RECONSIDERING THE KANTIAN CONCEPT OF GENIUS THROUGH THE QUESTIONS OF NATURE, FREEDOM AND CREATIVITY

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BY MERVE ERTENE

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Doç. Dr. Elif Çırakman  
Supervisor

Examinining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam  (METU, PHIL)  

Doç. Dr. Elif Çırakman  (METU, PHIL)  

Doç. Dr. Ertuğrul R. Turan  (AÜ, PHIL)  
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Merve Ertene

Signature :
ABSTRACT

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Ertene, Merve

M.A., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Elif Çırakman

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In this thesis, the role and the significance of the Kantian theory of art and concept of genius in Kant’s system is examined. In this examination, it is aimed to answer the question of the meaning of being human in Kant’s system through art and artist. To this end, Kant’s consideration of art from the spectator’s standpoint and ignorance of artist’s perspective are criticized. In conformity with this criticism, throughout the thesis, depending on Kant’s conceptualization of the genius, the artist’s perspective and artistic experience are tried to be exhibited. In order to understand and interpret the artist’s perspective, the meaning of the concepts of nature and freedom that arise along with the concept of genius is clarified. By considering the effects of the freedom and the natural necessity on genius, it is asserted that since the necessity of the naturally endowed talent of genius and the freedom of the productive act of genius cause to the one and the same act, the creative activity of genius refers to the unity of all the dualities in the Kantian system and hence to the completeness of the
system. As a result of this claim, art, which arises from the dual nature of human, becomes the way to unite this duality.

Keywords: Artistic Experience, Creativity, Natural Endowment, Artistic Freedom, Unity
ÖZ

KANTÇI DEHA KAVRAMLINI DOĞA, ÖZGÜRLÜK VE YARATICILIK SORUNLARI ÜZERİNDEN YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK

Ertene, Merve
Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

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Bu çalışmada Kantçı sanat teorisi ve deha kavramının Kant sistemi içindeki rolü ve önemi incelenmiştir. Bu incelmeyle Kant sisteminde insan olmanın anlamı nedir sorusunu sanat ve sanatçı üzerinden cevaplamak amaçlanmıştır. Bu amaçla Kant’ın sanatı izleyici gözünden değerlendirdirip sanatçının zengin sanatsal deneyimini göz ardı etmesi eleştirilmiş ve bu eleştiri temelinde Kant’ın deha kavramı hakkındaki görüşlerinden yola çıkarak tüm çalışma boyunca sanatçının perspektifi ve sanatçının deneyimi ortaya konulmaya ve yorumlanmaya çalışılmıştır. Deha kavramıyla birlikte açığa çıkan özgürlük ve doğa kavramları, sanatın ve dehanın sistem içindeki önemi ve rolü açısından belirleyici olduğundan bu kavramların anlamları açığa kavuşturulmaya çalışılmıştır. Özgürlük ve doğal zorunluluğun deha ve yaratıcı edimi üzerindeki etkinlikleri yorumlanıp şu sonuca varılmıştır: Dehanın doğa vergisi olan yeteneğinin zorunluluğu ile sanatsal üretimdeki özgürlüğün bir ve aynı edime sebep olması dolayısıyla dehanın yaratıcı edimi Kant sistemindeki tüm iklikler arasındaki birliğe, sistemin bütünlüğüne işaret eder. Bu
iddia ile insanın ikili doğasından kaynaklı sanatın, bu ikiliği birliğe kavuşturma yolu olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sanatsal Deneyim, Yaratıcılık, Doğa Vergisi, Sanatsal Özgürlük, Birlik
To *Muse*
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Twice two makes four seems to me simply a piece of insolence. Twice two makes four is a pert coxcomb who stands with arms akimbo barring your path and spitting. I admit that twice two makes four is an excellent thing, but if we are to give everything its due, twice two makes five is sometimes a very charming thing too.¹

A world in which twice two only makes four is secure and comfortable due to its constant and stable structure, which does not allow for any surprises. In such a world, everything is predictable and every question has an accurate answer. It runs like clockwork. The strict rules reign over the every single detail. The consequences cannot be anything more or anything less than what is expected. In such a world, there is no place for anything except what is, and hence no place for hope.

Although such a world allows us to feel the familiar sensations of comfort and safety that we often associate with returning home, why can we not feel satisfied with the idea of determinism? If what happens must necessarily happen, why do we keep on imagining and expecting other worlds? Why do we covet the ideal by being not contented with this bare reality? As a one single basic answer to these questions, we can say that thinking that we do not differ from the input-output elements of a chemical reaction makes us feel worthless in this world. However, we realize that an insurrection is possible against this insolent, strict structure of the world. We find in ourselves a power to declare our independence. By virtue of this power we realize that being under the yoke of these necessary laws of the world is not the only way for us to live and we have the chance to attain our ideals in our own way. This chance is called freedom.

Freedom as the power to act independently from the necessary laws of the world enables us to intervene in the operation process of the world and to change it. However, we should be well aware of the fact that making genuine choices is not to pick the best one out of the already given alternatives, but rather to create the alternatives. Being free and thereby creating alternatives is the only way to change this world into “our world”, because only through freedom we can go after our ideal world and strive for it. Our strivings will be the traces that we have left on this world.

In this world, Godot\textsuperscript{2} will never come and acting freely is the only way for us to make our existence meaningful. For a meaningful life, we want to be the real possessor of our actions and to prove ourselves (our freedom of will) in our actions, because we do not believe that the world can only be exactly what it is. However, sometimes we may need a motivation, which helps us not to ignore the power of freedom that we have inside, since our efforts do not always give the results that we aimed at. In such times, for not losing our faith in that our ideals will become real, we wish for a miracle, which indicates that the necessary structure of this world does not pose an obstacle for our ideals, it supports us in actualizing our ideals and the inherent purpose of this world is not against our purposes. In this regard, twice two makes five is the restful irrationality penetrated into rationality, it is a miracle.

Reading Dostoyevsky’s passage above as his standpoint towards the Enlightenment and his criticism of it, I can say that this passage is also an ideal expression of the underlying motivation of my thesis. We can say that in this passage, Dostoyevsky expresses that the irrational elements can have some positive aspects for rationality. In parallel with this idea, in the background of my thesis I will try to show that the irrational elements do not have to be the enemies of rationality even within the systematic philosophy of Kant. In relation to this, in this thesis, by examining the Kantian concept of genius in terms of its nature, freedom and creativity, I will try to show that the irrational elements can have some constructive and positive impacts on reason. In this sense, in my thesis, I will try to reveal the “miracle” in the Kantian philosophy, and examine the significance of its implications

for his system. In accordance with my proposal, throughout the thesis we may see that even a philosopher like Kant, who dedicates his philosophy to the idea of the system of reason, and grounds the conditions of experience and knowledge on reason, cannot remain indifferent to the issue of hope.

The main argument of this thesis will be as follows: The artistic productive act of genius (the creator of fine art) represents the reconciliation and the unity between natural necessity and freedom due to its double origin, that is, the naturally endowed talent of genius and genius’ free choice to act. In justifying this argument, we will see that the noumenal nature and the concept of the supersensible substrate of humanity, both of which cannot be known by reason, are used as conditions of the genius and genius’ art by Kant. For one thing Kant attributes the condition of the artistic experience and fine art to some supersensible ground, which refers to the beyond of our rational capacity. Given this we believe it is important to emphasize that the need for the transcendence of human existence which, as we shall try to show, finds its proper reference in Kant’s concept of genius. However, instead of interpreting this supersensible ground as a failure of Kant’s philosophy, we will try to show the unifying role of this transcendence and the positive impacts of it on his system by arguing that the gap between the theoretical and the practical realms (the gap between the necessity and the freedom) vanishes depending on this ground. In this context, whereas fine art will appear as the motivation that we may need sometimes for our moral vocation, the genius and its artistic experience will become the miracle within the Kantian system due to the unity that they represent.

Since we will mainly deal with a specific element of a specific part of a systematic whole, which is the “genius” as put forward and examined by Kant in the first part of the Critique of Judgment, I think that moving from the general outlook of the system to our specific field of inquiry will be an appropriate route for us to follow. This is to say that since a part of a system cannot be meaningful without its reference to the whole, examining the concept of genius requires for us to explain the brief summary of the whole system and to identify the place of genius in this system. Accordingly, the next chapter will be a preparation of the proper stage for our
arguments and discussions about the concept of genius. Since the concept of genius will appear in the system in relation to beauty, i.e., as the condition of artistic beauty, in the second chapter, we will examine beauty both in reference to itself and in reference to the whole system. In this way, we will clarify what beauty is and its significance in the Kantian system. So, the second chapter is to establish the substructure of the thesis, which is necessary for us to examine the concept of genius and to generate our arguments.

In conformity with this, the second chapter will begin with a brief summary of the Kantian system where we will explain the significance of the role of the *Critique of Judgment* in the system. We will try to clarify why *CJ* constitutes the field of hope and how it bridges the gulf between the theoretical and practical realms by means of the concept of purposiveness. Since the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” as the first part of *CJ* is also included in the field of hope and has the role of bridging the gap between the theoretical and the practical realms, in the rest of the chapter we will aim to explicate the relation between the aesthetic judgment and hope by focusing on the issue of beauty. In order to show how hope emerges in the experience of beauty, we will focus on the judgment of taste and its structure, which make aesthetic experience possible. In this examination, we will clarify that the judgment of taste as a kind of reflective judgment that does not determine its object, and hence does not produce any kind of knowledge, but instead it a regulative role for reason due to its relation with the concept of purposiveness. This regulative role of the judgment of taste will become explicit through our examination of the structure of the judgment of taste (the four moments of beauty as disinterested, universal and necessary liking and subjective purposiveness) and the free play between the cognitive faculties. This free play of mental faculties together with the four moments of judgment of taste will determine what beauty is and how we judge it. As a result of this second chapter, beauty will arise as a need of human existence for hope and meaning, because we will see that it is a way of our thinking the world

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as if it is in harmony with our cognitive faculties. In this context, in this second chapter, we will clarify what beauty is, how we experience it and why this experience of beauty brings about hope.

In the third chapter, we will examine beauty in its narrow sense, i.e., the artistic beauty. However, instead of dealing with the issue of artistic beauty from the spectator’s point of view, we will examine it from its creator’s standpoint and focus on the creation process of artistic beauty. In this regard, firstly, we will criticize Kant’s attitude towards art and assert that the failures and problems of his philosophy of art arise from his spectator-oriented perspective towards art. Depending on this criticism, throughout the thesis, we will try to evaluate the artistic beauty in terms of its creator and to understand the creative experience of the artist. To this end, we will introduce Kant’s definitions of art and fine art, in which the concept of genius is introduced as the necessary condition of the fine art. These definitions will have a crucial importance for us, because our main argument will basically depend on these definitions. Through these definitions, we will see that on the one hand, Kant determines art as a free production\(^4\), and on the other hand, he identifies genius as a natural talent\(^5\). Relying on these definitions, we will assert that there are two origins of fine art that contradict each other. To solve this contradiction, we will examine the meaning of the nature of genius. In this examination, we will introduce and evaluate different views about the meaning of the nature of genius. After arguing the positive and the negative aspects of these views on genius’ nature, we will interpret this nature as noumenal nature by referring to the concept of supersensible substratum of humanity and to some textual evidence.

Following this, we will state that genius is the individual who is able to bring the beyond into “here and now” by virtue of its supersensible nature. In other words, the process of the creation of the artwork of genius will become a process of making the supersensible sensible in a beautiful form. In relation to this creation process, we will examine the constituents of this process that are specified by Kant as the

\(^{4}\) CI, 303  
\(^{5}\) CI, 307
aesthetic ideas, originality, and the spirit. At this point, we will argue that creation process of fine art requires not only the innate talent of genius and but also the ability of taste. In other words, we will explain that the genius provides the content of its artwork only by means of its innate ability of intuiting the noumenal nature as aesthetic ideas. However, since art is also a matter of communication that is possible through judgments, we will see that presenting its artwork in a beautiful form, i.e., organizing the aesthetic ideas via an original rule and expressing them in a special way, which allows the spectator to think that the work has a life, requires genius to practice its ability of taste.

In the light of these, at the end, we will make a general evaluation and critique of the Kantian concept of genius. In this section, at the first place, we will assert that Kant’s one-sided attitude towards art results with approaching the genius as if it is the spectator of its own work and hence missing the creative experience of genius. However, in the second place, we will emphasize that although Kant’s philosophy of art does not seem to be satisfactory enough, its implications produce important results for the system. Depending on the theory of genius and our interpretations of it, we will assert that genius and its creative action represent the reconciliation between natural necessity and freedom.

In the fourth chapter, we will try to justify the above argument from another aspect. While in the third chapter, we will try to justify our claim by examining the nature of genius and asserting that it is the noumenal nature, that allows the reconciliation between freedom and necessity, in this fourth chapter, we shall claim that art as a free production is a moral action, and hence in the creative act of genius the moral freedom and the necessity of the genius’ natural talent coincide with each other. To justify our claim, in the first place, it is significant to show that in the Kantian system a free action must necessarily be a moral action by examining Kant’s ways of treatments of the concept of freedom. In this examination, we will see that free action is the self-determination of the will by obeying the moral law. Since in the definition of art, Kant claims that art is a free choice to act, we will claim that this

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6 **CJ, 310**
free choice to act refers to the self-determinative activity of the will and thereby to
the moral action. This claim will support our main argument about the reconciliation
between the freedom and the necessity. With this claim, we will be able to assert that
by being originated both from natural necessity (naturally endowed talent of genius)
and from freedom (genius’ free choice to act), the creative action of genius
represents the completeness of the Kantian system. In other words, the reconciliation
between the real and the ideal, which is hoped for, become actualized in the
productive act of genius. Moving from this claim, in the following section, we will
try to clarify genius’ relation to morality. By interpreting the relation of beauty to
morality given by Kant from the genius’ standpoint, we will say that in its productive
action, genius acts in accordance with its duty as well as with what its nature
necessitates. The genius is both active and passive. In accordance with this, we will
conclude by saying that since the artworks are considered both as the product of
noumenal nature and as the product of moral duty, they can be conceived as the
disclosure of the “nature in itself”, i.e., the noumenal nature with its intelligible
inherent purposes, in a sensible form. Given this, the genius would be able to display
the unity of the intelligible and the sensible in its creative act and so in its works. But
this same process is also the way in which noumenal nature announces itself through
the artworks as if it is standing by us, as if it is in conformity with our moral
purposes as long as we (the genius) do what we ought to do. Finally our thesis will
consist in investigating the ways in which the concept of genius operates in the
Kantian system as the locus where we transcend the duality of freedom and necessity
and, therefore with this, all the other dualities such as the intelligible and the
sensible, the active and the passive, the ideal and the real.
CHAPTER 2

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BEAUTY IN THE KANTIAN SYSTEM

If we tend to understand the world from the Kantian perspective, it is clear that the knowledge of the world is the construction of us. In other words, if the world is intelligible, it is not because the world has inherent intelligibility of its own, but because we impose an intelligible order to it.\(^7\) The world becomes this world by means of our active participation in it. We think about the world, we know it; we determine it and we try to change it. However, why do we deal with the world? Why does it matter to us? Can the answer be struggle for meanings? But what is the purpose of this meaning giving activity? Is it for making life more meaningful or is it for repressing the feeling of our futile striving? I mean that if things and actions matter to us because of the reason that we are trying to give them meanings, would not the meanings that we ascribe to things and actions be nothing but a reflection of ourselves? By approaching this question from the Kantian standpoint, we can infer that the meanings that we ascribe to everything that matters to us are the meanings about us, because we are not able to attain the meanings of things as they are in themselves. This is to say that meanings of things and actions are for human beings, since there would be no meanings without us. We ascribe meanings to things and things become alive for us.

Let me put it in this way, by taking the Kantian system as our ground; we may say that the world is a new and strange world in every single moment. This is to say that without any pre-given determinacy\(^8\), we are continually determining the world. With our performances, we encounter with the non-exhaustible, ever new and strange world, and try to determine it in order to annihilate its strangeness. Since there is no

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\(^8\) Ibid., p. 60
pre-determinacy about the world before we step into it, this determining process and our efforts against the newness and strangeness of the world never end. We always continue to try to make acquaintance with the world in order to feel at home. In other words, our impatience towards the otherness of the world that we encounter brings forth our desire to assimilate it. We subject the world to us through our efforts, which are to understand the relationships between the objects and to make them useful and functional means to our ends. Also, doing science and uncovering the mystery of universe, whether science is done for the sake of itself or for its functionality, is the basic way of overcoming the otherness of the world through knowledge. Both in our simplest daily relations with the world like using some object as a means to an end and in our higher level relations with the world as doing science and trying to achieve the genuine knowledge about the phenomenon and about the relations between them, we try to know and determine the external strangeness and otherness of the world and nature.

In this context, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*\(^9\), by giving the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, Kant shows us the valid way of overcoming this otherness of the world through knowledge. In relation to this, we can say that *CPR* as the answer of the question of “what can I know” defines one of the ways of our existence. In this world, we exist as the determining subjects, who try to overcome the otherness of the world through knowing and determining the world in accordance with the universal and necessary laws of reason. However, is it just this external strangeness and otherness of the world what makes us feel not at home?

By considering the two aspects of our existence, i.e., natural and intellectual aspects, together with our actions, we can say that the question of otherness and strangeness does not go just for the externality of the world. There is also an internal otherness within us, when what one ought to do is in question. I mean that deciding to act in some specific way can be possible either in accordance with our natural aspect, which refers to our feelings and natural drives or in accordance with our

intellectual aspect, through which we can choose to act freely. In this respect, since the birth of the natural drives and feelings do not depend on our will and they occur necessarily in accordance with natural laws, in our actions we try to overcome this independent natural aspect of us as long as our choice to act is grounded on reason. Ignoring the demand of our will and doing what our natural aspect desires in order to satisfy it means letting ourselves in the flow of natural causality without using our will to act. However, this otherness within ourselves can be overcome only through determining ourselves by grounding our action on reason. Just as in the case of overcoming the otherness of the external world, here we should also determine and know ourselves in order to feel at home. The assimilation of the strangeness of the external nature that we mentioned above, at this point, turns out to be the assimilation of the otherness of our inner nature. Reason qua the superior power should be able to command and master the nature inside us, because the only possible determination of ourselves can occur through rational choices. As long as we ground our actions on reason and determine ourselves within our actions independently of natural necessity, we can think of ourselves as free beings.

In this context, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*\(^\text{10}\), Kant determines the boundary of the territory of the practical use of reason, which shows us the condition of the possibility of freedom and morally right action. By giving the answer of the question of what one ought to do, *CPrR* and *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals*\(^\text{11}\) define the other way of our existence. We as the moral agents through our free actions, which are purified from the natural drives and feelings and which are grounded only on reason, determine and know ourselves practically. Surpassing natural necessity through freedom and existing as moral beings have their grounds on our efforts to realize a world of freedom, a moral ideal. This moral ideal is the moral world, “in so far as it may be in accordance with all moral laws, and this is what by means of the freedom of the rational being it can be, and what according to the

\(^{10}\) Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002). Hereafter *CPrR*.


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necessary laws of morality it ought to be.” Simply, moral world is where all human beings do what they ought to do by grounding their actions on reason. When we think this notion of moral ideal together with the Enlightenment’s obsession on rationality, we can say that the moral ideal refers to overcoming all otherness and strangeness through the hegemony of the reason.

Approaching to the Kantian philosophy through the question of otherness, we can say that because of the hegemony of reason in his system, overcoming the otherness is possible only through rationalizing what is not rational. This is to say that in the first Critique, the authority of reason shows itself as the determining power over the nature through the universal and necessary laws of reason. Subsequently, in the second Critique, the reason shows itself the only condition of freedom and proves its power in the field of morality. In this respect, as long as we determine ourselves in accordance with the commands of reason and become free agents, the power of reason proves itself, because it comes out victorious in the conflict, in which it encounters with natural necessity. However, when we consider that the proof of the absolute hegemony of the rationality is possible only through overcoming all otherness, we can say that the idea of the world of freedom remains just an ideal because of the two main reasons. First, we are sensible beings as well as rational beings and most of the time we cannot resist to our natural desires. Second, we cannot make certain predictions about the effects of our free actions, which are supposed to be morally right. Although we do what we ought to do, our action’s effects in the world can cause a chaos, which is not intended.

Under these circumstances, what is the meaning of our efforts to realize this moral ideal? What is the reason of our taking the moral demands of reason into consideration as moral commands? Without any guarantee of accomplishment rather with the fact of disappointments that we confront as the results of our free actions, why are we trying to act in the right way? How can we spend our whole life time by running after the shadows of our ideals?

\[12 \text{ CPR, A808, B836}\]
Perhaps we cannot do something different from this or we cannot exist in a different way. Perhaps what it means to be human consists in the struggle against the otherness, in and through which it works to realize its ideals and brings significance to its actions and to the world, in which these actions take place. However, there should be an ultimate meaning in our struggle against the otherness. We need to hope that there is an ultimate purpose, through which all of our efforts towards overcoming the otherness that we encounter both in external world and within us gain meaning.

In this world, the otherness cannot be annihilated totally both in theoretical sense and in practical sense. In theoretical sense, there is the endless manifold of the phenomenon, which cannot be exhausted through determining. In practical sense, “unless nature itself also co-operates with our moral strivings, this ideal can never be attained.”13 Also, since we are rational animals, the moral world, in which all actions are supposed to be grounded on reason remains as an ideal. Thereof, in this framework, our free actions remain just futile effort towards the unattainable ideal. In this context, the *Critique of Judgment* introduces the field of meaning, in and through which the two types of our existence gain purpose.

As it is explained in the end of the *CPR*, our efforts in this world can be meaningful only if we hope for being worthy of happiness. Since we cannot justify our hope for happiness in this sensible world both in theoretical and in practical sense, this hope takes its source from the ideas of reason as the idea of God and of future life. We hope that the moral laws of reason are not fictions of reason, but are the part of the intelligent design of God. Furthermore, we hope that there is a future life, in which we can attain happiness as a result of our moral actions in this world. Considering the world as an intelligent design means that it is thought as a purposive unity in itself, in which when we perform our dutiful actions, we can hope for being worthy of happiness. Therefore, all hope directed to happiness14 finds its ground on this idea of purposiveness.

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13 *GMM*, p.37 (Translator’s Analysis of the Argument)
14 *CPR*, A805, B834
In the *CJ*, Kant’s basic subject, therefore, is this purposive unity and purposiveness of nature. In the first part of *CJ*, which is the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment”, Kant examines the concept of beauty and claims that beauty is representing nature as a purposive order by means of reflecting on the form of an object. Besides, in the second part of the CJ, which is the “Critique of Teleological Judgment”, he examines the purposiveness in nature and claims basically that we represent for ourselves the organic life in nature as purposive and only in this way we can think the nature as a whole. In the light of this general framework of the Kantian system, our main question in this chapter will be how the experience of beauty can give us hope for the meaning of our efforts and our struggle? In this regard, in this chapter, I will examine the significance of beauty in the Kantian system.

If we ask for the significance of a part of a system, then we should examine the meaning of that part in reference to the whole. Therefore, in order to understand the significance of beauty in the Kantian system, we should take the issue of beauty both in reference to itself and to the whole Kantian system. For this aim, in the first four sections, I will introduce how experience of beauty is possible, what beauty is, how it emerges, and what the experience of beauty brings about. Subsequently, in the last section of this chapter, in the context of the questions above, I will examine the meaning of beauty in the whole system. In doing this, since our questions here is about us and our manner of existence, I will examine the meaning of beauty from a subject-focused point of view. This is to say that I will try to depict what the Kantian concept of beauty changes in our life by trying to understand why we experience beauty in the Kantian system.

### 2.1. The Framework of the Theory of Judgment

If we accept that our life and every little detail of it are possible only through experience, then it will be significant to ask how experience itself is possible. For Kant, experience is possible only through judgments. For him, in order to understand our experiences, we should first analyze the structure of the judgment causes this experience. Given that our main concern is to understand aesthetic experience, we
should first analyze the aesthetic judgment that makes aesthetic experience possible. To this end, now we will examine in what sense Kant uses the notion of judgment in general to be able to understand the distinctive features of aesthetic judgment.

According to Kant, “judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is determinative [...]. But if only the particular is given and judgment has to find the universal for it, then this power is merely reflective.”¹⁵ This is to say that whatever we think, we can think it only in two ways, either we determine our object by subsuming it under a priori universal laws of understanding or reason or without a pre-given universal, we reflect on our object to find the universal for it. In the first case, since the universal law is given a priori, by means of this law we can determine the object by subsuming it under this universal. On the other hand, in second case, since there is no given universal, but there is a particular waiting for its universal, the judgment gives its principle to itself for defining or explaining this particular and having a presentation of it. However, since this second type of judgment devises a principle for itself in order to work on this case of undetermined particular, it cannot determine the object but it can only reflect on itself. In this regard, whereas the “determinative judgment” produces knowledge, the “reflective judgment” cannot do. In this context, Kant defines two types of determinative judgment, namely theoretical judgment and practical judgment and also two types of reflective judgment, namely, aesthetic judgment and teleological judgment. Now, we will consider the types of judgment in regard to the three Critiques of Kant in order to clarify the difference between them.

We can say that the reason of this difference between determinative and reflective judgments lies on the ground of the binary characteristic of judgment. According to Kant, the presentation of the object has two features; one of them is subjective (aesthetic) and the other is objective (logical validity) in terms of its

¹⁵ CJ, 179
This is to say that in a presentation of an object, which we have through the judgment, we can find the reference of this presentation to the subject and also to the object. However, the type of judgment depends on which reference we find in this presentation. Kant says that in the theoretical judgments, through which we cognize the object of sense, “these two references [to the subject and to the object] occur together”17. As it is told in the CPR, the appearances, which we receive in and through the a priori forms of intuition i.e., space and time18, are determined or thought by being subsumed under the concepts of understanding19. Here, the forms of intuition are the subjective features of our presentation of the object of sense, because we cannot receive the things in a different mode or in other words, space and time are the necessary conditions for the object to appear to us20; whatever we perceive, it will be in space and time and without these forms, no object is possibly given to us. Besides, the concepts of the understanding are the objective features of the presentation of the object, because they determine the object that we receive in space and time, i.e., because they can function determinatively, only if the object is given to them or only in reference to the given object21. Yet, a priori forms of intuition constitute the subjective reference of the presentation of the object, because they are the forms, in and through which the received content becomes the given object. Since there would be no given object without the forms of space and time, the a priori forms of intuition cannot have an objective reference. In this respect, we can infer that the concepts of the understanding have objective reality, because they determine the given content through thinking it in correspondence with its intuition22. Put another way, the concepts of the understanding have objective reality, because object of experience can only be thought by means of them23. There can be an object of experience only in so far as it is the subject of the judgment, in which the object is

16 CJ, 188  
17 CJ, 189  
18 CPR, A 20, B 34  
19 CPR, A 50, B 74  
20 CPR, A 89, B 121  
21 CPR, A 89, B 123  
22 CPR, A 93, B 125  
23 CPR, A 93, B 126
determined as a unity by means of the concepts of the understanding. The important point for us in this issue is that since in the presentation of the object in cognition, there is a subjective character introduced by the forms of intuition; we can never know the things as they are in themselves, but we can know them only as they appear to us.

We see the second type of the “determinative judgment” as the “practical” or “moral judgment” in the CPrR and in the GMM. Whereas in the first Critique the theoretical judgments determine what is, in the second Critique and in the GMM, the moral judgments determine what ought to be24. If we try to explain this in general terms, we can say that the self as the part of intellectual world25 can be the cause of itself and, in this regard can determine itself. However, this determination is not exactly the same with the determination of the object of sense as we find in the first Critique. Through the moral judgment the self can determine itself through determining its actions freely by means of its rational will. In this process of determining itself in its action, the self is not given to itself from outside, but it determines itself by giving itself a universal law. For this reason, through the moral judgments, we think ourselves as moral selves and attain the practical knowledge of what ought to be. In Kantian terms, “everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws - that is, in accordance with principles and only so has he a will.”26 The will can be autonomous or free if and only if it is bound only by itself. In other words, we can be free rational beings, if we determine our actions in conformity with the Moral Law and for the sake of the duty alone27. This moral law finds its ground in reason and its commands are unconditioned. Therefore, in determining our actions for the sake of Moral Law, we cannot presume any other ends or motivations. Since our determined actions represent our will, and since the will can only be free if it determines itself for the sake of the Moral Law, it determines itself to be free. In this regard, rational

24 GMM, 388 / iii
25 GMM 451/ 107
26 GMM 412/36
27 GMM 397/9
being can choose itself freely by means of determining itself according to the
universal law of reason.

If we consider the theoretical and practical judgments together in terms of their
determinative characters, we can say that both have objective and subjective
references and thereof these judgments are determinative judgments, in which there
is a given universal according to which the particular is determined.

However, when we come to the CJ, we enter into the territory of reflective
judgments or the territory of the power of judgment, whose presentation has no
objective feature, but only a subjective feature, which cannot at all become an
element of cognition. What we can roughly say about the reflective judgments is
that in the process of generating the presentation of a given object, they do not
restrict themselves with the concepts of the understanding. Since the concepts of the
understanding constitute the objective reference of the presentation of the object,
reflective judgments do not contain any objective reference. Therefore, they cannot
determine their object in an objectively valid fashion, but they are the ways of our
thinking of the objects as if the objects inherently have some features, which we
ascribe them by exceeding the limits of the understanding. In aesthetic judgments,
although we have not a concept of beauty, we represent the object as if it is
inherently beautiful. On the other hand, in teleological judgments, we represent the
nature to ourselves as if it contains an intelligent design, which lies on the ground of
the unity of its endless particularity. At this point, the difference between the
determinative and reflective judgments becomes more evident. On this issue
Makkreel says that

Since determinant judgment proceeds from a given universal to particulars, it clearly involves a subordinating mode of thought. [...] however, that reflective judgment, which tends to begin with particulars, is a coordinating mode of thought. Determinant judgment appeals to universals to either describe the nature of particular objects or explain their behavior by subsuming them under the laws of the understanding. Reflective judgment, by contrast, is an expansive mode of thought that appeals not just to the understanding, but to reason as a framework for interpreting particulars. Because Kant calls reflection the power to

28 CJ, 189
compare a representation either with other representations or with our cognitive powers, [...] reflective judgment is not so much about objects per se as about their relation to us.²⁹

In accordance with this we can say that these coordinating and subordinating functions are at the heart of the difference between determinative and reflective judgment. Here, Makkreel implies that subordination is a mechanical process and works on the ground of “top-down relations of dependence”³⁰. On the contrary, coordination is a dynamical process. Since it works on the ground of the reason’s demand of a totality of order, it works through the relation between parts and wholes. In other words, we can say that the reason of why reflective judgment gets stuck in particulars and seek for them convenient universals is its attempt to give these particulars a meaning in regard to the whole by comparing, evaluating and interpreting the place of these particulars in the whole. Therefore, according to Makkreel whereas the determinative judgment arises out of unidirectional determination as from universal to particular, reflective judgment consists of a “process of reciprocal adjustment”.³¹

However, on which ground does this dynamic course of reflective judgment proceed? In respect of the fact that the object should be related with a predicate in a judgment, by means of what do we able to establish this connection in reflective judgment? On this ground, considering the dynamic of reflective judgment as the relation between the parts and the whole, now we can introduce the concept of purposiveness.

### 2.2. The Concept of Purposiveness

The concept of purposiveness is a priori concept of reflective judgment.³² Through reflective judgment, we think about the object as if our presentation of it

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³⁰ Ibid., p. 232
³¹ Ibid.
³² CJ, 181
describes the object as it is in itself. This way of thinking of the object is possible, according to Kant, only through attributing purposiveness to the object. In other words, through this concept of purposiveness, we consider the objects themselves in terms of how we should represent them. However, how can the concept of purposiveness provide us to think of the objects themselves? I think that this relationship between the concept of purposiveness and reflection can be understood, if we consider the relationship between the parts and the whole or the place of the part in the whole. When we reflect on the dynamic relation between parts and the whole, our evaluation is generally based on the function of these parts in the whole. This is to say that we interpret the meaning of the parts in the whole on the basis of our supposition of that these parts should be there for some reason. In other words, we suppose that these parts should have some purpose in the whole. At this point, when we explain the relation of the part to the whole by means of some purpose, it is called purposive explanation, through which we attribute to the part some determinate or indeterminate end, which is at the disposal of the whole. In this regard, Wicks says that reflective judgments are “purpose-related in a manner that is either determinate (i.e., when the purposes are specified) or indeterminate (i.e., when they are not).”

Kant defines purpose as the concept of an object that contains the basis for the actuality of that object. In this regard what we call as purposiveness is “a thing’s harmony with that character of things which is possible only through purposes.”

Through this concept we present nature as if an understanding contained the basis of the unity of what is diverse in nature’s empirical laws. Hence the purposiveness of nature is a special a priori concept that has its origin solely in reflective judgment. For we cannot attribute to natural products anything like nature’s referring them to purposes, but can only use this concept in order to reflect on nature as regards that connection among nature’s appearances which is given to us in terms of empirical laws. This concept is also quite distinct from practical

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33 CJ, 192
34 Makkreel, “Reflection, Reflective Judgment, and Aesthetic Exemplarity”, pp. 227-8
36 CJ, 180
37 CJ, 180
purposiveness (in human art or in morality), though we do think it by analogy with practical purposiveness.\textsuperscript{38}

Since our understanding works on nature and grasps it by dividing, classifying, and subsuming through its concepts; it is not able to grasp the unity of nature in its infinite diversity.\textsuperscript{39} However, since we cannot grasp the diversity of nature by subsuming it under the concepts of the understanding without presupposing the systematic unity of empirical laws, judgment attributes a harmony or a unity to this diversity of the nature or to the empirical laws.\textsuperscript{40} Put another way, judgment has an a priori principle as purposiveness for the unity of nature, but this principle is only for the subject to guide it in grasping the nature. Kant says that

We must think nature, as regards its merely empirical laws, as containing the possibility of an endless diversity of empirical laws that [despite being laws] are nonetheless contingent as far as we can see (i.e., we cannot cognize them a priori); and it is in view of this possibility that we judge the unity of nature in terms of empirical laws, as well as the possibility of unity of experience (as a system in terms of empirical laws) to be contingent.\textsuperscript{41}

As it is told in the CPR, what we can know a priori about an empirical object by means of the categories of the understanding is that the object must have necessarily some spatiotemporal and causal relation with other objects. However, this does not mean that this a priori knowledge of the object also determines the particular location and by what it was caused or what it will cause.\textsuperscript{42} This particular state of the object is an empirical issue and thereof it is contingent. Since every particular state of empirical objects within their relations with each other defines an empirical law, thinking nature in terms of its contingency means thinking nature as the possibility of an endless diversity of empirical laws. Therefore, if we try to think about the unity in nature in terms of empirical laws within the limits of theoretical

\textsuperscript{38} CJ, 181
\textsuperscript{39} CJ, 186
\textsuperscript{40} CJ, 184-6
\textsuperscript{41} CJ, 183-4
use of reason, this unity should be contingent. About the reasons of this Kant says that

And yet we must necessarily presuppose and assume this unity, since otherwise our empirical cognition could not thoroughly cohere to [form] a whole of experience; for though the universal natural laws do make things cohere in terms of their genus, as natural things as such, they fail to provide them with specific coherence in terms of the particular natural beings they are. 43

Since the categories of the understanding as the transcendental universal concepts of nature function like mould, they are indifferent to what they subsume under themselves. The particular conditions of the given empirical content are not determined by the categories of the understanding. In other words, whether the content is this specific smoke occurring in front of me or that smoke rising out from a building, the categories determines only that this appearance must caused by another appearance. Because of this indifference to the empirical content, the categories of the understanding cannot determine and explain the unity of the endless diversity of empirical laws in a universal and necessary and systematic fashion. For this reason, when we asked for the unity of this particularity of all empirical objects, we go beyond the limits of the understanding and begin to search for a universal, which is not contained in the understanding.

Hence judgment must assume as an a priori principle for its own use, that what to human insight is contingent in the particular (empirical) natural laws does nevertheless contain a law-governed unity, unfathomable but still conceivable by us, in the combination of what is diverse in them to (form) an experience that is intrinsically [an sich] possible. Now when we find in such a combination a law-governed unity cognized by us as conforming to a necessary aim that we have (a need of our understanding), but at the same time as in itself [an sich] contingent, then we present this unity as a purposiveness of objects (of nature, in this case). [...] this transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a concept of nature nor a concept of freedom, since it attributes nothing whatsoever to the object (nature), but [through] this transcendental concept [we] only think of the one and only way in which

43 CJ, 183-4
we must proceed when reflecting on the objects of nature with the aim of having thoroughly coherent experience. Hence it is a subjective principle (maxim) of judgment.44

Trying to understand the world as a unity in terms of the endless diversity of particular empirical objects is a need of the understanding, because the understanding is apt to synthesize the multiplicity as a unity in and through its categories. However, this basic unifying tendency of the understanding becomes a problem for it, when the unity of empirical laws is in question. In order to find the proper universal for the unity of the endless diversity of empirical laws, it must go beyond itself and the limits of knowledge. This activity of seeking for universal ends up with the concept of purposiveness. We present the unity of the empirical diversity of nature by thinking nature as a unity of purposive objects. By means of this idea of purposive unity of nature, what seem us as contingent within the limits of theoretical reason becomes a lawful ordered unity in and through the reflective judgment. Yet, the concept of purposiveness by being beyond of the limits of the understanding is a priori universal only for reflective judgment 45. Through this concept of purposiveness of nature, judgment presents nature as if it involves an understanding 46. We reflect on the natural appearances and on their connection with each other by means of the concept of purposiveness. In concrete sense, we can say that only way of thinking nature as a unity in terms of its empirical diversity is thinking it as if it is an organic unity, whose parts are related with each other by means of their purposive structure. In other words, when we reflect on the unity of nature, the judgment presupposes that the nature exists or is created by some reason through using the analogy of practical purposiveness.47

For Kant, the purposiveness in a given object is possible in two ways. Either “we can present it on a merely subjective basis: as the harmony of the form of the object […] with the cognitive powers – i.e., the harmony required in general to unite

44 CJ, 183-4
45 CJ, 182
46 CJ, 181
47 CJ, 182
an intuition with concepts so as to produce cognition.”\textsuperscript{48} Or “we can also present it on an objective basis: as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of thing in itself according to a prior concept of the thing that contains the basis of that form.”\textsuperscript{49} As we mentioned before the first kind of the purposiveness in a given object is the indeterminate purposiveness, in which the harmony between the form of the object and our cognitive powers is considered. This kind is called \textit{formal (subjective) purposiveness}, which depends on the pleasure that “we take directly in the form of the object when we merely reflect on it.”\textsuperscript{50} The second type of purposiveness is the determinate purposiveness, in which the harmony between the form of the object and the object in itself is considered. It is called \textit{objective (real) purposiveness}. This objective purposiveness has nothing to do with the pleasure that we take in the form of the object, because whereas in the formal purposiveness we judge with taste, in the objective purposiveness we judge with reason and understanding.\textsuperscript{51} This is to say that judgment of objective purposiveness does not refer to the object’s form but rather to the object in itself as a product of natural purpose. Therefore, we can say that whereas in aesthetic judgment, we present the purposiveness of nature in the form of the object, in teleological judgment we present the object itself as a natural purpose. However, in the aesthetic judgment I can never predict when and in which case I will judge the object, which I used to judge it in accordance with universal natural laws, as beautiful in accordance with the principle of purposiveness.\textsuperscript{52} The reason of why aesthetic judgment rests on the indeterminate purposiveness lies in its unpredictability. On the other hand, teleological judgment has specific objects, on which the concept of purpose of nature can be applied. Since the possibility of teleological judgments has its determinate conditions, this kind of purposiveness is determinate. I mean that we cannot consider unnatural objects as natural purposes, but organic life insofar as we present it in accordance with the concept of purposiveness of nature can be presented as natural purpose. In this sense, we can

\textsuperscript{48} CJ, 192
\textsuperscript{49} CJ, 192
\textsuperscript{50} CJ, 192
\textsuperscript{51} CJ, 193
\textsuperscript{52} CJ, 194
say that by regarding natural products as natural purposes, we present the nature as an organized body, in which every part has a meaningful function with regard to the whole.

The concept of purposiveness as the keystone of the reflective judgment is also the ground of aesthetic experience in the Kantian system. It is the reason of why we experience something as beauty. I mean that in our attempts to understand the unity of nature in its diversity, sometimes we find this unity in the form of an object. Finding this unity in the form of an object and calling this object as beautiful is aesthetic experience, which is possible through judgment of taste. Now, in order to understand how we experience beauty through the judgment of taste, we will examine judgment of taste in detail.

2.3. Judgment of Taste: Four Moments of Beauty

In parallel with the fact that for Kant experience is possible only through judgment, aesthetic experience is possible only through judgment of taste. In other words, when we judge an object in terms of its beauty, we experience the beautiful. Since Kant defines the taste as “the ability to judge the beautiful”\(^53\), the analysis of structural features of the judgment of taste gives also the explanation of what we describe as beautiful and how we represent an object as beautiful. By means of the structure of judgment of taste, in this section we will reveal the requirements for calling an object beautiful.\(^54\)

In the first *Critique*, Kant says that “If we abstract from all content of a judgment, and consider only the mere form of understanding, we find that the function of thought in judgment can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments.”\(^55\) In other words, in order to think in judgmental structure, we use four logical functions, according to which we relate the subject to the predicate in a certain way in our presentation. *Quantity* determines whether the

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\(^{53}\) *CJ*, 203  
\(^{54}\) *CJ*, 203  
\(^{55}\) *CPR*, A 70, B95
predicate is valid for a single thing, for some things or for all things. Quality determines the way in which the predicate is linked to the subject as affirmative, negative or infinite. Relation determines the relationship between subject and the predicate as categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive. Finally, Modality determines by means of its three moments as problematic, assertoric and apodeictic whether my presentation is a possibility, an actuality or a necessity.

In this regard, when Kant analyzes the structure of judgment of taste, he uses these four logical functions in order to disclose the specific moments of judgment of taste. By using these four logical functions for judgment of taste, Kant implies that although judgment of taste as a kind of reflective judgment has no objective reference, it still needs the activity of the understanding, which is not determinative. The function of the understanding in the reflective judgment will be examined in detail in the section 2.4., but for now we can say that since we can call an object beautiful only in relation with the effect of a presentation of an object, judgment of taste is possible only after the determinative activity of the understanding. In other words, after determining an object as rose, we can call this rose beautiful by reflecting to its form. Therefore, the judgment of taste consider these four moments of judging when it reflects.\textsuperscript{56}

However, these four moments differ from those that we use in theoretical judgments, because they are used in reflection, but not for the determination of the object. Our examination of these moments will start first with the moment of quality, because as Kant says “an aesthetic judgment about beautiful is concerned with it first.”\textsuperscript{57}

The first moment implies, briefly, that if we judge an object as beautiful with a feeling of pleasure, our liking must be disinterested. At this point, we should make clear the relation between interest and the feeling of pleasure. According to Kant, “Interest is what we call the liking we connect with the presentation of an object’s

\textsuperscript{56} CJ, 203
\textsuperscript{57} CJ, 203
existence." If we have an interest to an object, this means that we like it because of its existence. However, when we find an object beautiful, our liking must be disinterested, i.e., liking independently of the existence of the object. Whereas liking an object because of its existence implies our desire for owning this object, liking an object in a disinterested fashion implies “how we judge it in our mere contemplation of it (intuition or reflection).” About this difference between interested and disinterested liking, Horowitz says that interest and liking an object or taking pleasure in an object have intimate connection, because we feel pleasure when we find an object that satisfies our needs. In such cases, we have an interest in the existence of the object, because when we have a need, we want to fulfill it by exhausting the object, which we regard as a means to our end. However, the feeling of pleasure in a disinterested fashion indicates freedom; because it is a proof of that we can feel pleasure without depending on the satisfaction of our needs and thing’s existence. “[O]nly the liking involved in taste for the beautiful is disinterested and free, since we are not compelled to give our approval by any interest, whether of sense or of reason.” Briefly, this notion of disinterested liking means that the object in aesthetic experience does not satisfy or cause any need of the subject, because there is a feeling of pleasure, which arises in the subject spontaneously independent from all needs.

Taking this issue from another standpoint, we can say that in aesthetic experience, we reflect on the pure presentation of an object in order to see whether that pure presentation arises a feeling of pleasure in me or not. Since this reflection is a reflection for itself, we might say that nothing can be regarded as a means for finding the feeling of pleasure accompanying the pure presentation of the object. Even the existence of the object must be indifferent to my judging, since my

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58 CJ, 204
59 CJ, 204
61 CJ, 210
62 Horowitz, Sustaining Loss: Art and Mournful Life, p.30
63 CJ, 205
reflection is not a matter of object’s being present in front of me, but of pure presentation of the object.\textsuperscript{64} In calling an object beautiful, although it appears as if we refer to one of the feature of the object; we refer to how the subject responds to its own presentation, since the first case would be a cognition rather than reflection. In other words, when one presents an object as beautiful, this presentation finds its reference point only in the subject; in its feeling of pleasure and displeasure.

The second moment as the universal liking and the fourth moment as the necessary liking have an intimate connection with each other. For this reason, we can explain them with reference to each other. In this respect, while the second moment of judgment of taste says that “[b]eautiful is what, without a concept, is liked universally”\textsuperscript{65}, the fourth moment says that “[b]eautiful is what without a concept is cognized as the object of a \textit{necessary} liking”\textsuperscript{66}. These two moments as universal and necessary liking are rooted in the first moment of disinterested liking. “For if someone likes something and is conscious that he himself does so without any interest, then he cannot help judging that it must contain a basis for being liked [that holds] for everyone.”\textsuperscript{67} In other words, if we cannot find any personal reason for our liking an object and for calling it beautiful, we inevitably think that everyone should necessarily like this object. However, this mode of thought does not depend on any concept and thereof the universality and necessity of liking can only be subjective, but not logical. This is to say that although we judge the object and attribute the predicate of beautiful to the object as if we determine it by means of concept, there is no transition from concept to the feeling of pleasure\textsuperscript{68}. In this regard, through judgment of taste we speak with a “\textit{universal voice} about a liking unmediated by concepts.”\textsuperscript{69} If we try to make this point clearer, in reference to what we said above, we can say that liking an object and calling it beautiful is a matter of reflection or of contemplation, and it cannot be based on concepts. However, since we judge a

\textsuperscript{64} CJ, 205  
\textsuperscript{65} CJ, 219  
\textsuperscript{66} CJ, 240  
\textsuperscript{67} CJ, 211  
\textsuperscript{68} CJ, 211  
\textsuperscript{69} CJ, 216
beautiful object in a disinterested fashion, we judge it *as if* the object had this beauty inherently or objectively, and expect that everyone who judges that particular object feels the same pleasure like us.\(^70\) Here, our judgment is subjective by not depending on a concept and by being produced for a particular object, but at the same time it is universally valid. For one thing, since we feel that this beauty is an inherent property of the object, it must universally give pleasure to all. This subjective universality, however, does not depend on everyone’s agreement, because agreement needs comparison according to some general rules. Yet, in the case of judgment of taste, there cannot be any comparison because the judgment is valid only for a single object, whose beauty is universally valid. In other words, the validity of the subjective universality of judgment of taste cannot be based on everyone’s agreement; rather it is valid because every human being has a presentation that has its reference to the feeling of pleasure. Likewise, the emphasis on “a necessary liking” of the fourth moment refers to our thought that everybody should necessarily share this feeling of pleasure in experiencing this beautiful object. Moreover, this “necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment […] can only be called exemplary, i.e., a necessity of the assent of everyone to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that we are unable to state.” In this respect, “the subjective necessity that we attribute to a judgment of taste is conditioned”\(^71\). Since through the moment of universality we declare that “everyone ought to give his approval to the object at hand and that he too should declare it beautiful”\(^72\), the necessary liking depends on this expectation of everyone’s assent. At this point, the necessary liking that the judgment of taste claims becomes dependent on *common sense*\(^73\). This is to say that on the ground of the judgment of taste, there is a subjective principle as the feeling of pleasure and this principle is the reason of why the universality and necessity of judgment of taste is subjective and conditioned. Since there is no objective reference in the judgment of taste, the universality and

\(^{70}\) *CJ*, 211  
\(^{71}\) *CJ*, 237  
\(^{72}\) *CJ*, 237  
\(^{73}\) *CJ*, 237
necessity of its validity should be conditioned. Whereas the condition of the universality is the expectation of everyone’s assent, the condition of the necessity is a common sense. According to Kant, by common sense “we [also] do not mean an outer sense, but mean the effect arising from the free play of our cognitive powers”74. Simply, common sense is not the common understanding, which judges through concepts, but rather refers to the power to judge, through which we can have presentation of beauty that has its reference only to the subject. This point implies that necessary liking also signifies the way in which the judgment of taste becomes intersubjectively communicable, which means that we have a “necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition”75. In other words, in the case of the judgment of taste, there is an intersubjective agreement on a universal rule of beauty, which cannot be determined in an objective fashion.76 Although the feeling of pleasure is personal, since we presuppose that it is common to all, “the necessity of the universal assent that we think in a judgment of taste is a subjective necessity that we present as objective”.77

In the third moment, Kant refers what beauty is. In this respect, he says that “[b]eauty is an object’s form of purposiveness insofar as it is perceived in the object without the presentation of a purpose”78. Kant calls this kind of purposiveness as “purposiveness without a purpose”79. This moment implies that if we reflect upon a beautiful object, since we deal with the object’s form, not with the object’s appearance; we think inevitably that this object displays purposiveness without ascribing to it any particular purpose.80 This is to say that “[w]hen we reflect upon an object for the purpose of judging its pure beauty, we consider only its form, and consider this form only in relation to whether it compels us to ascribe an intelligent

74 CJ, 238  
75 CJ, 239  
76 CJ, 237  
77 CJ, 238  
78 CJ, 237  
79 CJ, 220  
80 CJ, 220
cause to that form.” Therefore, we can say that purposiveness is the a priori principle of judgment of taste as the driving force, which sets our cognitive powers in motion.

If we try to handle this issue of purposiveness in detail, firstly we should say that “a purpose is the object of a concept insofar as we regard this concept as the object’s cause (the real basis of its possibility); and the causality that a concept has with regard to its object is purposiveness (forma finalis).” When we suppose that there should be a cause of the object in itself in terms of its form or existence; this means that we think of a purpose, which makes this object in itself possible. However, since such causality is out of reach of our capacity to know, it finds its reference only in the subject. The feeling of pleasure, under these circumstances, comes to scene when we keep on thinking of purposiveness. We generally tend to think about the world in itself in terms of its purposiveness (i.e., to think that the world is based on a will, which organizes the particulars in the world according to purposes), which helps us to understand and grasp the mechanical operation of the world. In this context, Kant defines two kinds of purposiveness as subjective (formal) and objective. In the case of objective purposiveness, we have a determinate purpose in our mind and evaluate the object either in terms of its utility or its perfection. However, if we remember the first moment of judgment of taste, since our liking of beauty cannot be interested, we cannot like a beautiful object because of its utility. Besides, when we judge an object in terms of its perfection, we have a preceding concept of it, according to which we decide whether the object that we encounter is close to its perfect existence or not. On the contrary, in judging pure beauty, we neither use the concepts of understanding, nor consider the existence of the object. In judging an object in terms of its perfection, we need to know what the thing is meant to be in order to decide “whether the thing has everything that is

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81 Wicks, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on Judgment, p.51
82 CJ, 220
83 CJ, 220
84 CJ, 220
85 CJ, 226
required for being a thing of that kind". Yet, in the case of beauty, independently of any condition, we just reflect on the object’s form and we find it unconditionally beautiful. Therefore, when we judge an object as beautiful, our judging should be grounded on subjective purposiveness, i.e., purposiveness without a purpose. To make the issue clearer Kant says that

\[\text{T}he\;\text{stone\;utensils\;sometimes\;excavated\;from\;ancient\;burial\;mounds,}\]
\[\text{which\;are\;provided\;with\;a\;hole\;as\;if\;for\;a\;handle.\;Although\;these\;clearly\;betray\;in\;their\;shape\;a\;purposiveness\;whose\;purpose\;is\;unknown,\;we\;do\;not\;declare\;them\;beautiful\;on\;that\;account.}\;[\ldots]\]
\[\text{[W]e\;are\;referring\;their\;shape\;to\;some\;intention\;or\;other\;and\;to\;some\;determinate\;purpose.}\;[\ldots]\]
\[\text{A\;flower,\;on\;the\;other\;hand,\;e.g.,\;a\;tulip,\;is\;considered\;beautiful,\;because\;in\;our\;perception\;of\;it\;we\;encounter\;a\;certain\;purposiveness\;that,\;given\;how\;we\;are\;judging\;the\;flower,\;we\;do\;not\;refer\;to\;any\;purpose\;whatever.}\]

If we think our daily experience of natural beauty, in fact, we can see that when we look at a tree and find it beautiful, we are not concern with its purposes in the world or the reasons of why it is there especially at that point, instead we simply find it beautiful and this gives us pleasure. Therefore, Kant’s term here as purposiveness without a purpose signifies the relation between our presentational powers. This relation will be made clear in the following section.

2.4. The Free Play of Imagination and Understanding: The Feeling of Harmony

Since experiencing beauty and producing a judgment is universally communicable, there should be cognition in aesthetic experience, because the only thing, which is communicable, is cognition. For this reason, we should try to explicate in what way our cognition of beauty arises and how we determine the object as beautiful independently of any concept. About this issue, Kant says that in reference to a given presentation in cognition, the relation between the imagination

\[\text{\[CJ,227\]}\]
\[\text{\[CJ,\;236\;/\;fn.\;60\]}\]
\[\text{\[CJ,\;217\]}\]
and the understanding brings about our mental state; we produce a judgment of
taste.\textsuperscript{89} Now, if we consider the role of imagination in cognition, we can make a
difference between the function of imagination in theoretical cognition and of
creative imagination in aesthetic cognition.

In the theoretical cognition, imagination takes the role of relating or
synthesizing the intuitions of sensibility and the concepts of the understanding. In
doing this, imagination is law-governed, because it works in correspondence with the
concepts of the understanding. In theoretical cognition, imagination can have two
products; i.e. examples and schemas. An example is produced by imagination, if the
concepts are empirical\textsuperscript{90}. On the other hand, a schema is produced by imagination, if
the pure concepts of the understanding are applied to appearances\textsuperscript{91}. For there to be
any empirical cognition of an object, given that intuitions and pure concepts are
different in kind, the imagination must synthesize the undetermined manifold of
intuitions with the pure concepts of the understanding. Thus, we can say that
imagination is in one respect intellectual, because it is in relation with the categories
of the understanding, but in another respect it is sensible, because it is related with
the intuition.\textsuperscript{92} This synthesizing process of imagination, through which it provides an
image to the concepts of the understanding, is entitled as schematizing\textsuperscript{93}. In this
context, we can say that in the process of cognition, imagination plays the role of the
mediator between intuition and the understanding. However, what will be the role of
imagination in aesthetic cognition, in which the concepts of the understanding have
no determinative power?

In aesthetic judgment there is no concept that determines an object. In fact,
through aesthetic judgment, we reflect on the object’s form and judge it in terms of
its subjective purposiveness. In this reflection, the relation between the subject and

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{90} CJ, 351
\textsuperscript{91} Donald W. Crawford, “Kant’s Theory of Creative Imagination”, ed. Paul Guyer, Kant’s Critique of
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} CPR, A140, B179-80
the predicate of the judgment comes through the free play of imagination and understanding. This is to say that sometimes, although there is no determinate concept, in the face of a given intuition, imagination and understanding enter into a relationship freely with a reciprocal harmony. The imagination takes the form of the present object of perception freely, that is, in a creative fashion, and the understanding tries to comprehend and describe all those forms by giving them meanings in symbolic ways. Considering the function of the imagination in theoretical and reflective judgments in comparison, we can say that “while in theoretical judgments the imagination is responsible for the schematism of concepts, in aesthetic judgments it ‘schematizes without a concept’.” Schematizing without a concept implies imagination’s exhibition of the form of a concept in general. However, how does imagination’s schematizing process proceeds and what is the special meaning of the term harmony?

Imagination and understanding are two friends who cannot do without one another but cannot stand one another either, for one always harms the other. The more universal the understanding is in its rules, the more perfect it is, but if it wants to consider things in concreto then [it] absolutely cannot do without the imagination.

According to Allison, this passage indicates that the relation between imagination and understanding involves a certain tension, which is caused by the opposite characteristics of the imagination and the understanding. While understanding is directed to universality, imagination is directed to specificity. He explains this tension between imagination and understanding as follow:

Accordingly, though the understanding requires the imagination to exhibit intuitively what is thought in its concept, and the imagination presumably needs the understanding to give it direction so that it can

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94 C\textit{J}, 219
95 C\textit{J}, 287
99 Allison, \textit{Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment}, p. 48
100 Ibid.
know what to exhibit, they nevertheless often work at cross purposes (and therefore harm one another).\textsuperscript{101}

On this ground, we can say that in judging an object in a determinative fashion, imagination wants to remain loyal to the specificity of intuition in the process of representing it in correspondence to the universal concepts of the understanding. However, for there to be a determination of the object under the universal principles of the understanding, in theoretical judgments, an “accord”\textsuperscript{102} between imagination and understanding is necessary. Hence, in theoretical judgments, imagination is guided by the concepts of the understandings and it is restricted by the universal principles of the understanding.\textsuperscript{103} Because of the obedience of imagination to the understanding, the relationship between imagination and understanding, in this case, necessarily turns out to be a harmony. In a sense, imaginations’ rule-governed activity implies a necessary and compulsory harmony in the relation between these two faculties. At this point, Allison defines a difference in degree for the notion of harmony in order to explain the special meaning of harmony in aesthetic judgment. He claims that according to its degree of approximation to the ideal, harmony can be in a minimal or a maximal sense.\textsuperscript{104} The minimal harmony can occur whenever an intuition can be subsumed under the concept of the understanding. In this case there is no need of extreme fit between the particular and the universal. On the contrary, the maximal harmony can occur whenever the intuition and the concept match with each other in an almost perfect sense, i.e., the universal is not too indeterminate for the particular and the particular exhibits all of the essential features thought in the universal.\textsuperscript{105} Moving from this idea of maximal harmony, Allison gives the account of the harmony, which arises in the course of the aesthetic experience.

\[T\]he imagination, under the general direction of the understanding, provides an apprehended content that presents itself as containing

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\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Gorodeisky, “A Tale of Two Faculties”, p.419
\textsuperscript{104} Allison, \textit{Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment}, p.48
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
“something universal in itself,” that is, something that appears as if it were the schema or exhibition of an “as yet undetermined concept,” albeit no concept in particular. [...] It exhibits a pattern or order (form), which suggests an indeterminate number of possible schematizations (or conceptualization), none of which is fully adequate, thereby occasioning further reflection or engagement with the object. Thus, it is in this way that the object presents itself in intuition, prior to any conceptualization, as if designed for our cognitive faculties, that is, as subjective purposive.106

In the light of Allison’s claims, we can say that in the judgment of taste, imagination and understanding are related with each other in a harmonic fashion, because they directed to the same purpose and the tension between them become loose. Whereas in the theoretical judgment the understanding pulls towards universality and imagination towards specificity, in aesthetic judgment, imagination gives to the understanding a content, which presents itself as if it contains something universal. Since what imagination brings to the understanding is something in the form of universal, the harmful tension between them is disappeared. However, when the understanding tries to determine what imagination exhibits, its concepts remain inadequate. Since determination process cannot be succeeded, reflection proceeds and imagination keeps on providing content for the understanding. In this way, they prompt the activities of each other and enter in a free play. In this regard, the object presents itself in intuition without depending on any determination of the concepts of understanding. In this process of reflection, since imagination is not restricted by the concepts of understanding, it is free and productive. However, it is significant to emphasize that the freedom of imagination in the free play does not mean that the understanding becomes independent of its lawfulness. On the contrary, its lawfulness is the cause of the continuity of the free play, i.e., without its effort for determining the content under its universals, imagination cannot continue to provide content for it. Thereof, this reciprocal activity between these two faculties, basically means that “the imagination in its free play stimulates the understanding by occasioning it to

106 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, pp. 50-1
entertain fresh conceptual possibilities, while, conversely, the imagination, under the
general direction of the understanding strives to conceive new patterns of order.”\textsuperscript{107}

Throughout this free play between imagination and understanding, a feeling of
pleasure arises. According to Allison this feeling of pleasure, on the one hand, is the
effect of this free play of two mental faculties, but on the other hand, it is the means
through which we become aware of the harmony between imagination and
understanding.\textsuperscript{108} In other words, when we reflect on the form of the object, the
imagination represents this form as if it is a universal form of order, through which
we feel that the nature is in conformity with our mental faculties. In this context, the
feeling of pleasure is caused by the free play of mental faculties, but also through it
we realize that we are able to represent nature as something more than mere
appearance.

What we call as beautiful is this representation of the formal conformity of
nature with our mental faculties. What we find in the form of an object as the
conformity of nature with our mental faculties refers to the possible harmonic
internal structure of the object, which reveals in us a feeling of harmony between
freedom and nature. In other words, we think that the nature does not consist of just
the tight causality chain and it has an intelligent order, which works in conformity
with our freedom. This thought of harmony between nature and freedom arises with
a feeling of pleasure, because the order that it refers to is not something that the
understanding can determine objectively.

In this regard, we can say that through this free play of imagination and
understanding, the world of freedom, i.e., the moral ideal, is momentarily felt by us
as pleasure. Yet, “a feeling of harmony produced in us by the imagination’s freely
reflecting upon the beautiful and actually being free and in harmony with the world

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p. 171
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p. 54
around us are two different things”.109 If we try to understand the relation between the notion of harmony and freedom more explicitly, Kneller interprets it as follows:

[...] freedom of imagination [...] seems to be the precondition only of our being able to look at the world as if it were orderly and in harmony with our understanding. Imaginative freedom does not constitute this order and harmony. In fact, as moral agents we are constantly faced with evidence that the natural world is not well-ordered with respect to our best efforts. That is, we are regularly faced with the sight of moral virtue going unrewarded. It seems the best thing an imagination ‘at play’ can offer is a way of forgetting this fact for the time it takes us to judge an object in a wholly disinterested, ‘playful’ manner, since during the time in which we are contemplating the beauty of an object we are free from all interest.110

This idea makes sense, if we consider that the third Critique as the field of hope that provides for us a way of reflecting on nature and representing it as if it were in harmony with our cognitive powers, and in this regard, in harmony with our moral vocation. In relation to this idea, what Kant entitles as “feeling of life”, which occurs in the subject under the name feeling of pleasure111, becomes more apparent. Although Kant does not define clearly what this “feeling of life” is, I find this notion significant to understand the relation between beauty and hope, which is the basic issue of CJ. We can say that the field of hope and this “feeling of life” are something about being human. I think that in a world, in which purely rational beings live, there would be no place or need for hope. Yet, since we are human beings and can only strive against our natural desires in order to be free and moral, we hope that our efforts are not futile and we can be worthy of happiness. However, how can beauty give us such hope?

Kant claims that “beauty only for human beings, i.e., beings who are animal and yet rational, though it is not enough that they be rational (e.g., spirits) but they must be animal as well”112. Taking this claim into consideration together with the

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110 Ibid.
111 CJ, 204
112 CJ, 210
notion of feeling of life, we can say that this feeling of life may refer to the harmony between the animal nature and rationality of human beings. In other words, it may refer to our representation of nature as an intelligent order in conformity with our mental faculties. We can clarify this point in this way: In aesthetic reflection, the subject is affected by its own activity of mental faculties, and the form of the object is just a means to this affection. For this reason, in aesthetic experience what is in question is not the form of the object but is how the subject reflects back to itself from this form of the object. In this context, we can say that in aesthetic reflection, the pleasure arises as soon as the subject begins to think independently of a specific form of an object and to reflect on it. In fact, this is the answer of how we can think the nature in itself as having an intelligible order by seeing a single rose. Since the thought of the harmony between nature and freedom is a thought for nature in itself, it also refers to our natural aspect. In this sense, this feeling of life can be interpreted, in the strict sense, a harmony between our animal nature and free will.

Both in respect to the harmony between nature and freedom and the harmony between our animal nature and rational capacity, this feeling of life has its reference in the tension of being human. Put another way, after our efforts for actualizing the ideal, when we find ourselves in a desperate and hopeless position, we may ask ourselves, for what our actions are, and why we ought to continue to live if we cannot succeed in our ends. At such times, we need to see that life is beautiful and there are so many things to do waiting for us. Beauty, in this regard, can provide us this feeling of hope and turns us back to life. Therefore, we can say that the feeling of pleasure that arises in the experience of beauty is a manifestation of the feeling of life, with which we feel that the nature as a living organism is by our side and supporting our efforts.

In addition to our interpretation of “feeling of life”, Makkreel clarifies this notion by moving from the definitions of life given by Kant. In one of the definitions of life, which Makkreel points out, Kant says that “[w]hatever in world contains a principle of life, seems to be of immaterial nature. For all life rests on the inner
capacity to determine one’s self by one’s own will power.” In the other definition, he identifies life and the principle of life with mind, and says that

[I]n the absence of [some] feeling of the bodily organ, life is merely consciousness of our existence, and not a feeling of being well or unwell, i.e., of the furtherance or inhibition of the vital forces; for the mind taken by itself is wholly life (the very principle of life), whereas any obstacles or furtherance must be sought outside it and yet still within man himself, and hence in the [mind’s] connection with his body.

When we consider these two definitions as being complementary to each other, we can say that life, which is equal to mind, must involve activity of self-determination. Self-determination activity in terms of autonomy refers to our freedom, through which we produce ourselves. In this sense, by using analogy, we can say that mind can show its life, and its vitality only through its freedom. If it can show that it can produce itself through its free action, this would be the proof of life, i.e., of mind. By means of this idea the meaning of “feeling of life” becomes more apparent. This is to say that since in aesthetic experience our mental faculties work in a free and productive fashion under the name of free play, mind exhibits itself in its complete vitality. This manifestation of life of mind gives us pleasure and we feel that we are alive.

In a similar way, grounding on this equation between mind and life, Makkreel tries to clarify this feeling of life in terms of the relationship between the harmony, which enlivens the mental powers in the experience of beauty and our feeling of being alive. He says that “[p]leasure is always for Kant the feeling of the enhancement of the life of the subject as a whole, whether the source of the pleasure be the pleasant, the beautiful, or the good.” However, since the feeling of pleasure in experiencing beauty is the effect of disinterested liking, it heightens the sense of my

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114 According to Makkreel, in this definition, in using the term mind, Kant makes no claim about soul or spirit, but rather he uses this term as a descriptively neutral fashion. In this respect, throughout the text, Makkreel uses the term mind by implying what is mental and vice versa. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment*, p.91
115 *CJ*, 277-8
116 *CJ*, 219
existence. In other words, since taking pleasure in liking the pleasant or the good includes interest, the concern of our mental states cannot focus on themselves. Yet, in the free play of the mental faculties, the indifference to the existence of the object gives our mental faculties the chance to manifest how expansive their creative capacity can be. Hence, the harmony between imagination and understanding intensifies the activity of mental life. Thus through the freedom of mind, we feel being alive. In short, through aesthetic freedom, which is interpreted here as the manifestation of mind’s being alive, we feel life in its most intimate and purest sense, which is pure mental spontaneity. In relation with this point now we can turn to the reason of why we experience beauty.

### 2.5. Experiencing Beauty: A Need for Hope and Meaning

A few times in my life I’ve had moments of absolute clarity.
When for a few brief seconds
the silence drowns out the noise and I
can feel rather than think…
And things seem so sharp and the
world seems so fresh.
It’s as though it had all
just come into existence.
I can never make these moments
last. I cling to them, but like
everything they fade.
I’ve lived my live on these
moments.
They pull me back to the present
and I realize that everything is
exactly the way it was meant to be.

I suppose that all of us have such moments in our lives; the moments which illuminate us in an unpredictable and an unexpected way, and make us feel that

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117 Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment*, p. 92
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
whatever happened in life, we and everything surrounds us are in the right place. These moments are so short that there is no time for us to think and to conceptualize. In these moments, we can just feel the harmonic unity in us in an immediate fashion. We feel that we are in a new starting point and our ideals are not something impossible to realize. Life becomes a beautiful miracle and the world seems shining as if it proves that it is for us and sides with us. In such brief few seconds, we feel that we found something special that contains meaning and fountain of life. In the end, the power that we felt within us gives its place to pleasure. In point of fact, such moments remind us that in our daily efforts, conflicts and rush we forget to feel the life, to take pleasure without any concern about the world and about ourselves. In the blink of an eye, we find ourselves in a neutral place, where we feel the life sharply and intimately. Life becomes beautiful.

Can we say that these moments give us the exact description of the times when we call something beautiful? When we consider the above section, where we examined what Kant calls beautiful and judgment of taste, I can say that our description of these special moments fits into what Kant calls aesthetic experience in terms of beauty. There is no interest, no concept, but just immediate feeling, which renders these moments as intimate as possible, and yet as initiating the feeling of pleasure in a universal and necessary fashion. One night, when we look through the window, in the form of the moon, we can find the harmony. Although the moon was there all the previous nights and though we have seen it every night, especially that night it seems to us different. It seems as if it contains the harmony of the universe in its form. That is why we call it beautiful. In fact, there is no difference in the moon; the difference is in us, in that specific moment, in the relationship between our mental faculties.

About the experience of beauty, there is still a question, which we have not yet answered, i.e., why is there such a notion as beauty or why do we experience beauty? In this section, we will try to answer these questions in the light of the previous sections. Throughout our examination of what the aesthetic experience is and how
we experience beauty, we have seen that experiencing beauty is not a relation between the subject and the external world, instead, through the experience of beauty the subject relates to itself in a reflective manner. In this sense, experience of beauty is neither to determine the external world, nor to determine oneself in its free action. Similarly, it involves not a tension between the mental faculties as it happens in the determinative judgments, but a harmony, which accompanies with the feeling of pleasure. Moving from these points, we can say that experiencing beauty is about judging the reason of our existence in this world. It is about our denial of the fact that this world is a world of disappointments. In other words, it is about postponing our expectations about the reward of our efforts until another life. We experience beauty, because we are human beings, who live in the struggle between sensibility and rationality. As Kant states, thereof, “beauty [is] only for human beings”\textsuperscript{121}. In this respect, in order to understand the reason of why we experience beauty, we should first try to understand what it means to be a human in Kantian system. For this aim, similarly as what we did in the beginning of this chapter, now we will examine our ways of existence in this world in the framework of Kantian system.

Firstly, from the perspective of Kant’s first \textit{Critique}, we can describe our subjectivity as a part of deterministic nature or as a gear of a big machine. Since I exist as consciousness of empirical objects, I know myself as the unity of my representations. This is to say that as empirical subjects, by being subject to the natural boundaries and laws, we can know ourselves only within the limits of space and time like we know an ordinary phenomenal object. In this regard, when I wake up, I universally and necessarily wake up to the same world as the same consciousness. In other words, everything in the universe including me is strictly related with one another in accordance with universal laws. Every morning the sun rises from the east and every evening it goes down on the west. I cannot change it. Likewise, even the physical features of mine change or remain same in accordance with natural laws. If I want to change my appearance, I know the rules that I should

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{CI}, 210
obey. Like in doing science, I can predict everything step by step, if it is an issue of mechanistic nature.

In this deterministic world, I am subjected to necessary and universal laws of nature as long as my physical body remains a part of my existence. Moreover, if we try to answer what we are in ourselves within the limits of universal and necessary structure of empirical experience, the answer falls beyond the legitimate capacity of determination of understanding. Therefore, on the one hand we are obliged to know ourselves as the unity of representations of a given manifold or as a link in the causal chain. However, this does not mean that this is the only way we can think ourselves.

On the other hand, in the framework of Kant’s second Critique, we can know ourselves as free beings. We can determine ourselves practically, because our subjectivity consists in our capacity to will, that is, in our practical freedom. In the practical area, the moral subject is autonomous as long as it gives the rule to itself and to its actions and grounds them on reason. Put another way, as moral agents, we should give ourselves the obligation to act in accordance with Categorical Imperative, which commands us to determine the principle of our actions unconditionally; without regarding any purpose other than our duty, by grounding the rule of our action on reason. In this context, human being is a free rational being, who is able to choose to act in a particular way and to posit itself in its actions. I can and ought to be my own cause and effect as long as I determine myself in accordance with the Moral Law.

Within the framework of the first two Critiques, we can define human being as the moral autonomous being, who is the free cause of its actions in the practical area and, at the same time, is subject to the causal chain of nature. As a sensible being we are subject to natural laws, but as a rational being we can be the free cause both of our action and of a new causal chain in nature. Let me put it in this way, in inventing atomic bomb, we use the universal and necessary laws of reason. However, the decision about whether it should be used as a nuclear weapon or not, is a moral one,
through which our free action can start a new causal chain in the natural world. In
relation to this Guyer says that

We can give theoretical laws to nature through our pure intuition and
understanding, and we can give the moral laws for our own conduct
through pure reason, but it is not enough for us merely to know both sets
of laws or even merely to choose to act morally in some noumenal realm,
behind or above the natural realm of appearances; we must act on the
commands of morality in the natural world and thereby transform the
natural world into a moral world. We must make our own autonomy
effective in the natural world, and both aesthetic and teleological
judgment support us in our belief that we can do that.\textsuperscript{122}

It is a fact that we are living in this world and this world is subject to
determinate natural laws like our sensuous side. However, acting upon nature and
changing it can be both in accordance with natural laws and in accordance with
moral laws. This means that our actions and productions can change the world, and
this world can become a moral world as our ideal world. However, in order for this
world to become a moral world, natural laws and moral laws should be coherent with
each other. This is, after I do what I ought to do, the effects of my actions in nature
should be in accordance with what I expected from these effects. But, how can we be
sure about this coherence? Or here, we should ask how can we \textit{feel} that our free
actions and our efforts towards the moral ideal are meaningful?

Knowledge and morality are two different aspects of the same reason. On the
one hand, there is the theoretical use of reason that ends up with knowledge, and on
the other hand, there is the practical use of reason that creates the field of morality.
Since both the theoretical laws and the practical laws are the laws of the same reason,
it would be odd, if these two kinds of law contradicted each other. In order for these
two uses of reason to function equally well, their laws should cohere with each other.
Since the question here is the coherence of the laws of theoretical and practical
reason, neither the theoretical reason nor the practical reason can grasp this unity
between them through their own laws. For rendering this unity intelligible, there
should be a third faculty, which is judgment. Thereof, this coherence or the unity

between the faculties of reason is the matter of the third *Critique*. In this way, *CJ* has the task of bringing the faculties of reason together in a coherent unity. In other words, the *CJ* or the power of judgment is the bridge between theoretical and practical area. Through the reflective judgments, as we told in the course of this chapter, we think about this coherence or unity as if it exists. We hope that our efforts towards the moral world are not waste of time. In reference to our moral efforts, we hope that we are worth for happiness by assuming the unity between phenomenal and noumenal realms. Only with such a reflection on the unity between the ideal and the real, all of our efforts gain meaning. Hoping for being worthy of happiness makes this world a place that is worth for living.

At this point, experience of beauty as a type of reflection, is an opportunity that we provide for ourselves for thinking about the world as if it has an inherent intelligence, which is in coherence with our mental faculties. In this way, independently from the laws of theoretical and practical reason and both cognitive and moral determinations, we produce a world of meaning through aesthetic freedom, i.e., through free play of the cognitive powers.\(^{123}\) In other words, through aesthetic experience we think as if the world in itself is a well-ordered or well-designed organism, which is in harmony with our free actions and we may hope for being worthy of happiness. In this sense, we give meaning to things in the world and feel that we find the harmony and we are in the right way. However, we should here stress that considering the world as if it is a living organism in harmony with our cognitive faculties is not a mere fantasy, because by means of it, the history becomes the history of mankind with the meanings that we attribute to it.\(^{124}\) Therefore, the *CJ* is important first in the sense that it opens up the world of purposes and meanings. Second, it constitutes the bridge between the first and second *Critique* by underlining the importance of the feelings in our manner of positioning ourselves in this world. In relation to this Guyer says that “the *Critique of Judgment* contains the major

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123 Kneller, “Imaginative Freedom and German Enlightenment”, p. 185.
developments in Kant’s conception of the role and importance of feelings in the practice of morality, and of sensibility in our comprehension of morality.”  

Here, we do not mean that the moral law, on the ground of which our action is supposed to be right and free, can be discovered by reason only with the help of feelings. On the contrary, reason alone can discover the moral law. However, since we are rational animals, but not purely rational beings, for being moral, we have to struggle against to our animal nature, which is an obstacle to the moral ideal. In the path to the moral ideal, we can attain the end, only if the tension between our feelings and rationality looses and the opposition between them ends. In this sense, Guyer claims that “moral perfection requires the development of feelings compatible with and conducive to those intentions that are dictated by pure practical reason alone.”

Since we are not able to annihilate our feelings totally, the way to reconcile with them is to cultivate them in conformity with the moral law. In this regard, experiencing beauty has an aspect opening to freedom. The feeling of pleasure arising throughout the aesthetic experience in a disinterested fashion proves us that we are not wholly dependent on the satisfaction of our animal nature in taking pleasure. This fact shows us the way, in which our feelings can be in conformity with our moral end. Furthermore, what we feel in experiencing beauty is pleasure, because we feel the harmony between nature and freedom. In this sense, the feeling of pleasure that we take in a disinterested fashion, has a motivational aspect for our effort towards to moral end. Through aesthetic experience our feelings shows that they can stand by us in the way to moral world and they can support our efforts towards the ideal. By realizing this, we see that they become the supporters of our hope for being worthy of happiness, while at the beginning they are the reason of our need to hope.

In the light of this chapter, we can say that we experience beauty, because we need to hope; in other words, because we are human beings, who search for the meaning in this world and find this meaning by hoping.

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126 Ibid.
CHAPTER 3

CREATING BEAUTY AND THE CREATOR OF FINE ART

Moving from the previous chapter, where we examined the conditions of possibility of beauty and the significance of the role of beauty in the Kantian system, in this chapter we will deal with beauty in its narrow sense, namely with the artistic beauty. In this regard, the underlying purpose of this chapter is getting acquainted with the Kantian conception of artistic beauty, understanding the significance of the artistic beauty in the Kantian system and the role of it in bridging the gulf between theoretical and practical reason.

In reference to the results of our previous examination of beauty in general, now we will examine the relation of the artistic beauty to hope. However, evaluating this bridging role of the artistic beauty and its relation to hope require, first, an examination of the Kantian conceptions of art, artwork and artist. At this point, the factor that determines the direction of our examination and sets a course for it comes into sight as the dual aspect of art. What make art beautiful are both its creation and its appreciation. In other words, we can approach to beauty in art from two different perspectives, one of which is the observer’s appreciation of it and the other of which is the creation of it.

As we examined in the previous chapter, observer’s appreciation of beauty is possible only through the judgment of taste. Accordingly, in appreciating artistic beauty one must judge the artwork through its ability of taste. However, in his claims about the four moments of judgment of taste, i.e., disinterested, necessary and universal liking, and subjective purposiveness, for appreciating pure beauty, Kant mostly thinks of natural beauty. Since in the artistic beauty the object that is appreciated in terms of its beauty is changed and becomes more complex in terms of
its being artifact, Kant makes some modifications in the four moments of the judgment of taste in order to adapting it to artistic beauty. However, in spite of these changes, the mainframe of the structure of the judgment of taste remains the same for appreciation of artistic beauty. For this reason, instead of examining these modifications of the adapted judgment of taste and discussing them from the observer’s perspective, I prefer to focus on creating beauty and to approach to the notion of beauty in art from the artist’ perspective, which is mostly ignored by Kant. In this context, we will examine artist’s judgment on beauty and deal with beauty in terms of its being a free production of the artist, a manifestation of artist’s talent, a result of artist’s experience, and an embodiment of artist’s thoughts. Depending upon our attitude towards examining the artistic beauty, we will consider the relation of it to hope through the question of artist and its creation.

Consideration of beauty from the artist’s point of view will allow us to show that the artist plays also a significant role in bridging the gulf between the theoretical and the practical realms. Since the artist is an inseparable element of beauty as the creator of it, the task of beauty becomes also the task of the artist. In order to clarify this role of the artist, in this chapter, we will examine the artist’s talent, its mental powers, and especially its way of thinking in the production process. In our attempt to reveal the artistic point of view, Kant’s strategy in examining the artistic beauty will constitute an impediment to our aim, because he dealt with this issue of beauty in art mostly in terms of the observer. However, with the idea that the work can be regarded as a reflection of its creator, we will try to have an idea about the worldview of the artist. In this way, moving from the special features of artwork given by Kant, we will try to trace to the thoughts of the artist about beauty, and to see the mystery of beauty with its creator’s eyes.

For this aim, in this chapter, firstly I will try to introduce Kant’s personal relation to art in order to provide a background for understanding the reasons of the basic failures of his philosophy of art, and of why he conceptualizes the art in this way. In the following section, I will give the framework of this conception of art and fine art,
with which his concept of genius will also come into view as the necessary condition of fine art. Subsequently, I will examine the Kantian concept genius, the meaning of its nature and its activity in the production process by the help of the basic notions of artwork treated by Kant. In conformity with our route being followed, we will consider the significance of beauty in hoping for being worthy of happiness from the genius' perspective. In other words, we will try to understand, to reveal and to interpret genius’ relation to hope through its intimate connection with beauty. Yet, in doing this, we should bear in mind that it is not just an ordinary appreciator of beauty, but rather it is the creator of it. In this regard, comparing with the observers’ common ability of taste, its special ability of creating beauty seems to open a new dimension in the relation of humankind with hope.

3.1. The Effects of Kant’s Personal Relation to Art on His Philosophy of Art

I think that one’s conception of art is at some point connected with one’s inclination towards art, its personal knowledge about art and the spirit of art in its time. Similarly, Kant's theory of art cannot be isolated from his impressions towards artworks that he encounters, from his taste and background in art and also from the spirit of art in his era. In this respect, before we examine Kantian understanding of art and artist, I think it will be helpful to mention about his relation to art throughout his lifetime in understanding his perspective on art. In relation to this, Hughes says that Kant was at more of a disadvantage when it came to the arts, for although his surroundings were not without aesthetic interest, he did not have direct access to any of the great artworks, all of which were to be found far from Königsberg. Unlike Goethe, he did not travel south to Italy to discover the treasures of the classical period, a journey that was fashionable for the educated elite. Kant may have had access to prints and engravings, as well as direct access to lesser known local works and, thus, some exposure to a range of visual artworks. Even so, his education in the visual arts must have been restricted by the medium in which he encountered images, the originals of which were often highly coloured and physically commanding works. It is thus not surprising that some of
his most enthusiastic comments are directed not to the visual arts, but, rather, to poetry. When we consider that his sedentary lifestyle can have given rise to few opportunities for the experience of magnificent natural beauty and sublimity, we must be even more struck by the important role he gave to aesthetics. 127

It is a fact that in the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” Kant gives weight to the examination of natural beauty, instead of a comprehensive evaluation of artistic beauty. One of the reasons of this can be his poor background in the arts as a consequence of his life spent only in Königsberg. Under the limited conditions of communication of his time, living in a town without travelling to other cities and countries means having a little chance to get acquainted with the great artworks in different branches of art. Therefore, it is possible for us to say that Kant’s knowledge of artworks consists mostly of the works in the field of literature. In fact, the textual references made by Kant in the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” corroborate our claim. In the sections where Kant examines and comments on art, he uses examples mostly of literature and men of letters, i.e., Homer128, Wieland129, a poem of Frederick the Great130, and the novel Robinson Crusoe131. In this sense, Hughes’ claim about Kant’s disadvantage on art is convenient and meaningful; when it is considered together with the fact that Kant is probably distant from many of the great artworks belong different branches of art except literature. Correspondingly, since his personal relation with the arts is restricted mostly by literature, his philosophy of art is mostly dependent on his interest in literature and can be affected by the literary culture of Germany and the spirit of literature in his era.

Early Romanticism and especially “Sturm und Drang” as a manifestation of early romanticism are the dominant movements in the eighteenth century

127 Fiona Hughes, Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, A Reader’s Guide (London: Continuum, 2010), p. 8
128 CJ, 309
129 CJ, 309
130 CJ, 315-6
131 CJ, 276
Germany\textsuperscript{132}. These movements rose against the values of Enlightenment and specifically against the Enlightenment’s attempts of rationalization. Romanticism defends basically that the meaning of human experience cannot be fully grasped by scientists and philosophers, but rather by the artists, who are the “true seers”.\textsuperscript{133} On the other hand, “Sturm und Drang” Movement, which is known in English as the Storm and Stress, was born in the literary environment of Germany and manifests itself especially in the literature. In addition to the values of Romanticism, it strives for the liberation of German art from the classical rules of French and Latin arts and it claims that this liberation is possible only through the freedom of genius.\textsuperscript{134} The adherents of Storm and Stress put forward the power of emotions or feelings against Enlightenment’s reason, since they thought that rationalization kills “one-half of our humanity”.\textsuperscript{135} In other words, we can say that they react to the central role of reason in life, because they think that reason cannot give the account of our individuality and originality arising from our feelings, and it ignores the richness of emotions for the sake of universality. Within their anti-rationalist attitude, they aimed powerful expression through fullness of feelings in their works.\textsuperscript{136} In this respect, we can say that according to them, the real thing in an expression is the individual emotions, which enable subjectivity to show itself in a free fashion. In this sense, the truth, whether it is in conformity with the reality or not, hides behind the images in the powerful expression of genius and it should be attained by readers intuitively by means of these images.\textsuperscript{137}

In relation to this dominant art movement in the eighteenth century Germany, Crowther says that “Kant’s own sense of fine art is very much an eighteenth-century

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., p.136
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.p.129
However, since Kant is a loyal Enlightenment philosopher, his philosophy of art as a part of his philosophical system is not supposed to be detached from the values of Enlightenment. As a result of this, under the effects of these opposite views, his conception of art should represent a synthesis of the values of the early Romanticism and Enlightenment. In other words, his theory of artistic beauty should represent a combination of originality and feelings, and universal rules, which is possible only through his concept of genius.

Indeed we can see the effects of Romanticism’s emphasis on genius and its power of expression on Kantian philosophy of art, because for Kant the concept of genius is the necessary condition of fine art owing to its ability to express the ineffable in an original fashion. Yet, this does not mean that Kant values art above science and claims that only artists can unveil the truth. On the contrary, he banned the genius from its right to have the control of its creation. In this way, while he preserves the originality of fine art, he ignores the individuality of genius and the contribution of the individuality to the creation. Thereof, at this point, he comes into a conflict with the Romantic idea, which says that the universality annihilates the richness of the individuality. While he is affected by the Romantic emphasis on the genius, at the end he becomes the target of the Romantic critiques because of his concept of genius. Instead of considering the richness of the aesthetic experience of the artist in its unique particularity, he universalizes the process of artistic creation by ignoring its individuality. As a consequence, we can claim that his theory of art becomes detached from practice.

In relation to this issue of the individuality of artists, Nietzsche criticizes Kant as follows:

Kant thought that he was doing art an honour by preferring and pushing to the forefront as predicates of the beautiful those characteristics which constituted the glory of knowledge: impersonality and universal validity. This is not the place to discuss whether this was not for the

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most part a mistake: the only thing I wish to emphasize is that Kant, instead of viewing the aesthetic problem from the experience of the artist (the creator), like all philosophers considered art and the beautiful exclusively from the point of view of the ‘spectator’, and in the process unwittingly included the ‘spectator’ himself in the concept ‘beautiful’. But if only philosophers of the beautiful had been sufficiently familiar with this ‘spectator’ at least!—that is, as a great personal fact and experience, as an abundance of the most authentic, intense experiences, desires, surprises, delights in the domain of the beautiful! But the opposite has, as I feared, always been the case: and so right from the outset they give us definitions within which, as in each of Kant’s famous definitions of the beautiful, the lack of a more differentiated experience of the self sits like a fat worm of fundamental error. ‘That which pleases without interest’, Kant has said, ‘is beautiful’. Without interest! Compare this definition with that offered by a genuine ‘spectator’ and artist—Stendhal, who once described the beautiful as une promesse de bonheur. Here in any case the very aspect of the aesthetic condition which Kant emphasized at the expense of all others—le désintéressement—is rejected and crossed out. Who is right, Kant or Stendhal?—If our aestheticians admittedly never tire of arguing on Kant’s behalf that under the spell of beauty it is possible to contemplate even statues of naked women ‘without interest’, one is entitled to have a little laugh at their expense—the experiences of the artists are on this thorny issue ‘more interesting’, and Pygmalion was in any case not necessarily an ‘unaesthetic man’.

This criticism is primarily a critique of Enlightenment attitude; because here Nietzsche attacks to Kant in terms of his ignorance of the individuality of the artist and of his attempt to define artistic beauty in an impersonal and universal manner. In this sense, the Romantic criticism of Enlightenment and Nietzsche’s criticism of Kant have a common ground, which implies that the attitude towards universalization of experience leaves aside the individual aspect of experience, which includes the richness and depth of emotions. In addition, Nietzsche’s critique to Kant indicates also another issue, which is one of the essential problems in Kant’s philosophy, i.e., lifelessness of Kant’s philosophy. The universalist attitude of Kant brings about his philosophy’s being detached from life also in the field of art. For the sake of defining the universal conditions of beauty, Kant overlooks the vitality of the

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139 A promise of happiness
aesthetic experience of the artist and he determines only one way, which is judgment of taste, for aesthetic experience in terms of both appreciating and creating beauty. In other words, since Kant examines the experience of beauty via the judgment of taste and the relationship between the cognitive faculties, creation and appreciation of beauty become structurally homogenous. This attitude of him towards art is a result of his inability of considering the issues of creation and beauty from the perspective of the artist and of his inclination to judge the artist from the scientific standpoint. In this sense, “Kant’s theory of aesthetics in general set out from the standpoint of the appreciation or reception of beauty, and not its creation.” As a result of his attitude, we can say that his theory of art, not surprisingly, does not work in practice, because, as Nietzsche denotes, disinterested liking of beauty cannot be possible for the artist in creation process. That is, an artist cannot be stay disinterested to the existence of the object, because he creates the object and needs its existence. In this respect, the creator of beauty, which is supposed to comprehend what beauty is in a genuine sense, is banned from grasping what beauty is in its purest sense.

Put another way, as we explained in the previous chapter, for Kant one of the conditions of possibility of aesthetic experience is disinterestedness, which is necessary for the universal validity of aesthetic experience. However, when it is applied to what the artist experiences in the face of beauty, Nietzsche detects that this condition does not work in life just like in the given examples of Stendhal and Pygmalion. Since the artists are not exempted from this condition of aesthetic experience and can create and experience beauty only through the aesthetic judgments, are we going to regard Stendhal not as an artist because of his expectation of happiness from beauty? Or can we interpret this expectation of happiness from Kantian perspective as a hope, which is revealed in the aesthetic experience under the name of harmony? These questions about the practical validity of Kantian

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141 Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment*, p.143
142 Ibid., p. 142
143 Ibid., p. 131
philosophy of art will find their places in the proceeding stages of this chapter. However, here the issue of impersonality has the essential significance for us, because it refers to the source of the questions and problems of this chapter.

While experience of beauty is a vivid part of our lives, rendering it impersonal for the sake of universal validity amounts to cutting it off from life and smothering its vitality under the density of formal structure. By rendering aesthetic experience impersonal, Kant seems to disregard the richness of life and prefers the dullness of formality, which can never describe what aesthetic experience is in its fullest sense. On this ground, in accordance with Nietzsche’s critics, we can say that Kant’s obsession on reason and formality causes him to miss, at the first step, our vivid aesthetic experience within its richness and at the second step, specifically genius’ encounter with beauty. In contrast to this negligence, for the sake of saving the relation between philosophy and life, in the following sections, we will try to understand Kantian genius as an artist, who is not just able to experience beauty as spectator but also can create it. In this way, by making an attempt to see the beauty through artist's eyes, we will try to expose aesthetic experience from the artistic point of view, on which Kant seems indifferent.

3.2. Kant’s Conception of Fine Art: The Necessity of Genius

As a starting point, since our aim that is understanding and interpreting Kantian concept of genius can be realized only through examining genius’ artistic experience and the result of it as its work, we should first make a clarification about what art is in Kant’s philosophy. In other words, since creating is a way of existence of the artist, art and artwork become the reflections of its existence, by means of which we can trace the individuality of the artist, which is ignored by Kant. Also, when we consider on the one hand, for Kant, the reason of why we are talking about a unique notion called as genius is fine art, and on the other hand, the reason of why there exists something like fine art is genius, we see that there is a dialectical dependence
between the existences of fine art and genius. Therefore, if we want to examine the
notion of genius, we should look through the notion of art from Kantian perspective.

First of all, Kant defines art simply as “production through freedom”, which
means here “a power of choice that bases its acts on reason”. This essential
characteristic of art in general distinguishes it and its products from nature and
natural objects by implying that art is a production of humans, since, we can say that,
free choice based on reason is a peculiar capacity of humans. Moreover, two more
features distinguish art from other kinds of production like science and craft. Firstly,
according to Kant, art is a production of human skill, because there are no
mechanical laws of production. This implies that since works of art are produced
freely, determinate rules cannot give a work but just an effect or a determinate result
of a mechanical process. Secondly, art is “on its own account agreeable” and
chooses its purpose by itself and becomes purposive without any effect on it other
than itself. In all these three points about the basic characteristic of art, we can see
the same emphasis on freedom. Artistic production requires free action, which finds
its cause in itself. In this respect, art amounts to a self-caused action towards a self-
chosen purpose without any external effect on it. These characteristics of art imply
that Kant uses the term art in the sense of ancient Greek term “techne”, i.e., “the
capacity to produce in a purposive way” and refers to “all human intervention in
the natural order, all artifice”. In relation to this, in concrete terms we can say that
the artist chooses freely to create a work by giving form to natural objects, and the
completion of its creation will disclose the embodiment of the artist’s idea.

Moving from this general characteristic of art, Kant categorizes the kinds of
art as mechanical, agreeable and fine art, the last two of which are called aesthetic
arts. The main difference between mechanical and aesthetic art is that the former acts

144 CJ, 303
145 CJ, 303
146 CJ, 304
147 Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche* (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2003), p. 27
148 Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment*, p. 132
just to make a possible object actual for our cognition, but the latter acts to arouse a feeling of pleasure, which is the condition of the judgment of taste.\textsuperscript{149} Since the feeling of pleasure is the condition of aesthetic arts, the classification of aesthetic arts must be in accordance with this condition. In this respect, whereas agreeable art’s object is created for arousing a feeling of pleasure associated with sensation, fine art performs for arousing a feeling of pleasure accompanying “presentations that are ways of cognition”.\textsuperscript{150} In accordance with this distinction, agreeable art aims just at momentary sensual enjoyment, the object of which requires or arouses nothing on which one can reflect or meditate.\textsuperscript{151} On the one hand, fine art is purposive on its own and its product provides rich material for reflection, by which the mental powers are cultivated to social communication.\textsuperscript{152} This is to say that the works of fine art provide rich material for aesthetic experience, which leads the free play of imagination and understanding through our reflection on them. On the other hand, through the sensual enjoyment of agreeable art, which is not intended for future, we cannot deduce content for us to share with others, but we feel just momentary pleasure, which is not contemplative for the sake of contemplation. This point is important, because agreeable art cannot satisfy the conditions of aesthetic judgment, basically by being dependent on the existence of the object in the feeling of pleasure. In this sense, fine art has a gate opening to freedom, within which both the admirer and the creator find the opportunity of experiencing the aesthetic freedom by means of the free play of their cognitive faculties. In other words, since both the artist and the admirer experience beauty through judging it with taste, whether this experience happens in a creative or receptive fashion, it is conditioned by the aesthetic freedom. However, since aesthetic freedom requires the conditions of disinterested liking and subjective purposiveness, judgment of taste becomes problematic in terms of the experience of artistic beauty both in a creative and a receptive fashion.

\textsuperscript{149} CJ. 305
\textsuperscript{150} CJ. 305
\textsuperscript{151} CJ. 305-6
\textsuperscript{152} CJ. 306
Identifying art with artifact means that before we judge an artwork, we presuppose that art is a product of human being and produced in accordance with a purpose. For this reason, with regards to the spectator, it is impossible to stay disinterested in the existence of the work, by means of which the spectator identifies the encountered object as an artwork. Also, knowing that the artwork is a result of a purposive production of human being can pose a threat to the subjective purposiveness, because trying to find the purpose of the work or grasping its purpose explicitly in the work restrain the reflective activity and aesthetic freedom. Besides, with regard to the artist, it is impossible neither to judge the work in its creation process in a disinterested fashion nor to reflect on the work by means of the concept of subjective purposiveness. Since the artist brings the work of art into existence in a purposive manner, it is supposed to already know the intrinsic purpose of the existence of the work. In this respect, at the first step, to avoid the possible problematic aspects of appreciating artistic beauty, Kant uses an analogy between experience of natural beauty and of artistic beauty and by means of this analogy he conditions these two kinds of beauty in terms of their reference to each other. However, since this referential relation between natural and artistic beauty causes a paradox with regards to the artist, at the second step, he introduces the concept of genius, which is an attempt to eliminate the problematic aspects of creating beauty, which are disinterested liking and subjective purposiveness.

On the referential relation between natural and artistic beauty, Kant asserts that “[n]ature is beautiful (schön) if it looks like art; and art can be called fine (schön) art only if we are conscious that it is art while yet it looks to us like nature”.153 By intuition, we can say in relation to this claim that Kant might imply that works of fine art are beautiful in the same sense with the natural object. In this regard, since in the reflection on beauty we consider the form of the object only in relation to whether it forces us to ascribe an intelligent cause to that form154, by judging a natural object in terms of its beauty, we think of it as if its form has an intelligent cause. Here,

153 CJ, 306
154 Wicks, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on Judgment, p.51
whereas the assumed intelligent cause refers to the artist or artist’s intentional creation, the natural beauty refers to the artwork. In other words, we judge the nature in terms of its beauty only if we think that it is created by an intelligent cause just like an artwork is created by an artist. However, since in natural beauty we are not interested with its internal cause, but rather only assume its form as manifestation of an intelligent design, artistic beauty should also hide its internal cause and avoid exhibiting its purpose explicitly in the work. This is to say that fine art should look like nature in order to produce beauty, because the free play between the cognitive faculties can occur and continue by being dependent on this subjective purposiveness. In this sense, the issue of subjective purposiveness in appreciating artistic beauty is solved, but the issue of disinterested liking in appreciating artistic beauty seems still problematic.

Yet, consider that before we appreciate natural beauty, we realize that it is a natural object in the same sense that we realize the artwork is an artifact. In this respect, we can say that if identifying the kind of the object violates disinterested liking, then natural beauty cannot be disinterested either. In fact, such identification falls under the theoretical cognition and thereof this identification is not a matter of reflection. Yet, the four moments of beauty, since they are the moments of judgment of taste, are the conditions of reflection on beauty. Besides, the essential significance of the disinterestedness to the existence of object lies in its emphasis on that in reflection we are not pursuing a satisfaction by using and exhausting the object.

By contrast with our interpretation of disinterested liking in art, focusing on a different aspect of it, Crowther says that disinterested liking is not possible in art, because we need the real existence of the artwork in order to be negotiated by it in understanding how the world is seen by the artist. In one respect, he is right to claim that we are negotiated by the artwork, because we reflect on what is made visible in artwork by the artist and ascribe meaning to them by means of the free play of our cognitive faculties. However, in the other respect, this claim has a potential to

\[155\] Crowther, *The Kantian Aesthetic, From Knowledge to the Avant-Garde*, p. 171

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fall into “intentional fallacy”\textsuperscript{156} by rendering the spectator dependent on the meaning of the work that the artist has in mind.

The theory of intentional fallacy claims that “the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art”\textsuperscript{157}, because appreciating artwork is a matter of spectator’s reflection on an artwork and ascribing meaning to it in accordance of what they feel in front of it. As a matter of fact, what causes to the richness and the depth of inexhaustible meanings of the artworks is the almost total independence of the meanings that we produce from the meaning that the artist has in mind. In this respect, “intention is design or plan in the author’s mind, [and] has obvious affinities for the author’s attitude toward his work, the way he felt, what made him write”\textsuperscript{158}, but once its work is off its hands and meets with the spectator, the meaning of work is emancipated from the artist and is subject to the activity of reflections of the spectators. In other words, in experiencing artistic beauty, our thoughts and feelings towards the work are in question, but not the artist’s intention. The intention of the artist is related only with the process of the creation of the work, it shows its effect only in that way. Yet, after the work is finished and meets the audience, it becomes in a way independent from the intention of the artist. A displayed work is open to interpretation, which is possible through what the work awakens in the audience or what the audience thinks the work is. Therefore, experiencing the artistic beauty is not seeking the meaning that the author puts in it, but rather is what we see in it.

Above all, we can say that appreciating artistic beauty is to like an object in a disinterested fashion in the same sense with natural beauty. Only in this way, the disinterested liking makes sense both in terms of the natural and artistic beauty. In both cases, we deal not with the real existence of the object or the work, but rather we ascribe meaning to them through reflection and this meaning is about us, a


\textsuperscript{157} Ibid. p.1

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
production of our own way of thinking about the world. Otherwise, the free play of cognitive faculties becomes impossible and the aesthetic experience turns to be a kind of theoretical cognition, through which the spectator is supposed to investigate the underlying meaning of the artwork that caused to its existence. However, on the ground of four moments of judgment of taste, this kind of an aesthetic experience is not supposed to be what Kant has in mind, because the failure of the condition of disinterested liking in terms of the artistic beauty will affect the other moments of beauty, especially subjective purposiveness. Accordingly, Kant claims that the intention of the artwork must not appear in the work explicitly and by this means the artwork must look like nature. This claim shows us that both the disinterested liking and subjective purposiveness are valid for appreciation of artistic beauty, because without seeing the intention of the artist in the artwork, we become free both from the determinate purpose and from the real existence of the work.

However, while a work of art is created in a purposive way, in accordance with intentionality, how can it hide its purpose? Also, while an artist creates its work by means of the purpose in his mind, how can it judge its work in terms of its beauty in accordance with the subjective purposiveness? How the artist creates its work in a disinterested manner? These questions refer to the necessity of genius for fine art. In this context, genius is supposed to be the ability to produce towards its intentions without revealing them in the form of its work. For this reason Kant defines genius as

Fine art is the art of genius [and] genius is the talent (natural endowment) that gives the rule to art. Since talent is an innate productive ability of the artist and as such belongs itself to nature, we could also put in this way: Genius is the innate mental predisposition (ingenum) through which nature give the rule to art.\(^{160}\)

However, neither the subjective purposiveness nor disinterested liking seems to be possible for genius as an individual human being in judging its work throughout the production process. Thereof, this point becomes the first problem caused by

\(^{159}\) CJ, 307
\(^{160}\) CJ, 307
Kant’s ignorance of considering the aesthetic experience from the artist’s standpoint. If we try to interpret this problem by claiming that aesthetic experience of the artist does not arise through pure aesthetic judgment, which includes perfectly all of the four moments of beauty, but rather it is a modification of the pure aesthetic judgment\textsuperscript{161}, then we should face with the absurd and unrealistic conception of the genius. Similar to Nietzsche’s critique to Kant, it is very odd to say that the artist does not experience beauty in a pure manner, although it creates beauty. Under these circumstances, with regards to the relation with beauty, the audience seems to have more superior, mature, intensive and richer capacity to judge than the artist has, since artist’s experience cannot meet all of the conditions of the judgment of taste. The inability of the artist in being a good judge of beauty, thereof, refers to the paradoxical structure of the genius, which we will examine in the following section.

3.3. Possessing Genius and Being Genius: An Interpretation of Natural Endowment

In this section, we will try to clarify the definition of genius given by Kant in terms of its contradictory implications on nature and freedom. In the definition, Kant designates two contradictory aspects of genius as its simultaneous active and passive role in creation of art. By saying that genius gives the rule to art, Kant emphasizes the active role of the genius on the existence of its work and this activity of it is in consistency with his definition of art as production through freedom. Yet, since Kant defines genius as an innate productive ability or natural endowment, its active role in creation of the artwork becomes suspicious. If its talent is a natural endowment and if it has no control on its talent, then it becomes a passive carrier of its talent and its role on the artwork cannot be something more than a neutral mediator between nature and artwork. In this sense, genius’ active power on its creation vanishes and it becomes to be possessed by nature’s power. In this sense, genius produces art because of the necessity of its nature. In this respect, what gives the rule to art

through its free productive ability is not the genius itself, but rather is the nature by using genius as a means to its end. However, since fine art as a kind of art must be free production, this passivity of genius causes an incompatibility with the meaning of art. Is genius only a carrier of a talent, which is kept under control by the natural powers or is it the real possessor of its own talent and does it have the right to produce freely through using its talent? Is genius just an instrument to the nature’s ends or is it an end in itself? Is it a programmed machine or is it a free human being?

Within this framework genius’ simultaneous active and passive role in creation process causes a tension between the nature of genius and its freedom in production to emerge. On the one hand, genius should be a free law giver to its work in virtue of the definition of art. On the other hand, since its talent is given to him by nature, it does not choose to be a genius, but rather do what its nature necessitates. Therefore, its free will to choose to create and its necessary nature contradict with each other. However, understanding this tension between natural necessity and freedom and trying to defuse it, if it is possible, requires a detailed examination of the meaning of nature mentioned in the definition. For this purpose, now we will examine the meaning of genius and the nature of genius, in accordance with which we will try to understand and interpret the meaning of natural endowment, which has a critical importance for us to identify the genius in Kantian terms and to describe genius’ standpoint towards beauty.

In the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment”, Kant uses two different notions of genius, one of which refers to the uniquely gifted individual as the artist and the second of which refers to the genius as the productive faculty of mind.\footnote{Bradley Murray, “Kant on Genius and Art”, British Journal of Aesthetics, 47.2, (April 2007): 199-214, pp. 199-200}\footnote{CJ, 308} In the above mentioned definition of genius, in which it is determined as the necessary condition of fine art, it is identified with a special talent, which is grounded on the artist’s mental productive faculty.\footnote{Bradley Murray, “Kant on Genius and Art”, British Journal of Aesthetics, 47.2, (April 2007): 199-214, pp. 199-200} On the other hand, in another section, where
Kant compares the scientist with geniuses, he gives the examples for genius as Homer and Wieland.\textsuperscript{164} Afterwards, he says that

For the scientists’ talent lies in continuing to increase the perfection of our cognitions and of all the benefits that depend on [these], as well as in imparting that same knowledge to others; and in these respects they are far superior to those who merit the honor of being called geniuses.\textsuperscript{165}

As we can see in this paragraph, Kant makes a clear distinction between a person and its talent, and in accordance with this he uses the term genius not just to refer to the talent of the artist, but rather to the artist itself. By depending on these two different aspects of the Kantian concept of genius, in order to understand the meaning of being genius we have to ask ourselves two different questions, i.e., what is genius and who is genius? However, since one’s mental powers cannot be detached from its individuality, these questions should be answered in reference to each other, so that the concept of genius can be grasped as a unity.

Considering these two meanings of genius together with the tension between the necessity of genius’ nature and its freedom of production, we can say that by the given nature of genius, Kant refers to genius in terms of its being productive mental faculties. In this sense, he is supposed to think that in virtue of this special innate talent, an ordinary individual becomes a genius. For this reason, the natural endowment must be understood as the special mental abilities given by nature to an individual. However, since production through freedom is a matter of one’s capacity of grounding its act on reason, the necessary and natural mental faculties of genius and its freedom still contradict with each other.

How can the faculties of reason act simultaneously both in a necessary and also in a free fashion? How is it possible for somebody to produce an artwork freely, although its mental faculties of producing perform their function in a necessary fashion? There would remain no difference between free and necessary production, if here Kant claimed that the artist thinks that it chooses freely to produce, although he

\textsuperscript{164} CJ, 309
\textsuperscript{165} CJ, 309
acts only in accordance with its necessary nature. Yet, it is important to emphasize
here that this possible annihilation of the distinction between freedom and natural
necessity through the concept of genius can be read as a possible reconciliation
between them. In this sense, this concept of genius, which in definition contradicts
with itself at first sight, can be the first signal of its significance in the system in
terms of the bridging missions of the CJ and especially the mission of unifying
theoretical and practical areas. Yet, before we make certain claims about this role of
genius in the system, we should first clarify the notion of natural endowment.

First of all, since the obscure meaning of natural endowment is essentially
dependent on Kant’s usage of the concept of nature in the definition of genius, I
think that if this meaning of nature can be solved, then the meaning of natural
endowment becomes clear and the contradiction that it caused can be solved.

In the Kantian philosophical system, there are different meanings of nature,
which basically depend on the distinction between noumena and phenomena.
Therefore, examination of this specific meaning of nature should be made within the
framework of this essential division of the system. This method will be the most
effective way for our examination by saving us from getting lost in the crowd of the
implications of the concept of nature. Phenomena and noumena refer respectively to
the possible objects that can be rationally knowable and the possible objects that
cannot be rationally knowable but only thinkable. In accordance with this division,
the phenomenal realm refers to the totality of possible objects of cognition and
noumenal realm refers to the objects of thought that are beyond the limits of our
cognitive capacity. In reference to this, whereas nature in the phenomenal sense
refers to the sensible nature, which is a totality of the possible objects depended on
our cognitive capacities; nature in the noumenal sense refers to a supersensible
nature, which is beyond our knowing capacity, i.e., our thoughts about nature, in and
through which we represent nature as it is in itself.

We can use these basic senses of nature in a judgment either as adjective (as an
indicator of formality) like nature of an individual object in order to signify “the
connection of the determinations of a thing according to an inner principle of causality”\textsuperscript{166} or as substantive (as an indicator of materiality)\textsuperscript{167} in order to signify the nature in its entirety. In this respect, when we use the phenomenal sense of nature adjectivally, we refer to the physical features of an object, which are determined by the necessary rules of the understanding. In the same way, phenomenal nature in its substantive usage refers to “the unity in the existence of appearances”\textsuperscript{168}, i.e., to nature as a dynamic whole, which consists of the relation between appearances. However, when we use nature in its noumenal sense as adjective or as substantive, we do not refer to the nature that has objective reality, but rather to our reflection on nature, through which we represent the nature as it is in itself. In accordance with this, we can say that noumenal nature as adjective refers to the internal cause of an object in a purposive fashion, and as substantive refers to the purposive unity of all objects of thought.

On this ground, Kant says that the rational treatment of nature as “sum of given objects (whether given to the senses, or if we will, to some other kind of intuition)”\textsuperscript{169} can be possible only in two ways, i.e., either in a physical (immanent) or a hyperphysical (transcendent) fashion.\textsuperscript{170} In the physical treatment, reason is concerned with nature as the sum of all objects given to the senses in accordance with the a priori conditions.\textsuperscript{171} Objects of the senses can be given either to the outer senses or to the inner sense. On the one hand, reason deals with the sum of objects given to the outer senses and produces the knowledge of corporeal nature, which is entitled physics.\textsuperscript{172} On the other hand, reason is concerned with the soul that is the object of the inner sense and produces knowledge of thinking nature, which is entitled psychology.\textsuperscript{173} Since both in these two physical treatments, reason is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{166} CPR, A 418, B 446, fn. b
\item \textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{168} CPR, A 419, B 447
\item \textsuperscript{169} CPR, A 845, B 873
\item \textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{171} CPR, A 846, B 874
\item \textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
dependent on the a priori conditions of knowledge; it produces objectively real knowledge of nature.

Yet, in the transcendent treatment, reason is concerned with nature that surpasses all experience.\textsuperscript{174} In other words, in hyperphysical treatment, reason takes the connection of the objects of experience in a transcendent fashion.\textsuperscript{175} By being independent of a priori conditions of knowledge it reflects on the connection of the objects in order to have a representation of nature as it is in itself. In this transcendent treatment of nature, reason deals with nature either in terms of its inner connection or in terms of its outer connection.\textsuperscript{176} If the inner connection of the nature in its entirety is dealt with by reason, it is entitled “transcendental knowledge of the world”.\textsuperscript{177} However, if reason deals with the outer connection of the nature to a transcendent being, it is entitled “transcendental knowledge of God”.\textsuperscript{178} The important point about these two ways of transcendent treatment of nature is that neither the transcendental knowledge of the world nor transcendental knowledge of God has objective reality, because in these treatments reason takes its objects in its transcendent relation with itself or in terms of its relation with a being beyond experience.

These transcendent senses of nature, we can say, are the results of the tendency of reason towards the unconditioned unity\textsuperscript{179}. In other words, in thinking the nature in its entirety reason does not satisfied with a mechanical or empirical explanation of nature\textsuperscript{180}, because such an explanation gives rise to infinite diversity in nature. Instead of getting lost in this infinite diversity of empirical nature, reason wants to unify this infinite diversity of nature under the unconditioned condition of it. Therefore, whenever reason tries to determine nature in terms of these transcendent senses, it surpasses its boundaries and enters into the noumenal realm. For this

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{179} Lara Oštarić, “Between Insight and Judgment: Kant’s Conception of Genius and Its Fate in Early Schelling”, Diss. U of Notre Dame, Indiana, 2006, p.25-6  
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
reason, transcendental knowledge of the world and of God indicates reason’s thought of nature in noumenal sense, in and through which it puts the transcendent nature (a systematic unity) on the ground of all reality. In this respect, the transcendent meaning of nature refers to our representation of it as an unconditioned purposive unity. Such sense of nature, thereof, remains just a regulative Idea of systematic unity, which does not assume the existence of its object and does not have objective reality.

On the ground of these meanings of nature, we can say that the nature of genius can be interpreted in two ways. By using the term nature as an adjective in relation to the genius, we refer to the formal features of genius. In this regard, on the one hand, we can interpret its talent or its special mental faculties of it as the physical features of genius, which are determined by the necessary causal relations, and thereof, arises as a possibility within the phenomenal realm. Here, the nature of genius and its talent as a part of its nature are not something more than the corporeal or physical features that are the results of causal relations. On the other hand, we can also interpret its talent in a transcendent fashion as a purposive internal cause of genius, which surpasses the knowledge of phenomena and implies a beyond unknown intelligent cause. In other words, here by taken the nature of genius in a noumenal sense, we imply the natural features, which are designed in accordance with some purpose by an intelligent being, which is the unconditioned condition of all existence.

In addition to this, nature as the rule giver to art in the definition of genius is used as a substantiv. The nature as substantive can also have two meanings depend on its interpretation in a phenomenal and noumenal fashion. In phenomenal sense, as we examined above, the nature that gives the rule of art is the dynamic totality of the existences of appearances. From this perspective, the rule given to art is a necessary effect of the operation of nature, because here we treat nature as a unity that has a mechanical structure. Also, genius as an empirical entity in this mechanical structure has a contingent existence. Besides, in noumenal sense, the rule giver nature can be understood as the purposive unity, which is designed by the unconditioned
intelligence. From this perspective, nature acts in accordance with purposes, and every entity within it exist in virtue of their purposes.

In the light of these meanings of nature in the Kantian system, we can interpret the natural endowment in two ways either within the frameworks of phenomenal realm or noumenal realm. These interpretations can be called as the physicalist and the romantic understanding of the Kantian concept of genius.

Firstly, from a physicalist standpoint by grounding our interpretation on the phenomenal sense of nature, we say that while human beings as material bodies live in different spatio-temporal coordinates and have common characteristic of human species, they are also unique by having many individual physical differences in perceptual and genetic levels, which brings about the different world-view. In accordance with our unique world-view, we experience life, think about the world and express our ideas. Although we live with others in a society within the same social structures and subject to the same social norms, the specific ways that we choose to achieve our ends and the meanings that we ascribe to the world outside and inside us make us different from other people and consequently every human being becomes a unique individual.

In this respect, we can say that the Kantian genius as the natural endowment is “based on physically grounded differential origins”. If we also think that everybody has talent for different activities and that our different predispositions makes us to succeed in different fields, we can say that genius’ talent is nothing over and beyond the kind of talent everybody has. However, since genius is not an ordinary phenomenon that we can encounter every day, I think that Kant should imply something superior than the ordinary predisposition everybody has. In fact, since this natural endowment turns an ordinary individual into a genius, such a powerful talent cannot be considered equal to ordinary abilities. Moreover, this point

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181 Crowther, The Kantian Aesthetic, From Knowledge to the Avant-Garde, p.147.
182 Ibid.
183 CJ, 318
of view seems reductionist, because a world-view is not only a matter of genetic and physical differences, but we develop and enlarge our world-views with the help of learning by living, whereas, genius’ talent is neither acquired nor it is teachable.\(^{184}\) It is a special gift given by nature to genius.

Moreover, taken noumenal sense of nature into consideration, we represent nature to ourselves as if it is a purposive unity designed by an intelligent being. On this ground, from the Romantic point of view, we can interpret this notion of natural endowment as follows: nature as a living organism chooses a person and gives it a talent, through which nature discloses itself to the humanity in its works. Since in the Romantic understanding human being is created by nature\(^{185}\) or human being is intrinsically a natural creature, this kind of understanding sees genius as the symbol of unity of nature and freedom. Likewise, Wicks says that Kant’s position holds that “great works of art divinely inspired and God speaks to us inspirationally through both the artistic genius and through nature”.\(^{186}\) In this sense, “artistic products themselves can be regarded as natural products whose underlying intelligibility suggests the compatibility of nature with moral demands”.\(^{187}\)

Moreover, Zammito says that “artistic genius cannot explain his own achievement, cannot reproduce it at will, and cannot teach to others.”\(^{188}\) Thereof, genius is only a vehicle of natural revelation.\(^{189}\) However, this point of view seems magical and mythical, because the ability to choose implies necessarily free will and reason. If we are going to claim that nature has the capacity of free will, it means that we begin to make determinations about the noumenal realm. With regards to such a determination of the noumenal realm, this romantic interpretation of natural endowment is to say that Kant violates his own laws within his philosophical system. Yet, considering the bridging role of \(CJ\) together with this romantic view about

\(^{184}\) CJ, 309  
\(^{185}\) Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment*, p.136  
\(^{186}\) Wicks, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on Judgment*, p. 123  
\(^{187}\) Ibid. p. 124  
\(^{188}\) Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment*, p.140  
\(^{189}\) Ibid.
genius, we can say that it is not impossible for Kant to use genius’ nature in the
noumenal sense, because in this way he may think of a possible consistency between
nature and freedom.

In the light of these two opposite interpretation of the nature of genius we can
say, on the one hand, from the Romantic point of view, genius becomes just a means
between the audience and nature in itself or God, which uses the genius as a pen to
write about itself. Also, when we admit this view, we should also regard genius not
as a human being but as an instrument, which is set up by the nature. In this case,
genius has not a real active power on his production and on his mind and we cannot
even mention about his freedom. On the other hand, when we take the side of
physicalist view, there is nothing left to make genius special or extraordinary and in
this case we do not need any natural gift for genius. This is to say that if genius’
talent is considered just like any of our specific differences from other people, we
should say that everyone as unique being has a natural gift and in this respect we do
not need a special definition made for genius.

However, this noumenal sense of nature comes in sight not only in this
definition of genius. In his essay “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan
Point of View” 190, Kant uses the same noumenal sense of nature by saying that “[t]he
history of mankind can be seen, in the large, as the realization of Nature’s secret plan
to bring forth a perfectly constituted state as the only condition in which the
capacities of mankind can be fully developed”. 191 Here, nature is used in its
noumenal sense, because having a secret plan for mankind is not within the capacity
of phenomenal nature. Only a purposive unity can design a plan and thereof this kind
of nature must be the noumenal nature. Although we tend to think that it is
impossible for Kant to posit the noumena as a condition of the possibility of
something, moving from this explicit example of the reference to noumenal nature in
the history, we can say that it is not impossible to interpret genius’ nature as

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191 Ibid., p.21
noumenal nature. We accept that it sounds mythical especially within the Kantian philosophical system, but in this way Kant might try to dissolve the tension between natural necessity and freedom and to offer the harmony between nature and freedom in the genius’ creation implicitly.

Likewise, Oštarić claims that the meaning of nature in the definition of genius implies the noumenal sense of nature inside of us, and by this Kant refers to the supersensible substrate of humanity.\textsuperscript{192} The supersensible substratum of humanity is claimed by Kant as the ground of judgment of taste\textsuperscript{193} and regarded “as if the concept of the supersensible or noumenal ground of existence of both subjects and objects of knowledge and taste were the only indeterminate concept available”.\textsuperscript{194} This noumenal concept is introduced by Kant to solve the antinomy of taste, i.e., the contradiction arisen from the two theses concerning the principle of taste. On the one hand, “a judgment of taste is not based on concepts”\textsuperscript{195}, because it is not a matter of theoretical cognition. On the other hand, “a judgment of taste is based on concepts”, because otherwise we cannot expect the other people’s necessary assent on our judgment.\textsuperscript{196} These contradictory claims are solved by Kant by means of the concept of the noumenal ground of all existence, which is the supersensible substratum of humanity. Only on this supersensible ground of nature, we have the ability to judge the beautiful as if our judgment had objective validity. In other words, by means of this supersensible concept of nature, the antinomy of taste is solved as follows: “A judgment of taste is not based on a determinate concept, [but rather], on an indeterminate one”\textsuperscript{197}

Since this concept of supersensible substratum is at the ground of all existence, as we mentioned above, both the nature of the subject and of the object is grounded on it. Therefore, this supersensible substratum refers to the noumenal nature outside

\textsuperscript{192} Oštarić, “Between Insight and Judgment: Kant’s Conception of Genius and Its Fate in Early Schelling”, p. 109
\textsuperscript{193} CJ, 340
\textsuperscript{194} Paul Guyer, \textit{Kant and the Claims of Taste} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 301
\textsuperscript{195} CJ, 338
\textsuperscript{196} CJ, 338-9
\textsuperscript{197} CJ, 340-1
of us and inside of us. Moving from this point, when we reconsider the nature of genius, we can say that like our mysterious ability of taste, which is possible by the supersensible substratum of humanity, the contradiction between genius’ nature and its freedom can be solved by means of this noumenal concept. Whereas we have the ability to judge beauty with some kind of a certainty without using any determinate concept by virtue of our supersensible inner nature, genius can create freely although its productive ability is given by nature. In other words, genius, by means of its supersensible nature, has rich and fancy ideas that came in its mind in an inexplicable way, but he combines them and brings an artwork as the embodiment of these ideas in a free fashion through judging it with its taste. In this way, while its freedom in production is saved, the unknown source of its productive ability is clarified.

To claim that genius is not able to explain how the ideas come to his mind is actually to claim that genius has a field to act and produce freely, because knowing the cause of the birth of these ideas in a theoretical fashion would restrain it from the free play of its cognitive faculties. Yet, by means of such a supersensible nature of subject, both the unknown source of these ideas is explained and the freedom of genius is saved. In relation to this Desmond says that genius is a sign of an undeniable transcendence in human existence. This is to say that

The transcendent other may be put in clouds, or indeed placed on ice by the Enlightenment, but the need and exigence of transcendence does not vanish. Quite on the contrary, the genius becomes an image of transcendence as immanent, as actually coming to manifestness in human existence. It seems we do not have to look to a “beyond” for a sense of the transcendent: genius brings the “beyond” into the here and now.

In addition to this claim we can also say that within the context of this supersensible substratum of humanity, the need of something transcendent is not just manifested in the genius, but also it shows itself in every one of us whenever we experience beauty. In fact, the most remarkable example of the emergence of this need of transcendent as a symptom can be regarded as Kant, because such a man of

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198 Desmond. Art, Origins, Otherness, p.62
199 Ibid.
principle posits a noumenal condition within his system, although he is well aware that the concept of supersensible substratum of humanity refers to a mysterious, an inexplicable aspect of us. Now, in order to understand how “genius brings the beyond into the here and now”\(^\text{200}\), we will examine the process of artistic creation and the essential constituents of it.

### 3.4. The Process of Artistic Production

Whereas in appreciating natural beauty, we found an indeterminate purposiveness in the form of a natural object by means of the free play or harmony between our cognitive faculties, now in fine art genius must create such a work, which we judge in terms of whether it awakens the free play by forcing us to think more than what we perceive. For this, the purpose should not be exhibited explicitly in the work, i.e., the art work should appear as natural object, and hence the genius should express a subject or an idea in an indirect fashion, in rough terms, by using analogies and metaphors. Genius creates its work on an appropriate medium by combining these analogies, which express an idea in a rich fashion, in terms of their relations with each other in accordance with a specific order.

In this production process, there are two constitutive elements, which are genius’ talent and its ability of taste. Since by the talent we refer to the unknown sourced ideas or genius’ inspiration, and their rule-governed embodiment in a medium, genius’ special talent provides rich material for artwork by discovering aesthetic ideas and expressing them in a peculiar fashion. On the ground of our interpretation of natural endowment, we can say that “genius has the capacity to intuit- that is, the noumenal sense of nature to which Kant also refers as “the nature outside of us”.\(^\text{201}\) However, this does not mean that genius has the capacity to intuit the noumenal nature itself, but rather it intuits the noumenal nature as an Idea.\(^\text{202}\) In this

\(^{200}\) Ibid.

\(^{201}\) Oštarić, “Between Insight and Judgment: Kant’s Conception of Genius and Its Fate in Early Schelling”, p. 67

\(^{202}\) Ibid., p. 113
respect, like our experience of artistic beauty as producing ideas by reflecting on the expression of the work, genius has the ability to intuit the noumenal nature in an indirect fashion by means of the aesthetic ideas. Put another way, by means of the analogy of the indirect communication between us and genius, we can also understand the relation between noumenal nature and genius, who can intuit noumenal nature not within the determinate concepts, but as aesthetic ideas.

Moreover, since these ideas should be expressed in a certain order in accordance with the necessary structure of the used medium in order to become communicable, at this point, the ability of taste steps in. Kant says that

Taste, like the power of judgment in general, consists in disciplining (or training) genius. It severely clips its wings, and makes it civilized, or polished; but at the same time it gives it guidance as to how far and over what it may spread while still remaining purposive. It introduces clarity and order into a wealth of thought, and hence makes the ideas durable, fit for approval that it both lasting and universal, and [hence] fit for being followed by others and fit for an ever advancing culture.\textsuperscript{203}

The intuited rich material, namely the aesthetic ideas, can become communicable, if they are expressed in an order, which can be grasped by others. Since in experiencing beauty we use judgment of taste, and since artistic beauty of fine art can be judged only by means of taste, the artwork should have an order or form that fits to be judged. Otherwise, without an order of the aesthetic ideas, the work becomes only husky-voiced soliloquy of the artist. This is to say that genius’ special ability to intuit the aesthetic ideas is possible through the activity of productive imagination. Making these aesthetic ideas communicable in expression, the activity of productive imagination must accord with the lawfulness of the understanding. “For if the imagination is left in lawless freedom, all its riches [in ideas] produce nothing but nonsense”.\textsuperscript{204} This necessary combination of lawless freedom of imagination and lawfulness of the understanding is actually to control the thin line between genius and insanity. Without the lawfulness of understanding, the

\textsuperscript{203} CJ, 319
\textsuperscript{204} CJ, 319
expression of aesthetic ideas turns out to be an inconceivable meaningless mass, in which the relation between the ideas is invisible and hence not available to be followed. Because of this, lawless freedom of imagination can only produce nonsense like in the case of painter Frenhofer, who works so hard for years to create his masterpiece and in the end produces nonsense, a meaningless mass of lines, colors and shapes.

In this respect, in addition to its creative talent, the genius should work and practice its ability of taste, through which it find the best way to express its ideas in a medium. This point also implies that since a medium has some necessary physical feature, like the necessary hue of the mixture of different colors, or the specific sound of the each one of the piano keys, genius should also discover these features of its medium. Depending on the fact that using these features perfectly is a matter of practicing on them, the ability to express the ideas in a physical form (in a medium) successfully depends on genius’ accumulation of knowledge about its medium. On this ground, it requires taste to express its ideas on the combination of these features in a beautiful form. Since even genius can judge the beauty of its artwork only through taste, taste becomes a restriction of its imaginative freedom in a positive sense. In this sense, the perfect expression of love in artistic fashion, on the one hand depends on the special talent of genius, through which it discovers the concept of love as aesthetic ideas, but on the other hand depends on its ability of taste, through which it expresses the discovered ideas within its medium in a perfect way, in which they do not lose their meanings ascribed by genius. Therefore, practicing and learning through trial and error method provide to genius the way of expression of aesthetic ideas in a beautiful form. However, what does Kant mean by these aesthetic ideas?

By an aesthetic idea I mean a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., no [determinate] concept, can be adequate, so that no language can

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express it completely and allow us to grasp. It is easy to see that an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which is, conversely, a concept to which no intuition (presentation of the imagination) can be adequate.”

Depending on this definition of aesthetic ideas, we can say that Munch’s painting *The Scream* in its totality is an aesthetic idea, on which we can reflect and produce many thoughts by means of the free play of the imagination and the understanding. Yet, no determinate concept can express exactly what we think or feel in front of it. On the other hand, the full name of it, *The Scream of The Nature*, can be regarded as a rational idea, because just the expression independently from the painting cannot have an intuition, no sound that we hear in nature can be the exact equivalence of the scream of nature and if it is tried to be represented, there would be infinite possibilities of representations, every each of which will be deficient in some sense. With reference to our example, however, we can say that the name of the painting and the painting itself are the counterparts, because they are approximate complements of each other, that is, the painting gives a sensible expression of a nonsensible idea. Therefore, the aesthetic ideas as “inner intuition to which no concept can be completely adequate” is the ability or power to express the rational ideas in a sensible way that surpasses the limits of experience. In other words, aesthetic ideas open the door of the world of meanings, because it surpasses experience within its sensible structure. In comparison to our capability of surpassing the natural necessity which can take place in appreciating the beauty of the artwork, the power of genius consists both the ability to communicate about what is beyond in a sensible fashion and to create a beyond out of what is sensible.

In this context, since the aesthetic ideas provide sensible content to rational ideas in a symbolic way, a poet’s description of, for example, its love for somebody or of the concept of love in general by using the flow of a river analogically has no arbitrary structure. The genius poet represents the flow of water as a description or definition of love and its ability to do this lies in its talent to intuit the noumenal
nature as an aesthetic idea. In other words, the poet is capable of intuiting the meaning of the flow of the river as it is in itself; when it looks at the river it does not see just the physical movement of a physical object, but rather he does see the meaning of this movement, its purpose, its life. For it, the velocity and the intensity of the waves symbolize actually the enthusiasm on the way to the beloved. The river flows in a certain direction with the purpose of reuniting with its passion. In this respect, the genius expresses in its poem what the flow of river in itself is. In this way, he also expresses what love is in its real sense and what it might resemble. It gives the sensible expression of love by seeing love in the water.

In this context, the physical bodies and features that are used as representatives in an artwork are dematerialized by means of the meanings that they carry. These meanings or the symbolic ways of expression are produced or are formed owing to the activity of productive imagination. This is to say that whereas in theoretical cognition the reproductive imagination is responsible for the accord between intuitions and concepts, and hence it is bound with the law of association, in experience of beauty, as we told in the previous chapter, it becomes productive and free from the strict rules of conceptual determinacy. Although the productive imagination should be in harmony with the lawfulness of the understanding in the form giving activity of genius to an object in order to express the aesthetic ideas in a communicative fashion, in producing aesthetic ideas it is free to represent what is intuited. Thus, the genius through its productive imagination, which is free from the law of association\(^\text{208}\), makes the sensible a means to its end and thus it surpasses the natural necessity within its work. In relation to this Kant says that genius, by means of the power of productive imagination, creates another nature out of the material of the actual nature.\(^\text{209}\) In other words, genius by being free of the law of association breaks the necessity of causal chain in nature. By using the sensible, it creates

\(^{208}\) CJ, 314
\(^{209}\) CJ, 314
another nature, which consists of the ideas that surpasses the bounds of sense\textsuperscript{210} and is called as the world of meanings. Therefore, in Kantian terms,

\begin{quote}
[a]n aesthetic idea is a presentation of the imagination, which is conjoined with a given concept and is connected, when we use imagination in its freedom, with such a multiplicity of partial presentation that no expression that stands for a determinate concept can be found for it.\textsuperscript{211}
\end{quote}

In genius’ way of surpassing natural necessity, we can see that Kant assigns to productive imagination an ability to present the meaning of something in a preconceptual and prelinguistic way\textsuperscript{212}. In this way, a poem becomes the poem rather than a mere multiplicity of letters or a painting becomes a work of fine art rather than being mere figures, and art becomes the opening gate to the world of meanings. However, a poem can be beautiful as long as it was written under the control of taste, and in the same way a painting can be beautiful as long as the aesthetic ideas gain an order and clear expression by being painted in the most proper color, shape, perspective etc. In short, art can be “fine” art as long as the discovered ideas are embodied through passing the test of taste without losing their meaning grounded on their power of surpassing natural necessity.

An artwork, by being a result of the combination of genius’ talent and its ability of taste, is a way of communication in a general sense between genius and observers, and, in a broader sense between noumena and observers. In other words, since the completed work of genius becomes open to the meaning giving activity of appreciators, the genius becomes the ability to communicate about what lies beyond or about noumena in and through its sensible work and this is all thanks to the aesthetic ideas produced in virtue of its talent. Therefore, both from the perspective of observers and from the perspective of the artists, in artworks, the invisible is

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{211} \textit{CJ}, 316
\end{flushright}
rendered visible in a beautiful form, and this is the ground of the communicability of
the inexhaustible meaning of art.

However, in its essential sense, experiencing an artwork, regardless of whether
it is approached in a creative fashion or in an appreciating fashion, is a way of one’s
communicating with oneself, with one’s inner world. Facing with the meanings,
producing them, and reconciling with these meanings within the framework of
beauty, mean in a way squaring the accounts with one’s inner world, getting the
answer of one’s questions about life and shaking hands with them. In fact, from the
artistic point of view, this communication of the artist with itself becomes a pitched
battle because of the conflict between its talent (its nature) and taste. While the
irrepressible nature in it produces endless ideas like strange unstoppable voices in his
head and demands to be satisfied by being expressed in a certain form, the expression
of them on a medium requires clarity, a rule-governed order of this intensive, rich but
inexplicit and chaotic pile of ideas. In this respect, facing with our existence and its
meaning through appreciating a beautiful artwork is likely to result with a happy
reconciliation with it. However, for a genius, creating a beautiful work of fine art is
more likely suffering, which ends in the accomplishment of each work and starts
over for the new creation. In relation to this Hölderlin says that “I fear that I might
end like the old Tantalus who received more from the God than he could take”\(^{213}\). In
a similar way, Van Gogh wrote that “Well, as for my own work, I risk my life in it
and my sanity has already half melted away in it.”\(^{214}\) Also, about tough experiences
of artists, Rilke says that “works of art are always the product of a risk one has run,
of an experience taken to its extreme limit, to the point where man can no longer go
on.”\(^{215}\)

However, how does the vividness of genius’ experience survive in the artwork
under the pressure of the rules of taste? How do the unstoppable voices in genius’

Press, 1999), p. 5
\(^{214}\) Ibid.
\(^{215}\) Ibid.
head survive in the letters, colors, notes etc.? How does genius succeed to protect the life that it intuits in noumenal nature as aesthetic ideas? In other words, how does genius succeed to convey the life intuited as aesthetic idea to the appreciators without ruining it?

The Spirit, which is the ability to exhibit the aesthetic ideas\textsuperscript{216}, provides conveying the life intuited within the aesthetic ideas to observers. Genius exhibits these aesthetic ideas in such a way, through which the life sustains itself in a new material body. In other words, in virtue of spirit, the other nature created by genius gains life, which shadows itself forth to the observers in a pre-conceptual and pre-linguistic fashion, that is, by means of the activity of productive imagination. In this respect, genius in virtue of its spirit is the ability to create another nature, which does not lose its life in the process of transformation from the former nature intuited by genius. Through spirit, the relations between aesthetic ideas are combined in a powerful and effective way, in which the aesthetic ideas are aimed to animate the soul and give the purposive momentum to the mental powers.\textsuperscript{217} This is to say that spirit is the style of genius, on the background of which genius judges its work-in-process through taste to test it in terms of whether it animates the mental powers or not. Thus genius, in the creation process, becomes both the observer and also the creator of its work. In relation to this Wicks says that if we look at a beautiful object of nature, we cognize it as an object through the determinate natural laws that constitute the form of it, but on the other hand, we intuit something purposive in this form or a ‘mysterious quality’, which lets us think about that the object has a life as a part of the living nature.\textsuperscript{218} This mysterious quality is called as spirit.\textsuperscript{219} In the same sense, for there to be beauty of fine art, genius should create its work as if he gives to it a life.

\textsuperscript{216} CJ, 313–4
\textsuperscript{217} CJ, 313
\textsuperscript{218} Wicks, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on Judgment, p. 125
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
The unknown-sourced and inspired ideas, which are combined with each other in such a way, which serves as a reflection of life, become ordered in accordance with a rule. However, since this rule can be found only by judging the artwork in process through taste, this rule cannot be learned but only discovered or originated by genius, and hence it should be an original rule. What I am trying to say is that since judgment of taste is not a mechanical process, but rather a matter of reflection, the rule, which will be the ground of the beautiful form of the combination of the aesthetic ideas, cannot be learned from another source and applied to the work. On the contrary, genius must invent it with the help of its own way of practicing its taste, because only an original rule that is invented by genius can express its ideas in a perfect form that fits and preserves the life they carry.

3.5. A Critique and An Evaluation of Kant’s Theory of Genius: A Possible Consistency between Freedom and Necessity

On this ground, genius’ judgment on its work through taste implies that the four moments of judgment of taste, i.e., disinterested, necessary and universal liking and subjective purposiveness, are the necessary conditions also for genius to produce its work as a kind of beauty. In this respect, Kant thinks that creating the content of an artwork and bringing a work into existence as a beautiful object of art are two different modes of experience. While the former is possible by the courtesy of its nature, i.e., by means of its talent, which is conferred directly on it by the hands of nature\(^{220}\), the latter depends on the ability of taste, which is common to every human being, and hence it does not pertain only to genius. In fact, concerning this Kant says that “taste is merely an ability to judge, not to produce”\(^{221}\).

Depending on this, it is plausible to say that in one respect Kant spectatorizes the creator of beauty. For Kant, it seems that there is no difference between beautifying a work and appreciating its beauty, because both of them are experiences

\(^{220}\) CJ, 309  
\(^{221}\) CJ, 313
of beauty, and thus they are possible only through the judgment of taste. However, how is it possible to isolate the activities of producing content and expressing it in a beautiful way from each other in the process of creating a beautiful work of art? Would not this isolation be an external interference to the unity of the process of the artistic creation, while they strongly interpenetrate each other in the authentic act of artistic creation? As a matter of fact, originality and spirit of genius are examined as the elements of the genius’ activity of giving a beautiful form to the produced content, and thus they are regarded as the parts of genius’ judging its work through taste, although they pertain to genius’ special capacity. Therefore, I think that this haziness about the issue of spirit and originality is one of the conspicuous results of Kant’s attempt to distinguish genius’ taste from its ability to produce.

Moreover, as we introduced before in Nietzsche’s critic to Kant, the moment of disinterested liking becomes problematic as a result of this spectatorized genius. I think that it is impossible for genius to stay detached from the existence of its work in judging its beauty, while the work or the content of it, which is supposed to be formed, is originated from the very existence of genius. In other words, genius deals already with the existence of its work when it gives a form to it and thus it is impossible for it to render itself just the spectator in front of its own work. Besides if we also consider Hölderlin’s statement, with which he describes the burden of artistic talent\textsuperscript{222}, we can say that it is meaningful for an artist to feel satisfied in front of its own work of art, because in a sense its artwork is a way of externalizing the unstoppable voices in its head. However, in the case of Stendhal’s description of beauty as “a promise of happiness”, I think that there is no contradiction with Kantian understanding of beauty, if we approach to this issue from a broader perspective. Since Kant sees beauty as a result of the harmonic play between mental faculties, which arises with a feeling of pleasure, in his system the experience of beauty serves for making human being feel that there is purposiveness in this world, and hence our effort towards the moral ideal are not vain. In this respect, in Kantian system, beauty is actually a way of hoping for being worthy of happiness.

\textsuperscript{222} Agamben, \textit{The Man without Content}, p. 5
Accordingly, describing beauty as a promise of happiness, I think, is not so much different from describing beauty as a hope for happiness.

However, this point does not legitimize Kantian approach to artistic experience, because the disinterested liking still prevents genius to experience beauty in a pure fashion in the course of creation. Although genius is the capacity to create a beautiful artwork, its experience of beauty becomes inferior in quality when it is compared with appreciators’. It can put the spirit to its work, and it can even originate a rule to present the beauty in its work, but it cannot experience the beauty purely, because it fails to satisfy all of the conditions of judgment of taste. Under these circumstances, are we going to say that Kant’s adaptation of judgment of taste to genius’ experience fails or that Kant is right and no artist even the most talented one cannot experience beauty purely? When we think that an examination of genius and of its experience should reflect the facts and the attempt of conceptualizing genius’ artistic actions should not be independent of genius’ praxis, it is clear that Kant fails to give the account of artistic experience. By spectatorizing genius in front of its work he fails to explain the richness of its experience and cannot succeed to see the creation process from the artist’s standpoint.

Apart from these problems arising from the implementation of the theory on artists, what is the role of this theory of genius in the Kantian system? In accordance with the role of its examination place, the Critique of Judgment, in the system, we can say that Kant’s theory of genius is intended to establish the bridge between theoretical and practical reason. In fact, going a step further we can also say that the theory of genius is reconciliation between freedom and necessity. This is to say that the freedom of genius in artistic production, which refers to the freedom of productive imagination, takes its source from genius’s special nature. Since this natural endowment is a necessary condition of being a genius, in the artistic production the necessity of nature and the freedom of genius coincide with each other. I am trying to say that one’s nature whether it is a special gift or not indicates the necessarily determined aspect of one’s existence. In our actions we can resist the
compulsory and necessary demands of our nature through our capacity for freedom, but, in the case of artistic production the compulsory demand of genius’ nature as intuiting noumenal nature as aesthetic ideas can be satisfied only through the freedom of genius. In other words, in genius’ creative activity, the necessity of nature and the freedom of genius becomes the same, because genius’ art, which is supposed to be a free production, is mostly originated from its talent, which is bestowed upon genius by the hands of nature. In this regard, while genius produces freely, it also performs the necessary requirement of its nature.

Moreover, if we also regard our interpretation of the nature that gives the talent to genius, the noumenal nature adumbrates that it is not a chaotic mass resisting to our efforts, and that it supports our efforts and also that it can coincide with our freedom. However, here we do not mean that genius grasps this unity of freedom and necessity conceptually. Since it cannot intuit the noumenal nature directly as it is in itself, but rather indirectly as aesthetic ideas, this reconciliation between freedom and nature emerges not through concepts as knowledge, but through symbols as art. The important point here is that by the nature’s hand that touches genius, Kant may imply the unity of freedom and nature in the concept of genius. Since art arises substantially from this unity, artwork becomes the gate opening to hope and meaning.

Depending on this possible reconciliation we can see that such reconciliation is possible only by the permission of noumenal nature, i.e., only with such touch of hand of nature to human being. However, this kind of a touch of nature at least in the case of genius becomes the ground of freedom and hence it threatens human freedom, which is supposed to be an uncaused cause. In relation to this Desmond says that

[Aesthetic modernity] wants to affirm the freedom of creative origination; it wants to do this to an extreme which rejects any interference from anything other to creative freedom itself; but in affirming this freedom, it inevitably comes to see that the very power of creative imagination has something about it that it is not in the complete
self-mastery of the creative self; something other and over and above appears, and yet at the same times escapes beyond control. We begin by asserting our creative superiority, and end by wondering if we are the plaything of powers outside our control. We stand above nature, and end up as enigmatic productions thrown into being by a nature, now more enigmatic than before, and even filling us with a darker unease about something more sinister underground.223

In this respect, we can say that by being in between Enlightenment and Romanticism, Kant tried to save both the freedom of action and the expressive capacity of genius, and to this end he introduced a beyond in his system; a beyond, which becomes determinative for the concept of genius. At this point, by depending on our interpretation we can intrepidly say that even Kant, who is a man of Reason, needed to posit a transcendent ground, or in his terms a noumenal ground, which causes him to contradict with the basic aim of his philosophy, which is destroying the dogmatic metaphysics and determining the legitimate fields of knowledge and thought.

Under these circumstances, what can we say about the life of genius, whose creative capacity’s source is thrown to the unknown beyond and who is divested of the ascendancy right on its freedom? How can an individual, who is, from one aspect, a free human being, and from the other, a plaything of nature, construct its moral existence? What can we say about the moral freedom of the artist, who lives mostly in the world of meanings thanks to its nature, rather than in the world of facts? What are the reflections or implications of its special nature on its life in general? Can the art of genius serve as a supportive way to freedom both for genius itself and for humanity? Under the guidance of these questions remained from the results that we get in the end of this chapter, now in the following chapter we will examine the moral aspect of fine art and especially of genius and try to understand the relationship between artistic freedom and moral freedom through the question of genius.

223 Desmond. Art, Origins, Otherness, p.66
CHAPTER 4

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE GENIUS AND MORALITY

With reference to the image of the genius that took its shape so far in our examination, we can say that it resembles the person, who tries to see the light of the sun after coming out of the darkness of the cave in Plato’s allegory in *The Republic*\(^\text{224}\). In the allegory, when the person that came out of the darkness of the cave tries to look at the light of the sun, the light dazzles it and it becomes blind. Its sight becomes shadowy and hence it cannot perceive the surroundings as what they are, but rather as obscure and shapeless figures. It can see the sun, but not as what it is. In philosophical terms, this person can get in contact with the highest Idea (the Good) represented by the sun, but it cannot know it.

Likewise, the genius, who has the ability to intuit the noumenal nature as aesthetic ideas, does not have direct access to noumena. It traces noumena by following their shadows, but can never catch it. Everywhere in the world, it sees the noumena from behind the veil of aesthetic ideas. In fact, it lives its whole life with such half-blindness and shares what it sees with humanity. It sees goodness in the nature; it can paint it, or put it into words or into notes, but can never conceptualize it. It has in one sense an intimate relation with the noumenal reality, but in another it is too far to reach it. Although genius is the person, in whose action the necessity and the freedom coincide with each other, it is not able to comprehend this coincidence. The noumenal nature lives and acts within this special gifted person, but this fact can never be brought into cognition by genius.

Such a person does not understand the life as ordinary people do. It mostly lives within its special perspective, which surpasses ours. In other words, genius’ talent for intuiting the noumena as aesthetic ideas and discovering the noumenal reality in some way affects its general standpoint. For this special talented individual, literal comprehension is not the sufficient way to understand the

world, because its ability to intuit the noumenal reality continually announces that the world is more than it appears to be. Therefore, for it the best and the most satisfying way to understand the world and to get in contact with it consists in its ability to intuit the aesthetic ideas, through which it finds the answers of its questions and shares them with humanity as if it reveals a mystery. In this context, its way of life is formed mostly by its artistic standpoint, and thus there are no sharp boundaries between its work and its life. In fact, its work is its life. In this case, what can we say about genius’ moral life given that it has the power to shape its entire life through its artistic talent? What would be the impact of intuiting the world in a manner like a genius on our moral vocation?

Put another way, does one’s ability to set the concept of freedom to music or to poetize it or to paint it by intuiting freedom as an aesthetic idea make any difference in one’s moral life? How does genius’ artistic aspect reflect on its moral life? In fact, can we separate these two aspects from each other with sharp boundaries? My point is that if genius’ artistic acts as its way of life are also free actions, can we claim that its creative actions are also moral actions? In other words, since freedom in its basic sense means choosing to act in accordance with what reason commands, is there a difference between genius’ freedom in production and moral freedom?

To be able to find the answers to these questions, we should first examine the Kantian concept of freedom, on the ground of which we can compare and contrast the moral freedom with genius’ freedom in the production process. In accordance with the inferences that we will make in this examination of the concept of freedom, we will try to explicate the relation between art and morality, and thus get the clues of genius’ moral vocation by examining the relation of its free production to morality. Within this process, we will also find the answer of how it is possible to be moral by living aesthetically in the Kantian system. In this context, in this chapter we will question whether the Kantian genius is possible in terms of morality, and if it is possible, whether genius or we are blinder towards life.
4.1. An Examination of Kant’s Concept of Freedom through the Question of Genius

Up to this chapter, it is clear that by aesthetic freedom Kant refers to the harmonic free play of imagination and understanding arising in the course of judging an object in terms of its beauty through taste. By being free from the theoretical and practical determinations and interests, reason creates for itself an object of pleasure by means of the reciprocal harmony between its faculties. This free play is called as aesthetic freedom, because imagination and understanding simultaneously act as if there is a rule that they obey by entering into a reciprocal harmony and producing thoughts that are rich in content, although there is no determinative rule that governs the activities of the faculties. Since experiencing beauty is only possible through the judgment of taste and so through this free play of the faculties, the genius’ experience of aesthetic freedom does not differ in kind with the spectator’s. As we said in the previous chapter, as long as the genius judges the beauty of its artwork-in-progress, it is nothing more than a spectator of its work. Therefore, it experiences this aesthetic freedom in judging its work through taste in the same way as the spectators, i.e., by means of the free play between its mental faculties. However, aesthetic freedom is a matter of taste and as we emphasized before, taste is not an ability to produce\textsuperscript{225}. Since our aim is to clarify the notion of freedom within the context of genius’ productive act, our concern will be the notion of freedom that lies on the ground of the free act of genius. For this purpose, our central point will be the definition of freedom given in relation to artistic production as “a power of choice that bases its acts on reason.”\textsuperscript{226}

In the previous chapter, our main claim was that the free productive artistic action of the genius represents the unity between freedom and natural necessity. Briefly stated, we claimed that genius’ productive action is rooted both in the special talent of the genius which is endowed by nature and in its free choice to act. This double origin of the artistic productive action leads us to claim that the one and the

\textsuperscript{225} CJ, 313
\textsuperscript{226} CJ, 303
same action occurs as a result of genius’ necessary nature and also of its freedom. On the one hand, the productive action of the genius is a necessary result of its natural talent and hence by producing art, the genius does what its nature necessitates. On the other hand, since for Kant art is a free production, the productive act of genius is a free action. On this basis, we claimed that genius’ productive action is simultaneously both necessary and free and thus it represents the reconciliation between natural necessity and freedom.

We came up with this claim by examining and interpreting the meaning of the nature of genius. However, for a satisfying justification of our claim, we should also consider our claim in terms of its second aspect, which is freedom. Whereas in the previous chapter we justified our claim by grounding on the definition of the nature of genius, in this chapter we will try to justify our claim by focusing on the meaning of freedom in the productive act of genius. Through this examination of the meaning of freedom in genius’ productive action, we will claim that this free action is included in the scope of moral actions. In this way, we will have underlined the significance of the productive act of genius with regards to the Kantian system. Since this special action represents the reconciliation between moral and phenomenal world, the gap between theoretical and practical realms is bridged via the artistic action of the genius. In short, with our claim we would also like to point out that the unity between freedom and necessity, which seems to be a matter of hope in the Kantian system, is realized in and through the productive act of genius, albeit not in a cognitive manner. I think that this point can be considered as one of the reasons of why genius takes place especially in the third Critique in the Kantian system. In order to show the way in which the possible unity between freedom and necessity can become actual through the productive act of genius, we should now argue that this free productive act is a moral action.

In this context, in this section, we will examine what freedom and especially free action in the Kantian system are and whether the notion of freedom in genius’ productive acts is different from the freedom of moral actions. Moving from the basic fact that the free choice that grounds its act on reason is the ability of will, we
will claim that within the Kantian system genius’ production by being a free action grounded on reason should be included in the scope of moral actions, i.e., actions of free will. To justify our claim, we will try to show that the notion of freedom is always associated with morality either in a direct or in an indirect fashion. For this aim, now we will examine the notion of freedom as it is given within the frameworks of *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Critique of Practical Reason* and *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

### 4.1.1. Genius’ Creative Action as a Moral Action

In the first Critique, in the “Third Antinomy”, Kant introduces the notion of freedom as transcendental freedom, which is the idea of an unconditioned first beginning, i.e., causality that arises as an absolute spontaneity\(^\text{227}\). The thesis of the “Third Antinomy” claims that freedom must be presupposed as the uncaused cause of the natural causality, because without this presupposition of the causality of freedom as the ground of natural causality, the series of the causes do not complete\(^\text{228}\). Thing that appears in accordance with the law of nature arises as an effect of the preceding state, which arises also as an effect of a cause. In accordance with the reason’s tendency towards the unconditioned, to complete this chain, in which every state depends on each other with the cause and effect relation, we must presuppose a self-caused beginning, which does not take place as an effect of a preceding state but initiates the chain of the natural causality.

When we consider this thesis together with the antithesis, which claims that “there is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature”, we can say that through the Third Antinomy Kant shows that the idea of freedom and natural necessity do not contradict with each other, although both of them are true. This is to say that on the one hand, it is a fact that in the phenomenal world, everything happens in accordance with the laws of nature and natural causality, i.e., every phenomenal state can exist by being causally depended on.

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\(^{227}\) *CPR*, A 445-8, B 473-6

\(^{228}\) *CPR*, A 445, B 473
on the preceding states. However, the natural causality as the necessary condition of
the phenomenal world does not cancel the causality of freedom in the noumenal
world. In this respect, on the other hand, it is also a fact that an absolute noumenal
free cause in the noumenal world can be thought without falling into a contradiction.
Since natural causality and causality of freedom belongs to different realms, they do
not contradict with each other and thus a state in itself can be thought as a free cause
as long as it is known as a causally determined phenomenon.

With the thesis of the Third Antinomy, Kant clearly emphasizes the beginning
of the world, which initiates the causal chain in the phenomenal realm by being the
power of absolute spontaneity. However, once the possibility of an unconditioned
beginning in time and hence in natural causality is proved, the possibility of freedom
of will as the initiator of a new causal chain in the course of the world becomes also
be proved. In fact, in the observation on the thesis, Kant says

> The necessity of a first beginning, due to freedom, of a series of appearances we have demonstrated only in so far as it is required to make an origin of the world conceivable; for all the later following states can be taken as resulting according to purely natural laws. But since the power of spontaneously beginning a series in time is thereby proved (though not understood), it is now also permissible for us to admit within the course of the world different series as capable in their causality of beginning of themselves, and so to attribute to their substances a power of acting from freedom.\(^{229}\)

In this respect, while the absolute beginning both in time and in causality is
the free act of “a prime mover”\(^{230}\), rational beings are capable of starting a new
causal chain freely during the course of the world by being independent from the
determinations of the natural causes. In the Third Antinomy, Kant shows us that
freedom does not contradict with the nature’s mechanism and an action can be both
free by arising in the noumenal realm and also causally determined by occurring in
the spatiotemporal phenomenal realm\(^{231}\). In this way, the condition of the capacity to
act independently from the influence of the natural causality is given as the

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\(^{229}\) *CPR*, A 448-50, B 476-78  
\(^{230}\) *CPR*, A 450, B 478  
transcendental freedom, which will show itself in moral freedom not just only as a possibility but also as an actuality. In relation to this, Beck says that in the CPR Kant proves the possibility of transcendental freedom, and in the CPrR he shows the actuality of the transcendental freedom.\textsuperscript{232} In other words, the possibility of freedom is proved in the Third Antinomy as transcendental freedom, the actuality of freedom is proved in the second Critique as moral freedom.\textsuperscript{233}

In the first Critique, by the notion of the transcendental freedom, Kant shows us the possibility of the freedom by taking the concept of freedom in terms of its negative sense, i.e., its independence from the natural causality or any external effects on it. However, the actuality of freedom requires also the positive sense of the concept of freedom, through which the determining power of freedom and hereby its objective reality are proved. In other words, in order to posit its actuality, freedom should be in a determinative relation with an object. Since freedom by its nature cannot determine an independently existing object, to justify its actuality it requires bringing its object into existence. As long as the actuality of freedom is not justified by the determined object which is brought into existence in and through the self-caused action, the idea of freedom will remain just as a possible thing in itself and thus the only valid attitude towards freedom can be agnostic. However, in the second Critique, Kant justifies its objective reality by means of the moral law and shows us that freedom is applicable to the will on the ground of the practical use of pure reason.

The main aim of the CPrR is to demonstrate that there is pure practical reason by criticizing the practical ability of reason.\textsuperscript{234} CPrR is a stage that is set by Kant for pure reason on which pure reason can show us its practical abilities. Once pure reason proves that it can be practical within the legitimate limits of its faculties, the practical reason and its concepts will also have proved their realities. In this sense, the concept of freedom as the key concept of practical use of pure reason is also proved to be real. By means of the proof of the practical use of pure reason, reason

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid. p.36
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., p.41
\textsuperscript{234} CPrR, p.3
shows itself as the ability to produce practical knowledge, which is the knowledge of how to act or of what one ought to do. By grounding on pure reason and by showing that there is an unconditional a priori law of pure practical reason, to which all practical knowledge must conform, Kant shows us that there is a universally valid way of knowing what one ought to do. This unconditioned basic law of practical reason, i.e., moral law, reveals the positive sense of the concept of freedom by asserting itself as a command of reason. This is to say that since this command finds its origin only in reason, its execution cannot be done by causal mechanism of nature, but rather it can be executed only by freedom of will. At this point, this close relationship between moral law and the concept of freedom becomes important for us to examine, because this relationship brings about the free action (moral action), according to which we will try to justify our claim that genius’ free artistic act is a moral act.

The referential relation between freedom and moral law become apparent when the moral law posits itself as the unconditioned law of practical knowledge. Since freedom proves its actuality through the moral law, now we will look over Kant’s way of reasoning in the establishment of moral law. In conformity with universality that is the basic criteria of knowledge in general; practical knowledge or the knowledge of how to act must also be universally valid for all rational being. This universal ground of practical knowledge can only be possible through the universal laws that are based on pure reason, because universal conditions can only be found in pure reason.

In order to reveal this universal law of practical knowledge, Kant starts with the principles, on the ground of which actions take place. According to this analysis we can briefly say that if a principle of action that is not derived from experience and empirical conditions can be known by us only through reason and if this principle of how we ought to act can determine our will and moves us to act accordingly, then this principle is the principle of practical reason. If such a principle has the universal legislative form, then it is a practical law.\(^{235}\) In accordance with this, the

\(^{235}\) CPrR, p. 27
unconditioned basic law of pure practical reason (the Moral Law) commands as follows: “So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle of a universal legislation.”\textsuperscript{236} This is to say that, if one wants to know what one ought to do in a specific case, this person should determine its will through a principle that has the form of universal legislation and act accordingly. Since the moral law finds its ground only in reason, it is a command of reason, to which all practical knowledge must conform.

Execution of the moral law, i.e., determination of the will by the universal legislative form, is possible through freedom. In relation to this Kant says that

Since the mere form of a law can be presented solely by reason and hence is not an object of the senses and thus also does not belong among appearances, the presentation of this form as determining basis of the will is distinct from all determining bases of events [occurring] in nature according to the law of causality, because in the case of these events the determining bases must themselves be appearances. But if, moreover, no determining basis of the will other than that universal legislative form can serve as a law for this will, then such a will must be thought as entirely independent of the natural law governing appearances in reference to one another, viz., the law of causality. Such independence, however, is called \textit{freedom} in the strictest, i.e., the transcendental, meaning. Therefore a will which is such the mere legislative form of a maxim can alone serve it as a law is a free will.\textsuperscript{237}

It is a fact that the theoretical knowledge, i.e., the knowledge of what is, is possible through the law of causality, according to which all appearances in nature occur. However, the law of the practical knowledge, i.e., the law of the knowledge of what one ought to do, is not a law of an existence of something real, but rather it is the law of something ideal. In this respect, the moral law actualizes itself only in an action, in and through which the will is determined by the moral law. Since the unconditioned law of an ideal is the law of pure reason, which is completely independent of what is empirical, it cannot determine the will through the law of natural causality, according to which every event arises as the effect of the preceding event. This is to say that an action that is determined solely by the moral law cannot

\textsuperscript{236} \textit{CPrR}, p.31
\textsuperscript{237} \textit{CPrR}, 28-9
be the effect of appearance, because its existence has no reference to other actions and it takes place merely due to the unconditioned moral law of reason. However, within this framework we still define freedom in terms of its negative sense, i.e., in terms of its independence from the natural causality. In order to show its reality, we should consider it within its relation to the cognition of moral law as an obligatory command of reason.

The moral law is for all rational beings regardless of their finitude or infinitude. However, in the case of finite rational beings (human beings), whose will is not supreme will, moral law is a categorical imperative. It is imperative, because it commands us that we ought to determine our will in a particular way. Moreover, it is categorical, because it commands us that our action should be done only for the sake of law without regarding any other end. In this context, determining the will through moral law, which is obligatory, can possible only with a free will, which subjects itself to the moral law autonomously. Since the will determines itself freely (without any external effects on it) by the moral law and acts accordingly, freedom actualizes itself in this moral action. At this point, the reciprocal relationship between freedom and moral law become apparent. On the one hand, a moral law can become a command of pure practical reason only by means of the freedom (the free choice), because without the idea of freedom there would be nothing other than the natural necessity and hence no moral law. On the other hand, the idea of possible freedom (independence from the natural causality) can be known as real and thus become actual in a freely determined will only by means of the moral law, because only under the obligation of a command that reveals itself independently of all determinism, the will can determine itself freely. This reciprocal relation between freedom and moral law is articulated by Kant as follows:

[...] whereas freedom is indeed the *ratio essendi* of the moral law, the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom. For if the moral law were not *previously* thought distinctly in our reason, we would never consider

\[\text{References}\]

238 CPrR, 32
239 GMM, 40/414
240 Ibid.
ourselves entitled to assume such a thing as freedom (even though freedom is not self contradictory). But if there were no freedom, then the moral law could not be encountered in us at all.\textsuperscript{241}

In the light of our examination of freedom, we can say that in the Kantian system a free action always presupposes the moral law, because the knowledge of the freedom of the will is possible only through the universal law of pure practical reason. In other words, if we claim that an action is free, we claim at the same time that the freedom actualizes itself in the self-determinative action of a will, which is a free choice to act in accordance with the moral law. Therefore, we can say that in the Kantian system a free action is a moral action due to its necessary association with the moral law.

On this ground, we can claim that art as “a production through freedom, i.e., through a power of choice that bases its act on reason”\textsuperscript{242} involves the self-determinative action of will, and hence the productive action of the genius is a moral action. In other words, free choice or the self-determinative action of the will is the ability of pure practical reason, and thus it is necessarily associated with the moral law.

Besides, where Kant defines what art is, he makes a comparison between artistic products and the products that bees make, and he says that bees’ labor is not based on any rational activity and thereby the product that they produce is the product of their nature.\textsuperscript{243} For this reason, they are not the creator of their products; they are just the doers of what their nature necessitates.\textsuperscript{244} However, genius as the creator of fine art represents the independence from the natural laws in its free production. By exercising its will and makes free choices, it grounds its productive action on reason. In and through its free productive action, it actualizes what it ought to do. Indeed, an original cannot be created through the laws of natural necessity; it needs to be created by the power that surpasses natural necessity. As the rational way of surpassing natural necessity is freedom, genius can create its original artwork only

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\item \textsuperscript{241} \textit{CPrR}, p. 4, fn.25
\item \textsuperscript{242} \textit{CI}, 303
\item \textsuperscript{243} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{244} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
by means of freedom. In this respect, when we consider the concept of freedom as it is conceptualized in the Kantian system, we can claim that genius’ free artistic production as a free action, which can be possible within the scope of pure practical reason, is a moral action.

By claiming that genius’ productive action is a moral action, we have tried to support the idea of the reconciliation between freedom and necessity that we reached in the previous chapter. The productive action of genius, which occurs, in the one aspect, as an effect of natural causality due to the special talent of genius and in the other, as a moral action due to the self-determination of the will of genius, represents the unity between freedom and necessity. The genius acts by determining its will freely, but it is not conscious of the fact that it creates necessarily by its natural talent. Therefore, this unity is not cognizable by reason. However, an action that is both morally right and naturally necessary is significant for the Kantian system, because it represents the reconciliation and the harmony between the noumenal and phenomenal realms.

Furthermore, considering genius’ free productive act as a moral action has another important implication on the relation between art and morality. With this claim we have implied that art finds its origin in morality due to the free action of its creator. Depending on this, we can also say that art moves beyond being the symbol of morality and becomes the product of morality. In order to clarify this point, now, we will look over the relation between art and morality as it is given in CJ.

### 4.2. The Moral Significance of Genius

The relation of art to morality lies basically in art’s ability to exhibit the rational concepts (intellectual ideas) via aesthetic ideas. As we examined in the preceding chapter, the aesthetic ideas are the counterparts of the rational ideas\(^{245}\). On this ground, we can say that as long as a moral idea is a rational idea, an aesthetic idea can also be the counterpart of a moral idea and exhibit it.\(^{246}\) In other words,
moral ideas as a kind of rational ideas “can never be suitably exhibited in experience and stand, rather, as ideals of human behavior.” In relation to this, an aesthetic idea that expresses a moral idea in symbolic ways can be helpful for spectators to grasp the meaning of this moral idea by being an exemplary embodiment of it. In this context, art can be regarded as the reinforcement of the moral feelings and hence as a motivating power for morality. However, this relation between art and morality gains a more basic foundation towards the end of the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment”.

In the section 59 in CJ, Kant examines the relationship of beauty to morality from the spectator’s point of view. He links beauty to morality by depending on the state of the mental faculties in the course of judging the beautiful. He points out the similarities between the effects of the beauty and the good on the mental faculties, i.e., the similarities of formal features of beauty and morality, and reaches the conclusion that “beautiful is the symbol of the morally good.” Throughout this examination, he focuses just on the judger’s perspective and ignores the perspective of the creator of the beauty. However, in conformity with the general tendency of this thesis, in this section, we will try to evaluate this relationship from the genius’ point of view. By considering the relation of beauty to morality given by Kant together with our inferences about the creative experience of genius, we will try to clarify the significance of genius in the Kantian system.

Now, we will briefly examine the analogies between the good and the beautiful that Kant points out in order to grasp the relation of beauty to morality within its general framework. Firstly, Kant says that “the beautiful we liked directly (but only in intuition reflect[ed upon], not in its concept, as we do morality).” Here, we can say that Kant refers to the immediacy of the judgment of taste and moral judgment. Both of the judgments do not involve mediation through an external object, and hence they produce their object of pleasure by themselves. In addition to this, secondly, he states that “we like it without any interest. (Our liking for the

247 Ibid.
248 Ibid., p. 174
249 CJ, 353
250 CJ, 353-4
morally good is connected necessarily with an interest, but with an interest that does not precede our judgment about the liking but is produced by this judgment in the first place.)

In this second analogy, Kant implies that the satisfaction that we get both in the beauty and in the good does not arise from a sensory pleasure. In other words, we like the good and the beauty not because of the reason that they are the means that satisfy our ends. In both cases, liking does not determines the judgment, on the contrary, liking arises because of the judgment. Since this kind of liking does not arise from the dependence of the reason on any external sensory object, both in judging the good and the beautiful, reason takes pleasure from the autonomous operation of its faculties. In relation to this autonomy of reason, in the third place Kant brings up the analogy between the free play of faculties and freedom of will and says that

In judging the beautiful, we present the freedom of the imagination (and hence [of] our power [of] sensibility) as harmonizing with the lawfulness of the understanding. (In a moral judgment we think the freedom of the will as the will’s harmony with itself according to universal laws of reason.)

In parallel with what we above said about the autonomous operation of the faculties of reason, in both cases there are the harmonizing activities of the faculties of reason, which requires freedom. Whereas in the case of moral judgment the will is in harmony with itself due to its capacity of obeying the moral law freely, in the case of judgment of taste, imagination and the understanding enter into a harmonic relationship by acting as if there is a law that they obey. In both cases the harmony comes from the free activity of the faculties of reason. However, this independency from the natural laws does not hinder the reason from producing universally valid judgments. In terms of the judgment of taste, our liking the beautiful is universally valid, because our judgment does not arise from any personal interest. Since we are aware that we like the beauty disinterestedly, we think that this beauty must have a ground for being liked by everyone and in accordance with this we speak with a
universal voice.\footnote{\textit{CJ}, 211} Although this universality of judgment of taste does not depend on any concept, everyone who judges beauty judge it with such a universal voice. Therefore, intersubjective universality is one of the conditions of the judgment of taste. Likewise, the moral judgment is universally valid, because it finds its determinative ground in reason. In other words, since moral law that is the basic law of pure practical reason is the determinative base of the will, i.e., the will freely obeys the moral law, moral judgment has universal validity. In relation to this, finally, Kant states that

We present the subjective principle for judging the beautiful as \textit{universal}, i.e., as valid for everyone, but as unknowable through any universal concept. (The objective principle of morality we also declare to be universal[ly valid], i.e., [valid] for all subjects, as well as for all acts of the same subject, but also declare to be knowable through a universal concept.).\footnote{\textit{CJ}, 211}

Depending on these four formal similarities between the good and the beauty, we can say that their references to freedom constitute their common ground. For this reason, the relation of art to morality is primarily based on the free play between the imagination and the understanding and the implications of this free play in the system.

Judging beauty is not a matter of grasping what nature is or what purpose it has for us.\footnote{\textit{CJ}, 350} On the contrary, it is about how we think about it. The pleasure that we take in beauty is not something that nature presents to us, but it is our own creation for ourselves, i.e., what pleases us is not nature nor its purposes, but our way of thinking about it. By means of the free play of cognitive faculties, we surpass the objective reality and realize that there is an inner purposiveness of our faculties\footnote{\textit{CJ}, 350} that allows us to judge the objects in a necessary and universally valid fashion independently from the laws of nature. Likewise, in judging artistic beauty, we do not deal with what the purpose of the artwork is. We can judge an artwork as beautiful and hereby can take pleasure only if we reflect on it by means of the free play of the imagination.

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{CJ}, 211
  \item \textit{CJ}, 211
  \item \textit{CJ}, 350
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and the understanding. Since our necessary and universally valid judgments do not
depend on a determinate purpose of the object, they depend on something
supersensible\(^{257}\).

Although Kant does not explicitly state what he meant by this supersensible,
we can say that this supersensible ground presumably is the supersensible substrate
of humanity, which we have introduced in the previous section. This concept of
supersensible substrate of humanity is the only solution of antinomy of taste and it
makes possible for the judgment of taste to be universally valid. The idea of
intersubjectivity, on which the universality of the judgment of taste relies, gains a
conceptual basis with this supersensible substratum. In other words, this concept of
supersensible substratum is the reason of why everyone judges beauty with a
universal voice. This concept as a condition of being human makes intersubjectivity
possible. Besides, this supersensible concept also allows the harmony between
faculties. Since determination through its lawfulness is the usual task of the
understanding, the reason of its unusual action requires a justification, which is given
as the concept of supersensible substratum by Kant\(^{258}\).

When we consider this supersensible ground of beauty together with the task of
beauty within the Kantian system, we can say that beauty bridges the gap between
the theoretical and the practical area in a supersensible way, which is also the relation
of it to morality. Kant clarifies this point as follows:

> In this ability [taste], judgment does not find itself subjected to a
> heteronomy from empirical laws, as it does elsewhere in empirical
> judging –concerning objects of such a pure liking it legislates to itself,
> just as reason does regarding the power of desire. And because the
> subject has this possibility within him, while outside [him] there is also
> the possibility that nature will harmonize with it, judgment finds itself
> referred to something that is both in the subject himself and outside him,
> something that is neither nature nor freedom and yet is linked with the
> basis of freedom, the supersensible, in which the theoretical and the
> practical power are in a unknown manner combined and joined into a
> unity.\(^{259}\)

\(^{257}\) *CJ*, 350

\(^{258}\) *CJ*, 353

\(^{259}\) *CJ*, 353.
Until now, it is clear that the autonomy of the faculties of reason, which is common both in morality and beauty, underlines reason’s capacity to judge on the supersensible ground. Whereas in morality, the will produces its object through freedom, in the case of beauty, the reason finds a supersensible ground in itself, and on this ground it can judge an external object as if this object has beauty inherently. In other words, in judgment of taste, we do not produce our object, but we refer to an external object as beautiful, although beauty is something that the faculties of reason produces independently from the external effects on them. Since the subject receives the object as if it is in conformity with its judgment of taste, it receives the external world as if it is in harmony with its cognitive powers. In this context, the subject finds that it is possible for the nature to be in conformity with the autonomy of reason. This is the way, in which beauty bridges the gap between the theoretical and the practical areas. Since it shows the possibility of the harmony between the nature and the autonomy of reason and since it does this through an autonomous process of reason similar to the autonomy in moral judgment, i.e., on the ground of supersensible, beauty prepares the mind to fulfill the moral duties and thereby it supports morality. We can also say that in this way beauty motivates the good and gives the meaning of being moral.

In the light of these, we can say that by analyzing the relation between beauty and morality from the appreciators’ point of view, Kant reaches the result that beauty gives the hope to be worthy of happiness to the subject. When we try to interpret this relation from the genius’ standpoint, we can see that genius is as much significant as beauty for the system by being a bridging element between theoretical and practical realms. At the first place, in conformity with our claim in the previous section, beautiful artworks are related with morality at core due to their creation process. Since the free creative act of genius, as we claimed, is a moral action, artworks are originated from a moral action. The genius creates a work that surpasses the natural necessity by acting morally, i.e., in accordance with its duty. While genius determines its creative action through the freedom of the will, this action brings about some effects in the phenomenal world, the effects that allows other people to
hope. This point becomes very significant for our examination, because it implies what we have tried to emphasize throughout the whole thesis.

We essentially claimed that the productive act of genius represents the unity or the reconciliation between the natural necessity and the freedom. Since the artwork that originates in and through the moral action and allows other people in the end to hope due to its beauty, the genius acts in a morally good way. In other words, if one has a capacity to generate moral motivation for other people, using this capacity will be its duty. Since genius has this capacity due to its natural talent, using its talent is its moral duty. In this context, in one and the same action, the natural necessity as genius’ talent and the freedom of will as genius’ free choice to create coincide with each other. Therefore, through the genius’ free productive action; we see that the nature is in conformity with our cognitive capacities. Accordingly, the gap between the theoretical and practical areas is bridged by this single act of genius.

Lastly, when we consider our interpretation of the nature of genius together with these significant implications of the idea of genius that creates its art through a moral action, we can conclude as follows: Given that the genius owes it talent to its noumenal nature and producing artworks through this special talent is a moral duty for genius, we can say that in the artworks the noumenal nature articulates its ends to us (to the spectator). Indeed, within this Kantian framework, the artwork of genius becomes the manifestations of the inherent purposes of noumenal nature. At this point, the significance of genius for the Kantian system become distinctly apparent; the secret of the productive act of genius does not just represent the unity between nature and freedom, but it also guarantees that nature stands by us as long as we do what we ought to do.
Throughout this thesis, we have considered the Kantian philosophy through one basic question: what does it mean to be human? We tried to understand what it means to be human in the Kantian system, but especially tried to find the answer through his conception of art. In this respect, now we can say that neither science nor morality allow us to feel what we are, but only art, like a flawless mirror, reflects what we exactly are. Both in science and in morality, i.e., in the experience of the necessity and the freedom, we feel that one side of us is defeated by the other. Both of the experiences presuppose a certain kind of tension. However, art is not a conflict between rationality and sensibility, but rather a consensus and unification between them. This is the reason of why we coalesce with ourselves through the experience of art.

Art is not just a peaceful settlement made with the unknowable higher truth (noumena), but also coming to an agreement with ourselves. Experience of the harmony is the pleasure that we take from our own way of thinking about the world. Although we think about the world as if it is in harmony with our cognitive faculties, what are in harmony are actually our two different aspects. Thus, art allows us to reconcile ourselves with our human beingness by mending our dividedness between rationality and sensibility. In this way, art also manifests that freedom is not struggling with ourselves as if we are fighting against an enemy, but rather compromising the two manners of our existence. Art rises as a rebellious reaction to the human existence, but ends up as a peace that we made with our human beingness. Accordingly, art shows us the positive aspect of our dichotomous existence, i.e., shows us that what makes life meaningful and worth for living is to strive for living rightly by being in peace with our two different sides.
Let me put it in this way: Art rises from the concerns pertaining to the human race, because it is the work of the human being, i.e., work of genius. It is a mediator that tells the secret of human beingness to humanity. We find the expression of ourselves in it and this is the reason of why artworks seem as if they have a spirit, a life. Art comes into existence as a resurrection against this world, as a denial of the existing order, as a move towards the beyond, as a step towards the ideal, and hence it originates in the conflict between the real and the ideal. However, it results in constructive and calm experience, in and through which the essence of humanity is articulated.

What I am trying to emphasize is that the genius creates its work that surpasses natural necessity as a declaration of its ability of disobedience to the strict regularity of the world via its freedom. However, what makes this creation possible is its nature as well. In this respect, this nature, which refers to the supersensible substratum of humanity, shows us via the genius that it allows us to create, and hence we have an inner power to realize our ideals. It guides us to find the way of cultivating our sensible nature. In this regard, experience of art leaves us alone with our human beingness and its meaning, which cannot be ascribed externally. Art is the story about a type of existence that can create its meaning only by itself in its efforts. Art demonstrates that our supersensible nature offers the creativity as a way to freedom.

We can say that complaining about the world and the discontentedness with what the world is means also a complaint about ourselves, because our disappointments indicate our inadequacy. Lack of faith in our capacities causes us to hope for help from a supersensible power. However, in art, and in this case especially in the power of genius, the supersensible points out that the supersensible that we think of is not something beyond us, but rather within us. By virtue of our supersensible substratum we can hope for help only from ourselves, because the miracle that we hope for is within our capacity. The unity that we are pursuing throughout our lifetime shows itself in art and in the creative action of genius. The
unification becomes possible in and through the creative act of genius. Therefore, the creative capacity of human being becomes the way of realization of the ideal world. In relation to this inner power of creativity Van Gogh says that “I can very well, in life and in painting, too, do without God. But I cannot, suffering as I do, do without something that is greater than I am, that is my life—the power to create”\(^{260}\)

Within this framework, we can say that Kant’s theory of art and especially his theory of genius is a gate opening to German Idealism by taking into account their implications on the power of creativity and articulation of the substratum of humanity. Art is not just hoping for the unity, but rather being able to create this unity in the form of beauty. On this basis, if we try to define human being through the experience of art, we can say that we are beings who are not just able to hope for attaining the unity, but also can find an inner power to actualize this unity by means of creativity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTITÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü  X
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü
Enformatik Enstitüsü
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Ertene
Adı : Merve
Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Reconsidering the Kantian Concept of Genius through the Questions of Nature, Freedom and Creativity

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans  X  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. 
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. 
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.  X

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