

THE TALE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN A SMALL TOWN IN TURKEY:
HACILAR-KAYSERİ

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ABSTRACT

THE TALE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN A SMALL TOWN IN TURKEY: HACILAR-KAYSERİ

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This dissertation analyses the industrial transformation of Turkey by focusing on the history of Kayseri's small town Hacilar which has been showed an extraordinary performance in industry and economic development in the last 40 years. However, it is not a general history of industrialization; but a local development story from a traditional rural/ village community to an industrial production zone in relation with the local, national and universal dynamics. In line with the historical materialist conceptual and epistemological frame and against the "Calvinist Islam" kind theological arguments, this study explains the historical, regional, geographical, economic, social, and cultural reasons and factors of the industrial development of Hacilar in the context of the general industrial history of Turkey.

Keywords: Turkey, Anatolian Tigers, Islamic Capital, Islamic Calvinism, Kayseri, Hacilar.

ÖZ

KÜÇÜK BİR TÜRK KASABASININ SANAYİLEŞME HİKÂYESİ: HACILAR- KAYSERİ

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Bu tez son 40 yılda olağanüstü bir sanayileşme ve ekonomik gelişme performansı gösteren Kayseri'nin Hacılar kasabasındaki endüstriyel dönüşümü, Türkiye'nin sanayileşme süreci bağlamında analiz etmektedir. Çalışma, genel bir sanayileşme tarihinden ziyade Hacılar'ın endüstri öncesi küçük bir köy cemaatinden başlayıp bir sanayi odağı olmaya uzanan hikâyesini; yerel, ulusal ve uluslar arası dinamikler çerçevesinde açıklamaya çalışan bir yerel kalkınma incelemesidir. "İslami Kalvinizm" türü teolojik argümanlara karşı Hacılar'daki endüstriyel gelişmeyi; Türkiye'nin sanayileşme süreci bağlamında tarihsel, bölgesel, coğrafi, ekonomik, toplumsal ve kültürel nedenler ve faktörler çerçevesinde ve tarihsel materyalist bir kuramsal yaklaşım içinde açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Anadolu Kaplanları, İslami Sermaye, İslami Kalvinizm, Kayseri, Hacılar.

Babam Ahmet Cengiz'e

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I dedicate this thesis to a real man of Hacılar to my father, Ahmet Cengiz, who is the most modernist, communist and bull-headed man I ever know.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF THE STUDY

Since the beginning of the 1990s there is a growing dynamism, economic and social development in Turkey especially in some Anatolian cities such as Kayseri¹, Konya², Antep³, Çorum⁴, Denizli,⁵ and Eskişehir⁶. Sometimes called as Anatolian Tigers⁷, conceptualized as peripheral bourgeoisie, new industrial districts⁸ or stigmatized as Islamic or Green Capital⁹; the development of Anatolia had very different dynamics in relatively a long time. The increasing literature¹⁰ indicates the importance of the topic. Besides, there were made some other observations¹¹ on this energy which has been concentrated on the periphery (not just the periphery actually). Although this peripheral¹² energy has been repressed after the 28 February Military Intervention, it seems that it has been transformed and entered into a new phase and made a step forward to the center of politics in Turkey after 2002, 2007 and 2011 Elections.

¹ ESI 2005, Satoğlu 2008, Özcan 2000, 2006, Keyman and Lorasdağı 2010, Dikeçligil 2008

² Kutlu 2007, Demirpolat 2002

³ Ayata 2004, Eraydın 2002, Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman, 2009, Bayırbağ 2009 and 2011, Özcan 2000

⁴ Keyman and Lorasdağı 2010; Eraydın 2002

⁵ Özcan 2000, Saraçoğlu and Başak 2009, Erendil 2000; Eraydın 2002, Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman, 2009

⁶ Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman, 2009 Keyman and Lorasdağı 2010

⁷ Demir, Acar, Toprak 2004; Durakbaşa 2010; Buğra and Savaşkan 2010; Filiztekin and Tunalı 1999; Köse and Öncü, 1998; Yavuz 2006.

⁸ Eraydın 2002

⁹ Can, 1997a; Can, 1997b; Demiralp 2009; Özel, 2010; Atasoy, 2009;

¹⁰ Buğra 1998, 2002; Doğan 2007; Özdemir 2006, 2007; Tuğal 2010.

¹¹ Uzgel and Duru, 2009; Öniş, 2006; Pamuk 2008.

¹² Açıkel 2006; Gönenç 2006; Mardin, 2005; Arlı, 2006.

It is not possible to discuss all this process of almost thirty years within the limits of a dissertation. Instead, I took a small but critical cross-section from the center of Anatolia, from the Hacilar province of Kayseri, and tried to contribute to the literature from a micro scale in a macro context. Since, Hacilar is a very proper ground for analyzing social change both with its local (culture, tradition, social structure, religion, communities etc.) and global (flexible production, new industrial districts, articulations into the world market, export oriented industrialization etc.) dimensions and set up the discussion on the relations between industrialization economic development, and modernization. I could summarize what I meant with this ground as follows.

As the inheritor of the multi ethnic and cosmopolitan Ottoman Empire, Turkey is one of the rising developing countries of the world lying in between the Middle East and Europe. It is the 16th biggest economy of the world with its almost seventy five million population, \$10,000 GNP per capita and approximately \$144 billion export capacity in 2012. Despite the various deficiencies of its democracy, it is also the sole secular country in the world among the societies whose population overwhelmingly composed of Muslim people. Turkey is also in the EU Accession Process since 1963. It is in the status of candidate country since 1999 and the deliberations between EU and Turkey has been continuing since 2005 for the full membership.

In this general context, Kayseri which takes place in the middle and crosscutting points of south-north and west-east axis of the country is one of the biggest cities of Turkey with its over 1 million inner city population, a production over 5 billion dollars, 200.000 employment and 1,3 billion dollars of export capacity. It is also a famous historical trade center of the country notorious with its commercial propensity and religious conservatism. The percentage of votes for conservative

AKP (Justice and Development Party) in the city in the last four elections (2002, 2007, 2009, 2011) respectively as % 54,34, % 65,73 % 60.5 and % 64.9¹³ could be seen as clear indicators of this orientation.

As Ayata¹⁴ notes, it would not be a proper way to understand the cities in Turkey only by comparing the numbers and quantitative indicators. Since, irrespective of their population and economic capacity, every city in Turkey differentiates from each other by their unique socio-cultural and historical characteristics. Even when they are neighbor cities they are quite different with their particular and unique social structure and life styles. In this sense, Kayseri as a unique case is a very proper example to examine this particularity. Historically, there has been a considerable folkloric repertoire about the Kayseri identity in oral and written tradition of public discourse. Since the Ottoman times, “the people of Kayseriyya have been noted for their religious orthodoxy and for their business acumen” (Jennings, 1999: 18). It is such that Jennings notes that “Carnoy and Nicolaidis related a legend that no Jew could be live in Kayseriyya, a reference to the supposed commercial acumen of its inhabitants.... Simoen of Poland was aware that they were considered ‘dyers of asses’. It is widely believed that in Turkey today that the people of Kayseriyya have a special propensity for business and are hardworking and diligent” (Jennings, 1999: 18).

On the other hand, Kayseri had been a cosmopolitan city throughout the history and a critical settlement in which a serious number of Armenians and a considerable number of Greeks had lived besides the other minorities until the First World War (1914-1918), Deportation of Armenians (1915) and the Population Exchange with the Greece (1924). Therefore, as the talented artisans, traders and craftsmen the non-Muslim population of Kayseri had been great positive effects on the financial, industrial and social life of the city. Indeed, it is possible to argue that they had been holding the economic life of the city in their hands until that time. Today, the

¹³ See <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/index.html> and <http://www.belgenet.net> for election results in years.

¹⁴ Personal conversation with Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata.

historians and researchers reconciled that most of its propensity to trade and industry of the city was inherited from the non-Muslim population especially the Armenians.

As a matter of the fact, Kayseri has been generally a rich city in the history and had a certain sense of arrogance and autonomy from the central government stemming from this rich background. Although the city lost most of this rich cosmopolitan structure after the historical catastrophes I noted above; this inheritance still constitutes the most valuable social capital of the city. Therefore, it is possible to state that the fellows of Kayseri have been very individualistic, hard working, diligent, cautious and practical in their business and personal relations. In this sense, as the old mayor (1994-1998) of the city Şükrü Karatepe states; the life of an average man of Kayseri elapses with the estimation of his incomes and costs of the business during the day (Karatepe, 2003: 251). Since the middle classes comprising of the small shop keepers, small scale merchants or industrialists are dominant in the city; the ideology of these groups are quite hegemonic. As Korat claims while the daily program of life are organized according to the perception of the small shop keepers, traders and middle scale industrialists; the general frame of life in the city is shaped by the financial and industrial bourgeoisie. In other words while the big bourgeoisie controls the politics, the petty bourgeoisie influences to the everyday life and its ideology in the city (Korat; 1996: 138). As aptly underlined by Karatepe an average man of Kayseri watches the life with the eyes of a shop keeper or small scale tradesman. So, he is always in the pursuit of his net interests in the very short run. For this reason, the fellows of Kayseri avoid risks as a general tendency and avoid from the politics. The intensive commercial character of the city has been created also a confirmative political attitude with regard to the politics throughout the history of the city. Due to the short term interest vision of the fellows; the city has not been that successful in politics as in the cases of trade and industry (Karatepe, 2003: 250-252) until Abdullah Gül who is a politician from Kayseri became first the prime minister in 2002 and the president of Turkey in 2007. Kayseri has been characteristically the follower of the general political trends in the country and votes for the increasing parties every time with a business sensitive opportunistic approach. As Korat pinpoints, “since the times of Kadı Burhaneddin,

the fellows of Kayseri have not shown a clear political attitude and this did not change in the Republican Period too. Kayseri is a river which has been flowing always with the burbling water in its political choices” (Korat, 1996:138). In this context, it is an excellent place to examine and understand both the social, cultural, economic and political transformations of Turkey as a conservative and dynamic trade and industry city in the very center of deep Anatolia.

Turning our objective a bit closer this time we encounter with another unique place within the uniqueness of Kayseri itself. This is the extraordinary proud and arrogant small town/village, Hacilar, settled on the northern skirts of Mount Erciyes since the 15th Century. This small, landless, mountainous and poor village of Kayseri today is in 45th place based on the socio-economic development index among 872 towns of Turkey according to the statistics of State Planning Organization.¹⁵ It is in the first place based on rate of industrial workers with % 48.13; in 6th place based on the urbanization rate; in 37th place based on the GNP per capita; in 868th place based on the percentage of agricultural workers. The average household population is 4.73 and the unemployment rate is % 8. 22.

In the last 30 years the town experienced an enormous industrialization and the whole social and economic structure has changed. Given most of the women are housewives; it means almost all of the men (% 48) seems to work in industry. With this rapid industrialization, the great amount of unemployment of the past decreased, the life standard of people has been gradually increased. Today the schooling rate of Hacilar in Primary Education is % 100. For instance whereas, there was just one person who succeeded the central university exam held in 1974, today 492 of 700 total university students¹⁶ are taking scholarship from Hacilar Solidarity Association whose members are composed of industrial entrepreneurs and businessman. The total budget of the Association for the year 2009 is almost 1 million \$ and they have been making many different investments for the town. It seems that there has also been developed a philanthropic ethos and solidarity

¹⁵ Dinçer and Özarlan 2004.

¹⁶ These are the students who were born in Hacilar or whose parents were born in Hacilar. The other critical point is that half of these students are women.

parallel to the economic development in the town in the last 20 years. So, where does this welfare coming from? How and why did this great transformation take place in a relatively short time such as 30 to 40 years in Hacılar but not in elsewhere? In general, this would be “the” problem of my dissertation. Therefore, by picking up a small cross-section from Anatolia and around the historical, economical and social evolution of a town, I tried to understand the socio-economic and cultural transformation of Turkey. So, this work also aimed at bringing a new insight to the “Anatolian Tigers” and/or a “Green Capital” debates which has been dominated the literature and agenda for a long time.

Directly concerning over my problematic one critical answer was developed by a European think-tank ESI (European Stability Initiative) which published a report in 19 September 2005 with the title of “Islamic Calvinists: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia.” This report, focusing on Kayseri, had some rapid repercussions both in domestic¹⁷ and international circles¹⁸. The report had conceptualized the outstanding economic development of Kayseri and focused particularly on its near-by small town Hacılar with the notion of Protestant Ethic or with its term of Islamic Calvinism.

Actually, the debate on the “Protestant Islam” is not so new for Turkey. Since the last periods of Ottoman Empire, the reformation or adaptation of Islam has been intensively discussed¹⁹. Indeed, even the making of new secular Turkish Republic has been read by many Islamists²⁰ as the Protestantization of Islam. Besides, there are also other researchers²¹ who regard the issue from different perspectives such as the relations between capitalism and Islam. I will consider this general debate on the “Protestant Ethic” in the next chapters in detail. However, the concept of Calvinist

¹⁷ See Akyol 2006, Efeoğlu 2006, Özgürel 2006, Özkök 2006, Barlas 2006

¹⁸ See Judson 2005, Bilefsky 2006, Lodhi 2006, Proyect 2006

¹⁹ See Ülgener 2006, Hanioglu 2005, Çelik 2003, Ayengin 2005, Çiğdem, 2006, Türkdoğan 1994, Sarıbay 2006, Bardakoglu 2004, Aktay 2000.

²⁰ For instance, the Islamic Journal: “Bilgi ve Hikmet” devoted one of its volumes totally to this topic: Islam and Protestantism in Spring 1993 Vol 2. See and the Journal of Islamic Research Vol. 16 and 18. See also the particular works of Canatan 1993, Aydın 1993, Özcan 1985, Mutlu 1990

²¹ See. Kıvanç 1997, Can 1997, Arslan 1997, İnsel 1997, Swatos 2007, Roberts 2007.

Islam has many problematic dimensions beyond its being a contradictory definition. It is such that even the definition of “Islamic Calvinism” has full of methodological and epistemological problems crosscutting all the practices of social sciences.

Therefore this work²² also partly aimed at indicating the problems and inappropriateness of the conception of Calvinist Islam in the context of the industrial development process of Kayseri and Hacılar. Since I think first this argument is quite oversimplified and could not comprise of the diversity and colorfulness of the issue and second it has a very weak explanatory power regarding the Weberian theory itself.

Based on a historical materialist conceptual background I will try to elucidate the industrialization dynamics of Hacılar with a chain of material and social factors. I will try to refute the “Islamic Calvinism” argument by shedding light on the historical, economical, geographical, social and cultural factors and dynamics (including religion too), which paved the way for industrialization process of that region.

In this context I will first emphasize the role of Kayseri city in the development of Hacılar. As I noted above Kayseri is not a new developing city but it is a historical trade center. Indeed it is the birthplace of world trade in human history. Therefore, the first factor in the development of Hacılar was its proximity to the Kayseri city. The fellows of Hacılar has been always tried to be a part of the Kayseri economy. Especially after the establishment of the Republic, Kayseri became one of the

²² The first drafts of this study were presented in different conferences. See Cengiz K. “Hacılar’da Endüstrileşme ve Toplumsal Değişim: Weberci Bir Yaklaşımın Uygun(suz)lukları” paper presented to the 1. Hacılar Symposium, 11-13 May 2007, Kayseri; Cengiz K., “Religion, Industrialization and Social Change in Turkey: The Concept of Calvinist Islam, An Oxymoron?”, Paper presented to the MESA (Middle East Studies Association) 42nd Annual Meeting, November 22-25, Washington DC. USA, 2008; Cengiz K. “Türkiye’nin Yeri Neresi Olmalı? Kayserili (Hacılarlı) Sanayicilerin Yerellik Modernlik ve Küreselleşme Eksenindeki Eğilimleri”, Paper presented to the TSBD 10th National Social Sciences Congress, 9-11 December 2009, ODTÜ, Ankara; Cengiz K., “The New Industrial Class of Turkey between Community and Market. A Cross Section from an Anatolian City: Kayseri”, Paper presented to the “How Class Works-2010 Conference”, State University of New York Stony Brook, Center for Study of Working Class Life Department of Economics, New York, USA, 3-5 June 2010.

critical industrial centers of Turkey with the giant state enterprises. Parallel to these developments, the people living in the city have been benefited from these industrial investments in different ways. So did the fellows of Hacılar. Since, it was the poorest and crowded settlement among the other ones which are close to the city center. The start of primitive hand made textile production in 1930s and the carpet weaving industry in Hacılar in 1950s were the direct results of the industrial development in Kayseri. After 1950s and especially 1960s and 1970s the boys of Hacilar were sent to Kayseri this time for working as apprentices in the newly emerging industrial districts of the city. This intensive and massive child labor flow to Kayseri was the other critical dynamic in the subsequent industrial development of the town.

The second factor was related with the Hacılar's own characteristics. Hacılar is a very old, extraordinary and unique Sunni Turkish settlement among the town and villages of Kayseri. According to the Ottoman tax records its history dates back to the last quarter of 15th Century and it has been an old village/town having a permanent and settled social structure. On the other hand, the village has been placed on the northern skirts and slopes of the Mount Erciyes on the infertile lands of volcanic lava strata. So, the quality of lands is quite low and the average ownership of land is quite small due to the intensive population of almost ten to twenty thousand people during the 20th Century. Besides, the village was established on a blind spot in which no one except the fellows of Hacilar live and passes through. So, it has been a very homogenous place throughout its history. Therefore, there has been a quite intensive internal solidarity in the village due to its long history, geography and ethnic composition. As a matter of the fact, the shortage of land and related poverty in the village made the fellows of Hacilar as the acumen followers of additional and alternative income facilities in the city and other places. In this frame, since the last period of Ottoman Empire they had been worked in different formal and informal sectors and passed through different carrier paths and ventures such as banditry, tobacco smuggling, peddler, salesmen, minibus chauffeuring, labor migration to Germany, hotel management, construction sector (workers), cloth weaving, carpet producing and finally industry (first workers and

then factory owners). Given that the secondary school had opened in the village in 1965, it would be easier to understand why they did not choose school rather than the trade and industry in the edge of a historical trade center.

Among all these different paths, the banditry period is quite unique to Hacilar among the other towns of Kayseri. The fellows of Hacilar have been very famous around Kayseri region as the indifferent and bull-headed bandits. If to take the banditry and tobacco smuggling as different forms of entrepreneurship; the strong internal solidarity stemmed from the long history of the village provided them a reliable ground to be brave and courageous entrepreneurs in their subsequent commercial activities in the following years in the context of risk taking.

The third factor was the Armenian population. They did not live directly in Hacilar but their gardens and summer houses were in the region (Gavur Çukuru) between Hacilar and Kayseri city. Therefore, Armenians were the close, indeed border neighbors of Hacilar. So the fellows of the town learned too much information, know-how, talent and profession from the Armenians like weaving, carpet producing, pastrami and sausage production, metal and stone construction. The fellows of Hacilar were elaborating on these qualities of Armenians, and to a great extent took over these settled value system and entrepreneurial culture from the Armenians by virtue of their relations with Kayseri and over the city dwellers after the Deportation.

The fourth factor was the strict social tension between the city and the village. Until the last quarter of the 20th Century the poor fellows of Hacilar were working in different sectors of the city as the unqualified labor. They were construction workers, diggers, wood choppers, and tenant farmers in the gardens of rich city dwellers. So they were denigrated and insulted by them as the rude peasants and bandits as in the case of all other examples in the world. However, since the reasons I touched above, the internal solidarity of Hacilar were so strong and they could handle with them by using their capacity to resist against this social disclosure as the risk takers. Therefore, this city-village tension has been one of the most critical factors which had triggered the ambition of the fellows of Hacilar in the way to be

rich industrialists and businessmen against the city dwellers. So Hacılar has been made tense contacts with Kayseri with its illegal and illegitimate past on the one hand and aggressive ambition on the other hand without breaking its ties with the commercial ethos of the city where the entrepreneurial values step in. This dual and conflictual structure is still effective today between the relations of the two parts.

The fifth and other psychological factor has been related with the internal dynamics of the town. Besides the external solidarity against the city dwellers, there has also been a very strong internal tension in the town among the children of the same street, neighborhood, family and kinship. Contrary to the supposed Calvinist kind motivation stemmed from the religious tension in the way to salvation; the motivation of the Hacılar has been quite profane and oriented towards the material success. In Weberian interpretation of Calvinist theology the supposed internal religious tension turns out to be a rational motivation in the way to vocational success in the world for religious salvation. However, the ambition and motivation in Hacılar did not stem from a religious source but it originates in an overt and primitive feeling of excelling and predominating others. This very strong and burning “I will be rich like you” feeling between the fellows or brothers of a small village is of utmost importance in the industrial development of the town. Combined with the inferiority complex against the city dwellers; this passionate motivation to success created an incredible ambition among the entrepreneurs of Hacılar in the last forty years and it still determines the industrial and commercial relations of the town. As one of the industrialists puts it “what brings Hacılar to this point is the hostility they (the fellows) feel against each other”

For this reason, combined with other factors this communitarian synergy stemming from insult, ridicule and social disclosure created an interesting dynamism including a cruel internal economic competition among the fellows with a strong external social solidarity against the foreigners. Besides, they have been well adapted to the social, political and economic transformation of Turkey in regard to their economic decisions and enterprises. Only the establishment story of HES Cable Factory in 1974 in the middle of the village by the participation of only the local people could be taken as one of the unique cases in the world to exemplify the

strength of the local dynamics in the way to industry. In sum, my dissertation tries to understand these different and various dynamics of industrialization, economic development and social change in Central Anatolia around the trajectory of a small town. The most general frame of my work was designed to understand this transition from a traditional rural/ village community to an industrial production zone in the region.

Specifically, I will focus on Hacilar's "industrial entrepreneurs"; whose evolution I think is the best indicator of this development and transformation. By the term entrepreneur, I am referring to the definition of Ayata²³ who defines the entrepreneur as the person "who has the capacity to transform the existing facilities into new synthesis". The entrepreneurs bring new attempts and ways by breaking the existing stability and balances in industrial sectors. At the same time, these people could also be considered as economic elites from a different perspective. Therefore, the elites²⁴ could be taken as the most proper persons who first feel social change and its internal crises on their minds and bodies. So, it is my contention that for understanding the industrialization and transformation of a social formation, they are the best objects of inquiry. In Hacilar the industrial entrepreneurs are utmost important figures and most critical agents as the bearers of this transformation.

On the other hand, the terms of "Anatolian Tigers", "Islamic/ Green Capital" or "Islamic Calvinism", generally refers to the conservative and pious bourgeoisie²⁵ who re-invested the capital, gained from workmanship, artisanship or trade, to labor intensive and export oriented industrial production in some Anatolian cities²⁶ I touched above. Therefore, in accordance with my theoretical position I will talk about these people and groups as "Anatolian Capital", and called my local focus

²³ Ayata 1991: 17.

²⁴ Açıkel 2007

²⁵ Can 1997; Can 1997b; Demir, Acar and Toprak 2004; Filiztekin and Tunalı 1999; Durakbaşı 2010; Yavuz 2006 Köse and Öncü 1998; Demiralp 2009; Özel 2010; Atasoy 2009; Doğan 2007; Özcan and Çokgezen 2003; Jang 2005.

²⁶ Pamuk, 2011: 301-302.

group as the industrialists of Hacılar who has been making industrial production for local and global markets. Looking to the literature one can see that the Anatolian Capital is pictured as follows.

- Anatolian capital emerged as a result of a structural transformation in Turkish economy from import substitution to export oriented economy²⁷. This transformation is led by the critical actor Turgut Özal who was the architect of the 24 January Economic Decisions which paved the way for these neo-liberal reforms taken by Demirel Government in 1980 and kept up by the military regime²⁸.
- With the transition from Fordism to Post-fordism flexible production spread to the whole world. Especially in the 3rd World countries there emerged some local, small competitive and flexible enterprises which at the same time depend on personal and communal solidarity and trust networks²⁹.
- These kinds of small, conservative and pious entrepreneurs who have been historically represented by the National Outlook (Milli Görüş) parties³⁰ in Turkey found a proper and fertile ground to develop in the periphery³¹.
- These small and middle sized industrialists having roots in artisanship in general have been emerged with their own individual and familial efforts³² and mostly concentrated on the labor intensive sectors such as textile, furniture, iron and steel goods etc. They have been trying to carve small niches in the global markets by directly concentrating on export oriented production based on the principles of “lower wages and flexible working regimes³³”.

²⁷ Pamuk 2011: 302; Tuğal, 2002: 92.

²⁸ Demir, Acar, Toprak, 2004: 169-170; Pamuk 2009: 274, Yavuz 2004: 227.

²⁹ Buğra 1998: 524

³⁰ Toprak 1981: 105; Sarıbay 1985; Yücekök 1983 Şen 1995

³¹ Gülalp 2001: 435-437.

³² Buğra 2002: 194; Yavuz 2003: 278.

³³ Pamuk, 2011: 302; Buğra, 2002: 191

- Without giving permission to labor union organizations in their factories, these industrialists manage their factories with informal, personal, paternalistic, patrimonial and authoritative forms without or limited social security. On the other side, they control the labor by the traditional and religious forms of solidarity and charity mechanisms such as *zekat*, *fitre* and *sadaka*. By doing so they both try to enlarge their social networks and gain legitimacy in different layers of society especially in the eyes of working class³⁴.
- It has also been observed that the Islamic capital has differentiating and diversified fractions³⁵. In time, they have been transformed from small scale peripheral producers to world wide big holdings and lost its homogeneity.

Actually, this whole picture gives an impression that as if there was no capitalism or a very limited capitalist production in Turkey before 1980's; the state made pressure on the capitalist entrepreneurship before Özal freed entrepreneurs from their chains by decreasing the political pressure over the conservative peripheral bourgeoisie and opened the way for export oriented economy. The result was the rapid economic development and capital accumulation provided by the spiritual motivation (Islamic Spirit) stemmed from the religion. However, although this description seems to explain some particular facts, it includes many mistaken statements that are not in compliance with some historical and empirical realities. Since, it is almost impossible to understand and consider the development and transformation that have been taken place in Anatolia in 1980s and 1990s without looking at the historical roots, local dynamics, industrialization tendencies and carrier paths regarding these processes.

In this thesis, with focusing on the case of Hacilar, I will try to show the historical, social, economic and cultural origins of aforementioned transformation and prove that the "Calvinist Islam" kind of theological arguments do not reflect the reality and include mistaken statements by virtue of empirical data. However, what I am

³⁴ Doğan, 2007: 54

³⁵ Kemal Can 1997; Doğan 2007: 53-63

planning to do is not a general history of industrialization of Turkey. Rather, I will take a particular case, and focus on the historical evolution of that case from within the theoretical perspective and my problematic that I outlined above.

In this transition I will also examine different dimensions such as sub-contracting, industrial relations and technology; solidarity, competition etc. among the fellow entrepreneurs, and class relations between entrepreneurs and their workers. Besides, regarding with the industrial entrepreneurs I will also consider the relations of work/economics and politics, the daily life and family relations, leisure time and consumption, intergenerational relations, economic- social and religious networks, city and town relations, working ethics and finally the relations with the outside world; namely the attitudes or encounters of industrial entrepreneurs with globalization and modernity. However most importantly, while examining this transition I will be particularly focusing on the relations between religion and industrial/economic relations in the context of social change. I will try to answer the following questions:

- Why in Hacılar, but not in elsewhere, did such a great industrialization attempt or process begin and succeed? What are the socio-economic and historical dynamics that paved the way for industrial development in the local level?
- Where the industrialization of Hacılar does takes its part within the general development and economics of Turkey and Kayseri? What are the mutual relations, disconnections, conformities, ruptures and articulations between two processes?
- What are the basic characteristics of Hacılar Industry in production, technology, import and export capacities, management, research and development and class relations?
- What are the functions of social and religious networks in economic, social and political organizations in Hacılar? In which points these relations contribute to the industrialization of the town?

- What is the role of religion (Islam) in the capitalist development? Does Islam have a considerable effect on the industrialization dynamics of the town either as an obstacle or a facilitator? Is the concept of Calvinist Islam appropriate in explaining the dynamics of industrial and economic development of that region?
- What are the possible results of the interaction with the rest of the world for the industrial entrepreneurs concerning with their ideological attitudes, economical and political choices and orientations, particularly regarding capitalism, globalization and Western modernity.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

As I noted above, this study aims at analyzing the industrial transformation of Turkey by focusing on the history of Kayseri's small town which has been showed an extraordinary performance in industry and economic development. Therefore, it is not a general history of industrialization; but a local development story in relation with the local, national and universal dynamics. In line with the historical materialist conceptual and epistemological frame and by focusing on the trajectory of the town I will try to explain the historical, regional, geographical, economic, social, and cultural reasons and factors of the industrial development of Hacılar in the context of the general industrial history of Turkey.

Actually, every field (study) is a different and exciting adventure and life experiment for a researcher beyond its being an object of inquiry. However, this study is of another importance and ontological significance for me. Since, Hacılar is my heimatland. I was born in a hospital in Kayseri but I first opened my eyes in this town. My first memories about the world were about Hacılar. I was stayed there until I was eight years old and in the second year of primary school my parents who are modernist teachers decided to move to İzmir/Karşıyaka, a historical and liberal port city on the Aegean cost in the Western Turkey in order their children to grow in a free and modern environment. This was o conscious choice towards the West both in topographic and cultural sense in the will to modernization. Since, they did not want us to live and grow in the conservative and parochial atmosphere of Hacılar and Kayseri. So I was grown up in İzmir/Karşıyaka, attended to a private status state high school which offered education in German and then went to Middle East Technical University to study political science in English. At the end of the day, I became an "educated and modern" man as my parents desired. However

when I came back to my village after twenty five years to study and understand the industrialization, social change and modernization in Anatolia; I encountered with a different landscape.

There has been a very prevalent tendency among the shopkeepers and businessmen of both Kayseri and Hacılar. The families send their “smart and talented” children to industry and trade but the remaining ones who are deprived of these qualities have been sent to school. It seems that I am one the latter. Since, after twenty five years of education while I became an instructor in a university with a salary of approximately 1000 dollars; I recognized for instance that my peers became the young owners or managers who spend the half of the month in abroad looking for the export facilities for the products of their small factories having 1 million dollars of turnovers per year. Now the point is so who became more modern, them or me? In the remaining part of the dissertation, I also try to discuss this interesting landscape. Actually, this could also be read within the perspective of two different models, economic modernity and cultural modernity, of modernization in the history of Turkish Republic throughout the concrete lives. This duality has been the most vital conflict of Turkish politics and recent Turkish history since the Tanzimat (Reformation) period for almost 200 years.

As a matter of the fact regarding this study I could be considered both as an insider and outsider in relation to the field. I was an insider since all of my relatives are still living in Kayseri and Hacılar. Considering that my father had nine sisters and brothers; it means I have hundreds of close relatives in the city and town in every level of society. On the other hand, our relations as a family have never interrupted with our village. With the periodic and mutual visits we have been continually informed in detail about what happened in our village day by day by virtue of our relatives, family friends and acquaintances. Therefore I had many detailed information on Hacılar, its history, culture, myths, stories and people before to start this study.

On the other hand, I have been outside my village almost for twenty five years and I was grown up in almost totally different values, habitus, environments and life styles from my heimatland as the mayor of the town allegorically told to my father “your son had been weaved from a different fabric”. Therefore, I have also the required ethnographic distance to observe the relations in the village for making cool-headed interpretations about the data I collected. For this reason, this in between situation was actually my biggest advantage in this study when working in the field. The people I interviewed showed a deep intimacy after I presented my local identity. Many times I recognized later that I made interview with people who are my distant relatives. Besides, many other people were the school friends, neighbors or acquaintances of my father or my close relatives. So, I almost did not have any problem in reaching and making contact with the people. In addition the people were quite genuine and open to me and told me closely in general as if I am one of their nephews. By the way, in many cases it was true. So, I could make almost all of my interviews in the city and in the town without having any difficulty. It was such that many times some of my interviews lasted five to six hours until midnight in the summer houses of the local people. Beyond the formal interviews, I lived almost six months totally in the field in different time periods especially in summer and winter vacations and during this time I stayed in my relatives and acquaintances. So, I was really in the field in the very sense of the term from the morning to the midnight. Throughout this time I did also participate to the reciprocal evening visits, wedding ceremonies, religious settings, family dinners and gossips and many other social activities and meetings which provided me for incredible amount of information about my town, my family and even myself.

In this context, I used and applied many different data collecting techniques together at the same time. First I benefited from the former researches and historical works about the history of the town. I was quite lucky in reaching to these records. Since, between 11 and 13 May 2007 Hacilar Municipality organized a symposium with the participation of sixty one researchers who made presentations about different aspects of Hacilar. I was one of them too. So, I quite benefited from the

Symposium Book especially from the historian's works about the history of the village based on the Ottoman Records.

After the literature review, I started to the field study. Throughout the field study, between February 2007 and September 2009, I stayed in Kayseri in every possible time periods. After the first draft of the thesis, I visited again for reconsidering my interpretations with the people whom I interweaved. Totally I stayed 6 months in Kayseri and Hacilar. I made almost 100 in-depth interviews³⁶ with people whose majority is from Hacilar. Seventy of these interviews were recorded, forty seven of them were decoded and entered into a qualitative data analysis software program called ATLAS Ti. I made my analysis via this program.

Since my focus is the industrialists, I got into contact with The Association of Industrialists and Businessmen of Hacilar. They gave me a list of their members. In this list there were 72 people. By the help of some townsmen, we canceled out the members who are not directly involved with industrial production. There remained 35 industrialists to speak. I called each of them, presented myself and research project, took the appointments and realized my interviews. Each interview lasts one and half hour on average. Most of them last much more. There were some interviews which exceeded totally ten hours in different times with the same people. Besides, I also made in-depth interviews with the second generations of industrialists (their sons, nephews etc.) for understanding the intergenerational relations. Except the two industrialists³⁷ I interviewed all of the industrialists in the list.

³⁶ I will not present the list of my interview list due to ethical reasons. Since, first I promised the people I made interview with that I would disguise their identities. Moreover, Hacilar is a very small community and especially the number of industrialist is very limited. Anyone could find the owners of the quotations if I would give even some esoteric clues about the identities of the people. Therefore, I just give the names of some historical personalities who are already dead and some symbolic and historical institutions like HES Cable Factory. Regarding others I used some general expressions to identify the people like an old industrialist, a second generation industrialist or an opinion leader, a politician, a shopkeeper and so on. Besides, I will use the letter G for the interviewee and K for me in the conversations that I quoted in the text thereafter.

³⁷ One of them did not want to speak with me and I could not reach the other one since he was not in Kayseri every time I called him for appointment.

I started the interviews with the vocations of their grandfathers and fathers. Then I continued with the story of their firms and the details of the production processes such as relations of production, management, technology level, research and development and so on. I spoke their ideas, attitudes and orientations on religion, economics, politics, family, family, leisure, globalization and modernity in the last part of the interview. I finished the interview with a small and quantitative questionnaire composed of some demographic questions.

I took the permission from every participant for recording the interviews and switched of the recorder whenever they want. Off the record words were not included in the text. After the interview, some industrialists showed me their factories and gave some detailed information on the phases of production. They allowed me to take some photos by the way.

Beyond these interviews with the industrialists I made two times more interviews with the other people who gave me invaluable information about the history, social and cultural structure of Hacılar. Among them there were local administrators, members of parliament, representatives of public bureaucracy, artisans, elderly, workers, teachers and ordinary people from every section of society. Since, Hacılar is a province of Kayseri, I also made some interviews with the representatives of some NGO's in Kayseri such as Kayseri Chamber of Trade, Kayseri Chamber of Industry, Kayseri Chamber of Artisans and Shopkeepers.

Since all of the industrialists are man, the women stayed out of my focus. My interviews with women were most of the time limited with my relatives. I also made interview with workers; but they were also limited. My ideas on class relations are based mostly on the reflections of industrialists besides my own observations and limited interviews with workers.

Besides the interviews I made very detailed and enthusiastic participant observations during my stay in Kayseri. As I noted above, I have hundreds of relatives and close connections in the village, and throughout the study I quite

benefited from these relations for participant observations. First of all I did not stay in the hotel but in the homes of my relatives and acquaintances. For this reason, beyond the formal interviews almost all nights I met with the local people from every level at their homes and summer houses on the skirts of Mount Erciyes. Most of the time, these visits and gatherings lasted until midnight especially in summer. By the way, in Kayseri the intensity of social relations is unbelievable. I prefer to call this situation as an “extended familial life”. It seems as if the city is living as a big and extended family. In this sense I also participated into many social organizations in Kayseri and Hacilar like settings, gatherings, religious meetings, reciprocal or structured visiting, weddings, engagements, circumcision ceremonies, sick calls, condolences and celebrations for the newborn babies and sending of the young people to the military service.

In addition to the participant observations, I also made oral history and family history starting first and foremost with my own family and then with some other typical families, industrialists, traders and some opinion leaders in the town in order to depict and figure out the typologies of industrialists from the first generations to the third ones. The detailed tables about the development of the business in the way to industry are presented in the next chapters. In this frame, I also made some interviews with the second and third generation industrialists so as to understand the intergenerational relations in the town and among the family businesses. Actually, I started most of my interviews with the personal history of the interviewees. As a matter, most of my interviews and my study could be regarded in general within the category of oral history of a small town especially for industry beyond the other kind of resources and analysis.

Moreover, beyond the general outlook of historical and materialist analysis of things and processes, every field study either in sociological, anthropological or ethnographic ways should include the personal ideas, opinions, feelings, approaches and attitudes of the people who are the objects of any kind of inquiry. Even one can say that it has been a scientific principle since Weber for social scientists. In this context, without falling into the trap of “sociologism” and “Weberism”, I also benefited from the Weberian perspective, “*verstehende* sociology” which is ignored

by him particularly when looking at Islam as Turner³⁸ and Ülgener³⁹ points out. So, I allocated a serious time and energy in the interviews to take the personal feelings, ideas, perceptions and interpretations of people about their own lives and the stories told about them. By doing this, I also considered the empirical reflections of all the theoretical discussions which were assessed in the literature review of this study.

On the other hand, as I stated in the introduction part, one of the critical problems of this study is “Protestant Ethic” debate or “Islamic Calvinism” argument regarding with the development of industry in the town and the city. It is a quite broad topic related with the effects of religion over the economic development and industrialization in general. Therefore, I should clarify my stance and attitude to religion here too.

Many different studies in the literature state the tense character of religion in its relation to politics, gender and economics in Turkey. Within the literature of religion these tensions are presented in different dualities such as popular (practice) versus text(ual) religion; syncretic versus orthodox approaches or *Medrese* versus *Tekke* versions of Islam⁴⁰. In the public discourse these tensions are generally translated into the vocabulary of street politics such as: secular versus Islamist or traditional/ reactionary/conservative versus modern. However, most of these approaches are crippled with their one-sidedness. Since, as a source of tension itself, the modernity could not exist without conflicts and binary oppositions. In the same way, ideological systems could exist and survive in the modern world with their antagonistic qualities and religion here is not an exception. It also exists via these tensions and reproduces itself by virtue of them. Hence, these are not the external factors but the internal dynamics that give shape and reproduce religion itself.

³⁸ Turner 1997: 35

³⁹ Ülgener, 2006: 56-57

⁴⁰ Such as modern/traditional (White, 2003); secular/Islamist (Bayramoğlu, 2001); Islamist/Seculer-proWestern (Navaro-Yashin, 2003)

Regarding Turkey, it is also possible to observe that the religion itself has been lived and practiced continuously with these kinds of contradictions, tensions, ironies and paradoxes.

Sometimes, searches for change among the people who want to confirm their material and spiritual conditions with the demands of the modern world could be regarded in negative (by the conservative circles) and ludicrous (by the secular) terms. They consider them in a pejorative sense as if there has been lived a “degeneration”, “eclectism” or “Protestantization” in the practice of Islam. However, beyond this parochial frame, the field of religion has been passing through a continuous change and all these tensions constitute the basic condition, character and appearance of religion itself. So, it is these tensions that reproduce Islam or Islams⁴¹ in the (post) modern world. I do think that the Middle East and especially Turkey is a particular place in which these tensions have been perceived more intense than the other parts of the world due to the historical in-between position of the country. In Turkey, this tense existence is being diffused into to identity formation of the people from every level of society. Therefore, religion in general or religious fields in particular should be perceived as dynamic and contingent processes such as the concept of culture itself. While analyzing the industrialization and modernization process of Hacılar town, I will try to do this by evaluating the religious field and its relation with other fields on such a theoretical ground⁴².

By considering these tensions, and particularly shedding light on the relational character of social, the dissertation aims at transcending the classical dualistic approaches and categories on the experience of Islam. Regarding relationality, I’m referring to Bourdieu⁴³ and the theoretical framework developed by him, in

⁴¹ Al-Azmeh 1993

⁴² The theoretical ground of my study could be found also in detail in our collaborative work Akşit et.all 2012.

⁴³ Bourdieu 1987, Bourdieu 1991

analyzing the role and function of religious field among others⁴⁴. I do think that his self-reflexive sociology⁴⁵ is of very critical for analyzing particularly the relational and transient character of social formations.

In this dissertation I will consider this logic of practice outlined by Bourdieu in the case of Hacılar and try to show the historical, social, economic and cultural factors of this transformation. Based on the historical and empirical data I will try to show that that the “Calvinist Islam” kind of theological arguments do not reflect the reality which is conditioned by the network of various factors. However, what I’m planning to do is not a general history of industrialization of Turkey. Rather, I will take a particular case, and focus on the historical evolution of that case from within the theoretical perspective and my problematic that I outlined above. So, I can begin with the deep theoretical debate on the “Protestant Ethic” thesis in the world and “Islamic Protestantism” debates in Turkey starting with the main source of Weber in the next chapter.

⁴⁴ Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1999

⁴⁵ Bourdieu P. and Loic J. D. Wacquant 2003

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON PROTESTANT ETHIC THESIS and ISLAMIC PROTESTANTISM DEBATES in TURKEY

It is possible to analyze the discussions on the relationship between religion and economic development or industrialization in Turkey by focusing on two main theoretical approaches. The first one relies on the theological argument, which mainly understands religion as a thing in itself as a moral framework, affecting individuals' economic orientations, life styles and business successes. However, the second one focuses more on the sociological qualities of religion and suggests that it is not the religion itself but its multiplier social effects; namely, the traditional and religious organizations, relations and networks are effective on the economic relations in different forms. So, I will start with the first one of theological argument and then consider the second one in the remaining parts of this chapter.

3. 1 Theological Argument (Weber's Thesis)

As I said the first argument is a well-known presupposition claiming that a morally faithful individual, who sincerely follows the rules of religion, can be successful and prosperous in every area of life as well as in trade and industry. Needless to mention this approach is to a large extent familiar in conservative circles, pinpointing the fact that "there can be no economic development and progress without a spiritual recovery and improvement," which was originally framed by the National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*) Movement in Turkish politics⁴⁶. We can remember the dreams of Necmettin Erbakan who wanted to see Turkey as an industry complex producing a hundred thousand airplanes and military tanks. It is my contention that this is a continuous path of thinking, with changing emphasis at different times, extending from central Right parties to JDP in Turkish politics. Today it is also

⁴⁶ For a comprehensive account see Sarıbay 2005: 576–590; Yavuz 2005c: 591–603; Çalmuk 2005: 550–567.

possible to find the similar arguments in Erdoğan's own discourse about the relationship between "bringing-up religious generations" and "the technological necessity of laptops" in the high school education. Yet, without any doubt, one of most powerful representatives of this intellectual tradition in the last thirty years is the Gülen Movement⁴⁷.

Another version of this argument can interestingly be found from the agents of a different worldview, cosmology and history. It is argued that the capital owners and industrialists in Anatolia have developed their enterprises without any modern financial instruments such as leasing, bank loans or interests that are not religiously acceptable ways of making profit and use their own resources with a strict business ethics and moderate life styles as it was the case in the Protestant and puritan communities in Europe and accordingly this kind of capital accumulation has been interpreted as a model for Calvinist Islam⁴⁸. The common thesis in each version of this argument is quite clear: religion as "thing-in-itself" has direct effects on personal success, industrial progress and economic prosperity. I will now look at and critically analyze this argument in the relevant canon.

Let me begin with a simple observation. The theological argument, which claims that economic prosperity and business success in this world are strictly framed by a religious worldview, can be analyzed only in the realm of perceptions. Therefore, I shall discuss this theoretical structure by looking at the perceptions of the people that I have interviewed. My question is simple yet quite concrete: "Do people conduct and perform their economic activities by thinking their own interests to reach the services and goods in this world or do they have any spiritual motivation for the hereafter?" Yet before analyzing the empirical material, this question leads us to Weber's thesis on the Protestant Ethics and for nowadays to the discussions on Protestant Islam⁴⁹ and Calvinist Islam⁵⁰. Therefore, first and foremost it is important to focus on Weber's thesis in his famous work.

⁴⁷ See Turam 2011: 83–109; İnsel 1997: 67–77.

⁴⁸ ESI 2005; Yavuz 2003b: 281.

⁴⁹ See Loimeier 2005: 216-254 and Nafissi 2005: 408-38.

⁵⁰ See Can 2006; Bilefsky 2006; Barlas, 2006; Emre 2006; Judson 2005; Proyect 2006; Özkök 2006.

As it has been discussed above, Weber's *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*, published in 1905, aims to investigate "the processes of the cultural and economic structures which are peculiar to the West in the universal development of history" (Weber, 1997: 13). Indeed, for Weber Capitalism was operating and present in different places of the world before as we know it today. He argues that there had been vital developments in the areas of civil markets, craft guilds and the judiciary differentiation between the city and the town, but we do not have conceptually the notions of bourgeois and middle class and of course there is no specific working class that had yet developed. Weber believes that what happened in the West is a very peculiar structure and organization of Capitalism. In other words, this is "the rational organization of free and formal labor in the bourgeois capitalist management." According to Weber this qualitative differentiation, the detachment of the work place from private house or the establishment of a professional record keeping, is a rationalistic difference and peculiar to the West which has allowed a rational organization of free and formal labor processes (Weber, 1997: 23-24).

This argument is Weber's point of departure, yet how is his argument related with Protestantism? It is vital to understand Weber's original question: How can we explain the emergence of this particular rationalization? It can be claimed that Weber's own answer underscores the relationship between the Protestant ethos that is overly ascetic and the structures of an economic re-orientation. In the first chapter of his book, titled "Religious Sects and Societal Stratification" Weber tells us some of his observations. What are they? He argues that "the capital owners, the employers and even the well-educated parts of working-class members such as staff members in trade, banking and taxation, have held peculiarities of Protestantism" (Weber, 1977: 30). As we know most of the rich cities in Europe had accepted Protestantism in the 16th century. Furthermore, the religious reformation without surprise had happened in the economically developed regions. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the economic prosperity and the development of capitalism go hand in hand with the Church Reforms and its new impacts over citizens in Europe.

Indeed Weber's breathtaking anticipation about the peculiarity of capitalism is not related at all with new living techniques or experiences. Instead, he emphasizes the moral aspect of Capitalism. According to Weber "Capitalism has developed and processed in a very peculiar ethos. In this respect what we need to know about Capitalism is not a trade mentality but its very specific ethos. Here to earn and make money are the main principles of human life. They are not the means for the material utilities of the human surviving. This passionless and the general transformation of natural feelings into meaningless facts are the basic and substantial principles of Capitalism" (Weber, 1997: 47). This particular rationality includes the ability of focusing the thought on a specific issue, the attitude of "dutiful responsibility towards work," a rational and economic self-control in terms of maximizing the profits and a moderate psyche for the unusual increase of the production. This is the most suitable ground, which paves the way for the progressive development of Capitalism and sees the work as a vocation in itself.

What does then bring forth this different way of rationality? Weber believes that it is almost absurd to understand this new situation as a natural reflectivity of the material conditions in the ideal super-structure mechanisms⁵¹ Because what needs to be recognized is a very different organization of vocation, duty and rationality in Capitalism, focusing mainly on maximization of profits and material acquisition (Weber; 1997: 67). Therefore, it is advantageous to look at the new meanings and insights of the vocation in our debate. According to Weber, fulfilling the duties in the earthly vocations as the highest achievement in the moral act is quite a new incident. The words "*Beruf*" in German and "*Calling*" in English have been linguistically shaped by religious projections yet contrary to Catholic sects they are used more in a secular vocational ground in parallel with the birth of Protestantism and the development of Capitalism. In other words the emphasis now is on the moral dimension of the vocation (Weber, 1997: 70). Hence, what we must do, for Weber, is to analyze the psychological drives or motivations, shaped by the religious faith and worldviews, which keep the individual in very tight and stringent

⁵¹ This thesis of Weber has been accepted as the anti-thesis of the Marxist economic analysis.

ways. Weber announces that where this drive springs from is the ascetic Protestantism. According to Weber, this kind of puritan asceticism as in every kind of rational asceticism brings a new structure to individual psyche that restricts the passions and brings an order to the souls of subjects and forms their everyday lives (Weber, 1997: 106). What Weber particularly emphasizes is that Calvinism adds a positive meaning to this puritan asceticism and bridges it with the secular vocational worldview in its development. Consequently Calvinism re-arranges the relationship between religion and moral secular worldviews by uniting the ascetic puritanism and the ethos of non-political aspects of business life for the great masses.⁵² This definitely shows how the role of individual consciousness as the carries of God's face in this world is related with the new ethos of capitalism. Weber believes that Calvinism releases the new economic energy for the progress of Capitalism and the economic profit.

In sum, this worldly Protestant asceticism acted powerfully against the spontaneous enjoyment of possessions; it restricted consumption, especially of luxuries. On the other hand, it had the psychological effect of freeing the acquisition of goods from the inhibitions of traditionalistic ethics. It broke the bonds of the impulse of acquisition in that it not only legalized it, but also looked upon it as directly willed by God. The campaign against the temptations of the flesh, and the dependence on external things was not a struggle against the rational acquisition, but against the irrational use of wealth. According to Weber (1997: 150-151):

But this irrational use was exemplified in the outward forms of luxury, which their code condemned as idolatry of the flesh however natural they had appeared to the feudal mind. On the other hand, they approved the rational and utilitarian uses of wealth, which were willed by God for the needs of the individual and the community. They did not wish to impose mortification on the man of wealth, but the use of his means for necessary and practical things. The idea of comfort characteristically limits the extent of ethically permissible expenditures. It is naturally no accident that the development of a manner of living consistent with that idea may be observed earliest and most clearly among the most consistent representatives of this whole attitude toward life. Over against the glitter and ostentation of feudal magnificence which, resting on an unsound economic basis, prefers a sordid elegance to a sober simplicity, they set the clean and solid comfort of the middle-class home as an ideal.

⁵² It is referred and used in our context for leading a life by peeling off from the extreme desires and accepting a simple life style.

On the side of the production of private wealth, Weber argues that asceticism condemns both dishonesty and impulsive avarice. What is condemned as covetousness or Mammonism is the pursuit of riches for their own sake. For wealth in itself is a temptation. Even more important: the religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith, must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of that attitude toward life which we have here called the spirit of capitalism (Weber, 1997: 159). In this respect, a specifically bourgeois economic ethic had grown up. With the consciousness of standing in the fullness of God's grace and being visibly blessed by him, the bourgeois business man, as long as he remained within the bounds of formal correctness, as long as his moral conduct was spotless and the use to which he put his wealth was not objectionable, could follow his pecuniary interests as he would and feel that he was fulfilling a duty in doing so. The power of religious asceticism provided him in addition with sober, conscientious, and unusually industrious workmen, who clung to their work as to a life purpose willed by God.

At the end of all of these analyzes Weber states clearly that the importance of religious faith as a way of life, culture, and national character can not be understood in a unilateral one-sided "materialist" way. Moreover he adds that he does not plan to offer a spiritual explanation in his work⁵³:

We don't have any intention to argue the foolish or doctrinaire thesis that the spirit of Capitalism is the product of the specific effects of the Reformation or the Capitalism as an economic system can occur after Reformation (quoted by Alan Macfarlane, 1993: 204).

Consequently, Weber emphasizes that, "the development of the capitalist era has become conditioned, like everywhere else, either in a regressive way or in progressive manner by the effects of Christianity" (Weber, 1997: 161). If we follow Macfarlane here:

⁵³ Indeed Weber's own words are suggesting the hints to overcome the 100 years of discussion.

Protestantism was not the reason of Capitalism, but provided a necessary protection for older and deeper trends. It was the enabling power. Weber utilizes this approach in many places, which sees the Protestantism as a kind of shelter allowing the growth of young plants. For example, Weber argues that the Protestant understanding takes place as the cradle of modern economic man. He does not portray this process as if a mother gives birth, but rather a person who supports of a small baby and prays for him like a friend, perhaps as a baptismal father or mother (Macfarlane, 1993: 204).

Bendix, as one of the well-known scholars on Weber, agrees with this general argument: “So, this historical transformation around the world was not a product of Puritanism. On the contrary Puritanism was a later development, which reinforced and made it possible the different trends in European society for a very long time” (Macfarlane: 1993: 204).

3. 1. 1 Criticisms of Weber

As I tried to analyze in detail above Weber's work has been a groundbreaking contribution to the literature of the social sciences. There are two important reasons why Weber's work has an ongoing and powerful effect even though it has been discussed for many years and the content of his arguments have recently been invalidated. The first critique, which is the most basic materialist and Marxist thesis follows the claim that “the spirit does not determine the substance, but the substance determines the spirit.” This assertion has been accepted as Marx’s anti-thesis by the Weberian school of thought.⁵⁴ Now let’s recall the famous passage in Capital, which caused this interpretation:

The world of religion, is nothing more than a reflection of the real world. Based on the production of goods; producers of goods and products perpetrated with each other as values by addressing themselves in social relations, so that a homogeneous human labor in their own individual private affairs has been reduced to abstract human belief in a society of Christianity. In this respect, especially in its advanced forms of the bourgeoisie, Protestantism, Deism etc. are the most appropriate forms of religion (Marx, 1966: 88).

As seen above, Karl Marx is the first philosopher who connects in overall the economic, political, intellectual and religious phenomena and argues that there is some sort of relationship between Capitalism and the Reformation (Protestantism)

⁵⁴ See Wood 2008: 176-210.

and underlines the fact that Protestantism as a form of Christianity is the most appropriate form for bourgeoisie (Febvre: 1995: 89). Marx has identified this subject matter almost 40 years ago before Weber's own analysis. Yet since he was particularly interested with and focused on the historical movement of capital and reframes religion as a reflection of this infrastructure, he didn't explain further the question of religion as a separate philosophical investigation. On the other hand, as I have already argued in the previous paragraph Weber does not intend to offer his own work as an anti-thesis of Marx. I believe that the following words about the social psychology of the major religions in Weber's own investigation makes it clear his position: "The human behavior is not governed by thoughts but directly shaped by the material and ideal interests. Nevertheless, quite often the "world images" structured by ideas, just as the railway switchman ships with the rails, determines the dynamics of the action" (quoted in Turner, 1997: 50).

The second reason increasing the impact of Weber's work that is highly important and critical rivets the "Western-centrism" in the social science literature and practice due to the fact that he utilizes a specific methodology and epistemology as the main motivation of explaining and understanding the whole of modern industrial society including the aforementioned work *The Protestant Ethic*. In this respect, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber's first published book, has been continuously criticized from many different viewpoints since the year 1905. These criticisms are basically categorized in two ways: the first one is the historical, chronological and comparative studies based on the empirical and factual criticism and the second is the epistemological criticism of Weber's "Western-centrism". Let us begin with the first critique.

3. 1. 1. 1 Empirical and Factual Criticism

The first criticism is related with the factual quality of the content of Weber's analysis and aims directly to refute his argument. The first of these criticisms originates from Sombart's investigations. In his response to Weber, he published *Capitalism and the Jews* in 1911 and identifies the fact that "The Jewish religion has a strong and in-depth impact on life in general and on the direction and

organization of economic life in particular than others religions have.”⁵⁵ Therefore, according to Sombart, if we will talk about the religious influence concerning with the emergence of Capitalism, the relationship between Judaism and Capitalism is more pronounced than the so-called relationship between Protestantism and Capitalism.⁵⁶ Because there are trails of Jews, expelled from Spain and scattered through Europe, in the developments of trade and money markets since the beginning of Capitalism from the fifteenth Century. Moreover it is hard to ignore that the Jews plays a critical role in the processes of colonialism and paves the way while the United States has become a capitalist empire.

According to Sombart, the reason of this interesting link between the Jews and the Capitalism can be found in the morality of Jewish religion, which has developed a proper understanding of ethos that is highly appropriate for Capitalism. To make a living the Jews who have developed their talents in the intellectual activities such as trade and finance outlets managed to protect their racial bond in anywhere they have gone and also used it as an international commercial network due to the strict prohibitions of external matrimony rules. According to Sombart, the most substantial impact of the Jewish religion on Capitalism is related with its very “special manners”, which function against foreigners (non-Jews) and almost adopt double standards in every issue. Starting form the most ancient text, the famous principle, which separates the Jews from foreigners with a thick and obvious line, commands that “you are not allowed to lend money to your citizen but you have to give to a stranger.” This policy definitely promotes usury for Jews who are more protective to their own race yet not that strict in moral norms against other races. In general this led to an unlimited rotation in commercial morality especially for the Eastern European Jews who thereby improved their trade and industry in a more liberal attitude and become the pioneers of Capitalism (Sombart, 2008: 267-275).

Sombart needed to review his ambitious thesis on Jews in *Bourgeois: A Contribution to Man’s Moral and Intellectual History of Modern Economic Period*, published in 1913. In this work, he basically argued that he did not have enough

⁵⁵ Sombart 2008: 240

⁵⁶ For a more detaied analysis see Sombart 2005.

knowledge on the Thomist ethics while writing on Judaism. According to his new investigations, he was wrong by claiming that some of the particular circumstances of Jewish religion such as the submission of irrational principles in life or the acceptance of the wealth without any reservation were unique to Jews when he compared them with some of the pre-puritan conceptions of Christianity (Sombart, 2008: 268). Therefore, he seriously revised his theses in his new work and made a serious emphasis on the role of the Catholic sect in the emergence of Capitalism:

In this case, I only need to explain why Capitalism did not remain indebted to the Puritan and Quaker code of ethics. First and foremost we know that the bourgeois virtues has almost two hundred years of history during the emergence of Puritanism. If there were a system of religion, this would be the Catholic denomination, which created an environment conducive to the emergence of these virtues. The Protestant morality did not add anything else but wrote to its own account what the Thomist ethics created (Sombart, 2008: 246).

In a similar fashion, Birnbaum seems to be arguing that “the world’s autonomy” approach in the Calvinist theology can be thought in connection with Weber’s rationalization thesis yet “the spiritual origins of modern science can also be found in Scholasticism and Pantheism as well” (Birnbaum, 2002: 134). On the other hand, in his 1913 book *Luxury and Capitalism* Sombart came with new ideas on the rise of Capitalism. He particularly observed the changing trends in the consumption market by focusing on the intimate relationships between partners and pinpointed an opposite drive for luxury consumption contrary to what the Protestant ethos had argued. In all these works he repeatedly looked for the impacts of Catholic, Jewish and Protestant faith on the conditions of modern economic systems and developed a serious discussion on epistemology and he reached a general conclusion that there are parallels between the different faces of the capitalist mentality and the philosophical doctrines and teachings of religious systems (Sombart: 2008: 279).

After Sombart’s initial reflections on Weber’s work, the most powerful and pioneering empirical criticisms have been formulated by the famous European historians such as Henri Pirenne, Lucien Febre and Eric Hobsbawm. To begin with, in his famous article “The Periods of the Social History of the Capitalism” Pirenne contested the general postulate that the emergence of capitalism has its origins

approximately at the 16th century; namely during the Renaissance and Reformation periods and it did not exist in the Middle Ages, a thesis commonly accepted by Sombart, Bücher and even in general terms shared by Marx. Pirenne examined the history of the emergence of the capitalist merchants back to the 11th and 12th centuries by carefully analyzing the Italian (Venice, Genoa, Florence, Italy) and Flanders (Ghent, Ypres, Bruges, Douai, etc.) cities as the new centers of trade with the help of social history and rich archives. According to him, during the 13th century the international market centers and capital owners began to form in the big cities and “the Capitalism not only survived but developed and perfected itself quickly” (Pirenne, 2006: 67-81).

Moreover, each period of history, Pirenne emphasizes, had different qualities in its economic structure and created its own version of capitalist. In other words, the history of each period corresponds to a new class of capitalists. In his book, *Medieval Cities* what Pirenni quoted from Hermit Godric can be accepted as the embodiment of his own narrative. Born at the end of the 11th century into a poor peasant family, Godric accumulated a fortune with a business passion and showed the capitalist spirit (*spiritus capitalisticus*) before Renaissance had begun (Pirenne, 2006: 91).

The arguments of Pelliciani, identifying “the capitalist spirit with the Middle Ages and the Renaissance” and his opinions about the Catholicism permeating into capitalism can be understood as a synthesis of Pirenni and Sombart.⁵⁷ Tawney also pinpoints that the spirit of capitalism can be thought as old as the history itself and the Calvinist sect could only accelerate the process of capitalist formation.⁵⁸ Even though Hobsbawm shows that Islam and the sectarians of Protestantism had a special ability to spread in Europe during the period of 1879-1848, which he referred as the “Age of Revolution,” he also draws the attention to the fact that Industrial Revolution, contrary to common academic viewpoint, had originally occurred in the Catholic regions (Hobsbawm, 2005: 243-253).

⁵⁷ See Aktay, 2000: 132

⁵⁸ See Hanioglu, 2006: 474.

The Protestant Reformation neither directly nor indirectly – by creating a special “capitalist spirit” or any change in the forms of economic behavior – can be said to cause the Industrial Revolution. Moreover these can’t explain why the Industrial Revolution had happened in England and not in France. Needless to mention, this reform occurred two centuries ago before the Industrial Revolution. Protestantism can never be exposed the pioneer of the Industrial revolution in all of this regions. If we just want to evaluate a very specific example, the Catholic part of Netherlands (Belgium) had been previously industrialized than the Protestant part of it (Hobsbawn: 2008: 35).

In this context, researchers have attempted to develop a more materialist and Marxist criticisms. After appreciating his teacher Pirenne’s ways of thinking and scholarship, Febvre argues that “In spite of everything affixed the adjective “capitalist” to the names of people and their works in 12th century, he resists this general idea.” This attitude, Febvre believes, makes the adjective very blurred. Then to investigate how the Capitalism had been formed, the 13th century would not be enough and we need to go back to the Antique ages (Febvre, 1995: 84). The main problem here, as it gets more understandable from my discussion, is how to define capitalism.⁵⁹ Febvre, in this sense, denotes that there is a definition of “historical capitalism” not necessarily in conflict with economic definition of the capital accumulation.

It is right to go a little further to define Capitalism, or more precisely, about the psychology of the capitalist, not on the basis of spending the money and a carefree life in abundance, (this would be the absolute rejection of the capitalist mentality itself) but on the basis of saving the money to run and produce plenty of goods for the market and depriving himself from all of his desires, needs and passions. This might be a true guess for the mentality of modern Capitalism (Febvre, 1995: 85-86).

According to Wood, Weber has a teleological approach, which indicates that there is a capitalist essence since ancient times and it is blocked for political and ideological reasons during the Middle ages, yet has continued to live in the cracks of the feudal order and beginning with Renaissance, Reformation and the development of cities, the modern day capitalism has reached its re-blooming again. In a nutshell, the problem in Weber’s argument, for Wood, is the assertion that he already presumed a form of capitalism in order to prove the effects of the Protestant Ethics on Capitalism itself. To put it slightly different, "the existence of certain elements of the market economy based on private analytical method was developed

⁵⁹ See Rodney 1976; T. H. Aston C.H.E. Philpin (ed.) 1985; Colin Mooers 1997: 16-60.

by Weber for the type of a universalized logic". Therefore, Wood thinks that Weber's definition of "economic behavior" is a conceptual generalization as a historically specific form without any critical examination and directly fits into what Polanyi defines it an "economically wrong" formulation. In this respect if we attribute any role to the Protestant ethics, it has just accelerated the process of capital accumulation and made the environment more liberal to improve the quality of market conditions (Wood, 2008: 204).

Febvre's arguments might be helpful to conclude and synthesize this multi-dimensional and deep discussion in this section. According to Febvre, "it is quite dogmatic and even absurd to assert that Capitalism is the child of Reformation or the work of the Reformation" (Febvre, 1995: 107). We cannot conceptualize the relationship between Capitalism and Protestantism as in the allegory of giving-birth. Febvre particularly stresses the mutual interaction and the complex impulse-response relation between the two entities. For Febvre, it is important to realize the historical development of capitalism and portray the general orientation of the forces, governing the economic structures from the previous centuries. Without these conditions, we cannot imagine how Luther has emerged and created a social environment for the political and economic revolutions. When we came to the 17th century in Europe, Febvre argues that this new form of doctrine, such as Calvinism in France, which was a complex mixture of religion and economy, reached the people in a very short period of time and spread through the regions very quickly. Let us hear directly the rest of the story from Febvre: "This new form directs all its effort and energy to fulfill its duty as soon as possible in England and in the United States. When the mask of Puritanism is removed, it is not that difficult to realize the faces of a banker, a merchant, or a person who attacked stubbornly the goldmines" (Febvre, 1995: 105).

3. 1. 1. 2 The Epistemological Critique

The second and more critical area is, as I have mentioned above, the methodological aspect of Weber's work in general, which is closely related with its "Western-Centrism" and "Orientalism." First of all Weber's *Protestant Ethics*

underscores the attempts of understanding the uniqueness of the Western identity by asking the question of “why does the Capitalism emerge in this particular region?” In fact this particular effort of Weber’s sociological studies aims to outline the general formation of modern capitalism. Of course this attempt does not create a problem in itself, yet by structuring the problem in this framework, there is an explicit supposition that the East (of course in this case Islam) has its own essence. This also implies two different ontological positions against each other. The most serious criticisms of Weber's originate from this so-called dual structure of the East and the West.⁶⁰

In his classical work *Max Weber and Islam*, Turner makes an interesting and critical claim on the issue of Weber’s relationship with Islam. According to Turner, Weber’s ontological argument on the relationship between religious beliefs and the emergence of Capitalism is essential to understand his interpretation of Islam. However, contrary to popular belief Turner emphasizes that Weber’s thesis on Islam gets weaker if we compare it with his investigation on Calvinism. Weber mainly perceives Islam as a patrimonial domination in terms of feudal relationship and it is almost hard to neglect the affinities between Weber and Marx on this subject matter. Interesting enough, Turner argues, Weber considered Islam as the opposite of Puritanism. Islam is portrayed as a non-ascetic religion based on hedonistic relations on the issues of woman, property and luxury. Accordingly, the moral orders in Islam are not in conflict and perfectly compatible with the earthly issues. Weber’s natural conclusion can be interpreted that since there is no ascetic worldview in Islam, the expectation of finding a rational capitalism is a futile endeavor. For example, the excerpts from Weber's *Sociology of Religion* can be considered in this context:

⁶⁰ See Turner 1974a, 1974b, 1997.

In the first Meccan period of Islam, the advent religion of Muhammad in pietistic urban conventicles, which displayed a tendency to withdraw from the world was important. But since the move in Medina and in the development of the early Islamic communities, the religion was transformed into a national Arabic religion, and above all into status oriented warrior religion...The role played by wealth accruing from spoils of war and from political conquest in Islam is the most opposite to the role played by wealth in the Puritan religion. The Muslim tradition depicts with pleasure the luxurious clothes, perfume, and meticulous beard hairstyle of the pious...It stands in extreme opposition to any Puritan economic ethic and thoroughly corresponds with feudal conceptions of status. In the Koran, Muhammad is represented as completely rejecting every type of monasticism, though not all asceticism, for he did accord respect to fasting, begging, and penitential mortification. Muhammad's attitude in opposition to celibacy may have sprung from personal motivations similar to those apparent in Luther's famous remarks, which are so expressive of his strongly sensual nature; namely, in the conviction, also found in the Talmud, that whoever has not married by a certain age must be a sinner. But we would have to regard as unique among the saints of an ethical "religion of salvation"... Islam displays other characteristics of a distinctively feudal spirit: the obviously unquestioned acceptance of slavery, serfdom, and polygamy; the disesteem for and subjection of women; the essentially ritualistic character of religious obligations; and finally, the great simplicity of religious requirements and the even greater simplicity of the modest ethical requirements (Weber, 2012: 410-413).

As a consequence Turner believes that Weber's analysis on Islam have parallels with Marx's ascetic mode of production due the fact that they have both emphasized the patrimonial relationships in Eastern feudal societies. For Turner, Weber aims to show the lack of formal law, an economic reasoning, class structures and a decent political stability in Islam. For this reason Turner asserts that the main argument of Weber's work on Islam is not theological but a socio-economic investigation on the institutions of the West. Therefore, according to Turner "Weber points out the absence of the preconditions of a rational capitalism in the Ottoman Empire, Abbasids or the dynasties of Mameluk due to the characteristics of feudal and patrimonial bureaucracy. The military and economic conditions of the Muslim community are not conducive to the development of rational capitalism" (Turner, 1997: 38). From a similar perspective Zubaide, in his article "Economic and Political Activism in Islam,"⁶¹ debates how the powerful authority of state and military made the class relations passive and weaker in Ottomans and Abbasids. He

⁶¹ Zubaide 1972: 308-338.

continues to carry on Turner's analysis yet discusses it not very distant from Weber's own framework and his remarks on the Ottoman-Turkish society are quite well-known among Turkish scholars.⁶²

Weber did not write a separate, independent book about Islam. His comments on Islam are interspersed in his investigations on the studies of world religion and particularly in his work *Economy and Society*. Therefore, his attitude toward the non-Western societies emerges in utmost clarity when he deals with and examines the Asian societies and Eastern religions.⁶³

Commenting on why Capitalism has not arisen in the non-Western world, Weber points out that the system of patronage in the state, the language formations and the patriarchal establishments in the Chinese tradition are few structural obstacles to name. In a same fashion, the caste system and the belief in re-incarnation in India, for Weber, are serious obstacles for a rational and social system (Özcan, 1995: 2-3). On the other hand, Weber also thinks that the belief systems such as Confucianism and Taoism in China do not encourage an attitude for a rational and disciplined effort for gaining a more systematic, rational and long-term profit maximization. On the contrary, those beliefs systems rasp the economic rationalization. For him, the existing capitalism in Asia has already developed with the peculiar influence of the West (Alatas, 1963: 28). Let us again turn to Weber's own words:

⁶² See İnalçık 1995, 1998; Mardin 1990a, 1990b

⁶³ See Weber 2012

At all events, no motivation toward a rational system for the methodical control of life flowed from Buddhist, Taoist, or Hindu piety. Hindu piety in particular, as we have already discussed, maintained the strongest possible power of tradition, since the presuppositions of Hinduism constituted the most consistent religious solution in the "organic" view of society. The existing order of the world was provided absolutely unconditional justification, in terms of the mechanical operation of a proportional retribution in the distribution of power and happiness to individuals on the basis of their merits and failures in their earlier existences. All these folk religiosity of Asia left room for the "acquisitive drive" of the tradesman, the interest in "sustenance" of the crafts-person, and the traditionalism of the peasant... "Capitalism" existed among all these religiosity, of the same kind as in Occidental Antiquity and the medieval period. But there was no development toward modern capitalism, nor even any stirrings in that direction. Above all, there developed no "capitalist spirit," in the sense that is distinctive of ascetic Protestantism. But to assume that the Hindu, Chinese, or Muslim merchant, trader, crafts-person, or coolie had a weaker "acquisitive drive" than the ascetic Protestant is to fly in the face of the facts. Indeed, the reverse is true, for what is distinctive of Puritanism is the rational and ethical limitation of the "making-profit." There is no proof whatever that a weaker natural "endowment" for technical economic "rationalism" was responsible for the actual difference in this respect. At the present time, all these people import this "commodity" as the most important Occidental product, and whatever impediments exist result from rigid traditions, such as existed among us in the Middle Ages, not from any lack of ability or will... For the various folk religiosity of Asia, in contrast to ascetic Protestantism, the world remained a great magical garden, in which the reverence and coercion of "spirits" and the quest of salvation in this world or the next through ritual, idolatrous, or sacramental means were in practice oriented and secured. No path led to a rational, methodical conduct of life from the world accommodation of Confucianism, from the messianic expectations and economic pariah law of Judaism, from the world-conquest of Islam, from the world-rejection of Buddhism, or from the magical religiosity of the nonintellectual strata of Asia (Weber, 2012: 417-418).

Indeed this epistemological and methodological approach of Weber's works for analyzing the modern rational capitalism has established one of the current trends in the field of sociology as a dominant discourse which is called social Orientalism; referring to Said's terminology on Orientalism as well⁶⁴ (Nafissi, 1998: 98). Here Orientalism can be conceived in a categorization from Aeschylus up to Marx⁶⁵ in the Western discourse as a distinctive ontology and epistemology and creates its other; namely the East and tries to dominate it in an ongoing way (Bromley 1994:

⁶⁴ See Said, 1999

⁶⁵ See Turner 2001: 16.

11) Accordingly Weber's comparative sociology of religion, this essentialist⁶⁶ and orientalist approach has shaped the academic circles, known as the Weberian school of thought, and definitely set the tone and the theoretical basis for the scientific researches to conceptualize the West as well the non-Western societal structures (Salvatore, 1996:457).

This is the reason why, after Weber's own analysis, those who follow closely his theoretical approach on different sociological and political themes (such as capitalism, achievement orientation, entrepreneurship, democracy, civil society, citizenship, etc.) always look for an ideal Western model as a litmus test while analyzing the East. Hence, the modernization school becomes one of the most prominent and affective agencies of this theoretical framework around the world as a whole. As Bromley emphasizes since the modernization theory the sociological debates conducted on the nature of the Middle East have placed modernity and Islam into opposites polarities and are trapped in the horizons of this orientalist intellectual history (Bromley, 1994: 10). It is possible to argue that both Ahmad's⁶⁷ and Gellner's⁶⁸ works have in different degrees the traces of this Orientalist outlook (Bromley, 1994: 10). Swatos⁶⁹, for example, counts both Geertz's⁷⁰ and Gellner's⁷¹ classical anthropological researches as originally starting with the Weberian themes and then establishing unique ways and adds Bellah's⁷² works into this category as well (Swatos, 1995: 48).

More specifically, from the perspective of economic development and religion, which is the main focus of my thesis, we can divide this type of Weberian works into two substantial categories: *The Protestant Ethics positive* (PE positive) and *The Protestant Ethics negative* (PE negative). In other words, the first category, by

⁶⁶ See Asgari, 2004: 293–312

⁶⁷ Akbar 1992

⁶⁸ Gellner 1992

⁶⁹ Swatos 1995: 47-62

⁷⁰ Geertz 1963: 49, Geertz 1968

⁷¹ Gellner 1963: 71-86

⁷² Bellah 1963: 52-60.

following Weber's main thesis and adopting it to different cases in all over the world, confirms the fact that "the Protestant Ethics has created a positive contribution on the economic growth and development." On the other hand, the second category, again following Weber's thesis, argues that "those communities that are backward do not have the various values of the West"; namely the negative reading of Weber's thesis. Finally I will argue that there is a third and intermediate category that accepts the reciprocal relationship between religion and economic development in various degrees and acknowledges that the direction of this mutuality is not the one Weber defines in his *Protestant Ethics*. Let's now analyze each perspective carefully.

From the affirmative perspective of PA positive, we can see sufficient amount of investigations and researches generally held on Muslim communities in South Asia. The well-known initiating attempt in this area is Bellah's famous work; named *Tokugawa Religion*,⁷³ which was mainly an analysis of the pioneering economic and social development of Japanese society from a Weberian theoretical framework. Later, he applied his methodology as a further adaptation into other Asian societies as well.⁷⁴ As a result of this study, Bellah mentions many different trade organizations, which show a similar trend in terms of carrying the ethos of Protestant morality in South Asia; yet this does not lead to whole transformation of the society as we have witnessed the deep impact of the Protestant movements in Europe.

It is also crucial to realize that the survey results of Dator in Japan, which seeks for the measures of success in Japanese society and questions whether the Protestant analogy is an appropriate tool for this analysis, almost validates and confirms Bellah's investigations.⁷⁵ These results show that the ethos of Japanese society has some affinities with the Protestant morality but not necessarily in the direction of divine sublimity. The most obvious proof of this case is to see that the 80% of the participants are ungodly. Since the survey results clearly indicate that qualifications

⁷³ Bellah, 1957

⁷⁴ Bellah, 1963

⁷⁵ Dator, 1966: 23-40

such as working hard and diligently reflect the values of Japanese society, yet these are not necessarily originating from religious tradition but from cultural values, the socialization processes of family and friendship circles and finally educational backgrounds (Dator, 1966: 37).

Swatos's work that defends the "accuracy" of Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis from the examples of Indonesia and Malaysia is also a good example in this context. According to him, due to the different historical processes at the edge of the Pacific, a more rational and alternative conception of Islam has developed in the form of trader religion. A specific merchant of Islam in the Southeast Asia has emerged and differentiated itself from the Arab Islam, its nationalism as well as its "warrior ethics" as Weber denoted and has reinforced a capitalist hegemony by turning into its "essences" as the Puritans have done in Europe (Swatos, 1995: 57-58).

Freed from the warrior ethic ('real men don't make change') the Southeast Asian Muslim could 'recapture' the merchant ethic of the Prophet and ultimately transform it into an ethos consistent with the values of capitalism. This is not a refutation of Weber's understanding of the Islamic ethic, which refers to an early period in the expansion of Middle Eastern patrimonialism, but rather a confirmation of the *processes* inherent in the Protestant ethic thesis as a case study of the *complex interactionism* that characterizes Max Weber's understanding of the cultural integration of economic development (Swatos, 1995: 59).

Let's now analyze the critical perspective of PA negative. Shaped by the Weberian thesis, McClelland's⁷⁶ negative reviews on the achievement motive of Muslim communities (especially Arabs), Sutcliffe's work on Jordan⁷⁷ and Parkinson's work on Malaysi⁷⁸ all highlight the fatalistic and passive behavioral codes in Islam and tried to explain the negative impacts of the tradition on the economic progress. Following the footsteps of Weber, Bockstaele evaluates the Ismaili community in Tanzania, which attempts to recover the interrelationship between the ethos of religion and the economic activity. As a more innocent investigation he concludes that "Rational capitalism has not have its origins in the Ismaili community, since the active creative tension towards the earthly things is quite low and the will to power

⁷⁶ McClelland, 1961

⁷⁷ Sutcliffe, 1975: 77-81

⁷⁸ Parkinson, 1967

to be a dominant master in the world is absent in this religion. Only after Aga Khan has given them the necessary orientation and once after the development of rational capitalism has begun to develop, the Ismaili religion displays some affinities and establish connections with commercial and professional activities” (Bocock, 1971: 373).

On the other hand, of course, there are critical examinations in both theoretical and empirical level, which strongly oppose this orientalist perspective. For example the works of Turner (1974) and Zubaida (1972) both of which I have discussed above are examples in this category. These works can also be divided into two main categories; namely those close to Weber and those close to Marx. However, the common feature of these works is to conceptualize the relationship between religion and economic development in a reciprocal way instead of perceiving them as polarities. In this respect W.F. Wertheim did the first study on Malay-Indonesian community while evaluating it from the perspective of Weber’s sociology of religion. He particularly put forward how the class interests identify the religious movements in Asia and concluded that by prioritizing the class analysis, Weber investigation for Europe cannot be operative in the non-Western hemisphere.

We can also think of Alatas work in this third category that touches on Wertheim’s work and claims that Weber’s thesis cannot be verified in the Southeast Asian societies when analyzing the relationship between Islam and the Capitalism. However, Alatas also highlighted the fact that in spite of the well-known weaknesses in Weber’s theory, some of the elements in this region confirm the theory as well (Alatas, 1963: 29-30). Alatas discovers that as early as the Second World War, some Arab traders and medium size enterprises who came from the parts of Arabia that was not under the influence of Capitalism reveal the traces of the capitalist spirit in Indonesia and Malaysia. He interprets this spirit in the region as the ethos of “early Islam” and as a response against the colonial domination (Alatas, 1963: 32-33). According to him, the religion has certainly a definitive impact on the economic life in South Asia and the capitalist spirit has been still under development in the region, yet this has occurred in a different format than

Weber exposed. Here we witness economic activities operating in a parallel fashion with cultural and religious groupings (Alatas, 1963: 33-34).

Another interesting case study in the literature is the South African society, which has been established by Calvinist Dutch, German Protestants and French Huguenots.⁷⁹ Although Stokes accepts Weber's main thesis about the positive effect of religion on the secular worldviews, he considers that the general framework of Calvinist thesis cannot be applied to South African society. Moreover, he implies that the dynamic, social, economic and psychological potentials of European Calvinism lead to the opposite conclusion and are negated in this region.⁸⁰ According to him, a very strict secular orthodoxy has materialized in South Africa, which limits the rationalization and individualization processes, embodies the traditional attitudes and moral commandments and is based on collective structures has prevented the modernization periods in this society (Stokes, 1975: 79-80).

Another investigation which discusses the African Calvinism on the ground of the 19th century and focuses on Trekboer community asserts how much exaggerated and unfounded the Weberian approaches can be.⁸¹ Moreover. Another study on the Balokole community who live in the Kingdom of Uganda within the borders of Uganda demonstrates that the adherence to the Protestant ethics does not necessarily result in upward social mobility and lead to an improvement in the socio-economic situations of the inhabitants (Winter, 1983).⁸² The importance of the examples in South Africa is crucial for my own discussion since there are different interpretations of Calvinism even in a new society originally founded by Calvinists. This clearly portrays how any religion can be shaped by different social and cultural environments and take different forms. Therefore in the context of Protestantism the studies, comparing a red apple (the European Calvinism) and a green apple (the Calvinism of Trokboer) in the South African context are more helpful than comparing an apple (Calvinism) and a pear (Islam).

⁷⁹ It is called the community of Trokboer consisting of three different groups of White-immigrants.

⁸⁰ Stokes, 1975: 62-81

⁸¹ Andre du Toit, 1985: 234

⁸² Winter, 1983: 58-73.

3.1.2 The Discussion on "Islamic Protestantism" in Turkey

Now I can turn back to Turkey again. As I have mentioned in my introduction, the debates on Calvinism and Islamic Protestantism are not new and the issue has been discussed and examined from various aspects since the beginning of the 20th century. In fact the discussions concerning Protestantism can be traced back to 2nd Constitutional Monarchy. Referred from Tanıl Bora, Ayaz İshaki wrote “inspired from Protestantism, Islam needed to be simplified and reduced to a reasonable level of its language and traditions.”⁸³ As Bora claims Yusuf Akçura’s suggestions of the nationalization of religion, Ahmet Hikmet’s admiration of Luther who translated the Bible to German and helped the establishment of a new nation and language, the recommendations of the founding members of the Republic in terms of translating the Qur’an into Turkish, entering the mosques with shoes and allocating seats in there as well depended on the projects of the nationalization of the religion (Bora, 1998: 118-120). It is possible to think in this context Ziya Gökalp’s and Ali Suavi’s some arguments with regards to the rationalization and nationalization of Islam” (Yıldırım, 1993: 132-133).

Aktay confirms that “toward achieving for a new national religion, the version of a Islamic Protestantism becomes a new option” and this has basically two dimensions. On the one hand, it represents the political desires that the religion would be under the command of the politics, stripped from the traditional claims of intervening the everyday life. On the other hand, it is thought as a motivating factor for the national economic development and a positive flavor in the construction of the national identity (Aktay, 2000: 177). Bora asserts that the Protestantism as the nationalization of the religion is the incomplete side of the constructive/positive side of the project, yet the more fashionable side of the negative aspect focuses on the purification of Islam from the impacts of Persian and Arabian interpretations (Bora, 1998: 121). In this respect, there is a serious tendency among the Islamic-oriented researchers to examine the relationship⁸⁴ among modernity, capitalism and Islam from the perspective of Protestantism and to evaluate in an exaggerated way

⁸³ See Bora, 1998

⁸⁴ See *İslami Araştırmalar*, Vol 16 and 18 and *İslam ve İktisat* Vol I. and Vol. II.

the establishment of the Republic of Turkey as a radical effort to situate Islam in a Protestant context.⁸⁵ As a matter of fact, Aktay is under the impression that there are serious attempts in this period to comprehend Islam at the direction of Christianity in general.⁸⁶ Dursun agrees with this common opinion when he cites Falih Rıfki's words: "The Kemalist Revolution is a great Reform project on Islam."⁸⁷ On the contrary both Tunçay and Bora elucidate this approach as highly exaggerated and assert the sociological fact that religion needs to be modernized in this period as well. However, Bora also indicates that while the republican elite, with the inspiration of Reformation, has begun to oppose the church and not the religion itself in Turkey, they might have adopted Christianity as a model for themselves. Moreover, he underlines the fact that the authoritarian operations of the secularization project in the 28 February 1997 Military intervention can be analyzed as the final steps of the Protestant Islam (Bora, 1998: 119-120). After summarizing the general outline of the debates on Protestantism, in the final part of my chapter I will concentrate on specific works and researches. I will again follow the same method for analytic reasons as I have suggested below. Let's begin with *the PE negative* approach.

Without doubt, Sabri Ülgener's well-known classics can be counted as the first examples of the typical Weberian PE negative works.⁸⁸ Indeed, if we put aside Şemsettin Günaltay's writings on the Islamic work ethics – the first researcher who investigates on the relationship between economic development and religion (Yıldırım, 1993: 133), it is not possible to ignore Ülgener, who critically follows Weber's methodological and theoretical framework although he had some serious opposition⁸⁹ to Weber's arguments on Islam. In his academic works, Ülgener aims to reconstruct the Weberian model and asks this crucial question: "why did capitalism fail in the Ottoman Empire?" In this regard he wants to clarify "the inert mentality and passive attitude" of Ottoman Turks on the economic issues by

⁸⁵ See Canatan 1993: 38; Yıldırım 1993: 135; Çelik 1993: 67-83; Dursun 1993: 97- 107.

⁸⁶ Aktay 1993: 59 and Aktay 2000: 186.

⁸⁷ See Dursun 1993: 106

⁸⁸ See Ülgener 2006a and 2006b.

⁸⁹ See Ülgener 2006a: 64-90

working on the cultural, historical and aesthetic sources of the empire. While situating himself into the general Weberian paradigm, he offered a very qualified analysis on the horizon of Ottoman-Turkish human-mentality.

Having pure sociological outlook for religion Ülgener contends that both the dogmatic/ doctriner and economic mentality aspects of religion has been determined by the weight of the dominant social groups who are the daily representatives of the religion for that time. For him, the dominant strata also mark the religion perception and approach of society to some extend and for a certain time period and the weight could be shift from one group to another in time (Ülgener, 2006a: 75). In this context, there have been similar developments in Islam. The Meccan period in which the Islam perspective of noble, rich traders and land owers of Kureysh tribe prevails changed with the Medina period where the conquest (jihad) and gazha (the wholly war) feelings and entihusiasm dominates the followers of Islam mostly the desert fighters. So the deep ectasic and divine verses of Mecca replaced with the spirit of expansion conquest. With Ülgener's words "when Islam turned back to Mecca it was no longer a closed, ascetic and taqwa religion" (ibid. 77). With the magnificent brilliance of the Ummayyad Dynasity ascetism and taqwa had gradually alianeted from the main body of Islam. Therefore, for him since the beginning of Islam, the two opposite motivation courage (*mürüvvet*) and piety (*diyanet*) has been in a continous confilict with each other. While one of them represent the outwardly feudal spirit of warriors the others implies the innerwordly values of retreat and seclusion (ibid. 78). These two opposite forces also represent the tension between the urban and nomadic dynamics of Islam. As an urban religion by birth Islam never surrendered to the nomadism and it has been a dense fusion of urban rationality and organization and the striking power of the deserts for him (ibid. 79). In this sense, the historical result has been a sensitive balance between these opposite dyanamics in Islam (ibid. 80). In fact Ülgener thinks that every big religion is a great body in which at first sight some conflicting provisions and claims co-exist depending on the different conditions and needs and Islam is not an exception (ibid., 86). However, in the passage of history this balance is oriented towards the direction of "introversion and inclosure" in Islam (ibid. 88). Therefore,

despite the active willpower side of Islamic beliefs the fatalistic vision based on resignation came to the forth. For Ülgener, the strong opposition movements against the worldly sultanate of Umayyad Dynasity had a great role in this resignation.

Regarding the Ottoman Empire, this process had started with the empowerment of the sufi movements and tarikats. In the first times it was restricted with the small and elite sufi circles among the shopkeepers (*Fütüvvet's*); however, in time it spreaded to the different layers of society and started to penetrate into the the mental world of Ottoman society. This two sided influence went mostly on the axis of Esoretic (*batini*) school among the crowded masses and business circles and this led to a different kind of behavioral attitude and a different order; a climate of meaning which is quite close to a kind of rantier capitalism (ibid. 137).

In this context, Sufi movements had the great role and contribution in the espousal of some stereotyped ideas and attitudes such as the transiency of the mundane world; the negative perception on hurry and on the disobedience to the sheiks; living slowly in quite, sure and peace without thinking tomorrow (ibid. 138-139). For this reason, the fine beliefs and creeds established in elite sufi circles turned out to be ordinary, stereotyped and simple ides and expressions among the layers of popular belifs; lost their mystic depth and originality and inevitably resulted in the resignation (*tevekkül*) and submission (*teslimiyet*) (ibid. 142). As a matter an ordinary Ottoman man “is not stranger for the spacious living taste and pleasure; however, he doesn’t like to be in a hurry and determines his path for his economic calculations in the paths of this tradition and culture” (Ülgener, 2006a: 6).

To sum up, for Ülgener, there are two approaches on Islam in the Ottoman Empire; the one is the “mystical” and the other is the “ascetic.” The first is centered on Sufism that has been adopted by large numbers of people, escaping from the world and constructing an inward-looking identity. The second one is the orthodox understanding that is compatible with the surrounding political and legal structures and has been shaped by the scholars of Islam and it aims to construct an outward-looking identity (Aydın, 1993: 50-52). Yet according to Ülgener, Sufism, which

reflects the mentality of large groups in the Ottoman Empire, has turned into “a philosophy of resignation and contemplation for the God”. Needless to mention this is a transformation into the mystical realm, which does not consist of ascetic elements. Of course even though there are some religious movements such as Melami’yye, which highlights the ascetic and puritan worldview in general, it has never become the hegemonic interpretation and eventually “a shallow, fatalistic and inward-oriented understanding of society becomes the dominant one” (Aydın, 1993: 50-52). As a result, Ülgener thinks that the medieval morality especially in the period of decadence (Hanioglu, 2006: 475) and the ethos of Sufism are the main obstacles, which shut the door for a transition to a rational capitalist system in the Ottoman Empire (Sarıbay, 2006: 90).

Finally, we can also analyze Şerif Mardin’s works in this Weberian tradition. In his book *Religion and Ideology*, published in 1969, Mardin analyzes Islam as in the form of *Volk Islam*, which takes places in a soft ideological structure among different layers of people and uses Weber’s investigation on patrimonialism for exploring the Ottoman-Turkish society (Mardin, 1986: 76). In this context, Mardin touches upon the issue of Protestantism and agrees with Ülgener’s or Weber’s thesis regarding the general framework of his studies about the Turkish society.

The majority of the academic works, which deal with this topic, are in the category of the *PE positive* studies. One of the typical defensive examples of this approach can be found in the works of Mutlu, who insists that there are ample sociological facts in the non-Western world against the Weberian justifications (Mutlu, 1990). After describing the ethical values of the Protestant ethics; such as rationality, individualism, hard working and finally being an entrepreneur by constant savings, Mutlu demonstrates verses from the Quran without any theoretical or empirical field works and says that “we have these values in Islam as well” The similar patterns can be seen in Ayengin’s work, which basically verifies his argument from the Quran and avows that Islam encourages private ownership and is not against wealth and fortune in the economic life.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Ayengin, 2005: 463–472.

In parallel with those arguments, there is a more positivist approach that follows the same path yet operates in the empirical level. Such studies are mostly covered by psychologists, theologians and business-management scholars in the field of “values.” In general, these studies, which are mainly based on positivistic and standard survey results, are the quantitative applications of the Protestant “values” into certain groups. Aslan’s investigation is one of the best examples for this category, comparing 100 Protestant, 103 Catholic and 74 Muslim managers from the United Kingdom, Ireland and Turkey (Aslan 2001: 324-335). This type of research aims to indicate the priority of the empirical investigation regarding the sociological norms in the field.

It is also important to consider the works of Özdemir, Demirpolat and Yavuz in this category. Although it is not directly related with the issue of Protestantism, Özdemir’s work on *Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD)*, which scrutinizes the transformation of the Anatolian capital and evaluates the cultural aspects of the social modernity among MÜSİAD’s members can also be implicitly examined in my discussion.⁹¹ According to Özdemir, it is an academically futile endeavor to search for the resemblances between Islam and Protestantism since Islam never imposes a metaphysical lifestyle. As a result, Özdemir’s main argument indicates that there might be different rationalization processes, operating both in the West and the non-Western world (Özdemir, 2006: 255).

From a slightly different angle, Demirpolat’s thesis focuses on the rationalization of the religion by interrogating the industrialists in Konya. He especially observes the rising of a new middle class, mainly educated in engineering schools, in Anatolia after 1970s. This new class instrumentalizes the religion by adopting a profit-oriented economic rationality and relates itself to both domestic and international market. In this regard, a new form of *liberal Islam* has been emerging while the so-called “authentic version of Islam” gets slowly lost in the Muslim communities.

⁹¹ Özdemir 2006

Hakan Yavuz also argues that MÜSİAD represents the complex intersection of religion and economics among the new Anatolian bourgeoisie. This process could only have been consolidated with the help of Özal's economic liberalization. This policy also promotes the construction of an Islamic "Protestant ethic" by stressing puritanical, this-worldly values that seems to anticipate rewards for a virtuous life in the hereafter as well. This new bourgeoisie, organized around either Nurcu or Nakşibendi groups, criticizes "superstitious" beliefs, stresses a surprisingly rational understanding of faith, and defines Islam as the religion of progress.

For Yavuz, the dynamic interaction between contemporary Islamic movements and market forces, however, indicates that Turkish modernization is not necessarily a carbon copy of Westernization. Whereas in the West, the embourgeoisement of religion led to the process of disenchantment, the Turkish case indicates that disenchantment and re-enchantment can coexist. For example, in the case of MÜSİAD, religion has become intertwined with the market economy. Therefore, "the utilization of religious practices and idioms to justify the market economy has become the major source for the inner secularization of Islam."⁹²

It is my contention that there is a particular emphasis in the *PE Positive Studies* about the fact that Muslim merchants in the MÜSİAD compete to offer an economic basis for the sustenance of a moral community. They tend to see Islam as a pool of ideas and strategies that can be employed to justify social acts in the market environment. Thus religious enthusiasm, along with earning profits, can be analyzed the main motivating forces behind the expanding Turkish market. The Nakşibendi and Nurcu communities emphasize the merchant ethics of the Prophet Muhammad and try to fuse these with the values of modern capitalism. Let's look at one more time Yavuz's *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*:

⁹² Yavuz, 2003b: 281

Turkey has experienced the growth of an entrepreneurial spirit that has had an important impact on Islamic identity. Risk taking, the emergence of group individuality, and joint venturism are features of this entrepreneurial spirit. Willingness to take risks is significant because it involves liberation from blind submission to a higher order. The spirit of risk taking brings to the Turkish identity debate an approximation (proto-individualism) of the idiomatic character of individualism as understood in the West (Yavuz 2003: 97).

After discussing both the *PE Positive* and *PE Negative* Studies in Turkish context it is my contention that both approaches do not retrieve themselves from the acquisitions of Orientalism. Whether they try to defend the priority of the West or identify the ontological similarity of the East both approaches stay in the same Weberian methodology. Indeed, Sarıbay interprets, by referring Dirlik, all these approaches as “attempts of making Islam more and more Weberian” and concludes that “understanding the development of modern capitalism within the perspective of Weberian Calvinist studies leaves us with superficial and deterministic reading of history (Sarıbay, 2006: 91). Therefore as I tried to discuss above, there must be an alternative third realm, which can offer a more critical examination of this multilayered and complex sociological discussion.

The first of these critical trends is the nationalist and Islamist approach of the researchers that are as essentialist as the Orientalist group. Although lacking the depth of Mardin and Ülgener, the works of Türkdoğan fit quite well into this category. Türkdoğan argues that Islamic economic system with its norms and values is a complete structure and has a *sui generis* identity. Furthermore, he expresses that there is a vital methodological difference between Capitalism and Islam, and implies the possibility of an Islamic essence due to its universalistic discourse based on a divine order. For this reason, it is a complete mistake to bend the Islam in order to compare it with other systems (Türkdoğan, 1994: 121-2). I believe that Türkdoğan’s “Turkish-Islamic” synthesis displays an anxiety of cultural particularism in terms of identity issues. In this regard the more famous examples from Asian countries, such as Japan, are getting prioritized. Without any surprise, Türkdoğan recommends the injection of Islam - as the carrier of the tradition values - into the economic system (Türkdoğan⁹³, 2005: 322-3).

⁹³ Türkdoğan 2005

There are also more sophisticated and in-depth works, which examine the issue in a broader context from the historical, economic and sociological perspectives and definitely go beyond the limits of positivism. It is time to remember here Hanioglu's critical observations. Hanioglu detects four reasons about Weber's thesis that "Islam could not create a favorable environment for the fostering of capitalism." First and foremost, Islam is not based on a real ideal of forgiveness; second it did not allow independent cities due to its very strict feudal ethos; third the elastic character of the Islamic Shari'a law could not establish a positive law system which was unavoidable for the capitalist economy and finally the patrimonial character of the society couldn't lead to an autonomous political community (Hanioglu, 2006: 474). After critically evaluating all these claims, Hanioglu only agrees with the third assumption concerning the lack of positive law in the non-Western communities.

3. 2 Sociological Argument

I think I already examined the theological argument in detail above; so I can go on with the second one. Here the critical emphasis is on the relational character of religion with its dense organizational structure based on social networks. In the context of my dissertation, this was discussed mainly on the axis of Anatolian Tigers. It was emphasized that these newly emerging bourgeoisie dynamically uses the religious, traditional and cultural values and networks in the capital accumulation and labor processes⁹⁴. It means the use of religious relations as a social capital or a weak or strong (up to the followers choices) ties⁹⁵ with the definition of Granovetter. I can briefly summarize these kinds of arguments as follows:

⁹⁴ Doğan 2007: 53

⁹⁵ Granovetter 1973

- Every kind of tarikat and community (cemaat) networks such as reading communities of Nur circles or Sufi networks are being used in the creation of reciprocal trust patterns in the market and these groups works as business clubs⁹⁶. It was stated that these solidarity relations between the religious groups establish an Islamic sub-economy⁹⁷.
- It was noticed that some small and medium sized firms could benefit from the Arab or Gulf Capital via the Islamic Finance Banks and Institutions by the mediation of religious communities and/or *tarikats*⁹⁸. In this frame some firms and holdings such as KOMBASSAN, YİMPAŞ, İTTİFAK KİMPAŞ, JET GROUP are given as examples which collected money in return for the informal share certificates in 1990s by using the Islamic sensitivities in Turkey and Europe⁹⁹,
- There is made a distinction between the two business associations: TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD. The former is considered as the representative of the Istanbul Bourgeoise which has been the leading capital group of Turkey concentrated around İstanbul and historically developed under the sheltering wings of the state within the import substitution period's economic conditions without any rivals¹⁰⁰. On the other hand the latter is composed of traders and industrialists of developing Anatolian cities which has been rapidly articulating into the global capitalism. It was claimed that this new bourgeoisie grows without having any state subsidiaries and supports¹⁰¹ and shows different charecteristics from daily life routines to the political preferences and orientations¹⁰²

⁹⁶Yavuz, 2003: 279.

⁹⁷ Kuran 2002; Bulut 1997

⁹⁸ Yavuz 2004; Atasoy 2009: 135-7; Doğan 2007: 53-63

⁹⁹ Doğan, 2007: 53-63

¹⁰⁰ Buğra 2008

¹⁰¹ Yavuz, 2003: 227.

¹⁰² Gülaıp 2001: 433-438.

- As a local (capital's) reaction¹⁰³ to the capital groups in the center (İstanbul) this new grup is being saluted as the as the “essential and autenthic” bourgeoisie¹⁰⁴ of Turkey and it was considered as the widespread social ground of AKP in Anatolia¹⁰⁵.
- Lastly, there have been made many researches¹⁰⁶ on the business organizations of this second group such as MÜSİAD, HÜRSİAD, İŞHAD, TUSKON, ASKON and different SİAD's (associations of businessmen and industrialists)

In the two parts of the chapter above, I tried to consider the basic arguments and perspectives regarding the relations between economic development and industrialization in the literature. In the introduction and method chapters I suggested that I will evaluate the issue from a historical and materialistic perspective. Therefore, in the following chapter I will try to make a detailed historical analysis of Hacılar's industrialization process from being a pre-industrial peasant community to an industrial district. In this frame, I will try to test and examine the theological and sociological arguments with the historical and empirical material from the field.

In this context, I organized the rest of the dissertation in this way. In the next chapter, I will explain the long history of the town, its industrialization process and articulation into the first national and then global market. I will start with the previous works based on historical records and continue with the oral history that I collected in my in-depth interviews from the participants. In the subsequent chapter, I will focus on the immediate forms and relations of production in Hacilar industry and in the last chapter, I will discuss the cultural dimensions of industrialization by

¹⁰³ Tuğal, 2007: 5–34

¹⁰⁴ Hasan Bülent Kahraman (2008) Anadolu –İstanbul Meydan Muharebesi, *Sabah (daily)*, 15.09.2008, Hasan Bülent Kahraman (2008) Anadolu –İstanbul Meydan Muharebeleri II, *Sabah (daily)* 17.09.2008, Hasan Bülent Kahraman (2008) Anadolu –İstanbul Meydan Muharebesi III, *Sabah (daily)* 18.09.2008, Hasan Bülent Kahraman (2008) Muharebe Tahlilleri, *Sabah (daily)*, 24.09.2008,

¹⁰⁵ Pamuk 2009: 280

¹⁰⁶ Çınar 1997; Buğra and Savaşkan 2010; Buğra 1998: 521-539; Buğra 2002: 187-204; Güllalp 2001: 439-440; Özdemir 2007: 63-83; Özdemir 2006; Özdemir 2004: 837- 869; Koyuncu 2002; Uğur and Alkan 2000: 133-5; Öniş 2001: 290; Atasoy 2009: 128-146.

giving a special emphasis on religion; namely the findings on theological and sociological arguments besides the other findings related with local solidarity dynamics, political orientations and attitudes towards modernity and globalization. In the conclusion part, I will try to summarize my findings, compare them with the arguments in the literature and try to refine my contribution. So, I can start with Kayseri, the metropolis of deep Anatolia in which all the story takes the stage.

CHAPTER 4

INDUSTRIALIZATION OF HACILAR AND ITS ARTICULATION INTO THE CAPITALISM

4. 1 The Metropolis of Deep Anatolia: Kayseri

First of all, Kayseri is not a new rich and a newly emergent “tiger”. It has been a historical center for trade, artisanship, politics, art and education in the history and still a leading and capital city of its region. As a settlement, which has been lying in the cross-section of North/South and East/West axis of Anatolia, it was the biggest port¹⁰⁷ before İzmir on the Silk Road since the Assyrians times. Therefore, it is not surprise that the first written commercial documents in history were found in Kayseri in archeological studies. The city took its name, *Ceasarea*¹⁰⁸, in 8th century BC from the Roman Emperor Ceaser¹⁰⁹ and throughout its history it has been a lively and rich trade, art, craft and cultural center¹¹⁰. This distinctive character of the city did not changed in times of Phrygian, Persian, Roman, Seljuk and Ottoman rules.

As a result of its trade oriented structure Kayseri has been a cosmopolitan city which includes high proportion of non-Muslim population until the First World War. The historical records show that until 11th Century the Greeks were to a great extent majority in Kayseri but this population structure had changed with the Roman occupation of East Anatolia. The Byzantine Empire destroyed the Armenian Kingdoms in Eastern Anatolia and transferred some of the Armenian population of these kingdoms to Kayseri, Sivas and the Euphrates region¹¹¹”. The second critical upside down in the population structure of the city was lived with the Turkish

¹⁰⁷ Tuzcu 2000: 552-572.

¹⁰⁸ It means the city of the Emperor.

¹⁰⁹ Kayseri Municipality web site: <http://www.kayseribld.gov.tr/tarih/kayseri.htm> 22 March 2009

¹¹⁰ Tuzcu (2000)

¹¹¹ Büyükmihçi 2005: 19

occupation of Anatolia after the 11th Century. In time, the population was mixed and enriched with commercial and social relations and gave its cosmopolitan structure to the city. Indeed, historical records show that there is even a Persian population and an Italian neighborhood in Kayseri and the latter are called by the local people as “*Pizzalılar*” in Seljuk State¹¹².

According to the statistics of Ottoman Census records of 1914, there were living 184,292 Muslim (% 70. 05) and 78,782 Non-Muslim (% 29. 94) Ottoman citizens. All the Muslim populations Turkish, Kurdish or Caucasians were classified under a single category. But we know the exact numbers of non-Muslim people such as 26,590 Greek, 48,659 Armenian, 1515 Catholic, 2018 Protestant¹¹³. Besides, since the founder of Armenian Church, Surp Kirkor lived in Kayseri in 4th Century¹¹⁴ and the Basiliten fraction of Orthodox Church is from Kayseri, it has also been considered as the spiritual center of Armenians¹¹⁵. Therefore, there was a very rich Non-Muslim cultural heritage¹¹⁶ in Kayseri until the First World War.

For instance, it is possible to see a very intensive and effective commercial activity in Kayseri in 1800. Tuzcu’s work¹¹⁷ shows that, although the land structure of Kayseri is infertile and therefore grain production was limited, the agricultural production was intensified on some productions such as “*alaca boya, geven otu, kitre ve cehri*” which were used in textile, chemistry and pharmacy in those years. These products had a high commercial value at that time and they were imported from Kayseri in great amounts¹¹⁸. Besides, there was a very developed viniculture and viticulture with the support of missionaries especially in settlements of Talas, Germir, Gesi and Endürlük where the non-Muslim population is majority¹¹⁹. Besides, in the same period *pastirma and sucuk* producers who had been worked for

¹¹² Karatepe 2003:92.

¹¹³ Büyükmihçi 2005: 19-20.

¹¹⁴ ESI 2005: 7

¹¹⁵ Büyükmihçi 2005:1.

¹¹⁶ Doğan 2007.

¹¹⁷ Tuzcu 2000: 552-572.

¹¹⁸ Tuzcu 2000: 552-572.

¹¹⁹ Tuzcu 2000: 552-572.

domestic market started to import their goods to Europe. Carpet industry¹²⁰ having roots in the 12th Century in Anatolia was another profitable business which was under the hegemony of Armenian traders and producers at that time. They trained the local producers according to the foreign, (especially European) demand and started to produce silk carpets after the second half of the 19th century for the European markets.

The city had been already a center for producing the needs of Ottoman Army such as saltpeter, tent, gun, sword, apron shield and canvas¹²¹. Besides, the traditional goods of the city such as metal kitchen goods, agricultural tools, gold, silver, packsaddle, harness, carpet and rug, *sucuk*, *pastirma*, dried apricots had been preferred and demanded throughout the internal and external markets with their quality and sales¹²². In this century, the basic tools, concepts and applications of modern trade was known and practiced in the city like production, transportation, marketing, banking, cheque, voucher, interest, contract, notary etc. Between 1825 and 1914 it was possible to find all kind of goods in Kayseri coming from different cities of the world¹²³”.

In this lively atmosphere while the Jewish were dealing with jewelry and financial businesses as usual, Armenians became the rich mediators of international trade between West Asia and Europe since the 17th Century. With Yerasimos’ words “they became the most famous traders of the world¹²⁴”. The Gulbankian, Şahbender, Turabyan, Emirhenyan, Simyonoğlu, Seliyan Families were in the league of worldwide riches in this period¹²⁵. The Greeks were doing small scale wool trade and they were not a rich community in the beginning of 19th century; but with the Industrial Revolution they rapidly became the intermediaries of

¹²⁰ Yerasimos 1986 s. 136.

¹²¹ Tuzcu 2000: 552-572.

¹²² Tuzcu 2000: 552-572.

¹²³ Tuzcu 2000: 552-572

¹²⁴ Yerasimos 1986: 437.

¹²⁵ Tuzcu, 2000: 552-572

international trade between Ottoman Empire and Europe like Armenians¹²⁶”. Meantime, the Turks or in general the Muslim population were holding the domestic trade, dealing with agriculture and serving for military. However, as pointed out by many researchers, they were living a material and moral collapse stemmed from loosing their privileged political and legal statuses against the rise of Non-Muslims, especially after the Tanzimat Decree (1839) and Baltalimanı Act of Trade (1838) with Great Britain¹²⁷.

This was the general landscape both in Empire and Kayseri in the beginning of the 20th century. This rich, lively and cosmopolitan landscape started to change with the First World War and vanished after the tragic deportation of Armenians (1915) and the Population Exchange with Greeks lived between 1923 and 1927. In 1927, the ratio of Non-Muslim population in Turkey sharply declined to % 1. The sending of all the Non-Muslim population who constituted the backbone of Ottoman industry and trade lowered all the industrial and commercial accumulation in the country to the zero level¹²⁸. Under these circumstances, the filling of this gap remained from the Non-Muslim population would take almost 80 years. The Anatolian Muslim entrepreneurs should start almost everything from zero point as in the case of Hacılar until the 1990s. Since, they were deprived of not just entrepreneurial ability but lack even the basic talents of trade, artisanship and craft like shoemaking, woodwork, carpentry, tailoring among others. All these professions were in the hands of non-Muslims in Ottoman Empire¹²⁹.

After the wars ended and the non-Muslim citizens gone, there stayed almost no one for industrial production and trade. Under these circumstances, the state had to shoulder the economic, social, cultural and ideological gap remained from the Non-Muslim population. Yet, although Kayseri lost most of its social and cultural capitals related to industry and trade what has remained¹³⁰ became its advantage for

¹²⁶ Büyükmihçi 2005: 31

¹²⁷ Keyder 2010: 86-92.

¹²⁸ Tezel 2000: 98-99.

¹²⁹ Kazgan, 1999: 72

¹³⁰ Yurt Ansiklopedisi, 1983: 4727

it to be the new and favorite industrial center of the new Turkish Republic. Its geographical location and historical experience were the main factors in behind this political decision of the establishment of great industrial enterprises. Among these investments there were an airplane factory¹³¹ established in 1925, a tank-repair factory in 1926, a textile/thread factory in 1926, Kayseri- Ankara railway in 1927, the biggest textile/clothing factory of Turkey in 1935, a sugar factory in 1955 and a metallurgical factory in 1968. As Doğan argues, these big scale industrial investments established the infra structure of the concomitant industrialization attempts of private sector that started in 1950's. Since these state enterprises provided qualified labor and raw material for the private factories made thereafter. The followings are these private factories. *Birlik Mensucat* Thread Factory in 1950; in 1953 *Orta Anadolu* Thread and Textile Factory, *MEYSU* Orange Juice Factory in 1970; HES Cable Factory in 1974 and TAKSAN in 1975. As a matter of the fact, Kayseri became the 9th industrial city of Turkey in 1970's¹³². Therefore, Köse and Öncü¹³³ argue that Kayseri should not be considered in the category of Anatolian tigers which were developed by virtue of small and middle sized firms. However, with its 237 factories over 50 workers in the year 2002 it may be better to classify it as one of the traditional industrial centers of Turkey such as İstanbul, İzmir, Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli, Manisa, Sakarya, Samsun and Tekirdağ.

According to some basic indicators of Turkish Statistical Institute for the year 2000, Kayseri city appear in the 35th rank with 2308 \$ GDP per capita; in 17th rank for its 2.4 billion \$ contribution to GDP. It lies in 16th rank in the development index based on the 2008 statistics among other cities¹³⁴. For the same period the unemployment rate is % 11.1 and the ratio of workers in agriculture, trade and industry to the total employment is respectively % 46, % 8 and % 16. According to the statistics of the City Development Report prepared by the State Planning

¹³¹ It is a critical detail that the father of Turkish President Abdullah Gül is a retired worker of this factory.

¹³² Doğan, 2007: 94-95

¹³³ Köse and Öncü 2000: 117-128.

¹³⁴ Keyman and Lorasdağı 2010: 48

Organization¹³⁵ Kayseri is in the category of second level developed cities of Turkey with its share (contribution) of % 1, 22 to the GDP of Turkey. It appears in the 19. rank of socio-economic development level and 15th rank according to the industrial production list.

In an another index¹³⁶, prepared by CNBC-e Journal, based on different indicators such as economics, education, health, security, city life, culture and art, Kayseri seems to rise from 35th rank in 2008 to 19th rank in 2009.

According to the numbers given by the Kayseri Chamber of Industry¹³⁷ there is more than 1,000 production centers on all types of industry, more than 100,000 employees, and a production of more than 5 billion \$ and a foreign trade capacity of 2 billion \$ in Kayseri. Besides, it has the largest Free Zone of Turkey with seven million square meters. It is also possible to understand the place of the city from the list of the biggest industrial firms of Turkey prepared by Istanbul Chamber of Industry. According to the list there are eighteen firms in the first biggest 500 firms and 24 firms in the second biggest 500 firms from Kayseri With these firms Kayseri is in the 6th place in Turkey compared to other cities. Besides, it is in the 8th rank for textile import, 4th rank for trademark registration, 5th rank in innovation and 9th rank in the competitive cities list comprising of all the cities of Turkey. Lastly, according to the firm records of KAYSO¹³⁸ the total distribution of production sectors in Kayseri is as follows: % 27,15 goods made up of metal % 17.61 furniture and forest products % 12.23 textile, % 10.66 chemical plastic production and advertisement material % 9.73 construction and infrastructural goods % 8.43 food, % 4.9 electrical durable goods, % 4.73 mining, % 4.54 enginery¹³⁹. After

¹³⁵ Özarslan and Şeftalici 2002

¹³⁶ Mavi 2009: 35.

¹³⁷ See the web site of Kayseri Industrial Chamber:

http://www.kayso.org.tr/kurumsal/index.php?sayfa_no=12

¹³⁸ Kayseri Chamber of Industry.

¹³⁹ <http://www.kayso.org.tr/folders/18480/categorial1docs/12234/Neden%20Kayseri%20TR.pdf>, 24

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summarizing this general picture about Kayseri, I can focus on the extraordinary village of the city and take a closer look to the industrialization adventure of that village.

4.2 Hacılar: An Indifferent and Bull-headed Turkish Village on the Skirts of Mount Erciyes.

Hacılar is a mountainous Turkish, Sunni village settled on the northern skirts of old volcano Mount Erciyes embracing Kayseri Plateau almost from 400, 500 meter heights. It is 14 km far away from city center. It has a very cold climate, and the quality of its land is very low since it stands on the remnants of the lava streams of Erciyes¹⁴⁰. Therefore, there is a very limited and sustainable agricultural activity and the scale of average landownership is also very low due to the crowded population of the village since almost 16th century. It is also the main factor in behind the poverty of the village in the last 400 years.

According to the historical records the history of the village dates back to the 15th century. The “tapu tahrir” (land register) documents showed that there were 4 communities called as Hacı and 2 settlements called as Hacılu in Kayseri province (sancak) in 1848. In 1500 the number of communities called *Hacı* and *Hacılu* seems to rise to 14. Therefore according to İnbaşı, it is almost certain that there was a community called Hacılar which had settled in a village of Cebeli Erciyes sub-province of Kayseri in 15th Century and this community was composed of 265 people in 50 household in the year 1520 (İnbaşı, 1992: 96).

Faruk Sümer, claims that Hacılar society originated from the “Ağcalı” community of “Kayı” tribe which is one the 24 clans of “Oguz” Turks. For him, Hacılar society spread everywhere in Anatolia, especially to the Adana/Cilicia region, with the migration flows started in 1071 and lasted until the 16th Century. That’s why there are almost 50 settlements¹⁴¹ called Hacılar in Anatolia. Indeed, there are some other settlements called Hacılar in Armenia and Azerbaijan. So it seems the word

¹⁴⁰ Ayata, 1987: 68

¹⁴¹ For the other settlements in Anatolia called Hacılar see Alan 2008: 45; Özkan 2008: 533, Türkay 1979: 394-395; Rihtım 2008: 568-569.

“Hacılar” has its roots in Turkistan (quoted from Sümer 1992 by Alan 2008: 44). Based on the “tapu tahrir” documents in the Ottoman Archives, Demir argues that Hacılar community is settled in different parts of Anatolia. Especially the Kayseri “Temettuat” (revenues records) Books prove that Hacılar community has originated from the “Dulkadiroğulları”, which was the biggest clan of Oğuz Turks (Demir, 2008: 267–268).

Whatever the details, it is understood that Hacılar community exist in Anatolia almost since the 15th Century, the majority of them has been living in Adana-Kayseri region, and most probably from some internal problems some groups have been settled in this region, where is now called Hacılar in 1726¹⁴² (Alan, 2008: 46).

It is possible to understand from these records that Hacılar is a quite old and crowded rural community. For instance, according to the Temettuat Records of 1834, the population of Hacılar is 2,150 (Demir, 2008: 269). The 1875 Cencus records show that there were 574 household and 1,558 men in Hacılar. So it shows that the population of Hacılar is approximately 3,100 at that time. Similarly, the number of household is seen as 616 in the tax records belong to the second half of the 19th century (Cömert, 2008: 152).

There is not a proof in most of the historical records¹⁴³ about Hacılar showing the existence of Non-Muslim population except the work of Öztürk (2008: 560). Depending on his work on the Justice registrations (Osmanlı Şeriye Sicillere) Öztürk, argues that there is not Jewish or Greek population; but the Turkish and Armenian people live together. Though this statement deserves attention, I think this is a mistaken statement stemming from the closeness of Turkish and Armenian neighborhoods. Since, the houses and gardens of Armenians were taking place between Kayseri city center and the borders of Hacılar. The district between these borders is still called as “gavur çukuru” (gavur’s pit¹⁴⁴). Related with this district some industrialists I interviewed told me that they bought some lands from the

¹⁴² See Kamil 1982: 86-102 for details.

¹⁴³ Selçuk 2008: 590

¹⁴⁴ It is a pejorative word for stigmatizing the Non-Muslim population.

heritors of Armenians who already migrated to Istanbul before they established the HES factory to Hacilar. However, except this, all the other interviews did not give me any clue (like the remnants of a church or something like that) on the existence of non-Muslim population in Hacilar. Besides, reliable historian¹⁴⁵ also stated that “Hacilar was distinctively a Muslim village”.

Looking to the history of economic life, it seems that Hacilar stayed in the same economic structure almost for four hundred years except the last fifty years. The famous works of Jennings, who studied the economic and social life and population dynamics around the Mount Erciyes in the 16 century shows that Hacilar was a prosperous village in the second half of the 15th Century and following 50 years.

In 1492 %52 of the village’s taxes come from grain..... Although sheep production at first was modest, by mid century it was outstanding; even more substantial was honey production. However the most decisive factor in the economy of the village was wine yards, orchards, and gardens above the village proper which consistently produced sizeable crops..... The village economy was broadly based, but compared to other villages the vegetable; fruit and grape cultivation was most noteworthy.... Hacilar village obviously was a very prosperous village in 1490 capable not only of supplying itself completely with grain, honey, meat, wool, and hides, grapes and other fruits and vegetables but of marketing ample amounts of each.The village economy made remarkable progress in the interval before 1550 when both total and per *nefer* wealth of the village reached its peak.... At that time Hacilar was an extremely prosperous village (Jennings, 1999: 86-87).

Similarly, based on his work on *tahrir* (census) records of Ottoman Archives about 1500 and 1520 İnbâşî pictured the agricultural production in Hacilar as follows:

There were 25 and 50 households in the years of 1500 and 1520 respectively. There is also the Sultan’s decree on “the exemption of the *avarız* (a special tax collected for the expenses of the army in times of war) tax for the village. Wheat, barley, fruit, honey, almond, walnut, sumacs were the main products beside husbandry. The general tax collected from the village was 4495 and 4827 *akçe* in the years of 1500 and 1520. In Ottoman State, 12 *akçe* equals to a golden money of 3 grams. So the total income of Hacilar with current prices (1 gram gold equals to 30 YTL¹⁴⁶) equals 4827: $12 \times 30 \times 3 = 36.180$ YTL (quoted in Çayırdağ, 2008: 178).

¹⁴⁵ Jennings, 1999: 86.

¹⁴⁶ Today (15. July 2012) 1 gram gold is equal to 91 TL.

However, although, the village succeeded to maintain its position for a long time, the economy of Hacılar deteriorated after the second half of the 16th Century most probably due to the reasons stemmed from the population growth.

Between 1550 and 1584, while population grew 56 %, the economy was stagnant; no progress was made even in the volume of any crop. Certainly Hacılar was in much stronger position in 1584 than a village like Tomarza. The village still must have had a good standards of living, with quit an ample supply of good food. Nevertheless, there should have been a marked decline in the level of prosperity after 1550 if not earlier and further population growth might push the village to economic disaster. (Jennings, 1999: 87-88)

For instance, according to Kayseri *Temettuat* Records of 1834 the total value of 3 residential districts of Hacılar's real estates were respectively 73 775 *kuruş* for *Aşağı mahalle*, 70 389 *kuruş* for *Orta Mahalle* and 99 325 *kuruş* for *Yukarı Mahalle* (Demir, 2008: 269). A similar but comperative study (Cömert, 2008: 147) examining the tax records of 1875 gives a very close impression on the declining wealth of the Hacılar and proves that the poverty of the village compared to its neighbor settlements.

According to 1875 tax records the price of residents changed from 250 *kuruş* to 7500 *kuruş* in Hacılar.... The total number of valuable buildings and residents above 3000 *kuruş* is 70. In the same year, there were recorded 2303 residents, mansions and villas with gardens in Talas. The most valuable residents in Talas was 70 000 *kuruş* and the total number of valuable buildings and residents above 5000 *kuruş* were 471 in Talas whereas there were just 8 such residents in Hacılar. If we generalize the ratios (expensive residents above 5000 *kuruş* to total residents) they were 1,3 % in Hacılar and 20 % in Talas. These numbers clearly shows that Hacılar was a very poor village in compared to its neighbor settlements such as Talas, Akçakaya, Zincidere, Germir, Tavlusun.

There was the same picture in education level in the village. The same records show that there were just eleven people who knows reading and writing in 616 households. It means the literacy rate was 1.8 % in 1875. Therefore in the beginning of the 20th Century Hacılar was a very crowded and poor village. There was no way to the city center and the village was devoid of any kind of infrastructural investments like electricity and water and services such as school or medical center. For instance the first way (macadam) to the city center was established between 1910 and 1911 in the period of İttihat ve Terakki (Kars: 2008: 491). The extreme poverty of the village became also the object of the local newspapers. For instance

in 1908 Ahmet Hilmi Kalaç wrote this article on Hacılar in the 4th number of Erciyes Journal called “Hacılar Village”.

The indifferent and bull headed Hacilar village on the skirts of Erciyes mountain deserves a couple of sentences in our newspaper. Although 4409 people in 1045 households are living here and the village is two hours away from Kayseri it has deprived of any kind of services. Looking to the social and commercial life, what you see is a clear misery for such a big village. Although they could take their part from the priceless air of the nature they could not benefit from the water. Even though they live on the skirts of Erciyes, they still drink water from the wells. In some years when the water run out they live serious difficulties... These poor people have very bad living conditions. In summers they transport ice from Erciyes to the city center and collected some brushwood to sell. Besides this primitive trade, the jobs are limited with workmanship. The agriculture almost doesn't exist. Although their airy settlement provides them for their health, they live in very hard conditions to survive (quoted in Kars, 2008: 492-495).

This extremely poor and deprived condition of Hacilar was clearly stated by a different work made after 70 years in 1979. It seems the village had not changed much. The following is the observations of Ayata, applied a questionnaire in the village in 1979

The average height of the town is 1600 meter where the winters are very cold and the summers are dry. In addition Hacilar has been always historically a crowded place and therefore there has been a chronic scarcity of land in the town. For instance, the average landownership is limited with 10 hectare and the average number of children in a family is 6. Moreover, there is no water for irrigation. The land is not proper and fertile for agricultural production; since it is covered with deep rooted rocks. So, the agricultural activity is limited with gardening. Yet, that is the weakness of the agriculture traditionally has made the people of Hacilar as the followers of alternative working facilities” (Ayata, 1987: 69).

This is the words of an old fellow of Hacilar telling the past of the village.

You know, our brothers, fathers uncles were workers in the gardens of the city dwellers. My father was worker. He was bringing me to his work some time. He was working in the garden, truncating the wine yards, doing the things ordered by the house owners. There was oppression, deprivation and poverty (FB).

4.3 The Years of Banditry

As I have noted above Hacilar entered into the 20th Century as a very poor village. However The Balkan Wars (191-1912), First World War (1914-1918) and Independence War (1919-1922) exacerbated the existing misery and the relative recovery time between 1923 and 1939 was destroyed by the Martial Rule in Turkey during the Second World War. Therefore, throughout all that time there was an outstanding individual and social tension in the village due to the decreasing life conditions and increasing difficulties to survive. This tension was also threatening the nearby settlements in Kayseri. Therefore, the fellows of Hacilar were known (still Known as well) as hard, aggressive, assertive, vicious and bully people in Kayseri. On the other side, there were also the violent internal pressure mechanisms based on patriarchy such as feud blood or honor killings which accompanied those hard economic conditions. For instance, an author of Halkevi Journal in 1938 stated that the feud blood is still alive in the village (quoted from Tümer by Aydoğdu, 2008: 85). In this context, the direct and natural results of these dynamics resulted in bullying and smuggling in the village. Therefore, especially the elderly talked about those days as “the years of banditry” with a subtle smile in their faces. First from my relatives, I got very colorful information on those days from the fellow people and I got very surprised on the history of even my own family.

I was surprised when I learned that my grandfather whom I know as an ordinary peasant was a tobacco smuggler. My father told me that after participated to the First World War, my grandfather started to make some activities such importing and exporting some goods illegally between Southeastern Anatolia, Syria and Central Anatolia. He was bringing some valuable stuff on the horse such as silk, tobacco and garments from Aleppo and Damascus and sold it in the axis of Gaziantep, Adana, Maraş, Kayseri, and Sivas. I learned that my grandfather continued this job until the end of the forties and maybe fifties. Although a researcher¹⁴⁷ claims that tobacco smuggling had ended and there stayed no one in the village dealing with smuggling in 1938, it seems these illegal activities lasted in the next ten years in secret.

¹⁴⁷ Tümer 1938.

When I try to figure out the details about these interesting stories of smuggling in Hacilar, I understood that it was one of the remaining problems of Ottoman Empire. In the literature, the start of tobacco smuggling in Ottoman Empire is affiliated with the bankrupt of its economy in the last quarter of 19th century and its concomitant results. It was noted that the economic decline of the Empire resulted in giving some privileges to foreign lenders and the sales of some sources of income belong to the state. The direct consequence of these decisions led to the rise of some autonomous institutions that manage Ottoman economy directly and benefited from some economic privileges. Ottoman Bank, General Administration of Debts (Düyunu Umumiye İdaresi) Privileged Railway Firms, some private banks such as Deutsche Bank and the tobacco monopoly of French Reji Directorate are some examples of these autonomous institutions (Kazgan, 1999: 46). However, it was not a smooth process and in time this economic decisions resulted in some reactions from the people when these institutions gave harm to Ottoman economy and to the interest of its citizens. For instance, in 1895 the pious people in Istanbul (İstanbul softaları) complaint from the French Reji with these words:

Why this Düyun administration is destroying us? Reji is buying one okka tobacco to 60 para (40 para is equal to 1 kuruş so it is 1.5 kuruş) but selling it to 30 kuruş.... Every state has some amount of debt; but only we have this Düyun Administration. Why hundreds of Europeans is making money to the disadvantage of us? (Quoted from Quatert 1987 by Kazgan 1999: 48)

Avcıoğlu briefly outlines the logic of this tobacco story of French Reji as follows:

Düyunu Umumiye left the monopoly of tobacco to a consortium/firm composed of Ottoman Bank, Credit Anstalt (Wien) and S. Bleichröder (Berlin) Banks. This firm shortly known as Reji levied a monopoly on tobacco trade and decided the prices of buying and selling of tobacco.... However tobacco production and trade was free before. The state was just taxed the tobacco trade with banderol application. The Reji took the whole production and trade with the establishment to the disadvantage of the local producers and sellers and destroyed the tobacco industry of Turkey. It was buying tobacco from a lower price but selling it to a higher price. For instance, between 1885-1886 whereas the buying price was 7, 6 kuruş, the selling price was 26,1 kuruş. Similarly between 1912-1913 whereas the buying price was 10,3 kuruş and the selling price was 35,03 kuruş. This difference between the prices triggered and stimulated tobacco smuggling in Turkey. For struggling with smuggling Reji prepared a draft bill made the government to legislate this draft as a law. The execution of this law was left to the Reji and it established an army, a kind of gendarme organization, for his aim (Avcıoğlu 1974: 132-137).

As a matter of the fact, a serious war started with Reji and smugglers in the lands of the Empire. At the end of the day, there were killed thousands of people in the armed conflicts with the smugglers and this gendarme (Berkes, 1963: 90-92). The complaints of people from Reji and its gendarme had reached even to Sultan Abdülhamit II. After the examination of the problem, it was understood that the activities of Reji Administration was giving harm to the treasure and Ottoman economy and did not give the expected benefit. However, it could not be abolished even by the Sultan due to the foreign pressures. In 1913 when the privilege time of the Reji was coming to its end; the extraordinary conditions prevented the abolishment of the contract again. Since, this time *İttihat ve Terakki* (Union and Progress Party) government needed urgent hot money for recapturing Edirne which was lost in the Balkan Wars. In order to find money, they had to renew the contract with Reji with more severe conditions than the past (Quatert 1987: 23-43; Avcıoğlu 1974: 132-137; Kazgan 1999: 48).

Yet, that was the historical and economical context of the tobacco smuggling in Turkey. In this context, there were many people in Hacılar who were dealing with tobacco smuggling. My grandfather was one of them who frequently got into armed conflict with gendarme. It was such that those conflicts had been transmitted into the folk stories and folk songs of Turkish literature. One of them is directly originating from Hacılar. İlhan Başgöz, explains the background of these Dynamics:

The young Republic knew that it could not be independent without economic independence. In order for escape its independence from *Düyun-u Umimiye* the new state bought all the foreign corporations one by one..... All the (ayıncacı's) smugglers were delighted when the state bought The Tobacco Reji in 4 million francs. Ayıncacı means tobacco smuggler. Our peasants could not bring their tobacco production to the market. Tobacco was sold only under the price control of the Reji. When they bring it to the market, they were treated as smuggler. The result was either prison or armed conflict. Many smugglers were shut by the gendarme. An ayıncacı song puts it this way:

*Hacılar köyüne bastığım oldu,
Tütünümün dengi yastığım oldu,
Aman dostlar bakın benim çareme,
Tütünün tozunu basın yareme (Başgöz 2009)*

The complete folk song referred by Başgöz is as follows:

Hacılar Köyü'ne Bastığım Oldu¹⁴⁸
Hacılar köyünü bastığım oldu
Tütünün dengi de yastığım oldu
Zalim arkadaşların kaçtığı oldu

Gelin ahbablarım gelin yanıma
Sebebim tütünü basın kanıma

Bilseydim de Hacılar'a varmazdım
Tütüncü beyinin kızını almazdım
Gelen belalara karşı durmazdım

Gelin ahbablarım gelin yanıma
Sebebim tütünü basın kanıma

Ne yaptım Balağın Ali sana ne yaptım
Yerimi gösterdin ciğerim yaktın
Beşyüz altınla da açığa çıktın

Dost bildiğim Ali büktün belimi
Lal eyledin bülbül gibi dilimi

Erenler erenler kanlı erenler
Erenler içinde Çerkez vuranlar
Teslimim deyince cana kıyanlar

Gelin ahbablarım gelin yanıma
Sebebim tütünü basın kanıma

Eventually, the Tobacco Reji which had been one of the bloody legacies of the Otoman Empire was confiscated by the state in 1925 (Boratav, 1988: 35). However, as noted above Hacılar has been a critical center of smuggling marked even by the folk songs. The most important reason of its being a center of these kinds of activities lies in its geographical and ethnographic position. It was set up on a blind stop lying on the skirts of a big and sharp mountain. Therefore, it had been stayed as a very closed and homogenous community for years. There were no foreigners in the village except the brides. So, it has been a very proper and trustable place to hide and control the traffic between the axis of city center and the Taurus Mountains.

In sum, Hacılar was such an extraordinary place in the beginnings of the 20th century and its banditry past lasted almost until the end of the forties and fifties. For

¹⁴⁸ <http://www.turkuyurdu.com/turku-hikayeleri/hacilar-koyune-bastigim-oldu-1375.htm> (Access 8 January 2011)

instance, I was really shocked when I learned from my father that my uncle robbed a train that transported the textile products of Sümerbank near Kayseri in forties. My father told me that my uncle illegally got on the train, stole the cotton clothes, put them on the horse and sold in different cities. In a different case, my father told again that he shot the customers¹⁴⁹ in 1970's when he was managing a coffeehouse in the Kiçikapı district of Kayseri. The reason was the unpaid bills. It is possible to hear these kinds of stories from almost every people above 60 years old in Hacılar. A 65 years old shopkeeper who has been living and working in Hacılar told me these words while showing the square of the village:

You see this square (of the village)? In this place there were many unemployed and angry men in the past paced back and forth every day. So, there were fights every day due to absurd reasons. Every week at least one man was shut down. Now, all that bad days has gone. Thanks God, everyone is at work now.

The best of this kind of smuggling stories could be found in the interviews¹⁵⁰ of Yaşar Kemal. These real stories in which Kemal disguised his identity and lived and worked among the smugglers in Antep¹⁵¹ for 3 months in 1951 shows us smuggling economy is not limited with the South East Borders of Turkey: but it relies on complex networks from Damascus and Aleppo to İstanbul crosscutting Kilis, Urfa, Diyarbakır, Malatya, Sivas, Kayseri, Adana, Elazığ, Diyarbakır, Ankara and Bursa.

I learned these smuggling stories from my father and some elderly relatives. Since, first, there stayed very few elderly in the village remembering those days. And second, most of the fellowmen do not want voluntarily to talk about on this “dirty” past of the village which is standing at the top economic position among the similar settlements of Anatolia. However, quoted pieces below could give the reader a clear impression on the character and scope of the smuggling and banditry patterns practiced in Hacılar once upon a time. This is from a local historian:

There was a serious poverty prevailing in Hacılar. Poverty is the main reason of banditry. It was in this way the things happened. As I said they were going to work to the gardens of the city dwellers but their employers were not giving their rights and money back. Ignored and denigrated as

¹⁴⁹ A similar case is pictured in the biography of Hacı Mustafa Boydak, the founder of İstikbal Group. See Vardar 2008: 36.

¹⁵⁰ Kemal (2008)

¹⁵¹ For a detailed picture of banditry in Ottoman Antep see Soyudoğan 2011.

naïve peasants, the fellow of Hacılar showed serious and sudden reactions when they face even a smallest unfair behavior from the fellows of Kayseri. So, they fight and hit them very seriously. There were countless fights with the fellows of Kayseri. Therefore, people feared from the people of Hacılar and hesitate to say something in front of them. This is the first form of banditry: bullying. The second form was lived in the gardens. The sole economic form of Hacılar was animal husbandry besides the grain production. When they released these animals to the gardens of the city dwellers, they were complaining about that. However they were hit by them in return when they voice their complaints face to face.

However the following quotations exceed the limits of bullying forms outlined above.

K: How were those days?

G: They were not good, there was always fight and violence. But, after the industry Hacılar turned out to be a sheep. They don't say anything even when to overwhelm their head. They could not say. The men became docile after the industry.

K: So, how were the times they called banditry?

G: I don't know they were saying such things

K: What things?

G: They waylaid, robbed, and shot the people. But I did not see with my eyes.

This memory, I heard from a key participant (a prestigious man) over 80 years old shows also the ethnic dimension of this banditry in Hacılar related with the Turkish and Armenian relationship in times of deportation.

K: What were doing the fellow of Hacılar in 1920s and 1930s before the textile production?

G: They were killers wandering around. They shot someone who passes in front of them. Since the murder increased in Hacılar they brought the textile job to the village. After the job the number of murders decreased.

K: So, what is this murder what kind of murder what did they do?

G: Bandits shoot each other. They waylaid, stole, robbed the people. For instance they robbed the people going to Develi or Tekir.

K: Our fellows of Hacılamlılar?

G: Yes, they robbed them by laying on ambush; or they informed each other to the gendarme.

K: Have you heard such kind of stories about?

G: There was Halil Ağa and Osman Ağa in Hacılar. Halil Ağa was a bandit he was also a deserter ... There was an Armenian moneylender dealing with gold and other precious metals. He said that man: "show me of your business I was engaged. I will bring golden ring to my fiancé, don't you have other kinds? So, he had opened that man the case of gold. Than he put the gun to the man said "shut up" and filled its pocket with gold and moved away.

K: Were there any other people like this from Hacılar like Halil Ağa?

G: There is not a man like Halil Ağa, but all his brothers were also bandits. Someone said to Halil Ağa: “There is a rich Armenian in Tacın¹⁵² region. This man gathers people and organizes some entertainments with women around”. He said: “find me a couple of men having knife in their hands, I will overcome...” That night, after they eat and drink rakı they killed the Armenian, left the place and came to this side. There happened such things in the past.

My father also verified this story from his own memories. He told me that he directly heard from Halil Ağa that he killed Armenians in Adana region.

There was a man called *Behiye'nin Halil Ağa*. I was there and heard directly from him when he was sitting and talking with my father and other elderly in an evening gathering in Hacılar. He was talking that he killed 10 Armenians in the rural part of Adana. I am not sure maybe in Pozantı or in other Armenian villages or towns of Çukurova region. He was a rich man. He was riding very expensive racehorses. Maybe his wealth was originated in these murders.

The following is a similar quotation related with the same topic. A seventy five year old industrialist is speaking

K: What is this banditry in Hacılar what happened in those years?

G: It has a fatwa (religious permission) in itself. You know the Armenians allocated most airy places of Kayseri for themselves behind the city cemetery. The fellow of Kayseri took their commercial mentality from Armenians, but they (Armenians) did not treat the peasants, the people around so sensitive and polite... and in time since they (the fellow of Hacılar) were poor and did not have any agricultural or other (like animal husbandry) income some time they waylaid, robbed and shot some of them for earning their living.

Here, beyond the particular ethnic dimensions of the banditry, the critical importance of these kinds of illegal activities is coming from their economic character. Since, smuggling in its own not only provided economic gain but also served as a mediator form for transition from primitive exchange to the modern trade forms of peddle in Hacılar. It was a very complex form of trade based on entrepreneurial ability, courage, and talent besides the good working social networks. Therefore, these smuggling activities paved the way for the following commercial forms and relations, especially for peddle in Hacılar. So, I will examine peddlers of Hacılar in the next chapter.

¹⁵² It is a village of the Sub-province of Adana. Today it is called as Topsöğüt.

4.4 From Banditry to Peddler

Peddler means a primitive form of trade between the close towns and villages made on horse or donkey in a certain period of time which is between a week and a month. Therefore, the logic and function is the same both in smuggling and peddler... Indeed, most of the time these two forms intertwined each other in the past. Therefore, the banditry period of Hacılar evolved into the process of peddler in time. Moreover, it has been already a historical form of trade having a long history in Anatolia. I will recount this process over my own family; on the stories of my grandfather, my uncle and cousins. Since, first my family is one of the pioneers of peddler in the village and second some members of it have still continued this job until very recent past, say 10 years. Therefore it is possible to see the evolution of this trade in 3 generations over my own family.

My grandfather had to live smuggling in the end 1940s when he was approaching his sixties and started to cotton weaving (textile) business which I will analyze in detail in the next chapter. However due to some internal problems in the family he cannot carried on this job. At last, he decided to shift his smuggling experience into a similar job: peddler. For a certain period of time he did it with my uncle. After some time my uncle left my grandfather and worked for himself. Indeed, he had advanced this job to be opened a textile shop in Sivas in the mid sixties. After my uncle, it was the time of my father to help his father in 1964. In these years my seventy- year- old grandfather and fourteen- year- old father were working as peddlers in the villages and small towns of central Anatolia near Kayseri. They were selling first simple and cheap pieces of cotton garments such as *kaput bezi*, *tırl*, *savan basma pazen*. Then they shifted to more valuable pieces of textile products such as women blouses, blankets, laceworks, headscarves and some traditional ornaments used in marital arrangements called light *çeyiz*. These trips were taking 7 to 15 days and they were walking 20 km on average. The route was starting from Hacılar, crosscutting Hisarcık, Endürlük, Kıranardı, Zincidere and ending up to Başakpınar or Kuruköprü. They were staying in the house of an acquaintance that was known by my grandfather from banditry time. Next day they were continuing with the villages of Ermin, Kuruköprü, Güllüce and lodge in

Süksün. These trips were lasting throughout all summer in a circular way in different periods from June to November. The high season has been between August and September. The mothers of young girls in the age of marriage were their main customers. They were earning very limited money and any limited accumulation was almost not possible. It was totally a sustainable activity; although they never paid for accommodation and food. My father remembered that they could earn just 100 to 200 TL in every trip and it equals almost 500 TL for today's prices. When my father grew up and went to the university in 1967 my grandfather left working. He was 80 years old then. The job was carried on by my uncle and their sons; however, its form and scope had changed in time.

In 1970s automobile replaced the horse and the composition of the goods had changed; but the logic of the trade stayed the same. The scope of trade increased with the capacity of the automobiles and this raised the income gained from trade. My uncle's son who carried on the job stated the conditions of the peddler in the ends of the seventies with following sentences:

G: We were earning too much money with today's prices. Gesi, Pınarbaşı, Tomarza, Yahyalı, Yeşilhisar were the towns we visited.... The profit margins were too high in those days. You can make money with profit rates of 200, 300 %. For instance you could sell a piece you bought for 10 TL to 50 TL. One day we rode to Kapuzbaşı (Tomarza) with a minibus. There are some villages on the mountains. We did not know but they had too much money in these peasants. They emptied the minibus there. Curtains, bedclothes, laceworks all are sold out suddenly.

K: Why they bought too much without regarding higher prices?

G: They cannot reach. They could not find these rare pieces. We brought there. Besides, we were bringing the goods in front of their house. If they were in an urgent need they buy. On the other hand, they are the villagers, they are the women, they live on the mountains. They never had been in the city or town. And most of the time they cannot know the exact prices of the goods. There was a serious transportation problem of these kinds of villages. Only the men go to the city. But, the men do not know what to buy such kinds of things.

Towards 1980s some critical transformations happened in this job with the changing socio-economic conditions in Turkey. With the neo-liberal transition of Turkish economy from import substitution to export oriented economy the whole fabric of society started to change in an increasing rate. In addition, the accelerating urbanization movements had extraordinary influences on peddler. Since as a result of

the internal migration flows, the main customers of the peddlers migrated from the villages to the peripheral districts or squatter areas of Kayseri.

As a matter of the fact, the customers and market structure of peddlers has changed. However, the peddlers of Hacılar adapted very quickly to these new conditions. Since, rather than going to the villages, the villages, namely the customers gathered in the city center. Therefore, this time they started to walk in the city with their bags in their hands and sell the same products to the people who, are new comers of the city, were living in the new apartment blocks constituted around the suburban districts of Kayseri. Since, despite the rapid topographic changes the consumer patterns have not changed so easily and the women were still buying the same things. It was such that the women who already migrated to Germany and visited Turkey (their villages in summers) were still a critical group of customers of the peddlers. They continued to buy *çeyiz* from peddlers who travelled around the villages in summers. For a certain period of time, these two forms co-existed. They both sold in rural and urban areas; but in time the urban part outweighed. There was an overwhelming monopoly of peddlers from Hacılar in Kayseri and this continued until the end of the 1980s.

The trade was generally made on cash but the peddlers were accepting hire purchase for enlarging their customer network. They generally sell different kinds of ornaments such as *iğne oyaları*, *yaygı oyaları*, *iplik oyaları*, cafee table blankets with laceworks and different handworks. Average income was quite high between 10.000-15000 TL a month though it is not regular every time. One old peddler remembered those days with nostalgia:

G: For instance sometimes you can get the salary of an officer in ten minutes. Sometimes when you are in a lucky day you can empty your bag and come back with full of money to your home. For instance you buy for 1 TL and sell to 4, 5 -5 TL. 100 % profit was the minimum limit for per piece. You can earn 10 to 15 thousand TL for current prices a month. But these days are over. For instance, I remembered a day I sold 45 couple bedlinens. Today the worst of it is 100 TL. It means I had earned 4,500 TL. Subtract the cost of 1000 TL. 35000 TL was the net profit. There were many days you earn over 1000 TL. On the other side, some days you can't sell even one piece. That depended on your luck and destiny.

Towards 1990s these peddlers succeeded to open their own *Çeyiz* shops in the city center after having accumulated the required social and economic capital. But, like the transition in the former period the shop and peddler co existed for a certain time in the beginnings of the 1990s. While one of them was managing the shop the other brother was walking in the city with his baggage, making the presentation of the new shop, trying to maintain the customer portfolio and gaining new customers for the future. So, Hacilar's adventure originating in smuggling passed through the forms of peddler and reached to the settled shop keeping in the city. Towards the end of the 20th century the poor peasants of Hacilar turned out to be the urban traders of Kayseri after wending a hard road.

G: There was a little development. The income level increased. The number of buildings population and needs increased. We had to augment the pieces and portfolio in our hands. Our horizon enlarged. And one more with capital in our pockets our networks have also spread out. Then we started to think a small shop in a proper place in the city. Then we opened the shop earn money. In the next step we took the franchise of some famous textile firms such as Taç Perde and so on.

K: When did you finish peddler?

G: After 2000. There stayed no demand and supply any longer. Now most of the shops are being closed since these products are sold in everywhere even in small shopping malls. The small shopkeepers could not survive now. Peddler is over now especially after 2000.

4. 5 The Meeting of Hacilar with Primitive Textile Production and its Trade between 1930 and 1950

One of the critical thresholds in the industrialization process of Hacilar took place in 1930s when the village discovered the cotton industry as a new source of income. In the late 30s and early 40s actually during the Second World War period, there was an absolute poverty in almost all parts of Turkey. However, Hacilar lived this period much worse than any other place due to its scarcity of land and dense population. Moreover, most of the young men were recruited in the military service for 2-3 years on average and the alternative sources of income were sharply decreased due to the war economy. People had to invent something new to survive. At this point some entrepreneurs of Hacilar in some way founded an interesting solution to this problem of poverty. In the beginnings of 1930s a new economic activity: a primitive textile industry started in the village by the mediation of some

leaders who learned this job in different cities¹⁵³. The looms, which produce primitive cotton, spread to the whole town immediately. However this was not an accidental invention and highly related with the industrialization policies of the new Republic. In order to understand the context and see the whole picture we should first focus on the economic structure of Turkey in 1930s.

The basic economic politics of Turkey from 1908 to 1930, except the war times, could be defined as a soft liberalism implemented under the auspices of state. It was based on the idea that the state should pave the way for the individual enrichment of its citizens. In collaboration with the foreign capital¹⁵⁴ the new Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie was to be hoped as the prospective leading actor in the development of Turkish economy. However it was not that easy. First there had stayed no economic, social and cultural capital in the country with the exclusion of Non-Muslim population of the Empire. Second, the Turkish bourgeoisie was very weak and third the foreigners were reluctant to bring capital to the poor country left over the wars. Despite, all these difficulties they tried to implement a “moderate and sized” protection regime giving room for individual entrepreneurship between 1923 and 1930 for providing industrialization (Boratav, 1988: 47). Ahmad called this period as an economic model based on free enterprise though limited with the temporary restraints of Lausanne Treaty (Ahmad, 1999: 195). It is possible to summarize the basic characteristics of this period, 1920s, by referring to the works of reliable studies¹⁵⁵

- The reinforcement of private property within the system of Law (1924 Constitution, 1926 Civic Law, 1926 and 1929 arrangements in Turkish Trade Law).

¹⁵³ Such as Denizli which is a textile city in the South West of Turkey.

¹⁵⁴ Mustafa Kemal Paşa was not against the foreign capital. He was also thinking that that in order to develop the economy of the land Turkey should attract foreign capital as soon as possible. Since the fiscal situation was not enough for establishing public enterprises at that time in March 1922 in his speech at the Turkish Parliament (Ahmad, 1999: 186). In the same way, he called the foreign capital again in the İzmir Economic Congress organized in 1923 before the establishment of new Republic “as far as they guarantee to obey the national laws of the country” (Boratav, 1988: 30).

¹⁵⁵ Kazgan, 1999: 70; Tezel, 2000: 228-237.

- The constitution of new organizations such as chambers of commerce and industry, Ministry of Economy, General Directorate of Statistics.
- The development of banking system. The constitution of *İş Bankası* and 29 other banks. The transformation of *Ziraat Bankası* into a joint stock corporation. The constitution of *Sanayi ve Maadin Bankası* and *Emlak ve Eytam Bankası* in 1928
- The development of infrastructure for transportation (the integration of internal markets, the prioritization of railway construction).
- Customs Policies (increasing industrial production by protecting the local producers with high ratios of customs).
- The direct financial supports and advantageous to private capital accumulation (1927 Law for Supporting Industry; direct financial supports; benefits or monopolistic privileges to some entrepreneurs particularly in the confiscated public enterprises such as ports, insurance companies etc.; Distribution of credits from *İş Bankası* and other banks to bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen)

These economic policies did not provided for the desired economic development, but it led to the emergence of a limited group of entrepreneurs under the control of the state. The concomitant and expected results of this establishment were bribery, favoritism, clientalism and corruption in the axis of bureaucrats, businessmen and politicians. This state led policies aiming at crating a national bourgeoisie (new rich) is eloquently pictured and criticized in the works of famous writers such as Avcıođlu¹⁵⁶, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanođlu¹⁵⁷, Orhan Pamuk¹⁵⁸ and Falih Rıfki Atay¹⁵⁹.

¹⁵⁶ Avcıođlu, 1974: 379-442.

¹⁵⁷ Karaosmanođlu pointed out “Yesterdays cadres of national revolutionaries turned out to be the members of interest and profit firms in those days. Some of them were following land speculation business, some were dealing with brokering and some of them became the members of administration commissions” (quoted in Avcıođlu, 1974: 414).

¹⁵⁸ See the first novel of Pamuk: *Cevdet Bey ve Ođulları*, for the typical biography of a new rich Republican family and the story of its three generation.

¹⁵⁹ See Atay’s works of *Çankaya* and *Barış Yılları*

As Tezel analytically pointed out there were very clear reasons of this tendency. Since, in these years the Turkish economy was based on the export of agricultural goods and import of consumer goods such as cotton clothes, sugar, oil etc. In order to accelerate the industrial development, Turkey needed more import of intermediate and capital goods. However, there were no foreign exchanges for this. This was a vicious cycle. When the purchasing power of Turkey in foreign markets decreased the import-export balance of the budget was totally destroyed and this gave a serious damage to the external terms of trade especially before the 1929 World Economic Crises. Hence, Turkey was already in search of a new economic policy before the crises of 1930. The Crises just deepened and exacerbated the condition by restraining import capacity and decreasing the present values of budget incomes (Tezel, 2000: 238-240). Moreover, in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey had been started to pay the Ottoman debts since 1929 and this was aggravating the economic situation (Kazgan, 1999: 70). So, the 1929 crises led to a momentum to the policies defending the state intervention (Ahmad, 199: 195).

The indicators and statistics also reveal the catastrophic background of these new orientations. For instance, according to the industrial statistics of 1927, 46 % of all 237 000 workers in Turkey were employed in the workshops having 4 or less workers. The number of workshops employing 10 and more workers were just 3 % of the workplaces. Besides, 60 % percent of the industry was composed of primitive textile and food sectors (Kazgan, 1999: 85). The existing industrial structure was highly based on handcraft, traditional artisanship and small scale crafts. There were not industrial factories except the 6 state owned factories (Hereke Silk Weaving factory, Feshane Silk Thread factory, Bakırköy Cloth Factory, Beykoz Leather-Shoe Factory, İzmir Textile Thread Factory and a ceramic factory established in 1894) in the Empire. The pace of industrialization was in behind all the other sectors of the economy (Boratav, 1988: 39-48). Therefore, the disappointment of liberal policies combined with the public dissatisfaction reflected in the intensive interest in the opposition party *Serbest Fırka* (Free Party) resulted in the searches for new ways in the economy. In addition, 1930 Crises resulted in the sudden and sharp (30 %) decrease in the internal terms of trade to the disadvantage of the agricultural sector and this almost devastated the peasantry in the country (Tezel,

2000: 240). This quest for new ways in the economy inevitably direct the eyes of the bureaucrats to the USSR and the command economies based on central planning and statism (Tekeli and İlkin 1981, Vol. 3: 137). Since, these statist economies seemed not to be effected by the world economic crises (Ahmad, 1999: 185).

As Tekeli and İlkin (1981, cilt 3: 80-81) suggested, the statist policies had been discussed by the Ottoman intellectuals since the beginning of the 20th Century like the writers of Kadro Journal¹⁶⁰ and Ahmet Hamdi Başar. The other intellectuals and circles (Al-i İktisat Meclisi, İş Bankası and İstanbul Univeristy/Darülfünun circles, Celal Bayar, Ahmet Ağaoglu) who espoused the liberal economic policies were also ready to accept a gradual and protectionist statism which also gives room for individual entrepreneurship. Besides, the other critical governors such as İsmet İnönü, Recep Peker, Mustafa Şeref Özkan, Şükrü Kaya were defending a much more absolute statism. Therefore, though in the intellectual level, statism had a certain background in Turkey. İnönü's famous article published in 1933 October called "the statist character of our party" summarized what the government understood from statism in a very brief way:

We are taking statism as a new and enlightened way for the development. I want to say, not only from a conservative point to defend, we are taking it as an effective and positive tool for the politics of economic development and progress

It was how statism, based on protectionism and central planning became the official development strategy of the new Republic since 1930. As Boratav aptly states

Under these circumstances the protection mechanisms became the precondition for restraining the internal reflections of the external economic crises and transcending the stagnation. The investments based on import substitution started with the consuming goods such as the three whites (of sugar, flour and cotton) became the first attempts of industrialization in most of the developing countries in the first half of the 20th century" (Boratav, 1988: 49).

¹⁶⁰ We should point at this point the contribution of some intellectuals who were educated directly in USSR such as Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İsmail Hüsrev Tekin. They added the idea of central planning to the endeavors of creating a national economy. This was the product of their socialist past. See Türkeş 1999 and Yanardağ 2008 for details.

Despite all this background it was still a radical decision. Turkey became the second country which officially accepted statism as a governmental program in the world after USSR. Of course, this protectionist statism was designed in a way that did not reject private sector but to bolster it. The goal, here was to help the private sector by undertaking the cost of great scale state investments which cannot be financed by them. It was designed as a shelter mechanism for private sector which was very weak at that time (Ahmad, 1999: 195), Atatürk's message in the opening ceremony of Izmir Fair, was stating this policy very clearly.

Turkey's statism has not been translated from the ideas originating from the socialist thinkers. It is a system emerged from the needs of Turkey. Statism means prioritizing individuals private initiations while taking the economy of the big nation in the hand of the state... (quoted in Tezel, 2000: 246)

In other words, this new understanding of statism "emerged not as an ideology based reconstructing but as a pragmatic solution to the actual problems (Kazgan, 1999: 85). Thus, with 1930s, the state became the main actor controlling the economic life as the direct planner and investor. This policy became one of the 6 arrows of CHP in 1931.

This state led industrialization approach started with the planned economy discussions and its espousal¹⁶¹ among the Turkish elites of that time. Since, the economic and industrial developments based on planned economy realized in the USSR were carefully considered by the new Republic. In this context, first, foreign minister Tevik Rüştü Aras visited USSR in 1930. Then a large group of bureaucrats visited USSR between 25 April and 10 May 1932 for a detailed examination¹⁶². After these visits, the relations between Turkey and USSR evolved into a new stage. The concrete result of this visit was a Credit Agreement¹⁶³ of 8 million gold dollars (almost 16 million TL) for importing machines from USSR. Moreover, the specialists in the group were persuaded that "the heavy industry in USSR showed an extra ordinary development.....The required machines for the establishment of textile industry in Turkey could almost completely (90 %) provided from USSR.

¹⁶¹ See. Aytemur, 2010: 90.

¹⁶² In the scope of this visit: "70 institutions composed of industrial institutes, machine factories and the factories made up of the products of those factories were examined" (Tekeli, İlkin 1981: 140).

¹⁶³ Aytemur notes that this credit was used in the construction of Kayseri Cloth and Nazilli Cotton Print factories (Aytemur 2010: 91).

They also came to the idea that it would be very useful that a group of Russian specialists come to Turkey, to examine and analyze the requirements for the industrialization of Turkey” (Tekeli and İlkin 1981: 137-142).

A similar visit to Italy resulted in a credit agreement of almost 32 million TL and this attempts continued with the establishment of State Office of Industry (3 July 1932) and Turkish Bank for Industrial Credits (7 July 1932). All these were the infrastructural studies of First Development Plan prepared between 1932 and 1933. The plan was declared in 8 June 1934 and statism started to be executed within a coherent program¹⁶⁴ in Turkey. Beyond the plan, the state also became the initiator of many industrial institutions¹⁶⁵ (sugar, alcohol, ammunition, aviation and railway corporations) in different cities and took additional measures¹⁶⁶ for the development of private sector (Tekeli and İlkin 1981, vol. 3: 134-220). The above summarized¹⁶⁷ state led industrialization process became legalized and constitutionalized in 1937 with the entrance of statism into the constitution.

Yet, within the logic of this plan the government initiated to construct giant industrial institutions¹⁶⁸ never seen in the history of the country until that time. This state led industrialization also spread to some Anatolian small cities lying along on the the railway lines (Tekeli, 1982: 42). Besides, there were also established some infrastructural institutions that would establish the backbone of industrialization such as mining, electricity and water production and management units. The pioneers of these kinds of institutions were Etibank, MTA (Mining Research Institute), The Management of Electric Studies (EİEİ) and DSİ (State Administration of Water) in 1930s.

¹⁶⁴ See Tekeli ve İlkin 1981, cilt 3: 192 for the table of industrial investments decisions given in the First 5 Years Development Plan

¹⁶⁵ See Tekeli and İlkin 1981, vol. 3: 201-208 for details.

¹⁶⁶ See Tekeli and İlkin 1981, vol. 3: 208-250 for the measures taken for the orientation of the private industrial sector.

¹⁶⁷ This chapter was summarized to a great extent from the works of Tekeli and İlkin’ in 1981, vol. 3: 130-220.

¹⁶⁸ For the map of related investments see Eldek 2007 Appendix.

The plan was realized with a great success. The statistics proved this immense development. For instance, the growth rate (with constant prices) of Turkey was 11,6 % between 1930-1939 in compared to the rate of 8,5 % between 1923-1929. Besides, the share of the industrial sector that constituted 9, 9 % of the national product (with present prices) in 1929 went up to 18, 3 % in 1939. At the end of the day, these policies were so successful that the average rates of growth between 1930 and 1939 have never been reached in the history of Republic (Boratav, 1988: 50-58). The contribution of the state led industrialization and the public enterprises established in this frame could be summarized with reference to reliable historians¹⁶⁹ as follows.

First of all these investments established the industrial base of Turkey which had almost deprived of any kind of industry. On the other side, these investments were established not just on the principles of profitability but spread the whole country in the name of public good and this gave mobility to the different cities by moving many industrial relations (professions, talents, occupations, transportation facilities etc.). Thus, these relations brought a relative employment and welfare possibilities into these cities. These investments have been most of the time became the leading social and economic actors in especially underdeveloped regions.

As I suggested elsewhere one of the critical contribution of this state led industrial development and state economic enterprises were their sub functions. Beyond production they also provided the base, motivation and direct education in the training schools within the factories. First, the heavy industrial complex' that could not be established by the individual entrepreneurs of that time, provided raw material and intermediate goods to the newly emerging private sector. These intermediate goods sold under the cost prices directly increased the profit margins of private sector. Besides, there emerged small and medium sized firms which were dealing with the marketing of these intermediate goods such as the peddlers of

¹⁶⁹ Bkz. Boratav, 1988: 50-62; Kazgan, 1999: 84-90, Tezel 2000: 237-248)

Hacılar. Plus, the additional demand stemmed from the public sector also led to a revival in the sub and small industrial sectors that the state investments did not enter.

It was also valid for the technicians and managerial cadres working in the upper positions. “When they left the public sector and passed to the private sector, they provided ‘external benefits’ for them. Namely, the private sector employed a qualified labor without making any investments for (educating) them. The same had happened regarding for the dissemination of the technological knowledge (Kazgan, 1999: 87). As a result, manufacturing industry turned out to be a very profitable sector for the private sector in a closed, state led and protected economy in which the financial capital was restrained and private sector was supported in the general context of import substitution. These statist policies became the basic factor in the birth of the private manufacturing industry in Turkey. Thus, private sector started to accumulate capital in all over Turkey, where Istanbul took the first rank.

Under these circumstances, the new Republic made many infrastructural and industrial investments¹⁷⁰ which prepared the material background and human resources to Kayseri.

In this general context, Kayseri was one of the leading cities attracted these immense state investments. Among these: there were an airplane factory established in 1925; a tank-repair factory and a textile/thread (for carpet) factory in 1926; Ankara-Kayseri railway line in 1927; a hydro electrical factory in 1929; a textile/clothing factory¹⁷¹ in 1935. The sugar factory established in 1955 and a metallurgical factory established in 1968 could be considered as the extensions of these industrialization tendencies.

The selection of Kayseri was related with many rationales behind. It was a proper place for the industrial investments. The first reason was security and Kayseri lies in a central and secure point of Anatolia. Second, it has been a strategic stop in between the historical trade lines crosscutting the East-West and North-South axes

¹⁷¹ This was the biggest textile factory of Turkey for that time

and had a serious experience and social capital on trade and production. Third, it was thought as a connectable place to Çukurova and Mersin with the planned railway line of Ulukışla. Fourth, the morphological conditions of Kayseri were also convenient for these investments¹⁷².

As a matter of the fact the city became the 9th biggest industrial center of Turkey in the end of the 1970s (Doğan, 2007: 94–95). Therefore, it was argued¹⁷³ that Kayseri should not be regarded within the category of the Anatolian tigers that was developed by virtue of small and medium sized firms. Rather, with 237 factories over 50 workers based on the statistics of 2002, it should be considered within the category of traditional industrial centers of Turkey with İstanbul, İzmir, Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli, Manisa, Sakarya, Samsun and Tekirdağ.

On the other hand, these industrial complexes had been the bearer of modernity¹⁷⁴ in the periphery almost until 1990s both with their architecture, social organizations, industrial relations and their physical capacities including educational classes, theatre and cinema saloons, swimming pools, sport activities and recreation facilities. They were offering some kind of a modern life model in the small cities and towns of Turkey. For instance, my father saw the cinema first time in his life in the theatre saloon of Sümerbank Cloth Factory like thousands of people over 50 years old in Kayseri. Therefore, as pointed out by Eldek¹⁷⁵, this factory¹⁷⁶ had very critical contributions to the qualification of the labor in Kayseri besides with its other functions. It served as an industry school for the city with the courses organized for public and occupational/apprentices high schools for the young students. The same functions were performed by the other factories like Main Repair Factory (Ana Tamir Fabrikası) ve Airplane Factory¹⁷⁷ (Tayyare

¹⁷² See Tekeli and İlkin 1981: Appendix 5 for the whole report and Eldek 2007: 30 and 118.

¹⁷³ See Köse and Öncü, 1991

¹⁷⁴ See Koraltürk 1997: preface.

¹⁷⁵ Eldek, 2007

¹⁷⁶ See Aytemur, 2010; Toprak (1988)

¹⁷⁷ It is acritical detail that the father of Turkish President Gül: Ahmet Hamdi Gül is a retired turner/latheman from this factory.

Fabrikası). The young people were trained in the courses of these factories as an industrialist points out.

When Sümerbank was established by the Russians, my father stayed 6 months in Kayseri and attended the courses in the factory to learn lathe and textile weaving there. Plus, the rich men discovered that this hand looms would do work in Hacılar.

A mechanical engineer (from Hacılar), who had both worked and trained in the Airplane Factory six year after the primary school, wrote and sent a small piece on the training system and contributions of this factory to the industrial development of Kayseri in detail after the interview.

In each of this tree factory (Tayyare Fabrikası, Sümerbank Bez Fabrikası, Ana Tamir Fabrikası) there were apprentice schools. These schools were recruiting students after primary school. The education was full time in three years. After the morning sessions, practical trainings were practiced in the workshops. The instructors were the engineers and other managers working in these factories. In each of these apprentice schools, the students were taking a very serious education and discipline; since they were directly offered job just after the graduation. For instance, in order to pass the leveling course a student had to complete 25 *temrins*, which means metal production based on technical/mechanical drawing. This included the production mostly based on manual and partially lathe spline/cutter stalls. After the graduation they were appointed to the open positions. The trainings were lasting in these appointed positions/workshops too. Degree and promotion were based on the ranks such as: 1.class master, sub master, master, head man, chief man, and specialist. Every two year the workers/students had to take oral and written exams. In a nutshell, working in one of these factories was a real privilege in 1960s. Particularly the people who retired from Airplane Factory and passed into the private sector had real contributions to the development of manufacturing industry in Kayseri in 1960s and after.

Yet, the industry story of Hacılar starts at this point. The young people trained in these courses (weaving, lathe, leveling etc.) decide to implement their talents and qualifications in Hacılar and bring the weaving loom to the village. Though it is not clear who was the first, I understood from the interviews that there were also some connections with İstanbul, Bursa and Buldan in this knowledge and practice transfer. A seventy five year old trader shed lights on the roots of weaving industry in the village.

The weaving of Hacılar originated in the Second World War. There was İsmail Mustafa Efendi carpet seller. He trained in İstanbul and brought the loom from İstanbul to Hacılar. Then Hasan Emmi, did the same from Buldan Denizli region. His wife was from that region. He brought the four legged loom. God bless these men they brought these looms. The trade and industry started with these looms first time.

On the other hand, a serious carpet weaving potential in Kayseri city could be read from the reports of Soviet specialists (Tekeli, İlkin, 1982: 189). Therefore, the establishment of Sümerbank, jumped the weaving industry in the city by providing cotton threads for the clothes to be weaved. So, the basic dynamic were these state enterprises. In addition, the foresights and insights of the rich entrepreneurs of Kayseri were also an effective factor in the development of the looms and weaving industry. Since, these traders of Kayseri transformed into suppliers (those who distribute the cotton threads) and wholesale retailers (collectors of the clothes from the producers) of the clothes when the looms spread the whole village. After some time they became the founders of the first private textile factories in 1953 called Birlik Mensucat and Orta Anadolu Mensucat. As the combination of these factors the first weaving loom was set up in households of Hacılar in the second half of 1930s. These looms were depending on a quite easy mechanism necessitates an intensive labor. The mechanism was very simple. First the threads are prepared, colored and sized. Sizing means a chemical technique to increase the stability of the thread. This was applied with hot potatoes dust on the threads in the primitive conditions of those years. So, it is given slipperiness to the thread with sizing. However, after the threads are weaved as clothes this stuff (potato dust) should be removed by washing (Şahin, 2008: 605).

After the threads are prepared they are fixed on the looms whose dimensions are 1,5 to 2 meters. Weaver sits on a place and moves the heddle frames with his or her foots. When the loom starts to move the weft and warp mechanisms up and down it weaves the cloth. The result is a bundle of cloth in the scope of 90 centimeter to 36 meter. Though, the basic weavers are the men in Hacılar; the women and the children were also weaving clothes by helping the men in wrapping bobbins (Şahin, 2008: 605).

There were different clothes weaved in these looms. However the most common is the canvas known as Hacılar cloth. The checked *Çar* is made up of this canvas which the women used for covering their heads. Besides they were also weaving a special striped cloth called *dırıl* which was used in making of underwear, shirts, pajamas etc. The black and white clothes were called as *Kırzet*. These blankets were used for covering the tables. The thin floor covering *Savan* was the third category weaved in these looms. The women also lay out *savan* and work on it in preparing the local foods such as *erişte* (*vermicelli*) and *mantı* (Şahin, 2008: 605).

After the weaving process is completed, the clothes are extracted from the looms and sold in the square of the village. In the first years the traders of Kayseri comes and buy the clothes. In the following years, some fellow of Hacılar take the role of this traders. These traders buy the clothes and gives new threads to the producers. In the last phase these cloth bundles of 36 meters are pressed, corrected, fixed, ironed and sold out Kayseri, Adana or İstanbul. My interviews revealed that an average weaver could weave 20 to 25 meter clothes per day between springs and fall in 7 months and the maximum was 36 meter per day for a weaver.

Most of the people I interviewed could not say the exact income gained per meter with present prices; but, they remembered that a full time work was equal to the per diem wage of an ordinary worker. When to think of the conditions of poverty at that time this was an unbelievable income for Hacılar. We could estimate the total income roughly as follows with present prices. Suppose there is one loom in the household and the number of working days is 20 in 7 months. Under these conditions a man in Hacılar gained 7000 TL on average in a year: 1 (loom) x 140 (working days) x 50 TL (per diem) = 7000 TL.

After a very short time these looms entered into every house. Indeed most of the households have more than one looms. It was such that a minister who visited Hacılar in 1940s noticed that there were 1500 looms and the technical capacity of weaving is equal to two mechanized textile factories (quoted from Özdoğan by Ayata: 1987: 70). Under these conditions the total income of Hacılar in a year should be at least equal to 10.500.000 TL (as 1500 x 7000). By the way, this

estimation is based on the supposition that every fellow was worker. However, after a short time Hacılar creates its own middlemen, traders and salesmen within this form of production.

A critical step in this process was the constitution of Weaving Cooperative (Hacılar Küçük El Sanatları Kooperatifi) in 9 February 1942 in the village with 482 share holders and 5,500 TL capital for a period of thirty one years (Kartın, 2008: 506). Beyond its practical uses and benefits this Cooperative became a critical threshold in organization and institutionalization of the village that would pay the way for the prospective industrialization attempt of Hacılar. This was also the social and moral pre-stage of the multi-partnership that would be concretized in the establishment of HES Cablo factory in 1970s. As Ayata argues the most important function of this cooperative was providing raw material (thread) to the producers from the state factory without mediators and middlemen. An observer and author of Erciyes Halkevi Journal who visited the village in 1949 noted the functions of the cooperative with the following words:

The fellow of Hacılar worked as construction workers and stone breakers. Besides, they weave clothes in the remaining times. Today the weaver's cooperative of the village has 482 partners and totally 1856 looms. 1374 of them are in the village and the rest are outside. Every loom weaves 20 to 25 meter cloths. This is equal to 20 thousand meters a day and 1 million meters in a year. This is not a number to underestimate for a small town. Some looms also weaves thin headscarves. İstanbul likes this cloth very much. After pressing and coloring, İstanbul sell the cloth to the whole Turkey¹⁷⁸

Weaving (of cotton cloth) continued in Hacılar until the first half of the fifties. However, with the establishment of private textile firms, the rapid mechanization killed the labor intensive textile production. Hacılar could no compete with mechanized factories in Kayseri since there was no electricity in the village until 1961. So it ceased for a while. After faltering some time the experienced workforce of the village scattered to the different sectors until they would gather again for a similar sector: carpet weaving in the village. However as Ayata aptly states, weaving had two permanent results for the village:

¹⁷⁸ Quoted from Yedekçioğlu by Şahin, 2008: 604.

First this experience created a “skilled” labor and population on weaving. Cloth weaving was practiced by both men and women. So it created particularly a women population inclined for carpet weaving and men population for working as intermediaries. Likewise most of the middlemen originated from the weavers of Hacilar and their sons.....

Second, weaving created an “internal differentiation” in the economic structure of the village. A small group emerged as thread and fabric sellers. The experience gained around the trade of textile products made it easy to adapt for carpet business (Ayata, 1987: 71).

My interviews verify the statements of Ayata in general. As he suggested, these middlemen of thread and fabric traders spread the whole country to sell the clothes weaved in Hacilar. This gave them the possibility of having commercial and social contacts with different people in different cities and sectors beyond the money they gained. Some of the prospective actors of industrialization from the village collected their starting capital from this business. One of them analytically pictured the stages and direction of this business as such:

This business was made by a group of people. One of them was my father he was going to Samsun region. One was Mehmet Gürdoğan and his brother Hafız Mustafa Amca they were going to Ankara side. The father of the present mayor, Hamdi Herdem and Fikret Ayvaz were going to Tokat region for marketing the bundles of cotton cloths. In this way, weaving developed in Hacilar. The threads were given to the Cooperative by the prospective share holders of Birlik Mensucat and Orta Anadolu textile factories. After they took the bundles of cotton clothes from Hacilar they were selling them to the traders of Kayseri in return to their debts of thread plus a certain margin of profit. This lasted from 1942 to 1952.

4. 6 Carpet Weaving in Hacilar ¹⁷⁹

Carpet weaving has a long history in Anatolia as a traditional *volk* art before it became a form of capitalist putting out industry. Although Yetkin, traces carpet waving back to the Central Asia in which the Turkic tribes were living; the oldest definitely Turkish carpets were found in Konya from The Anatolian Seljuk State (Yetkin, 1991). So, it is possible to claim that the art of carpet weaving has been living in Anatolia since the 13th century. However carpet weaving had been limited with peasant’s need of additional income and it did not become commercialized for

¹⁷⁹ While writing this chapter, to a great extent I benefited from Ayata’s work (Ayata, 1987)

a long time. Referring to Braudel, Ayata suggested that the carpet demand of Europe increased since the 19th Century and this resulted in the unexpected rise of the exported carpet production in Anatolia beyond the traditional production (Ayata, 1987:38). Thus, as Kurmuş explained first the British Capital started to penetrate this sector in (1864) second half of the 19th century. In a very short time, towards end of the 19th century British entrepreneurs dominated the sector. Indeed, a British firm “Oriental Carpet Manufactures Ltd.” came forward in 1880s became the monopoly in the carpet trade of the Ottoman Empire in 1913. In this year it was making 70 % of the total carpet production in Turkey. The production was mostly based on the putting out system. However, they have also established weaving workshops and spinning factories in different cities and towns (mostly in western parts) of Turkey from 1880s to 1920s (Kurmuş, 2007: 178-179). For instance, in the second half of the 19th Century a carpet workshop with 1000 workers was opened in İzmir. Similar attempts were realized in Konya, Bursa, Bilecik, Mersin and Tarsus (Avcioğlu, 1974: 112).

As I underlined before like the western Anatolian cities Kayseri was one of the other traditional centers of carpet production. The archeological findings of Kültepe (Kaniş) show that weaving dates back to 2000s BC in Kayseri. However, in today’s forms it has been developed since the Seljuk State (Kayseri İl Yıllığı 1973: 4761). The carpet production was realized mostly by the peasants. The villagers were producing carpets only daily use and for their needs of wedding ceremonies or gift exchanges. The raw materials of wool and dye were provided from their own sources of sheep, and some local flowers like *cerhi* (*the main raw material of color*). For instance, some of my relatives (some uncles and cousins of my father) were still dealing with dye/color (*kök boya*) production in the first half of the 20th Century. They were walking around the villages like the peddlers and producing natural dye for coloring the carpet threads in return for a certain amount of money. Likewise, the historical records of Ottoman Empire reveal that there was a serious amount of *cerhi* production in Erciyes region. Indeed, *cerhi* turned out to be a critical export good for Kayseri in 19th century (Cömert, 2008: 148). All these clues show that there was a serious traditional carpet production in Kayseri. However,

until the end of the 19th Century this traditional production had not been commercialized. Only the excessive parts were sold in the local markets for additional income. However, towards the end of the 19th Century a new form of carpet emerged as an export good. This was called as “*Bünyan*¹⁸⁰ *carpet*” among the people. The producers were calling it as “Manchester carpet”, since the threads of the carpet were imported from England (Ayata, 1987:47).

The organization of this production was as follows in general. First the raw material, either silk, cotton or wool is produced in any place in the world. Then the carpet threads are produced from these raw materials and provided to the weavers by the traders. In the last phase the carpet is produced from these threads by the weavers. In the first years these threads were produced in England and imported to Turkey. However, after a while the threads were started to be provided by the local manufacturers of Kayseri. This import was being organized by the big international traders of Istanbul. Then the big retailers were buying these threads and selling to the traders of Kayseri. This time the local producers were taking these threads from the retailers and transmitting them into the weavers in the villages by their intermediaries. These middlemen were the masters who were controlling the production and weavers. They were intervening in the production process if necessary, collecting the final product and reaching them to the producers (Ayata, 1987: 43). Therefore, this Manchester carpets were the final products of a capitalist organization from its birth. Since, either as capitalist home production (putting out) or as intensive labor based workshop production it was directly addressing the international markets (Ayata; 1987: 41-42). The dominant form was putting out as in the case of Western Turkey. Since, in both places the labor was quite cheap (4, 5 penny for 5000 loops/knots) and controllable. On the other side, the working conditions in the workshops (particularly in Kayseri) established by the foreign corporations were catastrophic (Kurmuş, 2007 :178). In the beginning of the 20th Century there were 3,500 carpet looms in Kayseri and it increased to 7500 in 1930. This year 11.000 piece carpets were exported from Kayseri (Özdoğan, 1948: 131).

¹⁸⁰ A sub-province of Kayseri in South East.

At this point I should also underline a critical point. As I suggested above Kayseri was one of the dense Armenian settlements in Anatolia before the deportation and they were very dominant in production and trade. This applied to carpet production too. Most of the people I interviewed proved the weight of Armenians in the past in many sectors such as cutlery, smithery, jewellery and pastrami production besides trade. It was frequently stressed that these crafts were inherited from the Armenians; although all of the elderly I interviewed were born after the deportation. Regarding with carpet production, it was told that Armenian weight still continued for a certain time after deportation. The quotations below show this inheritance in the memories of the people. This is from an old trader almost 75-year- old:

I don't remember the first phase of carpet production. But, Hacılar learned it from the mother of Halıcı İsmail Efendi. His mother had learned this art from Armenians in Kayseri. When moved to Hacılar again, she transmitted it to the other women of Hacılar before the Ataturk Revolution. Carpet production came from Armenians, like the pastrami and *sucuk* production. They were very crowded here and holding the trade and economy of Kayseri in their hands. They became a rich class then.

A mechanical engineer who has been working in the carpet sector almost for 40 years said:

The trade and production were in the hands of Armenians and Greeks in Ottoman. When they gone, the biggest carpet producer was the local Hasoğulları family; but their partner was still an Armenian. They learned this job all from Armenians. Mustafa Hasoğlu, İsmail Hasoğlu, now Ahmet Hasoğlu etc. The family still goes on in İstanbul does carpet business with the trademark *Hasoğlu Halıcılık*.

Two of the leading politicians of the town were also thinking respectively in the same direction:

Though it had been reached to a quality level in the bundles of cotton cloths, it came to an end. Meanwhile, they learned the carpet production from Armenians and brought it to Hacılar by virtue of a woman. Thereafter, the looms spread to almost every household in the village and nearby settlements.

Carpet inherited from Armenians like the meat production, like pastrami and *sucuk*. All of them stayed from Armenians.

As seen from these quotations, in the first years of the 20th Century the commercial carpet business was limited with Kayseri city center and the labor needed by the capitalist home production was provided to a great extent by the urban population. Commercial carpet business spread to the villages in 1930s and it was organized by the big producers. According to the occupational and commercial records of Kayseri Chamber of Trade there were 24 firms dealing with carpet business between 1928 and 1945. The biggest firm had approximately 3000 carpet looms (Ayata, 1987: 42).

Towards 1950s this process has completed and all the nearby villages of Kayseri filled with carpet looms. There were overt reasons of this development. First the increasing domestic and foreign demand triggered the production. The main dynamic was the domestic demand. Since, as in the case of Sümerbank, these public enterprises and the following private corporations started to fulfill the raw material demand of the sector within the internal market. Besides, the increasing population, and the rise of average income led to the revival of the economy and this was combined with the migration movements to urban areas. With the rapid urbanization the demand in the construction sector boomed and this resulted in the peak of carpet demand for the homes. In addition, the villagers needed additional income as far as they tried to articulate into the urban economy. As in the case of Hacılar some peasants were staying in their homes and trying to combine limited agricultural production with small scale entrepreneurship and seasonal work outside the village. As Ayata underlines the other factor was the change in the organization of production. For him contrary to the first period of carpet production made by the bigger producers, the production shifted to the small producers who were controlling fifty to seventy carpet looms. Indeed, some local village entrepreneurs were much more common controlling ten to fifteen looms in the periphery (Ayata, 1987:43-44). Yet, these entrepreneurs were mostly from Hacılar. The following quotations are the memories of two old carpet weavers (and small entrepreneur thereafter) worked in carpet business respectively 60 and 75 years old:

There were 3-4 big producers in Kayseri and they were some men working for them like the franchise of the big producers in the city. These were subcontractors. They were putting the looms in homes and giving head start to the weavers in general. You were taking money up to the knot/loop you weaved like 300, 500, 700 knots. For instance 1000 knots means 3 meter carpet. A standard (*kelle*) carpet was 3x4 meter and it had a fixed price.

In 1951 I went to carpet business in Kayseri. I worked two years in the workshop of Hasoğulları. We were distributing looms to the homes. Everyone was weaving at home and then bringing the carpet back. We were just giving the threads and sharpening their knives. I was worker in the workshops. Then I quitted and start to my own business. I went to the villages and taught the carpet business to the villagers. I became the boss after 1954 and this lasted until 1980. In the first tour I was distributing the threads to the villages and towns of Hacılar, Bünyan, Pazarören, Pınarbaşı, Tomarza and their nearby villages. In the second tour when they (wevers) finish I was bringing them back to our shop in Kayseri. I had partners at that time. The fellow of Hacılar and Hisarcık was dominant in this business. They were holding the job.

As a result of these developments, the hand made carpet production in whole Turkey increased four-fold between 1955 and 1975. Likewise, the number of carpet looms increased up to 40,000-45,000 between 1945 and 1975. If to think the total number of looms were approximately 160 000 in whole Turkey, this could be considered a quite serious amount of production for Kayseri for that time (Ayata, 1987: 8-40). Ayata stated that there were 500 carpet producers registered to the Kayseri Chamber of Commerce and 35,000 looms were working for the registered firms. It means there were approximately seventy looms per producer. When assuming 3 people for each loom, this estimation brings us to the following conclusions:

Under these circumstances, if we take 40 000 to 45000 looms as base for Kayseri city (including the non registered ones) then we can assume that there were 120 000 to 135 000 carpet weavers in Kayseri in 1977. This is the half of the whole Kayseri population. In sum, this means one of two women in Kayseri was weaving carpet and working in the status of wage labor (Ayata, 1987: 43).

In parallel to the above stated social and economic transformations, Hacılar rapidly shifted to carpet production in 1950s. Since, it was closest, crowded and poorest place among other towns around Kayseri. Plus, it had a 20 years experience of

weaving. Actually, regarding with its inclination to textile production Hacılar was not a peculiar and extraordinary case in the world.

The works of Thirsk (studied the English textile industry of 16. and 17. centuries); Chambers (examined Midlands textile industry in 17th and 18th Century in England) and Coleman's studies (worked on the rural industry in Tudor and Stuart England) resulted in the same points. The development of capitalistic home production is the result of some internal agricultural factors such as unemployment, population pressure, scarcity of land, the shrinking of the land via inheritance and small scale problem of the rural production (quoted by Ayata¹⁸¹ 1987: 59).

It is possible to argue that all the factors juxtaposed above are valid for Hacılar¹⁸². As a matter of the fact almost all households were put carpet looms as soon as possible. It was frequently noticed that a carpet producer, İsmail Köker, gave the first start to the carpet loom production in the vilage (Şahin, 2008: 605; Gençoğlu, 2008: 379). However, my interviews show that it was a much older story and carpet weaving had been existed since the first quarter of the century in the village. What an old carpet weaver talks about his mother proves this situation very clearly.

My mother was saying that they were weaving carpets when they were young. She told me that her older cousin thought carpet weaving when she was a child 14, 15 years old. My mother died in 1989. She was 75-80 years old.

The gradual increase in carpet production boomed in 1950s parallel to the developments in Turkish economy. In fifties many entrepreneurs entered in the carpet business. It was such that in 1977, 40 % of the entrepreneurs and 60 % of the carpet producers in Kayseri were from Hacılar (Ayata, 1987: 69). In order to understand the contribution of the carpet production, we should also look at wage and profit margins in carpet industry. According to the estimation made by Ayata, in 1977 a weaver, who was working for 8 hours a day, was getting 63 TL. This was the half income of an ordinary construction worker of that time. The average income of a small and carpet workshop who owned by two person and controls 20 to 30 looms in a year was 236.500 TL for the same year. For an individual partner this was corresponding to an income level which was 6 times greater than the minimum wage. In other word it was a double or triple amount of a qualified

¹⁸¹ Ayata quoted from Thirsk 1961 and 1973, Chambers 1969 and Coleman 1975.

¹⁸² The same factors could be regarded for the other weaving centers in Turkey such as Denizli/Babadağ, Buldan and Manisa/Demirci

worker (Ayata; 1987: 73- 83). As it is seen carpet production was a common and profitable business. The profit margins were increasing from the ordinary weavers in the villages to the export firms in İstanbul.

In time, there was lived a shift in the sector from wool (Bünyan) carpets to silk¹⁸³ carpets whose profit margins were much higher though the production process was much harder and laborious (Şahin, 2008: 606). Until the 1980s carpet was still an important sector and product in Kayseri. Even I remember many women weaving carpets around our house in the first half of the 1980s. However as the combination of the some factors carpet industry lost power in whole Turkey including Kayseri. In these days carpet production in Kayseri restrained with expensive but very difficult silk carpet production which has been continued by the women living in very bad economic conditions. Since then it has been a marginal economic activity in Kayseri.

The numbers and statistics given by the president¹⁸⁴ of The Kayseri Chamber of Carpet Producers, reveal the change and existing picture of this business in time. “Whereas our chamber had 400 members in 1992, today (2008) we have only 117 active members including a member dealing with *kilim* production and 5 members repairing carpets and kilims”. Referring to the president, it is possible to summarize the factors led to the decline of the hand made carpet industry. The first reason is the occupation of the market by the cheaper machine woven carpets. This reduced the general demand to the hand made carpets and gave harm to the conditions of the weavers (the women) by decreasing the wages and exacerbating working conditions which has been deprived of any social security mechanisms. As the president notices, 4 women who weave a 6 meter carpet in 40-45 days take totally 900 TL with present prices in 2008. On the other hand, the working motivation of the women got down with the increasing wealth in Turkey and the concomitant expectations of social security and rights including higher wages.

¹⁸³ See Şahin, 2008: 603-614 for the details and characteristics of the carpets woven in Hacılar region

¹⁸⁴ See. <http://www.hali.com.tr/arsiv/haber/dergi/12/kayseri.htm> 21 June 2011 for the whole interview made by the president Mehmet Yeşiltaş

The sociological and demographical realities are the other side of the coin. Rapid migration to cities decreased the number of weavers in the villages. Likewise, the inappropriateness of carpet production in apartment blocks in the cities deepens the situation. Besides, there has been a serious marketing problem for the weavers who want to go on to carpet production in the villages. Because the shrinking of the carpet sector reduced the numbers of the carpet producers (traders) in Turkey. Moreover, the incapacities such as bad designs and unqualified labor and the deficiencies in research and development of carpet industry gave harm to the competition capacity of Turkey in the world markets.

The other reasons are related with the global economic dynamics. Whereas, carpet industry shifted from hand made (putting out) system to more effective big workshop production in the world in 1980s, Turkey could not adopt this new form and workshop system stayed limited¹⁸⁵ here.

On the other side, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the rapid entrance of Chinese into the global economy led to the radical changes in carpet production. Therefore, beyond the knowledge and technology based sectors, particularly the labor intensive industries shifted quickly to the countries that have dense and poor populations such as Chinese, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Especially Chinese became the leading country in 2000s in silk and wool carpet production. A mechanical engineer who has been working for almost 40 years in carpet industry gives the example of carpet production in China in order to underline the contrast

It is very cheap in China. I stayed there 2 to 3 months both in South, North and Middle China for business. Labor is unbelievable cheap and the purchasing power of money is high, the population is high and they are very concentrated in carpet industry with their state and private sector. Their production is excellent and with incredible prices. For instance, in big workshops a man sits on a platform and gives the commands to hundreds of people with loudspeaker. They do not use any models. All the commands are made with loud speaker. Say “5 red” Everyone weaves 5 red knots, then “2 whites” everyone knots 2 whites and so on. This is how the things go in Chinese. It is impossible with these prices in Turkey. For instance, I saw a high quality silk carpet of 15 square meters. There were 225 knots in every centimeter of it.

¹⁸⁵ See Ayata 1987: 113 for the reasons of this tendency in carpet production in Kayseri.

As a combination of all these factors today the common demand for hand made carpets has decreased and their market has restrained with upper classes who could afford higher prices for high quality carpets. Besides, the imported carpets led to losses in the market since they did not exactly correspond to the tastes of average Turkish consumers. On the other hand, the foreign demands could not be met by the Turkish producers due to the above discussed reasons. As a result, most of the carpet producers who were mostly from Hacılar quit the business or changed their sectors in Kayseri. However, despite the sad end of the sector, carpet production has provided many benefits to the industrialization of the village. It could be even argued that the villagers directly met with the concepts of factory via carpet business. Since, the first industrial production was organized by an entrepreneur of Hacilar in a carpet factory (ATLAS Halı Fabrikası). Yet, on the story of this man I want to focus on the inheritance of carpet production to the industrialization past of Hacilar.

This ambitious and talented entrepreneur, Lütfü Özden, started this business in Kayseri in the workshops of Armenian carpet producers when she was very young after the primary school. He had worked and learned the details of the carpet art nearby the Armenians and particularly focused on the design aspect of carpets throughout his career. In time, he quit and started his own business. After a very short time he became the best designer of Kayseri. Ayata explains the detailed story of Özden in his work with the code name of “Yusuf” and under the title of “a non-typical entrepreneur”. Ayata’s work shows that the main capital of this primary school graduate entrepreneur was his extraordinary talent in carpet design. This made him the famous carpet producer among others. From the very beginning, he had aimed at producing high quality carpets and his portfolio was composed of the special carpets particularly prepared for the riches of Kayseri of that time. He was very different than his colleagues with his dense concentration on the invention of new forms, patterns and designs in carpet production (Ayata, 1987: 119). One of the old producers who had worked with him for years pictured his self-styled production with these words:

He was the leader in 1969. The best carpet producer of that time. You had to wait for buying a carpet from him. The riches of Kayseri were waiting in turn for 3, 5, 6 months, indeed one year to buy. Since, he had worked with best carpet producers, the Armenians long years. The best designer in the city was an Armenian and Lütfü Amca had directly learned this art from these people. His pattern variety was unchallengeable. To buy a carpet from him was a real privilege. Everyone was producing carpets; but the color, the pattern, the thread... He was a primary school graduate but he was in the level of ordinarius. Give a three color to him, he would create the best coherent and harmonious carpet as if there was a computer in his head. He set up the ATLAS carpet factory thereafter.

After a couple of years, and on the long term professional experience, Özden started to make the feasibility studies of his first carpet production factory. A machine woven carpet which he first saw in İstanbul became his inspiration point. After a brief search, he learned that there were three producers (one in East Germany, others in Belgium and in England) of these machines which make (machine woven) carpets in the world. He first went to Bradford (England) to see the production system and after a short examination decided to buy the machine. After bringing it to Kayseri he convinced 5 to 6 rich traders in Kayseri into setting up a carpet factory in 1969. They were thinking that the time of hand made carpets was coming to its end and they should shift to industrial production without missing the right moment. So, they established the factory in Bünyan where they had offered a land without price. After a short time, Özden went to East Germany and bought new machines, since they were not satisfied with the ones came from England. In 1988 the number of German machines had increased to 35. The other carpet factories in Turkey followed the way of ATLAS and Turkey filled up with these machines from East Germany.

Due to some individual reasons with other partners Özden had to leave the firm after a while and decided to set up another textile (cotton spinning) factory whose name is Kayseri Tekstil on the way to Erkilet in 1973. However, his heart was still in carpet business and in two years Özden got back to his own job. He set up his second carpet factory, SARAY Hali, with his new partners near Develi town where they were given some support and stimulus from the state. As seen Özden's initiations were the first steps in the way to industrialization among the fellows of Hacılar. Although these factories did not have any direct relations with Hacılar; in

preparation process of them Özden visited every time the leading traders of Hacilar and called them for partnership in 1969, 1973 and 1975. Likewise, there were some shareholders from Hacilar in these factories. Therefore, he did a great job in bringing the industrial relations to the minds of entrepreneurs. By this way they met with industrialization, automation, and long term production investments. They recognized the huge profit margins of industry and beyond all these technical aspects they saw that it was possible to set up a factory. So, this brought them a new horizon which would change the destiny of themselves and their village in the very near future. Since the establishment of HES Cable Factory was just around the corner in 1974. I will explain the details about HES in the next parts but before to do, I want to stop here and touched upon the extraordinary practices which I think had a complementary contribution in the industrialization process of the village. These are the ventures of the Hacilar's entrepreneurs in Ankara as hotel managers.

4.7 Hacilar's Meeting with the Capital City, Its Facilities and Service Sector

The importance of the years in which Hacilar's entrepreneurs worked in Ankara has been generally ignored while talking about the industrialization history of the village. I preferred to call this period as Hacilar's meeting with capital city and service sector. However this period also provided the entrepreneurs for experience and know-how transfer in their prospective industrial attempts beyond the acquaintance with service sector.

As I noted above, some entrepreneurs had already emerged from Hacilar for marketing the bundles of cotton clothes to the different directions in Turkey. Yet, some of these men were making trade between Kayseri and Ankara and some of them started to settle there permanently towards 1950s. In the first years, they had opened some small textile shops in Ulus, Samanpazarı and Çıkırıçılar Çarşısı and brought their families thereafter. Since Ankara is a relatively close city; the density of relations and visits increased in time. In the next decade in 1960s the fellows of Hacilar could be recognized in 5 different sectors.

The first peddlers who first came to Ankara for marketing the bundles of cotton clothes shifted to settled trade and established their own shops. In a very short time, they became rich traders, who would come back to Kayseri with great amount of capital in the establishment of HES in 1970s.

Besides, there established a new circle of new comers around them. Like the first wave, these relatively poor small traders started to live and work in *Anafartalar Caddesi*, *Samanpazarı*, *Bent Deresi*, *Yenidoğan*, *Gülveren*, *Dışkapı* and *Keçiören* districts. They also opened small shops or started to work in free trade or lower level official posts. The number of these families was given as 20 to 30. Some of them still live in Ankara and spend the summer times in Hacılar.

In the next period some other people from Hacılar followed these forerunners and came to the towns around Ankara such as Kırıkkale, Keskin, Kırşehir and Yozgat to sell textile pieces in the local weekly markets (bazaars). These salesmen spent almost one week to one month time in these different markets and come back to Kayseri. Ankara became a supply center for their trade. Sometimes they stayed in long time periods such as the whole summer or winter in there. However, their life conditions were not so brilliant. Mostly they were staying in the homes of their relatives or in 3rd quality hotels of Ulus and other small towns. Their income level was quite low and they worked and lived definitely in misery. My father was one of these salesmen who made mobile trade with his nephews and cousins around Ankara in the second half of the sixties. Some of these people who succeeded to carve a niche stayed in Ankara; but, majority of them went back and continued to textile trade in Kayseri by using their enlarged networks in Ankara.

The second category was composed of the workers who came to Ankara to work directly in the organized industrial districts such as *Siteler* which has been the furniture production center of Turkey for years. Regarding the critical and central place of Siteler in furniture sector of Turkey at that time, we could understand how critic was this knowledge and know-how transfer for Kayseri, in which almost no one knows to produce good quality furniture. These workers learned the subtle

points of both production and marketing in Siteler and nearby industrial sites and recognized the scope of the sector for Turkey. The entrepreneur who brought his brother to Siteler to teach the details of the occupation was a typical example of this category:

I was working as a minibus driver at that time in the Siteler-Ulus. Line. But before coming back to Kayseri, I brought my brother to Siteler to make work him in there for one year. He developed himself in furniture production. He learned better there. Then we went back to Kayseri and our business gained a wonderful acceleration. After my brother, I also took my brother in law to my side and set up a new firm in 1971. We were making upholstery, furniture business in Kayseri.

Outside the Siteler, there were also some fellows who came to Ankara for learning artisanship and craft or for developing their proficiency in different sectors. A typical one of these was an industrialist who came to Ankara to work in a body shop as an apprentice in a quite late age by disguising his own occupational background. This is an outstanding story. Since, in real life this man was already a panel beater who had at least ten years of experience near a master. However, in order to develop their business they (master and his junior) decided together to send the junior to Ankara to gain the details of a new and promising field in the sector to establish it in Kayseri. So this young man went to Ankara and got in the workplace they decided in advance as an ordinary worker by disguising himself and his talents. The aim was to learn/steal know-how without to be noticed by the owner (master) of that place.

I worked in the repair and support of the chassis part of the trucks in ten years with my master after the primary school. I continued until I was 20 years old. When I came back from the military service my master proposed me partnership.

We were thinking to quit the repair business and pass to production of coachwork of the trucks. But how? There were people in Istanbul and Ankara, but there was no one in Kayseri to deal with this job. My master was old and tired. We agreed that I would learn this job in a firm specialized in this sector. There was a chassis master in Ankara at that time. I demand job from him as an apprentice. I was 22 years old. It was wrong because I disguised myself. I did not say that I am also metal worker. I tried to learn the job in secret without to be noticed in 3 months. An artisan could adapt very easily to the related sectors. So, in a very short time I got the job and demand permission from the master and talked the reality. He had already understood that I am already a craftsman. He smiled and said, "It would be better when you don't lied to me and to be sincere". However didn't get angry. Indeed he gave me from catalogs and helped me despite all my mistakes. He was a good man.

The fourth sector in which the fellows of Hacılar worked was hotel management. As I noticed before in sixties and seventies there were a serious group of people (from Hacılar) who were in Ankara for several reasons. These fellows knew each other and had strong ties and networks in between. By the way, they were staying in cheap hotels and hostels unless they could find a place near their relatives. However, these hotels were offering very miserable conditions. Most probably these terrible experiences led them to take the hotel business in their own hands. They should also consider it as a profitable business at the same time. So, they started to hotel business in Ulus region and in a very short period of time the number of hotels managed by Hacılar's entrepreneurs increased. Until 1980s they had managed ten to fifteen hotels in Rüzgarlı Street, Çankırı Street, Hamam Önü and Saman Pazarı. This could be considered as their introduction to the service sector. Besides, this also resulted in institutionalization of Hacılar. Those who lived and stayed in Ankara decided to establish an organization for the fellows as a result of the increasing reciprocal relations. "Hacılar Solidarity Association" was established in a room in Samanpazarı. The association could not live long time and closed down after a while although it was very active in its first years. However, even the existence of the association proves how intensive were the relations among the fellows at that time.

The fifth and last sector was the local transportation. Among the people, who did not involved in hotel management or furniture industry started to work as minibus drivers in different lines of Ankara. Their numbers was told me as ten to fifteen. As far as I learned from the interviews most of these drivers were working in the secondary lines in the south and east districts of Ankara such as Ulus- Etlik- Dışkapı-Keçiören and Ulus-Yenidoğan- Siteler. When to think Ulus and Siteler as the main commercial centers of the city we could argue that even the people who were not working in industry were still in the network of trade and production. Since, a considerable number of these ex-drivers would become furniture producers in the next two decades in 1980s and 1990s in Kayseri after having the required know-how on trade and a strong vision of a capital city. An industrial entrepreneur who left his real profession of upholstery in Kayseri and came to Ankara for working as driver told about those days with a sarcastic smile in his face.

After the military service, I opened a workshop of upholstery in Kayseri. I worked there 5 to 6 months but could not gain so much. Then I went to Ankara. My uncle bought me a minibus and I started to work as a minibus driver. I was paying my debt in part to my uncle. I worked in İaydınlık line in the axis of Ulus, İaydınlık, Site and Yıldız. In two to three year I completed my debt. I wanted to buy a bigger one, a station minibus. While giving the last part of my debt; my uncle said: “Look my son, this Ankara deteriorated us, this hotel management damaged us. You have an art/craft. Do it your own job. Give up this driving. If you want I will buy you a bigger one but go and do your own business. This job has not a future”. I listened him and went back to Kayseri started again to my own business.

To sum up, these different kinds of experiences in Ankara had many positive effects on the fellows of Hacılar. First, they gained knowledge, vision and good manner in Ankara. Those who came for trade benefited from the commercial and industrial facilities of Ankara. Those who came as workers to industry, gained information and know-how for their prospective business, workshops and factories and those who settled and opened permanent shops became big traders in time and accumulated great capital. Besides, they met with service sector and faced with the different dimensions of the commercial life. Lastly, the fellows who had not been organic relations with religious orders in Hacılar, met with different religious orders in Ankara and participated into some of them. The indirect effects of these networks would be revealed in the following decades particularly in 1990s.

4.8 Towards the Industry (1950-1974)

The fellows of Hacılar had been articulated into the national economy since the beginning of the 20th century in different forms. However, towards 1950s and 1960s both as the combination of the practices outlined above and in parallel to the economic transformation of the country in general the people moved to industry. These movements gained a momentum in 1970s. The workforce needed by the developing Kayseri industry was met by the young workers of Hacılar which is the closest settlement to city center. It is also similar for the nearby settlements such as Hisarcık, Erkilet, Kıranardı. But Hacılar was the poorest, most crowded and needy place among them. In order to grasp the context of this intensive mobilization to industry we should briefly look at the economic history of Turkey and Kayseri in those years.

1950 elections was a critical turning point in the history of the Turkey. The multi-party period started with 1946 elections had opened a relatively free place for politics and opposition in Turkey. The popular demands of different social groups started to be reflected in the political discourses. As a matter of the fact, in a very short time the opposition (Democrat Party) came to the power in 1950 Elections. It had two basic pillars. The first is the economic liberalism that defends the market against the state and second, freedom of religion which defends the local traditions against the political and ideological pressures of the political center (Keyder, 2010: 147). So, religion and market historically established the two critical dimensions of the bourgeoisie opposition in Turkey.

I will examine the adventures of industrialists between market and the community at large in detail in later chapters. But at this point, I want to give place to an anecdote which I think best explains the support given to the Democrat Party and its successors (Justice Party, Motherland Party, Justice and Development Party) by the fellows who were composed of poor seasonal workers, small peasants, traders and merchants of that time. My father was among the audience when the local politicians of Justice Party came to the village before the 1965 Elections. He pictured that scene as follows:

Towards the 1965 Elections we were high school students. TİP (Turkish Workers Party) was newly established and as a couple of students we were working for TİP with a great enthusiasm in the village. Every one was trying to convince his parents to vote for TİP. By the way, we made out 56 votes from the village in the elections. One day, before the elections Demirel's men came to the coffeehouse of the village. A man was talking on a seat, it was afternoon and I think that man was a bit drunk. I never forget he was exactly saying these sentences: "Dear fellows, CHP says: 'we will set up the workers government'. We don't let them to do!". Believe me, everyone in the coffeehouse was worker except us, the students, and their sweat was still flowing from their asses. Since, they had just arrived to the coffeehouse from their work places. These workers were clapping the man when he repeats "We don't let them to set up a workers government!". When we started to oppose "Aren't you all workers?" the workers started snorting us. We left the place with our friends in order not to make the relations tense. While walking in the street we were still talking naively how many roads we must walk down in this country with these people.

What my father and his friends did not understand was that although they themselves were workers, the fellows did not want a workers government. Since,

though limited, they had already perceived the smell of money from different sectors such as peddler, textile trade, carpet production etc. and the income level was rising in an increasing rate. Therefore, rather than a utopian project of a workers government in the future, they support the politicians who promised themselves much more money, work, employment and services right now. Moreover, the man who said: “We don’t let them to set up a workers government!” was also speaking with their own language and promising freedom to traditional culture, religion and religious symbols. Keyder, excellently elucidates why the ordinary peasants such as the fellows of Hacilar supported the political and economical program of DP and bounded to “the simple ideals of market society” beyond the conscious bourgeoisie who were defending its own class interests within the party.

The promise of an autonomous economy carried with it the image of producers freely competing in the market without the interference of bureaucratic control. For the bourgeoisie which felt itself to have come of age, this would be a desirable state of affairs. It must be remembered, however, that the population which could be characterized as living within capitalist relations of production remained an extremely small minority. In 1950, out of a population of 20 million, 80 per cent lived in the countryside - the great majority being small producers. Self-employment was the rule in urban retail trade and in services. Even in manufacturing, 37 per cent of the workers were self- or family-employed, while only around 400,000 wage-earners worked for employers.¹ These figures indicate that the overwhelming majority of the population were petty producers who might well be expected to subscribe to the ideals of ‘simple market society’. In other words the market ideal did enjoy an objective correlative in the Turkish political arithmetic, and did not remain a purely ideological construct mystifying capitalist relations of production. Subjectively as well, this vast majority of petty producers were ready to embrace market freedom as an avenue away from the traditional social balances which had changed little in recent decades. Their preference, in other words, was not only negatively determined as a reaction against bureaucratic interference; they also experienced the beginnings of economic development and personal enrichment, particularly rapidly after 1945. Per capita income had increased by 15 per cent between 1941-45 and 1950, and agricultural incomes by 30 per cent. The relative advance over the war years was especially remarkable (Keyder, 1987: 118-119).

The economic policies of DP was also corresponding to the desires of small villagers who were aware of that the state led import substitution policies were working mostly in favor of the industrial elites (Keyder, 2010: 150). On the other

hand, as Mardin¹⁸⁶ have been analysing for 40 years, the Kemalist center could not create a moral frame and ethos of "good, beautiful and right" for the larger sections of society. The center could not trigger an economic and social dynamic that could get out the petty bourgeoisie and peasants of the periphery from their deep historical life words rooted in centuries. When the ideological pressure increased, these sections of society hold on the traditions with a more intensive way and this time they were stigmatized by the bureaucracy as *irtica* (Keyder, 2010: 151). Therefore, in first free elections, the majority of different social groups (small producers, shopkeepers, rich peasants, peripheral petty bourgeoisie) supported DP in a great alliance with big bourgeoisie.

Actually, the liberalization attempts had gradually started by CHP in the second half of the fifties (Boratav, 1988: 77) but the DP Government deepened the economic liberalization of the society. The basic characteristic of this period was the liberalization of the economy without giving up the philosophy of the mixed economic model (Kılıçbay, 1991: 104) Likewise, the first operation of DP was putting aside the 5 Years Development Plan (of 1946) which includes the construction of state led industrial investment projects as in the case of 1930s. They shifted to a new program which gave the priority to the infrastructural investments such as high ways and electricity sources that would pave the way for the agricultural and industrial development within free market (Kazgan, 1999: 98). These policies coincided with an unprecedented social and economic revival and sociological transformation in the Turkish history. The infrastructural (highway) investments made by the help of USA in the frame of Marshall Plan and the mechanization¹⁸⁷ of agriculture were of particular importance in these developments (Kazgan, 1999: 98).

Special emphasis given to highways was a very vital political attempt in the integration of domestic markets. Besides, the intensive mechanization in agriculture resulted in expansion of the planted lands. For instance, albeit the population

¹⁸⁶ See Mardin, *Makaleler 1, Din ve İdeoloji* and Çakır (2009) for the recent debates.

¹⁸⁷ The best reflections of the mechanization in agriculture could be read in the novels of Yaşar Kemal and Orhan Kemal.

increased 20 %, the rate of planted lands got up from 9, 5 million hectare to 14, 2 million hectare (50 %) in the same period (Keyder, 2011: 160-170). The agricultural production was also doubled between 1947 and 1953 and the basic reason of this high performance was the expansion of agricultural lands. The infertile lands were also opened to agriculture with the use of tractors and this led to the 55 % increase in the acreage of whole planted lands (Pamuk ve Owen, 2002: 144). Therefore, the basic tendency was the enlargement of the peasant's property. For instance, while the rate of owned planted lands in 1950 was 2,3 million, it increased to 3,1 million in 1961. In the same way, the rate of landless families decreased to 10 % in 1950 from 16 % in 1960 (Keyder, 2011: 160-170). Besides, in the first 3 years of Menderes Government with the help of good climate conditions the total agricultural production showed an outstanding rise of 83 % and this led to a general economic growth in the whole country. So, from 1950 to 1958 the income per capita increased 28 % in Turkey. The income gained from increased exports was combined with the foreign aid (American) and used in the purchase of the tractors, earth movers and motor vehicles. It was such that the number of personal autos and commercial vehicles augmented from 8000 to 28000 and from 14000 to 34000 between 1948 and 1953 respectively (Keyder, 2010: 165).

To sum up, the years between 1946 and 1953 could be pictured as a period in which the life conditions and the real incomes of whole groups raised. However the only group was the paid workers and salaried people whose relative economic conditions were felt down. At the same time the rate of revenues stemmed from estates was also raised and the share of commercial bourgeoisie in GDP increased. Besides, the large mess of peasants could compensate their economic losses (stemmed from the price movements by the distorted income distribution) with the dynamic increase in production (Boratav, 1988: 84). Likewise, the average increase in GDP between 1947 and 1953 realized as 8.7 % and the internal terms of trade were in favor of agricultural sector until 1957. Although it was hard to determine the direction of the income distribution within the rural economy, the real winner of DP period was definitely the agricultural sector (Pamuk ve Owen, 2010: 145-149).

All these developments accelerated the rural to urban migration and the making of squatter areas around the cities. This resulted in new employment possibilities and the proliferation and differentiation of the consumer demands of newly migrated masses. For instance, the production of cement and cotton based textile industry doubled from 1951 to 1955. Likewise, there was a boom in making of private house making. It was such that the growth rate of Turkey's construction sector between 1951 and 1953 was 23 % (Keyder, 2010: 169). After 1954 the service sector and then the industry became the critical sources of employment. First, the small sections of industry created a certain employment capacity and this was followed and enlarged by the middle and big industrial establishments. The number of factories employing 10 and more workers increased from 163,000 to 324. 000 (Keyder, 2010: 169). Although the unplanned and untidy construction projects of Menderes government led to the inflation, external debt problems and devaluation towards the end of the fifties (Kılıçbay, 1991: 103-112), Turkish economy revived in general with the rising consuming tendencies.

Towards the 1960s, with the increasing social mobility and dynamism, a serious accumulation oriented to free enterprise and market economy had happened, with the fortification of peasants and industrial bourgeoisie. However, all these developments were basically related with the changes depended on the requirements of the accumulation regime within the world system. As aptly noticed, the basic class distinctions in Turkey towards 1960 was between the two groups. First group comprised of the petty bourgeoisie in the cities and peasants, small capitalists and commercial bourgeoisie while the industrial (big) bourgeoisie was on the other side. Actually, the struggle was between the two sections of bourgeoisie. In other words, it was between those who defend small market ideology and the others supporting the ideology based on the large scale industrial development (Keyder, 2010: 177). However, the development of industrial bourgeoisie with its international connections had reached to a critical level and it was necessitating the state control over the accumulation processes. So, this mission could not be fulfilled by the DP government which was highly politicized in its last years¹⁸⁸ (Keyder, 2010: 177).

¹⁸⁸ See A. Buğra 2008: 192 for a critical contribution to this interpretation.

Meanwhile, the general tendencies in the world were coincided with these developments in Turkey. It was the golden age of Keynesian industrialization policies based on import substitution in the whole world (Pamuk ve Owen, 2010: 150). Those years were the times in which the planning spread to the West and even USA defined itself as the mixed economy. Indeed, the successes of the countries were measured with growth rate, industrialization and equal income distribution (Kazgan, 1999: 111-12). Moreover, the hegemonic powers and financial institutions were also supporting these tendencies. That's why Boratav defines this period as "inward looking but foreign based development process" (Boratav, 1988: 94).

This model was based on the production of former imported goods in the domestic economy. The industrialists who will produce these goods would be protected with the higher customs from the international competition. This would serve the allocation of scarce resources of the economy (foreign exchange and credits) to the big industrial bourgeoisie via newly established planning units and financial instruments. For instance DPT (State Planning Organization) would decide who takes these state supports for private enterprises (Kazgan, 199:112). The other face of these program was the augmentation of the wage earners for guaranteeing the consumption of the produced goods; namely a moderate intervention to the unequal income distribution. The meaning of the relative legal freedom guaranteed with 1961 Constitution such as the rights to organization, unionization, strike and social security (1963), was affiliated with the attempts of this redistribution of income. Furthermore, in parallel to te zeitgeist these were also coincided with the expectations of the intellectuals, bureaucrats and soldiers who had lived real economic and social loss in the period of Menderes. It was such critical that "the decline of the life conditions and social statuses of the civil servants particularly the soldiers had a great role in the organization of the 1960 C'oup D'eta (Pamuk and Owen, 2001: 149). Lastly, this new strategy was also parallel to the demands of working classes. "The average incomes doubled between 1964 and 1978 and Turkish working classes gained more rights and privileges in compared to the underdeveloped countries in the same league. Particularly in the health and education system Turkey had a much better position then the countries in the

middle income level. Regarding the social security provisions such as institutionalized pension allowances Turkey was quite advanced of other countries” (Keyder, 196-198). What 1960 Military Intervention did was to realize the new accumulation strategy of the industrial bourgeoisie ahead of time (Keyder, 2010, 178-180).

So, Turkey shifted to planned economy with 1960 Intervention. One of the first executions of the army was to establish the DPT in 1960 (Pamuk and Owen, 2010: 150). The mixed economy of this period was based on the fortification of the public sector by virtue of state economic enterprises (Kılıçbay, 1991: 113-125). The industrialists constituted monopolies or oligopolies in the domestic market and worked with high profit margins; since they were protected with high rates of customs. On the other side they were also benefiting some subsidies and low priced inputs and credits and tax refund (Keyder, 2010: 203). So, the basic functions of these KİT’s (state economic enterprises) were providing cheap inputs and interim goods. At the same time the private firms were being directed to benefit from the adventurous of much profitable consumer goods sector. Likewise the pioneers of private sector had lived a gradual shift from food and textile to the production of radio, television, and refrigerators, automobile and other durable goods (Pamuk ve Owen, 2010: 151). As I noticed in peddler chapter, like Hacılar’s fellows who bought some pieces of clothes from Sümerbank in lower prices and selling them in higher prices in the villages and local markets; the industrialists were making money by buying the cheap inputs in lower prices from KİT’s and selling them as expensive final products in domestic markets. Despite all its handicapped dimensions, this strategy became successful until the last quarter of the seventies. The statistics proves this statement. For instance, the real wages doubled and GNP increased 6, 8 % on average between 1963 and 1977. The growth of production sector was much bigger. In the same period the growth rate was over 10 % (Pamuk and Owen, 2010: 151). These growth rates also reflected in the composition of exports. With the expanded and differentiated portfolios of production sector, the rate of industrial products within the total exports had increased from the interval of 13-18 % in 1960s to % 20 - % 39 in 1970s (Boratav, 1988: 98). GNP per capita was also quite high in this period in compared to other developing countries. It was %

4,3 between 1963-1977 and % 3,5 between 1969-1973. This performance was very close to the average growth rates of middle income level countries (% 3,6) and higher than the developed (3,4 %) and underdeveloped (1,4 %) ones (Pamuk ve Owen, 2010: 152).

As a result a national bourgeoisie was created at the end of the day in 1960s. The new industrial bourgeoisie was composed of big land owners who started to flourish in 1950s, the representatives (Turkish traders) of foreign firms, and the professionals (particularly the engineers who had passed from the experience of state economic enterprises). With the tax benefits provided for the sections of the bourgeoisie the firms rapidly turned out to be the conglomerations¹⁸⁹ and giant enterprises (Kazgan, 1999: 115). In this period Turkish economy was leaded by the big family firms like Sabancı and Koç holdings, the conglomeration of production and distribution firms, banks and other institutions taken place in service sector (Pamuk and Owen, 2010: 151). Hence the first winners of import substitution policies were the big industrial establishments located in İstanbul, İzmir, Adana and Mersin and their organized workers; roughly the factories¹⁹⁰ employing more than 1000 workers. Besides, there was a secondary category¹ of capitalists and workers whose destiny was bounded to the first one. This second group was composed of 186.000 employees working in 1278 firms having 50 to 500 workers. 93.000 employees working in 130 firms having 500 to 1000 workers was a transitory category (Keyder, 2010: 212).

Besides, there was a spreading small industry which has been rapidly increased beyond these groups and it comprised of the 66 % of the total industrial workforce. This small industry was divided into two categories as the producers of the first region (İstanbul, İzmir Adana Mersin, Bursa and so on) and the traditional producers of small cities in Anatolia. Yet, the Kayseri industry in which the fellows of Hacılar had been trying to enter in sixties and seventies was in this category and

¹⁸⁹ For detailed information see Tekeli 2010

¹⁹⁰ The statistics clarify the situation. For instance, whereas 1,3 million people were working in whole industrial sector in 1971; the number of workers in the first group was just 173.626 and 67 % of them were working in the public sector (Keyder, 2010: 212).

playing a bridge role between the developed industrial centers and some eastern cities particularly in the trade of textile, metal goods, and food sectors (Ayata, 1991: 70).

As I pointed out Kayseri was one of the favored industrial centers of Anatolia by the Republican regime. There was a consensus among the students¹⁹¹ of Kayseri that these investments constituted the base for the subsequent industrial attempts of the city. In this context, there were made many investments by the private sector benefiting from the DP's policies supporting the private sector. The typical and leading example was *Birlik Mensucat Fabrikası* established in 1954 by the partnership of local traders. This factory established for selling the products of *Sümerbank* was established by 20 partners of an 11 textile firms in 1949 and transformed into a publicly held corporation in 1951 (Özaslan and Şeftalici, 2002: 25). A study¹⁹² of Kayseri Industry Chamber counts this kinds of important investments made between 1950 and 1970 as follows: Birlik Mensucat, Orta Anadolu Mensucat, Sarıyıldız Un Fabrikası, Termo, Adaşlar, Asya Makine, Mavi Çelik ve Döküm, Süntaş. With these investments, the former food and textile based industrial structure of Kayseri had gradually varied and shifted to metal goods sector¹⁹³.

On the other hand there was also traditional petty production in the city dates back to Ottoman times and based on artisanship and craft which had been to a great extend devastated by the deportation of the Armenians and the population exchange with Greeks. As a matter of the fact, the landscape of Kayseri industry composed of two parts; on the one side there were the giant industrial establishments having more than 1000 workers and on the other side hundreds of tiny traditional workshops. There was not small and medium sized capitalist industry at that time (Ayata, 1987: 70-71). These small and medium size industries would emerge after sixties. For instance, whereas the numbers of private firms employing 10 and more workers was 9 in 1950, it increased to 37 in 1963 (Avcıoğlu 1974, Vol. 2 : 724).

¹⁹¹ Doğan 2007, Bilgili 2001, Özaslan and Şeftalici 2002, Van Velzen 1978

¹⁹² Kayseri Sanayi Odası 2004, 37-40

¹⁹³ Ayata, 1991

In the beginning of the 1950s these small workshops was collected and the first industrial district of Kayseri was established in the western part of the city center by the mayor Osman Kavuncu, who was known as the Hausman¹⁹⁴ of Kayseri. Bilgili's study focusing on the production sector of Kayseri in 1950s and 1960s pictures the condition as follows.

Some of the carpenters producing doors and windows started to make upholstered furniture towards the 1960s. However the supply of raw materials used for upholstering was hard. Therefore they were using some dried plants/grass and later sponge. In 1960s with the introduction of Formica, furniture production increased. This new situation also triggered the complementary sectors such as the sellers of sponge, leather artificial leather, wood glue, chipboard. Meantime some entrepreneurs started to produce, spring bad and metal furniture for homes and offices. With the establishment of metal pipe factories in Turkey in 1964 the round metal pipes were started to be produced for making up of table and seats. This made it easy the production of different goods. This development in wood and metal sector led to the establishment of two factories most of whose shareholders were abroad. The first was Erbossan set up for producing pipes and the other was Lüks Kadife established to produce fabrics for upholstering/covering the furniture. (Velzen, 1978: 78-82).

Looking from this perspective the leading sectors of Kayseri in 1960s were food, textile and metal goods. The food sector was depending mostly on traditional products such as pastırma and sucuk, besides there were also some firms producing wheat, pasta, farina, and biscuit. Additionally, there were opened 1 fruit juice and 3 feedstuff factories in Kayseri in this decade. (Bilgili, 2001: 88; Özaslan and Şeftalici, 2002: 24). Doğan notices that in this period Kayseri lived an enormous economic revival and the numbers of registered workplaces increased ten times from 567 to 5595. Besides, these years were also the times in which traders of different sections such as commercial bourgeoisie and building contractors holding capital in varying levels shifted to industrial investments (Doğan, 2007:95).

1970s were a period of rapid industrialization for Kayseri. It was such that a new industrial district was constructed a little farther in 1972. The other industrial centers Middle Industrial District and Woodwork Industrial District followed respectively in 1979 and 1985. This intensive tendency to industry resulted in the

¹⁹⁴ See Doğan 2007: 128

establishment of the Kayseri Organized Industrial District¹⁹⁵ (KAYSO) in Kayseri by the decision of Board of Ministers in 1973 in Karasaz region beyond Mount Yılanlı on the field of 12 million square meters (Özaslan and Şeftalici, 2002: 116).

In this industrial attempt of Kayseri in 1970s the workers remittances have a great share. Since the numbers of Turkish workers had reached to 800.000 in 1974 (Keyder, 2010: 223) and among them there were many fellows from Kayseri. Since, Turkish economy and industry was dependant of the foreign technology and basic inputs these remittances were of very critical in meeting the trade balance deficits. These remittances transcended 1 billion \$ in 1970s and became the basic component for fulfilling trade balance deficits (Boratav, 1988: 98-99; Keyder, 2010: 224). So was it for Kayseri economy. At this point, based do this remittances the multi partner stock joint companies which also benefited from state subsidies and credits became the main dynamic in industrialization of Kayseri (Doğan, 2007: 95) Lüks Kadife (fabrics for furniture and upholstery), Saray Halı (macine woven carpets), Türkteş Deri, (leather products) Erbosan (metal pipes) were the forerunners (Doğan, 2007: 96.) Besides, beyond these examples there were set up many other multi-partner firms without depending on remittances as the primary source in Kayseri in the same period such as Kayseri Yem Sanayi, Meysu, Garipsu, Kireç ve Tuğla Sanayi AŞ, HES Kablo, Panter Plastik, Serbest Halı, Atlas Halı (Yurt Ansiklopedisi 1983; Kayseri Sanayi Odası 2004). The public sector was quite influencing in the establishment of these factories. Since both part of the CHP and MSP coalition government of that time were supporting these kinds of investments. Whereas the former was defending a program called “people’s sector¹⁹⁶” based on the accumulation of wage earners; the latter was defending a state led heavy industry attempt.” Therefore, state bureaucrats, especially the specialists of DPT was leading and directing the entrepreneurs in their investments (Doğan, 2007: 96).

¹⁹⁵ Kayseri Organized Industrial District was started to be established in 1977 but completed in 1990.

¹⁹⁶ See Tekeli 2010: 285–341 for detailed information.

As a matter of the fact Kayseri industry was developed and increased in variety. This led to the production of different goods such as water machines, tractor, redresser, drilling machine, press, bicycle (Özaslan and Şeftalici, 2002: 24-25). The metal industry gained a certain weight in this process.

In 1978 there were almost 350 firms registered to the Industrial Chamber of Kayseri. 90 % of them were working in the metal, metal goods, textile and food. The rate of textile firms was 10 %, but they were large scale establishments including 22.000 employees. 5 of 7 firms which had 2000 and more workers were in textile sector. The others were producing zinc (ÇİNKUR) and sugar. We can add two more enterprises having played critical roles in the development of Kayseri: Airplane repair factory (Hava İkmal) and ammunition repair factory (Ana Tamir)” (Ayata, 1987: 70-71).

The statistics of the next year 1979 based on the Annual Records of Production verified the situation and showing that the distribution of the workplaces in the city was as follows: 41 % metal goods and machine; 20.6 % textile; 18.6 % food (Özaslan and Şeftalici, 2002: 24-25). However despite all these ventures, Kayseri industry was still backward and dependant in 1970s from the perspective of technology, subsidiary industry, market conditions, quality and so on. It was such that a Dutch researcher Van Velzen who studies Kayseri industry in 1978 did not made a well projection about the future of this industry though he would be mistaken than. He concluded that the craft and manufacture structure of Kayseri industry were organized in a way that could not direct it in the way to Western industrial capitalism. The followings are the reasons underlined by him related with the industrial structure of Kayseri in 1970s.

- a. The root of the accumulation is based on trade due to the scarcity of raw materials used for production in the city.
- b. Since the horizontal based capital accumulation character of this industrialization is so strong; it creates a primitive accumulation without giving way neither to the making of proletariat nor dispossession. It also does not result in the birth of an independent industrial capital which would change the form of production and existing domination relations in the economy.
- c. The borders of this totally foreign dependant (especially in technological renovation and raw materials) industrialization were determined by the national and international big industrial centers.

- d. The development of industry stemmed from and triggered by the consumer demand rather than the effective organization of factors of production. (Van Velzen, 1987: 181-184).

On the other hand, regarding from the perspective of working classes, the conditions were not so brilliant except some state owned factories. Keyder's statements regarding with the workers in the central industrial centers and their circle composed of small producers at that time in Anatolia definitely applies to Kayseri.

First in both groups the exploitation of labor was severe. Workers were not as a rule covered by social security or minimum wage regulations; child labor was frequent under diverse form of traditional practices and apprenticeship institutions. Working conditions were primitive and hours arbitrary; the employment of firing of workers depended entirely on the will of owners; finally, wages were a fraction of the prevailing rates in the organized sector. It seems that the average wage in smallest scale operations (private firms employing 10 workers or less) was around 40 % of the average income in firms employing 100 or more workers; or to compare the two adjacent categories the average wage in the 10-50 worker firm was 50 % higher than the wage in 0-10 class. Moreover it is likely that this data do not include the lowest wage category of under-aged and uninsured apprentices whose inclusion would change the picture considerably for the worse....The number of establishment in the small manufacturing sector increased, however. In 1963 there were 158.000 shops with less than 10 workers and in 1973 there were 170 000 new enterprises replaced the old ones and augmented the total. The pool out of which value was extracted and transferred continued to grow (Keyder, 1987: 175-6).

This piece quoted by Keyder was exactly corresponding to the period in which the child fellows of Hacılar started to move to industrial districts of Kayseri, worked as apprentices in very severe conditions more than 12 hours and deprived of any social security mechanisms. In the remaining part of the chapter I will analyze this process which has started from apprenticeship and reached to industrial ownership in detail.

In the context of those national and local conditions and despite the hard circumstances the families in Hacılar started to send their sons to the industrial districts of Kayseri since 1950s. There was no way out for themselves. In time, this labor flow was accelerated, became widespread and normalized. Industry turned out to be the sole way for the male children of Hacılar. The children had been sent generally after the primary school. However, there were also some children who

had been sent before the graduation of primary and secondary schools. From then on, hundreds maybe thousands of children were sent to industry. The below quoted pieces show the details of this process including the individual stories of some old industrialists.

My father said: “You won’t continue after the secondary school” “Why”. “No, you won’t go the high school!”. “But all my friends are going?”. “No you won’t!”. So, I didn’t go to high school. He held me from my ears and took away as an apprentice to a workshop of a master dealing with upholstering in the industry. When I went there, I saw one of my friends from primary school. Now he had become monitorial. I said: “Ooo Süleyman¹⁹⁷ how are you?”. He said: “You are an apprentice body, go, take the sweeper and clear around”. Look, Thank God he behaved me in this way. Thank God. Do you know why? Since welfare brings disease. I am telling you since you are a sociologist.

These children were working in very miserable conditions which could be definetly considered as the exploitation of child labor according to the provisions of UN and ILO. To put briefly, they were on the road in the blind of the morning every day, working in the dirty and unhealthy workshops, eating bad food on the newspapers in a corner of the workplace and taking almost nothing which was even not enough for their transportation costs. They were facing with insults and dressing-downs as ordinary attitudes everyday and they did not have regular working hours. Most of the time they were working until late night and some time sleeping in the workplace or some single rooms in squatters of Kayseri. Expectedly, they deprived of any kind of social rights and did not have any organizational protection mechanism. Some of these workplaces were unregistered at the beginning and they themselves were illegal in those years. Therefore, the general norm and tendency was uninsured work and the worst thing was child labor exploitation had been accepted and approved by the legal mechanism of state: the system of apprenticeship in the periphery and squatter areas (Keyder, 2010: 197). The following quotes could give us a total picture of today’s industrialists’ childhood which they had exhausted in the workshops.

¹⁹⁷ I changed the real name.

My weekly wage was just sufficed to the transportation costs and maybe to a bagel. I had many days came back home without eating something.

They were working almost just for bread and water; staying in the workplaces due to the lack of transportation, residing in the single houses of some neighborhoods close to industry. They learned their profession by working 18 hours instead of 8 hours. Look, the night men did not allow us to work at night. They were saying: “after a certain time you could not work here. It is not secure”. However, the fellows of Hacilar was turning the lights off and working until midnight to complete the orders. Since they do not have any capital.

In the first times the money you get does not suffice your transportation costs. When you in between apprentice and monitorial you just have your transportation costs. When you become a monitorial now you can save a little money. A master could save money if he works additionally per piece.

I started in 1963 after primary school as an apprentice in an upholstery shop. My weekly was 2.5 TL but transportation costed 6 TL and food belonged to me. In those years we worked for free of charge but we had nothing.After the God I was scared of the master..... I worked almost 6 years in this place.

The fathers were giving the children to the masters by saying: “Be as rough as you want with him. Don't spare the rod!” And the child knew that he totally belonged to this place and there was no way out.

Such a poverty was prevailing in the village that even most of the time the children could not find a limited money to reach the industry via bus. The mayor Hamdi Baktır who served between 1963 and 1968 recognized the depth of the misery and decided to put a priceless service bus which collects the students and apprentices in the morning from the village and take back home from the city in the evenings. This very simple service which has been still remembered with respect had a greater impact in the village. Since it, freed the parents from finding money for transportation and accelerated the flow of the children into the industry. This was showing us first how poor was the village and second how critical could be such simple applications even for relatively crowded places living almost 10.000 people. It was such critical that, most of the people I interviewed mentioned this service as the first step in the way to industry by forgetting the other historical practices.

Those children who were sent to industry first became monitorial after 5 to 7 years of hard work and after the military service opened they own shops as masters.

However, I also made many interviews with the industrialists who became masters in 16, 17 years old and opened their own shops. The little start up capital was saved gradually throughout their childhood. Actually they did not need a lot of money for setting up these kinds of workshops. Beyond the basic equipments the real component of capital was the total annual rent given as cash for once. When these basic components were met, the other inputs (raw materials, machines etc.) could be provided very easily either from social networks or with short term credits. Of course, the basic sources were the relatives for this start ups. These may be various supports taken from the close relatives such as, fathers, uncles, brothers etc. Under these circumstances in eight to ten years the first masters of Hacilar emerged in Kayseri city in 1960s. These are the related observations of a 75-year- old trader who has been working for 60 years in Kayseri industry.

The child learned the art in furniture, car repair, plumbing or electricity. The carpenters who worked as apprentices first opened little shops in old industry region. They did not have any capital. However, they were taking wood and cutting machines in long term credits. They were renting the shops on deferred terms. They started in this way. While producing, upholstering, marketing they got the business and took one step further. After 1960s all the children sent to apprenticeship from Hacilar opened their own business and started to production and grew step by step. Then they started to open big retail stores on the main street and marketed their own productions and others productions to the Eastern parts of Turkey.

Yet, it is time to take a detail look to the table I prepared from the stories of the thirty five factories with whom owners I made in-depth interviews. The table takes the founders as the basic unit and includes 3 generations. However, it is better to give some special information here.

All of these thirty five firms are family owned business. Therefore, although the number of founders is thirty to thirty five, there is a circle of at least 100-150 people in the management of these firms comprising of the family members like brothers, uncles, cousins, grooms and grandsons. Besides, clear distinctions and categorizations are not possible; since, many firms do different businesses at the same time and based on different partnerships. For instance, a firm could make excavation business while producing textile at the same time or a man are making textile trade with his brothers could be a partner of any other firm. Therefore, the basic unit should be taken here as the family. It means, thirty five industrialists are

representing thirty family-owned businesses. While making the list, I took the founder as the basic unit but I also noted his grandfather and fathers businesses. Even if the founder person is dead I did not change the system based on the information I collected from his son, brother or uncle in order to maintain the coherence of the table.

I started the interviews by asking the job of grandfather and father of the industrialist and continued with the story of their own business¹⁹⁸. From the data I collected, I made 2 tables on this 30 unit / family owned business. The Table 1 below shows the occupational background of the industrialist in 3 generations. The 4th and 5th columns show the birth years and educational level¹⁹⁹ (PS, SS, HS, UD, and GD) of the industrialists. The 6th column shows their occupation and the following 7th and 8th columns notice the start to business and the opening of first work place.

¹⁹⁸ After the story of the firm I asked questions about the production process in the factory such as forms and relations of production, management, technology, organization and so on. I spoke the other topics in the last part like religion, politics, economics, family, leisure time, globalization and modernity.

¹⁹⁹ These abbreviations mean PS (primary School), SS (secondary school), HS (high school), UD (undergraduate degree) and GD (graduate degree).

Table 1 The Occupations of Industrialists' Fathers and Grandfathers

| Industry. Entrep | Occupation of Grandfather | Occupation of Father | The Birth of Entrep. |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| G1 | Weaver | Draper | 1952 |
| G2 | Peasant | Peasant, stock farmer | 1960 |
| G3 | Peasant | Draper | 1950 |
| G4 | Peasant | Hotel manager, minibus driver | 1955 |
| G5 | Peasant | Peasant | 1952 |
| G6 | Weaver/salesman | Draper | 1967 |
| G7 | Peasant | Worker | 1955 |
| G8 | Peasant | Worker | 1946 |
| G9 | Peasant | Worker | 1950 |
| G10 | Peddler | Weaver | 1933 |
| G11 | Peasant | Worker | 1933 |
| G12 | Peasant | Plasterer | 1950 |
| G13 | Peasant | Peasant | 1956 |
| G14 | Peasant | Shoe maker/repair | 1958 |
| G15 | Peasant | Worker | 1958 |
| G16 | Peasant | Carpet producer | 1958 |
| G17 | Peasant | Shopkeeper | 1954 |
| G18 | Peasant | Peasant | 1945 |
| G19 | Peasant | Weaver | 1938 |
| G20 | Peasant | Truck driver | 1954 |
| G21 | Peasant | Peasant | 1958 |
| G22 | Retired sergeant | Carpet producer | 1948 |
| G23 | peddler, stonemason | Carpet producer | 1960 |
| G24 | Weaver Hotel manager | Carpet producer Draper | 1950 |
| G25 | (Ankara) | Carpet producer | 1957 |
| G26 | Peasant | Peasant | 1967 |
| G27 | Peasant | Imam | 1950 |
| G28 | Peasant | Hosiery | 1955 |
| G29 | Shopkeeper/glassware | Preacher | 1968 |
| G30 | Peasant | Horse carriage | 1950 |

Table 2 The Process of Starting Industry

| Industry. Entrep. | The education | Starting Business as | Year | First worplace |
|--------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| G1 | PS | Upholstery | 1963 | 1969 |
| G2 | PS | Body maker | 1974 | 1982 |
| G3 | PS | Draper | 1974 | 1974 |
| G4 | SS | Salesman | 1966 | 1978 |
| G5 | UD | Mechanical engineer | 1973 | |
| G6 | PS | Draper | 1979 | |
| G7 | PS | Steel fixer | 1967 | 1975 |
| G8 | PS | Upholstery | 1960 | 1968 |
| G9 | UD | Jeological engineer | 1973 | |
| G10 | Non | Draper | 1950 | |
| G11 | PS | Carpenter, upholstery | 1952 | 1955 |
| G12 | PS | Body maker | 1962 | |
| G13 | UD | Carpet producer, teacher | 1978 | |
| | | Automobile | | |
| G14 | UD | electrician/carver | 1979 | 1983 |
| G15 | PS | Steel fixer | 1960 | 1975 |
| G16 | PS | Upholstery | 1972 | 1973 |
| G17 | PS | Carpenter/ chest maker | 1965 | 1968 |
| G18 | HS | Body maker | 1957 | 1971 |
| G19 | PS | Draper | 1950 | 1962 |
| G20 | PS | Truck driver | 1966 | 1985 |
| G21 | SS | Upholstery/ carpenter | 1970 | 1977 |
| G22 | GD | Lawyer | 1976 | 1980 |
| | | Mechanical | | |
| G23 | UD | engineer/carpet producer | 1968 | |
| G24 | UD | Electrical engineer | 1970 | |
| G25 | PS | Upholstery | 1971 | 1975 |
| G26 | PS | Upholstery | 1979 | |
| G27 | HS | Panel beater/ metal worker | 1962 | 1972 |
| G28 | SS | Upholstery | 1968 | 1979 |
| G29 | SS | wood timber | 1980 | 1980 |
| G30 | HS | Iron master/metal worker | 1964 | 1970 |

Starting from the first column, it is clearly seen that almost all of the grandfathers were peasants. Except one hotel manager in Ankara and a shopkeeper/glassware in Kayseri, all the grandfathers were dealing with sustainable farming in their relatively small gardens. In this generation, the three weavers seem to be outstanding. These first entrepreneurs could also succeed to pass their occupation

on the next generation. The table shows their sons as weavers or drapers. We should add them also two peddlers one of which was dealing with stone mason. The only waged person was a retired sergeant in this generation.

The basic difference in second generation was the diversification of the occupations. For instance, besides the three drapers I noticed above there were two more in this generation. However, they could also be considered in the category of first generation due to their birth dates in 1933 and 1938. Since, whereas cloth weaving ended towards 1950s, a similar activity, carpet weaving, had started in these times. So, the five entrepreneurs who shifted to carpet production from weaving verify this statement²⁰⁰.

Beyond these two categories, it is seen that the second generation fellows had diversified also in different small occupational groups. It is possible to rank them as carpenter, plasterer, shoe maker/repair, truck driver, hosiery, horse carriage and shop keeping. While six persons continued to farming, one of them started also to stock farming. Besides, five people seem as workers in this generation. This means working both in construction sector and in field (agriculture) work. One Imam and a preacher who stemmed from the second generation complete the table. One more outstanding point in this generation seems that there was just one (actually they are two brothers but I put them as one in the table) entrepreneur (born in 1933) who had directly inherited his profession into his family's existing production (furniture industry) and thereby established the critical background for the next generations. Today, this family is managing the leading holding in Kayseri industry. So, it is very clear that the critical reason in their success is their being of the oldest and experienced firm among the whole furniture producers in Kayseri. To sum up this distribution excellently reflects the expansion of domestic market and the period of transition to market society in Turkey at that time period.

Regarding the third generation, we see a much more diversified picture. First of all except the three people who were born in the second half of 1940s, most of the

²⁰⁰ However there was just one family who brought carpet production to 3th generation. If to add the entrepreneur who left his own profession of schoolmastering, the number of industrialists whose originally dealt with carpet production was just two.

entrepreneurs (19) were born in 1950s. five people who were born in 1960s constitute the transitory generation binding the third to the fourth generations (today's children). To sum up, it is possible to argue that except the three entrepreneurs born in 1930s the industrialists of Hacılar to a great extent composed of people who were born between 1945 and 1968. This means the orientation of these entrepreneurs into industry corresponds to the period mostly between the years of 1960 and 1980.

Upholstering is the most distinctive and intensive pattern with seven entrepreneurs in this generation. A similar sector seems to be the iron/steel and metal good sector. Here there seem three iron masters, one panel beater/metal worker and three body makers. The other craft group is wood art. There seem three people; one carpenter, one carver and one chest producer. Besides, there were four drapers, three carpet producers, two salesmen, one lawyer and three engineers.

Here I should stop and give some additional information. In the table there seem some occupations as if staying outside industrial sector; but they actually did not. For instance, the three engineers had been shares (though little) in the joint stock firms of cable and carpet production since the beginning. 4 drapers were partners of HES Cable factory since the establishment of the institution. One salesman becomes the manager of production after a while and the lawyer who were very active in the establishment of HES tried also setting up a chicken farm in the village years ago. Briefly, there were just two families outside production in this generation among 30 families. One was directly dealing with wood timber the other was making excavation and transportation business.

It is possible to see the occupational roots of the fellows of Hacılar from the table above. However, for deeply understanding of the industrialization story of the village, the most critical factor, the establishment of HES Cable Factory with 832 share holders of Hacılar, should be explained in detail. HES has been a critical and constitutive place in the story of Hacılar. For instance, almost all of the entrepreneurs from different jobs listed above have been some shares of HES in

different times. Therefore, the establishment of HES directly refers to the main dynamic and the social codes of industrialization in Hacılar which crosscuts the whole occupational categories above. So it deserves to be examined separately in the next chapter.

4.9 The Start of Industrialization: The Establishment of HES Cable Factory

As I noticed above towards 1970s, the apprentices turned from the military service, became masters and opened their shops. Besides the first riches had stemmed from within the drapers, textile traders, carpet producers of Hacılar and a serious amount of capital was accumulated. The opening of the first shops verifies this situation. Table 1 shows the decades and the shops opened as follows: one in 1950s, three in 1960s, eleven in 1970s and four in 1980s. We should also keep in mind that these are number of the artisans who had transformed into industrialists. Apart from these, hundreds maybe thousands of young fellows has been sent to industry. On the other hand, as touched above, Lütfü Özden had established three different factories in 1969, 1973 and 1975 in Kayseri. So, the fellows of Hacılar were met with the concept of industry since then. Therefore, especially among the drapers, the debate had already started on the setting up a multi-partner textile factory (on thread or drapery); but the direction of the debate has shifted to the furniture sector with the intensification of furniture art in general among the fellows. Moreover, in 1970s the second generations of university students had been turned to Kayseri as professionals and were in search of different and alternative possibilities. When to add the industrial experiences and accumulations of the migrants who went to Europe from Hacılar; the only thing remained: a leader or organizer who would take the first step.

This step was taken by Saadettin Erkan a very young electrical engineer just graduated from ODTÜ Electrical Engineering Department in 1973. Beyond the personal qualifications of ambition and intelligence, his leadership was not accidental. Since, he was coming from a relatively rich family dealing with commercial activities in the line of weaving, drapery and carpet production. Indeed,

even the father of Erkan was an industrial entrepreneur since he was one of the partners of Atlas Carpet Factory. So, it would not be a mistake, to call Erkan as the second generation of industrialist's regarding his family. He had been within trade and industry since he was born. Therefore, either in university or in England where he went for language course, he had been thinking coming back to Kayseri and set up a factory to make production. Actually, he was passionate with the idea of production, since he already recognized how profitable it was from the experiences of his father and from the vision he gained in university and abroad. He started to work in Kayseri branch of TEK (Turkish Electricity Institution) as engineer but could not stand more than six months. Meanwhile, he heard that some of the leading traders of Hacılar were making preparations for setting up a factory related with the wood business. Before these venture, four traders of Hacılar had already came together and established a retailer firm to buy the raw material in cheaper prices. In 1973 in an evening sitting (gathering) the leading traders decided to establish a furniture factory in Hacılar. As the first step they went to İzmir Fair to examine the machines for their prospective factory. Saadettin Erkan who was informed about these developments met with these entrepreneurs in 1974 winter and convinced them to establish cable factory rather than furniture. He told: "There is electricity shortage in Turkey. 80 % of the villages were deprived of electricity and the energy cable business was extraordinary profitable. There are two Jewish firms SIEMENS and SURTEL exploiting the country". The basic talent of Erkan was to combine the illiterate but self-trained rich and ambitious entrepreneurs with the trained professionals of Hacılar in a same visionary project. In this way, in the next sitting in 1974 they decided to establish a cable factory as a joint stock corporation composed of only fellows of Hacılar. The day after, they opened an account in a bank and initiate an intensive campaign in the village for the factory.

The campaign had a great effect in the village. The ordinary people of Hacılar participated into the project by buying the shares. In order to buy they sold what they had as valuables such as the golden accessories of their women or daughter; carpets or animals. So, in a very short time 832 fellows became the shareholder of HES and 30 million TL was collected from the village. By the way, they had taken following decisions: the name of the factory would be Hacılar Electric Industry

(HES). It would be established in the village and the fellows of Kayseri would not be share holders of it. However, the capital collected from the village was not sufficient and there were needed alternative sources of income. This turned the eyes of entrepreneurs/forerunners to Europe: to the migrants (especially in Germany, France and Belgium) although their number is limited. Since, due to the gradual but continuous migration to city center, the village did not feel an urgent need of mass migration to Europe. I could not get the exact numbers but I guess there were approximately fifty families who were spread different cities like Stuttgart, Manheim, Dortmund in Germany at that time. Indeed, it was told me that the majority of these families turned back to Turkey in 1980s after ten to fifteen years of work. The founders wanted to use all the network of the village to incorporate all the possible contributions to HES due to the capital shortage; so they got into contact with a fellow of Hacilar who was a young graduate student of law in a German university at that time.

It was a proper coincidence since in parallel to the fellows in Kayseri this student was also searching and thinking for alternative projects to save the future of the village. He was quite influenced from a giant Asbestos factory employing 150,000 workers and based on the communal/joint ownership of local people. When he was doing his internship in the law office of this factory he had learned the details about the administration regime of the institution and he was thinking that a similar one could be established in Hacilar by virtue of a organization like a cooperative. After talking his ideas with the workers (of Hacilar) and gained support of them, he wrote five to six mails to the leading fellows²⁰¹ who he thinks could understand his vision in Hacilar. Since the preparations of industrialization had already established in the village, these mails were welcomed by the fellows and he was told that “do whatever you can to participate the fellows in Germany”.

Actually the conjuncture of those days was also very suitable for such an attempt. Since, in both parts (left and right) of the political spectrum the policies prioritizing the public enterprises were very popular. For instance, whereas these approaches

²⁰¹ These people are composed of one economist/account, two electrical engineers, the chairmen of a local development cooperative and the mayor of Hacilar.

were mentioned by CHP within a program of “public sector” (*Halk sektörü*); MHP was defending a similar perspective with the program called “Nation Sector” (*Millet sektörü*). Both programs were anticipating state support for the cooperatives and participant initiations and enterprises. For instance CHP’s “public sector” was defined in those days in the frame of: putting the surplus gained from the primitive commercial capitalism (Anatolian capital) into a proper ground of production by combining it with the voluntary accumulations of intermediate layers of society such as free traders, artisans, workers and civil servants (Tekeli, 2010: 301). In this sense these kinds of enterprises were supported from the governments of both right and left in 1970s.

Under these circumstances this young lawyer tried to organize the migrant workers in Germany. He told me that: “the workers adored this project. Since, they were slaves, they were treated as second class in Germany”. After these preparations, the forerunners of this enterprise came to Germany for directly demanding support from the workers and provide for their engagement. The lawyer organized a trip and they visited the certain places where did they live. At the end of day, they succeeded to convince the workers. So, in a very short time, they opened an account in a German bank in the name of a worker and started to collect money for HES.

However over a period of time, there emerged a divergence of opinions between the forerunners and the lawyer on the partnership regime of the prospective factory. The different imaginations, expectations and motivations of the entrepreneurs emerged on the surface. The lawyer was defending an egalitarian ownership regime in which no one could have privileges and everyone would be the equal partner of the factory. Since, this was the system he saw in the Asbestos factory employing 150,000 workers who were at the same time the equal partners of this enterprise. However, the forerunners coming from Turkey was defending a privileged regime for the founders (themselves) although they were taking care of giving an egalitarian picture to outside for gaining public support. After this overt divergence of opinions the lawyer quit this venture. The migrants did the same by following the lawyer who had organized them. So they took their money back from the business.

As a matter of the fact, since the beginning, the rich forerunners/founders paved the way for holding the prospective factory in their hands in the long run. One of the founders of the HES, explained this secret agenda in the beginning and the conflicts experienced between the partners meantime in this way:

By the way there were many rich people and entrepreneurs among them (forerunners). Some were not that rich but smart, good looking having the capacity to collect money. It was said to us in the meeting: “No one could buy more than 5 shares. Everyone one will buy 5 shares in equal way”. We fight on this sentence. However, Saadettin knew this business and they had already planned the future. They knew that it is possible to change the provision in a general board in the way that “there is no limit in buying of the shares of the factory” But we didn’t know that at that time.

Likewise, this was realized. Following the establishment of the factory with the participation of 832 fellows, HES was captured first by 8 families and then the factory stayed in the hands of two families after 1999. This is the reaction of an opinion leader of the town to what happened on HES regarding the local share holders.

Could you tell me brother how a factory of 830 partners stays in the hands of 8 and at last two persons? Where is the solidarity!..... How it became possible within the frequently referred brotherhood and solidarity in the village? If solidarity happened then every partner would have at least a Murat 124, I am not saying a jeep, from such a profitable factory. In this sense, Saadettin Erkan, may God rest his soul, yes established the factory, the machinery and equipment he succeeded; but they did not continued to execute the factory in a fair way afterword.

At this point it is also important to look at the critical stages (production, survival, expansion and separation) of the factory in detail so as to understand the structural characteristics of industrialization in Turkey. Now we can take a closer look to these stages.

The foundation of the factory was laid under these circumstances after all these preparations and debates in 1974. However, since the collected capital was not sufficient, Saadettin Erkan had to found credit from a Swiss bank (or fund) in two million franks to complete the construction of the factory. The construction process was also problematic. First, due to the interesting peasant obstinacies the factory was established on a hill where there is no road, no electricity and no other

facilities. In order to reinforce the local participation, the factory was constructed in a wrong place just for villagers to make them to believe in the reality of the project. One of the founders put the reason very briefly: “It was believed that the fellows should see the smoke of the factory with their naked eyes”. Moreover, the factory was constructed and assembled by the foreign workers and technicians due to the lack of qualified technical labor in Turkey and particularly in Kayseri. Even the translators were hardly found for the foreign workers. So, the construction process lasted a bit longer and the first cable could be produced in May 1978. However, this time the other problems were waiting in front of the door. Since, the oil crises of 1973 had deeply affected oil dependant Turkey. The Turkish economy was destroyed due to the (5 times) rising oil prices and the inflation went beyond 100 % with the subsequent results of decline in the growth rates. The basic problems encountered in those years were shortage of foreign exchange, the related energy cut offs and the subsequent shortages of secondary and exported interim and investments goods (Kılıçbay, 1991: 156). All these problems led to serious interruptions in production and consequently resulted in a radical transformation in the structure of the Turkish economy in 24 February 1980. In a nutshell, the period between 1973 and 1980 could be defined with the factors of imbalances, high inflations, shortages, decrease in production and growth (Kılıçbay, 1991: 157).

The political polarization of Turkey in 1970s with strikes, demonstrations, massacres, and martial rules were exacerbating the social tension in Turkey. The Cyprus Campaign happened in 1974 became another source of problem. Since with the campaign there emerged new problems with the concomitant military and economic embargo. All these factors almost stopped the production in Turkey despite the rapid expansion of the demands of good and services in domestic markets. The industry sector was heavily affected of these crises due to the lack of raw materials, interim goods and energy supplies. So the capacity use of the industry had rapidly fallen in this period (Boratav, 1988: 118). HES had to face with all these problems very deeply in this turmoil. Whereas the buyers were sleeping in front of the door, they could not find the raw materials of cable: copper, PVS and polyethylene in the market. However, the factory could survive until 1983 despite all these problems.

The spurt of the factory started with Özal period. As underlined Özal was the critical figure in the radical transformation of Turkey from import substitution to export oriented economy as the architect of 24 February Decisions. Yet, Özal²⁰²'s new neo-liberal reform program was directly corresponding to the industrialization axis and process of Hacılar with a historical coincidence. Since as an electrical engineer and old bureaucrat of DPT, Özal decided to prioritize the infrastructural investments on the electrification of Turkey. On the other side, since he graduated from Kayseri High School he knew Hacılar²⁰³ and closely followed the establishment of HES. After he became prime minister, he visited the factory in 1984 and it became a critical threshold in the history of the factory. The engineer who welcomed Özal in the factory mentioned the critical suggestions of him related with the prospective production of the factory in this way:

Özal directly came to here. While I was guiding him he told that “Look, give up producing this electric cables and shift to the fiber optic cable business!”. We were thinking and discussing the telephone cables at that time. Then we recognized without producing copper cables we could not pass to fiber optic ones. It became an exit for us, a salvation. Since, due to the scarcity of raw materials HES was on the threshold of closing down. As a matter of the fact with this decision both technology and surplus value had changed. The basic reason of the increase in surplus value was that; until that time there were just a couple of foreign firms such as SIEMENS NKF, NOKIA besides a Turkish origin firm among them. What is the necessity for Turkey, say 100 unit. These were producing 75 units and selling it in four fold expensive price to the Turkish markets and to PTT. We recognized that gap and made telephone cables with our own facilities and then participated in the tenders of PTT. So, HES became the critical actor in the pervasion of PTT services which has been very slow in those days. This would be realized one day at the end, but HES accelerated this process in 2 or 3 years. After we got in the market, the order in Ankara was destroyed. Everyone had to give his own price. Shortly after, we established HAS Çelik (Steel factory) for the production of steel strings/slings serving to the transportation of electricity. Afterwards HESFİBEL was founded for fiber optic cables.

These quoted pieces are of very critical for elucidating the ciphers of industrialization in Anatolia. First, we see that the emergence of production as a profitable sector and production oriented initiatives were the results of the structural

²⁰² Beyond its neo-liberal views, the ex-prime minister and ex-president Özal was an electrical engineer and was giving a special attention to the establishment of the telecommunication infrastructure in the whole Turkey.

²⁰³ Some of the fellows of Hacılar told met that Özal said: Hacılar hasn't changed at all” when he came in 1983for his election campaign.

transformation of Turkish economy since 1960s. Industrial production turned out to be very profitable field of investments in the economic atmosphere of increasing demands and shortages of goods. Second, the cable factory establishment was not an accidental decision. It was the product of a visionary perspective based on material grounds and projections. This vision was provided from one of the best technical universities of the country, ODTÜ. Third, the multi-shared character of partnership based on the village fellowship was also not accidental. There was not any other way for capital accumulation and it was filling the bill regarding the socio-political atmosphere of Turkey in 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, this local dynamic reinforced the moral dependency and led to the espousal of the factory by the fellows. Here, the sole coincidence was Özal's being of electrical engineer and his prioritization of this sector in his policies. I want to argue that Hacilar would be industrialized again if the entrepreneurs established furniture factory rather than cable one. The development process might not be rapid, effective, multi dimensional and profitable as in the case of the cable factory but in this or that way they would be industrialized.

Finally, the last dimension is related with the conflict of capital groups between İstanbul and Anatolia. In this sense the case of HES could be read as one of the first challenges to Istanbul. This could also be considered as the starting point which would constitute the base of the further “green capital” discussions in the context of Kayseri. Since, as underlined in other interviews with industrialists, Özal's suggestions were understood by the entrepreneurs rightly as: “when you produce high tech telephone or fiber optic cables, I'd better give you the tenders of PTT to you”. So was the case and the subsequent developments verified this fact. With the brief words of an industrialist who were one of the partners of the factory: “the power ruined the game”.

In 1983 we got an offer at an auction of PTT and that year we distributed a very good profit to the share holders thanks to Turgut Özal. Cengiz Tuncer was the minister of communication, may God rest his soul. He gave the tender to us rather than SIEMENS.

The below piece is the observations of a different trader of Kayseri.

Özal stopped the foreign firms from the auctions of PTT. He makes HES to get in the auctions of PTT. With the cash money given by the state they had rapidly developed. Both expanded their capacity and overcame their problems of cash. This led to the establishment of new factories.

In this context, HES rapidly developed in 1980s in the direction of Özal's suggestions and policies. The factory started to produce first telephone cables. Then it improved its technological infra structure and renewed its portfolio by directly buying a fiber optic factory in England and transfer the technology to HES Fibel. In 1999 it had already turned out to be a holding which employs 2,500 workers. However, these transformations led to some other changes in management and structure of the factory. As frequently emphasized in the quotations, the number of share holders went down from 832 to eight by virtue of capital augmentation.

Besides, contrary to the principles set out at the beginning, the factory accepted new partners from outside for meeting the need of cash in parallel to its development. Some of the new partners suggested moving the holding to İstanbul. This resulted in the separation in the administration. This idea was rejected by the majority since they were thinking that they would loose the control of the factory then. At the end of the day, HES stayed in Hacilar but those who want to move to İstanbul left. There were other problems too. Too much money led to some differences in opinions and conflicts within the managers. Some of them stemmed from individual or familial ambitions. Meantime, the children of the partners grew in time and started to demand positions from the administration. This was another critical source of the conflicts between the partners. Since, despite their educational differences and varying talents the children were tried to be put in critical positions by the partners. However, the most important factor was that after some time some partners of HES started to set up their own factories outside the group by using some technical and other facilities of the factory such as knowledge, know-how, technology, settled relations and networks. One of the partners of the factory put it in this way:

Without being noticed by us, the partners started to establish their own factories by using all of the facilities of HES such as technical council, technology and market. After established the factories they said “these are ours” and did not allowed us to be partners. Indeed, when they established HAS Çelik they even did not let even İSTİKBAL²⁰⁴ to join. For instance when İSTİKBAL was the partner of HES with 26 % of shares, they offer only 2 % shares to them. They even did not let them in the factory. Do you understand? Namely, they said: “we won’t be partner with you” and established HAS ÇELİK. Since steel spring was their job. So, they (İSTİKBAL) left the administration of HES and established their own factory: MERKEZ ÇELİK. This was a great breakthrough for them. After a couple of years they came again more powerful and said: “either you sell or buy the shares of this factory (HES)”. Anadolu Finans was already established at that time as financial bank.

This was a quite weird picture. Indeed, beyond the enterprises in other fields some partners established factories working in the same field of steel and cable as the rivals. Beyond MERKEZ ÇELİK a different cable factory was also established in İstanbul by some other partners. One of my interviewees who had worked long years in upper positions of HES since 1970s, explained the complex organization, development and capital accumulation processes with following sentences in detail.

You are writing the sociological history that’s why I am telling you these tricky organizations, these plays. So why the man established HES Kablo with 831 share holders and how then captured it totally? They established marketing firms and transfer the goods with receipts and without receipts. Then with the money they gained from those firms..... I am telling you one more challenging argument. All the other factories established within the body of HES, the children of HES such as Has Çelik, Hes Kimya, Hes Makine, Hes Fibel, Hema none of them were established with the capital stock of the founding partners. They were established with the bank credits and the additional rents gained from HES Kablo. The rent was acquired in three ways in HES Kablo. As I said after a while 8 people captured the factory. Then they established marketing firms. They produce for instance cable to 100 TL and the product was being sold in the market say to 150 TL. They sold the product to 105 TL to these marketing firms with a very minimum profit rate. All the additional profit was acquired by these 8 persons. Do you understand? Can I explain? Then they shared the subsequent factories among each other in 2000. The real profit stayed in their hands.

²⁰⁴ For, instance, The İSTİKBAL GROUP which is the most biggest company of Kayseri now, was a relatively small share holder of HES and at the same time they were producing furniture in their own factories. In those years their trade mark İSTİKBAL has newly started to be famous in the Turkish furniture market.

The second way was the capital accumulation issue. In capital augmentation processes there was the use of three rights. They made difficulties for third persons to want to use their rights in capital augmentation and used them for their own benefits. They made capital augmentation with long term cheques and vouchers and plus with the vouchers paid from this open accounts. So by these ways they made capital augmentation and became owners of invoiced share holders

The third way of making money was this. Yet, the raw material used by HES was PVC and electronic copper. They bought electronic copper from SARKUYSAN. What did they do with this copper? Then they bought electronic copper and the other from the market. Now suppose you are partner with HES but you have also another firm. You have an additional surplus there. Then you went and bought 10 tones of PVC in cash say for 1 TL. You brought it here and sold it to the factory for 1,3 TL with three months terms. They bought it in cash and sold in three months terms in a profitable way. They did all these things you understand? So, an incredible profit emerged. These firms were established with these accumulations plus bank credits.

One of the old partners of HES whom I interviewed verified this idea and method of making profit over shell companies. Indeed, he claimed that this idea was developed by him and that's why he was dismissed from the partnership of HES. What is tragic for himself was that the remaining partners realized his ideas into practice:

G: Meanwhile I said: "let's open a shop, let the factory loose and we sell the goods coming out of the factory here and turned it into profit". They said: "how can you suggest us this kind of a robbery for our own property!" and the HES group wanted to break with me and they did it. They gave me my share of 3 billion in 2 years, later.

K: I did not understand exactly why did you leave the partnership?

G: I said: "let us sell the cable here (in marketing firm). To whatever price it emerged out of the factory we could make profit here and then share among us, partners. The factory is already running down". Then they said "how can you suggest us this kind of a robbery for our own property?". They got in a different atmosphere. Eight of them got together against me and took the shares by force. However in 3 months they opened the marketing company and realized my idea.

As the combinations of these kinds of reasons the partnership came to an end in 1999 and except the small shares of 2 or 3 % the majority of them were gathered in the hands of two families. As matter of the fact, founding partners who had already made new investments parallel to HES went their own ways and shared the other factories within the body of HES group (Has Çelik, HES FİBEL, HES Kimya and HES Makine). So they constituted the backbone of the today's Hacilar industry. Despite some small controversies, the separation did not cause big problems among

ex-partners and some of them continued to make business some time. Consequently, as a successful industrialization experience, HES survived, developed and became one of the biggest firms of Turkey. Today, it is in the 57th place²⁰⁵ according to the list of Istanbul Chamber of Industry in 2007 among the first 500 firms of Turkey with its export more than 110 countries (BHFR, 2007: 29).

In my first interviews, in the beginning of the thesis study, village solidarity, identity and consciousness were addressed as the basic factors regarding the success of Hacılar in industry. I also used to think in that way. However, my detailed fieldwork revealed that it was not the case. Therefore, the success of HES could not only be affiliated with village solidarity. The quotations below clearly show the complexity of the story. To sum up, there are many different factors in the success of HES experience within all these complex relations. First, the factory was well managed since its establishment by visionary and professional managers. Second, although the result was not as it was anticipated by the ordinary partners; namely although the factory belong two families rather than a collective ownership of all village, it was espoused and supported by the fellows as a source of hope in the eyes of them. Third, the factory had grasped the critical transformations in the Turkish economy on time and adopted them very quickly. Fourth, it has been supported directly by the state since Özal. Fifth, although the remittances were not benefited, the foreign connections have been used very effectively in different fields beyond the inspiration and moral support. As a matter of the fact, HES functioned as an industry academy for the fellows of Hacılar. They learned the basic curriculum of industry like production, export, import, foreign trade, investment, marketing and all the tricky games of trade and industry in this school. So, it became the main dynamic in the industrialization of Hacılar.

²⁰⁵ It is in the 59th place according to the 2012 version of the same list.
<http://www.aktifhaber.com/iso-ilk-500-listesinde-14-kayserili-firma-yer-aldi-637373h.htm> Access
04. August 2012

4.10 The Industrialization Process of Hacılar from 1980s to 2000

As I emphasized above since 1980 the basic frame of Turkish economy was shaped by the 24 February Decisions which was designed by Özal. This program was depending on the ongoing demands of IMF such as devaluation, abolishment of control over prices and price hikes on the products of state economic enterprises. At the same time this was a structural adjustment program standing basically on two pillars. The first is the liberalization of domestic and international markets and second, the empowerment of the international and local capital classes against workers (Boratav, 1988: 121-122) Restriction of the public sector, release of labor and capital markets to the conditions of supply and demand and frequent devaluations were the other elements of the program (Kepenek, 2000: 2009). The program had three basic aims. Ameliorating the balance of payment, decreasing the inflation in short term and creating a new economic order based on the export oriented market economy integrated with the world economy (Pamuk and Owen, 2002: 159).

This program was tightly implemented under the military tutelage until 1987. According to the macro indicators, in this period the production was shifted from domestic to foreign markets. Besides, the domestic demand was limited by reducing the income of wage labor and it was shifted to luxury goods from basic consumption goods. However, despite these changes in the balance of demand and supply, the total production increased. The main reason in behind was the rapid increase of import capacity provided by the foreign debts of international finance circles (Boratav, 1988: 129-130). Since, in these years, a successful example was strongly needed for the orthodox liberalism program which had been insistently suggested by the international financial circles such as WB and IMF. The international conjuncture (Iran Revolution, Iran- Iraq War) was also convenient for the generous supports and cash flows to Turkey (Boratav, 1988: 130; Pamuk and Owen, 2002: 161; Kepenek 1999)

In this general frame, it is possible to state two dimensions of Turkey's industrialization after 1980. First, the state gave up industrial investments and started to privatize state enterprises. Second, the industrial investments and production was left to market conditions. However, contrary to these tendencies the withdrawal of state (public) sector from industrial investments did not led to the private sector to fill this gap. Indeed, in parallel to the decrease in public investments, the private industrial investments decreased too (Kepenek, 1999: 235). For instance, "contrary to the political discourse in favor of private capital the private sector investments receded 14 % between 1978/79 and 1985, while the total investments of public sector increased 25.6 %. However, despite this increase, investments were intensified in extra-productive fields such as communication, transportation, energy and municipalities" (Boratav, 1988: 131-132). On the other hand, the import oriented subsidies were given to the "exporter capital firms" rather than producers (industrialists) in this period in which permanent devaluations and import subsidies were in effect. Therefore, not the investment maker but predatory (mediator, consumer and parasitical) sections of bourgeoisie marked these years of Turkish economy (Boratav, 1988: 137-138).

The industrial policies of this era could be summarized in 5 headings as follows: devaluation of TL, reduction of the internal demand and labor costs (worker's incomes), reduction of customs and protectionism, direct subsidies to exporters, resource transfer to private sector by privatization (Kepenek, 1999: 236). So, this period could be defined as a shift from the policies prioritizing "industrialization" to the new ones preferring making export (Kepenek, 1999: 235-236).

In a nutshell, the positive consequences of these policies could be summarized as follows. 100 % inflation rate in 1980 receded and fluctuated around 40 % throughout 1980s; although it went up 70 % in the end of the decade (Pamuk and Owen, 2002: 160). The economic growth rate which declined to % -1. 1 in 1980 reached to 5. 9 % in the half of the 1980s (Kılıçbay, 1991: 189). In the same period the average growth rates of national income and industry reached to 3,7 % and 4,8 % respectively between 1980 and 1985 (Boratav, 1988: 128). The export of

commercial goods climbed from 2.3 million \$ to 13 million \$ from 1980 to 1990 and Turkey came first regarding the increasing rates of exports (Pamuk and Owen, 2002: 160). Lastly, the share of industry in the total exports increased from 35-40 % to around 80 % (Kepenek, 1999: 236).

However despite all these positive aspects, this development was not realized with the increased industrial investments of private sector but with the increasing capacity utilization ratios (Boratav, 1988: 131; Pamuk and Owen, 2002: 163; Kepenek, 1999:235). The economic development rate was smaller than the previous decade. “Average rate of annual GNP was 4, 6 % and GNP per capita increased 2, 3 % in 1980s. Furthermore, this was provided in return for the 50 billion \$ foreign debt which was little bit under 10 billion in 1980” (Pamuk and Owen, 2002: 163). The other failure of new program was unequal distribution of income. The real wages decreased 34 % from 1980 to 1987 and the internal terms of trade turned against agricultural sector more than 40 % from 1977 to 1987 (Pamuk and Owen, 2002: 163).

So, despite the growth in exports, the dependency of Turkish economy to the interim and investment goods increased. Besides, the income gained from exports was not used for the development of industrial capacity. This resulted in the overweight of international capital on the domestic economic policies of Turkey (Boratav, 1988: 128). Due to these factors, the competition of Turkish industry became restricted with labor intensive sectors of food, textile, garment etc. in parallel to the international division of labor based on the technological superiority (Kepenek, 1999: 237). Hence, Turkish industry encountered with a three legged congestion in 1990s: the difficulty of making fixed investment in the high rates of interests, competition in the international markets and the problem of transition to technology (Kepenek, 1999: 237).

1980s were also not brilliant years for Kayseri industry. The intensive labor flow between 1960 and 1980 were interrupted and there emerged a serious regression and recession in Kayseri industry. In this sense, the number of industrial workplaces

declined from 3,759 to 3,145 between 1980 and 1985 (Özaslan, 2003:170). Likewise, the share of Kayseri from the total national industrial value was declined from 1.45 % to 1.05 % between the same years and this rate was not to be exceeded throughout 1990s. Besides, the share of industrial sector (among others) within the city also decreased from the rates of 25. 1 % in 1978 to 17. 1 % in 1987 and to 16. 9 % in 1992 (Doğan, 2007: 97). However, in the same period the share of industry among other sectors in Turkey increased from % 18. 3 in 1978 to % 25. 8 in 1987 and to % 27. 2 in 1992. The electricity consumption per capita verifies this situation. Since, whereas it was almost equal to the average consumption rates in Turkey, it dropped 25 % back of this rate in 1990 in Kayseri (Doğan, 2007: 97).

Contrary to this picture, a gradual acceleration had been lived in the sector of industry with Özal Government. There were a couple of factors in behind. First, the establishment of Kayseri Organized Industrial District was completed and put into service. This led to the movement of the workshops and workplaces of artisans and craftsman to the district with the traders buying lands for investment. The advantages offered to industrialists combined with this spatial expansion have been some positive effects on industry in general. For instance 18 of 30 industrialists whom I focused moved to OSB in 1990s as shown in Table 3 below.

The second factor was the subsidies and public sector supports. The investment subsidies which had been given since 1985, gradually increased from 229 to 284 billion TL in 1989. Besides, in 1988 the rate of given supports for resource and capacity use in the organized industrial districts increased from 7 % to 40 %. Likewise, the augmentation of subsidies in the rate of 25 % increased the numbers of the big enterprises. For instance, the majority of large scaled investments in 1988 and 1989 were made in the organizational industrial district of Kayseri (Özaslan ve Şeftalici, 1994: 145-146). It was such that, in 1990s Kayseri became the city which mostly benefited from subsidies and supports for opening workplaces and sites among the other cities (Doğan, 2007: 98).

An extension of the second factor reinforced the effects of the subsidies. That was the new status: “a secondary prioritized region for the development” given to Kayseri in 1989. Although the direct supports were reduced in 1990s, all these factors had positive reflections on the industrial structure of Kayseri. So, the industry started to develop in some sectors such as textile, metal goods and furniture in which the city had been a certain historical experience. Outside the bigger enterprises employing over 200- 250 workers, there was particularly a great increase in small and medium sized enterprises having 50 to 150 workers (DPT, 2000: 182-192). The following was the picture of the city in end of the 1980s according to the statistics of 1992.

The total number of workplaces employing 10 and over workers are 152 and 145 of them belong to private sector. Among the workplaces which employ 10 and more workers 72 workplaces employ 10 to 24 workers. The rest 80 workplaces employ 25 and more workers.

From these 72 workplaces the biggest part belongs to metal goods and machine sector with 20 workplaces. The others are food industry (18 workplaces), main metal industry (13 workplaces), soil and stone industry (9 workplaces) and tekstile (8 workplaces).

While most of these 80 workplaces belong to the private sector just 6 of them are state enterprises (2 food, 2 textile, 1 metal, 1 machine industry)....

Textile is the dominant sector among the biggest workplaces. 8 of the (biggest ones employ over 200 workers)10 enterprises produce textile.

There is totally 2293 workplace in industry. 1186 (% 52) of them produces furniture, metal goods, and food. The biggest sectors are respectively furniture, machine-equipment, mainstream metal industry, food and textile (Dönek, 1997: 90-95).

1990s could be considered as the years of consistent growth though not a definite boom. For instance, the statistics show that the share of Kayseri in industry increased from 1.4 in 1988 to 1.6 % in 1998. Likewise, Kayseri increased its share of employment (within the total employment) from 1.78 % to 2. 18 % in the same period. It is also similar regarding the rates of total value produced in the country. It went up from 0. 87 to 1. 52 between the years 1988 and 1997 (DPT, 2000: 184). The increase of the number of industrial workplaces which went up 7,278 in 1997 verifies this development (Doğan, 2007: 98).

However despite all these developments in industry, Kayseri seemed still as a trade dominant city rather than industry in the end of 1990s. For instance “ According to data which was estimated with the fixed prices of 1987, the economic structure of Kayseri city was composed of following sectors: 27.9 % trade, 19.8 % industry, 12.3 % communication and transportation and 12.1 % agriculture (Bilgili, 2000: 91). This is related with some local reasons about Kayseri. First, Kayseri was historically set up as a trade center and organized and specialized in this way. Second, the city is quite poor regarding the raw materials and industrialists are dependant to the traders of these materials. Namely, the backward linkages of the city regarding industry have been always high. Actually that is the reason why the production sector was captured by the fellows of Hacilar instead of the local people of Kayseri city. Since the local traders who have considered the trade as a more reliable and risk free activity have been reluctant for the industry in the last 40 years. Even the ones who got in the industry business did not totally give up the trade. Since, in order to get high profit rates, they do not want to be dependant to the intermediary traders (Bilgili, 2000: 89). This applies to the most of the industrialists of Kayseri and Hacilar. On the other side, the third factor is related with the forward linkages of Kayseri industry. This lower level linkages resulted in the determination of the production to a great extend by the demand (Bilgili, 2000: 89). The natural consequence of this situation was a very open, vulnerable and fragile economic structure.

From this general perspective, the dominant sector of Kayseri industry seems to be textile (weaving) in 1990s regarding both the working hours of labor and total value added. As Erdem rightly put, “the textile sector became the most promising sector in the international markets since it was based on the cheap labor and raw materials. Besides, the doors of the sector were opened with the subsidies and with relaxed customs regime of EU after Customs Union Treaty” (Doğan, 2007: 99). Likewise, in 1998, textile products comprises of 60 % of the import made from Kayseri (Doğan, 2007: 100). On the other hand, we should not forget that this textile import is just 1 % of the total textile import of Turkey (Doğan, 2007: 109). The textile/weaving sector was followed by the metal goods, wood and food sectors (Bilgili, 2000: 89). According to the statistics, the followings are the sectors and workers of active 385 factories in the end of 1990s in Kayseri (Bilgili, 2000: 95).

Table 3 The Factories in Kayseri in 1990s and Their Distribution on Sectors²⁰⁶

| Sector | Number of factories | Number of workers |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Durable consumer goods | 75 | 3458 |
| Food and feedstuff | 39 | 2860 |
| Tekstile, weaving and leather | 38 | 13881 |
| Mining and Metallurgy | 9 | 1190 |
| Construction | 51 | 1204 |
| Stove and couldron production | 22 | 653 |
| Otomotive | 12 | 667 |
| Furniture and Bed | 48 | 3978 |
| Elektrical and Electronical | 11 | 2403 |
| Foundry and Metal | 24 | 805 |
| Forest Products | 5 | 648 |
| Other sectors | 51 | 2557 |
| Total | 385 | 34304 |

The famous list of İstanbul Chamber of Industry could also give an idea on the development of Kayseri industry. Among the biggest 500 firms there were respectively 8, 9, 11 and 14 firms in the years 1991, 1992, 1994 and 1995. For instance these 14 (1995) firms composed of 5 textile firms (two of them produce carpets) 3 bed-quilt-sponge, 2 cable , 2 metal, 1 sugar and 1 mining factory. 4 of the biggest 6 firms were producing textile.

Although it does not glitter above, the most outstanding and determining sector would be furniture in the years of 2000 in Kayseri. Since the end of the last decade of the last century furniture has been the leading sector in Kayseri industry. In 1998 Kayseri were producing 6 % of the total furniture export of Turkey. (Doğan, 2007: 100)

As I noticed before the fellows of Hacılar were intensively moved to industry in 1960s and 1970s and towards the end of these decades they became masters in their professions. Having accumulated some capital they opened their own shops and gradually transformed them into middle scale workplaces. The rapidly increased

²⁰⁶ Resource: Kayseri Valiliği İl Sanayi ve Ticaret Müdürlüğü, 2000: 28-30

demand in the domestic market was the main dynamic in behind. In this period, the entrepreneurs of Hacilar were oriented first the local markets of Central Anatolia and then expanded their horizon towards the eastern parts of Turkey. There was excessive demand in an atmosphere where the industry is very primitive, and the consumer good markets are quite scarce. Velzen's observations also proved that Kayseri industry was grown with the dynamics of demand in 1970s (Van Velzen, 1978).

As a matter of the fact, throughout 1970s, the entrepreneurs of Hacilar worked very effectively and earned much money almost with 200, 300 % profit margins. Namely, they did the real capital accumulation which would pave the way for their prospective development in this period. Since, Kayseri was a close center for the Eastern Turkey in which the industry sector was very weak and most of the traders and intermediaries of East were coming to Kayseri for fulfilling their needs of consumer goods. It was the same for the traders of Kayseri who were searching for new markets for themselves. Most of the industrialist I interviewed told me that the traders of the East were sleeping in front of the doors, within the trucks to bring more goods to their local markets and there was not such a thing like not finding any customers. This was almost valid almost for all sectors. The people were hungry to the consumer goods and production was incredibly profitable business at that time. These are the sentences of an old industrialist who started upholstery in his childhood and earned too much in a very short time before he was 20 years old.

I earned too much money before the military service. I was child then. I earned too much. Even I was shocked how I earned that much. How? I was covering an armchair or a seat for 7,5 TL. 2,5 TL was the costs and I was covering at least 2 or 3 seats. It was such that I had earned 33.000 TL in a year. Say 3, to 4 thousands were the costs and 7, 8 thousand were for the extra workers. The rests was mine. No one told me something and I spent all that money, you understand? I spent that money in the restaurants, in the strip clubs. I had many friends near by my side, since I had too much money.... I guess the wage of an officer was between 40 to 50 TL for a month then. I was taking that money in three days. It was such big money. Since the business was very open at that time. There was nothing in Turkey. Everyone was setting on the *sedirs*. While they were sitting on the blankets over stone blocks we were making armchairs. It was very new for the society. Our productions were sent to Çorum, Tokat, Sivas, Malatya, and Erzurum the entire East with trucks every day.

The piece above shows the amount which this young apprentice earned when he was 17, 18 years old and working in a shop of someone else. Besides, especially the patterns of consumption is giving us a sufficient impression why I am against the Calvinist Islam argument from the beginning of this thesis

Now I will try to analyze this industrialization processes in detail. The Table 3 below is the continuation of the Table 1 and shows the subsequent life histories of entrepreneurs from 1970s to 2000s from the small shops in old industrial districts of Kayseri to the large scale factories in Organized Industrial District by passing through different trajectories. The first two columns show the starting business and its year. The following column shows the opening of the first owned shop. The next two ones show the years of shift to new industrial districts and the following column notices the year of first import. The last one indicates the feature of the production. As a last note, I included also 3 industrialists who are not making production right now of several reasons (the one who rented his factory, the one who are preparing for a new investment and the last one who left production). They are here in this list to see the extensions of Hacilar industry. Let's look at the table.

Table 4 Transition from Workshops to New Industrial Districts

| Gir. | Starting Business | Year | First Place | Shift to new industrial districts |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|--|
| G1 | Upholstery | 1963 | 1969 | 1986-1990-1993 |
| G2 | Body maker | 1974 | 1982 | |
| G3 | Draper | 1974 | 1974 | |
| G4 | Salesman | 1966 | 1978 | 1987 |
| G5 | Mechanical engineer | 1973 | | 1995 |
| G6 | Draper | 1979 | | |
| G7 | Steel fixer | 1967 | 1975 | 1987 |
| G8 | Upholstery | 1960 | 1968 | 1971 |
| G9 | Jeological engineer | 1973 | | |
| G10 | Draper | 1950 | | |
| G11 | Carpenter, upholstery | 1947 | 1955 | 1978 |
| G12 | Body maker | 1962 | | 1970 |
| G13 | Carpet producer, teacher | 1978 | | |
| G14 | Automobile electrician/carver | 1979 | 1983 | 1991 |
| G15 | Steel fixer | 1960 | 1975 | |
| G16 | Upholstery | 1972 | 1973 | 1978 |
| G17 | Carpenter/ chest maker | 1965 | 1968 | 1977 |
| G18 | Body maker | 1957 | 1971 | 1973 |
| G19 | Draper | 1950 | 1962 | 1985 |
| G20 | Truck driver | 1966 | 1985 | |
| G21 | Upholstery/ carpenter | 1970 | 1977 | |
| G22 | Lawyer | 1976 | 1980 | |
| G23 | Mechanical engineer/carpet producer | 1968 | | |
| G24 | Electrical engineer | 1970 | | |
| G25 | Upholstery | 1971 | 1975 | 1991 |
| G26 | Upholstery | 1979 | | 1983 |
| G27 | Panel beater/ metal worker | 1962 | 1972 | |
| G28 | Upholstery | 1968 | 1979 | 1989 |
| G29 | wood timber | 1980 | | |
| G30 | Iron master/metal worker | 1964 | 1970 | 1980 |

Table 5 Transition to Factories in Kayseri OSB

| Gir. | Shift to OSB | First import year | Production at the present time |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------------------|---|
| G1 | 1995-1996 | 2001 | Furniture production |
| G2 | 1990-1998 | 2000 | Thread, fabric, body production Truck sale |
| G3 | 1974(HES) | Not | drapery and cable production |
| G4 | 1995 | Not | Furniture production |
| G5 | | | Carpet production (not now) |
| G6 | 1998 | 2000 | Socks production and drapery |
| G7 | 1989 | 2003 | Steel shelf production |
| G8 | 1986 | Not | Furniture production (factory was hired) |
| G9 | 1974(HES) | 1990 | Steel production |
| G10 | 1974(HES) | 1992 | Cable (electric, fiberoptic) production |
| G11 | 1992 | 1995 | Furniture production |
| G12 | 1992 | 2003 | Steel door and body production |
| G13 | 1993 | 2000 | Seramics production |
| G14 | 1995 | Not | Furniture production |
| G15 | 1995 | 2001 | Steel door production |
| G16 | 2006 | 2000 | Furniture production |
| G17 | 1995 | 1991 | Office furnitures production |
| G18 | 1986-1989 | 2002 | Steel door and body production |
| G19 | 2002 | Not | drapery, coach fabric production |
| G20 | 1997 | 1999 | excavation, thread and fabric production |
| G21 | 1996 | 2000 | Furniture production |
| G22 | 1987 | Not | Factory was hired by someone else |
| G23 | 2006 | Not | concrete production |
| G24 | 1974(HES) | Not | Machine production |
| G25 | 1995 | 2001 | Furniture production |
| G26 | 1995 | 1998 | Furniture production |
| G27 | 1995 | 2001 | Furniture production |
| G28 | 1996 | 2006 | Furniture production |
| G29 | 1996 | 2000 | Haircloth and towel production |
| G30 | 1997 | 2003 | Furniture production |

Before analyzing these tendencies in relation to the literature outlined above, it is possible to see some outstanding points which come forward. Firstly, there seems a contradiction with the macroeconomic data which I summarized above, about the condition of Kayseri industry in 1980s. Regarding the histories of their business, we see an uninterrupted (except the two years after military intervention) development line started mostly in 1960s and 1970s and reached to 2000s. This reminds us that sometimes the macroeconomic analysis could not reflect (or maybe miss) some

different dimensions of the reality. Of course they are true analysis and picture the landscape from a wider panoramic perspective; however, this view could not recognize some local dynamics and informal processes and activities. For instance, despite all its problems since 1950s there seems a very dynamic domestic market in Turkey with a certain capacity of demand and there has been an income transfer stemming from the economic inequality between the regions. There could be different sources of this capacity such as seasonal work, working abroad (in Europe, Saudi Arabia, Lebanese, Libya) remittances, agricultural economics, animal husbandry, smuggling except the regular wages. In a previous chapter, I had examined Hacılar's informal relations with the Eastern parts (including Syria) of Turkey within the context of smuggling. We could suppose that these relations and networks between Kayseri and the region turned out to be a new phase regarding the extraordinary circumstances in the region stemming from the terror of PKK. Therefore, it is possible that the economy of the region could be affected by the informal, indeed illegal sources of income that could not be registered and put in numbers.

Kayseri has been the convenient center of the Central Anatolia and for the cities around 250-300 kilometers such as Sivas, Kırşehir, Nevşehir, Yozgat, Niğde, Maraş. Therefore, it has been benefited from the consuming capacity of all these places. It is possible to add these cities the Eastern ones too. The data I collected from in-depth interviews clearly show that Kayseri has particularly risen economically on this Eastern hinterland until 1990s. The critical moments of growth could be followed in the table of the development of the firms. In this sense, the furniture and metal goods (the line from body to steel door production) industries could be considered as the typical examples of development from domestic to international markets in parallel to the economic and social transformation of Turkey from 1980s. Let's look at these two sectors in detail.

Looking to the table above, we see that eleven of the entrepreneurs (seven upholsterer, one salesman, one carver, one chest producer, couch producer) who started working as apprentices in 1960s near the carpenters in Kayseri industry

succeeded to establish their own factories. These carpenters were producing very simple furniture with hand labor such as wedding chest, window, seat, arm chair, couch, table, vitrine etc. between 1955 and 1985 in small shops. The table shows that they brought production to the large scale factories in Kayseri OSB in 1990. In this ten years period, they used the capital gained from the local economy for expanding their market to the national market. So they established sales and contact offices in İstanbul and gave their first advertisements to the national TV channels. The capital accumulated from this national market highly increased their production capacity and they decided to bring it to the world markets towards 2000s by focusing on export. It is also possible to observe that these export-oriented approaches also served for their development in domestic markets too. Since the competition in foreign markets led to the rise of quality in the production and this provided them for the new segments of customers who could buy expensive products having more profit margins in the domestic markets. As a matter of the fact, they expanded their markets, profits, investments and visions in this period. Before getting into the details of these development processes it would be better to hear some typical industrialist narrating their own stories. This is from an owner a relatively small furniture factory.

My father did not have a certain job. He worked as hotel manager and as peddler in Ankara. I worked 1 or 2 years with him. Then my father became partner of a carpenter in Sitemer. I started to work there. We produced cafe tables there. After the military service, I left working with my father and worked as a salesman in Ankara for a while. Then I came back to Kayseri and worked 1 year in a furniture firm. Then I met with a master there and became partner with him. We produced seats and couches for 3 years. My partner quit the job. Meanwhile, I have a brother and he was growing by the way. Then he became master at the end and I took him to my side. We started to produce furniture together until 1987 in a workshop of 200 square meters. Then we shifted to old industrial district and the workshop grew up to 800 square meters. Our products were also diversified. We started to produce furniture sets, sleeping and eating room sets and couches. Then in 1987 I quit production and shifted to raw material trade but I saw that it is not up to me. We became unsuccessful and got back to production. In the end of 1988, I became partner with another friend. By the way we were always together with my brother. We started again from the beginning in a small workshop of 200 square meters. We also had a small shop marketing our products of 60 square meters. Then we hired a bigger place of 1000 square meters for production in middle industry zone. In 1995 we bought a lot of 1000 square meters from OSB and constructed our factory. So, our total place went up to 5000 square meter in 2007.

This below piece is narrating the trajectory of the leader firm of both Hacılar and Kayseri industry. The chairman of the holding is speaking about what happened after 1980.

It was 1981 when our fathers (two brothers) left the business to us. They passed on the job to the young generations to me, my brothers and cousins In these years we were producing both furniture and steel goods and office equipments. We were producing hundreds of different units. Then we decided to specialization in 1982 and quit the production of steel goods and office equipments. We intensively focused on the furniture. After Özal came to power in 1983 he established a fund of collective housing. Thereafter many apartment blocks were started to build like mushrooms. At that time we focused on the couch. Couch with drawers, with 3 or 4 covers or chest of drawers. We tried to fill our capacity with couch production. In 1987 we started to produce couch made up of steel strings. It became the critical turn, a jump for us. After 1992 we became gradually famous in Turkey. In 1991 we established our regional directorate in Bayrampaşa, İstanbul. There were two small shops 150 and 50 square meters. After selling our products to İstanbul, we could not manage the excessive demand. So, İstanbul expanded our vision. Since, in the beginning we were selling our goods to the East or central Anatolia. After selling to West, İstanbul opened our vision after 1991. In 1992 we gave our first advertisement to the national TV channels when try to manage the incredible demand of the city.

Yet, this is a different example from a different sector, metal/ steel goods. The founder of the firm is talking about the development stages of his business.

Our firm was established between 1969 and 1970. It started with body making, chassis and panel beating. It is the business of our father. We are the second generation. The most productive years were the Özal period from 1980s to 1990s to 1995s. We made good business like everybody at that time when Turkey opened its doors to the outside world. ... We established our firm in 1993 before it was in the status of workshop. It is a family business. Until 1996 we were working in the new industrial district in a workshop of 50 to 70 square meters. In 1983 we added one more shop and it became 200-250 square meters. In 1992 we bought the lot on which we would establish our factory. This factory has 10.000 square meter place. 6.000 square meters is closed place.....1995 Crises shattered us but not killed. We could recover in a short time....However after the 1995 Crises we thought that “what should we do, how can be prepared for the next crises?” and we decided to get in a different sector. So, we started to produce outside doors made up of steel in 1996. Since it was related with metal work which has been already our business..... In the first three year we had partners. Then we got the business as family in 1999. Right after we established our own trade mark in 1999, a new crisis happened. In 2001 the biggest crises boomed. After 2001 Crises we thought that “the crises come in every five years” and decided to make exports as a precaution and established our foreign trade department. It was very difficult at the beginning but we had patient. After participated foreign fairs and got in touch with a couple of customers our business began to go well.

Regarding all these pieces above, it is possible to argue that Kayseri industry has been developed by using some local additional dynamics besides benefiting from the general socio-economic transformation of the Turkey in neo-liberal times. This also verifies that despite all the domination of the neo liberal ideological discourse prevailing in the country almost 30 years, the production sector in Kayseri was developed to a great extend by leaning on the local economies and the domestic market in 1990s and 2000s.

Generally speaking there was a certain growth in almost every sector between 1980s and 2000s including the industrial production and this was related with economic growth and the development of domestic markets. However there are also some special reasons regarding the sectors of cable, steel, carpet, furniture and steel goods focused by the entrepreneurs of Hacilar.

As I noted before the energy, communication and infrastructural investments of Özal triggered the rapid development and success of HES Group. Besides, the increased migration from rural to urban areas led to the augmentation of the leading construction sector and its affiliated sub-sectors. So the highly increased need for durable goods led to the expansion of domestic markets and the entrepreneurs of Hacilar benefited from these conjuncture by massively producing the required consumer goods. A similar process is still going on in the AKP era in which the TOKİ houses were built everywhere and the same construction campaign is at work. If to add the reversed migration movement from Europe to Turkey in the last 20 years it is possible to grasp the hugeness of the market. Since, the migrants have been making serious investments such as house constructions in the villages and consumer goods which expand and mobilize the domestic economy especially in summers.

As a matter of the fact, the İstikbal furniture and steel made outside doors entered into almost all lower and lower middle class houses of Turkey. There happened such kind of a “couch revolution” (ESI, 2005) in Turkey as noted by ESI report.

Considering all the interviews I made with industrialists, it is possible to argue that industrial production which intensified in 1970s lasted until 1994 Crises with high profit margins without interruption. Indeed, it may be suggested that this process had even continued until the 2000-2001 Crises with high inflation and accompanied extreme profit rates. One of the industrialists excellently pictured the effects of these factors and combined them to the fellows' unplanned, chaotic and risky way of doing business in analyzing the success of Hacilar.

The fellows, industrialists and traders of Kayseri behaved in a much more cautious way. Since the economic policies required such kind of controls. There were devaluations every 3, 4 years. Up and downs every year, some rises and some fall down. However, our villagers (industrialists) did not understand deeply what happened in Turkish Economy. So, they behaved unbelievably courage in trade and industry. In Özal Period between 1980 and 1995 indeed to 2000 everyone who has courage won. Since the supply is to a great extent in behind the demand. There were some days; we frequently came to say that: "brother! this is fabric, this is wood, this is steel spring, do it and send the money". Since, the customers were saying that: "just send me couches irrespective of its quality". On the other side, we were paying the costs of raw materials in 1 to 1,5 months later but we were taking money before 3 to 4 months from the customers. Such a great amount of money was accumulated in these years in our hands. However, meanwhile the experienced fellows (traders) of Kayseri were thinking that: "I will pay my debts in 3 months. But if devaluation happened I would fall down. So I have to pay it on time". Namely, what we saw as in favor of us were considered by themselves as disadvantageous. Do you understand?... We are in the same ship. If you are in the administration office of the ship and know what happens around, you behave with that anxiety. But our villager industrialists knew nothing and were making projections just for 1 year. How can I put it? A good industrialist makes plans and projections of at least 5 years. He plans its physical and fiscal capacity according to the borders of this plan. However our fellows did not behave within these borders. One hangar, one more, one more. They drifted themselves to the wind of growing economics. They did not make any plans. This disorganization and unplanned decisions triggered the extreme development of these industrialists of Hacilar.

Consequently, based on the Table 1 and 2, I could summarize the main trajectories and typologies of Hacilar's entrepreneurs (thirty families) as follows. I will discuss the details of present conditions of Hacilar industry in the next chapter.

1. Those who oriented to furniture production by passing through the businesses of upholstery, carpentry and woodcarving (eleven families).

2. Those who oriented to chassis, steel door, office furniture production by passing through the businesses of steel fixing, panel beating, body making and metal work (6 families).
3. Those who oriented to industry by becoming partners to ATLAS Halı and HES by investing money they earned from the trade (four families).
4. Those who bought shares of the factories after started working as professionals (engineers) in ATLAS Halı and HES (three families).
5. Those who earned money from the business outside the production (excavation, automobile repair/spare parts, wood timber, drapery etc.) but made investments to textile production (weaving, threads, haircloth, couch cloth, socks factories) after 1990s (four families)
6. Those who earned money from carpet business but invested money to industrial production (ceramics and concrete factories) in the end of the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s (two families)
7. Those who go on with the factories (HES Cable, HES Chemistry, HES Machine and HAS Steel) having devolved on their families after the separation of HES Group in 1999 (five families).

CHAPTER 5

FORM and RELATIONS of PRODUCTION

In this chapter I am going to examine the forms and relations of production of Hacilar industry in 2000s. However as in the case of previous chapters, first I will draw the general picture of Turkish economy and politics and the basic characteristics of Kayseri industry in these years for contextualizing the period.

After leaving the lost years of 1990s Turkey began the new century with a weak and clumsy coalition government which caused to the biggest economic crises of Republican History. By the way, since Turkish economy was dependant to the global economy this crisis corresponded to the declining tendencies of world economy between 1998 and 2001 (Boratav, 2009: 463-464). Actually, the macro economic balances of Turkish economy had started to deteriorate before the 1989 elections. Before the elections Özal, had relaxed the stability program and started to shift to populism to win the elections. His populist policies, promising income to different sections of society led to budget deficits and these deficits tried to be filled with foreign debts by Özal. So it caused to a vicious cycle since then. In order to close the financial deficits Özal opened the Turkish economy further to the global capital flows and this increased the dependency and volatility of Turkish economy. The additional costs of Kurdish problem deepened the urgency of financial needs which was tried to be closed with domestic borrowing and external debts. As a matter of the fact, the inflation was over 100 % until 1994 and fluctuated over 50 % between 1994 and 2001. The high nominal and real interest rates, the continuous increase in the public debt and increased volatility to foreign shocks were the main factors of 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2001 Crises (Pamuk, 2011: 299-300).

The 2001 crises emerged first in financial and banking sectors. The massive escape of capital from Turkey led to the devaluation of TL and the decline of the real income of the workers and wage earners. For instance, the real wages in industrial

production declined 14, 2 % as against the previous year and this decline continued with 7, 2 % in 2002. The internal terms of trade between agriculture/industry had fallen 23, 2 % and the unemployment continued to rise from 8,4 % to 14 % between 2001 and 2004 (Boratav, 2009: 464). Meanwhile, the white collar groups also experienced a serious unemployment and certain numbers of professionals in banking sector were fired. Besides, first time in Republican History, the shopkeepers and artisans were seriously damaged and poured into streets. The case of industrial producers was also not good. Especially the ones who became indebted with foreign exchange went bankrupt or lessened their production. Meanwhile, GNP decreased 9, 5 % in 2001.

As a solution to the 2001 crises Kemal Derviş was transferred from WB and put in the status of minister responsible from the economy. He prepared an urgent economic stability program mainly based on maintaining financial discipline and decreasing budget deficits (Pamuk, 2011: 301). Boratav considered this program as “the capture of Turkish Economy by the Bretton Woods institutions. As Ekzen rightly puts like the other ones having been implemented since 1998, this program was also based on the neo-liberal economic policies suggested by IMF and WB for years. It was reflecting their preference which would turn Turkish economy again to the montage industry and make it more dependable, vulnerable and weak against the foreign shocks (Ekzen, 2009: 475). The program was accepting the floating exchange rates and turns the due responsibilities of public banks to long terms public debts. It was also giving room for reforms in the fragile financial system, and for exclusion of political intervention into the public enterprises. Increasing the autonomy of Central Bank is one of these critical precautions (Pamuk, 2011: 301).

Yet, AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power under these circumstances in the middle of this heaviest socio-economic crisis of Turkey and continued to implement the neo-liberal stability program made by Derviş. This process was corresponded directly with the rising trend of world economy between 2002- 2007 including revivals in capital movements and foreign demand (Boratav, 2009: 464- 469). So, Turkey started to recover from the bottom of the crises. “GNP

increased 35 % in 4 years until 2005 and inflation declined below the 8 %. So did the nominal and real interest rates..... With the economic growth and big budget surpluses the debt load which had transcended 100 % of the GNP declined below 70 %. However, this was a revival that did not create employment. Despite the rises in production and incomes, the urban unemployment stayed over 13 % in 2005 (Pamuk, 2011: 301). For Ekzen the basic reason of this was “the growth model based on foreign demand which is directed to create foreign debts rather than surplus value and employment (Ekzen, 2009: 478). Likewise, “the total amount of annual net foreign capital flows between 2003 and 2007 was 186 billion \$... In the same period the rate of debt creating capital flows fluctuated between % 50 (2007) and % 82 (2004) and exceeded the threshold of 75 % in 2008 (Boratav, 2009: 464-465).

Actually this is the main source of “current account deficit” problem which has been frequently referred in considering the economic performance of AKP in these days. Since it went up to 116 billion \$ in the first 5 years of AKP rule. In this sense, Boratav notices that the main problem is the vicious way of meeting the deficit with foreign capital flows which would create extra deficits in the long run. Therefore, he suggests to set the law of causation not in the line of *growth- current deficit- foreign source (as autonomous capital)* but in the line of *foreign source - growth –current deficit* (Boratav, 2009: 467). As a matter of the fact, the foreign debts of Turkey rapidly increased from almost 130 billion \$ in 2002 to 247 billion \$ in 2007 and 284 billion \$ in 2008 by an average increase rate of % 13.8 per year. So in the same period foreign debt/ national income rate declined from 72.4 % in 2002 to 49.4 % in 2007 (Boratav, 2009: 468).

Another proof of this nonproductive growth tendency could be found via comparing the electricity demand of different sectors. For instance, whereas the electricity demand of Turkey was growing 8 %, there was a decrease in the electricity demand of industrial sector while the rates of electricity use in trading establishments increased over the annual average between 2004 and 2008 (Ekzen, 2009: 480). The distribution of the GNP may also give an idea on that. In 2000 GNP was composed

of 12, 2 % agriculture, 23, 5 industry and 52, 8 service sector (except construction, mining and energy). However it had changed in 2007 as such: 8, 9 % agriculture, 24 % services 55, 4 % (Ekzen, 2009: 478). As it is seen the growth was not in the industry but realized mostly in service and trade sectors.

To sum up, in 2008 Turkey was still a country whose export oriented economy is based on standart technologies, lower level fixed capital investment, cheap labor and foreign demand. So its destiny was depending on the decisions of private sector and international treaties (Ekzen, 2009: 491). The indicators of income distribution are the other parts of this picture. The unequal income distribution caused by the 2001 Crises could not be compensated in the following years and the pre-Crises conditions could not be turned back regarding the indicators such as real wages, employment in general and particularly agricultural employment, agriculture/industry prices etc. (Boratav, 2009: 471).

Besides all these positive and negative dimensions, the general recovery in economy in this period led to the victory of AKP in 2007 Elections with the support rate of 47 %. Actually, this economic growth has also a particular dimension directly affiliated with my thesis. As noted by Pamuk, Turkish economy opened more to outside under the AKP rule. The export rate verifies this statement. According to the statistics the total exports of Turkey went up from approximately 3 billion \$ in 1980 to 13, 28 and 100 billion dollars respectively in the years 1990, 2000 and 2007. Similarly, the rate of export to total production has also increased from 3 % in 1980 to 25 % in 2008. And what's more this increase was provided mostly by the manufactured goods. The rate of manufactured goods in the total export went up from 35 % in 1979 to over 95 % in 2007. Furthermore, the exports were to a great extend made to Europe and the share of Europe in total exports of Turkey was always over 50 % except a couple of years (Pamuk, 2009: 274-275).

Some parts of this growth were provided by the Anatolian industrialists who are called sometimes as Anatolian Tigers. Pamuk claims that these new industrial groups still not deserve to be called as "tigers" regarding the industrial structure of

Turkey. However, he also underlines that the II. (Tekirdağ, Kırklareli, Sakarya, Balıkesir, Eskişehir, Manisa and İçel) and III. group of industrial cities (Denizli, Konya, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş and Malatya) show a better performance than I. Group (İstanbul, Bursa, Kocaeli, İzmir, Ankara, Adana) regarding some indicators such as value added, employment and increase in labor productivity. They also increased their shares in total export of manufactured goods (Pamuk, 2009: 276). For him, the spreading out of the industrial production to the Anatolian cities established the third wave of Turkey's industrialization after the "state led" and "import substitution" stages. This critical transition from agriculture and trade dominant economy to industrial capitalism was realized by the new group of industrialists and middle classes newly emerged in Anatolia. These groups, for him, took a stand on the side of globalization rather than reject it. Since, they were developed in an era of open economy to outside markets. (Pamuk, 2009: 280). When the interests of small and medium scale enterprises, merchants and shop keepers coincided with the globalization process they have tended to give up to follow the National Outlook (Milli Görüş) parties whose economic perspective has been inward looking, Eurosceptical and limited (politically) with the Islamic World. Therefore, with its neo-liberal stance AKP turned out to be the main address for these groups which have been historically supported National Outlook tradition but recently stripped of their old mentality against EU and globalization. On the other hand, in its first 5 years the relations of AKP with business world was tremendous. The party definitely followed pro-private sector policies and took the support of them too (Pamuk, 2009: 280). However, for Pamuk, what is more critical was the maintenance of the support of Anatolian industrialist whose weight is of more critical and dominant in the elections (Pamuk, 2009: 279).

Moreover, AKP paved the way for Anatolian industrialist both with its attempts in economy and foreign affairs. Meanwhile the party also supported them indirectly by ignoring the informal character of Anatolian industry including some deficits in social security payments, insurance and other provisions. Indeed, sometimes it directly supported some sectors by reducing value added tax rates as in the case in automobile and furniture industries from 18 % to 8 % such within the 2009 Crises.

The industrialists in return supported AKP on condition that it keeps on the EU targets and shows loyalty to fiscal discipline and the general export oriented strategy (Pamuk, 2009: 281). The fellows of Hacılar as the critical component of Anatolian Tigers entered in the new century under these circumstances.

The times after 2000 could be generally considered as the years of opening out. However, before getting into details it would be useful to evaluate the general conditions of Hacılar industry. So, in this chapter, I will examine the basic features of industrial production having been made by the industrialists of Hacılar under certain headings. But I have to repeat again actually there is not such a thing as an independent entity of Hacılar industry. It is a component of Kayseri industry and I am just using this noun phrase for analytical purposes. In order to avoid from the confusion, it is better to clarify the situation.

Kayseri OSB (organized industrial district) was established in the large plane called Karasaz which lies behind the Yılanlı mountain in the west 15 kilometers far away from the city center. Some adjacent districts in the south of the OSB takes place within the borders and extensions of Hacılar. Therefore, in parallel to the industrial developments occurred in Hacılar the fellows of Hacılar decided to establish a new and private industrial district in order to benefit from the cheap lands nearby Kayseri OSB and mostly owned by them. So, in 1998 they set up “Hacılar Private Organized Industrial District” on a district of 700 hectare. It became the first private status OSB in Turkey. The establishment of Hacılar OSB was completed in 2000. However, due to some reasons I would explain in later chapters Hacılar OSB joined to Kayseri OSB in 2003. Although some firms of Hacılar origin intensified in the district of ex Hacılar OSB side, right now they had already spread to the whole Kayseri OSB. Therefore, before getting into the details of Hacılar industry, it would be useful to look at the general characteristics of the industrial production in Kayseri based on the data given by the Kayseri Chamber of Industry. Then it would be very easy to locate Hacılar within it.

5.1 Industrial Production in Kayseri in 2000s

Today, the industrial production in Kayseri is being made basically in 3 organized industrial districts (OSB) (Kayseri OSB, İncesu OSB and Mimar Sinan OSB) and the Free Zone adjacent to Kayseri OSB. Besides, there are 8 small industrial districts. 6 of them exist in the city center and the others are situated in Pınarbaşı and Tomarza provinces. There are totally 7750 workplaces in these small industrial districts and 37.500 people are working on an area of 6 million square meters²⁰⁷. Beyond these small districts, the main production was made in Kayseri OSB which was constructed in 1976 and right now Turkey's largest OSB with its area of 24 millions square meters. Today, more than 500 firms are making production with 50.000 employees and among them 17 firms are within the list of biggest 500 firms prepared by Istanbul Chamber of Industry²⁰⁸.

Kayseri Free Zone which was established in 1999 is also the largest free zone of Turkey with its almost 7 million square meters area. Here among the registered 70 ones, there are 27 firms making production with 1.600 workers. Cotton threads, metal pipes and profiles, electrostatic powder paint, durable consumer goods, aluminum conductors of strings, white goods are some products made here. The trade capacity of the Zone²⁰⁹ in 2010 is 525 million \$, and the export rate is 136 million \$.

Considering all these indicators, it is possible to observe that Kayseri has a quite developed and diversified industrial structure. According the information given by KAYSO (Kayseri Chamber of Industry) approximately 200.000 people are working in 1500 production center in Kayseri. The total production is over 5 billion dollars and there is a foreign trade capacity of 2,5 billion dollars in the city. Besides, 1, 3

²⁰⁷ See website of KSO: http://www.kayso.org.tr/web_18480_1/index.aspx Access 23 January 2012

²⁰⁸ See website of KSO: http://www.kayso.org.tr/web_18480_1/index.aspx and web site of

Kayseri Governership: http://www.kayseri.gov.tr/default_B0.aspx?id=44 Access 23 January 2012

²⁰⁹ See website of Kayseri OSB: <http://kayseriosb.org/sayfa/2/hakkimizda.html> Access 23 January 2012

billion dollars (1.315.753.93 million) of this capacity is composed of exports²¹⁰. Based on the information given by KAYSO the distribution of different sectors in Kayseri industry, the basic products and the forerunner firms are as follows.

- *27,15% Metal goods:* Steel good and equipments, metal furniture, elevator doors, aluminum works, market shelves, grocery carts, panel radiator, profiles, metal plate, ironing board, pressure cooker, kitchen tools, oven, vessels, heating boiler, hydrophone, heat exchanger, oil and water tank, nail, sun panel, heater, bolt, Copper and steel string, springs, robe and pipe, steel car panel, mould, diecast, etc. Some basic firms: Merkez Çelik San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Has Çelik ve Halat San. Tic. A.Ş., Boyçelik Metal San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Mega Metal San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti., Birlik Mensucat Ticaret ve San. A.Ş., Metal Matris San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Kayseri Metal Center San. Tic. A.Ş., Isısan Isı Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş., Femaş Emaye San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti.
- *17,61% Furniture and Woodworks:* Panel furniture, home office and kitchen furniture, shelves, étagère, chair, seat, table, couch, sleeping bed, bed base, seating groups, wood car panel, forest products etc. Some basic firms: Boytaş Mobilya San. ve Tic. A.Ş., İstikbal Mobilya San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Yataş Yatak ve Yorgan San. Tic. A.Ş., Form Sünger ve Yatak San. Tic. A.Ş., Ceha Büro Mobilyaları Ltd. Şti., Kilim Mobilya Kanepeler San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Gürkan Ofis Mobilyaları San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti., Mondri Yatak Yorgan San. ve Tic. A.Ş., İpek Kanepeler Mobilya San. ve Tic. A.Ş.
- *12,23% Textile:* cotton thread, acrylics thread, fibrilla, velvet, denim cloth, upholstery fabric, home textile, confection and garment, handmade and machine woven carpet, synthetic bag, towel, bathroom clothes, underwear, socks, etc. Some basic firms: Orta Anadolu Tic. ve San. İşl. T.A.Ş., Saray Halı A.Ş., Boyteks Tekstil San. ve Tic. A.Ş. Karsu Tekstil Sanayii ve Tic. A.Ş., Birlik Mensucat Ticaret ve San. A.Ş., Çetinkaya Mensucat San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Selenteks Tekstil San. Tic. A.Ş.)

²¹⁰ See website of KSO: http://www.kayso.org.tr/web_18480_1/index.aspx Access 10 January 2011 and 5 February 2011

- *10,66% Chemical plastics and advertisement materials:* Paper, carton box, plastic bags, PVC pocket materials, dust and liquid detergent.
- *9,73% Construction and infrastructural equipments:* Concrete, PVC doors and windows, pipes glassware, bricks, concrete parquet, natural stone etc. Some basic firms: Erbosan Erciyas Boru San.ve Tic. A.Ş., Eras İnşaat Turizm San. ve Tic. A.Ş.
- *8,43 % Food:* meat products such as pastrami, *sucuk*, salami and sausage. Fresh water fishing industry, poultry husbandry, eggs, feedstuff, animal oil and herbal oil, milk and milk products, spices, beverages, sugar, *lokum*, *helva*, jam, cookies, biscuits, baked products, wheat, whole meal, filo pastry, patty etc. Some basic firms: Kayseri Şeker Fabrikası A.Ş., Keskinılıç Gıda San. ve Tic. A.Ş., Gülsan Gıda San. Tic. A.Ş.
- *4,91% Electrical household utensils:* Electrolytic copper string, electric and communication cable, aluminum conductors, fiber optic cable, electric engine, panels, automation panels, AC and DC drivers, rubber/plastic plug and socket, telephone, telephone operator, electric stove, refrigerator etc. Some basic firms: HES Hacılar Elektrik San. ve Tic. A.S, Kumtel Day. Tük. Ml. Pls. San.Tic. A.Ş. Coreal Alüminyum Kablo San.ve Tic. A.Ş.
- *4,54% Machine:* milking machine, butter churn, rototiller, harvester, trailer pulvarizator, CNC stand, hand tools, air compressor, centrifuge, pump, Washing machine, refrigerator, press, vacuum cleaner, hydraulic pump, hydrofore, dump, air conditioning, roasting machine for dried nuts and fruits, knife, body armour, accumulator, axle, wagon, spare and repair parts
- *4,73% Mining: The principal mines and their regions are as follows.* Aluminum- Sarız; lead-zinc Yahyalı; zinc-Yahyalı (Celal Mountain); Iron-Yahyalı; plaster stone- Akkışla; concrete raw material - Bünyan; China Clay- Felahiye (Badanalık location); pumice- Develi, Talas, Tomarza; brick raw material Develi; lignite Pınarbaşı, Sarıoğlan, Yeşilhisar; Diatomite-Kocasinan (Hırka village); Chrome- Pınarbaşı²¹¹ Saeo basic firms: ÇİNKOM Kurşun Metal ve Madencilik San. Tic. A.Ş., Özkoyuncu Demir Madeni Ltd. Şti., Dedeman Madencilik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.

²¹¹ Quoted by Özasan ve Şeftalici 2002:120 from Kayseri Valiliği, İl Brifing Raporu, 2001

As seen in the table metal goods, forest products and textile seem to be the leader sectors in the city. The work of Bilgili, shows that regarding the total working hours of the workers in 2001 textile is the first sector and the others are respectively, metal goods, woodwork and food²¹². However 2011 statistics given by KAYSO indicates that the metal sector comes first and furniture and wood work sectors supervene. It seems in 10 years ranking has changed and metal goods sector came to the first position. However, as easily seen all these three sectors are labor intensive fields which could be considered as the weak side of the industry in Kayseri.

Actually, metal goods are one of the first developed sectors in Kayseri. Since 1950s some goods have been produced with manual labor and simple technology such as stove, oven, aluminum kitchen goods and stove. However, in the last 20 years the production of steel doors, metal furniture came forward. Besides, today the majority of exports composed of copper strings, steel springs, steel cables and ropes.

On the other side, in forest products sector; the production of couch, seat, armchair, panel furniture and office furniture came forward. Indeed it has been talked about a “couch revolution²¹³” in Kayseri and the city turned out to be a furniture production center. For instance, approximately 70 % of production and exports of couches, armchairs and beds in Turkey are made in Kayseri right now²¹⁴. Besides, there has been developed a trained workforce and supplier industry in the city for 30 years. A furniture producer whom I interviewed with claims that a man could start furniture production in his factory almost in 3 weeks with 2, 3 million TL in his pocket. Since, it is very easy to find workers with newspaper advertisement. The 2005 report of ESI notices that there are almost 3500 firms dealing with furniture business and 400 of them applies mass production techniques. The daily capacity of the city is 20.000 couch and 8.000 armchair and 40.000 people are working furniture industry in general. So it is the most critical sector for Kayseri city. The

²¹² Bilgili, 2001: 93

²¹³ Bkz. ESI 2005

²¹⁴ Kayseri Chamber of Furniture Web Site: <http://www.kaymobodasi.org/> Acces 25 January 2012

information given by the president of The Chamber of Kayseri Furniture Producers verifies the situation. “60 % of Kayseri OSB is composed of the furniture factories. Besides, 1000 workplaces in Woodwork Industrial District (*Ağaç İşleri Sanayi Sitesi*) and 700 shops in old industrial district (*Eski Sanayi*) deals with furniture production²¹⁵.

Likewise, though not glitters, Kayseri is one of the textile production centers of Turkey and it has been a serious experience in weaving, spinning and cloth production. The city became one of the serious suppliers of denim for famous trademarks such as *Levis*, *Wrangler*, *Rifle*, *Diesel* and *Mavi* since 1990s. For example, in 2005 the annual denim production capacity of Orta Anadolu Textile Factory increased to 45 million square meter which is the 1 % of total production in the world²¹⁶. On the other side, parallel to the development of furniture production there has been also established a subsidiary industry producing fabrics and clothes for upholstering the couches and armchairs, furniture stuff such as bad clothes, synthetic fiber, and floorcloth. While the handmade carpet production decreased in capacity the machine woven carpet industry still continues in the carpet factories such as SARAY Halı, ATLANTİK Halı and MEKİK Halı. Recently, the furniture producing groups have started to carpet production too. According to the statistics given by KAYSO whereas Turkey is the first textile producer of Europe, Kayseri lies in the 8th rank of textile export. The numbers given by ESI show that the total employment in textile sector exceeds 10.000 and 5 of the biggest 20 exporters of Kayseri composed of textile producers²¹⁷.

The other developing sector is the chemical plastic and advertisement materials sector. We can read this development as the derivative of the industrialization in Kayseri. Beyond the newly emerging products of paper, carton box plastic bags, PVC pocket materials, actually the critical progress was realized in detergent sector. IN the beginning of 2000s a firm of Hacılar gained a critical place in detergent sector of Turkey. Although, it had been rapidly showed an enormous development

²¹⁵ Kayseri Chamber of Furniture Web Site: <http://www.kaymobodasi.org/> Acces 25 January 2012

²¹⁶ ESI 2005:12

²¹⁷ ESI 2005: 15

and became one of the first 500 industrial firms; the main actor of this sector, HES Kimya Factory, went to bankrupt due to some failures in administration. With the words of an industrialist: “the monopolies of this sector, ALO and OMO did not allow the fellows of Hacılar to have this highly profitable business”.

Pastrami is the first traditional product recurs to the mind in Turkey when to talk about Kayseri. I have noticed that it is one of the traditional products inherited from the Armenians and the last Armenian pastrami master was Benjamin Toker²¹⁸. However, although the city has been very famous pastrami producers since Ottoman Empire, for a long time it was not successful to make it a trademark in domestic and international markets until recently. The production stayed local and the marketing was made via informal channels. However, in the last ten years there has been a serious progress from traditional production and marketing techniques to modern ones. Every year, 940 tones of pastrami and *sucuk* are produced from 25,000 animals and 2,000 people are employed in this sector²¹⁹.

The other critical sub sector of food industry is sugar in Kayseri. Kayseri Sugar Factory which was established in 1955 as a public enterprise is the leading and dynamic actor with its 12 thousands tones of sugar beet processing capacity. In this sense it is the biggest factory of Turkey regarding its processing capacity and with its turnover of 700 million TL in food sector. “In 2009-2010 the factory processed 2,250,000 tones sugar beet and planned 330,000 tones of crystal sugar and 88.000 tones of molasses²²⁰ Essentially, the food industry has a 50 years of history in the city based on the products obtained from the region such as wheat, fruit juice, pasta, semolina, biscuits and besides meat, egg, milk production and poultry husbandry. Kayseri has also a certain history on the production of electric household utensils for almost 40, 50 years. However, the pivotal attempt in this sector was the establishment of HES cable factory. It is such that most of the investments and exports in this sector are based on electric and electronic communication cables.

²¹⁸ See Taha Akyol, Milliyet 24 October 2006

²¹⁹ <http://www.kayseriden.biz/icerik.asp?ICID=154> Acces 25 January 2012

²²⁰ <http://www.kayseriseker.com.tr/tr/kurumsal> Acces 25 January 2012

Though limited regarding the share of the sector among others, there is also a remarkable progress in machine production related with the agricultural production of the region and the machine demands of local industry with its needs of maintenance and repair

Kayseri is a quite rich city of mine. However, the mining sector had not developed until 2000 both in Turkey and Kayseri. For instance, in 2000 there were just 9 mine and metallurgy factory with 1190 workers in the city²²¹. I have enumerated the mine potential of Kayseri above. The most important one for Kayseri industry is zinc. Since in 1968 a zinc processing factory, ÇİNKUR AŞ., was established in Kayseri on a district of 1800 decares as an open stock joint company which is the only factory producing zinc metal from raw material in Turkey. In 1999 the factory was privatized and owned by İpek Group which bought the factory actually for its large land. However, with the increasing world prices of zinc, the factory was repaired and began production. In the end of the 2007 it had produced 30 thousands tones²²² of enriched zinc concentrate resulted in 40 million \$ export. So, the firm went up to the rank of 391 among the first 500 export firms of Turkey and increased to the rank of 346 among the second biggest 500 firms of Turkey²²³.

Let us close this chapter with some additional and complementary information on the production sector of Kayseri. I gave the distribution of sectors and forerunner firms in Kayseri above. Besides, there are 12 firms in first and 22 firms in the second biggest 500 industrial firms list prepared by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry in 2010²²⁴. However this picture should not mislead us. As in the case of most Anatolian firms regarding the scales of the firms, the rate of large scale firms stayed just in the level of 3 % against the overwhelming domination of small and medium scale enterprises of 97 % in the city.

²²¹ Bilgili, 2001: 95

²²² See <http://www.insaatdergisi.com/insaat-cinkomunhedefi100milyardolar-haberayrinti-12228-duyuru.html> Access 25 January 2012

²²³ <http://www.cinkom.com/> Access 25 January 2012

²²⁴ According to the 2012 list the number of Kayseri firms have increased to 14 among the first 500 biggest firms of Turkey. See <http://www.aktifhaber.com/iso-ilk-500-listesinde-14-kayserili-firmaryer-aldi-637373h.htm> Access in 12 August 2012

According to the information given by KAYSO the total exports of Kayseri are respectively 1.139 and 1.315 million dollars in 2009 and 2010²²⁵. The followings are the 10 primary countries regarding exports and imports

Table 6 The Basic Directions of Export and Import of Kayseri in 2010

| Export (million \$) 2010 | Import (million \$) 2010 |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Iraq: 124,3 | Switzerland: 314 |
| Germany: 76,3 | Germany: 45,1 |
| China: 75,6 | USA: 27,2 |
| Italy: 63 | China: 27,1 |
| USA: 55 | Italy: 24,8 |
| Switzerland: 47,4 | Great Britain: 22,1 |
| Iran: 39,3 | India: 17,6 |
| France: 36,4 | Russia: 16,9 |
| Poland: 30,7 | Belgium: 12 |
| Great Britain 29,9 | Greece 11,8 |

The table is very clear regarding export and import rates. Europe has a definite weight in the export of Kayseri with the rate of 50, 14 %. The shares of other continents are as follows. Middle East 19, 28 %, Asia 18, 14 %, Africa 7,17 %, America 5 %²⁷ The dominance of Europe is more clear in import rates. It is first with 77, 64 % and then comes the others: Asia 16, 39 % USA 3,66 %, Middle East 1, 98 % and Africa 0,33 %. The tables below shows the exports and imports capacities based on the product groups.

²²⁵ These informations were collected from the website of KAYSO. See http://www.kayso.org.tr/web_18480_1/index.aspx Access 10 June 2011 and 5 February 2011

5.2 The Structure of Hacilar Industry with its Different Sectors in 2000s

Following the main tables I gave in the former chapters, I will try to elucidate here the condition of Hacilar industry with its different sectors in 2000s. However, I should stop here and clarify some points. First, the information given here is based on my interviews with industrial entrepreneurs. In order to avoid their hesitation on some points I will not put all the information I gathered on the table. Secondly, all the numbers used here belong to the year of 2009. Without any particular emphasize all the estimations made with the numbers of 2009. Thirdly, there are some exceptions like the interruption of the interviews for several reasons. In these situations, the missing information was collected from the web sites or advertisement documents of the firms, from the newspapers and some reports. Under these circumstances, I can claim that the table and information below could reflect the structural characteristics of Hacilar industry with 10 % fallibility. Although sometimes I have given place to particular numbers, generally I proffered the total amounts in elucidating the features of the firms. When giving detailed information on the production process I used some firms of different sectors as prototypes without giving the name. After all these warnings and reservations I can start the business. Let's begin with production, the scales of firms, number of workers, research and development, export capacities and orientations, turnovers and profit margins.

It is logical to start with the indicators which would give us the general picture. The data I collected shows that 18.765 people are working and except the ones in leader firm²²⁶, 591 of them are women in Hacilar industry. So, the rate of women workers stayed under 10 % of total workers. Since, it is to a great extend a labor intensive industry, except some textile firms the women are mostly working in the office services. and research and development departments.

²²⁶ I could not get the numbers of women workers

A similar situation prevails for the professionals having undergraduate degrees. For instance, except the leader firm, the total numbers of university graduates are 477 in Hacilar industry. As I will discuss in detail in R&D (Research and Development) chapter, it is one of the critical problems of Kayseri and Hacilar industry. In most parts of this industry, especially in small scale firms there are not any R&D departments at all. Indeed, most of them do not employ engineers and the production is controlled totally by masters. In this kind of firms the university graduates work to a great extent in accounting and management departments.

The total indoor and outdoor spaces of the factories belong to the fellows of Hacilar are respectively 1.198.000 and 852.500 square meters. We should add this 1 million square meter area of the leader firm and 1.840.000 square meters space of a mining enterprise.²²⁷

In the end of the 2009 the total of turnovers per annum by the fellows of Hacilar is 5,4 billion TL (approximately 3 billion \$). Except the total turnover of the leader firm (3,8 billion TL)²²⁸ the total turnover of other firms is equal to 1,6 billion (1639 million) TL. For the same year, the total exports of all Hacilar firms is 607,7 million \$ including the total export of the leader firm of 251 million \$. The number of countries made export exceeds 110²²⁹ and most of the exports are made to Europe. Middle East and Africa came thereafter.

When to think Kayseri as a city with the production and the foreign trade capacities of 5 and 1,3 billion \$ and having almost 200.000 employees; it means, Hacilar industry comprises of 3/5 of the total production, 1/10 of the employment and almost half of the total export of the whole city.

The profit margins depend to the sector and time periods however it fluctuates generally between 10 to 15 % in both furniture and metal goods sectors. Although some industrialists notice that they could not make profits but just turn over their

²²⁷ I can not take these two firms' indoor and outdoor spaces separately

²²⁸ The turnover of this firm reached to 4,1 billion TL in 2010 and almost 5 billion TL in 2012.

²²⁹ The website of KAYSO notes the numbers of countries made export as 50; however, the activity report of HES shows the number of countries as 110.

enterprises after 2000 Crises; we can think of the profit margins little bit over the uttered numbers. Besides, it was told that despite the lower profit margins the total profit is quite high for metal sector particularly for steel cables and guys due to the massive production. Lastly, it was emphasized that the profit margins of textile sector is 5 to 10 % higher than the other sectors.

After this general information I can turn back to the distribution of sectors in Hacilar firms. Table 5 shows this distribution. In this table, there are 32 industrialists different than the previous one with 30 individuals. This shows that 2 families make production in more than one sector. For a better reflection of the distribution in the table, I located them as if they are different industrialists.

Table 7 The Distribution of Sectors in Hacilar Industry

| Industrialists | Sectors |
|-----------------------|---|
| G1 | Furniture production |
| G2 | Thread, fabric, body production Truck sale |
| G3 | drapery and cable production |
| G4 | Furniture production |
| G5 | Carpet production (not now) |
| G6 | Socks production and drapery |
| G7 | Steel shelf production |
| G8 | Furniture production (factory was hired) |
| G9 | Steel production 2 firms (the first in first, the second in second 500 firms) |
| G10 | Cable (electric, fiber optic) production (in first 500 firms) |
| G11 | Furniture production (in first 500 firms) |
| G12 | Steel door and body production |
| G13 | Ceramics production |
| G14 | Furniture production |
| G15 | Steel door production |
| G16 | Furniture production |
| G17 | Office furniture production (in second 500 firms) |
| G18 | Steel door and body production |
| G19 | drapery, coach fabric production |
| G20 | thread and fabric production (in second 500 firms) |
| G21 | Furniture production (in second 500 firms) |
| G22 | Factory was hired by someone else |
| G23 | concrete production |
| G24 | Machine production |
| G25 | Furniture production |
| G26 | Furniture production |
| G27 | Furniture production |
| G28 | Furniture production |
| G29 | Haircloth and towel production (in second 500 firms) |
| G30 | Furniture production |
| G31 | Excavation |
| G32 | Mining (in second 500 firms) |

The table shows that, 13 of the 32 firms produces furniture (home and office furniture, armchair, couch, panel furniture, shelves etc.), 6 of them produces textile (thread, drapery, cloth, fabric, towel, haircloth etc.) 8 firms²³⁰ produces metal

²³⁰ One family has two different factories making steel production and the other family has two different textile factories. The information of these firms collected together otherwise the number of firms would be considered as 34.

goods and cables (steel door and body, chassis, cables). Besides, there is one ceramic and one concrete factories, one excavation firm and a mining company belong the fellows of Hacilar.

However, due to some commercial and industrial characteristics of Kayseri industry in general, the composition of Hacilar industry is somewhat confusing. There are intertwining cases in the distribution of sectors and there are some historical reasons of this situation. As I mentioned before the economic, social and cultural life of Kayseri has been dominated by the commercial bourgeoisie. Bilgili analyses this by referring to Van Velzen.

The capital accumulation in Kayseri does not originate in the process of capitalist production. Rather, it is the result of different forms of production such as commercial profits, speculation, usury, property ownership (Velzen, 1978: 175). Therefore the commercial profits have been preferred rather than the industrial profits. A popular phrase briefly puts it as: “Buy and sell to be rich, produce to be bankrupt.

I already discussed this problem above and related it with the high rates of backward linkages of Kayseri industry and its intensive dependency to the raw materials. That’s why most of the producers still dealing with trade in Kayseri. It also explains why the representative of this group, in this case Mehmet Özhaseki, still holds the administration of municipality for almost 20 years in Kayseri. Doğan aptly analyses this situation as follows:

The monocentric structure of Kayseri though it has been a metropolitan municipality could be considered as the hegemony of a class in the city politics. This commercial bourgeoisie in the axis of Kaleiçi- Kapalı Çarşı- Kışıkapı trade centers has a great influence on the local economics and politics of the city. Rather than creating a different locus, Kayseri OSB has been reinforced the hegemony of these commercial groups in which the Cami-i Kebir community is the most dominant. Considered as the real local notables of Kayseri, these groups own also most of the workplaces and factories of OSB (Doğan, 2007: 186).

Regarding my focus, it is not the case for Hacilar due to the historical reasons I outlined above. Since they have been excluded even from the social life of Kayseri untill 1970s as the “rude peasants”. Indeed, it is possible to say that it was those ambitious attitudes against the notables of Kayseri brings them to their position now. Since all the risky businesses of production were undertaken by the fellows of Hacilar and at the end of day they became the richest of the town. However, the

general structural conditions of Kayseri is also valid for Hacilar. I already noticed that the prospective partners of HES set up a retailer firm before the establishment of HES. Likewise, many families of Hacilar accumulated capital from their commercial activities in the way to industry and they don't want to give up trade which they find very secure and profitable²³¹.

Under these circumstances, there is division of labor in the family firms. While some of the brothers or cousins are dealing with trade, the others focus on industry. A marginal family is a quite good example. This family is a partner of a thread and fabric factory, at the same time it produces body parts of trucks, deals with selling of these trucks as a franchise of a famous truck company and besides it runs a store, bakery and gasoline station. Totally, there are 8 families (out of 30) which both carry out industry and trade. These are the different sectors they work:

- Partner of a thread and fabric factory, produces body parts of trucks, sells trucks as a franchise of a famous truck company, runs a store, bakery and gasoline station.
- Drapery, partner of a cable factory.
- Drapery, partner of a cable factory, couch belt production (in preparation)
- Drapery and couch cloth production
- Drapery and socks production
- Furniture production, mining, management of a shopping mall
- Steel door and body production besides metal and metal profile trade
- Furniture, cable, textile iron and steel production, finance, logistics, marketing, foreign trade, chemistry.

The second case is about the families who shifted to a close sector from its own field of specialization. The most proper examples are those who shifted to steel door production from body making for the trucks. These families make production in both sectors. These are all the cases:

- Two families shifted to steel door production from body making
- One family shifted from haircloth to towel production.
- One family shifted from thread to cloth production (as partner)

²³¹ We should add the necessity of establishing extra foreign trade firms for benefiting from the procedural advantageous for the firms which want to make exports.

The third case is the families making production in different sectors at the same time

- One family produces (as a partner) steel ropes and ceramics
- One family produces furniture and has a mining enterprise
- One family deals with excavation and produces (as a partner) thread (textile)
- One family produces body for trucks and produces (as a partner) thread and cloth
- One family started with furniture but shifted to investments in the sectors of cable, textile iron and steel production, finance, logistics, marketing, foreign trade and chemistry.

To sum up since the basic dynamic of Hacilar industry is HES, most of the critical factories are owned by the families who went own ways after the break up from HES Group in 1999. On the other hand, there are some other families still having little shares of HES. They could also be considered in the industrial activity though take a little piece of cake.

5.3 The Form and Structure of Production

Although differs from one country to another there is an intensive debate about a shift from Fordism to Postfordism regarding the production techniques and consumption patterns since 1970s. Fordism, for instance for Giddens was mostly affiliated with mass production techniques related to mass markets (Giddens, 2010: 796). However, this system got into crises in 1970s and there was lived a shift towards an epoch which is more flexible and more insecure²³².

The first symptoms of this period emerged in the Middle and Northeastern parts of Italy, the so-called Third Italy. The small but dynamic firms and workshops²³³ clustered in Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, Friuli, Trentino-Alto Adige, became the prototypes of this structural change (Kumar, 1999: 54-55).

²³² Giddens, 2010: 796

²³³ Kumar 1999: 54.

Piore and Sabel²³⁴, in their classical study “The Second Industrial Divide” generalized the use of the term “Postfordism” in the context of “the new industrial districts” debates when examining the organization of small firms and workshops in the beginnings of the 1980s. What they saw in brief was that in this area of Italy there had been developed a new kind of system based on flexibility as against the Fordist production patterns. What they meant with flexible specialization was to get of the different products depending on the changes in demand to world markets as soon as possible.

Here the small firms among them make a reorganization based both on competition and solidarity and carve certain niches for themselves in the world markets in accordance with the changing tendencies of demand. The basic logic here was continuous innovation depending on the adaptation rather than control (Piore ve Sabel 1984:17). The basic characteristic of this new production process was the determination of the inner structure of the production by the forces of outside world (Sennett, 2008: 53-54). As a matter of the fact, the labor have much at stake since the new system requires its definite subjection and adaptation to the changing conditions in production techniques (Eraydın, 1999: 272).

In these new districts of Italy there emerged a new dynamic including at the same time both the decentralization of production and the social integration of producers²³⁵ in the small workshops having 10 to 50 employees. Every district specialized in different product series loosely connected to each other²³⁶. Therefore these workshops which had already been a historical background of social integration and solidarity in agriculture and artisanship gained safe places in the international markets by virtue of developed portfolios based on innovations and elegant designs. The workers were high qualified and were working for higher

²³⁴ Piore and Sabel 1984: 17.

²³⁵ Brusco 1982: 167-184.

²³⁶ For instance: “Toscana specialized in textile and ceramics. Emilia-Romagna was producing durable ceramics, automatic machines and agricultural machines, Marche produces shoes. Venato also produces shoes besides ceramics and plastic furniture (Kumar, 1999: 54-55)”. For other sources see A. Amin 1989 and Goodman and Bamford 1989.

wages than the “1. Italy” comprising of the classical large scale factories. So, there was not much (economic) difference between the workers and the ones, the professionals, who control them. Under these conditions

It was easy to be transformed into an entrepreneur from a craftsman. Designing new products and benefiting from the gaps in the market require a serious solidarity between designers, engineers, and workers. This resulted in a flexible division of labor with the corrosion of the hierarchies in the firms.... The collective character aiming at collaboration within the firm was being also reproduced between the relations of different firms.... The vertical integration levels of the firms were very low and they were dependant to each other regarding series of specified tasks... They were outsourcing the orders to each other and by the way sharing the fixed expensive costs. They were also bringing their sources together for establishing local cooperatives to lessen the costs of accounting, marketing and technical services.... Moreover, the facilities of transportation, housing, education and social security were in high standards and providing them as additional income or “social price”. (Kumar, 1999: 55-56).

These industrial districts gained also the supports of local government, administration and NGOs besides the municipalities, banks and local politicians. This supports was reinforced with ideological attitudes adorned with “imaginary traditions” reinforcing the local solidarity relations.

Political parties and other sub-cultural establishments created an atmosphere of social reconciliation, a mutual support and solidarity between employers and workers.... These establishments provided cheap lands, low rent districts, vocational trainings and courses, low interest credits, tax advantageous and infrastructural services for supporting worker’s families (Kumar, 1999: 55-56).

As a matter of the fact, these districts made serious contribution to the export capacity and employment of Italy. In time, this organizational change in production was welcomed and presented as a paradigmatic shift in the reorganization of capitalism by transcending the borders of Italy as being a peculiar and local experience and around the concept of flexibility it turned out to be a break in the new production and accumulation regime of capitalism.

In line with the empowerment of the neoliberal ideology, the social welfare conception which has been based on a social consensus set up on mass production, full employment and social rights started to be undermined. Whereas all the trade

unions and all kinds of labor organizations losing power, the workers were coerced to be flexible and drifted to the waves of the world markets without any shelter. That's why Lash and Urry²³⁷ called this period as the end of the organized capitalism while Sennett conceptualizes the negative aspects of this new flexible order on the workers life as "the corrosion of character"²³⁸.

Under these circumstances similar organizations emerged both in different parts of the world since 1990s both in developing and developed countries. Whereas Baden-Württemberg²³⁹ and Silicon Valley²⁴⁰ examples were oriented to the agglomeration of high tech firms and sectors such as software development, invention and innovation; the firms in developing countries came together mostly on the classical sectors of industrial production such as textile, leather, shoe making²⁴¹, surgical equipments in the cases of Sinos Valley²⁴² in Brazil, Tripipur²⁴³ in India, Guadalajara and Leon²⁴⁴ in Mexico, Sialkot²⁴⁵ in Pakistan and Changwon²⁴⁶ in South Korea. Eraydin summarizes the basic characteristics of new industrial districts both in developed and developing countries as follows.

²³⁷ Lash and Urry, 1987

²³⁸ Sennett 2008

²³⁹ Staber 1996: 299- 316; Semlinger 1993: 435-463; Hiedenreich 1996: 401-417.

²⁴⁰ A. Saxenian 1990:89-112; Saxenian 1991: 423-37; Angel 1991: 1501-1516.

²⁴¹ R. Rabelotti, 1995:29-41

²⁴² H.S. Schmitz, 1995: 9-28; Roberta Rabelotti & Hubert Schmitz 1999:97-108; Stamer 1998:1495-1511.

²⁴³ P. Knorringa 1996; Cawthorne, 1995: 43-56; M. Holmström 1998; Das, 1998:33-49.

²⁴⁴ Rabelotti & Schmitz, 1999: 97-108

²⁴⁵ Nadvi 1999a:143-177; Nadvi 1999b: 81-107

²⁴⁶ Markusen and Park, 1993: 158-81

The basic characteristics of these districts are generally defined as the combination of some factors such as; specialization in certain sectors; the overweight of small and medium scale firms, inter solidarity networks between firms; an increasing collective efficiency in a competitive atmosphere based on quality rather than price; a socio-cultural identity which provides trust between employers and employees and affective local institutions. A common socio-cultural structure means common values, attitudes, and language. By virtue of face to face relations many partnerships and solidarity networks could be established around production. It is underlined that the local institutions and organizations support the spreading out of technology, information and creativity. On the other hand, especially in the high technology districts it is being observed due to the shared production costs and risks these production networks provide for the development of new products. Particularly, the relations between the main firms and the subcontractors producing spare parts are of very critical in innovation, invention and development of new products (Eraydın, 1999: 273).

Hence, the competitiveness and innovative capacity of local firms in the global markets are the popular topics underlined in the studies focusing on the industrial districts (Eraydın, 1999: 273). The focus of my study, Hacilar industry, is more close to the line of developing countries, so it is better to go further in the literature.

After the pioneer works examining the case of Italy, there were made many other studies on the cases of developing countries. For instance, *World Development Journal* allocated one of its volumes (volume 27) totally to this issue in 1999. The editors of the journal Schmitz and Nadvi²⁴⁷ state some common points after examining different cases in different countries. Firstly, although it is not easy to state the statistical significance of these districts, they are very effective and widespread from social and economic perspectives in these countries²⁴⁸. For the Turkish case the similar emphases was made by Pamuk²⁴⁹ and Filiztekin and Tunali²⁵⁰. They point out that the production in Anatolia should not be ignored but also not to be exaggerated. Secondly, the structure and increasing rates of these districts vary. For instance, whereas the small districts based on craft and artisanship are less dynamic in creativity and expansion; there are other types of

²⁴⁷ World Development (1999) Vol. 27. No. 9, pp. 1503-1514.

²⁴⁸ Nadvi, K. and Schmitz H. 1994

²⁴⁹ Pamuk 2009

²⁵⁰ Filiztekin and Tunali 1999

districts which had developed mutual solidarity and competitive capacity between the firms and searching for the new niches in the international markets²⁵¹. There are also intermediate cases between these two poles²⁵². Thirdly, they are quite heterogeneous. For instance, besides the inactive districts, in many other ones there are some large and medium size firms which have critical roles in the administration of these districts²⁵³. So, the cases in developing countries differ even in most successful cases than the developed ones (Schmitz ve Nadvi, 1999: 1504). It is clear that these industrial clusters create a general space of efficiency for the firms in the sense that they benefit from the external economies of themselves. However, existing in the same place is not sufficient for making collective efficiency; there is needed a deliberate force, organization and joint action (Schmitz ve Nadvi, 1999: 1504-5). So, what about Hacilar? The next chapter analyses Hacilar industry from within this literature.

5.3.1 The Organization of Production

To begin with, most of the statements made for the industrial districts of developing countries could be applied to Hacilar. Since, it constitutes a particular component of this global chain. In this chapter, I will try to give a detailed picture of the organizational structure of this industry including the research, development and technology dimensions. Based on the information I collected from my interviews and observations, I will make some comparisons with Italy case and others in the literature. So I can start the general composition and weight of the firms in Hacilar industry from the perspective of scales and turnovers of the first ten companies for the year 2009.

Both Kayseri and Hacilar industry is being leaded by a captain firm. This firm was established by two brothers who started to work in 1957 as carpenters and then shifted to furniture production. The children of these two brothers took over the business from their fathers in 1981 and transformed it into a global holding in

²⁵¹ Cawthorne 1995, Nadvi 1999b

²⁵² Knorringa 1996; Rabelotti 1997; Visser, E. J. 1996

²⁵³ Rabelotti & Schmitz (1999)

almost 20 years. The firm is mostly known by its trademarks of furniture. However, it has many other investments and firms in different sectors such as cable, textile, energy, finance, banking, logistics, foreign trade, chemistry, iron and steel. The 2010 and 2012 turnovers of the firm were respectively 4, 1 and 5 billion TL. The net profit of the firm in 2002 is 348 million TL²⁵⁴. After this firm, HES Cable Factory came second with its 677 million TL turnover in 2009. In the third rank there are 3 firms very close to each other regarding their turnovers of 200 million TL. First of these three is a furniture factory. The owner of this firm has other investments in mining industry and in the biggest shopping malls of Kayseri. Regarding all these investments this firm could be counted as the second biggest firm of Hacilar industry. The second of the three is a steel rope factory which has broken with HES Group in 1999. The third of the three is a family firm producing both towel and haircloth with 181 million TL turnovers. Two furniture firms come thereafter with almost 65 and 90 million TL turnovers. The 6th rank is occupied by a family which is a partner of a different thread and cloth factories. Their share of the whole turnover of two factories is 30 million TL. We should add this amount a10 million TL more coming from their other enterprise of excavation. A ceramics factory is in the 7th place with 22 million TL turnovers and followed by a furniture factory having 20 TL turnovers. The turnovers of remaining 20 firms change from 3 to 17 million TL.

As it is seen from the numbers, the industrial organization of Hacilar industry is not horizontal. There are serious differences with leader firm and others regarding production capacities and turnovers. For instance, the turnover of the leader firm (3, 8 billion TL) is two times more than the total turnovers of other firms (1, 6 billion TL). The turnovers of the first 5 firms comprise 5016 million of the total 5439 million TL.

The similar trend could be seen in the exports rates. The total exports of Hacilar firms are 607, 7 million \$. The leader firm is first with 251 million \$. HES follows it with 131 million \$. Third rank is occupied by two firms: a mining enterprise and a

²⁵⁴ See Taraf, 1 August 2012

furniture factory with 50 million \$. They are followed by a steel factory of 38 million. There is a furniture company at the 5th rank with 20 million \$. So, the total exports of 6 firms above are equal to 540 million \$. The remaining 67 million \$ is being shared by 24 firms.

The number of workers gives a similar picture. Whereas 12000 of total workers (18.765) are employed by the leader firm, the remaining ones are spread to other workplaces. The first 5 firms comprise 15437 of the total workers. Taking the first 10 firms, the number of employed workers increases to 17260.

As a matter of the fact, it is possible to argue that Hacilar industry is to a great extent led by a captain firm and organized around 5, 6 bigger firms below the captain. The other ones are small and medium sized firms regarding both production and technological capacity. Now, it would be useful to give additional information about some smaller firms in different sectors to complete the picture. The first example is from a small furniture factory.

This furniture factory has 90 employees, 10 of them are women and just 6 of them are professionals having undergraduate degree. The factory has 10.000 square meters indoor and 50.000 square meters outdoor spaces. It produces 20 sets of armchair and 350 couches per day. The owner talks about the unit of production with the following words: "Armchair production is little bit harder. One worker could produce 30-35 in a day. If it is an economic couch, production could increase to 45-50 couches per day from 8:00 am to 18:30 pm". This firm has a turnover of 8 million TL and 1 million \$ export capacity. Iraq, Iran, Netherland and Germany are the first countries in their export list. The other furniture firms are alike. Since furniture is a labor intensive job, the numbers of workers are direct proportion to production. Likewise, another firm employing 190 workers produces 15 sets of chair, 150 couch, 50 bed base, 60-70 beds per day and have a turnover of 15 million TL, that is almost the double of the former firm.

The second example is from the metal goods sector. The related firm has 125 workers and 6 of them are university graduates. The factory has 10.000 square meters indoor and 20.000 square meters outdoor spaces. It produces both body and steel door. It has a turnover of 17 million TL per year and an import capacity of 4, 5 million \$. The composition of exports is as follows: 55 % Africa, 30 % Arab countries, 15 % Turkic and Balkan countries. There is no a university graduate in the research and development department of this factory. The production is totally controlled by the masters. The scales and production capacities of two other firms which are smaller then the above are quite alike. For instance, the first one has a 72 workers and just 4 of them are university graduates. It produces 70-75 steel doors per day and 16.000 in a year. The turnover is 6, the export is 1 million \$. The composition of the export is as such: 80 % Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria (Aleppo), Nigeria, Arab and African countries, 20 % to Germany and Netherlands. There is just one engineer and 2 masters in its R&D department. The second firm produces 20.000 steel doors in a year with its 83 employee including 3 university graduates. It has a turnover of 7 million TL and 1, 3 million \$ import capacity. Export direction is the same to African countries such as Nigeria and Ghana. R & D department is the same of the former factory.

As clearly seen from the above information, although specialized in furniture and metal goods production, Hacilar industry is not like the 3rd Italy in which the small or medium size firms dominated the organization of production. On the other hand, there has not been a pattern of production which based on the qualified workers and developed portfolio of elegant designs for the international markets. On the contrary, until 1990s the quality of the products was very low and the production was totally oriented for domestic markets. Indeed, beyond exports, this industry developed totally by selling these low quality products to the Eastern parts of Turkey in its first 20 years. It was 1990s that the fellows of Hacilar started to increase the quality of their products and sell them to the Western parts of Turkey including Istanbul. As I indicated in the Table 2 and 3 except a couple of ones most of the small firms of Hacilar started to make exports in 2000s. Moreover, they still produce low quality goods in innovation and design. They still try to take place in

the international markets with their lower prices. For this reason, there is a highly hierarchical and vertical structure in Hacilar industry regarding the dimensions of turnovers, production, employment, export and technology. One of the critical factors of this vertical organization is outsourcing or subcontracting, in other words contract manufacturing (fason production). The next chapter deals with it.

5.3.2 Subcontracting in Hacilar Industry

The first 30 years, the incipient stages of Hacilar industry from the end of 1950s to the half of 1980s could be compared with the 3rd Italy's conditions in 1970s and 1980s in some way without taking into consideration of the great difference in qualitative labor and production of export oriented qualified goods. It was the time when the young entrepreneurs were working in small workshops as apprentices and masters and having a very limited capacity of production. Actually, the quantitative superiority is still in the hands of the small and medium sized firms, with the rate of 97 % in Kayseri industry. However, in time there emerged some firms who had started in the same conditions with others but came forward with some of their advantages. As in different cases²⁵⁵ in the world, these firms gained and overwhelming weight in industry and right now determining the industrial production. First, they manage and control the production processes with their large scale and Fordist style mass production units in which thousands of employees work. The second method is subcontracting or contract manufacturing (fason production).

When to think of fason, first a main corporation and the dependant small firms comes to mind. However, in its general sense "it is an exchange relation between two firms mostly two industrial ones" (Ayata, 1991: 167). This relation ought not to be theoretically hierarchical and it could be set up differently depending on the structure of the industrial production. I already noticed to the loosely connected small firms specialized in a series of products in Northern Italy. Ayata's work

²⁵⁵ This process was not stayed same also in Italy and moved further in different directions with 1990s. See for details Brusco, S. et all. (1996)

(1987) on the structure of Kayseri metal goods industry in 1970s draws a close but not the same picture regarding the relations particularly between the small firms. Likewise, a recent research (Saracoğlu and Başak, 2009) focused on contract manufacturing in Gaziantep and Denizli industries set forth similar results:

The micro firms are making contract manufacturing in the rate of 32 % in Denizli and 40 % in Gaziantep. However the interesting point is that these micro firms are subcontracting mostly with other micro firms.... It is observed that subcontracting firms preferred mostly the smaller firms..... In other words, the main firm is tended to choose a smaller firm for outsourcing but this does not necessitate the outsourced firm to be small or micro scaled (Saracoğlu and Başak, 2009: 227).

Therefore, we should remember some basic concepts before to look at the case of Hacilar industry. As pointed out by Saracoğlu and Başak, the literature in English examines the inter firm relations with the concepts of “linkages” and “subcontracting”. The former has three different forms.

These are forward, backward and horizontal linkages. If a firm uses the products of other firms as inputs in the production process, this is the condition of backward linkage. The forward linkages emerge when a firm produces its products to be used as inputs for the production of other firms. The horizontal linkages require information flows between the firms in the same production level (quoted²⁵⁶ by Saracoğlu and Başak, 2009: 218).

The second term “subcontracting” is generally used in Turkish with different words sometimes used as interchangeably such as *fason*, *taşeron* or *yan sanayi*. Therefore, there is a confusion of concepts in this topic (Müftüoğlu 2000²⁵⁷ and 2004²⁵⁸). For this reason in order to avoid this confusion, I preferred to use the general definition of Ayata in paralel to the use of Saracoğlu and Başak. So, if the firms are equal to each other and there is an exchange relation between the equivalents I take it as the first type of subcontracting; if the exchange relations are between two firms which are too different in technology, labor productivity and capital structure I take it as a secondary type of subcontracting (Saracoğlu and Başak, 2009: 219). On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that a relation to be a subcontracting one requires permanent transactions between the firms (Ayata, 1991: 168). Moreover, the observations of Ayata points out two more basic principles related with

²⁵⁶ Ajayi D.D., 2003: 89-111.

²⁵⁷ Müftüoğlu, B. G. 2000: 118-138.

²⁵⁸ Müftüoğlu, B. G. 2004: 57-62

subcontracting. “The outsourced firm should be in a condition to fulfill the demand of standard interim good of the main firm in a precise way and its technological level should be close to the level of the main firm” (Ayata, 1991: 171).

After this clarification of the concepts I can go on with the logic of subcontracting. Comprising of its different types subcontracting is briefly a relation of production or a strategy directed to lessen the labor costs. In this context, either some parts or the whole of the production is outsourced to other firms. So, based on the changing demand the production could be increased without new investments or recruiting new workers. At this point Holmes²⁵⁹ distinguishes subcontracting relations into 3 forms: capacity subcontracting, specialization subcontracting and producer based subcontracting. If the production capacity is not sufficient and/or the production costs are lower in other place, then the firms get into the relations of capacity subcontracting. If the production requires a specific kind of specialization or division of labor then the firms preferred the second type. Producer based subcontracting includes the conditions in which the subcontractors could definitely make their own decisions and have their own control in the production process (Holmes 1988: 80-106)

Yet, from within this conceptual framework, let us look at the condition of Kayseri industry and particularly focus on the furniture sector. Today, as I noticed before, there is one captain firm in the sector with 12000 workers (including the workers in other sectors too) and there are 4, 5 bigger firms beneath the leader with respectively 1300, 800, 550, 200 employees. In the last stage of this hierarchy there are hundreds of small firms with limited numbers of workers. Most of these small firms are making subcontracting with bigger firms with lower profit margins. Namely, the subcontracting relations here are being organized hierarchically from the top to the bottom in the form of a chain as pointed out by Ayata (Ayata, 1991: 168) A top manager of this leader firm summarized the general landscape with the following sentences:

²⁵⁹ Holmes, 1988: 80-106.

The biggest piece of cake in this organization belongs to *İstikbal*. There are many, hundreds of subcontracting firms around. Besides, there are some other rival firms making competition in the same lane with *İstikbal* such as *İpek*, *Meşe* and *Kilim*. They have their own place up to their portfolios. Let's say *İstikbal* is in A standart, the others are in B and the remaining are in C depending on their prices qualities, colors, patterns and their perception in public opinion.... You know everyone invested some amount in R&D, but ours is much bigger than others. Actually, everyone benefits from our investments in some way either by imitating or inspiring. However, they also provide some benefits for us in the market which has been created by us. First by means of their trained workers we could outsource some parts of our production by taking lower risks. We don't increase our capacity, but use the existing one for production.

In this context, I can claim that the organization of production here could be defined as a capacity subcontracting relation between the large scale main firms and hundreds of small producers. Since, furniture is not a high tech business, the technological affinity principle between the main firm and others are also being provided. As a matter of the fact, these subcontracting relations stands in the mid of the Kayseri industry and gives many detailed information to us related wit the structure and characteristics of the production. So it is the time to give an ear to a small industrialist making furniture production for understanding how the things go on.

I talked about the high inflation rates in 1990s. One of the sources our original wealth was that high inflation. For instance, in those times *İstikbal* could produce a couch for 100 TL cash money and sell it to 150, 250 TL. We could not produce the same couch for 100 TL in cash but we were producing it for 110 TL in forward prices and find markets to sell it for 160-170 TL. But it is over. What happens now, *İstikbal* outsourced the goods I produce. It does not aim at getting profits. His aim is destroying me. Although they do not think: "I want to give harm to these small firms". It happens in this way. They are giving advertisements to the TV channels like: "Mondi for 99 TL with 12 payments per month". Now look here! Brother it costs for 100 TL for me not 99 TL. They are outsourcing production to a poor man for 99 TL. Then the customers come to me and say that "Are you *İstikbal*, the guys sell bed bases for 98TL with 12 payments, buy you want 100, 120 TL in cash, isn't it weird". While we are making just 2 % of furniture production of the world, they are dealing with bed based for 98 TL here. Rather then going and competing with IKEA in the world market they are applying a harmful protocol here and giving damage to the small producers.

Some of the other small firms verified this general condition described above. They noticed that "the purchasing agents of the leader firm are "very cruel bargainers", who do not let them to make profits. However, the people I interview stressed that

they have to accept the conditions of leader firms for surviving among the hundreds of small furniture producers. The below quotation belongs to one of them.

There have been really established a supplier industry around furniture. However none of them actually desire to produce for İstikbal. I don't like. Why? They have incredible purchasing agents. They don't let you earn 5 kuruş profit. They know the production cost very well and proposes that exact prices: "do if you want brother". Someone accept if you don't. Because, most of them are in trouble. So, actually it is not a good thing. But, they have an immense volume of transportation and it is a continuous business when there is no job at all. At the end of the day it is business better then not.

As seen the subcontracting relations is one of the critical characteristics of Kayseri industry. Indeed, it is being noticed by the industrialists that even the leader firm got into relation of subcontracting with IKEA and produced beds for it. However there is a more serious problem regarding the organization of production which also includes subcontracting here. Different than the Italy and other industrial districts where based on the local solidarity relations, the small firms specialized in a series of products and compete around quality in the world markets; Kayseri and Hacilar industries are quite the opposite. Most of the firms produce and sell the same products. They are targeting at the markets and customers of each other and there is a deadly competition in the market on the prices. In this context, there occurs a vicious cycle in the industry and it happens in this way.

As underlined by Ayata, subcontracting provides increase in production without making additional investments; prevents the low capacity work of factories and by this way directly playing a critical role in increasing the profitability and the capital accumulation by providing room for controlling labor costs (Ayata, 1991: 151-152). Hence, the outsourced firms are tightly controlled and regulated by the main firms. They are given a small place to live and survive with very low profit rates. Paradoxically, except the bigger ones this resulted in the fall of profit margins in the whole sector. The decreasing profit rates led to the deterioration of the working conditions of employees who work in the small firms without any social security and thereby the elimination of small firms. An experienced industrialist excellently pictured the interior process of this interesting structure.

Look, there is İstikbal at the top okay and the father and son working in the shop are at the bottom. Now, there is 10 units demand but there are 12 units production here. These two lost units should be realized by some one else. The man in the top says: "I will allocate one million dollars more for the advertisement". Actually the responsibility of the man on the top is to enlarge the market not to enlarge its share in the market. Then the man behind says: "I will sell with 2 months deferred". The next man in behind says "I would decrease the quality of production one step further". The consumer perceives all this process with prices since the market does not enlarge. So, at the end, the man at the bottom says: "I will use the scrap metal for the steel spring". So, he decreases the price from 10 to 9. Then the price competition starts. So, the struggle between the top and bottom starts to gradually kill the whole sector in time. Since, the top have to adapt to the rules of guerilla at the bottom like the parts of a chain. Every stage had to adopt the rules of the bottom. At the end, the man at the bottom finds away for employing the workers without security and giving up paying tax. It means all the qualities producing surplus value are being gradually lost. So, the man in top stays in a position to apply to the arguments of the man at the bottom.

On the other hand subcontracting is not limited with furniture sector. It is quite widespread in textile sector too. For instance, the only task of a cloth factory owned by the fellows of Hacilar is to produce denims for Orta Anadolu Drapery Factory which also het in subcontracting relations for the famous world wide jean trademarks of the world. Depends on the changes in the demand it is also similar in socks production. As a matter of the fact, Hacilar participates into the global chain of subcontracting like Denizli industry.

5.3.3 Technology and R&D (Research and Development)

I can begin with a general statement I made in previous chapter. Kayseri industry produces labor intensive products in line with the Fordist patterns rather than technological products having high accretion value. It is possible to understand the labor intensive charecter of this production in Kayseri OSB with naked eyes from large spaces and crowded work force in furniture, textile and metal goods sectors. However, in last years there has been a certain attempt in competitiveness, trademark development and innovation. For instance, according to the URAK (a competitiveness index between cities) index, Kayseri lies in the 5th rank on the industrial design registration avarage; 4th rank on the patent registration, 5th rank on

the trademark development and innovation and 9th rank on the general list of competitiveness among the whole cities of Turkey between 2008 and 2009. I think the new universities of the city could be considered within this general framework. It was such that when I started this study in 2008, there was just one (Erciyes) university in the city, but now the number of universities²⁶⁰ went up to 4. Both these state and private universities are being directly supported by the industrialist and the traders of the city. Therefore, the investments based on information and technologies have rapidly increased in Kayseri.

Regarding the technological structure of the firms, I do not have any concrete quantitative data beyond the impressions I got from my observations and interviews. Most of the industrialist noticed that they do have the latest technological equipment pools (machine parks) in their factories. It was emphasized that most of the machines in furniture and metal goods sectors have been imported from Switzerland, Italy and Germany. I also witnessed these technological investments in the factories.

Besides, as I noticed before there is a quite developed subsidiary industry particularly in furniture sector regarding the components of steel spring, upholstery, couch clothes, bed technology, sponge, rubber, fiber. It was pointed out that the R&D investments of the leader firm exceeds 30 million \$ in 2011 and there is an intensive effort for developing new designs and products which could be followed some time from the advertisements of TV channels.

Actually, if to remember their visit to İzmir fair in 1974 before the establishment of HES it is possible to argue that the interest of the industrialist in technology dates back to almost 1970s. I can say that this interest has been continued and developed in the following years with the opening out to foreign markets and by virtue of business visits, fairs, and vocations to abroad. An important direction of this interest is being set up by the second generations having the foreign language skills. Most of these young children who are in their thirties and forties in these years are either

²⁶⁰ These are Abdullah Gül University (state), Melikşah University (private) ve Nuh Naci Yazgan University (private).

engineers or managers. So, they have the required capacity and vision to follow the new technological trends in the world. However, despite all these developments and except a couple of cases; Kayseri industry is still a dependant structure which just using technology rather than creating it. Likewise, a clear indicator of this situation is that more than half of the import of Kayseri was made from Switzerland in 2010 with a quite high rate of 314 million \$. One of the top managers of the leader firm verified this situation with the sentences below:

G: I think the most vital point of our industry is that we are making money with the technology of other countries. We could not develop our own technologies that rearing up our country on time. We are giving back all the money back to the European countries such as Italy and Germany. We earn too much money but invest it to the machines of them. You use the machines for 2 years and then change it again.

K: So, how is the condition of Kayseri industry regarding R&D?

G: Of course backward. Our R&D department is just related with the components of our products. It is okay if we could make technological products but our R&D is limited with door parts, couch or bed production. So, it is how that it could be. However, if the basic information of all these is the technology, we still import it from Europeans and give our money back to them again.

Regarding machine industry, Ayata shows Antep industry as a serious example in which the old machines are renewed and some new ones (models) are imitated besides the imports (Ayata, 2004: 572). There is just one firm in Hacilar industry dealing with machine production and sometimes produces some products for other factories. However, I think this could not be generalized. First this firm work mostly for specific projects directed to defence industry and second, it is not possible to talk about a subsidiary sector in machine industry as in the cases of Bursa and Konya for Kayseri. On the other hand, Ayata's observations of Antep below are to a great extent valid for Kayseri too.

Considering the whole of the Gaziantep economics we observe that the augmentation in production is provided by means of lower wages and increasing factor uses....The technological innovation attempts is being directed to reducing costs, increasing the scale, quality and diversity of production. On the other side, the following aims haven't been targeted yet: improvement of the organizational structure, providing for sustainable development by recognizing the environmental factors, decreasing the inventory costs by passing to the flexible production systems (Ayata, 2004: 571).

Actually, the basic problem emerges in the point of research and development. Since, except a couple of institutionalized firms²⁶¹, most of them do not have R&D departments and an accompanying consciousness on that. Plus, the ones who say they have R&D departments deprived of the qualified and trained staff such as engineers. For instance, outside the 3 to 4 big firms that I made interview with, there were not any firms employing engineers in the R&D departments in the furniture industry. The so called R&D departments are composed of technicians and masters. Most of the small factories deprived of any kind of engineering staff. Except the master workers, majority of the employees are unqualified and work for the minimum wages. The quotations below show the severity of this situation. The first three are from small and medium sized furniture factories; the last one is from a haircloth factory.

K: Who are working in your R&D department?

G: There is a technical designer and some other people who came from the base of the production in metal and wood sections.

K: Are there any engineers?

G: No.

K: Who are working in your R&D department?

G: There are different people in R&D from master to tailor and colour controller

K: Are there any engineers?

G: No, it is our fault. But we have been working with the existing friends (workers) for a long time so we don't feel any deficiency of engineers so far.

K: Who are working in your R&D department?

G: We are producing armchairs and couches so we have a planner, a chassis maker, a welder and a master of metal work. They are 4 persons.

K: Are there any engineers?

G: No

G: Who are working in your R&D department?

K: Since we don't have any concern of accretion value, there is not such a thing here.

²⁶¹ For instance the leader firm of the sector increased the amount spent 15 million \$ for R&D in 2007. In 2011 R&D costs went up to 30 million \$. See Radikal, 11.10.2011

Actually the best, brief and explanatory sentence regarding the R&D was told by an industrialist. He states that there is not a serious work to be called as R&D here and what is generally understood of it is “to steal from and to imitate others”. For him, this is true for the whole Kayseri industry and most of the industrialist I interviewed did not refuse this statement. One of them said: “Kayseri is copycat. If something is definitely accepted and popular product in the market, the others start to imitate it right away.....Namely trying to be rich in a short way”. The other critical point is the shortage of the product diversity and the weakness of the designs in Kayseri industry. The following remarks are from two industrialists.

G: R&D studies are not sufficient; they are not diversified and furniture dominant. A little bit textile and steel doors in the last ten years. “X firm produces this, let’s do the same”. Such kinds of imitation bring the people to the wrong directions. We don’t support each other as the subsidiary industry. For instance, the main firm says to the smaller one “brother, let’s do some parts of my production”. You make a subcontract; but, after one or two year, the man embark upon the whole of your production. We are still making such kinds of mistakes.

G: Now, like its population, the habits of Turkey are also arabesk. Namely, it doesn’t belong to a class..... Turks produce furniture for Turks. Germany produces furniture for Europe; but Italians produce for the whole world. Since, they sell colour, design and fashion. Namely, they sell something beyond the furniture. In order to sell to the whole world, you have to think like an Italian.

The study of Bilgili shows that it has been the structural problem of Kayseri since 1950s.

The technology is based on imitation in Kayseri. The exported technology of a firm is being imitated right away by the others when it shows the cost effective. For instance, it was the same in the past in the production of goods such as: electric oven, stove, butter churn, pressure cooker. Today furniture, armchair sets, spring bed, and steel door replaced the old ones. The imitation is a very frequent problem among the producers of these products. Many firms do not have any R&D departments. Beyond imitation, there are being experienced capacity use problems in the factories which were established without any planning and market and demand researches made in advance (Bilgili, 2001: 88).

The representative of the leader firm verified this widespread situation and noticed that they have spent millions of dollars for the innovation and R&D but the fellows unfairly imitated their products. He added that they have started to take these cases to the court for a couple of years.

G: Many firms are imitating our products. We have been tolerated them for years but we don't tolerate any more. Recently, we took many such firms to the court and confiscated the imitated products. Now, we are trying to access to the EU and everyone should obey the laws. Our R&D team study for months, they do one's utmost; but the others imitate our products one to one in the same way.

K: Are there any firms of Hacılar among them?

G: Yes of course there are such firms both from Hacılar and Kayseri. There are also foreign firms. We apply applying criminal sanction to all.

I also talked with the representative of a fellow small firm taken to the court by the leader firm. He was spitting fire to the leader firm and accused of them with irresponsibility to the small fellow firms:

Only 1, 5 – 2 % of the furniture production is made in Turkey. % 98 is made by others in the world trade of furniture. IKEA is coming here and making İstikbal a subcontractor for itself. Rather than struggling with IKEA, İstikbal told me: "I took out patent of this couch" without shame. Look, get out and deal with the gap of 98 % in the world.

Imitation is not the problem of bigger firms but small firms also imitate the products of each other. For instance an entrepreneur told me that he started to produce an American style carpet which has not been experienced so far in the city. But, first by the fellows, his production was imitated by 3 persons right away. He noticed that he took them to the court but the lawsuits did not prevent them doing this. For him the bigger part of these problems such as quality, standart, imitation and patent stems from the institutional deficiencies in legal regulations in Turkey.

The copy is already ready notwithstanding its criminal sanction. The sanctions are very light not deterrant. I think there are not 5 firms which take patent with an international examination. There are the ones taking out *utility patents*. But these are not so important. Anyone could take out utility patent for the same product from the Turkish Patent Institution. It is totally nonsense. They have these ostentatious buildings, many people are paid salaries but everything is nonsense. They do nothing but creating problems.

Therewithal, the recounts of a second generation engineer on the establishment process of their factory shed light on the other problems regarding the deficiencies of capacity use and feasibility beyond the imitation problems.

For instance the making of our factory was decided in the year of my graduation... I came here, started to work and it was decided. Then I said to my brothers, cousins and uncles: "we have to make feasibility first; a factory is not set up in this confusion without preparation". They said: "why are you worrying? We will establish four walls at the end, close the four sides, put the machines in and start to production". But, I haven't been trained with this mentality in the university. You should know and assume the final product from the very beginning before production. When I made these warnings they did not support me. And what is more, the business doesn't stop though. It goes on. They bought the land started to construct the walls. How can you do feasibility? Then I recognized that though I know the technical side of it, they look from a very different angle.

Actually, it is the same for most of the other factories. Particularly, majority of the small scale factories were set up in this way without any plan, feasibility, and R&D studies. It is the general development protocol from workshop to factory. First the entrepreneurs hire a workshop from the old industrial districts of the city with the limited capital they earned until that time. Then in time they enlarge the scale of this workshop depending on the income gained. Sometimes they opened additional commercial outlet shops for marketing their products. With the increasing gains they buy lots from Kayseri OSB and construct hangars on them. Some times these hangars are set up before deciding to the production. After the construction they move their workshops to hangars and turn it to a factory. Therefore the practical logic is on the front in their commercial and industrial behaviour. In this sense, the ignorance of the scientific attitudes and especially the disuse existing engineering potential is quite remarkable and indicates the limits of the production in the future. Since, as Kepenek states, the share of the labor among the unit costs is 15-20 % in the subsectors of industry. For this reason, the competitive capacity in the international markets provided from the decreasing of the labor costs is very limited (Kepenek, 1999: 238). Namely, it is always possible to find cheaper labor in the world. Hence, the future of Kayseri industry depends on a structural change which would improve its technological structure, R&D capacity, labor productivity and the real wages. It is possible to say that such kind of a recognition and consciousness had started in Kayseri though it is still limited.

Out of all these technical issues, there is one more critical socio-cultural dimension related with the maldevelopment of Kayseri industry particularly on the fields of technological innovation, design and invention. This is the shortage of “creative classes²⁶²” conceptualized by Richard Florida in the sense of high qualified societal groups. According to Florida, the world economics is getting through a transformation and in 21 Century it is being shaped by the factors in which the creativity preponderates. Accordingly, the futures of the cities depend on their capacity to attract these creative classes²⁶³ which became more mobile in the world with globalization. As a matter, it is a kind of “either be creative or die²⁶⁴” situation for the cities in the world like the old center of automobile industry, Detroit, in America. However, for Florida it is not a spontaneous process. The cities should make some arrangements to attract these qualified, creative, bohemian and eccentric but at the same time marginal sections standing in the edge or out of the social norms such as technology specialists, artists, programmers, text continuity writers, authors, musicians, gays, lesbians. At least, a relaxed atmosphere should be prepared for these people to live and feel free. For Florida, these classes provide for the attraction of businessmen, creative and qualified people and capital in these cities in the long run by establishing an open, dynamic urban atmosphere. It means, the cities in which the cultural climate is open to differences brings there with also high qualified innovations and economic gains²⁶⁵. Therefore, for instance the cities without gays and rock bands are sentenced to lose in the economic development race. Within the frame of this general argument, Florida makes a classification of creative cities based on his own categories of “bohemian index”, “gay index” or “diversity index” and indicates the top cities including these creative classes in USA as San Francisco, Austin, San Diego, Boston and Seattle²⁶⁶.

²⁶² Florida 2002a

²⁶³ Florida 2002b:1-14.

²⁶⁴ Peck, 2005: 740-770

²⁶⁵ Florida, 2004

²⁶⁶ Florida 2002b

Although Florida's theses are quite outstanding, these kinds of debates are not new. We know that since the rise of the capitalism the cities of dense industrial production are also technology, information and qualification centers besides the other facilities of art, culture and entertainment. These topics are considered with some concepts of human capital or skilled labor in the the sociology literature. However, what Florida tries to make is to set up the discussion by turning inside out. On the other side, there are of course some counter arguments²⁶⁷ against his thesis. Among them there are the ones²⁶⁸ which use Florida's own data set to refute his arguments. For instance Clark claims that the real correleation is not between the industrial development and numbers of gay in the cities but between industrial development and numbers of educated people.

Putting this progressive debate²⁶⁹ aside and turn our eyes to Kayseri we face a very serious landscape. Beyond the gays, lesbians, artists, musicians it is not possible to find a place for an ordinary women and man to drink a glass of bear or wine, hear music and dance together in the city having 1,000,000 population except the bar of the Hilton Hotel. There is just a visible bar only for men in the downtown and four to five taverns in the different parts of the city center again just for men. Four, five restaurants which offer alcoholic drinks are five to ten kilometers away of the city center. Briefly, the crative classes aside, there is not a free social space even for the ordinary people who are not conservative. People have to go to the Touristic places of Capadocia region such as Ürgüp and Göreme for their needs of alchol and entertainment. The chairmen of the Kayseri Chamber of Trade verified this situation with the following sentences.

K: Dou you think this would result in a disadvantage for Kayseri in attracting qualified labor to the city?

G: Yes of course. Professionalization and institutionalization takes time in Kayseri. These professional managers, the qualified labor coming from outside the city try to fulfill their needs in luxurious hotels or they left Kayseri at the weekends. Capadocia looks as an advantage in this sense. In a half hour they can reach to everywhere. Indeed, he goes with his darling. He has a darling in Kayseri but could not take out walking here. So Nevşehir steps in this point.

²⁶⁷ Peck 2005

²⁶⁸ Clark, 2003: 103-140; Glaese, 2005

²⁶⁹ For the answers of Florida against these critics see Florida (2004)

Actually, this not a peculiar problem of Kayseri. To some extent most of the central Anatolian cities shows similar characteristics. Kayseri stays in very behind of Antep, Adana and Eskişehir in this sense. Accordingly, this conservative structure which does not allow for the different lifestyles in the city, put it into a disadvantageous position also for the economic, technological and industrial development²⁷⁰. The reason is very simple. The city could not attract the qualified labor or creative classes including managers, designers, engineers, social scientists, artists and so on. The example given by a young industrialist from second generation clearly explains the condition.

The photographers are the typical examples of such people, photographers and painters. ... Maybe they would be angry to me but there is no photographer in Kayseri. We are importing photographers from İstanbul. Every time they come in the morning and we send them back in the evening to İstanbul. Actually the studios are very qualified but there are no photographers to take pictures. These people do not come, since they could not live in this place. We are so closed. A woman with mini skirt could not stay here in the industry. Why, because of this neighbourhood pressure.

Likewise, some industrialist I made interview noticed that beyond these qualified professionals there is also a serious shortage of qualified labor in the city but this is not emphasized overtly due to the anxiety for the external migration especially of Kurds. But this is the very point. This weird desire of being pure and homogenous could be considered as the main cause of these kinds of problems. This reactionary desire prevents individuals from being with different people, from participating into others life styles, ideas and practices. So the city life is considered as the extension of the private life and the “harmful” elements are being excluded from it. The analysis and reactions of a young industrialist from the second generation does not left any other words to us.

²⁷⁰ Florida, 2008: 22

G: I think Kayseri is not developing. Why? Because although we have a serious background in production, how much is the share of R&D and design in this background? You cannot attract the designers here. We don't have a trademark value except İstikbal. When there are no trade mark values in the society, you cannot attract the graduates of ODTÜ, İTÜ or Bilkent or the ones made their graduate studies in America or Europa. What happens then? A couple of locomotive firms prisoned the information into their own structure. Then the others stay behind. For instance, I can not recruit any one graduated from the Ceramics Department of Mimar Sinan University. Since this man could not stay here. We experienced. As I said for instance he moves to Kayseri with his family. Where is the school? It is in Akansu College. But, it is a school of religious community. He could not want to send his children. Maybe his world view is different. What happens then? He could put up with 6 months. Then his wife says: "who cares I am going". She takes the children and she goes.

K: Did it really happen? A man from Mimar Sinan University first came and then went right?

G: An R&D man came to us for production department. He could stay just one year. His wife came, his children came he moved his house here. However first the children went, then his wife and lastly he himself left Kayseri. Since, he cannot live here. If he want to drink beer there is no bar. Is it so bad? No? Is it so deficient? No. However, Kayseri should be a place in which different people could also live here or we have to make good plans to meet these deficiencies. If we need designers then you have to train designer or you should make pressure to the University for educating them.

On the other hand, I stated two more factors causing the lack of qualified professionals in the city beyond the weakness of the social life. The first is the lower wages for all levels. The example below shows the amount that the owner of a medium scale furniture factory deem proper for an architect in 2009.

G: There are no architects in Kayseri.

K: Isn't there a faculty of architecture here?

G: I hanged job ads in the chamber of Architecture besides the journals and human resources pages. But there is no one. Why, now, there are big firms here such as İstikbal, İpek and Kilim. Now, without exaggeration these architecture friends work for 600 TL wage in these factories. I say: "come I am giving you 1000 TL. Work with me!" He lies to me: "No I am taking much more in İstikbal" Why? After a couple of years of work there he would say: "I have worked in İstikbal". So he would demand 3000 to 4000 from you. This is the most important problem of us: the shortage of qualified personal.

When we remember that the average wages of ordinary workers fluctuate between 550 and 700 TL at that time, it is possible to understand that the industrialist, despite all their complaints, do not see too much difference between the qualified and unqualified labor regarding the wages they deemed proper. Besides, the second

factor is the problem of institutionalization. As one of the young engineers suggest; the reason is not the facilities of social life but the lack of institutionalization for the people who are qualified and having carier goals.

Now, the reason why these qualified people do not want to come to Kayseri does not stem from social facilities but from the institutional deficincies of the firms. Most of the firms do not have institutional identity here. For instance, we are a family firm. Suppose a qualified man comes to us from outside and start to work as a director. This man comes if he sees a carier path here towards the general directorate. Otherwise, no one moves from its place. I think the reason is not the social life. It spontaneously comes behind. There are a couple of firms here. The first is İstikbal, maybe Yataş. The numbers does not exceed the fingers of the two hands. So, the numbers of firms are no more than 10 that you can make a carier plan here. Then how could you bring these people here for carrier under these circumstances.

As is seen, the industrialists are aware of these kinds of problems of the city. Indeed, they suffered from. Actually, all the investments made in the sector of education in Kayseri such as the scholarships, private universities and dormitories could be regarded as the compensation attampts of these deficiencies. Likewise, even the recent investments prepared for ski tourism could be considered within the same framework. It is seen that the city has decided to create its own qualified labor in the last years. We will see in the future whether they could succeed or not. However, it is my contention that these kinds of problems would be solved at least particularly by the internal dynamics of the city in a time period which is not so late. Of course I do not claim that in a short time, Kayseri will be a lively center of culture, art and entertainment. However, if Kayseri could not succeed to offer a glass of wine in a couple of proper places to thousands of people coming to the city for business every day; it could create a great disadvantage for the city which tries to articulate into the world markets and could not be sustained very long. Otherwise, it would be Kayseri to loose.

We are closing up inside. We think the same things. There is no bar, no drinking people. Okey these are bed habits but I have foreign guests every day in the factory. Last week I have foreign guests from different countries every day of the week. All of them stayed one day and then left Kayseri. These people wanted to drink, the only place that I can bring them is Ürgüp, Göreme, Kapadokya, There are no other places.

5.3.4 Solidarity and Competition in Hacilar Industry

The role of solidarity relations is a crosscutting point of both sociology of religion and industrial sociology. So I intensively focused on this point. However, it took my time to understand that the frequently and proudly repeated local solidarity discourse does not reflect the reality well²⁷¹. I had to make interviews with all of the industrialists for hours, and sometimes more than one time to grasp the real picture. I asked the all the possible forms of solidarity (sharing of information and workers; establishing pool system for raw material buying, going together to the fairs, lending and borrowing money, providing support for the bankrupt firms, division of labor in production process, subcontracting and so on) to the industrialists. At the end of the day, I definitely conclude that the desired and pretended solidarity relations launched outside are actually not realized in production process. Now I will explain the situation with some quotations from my interviews made with industrialists.

G: My father was saying that: “*two heads could not be boiled in the same cauldron*” There is no solidarity. If you have a courage, if you sure, believe in your power you get the business.

K: Isn't it weird, there are many furniture producers here. Why don't they buy the raw materials together, wouldn't be cheaper for them for example?

G: Now the point is my father was asking: “Where are you going my son?” “To Istanbul, to buy raw materials”. Suppose you together with anyone. My father was saying: “Look at my son, take the bus together, eat together but when you get off the bus in Istanbul split up your friend tell him ‘see you in the hotel’” We were asking why?. My father was saying: “Look son, you have to pay attention, no one should know what you do in your business. Besides, the man you bring with your side could be a bad man and he could give harm to your commercial prestige afterwards with his bad acts”. Therefore I am going to any place alone. I say: “Selâmünaleyküm, Aleykümselâm”. I buy myself, bargain myself, and turn back myself” and no one knows what I do.

²⁷¹ Likewise, I think I came along in emphasizing the role of solidarity between the industrialists in my early works.

G: No, no there are not such kinds of things, absolutely not, forget it. Since the conditions of the firms are different. They cannot make pools with different sources. Here everyone is the captain of his own ship. Either sail his boat or sink it down. Everyone is independent. I never heard such kind of warnings depending on noble feelings such as: “Don’t go to this side there is storm is coming, you would sink your boat”. There are not such kinds of feelings and attitudes looking the plane from the top and aims at developing together.

K: Have you ever heard such a case like a firm has bankrupted but the other firms came together and rescued it from bankrupt? Are there any such cases?

G: No, never. Those who say these are liar. I have never heard? For instance, X²⁷² firm bankrupted here. Why didn’t they do anything? Look, who would give money 1 million, 50 million, 100 million, 500 million to another my friend?

As in the examples above, there has not been an internal solidarity in the industrialization process and the organization of production addressed in the industrial sociology literature. Indeed, some industrialists that I made interviews for hours made genuine statements totally opposite the above arguments of solidarity. They claimed that rather than solidarity it is the “hostility” that made Hacilar a place of industrial center. The below examples explains what these industrialists mean with this word hostility. This is from a middle aged industrialist.

G: Look, no one is telling this truth but what makes them (the fellows of Hacilar) survive is the hostility they feel against each other. It is not solidarity but hostility.

K: What kind of hostility?

G: It is not easy to define and maybe not reflected to outside. If Hacilar survive it is because of this hostility. Namely, this hostility was transferred from the street to the commercial field. There are very ordinary reasons in behind this hostility. It is like you know there are teenagers in the village. Some of them feel a very deep hostility since his friend for example said to him once upon a time: “get out of this place”. Or another one demanded the daughter of a family. If they didn’t give him that girl, he extremely struggles with the others in the industry to be rich. We don’t share these kinds of things with others. Never. But, these are the real things. Some time you can see such things in the serials in the TV. It is very similar. Illiteracy lies in behind of this hostility. It is like 3 people are sitting in the cafe and don’t get the fourth one among others. This fourth person works very hard to be rich and take the revenge of them. This spirit stems from these kinds of things. These are not expressed but I feel it.

²⁷² I concealed the name of the firm

Now, let us look at an anecdote from the childhood of an industrialist to grasp what was meant with the feeling of hostility or resentment

After the secondary school my father said: “You will not go the school” and gave me as an apprentice to an upholstery workshop in the city. The first day I saw my friend from the primary school. He had started after the primary school and now he became a monitorial. “Oooo Süleyman²⁷³ How are you” I said “You are an apprentice buddy, get a sweeper and clean the workshop” replied him to me. Thank God he behaved me in this way. Do you know why? Welfare brings illness. Don’t forget it! This sentence of my friend became a burden in my heart. But this burden created blessing thereafter. Due to this sentence I became a monitorial after 3 to 4 months. There was a cinema in front of us in the industry. Most of the monitorial and apprentices were going to cinema after the work. The master left the shop. I had the sentences of my friend in my head they were carving my mind. I wanted to escape this burden in my mind as soon as possible. It was the normal procedure that the apprentices prepare the skeleton of the armchair and the monitorial and the master completed the upholstery. I worked until the midnight after they left and finished the work. Then they came in morning and asked “Who did it?” Everyone looked each other. I said: “I did it”. First they did not believe in me? The master said: “fuck you”. Then they understood. So “you did it” said the master. I became monitorial at that moment. My friend had to leave the workplace at that weekend. He said: I am leaving. After he left, my career progressed a little bit. In the sixth month, the master said: “would you like to be my partner”.

Similar feelings were expressed by a second generation industrialist too. He explained his own experience with the concept of “hostility”.

G: I don’t believe in solidarity. The enemy of the Hacılar is Hacılar itself.
K: I can’t figure out what you mean by that?
G: Brother, I have a serious problem here. Every man for himself.
M: I mean the sharing of information or machines or you know solidarity between the masters.
G: There is nothing like that. About solidarity, of course we are not overtly the enemies of each other but it is like undermining each other. I lived it. When I was visiting my customer in his office, a man came from a fellow firm of Hacılar, I will not say its name, and he was saying that (referring our firm) “ brother do you have an intimate connection with them, I would give you an extra % 5 with two months’ time to pay”. I was there and he did not recognize me, indeed my customer winked to me like saying that “don’t be angry take it easy”. What kind of logic is this?

As all the practices show, it is not the solidarity based on the local, traditional culture and relations that triggered and provided the main motivation and dynamic of industrialization in Hacılar. So what happened then? An old industrialist from

²⁷³ I changed the name.

the first generation excellently summarized the picture of industrialization in the town:

No, no it is not the solidarity but it is the courage. Suppose that, you are living in the same neighborhood or in the same apartment block. The son of the neighbor opens a shop and sells television. The other sells textile products. You know his father, his income and conditions. You think: “ I am more clever than him. But I can’t do it alone. I should become partner with the son of my uncle”. Actually we originated from this idea. The screen of Hacilar was HES Group. Suppose it is a football match and you are not playing bad. Then you think: I can also be a football player. If İstikbal plays in Fenerbahçe, so I can play at least in Kayserispor”. Because I know İstikbal. I know the conditions of İstikbal community. Yesterday, they could not play football in the neighborhood. Now they are playing in Fenerbahçe. So I can play too. That was the case.

This peculiar sociological heritage which had already turned out to be a national tradition based on the unity, homogeneity and imitation in Turkey was aptly analyzed by Murathan Mungan²⁷⁴ with the following sentences.

Being successful creates the conflict and envy in its traditional sense..... For keeping on the admiration there needs to be a distance every time. On the contrary, hostility and envy necessitates proximity. The brothers are jealous of each other. There is an unfinished latent competition between the friends and fellows. The biggest fear is that someone is coming into prominence among us..... There is always an inconvincible side of a man who became famous from our neighborhood. We say, “Huh, he is the son of our neighborhood”. There is a kind of pride mixed with sniffing here including the calling back for the ruptured one to his old line.

The fellows of Hacilar briefly put it with the short Turkish expression of: “*ev danası inek olmaz*”. It means like “the son of the village never grows he stays always as a child”. However, notwithstanding its name either as hostility, hate or enmity we should refer to Max Scheler at this point and focus his concept of “resentment” to have an insight on this universal emotion intensively perceived by the small communities, settlements or localities. For Scheler, resentment could be defined as “a feeling of oppressed wrath which strolling through the dark labyrinths of the mind freed from the own action of the ego”. It is the re-experience of a particular emotional reaction (revenge, hate, anger, malice, envy) for another person. The repetition of this feeling settles it to the deeper parts of the personality; on the other side, it takes it out from the fields of action and expression. So, resentment emerges

²⁷⁴Mungan, 2009: 8-15.

as a continuous condition of emotion from the oppressed feelings of revenge, bad will, envy, grudge, slander²⁷⁵.” However, it is not a spontaneous. An attack or an injury should come first. So, there are two basic factors in the rise of resentment. First, the weakness or the feeling of occlusion comes out of the inability to give a reaction on time against the attack. Secondly, the historical, social and class based conditions cause this occlusion²⁷⁶.

In the case of Hacilar, these conditions are constituted by the industrial capitalist²⁷⁷ production which has been transformed a pre-capitalist rural community into an industrial district for 40 years. So, the quotations above shows how the local resentments combined with capitalist competition could be harmful on the traditional and social relations. Even in a homogenous settlement having 500 years of history, the deadly competition is prevailing rather than the solidarity among the children of the same street and neighborhood. Everyone walks in his own way; keep the information and practice for himself; compete with his fellows; steals the customer, master or market of his fellow if necessary. They take each other to court and they avoid the initiations organized for the common good of all industrialists. On the other hand, some industrialist note that there can be different forms of solidarity between the businessmen such as the cash supports deferments of the debt payments and subcontracting. It is also underlined that some industrialists were secretly supported to weather their crises. However, it was also suggested that these kinds of supports are limited and depends on different factors such as the quality of the business, religious community ties, ideological tendencies and personal characteristics. Likewise, I made interviews both with the supported ones and with those bow to the inevitable. So I can definitely claim that there are some forms of solidarity in Hacilar industry but they are exceptional rather than systematic and structural.

²⁷⁵ Scheler, 2004: 3-7

²⁷⁶ Koçak in Scheler, 2004: x.

²⁷⁷ Scheler, 2004: 18

5.3.5 Foreign Connections, Imports, Exports and Commercial Orientations

The first foreign connections of Hacilar dates back to 1960s and 1970s when the workers started to migrate to Europe. As I noted before, these connections were efficiently benefited in the establishment of HES Cable Factory in 1970s. Besides in the same years the shortage of capital led the founders to find foreign credits and they took two million Franks credit from a Swiss Bank in the end of the 1970s. Therefore, this credit could be considered as the first real foreign contribution to the industrial development of Hacilar. In the following years HES became again the pioneer in foreign affairs. Most of the fellow entrepreneurs learned this kind of connections such as import, export, international banking procedures all by virtue of HES. By the way, the first export was made by HES to Iran in the beginning of 1980s in the time of Iran-Iraq War. The estimated amount was approximately forty to fifty million dollars.

However, the industrialist of Hacilar encountered with many difficulties in those years. First, they were dependant to the intermediary firms in İstanbul for raw materials. Second, they did not have sufficient experience in production and export and third, the technological infrastructure was very weak. Similar difficulties were experienced in import and the maintenance services of the machines. Especially the embargos put after the Cyprus War exacerbated the condition of industrial production in Turkey. It was told me that even the migrated workers of Hacilar were benefited in carrying the foreign exchange and bringing spare parts of disrupted machines from Europe in those years. Most of these difficulties ended with the Özal government in 1983 and the export of HES rapidly increased due to the reasons I outlined in previous chapters. In 1980 there were no other firms making exports except HES Group. Therefore, most of today's managers of the firms in Hacilar industry gained experience in foreign trade departments of HES in those years. The other firms, started export in 1990s and the process mainly accelerated in 2000s.

Actually, most of the first generation entrepreneurs who are the owners of the factories composed of the primary school graduates who do not have any foreign language skills. Generally, they did not have competency to set up foreign contacts. However, with the rise of industrial production in 1990s, the firms started to make arrangements for making exports in order to escape the effects of chronic economic crises of Turkey. So they constituted foreign trade departments in their firms and started to recruit professionals in this period. In time, this need led them to send their children to English-medium universities in Turkey and Cyprus or to English courses in Great Britain and USA in 1990s. Therefore, the majority of the second generations of industrialists have a professional carrier and foreign language skills to get into contact with the outside world. Right now, these children are at the positions of foreign trade departments in the factories belong to their families. In addition, most of the medium scale factories employ foreign trade specialists. If there were no professionals in the factory they go abroad with the help of translators.

The firms are using different means and possibilities for making international contacts. They use their personal relations, participate into the international fair organizations, send their catalogs and advertisement brochures to the foreign firms and make websites. The organizations made by the chambers of commerce and industry besides the civil organizations of business associations are other channels for foreign contacts. The embassies and commercial attaches are playing critical roles and frequently benefited by the industrial entrepreneurs. Moreover, some industrialists noticed that they sometimes use the interim firms for finding customers in the world markets. Besides, these firms are also functioned for the imports of machines from Europe. After this short consideration we can look the general picture of exports in Hacilar industry. The table below shows the starting periods and the immediate export rates of the firms in Hacilar industry in 2009.

Table 8 Export Orientations of the Firms

| Firm | Production | First Export Year | Mil.\$ (2009) | Export orientation |
|-------------|---|--------------------------|----------------------|---|
| G1 | Furniture production | 2001 | 1 | Iraq, Iran, Holland, Germany |
| G2 | Thread, fabric, body production Truck sale | 2000 | 0 | No information |
| G3 | Drapery and cable production | No | 0 | |
| G4 | Furniture production | No | 0 | |
| G5 | Carpet production (not now) | | 0 | |
| G6 | Socks production and drapery | 2003 | 0 | 50 % to Europe until 2008. No exports now |
| G7 | Steel shelf production | 2003 | 1 | England, Holland, Europe |
| G8 | Furniture production (factory was hired) | No | 0 | |
| G9 | Steel production | 1990 | 38 | First Europe and USA besides 35 countries |
| G10 | Cable (electric, fiber optic) production | 1979 | 131 | 110 countries |
| G11 | Furniture production | 1993 | 251 | First Europe, Russia, Egypt and USA besides 80 countries. |
| G12 | Steel door and body production | 2003 | 4,5 | 55 % Africa, 30 % Arab countries the rest is to Turkic countries and Balkans |
| G13 | Ceramics production | 2000 | 6 | All the neighbor countries except Iran and Armenia besides Italy, Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Israel, Arab countries |
| G14 | Furniture production | No | 0 | |
| G15 | Steel door production | 2001 | 1 | 80 % to Egypt, Jordan, Arabia, Aleppo, Nigeria) 20 % Europe |
| G16 | Furniture production | 2000 | 4,5 | Europe, Africa, Middle East |
| G17 | Office furniture production | 1991 | 50 | England, France, Germany, Spain, Holland, Belgium, Austria |
| G18 | Steel door and body production | 2002 | 1,3 | Africa (Nigeria, Ghana) |
| G19 | drapery, coach fabric production | No | 0 | |
| G20 | thread and fabric production | 1999 | 12 | Portugal, Italy, Greece |
| G21 | Furniture production | 2000 | 13 | First Europe, Iraq, Syria, Azerbaijan, Egypt , Iran besides 30 countries |

Table 8 (continued)

| | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------------------|-------|-------|--|
| G22 | Factory was hired by someone else | No | 0 | |
| G23 | concrete production | No | 0 | |
| G24 | Machine production | No | 0 | |
| G25 | Furniture production | 2001 | 20 | Israel, UAE, Egypt, S. Africa, Europe, USA, Iran, besides 27 countries |
| G26 | Furniture production | 1998 | 4 | Israel, Iraq |
| G27 | Furniture production | 2001 | 1,4 | Greece, Israel, Iraq, Egypt, Syria |
| G28 | Furniture production | 2006 | 2 | Greece, Turkic countries, Germany, Israel |
| G29 | Haircloth and towel production | 2000 | 15 | Europe, Russia, all the Middle East |
| G30 | Furniture production | 2003 | 1 | Europe (France, Germany, Greece) |
| G31 | Excavation | No | 0 | |
| G32 | Zinc production | 2008 | 50 | First Chinese, Austria, EU countries |
| | | TOTAL | 607,7 | Million dollars |

Looking in detail, it is seen that the second firm made export in 1990 is a steel factory which takes place within HES Group again. It was followed by a factory producing office furniture in 1991. The next firm became again a furniture factory started to exports in 1998; the thread factory made its first export to Europe in 1999. Seen in the table, the remaining sixteen of thirty two firms had started to make export after 2000s. So, it is possible to argue that most of the firms of Hacilar opened out in 2008.

Yet, I can focus more on the export orientations of these firms. As I noted above, Hacilar starts industry and export with cable production, so now it has a prominent place in the world in cable market after almost forty years of experience. The number of countries made export has reached to 110 and the amount exceeded 131 million dollars. There is a similar picture in steel sector (steel, steel ropes, steel spring). There has been a production of more than twenty years in steel industry and thirty five countries are being made exports. The amount gained from steel export is reaching to thirty eight million dollars and besides, 10 % of the total turnover of the

leader firms is coming from steel production²⁷⁸ (including the steel pipe production). So the total export gains could be estimated as almost fifty million dollars.

Besides these two sectors the most important unit in exports is furniture. The total export of the leader firm (including other sectors) in 2008 was 251 million dollars. If to calculate half of this number as coming from furniture²⁷⁹ (125 million dollars) and add the exports amounts of other firms; the total number of exports made by the industrialists of Hacilar reaches to 260 million dollars.

The followings are the other sectors after furniture with the export amounts from top to the bottom respectively. Zinc factory with an export of 50 million dollars. Two textile firms one of which exports textile threads of 12 million dollars and the other exports haircloth and towel of 15 million dollars. The total export rate in steel door and body sectors is 6, 8 million dollars. Lastly the export rate of a ceramics factory is 6 million dollars. To sum up the total exports made by the industrialists reaches to 607, 7 million dollars in 2009.

A couple of points should be underlined regarding with the geography of exports. First the cable (110 countries) and steel exports (first Europe and USA besides 35 countries) are quite widespread to the world. A similar picture is taking place in the furniture sector particularly regarding the bigger firms. The export geography comprises of 80 countries, Europe, Russia, Egypt and USA at the outset. However, despite this large scale, furniture exports still address the cheaper markets deprived of intensive design and creativity. For instance Vardar's works indicates²⁸⁰ that, the leader firm's export portfolio in Germany comprises of 35 % Turks, 35 % of other foreigners and only 30 % of Germans.

²⁷⁸ See. Vardar, 2009: 127.

²⁷⁹ Vardar notices that: "the number of exported countries exceeds 100. Only the number of countries made furniture export is 74. İstikbal Group reached to an export capacity of 180 million dollars in 2006 and only the furniture exports is reaching to 100 million dollars. The exports made in 2007 were equal to 300 million dollars and it is estimated this number will increase to 360 million dollars in 2008. Moreover .25 % of the total export of Kayseri is being made by the firms of BOYDAK Group" (Vardar, 2009: 128). See also the website of BOYDAK Holding: http://www.boydak.com/n/107_istikbal-yurtdisi-yatirimlarini-surduruyor.aspx "Boydak Holding is targeting at an export rate of 140 million dollars in home furniture in 2010. The expected export for 2010 is estimated as 430 million dollars".

²⁸⁰ Bkz. Vardar, 2009: 97.

We observe that the small scale firms mostly intensified in peripheral markets around Turkey such as Syria, Egypt, Israel, Greece, Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran, UAE, Turkic countries. Besides there is certain export to EU countries. For instance, one of the factories of Hacilar only produces office furniture for European markets. However, when I was making my interviews the small firms were oriented to the Middle Eastern markets due to the economic crises and recession in Europe. So they have been highly affected by the conjunctural crises. Similar trends are seen in textile sector. An owner of a textile (socks) factory noted that until 2000s they were exporting half of their production to Europe but with the entrance of China, they had to give up exports and turned totally to internal market. Besides, despite all these difficulties, there is still a serious amount of export to Europe in thread, towel and fabric sectors.

Regarding the steel door sector, the regional orientation is much more overt. The markets of steel door producers are mostly Middle East and Africa. Besides Egypt, Jordan and Arabia there are also South African countries like Ghana and Nigeria. Interestingly, one of the owners of a steel door factory noted that they have recruited two foreign trade personals graduated from the Al Azhar University of Egypt, in order to reach the Arabian and African markets. Therefore, the share of Europe is limited with Balkans in these sectors.

I can complete the export geography with the ceramics factory making exports to different countries like Italy, Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Israel, Arab countries and the countries near our borders and lastly a zinc processing factory making exports of 50 million dollars to EU countries, China and Australia at the outset.

The other critical dimension of the foreign connections is the import. Regarding the quality of production of Hacilar industry, most of the raw materials could be provided from domestic markets indeed from the Kayseri itself. Since, as I noted before, particularly the furniture sector has a quite developed subsidiary industry in the city. Moreover, the bigger firms have already established the factories

producing the interim goods used in the making of furniture such as sponge, fiber, steel spring and couch fabric. Besides, among the big retailers of forest products in the city, the fellows Hacilar constitute the biggest and dominant group.

There is a similar structure in steel sector. The raw materials used for the making of steel doors, steel ropes, metal panels could be provided from the iron and steel factories of İskenderun and Ereğli. The required raw materials for textile are again provided from domestic markets. So, except some special products such as cable or ceramics which requires the combination of very different stuff imported from outside, the import of Hacilar is being realized to a great extend as buying of the machines used in production. I did not have the exact numbers about import as in the case of exports; but I can pinpoint some aspects.

Regarding the import statistics of the whole Kayseri industry the biggest part belongs to the Switzerland. As I noticed more than half the imports of Kayseri are being made from the same country. Naturally, there is parallel situation in Hacilar industry. Besides Italy and Germany, Switzerland is one of the top three critical countries made import from. The observation of a second generation industry who is also a textile engineer verifies the statistics.

G: These people are buying most of machines from Europe. If you want good machines you have to buy it from Europe.

K: Which country, Switzerland or?

G: Brother, German and Italy schools are of very critical in machine business. The English are a little bit but the German and Italian schools are very important. France is agriculture. Some little things (machines) are produced in Turkey but still the worst of Europe is better than ours. What I witnessed in industry is generally German, Italian and Swiss.

There is a similar condition in furniture and steel good sectors. Besides Germany and Italy we also see the machines from Japan and Holland in these sectors. There are also limited numbers of producers using domestic machines made in Bursa or İstanbul.

To sum up I should shed light on some points in considering the foreign connections in general. Firstly, the industrial entrepreneurs of Hacilar have been aptly adapted to the market needs (carpet, furniture, cable, steel doors) in their

industrial production in parallel to the urbanization and transition of Turkey from a rural economy to a market society. They have been efficiently benefited from the expansion of the domestic market. So, they have shifted very rapidly from producing cheaper and low quality goods for the Eastern parts of Turkey to better quality goods sold in international markets. However, despite this giant expansion the point here is that it is still the conditions of domestic market determining the structure of production. The amount of production is overwhelmingly dependant to the domestic demand. From the total turnover of 5, 4 billion TL, the share of exports are just 607, 7 million TL. This shows that the exports stay 10 to 15 % of total production. Likewise, an econometric analysis (Erdem and others, 2008: 357) proves that the effects of the exports are smaller than the other factors in the development of the Hacilar firms.

Secondly, this rapid industrialization process led to a differentiation between the institutionalized firms made the biggest part of production and export and the other small firms. Whereas the bigger ones expand to the Western Turkey and the global markets with better quality goods regarding technology and design; the others have been producing low quality goods particularly for Middle Eastern and African markets.

Thirdly, generally speaking despite the hopeful developments in the exports, the products of Hacilar industry are still consumed in cheaper markets in the world. Therefore, regarding the product portfolios it is possible to claim that Hacilar industry in general caters to the people in developing countries having limited purchasing power. The same time, it should be underlined that a serious technological level has been reached and a market share has been taken in some special goods like fiber optic cables, steel ropes, steel springs and to some degree furniture in EU and other regions of the world.

Fourthly, as seen in the table, the firms of Hacilar sell their products to a large geography and therefore regarding their global vision they do not want to give up and limit any of them. With their expression: “Turkey should be at everywhere and

not limits itself with a special place”. The furniture investment which was established in 2012 in Ukraine by the leader firm is a typical indicator of this desire. This furniture factory²⁸¹ is the first foreign investment of Hacilar industry in the history. As a matter of the fact, although the majority of the industrialist are supporting the EU direction of Turkey, they think that either in EU or not Turkey should not be get stuck in a particular geography. The political and economic developments verify these attitudes of the industrialists. Likewise, when I was making interviews for this study between 2007 and 2009 there was a local political crisis regarding the election of the president in Turkey and there was an economic crisis in Europe led to a long recession which is still shaking Europe. In this period, most of the entrepreneurs told that they had to change their direction towards the Eastern markets. Especially the Syrian market was addressed as the place where the demand and profit rates are high the customers are hungry and the expectations are low.

On the other hand, the majority of industrialists are defending the EU Accession perspective of Turkey; since they think that working with EU led to the rise of standards in every aspect of business life such as quality, control and business ethics. Most of the entrepreneurs I interviewed told me that they have been quite affected from business culture and institutional approaches of Europeans like knowing what to want, paying on time, obeying the rules of the deal etc. So, they are definitely supporting the EU perspective of Turkey and think that even the EU Accession process serves for the good of Turkey to increase the standards of Turkish industry.

5.3.6 Management and Organization: Administrative Structure, Professionalism and Intergenerational Relations

To begin with, putting aside hundreds of small scale shops, workplaces and traders 35 of 72 members of HASİAD has factories belong to his families. So, besides the owners or managers of these factories there is also a circle comprises of relatives. Moreover, there are some other combinations with partnerships of different people.

²⁸¹ See. “Boydak’tan Ukrayna’ya Yatırım” Hürriyet 20 March 2012

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/20167132.asp>

I can begin with the simple stage in picturing the profile of the managers. The table below shows the ages and educational conditions of first generation industrialists.

Table 9 The Age and Educational Level of Industrialists and Their Wives

| Firm | The Birth Year | Education | Education of His Wife |
|-------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------------------------|
| G1 | 1952 | PS | PS |
| G2 | 1960 | PS | PS |
| G3 | 1950 | SS | PS |
| G4 | 1955 | SS | HS |
| G5 | 1952 | U | PS |
| G6 | 1967 | PS | PS |
| G7 | 1955 | PS | PS |
| G8 | 1946 | PS | PS |
| G9 | 1950 | PS | PS |
| G10 | 1933 | No | PS |
| G11 | 1934 | PS | PS |
| G12 | 1950 | PS | PS |
| G13 | 1956 | U | HS |
| G14 | 1958 | U (OU) | HS |
| G15 | 1958 | SS | PS |
| G16 | 1958 | SS | PS |
| G17 | 1954 | PS | PS |
| G18 | 1945 | PS | PS |
| G19 | 1938 | PS | PS |
| G20 | 1954 | PS | PS |
| G21 | 1958 | U | PS |
| G22 | 1948 | G | PS |
| G23 | 1960 | U | PS |
| G24 | 1950 | U | HS |
| G25 | 1957 | PS | PS |
| G26 | 1967 | SS | PS |
| G27 | 1950 | PS | PS |
| G28 | 1955 | PS | PS |
| G29 | 1968 | HS (Imam hatip) | SS |
| G30 | 1954 | PS | PS |

The table shows that most of the first generation industrialists are primary school graduates. Whereas there are 5 secondary school graduates, the number of the high school graduates is just one. Among the managers there are 8 university graduates

one of which has a Ph.D. degree. This profile shows us Hacilar made an efficient combination of the professionals having university degrees and the self-trained people having occupational experiences. In addition, another research about the entrepreneurs of Hacilar indicates that only 17 % of the industrialists have the foreign language skills (Varinli et al. 2008:652). On the other side, there is not much difference in the education levels of their wife's. The majority of the wife's are primary school graduates and there are only four high school graduates. There is not a university graduate among the wife's.

Regarding the children of the industrialists the table is totally different. Except the small ones, there are very few children having the educational level beneath the high school. Out of the 5 primary and 5 secondary school graduates all the children are at least high school graduates. The private schools are indicated with PHS. These are generally community schools controlled by religious orders. There are many children sent to these schools. Another outstanding point is that there is just one child sent to İmam Hatip (Religious) High School. Maybe some industrialists did not emphasize the quality of the high school in the interviews but it is clear that the families prefer the private schools rather than İmam Hatip schools.

Besides most of the children have undergraduate degrees. The private universities were indicated as PU and the number of graduates of these universities is not less. The number of girls graduated from the universities are much less; but I think this does not come from a discrimination against women but maybe it does stem from the choices of women who want to be married after high school. Since, almost all of the girls who want to go the university are allowed and supported. Indeed, some of these women are working right now in the factories of their fathers. Among these children there are just two children trained in USA. One completed his undergraduate in USA and the other is still continuing to a language course in USA. However, there is no one attending to a graduate school. Besides, as I noticed before if we consider the other members of the families within the circle, the number of children having master and even PhD degrees increases. Some researches²⁸² on the small enterprises suggest that the entrepreneurs having

²⁸² D.C. Mead ve C. Liedholm (1998) "The Dynamics of Micro and Small Enterprise in Developing Countries", World Development, Vol.26. No.1.

professional education are more advantageous in developing their business. This table shows us the families of Hacilar do not have any deficiencies at the point of education particularly for the second generations.

Table 10 The Education Level of the Industrialist’s Children

| Ind. | Child 1 | Child 2 | Child 3 | Child 4 |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| G1 | No information | | | |
| G2 | No information | | | |
| G3 | Man (undergrad) | Man HS | | |
| G4 | Man (undergrad) | Woman (undergrad) | Man (Science HS) PHS | Woman(Science HS) PHS |
| G5 | Woman (undergrad) | | | |
| G6 | Woman (SS) PHS | Woman (PHS) | | |
| G7 | Man, (HS) | Man, (undergrad) | Woman (undergrad) | |
| G8 | Man, undergrad | Man, (undergrad) | Woman (undergrad) | Woman (undergrad) |
| G9 | Man, (undergrad) | Man(undergrad) PU | | |
| G10 | Man, (undergrad) | Man (undergrad) | Man, (undergrad) | Woman, (HS) |
| G11 | Man, HS | Man, (undergrad) | Man, (undergrad) | Man(undergrad) |
| G12 | Man (PS) | Man (HS) | Man (HS) | |
| G13 | Man, (undergrad) | Man, (undergrad) | | |
| G14 | Man, (PHS) | | | |
| G15 | Man, (SS) | Man, (HS) | | |
| G16 | Woman (imamhatip) | Man, (undergrad) | Man (undergrad) | |

Table 10 (continued)

| | | | | |
|-----|-------------------------|--|------------------------|----------------------|
| G17 | Man(undergrad) USA | Woman(HS) Lang. course in USA | | |
| G18 | Man (undergrad) PU | Man (HS) | Man(undergrad) PU | Woman (undergrad) |
| G19 | Woman, PS | Man (SS) | Man (SS) | Man (undergrad) |
| G20 | Man, (undergrad) | | | |
| G21 | Woman (undergrad) PU | Woman (PHS) | | |
| G22 | No information | | | |
| G23 | Children so small | | | |
| G24 | Man, HS | Man(undergrad) PU | | |
| G25 | Man (undergrad) | Man, (PHS) | | |
| G26 | Man, (PS) | Man, (PS) | Man, (SS) | Man, (SS) |
| G27 | Man, (HS) | Man (undergradu) Lang. course in USA | | |
| G28 | Man, (undergrad.) | Man, (undergrad.) | Man (undergraduate) | |
| G29 | Man, (undergrad) | Woman (undergrad) | Woman, (PS) | Man |
| G30 | Man, (HS) | Man, (SS) | | |

The statistics suggest that 99 % of the firms in Turkey are small and medium sized firms. Besides, 98 % of these small and medium scale enterprises are family firms (Ege, 2008: 305). This is valid also for Hacilar. Ege’s study reports that 66 of 71 businessmen of Hacilar say “yes” to the question of “the enterprise was established one the members of the family?” As emphasized in different studies²⁸³ on the

²⁸³ See. Nichols and Suğur, 1996; Ayata, 2004; Durakbaşa, 2010

entrepreneurs and the firms in Anatolia; there is a patriarchal management structure based on the family and kinship relations and these tendencies could be generalized for the whole periphery in Turkey. Actually we can extend the scope of these kinds of relations even to the developing countries²⁸⁴.

In this context, regarding the management of the firms it is possible to claim that the founder at the outset, the family has overwhelmingly dominant in the management of the firms in Hacilar. Likewise 66 of 71 businessmen said “yes” to the question of “a family member is managing the factory”. In a similar way, 61 of 71 the businessmen also verified that “the decisions are taken by the members of the family” (Ege, 2008: 312). A similar situation is seen in Gaziantep industry where the family is the basic element. The numbers given by Ayata, are very clear. For instance, “95 % of the small industries and 91 % of the big industries was established directly by the existing owners or family members. 89 % of the owners of the small firms noted that the decisions are taken by themselves or by the family members (Ayata, 2004: 574). First of all, I can suggest that most of the elements of the “family strategy²⁸⁵” which are discussed by Ayata in the context of Gaziantep are very similar in Hacilar. These are

Using the family labor effectively; given particular emphasize to the education of family members; preference of equities rather than the financial institutions; avoiding risks; the economic consideration of social relations and any other networks and ties; keeping the authority and resources within the family if possible (Ayata, 2004: 574-5).

Only two of these elements subjected to change in time in Hacilar. First, the industrial entrepreneurs were taking risks in the incipient stages of their business. However, with the development of scales and capacities they started to avoid risks in the last ten years. The second, the industrialists were not taking credits from the financial institutions in the first years but in time due to the same reasons they started to work with these institutions. Indeed, today a family of Hacilar is the

²⁸⁴ Menning 1997

²⁸⁵ Mulholland 1997

partner of the biggest Islamic financial institution of Turkey. Besides, among the industrialists I made interview, there was almost no one who does not get in the banking operations like credit or leasing.

As noted by Ayata the patriarchal relations play critical roles in the development of family capitalism. Kayseri is quite alike of Gaziantep pictured by Ayata.

The key positions and critical responsibilities in management are shared within the family members. Therefore, the division of labor in the management of the firm reflects the conditions of the adult males among the family and close relatives. In small firms first father and/or big brother split away from the production process but the other children and brothers direct the production process. In bigger firms family members and relatives totally split away from the production and it is transferred totally to the professional engineers. In these firms family member's deals generally with other functions such as marketing, finance and decision making (Ayata, 2004: 575).

I can suggest that the whole of the above sentences is true for Hacilar. At this point, I want to deepen this topic of patriarchy. Since, my study reveals that beyond its negative aspects, this patriarchal order has been a very critical factor in behind the success stories of Hacilar firms especially for the incipient stages.

During field work, I allocated half of my time to listen to the development stages of the firms and the business life's of the industrialists. I got most of the critical information from these stories rather than the direct questions. By the way, the people I interweaved were the successful ones who could bring its small business to a factory level production unit in 30 to 40 years. While taking their stories, a disturbing idea got stuck in my mind. What had happened to the hundreds of other apprentices sent to industry with these industrialists 40 years ago and what makes them successful different than the others?

Yet, when to consider all the stories of these families in detail; I concluded that one of the most critical factors is the organizational power of the patriarch in the family besides many other material factors. This patriarch could be a grandfather, father, big brother or the educated brother of the family. Here, the critical point is the existence of this founding and legitimate patriarchal authority even if he makes a mistake or takes wrong decisions. Namely, even the shadow of this real authority

constitutes the condition of surviving beyond the success of the firms in the periphery. I reached to this idea after comparing the successful cases with unsuccessful ones including my own family. Of course every family is a different case with its economic, social and cultural conditions. However, regarding the successful ones, this patriarchal connection is of utmost importance. There is not a coincidence here. I stated a similar pattern in almost all of the stories of successful families.

Among the 30 successful ones there are only 5 families in which the welfare inherited from the rich grandfathers or fathers to the next generations. Among these 5 cases three of them were dealing with drapery, one was producing carpets and the other was a truck driver. These people transferred the required economic and social capital to their children to carry on the same business.

The other but dominant pattern is quite different. In this case a talented entrepreneur who in a way succeeded in his business gathers the members of the family around and unites the different capacities of the family on a basic aim. In most of the examples we see that an apprentice gathers his brother or cousins or other relatives after he became a master and opened his own shop. 21 of the 30 families comprises of these kinds of families. Since the first generation of Hacılar was extremely poor, this pattern is the dominant one among others in the way to industrialization of Hacılar.

Since the story of Cain and Abel we know that how deep and affective could be the competition between the brothers. Dostoyevsky handled this subject in the level of masterpiece in his book *Karamazov Brothers*. In this sense, one should not forget that the periphery²⁸⁶ is not a warm place full of solidarity relations; but it is a deep hole in which the brothers and sisters undermines each other. Yet, the only condition of collective success in this deep hole is to come to heel together in front of the legitimate patriarch. Otherwise, ever man goes in his own way and the energy of the family diffuse. In this case, the unsuccessful ones are jealous of their

²⁸⁶ There are detailed analysis on the periphery in two books published recently. See Bora 2010 and Sualp and Güneş 2010.

successful brothers and sisters and rather than hanging together wait the fall of their relatives. For this reason, the common point of all these successful stories is the existence of a strong or smart patriarch who prevents and balances the competition between the brothers for maintaining the long term interests of the family.

If this person is a one man (a father for example) who established and developed the business the problems could be solved more easily under the legitimate authority of this person. If the founder is one of the brothers (due to the lack of the father or his being weak) then the family relations could be more confusing. For instance, if the big brother is not strong, smart or talented enough; then the separation of brothers is more likely to happen. Sometimes, although the little brother has the required capacities, it could also be not enough to balance the family relations. Besides, I observed that the potential problems between the brothers are being solved with the division of labor. It is very common that while some of the brothers dealing with production the others are managing the marketing departments of the firms.

In this context, there are only five industrialists (of thirty) who set up his own business without bonding to a patriarch or using familial relations. Three of them are already university graduates (engineers). Therefore, could be regarded as exceptions. The stories of remaining twenty five industrialists are the same as I outlined above. Actually, the three stage classification I made is not that absolute and sometimes the categories crosscut each other; however the secret of the success is that overt. It is time to apply to the witnessing of a worker who has been working in the business of a family for thirty years.

G: They developed with their mutual support between the brothers. Always the big brother decides and no one get out of it. No one opposed. It is still so. Süleyman²⁸⁷ decides everything he is the most educated one. They support each other if they have a kinship. Even the distant relatives. Their cousin bankrupted its business many times; they rescued him and make partner to their firm. They have very close relations. That's why they developed rapidly.

²⁸⁷ I changed the name.

Now, I can consider the conditions of unsuccessful firms in order to support my argument. However, I should note that these are “partially and relatively” unsuccessful firms since their conditions are objectively not so bad. I just use these words for indicating the perception of the industrialists regarding their own firms. Among the firms I interviewed there were only five industrialists, who think that they are not in the desired level of development or see themselves as unsuccessful or partially successful. These are the ones who left production, the ones who has not shifted to industrial production from trade or the ones who lessened the scope of heir business of several reasons. The first two industrialists are the ones who could not get along with their brothers. Now these two brothers made production in two different factories. The third industrialist is the one who could not get along with his brother, brother in law and children. Now his factory was hired by someone else. The other two industrialists who have not shifted to industrial production do have not brothers.

As clearly seen the patriarchal solidarity relations are of critical importance in both start up and development of the firms. The lack of these relations is a real disadvantage in the periphery for industrialization. Likewise, when to examine the conditions of other apprentices who were sent to industry forty years ago and still working as workers; it reveals that beyond the personal qualifications of intelligence and talent; the basic factor reveals as the lack of patriarchal solidarity patterns. These workers are the people who do not have any kind of additional income from their families; who dot have fathers or brothers or some strong close relatives like uncles to lean on. Therefore, these are the ones who cannot be courageous, aggressive and enterprising. In other words, these are the people who do not have any kind of (or limited) economic, social and cultural capital. The similar characteristics could be stated in most of the families who could not be industrialized.

Under these circumstances, the general condition of administrative relations could be summarized as follows. The founder patriarch is still on the central point of the business. He is still going to work early morning and controls the state of affairs. However, the enterprises are being directed de facto by the second generations. The

founder spent most of his time to control and regulate the internal (the relations between the brothers) and foreign affairs (the relations with other firms) of the business as the counselor.

Beyond this general picture, the real situation is a bit confusing. There are different forms. In the first condition, the founder patriarch is dead and the business is being directed completely by the second generations. There are only three such cases of thirty families. In the second condition, the founding patriarch voluntarily withdrew completely from the business. There are only four families like that. However, in the remaining twenty families the founding patriarch is still at work. Among these twenty persons only five of them is in a much more passive position. The last three families were not making production in the period when I made the interviews.

So what about the disadvantages of this patriarchal structure of management? In order to grasp it we should examine the intergenerational relations and the professionalization level of the firms. Let us look at the general picture first.

I observed that in majority of the firms the first, second indeed the third generations are working together. Regarding the intergenerational relations it is possible to state a similar condition with the case of Gaziantep.

The oldest and experienced one in the family mainly deals with decision making and financial business. The founder is not just a boss but a man identical with the firm. Dependency to the boss/father is almost equal to dependency to the firm. As seen family, management and market mechanisms are intertwined each other. Besides a couple of exceptions, family centered management is prevailing in Gaziantep including the bigger firms (Ayata, 2004: 575).

This is an example verifying the above stated management structure in Hacilar.

My father is leading the firm. He is our general director. The operation is shared by the members of the family. My uncle (smaller brother of my father) is directing the financial department. My other smaller uncle is dealing with marketing. I am working in the export department. This is our division of labor.

My interviews show that, the majority of the second generation of industrialist work in the factories of their families and they have a deep respect and admiration to the first generations. Therefore, while working in the management of these firms they

are subjected to the first generations and rather than opposing their uneducated fathers or uncles they tried to convince them in the decisions. For this reason, as a general statement it is possible to say that the first and second generations are working in harmony. There are several reasons of this compliance. First, these second generation industrialists have been working in industrial production since their childhood and in time they have taken place in different stages of the production process. As a matter, they have been sharing the similar socio-cultural atmosphere both with their fathers and workers. Therefore, it would not be very difficult when they complete their university education, come back to Kayseri and start in the factory of the family.

Generally, these second generation industrials do have professional carriers and now they are directing the foreign trade or marketing departments. They work like their fathers from 8:00 am to 18:00 pm. Almost all of them are married and have children. They do not have a night life and entertainment organizations apart from their families. Their life rhythms are quite alike their fathers except some differences in consuming patterns. Therefore, the intergenerational conflicts are not that severe as in the case of metropolitan cities.

On the other hand, we should stop here and look at the other face of these patriarchal relations which have played critical roles in the making of this industrial development. Based on my interviews, particularly made with second generations, I can suggest that the marginal utilities of these “necessary” patriarchal relations in the incipient stages of industrialization are gradually decreasing. Besides, in time they start to constitute some impediments on the second generations by preventing some firm’s institutionalization and professionalization processes. Especially some young industrialists of small and medium scale enterprises complained that it could be very exhaustive for them to work with and convince the first generations in the critical topics related with the future of the business. It was told me that the first generations are not reluctant to give the discretionary power in the management of the factories. They take the strategic decisions, investment plans themselves and do not want to give responsibility to the second generations. Their reluctance to

opening out and their dependency to the traditional forms of management are indicated as the obstacles in front of the institutionalization of these small and medium scale enterprises. Of course there are marginal examples of first generation industrialists who even bargain for the stewpots bought for the kitchen of the factory as indicated by Ayata in the case of Gaziantep. On the other side, the second generation is frequently criticized by the first generation as being consumptive. An old industrialist is speaking:

For instance we are the people who have the principles of living economical. We have been thinking to earn much but to consume less for years. The new generations are much more consumptive. For instance, we are on the side of trust and stability. We have some indispensable measures. However they are much more excited and flexible. There are some *sine qua nons* for us but they can say: “never mind, let it be this time when both buying and selling something.

A similar sentence was made by an industrialist who said: “We were living ten years with the stuff this young generations cast away”. However, beyond these negligible differences the real point is that whether these firms would be doomed to the capacities, talents and visions of the founders or they could adopt themselves to the changing economic and social conditions in the world parallel to the dynamics of world capitalism. At this point, there were made some statements that the approaches of first generations gradually lose its meaning. Since some young industrialist think that they could not grasp the requirements of the age and prevent development while insisting in the old.

In order to elucidate the difference in the approaches between the two generations I want to revisit the example I gave in the previous pages in a different context. In this case, the small firm was taken to court by the leader firm of the sector with the accusation of making the imitation of the products they took out the patent. As to remember, the manager (uncle) of the medium scale firm was spitting fire to the leader firm and blaming it with finishing the small firms rather than struggling with IKEA in the world markets. However, for the same case the attitude of the young industrialist of second generation was totally different. He was thinking that the leader firms is making right because they spent million dollars for R&D activities and by doing this they are protecting their rights. Let us give ear to this young engineer.

Brother you may be heard: “God bless İstikbal”. However, when someone hurt by a commercial attempt of İstikbal this time they say: “They destroyed and exploited everybody”. What does this mean now? You should think that this man makes his business what his business requires”. Since, there are both profit and loss in trade. Do you understand what I mean? If everybody speaks up to his interest then it is called hypocrisy. They are doing business; they are making the right thing for their business.

One of the famous and informative stories about the intergenerational relations is the story of the leader firm. According to the information given by the top manager of the firm, his father (of his 50s at that time) embarked upon a quarrel with his brother in 1980 when they estimating the annual accounts of the firm and decided to split up. At that point the children who were waiting in behind the door came forward and said “we don’t want to separate with our brothers and cousins. If you devolve work on the children we can keep going”. So, at the end of the day, the brothers accepted this offer, withdrew totally from the business and the children who were in their 20s (at that time) transformed the workshop into a worldwide holding in 20 years. Although it seems a very simple story; the critical and radical intervention made by the second generations here became one of the critical factors that made this firm the leader one among others. In order to understand the importance of the above example it is better to look the other cases that can not make this devolution to the second generations. The example below is from the factory in which the second generation nephews could not get along with their uncles when they finished the undergraduate education and started to work in the factory of the family. The result is the separation of the firm between the two brothers.

G: These two children could not get along with their uncles. So their uncle said: “I should leave because the minds of the children are working quite differently”

K: Was it like intergenerational conflict?

G: Yes.... When the children came back we made a new division of labor in the factory. After this division my brother got into conflict with my children. The children said: “You just do your business. We give information to our superior. You should first become successful in your work before annoying us. He said: “I am the uncle I make you what I want to you”. This kind of conflicts happened and then he left. We keep going with the children here.

As seen, when these patriarchal attitudes could not be replaced with professional approaches or when there could not be found some interim mechanisms to solve these tensions; the intergenerational conflicts may end up with the separation of the firms.

The other result of this patriarchal management structure besides the deficiencies in institutionalization is the reluctance of the firms in employing professional managers. As I noted before there are already serious problems in devolution of the responsibilities even to second generations of the family. Under these circumstances most of the small firms are not ready to employ foreign managers within the family. So, except a couple of firms, majority of the factories are managed with traditional methods without professionals and institutional organizations. The below example is from one of the typical firms having investments in both textile and metal goods and service sectors.

G: We took the biggest jab from this. We could not succeed to be institutionalized. We are suffering of it. When looking to other firms we understand that we can not keep going in this way. We made big mistakes.

M: What kind of mistakes?

G: We haven't used a single account we did not unite our different businesses in the same account. Everyone (the brothers) had a different account. Everyone spent for his business. We have not controlled and audited for years. In the last two years we said to our brothers: "at least write on a piece of paper what you spent in the business". Since, we have been tolerant to each other. We have thought that: "He is our brother; it doesn't worth to speak for 100 to 200 million TL... However recently we constitute a single account between the families among the brothers. But as I said we lost too much money in our different firms at least 500, 600 million or 1 billion TL in a year.

As I indicated in R&D chapter, the shortage of high quality professionals is the problem of the whole Kayseri; however, this patriarchal structure prevent also the prospective contribution of the second rank professionals to these firms such as the newly graduate engineers, architects, and managers. Since they know this structure, they do not want to work in these firms. For this reason this led to a vicious cycle for the future of these small and medium scale firms. However, it is known by everybody that one of the most distinctive characteristics of the leader firm is its delegation of the management to second generations and professionals 30 years ago²⁸⁸.

²⁸⁸ This point is explained in detail in Vardar's book. See Vardar 2009: 92.

To sum up, the firms belonged to industrialists of Hacilar is almost completely family firms and managed with patriarchal structure in which the family culture is dominant. Except a couple of big ones, the management structure has not been professionalized and institutionalized. There is a radical difference between the first and second generations about the education level. The majority of second generations comprises of educated and qualified professionals having the foreign language skills. Besides, they are working to a great extent in harmony with first generations. However, the intergenerational conflicts have been started especially in small and medium scale firms which have not shift to professional management organization. So, the future of these small scale firms will be determined by their adaptation capacity to the newly emerging conditions.

5.3.7 Labour Processes

In this part I will decipher observations regarding labour processes in Hacilar industry, but I should underline a point at the very outset. This study is not devoted to workers, but to industrialists. Therefore, workers are considered as a secondary issue of a study focussing directly on industrialists. That is why the information which will be presented in this section is mainly based on the analysis of perceptions and thoughts of employers regarding their own employees. The analysis is derived from the interviews I made with industrialists with a set of questions concerning their relations with workers. Surely, I also did certain interviews with workers themselves. Some of those interviews took place in restaurants, pide (Turkish pizza) shops, patisseries, stations, waiting lounges in the Organized Industrial Zone of Kayseri where I spent two months during two summers devoted to do fieldwork. In addition, I also had a chance to do random and free talks with those workers who came to apply for a job when I did interview with employers in factories. I could also talk with workers who sat next to me in buses and minibuses travelling to the Organized Industrial Zone and with those I did take in my car when they were hitchhiking on the road. The best information I could gather is the outcome of those free, unstructured talks. I also did in-depth interviews with five workers some of whom were my relatives. However this

output is not sufficient to see the big picture regarding labour processes in Hacılar industry. Such picture necessitates a distinct research design which should target a sufficient number of workers as research sample. Such reservations have to be kept in mind while reading and evaluating this section.

As I emphasised throughout the whole study the industry in Hacılar exhibits the features of a typically capitalist industry both in quantitative and qualitative terms. In that sense the employer-employee relations which I call labour processes in general or work relations are fully determined by the universal dynamics of capitalism. Like all other industrialists, Hacılar industrialists give minimum wages to their workers; constantly complain about workers' rights including social insurance, severance payment, social security. Except for the largest companies ones, companies do not allow union organising activities. In that sense they have no difference from other industrialists in the World. Thus, it is plausible to argue that those industrialists whose majority came from a working class background have a solid (bourgeois) class consciousness. I will illustrate different aspects of this naked consciousness, but it is important to decipher first the position of workers in the city of Kayseri for the purpose of contextualisation.

As the section where I explained the process of development of Kayseri and Hacılar industry after 2000s has already shown, one of the special reasons which made industrialisation possible is the ability to keep worker wages low thanks to the relatively cheaper living conditions in Kayseri. During the period of this research (2007-2009) wages varied between 420 and 1200 Turkish Liras. Most payment was based on minimum wage. Wage quantity illustrates an important aspect of the global-local relations of production in the post-industrial age of capitalism. Those companies which do low-technology, labour intensive production get the opportunity to enter World markets by using the advantage of keeping labour costs low. Such is the advantage of cities such as Kayseri. The population and workers in Kayseri city center come from the (close and far) districts of Kayseri (close and far) and the cities in the surroundings of Kayseri (Yozgat, Nevşehir, Sivas, Kırşehir, Niğde etc.). They are mostly ethnically Turkish

and Sunni in terms of religious sect. Therefore they live in a relatively smooth social environment created by this homogenous structure. Moreover those workers continue their organic links with districts and villages which are close to the center. In other words the urban and rural economies are intertwined. Most of those workers can go to their villages in the weekends and continue rural production necessary for the reproduction of the rural household (even though the level of rural production remains marginal).

In the city, housing rent, transport and basic consumption goods are cheaper than in big cities. A minimum wage of 600-700 liras offers a relatively better living condition as compared with the life in big cities. If a second family member the household works in one of the marginal sectors in the city, the total income can reach to 1000-1200 Turkish Liras. Those second workers are apprentices, secretaries, janitors, shop workers, cash clerks in supermarkets and waiters for adolescents and home based work for women including making and selling of pastry, Turkish dumpling, lacework, embroidery, carpet weaving, child care and cleaning.

To summarise, the opportunities provided to workers by provincial cities such as Kayseri constitute a big advantage for the provincial industrialists. Especially workers from villages and districts close to the city center such as Hacilar resolve the housing problem to a great extent. For instance workers who work in the factories of the Organized Industrial Zone owned by their co-villagers can still live in their village and can go to work by transport in 10-15 minutes. This closeness gains special importance during crisis periods. One striking example comes from an interview I made with Hacilar Municipal Administration officer who told me that after the 2001 crisis, 700 Hacilar workers repaired their family houses in their natal villages and moved to those houses.

Another advantage I observed is that workers live in a closed environment surrounded by relatives and acquaintances who do eliminate, at a certain level²⁸⁹, the sociopsychological pressures and anxieties. The fact that workers leave their families and children at a reliable place and the fact that childcare is relatively easy as compared to the residents of big cities, gives a bonus to provincial workers. One could even generalise such comfort to the residents of Kayseri, by keeping certain exceptions aside.²⁹⁰ In those conservative residential spaces where everybody is familiar or relative, the lack of confidence and anxieties emerging in modern industrialised cities decrease to a certain extent. This becomes a social capital added to the material capital of provincial residents and support their economic life.

Most of the industrialists I interviewed recorded that their employees work on minimum wage, yet there are also workers getting a pay above minimum wage depending on their seniority and quality. During the period of research (2007-2009) the net official minimum wage increased from 476 TL to 589 TL. Below one can see the wage regime of a furniture factory employing 200 workers. It is striking to see that the general minimum amount mentioned is below official minimum wage.

K: OK are those all working with minimum wage? What is that?

G: There is minimum wage, there is other. Generally minimum wage. But not only full minimum wage. They do not take 420 liras in general. 500, 600, 700, 800...

K: Does it depend on the level of being a master?

G: Yes yes, on the basis of the quality of men.

The words of the owner of a steel door company, while talking about export and import business, give a clear idea about worker wages.

So in that period your phone bill was 200 million liras, suddenly 2 billion, 3 billion.. So this offended us... 2, 3 billion liras is almost the wage of your 7-8 worker wages.

²⁸⁹ I say at one level because in another sense smaller places have an atmosphere which can increase such sociopsychological anxieties and suffocating people and this is an extremely rich issue which could be subject of another study.

²⁹⁰ The fact that children who went out to collect candies during a Ramadan in Kayseri were raped and then killed can be considered to show how provincial towns are losing their previous character. For the news, see <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1113158&title=kayserili-kayip-3-cocugun-cesedi-yozgatta-bulundu-2-kisi-gozaltina-alindi>

With an optimistic guess, if 3 billion is given to 7 workers, the amount paid to workers is 420 liras as in the previous one. Now let us look at social rights. The first and most important issue is social security. In academic studies on labour processes²⁹¹, especially when the object of study is small and medium size enterprises, the most emphasised points are: informal employment, making workers work without social security, paying less social security premiums, avoiding severance payment by firing and re-hiring workers. All of the industrialists I interviewed said that they do not employ workers without social security and they abide by relevant legislation on that issue. Since most of those industrialists have companies larger than small and medium size enterprises and given their rates of profit, such claims can be told to reflect the reality to a great extent. For instance, the workers applying for a job I spoke to while waiting in the lounge for an interview with a company manager told me: ‘This is a place like a state, social security premiums are paid and moreover they give lunch.’

On the other hand, in two separate studies on the workers in Konya which is a very similar city to Kayseri,²⁹² there are two contradictory results. Those results show that it is not sufficient to talk only to employers or employees under the custody of employers in order to obtain a correct conclusion. In fact, reading between the lines during the interviews reveals some findings that companies do not meet all the obligations imposed by labour legislation. I observed that problems occur mostly in relatively small size companies. Therefore I think that Durak’s findings about small and medium size enterprises in Konya reflect the truth. Especially work accidents emerging from a lack of abiding by law and which lead to fines paid by companies make industrialists angry and provoke the feeling that they are paying a price due to a problem which is not their responsibility. The situations which crystallise the real class identity and attitude of employers beyond their responses about workers’ conditions are their attitudes vis-a-vis work accidents:

²⁹¹ See Suğur (1995), Geniş (2006), Özüğurlu (2008), Durak (2011).

²⁹² The findings of Özdemir (2010) about working conditions were falsified by Durak (2011). According to Özdemir’s study which was made with 6 workplaces and 24 workers working for MÜSİAD member employers, social security premiums and wages were paid regularly, research universe was endowed with positive wages and rights. According to Durak’s study made with 10 employers, 15 workers, 5 unemployed, those findings were incorrect.

G: For instance for the last two years we were all hurt. We already had workers without social security. One fell from the car. He had an injury without social security. Since he did not have social security, normally I should not have any trouble. Work accident. Necessary precaution was also taken but his lack of social security turned into a fine for me.

M: Were you subject to a serious fine?

G: Not, not a serious fine. A worker of one month who had just been fired. Probation period could be a defense point for us but still there was a fine. Decision, my brother. Nobody will work without social security. What I mean we made those mistakes in the past and there are still people who are making such mistakes.

M: For instance, is there such thing as union here?

G: Rather than unionisation, workers can get their rights by requesting it.

M: In what ways?

G: He gets it with the Ministry of Labour, with the Social Security Institute. And by force, even more. After a work accident I considered that manufacturing was a crime. Can you look at auditing? The reverse gear lamp of the forklift was on and since it did not work like dit dit I was guilty. I got a fine. Can there be such a thing? Do warn me and I'll do it. The worker saw that. The state is with workers.

G: We do not want anything from the government. Do not create any shadow, I would not want anything else. Why? Brother, you employ workers. In this country employing workers is a crime. If the guy goes inside and cuts his hand, you are guilty. He has a reason! I did what is needed. I did it so that he is not cut. Look, he has glasses. He knows how to use machinery. He knows there is a cutting tool in this machine. He cuts his hand, come here, why did you make his hand cut? He should not have his hand cut! Now while this guy has an accident while going home see, you are responsible until he goes home. There can't be an absurdity like that. Man, it is a crime to employ workers in this country.

K: Are you saying that employing workers with social security, and tax rates are expensive?

G: Yes, expensive, I mean crime. Yes yes, crime. You look at the guy, he works with minimum wage. For 400 liras. His cost to you is 800 liras. There can not be such thing. You give food to the guy. Why do you need to give food? Perhaps he likes greasy food, perhaps plain food. I do not know, 300 men are working. You should do 200 food, different sorts. But you give a wage and then he should bring his own food and eat. It should be like this.

Apart from wages and social security, with respect to overtime payment and other opportunities, it is difficult to make a generalisation. In that area, company scale, capacity and work intensity are determining factors. If the company is in a relatively better off situation or in religious holidays they are more flexible. Most of the industrialists I interviewed affirmed that they do pay overtime and provide

extra help in religious holidays. Moreover, it is a common practice for furniture companies to give a gift of furniture to young workers who get married. It is also claimed that in certain situations (wedding, circumcision ceremonies, funeral, worship) workers are given days off. However I myself witnessed how strict the terms and conditions of those permissions are. When I was interviewing a factory owner one of the workers said that he would go to say goodbye to his nephew who would go to do his military service and he would like to have the afternoon off. The boss asked where his nephew would go. When he learnt that he would go to İzmir, the boss said that İzmir bus departs at 6 PM and he could even go after the working day but still could go after 3 PM. On the other hand when things go badly or during times of crisis, there could be irregularities in workers payment. I am unaware of how often such irregularities occur, but such problems happen even in large companies and a solution of making workers 'prospectively indebted' is developed. So such problems may occur also in other companies. Some workers I interviewed, especially in smaller companies confirmed that and said that they encounter such practices. Here is an extract from the history of the example leading company:

In the crisis which erupted in 1994, Boydak Group does not fire workers despite decreasing demand. He continues paying workers' wages fully. However since there is no production, workers are made indebted prospectively. Thus the workers get their wages and do not lose their jobs. In other words both sides win (Vardar, 2009: 81).

The example below is from an interview made with an industrialist:

G: When the economy is good, we can meet their expectations with what come from our heart, their pay rise as well. But if the economy is not very good, if the sector moves slowly if there are crises, unfortunately we can only give their wages with sadness. We can not give pay rise and overtly I feel discomfort about it.

Finally when we examine the union organising situation, we observe a very interesting picture. In 28 of the 30 industrial companies I interviewed there was no union. The attitude of employers to trade unions was negative. This is an expected finding compatible with the findings of the academic studies on Anatolian tigers and with the situation of unions in Turkey. However, there is a very surprising situation with respect to two companies. The first one is a company employing 140

workers and is on the list of the second biggest 500 industrial companies operating in the steel sector. The company owner said that there are workers who are members of Türk Metal union. The most surprising is the other one which employs 12.000 workers, a leading company. Those workers constitute 66 per cent of the total workforce in Hacilar industry. The employer stated that 90 per cent of workers are members of unions in Türk İş, Hak İş and Öz İplik İş whose wages are determined via collective bargaining. This means that 70 per cent of Hacilar workers are union members. The first quotation below is from the president of the Board of Director, the second one from the General Secretary.

K: OK for instance is there such thing as union?

G: 90 per cent of our workers are unionised.

K: Which unions do you have here?

G: There is Türk İş, Hak İş, Öz İplik İş. There are different unions.

G: So you know, employing workers is the biggest risk. We face this risk with 12000 people. So it is not making Money out of Money, it is not making rent out of rent. We try to gain from production and our workers do have all social rights and union rights.

M: For instance are workers unionised?

G: Of course of course.

M: Which union are they affiliated with?

G: Hizmet İş.

M: Hizmet İş is that all?

G: Hizmet İş, İplik iş. Then Ağaç-İş different types. For example Ağaç İş concerning wood then the ones affiliated with metal, for example Metal-İş. Öz İplik İş is about textile. So the union exists in all our institutions. There are collective bargaining negotiations. There is no informal.

In the light of what is told, even if we think about unionisation rate as 50 per cent with a pessimistic guess, this is a big number, which is outside of the general tendency of unionisation and pattern and does not confirm the literature on Anatolian tigers. How shall we explain this situation then?

If we assume that what is inferred here is correct, the following picture emerges: Hacilar industry consists of two different structures as I emphasised in the sectoral structure section. The first structure includes companies which can be considered as big capital, employing a very high number of workers and does mass production

at large scale. The second structure includes companies which are not as small as small and medium size enterprises (KOBİ'S), but can not be considered as 'big capital', employing 50-500 workers and doing medium scale production (usually concentrated on 80 to 200 workers). Big companies are organised on the basis of Fordist type of organisation. In parallel they follow technology, Research and Development (R&D), professional and institutionalised production and employment patterns. Workers' rights and union organising levels have developed in line with this Fordist framework. The fact that the leading company is the member of both MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD²⁹³ is compatible with the framework I have drawn above²⁹⁴. On the other hand, the small companies have a more informal character in terms of production, research and development, employment, workers' rights and union organising.

I will now focus on the human and informal aspects of the employer-employee relations. As mentioned in previous sections, Hacilar industrialists come from the very hard core of the working class, given that they shifted from an artisanship position to employer status. Thus, they are very well aware of all stages of production, conditions of the workers they employ, their problems, emotions and psychological status. I can even argue that this very awareness helps them to manage more strictly and make them work. They changed their class status both economically and socially. They developed a sharp consciousness about their new position and naturalised inequalities.

There can be no equality. Otherwise would be non sense. How can one be equal? When there is equality, everybody will come and sit here, who will work over there? If there will be equality you will ask everybody 'Why are you asking this question to me? There can be no equality my brother, there is no justice in equality! Can there be such thing! The guy won schol teaching and will teach there, the other managed to be university teacher, he became professor. How will you treat them equally? How will they be equal? Milk makes my stomache sick, you like milk and you tell me to drink milk, what kind of equality is that! Look, my friend, I observe, I look at the past, at the events in Kayseri, the father has two, three, four sons, has a trade place, the father dies or not. Bu the father likes wearing shirts, the elder brother likes wearing shirts and goes to buy 4 white shirts. He buys four boxes of apple or one since he likes apple and he divides them.

²⁹³ This is the only company which is TÜSİAD member among firms I interviewed.

²⁹⁴ The special situation here, employer-employee relations and union organising are all the object of study of a separate research.

However, to the outside world they exhibit a rather modest attitude in terms of speech and behaviour. This is not simply an attitude in appearance²⁹⁵. For there is not a large distance between their own past and their old position in terms of time and culture. Moreover, even though there emerged a spatial and class differentiation with the rising richness, since Kayseri is a small city, they meet often their co-villagers in weddings, vacations, Friday pray, visits in aftrenoons, vineyards in summer time. During my own visit I witnessed such meetings. Furthermore they have friends who started the same job yet could not be equally successful, they have relatives (close and far), acquaintances and co-villagers. While giving statistics about Hacilar, I had mentioned that 48 % of the population worked in the industry and most women were housewives. Almost all male workforce works in the industry. Therefore, the dynamics of employer-employee relations are not similar to the big metropolises. In other words relations are closer and more informal. This does not eliminate the historically specific conflictual relation between the employer and employee, but this very conflict is not predominant or overt. The relation between the two groups is characterised by a paternalistic and organicist approach. Informal support mechanisms, partial aid in critical periods, support of co-villagers, sharing of the same social, cultural and religious spaces constitute an informal sociality which plays a major role in employer-employee relations. For instance, if you are from Hacilar and accept to work with minimum wage, it is almost practically impossible to be unemployed in Hacilar. In other words Hacilar industrialists do look after workers in terms of employment. In return workers can express their problems and demands individually as long as they are not put in class terms. A type of informal negotiation is in operation. Durak calls this situation as ‘fragile obedience’²⁹⁶. In fact, that workers get their rights in work accidents ‘by giving hard time’ to employers is a proof of this. But here since village belonging is in operation,

²⁹⁵ As Durak reminds us, Thompson underlines that cultural hegemony requires a world view which is constantly reproduced by rules with skills, theater and concessions (quoted from Thompson 2006 by Durak 2011: 31).

²⁹⁶ Durak, 2011: 87.

obedience is not that fragile. From an outsider point of view,²⁹⁷ they look like ‘praying’ their bosses. The observations of a Hacilar teacher regarding those relations are telling:

I was walking in the garden at school. A guy came, we talked while standing. His son was studying. Petty talk... He said: ‘After having worked in Atlas (factory) they fired me. I worked 3 years in another place and got retired.’ Since he said Atlas, co-villager, relative...etc. I said ‘How did you leave? Atlas was a good factory.’ He looked at me ‘no, my teacher’. ‘There was Uncle Rasim. He used to come and say: Son of the aunt, hello, do you want anything? Good morning.’ Then he would go to his office. And then we would work so much until the evening by fear that it would be shameful for us not to do so to Uncle Rasim.

Uncle Rasim who is mentioned in this story is the founder of ATLAS Carpet Factory and is a first generation industrialist of Hacilar who passed away. That type of employers and workers no longer exist there. But I can argue that such patriarchal and paternalist model is still going on, although partially, in terms of general framework. Industrialists do identify themselves as the father of workers or brothers. The metaphor elder and younger brother is often used in the academic studies of Suğur²⁹⁸ in OSTİM and Durak in Konya. That is why the patriarchal and paternalistic relations which exist between first and second generation individuals in management is relevant in relations with workers. Now let me turn to examples which illustrate that point.

M: Let me ask you this, how is your relation with workers?

G: We are like brothers with our workers.

M: Is there a relationship like this or a professional relationship?

G: No we re like brothers but we are also professionals. I enter into the factory. I ask how my worker is, I win his heart. I caress his back. We get angry with some. We re like brothers. So we eat our bread from the worker. If they are happy we are happy. If possible we try to participate to weddings, circumcision ceremonies, special days as long as time allows. We love our workers, we re brothers.

²⁹⁷ A study which would be conducted from insider’s view would definitely yield different outcomes.

²⁹⁸ Suğur; 1995: 200

G: Although you have to be Professional, there is this closeness coming from Anatolian culture. In other words you put some rules, you say ‘My friend, on the 15th of every month we give wages, that is why the last fifteen days, nobody should take advance Money. We ll give to anyone.’ But if a worker comes and says to HR manager ‘brother I have a patient at home, and when he tells you this, you do something about it. You say ‘if he is in difficult position, then give it. This is a heart softness coming from being Anatolian. The West is more cruel. Life in the West is cruel. In İstanbul if a man does not work he can not survive but if a man does not work in Anatolia rice, bulghur come, his neighbour brings aid. Someway or another he can survive. Life conditions are a little bit different than in İstanbul.

One could even say that such a relationship type does not only occur between employer and employees but middle level managers and bosses. For instance, a second generation industrialist I did an interview with said the following about his brother who worked in a senior position in one of the big companies: “the man likes his boss so much that if he tells him ‘come and be my son’ he ll go”. In other words informal sociality is managed and manipulated at both levels.

On the other hand, those relationships whose informal character was depicted above are not only working in that framework. An important aspect of those relations is constituted by professional relations. Here is the reason: as can be seen in the Table in the 3rd part, amongst 30 industrialists I interviewed, only 4 employ less than 50 workers.

Therefore, most of those companies do go beyond the character of KOBİ both in terms of the number of employees and in terms of profit. That is why even though the relations above have close and informal characteristics, 18.765 workers who work in Hacilar industry are not only made of people with Hacilar origin. Moreover, as can be seen from the list, employment is created mainly by big leading companies and the Human Resources departments of those companies can not function on the basis of friendship and co-villager relations. Therefore, employer-employee relations are more professional than they appear. Especially big companies have often emphasised that they care about this in the name of institutionalisation. Now let us look closer at those relations with the following quotations. The first one is from an industrialist who ascribes his interest and conversation with the worker with his productivity.

K: How are your relations with workers?

G: Well me, I have some distance.

K: Is it more like elder and younger brother relationship or is there a more professional relation?

G: Now, it depends on the type of workers. If he is a productive worker, the relation is closer. It depends on the ability of the worker.

The two other examples reflect the attempt to balance elder-younger brother relationship and professionalism.

K: So how are relations with workers? Is it more like elder and younger brother relation or a professional relationship?

G: NOW it is like this, if you enter an elder-younger brother relationship with workers, you lose. That is why you will be both the elder brother of the worker you employ and you will work in an official way. You'll say you make mistakes like this. If you're elder-younger brother, this does not work.

K: So do you have a more fatherly relationship like brothers or?

G: When it is the time, brother, when it is the time Professional. Indeed we have a very good employer-employee relation with a professional background.

The final example shows how with the growth of companies there is a transition from relations of affinity to professional relationships.

When we were a smaller firm I was establishing one to one relationships. But now when the number of people increased, since seeing a few people and seeing not others would create a dilemma, we did create equal distance with everyone. We separated the foreman, manager, HR person. They deal with workers. But here when I walk downstairs for 10 minutes I have to ask how everybody is when possible. If it did not exceed 20, 30 and 40 people, this could be a little bit more intimate. But when people increase.

Now what is the function of all those informal relations with respect to the employer-employee relationships? In other words what do those relations serve for? I will conclude this section by discussing this issue below.

We know that in the modern period that what creates value is labour from the studies of Adam Smith and Ricardo. From the studies of Marx²⁹⁹, we know how labour plays a crucial role in the capital accumulation within the capitalist relations of production. In that framework, labour processes are not that different from other World examples in the process of capitalist industrialisation. Capital accumulation

²⁹⁹ See. Karl Marx (1966)

is created first at the level of the exploitation of workers who now became industrialists, then at the level of the appropriation of surplus labour produced by the workers, via a system of structural inequality.

Workers' wages are kept at very low levels. Social security premiums are paid on the basis of minimum wage, sometimes unpaid. There is no permission for union organising except for the two largest companies. Severance payments and work accident payments leap to the eye. Thus there is a strict control and supervision over labour processes. The submission of labour happens within forms of informal sociality, through hegemonic processes of patriarchal and paternalistic relations. But the appearance is totally different. Hacılar gives the impression of a happy village where the employer and employee cooperate to produce, where everybody wins, where everybody is pious, poor is fed by the rich and workers pray for their bosses.³⁰⁰ But what does the fact that this picture is praised by the neoliberal and Islamist power bloc representatives³⁰¹, the fact that Hacılar and Kayseri are praised as the model city to Turkey and the world by AKP³⁰² tell us?

The model of Kayseri is the synthesis based on the harmony and amalgamation of local and universal, reason and faith, calculation and help/solidarity, modernity and tradition, mortal instincts and search for eternity³⁰³.

In fact it tells the following clearly: Turkey experiences the agony of the transition to a neoliberal economic order (after the 24th January decisions implemented by 12 September coup d'etat)³⁰⁴. Özal started this transition by taking the support of the military but the completion of the process occurred with AKP government. The neoliberal programme/paradigm necessitated by capitalism to overcome to crisis of the 1970s and reproduce itself required the increase of structural inequalities and the transfer of resources to bourgeoisie from working classes.³⁰⁵ However, it was

³⁰⁰ See. Köseli, "Türkiye'nin en Mutlu İlçesi Hacılar" Zaman, 8 February 2008

³⁰¹ See. Öztürk, "Kalkınmada Kayseri Modeli" 28 October 2010, Zaman and "İşadamlarına Kayseri Dersleri 2 and 3" 1 to 4 November 2010, Zaman.

³⁰² Bkz. ESI (2005).

³⁰³ See. İbrahim Öztürk, "İşadamlarına Kayseri Dersleri", 4 November 2010, Zaman

³⁰⁴ See. Yalman (2009)

³⁰⁵ See. Ozan (2011)

not possible to achieve this project without ‘persuading’ workers. This persuasion with force was achieved by the coup d’etat, the persuasion with consent was achieved by civilians via the instruments of cultural hegemony.

In the period after 1980 the attempt of cultural hegemony in the new right³⁰⁶ was started by Özal who achieved the cooperation of Islamists with the big bourgeoisie. In the 1990s such hegemony was undermined for various reasons. AKP under the leadership of Erdoğan restored this hegemony in the aftermath of the most serious economic crisis and consolidated it.³⁰⁷ This process was carried out first by presenting capitalism as a system without alternative, then by promoting local, traditional and religious values as a way to build consent for and legitimise the system.

With the transition from Fordist accumulation regime to Post-Fordist accumulation regime, there occurred a structural transformation in the form and relations of production at the World scale. As I discussed in the previous sections while capital globalised, labour markets were made more flexible. With the end of organised capitalism,³⁰⁸ the cultural counterpart of this flexibility was the informalisation of social relations and making informality more structural.³⁰⁹ So it is in this context that the integration of local, traditional, religious and cultural values served as the tools of consent building in the process of cultural hegemony and control of labour.

Those ‘precarious, risky and fragile conditions of existence’ where wages are lowered, unions are undermined, labour markets are made flexible and subcontracted, contract work is disseminated, a growth model without employment is implemented, pushed the ‘working class into the hands of informal network of relations’ as Durak perfectly analysed (2011: 73-75). Since precariousness in work relations could be compensated by informal safety nets, workers had to rely on and

³⁰⁶ See. Tünay (1993)

³⁰⁷ See. Tuğal (2011)

³⁰⁸ Lash and Urry (1987)

³⁰⁹ The proposal of Prime Minister Erdoğan ‘if you can not find a job, sell lemons’ summarises the logic of this process very well.

abide by relations of relative, co-villagers, neighbourhood, acquaintances, friendship, religious communities, and to the existing dominant cultural references with their own free will. As Durak underlined, they had to be ‘more royalist than the king’.

First of all for workers, in several situations, commitment to cultural hegemony means commitment to family, relatives, co-villagers, neighbours, friends and rejecting the framework of legitimacy of the power bloc can mean rejecting all the social bonds..... Second for workers defending the legitimacy of those values and relations means the embracing of an ‘informal security’ offered by the employers in the precarious working life. Every worker who wants to prove his obedience to the employer has to share this world view and speak the language of hegemony... Third depending on the common World view - religious conservatism, which is one of the basic grounds of cultural hegemony, obtains a sacred legitimacy. Since the religion which constitutes the language of hegemony (Sunni İslam) presents the basic reference of the relations, inequalities are covered by the fog of the World of religion. Since real relations are carried out by ethereal references, commitment to cultural hegemony can also mean, for instance, a commitment to God (Durak, 2011: 73-75).

CHAPTER 6

CULTURAL ASPECTS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION PROCESS

This section aims to discuss the cultural aspects of industrialization process. I attempt to focus on the crucial relationship between industry and culture, which also incorporates the religious dimension. I had already set out the theoretical framework in the the third chapter in detail. Yet, in this section, there will be an evaluation of the status of the industrial bourgeoisie of Hacilar in the scope of above arguments by analyzing the data coming from the field work. For this aim, I will begin with questioning the availability of the classical Weberian thesis on the correlation between faith and economical achievement specifically; and then, of those sociological arguments, which highlight the networks of more traditional and communal structures. After examining and comparing both arguments with the field data, I will further extend my analysis in the direction of other cultural proponents that can have possible impacts on the industrialization process. In this respect, I will investigate and explore the identity formation of Hacilar, the importance of the notion of belonging, the political orientation of the community and finally the arguments and opinions of the industrialists of this region on modernity and globalization.

6.1 Findings on the Theological Argument

I have performed a solicitous effort in hounding about the correlation between religion and industrialization in Hacilar; since it was one of the indispensable problems of this dissertation. Accordingly, I asked many questions, mostly open-ended, in my interviews with the people of Hacilar, some of which took long hours; and, I listened and noted all of their answers with great endurance. Actually, most of those questions and themes have also been debated in a broader context provided

by a nation-wide study³¹⁰, which my research is a part of. That project indeed consists of a country-wide research carried out in 8 different cities of Turkey in between the years of 2008-2011. I also covered a plentiful data coming from the interviews made with 238 people. Those were some of the questions asked within that research:

- What is the main purpose of working/having a job and gaining money for you? Why are you working (in a job)?
- Do you see an inducement of your faith on your work/job performance? Do you think that your job performance/professional activities would be different if you were more or less religious?
- Do you think that being religious brings success at work? Does religion play any role in your economic/professional affairs? If it does, then how?

The outcome of that research about this theme was so clear: the people we interviewed, belonging various age and occupation categories and having different ideological orientations, said that they did not have any motivation like the kind Weber had mentioned behind their professional affairs. Definitely, it means that Turkish people mostly lack of any beliefs or thoughts on being heavenly awarded by the God if they work hard in this world. Indeed, they mostly treat their professional affairs as this-worldly activities, rather than relating them with spiritual objectives, behind which has material reasons like looking after himself/herself and his/her family, living well, and/or providing a positive contribution to the country. This is also the case for the industrialists of Hacılar. Then here are the answers of two industrialists to a question, essentially having an ontological sense.

My dream was having a workplace of my own, and a car, of course; having a car was so expensive but very prestigious. They were incredible! I should have a car! However, the business had antecedence for me; indeed, primarily I should have a job of my own. I should yield money. And it became true. OK, then how much did I get? I could never think about that amount of money. How could I employ 2 or 3 people in my workplace? I've never dreamed such kind of a thing! There is nothing about faith in this business. We are like the others, other people, other ones. Yes, of course, we are Muslim. But, how could our faith affect our business and make us successful? What does religion limit in the Middle East, thus Europe has an advanced economical position? No, here people are... As I said before, my aim was having my own working place, my own business. Living in more comfortable conditions...

³¹⁰ See Akşit et. all (2011) "Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Din" TÜBİTAK Project Report, No: 108K 207 Ankara or Akşit et. all 2012

I've reached the purpose of my life, thank Goodness! I've always wanted to live well, have a peaceful and happy family, and not to be in need. I've succeeded this situation by working hard. I have never gain money easily.

Our purpose is being the best within our industrial sector; and being successful with our children and family. This is a family corporation. Thank God, we've reached that point.

The answers of industrialists about the relation between professional achievement and faith are quiet similar.

There is nothing as religious motivation! There is time for prayer, and there is time for work. They are separate things. In fact, when we have so much work, I do not go to mosque to pray; I stay here and deal with my business.

If religion had really something about business, then Arabs should be prosperous in their economies! They should be the ones leading all the money. And, others, the nonbelievers would always be poor. They should not have anything. For example, US or the West should be very poor, if those claims were true. There is nothing like this! All is about working. If you work, you get what you want. It shows that God is on the side of the one who works.

I do live/perform of my own religion! There is no affiliation between my religion and my business! For me, I have to do my job in discipline; I have to do it properly and honestly. People must separate all those fields.

No, no, religion and business are the issues of different fields. People should not think about both in the same context. For instance, a man works for years, and one day he could have some economic problems. This is about the conditions of trade. For example, he could be got laid by a swindler. Anybody could give him a bounced check; so, he could loose all of his earnings of 10 years. Do you see anything about religion here? Should we say it was about his destiny?

Religiosity and trade/business are far different things, as I said before. Our religion does not bring anything that would restrain our business. It does not propose us to study religion all day, for example. So, our religion brings nothing that could retard our business.

Furthermore, the trend is similar about the answers on the industrialization of Hacilar specifically. People mostly emphasized on the specific material conditions of the village, for instance, the lack of the conditions for agricultural production,

land deficiencies, high rates of poverty, limited options, nearness to the city, and efficient leadership of some individuals in the adoption of industrial production.

There is nothing about the business works of Hacilar's people and religion... For instance, I was a share-holder in a company there. There was nothing about religion in our business. There were other partners in the company, who had different political thoughts. Yes, all of us are Muslim's. I am, too, doing my prayer. I've done the Pilgrimage. I am the benefactor of a mosque here; while, I also drink alcohol sometimes. But nobody reproved me about my drinking habits. Did they?

K: Do you think that there is a religious motivation mainly standing behind this industrial/economic growth here?

G: No. There is no other ways for the people of Hacilar, there is nothing to do here beside industrial business. The conditions forced them to work and look for other opportunities. So, no influence of religion on this growth... Specifically, no influence on me.

There are also individuals, of course, presuming a connection between religion and economic growth in Hacilar. However, those are mostly working in the religious sector as the clerics. Indeed, in the interviews with *imams*, preachers, and other official attendants of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, they usually talked about the importance of religion in the economic growth. However, as an interesting point for me, the *müftü* of Hacilar emphasized the scope of the secularity of the people here, by giving examples from the frequent questions about headscarf issues, revelries, or law of succession. According to him, people seem to be more secular than it is expected, especially in their attitudes about those issues. For instance, he mentioned the paradoxical behavior of them by giving an example from a specific case. He said that, some people, who are extremely scrupulous about the validity of their fasting activities in Ramadans, also do not hold back from drinking in wedding parties in other times; or, they usually prefer appealing to the secular Civil Code, rather than appealing to the Sharia or at least the consultancy of the religious attendants, for the issues about inheritance.

There are also some industrialists who see a real connection between their faith and economic success, like the religious officials. As an example, the industrilist emphasizing on the role of conditional inefficiencies in the growth of Hacilar above, talked about the specific influence of religion in this process as continues:

Yes, of course. Islam influences everything. Yes, the Great God relieves the needs of unbelievers, too. He also makes some of them rich. He does it in order to prevent them from asking, "Why didn't you help me in the world?" on the Apocalypse day. However, if a man prays in the morning, and leaves home to get the livelihood of his family for God's sake, he'll both have the money and the hearth of God. Is there any linkage? Yes, of course.

Similarly, another man, who says "there's nothing to do with religious belief in this business, buddy" in an interview and also sees religion in the basis of all activities, specially emphasized on the so-called duality of 'sacred and profane' from a self-reflexive way.

Yes, they are apart from each other. However, don't misunderstand what I'm saying. I don't claim that religion has nothing about this life. I don't mean this. We had to work hard, but God gave us the perseverance and power to work like this. It didn't come from me, It came from the God. But, anybody could also think that it is the God again made the guy drink alcohol. No, it would be a misinterpretation. There is a nuance between two facts. You have to ask this question to an authority. I have to go to a professor and ask him what about this case, how I will interpret its meaning. But I know there is a nuance here.

In my opinion, all these examples brings us a picture contrary to the theory of Weber. Most of the industrialists really think that there is nothing about their faith in being successful; but, they are rewarded by God since their hard work. In other words, individual hard work comes first, and God's dispensation is an answer to their efforts. It means that they markedly separate each worlds, and causally relate their professional achievements with their this-worldly individual efforts. Anyway, their thoughts about the successes of 'foreigners', 'Westerners' or 'alcohol drinkers' show their awareness about the issue. I think this conflictual situation is not really related with their individual thoughts; rather, it is about the flexible and conflictual nature of the religious discourse itself. As it is mentioned in another study of our own³¹¹ by referring An-Na'im³¹², religion essentially consists of secular practices which are far away from being divinely, stable and unchangeable. In other words, religions become profanized when people read, interpret and realize religious texts;

³¹¹ Paper presented to the 9th Tarabya Conference with Önder Küçükural titled "Liberalizm ile Muhafazakârlık Ekseninde Müslümanlar: Türkiye'de Değişen Toplumsal Cinsiyet Konumları ve Farklılaşan İslam Yorumları", 28-29 May 2011, Tarabya, German Consulate, İstanbul.

³¹² Quoted from the presentation of Abdullahi An-Na'im, "Coping with Shared Human Vulnerabilities: The Cultural Mediation of Resentment and Retaliation" Reset Doc İstanbul Seminars 09.05. 2011, İstanbul Bilgi University.

and, all those conflicting ideas, practices and approaches come together under the name of religious discourse. Therefore, even though the main motivation here is worldly, there is a general tendency to place the sacred into the profane, and use it as a source of legitimation.

Furthermore, the only point that Weber's thesis and the habits of the industrialists of Hacılar matches is related with their general tendencies about avoidance of luxury consumption. This is the case especially for the first generation industrialists. Indeed, there are people accounting for every penny, avoiding conspicuous and luxury consumption, and extravagance among the first generation; since they had realized capital accumulation under very difficult conditions. Sure enough, I have heard many stories especially about the first generation industrial bourgeoisie. As a consequence, an industrialist told me, “people of Hacılar do not see any difference between 1 million dollar and 1 lira; and bargain even for the price of a glass of tea”. Or, as in another favorite quotation, “people of Hacılar do not spare money as others chuck away in the night clubs of Istanbul or Izmir; they, on the contrary, use it in business investments”.

My general observations in the village also predicate this fact. People really beware of spending money for luxury consumption, except buying home, and car, and their spending for the preparations of marriage. For instance, they usually do not prefer runabout (*üstü açık*) models; despite the fact that they mostly use expensive automobiles. Moreover, their clothes, and behaviors generally seem to be humble and sincere. They also experience disciplined family lives; and generally do not have night-life habits. Actually, this is not only the case for Hacılar; but also a general trend for most of the industrialists from different regions of Anatolia. Nevertheless, when all the interviews are closely evaluated, the attitudes are not always so rigid in practice. For instance, cases show that there are exceptions about such kind of an asceticism even within the first-generations, and there seems a new trend of generosity especially related with luxury consumption towards younger generations. Let me mention an example of this kind taken from one of my interviewees' past memories about 1970's:

I made so much money in the past. Yes, 33000 lira in a year. Assume that I gave 7 or 8 lira of this money to the employee; I played away all the rest in clubs, or other places. I really spare all the money. I had many friends who even have no penny; but, I was so so rich!

I was told another story from present times by a second generation industrialists about a suicided businessman of Hacilar.

G: Hacilar isn't so much conservative indeed; but people always emphasize on this side. Yes, it is true; there is a generation here that knows how to enjoy themselves. They really know how to make fun of life. One (his father) is right inside the shop. We cannot experience even %5 of what they did in the past. They did not only work hard, but also did everything they want. Can I tell clearly?

K: Is it still going today?

G: No. Those were the people of the past. One of them was my father. Of course, that kind of living is ceased today. However, my father didn't let us recognize about his life habits. I've heard about him via other people. There were lots of people in that generation living such kind of an active life. Some of them married with his secretaries, for instance; or, some committed suicide. A businessman shot himself by gun indeed! He felt in love with his secretary. But his family refused.

K: Was he an industrialist, too?

G: Yes, he was. Indeed one of the bigger ones. In my opinion, all is about the ambitiousness and greed of the people in Hacilar!

As it is exhibited in those cases, I also made interviews with some industrialists in Hacilar, who were in their 60's in these days, declared about their joyful experiences of their young ages. I heard many stories about parties with prostitutes; endless drinking scenes in the wedding parties of relatives and neighbors, or in the *hamams* and, boys' regular visits to the night clubs in Kayseri, Ankara, Ürgüp, Adana and Tarsus. However, the most amazing anecdote for me was about the male-dancers (*zenne*) of Hacilar, who were one of the routine components of wedding and *sunnet* (circumcision of boys) ceremonies/parties in the past. In fact, some people mentioned one man's name specifically, Şükrü, whom they called as 'Şükrücük' ('little Şükrü' or 'feminine Şükrü'), and commemorated him as one of the favorite dancers. My father also remembered his name. However, he also noted that, depending on the fact that he was a gay, people also refused to give this name to their newly-born sons.

A scholar's historical study on the contents of local newspapers in Kayseri of different years also appraises this male-dancer tradition, especially of the early 20th century. In this regard, it is possible to see such news about conservative reactions against this kind of amusement patterns in some of those newspapers even during those years. (Kars, 2008: 500). This case shows the prevalence of such sort of 'unhallowed' habits in the city.

One of my interviewees who is also one of my relatives, gave a detailed information about this issue, too. Actually, my real aim was asking him about the reasons of his strength despite his old age. Indeed, he was born in 1922. He began to tell a long story, adorned with examples, about the factors that made him healthy in this age. According to him, the real reason behind this situation was working in agriculture rather than working in industry; and he also told that he had never smoked cigarette. However, then, he suddenly started to talk about the amusement habits of early generations:

G: When I was a kid, in those dancing parties, we see people drinking and smoking, and they laughed at us that we had to drink and smoke if we wanted to be a real guy! Then, we really tried them. Anyway, we couldn't buy any cigarettes since we didn't have so much money. But, then I noticed that those women, I mean prostitutes, were also smoking and drinking with those guys. It was a great shock for me; because, it should be only a masculine habit! Thereby, I quit both. I couldn't maintain a 'feminine' activity more. I was 10. I thought that smoking and drinking was the habits of women, of course, especially of fancy women; guys shouldn't smoke and drink like them.

K: Then, there were those kinds of women somewhere in Kayseri in those years where did you see them?

G: Now, some guys still take them to vineyards; but policemen always catch and pull up stakes with them, thank God!

It is very interesting for me to learn about the existence of this 'tradition' in Kayseri nowadays, despite the harder conditions. However, of course, it is hard to see such participants from 60 and above ages to those parties in these days. Although, the general trend of conservatism surely has an impact on this fact; I think, at the same time, age and social status also determine this situation. For instance, individuals, mostly between the ages of 50 and above, has gone to Hajj; and being a pilgrim, as a status, brings men some responsibilities about their behaviors. The below expressions of one of my elder interviewees can be considered as an indication about this process:

G: If your question is about our generation, yes, I see. For example, most of my friends, who were drinking and going to parties in the past, quit those habits. There is an explicit shift in our lives. Nevertheless, I think it is mainly about the age factor; because, some of our boys really tend to live like we did in the past. On the contrary, men of our ages regularly go ahead to prayer and other rituals.

K: Anyway, do you remember the percentage of those men of your age, nowadays as industrialists, who drank alcohol in the past?

G: Yes, may be % 80-90 of them were drinkers. However, today only %10 of them still drinks. As I said, I really relate this fact with age factor.

On the other hand, today as it was in the past, there are industrialists from both first-generation and second-generation who are still looking to have fun in various ways both inside and outside the country in terms of consumption and entertainment. Indeed, there are various activities organized for those groups, such as going to sea, mountains, skiing, picnic, other countries, yachting, or Hajj. In addition to that, second-generation industrialists, who can speak a second language, spend a significant portion of their time on business trips abroad; thus, there is another parallel life for them. Furthermore, there is another pattern of holiday, called as 'bachelor holidays', in which they leave their wives and children at home, and go to holiday man to man. Some of my interviewees told about their regular yatching activities with their male buddies in Erdek, Alanya, Antalya, or Göcek.

As an evaluation, although there is an explicit trend about have modest and simple lives among the industrialists of Hacılar; this mood is far from being an absolute puritanism. Therefore, the so-called moods of Protestant and Puriten sects, as Weber described in details and we see some of the old movies, which is identified as stigmatizing talking and even laughing so much as sinful activities, making sex only for parenting, having no social life except religious activities, always coping with neurotic ontological crisis, and considering professional achievement as the signs of his/her divinely choosiness, seems to be so 'radical/fundamentalist' when compared with the industrialists of Hacılar.

6.2 Findings on the Sociological Argument

Now, I will consider the findings related to the second argument. It is evident that Anatolian industrialists make use of local social networks and both religious and traditional cultural values and in the processes of labor, production and capital accumulation. This inference is not only valid for Anatolian Tigers and rapidly growing industries about all other ventures in all sectors in Turkey. It is very difficult to imagine business relations in Turkey where nobody resorts to these tightly knit social and cultural relations. Nevertheless my argument is that these relations are strictly confined and concomitant to the already well established rules of capitalist accumulation and its economic relations. In a nutshell, I argue that the economical relations reflect well entrenched rules and dynamics of capitalist relations given the fact that Hacılar has been a prominent player of in the capitalist market throughout the last 80 years. Apart from capitalism's own rules and regulations, traditional structures and religion plays secondary role in shaping of the market relations in Hacılar. I started this part by discussing theological arguments; from this point on I will delve into the discussion of impact of religious groupings and congregations on economic relations among the key industrialists and its overall effect on industrialization of Hacılar.

I made it clear in the forth section that the role of traditional solidarity networks in success of Hacılar's industrial development has actually been quite limited, but, because of its social value and desirability, Hacılar industrialists strived to give the impression that they are in good social solidarity relations and they established viable networks. Hence, in this section rather than the social solidarity issues, I will specifically discuss impact of religion. As it is well known that the assertions regarding the role of religion and religious congregation behind industrial development of Anatolian Tigers have been new old issue in the literature. Let us look at this issue in Hacılar.

As I also argued elsewhere,³¹³ most of the industrialists I interviewed are deeply religious people and strictly observe the five Islamic pillars such as praying five times, alms giving (*zakat*), fasting during Ramadan and pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj) and so on. With a few exceptions, everyone above certain age among my participants was pilgrims (*Hadji*); there were even some young pilgrims among the second generation industrialists. Due to intensive trade relations with Arab world, some mentioned that they went to Mecca for both hajj and Umrah many times.

Similar to the case in many other Anatolian towns and cities, it is common place to follow a religious congregation or to be a member of any such community in Hacılar. Over half of my participants mentioned that they indeed follow such congregations and communities. The most prevalent among Hacılar industrialists is Gulen Community and the Osman Nuri Topbaş congregation which is affiliated with Naksibendi Sufi tarikat (religious order) comes the second. Apart from those there were others who are not following any such religious groupings, however, the crucial points is that they do not consider these religions communities and congregations as having adverse effects upon Hacılar, rather they talk favorably about them. Hence, it is possible to argue that both in Kayseri and Hacılar these religions communities and congregations are widely appreciated, they are seen as legitimate and they achieved a hegemonic status in social relations. 70 years old man from Hacılar, an ex-CHP voter who denies any sympathy towards these groups tells the following about these relations:

There are teaching centers (*Dershane*), a women comes and offers training for 5 lira rather than 6 lira. They have revenues, they can provide, they have teaching centers, they offer courses. Can you imagine that they collect lathers with suits during Eid al-adha (Sacrifice festival), they devoted themselves to the cause. For example a youngster from Fettullah Community. Buckle full heartedly, they clean everywhere, when they serve, they really serve. Now they fulfill our old expectations. Yes, and they were serving as well. There were state servants, helpful ones ... Yes, congregations are serving now, this is pretty good indeed.

³¹³ Cengiz, 2011

The legitimacy and popularity of congregations also stems from regularly held meetings called as “*oturmalar*” (sittings)³¹⁴ More than half of my industrialist I interviewed were participating into either religious or other such meetings a few times a month. The following example is from an industrialist, who was a devout Muslim even before 1980 and voted for the Republican Party (CHP). Since 1982 ever since Özal entered politics the industrialist has been voting for the Right and has become interested in religious communities and has been participating in their activities:

As a congregation, the purpose of the congregation is not to grant privileges. We [aim to] learn discipline through our sacred religious duties, become more disciplined, [learn] not to give concessions. Let me give you an example. The rosary, if there is a rosary lesson we learn it; that is get up at night to pray (*namaz kılmak*), at three o'clock in the morning. These things require heart, don't you know? ... Now in our congregation we gather once a week for a religious conversation. It takes between the evening prayer and night prayer. We read together for forty-five minutes. It never lasts beyond forty-five minutes because it shouldn't interfere with the rest of the program we may have for that day. That is, we don't want it to hinder any part of the social program. That is why we only read three four pages, talk about how a Muslim must live, that is we are always interested in how a human being must live. These topics give us spiritual peace. In the end we read the Kuran, say the Fatiha [opening chapter of the Kuran], and then we leave. We drink a cup of tea, that's all we do. Worldly affairs, in those forty-five minutes we don't talk about any worldly affairs. This is what this [religious] meeting is like...I got started when I was in Hacılar because of a friend...It was right at the time when I got started in my industrial business. The year was 1982. Our leader is Osman Topbaş Hoca. Everyone in Turkey knows of him. He only comes once a year to preach, as a blessing (*şifai olarak*) because he is our leader (*üstadımız*). He has religious books. We buy them, we read them and we recommend them. We can't read very much, but we go these meetings (*sohbetler*). We have to work in shops so, alas, we give importance to worldly affairs. When I say worldly affairs I mean business dealings, trade dealings. These dealings are all very tiring, we go home very tired. There is no time to read... Usually it is ten people. Now and then there are guests. Say, I bring a friend along and so does someone else as well, so it may go up to twenty people. There is nothing wrong with this. But discussing worldly affairs is strictly forbidden. Talking politics is absolutely forbidden. We don't include politics. No talk of politics. No talk of any material topic. Purely our lessons, we only talk about our studies. Let me give you an example of our studies. I am told to get up at two o'clock a.m for the nightly prayer (*tespih namazı*) and you will recite a thousand “Estağfurullah” and a thousand “La İlahe İllallah.” The purpose here is to increase the time spent in prayer.

³¹⁴ I consider this issue in a unpublished work: Kurtuluş Cengiz, “At the Borders of Public and Private: The Old Traditional Sittings (*Oturmalar*) as the New Public Spheres in Kayseri City” paper presented to the *Emerging Fault Lines and New Public Spheres: Political Alliances and Identity Formations in Contemporary Turkey Conference*, The New Islamic Public Sphere Programme, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 19th – 21st of March 2010.

During the research by speaking not only to industrialists but also to other people and other congregations in Hacılar, I was able to achieve a greater perspective. There are several points I want to explain in further detail. During the interviews some industrialists openly acknowledge the congregation they belong to, they explained their practices, and frankly expound on why they felt the need to join a congregation. Others deny that there are congregations at all. This is something that is reported me by my participants as well. That is, the people I interviewed told me that there are some people who are involved with the congregations but nonetheless deny all participation in them. But since self-statement is taken as a basis in social sciences, I will provide my analysis accordingly. For indeed the fact that everyone knows that a person is active in a congregation but the person himself denies it or does not acknowledge it openly, is in itself a very important data and must be treated seriously.

So let me begin by going back in history. My older participants affirmed that the activities of the religious congregations in Hacılar date back to the mid-1940s. A former imam, who passed away last year, told me that at the time they used to meet in secret, in a house in Hacılar known for its religiosity. There was ten to fifteen people. He was not really aware at the time, but he was reading by gas lamp light the epistles of Saidi Nursi. When once night the gendarme was informed of these activities, the gendarme commander respectfully reproached and warned them. This goes to show that there is at least a seventy year legacy of congregational meetings in Hacılar. However, until the 1980s there were few people who participated. There were few individuals and families who were involved in Hacılar. This was something that was reported and stressed to me repeatedly by many of my participants. The religious congregations where industrialists from Hacılar participated began to spread in the 1980s and became very active in the 1990s.

K: So which congregations are there, what are these congregations?

G: There is the Fethullah Hoca congregation, Nakşibendi Musa Topbaş Efendi congregation, the congregation of Hacı Sami Efendi (*Erenköy Cemaati*), İskender Paşa congregation, that is what is called the Hakyol Foundation. They have a foundation and their representatives even here. And that's it.

K: So when these congregational networks established in Hacılar?

G: This is something that has ten to fifteen years, in my opinion. There were families that belonged to the Süleymancı. People lived according to their teachings or pretended to, at least. But the Nur congregation, the Fettullah Gülen has been around for at least fifteen years.

K: So who are these congregations, what are they?

G: In terms of Islam, they are Nakshibandi, Süleymancı, there are several of them. They are all based on servitude, on giving service. If there are other kinds [not based on this slave mentality] I don't know.

K: In your youth, were you interested in such meetings?

G: No, no. But of course, I went to pilgrimage in 1990. Since then I do all my daily prayers. For me it has been only 6 years [of going to congregational meetings.] There was a Nakshibandi tarikat in Kayseri. One branch was in Yahyalı, the other in Istanbul. Kayseri Yahyalı was left out. The one in Istanbul is headed by Osman Topbaş Hoca Efendi, the leader of the Topbaş group and he resides in Istanbul. They [these branches] preach the same things, but maybe they never came near each other. Their purpose is servitude. Who are they? They are disciplinarians. You have a university education, if only it was possible for me to take you to their meetings a couple of times. A man's feelings change once you are there. The inner self that leads you into temptation (*nefs*) is another matter. These are things that should be and should be lived. Our youth was lost, misspent because we lived outside Islamic teachings. Islamic teachings harm no one, they are useful. Useful how: [they provide] honesty. But it wasn't like that and this country suffered greatly.

To give an example, the Hakyol Foundation, which is an organization which belongs to the İskenderpaşa congregation, opened a branch in Kayseri at the beginning of 1990s and had some connections in Hacılar. This branch is now closed, however during the time they were active this branch as well as other religious congregations organized religious sittings (*oturmalar*) and Kuran study courses for housewives, children and adults. My participants reported that these congregations were competing among themselves to win participants. At the moment there is still a very active student dormitory belonging to the Gülen congregation in Hacılar. The people of Hacılar repeatedly emphasized that even though they accept the invitations to participate in the meetings organized by the congregations that have recently come to Kayseri, they prefer to follow in the

religious practices set by their fathers and grandfathers. This was confirmed by the representative authorities of Religious Affairs Directorate (*Diyanet*) located in town and with whom I spoke. The religious congregations show their strong influence among the newly enriched and economically empowered industrialists from Hacilar. Besides the already known conjectural reasons there are two basic dynamics that play an important role in the case of Hacilar. Firstly, the inhabitants of the town of Hacilar began initially moving to Kayseri in the 1950s, afterwards they moved to Ankara and other bigger cities in Turkey. This way they met with other congregations around Turkey. Secondly, the religious congregations began to flourish in Kayseri by asking for material support from the newly affluent industrialists. Therefore religion was not the basic dynamic for industrialization in Hacilar. From my interviews I learned that the religious congregations were not successful in gaining influence and increasing their ranks prior to the 1980s. Many of the entrepreneurs that are now industrialists were not the members of these religious orders before 1980s when they put all their energies into industry. They have formed small and medium enterprises since 1970s and began producing. Only afterwards especially after 1980s did the religious congregations target and approach them. Belonging to religious congregations became more intensive in the 1990s. My observations were confirmed during an interview with one of the most prominent personalities in Hacilar who is also the leader of an important NGO in Kayseri.

K: When did these congregations come to Hacilar? How and when did it happen?

G: It began when Hacilar was becoming rich. That is when the first generation made money and began to pass it on to the second generation. These groups targeted the second generation and later on even the first generation during 1994-1995.

So let us look at the other important topic in the literature. How does belonging to a congregation influence industrialization? Is the statement that the congregational organizations provide trustable networks for capitalist markets and contribute to the accumulation of investment capital true? Or is it possible to talk of a sub-economy existing between the members of the congregation?

In social sciences it is easier and more reasonable to identify a relationship between two events, processes or situations, rather than to identify an unrelatedness. At the most general level, everything is connected to everything else. Moreover, religions are social systems that have had a strong tendency to spread throughout their history. Islam's 15th century practice is a very good example of this. On the other hand religious congregations are the institutions through which these relations and practices are regularly and systematically organized. In this sense the inhabitants of Hacilar who deal in trade and industry and are also members of congregations have intensive, regular and organized relationships among themselves. In fact these relationships go beyond the borders of congregations and surround other people, institutions and relationships as well. As a result, as it is the case with other social networks, these religious networks extend to further and wider spheres beyond themselves; they affect also the economic, cultural, political and social spheres. They provide a productive base for the organization of the economic relations. However, my argument is that the function served by the religious congregations in the organization of economic relations is bounded by the logic of capitalism. If this is the case, we have first to analyze the form of these relations and then the boundaries within which they operate. I will begin with the words of a industrialist from Hacilar, who is known for his political personality and is a prominent figure in his community.³¹⁵ He has been praying five times a day ever since he was five years old; has worked in industry for many years but has never been a member of any of the congregations. His observations provide a broad, political and sociological perspective.

Now if in Turkey, in Kayseri there a yearly volume of 10 million dollars in trade, I can say without exaggerating that 8 million dollars of it is under the control of the businessmen who have connections to a congregation or a *tarikât*. They are in dialogue among themselves. So if you are not within the same congregation or congregations or tarikats you are left out of the 8 million dollars cake. The others are left to share the 2 million dollars cake. If you want inside the 8 million dollars cake you have to look like one of them. Weren't they Muslims 10 years ago? They sued to pick up whores in Chevrolet '64 and close down bars and nightclubs to themselves. Weren't those Islamic times then? Islam has been around for fourteen thousand years, fourteen centuries. But that's what they do! They give importance to appearances. I know this is difficult to explain. It is difficult to explain and difficult to comprehend.... I told you they are all Muslims, I told you.

³¹⁵ I need to state that this person has also read Mardin's book on Saidi Nursi.

Look at this pyramid. Look carefully. The top of the pyramid is always the target. The top of the pyramid is trade, the middle is politics, and the base is congregations and *tarikats*. ... Think of it like this pyramid. After all, it is trade that directs doing politics like this and strengthening the congregations. To give you an example, 20 years ago 30 people, 3 people, 10 people, 5 people; how much money do we have 10 thousand dollars each. Our sitting groups (*oturma grupları*) became an extension of the congregation groups. After the establishment of the Organized Industrial District, slowly and gradually they began to penetrate the Organized Industrial District. Those that grew independently are another matter. Like İstikbal and İpek. I am not talking about those.

The observations above, share widespread impression of the connections between politics in the public sphere, *tarikats* and congregations. Now let us look at the observations and opinions of an industrialist who affirm his membership in the Gülen congregation.

It has been 5 years since I finished the university and I have been living in Kayseri ever since. In Kayseri when you say sitting (*oturma*), yes we sit and talk. What do we talk about? The importance of prayer. A teacher, an elderly brother told us about prayer. We drink tea, and after the talk, once the topic is over, we talk of general things. “How are you doing? How is it going? How are things at work? Do you have any problems” etc. And from all that something comes up. Not there is necessary a problem, a financial problem to talk about. But it is stuff like “wouldn’t it be nice if we come together next month and do something, like a trip to Bosnia?” Being together is really important, don’t you know? Power is born from being together. One of us thinks of something, we begin to share something on the way there and back. When you go to Bosnia in 15, you learn about the place but you also learn more about your companions, you also learn about the locals. And you start sharing things, [business] ideas that can be shared spring forth. You do this with your travel companions, sharing things brings forth a common culture. Sharing starts there, so we don’t it to get ideas [you do things together and get business ideas.

As the quotes above show, religious congregations have a certain influence in the organization of the economic relations. However, this influence takes several forms. First, we see that religious meetings have role beyond the religious one. So industrialists or businessmen, who gather for a religious purpose, begin enjoying a social life that goes beyond religious practices. The expansion of the social environment allows for new business connections, for a trade of knowledge and ideas, contacts with markets abroad, and the creation of new networks. That is why

a lot of businessmen and industrialists are criticized for taking part in such organizations with purposes other than religious ones. Here are the observations of a second generation industrialist.

So what is the situation now? The situation now is like we discussed it before. Among 25-30 people there are those who are really close to the congregation. But there are also those who think that they have to behave that way. Bu that's not always the case. In that 30 people group two are who are really committed to the congregation. The 28 remaining play it by ear. They go where the wind blows.

From what is reported to me, it also becomes clear that religious congregations are a derivative of the politics. Politics is very influential on religious congregations. Businessmen and industrialist who is member of congregations are able to get their share in the economic favors (rents) that are distributed by the municipality. However, a point that is strongly emphasized is that in Kayseri, the real inhabitants of the city center are not distributed the rents to the people who come from provinces like Hacılar, but rather they take them all. These favors are distributed through land speculation and municipality tenders. So in a way more of the older inhabitants of Kayseri are getting the benefits of city rents.

It is also possible to talk of the influence that religious congregations have over politicians. Congregations provide political support, economic support and legitimize their candidacies through events of beneficence. To give an example, the fellows of Hacılar noted that one of the leader of the town, the director of Hacılar Fraternity Association (*Hacılar Yardımlaşma Derneği*), whose budget was one million dollars in 2009, made an appearance during AKP's provincial congress in Hacılar and sent a clear support message to the public. In addition, it is important to mention that the close relation religious congregations establish with national politicians facilitates theirs integration to the global networks. The most common example to illustrate this point is the following: 60 % of the shares of Türkiye Finans were sold to the biggest Saudi Arabian bank, The National Commercial Bank³¹⁶. This was a point that a second generation industrialist brought up.

³¹⁶ “On February 29th, 2008 60% of the shares of BDDK Türkiye Finans were confirmed to be sold to the biggest bank in Saudi Arabia, the National Commercial Bank (NCB). The partners of Türkiye Finans: Boydak and Ülker Groups, have agreed to sell 60% of bank's shares for the amount of 1 billion and 80 million dollars. The agreement to the sale of the shares was made in July 2007. The

K: How are these relations influential in trade and business?

G: Not necessarily in trade, but they are influential in politics. They have come to a certain point. Now they are in a certain point. Fethullah Gülen is one of the most influential people in the world. This is very important. No one can deny that. He is loved, he is hated, the man is very powerful. These people are beside him and are very prestigious. So what happens next? You become influential in politics. The world is not managed by politicians but by businessmen. ... The easiest example to come mind is the Gulf Capital. They didn't come to do business here for the sake of their fathers. They are the influences of a particular congregation. If Anadolu Finans hadn't merged with Ülker, Gulf Capital wouldn't be here. And maybe they wouldn't have grown as much. How did they decide to merge with Ülker Group? They are members of the same congregation. When you look at it from this perspective, there are advantages. There were no benefits while growing, but from this point on they will be influencing and benefiting one another, the congregation and the corporate.

A third situation, concerns the relations between the members of the congregation among themselves. This is something that is pointed out by the people who are not themselves involved with the congregations. Members of a congregation reciprocally do business, supply materials, give loans or help out financially in case of bankruptcy, form power blocks, and establish companies. These statements from my participants are parallel those of Timur Kuran³¹⁷ who argued for an Islamic sub-economy. However, when we look at the ways different congregations establish these economic relations, the variety of it is well worth noting. To give a concrete example: the Gülen congregation, one of the most effective ones in Turkey, has established loose and/or weak ties which form a very widespread network, to use Granovetter's³¹⁸ terms. The members of the community are involved in formal institutions like foundations, associations, and schools both at the local and global level. This organizational form which is based on loose ties extends also beyond the economic sphere. One of the industrialists I interviewed stated that his wife is a member of the Gülen congregation, she really enjoyed participating in their meetings, and they had both agreed to send their child to congregation's high school. He had a complaint however. Every four or five months, once the everyone knew everyone else and was getting comfortable with each other both the teachers,

transfer of the shares is the biggest shares transfer in the sector of no-interest banking. Moreover it signifies the serious strengthening of this banking sector.”

http://www.24dakika.com/news_detail.php?id=35372 Accessed 26 July 2010.

³¹⁷ Kuran, 1995

³¹⁸ Granovetter 1983

i.e. the leaders of the discussion groups, and also the members were asked to change, to circulate. Given that this was the case, the participant complained that this prevented the relationship from becoming deeper. Another example from the same family is the following: Their child has always gone to congregation's schools. Moreover, the family also pays tuition fees for a child who cannot afford to attend the school. However, when things were not going very well economically they were not able to pay the rates for the tuition fees. The school response was to send debt collectors to families home. I asked him how he felt about this. His reply was that "this is how things should be and the school's action is very perfectly reasonable". From the money that the school collects, students from all over the world are able to continue their studies. If someone does not pay than this chain is broken. So according to him the school was acting completely within the right. The family continued to send his own the same school and the wife still continued her attendance at the congregation's meetings.

The data from my interviews shows that the Nakşibendi congregations, on the other hand, are quite different from the Gülen congregation. Their relations are tighter, closer and more intensive. In this sense, they are more prone to do business together, to create partnerships, and to support each other financially. Here is an explanation from a member of the Gülen congregation on the other congregations.

K: Do you think that the way the congregation works in industry is to form alliances and associations, members supplying materials to each other, giving financial support in difficult times?

G: That is a different congregation. They are the Nakşi congregation, my uncles used to be members there too. They were there before Fettullah Gülen, they are the Nur congregation, followers of Saidi Nursi. They are a different Nakşi congregation. Esat Coşan passed away some time ago, maybe you remember. That is the congregation I am talking about. And they are a closed box. My uncles are still their supporters. I didn't see them and they didn't ask me to get involved with them. Not once did my uncle, as an elderly in my family, say "come along son, we have such and such meeting (*oturma*), where we have *sohbet*, in such and such congregation. Current trade there is at its maximum. If three people get together, they form a company right away, help each other out. These are things you hear a lot around here. 70% of the industry in Kayseri is in the hands of that congregation.

K: And yet everyone says that Fettullah Gülen's congregation is the most powerful.

G: Yes, that may be the case. But Fettullah Gülen's congregation is not an economic congregation. It is not there to support its members economically. It is about rightness and fairness. But I am not really sure how things are on this subject with the Nakşi congregation.

In sum, industrialists and businessman members of the same congregation have intensive and regular relations. There is a certain degree of socializing and solidarity, which from time to time turns into partnerships and trade, but this depends on members' choice; it does not follow automatically. However, many people, including members of congregations report that relationships are limited, that commerce and industry have their own rules. Those who do not behave in accordance with the rules cannot survive long in the market. In difficult economic situation congregation relations may help, but they do not play a decisive role. So let us look of examples of such cases. The following is from a member of the Osman Nuri Topbaş congregation.

Even though these groups are closer to each other because of Islam, and even though they trade with each other, at this point we are talking profits and interests. Whatever works best for the business, that's how it works. The fact that he is in a certain path, does not necessarily limit him.

Two second generation industrialists who do not belong to any of the congregations affirmed this observation.

Firstly, I still defend my thesis. Trade/ commerce do not accept anything outside its own rules. These people do not just work with specific suppliers because they belong to the same congregation. Where is the cheapest, where it works best, that's where they go and buy. And where it is more profitable to sell, that's where they sell, if you think in terms of demand and supply.... No matter what, it is difficult to get Hacılar and the businessmen who are from Hacılar from this box they have put in. Still we have to try. A businessman from Hacılar is successful because he does things right, and this has nothing to do with congregations. They don't make you rich. You may use the relations they provide but that's it.

G: As far as I can see there are industrialists in our Organized Industry that belong to congregations. But I am saying this as an outsider. Yes there is solidarity and mutual support within the congregation, but there is also competition. When the issue is trade, the thing [the congregation] doesn't come first... It won't work if you stick only with the congregation. Everyone has his own thing, his own business. Let's say how much this glass is. It is 10 lira. It means that even to a fellow member you will sell it for 10, not for 5. It just doesn't work like that.

Another experienced industrialists who are over 60 years of age expressed similar opinions:

No, no. It is each man to himself... Each man looks after his own ship. But if the situation is too serious, if he does not have enough money to bring bread to his table, then they will help him with that. They'll take him provision, enough for him not to go hungry. They'll give him a little money, but it is more like food money. By God, it is each man to himself!

As we see from the reports of the people from Hacilar, in terms of the relations between industry and congregations, the economic support that should be taken seriously but not exaggerated. When we evaluate the examples above, we see that the relation between economy and religion organized in the form of congregations is not as intensive or spread as it is emphasized in the literature. In the case I am studying congregations do not form their own sub-economy. Instead, as shown above, they indirectly contribute to the magnification the effects of the social organization of capital. In fact, there exists a fierce competition between businessmen and industrialists, hence besides a partial economic help we cannot talk of solidarity due to membership in the same congregation or family. Even though they have learned their profession at the same time, are socialized in similar and hard conditions, are related through ties of blood, or friendship or neighborhood proximity, my participants do not show intense and frequent solidarity towards each other. Therefore, I think it is unrealistic to claim that just because they joined the same congregation only a few days ago, now they are developing a sub-economy of their own.

In the forth section I reported production and export figures as well as the market orientation of the companies. For this reason I think we are analyzing a situation where everyone is subjected to the rules of the market. An industrialist from Hacilar who is in the furniture industry and who supplies raw materials, reported that due to his job he has had a good chance to observe relations among different companies. He named furniture industrialists who were in the same congregation and also in shared blood ties but did not agree with each other when it came to business, so they did not work together. It is important to understand that a producer of plastics, or fabric or leather buys his raw material wherever he finds it cheaper. What is at work is not the rules of the congregation, but the rules of the market.

One of the themes that is commonly agreed upon by almost all of my participants is that congregations target rich industrialists and businessmen and try to win them over to their group. They ask them for services or economic support for activities. These are usually activities like teaching or charity that are organized by the religious congregations. They include raising money for students at all education levels all over Turkey; for food assistance to the poor; or for organizing Koran courses. They may ask for cash or in kind support, like providing furniture, beds or fabrics. Sometimes congregations ask for subscriptions to their magazines or newspapers. Industrialists report that they don't turn down such requests and try to help any congregation that approaches them. Therefore, even if they are affiliated with a certain congregation, the most common form of relation between industrialists and religious congregations is the one based on such economic support.

However, there is an important question we have to answer at this point and it goes beyond the good intentions of supporting congregational activities. Why do businessmen feel that they have to respond to the calls for assistance coming from congregations? I mentioned some of the economic conditions that are partial answers to this question. What needs to be stressed is the following point and it is one that brings to the fore the most significant role of the congregations. Most of the industrialists do not have formal education, they childhood and younger years were spent working under hard conditions, and they have reached a certain affluence by working very hard. The religious congregations offer them a comprehensive understanding, a philosophy, and a moral ground that satisfactorily provide familiar answers to complexities, to conundrums and paradoxes that puzzle them either personally or socially. In Şerif Mardin's words it offers a framework of deciding about the "the good, the right and the beautiful"³¹⁹ within an Islamic culture.

³¹⁹ In Çakır 2008: 102-103

In the world of the people who work in the industry, not matter what level of job qualification, you push and are pushed, you behave aggressively to earn money and have to deal with issues like money, profits, debts, interests, loans, checks and financial bonds. This makes them feel ‘dirty’ and provokes anxiety and guilt. In Armando Salvatore’s terms, religious congregations teach these people “adab³²⁰”. This also happens through the more traditional forms of socializing like the sittings (*oturmalar*), where there are no strangers. Young industrialist affiliated with the Gülen congregation, strikingly calls it ‘to format the hard disk.’

There are teacher who have been trained on these subjects. We chat with them (*sohbet ederiz*). We analyze questions like what do we do? Are we being fair in our trade? How do we live? Where do we stand with regard to Islam? We measure and weigh ourselves. If we know the wrong of it, we go to *sohbet* like this and learn the right, twice a week. You have to keep them constantly in mind, and now and then you need to format your hard disk. You have to remember, so we read books... religious books. Why go through all this? Because you don’t want to make mistakes in trade.

Another industrialist referred to this interest and participation in congregations as ‘social poverty.’ His attempt to provide and explanation for of the local level and the life experiences of himself and fellow industrialists, bring to mind Bourdieu and his concept of “social capital.”

When you don’t have a social bank, than you have to invest your social richness in somebody else’s bank. Men are not like animals. They have to share important things with other people, they are hungry for this [sharing]. ... I think I understand this very well. We built a factory together. I have friend from our sittings (*oturma*). We used to get together every Friday, to talk. ...We moved to Istanbul and in four five years we were in charge of managing 20, 30, 50 million dollars. Our social environment changed. The world looks very different when you look at it from Istanbul. My priorities changed.... Now to people at Istikbal, I am sure they are very lonely. When evening falls there is no one to have meaningful talks (*derinlemesine sohbet*) with. Because they all reach too much, too fast. It feels virtual. It is like that TV series *Bizimkiler*, there is nothing beyond an artificial protocol. And that’s hunger. You know, in the social sense. Economically you can be in charge of everything, but if you don’t feel its social power, its social aspect, that particular richness... it is nothing. In the year 1200, a judge from Kayseri called Burhaneddin prayed thusly: ‘God, grant me my richness together with knowledge.’ That was year 1200. These days a looks at himself and thinks he is a big shot. But in the Gülen congregation in Kayseri, even a imam does not think of himself as an important man. He goes wherever he is asked to go.

³²⁰ Salvatore defines “adab” as the set of rules and practices that formulated by the learned people in the community. “Adab,” according to Salvatore plays a central role for the Islamic culture and civilization. See Salvatore, 2011: 55.

Beside the social function, religious congregations in Kayseri but also all over Turkey have another very significant function and that is education. This however is not only religious education, but also formally organized education. The children and young relatives of the industrialists I spoke go to schools like Akansu, Atlas, Yelkenoğlu, and Kılıçarslan, which owned by congregations. Therefore, congregations have become responsible for the education of the young generation from elementary to university. From interviews with industrialists that are not members of congregations I have learned that they too send their children to these schools. In the last 3 years the number of private universities has increased in Kayseri. As I mentioned above religious congregations have established their hegemony in the city. Because of both these function industrialists support the activities of the congregations and like the quality of education that they provide. They do not see anything wrong with their children receiving a religious education. The schools are different from those that train religious preachers and leaders, and the schools are perceived as being different by the industrialists. Indeed when you look at the number of industrialists who send their children to religious schools (imam hatip) schools, the number is very low. Congregations' schools are a very appeal alternative to the low quality education that is given in state schools. In addition they also provide a religious education.

In this section, as a last point I want to touch upon the Anatolian Tigers and the Green Capital issue. I would like to clarify some points that I mentioned in the literature review but did not explore in detail there. The first is about multi-partnership companies. The powerhouse of industrialization in Hacılar and a landmark in its industrialization history was the establishment of HES Kablo Factory in 1974, which is a partnership of 832 people. This process which I analyzed in detail in the third section was also based on multiple ownership of joint stock companies like the KOMBASAN and YİMPAŞ cases. However, different than these cases, HES experience was not based on religious identity but rather on the hometown (*hemşerilik*) identity. Therefore, the factory does not show any Islamic tendencies or characteristics either during its establishment or its development. There have been no other attempts at going something like this again.

A second debate in the literature concerns Islamic finance and bank institutions. And indeed one of these institutions, in fact the biggest one in Turkey belongs to a family from Hacilar. Yet again, when we look at its establishment history, the reason for its establishment in the eyes of its founders, was not due to Islamic concerns, but rather due to the pragmatic concerns and economic needs. In order to stop paying for huge bank commission they decided to bring together the capital that they already possessed but had not invested. As one of the founders of the Anadolu Finans himself reports, the reasons were extremely pragmatic.

K: There is a debate about the Islamic capital in Kayseri. There were lists that there published after 28 February.

G: Our name was also in that list

K: Where do you think all this comes from? What do you think about it?

G: I think this is an issue that is not grounded....There is no such thing as green capital or red capital. I don't believe it. Capital flows wherever it finds a free place. If a man has money he can go anywhere. Today even Great Britain and United States are looking for investors. So does India, and so does Turkey. Whoever has money can find himself [an investing] job anywhere? I think the green capital thing is the product of the narrow heads in Ankara. It was argued that is connected to the financial institutions. I was the person who came up with the idea of establishing the Anadolu Finans Group. Just like HES Kablo is the brainchild of Saadettin Erkan. But they supported us, of course. We brought the financial group to the agenda. And here is the reason why. We would go to İş Bankası. I have the money, I am going to import things from abroad, I am going to make a transfer of my own money. They would ask for 10 % commission. If I am going to make a million dollars transfer they request one hundred thousand in commission. Now is that acceptable?! They are just going to make a transfer, nothing else. So we thought, the state is giving us such an opportunity. There is such a thing as a Financial Foundation (*Finans Kurumu*). To establish a bank you needed 50 billions, for a financial foundation you only need 5 billion at that time. I know it very well. We could put together 5 billion then. As HES we could gather 5 billion. This is how we came to establish Anadolu Finans. It was not to built something Islamic. We just wanted a practical model that could respond to our daily needs. This just happened to coincide with the time when Özal was a president and prime minister.

The fact is that actors who operate in the economic sphere experience an enormous tension when the demands of capitalism clash with those of religion.³²¹ Those who experience it most are the people who are daily involved in commerce, production, import-export, and who have to face all kinds of relations. Of all the people I spoke

³²¹ For a broader analysis see Akşit et al, 2012.

to there was almost no one who was not into taking bank loans or leasing. Among those the number of people who did business with Islamic financial institutions is no more than three or five. Therefore, as it is the case with other spheres, in banking and finance it is not religious parameters like the forbidden (*haram*) and sin, but rather market rules that decisively govern. One of the frankest admissions on this subject came from an industrialist, who belongs to the Osman Topbaş congregation, when he was explaining about banks, leasing and interest.

G: That is exactly one of the biggest problems. Unfortunately it is not in our hands. The world economic systems make us go into things we don't want to go in. Do you think it is possible to do business today without having to go through banks? I ask you. We are contributing the development of an interest institution automatically. Hadis-i Şerif says that there will come a day even if you don't eat from it, its dust will engulf you. And that is a testament. So even if I don't want it I am caught in it. And the state tell me [...], but I already have complains about the state. "Are you going a buy machinery from Italy, then you have to pay 18% VAT" says the state. And I say: "Please have mercy! I am going to invest the money! How can I make it happen [if you ask for such a high tax]?" The bank tell me: "I will get it for you through leasing, and you can rent it from me, and VAT will be only 1%." What shall I do? The bank says: "Instead of giving 18% VAT directly to the state, give it 1%, the rest of the 17% money you were going to give to VAT give to me and I will give you four years rate. "By God! By God! Is that the case? " "Indeed it is." And there you go, you just got mixed with the bank. And you go shall I take, or shan't I?

K: I would take it.

G: But then what sort of Muslim are you! You know loaning with banking interest was forbidden (*haram*), you were not supposed to take it! You know who works with bank interest open war on God and his prophet. And I took it. I knew of this Kuranic verse and I took it. Who made me do it? Inflation. If there wasn't any inflation I would give all my capital and buy it. If you also had to give all your capital to buy it, our conditions would be equal. I look at you and see that it was not what you did. So in order to be able to stand up I have to follow your path. That's how I calculate it. I am doing economically fine, but spiritually I am in the loss. God says: "So you are picking a fight with God and his prophet and you think you can win?" Of course we didn't win. Just look at the conditions of our economy and industry. I was more at peace with myself 4 years ago. Now I am stronger, not at peace. Because we acted contrary to that verse.

As I mentioned above, "adab" is taught within the framework of prayer, *sohbet*, and remembrance of God's name (*zikir*), but it is also supported by the religious rulings (*fetva*) that are passed by either members of State's Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) or by preachers of religious congregations. The function it fulfills is to soften the tensions created by the work life, the tension that exists between the sacred and profane. *Fetva* can cover a range of topics, but from what I have

observed most of them concern to the issue of interest banking that has been strictly forbidden by Islam. It is very common for religious authorities to give permission to the use of banking interests under certain conditions for industrialists and businessman.

We did not use bank loans for a very long time. But 5-6 months ago we took an investment loan. From the state, from the bank, from Halk Bank. We borrow from the state bank. Up to that time... it is still wrong. But we were advised that it is permissible and how it would work. We asked, and we were asked back: "what do you want to use the Money for?" The elderly people we consulted told us that if we were going to use the money for investment, to buy land and built a factory and buy machinery and employ 10, 20, 50, 100 workers there, than we could do it. But we were told not get the money from a private bank. We were told to use a state bank. So we applied to Halk Bank and were granted it. And we used the money for what we said we would use it.

And this piece is from different industrialists:

Yes, I consulted a few people on the issue of leasing. Necmettin Nursaçan said to me: "This is not gambling, you weigh the pro and cons. This is not taking banking interest, this is buying material." Let me give you an example he gave me. It is money lending with interest if I get 100 lira from you to do the things I need to do, and then I give you 110 lira back. This is money lending with interest. I defer to this opinion. Whoever gives or takes money with interest is in the loss. But if you don't get it from the bank, you get it from somewhere else. I try to steer clear of the banks. I know I cannot escape from it in this world, but I know what is right and I want to live accordingly.

As can be seen from these quotes the devout Muslims are becoming more affluent and more middle class, they are becoming more integrated into the capitalist system. This has brought along the expansion of such practices which in turn push religion to change and accommodate them. How and at what rate this is happening is a fascinating subject that interest both academics and the public opinion. In the earlier section I tried to summarize this debate. My opinion on the subject is based on my date and I think that the transformation has already begun. As my participants emphasize this is the age of capitalist development and conditions, people have been acting accordingly and adapting for a long time now. When I was a child, there was a famous moneylender who built a mosque out of cut stone with money from his business. I spoke to a business man who borrowed money with interest from him in the 1980s. That businessman told my interlocutor: "I asked a preacher. There is inflation, so lending and borrowing money with interest is no

longer a sin.” In Hacilar this transformation has been going on for years. Indeed Professor Arif Ersoy’s words “everyone is looking for Kuranic verses to fit capitalism” are very appropriate.³²² Özdemir in discussing MÜSİAD interprets this transformation as a result of the deepening of Turkish modernization. I think this is more like the deepening of the capitalism in Turkey. At this point I would like to move to an important debate concerning also MÜSİAD.

I have already mentioned that one leg of the Islamic capital debate is the professional organization of businessmen. I conducted interviews with people on the Hacilar Industrialists and Businessmen List. I also asked them the names of the other associations in which they participate. Of all 35 industrialists only 1 said he was a member of TÜSİAD, and 4 of them were members of MÜSİAD. The member of TÜSİAD was also one of the 4 MÜSİAD members. 2 industrialists used to be members of MÜSİAD but left in the early 2000s for political reasons. I think it is meaningful that their leaving of membership overlaps with the aftermath of 28 February and they refused to comment upon it despite my persistent questions. Moreover, only one businessman stated he belonged to GESİAD, which is the association of young businessmen who belong to the Gülen congregation. Only one person said he belonged to both GESİAD and MÜSİAD. In addition one industrialist said that his son belonged to MÜSİAD and another said his nephew was a member of GESİAD. I was not able to talk to all the second generation industrialists, but I expect the numbers to be a little higher among them.

Moreover, this, almost all of the industrialists belonged to the Kayseri Chamber of Industry, many of them belonged to the Kayseri Chamber of Commerce, a few to the Chamber of Ironworkers, the Chamber of Furniture Makers, Mediterranean Exporters Union, and Furniture Industrialists Association (MOSDER). Besides their participation in these professional organizations it is difficult to say that the industrialists of Hacilar are interested in civil society organizations. In fact they do not seem to be interested in other spheres outside their profession. An important point at this stage is that the firms that are leaders in the Kayseri industry is a

³²² See Can, 1999: 64

member of TÜSİAD, however being a member of MÜSİAD has a symbolic meaning.³²³ This symbolic importance puts MÜSİAD at the forefront among Kayseri's professional organizations and reinforces its ideological hegemony over the city.

In this section I tried to evaluate the relationship between religion and economic development by beginning with Weber's thesis. Based on the interviews and participant observations I conducted I learned that even though religion itself does not play a direct role in industrialization process, its indirect role is too important to be dismissed. This role is not, however, as often reported, connected to the idea that religious faith contributes to success and that religious people are more successful. On the contrary, my argument from the outset has been that capitalism is limited by its own rules and religion should not be attributed an exaggeratedly strong role. My long and detailed account of the historical process as well as the data I obtained from interviews with industrialists show that there is nothing that resembles the puritan or Calvinist ethics in Hacılar and among Hacılar industrialists. People organize their economic activities mainly based on the conditions imposed by the material world and involvement in worldly affairs is very strong. Therefore the issue is not whether people who work for religious motivation can become capitalists. Rather the extremely ambitious people who become capitalists try to legitimize their actions in a broader framework. They use to their own profit their religious relations and networks to include the masses. Moreover, they gain a religiously based hegemonic supremacy over the other classes in order to further their own interest. My argument is that industrialization is better explained not by Calvinism but by capitalism. This argument does not preclude the fact that industrialists are aware of the tension that exists between the sacred and profane and use a variety of mechanisms to smooth over this tension. This is where, I think, the role of the religious congregations becomes more significant. The congregations fulfill the function of relieving the tension between sacred and profane by such practices as *zikir*, prayer and *sohbet*.

³²³ For more details see the interview with Hacı Boydak, Zaman, 9 May 2010.

However, this function is transformed in time. The world does not shaped by religious rules; rather religious rules are bending to the needs of the capitalist world. The leniency shown towards banks interests, based on inflation or conditions for investment, is a typical example that illustrates my point. The analysis of all this data shows that firstly, religion, whether in Hacilar or in Kayseri, plays a significant and unifying role in creating an organized, solidaristic/competitive, conservative and collective identity. Secondly, this conservative identity is an ally of the neo-liberal economy; in Laclau's words it functions as an "articulating" principle. As has been shown by Tuğal,³²⁴ Islam serves the function of legitimizing capitalism and even neo-liberalism in the eyes of the masses during this process. Islam serves to hegemonize capitalism and neo-liberalism before the masses. In this regard, religion offers the opportunity for the people to legitimize their actions in a broader and holier framework and also provides a foundation for such actions. In doing so it plays a momentous role in the deepening of the capitalist relations. Religion will continue to play this role and serve these functions in the foreseeable future.

6.3 Other Cultural Dynamics

At the beginning of the first chapter, I discussed the theological argument, then I touched on the impacts of religious entities and communities on the industrialists of Hacilar. Presently, I would like to bring up some of my findings about other cultural dynamics more through setting the framework of factors in regard to the utilization of traditional and local cultural values and networks. In this context, first of all, I will address village/town based solidarity patterns shaped around the tension ongoing between Kayseri (city) and Hacilar (village), respectively. After discussing political orientations of Hacilar and its industrialists, lastly, I will end up the fifth chapter by evaluating the global orientations of industrialists and their attitudes about the modernization/Westernization processes.

³²⁴ Tuğal 2010

6.3.1 Hacilar Identity and Local Solidarity Dynamics

First of all, it should be remembered that Hacilar is not a newly established settlement. Its history overruns 500 years and it is a settlement that has a considerably predominant social and cultural context/structure. The main reason of this dominance is that its geographical position. Except for the brides coming from out of the village, it stayed as a homogenous settlement where the foreigners don't come and go. As Jennings 325 narrates, Hacilar emerged as a relatively rich settlement late in 15. Century. Towards the end of 16.century, in conjunction with the population growth, it had languished; because of its little and infertile lands. As the economic income couldn't compensate the increasing population, it began to fall and began the 20th century as a extremely poor village. For the last two centuries, the dynamic and social tension caused by the land scarcity, extreme poverty and unemployment gave rise the people of Hacilar to become eager chasers of legal, illegal and informal non-agricultural alternative income possibilities; within this context, to work in some hard fields ranging from banditry to smuggling, from hawking to stall holding and to improve a working culture inherent in them; to be known as stern, blusterer, aggressive people who frightens the surrounding settlements. Besides, in the forthcoming years, as the fellows of Hacilar began to work mainly in the city center but also in the surrounding rich settlements in the positions of workers; they were insulted by the city dwellers, in other words the locals of Kayseri, as “brusque villagers”. This situation consolidated both their group identity and solidarity relations even more. Therefore, when the fellows of Hacilar trend toward industry, especially during the first period, the mentioned relations basing on both rivalry and solidarity continued and even limited, played a highly effective role on the industrialization of the town. Even nowadays the people of Hacilar does not want to speak of it as they became the richest and powerful people in Kayseri, I would like to relay some of the witnesses related to the villager-city dweller or in local language “*yilli-kolü*” tension that continues underhandedly. These witnesses have a key significance to understand the main

³²⁵ Jennings, 1999: 86-88.

dynamic of this town solidarity. These different and colorful anecdotes that I listened from almost everyone shows that this tension is as old as reaching to the beginning of the century.

I can begin with the story of ink thrown by the city-dwellers to the ice blocks that are put in the saddlebags of the animals by the people of Hacılar who bring snow from Mount Erciyes early in the morning to sell in the city. This scene of bringing ice from Erciyes is very interesting in the sense that it is pictured much as the same in the opening scenes of the famous movie “America America” directed by Elia Kazan whose family is also from Kayseri. The only difference is that the young ones who cut and bring ice are the Greeks.

G: In 1955, my father and others wake up in the morning, after the dawn prayer go to Erciyes, cut snow, bring, sell in the job market-amele pazari-. Thereafter, they go to their houses. Yet, at the time, the fellows of Kayseri and the fuzz would drip ink. As the ink dripped, the snow would become deep blue and couldn't be sold. After these conditions...

K: They were killing joy...

G: Of course.

K: Did your dad tell you directly that they were dripping on it?

G: Of course. These things took place.

In the same vein, the anecdotes about city-dweller tradesmen who try to boot peddlers of Hacılar out, do not want to rent shops to them, harming when receiving goods, ragging and anecdotes about local families who do not want to give away their daughter in marriage are the most told examples. Let's listen to an industrialist of over the age of 70s at first hand:

K: So Uncle X , was there a city-dweller villager thing?

G: True, there was. I got a beating from there, a city-dwellers' beating. It was the fall season. I came to buy washbowl, the washbowl you know. In his thing, one truck of him was working, there was Asım Aga. One flatbed of him was working in Hacılar. He had nothing else. You were only coming with truck, there wasn't any municipality and such like. Previously animals were also getting into it. Here the washbowl, I arrived to the inner part of the fortress. I asked the washbowl, I am the little boy, “how much?” I said. “How many you want?” he said. “I will buy 4-5 items, like so” I said. Here, “how much” I said, “well, let me see” I said. “I told you the price, why don't you buy?” he said. I said “ the price whatever you say, I heard the price” I said. “well, let me see” I said. Saying “What will you see man!” they sidle up to me, namely. You see those city-dweller selling 3-4 items of washbowl they beat me. Then, I took a peep, a tall man came. “*Lan*” he said, “ Are you not ashamed of beating a small kid” he said. He was the famous Ali of Eşşekkesen from Hacılar. Batterer, dasher.. “*Lan*” he said “Are you not ashamed of beating a very small kid” he said.

They tell Ali of Eşşekkesen, I learned this later. The man said “*Lan* where are you from” he said. That’s exactly what happened. “I am from Hacılar brother” I said. “Why did they beat?”. “Thus and so” I said. “the son of the beaches” he said. He took out an enormous sword. They ran away. With this sword, he made mincemeat of the washbowls. In short, nobody sidled up to us.

Again, another memory in regard to 1960s from an industrialist at his 70s:

Going through Kapalıçarşı, the shopkeepers were making barbecue. They were superheating the coins and put them on the street. If some one dressed like a peasant passes from the Çarşı they said “My hometown buddy, could you give me that coin?”. If the man touched, it would stocke on his hand and said: “Ooo it is hot”. They laughed. The villagers were bringing chicken to Kapalıçarşı. The shopkeepers were saying: “My hometown buddy, let me see one?” Then they were throwing the chickens to the chimneys in the Çarşı and saying: “You see the chicken got out of my hand”. They did many times such kinds of things to the peasants. They beat, held, and dashed. They did all.

The observations of one of the leading industrialists of Hacılar from the first generation:

From this event, the people of Kayseri are still annoyed. Here the people of Kayseri have phobia built on their relations with the villagers. They don’t appreciate the villager. The local people of Kayseri are like English people. Do you know what the English say? “We are the Great Britain” they say. Now, the actual local people of Kayseri are like Great Britain. Now he is, the one who represents the Britain is the current president of municipality. Therefore, the local people of Kayseri never like the villager and see the person of Hacılar as slaves for themselves. In a word, they hoe their vineyards over; they do something; as their economics is provided through body work while they are the *Ağa* of the city, the people of Hacılar, because Hacılar is close, are the servants of the city-dwellers. In short, they saw them thus and so. But *Elhamdülillah*, resulting from the effort of the person of Hacılar, diligence of the children, there was a rush on the city, a rush. When there was a rush onto the industry, when the people learned to execute a work, learned to trade, to buy and sell, everybody had their own respective shop. That’s why the city-dweller envies the villager, and also especially the fellows of Hacılar.

As it will be realized, such narratives were put into words by relatively old people of Hacılar from the first generation. This has a couple of reasons. Firstly, the integration of the people of Hacılar to the city has softened of villager-city-dweller tension gradually in the next generations along with the change of the social structure. Secondly, the industrialists of Hacılar seized the economic superiority and from now on they are the new bosses of the city. So they aren’t subjected to such kinds of treatments any more and they also have strategic relationships with the city-dwellers.

On the other hand, there are strong evidences related to the under-handed continuation of this tension. Apart from the unspoken ones maintained in the daily life, I would like to mention two examples for they are pretty extraordinary and institutional. The first one is “Hacılar Erciyes sport Case”. According to what is conveyed to me, the situation is shortly as such. Istiklal Group that took over Kayseri Erciyes Club in 1999, changes its name as “Hacılar Erciyes Sport” and made serious investments to the sports club. As a result of these investments, in a short time the club finished the 2. League as the leader and deserve to play in the 1. League in 2003-2004 seasons. Yet, as Kayseri sport couldn’t show the same success, this time, some groups that are alleged to be manipulated by Kayseri Metropolitan Municipality begin to harass Hacılar Erciyes Sport team and its audiences and managers. Thereon, to prevent the escalation of the cases, Boydak Family withdrew from this business, the name of the team was changed back to Kayseri Erciyes Sport again and the management was transferred to the Mayor of Melikgazi³²⁶. Hereby, let us listen to first-hand witnesses related to this case from opinion leaders of Hacılar.

G: Yet, here is Hacılar Erciyes Sport Club. If there wasn’t the name of Hacılar and there was the name of Erciyes sport, there wouldn’t be that problem; yet, as it became Hacılar Erciyes sport, it was perceived as a superiority of a neighborhood over a city or superiority of a village over a city. Every time fight and battle will go further, to prevent no recoverable tribulations between the people, although we were always right, the side who gave in was we. At all the matches, swearing at the management of this club, organized movements began. Those organized movements already annoyed us substantially. The people on our side, our fellows also wanted to reduce the movement to silence. Conflict between the two began. After that, some people came, they began to impose that this should be ended up, this name should be changed, thus this is the only way to end up the chaos, finally we behaved more mindful.

K: Well, you said that these organized movements began, who organized this?

³²⁶ For an informative article about this subject see “Ezilmişliğin Öyküsü Hacılar Erciyes Sport” <http://www.turkforum.net/1108654332-ezilmisligin-oykusu-Hacilar-erciyessport.html> Accessed 26 June 2012.

G: I am not a police, I could not know exactly yet, in other words, as we mentioned a little while ago, at these events, notables of the city probably put themselves into an unsuccessful position, as they couldn't bring back their teams. Therefore, in anyway, that superiority should be end up. Presently as how the people in West doesn't accept the superiority of Anatolian industry over the industrialist in West, the people in the city doesn't accept any success of the villager as well. Even accepts, reluctantly, or from now on, in the present era, because something's are irrefutable, they are accepted, I mean according to me. This city-dweller villager differentiation, although we don't desire, although we disapprove of putting into words, even tacitly, it is being experienced.

The second significant example about this subject is the "Hacılar Private Organized Industrial Zone Case". Again according to what is conveyed to me, Hacılar Organized Industrial Zone, which was established in 1999, nearby Kayseri Organized Industrial Zone, within the boundaries of the field of Hacılar, later incorporated with Kayseri Organized Industrial District and legally dissolved. This incorporation is evaluated by some of the interviewees in a sense on the similar line with Hacılar Erciyes Sport Case and it was perceived as conspiracy of the people of Kayseri who have close relations with Organized Industrial District managers. These interviewees told that through the incorporation, the valuable fields belonging to Hacılar were devolved on Kayseri Organized Industrial District. Later on OID management sold these fields at a much higher price and made a bundle; and what's more, a big part of the fields (% 35) were taken from them by means of dispossession. In short, their interpretations were that city-dwellers, who cant accept the name of Hacılar, through the incorporation, made money as well as they deleted the name of Hacılar. Hacılar mayor and also other industrialists who owns field there, being in expectation of making more money; but they were deceived.

On the other hand, naturally there are the ones who think that this incorporation has been beneficial to industrialists. Likewise, they mentioned that before the incorporation, public services were not provided properly for the Hacılar Organized Industrial District fields. The roads were rough and infrastructure services were very weak; therefore, they make loss all the time. Shortly, they told that present condition is much more positive than the previous one. As a matter of fact, the mayor stated that before the incorporation, he had made a survey

conducted to the industrialists who have fields in Hacilar Organized Industry Zone. As the ones who want the incorporation are the majority, incorporation was actualized. Accordingly, it seems that in this case there is nothing that constitutes a juridical problem. However, the main issue here is that, beyond the technicalities basing on detailed accounts, the discomforts are still made sense and stated in terms of city-dweller-villager tension. The examples above are noteworthy as they reflect this issue.

The tensions between the city and the village, community-fraternity discussions are of very productive field of discussion in sociology and no doubt these are not unique to Turkey. Remembering the continuing strength of the center-periphery approach in understanding the Turkish history can give us an idea at this point. Accordingly, it is possible to consider the relations between Kayseri and Hacilar in this context. In parallel with the state of affairs and transitions in Turkey, as a matter of course, the tension between Kayseri and Hacilar doesn't carry on as before. First of all, most of the people of Hacilar moved to city and they have been living and working there for many years. In addition, from now on, Hacilar have fallen under the borders of Metropolitan Municipality's urban area and in a sense it turned to be a neighborhood of Kayseri. By this way, Hacilar and Kayseri integrated not only economically, but also administratively and physically. On the other side, as I have stated with exact numbers in the fourth chapter, the people of Hacilar became bosses of the city in terms of production, employment, and also export figures. In return, their prestige and statuses increased as much in the eyes of the city-dwellers. Thus, the management of the leading NGOs such as Kayseri Chamber of Industry, Kayseri Chamber of Trade, Chamber of Manufacturers and most of the other civil organizations were occupied by the people of Hacilar. In other words, the newly rising industrial bourgeoisie of Hacilar gradually articulated into the urban trade bourgeoisie who dominated the city for centuries and many alliances, based on many common interests, with city-dwellers began to develop. However, despite of all these developments, the above examples that came to surface through economic and political unearned income struggle, indicates to the problems of this articulation and shows that the process hasn't been completed yet.

One of the main indicators of this is politics. Though their economic power, the people of Hacilar could not take the political power in the city yet. The fellows of Hacilar are not affective neither at the local administration level, nor at the national politics³²⁷. This situation, undoubtedly, has some clear historical and sociological reasons. These ambitious entrepreneurs including the second generations, who are between the ages of 30 and 40, spend most of their time and energy to protect and develop their business. Thereby, in comparison with the inhabitants of Kayseri who lives on urban rents and unrisky business of trade they don't have time and energy to spend for non-economic activities. The second one is that although they have partial experiences related to politics prior to 1980, they do not have social and cultural capital sufficient for controlling and manipulating the urban politics. As conveyed to me, in the uneasy political context of pre-1980, the majority of the provincial chairmen³²⁸ of leading political parties and movements, both from the center and also from the radical right and left, are from Hacilar. Yet, after the 1980 Coup d'Etat, the people of Kayseri again dominated the politics. Most of the interviewees from Hacilar analysed this situation with the "naivety" of Hacilar and the "slyness" of Kayseri. Because, according to them, at the period when the politics was dangerous and when the political gain was low, Kayseri people piled this work on Hacilar. However, when the threatening-situation left behind and urban gains began to increase, they take the administration again. For this reason, the people of Hacilar, for the present, have to be subjected to urban politicians. Among the urban politicians; tradesmen and merchants of Cami-i Kebir (who are traditionally local grandees of Kayseri) and Kapalı Çarşı are dominant. One of the interviewees stigmatized them as "Great Britain" while the other called as "Özhaseki Republic". About this subject, I would like to give place to the analysis of an industrialist whom I think summarizes the issue very well. Because, I think he summarizes the current dynamics of villager city-dweller tension and the meaning of this issue, this conflict in terms of local dynamics, very well.

³²⁷ Currently, CHP Kayseri deputy Mehmet Şevki Kulkuloğlu is the only man from Hacilar in the parliament. Before him, the first Hacilar originated deputy is MHP 21. Period Kayseri Deputy Hamdi Bakır.

³²⁸ The Hacilar originated politicians who at that time became provincial chairman are the following: AP Provincial Chairman Mustafa Derin; CHP Provincial Chairman Mustafa Kulkuloğlu who was murdered by fascists through armed assassination in 7 May 1979; Turkey Socialist Labour Party Provincial Chairman Yunus Başoğlu; Ülkü Ocakları Kayseri Provincial Chairman Hasan Ali Kilci.

Let's say there is a meeting. İstikbal organizes a meeting. Presently, İstikbal is the locomotive of Hacilar, locomotive of Kayseri. İstikbal determines if it wants. If a mayor is elected, when İstikbal says `so and so` İstikbal makes him elected however, İstikbal is the gentleman. Never directly get into the politics. That's why this people of Hacilar-city dweller concept disappeared. You see, there was Hacilar Sport Club, there was a Kayseri Sport Club. There, the city-dwellers couldn't accept us. As we get on, the city-dweller got frightened. The city-dweller said to Hacı Boydak: "Give this Hacilar Erciyes to us, transfer the management to us". Look my brother if you walk in front of the city-dweller, he doesn't make you walk; however if you go behind him, he respects you. I am saying this sincerely. Yet, we like giving much, as people of Hacilar, we give more than the city-dwellers. We compliment much more than the city-dwellers. However, we do not have culture as much as the city-dwellers. Because, we don't have background as much as the city-dweller has. When you say a Middle Anatolian (factory), (city-dweller) is industrialist for 50 years. We are industrialists for 10 years. Can I say "who is that 50 years man!?" It doesn't sound good. On the other hand, the second was the following. Kayseri was becoming a metropolitan city. It was enclosing the towns that are 25 km far. Most of these towns couldn't accept this. Haseki (Kayseri Metropolitan Mayor) called Ahmet Herdem (Hacilar Mayor), he said: "Are you in?" "I am" he said. So, the services made to Hacilar like roads, landscape, planning and so on. On the other hand we are neighbours now. They made the people of Hacilar became friends. "There are not any difference between the people of Hacilar and us", they said. At present time, they intermarry. In a word, a concept of city-dweller-villager tension disappeared.

As it is seen, even though the process of articulation to the city continues, a complete integration has not been provided yet. Since, though not within the industry, solidarity based on town/village belonging still keeps its strength in Hacilar. This has two significant indicators. Firstly, as I mentioned in the 4th chapter, almost all the men from Hacilar work in the factories of Hacilar originated industrialist. For sure nearly 70 years working experience have share in this. However, it also clear that Hacilar originated industrialists favors their townspeople in terms of employment. Since, they are old friends with many of them and they have kinship relations with many of them. So, they are not far away from their worker background.

The second indicator is the Hacilar Solidarity Association having the budget of 1 million dollars. The association supports the fellows of Hacilar directly with financial aids and indirect investments as I point out in the introduction. To sum up, the town tries to maintain its identity, unity and solidarity and the industrialists

played the crucial roles in it. To sum up The fellows of Kayseri, the notables of the city center, still hold the political power. But, I think the fellows of Hacılar will take the political power or at least share it with the urban bourgeoisie in a near future. In the next part I will discuss the political history of the town and then the political stances and tendencies of the industrialists of Hacılar.

6.3.2 Politics in Hacilar and Political Orientations of Industrialists from Hacilar

In literature related to Anatolian tigers, one of the mostly emphasized points is the idea that the social basis of the “National Outlook” (Milli Görüş) parties including AKP has been formed by the small and medium-sized merchant and industrialist in Anatolia. In this sense, it is frequently pointed out that one of the factors, which increases these small industrial businesses in Anatolia. It is claimed that that local urban rents which were transferred to these companies by the local municipalities shifted to the line of RP-FP-AKP. So, I will try to evaluate the relations with political parties and a political preference of industrialists of Hacilar in a framework involves these claims. First of all, I will begin by examining the general political tendencies of Hacilar since 1950. The followings are the results of local and general elections between 1950 and 2009. Since Hacilar became a province in 1991 the detailed results could only be found after 1991.

Table 11 The Results of Local Elections Since 1950 to 1989 ³²⁹

| Elections | Winner Party |
|------------------|---------------------|
| 1950-1960 | DP |
| 1963-1968 | CHP |
| 1968 | AP |
| 1973 | AP |
| 1977 | AP |
| 1984 | ANAP |
| 1989 | ANAP |

Table 12 The Results of Local Elections from 1989 to 2009 ³³⁰

| Election | 1st Party | 2nd Party | 3rd Party | 4th Party | 5th Party |
|-----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1994 | ANAP % 42 | DYP % 30 | RP % 13,5 | MHP % 11,2 | CHP % 2,8 |
| 1999 | DYP % 46,5 | FP % 37,9 | MHP % 14,8 | | |
| 2004 | AKP % 55 | MHP % 43 | | | |
| 2009 | AKP % 60,7 | MHP % 25,4 | SP % 10,8 | | |

³²⁹ See yerel.net.org.tr

³³⁰ See yerel.net.org.tr

Table 13 The Results of General Elections After 1991³³¹

| Election | 1st Party | 2nd Party | 3rd Party | 4th Party | 5th Party |
|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| 1991 | DYP 58% | RP 23% | ANAP11% | DSP 3% | SHP 3% |
| 1995 | RP 45% | DYP 16% | MHP 12% | ANAP 10% | DSP 9% |
| 1999 | FP 34% | DYP 25% | MHP 22% | DSP 9% | ANAP 2% |
| 2002 | AKP 73% | MHP 7% | DYP 6% | GP 3% | CHP 3% |
| 2007 | AKP 83% | MHP 8% | CHP 4,2% | DP 1,8% | SP 0,5% |
| 2011 | AKP 85% | MHP 11% | CHP 1% | SP 1% | HAS 0,5% |
| 2010-Ref | YES 88% | NO 12 % | | | |

As seen, the political preferences of Hacilar were generally for the center-right parties except for a limited CHP period (1963-68) in the local election after 1960 coup. In my interview with Hamdi Bakır, the mayor at that time, he stated that his being elected from CHP was purely coincidental. He found himself as a mayor because of a paper he signed when not considering nomination. Votes were given to him personally rather than party. Some other people of Hacilar whom I spoke to underscored the pragmatism, favoring conjuncture, of the fellows who evaluated the current politics of this election results (the impact of the military after 1960). It is possible to see this pragmatism directly in election results of the subsequent years, too. I can say that Hacilar vote for the rising parties in almost every election. As you can see Hacilar hardly ever changed its center-right line during multi-party period. It is hard to say that Hacilar come out of the center too much. For example, unlike many towns regarded as conservative, parties of the National Outlook tradition couldn't take much vote in Hacilar until 1995 when the RP (Welfare Party) won the elections as the first party. Especially, % 84, 6 percent high support for AKP from Hacilar in the last 2011 elections is one of the highest rates of votes of AKP through Turkey. Naturally, the wealth coming from the industrialization and the prosperity, and social solidarity provided by the Association has a big role in these

³³¹ See secimsonuclari.com

voting records. Therefore, it is often a referred matter that the political preferences of the industrialist are effective. One of the local politicians puts it in this way.

Hacılar doesn't have so much effectiveness on city politics. But, they are determining in Hacılar. For example in the last elections Ahmet Herdem applies for the nomination of mayor from AKP in the last 2000 election. When notables decide in favor of Ahmet Herdem, AKP nominates him as a candidate; although provincial party organization published an opposite declaration against Herdem. Two business men decided. They said Ahmet Herdem.

When examining the political tendencies of the industrialists of Hacılar, I can tell that in an interaction they have parallels with the general trends in the town. I started with asking all the industrialists I have met that in what direction their political preferences changed since 1960, and then asked how they evaluate government policies. Most of the industrialist of Hacılar (around % 70) said that they voted for AP and MHP before 1980. Even nearly half of this part expressed that they participated in nationalist movement, sympathize or supported this movement before 1980. The remaining % 30 portion is almost equally distributed between MSP and CHP. Therefore, this case shows that before 1980 among the industrialists of Hacılar, the rate of the supporters of MSP which has been the representative of political Islam, was around % 10-15 and industrialists in general tended to center and nationalist-right. This is a contradictory point regarding the literature. It means that Hacılar followed the general political trends in the country and did not resort to parties which represent the political Islam. 1980 Coup and Turgut Özal's appearance on the political sphere affected the political preference of many industrialists of Hacılar and provided the collection of votes to ANAP-rather Özal- during next 10 years. One of the important points that must be emphasized about this period is that even some of the former CHP supporters also shifted to right with Özal. One of the old industrialists of CHP nicely expressed this shift.

Now Kurtuluş, your father also knows that we were always support CHP before 1980. But, before 1980 what's wrong was associated with CHP all the time. Now that "they are communist, they are nonreligious, and so on, they said. When Özal appeared, we said, "lets we will join Özal and clear our names". We joined Özal and acted wisely, do you understand?

We will listen to another industrialist who shifted to right with Özal, a supporter of CHP before 1980.

We were great, we, with our predecessors, were supporters of CHP. We again supported CHP until Özal appeared. As the phrase goes I was a communist until Özal. I was a communist at that time. Meantime in Hacılar we used to go to mosque and perform five times prayer. Behind our street there were sitting the man of Türkeş. We had an iron gate that I have never forget and they used to write on it, “communists go to Moscow”. That is to say how they deceived people...they were deceived by politicians. Then there were great betrayals. With Özal we became rightist. Our economic situation has changed a lot with Özal, we entered industry. After that AKP was established. After Özal ANAP was established again. Until AKP, we followed ANAP. AKP was established. We moved to AKP.

There are very reasonable reasons that Özal had such a great effect on the industrialist of Hacılar. First of all Özal’s neo-liberal policies which facilitate the articulation of Turkey to the global economy and deepen the market relations have been adopted immediately by all industrialists and traders who primary benefit of this politics. Secondly, the inflationary growth policies, which Özal put into practice towards the second half of the 1980s, quickly raised the domestic market. When the demand burst in domestic market coupled with inflation, especially in the furniture industry which people from Hacılar concentrated in, manufacturers have achieved incredible profits and have accumulated capital rapidly. Beyond these, Özal’s paying attention to the telecommunication infrastructure of Turkey and investments he made in this field cleared the way for “HES Kablo” which is the first factory founded in Hacılar; especially when winning the tenders of PTT, getting the direct support of Özal and growing rapidly the factory became the powerhouse of industrialization in Hacılar. Let’s listen to one of the part owners of the factory:

In 1983, we participated in PTT tender, we distributed a very good profit in that year. Thanks to Turgut Özal, to us, there was may God rest in peace Cengiz Tuncer, he was the minister of transport and communication. He gave us something, tendered, not to SIEMENS but to us.

The engineer, who met him in there when Özal came to visit factory in 1984 and walked within the factory with him, described the visit and Özal’s product-oriented critical suggestions in that way:

Özal came here; our friends (the owners of HES-part owners) went to Hacılar as a team to welcome, but Özal came here (to the factory) directly. I was showing him factory, he said, “You better, give up this electric cable, take a search for this fiber cable business!”. We were yet thinking the phone cord at that time: “Should we attempt to phone cord, or not?” But we thought that without phone cord, without copper cable it is too hard to do fiber cable. Phone cord became an outlet to us, became a solution because HES was about the close down at that time due to shortage of raw materials.

So both technologies changed and added value increased. The reason for the rise of its added value was the following. Until that time there was SIEMENS NKF, NOKIA producing these cables. There was also a Turkish-owned company which they incorporated. Turkey needs what, 100 units. They are constantly producing 75 units, cable are sold for 4 times cost to PTT. When we got this gap, we have made phone cord here through our own means, and then we participated in tender and so on. After we stepped in we broke the tender system, the layout in Ankara was broken. Everybody began to give their own prize. On the heels of we set up HAS Çelik, there were not sling at that time. There is a phone cord called subscriber's cable and there isn't steel wire for it. So we can not produce cable. For this reason we set up HAS ÇELİK here. Then HESFİBEL was set up for fiberoptic.

So, Özal, among nearly all the industrialist whom I spoke to, was the political figure that most widely adopted, lauded and remembered with gratitude. I can easily say Özal is still a popular leader that much more loved and lauded than even Tayyip Erdoğan in this regard. Yet he was the only politician who brought in best for Hacılar. On the other hand, it is in fact quiet enlightening to the discussion of Puritanism. Since, in comparison with Erdoğan who draws a rather puritanical profile with his hedonism and flexibility, Özal was a much more laic figure and much more accorded with overflowing secularity of Hacılar. As on the industrial points out, Özal opened up new horizons for them and showed the consumption and luxurious living standards.

After Özal, we see that the industrialists, turned back to their old parties such as DYP and MHP. However, they totally re-united in AKP in 2002. Almost all of the industrialists with whom I interviewed said that they voted for AKP and supported Tayyip Erdoğan. Between the years 2007-2009 when I had an interview, presidential crisis took place; Turkey's economy was partly in a recession because of the global crisis; a closure case opened against AKP and resulted recently.

Therefore, there were critics emphasizing that the party had entered “unnecessary” political polemics as was in the case of “headscarf”. Besides they were also thinking that AKP has given up EU Accession Process which is of critical importance regarding especially the second term of the party. There were also some critics directed especially by small industrialist that the government protects the bigger manufacturers. However despite these critics many industrialists were still supporting the policies of Tayyip Erdoğan in 2009. This support reached the highest point in the Davos crisis. For example, an industrialist said that he couldn’t sleep until morning at night and felt himself as a real Turkish first time. Of course, as in the Özal era, industrialists’ supporting AKP is not based on purely ideological reasons. First of all, the memories of coalition period are still on the minds. Therefore, a coalition is seen as a nightmare scenario for industrialists and they definitely support “stability” in their choice of AKP.

The other important factor was that Turkey rapidly opened out to the outside world and the exports of Turkey increased very much especially in the first period of AKP. In this development of exports the Anatolian industrialists had also a great share. Therefore AKP played a critical role here. AKP’s foreign politics paved vital ways for the Anatolian industry which wants to make exports. Likewise, as I noted above the effects of economic crises and recession lived in Europe between 2007 and 2009 could be only avoided by the new markets in the East such as Syria and Iraq. Therefore Hacılar quite benefited from these commercial treaties signed with these countries. Since the goods produced in Hacılar industry is quite proper for these regions in which the demand is high, the expectation is low and the domestic markets are primitive. So, the furniture, steel doors or other durable goods are addressed for the needs of these regions. As a matter of the fact the policies called “Kurdish Opening” (*Kürt Açılımı*) “Syrian Opening” (*Suriye Açılımı*) or “African Opening” (*Afrika Açılımı*) played vital roles for the industrial entrepreneurs of Anatolia including Hacılar. The leading politicians of AKP knows the local needs very well and there is quite excellent coincidence of this political and economic policies of AKP and the political tendencies of Hacılar in this sense. There is a mutual protection and support balance between AKP and the Anatolian

industrialists. This could be overtly seen in the precautions against the crises. In this sense, the decrease of VAT (*KDV*) in automotive and furniture sectors from 18 % to 8 % directly resulted in a boom effect in furniture sector. For instance the top manager of the leader firm noticed that they developed 13 % within the crises period. As a matter of the fact, it is true that Anatolian Capital is one of the critical economic and social bases of AKP. However it is not a simple but a confusing relationship directed to the maintenance of the hegemonic relations. It is clear that the industrialists who are selling their products to 110 countries are not doomed to AKP. I think that they do not take direct material supports beyond the subsidies offered to KOBİ's in whole Turkey. However, I want to explain this relationship with an anecdote from the field. While I was making interviews I used to eat in a restaurant in the Kayseri OSB and talk with the different customers like the workers marketers, professionals etc in the breaks between the interviews. Once when I was eating with workers on the table there appeared news on the TV and the speaker started to give some information about CHP. One of the workers said: "I swear when this party would come to power, it would be a catastrophe for the Boydak Group" The other worker replied: "If they would live catastrophe you would live it worse than the Boydak's". Actually, it is this clear consciousness, crystallized in the perception of the workers gives the political hegemony to AKP. Since they are affiliating their own existence with the existence of capital and related it with the ruling party in power. Therefore, both the industrialists, the workers, the students who are taking scholarship and other groups like housewives, elderly people and the deprived people supported by the association vote for AKP and it seems it will be continued for a while.

6.33 The Attitudes towards Globalization and Modernity

After we have discussed the political tendencies of industrialists of Hacılar, we can now advert how they keep the relations with modernity and globalization. In this sense, the first thing which should be emphasized is what those industrialists think on what Turkey's economic, cultural and political vision to be. Yet, the perception of the entrepreneurs of Hacilar on what stance they will take over against West-East

matter which is both one of the most basic ontological problems of Republic of Turkey. Furthermore, this case also reveals hints concerning how AKP converts both its own structure and conservative body on the issue of EU.

I exactly asked the question: “where should be the position of Turkey in the world regarding the economics, culture and politics?”. When it is not fully understood I paraphrased the question like: “According to you, in which bloc Turkey should be, in AB or in Russia, China, Iran block or in the block of Islamic countries? Let me tell you straightly the answers. The answers depending along with the firms’ scope, customer portfolio and ideological preferences, but the general tendency is overtly to be in EU.

As I before mentioned, the industry of Kayseri has quite deep relations with different parts of the world. Thus, most of the industrialists’ general tendency is to be in EU. However, their common view is: “whether in EU or not, Turkey shouldn’t get stuck in a particular geography”. Cyclical developments and crises seem to reinforce the views of the industrialists as well. In brief, the industry of Kayseri generally does not produce high quality commodities. Accordingly, it usually appeals to eastern markets in terms of commodity portfolio. However, it holds a substantial market especially in the field of furniture and textile in EU. Furthermore, there are some firms which totally make production for EU countries. Industrialists are able to sell cable (fiber optic cable) and steel goods (steel ropes and string etc.) to many of countries in the world. Therefore, industrialists, regarding their own global visions, do not want to restrict these markets and do not want to abandon any of these markets. As they say: “Turkey should be in everywhere, not in one place.” However, the common view shared by the majority of industrialists is that EU Accession Process is making positive contributions in the fields of quality, control, standard and business ethics. Most of the firm owners I met reflect that they are considerably affected by the business culture and the institutional approaches (knowing what you want, delivering the commodity just in time, strictly obeying the rules that has been discussed before, paying in time etc.) and has accordingly improve themselves in this field. In general terms, they believe that being in EU

would have positive affects which would raise the standards of their own. Well then, how do they approach to EU in other circumstances, where do they feel better in the world, how do the relations with European countries and the other countries affect them? In this sense, I'll try to describe also how much the relationship with Europe affects the industrialists of Hacilar.

As I mentioned in previous chapters in detail, industrialists of Hacilar keep in intensive contact with West. On the other hand, along with some differences between them, both the first generation and the second generation do not have quite different lives. They work from the morning 8 am to the 8 pm intensively. Almost they all are married and have children and they had a life that goes around the work, family, relatives and community. Consequently, although industrialists of Hacilar have kept intensive contact with Europe, it's not much possible to say that they have Western tendencies considering their lifestyle, cultural preferences, applauses and tastes. Furthermore, these men do not consider themselves as a Western. They prefer to describe themselves as "Muslim and Turk" and they are proud of this. The thing that seems odd is that the similar attitude also appears in vision of East and Muslim's world. In other words, these people do not consider themselves as Western, however; it cannot be claimed that they lean towards East neither. Even more, when the question asked "where do they feel safe"; majority of them reply as: "in West." Yet, it is complained that in East, especially in Islamic countries, everything is complicated; there is no definite system, trade debtors do not know what they really want, trade and work culture is ineffectual and there are a lot of legal obstacles and bureaucracy. They also underlines that Islam is experienced best in Turkey. Therefore, the attitudes to West definitely follow a typical conservative approach constituted by Gökalp. In brief, "we shall take West's technology, institutional culture, and economic system but keep our culture, religion and family values aside". There is made a distinction between the modernization and westernization. The former is espoused and the latter is criticized. What they understand from the modernization is to keep up with the recent economic and technological innovations

People, while changing, they change their values as well, as they are getting rich. There are some values which cannot be changed. They have some values which comes by birth. What are those? Whose son am I? What is my surname? I cannot change these. I am a Turk, I cannot change this. I am a Muslim, I cannot change. However, there are some values that I may change. I change these pragmatically.

In a general framework, as Metin underlined modernization corresponds to the changes in the four main domains: politics, society, culture and economics. Whereas political modernization refers to the development of the political organizations and institutions, cultural modernization refers to the secularization of the society in the axis of rationality, universality and individual liberties. Besides, while economic modernization corresponds to the progress in agricultural, commercial and industrial capacities; the social modernization is expressed with some indicators such as increasing literacy, educational facilities, urbanization and public health (Metin, 2006: 20). When to remember the related indicators which I noticed in previous chapters such as the population, urbanization, schooling rates, production, trade and export capacity and international relations there is no doubt that Kayseri is a very modern place.

However, my interviews and observations reveal that there is a dominant and pejorative perception on modernity. It seems that that modernity or being a modern person is associated first and foremost with physical appearance, especially with alcohol, amusement and idle time patterns in the city. When I asked the question: “what do you understand from modernity or being a modern person?” Most of the people I met gave that kind of negative answers about modernity and noticed that modernity or the modernity they understood is “not something like that” as well. This result may be taken “normal” enough in a country where Clothing Reform has been made in its history and the “headscarf problem” is one of the most dynamic tensions of the local politics. The following comments of industrialists on this matter present a well sample to this situation. However, in terms of Turkish modernity, it is really disappointing to see that the discourse of modernity is understood so superficially in Kayseri.

I don't really get it, I think it is something like social life. Becoming modern is not something like doing unnecessary things; putting on

When talking about modernity I understand the newly developments that facilitates our daily lives without exaggeration. For me modernization not like İzmir, I don't understand the dress' immodestly. Being modern, to maintain himself as a human being and to feel comfortable without exaggeration I think.

Being modern should not mean mini skirts of women. Islam does not allow this.

If it (modernity) is so, if it is the bikinis of the women I don't accept this. But we should adopt our age. However, while adopting our age we should not get out of the borders of religion.

Maybe not modernization but westernization is decadence. Bars, nightclubs, alcohol, where do they all come from? From the West. Do we know this culture? No. There are not such kinds of things in Islam. We should be modest. Even in our wedding ceremonies the women and men sit in different places. They eat and hear religious music and talk to each other. But on the other side, there is alcohol, fight I can not accept all these.

What I understand from modernity is technology, space age I take them as the base. Watch the world from the space reaching to technology. If there are robots here we do not have to pay for the workers. There would not any security payments.

On the other hand, maybe the most overt and critical difference of Kayseri regarding modernity is the place of the individual, individualism and/or individual liberties. In other words, the basic tension between the traditional structure of the city and the necessities of modernity emerges between the conflicts of being a free individual and being a member of the community in its large sense including the family, kinship, informal clusters and networks, religious orders and the townsmanship.

My participant observations and in-depth interweaves showed me that the social life organization in Kayseri city is mostly shaped on the axis of home/family and work. What I mean by the family is of course the extended family including all the relatives of both woman and man. The circle starts from the nuclear family and

completed respectively by close and distant relatives, neighbors, friends, members of the religious community and the fellows of the city. From this perspective, the city looks as if it is composed of small circles intertwined into each other.

Based on the strict gender segregation this life has a dual rhythm in which women fulfilled her duties at home with childcare and domestic work and men go out for breadwinning very early and come back very late. There are some social events into which both man and women participate such as weddings, engagements, sunnets, and reciprocal evening visits. But even in these situations men's and women's groups differ after a while.

Men wake up very early, go to their job and don't come back before 19:00 or 20:00 pm. It is such that it is considered as a shame if a man doesn't be at his job very early. Since it is believed that if a man opened the rolling shutter of his shop in a late time, he would loose the "*bereket*" (blessing/fertility/abundance) of his job. For instance, an industrial entrepreneur told me that: "I come back home very lately. So the children are asleep then most of the time. So, after the morning pray, I wake up the whole family, have time with my children and then go to my job". The weekends and holidays are also the meeting times of the whole family with its extensions. So I can argue that the times left out of the job are mostly allocated for the family members and relations.

The family that I stayed some time in Kayseri in two summers of 2008 and 2009 was an upper middle class family. The woman was a director in the municipality and has a master degree. The man was a teacher in a high school. They were rich and high educated people. During the whole summer that I stayed there they were out at least four days of the week for social organizations such as weddings, engagements, sunnets or celebrations for newborn babies, send of the sons to military service, condolences, sick calls and so on. When to compare it with the social rhythm of Western Turkey; the relations are unbelievably intensive.

As I try to depict, this is not direct the result of the religion itself. What the role of the religion is to reproduce and articulate into these relations in the context of the whole social cosmos. So, the universe in which woman and man live is such a closed circle restrained with the borders of the big family. They are only free free within this circle. Particularly the rich women for instance, wander with their cars, visiting their relatives, leaving their children to the colleges, going to the shopping malls, organizing meetings with their friends. However, the problem arises outside this familial sphere. There is not much place here for individual stances, choices and sometimes physical existences. For instance, the single women do not have the chance to stay as single in the city. Of course no one marry off the women by force or make a physical pressure on women providing for their marriage. However, the social cosmos leaves no place except the communal and familial public sphere which calls her for marriage and its concomitant duties.

Therefore, regarding the logic of the modernity maybe the most different and “limping” characteristic of Kayseri appears at this point. I am not sure how to locate this solid structure in the context of alternative conceptions of modernity such as “multiple modernities³³²” or “non-western modernities³³³” debates. Since, this community based structure does not offer people a proper ground for the development of individuality. Indeed, it excludes, externalizes and does not tolerate the different life styles, practices, political views and organizations staying out of the borders of this big traditional community. In this sense, many young businessmen of second generation I made interview complaint about the suffocating atmosphere of the city for their individual choices while noticing at the same time to the adventitious sides of these communal relations both for their business and familial networks.

The selection of prospective wives, personal choices, the education of the children, the vocation plans, consumption and leisure time patterns such as cycling all are under the heavy pressure of of this cultural weight. In this sense, Özdemir (2006) is right to say that the transition of Anatolian Capital deepens the modernization in

³³² Eisenstadt 2000

³³³ Göle 2002a

Anatolia; however, the democratic dimensions of this modernity are still weak in the city particularly at the points of respecting to the differences, different life styles, world views, individual rights and liberties.

As a matter of the fact, regarding its political, social and economic dimensions Kayseri is a very modern city; however, there is a serious problem in cultural modernization side. Since as Eisenstadt aptly notices regarding modernity “central to the cultural program was an emphasis on the authonomy of man: his (in its initial formulation certainly ‘his’) or her emancipation from the fetters of the traditional political and cultural authority. In the continues expansion of the realm of personal and institutional freedom and activity, such authonomy, implied first; reflexivity and exploration, second; active construction and mastery of nature including human nature (Eisenstadt, 2000:5).

However as I noted above particularly this traditional cultural authority is stil holding the fellows of the city with very tightly. In this context, Kahraman suggests to define the existing situation as the secularization, taming or modernization of modernity and ends up with the statement that economic and social modernization prevailed the cultural modernization in Turkey; while analyzing the challange of Islamist and Kurdish movements against the military structure of Turkey in the last 30 years (Kahraman, 2010).

To sum up, the industrialists of Hacilar have a developmental vision of modernity within the capitalist paradigm of neo-liberal frame. This approach is based on adapting the technological innovations without loosing the so called “essential and traditional” social and cultural characteristics and values of the nation. Inspired by the South Eastern model³³⁴, this view overtly does not prioritize the democracy, human rights and freedoms but aims at the economic and technological development³³⁵.

³³⁴ Buğra 2002: 194; Buğra 1998; Yazar 1996

³³⁵ Doğan 2007: 53-63

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

When starting to the thesis study I considered the issue from within the literature of Anatolian tigers and/or Islamic capital debates. So, I summarized and critically evaluated some common points in the literature regarding the cities made industrial production in Anatolia. I located Hacılar in this context. My basic argument has been that the “Islamic Calvinism” argument does not reflect the reality in the context of Kayseri Hacılar. In this sense I defended that the religion has not a direct effect on the industrial development of Hacılar; but it is the result of the economic, social cultural and historical characteristics of the city. Lastly I suggested that as one of the traditional industrial districts of Turkey it is hard to consider Kayseri within the frame of Anatolian Tigers. I tried to analyze the Hacilar case within the frame of historical materialistic approach and formulate my arguments in this way. Yet, I want to end up the whole study with summarizing my basic findings in the light of my theoretical position, in-depth interviews and observations.

So I can begin with the particular reasons of the industrialization of Hacılar. Despite its many disadvantageous such as the shortage of water and land, poverty and intensive population, the village has been a strategic advantage and difference than the other mountainous villages in Anatolia: It has been settled near (14 km) the metropolis of the deep Anatolia, a trade center city of thousands years. Besides, Kayseri has been also one of the critical choices of the New Republic to be an industrial center. Therefore, first and foremost it is this geographical location and proximity to Kayseri that made Hacılar and industrial town. Moreover, lying on a blind spot on the Mount Erciyes, Hacılar has always been a closed, homogenous and strong ethnic and cultural social fabric that maintained the social structure of the town in the industrialization process. As a matter of the fact, Hacılar became the place which mostly benefited from the externality of Kayseri when the economic development and industrialization took place in the city. This geographical

proximity provided Hacılar to benefit from the different facilities of the city without breaking with the authentic life world of the village. So, when the labor needed in the industrial sector of the city, Hacılar became the most appropriate place to meet this demand. Since, it was the most poor and needed place among the close settlements to the Kayseri city center.

In this frame, the fellows of Hacılar have been working in different stages of trade, industry and service sectors since the pre-Republican Period by using their geographical advantage. The activities in these different sectors followed different pathways. For instances, the informal economics started with smuggling and directed them to be the settled drapers by crossing through the peddler, stallholder and shop keeper stages.

The industrial activities were triggered by the textile production as in the case of the whole world. The state investments made in 1930s prepared the background of this development. Especially the Carpet Thread Factory (1926) and Cloth Factory (1935) of Sümerbank became the forerunners of the textile sector and the fellows of Hacılar directly benefited from the multiplier effects of these factories to the city economics. These state investments also paved the way for the industrial development of the private sector in the city in the subsequent years and contributed motivation to this field.

In this general framework, the weaving activity which continued from 1930s to 1950 was the first attempt of industrialization in Hacılar. Weaving experience provided both an incredible capital accumulation (within the conditions of that time), increased the quality of labor in textile and led to the emergence of first intermediaries (thread and cloth sellers) and masters of the village. This experience on textile became the background for the next stage of carpet weaving.

From 1950s until 1990s carpet weaving was one the most important resources that provided cash money to the town. For instance, including my father, most of the students could attend to the schools with the money came from carpet weaving.

Besides, the fellows of Hacilar progressed in carpet business in a short time and became the dominant group in the carpet production and trade in Kayseri in 1970s. So with the drapers, the first capital owners emerged from the town in those years. One of the pioneer entrepreneur of these carpet producers established the first carpet factory (ATLAS Halı) in 1967 in Kayseri and this was followed by the other ventures of textile and carpet (SARAY Halı) factories. By virtue of all these investments, Hacilar met with the industrial production.

The Ankara years of Hacilar between 1960 and 1980 were also a critical but generally ignored period in the development of Hacilar industry. In these years, those fellows who went to Ankara, for being workers, peddlers, hotel managers, minibus drivers gained information, vision, and know-how for their prospective ventures in Kayseri.

To sum up, until 1960s the fellows of Hacilar tried to be a part of the city and national economics via different occupations. Towards 1950s and 1960s, as the combination of these activities the interest of the Hacilar shifted to industry in line with the development of Kayseri. This movement to industry started in 1950 and accelerated in 1970s. Under these circumstances, the families in Hacilar, started to send their sons to the industry as apprentices in order for them to acquire a profession in a short way despite the very hard working conditions. This child labor movement became accelerated and normalized in time. After a while, the industry became the sole way for the children who do not want to go to school including the ones who did not allowed to go.

These apprentices who were sent to industry became monitorial in 3 to 5 years and after the military service they started to open their own workshops as young masters with the limited capital they saved. Some of these children (30 industrialists) succeeded to transform their small workshops into a factory in almost 30 years. Looking to their distribution on sectors could give an idea in general: 7 drapers, 3 iron workers, 1 panel beater, 3 body (chassis) makers, 3 wood masters (1 carpenter, 1 carver, 1 chest producer), 4 drapers, 3 engineers, 2 carpet producers, 1 salesman, 1 lawyer, 1 wood timber, 1 truck driver.

During this movement to industry, a METU graduate young electric engineer combined the industrial energy accumulated in Hacılar with the technical knowledge and the political conjuncture of the time which supports the collaborative ventures to provide for the capital accumulation in both right and left wing of the national politics. So, HES Cable Factory was established in Hacılar with the participation of 832 people from Hacılar on a hill of the village in 1974 and Hacılar went a critical step further on the way to industry.

Despite the economic and politic instability of 1970s HES succeeded to survive and rapidly developed after the telecommunication investments of Özal. The PTT tenders given by the directives of Özal played a critical role in this development. In the further stages, HES shifted to fiber optic cable production and rapidly turned out to be a big holding with 2500 workers in 1999. During this development process the number of share holders went down first to 8 in 1980s. Meanwhile the share holders who learned the industrial production established also other family factories in different sectors. In 1999 the shareholders of HES decided to split up and the shared the different factories of HES Group based on their shares. Since then, these industrialist are managing both their own family factories and the ones remained from HES Group such as Has Çelik, HES FİBEL, HES Kimya and HES Makine. In a nutshell HES became the main agent and school for the fellows of Hacılar who learned production, import, export, foreign affairs and marketing besides the tricks of industry. On the other side, the smart, talented and advantageous ones among the apprentices developed their business. In time, since 1970s they brought their small work places in the old industrial district of Kayseri to the new ones and lastly transformed them into factories in the Organized Industrial District (Kayseri OSB).

Consequently, in 2009 Hacılar industry turned out to be a quite large scale employing 18.765 workers in 1.198.000 square meter open and 852.000 square meter space besides the total 1 million square meters space of the leader firm and 1.840.000 square meter total space of a mining firm. The total turnovers of the Hacılar industry were 5,4 billion TL (approximately 3 billion dollars). For the same

year, the total export of the Hacilar's industrialist was 607,7 million dollars and the number of countries made export was 110. This means the industrialists of Hacilar made 3/5 of the total production of whole Kayseri industry, employ 1/10 of the total workers in the city and made almost half of the import of Kayseri in the year 2009.

In 2009, the first three sectors in Kayseri industry were metal goods; furniture and forest products and textile with the ratios of 27,15%, 17,61% and 12,3% respectively. Hacilar industry as the biggest part of this structure was to a great extent organized in the same way. As a matter it was producing generally labor intensive products rather than technological ones having higher value. Besides, the industrial organization was quite hierarchical and there are tremendous differences between the leader firm and others regarding the turnovers and production capacities. In this sense, Hacilar industry is being organized around a leader firm and the 4,5 biggest firms around its circle. The tens of other firms were taking place under these firms and they were quite dependant to this core with different mechanism such as subcontracting.

Therefore, although it seems to be specialized especially in furniture and metal goods sectors; it could not be described as a place where the small and medium scale enterprises are dominant in the relations of productions as in the case of Italy in the beginnings of 1970s. It was such that, the organization of production in Kayseri has never been based on the small and medium scale firms which are employing skilled labor who are producing high quality goods with extraordinary designs up to the changing demands in the world markets.

Untill 1990s the production was almost completely oriented to the domestic market and especially to the Eastern Turkey. The quality of the goods was quite low. So, this industry had developed by selling goods to the East. After 1990 the industrialists of Hacilar increased the quality of their products and started to sell their products to the national market especially to the İstanbul and Western Turkey. Except a couple of firms the majority of the firms had started to export with 2000s.

And what's more the products of these firms are still not developed regarding design, technology and quality. They still use their lower prices to carve niches in the world markets.

As I noted above one of the crucial factors of this vertical organization in industry is the subcontracting. For instance, considering the furniture sector, we see the leader firm with 12.000 workers and its followers with employment capacity of 1300, 800, 550 and 200 workers respectively. The hundreds of others are working for these bigger firms some time with a very marginal profit rates. So, the subcontracting relations here are organized from the top to the bottom in a hierarchical chain. Therefore, there is not a horizontal structure in which the loosely connected small and medium scale firms specialized in a series of products. So rather than solidarity relations based on the sharing of the costs, the firms here are making an inappropriate competition on the cheap prices. They produce almost the same products up to their scales and capacities and addressing the same markets and customers with very similar products. Therefore in this highly competitive economic atmosphere which is bounded to the demand; the subcontracting relations provided an increase in production without making extra investments for the bigger firms. It prevents the factories from lower capacity working, increases the profitability of the firms and controls the cost of labor in a very effective way. Therefore, the satellite firms are tightly controlled by the main firms and they are allowed to survive on a very marginal profit rates. However, except the bigger ones this led to the decrease of the profit rates in the whole sector and this lower profit rates causes the exacerbation of the working conditions of the small firms in general. That's why they do not allow the trade unions, employ workers with minimum wages without paying their insurances and social security payments some time. The natural result of this process is the decreasing quality in the whole sector and the bankrupt of some small firms which could not bear on this hard competition.

Regarding the technological level and R&D perspective it is possible to claim that the whole Kayseri industry produces lower level technological goods which are produced in line with Fordist patterns. For this reason, rather than technology labor

is much more intensive in the form of production. Except a couple of bigger firms Kayseri industry is making production with the equipment pools of high technology but it is still in the level of using technology rather than producing it. In this frame the basic problem arises in the level of R&D. It is possible to argue that there is not a serious R&D mentality and organization in Kayseri industry. For instance, except a couple of ones among the whole visited firms there were no engineers in the so called R&D departments and the production processes are almost entirely controlled by the uneducated masters.

The other side of the coin, the social and cultural aspects of this issue is much more confusing. Since, R&D mentality requires first and foremost an open social structure which would pave the base for the innovation, invention and scientific development. As Florida notices without an open society, the scientific and technological studies could not find a proper place to develop. Therefore, one of the critical reasons of this shortage of Kayseri stems from the lack of creative classes³³⁶, namely the high qualified sections of society. According to Florida, these classes in the long run, led to the accumulation of capital and businessmen by constituting an open, free and dynamic social space³³⁷. The free, open and tolerant cities in which the different social groups could freely live brings also with high level developments and economic gains³³⁸. However, Kayseri seems very far away from being this kind of a city. In brief beyond the creative classes it is still a city in which ordinary people who are not conservative could find a free space to live in. Even for the simple activities of drinking and entertainment people should go to the Cappadocia region to meet these demands. Therefore, it is possible to argue that this closed an intolerant attitude of the city to the different life styles have negative effects not just on the cultural and social life but also on technological and economical development of the city³³⁹ in the long run. The entrepreneurs of the city are quite aware of these kinds of problems and it is my contention that in not a long time the local dynamics could partly find some solutions for them.

³³⁶ Florida 2002

³³⁷ Florida 2004

³³⁸ Florida 2004

³³⁹ Florida 2008,

The solidarity relations as a cross section point of both industrialization and sociology of religion literatures, took a serious energy and time of my study. After a certain time and having completed all the interviews with the industrialists I recognized that the common discourse on the solidarity within the industry is just a desired but not realized story. On the contrary I stated that there is a wild and cruel competition between the industrialists of the town. As against the positive picture presented to the outside, most of the industrialists of the town generally work for themselves, keep the knowledge and know-how for themselves and if necessary steal the market, customer and model of his fellowmen. They take each other to the court for such reasons and no one seems on the side of the visionary organizations for the common good of the industrialists. So, in short there lies a deadly competition between each other. On the other hand, though exceptional and limited with personal characteristics, ideological and community ties, there are also some forms of solidarity among them such as providing support in urgent times, postponing the debts and ordering subcontracting relations to the fellow industrialists.

There are also some critical points about the foreign connections and relations of Hacilar industry to be underlined. First the industrialist of Hacilar seems to make a very proper production (cable, furniture, steel door etc.) in line with the processes of urbanization and transformation to a market society. Therefore, they seem to be efficiently benefited from the expansion of domestic market. For this reason in a very short time like 30 years they have opened to the global markets. However, despite the development of the exports it is still the domestic markets which mostly matters for Hacilar industry. The production is still highly dependent to the domestic demand and among the 5,4 billion TL total turnover of Hacilar industry the exports comprises of just 607,7 million TL. This shows that the exports stay still 10-15 % of the total production. Likewise, some econometric analysis verifies that against the expectations, the effects of the exports are still very limited in the development of Hacilar firms (Erdem et. all, 2008: 357).

Second, this rapid industrialization caused a serious differentiation between the bigger enterprises making the great portion of the production and export and the other small ones. While the bigger ones are expanding towards the world markets with their relatively qualified product portfolios; the others are generally making production in the standards of Middle Eastern and African markets.

The third, despite the hopeful increase in export, the quality of exported goods are still not so high regarding their technological level. So, Hacilar industry address for the countries and social sections having lower level purchasing power in abroad. However, especially for some products such as fiber optic cables, steel ropes, springs and textile they have had a certain share in the world markets with their high quality products.

Fourth, right now the industrialists of Hacilar are selling their products to different geographies. So, they do not want to give up any of these places and limiting the markets regarding their commercial, political and global visions. Therefore, although the majority of the industrialists are supporting the EU Accession Process of Turkey; they do not want Turkey to get stuck in certain geography. On the other side, their common view in supporting Turkey's membership of EU is that they think working with Europe increased the standards and quality of Turkish industrial sector especially in the topics of quality, control, standards, business ethics and so on.

Regarding the administration structure of the firms and intergenerational relations it is possible to observe the following points. The founding patriarch is still holding the power in the firms and he still goes to work everyday; however the businesses are de facto directed by the second generations. The basic functions of the founding patriarch are to arrange the diplomatic relations of the factory with the outside world, to survive the social relations and to keep the familial relations alive and in order. There are radical differences between the generations. The second generation comprise of the educated young people having the skills of foreign language. Except a couple of firms, most of the second generations are working in the firms of their families; they have a deep respect and admiration for the first generations. In

this frame, yet they are working to a great extent as being subjected to the first generations. So, there seems harmony rather than conflict in intergenerational relations.

On the other hand, this patriarchal management structure led to some deficiencies especially in professionalization and institutionalization of the firms. Most of the Hacilar firms are still managed by the traditional methods within the family circle. Particularly, there are some serious problems in small firms in the delegation of the authority to the second generations and the first generations are still reluctant to employ professionals in the factories. The future of these firms would be determined by how they will solve these conflicts.

The other critical findings are related with labor processes. Hacilar industry is a typical capitalist industry with its quantitative and qualitative indicators in the very sense of the term. The capital accumulation is based on an unequal mechanism of surplus exploitation of the workers. As a matter, the wages, insurances and security payments are kept at the minimum; except the two bigger firms the trade unions are not allowed and even the redress payments (for the industrial accidents) are considered as a burden. Therefore, there is strict control over the labor. Nevertheless, the employer-employee relations are not as in the case of the big metropolitan cities. The relations are much closer and informal. The subjection of the workers is being provided by the cultural hegemony strategies based on the informal social mechanisms intertwined with paternalistic and patriarchal relations. Of course this does not cancel the historical and conflictual character of these relations; but they do not seem overt in the first place. As a matter, the informal mechanisms such as partial aids in critical times, doing favor for the fellowmen, being in the same social, cultural and religious atmosphere has a certain role in the employer – employee relations.

Now I can come back to the core discussion of my thesis: the Islamic Calvinism debate. As seen the religion had not much role within this story I told so far. As I discussed in the fifth chapter in detail, putting aside the concept of “Calvinist

Islam”, even the “Protestant Ethic” thesis itself is problematic from the factual and epistemological perspectives. Therefore, in a nutshell I think the theological arguments have a very weak analytical power to explain the economic development and industrialization processes regarding my object of inquiry. Both the historical development process of Hacılar I described for pages and the data I gathered from my interviews on the perception of religion by the industrialists show that there is not a puritan or Calvinist kind religious or moral orientation among them. The industrialists are organizing their businesses according to the material conditions of the world. Namely, the problem is not the people who are working with a moral or religious motivation and become capitalists at the end of the day. On the contrary, the entrepreneurs are working with ambition and resentment and they voluntarily become capitalists. The role of the religion here is just to justify and legitimize these activities in a broader framework and to use the religious networks for their benefits. So my argument is that it is the capitalism rather than Calvinism that explains the development of Hacılar.

The Turkish society has been familiar with capitalism since the Ottoman Period. The partial and untidy capitalistic activities in the Empire were structured by the Kemalist bureaucracy within a statist development project with the Republican Revolution. This capitalistic structure was adapted to the market society with the transition to multi- party system after 1950 and articulated into the new world order which has been dominated by the neo-liberal paradigm after the 1980 Military Intervention. Therefore, there was serious capitalist production in Turkey before 1980; but it was organized within the paradigm of import substitution. So, the arguments defending that capitalism was very restricted before 1980 and the Anatolian industry was oppressed by the state does not reflect the reality. I think these kinds of arguments are some retrospective reflections of the political implications of 28 February Process. State supported various local entrepreneurs also before 1980 and many industrialists benefited from these subsidies, facilities and supports of the state including the fellows of Hacılar. Likewise, Turhan Feyzioğlu from (CHP/GP) laid the foundation of the HES and Turgut Özal supported the factory with the PTT tenders. As a matter of the fact, religion did not

play a remarkable role like the pious people of Anatolia worked hard with the religious motivation and reached to the industrial level at the end of the day. As I noted before the capital accumulation had already started in Hacılar in 1930s.

On the other hand, the violent repression of the leftist movements and organizations and on the contrary the relatively free space allowed to the religious orders after the 1980 Military Intervention offered a very fertile ground for these historical establishments. Despite their anti-systemic discourses in 1980s these religious orders rapidly turned out to be the capitalist holdings in 1990s and their oppositions have been absorbed by the capitalist system³⁴⁰. In 2000s, especially with the AKP government they also became one of the critical elements of power block in Turkish politics. Therefore, during this process the traditional and religious networks have been used as social capital to some extent in the capital accumulation process for these sections of society. Likewise, Hacılar's entrepreneurs who did not have any kind of these connections started to participate in religious orders after 1980 and the processes accelerated in 1990s.

However, as I tried to elucidate above, the effects of these religious orders have always been limited with the rationale of capitalism and far from being an Islamic sub-economy³⁴¹ in the case of Hacılar. However, it is possible to talk about the endeavors of the industrialist to mitigate the tensions between the sacred and profane by virtue of different mechanisms. Yet, the religious orders, engaged at these points. They function to mollify these tensions via different forms such as pray, *zikir* and religious gatherings by putting the sacred into the profane. Nevertheless, it is also possible to observe that this function in time turns out to be an opposite tendency which makes religion more capitalistic rather than sacralizing the worldly affairs. Although conditional to the investment, the ratification to interest is the typical example of this transformation.

As a matter of the fact, based on my findings I could summarize my statements on the sociological argument as follows. First of all religion plays a connective role as

³⁴⁰ Bayırbağ 2008, Özçetin 2011

³⁴¹ Kuran 2002, Bulut 1997

one of the main elements of organismic, solidaristic/competitive and conservative collective identity in Kayseri and Hacılar. Besides, it functions as the articulating principle (Laclau) of conservative identity with neo liberal economy. As noted by Tuğal³⁴² Islam is legitimizing capitalism, indeed neo-liberalism and makes it hegemonic in the eyes of the masses. So, it serves for the deepening of the capitalistic relations and seems to continue to do this for a while.

Actually, as underlined by Eliaçık³⁴³ Kayseri has been a city which adored money rather than the God throughout the history. In close relations with the city since 1930s Hacılar also received its share from this structure. When I was a child we were playing in the garden of a mosque which was constituted by a philanthropist. When I was making interviews I learned that this man was a very famous usurer. I think building mosque with the money stemmed from usury should not be a proper attitude regarding the Islamic principles. However, this extra ordinary example could be considered as the summary of Kayseri's relation with the religion without making any other sentences.

The basic aim of our large research "Social Structure and Religion in Turkey³⁴⁴" conducted between the years 2008 and 2011 was to analyze this tense but inevitable coexistence of sacred and profane. As being a small part of this research, I hope my study could elucidate this situation throughout the whole thesis in the case of Hacılar.

In a nutshell, religion did not cause to industrialization and development in Hacılar. It had almost no role in the development dynamics. However, in parallel to the conjectural developments in the world and Turkey, the religiosity has been increased with 1980s and this found its reflection as the growing conservatism in some of the Turkish cities including Kayseri. The religious orders which already had the support of the state in behind got into the contact with the traders,

³⁴² Tuğal 2010

³⁴³ See 17 June 2012 demokrathaber.net : <http://www.demokrathaber.net/roportajlar/ihsan-eliacik-patron-iscilerin-degil-isciler-patronun-rizkini-verir-h9475.html> Acces 30 August 2012

³⁴⁴ See Akşit et. all 2012

industrialists and businessmen and increased their influence during this period. In time, these religious networks intertwined with commercial and political ties and made some positive contributions on the industrialists. So, though limited it is not reasonable to deny these kinds of contributions. However, the people live according to their material interests in their daily lives and economic relations as usual. With the increasing wealth and money, religion likens capitalism rather than vice versa.

Finally, I want to end up with some predictions and foresights regarding the future of Hacilar and its industry. First of all I could say that this industrial experience gained since 1930s is to be continued in the future. Since, there has been a serious experience of production, marketing, export and management and this experience is being supported by the trained professionals of second generation. Regarding the rapid growth rates of leader firms' turnovers it is possible to expect the perpetuation of the industrial development in the future. Foreign investments started with Ukraine are giving the signal that the new investment strategies will be organized in line with the global division of labor in the industry particularly by the bigger firms. In addition, it is also possible to predict that these big firms will be shifted to more technological sectors and other sectors having higher profit rates like energy, construction and chemistry in the following years.

On the other hand, the small and some medium sized firms specialized in furniture industry, having lower level of technological capacity, producing cheaper goods and survive with little profit rates will be probably abolished in the future if they would not come together and turn out to be bigger firms. However, there was no such kind of a tendency in the time period of my research.

As I noted above the firms in Hacilar expanded mostly in the domestic market; however they also had serious experience in export after 2000s. I think the rates of imports will be increased in the future and industrialists would go on to defend the pro EU perspective within their global vision of trade and industry. Indeed, it could also be expected that the industrialists would make political pressure on the government to change its dangerous orientations in the recent foreign policies of Middle East. Since both Syria, Israel and Iraq are very critical markets for the

industrialist of Hacılar and they are also the gate ways to African markets too. For this reason, President Gül's speech³⁴⁵ in the opening ceremony of the parliament could be read in this context as a warning which reflects the anxieties of the Anatolian industrialists and tradesmen to the government. When to remember the Kayseri identity of Gül, his close relations with local traders and industrialists and mass support given to him in the city; it is also possible to regard these kinds of differences as the informers of the probable breaks in the Turkish politics in the near future within the spectrum of right.

As a structural deficiency, I emphasized the weakness of Kayseri industry in R&D and the closed and conservative social life style of Kayseri. However, there are also some serious signals in the city to overcome these problems. The newly established state and private universities whose instruction language is English could be considered as the critical indicator of this tendency besides the increasing rates of investments allocated by the leader industrial firms of the city. It seems that the city is in the way to create its own qualified labor and professionals; since it could not attract them into. I think these efforts will result in positive consequences in a very near future and the life style problems, though not completely, will be partially solved by the own dynamics of the city.

Patriarchal management relations which I noticed about their critical roles in the incipient stages of industrialization could be regarded as obstacles particularly for the small and medium sized firms in the way to professionalization and institutionalization. These kinds of firms will be abolished in the long run if they do not change this patriarchal structure and adapt to the changing conditions.

It is also obvious that the families of the industrialists have been increasingly secularized with the rising wealth, production capacity and intensified international relations of Hacılar. For this reason, this secularization will be deepened in the future. The education, vocation, life style, marriage, consumption and leisure patterns of the next generations will be more secularized than the second

³⁴⁵ See Hürriyet, Habertürk, Cumhuriyet, Zaman 2 October 2012

generations. However, the changes in the religious and mostly social/family life will be slower than the changes in other aspects of life. The religious practices, meetings habits and customs and familial relations will maintain their traditional form and character for a long time. On the other hand, the second and particularly the third generations who have been trained in private schools controlled by the religious orders are growing in a much homogenous social atmosphere in compared to their fathers and grandfathers who grew up in a much colorful and rich social environment. Therefore, this could cause some pacifying effects on the third generations regarding with the entrepreneurship characteristics which require some qualities like arrogance, rowdiness and hyperactivity. In the long run, this could rasp the entrepreneurial abilities and qualities of the children.

The limited solidarity in the business relations will be to a great extend reduced with the abolishment of the small firms; however, the strong and rooted social solidarity patterns will survive in the future. Hacılar Solidarity Association will continue to be the major agent of this solidarity. The tension between the village and the city will be lessened in a near future; the third generations of industrialist will take their piece of cake from the local politics and the integration process with the city will be deepened and completed.

Since the beginning of the multi-party period Hacılar has been voted for the parties which they thought to provide material interest for themselves. Therefore, they supported the right wing parties not because of their religious qualities; but their promises to enlarge the scope of the market, trade and industry. It is the same for the AKP period. Their support will be lasted until they think that AKP will not be succesfull in the management of the Turkish economy. However, the probable change will most probably be in the direction of the right again.

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APPENDIX A

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

| Degree | Institution | Year of Graduation |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| MS | METU Sociology | 2005 |
| BS | METU Pol. Sc. and Public Adm. | 2001 |
| High School | Karşıyaka Gazi High School, İzmir | 1995 |

WORK EXPERIENCE

| Year | Place | Enrollment |
|---------------|------------------------------|---------------------|
| 2007- Present | AİBÜ Department of Sociology | Teaching Instructor |
| 2007 | METU Department of Sociology | Research Assistant |

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Fluent German, Beginner French

PUBLICATIONS

1. Akşit B., Şentürk R., Küçükural U., Cengiz K. (2012). *Türkiye'de Dindarlık: Sosyal Gerilimler Ekseninde İnanç ve Yaşam Biçimleri*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
2. Küçükural Ö, Cengiz K (2011) Müslime zwischen Liberalismus und Konservatismus. Wandel der gesellschaftlichen Geschlechterrollen in der Türkei und sich andernde Auslegungen des Islams. In: *Islam und Europa Als Thema der Deutsch- Türkischen Zusammenarbeit IX*, Ankara: Deutsche Botschaft Ankara, 107-128.

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8. Kalaycıoğlu S, Tol UU, Küçükural Ö, Cengiz K (2004). *Yaşlılar ve Yaşlı Yakınları Açısından Yaşam Biçimi Tercihleri*. Ankara: Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi Yayınları.
9. Cengiz, K., Tol, U. U., Küçükural Ö. (2003) "Yaşlılık Söylemi ve Yaş Ayrımcılığı" 2. *Ulusal Yaşlılık Kongresi-Kongre Kitabı* içinde, Yaşlı Sorunları Araştırma Derneği Yayınları, Denizli.
10. Akşit, B., Cengiz, K., Tol, U. U., Küçükural Ö. (2003) Türkiye ve Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum Tartışmaları: Sivil, 'Mivil' ya da 'Tivil' Toplum. *Sivil Toplum* (3): 33-59

HOBBIES

Mountainering, Swimming, Classical Guitar, Music and Literature

APPENDIX B

TURKISH SUMMARY

Çalışmaya başlarken, meseleyi Anadolu Kaplanları ya da İslami Sermaye literatürü çerçevesinde ele aldım. Bu kapsamda Anadolu'da sanayi üretimi yoluyla öne çıkan bazı şehirlere ilişkin yapılan çalışmaların üzerinde durduğu bazı ortak noktaları özetledim ve Hacılar'ı da bu çerçeve içine yerleştirerek eleştirel bir biçimde tartıştım. Bu tartışmada ana argümanım ESI tarafından yapılan analizin, yani "İslami Kalvenizm" yaklaşımının Kayseri Hacılar örneğinde gerçeği tam olarak yansıtmadığı idi. Bu anlamda gerek Kayseri'de gerekse Hacılar'da ortaya çıkan sanayi gelişmenin dinle doğrudan bir alakası olmadığını, bunun Türkiye'nin genel gelişme süreci bağlamında Kayseri şehrinin tarihsel, coğrafi, kültürel ve ekonomik özelliklerinin bir sonucu olduğunu; hatta Türkiye'nin geleneksel sanayi bölgelerinden biri olan Kayseri'yi bu anlamda sonradan ortaya çıkan bir Anadolu Kaplanı olarak ele almanın dahi doğru olmadığını ve şehrin ve şimdiki gelişmesinin de bu özelliklerinin bir sonucu olduğunu iddia ettim ve bu iddialarımı Hacılar özelinde ve tarihsel ve materyalist bir çerçevede analiz etmeye çalıştım. Giriş bölümünde ortaya koyduğum ve çalışma boyunca tartıştığım iddialarımı bulgularım ışığında şu şekilde özetleyebilirim.

Öncelikle bu sıra dışı gelişmenin neden başka bir yerde değil de Hacılar'da gerçekleştiği ile başlayayım. Hacılar, toprakları verimsiz, arazisi kıt, susuz, kalabalık ve çok yoksul bir köy olmakla birlikte Anadolu'daki benzer yerleşimlerden farklı bazı özelliklere sahipti. Bunun en başında da binlerce yıllık bir ticaret merkezinin ve Cumhuriyet'in en önemli sanayi yatırımlarının bulunduğu bir kentin kıyısında yer alması geliyordu. Yani Hacılar'ı bir sanayi kasabası haline getiren şey başta Kayseri'ye yakın (14 kilometre) mesafede oluşuydu. Buna ek olarak Hacılar son 20 yıla kadar Kayseri'den başka bir yere çıkışı olmayan, Erciyes'in yamacında bir kör noktada nerdeyse 500 yıldır yerleşmiş; bu yüzden

nüfusu, geçim kaynakları, etnik, dini ve kültürel yapısıyla homojen kalmış, kendine has nitelikleri olan bir Türkmen köyü idi. Bu yüzden de, 20 yüzyılın başından itibaren gerek Kayseri ile ilişkilerinin, gerekse Cumhuriyet'in sanayileşmeye dönük yatırımlarının artmasıyla birlikte de bu sürecin dışsallığından ilk yararlanan yerleşimlerden biri olmuştu. Zira, bu coğrafi yakınlık Hacıların kendi otantik yaşam alanından kopmadan kentin çeşitli olanaklarından yararlanmasına yol açtı. Kayseri'deki gelişme süreci başlayıp da emek ihtiyacı ortaya çıkınca; bu ihtiyacın karşılandığı ilk yerlerden biri Hacılar oldu. Çünkü, Kayseri kent merkezine yakın ilçeler arasında, en yoksul, en kalabalık ve ek gelire en çok ihtiyacı olan bölgeydi.

Bu çerçevede, Hacıların coğrafi konumlarının avantajını kullanarak Cumhuriyet öncesinden başlamak üzere gerek ticari, gerek sanayi, gerekse hizmet sektörünün çeşitli aşamalarında çalışmaya başladılar. Bu sektörlerdeki faaliyetler farklı yollar izledi. Örneğin, tütün kaçakçılığı ile başlayan gayri resmi ticari ilişkiler; çerçilik, pazarcılık faaliyetlerinden geçerek onları önce seyyar sonra yerleşik manifaturacılar olmaya yönlendirdi.

Sanayiye dönük faaliyetlerinin esasını ise tüm dünyada olduğu gibi tekstil üretimi tetikledi. 1930'lu yıllarda Kayseri'ye devlet tarafından yapılan tekstil yatırımları bu alandaki gelişmenin altyapısını hazırladı. O dönemde diğer fabrikaların yanı sıra Sümerbank Bünyan Halı İpliği Fabrikası (1926) ve Sümerbank Kayseri Bez Fabrikası (1935) şehirde tekstil sektörünün lokomotifleri olurken, şehir ekonomisine yaptıkları çarpan etkiler Hacıların doğrudan etkiledi. Bunu en basitinden Sümerbank'tan bez parçaları alıp civardaki köylerde ve etraftaki şehirlerin pazarlarında yamalık kumaş olarak satan Hacıların çerçilerden anlamak mümkün. Devlet öncülüğünde imalat sanayide gerçekleştirilen bu gelişme daha sonraki yıllarda özel sektördeki sanayileşmenin de altyapısını oluşturdu ve bu sektöre motivasyon ve büyük katkılar sağladı.

Bu genel çerçeve içinde 1930'lu yıllarda başlayan ve 1950'lere kadar devam eden dokumacılık faaliyeti Hacıların'daki sanayileşmenin esas dinamosunu oluşturdu. Dokumacılık tecrübesi hem köye o dönemin koşulları itibarı ile inanılmaz bir

sermaye kazandırdı, hem dokumacılık konusunda köydeki emeğin niteliğini arttırdı hem de köyden ilk aracı (ip ve kumaş) tüccarlarının ve ustaların çıkmasına yol açtı. Hacılar'da tekstil alanında edinilen bu tecrübe, bir sonraki aşama olan halıcılığa geçişi de kolaylaştırdı ve onun altyapısını hazırladı.

Dolayısıyla da Hacıların sanayileşmesinde bir sonraki aşama halıcılık aşaması oldu. 1950'li yıllardan neredeyse 1990'lara kadar süren bu dönemde halıcılık Hacılar'a nakit para sağlayan en önemli geçim kaynaklarından biri oldu. Benim babam dahil olmak üzere o dönemde okuyabilen bir avuç öğrencinin eğitimi dahi Hacıların kadınların dokuduğu halılar sayesinde mümkün oldu. Bunun ötesinde bazı Hacıların kısa zaman içerisinde halıcılıkta ilerlediler ve 1970'lere gelindiğinde Kayseri'deki halı ticaretine büyük orada egemen oldular. Böylece manifaturacılarla birlikte Hacılar'dan ilk sermaye sahipleri çıkmaya başladı. Nitekim bunlar arasından çıkan bir öncü girişimci, 1967 yılında başka ortaklarla birlikte ilk halı (ATLAS) fabrikasını kurdu ve bunu sonraki tekstil ve halı (SARAY) fabrikaları izledi. Böylece Hacıların girişimciler ilk kez fabrika üretimi ile tanışmış oldular.

Hacıların sanayileşme sürecinde üzerinde durulmayan ama bir diğer önemli dönem ise 1960 ile 1980 yılları arasındaki Ankara tecrübesidir. Bu yıllarda, Ankara'ya, işçilik yapmak, otel işletmek, dolmuşçuluk yapmak, pazarlamacılık ve manifaturacılık yapmak gibi çeşitli amaçlarla giden girişimciler, Ankara'da bilgi, görgü, vizyon ve know-how edindiler. Bu çerçevede kendisi dolmuşçuluk yaparken kardeşini getirip Siteler'de mobilyacılık öğrenmesine ön ayak olan ya da bir dampercinin yanında kendini gizleyerek çırak olarak işe girip damper yapımını öğrenen girişimcilerin hikayesi çok açıklayıcıdır.

Önceki bölümlerde aktardığım üzere, toprak kıtlığı ve ek gelir ihtiyacı yüzünden Erciyes'ten kar getirip satarak, at üstünde dantel oya satarak, şehirlilerin bağında amele olarak çalışarak, kuyu temizleyerek, DDY inşaatlarında geçici işçilik yaparak, Hacılar bezini ülkenin dört bir yanına pazarlayarak, şehirde dükkan, tezgah açarak ya da halı dokuyup satarak Hacılar halkı, daima şehir ekonomisinin hatta ülke ekonomisinin bir parçası olmaya çabalamıştı. 1950'lerden 1960'lara doğru

gelindiğinde ise hem yukarıda saydığım faaliyetlerin verdiği tecrübelerin bileşkesi olarak, hem de Türkiye ve Kayseri sanayisinin gelişmesine paralel olarak Hacırlıların ilgisi de sanayiye kaymaya başladı. 1950’lerde başlayan süreç 1970’lerde çok hızlandı. Bu koşullar çerçevesinde Hacırlı aileler, kısa yoldan meslek sahibi olacakları bir “sanat” öğrenmeleri amacıyla çocuklarını 1950’li yıllardan itibaren çok ağır şartlarda da olsa kente çalışmaya göndermeye başladılar. Bu çocuk işçi akışı zamanla çok hızlandı, yaygınlaştı ve “normalleşti”. Bir zaman sonra okumayan çocukların yegâne istikameti sanayi oldu. Bu dönemde çocuklar genelde ilkokulu bitirdikten sonra, sanayiye gönderilmekteydi; ancak, ilkokulu bitirmeden ya da ortaokulu terk edip gidenler de vardı. Kayseri’deki küçük sanayiye, atölyelere çırak olarak gönderilen bu çocuklar 3-5 sene içinde kalfalığa, askere gitmeden önce de ustalığa terfi ettiler ve askerden dönüşte de biriktirdikleri küçük sermaye ile kendi dükkânları açtılar. 1950 ile 1974 arasında yoğunlaşan bu süreçte şimdi hepsi birer sanayici (30 kişi/aile) olan çırakların çalıştıkları işkolları arasında döşemecilik, 7 kişiyle bu yönelimdeki en belirgin motifi oluşturuyordu. Döşemecilik ile aynı ağırlığa sahip bir diğer sektör ise demir/çelik ve metal eşya sektörü idi. Burada 3. soğuk demirci, 1 kaportacı/çelik eşyacı, 3 de damperci (karoserci) bulunuyordu. Bir diğer zanaat öbeği ise 3 kişiyle ahşap işçiliği idi. Bu öbeğin içerisinde 1 marangoz, bir oymacı, bir de sandıkçı bulunuyordu. Bunlar dışındaki dağılım ise şöyle idi: manufakturacılık yapan 4, mühendislik yapan 3, halıcılık yapan 2, tezgâhtarlık yapan 1, avukatlık yapan 1 kişi, sunta kereste ticareti yapan 1 kişi, kamyoncu yapan 1 kişi.

Sanayiye yönelim bu şekilde devam ederken ODTÜ mezunu genç bir elektrik mühendisi, Hacırlı’da biriken bu enerjiyi, teknik bilgi ve dönemin (tabandaki küçük sermayeleri birleştirmeye dönük hem sağda hem de soldaki eğilimleri) siyasi ve ekonomik konjonktürü çerçevesinde birleştirerek 1974 yılında 832 Hacırlının ortaklığıyla Hacırlı’da bir kablo fabrikası kurulmasına önyak oldu. Neredeyse köyün ortasında kurulan ve Hacırlı Elektrik Sanayi (HES) adını alan bu girişimle birlikte Hacırlı’nın sanayileşmesi ileri bir evreye girdi.

1970'li yılların sonunda zorluklar yaşansa da HES ayakta kalmayı başardı ve Özal'ın özellikle telekomünikasyon altyapısına dönük yatırımları ile birlikte hızla gelişti. Özal'ın doğrudan desteği ile alınan PTT ihalelerinin de bu gelişmede özel bir rolü oldu. Sonraki aşamada iletişim teknolojisindeki yeniliklere paralel olarak fiber optik kablo üretimine geçen HES Bu şartlar altında inanılmaz bir ivmeyle gelişerek 1999 yılında iki bin beş yüz çalışanı olan bir holding haline geldi. Tabi bu süre içerisinde HES kendi içinden yeni fabrikalar doğururken ortakların sayısı da azalarak önce 8'e sonra da ikiye düştü. Zaten bir süredir HES'e paralel olarak başka sektörlerde de üretim tesisleri açmış bulunan HES Kablo'nun kurucu ortakları, HES'ten ayrılarak kendi yollarına gitmeye karar verdiler. Hem kendi fabrikalarını devam ettirerek hem de HES bünyesinde kurulmuş olan fabrikaları hisseleri oranında paylaşarak (Has Çelik, HES FİBEL, HES Kimya, HES Makine) bugünkü Hacılar sanayisinin bel kemiğini oluşturdular. HES Kablo bu süreçte Hacırlı sanayiciler için bir akademi işlevi gördü. Hacırlılar, üretimi, ithalatı, ihracatı, dış ticareti ve pazarlamayı yani özetle, buna entrikaları da dahil olmaz üzere sanayiciliği bu okulda öğrendiler. Dolayısıyla, Hacırlar'ın sanayileşmesinin asıl dinamiğini HES tecrübesi sağladı.

Bütün bu süre içerisinde yukarıda dağılımın verdiğim sektörlerde çalışmaya gönderilen işçilerden de çeşitli avantajları kullananlar 1970'lerin başından itibaren eski sanayi bölgesinde kurdukları atölyeleri yavaş yavaş büyütürken Kayseri Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'ne taşındılar ve birer fabrikaya dönüştürdüler. Böylece, 2000'li yıllara gelindiğinde sanayileşme sürecine geçişteki ana güzergahlar ve ortaya çıkan sanayici tiplerini/modellerini şu şekilde oluşturdu.

1. Döşemecilik, marangozluk, oymacılık gibi ahşap işleri çıraklığıyla başlayıp, mobilya atölyesine oradan da mobilya fabrikasına evrilenler (11 aile).
2. Demircilik, kaportacılık, dampercilik, çelik eşyacılık sektöründe çırak olarak başlayıp damper (karoser), çelik kapı, ofis mobilyası ve raf üretimine kayanlar (6 aile).
3. Parayı asıl ticaretten ve manufakturacıktan kazanıp biriktirdikleri ile ATLAS Halı ve HES'e ortak olmak suretiyle sanayici olanlar (4 aile)

4. Profesyonel mühendis olarak ATLAS Halı'da ve HES'in kuruluşunda hisseyle çalışan, zamanla hisselerini arttırarak sanayici olanlar (3 aile)
5. Üretim dışındaki işlerden (hafriyat, oto yedek parça, sunta kereste ticareti manufakturacılık vb.) kazandıklarını ortaklı ya da ortaksız olarak 1990'lardan sonra tekstil üretimine (dokuma, iplik, keçe, havlu, kanep kumaşı, çorap fabrikaları) yatıranlar (4 aile)
6. Halıcılıktan edindikleri sermayeyi 1990'ların sonunda ve 2000'lerin başında sanayi üretimine (seramik fabrikası, beton üretim tesisi) dönüştürenler (2 aile)
7. HES Grubu'nun 1999'da dağılmasının ardından iştikakın içinden kendi hesabına düşen fabrikaları paylaşp üretime (HES Kablo, HES kimya, HES makine ve HAS çelik (çelik halat ve yay) devam eden aileler (5 aile).

Bu gelişmeler neticesinde 2009 yılına gelindiğinde, Hacılar sanayisi 1.198.000 metrekaresi açık 852.500 metrekaresi kapalı alanda olmak üzere 18765 kişi istihdam eden bir sanayi haline geldi³⁴⁶. Benim araştırma için Kayseri'de bulunduğum 2009 yılının sonu itibarı ile Hacırlı sanayicilerin cirolarının toplamı, lider firmanın 3,8 milyarlık (TL) cirosu³⁴⁷ da dahil 5,4 milyar TL (yaklaşık 3 milyar dolar) civarındaydı. Aynı yıl için Hacırlı tüm firmaların ihracat toplamı lider firmanın 251 milyon dolarlık ihracatı da dahil 607,7 milyon dolara yaklaşmış; ihracat yapılan ülkelerin sayısı da 110'u geçmişti. Kayseri'nin 2010 yılı itibarı ile 5 milyar doların biraz üzerinde üretim, yaklaşık 200 bin istihdam ve 1,3 milyar dolarlık dış ticaret hacmi bulunan bir kent olduğunu düşünürsek; yukarıdaki rakamlar, yaklaşık olarak Hacılar sanayisinin Kayseri'deki toplam üretim hacminin 3/5'ini, istihdamın 1/10'unu, ihracatın da yaklaşık yarısını oluşturduğunu göstermektedir.

³⁴⁶ Buna lider firmanın 1 milyon metrekarelik ve bir maden firmasının 1.840.000 metrekarelik toplam alanlarını da eklememiz gerekiyor.

³⁴⁷ 2010 yılında bu firmanın cirosu 4,1 milyar TL'ye ulaşmış, 2012'de ise 5 milyar dolara yaklaşmıştır.

2009 yılı itibarı ile Kayseri sanayisinde imalatın ilk 3 sırasında şu sektörler yer almaktaydı. % 27,15 ile metalden mamul eşya, 17,61 ile mobilya ve orman ürünleri ve % 12,3 ile tekstil. Bu yapının bir parçası olan Hacılar imalat sanayi de geneli itibarı ile teknoloji yoğun, katma değeri yüksek ürünler üreten bir sanayi değil büyük oranda emek yoğun bir sanayi örgütlenmesine sahip durumdaydı. Bunun yanı sıra Hacılar'daki sanayi örgütlenmesi yatay bir örgütlenme olmayıp üretim kapasiteleri ve cirolar açısından hem lider firmayla diğerleri arasında hem de önde gelen firmalarla diğerleri arasında muazzam farklar vardı. Örneğin lider firmanın cirosu (3800 milyon) diğer tüm firmaların cirolarının toplamının (1639 milyon TL) iki katından daha fazlaydı. İlk 5 firmanın cirolarının toplamı ise Hacılar sanayisinin toplam rakamı olan 5439 milyon TL'lik cironun 5016'lık kısmını oluşturuyordu ve aynı şey ihracat rakamları için de geçerli idi. Dolayısıyla, Hacılar sanayisi temelde lider bir firma ve onun altındaki 5, 6 büyük firma ve onların da altında üretim yapan onlarca küçük firma şeklinde örgütlenmiş durumdaydı. Diğer firmalar ise daha ziyade bu çekirdeğe bağlı hatta bağımlı olarak üretim yapmaktaydılar.

Dolayısıyla, Hacılar sanayi, her ne kadar mobilya ve metal eşya alanlarında uzmanlaşmış olsa da halihazırda, literatürde tartışılan (İtalya örneğinde olduğu gibi) birbirlerine yakın ölçeklerde küçük ve orta ölçekli birimlerinin üretim ilişkilerine egemen olduğu bir yer değildi. Zaten, burada yine literatürde çokça tartışılan dünya pazarından gelen taleplere hızla yanıt verecek becerikli ve vasıflı işçilere sahip iyi tasarımlara ve gelişmiş bir ürün portföyüne sahip küçük firmaların baskın olduğu bir doku da hiç olmadı. 1990'lara kadar üretim neredeyse tamamen iç pazara dönüktü ve ürün kalitesi de çok düşüktü. Bu yüzden bu sanayi yurtdışı bir yana Türkiye'nin doğusuna düşük kaliteli mal satarak büyüdü. 1990'larla birlikte ulusal pazara özellikle de Türkiye'nin batısına mal satmaya ve ürünlerinin kalitesini yükseltmeye başladılar. Önceki bölümlerde gösterdiğim gibi önde gelen bir iki firma hariç, Hacılırlı küçük firmaların ihracata başlaması neredeyse 2000'li yılları buldu. Üstelik bu firmaların ürettikleri ürünler hala tasarım ve kalite açısından çok gelişmiş ürünler değil ve daha çok ucuz fiyat avantajıyla pazarda bir yer edinmeye çalışıyorlar. Dolayısıyla, Hacılırlı firmalarla ilgili yukarıda verdiğim bilgiler, üretim, ihracat ve ciro miktarları açısından aradaki büyük farkları ve OSB içindeki hiyerarşik yapıyı açıkça gösteriyor.

Sanayideki bu dikey örgütlenmenin önemli faktörlerinden biri de fason üretimdir. Örneğin şu anda Kayseri'deki mobilya sektöründe (diğer firmaları da dahil olmak üzere) 12.000 çalışanıyla bütün sanayiye yön veren lider ana firma, onun altında sırayla 1300, 800, 550, 200 gibi çalışan sayılarıyla 3, 4 büyük firma ve onlarında altında da daha az çalışan sayılarıyla yüzlerce küçük firma var. Bu küçük firmaların birçoğu kendinden büyük firmalar için çok düşük bir kar marjıyla fason üretim yapıyorlar. Yani burada fason ilişkiler, “hiyerarşik bir zincir biçiminde ve en tepedeki firmadan başlayarak aşağı doğru incek biçimde” (Ayata, 1991: 168) organize olmuş durumda. Zira buradaki üretimde söz konusu olan İtalya ile ya da diğer sanayi odaklarıyla ilgili olarak söylenen gevşek bağlantılı bir ürün dizisinde uzmanlaşıp dayanışarak; yani maliyetleri paylaşarak ve fiyat değil de kalite üzerinden rekabet ederek dünya pazarlarında yeni nişler elde etmek değil. Tam aksine lider firmalar başta olmak üzere tüm üreticiler kapasiteleri ölçüsünde benzer ürünleri üretiyorlar. Birbirlerinin müşterilerini ve pazarlarını hedefliyorlar ve birbirleriyle ölümüne rekabet ediyorlar. Üstelik bu rekabeti de fiyat üzerinden yapıyorlar. Dolayısıyla aşırı rekabetçi ve talebe bağımlı bir ekonomide fason, ek yatırıma gitmeden ve gereksiz harcamalardan tasarruf ederek üretim artışı sağlıyor; fabrikanın düşük kapasite ile çalışmasını önüyor; firmanın karlılığını arttırmada ve birikim sürecini hızlandırmada doğrudan rol oynuyor ve emek maliyetini sıkı biçimde kontrol etme imkanı sağlıyor (Ayata, 1991: 151-152). Bu yüzden de uydu firmalar ana firma tarafından çok sıkı bir biçimde denetleniyor, çok az kar marjlarıyla yaşamalarına izin veriliyor. Ancak en büyükler hariç bu durum, bütün sektörde kar marjlarının çok ciddi bir biçimde düşmesine yol açıyor. Düşen kar marjları ise, zaten bir çoğu küçük firmalarda sendikasız, sigortasız ve sosyal güvencesiz çalışan işçilerin mevcut yaşam koşullarının daha da bozulmasıyla, üretim kalitesinin düşmesiyle ve nihayetinde bazı firmaların tasfiye olmasıyla sonuçlanıyor.

Teknoloji ve ARGE açısından bakacak olursak gerek Kayseri imalat sanayinin gerekse Hacırlı sanayicilerin fabrikalarında katma değeri ve teknolojik düzeyi yüksek ürünler değil Fordist kalıplara daha uygun malların üretiliyor. OSB'deki

fabrikalar gezildiğinde hem mobilya, hem çelik ve metal eşya hem de tekstil sektöründe geniş ölçeklerde, kalabalık bir işçi nüfusla, emek yoğun bir üretim yapıldığına şahit olmak mümkün. Dolayısıyla teknolojiden çok emek ön planda yer alıyor. Önde gelen birkaç istisna firma dışında Kayseri'deki sanayinin teknolojiyi üreten değil daha ziyade satın alıp kullanarak üretim yapan bir sanayi konumunda olduğunu söyleyebilirim.

Bununla birlikte, teknoloji konusuyla ilgili esas problemin ARGE noktasında ortaya çıkmaktadır. Zira, firmalara bu açıdan bakacak olursak kurumsallaşmış büyük firmalar³⁴⁸ hariç, görüştüğüm firmalar içinde ARGE bilinci ve çalışmaları yok denecek kadar azdı diyebilirim. Örneğin görüşme yaptığım firmalar arasında sözgelimi mobilya sektöründe önde gelen 3,4 firma dışında ARGE biriminde mühendis çalıştıran firma yoktu. Yani Kayseri sanayisi fason üretimin yaygın, ARGE kapasitesinin zayıf olduğu emek yoğun sektörlere dayanmakta ve rekabet gücü büyük oranda ucuz işçilikten kaynaklanmaktadır. Öte yandan Hacılar sanayisini de aşan bir biçimde Kayseri'nin, teknolojik gelişmenin en önemli bileşeni olan ARGE, tasarım ve buluşçuluk gibi konularda yeterince gelişmemiş olmasının çok önemli bir toplumsal ve kültürel bir boyutu daha vardır. Bu da, Richard Florida'nın "yaratıcı sınıf"³⁴⁹ olarak kavramsallaştırdığı yüksek nitelikli toplum kesimlerinin şehirde olmaması ya da şehrin bu açılardan çok zayıf bir durumda bulunmasıdır. Florida'ya göre bu sınıflar açık, dinamik, bir kentsel ortam yaratmak suretiyle hem diğer yaratıcı/becerikli kişilerin hem de işadamlarını ve sermayenin uzun vadede bu kentlere toplanmasını sağlıyorlar. Yani sanatın gelişme imkanı bulduğu ve kültürel iklimin farklılıklara açık olduğu şehirler aynı zamanda yüksek düzeyli yenilikleri ve ekonomik kazançları da beraberinde taşıyor³⁵⁰. Oysa bu ileri tartışmayı³⁵¹ bir yana bırakıp Kayseri'ye döndüğümüzde ise çok daha vahim bir manzarayla karşılaşılıyor. Kısacası, yaratıcı sınıflar da bir yana, muhafazakâr olmayan sıradan insanların dahi Kayseri'de özgürce ve rahat bir biçimde yaşayabilecekleri sosyal bir ortam yok. İnsanlar içki ve eğlence gibi ihtiyaçları için

³⁴⁸ Örneğin sektörün lider firması, 2007 yılında ARGE'ye yatırdığı 15 milyon TL'yi 2011 yılında 30 milyon dolara çıkarmıştır. Bkz. 11.10.2011 Radikal.

³⁴⁹ Richard Florida 2002

³⁵⁰ Richard Florida 2004

³⁵¹ Florida 2004

bile 1 saat uzaklıktaki Ürgüp ve Göreme gibi turistik merkezlere gitmek durumundalar. Bu durum, yani şehrin başka yaşam tarzlarına kapalı olması ya da şehrin ekonomik büyüme ve teknolojik gelişmenin ötesinde, yaratıcılık ve inovasyon ile birlikte tolerans temelinde birlikte yaşama imkânları açısından gelişmemiş olması³⁵², Kayseri'yi, yalnızca sosyal ve kültürel açıdan değil endüstriyel gelişme açısından da dezavantajlı bir konuma sokuyor. Şahsi fikrim, fazla uzun olmayan bir süre içinde bu tür sorunların şehrin kendi dinamikleri içerisinde tamamıyla olmasa da kısmen çözüleceği yönünde olmakla birlikte bunu zaman gösterecek.

Sanayileşmede dayanışma ilişkilerinin oynadığı rol, hem din sosyolojisi literatürünün hem de endüstriyel sosyoloji literatürünün kesişme noktası olduğu için üzerinde en çok durduğum konulardan bir oldu. Bu konuda Hacılardaki sanayileşme süreciyle ilgili olarak çalışmaya ilk başladığımda görüştüğüm herkes tarafından biraz da gururla söylenen bu hemşeri dayanışmasının aslında tam olarak söylendiği gibi olmadığını fark etmem biraz zaman aldı. Görüşmelerimin sonunda dışarıya dönük beyanlarda sıklıkla vurgulanan bu dayanışmanın arzu edilen, dışarıya pozitif biçimde yansıtılan ama aslında üretim sürecinde pek de gerçekleşmeyen bir ilişki olduğunu çok net bir biçimde anladım. Geleneksel, yerel kültürel ilişkilerin belki en homojen kaldığı ve yoğun yaşandığı 500 yıllık bir yerleşimde bile yeni sanayi odakları literatüründe vurgulanan dayanışma örüntüleri değil, aynı köyün, mahallenin çocukları arasındaki kıran kırana rekabet olduğunu görüyoruz. Genelde herkes, kendi hesabına çalışıyor, bilgiyi ve tecrübeyi kendine saklıyor. En başta kendi hemşerisiyle rekabet edip yeri geldiğinde onun, ustasını, müşterisini ya da modelini çalabiliyor. Modeli çalınan, çalanı mahkemeye veriyor ve bütün herkesin yararına olacak geniş ufuklu organizasyonlara da pek kimse yanaşmıyor. Öte yandan, bazı sanayicilerin ifade ettiği gibi sıkışık zamanlarda nakit desteği sağlanması, borç ertelenmesi yapılması, iş ismarlanması, fason iş verilmesi gibi bazı durumlar oluyor. Ancak bu desteklerin; kişisel ilişkilerin, ideolojik tutumların ve cemaat ilişkilerinin de rol oynadığı yapısal olmayan çok kısmi ve istisnai durumlar olduğunu rahatlıkla söyleyebilirim

³⁵² Florida 2008,

Hacılar sanayisini ithalat ihracat ve yurtdışı yönelimler açısından değerlendirdiğimizde ise şöyle bir manzarayla karşılaşırız. Birincisi Türkiye'nin yaşadığı kentleşme, orta sınıflaşma ve piyasa toplumuna geçiş sürecine uygun bir üretim (kablo, mobilya, çelik kapı vb.) sürecine giren Hacılarlı sanayiciler, iç pazardaki genişlemeyi çok iyi ve hızlı bir biçimde değerlendirmişlerdir. Böylece 30 yıllık bir süre içerisinde İç Anadolu ve Doğu Anadolu merkezli ucuz ve kalitesiz mal üretimiyle başladıkları sanayicilikte hızla yükselmişler; başta İstanbul olmak üzere Türkiye'nin Batısına, oradan da dünyaya açılmışlardır. Ancak ihracat konusundaki bu devasa atılıma karşın Hacılarlı firmalar için en önemli faktör hala iç pazardaki koşullardır. Üretim miktarı ezici bir oranda iç talebe bağlıdır. Hacılarlı sanayiciler tarafından oluşturulan toplam 5,4 milyar TL'lik ciroda ihracatın payı yalnızca 607,7 milyon TL'dir. Bu oran toplam üretimde ihracatın oranının % 10-15'ler civarında kaldığını göstermektedir. Nitekim bu konuda yapılan ekonometrik bir analiz (Erdem vd, 2008: 357) çalışması da beklentilerin tersine ihracatın Hacılarlı firmaların büyümesi üzerindeki etkisinin diğer faktörlerden daha küçük olduklarını tespit etmiştir.

İkincisi, bu hızlı sanayileşme süreci, Hacılarlı sanayiciler arasında imalatın ve ihracatın büyük kısmını gerçekleştiren kurumsallaşmış büyük firmalarla diğerleri arasında bir ayrışmaya neden olmuştur. Büyükler hedeflerini, kalite, teknoloji ve tasarım açısından daha nitelikli bir ürün yelpazesıyla küresel pazarlara doğru genişletirken; daha küçükler iç pazar başta olmak üzere, Ortadoğu ve Afrika pazarlarına yönelik bir üretim sürecine girmiş durumdadırlar.

Üçüncüsü, ihracattaki bu umut verici gelişmelere rağmen Hacılarlı sanayiciler tarafından üretilen ürünler hala katma değeri ve teknolojik niteliği düşük ürünlerdir. Dolayısıyla da aslında ürün portföyü açısından genelde küresel piyasada genelde alım gücü düşük ülkelere ve onların da dar gelirli kesimlerine hitap ediyorlar. Ancak buna rağmen özellikle mobilya ve tekstilde AB içinde ciddi bir pazar yakalanmış durumda. Hatta tamamen AB'ye çalışan bazı firmalar da mevcut. Kablo (fiber optik kablo vb.) ve çelik (çelik halat, yay) gibi sektörlerde ise dünyanın birçok bölgesine mal satabilecek kaliteye ve teknolojik düzeye erişmiş durumdadır.

Dördüncüsü, yukarıdaki tabloda da görüldüğü gibi Hacırlı firmalar oldukça geniş ve birden çok coğrafyaya mal satıyorlar ve oldukça geniş bir pazarda at oynatıyorlar. Bu yüzden, küresel vizyonları itibarı ile bu pazarları sınırlandırmak ve hiçbirinden vazgeçmek istemiyorlar. Onların deyimiyle söylersek: “bir yerde değil her yerde olmak” istiyorlar. Bu yüzden de sanayicilerin birçoğunun genel yönelimi AB içinde olmakla birlikte; ortak görüşleri: “AB içinde olsa da olmasa da Türkiye’nin yalnızca bir coğrafyaya saplanıp kalmaması” yönündedir. Öte yandan, büyük çoğunluğunun AB hedefini desteklerken paylaştığı ortak görüş ise; AB ile iş yapmanın kalite, kontrol, standart, iş ve ticaret ahlakı gibi konularda kendilerini eğiten ve geliştiren güçlü bir etki yaratması. Görüştüğüm birçok firma sahibi Avrupalıların, iş yapma kültüründen (ne istediğini bilmek, malı zamanında teslim etmek, üzerinde anlaşılan kurallara harfiyen uymak, parayı zamanında ödemek vb.) kurumsal yaklaşımlarından çok ciddi etkilendiklerini ve kendilerini de bu yönde eğittiklerini ifade etiler. Genel anlamda da AB içinde olmanın Türk sanayicileri açısından onların kendi standartları da yükseltecek olumlu etkiler taşıdığına inanıyorlar.

Hacırlı firmaların yönetimine ilişkin genel durumu özetleyecek olursak ise şöyle bir manzarayla karşılaşılıyor. Şirketin kurucusu olan patriark fabrikanın başındadır. Hala işe gidip gelmektedir ancak fiilen işlerden çekilmiş ve işlerin yönetimini ikinci kuşaklara bırakmıştır. Şu anda fabrikanın dış dünyayla “diplomatik” ilişkilerini idare etmekte, sosyal ilişkileri canlı tutmakta, önemli konularda ikinci kuşaklara danışmanlık yapmakta ve ikinci kuşaklar arasındaki ilişkileri düzenlemektedir. Yaptığım görüşme ve gözlemler Hacırlı’da da ikinci kuşak sanayicilerin bir iki istisna hariç büyük çoğunluğunun aile şirketlerinde çalıştığını; ilk kuşaklara büyük saygı ve hayranlık duyduğunu; işlerini onlara büyük oranda onlara tabi olarak yürütmeye çalıştıklarını göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla genel anlamda birinci ve ikinci kuşakların uyum içinde çalıştığını söyleyebilirim. Öte yandan, bu ataerkil yönetim anlayışının doğal sonuçlarından biri de bazı istisnalar dışında şirketlerin kurumsallaşma konusundaki eksiklikleri ve profesyonel yönetici çalıştırma konusundaki isteksizlikleridir. Yetkilerin yetmişmiş çocuklara devrinde bile ciddi sorunlar yaşanırken, şirket yönetimlerinin profesyonellere bırakılması konusu çok

daha tali önemde kalıyor. Nitekim önde gelen birkaç firma hariç Hacılırlı firmaların birçoğu halen geleneksel yöntemlerle idare ediliyor; profesyonel yönetici çalıştırmıyor ve kurumsallaşma konusunda ciddi problemler yaşıyor.

Kısaca, Hacılırlı girişimcilerin sahip oldukları şirketlerin neredeyse tamamı aile şirketleridir. Şirketlerin yönetiminde ataerkil ilişkiler ve aile kültürü egemendir. Yönetim süreçleri henüz lider birkaç firma dışında profesyonelleşmemiştir. Birinci kuşaklarla ikinci kuşaklar arasında eğitim açısından radikal bir fark vardır. İkinci kuşakların büyük bir bölümü eğitilmiş, yabancı dil bilen nitelikli gençlerden oluşmaktadır. Bununla birlikte ikinci kuşakların büyük bölümü aile şirketlerinde birinci kuşaklarla birlikte ve uyumlu çalışmaktadırlar. Ancak, özellikle profesyonel bir yönetim anlayışına ve kurumsallaşmaya geçememiş olan görece küçük firmalarda kuşaklar arası bir çatışma yaşanmaya başlamış durumdadır. Hacılırlı bir çok orta ölçekli şirketin geleceği bu çatışmanın ne yönde çözüleceğine bağlıdır.

Emek süreçlerine ilişkin duruma baktığımızda ise gördüğümüz manzarayı şu şekilde tarif edebilirim. Hacılardaki sanayi, hem niceliksel hem de niteliksel açıdan tam anlamıyla bir kapitalist sanayi özelliği göstermektedir. Bu çerçevede, benim genel anlamda emek süreçleri olarak adlandırdığım işçi-işveren ilişkileri ya da çalışma ilişkileri de tam anlamıyla kapitalizmin evrensel dinamikleri tarafından belirlenmektedir. Bu çerçevede Hacılardaki emek süreçlerinin de bir kapitalist sanayileşme süreci olarak dünyadaki diğer örneklerden bir farkı yoktur. Sermaye birikimi, şimdi sanayici haline gelmiş olan işçilerin önce kendi emeklerinin sömürülmesinden başlayarak hâlihazırda da yine işçilerin ürettiği artı değere el koyma mekanizması üzerinden yapısal bir eşitsizlik sistemi ile sağlanmaktadır. İşçi ücretleri olabildiğince düşük tutulmakta, sigortalar asgariden yatırılmakta, bazen yatırılmadığı da olmakta, en büyüklerden ikisi dışında sendikal örgütlenmeye izin verilmemekte, iş kazalarında ödenen tazminatlar ve kıdem tazminatları bile göze batmaktadır. Dolayısıyla emek süreçleri üzerinde sıkı bir kontrol ve denetim uygulanmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, işçi işveren ilişkilerinin dinamiği burada elbette büyük metropollerdeki gibi olmayıp daha yakın ve daha enformeldir. İşçilerin tabiiyeti daha çok enformel toplumsallık bağlamında paternalistik ve patriarkal

ilişkiler üzerinden yürütülen kültürel hegemonya süreçleri üzerinden sağlanmaktadır. Bu elbette işçi işveren ilişkilerinin tarihsel olarak çatışmacı niteliğini ortadan kaldırmıyor ama bu öne çıkan bir durum değil. Enformel destek mekanizmaları, kritik zamanlarda yapılan kısmi yardımlar, hemşeri kollama, aynı sosyal, kültürel ve dinsel ortamlarda bulunmak gibi unsurlara dayanan bu enformel toplumsallığın işçi işveren ilişkilerinde ciddi bir rolü var.

Gelelim sanayileşme sürecinin kültürel boyutlarına ve tezimin asıl sorunsalı olan Kalvinist İslam tartışmasına. Zira, buraya kadar anlattığım hikaye içinde görüldüğü gibi dinin öyle pek belirgin bir rolü yoktur. Çalışmanın ilgili bölümünde ayrıntılı olarak tartıştığım üzere “Kalvinist İslam” kavramı bir yana; Weber’in bu tartışmaya temel teşkil eden ” Protestan Ahlakı” tezlerini kendisi bile hem olgusal olarak hem de epistemolojik olarak sorunlu ve tartışmalıdır. Dolayısıyla ekonomik gelişme ve sanayileşme konusundaki bu ve benzeri teolojik argümanların açıklama güçlerinin oldukça zayıf olduğunu düşünüyorum. Gerek yukarıda uzun ve ayrıntılı olarak aktardığım tarihsel süreç gerekse sanayicilerle yaptığım derinlemesine görüşmelerden elde ettiğim veriler, Hacılar’da ve Hacıların sanayiciler arasında püriten ya da Kalvinist olarak adlandırılabilir bir ahlaki yönelimin bulunmadığını; insanların ekonomik faaliyetlerini büyük oranda bu dünyanın şartlarına ve ekonominin gereklerine göre organize ettiklerini; yani dünyevi yönelimin ağır bastığını açıkça göstermektedir. Yani mevzu dinsel motivasyonla çalışan insanların kapitalistleşmesi değil hırsla ve hınçla kapitalistleşen insanların yaptıkları işi daha geniş bir çerçevede meşrulaştırmak; halk kitleleri ve sınıf içerisinde hegemonik kılmak için dinsel ilişki ağlarını kendi çıkarları lehine kullanmaları ve ondan yararlanmalarıdır. Dolayısıyla benim iddiam meseleyi Kalvinizm ile değil Kapitalizm ile açıklamanın her açıdan daha mantıklı olduğudur.

Zira Kapitalizm Türkiye toplumuna yeni gelmiş bir sistem değildir. Osmanlı Dönemi’nden beri mevcuttur. O dönemde İmparatorluk topraklarının bazı bölümlerine parçalı ve dağınık olarak giren bu sistemin altyapısı Cumhuriyet Devrimi ile birlikte Kemalist bürokrasi tarafından devletçi bir kalkınma projesi çerçevesinde oluşturulmuş; 1950’den sonra çok partili hayata ve pazar toplumuna

geçiş ile birlikte pekiştirilen ve yaygınlaştırılan süreç; 1980 Darbesi'nden sonra da neo-liberal paradigmanın egemen olduğu yeni dünya düzenine eklenmiştir. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye'de 1980'lerden önce de ciddi bir kapitalist üretim ve kapitalist ilişkiler vardı ama ithal ikameci yaklaşım çerçevesinde örgütlenmişti. Yani 1980 öncesinde Türkiye'de kapitalizmin çok sınırlı olduğunu veya devletin Anadolu'daki kapitalist girişimi baskı altında tuttuğu iddiaları pek doğru değildir. Ben bu tür düşüncelerin 28 Şubat Dönemi'nde yapılanların geriye dönük olarak aksettirilmesi olduğunu düşünüyorum. Devlet 1980'den önce de çeşitli teşviklerle Anadolu'daki girişimcileri desteklemiştir. Hacırlılar da Anadolu'daki başka girişimciler de bu teşviklerden zaman zaman yararlanmışlardır. Nitekim, HES Kablo'nun temelini CHP'li Turan Feyzioğlu atmış; fabrika için İsviçre'de bir kuruluştan kredi alınmış; Darbe'den sonra Özal da fabrikayı PTT ihaleleri vererek desteklemiştir. Dolayısıyla bütün bu süreçte en azından Hacılar özelinde giriş bölümünde bahsettiğim gibi dinin herhangi bir rol oynaması, dinin manevi motivasyonundan da yoğun bir şekilde yararlanan Anadolu'nun hızla yükselmesi ve dinden kaynaklı bir sanayileşme ve sermaye birikimi oluşması gibi bir şey söz konusu olmamıştır. Zira usu usun anlattığım gibi Hacılarda sermaye birikimi ta 1930'larda başlamıştır.

Öte yandan, özellikle 1980 Darbesi sonrası dönemde sol ve emek eksenli partiler ve oluşumlar ağır bir biçimde ezilirken dini cemaatlerin ve tarikatların serbest bırakılmasının; zaten tarihsel bir örgütlülük birikimine sahip olan bu kurumların hızla gelişmesine ve muhalif söylemlerine rağmen kapitalist sistemle verimli bir ittifak ve uzlaşma içine girmelerine neden olduğu söylenebilir³⁵³. Dolayısıyla bu dönemde sermaye birikimi süreçlerinde din başta olmak üzere geleneksel kültürel değerleri ve ilişki ağlarının sosyal sermaye olarak kullanılması bir düzeye kadar söz konusu olmuştur. Nitekim, daha önce böyle bağlantıları olmayan Hacırlı sanayicilerin dini cemaatlere girmeleri de bu dönemde başlayan ve 1990'larda yoğunlaşan bir süreçtir. Ancak yukarıda ayrıntılı olarak açıkladığım gibi bu tarikat

³⁵³ Özçetin (2011)

ve cemaat bağlantılarının etkisi, Hacılar sanayisinde benim gözlemleyebildiğim kadarıyla kapitalizmin kuralları ile sınırlı kalmış ve varsayıldığı gibi bir İslami alt-ekonomi³⁵⁴ oluşturmaktan da uzak olmuştur.

Bununla birlikte elbette sanayicilerin kutsal ve dünyevi arasındaki gerilimi, çeşitli mekanizmalar aracılığıyla yumuşatma çabalarından söz etmek mümkündür. İşte dini cemaatlerin rolünün de daha çok bu noktalarda gündeme geldiğini düşünüyorum. Cemaatler, zikir, ibadet ve sohbet gibi formlarla kutsal dünyevi olanın içine yerleştirme ve gerilimi yumuşatma fonksiyonunu üstlendiler. Ancak bu işlevin de bir zaman sonra dünyayı dinin kurallarına değil de dini dünyanın kurallarına benzetmeye yönelik bir eğilime dönüştüğünü de görmek mümkün. Enflasyona ya da yatırım şartına bağlı olsa da faize verilen cevaz bunun en tipik örneğidir.

Dolayısıyla, tüm bu verileri değerlendirerek sosyolojik argümanla ilgili tespitlerimi genel anlamda şu şekilde özetleyebilirim. İlk olarak dinin, gerek Hacılar'da gerekse Kayseri'de organizmacı, dayanışmacı/yarışmacı muhafazakâr kolektif kimliğin ana unsurlarından biri olarak birleştirici bir rol oynadığını; ikinci olarak ise, bu muhafazakâr kimliğin neo-liberal ekonomiyle kurduğu ittifakın, (Laclau'nun deyimiyle) 'eklemleyici ilkesi' olarak işlev gördüğünü düşünüyorum. Tuğal'in³⁵⁵ dediği gibi bu süreçte İslam, kapitalizmi hatta neo-liberalimi geniş kitlelerin gözünde meşrulaştırıyor ve onu kitleler nezdinde hegemonikleştiriyor. Bu bağlamda din, buradaki insanlara yaptıkları işleri daha geniş, kutsal bir çerçevede meşru bir zemine oturtma imkânı veriyor; böylece de kapitalist ilişkilerin derinleşmesinde ciddi bir rol oynuyor. Şimdilik bu işlevlerini bir süre daha bu şekilde sürdürecekmış gibi de görünüyor.

Esasen İhsan Eliaçık³⁵⁶,ın da vurguladığı gibi Kayseri tarih boyunca daha ziyade paraya tapan bir şehir olageldi. Kayseri'nin bir parçası olan Hacılar da Kayseri ile

³⁵⁴ Kuran 2002, Bulut 1997

³⁵⁵ Tuğal 2010

³⁵⁶ See 17 June 2012 demokrather.net : <http://www.demokrather.net/roportajlar/ihsan-eliacik-patron-iscilerin-degil-isciler-patronun-rizkini-verir-h9475.html> Acces 30 August 2012

iletişime geçtikçe bundan nasibini aldı. Çocukluğumda köyün girişindeki bir alanda Hacıların bir hayırseverin Nevşehir taşından yaptırdığı caminin inşaatında oynardık. Bu adamın çok ünlü bir tefeci olduğunu, tezim için görüşme yaparken öğrendim. Zira bu kişiden faizle borç para almış bir çok insanla görüştüm. Herhalde, tefecilikten elde edilen parayla cami yaptırmak İslam ile pek bağdaşmasa gerektir. Ancak, bu örnek Kayseri'nin dinle ilişkisini başka söze gerek bırakmadan neredeyse kendi başına özetlemeye yeterlidir. Ben bu çelişkiyi, tez boyunca kutsal ile dünyevi olanın kaçınılmaz ve gerilimli birlikteliği çerçevesinde anlatabildiğimi umuyorum.

2008 ve 2011 yılları arasında yürüttüğümüz ve benim tez çalışmamı da kapsayan “Türkiye’de Din ve Toplumsal Yapı” adlı araştırma projesinin kuramsal zemini dinin ve dindarlığın kutsal ve dünyevi arasındaki gerilimli birlikteliğini analiz etme çabasına dayanıyordu. Çalışma boyunca dinin hep bu farklı gerilim eksenleriyle birlikte var olduğunu; din denen şeyin zaten ancak bu gerilimlerle var olabildiğini iddia ettik. Benim bu çalışmada yapmak istediğim de aslında bu oldu. Sonuç olarak Hacılardaki sanayileşmeye ve gelişmeye din neden olmadı. Gelişme dinamikleri arasında dinin neredeyse hiçbir rolü yoktu. Ancak gerek dünyadaki gerekse Türkiye’deki gelişmelere paralel olarak 1980’lerden sonra artan dinsel, yine tarihsel ekonomik ve toplumsal nedenlerin bir bileşkesi neticesinde muhafazakârlaşan bazı şehirlerle birlikte Kayseri’de de yankısını buldu. 1980’den sonra devletin de desteğiyle güçlenen cemaatler; işadamları, tüccarlar ve sanayicilerle iletişime geçip etki alanlarını arttırdılar. Zaman içinde dini bağlantılar, ticari ve siyasi bağlantılarla içice geçerek sanayicilere bazı pozitif katkılarda bulunmaya başladı. Dolayısıyla, sınırlı da olsa bu katkıları yadsımak mümkün değil. Ama her zaman olduğu gibi insanlar gerek gündelik ilişkilerinde gerek ekonomik ilişkilerinde yine kendi maddi çıkarları doğrultusunda yaşamaya devam ediyorlar. Para ve zenginlik arttıkça da din kapitalizmi değil kapitalizm dini kendine benzetiyor.

APPENDIX C

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

| | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Enformatik Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Cengiz
Adı : Kurtuluş
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :

The Tale of Industrialization in A Small Town in Turkey: Hacılar-Kayseri

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: