Polish public diplomacy in the period was to create a positive image of the country and of the society, shaping a new, positive brand Poland (Ociepka and Ryniejska, 2005).

However, the relationship between Poland and the Western Europe has often been asymmetrical, not only because Poles took from the West more than they contributed, but also because the West was more important for the Poles than Poland for Western Europeans (Ociepka and Ryniejska, 2005). Another important reason of this asymmetry is the predominance of West in the construction of 'Europe' in the EU. Regarding this unequal relationship, Mälksoo (2010) drew attention to the aftermath period of the Second World War. She claims that, the first conventions for European unification in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War called for the unity of "nothing less than all Europe" where "all European peoples whose society and way of life are not in disaccord with a Charter of Human Rights and the sincere expression of free democracy" would eventually participate. "Yet the actual project of European unification excluded those parts on the other side of the Iron Curtain, relegating them to the inevitable second league of Europe, despite solemn proclamations of refusing to accept the 'artificial division' of Europe into two parts" (Mälksoo, 2010). Thus, the seemingly openness of Europe towards the inclusion of 'the other countries of Europe' implied only the neighbouring countries of Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg and Italy.

All in all, it is seen that the European project did not welcome the Eastern Europe as much as it claimed it did. Within this scope, in this section it was argued that the Eastern Europe, more particularly Poland has been regarded as a 'latecomer' to Europe and did not reflect the features of 'full Europeanness', which made Poland struggle for closing the gap of this "true Europeanness". Even though Poland's attachment to nation, tradition and language is significantly strong, there have been

major efforts to integrate with Europe and adopt the European identity in the country. In this respect, from now on, I will focus on how language played a role in this identity limbo between the 'full Europeanness' and 'not-so-Europeanness' . In particular, I will focus on the EU's language tools within this process and question whether there has been a significant change in the linguistic structure of Poland after its accession to the European Union.

5.2.2. Linguistic Identity of Poland

In the previous section, I argued that Poland has been both a part and an "other" of the European project, mainly due to the double standards of the Western European countries set against the central and eastern regions. These countries were regarded as the "latecomers" to the European project; moreover, they are distinguished from the "true Europeans".

As a result, the central and eastern countries including Poland have historically been positioned within geographical Europe, but simultaneously put in the loop of being "less European" than their Western counterparts, and therefore destined to unceasingly attempt to close the gap of "full Europeanness". This contradiction makes Poland and the other Eastern European countries a distinct field of study regarding their transition and transformation process towards the EU and since 2004, as a member of the EU.

In the previous section, I have referred to communist background of Poland and pointed out the special features it introduced and influenced the country's transition. As previously mentioned, during the transition periods of the candidate countries, the value transfer from the EU to these countries has been at the core of Europeanization. Thus, it can be argued that language, being one the most effective means of value transfer, had a substantial role in the formation of European identity. Within this framework, in this section, I will emphasize the importance of language in Poland and touch upon its cultural and linguistic structure, before examining the change in its linguistic policies parallel to the ones of the EU.

“Around 39 million people in Poland, 2 million people in Europe and 8 million people in other parts of the world use the Polish language. On this basis it can be noted that Polish can be found on the list of the 25 most widely-spoken languages in the world (Urbaniec, 2006, p.2).

Furthermore, Poland has a relatively homogenous linguistic structure. The linguistic minorities in Poland such as Belarusians, Czechs, Germans, Lithuanians, Slovakians and Ukrainians are approximately 3-4 % of the population of Poland, which generally use their own languages on a daily basis (Urbaniec, 2006, p.2). It is stated in the Language Education Policy Profile of Poland by the Council of Europe that “on the whole Poland sees itself as an essentially monolingual society in which having a first language other than Polish still tends to be stigmatised or at least treated as a curiosity. For example, a Belarusian-speaking person might experience a sense of ‘conflict’ between Belarusian and Polish speakers in the east of the country, sometimes heightened by religious differences between the two communities, whereas in Warsaw people find the fact that one speaks Belarusian ‘interesting’” (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.20).

On the other hand, language awareness is highly developed in Poland since the 15th century, which can be seen in the works of the Academy of Krakow which emphasize the importance of the development of the Polish language. “The earliest known text written in the Polish language comes from 1136 AD (people and place names are found in "Bulla Gnieznienska" [Gniezno Papal Bull]), the oldest known sermon from 1350, the oldest example of a psalm from 1380, the oldest handwritten translation of the bible from 1450 and the oldest Polish dictionary from 1526” (Urbaniec, 2006, p.2).

Urbaniec also states that the richest period for the Polish language can be seen as the 16th century, in which important works were done by Mikołaj Rej, Jan Kochanowski and Piotr Skarga even though the official administrative language in Poland was still Latin at that time (Urbaniec, 2006, p.2).

Today, Polish is the language that is used in the political and administrative levels, as well as in the public and everyday life being the most efficient means of

communication. Especially after the communist era, Polish became dominant not only among doctors, lawyers, etc. but generally in public. Urbaniec claims that "it has taken at least eight hundred years for the Polish language to reach its current level of maturity" and the 20th century was the golden age for the Polish language as well as the language awareness among Poles, since they link Polish to the history which consist of wars, and winning independence (Urbaniec, 2006, p.5-6).

The EU now has 23 official languages; however Urbaniec claims that it is quite likely that within a few years, the languages that are used in everyday life of the members will be reduced. And she continues to state that in that case, only the languages which are extensively used by the "EU citizens" will be awarded official language status, among which Polish language will have a big chance of being one of these official languages of the EU.

That is why preserving the Polish language and the linguistic identity of the country becomes more prominent. Thus, a large number of laws on the Polish language were introduced in the 20th century, as the Act on the Polish Language of 7 October 1999 being an important one.

As it is briefly mentioned in this section, language has been one of the most important elements of national identity for Poland. Thus, especially after the accession to the EU, preserving national language and eventually the national identity gained a new aspect. On the other hand, while to integrate with the EU and to prevent the linguistic erosion Poland implemented language policies; at some point, Thus, in the next section, I will mainly focus on the tools of language imposition as well as the language policies of Poland and the EU; while pointing out the huge impact of English that cannot be avoided.

5.2.3. Tools of Language Imposition and Polish Responses

In Chapter 1 and 2, I have explained how the language policies can be effective in determining one's identity as well as shaping the identity of a nation or a community. In this regard, I have stated that the European Union felt the need to implement specific policies for both preserving the linguistic diversity in the Union

and to prevent the European identity from being adversely affected from this multilingualism. Additionally, I have mentioned that, these policies aimed at forming a European identity by affecting linguistic structure of the member states; which is a more complicated process in the Central and Eastern European Countries regarding their diversified linguistic structures, as taking Poland an example. Now in this section, I will elaborate on the tools of imposing the language policies and how these were implemented in Poland. While doing so, I will build my conceptualization on mainly four fields that indicates the change in national and supranational language policies: education, legal framework and minorities. In this respect, I will first analyze the language education of Poland and asses the change in official education policy. Second, I will examine the legal basis of the policies regarding Polish language and evaluate the legislation related to linguistic identity. In parallel, I will review the official documents of the EU regarding Poland, such as the Progress Reports. Third, I will briefly mention the concerns regarding the linguistic minorities betwixt and between the language policies of the EU and Poland. Finally, I will scrutinise the paradoxical situation of Poland which is between promoting multilingualism and preserving Polish against the dominance of English. Therefore, I will point out the two-legged trend in the language policy of Poland since its accession to the EU by three different examples: the role of elites in the language policy of Poland, the influence of media, and the special programmes regarding culture and language.

5.2.3.1. Post-Enlargement Trends in Foreign Language Education in Poland

It is clear that one of the most ideologically controlled fields during the transition period of the CEECs has been the education policy. The political field has a wide effect in all other social layers as said by Bourdieu (1973). Thus, as one of the important social fields education has a significant transformative power that helped the CEECs to overcome their Soviet past. “According to Bourdieu (1973), the political field plays to a great extent a determining role in all other social strata. As one of several interdependent central social sub-fields, education has featured as a principal transformative vehicle to overcome the limitations of the Soviet past”

(Hogan-Brun, 2010). Hogan-Brun asserts that education has been used as an important means of re-centring the cultural capital of the dominant group in the post-communist countries, upon the sizeable Russian-speaking section of the school population, with the political aim to transfer social capital through objects such as books, qualifications and, symbolically, the titular language. Consequently, the schools and universities became the key agents of the re-production of dominant social realities through cultural practices during the various phases of transition across CEECs. Thus, language politics, its implementation in the educational domain, and the conflict between formerly dominant and subsequently reconstituted languages to official status became among the key issues in these countries.

It is also possible for a language policy not only to emphasize on a single language but on the use of more than one language for the identification with the nation. as in the case of Odessa, where the use of both Ukrainian and Russian in education is allowed, people by partially refuse to use Ukrainian in schools, and preferred teaching in the language that best suits the people, without any apparent implications for cultural identity building. "It assumes that all agents (government and the local population/teachers) do not reject the language (i.e. Ukrainian) or the role of language per se rather than the idea that the language defines the nation, or that national identity is tied to the use of one single language. This would accord with Western European practice as well, where a mix of languages, not just one single language, can serve as a medium for expressing national cultures (as is the case for instance of the Welsh-speaking Welsh and English)" (Hogan-Brun, 2010).

At this point, foreign language education in the schools comes into prominence. In the previous chapter, the foreign education trends across Europe, but especially in Western Europe were explained. Teaching foreign languages to young learners currently presents diverging challenges in Western, as well as the Central and Eastern Europe. With a specific focus on the CEECs, for example Lithuania, political debates arouse in the country on the planned introduction of compulsory early foreign language education as generated through EU membership and the effects of globalization. According to Hogan-Brun (2010) "the language ideological

debates among different stakeholders entail positionings that range from ethnolinguistic nationalism to the acceptance of plurilingualism".

Foreign language education is again closely related to the dominance of English throughout Europe since the demand for the language courses mainly concentrate on English courses. For example, Polish people are available to be plurilingual independent from the education system, since other Slavonic languages (such as Slovak and Czech) are similar to Polish and relatively easy to learn for Polish people. Yet, parallel to the global tendencies, it is more popular to learn English in Poland too, even though the languages of neighbouring countries could have been learnt without spending much effort (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.20).

In the report of 2005-2007 of the Council of Europe on language education policy of Poland, it is stated that Poland has experienced significant changes in language education and teaching since the early 1990s; one of them being the abandonment of compulsory Russian. In parallel, Russian teachers also became subject to re-training to become English or German teachers. As a result, English in the language curriculum became dominant throughout Poland, while German also had a strong position especially in the western region. It is also asserted that the establishment of specialized colleges and bilingual programmes also led to major changes in the structure of language education (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.12).

Poland's accession to the EU has been another factor that supported language education in Poland, since it encouraged exchanges and other international contacts of schools and other educational institutions with significant financial support. Thus, the demand for language learning experienced a substantial increase particularly among youngsters; however, it was oriented mainly towards English, again.

It is seen that the parents, who are very concerned about the language education of their children, started investing for the language tuition of their children, and also for the private lessons in English. It was even argued that the spread of private language education caused erosion in the principle of equal opportunity for

education, since in some regions of Poland, access to language education is a big problem (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.16).

In 2005, the newly elected Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz stated that the language teaching would become obligatory from the very beginning of the primary education (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.12-13). This new emphasis on teaching languages from the early years of primary school indicated that the Polish government regards the language education as one of its priorities. Since then, there have been many discussions about making English a compulsory lesson from the first grade; however, it is also seen that learning only English would not be sufficient in the future, so learning a second foreign language gained importance. Thus, there is a political will in Poland to introduce a second foreign language as obligatory much earlier than today; however the lack of teachers with necessary qualification is a major problem (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.16).

The current policy of the Polish government is to introduce a foreign language in the first grade, which may not be English. Nevertheless, the parental demand for foreign languages is not for any other foreign language, but for English. Thus, the decision of the Ministry of Education of Poland taken in 2008 to grant an option to choose their foreign language among English, French, German and Spanish to the year-one students of the Polish schooling system made a big impact on Polish people. This decision of making English noncompulsory to the seven-year of children got the reaction of most of the parents which resulted with an open letter signed by 59 politicians and academics, including two former presidents, handed to Prime Minister (English at Schools, 2008). Also, a second foreign language is not obligatory in lower secondary education, and it is learnt only by a small group of people in upper secondary education as well. English is dominant as the first foreign language, while German being the second. Nonetheless, there is again a tendency towards learning Russian; at least the students have a more positive attitude regarding Russian (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.17).

On the other hand, language learning choices can vary across different regions of Poland. It is possible for the local or regional authorities to introduce their own language policies, since the Polish education system is flexible enough to do it. For example the local administration of the city Gdańsk introduced an early beginning to the language education in primary school. Whilst English as the most commonly learned foreign language among Poland is equally spread across the country, teaching of other languages differentiates upon the regions. Especially in some western regions of Poland, the choice of the first foreign language tends to be German, French is spoken on a smaller scale in some southern parts, and Russian is dominant in the eastern region of the country. Thus, student exchanges and cross-border contacts with native speakers seemed to be one of the best opportunities by teachers and politicians to increase the language learning. "A key aspect of language policy is also the promotion of the Polish language abroad and the development of teaching Polish as a foreign language" (Urbaniec, 2006, p.3). However such exchanges seem difficult since the demand for learning German in the western Poland, or learning Russian in the eastern Poland do not correspond to an equal interest of learning Polish in the east of Germany, or in western part of Russia (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.12-13 and 17).

The current education curriculum of Poland includes foreign language learning in pre-primary education upon the parents' concern, for which fees are paid. "In some kindergartens, especially in cities, all children aged 5-6 are enrolled in additional English language classes and the local self-government (gmina) pays for it. Such solutions are implemented on the gmina's initiative and not very common." (Structures of Education and Training Systems in Europe, 2009). In the primary schools, the compulsory language education comprises of Polish language of 16 hours per week and modern foreign languages of 8 hours per week. In the lower secondary education (which is a 3-years of full-time general lower secondary education for pupils who have completed the reformed 6-year primary school), 14 hours of Polish language per week and 9 hours of modern foreign languages per week is compulsory. The upper secondary education includes 14 hours per week of Polish language, as well as education of two foreign languages of 15 hours per week. Thus, it is clear that while foreign language education is of utmost importance for

Polish education system, it is not until the upper secondary education that students are subject to learning two other foreign languages apart from Polish (Structures of Education and Training Systems in Europe, 2009, p.18-40).



Figure 4: Average Number of Foreign Languages Studied Per Pupil in Poland

Source: Eurostat, Education statistics, UOE data collection

Notes: ISCED Level 1: Primary education level; ISCED Level 2: Lower secondary education level; ISCED Level 3 (GEN): Upper secondary education level (including pre-vocational programmes). ISCED Level 3 figures for 2000-2003 are missing.

As it is seen in the Figure 4, the trend of foreign language learning at ISCED level 1 in Poland has increased since 2000, and reached its highest level in 2009 and 2010. Yet, the students at the primary education level learn only one foreign language on average. On the other hand, the average foreign languages learned at ISCED level 2 have almost a linear trend between the years of 2000-2010. The increase in the learning of foreign languages starts with the years 2007-2008 for both ISCED level 1 and 2, which coincides with the education policies both within Poland and the EU. It is clear that the highest rates of foreign languages at the ISCED level 3, since the education of two foreign languages starts at the upper secondary level, as it was mentioned the previous paragraph.



Figure 5: Pupils Learning Foreign Languages at ISCED Level 1 in Poland as % of the Total Pupils at this Level

Source: Eurostat, Education statistics, UOE data collection

On the other hand, when the foreign language choices in the primary education level in Poland is examined (Figure 5), it is clear that English is by far the most preferred foreign language. Since Poland is more German oriented that French oriented, as it was mentioned earlier, German also has a significant share - not as much as English but much more than French. According to the Eurostat figures, almost 90% of the pupils at primary education level learn English, and 10% of them learn German, while there are almost none French learners. Thus, what we understand from these figures is that the attempts of Polish government to reduce the share of English among the foreign languages learned by Polish pupils have not been very successful. As it was mentioned above, the decision of making English selective for the year-one students not only got a big reaction from the parents, but also didn't change the foreign language tendency of Polish citizens. Even though they have the chance to select the others, they continue to choose English as the first foreign language.

In the lower secondary level of education in Poland (Figure 6), the share of English learners decrease only slightly, while the share of German learners increase, as well as French learners even though the increase in the learning of French is

significantly low. Approximately 85% of pupils at ISCED level 2 learn English, with an increase of 24% compared to 2000 (in 2000, 70% of pupils were studying English). On the other hand, French learners decreased by 55% between 2000 and 2010, while German learners almost remained the same.



Figure 6: Pupils Learning Foreign Languages at ISCED Level 2 in Poland as % of the Total Pupils at this Level

Source: Eurostat, Education statistics, UOE data collection

In the ISCED level 3, the dominance of English is still prevailing (Figure 7). However, since the education of two foreign languages became compulsory, the share of German increased significantly. From this trend, we can again understand the influence of German in Poland over French. In this regard, in 2010, 93% of total pupils at this level learned English, while 53% learned German and 9% learned French. However, in total of all education levels, English preserves its dominance with approximately 90% of total pupils which choose to learn English rather than the other foreign languages.



Figure 7: Pupils Learning Foreign Languages at ISCED Level 3 in Poland as % of the Total Pupils at this Level

Source: Eurostat, Education statistics, UOE data collection

On the other hand, while the rates of learning Russian was high both in the ISCED level 2 and 3 at the beginning of the 2000s, it experienced a decline in the last decade (Figure 8). With the lowering influence of the former Soviet Union, and the accession to the EU, the pupils learning Russian were decreased by 73% at ISCED level 2 between the years of 2000 and 2010. Additionally, the pupils learning Russian were decreased by 31% at ISCED level 3 between the years of 2004 and 2010.



Figure 8: Pupils Learning Russian at ISCED Level 2 and 3 in Poland as % of the Total Pupils at this Level

Source: Eurostat, Education statistics, UOE data collection
Notes: ISCED Level 3 figures for 2000-2003 are missing.

Nonetheless, as it was mentioned before in the last years Russian started to become popular again in the last years; at least the students have a more positive attitude regarding Russian. This attitude can be seen from the Figure 8. Although the Russian learners witnessed a decreased in the last decade, it increased by 100% in 2010 compared to 2009.

Apart from the language education of children, foreign language learning is very widespread among adults as well. "The Strategy for the Development of Continuing Education by 2010 (SDCE), adopted by the Government of the Republic of Poland in 2003, is implemented at various levels of administration (central, regional and local), with social partners involved in the process." (Report on the Implementation of the Education and Training 2010 Work Programme in Poland, 2007, p.2). Also in the report of the Council of Europe on language education policy of Poland, it is stated that as a part of the EU Lifelong Learning Strategy, a national strategy for language education of adults is also being prepared (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.15).

It is evident that one of the main reasons behind the language learning is the high unemployment rate in Poland, which leads Polish people to search for jobs in the other European countries that requires foreign language skills. The increasing activities of foreign companies in Poland and their tendency to hire people with necessary linguistic qualifications is another reason to learn foreign languages as well. There are also in-company language courses, for which, the demand is usually for English and German. However, the demand for learning the languages of the countries that have opened their borders to Polish workers, such as Ireland, Sweden, the UK and Norway is also high (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.15-16).

The decision taken in 2009 to teach English to the newly elected Polish politicians to the European Parliament is another significant example of this trend. This decision covered receiving up to eight hours of English-language schooling a day to develop the language skills of Polish politicians elected to the European Parliament. Even though the former Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro of the Law

and Justice (PiS) Party claimed according to the article that "without a very strong command of English or French, a European Parliament politician is a 'fourth-rate deputy.'", this decision of giving English courses to the member of parliaments represents an evident example of the strong influence of English on Europe (European parliament electees to get English language schooling, 2009).

All in all, it can be said that whereas Poland is trying to develop pluriligualism in schools and preserve the value of Polish, English is becoming more and more dominant across the education systems. Additionally, linguistic diversity can be developed only starting from the secondary level of education due to regional and economic factors. If linguistic diversity of children is aimed, it is obligatory to extend the access of the education of different foreign languages starting from the early ages.

In this regard, it is seen that in Poland, the role of language in educational transformation is significant since education debates have evolved around the choice of language as the medium of instruction in schools in these countries.

5.2.3.2. Legislative Developments in Poland and Counter Measures of the EU

As well as trying to integrate with the EU and to be accepted by the Europeans as one of them, Poland is also keen to preserve its own culture, tradition and language. Within this framework, in the previous section I have mentioned the change in the education trends in Poland and Poland's education policy to preserve its language and ensure plurilingualism. What I will explain in this section is that, apart from the education policy, the Polish government also seeks other means to ensure the viability of its language. Thus, throughout the history, Poland has made legislations with the aim of ascertaining the position of its language. In this regard, especially after the EU membership and parallel to the concerns of English's dominance throughout Poland as well as the rest of the EU, Polish government started to emphasize more on the official campaigns regarding Polish culture and language. Thus, there have been further legislative developments, some for the preservation of Polish and some according to the demands of the EU. In this section I will primarily analyze the legislative developments in Poland regarding the use of

languages after its accession to the EU, and then I will mention the EU's objections and interventions in this process.

One of the earliest legal regulations regarding the linguistic values of Poland was the Act on the Polish Language (the "Act") which was adopted on October 7, 1999 and came into force on May 9, 2000. The Act required Polish to be used in legal transactions in Poland between Polish entities/persons or if one party was Polish. This in particular regarded the names of goods and services, offers, instructions for use, guarantee conditions, invoices etc. The Act also required that all the agreements that were to be performed in Poland and involved a Polish party, may have a foreign version, however initially need to be drawn up in Polish. Polish is also the official language in schools, for examinations, for certificates and for any official information (The Act on the Polish Language, 1999).

As it was stated in the preamble of the Act, this regulation mainly concerned about the preservation of the national language, since "the Polish language constitutes a fundamental element of the national identity and presents a value of the national culture". Thus, "recognizing the necessity of protecting national identity in the process of globalisation" and "recognizing this protection as the responsibility of all public bodies and institutions of the Republic of Poland" is essential regarding the Act (The Act on the Polish Language, 1999).

Besides, the Polish Language Act also stressed on the fact that languages can be used as political instruments. In the preamble, the use of language as an instrument of denationalization, which was experienced throughout the history, was also taken into consideration.

However the Act on the Polish Language was not the first regulation that concerned the linguistic situation and linguistic rights in Poland. The Decree on the State Language of 1945 secured the absolute domination of the Polish language in all domains and at all levels of the public life. Only in 1999, the Act on the Polish Language replaced the regulations made by the 1945 Decree on the State Language. "From the sociolinguistic point of view this Law seems to be extremely unrealistic, since most of its prescriptions, formulated in a very unclear and wishing mood, result

from the fear of Anglicization and ‘globalization’ of the Polish language and thus also of the Polish national and cultural identity” (US English Foundation).

Urbaniec (2006) states that the language policy in Poland aimed at supervising the development of the Polish language, popularising the good use of the language, and ensuring its standardization and codification and the formulation of language laws (Urbaniec, 2006, p.3). Thus, there were institutions to protect the Polish culture and Polish language which include “the Commission on Language Culture of the Linguistics Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences, the Society of Friends of the Polish Language, the "Bristol" Academic Association of Teachers of Polish Culture and Polish as a Foreign Language, and the Polish Language Council advisory body of the Polish Academy of Sciences”, apart from the language laws (Urbaniec, 2006, p.2,3).

On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the EU, these regulations regarding the protection of Polish and the obligation to use Polish in certain areas also constituted obstacles for the linguistic rights of other communities. Thus, both during the accession period and after the membership, all the CEECs became the target of European criticism and intervention.

It is clear that some language policies are aimed at weakening the dominance of the national languages in the public and economic sphere by making international pressure on the countries’ national legislation. Ozolins (2003, p. 223) states that especially in the late 1990s, substantial international pressure was imposed on the Baltic States so as to convince them to soften the requirements in their language laws, especially the ones related to the private economic sphere. Ozolins (2003, p.223), by exemplifying Estonia and Latvia, claims that the language requirements of the Baltic States included the individuals who had direct contact with the public and who did not have previous education and language proficiency in Estonian or Latvian required for different occupations. These countries claim that the main aim of these language laws was not to interfere to the individual use of language but to ensure the capacity of communication in the national language “so that the doctor or

shopkeeper could in fact speak the national language if required" Ozolins (2003, p.223).

However, there had been several international obligations to such kind of regulations, such as the intervention of OSCE objected to Latvia's new Language Law in 1997. The obligation of OSCE was directed at the restriction of the private economic sphere through linguistic requirements, except for the situations that concern public interest. There were similar criticisms against Estonian requirements. In the case of Poland, the international objections were directed by the EU during the process of accession.

On the other hand, during the legislation process, it was claimed by the European Integration Committee (Komitet Integracji Europejskiej) that the Act is contrary to European Union Law, since Poland was involved in negotiations for the accession to the EU at that time. "It was said that although the obligation to use the Polish language regarding mandatory information on (or attached to) products is reasonable and justified, the requirement to use the Polish language for other information and descriptions constitutes an infringement of EU rules on the free movement of goods" (US English Foundation).

Thus, after May 1, 2004, the accession day of the ten new members states to the EU including Poland, new legal regulations came into force with the aim of adjusting Polish law to the EU requirements. It is claimed that the Act on the Polish Language caused many difficulties in business relations and international professional market, since all the documentation needed to be translated into Polish which substantially increased transaction costs. Thus it has been said that the requirements of the Act constituted restrictions on the freedom of transfer of goods and services and, being contrary to EU law, required amendment prior to accession (Mężykowski, 2004).

On the 2nd of April, 2004, an amendment was adopted regarding the Act. The main change provides that "Polish should be used in Poland in transactions with consumers and in exercising provisions of the labour law if the consumer or the person providing work is domiciled in Poland and the agreement is to be performed

in Poland. Additionally, Polish should be used in non-consumer transactions as well if governmental or other public authorities or institutions are involved. Further, the requirement to have a Polish language version of an agreement is also limited only to documents in the above scope (in particular agreements with consumers and employment agreements)" (Mężykowski, 2004). These changes to the Act have been welcomed in business circles as they make legal transactions easier and cheaper.

Furthermore, on 15th of October, 2009, a new amendment came into force on the Act on the Polish Language. The amendment was enacted upon the request of Polish Constitutional Tribunal, claiming some of the articles of the Act being unconstitutional; thus as a result, the Parliament, in cooperation with the Polish Language Council amended the Act (Europejskie Centrum Konsumenckie, 2009). "According to the newly enacted regulations, in case of bilingual versions of a contract with a consumer or an employee, if the consumer or employee is Polish citizen, it is always the Polish version of the contract, which serves as the basis for interpretation. On the other hand, regulations for EU and non-EU foreigners concerning the possibility of drawing up a contract in languages other than Polish have been unified. Especially right to usage of languages other than Polish has been extended to documents other than contracts, whereas the option of usage languages other than Polish has been restricted only to the languages, that the consumer or employee knows" (Europejskie Centrum Konsumenckie, 2009).

Previously EU foreigners could apply for the contract to be drawn up in a foreign language, whereas non-EU foreigners could not, which set up a different status between the two of them. Furthermore, in the framework of the previous regulation, when the employee and the employer were from a country outside EU, the contract had to be drawn up in Polish language. However with this amendment, it was acknowledged that there is no reasonable justification for significant differing the rights of Polish and foreign consumers (Europejskie Centrum Konsumenckie, 2009).

It is seen from this section that the laws and regulations can be used to influence the use of language in one country, and what language represents for a

country as well. That is why the Polish government was very keen on introducing official campaigns and regulations regarding Polish culture and language; so there have been many legislative developments for the preservation of the national language. On the other hand, the EU also introduced language policies that are aimed at weakening the monopoly of the national languages in the public and economic sphere by making international pressure on the countries' national legislation in order to ensure its integrity by preserving multilingualism and plurilingualism within the EU. However, the intrusion of the EU to the linguistic structure of Poland is not limited to the legal basis. The EU continued its pressures on Poland via the official documents that asses the improvement of Poland regarding its accession to the EU. Thus, in the following section, I will elaborate the role of the official documents published on Poland on the linguistic structure of the country.

5.2.3.3. EU Pressures on Poland: Evaluations of EU Documents

The intrusion of the EU to the linguistic structure of Poland is not limited to the legal basis. The legal basis of Poland's relations with the European Union is the Europe Agreement signed on 16 December 1991, which aimed at providing an appropriate framework for the political dialogue, and economic development, as well as establishing a basis for Community' technical and financial assistance to support Poland's gradual integration into the Union (Europe Agreement, 1991, p.2). However, the EU also publish many documents regarding the accession period of Poland, in which the Commission examined every field including political, economic, cultural and linguistic structure of Poland. Thus, the EU started to intervene to the linguistic structure of Poland even in its accession period via its official documents such as the progress reports, monitoring reports or strategy papers. Thus in this section I will examine the official EU documents that were published during Poland's candidacy as well as during its membership, and analyze their influence on Poland; the changes they cause on the linguistic structure and on the language policies of Poland.

In the Agenda 2000 about the opinion of the European Commission on Poland's application for membership to the EU, which was published in 1997, the

Commission stated that it would prepare regular reports to the European Council on the progress each member state from the Central and Eastern Europe made. In this regard, the Commission undertook to present a report for Poland no later than 1998 (Agenda 2000, 1997, p.114). Thus, within the framework stated in the Agenda 2000, the first Regular Report that analysed the progress of Poland towards its accession to the EU was published in 1998.

In the Agenda 2000, it is stated that Poland's accession was a part of an "historic process", since the Central and Eastern European Countries are part of the European continent, which had to stand apart from the Western part for more than 40 years, and now join the "area of peace, stability and prosperity created by the Union" (Agenda 2000, 1997, p.5).

However, the Commission also identified certain requirements for these countries, such as guaranteeing democracy and protection of minorities, and ensuring a functional market economy, that demonstrate their satisfying economic and political conditions.

One of the main political criteria is the respect for human rights and the protection of minorities. In the Agenda, it is accepted that Poland has introduced numerous rules and regulations to ensure the protection of human rights and minorities' rights (Agenda 2000, 1997, p.15). This view of the Commission was confirmed in the Regular Report of 1998, which stated that "Poland presents the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities" (Regular Report on Poland's Progress towards Accession, 1998, p.8). In both of the documents the Commission only drew attention to the key European documents about the minority rights that Poland has to ratify such as the Framework Convention on Minorities and the European Social Charter (Regular Report on Poland's Progress towards Accession, 1998, p.15). Additionally it is acknowledged by the Commission that the Article 35 of the Polish Constitution "ensures Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities the freedom to maintain and develop their own language, to

maintain customs and traditions, and to develop their own culture" (The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997).

Regarding the education of the linguistic minorities, the Commission stated in the Agenda 2000 that while there are financial severities, Poland has tried to develop teaching in minority languages in public educational establishments. The positive attitude of the Commission regarding the minority rights in Poland was reiterated in the Progress Reports published between the years of 1999 and 2002.

On the other hand, in the Progress Report of 1998, the administrative structures were examined and the Commission drew attention to the fact that a more coherent pre-accession strategy is necessary especially regarding the administrative structures of Poland. In the report, it is claimed that the employees, particularly the ones at the middle management level, should upgrade their foreign language skills (Regular Report on Poland's Progress towards Accession, 1998, p.40).

In the 1999 Progress Report of the Commission stated that Poland reached a high level of harmonization in the field of services sector. The new Banking Act, which entered into force on 1 January 1999, contained more open provisions, such as providing for branching from foreign banks; and the opening up of the banking sector continued in 1999 (Regular Report on Poland's Progress towards Accession, 1999, p.32). More amendments were made in September 2001, which mainly aimed to bring Polish Banking Law closer to the acquis especially in the fields related to credit institutions (Regular Report on Poland's Progress towards Accession, 2001, p.44). Additionally, the insurance services were also opening up to foreign firms on a reciprocal basis (Regular Report on Poland's Progress towards Accession, 1999, p.32). However, the Banking Law of Poland was amended in 2002 which caught attention of the EU. The linguistic requirements in the banking sector were mentioned in the "2002 Regular Report on Poland's Progress towards Accession". It is stated in the Report that the amendments to the Banking Law of Poland came into force in January 2002, which brought the Polish Banking Law closer to the acquis. Nonetheless, "the amendment to the Banking Law also introduced a new requirement that non-Polish citizens on the management board, including the bank's chairman,

whose appointment is approved by the banking supervision authority, must 'have a proven knowledge of the Polish language'. The authority justifies this measure for prudential and supervisory reasons and it is strictly applied. This regulation in its application to non-Polish citizens is not compatible with the Treaty; moreover, the measure is also disproportionate and does not conform to the principles established for protecting the 'general good'" (Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession, 2002, p.55). Thus, it is stated that the issue related to the language requirement for members of the boards of Polish banks needs to be resolved.

Also in the "Comprehensive monitoring report on Poland's preparations on membership" of 2003, the Commission repeated it concerns on the linguistic requirements in the banking and insurance system of Poland and it is stated that "Poland has partially aligned its legislation with the acquis in the banking sector … Efforts to address the problem of a language requirement for members of a bank's management board (…) need to be continued" (Comprehensive monitoring report, 2003, p.23).

As a result, with an amendment on April 5, 2011, the Polish government moderated this linguistic requirement of Polish. With this amendment, whereas the requirement of proven knowledge of Polish of the founders and persons proposed for members of the bank's management board was reiterated, it was also stated that if it is not necessary for prudential supervision, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority shall depart from the requirement concerning the proven knowledge of the Polish language.

In the Comprehensive Monitoring Report, as it was mentioned in the previous section, the Act on the Polish Language was regarded as an important unjustified trade barrier that needs to be removed. It is also stated that "in the gambling sector, an amendment to the law adopted in April 2003 removes the elements of discrimination against foreign investors, but introduces a discriminatory language requirement for members of the management boards of companies carrying out activities in this area. The Polish authorities should urgently address this issue, while

at the same time ensuring that amendments to the horizontal Polish Language Law comply with the acquis" (Comprehensive monitoring report, 2003, p.22).

Moreover, in the "Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries towards the Enlarged Europe" of 2002, it is stated that "Poland has produced an action plan but several problems such as discriminatory language requirements, problems with administrative structures and ensuring independent supervisory structures remain" (Strategy Paper, 2002).

Table 4: Initiatives of Poland and the EU Regarding the Linguistic Legislations of Poland

	INITIATIVES OF POLAND	**INITIATIVES OF THE EU**
THE ACT ON THE POLISH LANGUAGE (October 7, 1999)		
1945	The Decree on the State Language *Secured the absolute domination of the Polish language in all domains and at all levels of the public life.*	
October 7, 1999	The Act on the Polish Language (replaced the Decree on the State Language) *Polish to be used in legal transactions in Poland between Polish entities/persons or if one party was Polish.*	*Claimed that the Act is contrary to European Union Law; the requirement to use the Polish language constitutes an infringement of EU rules on the free movement of goods, as well as increasing costs.*
2003		Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland's Preparations on Membership *The Act on the Polish Language was regarded as an important unjustified trade barrier that needs to be removed.*
April 2, 2004		Amendment to the Act on the Polish Language to adjust Polish law to the EU requirements. *Polish should be used in transactions, and agreements in Poland, if the consumer or the person providing work is domiciled in Poland and the agreement is to be performed in Poland.*

Table 4 (cont'd)

October 15, 2009	Amendment to the Act on the Polish Language upon the request of Polish Constitutional Tribunal. *Previously EU foreigners could apply for the contract to be drawn up in a foreign language, whereas non-EU foreigners could not. This inequality between the EU and non-EU foreigners was eliminated with this amendment.*	
THE BANKING ACT OF POLAND (August, 29 1997)		
January 1, 1999	The new Banking Act entered into force on 1 January 1999, contained open provisions, such as providing for branching from foreign banks.	
September, 2001	More amendments were made, aimed to bring Polish Banking Law closer to the acquis.	
2002	An amendment was made by the Polish government *Non-Polish citizens on the management board, including the bank's chairman, whose appointment is approved by the banking supervision authority, must 'have a proven knowledge of the Polish language'.*	The 2002 Regular Report on Poland's Progress towards Accession *"This regulation in its application to non-Polish citizens is not compatible with the Treaty; moreover, the measure is also disproportionate and does not conform to the principles established for protecting the 'general good'.*

Table 4 (cont'd)

2003		The Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland's Preparations on Membership of 2003 *"Poland has partially aligned its legislation with the acquis in the banking sector … Efforts to address the problem of a language requirement for members of a bank's management board (…) need to be continued".*
April 5, 2011	An amendment was made by the Polish government *"The Polish Financial Supervision Authority shall, in the form of a decision issued at a request of the founders, depart from the requirement concerning the proven knowledge of the Polish language (…), if it is not necessary for prudential supervision, taking into account in particular the level of permissible risk or the scope of activity of the bank."*	
POLISH GAMBLING LAW (1992)		
April 2003	An amendment was made by the Polish government	The Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland's Preparations on Membership of 2003 *In the gambling sector, an amendment to the law adopted in April 2003 removes the elements of discrimination against foreign investors, but introduces a discriminatory language requirement for members of the management boards of companies carrying out activities in this area.*

As it can be seen from the earlier sections, protection and preservation of the national language has been crucial for Poland, which is a country deeply attached to its linguistic, cultural and national values. Within this context, it was inevitable for Poland not to make linguistic legislations so as to ensure the viability of its national language. Thus, as it is briefed in the Table 4, Poland made several legislations regarding the use of Polish in every field, such as banking, insurance, gambling, etc. The Decree on the State Language and its successor the Act on the Polish Language both have been one of the first regulations regarding the protection of Polish. However, with Poland's candidature to the EU, the Act on the Polish Language became a controversial issue between Poland and the EU, as well as the other regulations which ensure the common use of Polish in Poland. The EU institutions put pressure on Poland to change the linguistic requirements on the foreigners while doing business, by claiming that the requirements were contrary to the EU laws and regulations. One reason of the EU while insisting on the amendment was to create equal opportunity for EU citizens with Polish citizens in Poland. However, another reason, which was related the linguistic discussions within the EU, was to extend the use of foreign languages (EU languages) throughout Poland; while moderating the deep attachment to Polish, to prevent the attachment to national languages being a divisive factor for the European identity.

However, while the language issues are of utmost importance both at the national and supranational level; concerns regarding the divisive features of multilingualism overshaded the rights of the linguistic minorities Poland. Whilst with some deficiencies, the linguistic rights are being protected by the Polish government by means of specific laws and regulations; it was not until the late 1980s that the rights of the linguistic minorities were mentioned. Thus in the following section, I will make mention of the development of the linguistic rights of the minorities, as well as the migrant population in Poland, a country that was long been regarded as monolingual.

5.2.4. State Language or Language of Europe?

As it was mentioned in the previous sections, language has been one of the significant issues of European identity, and consequently the European Union necessitated taking political action in order to prevent multilingualism being a divisive factor for the European identity. Within this scope, while taking Poland as an example, I have also stated some examples of language imposition tools such as formal education, legislation or media. Thus, I also analyzed the effects of these language policies on Poland and explained the results.

If we look at the language issue at the EU level, we see that the identification with the EU, the access to global –at least EU wide- information, the participation to the EU level of political institutions, all requires whether usage of a single language, or a comprehensive language policy. In 2004 European elections for example, language was a live issue for commentary and lobbying in (at least) Spain, Poland and Ireland (Brumfit, 2006). However, the success of the EU while coping with the linguistic diversity in the Union and the efficiency of European language policies are questionable. "Although in the past years the Council of Europe and the European Union have increasingly taken up a more active role in conceiving a language policy beyond the individual member state, the field of language policy –especially in domains other than education- remains mainly a prerogative of the nation state" (Galasinska and Krzyzanowski, 2009).

In the transition period of the 1990s, languages passed through a transformation. "Throughout the region, language and culture therefore, have figured as crucial factors in the process of transformation" (Hogan-Brun, 2010). A substantial example was the position of the former dominant state languages which became minority languages with a low status in certain contexts (for example, Russian in the Baltic states in the 1990s). On the other hand, the former regional or minority languages were raised to the status of official languages, such as Estonian in the Estonian Republic. Besides the flag, the coat of arms, the national anthem, and the other insignia, the state language was considered a central element for the affirmation of 'new' national identities. Galasinska and Krzyzanowski (2009) refers

to the analyze of Bakhtin of 1930 who asserts that “we are taking language not as a system of abstract grammatical categories, but rather language conceived as ideologically saturated, language as a world view, even as a concrete opinion, insuring a maximum of mutual understanding in all spheres of ideological life”. He continues to state that language provides concrete verbal and ideological unification and centralization.

In the positioning of Poland within the EU, the propagation of a unitary state language as a part of the nationalistic discourse, among other nationalistic components played an important role. “Throughout the cultural history of Europe, language and culture have figured as a site for constructing and contesting different versions of national identity, or of delineation and assertion. They continue to function as an arbitrary divide between national entities, throughout Europe” (Hogan-Brun, 2010). As Galasinska and Krzyzanowski (2009) argue “in political practice both media and language are seen as crucial factors in processes of transformation. Freedom of information and access to information is often considered as a conditio sine qua non for political and social change and as prime indicators for a successful transformation process. The tacit assumption that these fundamental rights are guaranteed only to speakers of official languages within a given territory has rarely been questioned, neither in the so-called countries of transition nor in the EU member states. Speakers of minority languages and of languages of migration are still often impaired in their access to media in their language with a national spread. The common state language is still seen as a factor that can foster national unity and provide identification with a state”.

In this framework, the positioning of minorities and their linguistic rights is of importance within the linguistic developments of Poland. Thus, in the following section, I will make mention of the developments in terms of minority languages within a country that was long regarded as a monolingual state.

5.2.4.1. Concerns Regarding the Linguistic Minorities

As it was mentioned in the previous section, the prevailing official opinion about the structure of Poland was that Poland was a monoethnic and monolingual

country until the late 1980s. The linguistic rights of the minorities of Poland were not mentioned before 1989, since was no legal system to protect neither the cultural values of minorities nor the education in their language. Moreover, the Decree on the State Language of 1945 regulated the language politics of Poland rather in a strict way. Besides, the 1952 Constitution, in which the effects of communism were tangible, also did not mentioned protection of any minorities. According to the official and common opinion, Poland was a fully monoethnic and monolingual country (US English Foundation).

In the report of 2005-2007 of the Council of Europe on language education policy of Poland, it is stated that there are a number of minorities in Poland which have their own language. It is also argued that although there are legal provisions to protect their rights, the decrease in birth rate in Poland has an adverse effect on the learning of minority languages. The low birth rates cause fewer children to learn minority languages, so the teaching of these languages becomes difficult as well, mainly because of financial reasons. Thus, the continuity of these languages cannot be assured (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.13). However, the education of minority languages also takes a big share from the budget, while increasing funds are being transferred to this field. The budget of 2006 included financing schools for national and ethnic minorities, as well as "schools which undertake additional tasks of providing education for Romani pupils". "The implementation of the Programme for the Roma Community in Poland 2004-2013 is being continued (including an education module, within the framework of which remedial classes on the Polish language for Roma pupils are financed from the state budget)" (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.21-22).

In the Act on the System of Education (September 7, 1991 and the amendments in January 28, 1999), certain regulations were included regarding the cultural and linguistic rights of minorities. For example in Article 13 (1) of the Act on the System of Education (September 7, 1991 and the amendments in January 28, 1999) it is stated that "public schools shall enable pupils to retain their sense of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious identity, and in particular, shall make it possible for them to learn their own language, history and culture" (US English

Foundation). “There is a legal framework to ensure that minorities can maintain their languages – Armenian, Belarusian, Czech, German, Hebrew, Kaszubian, Lemko, Lithuanian, Slovak and Ukrainian are taught at diverse levels from kindergarten to secondary school… The National Ministry of Education finances the production of curricula, teaching materials, etc., and participates in promoting minority and regional languages” (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.21). Furthermore, in Article 13 (2) of the Act, minority classes and schools are supported by stating that “at the request of parents, the educational instruction may be conducted in separate groups, sections or schools”. Classes may also be held with additional lessons on the history and culture of the respective minority. Moreover, it is accepted to organize native institution for minority pupils on a volunteer basis by a resolution of the Minister of Education in 1992. “The resolution further establishes four types of minority schools: schools with non-Polish language of instruction; bilingual schools; schools with additional study of mother tongue of minorities; and inter-school groups of pupils from different schools with additional study of mother tongue” (US English Foundation).

On November 4, 2004, the Law on National and Ethnic Minorities and the Regional Language passed the lower chamber of the Parliament (Sejm) and entered into force on May 1, 2005; which defined the terms “national minority (Belarusians, Czechs, Lithuanians, Germans, Armenians, Russians, Slovaks, Ukrainians and Jews)” and “ethnic minority [Karaites (Karaimi), Lemkos (Lemkowie), Romas and Tatars]” (US English Foundation).

With this law, minority members gained the right to spell their names and surnames according to the orthography of their language, to study their language and to use it freely in public and private life. Likewise, “in the communes (the lowest local administrative territorial unit) where a minority comprises more than 20 percent of the population, its language may be used as a supplementary language in public offices and in names of localities, sites and streets (with the exception of those names which were given by the Third Reich or the USSR between 1933 and 1945)” (US English Foundation). Additionally, the provisions of the Act enabled the national and ethnic minorities to establish the Joint Government and National and Ethnic

Minorities Committee. Within the framework of this Committee, the Group for Education of National and Ethnic Minorities and the Group for the Romani Minority were also established (Language Education Policy Profile: Poland, 2007, p.21).

Further, Article 35 of the Constitution guarantees the right of minorities to preserve and develop their language, cultural identity and traditions and to have their own cultural, religious and educational institutions. Minorities also benefit from special electoral rules under which they are allowed to have their representative candidates elected to the Sejm with fewer than the normally required number of votes. Four deputies representing the German minority benefited from this provision at the last elections in 1993 (The Constitution of the Republic of Poland).

Yet, so as to maintain the use of the minority languages, and to enable the students who speak the majority language to study and understand a minority language in their country as well, lessons of minority languages should be accessible to the Polish-speaking students too. It is for sure that the meaning and function of these language classes would be different for students with minority languages and for Polish-speaking students; since for the former, these language classes is a means of maintaining their identity, whereas for the latter it is only a foreign language spoken in their country.

On the other hand, another important issue regarding the preservation of identities is related to the migration which was also mentioned in the previous sections. In this regard, it is important to state that after the liberalization of the regulations concerning the free movement of persons by the end of 1980s, immigration to Poland gained a new dimension, which required a new legal framework for immigrants. An extensive framework was created for the first time in the 1997 Polish Aliens Act, before which there was no clear legal framework dealing with the migration issue (Poland Country Profile, 2008). Along with further reforms in 2001 and 2003, the Polish Aliens Act regulated the entry and residency requirements for foreigners, as well as preventing the entry of “undesirable” foreigners.

In 2000, the Repatriation Act was accepted to deal with the immigrants coming from the regions of the former Soviet Union. Under this law, to apply for an entry visa as an ethnic Polish repatriate required to satisfy certain criteria: it must be proven that two great grandparents or one of the parents or grandparents are (or were) of Polish nationality; clear commitment to Polish nationality must be shown by cultivating the language, culture and customs; and a guarantee of sufficient accommodation in Poland must be demonstrated as well as a source of maintenance (Poland Country Profile, 2008).

Of course, after the accession to the EU, Poland had to change its legal framework parallel to the regulations of the EU and adopted the Schengen Agreement. Regarding the provisions of the Agreement, Poland had to secure its eastern border, as the border of the EU, and introduce visas for its neighbour states to the East as of October 1, 2003 (Poland Country Profile, 2008). In this framework, between the years 2004 and 2006, Poland continued adapting its migration policy to the EU standards.

A remarking regulation for ethnic Poles that entered into force in March 29, 2008, introduced "Karta Polaka" meaning Pole's Card, which gave certain advantages to the ethnic Poles originating from states of the former Soviet Union; Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, the (entire) Russian Federation and Ukraine. However, so as to acquire the Karta Polaka, the applicants need to prove that they are of Polish descent, have basic Polish language skills, and that they have cultivated an attachment to Poland and Polish culture (Poland Country Profile, 2008).

All in all, it is evident that Poland has witnessed a substantial progress regarding the recognition and protection of the linguistic rights of the minorities and migrants. However, there are still certain regulations such as the "Karta Polaka" that require knowledge of Polish culture and language at least on the basic level. Thus, what I have mentioned in this section is that since the late 1980s, and especially since the EU membership, Poland has shown a marked improvement in the area of the

linguistic minorities. However, Poland's linguistic concerns regarding its national language still reveal themselves at certain moments.

5.2.4.2. Poland: In Search for its Own Language

What I have mentioned in the previous sections is that language is an important identifier for both the EU and Poland. In this vein, it is one of the objectives of the EU to influence the language use and language choices of Poland in the advantage of the EU institutions to establish and maintain a European identity.

As mentioned, this interruption of the EU had many explicit and implicit consequences on Poland, additionally resulted with different language policies conducted by Poland as a response to the ones of the EU.

In this respect, one of the main changes in Poland was the growing use and acceptance of English among wide sections of Polish society as a result of Poland's turn to the West and its subsequent integration process. Duszak asserts that throughout history, Polish found itself dominated by other languages on different occasions, such as the spread of Latin and French or the administrative imposition of Russian under the Soviet regime, as well as the German influence. Thus it is claimed that the recent invasion of English is only a new form of linguistic 'imperialism', so it is possible to reanimate the traditional protective attitudes of the Polish language (Duszak, 2006).

Duszak defines the protection of the native tongue in Poland as a national imperative since guarding the integrity of its linguistic system meant the unity of the nation. Poland lost its independence at the turn of the 18th century and gained it back in 1918 but went under the Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. As a result, language policy exercised in the form of a standardization policy which became limited to the issues of grammatical correctness and stylistic coherence. "Within this framework, interlingual borrowings were always severely scrutinized for rational use, and performance was normally given to revitalization through native resources. Quite naturally, therefore, this language policy was also exercised towards English loans and it still persists today even though a more lenient orientation is on the

increase (Duszak, 2006). Duszak (2006) also refers to the increasing dominance of English and argues that today in Poland, as in the general of Europe, a hybridization process takes place that blends English and Polish patterns of talk and writing.

Thus, it is undeniable that the language policy of Poland has been in a process of change since the accession to the EU. This process has two main aspects. The first aspect is the promotion of Polish both in Poland and in the other EU countries so as to ensure its use nationally and to encourage EU foreigners to learn Polish as a foreign language. And the second aspect is the inevitable dominance of English throughout Poland. The two-legged trend in the language policy of Poland since its accession to the EU can be pointed out by three different examples that were mentioned below.

5.2.4.2.1. The Role of Elites in the Language Policy of Poland

Many studies on the European integration and European identity focused on the role of elites; since it was the elites who constituted the decision–makers. In this regard Adam, by making use of the cueing theory in his research, argues that the public opinion is being affected by the political ideology, political parties, and of course by the political elites. Moreover, the influence increases when the domestic elites are divided (Adam, 2009, p.5). Within the framework of the importance of the elites in shaping the citizens opinion, as well as their perception of identity, it is crucial to analyze the role of the elites in Poland on establishing the European identity on Polish citizens.

Within this framework, an interview which was conducted by the Warsaw Business Journal on 2011, named "Poland's cultural offensive" with the Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, Dr. Monika Smoleń is of great importance as an example. The interview points out how language is being seen in Poland and how the official language policy of the state has been evolved.

Dr. Monika Smoleń, as well as giving information about the current attitude of Poland regarding the language issues, also gave a brief introduction on how language and culture have been perceived in Poland for a long time.

In the interview with Warsaw Business Journal, she asserts that Poland has perceived culture "as a rather luxurious area, a kind of a financial burden for the state, and not an integral part of social and economic progress" (Interview: Poland's cultural offensive, 2011). She adds that as a result of this attitude of the Polish government, the issues of culture and language were rarely mentioned by the majority of the Polish politicians in their public speeches.

However, Dr. Monika Smoleń argues that in the last few years, this attitude has changed significantly, and consequently the role of culture and language at the national and regional level grew in importance. She believes that, whereas in the past culture and language were regarded as a financial burden and indifferent from social and economic progress; in recent years, the Polish government started to perceive them as core values of the country's development. Within this framework, she points out the importance of these factors to boost the GDP and to create employment, especially in creative industries and in promotion. She continues to affirm that the culture and language affect the construction of national and regional identities, while contributing to the establishment of an open, creative and innovative society (Interview: Poland's cultural offensive, 2011).

Furthermore, she states that the evolution of the position of language and culture in Poland is explicit in the strategic documents prepared the Polish government. As a novelty, the Polish government included the strategy of developing social capital among nine strategic documents prepared to define Poland's roadmap until 2020, in which culture and language were mentioned as vital elements. It is accepted by these documents that the development of the country cannot be independent from the development of social capital, including culture and language (Interview: Poland's cultural offensive, 2011).

Thus, from the interview, it can be understood that vision of the Polish government about the issues on language and culture has changed a lot during the

history. Parallel to the developments in the international fora, the importance of culture and language for the development of a country, as well as for the formation of identities was being appreciated more. In this vein, the Polish government started to focus more one language issue and initiated specific policies in this area. However, while assessing the opinion of a country on a specific issue, the evaluation of elites is not enough to make a comprehensive research. Thus, in the following section, I will indicate the impact of media on linguistic issues and point out the perception of citizens on the same subject by making use of the diffusive power of media.

5.2.4.2.2. Influence of Media: "Do you know Polska?"

In the previous section, I have made mention of the role of elites in the European integration process, consequently in the formation of European identity. However, while analyzing the European identity, only to make reference to the positioning of the elites does not seem to be a comprehensive research. Adam argues that between the elites and the citizens of the EU, there exists a significant gap in terms of their attitude towards the European identity, which came out in the process of creating a European Constitution by the rejections of Ireland, France, and Netherlands (Adam, 2009, p.5). Thus, in order to understand the interaction between the elites and the citizens regarding their perceptions of European identity, a linkage is necessary. In this regard, the domestic mass media can be regarded as the missing link between them, as the widely used source for citizens' information about the EU (Adam, 2009, p.6). The main information on policies, political issues, actors, and the like, first need to be diffused by the mass media so as to become visible for average citizens.

Yet, the diffusion process of the media is not without elimination. There is of course a selection process which may be driven by professional selection routines like news values or by the journalists, editors, or the political leaders. The important point here is that the selection and emphasis on certain issues result with the construction and reconstruction of reality by the media (Adam, 2009, p.6). This

indicates that, as well as other social, economic or cultural areas, also within the context of language, media are important tools to manipulate the use of language.

"Mass media might be a promoter of ideas by shaping processes of socialization and of persuasion" (Adams, 2009, p.7). The media, by offering arguments and positions, influence the attitudes, perceptions and opinions of the individuals. Burke argues that "what consistently modifies specific perceptions and appraisal of policies and institutions may, in turn, affect the deeper beliefs and, ultimately, the very identity of an individual" (Burke, 2003, p.1151).

Öner also agrees that public opinions are mostly formed by the media. Moreover, she exemplifies the Eurobarometer and argues that it is not only a tool for assessing the 'European public opinion', but it also reflects the endeavours to realize that opinion. This efforts are revealed by the support of the European Commission to the Eurobarometer (Öner, 2004, p.31).

In this sense, media and language policy are interlinked in a multiple way since the question of the language or languages used in the media already predetermines questions of inclusivity and exclusivity of the public sphere and representation. Media are also powerful actors in the implementation of language policies. "Media texts, just like other texts in the public domain, provide discursive and linguistic resources which can be seen as authoritative voice and media serve as fora in which folk beliefs on language, academic expertise in linguistics and political opinions on language can be expressed and language policies can be negotiated. Media discourse is shaped by everyday language practices and in turn contributes to shaping them." (Galasinska and Krzyzanowski, 2009).

Meanwhile, many specialists in Polish studies also analysed the position of language in the mass media, and widely claimed that Polish language is devaluated in the Polish media. In this regard, the Polish Language Council needs to initiate a policy with the aim of protecting the Polish language in the media especially among journalists, teachers and actors for whom language is a "tool of the trade" (Urbaniec, 2006, p.3).

Within this perspective, Poland initiated policies to ensure the use of Polish nationally and to encourage EU foreigners to learn Polish as a foreign language, as well as to diminish the dominance of English throughout Poland. One of the most prominent examples of that policy is a website established by the Polish government to promote the use of Polish among both Polish nationals and foreigners.

The website launched by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland in June 2011 was named "Do you know Polska?" which aimed at introducing and promoting Polish culture and language to the foreigners, especially targeting EU-foreigners. In the website, Poland is presented through unusual photos, slang expressions and interesting facts. Moreover, the website is operated by the Foreign Ministry's Internet Division, and is interactive; in which the visitors can also add photos, share experiences, expressions, and facts about Poland. As it was mentioned above; the website was designed for both Polish nationals and foreigners. Thus, it was prepared in both Polish and English. However, at this point, Poland has faced the same dilemma which was encountered by other EU members too. While targeting the extended use of Polish nationally, as well as EU-wide, Poland remained under the influence of the dominance of English by forming the website in only two languages: Polish and English.

On the other hand, it is also seen that the language policy of Poland has gone parallel to the ones of the EU, since both of their policies mainly targeted young population. It is stated in the previous chapters that the foreign language learning rate is far higher among the young population compared to the elder population. Thus, the European Commission has specialized policies on language on the young population, such as policies on the language education in schools, since affecting the youngsters would facilitate the manipulation of the citizens as a whole. In the same vein, the government of Poland initiated this website especially targeting the young population, which defines itself as "a visual and interactive dictionary of slang terms that describe Poland as seen by the young generation of Poles" (Do you know Polska).

The result was indeed successful. The website attracted great attention especially from the youth as intended, and was awarded the “Webstar Creative” prize in the “Education and Work” category (The MFA's website promoting Poland became the website of the year, 2011).

To sum up, in this section, I have explained the process that languages pass through with relation to their identification with the EU. In this regard, I have mentioned that Poland’s turn towards Europe resulted with substantial effects on its language use, the widespread use of English being one of the consequences. On the other hand, Poland has a sensibility regarding its national language, and it is resisting to the dominance of English, especially after struggling against Soviet dominance such a long time.

5.2.4.2.3. The Official Perspective of Language Policy: Special Programmes Regarding Culture and Language

Parallel to the new aspect gained by the Polish government regarding the cultural and linguistic issues, the institutions operating in the cultural and linguistic area were started to be supported by the government. Even though the mechanisms for supporting culture and language in Poland were decentralized, both Ministry of Culture of Poland and the local governments undertook the responsibility to support these institutions. In this regard, as of the end of 2011, 40 national cultural institutions were being financed directly by the Ministry of Culture of Poland. Additionally, over 10,000 cultural institutions are supervised and financed by local governments (Interview: Poland's cultural offensive, 2011).

Furthermore, the share of culture and tourism from the budget has also increased. In 2011, “75% of the budget provided for culture was at the disposal of local governments and 25% is administered by the Ministry of Culture, which now has over zł.2.4 billion at its disposal” (Interview: Poland's cultural offensive, 2011).

On the other hand, there are special programs prepared by the Ministry of Culture, such as ‘Culture Plus’. This programme was designed to ensure the access of citizens who live in rural areas and outside city centre to national culture, such as

the access to public libraries or local culture centres. Moreover, an agreement was signed between Telekomunikacja Polska and the Ministry of Culture to grant free access of internet in public libraries, so as to facilitate the Polish citizens to reach information.

Other examples of the growing importance of culture for the Polish government are special cultural website launched for children, the celebration of the Chopin Year, and the increasing share of funds from the budget for the development of cultural activities (Interview: Poland's cultural offensive, 2011).

As a result, the policies conducted by the Polish government started to give their fruits in the cultural area. For example, 16 cities of Poland participated to the 2016 European Capital of Culture competition and after the first selection, five of them were chosen for the final competition, namely Gdańsk, Katowice, Lublin, Warsaw and Wrocław. While the selection of five cities of Poland for the European Capital of Culture competition is an important achievement that shows the progress of Poland in this field, what is more crucial about this development is that, it shows the change in the point of view of the Polish government. The main target of the government is not the financial reward (which is relatively low - €1.5 million), but to improve the "economic potential, cultural achievements, heritage, vitality, and its ambitions in all areas related to cultural development" (Interview: Poland's cultural offensive, 2011).

All in all, it is evident that the government of Poland has gone through a substantial change regarding the perception of culture and language. Cultural and linguistic potential is being seen as an important asset that needs to be developed.

5.2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have indicated the role and impact of language in the Eastern enlargement and I have specifically focused on Poland to point out the linguistic developments during and after its accession to the EU. While emphasizing the "European but not so European" view of Western Europe towards Poland, I have mentioned the special features of this country that distinguishes it from the other

CEECs, such as its strong liability to patriarchy, nation, culture and language; as well as its huge population and territory. Within this framework, I have briefly explained the membership process of Poland which was both a Europeanization and a post-communist transition period.

Furthermore, as language being one the most effective means of value transfer, I have emphasized the importance of language in Poland and tried to analyze its linguistic identity, as well as its policies to prevent the linguistic erosion.

Within this framework, I have examined the linguistic changes in Poland by making use of five main areas: the new trends of foreign language education in Poland, the legal basis of language policies as well as the official documents of the EU, the positioning of the linguistic minorities, the role of Polish elites that shape the linguistic practices, and the impact of media on the language issues.

Regarding the new trends of foreign language education in Poland, I have concluded that despite the Russian and German effect in Poland, and even though Polish people are available to be plurilingual, since other Slavonic languages are similar to Polish and relatively easy to learn for Polish people, it is more popular to learn English among Polish people. The importance of foreign language education increased after the EU membership, and supported by the EU; yet it did not have a reversal effect on the dominance of English.

On the other hand, so as to preserve its national language and to ensure plurilingualism, Poland also introduced several legislative regulations throughout its history, one of the most prominent ones being the "Act on the Polish Language". Yet, the EU also introduced language policies that are aimed at weakening the monopoly of the national languages in the public and economic sphere by making international pressure on the countries' national legislation in order to ensure its integrity by preserving multilingualism and plurilingualism within the EU.

However, the concerns about the divisive features of multilingualism overshaded the rights of the linguistic minorities in Poland. Whereas the issues of linguistic minorities and migrants should be elaborated in a different study more

broadly, only a brief introduction to the subject was made within the limitations of this study. Within this framework, it is evident that Poland has witnessed progress regarding the recognition and protection of the linguistic rights of the minorities and migrants. Nevertheless, there are still certain regulations such as the "Karta Polaka" that reflect the concerns of Poland regarding its national language.

As the fourth aspect of the linguistic analysis of Poland, the role of the elites in shaping the citizens opinion as well as their perception of identity was also examined in this section. By making use of an interview conducted by the Warsaw Business Journal on 2011 with the Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, Dr. Monika Smoleń, it can be understood that the vision of the Polish government about the issues on language and culture has changed a lot during history. The importance of culture and language for the development of a country, as well as for the formation of identities was being appreciated more and the Polish government focused more one language issues and initiated specific policies in this area.

However, many specialists in Polish studies argue that parallel to the widespread use and global promotion of English, Polish is being devaluated in the Polish media. Thus, initiating a policy with the aim of protecting the Polish language in the media seemed indispensible since language is being regarded as a "tool of trade" among journalists, teachers and actors (Urbaniec, 2006, p.3). Within this perspective, one of the most prominent examples of that policy is the website "Do you know Polska?" established by the Polish government to promote the use of Polish among Polish nationals and foreigners; and besides targeting the more common use of Polish, the website also aimed at decreasing the dominance of the use of English nationally and internationally.

Yet, it should be noted that neither the substantial change in the perception of culture and language of the Polish government, nor the policies being conducted in several areas such as education or legislation weren't as influential as the Anglo-Saxon culture.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In my research, I have elaborated the interaction between two important phenomena; identity and language, and analysed the positioning of Poland among them during its accession to and membership of the EU. I have argued that language is not merely a tool of communication, but also a marker and a transporter of identity in the national level. Within this framework, I have questioned whether language functioned in the same way for the European identity at the supranational level, and acted as identity marker and transporter from the EU to the member states, namely Poland.

Within this framework, I have stated that language functions as a transporter of identity in the nation-states, but its role is limited when it comes to the European level. The EU attempted to create and diffuse it identity via common European norms and values and in parallel implemented language policies to encourage linguistic diversity. Even though multilingualism was seen as a hindrance to the development of the European identity, the EU has been trying to use it as a unifier element of European identity with its slogan "unity in diversity". The target of the EU was to establish and fortify the European identity in Poland via encouraging multilingualism within the country. On the other hand, the aim of Poland was to "return to Europe" and to be accepted as "true European" like its Western counterparts. However, while language had been an efficient vehicle of identity transportation for the national identities, in the aftermath, the result was not the same for the European identity. The language policies of the EU-wide resulted with the dominance of English, which undermined the use of Polish in Poland and threatened European identity to be dominated under the Anglo-Saxon values.

In order to show that, in the first chapter, I have started with the emergence and formation of the European identity, and within the framework of Anderson's conceptualization of "imagined communities", I have argued that European identity is constructed and being reconstructed to reinforce the confidence to the European project. Furthermore, I have stated that identities establish themselves against "others" and identity shifts occur parallel to the alterations in the conditions that were once used to define an identity.

To evaluate the emergence of European identity itself and the establishment of European identity in Poland, I have made a chronological analysis. Thus, I have mentioned that, within this process of construction and reconstruction of European identity, the interwar years have a special importance since the European identity was born in the interwar years out of the experience of cultural pessimism and decadence, and got stronger after the Second World War.

The period after 1990s is also significant for the evolution of European identity. In the 1990s, the profound social changes following the break- up of the Soviet Union, the re-unification of Germany and the ending of the Cold War caused large-scale movement of migrants, workers and refugees throughout Europe. This new conjuncture brought out new identities and new borderlands, resulted with both xenophobia and racism in Europe, and a focus on identity issues. The Single European Act of 1986 and the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 were the first indicators of the new attitude of the EU, which was identity-based. Within this conjuncture, the top-down policy of the EU gained a new aspect, which focused more on the transfer of "European values" to the candidate and member states within a more bottom-up manner.

Parallel to this period, the Europeanisation discussions also emerged. Generally referred as "being more European", Europeanisation is mainly the impact of the EU on domestic politics of one country, which is either a member of or a candidate for the EU. This policy of the EU went hand in hand with the formation of European identity. Like the increasing importance of identity discussion after the 1990s and the new shape that the European identity gained after the Maastricht

Treaty, it also changed aspect. Europeanisation, as a means to reinforce the European identity, is both a top-down and a bottom-up process. It means both the "downloading of EU policy into the national polity" and the "uploading of national preferences to EU level" (Grabbe, 2009, p.4).

While Europeanisation has been valid for all members very since the beginning, until the identity discussions of 1990s, it was mainly a top-down process conducted by the European institutions. Thus, the research on this concept as a separate field of study accelerated after the 1990s, because the construction of the European identity became highly contested after the Maastricht Treaty. Especially after the accession of the CEECs to the EU, the Europeanisation research became more popular and complicated. These countries, which have substantial communist background, constituted the biggest integration challenge of the EU. Thus, it was essentially after that enlargement that the EU started to implement these policies, mostly under the name of diffusing international values such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law. European identity or a "European consciousness" was deemed necessary for the successful transformation to a supranational entity (Öner, 2004, p.29).

Furthermore, globalisation accelerated this process of value transfer and resulted with the emergence of a new supranational set of identities that includes multiculturalism and multilingualism. As a reaction to the results of globalisation, several strategies were initiated by European countries so as to protect and preserve their national identity, since they regard globalisation as a threat.

In these cases, people generally develop bicultural identities; constituted partly from the local culture, and influenced partly by the global situation. On the other hand, globalisation also brought the danger of becoming uniform under the influence of the cosmopolitan information technology, of mass media or under the dominance of one culture. Within this context, this uniforming influence contributed to the above-mentioned dominance of the Anglo-Saxon culture and English in the case of the European identity. At this point, individuals search for policies to conserve and defence their actual identities. Poland's linguistic initiative, the website

"Do you know Polska?" that aimed at introducing and promoting Polish culture and language to the foreigners, is one of the significant examples of this kind.

As mentioned, the post-1990 policies of the EU, which concentrated on the identity and citizenship issues more than ever within a relatively bottom-up manner, aimed to create and maintain the European identity via creating and transferring European symbols. Whereas these symbols are generally accepted as the European passport, European flag, European anthem, Europe day and the like, the EU also attempted to make use of language as a transporter of identity. Nonetheless, no matter how efficient language has been in the construction of the national identities, in an era of a new set of identities that includes multilingualism and multiculturalism, the efficiency of language is limited as an identity transporter. That is why in the case of the European identity transportation from the EU to Poland, the EU failed to impose European identity in Poland by implementing language policies.

In this vein, in the second chapter, I have focused on language as the "vocaliser of identity", and while explaining its functions such as being a vehicle of thought and expression, and their transportation; emphasised on its function of being a value and identity transporter. To do so, I have made mention of both the identity-language relationship and the language policies introduced by the EU and Poland.

Language has been a controversial issue for the EU from the start. At first, the lack of a common language was seen as a deficit for the EU. A number of suggestions were made such as controlled multilingualism, the use of a single or a number of institutional languages, or creating an artificial lingua franca (Esperanto as an example). Nevertheless, the EU's policy to promote multilingualism under the name of "unity in diversity" brought a new aspect to the linguistic discussions within the Union. Whereas single language is the hearth of nation-states and national identities, what is new for the establishment of European identity is that the EU had to support multilingualism rather than monolingualism, so as to establish its identity on "unity in diversity".

However, the important point of EU's policy of encouraging multilingualism and the paradox deriving from it is the discrimination between the European

languages, which is elaborated in the third chapter. Whereas the EU declares that the linguistic diversity is to be preserved in the Union by granting equal rights to all languages, it creates an inequality among its languages. Currently the European Union has 23 official languages, but more than 60 indigenous regional or minority languages are spoken throughout the continent. However, for example Luxembourgish (an official language in Luxembourg) and Turkish (an official language in Cyprus) have not been accorded the status of official languages of the European Union although Luxembourg and Cyprus are member states. As a result, among the EU bodies, only certain languages are being used, while the language challenge of the EU became even more prominent after the 2004 enlargement. The above-mentioned inequality between languages best manifests itself with the dominance of Anglo-Saxon culture and its language, since English seems to take over other languages' place as the institutional working language and the lingua franca, especially in practice.

The discrimination between the European languages and the dominance of English will be the focal point of the third chapter. In order to evaluate the role of language during the adoption of European identity in Poland as an identity transporter, and analyse the change in the language use of Poland caused by the promotion of multilingualism, it is indispensable to question the rise of English as the lingua franca of Europe. English replaced the role of multilingualism and undermined its function as one of the essential elements of the European identity as reflected by the EU. Hence, the use of English produces and reproduces the unequal relations between the languages of Europe. While the aim of the EU was exactly the opposite –which was promoting multilingualism- only a single language stood amongst the others at the end. Since it was (maybe still is) only the elites who were able to speak more than one languages fluently, the promotion of multilingualism EU-wide only served for the elites at the end, because it was troublesome for the ordinary citizens to adapt. This is the dilemma of the EU: while trying to avoid the dominance of English, it also provoked the use of it by creating discrimination among the European languages.

Therefore, to analyze how the linguistic discrimination debates affect the European identity in practice, I have made use of the survey conducted by INRA in 2001, and the research of Ginsburgh and Weber (2005) on the fear of Europeans to become linguistically disadvantaged. Within this framework, I have compared the disenfranchisement rates among the Europeans which refers to the situation in which a certain percentage of Europeans would lose their ability to understand the EU documents and some discussions, if the number of EU working languages is reduced and some Europeans are denied to use their own language for official reasons (Ginsburg and Weber, 2005). There are a number of important conclusions that need to be explained here;

- It is well-known that the EU is promoting the linguistic diversity within the Union, whose language policies aim to protect linguistic variety and encourage the knowledge of languages. While the main reason behind this policy of the EU is to preserve the identities and ensure social integration, it is seen that the educational and professional opportunities for EU citizens are also closely related to language knowledge. Thus, it is necessary to make the EU a multilingual Union so as to provide equal opportunities for the EU citizens in the fields of education, communication, and vocation. Nonetheless, the practical implementations of the EU institutions do not comply with these aforementioned targets and priorities of the EU and its citizens. The purpose of making the EU a multilingual Union in which citizens can speak at least two other languages, is being damaged by the dominance of English. English is the most commonly known language by the European citizens. It is at the same time the first foreign language most frequently used by the Europeans, and being regarded as the most useful foreign language to learn. Furthermore, the EU institutions do not aim to reverse or amend this situation; on the contrary, they reinforce the dominance of English and reproduce the discrimination between the languages.
- The discrimination between the official languages of the EU, in practice, highly affects the political, social and economic life of the EU citizens. It was mentioned that the official EU documents and speeches of EU

bureaucrats are translated only into a number of EU languages, excluding smaller official languages as well as minority languages. Thus, this practice of the EU, which is certainly not complying with its official statements, damaging certain basic rights of its citizens, such as accessing information in the mother tongue. This damage becomes more crucial in the countries whose languages are used lesser out of their own country, such as Poland. This situation deteriorates the inequality between the European languages to the detriment of Poland, by affecting it more than the other European countries (such as United Kingdom, Germany or France).

- It is seen that the adoption of English as the single language of the EU reduces the disenfranchisement rates in the EU member states. Even in that case, however, the share of population which would lose the ability to understand and follow the main EU documents would be unacceptably high, especially in the countries like Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain and Italy.
- With respect to the disenfranchisement rates in the EU countries, another important point needs to be addressed is that while the foreign language learning has been increasing in the last years, the rate of foreign language learning is far higher among the young population compared to the elder population. Also the disenfranchisement rates are lower among the youngsters. In the case of adopting only one language throughout Europe (the language with the highest possibility for that seems to be English), the young population would be the least affected ones. One of the most remarkable points is that this tendency of learning foreign languages among young population is seen in each and every EU member countries. This trend complies with the official language policies of the EU, whose policies and initiatives generally target the younger EU citizens. Nonetheless, while the EU aims at creating a plurilingual young population and promotes their learning of foreign languages, the dominance of English causes a dilemma for the European Commission.
- Another aspect of the discrimination in the language policy and dominance of English is the special historical position of CEECs. Linguistically, Poland has been under German influence for a long time. Whereas in the EU-15,

> French had a more prominent role, the countries of the Eastern enlargement have been more German-oriented than French-oriented. Thus, they have made substantial change in the language mosaic of the Union after their accession. While these countries could not be excluded from the EU-wide dominance of English, their past tendencies towards German culture and language complicated the transition for them. As a specific example, Poland had to face with the pressure of two main languages (German and English) apart from its national language (Polish).

Within this framework, in the fourth chapter, I have fully focused on Poland and the process Polish went through.

Poland witnessed a significant transformation after its separation from the Soviet bloc and afterwards its accession to the EU. In this vein Poland, whose national identity is strongly shaped by its history, language, culture and tradition; which is a relatively more important accession country in comparison to the other accession countries in terms of territory and number of citizens; and which was regarded as "European but not quite European" by its Western counterparts whereas its aim was to "return to Europe", is a significant field of study.

In this sense, in the last chapter, I have indicated the role and impact of language in the Eastern enlargement, and I have specifically focused on Poland to point out the linguistic developments during and after its accession to the EU. While emphasising the "European but not so European" view of Western Europe towards Poland, I have mentioned the special features of this country that distinguishes it from the other CEECs, such as its strong liability to patriarchy, nation, culture and language; as well as its huge population and territory. Within this framework, I have briefly explained the membership process of Poland which was both a Europeanisation and a post-communist transition period.

Furthermore, as language being one of the most effective means of value transfer for the national identities, I have emphasised the importance of language in Poland and tried to analyse its linguistic identity. Hence, I have stated that the relatively monolingual structure of Poland has been an important element that shapes

its linguistic tradition, and positions Poland as a country strictly connected to its national language. In this vein, during the integration with the EU, Poland implemented several policies to prevent the linguistic erosion, however, at some point the dominance of English and the Anglo-Saxon culture became inevitable.

In this respect, I have examined the linguistic changes in Poland by making use of five main areas: the new trends of foreign language education in Poland, the legal basis of language policies as well as the official documents of the EU, the positioning of the linguistic minorities, the role of Polish elites that shape the linguistic practices, and the impact of media on the language issues.

Regarding the first research point, it can be observed that one of the major linguistic changes in Poland is the decrease of the impact of Russian and the abandonment of compulsory Russian lessons. Moreover, while German also takes a big share of foreign language education especially in the Western parts of Poland, regarding the foreign language education choices, the dominance of English is widespread. Whereas Polish people are available to be plurilingual, since other Slavonic languages are similar to Polish and relatively easy to learn for Polish people, it is more popular to learn English. Additionally, the importance of foreign language education increased after the EU membership, and supported by the EU; yet it did not have a reversal effect on the dominance of English. Furthermore, even though the Polish government introduced several different foreign language lessons, such as French, German and Spanish, right from the beginning of the education life of children; English is still the most preferred one among all.

On the other hand, so as to preserve its national language and to ensure plurilingualism, Poland also introduced several legislative regulations throughout its history, one of the most prominent ones being the “Act on the Polish Language”. Since the laws and regulations can be used to influence the use of language in one country, the Polish government was keen on introducing official campaigns and regulations regarding Polish culture and language. Yet, the EU also introduced language policies that are aimed at weakening the monopoly of the national languages in the public and economic sphere by making international pressure on the

countries' national legislation in order to ensure its integrity by preserving multilingualism and plurilingualism within the EU. However, the intrusion of the EU to the linguistic structure of Poland is not limited to the legal basis. The EU continued its pressures on Poland via the official documents that assess the improvement of Poland regarding its accession to the EU. The reason behind the concerns of the EU was to extend the use of foreign languages (EU languages) throughout Poland and to prevent the attachment to national languages being a divisive factor for the European identity.

However, the concerns about the divisive features of multilingualism over shaded the rights of the linguistic minorities in Poland. It was not until the late 1980s that the rights of the linguistic minorities were first mentioned; since Poland was regarded as a monoethnic and monolingual country until that time. After 1980s, several legislations were introduced to protect and preserve the rights of the linguistic minorities, yet there were still certain regulations that favour Polish ethnicity, such as the "Karta Polaka". Whereas the issues of linguistic minorities and migrants should be elaborated in a different study more broadly, only a brief introduction to the subject was made within the limitations of this study. Within this framework, it is evident that Poland has witnessed progress regarding the recognition and protection of the linguistic rights of the minorities and migrants, even though there are still certain regulations that reflect the concerns of Poland regarding its national language.

As the fourth aspect of the linguistic analysis of Poland, the role of the elites in shaping the citizens opinion as well as their perception of identity was also examined in this section. By making use of an interview conducted by the Warsaw Business Journal on 2011 with the Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, by Dr. Monika Smoleń, it can be understood that the vision of the Polish government about the issues on language and culture has changed a lot during history. The importance of culture and language for the development of a country, as well as for the formation of identities was being appreciated more and the Polish government focused more one language issues and initiated specific policies in this area.

However, while analyzing the European identity, only to make reference to the positioning of elites does not seem to be a comprehensive research, because there seems to be a significant gap between the elites and the citizens of the EU in terms of their attitude towards the European identity. Thus, I have elaborated the impact of media on linguistic issues and point out the perception of citizens on the same subject by making use of the diffusive power of media.

Many specialists in Polish studies argue that parallel to the widespread use and global promotion of English, Polish is being devaluated in the Polish media. Thus, initiating a policy with the aim of protecting the Polish language in the media seemed indispensible since language is being regarded as a "tool of trade" among journalists, teachers and actors (Urbaniec, 2006, p.3). Within this perspective, one of the most prominent examples of that policy is the website "Do you know Polska?" established by the Polish government to promote the use of Polish among Polish nationals and foreigners; and besides targeting the more common use of Polish, the website also aimed at decreasing the dominance of the use of English nationally and internationally.

The Polish government introduced several other programmes on the cultural and linguistic issues and provide more assistance to the cultural institutions, as well as allocating a bigger share to the cultural and linguistic issues from the budget. For example, 40 national cultural institutions were being financed directly by the Ministry of Culture of Poland, and over 10,000 cultural institutions are supervised and financed by local governments (Interview: Poland's cultural offensive, 2011). What is crucial about these developments is that, they indicate the change in the point of view of the Polish government on the cultural and linguistic area which were once regarded as issues of secondary importance.

Yet, the substantial change in the perception of culture and language of the Polish government, as well as the policies being conducted in several areas such as education or legislation, could not be as influential as the Anglo-Saxon culture. To sum up, after its EU membership, Poland had to face a dilemma regarding the language use within the country. On the one hand, the EU membership required the

promotion of multilingualism within both Poland and the EU. Thus, Poland initiated policies and programmes to encourage foreign language learning and promote multilingualism. On the other hand, the encouragement of multilingualism within Poland had unexpected consequences such as the overrating of Anglo-Saxon culture and English, so Poland felt the necessity to introduce policies to preserve its national language. As mentioned previously, since languages are one of the most important means of value transportation, the change in the language use directly affects the perception of identity. The EU, while supporting multilingualism, aimed at creating an integrative European identity; where Poland did the same thing so as to integrate with the European identity. However, both for Poland and the EU, the support for multilingualism resulted rather with the promotion of English globally, more than creating and strengthening the European identity.

All in all, the results of the language policies implemented by both the EU and Poland shows that the role of language in the creation of the national identity is different from its role while creating and diffusing the European identity. While implementing various language policies, the EU aimed to establish European identity in Poland. The EU, however, as well as supporting and encouraging multilingualism officially, in practice failed to promote the use of all the European languages, and fostered the unofficial use of certain ones.

To my knowledge, in the literature the general view is that multilingualism in Europe has a distortive effect on European identity, because in order to establish an identity, a single language is indispensable. It is argued that since Europe is a multilingual continent and the EU now has 23 official languages, the lack of a single unifying language undermines citizens' loyalty to the EU and deteriorates their identification with the EU. Yet, when the case of Poland's accession to the EU and the imposition of European identity in Poland are examined, it is seen that the language policies of the EU were not resulted with the establishment and strengthening of the European identity, nor did language function as an identity transporter. The striking point here is that language has a limited role as an identity marker and transporter when supranational identities are at stake.

Thus, neither multilingualism constitutes a threat to the European identity, nor is a single language obligatory for the establishment of an identity. One may suggest that in an era of multilingualism, multiculturalism, and multiple identities, the formation of identities becomes unattached to the language, contrary to the establishment of national identities. Additionally, the same could also be suggested for the countries with multiple ethnicities, languages, and cultures such as Turkey or the USA. Within this framework, so as to maintain its identity under these circumstances, the EU should form a new kind of pluralism that envisages full multilingualism, rather than the use of single language or the invention of artificial languages.

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